U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics [2 ed.] 9781685859121

Citation preview

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

U.S. VATI OVA I SECURITY Policymakers, Processes, and Politics SECOND EDITION

Sam C. Sarkesian

LYN N E RIENNER PUBLISHERS BOULDER. LONDON

Published in the United States of America in 1995 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 1995 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of C o n g r e s s Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sarkesian, Sam Charles. U.S. national security : policymakers, processes, and politics / Sam C. Sarkesian.—2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-411-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. National security—United States—Decision making. I. Title. II. Title: US national security. UA23.S275 1995 355'.033073—dc20 94-191657 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and b o u n d in the United States of A m e r i c a

'29

T h e paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

List of Figures Preface Preface to the First Edition

PARTI

vii ix xi

INTRODUCTION

1

National Interests and National Security

3

2

The Conflict Spectrum and the American Way of War

31

3

The U.S. Political System

53

PART II THE NATIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT 4

The President and the Presidency

69

5

The Policy Triad and the National Security Council

91

6

The Military Establishment

111

7

The Intelligence Establishment

125

PART III

THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE POLICY PROCESS

8

The Policy Process

151

9

The President and Congress

163

The Public, the Media, Political Parties, and Interest Groups

181

Allies, Adversaries, Potential Adversaries, and Others

201

10

11

v

vi

Contents

P A R T IV

CONCLUSIONS

12

Long-Range Issues of National Security

221

13

Making the System Work

243

14

The Study of National Security: T h e Presidential M a n d a t e

257

Reading Lisi Index About the Book and the Author

261 265 273

Figures

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6

National Security and Foreign Policy U.S. National Security Priorities Concentric Circle Approach Elite and Participatory Models Systems-Analysis Approach Policy Power Clusters and the National Security System

6 9 10 10 11 12

2.1 2.2 2.3

The Conflict Spectrum: Prevailing Views Special Operations C o m m a n d The Conflict Spectrum, Revised

34 37 45

4.1

The National Security Establishment

81

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5

93 94 95 97

5.6

The Policy Triad Department of State Reorganization of the Department of State Department of Defense, S i m p l i f i e d Version Department of Defense, Clinton Administration Organization The National Security Council

98 103

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Agency, Proposed Reorganization The Intelligence C o m m u n i t y Intelligence Cycle

130 134 137 138

8.1

Policy Phases

155

8.2

Differences: Policy Phases

160

11.1

U.S. Collective Defense Treaties, 1985

204

14.1

Framework for the Study of National Security

258

vii

Preface

Since the publication o f the first edition of this book, dramatic changes have taken place in world politics and the security landscape. The superpower era has ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany. The fear of major wars has diminished considerably. Attention has turned to domestic needs, and for many, economics has replaced the military as the prime mover in national security. Nonetheless, the world remains a dangerous place. The end of EastWest confrontations has given rise to a variety of ethnic, religious, and nationalist conflicts. The struggle of Christian Armenia against Muslim Azerbaijan, which is supported by some of its Muslim neighbors, continues unabated, a reflection of the Armenian genocide of 1915 by the Turkish government. And in 1994, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the resulting conflicts among Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians have challenged the ability and effectiveness of the United Nations and Western powers. The drug wars, the continuing conflicts in parts of Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, and the U.S.-North Korea confrontation over nuclear weapons development add to the confusing and unstable international security landscape. Complicating all of this is Russia's attempt to assert itself as a major player in international security affairs, while the world remains troubled about that nation's internal politics. The international problems seem endless. The changes from the Cold War and the uncertainties these have created have led to scholarly and policymaking disarray—there is a search for analytical and conceptual clarity in coming to grips with the post-Cold War period. At the same time, national strategy seems to lack vision, and military posture and contingency response lack operational guidelines. All these issues have focused on the relevance of the National Security Establishment and the national security system that were established at the outset of the Cold War: Are they relevant in the post-Cold War era? All these matters are complicated by questions regarding the strength and judgment of the national leadership. The major focus of this book remains, as spelled out in the first edition, the National Security Establishment—the offices and institutions responsible for U.S. national security—and the policy process. Again, studying these will not provide all the answers, but it will provide knowledge essential to seeking answers. New leaders are emerging in many parts of the globe, as are different types of ideologies and political systems—all this in the context of differing ix

x

Preface

strategic cultures. Thus, it would be best to wait until the "fog" clears before studying national security, but the U.S. political-military system does not have the luxury of waiting for a clearer picture. Also, such matters will not wait until the United States gets its National Security Establishment properly positioned. To understand what all of this may mean, one should begin with a study of the character and nature of the U.S. National Security Establishment, what policy procedures are in place, the structure and capabilities of the various national security instruments, and the quality of U.S. national security leadership. It is from such a study that we can determine with some degree of accuracy the effectiveness of the U.S. national security effort in any given area or in response to any specific threat or challenge. Equally important, such a study will provide reference points from which to examine U.S. national security in the remainder of this decade and into the next century. In this respect, various themes, concepts, and references are carried over from one chapter to the next. This is intended to demonstrate not only their importance, but also that they are multidimensional and have an impact on issues analyzed in different chapters. As was the case with the first edition, various aspects of U.S. national security have been part of my teaching and research. Also, I have discussed parts of the revised edition with colleagues, and I have included other sections in formal presentations at various professional conferences. Throughout these efforts, I have tried to avoid ideological biases. Yet, some will undoubtedly attempt to place an ideological label on these efforts because they disagree with my assessments. No apologies are offered. The analysis and conclusions of this new edition are my own, as are any mistakes or misinterpretations. Sam C. Sarkesian

Preface to the First Edition

It has often been said that "security is a state of m i n d " and that national security is the way people feel about t h e m s e l v e s and the c o n f i d e n c e they have in their leaders and the political system. But things like state of mind, confidence, and the nature of the political system are not easy matters to e x a m i n e — o r even to identify with precision. Indeed, simply defining the concept of national security evokes disagreement a m o n g scholars, policymakers, and the public in g e n e r a l — m o s t of us tend to see only "bits and pieces" of national security. How can we understand national security issues and provide informed assessments? There is no easy a n s w e r . But there is surely a place to begin: at the focal point of the national security process and the o f f i c e s and institutions responsible for U.S. national security. S t u d y i n g these will not provide all the answers, but it will provide knowledge essential to seeking the answers, which is the basic motivation for this book. The book is an outgrowth of my teaching, research, and experience involving a variety of national security issues. This b a c k g r o u n d has convinced me that the concept of national security has b e c o m e so distorted and politicized that it is increasingly difficult to develop a sense of balance and analytic objectivity. Indeed, many college s t u d e n t s — a s well as some policymakers, military professionals, academicians, and particularly elected officials—seem to lack a sense of history or understanding of the concept of U.S. national interests. T h e y tend to equate the ideals of American democracy with the realities of the existing international security environment. They a n a l y z e U.S. national security posture in t e r m s that a s s u m e and demand immaculate behavior and an immaculate system, while often glossing over the realities of the w o r l d . C o m b i n e d with a f o c u s on the issue of the m o m e n t only, such perspectives do little to develop a serious understanding of national security issues. Seen this way, national security b e c o m e s a zero-sum g a m e in which issues are black or white. One is either moral or i m m o r a l . National security policy is good or bad. Political actors in the external world are good or evil. Unfortunately, the international security e n v i r o n m e n t does not lend itself to such simplistic notions. Mind-sets in the United States tend to place national security issues in quick-fix, short-term, doable f r a m e w o r k s . That is, we tend to see an issue only after it becomes a national security problem and to respond to that particular problem in a traditional fashion: identify it, find the best solutions,

xi

xii

Preface to the First

Edition

apply them, and "fix it," all according to conventional notions and expectations. T h u s , we tend to seek s o l u t i o n s to the p r o b l e m s of the M i d d l e East, Central America, and nuclear war, for example, with momentary information and superficial understanding, neglecting a systematic basis for identifying and applying U.S. national interests, policy, and strategy. T h e purpose of this book is specifically to correct the p r o b l e m s that evolve f r o m such superficial d e c i s i o n s : to provide a s y s t e m a t i c way of studying U.S. national security by a p p r o a c h i n g the s u b j e c t f r o m a longterm perspective, linking it to historical continuities and discontinuities, and basing this analysis on the nature and character of the U.S. political system. From this perspective, national security is first determined by the leadership quality and mind-set of the incumbent of the Oval O f f i c e — t h e fundamental premise of this book is that the President is the center of the national security policy process. S o m e attention is given to the details of prevailing national security issues, but the intent here is not to o f f e r solutions to these issues. T h e f o c u s on some general substantive issues provides a realistic context within which the President, the National Security Establishment, and the policy process function; and s o m e attention to m a j o r substantive issues (such as the nature and character of the Soviet s y s t e m ) assists in understanding the difficulty of developing within the U.S. National Security Establishment a coherent policy and strategy direction and a supporting network of political actors. But one will not find here what the United States should do in the Middle East, f o r e x a m p l e , or in Southeast Asia or C e n tral America. This book is not offered solely as a textbook on U.S. national security. It is also a study and analysis of the problems of trying to f o r m u l a t e and implement coherent national security policy and strategy in a democracy. This additional dimension will assist serious students and policymakers to f o c u s on fundamental issues and, more important, to rethink the basis f o r U.S. national interests and long-term national security policy and strategy. T h e book is divided into f o u r parts. Part I is a study of the m e a n i n g and concept of national security, U.S. political characteristics, and the international security environment. This part establishes boundaries and reference points for the remainder of the book. Part II examines the National Security Establishment, beginning with the President and the nature of the presidency and continuing with special f o c u s on national security policy; this includes a study of the p o l i c y m a k ing structures, such as the National Security Council. T h e military and intelligence establishments are also analyzed. Part III begins with a study of the national security policy p r o c e s s , c o m p a r i n g foreign with domestic policy. The remainder of the chapters in this part use this policy process f r a m e w o r k to examine the system—that is, the important political actors involved in national security policy, their

Preface to the First Edition

xiii

roles and power, and how they relate to the President and the process. Part IV is a series of conclusions that provides a s y s t e m a t i c view of the U.S. national security system and its critical c o m p o n e n t s . T h e f u n d a mental f o c u s r e m a i n s : a c o m m o n sense way to study and understand the essentials of U.S. national security. I wish to thank Stephen J. Cimbala of Pennsylvania State University, w h o read and c o m m e n t e d on the manuscript. His knowledge of the subject matter and his incisive critique were invaluable. Students in my classes at Loyola University of Chicago also contributed by their questions and comments about many of the subjects in this book. Laurette Liesen of Loyola assisted more directly by reading and c o m m e n t i n g on the manuscript. H o w e v e r , this book represents my own views and interpretations of how U.S. national security should be studied and analyzed. Consequently, it is surely vulnerable to criticism, and I make no apologies for this. I have tried to achieve balance by taking account of views of noted scholars and experts on U.S. national security. But in the final analysis, this is my own work, and 1 am responsible for any errors, misinterpretations, and idiosyncrasies. S.C.S.

— Parti Introduction

1 National Interests and National Security " W h a t is it in o u r interest to p r e v e n t ? W h a t should w e seek to a c c o m p l i s h ? " 1 S o w r o t e H e n r y Kissinger o v e r t w o d e c a d e s a g o b e f o r e b e c o m i n g assistant to President N i x o n for national security a f f a i r s . T h e s a m e q u e s t i o n s c o n t i n u e to c h a l l e n g e p o l i c y m a k e r s , s c h o l a r s , a n d e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s t o d a y . T h e a n s w e r s w e r e elusive at the start of the C o l d W a r a n d r e m a i n s o t o d a y . W h y is t h i s so? D o n ' t w e k n o w w h a t is in o u r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t ? At first g l a n c e t h e a n s w e r s e e m s r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e . T h e p u r p o s e of U . S . n a tional interest is to p r o m o t e the c o u n t r y ' s v a l u e s ; to p r o m o t e t h e s e v a l u e s m e a n s to p r o t e c t t h e m by e s t a b l i s h i n g a n d i m p l e m e n t i n g e f f e c t i v e n a t i o n a l security p o l i c y . Upon close examination, however, these answers are inadequate, and they r a i s e a n u m b e r of f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s . W h a t a r e t h e c o u n t r y ' s v a l u e s ? H o w a r e they r e f l e c t e d in n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s ? W h a t is t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a n d n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s ? W h a t is n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y ? H o w s h o u l d U . S . n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y be i m p l e m e n t e d ? F o r t h e past f o u r d e c a d e s these q u e s t i o n s h a v e b e e n a d d r e s s e d b y m a n y U . S . p o l i t i c i a n s a n d s c h o l a r s . If t h e r e is a n y t h i n g t h a t t h e y a g r e e o n , it is that t h e r e is n o agreement. E a c h g e n e r a t i o n of A m e r i c a n s s e e k s to interpret t h e i s s u e s of n a t i o n a l v a l u e s , n a t i o n a l interest, a n d n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y in t e r m s of its o w n p e r s p e c tives a n d m i n d - s e t s . A l t h o u g h t h e r e is a g r e e m e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e c o r e e l e m e n t s , s u c h as p r o t e c t i o n of t h e h o m e l a n d , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s d i f f e r a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , t h e n a t u r e of e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s , a n d t h e b e s t c o u r s e f o r c o n d u c t of s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . C o m b i n e d w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e s in t h e w o r l d e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e d y n a m i c s of t h e q u e s t i o n s p o s e d b y K i s s i n g e r r e m a i n as f l u i d a n d e l u s i v e t o d a y as they w e r e in 1 9 6 9 . It is to b e e x p e c t e d t h a t in an o p e n s y s t e m s u c h a s that of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , in w h i c h t h e r e are m u l t i p l e p o w e r c e n t e r s a n d s h i f t i n g f o c a l p o i n t s , t h e r e will be a v a r i e t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d c l u s t e r s o f p o w e r a d v o c a t i n g o n e or t h e o t h e r national s e c u r i t y p o s t u r e . R e c o g n i z i n g that t h e s e m a t t e r s a r e rarely r e s o l v e d by o n e - t i m e s o l u t i o n s a n d that t h e y a r e , at b e s t , a m b i g u o u s in c h a r a c t e r , this c h a p t e r e x p l o r e s t h e c o n c e p t s of n a t i o n a l s e c u rity, national v a l u e s , a n d n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . In t h e p r o c e s s , a f r a m e w o r k f o r s t u d y i n g a n d a n a l y z i n g n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y is d e s i g n e d .

3

4

Introduction

First, w e study the c o n c e p t a n d m e a n i n g of national s e c u r i t y . S e c o n d , an e x a m i n a t i o n is m a d e of the c o n c e p t of national interest, its r e l a t i o n s h i p to A m e r i c a n v a l u e s , a n d h o w t h e s e v a l u e s a n d i n t e r e s t s " p l a y " in the international e n v i r o n m e n t . T h i r d , w e f o c u s on national security to d e t e r m i n e its general m e a n i n g and d e v e l o p a s y s t e m a t i c way to study it. A s the necessary starting point for this e x p l o r a t i o n , it m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d that r e g a r d l e s s of the v a r i e t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d v i e w s of t h e s e matters, the U n i t e d S t a t e s is in the w o r l d to stay. W h e t h e r they like it or not, U.S. citizens c a n n o t w i t h d r a w f r o m external r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , nor can they retreat to the isolation of the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . R e g a r d l e s s of the policies of any a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the U n i t e d States has links to most parts of the w o r l d — p o l i t i c a l l y , e c o n o m i c a l l y , c u l t u r a l l y , a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y . W h a t the United States does or d o e s not d o has an i m p a c t on international politics.

N A T I O N A L SECURITY T h e new i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y l a n d s c a p e has c l o u d e d the c o n c e p t a n d m e a n i n g of national security. M o r e o v e r , the interpretation of the c o u n t r y ' s v a l u e s and national interests into m e a n i n g f u l national s e c u r i t y p o l i c y has b e c o m e a d i f f i c u l t p r o c e s s . T h i s p r o b l e m is well s u m m e d u p by o n e expert: No formal definition of national security as a field has been generally accepted; none may be possible. In general, it is the study of the security problems faced by nations, of the policies and programs by which these problems are addressed, and also of the governmental processes through which the policies and programs are decided upon and carried out. 2 R e c o g n i z i n g the p r o b l e m s of d e f i n i n g and c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g national security, a p r e l i m i n a r y s t a t e m e n t is o f f e r e d : National security is the confidence held by the great majority of the nation's people that the nation has the military capability and effective policy to prevent its adversaries from effectively using force in preventing the nation's pursuit of its national interests. T w o d i m e n s i o n s are part of this d e f i n i t i o n : p h y s i c a l a n d p s y c h o l o g i cal. In the first instance, there is an o b j e c t i v e m e a s u r e b a s e d on the p h y s i cal strength a n d military c a p a c i t y of the nation to s u c c e s s f u l l y c h a l l e n g e adversaries, i n c l u d i n g g o i n g to w a r if n e c e s s a r y . T h i s a l s o i n c l u d e s a m o r e prominent role f o r e c o n o m i c strength a n d the ability to use it as a politicalmilitary lever against or in s u p p o r t of o t h e r states. T h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l dim e n s i o n is s u b j e c t i v e , r e f l e c t i n g the o p i n i o n and a t t i t u d e s of the m a j o r i t y

National Interests & National Security

5

of U.S. c i t i z e n s r e g a r d i n g the n a t i o n ' s ability to r e m a i n s e c u r e relative to the external w o r l d . National s e c u r i t y m u s t b e s e e n in the c o n t e x t of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . F o r eign policy is the policy of a nation that e n c o m p a s s e s all o f f i c i a l relations with other c o u n t r i e s . T h e p u r p o s e of f o r e i g n policy is m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l . In the United States, the p u r p o s e of f o r e i g n policy is to p u r s u e U.S. national interests, prevent c o n d i t i o n s d e t r i m e n t a l to the United States, and maintain r e l a t i o n s with o t h e r c o u n t r i e s in o r d e r to c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s f a v o r a b l e to U.S. national i n t e r e s t s . T h e i n s t r u m e n t s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y are p r i m a r i l y d i p l o m a t i c , and s e c o n d a r i l y e c o n o m i c and p s y c h o l o g i c a l .

National Security, Foreign, and Domestic Policies National security d i f f e r s f r o m f o r e i g n policy in at least t w o r e s p e c t s : ( 1 ) N a t i o n a l security p u r p o s e s are m o r e n a r r o w a n d f o c u s e d on s e c u r i t y a n d safety of the n a t i o n . ( 2 ) National security is primarily c o n c e r n e d with actual and potential a d v e r s a r i e s and their use of f o r c e ; this m e a n s there is a military e m p h a s i s that is not usually the case in m a t t e r s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . H o w e v e r , national s e c u r i t y p o l i c y o v e r l a p s with f o r e i g n p o l i c y — i n d e e d , s o m e t i m e s they are a l m o s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . A m e r i c a n v a l u e s c a n n o t be i m p o s e d on o t h e r s t a t e s e x c e p t in s i t u a tions that are c l e a r survival i s s u e s . T h u s , m u c h of f o r e i g n policy r e q u i r e s c o m p r o m i s e , n e g o t i a t i o n s , the d y n a m i c s of g i v e - a n d - t a k e , a n d all of the t e c h n i q u e s and subtleties a s s o c i a t e d with traditional d i p l o m a c y . T h i s kind of w o r k then b e c o m e s a m a t t e r f o r the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , w i t h l o n g r a n g e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . T h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s are s h o w n in Figure 1.1. T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of clearly d e t e r m i n i n g U.S. national interests and est a b l i s h i n g national security priorities are c o m p o u n d e d by the link b e t w e e n national security a n d d o m e s t i c p o l i c y . ( T h i s link is f a i r l y r e c e n t in U . S . history.) T h e d o m e s t i c e c o n o m i c i m p a c t of certain national s e c u r i t y policies (such as e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s , an e m b a r g o on a g r i c u l t u r e e x p o r t s to a d v e r s a r i e s or potential a d v e r s a r i e s , d i m i n i s h e d f o r e i g n oil s o u r c e s , a n d the e x p o r t of t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y a d v a n c e d industrial p r o d u c t s ) links U.S. d o m e s tic interests a n d p o l i c i e s to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l security a r e n a . T h e point is that m a n y national security issues c a n n o t be isolated f r o m d o m e s t i c p o l i c y . In b r i e f , in a d d i t i o n to the r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d l i n k a g e b e t w e e n f o r e i g n and national security p o l i c y , there is also a d o m e s t i c policy l i n k a g e that is an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r in e s t a b l i s h i n g priorities a n d interests. I n d e e d , f o r s o m e s c h o l a r s , this i s s u e is v i e w e d as " i n t e r m e s t i c " p o l i t i c s a n d policies. 3 N o n e t h e l e s s , it is my v i e w that national security rests primarily in the notion that there is a high p r o p e n s i t y f o r the use of military f o r c e . T a k i n g a p a g e f r o m S u n T z u , if a l m o s t e v e r y t h i n g is a matter of national s e c u r i t y ,

6

Introduction

P r e - W o r l d W a r II R e l a t i o n s h i p (noncrisis) Foreign Policy • - N a t i o n a l Security Policy Superpower Era (noncrisis) Foreign Policy National Security Policy Crises - N a t i o n a l Security Policy Foreign Policy Post-Cold W a r Era Foreign Policy • National Security Policy Ill-defined Source: Adapted f r o m Col. William J. Taylor, Jr., " I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , Specialization, and National Security: P r o b l e m s for Diplomats, Soldiers, and S c h o l a r s , " Air University Review, July-August 1979, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 1 7 - 2 6 . Note: T h e gap between foreign policy and national security policy indicates the relative degree of " c l o s e n e s s " between foreign and national security policy. T h e a r r o w s indicate the relative degree of overlap. As shown, during times of crisis, the gap b e t w e e n foreign and national security policy is minimal and virtually nonexistent. In the p o s t - C o l d W a r era, foreign policy has again b e c o m e the prominent focus, with national security b e c o m ing less oriented toward the use of the military in a combat role.

F i g u r e 1.1

National Security and Foreign Policy

then the concept of national security b e c o m e s virtually m e a n i n g l e s s . 4

Dis-

tinctions must be made between domestic policy and national security well as b e t w e e n foreign policy and national security. T h e primary

as

distinc-

tion r e s t s in t h e n o t i o n o f t h e u s e o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e a n d t h e m i l i t a r y a s t h e primary i n s t r u m e n t in the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f national s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . t h o u g h m a n y o t h e r m a t t e r s are i m p o r t a n t in t h e o v e r a l l n o t i o n o f

Al-

national

interests, they are b e s t incorporated into f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n d the o v e r l a p b e tween such policy and national

security.5

T h e s e o b s e r v a t i o n s are the basis for defining national security e x p a n d i n g on the c o n c e p t of national

policy,

security.

N a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y is t h a t p a r t o f g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d with f o r m u l a t i n g and i m p l e m e n t i n g national strategy to create a favorable military environment for U.S. national interests. A n

integral

National Interests & National Security

1

part of this is to prevent the effective use of military force by the nation's adversaries or potential adversaries in obstructing or denying U.S. ability to pursue its national interests. National security encompasses a psychological and physical component, and national security policy concentrates on the actions and goals of government and its strategy to effectively achieve the psychological and physical demands of national security. Thus, national security means more than the capacity to conduct wars in the international arena. In light of the characteristics of the international arena and contemporary conflicts, it is likely that challenges to U.S. national security may take on a number of nontraditional forms, ranging from economic to unconventional conflicts. Yet it is also true that the capacity to wage nuclear war and to engage in conventional conflicts remains essential for the conduct of national security policy even in the security era of the 1990s. National interests and national security policy must be carefully crafted and applied according to priorities delineating survival (vital) interests from others. Too often national security is used synonymously with any interest, raising the specter that all interests are survival priorities. If national security policy and strategy followed such a pattern, the United States would be placed in a position of having to defend everything, with the end result of being unable to defend anything. Resources and forces would be scattered throughout the world and rarely would this country be in a position to bring sufficient force to bear on a particular issue that may well be a survival matter. Short of clear threats to the territory of the United States, the public may disagree, and do, over priorities. Even when there is agreement on priorities, there is disagreement regarding resource commitment and strategy. Nonetheless, a system of priorities provides a way of identifying levels of threats and helps in designing strategies. But all of this must be guided by the meaning of national security and its conceptual dimensions. In my view, there are two overriding priorities. First is the protection of the homeland and the survival of its political system. Second is the maintenance, nurturing, and expansion of "open systems." This generally means democratic systems. (The concept of open systems is used here with the idea that there are various forms of democracy and, indeed, there may be socialist systems that have established the basis of openness and are nonthreatening to neighbors and to world peace.) Priorities can be listed as follows: First order: Vital interests. Protection of the homeland, and areas and issues directly affecting this interest, require a total military mobilization and resource commitment of the nation's total effort.

8

Introduction

Second order: Critical interests. These are areas and issues that do not directly affect the country's survival or homeland, but in the long run have a high propensity for becoming first order priorities. In the immediate period, these have a direct influence on first order interests. Such interests are measured primarily by the degree to which they maintain, nurture, and expand open systems. Third order: Serious interests. These are areas and issues that do not seriously affect first and second order interests, but do cast some shadow over such interests. U.S. efforts are focused on creating favorable conditions to preclude such interests from developing into higher order ones. Unfavorable third order interests serve as a "warning" to second order interests. All other interests are peripheral in that they are placed on a "watch" list. This means there is no immediate impact on any order of interests, but these matters should be watched in case events change them to a higher order of interests. In the meantime, these peripheral interests require little if any U.S. resources. Categories of priorities such as these can be used not only as a framework for systematic assessment of national interests and national security, but also as a way of distinguishing immediate from long-range security issues. Such a framework can provide a basis for rational and systematic debate within the establishment regarding U.S. national security posture and is useful in the study of national security. A realistic assignment of priorities can be better understood by equating these to geopolitical boundaries of core, contiguous, and outer areas, as shown in Figure 1.2.

THE STUDY OF NATIONAL SECURITY The exploration of national security and its various dimensions, including policy and priorities, leads us to the fundamental questions of this study. How can national security be studied? What are the fundamental principles that are the bases for U.S. national security policy and strategy? There are three major approaches to the study of national security (the concentric-circle approach, elite versus participatory policymaking, and systems analysis); all concentrate on the manner in which policy is made. These approaches must be distinguished from studies that examine national security issues, such as what U.S. nuclear strategy should be or what U.S. policy should be in the Middle East. Furthermore, they should also be distinguished from studies of government institutions. The concentric-circle approach (see Figure 1.3) presumes that the President is at the center of the national security policy process. The President's

National Interests & National Security

CORE (First Order)

CONTIGUOUS (Second Order)

OUTER AREAS (Third Order)

9

Scope of Strategic Options

/ Figure 1.2

U.S. National Security Priorities

s t a f f a n d the National S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t p r o v i d e a d v i c e a n d i m p l e m e n t national security p o l i c y . T h i s a p p r o a c h s h o w s the d e g r e e of i m p o r tance of v a r i o u s g r o u p s as primary o b j e c t s of national security p o l i c y . For e x a m p l e , a m a j o r o b j e c t i v e is to i n f l u e n c e the b e h a v i o r and policies of allies and adversaries. At the s a m e time, C o n g r e s s , the public, and the m e d i a h a v e i m p o r t a n t roles in the national security p o l i c y p r o c e s s . But they are not the p r i m a r y " o b j e c t s " of p o l i c y . I n c r e a s i n g l y w i d e r c i r c l e s r e p r e s e n t g o v e r n m e n t structures and agencies, constituencies, a n d the media. T h e farther f r o m the center, the less their importance as o b j e c t s of national security policy. T h e p r o b l e m with this a p p r o a c h is its o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of the national security policy p r o c e s s and p r e s u m p t i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y . T h e elite v e r s u s p a r t i c i p a t o r y p o l i c y m a k i n g a p p r o a c h ( F i g u r e 1.4) is b a s e d on the view that a b a s i c d i l e m m a in a d e m o c r a c y lies in the p o l i c y p r o c e s s . National s e c u r i t y p o l i c y is m a d e by an e l i t e w i t h i n the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t , but the elite in turn m u s t d e v e l o p b r o a d e r p u b l i c s u p p o r t f o r such a policy. On the o n e h a n d , the elite h a s the skill a n d acc e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n to f o r m u l a t e national s e c u r i t y p o l i c y in contrast to an u n i n f o r m e d p u b l i c . O n the o t h e r h a n d , f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y to b e s u c c e s s f u l in the long run, there must be s o m e d e g r e e of p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the w i d e r public. T h e elite m o d e l s e e s national s e c u r i t y policy b e i n g m a d e by a s m a l l circle that i n c l u d e s t h e P r e s i d e n t , his s t a f f , key m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s , key h i g h - r a n k i n g m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s , a n d k e y m e m b e r s of t h e b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y . T h e a s s u m p t i o n is that this is a c o h e s i v e elite, w h o s e own interests override other concerns. The participatory model assumes the e x i s t e n c e of a variety of elites w h o r e p r e s e n t v a r i o u s s e g m e n t s of the p u b l i c , interest g r o u p s , a n d o f f i c i a l s . In this m o d e l , the s a m e elites rarely c o n t r o l all a s p e c t s of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . C o a l i t i o n s are f o r m e d f o r particular issues, then are r e f o r m e d f o r o t h e r issues. T h i s a p p r o a c h s t r u g gles to reconcile the skill a n d p o w e r of the elite with the d e m a n d s of p a r ticipatory d e m o c r a c y .

10

Introduction

Figure 1.3

Concentric Circle Approach

Figure 1.4

Elite and Participatory Models

T h e s y s t e m s - a n a l y s i s a p p r o a c h ( F i g u r e 1.5) holds that m a n y d i f f e r e n t inputs g o into the policy p r o c e s s . T h e s e i n p u t s c r e a t e political d y n a m i c s w i t h i n the p o l i c y m a k i n g m a c h i n e r y , w h i c h m u s t r e c o n c i l e a n u m b e r of c o m p e t i n g interests and d e s i g n a p o l i c y a c c e p t a b l e to m o s t . In turn, the i m p a c t of p o l i c y must be m e a s u r e d by f e e d b a c k , both in t e r m s of p o l i c y e f f e c t i v e n e s s and h o w it is p e r c e i v e d by t h o s e a f f e c t e d . All of these a p p r o a c h e s , as well as their variations, are u s e f u l in the study of national security policy: this study therefore incorporates s o m e t h i n g of all three a p p r o a c h e s . W e e x a m i n e the f o r m a l National Security Establishment based on the assumption that the President and several g o v e r n m e n t structures and agencies established by law f o r m that Establishment and are at the center of the policy p r o c e s s — t h e concentric-circle approach. W e e x a m -

National Interests & National Security

11

The Political Environment Inputs

t

Figure 1.5

Policymaking Machinery

>- Outputs

Feedback-4

Systems-Analysis Approach

ine the National Security Council and the D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e f r o m the concentric-circle approach and partly f r o m the elite-participatory a p p r o a c h . Finally, w h e n we focus on the formal policy process, most of the attention is given to the national security n e t w o r k — a s y s t e m s - a n a l y s i s a p p r o a c h that considers many power clusters within the g o v e r n m e n t a l structure, the political system, and the international environment that have an impact on the National Security Establishment and in the p o l i c y m a k i n g process. T h e National Security E s t a b l i s h m e n t , c r e a t e d by law and d e s i g n e d to p r o v i d e the President an a d v i s o r y and o p e r a t i o n a l i n s t r u m e n t , is a f o r m a l p o l i c y m a k i n g instrument and an i n s t r u m e n t f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g national s e curity p o l i c y . O f t e n , h o w e v e r , the c h a r a c t e r a n d p e r s o n a l i t y of the P r e s i dent lead to the creation of i n f o r m a l and parallel s t r u c t u r e s a n d p r o c e s s e s f o r d e v e l o p i n g national s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . T h i s s e t s u p a s e r i e s of p o l i c y p o w e r c l u s t e r s that f o r m a national security n e t w o r k d r i v i n g the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t a n d the f o r m a l p o l i c y m a k i n g p r o c e s s . T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n and within these p o w e r c l u s t e r s a n d their p o w e r d e p e n d upon h o w the President exercises his l e a d e r s h i p a n d h o w he thinks the National S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t s h o u l d f u n c t i o n . T h e r e are three m a j o r p o w e r clusters, w h o s e p o w e r s are a l m o s t c o m parable: ( 1 ) the "policy triad," c o n s i s t i n g of the S e c r e t a r y of State, S e c r e tary of D e f e n s e , and the National Security A d v i s e r to the President; ( 2 ) the D i r e c t o r of the C I A and the C h a i r m a n of the Joint C h i e f s of Staff; a n d ( 3 ) the W h i t e H o u s e Chief of Staff and C o u n s e l o r to the P r e s i d e n t . T h e s e t h r e e p o w e r c l u s t e r s are e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t in s h a p i n g n a tional s e c u r i t y p o l i c y ( s e e F i g u r e 1.6). E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , they r e p r e s e n t critical p a r t s of the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t b u t o p e r a t e in w a y s that r e f l e c t presidential l e a d e r s h i p s t y l e a n d m i n d - s e t s of t h o s e w i t h i n the t h r e e p o w e r c l u s t e r s . A s s u c h , t h e s e m a y or m a y not b e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the f o r m a l N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t . In o t h e r w o r d s , the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t is m u c h m o r e f l u i d a n d d y n a m i c than s u g g e s t e d by the f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e . S i m i l a r l y , the p o l i c y m a k i n g p r o c e s s is not as r a tional a n d s y s t e m a t i c as m a y be s u g g e s t e d by the f o r m a l policy p r o c e s s .

12

Introduction

Power Clusters

White House Staff

L. | I |

Remainder of the System 1

Government Bureaucracies Congress (Key Members)

I Allies

Special-Interest Groups

Hie Media

The American Public (Opinion Leaders)

Adversaries

•Objects of national security policy and inputs into national security policy

Figure 1.6

Policy Power Clusters and the National Security System

T h e d e f e n s e p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . . . is beset with m u l t i p l e d i l e m m a s . A s s e s s ing the threat and a c q u i r i n g the f o r c e s t r u c t u r e to m e e t that threat r e q u i r e an e f f i c i e n t crystal b a l l — n o t only in the s e n s e of d e f i n i n g the f u t u r e in the here and n o w in t e r m s of e v e n t s and d a n g e r s ; the p r o c e s s also r e q u i r e s accurately e s t i m a t i n g the national m o o d years b e f o r e the critical e v e n t . 6

THE I N T E R N A T I O N A L SECURITY SETTING A N D U.S. N A T I O N A L SECURITY T h e international security s e t t i n g a f f e c t s the U.S. national security policy process in a n u m b e r of w a y s . First, each e l e m e n t is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o n tradictory f o r c e s c r e a t i n g c o m p l e x i t i e s a n d d i f f i c u l t i e s that a r e o f t e n intractable ( u n m a n a g e a b l e ) in t e r m s of U.S. national security. T h u s , there are limits to w h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s can d o r e g a r d i n g any g i v e n national security issue. T h i s has b e c o m e e v e n m o r e d i f f i c u l t in the s e c u r i t y landscape of the 1990s, w h e r e real threats to U.S. c o r e security interests have d i m i n i s h e d . T h e d i f f i c u l t y n o w is to d e t e r m i n e w h a t and w h o are threats to U.S. national interests. S e c o n d , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y s e t t i n g is not a neat a n d clearly d e l i n e a t e d o r d e r , nor is it n e c e s s a r i l y d r i v e n by a set of rational f o r c e s .

National Interests & National Security

13

A l t h o u g h t h e r e are a n u m b e r of c o m m o n a l i t i e s , e a c h s e c u r i t y issue and c h a l l e n g e h a s d i s t i n c t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . T h u s , each U . S . n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y issue m a y r e q u i r e a u n i q u e set of r e s p o n s e s . T h i s a l s o m a y r e q u i r e a b r o a d policy b e i n g i m p l e m e n t e d by a variety of s t r a t e g i e s that at t i m e s a p p e a r to be c o n t r a d i c t o r y . F u r t h e r , the t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t s of m i l i t a r y f o r c e m a y have limited utility in such a setting. T h i r d , international security issues m a y quickly d e v e l o p into crisis situ a t i o n s d e m a n d i n g r a p i d a n d f l e x i b l e r e s p o n s e . In s u c h c a s e s , it m a y be d i f f i c u l t f o r U.S. policy processes to b e e f f e c t i v e b e c a u s e of the c h a r a c t e r of the U.S. political s y s t e m . Also, the E s t a b l i s h m e n t t e n d s to be c u m b e r s o m e in t r y i n g to react quickly and legitimately in crisis s i t u a t i o n s . Fourth, U.S. national security policy m a y require secrecy or covert operations. G i v e n the nature of the U.S. s y s t e m , trying to u n d e r t a k e e f f e c t i v e covert o p e r a t i o n s p r o m i s e s to be d i f f i c u l t at best and i n e f f e c t i v e at w o r s t . T h i s m a k e s it d i f f i c u l t f o r the United S t a t e s to d e v e l o p a c o h e r e n t policy a n d s t r a t e g y to r e s p o n d to the m o s t likely c o n f l i c t s — u n c o n v e n t i o n a l , which may require "indirect" approaches and secrecy. Further, the resurgence of Congress into the national security policy area ( s o m e call it congressional m i c r o m a n a g e m e n t ) and the continuing debate and disagreement over the defense budget add to the problem. This is particularly true when such policies and strategies stray f r o m mainstream U.S. v i e w s and w a y s of war. Fifth, the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Soviet Union and the r e u n i f i c a t i o n of G e r m a n y h a v e b e e n the m a j o r f a c t o r s in c h a n g i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y l a n d s c a p e . T h e d i s a p p e a r a n c e of the " E v i l E m p i r e , " c o m b i n e d w i t h the c o l l a p s e of the s u p e r p o w e r era, has led to w h a t is c a l l e d the n e w w o r l d o r d e r . R e g a r d l e s s of what that m e a n s , it is c l e a r that a new s t r a t e g i c lands c a p e has e m e r g e d , o n e that is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a n u m b e r of e t h n i c , religious, and nationalistic conflicts. Yet Russia remains a m a j o r player on the w o r l d s c e n e , p a r t i c u l a r l y with its existing s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r s t o c k p i l e s , its r e s o u r c e s a n d p o p u l a t i o n , and its i n f l u e n c e with the i n d e p e n d e n t r e p u b l i c s . In 1994, R u s s i a w a s s t r u g g l i n g to r e f o r m its e c o n o m i c s y s t e m a n d t r y i n g to r e s o l v e its internal political p r o b l e m s . S i x t h , the p r o b l e m of s t r a t e g i c c u l t u r e s p o s e s a r e l a t i v e l y n e w issue for U.S. national s e c u r i t y . Strategic c u l t u r e s e v o l v i n g out of n o n - W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n s g o v e r n the political a n d s e c u r i t y o r i e n t a t i o n of m a n y s t a t e s in the S o u t h e r n H e m i s p h e r e as well as C h i n a a n d India. T h e c h a r a c t e r of c o n f l i c t s a n d the m e a n i n g of victory or d e f e a t m a y d i f f e r in f o r e i g n s t r a t e g i c c u l t u r e s in contrast to U.S. strategic principles. 7 Yet the United States c a n not c o m p r o m i s e its s t r a t e g i c culture w i t h o u t e r o d i n g its legitimacy a n d capacity as a m a j o r w o r l d p o w e r . M a i n t a i n i n g and n u r t u r i n g its c u l t u r e in b o t h d o m e s t i c a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a s is an essential part of its identity ( s e e " T h e N a t u r e of U.S. V a l u e s , " this c h a p t e r ) . T h e major conclusion is that there are boundaries, constraints, and limitations that cannot be separated from the operations of the U.S. E s t a b l i s h m e n t .

14

Introduction

Neither can the policy process be viewed in isolation from these considerations. As a result (and a l w a y s aside f r o m real threats to the h o m e l a n d ) , there is likely to be a great deal of d i s a g r e e m e n t and debate within the United States regarding U.S. national security. Disagreements are likely to occur within the National Security Establishment, between the Establishment and other branches and agencies of government, and between all of these and the public in general. T h e intensity of the disagreement increases in direct proportion to the size of the g a p between policies and strategies on one hand, and well-established U.S. perspectives and political-military posture on the other. W h e n we add to this the differing views of allies and adversaries and their national security e f f o r t s — p a r t i c u l a r l y in the post-Cold War era—it is not difficult to conclude that simply examining the Establishment or the policy process does not do justice to the complexities and complications inherent in U.S. national security. All of this is e x a c e r b a t e d by the d i f f u s i o n and decentralization of p o w e r within the U.S. political system, not only within and b e t w e e n the various branches of g o v e r n m e n t , but also within the general p o p u l a t i o n . Participatory politics and single-issue politics, the erosion of political party cohesion, c h a n g i n g d o m e s t i c d e m o g r a p h i c s , the policy role of the media, and internal power p r o b l e m s within the government have m a d e it almost impossible for the President to undertake any foreign policy or national security initiatives that are perceived as outside the mainstream or that appear to challenge U.S. constitutional principles. T o successfully induce changes and to place his own s t a m p on national security policy, the President, with his domestic allies, must build a political base within the government and the general public and convince the media of the appropriateness of new policies and strategies. This usually means that the matter (1) must be seen as a m a j o r national security issue, with the U.S. position clearly proper and morally correct, and (2) must involve m i n i m u m risk and high expectations of success. T h e U.S. fear of concentration of power ingrained in the constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and balances has provided clear limitations to the exercise of p o w e r of any o n e branch of g o v e r n ment. Yet these restraints can also prevent effective response to challenges that require a concentration of power. T h e legal niceties of U.S. constitutional practice may have little influence in the international security setting, where power and politics are often inextricable. And it is in this context that the U.S. National Security Establishment and the process by which security policy is f o r m u l a t e d and i m p l e m e n t e d meet their greatest test. Although this study is concerned primarily with the U.S. National Security Establishment and the security policy process, the international security setting and the factors that affect the substance of U.S. national security policy are examined in the final part of the book, and the chapters on the Establishment and the process are written with an eye to those issues.

National Interests & National Security

15

U.S. Perspectives An important part of how the United States perceives and responds to the international security setting is the view of its own historical experience, including ideology, culture, and the character of the political system. At the outset, we must recognize that a great deal has changed since the end of the Cold War. This was also the case at the end of World War II. Each generation has witnessed enormous changes in relations between nationstates and in the nature of conflicts and the nature and character of adversaries. Indeed, change has become so commonplace that it is a truism that the only permanent thing in the world is change. To study the security setting, at some point we need to take the world as it is, and see how recent critical changes have led to the present state of affairs. From here we can try to fix some point in time to see in what directions the world may be moving and what forces may be shaping U.S. national security issues. To grapple with these issues in a more comprehensible way and to design a framework for the following chapters, it is useful to do three things: (1) identify and define critical periods or events in the Cold War that have a direct bearing on international and U.S. national security; (2) study what changes have taken place in the post-Cold War era and what continuities there are from the Cold War period; and (3) identify reference points in these periods for designing a framework to study U.S. national security, recognizing that such reference points are not intended to be detailed chapters in the history of U.S. national security. Within the framework, the major features of the security setting can be outlined and can serve as the guide for the study of national security. From the U.S. perspective, there are two continuities from the Cold War period that spill over into the 1990s and beyond: the nuclear age and the Vietnam War. In addition, there are four reference points that are particularly characteristic of the post-Cold War era: the shape of the new world order, the conflict environment, interdependence, and communications technology. There are, of course, other important points, ranging from the shape and character of Russia to weapons proliferation. These are specific national security issues and are not the major focus of this study. The continuities and reference points, however, are springboards for shaping the mind-sets and worldviews of those in the National Security Establishment and for fashioning national security posture.

Post-World War II Continuities The nuclear age. In the post-Cold War era, the proliferation of nuclear technology, as well as biological and chemical weapons, has become an increasing danger. Smaller states with oil reserves and cash reserves can, as some have shown, employ what some call "intellectual mercenaries"— those with skills in developing nuclear devices; the former Soviet Union

16

Introduction

has supplied a number of such workers. Moreover, Iran and China, for example, have bought modern weapons from Russia. In 1994, fears persist that North Korea and Iraq are also acquiring (or already have) nuclear weapons. In sum, the "arms bazaar" continues with increasing efforts at acquiring sophisticated weapons and nuclear technology. Fears of nuclear war persist, even if at a lower level for major powers. It is also the case that nuclear proliferation has become intertwined with weapons proliferation, in general, and with the fear that such proliferation is expanding throughout many parts of the world that heretofore were relatively isolated from such proliferation. The Vietnam War. Even though many in the United States have tried to put "Vietnam behind us," the fact is that it is deeply embedded in the American psyche. Constant reminders of the Vietnam War appear in the literature. But the most important reminder is the Vietnam Memorial in Washington. This memorial is a constant and visible reminder of the war. Moreover, the sacrifices in the war and its disputed outcome remain part of military history and the military perspective. Even during the 1991 Gulf War, Vietnam surfaced. It became important to point out that the Gulf War was not like Vietnam: Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of the allied coalition in the war, was allowed to run the war from the battle area. Equally important, the military objectives were clear, the adversary was clear, the battle was short and pointed, and modern weaponry and sophisticated operational techniques were brought to bear to defeat Iraq—all in direct contrast to Vietnam. In any case, a serious study of U.S. national security in the post-Cold War era cannot dispense with the long-term impact of Vietnam on the psyche of U.S. citizens or on strategic plans and the use of military force. This does not mean that everything regarding military involvement or strategic plans should be totally rooted in the Vietnam experience. But the lessons drawn from that war must remain a part of the total strategic package for the future. These lessons include the impact of the U.S. withdrawal, its operational doctrines, the link between conflicts and the American people and political leadership, and, of course, what the Vietnam War did to the U.S. military.

The Post-Cold War Era The new world order. The final shape of the new world order remains elusive. Yet there are some signs of what may be evolving. The end of the superpower era has given rise to a variety of regional power clusters. In the Pacific region, China and Japan compete and are likely to become major economic and military powers. At the same time, India has the potential to become a major power prompted by its concern over Chinese power projections into the Indian Ocean. The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation

National Interests & National Security

17

( A P E C ) s e e m s revitalized w i t h o u t U . S . help. Further, the N o r t h A m e r i c a n Free T r a d e A g r e e m e n t (NAFTA), p a s s e d in 1993, has the potential of c r e a t ing a N o r t h A m e r i c a n e c o n o m i c b l o c . T h e E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u nity ( E E C ) b e c a m e a reality. A l s o , the f u t u r e s h a p e of the N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n ( N A T O ) is u n c l e a r , the N A T O s u m m i t in J a n u a r y 1 9 9 4 n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . T h e s e e x a m p l e s illustrate a n u m b e r of s h i f t s in p o w e r a l i g n m e n t s . But the larger issue has to d o with the s h a p e of the international arena with respect to the b a l a n c e of p o w e r b e t w e e n states a n d regional o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d to the role the U n i t e d N a t i o n s will play. In any c a s e , the w o r l d a p p e a r s to be h e a d e d t o w a r d a s y s t e m of r e g i o n a l p o w e r c l u s t e r s a n d e c o n o m i c b l o c s . A m o d e r n v e r s i o n of the n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y b a l a n c e - o f - p o w e r politics s e e m s to be in the o f f i n g . T h e s e matters raise a n u m b e r of q u e s t i o n s f r o m the U.S. p e r s p e c t i v e . W h a t role s h o u l d ( c a n ) the U n i t e d States play in s h a p i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t ? W h a t r e m a i n s of the old alliances? W h o are f r i e n d s a n d w h o are a d v e r s a r i e s ? W h a t is the c o n c e p t of national p o w e r in the n e w w o r l d o r d e r ? H o w can such p o w e r b e utilized to a c h i e v e national security o b j e c tives? P e r h a p s the m o s t c o m p l e x a n d d i f f i c u l t issue is: W h a t d o U . S . national i n t e r e s t s a n d n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y m e a n in this n e w w o r l d o r d e r ? In 1994, t h e s e q u e s t i o n s r e m a i n u n a n s w e r e d and t r o u b l i n g . The conflict environment. T h e c h a n g e s in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a n d the s e c u r i t y l a n d s c a p e h a v e c h a n g e d the c o n f l i c t e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e r e is a p o p u l a r v i e w in the U n i t e d S t a t e s that the possibility of m a j o r w a r s h a s c o n s i d e r a b l y d i m i n i s h e d . T h i s also s e e m s to be the g r o w i n g c o n v i c t i o n a m o n g l e a d e r s of m a j o r p o w e r s . Yet it is a l s o t r u e that t h e r e a r e any n u m b e r of lesser c o n f l i c t s a n d u n c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s in the w o r l d , r a n g i n g f r o m the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a , the C a u c a s u s , A f r i c a , Latin A m e r i c a , a n d a r e a s in S o u t h e a s t a n d S o u t h w e s t A s i a . A l s o , the p o t e n t i a l f o r c o n flicts in the M i d d l e East r e m a i n s high. M a n y of these c o n f l i c t s m a y not necessarily f o l l o w the patterns of c o n v e n t i o n a l conflicts, s u c h as t h o s e in the 1991 Gulf W a r . M a n y are m o r e likely to f o l l o w unconventional conflict patterns, e n c o m p a s s i n g e v e r y t h i n g f r o m revolution and c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n to terrorist a n d c o u n t e r t e r r o r o p e r a tions. E v e n though the conflicts in f o r m e r Yugoslavia s e e m on the s u r f a c e to f o l l o w conventional lines, the f e a r is that these not only could e x p a n d , but could eventually c h a n g e into an unconventional conflict f o l l o w i n g guerrilla o p e r a t i o n a l doctrines. ( U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s and N A T O lost credibility as they t h r e a t e n e d air strikes against the S e r b s at S a r a j e v o but failed to fulfill such threats until m u c h l a t e r — a f t e r a mortar attack on civilians in the S a r a j e v o m a r k e t p l a c e in m i d - F e b r u a r y 1994.) Fears of triggering an u n c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n f l i c t w e r e part of the strategic o v e r v i e w of U.S. a n d UN o p e r a t i o n s in Somalia in 1 9 9 3 a n d continued into 1994. A p r e s s i n g p r o b l e m f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s is the d r u g c a r t e l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y g r o u p c o a l i t i o n s s u c h as in P e r u . Not only d o s u c h c o a l i t i o n s p o s e

18

Introduction

a serious domestic threat, they also combine domestic and external issues into a complex and difficult national security threat. These threats cannot be met by the visible use of conventional military forces. Nor are they necessarily shaped by conventional doctrines. In 1992 and into 1994, another dimension surfaced in the United States. This was labeled "wars of conscience." Such conflicts did not necessarily challenge or threaten U.S. national interests but were moved by humanitarian concerns. U.S. involvement in Somalia and Rwanda are prime examples. Some even suggested that the U.S. involvement was video-driven. That is, the constant showing of suffering people, particularly children, played on the U.S. conscience and created the environment for committing the United States. Yet the character of conflicts in this decade and the form of possible U.S. involvement may not follow European-type or Gulf War scenarios. This raised a number of questions about the utility of military force; military operational doctrines; and long-term public support. But the more critical issue is how well prepared the U.S. military is to engage in unconventional conflicts that are shaped by foreign strategic cultures. Equally important, will U.S. citizens support such involvement, if so, for how long? Can the United States design an effective strategy or strategies that take into account foreign strategic cultures and a variety of nonconventional considerations? Interdependence. The new world order has focused attention on a variety of issues that cross national boundaries. These include environmental considerations, humanitarian impulses, the drug trade, and, perhaps most important, economic power as an instrument of national policy. Many of these issues have been placed in the context of national security. Environmental issues, for example, are seen as threats to the survival of the state and to the well-being of people. Similarly, it is argued that unless all peoples have some level of quality of life and are not hounded by hunger and poverty, a serious security environment is created that threatens the security and well-being of states and people w h o are relatively well o f f . But the most visible dimension of interdependence is economic. Historically, economic strength has been part of national security, but it was overshadowed by the focus on military power. However, in the new era, where many accept the notion of the decreasing utility of military power, economic power has gained a particular prominence as a major component of national security. For some, the use of the economic instrument can now achieve national security objectives unattainable by the use of military power. Economic power rests primarily on domestic economic strength: productivity and competitive capability in the external world. This f o r g e s a close link between national security and domestic economic and political issues. It is also argued that the ability to bring to bear economic power against other states, both explicitly and implicitly, shapes security and foreign policies. But it is also true that small states with an important

National Interests & National Security

19

resource such as oil can have a major impact on larger states whose need for that resource is critical. Thus, smaller states in the Middle East, for example, are important players in the national security field by virtue of their oil resources. The economic dimension is also part of the notion of the "global village" and interdependence. The clear implication is that no state can exist in an economic vacuum; domestic economics are closely linked to the international economic arena. This linkage forges close ties between the domestic economic issues of major states and international economic issues. This is reinforced by the increasing economic gap between developed industrial states and a number of underdeveloped states in the Southern Hemisphere. This is viewed in terms of the presence or absence of economic power. From another perspective, economic development is crucial to the well-being of any state. The continuation of those in power is in no small measure contingent upon the ability to implement specific policies to further the economic well-being of the people. Indeed, the 1992 presidential elections in the United States turned on such an issue. In the final analysis, those in the National Security Establishment must incorporate a number of considerations that tend to create an interdependent international community or global village. The most prominent of these is economic power, which needs to be incorporated into the national security equation beyond that envisioned in the past. The more difficult problem is to design appropriate strategies for responding to interdependent issues and for using economic power to achieve national security objectives. Complicating the matter is that economic power cannot be viewed in isolation. It must be systematically incorporated into other national security instruments and into strategic planning. In brief, for many policymakers in the United States, strategic thinking must go beyond the use of military power; it must incorporate a variety of instruments, consider a variety of options (including economic strategies), and possibly demand the creation of new instruments. Communications technology. A revolution in communications technology has not only added to the notions of global interdependence, but has also dramatically exposed the workings of government. Moreover, it has made information available almost instantaneously throughout the globe. This has been called the information age. The technological revolution in communications promises to continue unabated. What does this mean in terms of national security? Not only does the ability of government to communicate across national boundaries almost at will reinforce the notions of interdependence, but it also reshapes diplomacy and can provide a wealth of information on any particular state or group of people. Equally important, the ability to use satellite communications makes it increasingly difficult to control the media and to censor news reports.

20

Introduction

A l s o , s u c h t e c h n o l o g y h a s h a d an i m p a c t o n the ability to c o n d u c t w a r s . T h e highly s o p h i s t i c a t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s n e t w o r k s e s t a b l i s h e d by the c o a l i t i o n against Iraq in the Gulf W a r w a s an e x t r e m e l y important f a c tor in c o n t r o l l i n g f o r c e s and in c o n d u c t i n g a s u c c e s s f u l military o p e r a t i o n in K u w a i t . T h i s w a s particularly t r u e in the use of air p o w e r , a i r - t o - g r o u n d missiles, and s u r f a c e m i s s i l e s . A l s o , the ability of n e w s p e r s o n n e l to use satellite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s p r o v i d e d i n s t a n t a n e o u s r e p o r t s o n b a t t l e f i e l d operations throughout the w o r l d . Further, c o m m a n d c e n t e r s in W a s h i n g t o n , through the use of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s n e t w o r k , had a better g r a s p of military o p e r a t i o n s than did c o m m a n d e r s in the field in Saudi A r a b i a . At a n o t h e r level, the d r a m a t i c w o r l d w i d e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of p e r s o n a l c o m p u t e r s , fax m a c h i n e s , a n d c a m c o r d e r s , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , i n c r e a s e s p e o p l e p o w e r a n d o f f e r s direct p e r s o n - t o - p e r s o n c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a c r o s s national b o u n d a r i e s . T h e total g o v e r n m e n t control of such c o m m u n i c a t i o n s is a d i f f i c u l t if not i m p o s s i b l e task. T h e i m p l i c a t i o n s s e e m clear. T h e a c c e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n a n d the ability to transmit i n f o r m a t i o n quickly a n d relatively c h e a p l y links not only states but a l s o p e o p l e m o r e c l o s e l y . M o r e o v e r , a u t h o r i t a r i a n s y s t e m s that had a m o n o p o l y on c o m m u n i c a t i o n s n o w f i n d it h a r d e r to m a i n t a i n s u c h a m o n o p o l y . A l s o , the ability of g o v e r n m e n t s to s h a p e t h e n e w s a n d give it a p a r t i c u l a r spin is m o r e d i f f i c u l t g i v e n d i r e c t a c c e s s to a v a r i e t y of n e w s s o u r c e s m a d e a v a i l a b l e by the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s e x p l o s i o n . T h o s e in the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t m u s t a c c o u n t for the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t e c h n o l o g y not o n l y in d e s i g n i n g national s e c u r i t y strategy, but also in i m p l e m e n t i n g security policies, c o l l e c t i n g a n d e v a l u a t i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d c o n s i d e r i n g the p o l i t i c a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l dim e n s i o n of national security issues. A l s o , in the use of military f o r c e , c a r e m u s t b e taken r e g a r d i n g the r o l e of the m e d i a a n d a c c e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n that ultimately c o m e s with military o p e r a t i o n s . With c o m m u n i c a t i o n s techn o l o g y , national security has b e c o m e a m o r e c o m p l e x and a m o r e visible arena as a c c e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n by m o r e g o v e r n m e n t s a n d i n d i v i d u a l s inc r e a s e s . It is b e c o m i n g increasingly d i f f i c u l t to f i n d a place to hide.

Summary T h e continuities f r o m the Cold W a r era a n d the m a j o r characteristics of the p o s t - C o l d W a r period s h a p e the n e w w o r l d o r d e r . A n d m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e s e f a s h i o n the s e c u r i t y l a n d s c a p e that is e m e r g i n g in the n e w w o r l d o r d e r . T h u s , the n u c l e a r a g e and the V i e t n a m W a r f r o m the e a r l i e r period, c o m b i n e d with the c h a n g i n g c o n f l i c t e n v i r o n m e n t , i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t e c h n o l o g y , u n d e r p i n the s h a p e of the n e w w o r l d o r d e r . All of these d e v e l o p m e n t s create d i l e m m a s f o r the United S t a t e s b e c a u s e they contain contradictory f o r c e s and pose difficult and serious challenges. For our purpose, s u f f i c e it to say that how these d e v e l o p m e n t s are perceived

National Interests & National Security

21

and interpreted a n d h o w U.S. policy and strategy are d e s i g n e d to r e s p o n d are part of t h e b r o a d p a t t e r n s of the politics of p o l i c y m a k i n g a n d a f f e c t the s h a p e a n d m i n d - s e t s of t h o s e in the National S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t .

THE NATURE OF AMERICAN VALUES At this p o i n t it is n e c e s s a r y to r e v i e w A m e r i c a n v a l u e s a n d c u l t u r e t o und e r s t a n d h o w t h e s e a r e i n t e r p r e t e d a n d p r o j e c t e d into t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t . In b r i e f , the m a j o r f o c u s of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y is to f u r t h e r A m e r i c a n v a l u e s and c u l t u r e . W h e n w e s p e a k of A m e r i c a n v a l u e s , w e r e f e r to w h a t is e s t e e m e d and a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l a s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l , l e g a l , a n d m o r a l b a s i s f o r the c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e U . S . s y s t e m . In o t h e r w o r d s , t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s f r o m w h i c h the U . S . p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m a n d s o c i a l o r d e r d e r i v e their i n n a t e c h a r a c t e r a n d g i v e s u b s t a n c e to A m e r i c a n c u l t u r e . M u c h of this e v o l v e s f r o m the J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n h e r i t a g e , t h e R e f o r m a t i o n , t h e R e n a i s s a n c e , the p h i l o s o p h i e s of J o h n L o c k e a n d J a c q u e s R o u s s e a u , the p r i n c i p l e s r o o t e d in the A m e r i c a n R e v o l u t i o n , the D e c l a r a t i o n of I n d e p e n d e n c e , a n d the C o n s t i t u t i o n . A l t h o u g h t h e s e c o v e r a w i d e r a n g e a n d a v a r i e t y of h i s t o r i c a l r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s , w e c a n i d e n t i f y at least six f u n d a m e n t a l v a l u e s t h a t a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t to U . S . n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s a n d t h e i r r o l e in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l world. 1 * First is t h e right of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . It is t h e p r e s u m p t i o n that e a c h n a t i o n - s t a t e h a s t h e r i g h t to d e t e r m i n e its o w n p o l i c y and to g o v e r n itself as it s e e s fit. A n i m p o r t a n t c o r o l l a r y is that the p e o p l e w i t h i n that n a t i o n s t a t e a l s o h a v e t h e r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . F r o m t h e p o i n t of v i e w of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h i s m e a n s that t h r o u g h a m e c h a n i s m of f r e e a n d f a i r e l e c t i o n s , p e o p l e w i t h i n e a c h n a t i o n - s t a t e h a v e a r i g h t t o d e t e r m i n e by w h o m a n d h o w they will b e ruled, with the o p t i o n of r e p l a c i n g their r u l e r s as t h e y s e e fit. All of this is to o p e r a t e w i t h i n a s y s t e m of l a w s a n d p e a c e ful c h a n g e . S e c o n d , it f o l l o w s that t h e r e is an i n h e r e n t w o r t h to any o n e i n d i v i d ual in h i s or her r e l a t i o n s h i p to o t h e r s , to t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m , a n d t o the social o r d e r . W h a t d o e s this m e a n ? In the s i m p l e s t t e r m s , e v e r y p e r s o n is i n t r i n s i c a l l y a m o r a l , l e g a l , a n d political e n t i t y to w h i c h t h e s y s t e m m u s t r e s p o n d . E a c h i n d i v i d u a l h a s t h e r i g h t to a c h i e v e all t h a t he or s h e c a n w i t h o u t e n c u m b r a n c e s , o t h e r than those that p r o t e c t f e l l o w i n d i v i d u a l s a n d t h o s e r e q u i r e d f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n a n d s u r v i v a l of the h o m e l a n d . I n d i v i d u a l w o r t h m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , be r e f l e c t e d in e c o n o m i c , political, a n d legal s y s t e m s . T h i r d , " g o v e r n o r s " a n d t h o s e w h o h a v e b e e n s e l e c t e d to r u l e o w e t h e i r p o w e r a n d a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o the p e o p l e . T h e p e o p l e a r e t h e f i n a l a u t h o r i t y r e g a r d i n g w h o s h o u l d r u l e . F u r t h e r , t h e r e is a c o n t i n u i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by the g o v e r n o r s , as w e l l as t h o s e a p p o i n t e d to p o s i t i o n s in t h e s y s t e m , to r u l e

22

Introduction

a n d f u n c t i o n a c c o r d i n g to the m o r a l a n d legal principles e m b o d i e d in t h e c o n c e p t of " p o w e r to the p e o p l e . " T h e right of the p e o p l e to c h a n g e g o v e r n o r s is a b s o l u t e . In this r e s p e c t , t h e r e m u s t not be any o n e c o n s u m i n g p o w e r d o m i n a t i n g g o v e r n m e n t or e s t a b l i s h i n g its o w n r a t i o n a l e f o r r u l e . T h e f u r t h e r i n g of i n d i v i d u a l w o r t h n e c e s s i t a t e s limited g o v e r n m e n t w i t h n o a b s o l u t e and p e r m a n e n t f o c a l p o i n t of p o w e r . T o e n s u r e this, rule a n d g o v e r n a n c e m u s t be o p e n . In the m a i n , this m e a n s that d e c i s i o n s a n d polic i e s are o p e n l y a r r i v e d at w i t h i n p u t f r o m a variety of f o r m a l a n d i n f o r mal g r o u p s . T h e s y s t e m of rule must b e a c c e s s i b l e to the p e o p l e and their representatives. T h i s is the e s s e n c e of " o p e n s y s t e m s . " Fourth, policies and c h a n g e s in the international e n v i r o n m e n t m u s t b e based o n the first three v a l u e s . T h u s , p e a c e f u l c h a n g e b r o u g h t about by rational d i s c o u r s e b e t w e e n n a t i o n - s t a t e s is a f u n d a m e n t a l v a l u e . R e s o r t to w a r can be a c c e p t a b l e only if it is clearly based on protection a n d survival of the h o m e l a n d , a n d this o n l y if all o t h e r m e a n s h a v e f a i l e d . In this r e s p e c t , d i p l o m a c y a n d s t a t e - t o - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s must be b a s e d o n m u t u ally a c c e p t a b l e " r u l e s of the g a m e . " F i f t h , f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s , it is a f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p o s i t i o n that s y s t e m s p r o f e s s i n g these v a l u e s a n d seriously a t t e m p t i n g to f u n c t i o n a c c o r d ing to t h e m m u s t b e p r o t e c t e d a n d n u r t u r e d . Further, n a t i o n - s t a t e s w h o s e v a l u e s are c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h o s e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s are t h o u g h t to b e best s e r v e d by an international o r d e r b a s e d on the s a m e v a l u e s . F i n a l l y , t h e r e are m o r a l u n d e r p i n n i n g s to A m e r i c a n v a l u e s that o w e their i n c e p t i o n to the J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n h e r i t a g e . For m a n y A m e r i c a n s , t h e r e f o r e , this instills a s e n s e of " h u m a n i t y , " a sensitivity to the plight a n d status of individuals, and a s e a r c h f o r d i v i n e g u i d a n c e . All of this a d d s a d i m e n s i o n to w h a t is s e e n to be p r o p e r and j u s t in the m i n d s of m a n y A m e r i c a n s , and is c o n s i d e r e d by m a n y to be b e y o n d the legal d e f i n i t i o n of government. It is not s u g g e s t e d that t h e s e v a l u e s are perfectly e m b o d i e d in the U.S. s y s t e m . T h e r e are m a n y historical e x a m p l e s of distorting v a l u e s and u s i n g them to d i s g u i s e o t h e r p u r p o s e s . But the fact is that in the U . S . s y s t e m , n o matter h o w i m p e r f e c t , these v a l u e s are e s t e e m e d in their o w n right and are e m b o d i e d in the political-social s y s t e m . Further, the system of r u l e and the c h a r a c t e r of the political s y s t e m h a v e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d a n d " o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d " these values, n o matter h o w i m p e r f e c t l y . T h e e x p e c t a t i o n s of A m e r icans and their a s s e s s m e n t of o t h e r states are, in no small m e a s u r e , an a p plication of t h e s e v a l u e s .

American Values: Into the Twentieth Century T h e c o l l a p s e of the o l d o r d e r in E u r o p e f o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r I set the s t a g e f o r the e v o l u t i o n in E u r o p e of d e m o c r a t i c s y s t e m s o n the o n e h a n d and tyrannical a n d M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s y s t e m s on the other. Until that t i m e ,

National Interests & National Security

23

" P a x Britannica" provided a sense of stability and order to European affairs as well as to the United States and its relationships with Europe. But for many Americans, involvement in the " G r e a t W a r " to save E u r o p e seemed a mistake. The United States withdrew into a splendid isolationism that ended only with the start of World War II. Even in the a f t e r m a t h of World W a r I, A m e r i c a n s had been a c c u s t o m e d to a world d o m i n a t e d by a European order that w a s more or less compatible with the general nature of American values and national interests. Although this w a s an imperfect order, it was not threatening to what A m e r i c a n s felt was the proper order of things and their own value system. At the beginning of the twentieth century, American values s e e m e d to be best e x p r e s s e d by the progressive period of T h e o d o r e R o o s e v e l t ' s presid e n c y and Franklin R o o s e v e l t ' s New Deal, both f o c u s i n g on individual A m e r i c a n s and the g o v e r n m e n t ' s responsibility to them. T h e r e was little need to translate these values for use in the external world. A m e r i c a ' s interest only rarely extended beyond its own shores. Yet it w a s also at the beginning of the twentieth century that the United States b e c a m e a " w o r l d " power with its acquisition of territory resulting f r o m the Spanish-American War. A decade later, involvement in World War I was seen as a way of m a k i n g the w o r l d safe for d e m o c r a c y and s u b d u i n g a tyrannical old world power. In the aftermath, most Americans were glad to see their government distance itself from the old world again and f o c u s on domestic matters. " I t ' s their problem, not ours," was a common U.S. attitude with respect to Europe and the outside world. U.S. isolationism during the 1920s and 1930s is a well-recognized historical fact. World War II changed all that, even though most Americans wanted no part of the European war (beginning in 1939) right up to the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. In between the two Great Wars, Americans presumed that U.S. interests w e r e also world interests; American values were morally unassailable and t h e r e f o r e those to be sought by the rest of the world. In this context, U.S. national security was primarily a narrow view focused on the protection of the homeland, which required only minimum armed forces and limited strategies. Further, there w a s little need to struggle with issues of American values and how to protect them in the external world, except occasionally in terms of international economics. Regardless of its desire to return to its splendid isolation in the aftermath of World W a r II, the United States w a s in the w o r l d to stay. It bec a m e clear that U.S. responsibilities now e x t e n d e d b e y o n d the n a t i o n ' s borders. It was also b e c o m i n g clear that democracy and American values could not be nurtured and expanded by simply "staying at h o m e . " D e m o c racy m a d e political and moral d e m a n d s that required its nurturing in all parts of the world. B e y o n d protection of the h o m e l a n d , what did the U n i t e d States stand for? A n d how did it intend to achieve these goals, w h a t e v e r they were?

24

Introduction

T h e s e questions were less difficult to answer in the " n e g a t i v e " — t h a t is, the United States was against M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t systems as well as other types o f authoritarian s y s t e m s . C o n t a i n m e n t b e c a m e the m a j o r U . S . policy to prevent the e x p a n s i o n o f the S o v i e t U n i o n . P o s i t i v e responses to such questions were seen in the U . S . role in rebuilding E u r o p e — t h e Marshall Plan. All o f this placed the United S t a t e s in a leadership role in the W e s t , a reflection o f the earlier Puritan view o f the " c h o s e n p e o p l e . " 9 T h i s provided the moral basis for involvement in the Korean and V i e t n a m wars. B u t the end o f the C o l d W a r and the e m e r g e n c e o f a new security landscape made many A m e r i c a n s feel that it was time to focus on issues at h o m e . T h e r e was a turning inward, r e i n f o r c e d by the c o n v i c t i o n that the fear o f major wars had diminished considerably and the United States had won the Cold W a r . B u t this new l a n d s c a p e was muddled and lost in the " f o g o f p e a c e . " Indeed, s o m e even argued that the United S t a t e s w o u l d miss the Cold W a r . " 1 Moreover, turning inwards, A m e r i c a n s b e c a m e concerned with issues o f multiculturalism. C r i t i c s argued that although the United S t a t e s may never have been a melting pot, it did benefit from the waves o f immigrants who brought with them a rich cultural heritage. But this heritage, according to critics, is being promoted at the e x p e n s e o f " A m e r i c a n i s m . " T h a t is, the notion o f A m e r i c a n cultural heritage and the W e s t e r n tradition in which the roots o f d e m o c r a c y lie are b e i n g eroded by the i n c r e a s i n g prominence o f other cultures and loyalties. T h e greatest charge is that such a development can lead to the balkanization o f the United States. R e g a r d less o f the pros and c o n s , it is clear that demographics and cultural issues can have an impact on national security policy and strategy. U . S . involvement in A f r i c a , for e x a m p l e , must surely be sensitive to the v i e w s o f African A m e r i c a n s . T h e s a m e is true with respect to Latin A m e r i c a .

NATIONAL INTERESTS U . S . national interests are e x p r e s s i o n s o f A m e r i c a n values p r o j e c t e d into the international arena. T h e purpose o f these interests include the creation and perpetuation o f an international e n v i r o n m e n t that is not i n i m i c a b l e ( a n t a g o n i s t i c ) to the peaceful pursuit o f these values. It f o l l o w s that such interests are those that nurture and e x p a n d d e m o c r a c y and open s y s t e m s . C o n v e r s e l y , these interests are those that prevent the expansion o f c l o s e d systems by the use o f f o r c e or indirect a g g r e s s i v e means. In more s p e c i f i c terms, at the c o r e o f U . S . national interests is the survival o f the homeland and the U . S . political order. But survival cannot be limited to the " f i n a l " d e f e n s e o f the homeland. In light o f t o d a y ' s weapons technology and i d e o l o g i c a l imperatives, a m o n g other things, the c o n c e p t o f survival o f the h o m e l a n d means m o r e than retreating to the borders o f the United States and threatening total destruction o f any w h o attack.

National Interests & National Security

25

If national interest is invoked only in those cases where the homeland is directly threatened and its survival is at stake, then the concept is of little use. Indeed, it may be too late if Americans wait until survival is at stake. If the concept of national security is to have any meaning in terms of policy and strategy, then it must mean something more than survival of the homeland. It is the interpretation and application of this broader view that sparks a great deal of debate and disagreement between the executive and legislative branches of government and between a variety of groups in the U.S. political arena. The media also becomes involved in these matters, more often than not, with its own agenda. However, the National Security Establishment and those involved in the policy process rarely have the luxury of endless debate. Nor do they have unlimited time or all of the necessary facts in any given situation. Yet policy must be made and strategy options examined and implemented regardless of these conditions and while debates and disagreements remain intense. The fact is that at some point, policy must be decided upon and implemented. Before that is done, U.S. national interests for that particular situation must be identified and articulated. At the same time, national interests over the long range must be considered. Custom, usage, and constitutional powers have usually given the President the basis for articulating the meaning of U.S. national interests. Although in the contemporary period some Americans may challenge this notion, initiatives in foreign and national security policy usually rest with the President. T o be sure, Congress has an important role in these matters, but the President must take the lead and is the only legal representative of the United States with respect to relations with foreign countries. For better or for worse, therefore, it is the President who articulates the national interests and Congress that responds. The same holds true with respect to the President and the variety of interest groups in the public arena, as well as the government bureaucracy. In summary, three points need to be restated. First, American values as they apply to the external world are at the core of national interests. Second, national interests do not mean that U.S. strategy is limited to the immediate homeland of the United States. These may require power projection into various parts of the world. Third, the President is the focal point in defining and articulating U.S. national interests.

N A T I O N A L POWER The ability to successfully carry out national security policy is a direct result of the power the nation possesses and its ability to use that power effectively. But here again, we are faced with problems of definition. National power can be seen from two dimensions. It can be defined in

26

Introduction

u n i v e r s a l t e r m s a n d a l s o with r e s p e c t to p o w e r in any given s i t u a t i o n . In the first i n s t a n c e , national p o w e r can b e m e a s u r e d by a v a r i e t y of indicators, r a n g i n g f r o m the total n u m b e r in the a r m e d f o r c e s , to the ability of a n a t i o n to m o b i l i z e f o r w a r , to the n a t i o n ' s e c o n o m i c c a p a c i t y . In such c a s e s , o n l y r e l a t i v e l y large s t a t e s f a v o r e d b y l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n s a n d res o u r c e s can b e c o m e p o w e r f u l . But in any g i v e n situation, large states may not h a v e u s a b l e a n d e f f e c t i v e p o w e r . In s u c h c a s e s , s m a l l e r states m a y have p o w e r b a s e d on o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . For e x a m p l e , in the c a s e of V i e t n a m , m a n y a r g u e d that the U n i t e d S t a t e s did not h a v e u s a b l e p o w e r to b r i n g the V i e t n a m W a r to a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n . Yet the m i n o r state of North V i e t n a m had m o r e e f f e c t i v e p o w e r in that particular c a s e and was able to p r e v a i l . It may very well be that the S o v i e t U n i o n f a c e d a similar p o w e r r e l a t i o n s h i p with respect to the A f g h a n i s t a n w a r in 1987. In brief, national p o w e r is a c o m p l e x and o f t e n t i m e s a m b i g u o u s conc e p t . N o n e t h e l e s s , there are a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t s of national p o w e r that a nation must p o s s e s s if it is to p u r s u e its national interests on a global scale. A c c o r d i n g to o n e a u t h o r i t y : N a t i o n a l p o w e r . . . is a m i x of s t r a t e g i c , m i l i t a r y , e c o n o m i c , a n d p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h s a n d w e a k n e s s e s . It is d e t e r m i n e d in p a r t b y t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s a n d t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a c o u n t r y b u t e v e n m o r e b y t h e s i z e a n d l o c a t i o n of t e r r i t o r y , t h e n a t u r e of f r o n t i e r s , t h e p o p u l a t i o n , t h e raw-material resources, the e c o n o m i c structure, the t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t , the financial strength, the e t h n i c mix, the social c o h e s i v e n e s s , t h e s t a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s a n d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , a n d , f i n a l l y , t h e intangible quantity usually described as national s p i r i t . "

It is f r o m this c o n c e p t of national p o w e r that w e can design a m o r e abb r e v i a t e d o n e that m a y be u s e f u l f o r a r o a d m a p of the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y l a n d s c a p e . N a t i o n a l p o w e r is b a s e d on f o u r m a j o r e l e m e n t s : m i l i t a r y power, geostrategic importance, national character, and psychological sustenance. Military p o w e r is a m e a s u r e of the total ( a g g r e g a t e ) physical attributes of the a r m e d f o r c e s of a c o u n t r y . T h i s includes such indicators as the quality and q u a n t i t y of e q u i p m e n t , m o b i l i t y , a n d c o m b a t e f f e c t i v e n e s s (skills, leadership, a n d will to fight). G e o s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e r e f e r s to the location of the c o u n t r y in t e r m s of international e c o n o m y , international security, a n d the national security of other states. For e x a m p l e , the Straits of H o r m u z in the Persian G u l f area is of g e o s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e , given its international c h a r a c t e r as a w a t e r w a y to oil r e s o u r c e s , a m o n g other t h i n g s . Further, g e o s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e includes the availability of i m p o r t a n t r e s o u r c e s w i t h i n the c o u n t r y , a n d the c o u n t r y ' s c l i m a t e and terrain. All of t h e s e p r o v i d e a m e a s u r e of g e o s t r a t e gic i m p o r t a n c e .

National Interests & National Security

27

N a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r is a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n . B e c a u s e of its highly s u b j e c t i v e n a t u r e , s o m e d i s c o u n t its r e l e v a n c y to national p o w e r . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is i m p o r t a n t in p r o v i d i n g insights into the n a t i o n ' s political p r o c e s s e s a n d c o h e s i v e n e s s . National c h a r a c t e r is m e a s u r e d by such things as the h o m o g e n e i t y , size, and g r o w t h of the p o p u l a t i o n ; p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n and skills; e c o n o m i c s y s t e m s a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s ; the d e g r e e of c o m m i t m e n t of the p e o p l e to the political s y s t e m ; a n d the l e g i t i m a c y and e f f i c i e n c y of the g o v e r n i n g structures. F i n a l l y , p s y c h o l o g i c a l s u s t e n a n c e is an i n e x p l i c a b l e part of n a t i o n a l p o w e r . T h i s is an o b v i o u s s u b j e c t i v e d i m e n s i o n a n d , as e x p e c t e d , the m o s t d i f f i c u l t to m e a s u r e . T h e fact is that all of the e l e m e n t s of national p o w e r m a y be u s e l e s s if the p e o p l e of a n a t i o n are u n w i l l i n g to use t h e m in the pursuit of national interest. M o r e o v e r , if other states p e r c e i v e that the nation w i t h p o w e r is h e s i t a n t to use it a n d its p e o p l e are d i v i d e d o v e r the proper c o u r s e s of military action, then such states will ultimately p e r c e i v e it as a " p a p e r t i g e r , " w h o s e p o w e r is b a s e d solely on r h e t o r i c . S i m i l a r l y , even w h e n a nation h a s all of the o t h e r e l e m e n t s of p o w e r , its o w n p e o p l e m a y p e r c e i v e s u c h p o w e r as b e i n g useless and, f o r all practical p u r p o s e s , as d i m i n i s h i n g the n a t i o n ' s real p o w e r . T h u s , military p o w e r , as well as the other e l e m e n t s of p o w e r , are real only if buttressed by national will, political resolve, and staying power. At the s a m e t i m e , there m u s t be a c o m m i t m e n t to persist o v e r the long r u n — s t a y i n g p o w e r to see the m a t t e r t h r o u g h , o n c e c o m m i t t e d . A s will be discussed in the next chapter, it is with national will and staying p o w e r that the United States as an open system has the most difficult p r o b l e m s . T h i s is particularly true w h e n national interests and national security must deal with issues outside the homeland ( s o m e s e c o n d order and all third order interests). M e a s u r i n g national p o w e r is e v e n m o r e c o m p l e x than e a c h of t h e s e e l e m e n t s i n d i v i d u a l l y s u g g e s t s . T h e p r o b l e m b e c o m e s a c u t e in t r y i n g to link the e l e m e n t s , d e t e r m i n e their r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and identify their total impact on other states. Yet attention to national p o w e r d o e s p r o v i d e a " s e n s e " of the r e l a t i v e p o w e r of the c o u n t r y . It a l s o f o c u s e s a t t e n t i o n on the n e e d to t r a n s l a t e national p o w e r into u s a b l e p o w e r a n d link it t h r o u g h the N a tional S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t and the policy p r o c e s s to the pursuit of n a tional interests. M u c h of this has to d o with s t r a t e g y .

N A T I O N A L STRATEGY T h e r e is a g r e a t deal of c o n f u s i o n in the use of " s t r a t e g y . " M a n y use t h e s e t e r m s s y n o n y m o u s l y . an i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e , particularly w h e n used in c u r i t y . Policy refers to the m a j o r o b j e c t i v e s of the

the t e r m s " p o l i c y " a n d T h e f a c t is that t h e r e is the s t u d y of national sestate, w h e t h e r in f o r e i g n

28

Introduction

p o l i c y or national s e c u r i t y . S t r a t e g y , h o w e v e r , r e f e r s to the m e t h o d s a n d m e a n s used to a c h i e v e these p u r p o s e s . In the w o r d s of one a u t h o r i t y : The term "strategy," derived from the ancient Greek, originally pertained to the art of generalship or high c o m m a n d . In modern times, "grand strate g y " has come into use to describe the overall defense plans of a nation or coalition of nations. Since the mid-twentieth century, "national strate g y " has attained wide usage, m e a n i n g the coordinated e m p l o y m e n t of the total resources of a nation to achieve its national objectives. 1 2

T h e term s t r a t e g y as u s e d h e r e r e f e r s p r i m a r i l y to n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y . F r o m time to time, r e f e r e n c e s will be m a d e to what s o m e call national military s t r a t e g y , f o c u s i n g on " t h e g e n e r a t i o n of military p o w e r and its e m p l o y m e n t in state to state r e l a t i o n s h i p s . " 1 3 At the highest level, g r a n d strategy is the usual label given to the w a y a state intends to p u r s u e its national security g o a l s . From this a n u m b e r of o t h e r strategies are d e s i g n e d that are f o c u s e d on s p e c i f i c r e g i o n s or issues. T h u s , there is military s t r a t e g y , e c o n o m i c strategy, political strategy, psyc h o l o g i c a l strategy. A l s o , t h e r e is a U.S. strategy for the M i d d l e East and o t h e r parts of the w o r l d . N o w o n d e r there is c o n f u s i o n in u s i n g terms such as strategy, policy, and d o c t r i n e . W r i t i n g in the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , the r e n o w n e d G e n e r a l Karl von C l a u s e w i t z c o n c l u d e d , " S t r a t e g y b o r d e r s on politics and s t a t e s m a n s h i p or r a t h e r it b e c o m e s both itself . . . in s t r a t e g y e v e r y t h i n g is s i m p l e , but not on that account very e a s y . " 1 4 T h e r e is, of c o u r s e , m o r e to t h e s e t e r m s than this brief e x p l a n a t i o n . B u t the d i f f e r e n c e s are clear: Policy r e f e r s to goals; strategy is the m e a n s to reach these g o a l s . It f o l l o w s that strategy or strategies c a n n o t be realistically designed a n d i m p l e m e n t e d if policy is unclear or vacillating. In this s t u d y of national s e c u r i t y , the t e r m s p o l i c y a n d s t r a t e g y are used as d e f i n e d here. In a d d i t i o n , d o c t r i n e is t a k e n to m e a n a b o d y of b e l i e f s a n d t e a c h i n g s about national security a n d its i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . In c o n c l u s i o n , the s t u d y of the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t a n d the policy p r o c e s s c a n n o t be s e r i o u s l y u n d e r t a k e n w i t h o u t s o m e attention first to the issues a s s o c i a t e d with c o n c e p t s of national security, A m e r i c a n v a l u e s and culture, national interests, a n d h o w these are p r o j e c t e d into the international arena, as e x p l o r e d in this c h a p t e r . T h e s e are the matters a n d i s s u e s that are r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s f o r the w a y the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t operates and the w a y policy is m a d e .

NOTES 1. Henry A. Kissinger, American W . W . Norton, 1969), p. 92.

Foreign

Policy:

Three Essays

(New York:

National Interests & National Security

29

2. Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 301. 3. See, for example, John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), pp. 17-22. 4. Sun Tzu: The Art of War, translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). 5. Carnes Lord, "Strategy and Organization at the National Level," in James Process (Washington, C. Gaston, ed., Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992), pp. 141-159. 6. Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending America's Security (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), p. 146. 7. See Adda B. Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft: Selected Essays (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's [U.S.], 1992). 8. For a useful study see Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). 9. See, for example, Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1992). 10. See, for example, John Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 35-50. 11. Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), p. 11. 12. Bruce Palmer, Jr., "Strategic Guidelines for the United States in the 1980s," in Bruce Palmer, Jr., ed., Grand Strategy for the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 73. 13. Klaus Knorr, "National Security Studies: Scope and Structure of the Field," in Frank N. Trager and Phillip S. Kronenberg, eds., National Security and American Society: Theory, Process, and Policy (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1973), p. 6. 14. Anatol Rapoport, ed., Clausewitz on War (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 243.

The Conflict Spectrum and the American Way of War

Regardless of the changed and changing strategic landscape resulting from the end of the Cold War, military capability remains an essential component of national security. To be sure, a variety of other capabilities have become increasingly important: diplomacy, psychological strategies, and economics. But the fact is that none of these can substitute for the appropriate and effective use of military power. This is especially important for the United States, given its worldwide interests and the security objectives evolving from the new world order. This is not to suggest that military means should be the first or only option, but there may be times when national interests require the use of military force—although this must be considerably tempered by the nature of the conflict and the appropriate use of other instruments. Americans tend to view war as a clear struggle between "good" and "evil." 1 The military instrument, in this view, is an implement of war that should not be harnessed except to destroy evil. This mind-set dominates perceptions of contemporary security environment. As John Spanier said, Once Americans were provoked, however, and the United States had to resort to force, the employment of this force was justified in terms of universal moral principles with which the United States, as a democratic country, identified itself. Resort to the evil instrument of war could be justified only by presuming noble purposes and completely destroying the immoral enemy w h o threatened the integrity, if not the existence, of these principles. American power had to be "righteous" power; only its full exercise could ensure salvation or the absolution of sin. 2

The American way of war has historically rested on a number of premises: First, many Americans think a clear distinction should be made between instruments of peace and those of war. The implements of war remain dormant until war erupts, at which time the instruments of peace fade into the background to allow those of war to do what must be done to "win." This polarization is also reflected in the way Americans tend to view contemporary conflicts. Involvement is seen as a zero-sum game: 31

32

Introduction

The United States is either at war or at peace, with very little attention to "no war, no peace" conditions. Second, most Americans tend to view conflicts in the world through conventional lenses and mind-sets shaped by the American experience and by American values and norms. Issues of war and peace are seen in legalistic terms: Wars are declared and conducted according to established rules of law. Indeed, for many, international behavior must also abide by such rules. Seeing a new basis for U.S. interventionism, one author has written, "The new interventionism has its roots in long-standing tendencies of American foreign policy—missionary zeal, bewilderment when the world refuses to conform to American expectations and a belief that for every problem there is a quick and easy solution." 3 This applies equally well to conflicts. Third, the Vietnam experience left Americans skeptical and ambivalent about the commitment of U.S. ground combat forces in overseas areas, the 1991 Gulf War notwithstanding. Even though a new generation of Americans is emerging with only vague memories of Vietnam, the Vietnam Memorial in Washington promises to keep the experience of Vietnam alive. Fourth, U.S. involvement in war must be terminated as quickly as possible with a "victory," reflecting clear decisions and final solutions. That Americans seek clear and understandable solutions to complex issues compounds the policymaking difficulties. This mind-set assumes that every problem has a solution. As Ernest van den Haag writes: And many A m e r i c a n s still are under the impression that a benevolent deity has made sure that there is a just solution to every problem, a remedy for every wrong, which can be discovered by negotiations, based on good will and on American moral and legal ideals, self-evident enough to persuade all parties, once they are revealed by negotiators, preferably American. Reality is otherwise. Just solutions are elusive. Many problems have no solutions, not even u n j u s t ones; at most they can be managed, prevented from getting worse or from spreading to wider areas . . . international problems hardly ever are solved by the sedulous pursuit of legal and moral principles. 4

The consequences drive Americans to search for the "doable," which in turn leads to oversimplification, whether the issue is strategic weaponry, defense budgets, or unconventional conflicts. With respect to unconventional conflicts, most simplistic solutions sidestep fundamental problems and reveal a lack of understanding regarding relationships between culture, modernity, political and economic change, internal conflicts, and developing systems. This American predilection is reinforced by the fact that many effective responses to unconventional conflicts may not be within the realm of the values and norms of open systems. This does not mean

Conflict Spectrum & the American Way of War

33

that open s y s t e m s such as the U n i t e d States are not c a p a b l e of e f f e c t i v e res p o n s e . W h a t it d o e s m e a n is that o p e n s y s t e m s have s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s in d e v e l o p i n g a c c e p t a b l e policies a n d strategies for u n c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s b e c a u s e of the very nature and c h a r a c t e r of open s y s t e m s . In s u m , the ability of the U n i t e d States to r e s p o n d to c o n f l i c t s a c r o s s the s p e c t r u m is c o n d i t i o n e d b y h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e a n d the A m e r i c a n w a y of w a r . N a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s a n d national s e c u r i t y p o l i c y h a v e b e e n s h a p e d by the p r e m i s e s i d e n t i f i e d h e r e a n d h a v e c o n d i t i o n e d the w a y A m e r i c a n s see the c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d security e n v i r o n m e n t . Yet the security issues a n d c o n f l i c t s a c r o s s the s p e c t r u m m a y not be relevant to U.S. p e r c e p t i o n s , p o l i c y , and s t r a t e g y . T h e g a p b e t w e e n U . S . p e r c e p t i o n s a n d the realities of the security e n v i r o n m e n t poses a c h a l l e n g i n g and o f t e n dang e r o u s d i l e m m a to U.S. national security policy. T h i s r e q u i r e s a r e t h i n k i n g of the nature of c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n f l i c t s a n d the U . S . n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y posture.

THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM T h e c o n f l i c t s p e c t r u m is a m e t h o d of a n a l y z i n g c o n f l i c t s in t e r m s of U.S. c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d e f f e c t i v e n e s s . It is a l s o a m e t h o d to c a t e g o r i z e c o n f l i c t s in t e r m s of policy p e r s p e c t i v e s . In this c o n t e x t , c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n f l i c t s are p l a c e d in v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s of i n t e n s i t y . It m u s t be e m p h a s i z e d that Figure 2.1 s h o w s h o w most U.S. c i t i z e n s , military p r o f e s s i o n a l s , and policym a k e r s tend to see the c o n f l i c t e n v i r o n m e n t ; this is not " r e a l i t y . " C a t e g o r i z i n g c o n f l i c t s as low or high i n t e n s i t y — p r i m a r i l y f o r p o l i c y and strategic p u r p o s e s — i s an a t t e m p t to distinguish the requisite d e g r e e of m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d i n v o l v e m e n t of U.S. citizens in the " w a r " e f f o r t . T h e intensity level s h o u l d in no w a y b e c o n s t r u e d as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the actual c o m b a t area: for U.S. military personnel (as f o r their a d v e r s a r i e s ) , personal c o m b a t is " h i g h " intensity; too o f t e n , U.S. p o l i c y m a k e r s , as well as others, a s s u m e such c a t e g o r i z a t i o n is s o m e t h i n g m o r e than a policy posture. U . S . c o m p e t e n c e v a r i e s a m o n g c o n f l i c t c a t e g o r i e s . At the low e n d of the s p e c t r u m , the United States is c a p a b l e and r e a s o n a b l y e f f e c t i v e in prov i d i n g military a s s i s t a n c e , r a n g i n g f r o m military e q u i p m e n t and a d v i s e r s to f i n a n c i a l aid. In a d d i t i o n , the U n i t e d States has s h o w n e f f e c t i v e n e s s in the u s e of m i l i t a r y i n s t r u m e n t s f o r political p u r p o s e s t h r o u g h s h o w s of f o r c e and a v a r i e t y of m i l i t a r y m a n e u v e r s . A n d as s e e n in U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t in S o m a l i a in 1 9 9 2 , it is c a p a b l e in c o n d u c t i n g m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s as a c o v e r f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e ( a l t h o u g h in 1994, s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s w e r e raised a b o u t the c h a n g e d m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n in S o m a l i a ) . All of t h e s e military c o n t i n g e n c i e s are b a s e d o n the p r e s u m p t i o n that there is not likely to b e s e r i o u s c o m b a t , o r any c o m b a t at all, b e t w e e n U . S . f o r c e s a n d adversaries.

34

Introduction

Figure 2.1

The Conflict Spectrum: Prevailing Views

Operations Other T h a n W a r Noncombat3

LowIntensity 1 '

Conventional Wars

S h o w s of Force

Special Operations

Limited or M a j o r

Nuclear

Low-Intensity Conflict U.S. Capability Good

Fair to

G o o d to Excellent

»-

Poor Level of Intensity in Policy T e r m s Low

High

Notes: T h e a m o u n t of space devoted to each category of conflict s h o w s its perceived relative importance in the overall U.S. national security equation. Conventional conflict, using the Gulf W a r as a reference point, is the basis for f o r c e structure and operational d o c t r i n e s in the current period. a Includes a variety of humanitarian a n d p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s as well as coalition strategies and policies. b Special operations and low-intensity conflict are currently viewed as a l m o s t s y n o n y m o u s and have taken on a conventional veneer.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the United States remains well positioned in nuclear weaponry and strategic forces to deter adversaries. The end of the Cold War has led to the view that major wars and nuclear exchange between major powers have diminished considerably. Also, treaties between the United States and Russia to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons have ushered in an era of arms control efforts extending worldwide. In addition, the Presidents of the United States and Ukraine signed agreements in 1994 to eliminate strategic missiles in Ukraine. Many such efforts were a continuity from the Cold War era when agreements such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) were signed. Nonetheless, some states are developing and expanding their nuclear and chemical as well as biological capability: North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. Thus, the United States must retain a credible deterrence to counter the use of such weapons. Similarly, U.S. capability in conventional conflict was well demonstrated in the Gulf War, which was primarily based on operational principles deriving from a European-oriented battle scenario.

Conflict Spectrum & the American Way of War

35

It is the vast middle area on the spectrum where the United States is at a distinct disadvantage. And it is these unconventional conflicts that are the most likely in the foreseeable future; most contemporary conflicts are in this category, ranging from revolution and terrorism to conflicts associated with drug cartel-revolutionary group coalitions. This is not to deny the possibility of regional conventional wars. Indeed, in mid-1994 there was serious concern about the possibility of war between the United States and North Korea as a result of North Korean defiance of international inspection of nuclear facilities and fear that the North was developing (or had developed) nuclear weapons. Obviously if war should occur the power equation in Northeast Asia would change dramatically, as would relations between the United States, Russia, China, and Japan—not to mention the cost in human life. Yet when most Americans, who place emphasis on other conflict categories, give any attention to this middle area, they think primarily in terms of commando-type operations or special operations shaped by counterterror contingencies. The post-Cold War era seems to have brought a lessened concern with the middle area, even more so than before. But what seems to be emerging is a reshaping of this middle area to focus primarily on humanitarian, peacekeeping, and p e a c e m a k i n g missions under the rubric of coalition strategies and United Nations operations. All of these military contingencies and missions have now been placed under the official label "operations other than war" ( O O T W ) . Yet any of these contingencies has an underlying potential of shifting into an unconventional conflict. And it is this type of conflict that the United States seems least prepared to engage in effectively. Also, it appears that the Clinton administration is downgrading unconventional conflict efforts (the term used in U.S. government circles is "special operations and low-intensity conflict"). In early 1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin planned to downgrade the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, presuming that such a concern was a Cold War phenomenon. It remains important, however, to examine unconventional conflicts more closely, because they are likely to be based on strategic cultures that do not reflect JudeoChristian notions or European-type scenarios. Moreover, capability in unconventional conflicts allows the U.S. military to undertake a variety of lesser unconventional conflicts and contingencies in the middle areas, and what is being called "gray areas" by some, with a reasonably effective basis for response. 5 This is not necessarily the case at present.

UNCONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS The history of the United States is filled with the exploits of special or elite units dating back to the prerevolutionary period. From R o g e r ' s

36

Introduction

Rangers, the First Special Service Unit of World War II f a m e , to the Green Berets of the Kennedy era, to the Special Operations C o m m a n d of the contemporary period, the U.S. military has a long history and much e x p e r i ence in what many now call special operations and low-intensity conflict. Yet this e x p e r i e n c e has a l w a y s been placed on the periphery of military education, p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m , and s t r a t e g y — v i e w e d more as a curiosity rather than as curriculum and d e e m e d generally peripheral to the real issues of war and peace. In the 1980s, a new counterinsurgency era emerged, and with it an increased interest in special units and special operations. R e s o u r c e s c o m mitted to special operations increased both in terms of logistics and personnel. The creation of the First Special Operations C o m m a n d in 1982 was a major step in a permanent special operations capability within the military. In 1986, Congress provided for an Assistant Secretary of D e f e n s e for Special O p e r a t i o n s and L o w - I n t e n s i t y Conflict, and by 1990 Special Forces personnel numbered about 12,000, organized into five active Special Forces G r o u p s . Similar increases occurred in the U.S. Army R a n g e r battalions, Navy SEALS, and Air Force Special Operations Forces. 6 T h e organization of the Special Operations C o m m a n d is shown in Figure 2.2. Yet the p o s t - C o l d W a r era r e m a i n e d w e d d e d to a conventional perspective on unconventional operations. Although s o m e questions remained about organizational structures, many within political-military circles felt increasingly c o n f i d e n t about U.S. capability and e f f e c t i v e n e s s in these conflicts. T h e increased e f f o r t in the unconventional conflict area, which suggested a strong U.S. position, belied the underlying policy incoherence, flawed strategy, and doctrinal ambiguity. At the b e g i n n i n g of the new decade, additional e f f o r t s s e e m e d to strengthen the U.S. capability in unconventional conflicts. But again, this seemed primarily in areas that were more directed to special operations of a conventional nature than to unconventional operations. In the Gulf War, for example, special operations forces were involved in long-range reconnaissance and behind-the-lines operations—missions within the purview of ranger- and commando-type operations. Further, reduction of military forces and attempts to reshape them toward peacekeeping are likely to erode combat efficiency in the primary mission—warfighting (see Chapter 6).

Conceptual Coherence T h e most important aspect of developing an e f f e c t i v e U.S. political-military posture is conceptual clarity and coherence. During the 1960s counterinsurgency era, a variety of terms c a m e into b e i n g in attempts to provide some precision to this " n e w f o r m " of w a r f a r e . T h e s e included such terms as insurgency, counterinsurgency, special warfare, guerrilla warfare, w a r s of national liberation, p e o p l e ' s wars, and internal c o n f l i c t s . T h e

Conflict Spectrum & the American Way of War

WJ O

o1 .2

» « E

8 . 3 5/5 'o

< in

"O e