US Foreign Policy in The Horn of Africa: From Colonialism to Terrorism (Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy) [1 ed.] 9781138650794, 113865079X

Citation preview

“Exhaustively researched and argued with great sophistication, Donna Jackson has produced an impressive volume. A must-read for anyone interested in the evolution of US foreign policy during the Cold War era.” Steven Casey, author of The War Beat Europe: The American Media at War against Nazi Germany “US Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa provides a comprehensive analysis of American policy toward a little-examined and little-understood region of the world from the Cold War to the Somali revolutions of the 1990s. An important and useful volume that serious students of foreign policy should read and utilize. Highly recommended for its careful and detailed historical account.” James M. McCormick, Iowa State University, USA

US Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa

Examining American foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa between 1945 and 1991, this book uses Ethiopia and Somalia as case studies to offer an evaluation of the decision-making process during the Cold War, and consider the impact that these decisions had upon subsequent developments both within the Horn of Africa and in the wider international context. The decision-making process is studied, including the role of the president, the input of his advisers and lower level officials within agencies such as the State Department and National Security Council, and the parts played by Congress, bureaucracies, public opinion, and other actors within the international environment, especially the Soviet Union, Ethiopia and Somalia. Jackson examines the extent to which influences exerted by forces other than the president affected foreign policy, and provides the first comprehensive analysis of American foreign policy towards Ethiopia and Somalia throughout the Cold War. This book offers a fresh perspective on issues such as globalism, regionalism, proxy wars, American aid programmes, anti-communism and human rights. It will be of great interest to students and academics in various fields, including American foreign policy, American Studies and Politics, the history of the Cold War, and the history of the Horn of Africa during the modern era. Donna R. Jackson is a Senior Lecturer in Modern History, with particular specialism in American History in the Department of History and Archaeology at the University of Chester, UK.

Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy Edited by Inderjeet Parmar, City University, and John Dumbrell, University of Durham For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com/series/RSUSFP

This new series sets out to publish high-quality works by leading and emerging scholars critically engaging with United States Foreign Policy. The series welcomes a variety of approaches to the subject and draws on scholarship from international relations, security studies, international political economy, foreign policy analysis and contemporary international history. Subjects covered include the role of administrations and institutions, the media, think tanks, ideologues and intellectuals, elites, transnational corporations, public opinion, and pressure groups in shaping foreign policy, US relations with individual nations, with global regions and global institutions and America’s evolving strategic and military policies. The series aims to provide a range of books – from individual research monographs and edited collections to textbooks and supplemental reading for scholars, researchers, policy analysts and students. US Power in Latin America Renewing Hegemony Rubrick Biegon The Drug War in Latin America Hegemony and Global Capitalism William Avilés US Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa From Colonialism to Terrorism Donna R. Jackson The Foreign Policies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush A Comparative Perspective Martin Smith Eleanor Roosevelt Palestine, Israel and Human Rights Geraldine Kidd

US Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa

From Colonialism to Terrorism Donna R. Jackson

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Donna R. Jackson The right of Donna R. Jackson to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Jackson, Donna R., author. Title: US foreign policy in the Horn of Africa : from colonialism to terrorism / Donna Jackson. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2017. | Series: Routledge studies in US foreign policy | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017026242 | ISBN 9781138650794 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315620121 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: United States—Foreign relations—Horn of Africa. | Horn of Africa—Foreign relations—United States. | United States— Foreign relations—Ethiopia. | Ethiopia—Foreign relations—United States. | United States—Foreign relations—Somalia. | Somalia— Foreign relations—United States. | United States—Foreign relations—1945–1989. | United States—Foreign relations—1989– | Cold War. Classification: LCC DT367.63.U6 J33 2017 | DDC 327.73063—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017026242 ISBN: 978-1-138-65079-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-62012-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

For Judith and Roy, although even 100,000 words are still not enough to express my thanks for all they have done for me and For Jimmy and Rosalynn – my inspiration then, now and always

Contents

List of mapsx Acknowledgementsxi

Introduction: Cold War battleground

1

  1 The coming of the Cold War

10

  2 The United Nations and the Horn of Africa

24

  3 Forging the ‘special relationship’

38

  4 Self-determination and the new frontier

53

  5 In the shadow of Vietnam

69

  6 Vital and peripheral interests

85

  7 Revolution in Ethiopia

101

  8 The era of the Vietnam Syndrome

118

  9 The Ogaden War and the demise of détente

135

10 Realignment and Reagan

153

11 The end of the Cold War

173

12 Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism

191

Bibliography and further reading208 Index217

Maps

1  Colonial possessions in the Horn after World War II 2  The Horn of Africa 3  Conflict in the Horn of Africa

xiii xiv xv

Acknowledgements

Many years ago in a job interview, I was asked about my ultimate research goal. I replied that one day I wanted to write a book about the Cold War in Africa. At the time, it seemed like a lofty goal and now, having done it, I have an even greater appreciation of the size of the task that I set myself. This book represents years of research, thousands of miles of travel, as well as blood, sweat, tears, and the odd broken bone! However, and perhaps because of that, it’s something of which I am, and always will be, very proud. Needless to say, I could not have accomplished this without a great deal of help, and I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to all those who have provided encouragement, guidance and support through the years. Due to the historical period covered in this book, I’ve worked in archives all over the United States, the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, the British Library and Cambridge University Library. Everywhere that I worked, the staff were wonderful and helpful, and their expertise and advice has added greatly to the quality of research presented here. I therefore owe a debt of gratitude to everyone at the Truman Presidential Library, the Eisenhower Presidential Library, the Kennedy Presidential Library, the Johnson Presidential Library, the Nixon Presidential Library (where I had the great honour of working alongside Bob Woodward on one unforgettable occasion), the Ford Presidential Library (where I spent a memorable birthday), the Carter Presidential Library, the Reagan Presidential Library and the Bush Presidential Library. Such extensive research would not have been possible without immense financial assistance, and I cannot adequately express my gratitude to the University of Chester, and particularly the Faculty of Humanities, for providing the means by which I could conduct my research. This was largely due to the support of Dr Keith McLay, and I would like to thank him for his support, patience and encouragement during his years as Head of Department at the University of Chester, as well as his successor, Professor Meggen Gondek, for her support and friendship on both a personal and professional level during the past ten years. I must also acknowledge and thank Santander for awarding me an Excellence in Research grant, which enabled me to conduct research at the Library of Congress, and John Griffin and Lisa Bloor for their help in producing the maps used in this publication.

xii  Acknowledgements I am immensely proud that this book has been published by Routledge as part of the Studies in US Foreign Policy series. I am indebted to the series’ editors, Professor Inderjeet Palmer and Professor John Dumbrell, ever my mentor and friend, for their faith in me and in this book. I would also like to thank all the staff at Routledge, and especially Claire Maloney and Lisa Salonen, for their help and advice in preparing the manuscript for publication. On a personal level, I could not have done this without the constant support and love of my family and friends who have encouraged me every step of the way. Without their presence in my life, there would be no book. In particular, I need to thank my Cantina buddies Anne-Marie and Ellie for always being there; Kara, Caroline, Peter and Rachel for their comments and input on the final draft of the manuscript; Jackie for sharing a special ‘Djibouti’ moment that was anything but Pointless; and Stephen for letting me prattle on and on about the book and insisting that he really was interested. But all my family and friends, and there really are too many to mention all by name, have played a part in making this possible, and I am grateful for each and every one of them. Finally, I would like to thank the two most important people in my life, my parents, Roy and Judith, for their constant love, encouragement and abiding belief in me. They have always done everything within their means to ensure my happiness and support me in my hopes and dreams. Everything that I have now, and any success that I have enjoyed in the past or may enjoy in the future, is largely due to them. One last thing. At the end of every project, there is a need to find the motivation to start anew. I have that motivation, not only because of all the people mentioned here, but also because of two very special moments that I will never forget. One was a birthday kiss from President Jimmy Carter; just a moment in his presence is enough to inspire me to “always do my best.” The other came when Francis, my next-door neighbour, came to show me his school uniform on his first day at school because he was so excited about his new adventure. Education is, and always has been, a great adventure for me, and I became an academic mostly because I wanted to share that with others, both in the classroom and through my written words. As long as we are excited about learning, there is hope for the future. In different ways, both Francis and President Carter will always remind me of that, and for that I am the most grateful. So, what’s next?!

Map 1  Colonial possessions in the Horn after World War II

Map 2  The Horn of Africa

Map 3  Conflict in the Horn of Africa

Introduction Cold War battleground

When Harry S. Truman assumed the presidency in 1945, he later remarked that he felt as if the sun, moon and stars had all fallen upon him.1 Given the impact of the Cold War on the Horn of Africa, and the legacy of superpower conflict in the region, the peoples of Ethiopia and Somalia could be forgiven for feeling the same way. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser during the Carter administration, highlighted just one of the reasons why the Horn of Africa played an important role in the history of the Cold War when he claimed in his memoirs that détente was “buried in the sands of the Ogaden.”2 However, other major themes were also reflected in the Horn during the Cold War years, and therefore this study will extend our understanding of American political and diplomatic history by offering a fresh perspective on issues such as globalism, regionalism, proxy wars, American aid programmes, anti-communism and human rights. Using policy towards Ethiopia and Somalia as case studies, it will provide an evaluation of American foreign policy and the decision-making process during the Cold War, and consider the impact that these decisions had upon subsequent developments both within the Horn of Africa and in the wider international context. The geographical location of the Horn of Africa, with its proximity to the shipping routes to and from the oil-rich Middle East via the Red Sea passage to the Mediterranean, as well as its role within the global technological chain of communications and defence systems, made it strategically important to both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Indeed, William Odom, Military Adviser to the National Security Council (NSC) during the Carter administration, argued that the area should not be viewed within the African context, but as part of “the larger regional grouping of the Middle East-Southwest Asia states. Its ties to the Arabian peninsula and Egypt rival, and in some ways exceed, those to Africa.”3 Consequently, with both the United States and the Soviet Union recognising the Horn’s strategic importance, the stage was set for the region to become a microcosm of the Cold War. Both superpowers perceived Ethiopia as the ‘prize’ in the Horn due to its size – at 455,000 square miles, Ethiopia was one of the largest countries in subSaharan Africa – and the efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie to assure his country’s importance. Building on Ethiopia’s legacy as a rarity among African nations

2  Introduction due to its independence throughout the colonial era, Selassie ensured that Addis Ababa became home not only to the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, but also the Organisation of African Unity. Indeed, for many, Haile Selassie was the “father figure” of African nationalism.4 Ethiopia’s neighbour, Somalia, was therefore always the poor relation when it came to international interest in the Horn. However, Somalia offered the same geographical strategic benefits as Ethiopia, particularly via the port at Berbera, and accordingly was considered an acceptable second choice for whichever superpower was not in favour in Ethiopia. For much of the Cold War, the United States and Ethiopia enjoyed a ‘special relationship,’ warranting Soviet interest in Somalia; indeed, Paul Henze, renowned specialist on the Horn of Africa, maintained that “the Soviets moved into Somalia bag and baggage because they couldn’t get Ethiopia.”5 Similarly, when Ethiopia moved to the left following the Revolution in 1974, Somalia became much more attractive to the United States. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was played out with devastating effect in the Horn of Africa through proxy wars involving both Ethiopia and Somalia. With the superpowers supplying military aid to their respective allies, the means existed for long-standing rivalry to erupt into violent conflict. In the pre-colonial era, Christian-ruled Ethiopia, backed by the Portuguese Empire, had battled Muslim Somalia, supported by the Ottoman Empire but, by the twentieth century, the tensions between the two nations centred on a border dispute over the Ogaden, a mostly barren desert region within Ethiopia that was inhabited mostly by ethnic Somalis. This anomaly was a legacy of the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the nineteenth century when, as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, ethnic Somalis found themselves living in five separate nations: British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, which were united as the independent nation of Somalia in 1960; the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, which became Djibouti after independence in 1977; the Northern Frontier District of Kenya; and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The five-pointed star on the national flag of Somalia, adopted at the time of independence, served as a constant reminder to the Somali people of the five parts into which the Europeans had divided the nation, and a warning to their neighbours of the determination of the nation’s leaders to one day reunite all ethnic Somalis under that flag. As well as Somali irredentism, the legacy of colonialism further haunted the Horn of Africa with Ethiopia riven by a civil war lasting more than thirty years, as Eritrean rebels fought for the independence that they claimed had been stolen from them by the Great Powers and the United Nations. With both sides supplied by the United States and Soviet Union with military aid, this served as yet another proxy war within the developing world. However, the ultimate devastating legacy of superpower arms to the Horn of Africa was most apparent from 1989 onwards. The chaos that ensued as a result of Cold War activities and post–Cold War disinterest on the part of the superpowers led to Somalia being considered a ‘state of concern’ during the war on terror and ‘safe haven’ for terrorists today, and reawakened the interest of policy-makers and analysts in the region.

Introduction  3 With the Horn of Africa viewed by the superpowers through the Cold War prism, the impact on the people of Ethiopia and Somalia was often devastating and long-lasting. Regionalist concerns were largely subordinated to globalist priorities, questions of territorial and integrity and self-determination were skewed, and the post-colonial legacy would provide the setting for twenty-first-century terrorism. Consequently, research into this often overlooked region will provide a substantial contribution to our understanding of American political and diplomatic history during the Cold War, and the longer-term impact of those policy choices. Although the Cold War remains a central point of scholarship among modern Americanists, very little of the existing or current literature focuses upon either Africa in general or the Horn of Africa in particular – a neglect that is inconsistent with the region’s significance. A notable exception to this trend is Nancy Mitchell’s highly praised volume, Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War, which, while containing excellent and impressive research, is limited in Cold War analysis in that it focuses only upon the Carter administration.6 Other recent works, also constrained by a narrow focus, include Woodward’s US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, which examines the relationship between the United States and Islamic movements,7 or Clapham’s The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay, which looks at the development of terrorism in the post–Cold War era.8 Although there are several books that examine the Horn of Africa throughout the Cold War, including Schraeder’s United States Foreign Policy towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change,9 Lafebvre’s Arms for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991,10 Korn’s Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union,11 and Henze’s seminal work, The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace,12 none of these texts reflects recent scholarship. For these reasons, an understanding of the importance of the Horn of Africa during the Cold War in the wider scope of twentieth- and twenty-first-century American political and diplomatic history is currently limited, and it is this limitation that this book intends to address. Written almost entirely from detailed and extensive primary source research conducted at all the Presidential Libraries and Archives, as well as other relevant archives, the Library of Congress, the British Library and appropriate digital archives, this book will provide a detailed qualitative analysis of key events and issues in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War.13 Hence, it will provide a greater understanding not only of the history of American foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa, but also of the wider context for policy decisions and how these relate to and inform current issues and events. In doing so, it will go beyond those texts that are currently available and provide a significant contribution to Cold War scholarship.

Overview As the world entered the post-war era, one when the Cold War would come to dominate international relations, the priority of the Great Powers when it came to the Horn of Africa was decisions over the future of the territory that had constituted

4  Introduction Italian East Africa during World War II: Ethiopia, Italian Somaliland and Eritrea. Ethiopia, conquered by Italy in 1936, was liberated by the Allies in 1941 and regained its former independence. The future for Eritrea and Italian Somaliland was more complex, however, and these two former Italian colonies became pawns in the Cold War game as the United States and the Soviet Union battled for influence in this area of Africa considered strategically important. American declarations of support for freedom and independence – principles for which the war had purportedly been fought – were subordinated to Cold War concerns as Western European stability increasingly dominated policy-making. As in Indochina, where American support for the French would have a profound effect on future American foreign policy, the feelings of Ethiopia and Italy were prioritised as the United States sought to deny the Horn, important because of its proximity to the oil-rich Middle East, to the Soviets. By 1952, therefore, the region was a key recipient of Point Four aid and anti-communist rhetoric dominated both discussions and decisions. As well as adding to our understanding of the early years of the Cold War, an analysis of events in the Horn of Africa offers an intriguing insight into the establishment of the United Nations. Ethiopia played a vital role in the first key test of the fledgling body, where Haile Selassie’s doomed appearance at Geneva following the Italian invasion of 1936, which led to the ultimate demise of the League of Nations, was often invoked as justification for the need for UN action following the invasion of South Korea in 1950. However, as well as the importance of the ‘Ethiopian Analogy,’ the role of the UN in deciding the future of the former Italian colonies was also crucial in helping to establish its credibility in its early years. Although the United States and the Soviet Union disagreed over the disposition of the Italian colonies, both ultimately accepted the compromise position offered by the UN in 1949, thereby legitimising the authority of the new international body. Italian Somaliland was prepared for independence and self-determination, albeit after a period of UN trusteeship administered by Italy, despite its status as the former colonial power in the Horn. Similarly, although the United States initially seemed to favour Eritrean independence after a period of trusteeship, this stance had changed by the end of Truman’s administration, with the US ultimately supporting Ethiopian empirical claims to the region. While this might seem contradictory of the Americans’ anti-colonial philosophy, the Cold War perspective that was being increasingly dominant in American policy formulation meant that the Horn must be denied to the Soviets. For this, as with France when it came to Indochina, the support of both Ethiopia in the Horn and Italy in Europe was deemed essential. Thus, by 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency, there was a recognition that Ethiopia was a leading power within Africa, both because of its history of independence and its strategic location, and therefore worthy of a ‘special relationship.’ This stance had a major impact on discussions regarding the future of Eritrea, with the United States endorsing the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia; in essence, sanctioning Ethiopian imperialism. Given the American stance on self-determination, the explanation for this apparent contradiction can

Introduction 5 be found in Eisenhower’s world view. Instead of judging the needs of each country on its own merits, the spectre of the Soviet Union continued to dominate all policy discussions with decisions made through the Cold War prism. All too often, Soviet policy in Africa was perceived as a direct attack on the American vision for a free world, and American policy formulated in response. Consolidating the US relationship with Ethiopia in order to deny it to the Soviets was prioritised above all else, and formalised by a range of treaties. At the same time, the arrival of the Republic of Somalia among the world’s independent nations added an additional complication to Horn politics that was beginning to be recognised as the new decade began. When John F. Kennedy asked the world what “together we can do for the freedom of man,” his words resonated with those seeking independence in Africa. However, Kennedy’s rhetoric was not always reflected in policy towards the Horn of Africa. Although the United States gave full support to Somali independence, this was based upon the terms previously agreed by the UN and took no account of tribal boundaries that existed prior to European colonisation in the nineteenth century. Accordingly, from the earliest days of Somali independence, border skirmishes erupted with Ethiopia over the Ogaden – a region that would prove central in the progression from colonialism to terrorism in the Horn of Africa. As had his predecessors in the White House, Kennedy allowed the Cold War context to influence policy. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for the support of the newly independent nations was ever-present, and was clearly reflected in all aspects of policy formulation including military and economic aid, as well as in programmes such as the Peace Corps. The growing importance of Africa, due to the wave of independence that was sweeping through the former colonial possessions, was also reflected by the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs within the State Department in 1960, and the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1962. By 1963, the dominant theme in all policy choices by the Kennedy administration with regard to the Horn of Africa was the maintenance of good relations with the governments of both Ethiopia and Somalia in order to prevent Soviet inroads into either, with support for self-determination subordinated to this. From 1963 to 1969, policy towards the Horn of Africa was formulated by a preoccupied president whose main priority was to build a Great Society at home while also containing communism in South Vietnam. As well as concerns regarding Soviet and Chinese gains in Africa, the relationship to civil rights as well as other elements of the Great Society remained key themes of discussions within the Johnson administration. Although Lyndon Johnson worked on developing the relationship with the fledgling government in newly independent Somalia, Ethiopia remained the priority of the United States. This was not only because of the importance of the Organisation of African Unity (formally established in 1963 with Ethiopian leadership), but also because of the value of the communications facility, Kagnew Station in Eritrea, to American intelligence. The passage of the Cairo Resolution by the Organisation of African Unity in 1964, which decreed that existing African borders should be honoured and maintained, would have a

6  Introduction profound impact on future peace and stability in the region, and raise serious concerns for the Americans within the Cold War context, where there were fears that the ongoing border skirmishes between Ethiopia and Somalia could have global implications due to the potential of proxy war. Although Africa was never a priority for Richard Nixon, his policy choices in the Horn of Africa nonetheless reflect his administration’s globalist perspective and approach to the Cold War. This can be seen most notably in Nixon’s reaction to the Somali Revolution when, in October, 1969, President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated and a coup d’état brought Siad Barré to power. Although both the United States and the Soviet Union courted the new leader, it was soon clear that Siad’s interests lay with the Communist bloc. However, rather than this ‘loss’ to communism raising deep concerns within the Nixon administration, Somalia was considered only of peripheral interest and the relationship with Ethiopia remained the priority. Despite advances in technological capabilities reducing the importance of the communications facility at Kagnew Station, Ethiopia’s strategic location and its importance within the African community continued to ensure its position as the ‘vital’ interest in the Horn. As part of this, Haile Selassie was invited on a state visit to Washington, and a press release prepared on the visit offers a fascinating insight into the mindset within the Nixon administration. The release, although clearly written as a joke, reveals a level of arrogance and disrespect within the administration that can be seem as emblematic of the environment that led ultimately to Watergate and Nixon’s resignation. Hence, once again, American foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa is an effective case study for some of the wider, significant themes in modern American history. The most severe test to the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and Ethiopia came with the Ethiopian Revolution in 1974, with the American response clearly affected by the ‘Vietnam Syndrome.’ For several years prior to the revolution, there had been concerns in the United States over the stability of Haile Selassie’s rule. Although, encouraged by pressure from the US, Selassie instigated some governmental reforms, the drought and famine that hit Ethiopia from 1973 onwards proved to be the emperor’s undoing. On August 8, 1974, the same day that Nixon announced that he would resign the presidency, it was clear that the military was asserting control in Ethiopia. As Gerald Ford took office, Ethiopia was in chaos and the impact of Vietnam and Watergate can clearly be seen in American policy decisions. Selassie was ousted on September 12, and in December Ethiopia declared itself to be a socialist state. Although there was much discussion within the Ford administration over this, as well as the extent of Cuban involvement in African affairs, little was done to counter growing Soviet influence on the continent and it was clear that overseas engagement in Africa was not a priority for Ford. Despite full-scale war raging within Ethiopia, exacerbated by Eritrean rebels fighting for independence, the United States rebuffed all requests for aid. In the same way that the ‘dominos’ fell in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, they also fell in the Horn of Africa. The decision of how to approach the expansion of communism in the Horn of Africa was addressed by Ford’s successor in the White House, Jimmy Carter.

Introduction 7 The policy pursued towards Ethiopia and Somalia provides a good case study for examining the ways that Carter continued to wage Cold War within the constraints of the Vietnam Syndrome by prioritising issues such as regionalism and human rights, thereby asserting American moral superiority at a time when he was limited in his ability to utilise military power. Although the newly installed Ethiopian leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, greatly reduced ties with the US and formally allied his country with the Soviet Union, Carter, determined to view the developing world outwith the Cold War environment, adopted a regionalist approach and attempted to maintain ties with the Mengistu regime. In Somalia, Siad Barré watched the developing relationship between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union with concern and feared abandonment by his main supplier of military aid. Playing the ‘Cold War game,’ Siad contacted the Carter administration and hinted that he could be wooed from the Soviet bloc; Carter, however, while keen to improve relations between the United States and Somalia, invoked regionalism. Rather than attempting to replace the USSR in Somalia, the administration, as it had with Ethiopia, adopted a long-term approach, ignored the Soviet presence in Somalia, and focused instead on ways in which the United States might aid human rights, especially through means of economic and humanitarian aid. The biggest test to Carter’s regionalist approach came with the outbreak of war in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Because of Soviet support, Siad Barré was in such a strong military position that, in the summer of 1977, he launched an all-out invasion of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, an area mostly inhabited by ethnic Somalis and which Siad had always claimed should be part of the Somali Republic. This presented the Carter administration with possible involvement in a local conflict that potentially had global implications. With the Soviets increasingly supportive of Ethiopia, and the Somali leader seeking aid from the Americans, the prospect loomed that the Cold War could be fought out through proxies. However, reflecting the realities of the Vietnam Syndrome, which severely constrained the use of American military power, Carter refused to endorse the invasion of the Ogaden, arguing that it constituted a violation of international law and national integrity, and continued to apply a long-term, regionalist policy to the Horn, despite the immediate crisis. The president insisted that the US should remain neutral, stuck to the official administration doctrine that African problems should find African solutions and called for the Organisation of African Unity to sponsor negotiations. Unfortunately for Carter, none of the parties involved in the conflict supported the idea of a mediated resolution and, in the end, the Somalis were defeated by the combined military might of Ethiopia, the Soviet Union and Cuba. Perceived within the United States as another example of Soviet aggression and American weakness, the outcome of the conflict would lead Brzezinski to later claim that détente “lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden.”14 The ultimate act of Soviet aggression during the Carter administration came, however, at the end of 1979, with the invasion of Afghanistan. This, coupled with the Iranian hostage crisis and the state of the American economy, resulted in Ronald Reagan’s landslide victory in the election of 1980, and the return to a much

8  Introduction more conventional approach to the Cold War in American foreign policy. Deeming the Soviet Union as the “evil empire,”15 Reagan’s very traditional and bipolar view of the Cold War led to a focus within his administration on military power and the need to counter the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa. Notwithstanding, although the importance of human rights, and economic and humanitarian aid, may have been deprioritised by Reagan, not everyone shared his views. The severe famine in Ethiopia in 1983/4 produced an overwhelming wave of support from the American people, albeit with the response led by Congress and nongovernmental bodies. Most notably, the global reaction to the humanitarian crisis in the Horn highlighted the changing role of the media and television in American culture, as evidenced by Band-Aid, USA For Africa, and Live Aid. The end of the 1980s also signalled the end of the Cold War, but the jubilation that this brought to many parts of the world, including the United States and Eastern Europe, was not reflected in the Horn of Africa. Having spent over forty years pouring millions of dollars of military aid into the region, the near abandonment by the superpowers of both Ethiopia and Somalia as the Cold War came to an end led to chaos as tribal rivalries, suppressed since colonial times, finally emerged with deadly results. Of the two Horn countries, Ethiopia, as it had throughout the Cold War, fared better in the post–Cold War era. In May 1991 unrest in Ethiopia caused Mengistu to flee, driven from power by the success of separatist groups in Tigray as well as Eritrea. The transitional government formed by the separatist leaders sought American help in restoring order, and the ‘special relationship’ was re-established. Former president Jimmy Carter, through the auspices of the Carter Center, took the lead in talks that resolved the struggle for independence by factions in Ethiopia resulting in international recognition of Eritrea as in independent nation in 1993, and renewed stability in Ethiopia. In contrast was Somalia. Siad was overthrown in 1990 but no clear leader emerged to take his place, and the result in Somalia was near catastrophic as the country descended into devastating civil war. As well-armed tribal factions struggled for control, anarchy reigned and provided the context in which terrorist groups could flourish. Despite UN involvement, peace has not returned to much of Somalia and the country, a victim of colonialism, post-colonialism and superpower competition during the Cold War, remains in chaos. In both Ethiopia and Somalia, therefore, the progression from colonialism to terrorism offers a crucial insight into our understanding of American political and diplomatic history during the Cold War, and of the legacy and impact of those decisions on the global situation today.

Notes 1 Truman, Press Conference, April  13, 1945; Truman Library Digital Archive, www. trumanlibrary.org/lifetimes/whouse.htm. 2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 189. 3 William Odom, On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), p. 158; interview with author, July 14, 2000, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC.

Introduction 9 4 Paul B. Henze, The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), p. 163. 5 Interview with Paul Henze, Cold War Television Series – National Security Archive, Washington, DC. 6 Nancy Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2016); see also Donna Jackson, Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007). 7 Peter Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). 8 Christopher Clapham, The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay (London: C. Hurst, 2017). 9 Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 10 Jeffrey A. Lafebvre, Arms for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991). 11 David A. Korn, Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union (London: Croom Helm, 1986). 12 Paul B. Henze, The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991). 13 It should be noted that much of the primary source material from the 1980s remained classified at the time of writing, and this is reflected in the source base used for the final two chapters of this book. 14 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 189. 15 Ronald Reagan, Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983; Reagan Library Digital Archives, www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/ speeches/1983/30883b.htm.

1 The coming of the Cold War

The United States and the new world order In the aftermath of the devastation and carnage of World War II, it was clear that a new world order had emerged. Germany and Japan were defeated, Europe was in ruins both physically and economically, and the old European colonial empires were disintegrating. The United States, however, had emerged from the war relatively unscathed, and a dominant question in geopolitical circles was the role that the United States would play in this new world order. However, unlike the aftermath of the Great War, this time the consensus among American policy-makers was that the US must take its rightful place in the global community and assume the mantle of world leadership. As Franklin Roosevelt reported to Congress upon his return from Yalta, “responsibility for political considerations thousands of miles away can no longer be avoided, I think, by this great nation. . . . The United States now exerts a tremendous influence on the cause of peace.”1 When it came to the post-war world, the prevalent feeling within the United States was one of optimism and of a world predicated on the “four essential freedoms” articulated by Roosevelt in 1941: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear. This, Roosevelt insisted, was not a “vision of a distant millennium” but “a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation.”2 Winston Churchill shared Roosevelt’s vision, telling the House of Commons in February 1945 that his dream was for a world with “free, unfettered, democratic elections.”3 For the peoples of Africa, where governments were overwhelmingly dominated by colonial powers, these messages resonated strongly and questions of freedom and independence loomed large in the minds of African leaders as World War II drew to a close. For Ethiopia, it meant a return to the independence that had been a theme of the country’s international relations for generations but which had been temporarily interrupted by the Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941. The Ethiopians were not alone in their hopes and dreams for the new world order, though. The Somali people, and the inhabitants of Eritrea, also dreamed that the freedoms, which the allies purported to cherish, would come their way. However, the dreams of a post-war order of peace, freedom and democracy were soon shattered as

The coming of the Cold War 11 the world divided itself into opposing camps, and the colonial peoples of Africa became pawns in the emerging Cold War.

Onset of Cold War Although competition for the newly independent nations of the developing world would become a major theme of Cold War competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, in the immediate aftermath of the war there was no ‘inevitability’ of the conflict to come. Indeed, an editorial in the New York Times, discussing the future of the former Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa, commented that the Soviets “showed themselves concerned in what was to become of Eritrea, with sea approaches commanding the Strait of Aden and the Suez Canal [but] no sinister significance need be attached to that Russian move.”4 This benign view of the Soviet Union among American commentators and analysts did not last long, however, although the initial concerns over Soviet motives came not from the United States but from Great Britain. During the Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in London in September 1945 to discuss the details and practicalities of the post-war settlement, it was the British who were perceived as “somewhat suspicious of Russian influence in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria,” while the Americans seemed “embarrassed about being called either pro-Russian or pro-British.”5 Indeed, the Americans seemed to be taken by surprise by the Soviets, reported as being “quite unprepared for the large-scale Russian demands” with any illusion of post-war international cooperation “rudely shattered.”6 When it came to Greece and Turkey – the international situation that would subsequently lead to the Truman Doctrine and, arguably, the American declaration of Cold War – it was not a global Cold War between the Soviet Union and United States that was initially noted by the press but a “basic cleavage between Moscow and London.”7 There is much debate among historians as to who started the Cold War and there is little need to repeat them here. What is clear, though, is that, from 1947, the United States was adamant in the belief that the Soviet Union was a major threat to freedom and democracy around the globe. General Eisenhower, having led the Allied Powers to victory in World War II, contended that “Russia is definitely out to communise the world,”8 while Dean Acheson, Truman’s Secretary of State, was even more categorical when he asserted that “we are faced with a threat not only to our country but to the civilisation in which we live and to the whole physical environment in which that civilisation can exist.”9 A report issued by the House Foreign Affairs Committee compared current Soviet strategy to that of the Nazis and concluded that “it is clear that the leaders of the Soviet Union believe that they have a great opportunity” to lead a “world revolution” designed to establish a communist world.10 The fact that the report equated Soviet tactics with those of the Nazis demonstrated the depth of division between the former war allies by 1948, and confirmed that any dreams of a post-war world based on peace and international cooperation had been shattered.

12  The coming of the Cold War Accordingly, having deemed the Soviet Union a global threat, and having assumed the responsibility of preserving freedom, the Americans had no choice but to take action. On Capitol Hill, the views of Congress were summed up in the report from the House Foreign Affairs Committee which insisted that the “first conclusion to be drawn from the strategy and tactics of world communism is that we have to do something about them.”11 Meanwhile, George Elsey, special counsel and assistant to Truman, noted to administration colleagues that the opening line of the president’s speech to Congress in March 1947, in which he proclaimed the Truman Doctrine, was a way to “bring people up to the realisation that the war isn’t over by any means.”12 Acheson subsequently reiterated the speech’s themes, publicly declaring that “we are determined that communism shall not by hook or crook or trickery undermine our country or any other free country that desires to maintain its freedom.”13 More specifically, NSC 19/1 concluded that the United States must “prevent any potentially hostile power from obtaining a hold in the Middle East, the Mediterranean area or Africa” and that “no such control by a Soviet satellite or a non-satellite communist government would be acceptable.”14 Notwithstanding, Africa in general was not an immediate post-war priority in policy discussions when compared to Europe or even parts of Asia as much of the continent was still under colonial control, or was considered to have little strategic or economic value. The same could not be said of the Horn of Africa, though, where the proximity of Ethiopia and Somalia to the vital sea routes to the oil-rich regions of the Middle East sealed the fate of the region when it came to strategic concerns. As early as July 1947, CIA analysts asserted that “the accomplishment of US objectives requires administrations [in the Horn region] which are stable and favourably disposed toward the US.”15

Italy and Somalia In a report to the president in July 1947, CIA analysts identified the Soviet Union as the “only major power with present intentions to exploit potential threats to the security of the Western Powers,” and went on to assert that “Soviet capabilities for creating instability in the Middle East depend to a considerable extent on the opportunity arising from the disposition of the Italian African colonies.”16 Under the terms of the wartime armistice, later confirmed in the Peace Treaty, Italy agreed to yield all “territorial possessions in Africa” including Eritrea and Somaliland, and to recognise the “full independence of . . . Ethiopia.”17 With both the United States and the Soviet Union showing an interest in the region, the future of the Italian colonies, as the CIA noted, had “important implications affecting the present critical relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers.”18 Clifton Daniel of the New York Times put it more simply: “negotiations over the Italian colonies are simply another phase of the world-wide struggle between East and West.”19 The future of the colonies was one of the agenda items for the Council of Foreign Ministers, a body established during the Potsdam Conference to work out the practicalities and details of various post-war settlements, including those for

The coming of the Cold War  13 Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, as well as Italy. The Council met for the first time in London in September 1945 with representatives from the US, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China in attendance. One of the most interesting aspects of these discussions was the place of Italy in the post-war world order. Unlike Germany, Italy had been immediately welcomed back into the international community by the Western powers. On February 11, 1945, Roosevelt wrote to Churchill expressing his belief that “Italy is and will remain an important factor in Europe whatever we may think of the prospect,” and suggesting that some of the terms of the wartime armistice agreement – “the onerous and obsolete surrender terms which are no longer pertinent to the situation today” – might be mitigated in order to facilitate Italy’s future role in Europe.20 Churchill concurred, telling the House of Commons that “we look forward to Italy’s return under a truly democratic regime to a community of industrious and peace-loving people” and asserting that “in her efforts to help herself Italy can count on British goodwill and on Allied goodwill.”21 In welcoming the Italian declaration of war against Japan, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew acknowledged that the military impact of this would be negligible, but pointed out that the declaration would “further identify Italy with the United Nations and the victorious powers,” and would “give the Italian government and people an increased and prolonged opportunity to contribute to the common war aims of the United Nations and to increase Italy’s chances for an early and more secure place among them.”22 The acceptance of Italy’s post-war status was driven by the American vision for the world that required a stable and supportive Europe, with Italy as a vital part of the vision. Fortunately for the US, the Italians seemed just as keen to be part of the Western sphere. Keen to distance Italy from its recent past, Alberto Tarchiani, the Italian ambassador, wrote to Roosevelt in July 1945 and painted the Mussolini years and involvement with the Axis as unwanted and unavoidable, claiming that “the Italian people were thrust against their will by Fascist dictatorship” into the war, an action of “which they always disapproved and opposed.” He stressed Italian support for the Allies after the Armistice, and expressed his hope that the Italian people could expect “from the Allies the acknowledgement of their right to an honourable peace that should raise them” from war-induced desperate straits “to a normal status of a well-meaning and well-doing nation.” He concluded that American support for the Italians would lead to “advantageous consequences of which would not be in Italy’s favour alone,” clearly intimating that the Italians would be willing to support American plans in the post-war world as a quid pro quo.23 The ‘price’ of Italian support for the Americans in Europe became apparent in a meeting between Acheson and the Italian foreign minister, Count Carlo Sforza, in March 1949. Although agreement had not yet been reached about the future of the Italian colonies, one of the preferred options among all the world powers for those colonies that were not yet ready for full independence was a period of trusteeship under the auspices of the United Nations but with management by a specific country or countries. Although Italy had yielded control over her colonies in the

14  The coming of the Cold War war-time settlements, the changing context of the Cold War once more afforded her a degree of power and influence and, when it came to the issue of trusteeship, Italy saw an opportunity to regain some empirical power. American support, though, would be essential, and Sforza pressed the Italian claim for involvement as a trustee, insisting that Italy was “very much interested in the development of Africa,” which he claimed “must be developed wisely and well” with Italy “best able to provide the technical and physical effort which this development would require.”24 The intensifying Cold War meant that American support for colonial independence in Africa increasingly took second place to the needs for European support, and in the same way the US would support the French in Indochina, it also supported Italy in its demands for trustee status in Somalia. A report from the CIA pointed out that “the security of the US can be threatened by the adverse reaction of states or groups [i.e. Italy] who feel that their legitimate interests have not been properly safeguarded in any agreement to dispose of the colonies.” It went on to argue that “a disposition of the colonies in which Italy would have no participation would weaken the present anti-communist Italian government at a time when the US seeks to strengthen it by political and economic assistance.”25 Presidential hopeful Thomas Dewey echoed this view during the 1948 campaign, stressing the “vital importance of maintaining the de Gasperi government in power” in Italy and worrying that “if de Gasperi fell we might lose the whole of Western Europe.”26 A  report from the National Security Council (NSC) summed up the American position concerning Somaliland: the United States has no direct interest in Italian Somaliland beyond ensuring that it does not fall into unfriendly hands. An Italian trusteeship over the territory would help to reconcile Italy to the loss of her other colonies and thus assist in promoting the western orientation of Italy.27 As a consequence, in an meeting with Sforza, Truman confirmed the American position, telling him that throughout the entire period of our consideration of the problem of disposition of the former Italian colonies, the United States government has given the most sympathetic consideration to their relationship to Italy’s economic and demographic needs and . . . the United States has fully and actively supported an Italian trusteeship for Italian Somaliland.28 What is perhaps most notable about these discussions, however, and something that confirms the importance of Italy in the American view of the post-war order, is the fact that although the United States was championing Italy’s right to act as a United Nations trustee state, Italy was not, at this point, a member of the United Nations and would not be admitted until 1955. Nonetheless, there was no doubt in American minds that the Italians should be awarded this significant UN responsibility.

The coming of the Cold War 15

Ethiopia and Eritrea While the United States was supportive of Italian claims for trusteeship of Somaliland, the situation when it came to the future of Eritrea was complicated by the competing claim from the Ethiopian emperor. Haile Selassie was determined to make Ethiopia a leading power in Africa, and his priority in the immediate aftermath of World War II was to rebuild the Ethiopian Empire that had been shattered first by Italian colonisation and then by invasion. For him, an essential element of establishing great power status within Africa was access to the sea and, for this, he needed Eritrea. The former Italian colony, 45,000 square miles in size, may have been impoverished and, with the exception of the “central plateau around Asmara,” unfit “for European habitation” but, as the CIA reported it had “670 miles of coastline along the Red Sea, one of the world’s most important traffic routes,” while the port of Massawa was “the best harbour between Port Sudan and Mombasa.”29 Selassie pressed his claim to be treated as an equal with the Great Powers when it came to regional issues by demanding that an Ethiopian delegation be allowed to attend the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting “to discuss the disposition of the Italian colonies” and “acquisition [by Ethiopia] of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland in toto.”30 Although the Ethiopian request was refused, it nonetheless sent a definite message of the emperor’s intentions and vision for Ethiopia’s future role. Selassie pursued his claims in a letter to Truman in April 1946, making an emotional appeal in an effort to enlist the president’s support by arguing that “the decisions that are being reached at this fateful moment of history in regard to the peace settlement present for Ethiopia far more than problems of mere national interest, they hold her future for hundreds of years.” He insisted that the “continued progress” and even “independence” of Ethiopia was at stake, unless the problems caused by the “theft of Eritrea and Somaliland and the foreign control of all ports of entry into the Empire” were redressed.31 Not only did he assert that Eritrea was essential for Ethiopian security, but he also insisted that historic justice demanded that the colony be returned. During the official discussions between the great powers, Ethiopian diplomat and senior minister, Ras Imru, pressed Ethiopia’s claim, arguing that Ethiopia was the “mother country” of Eritrea, and had “belonged to Ethiopia for more than 3,000 years before Italy took it in 1870.” He insisted that “the Eritrean port of Massawa was essential to the economy of his country, which is suffering heavily because its only outlet to the sea is through foreign countries.”32 Haile Selassie repeated this claim, insisting that for centuries Eritrea had formed the oldest province of the Ethiopian Empire and “its people were joined to those of Ethiopia by bonds of common origin, language, tradition and national life. Eritrea must necessarily return to Ethiopia, with which she forms an economic unity.”33 Although Haile Selassie’s claim for control of Somaliland never received any support, the story was different when it came to Eritrea. The greatest boost to the emperor’s vision for the future of Ethiopia came when the United States, having acknowledged the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa as whole, also recognised that, within that region, the leading power was undoubtedly Ethiopia. During testimony to the House Foreign Relations Committee requesting $3.5 million

16  The coming of the Cold War in aid programmes to Africa, Jonathan Bingham from the State Department singled out Ethiopia and argued that the region was of great importance to the United States and to the free world generally, not only as a source of strategic materials, but because it is an area of great potentiality in which millions of people are beginning to stir with a growing sense that their destiny lies in their own hands.34 Thus, the official policy of the United States as formally articulated by the State Department confirmed that the American priority in the Horn was the “maintenance and improvement of friendly, cooperative relations between the United States and Ethiopia.”35 The positive approach to American-Ethiopian relations was reinforced on May 17 with the establishment of the first direct radio-telegraph link between the two countries. Truman used this to send a message of greetings to the Ethiopian emperor assuring him of the “sincere friendship of the American people for the people of Ethiopia” and his hope that the “new bond” would help to “strengthen peace and international cooperation in the future.”36 US-Ethiopian relations grew stronger in the spring of 1946 when both countries raised their respective diplomatic missions in Addis Ababa and Washington to the status of Embassy. Ras Imru, now appointed as the first ambassador of Ethiopia to the United States, described the decision as “another mark of the desires of the two governments to strengthen still further the cordial relations existing between the two countries.”37 American-Ethiopian relations were formally codified in treaties of “Amity and Economic Relations,” which stated that “there shall be constant peace and firm friendship between Ethiopia and the United States of America” and set out various ways in which the US would support Ethiopia through aid programmes and trade relations in return for access to overseas facilities and resources. The agreement was signed on September 7, 1951, on behalf of the United States by the American ambassador to Ethiopia, J. Rives Childs.38 During a meeting with Selassie, Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee “assured his Imperial Majesty of the importance which the United States attached to Ethiopia as a stabilising influence in its part of the world, and of our desire to assist Ethiopia in its development,” adding his hope that “this longstanding friendship would continue to be maintained and strengthened.”39

The Cold War and Ethiopia Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union might be deteriorating, but on one thing they were agreed: when it came to power and influence in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia was the prize. Therefore, as the Cold War intensified and the zero-sum perspective took hold, the Americans were determined not only to consolidate their own status in the Horn but also to deny the region to the Soviet Union. This position was codified in an administration Policy Statement of 1951, which confirmed that American objectives in Ethiopia were the “prevention of Soviet or communist influence over Ethiopia, and the maintenance of Ethiopia’s orientation toward the United States and western Europe.”40 However, like many

The coming of the Cold War 17 other leaders of developing nations, Haile Selassie was quick to recognise that the Cold War competition for his country gave him power and influence that belied his true geopolitical importance. Fortunately for the Americans, his preference was the Western sphere, but from the earliest days it was clear that Ethiopian allegiance came at a price. The first sign that the United States was willing to pay that price came with endorsement of Selassie’s empirical ambitions. An avowed American principle was advocacy of self-determination and independence for colonial territories but, when it came to Eritrea, the Truman administration was more sympathetic to Ethiopian claims to the province. In September 1945, at the first post-war conference, the Americans recommended that Eritrea should not retain its pre-war boundaries, but should “make a territorial concession in favour of Ethiopia, giving that nation access to the sea through the port of Assab.”41 However, three years later and with the Cold War increasingly established, the Truman administration now advocated that a greater portion of Eritrean territory should be ceded to Ethiopia: Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett reiterated that “Ethiopia should be given adequate access to the sea” but recommended that “the [more northerly] port of Massawa is the only satisfactory outlet.”42 Truman’s support for Haile Selassie’s territorial ambitions was motivated not just from a desire to please the emperor but also by more pragmatic reasons. Located just outside the Eritrean capital of Asmara was Radio Marina, a communications facility that had first been established by the Italians and then utilised during World War II, first by the British and then by the Americans. With the onset of the Cold War, the need for such facilities around the world increased exponentially and the importance of Eritrea in this context was recognised. An analysis prepared by the NSC concluded that Eritrea is an important site for strategic radio facilities. The United States maintains an Army signal station at Asmara, with extensive relay facilities serving a large part of the Middle East. It would therefore appear desirable to support such strategic interests in Eritrea.43 For that reason, if Ethiopia wanted support for colonial domination in Eritrea the Americans were willing to give it, but Asmara was the price and it was a price that Haile Selassie was more than willing to pay. During a meeting to discuss various aspects of the US-Ethiopian relations in General Hull’s Pentagon office, Foreign Minister Aklilou Abte Wold admitted that he had been instructed by the emperor to come to the United States to reach a settlement on three matters: (1) the problem of reimbursable military assistance for Ethiopia, (2) the US Military Training Mission for Ethiopia, and (2) the agreement for US military rights in Eritrea (Radio Marina).44 During the discussion both parties stressed the importance of good relations between the two countries and both showed willing to work out the details so that both got what they wanted. At a subsequent meeting with Acheson, the extent of

18  The coming of the Cold War American support for Haile Selassie’s territorial ambitions was revealed when Acheson expressed “the pleasure of the American government at the military facilities which the emperor indicated he would grant to the US in Eritrea” and confirmed that this would come “after that area had been ceded to Ethiopia.” Aklilou’s response was perhaps the understatement of the year when he told Acheson that “the emperor was pleased to be of help in this matter.”45 As well as agreement over Eritrea, the relationship between Ethiopia and the United States extended into areas of economic and military aid. For Haile Selassie, the financial benefits were an obvious boon to his determination to strengthen Ethiopia’s economy and improve the infrastructure, with particular emphasis on the education system. In June 1951, the New York Times reported that agreements to provide $200,000 in Point Four aid for Libya and Eritrea were signed at the Foreign Office [in London] today by United States Ambassador Walter Gifford, French Ambassador Rene Massigli and Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison. . . . In each country the funds will be used to start a technical assistance service to carry out health, education, soil reclamation and other projects. The service boards will be headed by United States specialists with the assistance of the administering powers and local relief agencies.46 By June 1952, Point Four appropriations for Ethiopia had reached a million dollars, and Marcus Gordon, director of Point Four aid to Ethiopia, confirmed that the programme would operate on the basis of $1.5 million for next five years.47 Point Four had first been announced in Truman’s 1949 inaugural when he declared that “in the coming years, our programme for peace and freedom will emphasize four major courses of action.” The first three elements consisted of support for the United Nations, world economic recovery, and support for “­freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression.” “Fourth,” he proclaimed, “we must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”48 While this may have sounded altruistic, it was clear that many within the administration saw Point Four as a major weapon in the Cold War. A State Department report asserted that the threat of communism is not primarily military. It is mainly in the human misery and unrest on which communism feeds. The chief defence against communism and tyranny lies, therefore, in a powerful and concerted attack on poverty, disease, and ignorance and their attendant miseries.49 Point Four was designed to make this attack. McGhee told a meeting of US Diplomatic and Consular Officers that in combating the expansion of communism in Africa, it was recognised that a negative approach to the problem of communist penetration should not be over-emphasised; rather positive programmes such as

The coming of the Cold War 19 Point Four, ECA and Educational Exchange, accompanied by intelligently prepared USIS material on objectives of these programmes would be effective counter weapons.50 Bingham, responsible for administering some of the Point Four programmes, similarly testified to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Point Four was in the “self-interest of the United States” as it provided a “positive answer to the wiles of communism” in the developing world. He argued that the “Communist powers will exert every effort to see that they do acquire effective control of these areas . . . cleverly painting a rosy economic and social future under Communist leadership,” but this could be countered through Point Four aid which would show that “improvement in their living standards lies ahead if they say on the side of freedom.” Thus, he asserted, in the current Cold War context “our Point Four programme is a necessity.”51 As well as agreement over Eritrea and aid programmes, there was a further dimension to American support that is worth mentioning: the way in which the country figured in Cold War rhetoric related to the danger of appeasement. A nation that was to base its foreign policy on the “rotten apple theory” or “domino theory” could not afford to turn its back on a country where neglect had arguably led to World War II. Therefore, in the same way that the Munich Analogy dominated policy-making thought in the early years of the Cold War, the Ethiopian Analogy could not be forgotten, and references to it appeared frequently in Cold War rhetoric. In April 1947, Senator Eastland proclaimed his support for the Truman Doctrine and financial aid for Greece and Turkey by stating the need to remember the lessons of the past. “War between the Soviet Union and the United States,” he claimed, was “inevitable” if they cannot recall the quiescent policy which was adopted by the leading nations of the world when Italy attacked Ethiopia, and when an upstart Hitler, with his regime in swaddling clothes defied the world and marched into the Rhineland in defiance of the Versailles Treaty. Unless communist expansion in Greece and Turkey was checked, he argued, the “peace-loving people of the world” would once more be “confronted with a Rhineland, a Manchuria, an Ethiopia, a China, a Czechoslovakia and a Poland.”52 In 1948, Defence Secretary James Forrestal testified to the House Armed Services Committee that four times the democratic nations waited too long to preserve the peace. In my opinion, had the Kaiser known that Britain would take the invasion of Belgium as a cause of war between herself and Germany; had the arrogance of Mussolini in invading Ethiopia been met with other than ineffective sanctions; had the Japanese entry into Manchuria been countered in 1931 with strong determination by the United States and Great Britain; had Hitler’s

20  The coming of the Cold War first tentative steps in the Saar and Ruhr been firmly opposed  – can there be doubt of the effect upon the rising tempo of their boldness? I believe that the expressed opposition, with the potential of force back of that expression, could have averted war.53 In his 1951 State of the Union message Truman justified American Cold War policy by also pointing to the past. “If the democracies had stood up against the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, or the attack on Ethiopia in 1935,” he argued, “or the seizure of Austria in 1938, if they had stood together against aggression on those occasions as the United Nations has done in Korea, the whole history of our time would have been different.”54 He repeated the same message in his farewell address of January  15, 1953, when he was extolling the virtue and success of America’s international stance: think back for a moment to the 1930s and you will see the difference. The Japanese moved into Manchuria, and free men did not act. The Fascists moved into Ethiopia, and we did not act. The Nazis marched into the Rhineland, into Austria, into Czechoslovakia, and free men were paralyzed for lack of strength and unity and will. Think about those years of weakness and indecision, and the World War II which was their evil result. In contrast was the “speed and courage and decisiveness with which we have moved against the Communist threat since World War II.”55 By the end of the Truman administration, therefore, the lessons had been learned, the dangers of appeasement recognised, and the determination reached that the communist threat would not be allowed to take over the world. In his farewell address, the outgoing president declared: I suppose that history will remember my term in office as the years when the “cold war” began to overshadow our lives. . . . But when history says that my term of office saw the beginning of the cold war, it will also say that in those eight years we have set the course that can win it. We have succeeded in carving out a new set of policies to attain peace – positive policies, policies of world leadership, policies that express faith in other free people.56 For Haile Selassie, emperor of Ethiopia, the onset of the Cold War would indeed prove beneficial, with the determination that his country – strategically, economically and ideologically – was an American asset that must be denied to the Soviets at all costs. However, for the former Italian colonies in the Horn, Eritrea and Somaliland, the future was less positive and as each entered the postcolonial era, the impact of the Cold War would be profound. Although the Somali leaders would come to understand and exploit their power as a counterweight to Ethiopia, this was always limited by a universal recognition that Ethiopia was considered the prize in the superpower competition. Meanwhile, the prioritisation

The coming of the Cold War 21 of Ethiopia would result in thirty years of civil war as Eritreans struggled for the independence they craved. This was yet to come, though. With the consolidation of the Cold War, and the common recognition of the strategic importance of the Horn region, it was perhaps not surprising that the four Great Powers – the United States, Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom – were unable to reach agreement over the disposition of the former Italian colonies. They did agree, however, on the appropriate forum for mediation, negotiation and resolution. Accordingly, at the same time that Ethiopia and the United States were establishing their special relationship, the futures of Somaliland and Eritrea were being decided in the organisation that had been established to represent the new world order referred to at the beginning of this chapter: the United Nations.57 The importance of this to both the history of the Horn of Africa and the UN itself was profound.

Notes 1 “Report of President Roosevelt in Person to the Congress on the Crimea Conference,” New York Times, March 2, 1945. 2 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, January 6, 1941. Digital Resources, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/ 3 “Churchill’s Report to the House of Commons,” New York Times, February 28, 1945. 4 “US Trusteeship in Libya Urged,” New York Times, September 12, 1945. 5 “Russian Ambition on Red Sea Seen,” New York Times, September 12, 1945. 6 “Soviet Africa Aim Surprises London,” New York Times, September 20, 1945. 7 “Russian-British Clash in UNO Traced to Soviet Empire Bid,” New York Times, February 4, 1946. 8 Diary entry, September 16, 1947. Robert H. Ferrell (ed), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), pp. 143–4. 9 Speech, Acheson to American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 22, 1950; SMOF, Ken Hechler Files Box 1, Foreign Policy [1 of 2], Truman Library. 10 Report: The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, 1948; Papers of George M. Elsey Box 33, 1948 Campaign Foreign Affairs Reference Material, Truman Library. 11 Report: The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, 1948; Papers of George M. Elsey Box 33, 1948 Campaign Foreign Affairs Reference Material, Truman Library. 12 Handwritten note, Elsey, March 9, 1947; Papers of George M. Elsey Box 17, 1947 March 12, “Truman Doctrine” speech, Truman Library. 13 Speech, Acheson to American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 22, 1950; SMOF Ken Hechler Files Box 1, Foreign Policy [1 of 2], Truman Library. 14 NSC 19/1, A Report to the President by the National Security Council on Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies in Africa, July 21, 1948; PSF Box 178, Meetings 17, Truman Library. 15 Report, Central Intelligence Group, Significant Considerations Regarding the Disposition of the Italian African Colonies, July 25, 1947; PSF Box 215, ORE 1947: 15–39, Truman Library. 16 Report, Central Intelligence Group, Significant Considerations Regarding the Disposition of the Italian African Colonies, July 25, 1947; PSF Box 215, ORE 1947: 15–39, Truman Library. 17 “Peace Pacts’ Main Points Outlined Nation by Nation,” Washington Post, July  31, 1946.

22  The coming of the Cold War 18 Report, Central Intelligence Group, Significant Considerations Regarding the Disposition of the Italian African Colonies, July 25, 1947; PSF Box 215, ORE 1947: 15–39, Truman Library. 19 “Big Powers in Wrangle Over Italy’s Ex-Colonies,” New York Times, August 15, 1948. 20 Memo Attachment, James Vardaman to Truman, June 12, 1945; Papers of George M. Elsey Box 3, Historical reports and research notes – Yalta Conference briefings, Truman Library. 21 “Churchill’s Report to the House of Commons,” New York Times, February 28, 1945. 22 Memo, Grew to Roosevelt, May 1, 1945; PSF Box 159, Italy General, Truman Library. 23 Letter to Roosevelt from Italian Ambassador Alberto Tarchiani, July  6, 1945; PSF Box 159; Italy General, Truman Library. 24 Memo of Conversation, Sforza and Acheson, March 29, 1949; Dean Acheson Papers Box 65, March 1949, Truman Library. 25 Report, Central Intelligence Group, Significant Considerations Regarding the Disposition of the Italian African Colonies, July 25, 1947; PSF Box 215, ORE 1947: 15–39, Truman Library. 26 Memo of Conversation, Dewey and Acheson, September  21, 1949; Dean Acheson Papers Box 66, August–September 1949, Truman Library. 27 NSC 19/1, A Report to the President by the National Security Council on Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies in Africa, July 21, 1948; PSF Box 178, Meetings 17, Truman Library. 28 Memo for the President, Dept of State, November 29, 1948; PSF Box 159, Italy General, Truman Library. 29 Report, Central Intelligence Group, Significant Considerations Regarding the Disposition of the Italian African Colonies, July 25, 1947; PSF Box 215, ORE 1947: 15–39, Truman Library. 30 “Russians are Ready to Push Red Sea Port, Trieste Issue,” New York Times, September 14, 1945. 31 Letter from Haile Selassie to Truman, April 4, 1946; OF319 Ethiopia, Truman Library. 32 “Minister to US Opposes Idea of Eritrean Trusteeship,” New York Times, May 17, 1946. 33 “Selassie to Seek Eritrea’s Return,” New York Times, June 17, 1946. 34 Jonathan Bingham, Acting Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State, Hearings, March 13–April 4, 1952, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 35 Policy Statement, Ethiopia, Department of State, March 1, 1951; RG59 Dept of State Decimal File 1950–54, Box 2846, National Archives II. 36 “Truman Greets Ethiopia,” New York Times, May 18, 1945. 37 Letter, Ras Imru to Roosevelt, April 4, 1946; OF319 Ethiopia, Truman Library. 38 “US and Ethiopia in Pact,” New York Times, September 8, 1951. 39 Aide-memoire, meeting between McGhee and Haile Selassie, March 15, 1950; FRUS, 1950 Vol 5, p. 1697–8. 40 Policy Statement, Ethiopia, Department of State, March 1, 1951; RG59 Dept of State Decimal File 1950–54, Box 2846, National Archives II. 41 “Rome Terms Given,” New York Times, September 23, 1945. 42 Memo for Sidney Souers, NSC from Robert Lovett, Under Secretary, Dept of State, August 3, 1948; PSF Box 178, Meetings 17, Truman Library. 43 NSC 19/1, A Report to the President by the National Security Council on Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies in Africa, July 21, 1948; PSF Box 178, Meetings 17, Truman Library. 44 Memo of Conversation between General Hull, Pentagon, and Aklilou, March 30, 1953; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol XI, p. 438. 45 Memo of conversation between Dean Acheson and Abte-Wold Aklilou, March  30, 1949; Dean Acheson Papers Box 65, March 1949, Truman Library.

The coming of the Cold War  23 46 “$200,000 in Point 4 Aid Allotted to Libya, Eritrea,” New York Times, June 16, 1951. 47 “Point 4 Will Build Ethiopian College,” New York Times, June 16, 1952. 48 Truman, Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949; Truman Library Digital Archives, www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1030. 49 State Department Pamphlet Our Foreign Policy, January 30, 1952; George M Elsey Papers Box 114, Foreign Policy – State Department Pamphlet, Truman Library. 50 Report, East-West African Regional Conference of US Diplomatic and Consular Officers, February 27–March 2, 1950; George McGhee Papers Box 1, East-West African Conference, Truman Library. 51 Jonathan Bingham, Acting Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State, Hearings, March 13–April 4, 1952, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 52 CR, April 11, 1947, p. 3324, Library of Congress. 53 Statement, James Forrestal, April 12, 1948, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 54 Truman, State of the Union, January 8, 1951; Truman Library Digital Archives, www. trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=202. 55 Truman, President’s Farewell Address to the American People, January 15, 1953; Truman Library Digital Archives, www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid= 2059. 56 Truman, President’s Farewell Address to the American People, January 15, 1953; Truman Library Digital Archives, www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid= 2059. 57 “Italian Colonies Issue Goes to UN as Big 4 Fail to Agree,” Washington Post, September 15, 1948.

2 The United Nations and the Horn of Africa

Establishing the United Nations As World War II neared its end, the thoughts of the leaders of the Allied Powers turned to the structure of the post-war world and for a way to avoid traditional balance of power politics that had resulted in conflict and carnage time and again: a world without war was one that would be based on global community and cooperation. As Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed to Congress: The structure of world peace cannot be the work of one man, or one party, or one nation, it cannot be just an American peace, or a Russian, or a French or a Chinese peace. It cannot be a peace of large nations – or of small nations. It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole world.1 Looming large in everyone’s memories, though, was the failure of the League of Nations and a determination to avoid any repetition. Roosevelt reminded Congress that “twenty-five years ago American fighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for which they fought and suffered.” Admitting that “we failed them then,” he went on to assert that “we cannot fail them again, and expect the world to survive again.”2 However, there was no suggestion that League should be revised; instead it would be replaced. As Churchill reported to the House of Commons, the “former League of Nations, which was so hardly used and found to be inadequate for the tasks it attempted, will be replaced by a far stronger body.” He went on to explain that all the work that was done in the past, all the experience that has been gathered by the working of the League of Nations will not be cast away; but the new body will differ from it in the essential point that it will not shrink from establishing its will against the evil doer or the evil planner in good time and by the force of arms.3 Thus, on April 25, 1945, representatives from over fifty nations, representing 80 per cent of the global population as well as every “race, religion and continent”

The United Nations and the Horn of Africa 25 gathered in San Francisco to establish the United Nations Organisation.4 Proposals for the necessity and structure of the Security Council were accepted, as was the need for the UN, unlike the League, to have access to military power. Neil McNeil of the New York Times commented, the aggressor of the future must face the wrath of an armed league – a league with an international police force that hits fast and effectively. Never again can a Hitler pick off one nation after another. . . . The peace-loving nations want to be done with aggression. And they are leaving nothing undone to assure this.5 After the signing ceremony, Truman addressed the conference, declaring that the Charter of the United Nations which you have just signed is a solid structure upon which we can build a better world. History will honour you for it. . . . With this Charter the world can begin to look forward to the time when all worthy human beings may be permitted to live decently as free people.6 However, as with the League, American membership of the United Nations would not become official until ratified by the Senate, and it was here that the symbolic importance of Ethiopia in the establishment of the United Nations was evident. Few could forget the image of Haile Selassie’s appeal to the League of Nations in Geneva in June 1936, and this image was evoked time and again during Senate discussions over ratification of American membership in the UN. In his endorsement of ratification, Senator Robert Wagner (D-NY) reminded his colleagues that “no effective action was taken when Ethiopia was trampled underfoot. Thus we find the world in the midst of its present agony and tragedy.”7 Senator Olin Johnston (D-SC) concurred, asserting that I think most of us now realise, that if the United States had adopted President Woodrow Wilson’s proposals for a League of Nations there would not have been a Second World War. Japan never would have thrust itself upon China; Mussolini never would have thrust the Italian Army upon Ethiopia and Albania; Germany never would have marched into the Rhineland, Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and other nations.8 At the conclusion of the debate, the Senate voted 89–2 for ratification with only Senators William Langer of North Dakota and Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota voting nay. In November 1945, with Haile Selassie’s appeal again echoing in their collective memory, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved a bill granting the American representative in the United Nations the right to vote use of United States troops in UN actions.9 With these resolutions, the United States threw off any vestiges of isolationism and pledged full support to the success of the new United Nations. Truman

26  The United Nations and the Horn of Africa alluded to the importance of the ‘Ethiopian Analogy’ in the American decision, writing to Haile Selassie that it has been, and will continue to be, the constant aim of this government to assure that the magnificent victory which Ethiopia, the United States and the other United Nations achieved through such sacrifice shall never be dissipated by a return to international anarchy. Towards this end, this government has given its wholehearted support to the United Nations which it views as a bulwark of protection to all peace-loving states, without regard to size.10

The UN and the Italian colonies Rhetoric and declarations of support for the United Nations were all very well, but doubts lingered over whether the UN would be any more successful than its predecessor. Whereas memories of Haile Selassie at Geneva had helped to establish the need for the United Nations symbolically, the future of the former Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa would play a major role in helping to establish the practical credibility of the fledging organisation. The Italian Peace Treaty had decreed that the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union should decide the future of the colonies, but had included the provision that if the Big Four were unable to agree, “the problem shall go before the Assembly” of the United Nations.11 This simple agreement held huge significance for the future of the UN as it represented an acceptance by the Great Powers that the new organisation should and must have authority over all the nations of the world regardless of their power or place in the geopolitical order. This importance did not go unnoticed at the time; Anne McCormick commented in the New York Times that regardless of the consequences, the United Nations’ decision on the Italian colonies is an event of great importance: first because it is the first step toward international responsibility for colonial rule and development, and second, because for the first time the General Assembly has superseded the Big Four by settling a problem the Great Powers were unable to solve.12 What made this issue so interesting, though, was the way that the global context had changed in the short time since the Peace Treaty had been agreed. Although the Big Four had vowed to accept the decision of the United Nations on the colonies, this pledge had been made before the Cold War intensified, a situation that made cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States much less likely. A New York Times editorial summarised that this unhappy change, which transforms every attempt to settle the war issues into a move in the cold war, is bound to and should alter the terms of the settlement, not only because Italy is now a partner in the Western defence system, but also because of the newly recognised importance of the African

The United Nations and the Horn of Africa 27 continent, and its values, human and material resources, to the future of Europe and the world.13 The larger question, then, was not the future of Italian Somaliland or Eritrea, but whether the authority of the United Nations would be enough to supersede the wishes of either of the superpowers. If decisions regarding relatively unimportant areas of the world, such as the Horn of Africa, were meaningless, then there was little hope for the future of the UN. The American representative to the UN, John Foster Dulles, warned that if this Assembly proceeds competently to find a just and practical solution, that will add greatly to the prestige of the United Nations. If, on the other hand, the Assembly proves itself impotent, then the result will be that international problems will more and more be dealt with on the basis of applicable national power, rather than on the basis of high principles internationally applied.14 As a result, when representatives from fifty-eight nations assembled in Paris for the next meeting of the UN General Assembly on September 21, 1948, they felt the weight of responsibility on their shoulders. Amongst the many agenda items at the meeting was the future of “territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war.”15 There was general agreement that the United Nations should assume the role of the former colonial power in a trusteeship system, which was described at the time as “a great experiment in international rule” but one essential to the UN if the “unexploited areas of the earth are not to become cockpits of power politics.”16 US Secretary of State James Byrnes contended that this proposal “would give the world a chance to test the operative efficiency of UN trusteeship machinery and would once and for all eliminate the Italian African colonies as a source of Great Power rivalry.”17 However, when it came to who should assume the trusteeship responsibility and prepare the former Italian colonies for eventual independence, disagreements arose. The Soviets proposed that the former colonies be divided among the Big Four, with each one assuming responsibility for one of the four regions under discussion: Libya (two regions), Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The Western Powers, though, increasingly were determined to exclude the Soviet Union from the region, and argued that Britain, France, Italy and Ethiopia should assume all trusteeship responsibilities.18

Italian Somaliland Within the Horn of Africa, the main disagreement between the superpowers came over the future of Italian Somaliland and, as with many areas of the disintegrating empires, the effect of its prior colonial status would have a profound impact on the future of the region. The boundaries of Italian Somaliland were “for the most part entirely artificial,” having been largely decided during the scramble for Africa

28  The United Nations and the Horn of Africa in the nineteenth century when the European powers drew arbitrary lines on a map as they divided the ‘dark continent’ between them.19 The Somali people were thus placed under the rule of Great Britain, France and Ethiopia as well as Italy. Although united by religious beliefs – the overwhelming majority was Muslim – homogeneity within the population went little further than that. As the CIA report on the region warned, the Somalis are divided into complex nomadic tribes, and are constantly engaged in bloody feuds over the water rights on which their nomadic existence depends. Little unity exists among them, nor is any likely to be achieved by them in the future.20 In addition to the problems caused by artificial borders and tribal divisions, was the fact that, in the early years of the Cold War, globalism triumphed over regionalism. Rather than consider how the colonial legacy could best be addressed in Italian Somaliland for the future good of the region, the future of the colony was decided based on Cold War concerns. The CIA pointed out that “native feeling is generally anti-European and specifically anti-Italian,”21 but the feelings of the Somali people were never a factor in the discussions. Even when it came to independence, it was not that the Somali people wanted it, but that a world based on freedom and independence fitted with American aims and principles. The United States may have been doing what was right for the people of Somalia but not necessarily for the right reasons. Hence, when Italy stated an interest in being awarded trustee control of Italian Somaliland, the anti-Italian feelings of the Somali people were never a factor in discussions. What was much more important for the Americans was support during the post-war reconstruction of Europe. Hence, in the same way that the French gained American support in Indochina, so the Italians gained American support when it came to the future of Italian Somaliland. On April 7, 1949, Dulles opened the debate on the future of the Italian colonies by pointing out that “in the case of Italian Somaliland, it is apparent that the inhabitants are not, and in any predictable period will not be, ready for self-government or independence.” He went on to assert the American view that “Italy should be invited to undertake the responsibility of administering Italian Somaliland under the United Nations trusteeship system” because of the “revival of democratic government and institutions in Italy since the overthrow of fascism and the demonstrated willingness and ability of the present government of Italy to assume the obligations of a peace-loving state in accordance with the [UN] Charter.”22 Discussions continued through the summer, with both the United States and Italy pleading for Italian control. On October 1, 1949, Sforza pleaded Italy’s case to assume trustee control before the UN General Assembly, insisting the best course of action “would be for the Somalis to go on benefitting by Italian collaboration until such time as the independence of that country is declared” and pledging that Italy would “do our best to hasten the coming of that day.”23 What is perhaps most striking about the American position on Italian Somaliland, and one that offers the most evidence that the Cold War was dominating policy decisions, is the fact that,

The United Nations and the Horn of Africa 29 at the time, the United States was advocating trusteeship authority for Italy, Italy was not a member-state of the United Nations and, indeed, would not be admitted to the organisation until 1955. Despite this, and the objections led by the Soviet Union, in October 1949 the Political and Security Subcommittee of the United Nations reached agreement on the future of Italian Somaliland by “a vote of 15 to 3, with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland against, and France, India and Pakistan abstaining.”24 The subsequent Resolution, formerly adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 21, 1949, pledged that “Italian Somaliland shall be an independent sovereign state” after a ten-year period of trusteeship, administered by Italy on behalf of the United Nations.25 The importance of this decision on the future status and credibility of the UN in the international system did not go unnoticed at the time. Michael Hoffman of the New York Times commented that not the least pleased by the successful disposition of this agenda item are the United Nations staff members who feel the organisation has been strengthened by having demonstrated its ability to produce through consultation and discussion a workable charter for governing an area in transition from colonial status to independence.26 Joining the Somali people and the Soviet bloc in opposition to Italy assuming trusteeship of Italian Somaliland was Ethiopia. Haile Selassie, who had made an attempt to claim ownership for himself, objected in vain to Italian administration of its former colony, arguing that the “setting up of a ten-year trusteeship over Somaliland under Italy’s administration created a “certain, inevitable and overwhelming” danger to his country. The Ethiopian emperor reminded the members of the United Nations that he had once stood at the rostrum of the League of Nations pleading in vain in the face of Italian aggression. Once again, he said, he was drawing the attention of the world to the “inevitable consequences of preferring appeasement to justice.” He expressed his “fervent hope” that the United Nations would find the way to “correct and to compensate adequately, in time,” the “injustice which has now been done to an innocent people”;27 the ‘compensation’ that he desired, of course, was official UN endorsement of Ethiopian control of Eritrea.

Ethiopia and Eritrea Although, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the United States had pledged to support Ethiopian territorial ambitions in Eritrea, the terms of the peace treaty granted the final decision over the future of the former Italian colony to the United Nations. Haile Selassie was not interested in trusteeship status for Eritrea, though. He had a more permanent arrangement in mind and he pursued it with American support, pressing his claim before the UN that “all peace-loving countries” should see that Eritrea is reunited with Ethiopia.28 During a meeting with Sforza, Acheson contended that “it might be difficult for Eritrea to become an independent state

30  The United Nations and the Horn of Africa because of its geographic, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity.”29 Instead, the United States, with the support of India, Liberia, Iraq and Brazil, proposed that Eritrea “be made an autonomous state, federated with Ethiopia under the crown of Emperor Haile Selassie.”30 The federation would last for ten years, after which time plebiscites would be held throughout Eritrea to determine the future of the region: either independence or closer ties with Ethiopia. The proposal also recommended that the Ethiopian emperor would be head of the proposed federation, and would have jurisdiction over matters of defence, foreign affairs, communications, commerce and currency.31 In opposition to the US-led federation proposal, the Soviet-bloc nations suggested that Eritrea should be granted independence, but this plan was rejected outright.32 However, rather than simply accept the American proposition, the United Nations in November 1949 appointed a commission with representatives from Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan and South Africa to ascertain more fully the wishes and the best means of promoting the welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea, to examine the question of the disposal of Eritrea and to prepare a report for the General Assembly together with such proposal or proposals as it may deem appropriate for the solution of the problem of Eritrea. However, American influence was apparent in the remit for the commission which was instructed to consider not only “the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea,” but also the “rights and claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic or economic reasons, including in particular Ethiopia’s legitimate need for adequate access to the sea.”33 As the commission carried out its review, officials of the United States worked hard to ensure a successful outcome for Haile Selassie and themselves. Acheson encouraged McGhee to “press the Italians to give adequate written assurances of their support, or of the circumstances under which they could support the federation formula,” and also to “urge the Ethiopians to accept the necessary changes in order to obtain a decision by the General Assembly this year.”34 Subsequently, Aklilou told the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly that Ethiopia was willing to drop demands for annexation and was instead “prepared to accept a fourteen-nation proposal for federation with the former Italian colony of Eritrea.”35 Thus, on December 2, 1950, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia on the terms originally proposed by the United States. By a 46–10 vote, with four countries abstaining, the member-states of the UN agreed that “Eritrea will be an autonomous part of the federation, with jurisdiction in domestic affairs. Foreign relations, defence and finance will be handled by the Federal Government.” The resolution also decreed that “Eritrea will go through a transition period ending by September 15, 1952, during which the Eritrea Government and Constitution will be prepared and put into operation.”36 The UN decision was greeted with great joy in Ethiopia. George Merrell, American ambassador to Ethiopia, reported in a telegram to Acheson that the “emperor

The United Nations and the Horn of Africa  31 declared national holiday yesterday to celebrate UN decision on Eritrea. Populace genuinely happy about decision. Emperor gave huge luncheon on occasion of UN decision to restore Eritrea to Ethiopia.”37 During the transition period dictated by the UN resolution, Eritrea chose a sixty-eight-man representative assembly, which then approved the constitution that had been prepared by the United Nations Commission and established the former colony as “an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia.”38 Reuters reported that Haile Selassie “using a golden pen” signed the Constitution, thereby “uniting his ancient kingdom with Eritrea in an East African Federation.”39 Observers claimed that “nearly 40,000 clapping, shouting Eritreans here today acclaimed the birth of a new nation as they watched the British lion bow himself out after eleven years and the lion of Judah take over this former Italian colony.”40 What was more important to the United States, though, was the resulting consolidation of the relationship between Ethiopia and the United States. Merrell subsequently confirmed Haile Selassie’s gratitude to the United States, reporting that when I congratulated emperor, he requested with obvious emotion that I convey his deepest thanks to my government for all its assistance. Acting Minister Foreign Affairs and Minister of Commerce also expressed their warmest appreciation and made it clear that in their opinion credit for solution was mainly due to US.41 A policy statement from the Department of State confirmed that the active support which the United States gave to Ethiopia’s claim to Eritrea in the General Assembly is deeply appreciated by the emperor and has gone a long way in assuring the Ethiopians of the sincerity of our intentions toward that country.42 As we have seen in Chapter 1, American support for Ethiopian designs on Eritrea was not driven by altruism. As NSC 19/4 pointed out, the federation agreement would allow the US government to make arrangements with the Ethiopian government for the continued use of certain military facilities in the Asmara-Massawa region. Since the Ethiopian government, and the emperor in particular, are quite grateful to the US for its stand on Eritrea the conclusion of such arrangements should not be too difficult.43 During a meeting with Aklilou, in which the Ethiopian foreign minister expressed Ethiopian gratitude for the “untiring efforts of the United States” on behalf of Ethiopia, McGhee expressed American interest in a “telecommunications base facility at Asmara and in an air and naval base facility at Massawa for use in times of emergency,” and suggested that further meetings to finalise arrangements should take place in the near future; Aklilou “nodded his agreement to such a

32  The United Nations and the Horn of Africa procedure.”44 In a report to the National Security Council (NSC), James Webb commented that the negotiations for use of the facilities might be “involved and protracted” but “it should be possible to come to an adequate understanding with the Ethiopians in view of the excellent relations we now have with them and the support we rendered in the solution of the Eritrean problem.”45 Notwithstanding, the role of the United Nations in Eritrea, as in Italian Somaliland, can be argued to have had a far greater importance than simply deciding the future of the peoples of the Horn of Africa. As Warren Austin, the second US ambassador to the United Nations, testified to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the UN had succeeded in settling the question of the disposition of the former Italian colonies after “the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union failed in three years of trying to find an acceptable solution,” and, most notably, the “great powers agreed to accept the decision of the General Assembly as binding.”46 Accordingly, the United Nations had proved its worth by establishing its political authority in the face of the emerging Cold War and geopolitical context. In 1960, when the period of Italian trusteeship came to an end, Eisenhower told the Somali people that your country’s accession to independence marks the successful conclusion of another United Nations trusteeship. This, understandably, is a source of great pride and satisfaction to all who have dedicated themselves to making the United Nations an effective instrument of world peace and progress.47 With the nations of the Horn of Africa playing a key role in so doing, a key step in establishing the credibility of the fledgling world body had been taken, but many realised that the UN would not be fully credible until it faced a true international security issue. Whereas the League had faced that threat in Ethiopia in 1936, and failed, the United Nations would face it in Korea.

Korea No consideration of the credibility of the United Nations can be complete without some mention of the moment that the Cold War became hot. On June 25, 1950, when North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel in an attempt to bring unification to the country that had been divided between the superpowers at the end of World War II, it was clear to everyone that the United Nations was facing the first real test of its authority. The League of Nations may have had its successes – for example, its efforts to combat slavery and improve health – but it will forever be perceived as a failure because of its inability to deal with the Italian and German expansionist aggression that ultimately erupted into world war. As a consequence, however effective the United Nations may have been in successfully reconciling the differences between the Great Powers over the future of the Italian colonies, if it proved ineffective in time of war, it would be similarly doomed. The Truman administration was well aware of the significance of the North Korean invasion of the South. Within the administration, the overwhelming

The United Nations and the Horn of Africa  33 perception was that the incursion represented communism on the march, rather than internal Korean politics. Minutes of a meeting of the National Security Council noted that the invasion was not only a “surprise and shock” but also that it “unmasked great and growing combined military strength of Soviet Russia, and such of its willing and ambition satellites as China and North Korea.”48 When members of the senior staff met with the president to discuss the situation, General Bradley somewhat casually commented that the “Korean situation offered as good an occasion for action in drawing the line as anywhere else,” with Admiral Sherman concurring that the “present situation in Korea offers a valuable opportunity for us to act.”49 However the underlying message was clear: having subscribed to the recommendations of NSC-68, the document that set out the doctrines of American Cold War foreign policy, the administration felt compelled to respond to this major test of the American commitment to containment. However, arguably more important to the Truman administration was the need to prove that the United Nations was both willing and able to deal with the international crisis. On June 26, Chang Myon, the South Korean ambassador to the United States, met with Truman in the Oval Office to plead for “expeditious and substantial help” in the face of the invasion. However, although the president reassured the ambassador of American support, he stressed that that would come via the United Nations and not through unilateral American action. Truman told Chang that he had “issued the necessary orders to give necessary supplies at the earliest possible moment in order to support the resolution of the UN and the efforts of the Koreans to defend themselves.”50 Later Truman praised Acheson for the way that the situation had been handled, commenting that “your initiative in immediately calling the Security Council of the UN on Saturday night and notifying me was the key to what developed afterwards. . . . Your handling of the situation since has been superb.”51 Although the Korean War is not the focus of this chapter and is ably discussed elsewhere, the ‘Ethiopian Analogy’ is worthy of further mention. Korea was the first time that the United States had engaged in combat as part of a collective security arrangement, and can be argued as a crucial turning point in the history of American foreign relations with the apparent abandonment of Washington’s enduring warning to avoid ‘entangling alliances.’ During the debates in the Senate over American involvement, one theme arose constantly: the dangers of appeasement. In his endorsement of UN action, Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) asserted that every Senator should be mindful of what happened in Ethiopia when there was delay, when there was indecision, and when there was ineffective action. I think we should be mindful of what happened in the Ruhr and the Rhineland when Hitler marched in with his legions and took over, and when no effort was made by the democracies to prevent that kind of aggression.52 In the House, John Walsh (D-IN) contended that although “the United Nations has spoken,” it was “powerless to act without the full support of the United States,”

34  The United Nations and the Horn of Africa and went on to insist American support was essential because, without it, Korea “could be the Manchuria and the Ethiopia of a third world war.”53 Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT) agreed, asserting that there are striking parallels between what has happened in Korea and what happened in the recent past. . . . This is similar to Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia, this is similar to Hitler’s reoccupying the Rhineland, this is an exactly similar parallel to Japan’s moving into Manchuria. Time after time it has been proven that inaction, that willingness to shut one’s eyes to injustice eventually leads to war. Appeasement and indifference with not stop wars. We know that Russian imperialism seeks the domination of all the world.54 The ‘Ethiopian Analogy’ continued to be used by senior administration officials to justify American involvement in Korea as well as support for the United Nations. In a speech on the first anniversary of the invasion of South Korea, Truman declared: One year ago today, the Communist rulers resorted to an outright war. They sent Communist armies on a mission of conquest against a small and peaceful country. That act struck at the very life of the United Nations. It struck at all our hopes for peace. There was only one thing to do in that situation – and we did it. If we had given in – if we had let the Republic of Korea go under – no nation in the world would have felt safe. The whole idea of a world Organisation for peace would have melted away. The spirit of resistance would have been broken and the free nations would have been open to conquest one by one. We did not let that happen. We remembered Japan and Manchuria, Italy and Ethiopia, and Hitler and the Saar Basin. For the first time in history a world Organisation of nations took collective military action to halt aggression. And, acting together, we halted it.55 Similarly, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, testified to the House Subcommittee on Appropriations that “we are in Korea because of the fact that in that country last June we were confronted with the first major action of aggression since World War II, and we had to make a choice.” He went on to contend that, given past events, in reality there had been no choice; that if we had made a decision to run away, as if nothing had happened in Korea, and refused to try to resist, sooner or later we would have to face the events that started the last World War, a situation similar to the events that started in Manchuria, in 1931, through Ethiopia, and finally to Pearl Harbor, which in fact, led to general war.56 Not surprisingly, given his country’s role in the disintegration of the League of Nations, the ‘Ethiopian Analogy’ was even more important to Haile Selassie. The emperor shared the determination of the United States to establish the United

The United Nations and the Horn of Africa  35 Nations as a credible and effective body, and an equal resolve to support UN actions. From the earliest days of UN action in Korea, Haile Selassie was adamant that Ethiopia would play its role. In August, the emperor sent a message to Truman pledging to “help the friendly government of US in its struggle in Korea on behalf of the UN.” Selassie maintained that Ethiopia “has been and continues to be a firm believer in collective security,” and asserted his belief in the “justice of UN and collective security.”57 By November, thirty-seven nations had joined the United States in supporting the UN Police Action with military or economic assistance, including 1,069 officers and men from Ethiopia, and in April 1951, a battalion of seven hundred Ethiopians became the first land forces from Africa to join the allies in Korea.58 Truman later acknowledged the significance of the Ethiopian involvement, commenting that it was “profoundly heartening to remember that far-off Ethiopia, which had been one of the first victims of the fatal policy of the 1930s, sent troops to fight in Korea,” and expressing his gratitude that, unlike in the 1930s, “the free nations now understand that nobody can be safe anywhere unless all free nations band together to resist aggression the first time it occurs.”59 In a speech to Congress in July 1952, Harry Truman admitted that “Korea might have been the end of the United Nations.”60 In his farewell address, the president returned to the same theme recalling his reaction to hearing the news of the invasion: I turned the problem over in my mind in many ways, but my thoughts kept coming back to the 1930s – to Manchuria, to Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Austria, and finally to Munich. Here was history repeating itself. Here was another probing action, another testing action. If we let the Republic of Korea go under, some other country would be next, and then another. And all the time, the courage and confidence of the free world would be ebbing away, just as it did in the 1930s. And the United Nations would go the way of the League of Nations. Therefore, he recalled, he reached a decision, one that was “the most important in my time as President of the United States.”61 Whereas, previously “free men had failed the test” when faced with aggression, “this time,” he contended, “we met the test. We met it firmly. We met it successfully.”62 The Korean War had been won; the UN had proved itself effective in the face of international aggression; and containment worked. However, although this may have been a cause for celebration in 1953, the repercussions of some of these decisions and actions would have a profound effect upon the peoples of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somaliland in the future.

Notes 1 “Report of President Roosevelt in Person to the Congress on the Crimea Conference,” New York Times, March 2, 1945. 2 “Report of President Roosevelt in Person to the Congress on the Crimea Conference,” New York Times, March 2, 1945.

36  The United Nations and the Horn of Africa 3 “Churchill’s Report to the House of Commons,” New York Times, February 28, 1945. 4 History of the United Nations, UN website, www.un.org. 5 “A New Kind of League, a New Kind of World,” New York Times, June 24, 1945. 6 History of the United Nations, UN website, www.un.org. 7 Senator Wagner, July 28, 1945, CR, Library of Congress. 8 Senator Johnstone, July 28, 1945, CR, Library of Congress. 9 “World News Summarised,” New York Times, November 8, 1945. 10 Letter, Truman to Selassie, July 3, 1946; OF319 Ethiopia, Truman Library. 11 “US-Soviet Showdown Faces Paris Assembly,” Washington Post, June 6, 1948. 12 “Following the Decision on the Italian Colonies,” New York Times, November  23, 1949. 13 “The Italian Colonies,” New York Times, April 9, 1949. 14 “Dulles Gives Plan on Africa Colonies,” New York Times, April 7, 1949. 15 Memo Attachment, James Vardaman to Truman, June 12, 1945; Papers of George M. Elsey Box 3, Historical reports and research notes – Yalta Conference briefings, Truman Library. 16 “The Italian Colonies,” New York Times, October 2, 1947. 17 “Colonies Taken Up,” New York Times, April 30, 1946. 18 “Assembly Gets Plan to Split Italy Colonies,” Washington Post, May 14, 1949. 19 Report, Central Intelligence Group, Significant Considerations Regarding the Disposition of the Italian African Colonies, July 25, 1947; PSF Box 215, ORE 1947: 15–39, Truman Library. 20 Report, Central Intelligence Group, Significant Considerations Regarding the Disposition of the Italian African Colonies, July 25, 1947; PSF Box 215, ORE 1947: 15–39, Truman Library. 21 Report, Central Intelligence Group, Significant Considerations Regarding the Disposition of the Italian African Colonies, July 25, 1947; PSF Box 215, ORE 1947: 15–39, Truman Library. 22 “Dulles Gives Plan on Africa Colonies,” New York Times, April 7, 1949. 23 “Sforza Statement of Italy’s Position on Former Colonies Before UN,” New York Times, October 2, 1949. 24 “UN Unit Endorses a Free Somaliland,” New York Times, October 18, 1949. 25 “Text of Resolution on Former Italian Colonies Approved by UN,” New York Times, November 22, 1949. 26 “UN Body Adopts Somaliland Pact,” New York Times, January 28, 1950. 27 “Ethiopia Warns UN on Somaliland Step,” New York Times, December 3, 1949. 28 “Eritrea Tie Urged by Haile Selassie,” New York Times, June 9, 1950. 29 Memo of conversation, Acheson and Sforza, September 14, 1949; Dean Acheson Papers Box 66, August–September 1949, Truman Library. 30 “US Would Give the Eritreans Autonomy Under Crown of Emperor Haile Selassie,” New York Times, October 20, 1949. 31 “5 Powers Sponsor New Eritrea Plan,” New York Times, October 23, 1949. 32 “UN Shuns Proposals of Soviet on Eritrea,” New York Times, November 25, 1950. 33 “Text of Resolution on Former Italian Colonies Approved by UN,” New York Times, November 22, 1949. 34 Department of State Memo of Conversation, November 1, 1950; Dean Acheson Papers Box 68, November 1950, Truman Library. 35 “Ethiopia Accepts Federation Move,” New York Times, November 23, 1950. 36 “UN Votes to Unite Eritrea, Ethiopia,” New York Times, December 3, 1950. 37 Telegram, Ambassador Merrell in Ethiopia to Sec State, December  6, 1950, FRUS, 1950 Vol 5, p. 1702. 38 “Constitution for Eritrea,” New York Times, July 10, 1952. 39 “Selassie Ratifies Union,” New York Times, August 12, 1952.

The United Nations and the Horn of Africa  37 40 “Eritrea Assumes Her Independence,” New York Times, September 16, 1952. 41 Telegram, Ambassador Merrell in Ethiopia to Sec State, December  6, 1950, FRUS, 1950 Vol 5, p. 1702. 42 Policy Statement, Ethiopia, Department of State, March 1, 1951; RG59 Dept of State Decimal File 1950–54, Box 2846, National Archives II. 43 NSC 19/4: A  Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on US Position on the Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies, July  26, 1949; PSF Box 179; Meetings 44, Truman Library. 44 Memo of Conversation, McGhee and Aklilou, December 11, 1950, FRUS, Vol 5, pp. 1702–1704. 45 NSC 19/5, April 30, 1951; PSF Box 184, Meetings 92, Truman Library. 46 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, June 11, 1951, US Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 47 Message, Eisenhower to Aden, July 1, 1960; Ann Whitman Files International Series Box 47, Somali Republic, Eisenhower Library. 48 Memo to the NSC from the National Security Resource Board, July  6, 1950; PSF Box 159, Korea NSRB Memo, Truman Library. 49 Memo of Conversation on the Korean Situation, June 25, 1950; Dean Acheson Papers Box 67, May–June 1950, Truman Library. 50 Memo of conversation, Truman and Korean Ambassador, June 26, 1950; Dean Acheson Papers Box 67, May–June 1950, Truman Library. 51 Handwritten note from Harry Truman to Acheson, July 19, 1950; Dean Acheson Papers Box 161, Truman Library. 52 Senator Hubert Humphrey, June 27, 1950, CR, p. 9233, Library of Congress. 53 Representative John Walsh, June 27, 1950, CR, p. 9262, Library of Congress. 54 Representative Abraham Ribicoff, June 27, 1950, CR, p. 9269, Library of Congress. 55 Truman, Address in Tullahoma, Tennessee, June 25, 1951; Truman Library Digital Archives, https://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=352&st=&st1= 56 Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, February 23, 1951, House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 57 Telegram from Ambassador in Ethiopia (Merrell) to Sec State, August 12, 1950, FRUS, 1950 Vol 5, p. 1698, Library of Congress. 58 “Ethiopians to Leave for Korea,” New York Times, April 12, 1951. 59 Truman, Message to Congress Transmitting Sixth Annual Report on US Participation in the United Nations, July 3, 1952; Truman Library Digital Archives, www.truman library.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2372. 60 Truman, Message to Congress Transmitting Sixth Annual Report on US Participation in the United Nations, July 3, 1952; Truman Library Digital Archives, www.truman library.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2372. 61 Truman, President’s Farewell Address to the American People, January 15, 1953; Truman Library Digital Archives, www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid= 2059. 62 Truman, President’s Farewell Address to the American People, January 15, 1953; Truman Library Digital Archives, www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid= 2059.

3 Forging the ‘special relationship’

Eisenhower, the Cold War and Africa By the time that Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency in January 1953, the Cold War was well and truly on. A CIA report prepared for the incoming president concluded that a war situation now exists between the Soviet Bloc and the group of Western nations under the leadership of the United States. . . . The USSR has virtually ended normal diplomatic relations with the West and has isolated the peoples of the Bloc from the rest of the world. Trade relations have been severely curtailed. Intense competition in armaments continues. . . . The Soviet rulers are implacable in their antagonism toward the free world. They have made plain their intention to subvert or destroy it and to establish a communist world dominated from Moscow.1 Thus, the continuing war in Korea and American-Soviet relations dominated foreign policy during the transition, with little thought for Africa. Indeed, in the early 1950s, the situation in the Horn of Africa seemed relatively secure and stable. The United Nations had proved its worth by solving the tricky problem of the disposition of the Italian colonies, and Haile Selassie, through his support for the UN forces in Korea and diplomatic discussions with the United States, was clearly stating his preference in the burgeoning Cold War. However, instead of an era of relative peace and security, the 1950s would instead prove to be a time of tension and concern, mainly because of the way that the Eisenhower administration’s perception of geopolitics through the Cold War prism would impact upon developments in the Horn of Africa. The hysteria associated with McCarthyism may have been abating by the time that Eisenhower assumed the presidency, but there was no doubt that he shared the prevailing view that communism posed a serious and realistic threat to US national security. When reflecting on the achievements of 1953 in his diary, unsurprisingly the first item on his list was the conclusion of the Korean War. Second, however, was that “our own defences and those of the free world have been strengthened against communist aggression.”2 That did not mean that the US

Forging the ‘special relationship’  39 could rest on its laurels, however. Instead, Eisenhower’s priority was to work to consolidate relations with partners and allies, particularly in the developing world which was perceived as a fertile breeding ground for communist infiltration. As Eisenhower explained in his diary: nationalism is on the march and world communism is taking advantage of that spirit of nationalism to cause dissension in the free world. Moscow leads many misguided people to believe that they can count on communist help to achieve and sustain nationalistic ambitions. Actually what is going on is that the communists are hoping to take advantage of the confusion resulting from destruction of existing relationships and in the difficulties and uncertainties of disrupted trade, security, and understandings – to further the aims of world revolution and the Kremlin’s domination of all people.3 As well as Asia – particularly Korea and Indochina – Eisenhower also recognised the importance of Africa when it came to the threat of communism in the developing world. As he told the members of the National Security Council (NSC), Africa was “very important to the United States”4 because “Africa today is being swept by the same ‘wind of change’ that transformed Asia and the Middle East earlier in the twentieth century.” He explained that “the whole continent, because of the impact of nationalism, has suddenly become of major importance,” because the “disappearance of the long dominant European rule opens to the door to Sino-Soviet Bloc penetration.”5 Vice President Richard Nixon concurred, commenting that “Africa is a priority target for the international communist movement” and contending that policy towards the newly independent African nations could “well prove to be the decisive factor in the conflict between the forces of freedom and international communism.”6 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Satterthwaite, testified before the House Subcommittee on Africa that Soviet activities in Africa were intended “to promote identification with the emerging nationalist elements and further to reduce western influence in the new independent states,” and warned that there was “great danger that newly granted independence may turn out to be but a brief interlude between the rule of colonialism and the harsh dictatorship of international communism.”7 The recognition of the growing importance of Africa in American foreign policy formulation culminated in the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in 1958, thereby separating African issues from the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, which had overseen foreign policy towards Africa since 1944. Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for the administration, explained that the step was necessary for three basic reasons: (1) the increasing world significance of political, economic and social developments in Africa, (2) the importance of Africa to the United States and (3) the growing need to counter unfriendly influences which are showing increasing interest in Africa.8

40  Forging the ‘special relationship’ Nixon concurred, adding that the new department confirmed the realisation throughout the executive branches of the Government, throughout the Congress and throughout the nation, of the growing importance of Africa to the future of the United States and the Free World and the necessity of assigning higher priority to our relations with that area.9 As well as recognising the growing importance of Africa as a whole, Eisenhower shared his predecessor’s view on the importance of the Horn of Africa in particular. In testimony to the House Subcommittee on Africa, Satterthwaite explained that the administration considered that the “Horn of Africa is a very sensitive and strategic area geographically,” with that significance resulting from the proximity of the Horn of Africa to the Middle East.10 As a New York Times editorial asserted, the Middle East had become a “major battlefield in the Cold War” with “countries from Morocco to Pakistan and from Iran in the north to Ethiopia in the south . . . targets of Soviet imperialism.”11 NSC 5903 formalised this position in February 1959, confirming that as an area of transition between Africa south of the Sahara and the Near East, the Horn of Africa, under friendly control, contributes to the security of western sea and air communications and offers a strategic position for the defence of important Western interests in the Red Sea and East African areas.12

The importance of Ethiopia Similarly, the Eisenhower administration shared the conviction that the most important country within the Horn of Africa was Ethiopia. This was not least, as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued, because it could “serve as a base of operations to protect the shipping lanes to the Far East, Europe and the Middle East.”13 As a result, it was not surprising that policy objectives towards Ethiopia, as detailed in May 1953, included: The maintenance of friendly and co-operative relations; the prevention of Communist infiltration and influence and the continuance of Ethiopia’s orientation toward the West; the establishment of stable administration in areas under Ethiopian sovereignty and the successful development of the ­Ethiopia-Eritrea Federation within the terms of the UN Resolution of December 2 1950; the balanced and orderly development of the economy of Ethiopia, and a successful Point IV programme; and, the maintenance of the right to use the military facilities required by the Department of Defence in Eritrea and to the rights and privileges we desire in connection therewith.14 Although listed last, the need to complete the agreement for access to the communications facilities at Asmara was uppermost in the minds of the administration, because it was a “point from which Soviet broadcasts and other broadcasts covering the Near East and other areas can be monitored” and a “crucial link in

Forging the ‘special relationship’ 41 the chain of our world-wide communications system which carries much of the Korean traffic as well as other military matters around the world.”15 Access to this particular base was considered essential, with a report from the Army Signal Corps asserting that “there is no location in the entire Near and Middle East to equal Asmara for radio transmission facilities” because of the geographical and physical location of the base.16 However, negotiations between the United States and Ethiopia had stalled at the end of 1952, as Dulles noted, because of Ethiopian demands for “a larger military mission than the US is prepared to send or some other concrete undertaking by the US to assist in Ethiopia’s defence.”17 Described as an “undeniable setback” by Dulles,18 this was perhaps the first sign that Haile Selassie was no puppet, and was aware of his power to benefit by manipulating the Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather than yield to Selassie’s demands for increased American aid, the administration discussed less expensive ways to placate the emperor and demonstrate respect for their African ally. Up until that point, the military base in Asmara had been known as Radio Marina, a name bestowed by the Italians and one considered “singularly inappropriate” given its colonial connotations. Instead, Ambassador Childs suggested that the name of the facilities should be changed to something “complimentary to Ethiopia” and that would “symbolise the association of United States and Ethiopian forces in Korea,” such as the name of one of the Ethiopian battalions that had served in Korea, the name of an engagement in which Ethiopia and the US had jointly participated, or the name of an Ethiopian serviceman who had shown “conspicuous gallantry.” Acheson agreed, arguing that “such a move at this time would not only show the friendship existing between the United States and Ethiopia but would foster goodwill towards the United States among all segments of the population in the new federation.”19 Thus Radio Marina became Kagnew Station, in honour of the Ethiopian battalions who had fought in Korea. As the Americans had expected, such a cosmetic gesture was not sufficient to fully win Haile Selassie’s approval for the base agreement, who was determined to obtain much more tangible support from the US. As Under Secretary of State Walter Smith reported to Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson, in conferences which officials of the Department of State and Department of Defence have had with the Ethiopian representatives during the past two weeks it has become evident that the Ethiopians are not prepared to conclude the kind of base agreement we have been seeking without assurances of adequate military assistance from us. Adequate military assistance to them means in reality a grant of essential arms and a military training mission.20 Such aid programmes would require congressional approval, but Smith recognised that the prevailing Cold War context could be utilised to good advantage. He recommended that, in the relevant budget requests, Eisenhower stressed that the strategic location of Ethiopia makes it of direct importance to the defence of the Near East area, that grant military assistance to Ethiopia is of critical importance to the defence of the free nations, and that the immediately

42  Forging the ‘special relationship’ increased ability of Ethiopia to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the Near East area and to the security of the United States.21 Similarly, Thurston Morton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, wrote to Alexander Wiley, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reminding the senator that the agreement was essential to guarantee continued use, with the necessary rights and privileges, of the important United States Army radio communications station at Asmara and certain other facilities in Eritrea. The radio station, which we acquired during World War II when Eritrea was under British occupation, occupies the most favourable site for radio reception and transmission in the entire Near East area. Because of the station’s great value in monitoring Soviet broadcasts and as a vital link in our world-wide military communications system, the Army plans to expand its facilities as soon as the agreement is concluded.22 Congress was duly persuaded and on May 23, 1953, Smith and Aklilou signed a mutual defence agreement providing US military aid, including the deployment of a military advisory group, to Ethiopia.23 With the treaties of commerce and friendship between the United States and Ethiopia ratified by the Senate, and going into effect on September 8, 1953, the process of formalising the relationship between Ethiopia and the United States was completed. Thus, the first year of the Eisenhower administration saw the beginning of what would be termed a ‘special relationship’ that would remain strong for over twenty years.24 As Dulles commented to the president, the “United States now exercises the predominant foreign influence in Ethiopia. The emperor seems clearly to have cast his lot with the West and with the US in particular.”25

The Soviet threat in the Horn Notwithstanding this apparent success, the Eisenhower administration knew that the Soviet Union also recognised Ethiopia’s strategic importance and would not accept American dominance there without resistance. The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), created by Eisenhower in 1953 as part of the National Security Council, provided an analysis of the internal security situation in Ethiopia and warned that a major threat, and one which is now in evidence, is the increased focus of Communist Bloc activities in Ethiopia. . . . The Soviet Union, the Soviet satellite countries of Czechoslovakia and China, and the communist government of Yugoslavia have made economic penetration within the past year . . . [and] some of the Soviet Union’s most experienced diplomatic and military personnel have been accredited to Ethiopia.26

Forging the ‘special relationship’  43 A follow-up paper a few days later warned that in view of the rising Soviet Bloc interest in and attention to Ethiopia and evidence of mounting internal pressure towards middle ground in the world conflict, it is evident that the present period contains a serious challenge to the Western bloc.27 These concerns were exacerbated by Haile Selassie’s awareness of his power as the United States and Soviet Union competed for his attention and support. During a formal visit to the United States in May 1954, the emperor pointedly spoke of Ethiopia’s “unique position on the most constricted but important of strategic lines of communications in the world, that which passes through the Red Sea” as well as lying “on the other most strategic line of communication in the world, namely the world band of telecommunications which, because of natural phenomena, circles the world at the equator.”28 His underlying intent – to combine geopolitics with strategic importance for Ethiopian benefit – did not go unnoticed by the Eisenhower administration; as Bromley Smith of the NSC warned in a briefing note for the OCB, “the Ethiopians, unhappy about the existing level of US aid, will be tempted to change their alignment unless we increase our assistance,”29 with a subsequent report acknowledging that “Ethiopian dissatisfaction with the limited amount of US aid has been manifested in proposals for a shift towards a neutralist policy and consideration of Soviet bloc offers of economic aid.”30 During the meeting of the NSC on November 15, 1956, Eisenhower shared the fear that Haile Selassie would seek arms “elsewhere” if he did not get them from the United States.31 Consequently, and given that a main policy objective of the Eisenhower administration was the “prevention of Communist infiltration and influence and the continuance of Ethiopia’s orientation toward the West,”32 the overall feeling was that, despite recognising what Haile Selassie was doing, the Americans had very few options. In September 1956, the OCB recommended that in order to ensure Ethiopia’s continued place within the Free World, the US has an unquestioned interest in devoting the necessary effort and resources to offset the immediate Soviet Bloc inroads and to assist this country to develop along Western standards.33 This should include increased economic aid, including Point Four, programmes, with additional emphasis placed on “psychological programmes intended to awaken and orient the educated population of Ethiopia to the true nation of the communist design for world conquest.”34 Eisenhower endorsed the recommendations, and in November  1956 approved the implementation of NSC 5615/1, which covered all aspects of policy, including plans for military aid, economic aid, information services, educational programmes, cultural programmes and diplomatic efforts.35 In addition, Ethiopia was added to Nixon’s itinerary for the vice president’s forthcoming trip to Africa, in the hopes of further consolidating the relationship between Ethiopia and the United States.36

44  Forging the ‘special relationship’ Accordingly, when Dulles contacted Aklilou in 1956 to reassure him that the United States would provide support which was “responsive to Ethiopia’s military needs this year and will, at the same time, make a significant contribution to the development of your country,” Haile Selassie realised that his tactics had literally paid off.37 He continued to court the Soviet Union while still publicly aligning himself with the United States, with neither superpower able to control him. In the summer of 1959, the emperor paid a formal state visit to the Soviet Union, and was rewarded with an increase in the level of Soviet economic aid.38 Despite admitting that “the Ethiopian emperor is, in a quiet way, attempting to blackmail the US,”39 the Americans seemed powerless to prevent him from doing so. Indeed, the CIA warned that “Bloc ties with Ethiopia will almost certainly continue to expand steadily,”40 adding that “if a substantial increase in grant military assistance is not forthcoming [to Ethiopia], the Asmara facility would be in jeopardy.”41 These concerns remained for the remember of Eisenhower’s term of office and in December  1960, NSC 6028 recommended that the “denial of the Horn of Africa to Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist domination and minimization of Soviet Bloc and Chinese Communist influence”42 must be the priority of subsequent policy decisions. Those decisions, however, would rest with Eisenhower’s successor, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

Eisenhower and Eritrea Eisenhower’s prioritisation of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa also meant that little changed with regards to American policy towards Eritrea. As Eisenhower prepared to take office, the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia was formally sanctioned by the United Nations with delegates from the United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Italy, and the United States leading the praise. Upon taking office, the new president also endorsed the federation, seemingly validating Ethiopian imperialism in return for Ethiopia’s continuing alignment with the West. Notwithstanding the administration’s public position, there were signs that, internally, the administration was concerned about the suppression of selfdetermination in Eritrea. A Department of State report noted that while we consider the federation is a closed chapter so far as the UN is concerned, we think it behooves the US as a practical matter to watch closely the development of Ethiopia’s relations with Eritrea with an eye to harmony within the federation and the preservation of the autonomy accorded Eritrea.43 This warning note proved to have foundation all too soon when, only a few months later, a National Intelligence Estimate confirmed that the federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea is leading to widespread dissatisfaction in the latter area due to Ethiopia’s tendency to ignore the local autonomy assured Eritrea by the UN. The federation increasingly will be dominated by Ethiopia despite Eritrean protests.44

Forging the ‘special relationship’ 45 In 1954, Dulles reported on further “evidence in Eritrea of considerable disappointment with the trend of affairs and of fear and distrust of Ethiopian motives.” The reason for this, he surmised “stems from concern that Ethiopia is going to violate the UNGA Resolution and incorporate Eritrea as another province of Ethiopia,” and warned that the United States should continue to monitor the situation and “be prepared to consider whether any action on our part is necessary to mitigate the intensity of the family squabbles.”45 The key word here was ‘family,’ which suggested that the United States had accepted Eritrea as part of Ethiopia and not as a separate nation with the right to independence. This position was confirmed in 1957, when one of the leaders of the Eritrean independence movement, Mohamed Omar Kadi, appealed to the United Nations and to the United States for support. He charged that Ethiopia was over-stepping the authority granted under the UN resolution, claiming that “Eritrean autonomy has been replaced by annexation; democratic liberties were suppressed and the federal system was fundamentally deformed in its interpretation in order to suit the flagrant violations of the General Assembly resolution.” He asked that the UN establish a “commission of enquiry” to look into the “grievances of the Eritrean people.”46 However, the only American response was a formal acknowledgement “of receipt of complaint.”47

Independence for Somalia When it came to Ethiopia’s other neighbour, Somalia, the Eisenhower administration had reason to feel encouraged that there would be no threats to its vision of a stable, Western-aligned Horn region. When Italy had been awarded trusteeship status by the United Nations, one of the conditions had been that the former colony must be prepared for independence. As Eisenhower took office, the Italians were confident that the aim would be achieved within the deadline set, reporting confidently to the United Nations Trusteeship Council that “allowing for the progress both in the educational and political fields to maintain its present pace,” Italian Somaliland would be ready for independence by 1960.48 By 1956, the Italians, seemingly taking their responsibility as trustees seriously, had “repaired the war damage, started port developments and irrigation programmes, built new hospitals and dispensaries, and tripled the number of native schools.”49 Similarly, political progress was evident, with definite signs of alignment with Western principles of democracy when, on May 1, 1956, Italy turned over all legislative power to an elected parliament under the leadership of Aden Abdullah Osman.50 As Time reported, the former houseboy “rode through the streets of Mogadishu, the capital, past cheering crowds and saluting soldiers, to become the chairman of Somaliland’s first elected Parliament and the leader of a new nation.”51 Notwithstanding such positive moves, there were warning signs of the troubles to come as the former colonies of Italian Somaliland and British Somalia prepared for full independence in 1960. Mason Sears, the US representative to the UN Trusteeship Council, had urged American support for the Somalis because “powerful freedom-destroying forces” stood ready at all times to subvert new nations at this first sign of instability.52 Evidence for his concern came, somewhat ironically,

46  Forging the ‘special relationship’ on July 4, when thirteen Mogadishu residents formally announced the formation of a Communist Party.53 Partly in response to the threat of communist expansion, the State Department announced in February 1957 that it was “strengthening all of its diplomatic missions in the Dark Continent and will open four new consulates there before June 30,” including one in Mogadishu. Eisenhower also announced that Nixon would make a “precedent-shattering” trip to newly independent Ghana to “emphasise the impending danger” throughout Africa and to “gather impressions . . . in the cold-war battle against communism.”54 Fears of communist inroads into the Horn of Africa led the OCB to recommend in July 1960 that American support for full Somali independence was essential because to do otherwise would “make us vulnerable to accusations of colonialist intentions which the Soviet Bloc would certainly exploit to the full.” It was also important to “give the Somalis an assurance of our interest in helping them after 1960” with steps taken to “strengthen the position of the moderates and prevent the accession to power of leaders whose extremist policies and expansionist views would permit Egyptian domination and Soviet penetration and lead to grave instability in this strategic area of Africa.”55 Subsequently, James Grant, deputy director of the International Cooperation Administration, explained to the House Appropriations Committee that the reason that the administration had increased the request for fiscal year 1961 by an additional $3.35 million, taking the total to $24.3 million, was because of the need to provide assistance to newly independent nations such as Somalia, in order to “encourage their identification with the free world.” He argued that it was “essential that we work with the new and prospective leaders in these countries while their attitudes are still forming. If we delay we may either greatly increase their economic and political costs or lose the opportunity altogether.”56 The administration’s arguments to Congress clearly had an effect; Senator William Fulbright (D-AR) commented that Somalia “lies in a rather strategic position in the African continent and I think the administration makes a pretty fair case for showing some interest in helping it.”57 The fact that the Soviets had offered economic aid to Somalia after independence provided “an added element of urgency,”58 and American fears were exacerbated by hints that Somalia could be wooed to the Soviet bloc. As his nation approached independence, Prime Minister Abdullahi Issa Muhamud said that he was looking forward to working with the Western powers, and that he “hoped to receive aid from the United States, Britain and Italy.” He also pointed out that the Italian administrators of the trusteeship had not permitted the Soviet Union to set up so much as a consulate in Mogadishu, and confirmed that “we have no relations with Russia.” However, he added that “after our independence, we shall see”59 – words that proved ominous to the United States as that day drew closer and closer. At the end of 1959, the UN General Assembly approved the proposal that Italian Somaliland should gain its independence on July  1, 1960, rather than on December 1 as previously scheduled.60 Earlier the same year, in February, the British Colonial Office announced its intention to press ahead with independence for British Somaliland with the people also obtaining “executive responsibility” for self-government.61 On April 23, the Joint Commission on the

Forging the ‘special relationship’ 47 Somalia-Somaliland Union reached agreement that, having both achieved their independence, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia would become a unitary state as of July 1.62 Thus, on June  26, the end of British rule in Somaliland was celebrated as “crowds danced in the streets here, bonfires blazed from the hills and fireworks burst in the sky.”63 Similar celebrations were witnessed in Italian Somaliland a week later, as the period of Italian trusteeship officially ended. Then, as reported in the Washington Post, at “one second past midnight the flag of the new republic – a five pointed white star on a blue field” rose over the city and the “90-member Italian Somalia Assembly and the 20-member British Somaliland Legislative Council” merged “into a single legislature for the new republic.”64 The proclamation of the Republic of Somalia was followed by a “glittering reception” attended by delegates from seventy-two countries, and messages of congratulations “poured in from around the world.”65 Among these was a telegram from Eisenhower to “His Excellency Aden Abdullah Osman, President of the Somali Republic, on the occasion of the independence of the Somali Republic, July 1, 1960,” expressing his “pleasure . . . most cordial greetings and heartfelt congratulations upon the independence of the Somali Republic.” Eisenhower told the new president that the people of the United States “share deeply in your joy in this occasion . . . and I am confident that in the years to come your country will strengthen the ranks of those devoted to this noble purpose.”66 On July 6, Somalia was formally admitted to the United Nations, becoming the eighty-seventh member, and the “fifth newly independent African state to be approved by the Council for admission next fall by the General Assembly.”67 The Americans were aware, though, that the glittering celebrations were masking many of the realities that the newly independent nation would face. As Prime Minister Issa had acknowledged as his country neared independence: “certainly there are troubles ahead, and we know we are poor. But we have confidence in our friends and in our strength as a free people.”68

Dispute in the Ogaden The main issue in Somalia’s future, though, was not the overwhelming poverty, but the legacy of colonialism. The European ‘scramble for Africa’ had divided ethnic Somalis among five colonial areas: British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, French Somaliland (the territory of the Afars and the Issas), Kenya and Ethiopia. The five-pointed star of the new nation represented each of the divisions, and many Somalis dreamed of the day when ethnic Somalis would be reunited on one nation. The first step towards unification was taken when the one and a half million people in Italian Somalia were merged with the 600,000 in British Somaliland in the newly independent nation of Somalia.69 Tom Farer, a professor at Rutgers University and specialist on the Horn region, remarked in testimony to the House Subcommittee on Africa that the creation of the Somali Republic in 1960 was “the first step toward the consummation of national unity,” but he also warned that “it would not be the last.”70

48  Forging the ‘special relationship’ Haile Selassie also shared this view, although for him it was more of a fear that the next phase of Somali unification would involve a claim on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. As NSC-5903 cautioned, the “development of national consciousness among the Somalis” was increasing demands for “political unification through the creation of a Greater Somaliland,” that would incorporate all lands occupied by ethnic Somalis. This expansion of Somali territory “in part at the expense of Ethiopia, threatens Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and has aroused Ethiopian antagonism . . . and tension in the Horn of Africa has heightened as the Imperial Ethiopian Government feels increasingly threatened by Somali nationalism.”71 The border problems between Ethiopia and Somalia dated back to 1897 when Ethiopia and the British reached a series of agreements that ceded the Haud territory to Ethiopia, and allowed Somali nomads grazing rights for cattle, sheep and goats for several months every year in the Ogaden.72 As part of the post-war settlement, the British returned the Ogaden to Ethiopian control, with the boundary “approximately the same as when this most easterly part of Ethiopia was overrun by the Italian invaders in 1935.”73 While the British remained a Horn power, the rights granted by the various treaties seemed secure but, with British withdrawal from the region, concern over their rights mounted among the Somali people, and, as Somalia prepared for independence, efforts were made to solve the border dispute. In October 1959, the former secretary-general of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, travelled to Ethiopia in an attempt “to arbitrate in the dispute between Ethiopia and Italy over demarcation of the Ethiopia-Somali border.”74 His attempts met with failure, and in August 1960, only weeks after Somali independence, the members of the NSC discussed the situation in the Horn of Africa and the possible implications for future American policy. Concern was expressed that “the unsettled boundary between Ethiopia and Somalia and the possible attempt of the Somali people to create a Greater Somaliland may lead eventually to hostilities,” which could lead to a “critical situation throughout Africa.”75 Smith admitted that “US efforts to lessen tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia have met with little success; there appears little prospect for success along this line in the near future.”76 Journalists soon confirmed administration fears with regular dispatches describing skirmishes along the disputed border. However, as the year, and the Eisenhower administration, drew to a close, the battles increased in intensity. The New York Times reported that “several clashes have occurred in the last four weeks between Somali tribesmen from the Somali Republic and Ethiopian Somali tribesmen in the Ogaden area,”77 and throughout January, news arrived of further skirmishes along the Ethiopian-Somali border, with hundreds of casualties reported. On the second day of the Kennedy administration, the secretary-general of the Somali National Movement, Ali Abdullah, warned that “war might develop between Somalia and Ethiopia.”78 His concern was not unfounded and Somali irredentism, and the unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, would remain a problem for the incoming president.

Forging the ‘special relationship’ 49

Independence and instability Achievement of Somali independence may have been a moment of triumph, but most analysts were under no illusions about the problems that would be faced by the newly independent nation as it headed into the new decade. With the World Bank estimating that Somalia would need at least $6 million a year in outside aid, an editorial in Time concluded that “of the new nations born last week, none faced bleaker prospects than the Somali Republic.”79 Nor was Somalia’s neighbour, Ethiopia, any more stable. As well as the simmering Eritrean insurgency, the end of 1960 revealed further internal problems for America’s most-valued ally in the Horn. On December 14, while Haile Selassie was on a state visit to Brazil, an attempted coup took place in Addis Ababa. The coup attempt was quickly thwarted, though, and Douglas Dillon, acting Secretary of State, informed Eisenhower that the emperor “has now regained control of Ethiopia,” with Eisenhower’s intelligence briefing noting that “Haile Selassie is well back in the saddle.” The briefing also summarised the grisly aftermath of the coup, noting that “much blood has been shed and several high ranking officials were shot, including the Minister of Defence, and reprisals are expected. Students who demonstrated in favour of the revolution have reportedly been arrested and shot.”80 Notwithstanding Haile Selassie’s brutal response, the unsuccessful coup served to further consolidate the relationship between Haile Selassie and the United States. Arthur Richards, American ambassador to Ethiopia, met with the emperor in Asmara and reported back that the “emperor called me forward and with some emotion expressed sincere gratitude assistance given those who put down revolt [sic]. He asked his gratitude be conveyed to the president.”81 Dillon also noted that American support for the emperor during the coup “will have a major effect on his feelings toward the United States and thus on our position in Ethiopia.” At Dillon’s recommendation, Eisenhower sent a message to Selassie, expressing his “gratification at Your Imperial Majesty’s safe return to your capital and at the enthusiastic welcome you received from your loyal subjects.”82 The coup attempt, though, raised questions in the United States about the future stability of Haile Selassie’s regime that added to the concerns about Somalia, Eritrea and the Ogaden. Those concerns, though, would not trouble the Eisenhower administration but would be placed on the desk of Eisenhower’s young successor in the Oval Office, and the importance of Africa in Kennedy’s foreign policy was not going unnoticed. As an editorial in the New York Times declared, as the 1960s began, the most important political shadow looming over this new decade is Africa’s. For it is on that vast continent, as under-developed economically as it is in terms of education, sociology and politics, that the greatest changes of the Sixties will occur. Whether the contest between communism and democracy continues as “cold war” or as competitive coexistence, its principal battlefield is likely to be African.83

50  Forging the ‘special relationship’

Notes 1 CIA Report: The World Situation Over the Next Decade, December 29, 1952; PSF Box 220, Special Estimates Reports 21–35, Truman Library. 2 Eisenhower diary entry, January  18, 1954; Robert H. Ferrell (ed), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), pp. 266–273. 3 Eisenhower diary entry, January 6, 1953; Robert H. Ferrell (ed), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), p. 223. 4 304th Meeting of the National Security Council, November 15, 1956; Ann Whitman Files Box 8, Eisenhower Library. 5 Briefing Note for the National Security Council, August 10, 1960; NSC Staff Papers Box 44, Africa – General (2), Eisenhower Library. 6 Report by Nixon, African Trip, March  21, 1957; CFOF Box  594, Vice President’s African Trip 3/1–18–57, Eisenhower Library. 7 Joseph Satterthwaite, Briefing on Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, March 5/July 21, 1959, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session, British Library. 8 Henderson, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Near East and Africa, July 31, 1957, House of Representatives, 85th Congress, 1st Session, British Library. 9 Report by Nixon, African Trip, March 21, 1957; CFOF Box 594, Vice President’s African Trip 3/1–18–57, Eisenhower Library. 10 Joseph Satterthwaite, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, March 5/July 21, 1959, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session, British Library. 11 “Cold War Finds New Battlefield,” New York Times, April 2, 1957. 12 NSC 5903, February 4, 1959; NSC Staff Papers Box 44, WHO, Eisenhower Library. 13 National Security Council Report, October  23, 1956; NSC Series Box  19, NSC 5615/1 – Policy Toward Ethiopia (2), Eisenhower Library. 14 Report, May 1953; RG59 Box 3, Military Assistance, National Archives II. 15 US-Ethiopian Agreement for the Use of Military Facilities in Ethiopia, May 15, 1953; RG59 Box 2, Negotiations, National Archives II. 16 US-Ethiopian Agreement for the Use of Military Facilities in Ethiopia, May 15, 1953; RG59 Box 2, Negotiations, National Archives II. 17 Circular Airgram from the Department of State, January 19, 1953; RG59 Box 2846, United States-Ethiopian Relations July-Dec 1952, National Archives II. 18 Circular Airgram from the Department of State, January 19, 1953; RG59 Box 2846, United States-Ethiopian Relations July-Dec 1952, National Archives II. 19 All references from Letter from Henry Byroade on behalf of Acheson to Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army, November 17, 1952; RG59 Box 2, 6B Kagnew Station, National Archives II. 20 Letter From Under Secretary of State (Smith) to Secretary of Defence (Wilson), April 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954 Vol XI, pp. 443–445. 21 Letter From Under Secretary of State (Smith) to Secretary of Defence (Wilson), April 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954 Vol XI, pp. 443–445. 22 Morton to Wiley, May 20, 1953; RG59 Box 2, Negotiations, National Archives II. 23 “US to Aid Ethiopian Army,” New York Times, May 23, 1953. 24 See, for example, Paul Henze, The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991). 25 Dulles to Eisenhower, May 25, 1954; Ann Whitman Files Box 3, Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Library. 26 Report, Operations Coordinating Board, September 4, 1956; OCB Central File Series Box 28, OCB 091, Eisenhower Library. 27 Report, Operations Coordinating Board, September 13, 1956; OCB Central File Series Box 28, OCB 091, Eisenhower Library.

Forging the ‘special relationship’ 51 28 Haile Selassie to the House of Representatives, May 28, 1954, CR, p. 7356, Library of Congress. 29 Bromley Smith, Briefing Note, October 15, 1956; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Box 4, Eisenhower Library. 30 Report, Operations Coordinating Board, September  13, 1956, NSC Staff Papers Box 28, OCB 091, Eisenhower Library. 31 304th Meeting of the National Security Council, November 15, 1956; Ann Whitman Files Box 8, Eisenhower Library. 32 Report, May 1953; RG59 Box 3, Military Assistance, National Archives II. 33 Report, Operations Coordinating Board, September  13, 1956; NSC Staff Papers Box 28, OCB 091, Eisenhower Library. 34 Report, Operations Coordinating Board, September  13, 1956; NSC Staff Papers Box 28, OCB 091, Eisenhower Library. 35 NSC 5615/1, November 19, 1956; NSC Staff Papers Box 28, OCB 091, Eisenhower Library. 36 Report, Operations Coordinating Board, February 11, 1957; NSC Staff Papers Box 28, OCB 091, Eisenhower Library. 37 Dulles to American Embassy, Addis Ababa, October 16, 1956; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Box 8, Policy Toward Ethiopia, Eisenhower Library. 38 414th Meeting of the National Security Council, July  23, 1959; Ann Whitman File Box 11, Eisenhower Library. 39 414th Meeting of the National Security Council, July  23, 1959; Ann Whitman File Box 11, Eisenhower Library. 40 Report, Operations Coordinating Board, July 13, 1960; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Box 26, NSC 5903 – Horn of Africa, Eisenhower Library. 41 Report, Operations Coordinating Board, July 13, 1960; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Box 26, NSC 5903 – Horn of Africa, Eisenhower Library. 42 NSC 6028, December 30, 1960; NSC Staff Papers Box 44, Horn of Africa (2), Eisenhower Library. 43 Circular Airgram from the Department of State, January 19, 1953; RG59 Box 2846, United States-Ethiopian Relations July–December 1952, National Archives II. 44 National Intelligence Estimate, December 22, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, Volume XI – Africa and South Asia, p. 86. 45 Department of State Instruction, February  23, 1954; RG59 Box  2846, National Archives II. 46 Kadi, Press Release, November  29, 1957; GF 122 Box  834, Ethiopia, Eisenhower Library. 47 AJ Goodpaster, December 3, 1957; GF 122 Box 834, Ethiopia, Eisenhower Library. 48 “Italy Reports on Wards,” New York Times, June 18, 1953. 49 “Somaliland: Beginning of a New Nation,” Time, May 14, 1956. 50 “Somaliland Opens Parliament,” New York Times, May 2, 1956. 51 “Somaliland: Beginning of a New Nation,” Time, May 14, 1956. 52 “Somaliland Aid Urged,” New York Times, June 15, 1954. 53 “Reds Form Party in Somaliland,” New York Times, July 4, 1956. 54 “US Meets Red Moves in Africa,” Washington Post, February 14, 1957. 55 Memo from William Rountree to Under Secretary of State (Christian Herter), July 22, 1958; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Box  1, Africa, Eisenhower Library. 56 James Grant, Deputy Director for Program and Planning, International Cooperation Administration, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, April 26, 1960, House of Representatives 86th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1315, Library of Congress.

52  Forging the ‘special relationship’ 57 Senator William Fulbright (D-AR), Debate on Foreign Assistance, July 8, 1959, CR, Library of Congress. 58 Memo from William Rountree to Under Secretary of State (Christian Herter), July 22, 1958; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Box  1, Africa, Eisenhower Library. 59 “Somali Premier Seeks West’s Aid,” New York Times, February 17, 1960. 60 Operations Coordinating Board Activity Report, December 21, 1959; OCB Secretariat Series Box 10, OCB 3191 Activity Report (File #6) (2), Eisenhower Library. 61 “Self-Rule Is Aim for Somaliland,” New York Times, February 10, 1959. 62 Operations Coordinating Board Activity Report, April  25, 1960; OCB Secretariat Series Box 10, OCB 3191 Activity Report (File #6) (5), Eisenhower Library. 63 “Somaliland Marks Independence After 73 Years of British Rule,” New York Times, June 26, 1960. 64 “Free Today, Somali Sets Celebration,” Washington Post, June 30, 1960. 65 “Somalia is Born as a Free Republic,” New York Times, July 1, 1960. 66 Message, Eisenhower to Aden, July 1, 1960. Ann Whitman Files International Series Box 47, Somali Republic, Eisenhower Library. 67 “Somalia Backed in UN,” New York Times, July 6, 1960. 68 “Somali Premier Seeks West’s Aid,” New York Times, February 17, 1960. 69 “Free Today, Somali Sets Celebration,” Washington Post, June 30, 1960. 70 Tom Farer to House Subcommittee on Africa, March 28, 1977, Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY78 Part 3: Economic and Military Assistance Programs in Africa, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 71 Report, Operations Coordinating Board, July 13, 1960; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Box 26, NSC5903 – Horn of Africa, Box 26, Eisenhower Library. 72 “Somalis’ Thrust Worries Ethiopia,” New York Times, February 17, 1957. 73 “British Return Ogaden to Control of Ethiopia,” New York Times, October 16, 1948. 74 “Lie Arrives in Addis Ababa,” New York Times, October 17, 1959. 75 Memo, National Security Council, August  10, 1960; NSC Staff Papers Box  44, Africa – General (2), Eisenhower Library. 76 Memo to James Lay, NSC, from Bromley Smith, Executive Officer of the OCB, July 21, 1960; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Box 26, NSC5903 – Horn of Africa, Eisenhower Library. 77 “Somali Clashes Listed,” New York Times, December 30, 1960. 78 “Somali Warns of War,” New York Times, January 21, 1961. 79 “Somalia: Nomad Nation,” Time, July 11, 1960. 80 Synopsis of Intelligence Material Reported to the President, December  19, 1960; Office of the Staff Secretary Box 14, Intelligence Briefing Notes, Vol 1 (9), Eisenhower Library. 81 Telegram, Richards to Dept of State, December 17, 1960; Office of the Staff Secretary Box 5, Ethiopia [July 1958–December 1960], Eisenhower Library. 82 Memo, Douglas Dillon, Acting Sec State to Eisenhower, December  17, 1960; Ann Whitman File Box 9, Ethiopia (1), Eisenhower Library. 83 “What Cold War Reaches Africa,” New York Times, January 6, 1960.

4 Self-determination and the new frontier

Let the word go forth When John F. Kennedy in his inaugural address asked the world what “together we can do for the freedom of man,” his words resonated throughout Africa as the continent shook off its colonial past and moved closer and closer towards total independence.1 Indeed, between the time when Kennedy formally announced his candidacy for president and the moment he swore the oath of office, seventeen African nations achieved independence, taking the total to twenty-seven, with half a dozen more on the “threshold of freedom.”2 During his campaign, Kennedy had pointed to the potential impact of the wave of African independence on the world order and organisations such as the United Nations, warning that “no area of the world deserves more of our knowledge and attention while getting so little as the great, throbbing continent of Africa” because the “balance of power is shifting” and predicting that, within ten years, “African nations alone may control 25% of all United Nations votes.”3 In recognition of the growing importance of Africa, the president-elect used the transition period to send his brother, Ted, along with Senators Frank Church (D-ID) and Frank Moss (D-UT), on a fact-finding mission to gather information that would, as Church acknowledged, “provide a basis for alterations in United States policy toward Africa.”4 Kennedy’s acknowledgement of the increasing importance of Africa was also reflected in the creation of the Advisory Council on African Affairs, as well as the African Policy Committee under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams, to advise Kennedy “on policy problems in Africa, to reach decisions on African policy as appropriate, and to improve the coordinated application to current operations of policy considerations.”5 National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk both agreed that these steps would be “most helpful in making the formulation of our policies more forward-looking and their execution swifter and more precise in an area which promises to present us with many opportunities and problems in the future.”6 The problems to which Bundy and Rusk referred, and to which the senatorial report alluded when it alleged that “the United States and the whole free world face some very troubled and dangerous times ahead in the continent of Africa,”7

54  Self-determination and the new frontier were those expected to be caused by the Soviet bloc. Publicly, Kennedy may have insisted that, when it came to Africa, he was not asking countries to choose sides and that “we want their friendship – and no more,”8 but, within internal government circles, it was clear that the administration’s policy ambitions went further than that. Discussions within the administration, the African Policy Committee and the State Department all highlighted Cold War concerns, emphasising the need to “pursue foreign policies which fall within the broad community of interests in the western world,”9 to gain “assurance of continued US presence at military installations considered vital to US interest . . . [and to] prevent strategically significant Bloc military influence in any African country.”10 The latter aim, as Kennedy knew from the report of the fact-finding mission to Africa, would prove particularly challenging given the “considerable evidence of Communist penetration . . . [with] communist infiltration particularly evident in such countries as Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic, Guinea and Ghana, all of which have received Soviet bloc aid.”11 One of the biggest problems for the United States, though, when it came to American-Soviet competition in Africa was that the Soviet Union had an advantage with newly independent nations because of its anti-colonialist and antiimperialist reputation. To address this, Kennedy also emphasised American support for self-determination throughout the developing world, including the “identification of the United States with basic African aspirations for freedom, independence and complete decolonisation of the continent.”12 Accordingly, in Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the policy of the Kennedy administration reflected a determination to prevent the spread of communist influence under the pretext of creating independent, democratic states or, to put it another way, to engage in nation-building in a Western model context. Chester Bowles, adviser on African affairs, stressed that “our primary objective in every part of the world should be the emergence of vigorous, independent nation-states,”13 while Professor Fred Burke, during a briefing on African policy, told Kennedy that “American leadership can enable this huge area and these millions of people to establish the conditions necessary to Democratic government and security.”14 In March 1962, a State Department report formalised this approach, confirming that “the critical factor in African nation-building is leadership” for both the United States and within the African nations, and explained that in choosing countries for special emphasis, we propose to make a major effort to help dynamic and progressive leaders who are reasonably friendly. We are also prepared to work with apparently unfriendly leaders who have or will have great influence, in the hope of eventually moderating their orientation.15 In practical terms, Kennedy maintained that the best way for the United States to help African leaders and thereby succeed in nation-building was through economic and developmental programmes that would make it appear as if the United States was respecting African disinterest in the Cold War while still providing a firm foundation to combat communist bloc influence. During his presidential campaign, Kennedy reiterated Albert Schweitzer’s view that “political independence

Self-determination and the new frontier 55 is meaningless without economic independence” and insisted that “sound and orderly development of Africa stands high on America’s agenda for the sixties.”16 Once in office, this rhetoric became reality when Kennedy established the Peace Corps with Executive Order 10924 on March 1, 1961. Bowles later commented that, with American economic and developmental programmes including the Peace Corps, “we have no better instrument, potentially, for associating ourselves with the constructive, progressive forces of the world and for thwarting, blunting and deflecting the forces both of feudalism and communism.”17

Kennedy and Somalia When it came to the Horn of Africa, newly independent Somalia seemed the obvious place to test the Kennedy administration’s avowed policy choices in Africa. On June 20, 1961, the Somali Republic formally adopted its new Constitution, and confirmed the appointment of Aden Abdullah Osman as its permanent president.18 Following the broader themes of his African policy, the Kennedy administration extended the hand of friendship to the newly independent nation, offering economic and developmental aid. Both President Aden and Somali Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke were equally keen to consolidate relations between their nation and the United States, welcoming all offers of American support. During a meeting with Kennedy, Shermarke expressed Somali gratitude for American support “both before and after independence” and expressed his hope that this would continue as Somalia “needed the help of the developed countries, especially the United States as a world leader.”19 Part of this help came in the form of Peace Corps volunteers, with the first group of 45 arriving in Mogadishu to a warm welcome.20 The initial focus was on education, and Sargent Shriver explained that in addition to teaching, “the volunteers will work with students and adults in such after-school activities as sports, handicrafts, music, reading, painting, etc.”21 However, when it came to US-Somali relations, things were never going to be simple. The first problem for the Kennedy administration was the strong interest being shown by the communist bloc in establishing relations with all the newly independent nations of Africa, including Somalia, and the Somali willingness to consider such proposals. State Department briefing notes prepared for Bundy confirmed that the “Soviet government has given every evidence that it considers Somalia a primary target in Africa.” In additional to a substantial aid package, “the Soviet Government has undertaken to construct port facilities at Berbera in the northern part of the country.”22 A report in the New York Times claimed that the Soviet aid package to Somalia was “one of the largest relative to population that the Soviet Union has given any country,” and provided the “basis for significant economic and political influence in the young East African republic.”23 Despite Shermarke insisting in a meeting with Kennedy that Somalia was “fundamentally pro-Western,” he made it clear that his alignment was not unqualified, adding that although he “would not go to the Soviet Union for its essential needs if it could obtain them in the West. But vital means must be sought wherever they can be found.”24 The second problem for the United States when it came to consolidating relations with Somalia was the opposition from Somalia’s neighbour, and the United

56  Self-determination and the new frontier States’ long-time ally, Ethiopia, particularly if the administration succumbed to Aden’s main request – that of military aid. Edward Korry, the American ambassador to Ethiopia from 1962, telegraphed the State Department to express his concern over the probable Ethiopian reaction if or when the United States provided any military aid to Somalia and asking for reassurances and, if necessary, conditions to be attached to the aid package: In view of fact we are giving arms to country which is pressing important territorial claims against two neighbours which have no claims against Somalia, we should seek reiteration Somalis undertaking not use them offensively. Failing that, appears we should make strongest possible statement that we will not permit US arms be used offensively and this statement should be made public when delivery programme announced.25

Ethiopia remains the priority Despite the desire to establish relations with Somalia, there was never any question in the minds of the Kennedy administration that the relationship with Ethiopia could or should be put at risk. During a meeting with Haile Selassie in October 1963, Kennedy insisted that “in the United States view, Ethiopia was the key country in that part of the world and that it was with that in mind that we made our policies.”26 In perhaps one of the most poignant statements regarding the Kennedy foreign policy, Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the American-Ethiopian relationship was vital because it represented the value of America keeping its word: At the present time we have commitments with more than 40 nations, multilateral, bilateral, that just about circle the earth. Now there are some of us who believe that aggression itself is the problem, and that the course of aggression, the chain of aggression, inevitably leads to World War III. Those who had to help decide the question of resistance in Korea in 1950, coming back to that one still once more, I think, were deeply impressed with the course of events which started in Manchuria in 1931, led through Ethiopia, the rearming of the Rhineland, reoccupation of the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, these other events, which led to World War II, and they felt it was very important to stop this chain of aggression at its source. Now, Laos, Vietnam are a long way from here, but so was Ethiopia before World War II. So that part of what is at stake is what our commitments mean.27 While the American commitment to Ethiopia may not have had the same overall and profound impact as the commitment to Southeast Asia, the principles were seen as the same. Ethiopia, like South Vietnam, could not be lost. The attempted coup against Haile Selassie in December  1960 aroused some concerns among the members of the new administration, despite its failure. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the coup concluded that it had been

Self-determination and the new frontier 57 sparked by the “dissatisfaction of the Imperial Body Guard officers with their low pay and what they felt to be their declining status in the military hierarchy,” but also noted that it had been supported by demands from a “growing number of young ‘modernists’ and western educated intellectuals for more rapid social and economic advance.”28 The NIE concluded that the impact of the coup was slight, but that it highlighted the need for continued developmental and economic aid from the Americans if further discontent against the emperor was to be minimised. Thus, when the Ethiopian ambassador, Berhanu Dinke, payed the traditional courtesy call on the president in 1961, Kennedy “expressed his very keen appreciation of the friendship that had existed between Ethiopia and the United States and his desire to do those things necessary to sustain and develop this friendship.”29 Along with continued substantial economic and developmental aid, a large Peace Corps contingent was sent to Ethiopia to work primarily in the field of education. Haile Selassie was reportedly embarrassed by fact that Ethiopia was 95 per cent illiterate,30 and requested “the Peace Corps to supply up to 300 volunteers to work in the country’s secondary schools” to teach “teach maths, English, geography, home economics, biology, typing, industrial arts, agriculture and physical education,” and work with “students and adults in such after-school activities as sports, music, sewing, reading and painting.”31 In November  1962, Shriver reported that during his meetings with Haile Selassie, the emperor had “personally expressed his delight at the work being done by the volunteers.”32 Shriver subsequently told Kennedy that the Peace Corps’ presence in Ethiopia, which numbered 277, could have a lasting impact on US-Ethiopian relations, even more profound than “Cleopatra’s visit to the conquering Lion of Judah 1,500 years ago.” In his report, Shriver also alluded to the Cold War context, asking “what the Congress would think if 277 Russian teachers were to work in Ethiopian classrooms and Ethiopia was asking for 200 more,” implying that, at least in Ethiopia, the Peace Corps was an important way in which to combat communist influence in the developing world.33 Notwithstanding his appreciation of the importance of American economic and developmental aid to his country, what Haile Selassie was really after was increased military aid. Although Ethiopia was the recipient of several million dollars in military aid every year, much of this had been provided to the army, and by the early 1960s Haile Selassie wanted to strengthen his navy and his air force. A sitrep sent to the State Department in February 1962 noted that “Ethiopia has one wing of F-86 jet fighters” but was “now seeking from the US a second wing in addition to a number of tanks and other military items.”34 The administration, wishing to maintain friendly relations with as many countries as possible while also avoiding entanglement in an arms race in Africa, tried to resist Selassie’s demands. After reviewing the request, Bowles told Kennedy that “there is no rational military justification for giving the GOE a second squadron of F-86s. Ethiopia’s military needs aren’t that great and she isn’t under enough of a threat from her neighbours, even Somalia.”35 The president agreed and sent Bowles to Addis Ababa to inform the government that the administration had “carefully reviewed IEG request for additional F-86 aircraft and regrets it is unable

58  Self-determination and the new frontier provide this equipment at present time.”36 Haile Selassie, though, was not happy. On October 19, 1962, Ambassador Richards telegraphed the State Department, reporting that “Ethiopian-US relations are about to reach low ebb as result rejection latest Ethiopian request for additional jets” as well as other proposed cuts to military aid.37 Given the Kennedy administration’s prioritisation of Ethiopia, this assessment was most worrying. The problem for the United States lay in Haile Selassie’s ability to play the Cold War game. His alliance with the United States, as for most leaders of developing nations, was driven not by strong ideological principles but by practical necessity and national interest. Although his preference for Western aid was genuine, he was not averse to doing whatever he needed to, including resorting to blackmail, to get what he wanted. When the United States was slow in responding to a request for radio transmitters, the emperor sent a message informing the Agency for International Development (AID) that “the Ethiopians are unwilling to accept the delays involved in soliciting new bids, and that they may possibly accept Soviet aid to obtain transmitters.” He also hinted that “Sovietfinanced transmitters might be so designed and located as to physically interfere with operation of the US facilities at Kagnew.”38 This last threat was the one that the Americans most feared. Despite Rusk’s rhetoric about the importance of the United States honouring its commitments and standing by its friends, there was a far more practical reason underlying the American fears of upsetting Haile Selassie: access to Kagnew station which remained, as General Shuler, Director of Installations, US Army, testified to the Senate Appropriations Committee, “a very key and large station, in Asmara, Eritrea.”39 An intelligence report compiled in February 1962 confirmed that the “communications base at Asmara is the key to US-Ethiopian relations. It is needed by the US because of its many advantageous characteristics as one of the four world-wide bases for future satellite communications in addition to regular military communications.” Unfortunately for the Kennedy administration, Haile Selassie was well aware of the base’s importance and used that knowledge to the full in attempts to get what he wanted; the intelligence report confirmed that “Ethiopia makes full use of this fact in negotiations for economic and military aid.”40 During a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, General Palmer conceded that the United States provided the first wing of F-86s to Ethiopia “in order to retain our base rights at Asmara” while his Defence Department colleague, Admiral Grantham, admitted that “blackmail is a dirty word, but let’s face it. This isn’t the only place we do it.”41 After their visit to Africa, Senators Phil Hart (D-MI), Maurine Neuberger (D-OR) and Albert Gore (D-TN) expressed some frustration on American support for Ethiopia given Haile Selassie’s autocratic rule, commenting that Ethiopia was one of the African states “receiving US assistance which do not, in our opinion, measure up to the minimum standards of free societies.” Their conclusion, that “the United States found it necessary to put up with a certain amount of blackmail simply because there were certain installations there that we wished to maintain” demonstrated the extent to which Haile Selassie’s ability to manipulate the United States was being noted.42

Self-determination and the new frontier 59 Instead of increased military aid, the Kennedy administration discussed other options that might help to placate Haile Selassie. Bowles pointed out that “we face a particularly complex situation in the fact that we may not be able to retain important military facilities while reducing military assistance unless we simultaneously step up economic aid.”43 This could be done in Ethiopia by an “expanded economic development assistance” that gave “high priority to the emperor’s new university in Addis Ababa (in which he takes great pride), to roads, to agricultural development . . . and to public health.” He therefore recommended “an economic development package that balances military assistance cuts with added economic assistance (some of it with military significance such as roads and airfields), plus adequate economic development assistance tied to improved performance by the national government.”44 In addition to this, Ambassador Richards suggested that an invitation for the emperor to pay an official state visit to the United States “would seemingly help relations.”45 The members of the African Policy Committee agreed, noting that such a visit would “demonstrate our continued friendship and support for Ethiopia” and create a “climate within the Ethiopian Government to ensure our continued effective use of the communications state at Kagnew.”46 Subsequently the emperor was invited on a formal state visit to the United States in October 1963 as a “mark of the continuing friendly relations between the United States and Ethiopia.”47 However, the main way that the US appeased Haile Selassie was through support for his plans for Eritrea. As previously noted, from the earliest discussions over the future of Eritrea, the Ethiopian emperor had made his designs on the province very clear. Although the region had been federated with Ethiopia by the UN in 1952, the terms of the federation dictated that Eritrea should retain a substantial degree of autonomy, including its own flag, judicial system, and parliament with control over domestic affairs. These rights, however, were gradually chipped away as Haile Selassie asserted Ethiopian authority. As the Washington Post reported, The partnership between Eritrea and Ethiopia is fundamentally that which exists between a horse and its rider: as long as the Eritrean horse behaves itself and does what he’s told to do, he’s fairly well-treated. But there is no question as to who is boss. In the decade since federation, the rights guaranteed to Eritrea have slowly withered away. The Eritrean flag, seal and coat of arms are no longer. There is freedom of speech only within certain tightly defined limits. The press would never dare to criticise the Ethiopian administration.48 Further, the supposedly independent parliament had become nothing more than a “powerless discussion club.”49 By the time that the Kennedy administration took office, the emperor was in the process of making his final plans for Eritrea. In July 1962, he took advantage of the unrest against Ethiopian rule by alleging that “certain traitors, alien puppets and hypocrites are trying to stir up trouble in Eritrea and create disunity between that northern region and Ethiopia proper.”50 Under this pretext, the Ethiopian military moved in to restore order and,

60  Self-determination and the new frontier on November 14, 1962, forced the Eritrean parliament to dissolve. The following day, Eritrea was formally annexed as Ethiopia’s fourteenth province by a unanimous vote in the Eritrean Assembly.51 Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea in violation of the UN terms caused some concern in Africa. Robert Komer of the National Security Council warned Kennedy that “we have a report that Somalia, backed by Arab states, may bring Ethiopia’s recent formal annexation of Eritrea before the UN.”52 Mecca Radio similarly reported that “the ‘free Eritrea’ movement has appealed for UN intervention to save Eritrea from its merger with Emperor Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia.”53 Not only did the United States not support such protests, the Kennedy administration also took active steps to try to prevent them achieving any success subsequent to Komer’s suggestion that “though we hardly applaud Haile Selassie’s action, we ought to tell Abdirascid that for Somalia to complain to the UN about it would be futile.”54 Indeed, and arguably due to the American stance, the complaints to the UN led to nothing. Smith Hempstone, in an editorial for the Washington Post, claimed that Eritrea had been “tricked by history.” The province, he maintained, has as much right to nationhood as at least a dozen African states that today are members of the UN. Where Eritrea lost out was in the timing of the decision concerning its fate. In 1950, the only Africa members of the UN were Egypt, Liberia and Ethiopia. Today, there are 26 African members. Were the Eritrea question brought up today, the majority unquestionably would vote for independence. But history passed Eritrea by.55 So, too, had the United States and the United Nations. With all diplomatic solutions seemingly exhausted, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) vowed to bring independence to the province by force if necessary. In September 1961, the first shots were fired in a war that would rage for over thirty years and for which the Kennedy administration had to bear some responsibility.

Somali irredentism and the Ogaden Eritrea was not the only place where conflict flared in the Horn of Africa during the Kennedy administration. In the same way that Haile Selassie’s territorial ambitions impacted upon Eritrea, so Somali irredentism threatened American dreams of establishing good relations with both Ethiopia and Somalia as well as stability in the Horn of Africa as a whole. As Williams told Kennedy, “peace in the Horn of Africa depends in large measure on the stabilisation, if not the ultimate solution, to two problems: the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia.”56 The root of these problems lay with the European colonisation of Africa which had resulted in the division of ethnic Somalis among five different nations. While Somali independence had united two of these groups, over 450,000 ethnic Somalis remained outside the Republic in French Somaliland, the Ogaden region of

Self-determination and the new frontier  61 Ethiopia and north-eastern Kenya. Indeed, one of the reasons why the Somalis were supportive of Eritrean independence was because of a belief that the “separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia would further their aim of acquiring Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabited Ogaden province.”57 Somali designs on parts of north-eastern Kenya, then under British control, erupted into armed clashes and skirmishes between British troops and Somalis in the disputed Northern Frontier District in February 1963. As Kenya was prepared for independence from British rule, the UK refused to yield to demands to cede the territory to Somalia with the result that the Somali government formally broke off diplomatic relations on March 19. This, Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research, told Rusk, was likely to result in even closer ties between Somalia and the Soviet bloc as Somalia sought alternative sources for British aid. The reason for the break, Hilsman explained, was that the Somalis were “claiming that the UK has reneged on a promise to consult Mogadishu before making final disposition of the disputed area.”58 When summarising the situation for Kennedy, Komer was scathing in his assessment of all the involved parties, blaming the “mess” on “British ineptness.” The British, he explained, had long encouraged the Somalis to think the UK would give them Somali Kenya before granting Kenyan independence. But Sandys, in negotiating the Kenyan constitution and paving the way for self-government there in May, reversed field and triggered off the Somalis.59 The situation, Bundy concluded, contained “elements of serious concern,” not least because of the need to compensate for the withdrawal of British aid from Somalia, a sum he estimated at approximately $3.4  million.60 He also worried about the increasing likelihood of violence erupting in the Horn but, in this region at least, the American fears were not realised. With no support for Somali claims to the Northern Frontier District, either in Africa or among the wider international community because, as Komer explained to Kennedy, “this sets a bad precedent,”61 the likelihood of Somalia being successful in its territorial ambitions decreased even further when Joseph Murumbi, acting prime minister of Kenya, announced that “all outstanding border disputes between Ethiopia and Kenya had been settled.”62 This agreement between Ethiopia and Kenya signified an alliance against Somalia that culminated in the signing of a defence pact in 1969, and all but ended Somali designs on Kenya. While the outcome of the situation in Kenya had left the Somalis disgruntled, it nonetheless had brought a greater degree of stability to the Horn of Africa. Unfortunately, the same could not be said when it came to Somali claims to the Ogaden. If anything, it only increased the demands for other ‘lost’ regions to be reunited in a Greater Somalia and the focus shifted to the disputed border with Ethiopia. In August 1962, President Aden told Thomas Judd, chargé d’affaires at the American embassy in Mogadishu, that as long as the “Ogaden issue remained, there would always be friction” between Ethiopia and Somalia.63 An editorial in the Washington Post stated the position even more strongly, maintaining that “Mogadishu’s

62  Self-determination and the new frontier desire to unite [all Somalis] poses the greatest single threat to peace today in the eastern Horn of Africa” with the constant “danger that an incident in the Ogaden will touch off a war.”64 Thus, as well as the need for economic and developmental aid, the Somali leadership welcomed American overtures of friendship because of the perceived opportunity to gain military aid and support for their territorial ambitions. During a meeting with Kennedy in November 1962, Prime Minister Shermarke attempted to elicit American support by launching into “an historical account of” what he claimed was “the “artificial and unjust” division of Somali lands during the last century into five parts by Italy, Great Britain (2 parts) France and Ethiopia,” and asserting that the “greatest hope of the Somali people was for reunification.”65 There was never any question of American support for Somali territorial ambitions, however. In a report for Kennedy, Williams urged that the United States cannot take any action which would appear to lend support to Somali irredentism. The United States supports the validity of current frontiers in Africa, despite the many claims and counter-claims which surround them and believes change should come about only with the consent of all parties involved. The United States should continue to make this clear to the Somali Republic.66 American efforts for a peaceful solution notwithstanding, throughout the years of the Kennedy administration, there were constant reports of skirmishes along the disputed border between Ethiopia and Somalia. Within days of taking office, Kennedy received reports that mounting tension between Ethiopia and the newly independent Somali Republic is causing grave concern here on the Horn of Africa. Exchanges of charges have increased markedly. One side has accused the other of massacring hundreds of its nationals; the other side has charged its neighbour with banditry, aggression and looting. Even hints of open warfare have appeared recently.67 Reports such as these were commonplace during 1961, and continued into 1962, when, as Kennedy prepared to face his biggest challenge yet in Cuba, Judd reported “Somali-Ethiopian relations now at lowest point” and warned that the “explosive potential of situation ought not be underestimated.”68 Although Judd’s fears were not immediately realised, the situation continued to deteriorate with a State Department summary of August 1963 confirming that “reports from Mogadishu and Addis Ababa indicate that the disturbances in Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabited Ogaden Province have reached serious proportions.”69 In October, as the administration prepared for the forthcoming state visit of Emperor Haile Selassie, a briefing paper reported that “recent fighting in the Ogaden, in which Somali tribesmen have been pitted against up to 7,000 regular Ethiopian troops, has resulted in considerable bloodshed.”70

Self-determination and the new frontier  63 The main concern for the administration, though, was not the immediate impact of the conflict on the people of Ethiopia and Somalia, but the larger, global implications. As Bowles explained to Kennedy, Ethiopia has no valid reason to fear any of its neighbours. . . . Although the Somali border problem is vexing, no informed person would suggest that one and one-half million Somalis, with a glorified gendarmerie of some two or three thousand presents Ethiopia with a serious military problem. Instead, the real danger lay in the involvement of outside powers in the Horn. Although American military aid to Ethiopia would not “affect the worldwide balance of power,” it was, Bowles continued, “likely to frighten Ethiopia’s neighbours into seeking modern sophisticated weapons with which to right a balance which should never have been tipped in the first place.”71 Komer agreed, commenting that “unless the trend is reversed, things are heading toward an eventual clash in which we will end up backing Ethiopia and the UAR/USSR the Somalis.”72 In other words, the real danger was that if both sides received external support, the malignity of the conflict would increase exponentially, and so would the danger that this could become yet another proxy war between the superpowers. This danger was exacerbated by the Somali reaction to the extent of Kennedy’s support for Ethiopia. Particularly in Mogadishu, there were often demonstrations protesting the American support for Ethiopia, and a State Department report to a House Appropriations subcommittee acknowledged the Somali dissatisfaction with “the relatively substantial US military and technical assistance programmes to Ethiopia while refusing to provide military assistance to them.”73 The Kennedy administration attempted to placate the Somalis by explaining that administration policy was to “render assistance to both the Somali Republic and Ethiopia in their battle against under-development, the only battle which the United States government supports” and insisted that “the use of military equipment furnished to the Ethiopian government by the United States government is restricted to internal security and defensive measures, or in support of operations of the United Nations,” and if that equipment was used for other purposes, “the government of the United States would certainly take appropriate measures” to redress the situation.74 Such reassurances from the State Department notwithstanding, the American prioritisation of Ethiopia and refusal to be swayed sufficiently by Somali pleas made Aden’s next move almost inevitable. In October 1963, Horace Torbert, who had presented his credentials as ambassador to Somalia in January 1963, reported that the “Somalis have accepted a Soviet offer of $30 million in military assistance.”75 Dr Ahmed Mohamed Darman, counsellor of the Somali mission to the United Nations, subsequently confirmed that Somalia had accepted military aid from the Soviet Union because its “long-standing request for United States military assistance was not met,” but denied that Somalia had joined the Soviet bloc, adding that he was “still hopeful” of military and economic aid from the United States.76 Kennedy was less conciliatory though and, as a result of the acceptance

64  Self-determination and the new frontier of Soviet aid by the Somalis, he decided that although the United States would “stay in Somalia with limited economic aid ($4  million a year) and the Peace Corps,” military aid should be reduced to a minimum. This, he noted should “make the Ethiopians happy.”77 This last concern was driven by Haile Selassie’s ability at playing the Cold War game. The Soviet Union, like the United States, recognised the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa and made overtures of friendship to both the newly independent Republic of Somalia and also to Ethiopia. Haile Selassie may have publicly and repeatedly expressed his preference for Western aid, but he also made it clear that he would take help from anyone if he had to. Cultural exchange agreements were signed by Haile Selassie with both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia to build an oil refinery at the Red Sea port of Assab. After Yuri Gagarin became the first man to orbit the earth in April 1961, he received widespread coverage in the Ethiopian press, with Alan Shepard’s journey into space 23 days later receiving very little attention. While all these were relatively trivial instances, they were nonetheless still significant indications that the United States would not have it all its own way when it came to Ethiopia’s international relations.

November 22, 1963 In August  1963, State Department Executive Secretary William Brubeck summarised American foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa during the Kennedy administration with these words: The primary objectives of the United States policy with respect to Ethiopia include (1) maintenance of friendly, cooperative relations between the two countries; (2) prevention of Soviet or Communist influence over the country; and (3) encourage and assist the economic and social development of Ethiopia.78 However, the position paper prepared in October 1963 for the forthcoming visit of Haile Selassie reflected the complexities and conundrums associated therein: The United States received repeated requests from the Somali Government for arms assistance starting prior to Somali independence July 1, 1960. We repeatedly declined, having in mind Ethiopian sensitivities. . . . It then became evident that Somalia, while desirous of receiving arms from the west, would turn elsewhere if its legitimate needs remained unmet from the west. The United States felt that if communist bloc countries were to become Somalia’s arms suppliers, the element of control exerted by the west would disappear and a threat to Ethiopia’s security would develop, subjecting us to renewed demands for increasing our military aid to Ethiopia, and threatening our tenure at Kagnew Station. . . . For the foregoing reasons, we determined to provide Somalia with minimum United States military aid.79

Self-determination and the new frontier  65 This analysis – that something that appeared very simple in principle was proving to be far more complicated in practice – was another example of the comparison drawn by Rusk who, when testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1961, likened the need for the United States to honour its commitment in Ethiopia to that of Southeast Asia. Similarly, as in Vietnam, the consequences of the decisions made by the Kennedy administration would have repercussions that would drag on through the remainder of the 1960s, and into the 1970s and beyond. It would not be Kennedy who faced the immediate effects of those repercussions though. Because of events in Dallas on November 22, 1963, these would be yet another legacy to be faced by Kennedy’s successor in the White House, Lyndon Baines Johnson.

Notes 1 Kennedy Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961; Speech Files, Digital Archives, Kennedy Library, www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-034-002.aspx. 2 Report From Church and Moss to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 12, 1961; WHCF Subject Files Box 38, CO1–1 Africa, Kennedy Library. 3 Speech, Senator Kennedy, Democratic Luncheon in Waterton, Wisconsin, November 13, 1959; Pre-Presidential Papers Box 1030, Foreign Affairs Africa the Coming Challenge, Kennedy Library. 4 “Democrats Begin Study of Africa,” New York Times, December 5, 1960. 5 Rusk, June  20, 1963; NSF William Brubeck Box  381, African Policy Committee, 1963, Kennedy Library. 6 Memo, Bundy to Rusk, June 21, 1963; NSF Countries Box 3, African Policy Committee 12/62–6/63, Kennedy Library. 7 Report from Church and Moss to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 12, 1961; WHCF Subject Files Box 38, CO1–1 Africa, Kennedy Library. 8 Report from Church and Moss to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 12, 1961; WHCF Subject Files Box 38, CO1–1 Africa, Kennedy Library. 9 Report to African Policy Committee, ‘The United States and Africa,’ August 12, 1963; NSF William Brubeck Box 381; African Policy Committee 1963, Kennedy Library. 10 Discussion paper prepared by Bureau of African Affairs, September  22, 1961; NSF Countries Box 2; Guidelines of US Policy and Operations Concerning Africa, Kennedy Library. 11 “Red Evidence in Africa,” New York Times, December 17, 1960. 12 Discussion paper prepared by Bureau of African Affairs, September  22, 1961; NSF Countries Box 2, Guidelines of US Policy and Operations Concerning Africa, Kennedy Library. 13 Bowles, Report, Some Requirements of American Foreign Policy, July 1, 1961; POF Box 28, Bowles Chester 3/24/59–7/5/61, Kennedy Library. 14 Briefing Paper for Senator Kennedy prepared by Professor Fred Burke, undated; Winifred Armstrong Personal Papers Box 1, Africa Documents from Senator Kennedy’s Office 2 of 3, Kennedy Library. 15 Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Africa, Department of State Report, March 1962; NSF Countries Box 2A, Africa General 3/62–4/62, Kennedy Library. 16 Speech, Kennedy at Saint Anselm’s College, Manchester, New Hampshire, March 5, 1960; Pre-Presidential Papers Box 1030, Foreign Affairs Africa, Kennedy Library. 17 Bowles, Report, Some Requirements of American Foreign Policy, July 1, 1961; POF Box 28, Bowles Chester 3/24/59–7/5/61, Kennedy Library. 18 Memo, Battle, State Dept, to Bundy, July 14, 1961; NSF Countries Box 158, Somalia General 1961, Kennedy Library.

66  Self-determination and the new frontier 19 Memo of conversation, Kennedy and Shermarke, November 27, 1962; NSF Countries Box 158A, Somalia General 11/62–12/62, Kennedy Library. 20 “Somali Hail Peace Corps,” New York Times, July 17, 1962. 21 Peace Corps Volunteers in Africa, February 14, 1962; WHSF (Harris Wofford) Box 1, Addis Ababa Plan, Kennedy Library. 22 Memo, State Dept to Bundy, June 27, 1962; NSF Countries Box 158, Somalia General 1/62–10/62, Kennedy Library. 23 “Somalia Will Get Soviet Aid,” New York Times, June 18, 1961. 24 Memo of conversation, Kennedy and Shermarke, November 27, 1962; NSF Countries Box 158A, Somalia General 11/62–12/62, Kennedy Library. 25 Telegram, Korry to Sec State, July 2, 1963; NSF Countries Box 69, Ethiopia General 6/63–7/63, Kennedy Library. 26 Memo of Conversation, Kennedy and Haile Selassie, October 1, 1963; NSF Countries Box 69A, Ethiopia Haile Selassie Visit 10/63, Kennedy Library. 27 Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Volume XIII Part 2, 87th Congress, First Session, 1961, Library of Congress. 28 National Intelligence Estimate 76.1–61, Ethiopian Prospects After the Abortive Coup, January 24, 1961; NSF Box 8, 76.1 Ethiopia, Johnson Library. 29 Memo of Conversation, Berhanu Dinke, Ambassador of Ethiopia, and Kennedy, May 23, 1961; NSF Countries Box 69, Ethiopia General 2/61–2/62, Kennedy Library. 30 Telegram, Matteson to State Dept, February 24, 1962; NSF Countries Box 69, Ethiopia General 2/61–2/62, Kennedy Library. 31 Peace Corps Volunteers in Africa, February 14, 1962; WHSF (Harris Wofford) Box 1, Addis Ababa Plan, Kennedy Library. 32 Shriver, Press Conference, November  9, 1962; Sargent Shriver Personal Papers Box 28, Africa October 28–November 18, 1962, Kennedy Library. 33 Letter, Shriver to Kennedy, March 15, 1963; NSF Countries Box 69; Ethiopia General 11/62–5/63, Kennedy Library. 34 Telegram, Matteson to State Dept, February 24, 1962; NSF Countries Box 69; Ethiopia General 2/61–2/62, Kennedy Library. 35 Telegram, Bowles to Kennedy, February 24, 1962; NSF Countries Box 69, Ethiopia General 2/61–2/62, Kennedy Library. 36 Telegram, Rusk to American Embassy Ethiopia, October  12, 1962; NSF Countries Box 69, Ethiopia General 3/62–10/62, Kennedy Library. 37 Telegram, Richards to Sec State, October 19, 1962; NSF Countries Box 69, Ethiopia General 3/62–10/62, Kennedy Library. 38 Report, Agency for International Development, Bureau for Africa and Europe, October 12, 1962; NSF Countries Box 3, Africa General Misc 8/62–3/63, Kennedy Library. 39 Hearings, Military Constructions Appropriations for 1963, July 27, 1962, Subcommittee on Appropriations, US Senate, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 40 Telegram, Matteson to State Dept, February 24, 1962; NSF Countries Box 69, Ethiopia General 2/61–2/62, Kennedy Library. 41 Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Volume XIII Part 2, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, Library of Congress. 42 3 Senators Oppose Aid in Africa to Nations Rejecting ‘Freedoms,’ New York Times, January 14, 1962. 43 Telegram, Bowles to State Dept, March 1, 1962; POF Box 62, Highlights of Bowles Trip, Kennedy Library. 44 Telegram, Bowles to Kennedy, February 24, 1962; NSF Countries Box 69, Ethiopia General 2/61–2/62, Kennedy Library. 45 Telegram, Richards to Sec State, October 19, 1962; NSF Countries Box 69, Ethiopia General 3/62–10/62, Kennedy Library. 46 Memo, Fredericks to African Policy Committee; NSF William Brubeck Box  381, Africa African Policy Committee 1963, Kennedy Library.

Self-determination and the new frontier  67 47 Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, May 29, 1963; NSF Countries Box 69A, Haile Selassie Visit 10/63, Kennedy Library. 48 “Eritrea is a Victim of History and Time,” Washington Post, September 23, 1962. 49 “Eritreans Press Secret Drive to Throw Off Ethiopian Rule,” Washington Post, July 19, 1962. 50 “Eritrean Unrest Angers Selassie,” New York Times, July 8, 1962. 51 Briefing Paper, November 26, 1962; NSF Countries Box 158, Somalia General 11/62– 12/62, Kennedy Library. 52 Memo, Komer to Kennedy, November  24, 1962; NSF Countries Box  158, Somalia General 11/62–12/62, Kennedy Library. 53 “ ‘Free’ Eritreans Appeal to UN,” Washington Post, January 1, 1963. 54 Memo, Komer to Kennedy, November  24, 1962; NSF Countries Box  158, Somalia General 11/62–12/62, Kennedy Library. 55 “Eritrea is a Victim of History and Time,” Washington Post, September 23, 1962. 56 G. Mennen Williams, US Policy Toward the Ogaden, August 26, 1963; NSF William Brubeck Box 387; Somali 4/63–10/63, Kennedy Library. 57 Briefing Paper, November 26, 1962; NSF Countries Box 158, Somalia General 11/62– 12/62, Kennedy Library. 58 Memo, Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research, State Dept, to Sec State, March  12, 1963; NSF Countries Box  158A, Somalia General 1/63–6/63, Kennedy Library. 59 Duncan Sandys, UK Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Memo, Komer to Kennedy, March 21, 1963; NSF Countries Box 158A, Somalia General 1/63–6/63, Kennedy Library. 60 Memo, State Dept to Bundy, March  18, 1963; NSF Countries Box  158A, Somalia General 1/63–663, Kennedy Library. 61 Memo, Komer to Kennedy, March 21, 1963; NSF Countries Box 158A, Somalia General 1/63–6/63, Kennedy Library. 62 “Ethiopia and Kenya Reach Border Pact,” New York Times, September 28, 1963. 63 Telegram, Judd, American Embassy, Mogadishu to Sec State, August 22, 1962; NSF Countries Box 158, Somalia General 1/62–10/62, Kennedy Library. 64 “Somalia Little Changed by Independent Status,” Washington Post, August 26, 1962. 65 Memo of conversation, Kennedy and Shermarke, November 27, 1962; NSF Countries Box 158A, Somalia General 11/62–12/62, Kennedy Library. 66 G. Mennen Williams, US Policy Toward the Ogaden, August 26, 1963; NSF William Brubeck Box 387, Somalia 4/63–10/63, Kennedy Library. 67 “Tension is Mounting at Ethiopian Border,” New York Times, February 5, 1961. 68 Telegram, Judd to Sec State, September 27, 1962; NSF Countries Box 158, Somalia General 1/62–10/62, Kennedy Library. 69 State Dept Report, Contingency Action on the Ogaden, August 26, 1963; NSF William Brubeck Box 387, Somalia 4/63–10/63, Kennedy Library. 70 Position Paper prepared for visit of Haile Selassie, October  1963; NSF Countries Box 69A, Haile Selassie Visit, 10/63, Kennedy Library. 71 Telegram, Bowles to State Dept, March 1, 1962; POF Staff Memos Box 62, Highlights of Bowles Trip, Kennedy Library. 72 Memo, Komer to Kennedy, November 28, 1962; NSF Countries Box 158A, Somalia General 11/62–12/62, Kennedy Library. 73 State Dept Report, Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, March  14, 1962, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 74 Attachments to Memo, State Dept to Bundy, June 27, 1962; NSF Countries Box 158, Somalia General 1/62–10/62, Kennedy Library. 75 Memo, Brubeck, NSC, to Bundy, October 11, 1963; NSF Countries Box 158A, Somalia General 7/63–11/63, Kennedy Library. 76 “Somalia Charges US Withheld Aid,” New York Times, November 17, 1963.

68  Self-determination and the new frontier 77 Memo, Brubeck, NSC, to Bundy, October 11, 1963; NSF Countries Box 158A, Somalia General 7/63–11/63, Kennedy Library. 78 Briefing Memo, August 1963; NSF William Brubeck Box 384, Selassie Visit Briefing Memorandum and Related Documents 9/63–10/63, Kennedy Library. 79 Position Paper prepared for visit of Haile Selassie, October  1963; NSF Countries Box 69A, Haile Selassie Visit 10/63, Kennedy Library.

5 In the shadow of Vietnam

Africa and Asia When Lyndon Johnson took the oath of office aboard Air Force One on November 22, 1963, it would be safe to say that policy towards the Horn of Africa was the furthest thing from his mind. From that day, and throughout the five turbulent years of his administration, his priority was his desire to build a Great Society in the United States, but the situation in Southeast Asia would soon come to dominate his thoughts. Indeed, in all areas, in both public announcements as well as private meetings and conversations, the shadow of Vietnam loomed large. When it came to African policy, as with policy towards Southeast Asia, Johnson continued the themes and principles set out by this predecessor: commitment to African independence, but a desire to prevent communist bloc influence or expansion throughout the continent. As Kennedy had learned, this was challenging enough, but Johnson was also faced with the full ramifications of the SinoSoviet split, complicated by the fact that, in 1964, China joined the elite group of nations that could claim to be nuclear powers. Hence Johnson was faced with the menace of communist expansion into Africa on a second front. An intelligence report prepared by Thomas Hughes in the State Department warned that the principal impact of the Sino-Soviet rift in Africa will be the acceleration of attempts on the part of each communist power to gain influence – since each is competing not only with the West but with his communist competitor as well.1 Chinese interest in Africa was arguably driven by the desire for full recognition of China within the United Nations, and the growing voting power of the African bloc. A CIA report asserted that the “Chinese Communists view Africa as a land of opportunity, an area where long-term gain in their drive for international recognition and influence are assured,”2 while Brubeck warned Johnson that “there is a variety of evidence that the Chinese are making a major long-term effort in Africa.”3 Following an official tour of Africa by Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai in January 1964, which included visits to both Ethiopia and Somalia, Brubeck and Bundy discussed the relationship between the “current ChiCom tour

70  In the shadow of Vietnam of Africa” and its relationship to the “ChiRep problem at the UN (and the crucial African votes).”4 The Chinese effort seemed to paying off when, in February, a joint communique was issued from Ethiopia and China which stated Haile Selassie’s intention to “strengthen and normalise relations with Communist China” and his support for “the “legitimate rights” of the Peking regime in the United Nations.”5 In February 1965, the House Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Operations reported that of the 31 African countries which became independent in the last 10 years, 16 now have diplomatic relations with Communist China, 7 of them established relations during 1964, and 2 of these subsequently broke relations with Nationalist Chinese. Recalling that only 10 years ago Red China had no diplomatic ties in Africa, it is obvious that the Chinese Communists have made dramatic and disturbing progress in this part of the world.6 Similarly, the CIA reported that communist countries continue to develop and expand their economic relations with African states. They have set up aid programmes in fifteen of these states over the past seven years and, concomitantly, have greatly increased academic and technical training facilities for African personnel.7 In contrast, there was a widespread belief in the United States, summarised in an editorial from the Washington Post, that “the men who make American foreign policy – President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary George Ball – are not interested in Africa.”8 The president’s first speech on African policy did not come until May 1966, but appeared to be motivated by Johnson’s rivalry with Bobby Kennedy, and his forthcoming visit to South Africa, rather than from a personal commitment to the African nations. White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers told Johnson that his speech would “pre-empt” Kennedy’s visit, who would be “making hay on the intangible issue of the rights of man” while in Africa. The speech, Moyers believed, would “make it difficult for Bobby to get far ahead of you on this issue.”9 Subsequently, to commemorate the third anniversary of the founding of the Organisation of African Unity, Johnson publicly pledged continued American support for African independence, and continued developmental and economic aid to Africa which, he pointed out, had amounted to more than $2 billion over the past five years.10 A further attempt to demonstrate the interest of the Johnson administration in Africa took place in 1968, when Vice President Hubert Humphrey embarked on a nine-nation tour of Africa. Notwithstanding, the interest of the Johnson administration in Africa was minimal; as the Washington Post put it, “Africa is at the bottom of the United States priority list.”11 Given Johnson’s desire to establish a Great Society in the United States as well as his emphasis on the importance of civil rights, his neglect of Africa may seem a little incongruous. However, as the shadow of Vietnam loomed larger over the Johnson administration, especially after the introduction of ground troops in

In the shadow of Vietnam 71 March  1965, the deprioritisation of Africa made more sense. Notwithstanding, Johnson was keen to ensure that his decision to Americanise the war was understood internationally, and particularly within the developing world. Rusk met with ambassadors from African nations shortly after the first Marines landed in Da Nang, including Ambassador Dinke from Ethiopia and Ambassador Mohallim from Somalia, to explain the American position. America’s only interest and purpose, Rusk explained, was to “assist the South Vietnamese to maintain the safely and independence of their country.”12 What was perhaps most interesting, though was the way that Rusk emphasised Kennedy’s support for the South Vietnamese and asserted that Johnson was fulfilling Kennedy’s legacy. Johnson, he said, shared Kennedy’s belief that the objective, the goal, the purpose of US policy in Southeast Asia and in South Vietnam were really simple. South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia are all entitled to live in peace and not to be molested by their neighbours through the introduction of military personnel and arms across frontiers.13 On his return to the US from a tour of Africa, Williams reassured the press that “some of the Africans are concerned with that war in Southeast Asia,” but insisted that “not a single one” had suggested that the US was wrong to be involved in Vietnam.14 Williams’s public assessments to the press, though, were a little disingenuous. Although there may not have been outright opposition among African national leaders, there was hardly unqualified support, either. During the meeting with the African ambassadors, there was a strong sentiment that the United States should work harder to seek a negotiated settlement to the conflict despite Rusk’s insistence that Johnson “was ready to go anywhere, anytime,” but there was no “indication from Hanoi that it was ready to stop what it was doing to its neighbours.”15 This point was reinforced in response to a question from the Ugandan ambassador, who asked “if the problem couldn’t be brought before the United Nations Security Council for its help.” Rusk replied that both the Soviet Union and the United States supported such action, but “Hanoi had refused to come.”16 In 1966, when Haile Selassie wrote to Johnson encouraging further efforts at negotiation and “finding a solution to the Vietnam question,” Johnson hastened to assure the emperor that “we shall leave no stone unturned in our effort to achieve peace in Vietnam.”17 After receiving a similar letter from President Aden expressing Somali concerns over American involvement in Southeast Asia, Johnson told the Somali president that “I can assure you that we will continue to press for negotiations with the aim of achieving an honourable and peaceful solution to the Vietnam conflict.”18 By the beginning of 1968, just as the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were preparing to launch the Tet Offensive, the shadow of Vietnam was affecting Johnson’s popularly in Africa as well as in the United States. The Washington Post reported that during a rally of 300 students of Haile Selassie University, effigies of Johnson and the American dollar were burnt to protest American involvement in Vietnam.19 The Washington Star also reported that “300 students

72  In the shadow of Vietnam hanged President Johnson in effigy and shouted ‘Johnson is a murderer’ as they waited yesterday on the Ethiopian University campus for Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey to come and address them.”20

The Organisation of African Unity Notwithstanding Johnson’s focus on the Great Society and the Vietnam War, there were developments in Africa during the Johnson administration that could not be ignored. Perhaps the most important of these was the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and its role in consolidating Haile Selassie’s dream of making Ethiopia the capital of Africa. From the earliest days of decolonisation in Africa, Ethiopia had strongly identified itself with the newly independent nations and stressed its interest in the creation of a coherent African bloc both in the United Nations in particular and international relations in general. Haile Selassie ensured the headquarters of the UN Economic Commission Africa were established in Addis Ababa in 1959, and that Ethiopia hosted the Second Conference of Independent African states in June 1960. The following year, Haile Selassie called upon his fellow African leaders to establish their own regional organisation that would strengthen the African voice in international affairs, and make it easier to resist outside influences and prevent the continent from transforming into “Cold War battlefields.”21 In January 1963, the heads of twenty-one African states, representing 135 million people between them, met in Lagos, Nigeria, “to launch a drive for pan-African unification”22 and announced their joint resolve to create a new Organisation of African States.23 Subsequently, on May 23, leaders from thirty-two African nations met in Addis Ababa to take the next step. At Bundy’s urging, Kennedy sent a message of support, declaring that “Africa’s dramatic march toward independence, unity and freedom is part of a revolution which makes this century unparalleled in man’s historic struggle for human dignity and self-realisation.” Describing the gathering as “significant,” Kennedy went on to assert that “never in African history have so many Heads of State assembled on such vital business. Never has there occurred a more dramatic illustration of African prominence in world affairs,” and pledged American support for the venture.24 As with many aspects of American foreign policy, though, the ideological rhetoric was underpinned by Cold War reality. A State Department briefing paper for Johnson subsequently acknowledged that while the United States had given “our general blessing to African unity by means of a message from President Kennedy to the Conference,” the Americans had also, and “with some success, stressed that the fact that we did not seek participation in the Conference contrasting our position with that of Soviet aggressiveness.”25 At the opening ceremony, on May 23, Haile Selassie declared that we stand today on the stage of world affairs before the audience of world opinion. We come together to assert our role in the direction of world affairs and discharge our duty to the great continent whose 250,000,000 people we lead.26

In the shadow of Vietnam  73 For the next three days, he led the discussions on policies and procedures, suggesting a structure similar to that of the Organisation of American States. Agreement was reached relatively quickly, and the summit concluded at 1:30 pm on May 26 with a formal signing ceremony for the Charter that established the Organisation of African Unity along the lines that Selassie had proposed. A further wish of Haile Selassie’s was granted when, in August, a gathering of African foreign ministers recommended that Addis Ababa “be the permanent site of the new Organisation of African States.”27 The significance of the event was noted internationally. The Washington Post described the charter as “historic,” not least because it represented the unification of nearly a quarter of a billion people. Columnist Russel Howe added eloquently that the “OAU – born in a single rushed 16-hour closed session of African leaders against a deadline of aircraft departures that presidents would not cancel – is a triumph for Emperor Haile Selassie and marks a turning point in African history.”28 The State Department was more circumspect, reporting to Bundy that the “Charter is an important step in the African attempt to find cooperative solutions to many of the continent’s difficult and important problems.”29

The OAU and Somali irredentism Perhaps the most serious problem that the newly established Organisation of African Unity needed to address was the ongoing border disputes that were rife throughout Africa as a result of its colonial past. The ‘scramble for Africa,’ during which borders were created between African nations at the whim of the colonial powers without regard for ethnic or tribal loyalties and divisions, resulted in unrest and conflict throughout the continent as the newly independent nations asserted their territorial dominance or sought to protect or reassert ethnic integrity. Somewhat ironically, given that the OAU was the brainchild of Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, one of the most serious of these conflicts threatened the emperor’s own borders. The ongoing threat to regional stability posed by Somali irredentism was widely recognised. The CIA prepared a report for Johnson, explaining the reasons for the conflict to him and highlighting the post-colonial legacy. The hostility, the report stated, “reflects an age-old problem. Much of the border is undemarcated, and the Somalis have been accustomed to running their livestock back and forth across it.” Now Somalia was demanding that the grazing lands should be returned to full Somali control, something that Ethiopia refused to consider, claiming instead that the Somali incursions were “unwarranted.” As the CIA concluded, “no solution is in sight.”30 For Haile Selassie, though, the solution was simple: Somali incursions must be stopped. In a meeting with Khrushchev, he insisted that the frontiers of Ethiopia and Somalia are established in treaties which have validity and binding force in the realm of international law. These boundaries received the sanction of the United Nations at the very moment when that

74  In the shadow of Vietnam organisation acted to create the Somalia state. That these borders were drawn during the period of the colonisation of Africa may be regrettable, but it is hardly Ethiopia’s fault that the Republic of Somalia did not then exist as an independent state, and in this Somalia is neither better nor worse situated than any other Africa state – indeed, than a great majority of the nations of the world today.31 Assrate Kassa, President of the Ethiopian Senate, reiterated Ethiopian determination in a meeting with Kennedy in which he asserted that “there is no way to settle the matter until Somalia changes its present inflexible ‘Greater Somalia’ policy.” That, Kassa acknowledged, was unlikely because “the Somalis are fanatical on the question of ‘Greater Somalia,’ ” and there was “nothing the Somalis would not do in pursuing their aims.”32 Indeed, despite the dictates of the Somali Constitution that reunification must be accomplished by “peaceful and legal means,”33 the reality was somewhat different and, in the early weeks of 1964, the Johnson administration received reports of escalating conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia.34 At the beginning of February, Addis Ababa radio reported on “large-scale incursions by armed ‘bandits’ from Somalia,”35 that escalated to the extent that both Ethiopia and Somalia declared a state of emergency. Reports from the American Embassy in Addis Ababa to the State Department confirmed that the fighting was the “most serious to date.”36 What was more serious, though, were the global implications; as an editorial in the Washington Post pointed out, “Somalia’s border conflicts with Ethiopia and Kenya are not obscure tribal clashes, fought with bow and spear, that the rest of the world may safely ignore.”37 The United States had long provided Ethiopia with military aid, which was being utilised in the border skirmishes but, in 1964, the CIA reported on the deal between the Soviet Union and Somalia for “about $28 million worth of military equipment, reportedly to include jet fighters.”38 With the Somalis utilising communist bloc aid, and the Ethiopians in receipt of substantial American military aid, the potential for the serious fighting to erupt into fullscale proxy war was immense. Fortunately, on this occasion, but arguably because they had more important priorities, both the Soviet Union and the United States made the same response to the conflict. Johnson wrote to Haile Selassie assuring him of American continued friendship for Ethiopia and opposition to Somali irredentism, but also stressed that the United States “cannot be sympathetic with efforts to employ force in territorial disputes.”39 Similarly, Khrushchev publicly called for a peaceful settlement of the territorial dispute.40 The possible repercussions had not gone unnoticed, though, and there was widespread agreement that some kind of mechanism needed to be in place to address such African conflicts. One option to provide mediation and peaceful resolution was, of course, the United Nations. However, when it came to the border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, U Thant, secretary-general of the UN, did little more than publicly call for an end to hostilities while a UN spokesman confirmed that the Security Council had no plans to discuss the situation.41 While this may appear that the UN was abrogating its responsibilities as a peacekeeping organisation, it can

In the shadow of Vietnam 75 also be argued that the motivation for UN reticence lay in a desire to demonstrate full support for the idea that the appropriate forum to address any such situations in Africa was not the UN. Haile Selassie was not alone in his assertion that “this problem, existing as it does within the African context, should be solved by Africans acting through the Organisation of African Unity.”42 The terms of the OAU Charter had provided for the establishment of a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration and, under its auspices, African foreign ministers met in Addis Ababa in November 1963 to consider the border disputes between Morocco and Algeria, and Ethiopia and Somalia. A State Department report noted that this set “a precedent for OAU actions in border quarrels,” and gave “unambiguous support to the OAU Charter principles of respect for territorial integrity and the peaceful settlement of disputes. This commitment has been underlined by the lack of support Somali irredentism has received in OAU circles.”43 Perhaps relieved that such regional organisations reduced the need for American involvement at a time when Johnson wanted to concentrate on the Great Society and was distracted enough with civil rights and developments in Vietnam, the United States fully endorsed the authority of the OAU. Rusk publicly declared that “there are various local disputes in Africa, some deep-rooted, others arising from boundaries which are unclear or which cut across tribal and other natural divisions. . . . We should like to see these disputes composed by the Africans themselves. We have followed with admiration the assumption of responsibilities by the young Organisation of African Unity. . . . The United States strongly supports African unity and the efforts of Africans to settle African problems.”44 In February 1964, the OAU held an emergency meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, to discuss the various border conflicts in Africa, including that between Ethiopia and Somalia. At the conclusion of the three-day meeting, the delegates issued a call for “an immediate ceasefire in the Ethiopian-Somali border war” and urged Ethiopia and Somalia to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict through a negotiated settlement.45 A telegram sent from the American embassy in Lagos to Rusk confirmed that the outcome of the meeting “requested both sides maintain cease fire, establish demilitarised zones each side frontier, disarm and control border populations, open direct bilateral negotiations soonest, and report to next Heads of State meeting.”46 The truce established by the OAU did not last for long though. Within days, reports began flooding in of continued fighting,47 and it was clear that more concrete action needed to be taken. While there may have been widespread agreement among African leaders, as well as in the wider world, that something needed to be done to reduce the risk of conflict, the question of what to do was more challenging. Haile Selassie was not alone in his assertion, as he stated to Johnson, that, “any policy which would involve the re-drawing of the map of Africa along ethnic or tribal lines would create an atmosphere of chaos and confusion” which would hinder “the preservation of peace and the peaceful development of this continent.”48 Thus, when the OAU held its second summit conference in Cairo in July 1964, it was clear that one of the main agenda items would be the matter of African borders.

76  In the shadow of Vietnam Among the other resolutions adopted by the assembly “by acclamation” was the “recommendation of the Council that Addis Ababa be the site for the Permanent Headquarters of the Organisation of African Unity.” The assembly also noted “with satisfaction the recent enactment of the Civil Rights Act designed to secure for American Negroes their basic human rights” and reaffirmed “its belief that the existence of discriminatory practices is a matter of deep concern to Member States of the Organisation of African Unity.”49 However, perhaps most significant was an agreement that would become known as the Cairo Resolution, and which would have a profound impact on the continent in general, and the Horn of Africa in particular, for many years to come. The formal resolution declared that considering that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissention, conscious of the existence of extra-African manoeuvres aimed at dividing African states, considering further that the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality . . . [and] recognising the imperious necessity of settling, by peaceful means and within a strictly African framework, all disputes between African states . . . [the OAU] solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.50 In other words, the Cairo Resolution affirmed the principle that existing African borders, regardless of the way that they had originally been established, would be honoured and maintained. Within the Horn of Africa, the nation most profoundly affected by this was Somalia. The Cairo Resolution made it crystal clear that the OAU would not support Somali irredentism, leaving the Somalis only one choice if they wished to realise their dreams of ‘Greater Somalia’: reliance on sources of support that lay outside Africa. Rather than avert the potential for proxy war in the Horn of Africa, the Cairo Resolution made it much more likely.

Eritrea When it came to Ethiopia, little changed during the Johnson administration with regards to policy decisions. Although Ethiopia remained the priority for the United States within the Horn, Johnson was no more inclined to yield to Haile Selassie’s demands for increased military aid than Kennedy had been. However, Johnson also faced the same complication as had Kennedy: the continuing importance of Kagnew Station. As Ambassador Korry in Ethiopia commented to Rusk, the American need for Kagnew station infinitely complicates practically all the major courses of action designed to achieve our various objectives in the Horn. . . . With Wheelus [Zanzibar] and the Moroccan naval communications facility seemingly on the way out, Kagnew may soon have the distinction of being the only remaining US military installation in Africa.51

In the shadow of Vietnam 77 Towards the end of 1966, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence, conducted a review of the need for Kagnew station but concluded that it does not appear that we can make substantial reductions at Kagnew over the near future unless we are prepared to sacrifice some significant capabilities and products which the Kagnew complex now provides. . . . We do not have feasible alternative sites.52 The conclusion, therefore, was that access to Kagnew was essential. Korry summarised the more public reason for this, and also reflected American justifications for involvement in Vietnam, when he explained his belief that with the possible exception of tiny Liberia, in African eyes there is no country more firmly linked to the United States than is Ethiopia. Such a bond is manifest in Kagnew, our MAP and AID and the great presence of Americans here. In a very real sense, therefore, US prestige is committed in Ethiopia.53 However, the more practical, and highly classified, reason for maintaining access related to the type of communications facilities that were housed at Kagnew Station. A report from the National Security Council (NSC) hinted at these when justifying the cost of the aid package to Haile Selassie: “our Ethiopian investment is linked directly to some exceedingly important intelligence facilities. Even at more than the current $9.7 million per annum (5% of the total), this rent does not seem unduly high.”54 The CIA concurred, adding that “the price will continue to go up for US use of the Kagnew Station, a key military communications base in Eritrea. US military aid to Ethiopia – the quid pro quo for use of Kagnew – in FY 1966 is scheduled at $15 million, nearly double that of the previous year.”55 The importance of maintaining access to Kagnew was one of the motivations for the Johnson administration to respond positively to Haile Selassie’s request for a formal state visit to Washington. A State Department briefing paper, produced in preparation for the forthcoming meeting, stressed the importance of the meeting, contending that “this is a fairly critical juncture in US-Ethiopian relations, and the emperor reportedly attaches great significance to his meeting with the president as a barometer of our future relations.”56 Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach elaborated on this to Johnson, explaining that “friendly relations with Ethiopia are important to our interests in Africa and particularly to the maintenance of Kagnew Station, an essential US military communications installation in northern Ethiopia. There is no alternative site available for these facilities.”57 Rusk went further, even alluding to Kagnew’s true importance when he told Johnson that “maintenance of friendly relations with Ethiopia is important to our interests in Africa and especially to the maintenance of Kagnew Station, an essential US military communications installation (with important intercept functions, a fact not to be mentioned to the emperor) located in northern Ethiopia.”58 When Johnson and Haile Selassie met on February  14, 1967, the conversation between the emperor and the president went as predicted. Selassie began

78  In the shadow of Vietnam by stressing Ethiopia’s allegiance to the west, pointing to the “contributions of his own country in support of UN collective security efforts and to the fact that Ethiopia had not recognised Communist China, thereby associating itself with the US despite criticism.” He then went on to outline his security problems, and his reasons for needing increased American military aid. He added that, despite his recent visit to Moscow he had “no wish to embark on military assistance ventures with the USSR.”59 His implication – that he might turn to the Soviet bloc if American aid was considered insufficient – was clear, and Johnson tried to hold firm to the American position, reminding Selassie of the extensive aid that the US provided, he did offer to “consider helping Ethiopia further in a modest way with its internal security problem, depending on Congressional appropriations.”60 The main reason for Haile Selassie’s requests for additional military aid was the ever-developing insurgency in Eritrea. Although there had been no international outcry when Ethiopia formally annexed the province in 1962, thereby ending the UN-imposed federation, the same could not be said for the people of Eritrea. In 1961, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) had been formed, and by 1966 had grown into a potent force. In January, Rick Haynes of the NSC reported that the “Eritrean Liberation Front, with outside support, continues to constitute a real threat to the emperor’s control over Eritrea.”61 Shortly afterwards, the CIA confirmed the “growing insurgency,” describing the insurgents as “aggressive and elusive.” The intelligence estimate went on to contend that the “raids, sabotage, and propaganda efforts against the Imperial government” were sufficient to “pose a serious threat to Ethiopian control over the province.” The report also acknowledged the external support, particularly from Sudan and the surrounding “Arab states.”62 Those fighting for Eritrean independence recognised the significance of Haile Selassie’s visit to the United States, and the importance of the US-Ethiopian relationship, and wrote to Johnson in February 1967 appealing for American support for the “just struggle of the Eritrean people for freedom and independence.” Idris Mohammed Adem, president of the ELF, was clearly attempting to invoke sympathy from the Americans by identifying his struggle with that of the United States against the British during the American Revolution, with a plea that echoed the Declaration of Independence. He opened by claiming that the “history of Emperor Haile Selassie is a history of repeated injustices and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over Eritrea.” After providing a list of grievances related to suppressions of freedom and national identity, he went to explain that “in every stage of the oppression we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms, but our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.” These petitions included pleas to the UN but “most unfortunately, the UN gave a deaf ear to the voice of justice.” Adem concluded by asserting that we are a small nation and we want nothing except peace with justice. But if it comes to fighting we will fight to the last man, no matter how big forces we meet, the same as your forefathers did under the leadership of General Washington to win the freedom of the US.63

In the shadow of Vietnam 79 The Eritrean rhetoric may have been powerful, but it was not enough to overcome the realities of the importance of Ethiopia to the United States. The State Department forwarded the letter to Walt Rostow, National Security Adviser, explaining that “letter complains of the Ethiopian government’s policy in Eritrea [but] we think no reply is necessary.”64 Notwithstanding the lack of American support, the ELF was not alone in its fight against Ethiopian control. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) prepared by the CIA estimated that the ELF had “1,000 fairly well-armed and well-disciplined guerrillas” by April  1967, was “well-organised” and had demonstrated “much striking power.” This was “in good part the result of growing support,” both direct and indirect, from “the Moslem states in the surrounding region” including Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAR (United Arab Republic), Sudan, Somalia, as well as the Soviet bloc.65 While the effectiveness of the ELF caused problems for Haile Selassie, the Americans were far more concerned with the threat to Kagnew. The CIA reported that “so far, the Eritrean insurgents have not attacked US facilities in Kagnew, but pressures for such attacks from within the ranks of the partisans and from radical foreign sponsors are bound to increase.”66 Katzenbach expressed similar fears to McNamara in May, commenting that the “gravity of the Eritrean insurgency situation has increased, and our estimates of the stability of the Horn of Africa and specifically Ethiopia over the next few years have become considerably more pessimistic.” With the “increasing likelihood of and capability for insurgent harassment of our station at Kagnew, such as the blowing up of antenna towers which cannot be protected or the cutting of roads, sabotage of the Massawa port and terrorism in Asmara itself,” McNamara was urged to develop as soon as possible a phased programme for relocation from Kagnew Station, together with proposed relocation sites, so that we may together review the best course of action to be taken in seeking to reduce our presence at Kagnew and maintain essential intelligence and communications capabilities in this area of the world to meet not only the Kagnew tasks but all others of importance to the national security.67 However, the response of the Joint Chiefs, having reviewed the request, concluded that “relocation, reduction, or elimination of missions assigned to Kagnew would seriously prejudice US security interests and would seriously reduce US military capability in the Middle East, South Asia and Indian Ocean areas.”68 As in Vietnam, Johnson seemed trapped in the quagmire of Eritrea.

A “nice surprise” from Somalia By 1968, with Johnson preoccupied with deteriorating situation in Vietnam and increasing division within American society, developments in Somalia must have come as a welcome relief. In June  1967, Shermarke succeeded Aden as president of Somalia, and Mohammed Egal took office as prime minister. With this change of leadership also came a change of direction in foreign policy as both

80  In the shadow of Vietnam men expressed an interest in improving relations both with the west and with Somalia’s neighbours. In October, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, under the auspices of the OAU, presided over talks to resolve the border issues between Somalia and its neighbours. Afterwards, Raymond Thurston, American ambassador to Somalia, met with Johnson and Rostow to report personally on “the very encouraging progress being made in the East African détente between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya.” Rostow agreed that the “détente is the first real break in a long-standing quarrel between these three countries over common border areas,” adding that the “real push for the détente has come from Somalia. They’ve pulled back the guerrillas who were raiding disputed areas in Kenya and Ethiopia, and they’ve stopped hostile propaganda.”69 Subsequently, Johnson wrote to Shermarke, expressing his delight at the recent efforts of Somalia to encourage peace and harmony with her neighbours. This initiative is an inspiring act of statesmanship. It gives all men renewed hope that the quarrels of the past will yield to the spirt of peaceful and constructive cooperation.70 Humphrey was similarly encouraged after his trip to Somalia in which he met with Shermarke and Egal.71 Upon his return to the US, he told Johnson that he felt that Somalia “tried valiantly and with considerable success to turn its back on old feuds and to seek a new relationship with its two principal neighbours, Kenya and Ethiopia.” He also recommended that the United States “strengthen our ties with Somalia through a broader spectrum of visits and exchanges” as well as with increased developmental and economic aid.72 Accordingly, in February, Egal was invited to visit Washington. In his briefing notes for the forthcoming visit, Edward Hamilton of the NSC reflected that Egal was “the nicest surprise to come along in African affairs since independence became the rule rather than the exception.”73 The State Department briefing paper on Egal’s visit contended that he had “completely reversed Somalia’s policies in the last nine months,” turning his back on Somali irredentism and seeking “peace and cooperation with neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia. He is pushing for greater economic development at the military’s expense” as well as emphasising a policy of non-alignment in the Cold War.74 Thus, while not willing to risk the USEthiopian relationship, the Johnson administration made their support for Egal’s approach very clear. At a formal State Department lunch honouring the prime minister, Rusk praised the Somali leader, asserting that “he strives for peace, not war; cooperation, not hostility and economic progress, not stagnation.”75 An editorial in the New York Times was just as laudatory: having successfully come to terms with Kenya, Ethiopia and France, Premier Mohamed Egal of Somalia has created around the Horn of Africa an aura of peace that looks brighter than anything the area has known in the eight years Somalia has been independent.76

In the shadow of Vietnam 81

Warning signs from the Horn Given the ever-spreading and darkening shadow of Vietnam, the growing divisions within American society, and his increasing desperation in attempting to create a Great Society, it was not surprising that Johnson was unable to pay much attention to the Horn of Africa during his term in office. This relative neglect was exacerbated by the fact that there were relatively few crises in the Horn during the five years of the Johnson administration. Indeed, if anything the region seemed to be showing greater signs of stability with the recognition that the Organisation of African Unity was the appropriate body to deal with African problems and Somali moves towards détente with its neighbours. However, underneath the relatively peaceful surface, there were worrying signs. The Somali people were not as keen as their leaders on the apparent abandonment of irredentist territorial ambitions, and, Eritrea notwithstanding, there were signs of unrest against the aging emperor’s somewhat autocratic rule in Ethiopia. On March 31, 1968, as Johnson was announcing his refusal to run for re-election, the New York Times reported that the “main campus of Haile Selassie University was closed today until further notice. The action followed a violent student demonstration against a fashion show and the miniskirts worn by models.”77 Although protests about miniskirts may seem trivial, they would come to represent a turning point in Ethiopian history as tradition and modernity clashed. As the United States braced itself for the final few years of the Vietnam War, so Ethiopia was also bracing itself for the end of an era. Thus, when Richard Milhous Nixon took the presidential oath of office on January 20, 1969, his priority was clearly the war in Vietnam but his approach to foreign policy would also have a profound effect on the Horn of Africa at a time when it would be facing a revolutionary change.

Notes 1 Memo, Thomas Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Dept State, to Sec State, May 15, 1964; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa General Vol I 2/64–6/64, Johnson Library. 2 Special Report: Chinese Communist Activities in Africa, CIA, June  19, 1964; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa General, Vol I 2/64–6/64, Johnson Library. 3 Memo, Brubeck to Johnson, January 29, 1964; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa East Vol 1 1/64–4/64, Johnson Library. 4 Note, Brubeck to Bundy, December 27, 1963; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa General Vol I 2/64–6/64, Johnson Library. 5 “Selassie Agrees with Chou on Tie,” New York Times, February 2, 1964. 6 Report of the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Operations to the Committee of Agriculture, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 1st Session, February 25, 1965, Library of Congress. 7 CIA Special Report: Communist World’s Economic Relations with Africa, April 16, 1965; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa General Vol II 7/64–6/65, Johnson Library. 8 “The Dark Continent is Overshadowed, Too,” Washington Post, April 3, 1966. 9 Memo, Moyers to Johnson, May 26, 1966; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa General Vol IV 3/66–5/66, Johnson Library.

82  In the shadow of Vietnam 10 Johnson, Remarks on Third Anniversary of Organisation of African Unity, May 26, 1966; NSF Speech File Box 5, Pres. Speech on Third Anniversary of OAU in Wash 5/26/66, Johnson Library. 11 “Humphrey’s Tour of Africa: A Solid Success, on the Surface,” Washington Post, January 12, 1968. 12 Meeting, Sec State and African Ambassadors, March  26, 1965; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa General Vol II 7/64–6/65, Johnson Library. 13 Meeting, Sec State and African Ambassadors, March  26, 1965; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa General Vol II 7/64–6/65, Johnson Library. 14 G. Mennen Williams Press Conference, January 8, 1966; White House Press Office Files Box 81, BB#13, Johnson Library. 15 Meeting, Sec State and African Ambassadors, March  26, 1965; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa General Vol II 7/64–6/65, Johnson Library. 16 Meeting, Sec State and African Ambassadors, March  26, 1965; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa General Vol II 7/64–6/65, Johnson Library. 17 Exchange of letters, Johnson and Haile Selassie, January 14, 1966; NSF Special Head of State Correspondence Box 15; Ethiopia 11/22/63–8/31/66, Johnson Library. 18 Letter, Johnson to President Aden, Somalia, March  23, 1966; NSF Special Head of State Correspondence Box 50, Somali-Aden Correspondence, Johnson Library. 19 “Putting His Best Teeth Forward,” Washington Post, January 7, 1968. 20 “Ethiopian Students Rap US,” Washington Star, January 7, 1968. 21 “African Grouping Urged by Ethiopia,” New York Times, October 3, 1961. 22 “Pan African Summit,” New York Times, January 27, 1962. 23 “20 African States to Form New Body,” New York Times, January 31, 1962. 24 Telegram, Bundy to American Embassy, Addis Ababa, May 11 1963; NSF Countries Box 3, Africa General Addis Ababa Conference, 5/63–6/63, Kennedy Library. 25 Discussion Paper on African Political Cooperation, Dept of State Policy Planning Council, March 12, 1964; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa-General Vol I 2/64–6/64, Johnson Library. 26 “Selassie Asks for Moderate Course,” New York Times, May 23, 1963. 27 “Africans Select Ethiopian Centre,” New York Times, August 11, 1963. 28 “30-Nation Pact Is Triumph for Selassie,” Washington Post, May 27, 1963. 29 Memo, State Dept to Bundy, May  27, 1963; NSF Countries Box  3, Africa General 5/63, Kennedy Library. 30 Memo, Ray Cline, Deputy Director CIA to Bundy, February 10, 1964; NSF Intelligence File Box 6, Codeword Material Vol I, Johnson Library. 31 CIA Intelligence Information Cable, March 10, 1964; NSF Country File Box 88, Ethiopia Vol I 11/63–2/65, Johnson Library. 32 Memo of conversation, Kennedy and Assrate Kassa, President of the Senate of Ethiopia, July  25, 1963; NSF Countries Box  69, Ethiopia General 6/63–7/63, Kennedy Library. 33 Report of the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Operations to the Committee of Agriculture, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 1st Session, February 25, 1965, Library of Congress. 34 See, for example: Telegram, Ambassador Torbert to Sec State, January 15, 1964; NSF Country File Box 99, Somalia Vol I 1/64–5/68, Johnson Library. “Somalia, Ethiopia Trade Aggression Charges,” Washington Post, January 17, 1964. “Ethiopians Kill 26 Somalians,” Washington Post, January 18, 1964. 35 “Selassie Consults Cabinet Over Somali Border Clash,” New York Times, February 7, 1964. 36 Telegram, American Embassy Ethiopia to Dept State, February 8, 1964; NSF Country File Box 88, Ethiopia Vol I 11/63–2/65, Johnson Library. 37 “Somalia Conflict Has World Implications,” Washington Post, February 13, 1964.

In the shadow of Vietnam  83 38 Memo, Ray Cline, Deputy Director CIA, to Bundy, February  10, 1964; NSF Intelligence File Box 6, Codeword Material Vol I, Johnson Library. 39 Letter, Johnson to Haile Selassie, February 21, 1964; NSF Special Head of State Correspondence Box 15, Ethiopia 11/22/63–8/31/66, Johnson Library. 40 “Somalia Orders Forces to Cease Border Fight,” Washington Post, February 12, 1964. 41 “Thant Asks Peace on Somali Border,” New York Times, February 10, 1964. 42 Letter, Haile Selassie to Johnson, March 4, 1964; NSF Special Head of State Correspondence Box 15, Ethiopia 11/22/63–8/31/66, Johnson Library. 43 Discussion Paper on African Political Cooperation, Dept of State Policy Planning Council, March 12, 1964; NSF Country File Box 76, Africa-General Vol I 2/64–6/64, Johnson Library. 44 Rusk, Address to American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, September 25, 1964; Records of the Democratic National Committee Box  172; Rusk Sec of State Dean Policy on Africa 1964, Johnson Library. 45 “Cease-Fire Urged on Somali Border,” New York Times, February 15, 1964. 46 Telegram, Embassy Lagos to Sec State, March 1, 1964; NSF Box 76, Africa General Cables Vol I, 2/64–6/64, Johnson Library. 47 “Ethiopia Charges Truce is Broken,” New York Times, February  17, 1964. “Ethiopia Says Somalia Clashes Go On,” New York Times, February 18, 1964. “Cease-Fire Fails to Halt Border Battle,” Washington Post, February  18, 1964. “Somali Border Fight Renewed,” New York Times, March 7, 1964. “Border Fight Losses Are Reported Heavy,” Washington Post, March 28, 1964. 48 Letter, Haile Selassie to Johnson, March 4, 1964; NSF Special Head of State Correspondence Box 15, Ethiopia 11/22/63–8/31/66, Johnson Library. 49 Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July, 1964, Library of Congress. 50 Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July, 1964, Library of Congress. 51 Telegram, Korry to Sec State, April 22, 1964; NSF Country File Box 88, Ethiopia Vol I 11/63–2/65, Johnson Library. 52 Letter, McNamara to Katzenbach, January 18, 1967; NSF Edward Hamilton Box 2, Ethiopia, Johnson Library. 53 Telegram, Korry to Sec State, April 22, 1964; NSF Country File Box 88, Ethiopia Vol I 11/63–2/65, Johnson Library. 54 NSC Report on Foreign Aid, November  20, 1965; NSF McGeorge Bundy Box  15, Foreign Aid, Johnson Library. 55 CIA Report, Prospects for Ethiopia, March 31, 1966; NSF Country File Box 88, Ethiopia Memos and Misc 7/65–1/69, Johnson Library. 56 Briefing Memo, State Dept to Rostow, January 16, 1967; NSF Walt Rostow Box 15, Non-Vietnam Jan-Feb 1967, Johnson Library. 57 Memo, Katzenbach to Johnson, February 9, 1967; NSF Country File Box 88; EthiopiaVisit of Emperor Haile Selassie 2/14–15/67, Johnson Library. 58 Memo, Rusk to Johnson, February  11, 1967 [italics added for emphasis of the true reason for Kagnew’s importance]; Ex Co Box 29, CO 73 Ethiopia, Johnson Library. 59 MemCon, Haile Selassie and Johnson, February 14, 1967; NSF Country File Box 88, Ethiopia Memos & Misc Vol II 7/65–1/69, Johnson Library. 60 MemCon, Haile Selassie and Johnson, February 14, 1967; NSF Country File Box 88, Ethiopia Memos & Misc Vol II 7/65–1/69, Johnson Library. 61 Memo, Haynes to Komer, January  19, 1966; NSF Ulric Haynes Box  1, Chrono (Haynes) 3/1/65–6/15/66, Johnson Library. 62 CIA Report, Prospects for Ethiopia, March 31, 1966; NSF Country File Box 88, Ethiopia Memos and Misc 7/65–1/69, Johnson Library.

84  In the shadow of Vietnam 63 Letter from Idris Mohammed Adem, President ELF, and Osman Saleh Sabbe, Secretary ELF, to Johnson, February 13, 1967; Ex Co 71 Box 29; CO 73Ethiopia, Johnson Library. 64 Memo, State Dept to Rostow, February 20, 1967; NSF Country File Box 88, EthiopiaVisit of Emperor Haile Selassie 2/14–15/67, Johnson Library. 65 NIE 75/76–67, April 27, 1967; NSF National Intelligence Estimates Box 8, National Intelligence Estimates, Johnson Library. 66 NIE 75/76–67, April 27, 1967; NSF National Intelligence Estimates Box 8, National Intelligence Estimates, Johnson Library. 67 Memo, Katzenbach to McNamara, May 8, 1967; NSF Edward Hamilton Box 2, Ethiopia, Johnson Library. 68 Memo, Cobb, Deputy Director, Joint Chiefs, to McNamara, July  13, 1967; NSF Edward Hamilton Box 2; Ethiopia, Johnson Library. 69 Memo, Rostow to Johnson, December 5, 1967; NSF Country File Box 99, Somalia Vol I 1/64–5/68, Johnson Library. 70 Letter, Johnson to Abdirascid Ali Schermarke, December 28, 1967; Ex CO Box 67, CO 267 Somali Republic, Johnson Library. 71 A rather amusing intelligence report on Humphrey’s forthcoming visit: Somalia security force has been increased, and the plain clothes detail enlarged to one hundred men. No outside egg or tomato purchases are known to the police. Police have no evidence that any missiles are to be thrown and expect no show of physical violence toward the vice president. Source: CIA Intelligence Cable, January  6, 1968; NSF International Meetings and Travel File Box 25; Vice President’s Trip to Africa Vol 1 Jan 1968, Johnson Library. 72 Report, Humphrey to Johnson, January 12, 1968; NSF Country File Box 77, Africa VP’s Report to the President, Johnson Library. 73 Memo, Hamilton to Rostow, February 19, 1968; NSF Country File Box 99, Somali Republic Visit of PM Egal, Johnson Library. 74 State Dept Briefing Paper, March 12, 1968; NSF Country File Box 99, Somali Republic Visit of PM Egal, Johnson Library. 75 “Johnson Honours Somali Premier,” New York Times, March 15, 1968. 76 “Peace is Restored on Somali Border,” New York Times, September 22, 1968. 77 “Campus Closed in Ethiopia,” New York Times, March 31, 1968.

6 Vital and peripheral interests

Nixon and the world Richard Nixon’s legacy would ultimately be determined by events at the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington, but the way that he wished to be remembered, as reflected in his chosen epitaph, was as a peacemaker. This was reflected from the first day of his administration in the courtesy reply to the congratulatory telegrams received from leaders around the world when he stated that his “foremost task will be to build a true and lasting peace for all mankind. My administration has made a solemn commitment to pursue this task with all its energy and strength.”1 Nixon’s priority, of course, was to end the war in Vietnam but in such a way that he would achieve ‘peace with honour.’ One element of his strategy was to differentiate between areas of the world that were of vital or peripheral interest; rather than attempting to apply containment everywhere, Nixon contended that that only areas of vital interest must be held, and that losses in areas of peripheral interest could be offset by exhibiting strength or making gains in areas of vital interest. Hence, building stronger relations in China could offset losses in other areas of Asia, such as Vietnam. Within this framework, it could be argued that the Horn of Africa would be classified as an area of peripheral interest, and therefore would not feature highly in administration plans. While this was undoubtedly true in many respects, there were various factors that elevated the region to an area of vital interest. As a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) summarised: More than in most other areas of Africa, the Horn is a stage for activity by the great powers. The US has long held a position of influence in Ethiopia; the USSR has recently built up its influence in Somalia; and the Chinese have renewed offers of economic aid for all countries in the area. . . . On still another level of involvement, the Arabs and Israelis are participants in the disputes and contributors to the tension of the Horn. . . . As Soviet interest and involvement in the region have developed, Somalia’s importance has increased somewhat because of its potential to provide deep water and shore facilities for Soviet naval vessels. This potential would be further enhanced if the Suez Canal were to be reopened and the Red Sea were again to become an important international trade route.2

86  Vital and peripheral interests The Arab-Israeli dimension, and the strategic proximity of the Horn nations when it came to access to the oil-rich nations of the Middle East, was widely noted. Joseph Alsop shared the administration’s assessment of the vital importance of the Horn, explaining that “because of the energy crisis – which is really a strategic crisis – the jugulars of the United States, Western Europe and Japan now run through the Persian Gulf.”3 Although the Horn of Africa could not therefore be ignored within Nixon’s foreign policy strategy, it did not mean that American support would be unqualified. Although directly aimed at the war in Vietnam, the themes of Nixon’s foreign policy, which would come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, were reflected throughout the developing world. Secretary of State William Rogers, while on a visit to Ethiopia in 1970, explained that Nixon felt a “special obligation” to provide aid, and honour existing commitments to African allies,” but also warned that “our resources and capacity are not unlimited.”4 The similarities in the approach was not lost on other nations. The Washington Post reported: US policy in Africa is a variant of President Nixon’s Vietnamisation doctrine, Yuri Zhukov said today in a Pravda commentary on Secretary of State William Rogers’ recent trip through Africa. The Soviet press often pins the Vietnamisation label on American efforts to treat other states as equals or to help other states try to solve their own problems.5 In particular was the determination by the Nixon administration that the United States could not become involved in any more proxy wars in the developing world. Rogers repeated Nixon’s pledge that Africa must not be the “scene of major-power conflicts.”6 William Lang, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, further reiterated to the House Subcommittee on Africa that one of Nixon’s major concerns regarding the future of Africa is that the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict in any form. In this same vein, Secretary Rogers has made clear that we seek an Africa which has no cold war – we desire no military alliance or spheres of influence.7

Ethiopia in 1969 Having designated the Horn as an area of vital interest, Nixon followed the example of his predecessors in the Oval Office and prioritised the US-Ethiopian relationship. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger explained to Nixon, when briefing the president on the forthcoming state visit of Haile Selassie, that “US-Ethiopian relations have been unusually close for years. We want to reinforce our ties,”8 not least because “the emperor sees a common interest with the US in making Ethiopia a bulwark against a Communist-Moslem thrust into the Horn of Africa.”9 Selassie, Kissinger pointed out, is “a worried man – he feels his regime is threatened on all sides and, with the student strikes earlier this

Vital and peripheral interests 87 year, even at the centre of the Empire.”10 The strikes, Kissinger explained were the result of a dilemma of [Selassie’s] own making. He has built a modern state from feudal fragments, surrendered some prerogatives to a constitution, and educated an urban elite – all in the interests of a stronger nationhood against the external danger. Now he is finding, inevitably, that these steps have only created greater political momentum – particularly among the young – toward a surrender of autocratic powers which he is determined to preserve.11 The emperor was “looking anxiously to the United States for help and reassurance.”12 But, Kissinger also pointed out, “Ethiopia is nearing an end of an era. Haile Selassie, approaching 77, has ruled for 53  years” and there was a recognition that the United States needed to prepare for a transition in Ethiopian politics. He said that there is a “growing concern (which we should share) that the emperor’s death will usher in a period of political chaos.” Given the need for the “continued, uninterrupted use of the important military communications installations at Kagnew Station,” which were already threatened by the “increasingly sophisticated” and effective Eritrean insurgency, constituting a “worry and a drain on valuable resources,” this was a real concern. Thus, Kissinger warned, when Selassie met with Nixon, the emperor would attempt to convince Nixon to increase American military aid, which currently stood at $12 million per year. Nixon’s job, Kissinger suggested, would be threefold: “to maintain a pro-western orientation of the Ethiopian regime; to safeguard the effective operations of Kagnew Station”13 which provided “advantages that would be either difficult or impossible to duplicate” elsewhere, and “to convince the emperor of our appreciation of his problems and of the high priority Ethiopia has in our military and economic assistance programmes, while not acceding to his demands for more military equipment.”14 During the meeting, when Haile Selassie made the predicted requests, Nixon alluded to the shadow of Vietnam, explaining that the “question of military assistance is a particularly sensitive one in the Congress at the present time,” that funding was limited and that “Ethiopia is already receiving approximately 60 per cent of the entire amount of funds available for Africa.”15 However, Selassie proved that he had lost none of his skill in attempting to play the Cold War game. He pointed to the strength of the communist bloc in the region, claiming that the Soviet Union posed the “greatest threat” to regional stability, and that the Red Sea was in danger of becoming a “Soviet-Egyptian lake.” He also repeated threats made to Nixon’s predecessors, implying the possibility that Ethiopia would turn “away from its traditional friends as a source of military assistance” and accept “such equipment from the Soviets,” but stressed that he wished to “avoid such a situation and, instead, to look to his traditional friends to be responsive to Ethiopia’s needs.”16 In reply, Nixon emphasised the importance of Ethiopia to the United States, maintaining that the “United States has no better friend in Africa than Ethiopia” and reiterated that while there would be “difficulties regarding

88  Vital and peripheral interests Congressional attitudes towards foreign assistance, and arising from the Vietnam War, nevertheless we will try to be as responsive as possible to Ethiopia’s needs within the framework of existing resources.”17 The main outcome of the meeting between Nixon and Haile Selassie was the realisation by both parties that nothing had changed when it came to US-Ethiopian relations: the Nixon administration would do as little as it could in order to achieve its objectives, and Haile Selassie would continue to demand more. However, developments in Somalia later that year would lead to profound changes that would impact upon American foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa throughout the 1970s.

Revolution in Somalia In October  1969, the Nixon administration prepared for the arrival of Somali Prime Minister Egal, who was in the United States to attend the UN General Assembly, and had been also invited to the White House. The administration was looking forward to the visit as a way to demonstrate support for Egal who was moderate, pro-Western and led, as Kissinger commented to Nixon, “one of the few multi-party democracies in Africa.”18 Most important though, as both Rogers and Kissinger agreed, was Egal’s pursuit of détente with Ethiopia. This was, Kissinger went on to explain, “still fragile” and “if the détente does not blossom, or if Egal stumbles personally, the dispute will slip back into the old bitterness and danger.”19 These dangers, Rogers argued, included the potential for proxy war, “as a result of US supply of arms to Ethiopia and the Soviets to Somalia . . . increasing pressure against our communications station” in Kagnew and the possibility that failure could “push Somalia closer to the Arab radical states and might even extend the Middle East conflict to the Horn.”20 While Egal was in the United States, though, the situation in Somalia took a drastic turn when, on October 15, Rogers informed Nixon that President Shermarke had been assassinated.21 Nixon publicly expressed his “deepest sympathy” and belief that “all men of goodwill are saddened by his death,”22 while, privately, frantic discussions took place on the reasons for the assassination and its possible impact on the United States. George Denney, Director of Intelligence and Research, acknowledged that while the “motives of the assassin, or whether any conspiracy was involved . . . are not yet known,” the assessment of the intelligence community was that the “dissatisfaction by the northern tribes with Somalia’s policy of détente with Ethiopia” was a likely cause. He concluded that the United States should not be too concerned and that the current government appeared “strong enough to sustain the present blow. An army takeover is not likely in the near future nor so long as the political system keeps functioning smoothly and tribal disorders are contained.”23 Kissinger agreed, telling Nixon that the National Assembly will elect a new president within 30 days. All leading candidates are pro-Western, and would probably continue Somalia’s ties with us as well as a conciliatory policy toward Ethiopia over the disputed border.

Vital and peripheral interests 89 Prime Minister Egal, whom you saw last week, is now flying home from California. His return should have a general calming effect on the country.24 However, almost immediately, further reports arrived from Somalia that directly contradicted these optimistic assessments. On October 21, Rogers informed Kissinger that an “army-police coup d’état bloodlessly overthrew Somalia’s government less than 24 hours after President Shermarke was buried.”25 The coup, according to a State Department assessment, came because of a “confluence of several factors” including economic woes, the perception by the army that the policy of détente was “an attack on their privileges and prerogatives,” and violence and corruption that was widespread throughout Somalia.26 Inevitably, there was some discussion within the administration as to the American response, and specifically whether the United States should officially recognise the new Somali government. Rogers acknowledged that “our relations are bound to be somewhat strained over the next few months,” but argued that “I can’t see how we could use our recognition to forestall any of these potential problems. On the contrary, snubbing the new government might only drive them faster toward a radical and belligerent posture.”27 Subsequently, Ambassador Fred Hadsel was told that “if Somalis specifically ask if US recognises new government, Embassy may reply in affirmative.”28 The administration’s concerns over the future of peace in the Horn of Africa seemed justified when Major General Mohammed Siad Barré, the man who had emerged as the new leader of the Somali nation, now calling itself the Somali Democratic Republic, held his first press conference. Siad stressed that the “new regime wants to continue Somalia’s friendly ties to both East and West,” endorsed the charters of the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations, and vowed that “power would be returned to civilians at an unspecified time.”29 However, he also pledged his support to “freedom fighters,” which Kissinger concluded was “almost certainly a reversal of Egal’s détente with Ethiopia over disputed border territories.”30 Kissinger’s fears for the future of détente in the Horn were reinforced by broadcasts from Radio Mogadishu, now dubbing itself “The Voice of the Somali People,” which described Egal as a “bloodsucker of the people.”31 The imminent collapse of détente led Kissinger to lament that: If the Somalis returned to bellicose irredentism (as these first signs seems to suggest), tension will rise throughout the area, including Kenya as well as Ethiopia. The old arms supply spiral could then begin again – with the Somalis going to the Soviets, the Ethiopians to us, the Kenyans to the British. Having tried détente and failed, Haile Selassie will probably find it impossible to hold his own hard-liners in check. And if the two sides slip back into belligerence, we should expect the Ethiopians to put our interests on the line – the important communications facility at Kagnew – in asking for increased military assistance.32 Unfortunately for the Americans, within days it appeared that Kissinger’s concerns were justified. As Nixon prepared to make his appeal to the ‘silent majority’

90  Vital and peripheral interests in the United States for support for policies in Vietnam that were designed to end the war in Southeast Asia, it appeared that Haile Selassie was gearing up for the outbreak of war with Somalia. On November 3, 1969, he announced his consideration of a “bill on compulsory military service” that would swell the ranks of the current army of 40,000 men.33 The emperor also increased the pressure on the Nixon administration for increased military aid by playing upon Nixon’s globalist and anti-communist stance and attempting to invoke fears of Soviet expansion. During a meeting in Addis Ababa in 1970 with Rogers, the Secretary of State was berated because the “Russians are moving in and you Americans are moving out.”34 Rogers subsequently reported to Nixon that the emperor and his regime feel under pressure, probably as much from within as without. They stressed Soviet-influenced encirclement, particularly recent events in Sudan and Somalia, also Eritrean Liberation Front. They believe Soviet policy through these points is now aimed against them. . . . Ethiopians also noticeably concerned about possible declining levels US aid.35 Although Rogers felt the existing levels of American aid were sufficient, he did recommend that the administration should “examine our programme to see whether we are helping adequately with smaller weapons needed to match rifles and bazookas reportedly being supplied to dissidents by Soviets.”36 Any prospects of a good relationship between the United States and the new Somali regime seemed to fade very quickly after the coup. Walter Carrington, Peace Corps regional director for Africa, announced that all American Peace Corps volunteers had been ordered to leave Somalia by the end of the year. The new Somali foreign secretary, Omar Arteh, acknowledged that Somalia was “grateful” for Peace Corps assistance, but that the new regime “has decided to dispense with the Peace Corps volunteers.”37 At the same time as American aid was being rebuffed, there came definite signs that Somalia was moving closer and closer to the communist bloc. In December, the New York Times reported on the arrival of a team of Soviet economic specialists to discuss ways that the USSR could provide additional aid to the new revolutionary government. The report also reminded readers of the extent of Soviet support since 1960 that had included “the building of a harbour in Berbera, meat and fish canning factories, a milk factory, two hospitals, a state farm and a secondary school.”38 In April 1970 Somalia established formal diplomatic relations with East Germany,39 and in May, all foreign banks and oil companies were nationalised.”40 By April 1973, the Soviet Union had also built a communications facility in Somalia, with American analysts noting that through it, Moscow had the ability to “directly control the movements of its warships throughout the Indian Ocean area.”41 As a report prepared by a Senate Subcommittee noted, the reality was that the Soviet Union had gained a foothold in Somalia. Accordingly, as of today, the United States is supporting one country; the Soviet Union, the other. Thus, our policies, by proxy, have set up a miniature cold war situation in the eastern portion of Africa.42

Vital and peripheral interests 91 While the potential for a proxy war in the Horn of Africa may have been worrying in itself, the implications of increasing communist bloc ties with Somalia had a far more pressing implication for a different war with which the United States was involved. On January 23, Hadsel telegraphed Rogers, reporting that a delegation representing the NLF/PRG had arrived in Mogadishu from Vietnam, to “wide and favourable publicity.”43 Not only that, Hadsel added, but Omar Arteh had announced that the new Somali government was “giving serious consideration to question of recognising Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG)” and that the “honourable struggle of Vietnamese people will be met with more vigorous and practical support.”44 Elements of that ‘practical support’ became evident in the early months of 1970 when reports arrived in the United States that North Vietnamese ships, including the Super Dragon and the Swift Dragon, were sailing under a Somali flag of convenience. Section 620 of the US Foreign Assistance Act required “termination of US bilateral aid to any country whose ships trade with North Vietnam,”45 and consequently questions were raised in the House and Senate. Kissinger warned Nixon that any decision to cut off aid to Somalia “may damage our relations with Somalia and produce a sharp reaction, especially in view of the political climate in Somalia and the leftist orientation of the new revolutionary government,” with the Somalis even going “so far as to break relations.”46 At Kissinger’s prompting, Rogers cabled Ambassador Hadsel, asking him to meet with Siad Barré, expressing American concerns over the use of the Somali flag, and making it clear that, if the flag-trade continued, it would “most regrettably, adversely affect US AID programme.”47 Although Hadsel met with the Somali Communications Secretary Warsama, the meeting produced no satisfactory results from the American perspective; Warsama acknowledged what he called the “rigid US legislative requirements” but asserted Somalia’s policy of “friendship and trade with all nations.”48 Such Somali intransigence left the administration with very little choice other than to invoke Section 620 and, on May 28, Hadsel notified Siad that the United States “must terminate our bilateral economic aid programme to Somalia as of June 1 1970” with the “present programmes phased out in an orderly manner over a period of some months.”49 When the aid programme was duly terminated on June 2 “because of continued Somali-flag shipping to North Vietnam (as required by the Foreign Assistance Act),”50 Siad publicly denounced the American action, adding that “Somalia has no interest whatever in a country that decides to withhold its aid.”51 Notwithstanding, despite the deterioration of relations between Somalia and the United States as a result of the coup and the flag-trade with Vietnam, the Nixon administration was determined to continue a relationship of sorts with Somalia. As Rogers pointed out to Kissinger, Somalia occupies an important position in the Horn of Africa both strategically and from the standpoint of a potential troublemaker in the area. The Soviets and, to a lesser extent, the Communist Chinese have been paying greater attention to Somalia since the drift to the left following the coup. . . . An errant Somalia could create significant difficulties for American interests

92  Vital and peripheral interests in the area. It is also in our interest to help maintain, along with other Western countries, a moderating influence which can be used to offset the sometimes harmful impact of communist objectives and activities in the area.52 American prospects seemed to improve in the early months of 1972 when, on February 8, 1972, Nixon announced the appointment of Matthew Looram as the new ambassador to Somalia. Following the meeting during which Looram presented his credentials and passed on a letter from Nixon to Siad, the Somali leader wrote to Nixon confirming “that our government is willing to reciprocate the good relations between our two countries as you have expressed . . . I would also like to reaffirm to you our desire to continue good relations with your government.”53 Looram added his assessment that he believed that “President Nixon’s original letter was genuinely appreciated by the Somali president and has contributed significantly to an improvement in our relations.”54

A sense of humour or fascinating revelations? Although the United States wanted to maintain a relationship of sorts with Somalia, the priority for the Nixon administration, as for all his predecessors in the Oval Office, was the relationship with Ethiopia. Accordingly, when Haile Selassie visited the United States to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations in October 1970, Nixon agreed to the emperor’s request for a personal meeting with him. As the minutes reveal, nothing unexpected or unusual took place during the meeting. Haile Selassie expressed his gratitude for American support, and issued the usual warnings about Soviet influence in the region due to the “high and increasing amount of Communist military assistance.” Inevitably, this led to Haile Selassie’s request for “more military help from the United States” in order for Ethiopia to remain a “bulwark against . . . Communist influence in the area.” Nixon’s reply also followed the usual pattern by reaffirming American support for Ethiopia, and promising to consider the emperor’s requests. However, reflecting the context of the growing Vietnam Syndrome and perception of American relative decline, Nixon warned that although the United States was “glad to help and would continue to help . . . there were limits on our resources.”55 Nonetheless, this meeting could be considered highly significant because of several associated factors and incidents that serve to highlight key themes associated with the Nixon administration. The first is these is the evidence it provides for the growing siege mentality within the Oval Office, and the dominance of the Nixon-Kissinger partnership in foreign policy. Although by no means is this the first time that it is apparent within the sources, the emperor’s visit provides a clear example of the way that other agencies were largely excluded from policy decisions. All briefing documents were sent to Kissinger, who provided a summary, which clearly reflected his personal stance, for Nixon.56 This trend was even more noticeable when Selassie visited again in 1973, with all paperwork, including briefing notes and suggestions for conversation topics channelled through Kissinger, who again produced a summary for Nixon.57

Vital and peripheral interests  93 The second, and arguably more interesting, aspect of the meeting can be a found in a press release prepared by the ‘Lower Level’ (staff of the communications office) for Alexander Haig, Deputy National Security Adviser. In it, the staff took the standard, formulaic press release phrases and reversed them, producing a document that revealed a witty and wonderful sense of humour. According to the mock press release, the “president and the emperor discussed a narrow range of subjects, none of which was of any mutual interest,” with the conversation “empty and completely lacking in candour.” What was perhaps more honest, however, and therefore more dangerous if the parody was ever leaked, was the contempt that was felt for Ethiopia. With the president expressing “considerable sympathy for the Eritrean Liberation Front,” “great relief” that he would never be “welcome to visit Ethiopia” and “gratified not to have to witness the great poverty, disease, ignorance and corruption that Ethiopia had achieved under the emperor’s long years of vigorously regressive leadership,” the spoof had the makings of an international incident. This potential danger was exacerbated by equally disparaging comments about Italy, with Nixon purportedly paying tribute to Ethiopia’s unique distinction as the only nation in the world ever to be defeated by the Italian army. Ethiopia’s contribution in this regard, the president assured the emperor, was greatly appreciated by the United States as a contribution to the morale and self-confidence of Italy which was now a NATO ally. The final sentence of the satire claimed that “while one could hardly state that the two heads of government parted amicably after their incomplete and insincere discussion, reports that they resorted to physical violence are greatly exaggerated.”58 Clearly, this satire was intended only for internal eyes, but its existence nonetheless reflects a degree of arrogance within the administration and an attitude that they could get away with anything. The prevalence of this throughout the White House goes some way towards explaining the context that would go on to produce the Watergate scandal and ultimately lead to Nixon’s downfall.

Impact of Vietnam Of more immediate concern for Nixon was the situation in Eritrea, and it was here that the impact of Vietnam was evident. By the 1970s, the insurgency had reached serious proportions, with the secessionists demonstrating a willingness to utilise all the techniques of modern terrorism in their efforts to achieve Eritrean independence. In September 1969, for example, when an Ethiopia plane was hijacked by members of the ELF, an ELF spokesman warned that the hijacking “was not the first blow to be aimed against Ethiopian economic interests abroad nor will it be the last.”59 The following year, Haile Selassie declared an official state of emergency in Eritrea, and the New York Times reported that “more than 1,000 Eritreans had been killed and many more had been injured in a major air and ground offensive launched by the Ethiopian armed forces” since the state of emergency had been declared.60 Kissinger subsequently informed Nixon that the

94  Vital and peripheral interests security situation in Ethiopia had “deteriorated significantly in the past several years,” largely due to the fact that “military Arab states have sharply increased their assistance to the Eritrean Liberation Front. . . . As a result, ELF activities have increased dramatically and caused the Ethiopian Government to declare martial law throughout the province of Eritrea.”61 In 1972, the situation in Eritrea was further complicated by growing divisions within the insurgents. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reported that “within the past year it has been torn by factional feuding to the extent that most of its energies and weapons are directed at rival groups. There are now two major divisions of the ELF and a number of factions within each.”62 This not only increased the level and intensity of fighting, but made the option of peaceful resolution much less likely. The impact of the Eritrean insurgency on the American aid package to Ethiopia prompted questions in Congress, and it was during these hearings that the impact of the Vietnam War on all aspects of American foreign policy was apparent. As early as 1969, when discussing Haile Selassie’s requests for increased military aid, Kissinger pointed out that the “main problem” was that the “emperor has an appetite for US arms which we can neither satisfy under present military aid limitations nor justify in terms of our own estimate of his position.”63 Those limitations were being imposed by Congress which was responding to the situation in Southeast Asia with increased oversight of American foreign policy. While this would eventually culminate in the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and the ‘Vietnam Syndrome,’ the early signs could be seen during the congressional hearings into foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa during the Nixon administration. In the spring of 1970, the House Subcommittee on Africa conducted a review of foreign policy towards Africa. During the Hearings, Lang explained that aid to Ethiopia was “designed to help the Ethiopian security forces improve their ability to cope with insurgency and other externally supported dissidence.” However, rather than accepting this as an American obligation, as might have happened a few years earlier, Charles Diggs (D-MI) questioned American involvement asking “why we think it is necessary to help Ethiopian security forces improve their ability to cope with the insurgency. Does that mean that they are not capable of handling their own internal security problems?”64 The clear implication was that Eritrea should not become another Vietnam. This concern was even more evident on the other side of the Hill. During hearings into the origins of the Eritrean insurgency, in response to a question from Fulbright, David Newsom of the State Department confirmed that Eritrea had been an “Italian colony for 80 years.” Fulbright’s response to this, though, was perhaps the most interesting and illuminating part of the conversation, reflecting the extent to which the shadow of Vietnam loomed over everything: Just like Vietnam. Don’t you remember when France took Vietnam about 1865?  .  .  . So we are now supporting with our arms and ammunition the Ethiopians to make Eritrea remain a part of their empire; that is about the effect of it.65

Vital and peripheral interests 95 Later in the discussions, Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO) questioned the need for the American military commitment to Ethiopia, and the subsequent potential for proxy war in the Horn of Africa, commenting that “I just do not like to see another Vietnam come up overnight or another Cambodia or another Laos or another Korea.”66 The increased sense of congressional responsibility was also apparent when Newsom, as well as George Bader from the Defence Department were questioned extensively about the extent of military aid being required, the types of weapons that were being given to the Ethiopians, and how, in detail, those weapons and other components of the military aid were being used. Towards the conclusion of the hearings, Fulbright summed up the legacy of Vietnam on the role of Congress in foreign policy formulation. The hearings he said were a: reflection upon Congress and the sloppy way we have done business, and the sloppy way of our relations with the State Department and the president. I have been more of a guilty party in many respects than you have because I was taken in by President Johnson and the Secretary of Defence, Mr McNamara. I believed what they told us. I had no idea that they were deceiving us. So my own gullibility is much more at fault than yours. I did not mean to be criticising you as an individual. You are doing your thing, as the hippies say, and we failed to do ours as we should have. But we have now been confronted with a difficult situation and some of us are trying to rectify it. I want to re-establish a little better understanding with the State Department in particular and also the Defence Department, that we are informed about these things and that they be made public.67

Kagnew The expanding intensity of the Eritrean insurgency and the impact of increased congressional oversight of overseas aid packages provoked more questions about the American presence at Kagnew Station. Despite an NIE assessment that “the Ethiopian government is likely to permit Kagnew to continue to function through the period of its lease (1978),”68 there were growing signs within the US government that this might not be the best idea. The Senate hearings on policy towards the Horn included questions on the need for Kagnew. Bader explained that the station was a “primary relay station of our worldwide defence communications system,” and were essential for American national security. However, for perhaps the first time there was a hint that there might be alternatives available. In response to a question along those lines from Senator Symington, Bader confirmed that “there are other ways that it could be done.”69 Discussions within the National Security Council (NSC) in November  1970 focused upon the advisability of maintaining Kagnew Station, especially given the “new level of activity” from the Eritrean insurgents.70 Shortly afterwards, as part of a full review of American interests in the Horn of Africa, Kissinger asked Rogers to study the importance of Kagnew Station’s importance to American

96  Vital and peripheral interests interests,71 with several assessments concluding that it would be more beneficial to the United States to phase out operations in Kagnew earlier than 1978 when the lease ended, as had originally been planned. Bill Clement, Assistant Secretary of Defence, summarised these, arguing that “budgetary constraints necessitate advancing the Kagnew withdrawal [from 1976–78] to FY 1974, with a goal of having all US military personnel out by the end of June 1974.”72 With the closure of the army base, Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird “directed that the Navy take over the residual base support responsibilities and examine the feasibility of relocating its tactical communications elsewhere.” Accordingly, the Navy “proposed to relocate from Kagnew and consolidate its communications station at Diego Garcia by the end of FY74.”73 What was perhaps most interesting about the discussions to phase out Kagnew, though, was the acknowledgement of the real purpose of the station. In explaining the recommendations to Nixon, Kissinger confirmed that “Kagnew served as a major intelligence station until last year, when budgetary limitations led the intelligence community to discontinue use of most of its facilities. That reduction left naval communications as Kagnew’s principal function, but the Navy now wants to shift this activity to Diego Garcia at a saving of about $10 million per year.”74 Despite the agreement from both the Departments of State and Defence on the closure of Kagnew, there were questions as to “when and how this can be done without disrupting US-Ethiopian relations or stability in the Horn of Africa.”75 Of particular concern was the impact on American military aid to Ethiopia which was already being hit by economic constraints and restrictions imposed as a result of Vietnam. Kissinger explained to Nixon that the closure of Kagnew “would weaken the case in Congress for US military assistance to Ethiopia which has often been viewed as a quid pro quo for Kagnew,” adding that “this rationale will not be tenable much longer.”76 However, although this was no small consideration, the feeling within the Defence Department was that US-Ethiopian relations would not be affected. Laird commented to Kissinger that “we are still giving Ethiopia enough military aid, so no need really for emperor to worry.”77

1973: the Horn on the brink In October 1972, a National Intelligence Estimate provided an evaluation of the situation in the Horn of Africa, describing it as an “area of chronic tensions and instability” where “state-to-state relations and the interests of great powers there are affected by a complex mixture of ethnic, religious, political, and ideological conflicts.” Although in recent years, “some of the more serious tensions have eased” the NIE warned, “much of this is transitory,” and regional and national stability depended “greatly on the quality and strength of the national rulers.”78 The future of Somalia, under the leadership of Siad Barré was a subject of some discussion within the Nixon administration but, undeniably, the main focus was on the future of Ethiopia given Haile Selassie’s age and the increasing signs of

Vital and peripheral interests 97 unrest against the emperor’s rule. An editorial in the Washington Post in May 1972 discussed the “waning era of Haile Selassie,” accusing him of increasingly stifling internal reforms and of throwing dissidents to the lions – literally. The emperor keeps lions as pets on the grounds of his half-dozen palaces and mansions dotted throughout the squalor and deadening poverty of this city, which has pretentions of being the capital of Africa. . . . Significantly, the frustration level among the younger businessmen, intellectuals and army officers who form the educated elite of Ethiopia seems to be mounting rapidly, and the number of the emperor’s critics growing.79 Haile Selassie’s biggest problem, though, was yet to come. At the end of 1973, reports began to emerge of an erupting famine in Ethiopia. They were fairly sporadic to begin with, but soon it was clear that the country was heading for a crisis. In February 1974, Charles Mohr reported that “almost unnoticed by a distant world, a cataclysm struck Ethiopia last year as famine swept at least two million farmers and herdsmen, killing uncounted thousands.” With victims in 1974 estimated to be more than a million, it was clear that Ethiopia was on the brink of a humanitarian disaster. The problems went further than that, though; as Mohr pointed out, the important question is not so much what foreigners think [of the government’s response to the famine] but what the Ethiopians think: will the famine affect the already awesome gap between traditional Ethiopia and the restless young students, intellectuals and radicals.80 Indeed, developments in Ethiopia over the next several months would suggest that this really was the crucial question.

Notes 1 Telegram, Nixon to Haile Selassie, January 29, 1969; WHCF Countries Box 26, CO 48 Ethiopia, Nixon Library. Telegram, Nixon to Shermarke, January 30, 1969; WHCF Countries Box 65, CO 134 Somalia, Nixon Library. 2 The Suez Canal was closed from June 5, 1967, to June 10, 1975, as a result of the ArabIsraeli wars. NIE 75/76–72, October 4, 1972; Project File of Documents Declassified Through the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) Programme Box 8, Horn of Africa, Ford Library. 3 “The Soviet Presence in the Persian Gulf,” Washington Post, April 25, 1973. 4 “Rogers Confers With Tito in Ethiopia,” New York Times, February 12, 1970. 5 “Soviets Criticise US Africa Policy,” Washington Post, February 27, 1970. 6 “Rogers Confers With Tito in Ethiopia,” New York Times, February 12, 1970. 7 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Africa, May 21, 1970, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 8 Memo, State Dept to Kissinger, June 20, 1969; NSC Files VIP Visits Box 914, Ethiopia State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, Nixon Library.

98  Vital and peripheral interests 9 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, July 6, 1969; NSC Files VIP Visits Box 914, Ethiopia State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, Nixon Library. 10 Memo, State Dept to Kissinger, June 20, 1969; NSC Files VIP Visits Box 914, Ethiopia State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, Nixon Library. 11 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, July 6, 1969; NSC Files VIP Visits Box 914, Ethiopia State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, Nixon Library. 12 Memo, Dept State to Kissinger, June 20, 1969; NSC Files VIP Visits Box 914, Ethiopia State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, Nixon Library. 13 Memo, State Dept to Kissinger, June 20, 1969; NSC Files VIP Visits Box 914, Ethiopia State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, Nixon Library. 14 Memo, Dept State to Kissinger, June 20, 1969; NSC Files VIP Visits Box 914, Ethiopia State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, Nixon Library. 15 MemCon, Nixon and Haile Selassie, July 8, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I, Jan 69 – Dec 71, Nixon Library. 16 MemCon, Nixon and Haile Selassie, July 8, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I, Jan 69 – Dec 71, Nixon Library. 17 MemCon, Nixon and Haile Selassie, July 9, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I, Jan 69 – Dec 71, Nixon Library. 18 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, October 4, 1969; WHCF Countries Box 65, CO 134 Somalia, Nixon Library. 19 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, October 4, 1969; WHCF Countries Box 65, CO 134 Somalia, Nixon Library. 20 Briefing Memo, State Dept to Kissinger, October 2, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I (June 69–July 74) 1, Nixon Library. 21 Memo, Rogers to Nixon, October 15, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I (June 69–July 74) 1, Nixon Library. 22 Telegram, Nixon to President Muktar, Somalia, October 16, 1969; WHCF Countries Box 65, CO 134 Somalia, Nixon Library. 23 Memo, George Denney, Director of Intelligence and Research, State Dept, to Sec State, October 15, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I (June 69– July 74) 1, Nixon Library. 24 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, October  20, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box  744, Somali Republic Vol I (June 69–July 74) 1, Nixon Library. 25 Memo, State Dept to Kissinger, October 21, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I (June 69–July 74) 1, Nixon Library. 26 Memo, State Dept to Kissinger, October 21, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I (June 69–July 74) 1, Nixon Library. 27 Memo, Roger Morris to Kissinger, October  28, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I (June 69–July 74) 1, Nixon Library. 28 Telegram, State Dept to American Embassy, Mogadishu, October 28, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I (June 69–July 74) 1, Nixon Library. 29 “Somalia Junta Leaders Admit Plot,” Washington Post, October 26, 1969. 30 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, October  21, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box  744, Somali Republic Vol I (June 69–July 74) 1, Nixon Library. 31 “Somali Army and Police Seize Power,” New York Times, October 22, 1969. 32 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, October  21, 1969; NSC Files Country Files Box  744, Somali Republic Vol I (June 69–July 74) 1, Nixon Library. 33 “Ethiopian Draft Bill,” Washington Post, November 3, 1969. 34 “Rogers is Beset With Aid Pleas in Addis Ababa,” Washington Post, February 13, 1970. 35 Telegram, Rogers to Nixon, February  14, 1970; NSC Files Country Files Box  736, Ethiopia Vol I January 69–December 71 (4), Nixon Library. 36 Telegram, Rogers to Nixon, February  14, 1970; NSC Files Country Files Box  736, Ethiopia Vol I January 69–December 71 (4), Nixon Library. 37 “Peace Corps to Quit Somalia by Request,” Washington Post, December 20, 1969.

Vital and peripheral interests 99 38 “14 Soviet Experts Arrive in Somalia for Aid Study,” New York Times, December 6, 1969. 39 “East German-Somali Ties,” New York Times, April 12, 1970. 40 “Banks and Oil Companies Nationalised by Somalia,” New York Times, May 8, 1970. 41 “US Hears Soviet Has Somali Base,” New York Times, April 9, 1973. 42 Hearings, Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, June 1, 1970, US Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 43 The National Liberation Front/Provisional Revolutionary Government was the official name for the political opposition in South Vietnam, and the government supported by North Vietnam. 44 Telegram, Hadsel to Sec State, January  23, 1970; NSA NSC Vietnam Information Group Box 5, National Liberation Front/Provisional Revolutionary Government 1968–75, Ford Library. 45 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, FRUS, 1969–1975, Vol E-5, Pt 1, June  6, 1970, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972; Digital Archive https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve05p1/d289. 46 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, FRUS, 1969–1975, Vol E-5, Pt 1, June  6, 1970, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972; Digital Archive https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve05p1/d289. 47 Telegram, SecState to American Embassy Mogadishu, March 17, 1970; NSA NSC Vietnam Information Group Box 2; Communist Shipping to North Vietnam 1968–72, Ford Library. 48 Telegram, Hadsel to Asst Sec Newsom, May 10, 1970; NSA NSC Vietnam Information Group Box 2; Communist Shipping to North Vietnam 1968–72, Ford Library. 49 Memo, Acting SecState to Nixon, May 29, 1970; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I June 69–July 74 1, Nixon Library. 50 Memo, Richard Kennedy, NSC, to Kissinger, June 2, 1970; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I June 69–July 74 1, Nixon Library. 51 Memo, Richard Kennedy, NSC, to Kissinger, June 2, 1970; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I June 69–July 74 1, Nixon Library. 52 Briefing Memo, State Dept to Kissinger, April  12, 1971; NSC Files Country Files Box 744, Somali Republic Vol I June 69–July 74 1, Nixon Library. 53 Letter, Siad to Nixon, May  12, 1972; WHCF Countries Box  65, CO134 Somalia, Nixon Library. 54 Telegram, Ambassador Looram to Sec State, June 8, 1972; WHCF Countries Box 65, CO134 Somalia, Nixon Library. 55 MemCon, Haile Selassie and Nixon, October 25, 1970; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I January 69–December 71 (4), Nixon Library. 56 See, for example, Memo, State Dept to Nixon, October 21, 1970; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I January 69–December 71, Nixon Library. Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, October 23, 1970; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia, Vol I, Nixon Library. 57 Briefing memo, Kissinger to Nixon, May 15, 1973; NSC Files VIP Visits Box 915, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia May 15 1973, Nixon Library. 58 Memo, October  24, 1970; NSC Files Country Files Box  736, Ethiopia Vol I  January 69–December 71, Nixon Library. 59 “More Disruption Pledged,” New York Times, September 14, 1969. 60 “Rebels Charge Ethiopian ‘Annihilation,’ ” New York Times, December 30, 1970. 61 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, January 20, 1971; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I January 69–December 71, Nixon Library. 62 NIE 75/76–72, October 4, 1972; Project File of Documents Declassified Through the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) Programme Box 8, Horn of Africa, Ford Library. 63 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, July 6, 1969; NSC Files VIP Visits Box 914, Ethiopia State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, Nixon Library.

100  Vital and peripheral interests 64 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Africa, May 21, 1970, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 65 Hearings, Subcommittee of United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, June 1, 1970, US Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 66 Hearings, Subcommittee of United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, June 1, 1970, US Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 67 Hearings, Subcommittee of United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, June 1, 1970, US Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 68 NIE 75/76–72, October 4, 1972; Project File of Documents Declassified Through the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) Programme Box 8, Horn of Africa, Ford Library. 69 Hearings, Subcommittee of United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, June 1, 1970, US Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 70 Memo, Wright to Kissinger, November 27, 1970; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I January 69–December 71, Nixon Library. 71 Memo, Kissinger to Sec State, Sec Defence, CIA Director, January 25, 1971; NSC Institutional Files NSSM Box H-181, NSSM115, Nixon Library. 72 Memo, Deputy Sec Defence to Deputy Sec State, April 17, 1973; NSC Institutional Files NSSM Box H-200, NSSM-184, Nixon Library. 73 Defence Dept Report, March 1973; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I January 69–December 71 (5), Nixon Library. 74 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, May 10, 1973; NSC Institutional Files NSSM Box H-200, NSSM-184, Nixon Library. 75 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, May 10, 1973; NSC Institutional Files NSSM Box H-200, NSSM-184, Nixon Library. 76 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, May  1973; NSC Institutional Files NSSM Box  H-200, NSSM-184, Nixon Library. 77 Memo, Sec Defence to NSC, March 29, 1973; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I January 69–December 71 (5), Nixon Library. 78 NIE 75/76–72, October 4, 1972; Project File of Documents Declassified Through the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) Programme Box 8, Horn of Africa, Ford Library. 79 “The Waning Era of Haile Selassie,” Washington Post, May 28, 1972. 80 “Rift in Ethiopian Society May be Deepened by Famine,” New York Times, February 18, 1974.

7 Revolution in Ethiopia

Trouble looms in Ethiopia As 1974 began, it was clear that the situation in Ethiopia was deteriorating. With news of the famine becoming more widespread and unrest increasing against the way that the Ethiopian government was managing the famine in particular and the country in general, Haile Selassie prepared to face his biggest test since the Italian invasion of 1935. The extent of the looming humanitarian catastrophe was summed up in a report published by a group of faculty members at Haile Selassie University on December  27, 1973, which conceded that the “nature, magnitude and intensity of the suffering and tragedy” in the areas hit by famine was “very difficult to verbalise,” and concluded that “this is a situation which requires a large-scale mobilisation of the efforts of all concerned in Ethiopia.”1 Instead, however, Haile Selassie had spent much of the year trying to minimise any admission of the disaster. There was no official acknowledgement of the crisis until April 1973, and even then, as a government source commented to the New York Times, “there was no attempt to inform us or the Ethiopian public of the scale of the problem. Instead, there was a tendency to minimise the problem, as though it was embarrassing.”2 The spreading news of the extent of the famine, the seeming disinterest of the government, combined with rising prices and other economic woes, resulted in growing unrest in Ethiopia. In February 1974, the student protests, which had “become an almost regular feature of Ethiopian life,” took on a more sinister aspect as, for the first time, workers in Addis Ababa took to the streets in protests and strikes to express their discontent with Haile Selassie’s regime.3 Then, in the most serious move to date, junior army officers, backed by as many as 10,000 soldiers, staged a mutiny in Asmara, taking over the city and demanding better pay and conditions, and government reforms.4 With reports that 1,700 sailors had joined the mutiny and seized control of the Red Sea base in Massawa, Haile Selassie yielded to the mutineers’ demands that the government must pay the price for the failure to control inflation and accepted the resignations of nineteen ministers including that of Aklilou Abte Wold, who had risen to the level of prime minister of Ethiopia.5 This seemed to be a matter of too little, too late, though, and the mutiny continued to spread. By the beginning of March,

102  Revolution in Ethiopia virtually all of the 40,000-strong combined military forces, soldiers, sailors and airmen of Ethiopia had joined the mutiny. In addition, a general strike, in which the 80,000 members of the Ethiopian Labour Confederation and another 20,000 civil servants and private company employees participated, brought the country to a standstill, both metaphorically and literally, with all air and sea ports closed and public transportation halted.6 By the end of March the dissent had spread from the cities to the countryside with reports that groups of peasants were “burning things on their farms and protesting exploitation by landlords.”7 This “peasant revolt,” according to analysts, had taken the constitutional crisis to a “new and terrifying stage.”8 The situation was considered so critical that a meeting of the Organisation of African Unity was cut short when the “Ethiopian government said it could no longer guarantee the delegates’ security.”9 One foreign diplomat commented that “something very fundamental seems to have happened, and Ethiopia will probably never be the same again.” Another remarked that this is an unprecedented situation. The emperor has been forced to change the government and to make concessions – and it has happened in the public view. That has never happened before and it is likely to change the rules in Ethiopia a bit.10 The potential extent of this change was apparent when members of a “secret committee of Ethiopian non-commissioned officers” held a clandestine meeting with reporters and revealed that “we may need to take power.”11 Back in the United States, although Nixon was more perturbed about his own political future than that of Haile Selassie, members of Congress expressed concern over the famine. On March 21, 1974, George Matzat of Lutheran World Relief testified to a Senate subcommittee that the famine was affecting over a million people, and reported “at least 50,000 dead.”12 With efforts of the Ethiopian government to combat the famine described as “so rudimentary” as to be ineffective,13 Edward Kennedy (D-MA) appealed for American support for the Ethiopian people, contending that “today a good share of Ethiopia’s population of some 25,000,000 people face the nightmare of starvation and death . . . we must do what we can, with what we have.”14 Aid efforts, though, were hindered by the political situation both in the United States and Ethiopia. The administration’s understandable preoccupation with the Watergate hearings, exacerbated by the impact of the Vietnam Syndrome, was further complicated by the resignation of Ross Adair as American ambassador in Addis Ababa and the refusal of Thomas McElhiney to accept the position when it was offered to him. Despite the recommendation of Hal Horan, Adviser for Africa and International Organisation Affairs in the State Department, that “this is a vacancy we need to fill as quickly as possible,”15 it would not be until Arthur Hummel presented his credentials on April  3, 1975, a year later, that the post would be filled. In April, the embassy passed on a request from the Ethiopian government for emergency military aid, but recognised that the impact of the Vietnam

Revolution in Ethiopia  103 Syndrome and the overwhelming preoccupation of the Watergate hearings meant that acquiescence was unlikely. Although Ethiopia retained strategic importance because of its “location in relations to Middle Eastern arena, the crucial Arabian peninsula, the reopening Suez Canal and US naval forces in the Indian Ocean – to say nothing of the important natural gas and possibly oil resources of Ogaden,” there was acknowledgement that “this importance . . . is insufficient to justify initiation of a massive military assistance programme.”16 Indeed, during the waning months of the Nixon administration a feeling pervaded that there was an “indication of USG ‘withdrawal’ from Ethiopia.”17 Analysts at the American embassy in Ethiopia concluded that the current situation bears some resemblance to such critical American policy decisions as those regarding Chiang Kai-Shek’s China, Israel, South Korea, and South Vietnam. We may face in near future what one in earlier years might have called “the loss of Ethiopia.”18

The creeping coup As summer began, the situation in Ethiopia continued to deteriorate. Reports claimed that the famine was “rampant,” with the drought taking a “grim toll in parts of Ethiopia.”19 Daniel Parker of AID appeared before the House Appropriations Subcommittee to appeal for American aid and testified that the “severe drought in Ethiopia resulted in famine conditions affecting 1.9 million people. One report estimated 30,000 people had died. The areas most seriously affected usually produce about 40% of Ethiopia’s total food crops.”20 Although an emergency aid effort was under way, bad management, corruption, and lack of appropriate transportation was limiting its effectiveness. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who visited some of the worst-hit areas, commented that I saw piles of foodstuffs in the capitals of the drought-stricken countries, but the governments told me they cannot ship it to the areas most afflicted. Because of the lack of roads – it is just sand, everywhere you look you have sand – after a relatively short time, the trucks are not usable anymore.21 Ethiopia’s desperation was reflected in the worsening political situation. At the end of June, the leading army mutineers seized control of the radio station in Addis Ababa and used it to issue statements that ordered the arrest of several government ministers, announced a night-time curfew in the capital and called on the Ethiopian people to cooperate with the armed forces. The broadcasts explained that the “military action taken at this time has been done to find a solution to the problems of the whole country.”22 With soldiers massing at other key facilities in Addis Ababa including the airport, a Western diplomat observed that “there is a distinct feeling that a military coup is taking place.”23 Two days later, New York Times reporter, Paul Hoffmann, claimed that the military was tightening its grip on power, contending that, despite their declarations of “unswerving loyalty” to

104  Revolution in Ethiopia the emperor, it was clear that political power now lay in the hands of an as yet “still shadowy military movement.”24 What was being termed the “creeping coup”25 took another step forward when it emerged that the leading group, comprised of junior officers and enlisted men, had dubbed itself the Armed Forces Committee. With such formalisation of their organisation came a recognition that this group was the effective government in Ethiopia despite their relative anonymity. No names were associated with the Committee, and they refused to grant any interviews with the foreign press. One army captain who was in contact with the Committee did reveal, however, that these were not the same men who had instigated the February mutiny. “It is a totally new group from February,” he said. “They are neither to the left nor the right. They are just Ethiopians who want reform and an end to corruption in government.”26 On July 9, the Armed Forces Committee publicly asserted its control of Ethiopia when it issued its first formal policy statement. Declaring that the “culture and history of Ethiopia are unique and so is the nature and course of this military movement,”27 the statement included a 13-point manifesto that was designed to accomplish “lasting changes without any bloodshed.”28 Within the statement were pledges that the army would work closely with the civilian cabinet and act as a kind of watchdog over its activities. The army was forced to take the action, it said, “to ensure the smooth functioning of the new Cabinet” by removing corrupt officials. Despite a pledge of loyalty to the emperor and promise to “uphold the crown,” the priority of the manifesto was a new constitution, stripping the emperor of many of his traditional powers and transferring these to Parliament and the Cabinet. Western diplomats commented that, once in effect, this would make the emperor “a constitutional monarch without effective powers.” Other points covered by the manifesto included better labour relations and increased aid to drought victims.29

Revolution in Ethiopia Newspaper reports on August 7, 1974, signified portentous changes in both the United States and Ethiopia. Nixon’s impending resignation due to the Watergate crisis was met with shock and disbelief in Ethiopia. One Ethiopian official told David Ottaway of the Washington Post, “I would never have believed such a thing of an American president. It’s shocking,” while the state-run radio station deemed Nixon’s decision as a “sensational admission of guilt.”30 However, for many Ethiopians, the comparisons between the Watergate revelations and the reports of widespread corruption that were emerging as the army mutiny developed into the creeping coup, struck close to home. “We now have our own Watergate,” an Ethiopian official told Ottaway and then added somewhat ominously, “we have watched with interest the way President Nixon was brought down.”31 Indeed, Haile Selassie’s downfall was under way. At the same time as Nixon was making his historic decision, a 30-member panel presented the draft of a new constitution to Premier Mikael Imru that would transform Ethiopia into a

Revolution in Ethiopia 105 constitutional monarchy.32 The proposed constitution retained Haile Selassie as a figurehead and “symbol of Ethiopian unity and history” but stripped him of all political power. As Ottaway reported, it “all but delivers the coup de grace to the once all-powerful Ethiopian emperor.”33 Haile Selassie’s increasingly vulnerable position was exacerbated by the fact that, by this point, virtually all of his political allies and personal friends had been arrested on charges of corruption, abuse of power or obstruction of reform.34 One Western diplomat commented that “the emperor’s downgrading is almost complete,” but added that “I don’t think they will depose Haile Selassie – he is still a national symbol.”35 The questions over Haile Selassie’s future posed a dilemma for the incoming president, Gerald Ford: whether his priority should be to establish a relationship with the new regime or maintain loyalty to a man who had been friends with the United States for decades. A key consideration for the new president in reaching his decision was news from Somalia. Although Ford, like his predecessor, accepted Siad’s left-wing leanings and the Soviet presence in Somalia, there were concerns at the increasing consolidation of that relationship. Just after taking office, Ford was told by Kissinger that “in a recently concluded but unpublished friendship treaty the Soviets obtained full base rights and access to Somali airfields in return for Soviet military assistance over a period of ten years” which would “formalise and strengthen what has been routine access already enjoyed by the Soviets to naval facilities.”36 Thus, with Somalia moving closer and closer to the Soviet bloc, and the worsening oil crisis increasing the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa due to its proximity to the sea routes to the Middle East, the feeling within the Ford administration was that a relationship with Ethiopia must be maintained regardless of whom was in charge. An intelligence briefing by the NSA concluded that the “principal instrument of our strategy” has been, and would continue to be, Ethiopia and that the “primary US interest in the Horn” remained the same as it ever had been – to “prevent control of this strategic area from passing to unfriendly powers, a development which would result in the outflanking of our interests in the Arabian peninsula.”37 Indeed, rather than stand by Haile Selassie, all the signs suggested that the Ford administration would support an alternative government. In a memo to Kissinger, Horan praised the Ethiopian draft constitution as a prescription for “a modern democratic system of government with a constitutional monarch fulfilling a unifying symbolic function above politics. Liberties are anchored in the law and there are checks and balances between the three coequal branches of government.”38 More practical support for the Armed Forces Committee was demonstrated when American military aid to Ethiopia was stepped up. By the end of August, Western diplomats and analysts commented on the arrival of “heavy arms” including “at least several dozen M-60 heavy tanks” in Addis Ababa with reports of more on the way.39 This increase, analysts surmised, would “undoubtedly strengthen the military group that has seized power by stages during the last six months, downgrading the authority of Emperor Haile Selassie.”40 With the vast majority of Ethiopia’s population consisting of rural peasants who remained relatively loyal to the emperor, it was not surprising that the leaders

106  Revolution in Ethiopia of the ‘creeping coup’ were moving carefully. Notwithstanding, their efforts to assert control of the nation moved inexorably on. At the end of August, statements from the Armed Forces Committee announced that Haile Selassie had been “stripped of nearly all his wealth inside Ethiopia”41 and confirmed the nationalisation of all the emperor’s palaces throughout Ethiopia, declaring that they had been built by the “sweat and money of the people” and therefore “belong[ed] to the people.”42 Ford was told that political leadership in Ethiopia was in the hands of “a new civilian government, dominated by the military, both committed to a programme of constitutional, political, economic and social reforms which has already greatly reduced the power of Emperor Haile Selassie and the country’s dominant aristocracy.” When it came to questions surrounding Selassie’s future, the briefing concluded that “Ethiopia is at present in a highly volatile state” with no clear signs of “where the ‘creeping revolution’ will lead.”43 Then, on September 4, Kissinger received a report from the American Embassy in Addis Ababa warning that the “future of the emperor and the monarchy are rapidly becoming the subject of a sharpening debate within the ruling Armed Forces Coordinating Committee. Lines are beginning to draw between radicals who insist the emperor must go and moderates who are prepared to retain the emperor and the institution. It is difficult to tell which way the debate is going, but leading observers in Addis speculate that the denouncement could come faster than anticipated, possibly within the next few days.”44 On September 8, Gerald Ford pardoned the former president “for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from January  20, 1969 through August 9, 1974.”45 The same day, in another ironic juxtaposition, the Washington Post, which had been so instrumental in Nixon’s downfall, published an article by David Ottaway which summarised succinctly the situation in Ethiopia: It began with a mutiny over conditions at an isolated army post in southern Ethiopia and apparently is ending, eight months later, in the destruction of the world’s most ancient monarchy. Deposition of Emperor Haile Selassie appears imminent. Foreigners have dubbed it a “creeping coup” and “salami coup,” and Ethiopians are calling it the “February Revolution.” What was most interesting about Ottaway’s article, though, was that it included the first mention of Mengistu Haile Mariam, with Ottaway describing him as the chairman of a “kind of higher committee of 7 to 12 officers” and suggesting that, although it was “too early to tell,” Mengistu may well emerge as the “Colonel Nasser” of the Ethiopian revolution.46 Then, on September 12, Haile Selassie was summoned to the National Palace (formerly the Jubilee Palace) in Addis Ababa, where a proclamation was read to him denouncing him for “having abused the power and dignity of his office and having subverted it for his own gain.” The proclamation ended by declaring that Haile Selassie had been “deposed from office.”47 An official announcement on Radio Ethiopia marked the final step in the coup, with the nation informed

Revolution in Ethiopia 107 that the emperor had been deposed due to his “oppressive rule,” and that he was “charged with committing crimes against the Ethiopian people and with refusing to take measures that might have alleviated the harsh famine in northern Ethiopia, which has so far taken an estimated 100,000 lives.” The broadcast also dissolved the civilian government, suspended the constitution, and announced that a “provisional military administration” would rule Ethiopia for the foreseeable future, under the command of Lieutenant General Aman Michael Andom.48 The news of Selassie’s overthrow was greeted with joy in the capital with an employee at the city’s Hilton Hotel telling reporters, “this is great. I’m very pleased about it. Things will change for the better now.”49 There were similar celebrations in Asmara, and hopes were expressed that the political changes in Addis Ababa might make it easier for a negotiated settlement to be reached over the future of Eritrea.50 Back in Washington, Kissinger was informed that the “deposition of the emperor is being generally well received in Addis. The rural response seems passive to favourable.” However, the sitrep also noted the visible military presence in the city, reporting that “troops, tanks, armoured cars, and machine gunand recoilless rifle-mounting jeeps continue to be deployed around Addis and are patrolling the road to the international airport, which remains closed.”51

The American response Given the years of support that the United States had given to Haile Selassie, it was no surprise that there was widespread interest in the reaction of the Ford administration to the coup. State Department spokesman John King told reporters that the “United States has enjoyed good relations with the Ethiopian government of Emperor Haile Selassie and looks forward to good relations with the new government there,” adding that “at this moment” the question of recognition of the new government was not relevant and that that full diplomatic relations were continuing as usual.52 The American abandonment of Haile Selassie as a personal ally and prioritisation of its relationship with Ethiopia regardless of political leadership was made most clear in a memo sent from George Springsteen in the State Department to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. As he had done after every presidential inauguration, Haile Selassie had sent a congratulatory telegram to the incoming president. However, when it came to Ford’s accession, the official recommendation was that no reply should be sent by President Ford to deposed Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie’s congratulatory message of August 8 on the occasion of the president’s inauguration. Such an acknowledgement is unnecessary since Haile Selassie is no longer Chief of State and it might needlessly irritate the present Ethiopian government which has just deposed him and has indicated its willingness to maintain good relations with the United States.53 The American reaction was buoyed by reassurances from General Aman that the “armed forces want to maintain a strong and friendly relationship with the

108  Revolution in Ethiopia US.”54 On September 19, Horan confirmed that the new government in Ethiopia had indicated “its desire to continue close and friendly relations with the United States.”55 On an appearance on Face the Nation in September, Ford confirmed that we value the close ties that have developed over the years between the United States and Ethiopia and look forward to continuation of these good relations. We are conducting normal relationships with the provisional military government, whose head, Lieutenant General Aman, has assured [us] of its desire to maintain a strong and friendly relationship with the United States.56 However, any hopes that the administration might have had for a smooth transition and continued good relations with the Ethiopian revolutionaries appeared to be threatened by internal disputes within the Armed Forces Committee regarding the role of civilian government in Ethiopia’s future. On October 4, Parker Wynne, chargé d’affaires at the American embassy in Addis Ababa, cabled Kissinger, reporting on the “deep cleavages within the military leadership” and warning of the loss of support for Aman.57 American concerns were heightened when Aman stepped down as Ethiopian leader because of “work pressure,”58 and by news that “armed forces units in Addis Ababa were put on alert as Ethiopia’s provisional military council met in emergency session to try to iron out major differences over what form of government is to rule the country.”59 Kissinger briefed Ford on the deteriorating situation, suggesting that “movement of troops into Addis may be primarily to influence the discussions of the 120-man military committee, which is divided along various lines and appears on the verge of a showdown in the power struggle between its radical and relatively moderate factions.”60 When reports arrived on October 8, that fighting had broken out between the “contending factions” of the Armed Forces Committee,61 it appeared that the ‘creeping coup,’ which had remained bloodless for nine months, had entered a more violent and revolutionary stage. On October 16, Kissinger received an intelligence assessment that warned that the “major threat to US interests in the period ahead will be a takeover of the government in Addis Ababa by the radical members of the AFCC.”62 Subsequently, Kissinger cabled Wynne reassuring him that American military, drought and economic aid would continue as “we are very mindful that we should seek to avoid any action that could become a flash point for the forces of radicalism during this period of uncertainty.”63 Notwithstanding, it was soon clear that the ‘forces of radicalism’ were asserting their control, when reports arrived in Washington that sixty former government officials had been executed as part of a power struggle between Aman and Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had recently been revealed as the “true moving force” and leader of the coup that deposed Haile Selassie.64 The Ethiopian Supreme Military Council confirmed via a radio broadcast that “those executed included Lt Gen Aman Andom, former chief of the military government who was arrested last night, and two former prime ministers, Aklilou Abte Wold and Endalkachew Makonnen.”65 According to reports, Mengistu was one of four officers who had “stood behind the trembling firing

Revolution in Ethiopia 109 squad at the Addis Ababa central prison with a machine gun trained on the hapless executioners to be sure they performed their orders.”66 Although Brigadier General Tafari Benti was announced as formal head of Ethiopia at the end of the November,67 the influence of Mengistu, officially vice chairman and military leader, in the direction of the new regime, now calling itself the Provisional Military Administrative Council [PMAC], or Derg, was apparent. One diplomat referring to the changes in Ethiopia, commented that “this is a whole new ball game. Everything is in a confused state.”68 The recognition of Mengistu’s rise to power aroused some concerns in the White House over the future of US-Ethiopian relations. The main question, as expressed in a State Department briefing paper for the president, was “whether the United States should continue to provide military supplies to Ethiopia on the scale projected by decisions made earlier this year.” Any “cessation or reduction of military aid would be taken as a sign that the US does not support the present regime and may actively oppose it. This could drive the PMG [PMAC] to seek arms from Communist countries,” which was a worrying prospect because of the continued strategic importance of Ethiopia due to its proximity to “the Middle East oil supplies and the Indian Ocean oil route.”69 Accordingly, Ford issued instructions that the PMAC should be informed that “the United States wants to continue with the new and emerging regime in Ethiopia the close and mutually beneficial relations we have enjoyed with previous governments.”70 Within the administration, though, it was agreed that the situation in Ethiopia needed to be closely monitored, and that any request for US economic and military aid should be reviewed “on a case by case basis before proceeding with it in the light of all the circumstances at the time.”71

Trouble flares in Eritrea The political upheaval in Addis Ababa had a profound impact on hopes for a peaceful resolution to the Eritrean insurgency. Eritrean-born General Aman had supported a negotiated settlement, and there were feelings within the administration that this disagreement had been a factor in Aman’s execution. In December, a briefing paper prepared for Ford reported on the increased number of government forces that were being dispatched to Eritrea and noted that “General Aman’s opposition to the dispatch of additional troops to the area, a step which the more militant elements in the PMAC had been demanding, may have contributed to his death.”72 Fears that the more militant approach by the PMAC would lead to increased hostilities in Eritrea became reality towards the end of 1974. The first reports came on December  24 when Ottaway reported on renewed fighting around Asmara, adding that “it appears that the long-feared resumption of war between the central government and the Front, which is seeking the independence of Ethiopia’s strategically located northern province of Eritrea, may have begun.”73 Shortly after Ottaway’s report, the ELF issued a statement confirming that insurgent activity was being stepped up because Ethiopia refused to negotiate on Eritrean independence,

110  Revolution in Ethiopia declaring that “as long as Ethiopia refuses our olive branch, there will be more bullets and grenades,” and asserting that the Eritreans “will not lay down their arms until Eritrea’s aspirations are fulfilled and its independence achieved.”74 The intensifying conflict in Eritrea brought forth a rather ironic comparison with the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia. On January 20, 1975, Wynne telegraphed Kissinger asking that “in view of increasing indications that major hostilities may soon break out in Eritrea, would appreciate earliest forwarding of administrative instructions to facilitate the departure of dependents who wish to leave Asmara.”75 The seriousness of the situation in Asmara was summed up by Jim Hackett, one of the employees at Kagnew, who told reporters that “it’s a bloodbath out there.”76 As a result, Kissinger telegraphed Wynne with instructions that, while Kagnew would remain open, all “nonessential personnel can be temporarily withdrawn to Addis.”77 Shortly afterwards, Kissinger informed Ford that the “evacuation of all US government dependents and those private Americans who chose to leave Asmara for Addis Ababa was completed February 4.”78 Kissinger acknowledged, though, that the situation for those Americans who remained in Asmara was grave, adding that “our consulate in Asmara reports a continuing lack of electricity, shortage of water, and developing shortage of food.”79 By February 7, the insurgency was being described as “full-scale war” that involved “thousands of Eritrean guerrillas and government troops” and casualties “running into the hundreds.”80 On February  16, Ottaway reported that the new regime in Ethiopia was “in serious trouble, battling not only for the mountain kingdom’s unity but also for its own life.”81 From the PMAC’s perspective, the loss of Eritrea would be catastrophic as it contained Ethiopia’s only oil refinery and provided Ethiopia’s only access to the sea, in addition to fears that successful secession might create a precedent that could lead to the complete disintegration of the Ethiopian Empire. Therefore, as long as the Eritrean rebels continued to fight, the regime had no option but to resist, and for this military aid from an external source was essential. This put the United States in a quandary. If relations with Ethiopia were to be maintained, then military aid had to be forthcoming. During a hearing to consider the request, Edward Mulcahy, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, testified to the House Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs that any abrupt cessation or reduction of aid at this critical period could have a highly unfavourable effect on our longstanding relations with the Government of this strategically located country. As Secretary Kissinger said, it would involve cutting off military support to a country whose military establishment is based on American arms at the precise moment when it needs it.82 Once again, the comparison with the imminent collapse of South Vietnam was eerily poignant, but when it came to Ethiopia, the decision by Congress was different. On March 18, the administration announced that it was “prepared to sell Ethiopia up to $7 million worth of ammunition in response to a request made five

Revolution in Ethiopia 111 weeks ago,” and that as “virtually the sole supplier of Ethiopia’s military needs for over 20 years . . . could not be totally unresponsive to the most recent request.”83 In a similar comparison with the Vietnam War, and arguably as a result of the confirmation of continued American aid to the Ethiopians, the war in Eritrea settled down in a stalemate similar to that identified by Walter Kronkite in his famous broadcast on the situation in Southeast Asia in 1968. This time the journalist in question was Thomas Johnson, who wrote in the New York Times that two months after government troops and secessionist guerrillas clashed in large-scale battles in and around the northern city of Asmara, what has been virtual civil war in Ethiopia has slowed to a stalemate. . . . One Ethiopian government source said: except that both sides have been bloodied again, reinforced and have been the objects of world attention for a while, the situation remains pretty much the same as it has been since the guerrillas started their war of secession 12 years ago.84 These similarities had not gone unnoticed by the ELF. Charles Glass, correspondent for the Washington Post, spent some time with the Eritrean insurgents, and was told that “they hope in another year to reach the present strength of the Viet Cong.”85 In hopes of doing this, the Eritreans pressed the Ford administration for military aid, but all requests were politely ignored on advice from the State Department.86 The administration’s official position when it came to the Eritrean insurgency was summed up in a briefing paper forwarded to the new American ambassador to Ethiopia, Arthur Hummel. Hummel was told that he should stress that the United States value[s] the long and friendly ties which have linked Ethiopia and the United States, and we want to maintain them; [believes] strongly in Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and are willing to continue to help the Ethiopian government preserve it [and] . . . despite the Eritrean insurgency, we believe that many Eritreans, because of religious, cultural and historical affinities, do not desire to sever their links with Ethiopia entirely.87

Mengistu moves left As well as the conflict in Eritrea, another potential setback for the Ford administration emerged when Mengistu, while willing to continue relations with the United States, indicated that he was not as keen on strong US-Ethiopian relations as his predecessors had been. Although Kissinger continued to reassure Ford that the PMAC did “not want to lose the support of the United States at this critical time,”88 there were definite questions as to the extent of the future relationship. One of the earliest signs was reported to Kissinger in December 1974, when the embassy forwarded an editorial published in the Ethiopian Herald, that it

112  Revolution in Ethiopia considered “noteworthy for its anti-American tone and communist phraseology.” The editorial criticised the “past regime in Ethiopia for befriending “certain notorious aggressors in the past when world public opinion was condemning atrocities committed by the aggressors in question” and described as “an insult,” the “tradition of a foreign policy subservient to one power.” It argued that it was not “wise to be the running dog of imperialists,” and concluded that Ethiopia’s foreign policy should consist of an “active and positive nonalignment,” and that “the master-servant relationship should be done away with.”89 Mengistu’s move towards the left was further evident when, on December 20, the PMAC declared that Ethiopia would become a socialist state, with a oneparty system, direct government control over the economy, collective farming on government-controlled land, and that all banks and insurance companies would be nationalised.90 By the beginning of February, over one hundred local and foreign companies had been partially or completely nationalised, and four foreign fuel distributors, including the American-owned Mobil, had been placed under state control.91 Then, on March 5, the PMAC announced the “nationalisation of all rural lands and an end to the 2,000-year-old feudal system that has kept tens of millions of peasants in a state of virtual medieval serfdom.” The purpose of the policy, the proclamation declared was to “alter fundamentally the existing agrarian relations so that the Ethiopian peasant masses, which have paid so much in sweat and in blood to maintain an extravagant feudal class, may be liberated from age-old feudal oppression, injustice, poverty and disease.”92

Ford and Somalia At the same time that Ethiopia was facing an uncertain future, Ford was approached by the Somalis seeking a meeting between him and Siad Barré, who was in the United States in his role as president of the OAU to address the UN General Assembly. Kissinger urged Ford to approve the request, seeing it as an ideal opportunity for the administration to improve relations with Somalia because the “independent-minded Somalis are chafing somewhat under Soviet heavyhandedness,” and as a result were seeking to “improve relations with the United States and other Western countries to reduce dependence on the Soviets.” “Failure to see Siad,” Kissinger added, “would have the opposite effect.”93 Ford agreed, and was briefed ahead of Siad’s visit by Robert Ingersoll of the State Department, who shared Kissinger’s view that the meeting presented a prime opportunity to reduce Somali dependence on the Soviets, but acknowledged that one of the problems for the administration remained the restrictions on American aid to Somalia “as a result of continued Somali flag-shipping to Cuba and North Vietnam.”94 Accordingly, Ford and Siad met in the Oval Office on October 11, 1974. Ford assured Siad of his desire for “good relations with Somalia,” expressed concern over “Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean” and reaffirmed the American “commitment to steady and peaceful progress towards self-determination in southern Africa, and to mutually beneficial relations with all African states.”95 In response,

Revolution in Ethiopia  113 the Somali leader reiterated Somali non-alignment, explaining that any suggestions that Somalia was “anti-American” were unfounded, and explaining his acceptance of Soviet assistance as one of dire need. He said, “let me tell you very clearly that Somalia is very small and very poor. We must struggle to survive. . . . For this we need the support of big powers. We cannot afford to be against the big powers.” Siad’s main aim for the meeting soon became apparent, however, when he went into great detail over Somali history, telling the president that “in colonial times we were divided into five parts,” and reiterating his determination to reunite ethnic Somalis in one nation. He maintained that “after our revolution we tried to get negotiations started with our neighbours to reach a compromise solution to these problems,” but peaceful resolution had proved impossible because of Ethiopian and Kenyan intransigence. He insisted that “we did not believe in war; we hate those who do believe in war” but added that “we believe very strongly – more strongly perhaps than some people think – in the importance of our Somali freedom. We will never let it go.”96

The end of an era As 1974 neared its end, it was clear that Ethiopia was undergoing profound changes. This was nowhere more apparent than in discussions over the future of the deposed emperor, Haile Selassie. Ever since he had been removed from power, the administration had sought assurances of his safety, demands for which had increased given the bloody turn in the revolution from November. In response to American enquiries, the PMAC sent a telegram to “assure the United States government that the PMAC has never contemplated to execute the ex-emperor, who is receiving humane treatment. The PMAC has further taken all measures necessary to assure the safety and security of the ex-emperor.”97 In December 1974, Tafari Benti, chairman of the PMAC, responded to reported offers of asylum for Selassie in Great Britain, maintaining that “until justice is rendered, it will be hard for the military council to accept any invitation for him to leave the country,” and indicating that the former emperor could be put on trial for his alleged crimes against the Ethiopian people that had resulted in his removal from power.98 Haile Selassie’s future was finally settled in August 1975. The first reports that he was nearing his end came on May 16, when Kissinger was informed by the embassy in Addis Ababa of increasing rumours that “the emperor is very ill and that physicians from England and France have been called for consultations.”99 His health continued to deteriorate, and on August 27, the PMAC announced the former emperor’s death. Ottaway, reporting from Addis Ababa, commented that his death aroused little reaction in the capital, with most Ethiopians continuing their “daily affairs without any outward sign of grief or concern at his death.”100 According to Ottaway, the former emperor was buried “like an ordinary Ethiopian peasant,” adding that “no flag was lowered, no praises sung nor any public notice taken of the passage of the man who for half a century was the incarnation abroad of Ethiopia itself and a leading international statesman.”101

114  Revolution in Ethiopia President Ford, however, did not feel that the emperor’s passing should go unremarked and issued a statement, declaring: It is with deepest regret that we have learned of death of Emperor Haile Selassie. For five decades, he was the towering leader not only of his own country but of the entire African continent. At time of invasion of his country, he was an inspiration to everyone around the world who believes in national independence and peace with freedom among nations. As friend of this country and as symbol of emergence of developing nations, he will be greatly missed. But his achievements – peaceful cooperation among African states and between African states and rest of world – will live on and continue to have fullest American support.102 With Haile Selassie’s death, it was clear that it was the end of an era in Ethiopia. Not only that, but the nation faced an uncertain future with trouble flaring in Eritrea, an increasing autocratic rule, and Siad professing full commitment to Somali irredentism. The Horn of Africa was in turmoil, but America’s response to that turmoil would be dictated by the impact of the Vietnam Syndrome, and the full repercussions of that will be discussed in the next chapter.

Notes 1 “Rift in Ethiopian Society May Be Deepened by Famine,” New York Times, February 18, 1974. 2 “Rift in Ethiopian Society May Be Deepened by Famine,” New York Times, February 18, 1974. 3 “Ethiopia Moves to Ease Protests,” New York Times, February 25, 1974. 4 “Ethiopian Army Takes Over City,” Washington Post, February 27, 1974. 5 “Ethiopian Mutiny Brings Down Cabinet,” Washington Post, February 28, 1974. 6 “Ethiopian Agreement Reached,” Washington Post, March 9, 1974. 7 “Ethiopian Rebels End Occupation of City,” New York Times, March 29, 1974. 8 “Peasant Revolt Sweeps Rural Ethiopia,” Washington Post, April 15, 1974. 9 “Emperor Fails to End Mutiny in Ethiopia,” Washington Post, March 1, 1974. 10 “Selassie, to Placate Army, Appoints a New Premier,” New York Times, March 1, 1974. 11 “Ethiopian Soldiers: A Warning,” Washington Post, March 10, 1974. 12 Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Committee on Labour and Public Welfare, US Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st session, March 21, 1974, Library of Congress. 13 “Ethiopian Famine Is Spreading,” New York Times, March 23, 1974. 14 Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, March  21, 1974, US Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st session, Library of Congress. 15 Memo, Horan to Scowcroft, May 3, 1974; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I January 69–December 71 (5), Nixon Library. 16 Telegram, American Ambassador Ethiopia to Sec State, April  17, 1974; NSC Files Country Files 736, Ethiopia Vol II, Jan 72, Nixon Library. 17 Telegram, Wynne, American Embassy, Ethiopia, to Sec State, May 2, 1974; NSC Files Country Files Box 736, Ethiopia Vol I January 69–December 71 (5), Nixon Library. 18 Telegram, American Ambassador Ethiopia to Sec State, April 17, 1974; NSC Files Country Files 736, Ethiopia Vol II Jan 72, Nixon Library.

Revolution in Ethiopia 115 19 “Famine Casts its Grim Global Shadow,” Time, May 13, 1974. 20 Report, Daniel Parker, Administrator, AID, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, June 3, 1974, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 21 “Famine Casts Its Grim Global Shadow,” Time, May 13, 1974. 22 “Calm, Confusion in Ethiopia,” Washington Post, June 30, 1974. 23 “Ethiopian Troops Seize Key Centres in the Capital,” New York Times, June 30, 1974. 24 “Army in Ethiopia Tightens its Grip,” New York Times, July 2, 1974. 25 See, for example, “Ethiopia: The Creeping Coup,” Time, July 15, 1974. 26 “The Stakes Go Up in Ethiopia,” Washington Post, July 8, 1974. 27 “Military Issues Stern Manifesto for Ethiopia,” Washington Post, July 10, 1974. 28 “Military Issues Stern Manifesto for Ethiopia,” Washington Post, July 10, 1974. 29 “Ethiopian Cabinet Gets Army Guidelines,” New York Times, July 10, 1974. 30 “World Press Focuses on Nixon’s Woes,” Washington Post, August 7, 1974. 31 “Ethiopian Monarchy Threatened,” Washington Post, August 22, 1974. 32 “A New Constitution Offered in Ethiopia,” New York Times, August 7, 1974. 33 “Ethiopians Get Draft Constitution,” Washington Post, August 11, 1974. 34 “Ethiopians Get Draft Constitution,” Washington Post, August 11, 1974. 35 “Selassie’s Future Raising Questions,” New York Times, August 20, 1974. 36 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, August 12, 1974; White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 1, Presidential Daily Briefing 8/12/74, Ford Library. 37 Report, August 1974; NSA Presidential Transition File Box 1, Issue Papers (3), Ford Library. 38 Memo, Situation Room to Kissinger, August 13, 1974; White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 1, Presidential Daily Briefing 8/12/74, Ford Library. 39 “Somalia Threat Eyed,” Washington Post, August 26, 1974. 40 “Somalian Threat Seen in Ethiopia,” New York Times, August 25, 1974. 41 “Selassie’s Wealth Reportedly Seized,” New York Times, August 27, 1974. 42 “Palace Nationalised,” Washington Post, August 26, 1974. 43 Report, August 1974; NSA Presidential Transition File Box 1, Issue Papers (3), Ford Library. 44 Memo, SitRoom to Kissinger, September 4, 1974; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 1, Presidential Daily Briefing 9/4/74, Ford Library. 45 Ford, Statement from the Oval Office, September 8, 1974; President’s Speeches and Statements Box 1, Presidential Pardon Message, Ford Library. 46 “A Monarchy Nears Death in Ethiopia,” Washington Post, September 8, 1974. 47 “The End of the Lion of Judah,” Time, September 23, 1974. 48 “The End of the Lion of Judah,” Time, September 23, 1974. 49 “Removal is Quiet,” New York Times, September 13, 1974. 50 “Farewell to the Lion,” New York Times, September 13, 1974. 51 Memo, SitRoom to Kissinger, September 13, 1974; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 1, Presidential Daily Briefing 9/13/74, Ford Library. 52 “US Sees No Break in Ethiopia Relations,” New York Times, September 13, 1974. 53 Memo, George Springsteen, Exec Sec Dept State, to Scowcroft, September 27, 1974; NSA Presidential Transition File Box 1, Letters to and from World Leaders (5), Ford Library. 54 Memo, SitRoom to Kissinger, September 13, 1974; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 1, Presidential Daily Briefing 9/13/74, Ford Library. 55 Memo, Horan to Kissinger, September 19, 1974; NSA Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger Box 1, September-October 1974 – United Nations, General, Ford Library. 56 Memo, Les Janka to Ron Nessen, September 21, 1974; Ron Nessen Papers Box 11, Foreign Policy Briefing Book 1974 (1), Ford Library. 57 Memo, SitRoom to Kissinger, October 4, 1974; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 2, Presidential Daily Briefing 10/4/74, Ford Library.

116  Revolution in Ethiopia 58 “Ethiopian Gives Up Armed Forces Job,” New York Times, September 29, 1974. 59 “Ethiopian Debate,” New York Times, October 2, 1974. 60 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, October 5, 1974; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 2, Presidential Daily Briefing 10/5/74, Ford Library. 61 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, October 8, 1974; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 2, Presidential Daily Briefing 10/8/74, Ford Library. 62 Memo, Richard Kennedy, NSC, to Kissinger, October  16, 1974; NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa Box 2, Ethiopia, Ford Library. 63 Telegram, SecState to American Embassy, Ethiopia, November 20, 1974; NSA Presidential Country Files Box 2, Ethiopia-State Department Telegrams, Ford Library. 64 “Ethiopia: Massacre in the Night,” Time, December 9, 1974. 65 “Ethiopian Officials Executed,” Washington Post, November 24, 1974. 66 “Ethiopia’s Government a Shambles,” Washington Post, December 1, 1974. 67 “Ethiopian Leader Chosen,” Washington Post, November 29, 1974. 68 The Provisional Military Administrative Council was also referred to as the PMAC, Provisional Military Government or PMG within the sources.   “60 Former Ethiopian Leaders Executed,” Washington Post, November 25, 1974. 69 Memo, State Dept to Scowcroft, December 18, 1974; NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa Box 2, Ethiopia, Ford Library. 70 Memo, State Dept to Scowcroft, December 18, 1974; NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa Box 2, Ethiopia, Ford Library. 71 Memo, Horan to Scowcroft, January 2, 1975; NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa Box 2, Ethiopia, Ford Library. 72 Memo, State Dept to Scowcroft, December 18, 1974; NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa Box 2, Ethiopia, Ford Library. 73 “Eritrean Towns Attacked,” Washington Post, December 24, 1974. 74 “Front Warns of Massacre,” New York Times, December 28, 1974. 75 Telegram, AmEmb Ethiopia to SecState, January 20, 1975; NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa Box 2, Ethiopia-State Department Telegrams, Ford Library. 76 “Main Asmara Road Cut Off, Americans Flown to Safety,” Washington Post, February 5, 1975. 77 Telegram, Kissinger to American Embassy Addis Ababa, February 5, 1975; NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa Box 2, Ethiopia-State Department Telegrams, Ford Library. 78 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, February 5, 1975; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 4, Presidential Daily Briefing 2/5/75, Ford Library. 79 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, February 5, 1975; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 4, Presidential Daily Briefing 2/5/75, Ford Library. 80 “Full-Scale Warfare is Raging in Eritrea,” Washington Post, February 7, 1975. 81 “Ethiopia Fights for Survival,” Washington Post, February 16, 1975. 82 Hearing, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, March 5, 1975, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 83 “Ethiopia Offered Munitions by US,” New York Times, March 18, 1975. 84 “Fighting in Ethiopia is at a Stalemate,” New York Times, March 31, 1975. 85 “Rebels Gain Momentum in Eritrea,” Washington Post, March 2, 1975. 86 Memo, State Dept to Scowcroft, March 7, 1975; WHCF Subject File Box 23, FO3–2/ CO27-CO54, Ford Library. 87 Telegram, Sec State to Ambassador Hummel, March 7, 1975; NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa Box 2, Ethiopia-State Department Telegrams, Ford Library. 88 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, December 21, 1974; White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 3, Presidential Daily Briefing 12/21/74, Ford Library. 89 Memo, SitRoom to Kissinger, December 11, 1974; White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 3, Presidential Daily Briefing 12/11/74, Ford Library. 90 “Ethiopia Nationalises Banks, Insurance,” Washington Post, January 2, 1975.

Revolution in Ethiopia 117 91 “Firms Seized in Ethiopia,” Washington Post, February 4, 1975. 92 “Ethiopia Nationalises Rural Lands,” Washington Post, March 5, 1975. 93 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, October 4, 1974; NSA Presidential Country Files Box 5, Somalia (1), Ford Library. 94 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, October 4, 1974; NSA Presidential Country Files Box 5, Somalia (1), Ford Library. 95 Memo, Robert Ingersoll, State Dept, to Ford, October 10, 1974; NSA Presidential Country Files Box 5, Somalia (1), Ford Library. 96 MemCon, Siad and Ford, October 11, 1974; WHCF Subject File Box 45, CO 134 Somalia, Ford Library. 97 Telegram, AmEmb Ethiopia to Sec State, December 2, 1974; NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa Box 2, Ethiopia-State Department Telegrams, Ford Library. 98 “Ethiopian Leader Says Haile Selassie May be Put on Trial,” Washington Post, December 12, 1974. 99 Memo, Sit Room to Kissinger, May  16, 1975; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box  6, Presidential Daily Briefings 5/16/75, Ford Library. 100 “Haile Selassie Dies a Prisoner at 83,” Washington Post, August 28, 1975. 101 “Emperor Buried Secretly,” Washington Post, August 29, 1975. 102 Telegram, Sec State to American Embassy Addis Ababa, August 28, 1975; WHCF Subject File Box 1, FE 3–1/Q-Z, Ford Library.

8 The era of the Vietnam Syndrome

A new era On July 4, 1976, the United States of America celebrated its bicentennial. The celebrations of national pride, though, hid the realities of a troubled nation gripped by the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate; a nation that had had its confidence shattered, and had lost its trust and faith in the symbols of democracy that were being honoured. However, although the fall of Saigon may have shaken American confidence, it had not eradicated the fear of communist expansion in the developing world. If anything, it had strengthened it. The difference now was that Americans were questioning their ability to contain the spreading menace. Thus, it was not surprising that developments in the Horn of Africa in the two years after Haile Selassie’s death, as the Soviet Union tightened its grip on the region, posed a challenge to the foreign policy formulation of Presidents Ford and Carter. Both men would have to deal with this alongside the repercussions of Vietnam and Watergate with its concomitant public scepticism, growth of investigative journalism, and an increasingly active Congress. Gerald Ford, who had inherited the presidency as a result of Nixon’s resignation, was the first to attempt to address the communist presence in the Horn of Africa in the era of the Vietnam Syndrome. His policy decisions were complicated by a renewed emphasis on the strategic importance of the region as a result of the re-opening of the Suez Canal on June 5, 1975. As William Schaufele, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, testified, the Horn of Africa controlled access to the Indian Ocean by the coastal states of the Red Sea. Since the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, it has enjoyed a dominant position on one of the world’s leading East-West maritime routes. In recent years, the importance of the area has been further increased by its proximity to the Middle East oil fields and the Indian Ocean oil routes.1 With the canal reopened, the Horn of Africa was once again poised on the brink of vital sea routes to and from the oil-rich regions of the Middle East, but this time the United States was in the middle of an energy crisis that intensified its need for oil, and the Soviets appeared to be winning the Cold War battle for control

The era of the Vietnam Syndrome 119 of the region. A briefing paper prepared for President Ford in January 1976 contended that the trend in Africa “was against us” and the “Soviet prestige was rising.”2 John Spencer, former chief adviser to the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agreed, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs that the Soviet presence in the Horn was a “very terrible threat to the lines of communications through the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the line of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to the ports of Western Europe.”3

Ford and Somalia Of immediate concern for the Ford administration was the Soviet-Somali relationship, with the Horn nation described as “the Soviet Union’s most notable satellite in the world.”4 A congressional delegation, led by Representative Samuel Stratton (D-NY), visited Africa and reported back to the House Armed Services Committee that the expansion of the Soviet military facilities at Berbera “represents a very significant enhancement of Soviet naval and air force capabilities to operate in the Indian Ocean area.”5 On the other side of Capitol Hill, Defence Secretary James Schlesinger testified that “Soviet facilities at Berbera in Somalia are both impressive and growing. They are now, it appears, constructing a cruise missile support facility . . . This represents reload capabilities for a potent weapon system that the US does not possess.”6 Meanwhile, in the White House, Kissinger explained to Ford that over the last seven years there has been a dramatic increase in the level and importance of Soviet activity in Somalia, with particular emphasis on Berbera. If the Soviets continue this trend of upgrading the facilities at this area, the end result will be a key Soviet facility overlooking one of the major strategic areas of the world.7 As Lee Griggs, bureau chief in Africa for Time, commented, this would give the Soviets the “capability of dominating the southern approach to the Suez Canal,” allowing them to “harass the sea lanes around the Persian Gulf, easily attaining naval dominance over large stretches of the Indian Ocean.”8 Fortunately for Ford, however, there were encouraging signs that Siad wished to cultivate a stronger relationship with the United States. In January 1975, Ambassador Roger Kirk reported on a meeting during which the Somali president commented favourably on his visit to Washington in October 1974, declared his intention to “clear the way for a US naval visit” and also announced that he had prohibited “Somali registration of ships trading with North Vietnam and Cuba.” This, Kirk felt, represented “a concrete demonstration of Somalia’s desire to improve relations with the United States.”9 During a subsequent meeting with Charles Diggs (D-MI), Siad stressed his non-alignment policy and made a point of denying that he was a Soviet puppet, insisting that “Somalia would never surrender sovereignty to any foreign power,” and pointing out that although the Soviets had access to a navy facility in Somalia, the US was being offered similar

120  The era of the Vietnam Syndrome facilities.10 Siad went further on July 4, 1975, publicly declaring that he was offering the Americans “naval refuelling and supply facilities in Somalia” providing that “the Americans come to us as friends.”11 Ford reciprocated, telling Ambassador Abullahi Ahmed Addou that “we share President Siad’s desire for closer relations between our countries” and confirming plans to “resume a modest development assistance programme to support your government’s ambitious efforts at long term drought rehabilitation.”12

Ford and Ethiopia Notwithstanding a desire to improve relations with Somalia, Ford’s priority in the Horn, as for his predecessors in the Oval Office, remained the ‘special relationship’ with Ethiopia, but the increasingly left-wing stance demonstrated by the PMAC had altered the balance of power between the two countries. By the mid1970s, the Americans were aware that their desire and need for a strong relationship with Ethiopia appeared to exceed that of the new Ethiopian regime. Fortunately for the Ford administration, the increased guerrilla activities in Eritrea, spurred by the political instability in Addis Ababa, ensured that the PMAC was as keen on American military aid as Haile Selassie had been; a need that the United States was willing to exploit. In May 1975, Horan wrote to Kissinger summarising the current situation: The new Ethiopian regime, like its imperial predecessor, perceives a military threat from Soviet supplied Somalia, and is trying to strengthen its military to meet the Eritrean insurgency. Therefore, following the recent hostilities around Asmara, we agreed to an ammunition resupply, (partly by airlift) as a gesture of support to Addis. At the same time, we attempted to deflect Arab sympathies for the Eritrean secessionists. We believe these gestures of support for the new government will preserve our position in Ethiopia just at the time the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea oil routes are acquiring a new regional significance.13 A problem for the administration, though, remained the political instability and internal government conflicts that had beset Ethiopia since the creeping coup against the emperor began. In October 1975, just over a year after Haile Selassie had been deposed, a state of emergency was declared in Addis Ababa. An announcement broadcast over the national radio “gave the police, the armed forces and the territorial army sweeping powers, including the right of search and indefinite arrest without warrant and the right to use force.”14 Although the state of emergency was lifted in December, the situation remained perilous. In January 1976, the CIA reported that the “new year in Ethiopia is beginning much as the old one ended, with violence occurring in nearly all of Ethiopia’s 14 provinces,” a stalemate in the war in Eritrea because “neither the Eritrean nor the government side has the ability to overcome the other,” and increased insurgency activity in the Ogaden.15 A foreign observer commented in the spring of 1976 that

The era of the Vietnam Syndrome 121 “no one is ruling Ethiopia today. In every area, there is a power struggle going on.” An officer of the government-controlled central bank added that “you have one thing one week, another the next. Anyone who speaks out gets some lead in the head.”16 By spring, though, there were signs that some kind of political stability was returning to Ethiopia, albeit through violent means. On March  21, 1976, Ford received a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) informing him that the radical faction of the ruling Provisional Military Advisory Council (PMAC), which has come to the forefront within the past few months, has apparently seized the initiative from the moderates and is pushing implementation of programmes designed to revamp Ethiopian society and policies. The radicals are apparently being led by PMAC first Vice Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam who is using them to consolidate his power.17 Further reports arrived throughout the summer of purges within the PMAC, involving executions of least twenty senior members,18 with the result that by the end of 1976, American intelligence suggested that Mengistu, Lieutenant Colonel Atnatu Abate, and Brigadier General Tafari Benti, the figurehead chairman, remained the only figures within the Derg with any real power.19 As a filling station owner in Addis Ababa told the New York Times, “whatever it is, we have a government now.”20 Mengistu’s rise to power may have brought in a degree of political stability to Ethiopia, but his accession was not good news for the United States, mostly because of his known pro-Soviet proclivities. Throughout 1976, the Ford administration received evidence that Ethiopia was moving closer and closer to the communist bloc. A distinct anti-American stance appeared in statements issued by the PMAC; for example, in October, the Washington Post reported that the Ethiopian military government has publicly accused the US Central Intelligence Agency of supporting “anarchists and reactionaries” seeking to disrupt its social course, and the state-run press has detailed in a recent series of highly critical articles how the agency has allegedly worked to subvert “progressive” governments around the world.21 More worrying, though, were the reports of a strengthening military relationship between the communist bloc and the Horn nations. On September 2, Ford was told that the “EPMG have reached an agreement with Cuba for an unspecified number of advisers for the Ethiopian military.”22 The following month a second report confirmed that “Ethiopia’s ruling military council (PMAC) is proceeding with plans for military procurement from both the USSR and China,” and that “Soviet-Ethiopian relations are ‘off to a good start’ ” from the Soviet perspective with “Moscow “willing to cooperate” regarding arms.”23 Further details on the Soviet military aid package were provided to Ford by Scowcroft, who informed the president that “the arms agreement which the Soviets recently signed with

122  The era of the Vietnam Syndrome Ethiopia includes enough SA-3 surface-to-air missiles for three air defence battalions.” This news was worrying in itself, but Scowcroft went on to explain that the defensive character of the weapons reportedly included in the Soviet-­ Ethiopian agreement reflect the desire of the Soviet Union to maintain its privileged position with Somalia. Delivery of these defensive weapons to Ethiopia will not upset the existing military balance with Somalia which is present squared off against Ethiopia.24 Administration concerns over the increasing Soviet influence in Ethiopia, as well as its apparent desire to maintain a strong relationship with Somalia, were compounded by the increase in guerrilla activity in Eritrea. In the years since the insurgency started, there had been a clear effort from both the Eritrean Liberation Front and its splinter organisation, the People’s Liberation Front, to avoid antagonising the Americans and therefore Kagnew had been left relatively unscathed. However, this changed in September 1975 when, perhaps prompted by the perception of American weakness in the era of the Vietnam Syndrome, Nathanial Davis of the State Department informed Kissinger that “the first armed attack against an American installation in Eritrea occurred.” The insurgents, Davis reported, “overran an isolated component of Kagnew Station [and] two Americans were abducted.” Although the Joint Chiefs had recently concluded that the Navy still needed the facilities provided at Kagnew, Davis contended that this new anti-American stance from the insurgents, and the fact that the PMAC was pressing for confirmation of the closure of Kagnew, meant that “our position at Kagnew has become tenuous” and recommended that “we put off confidential discussions with the PMG on the closure of Kagnew as long as we properly can” but also “undertake an intensive search for an alternative site.”25 Accordingly, a Senior Review Group meeting on February  12, 1976, adopted Davis’s recommendations, agreeing that, due to the current need for the facilities provided by Kagnew, the “United States should remain in Kagnew as long as possible” but that “alternate sites should be studied as part of NSSM 238: US Policy Toward the Persian Gulf.”26

Another proxy war? In March 1976, the CIA reported that “Moscow’s effort to strike a balance in its relations with Somalia and Ethiopia is apparently meeting with some success, at least so far as Addis Ababa is concerned.”27 However, as the year wore on, government analysts suggested that Siad might be willing to move on from his position of ‘neutrality’ that he had affirmed during meetings with American officials during 1975. As Ford prepared to leave office, he was told of “growing indications of strong Somali resentment over the reported Soviet arms deal with Ethiopia.” Indeed, the intelligence report went so far as to assert that the Somalis were

The era of the Vietnam Syndrome  123 “outraged over the Soviet arms deal with Ethiopia” and were considering “ousting Soviet military advisers” but concluded that we doubt that they would expel the Soviets so long as they lack alternative suppliers and see promising opportunities to recover their “lost territories” in the FTAI [French Territory of the Afars and Issas] and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.28 In the early years of the Cold War, such an opportunity would in all likelihood have been seized on by the Americans to assert their position in the strategic Horn of Africa. Now, however, decisions were being made in the era of the Vietnam Syndrome. Rather than grasping the opportunity to usurp Soviet influence in the developing world, the over-riding concern seemed to be the possibility that the United States might be dragged into another proxy war. Given the relationship of both the Soviet Union and the United States with Ethiopia and Somalia, Ottaway of the Washington Post asserted that the United States would also certainly find itself involved in the Somali-­ Ethiopian imbroglio . . . if a war breaks out – and thus locked in another indirect confrontation with the Soviet Union where the prestige and image of both superpowers would again be at stake.29 Leslie Gelb of the New York Times reached a similar conclusion, claiming that the “Soviet Union and the United States now face each other through surrogates in a checkered belt that runs down across Central Africa, from Somalia to Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Zaire and Angola.”30 The decision on how to proceed in the Horn, though, lay not with Ford but with his successor in the White House. The election of November 1976 brought a newcomer to Washington, an outsider who would bring a fresh perspective to the situation and attempt to formulate an effective foreign policy despite the constraints imposed in the era of the Vietnam Syndrome. As Drew Middleton commented in the New York Times, the global military situation that will confront Jimmy Carter as he takes office January 20 differs significantly from that faced by any of his predecessors since 1945. The difference arises from the growth of Soviet military strength and the relative decline of American power over the last ten years.31

A new hope Jimmy Carter was elected president in a year that, contextually, reflected both the best and the worst that the United States could be, with the shadows of Vietnam and Watergate juxtaposed against the bicentennial celebrations. With hopes for their nation’s third century in their minds, the American people went to the polls,

124  The era of the Vietnam Syndrome seeking an antidote to recent chief executives who had embroiled the nation in political scandal and military defeat. They turned to Carter who, with his status as a Washington “outsider” and his distinctive personal attitudes and beliefs, including his deep religious and moral convictions, was seen by many as the man who could and would restore the pride and prestige of the United States both at home and abroad. The Time report on Carter’s inauguration noted that, with the election of the new president, the nation was “hoping again.”32 So, in presenting his foreign policy, Carter applied new tactics to the Cold War as part of his hope to restore American faith and pride in the aftermath of recent disasters and tragedies. Constrained by the contemporary context, and unable to wield the might of American military force, he called for a move away from a preoccupation with the Soviet Union, with an emphasis on regionalist rather than globalist concerns. As he explained at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Legislative Conference: Our national security was often defined almost exclusively in terms of military competition with the Soviet Union. This competition is still critical, because it does involve issues that could lead to war. But however important this relationship of military balance, it cannot be our sole preoccupation to the exclusion of other world issues which also concern us both.33 Carter’s prioritisation of regionalism did not mean that he was yielding to the Soviet Union in the Cold War battle, however. Rather than competing on military terms, though, the new president chose instead to use moral certitude as the basis for American power and influence. In his inaugural address, he declared that “our commitment to human rights must be absolute,”34 subsequently telling the American people that his foreign policy would be based upon “respect for human rights . . . [and] our own moral values [because] I want our nation’s actions to make you proud.”35 This new approach, Carter hoped, would also improve the standing of the United States around the world, and would “strengthen our influence among some of the developing nations that were still in the process of forming their own governments and choosing their future friends and trading partners.”36 When it came to Africa, Carter did not advocate that the United States should remain distant from Africa, but argued instead that American interest should be long-term and productive, rather than short-term and reactive. Not only should this be perceived as a more constructive approach by African nations, it would also reduce the risk of involvement in proxy wars. Accordingly, as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance informed the NAACP, the administration would adopt “affirmative” policies towards African nations and not be reactive to what other powers do, nor to crises as they arise. Daily headlines should not set our agenda for progress . . . [because] a negative, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be both dangerous and futile.37

The era of the Vietnam Syndrome 125

Ethiopia, regionalism and human rights Carter shared the views of his predecessors that the Horn of Africa was strategically important, and that a strong relationship with Ethiopia was the priority. However, just days after Carter took office, this objective was challenged by dramatic changes within the PMAC. On February 3, Mengistu resolved the leadership battles that had plagued the Derg for two years by seizing sole power and eliminating all his rivals in a violent shootout that was described in the New York Times as one of the “bloodiest days of the Revolution” thus far.38 The former Ethiopian ambassador to Egypt, Getachew Mekasha, added that when “Tafari [Mengistu’s chief opponent within the Derg] and the others arrived at the palace they were arrested one by one and shot. Mengistu believed his power was being threatened, so he simply had his rivals shot.”39 Mengistu’s pro-Soviet inclinations were well-known within the administration, and no one was surprised when after visits from the Soviet president, Nikolai Podgorny, to Ethiopia and Mengistu to the Soviet Union, the two leaders signed a declaration proclaiming their friendship and pledging continued Soviet military, economic and technical aid.40 Fidel Castro’s visit to Ethiopia in March likewise consolidated Cuban-Ethiopian relations; Paul Henze, National Security Council (NSC) staffer responsible for the Horn of Africa, told Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser, that the Ethiopians were envisioning “all sorts of benefits from the new relationship with ‘Freedom Island’ (i.e. Cuba).”41 By the middle of April, the Cubans were supporting Mengistu with more than words, with a State Department spokesman confirming that “about fifty Cuban military advisers had arrived in Ethiopia.”42 However, Carter’s emphasis on a regionalist approach meant an acceptance of the mounting communist bloc presence in Ethiopia. The Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) on the Horn of Africa at the beginning of April recognised that the “present leftward trends in Ethiopia cannot be arrested,” and, at least in the short term, acknowledged that there would be “a decreased US influence in that country.”43 Another consequence of Mengistu’s seizure of power was harder to accept, however, especially given Carter’s avowed commitment to improving human rights around the world. The Policy Review Committee of April 11, 1977, reported that “current intelligence . . . indicates that the military regime in Ethiopia is becoming more brutal and more beleaguered,”44 while Henze described the internal violence in Ethiopia as an “orgy of killings”45 with increasing numbers of “random shootings, as well as killings of students and regime opponents.”46 These reports were supplemented by first-hand accounts from former Ethiopian officials fleeing from the terror, as well as international observers. Ambassador Mekasha, who sought political asylum in the United States, told the Los Angeles Times that his decision was motivated by the severe and brutal conditions that existed in Ethiopia, saying: Ethiopia is gripped by fear. The people are afraid of the Derg and the Derg’s members are afraid of each other. At the slightest excuse, soldiers will arrest and kill anybody considered an opponent. Those of us who welcomed the

126  The era of the Vietnam Syndrome military revolution are now embarrassed. At least under Selassie there were laws, a constitution. There was law and order. Under the Derg there is no law and no constitution. The only law and order is that imposed by the men with guns.47 Meanwhile, Dr Meyer-Lie, an official of Amnesty International, testified to the House Subcommittee on Africa in March 1977 that since the Derg seized power in 1974, Amnesty International considered the human rights violations in Ethiopia “a matter for urgent international concern.” He contended that: The violation of human rights in Ethiopia has escalated to a grotesque level. Detention without trial, the frequent use of the death penalty, the widespread practice of extrajudiciary executions and trial of civilians by military tribunals leads one to the conclusion that there is clearly a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights under the rule of the Derg.48 Given Carter’s declarations and determination to make the improvement of human rights a cornerstone of his foreign policy, a response to these reports was clearly necessary; the real question was what the new president would do. Candidate Carter had articulated the likely response in 1976 when he told a news conference that “I think the allocation of foreign aid and the normal friendship of our country would be determined or affected certainly by the attitude of those countries toward human rights.”49 This rhetoric became reality when Vance informed Congress in February that the administration had decided to reduce foreign aid to Ethiopia because of “arbitrary and wanton deprivation of human rights, including torture and execution of real and potential political opponents.”50 In this regard at least, Carter had full congressional support. The House Subcommittee on Africa concurred “that for the reasons of gross and systematic violations of human rights . . . all military assistance to the Mengistu government should be terminated.”51 On the other side of the Hill, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations likewise recommended that the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1977 prohibit “military assistance, training and FMS [Foreign Military Sales] credits for Ethiopia, and . . . FMS cash sales and deliveries of military equipment financed by military assistance, credits or guarantees.”52 The reduction of American aid increased tensions between Mengistu and the Carter administration that exploded in April 1977 over the future of Kagnew Station. Reflecting the government-sponsored terrorism that was evident in Addis Ababa, Mengistu’s response to the ongoing insurgency in Eritrea was similarly brutal. In March, Professor Tom Farer, a specialist on the Horn region at Rutgers University, testified to the House Subcommittee on Africa that, in attempting to subdue the secessionist movement, “the Ethiopian armed forces perpetrate My Lais and Guernicas in a random and obscene procession.” Human rights violations, he added, included the “use of starvation, a ‘weapon’ that at one point in the conflict seemed to threaten virtual genocide, the bombardment of undefended

The era of the Vietnam Syndrome 127 villages, shooting of hostages, and all of the kinds of humanitarian delinquencies we associate with full-scale insurgency warfare.”53 For the administration, though, the most immediate area of concern was the risk to the remaining Americans at Kagnew Station. In a memo to Brzezinski in March, Secretary of Defence Harold Brown claimed that “the situation in Asmara has become unpredictable and, therefore, that the security of our military and contract personnel there can no longer be assured.”54 Henze agreed, warning Brzezinski that “our remaining personnel there are potential hostages.”55 Although preparations to relocate the facilities at Kagnew to Diego Garcia and elsewhere were underway, the deteriorating internal situation within Ethiopia, and the increased threat to American personnel, prompted the Carter administration to bring forward the closure. Brzezinski accordingly confirmed to Brown that “the risk to the safety of US personnel created by the situation in Ethiopia” necessitated the early closure of the base.56 Mengistu was informed of the decision to close Kagnew on April 22, and retaliated by ordering the closure of that and other American facilities in the country, including a naval medical research unit, and the United States Information Service. American personnel in Ethiopia, which had numbered more than four thousand, were reduced to seventy-six staff and five Marine guards at the US Embassy and the Agency for International Development (AID) in Addis Ababa. In addition, Mengistu expelled the three remaining Western journalists from the country.57 Henze later claimed that Mengistu “feigned rage” and “seized upon the human rights report as the pretext to terminate the American military relationship.”58 State Department analyst Anthony Lake agreed with Henze’s assessment, concluding that Mengistu’s decision to scale down involvement with the United States “probably stemmed more from the new regime’s desire to seek a more ideologically compatible political and military relationship with Moscow than with unhappiness with our human rights advocacy.”59 Mengistu’s decision was greeted by the administration with “an official sigh of American regret . . . [and] the hope that the strains will not worsen.” In his press statement, Hodding Carter III, the State Department spokesman, added that “it is no secret that our relations with Ethiopia have deteriorated over the past two years, despite our efforts to maintain our former close ties . . . we hope this trend can be arrested.”60 One reason for this hope, but one only discussed privately within the administration, was the chance that Mengistu would not survive as the Ethiopian leader, and would be replaced by someone with a more pro-Western attitude. The PRM of April 1 noted that the instability of the present Ethiopian regime raises the presently remote possibility of its replacement over the medium or longer term by a leadership more amenable to co-operative relations with the US. This prospect, plus the fact that Ethiopia is the second-most-populous country in Africa, gives us an interest in so tailoring our policies that we are in a position insofar as possible to capitalize on possible future developments favouring a resumption of closer Ethio-US ties.61

128  The era of the Vietnam Syndrome The members of the Policy Review Committee, who met on April 11, 1977, agreed that “we should not pull out of Ethiopia entirely, because we wish to be in a position to reassert ourselves there if a friendlier and more humane government comes to power.”62

Carter and Somalia The growing closeness between Ethiopia and the Soviet bloc seemed to offer an ideal opportunity for the Carter administration to forge a closer relationship with Ethiopia’s neighbour, Somalia. In March, Brzezinski told Vice President Walter Mondale that “Somalia is upset about Soviet support for the Ethiopian military regime, feels it may be left in the lurch and is looking for ways to lessen its dependence on the Soviets.”63 Following Carter’s instructions to “move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our friend,”64 the administration sent messages of friendship through diplomatic channels and instructed John Loughran, the American ambassador in Mogadishu, to seek a meeting with Siad to discuss closer ties, and options for economic and humanitarian aid.65 As well as fitting in with Carter’s rhetoric advocating human rights and regionalism, there was a very practical aspect to this approach. As General William Odom, the military adviser to the National Security Council, explained, “as long as we have a foot in both camps, the amount of military required to maintain a stable regional power balance is small. When you lose your footing in one side, the amount of military requirements goes up.”66 In the era of the Vietnam Syndrome, no one in the administration wished to do anything that might require an increased American military presence. Regardless of American aims, Siad shared the administration’s desire for improved relations, publicly declaring that “we would rather have good relations with all powers as this would reinforce our non-alignment policy.”67 Subsequently, Addou, the Somali Ambassador to the United States, requested an audience with Carter to discuss the possibility of closer relations between Somalia and the United States,68 a request that the president was encouraged to approve by both the NSC and the State Department. Brzezinski argued that “this is a good opportunity to pass word directly to Siad that we are interested in closer relations. The symbolism of this meeting is at least as important as the substance.”69 Peter Tarnoff, a career Foreign Service officer before joining the State Department at Carter’s request, agreed that a meeting at the presidential level “would clearly demonstrate our interest in improving relations and should strengthen the hands of the officials in the Somali government who are arguing for a reorientation of Somali’s [sic] policies.”70 In his meeting with Addou on June 16, Carter expressed his desire for a closer relationship, and voiced his pleasure that Somalia appeared to be “non-aligned and not dominated by anyone . . . [because] we want the Somalis to recognize their own destiny.”71 In return, Addou told Carter that he “wished to convey greetings from President Siad and his admiration for the president’s stand on human rights,” and went on to suggest that the Somali government shared Carter’s belief

The era of the Vietnam Syndrome 129 in the protection of human rights, at least in the political sphere, insisting that “Somalia’s people are deeply democratic by nature” and there was “no political oppression in Somalia.” Talcott Seelye of the State Department, in his Memorandum for the Record of his meeting with Addou, noted also that the Somali ambassador had attempted to play upon Carter’s well-known devout nature, stressing the deep religious feelings of the Somali people, and taking “his prayer beads out of his pocket to emphasize that he himself prayed five times each day.”72 Practical evidence of the improvement in US-Somali relations came with Siad’s acceptance of economic and humanitarian aid which represented, according to Peter Bourne, Special Assistant to the President on Health Issues, a “significant shift on the part of the Somalia government.”73 In addition, the team sent by the Carter administration to assess the economic needs of the Somali people was, as reported in the Washington Post, “given high-level attention in the Somali capital of Mogadishu and accorded red-carpet treatment, in notable contrast to the severe restrictions usually placed on the activities of the US ambassador and other American officials there.”74 Siad’s ultimate goal, though, was military aid from the United States. Tarnoff reported that Siad had sent Addou to Washington with “an extensive military supply request,” including “armoured personnel carriers and mortars.”75 As expected, Addou passed on Siad’s requests during his meeting with Carter, and attempted to reassure the president that the Somalis had no aggressive intentions but wanted only to be able to defend themselves to ensure peaceful coexistence with their neighbours.76 This claim was greeted with scepticism by members of the Carter administration, though, who were both aware of and concerned by the longstanding enmity between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden. An American official remarked that the “Somalis see everything in terms of their quarrels with Ethiopia. . . . Whoever is Ethiopia’s friend is our enemy – that’s their byword.”77 The Somali president certainly did not hide his personal feelings about his Ethiopian counterpart; in an exclusive interview with Newsweek in June 1977, Siad declared that “Mengistu is a sick mind conducting bloodthirsty genocide. Ethiopia is neither Marxist nor Leninist, neither socialist nor democratic. They only know how to kill.”78 Similarly, Addou in this meeting with Carter contrasted the ‘peaceloving’ Somalia with the Ethiopian regime, which was violating the human rights of “two million Somalis in Ethiopia” who wished to express the right of selfdetermination and wanted “to be free of Ethiopian rule.”79 The Somali request for military aid was therefore greeted with a great deal of caution on the part of the Carter administration. Brzezinski told Carter that I am very skeptical about our getting involved in providing even token direct military assistance to the Somalis, much as we want to encourage them to disengage further from the Soviets. Somalia is already one of the most heavily armed countries in Africa and makes no secret of its territorial claims against its neighbors. We cannot really gain by getting involved in this problem.80 There was also the danger that an increased military relationship between the United States and Somalia might hinder the prospects of improved relations with

130  The era of the Vietnam Syndrome Ethiopia, which remained the ‘prize’ in the Horn. In May, Henze recommended that the administration should “not take too short-term a view” when considering policy towards the Horn of Africa, especially given the volatility of Ethiopian politics. He reiterated that “if the present Ethiopian regime were replaced by a better one, we would not want to find ourselves so linked to Somalia that we couldn’t shift back into friendlier relations with Ethiopia, the most important country in the Horn . . . we need to keep our own future options open.81 Brzezinski agreed, telling Mondale that “even if we find the Somalis warming up to us rapidly, we will have to exercise some caution, for the situation in Ethiopia is very fluid, and we haven’t reached the point where we feel we should give up Ethiopia in exchange for Somalia.82

A fading shadow Notwithstanding concerns over Siad’s requests for military aid, the “improvement of relations with Sudan and Somalia” was cited by Henze as one of the accomplishments of the administration during its first six months in office, and he also suggested that the administration should congratulate itself for “disengagement from support of the Ethiopian military regime” because of its human rights record.83 Not everyone was convinced about Carter’s reorientation of foreign policy, though, with its commitment to regionalism, the ideal of global community and human rights. In March 1977, Representative Joseph Waggonner (D-LA) warned the House that “while we are floundering, changing direction and wondering what our policies ought to be, the Russians and their communist allies are vigorously pressing for their goal of domination of all Africa.”84 On June 2, Representative Larry McDonald (D-GA) agreed that “the drivel the president uttered at Notre Dame notwithstanding, we do not live in any ‘new world,’ but the same world of the postwar struggle between East and West. That is what Angola and Ethiopia are all about.”85 Six days later he spoke up again, stating that the American presence is diminishing there [in Africa] daily, seemingly replaced by arriving Cubans. . . . Ethiopia is another piece of the mosaic known as the twentieth century – a century whose earmark is the betrayal of Western civilization by the leaders of the West.86 These sentiments were echoed in the media too. As early as February the Washington Post argued that “the priority being given by the Carter administration to the human rights issue . . . is playing nicely into the Soviet strategy” in the Horn.87 The more right-wing US News and World Report ran an article on April 4, 1977, entitled “Turmoil in Africa – How Moscow Capitalizes on Strife.” It declared: Exactly four years after the last American combat troops were pulled out of Vietnam, the US is under massive Soviet pressure to abandon yet another part of the world – black Africa. The extensive travel in central and southern

The era of the Vietnam Syndrome  131 Africa of two communist leaders – Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Russia’s president Nikolai Podgorny – underlines an increasingly serious situation on a volatile continent. Their efforts are concentrated on gaining influence in the region as a long step toward helping Marxist governments to get into power. Thus, barely six months after taking office, it appeared that the shadow of Vietnam was fading from the minds of some Americans, and this initial displeasure with Carter’s attempts to reorient foreign policy would develop and deteriorate throughout the remainder of the administration. However, more pressing in the minds of the Carter administration was an event in the Horn of Africa that began in the summer of 1977, and which would lead to the administration’s “first foreign policy crisis.”88

Notes 1 Hearings, US Relations with Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, Subcommittee on African Affairs, August  4–6, 1976, US Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session, Library of Congress. 2 African Policy Fact Sheet, January 1976; Ron Nessen Papers Box 1, African Policy Fact Sheet, Ford Library. 3 Hearings, US Relations with Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, Subcommittee on African Affairs, August  4–6, 1976, US Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session, Library of Congress. 4 “The Russians on Africa’s Horn,” Time, July 21, 1975. 5 “New Soviet Base Perturbs Hill Unit,” Washington Post, July 9, 1975. 6 “Soviets are Believed Building Cruise Missile Base in Somalia,” Washington Post, April 8, 1975. 7 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, April 24, 1975; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 6, Presidential Daily Briefing 4/24/75, Ford Library. 8 “The Russians on Africa’s Horn,” Time, July 21, 1975. 9 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, January 7, 1975; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 4, Presidential Daily Briefing 1/7/75, Ford Library. 10 Memo, Sit Room to Kissinger, February 20, 1975; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 5, Presidential Daily Briefings 2/20/75, Ford Library. 11 “Somalia’s President Stresses US Link,” New York Times, July 4, 1975. 12 Memo, Kissinger to Ford, September 24, 1975; NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa Box 5, Somalia (3), Ford Library. 13 Memo, Horan to Kissinger, May 23, 1975; Presidential Handwriting File Box 21, Foreign Affairs – Foreign Aid (2), Ford Library. 14 “Ethiopia Combats Challenge by Labour,” New York Times, October 1, 1975. 15 CIA Report, January 14, 1976; Dale Van Atta Papers Box 11, Intelligence Documents January 14, 1976, Ford Library. 16 “A Land of Anarchy and Bloodshed,” Time, May 31, 1976. 17 Intelligence Appraisal, Defence Intelligence Agency, March 21, 1976; Dale Van Atta Papers Box 15, Intelligence Documents March 31 1976, Ford Library. 18 SitRoom Evening Report, July 13, 1976; NSA White House Situation Room Evening Reports Box 1, Evening Reports July 13 1976, Ford Library. 19 Sit Room Report, December  13, 1976; NSA White House Situation Room Evening Reports Box 3, Evening Reports December 13 1976, Ford Library. 20 “Ethiopian Government Seen as More Stable,” New York Times, January 13, 1977. 21 “Ethiopia Denounces CIA,” Washington Post, October 8, 1976.

132  The era of the Vietnam Syndrome 22 Sit Room Evening Report, September  2, 1976; NSA White House Situation Room Evening Reports Box 2, Evening Reports September 2 1976, Ford Library. 23 Sit Room Afternoon Summary, October 5, 1976; NSA White House Situation Room Evening Reports Box 2, Evening Reports October 5 1976, Ford Library. 24 Memo, Scowcroft to Ford, January 5, 1977; NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings Box 19, Presidential Daily Briefing 1/5/77, Ford Library. 25 Memo, Nathaniel Davis, State Dept, to Kissinger, September 27, 1975; NSC Institutional Files Box 39, NSSM233 The Future of Kagnew Station, Ford Library. 26 Memo, NSC to Deputy Sec State, Deputy Sec Defence, Director CIA and Chairman JCS, March 1, 1976; NSC Institutional Files Box 15, Senior Review Group Meeting 2/12/76, Ford Library. 27 CIA Report, March 31, 1976; Dale Van Atta Papers Box 15, Intelligence Documents, April 5–15 1976 (1), Ford Library. 28 Sit Room Report, January 18, 1977; NSA White House Situation Room Evening Reports Box 3, Evening Reports January 18 1977, Ford Library. 29 “US Gets Into Africa Arms Race,” Washington Post, July 6, 1976. 30 “US-Soviet Stakes in Africa,” New York Times, July 18, 1976. 31 “World Military Situation Confronting Carter,” New York Times, January 4, 1977. 32 “The Inaugural: Jimmy’s Jumbo Jamboree,” Time, January 24, 1977. 33 Carter, Remarks at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Southern Legislative Conference, July 21, 1977, Public Papers 1977 Vol II, p. 1310. 34 Carter, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1977, The American Presidency Project Digital Archive, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=6575&st=&st1= 35 Speech, Carter, February 2, 1977, Public Papers, Carter 1977 Vol I, p. 75. 36 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 143. 37 Speech, Vance to the Plenary Session of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, July 1, 1977; Cyrus R. Vance and Grace Sloan Papers, Professional and Personal Activities Box  39, Speeches, Articles and Interviews by Cyrus R Vance [while Secretary of State] 1977–1979, Yale University Library Manuscripts Collection. 38 “Ethiopian Head and 6 in Capital Reported Slain,” New York Times, February 4, 1977. 39 “Bloody Persecution in Ethiopia Charged,” Los Angeles Times, March 9, 1977. 40 “Ethiopian Chief Starts Soviet Visit,” New York Times, May 6, 1977. 41 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March 16, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 5, Evening Reports File 2–6/77, Carter Library. 42 “Young Ends his Trip on a Dissonant Note,” New York Times, May 26, 1977. 43 Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-21, The Horn of Africa, April 1, 1977; No 1558, Items 1552 (cont) – 1558, Fiche 352, National Security Archive, Washington, DC. 44 Minutes, Policy Review Committee Meeting, April 11, 1977; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 24, Meetings PRC-10 4/11/77, Carter Library. 45 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March 16, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 5, Evening Reports File: 2–6/77, Carter Library. 46 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March 17, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 5, Evening Reports File: 2–6/77, Carter Library. 47 “Bloody Persecution in Ethiopia Charged,” Los Angeles Times, March 9, 1977. 48 Testimony, Dr Arnt K Meyer-Lie, Amnesty International, to House Subcommittee on Africa, March 28, 1977, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 49 Carter, News Conference, November 15, 1976, President Carter Special Report, Congressional Quarterly Inc, April 1977. 50 “Security Links Cited,” New York Times, February 25, 1977. 51 Transcript, Recommendations of the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee Markup Session, House Committee on International Relations, April 20–May 4, 1977, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress.

The era of the Vietnam Syndrome  133 52 Report, International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1977, Committee on Foreign Relations, May  16, 1977, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 53 Testimony, Tom Farer to House Subcommittee on Africa, March 28, 1977, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 54 Memo, Brown to Brzezinski, March 21, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 3/77, Carter Library. 55 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March  31, 1977  – NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 3/77, Carter Library. 56 Memo, Brzezinski to Brown, undated – NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 3/77, Carter Library. 57 “Ethiopia Orders Last 2 Western Journalists to Leave,” New York Times, April 26, 1977. 58 Henze, Paul, The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), p. 146. 59 Memo, Lake to Vance, January 16, 1978; Human Rights Collection Box HU-1, HU [1/20/77–1/20/81], Carter Library. 60 “Reversal of Once-Close Ties to Ethiopia Stirs Regret Here,” Washington Post, April 26, 1977. 61 Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-21, The Horn of Africa, April  1, 1977; No 1558, Items 1552 (cont) – 1558, Fiche 352, National Security Archive, Washington, DC. 62 Minutes, Policy Review Committee Meeting, April  11, 1977; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 24, Meetings PRC-10 4/11/77, Carter Library. 63 Memo, Brzezinski to Mondale, March  24, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 4/78, Carter Library. 64 “A Day with Jimmy Carter,” Time, April 18, 1977. 65 Minutes, Policy Review Committee Meeting, April  11, 1977; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 24, PRC-10 4/11/77, Carter Library. 66 Interview with General William Odom, July 14, 2000, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. 67 Newsweek, June 27, 1977. 68 Memo, Tarnoff to Brzezinski, June 2, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 6–7/77, Carter Library. 69 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, undated; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 6–7/77, Carter Library. 70 Memo, Tarnoff to Brzezinski, June 2, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 6–7/77, Carter Library. 71 Memorandum for the Record, Meeting with Addou, Carter, Brzezinski, Henze and Seelye, June 16, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 6–7/77, Carter Library. 72 Memorandum for the Record, Meeting with Addou, Carter, Brzezinski, Henze and Seelye, June 16, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 6–7/77, Carter Library. 73 Memo, Peter Bourne to Carter, June 6, 1977; WHCF Countries Box CO-53, Somalia, CO140 1/20/77–1/20/81, Carter Library. 74 “US Offers Military Aid to Somalia,” Washington Post, July 26, 1977. 75 Memo, Tarnoff to Brzezinski, July 12, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 6–7/77, Carter Library. 76 Memorandum for the Record, Meeting with Addou, Carter, Brzezinski, Henze and Seelye, June 16, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 6–7/77, Carter Library. 77 Newsweek, May 9, 1977. 78 Newsweek, June 27, 1977. 79 Memorandum for the Record, Meeting with Addou, Carter, Brzezinski, Henze and Seelye, June 16, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 6–7/77, Carter Library. 80 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, undated; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 4–5/77, Carter Library. 81 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, May 14, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 4–5/77, Carter Library.

134  The era of the Vietnam Syndrome 82 Memo, Brzezinski to Mondale, March 24, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 3/77, Carter Library. 83 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, July 14, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 6–7/77, Carter Library. 84 Speech, Representative Waggonner (D-LA) to the House, March 22, 1977, CR, 95th Congress, 1st Session, p. 8455, Library of Congress. 85 Speech, Representative McDonald (D-GA) to the House, June 2, 1977, CR, 95th Congress, 1st Session, p. 17394, Library of Congress. 86 Speech, Representative McDonald (D-GA) to the House, June 8, 1977, CR, 95th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 18085/18086, Library of Congress. 87 “Soviet Wooing of Ethiopia May Push Somalia Toward US,” Washington Post, February 28, 1977. 88 Paul Henze, conversation with author, April 1999, Washington, DC.

9 The Ogaden War and the demise of détente

Roots of war Although Jimmy Carter attempted to reorient American foreign policy to one that emphasised human rights, regionalism and global community, his administration saw the demise of détente, the collapse of the SALT II arms agreements, and the onset of the second Cold War. The reason for this profound deterioration of American-Soviet relations can be traced to an event in the Horn of Africa in 1977; as Brzezinski claimed in his memoirs, détente was “buried in the sands of the Ogaden.”1 The war that broke out in 1977 between Ethiopia and Somalia over the disputed Ogaden region was perceived by the American public as a classic example of Soviet adventurism and American weakness; perceptions that were then exacerbated by subsequent international events in places such as Afghanistan and Iran. Consequently, as in Vietnam, the Ogaden War was viewed by the American people through the Cold War prism. However, again reflecting the situation in Vietnam, the roots of the conflict lay much deeper, tracing back to the European ‘scramble for Africa’ in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the conflict over the Ogaden would prove to the most serious of the post-colonial problems faced in the Horn of Africa. Once Somalia achieved independence in 1960, the issue of ownership of the Ogaden region was always going to be an issue. The Somali constitution included a commitment to reunite all Somali peoples in one nation, and following the revolution in 1969, and the elevation of Siad Barré as president, Somali irredentism grew stronger. In a lengthy letter to Nixon in June  1973, Siad went into great detail of the history of the Somali claim to the Ogaden, claiming: Long before the Berlin Conference of 1884 in which Africa was partitioned between the colonial powers, the Somali people were one entity with one common culture, faith, language and origin living in a recognised and known land. . . . The Somali people had the misfortune of falling a prey [sic] after the Berlin Conference to three different colonial powers. . . . As a result of pressure from Ethiopia, and taking advantage of its independent status, both Britain and Italy concluded treaties with Ethiopia in 1897 and 1908 respectively

136  The Ogaden War and the demise of détente whereby large Somali territory was given to Ethiopia. This was done without the consent or knowledge of the Somali people. In fact, the existence of such treaties was only disclosed to the Somali people in the late 1950s when the Somali territory was about to be handed over to Ethiopia. Siad claimed that it was not the “intention of the Somali Democratic Republic to kindle a fire of destruction in the Horn of Africa” and insisted that he had attempted to negotiate a “just and last solution to our long standing territorial dispute” with Ethiopia, but had been rebuffed.2 Other attempts for peaceful resolution were dashed when the OAU passed the Cairo Resolution in 1964, and confirmed a decade later by the CIA, who reported to Ford in September 1975 that “almost all black African countries have announced their support for Ethiopia’s territorial integrity.”3 Thus by the mid-1970s, Siad had reached one inescapable conclusion; if he was to achieve his dreams of Somali reunification, it would have to be by military conquest.

War breaks out Although there had been skirmishes along the border between Ethiopia and Somalia for years, a report from the CIA in September 1975 suggested that, as Siad reached the end of his term of office as Chair of the OAU, the Somali government was “preparing to resume its support for guerrilla operations in the Ogaden.”4 Perhaps to counter claims that he was violating both the Cairo Resolution and international law, Siad was careful to deem the insurgency as a matter of self-determination, publicly affirming his supporting for regional autonomy, no doubt with the hope that, after independence had been declared, the Ogadeni people would then choose to legally incorporate their nation into the Somali Democratic Republic. He insisted that Mengistu “must give the nations living in the Ogaden, including both the Eritreans and the Somalis, the right to self-determination,”5 and claimed that the Ethiopians were “suppressing colonized people struggling for their freedom.”6 Notwithstanding Siad’s public declarations, his endorsement of the insurgency served to inflame the conflict to the extent that, by August, the skirmishes had developed into full-scale war. On August 18, Brzezinski informed Carter that “there can be no doubt that the Somalis have launched an only very thinly disguised, premeditated invasion of Ethiopia.”7 The situation deteriorated further in September when Ethiopia and Somalia formally broke diplomatic relations, and a government announcement from Addis Ababa confirmed that Ethiopia had “launched all-out war against the invading enemy” in the Ogaden.8 Initially, however, the invasion succeeded, and by October the Somalis had gained control of the entire region, with the exception of the strategic towns of Harar and Diredawa; Abdullahi Abdi, a Somali military commander, proudly declared that “the Ethiopians know they do not belong here. That is why they do not fight well. We are driving them away forever.”9 With the Washington Post suggesting that the war in the Ogaden was “the world’s largest military conflict at the moment,”10 Carter had little choice but to

The Ogaden War and the demise of détente  137 respond. Indeed, according to Henze, the war constituted the administration’s “first foreign policy crisis.”11 However, the first problem for Carter was not the extent of the conflict, but accusations of complicity. On July 26, virtually on the eve of the Somali invasion of the Ogaden, a State Department briefing confirmed the decision “in principle” to “grant military assistance” to Somalia as part of efforts to strengthen US-Somali relations.12 Given the timing of the announcement, it was not surprising that questions were raised both by the media and within Congress asking whether the administration had covertly encouraged the incursion. Henze insisted that the timing was coincidental, contending that it is wrong to say, as some critics have, that this announcement caused the invasion (a self-serving interpretation the Soviets like to encourage). The Somalis had planned to invade for a long time and may even have had incitement from some Soviets to do so. The oversupply of Soviet arms to Somalia in previous years was the real cause of the invasion.13 Henze’s contention was supported by Mohammed Aden, special aide to the Somali president, who insisted at a press conference that reports that the Carter administration had encouraged the invasion were “pure speculation,” and the “Somalis never deluded ourselves about the US attitude.”14 Notwithstanding, the House Committee on International Relations conducted an investigation into the allegations, but concluded that the administration’s decision to grant military aid to Somalia was “a foolish move at best.”15 Perhaps the most compelling evidence to support Henze’s assertion that the administration was not responsible for the invasion came in the way that Carter responded. Invoking his new approach to foreign policy, Carter rejected the use of military power and called instead for a focus on humanitarian concerns and peaceful resolution of the conflict within a global community framework. One of his first actions was to withdraw the offer of military aid to Siad; Hodding Carter explained at a press conference that “we have decided that providing arms at this time would add fuel to a fire we are most interested in putting out.”16 When it came to negotiating a settlement, Carter’s emphasis on regionalism required that “African problems should have African solutions,”17 and within that remit, the ideal forum was the OAU. Shortly after the outbreak of war, a meeting of the Policy Review Committee determined that “we want to try to persuade other Africans to feel a sense of responsibility for what is happening between Ethiopia and Somalia,”18 and pledged to try to get as many African leaders as possible to participate in a call to all outside powers to refrain from supplying arms to fuel the Ethiopian-Somali confrontation so that there can be a cease-fire and an effort at mediation.19 The first attempt of the OAU to mediate the conflict came in early August when the foreign ministers of eight African nations met in Libreville, Gabon, at the behest of the Ethiopian government. However, any hopes for a quick resolution

138  The Ogaden War and the demise of détente were soon dashed when the Ethiopian delegation refused to allow the Ogaden insurgents to participate in the talks and insisted that they would never accept the “humiliation” of surrendering the Ogaden to Somalia.20 In response, the Somali delegation walked out of the summit. Although the meeting concluded with a call for an end to the hostilities, there was little hope that either Ethiopia or Somalia would cooperate. Indeed, a month later, a spokesman for the Ethiopian government declared that Somalia had “shown no respect” for the resolution passed by the OAU and clearly “intended to pursue its aggression.”21

The Soviet Union and the Ogaden War As well as Ethiopian and Somali intransigence, the other main threat to hopes for a swift and peaceful resolution to the war came in the form of external involvement. The Carter administration supported the OAU’s position that “outside powers should not be ‘fuelling’ African territorial disputes,” and proposed an arms embargo to both sides for the duration of the conflict.22 However, military aid continued to flow from the Soviet Union to both Ethiopia and Somalia. On August 7, the Washington Post reported that “several Soviet ships loaded with war materiel have recently arrived [in Somalia],”23 while further reports in the autumn described a massive influx of military aid to Ethiopia, that included MiG-21 jet fighters, T-55 tanks and armoured personnel carriers.24 While communist bloc support for Ethiopia was extended with the arrival of Cuban and Soviet military advisers to support Mengistu’s activities in both Eritrea and the Ogaden, the opposite proved true for Siad. In September, the Soviet leadership began to publicly criticise the Somali invasion, and then, on October 20, announced that military support to Siad was being cut off. The Soviet ambassador to Ethiopia, Anatoly Ratanov, told a news conference in Addis Ababa that Moscow had “officially and formally” terminated military aid to Somalia, but would continue to provide Ethiopia with “defensive weapons” to counter the Somali invasion.25 In response to this, Siad abandoned Somalia’s official policy of neutrality in the Cold War. In November 1977, following a nineteen-hour government meeting, Siad renounced the treaty of friendship between Somalia and the Soviet Union, ordered the expulsion of all Soviet military and civilian advisers, and closed the Soviet naval bases on the Indian Ocean, including the base at Berbera. At the same time, Siad broke relations with the USSR’s ally and perceived proxy, Cuba, and also expelled Cuban diplomats and advisers.26 Cyrus Vance described Siad’s decision “a major step,”27 while Newsweek called it a “major gamble,”28 but the Somali leader understood that he was in a desperate situation, and one that called for desperate measures. In order to defeat Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, especially given the extent of communist bloc support for his enemy, he knew that he too would need external support and that his only remaining practical option was the United States. Accordingly, the official government announcement that Siad was breaking ties with the communist bloc attempted to emulate American ideals of freedom and self-determination, and thus elicit Carter’s sympathy and support: Somali Information Minister Abdulkadir Salaad

The Ogaden War and the demise of détente  139 Hasan claimed that the Soviet bloc was “brazenly” interfering “in the struggle of the peoples fighting for their liberation from the Ethiopian government.”29 Unfortunately for Siad, Carter was not swayed and continued to insist that outside powers should not fuel the Ogaden conflict. On November  15, Hodding Carter confirmed that despite the Somali action, there would be no change in the administration’s policy of non-involvement, reiterating the position that “African problems should be solved by Africans themselves.”30 Not surprisingly, this announcement was not well received in Somalia. The Somali adviser on foreign affairs, Hussein Abdulkador Kassim, criticised the administration’s stance, explaining that “it is the feeling of my Government that the international community has a responsibility to see that the plan of the Soviet Union to destabilize the area is not carried out.”31 Likewise, Siad Barré called on the United States to “fulfil its moral responsibility” to Somalia, complaining that he had “words, just words from the West” instead of material aid, even after expelling the Soviets.32 Throughout the remainder of 1977, communist bloc support for the Ethiopian war effort continued to flow into Addis Ababa. At the end of the year, Vance sent a telegram to American embassies around the world confirming that the administration had “incontrovertible evidence” of “substantial seaborne deliveries” as well as a “massive, continuing Soviet airlift of equipment and personnel” to Ethiopia, that included “large quantities of modern weapons such as armour, artillery and sophisticated aircraft.”33 Carter, however, continued to insist that the conflict should be viewed outwith the Cold War prism. During a cabinet meeting on the situation in the Horn, Brzezinski reported on the “scale of Cuban involvement in Africa, especially in Somalia,” but Carter determined that the United States would do nothing more than condemn the external involvement and “begin to express its frank criticism of the ‘Cuban intrusion’ into Africa.”34 In explaining the situation to American Ambassadors around the world, Vance acknowledged that the administration was “deeply concerned about the Soviet airlift and, particularly, the obstacle it presents for the success of the OAU efforts to mediate this African problem.” However, he added, the American response would be limited to “quiet diplomacy, including approaches to the Soviets and to key African states . . . in an effort to prevent the situation from assuming the public appearance of a great power confrontation.”35 Vance subsequently met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and told him that the United States supported the OAU position that the major powers should disengage from the Ogaden conflict, adding that “it would be useful if the USSR did too.”36 On January 25, Carter sent a letter to Brezhnev seeking Soviet support for a negotiated solution to the Ogaden conflict, based upon respect for territorial integrity, and the “immediate recall of both Soviet and Cuban military personnel from Ethiopia.”37 This was followed by a telegram to Havana, requesting that the Cuban government also support OAU peace initiatives, asserting that “continuing Soviet-Cuban involvement will not enhance prospects for such settlement.”38 As part of the ‘quiet diplomacy’ referred to by Vance, Carter shared his concern about the “Soviet Union’s unwarranted involvement in Africa” with “the NATO alliance, and specifically with France, the Middle Eastern countries, and India,”39

140  The Ogaden War and the demise of détente and also turned to fellow members of the Organisation of American States (OAS) for support. In official communiqués sent to OAS leaders, including the president of Venezuela, Carlos Andres Perez, Carter expressed his dismay that “the Soviet Union and Cuba have become increasingly involved in the Horn, in a way that has transformed a conflict largely limited to regional powers, to one with broader implications and risks.”40 Carter requested that Perez use his influence to “condemn foreign intervention in the internal affairs of another country.”41 The following month Carter wrote to President Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico conveying the “deep concern” of the United States over the situation in the Horn, and especially the Cuban involvement, and seeking his “advice on how we might persuade them to exercise more restraint.”42 Carter’s efforts to end the Ogaden War through diplomatic means came to naught, however. In a meeting with a congressional delegation led by Representatives Don Bonker (D-WA) and Paul Tsongas (D-MA) at the end of 1977, Mengistu warned that the United States should not “expect the OAU to solve the problem.” He insisted too that the Somalis would never yield their claim to the Ogaden, and that it was the “duty of Ethiopia and its armed forces to expel the aggressors.”43 The Ethiopian ambassador to the United States, Ayalew Mandefro, reiterated that the “Ogaden is part of Ethiopia and is not a point of negotiation with Somalia.”44 With the Somalis equally intransigent with regards to peaceful resolution, Henze summed up the situation succinctly to Brzezinski, commenting that “neither the Ethiopians nor the Somalis want negotiations now; how, then can you bring them to negotiate? Nor do the Russians and the Cubans want negotiations.”45 Brzezinski agreed that it was “inevitable” that any attempts by the OAU to end the conflict would fail, one reason being that it had no means of enforcement for its judgments.46

A military outcome Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continued to pour copious amounts of military aid into Ethiopia, while Cuban troops arrived by the thousands. On January 23 Henze informed Brzezinski that between 2,000 and 3,000 more Cuban combat troops are scheduled to arrive in Ethiopia shortly and that planning is well advanced to commit them in the northern Ogaden. . . . The Cuban role is thus rapidly shifting from an advisory one to one of significant involvement in the fighting itself.47 The following month, Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA, reported that “a Soviet General [Vasiliy I Petrov] is directing the Ethiopians in battle . . . [and] nearly 10,000 Cubans are in Ethiopia now.”48 Giving the extent of external support, as Henze remarked to Brzezinski, “sometime this year, with all the Soviet weaponry and Cuban help they are getting, [the Ethiopians] are bound to push the Somalis back decisively.”49

The Ogaden War and the demise of détente 141 No one was more aware of this than Siad, and he grew increasingly desperate in his quest for American aid. In an exclusive interview with Newsweek on February 13, the Somali leader invoked the Cold War in an effort to elicit American sympathy, warning that “Russia is outmanoeuvring America,” while a senior aide cautioned that “the Soviets can now see the day when they will control the oil supplies and the sea routes of the Western world.”50 Although Carter continued to insist on a regionalist response, in Congress, at least, Siad’s ploy met with some support. In the report on their visit to the Horn, Representatives Bonker and Tsongas argued that as long as there is turmoil and conflict in the Horn of Africa, the United States cannot afford to be complacent. To do so would risk possible Soviet domination of the whole Indian Ocean area and a consequent threat to fundamental Western interests.51 Representative Robert Sikes (D-FL) agreed, describing the refusal of the United States to aid the Somalis as “ineptness,”52 and contending that “the United States will be derelict if we do not move quickly to take advantage of the potential” for replacing the Soviet Union in Somalia, particularly in the strategic naval base at Berbera.53 In a subsequent speech he added: I find it exceedingly hard to comprehend an action of the US Government which virtually gives the green light for the conquest of Somalia and Eritrea by Cuban forces under Russian control. . . . Arms for Somalia could have forced a negotiated settlement and kept the strategic Horn of Africa out of communist hands.54 On the other side of the Hill, Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) also expressed his agreement, claiming that without American help, “Somalia’s relatively small and now-depleted military forces could not meet the military might of Ethiopia’s Soviet backed forces, thus assuring a Soviet takeover in the Horn of Africa.”55 There was also some concern within the administration that Carter’s approach might need reconsideration. A telegram sent from the United States embassy in Moscow pointed to a flaw in the administration’s regionalist orientation when it warned that a basic fact we must bear in mind in all of this is that the Soviets are still playing a geopolitical “zero-sum” game, and they have as yet shown little indication of a recognition that it would be to their long-range interest to reduce superpower involvement in the African continent.56 Similarly, Brzezinski maintained that “the situation between the Ethiopians and the Somalis was more than a border conflict,”57 and rather dramatically warned that Soviet success in the Horn could demonstrate that “containment has now

142  The Ogaden War and the demise of détente been fully breached.”58 He went on to argue that the implications of this would be felt worldwide, and the administration would “increasingly find Begin, Brezhnev, Vorster, Schmidt, Castro, Gaddafi, and a host of others thumbing their noses at us.”59 In addition, was the danger of a domestic backlash. In his weekly report of November 18, 1977, Brzezinski warned Carter that although the various initiatives you have taken have been right, and individually correct, I feel that we are confronting a growing domestic problem involving public perception of the general character of that policy. To put it simply and quite bluntly, it is seen as “soft.” . . . Our critics . . . will ask for some examples of “toughness,” and exploit against us such things as . . . the current Cuban activity in Africa.60 Henze, however, reassured Brzezinski that ultimately public opinion would be on the administration’s side, contending that the Somalis are not attractive as objects of a sustained campaign of sympathy: they brought the Soviets in in the first place, they committed bald aggression, they have lied and schemed; Siad’s “socialist” system is illiberal and has been repressive. These are not the kind of people the US public can identify with for long.61 Carter agreed, and maintained his position that the United States must not be drawn into a proxy war; Vance subsequently recalled that “the Somalis were increasingly desperate. Repeatedly, they appealed for US military help as Cuban and Ethiopian pressure mounted. Each time we asked whether they were prepared to withdraw from the Ogaden. Their answer was no.”62 In January 1978 State Department spokesman John Trattner confirmed publicly that the administration had rejected Siad’s request for military aid while the war continued, explaining that “we will not contribute to a conflict . . . by pouring gasoline on it,”63 while Carter instructed Ambassador Loughran in Mogadishu to “tell Siad that we can maintain our commitment to seek Congressional authority to provide him with defensive arms only if he withdraws his forces immediately and completely from Ethiopian territory.”64 Henze’s optimism over American public opinion appeared justified by an editorial in the New York Times commenting that “the world’s bloodiest war has been raging for several months in the Horn of East Africa. The Russians are deeply enmeshed in the conflict, which makes it all the more remarkable, and commendable, that the United States is not.”65 Meanwhile, Senator George McGovern (D-SD) told his Senate colleagues that he commended “the US administration for its restraint in not interfering in this border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia.”66 Notwithstanding, by February 1978, it was clear that Siad’s efforts to reclaim the Ogaden through military conquest would ultimately end in failure. The desperation of Siad’s position was confirmed when, on February 12, the Washington Post reported that “Somalia went on a full war footing last night as the government

The Ogaden War and the demise of détente  143 declared a state of emergency and announced it was formally committing its regular armed forces to the fighting with Ethiopia in the Ogaden desert.”67 The official statement claimed that because of the failure of Western powers to assume the responsibility of confronting Soviet aggression, it has become incumbent for Somalia to defend itself against naked aggression and to increase its assistance to the Western Somali Liberation forces by dispatching units of its own regular army to the area.68 However, the extra troops had little impact on the course of the conflict. On February 8, Baalu Girma, the Ethiopian information minister, declared that “we have taken a concerted action. We are now moving to drive the Somalis out.”69 Turner subsequently confirmed in an intelligence briefing to the NSC that a major push, in which the Cubans would be “deeply involved,” should be expected in the next ten days.70 Subsequently, the Somali Minister of Information Abdulkadir Salaad Hasan admitted that the effectiveness of the Ethiopian counteroffensive, launched in response to the commitment of Somali regulars, meant that the “situation is very grave for Somalia.”71 So grave, in fact, that on March 9 Carter held a news conference and announced that “last night, I was informed by President Siad Barré of Somalia that he was agreeing to withdraw his forces from the Ogaden area, the occupied areas of Ethiopia.”72 Ethiopian announcements of the end of the war were more triumphal; the Ethiopian Ambassador to Kenya, Mengiste Desta, held a press conference and announced that the Somali troops were “being chased out from Ethiopian land by our troops.”73

Post-war relations: the United States and Ethiopia The end of formal hostilities in the Ogaden did not mean that there would be any respite to the turmoil in the Horn. The ongoing Eritrean insurgency troubled members of the Carter administration, not only because of humanitarian concerns but also because of larger regional implications due to the support received by the rebels from Arab nations, including Iraq, Syria, Iran, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and North Yemen, as well as aid from the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Keith Wauchope, the American consul who had overseen the closure of the American base at Asmara before joining the State Department, warned Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, that following its victory over Somalia, the “EPMG will inevitably turn the full weight of their military might on Eritrea,” adding that this would “further inflame the fears and concerns of the Arab nations in the region.”74 Faced with possible involvement in another regional war that potentially had larger implications, Carter adopted the same approach of non-involvement and gave the same reasons for doing so. As discussed previously, American support for Ethiopian territorial integrity had often been driven by the need and desire to maintain a strong relationship with Haile Selassie. Given Mengistu’s rise to power and leftist orientation, such justification was less relevant to the Carter administration.

144  The Ogaden War and the demise of détente What was relevant, however, was Carter’s regionalist stance and belief that African problems should have African solutions. The OAU held the view that support for Eritrean secession would violate the Cairo Resolution and, as such, did not “recognize the Eritrean liberation movements.”75 Out of respect for the OAU, therefore, if for no other reason, Carter took the same approach; as Henze remarked to Brzezinski, “we support Ethiopian territorial integrity, which includes Eritrea, and always have.”76 During a visit to London, Vance publicly asserted that “the United States strongly supports the territorial integrity of all states in the region, including particularly Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya.”77 American support, therefore, as with the war in the Ogaden, was limited to a call for peaceful resolution of the conflict, with negotiations led by the OAU. Carter endorsed Wauchope’s recommendation that the administration should “encourage and support Nimeiri as president of the OAU and as a member in good standing of the Arab League to promote the formation of an Arab-African mediation group to seek a negotiated settlement.”78 However, the chances of peaceful resolution to the Eritrean insurgency seemed even less likely than in the Ogaden War. With no unity among the various factions fighting for independence, there was no one with whom the Ethiopian government could realistically negotiate even it if had been so inclined. A State Department briefing acknowledged that we see little prospect for a unified liberation movement negotiating front, and since Mengistu seems determined to solve the problem in terms of Ethiopian sovereignty, we believe that Ethiopia will step up the military pressure, and will campaign as long as necessary to bring the Eritreans to sue for peace on Ethiopian terms.79 The other main issue faced by the Carter administration in the immediate aftermath of the Ogaden War was summed up by Brzezinski when he reported that “Mengistu seems to be willingly moving closer and closer to the Soviets.”80 Although Henze maintained that “our ultimate aim in the Horn should be to get the Soviets out of Ethiopia [and] re-establish our own position there,”81 Carter’s regionalist approach meant that his priority was to strengthen the fragile American-­ Ethiopian relationship. His efforts appeared to be paying off in the summer of 1978, when Mengistu accepted the credentials of Frederic Chapin, thereby filling the ambassadorial post that had been vacant since July 1976. Henze commented to Professor Edward Ullendorff at Oxford University, that you have probably read that Mengistu has agreed to accept an ambassador from us. We . . . hope, once he is in place, that our relations can return to a level of “normalcy” where we at least have an established and recognized channel of regular communication with the Ethiopian government.82 Later in the summer, Henze wrote to Harold Marcus, professor at Michigan State University and editor of Ethiopianist Notes, expressing his satisfaction that “we have a new Ambassador in Addis Ababa, Fred Chapin, who has made a good beginning at warming up our relations a bit.”83

The Ogaden War and the demise of détente 145 Although, initially signs were encouraging that the relationship between Ethiopia and the United States would improve, the feelings of optimism faded over the following year. In May 1979, Gordon Beyer, East Africa director for the State Department, reported that Chapin “was not relating well to Ethiopians and was personally antagonizing many of the officials with whom he was dealing. He was becoming frustrated and disillusioned at not being able to solve the complicated legal issues affecting aid programmes.”84 Henze was similarly disillusioned, warning Brzezinski that “what little we have left of a position in Ethiopia” was under threat by Chapin who “angered by the Ethiopians’ lack of response to his intense effort to work out the compensation/aid-cut-off issue, has adopted a punitive, worse-the-better position.” Henze added that I am not sure that Chapin is not deliberately trying to worsen the situation to the point where the Ethiopians retaliate by PNGing him or breaking relations. This would be unfortunate, not only for our position in Ethiopia, but for the larger framework of our Horn and Middle Eastern policy in relation to Soviets and Cubans. And it might simply be playing into Soviet hands.85

Post-war relations: the United States and Somalia Concurrent with the efforts to improve the relationship with Ethiopia, the aftermath of the Ogaden War also prompted questions over the American role in Somalia. The largest of these centred on the advisability of developing the association with Siad who, as Henze pointed out, “makes a poor hero by any standards acceptable in the West,”86 describing the Somali leader as a “narrow, vain, intense, suspicious man [who] has led his country into catastrophe.”87 Although there was general agreement with Henze’s assessment,88 Carter’s commitment to regionalism and human rights led the administration to “avoid regarding Somalia and Siad as identical”89 and continue with efforts to build a stronger relationship, with a focus upon economic and humanitarian aid. However, it seemed that American goals for the future of Somalia differed from those of the Somali leader. Henze maintained that “by persisting in humanitarian and economic aid efforts, we demonstrate a commitment to improving the well-being of the Somali people,” but added that “Siad has nothing to offer his people but demands for more planes, tanks and artillery. He would go on keeping Somalia hopelessly at odds with all their neighbours.”90 When it came to consideration of Siad’s continued requests for military aid, though, Henze’s concerns were dismissed. Now that the American-imposed condition of Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden had been met, arguments were made that American credibility demanded that the administration should carry out its pledge of July 1977 to provide Siad with defensive arms. Lake insisted that we have promised to try to get arms for Siad; we have to live up to that commitment and the Saudis expect us to. I don’t care if Congress turns us down – we have to ask for it to show that we live up to commitments.91

146  The Ogaden War and the demise of détente Vance agreed, adding that military aid was essential if the administration was to build a stronger relationship with Somalia, counter the Soviet presence in Ethiopia, and might even be used as a tool to influence and therefore control Siad; it was important, he said, “to consolidate our political position with Siad and Somalia; to restrain Somali irredentism; [and] to prohibit the Soviets from restoring their influence in Somalia.”92 However, the administration was adamant that conditions must be placed on any offers of military aid to Siad; Carter’s declaration that any provision of arms to Somalia would require “a renewed commitment [from Siad] not to dishonour the international boundaries of either Ethiopia or Kenya,”93 was reiterated by Vance who appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, testifying that the administration had Siad’s assurances that “he would respect the internationally recognized borders of his neighbours as a precondition for any US military assistance.”94 Accordingly, in May 1978, arrangements to send a military survey team to Somalia to assess Siad’s needs began, and administration officials confirmed that an offer of military aid to Somalia had been made because they were satisfied that all Somali troops had been withdrawn from the Ogaden. Subsequently, it was announced that a survey team would be sent to Somalia as the first step “toward the supply of about $15 million in ‘defensive’ arms to that country.”95

Buried in the sand As Carter began his bid for re-election at the end of 1979, the situation in the Horn of Africa seemed relatively stable. Although the insurgency in Eritrea was ongoing, and relations with Ethiopia were not strong, things did not seem hopeless and, given the apparent improvement of relations with Siad, it could be argued that Carter’s approach based upon regionalism, human rights and global community might pay off. However, within a year, Carter would be ousted from the White House with his successor in the Oval Office, Ronald Reagan, overseeing the onset of a ‘second Cold War.’ Although there were many reasons for this, an event that occurred during the Ogaden War was argued by many, and most notably Zbigniew Brzezinski, to be a crucial determining factor. The key moment came during discussions within the administration of the possible deployment of a carrier task force to the Gulf of Aden during the Ogaden War. Brzezinski supported the deployment, arguing that it is important that regional powers not see the United States as passive in the face of Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Horn and in the potential invasion of Somalia – even if our support is, in the final analysis, only for the record.96 However, Brzezinski met with united opposition; in his memoirs, Vance recalled, “every other member of the committee opposed the idea of deploying a carrier task force.”97

The Ogaden War and the demise of détente 147 For Brzezinski, this constituted the turning point not only when it came to public support for Carter’s regionalist approach but also in American-Soviet relations and the wider Cold War. In his memoirs, he famously explained: In March 1980, as we were reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I wrote in my journal: “I have been reflecting on when did things begin genuinely to go wrong in the US-Soviet relationship. My view is that it was on the day sometime in . . . 1978 when at the SCC meeting I advocated that we send in a carrier task force in reaction to the Soviet deployment of the Cubans in Ethiopia. At that meeting not only was I opposed by Vance, but Harold Brown asked why, for what reason, without taking into account that that is a question that should perplex the Soviets rather than us. The president backed the others rather than me, we did not react. Subsequently, as the Soviets became more emboldened, we overreacted, particularly in the Cuban Soviet brigade fiasco of last fall. That derailed SALT, the momentum of SALT was lost, and the final nail in the coffin was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In brief underreaction then bred overreaction.” That is why I have used occasionally the phrase, “SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden.”98 Although Brzezinski was specifically referring to the American-Soviet relationship in his commentary, there is a deeper meaning to his assessment: the momentum of public opinion in support of Carter’s new approach to the Cold War was arguably the greatest loss for the president. Indeed, following the Ogaden war, domestic criticism of Carter’s approach in the Horn was more and more apparent. Unsurprisingly, much of the criticism levelled at Carter came from Republicans. In April 1978, Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) warned that the SALT negotiations were under threat “unless aggressive Soviet-Cuban military adventurism in Africa is halted,”99 while Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) criticised the Carter administration for its policy towards the Horn, arguing that unless those in the administration “wake up, the African continent is going to be a communist enclave.”100 The following month, thirty-six of the Senate’s thirty-eight Republicans issued a statement in which they accused the Carter administration of “incoherence, inconsistency and ineptitude in our foreign policy” and claimed that the United States was being “challenged around the globe by Soviet arrogance,” particularly in the Horn of Africa where the Soviet presence “creates a pincer movement around our vital sources of Middle East oil and threatens the sea lanes through which supplies are routed.”101 In August, Virginia Governor John Dalton announced his intention to “send the message, all over this state that the Carter administration is soft on communism.”102 In his reply to the president’s State of the Union message in January 1979, William Brock, the Republican National Party Chairman, declared that Carter says that things are good around the world, and he refuses to admit that we have lost allies, that countries have fallen under communist control, that the

148  The Ogaden War and the demise of détente world is in disarray, that this country has lost its ability to be a cause for peace.103 While such criticism from Republicans was not necessarily unexpected, Carter’s real problem lay in the fact that those that had previously supported him were losing faith in the president’s approach. Robert Sikes (D-FL) accused Carter of weakness in the face of Soviet aggression, claiming that the Soviet Union’s “major objectives are the Horn of Africa and the Cape. Control of these strategic locations would allow them to dominate shipping lanes where much of the world’s oil and minerals must travel. Both oil and minerals are essential to the West” and lamenting that “the sands of time are running out for the West in Africa.”104 Meanwhile, the Washington Post published the results of a Harris Survey on the American response to the communist bloc presence in the Horn of Africa and found real signs that Americans are increasingly worried about stepped up Cuban and Soviet military activity in Africa: . . . [by] fifty to twenty-four percent . . . [they feel] that unless the United States takes the lead in telling the Russians and Cubans they can’t take over these countries, Africa will be taken over by communists.105 In January 1979, House Minority Leader John Rhodes (R-AZ) complained that the deterioration in our foreign posture in the last two years is really hard to contemplate. . . . Look at the advances that the Russians have made around the globe. . . . You find all around the world the bastions of the United States for defending the free world in a position of crumbling [sic]. . . . You’ve got to say that something very bad went wrong as far as foreign policy is concerned.106 Unfortunately for Carter, by the end of the year, the situation grew even worse, leading to a second reorientation of foreign policy that would reinvigorate the Cold War and ultimately prove disastrous for the people of the Horn of Africa.

Notes 1 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 189. 2 Letter, Siad to Nixon, June 2, 1973; NSC Files Presidential Correspondence Box 762, President of Somalia General Mohamed Siad Barré, Nixon Library. 3 CIA Report, September 9, 1975; Dale Van Atta Papers Box 6, Intelligence Documents September 9, 1975, Ford Library. 4 CIA Report, September 9, 1975; Dale Van Atta Papers Box 6, Intelligence Documents September 9, 1975, Ford Library. 5 Minutes, Meeting Between Siad Barré and G V Samsonov, Soviet Ambassador to Somalia, February 23, 1977; Carter-Brezhnev Florida Conference Documents (1), I-1 Angola/Shaba, National Security Archive, Washington, DC. 6 Newsweek, June 27, 1977.

The Ogaden War and the demise of détente 149 7 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, August 18, 1977; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 8–9/77, Carter Library. 8 “Ethiopia Breaks Times with Somalia,” New York Times, September 8, 1977. 9 “Africa: Sticks, Stones and Rockets,” Time, October 24, 1977. 10 “Ethiopia Displays Somali Prisoners,” Washington Post, August 15, 1977. 11 Paul Henze, conversation with author, April 1999, Washington, DC. 12 “US Offers Military Aid to Somalia,” Washington Post, July 26, 1977. 13 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March 10, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 3/78, Carter Library. 14 “Somalia Suggests Talks to End War in Ethiopia,” Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1977. 15 Report, War in the Horn of Africa: A Firsthand Report on the Challenges for United States Policy, House Committee on International Relations, February  3, 1978, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 16 Newsweek, September 26, 1977. 17 Statement, Philip Habib, April 4, 1977, Department of State Bulletin, Vol LXXVI, 1971, Library of Congress. 18 Summary of Conclusion, Policy Review Committee Meeting, August 25, 1977; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box  24, Meetings: PRC 33 [8/25/77], Carter Library. 19 Minutes, Policy Review Committee, August 25, 1977; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 24, Meetings: PRC 33 [8/25/77], Carter Library. 20 “Ethiopia Now Talks of Full-Scale War,” New York Times, August 9, 1977. 21 “Ethiopia Breaks Ties with Somalia,” Washington Post, September 8, 1977. 22 Minutes, Cabinet Meeting, September 12, 1977; Cabinet Minutes Plains File, Cabinet Minutes, 6–10/77, Carter Library. 23 “Moscow on a Tightrope,” Washington Post, August 7, 1977. 24 “Major Battle in Ogaden,” New York Times, September 24, 1977. 25 “Soviets Halt Supply of Arms to Somalia,” Washington Post, October 21, 1977. 26 “Russians Go Home,” Time, November 28, 1977. 27 Minutes, Cabinet Meeting, November 14, 1977; Cabinet Minutes Plains File, Cabinet Minutes 11/77–3/78, Carter Library. 28 Newsweek, November 28, 1977. 29 “Somalia Breaks Cuba Ties,” Washington Post, November 14, 1977. 30 “Cuban Strength in Ethiopia on Rise,” Washington Post, November 15, 1977. 31 “Somali Says Soviet Aim is Instability in Africa,” New York Times, December 10, 1977. 32 “Somalia Says Two Towns Hit by Ethiopian Planes,” Washington Post, December 29, 1977. 33 Telegram, Secretary of State to American Embassies, December 13, 1977; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 27, Meetings: SCC 45 [12/12/77], Carter Library. 34 Minutes, Cabinet Meeting, November 14, 1977; Cabinet Minutes Plains File, Cabinet Minutes, 11/77–3/78, Carter Library. 35 Telegram, Secretary of State to American Embassies, December 13, 1977; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 27, Meetings: SCC 45 [12/12/77], Carter Library. 36 Telegram, Vance to Brzezinski, December  12, 1977; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 27, Meetings: SCC 45 [12/12/77], Carter Library. 37 Letter, Carter to Brezhnev, January  25, 1978; Subject File Accomplishments Plains File, B-C Correspondence 1978, Carter Library. 38 Telegram, State Department to American Embassy, Havana, February 10, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 2/78, Carter Library. 39 The President’s News Conference, January 12, 1978, Public Papers Carter 1978 Volume I (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 57.

150  The Ogaden War and the demise of détente 40 Letter, Carter to President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, January 19, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box  27, Meetings: SCC 56 [2/10/78], Carter Library. 41 Letter, Carter to President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, January 19, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box  27, Meetings: SCC 56 [2/10/78], Carter Library. 42 Letter, Carter to President Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico, February 13, 1978; WHCF Countries Box CO-25, Ethiopia CO49 1/20/77–1/20/81, Carter Library. 43 Report, War in the Horn of Africa: A Firsthand Report on the Challenges for United States Policy, House Committee on International Relations, February  3, 1978, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 44 Washington Post, January 19, 1978. 45 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, January 12, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 1/78, Carter Library. 46 Summary of Conclusions, SCC Meeting, February 21, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 28, Meetings: SCC 59 [2/21/78], Carter Library. 47 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, January  23, 1978, NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 1/78, Carter Library. 48 Minutes, NSC Meeting, 23 Feb. 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 11, Ethiopia-Somalia [4/77–2/22/78], Carter Library. 49 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, January 12, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 1/78, Carter Library. 50 Newsweek, February 13, 1978. 51 Report, War in the Horn of Africa: A Firsthand Report on the Challenges for United States Policy, House Committee on International Relations, February  3, 1978, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 52 Speech, Representative Sikes (D-FL), October 25, 1977, CR, p. 35101, Library of Congress. 53 Speech, Representative Sikes (D-FL), November 29, 1977, CR, p. 38050, Library of Congress. 54 Speech, Representative Sikes (D-FL), January 19, 1978, CR, pp. 146/7, Library of Congress. 55 Speech, Senator Eagleton (D-MO), February 8, 1978, CR, p. 2664, Library of Congress. 56 Telegram, American Embassy, Moscow, to Secretary of State, February 4, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 2/78, Carter Library. 57 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 178. 58 NSC Weekly Report #46, February 9, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 41, Weekly Reports 42–52 [1/78–3/78], Carter Library. 59 NSC Weekly Report #48, February 24, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 41, Weekly Reports 42–52 [1/78–3/78], Carter Library. 60 NSC Weekly Report #37, November 18, 1977; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 41, Weekly Reports 31–41 [10/77–1/78], Carter Library. 61 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, January  21, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 1, 1/78, Carter Library. 62 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 87. 63 “US Turns Down Somalia’s Appeal for Arms,” Washington Post, January 18, 1978. 64 Memo, Brzezinski to Vance, March  1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box  2, 3/78, Carter Library. 65 “The Horn – and No Dilemma,” New York Times, October 19, 1977. 66 Speech, Senator McGovern, March 16, 1978, CR, p. 7262, Library of Congress. 67 “Somalia Puts Nation on Full War Footing,” Washington Post, February 12, 1978. 68 “Somalia Announces Mobilisation,” New York Times, February 12, 1978. 69 “Ethiopia Says Drive is Limited to Ousting Somalis,” Los Angeles Times, February 8, 1978. 70 Minutes, NSC Meeting, February 23, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 11, Ethiopia-Somali [2/23/78–3/78], Carter Library.

The Ogaden War and the demise of détente 151 “Ethiopia Drive Reported,” New York Times, February 5, 1978. President’s News Conference, March 9, 1978, Public Papers 1978 Vol I, p. 490. “Ethiopia Rejects Somali Bid for Ogaden Peace,” Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1978. Memo, Wauchope to Moose, March 7, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 3/78, Carter Library Folder, Box Horn/Special: 2, NSA Staff Material, Carter Library. 75 Discussion Paper, SCC Meeting, March 27, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 28, Meetings: SCC 68, 3/27/78, Carter Library. 76 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March 11, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 3/78, Carter Library. 77 Speech, Vance at the CENTO Opening Session, London, April 19, 1978, Department of State Bulletin, Vol 78, 2015, June 1978, Library of Congress. 78 Memo, Wauchope to Moose, March 7, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 3/78, Carter Library. 79 Discussion Paper, SCC Meeting, March 27, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 28, Meetings: SCC 68, 3/27/78, Carter Library. 80 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, March 27, 1979; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 3, 3/79, Carter Library. 81 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, June 8, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 28, Meetings: SCC 77 [5/15/78], Carter Library. 82 Letter, Henze to Professor Ullendorff, Oxford University, Great Britain, June 26, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 6/78, Carter Library. 83 Letter, Henze to Professor Harold Marcus, Editor, Ethiopianist Notes, Michigan State University, August 9, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 8/78, Carter Library. 84 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, May 2, 1979; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 3, 5/79, Carter Library. 85 PNG, or persona non grata, is a term used in diplomatic circles, and elsewhere, to request the departure of an official. Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, May 8, 1979; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 3, 5/79, Carter Library. 86 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March 16, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 28, Meetings: SCC 65 [3/16/78], Carter Library. 87 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March 27, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 3/78, Carter Library. 88 Negative opinions of Siad were expressed in interviews by David Aaron, July 24, 2000, and Stansfield Turner, June 30, 2000. 89 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March 10, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 3/78, Carter Library. 90 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March 27, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 3/78, Carter Library. 91 Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, March 10, 1978; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 2, 10/78, Carter Library. 92 Summary of Conclusions, SCC Meeting, March 16, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 28, Meetings: SCC 65 [3/16/78], Carter Library. 93 “Carter, Congress Weigh US Arms Aid to Somalia,” Washington Post, March 16, 1978. 94 Hearings, Subcommittee on African Affairs, May 12, 1978, US Senate, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 95 “US Revives Plan to Sell Defensive Arms to Somalia,” Washington Post, June 2, 1978. 96 Summary of Conclusions, SCC Meeting, February 21, 1978; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Box 28, Meetings: SCC 59 [2/21/78], Carter Library. 97 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 87. 98 Zbigniew Brzezinski Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 189. 99 Speech, Senator Dole (R-KS) to Senate, April 20, 1978, CR, pp. 10964/5, Library of Congress. 71 72 73 74

152  The Ogaden War and the demise of détente 100 Speech, Representative Goldwater (R-AZ), May 23, 1978, CR, p. 15122, Library of Congress. 101 Republican Statement, May  3, 1978, Congressional Quarterly, May  13, 1978, p. 1160, Library of Congress. 102 “VA GOP Message: Carter Soft on Communism,” Washington Post, August 20, 1978. 103 Republican Statement in Response to President Carter’s State of the Union Message, January 24, 1979, US News & World Report, February 5, 1979. 104 Speech, Representative Sikes (D-FL) to House, May 31, 1978, CR, p. H4661, Library of Congress. 105 “Harris Survey,” Washington Post, April 17, 1978. 106 Republican Statement in Response to President Carter’s State of the Union Message, January 24, 1979, US News & World Report, February 5, 1979.

10 Realignment and Reagan

1980 – the ‘Empire Strikes Back’ On November 4, 1979, Iranian students seized the American embassy in Tehran and took ninety American citizens hostage.1 Then, on the day after Christmas, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The impact of these twin events – religious fundamentalist terrorism and communist advancement by military force – led to a profound change in Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy. While human rights remained on the policy agenda, it was deprioritised and, instead, Carter adopted a more traditional approach where American power, and a focus on the Soviet Union, was once again the main emphasis. This was publicly articulated by Carter when he appeared before Congress on January 23, 1980, to deliver his State of the Union message and declared that an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.2 Subsequently dubbed the ‘Carter Doctrine,’ this radical shift in Carter’s foreign policy approach received widespread public attention. For example, Don Oberdorfer commented that “for the first time since the high point of involvement in the Vietnam War a decade ago, the United States is increasing its military forces and security commitment in a far-away region rather than reducing them.”3 Other editorials pointed to the renewed focus on the Soviet Union, maintaining that Carter was “taking up the burden of resisting Soviet expansion,” and that the face-off with Russia represents a total reversal of a US foreign policy that, for nearly three years, downgraded the Russian threat and de-emphasized the role of American military power. Top priority is being given to preventing the Russians from extending their aggression beyond Afghanistan.4 Given the strategic and tactical premises that placed the Horn of Africa within the Middle East, it was not surprising that the Carter Doctrine would have

154  Realignment and Reagan far-reaching effects on policy towards Ethiopia and Somalia. As Turner argued, military access was essential if the United States was to project power in the region of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.5 Mengistu’s increasing tilt towards the communist bloc made it unlikely that any American request for a stronger presence in Ethiopia would receive agreement, but it was a different matter when it came to Somalia. Siad Barré had been desperate for American support ever since Mengistu had seized power, as Ambassador Donald Petterson reminded Vance: Siad needs us; he very much wants to see a US military presence in Somalia. He has assiduously sought the closest kind of relationship with the US. Siad has emphasized to me that even a modest amount of US military aid would provide him with sufficient symbolic and political support to placate those in the Somali military who he says claim that his move toward the West has endangered Somalia’s security. Moreover, the idea of a US military presence in Somalia is immensely popular with the Somali public.6 A Somali official told reporters that “we want the Americans here. The Americans want to be here. So where is the problem?”7 Although the ‘problem’ in the past had lay in Carter’s commitment to human rights and regionalism, the changes wrought in the international environment at the end of 1979, and Carter’s subsequent reorientation of foreign policy, resulted in a reconsideration of the American-Somali relationship. In interviews, both David Aaron, deputy director of the National Security Council, and Paul Henze insisted that the new attitude towards Somalia came about “because of Iran and Afghanistan. That’s the only factor [sic].”8 In February 1980, an administration official told the New York Times that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has “changed our whole military posture in that part of the world,” adding that once a decision is made that you need greater access for ships and aircraft in that part of the world, Somalia becomes a logical candidate. If you look at the map you find that you don’t have a lot of choice as to where you go.9 Odom agreed, pointing to the geographical location of Berbera – situated near the mouth of the Red Sea, opposite a Soviet base across the Gulf of Aden and within flying range of the Persian Gulf – and contending that “all you have to do is start looking at airplane ranges and you’ll see why you need some bases” in that region.10 Accordingly, officials from the Departments of State and Defence conducted a regional survey and subsequently recommended three sites that would meet the American needs for military bases: the island of Masire off the coast of Oman, the port and associated airfield at Mombasa in Kenya, and the port-airfield complex at Berbera in Somalia. On February 12, it was announced that agreement had been reached with all three respective governments, which would “allow American forces to pay regular visits to military bases and use them to store equipment and fuel” in return for military aid.11 A senior administration aide told reporters

Realignment and Reagan 155 that the agreement marked “the beginning of a significant reversal of our strategic decline in that part of the world.”12 The following month, Carter issued a Presidential Determination contending that the “sale of US-origin defence articles and services to Somalia would strengthen a number of United States security interests” because of its strategic location “at the entrance of the Bab el-Mandeb Straits, which is a major access route to petroleum supplies for Western Europe and Israel.”13 After several weeks of negotiations and congressional hearings into the need for an enhanced relationship, the State Department on August 22 formally announced that agreement had been reached with Somalia that would allow the “United States increased access to Somalia’s air and port facilities,”14 in return for an economic and military aid package that totalled $103.3 million.15 Officials added that “the agreement with Somalia, coupled with recent similar accords with Kenya and Oman and arrangements for more limited use by American forces of port facilities in Djibouti, would help achieve President Carter’s goal of enhanced security for the region.”16 While Siad might have achieved his aims, Mengistu was less pleased with the new arrangements. At the end of August, he wrote to Carter contending that the arms-for-bases deal meant that “your administration has openly and actively associated itself with the misguided policy of a country that has been fanatically obsessed with the dream of the so-called ‘Greater Somalia’ since the very day of its emergence to independence.” This, he claimed was “regrettable” as it would encourage Somali irredentism, and was therefore “neither useful to US African policy nor helpful to the promotion of peace and stability in our region.”17 While Mengistu’s stance would have resonated with Carter during the first three years of his administration, his reorientation as reflected in the Carter Doctrine was clearly apparent in the president’s reply. Although Carter tried to reassure Mengistu that the United States continued to “continue to support the integrity of internationally recognized boundaries” including that between Ethiopia and Somalia, he also affirmed his commitment to the new relationship with Somalia, maintaining that the purpose in reaching agreement with Somalia, and with a number of other nations in the region, is to enhance the peace and security of the Indian Ocean region in the face of commonly perceived danger resulting from aggressive Soviet activities there. I believe the US presence is in the interest of any regional state which seeks to preserve its independence and sovereignty from Soviet domination.18 With these words, Carter’s shift from a foreign policy based upon human rights and regionalism to one that prioritised the Cold War and American military power was clear. However, for the American people as they headed for the polls in November, it was too little, too late. Instead, seeking a tougher approach in foreign policy, they turned to Carter’s opponent in the presidential election in overwhelming numbers, trusting him to lead them into the 1980s and reassert American strength in both the Cold War and the Horn of Africa.

156  Realignment and Reagan

Ronald Reagan and the Cold War Carter’s successor in the White House, Ronald Wilson Reagan, may have focused upon domestic issues in his inaugural address but his stance as a classic Cold Warrior was also abundantly clear. In speeches throughout his first term as president, Reagan vowed to support the “long-term march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history,”19 described the Soviet Union as “an evil empire” and the “focus of evil in the modern world,” communism as a “sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages now are being written,” and the Cold War as a “struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.”20 Within this Cold War framework, the Reagan administration perceived Africa as strategically important. As the new Secretary of State George Shultz asserted, “off its shores lie important trade routes, including those carrying most of the energy resources needed by our European allies.”21 Of particular concern, of course, were the trade routes to the oil-rich regions of the Middle East and, when it came to these, the most important region in Africa was the Horn. Raymond Copson of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) summarised the situation, asserting that the Horn is strategically located on the Indian Ocean and within 900–1,500 miles of the oil-producing areas of the Persian Gulf, including Iran. Afghanistan is 1,600 miles away. These distances may seem great, but there are few closer areas, apart from Oman, in which the United States might hope to obtain access to military facilities useful for refuelling and resupply, and as staging areas. Oil shipped from the Persian Gulf must pass through sea lanes off the Horn of Africa, whether it is bound to Europe through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal or to Europe and the United States via the Indian Ocean and the Cape of Good Hope.22 However, as with his predecessors in the Oval Office, Reagan was faced with evidence that the communist bloc countries also recognised the importance of the Horn and were consolidating their hold. A report submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs asserted that “the countries on the Horn have been a prime Soviet target” with a foothold in the region offering “a greater ability to disrupt ongoing Western military and commercial traffic; . . . greater protection for the Soviet Union’s own access to the Indian Ocean,” and providing “a forward logistical base for Soviet naval squadrons operating in the Indian Ocean.”23 As a consequence, addressing the communist bloc presence in Africa, and particularly in Ethiopia, was a priority for the Reagan administration. Appearing before the House Armed Service Committee, Admiral Robert Long, commander-in-chief of American forces in the Pacific, testified that “with a large military force in Afghanistan, use of port and air facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen and ready access to other ports in the region, the Soviets are developing a substantial presence around the Indian Ocean,” and asserted that American opposition to “the

Realignment and Reagan 157 continued expansion throughout the area of Soviet military power and assertiveness either directly or indirectly through the use of surrogates” was essential.24 Copson’s CRS report similarly asserted that “the Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia . . . makes it necessary for the United States to have some countervailing power in the Horn.”25 During Reagan’s first term, there were no doubts over Ethiopia’s alignment with the Soviet bloc. As American intelligence sources confirmed to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Cuba still maintains combat troops in Ethiopia . . . [and] other troops serve primarily as advisers.”26 Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) told his Senate colleagues, “Ethiopia relies upon Soviet and Cuban advisers and military equipment,”27 and a report generated by the Congressional Research Service confirmed that “some 11,000 or more Cuban troops are still in Ethiopia together with Soviet military advisers” in the summer of 1982.28 Meanwhile, in Ethiopia, Mengistu described American overseas military bases as “the effort of the US administration to work against the forces of democracy and Socialism,”29 and, while on a state visit to Moscow in March 1984, joined Konstantin Chernenko, the new Soviet leader, in “accusing the United States of interfering in African affairs.”30 In June 1984, the Washington Post reported that “Ethiopia’s national Olympic committee announced yesterday it will not send a team to the Los Angeles Olympics and the Soviet news agency TASS spread the word almost before it was released in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia, the USSR’s closest African ally, becomes the twelfth country to join the Kremlin in officially refusing to attend the Summer Games.”31 Mengistu’s move to the left was finalised when, in September 1984, the PMAC, which had formed the Ethiopian government since Mengistu seized control in 1977, was dissolved and replaced by the establishment of a “full-fledged communist party.”32 Ethiopian officials told reporters that the party, “known as the Workers Party, marked a historic step in the transition from a “feudal bourgeois regime” 10 years ago to a Communist society,” and confirmed that the new party would be the only legal political party in Ethiopia, with Mengistu Haile Mariam as the party’s secretary-general.33 Long-time Ethiopian correspondent for the Washington Post, David Ottaway, commented that the development took Ethiopia “one step closer to the establishment of a ‘people’s republic’ modelled on those of Eastern Europe,” and further noted that the “party’s flag is similar to those of other communist countries, with a crossed hammer and sickle inside a yellow star in the upper left hand corner of an all-red flag.”34 In various public statements, Mengistu declared that “Ethiopia intends to tighten its already close alliance with the Eastern Bloc, follow the communist model of economic and political development and join in its opposition to US policies around the world.”35 While the Reagan administration and Congress might have agreed on the importance of the Horn of Africa and the need for American involvement to counter the communist bloc presence in Ethiopia, there was some disagreement on how the US should be involved. Reagan’s bipolar view of the world order was summed up by Pat Buchanan, Director of Communications, who wrote to members of Congress, warning that communism was “the wave of the future” in Africa and the

158  Realignment and Reagan “only alternative if America walks away from this vital subcontinent.”36 However, within Congress, this perspective was not always shared. In March 1981, Senator Byrd told his colleagues that my concern is that this administration has articulated an “us against them” policy as it applies to the Third World. In other words, if the countries of the developing world do not march to our tune, then obviously they are against us and “for them.”37 Most notably, in a letter to Robert McFarlane, Reagan’s National Security Adviser from 1983 to 1985, Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) thanked McFarlane for “sharing with me the NSC review of the Administration’s Africa policy” and expressed his “concern” over the simplicity of approach. He argued that to frame US policy towards Africa exclusively in the context of an East-West struggle seems unwise. As you know, political instability on that troubled continent derives from so many factors of equal or greater importance than the activities of the Soviet Union. The lack of economic and technological development and the widespread violation of human rights are just two which come immediately to mind.38 Indeed, in the early months of the Reagan administration a report for the House Foreign Affairs Committee had asserted that the level of attention given to the Third World, the degree of focus on developmental goals as opposed to containment of Soviet influence, and the coherence of policy implementation will be major determinants of the international standing of the United States during the 1980s.39

Reagan and Somalia Notwithstanding some disagreement over the emphasis placed upon the Cold War by Reagan, both the administration and Congress agreed on the importance of consolidating the American presence in the region. In January 1981, before Reagan had taken office, Henry Kissinger met with Siad Barré during a visit to Mogadishu and told reporters that it was “not tolerable that the Soviet Union and its proxy forces engage in expansion all over Africa and in the Middle East without opposition.”40 He said he would “recommend to President-Elect Ronald Reagan that American military presence be increased in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa.” Kissinger added that he believed the incoming Reagan administration would be more willing to “establish a balance of power in the region” than the outgoing Carter government.41 On January 17, three days before Reagan’s inauguration, the military relationship between Somalia and the United States took another step forward when the State Department provided the guarantees sought by Congress that “no Somali

Realignment and Reagan 159 troops are fighting in Ethiopia’s contested Ogaden region.”42 Even though the Carter administration had reached agreement with the Somali government to provide military and economic aid the previous August, congressional restrictions, due to concerns over the Ogaden had meant that the military provision, totalling some $40 million, had not been sent. A State Department spokesman confirmed that the administration had been able to provide “verified assurance” to Congress that there were no Somali regular troops in the Ogaden, thus enabling restrictions on the aid package that was “part of our strategic framework in the Southwest Asian area in response to the Soviet threat in the region” to be lifted. He added that the “programme provides only defensive arms in Somalia and so should not contribute to a resumption of fighting in the Ogaden.”43 In return, the United States was granted “access to facilities in Berbera and Mogadishu as part of the US build-up in the Indian Ocean.”44 Reagan went further than merely implementing the agreement reached by his predecessor though. In March, he requested an increase of over $33 billion in military spending, which included “proposals to extend the airfield runways on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia to accommodate B-52 bombers, to dredge the commercial port of Mombasa in Kenya and to improve the military port at Berbera in Somalia.”45 As the Reagan administration consolidated the military supply relationship with Somalia, questions were asked about both the suitability and the advisability of developing the relationship with a man who seemed to have such a disregard for avowed American principles. Indeed, in the twenty years since Somalia had achieved independence, any hopes for democracy or a constitutional system of government seemed to have vanished. Instead, as Alan Cowell summarised in an editorial for the New York Times, Siad had returned to “tribal rule – based on his own Darod clan – and continued authoritarianism.” In addition, “several hundred” political prisoners were reported to be held in Somalia; the press is tightly controlled, a state of emergency has been in force for a year and the president has reinstated the Supreme Revolutionary Council, the highly centralised power structure that emerged after the 1969 coup in which he took power. The secret police still operates, under the control of the president’s brother-in-law.46 Reagan’s response to such concerns was to invite Siad on an official diplomatic visit to Washington in March 1982, to discuss ways in which American-Somali relations might be further enhanced. During the visit, Siad continued to demonstrate the political astuteness that he had utilised in seeking superpower support since he had seized power, contending that he needed help because of threats not from Ethiopia but from Libya. The Reagan administration’s antipathy towards Libya was well known and was discussed by Secretary of State Alexander Haig in a meeting with Siad and the leaders of Israel, Sudan, Oman and Liberia. State Department spokesman Dean Fischer later reported that all parties in the meeting had agreed on the “need to defend the Middle East against all forms of intervention,” and when asked if his comment referred to Libya, Fischer replied, “if

160  Realignment and Reagan the shoe fits, wear it.”47 Subsequently, an administration official, reporting on the meetings between Reagan and Siad, commented that the Somali leader had expressed great concern about threats by the Libyan leader, asserting that Siad was “troubled by Quaddafi and his very clear pronouncements that it is the aim of Libya to overthrow the Barré government.”48 Following the meetings, which Haig described as “very productive,”49 Siad held a press conference and declared that “a new chapter of closer cooperation” between the United States and Somalia lay ahead.50 In July, 1982, as Copson reported to Congress, the United States “began to airlift defensive military equipment to Somalia,”51 and over the following year, Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, confirmed that the “Reagan administration, concerned about Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa” had “doubled military aid to key countries in the region” with “key pro-western governments” in the Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Liberia.52 Such confidence in countering the Soviet threat notwithstanding, the realities of the political situation in the Horn of Africa, particularly when it came to the Ogaden, should have sounded a warning note to the administration. Indeed, on November 19, 1980, the Ogaden had been described as “a focal point that could erupt into a major crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union, both vying for influence in the region.”53 The first signs that the war might flare up again came in July 1982, with reports that “Ethiopian troops and warplanes attacked Somali positions on two fronts today, prompting an urgent Somali appeal for aid in halting an 11-day-old Ethiopian advance. . . . The fighting between the two countries that occupy the Horn of Africa, at the entrance to the Red Sea, erupted July 1 with an Ethiopian air attack on Somali border troops.”54 In response to the attack, Siad renewed his appeals for American military support, citing the communist bloc support for Ethiopia, and subsequently received a favourable response as part of the Reagan administration’s emphasis on “military assistance to friendly governments to counter the expansion of Soviet military power.”55 On July 24, State Department spokesman Rush Taylor confirmed that “weapons and military equipment” were being flown to Somalia to “help that nation repel Ethiopian attacks across the border.”56 Mogadishu radio subsequently announced that “United States military transport planes have begun an airlift of $5.5 million in emergency weapons and supplies to Somalia to aid its war against Ethiopia.”57 What should perhaps have caused most concern though were the reasons behind the renewed conflict in the Ogaden. The Ethiopian advance came not because of Somali irredentism but was motivated instead by opposition to Siad. Cowell, reporting for the New York Times, claimed that “the guerrillas involved in the latest offensive belong to the Somali Democratic Salvation Front, an Ethiopian-based amalgam of Somalis opposed to President Mohammed Siad Barré.”58 Within three months, the fighting had settled into a stalemate, with both sides “bogged down,” leading Western and Somali sources to suggest that “Siad Barré appears to have weathered yet another threat to his 13-year-old presidency.”59 The warning signs were there, though, and would return to haunt American policy-makers in the final years of the Cold War.

Realignment and Reagan  161

Famine in the Horn It was not the conflict in the Ogaden, though, that would raise the most serious questions about the advisability of Reagan’s bipolar, Cold War–oriented foreign policy, but a news story that began in 1983 and would go on to engage the world by the summer of 1984. By the middle of 1983, reports began surfacing in the Western press that the severe famine that had afflicted Ethiopia in the early 1970s and been a factor in the downfall of Haile Selassie was once again bringing disaster to the Horn of Africa. On June 26, 1983, Jay Ross reported in the Washington Post that “tens of thousands of Ethiopians, mostly women and children, are threatened with starvation in the next few months in a famine that could become one of the most catastrophic in African history.”60 Trevor Page, of the United Nations World Food Programme, toured parts of northern Ethiopia where government and relief agencies reported that three million people were affected by drought with one million in “dire need,” and confirmed that “about 50 to 100 children are already dying daily,”61 while Peter McPherson, head of AID, warned that the situation in Africa constituted the world’s “most severe hunger problem.”62 Within the United States, the first signs of concern for the developing humanitarian tragedy came in Congress. A delegation led by Howard Wolpe (D-MI), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, visited the region in August 1983 to “gain a first-hand look at the famine conditions created by the severe drought affecting large parts of the country and to evaluate the effectiveness of the US response to requests for emergency assistance.” Their report to the Subcommittee explained that “Ethiopia is experiencing the worst drought in ten years,” leading to a “human catastrophe, with tens of thousands facing starvation and death,” and estimated that the death toll would exceed 200,000, the number of deaths during the famine of 1973–1974.63 Wolpe concluded that “thousands of inhabitants of drought-stricken Ethiopia face imminent death unless there is an immediate increase in the American and international relief assistance to Ethiopia.”64 By the end of 1984, it was clear that the concerns raised by the delegation were, if anything, conservative. James Wilde and Pico Iyer reported on the conditions for Time and claimed that at least 6 million people live at the brink of starvation . . . [and] twelve of the country’s 14 provinces have been laid waste by a famine of biblical proportions. More than 40% of the country’s 42 million people are malnourished, and 2.2 million have left their homes to wander in search of food.65 At one of the camps, they spoke to an Ethiopian they identified only as Abigurney, who had lost three children, and asked him how many had died in his village; his reply was “too many for me to count.”66 Although the famine that hit Ethiopia in the mid-1980s could only be described as catastrophic, there was a strong feeling that American aid was being limited, or

162  Realignment and Reagan even withheld, because of Reagan’s Cold War focus. Ross, reporting from Ethiopia, claimed that despite urgent appeals for international assistance while there is still time to save thousands of lives, the United States, the world’s largest source of surplus food, has virtually turned its back on the potential disaster . . . because of Ethiopia’s close ties to the Soviet Union. A Western diplomat in Addis Ababa added his belief that “there is not much inclination [for the United States] to feed Ethiopians while the Russians arm the country and direct it against the United States.”67 American disinterest would soon change, though, but not, as yet, because of changing political attitudes towards the Cold War. Instead, a cultural phenomenon would lead the way.

The impact of television While the disaster that befell Ethiopia in the mid-1980s was similar to the famine of 1973–1974 when it came to the human tragedy, the reaction of the world in 1984 was significantly different with a torrent of grief, sympathy, donations and public support that was awe-inspiring. Officials of various relief agencies told the New York Times in October that there had been “an outpouring of donations for the stricken Ethiopians” and that it “had been years since they had been so overwhelmed with offers of help,” with regular staff and volunteers working around the clock to “handle the deluge of telephone offers.”68 The reason for the deluge was the impact of a piece shown on the NBC Nightly News on October 23. That night NBC aired a report by Michael Buerk, the South Africa correspondent for the BBC, that had been shown in the UK earlier that day. The images of the Korem refugee camp in Ethiopia, shot by the Nairobi-based cameraman, Mohammed Amin, together with Buerk’s powerful voiceover, produced what was described thirty years later as “one of the most famous television reports of the late 20th century.” The BBC news item was transmitted by 425 television stations worldwide, including NBC in the US.69 If nothing else, the reaction to the coverage proved the power of television by the mid-1980s. Congressman Wolpe, who had been trying without success to get increased American aid for Ethiopia since his visit in 1983, asserted that the TV coverage was the thing that had made the difference. “That,” he said “was it. The facts were there for anyone who wanted to see them two years ago . . . [but] we didn’t want to see before.”70 Amin later asked, “why did it have to wait for a ten-minute TV film to awaken public sympathy?”71 The answer to that question is best discussed in texts that focus upon cultural history and the history of the media. The point to be made here is that, whatever the reason, it had. There had been TV coverage in 1974, but the reaction was not as drastic nor dramatic. This time, however, television proved to be the “turning point”72 and the “Western world was electrified.”73 This time, the footage that included “grim scenes of emaciated children and rows of corpses laid out on the cracked Ethiopian plain” was the widely recognised as the “catalyst” that ended any

Realignment and Reagan  163 apathy towards the humanitarian disaster.74 Similarly, a report in the Washington Post commented that the film of “emaciated children huddled by the hundreds in squalid camps . . . was horrible, riveting as only the sight of a starving child can be.”75 Reports alleged that both “British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke were said to have broken into tears at the sight.”76 As a result, the “dam of apathy broke at both government and private levels.”77 Buerk’s report from Ethiopia would prove historic in another way. Among the millions watching the broadcast was Bob Geldof, lead singer with the Boomtown Rats. Although there had been celebrity fundraising events in the past, Geldof’s reaction to the footage would instigate what has been described as “a new style of celebrity fundraising” that would produce “another key television memory.” Band-Aid in December 1984, and the Live Aid concert in July 1985, would “became a transforming moment in modern media history.”78 Geldof’s first action was to gather his musician friends to produce a charity single in the UK, “Do They Know It’s Christmas?” by Band-Aid. The band’s line-up represented the cream of British music in 1984 and included stars such as Bono, Phil Collins, Boy George, George Michael, Simon Le Bon, Rick Parfitt and Francis Rossi (Status Quo), the Kemps and Tony Hadley from Spandau Ballet, and Midge Ure, who co-wrote the song with Geldof. In addition, David Bowie, Holly Johnson and Paul McCartney recorded messages of support which appeared on the B-side of the single. All proceeds from the song, which became the biggest seller ever in the UK with over two and a half million copies sold, went towards the African famine relief efforts. Geldof explained, “You see a child dying on your television screen and you think, I can’t accept that, so you do what you’re capable of doing.” He added, I had an opportunity to do something besides just put my hand in my pocket, which a lot of people did. But that seemed inadequate to me: no matter how much you gave, it wasn’t enough. The only way I could commit myself is by doing what I do, which is write songs and sing them. I just took it in stages – the idea, the song, getting the people, then the studio, getting the record out fast, then unashamedly plugging it.79 Geldof also inspired other musicians in similar efforts. In the United States, Harry Belafonte contacted Ken Kragen, an LA-based manager whose clients included Lionel Richie and Kenny Rogers, to discuss the possibility of a similar project. Kragen agreed that it was a good idea, but told Belafonte that they should “find a way of doing it bigger and better.” He recalled that he called Lionel [Richie] and told him about the idea, and he told me he [and Michael Jackson] were going to try to write an anthem for our times, something that is really universal. Anyhow, 36 hours after Belafonte called, I called him back to say I have a song writing by Lionel Richie and Michael Jackson, produced by Quincy Jones . . . For the singers, I went to the record charts and started at the top.80

164  Realignment and Reagan The resulting supergroup, calling themselves USA For Africa, included Lionel Richie, Stevie Wonder, Paul Simon, Kenny Rogers, Tina Turner, Billy Joel, Michael Jackson, Diana Ross, Bob Dylan and Ray Charles. As an acknowledgement to his inspiration, Bob Geldof sang along on the chorus where he was joined by an eclectic mix that included the rest of the Jacksons, Waylon Jennings, Smokey Robinson, Bette Midler and Dan Ackroyd. “We Are the World” became the fastest-selling record in American history81 and within four months had raised nearly $11 million, with a further $47 million raised from sales of official merchandise.82 The culmination of Geldof’s dream to help the starving people in the Horn of Africa came on July 13, 1985, when a global audience of around 1.9 billion people in over 150 countries tuned in to watch Live Aid, a sixteen-hour concert held at Wembley Stadium in London and JFK Stadium in Philadelphia that featured some of the biggest artists in the world. Highlights of the shows included the performance by Queen in London, which has since been voted by industry experts as the “greatest live performance in the history of rock music,”83 the Beach Boys in Philadelphia, and Phil Collins who, after finishing his set in London hopped aboard Concorde so that he could also appear live at the Philadelphia concert. The finale of each concert featured all the acts on stage together singing their respective anthems – “Do They Know It’s Christmas?” in London and “We Are The World” in Philadelphia. Geldof said of Live Aid, “it’s not just the greatest show on Earth, it’s the greatest gig in the galaxy.”84 Labour MP Tom Torney argued that Geldof should be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, commenting that “Geldof has probably already done more to save the lives of famine-stricken people than anyone in history.”85 While that did not happen, Geldof was awarded an honorary knighthood (honorary due to his Irish citizenship) in the Queen’s birthday honours list of 1986 “in recognition of his work in organising Band Aid and other concerts that raised millions of dollars for the starving people of Africa.”86 It has since been estimated that Live Aid raised something in the region of £40 million towards famine relief in Ethiopia,87 and the full scale of its contribution can be seen in testimony given by Peter McPherson of AID before the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1985. McPherson explained the importance of providing adequate transport to “get food to areas that we desperately wanted to feed” and reported that the Americans had agreed to provide $13.5 million for 150 trucks while Live-Aid and Band Aid, together, will put in another hundred trucks. These discussions about working with Live-Aid and Band Aid have been going on for some weeks. We think it will be very productive. AID will contribute $2.4 million for the management-related aspects of this UN fleet, and LiveAid will contribute another $1.2 million.88 The historic importance of Live Aid, though, was not the money raised – substantial and influential though it was – but its place within cultural history. Michael

Realignment and Reagan  165 Mitchell, who oversaw the staging of the LA Olympics and served as executive producer for the Live Aid concerts, described the event as the largest television show in history. . . . There are some 60 major acts, which makes it in every sense the largest rock concert in history. It’s also the world’s largest telethon. . . . Television’s never been used this way, to create a catalyst of action, to create a day of such emotional interest and intensity that this question of hunger is actually faced on a worldwide basis. . . . We are engaging people for a purpose.89 After Live Aid, the power of television to motivate, manipulate and move the masses was unquestioned. Ethiopia’s role may have been unintentional, and it was certainly a role that was unwanted, but its place in a turning point in cultural and television history is undeniable.

American relief efforts Meanwhile, concurrent with Geldof’s efforts, the US government was also attempting to alleviate the crisis. On December 1, 1984, Peter McPherson of AID wrote to Michael Deaver, Reagan’s deputy chief of staff, to summarise the efforts thus far. He reported that the disaster in Africa caused by famine has generated widespread concern throughout the United States and the Western world. The US government response to the crisis has been prompt and to date, $200 million in food assistance has been provided to the people of Africa. The United States is also providing emergency food assistance for other drought-stricken African nations which are facing severe food shortages.90 McPherson later testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the US was taking the lead in the world in responding to this crisis. . . . In fiscal year 1984 we provided about 50 percent of the food that actually arrived in Africa, and we provided more food to Africa for drought during fiscal year 1984 than any American government had ever provided to Africa in the past. Crocker added that the United States has mounted an unprecedented campaign to provide assistance to African countries in their current hour of need. And I might add that equally impressive has been the direct response of millions of Americans from the private sector in this country in generating an additional response well beyond the government.91 Much of the driving force for the American aid package came from Congress, many of whom seemed to believe that the United States was not doing enough.

166  Realignment and Reagan In November 1984, House Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) asserted that “something is very, very wrong. We turn on the news and we see African children starving to death, and we get no explanation whatever of why we Americans are allowing this to happen.”92 Mickey Leland (D-TX), one of the leading advocates for African aid, was joined by congressional colleagues for a press conference in December 1984 and announced that they would be asking for more than $1 billion when the 99th Congress convened in January. He admitted that “the money may seem like a large amount, but it’s less than the cost of one Trident Submarine or four MX missiles.”93 The bill, co-sponsored by sixty-eight members of the House, was one of the first proposed when the 99th Congress convened on January 3, 1985, with Ted Weiss (D-NY) commenting that it was necessary because Reagan’s proposals had been “belated, inadequate and largely made up of previously committed funds.”94 On the other side of the Hill, senators were equally committed to providing aid to the stricken areas of Africa. Edward Kennedy visited the refugee camps in Ethiopia, and told reporters that he would be calling for increased aid packages. He claimed that, “we, as a society, are going to have to be even more responsive in the future then we’ve been in the past.” He acknowledged that the aid provided so far had made “a real difference,” but went on to assert that “what I’ve seen here is a beginning, not an end.”95 The congressional role was summed up by Leland during the hearings held by the House Select Committee on Hunger when he asserted that the role of the Congress in responding to the crisis in Africa has been, of course, to establish a policy for response that reflects the long-standing humanitarian traditions of the American public. . . . The Congress has set the policy guidelines – and provided the funding – for an official US Government response to the famine crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa. . . . The role of the Executive Branch, and of the Agency for International Development in particular, has been to execute that policy and to implement an effective disaster relief and rehabilitation operation.96

Reagan and famine relief When it came to the Reagan administration and famine relief, the Cold War prism was evident. While the administration was supportive of the various relief efforts, they also appeared more than willing to use the crisis in Ethiopia as another weapon with which to attack the communist bloc. Responding to criticisms that Reagan should have done more, McPherson asserted that the amount of food aid committed since the current fiscal year began October 1 “is frankly enormous” and reflected President Reagan’s “deep concern about this enormous human tragedy.” However, he went on to contrast the American response with the “callous indifference” of the Soviet Union, which he said had “done nothing” to help the Marxist government of Ethiopia to fight the famine, asserting that “the Soviet Union provided Ethiopia last year only with $3 million worth of rice, a food not usually eaten in Ethiopia, and otherwise concentrated on supplying military aid

Realignment and Reagan  167 to its client state.”97 In December, William Casey, Director of the CIA, suggested to Reagan that “we could make our generous response even more dramatic – and more effective” by using the situation to demonstrate for all peoples the fundamental superiority of free market policies and practices over Soviet-style statist models. . . . By sharply raising the profile and the magnitude of US assistance, we would serve also to shine a bright spotlight on the Soviet failure to respond to the problem.98 In February 1985, Vice President George Bush added his voice to those attacking the Soviet response, calling it “shocking” and telling the National Press Club that “food for starving millions still takes a back seat to military cargo when authorities decide the order in which ships can dock in the ports of Ethiopia.” He added that the Soviets were fully capable of putting a billion dollars’ worth of military hardware and nearly 20,000 Cuban troops into Ethiopia between November 1977 and March 1978. Yet they and their allies have donated only about $7 million in food, medical equipment and logistical support to the relief drive – 10 percent of what Americans have donated privately.99 Reagan echoed these sentiments in April, when he signed HR1239 authorising emergency famine relief aid for Africa. He declared that “the US response has been far larger and faster than that of any other nation or institution,” and maintained that “we have once again shown the world that individual caring and giving is an American way of life.”100 In remarks in Dallas in June, Reagan further reiterated that the American relief effort underscores the true strength of our country. . . . When famine raised its ugly head in Ethiopia, Americans rushed to aid those in need. So far this year the United States has donated 425,000 tons of food. This compares to a paltry 2,500 tons donated by Communist Ethiopia’s closest ally, the Soviet Union. It seems with all their sloganeering about the only things Communist countries produce in quantity are misery, weapons, and aggression. The record of humanitarian assistance provided by the Soviet bloc governments, even to their own allies, is a disgrace, and the world, especially the developing world, should know about it.101 The following year, Reagan continued to admonish the Soviets for the lack of support to Ethiopia calling for the Soviet Union to “do more, much more, to press for immediate reforms in Ethiopia that will prevent the horror of famine from happening again. The first time it was a tragedy; the second will be a crime.”102 Casey also implied that the famine could be used as a way to woo Mengistu from such a heavy reliance on the Soviet Union and might even lead to a restoration of the special relationship that the United States and Ethiopia used to enjoy,

168  Realignment and Reagan pointing out that the CIA “judge that Mengistu is now under sufficient pressure to respond favourably, but with conditions, to Western offers of large-scale aid.”103 Reagan agreed and in January 1985 declared that today’s food emergency reemphasises the need to tackle the underlying structural problems of agricultural stagnation in the Third World. . . . Socialist economic systems, prevalent in underdeveloped countries, have failed to achieve economic growth. As a result of this, and insufficient aid by the USSR, an increasing number of Third World countries once dominated by the socialist model are experimenting with free market approaches.104 Issued as NSDD 156, and entitled ‘Food for Progress,’ this pledged food aid to countries that had shown “commitments to agricultural policy reform,”105 and was a clear attempt to woo leaders of the developing world from the communist bloc who were “committed to undertaking agricultural reform during a transition period of economic hardship” with promises of American aid.106 The administration’s emphasis on the Cold War amidst the humanitarian crisis did not go unnoticed or without criticism. Bob Geldof, during an interview with the Washington Post on the forthcoming release of “Do They Know It’s Christmas?” in the United States, insisted that a monstrosity of this kind is above politics, it isn’t something to be argued over or thought about or rationalised. . . . It doesn’t matter who gives what aid or who is to blame. The point is 28 million people in the Horn of Africa may die within 12 months: that is the point. The issue is to save them.107 Members of Congress seemed to share Geldof’s view. In April 1985, the Hickenlooper and Brooke Amendments were passed, ensuring that both developmental and humanitarian aid could be sent to Ethiopia, “without regard” to previous legislative restrictions or the political orientation of the government there.108 For Geldof, and others like him, therefore, the Cold War had to take second place to larger humanitarian concerns. However, as Reagan entered his second term as president, none of them could have foreseen the portentous changes in the international environment that were about to occur that would have a profound impact not only on the Horn of Africa but on the whole world.

Notes 1 Although ninety hostages were originally taken, some, mostly women and AfricanAmericans, were subsequently released. The remaining fifty-two hostages were held for 444 days. 2 Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Message, January 23, 1980, Public Papers Carter 1980 Volume I (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 197. 3 “The Evolution of a Decision,” Washington Post, January 24, 1980. 4 “America’s Lonely Role,” US News & World Report, January 28, 1980. 5 Interview with Admiral Stansfield Turner, June 30, 2000.

Realignment and Reagan  169 6 Telegram, American Embassy Mogadishu to Secretary of State, January  21, 1980; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 4, 1/80, Carter Library. 7 “US Use of Somalia Base Expected to be OKd Soon,” Los Angeles Times, February 3, 1980. 8 Interviews with Paul Henze, July 19, 2000, and David Aaron, July 24, 2000. 9 “US Moving Toward Military Ties with Somalia,” New York Times, February 10, 1980. 10 Interview with General William Odom, July 14, 2000. 11 “Indian Ocean Lands Reported to Agree to US Use of Bases,” New York Times, February 12, 1980. 12 “Indian Ocean Lands Reported to Agree to US Use of Bases,” New York Times, February 12, 1980. 13 Justification for President Determination No. 80–12 on the Eligibility of Somalia to Purchase Defence Articles and Defence Services Under the Arms Export Control Act, March 3, 1980; NSA Staff Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Presidential Determinations Collection, National Security Affairs, Carter Library. 14 State Department Announcement, August 22, 1980, Department of State Bulletin, Vol 80, No 2043, October 1980, Library of Congress. 15 Testimony, Matthew Nimetz to House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, September 17, 1980, Congressional Quarterly, September 20, 1980, Library of Congress. 16 “US and Somalia Sign Arms Accord,” New York Times, August 23, 1980. 17 Letter, Mengistu to Carter, August 30, 1980; NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 5, 8–9/80, Carter Library. 18 Letter, Carter to Mengistu, September  30, 1980, NSA Staff Material Horn/Special Box 5, 8–9/80, Carter Library. 19 Ronald Reagan, Speech Before the British Parliament, June 8, 1982; Reagan Library Digital Archives, www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm. 20 Ronald Reagan, Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983; Reagan Library Digital Archives, www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/ speeches/1983/30883b.htm. 21 Speech, George Schultz, February 15, 1984; Executive Secretariat NSC Country File Box 2, Africa General 11/30/84–2/24/84, Reagan Library. 22 Raymond Copson, CRSR, July 26, 1982, Library of Congress. 23 Report, Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World, March 1981, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 24 “Ports and Oil Spur Naval Buildup by US and Soviet,” New York Times, April 20, 1981. 25 Raymond Copson, CRSR, July 26, 1982, Library of Congress. 26 Report, Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World, March 1981, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 27 Senator Byrd (D-WV), March 19, 1981, CR, p. 4708, Library of Congress. 28 Raymond Copson, CRSR, July 26, 1982, Library of Congress. 29 “Ethiopian, New Head of OAU Denounces US as Military Peril,” New York Times, June 14, 1983. 30 “Soviet Ethiopia in Criticising US,” New York Times, March 30, 1984. 31 “Ethiopia Follows Leader, Quits Games,” Washington Post, June 2, 1984. 32 “Ethiopia Prepares to Transfer Power From Military to Communist Party,” Washington Post, September 7, 1984. 33 “Ethiopian Communist Party Is Set Up, With Mengistu at the Helm,” New York Times, September 11, 1984. 34 “Ethiopia Forms Its First Party,” Washington Post, September 11, 1984. 35 “Ethiopia Prepares to Transfer Power From Military to Communist Party,” Washington Post, September 7, 1984.

170  Realignment and Reagan 36 Letter, Pat Buchanan, Assistant to the President, to Members of Congress, September 26, 1986; WHORM Subject File Box 027/09/3, CO141, Reagan Library. 37 Senator Byrd, March 19, 1981, CR, p. 4708, Library of Congress. 38 Letter, Senator Mathias (R-MD) to Robert McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, November 6, 1984; Executive Secretariat NSC Country File Box 2, Africa General 19/5/84–11/7/84, Reagan Library. 39 Report, Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World, March 1981, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 40 “Kissinger: Confronts Soviets in East Africa,” Washington Post, January 4, 1981. 41 “Kissinger Affirms US Should Increase Military Presence in Indian Ocean Area,” Washington Post, January 3, 1981. 42 “US Clears Way for Military Aid to Somalia,” Washington Post, January 17, 1981. 43 “US Clears the Way for Delivery of $40 Million in Arms to Somalia,” New York Times, January 20, 1981. 44 “US Proposes Selling Somalia Defence Arms,” Washington Post, February 7, 1981. 45 “Reagan to Request $38  Billion Increase in Military Outlays,” New York Times, March 4, 1981. 46 “Somalia’s Double Trouble as a Client State,” New York Times, November 1, 1981. 47 “Haig Meets with Five Foreign Guests in Cairo,” New York Times, October 11, 1981. 48 “Somali Leader in US to Seek More Assistance,” New York Times, March 10, 1982. 49 “Somali Leader Voices Optimism After Talks,” Washington Post, March 12, 1982. 50 “Somali Leader Voices Optimism After Talks,” Washington Post, March 12, 1982. 51 Raymond Copson, CRSR, July 26, 1982, Library of Congress. 52 “US Is Sending African Nations More Arms Aid,” New York Times, July 3, 1983. 53 “Former Battlefield Remains Strategic Region,” Los Angeles Times, November 19, 1980. 54 “Ethiopia Reportedly Attacks Somali Positions on 2 Fronts,” New York Times, July 13, 1982. 55 “US Flying Arms to Somalia after Ethiopian Raids,” New York Times, July 25, 1982. 56 “US Flying Arms to Somalia after Ethiopian Raids,” New York Times, July 25, 1982. 57 “Somalis Report Vast US Airlift,” New York Times, August 27, 1982. 58 “Guerrilla Drive in Somalia Seen as Part of a Proxy War,” New York Times, July 16, 1982. 59 “Ethiopian Drive Against Somalia Bogs Down,” New York Times, October 8, 1982. 60 “Famine, War Threaten Thousands in Ethiopia,” Washington Post, June 26, 1983. 61 “Famine, War Threaten Thousands in Ethiopia,” Washington Post, June 26, 1983. 62 “US Pledges $3 Million in Food Aid to Ethiopia,” Washington Post, July 27, 1983. 63 Report of a Congressional Study Mission to Ethiopia, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Algeria and Morocco, August 6–25, 1983 (delegation led by Howard Wolpe, Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa), March 9, 1984, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 64 “Ethiopians in Danger, Wolpe Says,” Washington Post, August 18, 1983. 65 “The Land of the Dead,” Time, November 26, 1984. 66 “The Land of the Dead,” Time, November 26, 1984. 67 “Famine, War Threaten Thousands in Ethiopia,” Washington Post, June 26, 1983. 68 “Offers of Aid for Stricken Ethiopia Are Pouring into Relief Agencies,” New York Times, October 28, 1984. 69 “Ethiopian Famine: How Landmark BBC Report Influenced Modern Coverage,” Guardian, October 22, 2014. 70 “TV Film of Emaciated Children Ended Apathy on Ethiopian Famine,” Washington Post, November 21, 1984. 71 “The Land of the Dead,” Time, November 26, 1984.

Realignment and Reagan 171 72 “TV Film of Emaciated Children Ended Apathy on Ethiopian Famine,” Washington Post, November 21, 1984. 73 “The Land of the Dead,” Time, November 26, 1984. 74 “Ethiopia: Finally, Relief,” Time, November 12, 1984. 75 “TV Film of Emaciated Children Ended Apathy on Ethiopian Famine,” Washington Post, November 21, 1984. 76 “The Land of the Dead,” Time, November 26, 1984. 77 “TV Film of Emaciated Children Ended Apathy on Ethiopian Famine,” Washington Post, November 21, 1984. 78 “Ethiopian Famine: How Landmark BBC Report Influenced Modern Coverage,” Guardian, October 22, 2014. 79 “Thought For Food,” Washington Post, December 18, 1984. 80 “Taking Relief on Tour,” Washington Post, June 19, 1985. 81 “Whoever Dreamed that Up?” New York Times, December 29, 1985. 82 “Record’s First Profits Will Go to the Hungry,” New York Times, May 19, 1985. 83 “Queen Win Greatest Live Gig Poll,” BBC News, November 9, 2005. 84 “Rock Around the World,” Washington Post, July 14, 1985. 85 “Rock Around the World,” Washington Post, July 14, 1985. 86 “Queen Knights Bob Geldof,” LA Times, June 10, 1986. 87 “Live Aid Makes Millions for Africa,” BBC, July 13, 2008. 88 Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, September 19, 1985, House of Representative, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 89 “The Greatest Show on Earth, Tomorrow,” Washington Post, July 12, 1985. 90 Memo, Peter McPherson, AID, to Michael Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President, December 1, 1984; Executive Secretariat NSC Country File Box 3, Ethiopia (12/29/82–12/6/84), Reagan Library. 91 Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, January 17, 1985, US Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 92 “Ethiopia: Finally, Relief,” Time, November 12, 1984. 93 “$1  Billion Sought to Feed the Hungry in Africa,” Washington Post, December 9, 1984. 94 “US to Add $176 Million to its Food Aid for Africa,” Washington Post, January 4, 1985. 95 “Kennedy Visits Ethiopia,” New York Times, December 23, 1984. 96 Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, September 19, 1985, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 97 “US Will Provide $45 Million for Famine Relief in Ethiopia,” New York Times, October 26, 1984. 98 Memo, Casey to Reagan, December 11, 1984; Edwin Meese Files Box 54, World Hunger Relief and Economic Development, Reagan Library. 99 “Bush Reproaches Ethiopians and Russians,” New York Times, February 26, 1985. 100 Statement, Reagan, April 4, 1985; WHSMOF Files Box 57, April 4 1985 (HR1239), Reagan Library. 101 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Annual Convention of the Lions Club International in Dallas, Texas, June 21, 1985; The American Presidency Project Digital Archive, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38804. 102 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a Luncheon Hosted by the Heritage Foundation, November  30, 1987; The American Presidency Project Digital Archive, www.presidency. ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33744. 103 Memo, Casey to Reagan, December  11, 1984; Edwin Meese Files Box  54, World Hunger Relief and Economic Development, Reagan Library. 104 NSSD 156, January 3, 1985; Executive Secretariat NSC NSCC Box 11. NSSC167 Food For Progress, Reagan Library.

172  Realignment and Reagan 105 Ronald Reagan. Statement Announcing an African Hunger Relief Initiative, January  3, 1985; The American Presidency Project Digital Archive, www.presidency. ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38610. 106 NSSD 156, January 3, 1985; Executive Secretariat NSC NSCC Box 11, NSSC167 Food For Progress, Reagan Library. 107 “Thought For Food,” Washington Post, December 18, 1984. 108 “US Will Give Development Aid to Ethiopia,” New York Times, May 9, 1985.

11 The end of the Cold War

Gorbachev’s new approach In November 1986, following the mid-term elections, Ronald Reagan gathered the senior staff in the White House and exhorted, “for two years more, my friends, let us make history together.” “You can take it from me,” he added, “Washington ain’t seen nothing yet.”1 Reagan’s words were to prove prophetic in ways that very few could imagine at the time. One of those exceptions was Walter Isaacson who, in July 1987, published an article in Time magazine in which he asked his readers to “imagine, just as a mind game, a world without the cold war.”2 While for many this ‘game’ might have seemed nothing more than a flight of fancy, Isaacson’s vision had been prompted by something much more solid: his analysis of the first two years of Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership of the Soviet Union. Not only was Gorbachev young for a Soviet leader (only fifty-four when appointed as secretary general on March 11, 1985), his political views were progressive and radical. After taking office, he instigated two key policies: perestroika (economic and social restructuring) and glasnost (political openness and reform). In effect, he announced willingness to change the fundamental systems upon which Soviet communism had been based. Among the new concepts advanced by Gorbachev was an abandonment of the traditional philosophy that the Cold War was a zero-sum game; that any gain for one side constituted a loss for the other. In a speech in the Soviet Union after the 1985 Geneva Summit, he insisted that “less security for the United States compared to the Soviet Union would not be in our interest since it could lead to mistrust and produce instability.”3 After a visit to Moscow in February 1987, Cyrus Vance observed that there had been a major change in both rhetoric and doctrine by Gorbachev, that ran “counter to Leninist doctrine, which was that one had to achieve superiority and threaten others in order to be safe.”4 This view was shared by Dante Fascell (D-FL), chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, who asserted that the “accession of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has brought unprecedented opportunities and challenges for American foreign policy and the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union.”5 What was even more relevant and poignant for the developing world was Gorbachev’s support for self-determination, and his retreat from the Soviet

174  The end of the Cold War commitment to aid wars of national liberation in the struggle against capitalism. In his speech to the 27th Party Congress in 1986, he maintained that “it is inadmissible and futile to encourage revolution from abroad” and announced that the Soviets would only provide aid to developing nations “to the extent of our abilities.” Instead, he insisted that those states should develop “mainly through their own efforts” and that the priority of Moscow would now be “the successful development of our own country.”6 In July 1987, he declared that “every nation had its own interests, and it is necessary to understand this reality. Refusing to recognise that is denying peoples the right of free choice.”7 Matthew Evangelista, a professor at the University of Michigan, commented that “Soviet support for national liberation movements has changed from promises of economic and military assistance to expressions of ‘profound sympathy.’ ”8 Clearly this would have a profound effect not only on the Cold War with the United States, but also with the Soviet client states in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, as the decade came to an end, and the Cold War reached its dramatic conclusion, the region descended into chaos and the full legacy of colonialism and the Cold War was revealed.

Reagan and Eritrea In Eritrea in the mid-1980s, there seemed no end in sight to the war that had been raging since 1961, and which had claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. By 1985, the insurgents in Eritrea were organised into two groups, roughly equal in size, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which claimed to be the official representative of the independence movement, and the newly created Eritrean Liberation Front Unified Organisation, formed from the three other factions demanding Eritrean independence.9 In opposition was the Ethiopian army, an impressive 210,000 strong, supported with over $3 billion in Soviet arms and 1,700 advisers, making it the largest and best-equipped in black Africa.10 Despite the military might of Ethiopia, however, the Eritreans showed no signs of yielding. Edward Desmond of Time spent some time with the EPLF in December 1985 and reported that although the Ethiopian forces held most of the major cities, the rebels controlled the surrounding countryside. Sebhat Ephrem, a member of the Politburo, the governing body of the EPLF, told Desmond that “the Ethiopians concentrate their effort on crushing our main units and controlling the roads and towns. That strategy does not leave them enough troops to control the countryside.”11 What came across most strongly though, was the determination of the rebels to continue to fight, whatever the cost. Isaias Afewerki a field commander of the EPLF, commented philosophically that “when you attack, you lose men, and when you defend, you also lose men,” but was still confident that the current Ethiopian offensive, like the seven other major offensives launched by Mengistu since 1977, would fail. Western intelligence analysts, Desmond reported, shared that confidence. The reason for Eritrean determination remained the same as it always had; as Afewerki told Desmond, “why we’re here is simple. All we want is our land.”12

The end of the Cold War 175 Notwithstanding this claim, the Eritrean rebels wanted something else; they wanted American support for their independence struggle. The Eritreans continued to adhere to the view that the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia in 1962 violated the terms of the 1950 UN Resolution on the future of the former Italian colony and demanded international support. Sebhat Ephrem insisted that “we base our case on that UN resolution, and we want the Americans and the West to act according to their promises at the UN.”13 Although Reagan did not go as far as overturning the avowed American commitment to the principle of Ethiopian territorial integrity, his rhetoric suggested, at the very least, sympathy for the insurgents’ cause. By the mid-1980s, Reagan was increasingly vocal in his support for opposition movements to the Ethiopian dictator, including them in the list of ‘freedom-fighters’ deemed worthy of support as part of the Reagan Doctrine, a strategy publicly articulated in the 1985 State of the Union that aimed to reduce or ‘roll back’ communist influence in the developing world.14 On February 16, 1985, he declared that “one of the most inspiring developments of recent years is the move against communism and toward freedom that is sweeping the world” and praised the “freedom fighters in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Angola” who were “fighting to undo the infamous Brezhnev doctrine, which says that once a nation falls into the darkness of Communist tyranny, it can never again see the light of freedom.”15 The following week the Reagan rhetoric soared again when he proclaimed that freedom movements “from Afghanistan to Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua,” were proving that the “weight of the world is struggling to shift away from the dreary failures of Communist oppression into the warm sunlight of genuine democracy and human rights.”16 Reagan’s support for Ethiopian ‘freedom-fighters’ went further than rhetoric, however. In April 1986, the Washington Post reported that “since 1981, the CIA – under authorisation by President Reagan – has provided about $500,000 a year to support propaganda and resistance tactics by an anti-communist group of Ethiopian dissidents.”17 Reagan had previously hinted at this in 1982 when he pointed out that “emerging countries” such as Angola and Ethiopia had “ended up under the totalitarianism of Soviet-inspired communism.” The way to deal with that, he claimed, was “what I have called quiet diplomacy, that, no, we don’t approve of the practices in some of those countries, but let us befriend them and then let us quietly and behind the scenes try to persuade them that there is a better way to live. In other words, our democracy.”18

Rebuilding the ‘special relationship’? As well as fitting into the precepts of the Reagan Doctrine, Reagan’s calls for democracy in Ethiopia fit within the long-term American goal of rebuilding the ‘special relationship’ with its traditional ally in the Horn of Africa. As early as 1983, there were signs that Mengistu could be interested in improving relations between his country and the United States when a congressional delegation visited Ethiopia and came away, Wolpe reported, “with the perspective that Mengistu

176  The end of the Cold War and his government do desire to improve relations with the United States” and that “the ball is now in the Reagan administration’s court.”19 Although there were signs that Mengistu was willing to make some concessions to American demands – for example, in December 1985, he agreed to compensate American companies for property that had been nationalised after the 1974 revolution20 – some elements of his stubbornness remained. He told a group of foreign journalists, including Sheila Rule from the New York Times, that in order for “a mutually advantageous relationship” to resume, Reagan would have to “curb the anti-Ethiopian stance which the administration had adopted.”21 Rule reported that Mengistu had “sharply criticised Washington for what he termed its “sheer arrogance” and “blind hatred” against his government’s Marxist policies,” but also that he did not believe that relations were “irreparably ruptured.”22 In June 1988, Mengistu repeated his desire for improved relations, telling reporters that “we have always pushed for better relations with the United States and I hope the United States will reciprocate. Once upon a time we were good friends.”23 Rather than being completely swayed by Reagan’s rhetoric, Mengistu was motived by pure necessity arising from Gorbachev’s radical new approach to the developing world. In April 1988, diplomat and military analysts studying the Soviet relationship with the Mengistu regime noted that “the Soviet Union delivered about $4 billion in military hardware to Ethiopia from 1978 to 1986 but has been trying to reduce its support since then.” James Cheek, chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, commented that the “Soviets now have more to think about. Not only is there a huge material cost, of which they are painfully aware, but there is a political cost to being associated to this regime. In other words, the price is going up.”24 Given Gorbachev’s policy positions, Mengistu was aware that it was increasingly unlikely that this was a price that the Soviet Union was either willing or able to pay and therefore needed to find alternative sources.

Somalia and the Ogaden As well as encouraging developments with regards to the American-Ethiopian relationship, hopes of peace in the war-torn Horn of Africa were boosted by developments in Somalia during Reagan’s second term. In April 1985, Libya and Somalia restored diplomatic relations,25 and the following year the Somali foreign minister, Abdirahman Jama Barré, announced that Somalia was normalising relations with the Soviet Union “for the mutual benefit of the two peoples.”26 Perhaps most striking was Siad’s acceptance of Ethiopian control of the Ogaden, the region of Ethiopia that had always been at the forefront of Siad’s irredentism and territorial ambitions. In this ambition, Siad had stood alone; a stance that was confirmed by an OAU resolution during the organisation’s eighteenth summit in 1982 which accepted the Ogaden as “part and parcel of Ethiopia.”27 However, in May 1986, news broke that the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia had entered into talks “aimed at ending the virtual state of war” that had existed between them because of the dispute over the Ogaden.28 Talks began with

The end of the Cold War 177 a meeting between Siad and Mengistu in Djibouti, and were continued by Foreign Minister Berhanu Bahiy of Ethiopia and Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Mohamud Farah of Somalia. It took almost a year but, on April 3, 1988, Mengistu and Siad signed a peace agreement in Mogadishu, and issued a joint statement declaring that Somalia and Ethiopia had agreed to restore diplomatic relations, “withdraw security forces from their border, end hostile propaganda against each other and exchange prisoners of war.”29 This development was greeted with pleasure in the United States, which had long opposed Siad’s territorial ambitions and the threat to peace in the Horn. On May 5, 1988, Don Gregg of the State Department sent a memo encouraging a meeting with Vice President Bush during Siad’s forthcoming visit to the UN because it would afford an opportunity to reaffirm support for an African country in which we have strategic interests and also would permit the VP to praise him for reaching agreement recently with Ethiopia. . . . THIS MEETING IS IMPORTANT TO DO.30 However, Siad’s motivation for these actions was probably more selfish than altruistic. Although the Somali leader was elected to a new seven-year term as president in December 1986 with more than 99.9 per cent of the vote,31 his hold on power was not as solid as the victory may have implied. In May 1986, he had been seriously injured in a car accident, and questions remained as to the extent of his injuries and his ability to govern effectively.32 Resistance to the Somali leader became more and more apparent and, in February 1988, the New York Times reported that a special court has sentenced a former Vice President and seven other people to death by firing squad for plotting against the Government of President Mohammed Siad Barré. . . . The Mogadishu radio said evidence submitted to the court showed they formed a sabotage unit with the aim of causing chaos and undermining the unity of Somalia.33 With internal dissent increasing, Siad had enough on his hands without the added complications of war with Ethiopia. However, the rapprochement with Ethiopia proved to have unintended and, for Siad, disastrous consequences, as we shall see in the final chapter of this book.

Bush takes over Across the border, Mengistu was also faced with internal dissent, not only in Eritrea but also, by the mid-1980s, in Tigray too. In April 1988, a Washington Post editorial warned that Mengistu “may be tottering. Despite its Soviet arms and advisers and its Cuban mercenaries, his army has just lost a big battle to secessionist rebels in Eritrea, and rebels in neighbouring Tigray also report major success.”34 One reason for the growing opposition was the return of famine to

178  The end of the Cold War northern and central Ethiopia caused by renewed drought in 1987. Dawit Wolde Giorgis, who had coordinated famine relief efforts for Ethiopia in 1985, reported that “there are now about five million people affected by famine,” and blamed the crisis on a combination of government policies, civil war and drought.35 In December, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation called for “massive donations of food aid for Ethiopia,”36 with predictions that Ethiopia was on the “brink of a famine that could rival the calamity that took hundreds of thousands of lives barely three years ago.”37 With memories of the famine of 1984–1985 still fresh in everyone’s minds, the international community rallied to the requests for aid. The House Select Committee on Hunger resolved that “a clear and immediate signal go forth that the US Government have the resolve that the drought which is again destroying the crops of Ethiopia will not again result in massive famine,”38 and Cheek offered reassurances to the Ethiopian people that “there will be a more sophisticated response this time.”39 Indeed, Alan Woods of AID confirmed in December that donations were “far ahead” of the situation in 1984, providing “a chance to save literally hundreds of thousands of lives.”40 The other notable difference in the international reaction to this famine was the response by the Soviet Union. Whereas there had been widespread criticism for the seeming apathy from the USSR in 1985, there was no such indifference this time. In December 1987, the Soviet news agency TASS reported that “medicines, food concentrates and baby food will be sent to Ethiopia in the near future,” explaining that the decision had been “guided by the principles of international solidarity and humanism.”41 Ottaway pointed out that the “Soviet Union has pledged 250,000 tons of emergency grain to Ethiopia – more than the United States has so far offered – to help feed 5 million Ethiopians facing starvation from drought in East Africa,” while American officials acknowledged that the “Soviet pledge might be the largest ever made by the Soviet Union to a Third World nation.”42 Gorbachev’s new approach to international affairs was apparent once again, although the full impact was yet to come. It would not be Reagan who presided over that transformation, however, but his hand-picked successor in the Oval Office. On January 20, 1989, George H. W. Bush took the oath of office and became the forty-first president of the United States. During his one term as president, he would oversee some of the most dramatic changes in the international order since the outbreak of the Second World War, and lead the United States into a new world order – one that would have a profound impact on the nations in the Horn of Africa. Shortly after taking office, Bush ordered a broad review of the status of AmericanSoviet relations with analyses provided by the CIA, the State Department, the Department of Defence, and staff of the National Security Council. The approach recommended by the report was dubbed “status quo plus” and described by Bush as “a deliberate step-by-step approach to East-West relations because recurring signs show that while change in the Soviet Union is dramatic, it’s not yet complete.”43 In other words, Bush adopted a policy of caution in the face of the radical and wide-ranging changes that Gorbachev had inspired, while at the same time

The end of the Cold War 179 supporting and endorsing the reforms within the communist bloc. Bush’s caution notwithstanding, after the Berlin Wall tumbled in November 1989 it was clear that the end of the Cold War was imminent and a new era had begun. Not everyone embraced the developments wholeheartedly, however. As revolution spread though Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania, global attention was riveted on events in Europe, and concern grew among national leaders and diplomats that Africa would be deprioritised on the global agenda. B. A. Kiplagat, a senior diplomat in the Kenyan Foreign Ministry, told the New York Times that “Eastern Europe is the most sexy beautiful girl, and we are an old tattered lady,” adding that “people are tired of Africa. So many countries, so many wars.”44 There were certainly signs that Gorbachev was deprioritising African nations when it came to his foreign policy agenda. Reports surfaced that, on a visit to the Soviet Union, Gorbachev had urged Mengistu to “seek a political solution” to the conflicts in Eritrea and Tigray and also had been “encouraged to broaden his relations with the West.”45 Further reports added that the Soviet Union was “weary of propping up the flagging Ethiopian army” which was suffering against the rebel movements in Eritrea and Tigray.46 It was not only the Soviet Union that was turning its back on Mengistu within the communist bloc. East Germany, responsible for Ethiopia’s security police and intelligence system, withdrew in January, 1990,47 all Cuban troops followed early in March,48 and, on March 21, the Soviet ambassador to the Sudan, Valery Sukin, confirmed that all remaining Soviet military advisers had left Ethiopia.49

Mengistu moves west Throughout his rule, Mengistu had adroitly played the Soviet Union and the United States off against each other, and it was therefore not surprising that, as Gorbachev showed signs that Soviet support for Mengistu’s regime was waning, the Ethiopian leader looked west again. As an editorial in the Washington Post in October 1989 eloquently explained, with his army reeling from defeats and purges, with the last Cubans going and Soviet advisers also heading for the door and with most of the people in a pitiable condition, [Mengistu] is showing a more friendly face to Washington.50 Mengistu gave an interview with Jane Perlez of the New York Times and told her that Bush’s election provided “a new opportunity for both of us to improve the situation, particularly for the United States to change its present perceptions” of Ethiopia.51 He described the break between the United States and Ethiopia in the 1970s as “something that happens between two countries, as it does between members of a family,” alluding to the close and historic ties between Ethiopia and the United States and implying that the ‘special relationship’ was important to him by adding, that now, “things have changed.”52

180  The end of the Cold War In April 1989, the Ethiopian government sent a formal request to the State Department asking that diplomatic relations between the two countries be upgraded to ambassadorial status. Since November 1977, when Ayalew Mandefro was withdrawn as the Ethiopian ambassador to the United States, Ethiopia had been represented by a chargé d’affaires, and although this did not change until Berhane Gebre-Christos presented his credentials in Washington in April 1992, and Marc Allen Baas was upgraded from chargé d’affaires to ambassador in Addis Ababa, the request from the Ethiopian government was a crucial step in rebuilding the ‘special relationship’ between the two countries. It was certainly a request that was welcomed by Representative Mickey Leland (D-TX), chair of the House Committee on Hunger and the most passionate and vocal supporter of aid for Ethiopia. During his fifth trip to Africa in April 1989, he declared his belief that “we should have full diplomatic relations without preconditions.”53 Leland’s passionate advocacy stemmed from a 1984 visit to the Sudan when he had seen a young girl die before his eyes. He later told a reporter that the child “looked to be about 70 or 80 years old, a skeleton of a person with a thin layer of brown skin on her, who had just a faint breath of life in her.” He added that he turned to a relief worker to ask about the girl, but “while I was talking to him, she died. I can see her face right now. Every day I see her face.”54 Subsequently, and despite opposition from many of his congressional colleagues, Leland succeeded in establishing the House Select Committee on World Hunger, which was key in the provision of $800 million in aid to Ethiopia during the famine of 1984–1985. When criticised for focusing his efforts on Africa rather than on the poor in the United States, Leland declared, I am as much a citizen of this world as I am of my country. To hell with those people who are critical of what I am able to do to help save people’s lives. I don’t mean to sound hokey but I grew up on a Christian ethic which says we are supposed to help the least of our brothers. In support, Reverend Jesse Jackson praised the “constant stream of humanity in Mickey Leland,”55 and Bush agreed that “his sense of compassion and desire to help those in need has aided millions of people from Houston to Addis Ababa.”56 Leland often quoted the Talmud, asserting that “if you save one life, you save the whole world.”57 Unfortunately, on August 14, 1989, Leland died aged forty-four when his plane crashed during his latest trip to Ethiopia. As the New York Times eulogised, Leland “died as he had lived, trying to end world hunger.”58 Fortunately for the peoples of Africa, Leland was not alone in this aim. Jimmy Carter’s post-presidential career was increasingly marked by the achievements of the Carter Center, founded in 1982 to help improve the quality of life for people around the world with many programmes aimed at addressing conflict, poverty and disease in Africa. During a visit to the region in April 1989, Carter was invited to a meeting with Mengistu that lasted three hours and exemplified the Ethiopian leader’s new and friendlier approach to the United States. A Western diplomat in

The end of the Cold War 181 Addis Ababa told the Washington Post that the cordiality of invitation by Mengistu to the Carters to join him for dinner was “practically unheard of” and part of the Ethiopian ruler’s “charm offensive” to the West. The diplomat went on to assert that Mengistu knows Carter will be talking to Secretary of State James Baker. He is using any channel, no matter how improbable to get across the notion that he is interested in better relations with the United States. For any reasonably credible American visitor, it is easy to get in to see Mengistu these days.59 The following year, Mengistu announced that he would be replacing the strict Soviet-style economic system in Ethiopia with a mixed economy that would be more compatible with the West. The various measures he proposed included removing limitations on capital investment, reducing restrictions on private ownership of homes, businesses and property and giving small farmers legal ownership of the land they till and the right to sell their produce to private wholesale and retail outlets. Ownership of the land has been held by the state, with purchase of crops handled by Government marketing boards.60 On August 3, 1990, Ethiopia cast its vote on the UN Security Council with the United States in condemning the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, leading an American diplomat to comment that “the Gulf crisis was a real turning point for us. . . . The Ethiopians suddenly found themselves on the side of the angels.” An official in Mengistu’s government commented on the coverage given to US and British envoys on Ethiopian state-run television who were discussing the Persian Gulf crisis and the importance of maintaining Kuwaiti freedom, joking that “this is the most air time given to the ‘imperialists’ in a long while.” An Ethiopian business, surprised by the discussions of democracy on state-run TV, remarked “this is the real beginning of something new.”61 In November 1990, Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, told the New York Times that “on the whole, I feel that US-Ethiopian relations continue to improve.”62 However, the waning Cold War removed the trump card that leaders in the developing world had often used; instead of being able to play the United States and the Soviet Union off against each other, Mengistu instead found the two superpowers increasingly united against him in their demands that he made a greater effort to bring peace to his war-ravaged country. Indeed, Bush’s policy of “status quo plus” greatly impacted upon Mengistu’s aims and Bush exercised similar caution in Mengistu’s “wooing of Washington.” An administration official commented that “we haven’t figured out what we want to do, whether it’s in our interest to have a new relationship.”63 Another told the Washington Post that Mengistu was “making a lot of the right moves [but] we’re not rushing headlong into a waltz with the dictator.”64

182  The end of the Cold War

Opposition gains momentum As the Cold War between the superpowers thawed, so the war in Eritrea, which had raged since the early 1960s and was Africa’s longest-running war, also crept towards its final stages. In March 1988, Tesfai Ghermazien, a spokesman for the EPLF based in Washington, reported on the recent offensives conducted by the rebels in Eritrea and claimed that the Ethiopian troops were “fleeing in disarray in the mountains and valleys.” “It took,” he maintained, “about 48 hours to annihilate 20,000 Ethiopian troops. The ramifications of this major victory are beyond anybody’s imagination. We have broken the backbone of the Ethiopian Army in Eritrea.”65 With similar successes reported in Tigray,66 those ‘ramifications’ would ultimately prove disastrous for Mengistu. By the spring of 1989, with Eritrea and Tigray all but lost, assessments from the American embassy in Addis Ababa reported that the military defeats had left Mengistu’s regime “politically and psychologically weakened,” even going so far as to claim that his control was “unravelling.”67 A Soviet diplomat confirmed that Mengistu was in trouble, asserting that “the popular masses [were] voicing their disagreement with the policy” of continuing the war. “The crowds are not enthusiastic at the rallies,” he added. “Many families have lost their sons. There are many wounded in Addis Ababa. There are shortages in the state-owned shops. In general, people are tired.”68 The full extent of disillusionment with Mengistu became apparent when in May, while Mengistu was visiting East Germany, senior military officers of the Ethiopian army staged a coup attempt, the first against the Ethiopian leader since he seized power in 1977. The attempt failed, but a diplomat told the New York Times that Mengistu was returning to a “dangerous and fluid situation,” adding that the forces that remained loyal to Mengistu, the Fourth Army, number “only a few thousand” and that in the “bulk of the army,” which was fighting in Eritrea and Tigray, and “bearing the brunt of the civil war,” there seemed to be “widespread sympathy for the coup.”69 As 1989 drew to a close, the Tigrayan rebels secured victory after victory, with major gains in the provinces of Gondar, a cultural prize due to the many historic churches in the ancient provincial capital, also called Gondar, and Shoa, the province where Addis Ababa was situated.70 In February, Eritrean rebels claimed a major victory with the capture of Massawa, the strategic port on the Red Sea; EPLF spokesman Yemane Gabre Meskal asserted that, for the first time since the conflict began twenty-nine years earlier, “the entire town is under the control of the EPLF,”71 with reports that 12,000 Ethiopian troops had been killed, wounded or captured.72 Mengistu’s precarious situation grew worse when Gorbachev refused to allow him to use any of the Soviet aircraft still based in Addis Ababa against the oncoming rebels,73 and confirmed that there were no plans to renew the four-year, $2 billion arms programme that would expire in December.74 By April, the rebels had encircled Asmara and were also closing in on Addis Ababa. One Western diplomat told the Washington Post that the “Ethiopian army has been in the process of a protracted military collapse for the last two years. Now we have to believe we are heading toward the end.”75

The end of the Cold War  183

Eritrea and the Carter Center The end was near in Africa’s longest-running civil war, too. In May 1989, officers of the Ethiopian army in Eritrea called for “the ouster of Colonel Mengistu, a negotiated settlement to the 28-year civil war and the introduction of a provisional government,” while reports emerged that officers of the Second Army had agreed to a rapprochement with the leaders of the EPLF, resulting in a two-week ceasefire to allow for formal negotiations to begin.76 However, although the Ethiopian parliament endorsed “unconditional peace talks” in an effort to end the fighting, the difficulty remained as to how to get the two sides together for meaningful talks.77 As much as the international community or the United States might have supported the calls for negotiations, the strictures of the diplomatic system made practical involvement highly problematic. As Carter acknowledged, the war in Eritrea was one of those “conflicts which are outside the purview of the Organisation of African Unity or the United Nations and where official negotiations by the United States would be contrary to our policy.”78 Carter, however, suggested an alternative option. Established in 1982 with a “fundamental commitment to human rights and the alleviation of human suffering,”79 one of the purposes of the Carter Center was to serve as a “springboard for resolution of worldwide conflicts.”80 Hence, under its auspices, Carter would be able to use his influence and experience to talk to both sides without any formal diplomatic restrictions. Subsequently, in August, Carter announced that officials from the EPLF and the Ethiopian government had agreed to travel to Atlanta in an effort to work with him to find a peaceful resolution to the civil war that had plagued Ethiopia since 1961. In preparing for the peace talks, Carter said that he had “worked closely” with both Mengistu and Isaias Afewerki, now general secretary of the EPLF, and that he was “convinced each has a sincere commitment to achieving peace for his people and desires a return to economic prosperity for the region” and were “fervent in their desire to end the war.”81 Thus, with the full support of the Bush administration, Carter, under the auspices of the Carter Center, began talks aimed at bringing an end to the longest civil war in Africa. In addition to official backing from the Bush administration, who Carter described as “wonderfully supportive,”82 Carter also received a message from Gorbachev confirming the Soviet commitment to help him “in any way” they could to bring peace to the Horn of Africa.83 In what was described as an “unprecedented venture in private American diplomacy,” Carter met with representatives of the Ethiopian government and the EPLF from September 7.84 Not only was this the first time that the opposing sides in the Eritrean conflict had sat down together, but it was also the first “example of a private American, or former president, being accepted as a peacemaker in a Third World conflict” and a “first test case of [Carter’s] non-governmental approach to Third World conflict resolution.”85 After three days of talks, Carter held a press conference and told reporters that “after these hours of communicating with each other, making concessions to each agreement, I don’t think there’s any doubt that they both know that the other side is sincere in trying to make progress toward peace.”86 After nine days of talks, the first meeting ended with agreement on an

184  The end of the Cold War agenda for more substantive peace talks to be held in Nairobi in November, and both sides committed to “continue the effort to a successful conclusion.”87

Mengistu ousted In the meantime, the insurgency continued in Eritrea, and posed, according to former Ethiopian officials who had defected to the United States, “an almost intolerable threat to Colonel Mengistu’s hold on power.”88 Along with reports of increasing rebel success in Eritrea, news arrived in March 1991 that the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), were on the march towards Addis Ababa. Perlez reported from Addis Ababa that “an eerie tension has enveloped this city as Ethiopians watch what may well be the death throes of their 16-year-old government and nervously consider what they fear is imminent: anarchy and bloodshed in the capital.” One Ethiopian told Perlez that “the town is loaded with guns. Everyone who knows how to use a weapon has one. Some have side arms. Others keep bigger weapons at home.”89 At that point the rebel group were only ninety miles from Addis Ababa and thirty miles from Assab, the only remaining port in government hands, but were closing fast after a series of “startlingly fast” victories.90 The following month, the fall of the town of Ambo to the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a newly formed amalgam of the four main rebel groups as a result of coordination and agreement between the EPLF and TPLF, left the rebels only sixty-five miles from the capital, and the American chargé d’affaires, Robert Houdek, warned all remaining Americans in Addis Ababa to prepare to leave as the country was on the verge of “anarchy.” By that time approximately six hundred Americans remained in Ethiopia, mostly humanitarian aid workers and missionaries, while the Embassy was operating with a skeleton staff of twenty-five.91 Houdek’s fears went unrealised though. Rather than abandon Ethiopia to its own devices, the United States acknowledged the legacy of the special relationship and stepped in to try to help to restore order. On May 9, 1991, the New York Times reported that Cohen would be presiding over peace talks to be held in London at the end of the month between the Ethiopian government and the three main rebel forces that had seized control of key areas of the African nation. Before the talks could begin, however, breaking news from Ethiopia changed everything. On May 21, Mengistu Haile Mariam abruptly resigned and fled Ethiopia leaving behind him a country in “shambles, economically bankrupt and on the verge of political disintegration,” as the Washington Post succinctly put it.92 The radio broadcast that announced the news suggested that Mengistu’s departure had not been completely voluntary, reporting that “in order to control the shedding of blood and return the nation to peace and progress, several individuals came to the understanding that the president should relinquish his power. Therefore, he has relinquished his power to Vice President Lieutenant General Tesfaye GebreKidan and left the country.”93 The news of Mengistu’s departure was greeted with joy on the streets of Addis Ababa. Journalists reported on the celebrations involving “thousands of Ethiopians” who “poured into the streets” to “sing and

The end of the Cold War 185 dance,”94 and cheer as “workmen dismantled a huge bronze statue of Lenin in one of the capital’s main squares,”95 while “Coptic Christian churches and Muslim mosques were filled with worshippers who prayed for peace and rejoiced at what they hoped would be the return of total freedom of religion.”96 On May 24, Asmara, described by one Western diplomat as “the jewel in the crown of Eritrea” fell to the forces of the EPLF,97 and the following day government officials confirmed that other rebel groups had captured the Red Sea port of Assab, the only remaining port that had remained in the hands of the Ethiopian government. With Mengistu gone, rebel military superiority, and all supply lines cut, it was clear that the Ethiopian government was doomed. As a senior government official told reporters, “everything is coming to an end because we have reached a stage where our military can’t do anything to stop the guerrillas. This is not the beginning of the end. It is the end of the end.”98

The rebirth of the special relationship In January 1991, the Bush administration confirmed that the United States had agreed to mediate peace talks in London between the Ethiopian government and the separatist rebels,99 restoring Washington to “a position of influence it has not had for nearly two decades in a pivotal part of Africa.”100 At the time that the announcement was made, the future of Eritrea was supposed to be the focus of the talks; Girma Amare, the Ethiopian chargé d’affaires in Washington, said his government was seeking a “lasting peace within the framework of Ethiopian unity” but conceded that Eritrean autonomy could be “the subject of discussion.”101 However, the developments in Ethiopia in May put a whole new perspective on the talks. They were now not only about Eritrea but also about the future for Ethiopia as a whole. As the three opposing factions met together for the first time ever with Cohen presiding over the meeting, a senior State Department official declared that “our focus will really be to midwife a new Ethiopian government.”102 The priority, though, was to bring an end to the immediate conflict. The fall of Asmara, the capture of Assab, and the encirclement of Addis Ababa gave the rebels, in the words of one Western diplomat, “all the cards to play,”103 allowing them to dictate the settlement terms. As the rebels surrounded the capital, Cohen announced from the London that a cease-fire agreement had been reached, Ethiopian government troops had been ordered to lay down their arms, and the rebels had been asked to enter the capital to restore order, “in order to reduce uncertainties and eliminate tensions in the city.”104 Meles Zenawi, chairman of the supreme council of the EPRDF, assumed command, but promised that his group would yield power to a broader, representative and democratic coalition government once order had been restored in the country. Meles asserted that “we expect that Ethiopia will be a really democratic country, united not by force of arms but by the freely expressed will of the people involved.”105 In doing so, he signalled his compliance with conditions set by Cohen for continued American assistance and support; Cohen had insisted “no democracy, no co-operation.”106 Bereket Simon, a rebel spokesman in Addis Ababa, told reporters that “we believe

186  The end of the Cold War in elections,” pragmatically adding that “we need and want good relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union.”107 As the peace talks in London ended, Cohen confirmed that Meles would assume “state responsibility” in Addis Ababa for the interim with full American support.108 One of the members of the rebel forces told Perlez that “yesterday we were rebels. Today I suppose we are the government!”109 In June, the Subcommittee on Africa convened to discuss the transformation in Ethiopia. Cohen, testifying on recent developments, stated that In the space of one remarkable week in May, Sub-Saharan Africa’s second most populous country experienced a watershed in its history. A dictatorship that had lasted 14 years was overthrown. Organised fighting stopped for the first time in 30 years. He pointed out that “these events leave Ethiopia poised at an historic crossroads,” and confirmed that “we have cautioned the interim administration that future cooperation from the United States depends on their holding to their announced commitment to human rights, democracy and due process for all.” American objectives, he said were to “see a stable coalition emerge, one that can lead Ethiopia into free elections and establish the groundwork for a democratic constitution and form of government.” In response, the committee discussed at length the ways that the US could support Ethiopia in the post-Mengistu era, including famine relief, economic support and aid, industry advice and support.110 At the beginning of July, with Herman Cohen in attendance as observer, a conference was convened by the EPRDF in order to form a “more broadly based provisional government” that could unite the country and restore some kind of political and economic stability.111 Meles Zenawi was confirmed as president in the interim period until elections could be held and representatives from most of the country’s eighty-odd ethnic groups were allotted seats in the new legislature. Paul Henze, the African specialist who had served in the Carter administration, was invited to visit Ethiopia as a personal guest of Zenawi and reported favourably on Meles and Ethiopia’s future prospects, remarking that “Meles is pragmatic. . . . Ethiopia has a good chance of becoming a productive country.”112 However, Ethiopia would never be fully united again. Another item on the conference agenda was the future of Eritrea and it was agreed that the province should be granted the right to hold a referendum over its future. Afewerki agreed that the referendum could be delayed for up to two years to allow time for Ethiopia to restore some stability, but gloated that “we came out on top.” As part of the deal, it was also agreed that Ethiopia would have “free access” to the port of Assab, thereby providing Ethiopia with access to the Red Sea regardless of the result of the referendum.113 In the meantime, Afewerki announced the formation of a provisional government for the province until a United Nations–supervised referendum on the future of Eritrea could be held. He told a news conference that “there is only one question whether Eritrea becomes independent or remains a part of Ethiopia.”114 The referendum was held between April  23 and 25, 1993,

The end of the Cold War 187 when Eritreans voted 99.83 per cent in favour of independence.115 On April 27, with the full support of the United States, Eritrea became an independent state, and was admitted to the United Nations on May 28. The longest-running civil war in Africa was over. Thus, as the Cold War came to an end, the future of Ethiopia seemed to “shine with new promise,” as an editorial in Time magazine professed, and the ‘special relationship’ between Ethiopia and the United States had been reborn. Meles was certainly committed to principles of democracy and self-determination, with the interim government adopting a charter that ensured that each ethnic nationality had the right to decide their own future. Twelve regional elections, in addition to the referendum in Eritrea, were scheduled to be held by the end of 1991 to decide whether they wanted to remain part of Ethiopia. When asked why he was supporting the policy, Meles replied that “a feudal monarchy and a repressive dictator couldn’t hold Ethiopia together. Now we are trying another way. If Ethiopia breaks apart, then it wasn’t meant to be,” insisting that “democracy is the only way to unify the country.” If that failed, he added, “it will be the choice – and fault – of all Ethiopians.”116 The Cold War may have begun with Truman’s clarion declaration that it was the role of the United States to “assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.”117 In Ethiopia, at least, that victory appeared to have been won.

Notes 1 Reagan, Remarks at a White House Briefing for Senior Staff on the Congressional and Gubernatorial Election Results, November 5, 1986, Reagan Library Digital Archive, www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1986/110486c.htm. 2 “Will the Cold War Fade Away?” Time, July 27, 1987. 3 “A Partner For Arms Control,” LA Times, December 22, 1986. 4 “Will the Cold War Fade Away?” Time, July 27, 1987. 5 Report, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behaviour, August 1, 1988, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 6 “Exorcising Brezhnev’s Foreign Policy,” New York Times, February 19, 1988. 7 “Will the Cold War Fade Away?” Time, July 27, 1987. 8 “Will the Cold War Fade Away?” Time, July 27, 1987. 9 “3 Eritrea Rebel Groups Merge but Largest Force Stays Out,” New York Times, January 25, 1985. 10 “Ethiopia: A Forgotten War Rages On,” Time, December 23, 1985. 11 “Ethiopia: A Forgotten War Rages On,” Time, December 23, 1985. 12 “Ethiopia: A Forgotten War Rages On,” Time, December 23, 1985. 13 “Ethiopia: A Forgotten War Rages On,” Time, December 23, 1985. 14 Reagan, State of the Union, February 6, 1985; The American Presidency Project Digital Archive, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38069. 15 Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Central America, February 16, 1985; The American Presidency Project Digital Archive, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38231. 16 Reagan, Toast at a Luncheon With Provincial and Community Leaders in Quebec City, Canada, March 18, 1985; The American Presidency Project Digital Archive, www. presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38346. 17 “Ethiopian Security Police Seized, Tortured CIA Agent,” Washington Post, April 25, 1986.

188  The end of the Cold War 18 Reagan, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the Student Body of Providence-St. Mel High School in Chicago, IL, May 10, 1982; The American Presidency Project Digital Archive, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42505. 19 Report, March 9, 1984, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 20 “Ethiopia to Pay for Seized Firms,” Washington Post, December 21, 1985. 21 “Mengistu Seeks Closer US Ties,” Washington Post, May 20, 1986. 22 “Ethiopian Leader Urges US to Soften Its Enmity,” New York Times, May 22, 1986. 23 “Ethiopia Denies Food is Weapon,” New York Times, June 2, 1988. 24 “Soviet Arms Aid is Seen as Pivotal to Ethiopia,” New York Times, April 30, 1988. 25 “Somalia, Libya to Reestablish Ties,” Washington Post, April 9, 1985. 26 “Somali-Soviet Ties Normalised,” Washington Post, October 9, 1986. 27 Report, March 9, 1984, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 28 “Somali-Ethiopian Talks,” Washington Post, May 8, 1986. 29 “Somalia and Ethiopia Resume Relations,” New York Times, April 5, 1988. 30 Emphasis in original. Memo, Don Gregg, State, to VP, May 5, 1988; Donald Gregg Files Box 26SVPGB G, Bush Library. 31 “Somali Leader Gets 99.9%,” New York Times, December 27, 1986. 32 “Somali Leader Gets 99.9%,” New York Times, December 27, 1986. 33 “8 Somalis Sentenced to Die,” New York Times, February 9, 1988. 34 “Ethiopia’s Agony,” Washington Post, April 18, 1988. 35 “Ex-Official Says Famine is Spreading in Ethiopia,” New York Times, September 16, 1987. 36 “UN Agency Appeals for Aid to Drought-Stricken Ethiopia,” New York Times, September 27, 1987. 37 “A Vast Drought Disaster Threatens Ethiopia Again,” New York Times, November 12, 1987. 38 Hearings, International Task Force, Select Committee on Hunger, October  8, 1987, House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 39 “Ethiopia Faces Famine Again, Requests Massive Food Relief,” Washington Post, September 14, 1987. 40 “US Sending Emergency Food Aid to Ethiopia,” Washington Post, December 20, 1987. 41 “Soviet Famine Aid,” Washington Post, December 31, 1987. 42 “Soviets Pledge 250,000 Tons of Grain to Ethiopia,” Washington Post, February 16, 1988. 43 George Bush, Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony, May 21, 1989; Bush Library Digital Archive, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/publicpapers/437. 44 “Africa Fears Its Needs Will Become Secondary,” New York Times, December 27, 1989. 45 “Ethiopia’s President Looks Toward Better US Relations,” New York Times, November 28, 1988. 46 “Ethiopia Asking US for Full Diplomatic Ties,” New York Times, April 20, 1989. 47 “Ethiopia Peers West,” New York Times, January 30, 1990. 48 “Third World Don’t Call Us, Friend, We’ll Call You,” Time, March 5, 1990. 49 “Soviet Pull Out Advisers at Ethiopia Fronts,” New York Times, March 22, 1990. 50 “Why Catch a Falling Dictator?” Washington Post, October 11, 1989. 51 “Ethiopia’s President Looks Toward Better US Relations,” New York Times, November 28, 1988. 52 “Ethiopia’s President Looks Toward Better US Relations,” New York Times, November 28, 1988. 53 “Ethiopia Asking US for Full Diplomatic Ties,” New York Times, April 20, 1989. 54 “Representative Mickey Leland, 44, Dies in Crash,” New York Times, August 14, 1989. 55 “Representative Mickey Leland, 44, Dies in Crash,” New York Times, August 14, 1989. 56 Bush, Statement on the Death of Representative Mickey Leland, August 13, 1989; The American Presidency Project Digital Archive, www.presidency,ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17424.

The end of the Cold War 189 “Representative Mickey Leland, 44, Dies in Crash,” New York Times, August 14, 1989. “Representative Mickey Leland, 44, Dies in Crash,” New York Times, August 14, 1989. “Ethiopia Seeks Thaw in Frosty Relations with US,” Washington Post, April 30, 1989. “Ethiopian Leader Wants to End Marxist Economy,” New York Times, March 6, 1990. “US-Ethiopian Relations, Long Strained, Undergoing Thaw,” Washington Post, December 26, 1990. 62 “Ethiopia Said Willing to Seek Peace,” Washington Post, November 15, 1990. 63 “Ethiopia Seeks Thaw in Frosty Relations with US,” Washington Post, April 30, 1989. 64 “US-Ethiopian Relations, Long Strained, Undergoing Thaw,” Washington Post, December 26, 1990. 65 “Eritrean Rebels Claim Big Victory Over Ethiopia,” New York Times, March 27, 1988. 66 “Ethiopia’s President Looks Toward Better US Relations,” New York Times, November 28, 1988. 67 “String of Military Defeats Deepens the Isolation of Ethiopia’s Rulers,” New York Times, March 22, 1989. 68 “String of Military Defeats Deepens the Isolation of Ethiopia’s Rulers,” New York Times, March 22, 1989. 69 “Coup in Ethiopia Seems to be a Failure, Diplomats Say,” New York Times, May 18, 1989. 70 “Ethiopia Base and 2 Towns Said to Fall to Rebels,” New York Times, December 28, 1989. 71 “Rebels in Ethiopia Claim Capture of Red Sea Port,” New York Times, February 11, 1990. 72 “Ethiopian Government Seen as Fighting to Survive,” New York Times, April 17, 1990. 73 “Ethiopian Government Seen as Fighting to Survive,” New York Times, April 17, 1990. 74 “Dying by the Thousands,” New York Times, June 8, 1990. 75 “Ethiopian Army Dealt Setbacks by Guerrillas,” Washington Post, April 9, 1990. 76 “Ethiopia Leader Tells of Execution of Coup Figure,” New York Times, May 19, 1989. 77 “Ethiopian Parliament Backs Talks with Rebels in Eritrea,” New York Times, June 6, 1989. 78 “Carter to Bring Together Ethiopian Foes,” New York Times, August 18, 1989. 79 Carter Center website, www.cartercenter.org/about/index.html. 80 “Carter to Bring Together Ethiopian Foes,” New York Times, August 18, 1989. 81 “Carter: Peace Talks Set on Ethiopian Conflict,” Washington Post, August 18, 1989. 82 “Carter the Peacemaker Now Turns to Ethiopia,” New York Times, September 3, 1989. 83 “Carter Opens Peace Talks Between Ethiopia and Eritrean Rebels,” Washington Post, September 8, 1989. 84 “Carter Opens Peace Talks Between Ethiopia and Eritrean Rebels,” Washington Post, September 8, 1989. 85 “Carter Opens Peace Talks Between Ethiopia and Eritrean Rebels,” Washington Post, September 8, 1989. 86 “Ethiopia Talks Build Trust, Carter Says,” Washington Post, September 10, 1989. 87 “Ethiopian Adversaries Agree to Talks,” Washington Post, September 20, 1989. 88 “Ethiopia Leader Tells of Execution of Coup Figure,” New York Times, May 19, 1989. 89 “As Rebels Surge in Ethiopia, Its Capital Fears a Harsh Fate,” New York Times, March 23, 1991. 90 “As Rebels Surge in Ethiopia, Its Capital Fears a Harsh Fate,” New York Times, March 23, 1991. 91 “US Urges Americans to Quit Ethiopia as Rebels Gain,” New York Times, April 27, 1991. 92 Neil Henry, “Mengistu Leaves Ethiopia in Shambles” Washington Post, May 22, 1991. 93 “Ethiopia’s Dictator Flees,” New York Times, May 22, 1991. 94 “Ethiopians Rejoice as Rebels Close in,” New York Times, May 24, 1991. 95 “Few Tears for the Tyrant,” Time, June 3, 1991. 96 “Ethiopians Rejoice as Rebels Close in,” New York Times, May 24, 1991. 97 “Eritrea’s Capital Reported Seized,” New York Times, May 25, 1991. 98 “Ethiopia’s Dictator Flees,” New York Times, May 22, 1991. 99 “Ethiopia Talks to Resume, Under US Leadership,” New York Times, January 30, 1991.

57 58 59 60 61

190  The end of the Cold War 100 “US Plans to be ‘Midwife’ to a New Rule in Ethiopia,” New York Times, May 26, 1991. 101 “Ethiopia Talks to Resume, Under US Leadership,” New York Times, January 30, 1991. 102 “US Plans to be ‘Midwife’ to a New Rule in Ethiopia,” New York Times, May 26, 1991. 103 “Eritrea’s Capital Reported Seized,” New York Times, May 25, 1991. 104 “Ethiopian Rebels Storm the Capital and Seize Control,” New York Times, May 28, 1991. 105 “Ethiopian Seeks to Form Temporary Government,” New York Times, May 29, 1991. 106 “Ethiopian Seeks to Form Temporary Government,” New York Times, May 29, 1991. 107 “Ethiopian Capital in Rebels’ Hands,” New York Times, May 29, 1991. 108 “Ethiopian Seeks to Form Temporary Government,” New York Times, May 29, 1991. 109 “A Mellowed Marxist: Meles Zenawi,” New York Times, May 30, 1991. 110 Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, June 18, 1991, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 111 “Ethiopians to Discuss a New Regime,” New York Times, July 1, 1991. 112 “A New Chance for a Fractured Land,” New York Times, September 22, 1991. 113 “Eritreans to Vote on Independence,” New York Times, July 5, 1991. 114 “Ethiopian Rebel Faction is to Govern Separately,” New York Times, May 30, 1991. 115 African Elections Database, http://africanelections.tripod.com/er.html. 116 “Return to Normalcy,” Time, November 4, 1991. 117 Truman, Address to Congress Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey, March 12, 1947; Elsey Papers, Truman Library Digital Archives, www.trumanlibrary. org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?document date=1947-03-12&documentid=5-9&pagenumber=1.

12 Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism

Civil war in Somalia On December 25, 1991, George Bush addressed the American people on the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. “That confrontation,” he declared, “is now over. . . . This is a victory for democracy and freedom.”1 The freedom to which Bush referred may have been celebrated from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe to Ethiopia, but when it came to Ethiopia’s neighbour in the Horn of Africa, the end of the Cold War was not so positive. Indeed, in Somalia, the legacy of both colonialism and the Cold War would result in bloody civil war and provide the context that would enable terrorism to flourish. Shortly after Bush took office in 1989, Siad Barré sent his prime minister, Mohamed Ali Samantar, on a tour of major Western capitals in an effort to improve relations and gain support for his faltering regime. Bush was also keen to further develop the American-Somali relationship and directed his vice president, Dan Quayle, to meet with Samantar to express “our continuing interest in their government and country and stress the necessity for continued progress on human rights and economic reforms.”2 The latter was a priority for Siad too. In his briefing ahead of the meeting, Quayle was advised by Cary Lord, his chief of staff, that one of Samantar’s aims would be to “improve Somalia’s negative image on the issue of human rights,” in order to convince the administration and Congress to release the $55  million in economic aid that had been withheld since 1986 because of Siad’s continued violations thereof.3 The meeting started well, with Samantar assuring Quayle that Somalia would be freeing “all political prisoners” and taking various other steps in efforts to improve human rights.4 State Department spokesman Charles Redman praised this pledge, affirming that “we think we can see the beginning of progress” with regards to the improvement of human rights in Somalia.5 The crux of the meeting came, however, when Samantar dismissed the idea of talks between the Somali government and the Somali National Movement (SNM), the rebel group which had seized control of northern Somalia and was threatening the rest of the country. This was a key issue for both the Bush administration and Congress, not only because of the devastation that another civil war in the Horn of Africa was likely to bring, but also because of the potential threat to the US military facilities at

192  Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism Berbera. Consequently, the talks ended in disappointment for Samantar; House Foreign Affairs Chairman Dante Fascell (D-FL) and African Subcommittee Chairman Howard Wolpe (D-MI) announced that the funds, requested by Samantar, would not be released until they saw “significant hope” for a political solution to the northern conflict, including a “meaningful dialogue” with the opposition.6 Dissent against Siad’s rule had been apparent for some time, but the full extent of the resistance only became apparent when rebels of the SNM, formed in 1982 from the Isaak clan which represented about 20 per cent of the Somali population, launched an offensive in northern Somalia on May 29, 1988. Although the population of Somalia seemed homogenous with regards to ethnicity and religion, the reality was much more complicated than that, with the populace divided into rival clans that had battled each other for centuries. Until the mid-1980s, Siad had been relatively successful in ensuring loyalty by dividing power and patronage amongst the clan leaders but, after his car accident in 1986, his authority had ebbed away and clan loyalty to his government was slipping along with it. The military challenge from the Isaak clan in the guise of the SNM, was described by Richard Green, a British political adviser in Siad’s government until 1987, as “the biggest threat to Barré’s regime and to the trust between the various segments of the Somali nation that has occurred since the coup that brought Barré to power.” He concluded somewhat ominously that “the odds now are that the government will fall.”7 A senior Washington official agreed with Green’s gloomy prediction, adding that “we are talking of months, not years.”8 The deep concern over the future prospects for stability in Somalia was perhaps best exemplified by the actions of some sixty Somali diplomats who has been ordered home after the fighting broke out in May; by the end of July, not one of the envoys had obeyed the order to return to Mogadishu.9 The reason for the onset of civil war in Somalia arose, rather ironically, from Siad’s attempts to bring peace to the Horn of Africa. The settlement reached with Ethiopia in April that ended decades of fighting over the Ogaden resulted in wellarmed and battle-experienced Somalis returning home, equipped to direct their hostilities elsewhere. Their plans to move against Siad must have been set before leaving the Ogaden because, upon their return home, they immediately “knocked off” two government divisions based in northern Somalia netting stockpiles of weapons, according to a Western official.10 The rebel army, reported to be 10,000 strong and with enough “arms, ammunition and civilian support to wage a protracted and destructive civil war,”11 was soon claiming major victories in northern Somalia. In August, a Western aid worker reported that “an expatriate doctor who was in Berbera said a Government military convoy left town and returned an hour later badly shot up. It means the SNM are expanding their field of influence.”12 The war continued unabated for the next eighteen months and by the end of 1990, the SNM had won control over much of the north, albeit at a terrible cost. Africa Watch, a human rights group, estimated that around 50,000 had died in the northern war, “most of them civilians killed by Government bombs, artillery shells and execution squads,” the city of Hargeisa had been all but destroyed by bombs and shelling, and around 200,000 refugees had fled to Ethiopia.13

Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism  193 The SNM victories over government troops served to encourage other opposition groups to Siad. Most notable of these was the United Somali Congress (USC), formed in 1989 under the leadership of the Hawiye clan.14 Its target was Mogadishu, and with Siad’s power and control deteriorating, the USC gathered strength daily. At the beginning of 1990, the State Department advised all dependents and nonessential personnel to leave and began arrangements to extract all Americans from the region, with both State and the National Security Council (NSC) recommending to Bush that “US military assets be pre-positioned to evacuate US personnel and private American citizens in Somalia where the security situation has seriously deteriorated.”15 Throughout 1990, reports of violence in Mogadishu were commonplace as Siad attempted to crack down on the dissent. For example, on July 8, reports emerged that dozens had been killed by government troops when they “fired indiscriminately into an angry crowd at a soccer match.” Witnesses reported that “spectators began booing and shouting anti-government slogans after Siad finished a short speech opening a regional soccer tournament and his Red Beret bodyguards opened fire.”16 The same month, forty-six prominent officials and leading citizens of Mogadishu were ordered to stand trial for “sedition” after publishing ‘Mogadishu Manifesto No 1,’ which called for an end to Siad’s rule, immediate elections and full restoration of human and civil rights.17 However, when the men appeared before a military court, all charges against them were dismissed and the men released,18 providing further evidence of the deterioration of Siad’s grip on power. By December, the forces of the USC were reported to be about thirty miles outside Mogadishu,19 and diplomats and refugees fleeing Somalia provided a graphic picture of the chaos and “near anarchy” in the capital as the rebel groups arrayed against Siad appeared poised to take the Somali capital. One American reported that “from 20 to 150 people are killed every day in and around Mogadishu.”20 The civil war, which had begun as a clash between the northern Isaak clan and ­southern-based government troops in May 1988 had, by the end of 1990 descended into all-out anarchy, with diplomats reporting that in all, “five clan-based rebel groups of various strength are arrayed against the president.”21 As 1991 began, the USC forces breached the capital’s defences and a State Department official confirmed that fighting was raging in downtown Mogadishu and moving closer and closer to the area of the presidential palace, adding that “nobody really controls anything. It’s a free for all.”22 On January 4, 1991, the USC issued a communique asserting they had “massed reinforcements” to prepare a “final offensive” and that the “capture of Siad Barré is only a matter of time.”23

American withdrawal The deteriorating situation meant that the priority for the Bush administration was the evacuation of the remaining westerners from Mogadishu. James Wallace, a United Nations pilot, described his experiences as he headed for the airport to evacuate fourteen United Nations officials from the capital. He explained that he took a white pillow case from a bedroom at the United States embassy, where he had been celebrating the New Year, and tied it to his car, speeding past checkpoints

194  Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism manned by the few remaining government forces attempting to defend the capital from the rebels. His white flag allowed him to reach the airport unharmed but, he told reporters, “I have never been so scared. The car behind us, they just pulled the driver out and blew his head off,” adding that “it’s hard to identify who’s who: rebels or bandits.”24 The chaos was such that State Department officials were forced to concede that plans to evacuate the remaining Americans from Mogadishu had not been implemented as yet because of the “dangerous situation on the streets and at the airport.”25 Those efforts continued, however. On January 5, Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, informed Nick Rostow of the NSC that “a contingent of US Marines consisting of two reinforced rifle platoons (approximately 72 men) was sent to provide immediate additional security to the US Embassy in Mogadishu.”26 Subsequently, in a joint air and sea operation with Italy, the State Department was able to report that hundreds of foreigners were evacuated from Mogadishu, including “the Soviet and United States Ambassadors and their diplomatic staffs, the rest of the Americans known to be in Somalia and foreigners from numerous other countries.”27 The danger of the situation was summarised in a letter from James Bishop, the outgoing ambassador to Somalia, to Bush when he expressed his thanks for the support you gave my colleagues and me when we found our lives imperilled last month in Mogadishu. The marines and sailors you sent to our rescue displayed great courage and professional competence evacuating us, and those other Americans and foreigners who had taken refuge on the embassy compound from the violence all around us.28 What is most interesting about the evacuation, though, are the comparisons that can be drawn with the evacuation of the American embassy in Saigon. In images reminiscent of Saigon in 1975, Neil Henry reported in the Washington Post that the US embassy in Mogadishu, a $35 million compound, had once been “the place for American and Somali officials to meet to devise ways to counter Soviet influence in Africa,” but that now, the “grand architectural symbol of US commitment in the region became an embarrassing point of departure for more than 250 US citizens and other foreigners who clambered aboard Marine helicopters on the embassy’s front lawn.”29 The ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ was also apparent in other ways related to the evacuation. At all stages of the evacuation, Congress was both notified and consulted, despite the fact that, as Scowcroft told Bush, “all senior administration counsel agree that the War Powers Resolution does not require a report to Congress on the evacuation of US and foreign nationals from Somalia.” Nonetheless, Scowcroft recommended that “you formally describe the operation, as was done with respect to the evacuation from Liberia in August 1990.”30 Subsequently Bush informed Thomas Foley (D-WA), speaker of the House of Representatives, that at approximately 10:10 (EST) on January  4, 1991, two reinforced Marine Corps rifle platoons were sent from the USS Trenton to augment security at

Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism 195 the Embassy and evacuate the US and foreign nationals who had sought refuge in the compound. . . . The evacuation was successfully completed by 6:30 pm (EST) on January 5, 1991. Fifty-one American citizens and 209 foreign nationals were evacuated. Our Embassy in Somalia will remain unstaffed until it is prudent to resume normal operations. . . . Because of my desire to keep Congress fully informed, I wanted to share this information with you.31 Fred Green, legal counsel to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, confirmed that the decision to deploy the Marines to the US embassy in Mogadishu had taken place “following discussions with Congressional leaders concerning the rapidly deteriorating conditions in Somalia.”32 Finally, and perhaps most crucially for the future of American policy towards Somalia in the post–Cold War era, there was a determination that the United States would not get bogged down in another civil war in the developing world. When informing the NSC of the evacuation plans, Powell stressed that the plans were taken for the purpose of protecting American citizens and were not intended to alter or preserve the existing political situation in Somalia, nor to make the US presence felt in any way. The temporary presence of US forces did not indicate or constitute any intention on the part of the US government to intervene militarily in the internal Somalian conflict.33

The end of the Siad regime As the new year dawned in Somalia, it seemed there was going to be a new beginning in more ways than one. On January 27, in a radio broadcast, the USC claimed that it had won control of Mogadishu, and had forced Siad Barré to flee the presidential palace, declaring “the government and the responsibility of the Somali people were taken over by the USC movement. We are addressing you from Radio Mogadishu, the voice of the Somali people.”34 The BBC later confirmed the reports, alleging that Siad and some of his top aides had fled in a convoy of more than forty vehicles, including some tanks, and was reported to be in the southern Somali town of Kismayu, about one hundred miles from the border with Kenya, where Siad had been offered “safe passage” by the Kenyan Foreign Ministry.35 However, Siad’s ousting did not bring peace to Mogadishu or Somalia. Political analysts and specialists had warned as early as 1988 that with Siad gone a “scramble for power among the various clans would likely ensue.”36 Indeed, within days of Siad’s deposition, reports emerged that new fighting had broken out between various rival groups who had been in a loose alliance against the former leader. On January 29, the USC installed Ali Mahdi Mohamed as interim president, but other groups, including the Somali Patriotic Movement and the Somali National Movement, objected.37 Subsequently, Somalia fell victim to “clan-based guerrilla groups that control different parts of this ruined country”38 with Mogadishu, a “city where lawlessness prevails.”39 In May, the northern part of Somalia, firmly in the grip of the Somali National Movement, declared its independence from the rest of Somalia and established Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as president. Although

196  Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism the independence of the region, which covered the territory that had been British Somaliland until 1960, was not recognised by the rest of the international community, relative calm ensued.40 In November 1991, the New York Times reported that in the self-styled Republic of Somaliland, the “situation there is peaceful.”41 The story in the rest of Somalia was very different though. There, as Professor I. M. Lewis, of the London School of Economics, concluded, Siad “will be remembered for destroying his country both economically and politically and for fragmenting Somalia’s clans, a terrible legacy for the people who come after him.”42

Somalia: from colonialism to terrorism The evacuation of the American Embassy in Mogadishu signalled the end of an era for the United States in Somalia in more ways than one, although not everyone recognised it as such at the time. In the immediate aftermath of Siad’s departure, Secretary of State James Baker was hopeful that the American embassy in Mogadishu could be reopened soon, although he did acknowledge that the new “Chief of Mission will face a transformed relationship with Somalia,” and with “large areas of Somalia in ruins, our priorities will be largely focused on rendering emergency humanitarian assistance.” He also admitted that the “new Ambassador will have to rebuild an Embassy, its staff, and the bilateral relationship almost from nothing.”43 A far more realistic assessment of the situation came from Representative Wolpe, who lamented the chaos in Somalia as a clear failure of American policy, and we should bear some responsibility. We established a strong security assistance relationship [with Somalia], and transferred millions in weaponry, while we totally disregarded the internal policies of the regime, the human-rights violations that occurred over time. . . . Now what you are seeing is a general indifference to a disaster that we played a role in creating.44 The crux of that ‘disaster’ was noted by commentators such as James Brooke who maintained that, in many parts of Africa, loyalties still often go first to the tribe . . . [and] ancient ethnic tensions continue to tear at the often arbitrary borders drawn by European cartographers, who hoped to turn the continent from a shifting patchwork of tribal territories into a land of well-delineated nations.45 In Somalia, Hassan, a leading figure in the Somali National Movement, confirmed that “people don’t see you as a Somali, they see you as a clan,” adding that “a gun has become a basic necessity – because someone’s going to get rid of you if you don’t get rid of them. It’s a tradition that can’t be changed overnight.”46 Exacerbating this tradition was, as Perlez recognised, “the legacy of the arms donations by the two superpowers,”47 which provided the means by which clan rivalry could descend into violent, catastrophic and deadly civil war. A refugee from

Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism 197 Mogadishu summed up the legacy of the interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union in Somalia, telling reporters that “a typical Somali soldier wears an American-supplied uniform and brandishes a Soviet-made AK-47 rifle.”48 Within this context, the battle for control of Somalia continued. After Siad had been deposed, Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the United Somali Congress had assumed the presidency, but never succeeded in consolidating his power and authority. In November 1991, Scott Spangler of AID testified before Congress that “in Somalia, there is no internationally recognised government and the political future of the country remains uncertain.”49 Spangler’s assessment was possibly the understatement of the year as Mahdi’s tenuous control crumbled, and the lawlessness in Mogadishu erupted into full-fledged war between rival factions of the USC. Aid workers and diplomats who remained in the war-torn capital reported that General Mohamed Farah Aideed had ousted Mahdi as president of the beleaguered country. As the heavy fighting entered its fifth day, relief workers from Doctors Without Borders, one of the few aid agencies still operating in Somalia, reported that the conditions in Mogadishu were “murderous” with “more than 300 people entering hospitals daily.” It also reported that the severe fighting was preventing “countless” other victims reaching medical facilities.50 By the end of November, after ten days of “artillery and rocket barrages,” Mogadishu had become “a grisly battlefield that has left 6,000 civilians wounded and possibly more than 1,000 dead” according to aid and medical workers who had been in the capital. Dr Sam Toussie, an American surgeon working with the International Medical Corps, told reporters that “I’ve been in war for eight years and I’ve never seen a slaughter like this. We were getting 150 casualties a day at one hospital – 75 per cent were children and we were losing five an hour.”51 As the fighting continued, relief workers described Mogadishu as a “frenzy of violence” with at least 4,000 killed and more than 9,000 wounded, adding that more than 90 per cent of the casualties were non-combatants.52 Dr Ruben Osorio, one of about forty-five relief workers who remained in Mogadishu conceded, “I have never seen anything like it in my life.”53 Toussie further lamented that the “slaughter keeps going up and up. We’ve been getting whole families coming in with shell injuries, with torn-open bodies. Cannon fire takes a chunk of a person out. There is nothing we can do with those.”54 In the United States, the desperate situation in Somalia did not go completely unnoticed. In Congress, concern crossed party lines and in December, several members of the House including Chairman of the House Select Committee on Hunger Tony Hall (D-OH), Ranking Minority Member Bill Emerson (R-MO), and Dennis Hastert (R-IL) wrote to Bush appealing for help. They expressed “extreme concern over the ongoing and unprecedented tragedy in Somalia,” especially given that “relief efforts are at a virtual standstill.” They reported that according to aid workers with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), one of the few agencies still active in the country, the situation in Somalia is worse than anything they have ever encountered. Unable to treat the mounting casualties, victims have been left to die in piles outside

198  Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism hospitals. If the situation continues much longer, the ICRC believes that the world may be left watching a potential genocide in Somalia. Although acknowledging that “the United States, as well as many other countries, has supported efforts to bring the warring factions together, unfortunately, without success,” they insisted that more should be done, asserting that we cannot just stand by and wash our hands of the horror in Somalia. Knowing that this is the most pressing humanitarian tragedy in the world, we feel it is imperative for the US to do its utmost. . . . Too many lives depend on it to do anything less.55 The Bush administration did respond, but only by doubling the amount of emergency assistance that was being sent to the war-ravaged capital. Andrew Natsios of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance confirmed that an extra $19 million, to be spent on “medical help, food and logistical support for humanitarian agencies working in and around Mogadishu,” had been allocated, in addition to the $21 million that had been provided since the civil war had begun a month ago.56 However, Bush was willing to go no further and, as Perlez of the New York Times commented, there appears to be little incentive for either the United States or Europe to try to settle the Mogadishu conflict. Somalia’s location on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is no longer considered so important a strategic prize and Washington . . . has concentrated on some humanitarian assistance.57 By the end of 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was clear the Cold War was over. Although a new freedom was being celebrated in many places around the globe, nowhere was the devastating legacy of the Cold War more apparent than in the poverty-stricken and war-ravaged country of Somalia in the Horn of Africa. There, Mogadishu was engulfed in a “mad swirl of selfgenocide,”58 with Somalia described as a “a nation that is destroying itself” filled with “roving armed subclans who fight to gain or deny power at the expense of thousands of innocents caught in their crossfire.”59 As the new year dawned, and the rest of the world looked forward to the new world order, the “sound of gunfire from Mogadishu continues.”60

Conclusion After a generation of independence, Africa faces harsh facts and hard choices. Our ancient continent is now on the brink of disaster, hurtling towards the abyss of confrontation, caught in the grip of violence. Gone are the smiles, the joys of life.61 —Edem Kodjo, Secretary-General, Organisation of African Unity, 1978–1983

There are many days that will live in infamy, but surely among the most infamous must be those days during the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 when European

Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism 199 leaders met to decide the future of Africa. The legacy of those decisions would reverberate for generations thereafter, leading to conflict, devastation and disaster. Lines drawn on a map to suit the needs of the colonial powers, without regard to tribal boundaries and loyalties, provided the context for an explosion of civil wars and internecine strife that bedevilled the continent in the years after independence swept through the former colonial possessions. These conflicts were exacerbated by the Cold War, with rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union evident in the numerous proxy wars in Africa supported and fuelled with weapons and troops supplied by the rival powers. As Leonard Robinson, president of the African Development Foundation, lamented in 1990, the East-West struggle has been played out in parts of Africa in cruel, painful and devastating ways. Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola and Mozambique being the most succinct examples of the chess game. The cost in human lives and property has been overwhelming.62 While the vast majority of Africa was affected by both the Berlin Conference and the Cold War, our focus here has been the legacy of colonialism in the Horn of Africa, and the way that Ethiopia and Somalia were used as pawns in the Cold War game between the Soviet Union and the United States. Geographically, both were strategically important but, as we have seen, Ethiopia was always the favourite and the priority for the United States. The basis for the ‘special relationship’ could again be argued to lie in the country’s history. Ethiopia was the role model for Africa in American eyes; independent throughout the colonial era and, as Haile Selassie had envisioned, generally perceived as the ‘capital of Africa.’ Support for Ethiopia therefore resonated with traditional American ideals and values. Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, reflected this is his testimony before the House Subcommittee on African Affairs when he asserted that in Ethiopia, the focus on war has changed to nation-building and development. Leaders there are taking steps to open the system to greater participation by the people. The first local elections are to be held soon. We, for our part, are looking for ways to begin our assistance to that country. It will, however, be dependent on continued progress in human rights and democracy.63 Ethiopia entered the post–Cold War era as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, under the leadership of Meles Zenawi of the TPLF. In 1994, a new constitution was adopted that established a parliamentary republic with a bicameral legislature and a judicial branch; Meles was formally elected as prime minister in the first multi-party elections held in 1995. Although still afflicted by allegations of political corruption and human rights violations, as well as by drought, famine and economic woes, Ethiopia became one of the more stable and prosperous areas in Africa. Perhaps most notably, and reflective of the enduring ‘special relationship,’ Meles was an outspoken ally of the United States during the war on terror. The legacy of colonialism and the Cold War on Ethiopia’s neighbour, Somalia, had a somewhat different ending however. Donald Payne (D-NJ) alluded to this

200  Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism during joint hearings before the House Subcommittees on Africa and International Operations in April 1992, when he pointed to Ethiopia as the model for future development in Africa. He contended that while Ethiopia is still far from stablised, it also warrants our continued attention, not just because of the humanitarian needs, but more important, to study the methods that were used successfully there to resolve the conflict in that country. . . . For example, does it say anything about the embarrassing delay by the United Nations to take effective action in Somalia, and our own hesitation to keep adequate funds for United Nations peacekeeping forces, when we have less hesitation to approve them for Yugoslavia, where far less suffering has taken place.64 Payne’s reference to Somalia was telling when it came to American policy towards Somalia in the post–Cold War era; many argued that Somalia was a colonial legacy, and ‘not America’s problem’ and a greater reluctance to get directly involved with the war-ravaged country was often apparent. Notwithstanding, particularly in Congress there was a degree of concern and sense of responsibility and, in the early months of the post–Cold War era, the House Select Committee on Hunger held hearings on the desperate situation in Somalia. In convening the hearings in January 1992, Representative Alan Wheat (D-MO) explained that the situation in Somalia has continued to denigrate into what many now consider to be one of the worst humanitarian crises anywhere in the world and certainly one of the most violent and brutal in recent history. . . . With as many as 15,000 people dead or wounded since intensive fighting began last November and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians, the situation in Somalia clearly deserves the world’s attention, and, more importantly it deserves the world’s help. It has had a hard time getting either. Robert Houdek, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, testified that in the year since the fall of former President Siad Barré, Somalia has almost ceased to exist as a state. The animosities fuelling Somalia’s conflict are based on clan affiliation and simple lust for power, not ideology. . . . A new round of fighting between rival clan leaders – Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed Farah Aideed – broke out in Mogadishu on December 17 [and] . . . the fighting continues, varying in intensity from day to day. Andrew Timpson, from Save the Children Fund in the UK, added, I was in Mogadishu at the weekend. It was my third visit during the year and I was shocked by what I saw. This is one of the most beautiful cities in Africa, and it is now really a heap of rubble. And the casualties that I witnessed over Saturday and Sunday were quite shocking. . . . The fighting since November has been savage and shows no sign of coming to a halt.

Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism 201 Wheat concluded that Somalia had “become a grim symbol of human tragedy, misery and degradation. This is hardly encouraging for a new world order.”65 During the next few months, further attempts were made to engage American attention but to little avail. In March, Cohen claimed that “in Somalia, the extent of the tragedy there grows daily. . . . Somalia is the most acute humanitarian tragedy in the world today.”66 Things were no better by July, when the Select Committee on Hunger held additional hearings; Wheat reported that Somalia has only further deteriorated since we met in January. Since then, more than 30,000 Somalis have been killed or wounded in ongoing fighting. Hundreds of thousands have sought refuge in Kenya, Djibouti and even across the sea in Yemen. At least one-third of the population is immediately threatened with starvation, and malnutrition rates in some areas hover at 80 to 90 percent. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), appearing as a witness to report on her recent visit to the region, lamented that “in many ways, Somalia has moved beyond cries and tears. It has been reduced to a level of desperation, almost beyond imagining of any of us.” Perhaps the most poignant moment of Kassebaum’s testimony came, though, when she invoked the Cold War, and its enduring legacy in Somalia. She declared that I believe the United States has a specific moral obligation to Somalia. Throughout the long years of the Cold War, Somalia and the rest of the Horn were of strategic importance to the United States. If the Soviet Union still existed today, we would never have allowed Somalia to disintegrate in this way. The question we must now face is whether our concern for human beings is as great as our great fear in the past of the Soviet empire.67 The concerns expressed by Kassebaum and reflected in the Select Committee finally resonated within the Bush administration. In July, Scowcroft informed Bush that the problem in Somalia is not drought but famine. And the famine is manmade. As many as 5,000 people a day may be dying. The major problem is not food and money, but delivering relief in the midst of armed anarchy [because] at present, there is no functioning government in Somalia and the political future of the country remains uncertain.68 He went on to argue that, if the much-needed aid was to be delivered safely, then the United States had to take more direct action. Bush agreed and on August 13, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater announced that the president has ordered the Department of Defence to offer a US military airlift to transport a UN guard force and its associated military equipment to Somalia. Authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 751, the force of 500 guards will help provide the security needed to deliver food and other relief supplies so desperately needed in Somalia.69

202  Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism In October, the administration agreed that “it is imperative that we develop a strategy of increments which will build on relief efforts and facilitate reconciliation and peace in Somalia.”70 Bush offered to take the lead, therefore, when, on December 3, 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 794 in response to “the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance.” The resolution deemed the situation in Somalia as “intolerable” and requiring “an immediate and exceptional response . . . to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” This was to be done using “all necessary means” including “military forces,”71 with the bulk of the troops, some 28,000, coming from the United States as a result of an offer from Bush. Prior to the passage of the resolution, Bush had contacted Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN secretary-general, and offered American troops to lead any UN action. The Resolution subsequently “welcome[d] the offer by a Member State . . . concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment.”72 Appearing on television on December 4 to explain the deployment of American troops to Somalia, Bush maintained that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death. Accordingly, he went on, I have given the order to Secretary Cheney to move a substantial American force into Somalia. As I speak, a Marine amphibious ready group, which we maintain at sea, is offshore Mogadishu. These troops will be joined by elements of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, based out of Camp Pendleton, California, and by the Army’s 10th Mountain Division out of Fort Drum, New York. These and other American forces will assist in Operation Restore Hope. They are America’s finest. They will perform this mission with courage and compassion, and they will succeed.73 In January  1993, Bush visited the American military personnel who had been deployed to Somalia to aid the relief efforts and told them, the world we face today is different. The fatal uncertainties of a Cold War have shattered into a jigsaw of international complexity. . . . We come together – not to make Somalia safe for democracy – but to make it safe for survival. Our mission: to secure the peace so that help can get through. Operation Restore Hope will do just that. Thanks to you, we’re ahead of schedule: we’ve secured bases from Baidoa to Bardera. The port is open, food is moving, people are being helped.74

Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism  203 Bush’s optimism was short-lived, though. He had insisted that our mission has a limited objective: to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary.75 However, what was envisioned as a short deployment dragged on, and on May 5, congressional hearings were held into the reasons why American troops were still in Mogadishu, with the sad conclusion that the goal of restoring stability in Somalia had not as yet been reached.76 On October 3 and 4, 1993, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down during the Battle of Mogadishu, the bloodiest battle involving American troops since the Vietnam War. Eighteen soldiers were killed, and the American people witnessed the distressing spectacle of fallen American servicemen being dragged through the streets. It was clear that American involvement in Somalia had ended in failure, and President Bill Clinton announced that all American troops would be withdrawn from the region. In March 1995, with all UN troops gone, there was nothing to stop the civil war that continued to rage in Somalia, nor the chaos and lawlessness that went along with it. The anarchy in Somalia provided the ideal environment for terrorist groups to flourish. A report from the Council on Foreign Relations noted that Somalia is a chaotic, poor, battle-weary Muslim country with no central government and a long, unguarded coastline. Its porous borders mean that individuals can enter without visas, and once inside the country, enjoy an almost complete lack of law enforcement.77 Of particular concern was the Al Shabaab group, which was designated a terror group by the United States in February 2008; the following year, CIA Director Leon Panetta claimed that “Somalia is a failed state. Yemen is almost there. And our concern is that both could become safe havens for Al Qaeda.”78 In a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2010, John Kerry (D-MA) concurred that the “threat from Al Qaeda and from its Somali affiliate, al-Shabaab, is increasing” and posing “new challenges for the United States and other countries fighting extremism worldwide.”79 Then, in 2015, the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), argued to be “the most powerful of the new Islamic State affiliates in sub-Saharan Africa,” broke away from al-Shabaab and pledged its support of ISIS/ISIL.80 As a consequence, while never on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, Somalia was considered a potential ‘safe haven’ for terrorists from 2001 onwards.81 In 2015, it was the first African country listed in the report issued by the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, which claimed that because of the continuing anarchy, terrorists used many primarily rural sections of south-central Somalia as safe havens. Terrorists continued to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate,

204  Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism recruit, train, and operate with relative ease in these areas due to inadequate security, justice, and governance capacity at all levels. Al-Shabaab’s capacity to rebound from counterterrorism operations is due in large part to its ability to maintain control of large swaths of rural areas and routes in parts of Somalia.82 Early in 2016, Barack Obama added Somalia to the list of countries affected by immigration restrictions in an effort to address “the growing threat from foreign terrorist fighters.” At the time of writing, this ban remained in place.83 “Does history matter?” asked Paul Henze in the frontispiece of his seminal work. “The answer in the Horn of Africa,” he concluded “must be a resounding ‘yes.’ ”84 That is particularly true when seeking to understand the terrorist threat in the world today, as we have seen in this book. Ethiopia, always the favourite and beneficiary of a special relationship, may have continuing political, economic and humanitarian issues but, overall, within the African context is relatively stable and considered a valued ally by the Americans. In contrast is Somalia, the pawn of the colonial powers during the scramble for Africa and the ultimate loser in the Cold War battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Tribal conflicts, fuelled by arms and other military equipment provided by the superpowers during the Cold War, led the nation into civil war, chaos and anarchy that, today, provides a safe haven for the terrorists that constitute a major threat to world peace. Somalia has been abandoned to its fate by its former allies and, while the Western world ponders the current threat level, still the sound of gunfire from Mogadishu continues.

Notes 1 George Bush, Address to the Nation on the Commonwealth of Independent States, December 25, 1991; Bush Library Digital Archive, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/ archives/public-papers/3791. 2 Memo, Lord to Quayle, January  31, 1989. VP Quayle Collection, Meetings Files Box 25SVPDQ G, 1/31/89 VP Meeting/Event – Somali PM Mohamed Ali Samantar, Bush Library. 3 Memo, Lord to Quayle, January  31, 1989; VP Quayle Collection, Meetings Files Box 25SVPDQ G, 1/31/89 VP Meeting/Event – Somali PM Mohamed Ali Samantar, Bush Library. 4 “Political Prisoners Being Freed, Says Somali Seeking US Aid,” Washington Post, February 1, 1989. 5 “Political Prisoners Being Freed, Says Somali Seeking US Aid,” Washington Post, February 1, 1989. 6 “Political Prisoners Being Freed, Says Somali Seeking US Aid,” Washington Post, February 1, 1989. 7 “Somali Rebels Score Major Battle Gains,” Washington Post, July 2, 1988. 8 “Over 300,000 Somalis, Fleeing Civil War, Cross into Ethiopia,” New York Times, August 13, 1988. 9 “Somali Enjoys Undiplomatically Resist Recall Orders,” Washington Post, August 26, 1988. 10 “Over 300,000 Somalis, Fleeing Civil War, Cross into Ethiopia,” New York Times, August 13, 1988.

Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism 205 11 “Somali Rebels Score Major Battle Gains,” Washington Post, July 2, 1988. 12 “Over 300,000 Somalis, Fleeing Civil War, Cross into Ethiopia,” New York Times, August 13, 1988. 13 “Unrest Fills Somalia’s Capital as Rebel Groups Press Drive to City,” New York Times, December 12, 1990. 14 “Somalia, Abandoned to its Own Civil War with Others’ Weapons,” New York Times, January 6, 1991. 15 Memo, William Sittman to Bonnie Newman, NSC, January  3, 1990; NSC CF Box GSOF73 G, Folder 9100031, Bush Library. 16 “Somali Guards Said to Shoot, Kill Dozens,” Washington Post, July 8, 1990. 17 “Somalia Orders Trial for Signers of Rights Letter,” Washington Post, July 14, 1990. 18 “46 Somali Dissidents Freed,” Washington Post, July 17, 1990. 19 “Unrest Fills Somalia’s Capital as Rebel Groups Press Drive to City,” New York Times, December 12, 1990. 20 “Unrest Fills Somalia’s Capital as Rebel Groups Press Drive to City,” New York Times, December 12, 1990. 21 “Somalia, Abandoned to its Own Civil War with Others’ Weapons,” New York Times, January 6, 1991. 22 “Heavy Fighting Erupts in Somali Capital,” New York Times, January 1, 1991. 23 “Somali Rebels Reject Appeal for Cease-Fire,” Washington Post, January 4, 1991. 24 “Pilot Evacuates 14 UN Aides from Somalia,” New York Times, January 3, 1991. 25 “Pilot Evacuates 14 UN Aides from Somalia,” New York Times, January 3, 1991. 26 Fax, Chairman JCS to NSC, January 5, 1991; NSC Nicholas Rostow Files Box GSOF73 G, Somalia #1 [6], Bush Library. 27 “US and Italy Evacuating Foreigners in Somalia,” New York Times, January 6, 1991. 28 Letter, James Bishop, Ambassador to Somalia, February 7, 1991; WHORM Foreign Affairs Subject Files Box 11SSFFO G, Diplomatic Affairs – Consular Relations, Bush Library. 29 “Somali Civil War Slaughter a Legacy of Cold War Feuds,” Washington Post, January 8, 1991. 30 Memo, Scowcroft to Bush, January 7, 1991; NSC Nicholas Rostow Files Box GSOF73 G, Somalia #1 [6], Bush Library. 31 Letter, Bush to Speaker Foley, January  7, 1991; NSC Nicholas Rostow Files Box GSOF73 G, Somalia #1 [6], Bush Library. 32 Fax, Chairman JCS to NSC, January 5, 1991; NSC Nicholas Rostow Files Box GSOF73 G, Somalia #1 [6], Bush Library. 33 Fax, Chairman JCS to NSC, January 5, 1991; NSC Nicholas Rostow Files Box GSOF73 G, Somalia #1 [6], Bush Library. 34 “Insurgents Claiming Victory in Somalia,” New York Times, January 28, 1991. 35 “Fighting Subsides in Somalia’s Capital,” New York Times, January 29, 1991. 36 “Somali Rebels Score Major Battle Gains,” Washington Post, July 2, 1988. 37 “Fighting is Reported to Break Out Between Somalia’s Rebel Groups,” New York Times, February 11, 1991. 38 “2 Months After Ousting Despot, Somalia Faces Life as an Abandoned Pawn,” New York Times, April 4, 1991. 39 “War Guts Capital of Somalia,” Washington Post, January 30, 1991. 40 Somaliland Votes on Independence, May 31, 2001, BBC Digital Archives. 41 “Hundreds Slain in the 5th Day of Strife in Somalia,” New York Times, November 22, 1991. 42 “Fighting Subsides in Somalia’s Capital,” New York Times, January 29, 1991. 43 Memo, James Baker to Bush, March 7, 1991; White House Counsel’s Office Appointment Files Box GSOF56 G, US Ambassador to Somalia Martin Cheches Department of State, Bush Library. 44 “Somali Civil War Slaughter a Legacy of Cold War Feuds,” Washington Post, January 8, 1991.

206  Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism 45 “In Africa, Tribal Hatreds Defy the Borders of State,” New York Times, August 28, 1988. 46 “2 Months After Ousting Despot, Somalia Faces Life as an Abandoned Pawn,” New York Times, April 4, 1991. 47 “Fighting Subsides in Somalia’s Capital,” New York Times, January 29, 1991. 48 “Somalia, Abandoned to its Own Civil War with Others’ Weapons,” New York Times, January 6, 1991. 49 Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, November 12, 1991, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress. 50 “Fighting in Somali Capital Described as ‘Murderous,’ ” Washington Post, November 22, 1991. 51 “Somali Capital a Grisly Battlefield as Civilians Die on Clan Warfare,” New York Times, November 29, 1991. 52 “Factional Fighting in Somalia Terrorises and Ruins Capital,” New York Times, December 8, 1991. 53 “Factional Fighting in Somalia Terrorises and Ruins Capital,” New York Times, December 8, 1991. 54 “Somalia Self-Destructs, and the World Looks On,” New York Times, December 29, 1991. 55 Letter, House Select Committee on Hunger to Bush, December 12, 1991; NSC Collection Box GSOF73 G, 9109427, Bush Library. 56 “US Increases Aid to Somalia After UN Balks,” New York Times, December 15, 1991. 57 “Somalia Self-Destructs, and the World Looks On,” New York Times, December 29, 1991. 58 “Somalia Self-Destructs, and the World Looks On,” New York Times, December 29, 1991. 59 “Somalia’s Descent to Mobocracy,” Washington Post, December 28, 1991. 60 “Somalia Self-Destructs, and the World Looks On,” New York Times, December 29, 1991. 61 “A Continent Gone Wrong,” Time, January 16, 1984. 62 “By Why Not More Help for Africa?” Washington Post, February 1, 1990. 63 Hearings, Subcommittee on African Affairs, March  19, 1992, United States Senate, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 64 Joint Hearings, Subcommittees on Africa and International Operations, April 8, 1992, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 65 Hearings, Select Committee on Hunger, January 30, 1992, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 66 Hearings, Subcommittee on African Affairs, March 19, 1992, US Senate, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 67 Hearings, Select Committee on Hunger, July  22, 1992, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 68 Memo, Scowcroft to Bush, July  29, 1992; Rear Admiral Jonathan Howe Files Box GSOF73 G 21366, Somalia, Bush Library. 69 Statement, Press Secretary, White House, August 13, 1992; Nancy Bearg Dyke Files Box GSOF73 G CF04137, Somalia [2], Bush Library. 70 Deputies Committee Meeting, October 21, 1992; Rear Admiral Jonathan Howe Files Box GSOF73 G 21359, DC Meeting re Somalia–October 21 1992, Bush Library. 71 S/RES/794 (1992), Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 1992, United Nations Digital Archive, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794 (1992). 72 S/RES/794 (1992), Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 1992, United Nations Digital Archive, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794 (1992). 73 Bush, Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia, December 4, 1992; Public Papers, Bush Library Digital Archive, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/5100. 74 Speech, George Bush, January  1, 1993; Timothy McBride Files Box  GSOF69 G, 12/30/92–1/2/93 – Saudi Arabia Somalia Russia, Bush Library. 75 Speech, George Bush, January  1, 1993; Timothy McBride Files Box  GSOF69 G, 12/30/92–1/2/93 – Saudi Arabia Somalia Russia, Bush Library.

Somalia – from colonialism to terrorism 207 76 Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, May  5, 1993, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 77 Julie Cohn, Terrorism Havens: Somalia, June 1, 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366. 78 John Kerry, Report, Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2010, US Senate, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 79 John Kerry, Report, Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2010, US Senate, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, Library of Congress. 80 Jason Warner, Assistant Professor at the US Military Academy at West Point, SubSaharan Africa’s ‘New’ Islamic State Affiliates, CTC Sentinel: Combating Terrorism at West Point, January 2017, Vol 10, No 1. 81 Terrorist Safe Havens, Department of State Report, 2005; Depart of State Digital Archive, www.state.gov/documents/Organisation/65466.pdf. 82 Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Department of State, www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257522.htm. 83 How the Trump Administration Chose the Seven Countries in the Immigration Executive Order, CNN, January  30, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/ how-the-trump-administration-chose-the-7-countries/. 84 Paul B. Henze, The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991).

Bibliography and further reading

Archival and primary source research NB: The following abbreviations have been used when referencing archival material: CF – Confidential File CFOF – Central File, Official Files CR – Congressional Record CRSR – Congressional Research Service Reports FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States GF – General File NSC – National Security Council NSF – National Security Files OF – Official File POF – President’s Office Files PP – Public Papers of the Presidents PPF – President’s Personal File PPP – Post-Presidential Papers PSF – President’s Secretary’s Files SMOF – Staff Member and Office Files WHCF – White House Central Files WHSF – White House Staff Files

Presidential libraries and archives Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, Independence, Missouri Dean Acheson Files George M. Elsey Files George McGhee Files Official Files President’s Secretary Files President’s Secretary Files, Meetings File Staff Member and Office Files, Ken Hechler Files

Bibliography and further reading 209 Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum and Boyhood Home, Abilene, Kansas Ann Whitman Files Ann Whitman Files, International Series Central File, Official Files General Files National Security Council Series National Security Council Staff Papers OCB Central Files OCB Secretariat Series Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Office of the Staff Secretary

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, Massachusetts National Security Files, Countries National Security Files, William Brubeck Files Pre-Presidential Papers President’s Office Files President’s Office Files, Staff Memos Sargent Shriver Personal Papers White House Central Files, Subject Files White House Staff Files, Harris Wofford Files Winifred Armstrong Personal Papers

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum, Austin, Texas Ex Co Files National Security Files National Security Files, Country File National Security Files, Edward Hamilton Files National Security Files, Intelligence File National Security Files, International Meetings and Travel File National Security Files, McGeorge Bundy Files National Security Files, National Intelligence Estimates National Security Files, Special Head of State Correspondence National Security Files, Speech Files National Security Files, Ulric Haynes Files National Security Files, Walt Rostow Files Records of the Democratic National Committee White House Press Office Files

Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California National Security Council Files, Country Files National Security Council Files, Institutional Files

210  Bibliography and further reading National Security Council Files, Presidential Correspondence National Security Council Files, VIP Visits White House Central Files, Countries

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan Dale Van Atta Papers NSA National Security Council Vietnam Information NSA Presidential Country Files NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa NSA Presidential Transition File NSA Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger NSA White House Situation Room Evening Reports NSA White House Situation Room Presidential Daily Briefings National Security Council Institutional Files President’s Speeches and Statements Presidential Handwriting File Project File of Documents Declassified Through the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) Ron Nessen Papers White House Central Files, Subject File

Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, Atlanta, Georgia NSA Brzezinski Material NSA Staff Material, Horn/Special President’s Files: Plains Files Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary Records of the Speechwriter’s Office White House Central Files: Country Collection White House Central Files: Human Rights Collection Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Center for Public Affairs, Simi Valley, California Edwin Meese Files Executive Secretariat NSC Country File White House Staff Member and Office Files WHORM Subject File

George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, College Station, Texas Donald Gregg Files Nancy Bearg Dyke Files National Security Council Collection National Security Council Confidential Files National Security Council, Nicholas Rostow Files

Bibliography and further reading 211 Rear Admiral Jonathan Howe Files Timothy McBride Files Vice President Dan Quayle Collection, Meetings Files White House Counsel’s Office Appointment Files WHORM Foreign Affairs Subject Files

Other archives The Cyrus R. Vance and Grace Sloan Papers: Yale University Library Manuscripts Collection, New Haven, Connecticut. •

Professional and Personal Activities Files

National Archives II, College Park, Maryland • •

Department of Decimal File 1950–54 RG59 Files

National Security Archives, Washington DC • •

Carter-Brezhnev Collection Carter Administration NSC Documents Collection

US government official publications Congressional Committee Hearings and Reports, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Senate • • • • •

Committee on Appropriations Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees

House of representatives • • • • • • • • •

Committee on Armed Services Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee on International Relations Select Committee on Hunger Subcommittee on Africa Subcommittee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Operations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies Subcommittee on International Operations

212  Bibliography and further reading • •

Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee on Near East and Africa

Congressional Record, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Congressional Research Service Reports, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Department of State Bulletin, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Foreign Relations of the United States, US Government Publishing Office, Washington, DC. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, US Government Publishing Office, Washington, DC.

Digital archives and websites Newspapers and Periodicals (Digital Archives accessed via the Library of Congress, British Library and Cambridge University Library: The New York Times The Washington Post The Los Angeles Times Time Newsweek US News and World Report The American Presidency Project: www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ Department of State: www.state.gov

Presidential digital archives Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum: https://fdrlibrary.org/ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum: www.trumanlibrary.org/ Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum and Boyhood Home: www.eisen hower.archives.gov/ John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum: www.jfklibrary.org/ Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library and Museum: www.lbjlibrary.org/ Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum: www.nixonlibrary.gov/ Gerald Ford Presidential Library: https://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/ Jimmy Carter Library and Museum: www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/ Ronald Reagan Presidential Library: www.reaganfoundation.org/ George Bush Presidential Library and Museum: https://bush41.org/ United Nations Official website and Digital Archive: www.un.org

Interviews Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA in the Carter Administration, 30/6/2000, Watergate Complex, Washington, DC. David Aaron, Deputy Director of the National Security Council in the Carter Administration, 24/7/2000, Washington, DC. General William Odom, Military Adviser to the National Security Council in the Carter Administration, 14/7/2000, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. Paul Henze, National Security Council Staffer responsible for the Horn of Africa in the Carter Administration, 19/7/2000, Bethesda, Maryland.

Bibliography and further reading  213

Selected bibliography and further reading Aron, R., The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945–1973 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2009). Barnhisel, G.,  & Turner, C., Pressing the Fight: Print, Propaganda and the Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010). Beisner, R., Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Bender, G., Coleman, J.S.,  & Sklar, R.L. (eds), African Crisis Areas and United States Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Brzezinski, Z., Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983). Bzdek, V., The Kennedy Legacy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Carter, J., Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (London: Collins, 1982). Carter, J., White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010). Clapham, C., The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay (London: C. Hurst, 2017). Colman, J., The Foreign Policy of Lyndon B Johnson: The United States and the World, 1963–1969 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). Dallek, R., John F. Kennedy: An Unfinished Life, 1917–1963 (London: Penguin, 2004). Dallek, R., Lyndon Johnson: Portrait of a President (London: Penguin, 2005). Damms, R., The Eisenhower Presidency, 1953–1961 (Harlow: Pearson, 2002). Daniels, C., Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2012). De Waal, A., Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). Dobrynin, A., In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to American’s Six Cold War Presidents 1962–1986 (New York: Random House, 1995). Downer Cain, A., The Ford Presidency: A History (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2009). Doyle, W., Inside the Oval Office: The White House Tapes from FDR to Clinton (New York: Kodansha America, 2001). Dunn, C. (ed), The Enduring Reagan (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009). Erlich, H., The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962–1978 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute, 1983). Ferrell, R.H. (ed), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981). Garthoff, R., Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1994). Gates, R.M., From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Giglio, J., The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). Grachev, A., Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). Graebner, N., Burns, R.D., & Siracusa, J., Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger Security, 2008). Greene, J.R., The Presidency of George Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). Hanhimaki, J., Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Henze, P.B., Rebels and Separatists in Ethiopia: Regional Resistance to a Marxist Regime (Washington, DC: Rand Corporation, 1985). Henze, P.B., The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991). Henze, P.B., Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia (London: Hurst, 2000).

214  Bibliography and further reading Hopf, T., Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945–1958 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Jackson, D., The Carter Administration and the Horn of Africa (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007). Jenkins, P., Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Johnson, R., Congress and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Jordan, H., Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1982). Keenan, J., The Dark Sahara: America’s War on Terror in Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008). Keenan, J., The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2013). Kennan, G., & Mearsheimer, J., American Diplomacy: 60th Anniversary Expanded Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). Klein, W., All the Presidents’ Spokesmen: Spinning the News – White House Press Secretaries From Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008). Korn, D.A., Ethiopia, the United States and Soviet Union (London: Croom Helm, 1986). Lefebvre, J.A., Arms for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia – 1953– 1991 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991). Lewis, I.M. (ed), Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa (London: Ithaca Press, 1983). Logevall, F., & Preston, A. (eds), Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969– 1977 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Maynard, C., Out of the Shadow: George HW Bush and the End of the Cold War (College Station, TX: A&M University Press Consortium, 2009). Meredith, M., The State of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011). Mitchell, N., Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016). Muehlenback, P., Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Nugent, P., Africa Since Independence: A Comparative History (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004). Odom, W.E., On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992). Patman, R.G., The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Perlstein, R. (ed), Richard Nixon: Speeches, Writings, Documents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Plummer, B., In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonisation, 1956– 1974 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Reagan, R., Reagan in His Own Hand: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). Reagan, R., & Brinkley, D., The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007). Reynolds, J., Sovereignty and Struggle: Africa and Africans in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). Rosser, R., The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: A Documentary Analysis (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007). Rotbert, R. (ed), Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Washington, DC: Bookings Institution Press, 2005). Sand, G. (ed), Defending the West: The Truman Churchill Correspondence, 1945–1960 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004).

Bibliography and further reading 215 Schraeder, P.J., United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Siniver, A., Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Strong, R.A., Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000). Suri, J., Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge: Belknap, 2007). Vance, C., Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983). Westad, O.A., The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Woodward, P., US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). Wukovits, J., Eisenhower (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

Index

Aaron, David 154 Abate, Atnatu 121 Abdullah, Ali 48 Acheson, Dean 11, 17 – 18, 30 – 1, 34, 41 Adair, Ross 102 Addis Ababa 2, 16, 49, 57, 59, 62, 72 – 6, 90, 101 – 3, 105 – 10, 113, 120 – 2, 126 – 7, 136, 138 – 9, 144, 157, 162, 176, 180 – 2, 184 – 6 Adem, Idris Mohammed 78, 137 Aden (Osman, Aden Abdullah), President of Somalia 45, 47, 55, 61, 71 Afewerki, Isaias 174 Afghanistan 7 – 8, 135, 147, 153 – 4 Africa 1 – 6, 8, 24 – 35, 38 – 40, 43 – 4, 73 – 7, 79 – 81, 85 – 7, 102, 105, 112, 114, 118 – 19, 123 – 7, 129 – 31, 135 – 6, 139, 141 – 2, 145 – 8, 153, 155 – 8, 160 – 2, 164 – 8, 174 – 6, 178 – 80, 183, 185 – 7, 191 – 2, 194, 196, 198 – 200, 203 – 4 African Affairs Subcommittee (Senate) 39, 110, 119 African Development Foundation 199 African Policy Committee 53 – 4, 59 African solutions for African problems 7, 137, 144 Africa Subcommittee (House) 34, 39 – 40, 47, 86, 94, 126, 161, 164, 186 Agency for International Development (AID) 58, 103, 127, 165, 178, 197 Aideed, Mohamed Farah 197 Aklilou Abte Wold 17, 30, 31 – 2, 42, 101, 108 Al Qaeda 203 Al Shabaab group 203 Aman Andom, Michael 107 – 9 Amare, Girma 185 American public opinion 142, 147 Amin, Mohammed 162

Amnesty International 126 Appropriations Committee (Senate) 32, 46, 58 Appropriations Subcommittee (House) 63, 103 Arab-Israeli conflict 85 – 6 Arab League 144 Armed Forces Committee 104 – 6, 108 Armed Services Committee (House) 19, 119 Army Signal Corps 41 Arteh, Omar 90 – 1 Asmara 15, 17, 44, 49, 79, 101, 107, 109, 110, 111, 120, 127, 182, 185; and communication facilities 17, 31, 40, 41, 42, 58, 143 Austin, Warren 32 Baas, Marc Allen 180 Bader, George 95 Bahiy, Berhanu 177 Baker, James 181, 196 Band-Aid 8, 163, 164 Barré, Abdirahman Jama 176 Barré, Mohammed Siad 6 – 7, 91 – 2, 96 – 7, 112 – 13, 120; Carter and 128 – 30, 155; civil war in Somalia and 191 – 3; end of regime of 195 – 6; Nixon and 135; Reagan and 158, 177; war in the Ogaden and 139, 141 Benti, Tafari 109, 113, 121 Berbera 2, 55, 90, 119, 138, 141, 154, 159, 192 Berlin Conference, 1884 – 1885 2, 135, 198 – 9 Beyer, Gordon 145 Bingham, Jonathan 16, 19 Bonker, Don 140 Bourne, Peter 129

218 Index Bowles, Chester 54 – 5, 57, 59, 63 British Somaliland 2, 45, 46 – 9, 61 Brock, William 147 – 8 Brooke Amendment 168 Brown, Harold 127 Brubeck, William 64, 69 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 1, 7, 125, 127 – 30, 145; on détente 135; deterioration of US position in the Horn of Africa and 146 – 8; on Eritrea 144; war between Ethiopia and Somalia and 136, 139 – 42 Buchanan, Pat 157 – 8 Buerk, Michael 162 Bundy, McGeorge 53, 55, 69, 72 Burke, Fred 54 Bush, George H. W. 167, 177; American withdrawal from Somalia under 193 – 5; civil war in Somalia and 191 – 3; deterioration of Somalia and 198 – 204; end of Siad regime and 195 – 6; Mengistu’s move west and 179 – 81; ouster of Mengistu and 184 – 5; rebirth of special relationship with Ethiopia under 185 – 7; takeover of Reagan’s policies 177 – 9; war in Eritrea during administration of 182 – 4 Byrd, Robert 157 – 8 Byrnes, James 27 Cairo Resolution 5, 76, 136 Capitol Hill 12, 119; see also US Congress, US Senate, US House of Representatives Carrington, Walter 90 Carter, Hodding, III 127, 137 Carter, Jimmy 1, 3, 6 – 8, 118; breakout of war between Ethiopia and Somalia and 136 – 8; Carter Center and Eritrea 183 – 4; Carter Doctrine 153 – 5; deterioration of US position in the Horn of Africa and 146 – 8, 153 – 5; Ethiopia, regionalism and human rights and 125 – 8; Mengistu and 125 – 7, 154 – 5, 181; military outcome in the Ogaden region and 140 – 3; new hope in election of 123 – 4; Ogaden War and the Soviet Union and 138 – 40; post-war relations with Ethiopia 143 – 5; post-war relations with Somalia 145 – 6; regionalist approach 7; Siad Barré and 128 – 30, 155; Somalia and 128 – 30, 154; Vietnam Syndrome and 128, 130 – 1 Casey, William 167 Castro, Fidel 125, 131

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 12, 14 – 15, 28, 38, 44, 69 – 70, 73 – 4, 77 – 9, 120 – 2, 136, 140, 167, 175, 178, 203 Chang Myon 33 Chapin, Fred 144 – 5 Cheek, James 176, 178 Childs, J. Rives 16 China 69 – 70, 78 Chou En-lai 69 Church, Frank 53 Churchill, Winston 10, 13; on the League of Nations 24 Civil Rights Act, US 76 Clement, Bill 96 Clinton, Bill 203 Cohen, Herman 181, 185 – 6, 199 Cold War, the 3 – 8; end of 8, 179, 187, 198; Ethiopia and 16 – 21; impact on the Horn of Africa 1 – 3; Italian Somaliland and 2, 4, 12 – 14; Kennedy and 53 – 5; Korea and 32 – 5; onset of 11 – 12, 20 – 1; Reagan’s focus on 156 – 8; rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union during 2; SALT II arms agreements 135, 147; the United States and the new world order of 10 – 11 colonialism 2, 8, 10; legacy in Somalia 47 – 8; Somalia’s transition to terrorism from 196 – 8 Communist bloc 6, 42, 54 – 5, 64, 69, 74, 87, 90 – 1, 121, 125, 138 – 9, 148, 154, 156 – 7, 160, 166, 168, 179 Conference of Foreign Ministers 11 Copson, Raymond 156 – 7, 160 Council of Foreign Ministers 12 – 13 Coup attempts 49, 56 – 7 Coup d’etat in Somalia (1969) 6, 88 – 9 Creeping coup in Ethiopia (1974) 103 – 4, 106, 108, 120 Crocker, Chester 160, 165 Cuba 125, 131, 138, 140, 157, 160 Dalton, John 147 Darman, Ahmed Mohamed 63 Deaver, Michael 165 De Gasperi, Alcide 14 Denney, George 88 Department of Defence 40, 41, 95, 96, 154, 178, 201 Department of State 5, 18, 31, 41, 44, 46, 54, 62, 63, 72, 75, 79, 80, 89, 95, 109, 111, 125, 128, 137, 144, 155, 158, 178, 144, 155, 158, 178, 180, 185, 193, 194

Index  219 Derg 109, 121, 125 – 6; see also Provisional Military Administrative Council, PMAC Desta, Mengiste 143 Détente 1, 7, 80 – 1, 88 – 9, 135 – 48 Dewey, Thomas 14 Diggs, Charles 94, 119 Dillon, Douglas 49 Dinke, Berhanu 57 Djibouti 2, 144, 155, 177, 201; see also French Territory of the Afars and Issas (FTAI) Doctors Without Borders 197 Dole, Bob 147 Dulles, John Foster 27 – 8; on Eritrea 45; on Ethiopia 40 – 2, 44 Eagleton, Thomas 141 East Germany 90 Eastland, James 19 Economic aid 5, 43 – 4, 46, 57, 59, 63 – 4, 70, 80, 85, 91, 108, 145, 159, 191 Egal, Mohammed 79 – 80, 88 – 9, 195 – 6 Egypt 1, 46, 60, 125, 143 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 11; Eritrea and 4 – 5, 44 – 5; importance of Africa in the Cold War and 38 – 40; importance of Ethiopia and 40 – 2; independence and instability in Horn of Africa and 49; McCarthyism under 38 – 9; Somalia’s independence and 45 – 7 Elsey, George 12 Emerson, Bill 197 Ephrem, Sebhat 174 EPMG 121, 143 Eritrea 4, 8, 144; annexation by Ethiopia in 1962 59 – 60; Carter Center and 183 – 4; Eisenhower and 4 – 5, 44 – 5; Johnson and 76 – 9; partnership with Ethiopia 31, 59; Radio Marina 17; Reagan and 174 – 5, 182; Selassie and 31, 59; trouble flaring in, 1974 109 – 11; Truman and 17 – 18; United Nations and 29 – 32 Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) 60, 78 – 9, 93 – 5, 109 – 10, 122 Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) 174, 183 Ethiopia 4, 8, 199 – 200; in 1969 86 – 8; American response to revolution in 107 – 9; annexation of Eritrea 60; breakout of war between Somalia and 136 – 8; Carter and 125 – 8; China and 70; the Cold War and 16 – 21; competition between the Soviet Union

and the US for influence in 17, 20, 43; control over Somaliland 15 – 16; creeping coup in 103 – 4; establishment of the United Nations and 25 – 6; Ford and 105 – 12, 120 – 2; importance under Eisenhower 40 – 2; instability 49; Kagnew Station 5 – 6, 76 – 7, 79, 95 – 6, 122, 126 – 7; Korean War and 34 – 5; as model for future of Africa 199 – 200; Nixon and 92 – 3; onset of the Cold War and 20 – 1; perceived as the “prize” 1 – 2; Point Four appropriations for 18 – 19, 40; post-war relations between the US and 143 – 5; as priority under Kennedy 56 – 60; Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) 109 – 10, 113; rebirth of special relationship between US and 185 – 7; Revolution, 1974 6; revolution in 104 – 7; television coverage of 162 – 5; trouble looming in, 1974 101 – 3; United Nations and 29 – 32; US Cold War policy toward 16; violence in, 1968 81 Ethiopian Analogy 26, 34 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 184 Ethiopian Revolution 6, 106, 108 Face the Nation 108 famine in the Horn of Africa 161 – 8 Farah, Ahmed Mohammud 177 Farer, Tom 47, 126 Fascell, Dante 173, 192 Fischer, Dean 159 – 60 Fitzwater, Marlin 201 Foley, Thomas 194 – 5 Ford, Gerald 6; death of Selassie and 113 – 14; Ethiopia and 105 – 12, 120 – 2; proxy war in the Horn of Africa and 122 – 3; Somalia and 112 – 13, 119 – 20; Vietnam Syndrome and 118 – 19 Foreign Agricultural Operations Subcommittee (House) 70 Foreign Assistance 88; Foreign Assistance Act 91 Foreign Affairs Committee (House) 11 – 12, 19, 158 Foreign Relations Committee (Senate) 15, 25, 42, 56, 58, 65, 165, 203 Forrestal, James 19 – 20 French Indochina 14, 39 French Territory of the Afars and Issas (FTAI) 2, 123; see also Djibouti Fulbright, William 46, 94 – 5

220 Index Gagarin, Yuri 64 Gebre-Christos, Berhane 180 Gebre-Kidan, Tesfaye 184 Geldof, Bob 163 – 5, 168 Germany 19 – 20; see also East Germany Ghermazien, Tesfai 182 Gifford, Walter 18 Giorgis, Dawit Wolde 178 Girma, Baalu 143 globalism 28 Goldwater, Barry 147 Gorbachev, Mikhail 173 – 4, 176, 178 – 9, 182 – 3 Gore, Albert 58 Grant, James 46 Great Society 5, 69 – 70, 72, 75 Greece 19 Green, Fred 195 Green, Richard 192 Gregg, Don 177 Grew, Joseph 13 Gromyko, Andrei 139 Hackett, Jim 110 Hadsel, Fred 89, 91 Haig, Alexander 93, 159 – 60 Hall, Tony 197 Hamilton, Edward 80 Hart, Phil 58 Hasan, Abdulkadir Salaad 138 – 9, 143 Hastert, Dennis 197 Hawke, Robert 163 Haynes, Ulric “Rick” 78 Henderson, Loy 39 Henze, Paul 2 – 3, 125, 127, 137, 144 – 5, 154 Hickenlooper Amendment 168 Hilsman, Roger 61 Hitler, Adolf 19 – 20, 33 – 4 Horn of Africa: American relief efforts in 165 – 8, 197 – 8; on the brink in 1973 96 – 7; deterioration of US position in, under Carter 146 – 8, 153 – 5; famine in, 1980s 161 – 8; importance in the Cold War 1 – 3; increased influence of the Soviet Union on, after 1976 118 – 19; independence and instability in 49; influence of Vietnam on foreign policy in 93 – 5; legacy of colonialism in 2; overview of US policy toward 3 – 8; proxy war in 122 – 3; Soviet threat during the Eisenhower administration 42 – 4; television coverage of 162 – 5; see also Eritrea; Ethiopia; Somalia

Houdek, Robert 184, 200 Hughes, Thomas 69 Humanitarian aid 7 – 8, 128 – 9, 145, 168, 184 human rights 125 – 8 Hummel, Arthur 102, 111 Humphrey, Hubert 33, 70, 72 Imru, Mikael 104 – 5 Imru, Ras 16 Ingersoll, Robert 112 International law 7, 73, 136 International Medical Corps 197 International Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee (House) 110 International Relations Committee (House) 137 Iran 7, 135 Iranian hostage crisis 7, 153 irredentism, Somali 60 – 4, 73 – 6 Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) 203 Israel 103, 155, 159 Italian colonies and the United Nations 4, 12, 15, 21, 26 – 7, 32, 38 Italian Peace Treaty 26 Italian Somaliland 2, 4, 12 – 14, 27 – 9, 45 – 9 Italy 4, 12 – 15, 19, 26 – 9, 34, 44 – 6, 48, 62, 93, 135, 194 Jackson, Jesse 180 Johnson, Lyndon B. 5, 65, 95; domestic problems during administration of 81; Eritrea and 76 – 9; policy towards Africa and Asia 69 – 72; Selassie and 71, 77 – 8; Shermarke and 79 – 80 Johnston, Olin 25 Judd, Thomas 61 – 2 Kadi, Mohamed Omar 45 Kagnew Station 5 – 6, 76 – 7, 79, 122, 126 – 7; see also Asmara Kassa, Assrate 74 Katzenbach, Nicholas 77, 79 Kaunda, Kenneth 80 Kennedy, Bobby 70 Kennedy, Edward 102, 166 Kennedy, John F. 5, 48 – 9; the Cold War and 53 – 5; death of 65; Ethiopia as priority under 56 – 60; inaugural address 53; interest in Africa 53 – 5; Johnson and legacy of 71; Somalia and 55 – 6, 62, 64 Kenya, Northern Frontier District of 2, 60 – 1

Index  221 Kerry, John 203 Khrushchev, Nikita 73 – 4 King, John 107 Kiplagat, B. A. 179 Kirk, Roger 119 Kissinger, Henry: Ford and 105, 107 – 8, 110, 112 – 13, 119; Nixon and 86 – 9, 91 – 2, 95; Reagan and 158 Kodjo, Edem 198 Komer, Robert 60, 63 Korea 32 – 5, 39 Korean War 33, 35, 38 Korry, Edward 56, 76 Kronkite, Walter 111 Kuwait 181 Laird, Melvin 96 Lang, William 86, 94 Langer, William 25 League of Nations 2, 24 – 5, 29 Leland, Mickey 166, 180 Libreville Conference 137 Libya 160 Lie, Trygve 48 Live Aid 8, 164 – 5 Long, Robert 156 Lord, Cary 191 Lovett, Robert 17 Lutheran World Relief 102 Makonnen, Endalkachew 108 Mandefro, Ayalew 140, 180 Massigli, Rene 18 Mathias, Charles 158 Matzat, George 102 McCarthyism 38 – 9 McDonald, Larry 130 McElhiney, Thomas 102 McFarlane, Robert 158 McGhee, George 16, 18 – 19, 30 – 1 McNamara, Robert 77, 79, 95 McPherson, Peter 161, 164 – 6 Mecca Radio 60 Mekasha, Getachew 125 – 6 Mengistu Haile Mariam 7, 108 – 9, 140; Bush and 177; Carter and 125 – 7, 143, 154 – 5; George H. W. Bush and 179 – 80; move to the left 111 – 12, 121; move west 179 – 81; ouster of 184 – 5; Reagan and 157, 175 – 6 Merrell, George 30 – 1 Middle East 1, 4, 12, 17, 39 – 41, 79, 86, 88, 105, 109, 118, 147, 153, 156, 158 – 9

Military aid 2, 7 – 8, 18, 42 – 3, 56 – 9, 62 – 4, 74, 76 – 8, 87, 90, 94 – 6, 102, 105, 109 – 11, 120 – 1, 129 – 30, 137 – 8, 140, 142, 145 – 6, 154 – 5, 160, 166 Mobil Corporation 112 Mogadishu 45 – 6, 55, 61 – 3, 89, 91, 128 – 9, 142, 158 – 60, 177, 192 – 8, 200, 202 – 4 Mohamed, Ali Mahdi 195 – 7 Mondale, Walter 128, 130 Moose, Richard 143 Morrison, Herbert 18 Morton, Thurston 42 Moss, Frank 53 Moyers, Bill 70 Muhamud, Abdullahi Issa 46 Mulcahy, Edward 110 Munich Analogy 19 Mussolini, Benito 13, 34 NAACP 124 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 44, 56 – 7, 79, 85, 95 – 6 Nationalism 2, 39, 48 National Security Adviser 1, 53, 79, 86, 93, 107, 125, 158 National Security Council 1, 12, 14, 17, 31 – 3, 39 – 40, 42 – 4, 48, 60, 77 – 8, 80, 95, 125, 128, 143, 154, 158, 178, 193 – 5 Natsios, Andrew 198 Neuberger, Maurine 58 Newsom, David 94 – 5 Nigeria 72 Nixon, Richard 6, 39 – 40, 46, 81; Ethiopia relations and 86 – 8, 92 – 3; Ford’s pardoning of 106; interest in Vietnam versus Horn of Africa 85 – 6; Kagnew Station and 95 – 6; legacy of 85; Selassie and 87 – 8, 92; Siad Barré and 135; Somalia revolution in 1969 and 88 – 92; Vietnam War and 85, 90 – 5; Watergate hearings and 102, 104 Obama, Barack 204 Odom, William 1, 128 Ogaden region 2, 7, 48; breakout of war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 136 – 8; military outcome in 140 – 3; Reagan and 176 – 7; roots of war in 135 – 6; Somali irredentism and 60 – 4; war and the Soviet Union 138 – 40 O’Neill, Tip 166 Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) 42 – 3, 46

222 Index Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 5, 7, 70, 72 – 3, 136; crisis in Ethiopia and 102; Eritrea and 144, 183; Somali irredentism and 73 – 6; war in the Ogaden and 137 – 9 Organisation of American States (OAS) 140 Osorio, Ruben 197 Page, Trevor 161 Panetta, Leon 203 Parker, Daniel 103 Payne, Donald 199 – 200 Peace Corps 5, 55, 57, 90 Perez, Carlos Andres 140 Persian Gulf 86, 119, 122, 153 – 4, 156, 181 Petrov, Vasily I. 140 Petterson, Donald 154 PMG 108 – 9, 122; see also Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia Podgorny, Nikolai 125, 131 Point Four 4, 18 – 19, 43 Policy Review Committee 125, 128, 137 Portillo, Jose Lopez 140 Powell, Colin 194 – 5 Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) 109 – 10, 113 Quaddafi, Muammar 160 Quayle, Dan 191 Radio Ethiopia 106 – 7 Radio Marina, Eritrea 17, 41 Ratanov, Anatoly 138 Reagan, Ronald 7 – 8, 146; Eritrea and 174 – 5; famine in the Horn of Africa and 161 – 2; famine relief and 166 – 8; focus on the Cold War 156 – 8; Gorbachev’s new approach and 173 – 4; Reagan Doctrine 174; rebuilding of “special relationship” with Ethiopia 175 – 6; relief efforts under 165 – 8; Somalia and 158 – 60, 176 – 7; television coverage of the Horn of Africa and 162 – 5; war in Eritrea and Tigray and 182 Red Cross 197 Redman, Charles 191 Red Sea 1, 15, 40, 43, 64, 85, 87, 101, 118 – 20, 154, 156, 160, 182, 185 – 6 Refugees 162, 166, 192 – 3, 196 regionalism 28, 125 – 8 Rhodes, John 148 Ribicoff, Abraham 34 Richards, Arthur 49, 58 – 9

Robinson, Leonard 199 Rogers, William 86, 88, 90 – 2, 95 Roosevelt, Franklin 10, 13; on need for the United Nations 24 Rostow, Nick 194 Rostow, Walt 79 – 80 Rusk, Dean 53, 56, 58, 65, 71 SALT II arms agreements 135, 147 Samantar, Mohamed Ali 191 – 2 Satterthwaite, Joseph 39 Saudi Arabia 79, 143 Save the Children Fund 200 Schaufele, William 118 Schlesinger, James 119 Schweitzer, Albert 54 – 5 Scowcroft, Brent 107, 194 Scramble for Africa 2, 47, 73, 135, 204 Sears, Mason 45 Secretary of Defence 19, 41, 77, 95, 96, 119, 127 Secretary of State 11, 13, 16 – 17, 27, 34, 39 – 42, 49, 53, 70, 77, 86, 90, 110, 118, 124, 143, 156, 159 – 60, 181, 196, 199 – 200 Seelye, Talcott 129 Selassie, Haile 1 – 2, 4, 6, 15 – 16, 30, 161, 199; appeal to the League of Nations in 1936 25; China and 70; Cold War competition for Ethiopia and 17, 20, 43, 64; coup attempt and 49, 56 – 7; crisis in Ethiopia and 101; death of 113 – 14; downfall of 104 – 5; end of era of 96 – 7, 104 – 7; Eritrean Liberation Front and 93 – 5; establishment of the United Nations and 25 – 6; Johnson and 71, 77 – 8; Kennedy and 56 – 9; Korean War and 34 – 5; Nixon and 87 – 8, 92; objection to Italian administration 29; Organisation of African Unity and 72 – 3; revolution in Ethiopia and 104 – 7; signing of Constitution united Ethiopia and Eritrea 31; on Somali irredentism 73 – 4; Somali unification and 48; United Nations and 74 – 5; see also Ethiopia Select Committee on Hunger (House) 166, 178, 197, 200 – 1 Self-determination 3 – 5, 17, 53 – 65, 112, 136, 138, 173, 187 Sforza, Carlo 13 – 14, 28 Shepard, Alan 64 Shermarke, Abdirashid Ali 6, 55, 62, 79 – 80, 89 Shipstead, Henrik 25 Shultz, George 156

Index  223 Sikes, Robert 141, 148 Simon, Bereket 185 – 6 Smith, Walter 41 – 2 Somalia 2; American withdrawal from 193 – 5; breakout of war between Ethiopia and 136 – 8; British 2, 45 – 9; Carter and 128 – 30, 154; civil war in, 1990s 191 – 3; deterioration of human condition in, in the 1990s 200 – 1; Ethiopian control over 15 – 16; Ford and 112 – 13, 119 – 20; independence 5, 45 – 9; instability 49; irredentism and the OAU 73 – 6; irredentism and the Ogaden 60 – 4; Italian 2, 4, 12 – 14, 27 – 9, 45 – 9; Kennedy and 55 – 6, 62, 64; legacy of colonialism in 47 – 8; Ogaden region and 2, 7, 48; under Osman 45, 47, 55; overthrow of 1990 8; post-war relations with the US 145 – 6; Reagan and 158 – 60, 176 – 7; Revolution, 1969 6; revolution in 1969 88 – 92; under Shermarke 6, 55, 62, 79 – 80; Soviet aid to 55, 90; transition from colonialism to terrorism 196 – 8, 203 – 4 Somali flag trade 2, 91 Somali National Movement (SNM) 191 – 3, 196 Soviet Union, the 1 – 3; aid to Somalia 55, 90; collapse of 198; Gorbachev’s new approach in 173 – 4, 176, 178 – 9, 182 – 3; increased influence in Ethiopia 121 – 2; increased influence on the Horn of Africa after 1976 118 – 19; interest in the Horn of Africa 1, 2; invasion of Afghanistan, 1979 7 – 8, 147, 153 – 4; Korean War and 32 – 5; military outcome in Ethiopia and 140 – 3; Ogaden region and 7; Ogaden War and 138 – 40; onset of the Cold War with the US 11 – 12; proxy war in the Horn of Africa 122 – 3; SALT II arms agreements 135, 147; Somali irredentism and 73 – 4; the space race and 64; threat in the Horn during the Eisenhower administration 42 – 4; UN agreement on future of Italian Somaliland and 29 Spangler, Scott 197 Special Relationship 2, 4, 6, 8, 21, 38 – 49, 120, 167, 175 – 6, 179 – 80, 184 – 7, 199, 204 Spencer, John 119 Springsteen, George 107 Strait of Aden 11 Stratton, Samuel 119 Suez Canal 11, 85, 103, 118

Sukin, Valery 179 Symington, Stuart 95 Tarchiani, Alberto 13 Tarnoff, Peter 128 television coverage of the Horn of Africa 162 – 5 Territorial integrity 48, 75, 111, 136, 139, 143 – 4, 175 terrorism 196 – 8, 203 – 4 Thant, U 74 Thatcher, Margaret 163 Thurston, Raymond 80 Tigray 182, 184 Timpson, Andrew 200 Torbert, Horace 63 Toussie, Sam 197 Treaties 5, 12, 16, 19, 26, 29, 42, 48, 73, 105, 135 – 6, 138; Friendship treaty between Somalia and Soviet Union 138; Italian Peace Treaty 26; Treaties of Commerce and Friendship, 1953 42 Truman, Harry S. 1, 14; Eritrea and 17 – 18; establishment of the United Nations and 25 – 6; Ethiopia and 15, 17; farewell address 20; Korea and 32 – 5; State of the Union message, 1951 20 Truman Doctrine 11 – 12, 19 Tsongas, Paul 140 Turkey 19 Turner, Stansfield 140, 143 United Nations, the 2, 4; establishment of 24 – 6; Ethiopia and Eritrea and 29 – 32; Italian colonies and 26 – 7; Italian Somaliland and 27 – 9; Korea and 32 – 5; Somalia’s independence and 45 – 7; Somali irredentism and 74 – 5; World Food Programme 161 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2 United Nations General Assembly 26 – 30, 32, 46, 88, 112 United Nations Political and Security Subcommittee 29 United Nations Security Council 25, 33, 71, 181, 201 – 2 United Nations Special Political Committee 30 United Somali Congress (USC) 193 United States, the 1 – 3; bicentennial 118; Civil Rights Act 76; Great Society 5, 69 – 70, 72, 75; onset of the Cold War with the Soviet Union 11 – 12; overview of policy towards Horn of Africa 3 – 8;

224 Index post-war relations with Ethiopia 143 – 5; post-war relations with Somalia 145 – 6; recognition of growing importance of Africa 39 – 40; response to revolution in Ethiopia 107 – 9; SALT II arms agreements 135, 147; the space race and 64 United States Congress 96; see also United States House of Representatives, United States Senate United States House of Representatives 194; see also Committee on Armed Services; Committee on Foreign Affairs; Committee on International Relations; Select Committee on Hunger; Subcommittee on Africa; Subcommittee on Appropriations; Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Operations; Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies; Subcommittee on International Operations United States Information Service 127 United States Senate 33; see also Committee on Appropriations; Committee on Foreign Relations; Subcommittee on African Affairs; Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad; Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees USA For Africa 8, 164 US Ambassador to Ethiopia 16, 30, 49, 56, 111 US Ambassador to Somalia 80, 128, 139

USSR 7, 38, 63, 78, 85, 90, 121, 138 – 9, 157, 168, 178; see also Soviet Union Vance, Cyrus 124, 126, 138 – 9, 142, 146, 154, 173 Vietnam 65, 72, 110 – 11, 123; influence on foreign policy in the Horn of Africa 93 – 5; Johnson and 69 – 72, 81; Nixon and 85, 90 – 5 Vietnam Syndrome 6 – 7, 92, 94, 102 – 3, 122; Carter and 128, 130 – 1; Ford and 118 – 19 Waggonner, Joseph 130 Wagner, Robert 25 Waldheim, Kurt 103 Wallace, James 193 – 4 Walsh, John 33 – 4 Watergate 102 – 4, 118, 123 Webb, James 32 Weiss, Ted 166 Wheat, Alan 200 Wiley, Alexander 42 Williams, G. Mennen 53, 60, 62, 71 Wilson, Charles 41 Wolpe, Howard 161, 192, 196 Woods, Alan 178 World Bank 49 World War II 10 – 11; establishment of the United Nations after 24; see also Cold War, the Wynne, Parker 108, 110 Yemen 203 Zenawi, Meles 185 – 7, 199 Zhukov, Yuri 86