Unwelcome Exiles: Mexico and the Jewish Refugees from Nazism, 1933-1945 9004262105, 9789004262102

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Unwelcome Exiles. Mexico and the Jewish Refugees from Nazism, 1933–1945

Jewish Latin America Issues and Methods Edited by

Raanan Rein (Tel Aviv University) Editorial Board

Edna Aizenberg (Marymount Manhattan College) Judah Cohen (Indiana University) Luis Roniger (Wake Forest University) David Sheinin (Trent University) Rosalie Sitman (Tel Aviv University)

Volume 4

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/jlam

Unwelcome Exiles. Mexico and the Jewish Refugees from Nazism, 1933–1945 By

Daniela Gleizer Translated by

Susan Thomae

Leiden • boston 2014

The publication of this book was supported by Tel Aviv University’s Elias Sourasky Chair of Iberian and Latin American Studies. Original Title: El exilio incómodo. México y los refugiados judíos, 1933–1945 © 2011, El Colegio de Colegio de México—Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Unidad Cuajimalpa. Published by permission of El Colegio de México. Cover Image: The Mexique, on which the Spanish Republican exiles arrived in Mexico, 1939. No Jewish refugees were aboard. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection. Gleizer Salzman, Daniela.  [Exilio incomodo. English]  Unwelcome exiles : Mexico and the Jewish refugees from Nazism, 1933–1945 / by Daniela Gleizer.   pages cm. — (Jewish Latin America : issues and methods, ISSN 2211–0968 ; volume 4)  Originally published as: El exilio incomodo : Mexico y los refugiados judios, 1933–1945. Mexico, D.F.: El Colegio de Mexico-Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana, Unidad Cuajimalpa, 2011.  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 978-90-04-25993-5 (hardback : acid-free paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-26210-2 (e-book) 1. Jews—Mexico—History—20th century. 2. Mexico—Emigration and immigration. 3. World War, 1939–1945—Refugees—Mexico. 4. Immigrants—Mexico—History—20th century. I. Title.  F1392.J4G53713 2011  972’.0004924—dc23

2013031672

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 2211-0968 ISBN 978-90-04-25993-5 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-26210-2 (e-book) Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

To Carlos

Contents Acknowledgments ........................................................................................... Preface to the English Edition ..................................................................... List of Figures .................................................................................................... List of Abbreviations .......................................................................................

xi xiii xv xix

Introduction ......................................................................................................

1

1 Background .................................................................................................. The International Context: Nazism and Jewish Emigration from the Third Reich ...................................................................... Latin America as an Alternative Destination .............................. The Mexican Context .......................................................................... The Jewish Community in Mexico ..................................................

13

2 Jewish Refuge: A European Problem, 1933–1937 ............................. Immigration Policy and Control of Foreigners during the Early Years of Cardenism .............................................................. International Efforts to Solve the Matter of German Refugees and the Case of Mexico ............................................... The Jewish Community of Mexico, Nazism, and Jewish Refugees .............................................................................................. The Attitude towards the Jewish Refugees during 1937 ...........

13 20 24 39 49 50 64 68 76

3 The Key Year: 1938 .................................................................................... 85 Mexico’s Welcoming Tradition towards Politically Persecuted Persons ......................................................................... 85 The Beginnings of Internal Pressure and the Évian Conference ......................................................................................... 89 The Continuation of the Évian Conference: The Intergovernmental Committee ........................................... 95 The Creation of the Committee for Refugees and Its Relations with the Government .................................................. 99 The Arrival of the First Jewish Refugees ....................................... 105 The Creation of the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico and the Arrival of More Refugees .............................................. 116 The Close of the Year .......................................................................... 120

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Illustrations ........................................................................................................ 123 4 From Projects for Jewish Colonization to Greater Inflexibility,  1939–1940 ................................................................................................ The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Speak Up .............................................................................. The Memorandum from the Minister of the Interior .......... The Memorandum from the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs ............................................................................................. The First Attempts at Agricultural Colonization: The Experiments at Coscapá, San Gregorio, and Sonora .... Projects under the Supervision of the Mexican Government ...................................................................................... The Project of the Governor of Tabasco .................................. The Efforts of Ramón Beteta, the Joint Distribution Committee, and the American Friends Service Committee .................................................................................... The Implementation of the Immigration Policy by the Ministry of the Interior, 1939–1940 ........................................... The Case of the Quanza, the Mexican Saint Louis ..................... The Exceptions ...................................................................................... “Major” Political Refugees ............................................................. Jewish Refugees ................................................................................ 5 Signs of a Thaw? The Early Years of Manuel Ávila Camacho’s  Government, 1941–1942 ...................................................................... The Immigration Policy of Ávila Camacho’s Government in 1941–1942: Legislation and Corruption ..................................... Projects for the Immigration of Jewish Refugees .................. The Rejections .................................................................................. The Admissions ................................................................................ Gilberto Bosques and the Mexican Consulate in Marseilles ........................................................................................... Relations between the Israelite Central Committee and the New Administration ....................................................................... The Role Played by the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico in Protecting Jewish Refugees Originally from the Axis Countries ..................................................................................

147 148 149 151 153 158 158 165 175 182 189 194 198 201 204 211 213 216 221 233 240



contents

ix

News and Reports on the “Final Solution” ................................... 245 Non-Jewish Refugees ........................................................................... 253 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................... 256 6 The Urgency of Refuge: 1943–1945 ...................................................... Projects for Bringing Refugees to Mexico ..................................... General Ávila Camacho and His Solidarity with Poland .... Efforts to Save the Polish Jewish Refugees .............................. Polish Refugees and Jewish Refugees: A Brief Comparison  New Requests to the Mexican Government for Help: The Proposal of the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society ......................................................................................... The Inter-American Demographic Congress ............................... The Inter-American Demographic Congress and Jewish Immigration ................................................................................. The War Refugee Board, George Messersmith, and Mexico .... The Creation of a “Safe Harbor” for Jews in Mexico and the Action of the American Jewish Committee ............................ The Last Chance: Saving the Hungarian Jews ............................. The Year 1944: The End of the Rescue Projects .......................... Concluding Remarks ...........................................................................

259 260 260 265 270

288 293 296 300

Final Thoughts .................................................................................................. Archives Consulted ......................................................................................... Bibliography ...................................................................................................... Index ....................................................................................................................

303 311 313 321

272 275 280 283

Acknowledgments The present edition was made possible, in the first place, by El Colegio de México, the academic institution where this study originated and which generously granted permission for its translation, and was funded by the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología and the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Cuajimalpa. I especially want to thank Mario Casanueva and Rodolfo Suárez at the UAM-C for their assistance and support. At the same time I express my sincere gratitude to Raanan Rein, director of the Brill Jewish Latin American Collection, for his invaluable help and to Katelyn Chin and Rachel Crofut, who supervised the publication process. I am deeply in debt to the people who took part in the preparation of the manuscript. Susan Maloney provided a commendable translation, while Gene McGarry, with his outstanding professionalism, contributed to editing the manuscript and improved it substantially. Julián González de León and Tamara Gleason diligently compiled primary sources and also contributed valuable suggestions, Verónica Cuevas assisted me with technical matters pertaining to the new edition, and Germán Gómez helped me to find the photographs. To all of them, and to Sylvia Sosa, Alejandro Araujo, and Akuavi Adonon, my deepest appreciation. Numerous people collaborated in producing the Spanish version of the book and I thanked them in the first edition. I take this opportunity to reiterate my gratitude, especially to Dr. Clara E. Lida, Javier Garciadiego, and Pablo Yankelevich. Many people from various institutions generously helped me to find information, archival as well as bibliographical material. I thank the personnel of the following institutions: in Mexico, especially the library of the Division of Social Science and Humanities of my university, the UAM-C; the library of El Colegio de México; the Center for Investigation and Documentation of the Ashkenazi Community of Mexico, especially David Plascencia and the directors of the center, Alice Backal and Enrique Chmelnik; the General Archive of the Nation; the Historical Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in particular its director, Jorge Fuentes; and the Vicente Lombardo Toledano Historical Collection of the Workers’ University of Mexico. In the United States I wish to thank Rachel Yood of the Tamiment Library; Elise Nienaber of the American Jewish Archives; and all of the personnel of the following archives: the Archive of the

xii

acknowledgments

Joint Distribution Committee; the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research; the Library of Congress; the National Archives and Records Administration; and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library. Finally, I thank Alina and Carlos, for supporting me in every possible way, and for accompanying me generously, enthusiastically, and lovingly throughout the entire process.

Preface to the English Edition This book is a revised and expanded translation of my El exilio incómodo: México y los refugiados judíos, 1933–1945 (2011), which questioned the traditional image of Mexico as a country of asylum and a source of hospitality for persecuted people. This surprised many people, and perhaps it is not so strange that Mexican Jews themselves were among the most surprised of all. To a certain extent, the publication of El exilio incómodo confronted collective memory with the historical record, challenging the familiar image of a country of outstretched arms—an image that survives in academic circles as well as in official history, and in the institutional memory of the Jewish community as well as in popular sentiment. The historiography on immigration policy and exile in Mexico has centered on the positive aspects, mainly on the reception of the Spanish Republican exiles (about 20,000 people), which has reinforced the general impression of the openness and hospitality of the country while neglecting other, less generous moments, such as the treatment of the Chinese and of the Jews themselves. The historiography on the Jewish group in Mexico, in turn, has been characterized by a focus on uncontroversial aspects: reconstructing with a certain degree of nostalgia the arrival of the first generation, in the 1920s, or documenting the founding of community institutions, rather than looking at the relationships between Jews, the government, and other groups outside of their own community. While the romantic image of Cardenism (1934–1940) still prevails today, within the country as well as abroad, the reputation of Mexico as a country of open doors is beginning to be questioned, especially in Mexican historiography. However, historiography produced outside Mexico has been less attentive to these nuances, and thus the need for books like this one to appear in English. At first the idea was to translate the book without making any changes to the original manuscript. However, over the last few years the record of Gilberto Bosques, who served as the Mexican consul in France from 1939 to 1942, has become a source of controversy, especially in reference to the role he played in saving the non-Spanish refugees. As more people, institutions, and even governments began to call for a widespread recognition of Bosques’s achievements, my surprise at the lack of research on the subject led me back to the archives. As all historians know, and others must

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preface to the english edition

sense, returning to the archives after a book has been finished can be risky, and I quickly realized the need to modify the original manuscript, with what I hope are good results. Research carried out in the archives of the Jewish Labor Committee and of the labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano allowed me not only to better understand Bosques, and to offer a more well-rounded and complex picture—and certainly a less positive one—of this figure, but also to better understand the mechanisms of exception that allowed some refugees to reach Mexico. This led me to reassess the role played by various organizations in Mexico, as well as in the United States and Europe, in saving refugees, and to rethink, qualify, and complete some of the discussions in the first edition of the book. Thus, the reader of this edition is holding a more complete book that attempts to answer questions that have arisen since the publication of the Spanish text. I hope that this narrative of the Mexican response to the refugee crisis provokes new questions, or new answers to old questions, and facilitates comparative studies that will shed more light on the experience of the Jewish refugees during World War II, and hopefully on broader matters related to the formation of nation-states, and their policies towards foreigners.

List of Figures 1. Parade for Business Day, Israelite Committee float, June 1931. Photographic Archive of the CCDA ............................... 2. Anti-Semitic banner in Mexico City, 1933. The banner reads: “Protecting Jews is treason to the country.” Photographic Archive of the CDICA ............................................................................. 3. Confrontation between members of the Mexican Communist Party and the Golden Shirts, November 20, 1935. In the left foreground, David Alfaro Siqueiros, wearing a black shirt, raises his fist. General Archive of the Nation. Enrique Díaz, Delgado and García Fund ...................................................................... 4. Anti-Fascist demonstration in Mexico City, November 20, 1935. The banner reads: “We demand punishment for the Fascist assassins of the workers.” General Archive of the Nation. Enrique Díaz, Delgado and García Fund .......................................... 5. Refugees aboard the Guinée (1937?). Photographic Archive of the CDICA ............................................................................................. 6. Lázaro Cárdenas in his office at the National Palace, 1937. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection ...... 7. Pro-Nazi demonstration in Mexico, 1937–1938. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection ...................... 8. Pro-Nazi demonstration in Mexico, 1937–1938. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection ...................... 9. Anti-Semitic pamphlet: “Defend what is ours! Let’s fight against the Jews!” AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 238/7 ............................. 10. First Zionist Convention in Mexico, March 1938. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection ...................... 11. First Zionist Convention in Mexico, March 1938. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection ...................... 12. Vicente Lombardo Toledano in his office. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection ........................................... 13. Ignacio García Téllez. Reproduced with permission from the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia/SNF/Fototeca Nacional (National Institute of Anthropology and History/ SNF/National Photo Archive), 11158 ...................................................

123 123

124

124 125 125 126 127 127 128 128 129

129

xvi

list of figures

14. The Mexique, on which the Spanish exiles arrived, 1939. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection ...... 15. Trains in which the Spanish refugees who arrived aboard the Mexique were transported, 1939. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection ................................................... 16. One of the agricultural colonization projects in Mexico. A view of the Hacienda de San Gregorio, 1939. Photographic Archive of the CDICA ............................................................................ 17. Jewish refugees at the Hacienda de San Gregorio, 1939. Photographic Archive of the CDICA ................................................. 18. Mobile canteen supported by the CCIM during World War II, ca. 1940. Photographic Archive of the CDICA ................................ 19. Board of directors of the Nidjie Israel Community Charity Alliance, ca. 1940. Photographic Archive of the CDICA .............. 20. Leaders of the Nidjie Israel Community Charity Alliance, ca. 1940. Photographic Archive of the CDICA ................................ 21. A record of funds collected by the Jewish community of Mexico to transport Jewish refugees to Palestine, 1940. Photographic Archive of the CDICA ................................................. 22. Receipt from the Committee for Refugees in Mexico 1938. Photographic Archive of the CDICA ................................................. 23. Manuel Ávila Camacho and Vicente Lombardo Toledano looking down from a balcony on a demonstration in support of the president, c. 1941. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection .................................................................. 24. Ezequiel Padilla. Reproduced with permission from the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia/SNF/Fototeca Nacional (National Institute of Anthropology and History/ SNF/National Photo Archive), 24164 ................................................. 25. Gilberto Bosques, ca 1930. Reproduced with permission from the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia/SNF/ Fototeca Nacional (National Institute of Anthropology and History/SNF/National Photo Archive), 11158 ................................... 26. Visa for Marie Schapiro de Kaspé, signed by Gilberto Bosques, December 15, 1941. General Archive of the Nation ....................... 27. Egon Erwin Kisch, in Melbourne, Australia, 1934. He found refuge in Mexico in 1940. State Library of New South Wales ...

130 130 131 131 132 133 133 134 134

135

136

137 138 138



list of figures

28. Victor Serge, Benjamin Péret, Remedios Baro, and André Breton in front of the Air-Bel Villa in Marseille, 1940. Serge, Péret and Baro found refuge in Mexico in 1941. Breton went to NY. Archives municipales de Rezé ..................................... 29. Marceau Pivert in front of Lenin’s armored car, May 1956. He found refuge in Mexico in 1940. Documents historiques, SFIO ............................................................................................................. 30. Anna Seghers, October 20, 1947. She found refuge in Mexico in 1941. © Bettmann/CORBIS .............................................................. 31. Bodo Uhse (left) and Theo Harych, East Berlin, October 3, 1954. Uhse found refuge in Mexico in 1940. Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-267 15-0002/photo: Hans-Günter Quaschinsky ............. 32. East German postal stamp commemorating Paul Merker, 1974. Merker found refuge in Mexico in 1942. Private collection ....... 33. Rally in support for President Ávila Camacho, in response to his appeal to national unity, 1942. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection .................................................. 34. Plutarco Elías Calles, Manuel Ávila Camacho, and Lázaro Cárdenas sending a message of national unity, September 15, 1942. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection ................................................................................................... 35. Manuel Ávila Camacho receives Franklin D. Roosevelt and his wife on an official visit to Monterrey, April 20, 1943. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection ..... 36. Stephen Wise and Theodore Resnikoff visit with members of the Committee for Hebrew Palestine, Mexico City, 1942. Photographic Archive of the CDICA ................................................. 37. Announcement by the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico of a one-hour work stoppage in commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. Últimas Noticias, April 19, 1944. CDICA ......................................................................................................... 38. General Assembly of the Popular Israelite League, June 27, 1945. Photographic Archive of the CDICA ......................................

xvii

139 139 140 141 142 142

143 143 144

145 146

List of Abbreviations AALyP

Archivo de Andrés Landa y Piña (Andrés Landa y Piña Papers) AFSC American Friends Service Committee AGN Archivo General de la Nación (General Archive of the Nation) AGN, PLC Archivo General de la Nación, Presidentes: Lázaro Cárdenas AGN, PMAC Archivo General de la Nación, Presidentes: Manuel Ávila Camacho AHINM Archivo Histórico del Instituto Nacional de Migración (National Institute of Immigration Historical Archive) AHSRE Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Historical Archive) AJA American Jewish Archives AJC American Jewish Committee AKA Archivo de la Kehilá Ashkenazí de México (Ashkenazi Community in Mexico Historical Archive) APGB Archivo Particular de Gilberto Bosques (Gilberto Bosques Papers) CCIM Comité Central Israelita de México (Israelite Central Committee) CDICA Centro de Documentación e Investigación de la Comunidad Ashkenazí de México (Documentation and Investigation Center of the Ashkenazi Community in Mexico) CIICM Cámara Israelita de Industria y Comercio de México (Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Mexico) CNC Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Confederation of Farmers) CPR Comité Pro-Refugiados (Committee for Refugees) CROM Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers) CTAL Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (Latin American Confederation of Workers) CTM Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Workers of Mexico)

xx DdD

list of abbreviations

Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados (Diary of Debates of the Chamber of Deputies) FHVLT Fondo Histórico Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Universidad Obrera de México (Vicente Lombardo Toledano Historical Collection of the Workers’ University of Mexico) HIAS Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society HICEM HIAS, ICA (Jewish Colonization Association), and Emigdirect (HIAS’s European branch) JDC Joint Distribution Committee (the Joint) JDP Josephus Daniels Papers MDW Morris D. Waldman Papers NARA National Archives and Records Administration of the United States of America RJLC Records of the Jewish Labor Committee SG Secretaría de Gobernación (Ministry of the Interior) SRE Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) WJC World Jewish Congress WJCR World Jewish Congress Records WRB War Refugee Board

INTRODUCTION I. Many years ago, in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I came across a confidential circular issued by the Ministry of the Interior in April 1934 that forbade, among other populations, the immigration of Jews into Mexico. The ban remained in effect until the middle of Lázaro Cárdenas’s presidency, when it was replaced by other orders that, in practice, continued the same policy. To a large extent this book is a result of trying to understand that prohibition within the domestic context of Cardenism—in contrast to the administration’s generosity toward exiled Spanish Republicans—and within the international context of the Nazi crisis, when the search for refuge became the last hope of survival for the Jewish people. This book covers the period from 1933 to 1945 and focuses on the position taken by the Mexican government towards the Jewish refugees (including Germans, Austrians, Belgians, Dutchmen, Frenchmen, Czechoslovakians, Poles, and Hungarians) who sought asylum in the country individually or collectively, directly or through negotiations by national and international organizations. In collective memory as well as in historiography on the subject, there prevails the idea that during the thirties and forties Mexico offered outright mass protection to peoples persecuted by totalitarian dictatorships around the world, including Jews who were fleeing Nazism. This is most probably one of the chief misperceptions surrounding the history of Jewish refuge during the Second World War, and also the history of exile in Mexico. The refuge offered to Spanish Republicans was an exceptional case. However, it served to feed the image of an understanding, supportive Mexico that made no distinction between anti-Franco Spaniards, antifascist Communists, and Jewish refugees, granting exile to them all equally.1 The vast documentation on the experience of Jews seeking

1 Judit Bokser has shown that it is necessary to recognize that the country did not extend its hospitality equally to all those who sought asylum, and to treat separately its behavior towards each sector. J. Bokser, “Alteridad en la historia y en la memoria: México y los refugiados judíos,” in Encuentro y alteridad. Vida y cultura judía en América Latina, ed. Judit Bokser and Alicia Gojman de Backal (Mexico City: UNAM/Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén/Asociación Mexicana de Amigos de la Universidad de Tel Aviv/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999), 343–44.

2

introduction

refuge in Mexico proves that this was not so, and therefore it is necessary to analyze each particular experience. The Jewish experience, in fact, was far removed from the Spanish experience, and to a certain extent it also constituted an exceptional case. The purpose of the book is to explain the factors that combined and resulted in a closed-door policy toward Jewish refugees during the years of Nazism and the Holocaust. To this end three main spheres of activity are analyzed. The first involves the state apparatus, which includes all of the authorities who were linked in one way or another to drafting policies for foreigners: the presidency, the Ministry of the Interior (and within this the Head Office of Population and the Department of Immigration), the Advisory Council on Population, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chambers of Senators and Deputies, and other departments, ministries, and government agencies concerned with the matter, as well as certain officials in particular. The second includes those elements that lay outside the state bureaucracy but had a bearing on the refugee question: political and economic pressure exerted on the government, the role of the media and public opinion, and the actions of various interest groups. Among the latter we can point out certain sectors and personages of the Mexican Left who fought to open the doors, and those right-wingers who sympathized with the German cause and flaunted their xenophobia. The third sphere of activity is comprised of organizations that represented the local Jewish community in their efforts to negotiate with the Mexican government and secure authorization for the admittance of Jewish refugees; these organizations also provided help in disembarking and aiding the few refugees who were able to reach the shores of the country using their own means. II. The subject of this book is inserted into two main historiographic contexts. The first is comprised of studies that analyze the role played by Western countries in the face of the crisis of the Jewish refugees during the period of Nazism. In this sense the book belongs to the body of research that uses a national approach to explore the policies followed by countries such as France, Holland, Great Britain, the United States, Canada, and Spain.2 2 See respectively, among others, Bob Moore, Refugees from Nazi Germany in the Netherlands, 1933–1940 (Dordrecht: IISG/Martinus Nijhoff, 1986); Ari Joshua Sherman, Island Refuge: Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933–1939 (London: Elek, 1973); Louise London, Whitehall and the Jews, 1933–1948: British Immigration Policy and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Vicki Caron, Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); David



introduction

3

Despite the fact that this national perspective is necessary as a starting point, I agree with the historians Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore on the need to carry out comparative approaches that transcend national settings, in order to answer the question of why, if each country had different legal structures, traditions, and political contexts, they all reacted in such an apparently uniform way during the years of 1933 to 1945, closing their doors to Jewish refugees. According to these authors, part of the answer can be found in the fact that a perception of the “threat” presented by German refugees was shared by all of the states involved. However, there are other factors that also played an important role and should be included in these comparisons.3 Other studies that are necessary for understanding the context of my subject address the subject of refugees in general, not only the Jewish exile, during the interwar period.4 The refugee crisis caused by German National Socialism has been acknowledged more and more as an essential element in understanding the Holocaust and has demanded a broadening of the geographic focus on the phenomenon, due to the fact that the activities of defense and rescue to a great extent did not depend on European agents. While not forming a central part of the conflict, Latin American countries, as possible sites of asylum with—in most cases—a traditionally open stance on immigration, occupied a not so marginal place within this complicated scenario. Although in the historiography of the Holocaust, Latin America appears as a not always well-differentiated whole, it is apparent that each country in the region drafted a specific policy to deal with the refugee problem,

S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941–1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984); Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933–1948 (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1982); Haim Avni, Spain, the Jews, and Franco (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1982); Bernd Rother, Spanien und der Holocaust (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001). 3 Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore, “Refugee policies in Western European states in the 1930s: A comparative analysis,” IMIS-Beiträge 7 (1998): 56. Some studies address comparative approaches, such as the volume coedited by F. Caestecker and B. Moore, Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), and Deborah Dwork and Robert Jan Van Pelt, Flight from the Reich: Refugee Jews, 1933–1946 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009). 4 Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War through the Cold War (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002); Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 1999); Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Jean Michel Palmier, Weimar in Exile: The Antifascist Emigration and America (London: Verso, 2006). The only general study centered on Jewish refugees is the one by Dwork and van Pelt, Flight from the Reich.

4

introduction

and these policies often present important differences, above and beyond the common elements that can be identified. Thus this book contributes to the research carried out on the attitudes of various Latin American countries towards refugees from Nazism.5 The present study continues, broadens, and deepens the work carried out by Haim Avni and Judit Bokser on the situation in Mexico,6 as well as continuing my own line of investigation on the subject of the Jewish refugees during Cárdenas’s term as president.7 I hope that the new documents that have been found, corresponding to newly opened archives and others that had not been consulted previously; the inclusion of actors and groups who had not been sufficiently taken into account in previous studies; and a more detailed analysis of the Mexican political context of the era, which includes taking corruption into account as an explanatory factor, all contribute to a deeper and more complex understanding of the subject. The second historiographic discussion in which the book participates has to do with the Mexican government’s policy on asylum. Mexico is not, nor has it ever been, a country that encourages immigration. On the contrary, it has adopted a restrictive attitude towards outsiders—the result,

5 Among others, Leonardo Senkman, Argentina, la Segunda Guerra Mundial y los refugiados indeseables, 1933–1945 (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1991); Jeffrey Lesser, Welcoming the Undesirables: Brazil and the Jewish Question (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Leo Spitzer, Hotel Bolivia: The Culture of Memory in a Refuge from Nazism (New York: Hill and Wang, 1999); Marion A. Kaplan, Dominican Haven: The Jewish Refugee Settlement in Sosúa, 1940–1945 (New York: Museum of Jewish Heritage, 2008) and Allen Wells, Tropical Zion: General Trujillo, FDR, and the Jews of Sosúa (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Avraham Milgram, ed., Entre la aceptación y el rechazo. América Latina y los refugiados judíos del nazismo (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2003). 6 See Haim Avni, The Role of Latin America in Immigration and Rescue during the Nazi Era (1933–1945): A General Approach and Mexico as a Case Study (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1986), “Cárdenas, México y los refugiados judíos, 1938–1940,” EIAL 3, no. 1 (1992), http://www.tau.ac.il/eial/III_1/avni.htm, and “De Bermuda a Santa Rosa. El rescate de judíos durante el Holocausto en perspectiva mexicana,” Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 166 (1996): 133–64. See also Judit Bokser, “Alteridad en la historia y en la memoria”; “Cárdenas y los judíos: entre el exilio y la inmigración,” in Milgram, Entre la aceptación y el rechazo, 248-76; and “El México de los años treinta: Cardenismo, inmigración judía y antisemitismo,” in Xenofobia y xenofilia en la historia de México. Siglos XIX y XX, ed. Delia Salazar (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Migración/ INAH/DGE Ediciones, 2006), 379–415. See also Richard Merren’s master’s thesis, “The politics of xenophobia: Mexico and the Jewish refugees, 1930–1944” (University of Texas, 1994). 7 See Daniela Gleizer, México frente a la inmigración de refugiados judíos (Mexico City: INAH/Fundación Cultural Eduardo Cohen, 2000), and “México y el exilio a judíos a partir de la solución final,” in Nación y extranjería, ed. Pablo Yankelevich (Mexico City: UNAM, 2009), 277–306.



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to a large extent, of a complex historical experience derived from multiple foreign interventions of which it has been the object. The subject of this book, however, is set in a very special time in Mexican history, when the country expressed its sympathy for the victims of European Fascism and was willing to open its doors to allow some groups of refugees admission. This was, perhaps, next to the policy of asylum for those expelled from their countries by South American dictatorships in the seventies, the occasion on which Mexico was most generous to foreigners. Therefore, the purpose of this investigation is also to analyze the distance between the government’s discourse of openness and the selective, discretionary admission of immigrants. Due to the fact that, as previously mentioned, Jewish immigration to Mexico had been legally prohibited since 1934, the case of the Jews generated a blatant contradiction between the country’s image as a traditional port of refuge and its refusal to accept a population, generally characterized as undesirable, that was being persecuted and later on exterminated in Europe. In other words, the plight of Jewish refugees exposed the conflict between Mexico’s immigration policy and its policy of asylum, and this tension produced a great deal of difficulty in orchestrating an answer to applications for refuge, on many occasions producing a lot of confusion. It is interesting that in Mexican historiography there are no studies dedicated to the history of the country’s immigration policy, and that works that delve into the history of asylum from a broad point of view are scarce. The lack of interest in these matters—with the exception of the Spanish and South American exiles—is surprising in light of the characterization of Mexico as a “country of asylum.”8 Among the attempts in recent years to fully understand how the country’s immigration policy developed and what the overall attitude of Mexican society has been towards foreigners, the work of Pablo Yankelevich stands out.9 There are also several studies 8 The principle general studies on asylum and refuge in Mexico are Hans Wollny, “Asylum policy in Mexico: A Survey,” Journal of Refugee Studies 4, no. 3 (1991): 219–36; Fernando Serrano Migallón, El asilo político en México (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1998), and Duras las tierras ajenas, un asilo, tres exilios (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2002); Cecilia Ímaz, La práctica del asilo y del refugio en México (Mexico City: Potrerillos Editores, 1995); Pablo Yankelevich, ed., México país refugio: La experiencia de los exilios en el siglo XX (Mexico City: INAH/Plaza y Valdés, 2002); Katia Somohano and Pablo Yankelevich, eds., El Refugio en México. Entre la historia y los desafíos contemporáneos (Mexico City: COMAR/SEGOB, 2011). 9 Pablo Yankelevich, Nación y Extranjería, and ¿Deseables o inconvenientes? Las fronteras de la extranjería en el México posrevolucionario (Mexico City: Bonilla Artigas/ENAH/ Iberoamericana Vervuert, 2011). See also Salazar, Xenofobia y Xenofilia.

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on the German-speaking exiles in Mexico, including the work of the historian Friedrich Katz, who approached the subject as an eyewitness, since he lived in Mexico during his childhood when his father, Leo Katz, received asylum in the country in 1940; and of the German historian Fritz Pohle.10 These studies, however, are centered on the case of political-cultural exile, which differs greatly from the case of the Jewish exile. Within this historiographic context, the intent of the present study is to delve deeper into a little-known subject that clearly shows the need for specifying that the generosity offered by the governments of Lázaro Cárdenas and Manuel Ávila Camacho was selective and discretionary. It is also my intention to foreground certain aspects that have not been dealt with in depth until very recently, such as those linked to xenophobia and racism in Mexican society as well as in the government. Mexico has faced serious difficulties when dealing with its past history of immigration: while almost completely suppressing the presence of certain ethnic or national groups, such as descendants of Africans, for example, it has also ignored the xenophobia of certain sectors of the government and various social actors during certain critical periods in the twentieth century. I share the concern of other authors who have insisted on the need to broach these subjects—racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism—in the disciplines of history and the social sciences, and to question the idea that “mestizo Mexico,” by being just that, a country of intermingling, would be immune to the virus of racism.11 Neither Mexico nor any other country is.

10 Friedrich Katz, “El exilio centroeuropeo. Una mirada autobiográfica,” in Yankelevich, México, país refugio, 43–8, and Fritz Pohle, Das mexikanische Exil: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politisch-kulturellen Emigration aus Deutschland (1937–1946) (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler Verlag, 1986). See also Christian Kloyber, ed., Exilio y cultura. El exilio cultural austriaco en México (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2002); Renata von Hanffstengel and Cecilia Tercero, eds., México, el exilio bien temperado (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Interculturales Germano-Mexicanas/Instituto Goethe México/Secretaría de Cultura del Gobierno del Estado de Puebla/UNAM, 1995). 11  José Jorge Gómez Izquierdo, “Los caminos del racismo en México,” Cuadernos del Campo Estratégico de Acción en Pobreza y Exclusión 1 (2006): 43. Also along these same lines Mauricio Tenorio observes that while mestizaje was a racial ideology, “above all, it constituted a rhetorical trap used in order to not have to talk about race.” M. Tenorio, “Guatemala y México: del mestizaje a contrapelo,” Istor. Revista de Historia Internacional 6, no. 24 (2006): 69. Meanwhile José Antonio Aguilar Rivera considered mestizaje to be a racist theory with its own theoreticians who systematized it, and which was placed in the middle of discourse on national identity. J. A. Aguilar Rivera, El sonido y la furia. La persuasión multicultural en México y Estados Unidos (Mexico City: Taurus, 2004), 14.



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III. In our day and age, almost all those who fled totalitarian regimes or Nazi anti-Semitism are known as refugees, but in the thirties to be awarded the status of a refugee—or in the case of Mexico, of an exile (asilado)—had important consequences. Not only did an exile receive privileged treatment along with this title; exile status legitimized the causes of his flight and entailed that the government act accordingly by protecting him.12 For these reasons the Mexican government had great difficulty in placing the Jews who were fleeing from Nazism within a legal category, at first alternating between considering them refugees and treating them as immigrants. As refugees, they could in theory claim asylum within the hospitable tradition the country had begun to build, although up until that time protection had been basically limited to certain Latin American political personages (especially from Guatemala and other nearby countries).13 On the other hand, as immigrants their admission was forbidden by the regulations, public or confidential, of the immigration policy of the times. Thus it is interesting to compare the asylum offered to the Spanish Republicans: in their case there was no contradiction between immigration policy and the policy of asylum (both receptive to Hispanics), but in the case of the Jews there was.14 The difficulty in defining the legal status of the Jews who were expelled from the Third Reich and sought refuge in Mexico was persistent. As the problem became more familiar, the Mexican government considered them fundamentally to be immigrants; a little later on it began to refer to them, at times, as refugees (specifically in communiqués with the authorities of various international organizations involved in the matter) until at the beginning of the forties the term “racial refugees” was coined. This concept acknowledged the Jews’ status as a persecuted people, but clearly distinguished them from political refugees, who in general were more favorably looked upon. It must be pointed out that in Mexico there did not exist the legal concept of refuge—which came from the international legal sphere—but rather only that of asylum, which formed a part of inter-American law. Asylum by definition has a political and individual character: it is applied for by a person who, for reasons attributable to the action of the state,

12 Caestecker and Moore, “Refugee policies,” 56. 13 See Serrano Migallón, El asilo político, 49–92. 14 I thank Clara Lida for having expressed this idea so clearly.

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questions and confronts the regime of his government and seeks protection from another authority, one outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state to which he is subject.15 What is special about asylum, furthermore, is that the applicant is already a victim of persecution, and his case must be treated individually by the state from which he has sought protection; in other words, asylum is not an instrument designed for treating collective problems. The legal concept of refuge, on the other hand, has a more humanitarian emphasis and it is normally used in a more extensive sense, broadening the spectrum of legitimate causes that may lead an individual to flee from his country of origin in search of a safer, freer situation. Unlike “asylee,” the definition of “refugee” has become broader over time, to include people who flee from general violence, the systematic violation of human rights, or natural disasters, and the term may, therefore, have a collective connotation.16 Implicit within the category of “refugee” is the presumption that the people in question deserve and should receive help—and, if necessary, protection from the causes of their flight.17 The fact that Mexico recognized the category of asylum—but not of refuge—has been interpreted by some authors as a purposeful act intended to ensure that all matters pertaining to the reception of foreigners in the country would be treated internally and would not be subject to international commitments.18 Similarly, we consider that the ambiguity in the definition of political asylees and refugees had the objective to leave the door open to deciding each case individually, without any legal limitations. While one of the cornerstones of Mexican immigration policy was the exercise of discretion, in the case of the policy on asylum the weight of this practice was even greater. Despite legal differences, during the period in question the Mexican government used, on a daily basis, the terms “political asylum” and “refuge,” as well as “exiles,” “asylees,” or “political refugees,” indiscriminately to refer to those to whom it was willing to offer protection. What is clear is that, whatever the terminology, the emphasis was on the matter of political persecution. The problem was that membership in this category was not strictly defined; it was not clear whether protection would be given only to those who were being personally persecuted for their own activism

15 Serrano Migallón, El asilo político, 33. 16 Ímaz, La práctica del asilo, 78. 17 Guy S. Goodwin, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 1. 18 Serrano Migallón, El asilo político, 80.



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(as in the emblematic case of Leon Trotsky) and who formally applied for asylum with the Mexican government, or whether it would be extended to those who were victims of state violence, whether or not they had taken part in any political activity. In the latter category were well-known intellectuals or artists, as well as those persecuted for racial, religious, or other reasons. The lack of clarity on this matter left the policy open to various interpretations, even by government workers and members of the Mexican foreign service themselves, as will be seen throughout the book. However, the fact that in Mexico there was no formal refugee status did not impede the government from offering protection to groups of people who did not comply with the prerequisite for being considered political exiles, as in the cases that we will see later on, namely the granting of temporary asylum to Polish refugees in 1943, and the authorization for one hundred orphans from France to immigrate to Mexico during the war. This shows how asylum was a flexible concept that could be broadened to protect a “collective” immigration for which it had not originally been designed. In this sense, the fact that in Mexico there existed no legal concept of refuge did not imply a de facto impediment to admitting the Jews expelled by Nazism, and as far as can be seen in the documents we located, it was not an argument the authorities used to justify restricting their admission to the country. Due to the difficulties presented by the problem of the distinction between refugees and emigrants, our analysis of the government’s stance towards Jewish refugees is situated within a more general analysis of the Mexican immigration policy in that era. IV. The subject I analyze is a marginal matter within the Mexican political setting in which the governments of Lázaro Cárdenas and Manuel Ávila Camacho unfolded. However, although it is peripheral, or rather precisely because of this, it offers many opportunities for historical analysis by revealing many of the conflicts underlying Mexican politics and society of the time. Many of the problems involved in the matter at hand are not exclusive to the Jewish case, while others are. By the mid-thirties Mexican immigration policy had forbidden the admittance of a large number of national, ethno-religious, and political groups. If we try to determine what distinguished the Jewish situation, we may point to the fact that of all the groups whose admission had been forbidden by legislation, only Jews confronted a generalized need for asylum. Thus, they presented Mexican immigration policy with a virtually new case: a group that collectively applied for refuge because they were the object of racial violence in the states to which they belonged.

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introduction

The deliberations, conflicts, and tension generated by the need to respond to Jewish pleas present a privileged vision of Mexican relations, thoughts, and attitudes towards foreigners who in general were considered “undesirable,” and of course, towards the Jews specifically. The other singular aspect of the Jewish case is that the Jews had no state that represented their interests. This affected them in two ways. On the one hand, since there was no fear of diplomatic reprisals from any country, there were no political reasons for loosening the restrictive regulations. If we compare this with the case of the Chinese workers who had immigrated to the country, for example—although the attitude towards them was much more violent than towards the Jews—the desire of the Mexican government during the first decades of the twentieth century to maintain diplomatic relations with China—or, at least, not to engage in open violations of international agreements—inhibited the adoption of absolute prohibitions at the federal level.19 In the Jewish case there was no equivalent counterbalancing factor. The only factor that at times put a damper on the adoption of measures that would affect the Jewish group established in the country was the power the Mexican government attributed to the Jewish community of the United States, and fear of their reactions. Secondly, the absence of a state that assumed ultimate responsibility for the applicants for asylum, in the face of the policy of denationalization implemented by the German state, turned them into nonrepatriable people, which was an important element used by the Mexican government to justify turning them away. The contradictions, different positions, and paradoxes surrounding the case I study, and the complex relationship within the state among discourse, rules, and practices, were not exclusive to the handling of the case of the Jewish refugees. They were characteristic of the post-revolutionary Mexican state, itself in the middle of a process of structuration. However, the case I analyze, due to its features, makes them especially evident. V. As I mentioned earlier, the problem of the Jewish refugees presented Mexican immigration polity with a case of collective refuge, which it had not faced before. Thus, the legislation then in effect was not sufficient to address the problem. Along with this, it is important to point out that 19 José Jorge Gómez Izquierdo, El movimiento antichino en México (1871–1934). Problemas del racismo y del nacionalismo durante la Revolución mexicana (Mexico City: INAH, 1991).



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the immigration laws can hardly explain the specific policy followed with regard to the Jewish refugees, or rather they can only partially explain it. It is not only necessary to take a look at the laws, but also their interpretation and use by different authorities and at different times, since as we will see, the same legislative corpus could be used to either allow or forbid the entrance of different groups of people seeking refuge. One of the difficulties in dealing with this subject arises from the fact that there is no correlation between the public discourse and the facts. “It is perfectly conceivable that the official discourse was one and the practical attitude was another.”20 The distance or contradictions between discourse and action with respect to the admission of refugees onto Mexican soil led to a long series of confusions and misunderstandings which at times proved counterproductive, for the regime as well as for the refugees themselves. In this respect, it is important to remember that, as Avraham Milgram holds, there was no correlation between the nature of a government—democratic or authoritarian—and its attitude of acceptance or rejection towards Jewish refugees. That is to say, it was not the case that authoritarian regimes sympathetic to the Axis powers would necessarily reject the refugees, nor did all of the pro-Allied governments share a favorable attitude to this persecuted people.21 The governments of Cárdenas and Ávila Camacho are illustrative of this point. The fact that a government offers hospitality to one group of individuals in search of refuge does not automatically turn that government into a “humanitarian” regime, nor is that asylum necessarily extended to other groups seeking protection. In fact, the Mexican case clearly shows that one government may, at the same time, assume distinct attitudes towards different groups searching for asylum; and from this fact can be drawn the central conclusion that the possibilities of receiving asylum depend to a large extent on how the group in question is conceptualized. Furthermore, the analysis of this situation illustrates the fact that an offer of asylum to a specific group may reduce the possibility of other groups receiving it. In this case, the effort made by the Mexican government to accommodate refugees from the Spanish Civil War exhausted the regime’s ability to negotiate—both within the government itself and in the face of public opinion—the possibility of accepting any other kind of refugees.

20 Milgram, Entre la aceptación y el rechazo, 11. 21 Ibid.

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introduction

The course of Mexican policy towards the Jewish refugees did not follow a straight line, nor even a winding but continuous line. It was filled with turns, curves, knots, interruptions, delays, waiting, and silence. Nor was it drawn up beforehand, but rather was improvised depending on the situations that arose at each moment, in respect to domestic as well as foreign policy, and as a function of public opinion. As we may observe, ideological considerations were of significant importance and often prevailed over pragmatic considerations. VI. Finally, I would like to make clear that in the archival sources used in this study, the sources from Lázaro Cárdenas’s term are much more abundant than those from Manuel Ávila Camacho’s government, and therefore Cárdenas’s position on the matter of the refugees from Nazism receives more attention in the following pages. There is still a lot to be done. Like all research, this book poses many more questions than it answers—at least, that is my hope.

Chapter One

BACKGROUND The purpose of this introductory chapter is to set the stage for the story that I am going to tell. There are multiple actors who speak various languages, come from diverse contexts, originally had nothing to do with one another, and belong to different cultures. On the one hand there are the Jews who sought countries that would grant them refuge from European Nazism, and on the other hand the Mexican authorities in charge of answering their pleas for asylum. In between are consulates, legations, emigration organizations, shipping companies, bureaucratic processes, visas, government authorities, diplomatic relations, immigration policies, ideological considerations, corruption, economic calculations, and group interests that exerted pressure to support or oppose opening Mexico’s doors. The International Context: Nazism and Jewish Emigration from the Third Reich As soon as the National Socialists gained control of the German government in 1933, the persecution of political opponents, especially those who formed part of the Left or were identified with it, began. In keeping with Hitler’s racist ideology, and his intention of turning the Third Reich into a vast pan-German empire that would stand as the purest expression of Aryan civilization, came the first signs of strong anti-Semitism. In theory the new racial policies referred to all “non-Aryans,” but in fact they specifically focused on Jews, considered the archenemy of the German nation.1 Although at first various government agencies in charge of the “Jewish question” proposed diverse ways in which to “solve” it, during the period of 1933–1935 legal channels were used to create an atmosphere of discrimination against the Jews by restricting their civil and labor rights. In this sense the first measures taken were the Law against Cruelty towards Animals, which forbade ritual slaughter, and the Law for the Restoration

1 Marrus, Unwanted, 208.

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of the Professional Civil Service of April 1933, which authorized firing nonAryan public servants from the bureaucracy.2 Shortly afterwards, during the month of April, when a boycott of Jewish professionals and merchants was organized by the state, a law was also issued against overcrowding in German schools and universities; it established a quota of 1.5 percent on the proportion of Jewish students who could attend secondary schools and universities in the whole country and a maximum of 5 percent in any other schools.3 Since the main objective of all of these measures was to eliminate the presence of Jews in public life, they mostly affected intellectuals, professionals, students, government employees (including many professors, doctors, and judges), and those who held public posts.4 Emigration from the Third Reich also began in 1933. That year about 10 percent of the German Jewish population—53,000 of the 522,000 Jews living in Germany—as well as 10,000 Germans who were not Jews fled the country, going mainly to neighboring countries.5 The first wave of emigrants consisted almost exclusively of political opponents and distinguished personalities, while the following waves were made up mainly of Jews, with a much larger percentage of young people, elderly persons, and entire families.6 Let us keep in mind Egon F. Kunz’s advice on the importance of not confusing the “anticipatory” movements of refugees with voluntary migrations, although they are somewhat similar. In order to identify the former, it is necessary to understand the historical and social background of the places of origin of their members, because emigration, to a large extent involuntary, does not stem from a desire to live in a certain country, but rather from the need to flee one’s own country.7

2 Dan Michman, El Holocausto. Un estudio histórico (Tel Aviv: Universidad Abierta de Israel/Dor Hemshej, 1986), 2:23, 113. 3 Dwork and Van Pelt, Flight from the Reich, 16. 4 It is estimated that almost 12 percent of the heads of Jewish families were employees of the state. Michman, El Holocausto, 2:23. 5 Between 37,000 and 45,000 German Jews found refuge in other countries in 1933. Dwork and Van Pelt, Flight from the Reich, 18. 6 Marrus, Unwanted, 130. 7 In the case we are analyzing, the anticipatory movements were made by people who abandoned Germany for political reasons, as well as those Jews who thought that the deterioration of their social and legal condition would lead to grave difficulties in continuing to live normal, free lives, and even in continuing to live. According to Kunz, in general terms, the members of anticipatory movements can usually plan their exit, because they have some economic resources and are informed of the measures they can take in order to continue making a living in other countries. The “acute” movements of refugees, on the other hand, became the norm with the radicalization of the Nazis’ anti-Semitic policies. In many cases, anticipatory movements turned into acute movements when the country



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Throughout 1934 and the first months of 1935, anti-Jewish activity in Germany diminished due to, among other things, the lack of stability of Hitler’s regime, the economic crisis, the conflict between the SA8 and the army, and the need of the new government to consolidate and resolve internal conflicts.9 This enabled the return of 16,000 of the first Jewish refugees who had left in 1933, and who had undergone humiliation, hardships, and hunger in the countries where they had temporarily taken asylum.10 It also resulted in a decline in Jewish emigration: fewer Jews left the Third Reich during the following two years, 23,000 in 1934 and 21,000 in 1935.11 The economic context in Europe between the wars was extremely complicated due to the effects of the crisis of 1929, which, among other things, caused a tremendous rise in the rate of unemployment. This, along with the problems brought about by the demobilization of military troops following the First World War, and the suspicion on the part of Germany’s neighbors that the asylum offered in 1933 to those being persecuted by the Nazis would have a longer duration than anticipated, led to the implementation by these countries of complex systems for limiting the entrance of foreigners and prohibiting them from working, with the intention of regulating and protecting their own national job markets. Moreover, there was already an important refugee problem, whose origins lay in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe from multiethnic empires into nation states following the Great War (which resulted in the displacement of millions of people, mainly of ethnic minorities), and, to a lesser extent, Italian fascism. The Jewish refugees, then, would join a preexisting flow of people in search of asylum, numbering between nine and ten million individuals.12 During the spring and summer of 1935 anti-Jewish legislation in Germany was renewed, its clearest manifestation being the Nuremberg Laws, issued in September of that year. These included the Reich Citizenship that offered asylum came under the political or military pressure of Germany. Egon F. Kunz, “The refugee in flight: Kinetic models and forms of displacement,” The International Migration Review 7, no. 2 (1973): 132–35.   8 The SA (Sturmabteilungen, “Assault Forces”) was the paramilitary branch of the National Socialist Party. The SA would soon decline in importance and disappear from the German public scene, giving way to the SS (Schutzstaffeln). See n. 14 below.   9 Michman, El Holocausto, 2:32–33. 10 Yehuda Bauer, A History of the Holocaust (Mexico City: Franklin Watts, 2001), 131. 11  Dwork and Van Pelt, Flight from the Reich, 92. 12 Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe, 31. Dwork and Van Pelt, Flight from the Reich, 57.

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Law and the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor, which established the basis for systematic discrimination against Jews and the divestment of their rights as citizens. Dan Michman maintains that the importance of these laws is that they signified the official acceptance by the German state of a racial principle that had not existed previously, and thus the infiltration of Nazi ideology into the sphere of the state.13 Various documents attest to Hitler’s objective of “dejudaizing” Germany. The first of these, written in 1934 by the SD (the SS Security Service)14 and known as the “Secret Situation Report,” seriously considered the mass emigration of the Jews of the Third Reich.15 Another document written in 1937 by the department in charge of Jewish matters (the so-called Department II-112) also clearly presented the objective of expulsion. Besides seeking measures to put pressure on the Jews and hasten their emigration, this report considered it necessary to control the way in which those who were driven out settled in other countries, in order to avoid concentrations that could form “enemy” nuclei outside the country and incite the local population against Germany.16 Up until 1938 the exodus from Germany was contained within certain limits. Michael Marrus estimates, from German sources, that between January 1933 and the fall of 1937 about 120,000 Jews abandoned the Reich. About a third of these had immigrated to other continents, while another third headed to Palestine; the others remained in Europe.17 However, 1938 would mark a beginning of a virtual refugee crisis. It is necessary to recall the annexation of Austria by Germany in March in order to understand the radicalization of Nazi policy towards the Jews that followed on its heels. The Anschluss neutralized the efforts to expel the Jews from Germany by annexing the Austrian Jewish population of nearly 200,000, almost the same number as those who had emigrated from Germany. Since the annexation of Czechoslovakia would also add new Jewish populations, the intention of eliminating Jews from the Third Reich led to a more elaborate and radical policy. The Central Office for Jewish Emigration, which was created in Austria and headed by Adolf Eichmann, was able to do in 13 Michman, El Holocausto, 2:38. 14 The SS (Schutzstaffeln, “Protection Squadrons”), created in 1925 as a brigade of bodyguards, quickly turned into the most powerful organization of the National Socialist Party and later of the Nazi State. Heinrich Himmler became their leader in 1929. 15 Vidal, El Holocausto (Madrid: Alianza, 1995), 56–57. 16 Michman, El Holocausto, 2:53–58. 17 Marrus, Unwanted, 213.



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a very few months what Germany had taken five years to achieve, expediting the exodus of Austrian Jews in a much faster and more violent and dramatic manner. In the month of May 1938 alone almost 10,000 fled, and between April and November more than 30,000.18 In less than two years half of the Austrian Jewish population had emigrated: about 63,000 people had abandoned the country in 1938 and about 54,500 in 1939.19 The main ports of destination were the United States, Palestine, Latin America, and beginning in 1941, Shanghai.20 The year 1938 also marked a qualitative shift in the numbers, with the first deportations to concentration camps.21 During the second half of the year, there were various events that worsened the legal, social, and economic conditions of the Jews and made a search for refuge paramount. These events began with the crisis caused by Hitler in Czechoslovakia and the incorporation of the Sudetenland, and they continued with the deportation of more than 15,000 German Jews to Poland in October, the pogrom called the “Night of Broken Glass” (November 9–10 in Germany, which caused the death of dozens of Jews and sent about 30,000 people to concentration camps), plus a long series of legal measures against Jews. As a result of this situation, some Western governments and the Soviet Union began to let more refugees into their countries. At the same time other locations around the world, including Latin America, were being considered more seriously as possible destinations for refugees. There were many factors that hindered the Jews from leaving Germany. In the first place, they had no desire to abandon their country, in which their ancestors had lived for over fifteen hundred years. Besides family ties and relationships of friendship, they had a strong feeling of belonging to the German culture that made leaving very difficult. Furthermore, the German Jews were mistaken in their evaluation of the situation in Hitler’s Germany, an assessment based on the early years of his rule when they foresaw a short-lived Nazi regime, thinking that emigration would not be necessary. In fact, the central organizations of Jews in Germany tried to organize everyday Jewish life within the restrictions and limits

18 Ibid., 168. 19 Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939–1945 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), 26. 20 Ibid., 66. 21  The population of the concentration camps was about 3,500 people in mid-1935 and had increased to 24,000 by the end of 1938, before the “Night of Broken Glass.” Bauer, History of the Holocaust, 115.

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placed on them and during those early years did not consider emigration.22 Along with this, the demographic profile of the German Jewish population (urban, for the most part professionals, and on average older) was not well suited to the immigration policies of Western countries, which preferred young farmers. German Jews were also dissuaded by the tax on emigration that had been introduced by the Weimar Republic in 1931. Especially reluctant to leave were those who enjoyed a higher economic status, since they would have to leave most of their resources in Germany.23 Paradoxically, this policy worked against the Nazi’s objective of “dejudaizing” Germany; it reduced the possibility that German Jews could resettle in other countries since no one would accept these impoverished people.24 Indeed, the most important obstacle to emigration was the difficulty in finding countries willing to accept Jewish refugees. The clearest example of this was the 1939 voyage of the ocean liner Saint Louis, which could not find refuge anywhere in the world for its 937 passengers, German Jews, who had to return to Europe after the Cuban government refused to receive them.25 With the invasion of Poland—which had the largest Jewish population in Europe, almost 3.3 million people—and the beginning of World War II in September 1939, emigration became more and more difficult. Most European countries closed their borders, while at the same time arguing that the war effort made it impossible to divert resources to help the

22 In this connection the rebirth of Jewish culture that took place during this time should be pointed out. The Jewish community had to replace the educational, medical, work-related, and cultural infrastructure that the state denied them. Segregated from German society, the German Jews, who had once been assimilated, turned once again to identifying with their Jewish roots. Beginning in 1938, the Reichsvertretung (National Representation of German Jews), led by Leo Baeck, more actively promoted the emigration of Jewish youth and sought to prepare them by teaching them new trades (such as handicrafts and agriculture) and new languages, so that they could meet the requirements laid down by the countries to which they planned to immigrate. Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson, Historia del pueblo judío (Madrid: Alianza, 1988) 3:1208. Dwork and van Pelt, Flight from the Reich, 123–29. 23 The material losses caused by the emigration are estimated at between 30 and 50 percent of the refugees’ capital during the years 1933–1937, and between 60 and 100 percent for the period 1937–1939. Marrus, Unwanted, 131. 24 In fact, a specific term existed for referring to this type of emigrant: LPC (liable to become a public charge). Bauer, History of the Holocaust, 134. 25 The classic work on this dramatic episode continues to be that of Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan-Witts, Voyage of the Damned (New York: Stein and Day, 1974). See also Margalit Bejarano, “La historia del buque St. Louis: la perspectiva cubana,” in Milgram, Entre la aceptación y el rechazo, 212–47.



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refugees. It became more and more difficult to obtain visas and the transatlantic transportation of civilians was extremely rare. In the summer of 1940 the German invasion of Belgium, Holland, and France, which up until then had been along with Great Britain the main destinations of refugees, proved crucial for the history of Jewish emigration, pushing a large number of persons to seek asylum for a second time.26 The subsequent annexations and invasions by the Nazis further complicated life for a growing number of Jews. In October 1941, while the plan for the extermination of European Jews, known as the “Final Solution,” was brewing, the Nazis forbade emigration of Jews from the Third Reich. The borders were closed. Added to the difficulty of obtaining entrance visas was that of obtaining exit visas, making emigration nearly impossible. Although numbers vary, it is estimated that up to this point about half a million Jewish refugees had managed to leave Nazi-occupied territory.27 Of these, 405,000 had left Germany, Austria, Bohemia, and Moravia between early 1933 and the beginning of World War II in September 1939. When war broke out there were still about 110,000 Jewish refugees in Europe; 71,000 of these were able to escape before the autumn of 1941.28 There were, however, groups of people who had obtained temporary refuge in neutral countries and were still searching for permanent asylum; from Portugal, Spain, North Africa and even the Middle East and Shanghai, Jewish refugees continued their search for adoptive countries. The main destinations for refugees in Europe before the outbreak of the war had been Great Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium, which received approximately 42,000, 30,000, 27,000 and 15,000 Jewish refugees, respectively.29 Switzerland, which remained neutral, gave refuge 26 Between 165,000 and 210,000 Jews fled to Vichy France following the German occupation of North and Northeastern France in June 1940. Part of this group consisted of refugees from Central Europe, who were in Paris, and another part was made up of thousands of Jews from Eastern Europe, who were primarily recent refugees. A German order of September 27, 1940, forbade Jews who were not French by birth to return to the occupied areas, among them 10,000 Jews from Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg who had taken refuge in France. Another 30,000 Jewish men joined this population when the army decided to demobilize the foreign troops, including the Jews who had served on the front. Caron, Uneasy Asylum, 330. 27 According to Michael Marrus, by this time about 537,000 Jews had emigrated. Marrus, Unwanted, 240. 28 Bauer, American Jewry, 26, 29, 66. 29 These are estimates since the figures vary depending on the study consulted. The calculation is difficult for various reasons, such as the war itself, the difficulty of legally defining Jewish refugees, their passage through various countries during the emigration

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to about 25,000 Jews before and during the war. Outside of Europe, the United States received the largest number of Jewish exiles, around 140,000,30 while the whole of Latin American accepted about 100,000.31 About 66,500 people travelled to Palestine32 and 16,300 to Shanghai,33 a Chinese city that was controlled by Japan and required no entrance visa. Latin America as an Alternative Destination Since at first the exodus from Germany was thought to be a temporary measure, the early options for refugees from Nazism were the countries bordering the homeland of the Third Reich. When the League of Nations’ high commissioner for refugees from Germany, James McDonald, travelled all over Latin America in 1935 in search of places that could take in Jewish refugees, the most remarkable thing at the time, as Haim Avni shows, was the lack of concrete applications from Jews looking to settle in the region, which was of little interest to them. “As a result, immigration to the entire region did not reach the potential level nor did it match the willingness the countries showed at the time” to receive fugitives.34 In 1938, as the objective of expelling the Jews from Germany and the occupied territories became clearer, the search for refuge outside of Europe became more and more urgent. After the United States closed its consulates in Germany in July 1941, the only remaining option for emigration from territories controlled by the Third Reich was to obtain visas for Latin America, which from this point on played a central role as a potential place of asylum.35 The image many Europeans had of America as a land of economic opportunity was still prevalent. In addition, most countries of the American continent had a long tradition of immigration. Many variables and process, the distinct status they received depending on the immigration laws of each country, illegal immigration, and the sources used. 30 Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European Jewry: 1933–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 144. 31 Haim Avni, “Los países de América Latina y el Holocausto,” in Shoá. Enciclopedia del Holocausto (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem/EDZ Nativ, 2000), 93. 32 Herbert Strauss, “Jewish Emigration from Germany,” Leo Baeck Yearbook 26 (1981): 359, quoted in Milgram, Entre la aceptación y el rechazo, 10. Louise London, however, places the number of refugees at 140,000, taking into account legal as well as illegal immigration to Palestine. London, Whitehall and the Jews, 11. 33 Dwork and van Pelt, Flight from the Reich, 318. 34 Haim Avni, “La guerra y las posibilidades de rescate,” in Milgram, Entre la aceptación y el rechazo, 20. 35 Bauer, American Jewry, 64.



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many combinations of elements came into play when these American countries considered taking in European immigrants: the internal political context, population policies, foreign affairs, the ability to absorb new groups of people, the economic situation, public opinion, and also ethnic and racial considerations. In analyzing the position of Latin America as a whole, we find various similarities and differences. As was true for other nations, Latin America countries were moving from open immigration policies to others with even more restrictive criteria. This took place mainly during the twenties and thirties, a bit later than in European countries (during World War I) and the United States, whose first important immigration limitations were established in 1921. The crisis of 1929, which also had consequences in Latin America, justified closing the doors to foreign laborers, while at the same time it changed the criteria for allowing immigrants into the country: in general, professionals and industrialists were not welcome as they would compete with the growing middle class in Latin America, while young farmers were allowed in. However, some countries such as Brazil adopted more pragmatic policies that distinguished between those refugees who could contribute to professionalizing and modernizing the country, and those who were not useful. For this reason they sometimes made exceptions to co-opt the capital and technical and professional abilities of select individuals, based on economic considerations.36 Nevertheless, as Leonardo Senkman points out, “the most radical innovation in the criteria for admission and rejection of immigrants in some Latin American countries was taking into account ethnic-cultural considerations, such as Latinism and the Catholic religion of the candidates for emigration.”37 The Jews, who were considered to have a difficult time assimilating into Latin American culture, were the object of various prohibitions and restrictions that blocked them from entering different countries in the region.38 36 Leonardo Senkman, “La cuestión de los refugiados judíos en Argentina y Brasil: la perspectiva de la política internacional y el neutralismo, 1938–1942,” in Milgram, Entre la aceptación y el rechazo, 78–80. 37 Senkman, Argentina, 10. 38 In Mexico, Confidential Circular no. 157 issued by the Ministry of the Interior in April 1934 forbade the entrance of Jews into the country no matter what their nationality or economic position was; in Brazil, the Confidential Circular of June 7, 1937, forbade the issuing of visas to people of Semitic origin; in Uruguay, the Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of December 17, 1938, ordered the Uruguayan consular representatives to not issue visas to Jews coming from the Axis countries, since they could not be repatriated; in Argentina, Confidential Circular no. 11, enacted in July 1938, forbade the ambassadors and consuls from issuing visas to undesirable immigrants, understood to be Jews.

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The common stance of Latin American countries towards the immigration of European refugees in general, and specifically Jews, was made clear at the Conference on Refugees that took place in Évian, France, as well as at the eighth Pan-American Conference in Lima, both in 1938. Both meetings contributed to strengthening a more restrictive position and putting into place a kind of regional policy: the representatives from these countries mutually backed each other in justifying the need for maintaining restrictions in their respective immigration legislation. Some interesting conclusions may be drawn by analyzing the position of Latin America as a whole. The first is that various countries which in the beginning had shown a certain willingness to take in Jewish refugees had the intention of using this population to fulfill internal political and economic aims. The Bolivian government, for example, was interested in settling the border with Paraguay after the Chaco War; the Dominican Republic had the objective of colonizing the border with Haiti in order to avoid infiltrations from that country, as well as to “cleanse” the dictator Trujillo’s image after the killing of Haitians which took place in 1937; the governor of the Mexican state of Tabasco proposed selling lands to Jewish refugees—at high prices—in order for the region to recover economically from the banana embargo imposed by the United States. Similarly, the intention of many government workers to try to profit from the fate of the refugees was notorious and it contributed to the emergence of a black market for Latin American passports and visas that in many cases (especially after 1944) saved the lives of refugees. At other times, as frequently happened, documents issued in Europe were not accepted by local immigration authorities at American ports of entry and were good for nothing.39 The second conclusion is that there was no relationship between the capacity of a country to absorb new contingents of immigrants (in the most developed or largest countries) and its willingness to receive refugees. With the exception of Argentina, which was the Latin American country that, in absolute terms, received the most Jewish refugees,40 the 39 Richard Breitman, Barbara McDonald and Severin Hochberg, eds., Refugees and Rescue: The Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald, 1935–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 279. See also Wyman, The Abandonment, 277–80. 40 It must be pointed out, however, that about half of the 45,000 refugees who immigrated to Argentina did so illegally from neighboring countries. Olga E. Rojer, Exile in Argentina, 1933–1945: A Historical and Literary Introduction (New York: Peter Land, 1989), 81.



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readiness of some of the smaller and less developed countries to open their doors to exiles—and the lack of receptivity among others with much greater capacity—stands out. We can point out the extremes of this case by first mentioning Bolivia, where 20,00041 Jewish refugees settled. According to Haim Avni, in relation to its size, Bolivia was responsible for saving more Jews than any other Indo-American country. At the other extreme is Mexico, which despite its size and capacity of absorption was one of the countries that received the fewest refugees: between 1,500 and 2,200.42 Comparative studies have also shown that there is no correlation between the type of government in each of these countries—authoritarian or democratic—and the path they took with respect to refugees fleeing Nazism.43 In fact, different types of regimes, with different origins and ideological positions, adopted very similar policies. I concur with Leonardo Senkman’s conclusion that economic reasons, which at the time were pointed out as the main cause for closing the doors to Jewish refugees, are insufficient to explain their rejection since, among other things, by the time Jewish refugees fleeing Nazism were seeking asylum, most Latin American countries had already recovered from the crisis of 1929. In this sense, it would be important to analyze how economic considerations combined with other reasons, especially discriminatory immigration policies that were fashioned on the basis of ethnic-cultural patterns.44 As I mentioned earlier, about 100,000 Jewish refugees had some Latin American country as their final destination. Of these, in round numbers,

41 Haim Avni and Leo Spitzer calculate that about 20,000 Jewish refugees entered Bolivia between 1938 and 1940, based on the census of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, this registry did not include those under sixteen years of age, nor those refugees who reemigrated to Argentina, nor the few who arrived between 1940 and 1944. Therefore the total must be greater, according to Breitman, McDonald, and Hochberg, Refugees and Rescue, 276. 42 Jean Michel Palmier estimates that the total number of political exiles and Jewish refugees who entered Mexico during the Nazi regime was 1,500 people. Palmier, Weimar in Exile, 572. Haim Avni estimates that there were 1,850 Jewish refugees. Avni, Role of Latin America, 62. Gloria Carreño estimates that the number is 2,250. Gloria Carreño, Pasaporte a la esperanza, vol. 1 of Generaciones judías en México. La Kehilá Ashkenazí (1922–1992), ed. Alicia Gojman de Backal (Mexico City: Comunidad Ashkenazí de México, 1993), 98. The sources that are available do not allow for establishing anything more than approximate numbers. 43 Milgram, Entre la aceptación y el rechazo, 11. 44 Senkman, Argentina, 20.

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Argentina received 45,000;45 Brazil 23,500;46 Bolivia 20,000;47 Chile 13,000;48 Uruguay 10,000; Colombia 3,900; Cuba 3,500; Ecuador 3,200; Mexico 1,800; the Dominican Republic 1,100; and Paraguay 1,000. Each of the following countries received fewer than 1,000 refugees; Panama, Costa Rica, Peru, Haiti, Venezuela, and the other Latin American countries that have not been mentioned.49 It is also worth pointing out the role played by some Latin American consuls who handed out citizenship papers that granted the refugees diplomatic protection by the countries which issued them, thus in some cases saving Jews from the concentration camps and extermination, or improving their treatment if they were already in the camps. Notable among these were the Salvadoran José Arturo Castellanos, and the Ecuadorian Manuel Antonio Muñoz Borrero. The Mexican Context Mexico is not, nor has it ever been, a country that draws immigrants. Since the nineteenth century, various attempts at promoting the flow of immigration, based to a large extent on the premise that Mexico was a largely underpopulated country that required not only laborers, but also foreign investment, did not succeed in attracting the great migratory waves that came mainly from Europe to the two extreme regions of the American continent: the United States and Canada, in the north; and Argentina and Uruguay, in the south. Indeed, the conditions of the country, and especially of the countryside, were not comparable to what was offered by the latter. In Mexico, immigration never reached significant levels; indeed, foreigners never made up even 1 percent of the national population.50 45 Rojer, Exile in Argentina, 81. Haim Avni calculates between 35,000 and 39,000. Avni, “América Latina y el Holocausto,” 93. 46 Senkman, “Refugiados judíos en Argentina y Brasil,” 80. 47 Many of the Jewish refugees who reached Bolivia reemigrated to Argentina, thus the totals do not coincide. 48 Irmtrud Wojak, “Chile y la inmigración judeo-alemana,” in Milgram, Entre la aceptación y el rechazo, 130. 49 Unless indicated otherwise, all figures are from Avni, “América Latina y el Holocausto,” 93. Regarding Mexico, see Chapter 1, n. 42. 50 Sergio Camposortega, “Análisis demográfico de las corrientes migratorias a México desde finales del siglo XIX,” in Destino México. Un estudio de las migraciones asiáticas a México, siglos XIX y XX, ed. María Elena Ota Mishima (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1997), 29.



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During the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth, immigration, open and spontaneous, was practically unregulated.51 Mexico’s first immigration law, which went into effect in March 1909, maintained the idea of openness and allowed for the free entry of any foreigner who was not “notoriously harmful” with respect to morals and health, establishing no “restrictions other than those which proved indispensable and commonly imposed by all nations.”52 Among others, it forbade the entrance of people who were sick or unable to work, and those who were fugitives of the law or prostitutes. With respect to the political order, it forbade the entrance of anarchists or other individuals who had the intention of disbanding the state, but did not establish limitations “on a single specific precept of citizens from a given nation, nor individuals of any determined race.”53 The loss of nearly one million lives during the Mexican Revolution, the drop in the birth rate, and expatriation all led post-revolutionary governments to encourage the arrival of new contingents who could contribute to the process of national reconstruction. For economic development as well as modernization in agriculture and industry, the country required foreign investment and a greater population, and thus immigration seemed the most suitable solution. The opening-up policies of Presidents Álvaro Obregón (1920–1924) and Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–1928) managed to attract a small proportion of the European wave of emigration between the wars. Between 1921 and 1930 the foreign population in the country rose from 100,000 to 160,000, reaching a peak in relation to the national population (0.97 percent) for the twentieth century.54 Two closely linked objectives were made explicit during the 1920s: the government’s need to have greater control over immigration in general,

51 In the nineteenth century the Naturalization Laws (1828) and the Immigration and Naturalization Laws (1886) were enacted, opening the doors to all those who wished to settle in the republic, “but avoiding the speculations of adventurers, who come only to exploit our misfortunes.” It was argued that preference should also be given to those from the republics of the Latin race from the American continent, “with whom we have close ties.” See Moisés González Navarro, Los extranjeros en México y los mexicanos en el extranjero (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1994), 2:88–9. On the immigration criteria and health codes see ibid., 3:30–34. 52 Ley de Inmigración de 1909, in Secretaría de Gobernación, Compilación histórica de la legislación migratoria en México: 1821–2000, 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Secretaría de Gobernación, 2000), 109. 53 Ibid. 54 Camposortega, “Análisis demográfico,” 29.

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and the intention of placing certain filters in order to control the selection of foreigners who entered Mexico. In this respect the country was following a tendency set in motion in Europe during the First World War, and which continued to be in effect in the United States, especially with the limitations of 1921 and 1924, adopting restrictions similar to those implemented by countries that had received strong migratory contingents. The matter of restricting immigration appears as an alternative in the Project for a Law of Immigration that Álvaro Obregón submitted in 1923, which considered the need of the “Public Authority to be in the position of selecting immigrants and excluding those who [. . .] were not desirable elements or who might bring about the physical degeneration of our race or the moral depression of our people, or put our political institutions at risk of dissolution.”55 Although this bill was never voted on by Congress, Obregón was granted extraordinary powers to legislate on the matter of immigration. A new Law of Immigration enacted in 1926 once again brought this concern into the spotlight and justified the repeal of the former law, since it had not allowed the government to choose “those foreign elements who came to mix with our society,” allowing for “the constant arrival of individuals who were not only undesirable, but who were outright harmful and dangerous to our people and our country.” While the potential advantages of immigration for the progress of the nation continued to be weighed, selection was thought essential. For this reason the National Registry of Foreigners was established, while in the meantime the Ministry of the Interior was being adapted to temporarily limit the entrance of workers whenever it deemed there to be a scarcity of work in the country.56 The law of 1926 did not specify which individuals would not be allowed into the country, nor quantitatively limit the arrival of foreigners. In fact, the criteria for selectivity should not be searched for in the law itself, but rather in various confidential circulars issued by the Ministry of the Interior that first forbade the entrance of specific groups based on ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, and national considerations. Through these circulars various populations were prohibited from entering the country: Chinese in 1921, Indians in 1923, Negroes in 1924, Gypsies in 1926, people of Arab origin in 1927, Poles and Russians in 1929, and Hungarians 55 Proyecto de Ley de Migración, Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados [Diary of Debates of the Chamber of Deputies, DdD], October 4, 1923, 3. 56 Ley de Migración de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario Oficial de la Federación [Diario Oficial], March 13, 1926.



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in 1931.57 There are still many unanswered questions in relation to the confidential character of these prohibitions; the process by which certain human groups were catalogued as “desirable” or “undesirable,” and what precisely was meant by these terms; on what sources the bureaucrats who thought up these measures based them; and more broadly the relationship between Mexican nationalism and racial thinking. These confidential circulars were combined with public restrictions, justified by economic considerations, whose main objective was to limit the entrance of foreign workers. The first public agreement to expressly limit the immigration of workers was enacted in 1927 and it affected anyone of Syrian, Lebanese, Armenian, Palestinian, Arab, or Turkish origin.58 Nevertheless, the fact that initially the entrance of only certain workers was banned indicated that the ban was not being applied for strictly economic reasons. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized this aspect in 1927 when it explained that in some cases, “the prohibition of immigration of these nationalities has been [in some cases] in order to protect our labor class, and in others to avoid the mixing of races, which has been scientifically proven to produce degeneration in the descendants.”59 Later on, in 1928, the Department of the Federal District clearly expressed that it was necessary to improve the race by mestizaje (miscegenation) and that this could not be done by “breeding” Mexicans with “individuals of insignificant lineage.”60 Due to the global economic crisis of 1929, immigration of foreign workers was once again temporarily limited,61 and this was repeated in 57 Gómez Izquierdo, Movimiento antichino, 111; Gónzalez Navarro, Extranjeros en México, 3:31 and 36; Pablo Yankelevich and Paola Chenillo, “La arquitectura de la política de inmigración en México,” in Yankelevich, Nación y extranjería, 196; Marta Saade, “Una raza prohibida: afroestadounidenses en México,” in Yankelevich, Nación y extranjería, 245; and especially Andrés Landa y Piña, Historia de las restricciones impuestas a la inmigración por motivos sociales, económicos, raciales y políticos (1927–1937) (Mexico City, 1938). 58 The original agreement, published in the Diario Oficial of July 15, 1927, included restrictions on these groups alone. However, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs later referred to this agreement in its Memoria de labores (Annual Report), it included “hindobritánicos, chinos y negros” (Hindu-British, Chinese, and Negroes) among the restricted groups. The prohibition had been made confidentially. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria de Labores. De agosto de 1926 a julio de 1927 (Mexico City: SRE, 1927), 512. 59 Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria: 1927, 512. 60 Memoria administrativa, geográfica y descriptiva del Distrito Federal, 105–6, quoted in Gónzalez Navarro, Población y sociedad en México (1900–1970) (Mexico City: UNAM, 1974), 2:42. 61 Although the restriction was lifted in November of 1929, once again the entrance of Syrians, Lebanese, Armenians, Arabs, Palestinians, Turks, Chinese, and Indians, among others, was forbidden, “as well as people who had previously been pronounced

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1931, 1932, and 1934.62 In spite of the consequences of this crisis being lesser for peripheral economies, such as Mexico’s, than for central economies, and in spite of the fact that by 1935 the effect of the crisis in diminishing the exportation of raw materials had been overcome,63 for a long time the argument of the worldwide depression was used as an excuse for closing the borders, and Mexico was no exception to this tendency. Actually, the main consequence of the crisis of 1929 for the Mexican government was the need to repatriate 350,000 Mexicans (including their descendants born in the United States) who were expelled by U.S. authorities between 1929 and 1933, as a result, precisely, of the Great Depression. It must be pointed out that even though there were advantages to the possible repatriation of people who had obtained labor experience outside the country, there were also fears with respect to the economic competition they could generate, as well as suspicion about the disloyalty and opportunism of these people who had gone to the United States in the first place, where they had offspring of another nationality.64 In fact, the labor and agrarian policies promoted by the Mexican state favored Mexicans who had remained over those who had left, and the measures taken in support of those who had to return were “prudent” at best.65 A new immigration law was enacted in 1930 since it was believed that the law of 1926 did not sufficiently regulate entry into the country, which was on the rise; the restrictions that the old law included allowed the admission of some foreigners, “in spite of the fact that their permanence in Mexico is not at all desirable.”66 The more restrictive character of the Immigration Law of 1930 is therefore evident, and may also be seen

undesirable.” Secretaría de Gobernación, Memoria que comprende el periodo del 1° de agosto de 1929 al 31 de julio de 1930 (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1930), 253. 62 The prohibition of 1931, which arose in the context of the Second National Convention on Immigration, justified the move on the basis of the economic crisis. DdD, September 1, 1931, 8, quoted in Gónzalez Navarro, Extranjeros en México, 3:40. The prohibition of 1932 was included in the Regulations of the Law of Immigration of June 14 of the same year, and the regulations of 1934 were laid down in the Diario Oficial of February 17, 1934. The prohibitions subsequent to 1934 will be discussed throughout the book. 63 Lorenzo Meyer, México y el mundo. Historia de sus relaciones exteriores, vol. 4. (Mexico City: Senado de la República, 1990), 98–99. 64 Fernando S. Alanís Enciso, Que se queden allá. El gobierno de México y la repatriación de mexicanos en Estados Unidos (1934–1940) (Mexico City: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte/ El Colegio de San Luis, 2007), 17–18. 65 Ibid., 18. 66 Secretaría de Gobernación, Compilación histórica de la legislación migratoria en México: 1909–1996 (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de México, 1998), 51.



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in the language used in the law, which included more and more racial considerations: The individual or collective immigration of healthy, hard-working, wellbehaved foreigners belonging to races which, thanks to their conditions, would be easily assimilated into our environment, with benefits for the species and for the economic conditions of the country, are considered to be publicly beneficial; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is authorized to promote this in all ways possible.67

In 1933, when the exodus of Jewish refugees from Germany began, Mexican president Abelardo L. Rodríguez (1932–1934) headed the last administration of the period, known as the “Maximato.”68 By then the path Mexican immigration policy was taking was clear: it was moving toward greater government control, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Since at this time all the information related to limitations and prohibitions on immigration was scattered throughout various confidential circulars, the Ministry of the Interior, headed by Eduardo Vasconcelos, decided to gather all the dispersed information and issued Confidential Circular no. 250, dated October 17, 1933, which forbade, for ethnic reasons, the immigration of individuals of “black, yellow (with the exception of Japanese), Malaysian, and Hindu” origin; for political reasons, the admission of citizens of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and “for reasons of bad habits and notoriously inconvenient activities,” Gypsies. In addition, Poles, Lithuanians, Czechs, Slovakians, Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians, Armenians, Arabs, and Turks were also characterized as undesirable and their admission was subject to preapproval by the Ministry of the Interior on a case-by-case basis.69 On April 27, 1934, the Ministry of the Interior issued amendments to the 1933 circular, also known as Confidential Circular no. 157.70 It is interesting to note that while Circular no. 250 made no mention at all

67 Ley de Migración de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario Oficial, August 30, 1930, 1–12. 68 This was the period between 1928 and 1934, when Emilio Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio and Abelardo Rodríguez served as president under the influence of the “Jefe Máximo” (highest chief ), Plutarco Elías Calles. 69 Archivo Histórico del Instituto Nacional de Migración (AHINM), file 4-350-2-1933-54, Departamento de Migración, circular no. 250. Strictly confidential. Mexico City, October 17, 1933. Investors with a minimum capital of 10,000 pesos were exempt from the restriction, although they also needed the prior authorization of the Ministry of the Interior. 70 Ibid., circular no. 157. Strictly confidential. Mexico City, April 27, 1934. This was sent to the Mexican consuls abroad on August 15, 1934.

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of Jewish immigration, the amendments made six months later not only forbade the admission of Jews into the country, but depicted them as “the most undesirable of all.” This was justified by the need to attack what was considered to be the problem created by Jewish immigration, “which more than any other, due to their psychological and moral characteristics, the type of activities which they carry out, and the procedures used in their commercial businesses which they invariably undertake, proves undesirable; and in consequence individuals of the Semitic race may not immigrate into the country.”71 The last two paragraphs related to the prohibition read: Since the political identification of a Jew, despite his racial features, is difficult due to the fact that having spread throughout the world, without breaking with their ethnic unity, they have nowadays various nationalities, the Ministry has thought of a more viable means for establishing the identity of a Jew, which is to demand that anyone who seeks admission into the Country, as an indispensable requirement during his application, declare his race, sub-race, and religion, since Jews profess, almost without exception, as a religion, the Israelite religion or Mosaic or Hebraic Law. For this reason, we beg the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send confidential instructions to our consuls outside the country; to establish as a general rule not to act on any application that does not meet the aforementioned prerequisites, and to warn that Office that even if the Ministry has authorized the admission of a foreigner who falls within the aforementioned exceptional cases, if it is discovered that he is Jewish, no matter what his nationality, his admission must be forbidden, and immediate notification given via telegram to this Ministry.72

The more restrictive character of the circular of 1934 was due to “the ethnic, economic, political, and demographic conditions prevailing in the Republic.” In this sense it is necessary to analyze the reactions of civil society, as well as of the Mexican government, to Jewish immigration during the twenties, and to consider how foreigners were integrated into Mexican society.

71 Ibid., article XII. This document also rectified the agreement of February 16, 1934, since the latter, while forbidding for an indefinite period of time the entrance of worker immigrants to the country, allowed the entrance of investors who could prove previous possession of a minimum capital of 20,000 pesos that could be invested, which was no longer acceptable. Diario Oficial, February 17, 1934, agreement by which the immigration of workers was forbidden. 72 AHINM, file 4-350-2-1933-54, Departamento de Migración, circular no. 157. Strictly confidential. Mexico City, April 27, 1934, article XII.



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Circular no. 157 established more specifically the races, ethnic groups, and nationalities that were to be denied admission into the country, based mainly on the degree of racial and cultural assimilation of the group, which was to be determined by the government. Thus, to the list of “undesirables” were added Latvians, Bulgarians, Romanians, Persians, Yugoslavians, Greeks, Albanians, Afghans, Abyssinians, Egyptians, and Moroccans. It should be understood, then, that Mexican immigration policy during the thirties was based, to a large extent, on the intention of not allowing the admission into the country of foreigners who were considered to be “undesirable.” The condition of being “desirable” was tied directly to the ability, real or imaginary, of the foreigner to be assimilated into the national population. Alfredo M. Saavedra, the director of the Mexican Society of Eugenics, was one of the principle promoters of the concept of “assimilability,” relating it to racial proximity, under the premise that the mixture of close or similar races tended to produce “robust” mixtures, while the interbreeding of different races gave rise to undesirable progeny: Not all races [can] mix compatibly; from the biological or social point of view not all can fuse into a desirable mixture; there are families who degenerate with mixing or cross-breeding, while others improve. For a good mixture, one must know how to decide, and that it is necessary that the races which fuse together do not keep their old elements, that all stigmas of the respective cultures are erased, [and] that the distance between them is narrowed.73

Although according to Alexandra Stern, the supporters of eugenics did not call for the exclusion of any specific ethnic groups, and their call for national cohesion was seldom based on the exclusion of groups which were considered “undesirable,”74 those who shaped immigration policies did in fact call for the exclusion of “undesirable” elements. The successive limitations on the admission of foreigners, with their various justifications, converged in the ideal figure of the person of mixed blood, the mestizo. Little by little the admission of various groups was forbidden, until in the context of World War II, all of those who were not Americans (i.e., from the Americas) or Spanish were excluded. Thus, with the exception of people from the United States and Canada, who 73 Alfredo M. Saavedra, Eugenesia y medicina social, 119, quoted in Alexandra Stern, “Mestizofilia, biotipología y eugenesia en el México posrevolucionario: hacia una historia de la ciencia y el Estado, 1920–1960,” Relaciones 21, no. 81 (2000): 67. 74 Stern, “Mestizofilia, biotipología y eugenesia,” 65 and 77–78.

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for political reasons could not be excluded, el mestizaje was embodied in the provision that accepted only Spanish populations (and their Latin American descendants), one of the two original groups seen as contributing to the distinctive national quality of mexicanidad. The integration of the other group, the Indians, had more to do with the policy of internal population. As has been shown, selectivity was one of the cornerstones of Mexican immigration policy. The other was discretion. In reality they were closely related: given the difficulty of understanding what was meant by a “desirable” foreigner, and given the fact that the criteria of what was considered “desirable” and “undesirable” kept changing despite attempts to legislate the matter, the subject was left up to the discretion of the authorities. The concept of discretion in relation to foreigners goes back a long way. In fact, it can be traced to the Constitution of 1857, in which the government was given the right to expel pernicious foreigners. The Constitution of 1917 was more precise, giving the president the right to “order any foreigner whose permanence was considered inconvenient to leave the national territory, immediately and without the need of a trial.”75 Later on, the element of discretion reappears in Obregón’s project of 1923, in the Immigration Laws of 1926 and 1930, and in the Rule of the Law of Immigration of 1932, which even gave the minister of the interior the right to establish changing criteria for the admission of foreigners “depending on the degree of their ability to assimilate into our environment.”76 Discretion, however, was not the sole prerogative of immigration policy. It can be traced in several other areas of Mexican politics of the time and should be understood as part of the post-revolutionary state’s attempt to gain more control over Mexican territory as well as over the population. What was behind all of these laws, circulars, and provisions that to a great extent drove the articulation of selective and discretionary migration policies, based on racial criteria? Besides external influences (the application of racial considerations to immigration policy is common in all of Latin America), we believe that two closely linked internal processes

75 As Pablo Yankelevich has shown, the Judging Commission, which presented Article 33 to the full Constituent Assembly in January 1917, stressed the dangers of endowing the executive with such broad powers. Yankelevich, “Proteger al mexicano y construir al ciudadano. La extranjería en los debates del Constituyente de 1917,” Signos Históricos 10 (2003): 60–63. 76 Reglamento de la Ley de Migración, Diario Oficial, June 14, 1932.



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contributed to reinforce this stance of rejection in the face of foreign immigration during the first half of the twentieth century. The first is closely tied to revolutionary nationalism, which questioned the role foreigners should play within the new national project and sought to limit it. With a strictly nationalist character, the revolution “was inclined to prefer anything Mexican; and was also associated with a reaction, at first vaguely, against the Europeanizing ostentation of General Díaz, and, later, more clearly and decisively, against ‘imperialism,’ that is, against any foreign influence that might prevail.”77 However, mexicanidad was primarily identified with the Indigenous roots of the nation. From that point on, the reassessment of the pre-Hispanic past was the source of two basic ideological premises with respect to immigration: First, that foreigners in modern Mexico, like the conquerors of days gone by, only answered to material motivations and lacked attachment to the country that took them in. Second, that the great vitality of Mexican culture, now, as in the sixteenth century, came from Indigenous roots, spurned for four centuries by Europeans and Creoles. As xenophobia increased, a new and almost mythic Indigenous ethnophilia emerged.78

On the basis of these thoughts, foreigners began to be considered as external to the national project. The “defensive” nationalism of the regime, as Pablo Yankelevich called it, can be seen especially clearly in the debate on immigration laws that took place in the Constitutional Congress of 1917: “A national citizenship had to be built to protect what was Mexican from the secular foreign threat, an idea that the Revolution built by way of the renovation of myths, symbols, and remembrances that had circulated in Mexico from the time of the dawn of Independence.”79 Other implementations of defensive nationalism may be seen in the economic sphere, in all of the regulations that tended to protect national workers from foreigners and in the reiterated fear in the face of the economic rivalry of the latter. The second process that contributed to limiting foreign immigration was not linked to the portrayal of foreigners, but rather to the way in which the national population was defined: “heterogeneous and unalike, since the groups that made it up are different in historic backgrounds, 77 Daniel Cosío Villegas, “La crisis de México,” in Extremos de América (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1949), 16. 78 Clara Lida, Inmigración y exilio. Reflexiones sobre el caso español (Mexico City: Siglo XXI/El Colegio de México, 1997), 31–32. 79 Yankelevich, “Proteger al mexicano,” 78.

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in racial traits, in matters of material and intellectual culture, and in the expression of their ideas in numerous languages and dialects.”80 The search for integration, unity, and common identity, as a national project and as an indispensable prerequisite for development, found its answer in miscegenation. “It finally appeared that Mexico had found its national subject; the mythical ethnic identity that gave support and reason for being was a new mestizo race with which all Mexicans should identify.”81 Mestizaje has been defined as a racial ideology; as a political project; as the founding myth of the Mexican state; as an expression of the national desire for unity, equality, and development; as a form of mexicanidad itself; and also as an “undeniable fact,” with no ethical or political value.82 Some authors such as Antonio Aguilar Rivera have emphasized the ideological character of mestizaje, by insisting on the idea that it was not only an informal belief, but rather a racist doctrine that had theoreticians who systemized it and placed it at the center of discourse on national identity.83 It was also the social and political thinking that accompanied the development of the Revolution, to a great extent the responsibility of the generation that formed the Ateneo de la Juventud (Youth Association) which would promote, theoretically as well as practically, the mestizofilia: “the idea that the phenomenon of Mestizaje, that is, the mixture of races and/or cultures, was actually desirable.”84 Mestizaje was constructed as an inverse ideology to the complex system of racial classification that had tried to impose order on the various social groups based on the purity of their bloodline during the colonial period, assigning each a specific place on the social scale. In a reversal and reordering of the theories based on colonial evolutionist hierarchies, the mestizo was placed on the top rung of the social hierarchy, as the human, social, and ethnic ideal of fusion; as the polished synthesis of Spanish and Indian heritage; as the factor of social unification; and as the identifying 80 Manuel Gamio, Programa de la Dirección de Antropología para el estudio y mejoramiento de las poblaciones regionales de la República, 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento, 1919), 37–38. 81  Tomás Pérez Vejo, “La extranjería en la construcción nacional mexicana,” in Yankelevich, Nación y extranjería, 179. 82 Aguilar, El sonido y la furia, 14. 83 Ibid. 84 Agustín Basave Benítez, México mestizo: análisis del nacionalismo mexicano en torno a la mestizofilia de Andrés Molina Enríquez (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992), 13.



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axis of the nation. “Mestizaje was not a project intended to improve the race, but rather a reality that embodied all of the virtues of a race that needed no improvement: it was already perfect.”85 However, it was still thought that the process of mestizaje was incomplete and that it was the state’s job to complete it. It is interesting that although the ideologists of mestizaje strongly criticized the theory of the inferiority of the Indigenous race, they could not escape racial logic. As Alan Knight concludes, “indigenismo tended to reproduce many of the racist assumptions of the preceding ‘Westernism’, which it formally opposed. It did so because, even where it reacted against Porfirian racism, it continued to operate within the racist paradigm.”86 The first great ideologist of mestizofilia was Andrés Molina Enriquez, who in 1909 published Los grandes problemas nacionales (The Great National Problems). Other scholars such as Manuel Gamio, Luis Cabrera, and José Vasconcelos collaborated in the re-elaboration, expansion, and strengthening of the notion of mestizaje from different angles, all coinciding in the diagnosis that the lack of social integration and national identity were strong obstacles to overcome. According to Gamio, an essential figure of the movement as the post-revolutionary period moved forward, the program was in short the “fusion of races, the convergence and fusion of cultural manifestations, linguistic unification, and economic balance of the social elements.”87 Mestizaje was not an inclusive ideology, but quite the opposite, since “it assumed a limited number of constituent elements: the Indian and the Creole,”88 and since it left those who did not belong to either of these two original branches outside of the national project. However, it was not only an ideology or a more or less theoretical project of linguistic, racial, and cultural unification. It was also a political project of the state. Having observed that the spontaneous mechanisms of unification had not had the desired results, the post-revolutionary Mexican state decided to stimulate mestizaje with a direct policy.

85 Pérez Vejo, “Extranjería,” 179. 86 Alan Knight, “Racism, Revolution and Indigenismo: Mexico, 1910–1940,” in The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870–1940, ed. Richard Graham (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 87. 87 Gamio, Programa de la Dirección de Antropología, 8. 88 Aguilar, El sonido y la furia, 93.

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In this sense it is important to point out that many scientists, anthropologists, demographers, and intellectuals who contributed to the systematization of the ideology of mestizaje took part in the post-revolutionary administrations, in the fields of public health, education, and social work, and of course in all fields related to population policies. Besides this participation, Beatriz Urías Horcasitas thought that there was a sharing of ideas, interests, and projects of social transformation among the scientific, artistic, and political elite that could be seen in, among other things, their common membership in Masonic and Theosophical societies.89 The figure who probably best personifies the attempt to translate these ideas of racial unification into state policies was Manuel Gamio, the author of Forjando patria (Forging a Country) (1916), one of the most important anthropologists in the country. Gamio exemplified in his own trajectory the political turn taken by social scientists at the end of the Revolution. He is an example of the ideologists who placed themselves within the state apparatus in order to carry out the political “mission” of modernization and social transformation.90 He headed the Office of Archeological and Ethnographical Studies (which in 1918 changed its name to the Office of Anthropology) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Promotion (during the government of Carranza and up until 1925); he was vice-minister of public education (for a few months during Calles’ government); he led the Office of the Department of Demography in the Ministry of the Interior from 1938 to 1942, and was the director of the Inter-American Indigenous Institute from 1942 until his death in 1960. Another one of the most important links between ideologists and politicians was Gilberto Loyo, who advised several Mexican administrations on matters of statistics and demography, created the Mexican Committee for the Study of Population Problems, and began a closer collaboration with the Maximato and Cardenist administrations.91 As Alexandra Stern maintains, it can clearly be seen that the proposal advanced in his work La política demográfica de México (Demographic Policy in Mexico) (1935) was the basis for the Law of Population of 1936.92

89 Beatriz Urías Horcasitas, Historias secretas del racismo en México (Mexico City: Tusquets, 2007), 86. 90 Ibid., 85. 91  Gilberto Loyo (1901–1973) was a lawyer and held a doctorate in economy. He was the national director of statistics (1950) and president of the Technical Council of the General Office of Statistics. He also served as minister of national economy. 92 Stern, “Mestizofilia, biotipología y eugenesia,” 69.



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The counterpart of this process, as Urías Horcasitas wisely points out, was the dependence of social science on the governmental political project, which led to an inability to develop critical thinking and the abandonment of research on problems that did not serve the needs of post-revolutionary nationalism.93 Mestizaje as a political phenomenon, that is, as an attempt by the state to implement mechanisms of social unification and homogenization, must be viewed together with the state’s attempt to foster governability among its citizens in order to centralize the power that at the end of the Revolution was still dispersed among various caudillos who had participated in it. This attempt was manifested in the creation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party) (1929) as an instrument for legitimizing the institutionalization of a centralizing state that would serve as a mediator between distinct social groups, a project founded on a close collaboration between intellectuals and politicians.94 In order to understand the process we are analyzing, we must keep in mind that there is a relationship between post-revolutionary nationalism, the tendencies of the state to concentrate power, the Mexican way of thinking about race (the identification of the “essence” of nationality with the mestizo), and the implementation of these considerations as a political project through demographic and immigration policies. Finally, it is important to point out that together with the immigration policy a new population policy was begun, the latter to be understood as a set of norms designed by the state to regulate the relations established between national population and territory.95 Along these lines it is interesting to observe how the regulations on foreign immigration were articulated based on various diagnostics related to the needs of the Mexican population. The General Law of Population of 1936, for example, for the first time favored the natural growth of the Mexican population over foreign immigration, because, while there was still a desire to increase population density, there was a stronger desire for a unified community, “industrious and capable of consolidating the well-being of our race and the plenitude of our nation.”96

93 Urías, Historias secretas, 99. 94 Ibid., 98. 95 Luz María Valdés, “Política de población en México (1930–1974). Antecedentes y recuento histórico de la Ley General de Población,” in Población y movimientos migratorios, ed. L. M. Valdés (Mexico City: Secretaría de Gobernación, 2000), 11. 96 Gónzalez Navarro, Población y sociedad, 2:33.

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This ideological context is fundamental to understanding the decisions that were made in relation to immigration in general and to Jewish immigration in particular, since it directed state policies towards those foreigners classified as “nonassimilable.” The rejection of “nonassimilable” foreigners, however, affected not only immigration policies, but also excluded those groups of foreigners from historical accounts and memories of the conformation of Mexican society. Starting from the premise that Mexico had only two cultural sources, the Hispanic and the Indian, everything else could be defined as anomalous. “Chinese, Jews, Mennonites, Italians, French, etc., symbolically did not exist because they cannot be explained by the originating fusion of Indians and Spaniards. Foreigners only existed at the moment they disembarked in Mexico. From then on, there were only mestizos.”97 As for the Jews, the idea of their non-“assimilability” originated in a diverse gamut of racial and pseudoscientific theories, as well as from deep-rooted prejudices that I will not analyze here. The traditional antiJudaism of Christianity also had an influence; it was deeply rooted in largely Catholic societies, who blamed the Jews for Jesus’ death. Religion played a large part in the difficulty of identification between Mexicans and Jews, deepening the distance that separated them geographically, culturally, and symbolically, and diminishing Mexicans’ willingness to admit Jewish immigrants into the country. The endogamy of the Jews was also cited as one of the main factors that made total integration of this minority impossible, although on the other hand it must be pointed out that their integration seemed neither expected nor desirable. In the official sources we consulted, the characterization of the Jews bore broad negative connotations, which to a large extent were due to the anti-Semitism in the air at that time. In Mexico, such sentiments were encouraged by the National Socialist German government through the German Legation, the Organization for Foreigners (Auslandsorganisation),98 and other groups associated with the German colony in Mexico, as well as various Mexican associations that will be looked at more closely in the following chapter.

97 Aguilar, El sonido y la furia, 145. 98 See Jürgen Müller, “El NSDAP en México: historia y percepciones, 1931–1940,” EIAL 6, no. 2 (1995), http://www1.tau.ac.il/eial/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 739&Itemid=283; Brígida von Mentz et al., Fascismo y antifascismo en América Latina y México (Mexico City: CIESAS, 1984); María Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security and Spies. Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1997), 25–46.



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Along these lines, it must be taken into consideration that together with the political and economic limitations on admitting Jewish exiles, there were also important cultural limitations; during the thirties these fed off each other and at times overlapped. The Jewish Community in Mexico99 At the beginning of the 1930s there were about 10,000 Jewish people in Mexico.100 Most of these (about 7,500) had arrived during the twenties, specifically beginning in 1924, when the restrictions placed on immigration by the United States coincided with Mexican president Plutarco Elías Calles’s offer to open the doors to Jewish immigration.101 The limiting of   99 I use the term “Jewish community” since it simultaneously incorporates various connotations: “one that refers to the Jewish presence in a country and is used as a synonym for the Jewish population which resides in the country; one that recovers essential historic traits of Judaism, among which the outstanding one is precisely its dimension of community (and not of church) as a definition and exercise of belonging; and one that is related to its organizational structure, as represented in a broad institutional and associative mosaic which is meant to provide for its welfare, its religious, educational, and political-cultural needs, and the defense and representation of its interests.” Judit Bokser, “El movimiento nacional judío. El sionismo en México, 1922–1947” (PhD diss., Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1991), 171. For the history of the Jewish community in Mexico see, among others, Corinne Krause, Los judíos en México. Una historia con énfasis especial en el periodo de 1857 a 1930 (Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana, 1987); Judit Bokser, ed., Imágenes de un encuentro. La presencia judía en México durante la primera mitad del siglo XX (Mexico City: UNAM/Tribuna Israelita, 1992); Alicia Gojman de Backal, ed., Generaciones judías en México; Liz Hamui, ed., Los judíos de Alepo en México (Mexico City: Tierra Firme, 1989); Jacobo Smecke and Sofía Mercado, eds., Historia de una alianza (Mexico City: Alianza Monte Sinaí, 2000); Natalia Gurvich, La memoria rescatada. La izquierda judía en México (Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2004). 100 León Sourasky, Historia de la comunidad israelita en México (1917–1942) (Mexico City: Imprenta Moderna Pintel, 1965), 229. The General Population Census of 1930 showed a total of 9,072 Jews, of whom 4,851 were men and 4,221 women. According to a modern study that made a retrospective estimate, at the close of the 1920s, the end of the period of greatest immigration, the approximate number was 9,500 people. Sergio Della Pergola and Susana Lerner, La población judía en México. Perfil demográfico, social y cultural (Mexico City: El Colegio de México/Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén, 1995), 28. Despite the variations, the estimates coincide quite closely. 101  Before setting sail for Europe on a tour as president-elect, Calles had stated that the government of Mexico was prepared to receive in “the warmest way” the immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe, in order to involve them in agricultural as well as industrial proposals, offering a series of guarantees and facilities related to reduced taxes and the acquisition of cultivable land. In October 1924 he reiterated the invitation, broadening the profile of the desired Jewish immigrant to include merchants as well. El Universal, August 11, 1924, and “Documento importante acerca de la inmigración judía en México. El Gral. Calles, presidente de México, renueva la invitación a los inmigrantes judíos,” Der Weg, Almanaque 1930–1940, [n.d.], 49, quoted in Carreño, Pasaporte a la esperanza, 55.

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this immigration flow was marked by two events: the economic depression of 1929, which would prevent new foreign workers from entering the country because of the repatriation of Mexicans from the United States, and the Mexican Immigration Law of 1930, which, as we have already seen, established new criteria for the selection of immigrants based on the foreigner’s ability to assimilate into Mexican nationality. The prohibition of Polish and Russian immigration in 1929 also had repercussions on Jewish immigration, which to a large extent came from these countries.102 León Sourasky, one of the leaders of the Jewish community at that time, in his memoirs tells how at the beginning of the thirties “immigration became more and more inaccessible and restrictive” and the prerequisites harder and harder to comply with, although each year several dozen new families arrived.103 Table 1. Number of Jewish foreigners entering Mexico per year, 1920–1931. 1920

1921 1922 1923

1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931

107* 195**

195

503 661

211

397

748

537

507

985 934

662 383

648 456

150

  * The data in this row are from the Estudio histórico demográfico de la migración judía a México 1900–1950 (Historical-Demographic Study on the Jewish Immigration to Mexico 1900–1950), 2005.104 ** This row registers the data included in the General Encyclopedia in Yiddish, 1957, p. 407.

102 Secretaría de Gobernación, Memoria que comprende el periodo del 1° de agosto de 1930 al 31 de julio de 1931 (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1931), 206. See Gónzalez Navarro, Extranjeros en México, 3:133. 103 Sourasky, Comunidad israelita en México, 229. 104 Bella Attie Sutton, Sofía Betech Tawil, et al., Estudio histórico demográfico de la migración judía a México 1900–1950 (Mexico City: CDICA/AGN, 2005), CD-ROM. This source digitally reproduces the entrance registries of those Jews who reached the country during the first half of the twentieth century, based on the National Registry of Foreigners of the General Archive of the Nation. However, it must be kept in mind that these records make no distinction between categories such as immigrants, tourists, trans-migrants, and visitors, and the original registry is not complete. It is difficult to estimate the percentage of those who were not registered, as well as those who registered but eventually left the country or had only come as tourists. For the time being, however, this is the best data available, and it at least comes close to the real numbers. According to this source, between 1921 and 1930, 5,393 Jews entered Mexico.



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Table 2. Estimate of the Jewish population in Mexico, 1921–1950. Year

Total Population*

Jewish Population**

Percentage

1921 1930 1940 1950

14,334,780 16,653,552 19,653,552 25,769,850

2,000 9,500 18,299 23,907

0.001 0.056 0.093 0.092

  * Source: General Population Census. ** Source: Della Pergola and Lerner, 1995, p. 28, and General Encyclopedia in Yiddish, 1957, p. 407. The data on the Jewish population are estimates.

Among the Jewish immigrants who arrived in Mexico during the first decades of the twentieth century we find three distinct groups. What distinguished them was their place of origin, their cultural and religious practices, and their language: Ashkenazi Jews, Sephardic Jews, and Jews who spoke Arabic.105 Although there are no precise data, it is estimated that 70 percent of the Jewish population was Ashkenazi and the rest Sephardic (this included those who came from the Middle East).106 The Sephardic immigration reached its peak in 1924 and the Ashkenazi in 1928.107 It was estimated that in 1930, 70 percent of the Jews lived in Mexico City and the majority of the remaining 30 percent in Monterrey, Guadalajara, Puebla, and San Luis Potosí.108 By 1940, 40 percent of the Jewish population had been born in Mexico. The early Jewish immigrants devoted themselves to hawking and installment sales. According to Sourasky, by the thirties the trade in installment sales had become less and less common and had begun to disappear.109 When the immigrants managed to save enough capital, they set up small

105 The Ashkenazis, Yiddish speakers, came mainly from Poland, Russia, and Lithuania. The Sephardis, whose common language was Ladino, came from Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The majority of the Arabic-speaking Jews came from Syria (from the cities of Aleppo and Damascus) and a minority from Iraq and Lebanon. 106 General Encyclopedia in Yiddish (New York: Waldon Press, 1957), s.v. “México.” A study carried out by the Israelite Central Committee in 1949 estimated 75 percent Ashkenazis, 23 percent Sephardis, and 2 percent North American Jews. Efraim Zadoff, “Keren Kayemet Leisrael en México. Organización e institucionalización (1925–1946)” (unpublished manuscript, 1994), 14. 107 Enciclopedia judaica castellana, ed. Eduardo Weinfeld (Mexico City: Enciclopedia Judaica Castellana, 1951). 108 Tuvia Maizel, “Miktzat netunim statistiim udemografiim iehudiim ujlaliim,” Tfutzot Israel 16:1 (enero-marzo 1978): 46, quoted in Zadoff, “Keren Kayemet Leisrael,” 14; Della Pergola and Lerner, Población judía en México, 28. 109 Sourasky, Comunidad israelita en México, 229.

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shops and workshops. One point that is fundamental to understanding the economic mobility of the Jewish group, beyond the situation of the Mexican economy itself, was the historic reproduction of the institution of mutual aid. At the end of 1927 a lending institution was established, with mixed capital provided by the B’nai B’rith of North America110 and the local Jewish community; this institution contributed to financing the transition from hawking to permanent establishments, from commerce to manufacturing workshops. Originally founded with the purpose of lending small amounts of money, this was the predecessor of a Jewish bank, the Banco Mercantil (Mercantile Bank), founded in 1933 with the approval of the Mexican authorities of the Office of Finances and Public Credit.111 The emergence of this bank is also linked to the immigrants’ need for credit—they did not always meet the requirements of commercial banks—and with the rise in Jewish commerce and industry, which needed capital resources. Along with the differences in geographic origin—which led Jewish immigrants to associate with others from their place of origin112—the organizational division within the Jewish community in Mexico also had to do to a large extent with the political-ideological diversity that the newcomers (especially the Ashkenazis) had imported from Europe, where the Left had made a profound impact on the Jewish communities, especially those living in Poland and Czarist Russia.113

110 The B’nai B’rith is the oldest Jewish aid organization. It was founded in 1843, in the United States, with the objective of “consolidating the spiritual and moral traits of the Jewish people and spreading the elevated principles of mankind [. . .], helping the poor and sick and aiding the persecuted.” Efraim Zadoff, ed., Enciclopedia de la historia y la cultura del pueblo judío (Jerusalem: EDZ Nativ, 1999), 57. 111 In the creation of the Banco Mercantil (Mercantile Bank) a government law intervened, demanding that the institution limit itself to small operations of credit distribution or become a formal bank. Along with this, the withdrawal of the B’nai B’rith from the institution also motivated its reorganization. The Banco Mercantil had an initial capital of 250,000 pesos (equivalent to $125,000). On the history of this bank, see Sourasky, Comunidad israelita en México, 179–91, and the interview of Haim Avni and Alicia Gojman de Backal with Jacobo Landau: H. Avni and A. Gojman de Backal, Entrevista a Jacobo Landau (Mexico City: Archivo de Historia Oral de la Comunidad Judía de México/Universidad de Jerusalén/Asociación de Amigos de la Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén, 1987). 112 The Ashkenazis founded the Nidje Israel congregation in 1922. The Sephardic formed La Fraternidad (The Brotherhood) in 1924, which became the Sefaradi Union in 1943. The Jews from Aleppo (Syria) began to distance themselves from their Damascan compatriots in 1931, and in 1938 formed their own organization, called Sdaká Umarpé. The Jews from Damascus remained as the only members of the Sociedad de Beneficencia Alianza Monte Sinai (Mount Sinai Alliance Charity Society). 113 See Gurvich, La memoria rescatada, 32.



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Without going into the emergence and development of the various ideological schools of the time, I will limit myself to mentioning that within the political spectrum of the Jews in Mexico during the thirties, we find three main groups: Communists, Bundists,114 and Zionists.115 The relations among these were marked by a complex geography of agreements and disagreements, alliances and ruptures, and by an ideological struggle that had a correlate in the dispute over the internal political control and representation of the local Jewish group.116 At the beginning of the thirties the Jewish community in Mexico—like many other Jewish communities in the Diaspora—underwent a process of “organizational proliferation” that led to the creation of nearly thirty educational, cultural, political, religious, Zionist, and other organizations. By then the Colegio Israelita (Israelite School), founded in 1924, already existed, as well as various branch schools that gave only religious education. There were several synagogues and two cemeteries. According to Sourasky, the excessive organizational dispersion of the Jews in Mexico hindered the creative possibilities of the community on the whole.117 In response to this situation there were several attempts at creating a common institution that could function as a representative body as well as an intermediary between the Jewish community, on the one hand, and the government authorities and Mexican society as a whole on the other, and that could defend the interests of the minority in its process of insertion 114 The General Alliance of Jewish Workers in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia, habitually known as the Bund (the German term for alliance or union), was the first Jewish workers’ Socialist party, founded in Vilna, Lithuania, in 1897. The Russian Bund became part of the Soviet Communist Party in 1920, following the Bolshevik Revolution, but was chased down and annihilated. The Polish Bund, in contrast, was founded as an independent entity in 1914 and in 1939 had about 100,000 members. It took on a militant anti-Zionist and antireligious position and adopted the idea of Jewish cultural autonomy, promoting Yiddish as the national language. See Zadoff, Enciclopedia, 64. 115 Zionism has been defined as a political movement and as a modern ideology that has promoted a political solution to the problem of the geographic dispersion of the Jewish people. Its first objective was the creation of a modern Jewish state, believing that this would give the Jewish people back their status as a nation and put an end to two millennia of life in exile. It was founded in 1897 by Theodor Herzl. As a movement, Zionism is fed from two sources: traditional Judaism, on the one hand, and the impact of modernity and the European Nationalist awakening, on the other. Zionism went through various stages before establishing the State of Israel in 1948, and the movement continues to exist. Within it there are various branches (e.g., political, religious, socialist). See Zadoff, Enciclopedia, 406–8. 116 See Adina Cimet-Singer, “The Last Battles of Old-World Ideologies in the Race for Identity and Communal Power: Communists vs. Bundists vs. Zionists in Mexico,” EIAL 5, no. 2 (1994), http://www.tau.ac.il/eial/V_2/singer.htm. 117 Sourasky, Comunidad israelita en México, 229.

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into and adaptation to the new country. It was also considered of paramount importance to create a certain amount of cohesion within the Jewish community, gathering people and groups with very diverse geographic backgrounds, cultural heritages, and ideological persuasions into a common project. The first attempt at creating a centralizing organ took place in 1932 with the founding of the Federación de Sociedades Israelitas (Federation of Israelite Societies), but the attempt was unsuccessful.118 In fact, it was the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce, created in 1931, that acted as the de facto centralized representative of the Jewish community until 1938, when the Central Israelite Committee of Mexico was founded. This brief profile of the Jewish community of Mexico during the years previous to the Jewish emigration from Nazism is important in explaining the lack of resources that the community had at its disposal to influence the Mexican government when the question of accepting Jewish refugees fleeing Nazism came up. As we have seen, it was a small group whose members had immigrated to Mexico only a few years earlier; as a heterogeneous, ideologically diverse group still in the process of organizational and institutional proliferation it had difficulty consolidating itself under a single representative body, and its members had little economic weight and no political presence on the national scene. Their relation with the Mexican government was becoming complicated. In fact, the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce came into being when two hundred and fifty Jewish shopkeepers were expelled from the La Lagunilla market in 1931, in response to the merchants’ desire to have an organization that represented and defended their interests.119 As the only central Jewish 118 Ibid., 230. Among the societies that made up the Federation were the Beneficencia Israelita (Israelite Charitable Organization), the Colegio Israelita (Israelite School), the Organización Sionista Unida (United Zionist Organization), the Asociación Juvenil YMHA (YMHA Youth Association), the Sociedad de Crédito Israelita (Israelite Credit Society), Nidje Israel, and Agudat Ajim. According to Moisés Glikowski, those of the “opposition” did not belong to the Federation, nor did the leftist groups. M. Glikowski, “Apuntes para la historia de la prensa judía en México. Memorias, fechas y cronología,” Der Weg (anniversary special issue, 1940): 59. 119 The expulsion seems to have been the result, to a large degree, of the agreement of government interests with those of the groups of established merchants who fought to limit the commercial rights of foreign merchants. However, the Israelite Chamber said they had proof that it was the “large-scale” foreign merchants who were responsible for financing and promoting anti-Jewish propaganda in Mexico. Archivo de la Kehilá Ashkenazí de México (AKA), box 73, file 10, “Asuntos pendientes en el Departamento Jurídico de la Cámara Israelita de Industria y Comercio de México,” [draft, without place, 1931?]. In May 1931 the Chamber had 298 members, of whom 176 were merchants, 92 industrialists,



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organization, along with performing the normal everyday activities of a chamber of commerce, this body was in charge of developing measures that could mediate the Jewish community’s adaptation to the country. These measures included defending against anti-Semitic attacks, principally from extremely radical groups on the Right, as well as striving for the acceptance and integration of the Jews in Mexico. While theoretically the prohibition on Jewish immigration established confidentially in 1934 should not have affected the Jews who were already in the country, undoubtedly the opinions and prejudices expressed in Circular no. 157 reflected the views of a certain sector of the government on the Jews and it very possibly affected relations with them. Despite the government’s official stance against xenophobic nationalism, which was often manifested in hostile acts against foreign businesses, the authorities also began developing mechanisms for exercising more control, with the objective of expelling those immigrants whose situation was irregular or who did not respect the laws. It is important to take into account that Jews, like the Chinese, were competing with groups of merchants belonging to the middle class who had, or were beginning to have, corporative representation in the state and thus could exert some pressure.120 In 1930, for example, the bill for reforms to the Expenditure Budget included increasing the resources used in the campaign for the expulsion of undesirable foreigners, “which is being carried out in accordance with the new Law of Immigration.”121 The Nationalist Campaign that took place in 1931 for the purpose of boosting the development of national industry by means of increasing internal demand had no less an element of xenophobia.122 The campaign, which was based on the rejection of foreign products, on more than one occasion extended this rejection to foreigners themselves; despite the fact that they produced Mexican products, they were considered exploiters of native riches and labor. The administration of Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930–1932) continued to watch over the economic activities of those who had not been born in Mexico, including the Jewish

11 merchants and industrialists, while 4 pursued miscellaneous activities; of these 36 lived outside Mexico City. Alicia Gojman de Backal and Gloria Carreño, Parte de México, vol. 7 of Generaciones judías en México. La Kehilá Ashkenazí (1922–1992), ed. Alicia Gojman de Backal (Mexico City: Comunidad Ashkenazí de México, 1993), 65. 120 Interview with José Antonio Aguilar Rivera by the author, April 2007. 121  DdD, November 12, 1930. 122 See José Manuel López Victoria, La Campaña Nacionalista (Mexico City: Botas, 1965), 11.

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merchants, by way of the Confidential Department of the Ministry of the Interior, that is, an incipient bureau of national intelligence.123 Meanwhile, in 1933, the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce (CIICM) began to deal with the expressions of anti-Semitism coming from some groups of the Mexican secular Right, such as the Committee on Race of the Federal District. While the CIICM thought that the propaganda which had “flooded” the streets of the capital had not found acceptance in the political circles of the country, the organization expressed the need to take the necessary legal steps to prevent it from influencing public opinion.124 To this end a commission met with President Abelardo L. Rodríguez to ask him, in the name of the entire colony, to order an end to the anti-Semitic propaganda. The meeting took place in the National Palace on November 17, 1933, and as was later recounted, the president intimated “on very friendly terms” that the government appreciated the role played by the Jewish community in boosting the economic development of the country. He also assured the interlocutors that the Committee on Race had neither government support nor support from political circles in the country, since the government as well as the Mexican people “are of democratic affiliation and would not allow the sowing of seeds of racial hate in the country.” Therefore, according to this source, Rodríguez promised to look into the case and take whatever steps were necessary to stop the campaign.125 However, the perception of the CIICM was that the authorities were doing nothing and its members decided to take things into their own hands. In April 1934 they called on the main Jewish institutions of the day to organize a Committee for Defense: “today the anti-Semitic conflict has founded a Fascist Organization; this movement is developing day by day and we must not wait any longer to take all of the measures in our power and to defend ourselves.”126 The vice president of the CIICM, Jacobo 123 See, among others, Cámara Israelita de Industria y Comercio de México (CIICM), Relaciones con el gobierno, box 77, file 2, f. 23, report of agents no. 6 and no. 11 from the Confidential Department of the Ministry of the Interior to Coronel A. Torres Estrada, Mexico City, June 6, 1932. In this report reference was made to research carried out in order to obtain data related to the Jews established in the area that made up the fourth demarcation of the capital. 124 AKA, CIICM, Directiva, box 78, file 5, f. 7, circular no. 15, Mexico City, November 14, 1933. 125 Ibid., f. 8, circular no. 16, Mexico City, November 22, 1933. 126 AKA, CIICM, Relaciones con el gobierno, box 7, file 8, f. 1, Act of the Governing Board of the CIICM, called to talk about the organization of a Committee for the Defense of the Israelite Colony, Mexico City, April 12, 1934.



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Landau, argued that on previous occasions the authorities had endeavored to defend the Jewish community when presented with complaints of anti-Semitism, “but today they do not pay any attention and not only that, anti-Semitism has even penetrated government circles.”127 In the discussion that followed on what measures should be taken, it became evident just how far removed the Jewish group was from the governmental political sphere. Thus, while some of its representatives thought it unwise to seek the support of politicians, J. B. Tafelov, who would be elected president of the Committee for Defense, thought that this was not even a possibility, “since it is not known who needs protection and who does not, who will win and who will not, etc.” Another leader, Marcos Corona, maintained that it was necessary to support the candidates for deputies who were against the Jewish groups, such as Ladrón de Guevara, since “it is advisable [. . .] to be on good terms with him precisely because he is our enemy.”128 The Committee for Defense finally broke up in July 1934, due to the lack of participation by its delegates, the absence of common agreements on what strategy should be followed, and differences of opinion.129 Added to this was the lack of political resources, alliances, and support from within Mexican society. It is also possible that its disappearance was linked in some way to the ascertainment that the anti-Semitic propaganda was not coming from a large sector of the population and that, in spite of the concerns it produced, the Jewish community in Mexico was in no real danger. The matter of the relations between the Jewish minority in the country and the government authorities requires further study since, on the one hand, it is tied to the will and ability of the state to integrate ethnoreligious minorities, and on the other hand to the latter’s intention to be integrated without losing their own religious and cultural characteristics. What we do know is that in these complex processes there were important convergences and divergences that influenced the events we are investigating.

127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. According to Moisés Glikowski, Ortiz Rubio had decorated Ladrón de Guevara, who in his words was a staunch anti-Semite, for patriotic merit. See Glikowski, “Apuntes,” 53. 129 AKA, CIICM, Relaciones con el gobierno, box 77, file 8, f. 22, Last meeting of the Committee for Defense, [Mexico City], July 11, 1934.

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We conclude this chapter with the consideration that it was during the Maximato that a relationship between the Jewish group and the government began, at the same time that Jewish immigration to Mexico peaked. In contrast to the open attitude to Jewish immigration during the administrations of Porfirio Díaz, Álvaro Obregón, and Plutarco Elías Calles, when the arrival of foreigners in general was looked upon favorably, the administrations of Presidents Emilio Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and especially Abelardo L. Rodríguez assumed a more ambiguous and restrictive attitude. While in a practical sense this did not affect the development of the Jewish community already living in the country, it did lead to the prohibition in 1934 of Jewish immigration and to the fact that the climate for the arrival of Jewish immigrants—refugees or not—was not favorable.

Chapter Two

JEWISH REFUGE: A EUROPEAN PROBLEM, 1933–1937 Due to the fact that during the early years of Nazism there was not much demand for refuge in Mexico nor in the rest of Latin America in general, the prohibition of Jewish immigration issued in 1934 by the Ministry of the Interior did not have any immediate repercussions. In fact, it affected North American Jews more than German Jews. Beginning in 1935 the Mexican ambassador to the United States, Francisco Castillo Nájera, told of the difficulties that the prohibition caused for U.S. Jews who wanted to enter the country and warned the Mexican government of possible repercussions: “if information on this immigration provision which limits the entrance of individuals of Jewish race into Mexico were to reach the State Department, a complaint would certainly be lodged about this distinction made between American citizens.”1 While Confidential Circular no. 157 authorized consuls to document North American Jews as tourists “under their strictest responsibility and care,” that is, with no previous assurance of repatriation and without first consulting with the Ministry of the Interior, many Mexican consuls, “overzealously, not wishing to incur any responsibility at all,” refused to authorize the necessary documents for their visit to Mexico. Castillo Nájera recommended to these consuls that they treat the Jewish Americans as they would any other citizen of that country, for reasons of reciprocity and neighborliness. Just as he explained to the minister of foreign affairs, this was due to the intention “of not creating problems for ourselves in relation to this point, since clearly, if it were to be made public and notorious that our government gives individuals of the Semitic race different treatment, Jews, who are so strong and powerful in the United States, would join in the anti-Mexican propaganda that is now being spread in that country by Catholic sectors.”2 1 Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (AHSRE), file III-2334-12, f. 5, Castillo Nájera to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE), Washington, DC, July 25, 1935. See Gleizer, México frente a la inmigración, 99–100. It must be pointed out that Castillo Nájera on occasion differed with the decisions of President Cárdenas, whom he described as “an integral man and of honest intentions but without experience and ‘extremely naive’ in political matters.” See Adolfo Gilly, El cardenismo. Una utopía mexicana (Mexico City: Era, 1994), 73. 2 AHSRE, file III-2334-12, Castillo Nájera to SRE, Washington, DC, July 25, 1935.

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The lack of demand for asylum in Mexico might also have been tied to the fact that international Jewish organizations knew of the legal difficulties faced by Jewish immigrants in the country. Although the prohibition on Jewish immigration was confidential, the 1934 ban on the entrance of workers into the country had been publicized and was reproduced word for word in the Informationsblätter of the central Jewish representation in Berlin on November 15, 1935. Up until 1938, when the situation turned critical, no international Jewish organization supported the idea that Mexico was an option for the refugees from Nazism.3 The League of Nations high commissioner for refugees (Jews and others) coming from Germany, James McDonald, shared this position after a trip to Latin America in search of possible refuge, where he judiciously observed that in these countries the difficulty was “based on the increase in nationalist tendencies, focusing on the immigration problem, among others.”4 The policy of the Mexican government on Jewish refugees was implemented along various axes. During the period of 1933 to 1937 it was fundamentally based on domestic legislation that regulated admission into the country, including the confidential provisions. Later the situation became more and more complex, and new variables such as international pressure, especially pressure exerted by the United States, would intervene, but all in all, for the first few years Mexico faced the problem in a relatively autonomous manner. Immigration Policy and Control of Foreigners during the Early Years of Cardenism The government of General Lázaro Cárdenas, who became president in December 1934, continued the policy of watchfulness towards foreigners and repeatedly carried out various actions aimed at controlling their activities. In January 1935 it conducted a “severe and scrupulous” review of foreigners in the country in order to corroborate that its registry was

3 See Avni, Role of Latin America, 20–21. In Mexico the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce kept up correspondence with various Jewish organizations outside the country, to whom it reported constantly on the dispositions on matters related to immigration. 4 Haim Avni, Argentina y las migraciones judías. De la Inquisición al Holocausto y después (Buenos Aires: Milá/AMIA/Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén, 2005), 312.



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in keeping with the Law of Immigration.5 Shortly afterwards the Ministry of the Interior warned that those foreigners whose commercial and industrial activities were detrimental to the national economy—that is, those who, in the opinion of the inspectors of the Treasury Department, were exploiting Mexican workers—would be considered pernicious and Article 33 of the Constitution would be applied against them.6 Also in 1935, and in compliance with the stronger controls being sought, the Institute of Social, Political, and Economic Studies of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) entrusted Gilberto Loyo with an investigation of the expulsion of foreigners from 1921 to 1934. The results of this study yielded nearly 800 cases of expulsion, of which 256 were Guatemalans, 140 from the United States, 124 Spaniards, and 106 Chinese. Among the “lesser” figures, the country ordered the expulsion of 27 Greeks, 26 Poles, 22 South Americans, 21 Syrians, 19 Cubans, 16 Central Americans, and a small number of Germans, Italians, Colombians, and Scandinavians. Of these, half were due to violations of the Law of Immigration and the other half to “strict” cases of undesirable foreigners, “which is highly indicative of the very low moral standards of the adventurous foreigners who, in search of easy money, have entered our country over the previous decades.” The list of these “undesirables” was headed by Spaniards, followed by North Americans and Chinese. Jews, as such, did not appear in the report, but it is probable that the Poles who were expelled were mostly of Jewish origin.7 According to Loyo, these figures should have been taken into consideration by the immigration authorities “in order to dictate their rules and express which are the nationalities with the largest proportion of unscrupulous adventurers, who should be expelled for their fraudulent activities, which are frequently harmful to the national economy.”8 Loyo recommended increasing the restrictive nature of the immigration policy, insisting on the need to base it on health and on economic, demographic, cultural, social, and racial criteria. He also added:

5 AKA, CIICM, Directiva, box 78, file 7, bulletin no. 51, Mexico City, January 23, 1935. 6 Ibid., bulletin no. 58, Mexico City, April 1, 1935. 7 Information exists on the expulsion of some Polish Jews for cheating, drug trafficking, and bringing white women into the country and forcing them into prostitution. Some of these cases can be found in the archives of the Direction of Political and Social Investigations, in the Ministry of the Interior’s files in the General Archive of the Nation. 8 Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Gobernación, Dirección General de Gobierno, Expulsión de extranjeros, 2.360 (29) 8143, box 11, file 14, Investigation on expelling foreigners from 1921 to 1934, carried out by Gilberto Loyo for the Institute of Social, Political, and Economic Studies of the National Revolutionary Party, Mexico City, 1935.

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chapter two Lastly, the fact that along with the crisis, the naturalization of foreigners has increased, most of these being merchants dedicated to parasitic activities, and being heterogeneous in their origin, as well as the entrance of many foreigners, in general undesirables, over the years in which the doors of this country were open to all, demands that the educational authorities plan and carry out the effective Mexicanization of the foreigners, especially those residing in cities.9

Although, as was previously mentioned, the proposals of his book La política demográfica de México (Mexico’s Demographic Policy) (1935) were the basis for the Law of Population of 1936, there was no relation between the data contributed by Loyo in this study and the establishment of the differential tables related to the quotas for immigration, as evidenced in the fact that the two nationalities having the greatest proportion of cases of undesirable foreigners expelled (Spaniards and citizens of the United States) were not the object of any restrictions at all, and the third (Chinese) had been outlawed since 1921. Regarding the Jewish community, in contrast to the unpopularity of this group at the government level in 1934, by 1935 it was reported that things had calmed down somewhat. A bulletin issued by the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Mexico stated that “today we enjoy all the same prerogatives as other foreigners in the country thanks to good government,” and the chamber reported that its representatives, along with those of other foreign chambers, had been invited to participate in various government agencies “in order to form part of several councils and resolve social-economic problems with collective benefits for the country.”10 The new attitude perceived by the Israelite Chamber was most probably due to the change of president. In a meeting between President Lázaro Cárdenas and the North American rabbi Louis Binstock11 in June of 1935, Cárdenas assured the rabbi that in the first place he personally was not anti-Semitic at all, and that he would oppose the efforts of the “Camisas Doradas” (Golden Shirts) or any other anti-Semitic movement and defend the constitutional rights of the Jews and their privileges as citizens of the country.12   9 Ibid. 10 AKA, CIICM, Directiva, box 78, file 7, f. 18, bulletin no. 60, Mexico City, April 25, 1935. 11  Louis Binstock (1896–1974) officiated at the Shalom Temple in Chicago. He was vice president of the American Council for Judaism (created in 1943), a group of non-Zionist rabbis, and author of the book The Road to Successful Living. 12 Archivo General de la Nación, Presidentes: Lázaro Cárdenas (AGN, PLC), file 521/4, Binstock to Cárdenas [n.p.], December 30, 1937.



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However, despite the president’s best intentions, various leagues and committees that included racism and anti-Semitism in their platforms were founded in the country during the thirties. In general these groups belonged to the front that opposed Cárdenas’s government and voiced the middle class’s rejection of government policies that increased the power of the proletariat to the detriment of the middle and business classes.13 Many of these organizations, made up of veterans of the Revolution who had lost their prestige and prominence, adopted the model of fascist paramilitary groups. Others tried more institutional ways, such as many ex-Callistas who, displaced from the government apparatus as a result of the break of Cárdenas with former president Plutarco Elías Calles, founded the Mexican Constitutionalist Party. The number of these opposition groups rose with the radicalization of Cárdenas’s policies during 1935 and 1936.14 Among these organizations were the Confederación de la Clase Media (Confederation of the Middle Class), the Comité Pro-Raza (Committee on Race), the Unión Nacional de Veteranos de la Revolución (National Union of Veterans of the Revolution), Acción Revolucionaria Mexicanista (Mexican Revolutionary Action), the Partido Antirreeleccionista Acción (Anti-reelection Action Party), Vanguardia Nacionalista Mexicana (Mexican Nationalist Vanguard), the Juventudes Nacionalistas (Nationalist Youths), the Partido Nacional Femenino (National Feminist Party), the Frente Constitucional Democrático Mexicano (Mexican Democratic Constitutional Front), the Centro Unificador Revolucionario (Revolutionary Unifying Center), the Acción Cívica Nacional (National Civic Action), and the Frente Anticomunista (Anticommunist Front).15 While the ideological platforms of these groups were different, many shared a true anticommunist, nationalist, and xenophobic character. Most notable among these organizations is the Mexican Revolutionary Action, a fascist, anti-Semitic group whose members were known as the Golden Ones or Golden Shirts, founded in 1934 by Nicolás Rodríguez, who claimed to be an old villista (supporter of Pancho Villa);16 the Confederation of the 13 Javier Garciadiego, “La oposición conservadora y de las clases medias al cardenismo,” Istor. Revista de Historia Internacional 7 no. 25 (2006): 38–39. 14 Ibid., 42. 15 Ariel Contreras, México 1940: industrialización y crisis política. Estado y sociedad civil en las elecciones presidenciales (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1980), 17–18, quoted in Ricardo Pérez Monfort, “Por la patria y por la raza.” La derecha secular en el sexenio de Lázaro Cárdenas (Mexico City: UNAM, 1993), 33–34. 16 According to Ricardo Pérez Montfort, the Mexican Revolutionary Action was disbanded by presidential decree in December 1935. Pérez Monfort, La derecha secular, 46. Alicia Gojman de Backal points out, however, that Cárdenas tried to break up this group

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Middle Class, which arose in 1936 under the leadership of the brothers Enrique and Gustavo Sáenz de Sicilia as a coalition of different reactionary groups, and which professed strong anticommunist and anti-Semitic sentiments; the Committee on Race, which insisted on reinforcing control over foreigners and expelling “undesirables,” founded in 1933 and led by José Ángel Espinoza; and the Anti-Chinese and Anti-Jew League created in August 1935 in order to oversee the activities of the Chinese and Jews and rescue the economy from the hands of undesirable foreigners.17 Obviously the federal government did not support these kinds of organizations. But “within the regional sphere the municipal police, the caciques, and even governors supported the nationalist campaigns against minorities.” Otherwise there would be no explanation for the enduring presence of such movements.18 Besides these expressly xenophobic groups, many small local committees, professional organizations, and commercial groups that had been created with other aims in mind repeatedly insisted on the need to limit foreign immigration in order to avoid competition and the displacement of nationals.19 The National Revolutionary Party—the party in power—also joined the anti-foreigner campaign. This party, committed to the exploited classes and opposed to the rich, foreigners, and the clergy, stemmed from a proposal to “unify and instill discipline in the unpredictable revolutionary political class.”20 In its desire to achieve unity within the great family of the Revolution, made up of alliances with political groups in the states and regions, the party joined the xenophobic campaigns and even lent and ordered Nicolás Rodríguez expelled from the country in February 1936, but the latter continued to operate outside Mexico City, especially in Monterrey, Coahuila, and Chihuahua. Beginning with the failure of the Cedillista rebellion, in 1938, Rodríguez set up his general headquarters in Texas. Alicia Gojman de Backal, Camisas, escudos y desfiles militares. Los Dorados y el antisemitismo en México (1934–1940) (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000), 221–22. 17 See Pérez Monfort, La derecha secular; Gónzalez Navarro, Extranjeros en México; Gojman de Backal, Camisas, escudos y desfiles militares; Gleizer, México frente a la inmigración; Garciadiego, “La oposición conservadora.” 18 Gojman, Camisas, escudos y desfiles militares, 167. 19 This matter should be studied in more depth, since no study exists that analyzes the economic role played by the newly arrived immigrants in order to establish whether they actually competed with or displaced Mexicans; therefore it is not possible to determine whether these nationalist groups were reacting to a real phenomenon or whether they were expressing fear in the face of the possibility of this happening. In both cases, however, along with the economic justifications they cited, they showed strong xenophobic prejudices. 20 Luis Medina, Hacia el nuevo Estado. México, 1920–1994 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994), 71 and 57.



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its offices to nationalist anti-Chinese organizations. It also directly participated in the creation of the Directing Committee of the Nationalist Anti-Chinese Campaign of the Chamber of Deputies.21 In the case of the Chinese, pressures on Congress to issue federal antiChinese legislation failed, but local legislatures and state governments did manage to achieve this end.22 In relation to the Jews, we know that the situation they enjoyed in the Federal District, which included being on good terms with the government authorities, was not representative of what was going on in other parts of the country. Reports from the North American consuls in Guaymas and Mazatlán, for example, mentioned that the “undesirable” foreigners (among them Jews) were charged more in taxes, between 100 and 200 percent of the total that merchants born in the country paid.23 Another very significant case with respect to the situation outside Mexico City occurred in Morelia, where Jews were assaulted by an anonymous group in that city, apparently sponsored and supported by the local authorities. According to the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce, this campaign had the intention of eliminating legal competitors, “trying to make a few modest Israelite merchants seem [. . .] like vile exploiters of the Mexican Worker and People, humiliating and denigrating them in the public opinion and prejudicing them in this manner in their personal and commercial interests.”24 The organization’s denouncement was addressed directly to President Lázaro Cárdenas and not to the state authorities, whom they suspected of being involved in the anti-Jewish campaign. In this document, maybe for the first time, the Jewish group began to use political arguments rather than economic ones, basing their arguments on government discourse in order to justify the protection that the state should provide to minorities: “We are convinced that you, given your great discretion and your revolutionary creed, will share our opinion that such a campaign is not only incompatible with the progressive guidelines of your government, which gives guarantees to all

21 Gómez Izquierdo, Movimiento antichino, 130. 22 See among others Gómez Izquierdo, Movimiento antichino, and “Los caminos del racismo.” 23 The American vice-consul in Guaymas, A. F. Yapis, and the American consul in Mazatlán, F. W. Hinke, to the secretary of state, July 5, 1932 and December 1, 1933, respectively, quoted in Merren, “Politics of xenophobia,” 53. 24 AKA, CIICM, Relaciones con el gobierno, box 76, file 2, f. 18, CIICM to Cárdenas, Mexico City, December 10, 1936.

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foreigners without distinction to race or nationality, but is an offense to human dignity.”25 One of the main attacks on the Jewish group during the administration of Lázaro Cárdenas was carried out by the Camisas Doradas, who tried to assassinate the president of the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Jacobo Landau, in 1935. The aggressors were captured, but despite this fact the chamber requested an investigation by the Central Department into the responsibility of the Mexican Revolutionary Action “in all the aggressions and attacks that have been committed up to now on the persons and goods of our members.” The Israelite Chamber argued that they had addressed the Central Department previously, and in all of our written documents there can be seen repeated complaints against the members and Directors of the many-times-named Group which in a multitude of cases has committed direct aggressions and actions against members of this Chamber, peaceful hardworking merchants and industrialists, causing them material and moral harm [. . .] which places the actions of said Mexican Revolutionary Association, due to the repeated acts of violent and anti-constitutional aggressions, outside the Law.26

We do not know whether there was an official response to this request or not, but the association lost power beginning with the expulsion of Nicolás Rodríguez from the country in 1936. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the groups with clearly xenophobic tendencies never had access to power and tried to make up for their inability to obtain their political objectives by using openly demagogic speech. None of them was successful in the field of national politics, be it due to a lack of resources or tactics, or inactivity.27 However, the joint pressure exerted perseveringly by these groups at the municipal, district, and state levels formed a “pyramid” of pressure, exerted from the bottom up, that was made possible by the structure of the party in power itself, “a party of indirect adhesions, in which federated groupings and not individual militancy were what counted.”28 This pressure, along with the nationalism of the regime, the need for unity, and the search for support and political alliances, led to nationalist xenophobic groups having a considerable influence on certain matters—especially 25 Ibid. 26 AKA, CIICM, Departamento legal, box 73, file 12, f. 1, CIICM to the head of the Central Department, Mexico City, September 10, 1935. 27 See Pérez Monfort, La derecha secular, 91. 28 Medina, Hacia el nuevo Estado, 72.



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those linked to limiting immigration—that was out of proportion with their political presence in general. As for the Jewish community, in contrast to the good relations enjoyed with the government in 1935, during 1936 and 1937 certain general laws and regulations that were not aimed at the community specifically did affect it. The first of these was the General Law of Population, published in August 1936. This new law, which took the place of the Law of Immigration of 1930, outlined the Mexican population policy, and as a part of this, the immigration policy. The first one set out, very optimistically, to solve the fundamental problems of population in the country, namely: Population growth; its racial distribution within the national territory; the ethnic fusion of national groups with each other; the growth of national mestizaje through the assimilation of foreign elements; the protection of nationals in their economic, professional, artistic, or intellectual activities, through immigration regulations; [. . . and] the general protection, conservation, and improvement of the species.29

In fact, the demographic problems that the law was trying to solve were really aims of the government: above all, the ethnic fusion of the national groups with each other, the promotion of mestizaje, and the protection of national workers. To this end programs of action were to be developed by various agencies of the executive power, mainly the Ministry of the Interior. In order to regulate immigration, the General Law of Population of 1936 introduced a system of differential quotas and tables that determined the maximum number of foreigners who would be admitted into the country each year. Along with these measures, it “strictly” forbade foreigners from practicing commerce as well as liberal professions, leaving for them only the fields of industry, agriculture, and exportation. Moreover, it also prohibited immigrant workers from entering the country, while it allowed the Ministry of the Interior to assume “absolute responsibility for the entrance of foreigners.”30 The policy of discretion remained unchanged; the law reiterated the ability of the Ministry of the Interior to prevent specific undesirable foreigners from entering the country, even if they complied with all of the established prerequisites.31

29 Ley General de Población, article 1, Diario Oficial, August 29, 1936. 30 Secretaría de Gobernación, Memoria de la Secretaría de Gobernación. Septiembre de 1936–agosto de 1937 (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937), 24. 31 Ley General de Población, article 74.

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There was widespread criticism of several articles of this law. Anselmo Mena, head of the Diplomatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, reproached the system because it “did not decide outrightly on an open door policy nor on one of limited immigration.” The administrative regulations were criticized on the grounds that the country did not have the infrastructure nor the personnel to comply with what was laid down in the law. Referring to these measures, Mena thought that “they are so obscure, so indeterminate, so prone to the abuse and the excesses of the personnel in charge of applying them, that their objective is decimated and this results in a very complicated situation in which immigrants are constantly victimized by immorality.”32 Most of the criticism of this law stemmed from the differential tables, inspired by North American legislation. For each nationality, U.S. authorities calculated the immigration quota as a percentage of the number of persons of that nationality already living in the country. In Mexico, however, “they would be determined by the national interest, the degree of racial and cultural assimilability, and the convenience of their admission, in order for them not to become factors of unbalance.”33 That is to say, the law did not establish “any criteria for the construction of the tables.”34 Due to the fact that the government had no statistics on the number of foreigners residing in the country, Lucio Mendieta y Núñez35 thought that it would not be surprising “if these tables were drawn up a priori, by empirical and even capricious means.”36 In turn, Francisco Trejo, the general director of population, also admitted that “there were no accurate statistics on the number of foreigners in the country” and that the criteria utilized in establishing the differential tables were, in the end, chosen to limit the entrance of “the least desirable races.”37

32 AHSRE, Embajada de México en Estados Unidos, file LE-294, Considerations of Lic. Anselmo Mena on Immigration, for VIII Pan American Meeting in Lima, Mexico, July 3, 1937, 15. See the conditions for foreigners to enter the country: Ley General de Población, Chapter III, “Requisitos a los Extranjeros.” 33 Ley General de Población, article 7-III. 34 AHSRE, Embajada de México en Estados Unidos, file LE-294, Considerations of Lic. Anselmo Mena on Immigration, for VIII Pan American Meeting in Lima, Mexico, July 3, 1937, 15. 35 Lucio Mendieta y Núñez was, among other things, the representative of the Department of Indian Affairs before the Advisory Council on Population. 36 Andrés Landa y Piña Papers (AALyP), “Algunas consideraciones sobre la ley de 1936,” September 7, 1936, in Yankelevich and Chenillo, “Política de inmigración,” 222. 37 Quoted in Yankelevich and Chenillo, “Política de inmigración,” 225.



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The most serious accusation against the law of 1936 was made by Mendieta y Núñez himself, when he specified that various articles of the law were unconstitutional, since they were in opposition to Articles 4 and 11 of the Carta Magna, which guaranteed the freedom to work and free transit for all of the inhabitants of the Republic of Mexico.38 The new Law of Population established the General Office of Population, which would be responsible for overseeing all matters related to demography, migration, and tourism, and stipulated the formation of the Advisory Council on Population (which replaced the Advisory Council on Migration). According to Pablo Yankelevich and Paola Chenillo, “judging from the discussion among the members of this organization, it is possible to see that they were far from promoting an immigration policy on ‘rational and scientific’ bases, but rather, despite the best efforts in this sense, just as in the past, arbitrariness, improvisation, and ethnic prejudices were still the norm.”39 The General Law of Population of 1936 was followed by other government measures that would continue the strict nationalist line of the law. There was a definite intention on the part of the state to exert more control over the population, both internal and external. Various articles of the 1936 law would affect Jewish immigration, some negatively and some positively. Among the former are the indefinite prohibition of the immigration of workers (with the exceptions later laid down in the differential tables)40 and the prohibition on foreigners working in commerce and the liberal professions, into which fields the majority of the emigrants of the Third Reich fell.41 Among the positive provisions was Article 82, which established that immigrants had the right to bring with them to the country their spouse, single children, parents, and blood relatives up to the third degree—provided they were underage—if they were economically dependent on the immigrant; these others would be accepted into the country for exactly the same period of time as the immigrant himself.42

38 AALyP, “Algunas consideraciones sobre la ley de 1936,” September 7, 1936, in Yankelevich and Chenillo, “Política de inmigración,” 222. 39 Yankelevich and Chenillo, “Política de inmigración,” 222. 40 Ley General de Población, article 84. 41  Ibid., articles 31 and 87. 42 Ibid., article 82.

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While the General Law of Population of 1936 abolished the Law of Immigration of 1930 and other regulations in force at the time “as they were in opposition to the present [law],” it did not revoke the confidential circulars of 1933 (no. 250) and 1934 (no. 157), which would continue to be followed until the differential tables were made and published.43 This resulted in two different, often contradictory, pieces of legislation being in effect at the same time. By presidential order, the two circulars were abolished on May 20, 1937, by Circular no. 930. The latter left the consular authorities free to document foreigners who wished to enter the country as tourists or transmigrants (passengers in transit), but reserved for the Ministry of the Interior the exclusive right to authorize the admission of immigrants.44 This freed the Ministry of the Interior from having to honor the regulations of the General Law of Population and in fact, immigration policy would be at the sole discretion of that ministry. More than a year after the law of 1936 was enacted, the first differential tables, which would regulate the immigration of foreigners in 1938, were published in the Diario Oficial. They allowed, without any limitations, the admission of immigrants from American countries and from Spain; up to five thousand immigrants from Germany, Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Holland, Hungary, England, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland; and up to one hundred foreigners from other countries.45 As Yankelevich and Chenillo affirmed, “the ethnic preferences, the prejudice, the lack of census data, and the absurdly low flow of migrants were evident in the numbers authorized in these tables.”46 Limits were never placed on immigrants from Spain or countries in the Americas. The year of 1937 proved exceptionally difficult for foreigners in Mexico. The radicalization of Cárdenas’s politics over the previous two years had produced more discontent (and mobilization) among middle-class opposition groups, which added to the unease brought on by the economic 43 AHINM, file 4-350-2-1933-54, from the Chief Officer of the Interior, Arturo Cisneros Canto, to the Department of Immigration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, September 14, 1936. On these circulars see Chapter 1. 44 Ibid., circular no. 930, Mexico City, May 20, 1937. 45 “Acuerdo por el cual se fijan las tablas diferenciales que regirán la admisión de extranjeros, en calidad de inmigrantes durante el año de 1938,” Diario Oficial, November 19, 1937. 46 Yankelevich and Chenillo, “Política de inmigración,” 224.



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crisis that year. From early 1937 the national media published reports on the growing hostility towards foreigners. Various associations, even those belonging to the government or linked to these, began to call for the need to protect national jobs from what they considered an invasion of undesirable elements. Thus, for example, the National Chamber of Labor of the Mexican Republic asked the president to prohibit for five consecutive years the registration of commercial societies that were not made up of native Mexicans and to suspend for the same length of time the issuing of naturalization documents throughout the country.47 An editorial in the newspaper Excelsior criticized this: “the worst of it is that the aforementioned chamber makes no distinction between desirable and undesirable foreigners; thus, an Englishman, a German, Frenchman and a Spaniard, etc. are all the same as a Jew of dubious nationality, a Lithuanian, or a relatively Bolshevik Russian.”48 Some, like federal deputy and lawyer Héctor Serdán, really made no distinction, believing that “every foreigner in Mexico is a problem.”49 The ever larger protests against foreigners and the accusation that they competed unfairly with national workers led the Senate to take up the subject, suggesting the matter was a serious economic problem for the country.50 It was in this atmosphere of hostility towards foreigners, which would continue and even intensify during 1938, that one of the first confrontations between government officials and representatives of the local Jewish community took place. Within the context of the First Week of Demographic Studies, organized by the National Association of Science and Arts of Mexico and the Mexican Committee for the Study of Population Problems, once again the matter of undesirable foreigners came up, among whom Jews headed the list. “In the debates, in which members of the public who attended the assembly took part, the Jews were rudely attacked, considering them to be the most undesirable; and it was agreed that the best immigration for Mexico is that of Spaniards and southern

47 “Inténtase rodear a México de murallas chinas a base de un severo nacionalismo,” Excelsior, February 14, 1937. 48 “Ayer, hoy y mañana,” Excelsior, February 15, 1937. 49 “Nuestro país empieza a ser para los mexicanos, tierra extranjera, dice H. Serdán,” Excelsior, February 6, 1937. 50 “Una competencia ruinosa,” Excelsior, February 17, 1937. It is necessary to take a more exhaustive look at the role played by the Chamber of Senators as well as the Chamber of Deputies with respect to foreigners. The documents found so far have not permitted this.

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European races.”51 The representative of the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Jacobo Landau, tried to refute this, arguing that in the United States there were over three million Jews who were not undesirable, and also that the Jews of Mexico who “do not leave the country” employed thousands of Mexicans in their factories. However, when the Jewish representative mentioned that the school which the Jewish community had donated to Mexican society had a government subsidy, he was the object of strong criticism.52 A presidential resolution in June 1937 for the protection of small-scale national commerce ordered another review of the immigration status and economic activities of all foreigners, threatening to deport any who did not comply with the prerequisites for staying in the country legally. The continued joint pressure exerted by nationalist organizations since 1935 surely played an important role in the issuing of the resolution.53 According to the newspaper Excelsior, the resolution urged citizens not to “cause useless agitation among foreign elements; this is only a matter of checking the conditions of their immigration status,” and it assured that those who were in compliance with the law would not be bothered.54 The explanation was necessary since the general atmosphere of xenophobia had favored abuses. Such was the case of the “false inspectors of the Demography Department,” people who, under the pretext of inspecting foreigner’s immigration documents, extorted money from them for false offenses. According to the American ambassador to Mexico, Josephus Daniels, “The Jews say some of these men were more desirous of securing blackmail than of enforcing the law.”55 In July 1937 the Ministry of the Interior announced that the document inspection campaign had not yet begun and that inspectors should identify themselves with an official letter. Also a phone number for the Department of Demography of the Ministry of the Interior was announced where any abuses could be

51 “Rudos ataques se lanzaron a los judíos en la Junta de la Semana Demográfica,” Excelsior, March 5, 1937. According to this article, in this session Gilberto Loyo defined undesirable foreigners as those “whose presence in Mexico constitutes, sooner or later, an economic, social, or cultural problem for our nationals.” 52 Ibid. 53 See, for example, the messages of congratulation that President Lázaro Cárdenas received from the various nationalist organizations in August 1937. AGN, PLC, file 546.2/48. 54 “La competencia de los extranjeros,” Excelsior, February 14, 1938. 55 Josephus Daniels Papers (JDP), Mss 18 958, reel 6, Mexico City, January 22, 1938.



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reported. This was one of only a very few measures taken at this time on behalf of foreigners.56 Ambassador Daniels reported that the Ministry of the Interior, under the leadership of Silvestre Guerrero,57 had implemented a secret service meant to control foreigners, especially Jews and Syrians, whom they visited, demanding to inspect their passports. The new minister of the interior, Ignacio García Téllez, discussed with Daniels the matter of deportation of those who did not comply with the legal requirements for staying in the country. According to the ambassador, the senior officials did not agree with a general policy of deportation, but those who competed with Jewish merchants demanded that the latter be expelled. Daniels pointed out to García Téllez that to deport immigrants from southern Europe, especially the Jews who had come as farmers following an invitation by the Mexican government, would be like abandoning someone in a canoe in the middle of the ocean, without a map or a compass. To this García Téllez responded: “Yes, it would be like sending them to sea in a ship with eleven sails.” According to the same source, the new minister of the interior had suspended the work of the secret service and was studying the situation.58 Within this complex legal context and atmosphere of hostility towards foreigners, the country began to hold, little by little, the first formal and informal consultations on the type of contribution the country could make in the matter of exiles fleeing from Nazi Germany. Along with these came the first applications for individual asylum. Up until that time, the general perception in Mexico was that this was a European problem and that it was up to them to solve it, as we shall now see.

56 “Medida en favor de extranjeros,” Excelsior, July 29, 1937. 57 The Ministry of the Interior had four ministers during Cárdenas’ term: Juan de Dios Bojórquez (December 1934–June 1935), Silvano Barba González (June 1935–August 1936), Silvestre Guerrero (August 1936–January 1938), and Ignacio García Téllez (January 1938–November 1940). 58 JDP, Mss 18 958, reel 6, Mexico City, January 22, 1938.

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chapter two International Efforts to Solve the Matter of German Refugees and the Case of Mexico

The Society or League of Nations took up the matter of German refugees— Jewish and non-Jewish—beginning in 1933.59 In order to organize international aid, which was necessary to deal with problems of economic, financial, and social order that were being caused by a large number of German refugees in various countries, the necessity of naming a high commissioner for refugees (Jewish and others) coming out of Germany was agreed on. The responsibility fell on the shoulders of the American James McDonald, a university professor, devout Christian, Germanophile, and a man with good relations with liberal Jews. The small office he headed did not depend directly on the Council of the League of Nations and did not have its headquarters in Geneva; it operated under very difficult circumstances, both in terms of practical (such as a lack of financing) and political matters. For McDonald, who was in charge of coordinating the activities of the states involved in the refugee crisis, it was very difficult to carry out his aid work. In fact, in order to avoid Germany’s veto—at this point Germany was still a member of the League of Nations—it was even explicitly forbidden for him to deal directly with the German government on this matter.60 This, in addition to the fact that he could neither speak nor act in the name of the League, greatly undermined his power. In December 1935 McDonald resigned from this post due to various factors: lack of support for his small organization and the difficulties caused

59 Dwork and van Pelt, Flight from the Reich, 63. A German law of 1933 established that those German Jews who were outside the country would not have the right to consular services (renewal of passports) or diplomatic protection, which began to cause problems that went beyond Germany’s borders. This meant, in practice, that those who left Germany became stateless people. For them the complicated bureaucratic network for obtaining exit visas and entrance visas was much more difficult to negotiate, not only because they did not have the proper documentation, but also because the fact that they were not “repatriable” was used by a number of countries, including Mexico, to deny them entry. Thus, beginning in 1936, the Mexican consul general in Hamburg, Alfonso Guerra, warned that those German Jews who left would be forbidden to reenter the country, which should be taken into consideration when temporary immigration permits were issued to German Jews. AHINM, file 4-350-359, Ernesto Hidalgo to SRE, retransmitting communication from Alfonso Guerra, Mexico City, November 23, 1936. Later on, Mexico forbade the immigration of stateless people in article IV of the differential tables that would govern the admission of foreigners for the year 1939. AHSRE, file III-1246-9, Mexico City, October 31, 1938. 60 Dwork and van Pelt, Flight from the Reich, 65. Germany left the League of Nations in October 1933.



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by the Nuremberg Laws, which revoked German Jews’ citizenship,61 along with his intention to call the attention of the world to the refugees. In his famous letter of resignation,62 he stated: When domestic policies threaten the demoralization and exile of hundreds of thousands of human beings, considerations of diplomatic correctness must yield to those of common humanity. I should be recreant if I did not call attention to the actual situation, and plead that world opinion, acting through the League and its Member-States and other countries, move to avert the existing and impending tragedies.63

Neill Malcolm, who was an employee of the League of Nations and therefore had access to institutional funds, replaced James McDonald, who continued to collaborate with the cause of the refugees. Malcolm concentrated on guaranteeing the legal status of the German refugees, leaving matters linked to emigration and resettlement entirely in the hands of private organizations.64 His mandate was extended until the end of 1938 and also included Austrian refugees. At the Sixteenth Assembly of the League of Nations in December 1935, measures were proposed that needed to be approved by the governments in order to begin to administer international aid to refugees coming out of Germany.65 Finally, after two years of intense negotiations with European chancellors, a Certificate of Identity for Refugees Coming from Germany was issued, recognized by Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Holland, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. This certificate was intended to be used by those refugees who were only citizens of Germany, and who did not have any legal means of protection from the Reich. It guaranteed the bearer the right to return to the country where the document had been issued and the opportunity to apply to other countries for visas, as well as the assurance that he would not be sent back to territories of the Third Reich. Although deficient, this certificate, which was never as powerful or 61  See the “Reich Citizenship Law,” September 15, 1935. Michman, El Holocausto, 2:35. 62 To which was attached an appendix with documented evidence on the Nazi persecution of non-Aryans. The complete letter of relinquishment is included in Norman Bentwich’s book, The Refugees from Germany, April 1933 to December 1935 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1936), 119–228, quoted in Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe, 234–35. 63 Quoted in Breitman, McDonald and Hochberg, Refugees and Rescue, 102. 64 With the sole exception of the refugees who fled the region of Sarre right before this territory was returned to Germany, following the plebiscite of 1935. See Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe, 201. 65 AHSRE, file III-541-5, 1st part, Report on refugees from Germany, presented to the General Assembly of the League of Nations by the High Commissioner Sir Neill Malcolm, Geneva, September 1, 1936.

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prestigious as the “Nansen passport,” was better for the German refugees than having no documents at all.66 There was also an attempt made at guaranteeing the refugees the right to work, which did not always happen, since various countries tried to prevent the newcomers from becoming competition for native workers. Beginning in 1934 the Mexican government was informed of the activities being carried out by the League’s high commissioner for refugees coming from Germany. The commissioner asked that the Mexican authorities be willing to give to German refugees who did not hold valid national passports the certificate recommended by the commission, when necessary.67 In September 1936 the League of Nations made known that the Provisional Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany was ready to be signed by governments, and in 1937 once again asked the Mexican government for their opinion on this agreement.68 The answer from the Legal Department of the Ministry of the Interior recommended endorsing the draft “with the express condition that the refugees held the same legal status as other foreigners; and were therefore subject to all of the laws which govern the latter in particular.”69 In the recommendations made by the minister of the interior, Silvestre Guerrero,

66 In 1921 the League of Nations named the Norwegian representative, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, high commissioner for refugees. Dr. Nansen had a very successful tenure, since he managed to get various governments and organizations to participate as volunteers in protecting hundreds of thousands of mainly Russian, Greek, and Armenian refugees. The identity document created for these people, known as the “Nansen passport,” was acknowledged by fifty-two countries. There followed the creation of an autonomous office with its own directive organ, known as the Nansen International Office for Refugees, which began work in 1931. Antonella Gesulfo, “La comunidad internacional se hace cargo del problema,” accessed June 19, 2010, http://www.acnur.org/index .php?id_pag=374. Germany objected to this office taking charge of the situation of the Jewish refugees, just as other countries did, since they believed that it would increase the flow of refugees and encourage the German government to get rid of their “undesirable” population at the expense of other countries. No one wanted to become involved in what was thought to be the internal affairs of Germany. Dwork and van Pelt, Flight from the Reich, 63–4 and 66. 67 We have not found any reply from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this matter. We do know that Mexico had recognized the validity of the Nansen passports since 1923 and had authorized its diplomatic representatives and consuls to issue visas with these documents. AHSRE, file III-520-8. 68 AHSRE, file III-520-8 and file III-541-5, 1st part, Report on refugees from Germany, presented before the General Assembly of the League of Nations by the High Commissioner Sir Neill Malcolm, Geneva, September 1, 1936. 69 AHSRE, file III-541-5, f. 6, 1st part, Dictamen emitido por el Departamento Jurídico y de Legislación de la Secretaría de Gobernación (SG), Mexico City, June 22, 1937.



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can be seen the intention to make no distinction between refugees and immigrants. On the other hand, the Mexican representative at the League of Nations, Isidro Fabela, was against Mexico’s signing the Provisional Arrangement, believing that it would be nearly impossible to obtain the ratification of the Senate in time, and besides, it was considered essentially a European problem.70 The Mexican delegation led by Fabela had adopted an attitude of “total abstention” in relation to the problem of the refugees, in accordance with the instructions it received and keeping in mind the restrictions which existed in Mexico, making it perfectly clear “that Mexico is not a country of colonizing immigration.”71 It is consistent, then, that in November 1937, when the International Labor Organization invited the Mexican government to a conference on international technical and financial cooperation related to colonizing immigrations, to take place in February 1938, Fabela recommended sending only an observer, and not an expert on the matter, to the conference.72 Finally, “in order to not adopt [. . .] an attitude of indifference or hostility,” and “in order to learn what the countries of their race decided with respect to the problem of immigration,” Fabela decided to send Palma Guillén, interim head of the Mexican Delegation at the League of Nations. Her observations are interesting, since she thought that due to the policies adopted by some European countries on their minorities abroad, immigration was not only a form of colonization, “but also a form of conquest and ideological penetration.” Guillén’s report referred to the financial and technical conditions that European nations were trying to impose on Latin American countries, who “realized” that it was a matter of trying to organize immigration, “especially of Jewish masses.”73 In short, despite the fact that since 1936 the Mexican government had been involved in the problem of Jewish refugees through its participation in the League of Nations, the country adopted a policy of distance and abstention. Through this policy Mexico tried to cut itself off from the problem, claiming it was an eminently European matter, showing reluctance to issue the legal status of refugee to the Jews, and making it clear to the international organization that Mexico was not a country open to immigration. This policy lasted until the end of 1937, when the Jewish 70 Ibid., 1st part, Fabela to Hay, Geneva, August 23, 1937. 71  AHSRE, file III-363-7, Fabela to SRE, Geneva, November 12, 1937. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid., Guillén to SRE [Geneva], May 30, 1938.

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exodus was still contained within certain limits and considered a strictly European problem that had not yet become an international issue. However, in 1938 the scene changed drastically. The Jewish Community of Mexico, Nazism, and Jewish Refugees Beginning in 1933 the small Jewish community in Mexico began to react to anti-Semitic policies implemented by Adolf Hitler’s government in Germany.74 A meeting of the Federation of Israelite Societies of Mexico in March of that year caused the German minister, Walter Zechlin, to protest the “highly offensive” phrases used when talking about Germany. The meeting referred to the Nazi regime as a “reactionary bloodthirsty government” and stated that it was an embarrassment to the Western world that Hitler was governing a civilized country.75 The minister presumed that the organizers of said protest were foreigners (since nationals would not take matters of German foreign policy so much to heart) and that, as foreigners, they were violating the hospitality that Mexico had shown them and the laws that regulated the political activities of foreigners.76 In answer to the intervention of the German minister, Mexico’s minister of foreign affairs recommended measures be taken “to prevent phrases considered slanderous to the German Government from being uttered in demonstrations related to this matter.”77 Zechlin’s position in this matter was exceedingly uncomfortable since he was a Social Democratic diplomat representing a National Socialist government. Thus, while his fellow party members were being pursued, Zechlin had to defend the honor and reputation of Nazi Germany, lodging complaint after complaint with the Mexican government, demanding a halt to the protests against Hitler. Two months later appeared a flier with no signature—presumably distributed within the Jewish community—calling for a boycott on German products in protest of the violent anti-Semitic actions taken by German 74 Friedrich Schuler affirms that in Mexico City the Mexican communist organizations were the first to demonstrate against Hitler before the German Legation. F. Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt. Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934–1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 49. 75 AHSRE, file III-134-20, Zechlin to Puig Casauranc, Mexico City, March 31, 1933. 76 See Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 49. 77 AHSRE, file III-134-20, Jiménez D., by orders of the minister of foreign affairs, to the minister of the interior, Mexico City, April 5, 1933.



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National Socialism. The flier, dated May 1933, called for direct action to be taken against the Nazi regime, and it recommended the public not to buy German merchandise or make investments that would benefit the country; not to travel in German ships or send merchandise in them; not even to visit the Leipzig fair or German establishments outside of Germany; and to “reject” the German nation whenever possible. The flier also mentioned the Mexican government: “We have no official help, so we must seek help among ourselves. We cannot achieve very much with thunderous agitation, but effective propaganda may be extended in silence.” Finally, calling for unity, it urged its readers to maintain a vigorous attitude of protest until the German government modified its anti-Jewish attitude.78 The National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce, by means of an open letter published in the major newspapers of the country, held the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Mexico responsible for the boycott. In the letter it accused the CIICM of including in the boycott Mexican industrialists who traded with Germany, stating that “it was not within the strictest moral commercial grounds, to declare a boycott on Mexican industrialists and merchants, since the former used raw materials of German origin, and this would be restricting the freedom of national industrialists, which would not be in keeping with the hospitality the country offered the aforementioned merchants.”79 The CIICM responded that they had not called for a boycott and that the role their commercial organization played was limited to attending to those Jews and anti-Nazis who spontaneously refused to “consume articles soaked in their own brothers’ blood” and who had asked for help in finding importers from other countries. By defending themselves as “being within their own rights and reasons” in acting as they did, they hoped the confederation would rectify its judgment.80 Although we do not know whether the CIICM organized the boycott, we do know without a doubt that they supported it. We find signs of this in a meeting of stocking manufacturers and importers organized by the CIICM, their objective being to deal with matters related to the purchase of merchandise coming from Germany. The invitation to the

78 AKA, CIICM, Relaciones con el gobierno, box 75, file 1, f. 1, Flier on the boycott of German products, [Mexico City], May 1933. 79 Ibid., box 77, file 3, [n.d.], CIICM to the Confederación de Cámaras de Comercio de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Mexico City, July 20, 1933. 80 Ibid.

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meeting specified that due to the situation created around the world by the persecution of the Jews in Germany, it was the obligation of each Jew to attend, thus helping to carry out the resolutions that the circumstances demanded.81 Also in 1933 a French hardware exporter sent a letter to the Israelite Chamber in which he said he had read in Les Échos de L’Exportation, of Paris, that the chamber was looking for hardware exporters to replace German articles.82 The Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce reacted not only to the political situation in Germany, but also to the anti-Semitism they perceived in Mexican society, which they attributed mainly to groups identified to a greater or lesser extent with German National Socialism. While these groups did not receive government support, it was clear that the authorities did not intervene to put a stop to the anti-Semitic campaigns developing in 1933 (which, according to the CIICM, had flooded the capital with propaganda). Faced with the impossibility of taking direct political action, two options were set forth in meetings of the various Jewish organizations. The first strategy was to obtain the support of influential individuals inside the government, reclaiming and disseminating the idea that Mexico had a liberal constitution and that the anti-Semitic propaganda worked to the detriment of the entire country, not only the Jews. Sharing the same sentiment, the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM) had offered to collaborate with the Committee for Defense (which the Jewish community had organized), through its secretary, Luis Islas Osorno, in order to begin a massive campaign which explained that Fascist-like movements were against the interests of the country.83 In documents related to the Committee for Defense mention is also made of support from various Mexican intellectuals, who “put forth their intentions of organizing a Meeting on our behalf; but in both cases it would have been necessary for the Jewish community to provide the money and this was very scarce.”84 81 Ibid., f. 30, Circular from the CIICM, Mexico City. (This document has no date, but the list of members of the board of directors that is printed in the margin indicates it was produced in 1933.) 82 AKA, CIICM, Directiva, box 78, file 1, f. 12, CIICM to a group of twelve hardware dealers, Mexico City, August 7, 1933. 83 AKA, CIICM, Relaciones con el gobierno, box 77, file 8, f. 5, Act of the Board of Delegates from the various Israelite organizations of Mexico, Mexico City, April 23, 1934. 84 Osorno had assured that the CROM would be unconditionally placed at the disposition of the Jewish representatives, and did not ask for anything more than “only money to cover the costs of the propaganda that [. . .] they mean to make.” Ibid., f. 3, Act of the Board of Delegates . . ., Mexico City, April 19, 1934.



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The second strategy was to try to obtain the support of the national media, recognizing that “if the press sides with the Nazis, there will be no way to turn things around.”85 In fact, these worst fears came true. In April 1935, Arthur Dietrich was named press attaché of the German Legation in Mexico and began extending his control and influence to include even independent papers such as Últimas Noticias, Excelsior, Novedades, and El Universal. These papers not only published information coming from the German Legation, but editorials favoring the cause.86 The Israelite Chamber had tried to use these same resources, but much less successfully, by recommending Jewish industrialists and merchants advertise in the largest newspapers in the capital. Apparently the CIICM sought the intervention of President Abelardo Rodríguez, but Tafelov, a representative, later concluded that “it was not possible to take any concrete measures due to the divergence of opinions on the subject,” since according to some members of the Committee for Defense, presidential intervention was not necessary.87 Jewish demonstrations against Nazism continued in 1935 with the start of another boycott of German merchandise, which once again provoked serious complaints by the German Legation in Mexico, headed by Minister Rüdt von Collenberg beginning in 1933.88 This boycott included suspending the importation of merchandise from Germany for a period of three months beginning in August. This would be enforced by asking Jewish merchants and industrialists to turn over copies of their orders. For those who signed the agreement and then violated it, the punishment

85 Ibid., f. 10, Act of the Board in order to carry out the work of the Committee for Defense, Mexico City, May 7, 1934. 86 Paz, Strategy, Security and Spies, 30. 87 AKA, CIICM, Relaciones con el gobierno, box 77, file 8, f. 10, Act of the Board in order to carry out the work of the Committee for Defense, Mexico City, May 7, 1934. 88 Rüdt von Collenberg, who had served as consul general of Germany in Calcutta and Shanghai, represented the Third Reich in Mexico from his arrival in December 1933 until relations between the two countries were broken off in 1941. His membership in the German National Socialist Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP), in contrast to what happened with other members of Germany’s Foreign Service in other countries, prevented any conflicts from developing in Mexico between his party and the German state. However, von Collenberg was not a prominent member of the party (he had joined only months earlier, in May 1933) and compared to other German diplomats in various Latin American capitals, he had lost influence in the German Ministry of the Exterior and in the Organization for Foreigners (Auslandsorganisation) dependent on the NSDAP, which was perhaps an indicator of the secondary place Mexico occupied in Germany’s foreign affairs. Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 50.

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would be “excommunication” from all Israelite organizations in Mexico.89 Members of the Committee for Defense were obligated to denounce anyone who did not respect these agreements; however, it is not clear whether the merchants’ adherence to the boycott was voluntary or not. What apparently happened was that not all Jewish merchants respected the agreement, and in late September 1935 one member of the community denounced their behavior. Given that no one who signed the agreement for a Boycott stuck to it, and given that everyone in general (except for Misters Kushner and Freidberg) imports and buys contraband German merchandise in the house of Morales and Gutiérrez, sending maids and servants using false names and placing orders with various German establishments here as well as directly in Germany, I inform you that from this day on I dissociate myself from this committee.90

There was a strong reaction from the German Legation in Mexico to the measures taken by the Jewish organizations. Addressing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the legation stated that the boycott would bring deplorable consequences, including a decrease in Mexican imports by Germany and a subsequent reduction in trade between the two countries.91 Minister von Collenberg added that the provisions adopted by the German government against the German Jewish population were a matter of internal politics that had been carried out legally.92 There is not enough information to determine whether the boycott affected economic relations between Mexico and Germany. Jews made up only 0.06 percent of the population of Mexico and in 1931 there were

89 The boycott was agreed upon in a meeting that took place on July 8, 1935, in which the Banco Mercantil de México (Mercantile Bank of Mexico), the YMHA, the Beneficencia Israelita (Israelite Charity), the Nidje Israel congregation, Tiferet Israel, the Organización Sionista de México (Zionist Organization of Mexico), the Colegio Israelita de México (Israelite School), Agudat Ajim, the Colegio Talmud Torá, the Club Deportivo Macabi (Macabi Sports Club), the Club de Estudiantes Israelitas (Israelite Students’ Club), the Logia Bnei Brith (B’nai B’rith Lodge), and the Mexican League in support of Palestina participated. AKA, CIICM, box 52, file 3, f. 1, from the “Executive Committee” for the reestablishment of a boycott on imports of German goods, to the main Jewish organizations in Mexico, Mexico City, July 11, 1935. 90 Ibid., file 4, f. 22, D. Alberto, president of the Mella Importing Company, to the Boycott Committee, Department of Hardware, Mexico City, September 30, 1935. 91  Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 52. 92 AHSRE, file III-134-20, memorandum [on the measures to be taken in the face of a possible boycott by the Jewish community of Mexico of German products], Mexico City, September 2, 1935, and AHSRE, file III-670-4, September 2, 1935, quoted in Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 52.



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nearly three hundred members of the Israelite Chamber, who included both merchants and industrialists (there are no exact figures for 1935). Since not all of them imported German merchandise, it is plausible to think that von Collenberg was exaggerating.93 We believe that the reaction of the German minister is more closely tied to the symbolism of the boycott—and its possible propagandistic consequences—at a time when one of his main objectives was to promote the development of economic relations between Mexico and Germany, in the interests of expanding the state’s control over private commerce taking place between the two countries.94 The boycott was ignored by most government agencies, with the exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.95 In contrast to the events of 1933, the ministry took the denunciation of the German minister more seriously, but with reservations. Initially it maintained that it was necessary to confirm “whether the anti-Nazi activities in Mexico reached the acute nature indicated,” arguing that the chancellor should not make any move before obtaining all of the relevant information, referring to the fear that state coercion against the Jews in Mexico would cause a reaction by the Jewish community in the United States, to whom great political power was attributed. According to the reasoning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if the rumors of the boycott proved true, an order to dissolve the Jewish institutions involved (the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the Mercantile Bank, and the Israelite Charity) could be issued, since it could be argued that they damaged the interests of international commerce between Mexico and Germany,96 and “foreign Jewish elements” could even be denied the right of association since meetings in which illegal decisions were made were prohibited by the constitution.97 Although the implementation of these measures might have been legal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally opted to utilize more persuasive measures: 93 Gojman de Backal and Carreño, Parte de México, 65. 94 The framework of the new commercial policy towards Latin America, which had been launched by the German minister of economy in 1934, led the German Legation in Mexico to appoint a full-time economic attaché, who was Hans Burandt. See Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 50–52. 95 Ibid., 52. 96 “Well precisely as the minister from Germany observes, the line of exportations is parallel to that of importations, a circumstance, which if the former were reduced would necessarily weaken the latter.” AHSRE, file III-134-20, memorandum [on the measures to be taken in the face of a possible boycott by the Jewish community of Mexico of German products], Mexico City, September 2, 1935. 97 Ibid.

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chapter two However, given that the recommendations which are indicated [. . .] would seriously affect the interests and activities of the Israelite Colony of Mexico, whose ties to the Jews in the United States would bring about the danger of hostile attacks and activities against our country, since the Israelites in the United States have considerable influence in the political field, it is advisable, before adopting a platform with respect to the Law and absolute neutrality in the fight that has been brought about against fascism, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to warn the Jews, in a friendly informal way, that the Mexican Government is willing to adopt energetic measures, if they persist in their project to boycott merchandise of German origin.98

Finally, the memorandum advised giving assurance to the German Legation “that the Mexican Government would take care that the traditional relations of friendship with that country were not altered by Jewish elements.”99 This is an example of the efforts made by Mexico to maintain its political and economic relations with the German nation, efforts which in general were not reciprocated by the latter. It is also a good indication that a certain amount of political power was attributed to the Jewish community in the country by the Mexican government, based on the backing this community had—or was thought to have had—from American Jews. Finally the boycott took place, and with this act the Jewish community in Mexico joined forces with acts of protest carried out by the international Jewish community. In fact, the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce made contact with the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League in New York, asking for support and literature on the anti-Nazi campaigns taking place in other countries. The league, in turn, acknowledged “the good work that the Israelite Chamber was carrying out by asking Mexican manufacturers and importers to stop trading in German products and to find non-German sources to replace them.”100 It is not known whether the boycott was carried out for three months as planned, whether it ended spontaneously, or whether the government did indeed alert the Jewish community; what is known is that none of the forceful proposals included in the memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was adopted. According to Friedrich Schuler, the boycott was initially successful to a

  98 Ibid.   99 Ibid. 100 AKA, box 52, file 4, f. 5, CIICM to the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League of New York, Mexico City, August 9, 1935, and Ibid., f. 18, Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League to CIICM, New York, September 12, 1935.



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certain extent, but because it was not supported by any significant sector of the Mexican population, it did not endure.101 As part of the effort tied to the struggle against Nazism, the Jewish community of Mexico in 1935 addressed President Lázaro Cárdenas on the matter of Jewish immigrants coming from Hitler’s Germany: In Mexico there is vast area for thousands of active, solvent, technical, intelligent, and hardworking foreigners to come to the Country and promote national life. We beg you to bear in mind that the young industry created by Mexican Judaism has been of benefit to national life, and we ask you to facilitate the immigration of our brothers in race into the Country, by allowing the admission of relatives of Israelites already living in Mexico. We also beg you to allow the entrance into the Country of German Israelites who, due to the hostile regime, have to abandon said country. Since these brothers are experts in various fields and have been warmly welcomed by Latin American Countries, we consider this a wonderful opportunity for Mexico to take advantage of the immigration of German Israelites for its young industry.102

The president’s private secretary responded only that the requests of the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce would be sent to the Ministry of the Interior for its consideration.103 As far as can be seen in official documents, this was the first time that the Jewish community of Mexico addressed government authorities to request that they further facilitate immigration for refugees from Nazi Germany. Here it is necessary to highlight their economic arguments, since later on they would turn to political and humanitarian justifications. Although it was apparently a private communication between the CIICM and Lázaro Cárdenas, this early request caused reactions from the National Anti-China and Anti-Jewish League, which communicated to the president its opposition to allowing more German Jews to enter the country. A few months later, the Israelite Chamber informed the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League that they had been in touch with the Ministry of the Interior with the hope of convincing Mexican citizens that receiving German Jewish refugees would be beneficial and highly useful to the country, and therefore they sought the league’s opinion on the type of refugee who

101  Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 52. 102 AGN, PLC, file 521/4, Extract of the telegram from Landau to Cárdenas, sent by the president’s private secretary to the minister of the interior, Mexico City, August 31, 1935. 103 Ibid., Rodríguez to Landau, Mexico City, August 31, 1935.

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was most likely to be admitted.104 In December 1935 the CIICM began negotiating the admission of the first German refugees, albeit not very successfully.105 At practically the same time, they sought the support of the CROM, asking them to join the boycott against the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. Since the Israelite Chamber had no direct contacts, they asked the American Jewish Congress to use its influence and good relationship with the CROM, arguing that “Mexican Sportsmen should not participate in the German Olympiad to be held in Berlin in 1936 following the human and noble example of hundreds and hundreds of Sport Organizations from both American Continents.”106 The fact that Mexican Jews had to turn to fellow North Americans in order to exert pressure on Mexican labor organizations once again shows their lack of political strength, but at the same time indicates a certain ability to utilize other kinds of resources that sometimes proved effective. At present, we do not know whether during this period the Mexican government gave an answer to the Jewish community regarding the possibility of offering the country as a refuge from Nazism. However, no document found to date suggests that this took place. The Attitude towards the Jewish Refugees during 1937 The Mexican consuls in Berlin and Hamburg107 noticed the contradictions between what was set down in the General Law of Population of 1936 and Confidential Circular no. 157. In January 1937 they discussed the matter with the Ministry of the Interior. These consuls had been authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to document some Germans of Jewish origin as temporary immigrants, but Circular no. 157 warned, “even in the case that authorization for admission into the country had been granted to a foreigner, if it was found that he was of Jewish origin, no 104 AKA, CIICM, [uncatalogued document], CIICM to the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League of New York [Mexico City], November 7, 1935. 105 Referring to Walter Shuk, Haleshitz Volanovsky, S. Dobín, and others, AKA, box 72, file 8, f. 6, Israelite Private Charity Center of Mexico to CIICM, Mexico City, December 6, 1935. 106 AKA [uncatalogued document], CIICM to the president of the American Jewish Congress, Mexico City, November 7, 1935. We do not know whether the CROM was ever contacted; Mexico did participate in the Olympic Games of 1936. 107 Salvador Elizondo and Alfonso Guerra, respectively.



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matter what his nationality, his entrance should be forbidden.”108 The result was that in general Mexican representatives abstained from documenting applicants, which is what had elicited a complaint from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who generally ratified their authorizations. Finally, the consuls were informed that “only the Minister of the Interior himself could authorize these exceptional cases, knowing that on the respective application forms the race of the person seeking admission would be stated” and that they should abstain from authorizing other cases.109 What is clearly illustrated by this example is that there was not only a sharp contradiction between what was stated in the General Law of Population and the confidential circulars, but also that there was great tension between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worried about the image Mexico presented to the rest of the world, and the Ministry of the Interior, concerned to prevent what were considered to be undesirable foreigners from entering the country. This tension, however, was nothing new. In 1937 the first applications for admission to Mexico, addressed to President Lázaro Cárdenas, were received, and strangely enough they were not from German refugees, but from Polish citizens claiming that due to the anti-Semitism in Poland, it was nearly impossible for Jews to obtain jobs or study, and therefore they sought authorization to immigrate to Mexico.110 In the replies that we have been able to find, the Ministry of the Interior denied entrance to the applicants based on Article 84 of the General Law of Population, which forbade the entrance of workers,111 or argued that the quota of Polish immigrants for the year established in the differential tables had already been met,112 in spite of the fact that the first tables had not yet been published; they first appeared in the Diario Oficial on November 19, 1937, and went into effect in 1938. Concerning the Jewish refugees, Anselmo Mena, head of the Diplomatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said:

108 AHINM, file 4/350/351. 109 Ibid. 110 See AGN, PLC, file 545.6/16, 546.6/97 and 549.2/18. 111  See AGN, PLC, file 546.6/97, from the Ministry of the Interior to A. Zelazo, Mexico City, July 21, 1937, and from the vice-minister of the interior to the chief officer of the Presidency, Mexico City, September 14, 1937. 112 Ibid., from the vice-minister of the interior to J. Federman, denying authorization for the admittance of his mother, Mrs. Malacibia Rosemberg, Federman’s widow, Mexico City, August 11, 1937.

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chapter two It is common knowledge that in Germany and central Europe individuals of the Semitic race are tirelessly persecuted, and these Jews trying to avoid this persecution seek refuge in the few countries where they are still allowed admission; but this admission cannot be undertaken lightly and recklessly, taking into consideration only the increase in the population of the country, since the most important ethnic problem is that of the quality and not the quantity of the people who make up our population.113

During these months after Circular no. 157 had been abolished, some direct relatives of Polish Jews who were living legally in the country were admitted. The reluctance of certain sectors of Mexican society to accept them can be seen in the debate carried out in the press while the Polish Jews aboard the steamship Mexique were on their way to the port of Veracruz. According to the newspaper Excelsior, the Ministry of the Interior itself was accused (although it did not say by whom) of unduly authorizing the entrance of Poles into the Mexican Republic.114 The ministry firmly denied that said vessel was “full of Jews,” specifying that there were only twentyfive Poles, among other immigrants, “and that these are for the most part parents, spouses, and children of foreigners of the same nationality, legal residents in the country, who have a right to bring their relatives into the country, according to Article 82 of the General Law of Population. All of the others on the ship are visitors or tourists arriving in accordance with Articles 61 and 64 of the same Law.” The statement issued by the Ministry of the Interior proves interesting because it defends itself from the attacks, justifying its own actions in accordance with the laws: If there is no law declaring Polish immigrants undesirable and forbidding their admission, and on the other hand, if the General Law of Population authorizes the entry of foreigners in the terms set down in its articles [. . .] the Ministry cannot legally, without violating aforementioned regulations and proceeding arbitrarily, deny said authorizations. If the law is not satisfactory, the procedure that must be followed is to reform it and forbid the admission of individuals of Polish nationality, and not to have the Ministry violate the law.115

113 AHSRE, Embajada de México en Estados Unidos, file LE-294, Considerations of Lic. Anselmo Mena on immigration, for the VIII Pan American Conference in Lima, Mexico, July 3, 1937, 7. 114 According to Moisés González Navarro, Deputy Jesús Yurén objected to the disembarkation of the Poles since they themselves “made feminine work at home the victim of unjust exploitation.” Gónzalez Navarro, Extranjeros en México, 3:43, note 114. 115 “Ninguna inmigración ilegal ha sido acordada hasta hoy por las autoridades mexicanas,” Excelsior, October 30, 1937.



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During the final months of 1937 and the early months of 1938, antiforeigner agitation continued to develop and for the first time public expressions of anti-Semitism appeared in the Senate as well as in the Chamber of Deputies. In the Senate, Guillermo Flores Muñoz and Rodolfo T. Loaiza led the anti-Semitic campaign.116 According to Excelsior, in October 1937 the Joint Commissions of Immigration, the Interior, and Constitutional Matters together proposed, As a measure to drastically resolve the immigration problem, and, hence, the displacement of nationals from various fields of labor, that individuals of the Hebrew race be denied entrance. This is due to the fact that it has been proved with statistics and throughout the world that they never work for the country where they live, but rather that they endeavor to prosper as much as possible, and keep to themselves as if they were insatiable birds of prey.117

However, we have found no documents related to this response; the Debate Diaries of the Senate do not include it. According to the same newspaper, the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce sent a memorandum to the Senate defending its members, which was refuted by the Alianza Sindical de Comerciantes e Industriales Mexicanos (Union Alliance of Mexican Merchants and Industrialists), an organization that supported Guillermo Flores Muñoz, and the petitions formulated by the Bloque de Acción Revolucionaria pro Pequeño Comercio e Industria (Revolutionary Action Bloc in favor of Small Businesses and Industries), asking for drastic measures to be applied to “Israelites, Turks, Russians, and other undesirable foreigners residing in the country.”118 Apparently the presidential agreement of June had not yet been put into practice, since Loaiza proposed almost the same thing: the inspection and surveillance, by the Ministry of the Interior, of the activities of all foreigners living in Mexico, once again in defense of Mexican small business owners who were victims of unfair competition by the “undesirables.”119 The Asociación Nacionalista de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Nationalist Association of the United

116 Guillermo Flores Muñoz was senator for Nayarit, and Rodolfo T. Loaiza was senator for Sinaloa. Both later participated in the Movement in Support of Ávila Camacho in the Chamber of Senators. See Contreras, México 1940, 28. 117 “Drásticas medidas se propondrán en el Senado contra extranjeros que han violado nuestras leyes,” Excelsior, October 2, 1937. 118 “Apoyan las medidas contra los judíos,” Excelsior, October 27, 1937. 119 “Estrecha vigilancia sobre los elementos extranjeros,” Excelsior, October 30, 1937.

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States of Mexico) had also asked the Senate to reform the Law of Immigration, believing that this held the key to the immigration problem, since the differential tables made no distinction between foreigners, “except in relation to numbers.”120 Finally the Senate named a commission— of which Muñoz and Loaiza formed a part—to deal with the matter of Jewish immigration in conjunction with the Ministry of the Interior. On January 14, 1938, the commission met with the new minister of the interior, Ignacio García Téllez,121 to make clear that “it was not a matter of xenophobia nor misunderstood patriotism, but rather of improving the law, in order to forbid undesirables, the foreigners who surreptitiously enter the county to continue to flood the Mexican population under the pretext of dedicating themselves to agriculture and other occupations, when in reality they are displacing national workers.”122 Perhaps as a result of this interview, or as part of the control that the Ministry of the Interior was trying to exert on foreigners, in January 1938 this department called on Mexican citizens to denounce, for motives of “public health,” any foreigners who, without having at least five years of residency in the country, were working (especially in commerce).123 That same month the Ministry of the Interior and the Department of the Federal District agreed to jointly monitor compliance with the conditions under which foreigners residing in Mexico were admitted.124 Public arguments against Jewish immigration first appeared in the Chamber of Deputies when Deputy Ismael Falcón called the Banco Mercantil (Mercantile Bank) a “true instrument of Jewish invasion,” accusing it of lending money to immigrants—in the ports where they arrived—in order for them to comply with the legal prerequisites for entering Mexico (money which, once the inspection was over, was to be returned to the bank).125 The deputy himself proposed calling the minister of the interior before the national representation to talk about the legal immigration of foreigners. According to information provided by María Emilia Paz, Falcón was one of the deputies paid by Arthur Dietrich, the German Legation’s press attaché, to form a pro-neutrality bloc within Congress, to

120 “En la Ley de Migración se halla la clave del asunto,” Excelsior, December 6, 1937. 121 Ignacio García Téllez was one of the few men whom Cárdenas fully trusted, along with General Francisco J. Múgica. 122 “Serán revisadas las tarjetas de nacionalización,” Excelsior, January 14, 1938. 123 “Una excitativa para denunciar a los intrusos,” Excelsior, January 17, 1938. 124 “Más vigilancia a extranjeros,” Excelsior, January 25, 1938. 125 DdD, November 9, 1937, 9–12.



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avoid Mexico’s entering the war on the side of the United States. According to Paz, Ismael Falcón also provided Dietrich and his successor Hans Burandt, the German commercial attaché, with confidential information on matters debated at high levels of the Mexican government.126 The only reaction of the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce to the development of this anti-Semitic campaign that we found was a letter sent to Excelsior, signed by Gregorio Shapiro and A. Wallerstein (president and secretary of the CIICM, respectively), who insisted that Jewish industrialists and merchants were not in violation of the country’s laws, since they had not stated that they were farmers nor had they come to perform agricultural work: We have read with the necessary care the campaign that the press has been carrying out for some time now against Israelite immigration into the Mexican Republic. And since in general, lines of reasoning lacking foundation and truth are being used, we wish to rectify the main news items that say: “That the Israelites have entered Mexico by the thousands to farm.” This reasoning is false because of all the Israelites who have entered Mexico, only two or three declared upon entering that they were farmers: the rest have come as industrialists and merchants and are devoted to these activities. And the best proof of all is that the Ministry of the Interior has carried out a meticulous investigation of the matter without finding proof of that reasoning, which has been exploited in reports, communiqués, and press releases.127

Most of the Jews living in Mexico had come during the twenties, when immigrants were allowed to engage in paid activities, both industrial and commercial. Rather than attempting to counteract the anti-Semitic campaign, the Jewish community tried to continue to contribute to various national causes, thinking that this would directly benefit them in the near future.128 Above and beyond the regulations issued in 1937 in relation to the control of foreigners in general, and specifically the Jews, I would like to end by referring to an “ethnographic study” elaborated in 1937 by the Autonomous Department of the Executive Press and Publicity (DAPP), which was the department that consolidated, processed, broadcast, and 126 Paz, Strategy, Security and Spies, 30. Dietrich also financed the Comité Patriótico Pro Neutralidad (Patriotic Committee for Neutrality) headed by Adolfo León Osorio. 127 “Pocos Israelitas han declarado que son agricultores,” Excelsior, January 27, 1938. 128 See the discussion, in the following chapter, of the creation of a Comité Israelita ProRedención de la Economía Nacional de Mexico (Israelite Committee for the Redemption of the National Economy), in order to help pay the country’s oil debt in 1938.

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controlled official information.129 DAPP was also part of the Advisory Council on Population, where it was represented by Eugenio Maldonado, who had distinguished himself in this advisory group by defending the most restrictive stance of all in relation to immigration, especially Jewish immigration, to the degree that his proposals “projected shadows of unconstitutionality.”130 We do not know whether the document, entitled “Report on the proposal to attract and promote Israelite immigration to Mexico,”131 was ever discussed in the Advisory Council on Population. Neither do we know who its author was, although the arguments used resemble almost word for word Maldonado’s own contributions in the Advisory Council.132 However, it may be presumed that due to the important tasks carried out by the DAPP in relation to the handling of information, its position on Jewish immigration must have had some influence. In relation to its content, the study began by affirming that Mexican nationality was essentially Spanish-Indian and that any other racial ingredient “would complicate and hinder the road to national integration” that was about to be completed, thereby threatening to destroy the eugenic work of at least four hundred years. On the other hand, it was to be noted that the Mexican population in general was justifiably xenophobic. This had brought about a growing feeling of mistrust and hostility, at critical moments taking the form of violence, towards those foreigners. On the specific attitude of the Mexican population towards the Jews, this document referred to the intense anti-Semitic campaign that was being carried out, driven by certain commercial sectors upset about Jewish competition, by the public who had been extorted by the practice of abono (installment payments), and above all by the workers who were exploited in largely clandestine workshops that Jews had set up in various neighborhoods of the city. This anti-Semitism, according to the document, had been strengthened by the attitude of the Jews themselves, due to “their 129 The DAPP was created by presidential decree in January 1937 and cancelled in the same way in 1939. According to Manuel Buendía, it became the “laboratory of social communication” of the government. Fernando Mejía Barquera, “El Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (1937–1939),” Revista Mexicana de Comunicación no. 2 (1988): 46-49. http://wikicomunicacion.org/1/departamento-autonomo-de-prensa-ypublicidad-1937-1939-2/. 130 Yankelevich and Chenillo, “Política de inmigración,” 223. 131 AGN, PLC, file 711/516, Dictamen sobre la posición de atraer y fomentar la inmigración israelita en México, July 14, 1937. 132 AHINM, file 4-350-1935-228C, extraordinary session of the Advisory Council on Population, October 23, 1939.



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arrogance, their little or null respect for our laws [. . .], their lack of integrity in commerce (credit that ripped people off and excessive profits), and in general, their position as middlemen, all of which made them unpopular among the masses.” It would be worth finding out whether the DAPP had a hand in this campaign. Finally, the document considered the difficult assimilation and the “deep-rooted racial prejudices” of the Jews as the main obstacles to allowing their admission to Mexico: Their pride has led them to never be assimilated by another race, nor to identify with and take root in the country where they temporarily live, to the extent that after living with other peoples for centuries, they are still “Jews” in every sense of the word, that is, faithful to their religion, their language, their literature, their rabbis, and their endogamy. This has always made them easily identifiable and left them existing as “cysts” within the nations that have welcomed them in their midst.133

It was also argued that if the Jews had not been assimilated by “established and powerful” races, they were less likely to be assimilated by the Mexican people, “above all if we consider that they despise us for our very low level of livelihood.” The study concluded, then, that Jewish immigration to Mexico was not advisable, based on the following reasons:   I. Due to not being useful for the racial integration of our nationality, rather quite the contrary, useless in that they would always constitute an ethnic, linguistic and religious minority, unyielding and inassimilable BY US.   II. Due to the sentimental reaction against it (the Jewish immigration) by our people, who are in general anti-foreigner, and specifically with respect to the Jew, anti-Semitic. III. Due to the Israelite himself being unassimilable and unyielding.134 This document is not representative of the entire government sector—as Yankelevich and Chenillo show, in the meetings of the Advisory Council on Population other voices were also heard—but it does represent the position of one segment of the government. It can be clearly seen that mestizaje was not just a theory; it was an ideology that was used to justify

133 AGN, PLC, file 711/516, Dictamen sobre la posición de atraer y fomentar la inmigración israelita en México, July 14, 1937. 134 Ibid., 17. The capital letters are in the original.

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the prohibition on the admission of certain ethnic or national groups to the country. The formula of rejecting anything that did not contribute to the aim of promoting mestizaje exempted the government from the need to justify or argue the positions that were assumed, automatically legitimizing xenophobic and racist stances as true nationalism in defense of the country. In bringing this chapter to a close I would like to point out that at the national bargaining table, the question of whether Mexico would receive Jewish immigrants was discussed under the assumption that the individuals in question were common emigrants; their persecution was almost never mentioned, and the subject was approached from the ideological viewpoint of mestizaje. I cannot help noting that the situation presented by the national political scene, in which anti-Semitism came not only from radical rightist groups, but also from government spheres, was not the most conducive to promoting a policy of openness for the Jewish refugees. However, it must be pointed out—and maybe this is one of the inherent contradictions in the matter studied here—that while this reluctance to accept Jewish immigration was reflected in a series of limitations, controls, and prejudices towards Jews living in the country, the latter were never in danger of being the target of aggression or of having their rights limited by the state, and that the anti-Semitism referred to here did not, for the most part, go beyond mere discourse.

Chapter Three

THE KEY YEAR: 1938 Even though Mexico remained distant from the problem of the Jewish refugees until the end of 1937, various events in the world brought on the internationalization of the conflict in 1938 and American countries became involved. The most important event took place during the first months of that year, exacerbating the Jewish refugee crisis: Germany annexed Austria on March 12, 1938. To this would be added the crisis Hitler caused in Czechoslovakia and the annexation of the Sudetenland in September, the deportation of German Jews to Poland in October, and the “Night of Broken Glass” in November. In Mexico the most important event of the year, and probably of Lázaro Cárdenas’s presidency, was the decision to expropriate the foreign oil companies, once the Mexican government felt it had exhausted all the institutional channels available to solve the labor-management conflict in the oil industry. A few days later, the government of Franklin D. Roosevelt invited his Mexican counterpart to participate in the Évian Conference, on the matter of refugees, which would take place in France, in July 1938; thirty-two representatives, twenty-three of whom were Latin Americans, would participate. By accepting the invitation, the Mexican government would become directly involved in the question of the Jewish refugees fleeing Nazism and would begin to lay out a policy for confronting this problem. Before proceeding to discuss this matter, it is necessary to deal with, if only briefly, the question of asylum, which Cárdenas’s government had offered to politically persecuted persons. This will serve to establish the context for the political stance adopted towards the Jewish refugees. Mexico’s Welcoming Tradition towards Politically Persecuted Persons Mexico had previous experience with asylum: it had signed the pact of the Convention of Havana (1928) and ratified the Convention of Montevideo (1933) on asylum, and since the time of the Mexican Revolution (which, according to Fernando Serrano Migallón, modified the way in which the Mexican government understood asylum) had offered refuge to Latin

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American revolutionaries and dissidents (above all those from Guatemala and other nearby countries).1 However, it was President Lázaro Cárdenas who would adopt an exceptional attitude towards matters of asylum, by generously opening the ports of the country to Republicans of the Spanish Civil War and other great figures among the anti-Fascist exiles, such as Tina Modotti and Mario Montagnana, Anna Seghers, Paul Merker, Jacques Soustelle, Paul Rivet, and, of course, Leon Trotsky. Cárdenas had expressed his position in relation to refugees in his first State of the Union address in September 1935, in which he stated that while Mexico would make sure that the country would not serve as a base for activities against other governments, that did not mean that Mexico “would cease being a selfless asylum for political refugees, in specific situations.”2 Meanwhile, the General Law of Population of 1936 stipulated that foreigners fleeing political persecution who reached Mexico would be provisionally admitted by the immigration authorities, with the obligation of remaining in the port of entry while the Ministry of the Interior resolved each case.3 The tradition of solidarity between Mexico and politically persecuted people was more precisely defined by Cárdenas at the end of 1936: The policy of Mexico [. . .] not only adheres to the universally established norms, but throughout our history has made a permanent effort to achieve the evolution of the law in the correct sense of justice for nations and liberality for men, whatever their provenance or origin.  Faithful to this behavior, Mexico now feels the obligation to demand, by way of its actions, one of the most human of conquests obtained by the Rights of Peoples: the prerogative of Asylum for political exiles.  Asylum does not necessarily assume the affinity of thinking, intentions, or tendencies between the country granting it and the person benefitting from that asylum. This concept is so evident, that it is only expressed here in order to avoid skewed interpretations, which might be fueled by mistake.4

1 See Serrano Migallón, El asilo político, 49–92. 2 “El general Lázaro Cárdenas al abrir el Congreso sus sesiones ordinarias, el 1 de sep­ tiembre de 1935,” quoted in Luis González y González, ed., Los presidentes de México ante la nación. Informes, manifiestos y documentos de 1821 a 1966 (Mexico City: Imprenta de la Cámara de Diputados, 1966), 4:16. 3 Ley General de Población, article 58. 4 “Comunicado del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, emitido por acuerdo del Presidente de la República,” Mexico City, December 7, 1936, in Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Septiembre de 1936–agosto de 1937 (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937), 1:47–48.



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The declarations made by the Mexican government in favor of the prerogative of asylum for political exiles were repeated on various occasions and published in the international press, which generated certain expectations among the public in Europe and the United States, and, evidently, among the refugees themselves, causing the number of applications for asylum to increase.5 Along with this, Mexico’s forceful and solitary protest against the Anschluss in the League of Nations—in the face of the indifference of the rest of the democratic countries—was of important symbolic significance.6 It must be remembered that this condemnation followed on those previously expressed by the Mexican government with respect to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (1935) and the Japanese invasion of China (1937), thus contributing to winning backing for Mexican foreign policy from those on the democratic side of the conflict. The main characteristic of Mexico’s policy of asylum as well as its immigration policy, as we have already mentioned, was its discretion, one of the most common mechanisms in decision-making in the field of politics. The declarations of the government did not specify who, nor how many, could benefit from Mexico’s generosity, nor what prerequisites were necessary and what mechanisms were to be followed. While some of the applications for asylum were directly underwritten by President Lázaro Cárdenas, the majority needed the approval of the minister of the interior, Ignacio García Téllez, or at least of the Department of Immigration, under his ministry. However, in Europe the applicants for asylum looked to the Mexican consulates and ambassadors, who forwarded their applications to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which in turn, as we saw in Chapter 2, authorized certain admissions without first consulting the Ministry of the Interior. Meanwhile, projects of colonization with exiles or refugees were analyzed and approved by various offices such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Promotion, the Department of Labor, the Ministry

5 We do not have exact figures on the number of applications reaching Mexico. In 1939 the Ministry of the Interior referred to an enormous number of Jews who had sought refuge in Mexico, affirming that among the applications “were thousands” of tailors, doc­ tors, engineers, chauffeurs, employees, and so on. AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, García Téllez to Cárdenas, Mexico City, January 3, 1939. 6 On Mexico´s oficial protest see Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, México frente al Anschluss, (Mexico City: SRE, 1988), 75. The protest in which Isidro Fabela declared that his government would not acknowledge any conquest made by force led to a strong protest by the German government, which was beginning to take offense at the Mexican attitude at the Geneva Forum.

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of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Immigration of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Advisory Council on Population. The discretionary measures caused problems and confusion not only among the authorities themselves—whose interpretation of the matter sometimes differed— but also among those who were applying to the Mexican government for protection. According to the first declarations of President Cárdenas, asylum was offered to political refugees and exiles. This implied a distinction between this group and nonpolitical refugees, primarily based on the reason refuge was sought, and taking into account the individual political activities of the persecuted persons. The matter was made clearer in 1938 when Ignacio García Téllez declared that, while no conclusions concerning international obligations had been reached, the country would only receive as persecuted immigrants those who were “prominent fighters for social progress, valiant defenders of Republican institutions, or select expositors of science and the arts [. . .] being careful, on the other hand, that disorganized or fraudulent immigrations, which were a danger as a social burden or competition that would displace our working classes, were not allowed in.”7 The distinction between political and nonpolitical refugees was greatly expanded during the final two years of Cárdenas’s term. Jews fleeing from Hitler’s regime were not initially considered refugees, but rather immigrants, and therefore subject to the laws and multiple resolutions, public and secret, that governed the admission of foreigners at this time. By mid-1938, in the face of the Évian Conference and the commitment made by President Lázaro Cárdenas to facilitate immigration to the country, they began to be called political exiles, although according to the minister of the interior a clear definition of this term had not been given, nor were there official guidelines regarding the duration of time for which they would be admitted.8 Nevertheless, towards the end of 1938 it began to become clear that the definition of political refugees would not include those people fleeing Nazism. There is a lot of information available that documents this. A conversation between Minister of the Interior García Téllez and a representative of the North American Jewish

7 “Discurso inaugural de la Primera Quincena Pro-Población, pronunciado por el secretario de Gobernación, Ignacio García Téllez, 16 de diciembre de 1938,” El Nacional, December 17, 1938. 8 AHINM, file 4-350-1935-228C, extraordinary session of the Advisory Council on Popu­ lation, Mexico City, July 22, 1938.



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organization, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC),9 was illustrative of this point. In this conversation the latter tried to ascertain whether the Mexican government would be willing to support a proposal for colonization with German and Austrian refugees: At the end of an hour of back and forth discussion, during which he pointed out that Mexico admits political but not religious exiles, they being more numerous and very hard for a country going through what this country is, to absorb. I answered that these refugees were certainly political, and asked him if he thought that by changing his religion a Jew in Germany would be permitted an Aryan’s rights? He saw the point. I also directed his attention to the fact that we are not asking Mexico to absorb anybody.10

Around 1939 the Ministry of the Interior coined the term “racial refugees” referring to the Jews, defining them precisely as those people who “had sought asylum due to racial persecution.”11 He also acknowledged that the policy followed in their case was different than the one followed for political refugees.12 The Beginnings of Internal Pressure and the Évian Conference In February 1938 the International Conference on Adopting a Convention concerning the Status of Refugees from Germany took place in Geneva. The main objective was to reach a definitive agreement that would guarantee the refugees not only safety, but also some minimum rights of nationality. Mexico sent as its representatives Andrés A. Guffanti (as an observer) and Isidro Fabela. Guffanti in his report alluded to the intention of the countries bordering Germany to find places for definitive reemigration for the refugees who had been temporarily in exile there. In this regard, all 9 The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee—known as the Joint—emerged during the First World War, when the main Jewish charity organizations came together to assist the Jewish Committee for Support of War Victims and send direct aid to the territories occupied by Germany. Ben Sasson, Historia del pueblo judío, 1103. Later the Joint continued working as a philanthropic organization. During the Holocaust it was the cen­ tral body of American Judaism for aiding and saving European Jews. After the war the JDC was the main Jewish organization financing the survivors of the displaced persons camps. Yad Vashem, Shoá. Enciclopedia del Holocausto (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem / EDZ Nativ, 2000), 305–6. 10 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743 (1), [unsigned], New York, February 21, 1939. 11 Ignacio García Téllez, “Puntos de vista de la Secretaría de Gobernación, en relación con el otorgamiento de asilo a los refugiados políticos,” Migración y Población 1, no. 1 (1940). 12 See Chapter 4.

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eyes were on Latin America, considered to “have advantageous conditions for receiving this contingent.” Reference was also made to the fact that the reluctance of European countries, “regardless of any humanitarian aspect,” was due to the difficulty of assimilation that this emigrant population presented, since, along with political considerations, it was feared that a large group of refugees would negatively influence the labor market “and, as far as the Jewish emigration is concerned, their commercial life.”13 The reluctance to receive Jewish refugees was general. In this sense it is probable that the participation of the Mexican representatives in international conferences on the matter contributed to reinforcing a more restrictive position, instead of promoting international cooperation and the opening of ports, which was in theory the purpose of these meetings. Guffanti, however, recommended that Mexico sign the aforementioned convention, “especially in view of the declarations of our Government— published in European newspapers—on the broadmindedness and the humanitarian and generous spirit with which it is willing to face this universal refugee problem.”14 Isidro Fabela, who had, as we have seen, previously considered it to be an essentially European problem, maintained that Mexico could sign the convention, with the necessary reservations, “which would, in my opinion, reconcile with the guidelines set forth by our government on this matter.”15 However, in the end Mexico did not sign the final agreement of the convention. In March of that same year, the American president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, invited the Mexican government to participate in a conference that would take place in July 1938 in Évian, France, in order to coordinate international efforts to promote the immigration of political refugees from Germany and Austria. As we mentioned earlier, Mexico accepted the invitation.16 The connection between these events, and especially the positive answer of the Mexican government, have been linked to a desire of the latter to lessen any differences between the two countries, precisely since the oil expropriation marked one of the “crucial peaks” of the nationalism forged in the Mexican Revolution. In Lorenzo Meyer’s words:

13 AHSRE, file. III-541-5, Final Report on the International Conference for adopting a Convention concerning the Statute of Refugees from Germany, sent by Andrés A. Guffanti to SRE, [Geneva], March 8, 1938. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 AHSRE, file III-1246-9 (1), fs. 1–2, memorandum from the ambassador of the United States of America, Mexico City, March 24, 1938.



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From this moment on, tendencies that hoped to diminish points of conflict with the great powers and underline the points of agreement in common interests, were on the rise. With Mexico’s defiance in 1938 of the great oil consortiums and their governments, the capacity of Mexico to openly defy the international economic order imposed by the central economies reached one of its limits.17

The acceptance has also been tied to the intention of the Mexican government to ingratiate itself with those sectors of public opinion in the United States that had expressed criticism of the Mexican government’s attitude towards the Jewish immigrants. The fact that in May 1938 the Mexican government condemned anti-Semitic unrest in the country by means of a communiqué that was cited in the American press may also be interpreted in this way.18 Since the participation of the Mexican government in the Évian Conference marked the first time the country had been involved in the problems of the refugees expelled by German National Socialism, it forced the government to define its position more precisely. In his reply to Roosevelt’s government, the minister of foreign affairs declared that “Mexico is most willing to take in the refugees in question, within the limits of our immigration laws,” since for humanitarian reasons he judged that on this occasion too the hospitable tradition of the country should be made clear to the fullest extent and with good will.19 It must also be emphasized that this was the first time that Jews expelled by Nazism were referred to as refugees. In preparation for the conference, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew up a document entitled “The Évian Conference. Reasons for convening it and the policy Mexico will follow there,” in which a first proposal for receiving Jewish refugees to Mexico was included: Those who are willing to join the productive effort of Mexican farmers, those who wish to devote themselves to agricultural labor, as well as prominent professionals, highly skilled technicians, and specialists in various fields of knowledge, who, expelled from their centers of investigation and work, wish to come to contribute their experience and knowledge to the study and

17 Meyer, México y el mundo, 163–64. 18 AGN, PLC, file 521/4, national secretary of the Jewish People Committee to Cárdenas, New York, May 19, 1938. 19 AHSRE, file III-1246-9 (1), fs. 3–4, Hay to Daniels, Mexico City, March 26, 1938.

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chapter three exploitation of natural resources and the improvement of agriculture and industry will receive preferential welcome.20

This apparent change of heart of the Mexican authorities responds, first, to pressure exerted by the United States, but also to the internationalization of the conflict, which by now affected, directly or indirectly, almost the entire Western world. The stipulations of the Mexican proposal not only broadened the criteria on accepting immigrants, but also the desired profile of the latter, which would benefit many refugees who had no connection with agricultural activities.21 Even though the document stated that the differential tables stipulated by the Law of Population should be taken into account when considering the number of refugees to be admitted, it also contemplated broadening those tables if necessary.22 The willingness of the Mexican government did not appear to be just a means of grooming its relations with the United States or maintaining the image projected by Mexico to the world. In the sessions of the Advisory Council on Population the matter was brought up and the profile of acceptable refugees was discussed; these included farmers, outstanding technicians, and industrialists. The minister of the interior, who even read a proposal for an agreement for receiving refugees, “shared the criteria that the doors should not be closed on those who distressfully sought asylum, because they are persecuted and their lives are in danger, and said that what should be done was to set up bases for admitting these foreigners.” This contrasts greatly with the public declarations made by García Téllez on the matter. When some of the members of the council expressed their reluctance to open the doors for Jewish refugees, García Téllez answered that the admission of political exiles was an international obligation that President Cárdenas had promised to carry out.23 In a later session, Francisco

20 Ibid., f. 44, “La Conferencia de Évian. Razones para convocarla y política que México seguirá en ella,” [n.p.], [n.d.]. 21 Juan Felipe Pozo, “La presencia de México en la Conferencia de Évian: propuestas teóricas y realizaciones concretas (1938–1942)” (unpublished manuscript, 1996), 33. 22 As was mentioned earlier, the differential tables for 1938 allowed the admission of up to 5,000 immigrants coming from Germany and 5,000 from Austria. “Acuerdo por el cual se fijan las tablas diferenciales que regirán la admisión de extranjeros, en calidad de inmigrantes durante el año de 1938,” article 2, Diario Oficial, November 19, 1937. 23 AHINM, file 4-350-1935-228C, extraordinary session of the Advisory Council on Popu­lation, July 22, 1938. In this same session García Téllez read a list of applications for asylum that consisted of 662 Austrians, 440 Poles, 289 Germans, 187 Russians, and 118 Armenians, among others, of whom 240 were electrical engineers, 150 employees, 125 experts in mechanical industry, 29 typists, 86 workers, 84 professors, 78 seamstresses, 75 chauffeurs, 72 travel agents, and 58 lawyers. Among the applicants, 91 spoke Spanish.



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Trejo, the general director of population, once again pointed out that “in the face of the presidential commitment” refuge should be offered to those who, for political, religious, or racial reasons, sought to flee to Mexico. The head of the Department of Immigration, Andrés Landa y Piña, also made reference to the decision made by Cárdenas: “This is so because the President of the Republic has declared that he has no racial or religious prejudices, and the offer to give asylum to those who need it is based on this consideration and on the urgency of assisting a sector of humanity in deep grief.” Later on he added: I can tell you that every day I receive dozens of humbly imploring statements from individuals who are mainly in Austria, stating that their lives are in danger, that their goods will be confiscated, etc. And in the face of this situation it is my desire to be able to answer opportunely that their applications must be granted.24

The Ministry of the Interior, through its various departments, came out in support of the president. Up to this point, according to Trejo, not a single authorization had been granted.25 Mexico designated Primo Villa Michel, a lawyer who had been a legal consultant for the Ministry of the Interior and who was at that time Mexican ambassador to the United Kingdom, to be the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the Évian Conference.26 At the Évian Conference on July 9, 1938, he honored Mexican diplomacy by giving a speech that was very empathetic with the cause of those who were being persecuted, and by reiterating the hospitable tradition of the country towards political refugees, without making any specific commitments: My country has always maintained a tradition of hospitality and understanding with respect to political refugees. Those who have gone to Mexico have received favorable welcome and have enjoyed total liberty and safety, and all of the possibilities to which foreigners have a right.  Recently our Minister of the Interior, acting with this tradition in mind and interpreting the point of view of the government, told this convention that Mexico has offered asylum based on profound humanitarian motives to 24 AHINM, file 4-350-1935-228C, Session of the Advisory Council on Population, July 29, 1938. 25 Ibid. 26 Primo Villa Michel had previously expressed the opinion that undesirable foreign­ ers should not be allowed to enter the country. Among these he included Blacks, Arabs, Armenians, Turks, Syrian-Lebanese, Poles, and Czechs who came to devote themselves to “miserable business,” displacing the lower classes from small businesses. AHINM, file 4/350-1929/426, quoted in Yankelevich and Chenillo, “Política de inmigración,” 198–99.

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chapter three foreigners who are seeking a safe place and an atmosphere where they can enjoy freedom of thought and legal activities.  Thus it has been in a spirit of true solidarity and international cooperation that my government has decided to accept the invitation made by the leader of American democracy. We are prepared to contribute to the extent of our legal, social, and economic possibilities to the solution of this immense problem of justice, humanity, and civilization which we are now considering.27

These declarations were interpreted in various spheres as a sincere expression of the Mexican regime’s sympathy for the cause of the refugees and as a promise of asylum. A statement from the Mexican Jewish community, for example, affirmed that the Mexican representative “gave a note of optimism to this international meeting, fervently promising asylum to the exiles who were victims of Nazism.”28 Primo Villa Michel supported the proposal that emerged from Évian for forming a permanent Intergovernmental Committee, taking into account “that it might be very useful in defending ourselves if we so desire, to keep us in proportion with what the rest of the American countries are doing, or to go as far as our policies and immigration laws allow us to.” The Mexican representative also reported that the final statement of the conference was the object of multiple negotiations, due to the fact that the Nordic countries and those of Central and South America demanded “that Germany not be bothered at all.” Villa Michel did not see the need for including any reservations or political references, due to the fact that “taking into account the nature of the Intergovernmental Committee, its humanitarian ends and concrete proposals on an existing situation, the document has no effect or influence on the de facto or de jure political position that we have with the Reich.”29 According to Haim Avni, the goal of the Évian Conference was to demonstrate to American public opinion as well as to the rest of the world that the United States was carrying out concrete actions in favor of the victims of Nazism in Austria and Germany.30 The attitude of sympathizing with the refugees without making any direct commitments that prevailed during the conference was in reality instigated by President Roosevelt’s 27 AHSRE, file III-1246-9 (1), Speech given by the Mexican representative to the Évian Conference, Primo Villa Michel, Évian, July 9, 1938. 28 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, file 96, f. 31, “Los ‘falsos turistas’ pueden ser elemen­ tos útiles para el país,” [Mexico City], [n.d.]. 29 AHSRE, file III-1246-9 (1), fs. 83–85, Villa Michel to Hay, Geneva, July 18, 1938. 30 Avni, Role of Latin America, 22.



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invitation itself, in which he clarified that no country would be expected to take in more refugees than its laws permitted.31 The Évian Conference was brought to a close on July 15, 1938, and Primo Villa Michel reported with satisfaction to the minister of foreign affairs that he had not had to use any of the instructions he had received.32 However, it should be noted that the Mexican government was willing to broaden its criteria with respect to Jewish refugees if international pressure obliged it to do so. The only tangible result of this conference was the creation of an Intergovernmental Committee that would continue working in favor of the refugees fleeing Nazism. The Continuation of the Évian Conference: The Intergovernmental Committee The objective of the Intergovernmental Committee was to continue to develop the work begun at the Évian Conference, coordinating international efforts related to the situation of the refugees from Germany and Austria. The Mexican delegate to this committee was Gustavo Luders de Negri, who was Mexico’s consul general in London.33 Due to the fact that his appointment was not accompanied by any instructions at all from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luders de Negri had to repeatedly ask the Chancellery for instructions, at first requesting the circulars related to the prerequisites for immigration to Mexico.34 The personal opinions of the consul coincided closely with the reservations the Mexican government had on the matter, while at the same time he nonchalantly expressed strong anti-Jewish prejudices: It is well known that the elements who seek refuge make up nonassimilable groups and that the experiences of other countries has shown that, in the long run, when the number of Jews is considerable, they become an exclusive caste, dominating and powerful, having no ties to internal problems. If we must take them in, it should be as few as possible, selecting them

31 AHSRE, file III-1246-9 (1), Daniels to Hay, Mexico City, March 24, 1938. 32 Ibid., fs. 83–85, Villa Michel to Hay, Geneva, July 18, 1938. 33 Apparently his designation owed to practical motives, since Primo Villa Michel would have been unable to attend the meeting and Luders de Negri was in London. 34 Luders de Negri asked for instructions in August 1938, and repeated his plea in Janu­ ary and March 1939. AHSRE, file III-1246-9 (1).

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chapter three carefully, and only when they will not constitute an economic or ethnic burden to the country.35

Beyond his personal opinions, the Mexican delegate’s general impression of the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee, which took place in London in August 1938, was that there was a general lack of commitment and an obvious manipulation of all matters by the United States, France, and England, who devoted themselves to mutual praise, “giving the impression that everything had been prepared beforehand.”36 Luders de Negri alluded to the clear preoccupation of those states with finding accommodations for the refugees outside their borders. In this sense, there was a clear intention to use Latin America to “free Europe of great masses of surplus population—mainly Jews—in order to alleviate the economic situation of certain countries.”37 Without precise instructions on how to act, Luders de Negri simply limited himself to sending the Ministry of Foreign Affairs his recommendations on the point of view the Mexican government should take with respect to admitting refugees. In August 1938, shortly after receiving his commission, he proposed that “in order to give proof of Mexico’s goodwill in helping find a solution to this problem,” Mexico should take in up to one thousand refugees a year. This measure would be well received and would not constitute a problem for the country, since five thousand refugees over the course of five years could easily adapt to the national economic life, even more so if they were selected very carefully. Thus, they would also be complying with President Roosevelt’s proposal on how to solve a problem of general interest.38 In his later communiqués Luders de Negri suggested adopting a more restrictive position, without a doubt influenced by the trend prevailing at the meetings: the lack of commitment on the part of most of the governments, and the reluctance of all of them to open their doors to Jewish exiles. In January 1939, for example, he recommended “that our answer be worded in such a way that it leaves the door open for accepting only those elements that it would be in the interest of the country to accept, letting in only a limited number of people

35 Ibid., de Negri to SRE, London, August 15, 1938. 36 Ibid. The committee estimated that they needed to find asylum for 300,000 people over a five-year period. The United States was admitting about 20,000 individuals per year. The Dominican Republic also offered to receive between 50,000 and 100,000 refugees as long as they had economic resources for setting themselves up. 37 Ibid., de Negri’s report, London, March 20, 1939. 38 Ibid., de Negri to Hay, London, August 31, 1938.



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and only when the economic conditions of the country could absorb them without any detriment to ourselves.”39 The Mexican representative was also observant of the position of the other Latin American countries, and proposed that the Mexican government adopt a solution similar to that chosen by the government of Peru. The latter only accepted agricultural workers who had enough seed money, assigning them to areas they deemed appropriate, and did not commit itself to accepting any specific number, but rather only those who would serve the interests of the state.40 In July 1939 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wondered whether it was in the best interest of the country to continue to take part in the Intergovernmental Committee, “in view of the failure of said Committee and the impossibility of any real cooperation on the part of Mexico to take in Jewish immigrants.”41 However, by presidential agreement, it was decided that Mexico would continue to collaborate with the organization, in line with the general tenor of Mexican foreign policy and its emphasis on maintaining forms and participating in international organizations. This was especially desirable when the initiative came from Roosevelt’s government and when Mexico’s participation apparently did not demand anything more than the payment of the annual fee.42 The next meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee took place in October 1939 in Washington, DC, and therefore Mexico was represented by its ambassador to Washington, Francisco Castillo Nájera. In this meeting the president of the United States declared that the situation had worsened considerably with the war (which had broken out in September of that year) and also due to the fact that it was impossible for England and France to continue cooperating in the matter of asylum. With respect to Latin American countries, Castillo Nájera reported, all of them except the Dominican Republic refused to receive refugees.43 The failure of the Évian Conference and the Intergovernmental Committee was due to various factors, most importantly the lack of government financing to support the resettlement of the refugees (it was practically impossible for private organizations, Jewish and non-Jewish, to solve the 39 Ibid., de Negri to Hay, London, January 25, 1939. 40 Ibid., letter from the delegate of Peru to the president of the Intergovernmental Committee, January 12, 1939, sent by de Negri to Hay, London, January 25, 1939. 41 Ibid., memorandum for presidential agreement endorsed by SRE, Mexico City, July 27, 1939. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., Castillo Nájera to Hay, Washington, DC, October 19, 1939.

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problem); the anti-Semitism of some of the participating governments; the lack of pressure by the important powers (due to the fact that by putting pressure on other countries they, at the same time, would be forced to change their own conduct in relation to the refugee problem); the failure of negotiations with Germany to allow Jews to take part of their capital out of the Reich; and general indifference in the face of a minority that no one wanted to take in. Once both of these organizations failed, it became clear that it would be very difficult—maybe even impossible—to reach any international agreement on helping the refugees, who would virtually be left to their own fate, with the help of a few private aid agencies. To some measure the existence of the Intergovernmental Committee had a counterproductive effect since, as seen in the Mexican case, it offered Western governments a good excuse to do nothing for the refugees as long as international agreements were not reached. The Mexican minister of the interior expressed this opinion several times. To his way of thinking the government maintained a position of hospitality towards the victims of the dictatorships, however, so that its behavior be in keeping with that of the countries represented at the Intergovernmental Convention of London, we should wait to see what the other countries as a whole are going to contribute and allow in coming to the rescue of the refugees, so that they enjoy the peace and freedom they long for, without affecting the internal economy nor the rights of the native workers.44

In fact, Ignacio García Téllez told the minister of foreign affairs, Eduardo Hay, that after seeing the course taken in the meetings at Évian, he had noticed the frankly reserved attitude of all of the nations toward allowing immigrants entrance—even among those countries who had extensive territories in their colonies and whose resources were far superior to Mexico’s—and insinuated that no more should be expected of Mexico than of the countries who had done nothing at all.45 Later on, in 1940, the Ministry of the Interior once again justified the limited acceptance of refugees persecuted for racial reasons by the fact that even the democratic countries had not reached an agreement on the matter. 44 “Discurso Inaugural de la Primera Quincena Pro-Población, pronunciado por el sec­ retario de Gobernación, Ignacio García Téllez,” El Nacional, December 17, 1938. He also made similar declarations in the memorandum he sent to President Cárdenas in January 1939. AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, memorandum from García Téllez to Cárdenas, Mexico City, January 3, 1939. 45 AHSRE, file III-1246-I (1), García Téllez to Hay, March 23, 1939.



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We think this at least partly explains the change of attitude of the Mexican authorities, who in July of 1938 had seriously considered the possibility of opening the country’s doors to the Jewish exiles—for humanitarian reasons—and shortly after had apparently decided to back off. Various internal and external situations had influenced this decision, resulting in a failure to take advantage of the initial willingness to aid in a solution to this international problem. Among the external influences, the experience of Mexican authorities in the international forums on the question of refuge for the Jews expelled by Nazism, where they could observe the relaxed attitude of all the nations, definitely played a role. However, in Mexico, the statements made by the Mexican representative to Évian were interpreted literally by the Jewish community, who even formed a special committee to receive the refugees. The Creation of the Committee for Refugees and Its Relations with the Government As we mentioned earlier, the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce had presented the question of accepting Jewish refugees to President Lázaro Cárdenas in 1935, and by 1937 it had taken charge of processing the first applications for admission to Mexico, quite unsuccessfully. Up to this point it had been this organization, which in practice was the institution that represented the Jewish community, that was in charge of centralizing all processes related to refugees. In May 1938, two months after the announcement of the Évian Conference, the Jewish community in Mexico organized the Comité Pro Refugiados (Committee for Refugees, CPR). It had a double objective: on the one hand it tried to negotiate with the authorities the admission of Germans and Austrians into the country, and on the other it took charge of the situation—mainly economic—of the few who did reach Mexico, these almost always being exceptional cases. It seems that the creation of this committee responded, at least in part, to a government initiative, specifically to the recommendations made by the head of the Office of Population, Francisco Trejo.46 The idea of creating this kind of organization seems to have been related to the 46 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 5, f. 1, Pro Refugee Committee of México to Ignacio García Téllez, Mexico City, July 15, 1938. Ibid., file 9, f. 1, CPR to the General Direc­ tor of Population, Francisco Trejo, Mexico City, August 13, 1938.

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presumption on the part of some government employees, like Trejo, that the government would be compelled to make immigration easier. In the first sessions of the Advisory Council on Population in which the question was taken up, García Téllez as well as Trejo expressed their opinions that the CPR would cooperate in finding a solution to the problem, taking care of the needs of those who sought asylum in the country.47 The emergence of the CPR was also a result of the Jewish community’s interest in having an organization that dealt specifically with the matter, especially in the wake of the crisis of 1938, and its need for a body that could act as a go-between with the government. Once the conflict was internationalized, like the Western countries who could not stand aside, the Jewish communities in those countries could not—or chose not—to stand by and watch (especially the Ashkenazi sectors, these being directly involved through familial and emotional ties with those who were expelled from Germany and Austria). León Behar was president and Marcos Corona secretary of the CPR when it was constituted on May 10, 1938.48 Among its main tasks was arranging the legalization of those foreigners who were not in strict accordance with the Law of Population; negotiating the applications for new arrivals, giving preference to those who were persecuted for political or racial reasons; backing the applications for naturalization of foreigners who wished to settle in the country permanently; and contributing to the “dignification” of Mexico abroad by promoting American tourism in Mexico.49

47 AHINM, file 4-350-1935-228C, extraordinary session of the Advisory Council on Population, Mexico City, July 22, 1938. 48 León Behar, of Sephardic origin, was later the first president of the Israelite Cen­ tral Committee of México and headed that organization during 1938–1940, 1941–1942, and 1943. Marcos Corona, of Ashkenazi origin, was one of the most active leaders of the Jewish community at that time, in charge of matters of aid to refugees; he was president of the Israelite Popular League and secretary general of the Central Committee between 1938 and 1941. The executive committee of the CPR was made up by León Behar (president), Jacobo Landau (vice president), Jacobo Glantz (secretary of acts), Moisés Rosenberg (secretary of propaganda), I. Warman (secretary of finances), D. S. Rafalín (treasurer), and Moisés Glikowski (executive secretary). AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 7, act no. 1 of the CPR, July 29, 1938. 49 AKA, CCIM, Antidifamación, file 1, CPR to Trejo, Mexico City, May 28, 1938. In these cases, the term “foreigners” should be understood to mean foreigners of Jewish origin, since in the beginning the committee did not have as one of its objectives dealing with other types of immigrants (although later on it did collaborate in the disembarking of non-Jewish political refugees).



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The CPR declared their main concern to be new arrivals, especially political refugees, and to this end, they offered to cooperate fully with the government of the republic.50 However, through an analysis of the documents of this organization, we can see more concern for guaranteeing permanent legal residence and sustenance to those who were already in the country than for negotiating the admission of new refugees. This was probably due to their limited success in obtaining entrance permits and the immediacy of the problems of those who had already arrived.51 During the first few months of work, the CPR made their way through a progressive process of “deception.” A few days after the declarations made by Primo Villa Michel in Évian, genuine optimism reigned among the members, and the marked intention to support the government “who with a spirit of such humanity has decided to open its doors to the victims of the totalitarian systems ruling in some countries of the old world”52 was obvious. Having in mind the admission of a large number of refugees, the committee made a proposal to the minister of the interior, as a collective solution to the problem, asking that the new arrivals be allowed to work, which was forbidden by the existing Law of Population.53 They also requested, among other things, the suppression of the repatriation bond, because the exiles could not withdraw their capital when emigrating, and the modification of the existing differential tables in order to remove Poland from the list of countries of undesirable immigration: up to this point only one hundred Poles were allowed entrance per year.54 The first assessment of the Committee for Refugees’ progress quickly crushed members’ hopes, illustrating the difficulties they faced. After several months they had only obtained two permits for the admission of refugees and one successful legalization, while all of the other cases were 50 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 5, fs. 1–2, CPR to García Téllez, Mexico City, July 15, 1938. 51 It is interesting to verify that the committee clearly differentiated between refugees and immigrants. We believe this was based on geographical differences: refugees were those who came from Germany, Austria, and Poland, while the others were considered immigrants. It should also be pointed out that the committee was aware that the best opportunities the country offered were for political refugees. 52 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 5, fs. 1–2 and 4, CPR to García Téllez, Mexico City, July 15, 1938. And he later reiterated: “Tenemos conocimiento de que varios hom­ bres eminentes de ciencia desean establecerse en la República Mexicana, acogiéndose al derecho de asilo que con tanta bondad les ha sido ofrecido.” (We know that various emi­ nent men of science wish to set themselves up in the Mexican Republic, opting for the right of asylum which has been so graciously offered to them). 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid.

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pending or being processed: with reference to immigrants, only six admission permits and twelve legalizations had been obtained.55 The silence of the Ministry of the Interior, which had not responded to any of the communiqués sent by the committee, “gives the impression that our requests are not being taken into account with the attention they merit.”56 The failure of the ministry to answer was a good indication of the way things were changing. The CPR then addressed Francisco Trejo, with whom they apparently had a close relationship,57 in order to express their surprise and consternation, informing him that the work of European and North American Jewish organizations who were studying projects for agricultural colonization could not be completed “because the position of the Mexican government in relation to these projects and the admission of Israelite refugees in general has not been determined up to now.”58 In fact, the committee told Trejo that they felt a certain degree of withdrawal by the government on the matter of awarding entry permits: It is striking that after the first official declaration offering asylum to the victims of Nazism, the Ministry of the Interior awarded written permits, with the understanding that under such and such conditions the entrance of the applicants would be authorized, and recommended the ratification of their applications by the C[itizen] Consuls of Mexico abroad. Nevertheless, once various interested parties had accepted the conditions and ratified their applications, thus exposing themselves to the inhuman persecution of the Nazi regime, the entrance permits were not awarded. Our records show that after three months’ work, only two of these permissions have been granted. Many of those who have sought asylum with us are willing to invest their capital in industrial and agricultural establishments, completely in keeping with what is set down in the Law of Population, and we have communicated this to the Office under your worthy charge. Despite this, our applications are pending, and are not receiving proper processing. These events have resulted in many of the applicants losing faith in the actions of the Committee for Refugees in Mexico as well as in the promises of asylum that they have been given.59

The head of the Office of Population advised the committee to request a meeting with the minister of the interior, who was in charge of the cases 55 Ibid., file 7, act no. 1 of the CPR, July 29, 1938. 56 Ibid., file 9, f. 3, CPR to Trejo, Mexico City, August 13, 1938. 57 In the letter the “loyal and harmonious” policy of cooperation that on Trejo’s insis­ tence had been established with the committee was mentioned. Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid.



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of admission of refugees, admitting that he himself had no influence on the decisions that were made in this respect.60 Taking his advice, the CPR immediately requested a meeting with Ignacio García Téllez, but it was not granted. Given the lack of response from the Ministry of the Interior, the committee sent a telegraph directly to the president of the republic to ask him to expedite the process of arranging asylum for the German and Austrian exiles, stating that a multitude of foreign societies and individuals in urgent need of asylum “are constantly hounding us” without any progress being made in this matter up to now. They also asked for a meeting with him to discuss the matter in detail.61 We do not know how Cárdenas responded. The attitude assumed by the secretary of the interior toward the situation of the refugees seems to have had a correlation with how the question of the naturalization and legalization of the Jews who had entered the country in previous years was addressed. With respect to the former, the committee made reference to the difficulties that foreigners who tried to seek Mexican naturalization met: We have data on the hundreds of applications for PRIVILEGED Naturalization in accordance with the existing laws on the matter, which have been being processed for the last three or four years, despite the privileges that according to the Law should be granted to the applicants, since they have children born in the country, and have resided here for many years, having legal means of sustenance.62

With respect to those immigrants whose immigration status needed regularizing, the Committee for Refugees charged that after the Ministry of the Interior had promoted the normalization of their status according to the law, assuring there would be neither deportation nor fines, exactly the opposite happened: in some cases attempts at legalization incurred very high fines (over 500 and up to 1,000 pesos), and in others deportation orders were issued for those who had tried to regularize their status. The CPR made reference to the specific case of José Gurfinkiel, a young man of Polish nationality, captured and threatened with deportation after the committee had presented his file for legalization to the Ministry of

60 Ibid. 61  AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, Extract from a mailogram sent by Behar to Cárdenas, Mexico City, October 7, 1938. 62 AKA, CCIM, Refugados, Diáspora, file 9, f. 4, CPR to Trejo, Mexico City, August 13, 1938.

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the Interior.63 Apparently the government had promised not to deport anyone without giving the CPR the opportunity to defend him, but failed to do so in this case. The report on Gurfinkiel, written by a representative of HIAS,64 communicated the desperation, sadness, and frustration of the members of the committee, to which was added the fear that they themselves, without realizing it, were “denouncing” those foreigners who needed legalization, allowing the government to seize them.65 The problem of those Jews who wished to be naturalized or legalize their status does not have a direct bearing on our subject, but it offers a good opportunity to consider the issue of the integration of foreigners into the Mexican nation from another perspective: not from the perspective of the capacity of different groups to assimilate, but rather from the perspective of the state’s capacity and willingness to integrate—or not— foreigners into the country. The obstacles from the Ministry of the Interior were not the only ones faced by the Committee for Refugees. They also faced strong criticism from the heart of the Mexican Jewish community, whose members questioned the need for maintaining an organization that was not really doing anything. The constant criticism and objections—largely a reflection of the ideological differences that existed within the Jewish group—profoundly affected all of the Jewish organizations of the era. The CPR, worried about its legitimacy, argued that the lack of activity was due to the slow progress of the matters awaiting resolution in the Ministry of the Interior.66

63 Ibid., file 9, fs. 2–3, CPR to Trejo, Mexico City, August 13, 1938. José Gurfinkiel was found, according to Special Services, to be performing work that his status as a student did not permit. He was fined 100 and later 500 pesos, and after having promised before the Ministry of the Interior and the Pro Refugee Committee to not violate the laws again, he was sent to Veracruz for deportation. The committee thought it had done everything pos­ sible to prevent the deportation of this man, since given the political situation in Poland, it would have been catastrophic for him. We have no information on how this case ended. 64 The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) was the first organization that helped Jewish emigrants in Europe, mainly from Russia, with their process of resettlement. It was founded in New York in 1909. 65 HIAS-HICEM Archives, series I, file XIII, Mexico City 4, 1938, Dr. M. Joel Freedman and Florence B. Freedman, “Additional Report on Investigation of Mexican Situation in Respect to Immigration,” sent to HIAS, August 1938. 66 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 7, f. 15, act no. 5 of the CPR, September 2, 1938. In November of 1938 the Israelite Central Committee, recently established, explained the distrust the refugees themselves had in this organization, “because up to now the legal­ ization of their documents has not been carried out.” AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 6, November 29, 1938.



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An analysis of the sessions of the Committee for Refugees shows that, in effect, the matter of the Jewish refugees was in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior or, more precisely, the hands of its minister, and only presidential intervention could prevent drastic actions from taking place. Apparently not even the head of the Office of Population seemed to have any say in the matter. The analysis also shows the lack of contacts that the organization could rely on in order to reach its goals.67 From what we can see, the Ministry of the Interior paid little attention to the matter and apparently never answered any of the communiqués sent by the CPR.68 The Arrival of the First Jewish Refugees As was already mentioned, a few Jewish immigrants were able to enter Mexico because they happened to be covered by exceptions set down in the law (mainly because they had relatives in the country who were able to arrange their admission) or because they were able to take advantage of gaps in the immigration policy. According to a report of the Joint Distribution Committee, the problem of Jewish refugees in Mexico began in August 1938, when the first seekers of asylum arrived at the port of Veracruz from the Rhineland and Austria. Their disembarkment was apparently not entirely trouble-free: while they had tourist visas signed by the honorary Mexican consul in Cologne, they obviously did not have sufficient economic resources.69 The CPR had to support at least five of these refugees, with the help of B’nai B’rith: an airplane mechanic, two farmers, a tailor, and a merchant, who were put up

67 This was discussed at the time. Besides the general director of population, the members of the committee sought the support of Vicente Lombardo Toledano and of the president of the League for German Culture, Dr. Luft, who, according to them, was very influential in official departments and could collaborate with the committee in more complicated matters. AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 7, f. 10, act no. 4 of the CPR, August 26, 1938. 68 In the first meeting of the committee, however, was mentioned an interview between three of its members (its president León Behar, the secretary of propaganda, Moisés Rosenberg, and the executive secretary, Moisés Glikowski) and the minister of the interior, although there is no report on the results of this meeting. Reference was also made to a meeting Behar had with the head of the Department of Immigration. Ibid., fs. 1–2, act no. 1 of the CPR, July 29, 1938. 69 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743, The Jewish Community in Mexico, September 5, 1939, p. 2.

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in a guest house and given assistance in finding work.70 A short time later the CPR announced that it had not been able to find work for the airplane mechanic, nor had it located opportunities for the farmers, and that the Casa Grossman had refused to employ the tailor.71 Nevertheless, two of the refugees seemed to have a good chance of legalizing their status and remaining in the country. The first was Mr. Munz, the airplane mechanic, who apparently had official help, and the second Mr. Kaufman, “because he had documents certifying that he had been in a concentration camp in Germany, and therefore, was a real case of political asylum.”72 However, later on Kaufman was included in a group of fourteen refugees who were threatened with deportation for having come into the country as tourists and for not having a valid passport. As the situation worsened for German and Austrian Jews, the number of refugees arriving in Mexico with tourist visas rose. They came with the hope of later being able to change their status and extend their stay. It was the honorary Mexican consuls in Cologne and Vienna, apparently both of Jewish origin, who issued this type of visa to the refugees. We have no information on the former. About the Mexican consul in Vienna, we know only that his name was Francisco Stein.73 Some refugees indicated that they had submitted their applications in his consulate, including Josef Wolynsky, who gave this information when he was detained by the Special Migratory Services,74 and Ernst Brauner, one of the Austrians who arrived on the Orinoco, who affirmed that in his case the document signed by Consul Stein included a specific authorization from the head of the Department of Immigration, Andrés Landa y Piña, authorizing his 70 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 7, f. 12, act no. 4 of the CPR, August 26, 1938. The B’nai B’rith was in charge of economically supporting these people, with a contribu­ tion of five pesos per week per person. 71 Ibid., f. 14, act no. 5 of the CPR, September 2, 1938. 72 Ibid., act no. 6 of the CPR, September 13, 1938. 73 The consular office of Mexico in Austria was abolished in November 1938, since in order to continue to operate, it would have been necessary to obtain an exequatur for the honorary consul, which would have been equivalent to acknowledging Germany’s annexa­ tion of Austria. AHSRE, file III-230-16, memorandum from the head of the Diplomatic Department to the head of the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, November 18, 1938. 74 When the chief of Special Services pointed out to him that tourists could not work, the declarant responded “that he was not aware of the Mexican immigration laws and regulations and that when he was issued the form which he presents, he told them every­ thing he had just said, without their having refused to issue said document.” AKA, box 71, file 11, Declaration of Josef Wolynsky before Andrés Guerra, chief of Special Services of Immigration, Mexico City, October 7, 1938.



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admission as a “political exile.”75 The minister of the interior expressed his opinion on the matter: This Ministry has received reports that some consuls who issue the irregular migratory documents referred to, are honorary consuls, which certainly leads them not to feel responsible to the Government and its policies; and the others, also honorary, are foreigners and among these are some Israelites who, due to their feeling of racial solidarity, act out of the dictates of their conscience and not according to the national feeling of the Government whom they represent.76

The presence of these refugees became a serious problem because they could not return to their countries of origin; they could not remain in Mexico for more than six months nor were they allowed to change their immigration status, as set down in the General Law of Population. In addition, they were of course not allowed to perform any paid work. This was of concern not only to the authorities of the Ministry of the Interior but also to some of the leaders of the local Jewish community. The former had tried to prevent the admittance of the refugees as tourists through various regulations on travel. In fact, beginning in 1938 the head of the Department of Immigration made clear to the minister of the interior the need for abolishing Circular no. 930, of May 1937, which left it up to the consuls to document as tourists or trans-migrants those who complied with what was established in the General Law of Population, in order for the Ministry of the Interior to have the discretionary power “to admit or not, as tourists, those who applied; especially those individuals of nationalities whose immigration had been restricted.”77 This was based on the idea that the country was receiving a flow of travelers constituted apparently of masses of tourists, but in reality they are not coming to the country [. . .] except with the fixed idea of settling here any way they can; thus the effort developed by the Ministry to avoid the immigration of the elements who, for some time, have displaced and continue to displace small business owners and other activities that have always been carried out by Mexican classes with modest resources, our least favored compatriots, has been thwarted.78

75 Frank L. Kluckhohn, “Refugees Amazed by Mexico’s Action,” New York Times, Octo­ ber 31, 1938. 76 AHINM, file 4-350-2-1938-69, García Téllez to Hay, Mexico City, January 3, 1939. 77 AHINM, file 4-350-2-1933-54, Landa y Piña to García Téllez, Mexico City, January 3, 1939. 78 Ibid., Landa y Piña to García Téllez, Mexico City, February 28, 1938.

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Andrés Landa y Piña admitted that there were no statistical data to categorically demonstrate that this was the case, but cited as evidence “the direct observation, which is apparent from the public outcry, that in spite of all the restrictions on immigration, the presence of undesirable elements continues to grow.”79 In reality, the head of the Department of Immigration attributed this situation to Circular no. 930, assuming that the cancelation of the restrictions was what had triggered the increase in the flow of candidates for immigration into Mexico. The data provided by Landa y Piña himself, however, did not bear out this affirmation, since in 1937, for the first time in many years, the number of people entering the country on tourist visas and overstaying their visa had greatly decreased.80 Even so, on March 12, 1938, Circular no. 930 was repealed and replaced by Circular no. 84, which established as a prerequisite that European tourists from the countries of “undesirables” had to seek prior authorization from the Ministry of the Interior to visit the country; it included as well the requirement that all tourists present a guarantee of repatriation.81 What can be clearly seen is that when the confidential circulars that limited the admittance of “undesirable” foreigners into Mexico were repealed, they were replaced by other restrictions that patched the holes in immigration legislation. With these measures, the Ministry of the Interior once again assumed sole control of the admittance of all foreigners, implementing, discretionally, many of the same criteria that had been set down in the confidential circulars of 1933 and 1934 that have already been mentioned. Within the leadership of the Jewish community, the situation of the refugee-tourists especially worried León Behar, who expressed to the head of the Department of Immigration the unsuitability of issuing tourist visas to Germans and Austrians, anticipating that later on it would become a real problem for the Jewish colony. While the board of the Committee for Refugees did not agree with its president’s personal actions (resolving 79 Ibid. 80 While in 1936, 7,258 tourists had remained in the country, in 1937 only 166 people stayed. Ibid., Landa y Piña to García Téllez, Mexico City, March 5, 1938. 81 With the exception of citizens of the United States, Guatemala, Cuba, and Canada. This guarantee was 250 pesos for the individuals from the rest of the American continents, 750 pesos for European tourists and trans-migrants, and 1,000 pesos for people of any other nationality. In any case the consuls were to ask the interested parties for personal information “and evidence that their economic situation and background guaranteed that they would not take advantage of the situation to stay illegally in the Republic following the opportunity they were given to enter the country.” AHINM, file 4-350-2-1938-69, V. Santos Guajardo, vice-minister of the interior, to SRE and others, Mexico City, March 12, 1938.



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that in the future no member would take any action that would hamper the issuing of said permissions), Behar continued to insist on the need for taking action against this “pseudo-touristic” flow.82 What the board did do was to alert the HICEM83 of Paris to the difficulties that refugees would find when trying to settle in Mexico, and to recommend that they refrain, as much as possible, from issuing tourist visas.84 The HICEM acknowledged the communiqué, but defended the use of this resource: However, we need to point out that in many cases the Hilfsverein of Berlin and the Israel Kultusgemeinde of Vienna have no alternative for rescuing people from the concentration camps but to obtain tourist visas. We hope that it will be possible to consider such tourists as real political refugees and that they will be granted permission to stay in Mexico.85

The CPR also sought Francisco Trejo’s help. He responded: “Despite my broad humanitarian spirit, and with a heavy heart, I will be obliged to dictate expulsion orders for those tourists whose legal stay in the country expires.” When Moisés Glikowski intervened in the meeting between representatives of the CPR and the minister, indicating that that would mean sending them to their death, Trejo responded that the only possibility for preventing expulsion would be if he received presidential orders to the contrary.86 The discussion of refugee-tourists continued during practically all of the sessions of the Committee for Refugees for which we have

82 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 7, f. 1, act no. 1 of the CPR, July 29, 1938. 83 The HICEM was founded in 1927 with the merging of three Jewish emigration agencies: the HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society of New York), the ICA (Jewish Coloni­ zation Association, of Paris, founded by Baron Maurice de Hirsch), and Emigdirect (based in Berlin and founded in 1921 in order to centralize the work of the local organizations related to Jewish emigration). HICEM is an acronym for HIAS, ICA, and Emigdirect. Once the HICEM was formed, the HIAS of the United States continued to deal with matters tied to Jewish immigration in that country; Emigdirect abandoned the alliance in 1934, and the ICA could not contribute funds, and therefore the HICEM was financed only by the HIAS. The HICEM had its base in Paris, but with the German invasion in 1940 it moved its general headquarters to Lisbon. Its director was James Bernstein and its secretary general was Ilja Dijour. 84 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 7, f. 4, act no. 2 of the CPR, August 12, 1938. 85 HIAS-HICEM Archives, series I, file XIII, Mexico 3, letter from CPR to HIAS-New York, Mexico City, August 22, 1938 (which transmitted the application of CPR to HICEMParis) and the answer of HICEM-Paris to HIAS-New York, Paris, Sep­tember 15, 1938. 86 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 7, f. 9, act no. 4 of the CPR, August 26, 1938. Apparently the only proposal for solving the case of the refugee-tourists was made by Glikowski himself when he suggested turning them into rentiers, to this end asking various foreign Jewish societies for economic resources.

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documentation; while Behar was firm in his stance, the CPR decided to wait to see how things developed.87 The expected arrival of thirty new refugees from Austria and Germany, in September of 1938, was the motive for intense discussion within the CPR on the best way to raise money to support them. Due to the fact that the organization had no money, and that organizing collections within the local Jewish community would be insufficient and unsustainable, the need for long-term solutions was addressed; these included somehow obtaining permission for the refugees to work, as well as legalizing their stay in Mexico. The restlessness caused by the news of the imminent arrival of these refugees shows us how narrow the margin of action of the CPR was—by now it was supporting seven people—in solving the problem of those who arrived in Mexico after fleeing Nazism. There were various proposals for solving the problem: founding an agroindustrial colony, renting a house to be turned into a kind of “asylum” for newcomers,88 asking the B’nai B’rith and the HICEM for help, establishing a fixed monthly contribution for all Jewish residents in Mexico, and so on. The vice president of the CPR, Jacobo Landau, offered to cede for some years 2,800 hectares of land in Coscapá, Veracruz, where the Europeans could work under certain conditions to be stipulated later; a committee was formed to study this possibility. Also the Liga Pro Cultura Alemana (League for German Culture) (formed by anti-Nazi German exiles in 1938) offered to help, mainly with the projects for agricultural colonization, assuring that they had experts in the field and the support of the Ministry of National Economy.89 León Behar, the president of the CPR, maintained that if the study on the possibilities offered by the land in Coscapá was favorable, all of the newcomers would be sent to this ranch.90 The fact that the CPR determined that for no reason should it seek help from the United States since, in its own words, this would not be fitting for the Jewish colony in Mexico is interesting; this indicates that they saw the maintenance of refugees as their own responsibility and moral obligation. The idea that the CPR should take charge of thirty more people gave rise to discussions on reorganization; as it was presently constituted—above all as a legal office for processing legal matters—it could not take charge 87 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 7, f. 7, act no. 3 of the CPR, August 18, 1938. 88 This proposal was based on a precedent, since in 1923 in Mexico there existed a kind of asylum for Jewish immigrants who came to the country without resources, and were aided by the B’nai B’rith and by the Sephardic colony. 89 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Diáspora, file 7, f. 22, act no. 7 of the CPR, September 23, 1938. 90 Ibid., f. 26, act no. 8 of the CPR, September 29, 1938.



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of the problem. Therefore the creation of three different commissions was decided upon: the first, in the hands of the B’nai B’rith, would be in charge of supporting and assisting the newcomers; the second, in the hands of the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce, would be in charge of finding them work; and the Committee for Refugees would continue to deal with legal matters.91 We do not know the exact number of Jewish refugees who disembarked from the Iberia on September 18, 1938. We have information that eleven did so as tourists and later declared they were really political exiles. Without waiting for their tourist visas to expire, the Ministry of the Interior arrested them on October 7 of the same year, only to free them shortly afterwards with the express condition that they should leave the country within thirty days or be deported to their country of origin.92 The group that was detained consisted of fourteen people; supposedly eleven had arrived on the Iberia while the other three refugees had entered the country previously. The Committee for Refugees reacted by asking the Ministry of the Interior for a ninety-day extension in order to seek a solution to the problem. Afterwards various communiqués and interviews with the minister of the interior contributed to the government’s softening its initial position and backing down on the decision to deport the refugees. Ignacio García Téllez justified the change of attitude based on the Mexican government’s humanitarian tradition of conceding refuge to those in need of it, on the one hand, and the measures taken by various groups interested in the refugee situation, on the other.93 Thus, he stated that “the Government, just this once and without setting a precedent, will suspend the effects derived from the illegal migratory status of the 15 aforementioned persons, provided this Committee places them within the legal requirements in the matter, in compliance with the following prerequisites applied to investor immigrants.”94

91 Ibid., f. 20, act no. 6 of the CPR, September 13, 1938. 92 See Avni, Role of Latin America, 27–28 and AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, [box without no.], file 38, CPR to García Téllez, Mexico City, October 19, 1938. 93 Nathaniel and Sylvia Weyl proposed that the vice president of the Committee for Refugees seek the intervention of the PRM, through the intermediation of Luis I. Rodríguez, in order to make these refugees “official guests of the party” and thus prevent their deportation. AKA, CCIM, [uncatalogued document, in photocopy], N. y S. Weyl to Landau, Mexico City, [n.d.]. 94 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, [no box number], file 38, García Téllez to CCIM, Mexico City, December 9, 1938. This document mentions fifteen people, while the rest of the documentation in this case mentions fourteen refugees.

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Without questioning the good intentions of the Mexican government in making this exception, which it justified on humanitarian terms, it must also be viewed in light of the fact that these people could not be repatriated. As one of them pointed out, when detained by the Special Immigration Service, “due to the political conditions in Germany, it is not possible for me or any of my compatriots to return to our country, this having been forbidden beforehand by the respective Nazi Authorities.”95 This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that they were not given political asylum, but rather permitted to stay as investor immigrants on the condition that they comply with the corresponding prerequisites.96 The exception that was made helped to reinforce the rule, since from then on the Ministry of the Interior was more precise in establishing its position on the refugee problem: From now on, permission for entrance into the country, for refugees, will only be authorized after careful verification before the Ministry of the Interior, by foreign or national Institutions of comprehensive credit, that the people are prominent Jews, in the field of social struggle, in the sciences, arts, etc., [and] victims of persecution.  The Ministry disavows any collective admission until the conclusions of the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference in Évian, which was later transferred to London, are made known.  The Committee will be committed to cooperating with the immediate repatriation of any Jew who wrongfully enters the country.97

It should be pointed out that in the Mexican press there were various articles condemning the trend of “false tourists.” Meanwhile, the Jewish community in Mexico drew up a statement in which it made clear that there were not hundreds of “false tourists,” but only fourteen people who, fleeing from Germany and Austria, had entered Mexico on tourist visas due to the fact that they were not allowed to leave their countries of origin with any other migratory status, much less as political exiles. According to the statement, the refugees came to Mexico, assured of the spirit of

95 AKA, box 71, file 11, Declaration of Josef Wolynsky before Andrés Guerra, chief of Special Services of Immigration, Mexico City, October 7, 1938. 96 The Israelite Central Committee had to guarantee by way of a bank deposit that each of the fourteen interested parties had a minimum capital of 5,000 pesos, prove their acquisition of cultivable land for agriculture within a period of no longer than six months, and issue a repatriation bond for each. AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, [no box number], file 38, García Téllez to CCIM, Mexico City, December 9, 1938. 97 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, [no box number], file 38, García Téllez to CCIM, Mexico City, December 9, 1938.



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hospitality of the Mexican people and the government of President Cárdenas, “who only recently had made public his intentions of offering asylum to those in need.”98 It also made reference to declarations of the Mexican representative to the Évian Conference, arguing that he had fervently promised to give asylum to those exiles who were victims of Nazism, and that other countries that attended that conference and did not make such a promise, such as Chile and Peru, were nevertheless allowing several hundred refugee families to settle in their countries.99 While the refugee-tourist matter remained unsolved, on October 22, 1938, the steamship Orinoco arrived at Veracruz with twenty-one Jewish refugees who also held tourist visas, and whom the Mexican government did not allow to disembark. Six of these had been released from concentration camps and four apparently had permission to enter the United States, within the quota of Germans allowed in. Several groups and personages tried to intercede with the Mexican government on their behalf in order to have their admission authorized, among these the Jewish People’s Committee for United Action against Fascism and Anti-Semitism of New York through its president, William Weiner; the Joint Distribution Committee; and the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce. It was the latter and not the Committee for Refugees who addressed President Lázaro Cárdenas, begging him to allow the refugees to remain in the country temporarily until they obtained permission to enter another country, promising to assume full responsibility for them, and offering whatever guarantee was deemed necessary, within the conditions set down by the government.100 The Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce was perhaps better known and was looked on more favorably by the government than the CPR itself, which, as we have seen, was not taken into account. The North American ambassador Josephus Daniels tried unsuccessfully to unofficially intervene with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Interior.101

98 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, Correspondencia del Sr. Jacobo Landau, file 96, f. 31, “Los ‘falsos turistas’ pueden ser elementos útiles para el país.” We do not know whether this article was in fact published. 99 Ibid. 100 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/16, [n.d.], Landau to Cárdenas, Mexico City, October 31, 1938. 101 JDP, Mss 18 958, reel 6. Josephus Daniels, Diaries, entry of November 9, 1938. “Mexico sends back German Refugees,” New York Times, November 2, 1938.

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The decision to forbid disembarkation was made by the Ministry of the Interior and ratified by Lázaro Cárdenas.102 Ambassador Daniels, writing to the American secretary of state, confirms this: “At the request of the Jewish Committee here Beteta took the question up with President Cárdenas last night. In view of other similar cases the president declined overruling the action of Gobernación [. . .] Impossible to get desired permission.”103 In the same letter, Daniels mentioned that Eduardo Hay, minister of foreign affairs, said Mexico was ready to cooperate with the Intergovernmental Committee of London, “but selection must be approved before it [i.e., the group of refugees] can be admitted.” After a few days, Daniels wrote in his diary, “Therefore, the human desire I had to help these poor refugees availed nothing.”104 The case of the Orinoco went beyond Mexican borders and generated a lot of criticism of Cárdenas’s government, especially among certain sectors of public opinion in the United States and France. The journalist Frank L. Kluckhohn was responsible for two articles in the New York Times. In one of them he maintained that in Mexico there had been a noisy anti-Semitic campaign going on for several months, orchestrated by the Mexican press and inspired by the German Legation.105 Nevertheless, Kluckhohn’s opinions should be taken with a grain of salt, since he was identified with the interests of oil companies and headed the campaign begun in the North American press to discredit Cárdenas’s government, channeling “a current of public opinion which presented the Mexico reformed by Cárdenas as a nest full of anti-North American actions, into which the interests of the Third Reich fit perfectly.”106 In the case of French criticism, however,

102 The Ministry of the Interior informed President Cárdenas’s private secretary that it was looking into the matter, informing each of the various groups that had sought asylum for the passengers of the Orinoco about the statements made by Ignacio García Téllez on the population policy of the Mexican government. AGN, PLC, 546.6/16, Lanuza Jr., by orders of the minister of the interior, to President Cárdenas’s private secretary, Mexico City, November 26, 1938. 103 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), R. G. 59, lot file 52 D 408, Country Files 1938–1941, box 6, Josephus Daniels to the secretary of state, Mexico City, Octo­ber 31, 1938. See also JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743 (1 of 3), Glikowski to Katz, Mexico City, November 9, 1938. According to this source it was Cárdenas himself who made the deci­sion. Also, Frank L. Kluckhohn, “Refugees Amazed by Mexico’s Action,” New York Times, October 31, 1938. 104 JDP, Mss 18, 958, reel 6. Josephus Daniels, Diaries, entry of November 9, 1938. 105 Frank L. Kluckhohn, “México Sends Back German refugees,” New York Times, November 2, 1938. 106 Pérez Monfort, La derecha secular, 120. Lázaro Cárdenas remarked, in the face of this defamatory campaign, that “with this publicity which at times paints us as communists at



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the author was the well-known politician and writer André Leroux, who had repeatedly shown his sympathy for the policies of Cárdenas’s government. In his article, which appeared in the newspaper Le Populaire, an organ of the socialist party, he affirmed that the Mexican government had been obliged to follow express orders from Berlin, due to the fact that Germany was the only country buying Mexican oil.107 The Mexican minister plenipotentiary in Paris, General Leobardo C. Ruiz, asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for instructions on how to answer this accusation. He was told to explain that certain individuals, especially of Semitic origin, were trying to enter Mexico in violation of the respective laws by registering as tourists when in reality they were immigrants who did not comply with the prerequisites established by immigra­ tion law; thus the decision to deny them entrance was justified. Ruiz was also advised to clarify that the case had no relation at all to the oil situation, since the immigration laws had been passed before the expropriation of the foreign oil companies. It was the objective of these laws, as of almost all similar legislation, to protect national workers from foreign competition. The position of the Mexican authorities was clear, especially the requirement that the foreigners who arrived in the country should do so “by fulfilling the respective prerequisites and not by surprise.”108 Later Ruiz was advised to abstain from reaffirming anything in order to avoid entering into controversy.109 The Orinoco case must be interpreted in relation to the express purpose of the minister of the interior to set no precedent for accepting Jewish refugees arriving in Mexico with tourist visas. It must be linked to the case of the fourteen refugee-tourists who, already in Mexico, had become a problem for the authorities. In view of the deportation ordered

the service of Moscow and international Judaism, and at others as anti-Semitic Nazis influenced by Germany, movements are encouraged and artificial problems are created which later turn into obstacles to the government’s ability to work with absolute freedom in solving its problems.” Lázaro Cárdenas, Epistolario, 1:340, quoted in Ricardo Pérez Mont­fort, “La quinta columna y el buen vecino,” Anuario de Historia 11 (1983): 123. Kluckhohn was eventually expelled from Mexico in 1939. 107 AHSRE, file III-2334-12, f. 62, Leobardo C. Ruiz to SRE, Paris, November 8, 1938. Apparently Leroux had based his information on The New York Herald, Novem­ber 4, 1938. 108 AHSRE, file III-2334-12, f. 63, Hidalgo to García Téllez, Mexico City, November 11, 1938. 109 Ibid., f. 67, Mena to Ruiz, Mexico City, November 25, 1938.

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for the latter, it seemed congruent to refuse admission to the passengers of the Orinoco.110 What was not congruent was that these people did have legal visas for admission to Mexico and that by not allowing them to disembark, the employees of the Ministry of the Interior disavowed the authority of the members of the Mexican consular service. García Téllez acknowledged that this caused “an irritating situation.” The foreigners had made a long voyage under the protection of a permit issued by a representative of the Mexican government who had assured them they would be allowed admission.111 Even so, he had held earlier that the admission of refugees with tourist visas could not be considered legal under any circumstance: while seeming to be tourists with tourist cards, the truth of the matter, deduced from the statements of the people themselves, has undoubtedly highlighted the fact that these are individuals who have the intention of immigrating, fleeing from racial persecution, with the idea of remaining in the Country indefinitely.112

The situation provoked by the case of the Orinoco set an important precedent for the treatment of refugees who reached the country without being part of an organized scheme of Jewish immigration. The Creation of the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico and the Arrival of More Refugees The Committee for Refugees operated until the end of October 1938. The critical situation it faced made it clear that the refugee question was much more complex than it had seemed at first; that it would require a lot of energy, coordination, and effort; and that it should, due to the importance it had, involve all sectors of the Jewish community in Mexico. From then on its members contemplated the need for having an organization in which the Jewish group had a greater degree of representation in the Mexican government, an organization designed with a more complex structure in order to deal with the multiple tasks related to the matter of 110 The Orinoco carried on board three hundred refugees. After those who were headed for Mexico were not allowed to disembark, they had to return to Havana, on October 18, 1938, where they were granted a temporary stay, due to the intervention of the Joint Relief Committee. JDC, Collection 33/44, file 1059, “Panic Migration,” [n.p.], [March 30, 1939]. 111 AHINM, file 4-350-2-1938-69, García Téllez to Hay, Mexico City, January 3, 1939. 112 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, [no box number], file 38, García Téllez to CCIM, Mexico City, December 9, 1938.



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refugees (undertaking negotiations with the Ministry of the Interior, facilitating the disembarkment of refugees at ports of entry, securing economic support for those who arrived in the country, maintaining relations with international Jewish organizations, influencing public opinion, broadcasting news on Nazism, organizing protests, and so on). Thus, the CPR created an organizing commission in charge of constituting the Israelite Central Committee (CCIM). It is important to point out that within the Mexican government there was also an interest in having a single spokesperson for the local Jewish colony, as pointed out by Francisco Trejo and the minister of the interior himself, who had told of receiving various commissions from the United States to talk about the matter of the refugees, without knowing who the real representative of the Jewish colony in Mexico was.113 The Israelite Central Committee of Mexico was officially brought into being on November 9, 1938, in an assembly in which representatives of twenty-seven Jewish organizations took part.114 Each of the main sectors that made up the Jewish community was represented in proportion to its size, and so the first Central Committee consisted of ten representatives from the Ashkenazi group and eleven from all of the others (three Sephar­ dics, two Germans, two representing Syrian-Damascan Jews, one Hungarian, one Frenchman, one from the Syrian-Aleppine colony, and one from the English-speaking sector), making a total of twenty-one people.115 From the information we have, we know that in 1939, a few months after its creation, the Central Committee had 213 members in the capital and 130 in the rest of the country. By January 1940 the number had risen to 560. While this increase was not continuous (in 1940, for example, there was a decrease in the registration and the membership fees collected), in the long term it was considered effective.116 The first president of the CCIM was León Behar and the first secretary Marcos Corona (both from the CPR).117 113 AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 4, November 22, 1938. 114 Ibid., act no. 1, November 9, 1938; Isaías Austri-Dunn, Anuario del judaísmo mexicano (Mexico City: Comité del Congreso Judío Mundial en México, n.d.); Sourasky, Comunidad israelita en México, 233. 115 Moisés Rosenberg, ed., “Der Weg” Yearbook. Special Issue to Commemorate the Tenth Anniversary, 1930–1940 (Mexico City: Der Weg, 1940) (In Yiddish, translated by Naty Gurvich). The “French colony” does not appear in any of the other sources consulted. 116 Enciclopedia judaica castellana, s.v. “México.” 117 The first board was made up of Sam Wishñiak, vice president; Gregorio Shapiro, cashier; Jorge Knopfler, treasurer; and as representative members Jacobo Landau and Sam Rosen. The other members were Arturo Wolfowitz, León Sourasky, Pesaj Lisker, Víctor

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The Central Committee was made up of members from various ideological walks, although from the start the most popular one was Zionism. For example, on the first board we find only one communist (S. Warman) and no Bundists,118 professed Zionists (such as Víctor Mitrani), Zionist sympathizers who did not officially belong to the ranks, and various members who could be considered apolitical (above all those coming from the Arab ranks).119 The lack of ideological representation was considered to be a problem to be overcome and thus, beginning in 1939, the CCIM recognized the advisability of approaching the leftist sectors of the Jewish community, as well as individuals apparently thought to be “influential” at the other end of the political spectrum, seeking their cooperation over time.120 The ultimate purpose of this organization was to constitute a central representation of Jews before the Mexican government, in order to defend their interests and carry out some of the duties of internal coordination. This committee eventually became the official representative of the World Jewish Congress and the HICEM, and collaborated closely with the Joint Distribution Committee, the ORT Federation121 and other international Jewish organizations. However, the most immediate interests of the members of the Central Committee were related to saving the refugees, broadcasting news of the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis, and fighting local anti-Semitism, forming various commissions to carry out these tasks.122 The Committee for Refugees was replaced by the Comisión Pro Refugiados (Commission for Refugees), within the CCIM, and was in the hands of Víctor Mitrani (from the Sephardic sector), Jacobo Landau (from the Ashkenazi sector), I. Dabbah (from the Allepine sector), José Kalach

Mitrani, Y. Katz, T. Sakal, S. Dabbah, Kaiser, Frenk, S. Warman, A. Wallerstein, José Kalach, G. Shimanovitz, and Jacobo Glantz. 118 See Chapter 1, n. 114. 119 I thank Alicia Gojman de Backal for her comments on this matter. 120 AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 44, August 29, 1939, report of the Campaign Com­ mission of the CCIM. 121 ORT is the Russian acronym for the Society for Trades and Agricultural Labor. It was founded in 1880 in Russia, in order to incorporate Jews into the production process by means of their professional and later agricultural training. It subsequently broadened its field of action and became an international organization of scientific and technological edu­cation, which today is present on all continents. Its headquarters have been located in Switzerland since 1921. 122 Later, as the world scene was reconfigured after World War II (1945), its objectives were redefined and it was mainly dedicated to supporting Zionism and the defense and development of the interests of the local Jewish group.



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(from the Damascan sector), Jorge Knopfler (from the Hungarian sector), and Mr. Kaiser (from the German sector).123 One of the first tasks of this organization was to assist in disembarking thirty-five passengers aboard the steamship Iberia, which would arrive in Veracruz on November 17, 1938.124 The arrangements for disembarkation were made directly with the Ministry of the Interior, who had contacted the members of the CCIM. At first the Ministry demanded a guarantee of 25,000125 in order to help establish these people as farmers (part of this would be used to buy the necessary farming tools) and offered to provide for their support and grant certain accommodations, such as exemption from taxes for a period of twenty years. The initial positive attitude in dealing with this case is noteworthy. Nevertheless, in a subsequent interview between the minister of the interior and the representatives of the Israelite Central Committee, García Téllez informed them “that in relation to those who are on the Iberia, there is an order from the President of the Republic to not allow them to disembark.”126 In view of the news, the Jewish leadership turned to the HIAS of New York asking them to negotiate the admission of the refugees on board the Iberia in Havana.127 In the end, the Mexican government did not allow the passengers of the Iberia to disembark, except for three people who perhaps had different migratory status.128 The Orinoco returned to Mexico on December 18, 1938, with some Jewish refugees who were not allowed to disembark either.129 This time the fact that they had tourist visas was not the only reason they were prevented from disembarking. As shown in the documents I consulted, the Ministry of the Interior also delayed the admission of all of those whose passports were marked with a red J, “which meant that the bearer was of Jewish race,” arguing that these documents had an expiration date that differed from the one set down in the official text, “which meant that the bearer would not be allowed back into the country.”130 123 AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 1, November 9, 1938. 124 Ibid., act no. 2, November 15, 1938. 125 The original does not specify the currency, but the figure probably refers to pesos, not dollars. 126 AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 6, November 29, 1938. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Merren, “Politics of xenophobia,” 95. 130 AHINM, file 4-350-2-1938-69, García Téllez to Hay, Mexico City, January 3, 1939. Also JDC, Collection 33/44, file 1059 (2), Cecilia Razovzky, “Bound for Nowhere. Disorganized Panic Migration,” November 3, 1939. The J of Juden, the German word for Jew,

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There were exceptional situations that allowed some refugees admission to Mexico. These were usually individuals who arrived on smaller, less well-known ships, whose cases had not yet been appealed by international Jewish organizations, nor had they required the previous commitment of the federal government. In these cases the local authorities at the port of entry demanded that the Jewish community pay a certain amount of money in order to allow disembarkation. (Due to the nature of these arrangements, almost no information is available; they were obviously kept from the press deliberately.) This is the case, for example, of a French steamship that arrived in Mexico on November 1, 1938: “after a trade, like in a marketplace, (imagine trading in human beings), we have agreed on the price and they all have been allowed to land.”131 These arrangements would become more and more common as Jewish emigration from the Third Reich became a matter of life or death. The Close of the Year The course of the Mexican government’s policy towards admitting Jewish refugees during 1938 ends, quite symbolically, with two different events that unfolded on the international as well as the Mexican stage. The first was the suspension of Jewish honorary consuls of Mexico in Germany. The Mexican consul in Hamburg, Alfonso Guerra, proposed this suspension after anti-Semitic demonstrators attacked the house of the Mexican consul in Munich—which was identified by the Mexican seal on the outside of the house—and the consul, by the name of Berheimer, was sent to prison. In view of the material impossibility of action on the part of the honorary Jewish consuls, Guerra thought that it would be best to suspend their functions, and this was accepted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which sent official instructions on the matter on November 14, 1938.132 Months later, in May 1939, Alfonso Guerra reported that in stamped in red on passports, identification, and ration cards, identified the carriers as Jews. The measure was implemented on December 31, 1938, in response to an initiative of the Swiss government. See Joseph Epstein and Philip Rosen, Dictionary of the Holocaust: Biography, Geography, and Terminology (London: Greenwood, 1997), 141, 157, and 263. 131 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743 (1 of 3), Glikowski to Katz, Mexico City, November 9, 1938. 132 See AHSRE, file III-230-1, confidential memorandum from the Diplomatic Depart­ ment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, November 12, 1938, and confidential memorandum from the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, November 14, 1938. Due to the date of the documents, it is possible that the riots that



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order to prevent undesirable immigrants from heading for the country, the action of the honorary consuls had been limited, sometimes to the point of imposing disciplinary penalties on them.133 The other significant event was the first Convention on Population, which took place December 16–21, 1938, in the Palace of Fine Arts; representatives from various ministries and delegates from diverse organizations throughout the republic took part. While the main subject to be dealt with at the convention was the repatriation of Mexicans from the United States, matters directly relating to the acceptance of immigrants and political refugees were also discussed. According to what was reported in the press at the time, when the agenda came to the matter of immigration, hostility towards the Jews was expressed in detail in a memorandum that included strong anti-Semitic proposals. The representatives of the Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce did not receive the support of any Mexican delegate in their efforts to respond to the attacks.134 According to the newspaper El Nacional, the matter of Jewish immigration “provoked passionate speeches and [. . .] finally its approval was left pending, turned over to the Advisory Council on Population to be studied and judgment passed.”135 Apparently Francisco Trejo prevented a direct attack on the Jews in the document that was drawn up by suggesting to the “nationalists” that the term “foreigner” replace the term “Jew.” The Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce was represented at the convention by a commission made up of its president, Jacobo Landau, and the lawyer for the organization, Gabriel Anaya Valdepeña. According to the latter: “The attitude assumed on this occasion by Mr. Landau as well as by myself, which was duly noted in the press, specifically Der Weg, I believe at least avoided the massive agitation that had been planned on account of the Council itself, and that owing to the results, the Israelite Colony has remained untouched and untouchable by its free enemies, at least to a great extent.”136 However, according to Haim Avni, the

Consul Guerra referred to had to do with the pogrom of November 9 and 10 in Germany known as the “Night of Broken Glass.” 133 AHINM, file 4/350/683, Hidalgo to García Téllez, communiqué retransmitted from the consul general in Hamburg, dated May 20, 1939, Mexico City, June 28, 1939. 134 Avni, Role of Latin America, 30. We have not yet found the memorandum that con­ tained the proposals. 135 El Nacional, December 22, 1938. 136 AKA, CIICM, Departamento legal, box 73, file 25, f. 96, Resignation of Lic. Gabriel Anaya Valdepeña sent to the members of the board of the CIICM, Mexico City, February 22, 1940.

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anti-Semitic nature of the convention was harder to hide, since the theme of not assimilating Jews came from high-level authorities, supposedly friendly to the cause.137 At the beginning of this convention the minister of the interior defined the profile of refugees who would be admitted into the country, which was quoted at the beginning of this chapter. García Téllez reported, thus, that until the time when international commitments were made, the government would only allow in refugees who were prominent politicians, scientists, or artists, thus avoiding what he called the “disorganized and fraudulent immigration” that threatened to become a social burden or to create economic competition for the working classes.138 As we have seen, it was becoming clear that the only people who would be treated as refugees were extremely distinguished figures, while the rest would be considered “nondesirable” immigrants, and, as such, they had little possibility of entering the country. The decision to not legally acknowledge the Jews as persecuted people fleeing Nazism—which was not predetermined, but was reached as affairs unfolded—seems to have been a wise strategy: the Mexican government did not have to commit itself to opening the country’s doors to Jews, yet it avoided a flagrant contradiction of its own discourse of openness toward the victims of dictatorships.

137 Der Weg, December 8, 10, 13, 17, 20 and 22, 1938, and the article by Moisés Rosen­ berg of December 24, 1938, quoted in Avni, Role of Latin America, 29. 138 “Discurso inaugural de la Primera Quincena Pro-Población, pronunciado por el Secretario de Gobernación, Ignacio García Téllez,” El Nacional, December 17, 1938.

Illustrations

Figure 1. Parade for Business Day, Israelite Committee float, June 1931. Photographic Archive of the CDICA.

Figure 2. Anti-Semitic banner in Mexico City, 1933. The banner reads: “Protecting Jews is treason to the country.” Photographic Archive of the CDICA.

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Figure 3. Confrontation between members of the Mexican Communist Party and the Golden Shirts, November 20, 1935. In the left foreground, David Alfaro Siqueiros, wearing a black shirt, raises his fist. General Archive of the Nation. Enrique Díaz, Delgado and García Fund.

Figure 4. Anti-Fascist demonstration in Mexico City, November 20, 1935. The banner reads: “We demand punishment for the Fascist assassins of the workers.” General Archive of the Nation. Enrique Díaz, Delgado and García Fund



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Figure 5. Refugees aboard the Guinée (1937?). Photographic Archive of the CDICA.

Figure 6. Lázaro Cárdenas in his office at the National Palace, 1937. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.

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Figure 7. Pro-Nazi demonstration in Mexico, 1937–1938. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.



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Figure 8. Pro-Nazi demonstration in Mexico, 1937–1938. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.

Figure 9. Anti-Semitic pamphlet: “Defend what is ours! Let’s fight against the Jews!” AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 238/7.

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Figure 10. First Zionist Convention in Mexico, March 1938. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.

Figure 11. First Zionist Convention in Mexico, March 1938. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.



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Figure 12. Vicente Lombardo Toledano in his office. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.

Figure 13. Ignacio García Téllez. Reproduced with permission from the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia/SNF/Fototeca Nacional (National Institute of Anthropology and History/SNF/National Photo Archive), 11158.

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Figure 14. The Mexique, on which the Spanish exiles arrived, 1939. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.

Figure 15. Trains in which the Spanish refugees who arrived aboard the Mexique were transported, 1939. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.



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Figure 16. One of the agricultural colonization projects in Mexico. A view of the Hacienda de San Gregorio, 1939. Photographic Archive of the CDICA.

Figure 17. Jewish refugees at the Hacienda de San Gregorio, 1939. Photographic Archive of the CDICA.

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Figure 18. Mobile canteen supported by the CCIM during World War II, ca. 1940. Photographic Archive of the CDICA.



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Figure 19. Board of directors of the Nidjie Israel Community Charity Alliance, ca. 1940. Photographic Archive of the CDICA.

Figure 20. Leaders of the Nidjie Israel Community Charity Alliance, ca. 1940. Photographic Archive of the CDICA.

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Figure 21. A record of funds collected by the Jewish community of Mexico to transport Jewish refugees to Palestine, 1940. Photographic Archive of the CDICA.

Figure 22. Receipt from the Committee for Refugees in Mexico 1938. Photographic Archive of the CDICA.



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Figure 23. Manuel Ávila Camacho and Vicente Lombardo Toledano looking down from a balcony on a demonstration in support of the president, c. 1941. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.

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Figure 24. Ezequiel Padilla. Reproduced with permis­sion from the Instituto Nacional de Antro­pología e Historia/SNF/Fototeca Nacional (National Institute of Anthropology and History/SNF/National Photo Archive), 24164.



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Figure 25. Gilberto Bosques, ca 1930. Reproduced with permission from the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia/SNF/Fototeca Nacional (National Institute of Anthropology and History/SNF/National Photo Archive), 11158.

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Figure 26. Visa for Marie Schapiro de Kaspé, signed by Gilberto Bosques, December 15, 1941. General Archive of the Nation.

Figure 27. Egon Erwin Kisch, in Melbourne, Australia, 1934. He found refuge in Mexico in 1940. State Library of New South Wales.



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Figure 28. Victor Serge, Benjamin Péret, Remedios Baro, and André Breton in front of the Air-Bel Villa in Marseille, 1940. Serge, Péret and Baro found refuge in Mexico in 1941. Breton went to NY. Archives municipales de Rezé.

Figure 29. Marceau Pivert in front of Lenin’s armored car, May 1956. He found refuge in Mexico in 1940. Documents historiques, SFIO.

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Figure 30. Anna Seghers, October 20, 1947. She found refuge in Mexico in 1941. © Bettmann/CORBIS.



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Figure 31. Bodo Uhse (left) and Theo Harych, East Berlin, October 3, 1954. Uhse found refuge in Mexico in 1940. ­Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-267 15-0002/photo: Hans-Günter Quaschinsky.

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Figure 32. East German postal stamp commemorating Paul Merker, 1974. Merker found refuge in Mexico in 1942. Private collection.

Figure 33. Rally in support for President Ávila Camacho, in response to his appeal to national unity, 1942. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.



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Figure 34. Plutarco Elías Calles, Manuel Ávila Camacho, and Lázaro Cárdenas sending a message of national unity, September 15, 1942. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.

Figure 35. Manuel Ávila Camacho receives Franklin D. Roosevelt and his wife on an official visit to Monterrey, April 20, 1943. General Archive of the Nation, Hermanos Mayo Collection.

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Figure 36. Stephen Wise and Theodore Resnikoff visit with members of the Committee for Hebrew Palestine, Mexico City, 1942. Photographic Archive of the CDICA.



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Figure 37. Announcement by the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico of a one-hour work stoppage in commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. Últimas Noticias, April 19, 1944. CDICA.

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Figure 38. General Assembly of the Popular Israelite League, June 27, 1945. Photographic Archive of the CDICA.

Chapter Four

FROM PROJECTS FOR JEWISH COLONIZATION TO GREATER INFLEXIBILITY, 1939–1940 In order to understand the development of Mexican immigration policy as it pertained to the Jewish refugees during the years 1939 and 1940, it is necessary to bear in mind that it unfolded at an especially difficult moment, nationally as well as internationally. The final two years of Cárdenas’s government in Mexico were hard times for a regime that, on the one hand, had caused discontent among the many social sectors that were affected by its reforms and nationalist policies (above all the middle class and the economic and political elite), and on the other hand had not fulfilled all of the expectations and demands of the lower classes. The polarization of this society was reflected in the formation of right-wing opposition groups—which would play an important role in the years to come—such as the Unión Nacional Sinarquista (National Synarchist Union, 1937) and the Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, 1939) as well as in the radicalization of groups and organizations sympathizing with Cárdenas’s reforms, such as the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Workers of Mexico, CTM), the so-called Frente Popular (Popular Front), and the Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Confederation of Farmers, CNC), among others.1 The presidential succession reflected the climate of political tension and confrontation present in the country, with the support of the most conservative sectors of the opposition going to Juan Andreu Almazán, in a clear show of disagreement with President Cárdenas’s politics of the masses. These were definitely the most unstable years of Cárdenas’s term. On the international front this was the period when the Spanish Republic was overthrown, Germany occupied Poland, nations organized into rival blocs, and World War II broke out. Hitler’s strength led to the fall of

1 Ricardo Pérez Monfort, “La unidad nacional,” in La política interior y la estabilidad de la nación, ed. Jorge Javier Romero (Mexico City: Secretaría de Gobernación/INEHRM, 2000), 126.

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France in 1940 and the possibility of Great Britain following suit, while the United States stayed out of the conflict for the time being; meanwhile the Latin American countries in general remained watchful of the reorganization of the world map. In the League of Nations, Mexico protested against the Fascist and Nazi invasions, but national public opinion clearly sided with the Germans, partly supported by the anti-Allied agitation coordinated by the German Legation in the country. During the early months of 1939 President Lázaro Cárdenas considered the possibility of receiving Jewish refugees, carrying out a study of various colonization plans while allowing some refugees to disembark at Mexican ports. However, towards the second half of the year, immigration policy would once again become more restrictive, reaching its climax in 1940. The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Speak Up In the early days of 1939 two memorandums addressed to President Lázaro Cárdenas, one signed by the minister of the interior, Ignacio García Téllez, and the other by the vice-minister of foreign affairs, Ramón Beteta, weighed the advantages and disadvantages of opening the country’s doors to the immigration of Jewish refugees. Dated only three days apart, these documents suggest that Cárdenas sought the opinion of the two ministers involved in the matter and that, therefore, the president was assessing it personally. While the two ministers agreed on some points, they reached different conclusions. They agreed on the characterization of the Jewish group as an ethnic minority whose members would not integrate into the national population and were dedicated to “undesirable” economic activities, and whose occupational profile was not in keeping with the plan to attract people who could work in agriculture or industry. They also shared the opinion that these were people who had no economic backing, due to the persecution of which they were victims, and they warned of the danger posed by newcomers who did not bring enough money to support themselves. However, while Ignacio García Téllez only contemplated the inconveniences that Jewish immigration might cause and thus voted against it, Ramón Beteta considered the possible advantages, which led him to present a positive plan that attempted to regulate the variables included in the matter.



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The Memorandum from the Minister of the Interior The text drawn up by Ignacio García Téllez, only a page and a half long, to a large extent justified his refusal to admit Jewish refugees with arguments tied to economic nationalism and the nonassimilation of the Jews. Regarding the former, he felt that the Mexican government had the obligation to protect its working classes by denying admission to possible competitors. In fact, referring to the attitude assumed by the Ministry of the Interior in the recent cases in which Jewish refugees had been denied admission into Mexico, he stated that the reasons were “legitimate and defensive of the national interests, mainly of our proletariat classes, small businesses, and small industries, by avoiding the disastrous consequences that would be produced should false tourism and undesirable immigration be allowed.”2 With respect to the matter of nonassimilation, García Téllez maintained that these were individuals who did not mix with “our race” spiritually, economically, or in bloodlines, nor with the revolutionary movement. He concluded: It is advisable to avoid that these individuals who are dedicated to undesirable economic activities enter the territory through their immoderate, disorganized and fraudulent affluence. We have no information on their quality as persecuted people and they would cause a great deal of popular hostility that would thwart Mexico’s compliance with international obligations.3

The minister of the interior was right in affirming that it was a “disorganized” immigration, since no international organization, Jewish or nonJewish, was able to regulate the flow of those who were fleeing Nazism. But the idea that there was no information on these individuals’ status as persecuted people is more difficult to interpret within this context, since by 1939 the anti-Semitic policies of the Nazis and the persecution of Jews, both described in the international press, were well known to the world’s governments, including Mexico’s.4

2 AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, García Téllez to Cárdenas, Mexico City, January 3, 1939. 3 Ibid. 4 In fact, in the same memorandum Ignacio García Téllez began to argue that the racial persecution which some European nations had begun against hundreds of thousands of Jews forced them to emigrate in order to escape concentration camps, humiliation, and so forth.

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In spite of this, García Téllez believed that the refusal to open the doors to Jewish exiles “in no way implied that our Country closes its doors to victims of foreign dictatorships.” This may be interpreted as referring only to the political exiles from said regimes; otherwise it would appear to be an important contradiction. On the other hand the reference made by the minister of the interior in this document to the “huge multitude” of Jews who had sought refuge in Mexico catches one’s attention, since he affirms that among the applicants “there are thousands” of tailors, doctors, engineers, chauffeurs, employees, and so on.5 This matter is related to the question of the demand for refuge in Mexico on the part of the Jewish exiles. Some of the petitions for admittance into the country made by the refugees themselves can be found in the National Archives, but it is impossible to determine what proportion of the total number they constitute. To conclude the analysis of this document it is important to point out that the minister of the interior thought that the “position of the Mexican Government is absolutely correct and besides, it was based on legal regulations issued much earlier than the present state of things (The General Law of Population in force, issued in August 1936).”6 García Téllez thus endorsed the idea of confronting the problem of the Jewish refugees from the existing legal standpoint, which regulated the admission of foreigners into the country, and not by means of new mechanisms, exceptions, or modifications to existing laws; in practice, this implied that the problem of the refugees should be handled with instruments created to regulate the admission of immigrants. In order to better understand the position of the Ministry of the Interior, it must be pointed out that the Ministry itself maintained an attitude of distrust regarding the arrival of foreigners in general, immersed as it was in its role of protecting national interests. This attitude even affected its stance on the immigration of Spanish Republican exiles: Even in this case the Ministry of the Interior insists on it being absolutely necessary to avoid that, with the immoderate and disorganized influx, individuals who carry out undesirable migratory [sic] economic activities enter the country; and that, in the end, instead of producing beneficial results, they would cause a wave of popular hostility that would frustrate compliance with the humanitarian intentions of the Mexican government.7

5 AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, García Téllez to Cárdenas, Mexico City, January 3, 1939. 6 Ibid. 7 AHSRE, file III-1246-9-I, García Téllez to Hay, Mexico City, March 23, 1939.



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In fact, this quotation from the minister of the interior, which refers to the Spanish exile and which comes from a letter he sent to the minister of foreign affairs in March 1939, is almost identical to the last paragraph of the memorandum that we analyzed, whose subject was Jewish immigration. The Memorandum from the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs The much longer text from the vice-minister of foreign affairs, Ramón Beteta, began with an analysis of the main population problems of the country, among which he placed the “lack of hands,” on the one hand, and the emigration of Mexicans to the United States in search of better opportunities, on the other. It also analyzed the unsuccessful attempt to increase the national population with foreign colonization and the need for taking the precautions necessary to avoid relative overpopulation, although the absolute number of foreigners was not high.8 With respect to Jewish immigration, the vice-minister thought that it could be advantageous: first, duly selected, they would provide a new workforce that would contribute to increasing the performance of the productive sectors and could serve as an example to Mexican peasants. Secondly, he pointed out that since they were a people who were cutting all ties with their homelands, “there is no danger of diplomatic petitions and legal claims of any kind [. . .] but that they would legally constitute an increase in the national population.”9 Reflecting on the interests of the Ministry itself, and with a certain degree of pragmatism, Beteta also saw that in the international sphere, receiving the Jewish refugees on Mexican soil could be advantageous, especially in easing the effect of the smear campaign against Cárdenas’s regime brought on by the expropriation of foreign oil companies. First, by coming to Mexico and submitting totally to Mexican laws, the immigrants would prove that it was possible to live, work, and even make a profit in Cárdenas’s regime. Second, Mexico would prove it was a lover of liberty and completely free of racial prejudice, by showing its liberal, hospitable, friendly spirit towards persecuted people. While this advantage seems theoretical, it is important to keep in mind because [. . .] with the campaign against Mexico, the influence of a factor that creates a favorable opinion of the country, especially with our neighbor to the north, where Jewish elements have an unquestionable influence, must not be downplayed.10

  8 AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, p. 5, Beteta to Cárdenas, Mexico City, January 6, 1939.   9 AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, p. 5, Beteta to Cárdenas, Mexico City, January 6, 1939. 10 Ibid., p. 6, Beteta to Cárdenas, Mexico City, January 6, 1939.

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In his memorandum, Ramón Beteta also evaluated the difficult aspects of admitting Jewish refugees into the country, referring to the fact that they were a closed group that mixed very little with others, showed an “excessive love” for money and, in the countries where they lived, had caused antagonistic attitudes that periodically resulted in persecutions. The vice-minister thought, then, that if the Jewish immigration was accepted without any control or precautions, displacing Mexicans from lucrative activities, “we would soon have in Mexico an anti-Semitic movement that would result in serious trouble.”11 Despite the disadvantages, Beteta reached a positive plan, based on the fact that for Jewish immigration to be profitable, it was essential to choose the immigrants beforehand, giving preference to young people, and to confirm that they really were carrying out the agricultural or industrial activities which were permitted. He also recommended taking the precautions necessary to avoid their moving to the cities or taking part in commercial activities, gravitating to form large social nuclei that would turn into units completely disconnected from national life, and turning into employers who exploited Mexican workers. The plan in question was based on the assumption that the immigrants would form a diverse and numerous group of men, women, and children who would be aided by the Jewish organizations in the United States so that they could establish themselves in agricultural colonies and industrial centers specifically chosen for them.12 With respect to colonization, Beteta suggested beginning by setting up a model agricultural colony with a checkerboard pattern, where the fields of Mexicans (repatriated or coming from other parts of the republic where there was no more land to distribute) and of foreigners would be interspersed, in order to insure Jewish integration into national life. The project also called for industrial immigration, for which the advice of 11 Ibid., p. 7, Beteta to Cárdenas, Mexico City, January 6, 1939. In this respect he agreed with the minister of the interior. 12 It was proposed that a commission made up of a representative from the Ministry of the Interior, one from the Ministry of Agriculture, and another from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with a representative of the organizations that would finance the immigration of the refugees, be formed in order to organize the project. It was also suggested that the Ministries of National Defense, Finance, and Economy as well as the Agrarian Department and the National Bank of Agricultural Credit be involved in order to ensure coordinated action among all government agencies and thus assure the success of the project. Beteta suggested that the amount of approximately 5,000 pesos be charged to each foreign family who wished to enter the country. At the time this was equal to $1,000.



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the Ministry of National Economy would be sought, especially in relation to new industries that the country needed, ideal places for establishing them, the necessary capital for these projects, and other factors.13 Finally, he proposed modifying the Law of Immigration in order to allow foreigners who came as part of this project to obtain Mexican nationality without complying with all of the prerequisites that were usually required.14 The positions of the two ministries involved in the matter of accepting Jewish refugees into Mexico differed in the way they interpreted the problem as well as in the solutions they proposed. However, it must be pointed out that within the Mexican government, differences were more often the rule than the exception, above all between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerned with showing the world a positive image of the country, and the Ministry of the Interior, worried about internal policies and the ability to govern the country, especially during the last two years of Cárdenas’s term. As we shall see later on, Ramón Beteta’s proposal was taken into consideration and served as the basis for a project of Jewish colonization that was proposed for the state of Tabasco. The First Attempts at Agricultural Colonization: The Experiments at Coscapá, San Gregorio, and Sonora The first experiments in agricultural colonization that took place in the country in 1939 were largely due to the attempt by Jewish refugees who had already entered Mexico to legalize their immigration status; they were not intended to accommodate more people from Europe. In fact, in both the experiments at Coscapá and San Gregorio, the groups involved were refugee-tourists who had entered the country between August and September 1938 and, after being seriously threatened with deportation, were given permission by the Ministry of the Interior to stay in Mexico as 13 It was deemed advisable to demand of the immigrants—or of the organizations that financed immigration—a non-returnable deposit to the Mexican government for the value of the land, machinery, equipment, and necessary installation expenses. In this case industries should not be made up of more than 50 percent foreigners. The plan also contemplated the actual intervention of the federal government in these new industries, either those formed as cooperatives, or those actively participating in the administration of what was considered semi-official business. AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, pp. 3–4, Beteta to Cárdenas, Mexico City, January 6, 1939. 14 Ibid., p. 5, Beteta to Cárdenas, Mexico City, January 6, 1939.

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immigrant investors, dedicated to agricultural activities.15 The permission, issued in December 1938, gave them a period of six months to individually acquire cultivable lands, which explains the fact that these two projects, which were organized very quickly, lacked the appropriate planning and consultation. The attitude of the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico towards agricultural colonization was ambiguous. On the one hand, it was aware of the difficulties this involved: the run-down state of the Mexican countryside, the refugees’ lack of experience in farming, and the difficulties they would face in trying to adapt to conditions that were so different from those in their native lands. On the other hand, the finances of the CCIM would not permit it to take charge of the newcomers,16 and the only work they were legally permitted to perform was agricultural. Therefore, in spite of the fact that its members knew that the projects were sure to fail, they decided to support those who wanted to farm the land.17 The first of these attempts took place on a farm near Coscapá, in the township of Pajapan, in the state of Veracruz. This belonged to Jacobo Landau, who would sell it to the refugees in yearly installments, deferred for seven years. According to Haim Avni, “the owner was afraid that, if the hacienda remained unproductive, the authorities would confiscate it within the framework of the agrarian reform, in order to distribute the land to peasants.”18 The first refugees who arrived in Coscapá during the month of March 1939 were no more than twelve in number. The project failed almost immediately, although the reasons for its failure are not so clear. While the climate and the quality of the land seemed good, even better than those in other lands they tried to colonize,19 Jacobo Landau and the Commission for Refugees (Comisión Pro Refugiados) agreed that the refugees, who were not farmers, did not want to work

15 See Chapter 3. 16 In 1939 the president of the Israelite Central Committee warned of the imminent danger of having to disband the organization for lack of funds. AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 43, August 22, 1939. 17 Ibid., act no. 39, July 25, 1939. 18 Avni, “Cárdenas, México y los refugiados judíos,” 8. 19 S. Arons, who was sent by the Joint Distribution Committee to investigate the project, thought thus. AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, Hacienda Coscapá, file 90, fs. 4-39, S. Arons’s report on Hacienda Coscapá, February 19, 1940.



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the land.20 In March 1940, after the farm had been abandoned, the CCIM decided to remove its machinery and tools from the property.21 The case of Coscapá, representative of the difficulties involved in the attempts at agricultural colonization as they were perceived at the time, also illustrates the fact that relationships between the refugees and the representatives of the Jewish community were not without problems. In fact, the attitude of the foreigners was the subject of harsh criticism by some members of the Central Committee, after the refugees demanded the fulfillment of many conditions if they were to stay on the ranch. Among these, they requested that the CCIM support them economically, negotiate their legalization with the Ministry of the Interior, and divide the land into lots, so they could prove individual ownership of the land.22 This case led to the resignation of two members of the Commission for Refugees (Víctor Mitrani and Dr. Frenk), since to their way of thinking the refugees’ general attitude was intolerable;23 the refugees, meanwhile, complained that they had not been treated “amicably” by the committee and had not received the necessary support.24 The next project after Coscapá was at a ranch called San Gregorio, located thirty kilometers from Saltillo, Coahuila, and acquired by Mrs. Ana Schachter de Solymossy, apparently with the intention of helping the refugees. The project began as a response to the failure of Coscapá, because 20 Interview with Jacobo Landau by Haim Avni, quoted in Celia Zack de Zuckerman, Colectividad y Kehilá, vol. 4 of Generaciones judías en México. La Kehilá Ashkenazí (1922– 1992), ed. A. Gojman de Backal, 42–43. On the opinions of the Commission for Refugees, see AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 37, July 11, 1939. 21 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, Hacienda Coscapá (Maquinaria), file 91, f. 3, Corona to Caminer, Mexico City, March 1, 1940. 22 They also requested that the Central Committee provide 900 pesos per month for personal expenses and food, peasant’s salaries, and other expenses, along with a reserve fund for any other needs, advice from a specialist on tropical land, an electric generator, hospital care, and so on. AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, Hacienda Coscapá, file 89, “Condiciones que imponen los refugiados de Coscapá al Comité Central Israelita de México,” Coscapá, Veracruz, April 21, 1939. 23 AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 39, July 25, 1939. In this meeting of the Central Committee it was even proposed that the committee cut itself off completely from matters related to the refugees. The session ended on the following note: “In virtue of the fact that all those present are offended by the refugees’ letter and do not feel able to solve the problem, it is left pending for the next session.” Ultimately those who had resigned reconsidered their decision and continued working for the commission. 24 In their petition they argued that “they did not want to be slaves of the Central Committee, they wanted to be free, the same as the farmers.” AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, Hacienda Coscapá, file 89, “Condiciones que imponen los refugiados de Coscapá al Comité Central Israelita de México,” Coscapá, Veracruz, April 21, 1939.

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the people who took part in the first attempt had to find another agricultural colonization project that would allow them to remain in the country legally. In September 1939 the Israelite Central Committee commissioned William Mayer to evaluate the viability of the project, and Rufino Monroy to carry out an agricultural study of the farm. The rather disheartening opinion of both was based on the determination that the ranch had serious problems obtaining water, and that agricultural work there could support at the most four families.25 In spite of this, Mayer suggested the Central Committee back the project, especially to avoid the criticism of the government and the Jewish community. If the project were at least moderately successful, he argued, it could be proven to the Ministry of the Interior that Jews could adapt to agricultural life and that the committee was interested in helping them. Besides, if the project failed, it would not be the fault of the CCIM, which had kept its moral commitment to help them.26 A later study made by S. Arons, a representative of the Joint Distribution Committee, once again confirmed the unworkability of the project: out of the 1,700 hectares of the ranch only 100 were suitable for cultivation, and of those only 10 or 12 had water. Mrs. Solymossy had kept the latter for herself, selling the rest of the land to the refugees—500 pesos for each completely worthless fifty-hectare lot. Arons reported that with only one or two exceptions, the Europeans did not even know where their own lots were nor how to get to them.27 When Arons arrived at San Gregorio at the beginning or 1940, he found there seventeen people (fifteen men and two women) ranging in age from twenty-five to sixty-five years. The families of thirteen of these were still in Europe. In contrast to Coscapá, both Mayer in his report and Arons made reference to the enthusiasm, determination, and hard work of the refugees, who worked the land of Mrs. Solymossy. According to Mayer, “Their optimism may be due in part to their ignorance of the environment and

25 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, San Gregorio, file 82, f. 5, “Informe que rinde el Sr. William Mayer al Comité Central Israelita de México sobre el Proyecto de San Gregorio” (confidential), Mexico City, September 8, 1939, and file 81, f. 2, report given by Rufino Monroy on the San Gregorio farm, Mexico City, September 11, 1939. 26 Ibid., file 82, f. 7, Mayer to CCIM, Mexico City, September 8, 1939. 27 Ibid., file 81, p. 10, report on San Gregorio, by S. Arons, representative of the JDC, 1940.



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the hardships of the land, as well as the fact that they had no other choice if they wished to remain in the country and later bring their families.”28 Due to the condition of the land, the refugees tried devoting themselves to dairy production and raising chickens, but once again the lack of water was an insurmountable obstacle. Unable to become self-sufficient, they were finally supported by the Jewish communities in Monterrey and Saltillo, and by small contributions from the Joint.29 Apparently they were able to change their immigration status, and according to Haim Avni, some were even able to obtain permission to bring their families.30 This time, the CCIM had decided not to support the project, after hearing the unfavorable reports made by Mayer, Monroy, and Arons. Nor did they intervene when their collaboration was requested later on, in 1942. The committee justified its position by arguing that its budget only allowed it to help the refugee newcomers, who faced many more urgent and important problems than “small-scale agricultural colonization that was, is, and will be a resounding failure.”31 By 1942 fourteen refugees had abandoned the ranch and were living independently in nearby areas, although they still had to prove to the Ministry of the Interior that they continued to reside on the ranch in order to justify their legal stay in the country. Later on, three more families broke away and rented a farm. Little by little all of the refugees left San Gregorio. In order to illustrate the difficulties involved in the projects for colonizing the countryside—from their planning to their execution—it suffices to mention that this was the most successful attempt of them all. There was a third proposal to create an agricultural settlement with Jewish refugees on the Sonora ranch, located in the township of Santa 28 Ibid., file 82, f. 5, Mayer to CCIM, Mexico City, September 8, 1939. 29 The Jewish community of Monterrey consisted of seventy-five families, while Saltillo had only four. Beginning in 1939 the former complained that maintaining seventeen refugees in San Gregorio was a burden on their very small congregation. Ibid., file 82, f. 26, I. Zaslaw, representative of the Club Cultural Hatikva to CCIM, Monterrey, November 14, 1939. Ibid., file 82, f. 43 or 93, report on the San Gregorio ranch, made by Víctor Mitrani, [n.p.], [n.d.]. 30 Avni, “Cárdenas, México y los refugiados judíos,” 9. 31 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, San Gregorio, file 82, f. 55, Glikowski to Nathan, Mexico City, June 20, 1942. The first refugees to abandon San Gregorio were Wonderwalde, Arlevsky, and Sal Levy, who were being sought out by the Ministry of the Interior. Later on the Baschwitzes, Max Kaufmann, and Erich Lechner, who according to Víctor Mitrani’s report rented the Swartz ranch, left the group. At the time of Mitrani’s study the Donner family, Alex Schwartz, David Grünbaum, and Ernst Lechner were all ready to leave, so the only ones left on the ranch were Max Kussel, Isidor Kahn, Emil Levy, and Josef Treu. Ibid., f. 43.

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Ana, District of Magdalena, Sonora. The property, located in the region known as the “Great Sonoran Desert,” was donated by a Dr. Paul Maag, who lived in Zurich and offered to sell the adjoining land.32 But this time it was immediately decided that the land was utterly useless for farming and, therefore, the project was rejected.33 It should be pointed out that in these projects, which were the only option open to those who were obligated to devote themselves to farming, the economic interests of the owners of the land also played a part. The lands were largely useless and there were many people who tried to take advantage of the situation of the refugees. On the other hand, these cases also suggest that the attitude of the refugees themselves should be studied further. In this respect, it should be mentioned that the Israelite Central Committee had a very hard time trying to collect the loans they had made to the newcomers, even years later, when the situation of the refugees was much more comfortable.34 Projects under the Supervision of the Mexican Government The Project of the Governor of Tabasco The development of the project for Jewish agricultural colonization in Tabasco began in the second half of 1939. In theory it was designed so stateless people from Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Poland who were refugees in Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, England, and the United States could colonize the land in the township of Huimanguillo, Tabasco, a state with a very low population density.35 The governor of the state, Francisco Trujillo Gurría, promoted the project along with M. R. Schwartz, director of the Mexican Enterprise Company, with whom the governor had signed a contract for developing the land. The colonization plan was subject to strict scrutiny by various departments of the Mexican government, among them the Ministries of Agriculture and Promotion, of the Treasury and Public Credit, and of Foreign 32 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, Rancho Sonora, file 97, f. 30, S. Arons’s report on the Sonora Ranch, March 8, 1940. 33 Arons recommended that the 320 acres of land which Dr. Maag had donated to the Jewish community of Switzerland be returned to him in order to avoid paying taxes on the land. Ibid., f. 36, S. Arons’s report on the Sonora Ranch, March 8, 1940. 34 See AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, HICEM-Portugal, files 7, 9, 10; and AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Asistencia a Refugiados, file 4. 35 It was not specified that they were Jews, but it was implicit.



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Relations; the Department of Labor; the Autonomous Department of Press and Publicity (DAPP); and within the Ministry of the Interior, the General Office of Population and the Department of Immigration. The project was also examined in several sessions of the Advisory Council on Population.36 It may be concluded from the discussions carried out by this council that the only one who openly supported the Huimanguillo plan was President Lázaro Cárdenas, who “endorsed the view [. . .] that the trials of colonization with Jewish elements should not be prevented,” seconded by the representatives of the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Agriculture, with certain reservations. The other departments either resolutely opposed it (especially the Ministry of National Defense, the DAPP, and Manuel Gamio, at the time head of the Department of Demography of the Ministry of the Interior) or made their approval conditional according to the economic benefits the project might provide, depending on the interests of each institution. Thus, the representative from the Department of Health proposed that conditions be placed on the colonizers, such as building permanent water supply lines and financing medical services; the representative of the Ministry of Defense demanded the refugees pay for the construction of barracks, a landing strip for airplanes, and the erection of telephone and telegraph wires; and Galeano Molina asked that they build 140 kilometers of road on which to transport their agricultural produce.37 The project was analyzed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which recommended that only those foreign colonists with a valid permit to return to their place of origin, in the event that they were expelled from the country, should be admitted; and that the numbers should be in keeping with the differential tables of 1940. Both prerequisites were almost impossible to fulfill.38 Based on the plan outlined by Ramón Beteta in January 1939, the Ministry also recommended including, along with 1,500 foreign

36 The project was at least discussed in the extraordinary sessions on October 23, 1939, which Governor Trujillo Gurría attended, and November 16, 1939. See AHINM, file 4-3501935-228C. 37 Ibid., extraordinary session of the Advisory Council on Population, November 16, 1939. 38 In fact, the lawyer present at the November 16 session thought that if the requirement that the refugees must be able to return to the countries from which they came were imposed, “there would be no colony” (ibid.). On the other hand, the Differential Tables for 1940 contained various articles that affected Jewish immigration, as discussed later in this chapter.

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families, a similar number of Mexican families (preferably repatriated from the United States) who would be interspersed with the foreigners in order to assure the integration of the latter. The Mexican families would receive free land and housing, as well as the necessary commodities to match the conditions of the foreigners.39 The governor of Tabasco agreed on the recommendations made by the government agencies, subject to his discussing the matter of the federal government’s financing the group of Mexican colonists with the president, “because if this were not the case, the matter would not be of much interest to the Government of Tabasco, since the extra income that would be obtained from selling lots was destined to be used to meet diverse economic needs of the State, as he had repeatedly explained, so it would not be possible to spend that revenue on anything else.”40 According to Bernhard Kahn, executive director of the Joint, the representative of the Mexican Enterprise Company had openly confessed to him that Trujillo Gurría planned to sell each hectare, whose actual value was five pesos, for five hundred pesos. At first the requirement they established was that each family or unit would buy at least two hectares, but in the final agreement the minimum was ten and the maximum thirty hectares per family. According to Kahn, Schwartz had told him that with 25 percent of the earnings the governor planned to give the immigrants credit to buy tools, pay for irrigation and railway construction, and so forth.41 Although in the end Trujillo Gurría failed to convince the federal government to finance the repatriated Mexican colonists—to whom the government of Tabasco was to give the land to be colonized for free—he was still interested in the project.42 The plan was also devised with the intent of benefitting Schwartz; he would be in charge of transporting the refugees from Europe to Mexico, thus obtaining considerable profit.43 Schwartz had asked the JDC for their 39 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/16, Study on the Agricultural Colonization Project in the State of Tabasco, sent by Andrés Landa y Piña to the Advisory Council on Population, Mexico City, November 2, 1939. 40 Ibid. 41  JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743, report on the meeting of Bernard Kahn with M. R. Schwartz, [New York], January 18, 1940. 42 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/16, Agreement on colonization in the State of Tabasco, signed by President Lázaro Cárdenas and sent to the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Public Credit, and Agriculture and Promotion, Mexico City, November 13, 1939. 43 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743, report on the meeting of Bernard Kahn with M. R. Schwartz, [New York], January 18, 1940.



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collaboration but the organization flatly refused, arguing that its principles did not allow it to cooperate in projects of colonization promoted by individuals, but rather only by organizations with a public reputation. It was clear to the authorities of the Joint that this was not a legitimate plan for agricultural colonization, since it completely lacked the conditions such plans should guarantee; rather, in the Joint’s opinion it was “an attempt on the part of rather irresponsible parties to organize the camouflaged sale of visas to Mexico.”44 This organization had called the Mexican Enterprise Company a “travel agency” and therefore Kahn thought it was criminal that Jewish organizations supported these types of plans, which were greatly detrimental to their image and reduced the chances for success of serious projects for Jewish immigration.45 What we still do not know is how many of the governmental agencies involved knew of this situation. As we mentioned previously, some members of the Advisory Council on Population came out against the project in the sessions in which it had been discussed, but they did so more in reference to ethnic-racial questions. Eugenio Maldonado, representative of the DAPP, summing up the position of the members of the council who were opposed to Jewish immigration, thought “that if the minority group turned down Hebrew immigration, it is because it is convinced that that race cannot contribute to our mestizaje, and thus it has always come out against said immigration, believing that people who will not assimilate into our country should not be admitted.” He also clarified that, while those delegates supported the thesis of mestizaje, “they do not believe in the supremacy of races nor judge these types of matters with Nazi criteria.”46 The minister of foreign affairs had also expressed to President Cárdenas his serious doubts about the advisability of accepting the project of colonization in Tabasco—doubts that in his opinion were not based on any racial prejudice, “since they are dictated solely by a desire that the Jewish colonization not be a motive for severe criticism of the Government that you honorably head.” Eduardo Hay also called the president’s attention to the possibility that accepting the projected Jewish immigration “would

44 Ibid., Rosen to Kahn, [n.p.], December 5, 1939. 45 Ibid., Kahn to Razovsky, [New York], September 26, 1939. 46 AHINM, file 4-350-1935-228C, extraordinary session of the Advisory Council on Population, October 23, 1939. On Maldonado’s position see Chapter 2.

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be a commitment that future governments would inherit, something that you have tried to avoid at any cost.”47 After the various departments that were part of the Advisory Council on Population had studied the project, Andrés Landa y Piña, the director of immigration, was in charge of its final review. The recommendations he made were along the lines of the central concern of the General Office of Population: to guarantee the possibility of repatriating the refugees, stipulating the conditions for the latter’s assimilation into Mexican society and taking care that the proportion of immigrants according to their origin and nationality should be maintained.48 He also recommended certain measures be taken to insure the financial viability of the project, including that the government of the state of Tabasco grant the Ministry of the Interior an economic guarantee to vouch for the general fulfillment of the plan.49 Finally, on November 13, 1939, President Lázaro Cárdenas signed the agreement on agricultural colonization in Tabasco, enabling the settlement of 1,500 foreign families and an equal number of repatriated Mexican families in the township of Huimanguillo. According to Andrés Landa y Piña, the reason the plan had finally been approved by the Advisory Council on Population “was exclusively due to the fact that it resolved vital economic needs of that state, but not without recognizing the possibility of its giving rise to an ethnic problem of greater or lesser importance, in view of the proven historic inassimilabilty of the Israelite groups.”50 On November 17, four days after signing the agreement, Excelsior, a newspaper of the Mexican capital, published an article entitled “One Thousand Five Hundred Families from Europe Are Going to Colonize an Extensive Region of Tabasco.” According to the article, the governor of Tabasco had announced that President Cárdenas had just signed an agreement allowing for large-scale colonization in that state, with elements from Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria. The article added information on the conditions stipulated by the Mexican government for the admission of the immigrants, and the provision that “among the new 47 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/16, Hay to Cárdenas, [Mexico City], October 27, 1939. 48 50 percent Germans, 30 percent Czechs, 10 percent Hungarians, 10 percent Poles, and without restrictions for Americans. 49 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/16, Study on the Agricultural Colonization Project in the State of Tabasco, sent by Andrés Landa y Piña to the Advisory Council on Population, Mexico City, November 2, 1939. 50 AHINM, file 4-350-228, Landa y Piña to García Téllez, Mexico City, November 29, 1939.



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European immigrants there be families of different races and who profess different creeds. A large number of Hebrews would also be coming.”51 The same day that this information was published, when the representative of the government of Tabasco was about to get on a plane for New York to meet the representative of the immigrants, Governor Trujillo Gurría received a message from President Cárdenas, by way of the Ministry of the Interior, in which he deemed “it necessary to suspend momentarily the agreement pending the reaction of public opinion in relation to the publication of the news.”52 Finally, to the original agreement signed by Cárdenas was added a handwritten note in the margin: “The agreement remains pending by orders of Mr. President.” The reaction of the public to the news was, in a word, bad. The publication of the news provoked a quick response from those sectors opposed to Jewish immigration, especially the Nationalist Association of the United States of Mexico.53 The press also questioned the motives behind the project, as well as the reputation of the Mexican Enterprise Company. According to Andrés Landa y Piña, the case of the projected colonization in Tabasco “served to provide evidence, once again, that Jewish immigration was in general repudiated by public opinion, by those who were considered learned as well as the ‘general public’; and it is a fact that those who are decidedly in favor of said immigration are definitely a minority.”54 Here we must point out that, in general, all of those interested in the projects for Jewish immigration to Mexico were asked to deal with the matter very discretely, as reported by the Joint’s chief director, J. C. Hyman, based on his own experience: “The special settlement plan, presented by the aforementioned delegation, was very favorably received by President Cárdenas, but later it had to be postponed because we were advised that during the pre-election and election period, our plan should not be made a public issue.”55 However, Mexican politicians also needed to be discreet, and this was not their strong point. Josephus Daniels, the ambassador of

51 “Mil quinientas familias de Europa van a colonizar una extensa conmarca tabasqueña,” Excelsior, November 17, 1939. 52 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/16, Trujillo Gurría to Cárdenas, Mexico City, November 17, 1939. 53 “Seria oposición para que Tabasco sea colonizado por mil familias extranjeras,” Excelsior, November 19, 1939. 54 AHINM, file 4-350-228, Landa y Piña to García Téllez, Mexico City, November 29, 1939. 55 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743, J. C. Hyman to J. V. Clinnin, [n.p.], December 31, 1940.

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the United States in Mexico, believed that many of the problems were due to leaks in government circles, since in Mexico “there were too many people who talked too much.”56 In relation to the Tabasco case, it is interesting to note that the response of the public was not foreseen; in fact it even seems to have taken the president by surprise. It is possible that the statement made by Trujillo to the press was a political error on the part of the governor or an attempt at fixing a leak. The project, however, had not been canceled yet. Once again in April 1940 Trujillo Gurría was taking steps, now with the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico, with whom he had reached certain verbal agreements.57 Without being aware of the negative attitude of the Joint towards this immigration plan, the committee asked them to send an investigative commission to Mexico, whose results would also serve to “free the CCIM and the Israelite Colony of all responsibility in the eyes of our authorities, in case the project, in the opinion of the Joint, cannot be carried out,” although they considered there to be a good chance of success.58 This is a good example of how lack of communication between the North American organizations and the local Jewish community led to duplicated efforts, since in this case the experience of the Joint would have prevented the CCIM’s becoming involved in the matter. The JDC evidently responded that it was not possible to send a negotiating commission to Mexico, and the reasons why were given in New York in person to Arturo Wolfowitz, a member of the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico.59 As we shall see later on, by then this North American organization was convinced that the actual possibility of Jewish immigration to Mexico was slight and that any project, even if it had the support of all branches of government, would sooner or later face a series of almost insurmountable difficulties. The CCIM tried to deal with the matter as delicately as possible, believing that it was of vital importance not to confront the governor of Tabasco with a resounding no, since he might hold an important position in the next national government, and hoping he would maintain a friendly

56 Quoted in Gilly, El cardenismo, 130. 57 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, Proyecto colonización en Tabasco, file 88, Trujillo Gurría to the president of the CCIM, Mexico City, April 3, 1940, and CCIM to Trujillo Gurría, [Mexico City], April 4, 1940. 58 Ibid., file 98, f. 19, Corona to Wolfowitz, [Mexico City], April 11, 1940. 59 Ibid., file 98, f. 22, Kahn to Corona, New York, April 18, 1940.



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attitude towards the Jewish community.60 Years later, in 1944, Francisco Trujillo Gurría declared that unfortunately the difficulties brought on by the war and the end of his term thwarted the plan for agricultural colonization in Tabasco. He added, “I still believe that this kind of immigration would be beneficial to Mexico. Jewish immigrants are very profitable for countries with a low population density. They are hard-working people; they adapt easily to the circumstances they need to live with and contribute to the progress of those nations that open their doors to them.”61 The Efforts of Ramón Beteta, the Joint Distribution Committee, and the American Friends Service Committee Ramón Beteta was commissioned to assess the possibility of an organized Jewish immigration to colonize unexploited agricultural areas, and to a lesser degree to develop new industry. To this end he talked to representatives from various North American organizations interested in the opportunities the country could offer European refugees. The appointment of Beteta was evidently tied to the favorable position he had taken toward Jewish immigration in the memorandum he presented to Cárdenas in January 1939. While it was the Ministry of the Interior that dealt with matters regarding foreigners entering the country, in this case it seemed logical to entrust the matter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or, rather, to Beteta, since the Ministry of the Interior had openly come out against admitting Jewish immigrants, and the minister of foreign affairs had also expressed similar opinions on various occasions. It is worth quoting a letter addressed to Ignacio García Téllez, which helps explain the position held by Hay. The letter explicitly talks about Jewish immigration, which it described as “truly ruinous and unfavorable to the economy of the country,” adding, In most American countries strong rulings in favor of stopping such a wave of immigrants have already been issued; it has been foreseen that in a very short time they would not only injure the people of the country by taking

60 The CCIM referred to Governor Trujillo Gurría as a “person friendly to the Israelites,” who had for many years been in close contact with Professor A. Goldschmidt. Ibid., file 98, f. 14, CCIM to Rosen, Mexico City, April 9, 1940. 61 Fraternidad. Órgano del Comité Mexicano contra el Racismo 1, no. 2 (Mexico City, July 1, 1944): 4.

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chapter four over their sources of wealth, but also that their influence in official spheres would be detrimental to the effective running of Public Administration.62

Following President Cárdenas’s order, Ramón Beteta met with representatives of President Roosevelt’s Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, the leader of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC, a Quaker organization), and members of the Joint Distribution Committee. The meetings took place on June 15–19, 1939, the first in the Mexican Embassy in Washington and the second in the house of Frank Aydelotte, president of Swarthmore College, in Pennsylvania.63 In the first meeting, presided over by Frank Tannenbaum, Roosevelt’s right-hand man and a good friend of Cárdenas,64 representatives of the Spanish Republic also participated, since the JDC had proposed that the matter of Spanish and Jewish immigration be dealt with together, arguing that “in order to obtain money, it was essential that they present the public with an image of Mexico as a humanitarian country who took in all those who were persecuted, with no distinction as to race or religion, and that, therefore, it would be very useful for placing the Spaniards to have help coming from other, better endowed sources, that is, the Jews.” Beteta, however, insisted on the need to differentiate between these two immigrations: While Spaniards are arriving and will continue to arrive in Mexico up until we reach our capacity and are elements that are easily assimilated, and speak our language, the Jewish immigration is just being considered as a possibility and there are some obstacles. Among these, they speak a different language, the difficulty of assimilation, the existence of a religion which is different from that of our country, the lack of agricultural skills of the proposed colonists, who, for the most part come from cities.65 62 AHINM, file 4-350-683, Hidalgo, by orders of the minister, to García Téllez, Mexico City, June 28, 1939. 63 In the first meeting the following people participated: Frank Tannenbaum; George Warren, secretary of the Advisory Committee on Political Refugees; Mordejai Ezekial, of the Department of Agriculture of the United States; Frank Aydelotte, president of Swarthmore College and prominent member of the American Friends Service Committee; Juan Pantin and Daniel Alonso, of the Confederated Spanish Societies; Mary Carter Jones and Lillian Traugott, also from the AFSC; and Mr. Batel and Isaac Levy, of the Joint Distribution Committee. 64 Frank Tannenbaum was born in Austria in 1893 and died in the United States in 1969. A journalist, historian and sociologist, he was also a political and social activist. He lived in Mexico between 1922 and 1945, where he carried out research on rural education and later collaborated in producing the legislation that established the administration of agricultural insurance. He was a friend and advisor to Lázaro Cárdenas. 65 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/16, Beteta to Cárdenas, Washington, DC, June 15, 1939.



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Tannenbaum had explored the lands in Mexico that were suitable for agricultural colonization (accompanied by Beteta) and had also been in contact with President Cárdenas, with whom he had discussed the possibility of taking advantage of some of this land for setting up foreign families, as long as they brought with them enough money to live on and to acquire the things necessary for colonization. The Mexican government had considered the possibility of offering free land or land paid for in installments; building schools, telegraph, and telephone offices; and creating connections between the agricultural colony and the main transportation routes.66 The representative of the Joint, Mr. Levy, offered to contribute about one thousand dollars per family in order to help the refugees get set up, but pointed out the need for Mexico to create an official organization through which everything related to colonization would be handled and whose attitude towards immigration would be favorable. He argued that if Mexico was thinking of allowing the immigration of foreigners, then the antiJewish attitude, which in reality was an “anti-immigration” attitude among the offices involved, should be modified. Beteta responded that the government’s attitude was neither anti-Jewish nor anti-immigration, but that there was a series of well-justified restrictions on disorderly immigration.67 In summary, the impression held by the vice-minister of foreign affairs after the first meeting was that the government should keep the Spanish problem separate from other problems, and that there was a possibility of obtaining acceptable immigrants, financed by societies throughout the world who were interested in the fate of the refugees, Jewish or not, who were fleeing from persecution in their countries.68 In the second meeting Beteta met with representatives of the JDC and AFSC in private, without representatives of Spanish organizations.69 Dr. Joseph A. Rosen,70 one of the most important representatives of the Joint, proposed beginning with a small-scale, experimental immigration, of no more than five hundred families, with the condition that if this 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid., Beteta to Cárdenas, Washington, DC, June 20, 1939. 70 Dr. Joseph Rosen, a world-famous agronomist, directed the activities of the Joint Distribution Committee in Russia and later founded the Agro-Joint, which lent assistance to the Jewish settlements in Crimea and Birobidjan until the Soviet government forbade its activities. Ben Sasson, Historia del pueblo judío, 1169. Beteta said that Rosen had made a very good impression on him.

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was successful, more could come until the limits set by the country were reached. Rosen emphasized that there were thousands of young people in camps in England, Holland, and Switzerland being trained in agriculture while they waited to be received by some country, and that the first colonists could be chosen from among them. He also said that various regions of Latin America had been visited in search of a place with the potential to receive Jewish refugees, and noted that in Mexico various people had proposed “more or less unfeasible” immigration projects, whose objectives were very probably linked to obtaining economic profit. In this meeting they also discussed the possibility of immigration with industrial development in mind. In this respect Beteta was assured that among the Jews expelled from Germany were many individuals trained in industrial chemistry who in Mexico could establish factories for manufacturing dyes, anilines, medicines, vials, and so on. These plants would employ not only Jews but also Mexicans. There was also mention made of the possibility of establishing in Mexico industries that had disappeared from Czechoslovakia, such as those that manufactured porcelain, glass, and toys, which would have a global market, especially in North America. The impression that Ramón Beteta took away from the meeting was that the attendees, especially the Jews, “are familiar with the problem, and have a desire to resolve it, and that immigration to Mexico interests them very much.”71 At this point neither side made any concrete commitment. The vice-minister of foreign affairs stated that Mexico was studying the matter and that, except for the Spaniards, with whom there was a commitment, his government had not reached any agreement nor authorized anyone to deal with these matters. Beteta appeared positive—and even enthusiastic—about what foreign immigration could offer the country. Finally, he expressed his opinion to President Cárdenas: If the problem is attacked from all sides: repatriation, Spanish immigration, and foreign immigration of other nationalities, and if the capital needed for orderly colonization by carefully selected groups can be obtained, an incalculably important step towards changing the physiognomy of the country and increasing its economic potential would be taken.72

Frank Aydelotte visited Mexico in August 1939 in order to continue the negotiations, and he reached an agreement with the Mexican government to form a small experimental colony with two hundred Jewish families.73 71 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/16, p. 5, Beteta to Cárdenas, Washington, DC, June 20, 1939. 72 Ibid. 73 He met with Ramón Beteta, Ignacio García Téllez, and Dr. José G. Parrés.



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The AFSC and the Joint formed a technical committee, headed by Dr. Arthur Morgan and Rosen himself, who would visit Mexico in order to inspect the available sites and acquire land suitable for the colony.74 They were aware that there were certain difficulties involved in Jewish immigration and that only a small-scale immigration could be considered, but after a thorough assessment it was determined that the benefits justified continuing with the project. After traveling around various regions of the country, the so-called Technical Committee for the Colonization of Refugees from Germany showed interest in some land that was for sale near Uruapan, Michoacán. Therefore, they asked Ramón Beteta for information on the condition of that land (in particular, they wanted to know whether it might later be subject to redistribution under Cárdenas’s land reform policy) and about the advisability of acquiring the land. Together with the letter signed by Morgan, a note typed on a small sheet of paper torn from an almanac asked on behalf of Beteta to have the condition of the land investigated in the Agrarian Department. But on the same sheet a handwritten note had been added: “The investigation that was ordered did not take place because the interested parties declared that it be deferred in view of the difficulties being faced nowadays by the Ministry of the Interior.” The note was signed by Beteta.75 These difficulties were linked precisely to the Jewish colonization project in Tabasco, which had come up at the same time. While they were two very different matters, with different backing, the doubts and shadows hanging over the latter project—as well as disapproval by the public— created an atmosphere of distrust that extended to the plan backed by the Joint, causing the Mexican government to postpone all negotiations on the matter once it had been approved. According to Alberto Terrones Benítez, one of the Mexican lawyers hired to represent the interests of the North American organizations, the Tabasco case was used as an excuse to pressure President Cárdenas to not accept any project for the immigration of Jewish refugees.76 The obstacles present within the Ministry of the Interior can be grouped on two levels. The first level of obstacles comprised essentially technical matters that arose as the officials of the Department of Immigration and 74 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/16, Aydelotte to Cárdenas, Pennsylvania, September 12, 1939. 75 AHSRE, file III-2398-1, Morgan to Beteta, Mexico City, October 26, 1939, and attached manuscript note. 76 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743, Terrones Benítez to Rosen, Mexico City, December 1, 1939.

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the Head Office of Population tried to ensure that the colonization plan of the Joint/AFSC complied with all legal requirements. These obstacles included the need to place the immigrants in areas with low population density, interspersed with Mexican colonists, and the requirement that the former be repatriable once the war ended. Some of these conditions were unacceptable to the Joint. On the second level were the obstacles generated by the opposition to Jewish immigration by certain government employees, notably Andrés Landa y Piña himself, as he expressed to Ignacio García Téllez in a letter in relation to the project under analysis: I must say that my opinion is negative regarding the admission of these immigrants; but, with reference to the attitude of our Government, favorable to men who are the object of persecution due to their political ideas and who therefore are in danger of losing their lives, the members of these Israelite families should be admitted, and not just because it is considered useful or convenient to embark on colonization activities in the country; in this case, I repeat, I think that the conditions for admission should not be less than those required for the admission of stateless families who were planning on colonizing the township of Huimanguillo in the State of Tabasco.77

In late January 1940, the other Mexican lawyer in charge of representing the Joint/AFSC, Carlos Sánchez Mejorada, Jr., met with Landa y Piña and Francisco Trejo, who had abandoned his attitude in favor of Jewish immigration. According to his report, Trejo stated that to be quite honest, they were wasting their time, since up to that moment, there had been more than thirty-five projects for Jewish colonization presented to the Mexican government, none of which complied with the necessary requirements. Part of the problem, according to Sánchez Mejorada, was precisely that the requirements were not clear and for that reason he wished to discuss the matter.78 The general director of population, whose attitude was described by the speaker as hostile and irrational, argued that he would not go into the details or concrete aspects of the project until the JDC had made a cash deposit as a guarantee of its seriousness and interest. The amount of the guarantee was left up to the interested parties. The lawyer answered that the Joint was willing to put up a guarantee, provided there was indeed something to guarantee and that the conditions 77 AHINM, file 4-350-228, Landa y Piña to García Téllez, Mexico City, November 29, 1939. 78 In other documents of the Joint, reference is made to the impossibility of complying with the prerequisites of the Mexican government, due to their arbitrariness.



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were laid down in writing, but Trejo did not accept, insisting on his initial position.79 The secretary of the interior, Ignacio García Téllez, had referred earlier to the matter of economic guarantees for immigration projects: In keeping with this, and calculating that the Jews have declared that they have substantial capital to be used to help their compatriots, they have been told that in order to deal seriously with any problem related to the acceptance of Jewish contingents, they should deposit in an official banking institution an amount deemed sufficient to finance agricultural or industrial investments, to which they should dedicate themselves in keeping with the planning of businesses that, depending on the number of Jews and amount of resources they have, will be stipulated by the technical commissions of the various official dependencies and the representatives of the interested foreign groups. To date none of the more distinguished agents of this hospitable movement has presented their proposition according to the groundwork laid out, this being the reason that the Ministry has continued its policy of restriction, in accordance with the differential tables along with its duty to defend the economy and native workers.80

Returning to Sánchez Mejorada, he thought that, despite the attitude of Francisco Trejo, who without a doubt was in a key position, the project could go forward if President Cárdenas was willing to collaborate, since they had the support of Beteta.81 After direct negotiations with Cárdenas as well as García Téllez and Beteta, in February 1940 the project was once again turned over to the Advisory Council on Population, which meant it had returned to the normal routine channels that led nowhere.82 The suspension of the project caused uncertainty and annoyance among its promoters, basically because they did not understand the causes behind the refusal and because of the treatment they received. Bernhard Kahn, the executive director of the Joint, asked Frank Tannenbaum to intervene with President Cárdenas, explaining: [. . .] we do not understand either the delay or the way this matter has been handled so far. If there is a change in the attitude of the President and his

79 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743, Sánchez Mejorada Jr. to JDC, Mexico City, January 30, 1940. 80 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/16, García Téllez to Leñero, Mexico City, August 9, 1939. 81  JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743, Sánchez Mejorada Jr. to JDC, Mexico City, January 30, 1940. 82 AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, García Téllez to Leñero, Mexico City, February 22, 1940.

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chapter four advisers, he should let us know, and we would then take the position we think necessary for an organization like ours; after the assurances given us, we feel the whole thing was handled in a way that is rather humiliating to us.83

In April 1940 the committee of the Joint/AFSC considered temporarily suspending negotiations on the project of colonization in Mexico, and resuming them once the change of government had taken place, when a new administration was in power.84 This decision was based mainly on three considerations. First, a climate of political instability prevailed in Mexico as the end of the president’s administration approached. This climate was unfavorable to dealing with any but the most important matters. The committee members were advised to wait by one of the Mexican lawyers representing them, who wisely summed up the political climate of the time: “it seems that under prevailing circumstances the Government has other pressing matters to attend to, arising from the last elections. In fact, the present has been a political moment that does not afford any opportunity to take up other matters with government officials.”85 Second, the committee feared that all of the employees of the Ministry of the Interior, and in particular Trejo and Landa y Piña, would be insurmountable obstacles to reaching an agreement on any projects for Jewish immigration.86 In this respect, Terrones Benítez advised Bernhard Kahn: It is my opinion, however, that it is not advisable to negotiate anything during the present administration; our experience has shown us that nothing can be accomplished, although you were always agreeable to fulfilling the reasonable prerequisites according to our laws. Beginning on December 1 another administration will take over, and then we can once again begin negotiations with the new officials who will surely be replacing those now in office.87 83 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 743, Kahn to the members of the Mexican Committee, [n.p.], January 25, 1940. 84 Part of the responsibility for the failure of this project was assumed by its leaders, who thought they had handled the matter very badly by leaving it in the hands of third parties (the lawyers Sánchez Mejorada and Terronez Benítez) instead of following it closely from Mexico. Ibid., Rosen to Kahn, Dominican Republic, February 9, 1940. 85 Ibid., Terrones Benítez to Kahn, Mexico City, September 14, 1940. 86 Ibid., See the letter from Carlos Sánchez Mejorada Jr., to JDC, Mexico City, January 30, 1940, in which he tells of an interview the former had with Manuel Tello and Andrés Landa y Piña, and the rough draft of the memorandum for Ignacio García Téllez, Mexico City, January 31, 1940, signed by Carlos Sánchez Mejorada Jr. and Alberto Terrones Benítez. 87 Ibid., Terrones Benítez to Kahn, Mexico City, October 18, 1940.



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Internal documents of the Joint/AFSC and their legal representatives in Mexico make reference to a great deal of corruption prevalent among the employees of the Ministry of the Interior, which led to the project for Jewish colonization being limited to certain predetermined states within the republic (Campeche and Tabasco) based on an economic arrangement made previously by the highest authorities in immigration matters and the governors of those states. Once again, in the opinion of Terrones Benítez, the imposition of the condition that colonization would be limited to certain areas of the country encroached on the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture. That administrative division was the only one that could establish which lands were suited for colonization, according to the stipulations of the Law of Colonization. Thus, Terrones Benítez advised gaining a clear understanding of those matters before approaching the immigration authorities and the president again.88 According to employees of the Joint and the AFSC, Cárdenas had admitted that corruption within the Ministry of the Interior was a fundamental part of the problem, and he had suggested to one of them, Mr. Neill, that they wait until after the elections.89 Mr. Reich, one of the representatives of the AFSC who had been in Mexico, thought that the attitude of the minister of the interior was in general terms favorable to the committee, but that he was not familiar with any of the details, which he delegated to Francisco Trejo.90 The third consideration, closely linked to the previous one, pertained to Lázaro Cárdenas himself. In the opinion of the Joint/AFSC, the president sympathized with the project of Jewish colonization—and had even promised his full support—but due to the obstacles placed by the Ministry of the Interior it would apparently be easier for him to support the project “from behind the scenes” once the new administration took power.91 While appearing contradictory, the officials of the Joint/AFSC thought that then “the new president and Cárdenas would be strong enough to manage to impose themselves on governors and officials avid to obtain personal benefits.”92 This was really very optimistic.

88 Ibid., Terrones Benítez to Aydelotte, Mexico City, December 17, 1940. 89 Ibid., Notes on the Meeting of the Mexican Committee held on April 2nd, 1940 at the office of the JDC. 90 Ibid. 91  Ibid., “Mexico,” [n.p.], April 10, 1940. 92 Ibid., Notes on the Meeting of the Mexican Committee held on April 2nd, 1940 at the office of the JDC.

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Following the presidential elections, the committee of the Joint/AFSC contemplated the possibility of resuming negotiations with the Mexican government, but the officials who would hold the key positions in immigration would not be named until the middle of December 1940. And while the committee believed that there might be a change in immigration policy in the country, they thought it better to wait until the new government was well established before making a move.93 In the end the project was not taken up again due to, among other things, the fact that the money destined for Jewish colonization in Mexico, $200,000, had to be “unfrozen” in light of the many plans for evacuating refugees from Europe, above all by the United Kingdom, which needed large sums of money.94 Notwithstanding this urgent need, the Joint felt that the financial difficulties were not the main reason that negotiations with the Mexican government were postponed. The delay was closely tied, in its opinion, to the fact that the matter of the Spanish refugees kept the Mexican authorities busy, and that any negotiations on immigration would be affected by this. In fact, the Mexican government justified its policy toward the Jewish refugees by arguing that it was already devoting its resources to the Spanish refugees. For example, when Henry Green, director of the Associated Press Workers in the United States, wrote to Ávila Camacho to ask whether the Mexican government would consider establishing a colony for Jewish refugees in Baja California, the answer he received was that for the time being it was not possible to consider this matter, since the government was already taking steps to accommodate other groups, especially Spanish refugees.95 In any case, by the end of December 1940, almost a year and a half after the project was first outlined, the international situation was greatly changed. Even if a favorable agreement had been reached with the Mexican authorities, the war in Europe would have made it exceedingly difficult to comply with the requirements necessary for the implementation of colonization, while the scarcity of transatlantic transportation further complicated things.

93 Ibid. 94 Ibid., Kahn to Pickett, [New York], June 24, 1940. 95 Archivo General de la Nación, Presidentes: Manuel Ávila Camacho (AGN, PMAC), 704/37, Green to Ávila Camacho, New York, March 14, 1941 (both Green and Ávila Camacho were friends of Vice President Henry A. Wallace), and González Gallo to Green, Mexico City, March 29, 1941.



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The Implementation of Immigration Policy by the Ministry of the Interior, 1939–1940 While the various plans for Jewish colonization in Mexico were being analyzed, the Ministry of the Interior continued with the implementation of a selective, discretionary immigration policy. In fact, the differential tables that would govern the admission of immigrants in 1939 were in general stricter than the ones for the previous year, since they reduced the admission from non-American countries, with the exception of Spain, from 5,000 to 1,000 individuals.96 There were also two articles in particular that would affect the Jewish refugees fleeing from Nazism. According to one of the vice-consuls of the United States appointed to Mexico City, Edward Anderson, these articles were specifically designed to limit Jewish immigration.97 The first established that “Foreigners who have lost their nationality and those who are stateless, will only be admitted in exceptional cases, when obviously beneficial to the country, by way of individual, express agreements of the Ministry of the Interior itself.”98 This article specifically affected the Jewish refugees who, as we have seen, had lost their rights of citizenship in 1935 and effectively became stateless when they left Germany. The second was Article 15 of the differential tables, which stipulated that “The applications for asylum will not be acceptable if they come from persons who leave their country of residence due to motives of personal convenience or if the application is filed in a country other than the one where the persecution has been carried out. No foreigner who had entered the Republic as a visitor, temporarily or as a tourist or trans-migrant, will be accepted as a refugee.”99 This article touched on three fundamental aspects related to the Jewish refugees. The first was the difficulty those who were persecuted for political reasons had in proving that they were the object of persecution. Second, the majority of applications for asylum by those who had fled Nazism were in fact made outside the country where the persecution took place, in another country 96 The countries included were Germany, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Holland, England, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. “Tablas diferenciales a que se sujetará la admisión de inmigrantes durante el año de 1939,” Diario Oficial, November 1, 1938. 97 Edward Anderson, “Admission of Aliens into Mexico. An Analysis of the Immigration Laws and Practice,” November 17, 1938, quoted in Merren, “Politics of xenophobia,” 53. 98 “Tablas diferenciales a que se sujetará la admisión de inmigrantes durante el año de 1939,” article 1, paragraph IV, Diario Oficial, November 1, 1938. 99 Ibid.

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that offered the exiles temporary asylum while they searched for a definitive resettlement opportunity. The third reiterated the deterrent placed on refugees who tried to enter the country as tourists. Finally, Article 15 also insisted on denying admission to those refugees who did not have asylee status, that is, those who had not been recognized and accepted as such by the government before they reached the country. In this way the Ministry of the Interior tried to maintain control over the admission of Europeans, making it clear that they would not accept impositions. However, despite these regulations, during the first months of 1939 immigration authorities allowed the sporadic disembarkation of some Jewish refugees. Richard Merren thought that the promise of the Refugee Economic Corporation100 to provide $500,000 in aid for settling refugees in Mexico might have influenced the decision to allow some Jews to enter. Nevertheless we have found no information to confirm that. According to reports from the American consuls in Mexico and from the ambassador himself, Josephus Daniels, between April and July 1939, 70 Jewish refugees were admitted while 109 were rejected.101 During the second half of 1939, the policy towards Jewish refugees once again became more rigid. The 124 Germans aboard the French steamship Flandre who were rejected by Cuba were not allowed to disembark on Mexican soil either when they arrived in Veracruz in June 1939. The ship was stuck in port for several days during negotiations with the Mexican government to allow the refugees to disembark; but only the Rosenberg family, who had a travel permit that was valid until the month of December, was allowed in.102 It is probable that this change was due to the increase in the flow of emigrants from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, and to the measures adopted by the consul general of Mexico in Germany, Alfonso Guerra. It is worth quoting the document that he sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1939: 100 This organization, originally called the Refugee Rehabilitation Committee, was founded by the American philanthropist Charles J. Liebman on the recommendation of High Commissioner for Refugees James McDonald, who beginning in 1934 suggested that Jewish organizations create their own organs for financing emigration from Europe. 101 See especially Josephus Daniels, “Monthly report of refugees either admitted or refused admittance into Mexico to June 30, 1939,” August 10, 1939, and Daniels to the secretary of state, October 16, 1939, quoted in Merren, “Politics of xenophobia,” 96. 102 El Dictamen, Veracruz, June 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1939. The refugees on the Flandre managed to disembark in France where, in the words of Arturo Wolfowitz, they were kindly taken in by the French authorities and people. AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 63, January 9, 1940.



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I would like to state that as soon as the problem of mass immigration came up, as a consequence of the hostility that was shown in this country towards individuals of the Semitic race, on my own initiative which is free of racial prejudice, I took the measures which I thought necessary in order to avoid that, contrary to what is set down in the General Law of Population, a considerable contingency of people, undesirable due to their labor methods or due to their being indigents set out for our country. These measures, known to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consisting of Circulars that limited the actions of the Honorary Consuls, which constituted, at the time, disciplinary sanctions, were partially made known to all of our Consul Generals in Europe [. . .] since as I have reiterated, the rigidity with which we have acted in Germany [. . .] allows me to affirm conclusively that not a single immigrant, visitor, or tourist of the so-called undesirables is documented today in the Consulates of this Department.103

The reiterated insistence of government employees that their actions were not motivated by racial prejudice attracts one’s attention. We find these affirmations consistently in all of the statements in which racial arguments are used. This shows that officials worried about the matter, and that they were aware that their statements could at least “seem” racist; otherwise there would have been no need for these clarifications. Getting back to Consul Guerra, he complained that, compared to the rigid performance of the consular representatives in Europe, in Mexico there was a certain “organized tolerance” that allowed the admission of Jewish refugees into the country. This tolerance was manifested in telegraphic orders, at times categorically, that obligated us to smooth the way, which leads them to create unfair competition for Mexican workers, since, as I have reiterated many times, with few exceptions, the Jewish tourists, temporary visitors or immigrants, cannot return nor is it in their interest to return to Germany [. . .] thus, their immigration is definitive.104

Upon receiving these communiqués, the minister of foreign affairs addressed the minister of the interior in order to tell him that, despite the Mexican consulates in Europe having precise and strict instructions to not document undesirable refugees, “in some cases we run into the difficulty that they have received from your office dependent on the Executive subsequent orders exempting the interested parties from those prerequisites 103 AHINM, file 4/350/683, Hidalgo to García Téllez, official document of the General Consulate of Mexico in Hamburg retransmitted, dated May 20, 1939, Mexico City, June 28, 1939. The underlining is from the original document. The italics are the author’s. 104 Ibid.

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with which they were unable to comply. The result of this is that those who desire to come to Mexico somehow manage to do so anyway.”105 The authorizations that the consuls received were directly approved by President Lázaro Cárdenas and included, along with the Spanish refugees, a select number of German and Austrian political refugees (some of whom were Jews), as we shall see later on. The Israelite Central Committee of Mexico, for its part, was aware of the restrictive policies. When in September 1939 a commission of Spanish refugees from the Comité Hispano-Mexicano (Hispanic-Mexican Committee) approached the Jewish community to ask for their cooperation— arguing that the Jews could form part of the Spanish colonization in Mexico—they answered that “in Mexico there is almost no problem with Israelite refugees, since they are not allowed to immigrate to the country; thanks to the war, at this moment the problem of Israelite refugees is about to disappear.”106 The beginning of World War II, in September 1939, further complicated the situation for Jewish refugees, above all because it would create a parallel flow of refugees and displaced persons, and also because it would hamper transatlantic transportation enormously, among many other problems.107 While during 1939 the matter of the refugees fleeing Nazism seemed to be the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and in general the latter was much more involved in the projects of agricultural colonization than the former, as we have seen), at the beginning of 1940 the Ministry of the Interior tried to take control of everything related to foreign immigration to Mexico. On January 13, 1940, a letter signed by Ignacio García Téllez asked Eduardo Hay to instruct Mexican consuls to henceforth abstain from issuing visas and immigration documents to political exiles without the prior authorization of the Ministry of the Interior. At the time this could be justified based on the need of the latter to issue a ruling on the settlement 105 Ibid. 106 AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. I, act no. 45, September 5, 1939. 107 In September 1939 the CCIM was informed that for the following two or three months American ships would only be returning American citizens to the United States, while Italian ships were fearful of being detained if they were found to be transporting Germans. Dutch ships would probably be in the same situation, due to the fact that when the New Amsterdam was returning to Europe it was detained, and some Germans taken off. In its communiqués the JDC reported that they were trying to reach an agreement with the British authorities so that emigration could continue. AKA, CCIM, Relaciones Intercomunitarias, Joint Distribution Committee, Bernhard Kahn to E. Frenk, New York, September 20, 1939.



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and activities of those foreigners who were allowed into the country as political exiles.108 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs obeyed the order, asking Cárdenas’s private secretary, Agustín Leñero, from that time forward to carry out all of the president’s resolutions ordering the documentation of individuals as political refugees through the Ministry of the Interior, and no longer through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as had been done up to that moment.109 García Téllez also presented this request directly to Leñero,110 who responded that by presidential order, whenever the head of state dictated a resolution in this regard, it was simultaneously transmitted to the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Relations, in order that the respective transaction be carried out quickly and effectively.111 The Ministry of the Interior also tried to exercise more control over the immigration of Spaniards. García Téllez once again, if only briefly, took over the resolution of cases of new Republican refugees seeking entry during the months previous to July 1940.112 During this period he authorized the admission of forty-three people as political exiles, but warned that these people had to have either enough money to support themselves or the support of individuals or businesses that could guarantee them paying jobs. The minister insisted on pointing out that otherwise there would be more problems with immigrants, since in Mexico City there were already 1,155 Spaniards who still did not have any work and whose position was growing more and more distressing. In April 1940, three months after Cárdenas had made his generous offer to collectively take in the Spanish refugees who were in France, García Téllez believed that, due to the fact that the seriousness of the situation for the Spanish Republicans has disappeared since they have met with a favorable reception in France and some American countries, it is opportune to impose the measures of selection recommended by the Council on Population from the beginning, in order for the country to benefit as much as possible from the Spanish immigration caused by the end of the war.113

108 AGN, PLC, file 549.2/20, Hay to Leñero (transmitting instructions of Ignacio García Téllez), Mexico City, February 8, 1940. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid., García Téllez to Leñero, Mexico City, February 22, 1940. 111  Ibid., Leñero to García Téllez, Mexico City, March 2, 1940. 112 The Ministry itself reported: “since our embassy in Paris had finished its administration, this department would once again have the power to solve the cases of admission of new refugees.” Ibid., García Téllez to Leñero, Mexico City, April 16, 1940. 113 Ibid., García Téllez to Leñero, Mexico City, April 16, 1940.

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The minister of the interior reiterated this opinion to Luis I. Rodríguez, Mexico’s minister in France in charge of negotiating the asylum offered to the Spaniards, recommending that for any new contingency admitted, it is essential that they have enough money, previously deposited in a Mexican financial institution; that those who are in charge of receiving, accommodating, and financing follow a prudent plan; that all necessary adaptations be made to place them in productive working conditions immediately; and that those who are allowed in should have in their heart a sense of duty to constitute productive units that cooperate with the national wellbeing [. . .] As you can deduce, the situation is very delicate, more so at these moments of electoral unrest. New experiments with expectations of partial failure, as we experienced with groups who were allowed in, are intolerable, and it is urgent to take all possible precautions with any new collective admission.114

Luis I. Rodríguez’s answer made it clear that he would follow President Cárdenas’s instructions, subtly suggesting to the Ministry of the Interior that they do the same: “In view of the dire situation faced by Spanish refugees, President Cárdenas gave me instructions to come to their aid, absolutely and definitively. Applauding such a generous decision, I hope to be able to count on your invaluable, indispensable support in order to carry out the orders I have been given.”115 García Téllez replied by offering his full cooperation.116 In August 1940, the minister of the interior justified the admission of the Spanish refugees, arguing that the president had responded to the needs of the universal duty of hospitality and to the collective misfortune of Spain by agreeing to open the doors of Mexico to the Republican elements who could not remain in their country without putting their lives in danger. He added that their presence would constitute “a contribution of human strength as well as of a race similar in spirit and blood to our own, which when mixed with the natives formed our nationality, and which will now come to contribute to the development and progress of the nation with its capacity and strength.”117 With respect to the immigration of other kinds of refugees, the minister of the interior declared: 114 García Téllez to Rodríguez, Mexico City, May 31, 1940, in Rafael Segovia and Fernando Serrano Migallón, eds., Misión de Luis I. Rodríguez en Francia. La protección de los refugiados españoles, julio a diciembre de 1940 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México/SRE/ Conacyt, 2000), 16. 115 Rodríguez to García Téllez, Vichy, July 23, 1940, in ibid., 17. 116 García Téllez to Rodríguez, Mexico City, July 25, 1940, in ibid. 117 García Téllez, “Puntos de vista,” [no page].



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This open door policy, particularly wide open for the admission of Spanish citizens, when dealing with other nationalities has been limited to special isolated cases of truly persecuted foreigners who can prove this and are not coming to the country to compete with the active native population, nor displace them from the activities they carry out, harming our economy. The acceptance of refugees who have sought asylum based on racial persecution has been much more limited since these constitute very large population groups uprooted from their native land, and Mexico has been waiting to see whether democratic, progressive countries, in a large-scale, generous, and sympathetic effort, will reach an agreement for carrying out this enormous task, which can only be undertaken with hopes for success through the combined effort of them all.118

This is one of the earliest statements that we have been able to find in which the Ministry of the Interior made a clear differentiation between the Spaniards, political refugees, and refugees persecuted for racial reasons, admitting that different policies had been followed in each case. In the case of the “racial” refugees, the limited acceptance was justified in terms of the large number of people that made up this group, which seems paradoxical, and the intention to await international decisions on the subject. On August 6, 1940, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent Circular 55772 to its consuls and on August 14 of the same year added Confidential Circular IV-21-34, which instructed its ambassadors, ministers, consul generals, and the consuls of Mexico in Latin America that “no German passport could be visaed without prior authorization by this Ministry.”119 On September 13 they were ordered “to under no circumstances document European immigrants, unless there is a prior ruling by the Ministry of the Interior and precise orders from that office to document them.”120 That same day, the Ministry of the Interior reported that immigration was to be suspended for the rest of the year because the limits set down in the differential tables had been reached. According to an article in El Universal, an official of the ministry had declared: “It is not that the Mexican Government has racial prejudices, but rather simply that [. . .] the measures stipulated in the laws and rules do not allow for any more foreigners to come to

118 Ibid. 119 AHSRE, Mexican Legation in Portugal, file 44-6, “Colección de circulares del año 1940,” Hay to the ambassadors, ministers and consuls of Mexico, Mexico City, August 14, 1940. 120 Ibid., Hidalgo, by orders of the minister, to the members of the Mexican Foreign Service, Mexico City, September 13, 1940.

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live in the country.”121 Once again the issue of racial prejudice is evident. On September 26 the members of the Mexican Foreign Service were told yet again that even in the case of an authorization for the immigration of certain Europeans, they had to be sure that the interested parties were not undesirable elements due to their political affiliation, in which case they should get in touch with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.122 Also in 1940 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned foreigners who wanted to enter Mexico “to take care not to fall into the hands of certain imposters who, in order to carry out easy and fast negotiations, have even falsified the respective telegrams of authorization.”123 One month later the Ministry of the Interior published the differential tables that would govern the admission of refugees during 1941. With respect to those of the previous year, these tables limited to one hundred the entrance permits for citizens coming from outside the Americas, with the exception of Spain.124 These tables were sent by the Central Committee to the HIAS in New York, suggesting that “those people who wish to obtain permits for immigration to Mexico, should hurry up, since it is estimated that in the first months of the coming year the limit established by the Law will be reached.”125 The Case of the Quanza, the Mexican Saint Louis Probably the most significant event of 1940 related to the attitude of the Ministry of the Interior towards the Jewish refugees was the arrival of the Portuguese steamship Quanza and her passengers. The Quanza set sail from Lisbon on August 9, 1940, carrying 317 passengers, with its final destination being Veracruz. After stopping in New York, where 196 of the passengers and some merchandise were disembarked,

121 “La inmigración se ha suspendido en Mexico,” El Universal, September 13, 1940. 122 AHSRE, Mexican Legation in Portugal, file 44-6, “Colección de circulares del año 1940,” Hidalgo, by orders of the minister, to the members of the Mexican Foreign Service, Mexico City, September 13, 1940. 123 “Telegramas falsificados,” El Universal, September 13. 124 “Tablas diferenciales y condiciones a que se sujetará la admisión de inmigrantes durante el año de 1941,” Diario Oficial, October 15, 1940. These will be analyzed in the next chapter. 125 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Correspondencia recibida 1939–1941, file 13, f. 16, Lisker to HIAS-NY [Mexico City], October 22, 1940.



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on August 20 the ship continued on its way to Veracruz.126 Initially there were 126 passengers bound for Mexico, 12 of whom had authorization from the Ministry of the Interior to enter the country as immigrants, while 111 were destined for other countries on the American continent—and thus had transit visas issued by the Mexican Legation in Lisbon—while the remaining 3 were Spanish subjects who had no passports.127 As Juan Manuel Álvarez del Castillo, the Mexican minister in Lisbon who had registered them, explained, the majority of those who held temporary visas were individuals included in Article 58 of the Law of Population “due to persecution by the Germans, almost all of them of Jewish origin, and who fearful of an invasion of this country by Nazi troops, are making a desperate attempt to flee from atrocious reprisals.”128 The Quanza was also carrying 180 tons of merchandise to Mexico, destined for various businesses in the country. This was a unique case of a direct trip from Lisbon to Veracruz, for which special permission had been obtained from the Portuguese government, with the objective of exploring the possibilities of establishing a shipping line between Mexico and Portugal and thus increasing commercial exchange between the two countries. When the Quanza reached Veracruz at the end of August 1940, the immigration authorities did not allow 85 of the 111 refugees with transit visas for Mexico and entrance visas for other American countries to disembark.129 The reason for this rejection was that the Mexican Legation in Lisbon had not sought the corresponding authorization from the Ministry of the Interior to issue the permits. Álvarez del Castillo, annoyed, reported that he had issued the visas in accordance with the Rule for Issuing Visas and Passports and the General Law of Population, and that he was unaware that the Ministry of the Interior had to authorize the issuance of permits for trans-migrants.130 The Mexican minister, who up to

126 According to Morewitz and Lieberman, in the United States 66 Americans citizens and 130 foreigners with visas for the United States disembarked. Stephen J. Morewitz and Susan B. Lieberman, “The Saving of the S.S. Quanza in Hampton Roads, Virginia on September 14, 1940: A Prelude to the Nazi Holocaust” (unpublished manuscript). 127 The Spaniards were Joaquín Díez-Canedo, Isidro Covisa, and Leonor Fernández Gaviria. 128 AHSRE, file III-430-38, Álvarez del Castillo to SRE, Lisbon, August 13, 1940. 129 AGN, PLC, 549.2/18, “Pasaje del vapor portugués Quanza que desembarcó en el puerto de Veracruz el día 30 de agosto del año en curso, según informe de la Oficina de Población en dicho lugar,” Mexico City, September 5, 1940. 130 AHSRE, file III-430-38, Álvarez del Castillo to SRE, Lisbon, September 10, 1940.

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that time had carried out essentially diplomatic activities of representation and who had just taken charge of the Mexican Legation in Lisbon, had based his decision on information provided by the person in charge of the consular section of the Mexican Legation, Julio Machado Sánchez.131 The latter, assuming full responsibility for what had taken place, acknowledged that he had on several occasions assured his superior that the files of the legation contained no regulation referring to the issuance of transit visas.132 But the regulation had actually been misfiled. The error occurred because the official letter-circular no. 66394, of April 5, 1940, which contained Circular no. 44 from the Ministry of the Interior, which stated that the Ministry itself had to authorize the issuance of temporary visas, was entitled “Tourist Matters.” Thus it was placed in the corresponding file, where it lay undiscovered as “there was no reason at all to consult the Tourism file since this was a matter of documenting trans-migrants.”133 Álvarez del Castillo was called back to Mexico by order of President Cárdenas, but since the first ship he could take would not leave Lisbon until the end of the month, he decided to submit his report early, reserving the right to expand it later on.134 At first, the minister in Portugal tried to persuade the authorities of the Ministry of the Interior to consider the consequences that refusing the refugees would have. Among other factors, he listed criticism in the international press, due to the discrepancy between this action and the declarations President Cárdenas made on the humanitarian acceptance of refugees in Mexico; the loss of the opportunity to increase trade between Mexico and Portugal by way of a direct shipping route; the decrease of the credibility and “moral authority” of the Mexican Legation in the eyes of the Portuguese government; and the complaints of those people who were affected.135 Álvarez del Castillo later justified his attitude on the basis of legal reasons (adducing that they had complied with all the legal forms) as well as political and moral arguments. The Mexican minister, thinking he had acted in accordance with the humanitarian policies of President Cárdenas, 131 This was an individual of Spanish nationality who had been named an auxiliary by the chargé d’affaires of the legation, Francisco Ortiz Monasterio, and who had been working in the legation for two years. Ortiz Monasterio had extensively recommended Machado as an exemplary employee, well versed in immigration laws. 132 AHSRE, file III-430-38, Machado Sánchez to Álvarez del Castillo, Lisbon, September 6, 1940. 133 Ibid., Álvarez del Castillo to SRE, Lisbon, September 19, 1940. 134 Ibid., SRE to Álvarez del Castillo, Mexico City, September 5, 1940, and Álvarez del Castillo to SRE, Lisbon, September 5, 1940. 135 Ibid., Álvarez del Castillo to SRE, Lisbon, September 6, 1940.



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explained that “he thought that by acting as he did, giving one hundred political refugees, many of them women and children, the chance to head for other countries through our own, he was interpreting the humanitarian thinking of Mr. President Cárdenas, who, on repeated occasions had proclaimed Mexico as a land of refuge.”136 But he also added: There is another point to consider: it seems fantastic to issue a transit visa for Mexico, going, for example, to Santo Domingo; but this is due to the fact that the world is at war, that everything is abnormal, that there are no regular maritime routes, that the shipping traffic is changeable, that the ill-fated ones “without a country” wish to leave this continent of bitterness at any price and that it doesn’t matter to them that they have to make implausible trips in order to reach a place of rest! Such a state of things in certain aspects is in contrast to the rigidity of legal molds elaborated for normal times. In this small, poor country there are 35,000 refugees in transit [. . .] You should have heard the refugees who obtained a transit visa in our Legation, describing their suffering and blessing the name of Mexico, if only because in our Office they were spoken to and not treated like beasts of burden!137

This statement is remarkable because it indicates that Minister Álvarez del Castillo himself was surprised by the lack of flexibility in the Ministry of the Interior at an especially difficult time for the world in general and especially for the refugees. Showing a humanitarian attitude, the government official thought that the rigidity of the legal molds developed for normal times no longer applied at this moment of global conflict. Apparently he did not realize that the Ministry had taken its rigid stance in reaction to the international situation and with the objective of firmly controlling all matters linked to immigration, even those concerning passengers in transit. Julio Machado also set down in writing an explanation of the events, which he addressed to Álvarez del Castillo, in which he took full responsibility for everything that had happened, reiterating the matter of the misfiled Circular no. 44 and adding: Besides, I did not think there would be difficulties over the race issue if we consider that this Mexican Legation documented and continues to document people of the JEWISH race as immigrants, and that of the people of the Jewish race this Office documented, all of them had their documents and guarantees duly in order, etc., and what they were requesting was merely a transit visa for 30 days.138

136 Ibid., Álvarez del Castillo to SRE, Lisbon, September 10, 1940. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid., Machado Sánchez to Álvarez del Castillo, Lisbon, September 6, 1940.

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Three things may be inferred from Machado’s statement. First, up until that moment the Mexican Legation in Lisbon did not know that there were limitations on issuing visas to Jewish emigrants, and so they had continued to grant them, apparently without restrictions. Second, as a result of the Quanza incident, perhaps due to the number of passengers involved, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported the limitations to the legation headed by Álvarez del Castillo; consequently, the practices at his legation would differ greatly from what was happening in the consulates of Mexico in Germany. Third, Mexican immigration policy evidently still had rules that limited the admission of Jews to Mexico. In this regard, it can be assumed that the Ministry of the Interior managed to impose its way of thinking on other sectors of the government that showed a more open attitude towards the problem, although according to the Mexican press it was President Cárdenas who made the decision to forbid the disembarkation of the refugees.139 The fact that immigration policy with respect to Jewish refugees was unknown to the employees of the Mexican Legation in Lisbon is striking, since Portugal, due to its neutral stance in the war and its geographic location, by 1940 had become practically the only port of departure for traveling to Latin America. In fact, Machado’s report discussed the general problem of a lack of information in Mexico’s Foreign Service. He referred to the fact that the legation to which he belonged “had never received any concrete news of new regulatory provisions on Migration by cable or official letter, which can always be remembered, but rather merely by one circular or another.”140 In fact, the employees of the Foreign Service in Lisbon had learned that Mexico had banned the admission of tourists and established new norms with relation to immigration because, by chance, they had read a short article on the matter published in the newspaper Diario de Noticias in April 1940, and at that point had requested the respective orders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.141 In relation to the

139 “Cien judíos, rechazados,” El Universal, September 5, 1940. “Zarpó el vapor Quanza con los extranjeros que no fueron admitidos,” El Universal, September 6, 1940. In this last article it stated: “It is said that behind General Cárdenas’s back there was an attempt to allow these elements into our country; but upon finding out, the First Magistrate himself ordered they not be allowed to disembark without his express orders.” 140 AHSRE, file III-430-38, Machado Sánchez to Álvarez del Castillo, Lisbon, September 6, 1940. 141 The SRE responded by sending information that included the aforementioned document-circular no. 66394.



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matter at hand, Machado stated that “such a mistake would never have occurred if, as in other cases, the pertinent notification had been made more clearly and had only referred to the matter of TRANSIT.”142 The lack of information was a problem common throughout the Mexican Foreign Service. For example, Mexico’s ambassador to Guatemala also thought it necessary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send a message-circular, every week or two, in which they released in condensed form their point of view and tendencies in relation to the events and problems affecting the world at such an extraordinary moment. He added, “this information would be even more useful since, as the Authorities know, to stay informed of the course of the international policies of the day, our Missions can only count on insufficient news in the press, radio, etc., that is clearly tainted by partiality due to propaganda and censorship.”143 Finally, from the Quanza thirty-three passengers disembarked legally and one illegally.144 Among the first were a repatriated Mexican, a Spaniard with resident status, a “visitor,” five tourists,145 five immigrant investors with their families (three more people), four relatives of immigrants, nine political exiles (five Spaniards, one Frenchwoman, one Czechoslovakian, one German, and one Hungarian) and four trans-migrants. The latter, the only ones to enter the country under the transit visas issued in Lisbon, were Illan Pierre Joseph Álvarez de Toledo, the Marquis of Casa Fuerte, and the Goldschmidt Rothschild family, whom the head of population in Veracruz allowed to disembark without the authorization of the Ministry of the Interior, “taking into consideration that they were not Jews, their economic solvency, [. . .] and for bringing high recommendations from our

142 AHSRE, file III-430-38, Machado Sánchez to Álvarez del Castillo, Lisbon, September 6, 1940. 143 AHSRE, file III-861-5, Martínez de Alba, Mexican ambassador to Guatemala, to Hay, Guatemala, March 19, 1941. 144 According to Morewitz and Lieberman, who took the testimony of the officials of the ship, there were thirty-five persons who managed to disembark in Mexico by bribing the immigration officials. Reporter’s Transcript of Testimony, Moritz Rand et al. versus Steamship “QUANZA,” 115–20, quoted in Morewitz and Lieberman, “Saving of the S.S. Quanza,” 46. The “illegal” was Sygmunt Wasserberger, a Polish citizen. El Universal reported that Wasserberger had disappeared shortly before the ship sailed again, and it was supposed that during the early hours he had managed to sneak onto Mexican soil. El Universal, September 6, 1940, and AHSRE, file III-430-38, letter from the Polish Legation in Mexico to SRE, Mexico City, October 7, 1940. 145 Among the tourists there were some Jews: Otto Weiss y Birbaum, of Cuban nationality, and Otto de Smolenski and his wife, of Dominican nationality.

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minister in Lisbon, Portugal, having established a guarantee of repatriation of 150 dollars for each one.”146 I would like to call attention to the handling of information by the Mexican press, particularly the newspaper Últimas Noticias, which reported that nearly eighty people of different origins “expected to enter the country since it was considered an easy matter, without any documents or permission from the authorities of the Ministry of the Interior.”147 In that newspaper it was also reported that a meticulous investigation would begin with the objective of indicting Minister Álvarez del Castillo, while unofficially it was said that the diplomat had been dismissed from his post.148 However, Álvarez del Castillo remained in his post until his mission was over, in April 1944, when he was designated ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Columbia. He continued to issue some visas, but with the authorization of the Ministry of the Interior. As far as we know, the only diplomatic representations that tried to intercede on behalf of the passengers were the legation from the Netherlands and the Polish Legation in Mexico.149 The latter remarked that all of the Polish refugees on board the Quanza had permission to enter other countries as well as Mexican transit visas, insisting that “a negative decision on the part of the Mexican authorities would have very grave consequences for said refugees.”150 On September 4 the passengers on board the Quanza also tried to intercede with President Cárdenas, sending him a letter in which they praised him for his policy of granting asylum to political refugees, as they considered themselves to be, insisting that if they were not allowed to disembark their lives would be in danger, “and many are willing to lose it (their life) rather than return to Europe.”151 Their efforts, which the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico supported, were not successful.152

146 AGN, PLC, 549.2/18, “Pasaje del vapor portugués Quanza que desembarcó en el puerto de Veracruz el día 30 de agosto del año en curso, según informe de la Oficina de Población en dicho lugar,” Mexico City, September 5, 1940. 147 “Querían entrar a México 80 judíos. Por fortuna se evitó el desembarque, autorizado por no se sabe quién,” Últimas Noticias, September 2, 1940. 148 “El caso de los judíos,” El Universal, September 12, 1940. 149 AHSRE, file III-430-38, Legation of Holland in Mexico to SRE, Mexico City, September 3, 1940. 150 Ibid., Legation of Poland in Mexico to SRE, Mexico City, September 2, 1940. 151 AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, Wolf Rand, passenger on board the Quanza to Cárdenas (urgent telegram), Veracruz, September 4, 1940. 152 This committee opted to continue insisting that international Jewish organizations (in this case the HICEM in Lisbon) do whatever was necessary to convince the emigrants



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The next day, as the Quanza set off for the United States, Lázaro Cárdenas offered diplomatic protection to the members of the International Brigades who had participated in the Spanish Civil War, who were at that time in France and who were in danger of being arrested and taken to Germany and Italy.153 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in turn, on September 30, 1940 forbade—through Confidential Circular IV-27-42— the entrance of trans-migrants into the Mexican Republic, “because most stay in the country, causing immigration problems.”154 The case of the Quanza shows that while the Mexican government had become involved in many aspects of the problem of the Jewish refugees, that did not mean that in practice it was willing to take a more flexible attitude—not even towards those equipped with legally obtained transit visas, whom they prevented from reaching their final destination. However, it is also a good example of the sensitivity and goodwill of some members of the Mexican Foreign Service, such as Minister Juan Manuel Álvarez del Castillo.155 The Exceptions The Mexican policy towards Jewish refugees also had gaps, cracks, and exceptions. Consequently during the years we are dealing with a certain number of German-speaking intellectuals and political refugees, along with some Jewish refugees, did enter the country. There are no exact figures as to the number of non-Spanish political refugees received by Cárdenas’s government. According to Friedrich Katz, the German-speaking that under no circumstances should they embark for Mexico if they did not have the corresponding authorization from the Department of Immigration. AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Correspondencia Recibida 1939–1941, file 15, f. 4, CCIM to HICEM-Lisbon, Mexico City, September 10, 1940. 153 “Protección a extranjeros perseguidos. El Gral. Cárdenas atiende una petición de la Brigada Internacional,” Excelsior, September 5, 1940. According to the news, instructions had been given to the Mexican Legation in France to protect under the Mexican flag German and Italian members of the International Brigades who were in danger. It was also reported that the Mexican government had made arrangements with the government of Marshall Pétain in order to allow some Spanish citizens who were refugees in France to be transferred to Mexico. 154 AHSRE, Legación de México en Portugal, file 44-6, “Colección de circulares del año 1940,” Hidalgo, by orders of the minister, to the members of the Mexican Foreign Service, Mexico City, September 13, 1940. 155 In his memoires, Juan Manuel Álvarez del Castillo made no reference to the matter of the Jewish refugees nor to the Quanza episode. J. M. Álvarez del Castillo, Memorias (Guadalajara, n.p., 1960).

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exiles made up a group of approximately one hundred people; Brígida von Mentz and Verena Radkau maintain that there were two hundred German-speaking Communists; and Jean Michel Palmier refers to three hundred Communist exiles who were active in Mexico.156 To these must be added a handful of political refugees of other nationalities (Hungarians, Yugoslavians, and Poles). With reference to the Jewish refugees, in 1940 the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico estimated, without having any exact numbers, that since 1933 between six hundred and one thousand Jews had entered the country, coming from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.157 As we have seen, Lázaro Cárdenas’s regime maintained a considerably different attitude towards “racial” refugees than towards political refugees, under the implicit premise that in the case of the latter offering asylum was more justified. In the case of the former, that is, those who could not justify their status as persecuted people (even when they were persecuted for political reasons, as was the case for middle- and lower-level members of various political organizations and trade unions) had little possibility of obtaining visas for Mexico. There were three main routes to obtaining a visa available to these people. The first was for relatives who had already become established in Mexico to apply for a visa for their European kin with the Ministry of the Interior, under the provision of the General Law of Population which, as we mentioned earlier, gave the spouse, single children, sisters and brothers, parents—if they were economically dependent on the immigrant—and underaged nieces and nephews in the same situation the right to immigrate to Mexico.158 However, in this case, it was necessary to hire a lawyer to carry out the process, and also to know someone with good government connections who could plead the case since, as Isidro Fabela stated

156 Katz, “El exilio centroeuropeo,” 45; Mentz et al., Fascismo y antifascismo, 48; Palmier, Weimar in Exile, 571. Zogbaum, based on Fritz Pohle, maintains that there were approximately sixty members of the KPD who reached Mexico. Heidi Zogbaum, “Vicente Lombardo Toledano and the German Communist exile in Mexico, 1940–1947,” Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research 11, no. 2 (2005): 1. 157 AKA, CCIM, Relaciones Intercomunitarias, Joint Distribution Committee, Answers to a questionnaire of the American Joint Distribution Committee of Paris, Mexico City, April 9, 1940. Documents found in the archives do not allow for a more precise estimate since there is no complete registry of all the refugees who entered Mexico during this period. 158 Ley General de Población, articles 2 and 83, and “Tablas diferenciales y condiciones a que se sujetará la admisión de inmigrantes durante el año de 1940,” Migración y Población 1, no. 1 (August 1940). These Tables were first issued on August 24, 1939.



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when asking for a visa for his friend Roberto Block: “[. . .] following the normal process it would be a long and difficult procedure to achieve the official authorization for said visa.”159 The regular channels were too slow and did not bring satisfactory results. Despite the provisions of the General Law of Population, the resolution of each case rested on the discretion of the authorities. As we mentioned in Chapter 2, we have found applications that were turned down, although the applicant was the mother of the immigrant, where the decision was justified by alleging that the total number of people permitted by the differential tables for that year had been reached (even when these tables had not yet been enacted) or that the law forbade the entrance of foreign workers.160 In these cases it was also required that the beneficiary comply with a series of prerequisites—such as presenting a passport valid for two years when receiving the visa, and being repatriable—which in the context of the war in Europe were becoming more and more difficult to fulfill. In the opinion of one of the pro-refugee activists, “The asking of passports and other regulatory documents from those who are trying to leave France is equivalent, in practice, to barring them from departure.”161 The Mexican consuls in various parts of Europe, in charge of verifying that the interested parties complied with all of the prerequisites before receiving documents, did not generally make exceptions (or at least not legally). Edith Sadger, a Viennese refugee in France whose visa application had been submitted by her brother, Dr. Roberto Stern, had a passport that would expire in less than two years. When the Mexican consul in Paris, Gilberto Bosques, was asked in 1940 to make an exception for this case, he refused, responding that “the consulates have very strict orders in the matter, in regard to demanding compliance with all of the aforementioned prerequisites for authorization for entering the country.”162 The second possibility for obtaining a visa was as an investor immigrant or rentier, in which case the foreigner had to be able to prove he

159 AGN, PLC, file 546.6/309, Fabela to Cárdenas, Mexico City, November 9, 1940. 160 See various applications in AGN, PLC, file 546.6/97. Also see Chapter 2, n. 112, above. 161 Records of the Jewish Labor Committee (RJLC), Holocaust Era Files I, series III, box 38, Modigliani to various recipients, Toulouse, France, July 1, 1940. I wish to thank Tamara Gleason for having called this source to my attention. 162 AHSRE, Archivo Particular de Gilberto Bosques (APGB), file 104, Bosques to Glikowski, [Paris], March 5, 1940.

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had enough resources.163 However, while the General Law of Population established the necessary amounts, it did not determine how this should be proved. Sometimes, as in the case of Julio Gimbel, the applicant was asked to show the money (25,000 pesos, approximately $5,000) in cash at the Mexican Consulate in Paris. Manuel Gómez Pezuela, a friend of Gimbel’s who tried to intervene with Consul Gilberto Bosques, considered that “[. . .] at the present and given the emergency provisions set forth by the French government and imposed by the conditions of war present in the country, it would be very difficult for my friend to integrally carry out such an exhibition,” although he assured him that Gimbel possessed various properties in France as well as in the United States.164 In this case Bosques’s answer was the same: “In the absence of compliance with any of the preceding conditions, the consul must abstain from issuing the corresponding documentation.”165 A third group was made up of “minor” political refugees whom likeminded groups tried to help by obtaining for them visas as political exiles. In this case there were many difficulties, the main one being the impossibility of proving that they were being persecuted for their political activity, or for having participated in political parties or movements that were later banished by the Nazis. In order to assist these refugees (in the same way that more famous political refugees were aided) various networks were established among different groups, which generally included North American committees such as the American Committee to Save Refugees, the Exiled Writers Committee, the League of American Writers, the Jewish Labor Committee, the Emergency Rescue Committee, the Unitarian Service Committee; and Mexican committees such as the Liga pro Cultura Alemana (League for German Culture), Acción Republicana Austriaca de México (Austrian Republican Movement of Mexico), the Comité Central Israelita de México (Israelite Central Committee of Mexico), the Liga pro Cultura y Ayuda (League for Culture and Aid), and the Comité Unido pro

163 Investors had to prove they had 100,000 pesos if they planned to invest in establishing a business in the Federal District, 20,000 pesos if they wanted to set up in the capital of one of the states, and 5,000 for any other place. Ley General de Población, article 8. Rentiers needed to deposit in a Mexican bank 12,000 or 20,000 pesos, depending on their nationality. “Tablas diferenciales y condiciones a que se sujetará la admisión de inmigrantes durante el año de 1940,” article 11, Migración y Población 1, no. 1 (August 1940). 164 AHSRE, APGB, file 104, Gómez Pezuela to Bosques, Mexico City, March 20, 1940. 165 Ibid.



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Víctimas del Fascismo (United Committee for Victims of Fascism), among others. Committees were also established directly in Marseille, such as the Centre Américain de Secours (American Relief Center), an affiliate of the Emergency Rescue Committee, led by Varian Fry, and a branch office of the Unitarian Service Committee, headed by Noel H. Field. Communications between the Jewish Labor Committe, in New York, and its Mexican affiliate, the Liga pro Cultura y Ayuda (League for Culture and Aid), of Bundist orientation, give accounts of how in order to obtain authorization from the Ministry of the Interior for “non-famous” political refugees it was necessary to pay between $200 and $1,000 per person (the costs increased as the war progressed), which unveils the corruption which existed in the Ministry.166 Even then, obtaining a visa was only the first step. The second step took place at the Mexican consulates in Europe, where the consuls interviewed the interested parties “in order to check their identity and other prerequisites which in each case are different,”167 which indicates that there was a certain margin for discretion. As can be seen in recently discovered information concerning the Mexican Consulate in Marseille, this interview was crucial in determining whether the visa, which was processed in Mexico City, would be given to the interested party or not; and in fact, many of the visas were never given out.168 The third step— once the refugee had managed to carry out all of the procedures necessary to leave France and reach Mexico, which few managed to do—was disembarkation, where once again things could become complicated. In general almost all ships that reached Mexico had certain difficulties in disembarking non-Spanish passengers, and even Spaniards had problems at times. But at the time of disembarkation there were also certain informal financial arrangements that could sometimes allow the admission of refugees, even when their papers were not in order. While the refugees tried to take advantage of all of the loopholes in Mexican immigration policy in order to obtain visas—pretending to be 166 See various documents in RJLC, Holocaust Era Files I, series III, box 34: Mexico, reel 93. Among others: a letter from Frances Toor to Jacob Pat, October 24, 1941, and Pat’s answer to Toor, October 28, 1941; a letter from Jacob Pat to Tuvia Maizel, October 28, 1941; a telegram from Nathan Chanin to José Zacarías, January 17, 1942 (sending $10,000); a telegram from José Zacarías to the Jewish Labor Committee asking for them to send $15,000, Mexico City, February 9, 1942; and a telegram from Szymon Jezior to the Jewish Labor Committee that reads, “We need immediately money,” Mexico City, April 29, 1942. 167 AHSRE, APGB, file 104, Bosques to Campos Viveros, [Paris], April 22, 1940. 168 See the section on Gilberto Bosques’s service in the Mexican Consulate in Chapter 5.

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investors or rentiers, for example, and even visitors—most of the consuls in Europe used their power to limit the entrance to the country of those who, to their way of thinking, fell into the category of undesirables, many times demanding a series of prerequisites that were impossible to comply with, and thus in practice they invalidated some of the visas that had been obtained. “Major” Political Refugees The stance towards “outstanding” political refugees was different. In this case authorization was negotiated directly through the presidency, not the Ministry of the Interior, although the authorization of the latter was necessary. Only in the case of the Spaniards, and only during a few months in 1939, did the Mexican Legation in Paris have the ability to decide on the admission of political refugees into Mexico. But with the beginning of World War II in September 1939, this provision was canceled. As Narciso Bassols remarked, “our Government, in the face of the present international situation, has justifiably ordered that no more visas be issued for the immigration of political refugees [. . .] Naturally the previous provision does not mean that Mexico will close its doors to foreign immigration, but rather that immigration will be subject to ordinary processing, in accordance with our legislation.”169 One of the most important cases of political asylum granted by the Mexican government took place in August 1940, when President Lázaro Cárdenas approved the petition made by Silvestre Revueltas, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, and Gabriel Fernández Ledesma, among others, to allow a group of twenty German political exiles into the country. Although the petition was signed by various figures, apparently it was Enrique Gutmann, president of the League for German Culture and close to Cárdenas, who obtained the permission.170 Among the refugees—Jewish and non-Jewish—were Franz Werfel, Leonard Frank, Konrad Heiden, Alfred Döblin, Friedrich Wolf, Walter Mehring, Ernst Weiss, Rudolf Leonhard,

169 AHSRE, APGB, file 104, Bassols to the Mexican minister in Caracas, Dr. Salvador R. Guzmán, Paris, October 17, 1939. 170 We have not yet found any documentation with reference to Enrique Gutmann. We know, however, that he played a very important part in the negotiation of entry permits for refugees with the Mexican government. The acts of the Israelite Central Committee tell us this, especially during 1940 and 1941. Also, a document of the Joint affirms that the American organizations approached Mexican intellectuals to seek asylum for these people.



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Alfred Kantorowicz, Hans Marchwitza, Anna Seghers, Adrienne Thomas, Ruth Jerusalem, Mrs. Hermann Kesten, Franz Dahlem, Hermann Duncker, Gerhard Eisler, Andreas Ewert, Rudolf Neumann, and Professor Julius E. Gumbel.171 In this respect, President Cárdenas considered that the admission of these people into the country, agreed upon as was mentioned, has been a motive of satisfaction for the undersigned, since it deals with people who, due to their background, represent the tradition of German culture and whose personal qualities are combined with their being fighters for justice [. . . and] for the ideal of liberty in opposition to imperialism that seems to want to overflow and drown all of humanity.172

It is important to point out that, despite this initial proposal to generously welcome certain political refugees, things were not really that simple. Bodo Uhse, who had arrived in Mexico earlier, in a letter to Vicente Lombardo Toledano referred to the fact that of twenty people who had received Mexican visas in August, twelve were still waiting in France towards the end of November, and that Dr. Ernst Weiss, in despair over the difficulties that the French authorities imposed on their emigration, had committed suicide. Others, held in internment camps, were denied the necessary permission to pick up their visas in the consulate in Marseille. Some of the twenty later obtained tourist visas for the United States and then managed to stay there.173 However, the Mexican government also created complications for the refugees since the permit issued by Cárdenas was valid for six months and would expire on February 8, 1941. Renewing these visas under Manuel Ávila Camacho’s government was not easy; several figures repeatedly applied to the Ministry of the Interior for renewal.174 According to Benedikt Behrens, of those on the list authorized 171 AGN, PLC, 549.2/18, Cárdenas to Revueltas, Lombardo Toledano, Fernández Ledesma, and the other signers, Mexico City, August 7, 1940. 172 Ibid. 173 Among these were Franz Werfel, Alfred Döblin, Walter Mehring, Julius E. Gumbel, Konrad Heiden, and perhaps Adrienne Thomas, Ruth Jerusalem, and Mrs. Hermann Kesten. Benedikt Behrens, “El consulado general de México en Marsella bajo Gilberto Bosques y la huída al sur de Francia de exiliados germanoparlantes 1940–1942,” Tzintzun, Revista de Estudios Históricos 37 (January–June 2003): 154. 174 Bodo Uhse, from the League for German Culture, asked Vicente Lombardo Toledano in 1941 to obtain the intervention of the president. Universidad Obrera de México, Fondo Histórico Vicente Lombardo Toledano (FHVLT), file 414-23101, Bodo Uhse to Lombardo Toledano, Mexico City, February 10, 1941. More than one year later, Gilberto Bosques, from Marseille, wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeking authorization to document those whose visas had expired (Franz Dahlem and his wife, Rudolf Leonhard, Siegfried Raedel, and others). FHVLT, file 460-26842, from the chief officer of SRE to the minister of the interior (retransmitting a telegram from Bosques), Mexico City, June 1, 1942. Even Edward

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by Cárdenas, only Anna Seghers and Andreas Ewert and his wife reached Mexico.175 Of these two cases, at least one applicant, Anna Seghers, confronted Mexican bureaucracy, as she had to wait two months in France— under very risky circumstances—for the Ministry of the Interior to issue a visa under her real name (Netty Radvanyi) so that her husband (Laszlo Radvanyi) could be included in the permit, since the first authorization she had received under the name of Anna Seghers only included herself and her two children.176 During 1940 President Cárdenas personally approved the admission of, among others, Otto Katz and his wife,177 Victor Serge and his son Vlady,178 Egon Erwin Kisch, Leo Katz, and ten Austrian political exiles, among them Helene Bauer (the widow of Otto Bauer, who had been prime minister of Austria and had died in exile), Karl Boehm (former minister of war in Hungary), Karl Heinz (one of the leaders of the Austrian Socialist Party), and Rudolf Neuhaus (an Austrian union leader and professor who would play an important role in saving his companions once he reached Mexico).179 In October 1940 another list was authorized; it bore the names of political refugees from Austria, Germany, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, including Trude Kurtz, Luigi Longo, Heinrich Mann, and Otto Heller.180 By the end

Barksy tried to intercede on their behalf, addressing President Manuel Ávila Camacho on August 29, 1942, in reference to the mortal danger facing Dahlem, Rau, Raedel, Leonhard, and other prominent anti-Fascist leaders whose extradition to Germany had been granted by the Vichy Regime. AGN, PMAC, file 546.6/17, telegram from Barsky to Ávila Camacho, [New York], August 29, 1942. 175 Behrens, “Consulado general de México en Marsella,” 154. 176 Ibid., 155, nn. 15, 16. 177 Political asylum for Otto Katz was not offered spontaneously, but rather requested by the League of American Writers, which in August 1940 addressed Cárdenas in order to beg him to intercede with García Téllez for authorization to be granted for Katz’s entrance into Mexico. AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18, Donald Ogden Stewart, president of the League of American Writers, to Cárdenas, New York, August 22, 1940. (Extract made by the private minister of the Presidency.) 178 Political asylum for Víctor Serge was requested by Frank Tannenbaum and by Dwight McDonald, editor of the Partisan Review, who requested that the process of immigration be activated due to the danger he faced. AGN, PLC, file 546.6/295, Tannenbaum and McDonald to Cárdenas, New York, October 18 and November 25, 1940, respectively. Following a lengthy wait, Serge and his son finally entered the country in September 1941. In 1942 Serge’s partner, Laurette Séjourné, and Vlady’s younger sister, Jeannine Kibalchich, joined them. 179 See AGN, PLC, file 546.6/295 and 549.2/18. The entrance of these ten Republican political exiles and Austrian Social Democrats was also requested by the League for German Culture. AGN, PLC, file 549.2/18-1, Gutmann, Uhse, and Friedeberg to Cárdenas, Mexico City, October 4, 1940. 180 AGN, PLC, file. 546.6/305.



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of 1940 Ludwig Renn, Gustav Regler, Gertrude Düby, Rudolf and Hilde Neumann, and Franz Pfemfert181 had entered Mexico. During the following years other important figures also arrived. When it was a matter of political refugees there was no religious distinction made, and Jews were accepted the same as all the others. It is estimated that about half of the political exiles who reached Mexico were Jews. It must be pointed out that a good number of the political exiles who reached Mexico had been members of Communist parties, mainly the KPD (German Communist Party). It is not clear whether the Mexican authorities knew about this (and thus expedited their immigration) or whether they were unaware of the background of many of the people to whom they issued visas. According to Heidi Zogbaum, when President Cárdenas authorized the first group of political refugees who came to Mexico he “could not know that this list also bore the stamp of the Communist Party. Hermann Duncker, Ruth Jerusalem, Franz Dahlem and Gerhard Eisler were not intellectuals ‘who represent the German cultural tradition.’ They were present and past KPD politbureau members.”182 The members of the KPD formed their own cell in Mexico, which followed the Comintern’s orders and came into conflict with other non-Stalinist political refugees who had also emigrated to Mexico, mainly from the group made up of Marceau Pivert, Gustav Regler, Victor Serge, Julián Gorkin, Benjamin Péret, and others, who would found the Mexican chapter of the group Socialism and Freedom,183 as well as the League for German Culture.184 According to Zogbaum, What made the Mexican KPD group so outstanding among other centers of the German exile was its unusual concentration of journalistic and organizational talent. Bruno Frei and Rudolf Feistmann were experienced editors and writers; Egon Erwin Kisch was Central Europe’s most famous journalist; Otto Katz, besides all his other special missions, had run the Agence Espagne in Paris, and organized all of Münzenberg’s Communist fronts. After Paul Merker arrived in December 1941 the KPD group could boast having one of four surviving politbureau members in its ranks.185 181 Behrens, “Consulado general de México en Marsella,” 151. 182 Zogbaum, “Vicente Lombardo Toledano,” 3. 183 See Claudio Albertani, “Socialismo y Libertad. El exilio antiautoritario de Europa en Mexico y la lucha contra el estalinismo (1940–1950),” http://www.fundanin.org/albertani7 .htm. 184 On the characterization that Enrique Gutmann, president of the League for German Culture, made of the changing ideology of the Communists, see Zogbaum, “Vicente Lombardo Toledano,” 15. 185 Ibid., 9.

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This journalistic talent served them well when being introduced as “literary exiles” rather than political ones, a reputation that to a great extent has lasted to this day. Jewish Refugees During 1940 there were also certain exceptions to the general attitude the Mexican government adopted towards Jewish refugees. According to Friedrich Katz, Cárdenas finally agreed to grant several hundred visas, but he does not explain whether the visas were issued or not, and we have found no evidence of them. The Israelite Central Committee of Mexico, however, registered an increase under the heading connected with “disembarkation,”186 and the admission of some Jewish refugees who arrived in Manzanillo in Japanese ships such as the Heyo Maru, Rakuyo Maru, and Genio Maru, although they were small groups (the largest being from the Heyo Maru, with thirty people). It is still not clear what brought about this change, but given the inconsistency surrounding government policy toward Jewish refugees, variation and contradiction are inherent parts of it. Perhaps towards the end of the presidential term, control over the immigration process eased up a little due to the internal political agitation of the country in the face of governmental transition. Or perhaps the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico had managed to find new strategies to use in disembarking refugees. In order to fix any problems that might occur in the ports of entry, the committee regularly sent to help the newcomers a representative of the Committee for Refugees, who on occasion used, in the committee’s words, “methods that we are not going to describe” and that could not be officially supported or justified.187 It is also feasible that the ports on the Pacific coast were guarded less strictly than those on the Atlantic, and that it was easier for refugees to disembark in Manzanillo than in Veracruz.

186 The expenses of disembarkation included the payment of a repatriation guarantee for each individual, renewable yearly for five years, which covered the respective expenses in case a refugee was deported or repatriated, and also the fines, in the event that the foreigner committed an irregularity. In 1940 the guarantee was 750 pesos per person, which could be paid directly in cash or through a bonding company. AKA, CCIM, Relaciones Intercomunitarias, Joint Distribution Committee, CCIM to JDC, [Mexico City], November 28, 1940. 187 Ibid.



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With regard to President Cárdenas’s personal stance, various documents refer to his empathy for the fate of the refugees. A report dated January 1939, quoted by Richard Merren, claimed that the president was “more sympathetic to Jewish immigration than is generally known.”188 If this were indeed the case, we need to reconsider the power the president actually held over the Ministry of the Interior, which in reality limited the admission of Jews, and over his cabinet in general. It is possible that in the case of the Spanish refugees—in which the president did manage to prevail over those sectors of the government that did not support him— Cárdenas used up his political negotiating power, leaving him with little or no influence on the fate of other refugees, especially the Jews, against whom there had been various manifestations of rejection by both the government and the public. Furthermore, in regard to the Jewish refugees Cárdenas did not have allies within his government. The fact that various initiatives supported by the president were canceled at some point in the planning process proves that the political costs of maintaining a firmer stance on the subject of the Jewish refugees were probably more than he could or was willing to pay. Various documents make reference to the idea that once the president had left office he would be able to exert more influence, perhaps because he would have more freedom of action. On January 1, 1941, the newspaper Der Weg (The Way) reported an incident that took place at the end of 1940, which, while isolated and affecting a group of only six people, may support this view. It was the case of the Rakuyo Maru, a Japanese ship that stopped over in the port of Manzanillo on the way to Japan. It was returning six Jewish refugees (two of them children) who after sailing for 112 days had not found asylum in any Latin American country. They were allowed off the ship to eat in the Mexican port, but an order from the capital immediately arrived, stating that the refugees could not enter the country, and thus the customs agents found them and led them back to the ship. When the Rakuyo Maru was about to weigh anchor, however, “government people” arrived, with a military escort and authorization for the passengers to disembark and be admitted into the country as political refugees. According to the article, the order to receive the refugees, which arrived at the most tragic moment, was given by President Cárdenas two

188 Theodore C. Achilles, “Refugee Colonization in Mexico,” quoted in Merren, “Politics of xenophobia,” 95.

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days after turning over the presidency. “This was the final humanitarian gesture with which his administration ended.”189 As ex-president, Cárdenas continued to intervene in favor of some refugees, for example by following up on the case of Victor Serge and his son Vlady, whose asylum he had granted in the final weeks of his term in 1940.190 Nevertheless, once the new president came into office in December 1940, it would be Manuel Ávila Camacho’s government that would have the final say on the matter of refugees entering the country, as will be seen in the following chapter.

189 Moisés Glikowski, “Refugees across the Pacific,” Der Weg, January 1, 1941 (translated from Yiddish by Maty Sommer). 190 Adofo Gilly, “Vlady, el pintor vagabundo,” La Jornada, June 21, 2007.

Chapter Five

SIGNS OF A THAW? THE EARLY YEARS OF MANUEL ÁVILA CAMACHO’S GOVERNMENT, 1941–1942 General Manuel Ávila Camacho took over as president on December 1, 1940, following very complicated elections. One of the main goals of his term in office was to make certain corrections to Cárdenas’s policies, since they had polarized the various social forces in the country. His government would bring the period of revolutions and great reforms to a close, and would mark the start of a reorganization of national politics and relations with other countries.1 His administration was shaped by two main goals. First, he advanced a moderate domestic program aimed to boost the economic development of the country, and for this to happen stability and “national unity” were necessary. Second, in its foreign policy the government sought to redefine relations with the United States, as well as to adapt national politics to the new international situation produced by the Second World War. During his term relations between Mexico and the United States were strained at first, as in the previous decades, but the initial tension gave way to a more open cooperation, based on a diplomatic rapprochement that focused on building an American bloc against the Nazi-Fascist axis. The commencement of collaboration between the two countries would create a climate conducive to future negotiations, and to a great extent explains the prompt support Ávila Camacho offered the United States when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941; Mexico broke off diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany, and Italy that same month.2 1 Rafael Loyola, ed., Entre la guerra y la estabilidad política. El México de los 40 (Mexico City: Conaculta / Grijalbo, 1990), 4. 2 Paz, Strategy, Security and Spies, 103. In December 1941 Mexico broke off diplomatic and consular relations with Japan, Italy, and Germany, on the seventh, eleventh, and twen­ty-fourth of that month, respectively. Mexican interests in these countries were left under the charge of the diplomatic representatives of Sweden. The German interests in Mexico were left to the Swedish representative; those of Italy to the Argentinean Embassy and later to the consulate general of Switzerland; and those of Japan to the Portuguese Lega­tion. AHSRE, file III-210-2, circular no. III-5-9 sent by SRE to the heads of the dip­ lomatic and consular missions of Mexico abroad, Mexico City, January 21, 1942.

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Certain events that took place earlier, however, seem to have anticipated this distancing. Among these we may mention the confiscation in April 1941 of German and Italian ships that were stuck in Mexican ports;3 the repeated protests the Mexican government made in the wake of Nazi aggressions and invasions;4 the confrontation with the German Legation in Mexico over its attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of the country, motivated by the publication of blacklists in the United States;5 the withdrawal of the exequatur of the German consuls in Mexico, followed by the closing of all Mexican consulates in Germany; Mexico’s support for the initiative presented by Chile to intercede with the Reich to suspend the execution of hostages in European territory occupied by German troops; and the decision made in the early days of December 1941 to appoint diplomatic representatives to the governments of Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Poland residing in London.6 The conditions created by the war would lead the governments of Mexico and the United States to initiate a stage of open and formal cooperation, which had not been the practice before,7 and would result in a 3 On April 1, 1941, the Mexican government ordered the occupation of ten Italian and two German ships in the ports of Tampico and Veracruz, which it justified by arguing that it wanted to avoid acts of sabotage in Mexico such as those carried out by the crews of var­ ious ships immobilized by the war in other Latin American ports during the first months of the year. On the April 8, a decree was issued to seize the twelve ships, citing the right of angary. The seized Italian ships (with their new names in parentheses) were the following: Fede (Poza Rica), Americano (Tuxpan), Genoano (Faja de Oro), Vigor (Amatlán), Tuscania (Minatitlán), Lucifero (Potrero del Llano), Stelvio (Ébano), Atlas (Las Choapas), Marina O (Tabasco), and Giorgio Fassio (Pánuco). The German ships were the Orinoco (Puebla) and the Hameln (Oaxaca). Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Septiembre de 1940–agosto de 1941 (Mexico City: SRE, 1941) 137–47. 4 The government of Ávila Camacho protested the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941. 5 Due to the fact that the blacklists published by the government of the United States on July 17, 1941, included some businesses with German capital in Mexico, the German Legation sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico a note in which Minister Rüdt von Collenberg requested that the Mexican government lodge a protest with the United States for discriminating against these businesses. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that the German Legation had formulated, in the name of its government, “demands that imply an undue proposal to intervene in acts that are the exclusive domain of the free­ dom of determination that characterizes the Mexican government, as the leadership of a sovereign country,” and replied to Minister von Collenberg that the Mexican government “did not for a minute admit the insinuation contained [. . .] since it is absolutely incum­ bent on the Mexican government alone to determine when the freedom of commerce and Mexico’s sovereignty are damaged.” Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria. 1940–1941, 148–51. 6 Alfonso García Robles, “Política internacional de México,” in Seis años de actividad nacional (Mexico City: Secretaría de Gobernación, 1946), 55–56. 7 Schuler, México between Hitler and Roosevelt, 112. Mario Ojeda, Alcances y límites de la política exterior de México (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2006), 37–38.



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strong concentration of economic ties between Mexico and its northern neighbor. On the other hand, the conflict would also force Manuel Ávila Camacho’s government to redirect part of its foreign policy in order to reestablish ties with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, since, as Blanca Torres points out, it was paradoxical that Mexico was drawing closer and closer to the Allied forces but had no diplomatic relations with two of their most important members.8 Relations with the United Kingdom were resumed in October 1941, expedited by the intention of the British government to look for as many allies as possible as Hitler advanced on Europe; relations with the USSR were reestablished in November 1942. On the international front, the breaking of the Ribentropp-Molotov Pact with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 (the famous Operation Barbarossa, which opened up the eastern front of the war) realigned political alliances and clearly defined the blocs that would face each other in the conflict. The United States’ abandonment of its isolationist policy and entrance into the war, Mexico’s clear sympathy for the Allies, and German aggressions led Ávila Camacho’s regime to also become involved in the world conflict, in May 1942. This chapter covers Mexican policy toward Jewish refugees during the years in which the Nazis decided to implement the so-called Final Solution: the methodical and systematic extermination of the entire European Jewish population. According to historians of the Holocaust, this decision was linked to the German invasion of the USSR, specifically to the German decision to exterminate the Jews of that country, in July 1941.9 This measure, in which Hitler played a central role, did not imply a rupture with the policies that the Nazis had followed in relation to the Jews; rather, it was the continuation—of course, more radicalized—of a process of decision making that would continue even beyond 1941, since most historians place the final decision on the Final Solution in the summer of 1942.10 This made saving the Jews a priority for many organizations and individuals, although it became more difficult beginning in October 1941, when the Nazis forbade Jewish emigration from the Third Reich. From then on, those who wished to escape extermination not only had to negotiate entry visas for other countries, but also exit visas authorized by the Germans, which proved extremely complicated. 8 Blanca Torres, De la guerra al mundo bipolar. México y el mundo. Historia de sus rela­ ciones exteriores, vol. 7 (Mexico City: Senado de la República, 1989), 23. 9 Christopher Browning, “The decision-making process,” in The Historiography of the Holocaust, ed. Dan Stone (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 185. 10 Ibid.

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chapter five The Immigration Policy of Ávila Camacho’s Government in 1941–1942: Legislation and Corruption

Within the context of the Second World War the configuration and orientation of immigration policies were reshaped throughout the world. More and more limitations were placed on the entrance of foreigners, until countries finally decreed that their borders were closed. At first, in order to control immigration, Manuel Ávila Camacho’s government relied on the General Law of Population of 1936, and on the differential tables (published in October 1940) that would be used to control the admission of immigrants during 1941. As previously mentioned, these tables provided for the admission, without limits, of citizens from American countries and Spain, while the number of citizens from other countries who could enter Mexico was reduced from 1,000 to 100.11 References to mestizaje as a resource of national unity were still part of official policy: Article 2 of the differential tables, introduced in 1939, stipulated that “the applicants shall categorically declare that they harbor no racial prejudices, and, if necessary, would be willing to form a mestizo Mexican family.” Finally, the Ministry of the Interior announced that, due to the world conflict, it would have the final word in discretionarily denying the admission of foreigners, canceling authorizations that might have been given, and designating the specific areas within the territory where foreigners who were admitted could reside.12 Discretion continued to be the cornerstone of Mexican immigration policy. The tables for 1941, formulated by authorities of Cárdenas’s government, were without a doubt stricter than those of the previous year. Nevertheless, they also included the innovation that “the foreigners who, for matters of politics or religion, flee from persecution which puts their liberty or life in imminent danger”13 would be admitted as political exiles. For the first time, the legislation extended the category of political exiles to include those persecuted for other causes, as was the case of the Jews

11 The exceptions included the direct relatives of Mexicans or foreigners who had immi­grated previously, agricultural colonizers, professionals “in clear cases of obvious utility,” technicians (when there were no competent specialists in the country), investor immi­grants, and people of independent means who lived off of the income of their investments. 12 “Tablas diferenciales y condiciones a que se sujetará la admisión de inmigrantes durante el año de 1941,” Diario Oficial, October 15, 1940. 13 Ibid., article 13. Italics added.



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who were trying to escape Nazism.14 In his first State of the Union message, Ávila Camacho reiterated this position when he referred to the frank hospitality that the Mexican government afforded the victims of racial or political persecutions, placing both causes on the same level. Another change that could also benefit European refugees was the consideration in Article 13 that those who were exiled in other countries would not be admitted into Mexico. This was less stringent than the previous differential tables, which stated that applications for asylum which were submitted from a country other than the persecuting nation would not be admitted. These new provisions could benefit many temporary refugees who, installed for a time in some of the neutral countries in Europe, were waiting to be admitted for permanent resettlement in other places but had not yet been granted formal asylum.15 The tables for 1941 also eliminated the stipulation that no foreigner who entered the republic as a visitor, with temporary goals or the status of tourist or trans-migrant, could be accepted as a refugee. When the tables formulated in 1940 were implemented in the following year, they specified considerable reductions in entrance permits. These limitations may have created the initial impression that Ávila Camacho’s government would be stricter than the previous one in immigration matters. For example, a newspaper that served the Jewish community of Mexico stated: “Despite our hoping that the government of President Manuel Ávila Camacho would relax the laws for the immigration of foreigners to Mexico, from what we can see, the difficulties for immigration are now even more extreme.”16 However, in the course of 1941 several events would change this impression. In fact, towards the end of the year, the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico judged that legal immigration to Mexico was possible, although in order to obtain the respective authorization it was necessary to make arrangements through a competent lawyer, whose fees were generally “very inflated.”17 By then mechanisms had been created, some legal, some illegal, to facilitate the entrance of refugees. 14 The tables for 1940 only referred to asylum granted to foreigners who reached the country after fleeing from political persecution. See “Tablas diferenciales y condiciones a que se sujetará la admisión de inmigrantes durante el año 1940,” article 17, Migración y Población 1, no. 1 (August 1940). 15 “Tablas diferenciales y condiciones a que se sujetará la admisión de inmigrantes durante el año de 1941,” article 13, Diario Oficial, October 15, 1940. 16 Der Weg, January 21, 1941, 1. (Translated by Maty Sommer.) 17 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Correspondencia Recibida 1939–1941, file 13, CCIM to HIASNY, [Mexico City], November 12, 1941.

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The situation created by the Second World War had a massive impact on Mexican immigration policy. An agreement dictated by the minister of the interior, Miguel Alemán, authorized by force majeure the continued residency of foreigners who due to the conflict were unable to return to their places of origin; they were also granted permission to work if they did not have economic resources.18 In order to control the foreigners, in March 1942 it was stipulated that all of them should once again enroll in the Registro Nacional de Extranjeros (National Registry of Foreigners) and exchange their immigration documents for new “forgery-proof ” ones. According to the newspaper El Universal, the Ministry of the Interior reserved the right to verify the “moral probity” of any foreigner of dubious character.19 While the measure appeared to be a legitimate measure during wartime, sources from the FBI thought that, due to the fact that previous registration forms would be turned over to the Ministry of the Interior, after the agreement it would be extremely difficult to obtain information on foreigners in Mexico.20 The director of the FBI told the American State Department that based on dependable and confidential information, the measure, which would not affect the Germans and Japanese who were in the country as visitors or tourists, was “basically a scheme to obtain profits, more than a real attempt to register all foreigners in Mexico with the objective of achieving more effective control over their activities.”21 After German submarines sank two Mexican tankers—the Potrero del Llano, on the night of May 13, 1942, and the Faja de Oro seven days later—a decree from the Congress of the Union on June 1, 1942, declared a state of war between Mexico and Germany, Italy, and Japan, as of May 22 that year. Mexico’s entry into the Second World War forced the closing of the borders to all non-American immigration. In reality, however, the doors were not closed to everyone. As the president’s private secretary explained to Indalecio Prieto: “the recent provisions dictated by the Government for controlling immigration into the

18 AHINM, file 4-350-934, Arcadio Ojeda García to the judges of the Department of Immigration, Mexico City, August 13, 1941. The agreement is dated August 1, 1941. 19 “Inscripción de los extranjeros en Gobernación,” Diario Oficial, March 4, 1942; and El Universal, March 5, 1942. 20 NARA, R.G. 59, file 812.11/854, J. E. Hoover, director of the FBI, to Adolf A. Berle Jr., assistant secretary of state, Washington, DC, April 1942. 21 Ibid.



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country only affect those foreigners who Mexico considers undesirable, not those of Spanish nationality who may continue to come.”22 In September of 1942 the Ministry of the Interior stipulated that all foreigners who had not been born on the American continent (comprising North, Central, and South America), regardless of their nationality, could not under any circumstance enter Mexico without prior authorization from the ministry. This brought about reiterated complaints by U.S. citizens born in Europe who sought the intervention of the American Embassy in Mexico, which only acted in certain cases since embassy officials understood that the agreement was part of the measures adopted by the Mexican government to control the movement of foreigners who belonged to Axis nations. However, the agreement was the occasion for harsh criticism of the Mexican government, especially from those near the border between the two countries.23 A new decree in November of the same year determined that for immigration purposes, the nationality of immigrants would be decided by their origin, “not by taking into account naturalization letters granted by other governments.” This would reduce even more the chances—already practically null—that a stateless person who had been born in Germany or any other country occupied by the Nazis could enter Mexico.24 Apparently the prohibition on European immigration, once Mexico declared war on the Axis powers, did not affect those who were on their way to the country or who had Mexican visas and were only waiting to embark on their journey. In fact, all of the refugees who arrived on the steamship Guinée on June 16, 1942, were allowed to disembark. Although the government had not proclaimed an official stance in this respect, experience was proving that those who were in these situations could enter Mexico, with varying degrees of difficulty.25 The opinion of the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico, expressed in correspondence kept up with Jewish organizations that supported the emigration, was that the Mexican authorities were confronting the Jewish refugee question with a “spirit of great benevolence and humanitarianism.” The committee specifically referred to the fact that the Mexican 22 AGN, PMAC, file. 546.6/39, González Gallo to Prieto, Mexico City, June 8, 1942. 23 NARA, R.G. 59, file 812.111/1093, Stafford to the secretary of state, Embassy of the United States of America in Mexico, Mexico City, February 10, 1943. 24 AHSRE, exp. III-210-2, circular IV-35-75, Mexico City, November 27, 1942. The excep­ tions were persons who were born in the Americas and naturalized in another American country. 25 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, Beckelman to JDC, Mexico City, June 21, 1942.

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government had allowed refugees who had no valid visas, but rather what were known as “Vichy visas,” which were not endorsed by the Ministry of the Interior,26 to enter. They also made reference to the fact that in exceptional cases entrance permits were being granted.27 Therefore, they stated, “Based on the hospitable spirit that drives the government of the Mexican Republic, we firmly believe that war victims and those persecuted by Nazi-Fascists would continue to find asylum in Mexico, including those who will arrive shortly in Veracruz.”28 On the other hand, Ávila Camacho’s regime also allowed the legalization, as political exiles, of the majority of the immigrants who had arrived in Mexico in previous years, even those who had come as temporary visitors. As long as they were political exiles, they were guaranteed the right to work but not the right to acquire residency, and once the war was over, they had to leave the national territory.29 In this regard, once again the discretionality and loopholes within the immigration policy that allowed some refugees to enter the country must be pointed out. As we have seen, the exceptions included those who had friends or relatives in Mexico, in positions that allowed them to exert pressure on behalf of applicants and to cover their regular and extra expenses; they also included distinguished figures in whose cases the president would intervene.30 The reasons for this change may be tied to the international scene, as well as to the process of redefining the direction of domestic and foreign politics, whereby the nation moved towards the democracies and distanced itself from the Axis powers (with whom Cárdenas’s government had been closer). The context of the Second World War must also be taken into account, as well as the gradual change in public opinion as Mexicans began to look more favorably on the victims of European Fascism. On the other hand, in more pragmatic terms, helping the refugees could bring the regime certain benefits: “While the discourse of national unity diluted the socialist profile of Cardenism, the matter of asylum for the persecuted, disguised as continuity, knitted together the anti-Fascist, libertarian, and hospitable character of Mexico.”31 26 Ibid., CCIM to JDC, Mexico City, May 15, 1942. See below, p. 224. 27 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Correspondencia Recibida, CCIM to HICEM-Jamaica, [Mexico City], May 23, 1942. 28 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, CCIM to JDC, Mexico City, June 1, 1942. 29 Ibid., CCIM to JDC, Mexico City, August 20, 1942. 30 Ibid., Beckelman to JDC, Mexico City, June 21, 1942. 31 Bokser, “Alteridad en la historia,” 355.



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Without failing to consider that there could have been more openness on the part of the government, as archival sources indicate, in order to explain the arrival of refugees during this period it is necessary to look at the illegal arrangements that allowed the persecuted to disembark. In this respect we quote the conclusion drawn by the American Department of Justice: “The Mexican authorities seem to be so corrupt that visas can be obtained at any time for the right price.”32 While documenting illegal visa arrangements is complicated (since they rarely leave a paper trail), the information found up to now provides various pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that, even half assembled, illustrates the extent, variety, and frequency of these practices. In fact, corruption was general. We find it inside the Mexican Consulate in Marseilles (denounced by Gilberto Bosques) and other Mexican consulates in Europe, in the federal government, in state governments, in the local customs offices, in the ports of entry, in the negotiations of lawyers and coyotes (fixers), and so on. Illicit activities included forging Mexican passports, selling visas, granting tourist visas to refugees, bribing officials to allow refugees to disembark, devising colonization projects that had the sole objective of making money for local governments, and other schemes. Many people tried to turn a profit at the expense of the refugees, who, fleeing concentration and extermination camps, were willing to pay whatever was necessary to survive. Probably the most well-documented matter was the sale of visas, which increased considerably in value when Mexico entered the war. Up until then, while the price varied depending on who was doing the negotiating, they cost around $300 per person; after May 1942 the price reached $500 and even $1,000.33 In May of 1942 a lawyer charged $600 per person, $750 for two members of the same family, and $100 more for each additional family member. Apparently it was easiest to obtain entrance permits for Belgian, French, English, Scandinavian, Czech, Polish, and Dutch citizens, as well as citizens of the Balkan nations, while Hungarians, Romanians, and (Jewish) Germans faced the greatest difficulties. Each person over eighteen years of age needed a letter of credit from a Mexican branch of the National City Bank of New York.34 From Mexico were offered visas that would permit

32 NARA, R.G. 59, file 812.111/10551/2, letter from the Justice Department, July 23, 1942. 33 See various documents in NARA, R.G. 59, Central Files: Mexico, 1940–1944, reel 23. 34 NARA, R.G. 59, file 812.111/924.

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interested parties to be admitted as visitors, political refugees, or investor immigrants.35 The Ministry of the Interior, in the hands of Miguel Alemán, appears to have been involved in various cases of corruption, especially in relation to arrangements for entrance made from Veracruz. The FBI offers as an example the case of Pablo Loperena, a former customs agent in the port of Veracruz who, once the war began, moved to Mexico City, where he acted as a coyote negotiating matters of immigration with the National Registry of Foreigners, whose office was known as the “Veracruz Consulate.” According to American intelligence, Loperena was quite close to Alemán, who was also from Veracruz.36 The corruption in Veracruz was evident in the case, in 1942, of the last ships to arrive in port carrying European refugees, as we will see later on. The Office of Strategic Services of the United States was involved in the problem of the sale of visas insofar as many falsified Mexican documents were used to apply for transit visas to the United States, where the refugees usually tried to stay. One of these cases took place in the Mexican representation in Marseilles, where the consular employee Máximo Muñoz López, boasting of his great influence with the general consul, Gilberto Bosques, offered to save the refugees the long and tortuous process of obtaining visas, charging 30,000 francs per person in order to resolve their situations quickly. Apparently Muñoz López was an ex-Spanish refugee who, by the time Bosques exposed the affair, was in Mexico. According to the Mexican consul, Muñoz López, who had teamed up with the French general commissioner within the police department, had also forged visas from the Venezuelan Consulate in Marseilles.37 Gilberto Bosques also reported an organization that specialized in altering the identity and travel cards issued by the Mexican Legation to Spanish political refugees in order to facilitate their emigration to Mexico. The procedure consisted of buying these documents from Spaniards who had to return to their country because they were not included in the lists of people who could embark for Mexico, and from those who were sentenced to forced labor by French or German authorities. The names and photographs on the documents were then changed. In this business 35 NARA, R.G. 59, file 812.111/1123. 36 NARA, R.G. 59, Central Files: Mexico, 1940–1944, reel 23, [no file number] (5A15363), letter to Hyner Oppenheimer, Mexico City, May 29, 1942. 37 NARA, R.G. 59, file 812.111/1077, “Widespread forging of Visas for Mexico in Europe,” Office of Strategic Services, Washington, DC, November 30, 1942.



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several people were involved, including a colonel in the Mexican Army (whose son was the attaché in the Spanish Embassy in Vichy) and presumably also Máximo Muñoz López.38 In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received reports referring to the falsification of passports, especially Latin American passports, in Germany during the war. The ex-honorary consul of Mexico in Warsaw, Julian Brygiewicz, for example, was imprisoned for selling five passports, apparently issued to Jewish refugees.39 Many individuals tried to take advantage of the last months in which there were ships available for transporting civilians. This constellation of circumstances may explain why the number of entries of Jewish refugees increased in 1942. Projects for the Immigration of Jewish Refugees Towards the end of 1940, when General Lázaro Cárdenas’s government was drawing to a close, all spheres of domestic politics had their attention on the transition that would take place in December 1940. Therefore, projects for the immigration of Jewish refugees into Mexico had been temporarily suspended, since the climate of political instability was not very conducive to the government’s dealing with any but the most urgent tasks. The arrival of the new administration raised optimistic expectations on the part of those who thought that it was not worth the trouble to negotiate with Cárdenas’s immigration authorities. During the government of General Manuel Ávila Camacho the projects for the admittance of groups of Jewish refugees were revised. The attempts at agricultural colonization were abandoned, after those involved in planning them came up against multiple obstacles, as we saw in the last chapter, and after the failures of the colonization experiments of 1939 and 1940. Reorienting their efforts, those involved in the rescue of refugees focused on saving children. In 1940 a campaign was organized to save orphans, who would be adopted by Jewish families living in Mexico.40 In retrospect, 38 Ibid. See also NARA, R.G. 59, file 812.111/985, Inzunza to Fresco, Marseilles, February 25, 1942. 39 AHSRE, file III-736-25, Ortiz, by orders of the vice-minister of foreign affairs to the minister of the interior, Mexico City, August 3, 1945, and AHSRE file III-419-7, Navarro to SRE, Berlin, August 10, 1941. 40 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Correspondencia Recibida 1939–1941, file 13, CCIM to HIASNY and the American Jewish Congress, Mexico City, August 7, 1940.

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this project was very advantageous: most of the arguments used to justify closing the doors on adults would have been difficult to utilize when talking about children (i.e., the economic competition they represented to national workers, the burden they would constitute for Mexican society, their lack of resources, the fear of public opinion, and so on). On the other hand, if there was any circumstance that could tug at the heartstrings of those who were in charge of decisions linked to immigration policy, it would undoubtedly be this. The project was dogged by one financial and legal obstacle after another, not to mention the immense problem that the scarcity of transatlantic transport presented, along with its cost and dangers. Eventually the actions taken by the Israelite Central Committee, with the support of the World Jewish Congress and the Joint Distribution Committee, as well as the intervention of certain figures in Mexican politics, among these Isidro Fabela and Vicente Lombardo Toledano,41 succeeded in January 1943 in obtaining the authorization of the Mexican government for the immigration, with the status of political exiles, of one hundred children, sons and daughters of fathers who were doing forced labor and mothers obliged to work in the internment camps in France.42 Since up to that point very few young children had been rescued from occupied Europe, Isidro Fabela was asked to intervene in order that the authorization be extended to young people under eighteen years of age, who had a greater likelihood of being saved from some concentration camps; authorization was granted. At the end of June 1943 the permit was about to expire, and no detailed, complete list of the names of the candidates had been compiled, due to the difficulties linked to the selection process.43 Despite the rescuers’ efforts, the circumstances of the war, disorganization, and lack of coordination among the organizations that strenuously tried to help with the emigration of European refugees prevented the young people from ever reaching Mexico. However, what was achieved—and this was almost the only time this happened—was a positive response from the Mexican government to an organized project for Jewish immigration. 41 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, [no box number], file 28, Glikowski to Fabela, [Mexico City], April 30, 1943, and AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, Permiso de admisión de niños refugiados, 1943, file 92, Sub-Committee of the World Jewish Congress in Mexico to Lombardo Toledano, [Mexico City], February 16, 1943. 42 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, [no box number], file 28, Glikowski to Fabela, [Mexico City], April 30, 1943. 43 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, Permiso de admisión de niños refugiados, 1943, file 92, Behar to Kahn, Mexico City, June 30, 1943.



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Beginning in October 1942, when the first confirmed reports of the systematic extermination of Jews appeared, various international Jewish organizations intensified their aid programs in order to help those who were in areas not occupied by the Nazis. The World Jewish Congress began a program for rescuing the Jews in southern France, which consisted of asking all of the governments in the Western hemisphere to take in a predetermined number of refugees. The Israelite Central Committee of Mexico tried to negotiate the admission of five hundred of these people into the country;44 however, while negotiations to obtain the necessary financial support were in progress, nonoccupied France was conquered and the last opportunity for an effective rescue operation was extinguished.45 In December 1942, an internal communiqué between members of the Joint referred to the fact that, apparently, the Mexican government had promised that the three or four hundred visas which at first had been approved for the refugees in France would be transferred to refugees in Lisbon,46 but as far as the extant documents indicate, these visas were not used either. The Rejections Due to the fact that the situation in Europe was deteriorating, applications from refugees seeking admittance to Mexico continued to arrive, although most of them were denied. A report on the opportunities for immigration offered by Mexico, produced in March 1941 by the president of the CCIM, León Behar, attempted to explain the situation. Although in his opinion there was no official policy of discrimination against Jewish refugees, Behar related that a spokesman for the government who was reproached because a number of German Jews with regular immigration visas were not permitted to disembark in Veracruz explained that the decision to admit those who had German passports marked with the letter “J” had been left in the hands of immigration officials at the ports of entry.47 Even when a person was given a regular immigration visa, the Mexican government reserved the right to repatriate him within five years. The fact that those with 44 To this end it contacted the World Jewish Congress, the JDC, the HICEM, the Jewish Labor Committee, and the American Federation of Polish Jews. See letter from CCIM to Stephen Wise, Mexico City, October 14, 1942. 45 Avni, Role of Latin America, 60. Bokser, Imágenes de un encuentro, 222. 46 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, Buchman to Leavitt, [n.p.], December 29, 1942. 47 See Chapter 3.

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German passports stamped with a “J” were nonrepatriable was the main reason for the objections presented by immigration officials. In Behar’s opinion, the applications for immigration of Jewish refugees were usually not even examined by the authorities, but rather immediately rejected. However, he clarified that sometimes the difficulties could be “set right” along the way, which was common in some Latin American countries.48 Among the cases that were denied was the petition for entry formulated by the Polish minister in Mexico in the name of eightyfive Polish ex-officials who were commissioned in France at the time of the German occupation and who had found temporary refuge in Casablanca. Although the minister of foreign affairs, Ezequiel Padilla, recommended granting permission for immigration since these people, on the basis of their education and background, would be considered desirable, the application was rejected.49 According to Haim Avni, the Polish minister had also sought authorization for the entrance of seventeen members of two Jewish families from Lisbon and Brussels, while the representatives of the anti-Nazi Austrians living in Mexico requested the entrance in January 1942 of more than eighty individuals, Jews and non-Jews, from Portugal. All of these applications were remitted to the minister of the interior and were rejected.50 In July 1941 the minister of Mexico in France, Francisco J. Aguilar,51 asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for instructions in relation to the application for immigration by a group of forty Sephardic refugees who, according to what the former could learn after studying the files, “are honest, capable people, with economic means,” most of them heads of households. This petition was also turned over to Miguel Alemán and denied.52 A group that seemed to have a greater chance of success was made up of several families of diamond cutters from Ambers who had taken refuge in France, and whom Consul Gilberto Bosques strongly recommended to the minister of foreign affairs and to President Cárdenas in September 1940. While the ministry authorized the entrance of ten of

48 American Jewish Archives (AJA), WJCR, MS-361, H 238/13, León Behar, “Immigration chances in Mexico,” included in the “Report on Mexico” sent by Kate Knopfmacher to the World Jewish Congress, Mexico City, March 7, 1941. 49 AHSRE, file III-601-27, Padilla to Alemán, Mexico City, July 25, 1941, and Ruiz Cort­ ines to Padilla, Mexico City, September 10, 1941. 50 See Avni, Role of Latin America, 57. 51 General Francisco J. Aguilar was designated envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary minister of Mexico to France in February 1941, replacing Luis I. Rodríguez. 52 AHSRE, file IV-745-32, Aguilar to SRE, Vichy, July 1, 1941. Avni, Role of Latin Amer­ ica, 57.



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these families based on the report on their assets sent by Bosques, upon their arrival in Mexico the ministry demanded they show one and a half million dollars in capital, a requirement with which they obviously could not comply. Although the consul tried to explain that the war complicated efforts to move that kind of money, on August 6, 1941, the authorization was revoked.53 Between October and November 1941 a group of Polish Jewish refugees who had been rejected by the Brazilian government and departed aboard the steamship Alsina began desperately to seek asylum, appealing to the goodwill of the Mexican authorities. Apparently the Spanish refugees and the Jews who had their papers in order were able to disembark in Buenos Aires, but those who were considered undesirable by Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay were transferred to the Cabo de Hornos in order to begin the journey back to Europe.54 In November 1941 the passengers sent a final plea to the Mexican authorities, begging they be saved from a “cruel, undeserved fate.”55 The petition was seconded by those passengers who had been able to disembark in South America and also by the Polish minister in Mexico, who tried to intercede on behalf of the refugees with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the latter’s reply, they were carrying out “tenacious negotiations” with the Ministry of the Interior so that eighteen Polish citizens who were aboard the ship could be admitted to Mexico as political refugees, but this was not achieved.56 Finally, behind the back of the Mexican authorities, permission was obtained for the passengers to disembark on the island of Curacao.57 Other cases of rejection involved people who did not have their papers in order. In July 1941, for example, the Jewish refugees who had reached Manzanillo with their documents in order (probably aboard the Rakuyo Maru) were allowed to disembark, but the Warszawsky family, who had

53 AHSRE, APGB, Folder 104, Bosques to SRE, Mexico City, September 5, 1940, and memorandum from Ernesto Hidalgo, chief officer of the SRE, August 19, 1941. Letter from Rodríguez to Bosques, Vichy, November 19, 1940, may be found in Segovia and Serrano Migallón, Luis I. Rodríguez en Francia, 521. AGN, PLC, Bosques to Cárdenas, Marseille, Sep­ tember 5, 1940, AGN, PLC, file 546.6/307. 54 AGN, PMAC, file 546.6/96, the Mexican ambassador in Buenos Aires to the private secretary of Ávila Camacho, Buenos Aires, October 31, 1941. 55 Ibid., Dr. Chazen to the private secretary of Ávila Camacho, [n.p.], November 10, 1941. 56 AHSRE, file III-2413-15, Padilla to the minister of Poland in Mexico, Mexico City, November 14, 1941. 57 AJA, WJCR, series A, subseries 2, A19-18, Knopfmacher to Shultz, Mexico City, November 25, 1941.

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no visas, had to continue their journey towards South America, in spite of efforts made by the Committee for Refugees to persuade the Mexican authorities to allow them to enter the country as political exiles.58 To these applications for group entrance can be added a good number of individual negotiations that were carried out by refugees from Spain, Portugal, France, and other countries.59 The available sources do not allow us to conclude how many of these petitions were accepted and how many were rejected, but generally, individual applications unaccompanied by some kind of recommendation were turned down. The Admissions The situations that were resolved favorably included, in broad terms, the few Jewish refugees who reached Mexico with their papers in order and were able to disembark without any problems, for example the passengers aboard the steamship Rakuyo Maru, which docked in Acapulco in July 1941.60 The main instance of Manuel Ávila Camacho’s government opening up to refugees from Nazism, both Jews and non-Jews, was the case of the steamship Serpa Pinto. The Serpa Pinto set sail from Lisbon in November 1941 with 328 people on board. After picking up another 470 in Casablanca, it undertook the voyage to Cuba, Santo Domingo, Mexico, and the United States.61 The refugees who embarked in Casablanca had been “trapped” in unoccupied France because they could not get transit visas for Spain, indispensable for reaching Lisbon and from there leaving Europe. The Joint made the appropriate arrangements for these people to cross the Mediterranean to the Moroccan port, where they were picked up by the Serpa Pinto.62 The majority of the passengers were refugees who had recently been freed from different concentration camps; among them

58 AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 137, July 1, 1941. 59 On individual cases see AGN, PMAC, 546.6/29, 30, 32, 98, 157. 60 AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 137, July 1, 1941. 61  JDC, Collection 33/44, file 387, “SS Serpa Pinto. Sailing November 17, 1941. Recapitulation,” Joint Fund of Lisbon to JDC of New York, Lisbon, November 18, 1941. The total cost of passage for the refugees on the Serpa Pinto was $330,104, of which $248,176 was contributed by the HICEM, $26,669 by relatives, and the rest by the JDC. 62 Ibid., Roman Slobodin, “118 Refugees Arrive on Serpa Pinto, Escape Aided by Joint Distribution Committee.”



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were a good number of German Communists. According to a memorandum from the Joint, many were sick, and some blind.63 When the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico learned that 180 refugees aboard the Serpa Pinto were about to arrive in Mexico, it tried to find out how they had obtained Mexican visas and what type of visas they had (in short, whether the documents were legal or not) in order to ascertain the situation they would confront. They were trying to avoid the repetition of cases like the Quanza or the Saint Louis.64 The documentation related to the nine people who embarked in Lisbon for Veracruz was examined by the Mexican Consulate in the Portuguese city, which reported that they were valid documents that had been procured by relatives living in Mexico. However, almost all of the refugees who were headed for Mexico had embarked in Casablanca, which precluded obtaining any information on their documentation.65 According to reports by the CCIM, the passenger list for the Serpa Pinto, sent by cable from Casablanca, had not arrived soon enough: “we ran the risk that many of the refugees would not be able to disembark.”66 However, we know that not all of the refugees had the correct documentation for entering Mexico. According to Isaac L. Asofsky, executive director of HIAS, who traveled to Mexico to assist with the disembarkation of the passengers, in the review conducted when the ship docked in Veracruz, on December 16, 1941, they found that 107 immigrants did not comply with the prerequisites laid down by Mexican laws: in some cases the visas or passports had expired, or the corresponding photographs were missing. On December 17 immigration officials in Veracruz wired Mexico with the names of all of those persons who were being detained and the reasons for their detention; meanwhile, contacts were made with “important people” in Mexico, with the objective of using their influence to have the immigrants admitted. The next day a commission met with President Ávila Camacho’s private secretary and, according to the report of the CCIM, the government finally gave the order to admit all of the 63 Ibid., memorandum of the meeting of Leavitt and Kahn with Behar, president of the CCIM, [New York], November 3, 1941. 64 Although the Saint Louis did not reach Mexico, it is usually quoted as the paradig­ matic case of the many ships that the American government refused to receive, sending them back to Europe without permitting them to disembark any passengers. 65 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 387, memorandum of the meeting of Leavitt and Kahn with Behar, [New York], November 3, 1941. Ibid., Schwartz to JDC, [Lisbon], November 6, 1941. 66 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, CCIM to Khan, Mexico City, February 2, 1942.

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immigrants.67 The representative of this organization reported that “fortunately, this time we were treated in a very humanitarian and selfless way by the Immigration Authorities who were, apparently, obeying orders from above.”68 On December 23, 1941, the CCIM reported having helped all of the refugees to disembark—182 individuals in all, including the non-Jews. In addition to the efforts made at the time, the decision to allow the passengers to disembark had apparently been “worked out” beforehand. In a meeting of the Committee for Refugees it was reported, in relation to the upcoming arrival of the Serpa Pinto, that the government had been approached and asked to give the Jewish refugees the same treatment that the Spanish refugees received, to which the government had agreed. According to the report, the appointment of two people from the government to receive the ship and collaborate with immigration officials in order to facilitate the admission of the refugees had even been approved.69 Afterwards the committee acknowledged that thanks to the good will of the Mexican government, and the intervention of friendly and influential societies, the disembarkment was arranged.70 Figuring among these societies, in the first place, was the League for German Culture, whose contacts included eminent political figures of the Mexican Left, such as the leader of the Latin American Confederation of Workers (CTAL), Vicente Lombardo Toledano.71 The Serpa Pinto continued its journey towards New York, where it would deliver another 150 refugees. Of the 182 refugees who disembarked in Mexico, 128 registered with the Israelite Central Committee. Of the latter, a third consisted of non-Jews (some Protestants, others Catholics, and

67 Ibid., Isaac L. Asofsky, “Report on Arrival of SS Serpa Pinto to Veracruz, Mexico, and discussions with Central Jewish Committee of Mexico.” Unfortunately the document does not record who took part in this commission. 68 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Correspondencia Recibida 1939–1941, file 34, Glikowski to Khan, [Mexico City], December 23, 1941. 69 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, Isaac L. Asofsky, “Report on Arrival of SS Serpa Pinto to Veracruz, Mexico, and discussions with Central Jewish Committee of Mexico.” 70 Ibid., CCIM to Khan, Mexico City, February 2, 1942. 71 The CCIM paid the non-Israelite committees the amount of 7,357 pesos to be used for helping the non-Jewish refugees, in exchange for the assistance obtained in legalizing the Jewish refugees. See AJA, WJCR, file H-240/7. CCIM to the World Jewish Congress, Mexico City, February 23, 1942.



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some others registered only as “non-Israelites”).72 All of the passengers of the Serpa Pinto were legalized as political exiles, with the right to work.73 The sources do not allow us to confirm whether the Mexican authorities had truly adopted a more flexible stance in relation to the arrival of Jewish refugees, or the authorities at the ports of entry had decided to take advantage of the situation, making local arrangements to allow disembarking. It is also possible that both of these were true, and that flexibility at the upper levels of the government was paralleled by corruption among lesser authorities. The cases of the steamers Nyassa, San Thomé, and Guinée are other examples of ships whose passengers were able to enter the country. The Nyassa arrived in Veracruz in March 1942.74 All of the refugees aboard (Jews and non-Jews) who had Mexican visas were allowed to disembark, although not without many difficulties, with the help of the League for German Culture, which in its requests to allow the disembarkation argued that “of all of the entry permits granted by our government, not even one fourth have arrived due to the European War.”75 The Central Committee, which had also helped with the disembarkation, affirmed that it was supporting the majority of the newcomers.76 Various refugees who were headed for Santo Domingo asked the CCIM to negotiate their permanent residency in Mexico, but the committee responded in the negative, thinking it wiser to reserve the possibilities of immigration for refugees who were still in Europe.77 In April 1942 the San Thomé arrived in Veracruz, bringing 104 passengers who had Mexican visas. At first 79 of them were able to disembark, while the situation of the other 25, members of the International Brigades who had fought in Spain, was not decided upon.78 Finally, hours 72 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 387, “Lista de refugiados del Serpa Pinto atendidos por el CCIM.” This list contains forty-two non-Jewish refugees, six of whom were married to Jews. 73 AJA, WJCR, file H-240/7, CCIM to the World Jewish Congress, Mexico City, February 23, 1942. 74 The Nyassa made three trips to Mexico during 1942 with Spanish refugees. Only on the first of the three, in February–March, did Jewish refugees arrive, among these appar­ ently also a Jewish committee from Marseilles. Emilio Calle and Ada Simón, Los barcos del exilio (Madrid: Oberon, 2005), 221–22. 75 AGN, PMAC, file 546.6/17, League for German Culture to Ávila Camacho, Mexico City, December 26, 1941. 76 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, CCIM to JDC, Mexico City, March 25, 1942. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., “Memorandum on Telephone Conversation between Mr. Leavitt and Mr. Behar in Mexico City,” signed by Moisés A. Leavitt, [New York], April 22, 1942. In a later document

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before the ship was to set sail for Europe, and thanks to the intervention of many organizations and individuals, all of the refugees were able to disembark.79 According to Avni, the Nyassa and the San Thomé brought about 260 Jewish refugees with legal entry visas.80 After the declaration of war in May, apparently three more arrivals were registered. One was the steamship Guinée, in June 1942, with 169 refugees, of whom 70 were Jews; they may have comprised the last contingency of Jewish refugees to reach the country. The Serpa Pinto docked once again at Veracruz on October 1, 1942, while the Nyassa, which reached Mexico on October 16 and was the last direct trip from Europe, brought 138 people, among whom there were no Jewish refugees. During 1943 and until the end of the war, the CCIM registered only 72 people: 31 were Polish Jews who had arrived at the Hacienda de Santa Rosa, and the rest were people who had obtained individual visas for the country.81 In order to explain the disembarkation of passengers who reached the country during the second half of 1942, we believe that along with President Ávila Camacho’s more generous attitude toward refugees, it is important to take into account the documentation that alludes to the corruption which took place at the port of Veracruz. An FBI report entitled “Immigration Racket at Veracruz, Mexico” referred to the shady negotiations of the local head of the immigration office, Alfredo Reguero, who was “protected” by the minister of the interior, Miguel Alemán. Apparently the refugees who had arrived in Veracruz on October 1, 1942, aboard the Serpa Pinto without their papers in order were able to disembark at a cost of 2,000 pesos for the group.82 According to the report, Reguero allowed only his men to board the ships before authorizing the descent it was reported that there were forty-nine people who had difficulty disembarking. See ibid., telegram from León Mayer, aboard the steamship San Thomé, to JDC, Vera­cruz, April 23, 1942. 79 The League for German Culture wrote to President Ávila Camacho, despairingly, in order to ask that the disembarkation of the refugees be approved, arguing that “almost no boats with refugees arrive any more” and that these refugees would not constitute an eco­nomic burden on the country. AGN, PMAC, file 546.6/17, Gutmann to President Ávila Camacho, Mexico City, April 20, 1942. JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, CCIM to Moisés Leavitt, Mexico City, April 25, 1942. We do not know how many of the refugees were Jews. Among them was the photographer Walter Reuter. 80 Avni, Role of Latin America, 59. 81 Ibid., 59–60. We must point out that not all refugees registered with the Central Committee, so the numbers are probably higher. 82 According to the aforementioned document approximately three hundred refugees disembarked from the Serpa Pinto and five hundred from the Nyassa, which docked at Veracruz on October 16, 1942.



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of the passengers. The money was collected through a simple ruse: an official boarded the ship and inspected the refugees’ papers, discovering some technicality that made disembarkation impossible. A second individual from the same office, but dressed as a civilian, would offer to fix the problem for a sum that ranged from 10 to 50 pesos per person. The document added: “It is said that Reguero affirmed that he would probably only be in his present position for at the most two more years and that he would make enough money during that period to last him his whole life.”83 Reguero worked along with the vice-head of Immigration, Aurelio Cueva, and it seems he was also in cahoots with the Cuban consul in Veracruz, who was a good friend.84 Corruption, of course, affected all of the refugees arriving in Mexico, not just the Jews. Gilberto Bosques and the Mexican Consulate in Marseilles Gilberto Bosques, who belonged to President Cárdenas’s closest circle, was the consul general of Mexico in France in 1939, first in Paris, and following the German invasion in 1940, in Marseilles.85 Before leaving Mexico, the president had granted him broad powers to organize the rescue of the Spanish Republicans who were being held in internment camps and were in imminent danger of being deported to Spain. According to an interview with Bosques, in the meeting he had with Cárdenas, they had also contemplated the possibility of adopting certain measures for protecting Jewish refugees and bringing a significant number to Mexico. Cárdenas answered, “Have a look at all this, subject to the necessary agreements being reached on the matter, in order to document them. On the other hand, the situation of the Spanish refugees is already very delicate. You will need freedom of action. You will have all of the support of the presidency.”86 We do not know exactly what President Cárdenas was referring to by making aid to the Jewish refugees conditional upon the issuing of the “necessary agreements”; but as we have seen, in general 83 NARA, R.G. 59, file 812.111/1073, “Immigration Racket at Veracruz, Mexico,” Hoover to Berle Jr., Washington, DC, November 7, 1942. 84 Ibid. 85 Apparently Bosques had asked Cárdenas if he could join the Mexican Foreign Service in order to study up close the situation before the war. He wanted to go to France as a consul, not as a minister, since the latter post entailed many social obligations that would not have left time for his studies. Graciela de Garay, “Gilberto Bosques,” in Historia oral de la diplomacia mexicana (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1988), 38–39. 86 Ibid., 39–40.

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the president had decided to wait until international agreements had been reached on the matter before committing to any help from Mexico. The Mexican Consulate in Marseilles was especially important because this French port, located in the unoccupied zone, turned into the meeting place for all those who were desperately trying to flee from Nazi and Fascist persecution, especially beginning in the summer of 1940 when the Germans occupied northwestern France, a country which up to that point had been one of the main places of refuge.87 In El manuscrito perdido (The Lost Manuscript), Theodor Balk describes the situation in Marseilles: By the tens of thousands outcasts reach the port city of Marseille with the sole objective of obtaining one of those miraculous seals, keys to freedom.  For those who are unable to obtain one, the horizon is full of threats. They may be condemned to “Vernet” or to “Djelfa,” sent to concentration camps or sent to do forced labor, building the Saharan Railway . . . For many something far worse: nothing less than extradition to the “Reich.”  Unfortunately, the seals are few. The countries of the new continent hide behind a barricade of visas and seals, many even more effective than the ancient Great Wall of China.  Mexico opened its doors to many of those threatened. From the United States came letters of guarantee and tickets, making the flight of others possible, a blessing that several hundred or perhaps thousands of persecuted people were able to take advantage of.88

In Marseilles various aid committees were set up, some devoted only to helping Spanish Republicans, such as the Junta de Auxilio a los Republicanos Españoles (Board of Aid to the Spanish Republicans, JARE) and the Servicio de Evacuación de Refugiados Españoles (Service of Evacuation of Spanish Republicans, SERE), both of which were closed down by the French government in 1940, and others devoted to saving Spaniards as well as anti-Fascists of diverse nationalities, mentioned in Chapter 4.89 In 1941 the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee90 was formed, and in 1942 the International Rescue and Relief Committee,91 which along with the Unitarian Service Committee played a vital role in Marseilles, was 87 See Caron, Uneasy Asylum. 88 Theodor Balk, El manuscrito perdido (Buenos Aires: Lautaro, 1944), 302–3. 89 See the section “The Exceptions” in Chapter 4. 90 Formed by the union of the United American Spanish Aid Committee, the American Committee to Save Refugees, and the Exiled Writers Committee. Its executive secretary was Helen Bryan and its president was Edward K. Barsky. Charles R. Joy was the European commissioner. 91 As a result of the union of the Emergency Rescue Committee and the International Relief Association. It later shortened its name to the International Rescue Committee.



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established. The HICEM, being a Jewish organization, moved its headquarters from Paris to Lisbon in 1940, but maintained an office in Marseilles. Other organizations, such as the International Office for Refugees, operating out of Berne, the International Office of Artists and Writers in London, the World Jewish Congress and the Joint Distribution Committee in New York, as well as other North American organizations such as the League of American Writers, also provided diverse forms of help. All of the committees operating in France were under the watchful eye of the French authorities who, together with the Germans, tried to block their work. Therefore they had to carry on secretively, running into many obstacles while trying to make sure the money sent by American committees reached its final destination, as well as documenting and directly helping refugees, many of whom were in internment camps or hiding outside the city. Besides permanent visas and all of the other papers needed to leave France, the refugees also needed immediate material assistance—food and clothing, and in many cases medical care. The main task of the Mexican Legation in Vichy and the consulate in Marseilles was to coordinate the evacuation of the Spanish refugees, for which they counted on funds mainly from JARE.92 Furthermore, it was the job of the consulate to document those who had received authorization to be admitted into Mexico, these being mainly German, Austrian, and Czechoslovakian political refugees. As we mentioned in Chapter 4, visas for refugees had to be authorized by the Ministry of the Interior in the Mexican capital, which then sent the corresponding authorizations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the latter was in charge of transmitting them, by telegram, to the Mexican consuls in Europe. Neither the Mexican Consulate in Marseilles nor the other Mexican consulates were authorized to grant visas that did not have prior authorization. In this respect it must be pointed out that each of the visas the refugees received, many signed by Bosques, but also signed by other consuls in Europe, bore a unique identifying number. The numbers on the visas match the numbers on telegrams we have been able to find in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorized the Mexican consuls to issue visas to certain refugees, and they also appear in other documents

92 See Ángel Herrerín López, “Las políticas de ayuda y de evacuación de los refugiados españoles en Francia durante la ocupación nazi,” Cahiers de civilization espagnole con­ temporaine 9 (2012), consulted on June 19, 2013, doi:10.4000/ccec.4287, http://ccec.revues .org/4287.

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in which the telegrams are quoted.93 Thus, as far as we know, all the visas had the authorization of the Ministry of the Interior. The only exceptions we have found are the so-called “Vichy visas”; according to remarks made by the CCIM, these visas did not have such authorization.94 We do not know whether they were issued by the Mexican Consulate in Marseilles or the legation in Vichy, or whether they were false visas processed through Máximo Muñoz López. Behind each visa that Bosques granted was a long story and a full cast of characters. Rescue networks were made up of dozens of volunteers from Mexico and the United States who, in coordination with committees in France, joined forces to save refugees by obtaining all of the required authorizations in Mexico and procuring transatlantic transport, exit permits from France, and transit visas. Hundreds of others, through their donations, made this very expensive work possible.95 In this respect, Bosques was the last link in a long chain. The cases are varied. Danielle Wolfowitz, for example, reached Mexico thanks to the arrangements made by her uncle, Arturo Wolfowitz, who belonged to the CCIM; Bruno Schwebel left France with his parents and a brother, thanks to the visas transmitted by the Asociación pro Cultura y Ayuda (Association for Culture and Aid) together with the Jewish Labor Committee; Brígida Alexander’s visa was processed by Albert Einstein, with the help of the New York lawyer, Rudolph Uhlman; the permit for Leo Katz was obtained by the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee; while Walter Gruen, for example, attained 93 We found some of these telegrams in the correspondence between the Sociedad Pro Cultura y Ayuda (Society for Culture and Aid, an organization that processed visas in Mexico) and the Jewish Labor Committee. See various documents in RJLC, Holocaust Era Files I, series III, box 34: Mexico. Several of these are also quoted in the lists which Bosques sent to Lombardo Toledano: FHVLT, Documentos, file 455-25139, “Lista de los Refugiados Austriacos que el Consulado en Marsella negó su visación,” and file 487-29305, “Autorizaciones concedidas a personas a que se refiere el cable del Sr. Vicente Lombardo Toledano,” [n.p.], 1942. 94 The refugees who arrived aboard the Quanza in December 1941 had “Vichy Visas” and were therefore detained for several days while their case was decided. We do not know whether they were able to disembark. AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 1, act no. 157, December 9, 1941, and act no. 158, December 16, 1941. JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, CCIM to JDC, Mexico City, May 15, 1942. 95 For example, towards the end of 1940 the Jewish Labor Committee, one of the main aid organizations, had saved 308 people from France and Lithuania. The operation cost nearly $140,000. Catherine Collomp, “The Jewish Labor Committee, American Labor, and the Rescue of European Socialists, 1934–1941,” International Labor and Working-Class His­ tory, no. 68 (fall 2005): 112–33. On the role played by the Jewish Labor Committee, see also Jack Jacobs, “A friend in need: the Jewish Labor Committee and refugees from the Germanspeaking lands, 1933–1945,” YIVO Annual 23 (1996), ed. Deborah Dash Moore, 410, n. 18.



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authorization to enter Mexico through the League for German Culture. In turn the Austrians in general had the support of Rudolf Neuhaus, who headed the group Acción Republicana Austriaca (Austrian Republican Action), and many others reached Mexico thanks to the intervention of organizations mentioned earlier, mainly the International Rescue and Relief Committee and the Unitarian Service Committee. Along with the visas, it is said that Gilberto Bosques issued safe conduct permits from the Mexican government. These papers, which were not authorizations to enter Mexico but rather letters stating that the refugee had the opportunity to go to Mexico, served as protection from the French police. According to Bosques, “They said ‘I am going to Mexico,’ and then they were not bothered.”96 We have not found archival evidence of the help granted by Gilberto Bosques and Luis I. Rodríguez to an undetermined number of Italian, Yugoslavian, Austrian, and German political refugees who decided to stay in Europe to fight in the resistance movements; given that these people never reached Mexico, documenting the cases is difficult. Besides Bosques himself, the historian Friedrich Katz mentions them in an autobiographical narrative, affirming that “hundreds of letters signed by Bosques reached those refugees in internment saying that they had visas for Mexico, although they did not have them, and these people could thus save their lives by leaving the camps.”97 What then was the role played by the Mexican consul in regard to nonSpanish refugees? As far as we can determine from documents and personal recollections, Bosques played an important role in various ways: he tried to persuade the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to authorize the admission of certain people, generally those recommended to him by organizations or people with whom he had close ties. Among these cases can be found people of various nationalities and occupations, mainly of good economic standing. We find, for example Dr. A. S. Salmanoff, recommended based on his ability to train rural doctors and contribute his experience in matters of sanitation; the composer Julio César Brero, a person of “avowed artistic value” who had been recommended to Bosques by various French personages and intellectuals; the artist Alfredo Silbermann, who would be able to contribute his experience

96 Garay, “Gilberto Bosques,” 63. 97 Katz, “El exilio centroeuropeo,” 44–45.

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in the textile industry and in artistic ceramics; and the group of diamond cutters from Ambers to whom we have already made reference.98 In the second place, Bosques acted as a contact in France for several of the aid organizations discussed earlier. When the American Department of the Treasury forbade sending money directly to France, Bosques was the intermediary through whom the American committees sent funds, in particular to Noel Field, who directed the work of the Unitarian Service Committee in Marseilles. Part of this money, along with the money sent by the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, was handed over directly by the Mexican consul to certain refugees, even to some who were in internment camps, which on various occasions allowed them to leave those camps.99 Bosques also directly arranged the liberation of various political refugees and cultural figures, among them Max Aub,100 whom he rescued once from the camp at Vernet and then again from the camp at Djelfa, in Algiers; and Paul Merker,101 who was wanted by the Gestapo and protected by Bosques until he was able to set sail for Mexico, using a false identity, aboard the Guinée in May 1942.102 In addition, Bosques played an important role with respect to the political refugees whom he helped directly at different stages in the difficult process of abandoning France. The refugees needed exit permits issued by the French Prefecture, transit visas for the countries they would cross on the way to their final destinations, and fare for the ship, not to mention a permanent visa. Synchronizing all of these permits was very complicated for most refugees, since each document was valid only for a very short time. Many refugees attested to the help Bosques gave them. Thus, Leo Zuckermann told of how the Mexican consul helped him on his way to Lisbon, from where it would be possible to set sail for America. “Zuckermann could never understand how cars with the flag of the Spanish Phalanx 98 All of these cases are in AHSRE, APBG, file 104. 99 Many of these accounts may be found in ibid. 100 Max Aub (1903–1972) was a Spanish writer and playwright of French origin. He sailed on the Serpa Pinto from Casablanca, reaching Mexico on October 1, 1942. 101 Paul Merker (1894–1969) had been a member of the German Communist Party (KPD) since 1920, and secretary of the central committee of the organization since 1934. He fled Germany for France in 1934 and in 1940 was interned in Vernet. In 1942 he reached Mexico, where he had a great influence on the Free Germany movement. In 1946 he returned to East Germany and served as a member of the politburo of the Communist Party until 1950, when he was expelled from the party. 102 Wolfgang Kiessling, “Quien tanto hizo por nosotros,” Política y Cultura 8 (1993): 342.



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played a role in his escape. . . . He preferred not to ask. He confined himself to obtaining the large sum of money necessary for this service and did not worry about which coffer it would end up in.”103 And Alfred Kantorowicz tells how Bosques helped his wife and Anna Seghers obtain transit visas at the American Consulate, at a time when such visas were highly restricted.104 A letter of thanks from Kantorowicz himself to Bosques reads, “I have the pleasure to announce that we shall be leaving tomorrow—via Martinique—to Mexico. I cannot leave Marseilles without repeating the sincere thanks, both my wife’s and mine, for everything you have done for us. If we can leave, it is thanks to your protection and help.”105 Bosques carried out his work according to agreements he made with representatives of organizations that supported refugees. Thanks to the official backing Bosques had, he was able to negotiate the freeing of inmates with the heads of the concentration camps, something that proved very valuable to the representatives of the aid organizations. However, there was another side to Bosques’s administration, almost unknown up to now. Other refugees who approached the Mexican Consulate in Marseilles were not received with the traditional Mexican warmth and hospitality, but instead ran into a hard bureaucratic wall, impossible for many to scale. Indeed, many of those who were denied permission to emigrate already had a visa authorized by the Mexican government. First of all, there were refugees whose visas had been approved by the Ministry of the Interior, but who lacked some prerequisite necessary for receiving the actual document. We saw some of these cases in Chapter 4: refugees who did not have a passport that would be valid for two years, or those who could not prove they had enough money to qualify as an investor or rentier. In these situations there were no exceptions. As Bosques explained, the consuls had received very strict orders in this respect. The case of Bruno Salomon and his partner is illustrative of the matter. After fleeing Germany, Salomon had been wounded in the Spanish Civil War, imprisoned in France for violating the immigration laws, and condemned 103 Renata von Hanffstengel, “México, un exilio bien temperado para Leo Zuckermann, tanto en la guerra fría como en la de altas temperaturas,” in Revolución y exilio en la historia de México. Del amor de un historiador a su patria adoptiva. Homenaje a Friedrich Katz, ed. Javier Garciadiego and Emilio Kourí (Mexico City, El Colegio de México / Katz Center for Mexican Studies / University of Chicago / Era, 2010), 677–8. 104 Quoted in Behrens, “Consulado general de México en Marsella,” 156. 105 Liebe Geft and Harold Brackman, “Gilberto Bosques and Jewish rescue during World War II,” Midstream 53, no. 2, accessed June 19, 2013, http://www.questia.com/ library/1G1-161556102/gilberto-bosques-and-jewish-rescue-during-world-war.

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to death in Nazi Germany. He finally managed to obtain a Mexican visa for himself and his partner. However, the permit was conditional upon “prior proof of the bond that unites them,” and since they were not legally married, the Mexican consul did not grant them permission to travel to Mexico. While the couple was trying to resolve the situation, the SRE informed Bosques that the visa had been canceled, and they were not allowed to go to Mexico.106 As in the case of other Mexican encounters with foreigners, in which bureaucracy constituted a true mechanism of exclusion, some of the prerequisites were impossible to comply with. Among these was the requirement that those who received visitor visas for six months must have “a passport with an exit and re-entry visa.” Obtaining an exit visa from France was in itself very complicated, and as the representative of the International Rescue and Relief Committee said, “there is not a single person among our refugees who can entertain the slightest illusion of ever obtaining permission to come back to France after a six months’ sojourn abroad. Even for native French it is difficult to get an exit and return visa unless they are sent by the French government on an official mission.”107 Therefore, he recommended that aid organizations not waste their energy obtaining visitor permits. Another factor that complicated delivery of the documents was the presence of errors in authorizations sent from Mexico with respect to the names of refugees, their nationalities, their relationships, their date of birth, or any other data; such errors were reason enough to withhold visas from their would-be recipients. Usually the mistakes had been made by the Mexican authorities themselves when they were transcribing the information. In these cases, however, there was a large margin for discretion—or perhaps ill will—as illustrated by the case of Richard Kamepfer: “although Mr. Kamepfer was born in Poland, he is regarded by the Consul as an Ex-German citizen and for that reason he has not received his visa.” Sheba Strunsky, executive secretary of the International Rescue and Relief Committee, requested through the Jewish Labor Committee a new authorization that identified Kamepfer as a “stateless German” instead of “Polish,” even though Germans had even less of a chance of receiving a visa than others.108 These cases required many transactions for the 106 AHSRE, APGB, book 36 (II), Bosques to Gutmann, [Paris], April 22, 1939. 107 RJLC, Holocaust Era Files I, series III, box 34: Mexico (reel 93), The International Rescue and Relief Committee to Jacob Pat, Marseille, May 7, 1942. 108 Ibid., Sheba Strunsky to the Jewish Labor Committee, New York, May 19, 1942.



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authorizations to be corrected and sent from Mexico to Marseilles, and there was always the possibility that in the meantime the Ministry of the Interior would cancel the visas that had already been authorized.109 The time that it took to make these corrections was vital for those refugees who were at risk of being captured. In other cases, however, the reasons for Bosques’s refusal to hand over the authorized visas is less clear, and various documents make mention of the fact that things in Marseilles were becoming more and more difficult, although no one really understood why. This was obvious in the case of a group of fifty Austrian Social Democrats. Although they all had authorization to receive Mexican visas, Bosques only released the documents to some of them. In reference to this, a member of the International Rescue and Relief Committee stated,110 We have on several different occasions drawn your attention to the difficulties created by the Mexican Consulate here on the delivery of visas accorded by the Mexican government and cabled to the Consulate at Marseilles. As you know, candidates for immigration visas now are closely questioned by the Consul not only on their civil status but also on their political antecedents and intentions on arrival in Mexico. Our impression was, that no matter what the replies to the questionnaire might be, the visa is granted or refused according to the good-will of the Mexican Consul-General of Marseilles. As all these Austrians appeared on the same list presented to the Mexican government and as all the visas were granted at the same time, the discrimination made by the Mexican Consul was absolutely incomprehensible to us.111

Nevertheless, there seems to have been a certain logic to the decisions, since later on in the same letter it said, “we were told that the visas were not granted because the declarations made by the candidates did not correspond to the terms of the cable received by the Consulate here concerning the said visas.”112 This coincides with what Bosques himself wrote to Vicente Lombardo Toledano, when the latter asked him about various cases which had been turned down by the consulate: I must inform you that, under orders from higher up, the interested parties are obligated to demonstrate their status as refugees and to make, upon

109 See various telegrams in which corrections had been made in ibid. 110  The letter, which is an extract, is not signed. 111  RJLC, Holocaust Era Files I, series III, box 34: Mexico, reel 93, The International Rescue and Relief Committee to Jacob Pat, Marseille, May 7, 1942. 112  Ibid.

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chapter five reporting to our office, a declaration that is in accordance with the terms of the authorization. All of those whose cases are pending confirmation have not been able to comply with these prerequisites since several of them have been in France for years and cannot be considered refugees.113

Just as the secretary of the Jewish Labor Committee stated, the visas were being granted only to political refugees. The problem for refugees in France was being able to “prove” they were politically persecuted persons, within the very complicated context of the war. Determining who was and who was not a political refugee was left up to the discretion of the Mexican authorities, in this case Bosques and his collaborators. At least since February 1942, but most probably long before that, consuls could revoke authorizations from the Ministry of the Interior: “the Mexican Consular Service abroad is empowered, in case of doubts on the background of foreigners already authorized for visas by this Ministry, to deny these people being documented despite said documentation.”114 This power was used by Bosques on more than a few occasions. The cases of Hermann Pollak, Siegmund Jonas, and Karl Ehrenthal are representative of this. The three Austrians had received authorization from the Ministry of the Interior in December 1941.115 Bosques cancelled their visas, according to the refugees themselves “without giving reason,” but in a telegram sent to the SRE the consul explained, “According to their own declarations they are not political refugees nor do they comply with the conditions of the Law of Immigration. They intend to work in Mexico in the professions of dentist, pedicurist, [and] administrative employee respectively.”116 While several pleas were made on behalf of the refugees, they were to no avail. In 1942, Friedrich Adler reported that Karl Ehrenthal and his wife had been deported to Germany, while Hermann Pollak had twice tried to commit suicide. Other cases, however, show that even those who could prove they were political refugees were denied visas. Such was the case of Mr. Weisselberg, who managed to gather the necessary documents to verify that he was a political refugee, having been warned by his Austrian 113 FHVLT, Correspondencia, file 463-27139, Bosques to Lombardo Toledano, Marseille, June 30, 1942. 114 AHSRE, file III-210-3, circular IV-9-19, “Facultades de nuestros cónsules en el extran­ jero sobre materia de migración,” Mexico City, February 14, 1942. 115 The communiqué to Consul Bosques was sent by cable 63370 from the SRE, Decem­ ber 24, 1941. 116 RJLC, Holocaust Era Files I, series III, box 34: Mexico, reel 93, Bosques to SRE [January 1942].



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friends of the prerequisites set by the Mexican consul. Although Weisselberg could prove his status, Bosques denied him the visa because his instructions from the Mexican government “were to grant him a visitor’s visa valid for 6 months—a visa which could not be granted to a political refugee.”117 Presumably affected by these and other cases, Friedrich Adler wrote: “I could keep on telling you about the cases, but I suppose these examples will show you in what mood we are thinking of the crimes for which slowness and lack of understanding of the buerocracy [sic] are responsible.”118 Others who had relations with the Mexican consul, such as the European commissioner of the Unitarian Service Committee, Charles R. Joy, had a similar opinion of the bureaucratic behavior of the Mexican administrators. While Joy considered Bosques to be a good man, he also believed that, the Mexican officials in France have badly muffed a splendid opportunity. Hundreds of visas for Mexico have long been available but the report I get is that the Mexican officials are playing politics in France and the result is interminable delays, and in the end sacrifice of opportunities to escape. This is not only my opinion but the opinion I believe of all the relief organizations.119

Joy’s verdict is corroborated by information from the League for German Culture, transmitted to President Manuel Ávila Camacho in a telegram in March 1942, mentioning that only 20 percent of those holding visas for Mexico had reached the country, a figure that according to historian Benedikt Behrens seemed perfectly plausible.120 Bosques’s tenure as the head of the Mexican Consulate in Marseilles, or rather the legation in Vichy, where he was the chargé d’affaires from the middle of 1942 on, ended when in November of that year the Germans invaded the unoccupied zone of France and took as prisoners the staff of the Mexican Legation, including Bosques himself and his family. They were taken to Germany where they were confined to a castle in Bad

117 Ibid., The International Rescue and Relief Committee to Jacob Pat, Marseille, May 7, 1942. 118 Ibid., Friedrich Adler to Mr. I. Minkoff of the General Jewish Council of New York, [n.p.], October 6, 1942. 119 Unitarian Service Committee, Administrative Records, bMS 16031, box 2, folder 1, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, Correspondence, 1941–1943, Charles R. Joy to Miss Helen R. Bryan, [n.p.], October 20, 1942, http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/14252290?n =75&imagesize=1200&jp2Res=.25&printThumbnails=no. 120 Behrens, “Consulado general de México en Marsella,” 166, n. 29.

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Godesberg for over a year.121 From that time on the only possibility for those refugees who wanted to reach Mexico was to obtain a visa from the Mexican Legation in Lisbon. However, as we have seen, Mexico’s entering World War II practically closed the doors of the country for good on European immigration, with the exception of Spaniards. From the data that have been analyzed, it is clear that Gilberto Bosques’s activity was more complex than previously believed. While he did help many people—among them, apparently, the best-known political refugees—other refugees experienced the sort of bureaucratic trials that were common occurrences in almost all of the Mexican consulates of the era. Any error, be it a misspelled name, a missing document, a failure to comply with a difficult prerequisite, or an incongruity between the refugee’s statement and the information in his visa authorization, was reason enough to withhold from applicants the visas that had been authorized by the Mexican government so that they could leave France and escape harm. There is no record of how many non-Spanish refugees finally obtained Mexican visas from the Mexican Consulate in Marseilles, whose archive was burned so that it would not fall into the hands of the Germans. According to Behrens, “From Bosques’s own information, between 1940 and the closing of the Mexican Legation as a result of the occupation of southern France by the German army in November 1942, more than a thousand Germans and Austrians received visas for Mexico from the Consulate General in Marseilles, of whom ‘something like half ’ reached the country.”122 As we mentioned in Chapter 4, the estimates by Katz, von Mentz and Radkau, and Palmier of the number of German-speaking exiles in Mexico range from one hundred to three hundred individuals; in comparison, the number of Jewish refugees who reached Mexico during the Nazi period was around two thousand people.123 In general, the figures given by aid organizations were low. One of the main networks trying to obtain Mexican visas, which was made up of the Jewish Labor Committee in conjunction with the Society for Culture and Aid 121 See Garay, “Gilberto Bosques,” 68–71. 122 Behrens, “Consulado general de México en Marsella,” 166, n. 29. Behrens quotes three sources: a conversation between Sybille Flaschka and Bosques (in 1992–1993) entitled “Der Generalkonsul,” in Gert Eisenbürger, ed., Lebenswege. 15 Biographien zwischen, Europa und Lateinamerika, (Hamburg, 1995), 77–93; Wolfgang Kiessling, Brücken nach Mexiko. Traditionen einer Freundschaft (Berlin, 1989), 304, 315, and Fritz Pohle, Das mexikanische Exil, 15. 123 See Chapter 4, n. 156, and Chapter 1, n. 42.



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and the International Rescue and Relief Committee, reported that during 1942 only forty-three people had been able to reach Mexico with their help.124 The recent claim that 45,000 people were saved by Bosques, which has become widely known due in part to the documentary Visa al Paraíso (Visa to Paradise, directed by Lilian Liberman, 2010),125 is unsustainable, even if we were to include in this figure all the refugees, including the Spaniards,126 who reached the country during the period of Nazism, before and after Bosques’s term of service. Relations between the Israelite Central Committee and the New Administration While the problem of the Jewish refugees had been the main topic of communications between the Israelite Central Committee and the Mexican government during the final years of Cárdenas’s term, in 1941 the matter of anti-Semitism in Mexican society itself was once again placed on the table. Less than two months after Manuel Ávila Camacho took over the presidency, the CCIM urgently requested that he guarantee the safety of their fellow Jews. The committee pointed out that in Mexico, “a democratic and hospitable country that liberally guarantees human rights,” there were no laws that prevented defamatory or threatening attacks against communities or groups of individuals with common interests, who as a

124 RJLC, “Retung-arbet,” December 2, 1942, quoted in Jacobs, “A friend in need,” 410, n. 18. 125 This is the same figure that the Gilberto Bosques Center for International Studies of the Senate of the Mexican Repub­lic reports (http://centrogilbertobosques.senado .gob.mx/index.php/biografia-gb), and the AJC (http://www.ajc.org/site/c.7oJILSPwFfJSG/ b.8701367/k.60FB/AJC_Interactions_LatinoJewish_Agenda.htm?msource=IntMay2013). The Museo Memoria y Tolerancia in Mexico City (Museum of Memory and Tolerance of Mexico City) mentions 30,000 visas (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mjCi3GfKmis). It is not known how this number was deter­mined. A similar high estimate is given in Richard Grabman’s book, Bosques’ War. How a Mexican diplo­mat saved 40,000 from the Nazis (and maybe prevented World War III), published by an unknown publishing house, “Mazatlan,” and without any ISBN. 126 It is estimated that about 20,000 Spanish refugees reached the country. Dolores Pla Brugat, ed., Pan, trabajo y hogar. El exilio republicano español en América Latina (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Migración / Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia / DGE, 2007), 62. But this immigration was gradual. According to Herrerín López, the total number of Spanish refugees who reached Mexico from France and North Africa between August 1940 and November 1942 was less than 2,000.

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result were unable to seek justice through the courts.127 With consternation, the committee reported that certain groups of people had redoubled their attacks against the Jews “in the most unfair and cowardly way, even reaching the extreme of inciting the masses to direct action against us just because we are members of the Hebrew race,” and it included examples of what it considered public statements calling for Jews to be expelled from the country.128 Since the proper authorities had not previously adopted any measures to avoid these kinds of actions, Ávila Camacho was being asked to do so, in the interest of the democratic ideals of the country and the Jewish communities living in it. Most public expressions of anti-Semitism came from a few clearly identified groups, above all the Vanguardia Nacionalista (Nationalist Vanguard), led by Rubén Moreno Padrés, and the Partido Nacional de Salvación Pública (National Party for Public Salvation), led by Adolfo León Osorio.129 However, the fact that they openly and publicly advocated rejection of the Jews in the context of the terrible events taking place in Europe created tremendous unrest within the Jewish community as a whole. According to the Central Committee, the public incitations directed against the Jews were made without taking into consideration that the highest authorities of the country had generously granted them asylum, and that many of them had become naturalized Mexican citizens or had married Mexican women.130 The question of anti-Jewish expressions by Mexican groups with Fascist overtones should be placed in its broader context, namely, the pro-Nazi 127 AKA, CCIM, Anti-defamation, files 3 and 21, CCIM to Ávila Camacho, Mexico City, February 13 and 18, 1941, respectively. 128 See AKA, CCIM, Antidifamación, file 2. 129 Both groups, made up of ex-revolutionaries, are placed by Luis Medina in the secondary rank of opposition to the PRM at the time of the 1940 elections. Vanguardia Nacionalista (Nationalist Vanguard) was one of the parties that was incorporated into the Partido Revolucionario Anti-Comunista (PRAC, Revolutionary Anti-Communist Party), whose candidate was General Manuel Pérez Treviño. The Partido Nacional de Salvación Pública (National Party for Public Salvation) had its origins in the Centro Unificador de la Revolución (Unifying Center of the Revolution), founded by General Francisco Coss and Colonels Adolfo León Osorio and Bernardino Mena Brito. This organization “never was more than a political masquerade, with a program that mixed rectifications of Cardenism with anti-Semitic positions.” Although it changed its name to the Partido de Salvación Pública (Party for Public Salvation), it ended up disbanding and disappearing as its participants moved on to form their own groups. Luis Medina, Historia de la Revolución mexicana, vol. 18, Del cardenismo al avilacamachismo (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978), 102–3. 130 AKA, CCIM, Antidifamación, file 21, CCIM to Ávila Camacho, Mexico City, February 18, 1941.



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propaganda that was being generated in Mexico with the support of the German Legation, on the one hand, and on the other hand the reaction of the Mexican government as well as the American government to that propaganda.131 Beginning in 1940 the country became more and more a zone where the interests of the United States and the Third Reich clashed.132 While for tactical reasons the United States exaggerated the importance of the National Socialists in Mexico, seeing them as a threat to its sphere of activity on the American continent, the Mexican government did not seem to pay them much heed.133 Within this context, the rapprochement between Mexico and the United States, and especially the agreements for military cooperation, led to protests, some evidently driven by the German Legation.134 While on the one hand the Chancellery condemned the interference of foreign diplomats in national politics, on the other it tended to not pay much attention to the demonstrations, since it felt they did not represent the authentic feelings of the Mexican people. A public anti-Jewish demonstration planned for March 26 in the Arena Libertad, which had been publicized as the “great meeting of the Nationalists,” was finally canceled by the government, although the Central Department had already authorized it. There are other facts that, along with this one, confirm official opposition to German propaganda: the number of posters with anti-Jewish slogans decreased and the Nazi newspaper, Diario de la Guerra, was banned.135 As the pertinent documents reveal, the American Embassy as well as the local Jewish community played an important part in curbing antiSemitic expressions within Mexican society. The North American ambassador, Josephus Daniels, considered the anti-Semitic agitation in Mexico only one of the Nazi expressions of opposition to the political friendship

131 See Müller, “El NSDAP en México,” and Pérez Monfort, La derecha secular. 132 Verena Radkau, “El Tercer Reich y México,” in Los empresarios alemanes, el Tercer Reich y la oposición de derecha a Cárdenas, vol. 2, ed. Brígida von Mentz (Mexico City: CIESAS, 1988), 100. 133 Ibid., 65 and 101. 134 See the demonstration that took place outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 19, 1941, staged by persons posing as students, in which Padilla was called “unpatri­ otic [and] at the service of Yankee imperialism” and cries of “Viva Hitler” (Long live Hitler) were shouted continuously. Novedades, Mexico City, March 20, 1941. 135 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, file H 238/13, Mayer to Wise, Mexico City, April 9, 1941 and file H 238/7, E. Knopfmacher to Goldmann, [n.p.], March 30, 1941.

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of Mexico towards the United States, and thus he thought that it should be treated as part of a greater problem.136 In fact, the decision to forbid the “great meeting of the Nationalists” was apparently made in the wake of a meeting between Daniels and Padilla, after the former had been approached by representatives of the Mexican office of the World Jewish Congress and the CCIM, insisting on the need to limit the actions of the fifth column and to monitor the demonstration that would take place the next day.137 According to the report of the meeting, the ambassador showed a great deal of interest in this information and that same night met with Padilla. The forceful press release the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a few hours later, which was published the next day, was entitled “The government will not allow Fifth Column conspiracies.”138 In reality, the American government had been approached earlier on the matter of anti-Semitism in Mexico. William Mayer had urged the representatives of the World Jewish Congress to ask the American State Department to take up the matter and alert Ambassador Daniels to the risks of the anti-democratic movement that was developing in Mexico. Mayer, obviously trying to get the Americans to make a commitment, thought that the real objective of the Mexican anti-Semitic movement was to put a damper on relations between Mexico and the United States.139 In compliance with Mayer’s recommendation, in April 1941 the executive president of the World Jewish Congress, Stephen Wise, wrote to the undersecretary of state, Sumner Welles, to call his attention to the subject of anti-Semitism in Mexico. The intention of his letter was to inform him of the disturbing phenomena that were taking place in the public sphere in Mexico and which, in his opinion, called for the immediate attention of the government of the United States. Wise informed Welles of the violent anti-Semitic and anti-American movements in Mexico, supported and even organized by Nazi agents, that were trying to create public opinion

136 Ibid., file H 238/7, K. Knopfmacher to Wise, Mexico City, March 26, 1941. 137 This is what Ernst Knopfmacher thought. Ibid., E. Knopf­macher to Goldmann, [n.p.], March 30, 1941. 138 According to the article, Padilla declared: “I also want to state that the Government of the Republic will not allow Mexican soil to be used for fifth columnists’ conspiracies, and that if we offer foreigners who obey our laws all of the guarantees, under no circum­ stances will we allow them to take advantage of the hospitality of Mexico. We are alert, we are guarding the security of the Republic.” “No permitirá el Gobierno conspiraciones quin­ tacolumnistas. Declaraciones del Secretario de Relaciones,” Novedades, March 26, 1941. 139 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, file H 238/7, Mayer to Goldmann, Mexico City, March 12, 1941.



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favorable to Nazi Germany and unfavorable to Great Britain and the United States. While the executive president of the World Jewish Congress considered the measures taken by the Mexican government to halt this movement highly desirable, he thought they were not enough: We have had a lot of tragic experiences of this type in European countries and there is no doubt that if this propaganda is not withdrawn by the Mexican government once and for all, it may cause a lot of damage, not only to the interests of the Jewish population, against which it is mainly directed, but also against the interests of the United States and all other American countries.140

Wise suggested, therefore, that the matter be brought to the attention of the Mexican ambassador in Washington, and that the representatives of the American government in Mexico should be instructed to put pressure on the Mexican government to take the necessary legal steps against the nationalist anti-Semitic and anti-American organizations and the individuals behind them, assuming that the Mexican authorities would be interested in preserving amicable relations with the United States. Sumner Welles, in turn, had been told of the Mexican anti-Semitic propaganda by Ambassador Daniels, who had conveyed the impression that this propaganda, despite the possibility of its increasing, could not reach significant proportions. However, Welles assured Wise he would talk about the issue with Daniels once again.141 The Mexican government had taken some steps, though not radical ones, against the groups of Nationalist-Fascist persuasion. In June 1940, for example, in response to the repeated demands of the American Embassy in Mexico to put an end to the Nazi propaganda in the country, the minister of foreign affairs, Eduardo Hay, declared the press attaché of the German Legation, Arthur Dietrich, persona non grata.142 A year later, the leader of the Nationalist Vanguard group, Moreno Padrés, was arrested, due to the fact that he had organized two anti-Semitic meetings in the Lagunilla. According to an article published in the Jewish daily Mizrah, it was the first time that the Mexican police, who had intervened thanks to the complaints lodged by the Israelite Central Committee,

140 Ibid., Wise to Welles, [New York], April 4, 1941. 141  Ibid., Welles to Wise, Washington, DC, April 23, 1941. 142 On Dietrich see Müller, “El NSDAP en México,” and Paz, Strategy, Security and Spies, 27–30.

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had arrested an anti-Semitic leader for his activities against the Jewish population.143 These measures adopted by the Mexican government must be understood within the context of Mexico’s policy of rapprochement and cooperation with the United States, and of Mexico’s attitude of declared anti-Fascism, which was clearly reinforced by Mexico’s declaration of war against the Axis powers in May 1942. For the Mexican Jewish community, Mexico’s entry into the conflict meant identifying with the government against a common enemy; it was also seen as an assurance that the anti-Fascist position (including a disavowal of anti-Semitism) would be fortified.144 Following the declaration of war, the CCIM communicated to President Ávila Camacho that Aware of our duty to our Country and towards civilized mankind, in our heroic fight against the enemy, we adhere without reservations to the behavior the Honorable Government under your wise leadership has established by declaring a state of war on the Nazi-Fascist Axis; and offering you, Mr. President, our complete cooperation, we place ourselves at your esteemed command in every way you make known to us.145

In this same context of rapprochement between the Jewish community and the Mexican government should probably be placed the government’s official recognition of the Israelite Central Committee as the legal representative organization of the Jews in Mexico:146 This seems to mean that all matters which will henceforth come before the Mexican government pertaining to Jews, will be reported to and discussed with the Central Committee before the Mexican government takes any action. This seems to mean also that the Central Committee will now be able to make representations, protests, etc. to the Mexican government, and these will be considered officially as coming from all the Jews of the Republic.147

The Jewish community, in turn, also adopted various measures aimed at nurturing and improving their relationship with the government. These 143 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, file H 238/7, “El líder antisemita Moreno Padrés ha sido arrestado,” Mizrah, June 6, 1941. 144 Bokser, Imágenes de un encuentro, 224. 145 CCIM to Ávila Camacho, Mexico City, June 3, 1942, quoted in ibid. 146 The Israelite Central Committee of Mexico was officially recognized as a civil asso­ ciation on October 1, 1942. JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, financial report for the period of October 1, 1942 to December 24, 1943, sent by CCIM to JDC, Mexico City, February 21, 1944. 147 Ibid., Weisman to Leavitt, New York, October 15, 1942.



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measures included the strong economic support they provided for various government projects, the abstention of the Central Committee from intervening with the government in matters that were not within its competence,148 and the care bestowed on everything published about Mexico in the Jewish press, at the national as well as the international level. The good relations that were established between the Jewish community of Mexico and the government can also be related to certain aspects of internal economic policy, especially the impetus to industrialize and the role that the Jewish minority played in this process. Towards the beginning of the forties, the Jewish community was also undergoing a process of adaptation and integration into the country that in some cases involved developing good relationships with certain sectors or figures with political and economic power who could sympathize with the cause of this minority. In this connection, it must also be pointed out that ties were formed between the German-speaking political exiles, who were held in high esteem by the government; Mexican intellectuals of the Left; and the Jewish community. It must be clarified that this “cordial” relationship did not mean that the Jews had any influence on decisions that affected immigration policies in the country, since their bargaining power was limited. However, as records show, the work of the Central Committee was indispensable in helping those refugees who arrived in Mexico on their own, in their disembarkation as well as their legalization, thus making sure they would be able to stay in the country and, in contrast to what was happening in some other places, be able to work. To this end, the Jewish representation developed a set of strategies for interacting with the government that proved highly effective.

148 The Central Committee rejected personal applications for intervention in civil and penal cases, arguing that they could only intervene before the government to protect their fellow Jews in cases of anti-Semitic discrimination, immigration matters, or matters associ­ ated with wartime conditions. AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, HICEM-Portugal, file 10, CCIM to Ziman, Mexico City, May 3, 1943.

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chapter five The Role Played by the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico in Protecting Jewish Refugees Originally from the Axis Countries

The gradual distancing of the Mexican government from the Axis powers was reflected in the general attitude it assumed towards citizens of those countries residing in Mexico. This heterogeneous group included Germans, Italians, and Japanese who had been living in the country before the war, and whose affiliations varied (although in general, the German colony showed strong sympathies for National Socialism). There were also diplomats, marines from Axis countries (the crews of the ships that had been seized), and refugees who had fled the Nazis (included in this group were political exiles as well as refugees in general). The measures taken by the Mexican government beginning in December 1941 as a consequence of the political strain with the Axis powers included the suspension of granting Mexican naturalization letters to nationals from Germany, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; adopting precautionary measures in view of the possibility of espionage or agitation on behalf of Axis powers; limiting Japanese, German, and Italian subjects’ access to their deposits in Mexico; controlling telegraphic and radiotelegraphic communication; and requiring all foreigners residing in Mexico to register, as we saw earlier.149 Since these measures would equally affect Germans sympathizing with Hitler as well as known anti-Fascists, the leadership of the Jewish community felt it was necessary to intervene in order to prevent their fellow Jews from being considered foreign enemies.150 This situation, which in itself was rather paradoxical, worsened since most of the pro-Nazi Germans in Mexico were naturalized Mexican citizens, and therefore not subject to the new conditions that would be imposed on Axis nationals, while the German Jewish refugees, despite having lost their German citizenship, would be subject to these restrictions.151 Since mid-1941 the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico was involved in protecting Jews who came from Axis countries and were living in the country. They had begun to issue letters of “recognition,” in which assurance was given that the bearer was Jewish, a friend of democracy, and

149 García Robles, “Política internacional de México,” 56. 150 We have not yet found evidence of how other non-Jewish groups of political exiles reacted to this matter. 151 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, file H 238/13, Mayer to Wise, Mexico City, February 7, 1942.



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loyal to the Mexican government,152 to those who asked for them. They also began to organize a General Registry of Israelites, for the purpose of intervening with the authorities on behalf of the Jews. The task of building up the registry fell on the Asociación de Israelitas de Habla Alemana Menorah (Menorah Association of German-speaking Israelites), which would be in charge of revising, studying, and approving each case, based on the respective documentation.153 The registry included Jews from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, and Romania.154 By the beginning of 1942 only 122 Jewish families from Germany and Austria had registered. In parallel to the internal development of the registry, the CCIM addressed President Manuel Ávila Camacho in order to explain to him the extraordinary situation of the refugees who had obtained asylum in Mexico: “Now that they have been saved from Bloody Enemy Claws, they find themselves being unfairly considered hostile foreigners and under restrictions that are adopted against real enemies.”155 The matter was turned over to the Ministry of the Interior for consideration.156 On June 11, 1942, the Law Relating to Enemy Property and Business was enacted. This gave the president the authority to seize such businesses and property; it also called for the creation of an Inter-ministerial Board for Matters of Enemy Property and Business to control and manage them, and a Board for the Administration and Supervision of Foreign Property.157

152 At first these letters were applied for mainly by those wishing to travel abroad and were to be presented to the respective consuls. See, for example, AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, box 13, [no file number], CCIM to the consul general of Great Britain, Mexico City, May 9, 1941, and also CCIM to the Consulate of the United States of America in Mexico, Mexico City, August 4, 1941. 153 This is why they checked to see whether passports had a red J stamped in them, noted the expiration date set by the German Legation, and checked to see whether the refugees presented documents issued by Jewish organizations or whether they possessed documents that proved racial discrimination, and so on. When Menorah considered it desirable, they could also attach to each registration proof of the individual’s political loy­alty. 154 AKA, CCIM, Correspondencia, Menorah, file 28, CCIM to Oscar Isaac, president of Menorah, [Mexico City], January 17, 1942. 155 AGN, PMAC, file 546.1/1, CCIM to Ávila Camacho, Mexico City, January 28, 1942. 156 Ibid., Gallo to Behar, Mexico City, January 29, 1942. AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, [no box number], file 38, CCIM to the Minister of the Interior, Mexico City, February 6, 1942. 157 García Robles, “Política internacional de México,” 58. This Law related to the Prop­ erty and Businesses of the Enemy was replaced by another one with the exact same name on February 24, 1944.

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One of the main problems faced by the German and Austrian Jews who reached Mexico during this period was the reluctance of the employees of the Ministry of the Interior to acknowledge the denationalization of the Jews by the Third Reich, accomplished through a law issued on November 25, 1941. On the Jews’ original declarations the government employees crossed out the statements affirming they were stateless people and replaced it with the phrase, “German nationality.”158 The Central Committee also intervened in this problem, requesting the inscriptions in the Registry of Foreigners be corrected.159 “List Number 1 of German Israelites,” containing one hundred and fifty names, and “List Number 1 of Austrian Israelites” with forty were turned over to the Ministry of the Interior at the beginning of 1942. The two documents are noteworthy for the absence of children: the list of German Jews included only sixteen children while the list of Austrian Jews named only three.160 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the concerns of the CCIM, indicating which documents should be presented by those affected so that the loss of German citizenship could be declared for “those people of Israelite origin but who have German nationality.”161 The first document required was a certificate extended by the Central Committee stating the Jewish origin of the interested party, which shows that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized the authority of the committee. Some problems also arose in relation to the registry. For example, various people tried to register directly with the Central Committee, in order to intentionally avoid the board of the Menorah, fearing they would not be approved by the latter. There were apparently also cases of people who

158 AKA, CCIM, Correspondencia, Menorah, file 28, Menorah to CCIM, Mexico City, April 21, 1942. 159 A copy of the text had been sent by the Mexican ambassador in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ibid., Menorah to CCIM, Mexico City, May 18, 1942. 160 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, [no box number], file 38, CCIM to Miguel Alemán, Mexico City, May 21 and June 4, 1942, “Lista de israelitas originarios de países del Eje Nazi­fascista que residen en México y que son recomendados por el Comité Central Israelita de México a la H. Secretaría de Gobernación como amigos de la democracia y leales al gobierno mexicano.” 161 The prerequisites were to show a certificate issued by the CCIM that proved the Israelite origin of the interested party; proof of German citizenship; proof of legal entry into the country; proof of address; and a document from the Swedish Legation certifying the individual’s loss of German nationality. Document 710872 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the head of the Legal Advising Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the president of the CCIM, Mexico City, May 21, 1942.



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were not Jewish and wished to register as members of the Israelite community in order to avoid restrictions.162 Despite their efforts, the leaders of the Jewish community ran into serious problems. In order to try to deal with them, they based their negotiations on cases in other Latin American countries where certain agreements had been reached with their Jewish residents,163 and they also sought support in other sectors of Mexican society. In this effort, it was the president of the National Anti-Nazi Anti-Fascist Committee, Deputy Félix Díaz Escobar, who defended the interests of the Jewish group. On October 6, 1942, he presented the Chamber of Deputies with a proposal for a decree that would exclude Jewish nationals from Axis countries from the restrictions imposed on enemy foreigners.164 This was, perhaps, the first time that a bill sponsored by the Jewish community had the support of a federal deputy. In his speech, which was not very clear to the other members of the Chamber, Díaz Escobar began by presenting a lengthy summary of the killing of Jews that was taking place in the countries occupied by National Socialism, and an account of the opinions expressed by relevant figures in the democratic world in relation to said atrocities and crimes. Later the president of the National Anti-Nazi Anti-Fascist Committee presented a proposal that the Israelite colony, with the official recognition of the authorities of the country, be responsible for certifying the Jewish origin of the interested parties, and also their political and ideological loyalty to the cause of democracy.165 Díaz Escobar argued that if the measures against hostile foreigners were also applied to the Israelites, “this fact would have the unprecedented result that the victims of

162 AKA, CCIM, Correspondencia, Menorah, file 28, Menorah to CCIM, Mexico City, July 3, 1942. One of the problematic aspects the Central Committee had to face concerned Jewish refugees who arrived in Mexico with baptismal certificates, who in some cases did not want to give up Catholicism but had nevertheless approached the Central Committee in order to ask it to intercede on their behalf with the authorities. JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, Beckel­man to JDC, Mexico City, June 21, 1942. The organization Menorah, in turn, excluded from the registry those who had converted to another religion and did not belong to the Jewish community. AKA, CCIM, Correspondencia, Menorah, file 28, Menorah to CCIM, Mexico City, June 23, 1942. 163 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, file H 240/7, CCIM to Stephen Wise, Mexico City, August 11, 1942. 164 AGN, PMAC, file 545.2/132, “Iniciativa del C. Dip. e Ing. Alfredo Felix Díaz Escobar para que se expida una ley que excluya a los israelitas nacionales de los países con los cuales estamos en Guerra, de las restricciones impuestas contra extranjeros enemigos,” Mexico City, October 6, 1942. 165 DdD, October 6, 1942.

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Nazi-Fascism would also be the victims of democracy.”166 The restrictions from which this law meant to free the Jews included those related to freezing or seizing their goods, rights of residency in national territory, freedom of general movement, and all restrictions related to individual rights and guarantees that would affect hostile foreigners.167 The bill produced immediate debate in the Chamber, in which strong anti-Semitic prejudices were expressed by Deputies Leopoldo Zincúnegui Tercero and Luis Márquez Ricaño, who called the Jews systematic exploiters who were ruthless to Mexican workers and even made reference to international Judaism’s plot to seize capital throughout the whole world. Their statements brought applause from the Chamber, but Alejandro Carrillo (Vicente Lombardo Toledano’s right-hand man) also met with approval when he came out in defense of the equality of the races, accusing those who accepted the thesis of racial superiority of being Nazis.168 Finally Díaz Escobar intervened once more, returning to the central theme, namely, the proposal to exclude the Jews living in the country from the restrictions that would be applied to enemy foreigners, but he did not manage to convince the deputies. With respect to the fate of the bill, the CCIM later reported that “the aforementioned project had to be shelved due to the strong opposition it sparked in Mexico.”169 Despite the failure of the legislative effort, documents show that Menorah continued its negotiations with the Inter-ministerial Council in 1943, while the Central Committee seems to have distanced itself from the matter. We do not know whether Menorah achieved a legal resolution of the problem, but the council’s attitude to the plight of stateless Jews seemed favorable. Furthermore, the many letters we have been able to find (mainly addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, the Interministerial Council on Enemy Property and Business, or to the interested parties themselves) indicate that the letters themselves played a useful role in the defense of the rights of the Jews.170 The strategy followed by Menorah was to negotiate each case with the help of a lawyer in order to request, for example, that the interested parties be allowed to make

166 AGN, PMAC, file 545.2/132, “Iniciativa del C. Dip. e Ing. Alfredo Félix Díaz Esco­ bar . . . ,” Mexico City, October 6, 1942. 167 Ibid. 168 DdD, October 6, 1942. 169 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, box 13, [no file number], CCIM to the representative committee of the Chilean Israelite Collectivity, Mexico City, September 17, 1943. 170 See AKA, CCIM, Refugiados de Guerra, file 50.



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a business trip or to preserve business relations they had maintained for years. The corresponding authorization was not obtained in all cases.171 News and Reports on the “Final Solution” As has been pointed out in various studies on the Holocaust, the news related to the mass killing of the Jewish population that began to trickle out in 1941 was at first very difficult to process. Much of it was considered Western, anti-German propaganda and some of it was labeled exaggerated or false: the very concept of the total annihilation of an entire people in the middle of the twentieth century was incomprehensible.172 Although the news was broadcast in the press and radio, it was neither believed nor assimilated, not even by the Jews themselves: “Well, at first one did not want to believe it; we thought it was American propaganda, until we learned that all my relatives had been killed, no one was left.”173 Even those who were in the concentration camps found it difficult to find out what was going on: “and when we asked the people we were in communication with: So-and-so? And so-and-so? ‘they burned him, they burned him,’ we thought it was an expression for ‘who knows where he is’ [. . .] but we never thought about the instruments that the Germans used to annihilate a people.”174 As Yehuda Bauer maintains, it is not until information is internalized and becomes knowledge that it can lead to action. But action was not easy, since rescue operations were extremely complicated: the Western nations were immersed in a war that was not going very well and was causing the death, suffering, and displacement of millions of people; it was not possible to negotiate anything with the Nazis in relation to the matter of rescuing people nor could food be sent to the concentration camps or to the ghettos; there were no ships in which to transport those who managed to escape, and in any case few countries were willing to take them in.175 Nevertheless, although the same information was available in all Western nations, public demand for government action regarding the Jews varied from country to country. 171 See, for example, the case of Josef Oberwager, in AKA, CCIM, Refugiados de Guerra, file 55, CCIM to Turrent Artigas, [Mexico City], April 29, 1943, and the answer from the head of the Department of Political and Social Investigations of the Ministry of the Interior, Mexico City, May 18, 1943. 172 Bauer, History of the Holocaust, 328. 173 Author’s interview of Clara and Enrique Stern, Mexico City, April 19, 2007. 174 Author’s interview with Julio Botton, Mexico City, April 12, 2007. 175 Bauer, History of the Holocaust, 330–31.

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Beginning in 1941, the first reports on the extermination reached Mexico by way of the international press and specific communiqués addressed to the government, such as the political reports that the diplomatic representative of Mexico in Europe sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.176 For example, in November of that year, a telegram from the Mexican minister in Berlin, Juan F. Azcárate, reported: Press minister hurls insults at Jews blaming them for war. Threatens to treat as Jews all Gentiles who have individual dealings with Jews, considering them enemy emissaries in Germany, even forbidding them to talk. Says noble enemies will be treated with magnanimity after defeat but not the Jew. Concludes: it is the German government’s objective to finish once and for all with Jews.177

In July 1942, the Mexican minister in Great Britain sent to the minister of foreign affairs, Ezequiel Padilla, several documents that he had received from the Polish minister of foreign affairs, “reporting on the intensifying of the terror methods used by the German occupation authorities in Poland on the Polish people, and also on the measures taken by the invaders, which were contrary to International Law.” In these documents, which included a speech given by the president of the Council of Ministers of Poland on June 9, 1942, it was reported that the Jewish population in Poland had been condemned to extermination.178 Additional information arrived in the form of bulletins, letters, telegrams, and messages from private citizens. Various sectors of Mexican society that identified with the anti-Fascist movement began to publically express their repudiation of what was happening in Europe in general, and the situation of the Jewish people specifically. One of the most important meetings took place on August 20, 1942, at the Palacio de Bellas Artes, with the objective of “condemning the crimes committed by Hitler’s people on hundreds of thousands of people belonging to the Israelite race: men, women, and children.”179

176 See the confidential reports that Francisco Navarro, first secretary of the Mexican Legation in Germany, sent to the minister of foreign affairs, especially those of September 20, 1941, and October 15, 1941. AHSRE, file 29-27-3. Unfortunately the reports for 1942 are not in the file. 177 Ibid., Azcárate to SRE, Berlin, November 15, 1941. 178 AHSRE, file III-2389-1 (5th part), Rosenzweig Díaz to Padilla, London, July 9, 1942. 179 AKA, CCIM, Antidifamación, file 21, flyer entitled “Mexico contra el terror antisemita de los nazis.”



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Appearing on the list of speakers for the meeting were Vicente Lombardo Toledano, general secretary of the CTAL; Isidro Fabela, governor of the state of Mexico; Félix F. Palavicini, president of the Ateneo de Ciencias y Artes de México (Athenaeum of Arts and Sciences of Mexico); César Marino, of the Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Confederation of Farmers); Félix Díaz Escobar, president of the National Anti-Nazi Anti-Fascist Committee; Fernando Amilpa, representing the CTM (Confederation of Workers of Mexico); Antonio Villalobos, president of the PRM (Party of the Mexican Revolution); and Gabriel Galaviz, representing the Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (Federation of Unions of Workers at the Service of the State).180 According to the newspaper La Voz de Chihuahua, Vicente Lombardo Toledano’s speech, more than an hour and a half long, “constituted the most brilliant defense and the most enthusiastic eulogy of all of those heard in Mexico in favor of the Israelite race.”181 The president of the National AntiNazi Anti-Fascist Committee expressed his solidarity and sympathy towards the Jews and clarified, referring to the Mexican situation: Under no circumstances will we allow groups of people representing regressive tendencies to follow the example of this disgraceful and anti-Christian racial persecution against the members of the Israelite Colony of Mexico, as long as the latter identify with the legitimate aspirations of our people and distinguish themselves by their love of our country.182

Isidro Fabela’s speech, in turn, was evidently aimed at seeking the sympathy of the audience, mostly Catholics; he alluded to the fact that Hitler and Mussolini did not limit their attack to Jews, but had also harmed and attacked the Catholic Church in different ways, drawing protests from Pope Pius XI and his predecessor.183

180 Among the institutions that called for the protest were the ruling party, the Party of the Mexican Revolution, the Confederation of Workers of Mexico, the National Federation of Intellectual Workers, the Confederation of Mexican Youth, the Workers’ University of Mexico, the National Anti-Nazi Anti-Fascist Committee, the National Association of Arts and Sciences of Mexico, the National Farmers Confederation, the Union of Mexican Electri­cians, and the Federation of Unions of Workers at the Service of the State. 181 “Comunistas, cetemistas y la colonia judía en el gran mitin,” La Voz de Chihuahua, August 21, 1942. 182 AKA, CCIM, Antidifamación, file 21, “Salutación del Dip. Ing. Alfredo Félix Díaz Escobar, Presidente del Comité Nacional Anti-Nazifascista, en el Mitin de protesta contra el terror antisemita de los nazis, verificado en el Palacio de las Bellas Artes el día 20 de agosto de 1942.” 183 “Los crímenes de Hitler, motivo de un mitin,” Excelsior, Friday, August 21, 1942.

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The CCIM decided not to participate in the event, but rather addressed a letter to the organizer of the demonstration, Alejandro Carrillo, which was read at the meeting. On behalf of the Jewish residents in Mexico, the CCIM thanked the warm Mexican people and their legitimate democratic and popular institutions for organizing “this memorable act of great humanity” and declared: The strong attitude against anti-Semitism of the Mexican Institutions, revealed tonight through the thought-provoking speeches of great Political figures, of intellectual circles and of Workers Unions, is one more guarantee that Mexico is a powerful bastion of Democracy and that it has come to understand, with the clarity that the moment demands, that Hitler’s antiSemitism is but a terrible weapon against civilized Mankind, which our enemies wish to enslave or destroy.184

The Central Committee emphasized that the importance of the event resided in that it had not been arranged by the Jewish community, but rather by very prestigious Mexican organizations, and they conveyed this to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.185 However, based on the documents we consulted, it can be concluded that the meeting was in fact organized by the CCIM.186 This does not mean that the figures and institutions that participated were not sincere in their repudiation of Fascism in general and of the killing of Jews in particular (which correlates with the attitude displayed by Mexican anti-Fascist groups). It does, however, point out that there was apparently not much “spontaneity” in relation to the protests against Nazism, and that in this case it was necessary for the Jewish community to shoulder the organization and financing of the event. Since this was an event of such great magnitude for the Israelite Central Committee, they were even able to have the speeches broadcast via shortwave radio all over Latin America.187 184 AKA, CCIM, Antidifamación, file 21, CCIM to the president of the Anti-Nazi AntiFascist Demonstration, Mexico City, August 20, 1942. 185 Ibid., CCIM to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Mexico City, [n.d.]. 186 In an exchange of mail between two members of the Joint, the sender, who had been in Mexico during the demonstration, reported: “Although this entire meeting was arranged, planned, and financed by the Central Committee, it was ostensibly sponsored, so far as the public was concerned, by a united Christian committee and by the labor organizations.” JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, Weisman to Leavitt, New York, October 15, 1942. See also the corresponding letters in AKA, CCIM, Antidifamación, file 21, CCIM to Díaz Escobar, president of the National Anti-Nazi Anti-Fascist Committee, Mexico City, August 21, 1942, and CCIM to Lombardo Toledano, Mexico City, August 21, 1942. 187 The World Jewish Congress, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, and the Jewish commu­ nities in the American countries were appealed to, as well as the representative and



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Confirmation that the Nazis were implementing the plan to exterminate Jews reached Mexico in late November 1942 in a cable sent jointly by the American Jewish Congress, the World Jewish Congress, and the World Zionist Organization to the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico. It read: “We now have confirmation that Hitler ordered the extermination of all of the Jews in the countries occupied by the Nazis; as of December 31, 1942, almost two million have been killed.”188 The telegram also reported that a conference of the main international Jewish organizations had designated Wednesday, December 2, a day of mourning, fasting, and prayers for the Jewish victims of Nazism, urging the Jewish community in Mexico and their organizations to join in these events and to seek the support of the press and of Mexican society in general. However, because of a delay due to censorship, the cable reached Mexico on Tuesday at 1 o’clock in the morning, when it was too late to organize a protest for the following day. Upon receiving this tragic news, the Central Committee sent an urgent telegram to President Ávila Camacho and called a meeting of all of the Jewish societies in the capital for Wednesday, December 2, in order to look into the situation and decide what action to take.189 The telegram to the president read: We have allowed ourselves to raise our voice to you in anguish for the fate our brethren suffer under the Nazi terror in Europe begging your invaluable and urgent intervention before the United Nations in order to threaten to take just reprisals against the Aryan Germans if Hitler carries out his diabolical plan, one without precedent in history [. . .] On behalf of Jews of Mexico who are mostly faithful citizens of the country we beseech you Mr. President to make contact with whom it may concern in order to take immediate measures and once again make heard the avenging voice of Mexico in order to protect our close and distant relatives and all of our brethren under the terror of the mortal enemy of civilization.190

sub-committees of the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico. AKA, CCIM, Antidifamación, file 21, CCIM to CJM, Mexico City, August 12, 1942, and other letters. The demonstration was broadcast via long and short wave on XEFO and Radio Gobernación. 188 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, box 13, [no file number], cable sent by the president of the American Jewish Congress, the Executive Committee of the World Jewish Congress, and the president of the World Zionist Organization to CCIM, New York, November 28, 1942. 189 The list of Jewish associations summoned to the extra-urgent meeting on Wednes­ day, December 2, included forty-two organizations. 190 AGN, PMAC, file 546.1/1, extra-urgent telegram sent by CCIM to Ávila Camacho, Mexico City, December 1, 1942.

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The minister of foreign affairs, Ezequiel Padilla, answered the telegram, saying that “the Government of Mexico is on the alert for any opportunity, within the difficult circumstances in which the world is situated, to intensify its efforts in favor of Israelite elements, so cruelly persecuted by the Nazi regime.”191 We do not know whether there was any official public condemnation by the Mexican government of the Jewish extermination.192 On December 7 the Central Committee organized a reception for the journalists in the capital, with the purpose of spreading the news about the fate of the Jews in the countries occupied by the Nazis.193 The fiftyeight people invited to the press conference included important figures from the government as well as from anti-Fascist groups.194 The declarations the CCIM delivered to the press reported that up until September 1942, two million Jews had been killed one way or another, mainly through starvation or disease or one of the massive pogroms. Beginning in September, however, the annihilation had taken on new dimensions. According to information provided by the Polish government in London and by the American State Department, Hitler had given the order to exterminate the remaining five million European Jews, after deporting them from various countries and concentrating them in extermination camps in Eastern Europe. Also mentioned was the creation of extermination squads. These groups had implemented various techniques for mass killings (poisonous gas, electrocution, injection of air into the veins, firing squads, and so on) as well as the use of cadavers for making war materials, soap, lubricants, and fertilizer. Finally the Central Committee referred to the general apathy of the public and the need to take drastic and immediate measures to stop the slaughter.195 This information was also conveyed in writing to the 191 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, box 13, [no file number], Padilla to CCIM, Mexico City, December 7, 1941. 192 In 1944 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the CCIM that “the Government of Mex­ ico has on repeated occasions made public the condemnation deserved by these attacks against humanity that the Nazi regime has been perpetrating, and has always fought for the equality of rights for all men, with no distinction as to race or religious creeds.” AGN, PMAC, file 546.1/1, Tello, by orders of the minister of foreign affairs, to CCIM, Mexico City, May 25, 1944. 193 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, box 13, [no file number]. 194 Ibid., “Personas invitadas a la recepción de prensa del lunes 7 de diciembre de 1942.” Among the invited guests were Alejandro Carrillo, Félix Palavicini, Pablo Neruda (Chilean consul to Mexico), Paul Merker (Free Germany), Egon Erwin Kisch, Leo Zuckerman, Dr. Bruno Frei, Dr. Francisco Mayer (the chief editor of Excelsior), Salomón de la Selva, and Ludwig Renn (president of the Free Germany movement). 195 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, box 13, [no file number], “Declaraciones del Comité Central Israelita de México a la prensa,” Mexico City, December 7, 1942.



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president of the Mexican Association of the Red Cross, A. Quijano, so that he could transmit the report to whomever it might concern, “in the hope that the Honorable Mexican and International Red Cross would do everything in their power, on behalf of civilized mankind, to make these crimes, which History has never seen the likes of before, disappear.”196 Later on the organization gave special thanks to the metropolitan press “for the attention they have paid us and for the broad understanding of today’s public event and other similar acts of protest that are being carried out in Mexico as in all other countries of the free world.”197 In response to the press release of December 7, various organizations spontaneously expressed their solidarity with the Jewish community of Mexico, sending telegrams to the CCIM and petitions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to request the intervention of the Mexican government on behalf of Jews who lived in countries occupied by Nazism, as well as to ask that they be granted shelter in Mexico.198 The CCIM declared all of December a month of mourning and protest, during which time it requested that the subcommittees and representatives of the organization in the republic join together in various public events that would take place, recommending, above all, that they spread information about the slaughter and win the support of public opinion.199 The ninth of December was chosen by the board of representatives of the Jewish societies of the country as the date for a two-hour protest that would include the closing of financial institutions, businesses, and industries, as well as offices belonging to Jews and sympathizers. Various organizations were invited to take part in the event200 and it was

196 Ibid., CCIM to Lic. A. Quijano, president of the Mexican Association of the Red Cross, Mexico City, December 5, 1942 and December 29, 1942. 197 Ibid., “Declaraciones del Comité Central lsraelita de México a la prensa,” Mexico City, December 9, 1942. 198 See, for example, the two telegrams sent by the Federation of Workers of the State of Veracruz to the minister of foreign affairs, Mexico City, December 7, 1942. Ibid. 199 Ibid., CCIM to all sub-committees and representatives of the Israelite Central Com­ mittee in the Republic, December 4, 1942. 200 The Inter-Ally Committee (of the Consulate of Great Britain), the American, French, Chinese and British chambers of commerce, the Rotary Club, the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Mexico City, the Anglo Mexican Bank, the Mercantile Bank of Mexico, the Compañía General Financiera (General Finance Company), the Financiera Azteca (Aztec Finance Company), the Leishman Bank, Cédulas Hipotecarias (Mortgage Bonds), the Banco Capitalizador de América (Capitalizing Bank of America), the Central de Fianzas (Financial Center), and all sub-committees and representatives of the Israelite Central Committee of the Mexican Republic, among others, were invited. See AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, box 13, [no file number].

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also requested that in the establishments which were to close, a poster be placed with the following information: “This establishment will close today from 10 a.m. to 12 p.m. as a sign of indignation and a protest of the horrific killing of free people ordered by the Nazis and of the diabolical project of the annihilation of seven million Israelites in bloody Europe, without equal in all of history.”201 Shortly afterwards the CCIM reported with satisfaction that various establishments had spontaneously joined in the suspension of activities, in the capital as well as in the rest of the country, above all in the states of Veracruz, Puebla, and Coahuila. They also gave special thanks to the French Chamber of Commerce and to all of its members for having supported the action by carrying out a similar act from 9 to 10 a.m. on the same Wednesday.202 The demonstrations of solidarity also included the Belgian Legation, the Free France Committee, the Free Germany Movement, the Great Lodge Valley of Mexico (and other Masonic lodges), the Assembly against Nazi-Fascist Terror, the Giuseppe Garibaldi Alliance, the Federation of Organizations of Aid to Spanish Republicans (FOARE), the Lebanese Central Committee, the Federated Committee of Czechoslovakians, Greeks, Poles, and Yugoslavians, and the Central Committee for the Civil Defense of the Federal District, as well as individual support. The latter committee, belonging to the Department of the Federal District, recommended that all inhabitants of the city support the closing of businesses and suspension of activities on December 9, and at its suggestion various public events were staged in theaters in the capital in honor of the fallen Jews and in protest against Nazi barbarity.203 Among the many demonstrations of support for the Jewish people, the fifteen-minute work stoppage that was carried out across Latin America on December 11, 1942, cannot go unmentioned. This protest of the Nazi assassinations and expression of solidarity with the victims was organized by the CTAL and the CTM in collaboration with various labor organizations and financed by the Central Committee. It was coordinated by Vicente Lombardo Toledano and Tuvia Maizel, who was one of the most important figures in the Jewish community at that time, a Bundist and

201 Ibid., CCIM to all sub-committees and representatives of the Israelite Central Committee in the Republic, Mexico City, December 4, 1942. 202 Ibid., “Declaraciones del Comité Central Israelita de México a la prensa,” Mexico City, [n.d.]. 203 Ibid., CCIM to the Central Committee for the Civil Defense of the Federal District, Mexico City, December 18, 1942.



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a member of the Central Committee who had important relations with Mexican labor leaders.204 The members of the CCIM also contributed economically during 1942 and 1943 to organizations such as Acción Democrática Internacional (International Democratic Action), the magazine Mundo Libre (Free World), the Comisión Permanente de la Asamblea contra el Terror Nazifascista (Permanent Commission of the Assembly against Nazi-Fascist Terror), the FOARE, the Mexican Red Cross, Hungría Libre (Free Hungary), the military magazine Defensa (Defense), and the Central Committee for the Civil Defense of the Federal District.205 I believe that the role played by the Jewish community in the organizing and financing of the Mexican anti-Fascist movement should be analyzed in greater detail, since it appears to have had more importance than was previously thought. Non-Jewish Refugees The absence of any effective aid organizations for non-Jewish fugitives from Nazism constituted an important global problem. Normally political refugees linked to communism or social democracy were not welcomed due to their leftist position. In this sense, the asylum the Mexican government offered the communist political refugees was an exception. In European countries, by contrast, refugees with Marxist tendencies were placed in camps and deported and only received help from like-minded groups. On the other hand, “non-Aryan” refugees included many Jews who had converted to Catholicism, but were apparently not included in any of the groups that received assistance. It was not until 1936 that the Comité Cristiano para los Refugiados Alemanes (Christian Committee for German Refugees) was created. An exception to this slow response was the Society of Friends (the Quakers), which established an Emergency Committee to help all of the refugees who were beginning to abandon Germany (Jews, Christians, Social Democrats, and Communists).206 In principle the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico helped only their fellow Jews. According to a member of the Joint who had been to

204 See AKA, CCIM, Actas, vol. 2, act. no. 204 and act no. 206 of December 2 and 4, 1942. 205  JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, financial report for October 1, 1942, through December 24, 1943, sent by CCIM to JDC, Mexico City, February 21, 1944. 206 Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe, 204.

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Mexico, this was for two main reasons: various Christian aid organizations already existed (among these he mistakenly cited the League for German Culture), and the CCIM had very limited funds.207 It appears, however, that the first consideration was not true. In fact, the Israelite Central Committee acknowledged the lack of effective committees for helping non-Israelite refugees and thus had decided to give mixed marriages the same treatment as Jewish families, in order to help alleviate the problem.208 Gradually their range of action was widened to include nonJewish refugees in their aid programs. In the case of the steamship Serpa Pinto, for example, the Central Committee reported: “As a Jewish Committee, we felt that we were called upon to help only the Jewish refugees; but in order to be able to help these to disembark, we also had to be of assistance to the non-Jewish refugees in accordance with an agreement reached with various influential elements of the Government.”209 The aid included disembarking negotiations, transportation to Mexico City, food and shelter during the first days, arranging for legalization, and work permits. Also, since it was not possible to establish with precision the financial condition of each refugee, economic support was offered to those who requested it, along with medical assistance.210 In these cases the Central Committee worked in coordination with the League for German Culture, famously anti-Nazi. The League usually took charge of offering the Mexican government guarantees of the political affiliation of passengers who came ashore in Veracruz, and in exchange the CCIM was responsible for the expenses of disembarking all of the passengers, transporting them to Mexico City, and maintaining them during the early days of their stay in the country. On other occasions the assistance of the Central Committee was not provided directly, but rather through economic contributions to the League for the sustenance of the newcomers (200 pesos per refugee or 5,000 pesos for a group).211 The committee noted that “By taking such measures, it is obvious that 207 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, Beckelman to Pilpel, Mexico City, June 12, 1942. 208 “We have, in general, adopted the system of considering all mixed marriages as Israelites deserving our direct help, thus trying to smooth over the problem, since there are no Committees that will help non-Israelite refugees.” Ibid., CCIM to JDC, Mexico City, June 9, 1942. 209 Ibid., “Translation of Letter Received from the Israelite Central Committee of Mex­ico,” Glikowski to Kahn, Mexico City, January 10, 1942. 210 In this last entry, however, the Central Committee reported that it had not had to disburse large sums of money since the Jewish doctors offered their services free of charge. 211  JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, Beckelman to JDC, Mexico City, June 21, 1942.



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we are thinking into the future, when we may have to once again disembark passengers and need the cooperation of these same authorities.”212 For reasons that are still not clear, the committee preferred to help nonJewish refugees indirectly, through other organizations. In June 1942, for example, this group reported having given large sums to the League for German Culture and the Free Germany group for the sustenance of nonIsraelite refugees.213 In this case there were some problems due to the fact that the aid these organizations gave the newcomers—a weekly allowance for their sustenance—was greater than the amount agreed upon by the CCIM, which was interpreted as an attempt by the other groups to win over the sympathy of the refugees.214 The situation of the non-Jewish refugees who had reached Mexico also worried some other aid organizations in the United States, such as the Unitarian Service Committee in Boston, whose executive director wrote in a letter to the Joint that There is apparently no question but that the situation of non-Jewish refugees is serious. Apparently, your Committee or its affiliates are doing a splendid job with the Jewish people and doing the best they can with others, and we are deeply grateful. At the same time, it seems to me that some of the non-Jewish Committees ought to be doing a more effective job, and I am beginning to wonder, in case no one else is doing it—except for the Christian Committee, whose efforts seem to be rather inadequate—if we ought not to undertake an investigation of the situation there. [. . .] We do not want, of course, to duplicate anybody’s work but on the other hand, the continuous reports we are getting from refugees whom we helped to send to Mexico are exceedingly disquieting.215

The lack of aid for non-Jewish refugees, in my opinion, is a problem that deserves further investigation. The information found up to now suggests that, for the time being, despite the existence of a goodly number of organizations for German-speaking political exiles in Mexico,216 as well as Mexican organizations such as the National Anti-Fascist Committee, 212 Ibid., “Translation of Letter Received from the Israelite Central Committee of Mex­ ico,” Glikowski to Kahn, Mexico City, January 10, 1942. 213 Ibid., CCIM to JDC, Mexico City, June 9, 1942. 214 Ibid., Beckelman to Robert Pilpel, Mexico City, June 12, 1942, and Oscar Braun, “Report about the Refugee Situation in Mexico,” [n.p.], May 7, 1942. 215 Ibid., letter of Robert Dexter, Executive Director of the Unitarian Service Commit­ tee, to Joseph Hyman, Boston, May 25, 1942. 216 For example, the Asociación de Republicanos Alemanes en Mexico (the Association of Republican Germans in Mexico), the Liga pro Cultura Alemana (the League for German Culture) which later became the Liga Antinazi de Habla Alemana (German Speaking

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none of them had the organizational structure necessary to directly assist refugees who arrived in the country and to support them until they found work. In fact, it is noteworthy that the League for German Culture was basically in charge of negotiating entrance permits. In light of this, we can assume that the league did not have the necessary strength to organize additional efforts, due to the fact that beginning in 1941 it was boycotted by the German Communists who had left that organization (which they accused of having Trotskyite and anti-Soviet tendencies) in order to form the Free Germany group, which was more important from the political and cultural point of view.217 There is a need to further investigate the absence of organizations—whether Christian or government-sponsored, for exiles or for others—dedicated to helping non-Jewish refugees of Nazism, and how these refugees adapted to the country. Concluding Remarks During the two years covered in this chapter, international conditions (namely the urgency of finding refuge for those who were still able to leave the occupied zones or who were in neutral countries), as well as conditions within the country related to the change of government, allowed the government’s position towards the Jewish refugees to relax a little, and so authorization was granted for the disembarkation of various ships carrying exiles to the country, although the process was not without difficulties. In order to better understand the refugee crisis, the role of certain political figures during Manuel Ávila Camacho’s term in office must be analyzed in greater detail: among these are the minister of the interior, Miguel Alemán, and the minister of foreign affairs, Ezequiel Padilla, as well as the new immigration authorities, since the documents found to date do not allow for an in-depth analysis. It is also necessary to carry out a detailed statistical analysis in order to determine how much more flexible this period was compared to others. In my opinion, however, in order to explain the admission of Jewish refugees who reached Mexico during 1941–1942, it is not sufficient to examine the country’s domestic policy or the shift in its foreign policy, namely its turning away from Germany and toward the United States. Anti-Nazi League), the group Alemania Libre (Free Germany), the Heinrich Heine Club, and the Acción Republicana Austriaca (Austrian Republican Action). 217 Mentz et al., Fascismo y antifascismo, 46–47.



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An accurate picture of the situation can only be achieved by taking into account the mechanisms—many of them tied to corruption, in Mexico as well as in Europe, while others were related to political contacts or favors—that were improvised to ease each case through the system. As the war advanced and the situation became ever more dangerous for Jews in Europe, these arrangements grew increasingly common, until the country closed its doors on non-Spanish European immigration altogether.

Chapter Six

THE URGENCY OF REFUGE: 1943–1945 The immigration policy of the Mexican government during 1943 and 1944 was defined, above all, by the situation created by World War II. The arrival of refugees in the country was practically suspended altogether by the Mexican prohibition on European immigration and the conditions imposed by the Nazis on the Jews and other persecuted persons. By then, it had also become clear that Mexico could not be considered a country of immigration and that any project to save Europeans should be dealt with in the Mexican political sphere of asylum, that is, as an exceptional case. With respect to immigration policy as such, there was practically no change in the legislation. The differential tables that regulated the admission of immigrants during 1943 were almost the same as those for the previous year, with the only difference being that the first article eliminated the quota for those who were neither Spaniards nor Americans, who would only be allowed to immigrate following a meticulous study of each individual case and under exceptional circumstances.1 No differential tables were issued for 1944, because the period in which they were normally published (October) coincided with the First Inter-American Demographic Congress, held in Mexico, and thus the migratory legislation was put on standby until the measures taken at the meeting were made known. The quotas for 1945 remained almost the same as those for 1943. With respect to Jewish refuge, the implementation in Europe of the “Final Solution,” the desperation caused by the war, and the attempt to save those who could be evacuated forced all possible options to be used in 1943. For their part, the Mexican government, which had shown small signs of intermittent solidarity, had already declared a state of war against the Axis powers, and had indisputably aligned itself with the Allies, especially the United States, which had given reason to hope that it might cooperate.

1 “Acuerdo relativo a las tablas diferenciales y condi­ciones que regirán la admisión de extranjeros durante el año de 1943,” article 1, Diario Oficial, December 16, 1942.

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Various organizations continued trying (in Mexico as well as abroad) to get the government of Manuel Ávila Camacho to grant certain considerations for the arrival of refugees. Despite conditions in wartime Europe, it was still possible to rescue those who were in neutral countries, like Spain and Portugal, and other areas, such as North Africa, as well as some Asian countries, such as Iran.2 Likewise, there were also some possibilities of rescue related to various projects in which the governments of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania participated; in spite of being Nazi allies they were willing to negotiate the departure of the Jews.3 Projects for Bringing Refugees to Mexico General Ávila Camacho and His Solidarity with Poland The only case of collective asylum offered by the Mexican government to European refugees benefited a group of non-Jewish Poles who were in Iran. Analyzing this situation will allow us to draw some comparisons that will increase our understanding of the issue at hand. Negotiations were begun in 1942, on the initiative of the British government, for Mexico to receive a certain number of refugees from the war in Poland who, after having been sent to Siberia as a result of the invasion 2 In January 1943 there were about 32,000 Polish refugees in Iran. Der Weg, January 1, 1943. It is estimated that in Spain, which was an obligatory stopover before leaving Europe, there were about 14,000 French refugees in 1943; 800 citizens of allied countries, mainly Polish; and between 6,000 and 8,000 refugees from Central Europe, most of them Jews. Marrus, Unwanted, 264. During the final years of the war, Spain offered protection to sev­ eral hundred Sephardic Jews who were in Greece, Bulgaria, and Hungary. It is estimated that 800 Jewish refugees were rescued directly from countries where they were in grave danger of death, while Spanish diplomats, taking advantage of their relatively favorable position with the Germans, offered consular protection to almost 3,300 people, above all in Hungary. Marrus, Unwanted, 261–63. Portugal, in turn, played a central role as an exit route for refugees from Europe and also as the headquarters from which various rescue agencies worked. Despite the fact that the Portuguese policy was to allow those with visas for other countries to travel through Portugal, in practice the lack of transport meant that refugees spent a long time in Lisbon. 3 From the beginning of 1942 until the first months of 1944, Hungary offered protection to thousands of Jewish refugees who fled Poland and Slovakia. In Budapest local Jewish activists established an aid network to help refugees, called the Jewish Mutual Assistance Committee. Marrus, Unwanted, 251–52. At the beginning of 1943 Romania was willing to free between 60,000 and 70,000 Jewish refugees who were in various camps in Romanian occupied territory if the Jewish organizations paid about $100 per person. The refugees would be sent to Palestine in ships flying the Vatican flag. Bulgaria proposed a similar project. These offers, however, did not have the support of the Americans or the British. See ibid., 290–91.



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of eastern Poland by the USSR (1939), were granted amnesty by the Soviet government in 1941 and sent to various refugee camps in Iran.4 Word of this matter first appeared in the Mexican press in December 1942, which reported a concession for twenty thousand visas for Polish citizens, who were at that time in Iran, to settle in Mexico for the duration of the war, at the end of which they should be repatriated.5 Later documentation alluded to the number of permissions being five thousand. On December 31, 1942, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement that made reference to the traditional Mexican policy of granting asylum for people persecuted by tyrannical and Nazi-Fascist regimes and expressed Mexico’s willingness to shelter a contingent of Poles until the end of the war, in accordance with the immigration capacity of the country (without specifying numbers), and reiterating the fact that the foreigners would not compete economically with Mexican citizens.6 The agreement between the Mexican government and the Polish government in exile, which was never written up,7 was settled on with a visit by the prime minister of the Polish government in exile, General Władisław Sikorski, to Mexico. It was not really a bilateral agreement, since the United States and Great Britain were its main promoters. Although both countries were interested in maintaining the image of their respective governments among their citizens, who demanded that something be done to save those who were being exterminated in Europe, their interests differed. Great Britain promoted the project due to the need to evacuate the refugee camps in Iran as soon as possible in order to keep the lines of communication open for the English army and to supply arms and food to the Red Army, as well as to fulfill the objective of establishing an 4 In the USSR there were between one and two million Poles who had fled or been exiled to the inner regions of the country after the Red Army conquered the eastern prov­ inces of Poland in the fall of 1939. The evacuation of these people was very difficult since they were to be responsible for their own maintenance and for reaching a train station, often walking long distances to do so. With the help provided by the Polish government in exile, two evacuations were organized, one in March–April 1942 and a second, more important one, in August–September of the same year. About 114,000 people were evacu­ ated, of whom 72,000 were soldiers. See Israel Gutman, “Jews in General Anders’ army in the Soviet Union,” quoted in Avni, “De Bermuda a Santa Rosa,” 140. See Gloria Carreño and Celia Zack de Zukerman, El convenio ilusorio. Refugiados polacos de guerra en México (1943–1947) (Mexico City: CDICA, 1998), 55–82. 5 “La visita del general Sikorski,” El Universal, December 23, 1942. 6 “La venida de los polacos,” El Universal, December 31, 1942. 7 In fact it was more a series of exchanges between Sikorski and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Septiembre de 1942–agosto de 1943 (Mexico City: SRE, 1943), 457–59.

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Anglo-American air force base in Iran, from which they could defend the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus Mountains, threatened by the Nazis.8 Only after the British authorities found that they could not solve the problem of the Polish refugees in Iran by themselves was Mexico suggested as a viable option, and although Great Britain did not appear in any signed agreements, its diplomatic role was decisive.9 Meanwhile, the American government financed the project with an initial amount of three million dollars to cover the costs of transportation and the first year of the refugees’ stay, in what has been considered an attempt by Roosevelt’s government to show its willingness to help solve the refugee crisis without opening his nation’s doors. It must be pointed out, however, that the United States had warned that it would not take any responsibility for the treaty between Mexico and the Polish government in exile.10 The reasons that led Mexico to reach this agreement are not, however, so clear, especially if we remember that Polish immigration had been subject to great restrictions in Mexican immigration policy, and that Poles had been the object of great prejudice. The consent of the Mexican government to allow a group of Polish refugees to reside in the country during the war must have been directly related to the intervention of Great Britain and the United States. In fact, these powers not only exerted pressure on the Mexican government, but also on its Polish counterpart, which at times appeared reluctant to send its compatriots to Aztec soil, preferring to wait and seek other locations.11 It is important to note that Mexico under the government of Ávila Camacho had begun to show some signs of opening up in the face of the problem of persecuted peoples: in 1942 it had authorized the concession of five hundred visas for Jewish refugees

8 See Avni, “De Bermuda a Santa Rosa,” 141. 9 The English authorities had tried to solve the problem of the refugees in Iran by send­ ing them to the countries of British colonial dominion: Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, North­ ern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. By November 1942 about 1,800 Polish civilians had reached Uganda, and about 4,500 Tanganyika. Since local authorities had a hard time keeping and feeding these people, it was decided to seek new destinations for the refugees. Ibid. 10 Carreño and Zack de Zukerman, El convenio ilusorio, 130–31. Participants in the April 1943 meeting in which a project to bring the Polish refugees to Mexico was agreed upon included the newly arrived minister from Poland to Mexico, Władysław Neumann; the ambassador of the United States, George Messersmith; the British ambassador, Charles Harold Bateman; the vice-minister of foreign affairs, Jaime Torres Bodet; and a representa­ tive of the Ministry of the Interior, with no name given in the documents. 11 See Avni, “De Bermuda a Santa Rosa,” 148–49.



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from France, and shortly after, in January 1943, it had also finally approved the project to bring one hundred Jewish children to Mexico, as was seen in the preceding chapter.12 Despite the fact that since the beginning of the war (except for the case of the Spaniards) the Mexican government avoided making agreements to take in large contingents of refugees (and, in general, all of the plans failed at some point, when it was necessary to act on them), it is possible that in the case of the visas for Polish refugees various factors converged to make things easier. In the first place, these people would only settle in Mexico until the end of the war, when they would be repatriated. Moreover, while all the financing was taken care of by the United States and the Polish government in exile, the Mexican government could obtain some benefit by projecting an image of cooperation in solving the refugee crisis. In fact, in a memorandum sent by the British government to its American counterpart in January 1943, the former proposed engaging Latin American countries, with the exception of Mexico, in the search for a solution to the problem of the Jewish refugees, since Mexico had already presented a significant proposal for aid in relation to the Poles in Iran.13 Based on this consideration, the Mexican government might have calculated, or even negotiated, that taking in the Poles would exempt the country from any future pressure to accept less desirable refugees or to admit them under less favorable conditions. On the other hand, following on Lázaro Cárdenas’s administration and its generosity to the Spanish refugees, Manuel Ávila Camacho may have wanted to show the country that his administration was continuing with the Mexican tradition of granting political exile, and to demonstrate to the outside world that it supported the Allies, expressing its goodwill in helping to solve an international problem. An additional factor in the decision was the fact that, unlike Jewish immigration, which only had the support of private organizations (which led the Mexican government to feel a certain distrust), this project was intergovernmental and was backed by two world powers. The first contingent of Polish refugees from Teheran, made up of 689 people, reached Mexico in July 1943. Another 728 refugees arrived in November of that same year, making a total of 1,417 individuals.14 It is 12 However, in neither case could the visas be used. See Chapter 5. 13 See Avni, “De Bermuda a Santa Rosa,” 136. 14 On November 1, 1944, a census was taken of the refugees at Santa Rosa, giving a total of 1,453 Polish refugees, plus 10 children who had been born at the camp. Since the number of those who disembarked was 1,417, it must be assumed that the other 36 reached

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important to point out the great difficulties the matter of the emigration of the refugees posed at this point in time, beginning with the fact that these refugees made an almost implausible journey of over 22,500 kilometers to reach America without passing through Europe and the areas controlled by the Japanese. They traveled from Siberia to Uzbekistan, from Uzbekistan to Pahlavi, from Pahlavi to Teheran, from Teheran to Afghanistan, and from there to Karachi; from Karachi they set sail for Bombay, then Melbourne and later New Zealand, finally disembarking in San Diego, California. From there they were driven in U.S. Army buses to a military camp near the border with Mexico. In Ciudad Juarez they took the train to Leon, Guanajuato, and were finally deposited on a former hacienda named Santa Rosa a few miles away. Santa Rosa was fitted out to accommodate the Polish refugees for the duration of the war. The colony was made up mainly of women and children, as well as elderly people and old soldiers who were unsuitable for military duty. Thus no agricultural work was carried out in the fields that belonged to the hacienda, and the colony was entirely supported by funds from the American government.15 The refugees, who had not been granted permission to work and who had to stay within the confines of this property, mainly busied themselves with the maintenance and administration of the hacienda. When the war ended, the Mexican authorities allowed those Poles who complied with the prerequisites set down in the immigration laws of the country to stay on in Mexico as immigrants.16 The Santa Rosa camp was officially closed on December 31, 1946. Of the 1,453 who had arrived there, some 500 were allowed into the United States, about 50 returned to Poland, and the great majority of the others were in the process of regularizing their legal status in Mexico.17 The Santa Rosa project shows how difficult immigration of refugees to Mexico was, even when supported by an intergovernmental project

the camp from somewhere else. Carreño and Zack de Zukerman, El convenio ilusorio, 302. 15 The funds came from the Polish War Relief of the United States, the National Catho­ lic Welfare Conference’s War Relief Services, and from a loan made to the Polish govern­ ment in exile by the Foreign Economic Administration. 16 AHSRE, file III-2413-16, quoted in Carreño and Zack de Zukerman, El convenio ilu­ sorio, 279. 17 “Polish Refugee Camp in Mexico is Closing; Last of 1,434 Likely to Leave Tomorrow,” New York Times, December 30, 1946. Carreño and Zack de Zukerman, El convenio ilu­sorio, 271.



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involving four countries (two of them among the most powerful in the world), with financing from the United States and the consent, goodwill, and help of the Mexican government. Of the 5,000 visas the Mexican government offered, not even half, only 1,453, were used. The reasons why nearly 3,500 visas were wasted are multiple and linked, according to some authors, to the difficulties that arose in Mexico during the search for a second location to settle refugees;18 other authors point to the not very attractive conditions offered the Poles in Mexico, who were confined to the hacienda and could not secure other employment, together with the lack of interest of the Polish government in exile.19 The lack of interest on the part of the Mexican government itself, probably combined with decreasing pressure from the Allied powers, should also be pointed out, for when that pressure was firm, Mexican authorities responded immediately. Efforts to Save the Polish Jewish Refugees Before the beginning of World War II, the Jewish population of Poland consisted of approximately 3,351,000 people, of whom only 369,000 survived the Holocaust. It was Europe’s largest and most traditionalist Jewish colony.20 It was also the one most affected, since practically half of the six million Jews who died at the hands of the Nazis were Polish. The Mexican Jewish community, with a large proportion of Polish families, tried to help the Jews in Nazi-occupied Poland by sending money, food, and clothes, as well as negotiating visas for Mexico.21 However, their good intentions encountered almost insurmountable obstacles: the money and articles that they sent with great difficulty, through organizations such as HIAS, ran the risk of being confiscated by the Nazis, thus aiding the enemy, and such shipments were therefore not encouraged. In order to emigrate to Mexico, Polish refugees had to overcome two basic difficulties: the first was the impossibility of obtaining permission

18 Carreño and Zack de Zukerman, El convenio ilusorio, 207. 19 Avni, “De Bermuda a Santa Rosa,” 152–54. 20 The Enlightenment (Haskalah), a Jewish ideological school of thought that from the second half of the eighteenth century through the nineteenth promoted the rapproche­ ment of the Jews with other people and cultures, did not exert much influence on the Polish Jews, since the Jewish intellectuals and elite in Warsaw had been assimilated into the mainstream population, and the Jewish “masses,” therefore, were still very traditional­ ist. Zadoff, Enciclopedia, 159, 344. 21 Also, Polish Jews with relatives in Mexico had been trying to locate them through the HIAS of Warsaw and the HICEM of Lisbon.

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to emigrate22 and the second was the fact that in Poland there was no Mexican Consulate nor any way in which to process a visa for Mexico.23 This was obviously a vicious circle: the Polish Jews could not depart for a neutral country that had Mexican representation in order to process the visa because in order to leave, they had to have a visa in the first place. Since rescuing the Jews from Nazi Poland was practically impossible, attempts were made to evacuate those who had fled to a neutral country, above all Spain or Portugal, but it was still necessary to find a final destination where they could live out their lives. During the final months of 1942 the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico, informed that the Mexican government would approve a certain number of visas for Polish refugees and hoping to find an answer to the strong pleas for help made by the Polish Jews that had been spread by the World Jewish Congress, began to carry out diverse activities in order to negotiate the immigration to Mexico of some of these people. Thus they contacted the Polish Legation in Mexico, who informed them that they might succeed, provided the immigration of these refugees did not incur any financial expenses for the country.24 The Polish minister Mieczysław Marchlewski told the CCIM that he would ask the Mexican government for the approval of five hundred visas to save the same number of Polish Jews. Those who were in France were unable to leave, but the visas could be used by the thousands of refugees who had fled to Spain from France.25 However, during the first meeting he had with the committee, in December 1942, it became clear that this 22 In fact, in 1941 a representative of the World Jewish Congress reported that in order to obtain exit visas for the Polish Jews, papers certifying that the individuals in question were citizens of some other country needed to be obtained. AJA, WJCR, H-240/7, Tarta­ kower to CCIM, New York, January 31, 1941. 23 The Mexican Consulate in Warsaw was closed on July 1, 1939. AHSRE, file III-2397-16, from the head of the Consular Department to the head of the Diplomatic Department. Mexico City, February 21, 1940. 24 Letter from M. Marchlewski to CCIM, Mexico City, October 8, 1942, and Marchlewski’s application to the minister of foreign affairs, Ezequiel Padilla, February 4, 1941, quoted in Carreño and Zack de Zukerman, El convenio ilusorio, 99. 25 According to the World Jewish Congress the refugees who had arrived in Spain from France were immediately arrested. The congress, therefore, was trying to have them liberated and to concentrate them in one or two small towns, from where they would be evacuated as soon as possible. AJA, WJCR, H-240/7, Goldmann to Wolfowitz, [New York], November 27, 1942. Spain’s position towards the Jewish refugees was ever chang­ ing, becoming stricter in 1941, although in general they did allow those with a visa for a final destination to pass through Spain. Spain was also generous with the rescu­ing of the Sephardic Jews and with the refugees who were on Spanish soil, who although confined, were not handed over to the Nazis. On this matter see Avni, Spain, the Jews and Franco;



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was another project destined to fail, since neither the Mexican government nor the Polish government in exile had diplomatic relations with Francisco Franco, and therefore helping those who were in Spain would prove extremely complicated. Perhaps as a palliative measure, in the same meeting Marchlewski promised to negotiate the immigration of Jewish refugees who were in Portugal.26 The Central Committee then tried to immediately obtain a list of the most urgent cases in order to begin negotiations, letting the HICEM in Lisbon know that they needed a maximum of five hundred people, preferably Polish Jews, none of whom could be nationals of the Axis powers.27 By January 1943 the Central Committee had decided that the attitude of the Polish minister was not serious enough. Marchlewski, who was in the final days of his assignment and about to return to London, had promised to negotiate the visas as “a farewell gift.” However, his departure coincided with the arrival of General Sikorski and with the signing of the agreement between the latter and President Ávila Camacho on the concession of five thousand visas for the Polish refugees in Teheran, which cancelled any prior negotiations made by Marchlewski—whose efforts were, apparently, half-hearted at best. The latter promised, in any case, to do his best so that one hundred and fifty Polish Jews who were in Lisbon would be included within the list of the five thousand refugees from Iran.28 The Israelite Central Committee confessed to having wagered too much on the intervention of the Polish minister in Mexico, without having obtained anything through him.29 The hope placed on the Polish government in exile suffered another setback during Sikorski’s visit to Mexico, in which he, as well as his private secretary, Rettinguer, expressed strongly anti-Semitic sentiments. Sikorski proved especially indifferent to the tragedy of the Polish Jews in a meeting he had with the Mexican Federation for Polish Israelites, in which, presented with the request that some of the visas obtained be used to save a certain number of Jews who were Antonio Marquina and Gloria Inés Ospina, España y los judíos en el siglo XX (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1987), and Rother, Spanien und der Holocaust. 26 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 240/8, CCIM to Goldmann, Mexico City, December 17, 1942. 27 The list was finally drawn up by the Polish Legation in Portugal with the help of the HICEM of Lisbon. AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, HICEM-Portugal, file 3, CCIM to HICEMLisbon, Mexico City, December 17 and 21, 1942. 28 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 240/8, CCIM to Tartakower, Mexico City, January 27, 1943 (translated from the Yiddish by Maty Sommer). 29 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, HICEM-Portugal, file 5, CCIM to the Jewish LaborCommittee in New York, Mexico City, January 27, 1943 (translated from the Yiddish by Maty Sommer).

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in concentration camps, he answered that once Poland was freed, the Jews would have the same rights as the rest of the population. Later on Sikorski called attention to the fact that in Mexico some Polish Jews were involved in “dirty business,” which was apparently denied by the president of the delegation who had met with him. And later, when the Polish prime minister was asked that a percentage of the visas for refugees from Iran be used for saving Jews, the leader ironically answered that if they were to be used for saving the Jewish diamond cutters in Belgium and Holland from the Nazis, he could make no promises. Józef Rettinguer, in turn, declared to a reporter from Excelsior that the Jews in Mexico should not abuse the hospitality of the Mexican government, insisting on the need for them to stop the doubtful business affairs in which they engaged.30 These declarations offended the Jewish community of Mexico, which was probably not aware of the fact that on previous occasions Rettinguer had shown outright anti-Semitic attitudes. Apparently both government officials felt at ease in the country and did not think that their statements would have any repercussions, as indicated by the private secretary’s surprise at finding out that they had been published in the Jewish newspapers in New York. The World Jewish Congress reacted vigorously in the wake of this incident, making their protests known to the representation of the Polish government in London, to Rettinguer, and to the new Polish ambassador to Mexico, Władysław Neumann. The central representation of the Jewish community of Mexico did the same.31 The Israelite Central Committee of Mexico as well as the World Jewish Congress continued to press for a proportion of Jews equivalent to the number of Jews in the Polish population in Iran (20 percent) to be included in the group of Poles who would arrive to Mexico.32 According to Tartakower, Neumann had assured him that he would not tolerate any discrimination to that effect.33

30 Letter from the Mexican Society for Polish Jews to the World Jewish Congress, Mexico City, January 9, 1943, quoted in Carreño and Zack de Zukerman, El convenio ilusorio, 128. 31 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 238/3, Tartakower to Wise, Goldmann, Perlzweig, and oth­ers, [New York], January 27, 1942. See also Jaim Lazdeisky, “General Sikorski mounted on an anti-Semitic horse,” Der Weg, January 12, 1943. AKA, CCIM, Mexican Society for Polish Jews, Tartakower to the Mexican Society for Polish Jews, New York, January 28, 1943. 32 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, HICEM-Portugal, file 4, CCIM to HICEM-New York, Mexico City, February 4, 1943 (translated from the Yiddish by Maty Sommer). 33 AKA, CCIM, Mexican Society for Polish Jews, Tartakower to the Mexican Society for Polish Jews, New York, January 28, 1943.



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As the months went by, hope faded. The CCIM reported on the slim possibility of obtaining visas for the Polish refugees. As the Polish minister said, it was not possible to obtain Mexican visas for isolated individuals, but only for groups of political exiles like the one in Lisbon, whose emigration to Mexico was being processed with, according to him, some probability of success.34 A letter dated a few days later told of how the matter of the refugees in Lisbon was postponed over and over again. The CCIM reported: With reference to the project for obtaining blanket immigration permission for the Israelite refugees of Polish origin who are in Spain and Portugal, we have the honor of informing you that a few days ago a Commission of the Central Committee met again with the Minister of the Polish Republic in Mexico. Once again this Diplomat confirmed that it is not advisable to carry out any negotiation for obtaining said project as long as the first shipload of Polish refugees does not leave Bombay for our country. The Minister told us that such negotiations would inevitably fail, and if we want to lay ourselves open to failure, he could begin said negotiations. Naturally, for now we preferred not to insist any more on the matter, in order to not leave ourselves open to the failure the Polish Minister warned us of.35

This letter also testifies to some other aspects of the problem, such as the disdainful treatment the representation of the CCIM received, as well as the lack of resources of the organization. The CCIM continued to await positive action by the representation of the Polish government, when they had already met with clear proof of its lack of interest on several occasions. A document issued by the Central Committee at the end of December 1943 records that when the Polish minister finally agreed to use certain visas for Jewish Polish refugees from Spain and Portugal, the office of the HICEM in Lisbon informed them that there were no longer enough candidates.36 Of the 1,453 Polish refugees who reached Mexican soil, only 31 were Jews, which shows the failure of the negotiations carried out by the Jewish organizations. These people’s situation was extremely difficult and troublesome from the start due to the anti-Semitism of their fellow Poles, 34 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, HICEM-Portugal, file 1, CCIM to HICEM-Lisbon, [Mex­ico City], May 3, 1943. 35 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados, Deudas, Proyecto de inmigración de judíos polacos, 1943, file 87, CCIM to HICEM-New York, [Mexico City], May 7, 1943. 36 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 238/12, “Report on Camp Santa Rosa by the Central Jewish Committee of Mexico,” Mexico City, December 20, 1943.

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which at times was manifested in violence, causing the Jews to ask to be separated from the group as soon as possible.37 The position of the Israelite Central Committee was to not interfere in the matter, since they had promised the Mexican government that the Jewish refugees who reached the country “would only live in the places that had been agreed upon and would not displace Mexican workers and merchants from their economic positions.”38 The caution of the committee was linked to the possibility that more transports would arrive with refugees from Spain and Portugal. By mid-1944, when it had been proved that this would not happen, the CCIM changed its attitude and began to carry out negotiations to remove the Jews from Santa Rosa. Polish Refugees and Jewish Refugees: A Brief Comparison Santa Rosa provides an opportunity for a closer look at the immigration of the Jewish refugees who came to Mexico, because it presents a small setting that recreates some of the central elements related to the general topic at hand. It exposes the lack of interest the Allied powers had in relation to saving Jewish refugees (this is clearly due to the fact that their priority, based on self-interest, was the evacuation of Poles from Iran, where they were in no danger, and not saving the Jewish refugees threatened with death); the indifference of the Mexican government; the difficulty in obtaining entrance visas for Jewish refugees; and also the Israelite Central Committee’s lack of resources, even when it was receiving support from international Jewish organizations. Haim Avni offers an interesting analysis of the Santa Rosa experiment, in which he reaches the conclusion that this case refutes several of the main arguments used by the Allies in the Bermuda Conference (1943) in justifying the impossibility of saving Jews from Europe, once the “final solution” was made known throughout the world. Among these are the scarcity of maritime transport for evacuating refugees and the fact that the rescues were organized only for refugees who were “as close as possible to the places from where they are to be rescued and from where they may be returned to their countries as fast as possible when the hostilities end.” Besides, the difference between the handling of the Santa Rosa

37 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 886, Council of Jewish Women of Los Angeles to Joseph Hyman, Los Ange­les, July 2, 1943. 38 AKA, CCIM, Refugiados de Polonia, 1942–1945, file 24, CCIM and Mexican Society for Polish Jews to the Polish Legation in Mexico, [Mexico City], [n.d.]. Italics in original.



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episode and the treatment given to Jewish matters can be seen in the fact that, in the first case, Great Britain and the United States decided to act directly, without awaiting the intervention of the Intergovernmental Committee, proving that they could act quickly when need be.39 A parallel analysis may be made in the case of Mexico. The experiment of Santa Rosa refutes some of the restrictions that the Mexican government had imposed on the immigration of refugees, specifically in reference to the character of the latter, since the Poles who reached Mexico were neither farmers nor industrialists nor investors. Besides, it is contradictory to the arguments over the characteristics of racial and cultural assimilability of the immigrants. Due to the temporary nature of their stay in Mexico, the Poles were not expected to assimilate, but this no longer seemed to matter when they were allowed to stay in the country after the colony disappeared. This case also illustrates the way in which the normally slow passage of Mexican immigration projects through routine channels could be accelerated when there was a will to do so; the Mexican authorities could act efficiently if they wanted to. Finally, it is paradoxical that following years of multiple attempts and renewed efforts, inside as well as outside the country, to convince Mexico to open its doors to the Jewish refugees fleeing Nazism, the only immigration project organized by the Mexican government of Manuel Ávila Camacho that was carried out, with the exception of efforts related to the Spanish Republicans, focused on Polish refugees, the vast majority of whom were Catholics, who were not in danger of dying. To close this section, we once again quote Avni: The way in which the transfer of the Poles to Mexico was dealt with was the direct opposite of the “organization” of rescuing the Jews. The way in which the consent of Mexico was obtained, the preferential treatment of the matter in March 1943 by the American ambassador and the British and Polish ministers in Mexico City, and the quick results reached through their intervention show the weight of the direct activity of the powers and their real authority, like that which Sikorski’s government had even when it was conquered and exiled. None of these factors was within reach of the Jewish people in 1943, when a comprehensive program was so necessary for saving them.40

39 Avni, “De Bermuda a Santa Rosa,” 157. 40 Ibid.

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In June 1943 the Mexican ambassador to the United States, Francisco Castillo Nájera, passed on to the Mexican Chancellery the request he had received from the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society, backed by the World Jewish Congress, for the Mexican government to admit into the country five thousand Jewish refugees who, having managed to escape from the occupied countries, were now in neutral countries in Europe “without a home, without a Country.”41 The request, which was accompanied by information meant to influence the answer of the Mexican government, referred to the democratic ideals of the people of Mexico: “Nowadays we are brothers in the fight and we fight the common enemy. What should be done, then, is that all of us should contribute to relieving the suffering of these victims of persecution and saving them whenever and wherever possible.”42 In order to ensure that the refugees would not become a burden on the Mexican people, the HIAS promised to cover their transportation and maintenance expenses until they could leave Mexico or were in a condition to fend for themselves. In contrast to projects that had been presented earlier by various Jewish organizations, the HIAS was willing to deposit up front a guarantee fund of $25,000.43 Even before sending the request of the HIAS to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Castillo Nájera let the organization’s representative know that he very much doubted whether at that moment Mexico could receive that many refugees, but that he would pass the request on to be studied and decided upon.44 The minister of foreign affairs consulted President Ávila Camacho on the matter, arguing that his ministry “is of the opinion that, for now, the admission of these people would not be advisable, even though, in fact, they would not cause any expenditure.” Since Mexico was about to host the Inter-American Demographic Congress, in which

41 AHSRE, file III-2468-12, memorandum from the HIAS to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, forwarded by Castillo Nájera to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, June 17, 1943. 42 Ibid. 43 This is due to the fact that Jewish organizations were more liberal with their mon­ etary resources for saving refugees once the situation in Europe worsened with the imple­ mentation of the “Final Solution.” 44 AHSRE, file III-2468-12, Castillo Nájera to Padilla, Washington, DC, June 17, 1943.



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matters such as the admission and distribution of refugees from European countries were going to be studied, Padilla thought that “it would appear premature [. . .] for Mexico to make a decision in this respect before the problem was examined in all its aspects, as regards not only Mexico, but all the countries of the Americas.”45 Just as had happened years earlier, in the context of the Évian Conference (1938), the admission of Jewish refugees to the country in 1943 was subject, in theory, to what the other American countries as a whole decided, although it was very probable, based on past experiences, that in the Inter-American Demographic Congress the specific matter of Jewish refuge would not be brought up, and this was indeed the case. Moreover, it was a subject for each country to decide upon individually, depending on its immigration policy. The difference from the situation in 1938 was that in the second half of 1943 the Nazis were carrying out the operation to exterminate Jews at its maximum level. Padilla also justified the refusal based on the fact that the possibility of admitting some of the Spanish exiles who were in North Africa was being studied, as well as the fact that a certain number of Polish refugees, some of whom had already reached the country, had been granted admission. In conclusion, the Mexican chancellor proposed in a memorandum to the president: The “Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society” could be told that while our Government sympathizes with the case of the Jewish refugees coming out of the Axis powers, it is sorry not to be able, on this occasion, to admit them into our country, since Mexico’s capacity for accepting foreign refugees is filled, for the moment, by those who are already here and those who are on their way in accord with prior commitments.46

Without further discussion, this was the answer that Padilla sent verbatim to the Mexican ambassador in the United States, who was to transmit it to the representative of HIAS. This suggests that, apparently, Ávila Camacho accepted the recommendations of his minister of foreign affairs without any modifications.47 The story does not end here, since Salomon Dingol, vice president of the HIAS, traveled to Mexico in order to carry out direct negotiations with the Mexican government and presented the Ministry of the Interior

45 Ibid., memorandum for presidential agreement, drawn up by Ezequiel Padilla, Mex­ ico City, July 1, 1943. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., Padilla to Castillo Nájera, Mexico City, July 14, 1943.

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with a new request in which the number of refugees to be admitted was decreased to one thousand and the HIAS promised to take on a larger proportion of the expenses for their stay in Mexico, which would be temporary.48 The Israelite Central Committee of Mexico supported the request by the HIAS and begged the Mexican government to adopt the same generous policy toward the Jewish refugees as it had shown toward the Spanish and Polish refugees and to allow at least one thousand of their brethren to be admitted into Mexico. In the document the agreement was made that the refugees would not settle in the capital of the republic, would not devote themselves to commerce but rather to developing the natural resources of the country, and would not be a burden to the Mexican government. The Central Committee proposed the refugees arrive in groups of up to two hundred people who would be carefully selected by the Jewish committees in accordance with their usefulness and ability to serve the Mexican economy. In order to back up their request the CCIM quoted the observation by the minister of foreign affairs that the lack of population and capital made Latin American countries economically weak, arguing that the Jewish refugees were able to contribute many stimuli to Mexico’s economy. Finally the CCIM pointed out that there were already hundreds of Jewish refugees entering the country individually, “and it is a well-known fact that none of them have become a public burden, nor broken the laws of the country.” The committee added: The Mexican Government has shown its generosity by collectively admitting refugees, mainly Spanish and Polish. There has not really been an opportunity for it to proceed in the same way with the Jewish refugees, and it is undeniable that the democratic Nations would see in this action invaluable cooperation by the Mexican Government in resolving problems that concern us all, and the example of the government of Mexico would be followed by other Governments, this mainly constituting the aid for solving our problems.49

This is a rough draft of the text and we do not know whether this was the final version that was given to the minister of the interior. However, it should be emphasized that the CCIM itself clearly admitted that the 48 Ibid., Padilla to Alemán, Mexico City, July 23, 1943. HIAS-HICEM Archives, series I, file XIII, Mexico 8, 1943, “Reporte sobre México,” Salomon Dingol, vice president of the HIAS, to the Board of Directors, August 18, 1943. 49 AKA, CCIM, [no box number] (Refugiados 1945–1948), file 38, [rough draft of a let­ter from CCIM to the minister of the interior], Mexico City, July 26, 1943.



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Mexican government had not adopted a humanitarian policy regarding the fate of the Jewish refugees. This is in contrast to other texts in which the intention was to thank the country and to avoid confrontation with the authorities by not mentioning the matter. Unfortunately we have not been able to find the answer of the minister of the interior, if there was one, but we do know that the case ended in refusal. The question of why, after having approved five hundred visas for Jewish refugees who were in France at the end of 1942 that could not be used due to the German invasion, the government refused to negotiate with the HIAS the granting of a similar number of entrance permits, has not yet been answered. According to Salomon Dingol’s report, the vice-minister of the interior, Fernando Casas Alemán, had told him that the Mexican government “would do something” for the Jews, but not before October, when the Inter-American Demographic Congress would take place. As we have seen, this may have been a justification for the delay, but not the true motive. Dingol himself, in contrast, referred to the political isolation of the Jewish community of Mexico: its members did not participate in political campaigns nor vote, which led to a very strange relationship between the community and the Mexican government. In this respect, for example, Dingol mentioned that León Behar had not wanted to accompany him to the meeting at the Ministry of the Interior, since during the presidential campaign he had been asked to form a committee in the Jewish community to back the candidacy of Ávila Camacho, which he refused to do.50 It is possible that matters such as this had an influence on the attitude of the Mexican government towards the Jewish refugees, since there was no political motivation to take direct action to save them. The Inter-American Demographic Congress The first Inter-American Demographic Congress, convened by the Mexican government, took place in the Federal District from October 12 to 21, 1943, with the participation of delegates from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, the United States, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,

50 HIAS-HICEM Archives, series I, file XIII, Mexico, 1943, “Reporte sobre México,” Salo­ mon Dingol, vice president of HIAS, to the Board of Directors, August 18, 1943.

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Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela.51 Its main objective was to discuss, exchange, and coordinate points of view on the demographic policies the American countries would adopt in relation to the problems caused by migration in postwar Europe in the face of the predicted success of the Allies.52 According to Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán (at that time head of the Demographic Department of the Ministry of the Interior), the Mexican government thought that solving the population problems that originated in the war could not be achieved within a narrow national framework, but rather required the harmonious cooperation of all of the countries concerned.53 Actually, these countries shared a common fear that once the war had ended, large, uncontrollable waves of immigrants would arrive on the shores of the continent; this fear reflected in part their experience of the First World War. In the words of the minister of the interior: After this war many nations would be literally destroyed, and their people would want to emigrate. The Americas, a legendary shelter for immigrants, would hear the hue and cry with which they would knock on the doors. We must be prepared to meet this call with the greatest mercy in the world. However, we should in no way let this mean thoughtlessly unloading onto our own populations—frequently helpless, fighting to slowly attain a more human life—a burden they cannot support.54

The congress brought to light the intention of the Mexican government to define a continental immigration policy “and in this way present a solid common front and a uniform criterion before the nations who produced immigrants.”55 It should be added that this plan was undertaken not only in respect to the latter nations, but also with regard to the United States and Great Britain, who, under the increasing pressure of public opinion

51 With respect to the Mexican delegation, who were the most numerous because they were the organizers, it is worth pointing out that it included figures of the stature of Alfonso Caso, Manuel Gamio, Luis Chávez Orozco, Miguel Othón de Mendizábal, and Alfonso García Robles. With respect to their occupations, the commission included gov­ ernment workers and ex-workers in charge of the departments of demography and pop­ ulation, along with historians, demographers, anthropologists, and specialists on native groups. Primer Congreso Demográfico Interamericano (Mexico, 1943). 52 Another objective was to analyze the statistical aspects of the foreign population in Latin America in relation to its distribution, economic occupation, “evolution,” and assimilation. 53 Aguirre, “El Primer Congreso Demográfico Interamericano,” 12. 54 “Discurso del Lic. Miguel Alemán, al inaugurarse el Congreso Demográfico,” El Uni­ versal, October 13, 1943, 4. 55 Aguirre, “El Primer Congreso Demográfico Interamericano,” 12.



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calling for the rescue of victims of Nazism, insisted that Latin American countries relax their immigration policies. Three theses that had permeated Latin American thinking on immigration since the thirties continuously cropped up in the deliberations of the participants. The first, underlying the text of the Ministry of the Interior quoted above, was the reiterated intention to protect nationals from the threat, real or potential, that the arrival of foreigners constituted: “The primordial duty of each country shall be, as it has always been, to its own nationals. The humanitarian feelings would be false if its own people were sacrificed for the sake of altruism without measure. Each country should not only determine what immigration it wants to receive but also, above all, what immigration it can receive.”56 The second thesis, which was expressed especially well by the delegate from Argentina, refers to the need for “ethnic selectivity”: In order to exploit the natural riches of the American Continent a determined ethnic type should be chosen carefully, a type that when fused with the native people, results in a superior product in all senses, and does not come to convert the weak and backward into instruments of labor.57

The third thesis insisted on the assimilation of the foreigners, recommending “facilitating the process of trans-culturalization of the immigrants, promoting rapid adaptation of their native culture to the culture of their adopted country.”58 As we saw in the first chapter, these three premises were interrelated: selectivity was indispensable in permitting the entrance of only those who were considered assimilable into the Mexican nation, and thus protecting the native population from possible subjugation and exploitation. Up to this point these theses are familiar to us. The difference lies in that during the Demographic Congress, reiterated, firm, and public denials of racial discrimination took place. The delegations from Mexico, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Haiti presented four papers against racial prejudice, specifically against the use of the word “race.” The Mexican delegation in particular proposed that the congress approve resolutions that would condemn discrimination against any social, linguistic, religious, or political group 56 “Discurso del Lic. Miguel Alemán, al inaugurarse el Congreso Demográfico,” El Uni­ versal, October 13, 1943, 11. 57 “El problema demográfico es esencialmente étnico,” El Universal, October 14, 1943, 1. This idea is found recurrently in the press of the age. 58 HIAS-HICEM Archives, series I, file XIII, Mexico 15, Inter-American Demographic Congress, Resolutions, XIV, “Social misfits,” point 1.

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under the pretext that its members were racially inferior. This must of course be understood within the context of the Nazi atrocities in Europe and the Mexican delegation’s intention to distance itself from this situation. The final resolutions of the congress included the recommendation that the Latin American governments should totally reject any policies or acts of racial discrimination, use the word “race” to refer to physical inheritance alone (and not psychological, cultural, religious, or linguistic traits), and consider antiscientific “any tendency that is meant to promote feelings of racial superiority which, besides being contrary to the conclusions of science, denies the highest principles of social justice, which American nations maintain.”59 It was also proposed that the word “undesirable” be eliminated, in referring to determined nationalities, from the immigration legislation of the American governments.60 Despite these measures of linguistic cleansing, racial thinking was far from abandoned. The term “ethnic group,” with many fewer negative connotations, replaced the word “race” but was used in a synonymous sense. As Alan Knight stated, “To equate ethnicity and race, and to suppose that they determine significant ascribed characteristics of such strength and staying power that they are, in practical terms, immutable, is to fall prey to racism, even if those characteristics are not alleged to be biologically determined.”61 The participants in the congress continued to speak in terms of physical inheritance and of biological features shared by individual peoples. In fact, eugenics, understood as “a factor for the biological and social improvement of individuals,” was proposed as the basis of national immigration policies. That is to say, the recommendation was to take in those immigrants who, from the biological and economic point of view, would make real contributions.62 The ideology of mestizaje, which was based on racist logic, whether or not the term “race” was actually used, remained almost unscathed: thus, the promotion of mestizaje continued to be insisted on in every way possible: “the increase in population should be carried out with those

59 Población. Divulgación Demográfica y Turística. Migración. Turismo, December 1943– January 1944, year IV, vol. 10, nos. 31, 30 and 37, Resolution on racial prejudices. 60 HIAS-HICEM Archives, series I, file XIII, Mexico 15, Inter-American Demographic Congress, Resolutions, XV. Suppression of the word “indeseable.” 61 Knight, “Racism, Revolution and Indigenismo,” 93. 62 Población. Divulgación Demográfica y Turística. Migración. Turismo, December 1943– January 1944, year IV, vol. 10, nos. 31, 30 and 37, Resolution on racial prejudices, and resolution on demographic policy based in eugenics.



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immigrants who, through the mestizo family, favor ethnic homogenization in the physical, psychological, and cultural aspects of the countries of America.” Despite the criticism of racism, there were expressions of xenophobia. Some of these came precisely from the Mexican delegation, which insisted on the need for future immigration to be regulated for the sake of the country. It is interesting that the Mexican delegates thought that for the past twenty years immigration to Mexico had been anarchic, without any rules or effective control. Thus, they concluded that this immigration had caused more harm than good. A statistical study on immigration by Professor Rafael Molina Betancourt, general director of population, and Roberto Parra Gómez, vice-general director of statistics at the Ministry of National Economy, affirmed that 94 percent of the immigrants who had reached Mexico over the last twenty years were people whose origin made them nonassimilable to their new surroundings, “and that they have come to the country as if it were the Promised Land, with no personal aptitudes nor economic resources to invest.”63 In addition, the authors argued that the nation had thus given shelter to immigrants from whom very few or no benefits had been obtained, which was not desirable as a future occurrence in Mexico or in any other part of the continent.64 In fact, in the Demographic Congress, the matter of “social misfits” was dealt with explicitly in relation to the foreigners who had arrived in Latin America. This category was applied to two groups of immigrants. The first was made up of those who “because of their culture and their habits, which were very different from what was common in the American Nations, encounter extremely unfavorable conditions due to the hostility they may find towards their adaptation, which creates in them moods that very easily lead them to take up antisocial activities.” The second group, described as another maladjusted class, corresponded to those immigrants who due to a deliberate negative intention, especially of a political nature, strive to stay apart, culturally, from the new social medium in which they live, and keep, not only for themselves, but also for their descendants, their features

63 “El volumen de inmigración. Ponencia de México que será discutida hoy en el con­ greso Demográfico,” El Universal, October 18, 1943, 1 and 9. 64 Ibid.

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It requires little imagination to perceive that the first category referred to the Jewish exiles and the second to the Spanish exiles. However, with reference to the latter, positive opinions also prevailed; their entry was seen as an organized body of immigrants whose members identified with the country not only because of their blood ties, language, and customs, but also because they shared the same democratic ideals and political ideology.66 Thus, it was concluded that it was preferable to accept immigrants with enough technical capacity to develop incipient Mexican industries, or families of similar nationalities who would contribute their blood to promote mestizaje.67 The Inter-American Demographic Congress and Jewish Immigration The meeting of the first Inter-American Demographic Congress attracted the attention of the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico, which thought the future of Jewish immigration in Latin American countries depended almost entirely on the results of the meeting. Therefore, two months before the delegates met in Mexico City, the committee addressed the World Jewish Congress to insist that they recognize the importance of the matter. The main point they reported was that they had confidentially gotten word of the discussions that were taking place in Mexico and their unfavorable character with respect to immigration in general and the Jewish immigration specifically. In the opinion of the members of the CCIM, the Mexican authorities looked on immigration as a “necessary evil” and thought that the European migratory wave after the war would be made up of elements who were not well suited to assimilating and taking root in new lands. Moreover, they perceived an attitude of rejection towards those who were not considered to be easily integrated (which, in the opinion of the committee,

65 HIAS-HICEM Archives, series I, file XIII, Mexico 15, Inter-American Demographic Congress. Resolutions, XIV, “Social misfits,” point 1. 66 Carlos A. Gómez, “Estudio sobre el tema B, fracción 4a, del temario del Congreso Demográfico Interamericano (Experiencias de cada país con respecto a la migración orga­ nizada),” in Primer Congreso Demográfico Interamericano, Sección Demografía, Ponencias presentadas (mimeo., n. p., 1943). 67 Ibid.



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alluded to those who kept their own religious practices and their own schools, without establishing much contact with the local population). Although the CCIM voiced low expectations regarding the results of the congress, at the same time they knew that the idea that Mexico needed immigration in order to promote the economic development of the country, its industries, and its raw materials was still prevalent in the government. Therefore they thought that by emphasizing the contributions of the Jewish immigrants who had reached Latin America over the past decades, they would have a chance to strengthen their position. This committee also addressed the Inter-American Jewish Council in order to suggest that they try as hard as they could to influence the representatives of the Latin American republics in favor of Jewish immigration before the congress was to take place.68 And they added: “We ourselves have already taken the necessary steps with our own government. However, we think that it is just as necessary to follow the same line with the other republics. Naturally, for this task, the Inter-American Jewish Council is amply suitable.”69 The Inter-American Jewish Council responded to the initiative of the Central Committee by drawing up a document entitled “A Few Remarks about the Problem of Immigration into American Countries,” to be distributed among the delegates of the Demographic Congress. The text, which survives in a manuscript draft, tried to refute by way of documentation, statistics, and historical experiences the main theses that supported opposition to Jewish immigration. It began by establishing as an irrefutable fact that in terms of absolute as well as relative numbers, almost all of the Latin American countries could be considered underpopulated, wherein lay the importance of immigration as a resource for increasing and stimulating their creative efforts. Later each of the arguments put forward against said immigration was analyzed. These arguments were relatively new in the history of the Latin American countries, which had traditionally opened

68 Along these lines Víctor Mitrani, president of the Mexican subcommittee of the World Jewish Congress, proposed that each Jewish community in Latin America approach the delegates from their countries who would be attending the Inter-American Conference in order to provide them with as much documentation as possible related to Jewish immigration in general and Latin American immigration in particular. Besides general documents, he recommended that each community include information on the economic contribution that Jewish immigrants had made over the previous years to their respective countries, as was being done in Mexico. AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 240/8, Mitrani to WJC, Mexico City, August 12, 1943. 69 Ibid., CCIM to Zuckerman, Mexico City, August 6, 1943.

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their doors to immigrants considered as valuable elements per se, beyond their economic or cultural capital. The document defended four main theses. The first asserted that the emigration of Jewish refugees to Latin America that began in 1933 was not numerically significant, as was commonly maintained.70 The second rejected the argument that this emigration was made up of people with no means of livelihood;71 even from a strictly financial point of view, it was maintained that it was much more probable that the immigrants were more of a benefit than a risk. The third thesis, which related to concern about the occupational structure of the immigrants, alluded to the fact that many of the Latin American countries were quite interested in broadening their industrial sector, and therefore not only farmers but also industrialists could be considered beneficial immigrants. The fourth dealt with the matter of the “nonassimilability” of the Jewish refugees. In this sense the authors of the document maintained there was no reason to demand that these immigrants break with their original culture, as long as they showed the greatest loyalty possible towards the country that took them in, to which the majority were destined to develop strong ties. In defending this point, they considered that experience had proved that those who maintained their loyalty to their people were generally better citizens of the new countries than those who were willing, for real or imaginary benefits, to cut their ties with the past and their cultural heritage. Lastly, it was pointed out that the Jewish refugees did not present the problem of turning into a fifth column. The manuscript ended by expressing the hope that any effort to stop immigration would meet with firm opposition, and that the Demographic Congress would proclaim the desire of the Latin American republics to liberalize existing immigration policies in order to admit those who, for certain reasons, could not or did not wish to stay in their countries of origin—immigrants who without a doubt would be beneficial to the Latin

70 In fact, in no American country did the number of refugees admitted represent more than 0.4 percent of the total population, from which it could be deduced that there was no danger that the existing political and economic condi­tions in those countries would be altered. 71 Quite to the contrary, it was pointed out—using data from the United States—that the refugees had not only brought about one and a half billion dollars into the country since 1933, but had also set up more than 260 new businesses, with a significant amount of capital, exporting manufactured products (which in some cases replaced imports) and giving work to native workers.



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American countries.72 This text, in its final version, and another memorandum drawn up by the HICEM were handed out to the delegates of the congress, although we do not know whether the delegations studied them or not. The Israelite Central Committee reported having a very active, if indirect, participation in the Demographic Congress. They did not think it necessary to make direct contact with representatives among the foreign delegations, but were receiving information on the discussions that were taking place from apparently reliable Mexican sources. Moisés Glikowski, executive secretary of the CCIM, affirmed this: “Our fear was that the racist stance would prevail during the conference, despite all of the security measures which had been taken, but as things turned out, it was apparent that this fear was unfounded.”73 The matter of Jewish immigration was not discussed explicitly, which is significant given the international context in which the Demographic Congress was held. This very fact may be an indication of the lack of interest the Latin American countries had in delineating postwar immigration policies that included Jewish populations. While racist arguments were not wielded, careful selection and the prerequisite of assimilability for immigrants still operated as filters to keep many people out. While the qualitative criteria for the admission of industrial immigrants were broadened, the fear expressed by Latin American countries of being overwhelmed by a wave of immigrants of alarming proportions remained clear. One of the few concrete results of the congress was the creation of a Permanent Demographic Committee, with representatives from, among other countries, the United States, Mexico, Peru, and Argentina. It began to function in March 1944. The War Refugee Board, George Messersmith, and Mexico In January 1944 Franklin D. Roosevelt established the War Refugee Board, an organization that met directly with the president, and entrusted it with carrying out the policy of the North American government on behalf of the

72 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 240/12, “A Few Remarks about the Problem of Immigration into American Countries” (memorandum submitted by the Inter-American Jewish Coun­cil to the Inter-American Conference on Demography and Migration). 73 Ibid., H 240/8, CCIM to HICEM-New York, Mexico City, December 6, 1943 (trans­ lated from the Yiddish by Maty Sommer).

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victims of enemy oppression who were in mortal danger.74 The measure was above all an answer to the pressure that public opinion had exerted on Roosevelt’s government. The Board, as it was called, was to implement as quickly as possible the tasks of rescue and aid.75 Throughout 1944 the organization sought the cooperation of Latin American countries in joining the international efforts to save the Jews and other people being persecuted in Europe, as well as the cooperation of neutral European countries willing to allow refugees to enter their territories. Aware of the fact that helping those who were in occupied territories was practically impossible, the Board tried to save those who had passports or visas for Latin America.76 To this end it addressed the governments of Honduras, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Haiti, Venezuela, and El Salvador to request that, for humanitarian reasons, they take no action to revoke, cancel, or annul the validity of Latin American passports, at least not until the war had ended.77 The governments of the majority of these countries, who up until then had not acknowledged the validity of these documents, agreed, formally or informally, to the plea for help made by the Board via the American embassies of these countries. The Latin American governments were also asked to intercede on behalf of persecuted people with the German authorities, demanding that all inmates who had Latin American passports or consular documents receive the same treatment as prisoners of war, as set down in the Geneva Convention. Due to the fact that the Board knew the position of the Latin American countries with respect to refugee immigration, it clarified that the American government did not expect any of the persecuted people to be physically admitted to their territories, but rather only

74 War Refugee Board (WRB), box 119, vol. I (1/4), Executive Order 9417 “Establishing a War Refugee Board.” 75 Despite these express intentions, they achieved little power, enjoyed practically no cooperation from the president of the United States or his administration, and received inadequate governmental financing, which left the Jewish organizations (whose contribu­ tions were limited) to cover 90 percent of the expenses. With the dedicated work of a relatively small number of people, the War Refugee Board helped save about 200,000 Jews and at least 20,000 non-Jews. Wyman, Abandonment, x, 209–307. 76 As previously mentioned, there was a lot of trafficking in and forgery of these kinds of documents. In February 1944 the vice director of the Intergovernmental Committee estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 people in occupied Europe had documents from Latin America; 4,000 of these were issued by Latin American consuls in Switzerland. Ibid., 277–80. 77 WRB, box 119, “Projects and Documents. . . ,” vol. II, (3/4), “Recognition of Latin Amer­ican Passports,” p. 2.



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that they be brought to safety and relocated in other areas.78 The Board explained that “Any insinuation on our part that it was expected that the Jewish applicants in question be admitted into the respective Latin American countries, even on a temporary or tentative basis, will only bring more delays in the necessary cooperation of these governments in approaching the Germany authorities in the name of the Jewish demands.”79 Moreover, the Board bought time with this measure, since it was not necessary to wait until immigration projects were negotiated and approved, which, as we saw in the case of Mexico, could take years. The German authorities adopted different attitudes with inmates who had Latin American passports or “promises” (documents issued by the representative of an Allied or neutral country which certified that the bearer would receive a visa from that country as soon as he appeared before a consular representation of the country). In some cases they were allowed to leave the occupied territory unilaterally (as was the case for many Sephardic Jews who could prove Spanish or Turkish nationality), while in others, the most common ones, they were sent to concentration camps (mainly Bergen-Belsen and Vittel) where they were kept alive in hopes that they would be useful to exchange for Germans who wished to return to the Third Reich from Latin America.80 With respect to Mexico, the War Refugee Board asked the American ambassador, George Messersmith, to make inquiries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as to the possibilities of Ávila Camacho’s government adopting public measures similar to those adopted by President Roosevelt, and promising to take in a predetermined number of French children when the war was over, in order to negotiate temporary asylum for them with the Swiss government. However, Messersmith did not wish to tackle the matter with the Ministry of the Interior nor with the presidency, considering that the moment was not right and the consultation might prove counterproductive. However, he did approach the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report on the creation of the War Refugee Board and to let them know that his government expected the effort to not be unilateral,

78 Ibid., p. 4. Among these zones Palestine, Cyprus, Africa, the Virgin Islands, and neu­ tral territories were mentioned. 79 WRB, box 53, folder 46, “Recognition of Latin American Passports,” vol. I (2), April 5, 1944, p. 3. 80 Ibid., p. 1. According to the War Refugee Board, 2,000 people survived because they were deliberately kept alive for use in exchanges.

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requesting the cooperation of the Mexican government by means of the implementation of similar measures: While making clear the position of the government of the United States on this problem, at the same time we wish to express the hope that there will be cooperative action by the government of Mexico. It is believed that the action taken by the government of the United States would be better implemented if the Mexican government issued a statement which contained a similar policy to the one enacted by the President of the United States.81

The response of the Mexican government is of interest because on the one hand, the government affirmed in writing that Mexico had always abided by a policy of aid to refugees from all backgrounds (specifically mentioning the case of the Spanish refugees and the Polish colony of Santa Rosa); on the other hand, the government indicated in an oral communication that, for the time being, “Mexico did not think it would be able to make, in this matter, any effort other than the one it has carried out and continues to fulfill,” and it restricted its policy to taking in, in individual cases, people who found themselves in special circumstances that merited their admission.82 Messersmith’s opinion was that the Mexican government, despite its liberal policy with respect to asylum, was not interested in taking in a considerable number of refugees from Europe before or after the war.83 He came to this conclusion following the private, confidential conversations he had held at different times with high-level officers of the Mexican government, as well as with private organizations of the United States, when he discretely looked into the situation. In a conversation with a representative of the American Jewish Committee (AJC), he assured him that he had not been successful in his efforts to promote a more receptive attitude on the part of the Mexican authorities on the settlement of Jewish refugees.84

81 AHSRE, file III-2477-1, fs. 1 y 2, memorandum from the ambassador of the United States in Mexico to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Mexico City], March 24, 1944. 82 Ibid., fs. 7–10, memorandum for presidential agreement from the Diplomatic Depart­ ment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, April 12, 1944, and memorandum of April 17, 1944, which was never sent, but rather transmitted verbally. 83 WRB, box 39, folder 33, George Messersmith, “Activities of the War Refugee Board and the Possibilities of Collaboration with it by the Mexican Government,” Mexico City, April 27, 1944, pp. 2–3. 84 AJA, Morris D. Waldman Papers (MDW), Manuscript Collection no. 23, series C, box 6, folder 5, Latin America 1944–1952, p. 3, Declaration of Morris Waldman, July 29, 1947.



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Messersmith reported that the restrictions placed by Mexican consular and diplomatic authorities on the issuing of visas were so severe that in recent years they had taken in practically no one other than Spanish refugees. He also observed that this change of policy, which even included Spain, was based on the Mexican government’s experiences with many of the refugees, which had not been very satisfying. While the Spanish refugees had caused problems due to their political activities, the refugees from other European countries had not made a good impression on Mexican society, especially due to their economic activities, and this had influenced the government’s attitude.85 The ambassador also transmitted his impression that the Mexican government did not think the country needed immigration, but rather needed to improve the life of the current population and to develop national industry.86 His point of view was shared, almost word for word, by the MexicanAmerican journalist and intellectual Anita Brenner, who thought that the Jews who had reached Mexico earlier had won a rather bad reputation— above all, for having introduced sales on the installment plan—and that this had caused an unfavorable attitude towards Jewish immigration in general.87 According to Messersmith’s reports, the minister of foreign affairs, who had handled the matter extensively with President Ávila Camacho, told him that “Any request for admittance by any specific group of refugees from any country would have to be rejected since the Mexican government was not in a position [. . .] to take in any for the moment.”88 The ambassador referred to the visible discomfort of the minister of foreign affairs, Ezequiel Padilla, who was unable to cooperate in the solution to this conflict, although his collaboration on other matters of interAmerican and international politics had been, up to this point, extremely positive, “to an unusual degree.” Messersmith, in turn, ended by advising the War Refugee Board not to exert any pressure on the Mexican government 85 WRB, box 39, folder 33, George Messersmith, “Activities of the War Refugee Board and the Possibilities of Collaboration with it by the Mexican Government,” Mexico City, April 27, 1944, pp. 3–4. According to this source, many arrived with considerable sums of money and instead of starting new industries or new businesses, they showed more inter­ est in controlling businesses and industries that were already established. 86 Ibid., p. 4. 87 HIAS-HICEM Archives, series I, file XIII, Mexico 8, 1943. Interview with Anita Brenner, New York, June 24, 1943. 88 WRB, box 39, folder 33, George Messersmith, “Activities of the War Refugee Board and the Possibilities of Collaboration with it by the Mexican Government,” Mexico City, April 27, 1944, p. 4.

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due to the fact that it would be useless and, to the contrary, it might have an unfavorable effect.89 Although in an internal memorandum the Board suggested ignoring the recommendations of the American ambassador and instead waiting for a specific project before seeking his cooperation,90 the history of this period seems to have proven him right. Mexico was not willing to cooperate with the government of the United States on this matter. The Creation of a “Safe Harbor” for Jews in Mexico and the Action of the American Jewish Committee Within the context which we have just described, and taking into account that all of the projects for Jewish immigration to Mexico during 1943–1944 had failed, an article that appeared in the Mexican press on August 2, 1944, reporting that Mexico would open its doors to Jewish political refugees for the duration of the war, did not escape attention. The article, entitled “Encontrarán hospitalidad” (They will find hospitality), published in El Universal, read: The Government of Mexico has decided to grant facilities to political refugees of Israelite origin to build an agricultural colony, when the elements may be considered political refugees.  In this connection we were given a document at the General Direction of Information, in which, among other things, it says:  It is traditional [to extend] the hospitality of our country towards people of other nationalities who, suffering political persecution in their places of origin, take refuge among us. Continuing this tradition, the Government of Mexico will grant facilities for establishing a colony of political refugees of Israelite origin in a certain determined area, and only for the duration of the war, which prevents them from living in their places of residence, to which they must return once the wartime circumstances cease. It is understood that the group which will arrive will be made up largely of persecuted women and children. Their maintenance will be covered by themselves or charitable institutions and not by the Government of Mexico, which will only provide them the opportunity to live under the protection of the guarantees granted by our laws.91

89 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 90 WRB, box 39, folder 33, memorandum, April 20, 1944. 91 “Encontrarán hospitalitalidad. Los refugiados israelitas podrán vivir en México mien­ tras dura la guerra,” El Universal, August 2, 1944.



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In spite of the efforts made by the American government through various authorities, it was Jacob Landau, director of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) and a member of the executive committee of the American Jewish Committee, who apparently convinced the Mexican government to make this statement. Landau had travelled throughout Mexico as part of a trip around Latin American he made accompanied by Morris Waldman, the vice president of the executive committee of the AJC. They were both interested in learning about the Latin American situation in general, and especially about the situation in relation to Jewish matters (anti-Semitism, immigration, assimilation, and so on), as well as in making contacts that would prove useful to the committee to which they belonged. Landau and Waldman had the support of the War Refugee Board, which entrusted them with the possibility of broadening the opportunities for the settlement of European refugees in the countries they would visit, and the American State Department, which showed special interest in their trip. The secretary of state, Cordell Hull, with whom they met a few days before leaving, also hoped the mission would be successful, since he had personally sent cables to all of the ambassadors in the Latin American countries to ask for their cooperation. In Mexico, therefore, they received help from George Messersmith, who told the minister of foreign affairs, with whom he enjoyed a close friendship, that the purpose of the visit of the representatives of the American Jewish Committee was to find out whether the Mexican government would be willing to create what he called a “safe harbor” for Jewish refugees, similar to the one recently established in the United States.92 In the memorandum handed to Padilla, Landau and Waldman clarified that what they were asking the Mexican government for, primarily, was a “moral gesture”: “It is not expected that any refugee will really reach the safe harbor. This safe harbor would be, basically, a moral gesture showing the humanitarian interest of Mexico in the face of the number of innocent people who are being cruelly exterminated by our common enemy.”93

92 AHSRE, file III-2477-1, fs. 43–44, Messersmith to Padilla, Mexico City, July 25, 1944. 93 Ibid., f. 45, memorandum from Jacob Landau and Morris Waldman, transmitted by Ambassador Messersmith to Padilla, Mexico City, July 25, 1944. Waldman thought that it would be better for the declaration of the Mexican government to be interpreted by public opinion as a spontaneous, disinterested action that could serve as an example for other Latin American countries. Therefore, he did not want any mention made of the interven­ tion of the American Jewish Committee.

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The offer of asylum would be no more than a symbolic act, they thought, since the end of the war was near.94 The most unusual part of the case is that the only reference made to the statement by President Ávila Camacho seems to have been the article that appeared in El Universal. In fact, when Ambassador Messersmith was instructed to obtain and send the text of the statement to the War Refugee Board (so that this organization could use it in its negotiations with the government of Hungary in relation to Jewish emigration), he replied that he had not been able to carry out the instructions “since up to this time no declaration of this kind has been published by the President and the status of the matter is certainly not such that, as far as I know, the establishment of a safe harbor here could be used as a basis for the negotiations with the Hungarian government for the emigration of refugees from Hungary.”95 In light of this, and despite the news that the hospitality towards Jewish refugees brought many congratulatory messages,96 its failure to make the pages of one of the two main Jewish-Mexican newspapers of the era, Der Weg (The Way), is noteworthy.97 Likewise, the negligible space devoted to 94 AJA, MDW, Manuscript Collection no. 23, series C, box 6, folder 5, p. 7, Dec­laration of Morris Waldman, July 29, 1947. 95 WRB, Projects and Documents Files. Programs with respect to Relief and Rescue of Refugees: Temporary Haven, box 54, folder 47, Mexico, Messersmith to the secretary of state of the U.S., Mexico City, August 5, 1944. 96 Among others, from the Central American Office of the World Jewish Congress, AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 242/10, Israelite Information. Provided by the Central American Office of the World Jewish Congress, no. 10, August 8, 1944. Also from the Israelite Central Com­ mittee of Mexico, AGN, PMAC, file 546.1/1, CCIM to Manuel Ávila Camacho, Mexico City, August 10, 1944. From the United States the American Jewish Committee, the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe and the War Refugee Board. See, respec­ tively, AGN, PMAC, file 546.1/1, Joseph M. Proskauer, president of the American Jewish Committee, to Francisco Castillo Nájera, New York, August 4, 1944; AHSRE, file III-2477-1, fs. 61–63, telegram from the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, New York, August 4, 1944 and AHSRE, file III-2477-1, f. 50, official document from the Chief Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Miguel Alemán, Mexico City, September 12, 1944. There were also congratulatory telegrams from non-Jewish organizations, such as the Railroad Workers’ Union, which, signed by Valentín Campa, acknowledged in the name of “Mexicans, enemies of Fascist theories of racial discrimination” that the gesture made by the Mexican gov­ernment reaffirmed the Mexican policy in favor of democratic measures, with which the Mexican Republic gained prestige before mankind; the acknowledgement of the recently formed Mexican Committee against Racism (financed by the American Jewish Commit­tee); that of International Democratic Action, and of the Sugar Workers’ Union. See AGN, PMAC, file 546.1/1. 97 In contrast, the newspaper Di Shtime (The Voice), aligned farther to the left, reported the news in terms highly laudatory of the Mexican government and its humanitarian



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this matter in the magazine Mundo Libre (Free World), which was edited by Isidro Fabela, a figure close to the members of the Israelite Central Committee, and had a special section dedicated to the Jewish world, must be pointed out. It is possible, then, that many groups read the declarations correctly, interpreting them to be a mere gesture of kindness towards the Jewish tragedy, without any greater significance. That there were some indications that the statements made by the president would not have any important repercussions can be seen in the fact that in the same month of August 1944, Manuel Ávila Camacho did not personally meet with the president of the World Jewish Congress, Nahum Goldmann, who was visiting Mexico at that time.98 The content of the statement issued by the Mexican government must be pointed out and reference made to the apparent contradiction between the fact that asylum was offered to those who were considered to be “political refugees,” while at the same time establishing that the group would mainly be made up of persecuted women and children who, besides, would dedicate themselves to agriculture. Jacob Landau had negotiated not only the statement of the Mexican government, but also the authorization of four hundred Mexican visas to save a similar number of Hungarian Jews, through a rather unclear arrangement, which he asked to be kept secret.99 In fact, Landau, belonging to the American Jewish Committee, committed the Joint Distribution Committee to pay Vicente Lombardo Toledano $80,000, which corresponded to the four hundred certificates.100 The money was to be used

attitude: “Puertos de salvamento para los judíos en México,” Di Shtime, Mexico City, August 5, 1944. 98 AGN, PMAC, file 546.1/1, Fabela to Ávila Camacho, Mexico City, August 8, 1944, and the answer of the Chief Officer Lic. Amorós G., Mexico City, [n.d.]. Goldmann and Zuckerman were received by the minister of the interior and the minister of foreign affairs. 99 “Of course, this secret should be jealously guarded; if it were to become public, it would prove extremely shameful.” AJA, MDW, Manuscript Collection no. 23, series C, box 6, folder 5, p. 7, Declaration of Morris Waldman, July 29, 1947. 100 Ibid., p. 6. Since we have only this declaration by Waldman as a basis, it is necessary to investigate the matter more carefully. It should be pointed out, however, that with respect to the situation of the refugees there were innumerable cases of corruption in general, as proven by the sales of Latin American visas that at that moment were taking place in Europe (see Wyman, Abandonment, 277–80), and that some of these cases may have taken place within the Mexican political sphere. The problem with these “informal” arrangements, due to their very nature, was that there were hardly ever any official records, while the refugees we have interviewed prefer not to talk about it. Thus, there is very little possibility of documenting them fully.

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to renew the printing presses of El Popular, which he referred to as the only liberal newspaper in Mexico, whose modernization would allow it to increase its circulation and influence, benefitting the cause of democracy. In exchange, presumably, Lombardo Toledano would negotiate with the Mexican government for approval of the visas. It is not clear how this relationship between Landau and Lombardo Toledano came into being, but by then the AJC was financing the Mexican Committee against Racism, whose executive committee included, among others, Lombardo Toledano, Jaime Torres Bodet, and Isidro Fabela.101 In order to put the final touches on the deal, Moises Leavitt travelled to Mexico. He was the executive secretary of the Joint and showed little enthusiasm for the success of the negotiations, since he felt the end of the war was near, and then there would be no need to take up the offer of the Mexican government. However, the Joint decided not to renege on paying the amount offered (which by then had been fixed at $75,000) since that would bring discredit to those involved.102 The final destination of this money is uncertain. The Joint apparently followed through on its offer with a check for $50,000 (deposited in the National City Bank of New York) and $25,000 in cash. According to Waldman’s report, $25,000 was sent to Elena Vázquez Gómez, the executive secretary of the Mexican Committee against Racism; however, the money was not used to finance that committee, but rather to form a prodemocratic, liberal news agency called ANLA that would offer regular service to several Mexican newspapers and later on to other Latin American newspapers.103 We do not know to what use the other $50,000 dollars was put. As far as is known, the printing presses of El Popular were not modernized nor did the paper increase its circulation. The Joint was not notified how the money was spent, either. In 1947 Waldman declared that he had not wanted to make any statements on the subject for fear of the fact that it would be made public that $25,000 from the Joint had been used to fund a project of the AJC. He also reported that when he met with Alejandro Carrillo in New York (Carrillo was Vicente Lombardo Toledano’s

101 AGN, PMAC, file 546.1/1, Fraternidad. Órgano del Comité Mexicano contra el Racismo, no. 1 (June 1944). I thank Ariela Katz for sharing with me the documentation of the Morris Waldman collection in the American Jewish Archives. 102 AJA, MDW, Manuscript Collection no. 23, series C, box 6, folder 5, p. 7, Dec­laration of Morris Waldman, July 29, 1947. 103 Ibid., pp. 14 and 18–19.



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right-hand man), after constantly trying to find him, Carrillo told him that “he had not personally received any money but that he was sure that it had all been handed over.”104 What we can conclude, however, is that once again, as in many other cases in the story we are telling, corruption played an important role. Now we will look at the final destination of the four hundred visas. The Last Chance: Saving the Hungarian Jews The matter of saving the Hungarian Jews presented itself to international circles beginning when the government of Miklós Horthy stopped deporting Jews in July 1944 and would allow those who had a valid visa for other countries (preferably for Palestine, if they were adults, but indiscriminately if they were children with their parents) to leave the country.105 Mexico had been consulted on the matter, since it formed part of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees;106 the organization was asking all Western countries to admit a certain number of refugees from Hungary, in what was thought to be the only opportunity at the time

104 Ibid., p. 20. 105 The “Final Solution” was implemented in Hungary beginning with the German invasion of the country in March 1944. The occupation forces included a Sonderkom­ mando unit led by Adolf Eichmann, who in collaboration with the Hungarian authori­ ties deported about 440,000 Jews to extermination camps between May and July of that year. The Hungarian government of Milos Horthy stopped the deportations in July 1944 (due to the deterioration of the German military situation and fear of later retaliation by the Allies), but a coup d’état directed by the Germans, which took place in October of the same year, brought the Fascist, anti-Semitic Arrow Cross party to power, and Eichmann’s plan continued. In January 1945, with the Soviet forces in the area of Pest, Hungary signed the armistice. The Red Army freed the section of Buda in February 1945, and threw the last German units and their Arrow Cross collaborators out of the western zone of Hungary in April. Of the nearly 825,000 Jews who lived in Hungary in 1941, about 63,000 died or were killed before the German occupation in 1944. Under the direct responsibility of the Nazis approximately 500,000 people were killed or died from mistreatment. About 255,000 Hungarian Jews survived the Holocaust. “Hungary after the German Occupation,” in the Holocaust Encyclopedia on the website of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005458. 106 In April 1943 at the Bermuda Conference, with representatives from the United States and the United Kingdom, the reconstitution of the Intergovernmental Committee was decided on, giving it the broadest jurisdiction and power and establishing its head­ quarters in London. However, due to the fact that the emigration of Jews and other per­ secuted peoples could not be negotiated with the Nazis, this measure had practically no effect at all.

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to save numerous lives. In September 1944 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to grant four hundred visas.107 The idea initially was to receive these refugees in Mexico, and instructions were even sent for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to document them for a year as war exiles, exempt from issuing guarantees of repatriation.108 However, one week later the authorities changed their minds, when the Ministry of the Interior stated that with respect to the four hundred visas for Hungarian Jews, “it is only a matter of removing this nucleus from the hands of our enemies by providing them, under the protection of our visas, with resettlement in various places where their lives may be saved.”109 These instructions were repeated a month and a half later, clarifying that “this authorization did not entail granting permission for said Israelites to come to Mexico.”110 The Mexican government went even further in its desire to assure that the refugees not reach Mexico, ordering that entrance into the country be blocked for Jewish individuals who presented F-5 forms issued by the Mexican Consulate in Berne, Switzerland, that bore certain serial numbers, which were specified.111 This instruction was also repeated various times. Since Mexico did not have diplomatic relations with Hungary (it must be remembered that Sweden represented the interests of the Mexican Republic before the Axis powers and their satellites), issuing the certificates to the interested parties was extremely complicated. The Mexican consul in Berne, Switzerland, Jorge Daesslé Segura, was in charge of issuing the Mexican certificates (after receiving the list of names from the American Aid Society for Israelites). Once issued, these documents would be sent to the Swedish Legation in Budapest to be handed over to the interested parties. The Mexican Consulate in Berne had multiple difficulties. Since Daesslé Segura did not have four hundred F-5 immigration forms, he consulted the Mexican authorities to ask whether he could replace them with sheets

107 AHSRE, file III-2477-1, telegram from Crespo de la Serna to SRE, [n.p.], August 21, 1944, and the telegram from Rosenzweig Díaz to SRE, London, September 19, 1944. 108 Ibid., Casas Alemán to Padilla, Mexico City, August 22, 1944. 109 Ibid., f. 40, Casas Alemán to Padilla, Mexico City, August 30, 1944. (Strictly confiden­ tial reserved document.) 110 Ibid., f. 83, Pérez Martínez to Padilla (reserved confidential message), Mexico City, October 17, 1944. 111  Ibid., f. 88, Pérez Martínez to the head of Population Service of the Ministry of the Interior, Mexico City, November 25, 1944.



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of legal-sized paper containing all of the data required by the forms, and whether it was possible to exempt the Jewish refugees from the formality of appearing before the consulate, in the event that they were unable to do so.112 The Ministry of the Interior answered both questions in the negative, ordering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send the required four hundred sets of F-5 forms to Switzerland, and stipulating that the interested parties had to appear before the Mexican Consulate in order to obtain the visas, which was impossible. They also requested that the refugees be told that the granting of the visas had the objective only of providing them with the possibility of settling in places where their lives could be saved, but did not include authorization to enter the national territory: this notification had to be signed at the bottom of the page by the refugees.113 After traveling a long bureaucratic route, the four hundred sets of F-5 migration forms reached Berne on March 16, 1945, more than six months after the Mexican government had approved the visas. Only after they had arrived did the Mexican consul discover that he also needed four hundred sets of the “blue form 1” for applicants for immigration, which he then requested from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.114 Daesslé Segura also addressed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ask whether the Swiss government was aware of the “special way” in which the four hundred Hungarian Jews would be documented, since due to prevailing circumstances in Europe, the majority of these refugees would in fact remain in Switzerland, where there were over one hundred thousand exiled people. Foreseeing a complaint by the Swiss authorities, the consul recommended informing them about the question ahead of time, a move that was accepted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.115 Two years later, in the context of an episode related to the entrance of a group of Jews into Palestine under the protection of Mexican visas, which apparently was an unfounded rumor coming from the British Chancellery, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the consulate in Berne whether this might be related to the four hundred visas that had been authorized in 1944, to which the Mexican consul responded: “Counselor Daesslé reports 112 Ibid., Daesslé Segura to SRE, Berne, September 21, 1944. 113 Ibid., SRE to Daesslé Segura, Mexico City, November 5, 1944. 114 Ibid., f. 100, Mexican Consulate in Switzerland (no signature) to SRE, Bern, March 16, 1945. 115 Ibid., Daesslé Segura to SRE, Bern, December 19, 1944, and SRE to Daesslé Segura, Mexico City, January 10, 1945.

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that not a single visa was issued in the year 1944 to save from Nazi terror [the] 400 Jews to whom you refer with reference [number] 52131 because we did not receive precise instructions and because they were freed in due course by the Russian army.”116 Once again, we find another case in which the discourse of Mexican government authorities in relation to the admittance of Jewish refugees into the country contrasts with the actions carried out, or rather not carried out. It is possible that Daesslé Segura did not receive precise instructions on time. It is not even clear whether the Mexican Consulate in Berne received the names of the four hundred people to whom it was to grant the moral protection of the Mexican government. What is clear, in any event, is that during the final months of 1944 these certificates would have saved at least 400 of the nearly 560,000 Hungarian Jews deported and killed in various extermination camps by the Nazis and the collaborating Hungarian authorities. Despite the fact that the Mexican government’s option to grant safeconduct permits that would allow Jews to escape from the areas controlled by the Nazis would have been the ideal way to fulfill the desire to help those who were being killed without opening the doors of the country, the Mexican authorities once again on this occasion failed to make a significant contribution to saving the persecuted people. The Year 1944: The End of the Rescue Projects By 1944 opportunities to rescue Jewish refugees were extremely scarce. With the failure to save the four hundred Hungarian refugees, the matter of Mexico’s offering refuge to the Jewish refugees came to an end. In fact, the problem of the Jewish refugees was slipping into second place. The Mexican government’s attention was now turning to postwar immigration and the legal status of those refugees who would remain in the country. In this connection, in March 1944 the lawyer Carmen Otero y Gama, a close collaborator of Vicente Lombardo Toledano with connections to the highest levels of government, met with a group of representatives of the local Jewish community to inform them of the situation. Perhaps picking up the thread of the Inter-American Demographic Congress, she reported: 116 ACSRE, file III-1431-5, SRE to the Mexican Consulate in Berne, Mexico City, August 12, 1946, and Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz to SRE, Paris, August 17, 1946.



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(1) From the official standpoint no racial factors would be taken into account in relation to immigration. The main criteria would be the capacity of the country to economically absorb the immigrants. (2) Immigration into Mexico would be suspended for a year beginning with the signing of the armistice. The main reason was to prevent fifth columnists from entering Mexico during that period. (3) No new changes would be made in the existing immigration laws. This meant that the prohibition on the immigration of workers would remain in force. The profile of the immigrants to be admitted would be mainly capitalists able to invest 50,000 to 100,000 pesos, and industrial experts. (4) Those refugees who were in Mexico at the time would be placed in two categories: (a) political refugees without the right to work; (b) refugees who had reached Mexico due to the war and who could not be classified under any of the categories of immigrants envisaged by the law. Apparently, those who were in the first situation (there were not many) would be allowed to stay in the country permanently and legally as foreign residents (this was a right that immigrants usually acquired after having lived in Mexico for five years). Those in the second category (most of the Jewish refugees) would have to fit into one of the categories acknowledged as legal immigration following the war, or, otherwise they were going to have to return to their countries of origin.117 It was reported that exceptions would be made in the case of refugees with children born in Mexico, because according to the law these children were considered Mexicans and their parents, therefore, would have the privilege of remaining in the country. Apparently the five “legal” years that were necessary in order to obtain the right of permanent residence would begin to be counted after the war; that is to say, the time the refugees had already been in Mexico would not count.118 Despite this information and the fear it caused, five months later the minister of the interior told Nahum Goldmann, representative of the World Jewish Congress, that the position of the Mexican government in relation 117 Underlined in the original. 118 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 241/10, Glikowski to Zuckerman, Director of the InterAmerican Jewish Council of the World Jewish Congress, Mexico City, March 2, 1944. (Confidential.)

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to the Jewish refugees who had immigrated as a result of the European tragedy was to grant them permission to stay in Mexico with all the rights of residents. Goldmann expressed his gratitude for the humanitarian declaration and stance of the authorities, pointing out that Mexico could serve as a good example, thanks to its generosity, for Latin American countries that had taken in Jewish refugees.119 One month later, Francisco Trejo, Mexican representative to the InterAmerican Demographic Congress (and the previous general director of population) assured Moisés Glikowski that the statement Miguel Alemán had made to Nahum Goldmann was not merely a casual comment, but was in full keeping with the position Mexico had assumed, more than a year before, at the Inter-American Demographic Congress. Trejo affirmed that, despite the fact that it had been clearly established that the time the refugees had spent in Mexico would not be taken into account when regularizing their legal status, he was convinced that this would change when the matter of the permanent status of the refugees in Mexico was dealt with.120 It is still necessary to investigate the legal situation of the refugees who stayed and how the process of their integration into Mexican society worked out. For the Jewish community as well, the subject of refuge was moving into second place. First of all, as we have mentioned, it was impossible to save those who were in concentration and extermination camps. By then the position of the Mexican government on the projects of Jewish immigration into Mexico was clear and apparently the channels for negotiation were practically closed. Second, the matter of rescuing the refugees took a back seat due to the fact that the Jewish community was turning its support toward the Zionist movement. Zionism, defined as a national Jewish movement, aspired to normalize the abnormal situation of the Israelites (a “landless people”) by creating a Jewish state in Palestine, based on the assumption that the lack of a state was what had prevented them from stopping the Nazis in their objectives of extermination. Unlike what happened in other Diaspora communities, in Mexico Zionism was supported by the majority of the

119 “All of the Jewish Refugees are going to be able to stay in Mexico,” Der Weg, August 22, 1944 (translated from the Yiddish by Maty Sommer). 120 AJA, WJCR, MS-361, H 241/11, Zuckerman to the members of the Committee of the Office of WJC, [New York], September 26, 1944.



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Jewish community.121 There were still some critical voices to be heard, such as the executive secretary of the CCIM, who criticized the fact that the subject of Jewish immigration to Latin America was not included in the points to be dealt with at the Assembly of the World Jewish Congress to take place in May 1944. In his opinion, “probably, this fact is intentional, with the purpose of not disturbing the basic solution of the Jewish problem in the world at all, which is that of rebuilding a Jewish Country in Palestine. But we must discuss whether we agree with such a policy of the Congress or whether we should object to it.”122 Apparently no objection was made from Mexico. Zionism also had the support of renowned figures from the Mexican political sphere, who formed the Comité Mexicano pro Palestina (Mexican Committee for Palestine), headed by Isidro Fabela.123 The creation of this committee was linked to the visit to Mexico in December 1943 of Luis Lipsky and Manuel Newman, Zionist leaders from the United States who met with representative figures from the non-Jewish world, among them various foreign diplomats. When the administrative director of the World Jewish Congress, Nahum Goldmann, visited Mexico in 1944 he met with Chancellor Ezequiel Padilla, who expressed the sympathies of the Mexican government for the Jewish claim to the land of Palestine and apparently promised the full support of his government when the time came to take the proper stance.124 In July 1944 the Organización Sionista Unida de México (United Zionist Organization of Mexico) sent a letter to President Manuel Ávila Camacho in which it maintained that all of the unjust persecutions, massacres, and exoduses of which the Jewish people had been the object throughout their history were due to the lack of a national home and to the dispersion caused by this fact, and therefore the need to reconstruct a country for the Jewish people in Palestine was justified: At this decisive hour, when scores of nations fight against Nazi-Fascism and in favor of a more just and democratic world and for the liberty and 121 According to a report of the World Jewish Congress, by the mid-forties, between 90 and 95 percent of the Jewish population of Mexico (about 20,000 people) were Zionists or pro-Zionists. While this figure may seem large, it was obvious that the people sympathized with this movement and contributed to its two main funds, the Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemet. AJA, WJCR, MS-361 H 243/5, “Mexico,” [n.p., n.d.]. 122 Ibid., H241/10, Glikowski to CCIM, Mexico City, February 29, 1944. 123 Brief News no. 48 (1944). AKA, box 72, file 24. 124 “All of the Jewish Refugees are going to be able to stay in Mexico,” Der Weg, August 22, 1944 (translated from the Yiddish by Maty Sommer).

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chapter six well-being of the people, the Jewish people, who have paid the highest price in lives during this war, also demand justice so that, with the creation of the Jewish State in Palestine, an end is put to our incomparable national disgrace. In this sense, we appeal to the democratic world, to public opinion, to the governments and the people united in this battle, to the progressive movements, and especially to the labor movement that has always been the active vanguard in the anti-Nazi-Fascist fight, requesting that our demand to establish a Jewish State in Palestine be accepted.125

The answer of the minister of foreign affairs to this letter was written in very careful terms. The fact that he alluded to the Jewish genocide in terms of “discriminatory acts” is noteworthy: the Mexican government has invariably maintained the principle of racial equality and therefore vigorously rejects the discriminatory acts that have been committed against, among others, the Jews.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes a note of the position adopted by this Organization on the problem of establishing a Jewish State in Palestine, but regardless of the solution that is reached in the international sphere, I am pleased to notify you of the most sincere hope of the Mexican government that, with the triumph of the United Nations, an era of justice and understanding will ensue that benefits all people without distinction of race, beliefs, or degree of development.126

When the vote on the creation of the State of Israel actually took place at the United Nations in November 1947, the Mexican delegation abstained from voting. However, this abstention was interpreted by many as an achievement, since it avoided the issuance of a nay vote. Concluding Remarks We wish to end this chapter by mentioning that during 1943 the Israelite Central Committee registered the admission of only seventy-two people: Over the past 15 months almost no new immigrants have reached Mexico, mainly because of the difficulties in communication, with the exception of 31 Jewish refugees from Poland who are now in the Santa Rosa Colony, León, Guanajuato, as well as a few other exceptions. In October 1942 the last direct ship from Europe arrived in Mexico, bringing a considerable load of refugees. From October 1, 1942, to the end of December 1943 the CCIM 125 AGN, PMAC, file 546.1/1, United Zionist Organization of Mexico to President Man­uel Ávila Camacho, Mexico City, July 15, 1944. 126 Ibid., Padilla (by presidential agreement) to the United Zionist Organization of Mexico, Mexico City, August 5, 1944.



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registered 138 new refugees. During the whole year of 1943, 72 refugees were registered. In total 612 refugees were registered with the CCIM; this is due to the fact that at the beginning of our work, they were offered help without the condition of registration.127

The total figures must be higher, if we take into account the fact that there were a certain number of refugees who did not register with the Israelite Central Committee because they did not need to, or because they did not know about it, or because they did not believe in the centrality and representative authority of the organization. In respect to the arrival of Jewish refugees during 1944 and 1945, the information from the National Registry of Foreigners records approximately fifty to seventy Jewish arrivals (not necessarily refugees) for each year. While it is not known where they came from, they were people who had been born in European countries (Poland above all, but also Germany, Austria, Hungary, France, and others). The entry of some of them via Mérida (Yucatán) makes us think that they came from Cuba or some other region of the Caribbean, such as the Dominican Republic, and that in these cases it was a second immigration process. It is still necessary to systematize this information.128 In fact, a quantitative general analysis of the Jewish immigration to Mexico during the years of Nazism is necessary, and the cases of exception should be looked into further. Up until now, other studies have suggested that the total number of Jewish refugees the country took in from 1933 until 1945 varies between 1,500 and 2,250.129 Also, the immigration policy of the country after 1945 should be analyzed more closely. In this regard, it seems that the doors remained closed to Jewish immigration. A letter from the Israelite Central Committee, dated June 4, 1948, states: “I regret to inform you that at this time it is absolutely impossible to obtain entrance permits for Jews to enter Mexico.”130 According to Hans Wollny, after the Second World War, Mexico maintained its reservations about admitting any refugees other than Spaniards. “While between 1947 and 1951 the International Refugee Organization—the immediate predecessor of the UNHCR—had been able to resettle, for example, more than 127 JDC, Collection 33/44, file 744, “Informe financiero del Comité Central Israelita de México, del 1º de octubre al 24 de diciembre de 1943,” sent by CCIM to JDC, Mexico City, February 21, 1944. 128 See Attie Sutton, Betech Tawil, et al., Estudio histórico demográfico. 129 See Chapter 1, n. 42. 130 Letter sent by the executive secretary of the Israelite Central Committee of Mexico, Saúl Lokier, to Mrs. Sadie Lavut, [Mexico City], June 4, 1948.

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32,000 European refugees in Argentina, 28,000 in Brazil and 17,000 in Venezuela, there were not even 1,000 cases of resettlement at the same time in Mexico.”131 To conclude this chapter we wish to point out that the policy of Manuel Ávila Camacho’s government between 1943 and 1945 with respect to Jewish refugees contrasts with the policy that was followed during the first two years of his term, which was in general more permissive. We still do not know what caused this change of attitude, especially taking into account the extreme urgency of the need for refuge during 1943 and 1944. There was apparently a certain “retraction” in 1943–1944, which contrasts with the exceptional situation of 1941 and 1942, when passenger ships were still arriving with non-Spanish passengers who were welcomed into the country. As far as we know, despite toughening up its position, the Mexican government did not send any Jewish refugees back to Europe once the war was over. In this act of acceptance it finally did honor the tradition of asylum that the authorities of the country had so often evoked, allowing the refugees who had managed to reach Mexican soil to stay there.

131 Report of the International Refugee Organization. See Yearbook of the United Nations 1952, 492, quoted in Hans Wollny, “Asylum policy in Mexico: A Survey,” Journal of Refugee Studies, 4, no. 3 (1991): 225.

FINAL THOUGHTS In order to explain Mexico’s position toward the Jewish exiles during the years of Nazism, we must tease apart the threads of a complex and tangled web of political, economic, and legal circumstances. Looking at the situation from a distance, what seems to stand out is the generalized indifference and absence of political willpower—in all sectors of the government and in most of civil society—to help a people who received little empathy due to preexisting prejudices. Widespread distrust and wariness towards foreigners in general, the geographical and cultural distance that separated Mexicans and Jews, and the automatic classification of the latter as “undesirable foreigners” constituted a great obstacle to seeing them as people in danger and often threatened by death, especially as the war progressed. Hence the difficulty of placing them in the category of refugees, legally and practically, and doubts as to their categorization as persecuted people; hence the almost total absence of humanitarian arguments in discussions of the Jewish situation, although they were heard when talking about other groups of refugees. The Mexican state had no experience with sheltering large groups of persecuted people searching refuge, nor did it have legislation that might allow it to define the limits of its action. Thus the first regulations seemed to be on the order of precautionary measures: refusing to authorize admission, even for very small groups, with the objective of sending a clear message in the face of what they thought might turn into a veritable avalanche of refugees. In light of this fear, the government’s intention to study the matter and observe the position of other countries seemed to be the most appropriate immediate solution. Lázaro Cárdenas’s government, the first to have to deal with the matter, responded to requests for asylum, individual and collective, as they came in. Many of the provisions that were implemented were improvised as they went along, as were many other matters, resulting in a series of events, arguments, stipulations, and interpretations that not only lacked coherence or any clear relationship with one another, but also at the time seemed to contradict one another. As we have mentioned, the internal contradictions and lack of structure were characteristic of the Mexican state in that era, still in the process of consolidation. Its inability to orchestrate a more or less articulated response was not limited to the case of the

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Jewish exiles, but the latter is a vivid illustration of how the government functioned in this transitional period. In addition to the difficulty the government authorities faced in deciding the legal status of applicants for asylum, other problems cropped up: contradictions between federal laws; the simultaneous issuing of conflicting public and confidential provisions; the dissimilar positions assumed by different government agencies involved in deciding how the country should respond to applicants for asylum; the differences that existed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and Congress; and the fact that government officials (including President Cárdenas himself and Minister of the Interior Ignacio García Téllez) changed their position. These factors, in combination with the government’s claims regarding the generous refuge the country offered to politically persecuted people, created tremendous confusion for government officials, refugees, and all those involved in the process of admitting them. As a result of this confusion, at different moments government authorities approached the refugee crisis in distinct ways, resorting to one group of provisions or another depending on their own viewpoint and position on the problem at hand. This is best exemplified in the case of the steamship Quanza. While Secretary García Téllez would not allow the refugees to disembark because of technical violations of immigration provisions, the minister in Lisbon, Juan Manuel Álvarez del Castillo, who had documented the refugees, defended their right to free passage through the country, arguing not only that it was an exceptional situation, but also that he had acted in keeping with President Cárdenas’s goodwill towards the victims of totalitarian Europe. Thus, while one official considered the passengers of the Quanza to be emigrants, the other thought of them as refugees. The main differences within the government took place during the first years of Cárdenas’s term, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (specifically Vice-Minister Ramón Beteta) supported a proposal to open the doors to limited, selective Jewish immigration while the Ministry of the Interior firmly opposed the measure. However, the differences did not lead to an open confrontation, and as we have seen, the Ministry of the Interior took complete control of matters related to immigration. It is difficult to track President Cárdenas’s position. Many sources show that his personal stance was favorable to the cause of the refugees, without distinction of religion or nationality. It appears that the commitment he made in 1938 to collaborate with the Western powers in solving the conflict was sincere, as were his attempts at supporting some of



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the projects for Jewish immigration to Mexico (such as the colonization in Tabasco). However, other episodes belie this attitude, especially the cases in which groups of refugees who had paid their own way were not allowed to disembark from the ships but were forced to turn around and travel back to Europe. The president may have been in favor of organized, regulated, preapproved immigration, but he was not willing to approve the disembarkation of refugees who arrived without prior authorization, lest he set a precedent of flexibility and openness that would certainly invite the arrival of more persecuted people. Ultimately, Cárdenas left the matter in the hands of the minister of the interior, knowing full well that the minister himself was openly opposed to Jewish immigration. Thus the president decided, in practice, to distance himself from the matter, and by delegating it to the Ministry of the Interior, he ensured that the refugees were to be treated as immigrants rather than exiles. In stark contrast to this delegation of power, the president would take charge of the asylum of Spaniards personally. The fact that President Cárdenas did not impose on the administration his own view of the position Mexico should adopt in relation to the Jewish exile may have been the result of a cluster of factors: a complex series of political calculations, limitations that came from the government itself as well as from public opinion, and his decision to use his influence within the government to secure the admission of the Spanish Republicans. All of this played out within the context of the complicated political situation that his government faced during the final two years of his term. Since the refugee crisis was not an issue of utmost importance for his regime, he probably did not want to increase the existing causes of internal conflict and discontent, which included Mexican opposition to the exile offered to the Spaniards. Although the issue is not specifically addressed in this book, the evidence suggests that the arrival of the Spanish Republicans exhausted the capacity of the regime to receive more refugees—and this is indeed how the government justified the matter—while it also exhausted the president’s capacity to negotiate internally with his own cabinet, which was generally opposed to opening the doors to the Jewish refugees. In this regard, one of the lines of inquiry opened by this book is how a government, at the same moment and on the basis on the same legal corpus, may give distinct answers to different groups seeking asylum. In addition to open-door and closed-door policies, a country may practice a selective immigration policy, in which case the admission of one group of refugees may reduce the possibility that other groups will be accepted.

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President Manuel Ávila Camacho’s position on the matter has proved even more elusive. Documentation on the issue during his term is scarce and not enough sources have been found. As far as we can see, Ávila Camacho was less involved than his predecessor in the matter of the Jewish exiles, despite the fact that due to Mexico’s participation in World War II they shared a common enemy, and despite the fact that from at least 1943 on, news of the terror inflicted by the Nazis on the Jews was being transmitted by different organizations, mass media, and publications, in particular El Libro negro del terror nazi en Europa (The Black Book of Nazi Terror in Europe), with a prologue by the president himself, which presented a very graphic depiction of what was happening in Europe. The portrait of the minister of the interior, Miguel Alemán, is also blurry, although he was tied to various cases of corruption that allowed some refugees to disembark. Meanwhile the minister of foreign affairs, Ezequiel Padilla, seems to have agreed, without much enthusiasm or success, to support some projects for Jewish immigration, especially if they were undertaken in cooperation with the United States. Although in the story we tell there were periods in which the Mexican government showed some flexibility in dealing with the disembarking of those people who reached Mexican shores or with certain immigration projects, I have not yet found a logical explanation for these actions and attitudes and it is quite possible that none exists. In general these episodes, which involved very few immigrants, cannot be attributed to domestic politics, nor to the state of foreign affairs, nor to the characteristics of the refugees who sought asylum. What must be pointed out is that the Mexican government did size up the possibilities of opening the doors of the country to Jewish refugees, and there were times when small groups of people were allowed in. In this regard it is also possible that an explanation is not to be found in any change of policy at the federal level, but rather in circumstantial arrangements: political negotiations (probably favors the government did for the Mexican Left) as well as local corruption (in the ports of entry) or corruption higher up in the government. As for corruption, while it is difficult to document, at first it shyly poked its head out of the archives, and as the research progressed its presence became blatant. It is my opinion that in order to explain the actual treatment of refugees, it is necessary to understand how things worked outside the sphere of law and official regulations and speeches and intentions. There were many who tried to profit from the refugees. In this respect, as I mentioned, their schemes included selling visas, forging passports



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and other documents, taking bribes at the ports of entry, selling land at one thousand times its real value, devising fraudulent immigration projects, and using lawyers to “fix” the immigrants’ status with the Ministry of the Interior; overall, a great deal of money changed hands. Corruption became worse and worse with the passage of time. For one thing, the groups who were in favor of opening the doors began to learn how to negotiate with local authorities, who, for the most part, understood that the situation could prove profitable. Also, the urgent demand for refuge once the Nazis implemented the “Final Solution” required drawing on all possible options, and Jewish organizations were now much more free with their financial resources. The stance taken by the Mexican government in relation to refugees was not exceptional, but rather shared by most of the countries of Latin America. Facing pressure from the Western powers, the countries of the region joined together in order to justify closing their doors to European immigration in general. In the case of Mexico, on several occasions the Ministry of the Interior justified its indecision by arguing that it was awaiting an international resolution on the matter, since only then would the country’s contribution to solving the refugee crisis be meaningful. The void left by the absence of definite government policies on the admission of Jewish refugees allowed groups who clearly opposed their admission to demonstrate against it, which gave those groups a level of prominence they otherwise did not enjoy. The pressure exerted by organizations on the Right, who were neither representative of Mexican society nor a majority, in my opinion, enabled them to guide government behavior at decisive moments. Since there were also sectors within the government who resolutely opposed the immigration of Jewish refugees (especially in the Chambers of Deputies and Senators), it is possible that these sectors provided each other with mutual reinforcement. On the other hand, the leftist factions managed to take advantage of their connections—above all their relationship with Lázaro Cárdenas’s government—to gain approval for the admittance of a group of important intellectuals and anti-Fascist political refugees, many of whom would reach Mexico during the administration of Manuel Ávila Camacho. In this endeavor, the role played by Vicente Lombardo Toledano and the mainly moral support of organizations such as the CTM and the CROM, as well as some unions, deputies, and anti-fascist organizations, was publically visible and served to offset the arguments against Jewish immigration,

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providing support for the actions of the local Jewish community. Upon their arrival, some of the exiles, who often had broad political and organizational experience, worked vigorously to save their comrades who were still trapped in Europe. However, the Left in general was caught in the middle of intense fighting between the pro-Stalinist Communists and the anti-Stalinist refugees, mainly Socialists and Social Democrats, and these battles drained a lot of the political energy of these groups. It must be pointed out that the Mexican government was willing to bend its position on the Jewish refugees under international pressure: this appears to have been the case in relation to the Évian Conference (1938) and the asylum sought for the Polish refugees from Iran (1943). It turned out that pressure from the Allied powers produced swift results. However, with the passing of time, it became apparent that in the case of the Jewish refugees these powers were not willing to intervene. They limited their actions to participating in some meetings that were merely meant to demonstrate to the world that something was being done to help the persecuted people in Europe. As I have mentioned earlier, in Latin American and international meetings on the subject, Mexico took note of the general reticence to accept Jewish refugees, and this may have stifled any intention of collaborating to save them. The role played by the Jewish community, on the other hand, was more important than has been acknowledged. Given that they were a numerically insignificant minority who had settled in the country only a few years earlier, with relatively scarce resources and no representation in national politics, and whose capacity to negotiate was practically nonexistent, they had almost no possibility of influencing the course that Mexican immigration policy would take. Nevertheless various groups within this community that—with the exception of the Central Committee—had been trained by leftists, brought into play all of their resources in order to help those who came to the country on their own, taking advantage of every opportunity to acquire as many entrance permits as possible, helping to negotiate the disembarkation of refugees at the ports of entry, insuring their legal status in Mexico, supporting them economically as well as in matters of work, and integrating them, in a process not free of difficulties, into the local Jewish community. Since the number of refugees who entered the country in the end was small, the Jewish community, despite its limited means, was able to supply the help they needed. It also managed to curb certain measures that would have affected the Jewish community and, above all, to successfully negotiate with the government the



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exemption of Jewish refugees from the restrictions placed on foreigners who were citizens of the Axis countries once Mexico entered the war. Along with this, the local Jewish community, with strong support from Jewish organizations in the United States, played a significant part in broadcasting reports on the Holocaust, and above all, in providing an impetus for the Mexican Anti-Fascist movement, from the organizational point of view as well as the financial. To this must be added the role that the community played in providing assistance to non-Jewish refugees since, as we have seen, there was no other group in Mexican society willing to help them. Finally, it must be pointed out that a study of Mexican immigration policy shows a state with not insignificant doses of xenophobia. In this regard the reasons that led the government to forbid Jewish immigration in April 1934 seem to have persisted throughout the period covered by this study. The internalization of the theory of mestizaje draws one’s attention: the justification for closing the doors to the Jewish refugees was their “nonassimilability,” and the view that they would not contribute to reinforcing national mestizaje was recurrent, widespread, and uniform. While the popular attitude toward Jews was in some cases ambivalent, at times acknowledging some positive characteristics (such as their culture, education, and hard work), very few people doubted that they were indeed “nonassimilable” people who would compete with national workers. What has been made clear through this study is that xenophobia was not a harmless attitude but was translated into exclusionary policies that prevented a large number of people from entering Mexico, and thus from being saved. Many of the arguments brandished to justify closing the doors to Jewish refugees were put aside when other national groups were concerned, such as the Spanish and Poles, as seen throughout the book. In this respect, we must conclude with the consideration that cultural objections to admitting Jewish exiles played an important role in their exclusion, along with political and economic limitations. Out of the total of half a million refugees who tried to escape the fate that awaited them within the Reich, during the Nazi period Mexico admitted about two thousand. Although the nation’s stance on Jewish refugees was similar to that of the majority of Latin American countries, this figure is considerably lower than the number of people taken in by other Latin American countries, such as Argentina. Even much smaller and poorer

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countries than Mexico, such as Uruguay and Bolivia, received much larger contingents of people. Mexico was not a land of asylum for the Jewish exile. The multiple reservations about opening the doors to the Jewish refugees turned out to be stronger than the country’s tradition of hospitality, which should be reconsidered.

Archives Consulted AALyP Archivo Andrés Landa y Piña, Mexico City AGN Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City AHSRE Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City AJA American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati AKA Archivo de la Kehilá Ashkenazí de México, CDICA, Mexico City APGB Archivo Particular de Gilberto Bosques (AHSRE) CDICA Centro de Documentación e Investigación de la Comunidad Ashkenazí de México, Mexico City FHVLT Fondo Histórico Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Universidad Obrera de México, Mexico City HIAS-HICEM Archive of the HIAS-HICEM, YIVO, New York JDC Archive of the Joint Distribution Committee, New York JDP Josephus Daniels Papers, Washington, DC MDW Morris D. Waldman Papers, AJA, Cincinnati NARA National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC RJLC Records of the Jewish Labor Committee, Tamiment Library, New York Unitarian Service Committee Archives, Andover-Harvard Theological Library (online) http://www.hds.harvard.edu/library/collections/digital/ holocaust-rescue-and-relief WJCR World Jewish Congress Records, AJA, Cincinnati WRB War Refugee Board Archive, Hyde Park Newspapers, Journals and Periodicals Der Weg Di Shtime Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados Diario Oficial de la Federación El Dictamen El Nacional

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El Popular El Universal Excelsior Fraternidad. Órgano del Comité Mexicano contra el Racismo La Jornada La Voz de Chihuahua Migración y Población New York Times Novedades Población. Migración. Turismo Población. Divulgación Demográfica y Turística. Migración. Turismo Últimas Noticias

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Index Abyssinia, 31, 87 Acción Democrática Internacional (International Democratic Action), 253, 290n96 Acción Republicana Austriaca de México (Austrian Republican Movement of Mexico), 192, 225 Acción Revolucionaria Mexicanista (Mexican Revolutionary Action), 53, 56 Adler, Friedrich, 230 Afghan immigrants, 31 Africa, 19, 260, 262n9, 285n78 agriculture. See under colonization Aguilar, Francisco J., 214 Aguilar Rivera, Antonio, 34 Aguirre Beltrán, Gonzalo, 276 aid, international, 65, 152, 224–25, 272 See also organizations; particular organizations Albanian immigrants, 31 Alemán, Miguel, 206, 210, 214, 220, 256, 298, 306 Alexander, Brígida, 224 Alianza Sindical de Comerciantes e Industriales Mexicanos (Union Alliance of Mexican Merchants and Industrialists), 79 Alonso, Daniel, 166n63 Alsina (ship), 215 Álvarez del Castillo, Juan Manuel, 183–89, 304 Álvarez de Toledo, Illan Pierre Joseph, 187 American Aid Society for Israelites, 294 American Committee to Save Refugees, 192, 222n90 American Embassy in Mexico, 207, 235–37 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), 166–74 American immigrants, 31–32, 60 American Jewish Committee (AJC), 286, 288–93 American Jewish Congress, 76, 249 American Relief Center (Centre Américain de Secours), 193 Amilpa, Fernando, 247 Anaya Valdepeña, Gabriel, 121 Anderson, Edward, 175

Andreu Almazán, Juan, 147 Anti-China and Anti-Jewish League, National, 54, 75 Anticommunist Front (Frente Anticomunista), 53 anti-Fascist movement, Mexican, 246–48, 309 Anti-Nazi Anti-Fascist Committee, National (Comité Nacional AntiNazifascista), 243, 247, 255–56 Anti-Nazi League, Non-Sectarian (New York), 74, 75 Antireelection Action Party (Partido Antirreeleccionista Acción), 53 anti-Semitic movement, Mexican, 6, 38, 118, 121–23, 126, 152; and Cárdenas, 52–53, 55–56; and Jewish community, 45–47, 68–76, 235–36, 248; and Mexican government, 79–84, 91, 233–38; and Mexico–U.S. relations, 235–37; organizations supporting, 53–55, 234 Arab immigrants, 26–27, 29, 93n26 Arab Jews, 41, 118 Argentina, 21n38, 22, 24, 201n2, 275, 283, 302, 309 Armenia, 27, 29, 92n23, 93n26 Arons, S., 156–57 Artists and Writers in London, International Office of, 223 Arts and Sciences of Mexico, National Association of, 247n180 Ashkenazi Jews, 41, 42, 100, 117–18 Asociación de Israelitas de Habla Alemana Menorah (Menorah Association of German-speaking Israelites), 241, 242, 243n162, 244–45 Asociación Nacionalista de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Nationalist Association of the United States of Mexico), 79–80, 163 Asociación pro Cultura y Ayuda (Association for Culture and Aid), 224 Asofsky, Isaac L., 218 Assembly against Nazi-Fascist Terror (Asamblea contra el Terror Nazifascista), 252–53 assimilation: and immigration policy, 31–32, 38, 40, 277–80, 283; of Jews, 21, 38,

322

index

45, 47, 83, 90, 95, 122, 147–49, 152, 160–62, 166, 239, 282, 289, 308–9; and mestizaje, 57; of Mexican immigrants, 29–32, 38, 40, 47, 58, 82, 104, 271, 279–81, 298; and Mexican state, 104 Associated Press Workers, 174 asylum policy, Mexican, 4–8, 253, 259, 261, 263, 286, 302, 304, 310; and Cárdenas, 6, 86–88, 194–97; collective vs. individual, 8–10, 112, 260, 303; and distinguished persons, 122, 194–98, 208. See also hospitality, tradition of Ateneo de Ciencias y Artes de México (Athenaeum of Arts and Sciences of Mexico), 247 Ateneo de la Juventud (Youth Association), 34 Aub, Max, 226 Auslandsorganisation (Organization for Foreigners), 38, 71n88 Austria: and Anschluss, 16, 85, 87; immigrants from, 60, 176, 301; Jews from, 16–17, 19, 241; refugees from, 65, 92n23, 106, 158, 162, 178, 190, 196, 223, 225, 229, 232 Austrian Republican Movement of Mexico (Acción Republicana Austriaca de México), 192, 225 Autonomous Department of the Executive Press and Publicity (DAPP), 81–84, 159, 161 Ávila Camacho, Manuel, 135, 142–43, 174, 205, 241, 272–73, 290–91, 306 Ávila Camacho government, 6, 12, 249, 260–65, 299–300; and CCIM, 205, 233–39, 241; and immigration policy, 195, 204–21, 256, 302, 306–7; and Jewish refugees, 11, 216–21, 262–63, 274–75; and national unity, 142–43, 201, 208; and U.S., 201–3, 207, 235–38, 256, 288 Avni, Haim, 4, 20, 23, 94, 121, 154, 157, 213–14, 220, 270–71 Aydelotte, Frank, 166, 168 Azcárate, Juan F., 246 Baeck, Leo, 18n22 Balk, Theodor, 222 Balkan immigrants, 209 Banco Mercantil de México (Mercantile Bank of Mexico), 42, 72n89, 73, 80 Barba González, Silvano, 63n57 Baro, Remedios, 139 Barsky, Edward K., 195n174, 222n90 Bassols, Narciso, 194

Bateman, Charles Harold, 262n10 Bauer, Helene, 196 Bauer, Otto, 196 Bauer, Yehuda, 245 Behar, León, 100, 105n68, 108–10, 117, 213, 275 Behrens, Benedikt, 195, 231–32 Belgium, 19, 60, 158, 175n96, 202, 209, 252 Beneficencia Israelita (Israelite Charity), 72n89, 73 Bergen-Belsen camp, 285 Berheimer, Mr. (Mexican consul), 120 Bermuda Conference (1943), 270, 293n106 Bernstein, James, 109n83 Beteta, Ramón, 114, 148, 151–53, 159, 165–69, 171, 304 Binstock, Louis, 52 Black Book of Nazi Terror in Europe (Libro negro del terror nazi en Europa), 306 Block, Roberto, 191 Bloque de Acción Revolucionaria pro Pequeño Comercio e Industria (Revolutionary Action Bloc in favor of Small Businesses and Industries), 79 B’nai B’rith, 42, 72n89, 105, 110–11 Boehm, Karl, 196 Bohemia, 19 Bojórquez, Juan de Dios, 63n57 Bokser, Judit, 4 Bolivia, 22–23, 24, 275, 310 Bosques, Gilberto, 24, 137–38, 214–15, 221– 33; and corruption in Marseilles, 209–11; and denial of entry, 191–92, 227–33; and non-Spanish refugees, 225–31 boycott, German products, 68–69, 71–76 Brauner, Ernst, 106 Brazil, 21, 24, 275, 302 Brenner, Anita, 287 Brero, Julio César, 225 Bretón, André, 139 Bryan, Helen, 222n90 Brygiewicz, Julian, 211 Buendía, Manuel, 82n129 Bulgaria, 31, 240, 241, 260 Bundism, 43, 118 Burandt, Hans, 73n94, 81 Cabo de Hornos (ship), 215 Cabrera, Luis, 35 Caestecker, Frank, 3 Calles, Plutarco Elías, 25, 29n68, 36, 39, 48, 53, 143 Camisas Doradas (Golden Shirts), 52–53, 56 Campa, Valentín, 290n96 Canada, 24, 31–32, 275



index

Cárdenas, Lázaro, 1, 50, 62n53, 103, 114, 124, 143, 166–67, 221, 304–5; and antiSemitism, 52–53, 55; and asylum, 86, 87–88, 194–97; and Castillo Nájera, 49n1; and CIICM, 52, 75, 99; and García Téllez, 80n121; and Jewish refugees, 88, 92–94, 113, 148, 169, 171, 173, 178, 184–88, 198–200; and Ministry of the Interior, 63n57, 199; and oil company expropriation, 85; and Spanish refugees, 130, 179–80, 189, 199, 263, 305; and Tabasco colonization project, 159, 161–63 Cárdenas government, 4, 6, 11–12, 36, 50–51, 113–16, 172, 190, 303–4; and social forces, 147, 201 Carranza government, 36 Carrillo, Alejandro, 244, 248 Casas Alemán, Fernando, 275 Caso, Alfonso, 276n51 Castellanos, José Arturo, 24 Castillo Nájera, Francisco, 49, 97, 272 Catholicism, 38, 243n162, 247, 253, 271 Catholic Welfare Conference, National, War Relief Services of, 264n15 CCIM. See Israelite Central Committee of Mexico Cedillista rebellion, 54n16 Central American immigrants, 51 Central Committee for the Civil Defense of the Federal District, 252, 253 Centre Américain de Secours (American Relief Center), 193 Centro Unificador Revolucionario (National Civic Action), 53 Chávez Orozco, Luis, 276n51 Chenillo, Paola, 59, 60, 83 Chile, 24, 202, 275 China, 10, 26, 51–52, 54–55, 87 Christian Committee for German Refugees (Comité Cristiano para los Refugiados Alemanes), 253 CIICM. See Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce Circulars: no. 250 (1933), 29–30, 60; no. 157 (1934), 21n38, 29–31, 45, 49, 60, 76–78; no. 930 (1937), 60, 81, 107–8; no. 84 (1938), 108; no. 55772 (1940), 181; no. IV-21-34 (1940), 181 Colegio Israelita (Israelite School), 43, 72n89 Collenberg, Rüdt von, 71–73, 202n5 Colombia, 24, 51, 275 colonization, 89, 148; agricultural, 110, 131, 152–74, 178, 204n11, 211; and corruption,

323

160–61, 209; at Coscapá, San Gregorio, and Sonora, 153–58; and inclusion of Mexicans, 152, 160, 170; and industry, 152–53, 165, 168, 171; and Mexican government, 158–65; at Santa Rosa, 263n14, 264–65, 270, 300; in Tabasco, 22, 158–65, 169, 305 Colonization, Law of, 173 Colonization of Refugees from Germany, Technical Committee for the, 169 Comisión Permanente de la Asamblea contra el Terror Nazifascista (Permanent Commission of the Assembly against Nazi-Fascist Terror), 253 Comisión Pro Refugiados (Commission for Refugees), 118 Comité Central Israelita de México (CCIM). See Israelite Central Committee of Mexico Comité Hispano-Mexicano (HispanicMexican Committee), 178 Comité Mexicano pro Palestina (Mexican Committee for Palestine), 299 Comité Nacional Anti-Nazifascista (National Anti-Nazi Anti-Fascist Committee), 243, 247, 255–56 Comité Pro-Raza (Committee on Race), 46, 53–54 Comité Unido pro Víctimas del Fascismo (United Committee for Victims of Fascism), 192–93 Committee for Defense, 46–47, 70, 72 Committee for Hebrew Palestine, 144 Committee for Refugees (Comité Pro Refugiados; CPR), 99–106, 108–11, 113, 116–18, 134, 154–55, 198, 216 communism, 43, 53, 68n74, 118, 190, 197, 216–17, 226n101, 253, 256 concentration camps, 17, 226–27, 245, 250, 285. See also extermination, Jewish Confederación de la Clase Media (Confederation of the Middle Class), 53–54 Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Workers of Mexico; CTM), 147, 247, 252, 307 Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Confederation of Farmers; CNC), 147, 247 Confederation of Mexican Youth, 247n180 Conference on Refugees (France, 1938), 22 Constitution, Mexican, 32, 51 Convention of Havana (1928), 85 Convention of Montevideo (1933), 85

324

index

Convention on Population (1938), 121–22 Corona, Marcos, 47, 100, 117 corruption, 4, 13, 120, 209–11, 219, 257, 284n76, 291–92, 306–7; and colonization, 160–61, 209; and Ministry of the Interior, 173, 193, 210; in Veracruz, 210–11, 220–21 Coscapá agricultural colony, 153–55 Costa Rica, 24, 275, 284 Covisa, Isidro, 183n127 CROM (Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers), 70, 76, 307 CTAL (Latin American Confederation of Workers), 218, 247, 252 Cuba, 18, 24, 51, 176, 187n145, 275, 301 Cueva, Aurelio, 221 Cyprus, 285n78 Czechoslovakia, 17, 85, 196, 241; immigrants from, 29, 60, 93n26, 175n96, 176, 209; refugees from, 158, 162, 187, 190, 223 Dabbah, I., 118 Dabbah, S., 117n117 Daesslé Segura, Jorge, 294–96 Dahlem, Franz, 195, 197 Daniels, Josephus, 62–63, 113–14, 163, 176, 235–36 Danish immigrants, 60, 175n96 DAPP (Autonomous Department of the Executive Press and Publicity), 81–84, 159, 161 Defensa (Defense; military magazine), 253 de Hirsch, Maurice, 109n83 Demographic Committee, Permanent, 283 demographic policy. See population policy Demographic Policy in Mexico (La política demográfica de México; Loyo), 36, 52 demonstrations, public: Jewish support, 68, 71, 246–49, 251–53; pro-Nazi, 125–26, 234–36 denationalization, 10, 64n59, 175, 207, 242 de Smolenski, Otto, 187n145 Díaz, Porfirio, 33, 48 Díaz Escobar, Félix, 242–44, 247 Dietrich, Arthur, 71, 80–81, 237 Díez-Canedo, Joaquín, 183n127 differential tables, 77, 80, 92, 159, 175, 181–82, 204–5; introduction of, 52, 57–59, 60; and WWII, 259 Dijour, Ilja, 109n83 Dingol, Salomon, 273, 275 Djelfa camp, 222, 226 Döblin, Alfred, 194, 195n173 Dominican Republic, 22, 24, 97, 187n145, 275, 301

Düby, Gertrude, 197 Duncker, Hermann, 195, 197 Dutch immigrants, 60, 175n96, 209 economic factors, 13, 21–23, 26–28, 51, 60–61, 184; and benefits of immigration, 25, 151, 168, 180, 274, 281–82; and colonization, 160–62, 174; and crisis of 1929, 15, 21, 23, 27–28, 40; and development, 25, 46, 73, 152–53, 165, 168, 171, 180, 201, 239, 280–83; and displacement of national workers, 33, 54, 57, 61, 80–82, 88, 107, 115, 122, 148–49, 171, 177, 181, 212, 261, 270, 309; and German product boycott, 69, 72–75; and immigrant resources, 105, 119, 171, 179–80, 187, 191–92, 206, 212, 214–15, 225, 227, 273–74, 297; and immigration policy, 2, 15, 25, 40, 168, 171, 180, 280–83, 287; and Jewish community, 44n119, 45–46, 134, 239; and Jewish refugees, 75–76, 97, 105, 110, 148, 151, 177, 212, 282n70; and Mexico– U.S. relations, 202–3 Ecuador, 24, 275, 284 Egyptian immigrants, 31 Ehrenthal, Karl, 230 Eichmann, Adolf, 16, 293n105 Einstein, Albert, 224 Eisler, Gerhard, 195, 197 elections, presidential, 173–74, 180, 201 El Salvador, 24, 275, 284 Emergency Rescue Committee, 192–93, 222n91 Emigdirect (Berlin). See HICEM enemy foreigners, 240–44, 308–9 Enemy Property and Business, Inter-ministerial Board for Matters of, 241, 244 Enemy Property and Business, Law Relating to, 241 England. See Great Britain Espinoza, José Ángel, 54 ethnic-cultural factors, 21, 23, 30, 31–39 eugenics, 31, 82, 278 Europe: and WWII refugees, 16, 206–7, 232, 259, 280, 286–88, 307. See also particular countries Évian Conference (1938), 22, 85, 88, 93–95, 113, 273, 308 Ewert, Andreas, 195, 196 Excelsior (newspaper), 71 Exiled Writers Committee, 192, 222n90 exiles, 7–9, 86–89, 187, 194, 208, 239–40, 255, 263, 280, 305. See also refugees



index

expulsion, 45, 51, 109 extermination, Jewish, 19, 203, 245–53, 259, 272n43, 293n105, 306, 309 Ezekial, Mordejai, 166n63 Fabela, Isidro, 67, 87n6, 89–90, 190–91, 212, 247, 291, 299 Faja de Oro (tanker), 202n3, 206 Falcón, Ismael, 80–81 Farmers, National Confederation of (Confederación Nacional Campesina; CNC), 147, 247 FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), 206, 220 Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (Federation of Unions of Workers at the Service of the State), 247 Federación de Sociedades Israelitas (Federation of Israelite Societies), 44, 68 Federated Committee of Czechoslovakians, Greeks, Poles, and Yugoslavians, 252 Federation of Organizations of Aid to Spanish Republicans (FOARE), 252, 253 Feistmann, Rudolf, 197 Feminist Party, National (Partido Nacional Femenino), 53 Fernández Gaviria, Leonor, 183n127 Fernández Ledesma, Gabriel, 194 Field, Noel H., 192–93, 226 Final Solution. See extermination, Jewish Flandre (ship), 176 Flores Muñoz, Guillermo, 79–80 Foreigners, Organization for (Auslandsorganisation), 38, 71n88 Forjando patria (Forging a Country; Gamio), 36 France, 96, 114–15, 176n102, 179, 189n53, 191–96, 216, 224n95, 266; and German occupation, 19, 147–48, 213, 223, 231; immigrants from, 60, 175n96, 187, 209, 301; Mexican Consulate in Marseilles, 193, 209–11, 221–33; refugees from, 9, 260n2, 262–63; Vichy, 19n26, 195n174, 208, 223, 224, 231 Franco, Francisco, 267 Frank, Leonard, 194 Fraternidad, La (The Brotherhood), 42n112 Free France Committee, 252 Free Germany Movement, 252, 256 Free Hungary (Hungría Libre), 253 Frei, Bruno, 197 French Chamber of Commerce in Mexico, 252

325

Frenk, Dr., 117n117, 155 Frente Anticomunista (Anticommunist Front), 53 Frente Constitucional Democrático Mexicano (Mexican Democratic Constitutional Front), 53 Frente Popular (Popular Front), 147 Fry, Varian, 193 Galaviz, Gabriel, 247 Gamio, Manuel, 35, 36, 159, 276n51 García Robles, Alfonso, 276n51 García Téllez, Ignacio, 63, 80, 88–89, 98, 114n102, 116, 122, 128, 165, 304; and CPR, 100, 103, 105n68, 111; and Jewish refugees, 148–51, 168n73, 171; and Spanish refugees, 179–81 General Law of Population (1936), 36–37, 52, 57–60, 76–78, 86, 100–101, 107, 150, 190–91, 204 General Registry of Israelites, 241–43 Genio Maru (ship), 198 German Communist Party (KPD), 197, 217, 226n101, 256 German Jews, National Representation of (Reichsvertretung), 18n22 German Legation in Mexico, 38, 71, 72–73, 114, 148, 201, 234–35 Germany, 64, 120–21, 194, 196, 202–3, 284–85; immigrants from, 38, 51, 60, 85, 175n96, 176, 209, 239–40, 255, 301; Jews from, 13–20, 213–14, 241; and Mexico, 71n88, 72–75, 87n6, 115, 148, 201, 240, 256; refugees from, 65, 67, 75–76, 92n23, 158, 162, 178, 187, 190, 223, 225, 232 Gimbel, Julio, 192 Giuseppe Garibaldi Alliance, 252 Glantz, Jacobo, 100n48, 117n117 Glikowski, Moisés, 100n48, 105n68, 283, 298 Gojman, Alicia, 53n16 Goldmann, Nahum, 291, 297–99 Goldschmidt Rothschild family, 187 Gómez Pezuela, Manuel, 192 Gorkin, Julián, 197 grandes problemas nacionales, Los (The Great National Problems; Molina Enriquez), 35 Great Britain, 2, 96, 175n96, 246, 271, 276–77, 293n106; immigrants from, 60; Mexico’s relations with, 203; and Polish refugees, 261–65; refugees in, 19, 158, 168, 174, 209; and WWII, 148, 237 Great Lodge Valley of Mexico, 252 Greece, 31, 51, 202n4, 260n2

326

index

Green, Henry, 174 Gruen, Walter, 225 Guatemala, 51, 86, 275 Guerra, Alfonso, 64n59, 120–21, 176–77 Guerrero, Silvestre, 63, 66–67 Guffanti, Andrés A., 89 Guillén, Palma, 67 Guinée (ship), 124, 207, 219–20, 226 Gumbel, Julius E., 195 Gurfinkiel, José, 103 Gutmann, Enrique, 194 Gypsies, 26, 29 Haiti, 24, 275, 284 Harych, Theo, 141 Haskalah (Enlightenment), 265n20 Hay, Eduardo, 98, 114, 161–62, 165, 237 Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), 104, 109n83, 182, 265n21, 272–75. See also HICEM Heiden, Konrad, 194, 195n173 Heinz, Karl, 196 Heller, Otto, 196 Herzl, Theodor, 43n115 Heyo Maru (ship), 198 HICEM (HIAS, ICA, and Emigdirect), 109–10, 118, 188n152, 213n44, 223, 265n21, 267, 269, 283 Himmler, Heinrich, 16n14 Hispanic-Mexican Committee (Comité Hispano-Mexicano), 178 Hitler, Adolf, 13, 16, 68, 203 Holland, 19, 158, 168, 202 Holocaust. See extermination, Jewish Honduras, 275, 284 Horthy, Miklós, 293 hospitality, tradition of, 1, 11, 85–89, 91, 93, 111, 122, 150, 166, 184–85, 208, 288, 310 Hull, Cordell, 289 Hungary, 240, 260, 290; immigrants from, 26–27, 60, 209, 301; Jews from, 241, 291, 293–96; refugees from, 158, 187, 190 Hungría Libre (Free Hungary), 253 Hyman, J. C., 163 Iberia (ship), 119 ICA (Jewish Colonization Association). See HICEM Immigration, Second National Convention on (Mexico), 28n62 immigration laws, 10–11, 25; Naturalization Laws (1828), 25n51; Immigration and Naturalization Laws (1886), 25n51; Law of Immigration (1926), 26, 32; Law of Immigration (1930), 28–29, 32, 40, 45, 57,

60, 80, 153; prohibitions of 1931, 1932, and 1934, 28n62; Rule of the Law of Immigration (1932), 28n62, 32. See also Circulars; General Law of Population immigration policy, Mexican, 5–6, 13, 24–27, 286–88, 296–304; and assimilation, 31–32, 38, 40, 277–80, 283; and Ávila Camacho government, 195, 204–21, 256, 302, 306–7; and benefits of immigration, 25, 151, 168, 180, 274, 281–82, 287; and Bosques, 227–33; and bureaucracy, 228–33; and Constitutional Congress of 1917, 33; and Convention on Population, 121; and differential tables, 52, 57–59, 60, 77, 80, 92, 159, 175, 181–82, 204–5, 259; and discretion, 8–9, 32, 57, 60, 87, 175, 191, 193, 204, 230; and displacement of national workers, 33, 54, 57, 61, 80–82, 88, 107, 115, 122, 148–49, 171, 177, 181, 212, 261, 270, 309; and economic factors, 2, 15, 25, 40, 168, 171, 180, 280–83, 287; and enemy foreigners, 240–44; exceptions to, 120, 189–200, 208; and government authority, 25–26, 29, 37, 59; and immigrant relatives, 59, 75, 78, 157, 190, 204n11; and immigrant resources, 105, 119, 171, 179–80, 187, 191–92, 206, 212, 214–15, 225, 227, 273–74, 297; and immigrant workers, 26–28, 51, 81–82, 206, 219, 239; and international relations, 90–92, 95–98, 151, 222, 307, 308; and Jewish community, 2, 44, 239, 308; and Jewish refugees, 1–5, 96–97, 105–6, 113–16, 147, 175–77, 198–200, 213–16, 256; and mestizaje, 37, 57, 204, 280; and Ministry of the Interior, 1–2, 80, 175–82, 294, 304; and Obrégon, 25, 26, 32, 48; and political factors, 2, 8–9, 29, 30, 306; and political refugees, 7, 88–89, 92–93, 107, 121–22, 150, 178–81, 189–98, 204–5, 230, 297, 307; and Project for a Law of Immigration, 26, 32; and public discourse vs. action, 11, 296; and public opinion, 2, 12, 21, 208; and race, 29–30, 32–33, 89, 98, 177, 185, 205; and repatriation, 49, 64n59, 101, 108, 112, 159, 162, 168, 170, 188, 191, 198n186, 213, 294; and requirements, 105, 112, 227–31; and restrictions, 51–52, 54, 67, 205–7; and selectivity, 26–27, 32, 175, 277, 279–80, 305; and Spanish refugees, 7, 11, 150–51, 168, 174–75, 179–81, 194, 221, 287, 309; and stateless peoples, 10, 64n59, 175, 207, 242; and “undesirable” immigrants, 54–55, 57, 61, 62n51, 79, 122, 206–7, 278, 303; and WWII, 194, 206, 259



index

Indians, 26 Indian-Spanish heritage, 32–35, 82 industrial development, 152–53, 165, 168, 171, 239, 280–83 integration, See assimilation intellectuals, 70, 194n170, 239, 307 Intellectual Workers, National Federation of, 247n180 Inter-American Demographic Congress, 259, 272–73, 275–83, 296, 298 Inter-American Jewish Council, 281 Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, 94–98, 112, 114, 271, 293 International Brigades (Spanish Civil War), 189, 219–20 International Conference on Adopting a Convention concerning the Status of Refugees from Germany (Geneva, 1938), 89 International Democratic Action, 253, 290n96 International Labor Organization, 67 International Office for Refugees, 223 International Refugee Organization, 301 international relations, Mexican, 50, 77, 85, 262–63; and immigration policy, 90–92, 95–98, 151, 222, 307, 308 International Rescue and Relief Committee, 222–23, 225, 228–29, 233 investor immigrants, 29n69, 30n71, 111–12, 154, 191–92, 204n11, 210, 227 Iran, 260–65, 308 Islas Osorno, Luis, 70 Israel, 43n115, 300 Israelite Central Committee of Mexico (Comité Central Israelita de México; CCIM), 100n48, 104n66, 132, 182, 188, 192, 194n170, 198, 308; and agricultural colonization, 154–58, 164; and Ávila Camacho government, 205, 233–39, 241; formation of, 44, 116–19; and InterAmerican Demographic Congress, 280–83; and Jewish refugees, 118, 178, 212–13, 219, 239–45, 266–70, 274–75; legal status of, 238; and non-Jewish refugees, 253–55; and public demonstrations, 145, 236, 248; resources of, 252–53, 254, 270 Israelite Chamber of Industry and Commerce (CIICM), 44–46, 50n3, 52, 75, 99, 111, 113, 121; and anti-Semitism, 55–56, 70, 79, 81; and German product boycott, 69, 73, 74 Israelite Charity (Beneficencia Israelita), 72n89, 73

327

Israelite School (Colegio Israelita), 43, 72n89 Italy, 15, 51, 60, 87, 175n96, 196, 201, 225, 240–41 Japan, 29, 60, 87, 175n96, 198–99, 201, 240 JARE (Junta de Auxilio a los Republicanos Españoles; Board of Aid to the Spanish Republicans), 222–23 Jerusalem, Ruth, 195, 197 Jewish Colonization Association (ICA). See HICEM Jewish community, Mexican, 39–48, 52, 94, 107–10, 112–13, 249, 268; and antiSemitism, 45–47, 68–76, 235–36, 248; and economic factors, 44n119, 45–46, 134, 239; and immigration policy, 2, 44, 239, 308; integration of, 38, 45, 47, 83, 239; and Jewish organizations, 43–44, 164; and Jewish refugees, 99–105, 155; and Mexican government, 48, 61–62, 74, 84, 100, 116–17, 238–39, 275, 308–9; and Zionist movement, 298–300 Jewish immigrants, 29–30, 38–39, 48, 51, 59, 280–83; and agricultural colonization, 153–65; assimilation of, 21, 38, 45, 47, 83, 90, 95, 122, 147–49, 152, 160–62, 166, 239, 282, 289, 308–9; and displacement of national workers, 33, 54, 57, 61, 80–82, 88, 107, 115, 122, 148–49, 171, 177, 181, 212, 261, 270, 309; numbers of, 39–41. See also Jewish refugees Jewish Labor Committee (JLC), 192, 193, 213n44, 224, 228, 232 Jewish Mutual Assistance Committee, 260n2 Jewish People’s Committee for United Action against Fascism and AntiSemitism (New York), 113 Jewish refugees, 5–6, 13–20, 63, 76–84, 155–58, 170, 181–82, 257; and Ávila Camacho government, 11, 216–21, 262–63, 274–75; and Cárdenas, 88, 92–94, 113, 148, 169, 171, 173, 178, 184–88, 198–200; and CCIM, 118, 178, 212–13, 219, 239–45, 266–70, 274–75; denationalization of, 10, 64n59, 175, 207, 242; and economic factors, 75–76, 97, 105, 110, 148, 151, 177, 212, 282n70; and enemy foreigners, 240–44, 308–9; and García Téllez, 148–51, 168n73, 171; and international community, 89–98; and Latin America, 17, 21–24, 50, 90, 96–97, 284–85, 309–10; and Mexican government, 39, 50, 91,

328

index

199, 239, 242, 270, 288–89; and Mexican immigration policy, 1–5, 96–97, 105–6, 113–16, 147, 175–77, 198–200, 213–16, 256; and Mexican Jewish community, 99–105, 155; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 148, 151–53, 165–66, 178–79, 189, 223; and Ministry of the Interior, 148–51, 165, 223; numbers of, 19n29, 23–24, 150, 190, 220n81, 232–33, 282, 300–301; from Poland, 215, 220, 265–71, 300; and public opinion, 163–64, 199, 212, 276–77, 284; and repatriation, 10, 21n38, 64n59, 177, 214, 294. See also Jewish immigrants Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), 248, 289 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 222, 224–25, 226 Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), 105, 113, 118, 194n170, 212, 213n44, 223, 291–93; and colonization in Mexico, 89, 156–57, 160–61, 164, 166–74 Jonas, Siegmund, 230 Jones, Mary Carter, 166n63 Joy, Charles R., 222n90, 231 Junta de Auxilio a los Republicanos Españoles (Board of Aid to the Spanish Republicans; JARE), 222–23 Juventudes Nacionalistas (Nationalist Youths), 53 Kahn, Bernhard, 160, 171–72 Kaiser, Frenk, 117n117 Kaiser, Mr., 119 Kalach, José, 117n117, 118–19 Kamepfer, Richard, 228 Kantorowicz, Alfred, 195, 227 Katz, Friedrich, 6, 189, 198, 225, 232 Katz, Leo, 6, 196, 224–25 Katz, Otto, 196, 197 Katz, Y., 117n117 Kesten, Mrs. Hermann, 195 Kibalchich, Jeannine, 196n178 Kisch, Egon Erwin, 138, 196, 197 Kluckhohn, Frank L., 114 Knight, Alan, 35, 278 Knopfler, Jorge, 117n117, 119 KPD (German Communist Party), 197, 217, 226n101, 256 Kristallnacht (“Night of Broken Glass”), 17, 85, 120n132 Kunz, Egon F., 14 Kurtz, Trude, 196

117n117, 118, 121, 154; and American Jewish Committee, 289, 291–92 Landa y Piña, Andrés, 93, 106, 108, 162, 163, 170, 172 Latin America, 3–4, 20–24, 73n94, 85–86, 252–53, 276–77, 307; and immigration policy, 21–22, 32, 277; and Jewish refugees, 17, 21–24, 50, 90, 96–97, 284–85, 309–10; population of, 276n52, 281. See also particular countries Latin American Confederation of Workers (CTAL), 218, 247, 252 Latvian immigrants, 31 laws. See immigration laws; Nuremberg Laws League for Culture and Aid (Liga pro Cultura y Ayuda), 192–93 League for German Culture (Liga pro Cultura Alemana), 105n67, 110, 192, 194, 196n179, 197, 218–19, 225, 231, 254–56 League of American Writers, 192, 223 League of Nations, 64–67, 87, 148 Lebanese Central Committee, 252 Lebanese immigrants, 27, 29, 93n26 legal issues, 7–8, 111, 150, 170, 181–82, 184, 212, 238, 241–44, 304 legalization, immigrant, 100–104, 110, 153, 208, 219, 239, 296–98 Leñero, Agustín, 179 Leonhard, Rudolf, 194, 195n174 Leroux, André, 115 letters of recognition, 240–41 Levy, Isaac, 166n63, 167 Liberman, Lilian, 233 Libro negro del terror nazi en Europa (Black Book of Nazi Terror in Europe), 306 Lieberman, Susan B., 183n126, 187n144 Liebman, Charles J., 176n100 Lipsky, Luis, 299 Lisbon, Mexican Legation in, 183–86, 232 Lisker, Pesaj, 117n117 Lithuania, 29, 224n95 Loaiza, Rodolfo T., 79–80 Lombardo Toledano, Vicente, 105n67, 128, 135, 194–95, 218, 229, 244, 296, 307; and Jewish support demonstrations, 247, 252; and refugee projects, 212, 291–92 Longo, Luigi, 196 Loperena, Pablo, 210 Loyo, Gilberto, 36, 51–52, 62n51 Luders de Negri, Gustavo, 95–97

Ladrón de Guevara, 47 Landau, Jacobo, 46–47, 56, 62, 100n48, 110,

Maag, Paul, 158 Machado Sánchez, Julio, 184–85



index

Maizel, Tuvia, 252–53 Malcolm, Neill, 65 Maldonado, Eugenio, 82, 161 Mann, Heinrich, 196 manuscrito perdido, El (The Lost Manuscript; Balk), 222 Marchlewski, Mieczyław, 266 Marchwitza, Hans, 195 Marino, César, 247 Márquez Ricaño, Luis, 244 Marrus, Michael, 16 Marseilles, Mexican Consulate in, 193, 209–11, 221–33 Masonic lodges, 252 Maximato administration, 29, 36, 48 Mayer, William, 156–57, 236 McDonald, Dwight, 196n178 McDonald, James, 20, 50, 64, 176n100 media. See press Mehring, Walter, 194, 195n173 Mena, Anselmo, 58, 77–78 Mendieta y Núñez, Lucio, 58–59 Menorah Association of German-speaking Israelites (Asociación de Israelitas de Habla Alemana Menorah), 241, 242, 243n162, 244–45 Mentz, Brígida von, 190, 232 Mercantile Bank of Mexico (Banco Mercantil de México), 42, 72n89, 73, 80 Merker, Paul, 86, 142, 197, 226 Merren, Richard, 176, 199 Messersmith, George, 262n10, 284–90 mestizaje, 31–39, 161, 309; and immigration policy, 37, 57, 204, 280; and racism, 6, 27, 34–38, 83–84, 278–79 Mexican Constitutionalist Party, 53 Mexican Democratic Constitutional Front (Frente Constitucional Democrático Mexicano), 53 Mexican Enterprise Company, 158, 160–61, 163 Mexican Foreign Service, 9, 176–77, 181–82, 186–87, 189, 191, 194; authority of, 60, 87, 116, 178–79, 181, 223, 230; in Germany, 64n59, 120–21, 202 Mexican government: and anti-Semitism, 79–84, 91, 233–38; and immigration projects, 158–65, 212, 288, 290; and Jewish community, 48, 61–62, 74, 84, 100, 116–17, 238–39, 275, 308–9; and Jewish refugees, 39, 50, 91, 199, 239, 242, 270, 288–89; and U.S., 49–50, 90–92, 201–3, 207, 235–38, 256, 288. See also particular administrations and ministries

329

Mexican Nationalist Vanguard (Vanguardia Nacionalista Mexicana), 53, 234 Mexican Revolution, 25, 34, 37, 53, 85 Mexican Revolutionary Action (Acción Revolucionaria Mexicanista), 53, 56 Mexican Society of Eugenics, 31 Mexique (ship), 78, 129 Meyer, Lorenzo, 90–91 Michman, Dan, 16 Middle East, 19 Milgram, Avraham, 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1, 2, 73, 159, 161, 186; and Jewish refugees, 148, 151–53, 165–66, 178–79, 189, 223; and Ministry of the Interior, 77, 87, 153, 304. See also particular officials Ministry of the Interior, 29, 57, 60, 63n57, 75, 102–5, 111, 114, 182–88; authority of, 77, 87, 105, 107–8, 116, 176, 178, 199, 204, 223; and colonization, 159, 162–63, 169, 172; and corruption, 173, 193, 210; and immigration policy, 1–2, 80, 175–82, 304; and Jewish refugees, 148–51, 165, 223; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 77, 87, 153, 304. See also particular officials Mitrani, Víctor, 117n117, 118, 155, 281n68 Modotti, Tina, 86 Molina, Galeano, 159 Molina Betancourt, Rafael, 279 Molina Enriquez, Andrés, 35 Monroy, Rufino, 156–57 Montagnana, Mario, 86 Moore, Bob, 3 Moravia, 19 Moreno Padrés, Rubén, 234, 237 Morewitz, Stephen J., 183n126, 187n144 Morgan, Arthur, 168n73 Moroccan immigrants, 31 Mount Sinai Alliance Charity Society (Sociedad de Beneficencia Alianza Monte Sinai), 42n112 Múgica, Francisco J., 80n121 Mundo Libre (Free World; magazine), 253, 291 Muñoz Borrero, Manuel Antonio, 24 Muñoz López, Máximo, 210–11, 224 Nansen, Fridtjof, 66n66 Nansen Passports, 66 National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional), 147 National Chamber of the Mexican Republic, 61

330

index

National Civic Action (Centro Unificador Revolucionario), 53 National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce, 69 nationalism, Mexican, 27, 33, 37, 45, 50, 53–56, 59, 62, 84, 90, 147–50 Nationalist Association of the United States of Mexico (Asociación Nacionalista de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos), 79–80, 163 Nationalist Vanguard, 237 Nationalist Youths (Juventudes Nacionalistas), 53 National Party for Public Salvation (Partido Nacional de Salvación Pública), 234 National Registry of Foreigners (Registro Nacional de Extranjeros), 26, 206, 210, 301 National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario; PNR), 37, 54; Institute of Social, Political, and Economic Studies of the, 51 National Synarchist Union (Unión Nacional Sinarquista), 147 National Union of Veterans of the Revolution (Unión Nacional de Veteranos de la Revolución), 53 Nazism, 13–14, 16, 125–26, 244 Negro immigrants, 26, 93n26 Netherlands, the, 188 Neuhaus, Rudolf, 196, 225 Neumann, Hilde, 197 Neumann, Rudolf, 195, 197 Neumann, Władysław, 262n10, 268 New Amsterdam (ship), 178n107 Newman, Manuel, 299 Nicaragua, 275, 284 Nidje Israel congregation, 42n112, 72n89 Nidjie Israel Community Charity Alliance, 133 “Night of Broken Glass” (Kristallnacht), 17, 85, 120n132 North Africa, 19, 260 Norway, 60, 175n96, 202 Novedades (newspaper), 71 Nuremberg Laws, 15–16, 65 Nyassa ship, 219–20 Oberwager, Josef, 245n171 Obregón, Álvaro, 25, 26, 32, 48 oil companies, 114–15; expropriation of, 85, 90–91, 151 Olympic Games (Berlin, 1936), 76 Organización Sionista Unida de México (United Zionist Organization of Mexico), 72n89, 299

organizations, 164, 165–66, 223, 251n200, 272, 307; anti-Semitic, 53–55, 234; Jewish, 43–44, 102, 249; Mexican, 25n216, 43–44, 53–55, 68n74, 234, 249; nationalist, 56, 62. See also particular organizations Orinoco (ship), 113–16, 119 ORT Federation, 118 Ortiz Monasterio, Francisco, 184n131 Ortiz Rubio, Pascual, 29n68, 45, 48 Osorio, Adolfo León, 234 Otero y Gama, Carmen, 296–97 Othón de Mendizábal, Miguel, 276n51 Padilla, Ezequiel, 136, 213–14, 236, 246, 250, 256, 273, 287, 299, 306 Palavicini, Félix F., 247 Palestine, 16, 17, 20, 27, 29, 134, 260n2, 285n78, 298–300; Mexican Committee for (Comité Mexicano pro Palestina), 299 Palmier, Jean Michel, 190, 232 Panama, 24, 275 Pan-American Conference (Lima, 1938), 22 Pantin, Juan, 166n63 Paraguay, 22, 24, 275 Parra Gómez, Roberto, 279 Parrés, José G., 168n73 Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party), 147 Partido Antirreeleccionista Acción (Antireelection Action Party), 53 Partido Nacional de Salvación Pública (National Party for Public Salvation), 234 Partido Nacional Femenino (National Feminist Party), 53 Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party; PNR), 37, 51, 54 Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM), 247 Paz, María Emilia, 80–81 Péret, Benjamin, 139, 197 Permanent Commission of the Assembly against Nazi-Fascist Terror (Comisón Permanente de la Asamblea contra el Terror Nazifascista), 253 persecution, Jewish, 122, 149, 175, 181, 204–5, 303 Persian immigrants, 31 Peru, 24, 275, 283 Pétain, Marshall, 189n53 Pfemfert, Franz, 197 Pivert, Marceau, 139, 197 Pohle, Fritz, 6



index

Poland, 17, 18, 85, 147, 202, 246; immigrants from, 26, 29, 40, 42, 51, 77, 78, 93n26, 209, 301; Jewish refugees from, 215, 220, 265–71, 300; refugees from, 9, 92n23, 101, 103, 158, 162, 188, 190, 260–65, 270–71, 273, 308–9 Polish Israelites, Mexican Federation for, 267 Polish Jews, American Federation of, 213n44 Polish Legation in Mexico, 188, 266–67 Polish War Relief of the United States, 264n15 política demográfica de México, La (Demographic Policy in Mexico; Loyo), 36, 52 political factors, 4, 21–22, 42, 55, 172, 257, 282, 287, 303, 308; and immigration policy, 2, 8–9, 29, 30, 306; and mestizaje, 34–38, 83–84. See also under refugees Political Refugees, Advisory Committee on (U.S.), 166 Pollak, Hermann, 230 Pope Pius XI, 247 Popular Front (Frente Popular), 147 Popular Israelite League, 146 population policy, 21, 26–27, 30, 36–39, 114n102, 151; Advisory Council on Population, 2, 59, 82–83, 88, 92, 121, 159, 161–62, 171; Convention on Population (1938), 121–22; General Law of Population (1936), 36–37, 52, 57–60, 76–78, 86, 100–101, 107, 150, 190–91, 204; General Population Census (1930), 39n100, 41; Inter-American Demographic Congress, 276–83; Office of Population, 105 Portes Gil, Emilio, 29n68, 48 Portugal, 19, 60, 182–88, 214, 216, 232, 260, 267 Portuguese Legation, 201n2 Potrero del Llano (tanker), 202n3, 206 press, 2; international, 87, 149, 184, 246; Jewish, 239, 248; Mexican, 71, 112, 114, 162–63, 188, 250 Prieto, Indalecio, 206 PRM (Party of the Mexican Revolution), 247 projects, immigration, 285, 298, 304–7; and child refugees, 211–12, 263; and Polish refugees, 260–70; “safe harbor,” 288–92. See also colonization public demonstrations: Jewish support, 68, 71, 246–49, 251–53; pro-Nazi, 125–26, 234–36

331

public opinion, Mexican: and antiSemitism, 46; and Germany, 148; and immigration policy, 2, 12, 21, 208; and Jewish extermination, 251; and Jewish refugees, 163–64, 199, 212, 276–77, 284 Quakers (Society of Friends), 253 Quanza (ship), 182–89, 217, 224n94, 304 Quijano, A., 251 quotas, immigration. See differential tables race, and immigration policy, 29–30, 32–33, 89, 98, 177, 185, 205 Race, Committee on (Comité Pro-Raza), 46, 53–54 racism, 181–82; and Inter-American Demographic Congress, 277–79; and linguistic cleansing, 177, 278; and mestizaje, 6, 27, 34–38, 83–84, 278–79 Racism, Mexican Committee against, 290n96 Radkau, Verena, 190, 232 Radvanyi, Laszlo, 196 Radvanyi, Netty (Anna Seghers), 196 Rafalín, D. S., 100n48 Railroad Workers’ Union, 290n96 Rakuyo Maru (ship), 198–99, 215 Red Cross, 251, 253 refugee crisis (1933–45), 2–4, 16, 64, 85, 256, 262–63, 304–5, 307 Refugee Economic Corporation, 176 Refugee Rehabilitation Committee, 176n100 refugees: and absorption capacity, 22–23; child, 211–12, 263; vs. immigrants, 7, 67, 84, 88, 101n51, 303–4; non-Jewish, 253–56, 309; numbers of, 92n23, 233n126, 260n2, 263n14, 301–2; political, 7, 88–89, 92–93, 107, 121–22, 150, 178–81, 189–98, 204–5, 230, 297, 307; racial, 7, 88–89, 93, 98, 181, 190, 205; religious, 9, 89, 93; stateless, 10, 64n59, 175, 207, 242; tourist, 60, 105–16, 149, 153–54, 175–76, 205; voluntary vs. involuntary, 14; and WWI, 15, 276. See also Jewish refugees; Spanish refugees; particular countries Refugees Coming from Germany, Provisional Arrangement concerning the Status of, 66–67 Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM), 70, 76, 307 registration: General Registry of Israelites, 241–43; Registro Nacional de Extranjeros (National Registry of Foreigners), 26, 206, 210, 240, 301

332

index

Regler, Gustav, 197 Reguero, Alfredo, 220–21 Reichsvertretung (National Representation of German Jews), 18n22 religion, 9, 38, 89, 93, 204–5. See also particular religions Renn, Ludwig, 197 repatriation: and immigration policy, 49, 64n59, 101, 108, 112, 159, 162, 168, 170, 188, 191, 198n186, 213, 294; and Jewish refugees, 10, 21n38, 64n59, 177, 214, 294; of Mexican emigrants, 28, 40, 121, 160; and Polish refugees from Iran, 261, 263, 271 “Report on the proposal to attract and promote Israelite immigration to Mexico” (DAPP), 82–84 resistance movements, 225 Resnikoff, Theodore, 144 Rettinguer, Józef, 267–68 Revolutionary Action Bloc in favor of Small Businesses and Industries (Bloque de Acción Revolucionaria pro Pequeño Comercio e Industria), 79 Revueltas, Silvestre, 194 Ribentropp-Molotov Pact, 203 Rivet, Paul, 86 Rodríguez, Abelardo L., 29, 46, 71 Rodríguez, Luis I., 111n93, 180, 225 Rodríguez, Nicolás, 48, 53, 56 Romania, 31, 209, 240, 241, 260 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 143 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 85, 90, 94–97, 143, 166, 283 Rosen, Joseph A., 167–69 Rosenberg, Moisés, 100n48, 105n68 Rosenberg family, 176 Ruiz, Leobardo C., 115 Russia, 26, 40, 42, 92n23 Saavedra, Alfredo M., 31 Sadger, Edith, 191 Sáenz de Sicilia, Enrique, 54 Sáenz de Sicilia, Gustavo, 54 safe conduct permits, 225 “safe harbor” project, 288–92 Saint Louis (ship), 18, 217n64, 218 Sakal, T., 117n117 Salmanoff, A. S., 225 Salomon, Bruno, 227–28 Sánchez Mejorada, Carlos, Jr., 170, 172n84 San Gregorio agricultural colony, 131, 153, 155–57 Santa Rosa colony, 263n14, 264–65, 270, 300

San Thomé (ship), 219–20 Scandinavian immigrants, 51, 209 Schapiro de Kaspé, Marie, 138 Schuler, Friedrich, 68, 74–75 Schwartz, M. R., 158, 160 Schwebel, Bruno, 224 Sdaká Umarpé, 42n112 Sefaradi Union, 42n112 Seghers, Anna, 86, 140, 195, 196, 227 Séjourné, Laurette, 196n178 Senkman, Leonardo, 21, 23 Sephardic Jews, 41, 42n112, 214, 285 Serdán, Héctor, 61 Serge, Victor, 139, 196, 197, 200 Serge, Vlady, 196, 200 Serpa Pinto (ship), 216–20, 226n100, 254 Servicio de Evacuación de Refugiados Españoles (Service of Evacuation of Spanish Republicans; SERE), 222 Shanghai, 17, 20 Shapiro, Gregorio, 81, 117n117 Shimanovitz, G., 117n117 Shtime, Di (The Voice; newspaper), 290n97 Sikorski, Władisław, 261, 267–68, 271 Silbermann, Alfredo, 225 Slovakia, 29, 260n2 Socialism and Freedom, 197 Sociedad de Beneficencia Alianza Monte Sinai (Mount Sinai Alliance Charity Society), 42n112 Society for Culture and Aid, 232 Society of Friends (Quakers), 253 Solymossy, Ana Schachter de, 155–56 Sonora agricultural colony, 157–58 Sourasky, León, 40, 41, 43, 117n117 Soustelle, Jacques, 86 South American immigrants, 51 Soviet Union, 17, 203, 261 Spain, 19, 216, 260, 266; immigrants from, 51–52, 60, 61, 166, 179–81, 180, 207. See also Spanish refugees Spanish Aid Committee, United American, 222n90 Spanish Civil War, 86, 147, 189, 219–20 Spanish-Indian heritage, 32–35, 82 Spanish refugees, 1–2, 129–30, 166, 178, 210, 221–23, 232, 233n126, 273; and Cárdenas, 130, 179–80, 189, 199, 263, 305; and immigration policy, 7, 11, 150–51, 168, 174–75, 179–81, 194, 221, 287, 309 Spanish Republicans, Board of Aid to the (Junta de Auxilio a los Republicanos Españoles; JARE), 222–23



index

Spanish Republicans, Service of Evacuation of (Servicio de Evacuación de Refugiados Españoles; SERE), 222 SS (Schutzstaffeln, “Protection Squadrons”), 16n14 stateless peoples, 10, 64n59, 175, 207, 242 Stein, Francisco, 106 Stern, Alexandra, 31, 36 Stern, Roberto, 191 Strunsky, Sheba, 228 Sudetenland, 17, 85 Sugar Workers’ Union, 290n96 Sweden, 60, 175n96, 201n2, 294 Switzerland, 19–20, 60, 158, 168, 175n96, 201n2, 295 Syrian immigrants, 27, 29, 51, 93n26 Tabasco colonization project, 22, 158–65, 169, 305 Tafelov, J. B., 47, 71 Tannenbaum, Frank, 166–67, 171, 196n178 Tartakower, Arieh, 268 Tello, Manuel, 172 Terrones Benítez, Alberto, 169, 172–73 Thomas, Adrienne, 195 Torres, Blanca, 203 Torres Bodet, Jaime, 262n10 tourist refugees, 60, 105–16, 149, 153–54, 175–76, 205 trans-migrants, 40n104, 60, 107, 108n81, 183–84, 187, 189, 205 transportation, maritime, 174, 178, 212, 270 Traugott, Lillian, 166n63 Trejo, Francisco, 58, 92–93, 99–100, 102, 109, 117, 121, 170, 172–73, 298 Trotsky, Leon, 9, 86 Trujillo, Rafael, 22 Trujillo Gurría, Francisco, 158, 159n36, 160, 163–65 Turkish immigrants, 27, 93n26 Uhlman, Rudolph, 224 Uhse, Bodo, 141, 195 Últimas Noticias (newspaper), 71 UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), 301 Union Alliance of Mexican Merchants and Industrialists (Alianza Sindical de Comerciantes e Industriales Mexicanos), 79 Unión Nacional de Veteranos de la Revolución (National Union of Veterans of the Revolution), 53

333

Unión Nacional Sinarquista (National Synarchist Union), 147 Union of Mexican Electricians, 247n180 Unitarian Service Committee, 192–93, 222, 225, 226, 231, 255 United Committee for Victims of Fascism (Comité Unido pro Víctimas del Fascismo), 192–93 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United States, 17, 110, 114, 158, 217n64, 261–65, 271, 275, 283; financial support from, 152, 262, 264–65; immigrants from, 28, 31–32, 40, 51–52, 121; and immigration policy, 21, 24, 26, 39, 276–77; and Intergovernmental Committee, 96, 293n106; Jewish community in, 10, 49, 73, 74, 76; and Mexico, 49–50, 90–92, 201–3, 207, 235–38, 256, 288; Office of Strategic Services, 210; and WWII, 148, 203 Universal, El (newspaper), 71, 288, 290 Urías Horcasitas, Beatriz, 36, 37 Uruguay, 21n38, 24, 275, 310 Vanguardia Nacionalista Mexicana (Mexican Nationalist Vanguard), 53, 234 Vasconcelos, Eduardo, 29 Vasconcelos, José, 35 Venezuela, 24, 275, 284, 302 Vernet camp, 222, 226 Vichy France, 19n26, 195n174, 208, 223, 224, 231 Villa, Pancho, 53 Villalobos, Antonio, 247 Villa Michel, Primo, 93–95, 101 Virgin Islands, 285n78 Visa al Paraíso (Visa to Paradise; documentary), 233 Vittel camp, 285 Waldman, Morris, 289 Wallerstein, A., 81, 117n117 Warman, I., 100n48 Warman, S., 117n117, 118 War Refugee Board (U.S.), 283–88, 289 Warren, Gorge, 166n63 Warsaw Ghetto uprising, 145 Warszawsky family, 215–16 Wasserberger, Sygmunt, 187n144 Weg, Der (The Way; newspaper), 290 Weiner, William, 113 Weiss, Ernst, 194–95 Weisselberg, Mr., 230–31 Weiss y Birbaum, Otto, 187n145

334

index

Welles, Sumner, 236–37 Werfel, Franz, 194, 195n173 Weyl, Nathaniel, 111n93 Weyl, Sylvia, 111n93 Wise, Stephen, 144, 236–37 Wishñiak, Sam, 117n117 Wolf, Friedrich, 194 Wolfowitz, Arturo, 117n117, 164, 176n102, 224 Wolfowitz, Danielle, 224 Wollny, Hans, 301 Wolynsky, Josef, 106 workers: displacement of, 33, 54, 57, 61, 80–82, 88, 107, 115, 122, 148–49, 171, 177, 181, 212, 261, 270, 309; exploitation of, 51, 82; immigration of, 26–28, 51, 81–82, 206, 219, 239 Workers’ University of Mexico, 247n180 World Jewish Congress, 118, 223, 248n187, 249, 266, 268, 272, 291, 297, 299; and antiSemitic movement in Mexico, 236; and child refugee project, 212; and InterAmerican Demographic Congress, 280

World War I, 15, 276 World War II, 18, 147–48, 178, 203, 206–7, 232, 280; and Mexican immigration policy, 194, 206, 259; Mexico’s entry into, 201–2, 206, 208, 238 World Zionist Organization, 249 xenophobia, 2, 6, 33, 53–56, 82–83, 279, 309 Yankelevich, Pablo, 5, 33, 59, 60, 83 Youth Association (Ateneo de la Juventud), 34 Yugoslavia, 31, 190, 202n4, 225 Zechlin, Walter, 68 Zincúnegui Tercero, Leopoldo, 244 Zionism, 43, 118, 298–300 Zionist Convention (Mexico, 1938), 127 Zionist Organization of Mexico, United (Organización Sionista Unida de México), 72n89, 299 Zogbaum, Heidi, 197 Zuckermann, Leo, 226