Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain 9789633865071

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UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY 1953

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE COLD WAR READERS Series Editor MALCOLM BYRNE Previously published: THE PRAGUE SPRING '68

Forthcoming: Hungary 1956 Poland 1980-81 The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: Soviet Policy toward Eastern Europe, 1985-89 Poland, 1986-1989 Czechoslovakia, 1987-1989 Hungary, 1989-1990

Produced in collaboration with: The Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY 1953 THE COLD WAR, THE GERMAN QUESTION, AND THE FIRST MAJOR UPHEAV AL BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

Compiled, edited and introduced by CHRISTIAN F. OSTERMANN Editorial coordination by MALCOLM BYRNE

.

.. � ' � CEU PRESS 4 ••

CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY PRESS

Pubhshed by Central European University Press Nador utca 15 H-1051 Budapest Hungary 400 West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 USA An imprint of the Central European University Share Company

© 2001 by The Nat10nal Security Archive Distributed in the United Kingdom and Western Europe by Plymbridge Distributors Ltd., Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PZ, United Kingdom All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the permission of the Publisher. ISBN 963 9241 17 2 Cloth ISBN 9789633865071 ebook Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book 1s available upon request

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CONTENTS

Preface by Charles S. Maier, Harvard University Introduction and Acknowledgements

XV xix

Acronyms and Abbreviations

XXVII

Chronology ofEvents

XXXI

PARTONE

THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS

Introduction

1

Document No. 1: Soviet and East German Minutes ofConversations between JosefStalin and SED Leaders in the GDR, 1 April and 7 April 1952

22

Document No. 2: CPSU CC Resolution Approving the Deployment ofBorder Guards along the Eastern Border ofthe GDR, 2 January 1953

43

Document No. 3: Memorandum ofDiscussion at the 136th Meeting ofthe National Security Council, 11 March 1953

44

Document No. 4: Draft lnstructions for General Vasilii Chuikov and Vladimir Semyonov Regarding GDR Control ofBorders, 18 March 1953

50

Document No. 5: Memorandum by Ivan Tugarinov, "On the Western Powers' Policy Regarding the German Question," 18 April 1953

52

Document No. 6: Memorandum on the German Question, from Georgii Pushkin and Mikhail Gribanov to Vyacheslav Molotov, 18 April 1953

67

Document No. 7: Soviet Foreign Ministry Memorandum, "Regarding Further Measures ofthe Soviet Government on the German Question," 28 April 1953

71

Document No. 8: Cable from N. Spencer Barnes to U.S. Department ofState Reviewing Developments in the GDR since Stalin's Death, 30 April 1953

74

Document No. 9: Memorandum from Vladimir Semyonov to Vyacheslav Molotov Evaluating the Prospects for a Successful Resolution ofthe German Question, 2 May 1953

82

Document No. 10: Report on 4 May Disturbances at the Tobacco Depot in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, 7 May 1953

86 Vll

Document No. 11: USSR Foreign Ministry Draft Memorandum,"On Further Soviet Govemment Measures Pertaining to the German Question," 8May 1953

90

Document No. 12: Memorandmn from the Soviet Ministry ofInternal Affairs to

Vladimir Semyonov,"On the Question ofPreventing the Defection oflnhabitants from the GDR to West Germany," 15 May 1953

97

Document No. 13: Memorandum from General Vasilii Chuikov,Pavel Yudin, and Ivan Il'ichev to Georgii Malenkov Critically Assessing the Situation in the GDR,18Mayl953

100

Document No. 14: CIA Report Evaluating Vladimir Semyonov's Appointment as Soviet High Commissioner for Germany,29 May,1953

110

Document No. 15: Cable from Ambassador Charles Bohlen to John Foster Dulles regarding the Transfer ofSoviet Contra! in East Germany to Soviet High Commissioner Vladimir Semyonov,29 May 1953

111

Document No. 16: Materials for a Meeting ofthe Organizational Secretariat of

the CPCz CC,with Attached Report on Paiiy Activities in Pizen in Connection with the Events of 1 June 1953,31 July 1953

Document No. 17: Radio Free Europe Report on the Strikes in Plzeü. during

113

Early June 1953,8September 1953

128

Document No. 18: USSR Council ofMinisters Order "On Measures to Improve the Health ofthe Political Situation in the GDR," 2 June 1953

133

Document No. 19: Otto Grotewohl's Notes ofMeetings between East German and Soviet Leaders in Moscow,2-4 June 1953

137

Document No. 20: SED CC Politburo Minutes Discussing Moscow's Directives

for the New Course,6 June 1953

139

Document No. 21: Cnble from Samuel Reber to U.S. Department ofState Outlining U.S. Perspectives on Four-Power Talks,13 June 1953

142

Document No. 22: Transcript ofConversations between the Soviet Leadership and a Hungarian Workers' Party Delegation in Moscow, 13 and 16 June 1953

144

Document No. 23: Letter from Lavrentii Beria to Georgii Malenkov Reflecting on the Events of Spring 1953,1 July 1953

155

Document No. 24: Transcript ofthe CPSU CC Plenum Meetings Regarding

Beria's Views on the German Question in Spring 1953, 2-3 July 1953 (Excerpts)

Vill

158

PARTTWO

THE UPRISING

Introduction

163

Document No. 25: Situation Report from Vladimir Semyonov and Andrei

Grechko to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, 7:26 a.m. Moscow Time (5:26 a.m. CET)

181

Document No. 26: Situation Report from Vladimir Semyonov and Andrei

Grechko to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, 11:15 a.m. CET Document No. 27: Cable from the Czechoslovak Mission in Berlin to Foreign

Minister Vaclav David, 17 June 1953, received 1:45 p.m. CET

183 185

Document No. 28: Radio Telegram from Vladimir Semyonov Providing

Situation Report to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, as of2:00 p.m. CET Document No. 29: Situation Report from the Czechoslovak Mission in Berlin

186

to Foreign Minister Vaclav David, 17 June 1953

188

Document No. 30: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, received 6:30 p.m. Moscow Time (4:30 p.m. CET)

190

Document No. 31: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, as of5:30 p.m. CET

192

Document No. 32: Cable from Cecil Lyon to U.S. Department ofState Relaying

Minutes ofthe First Meeting ofthe Western Military Commandants in Berlin, 17 June 1953, 6:00 p.m. CET

194

Document No. 33: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, as of 11:00 p.m. Moscow Time (9:00 p.m. CET)

196

Document No. 34: Cable from Cecil Lyon to the State Department Reporting on Afternoon Meeting ofthe Western Commandants, 17 June 1953, 9:00 p.m. CET

198

Document No. 35: Telephonogram from Vladimir Semyonov and Marshal

Vasilii Sokolovskii to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin Reporting on the Situation in East Berlin, 17 June 1953, as of11:00 p.m. CET Document No. 36: Pravda Correspondent P. Naumov to Dimitrii Shepilov,

200

"Report on the Events in Berlin on 16 and 17 June 1953," 22 June 1953

202

Document No. 37: Situation Report from Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii and Marshal Leonid Govorov to Nikolai Bulganin, 18 June 1953, 2:05 a.m. Moscow Time (12:05 a.m. CET)

208

Document No. 38: Psychological Strategy Board Memorandum from John M.

Anspacher to George A. Morgan, 17 June 1953

210

ix

Document No. 39: Cable from John Foster Dulles to HICOG Bonn on the Propaganda Value ofthe East Berlin Demonstrations, 17 June 1953, 7:02 p.m. EST (18 June 1953, 1:02 a.m. CET)

213

Document No. 40: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 18 June 1953, as of8:00 a.m. Moscow Time (6:00 a.m. CET)

214

Document No. 41: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 18 June 1953, as of1:00 p.m. Moscow Time (11:00 a.m. CET)

216

Document No. 42: Telephonogram from Vladimir Semyonov and Vasilii Sokolovskii to Vyacheslav Molotov Reporting on the Situation in East Berlin, 18 June 1953, as of2:00 p.m. CET

217

Document No. 43: Sihiation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 18 June 1953, as of6:00 p.m. Moscow Time (4:00 p.m. CET)

219

Document No. 44: Telegram from Cecil Lyon to U.S. Department ofState Reporting on Developments in Berlin, 18 June 1953, 7:00 p.m. CET

220

Document No. 45: CIA Current Intelligence Review Analyzing the "Commtmist 'New Look"' and "Recent Unrest in Eastern Europe," 18 June 1953

222

Document No. 46: Minutes ofDiscussion at the 150th Meeting ofthe National Security Council on 18 June 1953, 19 June 1953

225

Document No. 47: Report from KGB Resident in Berlin Co!. Ivan Fadeikin to Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, 19 June 1953

232

Document No. 48: Telephonogram from Vladimir Semyonov and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin Reporting on the Situation in East Berlin, 19 June 1953, 3:35 p.m. CET

236

Document No. 49: CPCz Information Bulletin on Czechoslovak Reaction to the Events in East Germany, 19 June 1953

237

Document No. SO: Order from the Polish Minister ofState Security, to Regional Branches Outlining Steps to be Taken to Limit Spillover of Events in East Germany, 19 June 1953

241

Document No. 51: CIA Current Intelligence Digest, "Comment on Berlin Rioting," 19 June 1953

243

Document No. 52: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 20 June 1953, as of10:00 a.m. Moscow Time (8:00 a.m. CET)

244

Document No. 53: Special Report No. 2 ofthe WUBP in Wroclaw (Poland), Regarding Spillover from Events in Berlin, 20 June 1953

245

Document No. 54: Memorandum from Karl Schirdewan to First Secretaries of the District Leaderships ofthe SED, 21 June 1953

247

Document No. 55: Diary Entiy from U.S. HICOG James B. Conant on the Effects ofEast Zone Troubles on Soviet Policy, 21 June 1953

248

X

Document No. 56: CIA Current Intelligence Bulletin on Comments by Charles Bohlen and the Deployment ofSoviet Troops, 21 June 1953

249

Document No. 57: CPSU CC Memorandum to the SED CC, Enclosure to Minutes No. 40 from the SED Politburo Session of21 June 1953, 23 June 1953

251

Document No. 58: Minute from Selwyn Lloyd to Winston Churchill, Reflecting British Perspectives on the Berlin Uprising, 22 June 1953

252

Document No. 59: Special Repmt No. 4 ofthe WUBP in Wroclaw (Poland), Noting the Spread ofRumors about East Germany, 23 June 1953

255

Document No. 60: Report from Vasilii Sokolovskii, V ladimir Semyonov, and Pavel Yudin "On the Events of 17-19 June 1953 in Berlin and the GDR and Certain Conclusions from These Events," 24 June 1953

257

Document No. 61: CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "Indications of [Soviet] Intentions in Europe," c. 24 June 1953

286

Document No. 62: CIA Information Report, "Continuing Resistance among Workers," 25 June 1953

288

Document No. 63: Memorandum from Secretary ofthe Moscow Committee N. Mikhailov to Nikita Khrushchev, 26 June 1953

289

Document No. 64: Report from Lt.-Gen. F. Fedenko to Lt.-Gen. N. D. Pavlovskii Summarizing Data on the Number ofParticipants in the East German Uprising, 27 June 1953

291

Document No. 65: Protocol #1 ofa Meeting ofthe Vyshinskii Commission to Draft a Proposal Pertaining to the GDR, 2 July 1953

293

Document No. 66: Memorandum from Vladimir Semyonov and Pavel Yudin to Vyacheslav Molotov Regarding Inter-Zonal Movements in Berlin, 4 July 1953

295

Document No. 67: Otto Grotewohl's Handwritten Notes ofa SED CC Politburo Meeting, 8 July 1953

297

Document No. 68: Report from Maj.-Gen. Sergei Dengin to Vladimir Semyonov, "On the Situation in the Soviet Seetor ofBerlin," 8 July 1953

299

Document No. 69: Memorandum from Georgii Pushkin to Andrei Vyshinskii Regarding Proposals Made by Semyonov, Sokolovskii and Yudin, 9 July 1953 (Excerpt)

303

Document No. 70: Note from Sergei K.ruglov to Georgii Malenkov, with Attached Communication from Pyotr Fedotov and Ivan Fadeikin Regarding the SED CC Politburo, 9 July 1953

309

Document No. 71: CIA Information Report, "Berlin Situation as of5.00 p.m., 9 July 1953," 10 July 1953

314

Document No. 72: Memorandum from Sergei K.ruglov to Georgii Malenkov Summarizing an East German Investigation into the Alleged Western Role in the Provocations of17 June 15 July 1953

315 xi

PARTTHREE

THE AFTERMATH: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

lntroduction

317

Document No. 73: Summary ofDiscussion at the 151st Meeting ofthe National Security Council, 25June 1953

329

Document No. 74: NSC 158, "United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States," 29June 1953

332

Document No. 75: Czechoslovak Communist Party Information Bulletin, 1July 1953

335

Document No. 76: Memorandum of Informal Psychological Strategy Board Meeting, 1July 1953

337

Document No. 77: Memorandum ofInformal Psychological Strategy Board Meeting, 8July 1953

339

Document No. 78: Report ofthe Chiefofthe WUBP in Olsztyn (Poland) for June 1953, 9July 1953 (Excerpts)

341

Document No. 79: Memorandum ofTelephone Conversation betweenJohn Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, 10 July 1953

344

Document No. 80: CIA Special Supplement to the Current Intelligence Weekly, 10 July 1953

345

Document No. 81: CIA Information Repoti, "Plans for Renewal ofStrikes in East Germany," 13July 1953

351

Document No. 82: Letter from President Eisenhower to Field Marshal Montgomery ofAlamein, 14July 1953

353

Document No. 83: Intelligence Advisory Committee, Special Estimate (SE-47), "Probable Effect of Recent Developments in Eastern Germany on Soviet Policy with Respect to Germany," 21July 1953

355

Document No. 84: Letter fromJames Conant toJohn Foster Dulles, 28July 1953

359

Document No. 85: Draft Resolution ofthe CPSU CC, c. 31July 1953

361

Document No. 86: CIA Information Report, "Unrest over Food Packages," 7 August 1953

363

Document No. 87: Conclusions from Reports ofthe SED District Leaderships, 8 August 1953

364

Document No. 88: Cable fromJames Conant toJohn Poster Dulles, 8 August 1953

365

Document No. 89: Memorandum fromJohn A. Bross to Allen Dulles Regarding Food Depots along Zonal Boundaries, 11 August 1953

366

Document No. 90: Memorandum from Leonid Brezhnev to Nikita Khrushchev, 20 August 1953

368

Document No. 91: Report ofthe Polish Diplomatie Mission in Berlin for the Period 21 June-31 August 1953 (Excerpts), c. September 1953

371

Document No. 92: CIA Infonnation Report, "Aftermath ofthe Riots," 10 September 1953

374

Document No. 93: HICOG Report on the U.S. Food Aid Program for East Germany, 17 September 1953

376

Document No. 94: CIA Infom1ation Report, "Estimated Damage as a Result of the June 16/17 Mass Demonstrations," 16 October 1953

390

Document No. 95: NSC Report No. 174, "United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," 11 December 1953

392

Epilogue

415

Main Actors

423

Bibliography

427

Index

441

xiii

PREFACE

Unlike the Hungarian revolution of1956, the Prague spring of1968, or the emergence of Solidarity in 1980, the East German uprising of 17 June 1953 sometimes seemed too local and ephemeral to represent more than a momentary outburst of anger. To be sure, it was the first real mass uprising within the Soviet sphere of influence. lt provided poignant and indelible images of unarmed citizens in East Berlin as they challenged Russian tanks with fists and rocks. But the revolt was quickly suppressed. lt remained unclear to what extent it had been orchestrated across the West Berlin sector lines, above all by the radio station RIAS. Precisely because it came first it was overlaid in memory by the later challenges to Communist rule. lt became convenient for West Germans to subtly downplay its role even as they commemorated it each year. Still, as recent archival disclosures and memoirs confirm, it was not just a manufactured cold-war event. lt was triggered by the issue of work "norms," that is by state demands for increased time and output on the job, but it far transcended a dispute over labor conditions. The documentation collected in this volume presented by the National Security Archive, along with the Cold War International History Project, discloses a new Soviet leadership often uncertain about their power and unsure of what policies to follow. lt reveals the East German State to be fragile in the extreme, as even the Russian representatives cautioned that it could easily be blown away by a popular revolt. In effect 1953 foreshadowed the deep crisis of legitimacy that would finally overtake the GDR and the Soviet control of Eastern Europe in autumn 1989. lt revealed that ultimately the structures ofCommunist control rested 011 armed domination. This was not an unreal basis of power, and it might still allow genuine loyalties and political commitments to develop over time-but many observers had tended to forget that it was the underlying scaffolding ofthe Communist system. This volume will serve to keep us from forgetting again. The documentation provided in this collection is a precious one. lt reveals first-hand the deep uncertainties in the Soviet system as the ideological obsessiveness ofStalin 's last months suddenly altered with his abrupt disappearance. The problem for his lieutenants became how to manage a succession without the unleashing oflethal rivalry, even as they quickly came to realize that their control over Eastern Europe could evaporate given the anger among the population against ideological repression, increased demands for labor, and unpopular and unproductive collectivization. The editors, from the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project-organizations whose continuing publications have pro­ vided essential insights into the recurring crises of the Communist system from the l 940s until its collapse by 1991-have assembled a series of sources that demonstrate the true depth and amplitude ofthe East Gennan uprising of 16-17 June 1953. Working through these documents, with their careful summaries and the guide to the secondary literature and other publications provided by the notation, the reader will under­ stand how complex a set ofproblems crystallized during this period. The Soviet system had become warped around the unquestioned authority of its leader. Stalin's power confirmed XV

the control for local communists who were both subservient to his guidelines and ambitious to emulate his authority at the vertex oftheir own home paiiies and states. The Machiavellian realism of the dictator led him repeatedly to urge some restraint upon the East Germans even as in the last year ofhis life, he supervised a convulsive effort to construct socialism in Eastern Europe. No matter what misgivings Moscow may have harbored about the skill ofthe East German communists, the reluctance of Washington, London, and Paris to respond positively to Stalin 's 1952 offer-genuine or spurious-to negotiate German reunification meant that the East German State must be consolidated-even as the SED leadership apparently still fantasized that they might successfully compete as a party in West Germany. And after Stalin's sudden death on 5 March 1 953, his successors oscillated over the German problem, trying to steer a course between the hard-liners who remained posted in Berlin and the renunciationists-each of which positions was soon a stake in the domestic battle for the succession. The collection here reveals one gern after another. To cite just a few: Stalin's "jocular" advice to his East German supplicants, who were thanking him for sending performers to a Beethoven festival, that musical cooperation was fine, but an army was better; the Kremlin's fierce dressing down of the arrogant Matyas Rakosi in spring 1953 as anxiety grew about unrest in the satellites; Walter Ulbricht's proposal to post soldiers along the Soviet sector boundaries in Berlin to impede flight (a Wall before the Wall), initially approved and then sternly vetoed by the new Russian collective leadership against the advice of their men on the scene; reports on the little-known demonstrations in Bulgaria and Pilsen (Pizen), Czecho­ slovakia, shortly before the East German explosions; Khrushchev's bitter denunciation of Beria for alleged willingness to surrender East Germany, as the once cocky and choleric Security Chief, deprived even ofhis glasses, was reduced to fawning (and obviously unavail­ ing) appeals to his arrestors; or Washington's awkward debates and-in this reader 's judg­ ment at !east-the NSC's and CIA's banal analyses of East European developments. The archives suggest the brief openness of a history that soon reverted to dismaying closure. Historians have long debated whether the famous Stalin note of April 1 952 calling for a unified, neutralist but still rearmed, Germany on the basis of national elections was anything more than a ploy to slow down the European Defense Community and Western rearmament. lt was at least a gambit designed to hinder Western integration-a concept deeply opposed by Konrad Adenauer and soon believed in Washington, if not Paris and London, to be far too costly to pursue. For Stalin's successors the problem by the spring of 1953, however, was not whether they wished to wager on such a negotiation, but whether they might simply lose control of their Satellite State-and perhaps Hungary and Czecho­ slovakia as well. The documents published here leave little doubt as to the depth ofthe threat that the Soviets perceived and the vulnerability of their control. Of course, they could and did use force; ultimately control would rest on tanks, just as eight years after 1953 it would be constructed on the basis of a sealed border. The Soviets did not doubt it was justified, but they were shaken by the disaffection. As the documents suggest, local commanders found it easiest to fall back on the idea ofWestern provocateurs and agents. But Kremlin leaders had to consider the disaffection ofthe population and the arrogance and insensitivity ofthe leaders they had elevated to power. Their own local henchmen seemed sometimes so clumsy and over-zealous. But although CIA observers feit, so we learn here, that after the uprising the Russians must compel their vassals to liberalize, they were logical but incorrect. Rather, a still emerging Khrushchev, along with others, decided they had to cling to Ulbricht all the more firmly. Instead, the critics of his authoritarian methods were the ones to be sacrificed. Not that they had opposed the disastrous policies of collectivization before the uprising; rather, they had xvi

feared (rightly as it turned out) the undermining of authority that a rapid reversal of policy might cause. The 1 7th of June soon acquired the standing of a cold-war artifact. Was it not in fact slightly embarrassing? The Adenauer and Erhard governments had an unavowed stake in the status quo of a divided Germany, and celebration of the movement's national aspirations could become a potential rebuke. When the Social Democrats came to power in Bonn, their Ostpolitik did not allow for an easy reckoning with those who had defied the East German regime-although Willy Brandt lived long enough to celebrate the demonstrators of 1 989. Western intellectuals found the rawness of the anticommunist aspirations awkward. None­ theless what this volume suggests is not the limits of the movement but its genuinely radical thrust. Popular movements do not have to set out a well-articulated alternative social vision to be truly radical. They do not need a coherent program. They just have to say No to power in a demonstrative and courageous fashion; the lineaments of an alternative future will soon emerge. In this sense, the demonstrators deserved to be remembered by a national holiday. The Empire was indeed shaken: to have to rely on force revealed the limits and hollowness of its supposed historical mandate. The demonstrations remained as the East Gennan index ofvulnerability-and as the power ofthe GDR leadership deliquesced in October 1 989, they sought to reassure themselves that control was not yet so precarious as in June 1 95 3 . They were wrong. The difference was that the demonstrators of 1 989 abjured violence; but on their part, the Soviets forswore intervention, and it did not take violence under those conditions to force a transformation. The East Germ an State was built upon the memory of 1 9 5 3 , which set the limits to change as weil as revealing the limits of consensus. Absent the Soviets, there was no reason it would subsist. Soviet enforcement ofthe SED 's power did not mean that over the years and decades a certain degree of acceptance could not emerge. Two long generations would come of age, many willing to try and work within the limits of the system whether as simple workers, athletes, managers, or researchers. Even ideals, manipulated as they were for political ends, could still motivate-notably the idea of antifascism, or some vague commitment to peace. Within the !arger sub-optimal economy of the state-socialist systems, the East Germans played a key role providing machine tools and cooperating on computer ventures, always decisively behind the West, but never renouncing high tech. Urban infrastructure and buildings could decay, private autos would remain expensive and shoddy, dissenters would find their careers blocked-indeed some would be expelled or imprisoned-the media would continue the vapid uncritical slogans (although Western television would provide some alternative for many); but brute industrial output would remain dominant in the Eastern bloc. Churchmen would carve out a conditional autonomy; some scholars would attempt honest research. Eventually Western loans and cross-border visits would allow the GDR's second­ rate and tawdry material life, the muffled public sphere (riddled through by private sociability and the emerging postmodern protests of the 1 980s) to subsist for four decades. 1 95 3 came to seem distant and irrelevant. But from the perspective of 1 989 and with the help of the reports and transcripts now collected here we can see that it had represented an alternative world, unpredictable for both sides in the great stmggle, violent and spontaneous, and although suppressed at the time, a continuing revelation as to how thin the authority of even massively authoritarian systems might become. Charles S. Maier Harvard University

xvii

INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

" ... 1 am quite certain that future historians, in their analysis ofthe causes which will have brought about the disintegration ofthe Communist Empire, will single out those brave East Germans who dared to rise against the cannons of tyranny with nothing but their bare hands and their stout hearts, as a root cause " 1 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Konrad Adenauer 20 July 1953

For President Eisenhower, as for many of his contemporaries in East and West, the widespread rebellion against the oppressive Communist government in East Germany in the summer of 1953, suppressed only by a Soviet military crackdown, was a pivotal moment in the Cold War. Did it mark the beginning ofthe end ofthe Soviet empire? Was it the dawn of the post-Cold War world? The spontaneous revolt ofworkers, farmers, and youth against a tyrannical regime was the first major uprising within the Soviet empire since the Kronstadt un­ rest in 1921. lt demonstrated to the world that the "captive peoples" ofthe Soviet bloc could and would oppose Stalinist rule when the opportunity arose--and that the Moscow-backed re­ gimes could be upheld only by military force. The "proletariat" had risen against the "dictatorship ofthe proletariat;" workers and peasants were throwing stones at the organs ofa state that had been proclain1ed in their name. Politically, ideologically and diplomatically, East Germans had dealt their Communist rulers-and their Soviet masters---a heavy, almost mortal blow. Before long, the events of1953 would become part ofthe propaganda, legends, and identity of both sides of the Cold War in Germany. 2 In the GDR, the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) quickly charged that the uprising had been a "fascist provocation" hatched by American and West German "imperialist agents." Historical research into the deeper causes of the crisis remained a taboo in East Germany where history was used in the service of legitimizing the regime. 3 W hile in the years after SED leader Walter Ulbricht's death in 1973, and increasingly in the 1980s, some East German historians tried to give a more differenti­ ated, less grossly distorted picture ofwhat had happened, the idea that "Day X" had been a U. S.-instigated plot remained predominant. Some Soviet and SED officials stubbomly adhere 1 Draft letter from the Pres1dent to Chancellor Adenauer, 20 July 1 953, Dwight D. Eisenhower L1brary (Abilene, Kans.), C.D. Jackson Records, Box 3; New York Times, 26 July 1 953. 2 See llse Spittmann, "'Der 1 7. Juni im Wandel der Legenden," in / 7. Jum-Arbe1teraufstand m der DDR, ed. llse Sp1ttmann and Karl-Wilhelm Fricke {Köln. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1 988), pp. 1 2 1-132, Dietmar Schiller, "Pol itische Gedenktage in Deutschland. Zum Verhältmss von öffentlicher Erinnerung und politischer Kultur," A us Polrllk und Zellgeschichte 825/93 (June 1 993), pp. 32-39. 3 llko-Sascha Kowalczuk, "Die Historiker der DDR und der 1 7. Juni 1 953," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 44 ( 1 993 ), pp. 704-724; Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Legitimation eines neuen Staates. Parteiarbeiter an der historischen Front: Gesch1chtsw1ssenschaft m der SBZIDDR 1945 bis 1961 (Berlin. Links, 1 997). XlX

to this view·even today,4 and the legend of Western provocation, popularized in such books as Stefan Heym's Der Tag X (later published in the West as Fiinf Tage im Juni) and taught for years in high schools and universities throughout the GDR may still have its hold on many. In West Germany, the unanimous condemnation of the Soviet military action resulted in the adoption of an annual "Day of German Unity." In parliament, 1 7 June was hailed as "the most important event in the recent history of German democracy. "5 But even as early as the summer of 1 953, the events in the East were already manipulated for the political purposes of the day: for Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the uprising bolstered support for his policy of integrating the Federal Republic with the West in the hopes of some day negotiating with the East from a position of strengtb . By contrast, for many within the Social Democratic opposition in the FRG, the revolt prompted calls for further immediate steps towards German reunification. Over the years , official statements and public commemorations in West Germany on the "Day of German Unity" became a rather precise barometer of the dominant strain of Deutschlandpolitik of the day. Progressively, the mem01y of 1 7 June faded and lost its emotional appeal. Against the backdrop of detente, Ostpolitik, and the seeming permanence of Gennany 's division in late 1 960s and 1 970s, many West Germans increasingly wondered whether to commemorate 1 7 June at all. At the same time, curiously, the student movement and German Left began to discover 1 953 and interpret it according to their own concep­ tions-as a failed attempt at class struggle by East German workers against the all-G erman state-capitalist (East) and bourgeois (West) elites. 6 Historians soon took up the battle where the politicians had left off. At the height of the Cold War, 1 7 June in the West was a symbol for German unity in tbe quest for freedom; most historians emphasized the uprising's political goals and its broad popular base. In the l 970s and early l 980s, the focus shifted towards the economic roots of the crisis. Though the new evidence seems to suggest that the protests were marked by both social-labor grievances and political demancls from the beginning, to this day German historians argue acrimoniously over the character of the revolt. Was it largely a "workers ' revolt with potential for a popular uprising," a genuine popular revolt, or a "failed revolution"? 7

*** As the documents presented in this reader will show, the 1 953 crisis had a profound impact not only on the GDR but outside it as well, affecting the policies of each of the greater and lesser powers involved. Within East Germany, Ulbricht set the country on a hard-line course, 4 See for examplc the memolfs of the SED chief ideologue, Kurt Hager, Ermnerungen (Leipzig Faber & Faber, 1 996), pp 1 93-1 95; Wl ad 1111 1r S SemJonov, Von Stalin brs Gorbatschow. Em halbes Jahrhundert rn d1p/omatrscher M1ssron, 1 939--1991 (Berl 111. Nikolai, 1 995), pp 29 1 -299 5 Deutscher Bundestag delegate Stefan Meier on 3 July 1 953 111 the parliamentary debatc on the l aw; Deutscher Bundestag, cd , Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berrchte. First Legrslalive Penod, 280th sess1011, p 1 4070, quoted 111 Edgar Wol frum, "Kein Sedantag glorreicher Erinnerung. Der Tag der Deutschen Einheit in der alten Bundesrepublik," Deutschland Archiv ( 1 998), p 434. 6 Rudi Dutschke, "Der Kommumsmus, die despotische Verfremdung desselben und der Weg der DDR zum Arbeiteraufstand vom 1 7 Jum 1 953," 111 Dte Soiv1etumon, Solschencyn unddie westlrche lmke, ed. Rudi Dutschke and Manfred Wtlke (Rcmbeck Rowohlt, 1 975), see also Alexander Gallus, "Der 1 7 .Tunt 1m Deutschen Bundestag von 1 954 bis 1 990," A us Po!tttk und Ze1tgesc/11chte 825/93 (June 1 993), pp 1 2-2 1 7 Torsten Diednch, '"Putsch-Volksaufstand-Arbe1tercrhehung," Aus Polwk und Zertgesch1chte 825/93 (.Tune 1 993), pp 3-1 1 , Ruud van D1Jk, "Der 1 7. Jum al s Krise im Kalten Kneg," Deutschland Archiv 30.2 ( 1 997), pp 2 9 1 -293 XX

as was immediately evident in the massive expansion ofthe state security apparatus. Haunted by the 195 3 experience, Walter Ulbricht and the GDR political elite became advocates of equally harsh crackdowns against subsequent crises in other Warsaw Pact countries. In Moscow, the intersection of the post-Stalin power struggle with the East German uprising, and its potential for spilling over into other countries, including the USSR, undercut those Soviet leaders who strove for a more flexible Deutschlandpolitik. Once the ousted KGB chief Lavrentii Beria was identified (rightly or mistakenly) by his Kremlin rivals with the idea of moderating or abandoning socialism in the GDR, such a policy option became a political taboo. This circumstance laid the foundation for Soviet-East German relations for the next three decades. The Western response, as revealed by the new documentation, was more complex. The initial reaction was essentially passive, although Western radio broadcasts, in particular RIAS, worked aggressively to spread the news of the East Berlin strikes. In the aftermath, the U.S. government, especially, sought to capitalize on the uprising in several ways: by putting Soviet German policy on the defensive, strengthening the position ofAdenauer, and maintaining a level ofinstability inside the GDR. But, this was a far cry from the ambitious "roll-back" rhetoric of the Eisenhower presidential campaign and first term. Despite their general caution, U.S. policymakers stumbled on a surprisingly successful method ofexacer­ bating the SED 's difficulties-through a food program aimed at providing the GDR popu­ lation with vitally needed supplies. In fact, the overwhelming response to the program by ordinary East Germans gave pause to many in the West and influenced the rethinking of American strategy towards Eastern Europe later that year. The uprising was equally important for British policy inasmuch as it undermined even further Winston Churchill 's efforts towards East-West summitry and a great power deal to bring an early end to the Cold War. Despite the wealth of new evidence partially represented here, questions remain. Who within the Soviet leadership favored a more flexible Deutschlandpolitik in the spring of 195 3 ? What were the goals-and limits-ofthis more accommodating policy? How did the uprising affect the decision-making process in Moscow? Would a more decisive, aggressive Western stance on 17 June have strengthened the position of the East German population vis-a-vis the SED regime? Did Western intelligence agencies launch any additional clandestine operations in the GDR during or after the uprising? Although the new documents shed important light on these and other questions, they can only be answered through further archival releases in Moscow, Washington, and Berlin.

*** Nonetheless, the opening of sometimes extraordinary new primary sources in the last decade has altered and deepened our understanding ofthe crucial events of l 953. 8 Until 1990, scholars researching this history had to rely on a relatively small quantity of published documents, a scattering ofnot-yet published Western archival materials, the records of the Ostbüro ofthe Social Democratic Party (with its many ties to East Germany), and accounts 8 Documents for this reader were drawn largely from the Archive of the Pres1dent of the Russian Federation, the Russ1an Foreign Mm1stry Archives, the Russ1an General Staff Archives, the Foundation "Archive ofthe Parties and Mass Orgamzattons of the Former GDR" w1th the Federal Archives "Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv," the Hungarian National Archives, the Bulgarian National Archives, the Archive of Modern Records (Warsaw), the Archive ofthe Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Comm1ttee, the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentat1on (Moscow), the Archive of the Polish Ministry ofForeign Affairs, and the Nat10nal Archives and Record Admm1stratton, College Park, Maryland.

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by those who had personally experienced the unrest. 9 While the strikes and demonstrations in East Berlin were fairly well known, new historical evidence, in particular the intemal records of the SED and the files of East German State Security (the Stasi), have a great deal to tell that was previously obscure. For example, these documents show that the unrest was far more widespread and prolonged than many Western observers had assumed. 1 0 Strikes and strike threats had occurred in the fall of 1 952 and appeared with greater intensity in the spring of 1 95 3 at individual plants (although they remained limited to the shop floor). We know now that these actions continued into July-less forcefully to be sure-but the fact that they took place at all under conditions of martial law was indicative of the depth of the crisis in the GDR. Numerous studies also now reveal the history ofthe 1 953 uprising as it played out in various East German localities and among prominent professional groups. With the recent boost in access to relevant materials it has also become clear that anti-regime activities in the countryside were more intense and widespread than Western observers had assumed. The "Herrnstadt File," a memoir-like document written in 1 956 by RudolfHerrnstadt, the leading opponent of Ulbricht within the SED, and hidden by his family from the Stasi, sheds light on the dramatic power struggle within the party leadership that resulted in Hermstadt's ouster in July 1 95 3 . 1 1 Unfortunately, historians are still being hampered by difficulties in archival access. While the SED Politburo, GDR State Security and Foreign Ministry files are by and large accessible, Russian documents crucial for an understanding ofSoviet policy have not been fully released. Key documents, such as the transcripts of CPSU Presidium meetings in the spring and summer of 1 95 3 , memoranda of conversations between USSR and foreign officials, cable traffic as well as intelligence and military records have not yet become available. The Soviet General Staff documents presented in this reader are only a fraction of the materials that must exist in contemporary Russian military archives. The same is true for the limited number of MVD/KGB documents that have become available. 1 2 While the situation with regard to the U.S. State Department materials is somewhat brighter, selected foreign policy records as well as military files also remain closed to researchers. As for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), numerous intelligence reports were released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and through the Agency's Historical Review Program. But the available materials are limited almost exclusively to analyses of events as opposed to field activities. Information on covert CIA intelli­ gence operations in East Germany before and after the uprising which might reveal so­ called "sources and methods" have been exempted from the FOIA and remain state se­ crets. The situation in the British, French, and Federal Republic archives is similarly restric­ tive. Because of these limitations on access, the documents which follow do not attempt to provide a füll record of the 1 953 crisis. Rather, they are meant to represent the highlights of what is now available through cooperative, multi-national research efforts, and to provide a 9 The standard account was for many years AmulfBaring, Der 1 7. Jum 1953 (Stuttgart· DV A, 1 982), see also Sp1ttmann and Fricke. ed , Der 17 Jum 1953 1 0 The best study 1s Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, ed Der Tag X-1 7. Jum 1 953. Die Innere Staatsgrundung der DDR als Ergebnis der Krise 1952/54 (Berlin· Chr Links, 1 994) 1 1 RudolfHermstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument. Das Politbüro der SED und die Geschichte des 1 7. Jum 1 953, ed. Nadja Stulz-Herrnstadt (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1 990). 1 2 Recent publtcat10ns that include new Russian and U. S documentation include Donald P Steury (CIA History Stafl), On the Fronthnes ofthe Cold War. Documents on the lntel/1gence War m Berlm, 1 946-1961 (Washmgton, D. C„ CIA, 1 999), David Murphy, George Bailey and Sergei Kondrashev, Battleground Berlin (New Haven. Yale University Press, 1 997).

xxii

baseline for new exploration of the subject. The focus, therefore, is on recently released records from Russian, German, Czech, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, British and American archives that help to document the international context, that is, the Soviet, East European and Western perceptions of, and involvement in, the crisis from the time of Stalin 's death on 5 March 1 953 until the fall of that year. 1 3 In so doing, the hope of those involved with this volume is to contribute to our knowledge of an important chapter in the international history of the Cold War. As far as the domestic context of the crisis in East Germany ( or any of the other countries) is concerned, the materials do shed light on some interesting issues, but internal matters are mainly dealt with if they influenced international developments. The documents appear largely in chronological order and fall into three main parts. Where they relate more closely to the topic of a part other than the one to which they belong chronologically, they have been placed according to topical relevance. Introductory essays by the editor precede each ofthe three document parts, placing the archival materials in their !arger historical context. The headnotes for the documents provide additional information regarding each item. F ootnotes to the documents are by the editor, unless marked as belonging to the original document. The source line indicates the archival provenance, or a generally accessible current location, for the materials, as weil as the name of the translator. While the document transcriptions and translations attempt to provide a sense of how the document looked and read in its original, declassification stamps and letterheads have usually been omitted. Transliteration of the Cyrillic follows international standards. Diacritics have generally been used when rendering foreign names, but spellings have not been corrected in reprinted English-language documents. Editorial additions or deletions for relevance or space have been marked with brackets ("[ ]") .

*** This document collection is the result of a multi-year, multi-archival international collabo­ rative research effort conducted under the auspices of the National Security Archive's "Openness in Russia and East Europe Proj ect" ( directed by Malcolm Byrne ). In collaboration with the Woodrow Wilson International Center 's Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and its Russian and East European partners, the National Security Archive organized a remarkable series of conferences aimed at expanding the historical record and informing the public debate over a series of key crises in the Cold War. The Archive's principal partners include: the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences; the Institute of Contemporary History and the recently-formed Center for Ad­ vanced Studies of the Anti-totalitarian Resistance, both of the Czech Academy of Sciences; the Institute for the History of the 1 95 6 Hungarian Revolution; the Civic Academy Founda­ tion (Bucharest); the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and the human rights research and advocacy group "Memorial" (Moscow). This documents reader is, in part, an outgrowth of one conference in the Archive/CWIHP series : "The Crisis Year 1 95 3 and the Cold War in Europe," organized by the editor, on the American side, and co-sponsored and hosted by the Potsdam-based Center for Contemporary History Research, in November 1 996. As with the related conferences on the Prague Spring and subsequent Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia (Prague, April 1 994); the 1 95 6 1 3 Additional supporting documents have been posted on the National Security Archive 's and CWIHP ' s websites. Where documents were cut from this volume due t o space limitations, füll vers1ons are accessible at the National Security Arcl11ve in the "Russian and East European Archival Documents Database" (READD) collection, sponsored by the Archive and CWIHP

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Hungarian Revolution (Budapest, September 1 996); the 1 980-8 1 Solidarity crisis in Poland (Warsaw-Jachranka, November 1 997); and the collapse of the communist system in East­ ern Europe (Musgrove Island, USA; Budapest; Prague; Warsaw, 1 999); the Potsdam confer­ ence provided an opportunity for scholars from throughout Europe, the former Soviet Union and North America to collect, disseminate and discuss the newly available archival sources. The documents prepared for this meeting by the Archive, CWIHP, and others, as well as the analyses presented by the participants, helped provide a foundation for this volume. For their generous support, the editor and the National Security Archive would like to thank the following: - Malcolm Byrne, deputy director and director of research at the Archive, who oversees the "Openness Project" and its publications; - James Hershberg ofGeorge Washington University, and former director of CWIHP, for his editorial involvement and encouragement at all stages of this undertaking; - Vladislav Zubok ofthe National Security Archive, for his editorial advice and support; - Hope Harrison of George Washington University and Thomas A. Schwartz of Vanderbilt University for reviewing and commenting on the manuscript; - All those scholars and archivists who contributed documents to the collection, including Jordan Baev, Csaba Bekes, William Burr, David Haight, Hope Harrison, Alexei Filitov, Viktor Gobarev, Volker Lange, Andras Mink, Leonid Reshin, KrzysztofRuchniewicz, Bosko Spasoj evic, Michael Thurman, Natalia Tomilina, Oldfich Tuma, Zoia Vodopianova, and Vladislav Zubok. - For help with translations, Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie, Csaba Bekes, Jan Chowaniec, Nedialka Douptcheva, Hope Harrison, Christiaan Hetzner, Caroline Kovtun, Daniel Rozas, Svetlana Savranskaya, Radek Spicar, Michael Thurman, Kathryn Weathersby, David Wolff, Vladislav Zubok. - Greg Domber, research assistant at the National Security Archive and CWIHP, for his lang hours organizing the collection, transcribing and editing documents, and helping to compile the front matter; - Catherine Nielsen, research assistant at the National Security Archive, for copy-editing, translation checking, and document transcription; - Christoph Klessmann of Potsdam University and director ofthe Center for Contempo­ ra1y History Research who hosted the 1 996 Conference, "The Crisis Year 1 953 and the Cold War in Europe;" - National Security Archive Executive Director Tom Blanton for support throughout this project; - Other staff members of the National Security Archive: Pete Voth for early work on the front matter; Aliza Saivetz for copy-editing and keyboarding; Jimmy Wong for document transcription; Bill Burr for help in acquiring documents from the CIA through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); Will Ferroggiaro for additional FOIA assistance; John Martinez for assistance with scanning; Mary Burroughs for additional transcriptions; - Former CWIHP Director David Wolff, who oversaw some of the early document translations; XXIV

- Geir Lundestad and Olav Nj0lstad at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, for their support of the editor's work through the lnstitute 's fellowship program; - CWIHP Advisory Committee members William Taubman, John Gaddis, Prof. Warren Cohen, Sharon Wolchik, and Samuel F. Wells; Nancy L. Meyers, CWIHP administrator; and Janine Rowe, Michael Thurman, Christiaan Hetzner CWIHP research assistants; - Robert S . Litwak, director of the Division of International Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, who oversees CWIHP 's activities; - Anne C. Kj elling, librarian of the No1wegian Nobel Institute, for her invaluable help with locating sources; - The scholars and archivists who participated in the 1 953 conference, particularly: Robe1t R. Bowie, Gary Bruce, Ruud van Dijk, Leo Gluchowski, Manfred Hagen, Richard Immerman, Wanda Jarz�bek, Jürgen Kocka, Klaus Larres, Jochen Laufer, Michael Lemke, Vojtech Mastny, Elke Scherstjanoi, and Gerhard Wettig; - The philanthropic foundations whose generous support has made the Openness Proj ect and this volume possible: The Open Society Institute (New York), The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago), The Smith Richardson Foundation (Westport, CT), and the German Marshall Fund of the United States; - Central European University Press for its continuing support of this book series, especially Klara Takacsi-Nagy, director and editor of CEU Press, and Frances Pinter, former director of the Center for Publishing Development.

XXV

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACC Amembassy BDJ BGL BMV BPO CC Cde. CIA CIC CDT CDU Cominform Comintem CPCz CPSU CSM CSR

czv

DAD EAD EDC EE EUCOM EUR FDGB FDJ FGY FRG GDR GEC GER GVP HICOG HO HVDVP JNV JZD KBW

Allied Control Commission American Embassy [West German] Federation ofGerman Youth Factory or trade union leadership Czechoslovak Bureau ofthe City Committee Factory Party Cell Central Committee Comrade Central Intelligence Agency United States Army Counterintelligence Corps Commandant Christian Democratic Union Communist Information Bureau Communist International Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union Czechoslovak Youth Association Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Czechoslovak Factory Party Worker 's Committee [West] German Intelligence Service Eastem Affairs Division, HICOG European Defense Community Eastern Europe European Command, United States Army Bureau ofEuropean Affairs, U.S. Department ofState East German Free German Trade Unions Free German Youth Free German Youth Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) German Democratic Republic (East Germany) German Economic Commission Bureau ofGerman Affairs, U.S. Department ofState All-German People's Party United States High Commission(er) for Occupied Germany East German Retail Trading Association Main Administration of the German People's Police Czechoslovak City Government Czechoslovak standard farming cooperatives Polish Interna! Security Corps xxvu

KGB KgU KNV KPD KPDR KV KVP LDP LM LPG MDP MFA MfS MGB MID MO MRS MSA MTS MVD NATO NIE NEP NSC NVA OCB PRC PSB PUBP PUWP PZPR RFE RIAS ROK S/P SAG

sec

SED SNM SP SPD STB SVAG/SMAG TAN U.N . UBP USIG VB xxviii

Committee for State Security, USSR Fighting Group against Inhumanity Czechoslovak organ ofstate administration, Regional National Committee Communist Party in West Germany Korean People's Democratic Republic Czechoslovak Regional Party Committee Garrisoned People's Police, GDR Liberal Democratic Party Czechoslovak People's Militia Agricultural Production Cooperative Hungarian Workers' Party Ministry ofForeign Affairs, USSR Ministry for State Security (Stasi) , GDR Ministry ofState Security (Russian acronym), GDR Ministry ofForeign Affairs, USSR Polish People's Militia Machine-Rental Stations Mutual Security Agency, United States Machine Tractor Stations Ministry ofInterna! Affairs, USSR North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Intelligence Estimate New Economic Policy National Security Council National People's Army Operations Coordinating Board, United States People's Republic ofChina Psychological Strategy Board, United States County Office ofState Security, Poland Polish United Workers' Party Polish Unitcd Workers' Party (Polish acronym) Radio Free Europe Radio in the American Seetor ofBerlin Republic of Korea Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department ofState Soviet State-Stock company (after 1954 Soviet-German joint stock company) Soviet Control Commission Socialist Unity Pa1ty, GDR Free Gennan Youth (Russian acronym), GDR Polish Communist youth organization German Social Democratic Party Czechoslovak State Security Soviet Military Administration in Germany Technically-based work norms United Nations Office ofState Security, Poland Administration for Soviet Property in Germany Czechoslovak public security

High-Frequency Telephone line (used by Soviets for secret communications) Peoples ' Owned Plant Volunteer Freedom Corps People's Police, GDR People's Police, GDR People's Police, GDR "Libe11y, Equality, Independence," (Polish underground anti-communist resistance movement) Voivodship Office of State Security, Poland

VCH VEB VFC VOPO Vopos VP WRN WUBP

Abbreviations Used in Document Source Citations AAN AGSh A MSZ AP AP RF AÜV KSC AVP RF CA MSWiA d. DDEL DDEP f. FOIA FRUS 1. 11. MBP NARA op. por. RG SAPMO-BArch SVRA TsKhSD ZW ZMP

Archive of Modern Records, Warsaw Archives of the General Staff of the Armed F orces, Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw Polish National Archives, Warsaw Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow Archive of the CPCz Central Committee, Prague Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow Central Archives, Ministry of lnterior and Administration, Warsaw Delo (File) Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers Fond (Collection) Freedom of Information Act f Foreign Relations o the United States List (Page) Listy (Pages) Minister of Public Security National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maiyland Opis ' (lnventory) Portfolio Record Group Foundation "Archive of the Party and Mass Organizations of the Former GDR"-Federal Archives, Berlin Foreign Intelligence Service ofthe Russian Federation Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, Moscow Provincial Office, Polish Youth Union

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Pre-1952 7-8 May 1 945: Germany surrenders, ending the war in Europe. 1 7 July-2 August 1 945: Leaders of the U. S., USSR, France, and Britain attend the Potsdam Conference, signing agreements on the future of Germany, including the disarmament of the country. Germany is divided into four zones of occupation. 21-22 April 1 946: The SED is created when the SPD and KPD merge. Wilhelm Pieck of the KPD and Otto Grotewohl of the SPD are elected co-chairmen. 24 June 1948: The Soviet "blockade" ofBerlin begins. The Western powers institute an airlift to supply the city. 4 April 1 949: The NATO treaty is signed. lt enters into effect on 24 August. 12 May 1 949: The Soviets end the blockade of Berlin. 23 May 1949: The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany is proclaimed. 15 September 1 949: Konrad Adenauer is elected Federal Chancellor. 7 October 1 949: The Gennan Democratic Republic is proclaimed. The Western powers refuse to recognize the new state, claiming that the Federal Republic is the only legitimate government in Germany. Pieck becomes president and Grotewohl prime minister. Walter Ulbricht retains the position of deputy prime minister.

1952 10 March 1952 : Stalin sends the first ofseveral notes to the governments ofthe three Western powers proposing a peace treaty with Germany. Germany is to be united, "democratic," and pennitted to create an anny, but prohibited to join any military alliance. The Western Allies are unconvinced that the proposals are genuine but engage in an exchange of messages with Moscow which ends with a Western note on 23 September. 1 and 7 April 1 952 : Stalin meets with Grotewohl, Pieck, and Ulbricht in Moscow. 26 May 1 952: In Bonn, the U.S., France, Britain, and the FRG sign the General Treaty officially ending the Allied occupation of West Germany. 2 7 May 1 952: The U.S., France, Great Britain and the FRG sign the Paris Agreement, creating the EDC. The agreement awaits ratification by the signatories. 8 Ju�v 1 952 : Stalin sanctions the announcement ofthe "Planned Construction of Socialism." 9-1 2 July 1 952 ; The Second Party Congress of the SED meets and adopts the policy of the "Planned Construction of Socialism" in the GDR. 23 July 1 952 : The Volkskammer passes legislation reorganizing the territorial divisions within the GDR. The former provinces are abolished and replaced by districts and precincts. 2 4 July 1 95 2 : The GD R Council of Ministers announces special privileges for agricultural collectives.

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4 November 1 952 : Dwight D . Eisenhower is elected president of the United States. 21 November 1 952: Paul Baender (SED), secretary ofstate in the Ministry ofTrade and Food, is relieved of his post and arrested. 15 December 1 952: Minister of Trade and Food Hamann and Secretary of State Albrecht are relieved of their posts and arrested.

1953 15 January 1 953 : The GDR State Planning Commission points to "alarming deficiencies" in the state-run industrial concerns. The SED press office attacks labor unions for disregarding the question of higher work nonns. 5 March 1 953: Stalin dies. Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Beria join forces to lead the Soviet government, but a struggle for power soon develops within the Kremlin. 8 March 1 953: Neues Deutschland publishes an article by Ulbricht calling for the GDR to continue vigorously to pursue the "Planned Construction of Socialism" in the GDR. 11 March 1 953 : The U . S . National Security Council meets to discuss the policy implications of Stalin 's death. 15 March 1 953: Before a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Malenkov announces that there is "no litigious or unresolved question which could not be settled by peaceful means on the basis of the mutual agreemcnt of the countries concerned . . . including the United States." This begins the so-called "Peace Offensive" timt will dominate U. S.-Soviet re­ lations over the coming months. 1 9 March 1953 : The West German Bundestag ratifies the Paris and Bonn treaties. 1 5 April 1 953 : Ulbricht publishes another article in Neues Deutschland reiterating the necessity of creating socialism in the GDR; however, he makes no reference to the establishment of armed forces, reaffirms the voluntary nature of the agricultural coopera­ tives (LPGs), and admits to mistakes made by local courts and party officials in dealing with small and middle-class farmers. 4 April 1 953 : The Soviet Ministry of Interna! Affairs announces that the Krcmlin doctors arrested on 9 January 1 953 (in the infamous "Doctor 's Plot") bad been detained without justification. 1 6 April 1 953 : Reacting to the Soviet "Peace Offensive," President Eisenhower delivers a speech entitled "A Chance for Peace" in Washington, D.C. Mid-April 1 953 : Small-business owners in the GDR are precluded from receiving ration cards; the SED regime heightens its fight against the Protestant Church, especially its youth organization, Junge Gemeinde. 18 April 1 953 : The Soviet Union grants the SED additional economic aid, reduces reparations payments by 20-25%, and extends the term of these payments. 2 1-22 April 1 953 : Vladimir Semyonov, political adviser to the Soviet Control Commission, is recalled to Moscow to become the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ' Third European Department responsible for Germany. 25 April 1 953 : Pravda reacts in a positive way to Eisenhower's 1 6 April speech. 3 May 1953: Hundreds of tobacco workers in Plovdiv and Khaskovo, Bulgaria, go on strike. 11 May 1 953: Winston Churchill delivers a speech to the House of Commons calling for a Great Power summit on the German problem.

xxx ii

13-14 May 1 953 : The 1 3th Plenum of the SED CC is held, during which Franz Dahlem (Ulbricht's main domestic opponent) is ousted and a "voluntary" 1 0% increase in work norms is decreed. 14 May 1 953: The CPSU Presidium meets to discuss the deteriorating situation in the GDR. 16 May 1 953 : The SED Politburo 's decision to increase industrial work norms by 1 0% is published. 27 May 1953: The Presidium ofthe USSR Council ofMinisters meets to discuss the situation in the GDR and decides to terminate the "forced construction of socialism." 28 May 1 953: Vladimir Semyonov is appointed Soviet High Commissioner for Germany after the sec is dissolved. 28 May 1 953 : The GDR Council of Ministers decrees the implementation of the norm increase by 30 June; SED meetings in many state companies prepare for the "voluntary adoption" of the decree, but resentment among labor leaders and workers is widespread. 1 June 1 953 : Workers strike at the Skoda munitions plant in Plzen, Czechoslovakia. Calling for free elections and a new government, the strike soon leads to rioting and violent clashes with the Czechoslovak militia. Disturbances and work stoppages continue until 3 June. 2 June 1953 : The USSR Council of Ministers completes an order criticizing the forced construction of socialism in the GDR. The same day, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, and Fred Oelssner arrive in Moscow for two days of discussion with the CPSU CC Presidium on adopting the "New Course" for the GDR. The Soviets ' demands include ending forced collectivization, relaxing judicial controls, and revising the heavy industry plan. 5-9 June 1 953 : Grotewohl and Ulbricht return to East Berlin and meet almost continuously with the SED CC Politburo over the next four days to discuss Moscow's instructions for the "New Course." Ulbricht and his policies come under intense criticism from within the SED leadership. 7 June 1 953 : Col.-Gen. Andrei Grechko is named commander ofthe Group ofSoviet Forces in Germany. 9 June 1 953 : The SED CC Politburo adopts the "New Course," publishing a communique in Neues Deutschland on 1 1 June. Many policies of the "Planned Construction of Social­ ism" are relaxed; however, the "voluntary" increase in work norms remains in place. Many party members are shocked by the dramatic changes in policy. 11 June 1 953 : Confusion reigns among the party and the population as to the significance of the "New Course." 12 June 19 5 3: Transport company workers demonstrate in front of Brandenburg prison. 12-13 June 1 953 : Workers in East Berlin institute work slow-downs to protest the increased work 1101ms. 13-1 6 June 1 953: Members of the CPSU CC leadership hold meetings with Hungarian communist leaders in an attempt to mitigate some of the worst excesses of Stalinist rule under Matyas Rakosi. 15 June 1 95 3: Members ofthe CPS U CC leadership meet with Albanian leader Enver Hoxha. 15 June 1 953 : Semyonov meets with Grechko and agrees to call Soviet troops from their summer training camps back into garrisons. 15 June 1953: A workers ' delegation from Stalinallee Block 40 presents a resolution on the 1 0% work norms increase to aides of Grotewohl. The delegation threatens a strike to begin at 7:00 a.m. the next day unless Grotewohl satisfactorily addresses the workers ' concerns. 15 June 1953 (7:30 p.m.) : RIAS news reports on protest strikes at three East Berlin construc­ tion sites.

XXXlll

1 6 June 1 95 3 : An article in the union paper Tribüne argues for the necessity of the norm inerease. Early in the morning, workers at the Hospital Friedriehshain and Stalinallee Block 40 construetion sites begin to gather, eventually marching towards the center of Berlin and eongregating at the House of Ministries. Calls are made for a general strike at 7 : 00 a.m. the following day. The demonstration continues throughout the day. Strikes occur at other East Berlin eonstruetion sites and plants. 1 6 June 1 95 3 : The SED Politburo meets for its regular Tuesday morning meeting and deeides to revoke the forced norm increase. 16 June 1 95 3 (12:00 p. m.) : Demonstrations continue in front of the House of Ministries. After an hour, Heavy Industry Minister Fritz Selbmann and Professor Robert Havemann speak to the workers. Despite repeated calls by the assembled demonstrators, Grotewohl and Ulbricht fail to appear. 1 6 June 1 953 (early afternoon) : The government announces the revocation of the forced norm inerease, but the concession eomes too late; by now the workers are also demanding free elections and the resignation of the government. 1 6 June 1 95 3 (4:30 p. m.) : RIAS begins to report on the volatile situation in the East Seetor of Berlin and on calls for a general strike. 1 6 June 195 3 (evening) : Three thousand members of the Berlin SED Party Aktiv meet in the Friedriehstadtpalast to hear speeches by SED party leaders, including Ulbricht and Gro­ tewohl. 1 6 June 1 95 3 (late evening) : Semyonov meets with the SED leadership about bringing Soviet troops into Berlin; riots occur in parts of East Berlin. 1 7 June 1 953 (ear(v morning) : Ulbricht meets with State Seeurity Chief Wilhelm Zaisser and General Heinz Hoffmann about the deployment of KVP units. Soviet troops enter the outskirts of Berlin. 1 7 June 1953 (approx. 7:00 a.m.) : Masses ofworkers begin entering Berlin and eongregating at the House of Ministries. By 9:00 a.m. 25,000 people have joined the demonstration. Sometime after 1 0. 00 a.m., 80- 1 00 demonstrators storm the government building, forcing their way through ranks of Volkspolizei and KVP troops. Strikes, demonstrations and riots occur throughout the GDR. 1 7 June 1 953 (approx. 1 0. 00 a. m.) : The SED CC Politburo meets at party headquarters. By 1 0:30 a.m., Semyonov instructs the SED leaders to move to Soviet headquaiters in Karlshorst for safety. 1 7 June 1 953 (approx. 1 1 . 00 a. m.) : The three Western Commandants meet in West Berlin. 1 7 June 1 953 (approx. 12. 00 noon) : Soviet tanks and troops fire into the crowd of demon­ strators around and inside the House of Ministries. The protestors disperse, but fighting continues throughout the afternoon and into the evening. All train and tram traffic into the Eastern Seetor of Berlin is terminated. 1 7 June 1 9 53 (1 : 00 p. m.) : Soviet Commandant, Maj.-Gen. Dibrova declares martial law in the Eastern Seetor of Berlin. Eventually, martial law is declared in 1 67 out of 2 1 7 distriets throughout the GDR. 1 7 June 1 95 3 (afternoon) : RIAS continues to broadeast reports about the demonstrations and riots in the Eastern Zone. 1 7 June 1 9 53 (4: 1 0 p. m. CET, J 0: 1 0 a. m. EST) : President Eisenhower discusses possible reactions to the growing crisis with his adviser, C. D. Jackson. 1 7 June 19 5 3 (evening) : Demonstrations and rioting continue throughout the afternoon and into the evening. Overnight, Soviet troops and MfS arrest hundreds of demonstrators.

xxxiv

1 7 June 1 953 (approx. 9:00 p. m.) : Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Sokolovskii arrives in Berlin with Soviet Marshal Govorov. 1 7 June 1 953 (1 0:36 p. m.-11 : 1 3 p. m.) : A special session of the Berlin House of Delegates takes place to commemorate the casualties of the day's unrest. 18 June 1 953 : Strikes and violence continue in cities and rural areas throughout the GDR. 18 June 1 953: Soviet Commandant Dibrova announces that West Berlin resident Willi Göttling has been sentenced to death and executed. In Magdeburg, the Soviet military tribunal announces death sentences for two local residents: Alfred Dartsch and Herbert Strauch. 18 June 1 953: At the 150th meeting of the U.S. National Security Council, President Eisenhower is briefed on the situation as Washington works to understand the policy implications. 18 June 1 953: The Western Berlin Commandants release a communique denying charges of Western involvement in the riots. 1 9 June 1 953 : Martial law is relaxed in several East German cities. 20 June 1 953 : The SED Politburo meets for the first time since the morning of 17June. 20 June 1 953: During a protest demonstration in Magdeburg-Rothensee, eight people are killed. 21 June 1 953: In cables to Eisenhower, Churchill and French Prime Minister Mayer, West German Chancellor Adenauer denounces the terror regime in East Berlin and the Soviet Zone. 21 June 1953 (11 :00 a. m.-5:00 p.m., 9:00 p. m.-11:20 p. m.) : After a day ofprolonged debate, the SED Politburo adopts the "Draft Declaration of the CC on the Situation and on the Immediate Tasks Facing the Party." 21 June 1 953 (11 :20 p.m.) : The hastily assembled 14th Plenum ofthe SED Central Committee meets to adopt the Declaration drafted by the Politburo. 23 June 1 953: For the first time since the uprising ernpted, Adenauer participates in a !arge memorial celebration for the victims in Berlin. 25 June 1 953 : The CPSU CC receives a lengthy report from Soviet milita1y officials Semyonov, Yudin, and Sokolovskii on the demonstrations in the GDR. 25 June 1 953 : The U.S. National Security Council holds its 151 st meeting to discuss PSB D-45, "Interim U.S. Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe." Four days later, PSB D-45 is adopted as NSC 158. 26 June 1 953: KGB ChiefLavrentii Beria is anested. 2 7 June 1 953: In order to avert a crisis similar to that in the GDR, Imre Nagy announces a New Course program in Hungary. 1 July 1 953 : The Psychological Strategy Board approves the implementation ofa large-scale food program for East Germany. 2-4 July 1 953: The CPSU CC convenes a special Plenum to criticize Beria and to discuss the effects of the events in the GDR. 7 July 1 953: Workers in Stalinallee, Lichtenburg, Köpenick, Hennigsdorf and Wiessensee threaten to strike, demanding the release of strikers detained since 17June. The following day, sit-down strikes occur in several factories in East Berlin. 8-9 July 1 953: Grotewohl and Ulbricht travel to Moscow to meet with Soviet officials. 9 July 1 953 : Travel restrictions between East and West Berlin and the system oftemporary passes adopted after 17June are removed. 1 0 July 1 953 : The Soviet govemment publicly announces Beria's arrest.

XXXV

l 0 July 1 953 : The U.S. and West Germany publish an exchange ofletters between Adenauer and Eisenhower officially announcing plans for a Food Distribution Program for East Germany. They also release a letter offering the Soviets $15 million worth offood aid for the East Germans, but this offer is promptly rejected, as expected. 1 0- 1 4 July 1 953: The foreign ministers ofthe three Western powers meet in Washington. As a result of their talks, they propose a four-power conference on Germany as part of an attempt to reclaim the initiative on the German issue from Moscow. 12 July 1 953 : Authorities lift the state ofemergency in East Berlin. 12- 1 4 July 1 953: Large strikes and work slow-downs occur at several locations in East Germany. The Soviets threaten to use troops and violent reprisals ifwork is not resumed. 14 July 1 953 : Ulbricht attacks the "Herrnstadt-Zaisser group. " 1 6 July 1 953 : Max Fechner. GDR minister ofjustice, is dismissed and arrested. 24-26 July 1 953 : The 15th SED CC Plenum is convened, during which the party leadership reinforces its decision to follow the New Course. Wilhelm Zaisser and RudolfHerrnstadt are purged from the party. Anton Ackermann, Hans Jendretzky, and Elli Schmidt are not re-elected as candidate members ofthe Politburo. 2 7 Ju(v 1 953: The Food Distribution Program begins with distribution centers opening in the Western Seetors ofBerlin that are easily accessible from the East. Early August 1 953 : GDR officials begin a campaign to combat the Food Distribution Program, including restricting travel to West Berlin, confiscating food packets, and initi­ ating a propaganda program. The regime even inaugurates its own food distribution op­ eration aimed at West Berlin retirees and unemployed persons. 8 A ugust 1 953: Malenkov announces the New Course in Soviet economic policy. 15 A ugust 1 953 : The first phase of the Food Distribution Program ends. Nearly 865,000 people havc come from East Berlin and throughout East Germany to receive 2,598,202 food packages. 20-22 August J 953: A top-level GDR government delegation travels to Moscow where Soviet officials promise increased economic aid, declare an end to reparations payments, and elevate the diplomatic missions between the two governments to embassies. 26 August 1 953: The Soviet Union sends a communique to the Western Allies agreeing to a four-power meeting on Germany as proposed by the Western powers on 15 July. 28 A ugust 1 953: The second phase ofthe Food Distribution Program begins and continues until early October. 6 September 1 953: Chancellor Adenauer wins re-election. Late September 1 953 : The Adenauer government begins urging a "visible stop " to the food program. Mid-October 1 953: The East German regime initiates a series of "terror trials " against 25 participants in, and Western sympathizers of, the June riots. 11 December 1 953: The National Security Council approves NSC 174, "United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, " re-evaluating the Eisenhower administra­ tion 's "rollback " policy, concluding that U . S. policymakers needed to walk a "fine line, which is not stationary, between exhortations to keep up morale and to maintain passive resistance, and invitations to suicide. " 18-23 December 1 953 : The trial against Beria takes place. He is executed on the last day of the proceedings.

XXXV!

1954 1 January 1 954: As part of a package of economic aid to East Germany, Soviet stock companies are transferred to GDR ownership; GDR reparation payments to the USSR come to an end. 22-23 January 1 954: At the 17th SED CC Plenum, Anton Ackermann is expelled from the CC for supporting the "Herrnstadt-Zaisser group." HansJendretzky and Elli Schmidt are reprimanded on similar charges. 2 3 October 19 54: The Paris Treaties are signed. The Federal Republic ofGermany becomes a member ofNATO in 1955.

1955 14 May 1 955 : The Warsaw Pact is established; the GDR becomes a member. 20 September 1955: The USSR and East Germany reach agreement on the "füll sovereignty" ofthe GDR.

xxxvii

PART ONE

THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS INTRODUCTION

Stalin and the Construction of Socialism in East Germany The roots ofthe summer 1 953 East German crisis date back to July 1 952, when the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Gennany (SED) adopted a crash socialization and collectivization program termed the "Planned Construction of Socialism." 1 A number of other East and East-Central European states had already embarked upon this approach a few years earlier, seeking to promote rapid short-term economic growth. By late 1 952, however, the devastating effects of these policies-both in human and economic terms-had gradually become evident, even in Moscow itself. Towards the end ofthat year, Soviet officials were receiving a growing number of accounts of economic dislocation and popular unrest. Soviet diplomatic and intelligence sources reported a state of"near-total chaos" in the Czechoslovak economy, "severe deficiencies" in Hungary, and "extremely detrimental conditions and disruption" in Romania. 2 Local communist rulers maintained control only through massive expansion of the largely Soviet-controlled security apparatus, mass terror, purges and show trials. In East Germany, the decision to undertake open and accelerated socialization of industry and agriculture seemed to mark a turning point in Soviet policy toward Germany, which had remained essentially unresolved since the end of World War II. Moscow's options had included the sovietization of the eastern occupation zone; 3 the creation of a unified, socialist Germany; and the establishment of a unified and democratic, but "neutral" Germany. 4 Even after the establishment of the GDR in October 1 949 under the control of the SED (formed when the German Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party were forcibly merged in 1 946), Stalin's policy continued to be, by all indications, torn between the füll "satelliza­ tion" of the new state and the realization of his all-German aspirations. But a series of events may have combined to remove the Kremlin 's indecisiveness. One crucial moment was the Western powers ' rejection ofthe March 1 952 "Stalin note," in which the Soviet leader had called for allied negotiations on a peace treaty for Germany, an 1 The SED (So::whsllsche Emhe1tsparte1 Deutschlands) approved the program at its Second Party Convention, held from 9-1 2 July 1 952. "Beschluss der 2. Parteikonferenz," Neues Deutschland, 1 3 July 1 952, p 1 , Protokoll der Verhandlungen der 2. Parte1konferen:: der SED, 9-12 July 1 952 (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1 952); for the development leadmg up to the Second Party Conference, sec Heinz Heitzer, "Entscheidungen 1m Vorfeld der 2. Parteikonferenz der SED (Februar bis Jul i 1 952)," Betrage ::ur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 34:4 ( 1 992), pp 1 8-32 , Gerhard Wettig, ed., Die sow;ellsche Deutschland-Politik m der Ara Adenauer (Rhöndorder Gesprache 1 6) (Bonn Bouvier, 1 997), Wett1g, Bereitschaft ::u E111he1t 111 Fre1he1t? Die sow;e11sche Deutschland-Politik 1945-/955 (Mumclr Olzog, 1 999), Elke Scherst.1anoi, "Zwei deutsche Staaten?" Tel Av1ver Jahrbuch/ur deutsche Gescluchte 28 ( 1 999), pp. 257-302. 2 C1ted in Mark Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalm Succession Struggle and Uphcavals in Eastern Europe (Part 1 )," Journal o/Cold War Stud1es 1 : 1 (Wmter 1 999), pp. 3-55, here 6-7; see also the massive documenta!lon in Galina Murashko et al. , eds., Vostochnaia Yevropa v dokumentakh rossiisk1kh arkhivov, vol 2 (l 949-53), (Moscow· Siberian Chronograph, 1 998). 3 Thc German des1gnation for the Soviet zone was Sow;ellsche Besat::ungs::one, or SBZ. 4 Norman M Naimark, The Russians 111 Germany: A H1story of the Sov1et Zone of Occupatwn (Cambridge, Mass · Harvard Univers1ty Press, 1 995).

all-German govemment and all-German elections, and proposed establishing a unified, "democratic" but neutral German state that would have its own national armed force. Many Westerners doubted that Stalin's offer was more than a propaganda ploy aimed primarily at delaying the signing oftreaties which were to provide greater sovereignty for West Germany and accelerate its military integration with Western Europe. 5 Prior to the summer of 1 952, Soviet designs for German unification had precluded füll satellization of the GDR along the model of the East European "people's democracies . " But the announcement of the GDR's new policy by the country's strong man, SED General Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister Walter Ulbricht, now seemed to signal openly that the priority of promoting all-German concerns had been abandoned in favor of unimpeded sovietization and consolidation of the eastern zone. As early as April 1 952, Stalin had told visiting East German leaders, "you, too, need to organize an independent state." He further demanded that they turn the relatively open demarcation line between East and West Germany into a "border," and insisted that everything needed to be done to "strengthen the defense of this border"6 (Document No. 1 ) . Stalin also decreed the creation of an East German army-"without making much noise"-announcing that the "pacifist period" was over-"[pacifism] was needed in the past but not any more" (Document No. 1 ) . The Soviet leader also sanctioned the socialization of GDR agriculture and industty, but in a piecemeal fashion: "Even now they should not shout about socialism. " By late 1 952, hard-line policies had already backfired. Forced socialization i n industry and agriculture had driven East Gennany's economy into the ground, and socio-economic conditions had become critical. Hardest hit was the "middle class," mainly small entrepre­ neurs and wealthier farmers ("kulaks"). In this new phase of the "class struggle," the regime levied prohibitive taxes against remaining small and medium private enterprises in trade and industry. In addition, small business owners were, by April 1953, precluded from receiving ration cards, forcing them to buy food at exorbitant prices at state stores. The general population was directly affected as increased output targets for heavy industry caused consumer goods production, and hence the living standard, to lag far behind that of Western Germany. In agriculture, meanwhile, contrary to Stalin's advice in April to entice fanners to join well-equipped and productive collectives voluntarily, the SED 's drive for collectiviza­ tion coerced independent farmers into "production cooperatives," which met widespread public opposition. Those who refused to go along were subj ect to heavy, state-enforced delive1y quotas. The resulting havoc caused food shortages throughout the GDR and even a 5 On the Stalm notes controversy sec Gerhard Wett1g, "Stahn and German Reunificat1011 Archival Evidence on Soviet Fore1gn Pol1cy 111 the Spnng 1 952," The H1stor1cal Journal 37: 2 ( 1 994), pp. 4 1 1 -4 1 9; Ruud van D1jk, The 1 952 Stalin Note Debate: Myth or Missed Opportunityfor German Umjicatlon, Cold War lntcrnat1011al Hlstory Project Working Paper No. 14 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1 996); Wettig, "Die Deutschland-Note vom 10 Marz 1 952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten des russischen Außenmin­ isteriums," Deutschland Archiv 26. 7 ( 1 993), pp. 786-805 , Wett1g, "'Die Stalin-Note vom 1 0. Marz 1 952 als gesch1chtswissenschaftliches Problem. Ein gewandeltes Problemvcrstimdms" Deutschland Archiv 2 5 · 2 ( 1 992), pp 1 57- 1 67; and sce the debate betwcen Wettlg and Elke Schcrstj anoi, Deutschland Archiv, 25: 8 ( 1 992), pp 858-863 , Michael Lemke, "Chance oder RISlko? Die Stalin-Note im außenpolitischen Konzept der Bundes­ regierung," Ze1tschnft fitr Gescluchte 2 ( 1 99 1 ), pp. 1 1 5-1 29, Rolf Steininger, Eme Chance :::ur W1edervere1mgung? Die Sta/111-Note vom /0 Mät-= 1952. Darsteflung und Dokumentat10n auf der Grundlage unverojfen­ tftchter bnttscher zmd amenka111scher Akten, Archiv für Sozialgescl11chte Supplement 1 2, (Bonn Verlag Neue Gesselchaft, 1 985). 6 See Stefan Creuzberger, "Abschirmungspolitik gegenüber dem westhchen Deutschland 1111 Jahre 1 952," in Die sow1et1sche Deutschlcmd-Po//t1k, ed. Wettig (Bonn: Bouv1er, 1 997), pp. 1 2-36; Inge Bennewitz and Rainer Potratz, Zwangsauss,ed{ungen an der mnerdeutschen Gren:::e. Analysen und Dokumente (Berlm: Ch. Links, 1 994 ).

2

few isolated strike incidents, adding to other hardships such as frequent electricity outages or heating cut-offs, from which virtually the entire East German population suffered. The regime also intensified its battles on other fronts. lt instituted a compulsory build-up of the armed forces. lt also carried out campaigns against restive social organizations. A particular target were the churches, especially the dominant Protestant Church and its active youth organization, the Junge Gemeinde, preferred by many young East Germans to the SED-dominated Free German Youth (FDJ). The combined assault on society by the authori­ ties put additional strains on the GDR's socio-economic fabric. While prisons were filling up with the victims ofsocialist criminal "justice, " an unprecedented number ofEast Germans fled to Western Germany. While some 166,000 people had turned their back on the regime in 1951, and some 182,000 in 1952, in the first four months of 1 953, according to internal GDR statistics, some 122,000 East Germans left, despite the mostly sealed border. 7 As the Soviet intelligence chief could inform the CPSU Politburo, the GDR no longer held "any attraction to citizens ofWest Germany. "8 Eager to close the last escape valve-the still open sector crossings in Berlin-and to put pressure on the Western powers by increasingly harassing the Western outpost, the SED proposed to take the drastic measure of virtually closing offthe border between the Eastern and Western sectors early in 1953 (thus foreshad­ owing the construction ofthe Berlin Wall in 196 1 ) (Document No. 2).

Change of Guard in Moscow: The Post-Stalin Leadership and the "Peace Campaign " The growing crisis in East Germany coincided with a change ofleadership in the USSR-in fact the dawn ofa new era in the wake ofStalin 's death on 5 March 1953. Even as the dictator lay dying at his dacha in a Moscow suburb, Georgii Malenkov and Lavrentii Beria plotted to seize the reins ofpower. Besides Malenkov and Beria, the newly-created CPSU Presidium included Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, Lazar Kaganovich, Anastas Mikoyan, Maksim Saburov and Mikhail Pervukhin, all ofwhom had held high positions under Stalin. The momentary pre-eminence of Malenkov in what was presented to the party and the outside world as the new "collective leadership " was underlined by his appointment on 5 March as chairman ofthe Presidium ofthe USSR Council ofMinisters. Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich were appointed deputy chairmen. 9 Seemingly ready to break with Stalin's hard-line and paranoid approach which had placed the Soviet Union on the defensive worldwide, the new leadership immediately moved to set Soviet foreign policy on a more calm and flexible track. On 15 March, Malenkov announced to the Supreme Soviet that there was "no litigious or unresolved question which could not be settled by peaceful means on the basis ofthe mutual agreement ofthe countries concerned 7 "Analysc der Rcpubl1kflucht," 1 954, Bundesarchiv Potsdam [BA-Potsdam], Ministerium des Innern, Haupt­ verwaltung der Deutschen Volkspolizei (MI/HDV), 1 1/962 Within the first six months of 1 953, over 225,000 peoplc left the GOR. 8 '"TsK KPSS," Top Secret Memorandum 708/l by S. lgnatiev, 1 9 February 1 953, Arkh1v Sluzhby Vneshnei Razvedki Ross1isko 1 Fcderatsii (ASVR), F. 2589, tom. 7, D. 455 1 3, LI. 97-99, quoted 111 David E. Murphy, Serge, A. Kondrashev and George Bailcy, Batt/eground Ber/111: CIA vs. KGB m the Cold War (New Haven, Conn. : 1 997), p 1 56. 9 Vladislav M . Zubok and Constantme V Pleshakov, Inside the KremIm 's Cold War: From Stalm to Khrushchev (Cambndge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1 996)

3

. . . including the United States of America." 1 0 In the following weeks, the USSR signaled readiness for a truce in Korea; eased the contentious traffic problem around Berlin; called for a resumption of quadripartite negotiations on safety in the Berlin air corridors; expressed regret for the shooting down of a British plane; waived its long-standing claim on control of Turkish territory; and agreed to the appointment ofDag Hammarskjöld as new U.N. secretary general. The "hate America campaign" in the Soviet media was apparently called off; the Kremlin even hinted at its interest in a U.S.-Soviet summit on disarmament and other issues. Similarly, a growing consensus within the Moscow leadership seemed to emerge on the need for drastic changes in Soviet policies toward East-Central Europe that would help stabilize the deteriorating situation in the region. 1 1 lt is unclear precisely when the East German leadership was informed of any impending changes in Kremlin policy toward the GDR. Unaware of the Moscow's intentions-or perhaps in an effort to preempt any changes-Ulbricht, in a Neues Deutschland article published on 8 March (the day before Stalin 's funeral), reasserted in the most vigorous terms his determination to proceed with the accelerated program of building socialism, including the creation ofNational Armed Forces, and he took pains to attribute these policies to Stalin directly. 1 2 With the backing of two key Soviet officials stationed in the GDR, Ulbricht also renewed an earlier request for Moscow's authorization to place border guards along the sectors between West and East Berlin, continuing his efforts to isolate the Western outpost in the heart of the GDR. 13 Once back from Stalin 's funeral, however, Ulbricht fell noticeably silent. Apparently, his colleague, Premier Otto Grotewohl, received his first inklings ofthe new Soviet leadership's intentions while in Moscow, namely that the GDR would be left to its own devices to deal with its economic difficulties. 1 4 A few days later, Moscow refused to give Ulbricht a "green light" on any further measures of "border protection" along the sector line in Berlin. The Soviet Control Commission (SCC), Moscow's chief policy implementing arm in the GDR, was instructed to explain "tactfully" to the SED that the "grossly simplistic" measures they were proposing would interrupt the "established order of city life," would "create bitterness among the Berliners and produce economic dislocations, and, most importantly, place in doubt the sincerity of the policy of the Soviet government and the GDR government, which are actively and consistently supporting the unification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty. " Closing borders, Moscow declared, would present a "clear disadvantage" to the USSR in its relations with the Western powers. Further, the Kremlin wanted to be sure that any countermeasures against the "hostile forces" in West Berlin aren 't "hurried and simplistic" (Document No. 4). Similarly, Moscow's propaganda directives for the month of April apparently admonished the East Berlin newspapers to cease their vitriolic attacks 1 0 New York Tunes, 1 7 March 1 953, p A6 1 1 HICOG Berlin to Department of State, 27 March 1 953, NARA, RG 5 9, 762.02 2 1 /3-2753. 12 Neues Deutschland, 8 March 1 953. HICOG's Eastern Affairs D1vis1011 in Berlin reported that it was unclear as to '"whether Ulbncht acted on his own . . or 111 col laboratlon with local Sov1et and/or Kreml m leaders. DAD [West German 111telhgence serv1ce] shares our feeling that Ulbricht 1s momentarily in a particularly difficult and exposed pos1tion In fact DAD has some reports that Ulbricht was strictly a Stalm man; tliat he was not liked or actively accepted by other Krem Im leaders, and that a movement to have h1m removed from his powerful posihon 111 the SED was only prevented by mtcrvenllon of Stal111 h1mself " Lyon to HICOG Bonn, 12 March 1 953, 762B 00/3- 1 25 3 . 1 3 The two officials were the commander 111 ch1ef ofSoviet Occupat10n Forces 111 Germany, General Vasilii I . Chmkov, and the political advisor t o the Soviet Control Commission, Vladimir S Semyonov 1 4 Fritz Schenk, a personal ass1stant to GOR planning chiefBruno Leuschner, reports th1s in his mem01rs, Im Vor::1111111er der D1klatur. 12 Jahre Pankow (Köln: Ktepenheuer and Witsch, 1 962), p. I 82; see also his "Wie die Regierung den 1 7. Jum erlebte," SBZ-Arch1v 1 3 ( 1 962), p. 1 50.

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against the Western powers and to focus their attention on West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as an opponent to the peaceful solution ofthe German question. 1 5 The SCC also forced a scaling back of the massive numbers of arrests and trials the SED regime had inaugurated under the pretext of enforcing a law for the protection of people's property. A report by the GDR Prosecutor's Office, ordered by the SCC, estimated that if the re­ gime continued to convict perpetrators of economic crimes at the current rate, "more than 40,000 people will be in prison by the end of 1 953," a situation that would be "simply un­ feasible." 1 6 By mid-April, however,the circumstances had shifted once again. Ulbricht had somehow managed to reassure himself of Moscow's support, possibly by soft-pedaling some of the harshest features of SED policy. On 1 0 April, the USSR Council of Ministers reduced the level ofcompulsory GDR shipments from Soviet enterprises in East Germany,and three days later granted East Berlin further economic support. In bis first major policy pronouncements since tbe 8 March statement,Ulbricht reiterated in two Neues Deutschland articles on 1 5 and 16 April tbat tbe construction ofsocialism in the GDR was tbe most important contribution to peace and German unity,althougb he made no references to the creation ofarmed forces or to the enactment ofrestrictive measures around Berlin. U.S. observers detected "[n]otice­ ably more restraint in tone than [tbe] usual Ulbricht style," including his reaffirmation ofthe voluntaiy nature ofthe production cooperatives (known as LPGs 1 7 ) and his acknowledgment that local courts and party officials bad erred in dealing with small and middle-class farmers. But tbe "de-dramatized" program,U.S. officials noted,still stressed increases in productivity, especially in heavy industry. 1 8 The "striking feature" of Ulbricht's pronouncements, they observed,was how they fit "neatly into the changed tactical position currently being followed by Moscow. " 1 9 Despite the elimination of some of the "frightening features" of SED policy, the party continued to put pressure on !arge segments of the population. On the political level, the regime sharpened the battle against potential centers of opposition such as the churches, as weil as targeting certain key individuals. In mid-May,for example,the 1 3th SED CC Plenum 20 ousted Franz Dahlem,considered Ulbricbt's only serious rival within the party,ascribing the move to further "lessons ofSlanskyism," an allusion to the purged Czechoslovak Communist leader who had been executed as an "Anglo-American spy" in December 1952. 2 1 The SED also renewed its drive for austerity,"vigilance" against foreign enemies,and internal party discipline; reinforced efforts to increase industrial productivity and the viability of the existing LPGs; and launched new measures to undermine the existence of small entrepre­ neurs. Ignoring the signs ofgrowing dissatisfaction among tbe population,tbe Politburo bad the CC adopt a 1 0 percent compulsory raise in industrial work norms,effective l June. The GDR Council of Ministers eventually decreed the norm increase "recommended" by the Central Committee,but changed the deadline to 30 June.

1 5 I-IICOG Berlin to Department of State, 30 Apnl 1 953, National Archives II. (NARA), Record Group (RG) 59, 7628 00/4-3053 . 16 Falco Werkcntm, Polillsche Strafjus//= 111 der Ara U/bncht (Bcrl111. Ch Lmks Verlag, 1 995), pp 70-7 1 1 7 The Germ an phrase 1s Landw1rtschaftliche Produkt,onsgenossenschaften. 1 8 J--IICOG Berlm to J--IICOG Bonn, 20 Apnl 1 953, NARA, RG, 7628 00/4-2053. 19 J--IICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn, 20 Apnl 1 953, NARA, RG, 7628.00/4-205 3 . 20 The Plenum was held 111 Berlin from 1 3-1 4 May 1 953. 2 1 On Slansky, see !gor Lukes, "The RudolfSlansky Affair. New Evidence," Slav1c Review, no l (Sprmg 1 999), pp 1 60-1 87; and HICOG Berlin to Department of State, 27 May 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 762B 00/5-2753.

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The Eisenhower Administration and the Soviet "Peace Campaign " Stalin's death and his successors' "peace offensive " had come as a surprise not only to Ulbricht, but to the new administration ofDwight D. Eisenhower as well. Despite the fact that Stalin 's demise had been expected ever since the end of World War II, nobody had apparently examined the scenario ve1y seriously. "Ever since 1946, I know that all the so-called experts have been yapping about what would happen when Stalin dies and what we as a nation should do about it, " Eisenhower complained at a cabinet meeting on 6 March. "Well, he's dead. And you can turn the files of our government inside out-in vain-looking for any plans laid. We have no plan. We are not even sure what difference his death makes. " 22 In fact, contingency plans did exist, but the key document, PSB D-24 (1 November 1952) was largely useless as an operative guideline, proclaiming only the "many uncertainties in this field " and blandly stating that "(1) Stalin must die sometime; (2) strains must be presumed to exist between individuals and groups closely connected with the problem of succession; (3) ... there is evidence of group dissatisfaction throughout the population of the Soviet Union. "23 The thinking ofthe president and his administration about how to respond soon c1ystallized around the idea of a presidential speech. Interna! disagreements, however, forestalled any immediate action. Presidential adviser C.D. Jackson, an old World War II psychological warfare hand and long-time editor of Time & Life magazine, favored an aggressive exploi­ tation of this "first really big propaganda opportunit)'. offered to our side for a long time. " Led by Jackson, the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), an inter-agency panel set up to coordinate the administration's psychological warfare efforts, suggested formulating "A Message to the Soviet Government and the Russian Peoples " centering on a proposal for a four-power conference. 24 By contrast, Secretaiy of State John Foster Dulles, known for his fervent anti-communism and calls for "liberation " ofthe "captive peoples " ofEastern Europc, surprisingly urged a more cautious approach. Dulles was also dead-set against a four-power meeting, because it would entail discussing German unification. Opening the "Pandora 's box " of the German question, he believed, was certain to disrupt the American high-wire act of obtaining British, French and Italian, as wcll as West German, ratification for the "European Defense Community " (EDC), j ust as he feared it would upset plans for the impending West German federal elections. To the West Europeans and Americans, thc EDC assured West German militaiy integration into the Western alliance, and thus precluded the resurgence of Germany as an independent military power. To many Germans, it held out hopes, most immediately, for the end ofthe occupation regime and West Germany's speedier attainment of sovereignty and international acceptance, as weil as the admittedly distant goal of fulfilling the national desire for reunification on Western terms. But for both West Europeans and many Germans, negotiations with the Soviets remained a tempting alternative path to pursuing a resolution of East-West differences and German unity. Dulles therefore apocalyptically suggested timt negotiating with the Kreml in would be "tantamount to inviting the fall of the French, German and Italian Governments, and possibly even rendering 22 Stephcn Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol 2 (New York. S1111on and Schuster, 1 984). pp 67---68. see also ·'Mmutcs of Cabmet Meetmg, March 6, 1 953," DDEL, Dwight D Eiscnhower Papers, Ann Wh1tma11 filc, Cabmet senes, bo:\. 1 23 PSß D-24, NARA, RG 59, PSB Files. 24 The four powers controlling Gennan affäirs were the Umtcd States, the Soviet Umon, Bntain and Francc On J ackson, see H. W Brands, Jr., Cold Warnors. Ersenhower 's Genera/1011 and A111enca11 Fore1gn Pohcy (New York Columb1a Umvers1ty Press, 1 988), pp 1 1 7-1 37; and Valur Ingimundarson, " ' Der Chef des kalten Krieges' C D .lackson psychologische Kriegfuhrung und die deutsche Frage, 1 95 3/54," Vrerte!;ahrsheftefi,r Zerlgeschrchte 46 2 ( 1 998), pp 22 1 -25 1 .

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Mr. Eden's position in the British government untenable." If any official proposition was made that German unity could be obtained by some other vehicle, Dulles wamed, "then certainly the EDC would be finished." (Document No. 3, NSC). Soviet Premier Georgii Malenkov's 15 March speech increased the pressure on the Eisenhower administration. Across the board, U.S. officials doubted that the speech or Moscow's other conciliatory gestures indicated a basic change in Soviet policies and long-range objectives. But Malenkov, not Eisenhower, had seized the initiative. Everything now seemed to be "building up towards a new offer on Germany," as the new U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen, predicted-possibly even, "with Stalin gone ... a really big one involving Soviet withdrawal from Eastem Germany."2 5 In the end, Eisenhower's 16 April speech, "A Chance for Peace," delivered before the American Society ofNewspaper Editors in Washington, called for a "deeds not words" test ofthe Soviet peace campaign. Eisenhower suggested, among other things, an agreement to end the Korean War and to address the German and Austrian problem. He was careful, however, to avoid any mention of an East-West conference. The speech, as the State Department briefed its embassies, was designed to seize the political and psychological initiative from the USSR and would, as Dulles boasted to the newspaper editors after Eisenhower 's speech, turn the Soviet peace offensive "into a 'peace-defensive'." Intemally, Dulles sounded more pessimistic: "The present course we are following is a fatal one for us and the free world. lt is just defensive: we are always worrying about what the Soviets will take next. Unless we change this policy, or get some break we will lose bit by bit the free world, and break ourselves financially. ... You can't hold the world by just defensive action much longer."2 6 Administration officials followed events in the GDR closely to see whether they gave any clue to Soviet intentions. Given how starkly Ulbricht's 8 March restatement of hard-line policies had contrasted with the Soviet peace campaign developed after Stalin's funeral, the U.S. High Commission for Germany (HICOG) 27 speculated that Ulbricht's emphasis on the necessity to develop national armed forces "may have represented an independent decision ofUlbricht not cleared with the new Kremlin leaders."2 8 In HICOG's view, this was followed by a period "during which Ulbricht and his lieutenants were adjusting themselves and the SED 's policy, both intemal and extemal." However much out ofstep with Moscow Ulbricht had been, by mid-April it appeared that "coordination between Pankow29 and Moscow ... ha[d] been fully reestablished." There was by then "every indication that Moscow [was] exercising complete control of SED policy and actions." 30 Nevertheless, rumors about Ulbricht's position persisted; information from the SPD East Bureau (the underground East Zone branch of the SPD) in Berlin predicted that Ulbricht "might be sacrificed by [the] 25 Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 3 7 1 / 1 06 532/NS 1 0345/9, "Minute," Robert to Strang, as quoted m Klaus Larres, "Eisenhower and the First Forty Days after Stahn's Death· The Incompatibility of Detente and Political Warfare," D1plomacy and Statecraft 6 2 (July 1 995), pp. 43 1-469, here p. 449, see also John J. Yurechko, "The Day Stalm D1ed· American Plans for Exploiting the Sov1et Succession Crisis ofl 953," The Journal ofStrategie St11d1es 3 · J (May 1 980), pp. 44-73. 26 "Solanum ProJect. Princ1pal Points Made by JFD," 8 May 1 953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL), Mandatory Review release 27 HICOG succeeded the U S military occupat1on authonties as the U S. representation m Germany upon establishment of the partially sovere1gn Federal Repubhc in 1 949 28 HICOG Berlin to Departiuent of State, 13 March 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 7628 .00/3-3 1 53 . 2 9 Pankow was the city district of Berlin which housed the seat of the GOR government. The phrase was used to avoid any reference to the GOR governrnent as the "Berlin government" or "East Berlin government." The latter phrases would have tended to undermine Western Allied claims to a special, joint occupation status ofthe city and to help leg1timize the SED regime. 30 HICOG Berlin to Department of State, 30 April 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 7628.00/4-3053 .

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Soviets. "3 1 Other signs seemed to suggest that "Ulbricht may have had his wings clipped somewhat by Moscow," and HICOG speculated that the SCC "may call for a more drastic curtailment of Ulbricht's dominating position of control. "3 2 HICOG officials perceptively noted contradictory signs in Moscow's actions and warned the State Department that "we [ are] faced at present with unstable factor[s] in analyzing GDR developments re Soviet tactics and intentions vis-a-vis Germany as [a] whole." 3 3 Much like their colleagues in Washington, U.S. observers in Berlin, however, were skeptical that Soviet long-range obj ectives in Germany had changed: at the end of April, they reported that the SED apparatus was actively endeavoring "to achieve acceptance and implementation ofwhat amounts to basically the same internal SED program as before, with some slight outward modifications."3 4 Nevertheless, the U . S . mission in Berlin argued that the possibility could not be excluded that "Ulbricht represents a point of view which is still under discussion in Moscow," and that the SED leader may "be making an effort to commit Moscow to this policy with the tacit support of a group in the Kremlin which, in his opinion, will win the stmggle for power. "3 5

Soviet Deutschlandpolitik in Spring 1953 The German issue was indeed under intense review within the Soviet leadership in the spring of 1 953 . lt is unclear whether this occurred in reaction to the 1 9 March Bundestag agreement to the EDC treaty, to mounting skepticism over the efficiency of Stalinist policies in the GDR and throughout Eastem Europe, whether it arose as part of a fundamental policy reassessment to try to forestall further moves towards West Germany's militaty integration, or whether it was a combination of these factors. Initially, reports on the growing dissatis­ faction within the GDR seem to have been ignored in Moscow; rather attention was focused on the impending ratification of the West German contractuals. 3 6 As Ivan Tugarinov, head of the Committee on Information, informed the Third European Department of the Foreign Ministry (responsible for Germany) in mid-April, "There is a widespread assumption in the USA and the Western European countries that, in the near future, the Soviet government will come out with a proposal for convening a quadripartite conference to discuss the German problem." Tugarinov surmised that "the main reason for the alarm" in the West was that the 3 1 Berlin to Secretary of State, 9 June 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 762B 00/6-953. 32 HICOG Berlin to Department of State, 30 Apnl 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 762B 00/4-3 053 On 1 Apnl 1 95 3 , f-ll COG Berlm rcported that C J C h a d obtamcd a n mtelligence report late the prev10us month The report contamed propaganda direct1ves g1ven by chiefSov1ct ed1tors of Tagl1che Rundschau to German ed1tors at a meetmg on 1 7 March They mcluded, among other things, instruct10ns t o popularize the new men 111 the Kremlm through a senes of b1ograph1es, to place strong emphasis on the activ1t1es of the West German group "'Deutsche Sammlung," and to soft-pedal GDR media reports 011 West Berl in. Lyon to HICOG Bcrlm, 1 April 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 962 B .40/4- 1 5 3 . 33 Bcrlm t o Sccretary o f State, 9 .Tune 1 953, NARA, R G 59, 7628 00/6-953. 34 HICOG Bcrlm to Secretary of Statc, 30 April 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 762B 00/4-3053, JIJCOG Berhn to HICOG Bonn, 20 Apnl 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 762 B 00/4-2053 35 HICOG Berlin to Sccretary of Statc, 20 May 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 7628 00/5-2053 See also HICOG B erlm tu Department of State, 27 May 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 762 ß. 00/5-2753. 36 Valerü I Masaev, who at the time worked 111 thc Radio and Press department of the Sov1et Control Comm1ssion, recounted in 1 992 that 111 response to rcports on the cnt1cal s1tuat1011 in the GDR "we rece1vcd secret mstruct1ons from Moscow not to col lcct such mfomrntion. They were sccn as incorrect and pan1cky. The lcadersh1p in Moscow cons1dered the GDR regime as strong and did not want to take note of negative aspects " Quoted in Gerhard Be1er, vVir Wol!enfre1e lvfenschen sem (Koln: Bund, 1 993), p 3 7 .

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"apparently pending announcement by the Soviet Union of new proposals on the German question" could "bring about the failure of American plans" to include West Germany in its "aggressive bloc" (Document No. 5). Rumors of a new Soviet initiative on Germany had been reinforced by Moscow's recall in mid-April of the long-time political adviser to the Soviet Military Administration, later the Soviet Control Commission, Vladimir S. Semyonov, as well as preparations for reorganizing the SCC as a new "Soviet High Commission" analogous to the Western High Commissions in West Germany. 3 7 In recent years, interpreting the purpose, timing, and scope of this Soviet initiative on Germany has been controversial. 38 Was it merely a propaganda move designed to forestall the further military integration of West Germany? Or did it reflect a new flexibility on the part of the post-Stalin leadership on the German question, even to the extent of abandoning socialism in the GDR? The documentary record is too fragmentary to provide a definite resolution of this question at this time. What is noteworthy, though, is the seemingly contradictory and ambivalent character of the evidence. Perhaps this incoherence and uncertainty is an accurate reflection of Soviet thinking about the German problem in the spring of 1 9 5 3 . The existence of several internal F oreign Ministry drafts of the planned policy directive make clear that the initiative was by no means spontaneous or improvised. Strikingly, Foreign Ministry and intelligence officials saw little chance that the Western powers, in particular the new Eisenhower administration, would react positively to any new Soviet proposals, and in that sense they would only serve the purpose of "exposing" Western "aggressive designs" in Germany. As Semyonov put it in a memorandum on 2 May, "since the negative consequences of the Bonn and Paris 'treaties ' . . . so far have not appeared, the popular movement against these treaties and in defense of German unification on peaceful and democratic foundations is becoming weaker in West Germany." Further, "old slogans regarding the question ofGerman unification currently do not fully correspond to the changed circumstances, and their mobilizing role has somewhat weakened" 39 (Document No. 9). New slogans were needed. At the same time, other Soviet Foreign Ministry officials seemed to believe that the new proposals on Germany would be more than purely propagandistic; many of the memoranda are permeated with the expectation that new Soviet proposals would indeed be recognized as "new active steps" (Document No. 6), as a "new concrete step" (Document No. 7), or as "serious further steps" (Document No. 9) in the direction of German unification that would exert influence on West German public opinion and Western European governments . The essence of these new proposals was both to boost the prestige of the East German regime and resurrect the idea of German unification (Document No. 6). The head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Third European Department, Mikhail Gribanov, and Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Pushkin, in a memo on 1 8 April dealing with the "activation of our policy on the German question," proposed to invite a GDR government delegation to Moscow headed by Grotewohl. They pointed out that no GDR government delegation had officially traveled to the USSR since 1 949 and that a visit would "increase the authority of the GDR." As a "new step" in the German question, Gribanov and Pushkin suggested the formation of 37 Elke ScherstJ anoi, Das SKK-Stalu/. Zur Geschichte der Sow;ellschen Kontrollkomm 1ss1on m Deutschland, 1949-/953 (Munche,r K G Saur, 1 998), pp. 95-1 05. 38 This was apparent from the discussion betwcen Gerhard Wettig, W1lfried Loth, and Elke Scherstjanoi at the confcrence on "The Cnsis Year 1 953 and the Cold War in Europe," organized by the Cold War International H1story Project, The National Secunty Archive, and the Zentrum für Zeithistonsche Forschung Potsdam, Potsdam, November 1 996. 39 This document was provided by Prof. Hope Harrison (George Washington U111vers1ty) for the conference on "The Crisis Year 1 953 and the Cold War m Europe," Potsdam, November 1 996

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a Provisional All-German Government composed of representatives appointed by the West and East German parliaments while preserving, at least for the time being, the GDR and West German governments. A provisional government would prepare recommendations for the unification process, but also be responsible for all-German problems of a more practical nature, such as intra-German trade and postal communications. Most importantly, the provisional government would draft an all-German election law. Further proposals included turning the Soviet mission in Berlin into an embassy, reorganizing the SCC as a Soviet High Commission, releasing a significant number of German prisoners of war, and taking eco­ nomic measures to bolster the GDR, such as the transfer of 33 Soviet-owned enterprises to East German control. Another Foreign Ministry proposal, "Regarding Further Soviet Measures in the German Question," probably written around 28 April, placed the formation of an all-German govern­ ment at the center of the Soviet proposal to "retain the initiative on the German question," arguing that such a "new concrete step" would "evoke a broad positive response among the German people" and "expose the position of the [ other] three great powers on the German issue" (Document No. 7). To "thoroughly undermine" the Western powers ' call for free and internationally supervised all-German elections, the memorandum also proposed the simul­ taneous withdrawal of all occupying armed forces immediately after the formation of the Provisional All-German Government. This, it was argued, would mean the "effective collapse of the aggressive plans of the North Atlantic bloc in Europe," and make the Western powers "very likely to decline the proposal to withdraw troops." The plan also called for the liquidation of the SCC, a POW amnesty, a cut in reparations payments by 50 percent, the transfer of Soviet-owned enterprises to the GDR, negotiations to establish the "Wismut" uranium-mining enterprise as a joint stock-company, and finally, an invitation to a GDR government delegation. Four days later, Semyonov, as the new head of the Foreign Ministry 's Third European Department, submitted essentially the same proposals to Molotov (Document No. 9). He argued that the West would suffer "significant political damage" by "probably" coming out against the envisioned Soviet proposal which would "put [the German] question before the Germans as a real possibility even at the present time. " Since the Western governments would "in all likelihood reject these new proposals as weil," it was imp011ant to "avoid the im­ pression that the Soviet government is on this occasion limiting itself only to diplomatic posturing," and to take measures to strengthen friendly relations between the USSR and the GDR, and increase the all-German and international prestige of the East German state. Since the GDR had "by now grown and strengthened to a sufficient degree to govern the country independently," and since "the sec continued to emphasize sharply the inequalities between the USSR and the GDR," Semyonov recommended the "removal of the Soviet military authorities' control over the GDR." He noted that liquidating the sec would constitute "clear, practical proof of the sincerity of the Soviet government's proposals on all-German ques­ tions" (Document No. 9). lt is crucial to understand that the proposals for a major initiative for German reunification presumed the "interim" existence, and in fact the key role, of a stable East German state, however incompatible with Western ideas or interests this may have been. Strengthening East Germany was hence the other side ofthe coin of any Kremlin proposal to the Western powers. This is borne out by a Soviet Foreign Ministry memorandum of 8 May, written presumably as a result of a USSR Council of Ministers ' meeting three days earlier, which developed additional measures on the German question (Document No. 1 1 ). The memorandum declared that the "chief task" now facing the Soviet Union was the "undete1Ted implementation ofthe policy to strengthen the political and economic positions ofthe GDR." Reaching "some type 10

oftemporary or at least partial agreements on all-German questions" that would "popularize the USSR's policies on the German question," took, for the moment, a secondary priority. The memorandum presented the already familiar recommendations, adding that East German financial and economic obligations for 1953-1955 should be set at the 1953 level, with all obligations ceasing as of1956. Though occasional diplomatic and intelligence reports hinted at the "worsening class conflict in the GDR," Moscow seems to have had little awareness ofhow quickly the situation in the GDR was deteriorating, due in part to Beria's efforts after Stalin's death to revamp the security apparatus, but also to the reorganizing and eventual dismantling of the SCC that spring. 40 By early May, however, the worsening conditions increasingly drew attention in Moscow. Based on a report by the chief representative of the Soviet Ministry of Interna! Affairs in Germany, Colonel Ivan Fadeikin, spotlighting the growing refugee problem, Beria asked the CPSU Presidium on 6 May to offer "proposals for measures that will bolster the work ofthe appropriate organs in the GDR and halt the exodus ofthe GDR citizens to West Germany."4 1 As Beria's report pointed out, the mass flight could be explained not only by increased hostile propaganda among the GDR inhabitants carried out by West Gennan organs, but also by the desire of individual groups of peasants to avoid entering into agricultural production cooperatives currently being organized, by fears among the small and middle-size private entrepreneurs that their personal property and assets will be confiscated, by the desire among a number of youth to avoid serving in the GDR arrned forces, and by the difficulties experienced in the GDR with regard to the supply offood and merchandise available to the inhabitants. 42 Beria concluded that "the Central Committee ofthe SED and the responsible state organs ofthe GDR do not conduct a sufficiently active fight against the demoralizing work carried out by West German authorities" and that "they falsely assume that as long as free circulation exists between West Berlin and the GDR, such flights are inevitable." Beria then suggested having the SCC address these issues and discuss its proposals at a forthcoming meeting of the CPSU CC Presidium "in order to make the necessary recommendations to the German friends. "43 The degenerating situation was apparently discussed at a CPSU Presidium meeting on 1 4 May, at which the leadership approved a F oreign Ministry draft telegram that instructed the SCC "tactfully" to advise Ulbricht and Grotewohl that "collectivization in East Germany should be halted for at least the rest of the year. "44 Less tactfully, Ulbricht was also to be rebuked for his 5 May speech commemorating Karl Marx, which declared that the GDR had attained the status of a people's democratic state in which the dictatorship ofthe proletariat was to be carried out. The Soviet leadership termed the speech· "politically misguided" and prone to "severely damage the struggle ofboth the GDR itselfand the Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany on a peace-loving and democratic basis." The CPSU leadership 40 Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlm, pp. 1 54-1 68; the quote is on pp 1 5 1-1 68, citmg a report by Medvedev, 9 March 1 953, SVRA, file 6888 1 , vol. 3, pp. 21-28, sec 9 4 1 Lavrentii Bena to CPSU Presidium, Memorandum No. 44/B, "V Prezidium TsK KPSS," 6 May 1 953, ASVR, f 2589, t. 7, d 358 1 , II 326-328, here 327-328; cited in Kramer, "Tue Early Post-Stalin Success10n Struggle (Part 1 )," p. 23. 42 SVRA file 358 1 , vol. 7; pubhshed as facs1mile in Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlm, p 1 57 43 Quoted m Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlm, p. 1 58. 44 Top secret draft memorandum, "Proekt ukazanu tt. Chmkovu, Yudinu," 14 May 1 953, w1th cover note from Molotov to the CPSU Pres1dmm, AVP RF, f. 6, op. 12, p. 1 8, d. 278, 11. 39--40, cited in Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalm Succession Struggle (part 1)," p 24.

11

also criticized SCC Political Adviser Pavel Yudin for committing "an egregious error" by not intervening with Ulbricht and failing to consult Moscow. 45 By mid-May, the refugee crisis in the GDR seriously alarmed Soviet Foreign Ministry officials. A 15 May memorandum by Gribanov and colleagues to Semyonov warned that the illegal movement of people from East to West Germany had become "massive" and recommended a temporary halt to the drive for new LPGs, expansion of consumer goods production, further housing construction, and an amnesty, as well as "mass-political explana­ tory work, especially among the youth" (Document No. 12) . Three days later, Chuikov, Yudin, and the head ofthe Soviet diplomatic mission in Berlin, Ivan Il'ichev, painted an even more ominous picture in a report to Malenkov: "measures to limit capitalist elements in the city and the count1yside," they wrote, had been implemented "without sufficient political and economic preparation," while food shortages, food rationing, and "many cases of incorrect arrests" were occurring. Furthermore, the SED leadership had underestimated the signifi­ cance of the mass flight, and had committed "serious mistakes" in its work with the intelligentsia. Byand large, however, the suggested measures implied simply a more efficient continuation of Stalinist practices and fell far short of a fundamental change of course (Document No. 13). These warnings from Germany must have caused Moscow planners to reassess the key role that had been ascribed to the GDR in their Germany initiative. Of equal impo1tance, Churchill 's 11 May call for East-West negotiations "at the summit" might have induced a greater willingness to take-or at least profess-more interest in all-German concems. Certainly, Ulbricht continued to annoy the Soviet leaders. At the 20 May CPSU Presidium meeting, criticism focused on East Germany's "little Stalin" personally, including the planned festivities for his 60th birthday on 30 June. 46 Following up earlier proposals by Semyonov directed at de-emphasizing Soviet control over the GDR and mirroring-at least nomi­ nally-the situation in West Germany, the CPSU Presidium finally decided to reorganize the SCC and establish a "Soviet High Commission in Germany. " In putting forth this proposal, Molotov might also have been trying to reassert Foreign Minist1y prerogatives in German affairs over those of the Soviet military-successfully as it turned out, since on 27 May Semyonov was appointed to the new post ofhigh commissioner. 47 Demonstrating a sharp break with the institutions and cadre choices ofthe previous era, Beria won approval for a reorganization of the MVD's apparatus in Germany, part of a larger shake-up of the intel­ ligence bureaucracy intended to ensure loyalty to the new leadership. 48 Concerns about the stability of the GDR and increased expectations of four-power negotiations on German unification may have been one reason the policy memorandum that was eventually submitted to the Council ofMinisters on 27 May placed greater emphasis on measures to effect all-German unity. The paper, likely tabled by Molotov, avoided much of the usual ideological verbiage against the Western powers. Instead, it argued that the 45 "Protokol No 8 zasedaniya Prezidmma TsK KPSS ot 1 4 maya 1 953 goda," 1 4 May 1 953 TsKhSD, f 3, op. 1 0, d. 23, II 4 1-42, cited 111 Kram er, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle (part 1 )," pp. 24-25 For Ulbncht's speech, see "Karl Marx-der größte Sohn der deutschen Nation: Aus der Rede des Genossen Walter Ulbncht auf der Gedenkkundgebung 111 Berlin zum 1 35 . Geburtstag von Karl Marx am 5. Mai 1 953," Neues Deutschland, No 1 06, 7 May 1 953, p. 3 -This might have been one of the rcasons for Yudin's replacement by Semyonov at the end ofthe month 46 The Soviet leadership finally resolvcd to ask M1khail Suslov to talk to W1lhelm Pi eck, the ailing GOR president who was at that time staymg in Moscow on vacation. P1eck talked to Ulbricht who denied having anything to do with the dec1sion or the preparations for his birthday festivities 47 Scherstjai101, Das SKK-Statut, pp 96-98. 48 Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 1 59-1 62

12

proposal for a provisional all-German government would be a way around the long-standing East-West juxtaposition of unification and the conclusion of a peace treaty on the one hand with free elections on the other. The proposal could also supply the key component of a "political platform on the German question which accorded with the national interests ofthe German nation while at the same time conforming with the principles of democracy and contributing to the strengthening of peace in Europe. "49 F or the moment, the Soviet F oreign Ministry under Molotov seemed to be moving closer towards a serious proposal on the unification issue that might have been credible and attractive to Germans in East and West.

A "Beria Plan " to Abandon East Germany? The debate after Stalin's death within the Soviet leadership over policy toward the GDR probably culminated at the 27 May session of the Presidium ofthe Council of Ministers and the days that followed. Since the minutes of this meeting-if they exist-have not been declassified, it remains unclear exactly how the German issue played out, whether the crisis in the GDR led to arguments in favor of pursuing all-German concems (as seemed to be indicated in the MID memorandum mentioned above) and even abandoning socialism in the GDR altogether (as Beria allegedly argued), or whether it prompted the exact opposite, moving the debate away from more all-German considerations to consolidation ofthe GDR. 50 Most likely the crisis forestalled any decision on the overall issue of an initiative on Germany. After all, the 27 May session had been called to "analyze the causes which had led to the mass exodus of Germans from the GDR to West Germany and to discuss measures for correcting the unfavorable political and economic situation in the GDR. " 5 1 The Presidium members agreed that the policy of "forced construction of socialism" had to be terminated in order to avert a full-blown crisis. According to the testimony by Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin and Khrushchev at the July 1 953 CPSU CC Plenum, as weil as later accounts by Khrushchev, Molotov, and Andrei Gromyko, Beria was not satisfied with merely adjusting 4 9 Top Secret Draft Memorandum, "On Further Measures ofthe Soviet Govemment in the German Question," not dated (second half of May), A VP RF, f 6, op 1 2, p. 1 6, d. 259, II. 39-47; see Scherstjano1, "Die sowjetische Deutschlandpol itik nach Stal ms Tod 1 953. Neue Dokumente aus dem Archiv des Moskauer Außenmmistenums," Vterteljahrsheftefur Ze1tgesch1chte 46.3 ( 1 998), pp. 497-549 50 James R ichter, Reexamming Soviel Policy Towards Germany Dunng the Berw Interregnum, Cold War Intemat10nal H1story Project Working Paper No 3 (Washington, D C „ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1 992), Lew Bezymensk1, "'Ein Exklus1vbencht aus Moskau 1 953 Berija will die DDR beseitigen," Dte Zetl 42 ( 1 5 October 1 993), pp 8 1-83 ; Richter, "'Reexam111111g Soviel Policy Towards Gennan 111 1 953," Europe-Asta Studtes 45 3 ( 1 993), pp 67 1-69 1 ; Amy Kmght, Berw: Stalm 's First L1eutenant (Princeton, N J : Prmceton Umvcrslly Press, 1 992); Hope Harnson, "The Bargaining Power of Wcaker Al11es 111 B lpolarity and Cris1s Soviet-East German Relat10ns, 1 953-1 96 1 ," (Ph.D., dissertation, Columbia Umversity, 1 993); Wettig, "Sowjetische Widervereinigungsbemühungen im ausgehenden Frühjahr 1 953? Neue Aufschlusse über ein altes Problem," Deutschland Archiv 25 :9 ( 1 992), pp 943-95 8, Wettig, "Zum Stand der Forschung über Berij as Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1 953," Deutschland Archiv 26 ( 1 993), pp, 674-82; Wettig, "Neue Erkenntmsse uber ßerij as Deutschland-Pol itik," Deutschland Archiv 26 ( 1 993), pp. 1 4 1 2; Wettig, "Zum Stand der Forschung uber Benjas Deutschland-Politik im Fruhjahr 1 953," in Die Deutschland/rage von der staatlichen Teilung Deutschlands bis :::um Tode Sta/m (Studien zur Deutschlandfrage, vol. 1 3) (Berlin Dunckcr & Humblot, 1 994), pp 1 83-200, Wettig, "Die begmnende Umonent1erung der sowjetischen Deutschland-Poht1k 1m Frühj ahr und Sommer 1 953," Deutschland Archiv 28 5 (May 1 995), pp 495-507; Wettig, Bereitschaft :::u Emhe1t m Fre1he1t, pp 235-256; Zubok, "' Unverfrohren und grob in der Deutschlandfrage . ' Beria, der Nachfolgestreit nach Stalins Tod und die Moskauer DDR-Debatte in April-Mai 1 953," in 1953-KnsenJahr des Kalten Kneges m Europa, edited by Christoph Klessmann and Bernd Stöver (Köln: Böhlau, 1 999), pp. 29-48. 5 1 See "Delo Berrn," 2 ( 1 99 1 ), p. 1 44.

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the pace of socialization in East Germany. Instead of terminating theforced construction of socialism, he allegedly shocked his colleagues with a proposal to forego socialism in the GDR altogether in favor of creating a united, neutral and non-socialist Germany. "We asked, ' Why? ' ," Molotov later recounted. "And he [Beria] replied, 'Because all we want is a peaceful Germany, and it makes no difference whether or not it is socialist' ." 52 According to Molotov, Beria kept insisting on this point. A special committee, consisting of Beria, Malenkov and Molotov was apparently created to consider the matter, and, according to Molotov, following several discussions and a late evening telephone conversation, Beria finally gave in: "To hell with you! Let's not go to another meeting. I agree with your stand." 5 3 Beria's alleged zigzags on policy towards the GDR conform to what we know about his views. 54 Much less ideologically committed than Molotov, or, as Molotov put it himself, "lacking deeper interest in fundamental policy decisions," Beria would not shy away from unorthodox, "heretical" solutions. 55 The secret police chief followed German affairs closely, and with a wide-ranging intelligence apparatus at his command ( even as he set out to revamp it), he was better informed about the growing crisis in the GDR than many ofhis rivals, even Molotov, and he used his unmatched sources to challenge the foreign minister in his own field-foreign policy. 56 lt is possible that Beria's exclusive knowledge among the leadership of the recent strides in Soviet nuclear weapons development (the U S SR successfully tested a thermonuclear device later that ycar) might have given him less cause for concern about the wider repercussions of any radical solution in Germany. 57 His shifting stance was also fully in line with what is now known about his tendency to withdraw proposals as soon as he faced strong opposition, such as Molotov and Khrushchev seem to have mounted within the Presidium. In his letters from prison, Beria later acknowledged displaying "inadmissible rudeness and insolence . . . toward comrades N . S . Khrushchev and N.A. Bulganin during the discussion on the German question" (Document No. 23). A year and a half later, at the January 1 95 5 CC CPSU Plenum, Beria 's alleged ally in 1 95 3 , Malenkov, now under attack by Khrushchev and Molotov, "admitted" that he had been wrong when he held the view that "the task of socialist development in Democratic Germany" was "inconect." "Today I admit tl1at I essentially took a wrong position on the German Question." 58 Secondary figures such as KGB operative Pavel Sudoplatov, a close collaborator ofBeria, provide additional evidence of his position. In his controversial memoirs, Special Tasks, Sudoplatov recounts that as early as April, "[p ]rior to the May Day celebration in 1 95 3 , B eria ordered me to prepare top-secret intelligence probes to test the feasibility of unifying Germany. He told me that the best way to strengthen our world position would be to create a neutral, unified Germany run by a coalition government. Germany would be the balancing factor between American and Soviet interests in Western Europe . . . . East Germany, the 52 Nik1ta Khrushchev, "Die Aktion," in Vladim1r F. Nekrassow, cd., Beri_;a. Henker 111 Sta/111s Diensten Ende einer Karriere (ßerlin: edition Q, 1 992), pp 323-324, Albert Resis ed , Aiolotov Remembers. Inside Krem/111 Po/it1cs. Conversallons Wlth Fe/IX Chuev (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1 993), pp 334-335. 53 Resis, Molotov Remembers, p. 335, see also Vojtcch Mastny, The Cold War and Soviel Jnseczmty (New York. Oxford, 1 996 ), p 1 80 54 Vladtslav Zubok, "'Unverfrohren und grob m der Deutschlandfrage . . . '," pp 29-48 55 Richter, Reexam111ing Soviel Poltcy, pp 1 5- 1 6 See also Kmght, Bena 56 Vladisl av Zubok, "Sov1et lntclhgence: The ·small Committce of lnformation', 1 95 2- 1 953," D1plomat1c H1S101y 1 9 ( 1 995), pp 453-72, first published as CWIHP Working Paper No 4 (Washington, D.C Woodrow Wilson Jnternat1onal Center for Scholars, 1 993); Murphy, Kondrashev, and ßmley, Ba11/eground Ber/111, p 1 55 . 57 Zubok and Plcshakov, Inside the Krem/111 's Cold War, pp. 1 5 9-1 62. 58 "Stenographie Report ofthe Plenum ofthe CPSU Ccntral Committee," 3 1 January 1 955, TsKhSD, f 2, op 1 , d 1 27, II 65-66, cxcerpted i n Cold War Jnternallonal H1s/ory Project Bulle/111. no. 1 0 (March 1 998), pp. 34-36

14

German Democratic Republic, would become an autonomous province in the new unified Germany. " According to Sudoplatov, Beria intended to air the idea through his intelligence contacts in Central Europe and "begin negotiations with the Western powers." 59 Similarly, Semyonov, who, as head of the responsible department within the Foreign Ministry, partici­ pated in the key meetings of the Soviet leadership on Germany ( as well as the later meetings with the SED leaders), charges in his 1 995 memoirs that Beria was pursuing a line on Germany which would have "disrupted the continuity of our policy on the German question and aimed at shocking the Soviet Union and eliminating the GDR. " Semyonov reports that during a Presidium meeting in the second half ofMay 1 95 3 , Beria, when asked for his views, "took a paper out of his jacket pocket, without haste, as if he was the master of the house, put on his glasses, and read his own draft on German policy. It differed fundamentally from the one which I carried in my bag." 60 However, serious doubts have been raised about the existence of a "Beria plan." Thus far, much of the evidence on Beria's role in the Kremlin decision-making process remains fragmentary, contradictory, and very likely biased. lt is important to note that mention of Beria 's alleged initiative on the German question was first made by his opponents at the July 1 953 CPSU Plenum, which condemned him following his arrest on 26 June. 6 i It is probable that Khrushchev and others leveled charges about Beria's views on Germany at the Plenum largely out of a desire to portray him in the most sinister manner possible-characterizing him as a traitor to the socialist cause, a Western agent and a provocateur. United in their fear of a powerful rival they hoped to eliminate, Beria's opponents might weil have fabricated, distorted, or exaggerated any difference of opinion on his part, in the very best manner ofthe Stalinist purges. 62

Unrest in East-Central Europe and Moscow s "New Course " The policymaking process on the German issue and growing concerns in Moscow about the deteriorating situation in the GDR have to be placed in the !arger context of the growing crisis within the Soviet empire. Confronted with the results of Stalinist policies throughout Eastern Europe and eager to alleviate the strains within the region, the new Soviet rulers decided in the spring of 1 953 to impose course corrections on all ofthe satellite governments. 59 Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L and Leona P. Scheeler, Special Tasks: The Memo,rs of an Unwanted W1tness-A Soviel Spymaster (Boston Little, Brown, 1 994), pp. 363-365. For a review ofSudoplatov's memmrs see Vladislav Zubok, '"Atom1c Esp10nage and Its Soviel 'Witnesses '," Cold War Internatwnal H1story Pro1ect Bulletm, no 4 (Fall 1 994), pp 50, 52-53. 60 Wladimir S SemJonow, Von Stafm bis Gorbatschow, pp. 290--29 1 . SED functionary Karl Schirdewan, who headed the Department of"Leadmg Organs of the Party and the Mass Organizations," wntes 111 his 1 995 me11101rs that at that Inne, "Soviel comrades" told him that "your party will have to solve a great and difficull task and preparc for free and secret elect10ns " Aufstand gegen U!bncht (Berlm: AtV, 1 995), pp 47-48 61 On the events surrounding Beria's arrest see: Mark Kramcr, "The Early Post-Stalin Success10n Struggle and Upheavals 111 East-Central Europc Internal-External Lmkages in Soviet Policy Making (Part 2)," Journal ofCold War Stud1es J ·2 (Spring 1 999), pp 3-3 8. David Murphy and Sergci Kondrashcv have argued that "it was Beria's detennination to reasscrt control over the security and mtelligence apparatus that led to his downfall." Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, p. 1 5 1 . 62 See statements by A. Filitov at the conference on "The Crisis Year 1 95 3 and the Cold War in Europe," organized by the Cold War International Hlstory Project, The National Security Archive and the Zentrum für Zeithistonsche Forschung Potsdam, Potsdam, November 1 996, Murphy, Kondrashev, and B ailey, Battleground Ber!tn, pp 1 55-56

15

Two key moments of crisis that have been overlooked thus far-the unrest among tobacco workers in Bulgaria and the Pizen strike-foreshadowed the pattem of the uprising in East Germany. 63 In Bulgaria, CP leader and Prime Minister Vulko Chervenkov's ruthless collectivization and industrialization policies had, much as in East Germany, taken a heavy toll on the population and the country's resources, and resulted in Bulgarians leaving the country en masse. The exodus in turn only provoked increased repression as Chervenkov sought to crack down on "illegal" emigration by severely punishing the relatives of those who fled. Moscow had supported Chervenkov 's desire to increase industrial and agricultural production quotas in May 1 95 3 . But his policies led to scenes reminiscent of the GDR. Outraged by norm increases that effectively translated into wage-cuts, hundreds of tobacco workers in Plovdiv and Khaskovo, traditionally a reliable bastion for the Bulgarian CP, went on strike on 3 May 1 9 5 3 , forcing Chervenkov to dispatch a popular form er deputy prime minister who had been purged in March 1 949 to calm the workers (Document No. 1 0) . 64 Even more shocking to the new Moscow leadership must have been the demonstrations against a currency reform by thousands of workers in the westem Bohemian city of Plzen, Czechoslovakia, on 1 June 1 953 (Document Nos. 1 6 and 1 7) . 65 The similarities to the developments in East Germany are remarkable, except that in this case monetary reform provided the catalyst for mass protests, and the recent death ofCzechoslovak leader Klement Gottwald added to the atmosphere of uncertainty in the wake of Stalin 's demise. 66 Rumors about an impending monetary refonn had persisted since late 1 952. At the city's "Lenin" Skoda works, management repeatedly assured the workers that the currency was sound, but on the afternoon of 30 May, a Saturday, Prague radio announced that a reform had been promulgated. Returning to the factory the following Monday, the workers demanded an explanation. Unsatisfied by the confused response of the director and other, poorly-briefed party agitators, the workers, much like their German counterparts two weeks later, decided to march to the city center. At first, the protesters met with some resistance from the workers ' militia posted outside the plant, but with a !arge number of laborers looking 011 "as if it were a theater performance," the militia stood 110 chance . Roughly 3 ,000 workers, joined by bystanders, proceeded to city hall. Mirroring the unfolding of the Berlin demonstrations, the initial slogans against the currency reform quickly escalated into calls of "Plzen cerna, Benesovi vema" (Black Plzen is faithful to Benes 67) , and "Bude zase hej , pfijdou hosi z USA" (We shall have good times again, the boys from the USA will come back again) 68-slogans clearly directed against the Communist regime. 69 By the time the demonstrators reached Republic Square the crowd numbered several thousand people. After entering the mayor 's office, "happy youths inside seized upon that traditional Bohemian form of political protest-de-fenestration. Only this time . . . busts of 63 Zbigniew Brzezmski, The Soviel Bloc: Umty and Conjl1ct (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Umversity Press, 1 967), p 1 64. 64 See Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Success1011 Struggle (Part ! )," pp 1 5- 1 7. 65 The only dctailed account ofthe Pizen demonstrations 1s Otto Ulc's "P1lsen· The Unknown Revolt," Problems ofCommumsm, 14 3 (May-June 1 95 7), 46-49. Ulc was a distnct Judge in Pizen during 1 956. As an ass istant judge after the Pizen upnsmg 111 1 953, he attended dozens ofsecret trials He later defccted to the Umted Statcs See also J1fi Pemes, "Die poht1schc und wirtshafthche Krise 111 der Tscheckoslowakei : 1 953 und Versuche ihrer Überwm­ dung," 111 Christoph Klessman and Bernd Störer, eds., 1953�Knsen;ahr des Kalten kneges m Europa (Koln· Böhlen, 1 999), pp. 93-1 1 3 66 Klement Gottwald had d1ed on 14 March 1 95 3 6 7 Czechoslovak wartime and postwar President Eduard ßenes. 68 Pizen had been liberated by the U S Anny in 1 945. 69 Ulc, "The Unknown Revolt," p. 47

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Stalin and Gottwald came flying out of the windows."7 0 After taking over the city's public broadcast system, the demonstrators voiced their demands, including "We want free elec­ tions ! ," "Long live Free Europe ! ,"71 "Long live Eisenhower! ," "Death to the Communists ! " throughout the city. Others stormed the nearby judiciary headquarters intent o n destroying court files. Elsewhere, a jeep ornamented with Czechoslovak and American flags was followed through the streets by several thousand protesters. Pictures of form er Czechoslovak presidents Masaryk and Benes could suddenly be seen in windows. Party symbols, by contrast, were torn down and burned. In some instances local party or government officials were attacked. For two days, control over the city fell into the hands of anticommunist protesters. 72 Czechoslovak Party and state authorities seemed paralyzed in the face of the spontaneous mass action, as a later internal party report admitted: "The leadership of the state security and public security failed, the People's Militia was improperly led and deployed, the City Committee failed to function as a party organ; it did not direct anything, and the organs of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH) and the Czechoslovak Youth Association (CSM) were not involved at all." Several party members in the Regional National Committee allegedly behaved "disgracefully," locking themselves in the Committee's building until well into the moming. The local and regional party leaderships were also faulted for not mobilizing the 28,000-strong party organization, for fear that party members "might join the demonstra­ tors," and thus allowing "the demonstrators to riot with impunity." An army detachment appeared at one point in front of the courthouse but was ordered by its commanding officer to leave. Leading party officials apparently at first-and wrongly, the CP would later claim-"considered the demonstrations and riots to be expressions of popular discontent incited by a few provocateurs." Only when the Interior Guard and a contingent of the Workers ' Militia from Prague arrived in Pizen and martial law was declared, did authorities bring the turmoil under control (Document No. 1 6) . The Plzen demonstrations struck a nerve i n Moscow, precisely at the moment when decisions on Germany were being made. The anti-government unrest, Beria informed Malenkov on 2 June, should be "considered as a warning that we do not have a clear view of the real internal political and economic situation in the Czechoslovak Republic ." Beria emphasized timt "we are not sufficiently informed about the real political and economic situation in other people's democracies either," adding that "it has to be openly stated that our recommendations have not always been successful." 73 Criticizing the existing mecha­ nisms for Moscow's economic and military control-the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) and the Coordinating Committee that had been created in February 1 95 1 to organize bloc defense matters-the intelligence chief warned that "what had happened in Czechoslovakia could be repeated in other countries and lead to more serious undesirable consequences." Drastic changes, Beria seemed to imply, were necessary in Eastern Europe, with Moscow providing "active and qualified assistance." The GDR may have been his first case in point.

10 Jb1d.

71 A reference to the U.S -controlled Radio Free Europe. Ulc, "The Unknown Rcvolt," p. 48 73 L. Beriu to G. Malenkov, 1 /2 .Tune 1 953, Murashko et al , Vostochna1a Yevropa v dokumentakh ross11Sk1kh arkh1vov, vol. 2, pp. 9 1 8-9 1 9 (citmg AP RF, f 3, op. 66, d. 806, II. 98- 1 06 as source) 72

17

The "New Course " and the Path to 1 7 June Beria's dire warnings came at the very moment the USSR Council of Ministers adopted as an "order" the final draft resolution on the GDR that had been under discussion since the Council Presidium's meeting on 27 May. The 2 June order, "On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR," sharply criticized the SED 's policy of accelerated construction of socialism (Document No. 1 8). It acknowledged that the mass exodus of East Germans of all professions and backgrounds had created "a serious threat to the political stability of the German Democratic Republic" and called for a decided shift in economic policy on a broad front: an end to forced collectivization and the war on private enterprise. It ordered a revision of the Five-Year Plan at the expense of heavy industry, and a relaxation of political-judicial controls and regimentation. It also directed the termination of coercive measures against the Protestant Church and denounced the "cold exercise of power" by the Ulbricht regime. Significantly, it did not explicitly demand a reversal of the unpopular raised work norms. 74 On the issue of Deutschlandpolitik, the resolution (much like the preceding drafts by the Foreign Ministry), ambiguously asserted that "at the present and in the near future" it was necessary to "put the tasks ofthe political struggle to reestablish the national unity of Germany and to conclude a peace treaty at the center of attention of the broad mass of the German people both in the GDR and in West Germany. " At the same time it was held "crucial to correct and strengthen the political and economic situation in the GDR and to strengthen significantly the influence of the SED among the broad masses of workers and in other democratic strata ofthe city and the country." Recent regime propaganda about the necessity ofthe GDR's transition to socialism, which was "pushing the party organizations of the SED to unacceptably simplified and hasty steps both in the political and in the economic arenas," was deemed "inconect." Arguing that "the political and economic condition of the GDR is one of the most crucial factors not only in the resolution ofthe general issue of Germany but also in the peaceful settlement of fundamental international problems," the Council of Ministers ' order decreed that it was "necessary to take strict account of the real conditions inside the GDR, both the situation in Germany and the international circumstances as a whole," when deciding on measures to strengthen the GDR in the future. 7 5 While re-empha­ sizing all-Gennan unification, the order underlined the crucial role a "healthy" GDR was to play in this process (Document No. 1 8). The decree was handed to SED leaders Ulbricht and Grotewohl on 2 June, the very same day they arrived in the Soviet capital. 76 In their conversations at the Kremlin, Grotewohl noted, the Soviet leaders expressed their "grave concern about the situation in the GDR." 77 The East German response, half-heartedly drafted the following night and tabled the next day, fell short of Soviet expectations. According to the memoirs ofRudolf Herrnstadt, editor of the SED pa1ty organ Neues Deutschland, the GDR leaders were subj ected to a verbal beating. "Our document is [a] reversal, yours is [just] reform," an exasperated Kaganovich exclaimed (Document No. 1 9). Beria was particularly aggressive, allegedly throwing the 74

AP RF, f 3, op 64. d 802, II 1 53-1 6 1 . The German vers1on of the decree, "Über die Maßnahmen zur Gesundung der pohtischen Lage in der Deutschen Demokratischen Repubhk," relcased m 1 989, was first pubhshed in Beitrage ::;ur Geschichte der Arbellerbewegung 32 ( 1 990), pp. 65 1-654. 75 lb1d. 76 Pohtburo rnember Frcd Oelssner accompanied them, scrving as translator 77 Rolf Stöckigt, "Ein Dokument von großer lustonscher Bedeutung vom Mai 1 953,"Beitrage ::;ur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 32 ( 1 990), p. 649

18

documents at Ulbricht across the table with the remark: "This is a bad rewrite of our document! 7 8 " According to Grotewohl's notes, the Soviet Ieaders acknowledged that "we all have made mistakes" and that the recommendations were not meant as "accusations," but insisted that "the starting-point for everything has to be a change in conditions in the GDR. " Demanding that the SED leaders "not worry about [their] prestige," Malenkov warned, "if we don't correct [the political line] now, a catastrophe will happen." The Soviet leaders appealed to the Germans to "correct fast and vigorously." "Much time [has been] lost. One has to act quickly," Molotov added, "[so] that all ofG[ ermany] can see it" (Document No. 1 9). The 2-4 June talks with the East German leaders presaged similar consultations with other satellite leaders. In each case, the announcement of a comparable "New Course" pro gram followed. The Hungarian leadership ( 1 3- 1 6 June 1 953) was next, followed by Albanian leader Enver Hoxha on 1 5 June. Talks with the Czechoslovaks, Romanians, Poles and Bulgarians were planned for the following month. 79 The transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian meetings shows striking similarities with the SED talks. As in the German case, the dis­ cussions focused on the "audacious" industrialization and socialization drive and abuses of power ( especially by the security police) in Hungary, although cadre questions received considerable attention, too (Document Nos . 2 1 and 22). As with the East Germans, the Soviet leaders "urgently" demanded changes and warned "a catastrophe will occur if we do not improve the situation." Once again, Malenkov and Beria were harshest in their criticism, although Molotov and Bulganin did not lag far behind. Unlike their criticism of the SED, Moscow's unhappiness was largely directed at Premier and party chief Matyas Rakosi, the embodiment of Stalinist rule in Hungary. The confrontation quickly produced changes: within days, Rakosi resigned the premiership which passed to the agrarian specialist and reform-minded hnre Nagy. Rakosi was allowed to hold on to his post as party leader. 80 The SED delegation returned to East Berlin on 5 June. Even before their arrival, Ulbricht and Grotewohl issued orders to purge all literature on the Second Party Conference from libraries. Several days of intense discussion within the SED Politburo ensued (Document No. 20). Just as their colleagues had been in Moscow, many Politburo members were troubled by the Soviet document. Stunned by how sharply Moscow had reacted against the "construc­ tion of socialism," East Berlin Mayor and Politburo member Friedrich Ebert wondered at one point during the 6 June SED Politburo session: "do we want socialism at all?"8 1 As a recently declassified report by KGB Berlin Resident Fadeikin shows, the SED leadership was particularly unsettled by the shift of resources from the heavy to consumer goods industries. Ulbricht argued to the Politburo on 9 June that instead of disrupting the economy by such a move, "we should turn to the Soviet govemment with the request that they lower the reparations payments." A fellow Politburo member spelled out what must have been on everyone's mind: the only way "to get out of this catastrophic situation and improve our position" would be for the Soviet Union to give "us the same help that the USA is giving Western Germany through the Marshall Plan." According to a later account, "[n ]o one reacted to this statement. " 82 78

Hem1stadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, pp 58-59. Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle (Part 1 )," p. 3 1 80 Gyorgy Litvan, The Hunganan Revolut1on of 1 956: Reform, Revo/t and Represswn 1 953-1963 (London: Longman, 1 996 ), pp. 24-25, see also Imre Nagy 's contemporary (but posthumous) account in On Commumsm. In Defense ofthe New Course (New York· F. A Praeger, 1 957). Curiously, the East Gemrnn crisis was apparently not mentioned in the record of the talks with the Hunganan leadership 81 "Diskuss10nsrede auf der Sitzung des Po!Jtbtiros vom 6 6. 1 953," published by Schersljanoi in "Wollen w1r den Sozialismus ? ," Beiträge ::.ur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 32 ( 1 990), pp 658-680 82 Sec Documcnt No 70. 79

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The emotional uproar over the New Course documents soon tumed into explicit criticism of Ulbricht. Various Politburo members vented their dissatisfaction with Ulbricht's per­ sonality cult and his transformation of the CC Secretariat into his personal power base. Semyonov, who had returned with the SED delegation from Moscow and participated in the sessions, seemed increasingly inclined to support Ulbricht's critics. 83 Referring to the party leader 's plans for an extravagant celebration of his own birthday, S emyonov recommended that he observe the occasion the way Lenin had his 50th birthday, by "inviting a few friends to drop in for dinner. "84 The Politburo finally decided to draw up a comprehensive statement on "the self-criticism of the work of the Politburo and the Secretariat," which would be presented to the CPSU CC. lt also resolved to set up a commission to "prepare an organiza­ tional reform of the working methods of the Politburo and Secretariat." 8 5 The Politburo on 9 June also adopted language for a public announcement of the New Course. Most Politburo members had agreed that the announcement warranted careful preparation of the party and the population at large, but Semyonov urged speedy implemen­ tation of Moscow's instmctions. When, on the evening of 1 0 June, Herrnstadt pleaded with Semyonov to give the SED two weeks to prepare the policy change, the High Commissioner insisted that the communique had to be announced the next day, warning that "you may not have a state for much longer." 86 Heeding Semyonov's order, the SED published the "New Course" pro gram in Neues Deutschland on 1 1 June. 87 As expected by Herrnstadt and others, the communique and its frank admission of past mistakes shocked many East Germans in and out of the party. Reports from local party organizations, carefully monitored by SED headquarters in Berlin, candidly described the widespread disappointment, disbelief, and confusion within the ranks, as well as among the populace. To many, the communique signaled the SED's final bankmptcy and the beginning of its demise. Party members feit betrayed and "panicky," some even called for Ulbricht's resignation. Many thought the SED retreat from crash socialization resulted from pressure by the West German govemment under Konrad Adenauer and the Western powers. In the small town of Seehausen, according to a local SED account, "the entire village is in the bar, drinking to the health of Adenauer." Another internal SED report summarized the develop­ ments: "broad segments of the population did . . . not understand the Party's New Course, viewed it as a sign of weakness or even as a victory by the Americans or the Church." 8 8 To make matters worse, the only segment ofthe population which seemed to have been excluded from the new liberalization was-paradoxically-the workers: the raised production norms Hermstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, p 65 Quoted in Hope M. Harrison, "Pohttcs m East Germany and Soviet Policy Towards East Germany Leading Up to and Following the June 1 953 Uprismg," (summary of paper prepared for the conference "The Crisis Year 1 953 and the Cold War in Europc," organized by the Cold War Internat10nal History Project, The National Secunty Archive and the Zentrum für Ze1thistonsche Forschung Potsdam, Potsdam, November 1 996.) 85 The commiss1on was to be composed ofUlbricht, State Secunty chiefWilhelrn Zaisser, Oelssner, Herrnstadt, and Berlin SED boss Hans .Jendretzky. See Grotewohl Notes, SAPMO-BArch, NY 90/699; "Protokoll Nr 33/35 der außerordentlichen Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 6 Juni 1 953," SAPMO-BArch J IV 2/2/287; Scherst]ano1, '"Wollen wtr den Sozialismus? ' ," pp 658-680; Herrnstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, p. 74 86 Hcrmstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, p. 74 87 The 1 1 June announcement was reprinted in Dokumente des So:;w/istischen Emhe11sparte1 Deutschlands · Beschlusse und Erklarungen des Zentra/komm1tees sowie seines Politburos und seines Sekretartats, vol IV (Berlin: Staatsverlag des DDR, 1 954), pp. 428-430, for an Engltsh translation, see Amulf B aring, Uprmng m East Germany: June 1 7, 1953 (Ithaca Cornell University Press, !"972), pp 1 23-1 27. 88 Abt leitende Organe der Partei und der Massenorgamsationen, "Analyse liber die Vorbereitung, den Ausbruch und die Niederschlagung des faschistischen Abenteuers vom 1 6.-22.6 1 95 3 ," 20 July 1 953, SAPMO­ BArch, 2/5/546. 83

84

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that had been arbitrarily imposed in May remained in force. Labor dissatisfaction was further fueled when the SED regime,groping to maintain its authority,confirmed the controversial norm increases on 13 June. 89 In Washington,meanwhile,the Eisenhower administration reacted cautiously to the New Course announcement, treating it with the same skepticism as it had the Soviet peace campaign. The U.S. government tended to underestimate the crisis in the GDR. As late as 2 June,the day Ulbricht was in Moscow to listen to Soviet warnings,HICOG estimated that the economic crisis brought on by collectivization and socialization was not critical: "[T]here is currently no reason to believe the situation has reached the stage of catastrophe or that the GDR Govemment does not have the means at its disposal to prevent it from becoming such. " 90 Moreover,Soviet moves in Germany,such as the appointment of Semyonov as Soviet high commissioner on 27 May,seemed to show more than ever that Moscow would guarantee the existence of the communist regime in the GDR. "Certainly no (rpt no) abandonment of East German Republic is indicated,"9 1 the U.S. ambassador to Moscow rcported. If anything, the reorganization of the SCC was seen as "prompted in part by pressure from East Germany " whose leaders recently appeared to be in an "assertive mood. "92 While acknowledging the imponderables of the situation in the Kremlin and the possibility that Ulbricht might eventually be sacrificed by the new Soviet rulers, HICOG's Eastern Affairs Division concluded that events in the GDR since April made Ulbricht's position "look as strong or stronger than ever. "93 Not surprisingly then,the Eisenhower administration initially doubted the seriousness of the New Course announcement. U.S. intelligence estimates concluded that "the recent Soviet move in [the] GDR,coupled with [the] Korean Annistice and other Soviet moves on [the] world chess board,represent a tactical and not . .. strategic shift in Germany. "94 The CIA concluded that while the unveiling of the New Course was designed to cope with growing popular unrest and suggested at least an attempt at a basic solution of the refugee problem, the Russians' real intention was to "soften Western skepticism. "95 The State Department regarded the measures taken by the Ulbricht regime as "part of [a] build-up for a Soviet proposal for Four-Power talks,probably on Germany," designed to "convince the world that [the] Soviet Union is prepared to compromise on Germany and that [the] Western Powers should therefore enter into talks with [the] Soviet Union before proceeding with the rearma­ ment ofthe Federal Republic through [the] EDC. "96 Despite the warning signals, therefore, neither Moscow nor Washington expected the unrest and dissatisfaction to develop into a popular explosion and upset their own carefully elaborated agendas.

89 On the events leadmg up to 1 6-17 June, see Christian Ostermann, "New Documents on the East German Upnsmg of 1 953," Cold War lnternat1011a/ H,story Pro;ect Bulletin, no. 5 (Spring 1 995), pp 1 0-20. 90 HICOG Berlm to Department of State, 2 June 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 762.00/6-253. 91 Bohlen to Secretary of State, 29 May 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 762. 022 1/5-2953 See also Lyon to Secretary of State, 30 May 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 762.0221 /5-3053. 92

lbrd.

93 HlCOG Berlin to Secretary of State, 9 .Tune 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 7628.00/6-953. 94 HICOG Berlm to Secretary of Statc, 1 5 June 1 953, NARA, RG 59, 762B 00/6-1 553 95 CIA, Office of Current Intelhgence, 1 1 June 1 953, DDEL, C D Jackson Records, Box 3. 9 6 Gen. Persons to Pres1dent Elsenhower, 1 1 June 1 953, DDEL, Dw1ght D. Eiscnhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, Intemat10nal Series, Box 14. 21

DOCUMENT No. 1 : Soviet and East German Minutes of Conversations between Josef Stalin and SED Leaders in the GDR, 1 April and 7 April 1952 Among the most significant Russian documents on the German question yet to emerge from the Russwn archives, the recently discoveredRussian transcripts ofthe secret consultations between Stalin and the SED leadership on 1 and 7 April 1952 shed new light on a critical moment in the events leading up to the 1 953 crisis. A month before this meeting, Stalin had sent a diplomatic note to the governments of the United States, France, and Great Britain proposing that they resolve the issue oj Germany s division by establishing a unijied German state. While it assured the withdrawal of all joreign troops and allowed a national army, unified Germany would not be permitted to join military alliances. Western officials rejected the proposal, which they considered a blatant attempt to under­ mine plans to rearm West Germany within the Western A lliance (as part of the so-called European Defense Community) rather than a genuine ejfort to resolve East- West dif.Jerences over German unification. Now, 111 his last such session with the SED leadership, Stalin showed a readiness to jorego any ji1rther ejjorts to reach agreement with the West on the subject. lnstead, he chose to pursue a hard-line militarizat1011 and socialization course in the GDR-several months prior to the formal adoption of the pohcy of "construction ofsocialism. " The three documents reproduced here are, respectively, Soviel and East German renderings of the discuss1on.

Record of Conversation ofLeaders of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany W Pieck, W V/bricht, and 0. Grotewohl with J V. Stalin 97 l April 1 952 98 Attended by: Comrades Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, [Mikoyan] , and Semyonov (ACC) Interpreter: member of the Politburo of the SED [Oelssner] Com rade Pieck says that they have a number of questions, which they would Iike to discuss with Comrade Stalin so that they get some clarity. The first group of questions has to do with thc situation in Germany that developed in connection with the proposals of the Soviet government about the basic principles of the peace treaty with Gennany on the one hand, and in connection with the military policy of the Western powers on the other. What tasks derive from this situation for the SED and for the government of the GDR? The position of the SED was formulated in the draft theses for the Second Conference of the SED. Briefly summarizing that position, Pieck says that the Soviet government's proposals regarding a peace treaty with Germany inspired wide movement of the masses in Germany, and created 97 Pieck, Grotewohl , and Ulbricht vistted Moscow from 29 March to 1 0 April 1 952 Two rneetmgs 111 the CPSU Politburo took place ( 1 and 7 April). The program also mcluded consultat1ons with CPSU Central Comm1ttee members and an extensive movte agcnda, wh1ch mcluded thc two-part movie "Tarzan " 98 According to Pieck's notes, the conversation lasted from 9 : 00 p m to 1 1 ·07 p m See W1lfned Loth and Rolf Badsti.lbncr, eds , Wilhelm P1eck-Auf:e1chnungen :::ur Deutschlandpo/111k 1945-1953 (Berlm Akademie Verlag, 1 994), p. 382

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a difficult situation for the Adenauer government, which became clear from the Western powers ' response to the note of the Soviet govemment. 99 That raises a number of issues, on which we would like to know Comrade Stalin's opinion. First. What are the prospects for concluding a peace treaty with Germany, will the conference offour powers be convened, and what results can we expect from the conference? Second. On holding free all-German elections without U.N. interference. Should we start a mass movement for such elections, trying to overthrow the Adenauer government? Third. How should the party continue its struggle in West Germany in the future? The main task at the present time is to achieve unity of the working class. The SED CC has recently sent a letter to the SPD CC with proposals on the issues of German unity and the peace treaty. I 00 However, it is most likely that the right-wing leadership of the Social Democrats will rej ect this proposal as well. Our next task is to pool all bourgeois nationalist forces together. In the near future, we will hold the "Conference ofthe Thousand" 1 0 1 with the participation of various patriotic groups. Comrade Stalin asks-in the West? Comrade Pieck confirms this. The conference will elect a permanent presidium for organization of coordinated actions in the struggle for unity and the peace treaty. This will help us to expand the movement. The decisive issue will be the strengthening of the Communist Party of [West] Germany [KPD] . Last year, it achieved good results in its struggle against remilitarization and for German unity. In this connection, there is a