Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace 3161607791, 9783161607790, 9783161607806

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Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum Studies and Texts in Antiquity and Christianity Herausgeber/Editors Christoph Markschies (Berlin) · Martin Wallraff (München) Christian Wildberg (Pittsburgh) Beirat/Advisory Board Peter Brown (Princeton) · Susanna Elm (Berkeley) Johannes Hahn (Münster) · Emanuela Prinzivalli (Rom) Jörg Rüpke (Erfurt)

125

Greg Stanton

Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace

Mohr Siebeck

Greg Stanton, born 1943; 1963 First Class Honours in Greek at the University of Sydney; 1970 PhD at the University of New England (Australia); 1965 – 1974 Teaching Fellow, Lecturer and Senior Lecturer at New England; 1975 – 2003 Associate Professor; since 2003 Adjunct Associate Professor in Classics and Ancient History.

ISBN 978-3-16-160779-0 / eISBN 978-3-16-160780-6 DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-160780-6 ISSN 1436-3003 / eISSN 2568-7433 (Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum) The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2021  by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Germany.  www.mohrsiebeck.com This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was printed on non-aging paper by Laupp & Göbel in Gomaringen, and bound by Buchbinderei Nädele in Nehren. Printed in Germany.

Preface The Roman empire of the first two centuries C.E. encompassed ethnic groups that bordered on the Mediterranean Sea and some further inland, such as the Dacians. People who spoke Greek dominated the eastern half of the Mediterranean and Egypt. The Roman élite wanted their conquered peoples to accept Roman rule and to embrace the peace they had established, the pax Romana. This book explores what Greeks under Roman control thought about unity at several levels, beginning with the smallest entity, the Greek city, and moving through the Roman empire and humankind to the universe. Gods, humans, and the universe were sometimes thought to be bound up together. Also of interest is the transmission of ideas. Platonism in various revised manifestations tended to become more dominant in these two centuries from Augustus to the early Severan rulers, but Epicureans and Stoics continued to pass on their ideas, though Stoics such as Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius are not as unified in their thinking as is sometimes claimed. Writers in the rhetorical tradition, such as Plutarch, Dion of Prousa and Ailios Aristeides, share a number of ideas on concord and disharmony, but can also differ. The Christian writers of the first two centuries had some distinctive ideas on unity, such as harmony among churches and the unity of God. But they treated other ideas, such as the unity of humankind, with a similar lack of enthusiasm to that of their non-Christian contemporaries. Also meriting consideration is the issue as to how far writers inclined to Stoicism or to Platonism, or those committed to Christian belief, were intent on seeing practical outworkings of their beliefs. There are many people whom I thank for considering my ideas and challenging me over the years, including the students of an advanced undergraduate unit in Ancient History entitled ‘Unity and Disunity among the Greeks’ that was offered at the University of New England in Australia for many years. Professor E.A. (Edwin) Judge has constantly offered interesting ideas that I needed to consider. Professor G.H.R. (Greg) Horsley kept urging me to finish the book and send it off, and he has provided notes on page after page of the formatted version that have forced me to rephrase what I had thought was clear. Allison White has done marvels in converting the text and footnotes into the style of the series and has graciously made corrections until the final completion of the book. Feast of St Justin, 1 June 2021

Greg Stanton

Table of Contents Preface................................................................................................................ V List of Abbreviations........................................................................................ IX

Chapter 1: Unity Ancient and Modern ....................................................1 Unity Movements in the Modern World .......................................................... 1 Rhetoric and Action........................................................................................ 14 Peace and Concepts of Unity .......................................................................... 28 Early Greek Interest in Unity ......................................................................... 36 The Educated Public and Concepts of Unity .................................................. 38 Possible Implications...................................................................................... 39

Chapter 2: Greek Cities .............................................................................41 The Vocabulary of Harmony and its Opposites ............................................. 44 Harmony within Greek Cities ......................................................................... 51 Harmony among Greek Cities ........................................................................ 60 Greek Intellectuals and the Roman Administration........................................ 65

Chapter 3: The Roman Empire ................................................................70 The Empire as a Unit ...................................................................................... 73 The Empire Coterminous with the Inhabited World ...................................... 75 The Unity of the Roman Empire .................................................................... 79

Chapter 4: Humankind ...............................................................................91 The Unity of Humankind ............................................................................... 94 Citizen of the Universe ................................................................................. 110 The Transmission of Ideas ........................................................................... 117

VIII

Table of Contents

Chapter 5: Gods, Humans and the Universe...................................... 123 Only One God?............................................................................................. 125 The Monad ................................................................................................... 135 Harmony among the Gods ............................................................................ 136 Gods and Humans ........................................................................................ 136 God and the Universe ................................................................................... 142 Humans and Nature ...................................................................................... 146

Chapter 6: The Universe.......................................................................... 157 The Harmony of the Universe ...................................................................... 157 The Harmony of Opposites .......................................................................... 168 The Universe and the City ............................................................................ 170

Chapter 7: The Early Christians: Distinctive Ideas ......................... 174 The Unity of the Roman Empire and Christian Exclusiveness .................... 176 Christian Unity ............................................................................................. 184 Christian Unity: Local Churches .................................................................. 195 Christian Unity: Inter-Church Relations....................................................... 200 The Unity and Uniqueness of God ............................................................... 205

Chapter 8: The Early Christians: A Common Heritage ................. 214 The Unity of Humankind ............................................................................. 214 Union with God ............................................................................................ 225 The Harmony of the Universe ...................................................................... 233

Chapter 9: In Praise of Harmony and Unity ...................................... 238 Unity Themes under the Roman Peace......................................................... 240 The Transmission of Thought ...................................................................... 244 Practicality of Thought ................................................................................. 248 The Unity of Philosophy .............................................................................. 250 A Final Comment on Modern and Ancient Ideas of Unity........................... 256 Bibliography.................................................................................................... 259 Index of References......................................................................................... 305 Index of Subjects ............................................................................................. 355

List of Abbreviations Ælius Aristide écrivain Alcock Antonine Literature ANRW Bakke

Baldry Barrow Behr Being Greek under Rome

Béranger

Birley Bonhöffer Boulanger

Bowersock Boys-Stones CIG Desideri

Dio Chrysostom

L. Pernot et al. (eds.), Ælius Aristide écrivain [Recherches sur les Rhétoriques religieuses, 19] (Turnhout 2016) S.E. Alcock, Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece (Cambridge 1993) D.A. Russell (ed.), Antonine Literature (Oxford 1990) Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase (Berlin 1972-) O.M. Bakke, ‘Concord and Peace’: A Rhetorical Analysis of the First Letter of Clement with an Emphasis on the Language of Unity and Sedition [WUNT, 2.141] (Tübingen 2001) H.C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge 1965) R.H. Barrow, Plutarch and his Times (London 1967) C.A. Behr, Aelius Aristides and the Sacred Tales (Amsterdam 1968) S. Goldhill (ed.), Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire (Cambridge 2001) J. Béranger, Recherches sur l’aspect idéologique du principat [Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 6] (Basel 1953) A.R. Birley, Marcus Aurelius: a Biography2 (London 1987) A.F. Bonhöffer, Epictet und die Stoa: Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie (Stuttgart 1890) A. Boulanger, Aelius Aristide et la sophistique dans la province d’Asie au IIe siècle de notre ère [Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 126] (Paris 1923) G.W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford 1969) G.R. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen (Oxford 2001) Corpus inscriptionum Graecarum, ed. A. Böckh et al. (Berlin 1828-1877) P. Desideri, Dione di Prusa: un intellettuale greco nell’impero romano [Biblioteca di Cultura Contemporanea, 135] (Firenze 1978) S.C.R. Swain (ed.), Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy (Oxford 2000)

X DK DNP Dobbin Dodds

Farquharson Festugière Fowden Greeks on Greekness

Hadot IGRR Jaeger Jäkel

Jones, Dio Jones, Plutarch Kidd Klein, Einführung Klein, Romrede Laks/Most or LM Lamberton Long Magie Millar Monotheism

List of Abbreviations H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker6 (Berlin 1951-1952) Der Neue Pauly, ed. H. Cancik et al. (Stuttgart 1996-2003) R.F. Dobbin (trans.), Epictetus: Discourses Book I (Oxford 1998) E.R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (Cambridge 1965) A.S.L. Farquharson (ed.), The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus (Oxford 1944) 3 A.-J. Festugière, La Révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste (Paris 1949-1954) G. Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to the Late Pagan Mind (Cambridge 1986) D. Konstan and S. Saïd (eds.), Greeks on Greekness: Viewing the Greek Past under the Roman Empire [Cambridge Classical Journal Supplementary Volumes, 29] (Cambridge 2006) P. Hadot, The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (Cambridge, MA 1998) Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes, ed. R. Cagnat et al. (Paris 1906-1927) W. Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge, MA 1962) S. Jäkel, Marcus Aurelius’s Concept of Life [Turun Yliopiston Julkaisuja = Annales Universitatis Turkuensis, B.195] (Turku 1991) C.P. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom (Cambridge, MA 1978) C.P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome (Oxford 1971) I.G. Kidd (ed.), Posidonius [Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 13-14 and 36] (Cambridge 1972-1999) R. Klein, Die Romrede des Aelius Aristides: Einführung (Darmstadt 1981) R. Klein (ed.), Die Romrede des Aelius Aristides [Texte zur Forschung, 45] (Darmstadt 1983) A. Laks and G.W. Most, Early Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, MA 2016) R. Lamberton, Plutarch (New Haven, CN 2001) A.A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford 2002) D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ (Princeton 1950) F.G.B. Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (31 BC AD 337) (London 1977) S. Mitchell and P. Van Nuffelen (eds.), Monotheism between Pagans and Christians in Late Antiquity [Interdisciplinary Studies in Ancient Culture and Religion, 12] (Leuven 2010)

List of Abbreviations Morlet

Neuenschwander

Nock-Festugière Nörr2

OGIS Oliver

One God Osborn, Clement Osborn, Irenaeus Osborn, Justin Osborn, Tertullian Pagan Monotheism Palm

PIR2 Plutarch and his Intellectual World Pohlenz P.Oxy RE Renoirte

Ruling the Greek World

XI

S. Morlet, Symphonia: La concorde des textes et des doctrines dans la littérature grecque jusqu’à Origène (Paris 2019) H.R. Neuenschwander, Mark Aurels Beziehungen zu Seneca und Poseidonios [Noctes Romanae: Forschungen über die Kultur der Antike, 3] (Bern 1951) A.D. Nock and A.-J. Festugière (eds.), Corpus Hermeticum 1-22 (Paris 1960), 3-4 (Paris 1954) D. Nörr, Imperium und Polis in der hohen Prinzipatszeit2 [Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 50] (München 1969) Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae, ed. W. Dittenberger (Leipzig 1903-1905) J.H. Oliver, The Ruling Power: A Study of the Roman Empire in the Second Century after Christ through the Roman Oration of Aelius Aristides [Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s. 43 part 4] (Philadelphia 1953) 871-1003 S. Mitchell and P. Van Nuffelen (eds.), One God: Pagan Monotheism in the Roman Empire (Cambridge 2010) E.F. Osborn, Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge 2005) E.F. Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge 2001) E.F. Osborn, Justin Martyr [Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 47] (Tübingen 1973) E.F. Osborn, Tertullian, First Theologian of the West (Cambridge 1997) P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede (eds.), Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity (Oxford 1999) J. Palm, Rom, Römertum und Imperium in der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit [Acta Reg. Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis, 57] (Lund 1959) Prosopographia imperii Romani: saec. I, II, III2, ed. E. Groag, A. Stein and L. Petersen (Berlin 1933- ) J. Mossman (ed.), Plutarch and his Intellectual World: Essays on Plutarch (London 1997) M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung (Göttingen 1948-1949) The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, ed. B.P. Grenfell et al. (London 1898-) Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. G. Wissowa et al. (Stuttgart 1894-1980) T. Renoirte, Les ‘Conseils politiques’ de Plutarque: une lettre ouverte aux Grecs à l’époque de Trajan [Université de Louvain: recueil de travaux d’histoire et de philologie3, 40] (Louvain 1951) J.M. Cortés Copete, E. Muñiz Grijalvo and F. Lozano Gómez (eds.), Ruling the Greek World: Approaches to the Roman Empire in the East [Potsdamer Altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge, 52] (Stuttgart 2015)

XII Russell, Dio Russell, Plutarch Rutherford SB Schoedel Schofield Scott

SEHRE2 Smith Souilhé SVF Swain

The Philosophy of Epictetus Trapp van Moorsel

von Arnim, Dio Wengst WUNT

List of Abbreviations D.A. Russell (ed.), Dio Chrysostom, Orations VII, XII and XXXVI (Cambridge 1992) D.A. Russell, Plutarch (London 1973) R.B. Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: A Study (Oxford 1989) Sammelbuch Griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten, ed. F. Preisigke et al. (Straßburg et alibi 1913-) W.R. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch (Philadelphia 1985) M. Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City (Cambridge 1991) W. Scott (ed.), with A.S. Ferguson, Hermetica: The Ancient Greek and Latin Writings which contain Religious or Philosophic Teachings Ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus (Oxford 1924-1936) M.I. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire2 (Oxford 1957) Diogenes of Oinoanda, The Epicurean Inscription, ed. M.F. Smith [La Scuola di Epicuro, suppl. 1] (Napoli 1993) J. Souilhé with A. Jagu (eds.), Épictète: Entretiens (Paris 1943-1965) Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. H. von Arnim (Leipzig 1903-1924) S.C.R. Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 50-250 (Oxford 1996) T. Scaltsas and A.S. Mason (eds.), The Philosophy of Epictetus (Oxford 2007) M.B. Trapp, Philosophy in the Roman Empire: Ethics, Politics and Society (Aldershot 2007) G. van Moorsel, The Mysteries of Hermes Trismegistus: A Phenomenologic Study in the Process of Spiritualisation in the Corpus Hermeticum and Latin Asclepius [Studia Theologica Rheno-Traiectina, 1] (Utrecht 1955) H. von Arnim, Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa (Berlin 1898) K. Wengst, Pax Romana and the Peace of Jesus Christ (London 1987) Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament

Chapter 1

Unity Ancient and Modern Unity Movements in the Modern World Unity Movements in the Modern World

Over the century since the First World War there has been a wave of movements promoting unity of various kinds: political unity, ethnic unity, religious unity, the unity of humankind. Leaders of opinion have won support for the establishment of organisations that have formally brought together diverse political or religious entities. Over many centuries prior to the First World War certain political unions were created, even imposed, such as those of Scotland and England or of Lithuania and Poland. Many of the associations of powers, such as Leagues, Congresses and Holy Alliances, were formed with limited objectives, typically military ones. They frequently had an exclusivist purpose. But the 1914–1918 War brought forth the idea that such diplomatic instruments had negative as well as positive effects; they often constituted barriers to wider unity. The bold idea took hold that exclusivity was a bad thing and that a new organisation should be formed that was open to every nation. The League of Nations was formed in 1919 with great optimism from political leaders such as Woodrow Wilson.1 Neither the United Nations Organisation (UN) nor the League that it replaced has pretended to unite nations. But they provided, and provide, a forum in which neighbouring nations in conflict (such as India and Pakistan, or Israel and its neighbours) can jockey for support, or at least let off steam, rather than fight on a battlefield. Ironically, however, the UN has been regarded as having one of its finest hours in 1990–91 when it sponsored military action against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War with the intention of safeguarding the peace of the global community. By contrast, the nations that invaded

1 Incarnations of unity and disunity in Europe before the signing in 1951 of the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community are discussed in an introductory fashion by R.H. Ginsberg, Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration2 (Lanham, MD 2010), chap. 1. For Wilson’s promotion of a League of Nations as early as 1916 see T.J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton 1992), especially 66–69, 74–81, 86–87, 95–99.

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Iraq in 2003 – the United States of America, Great Britain, Australia and Poland – snubbed the UN and started bombing without submitting a final resolution to the Security Council.2 Following the establishment of the UN, attempts at regional unity began to proliferate. One that actually took ‘unity’ into its name was the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (OUA). It was set up in 1963 with considerable enthusiasm by Francophone and Anglophone leaders of newly independent countries in Africa. The Organisation held its last meeting in 2001, following a series of meetings (two of them held in Libya) at which the delegates finally opted not for Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s plan for a federal ‘United States of Africa’ (adumbrated by Dr Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana as early as 1960) but for a union of African states based loosely on the model of the European Union. When Qadhafi tried again to promote his policy at the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union (AU)/Union Africaine (UA) in Ghana, the Accra Declaration (3 July 2007) stated only that the United States of Africa is an ultimate objective of the AU but it initiated further examination of the Union Government concept and the relations of such a government with national governments. The prospect was raised, and continued to be raised as late as the Thirteenth Ordinary Session of June/July 2009 in Sirte (Libya again), that the AU might split over the idea of unity. But this 2 The Gulf War was not, of course, the first massive military action of the UN; one thinks of the Korean War (1950–1953). On the “unprecedently firm and united response” to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis see B. Urquhart in F. Barnaby (ed.), Building a More Democratic United Nations (London 1991) 1.293–302 (quotation from 293); B. Boutros-Ghali in The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990–1996 [The United Nations Blue Book Series, 9] (New York 1996) 111–115; S.A. Yetiv, The Persian Gulf Crisis (Westport, CT 1997) 93– 99; P.R. Baehr and L. Gordenker, The United Nations at the End of the 1990s (Basingstoke 1999) 76–83. Others have seen the Gulf War as a negative experience for the UN: for example, K. Suter in S. Kettle and S. Dowrick (eds.), After the Gulf War: For Peace in the Middle East (Sydney 1991) 56–66; C. Rakisits in K. Clements and R. Ward (eds.), Building International Community: Cooperating for Peace Case Studies (Sydney 1994) 58–103; K.-K. S. Pease, International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century3 (Upper Saddle River, NJ 2008) 111–123. On the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003 see, for example, F. Keane in S. Beck and M. Downing (eds.), The Battle for Iraq: BBC News Correspondents on the War against Saddam and a New World Agenda (London 2003) 64–65 and R. Fawn in id. and R. Hinnebusch (eds.), The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences (London 2006) 6, 85. Some have sought to promote 15 February 2003, the date on which mass protests against the imminent invasion of Iraq erupted spontaneously in many countries, as more significant in the long term than 20 March: see J. Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge 2006) 39–48, 55–56, 87–89. E.A. Heinze seeks to make a coherent ethical and legal case for military intervention in other countries in pursuit of humanitarian (as distinct from strategic or self-interested) ends: Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Albany, NY 2009). Several contributors deal with the same issue in M. Heazle and I. Islam (eds.), Beyond the Iraq War: The Promises, Pitfalls and Perils of External Interventionism (Cheltenham 2006).

Unity Movements in the Modern World

3

threat may well have passed with the killing of Qadhafi in Sirte in October 2011.3 In Europe there has long been a European Parliament (called the European Parliamentary Assembly before 1962) meeting in Strasbourg, though its power relative to the European Commission based in Brussels has yet to be finally settled. From 1954 to 2011 there was a Western European Union/Union de l’Europe Occidentale, though it was scoffed at for lacking the military forces to back up its resolutions.4 The European Union (EU), which celebrated its sixty-fifth anniversary in July 2017, grew out of ‘the Six’ of the European Coal and Steel Community, which led to the European Economic Community in 1957. As the European Union (1992) it has increased greatly the number of member states: in December 2002 the European Union resolved to enlarge the 3 Inauguration of the African Union: The Times (London), 10 July 2002. President Qadhafi was prominent on the stage at the stadium in Durban, South Africa. On his late move from pan-Arabism to African unity see D.J. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya2 (Cambridge 2012) 6, 137, 194–198 (unfortunately, Vandewalle does not include the inauguration of the AU – or any other event in 2002 – in his Chronology [xvii–xxxv] or deal with it elsewhere). On Qadhafi’s stormy relationship with the OAU from 1972 for two decades see J.-E. Pondi in R. Lemarchand (ed.), The Green and the Black: Qadhafi’s Policies in Africa (Bloomington, IN 1988) 139–149. After the formation of the AU Libya continued to be active in debate about a Union Government even before Qadhafi became chairperson in February 2009: see T. Murithi, Africa Quarterly (New Delhi) 47.3 (2007) 30–35 at 33. The fiftythree member states of the AU carried over from the OAU; a fifty-fourth, South Sudan, has since been added. On the Constitutive Act of the AU see C.A.A. Packer and D. Rukare, The American Journal of International Law 96 (2002) 365–379; R. Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union (Cambridge 2004) 280–293 (text); S.M. Makinda and F.W. Okumu, The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance (London 2008) 122–136. For the disparate interests that coalesced in the creation of the AU see T.K. Tieku, African Affairs 103 (2004) 249–267 (explaining the rapid formation of the AU in terms of the foreign policy interests of Nigeria and South Africa); D.J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Aldershot 2006) 25–31; S.M. Makinda and F.W. Okumu, op. cit. 28–35. ‘United States of Africa’: K. Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology (London 1961) 251; cf. ‘a Union or Commonwealth of African States’ in 175–177 (1958), 206 (1960). Accra Declaration: see www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2007/ghan_decl0706.htm (accessed 1 September 2018). 4 This became even more obvious when the Western European Union (WEU) was incorporated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, a military organisation that continues to expand eastwards in Europe (and includes Asian Turkey). Following adjustments in the 1990s the WEU had ten member states and six associate members (including Turkey), all of them members of NATO. It was separate from but operated within NATO, although the United States was excluded from membership. The first instance of concerted action by military forces was clearance of mines from the Persian Gulf in 1988–1990. The Council of the Western European Union had not met since 2001. See M. Palmer et al., European Unity: A Survey of European Organisations (London 1968), chap. 9; P.J. Byrd in D.W. Urwin and W.E. Paterson (eds.), Politics in Western Europe Today: Perspectives, Policies and Problems since 1980 (London 1990) 87, 109–110; www.weu.int (accessed 1 September 2018). European Parliament: M. Palmer et al., op. cit. 177–185.

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organisation from fifteen to twenty-five member states; it did so in May 2004 and in September 2006 approved the inclusion of two more states in January 2007. A twenty-eighth country, Croatia, joined in 2013, but from March 2017 Great Britain was negotiating to leave the EU and did so in January 2020. The enlargement of the EU highlights another facet of both the world-wide and the regional associations: they do not seek uniformity. They positively encourage diversity, as the UN does through its agency, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). What these associations discourage is disunity and conflict. But there are some cautions to be stated about attempts to achieve regional unity. These centre on national sovereignty. The Organisation of African Unity took the policy of non-intervention in the affairs of member states to the extreme of allowing African nations to oppress their people with immunity and to do “little or nothing to prevent massive human rights abuses in their neighbouring countries”. Since some self-appointed dictators have continued to represent their countries in the successor organisation, there is a question whether the African Union will be willing to take action to protect sub-national communal groups. The European Union has sometimes been surprised by the reluctance of the public and some national leaders in (particularly) Denmark, Great Britain and Ireland to accept commitments to greater unification such as the Maastricht Treaty (1992), a common currency (2002) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2008). Although only nineteen of the twenty-seven members of the EU are in the Eurozone, that monetary union (and perhaps the EU itself) faces the danger of secession by countries whose populations are suffering very high unemployment and significant reduction in living standards through legally enshrined programmes of fiscal rigour imposed by the EU in return for rescue from default on sovereign debt, which has often arisen from the kind of reckless lending by banks that led to the global financial crisis of 2008. One currency is not enough. One treasury to determine policies on taxing and spending and to require wealth-sharing between member states is needed, and that probably means that both those who want to impose austerity and those who want to promote economic growth will have to compromise in the loss of national sovereignty. Greater political integration might stop member states going their own way on fiscal and social policies, but already by 2012 some EU countries had forced out governments that agreed to harsh austerity programmes. Then in March 2020, after the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic, Italy complained about the failure of EU member states to respond to its call for medical equipment. Although China offered to sell lung ventilators, masks and so on to Italy, Germany and France were among the EU countries to impose limits on the export of protective medical equipment. In April the so-called ‘Frugal’ countries in northern Europe risked losing a single EU market by insisting that aid must come to the so-called ‘Club Med’ group of countries in the form of loans. The French president Emmanuel Macron argued strongly that piling more debt

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on countries already drowning in debt will not resolve the underlying issue. Northern states that make handsome profits from exporting to the south might wake up one day to find that the EU single market is no longer there. The German president Angela Merkel, who said in April that grants of money were not in a category to which she could agree, was persuaded that Macron was correct. So in a marathon meeting in July country leaders agreed to a €750 billion package of which €390 billion would be grants and €360 billion would be loans. Merkel’s switch to join Macron in support of common borrowing by the EU weakened the ‘Frugals’ (The Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden), though the leaders agreed on ways for a government to complain about “serious deviations” from a country’s investment plan and ask the European Council to investigate.5 In the period of the League of Nations, while politicians struggled over unity between nations, academics in the public eye talked about a much broader unity, ‘the unity of mankind’. One of them pointed out that about fifty-six of 5

OAU: T. Murithi, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development (Aldershot 2005) 2–3, 26–30, 82 (quotation from 26). In discussing the AU in the twentyfirst century Murithi highlights the lack of attention to cultural values in efforts to build peace (125–130). See further on human rights in African countries G.W. Mugwanya, Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African Regional Human Rights System (Ardsley, NY 2003); R. Murray, Human Rights (n. 3); M. Evans and R. Murray (eds.), The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice2 (Cambridge 2008); F. Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa2 (Oxford 2012), especially Part 3; A. Jeng, Peacebuilding in the African Union: Law, Philosophy and Practice (Cambridge 2012), with case studies of Burundi (chap. 7) and Somalia (chap. 8). For an introduction to the European Union see J. McCormick, Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction2 (Basingstoke 2002), D. Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union (Boulder, CO 2004) or R.H. Ginsberg, op. cit. (n. 1). For the Maastricht Treaty signed in February 1992 and ratified in 1992–93 see Council of the European Communities, Treaty on European Union (Luxembourg 1992) or, for a version as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, F. Emmert (ed.), European Union Law: Documents2 (The Hague 2011) 1–22. For an analysis see, for example, P.C. Schmitter in G. Marks et al. (eds.), Governance in the European Union (London 1996) 121–150, 161–165. For the Treaty of Lisbon see the site http://eur-lex.europa.eu (accessed 2 November 2010) and, for an introduction, I. Bache et al., Politics in the European Union3 (Oxford 2011) 211–216 or A. Kaczorowska, European Union Law2 (London 2011) 29–34. For the EU as a cosmopolitan empire see U. Beck and E. Grande in J. Meyer and A. Wiener (eds.), Political Theory of the European Union (Oxford 2011) 21–46. On the link between monetary and political union see P. De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union8 (Oxford 2009) 106–114. A Belgian scholar who writes reports for the EU reviewed the responses of the EU to the global financial crisis and to sovereign debt problems of countries in the euro area and concluded that “monetary union does indeed require some form of fiscal union” and a probable reduction in the “fiscal sovereignty of eurozone countries”: A. Sapir in L. Tsoukalis and J.A. Emmanouilidis (eds.), The Delphic Oracle on Europe: Is There a Future for the European Union? (Oxford 2011) 91–105 (quotations from 105). Italy’s complaint: The Guardian (Australia), 11 March 2020. Threat to single EU market: Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 2020; 22 and 23 July 2020.

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what were then only sixty-eight nations in the world were currently members of the League of Nations; he suggested that it was necessary to deal with the self-assertive and aggressive impulses in people. After the Second World War another scholar saw in the League of Nations, United Nations, Benelux, the Strasbourg Assembly and movements such as Pan-Slavism evidence of “that instinctive belief that the human race has a corporate and universal destiny”; the problem of unity is the “all-absorbing human preoccupation today”. Also in the early 1950s a scholar who had long had an interest in the unity of humankind and had been a South African delegate to UNESCO wrote an introductory essay on the topic for the International University Society. A quarter of a century later again it was argued that, given the biological unity of the human mind implicit in the unity of humankind, humans should seek a unity of truth, which entails some restrictions on cultural diversity. About the same time Thomas Molnar produced a devastating critique of the recurrent dream of the oneness of humankind. Efforts to organise people into unity and cohesion – envisaged briefly by mediaeval Christians and taken up more rigorously by Marxists and Christian thinkers such as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Paul Tillich – , he argued, reduce human freedom and deify humans. What was missing, in Molnar’s view, was a recognition of human sinfulness.6 More recently, Internet technology has enabled people to discover what is happening elsewhere. But if companies which advertise on American television can effectively limit the information that is readily available to the American public, one can imagine that the information reaching citizens of a country with state censorship will be severely restricted. Moreover, the great expansion of social media has allowed the invention and acceptance of false ‘facts’, and some leaders 6 On 21 March 1935 Professor Morris Ginsberg gave a lecture to the London School of Economics and Political Science on The Unity of Mankind [L.T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lectures, 5] (Oxford 1935); cf. R. Fletcher in id. (ed.), The Science of Society and The Unity of Mankind: A Memorial Volume for Morris Ginsberg (London 1974) 20–21. Two years earlier Sir William Tarn had delivered a Raleigh Lecture on History to the British Academy on ‘Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind’: PBA 19 (1933) 123–166. Tarn’s view that Alexander was the first person to conceive of the unity of humankind was mistaken: see chap. 4 at n. 16. Preoccupation with unity: C.G. Hope, The Nineteenth Century and After 148 (1950) 322–330 (quotations from 322). South African scholar: T.J. Haarhoff, following his The Stranger at the Gate: Aspects of Exclusiveness and Co-Operation in Ancient Greece and Rome, with Some Reference to Modern Times (London 1938), with an expression of admiration for Tarn’s lecture on 5, published The Unity of Mankind (Nottingham n.d. [c.1951]); note especially his approval of bans on inter-racial marriage (36; contrast 22 against a Colour Bar) and his faith in Western Union (37–39); he provided questions for reflection or discussion keyed to a volume of readings. Restrictions on cultural diversity: M.J. Adler, Truth in Religion: The Plurality of Religions and the Unity of Truth: An Essay in the Philosophy of Religion (New York 1990) 113–128 (from a lecture delivered in 1973). T. Molnar’s critique: Utopia: The Perennial Heresy (London 1972), especially chaps. 1, 2 and 5.

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of countries (including the man who was President of the United States of America from 2017 to 2020) have taken to making untrue claims about history. Nevertheless, the Internet is a potential means of promoting the sense of one world. Against the background of these attempts at what is essentially political and economic unity there have taken place attempts at religious unity. Not that precedents were lacking in Christian thought. Jesus the Christ claimed that when he was to be lifted up from the earth he would draw all people to himself and he prayed that his followers might be one as he and his holy father were one. The former claim is to an ultimate unity of all humankind in Christ and it continues to be taken up in today’s world. The first council of Christians at Jerusalem, recorded in Acts of the Apostles, rejected division among Christians on grounds of Jewish law. The church was already thought of as universal in a passage from Ignatios of Antioch discussed below in chapter 7: “wherever the bishop shows himself, there shall the community be, just as wherever Christ Jesus is there is the catholic church”. The affirmation of belief in one catholic church derived from the apostles is made early in the history of Christian creeds and from the late fourth century in the West.7 From the time when the League of Nations was developing, efforts to bring about a union of Christian churches began and they culminated in the formation of the World Council of Churches (WCC). The World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in June 1910 was followed by two significant conferences in Oxford and Edinburgh in July and August 1937, the first of which led to the approval of a Provisional Committee of the ‘World Council of Churches – in Process of Formation’ in Utrecht in May 1938. After a postponement of the projected formation in 1940 because of the Second World War, the WCC proceeded to hold world congresses from 1948, as well as smaller meetings (notably, the Faith and Order Commission meetings). The influence of the establishment of the League of Nations on overtures towards church union was explicitly recognised by the Patriarchate 7 NT John 12:32; 17:11, 20–23; Acts 15:19–21, 28–29. Ignatios, Smyrn. 8.2; cf. M.Polyk. inscr., 8.1, 19.2 and chap. 7 at nn. 26–27. Creeds: J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds3 (London 1972) 384–387; the creed of the Council of Constantinople (381 C.E.) includes belief in μίαν ἁγίαν καθολικὴν καὶ ἀποστολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν: E.J. Jonkers (ed.), Acta et symbola conciliorum quae saeculo quarto habita sunt [Textus Minores, 19] (Leiden 1974) 138 or J.J. Pelikan and V.R. Hotchkiss (eds.), Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition (New Haven, CN 2003) 1.162. Some scholars have explicitly sought light in the New Testament for the twentieth- and twenty-first-century ecumenical movement: see, for example, K. Goebbels, Christliche Einheit aus der Sicht des Neuen Testamentes: Ein Beitrag zum ökumenischen Gespräch (Augsburg 1964); C. Maurer in J.R. Nelson (ed.), No Man is Alien: Essays on the Unity of Mankind (Leiden 1971) 45–61, in a volume of essays in honour of the first Secretary General of the World Council of Churches (see also below, at n. 12); A.C. Mayer, Sprache der Einheit im Epheserbrief und in der Ökumene [WUNT, 2.150] (Tübingen 2002).

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of Constantinople in an Encyclical Letter of January 1920.8 But Christians who disagreed with the thrust of the WCC did not hesitate to form international bodies which they saw as alternative routes to unity, such as the Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization (the Lausanne Movement), which has held international congresses in 1974, 1989 and 2010.9 The League of Arab States (founded in 1945) can be considered to have Islam, rather than a particular form of government or a particular political ideology, as its key common denominator. But again there are rival movements that attack Arab states considered insufficiently Islamic, such as the al-Qa‘eda network, which attempted in association with the Egyptian group al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya to assassinate

8 The ecumenical movement is generally thought to have its origins in the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in June 1910 (see, however, D. Hudson, The World Council of Churches in International Affairs [Leighton Buzzard 1977] 24–25 and B. Stanley, The World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910 [Grand Rapids, MI 2009], especially 7–12, 71–72, 277–281; also below, at n. 28). On the World Conference on Church, Community, and State (Universal Christian Council for Life and Work) in Oxford in July and the Second World Conference on Faith and Order in Edinburgh in August 1937, see the Third Series, covering 1930–1948, of G.K.A. Bell (ed.), Documents on Christian Unity (Oxford 1948) 244–286 and, more fully, W. Moberly et al., The Churches Survey their Task: The Report of the Conference at Oxford, July 1937, on Church, Community, and State [The Church, Community, and State, 8] (London 1937), with the proposals passed for a World Council of Churches on 279–281, and L. Hodgson (ed.), The Second World Conference on Faith and Order Held at Edinburgh, August 3–18, 1937 (London 1938); cf. G. Smith, Oxford 1937: The Universal Christian Council for Life and Work Conference [Studien zur interkulturellen Geschichte des Christentums, 135] (Frankfurt am Main 2004). For the first assembly of the WCC, marking its formal establishment, see W.A. Visser ’t Hooft (ed.), The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches Held at Amsterdam, August 22nd to September 4th, 1948 [Man’s Disorder and God’s Design, 5] (London 1949), with the preparatory papers in The Amsterdam Assembly Series [Man’s Disorder and God’s Design, 1–4] (New York, n.d. [1948–1949]). Documents of the Commission on Faith and Order are excerpted in L. Vischer (ed.), A Documentary History of the Faith and Order Movement 1927–1963 (St Louis, MO 1963) and G. Gassmann (ed.), Documentary History of Faith and Order 1963–1993 [Faith and Order Papers, 159] (Geneva 1993). For other documents see G.K.A. Bell (ed.), Documents on Christian Unity (4 vols., Oxford 1924–1958). Encyclical Letter ‘Unto All the Churches of Christ Wheresoever They Be’: G.K.A. Bell (ed.), Documents on Christian Unity 1920–4 (Oxford 1924) 44–45, 47–48 = Documents on Christian Unity: A Selection from the First and Second Series 1920–30 (Oxford 1955) 17–18, 20–21. 9 The compendia of the first two Lausanne congresses (the second held in Manila) were edited by J.D. Douglas: Let the Earth Hear His Voice: International Congress on World Evangelization, Lausanne, Switzerland (Minneapolis 1975); Proclaim Christ Until He Comes: Calling the Whole Church to Take the Whole Gospel to the Whole World (Minneapolis 1990). See further below, with n. 30. For the concern of evangelical Christians to mobilise congregations for evangelisation of people groups ‘unreached’ by missions with the Christian gospel see B. Larsson and E. Castro in J.H.Y. Briggs et al. (eds.), A History of the Ecumenical Movement 3: 1968–2000 (Geneva 2004) 138–139.

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President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt as he arrived in Addis Adaba for an OAU summit in June 1995.10 Since, then, the Christian ecumenical movement blossomed in the era of the early development of the UN, one may ask how far it was influenced by the existence and activities of the League of Nations and the UN. The WCC, indeed, adopted and Latinised as its motto a word (oikoumene) which Greeks under the Roman peace used to refer to the inhabited world (or sometimes only the Roman empire). The motto pointed to cross-national interests. But just as there were divisions in the ancient oikoumene (Greeks versus barbarians, Roman citizens versus non-Romans), so there have emerged other cross-denominational and international organisations within Christianity, such as the abovementioned Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization. Another indication of the interrelation between movements towards unity is the interest of the Christian churches in the unity of humankind. The WCC has, of course, been 10 For the League of Arab States see, for example, M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record (Beirut 1962), especially 2.1–96, 145–150 (the editor frequently comments on the Arabic words translated by ‘union’, ‘federation’ and so on); A.M. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States: Wartime Diplomacy and InterArab Politics, 1941 to 1945 (London 1977); Y. Porath, In Search of Arab Unity 1930–1945 (London 1986), especially chap. 5; B. Maddy-Weitzman in A. Susser and A. Shmuelevitz (eds.), The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World: Essays in Honour of the late Professor Uriel Dann (London 1995) 183–197; M. Thornhill in M.J. Cohen and M. Kolinsky (eds.), Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Response to Nationalist Movements 1943–55 (London 1998) 41–63. On 1 November 1950 the Secretary-General of the Arab League said in the UN General Assembly: “In fact, this [spiritual and cultural] influence is the sacred heritage that devolved upon the League …” (M. Khalil, op. cit. 2.81). In the same year the Arab League took steps to be treated as a regional organisation within Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (ibid. 2.147). See also R. Murray, Human Rights (n. 3); G. Nesi (ed.), International Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism: The United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Fight against Terrorism (Aldershot 2006), Part 2 (especially chapter 12 by M. Samy); M.N. Shaw, International Law8 (Cambridge 2017) 780, 988. On the 1995 attempt on President Mubarak’s life see R. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Melbourne 2002) 38, 165; A.K. Cronin et al. in E.V. Linden (ed.), Foreign Terrorist Organizations: History Tactics and Connections (New York 2004) 22–25; L. Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York 2006) 213–215, 220–221. It is estimated that Mubarak survived six attempts on his life before his arrest in May 2011 by the military government of Egypt: R.L. Tignor, Egypt: A Short History (Princeton 2010) 286. A four-line sura on the unity and uniqueness of God at the end of the Qur’an (112), sometimes entitled ‘The Unity’, is regarded by many as its essence: N.R. Reat and E.F. Perry, A World Theology: The Central Spiritual Reality of Humankind (Cambridge 1991) 309. On the other hand, there are deep divisions within Islam and the various segments continue to “maintain their respective claims to be the only valid form of the religion” (ibid. 265). P. Jenkins argues that even in Europe organisations intended to unify Muslim groups in a country, such as L’Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia, founded in 1990, exacerbate deep divisions within the Muslim communities by their activities: God’s Continent: Christianity, Islam, and Europe’s Religious Crisis (Oxford 2007) 137.

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primarily concerned with the unity of the Christian churches, publishing regular surveys of church union negotiations.11 But since (at least) the Third Assembly of the WCC at New Delhi in 1961 the World Council and its leaders have been concerned to place the study of the unity of the Church in the context of the unity of humankind. The chairperson of the Working Committee of the Faith and Order Commission in 1968 and 1969, J.R. Nelson, pointed to the evidence of current human experience and history that the human race shows many disintegrative characteristics. He believed that the Church should be concerned with its unity in the milieu of all humankind because it sees itself as a united community with a mission to all humankind. While most of his recommendations relate to attitudes, he was at his most practical when he stressed that concern for the unity of humankind means for all Christians participation in the struggle to eliminate the causes and structures of division among and within the many churches and confessions. He believed that the unity of humankind is a reality, not an illusion, but a reality not yet realised. The task of the Christian church is to bring about a visible unity so that the cause of human unity is advanced.12 More recently, Christian thought has turned its attention 11 In The Ecumenical Review and Faith and Order Commission Papers. One can, for example, follow the later stages of the negotiations that started in earnest in 1954 and ended in May 1974 with the Presbyterian Church of Australia agreeing to join the Congregational Union of Australia and New Zealand and the Methodist Church of Australasia. The Uniting Church in Australia was inaugurated in June 1977; see, for example, P. Bentley and P.J. Hughes, The Uniting Church in Australia (Canberra 1996) 4–12 or R. Smith in W.W. Emilsen and S. Emilsen (eds.), The Uniting Church in Australia: The First 25 Years (Melbourne 2003) 7–10. Faith and Order Commission Papers 11c (Geneva 1957), reprinted from The Ecumenical Review 9 (1957) 284–302, sees itself as the third supplement, after The Ecumenical Review 6 (1954) 300–315 and 8 (1955) 76–93, to S.C. Neill, Towards Church Union 1937–1952: A Survey of Approaches to Closer Union among the Churches [Faith and Order Commission Papers, 11] (London 1952). For subsequent surveys of church union negotiations see the list in G. Gassmann, op. cit. (n. 8) 323. 12 W.A. Visser ’t Hooft (ed.), The New Delhi Report: The Third Assembly of the World Council of Churches 1961 (London 1962) 182–185, 187–188. In 1963 the Faith and Order Commission (in Paper 41) raised the need to study the history of the church in relation to the history of humankind (G. Gassmann, op. cit. [n. 8] 14–15; cf. 56). The Working Committee of the Faith and Order Commission at its Canterbury meeting in 1969 decided to disseminate a working paper on the subject of the unity of the church and the unity of humankind (English version of the working paper in Study Encounter 5 [1969] 163–181). This led eventually to the 1973 statement “Unity of the Church – Unity of Mankind” (Faith and Order Papers, 66), excerpted in G. Gassmann, op. cit. (n. 8) 137–143. J.R. Nelson’s views: in R. Groscurth (ed.), What Unity Implies: Six Essays After Uppsala [World Council of Churches Studies, 7] (Geneva 1969) 101–114 and in Nelson (ed.), op. cit. (n. 7) 1–14, especially 12–14. In the latter volume J. Moltmann suggested that a prophetic eschatology of the coming God will entail the commonality of all humans and that this Jewish/Christian concept offers more than the Stoic ontology of human nature (both ideas were expressed in Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech of 28 August 1963): ibid. 203–224, especially 203–210. P.B.

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to the constraint that there is only one earth. The WCC stimulated “a global discussion around justice and sustainability”. It prepared a draft proposal for the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 on ‘One Earth Community’ based on shared convictions from various religious traditions around the world about “the unity of the human family and the oneness of the earth”. It also brought together persons from its Justice, Peace, and Integrity of Creation programme and persons representing the Faith and Order movement.13 But it has not simply been influence from the political sphere on Christian thought and action. Church leaders concerned about unity have had an effect on political integration. A group of men and women who were committed to international church union were remarkably influential in the setting up of institutions that would shape efforts to achieve ‘a just and durable peace’ after the Second World War. This group openly saw its work as one aspect of an ‘ecumenical movement’ while seeing it also as a missionary movement. In a manner that would have been inconceivable in the last third of the twentieth century their voices were heard on public constitutional issues by political leaders seeking to develop a post-war ‘global order’. Specifically, this group of ecumenically-minded Christians promoted human rights and religious liberty. Beginning in 1942 they worked to have human rights included in the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and to define those rights – particularly freedom of religion and of conscience – in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The International Missionary Council (understandably interested in converts being able to change their religion) and the WCC set up a joint Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA). Although this commission was not established until 1947, leaders of the churches (especially in America) were far better equipped when a draft UN Charter was discussed at the Conference on International Order in San Francisco in 1945 than were their predecessors in 1919, and they had a singular success in getting included in the draft of what was to replace the League of Nations a reference to human rights

Hinchcliff pointed out that the third-century bishop Cyprian was not much worried about human disunity, though greatly by Christian disunity; he by contrast is concerned with human disunity in general: in N. Autton (ed.), Christianity and Change (London 1971) 39–48. 13 W. Granberg-Michaelson, Redeeming the Creation: The Rio Earth Summit: Challenges for the Churches [Risk book series, 55] (Geneva 1992) 59, 81–85 (= Appendix 4); T.F. Best and W. Granberg-Michaelson (eds.), Koinonia and Justice, Peace and Creation: Costly Unity (Geneva 1993). C.A. Russell seeks to link Biblical views with scientific data and sees a way forward in human ‘stewardship’ of the earth: The Earth, Humanity and God (London 1994). ‘Stewardship’ is also seen as the way forward by many contributors, of diverse backgrounds, to R.J. Berry (ed.), Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives – Past and Present (London 2006).

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– and justice – as a precondition of peace and, even more remarkably, a mandatory commitment to establish a human rights commission.14 In the European Union some clauses in the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

14 J.S. Nurser’s book For All Peoples and All Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights (Washington 2005) on the influence of ecumenically-minded Christian leaders on the promotion of human rights in the 1940s, superseding his preliminary statement in Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003) 841–881, highlights the leadership of the WCC in Process of Formation during the Second World War in Geneva and the United States of America and the achievements of O.F. Nolde, the first director (1947–1969) of the CCIA; see especially 1–2, 16, 22–23, 29, 41–42, 58–59, 84–86, 88, 94–97, 105–107, and chapters 7 and 9. The American commission that reported on the ‘International Safeguard of Human Rights’ in May 1944 and recommended a permanent UN Commission on Human Rights indicated Christian roots to thought around the world about the topic: Building Peace: Reports of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace 1939–1972 (Metuchen, NJ 1973) 163–184 at 167, 180, 184. The UN Charter subsequently mandated such a commission: see B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary2 (Oxford 2002) xlv–xlviii (Articles 55–56, 60, 62, 68, 71; human rights are also mentioned in Articles 1, 13 and 76), with comments on 928, 993, 1032 and 1046–1049. On the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights see J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia 1999) 1–35 and for Article 18 (on freedom of religion and belief) 258–263. Many of Nolde’s suggestions for drafting Article 18 of the Declaration were accepted: see E. Duff, The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches (London 1956) 276–280; C.H. Malik’s reflections in O.F. Nolde, Free and Equal: Human Rights in Ecumenical Perspective (Geneva 1968) 10–11; B. Thompson, The Christian Century 86 (28 May 1969) 736; W.A. Visser ’t Hooft’s Foreword to O.F. Nolde, The Churches and the Nations (Philadelphia 1970) vii; T. van Boven, California Western International Law Journal 20 (1989–90) 207–225 at 211; cf. O.F. Nolde in The Amsterdam Assembly Series (n. 8) 4.150–152 and Free and Equal (above) 35–46. Nolde was present also “at Paris in 1948 when the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was proclaimed, and at most of the United Nations meetings where significant actions on human rights were taken” (The Churches [above] 109). On the influence of non-governmental organisations at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 see O.F. Nolde, Free and Equal (above) 20–25; The Churches (above) 161– 162; P.G. Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia 1998) 188–193, 195; W. Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “A Curious Grapevine” (Basingstoke 1998) 29–41; M.A. Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York 2002) 15, 17. The Commission on Human Rights was replaced in 2006, following the election to the Commission of countries that abused human rights (a rather milder assessment in J.A. Mertus, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Guide for a New Era [London 2005] 77–79), by a standing body, The Human Rights Council. The new Council has had some successes in particular countries, to judge from the cases reported in chap. 2 and appendix D in T.J. Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN’s Independent Experts Promote Human Rights (Washington 2012). On the involvement of the WCC in international affairs generally see D. Hudson, op. cit. (n. 8), especially 31–48 on the organisation of the CCIA and 101–104 on human rights. Hudson thought (ibid. 41–42) that the CCIA might have continued to be influential in world affairs, in the style of Nolde, into the last quarter of the twentieth century.

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(2003) were altered as a result of lobbying by the European Evangelical Alliance and other Christians in order to strengthen freedom of religious belief and practice.15 Earlier, the philologist and theologian G.A. Deissmann (born 1866) joined in Christian ecumenical activities even before the First World War, then from 1914 to 1917 produced and distributed his Protestant Weekly Newsletter – aimed primarily at an American audience – along with the German edition Evangelischer Wochenbrief (1914–1921). He was heavily involved in global post-war conferences such as ‘Life and Work’ in Stockholm in 1925 and ‘Faith and Order’ in Lausanne in 1927. His belief in the unity of humankind and his concern for reconciliation among nations sprang from Christian beliefs.16 Again, in October 1965, before the Roman Catholic church took much part in the ecumenical movement – and consequently not an example of people interested in religious unity influencing political unity – Pope Paul VI visited the United Nations and called for concord, peace and unity among nations.17 In the 15 According to I.M. Randall, European Journal of Theology 14 (2005) 17–26, especially 18, 22–24, and in J.H.Y. Briggs (ed.), A Dictionary of European Baptist Life and Thought [Studies in Baptist History and Thought, 33] (Milton Keynes 2009) 184. Briggs has worked with the WCC (cf. n. 9 above) and both he and Randall held positions at the International Baptist Theological Seminary in Prague and are research fellows at the International Baptist Theological Study Centre in Amsterdam: www.ibts.eu (accessed 26 September 2018). See their reviews of C. Woodfin, An Experiment in Christian Internationalism: A History of the European Baptist Theological Seminary (Macon, GA 2013) in Journal of European Baptist Studies 14 (2013) 46–48 (Randall) and Baptist Quarterly 50 (2019) 75–76 (Briggs). Draft Treaty: http://european-convention.eu.int (accessed 2 February 2011). 16 For example, he highlighted “that they all may be one” (NT John 17.20; n. 7 above) and his last book was Una Sancta: Zum Geleit in das ökumenische Jahr 1937 (Gütersloh 1936). See A. Gerber, Deissmann the Philologist [Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche, 171] (Berlin 2010) 313–334 (quotation from John on 319 and 322) with 497–498, 505 and, more briefly, C.J. Markschies in C. Möller et al. (eds.), Wegbereiter der Ökumene im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen 2005) 32– 53, especially 32–33, 37–39, 41–42. On the ecumenical conferences of 1937 see above at n. 8; for Deissmann’s reflections on the Lausanne conference in 1927 see Una Sancta (above) 60–66. On Deissmann’s connection with the Archbishop of Uppsala, Nathan Söderblom, in ecumenical activities, including Stockholm 1925, see D. Lange in C. Breytenbach and C.J. Markschies (eds.), Adolf Deissmann: Ein (zu Unrecht) fast vergessener Theologe und Philologe [Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 174] (Leiden 2019) 23-40. Those who nominated Deissmann for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1929 and 1930 stressed his ecumenical activities and the message of reconciliation and peace that the churches offer to the world (A. Gerber, op. cit. 333–334; cf. 338 n. 220). On Deissmann’s concern for disadvantaged members of society see A. Gerber, Australian Journal of Politics and History 57 (2011) 174–187, especially 177, 183, 186. 17 It is perhaps true that the Vatican approached the United Nations (of which it was not a member) both as a sovereign state and as a church. For documents emanating from the Vatican that bear on human rights see M. Walsh and B. Davies, Proclaiming Justice and Peace: Papal Documents from Rerum Novarum through Centesimus Annus (Mystic, CT 1991), e.g. 129–131, 255, 416–417. For Paul VI on his own visit to the UN, ibid. 224. For

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1980s the ecumenically-minded pastor of the Nikolaikirche in Leipzig, Christian Führer, hosted Monday prayers for peace in the face of the arms race between East and West and this action fostered a much wider movement that led to the peaceful dismantling in 1989 of the wall restraining inhabitants of Warsaw Pact countries.18 More recently, after suspicion between Muslims and others increased following the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the strongly secular United Nations has opened its doors to religious organisations, such as the ‘Temple of Understanding’ in New York, which promote inter-faith dialogue and can lead a debate on peace.19 Two things, then, are to be noted: there are in step, as it were, a number of movements promoting unity; and these movements do not hesitate to transcend their apparent borders, whether political, economic or religious. Some of the most admired work of the UN is carried out by its High Commissioner for Refugees. The European Economic Community dropped the word ‘Economic’ from its title in 1967, even before it grew from ‘the Six’ to encompass nine (in 1973) and then ten (1981), twelve (1986), fifteen (1995), twenty-five (2004), twenty-seven (2007) and twenty-eight (2013) nations. What began as an economic association, with emphasis on reduction of agricultural subsidies, tariffs and the like, became a political enterprise.

Rhetoric and Action Rhetoric and Action

The historian of ideas of unity in the twentieth century has much to enquire into concerning the relationship between theory and reality and between stated

his concern for world peace at the time see his first encyclical letter (Ecclesiam suam): The Church in the Modern World (London 1965) 8–10, 52–57 = Acta Apostolicae Sedis 56 (1964) 609–659 at 612–614, 650–654. 18 K. Cordell in D. Rock (ed.), Voices in Times of Change: The Role of Writers, Opposition Movements and the Churches in the Transformation of East Germany [Culture and Society in Germany, 3] (New York 2000) 45–71 at 52–57, 65; D. Mundus, Leipzig 1989: A Chronicle (Leipzig 2009), especially 2–28. 19 See P. Kirkwood, The Quiet Revolution: The Emergence of Interfaith Consciousness (Sydney 2007), especially 158–159, 163–167. The significant change is that member states of the UN are looking for dialogue with religious NGOs. In such inter-faith dialogue participants firmly retain their own tradition, but are open to others. Thus a Dean of the Anglican Cathedral in New York City, J.P. Morton, opened his cathedral to ordinations conducted by the ‘Community of Peace and Spirituality’ (ibid. 151–152). The inter-faith organisations disavow attempts to create one world religion (ibid., chap. 4). K. Koyama took the view that Christian faith can have a message for secular countries (such as his native Japan) with respect to war and peace: Reflections on War and Peace for an Ecumenical Theology 40 Years after Hiroshima [Peter Ainslie Lectures on Christian Unity, 4] (Indianapolis, IN 1985) 144– 145.

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objectives and practice. Clearly the United Nations makes valuable contributions in fields of marginal relevance to political unity, such as refugee welfare and health. But has its General Assembly, by its debates and resolutions on such countries as China and Taiwan, South Africa, and Israel and the Palestinians acted as an instrument of unity or of disunity? The OAU is a good example of the disparity commonly discerned between rhetoric and practice. Before its formation in May 1963 President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika (as it then was) spoke openly in favour of political unity among the newly independent nations of Africa. He still hoped for such unity when the Organisation took stock after fourteen months. An even more prominent proponent of African Unity was President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; he promoted continental unity at the expense of narrow nationalism and regionalism. But in the event the OAU retained with vigour the arbitrary boundaries resulting from the colonial activities of European empires in the nineteenth century. The nascent Organisation made no attempt to reconstitute under a new name the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953) when Zambia joined its neighbour Malawi in the OAU. While some national leaders, such as Dr Nkrumah, felt that regional unity took away from Pan-African unity, the OAU did not encourage an East African Federation consisting of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (with Zanzibar). But when the Ibo of Nigeria sought independence in 1967 the Organisation supported the interests of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, not breakaway Biafra. One might, therefore, conclude that there was a contradiction of policies concerning unity in the 1960s.20 What is the practical value of a Chris-

20 J.K. Nyerere, The Second Scramble (Dar es Salaam 1962); Speech by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere at the O.A.U. Cairo Conference ‘Mkutano wa Cairo’ (Dar es Salaam 1964). See also his Cairo address of April 1967 (by which time the OAU had grown from thirty-one to thirty-eight members and several African states had broken diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia) on ‘A New Look at Conditions for Unity’ in Freedom and Socialism: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1965–1967 (Dar es Salaam 1968) 291–300. For Nkrumah’s views see his I Speak of Freedom (n. 3), especially 29–30 (1953), 133–134 (1958), 167–168 (1959). For the Charter of the OAU see Ž. Cervenka, The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter2 (London 1969) 231–239 or I. Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents in International Law5 (Oxford 2002) 56–63. For evaluations of African unity see A.B. Sawant, Africa Quarterly (New Delhi) 46.3 (2006) 14–21 and S.M. Makinda and F.W. Okumu, op. cit. (n. 3) 114–121; for discussion of the OAU by an insider see C.O.C. Amate, Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice (New York 1986) 60–73, 80–82. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Colonial Office (Great Britain), Report on the Nyasaland Protectorate for the Year 1953 (London n.d. [1954]) 5, 144–145; J.R.T. Wood, The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Durban 1983). East African Federation: Ž. Cervenka, op. cit. 149–152, 167–168 n. 13. Even the Treaty for East African Co-Operation establishing the East African Community (1967) was officially dissolved in 1977. A new Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community was promulgated in 1999 (amended in 2006–2007) and may lead to a political Federation: see www.eac.int (accessed

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tian statement on the unity of humankind such as that made by the World Congress on Evangelism in Berlin in October 1966? The Closing Statement emphasised one human race: “All men are one in the humanity created by God himself. All men are one in their common need of divine redemption, ... . All who are ‘in Christ’ henceforth can recognize no distinctions based on race or color ... .”21 Why have federations such as the Malaysian, constructed out of former British colonies, disintegrated in practice?22 Consistency and practicality are issues worth examining in the twentieth century as they are in the Roman empire. In the ancient Greek world, prior to Roman expansion into the eastern Mediterranean, various attempts were made to come together in federal states and alliances. Alliances (summakhiai) were often designated in terms of the hegemon or leader, as for example ‘the Athenians and their allies’ or ‘Philip and his allies’. The latter alliance (usually called ‘the League of Corinth’) may have had representative government in the form of varied numbers of delegates to the Council (sunhedrion), but there was no doubt that Philip II dominated the alliance, even extracting an oath from the allies that they would support his descendants as the legitimate rulers of Makedon. A century and a half earlier, in 481 B.C.E., the Greeks formed under the leadership of Sparta an alliance (‘the 8 May 2012). Biafra: Ž. Cervenka, op. cit. 192–224; A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook 1966–1970 (London 1971), especially 2.172– 174, 244–245, 328–329, 375–376, 445. On the paradox of the OAU striving for regional cooperation and integration while “rigidly adhering to the colonial borders drawn in imperial European capitals” see N.J. Udombana, Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 13 (2002) 185–236 at 226–229 (quotation from 228). He points out (ibid. 212–213) that respect for the borders existing at the independence of African states was effectively enshrined in the Charter of the OAU (Article 3.3) and made more explicit in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (Article 4.b; see n. 3 above). He also comments on the reluctance of African leaders to translate rhetoric into action (ibid. 221, 223). Cf. R. Murray, Human Rights (n. 3) 11–15. 21 C.F.H. Henry and W.S. Mooneyham (eds.), One Race, One Gospel, One Task (Minneapolis 1967) 1.5. See also the statement by Philip Potter, the incoming General Secretary of the WCC, in 1972: “Today one cannot speak about the unity of the church without speaking about the unity of mankind” (interview in The Christian Century 89 [30 August 1972] 849; cf. 847 and D. Hudson, op. cit. [n. 8] 41). Potter and his predecessor Visser ’t Hooft (n. 8) are profiled in C. Möller et al. (eds.), op. cit. (n. 16) 354–375 (F. Enns), 214–231 (D. Ritschl). In 1985 K. Koyama grounded the unity of humanity (also the unity of the church) in the unity of God, with an emphasis on the suffering of Jesus Christ: op. cit. (n. 19) 145– 146, 151–153. 22 See C.M. Turnbull, A History of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei (Sydney 1989) 255– 260; H.P. Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur 1995) 8– 11; V.M. Hooker, A Short History of Malaysia: Linking East and West (Sydney 2003) 223– 226; M.A. Yusoff, Malaysian Federalism: Conflict or Consensus (Bangi 2006) 60–67. The ‘Malaysia Agreement’ of July 1963 was published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office in London.

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Hellenic League’) to meet the impending invasion by Xerxes, Akhaimenid king of Persia. This alliance was still in existence when an alliance led by Athens (often called ‘the Delian League’ by modern scholars) was formed alongside or within it in 478/7 B.C.E. Athens was so imperialistic as hegemon that special measures were taken to protect the allies when an invitation was issued a century later for cities to join a new Athenian alliance on the same terms as six foundation members. The other kind of arrangement, federal states or confederacies, often provided a stronger guarantee of protection without submission to a hegemon. When the Arkadian Confederacy was formed in the centre of the Peloponnese in 370 B.C.E., a new ‘capital’ was established at Megalopolis (the ‘great city’) to lessen the risk of either Mantineia or Tegea becoming dominant. In the Boiotian Confederacy formed in 447 B.C.E. the largest city, Thebes, had only two units out of eleven – the same as Orkhomenos and Thespiai, but more than other cities – though it did acquire the two units belonging to Plataiai when that city was destroyed early in the Peloponnesian War. However, in the Confederacy as reconstituted after 379 B.C.E., Thebes had four units out of seven and might be considered to have had control. Now, while the alliances had a limited lifespan (although generally intended as permanent), the confederacies often continued under Makedonian and Roman rule, especially the regional ones such as the Ionian koinon.23 Somewhat akin to the efforts of Greek cities to establish and maintain harmony within a city or between cities are the attempts of early Christian communities to maintain unity. These also have parallels in the modern world. Two movements, one regional and the other worldwide, illustrate ways in which initiatives towards Christian union are pursued. The Evangelical Alliance (British Organization) arose out of several preliminary meetings which culminated in 216 ‘Brethren’ from twenty denominations of Protestants meeting in Liverpool on 1–3 October 1845. An eight-page brochure reporting on this meeting and announcing a proposed Evangelical Alliance to be deliberated on 23

See especially J.A.O. Larsen, Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History (Oxford 1968), with discussion of the terminology at xiii–xix, 7–11, 531–533, and H. Beck and P. Funke (eds.), Federalism in Greek Antiquity (Cambridge 2015). I provide a brief introduction to ten federal bodies in G.H.R. Horsley (ed.), Hellenika: Essays on Greek Politics and History (Sydney 1982) 183–190 at 184–186. See also Larsen’s Representative Government in Greek and Roman History [Sather Classical Lectures, 28] (Berkeley 1955). The charter of the Second Athenian League and part of the oath for the ‘League of Corinth’ are conveniently translated in P.J. Rhodes, Greek Historical Inscriptions 359–323 B.C.2 [LACTOR, 9] (London 1986) 1–4, 21–23 and P. Harding, From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus [Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, 2] (Cambridge 1985) 48– 52, 123–125. On the evolution of the koina of Asia Minor under Rome see, for example, J. Deininger, Die Provinziallandtage der römischen Kaiserzeit von Augustus bis zum Ende des dritten Jahrhunderts n.Chr. [Vestigia, 6] (München 1965) 36–98 and S. Mitchell in id. and G. Greatrex (eds.), Ethnicity and Culture in Late Antiquity (London 2000) 117–150 at 122– 127.

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in London in the following northern summer records that “there has been found not only a general and warm desire for extended Christian Union, but ample ground of common truth, on a cordial belief in which, the assembled brethren could themselves unite, for many important objects, and also invite the adhesion of all evangelical Christians”. The brochure makes it clear “that any union or alliance to be formed, should be understood to be an alliance of individual Christians, and not of denominations or branches of the Church; and the design of this Alliance shall be to exhibit, as far as practicable, the Essential Unity of the Church of Christ”. The promoters desired a ‘manifested Union’ and quoted a passage from 1 Clement discussed in chapter 7. They accepted that they could not expect at an early stage the general concurrence of ‘even real Christians’. That this term excluded Roman Catholics seems clear from the statement that “the necessity for this union of faithful brethren arises from the mighty efforts of Popery and Infidelity within the visible Churches, and the vast extent of untouched idolatry and Mohammedanism”. An address “to those throughout the world who love the Lord Jesus in sincerity” on behalf of the proposed Evangelical Alliance by the Rev. James Hamilton published by the London Branch of the Provisional Committee announced more widely that the London conference “of ecumenical evangelism” would consider a recommendation, in the words of the Liverpool minutes, for “the formation of an Institution to be called The Evangelical Alliance – for carrying out the objects included in Christian Union”. The organisers hope to exhibit as far as possible the existing oneness of the Christian church, and Hamilton looks forward to “mutual affection, manifested unity, and common measures” for the defence and extension of the common Christianity. Deputations will be sent out to foreign countries and into the different provinces of England (actually, the Liverpool minutes show a Provisional Committee in four divisions of Great Britain and Ireland). The adversaries (perhaps even ‘Antichrists’) named by Hamilton are Socinianism and Romanism.24 24

Brief Statement of The Proceedings of the Conference in Liverpool for Promoting Christian Union, and of the Object of the Proposed Evangelical Alliance (London n.d. [1845]); quotations from 3, 4, 6, 5, 6 respectively. 1 Clement 46.6–7: chap. 7 at nn. 59, 88. Rev. James Hamilton: Proposed Evangelical Alliance: An Address on Behalf of the London Branch of the Provisional Committee (London 1845); quotations from 3, 5, 8 (existing oneness: ibid. 8, 11; deputations: ibid. 16; adversaries: ibid. 13). The Rev. Dr. Thomas Chalmers, Principal of the New College, Edinburgh, who had led more than a third of the clergy out of the Church of Scotland in the Disruption of 1843, was supportive but also critical; for example, he would have preferred the title of the enterprise to be the Protestant Alliance rather than ‘Evangelical Alliance’: On the Evangelical Alliance: Its Design, its Difficulties, its Proceedings, and its Prospects (Edinburgh 1846), especially 23. On the other hand, there was a significant impetus in Scotland for ‘Christian Union’ leading up to the Liverpool conference: see J.B.A. Kessler, Jr., A Study of the Evangelical Alliance in Great Britain (Goes 1968) 19–23. Liverpool minutes: Conference on Christian Union. Held in Liverpool, on Wednesday, the 1st of October, 1845, and Subsequent Days (Liverpool 1845)

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It is, however, easy to sense that conformity to a set of doctrines is more important than Christian unity. Another resolution from the Liverpool conference said “that the parties who shall be invited to the future meeting, shall be such persons as hold and maintain what are usually understood to be Evangelical views in regard to such important matters of doctrine as the following, viz. ... .” There follow eight topics of belief, of which the fourth was expanded and to which a ninth was added before the conference held in London from 19 August to 2 September 1846. There was much discussion of the additional Article on the third day, and some disquiet that the Fourth had been expanded. However, the doctrinal ‘Basis of Union’ was passed. One speaker said that “it never was the intention to include Roman Catholics, though some of them might be real Christians”, and the Seventh Article, the right and duty of private judgment in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, was intended according to another to exclude Catholics, even though “there are hundreds and thousands of Roman Catholics who are proceeding to heaven”. Although no American or Continental Brother was invited to chair a session, ‘Christian Union’ was much on the mind of the delegates from those countries who spoke. On the second day a motion was passed which, “while recognizing the essential Unity of the Christian Church”, deplored “its existing divisions” and expressed the participants’ “deep sense of the sinfulness involved in the alienation of affection by which they [the divisions] have been attended”. On the ninth day an amendment was put to exclude Slaveholders from membership of the confederation named ‘The Evangelical Alliance’, which led to a great deal of discussion. Various anniversaries of this conference were celebrated, such as the 60th under the banner ‘Maintaining the Unity’, for which invitations were issued in English, French and German “to all Evangelical Christians”. The Proceedings state the main object of the Alliance as “to manifest the unity of the One Church, which is the body of Christ, and to promote Christian love and fellowship”. One speaker in the session on ‘Some Essentials of Christian Union’ referred to “that formidable foe which is in every land, namely, Roman Catholicism”.25 17 (formation), 19 (four divisions). Further details are given in Conference on Christian Union. Narrative of the Proceedings of the Meetings Held in Liverpool, October, 1845 (London 1846). 25 D.W. Bebbington points out that Evangelicals stressed what distinguished them from other orthodox Christians rather than the beliefs expressed in the ancient creeds: The Dominance of Evangelicalism: The Age of Spurgeon and Moody (Leicester 2005) 19–21. Resolution in Liverpool minutes: Conference on Christian Union (n. 24) 12; Brief Statement (n. 24) 3–4. Passage of doctrinal basis: Evangelical Alliance, Report of the Proceedings of the Conference, Held at Freemasons’ Hall, London, from August 19th to September 2nd inclusive, 1846 (London 1847) 77–132, 135–193. Ninth (which became the Eighth) Article: ibid. 93– 121. It was added to counter the liberal universalism then emerging: see J.B.A. Kessler, Jr., op. cit. (n. 24) 66–69. The provisional Doctrinal Basis of Faith (1845) and the one adopted in 1846 are printed in I.M. Randall and D. Hilborn, One Body in Christ: The History and

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Chapter 1: Unity Ancient and Modern

In September 1965, nearly 120 years after the Evangelical Alliance was established, a new series of National Assemblies was initiated in Great Britain. At the opening of the second of this new series, on 18 October 1966, a venerable figure of the evangelical movement, D. Martyn Lloyd-Jones, gave an address which appealed to adherents of the Evangelical Alliance to secede from their denominations and join an association of non-denominational churches (of the kind where Lloyd-Jones had been a pastor for twenty-eight years): “we, as evangelicals, are divided among ourselves, and scattered about in the various major denominations”; “you cannot justify remaining in an Episcopal situation, or in a Methodist or a Presbyterian situation …”; “we, of all people, ought to be the first to preach the vital necessity of church unity”. In the context of the report that was about to be discussed, many in the audience would have interpreted this address as a call to form a United Evangelical Church. The chairperson on that occasion, J.R.W. Stott, must have felt that the appeal would strike at the heart of the movement, for he stepped outside the rôle of the chair and warned against secession from denominations. Instead of a meeting the following year, as planned, there was a thirty-year delay before the next Assembly met and at that time (1996) several people were willing to report on their recollection of 18 October 1966 under the heading ‘I was there’. So a speech in 1966 on ‘evangelical ecumenicity’, which held out the fear of absorption in the Roman Catholic Church, had caused bitter division within evangelical ranks.26 ‘Unity’ has continued to be a key term in the thinking of the Significance of the Evangelical Alliance (Carlisle 2001) 357–359; a substantially revised version was accepted by the Alliance in 1970 (ibid. 360–361). This book includes a chapter (3) on the formation of the Alliance. Divisions of Church: Report of the Proceedings … 1846 (above) 54. Formation of Alliance: ibid. 64–74. Views on Roman Catholics: ibid. 95 (Rev. J.H. Hinton), 143–144 (Rev. W.W. Ewbank). Anti-Slavery debate: ibid. 290–339, 387–472. 60th anniversary: Maintaining the Unity: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference and Diamond Jubilee Celebration of the Evangelical Alliance held in London, July 1907 (London 1907): quotations from ix, viii, 237. The doctrinal ‘Basis of the Evangelical Alliance’ is published on the back of the title page. The previous conference: A.J. Arnold (ed.), Jubilee of the Evangelical Alliance: Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference held in London, June-July, 1896 (London 1897). The invitation to this conference declares that the past history of the Evangelical Alliance “proves it to be an eminently practical organization” (vii), having held seven ‘oecumenical assemblies’ in Europe, two in London and one in New York (49–50) and worked on behalf of persecuted Christians in many lands (54–64). The chief object of the Alliance is expressed as the promotion of “the manifestation of the essential unity of all true believers; the union of believers, and not the association of Churches” (vii–viii). Auxiliary Alliances in many countries, even Australia, were represented by speakers (cf. 47). These volumes have the motto unum corpus sumus in Christo (“We are One Body in Christ”: NT Rom. 12.5) engraved on the front cover. 26 Lloyd-Jones allowed to be published a version of what he said on that fateful evening, though it did not appear until after his death: Knowing the Times: Addresses Delivered on Various Occasions 1942–1977 (Edinburgh 1989) 246–257 (quotations from 250, 254, 249). But it was well known that he spoke from sparse notes (ibid. vii) and I.H. Murray prints a

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Evangelical Alliance. In 1995 it set up the Alliance Commission on Unity and Truth among Evangelicals in order to work for consensus on theological issues with a view to offering a co-ordinated response on matters of public debate. However, the theological disagreement on which the Commission has focused its attention has largely been among evangelical Christians.27

photograph of the first of two small pages of notes for this address (David Martyn LloydJones: The Fight of Faith 1939–1981 [Edinburgh 1990] 533). And Lloyd-Jones himself wrote that in November 1966 he felt “that the only people who should be excluded from it [a fraternal that was to replace The Westminster Fellowship which met at his Chapel in London] are those who are convinced denominationalists and who feel that evangelicals must always stay in the larger bodies” (letter to Rev. D.N. Samuel, 10 December 1966, in I.H. Murray [ed.], D. Martyn Lloyd-Jones: Letters 1919–1981 [Edinburgh 1994] 170–171). On this view, evangelicals are not just a sub-set of the church, but the church. Lloyd-Jones considered the word ‘evangelical’ to be synonymous with ‘Christian’ (I.H. Murray, The Life of D. Martyn Lloyd-Jones 1899–1981 [Edinburgh 2013] 365) and Stott regarded non-evangelicals as the deviationists in the Church of England (T. Dudley-Smith, John Stott: A Global Ministry [Leicester 2001] 66). For accounts of the October 1966 meeting sympathetic to Stott see A.E. McGrath, To Know and Serve God: A Biography of James I. Packer (London 1997) 123, T. Dudley-Smith, op. cit. (above) 65–70 and A. Chapman, Godly Ambition: John Stott and the Evangelical Movement (Oxford 2012) 93–95. Versions favourable to LloydJones are given by I.H. Murray, David Martyn Lloyd-Jones: The Fight of Faith [above] 499– 506, 521–533 and Evangelicalism Divided: A Record of Crucial Change in the Years 1950 to 2000 (Edinburgh 2000) 44–49, 278–285, 293 and by others in the journal of the British Evangelical Council: Foundations 37 (1996) 7–20. Recollections such as these, to which most of one issue is devoted, are by men in sympathy with Independent and Free Church perspectives. That the reverbrations of that evening were great is suggested by several sources: the programme booklet for the following Assembly (National Assembly of Evangelicals 1996 Programme: Shaping the Future Together 6–7 [J. Edwards: “The last National Assembly of Evangelicals in 1966 went tragically wrong”]); E. Davies, Foundations 37 (1996) 1 (“there was disagreement and deep division”); I.M. Randall in S. Brady and H. Rowdon (eds.), For Such a Time as This: Perspectives on Evangelicalism, Past, Present and Future (London 1996) 174 (“The search for unity led, in 1966, to schism”); P. Lewis, ibid. 179 (“The hope had been ‘to clear the air’, but in the event the air was ignited rather than cleared”); I.M. Randall and D. Hilborn, op. cit. (n. 25) 245–253 at 252 (“the October 1966 debacle”). A participant in the Lausanne movement Congress in 1989 commented: “Lausanne has had a parachurch image; it is now much more geared towards churches in denominations. I believe that renewal of the main churches is a key to evangelism; Lausanne II in Manila confirmed this” (A. Nichols in id. [ed.], The Whole Gospel for the Whole World: Story of Lausanne II Congress on World Evangelization, Manila 1989 [Charlotte, NC 1989] 144). 27 See, for example, The Nature of Hell, a report published by the Commission (London 2000) ix, 2–8, 122–129. On the formation of this Commission (‘ACUTE’) see I.M. Randall and D. Hilborn, op. cit. (n. 25) 309–314. The continuing caution of evangelical Christians about unity is shown in J.M. Woodhouse, Unity That Helps and Unity That Hinders (Sydney 2002), based on lectures given in Britain in 2001. By contrast, fifty years earlier D. Webster, Home Education Secretary of the Church Missionary Society in London, could write that

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Chapter 1: Unity Ancient and Modern

These activities of the Evangelical Alliance have been largely focussed on Great Britain. But a conference in Edinburgh in 1910 (see the first section above) drew together missionaries on a worldwide scale. The Continuation Committee of this World Missionary Conference became the International Missionary Council, which was finally integrated with the WCC at its third assembly in New Delhi in November 1961. While they were openly linked with missionary activities around the world, evangelical Christians were often wary of alternative Christian doctrines they encountered in unity movements. In the mid-twentieth century a book of essays produced in Britain opened with the admission that the ecumenical movement needed to be considered more enthusiastically by ‘Conservative Evangelicals’ or ‘definite Evangelicals’, but the contributors put ‘truth’ (their interpretation of the Christian Scriptures) ahead of ‘unity’.28 The famous evangelist Billy Graham was a moving force (in funding as well as organisation) behind the World Congress on Evangelism in Berlin in 1966. In the context of this conference evangelism was seen as a basis for unity among Christians, but this vision seems to have been restricted to ‘true believers’ (to quote from Billy Graham). A speaker from Mexico lamented that some people think “that the Holy Spirit ... has for many years been a special monopoly of evangelicals who emphasize the intervention and operation of the Holy Ghost”, while another speaker in the same session “warned against an unwholesome concentration on the Spirit in theology and in the Church”. In a long section on obstacles to evangelism in the world, disunity among Christians does not rate much attention.29 Graham also stimulated the “some [evangelicals] … know that if the Church is to convert men it will only do so effectively if it is united”: The Ecumenical Review 6 (1954) 385. One hundred and fifty years earlier the Liverpool minutes (n. 24) state “that the alienation of Christians from one another, on account of lesser differences, has been one of the greatest evils in the Church of Christ, and one main hindrance to the progress of the gospel” (16). At the time of Dr Woodhouse’s lectures in the United Kingdom there appeared Evangelicalism and the Orthodox Church (London 2001), another report issued by the Evangelical Alliance’s Commission on Unity and Truth among Evangelicals, and one showing evangelicals much more open to other Christian experiences than The Nature of Hell (above). 28 J.D. Douglas (ed.), Evangelicals and Unity: Six Essays (Appleford 1964). For the misgivings felt by Conservative Evangelicals see the editor’s chapter (9–18) or – a book published by the Evangelical Alliance – L. Samuel, Evangelicals and the Ecumenical Movement (London n.d. [1962]). About the same time articles in The Reformed Theological Review, some in response to the deliberations of the Second Vatican Council, discussed Christian unity but with considerable reservations: see, for example, H. Sasse, RThR 22 (1963) 1–13, 33–45; 23 (1964) 1–15; E.A. Judge, 22 (1963) 65–76 (= The First Christians in the Roman World: Augustan and New Testament Essays [WUNT, 229] [Tübingen 2008]) 586–596; K. Runia, 22 (1963) 77–89; D.B. Knox, 23 (1964) 44–53. Integration of the International Missionary Council and the WCC: The New Delhi Report (n. 12) 56–60. 29 C.F.H. Henry, editor of Christianity Today which co-sponsored the Congress, co-edited the proceedings: One Race, One Gospel, One Task (see n. 21 above). Quotations from

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first International Congress on World Evangelization at Lausanne in 1974. In his opening address he made clear that it was a section of the Christian church (“This is a conference of evangelicals”) that was meeting. This conference produced ‘The Lausanne Covenant’, which was expounded and commented on the following year by J.R.W. Stott, who chaired the Drafting Committee for the Covenant. He reports that participants in the 1974 Congress “were conscious of a deep and wonderful unity” and felt they should bind themselves by a covenant. They affirmed the unity of the God who revealed himself in three stages and the uniqueness and universality of Christ. Section five, on Christian social responsibility, affirms that “because mankind is made in the image of God, every person, regardless of race, religion, color, culture, class, sex or age, has an intrinsic dignity because of which he should be respected and served, not exploited”. Section seven affirms “that the church’s visible unity in truth is God’s purpose”. However, there is hesitation about visible (‘organizational’) unity, as shown by the qualification ‘in truth’. That it indicates something akin to ‘those who basically agree with us’ is suggested by the statement that “we who share the same biblical faith should be closely united in fellowship, work and witness” and by the pledge “to seek a deeper unity in truth, worship, holiness and mission”. A second Congress fifteen years later in Manila produced ‘The Manila Manifesto’, which at twice the length is issued along with and does not supplant ‘The Lausanne Covenant’. It reflects on matters touched on at Manila, such as the idea of ‘unreached people groups’. Following the strong response to a Forum in Pattaya (Thailand) in 2004 the Lausanne movement was still seen as serving “to unite evangelicals globally”, whatever the church organisations to which they belonged, and a proposal emerged to hold a third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization in 2010, on the 100th anniversary of the Edinburgh conference (above). This came to fruition in Cape Town in October 2010.30 No structural union is being sought by these congresses. The

1.32 (B. Graham), 2.47 (J.M. Isais), 2.49 (V.R. Edman). Obstacles to evangelism: 2.249– 339. 30 ‘The Lausanne Covenant’ is printed in the compendium of the first Congress: J.D. Douglas (ed.), Let the Earth Hear His Voice (n. 9) 3–9 and is also available at www.lausanne.org/about/html (accessed 1 November 2010). Stott’s exposition: The Lausanne Covenant: An Exposition and Commentary (London 1975; reissued as Lausanne Occasional Paper 3 in 1979); quotations from 5, 7, 15, 18, 3 (in the American edition [Minneapolis 1975] from 3, 25, 33, 30, 34). Graham’s opening address ‘Why Lausanne?’ is printed in J.D. Douglas (ed.), Let the Earth Hear His Voice (n. 9) 22–36 (quotation from 27; on Graham’s rôle in the Congress see J. Pollock, Billy Graham: Evangelist to the World: An Authorized Biography of the Decisive Years [Sydney 1979] 187–215 and The Billy Graham Story: The Authorized Biography2 [Grand Rapids, MI 2003] 132–136, 269). The Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization sponsored ten consultations or colloquia between 1977 and 1988. The documents are conveniently gathered in J.R.W. Stott (ed.), Making Christ Known: Historic Mission Documents from the Lausanne Movement 1974–1989 (Carlisle 1996). Manila Congress:

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links are less tangible, even when unity in mission is considered. Sometimes evangelical Christians are surprisingly critical of each other. In 1975 one might have wondered how much unity was possible for them when a journal emanating from the Evangelical Alliance, Crusade, published a mildly cynical, if humorous, report on the Lausanne congress. And in 1997 the journal of the British Evangelical Council published criticism of speakers at the 1996 National Assembly of the Evangelical Alliance. However, at Lausanne III in Cape Town the World Evangelical Alliance was a partner of The Lausanne Movement.31 Slogans often develop a life of their own. In 1942 Wendell L. Willkie, who had been a candidate in 1940 for President of the United States of America, flew around the world and wrote a book entitled One World. It is unclear how much this slogan influenced thinking about the unity of humankind, such as

Proclaim Christ Until He Comes (n. 9). Hindrances to co-operation were discussed in Lausanne Occasional Paper 24: Co-operating in World Evangelization: A Handbook on Church/Para-church Relationships (Wheaton, IL 1983). 2004 self-assessment: Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization, The Lausanne Movement: A Fresh Vision for the 21st Century (South Hamilton, MA 2005) 1. The proposal for a third Congress, which might revisit the issue of the uniqueness of Christ in a context of a pluralistic world, emerged from the Lausanne 2004 Forum in Thailand (P. Eshleman et al. in A Fresh Vision [above] 3–6 or www.lausanne.org/issuegroups). In calling for a renewed commitment to the Lausanne Covenant in 2005 the Executive Chair mentioned as a factor “the need for greater unity and cooperation. Evangelicals today are in danger of continued fragmentation. We must reflect more profoundly on what Christ yearned for as He prayed for the spiritual oneness of His people” (A Fresh Vision [above] 6). The 2010 goal of Lausanne III in Cape Town “was to re-stimulate the spirit of Lausanne represented in The Lausanne Covenant and so to promote unity, humility in service, and a call to action for global evangelization”: www.lausanne.org/about.html (accessed 1 November 2010). The Cape Town Confession of Faith is formulated in affirmations of what ‘we love’ rather than what ‘we reject’ and is followed by The Cape Town Call to Action. See C.J.H. Wright (ed.), The Cape Town Commitment: A Confession of Faith and a Call to Action (Peabody, MA 2011) or www.lausanne.org/ctcommitment.html (accessed 30 August 2018). The authorised record of the Congress is J.E.M. Cameron (ed.), Christ our Reconciler: Gospel/Church/World (Nottingham 2012). Whereas John Stott expounded the Lausanne Covenant in 1975, in 2012 Rose Dowsett produced questions for reflection and additional references to the Bible for study: The Cape Town Commitment: Study Edition (Peabody, MA 2012). 31 J. Capon and others in Lausanne ’74: Let the Earth Hear Whose Voice? (London n.d. [1975]). More vehement objections are expressed in a retrospective study by P. Back, Social Action and Evangelism: Has Lausanne 1974 Helped to Redefine Mission as a Part of The New World Order? [Church and Mission Monographs, 17] (U.K. 2004), who attacks the World Evangelical Fellowship (ibid. 11 n. 15) as well as the Lausanne Movement. British Evangelical Council members: see the comments, again under the heading ‘I was there’, in Foundations 38 (1997) 8–13, especially 9, 11. World Evangelical Alliance at Lausanne III: R. Dowsett, op. cit. (n. 30) x, xii. For a mid-twentieth century assessment as to whether Christian unity could be achieved through the Evangelical Alliance see K. Goebbels, op. cit. (n. 7) 15–20.

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Arnold Toynbee’s when he wrote a quarter of a century later about ‘Ecumenopolis’.32 One World was in the later twentieth century the title not only of individual books, but also of a monthly magazine produced by the WCC from 1974, at a time when that Council linked 271 member churches in some 90 countries. ‘One World Only’ was the title for a series of conferences from 1967, mainly on social development in Asia, sponsored and published by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in West Germany. Elise Boulding, born in Norway, promoted from the Conflict Resolution Consortium in Boulder, Colorado, education for world citizenship.33 In Australia one of the major welfare organisations (Community Aid Abroad, now under the umbrella of Oxfam International) ran ‘One World Travel’, an organisation which was accredited by the International Association of Travel Agents but aimed to provide ‘responsible travel’ in order “to understand the culture that you are visiting, to respect and be sensitive to the people who are hosting your visit, [and] to tread softly on the environment of your hosts”. The influence of the environmental movement on a travel agency run by a voluntary association to help people in the Third World could be seen in their brochure. Funded by the British Council, One World Action “is working for a world free from poverty and oppression in which strong democracies safeguard the rights of all people”. Willkie’s slogan ‘One World or 32

A.J. Toynbee, Experiences (Oxford 1969) 42–44, 357. ‘Towards One World’ seemed to one author an appropriate title for a book in the early 1960s about a world made one by European methods and techniques: G. Pearson, Towards One World: An Outline of World History from 1600 to 1960 (Cambridge 1962). Twenty years later ‘Towards One World?’ seemed an appropriate heading for critical discussion of the Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues chaired by the former Chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt: Friedrich Ebert Foundation (ed.), Towards One World? International Responses to the Brandt Report (London 1981). Thirty years later again F.M. Moghaddam argued that ‘one world’ is better achieved by constant contact that leads to assimilation (and involves the death of languages) rather than by promoting cultural diversity: How Globalization Spurs Terrorism: The Lopsided Benefits of “One World” and Why That Fuels Violence (Westport, CN 2008), especially chaps. 4–5. On Willkie’s flight and subsequent book (London 1943), see E. Barnard, Wendell Willkie: Fighter for Freedom (Marquette 1966) 347–381, 411–415. On his presidential campaign see H.S. Parmet and M.B. Hecht, Never Again: A President Runs for a Third Term (New York 1968). 33 ‘One World Only’: see, for example, E. Kristoffersen (ed.), One World Only: Social Aspects of Economic Development Planning in Asia: An International Forum under the Auspices of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Bangkok, January 3–9, 1971 (Bangkok n.d. [1971]). For an interview with Elise Boulding see Education for World Citizenship: Peace Learning, Empowerment into Action, and Transnational Networks [Peace Education Miniprints, 10] (Malmö 1991). For use of Willkie’s slogan see also C.B. Tonkin and P.J. Pledger, One World: A Study Guide to World Problems (Melbourne 1967); B. Maegraith, One World [Heath Clark Lectures, 1970] (London 1973), with an explanation in chapter 1 as to why it was chosen for a book on (mainly medical) aid to the developing world; J. Kiang, One World: The Approach to Permanent Peace on Earth and the General Happiness of Mankind: A Popular Manifesto with Scholarly Annotations (Notre Dame, IN 1984).

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None’ was picked up at the time by an enthusiast for the British Commonwealth of Nations and used forty-five years later by a One World Campaign in Australia.34 In the modern world as in the ancient, one can ask how far it is possible to detect lines of influence from one writer to another, or from one movement to another. Or is unity simply in the air, part of the intellectual climate, available as a catchcry for whoever wants it? Sometimes the vocabulary seems to lose its force. When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissolved, most of the components formed the Commonwealth of Independent States, apparently feeling the need for a term which encompassed ideas of unity and sharing – a term, moreover, which had a long history in the British Commonwealth. They proceeded to enter ‘the Unified Team’ in the 1992 Olympic Games, though the International Olympic Committee might be thought to have encouraged political disunity by allowing entries to team sports competitions from components of Yugoslavia (the process of splitting up Czechoslovakia was insufficiently advanced at that time). In the Roman world of the first two centuries C.E. one gets the impression that unity began to lose its distinctive meaning in some passages. Lists such as “one faith, one hope, one love, ...” tend to be transitional contexts, indicating both ideals of unity (such as agreement in belief and expectation) and items which the writer values (in this New Testament example, faith, hope, love and so on). We shall see a Caesar of the late second century, Marcus Aurelius, proclaiming that “there is one universe consisting of all, one God immanent in all, one substance, one law – the reason common to all intelligent creatures – and one truth”. But since we know that he is really a polytheist, we can conclude that the successive uses of heis (one) after the first serve to reinforce the crucial belief, one universe and not a number of universes. At the end of our period the Christian writer Clement of Alexandria speaks of ‘the common salvation’; koinos here is interpreted as meaning that the faith of those who have chosen 34 ‘One World Travel’ became ‘Our World Travel’ (www.caa.org.au/travel, accessed 7 September 2002). One World Action has been producing reports of seminars organised ‘with’ the British Council, such as Women and Democracy (1997 seminar) which are then published; quotation from the back of the title page. ‘One World or None’: T.J. Haarhoff, The Unity of Mankind (n. 6) 37. The One World Campaign, run by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, was directed at making sustainable development the central objective of all Australia’s aid and development policies, increasing Australia’s aid and improving its economic policies towards Third World countries, ensuring that aid promotes human rights, and cutting military spending: J. Hunt et al., One World or … None: Making the Difference (Canberra 1989). Records of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid between 1964 and 1996 have been lodged in the Australian National Library: see http:/nla.gov.au/nla.msms9347. By contrast with the use of ‘one’, it has been argued that the Greek prefix παν-, as in Panhellenes, emphasised diversity rather than unity: see R.L. Fowler, PCPhS 44 (1998) 1–19 at 10; J.M. Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago 2002) 132, 153– 154; the point is already implicit in A. Diller, Race Mixture among the Greeks before Alexander [Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, 20] (Urbana, IL 1937) 20–21.

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this salvation is common, but the impression is given that it also denotes something of great value to the writer, salvation. In such passages the favourable connotations of unity are being used by writers to reinforce their beliefs.35 How seriously are concepts of unity taken? Two points suggest that the Greek writer’s heart is not always behind the statements about unity. One is the characteristic of talking a lot about unity and doing little about it. The second is the way in which some writers contradict their ideals when they get down to more detailed suggestions. For example, the division between Greek and barbarian remained endemic, despite protestations about the unity of humankind. Lofty words flow freely from the writers and speakers of the period that I am about to define and they are not always conscious of the full implications of what they are saying. The parallel between modern leaders and the ancient writers is not of course a complete one. The simultaneous advances of modern unity movements have generally been in the hands of different people – church leaders being influenced by efforts towards political unity or vice versa. In the eastern Mediterranean of the first and second centuries the easy transition from harmony of the universe to political unity was made within the one person, a Plutarch of Khaironeia or Dion of Prousa. But it may be true that in the ancient world as in the twentieth century the value of unity was widely accepted among the educated population. So unity may be pursued on more than one front. And, of course, unity has continued to have appeal in many cultures in later periods. Literary critics, for example, have even at the height of postmodernism used the unity of a poem or a novel as a criterion for judging the work of literature.36 35 M.A. 7.9, discussed in the first section of chap. 5. Clement: Stromateis (Miscellanies) 7.2.8.1; see chap. 8 at n. 20. Paidagogos 1.4.10 offers a list with heis, koinos and homoios used to commend items (chap. 7 at n. 18). Students of the New Testament have been much concerned recently with issues of rhetorical criticism: see, for example, M.M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians [Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie, 28] (Tübingen 1991); S.E. Porter and T.H. Olbricht (eds.), Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference [Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series, 90] (Sheffield 1993); A. Eriksson, Traditions as Rhetorical Proof: Pauline Argumentation in 1 Corinthians [Coniectanea Biblica, 29] (Stockholm 1998); S.E. Porter and D.L. Stamps (eds.), Rhetorical Criticism and the Bible [Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series, 195] (Sheffield 2002); bibliography by D.F. Watson in id. and A.J. Hauser, Rhetorical Criticism of the Bible: A Comprehensive Bibliography with Notes on History and Method [Biblical Interpretation Series, 4] (Leiden 1994) 126–206. On Clement’s allegorical rhetoric see T.H. Olbricht in S.E. Porter and D.L. Stamps (eds.), op. cit. 24–47 at 42–46. 36 For example, with reference to the Homeric poems, G.E. Dimock, The Unity of the Odyssey (Amherst, MA 1989), especially 3–4; J. Kim, The Pity of Achilles: Oral Style and the Unity of the Iliad (Lanham, MD 2000). Some scholars who discuss the unity of a poetic work freely use the language of postmodernism (e.g. ‘reception’, ‘complicate readings’):

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Peace and Concepts of Unity Peace and Concepts of Unity

Following the civil war started by C. Iulius Caesar (Julius Caesar) when he crossed the Rubicon in January 49 B.C.E. – fought initially against Pompeius and carried on for three years after the latter’s death – and the civil wars among Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony), C. Octavius (Octavian), M. Aemilius Lepidus, Pompeius’ son Sextus and the last Kleopatra, the ultimate victor Octavian (the later Augustus) enjoyed a period of relative stability for the last forty-five years of his political leadership. He says, in the much-revised record of his achievements and disbursements (Index rerum gestarum et impensarum), that three times while he was princeps or overwhelming leader (me principe) the Ianus Quirinus gate was closed to indicate peace throughout the whole empire of the Roman people, whereas it had only been closed twice in the seven hundred years between the foundation of the city and his birth.37 This peace established by Augustus continued for some two hundred years, with the only open break being the so-called ‘Year of the Four Emperors’ (68–69 C.E.). The eighteenth-century historian Edward Gibbon expressed the view that the period from the death of Domitian in 96 C.E. to the death of Marcus Aurelius in 180 C.E. was the one in which “the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous”. It is true that there was no catastrophic outbreak of violence in the empire of the Caesars concerned. But the empire continued as before under Commodus (180–192 C.E.), despite the unpleasant features of his personality. Moreover, many of the problems of the third century had their roots in this golden age: Antoninus Pius, perhaps the best regarded of them all, was responsible for devaluing the coinage (by using a smaller proportion of silver) see, for example, J.C. Pellicer, SO 82 (2007) 90–115 (on the unity of Virgil’s Georgics); Pellicer recognises that seeking “a poem’s unity arguably entails making judgments about its author’s intentions” (ibid. 108). The concern of the later Neoplatonists with literary unity was based on their philosophical position: “a dialogue was a miniature cosmos, containing within itself matter, form, nature that combines them, soul, intellect, and good” (H.A.S. Tarrant, Plato’s First Interpreters [London 2000] 41; cf. J.A. Coulter, The Literary Microcosm: Theories of Interpretation of the Later Neoplatonists [Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, 2] [Leiden 1976], especially chap. 4 and conclusion). 37 Augustus: Res gestae diui Augusti 13 (ed. P.A. Brunt and J.M. Moore [Oxford 1967] 24). For a contrary view, that Res gestae was composed between 26 June and 19 August in 14 C.E., see E.S. Ramage, Chiron 18 (1988) 71–82. The reaction of the Council (koinon) of the province of Asia to Augustus’ supreme benefaction to humankind in the cessation of war and his intention to establish a peaceful order was to synchronise the Greek calendar to the Roman and to make the new calendar begin on the birthday of Augustus (V. Ehrenberg and A.H.M. Jones, Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius [Oxford 1955] 82 no. 98[b]; translation in D.C. Braund, Augustus to Nero: A Sourcebook on Roman History 31 BC–AD 68 [London 1985] 57–58). For Caesar’s initiation of the war against Pompeius and the optimates see G.R. Stanton, Historia 52 (2003) 67–94 = Classical and Medieval Literature Criticism 173 (2015) 42–57.

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and for bestowing benefactions on a scale that was not sustainable, and Marcus Aurelius was already allowing barbarians to settle within the bounds of the Roman empire.38 But there were significant changes in the third century: peace gave way to anarchy, religion was affected by the monotheistic influence of Sol Inuictus (the Unconquered Sun) and ideas of unity were transformed by the pervasiveness of the Ploteinian One.39

38 E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J.B. Bury 1 (London 1896) 78 (chap. 3); cf. the recent favourable assessment by C.J. Markschies, Between Two Worlds: Structures of Earliest Christianity (London 1999) 16–19. As K. Wengst (9–11 with 173–174 nn. 16–19) makes clear, any claim that the period of the pax Romana was a golden age should face the question ‘for whom?’. Commodus’ violence: Cassius Dio 72.4–7; Herodianos 1.8.2, 1.8.8, 1.13.4–8; HA Comm. 1.7–8, 3.9, 4.8–6.2; cf. M. Zimmermann, Kaiser und Ereignis: Studien zum Geschichtswerk Herodians [Vestigia, 52] (München 1999), chap. 2; A. Timonen, Cruelty and Death: Roman Historians’ Scenes of Imperial Violence from Commodus to Philippus Arabs [Turun Yliopiston Julkaisuja, B.241] (Turku 2000) 57–60, 88–101. For an attempt to minimise Commodus’ violence see O. Hekster, Commodus: An Emperor at the Crossroads [Dutch Monographs on Ancient History and Archaeology, 23] (Amsterdam 2002) 1–2, 6, 8, 51, 55, 77, 137, 163, 185, 197–198, 202. For the continuation of the empire as before, ibid. chap. 2. Antoninus Pius is treated favourably by M. Grant, The Antonines: The Roman Empire in Transition (London 1994), chap. 1, despite the questions raised earlier (ibid. 2), by A.R. Birley in The Cambridge Ancient History 112 (Cambridge 2000) 149–156 and by G. Aumann, Antoninus Pius: Der vergessene Kaiser (Wiesbaden 2019). See also C. Michels, Antoninus Pius und die Rollenbilder des römischen Princeps (Berlin 2018). Pius’ devaluation of the coinage: D.R. Walker, The Metrology of the Roman Silver Coinage 2 [British Archaeological Reports Supplementary Series, 22] (Oxford 1977) 57–58, 3 [BAR Supplementary Series, 40] (Oxford 1978) 124–125, K.W. Harl, Coinage in the Roman Economy, 300 B.C. to A.D. 700 (Baltimore 1996) 7–8, 94; cf. ibid. 95 on Marcus’ later devaluations. The distribution made to citizens, soldiers and communities after the accession to power of Antoninus Pius was followed by another eight donatives: F. Pöschl, Hermes 76 (1941) 423–426. Settlement by Marcus of “countless numbers from foreign peoples on Roman soil”: HA Marcus 24.3; cf. Cassius Dio 71.11.4–5. 39 Sol Inuictus: see F. Altheim, Der unbesiegte Gott: Heidentum und Christentum [Rowolts deutschen Enzyklopädie, 35] (Hamburg 1957); G.H. Halsberghe, The Cult of Sol Invictus [Études préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l’empire romain, 23] (Leiden 1972); idem, ANRW 2.17.4 (Berlin 1984) 2181–2201; K.M. Girardet, Der Kaiser und sein Gott: Das Christentum im Denken und in der Religionspolitik Konstantins des Großen [Millennium-Studien, 27] (Berlin 2010) 22–25, 34–43, 152. The literature on Ploteinos is voluminous: see the bibliography for 1950–2000 compiled by R. Dufour in Phronesis 46 (2001) 233–411. On the Ploteinian One see É. Bréhier, The Philosophy of Plotinus (Chicago 1958) 132–163; J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge 1967) 21–83; L.P. Gerson, Plotinus (London 1994) 15–41; J. Bussanich in L.P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge 1996) 38–65. For examples of Ploteinos’ continuing influence see E.R. Dodds’ edition of Proclus, The Elements of Theology2 (Oxford 1963) xxi–xxiii and commentary (187–193 and passim) and A.D. Nock’s edition of Sallustius (Cambridge 1926) lvi, xcviii–c. For a discussion of the notion of tradition see R. Harder in E.R. Dodds et al., Les Sources de Plotin [Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique, 5] (Genève 1960) 327–332.

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In the Mediterranean world, then, the first two centuries of the common era were characterised by a peace established and maintained by Roman military forces. For most of the twentieth century (educated readers being presumed to understand Latin) this peace was referred to as the pax Romana. However, pax Romana also had a chronological reference: it indicated the period from the settlement of the Roman world by Augustus in the hands of his own family after a long period of civil war to the auctioning of the Roman empire by an élite unit of the army stationed in Rome (the ‘Praetorian Guard’) after the death of Commodus on the last day of 192 C.E.40 The eastern half of the Roman empire was inhabited by people whose written communications were primarily in 40

P. Petit’s La paix romaine [Nouvelle Clio, 9] (Paris 1967), dealing with the period 31 was published in English as Pax Romana (London 1976). The first half of the selection of documents by N. Lewis and M. Reinhold in volume 2 of Roman Civilization3 (New York 1990) is entitled ‘the Roman Peace (A.D. 14–192)’. The conceptual framework, with Augustus treated as the first princeps, is seen in these books and in many other places: for example, the tenth volume (Cambridge 1934) of The Cambridge Ancient History was given the title ‘The Augustan Empire: 44 B.C. – A.D. 70’ and the eleventh volume (1936) the title ‘The Imperial Peace: A.D. 70 – 192’. Note especially the ‘Conclusion’ to the latter volume by F.E. Adcock (845–853), ending with the quotation immensa Romanae pacis maiestas (Pliny the elder, Natural History 27.3). pax Romana first occurs in Seneca, On Mercy 1.4.2. H. Dieter compares pax Romana with koine eirene (common peace) as it appeared in the Greek world of the fourth century B.C.E.: in K. Buraselis (ed.), Ἑνότητα καί ἑνότητες τῆς ᾽Αρχαιότητας: ᾽Ανακοινώσεις ἀπό ἕνα Συμπόσιο στούς Δελφούς, 5–8.4.1992/Unity and Units of Antiquity: Papers from a Colloquium at Delphi, 5–8.4.1992 (Athina 1994) 85–102. For criticism of the idea that Augustus brought about a change in constitution see G.R. Stanton in T.W. Hillard et al. (eds.), Ancient History in a Modern University (Sydney 1998) 1.281– 298; E.A. Judge, The First Christians (n. 28) 111–116, 339–344 and in The Failure of Augustus: Essays on the Interpretation of a Paradox (Newcastle upon Tyne 2019) 79–83. Part One of P.J. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians (Oxford 2006) is provocatively entitled ‘pax Romana’; it explores the state of the Roman empire in the fourth century. Peace as a virtue of Empire is debated with reference to the Roman empire by, for example, M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA 2000) 10–11, 167. R. Hingley begins his attack on the term ‘Romanisation’ (he prefers ‘globalisation’) with a drawing of a coin produced between 36 and 31 B.C.E. that shows Octavian (see beginning of this section) with his boot on the globe: Globalizing Roman Culture: Unity, Diversity and Empire (London 2005) 1–2 with Fig. 1 (however, oikoumene can scarcely mean ‘sole power’, ibid. 121 n. 1); photograph in P. Zanker, The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus [Jerome Lectures, 16] (Ann Arbor, MI 1988) 40–41 with Fig. 31a; another coin in S. Walker and A. Burnett, The Image of Augustus (London 1981) 26 Fig. 28d. Of course, others have expressed doubts about the usefulness of the term ‘Romanisation’: see, for example, many of the essays in D.J. Mattingly (ed.), Dialogues in Roman Imperialism: Power, Discourse, and Discrepant Experience in the Roman Empire [JRA Supplement Series, 23] (Portsmouth, RI 1997); but ‘globalisation’ as a concept has needed adaptation in order to be applied to the Roman empire: see P.B. Hartog in G. van Kooten and J. van Ruiten (eds.), Intolerance, Polemics, and Debate in Antiquity: Politico-Cultural, Philosophical, and Religious Forms of Critical Conversation [Themes in Biblical Narrative, 25] (Leiden 2019) 206– B.C.E. – 193 C.E.,

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Greek, even if they spoke Lykian or Aramaic or (in Egypt) Demotic at home. The surviving documents of those people who could write Greek, whether literary or preserved on papyri and inscriptions, show that they had adopted Greek cultural traditions going back to the Homeric poems.41 They knew about, even cherished, the Greek victories over the Persians in 490 and 480–479 B.C.E. – indeed, one of the orators who features frequently in this book, Ailios Aristeides, writes as though they occurred quite recently. They repeated the traditions of tyrants being overthrown in Greek cities and of alliances and wars between cities great and small. But Greek politicians under Roman control were not able to propose in their city’s Assembly that the citizens go to war with a neighbouring city or make an alliance with a city on the other side of the Aegean as they had in the past. 42 To this period of the pax Romana belong the Greek intellectuals whose ideas are studied in this book. As might be expected from the founding in the 1980s of a journal The Second Century, more of the preserved writings belong in the second than the first century.43 The philosophical documents of the Hermetic writers, on the other hand, which have often been thought to have reached their final form in the third century, can be dated in the first, according to a recent

210. How pervasive the language of chattel slavery and of clientship was for the description of the humans in Roman provinces is explored by M. Lavan, Slaves to Rome: Paradigms of Empire in Roman Culture (Cambridge 2013), especially 75–80, 111–119, 179–190. 41 For attempts by the ancient educated élite in the central west of modern Turkey to emulate the Homeric hexameter see the inaugural lecture by my colleague G.H.R. Horsley, Homer in Pisidia: Degrees of Literateness in a Backwoods Province of the Roman Empire (Armidale 1999), particularly the revised version with a different sub-title: ‘Aspects of the History of Greek Education in a Remote Roman Province’ in Antichthon 34 (2000) 46–81. 42 Plutarch warns the leading politicians in Greek cities about the current limitations of their activities under Roman rule (mor. 805a–b, 813d–e, 824d–825a, cited, for example, in N. Lewis and M. Reinhold, op. cit. [n. 40] 2.231–232). On the Persian Wars as a symbol of unity in the second century see A. Spawforth in S. Hornblower (ed.), Greek Historiography (Oxford 1994) 233–247, especially (on Plutarch and Aristeides) 242–243, 245–246. 43 This journal, however, had the sub-title Journal of Early Christian Studies, which became the main title from 1993 when a different publisher took over from the original one, which published nine issues from 1981 to 1992. For general assessments of Greek literature in the second century see B.A. van Groningen, Mnemosyne4 18 (1965) 41–56; B.P. Reardon, Courants littéraires grecs des IIe et IIIe siècles après J.-C. [Annales littéraires de l’Université de Nantes, 3] (Paris 1971); A. Dihle, Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire from Augustus to Justinian (London 1994), chap. 4; T. Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire (Oxford 2002), opening Part I with a strong reaction to van Groningen’s hostile assessment: 41–42, 44, 48; cf. 88–89. For the impact of display oratory on Greek literature under Roman occupation see T. Whitmarsh, The Second Sophistic [Greece & Rome: New Surveys in the Classics, 35] (Oxford 2005), chap. 5.

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commentator on them.44 We cannot readily discover what the ordinary person thought about unity – someone equivalent to the illiterate people in Roman Egypt who employed a scribe and whose letters, accounts and petitions are preserved on papyri. It is not possible to discover this even for the early Christians, who are often, mistakenly, thought to belong to the lower strata of society: as soon as we ask, for example, about the extent of Paul’s geographical knowledge we are confronted with the considerable amount that an educated person would have known.45 These intellectuals betray many of the faults of their modern counterparts, such as misunderstanding of what others have written and quotation from memory, but they also betray some understanding of philosophical traditions and knowledge of earlier Greek literature. There was, as I have indicated, a political unity in the Mediterranean world that invited comment by reflective Greeks of the first two centuries.46 Did they in fact reflect not only on such political unity, but also on unity of other kinds? The Greek authors we shall examine in some depth in order to answer this question are five in number. Epiktetos was a philosopher who began life as a slave of one of Nero’s henchmen, the ex-slave Epaphroditos. Epiktetos’ lameness may have been caused by ill-treatment while he was a slave. After manumission he taught philosophy in Rome, but was banished along with other philosophers by Domitian in 92/93 C.E. He subsequently set up a school in Nikopolis, near the site of Octavian’s final victory at Actium (Aktia). Classroom discussions, in which Epiktetos does virtually all the talking, were recorded there 44

G. Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: An Historical Approach to the Late Pagan Mind (Cambridge 1986) xiv accepts the argument of Isaac Casaubon (1614) that the philosophical Corpus Hermeticum belongs in the late first century. 45 Cf. C.E.B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 2 (Edinburgh 1979) 766–768. Jesus of Nazareth seems to have grown up in a small business milieu (NT Mt 13.55; Mk 6.3 suggests he ran the family’s construction business after Joseph’s death) and recruited followers who owned boats and hired workers (NT Mk 1.20 with Lk 5.7, 10 makes clear that the families of Simon and Andrew and of James and John were business partners). Like Paul, he had some wealthy female patrons (NT Lk 8.1– 3; cf. Acts 16.1, 14–15). On the economic and social status of the earliest Christians see G.R. Stanton, JGRChJ 12 (2016) 99–126 and NovT 60 (2018) 227–246. The fishing industry in Palestine has since been discussed by scholars who would not have seen my JGRChJ article (which appeared in 2017): R. Hakola, NovT 59 (2017) 111–130; J.S. Kloppenborg, EThL 94 (2018) 571–599. 46 The extent of political, economic and cultural unity is examined in successive chapters by M.D. Goodman, The Roman World 44 BC – AD 180 (London 1997) 135–156. He concludes that the political unity of the inhabitants of the Roman empire was imposed by the state, deploying the ‘imperial cult’ in particular; that a coherent taxation system and use of Roman coinage in most areas point to a degree of economic unity; and that cultural unity is seen in public buildings, burial fashions and art, and to a lesser extent in literature. The New Testament writers could, since Jesus was a victim of violence perpetrated in the name of the pax Romana, call into question whether that pax deserves that title (‘peace’) and thus proclaim that Christ brought genuine peace and reconciliation: see Wengst 1–4.

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by L. Flavius Arrianus (Arrianos). The accuracy of these reports has, understandably, been questioned by modern scholars. However, patterns of training have been discerned in the reports by Arrianos that suggest we have what Epiktetos actually taught. Furthermore, many of the stances approved by Arrianos are in direct contradiction to what Epiktetos recommended.47 Dion of Prousa (modern Bursa) lived in the province of Bithynia in northwestern Turkey. His Roman citizenship – the name Cocceianus Dio may or may not refer to Nerva – was probably inherited. He perhaps saw himself as an adviser to Nerva’s heir, Trajan. He travelled widely, particularly when he was in exile as a result of Domitian’s decree. He was a citizen of Prousa’s great rival, Apameia (Mudanya), as well as his native city, and he had sufficiently close relations with two other rival cities, Nikaia (Iznik) and Nikomedeia (Izmir), as to give them also advice on harmony.48 Plutarch came from central Greece, residing mainly in his native city Khaironeia and performing his duties at Delphoi, where he was a priest of Apollon. He was a Roman citizen, and was particularly close to a confidant of Trajan, Q. Sosius Senecio. He is of course best known for his paired biographies of Greeks and Romans, but he left as much writing again in the collection of essays, treatises and letters known as the ‘Moralia’. His advice to Greek politicians under the Roman peace can be seen, like that of Dion, as serving the interests of the Roman government.49 47 The doubts of T. Wirth, MH 24 (1967) 149–189, 197–216, revived recently by H. Selle, Philologus 145 (2001) 269–290 – who, however, does not support Wirth’s view (197, 200– 212, 215–216) that Arrianos intended to imitate Xenophon’s Memorabilia – are countered by the askesis discerned by P. Hadot (82–100; see also his Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault [Oxford 1995] 191–202 and What is Ancient Philosophy? [Cambridge, MA 2002] 200–202, 243–245). Moral judgments of Arrianos in contravention of Epiktetos’: P.A. Brunt, Athenaeum 55 (1977) 19–48. Long (39–41) argues that Arrianos’ record is basically authentic, even if worked up to some extent. Within a few years of Epiktetos’ death Aulus Gellius (1.2.6) refers to “books of Epiktetos’ discourses, arranged by Arrianos” (ibid. 41). Long and Dobbin provide excellent introductions to Epiktetos, though the latter (xxii) minimises to an implausible extent Arrianos’ refashioning of what he heard (so Long 64). See also the introduction and bibliography by P.P. Fuentes González in R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques 3 (Paris 2000) 106–151. 48 Desideri; J.L. Moles, JHS 98 (1978) 79–100; Jones, Dio; B.F. Harris, ANRW 2.33.5 (Berlin 1991) 3853–3881; H. Sidebottom, Studies in Dio Chrysostom on Kingship (thesis, Oxford 1987); P. Desideri in R. Goulet (ed.), op cit. (n. 47) 2 (Paris 1994) 841–856; J.L. Moles in D. Innes et al. (eds.), Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday (Oxford 1995) 177–192; Swain, chap. 6; J.-M. Claassen, Displaced Persons: The Literature of Exile from Cicero to Boethius (Madison, WI 1999) 163– 168; the essays in Dio Chrysostom. 49 On this last point see the final section of chap. 2. There are a number of useful studies of Plutarch in ANRW 2.33.6 (Berlin 1992). See also Jones, Plutarch; D.A. Russell, Plutarch (London 1972); ICS 13.2 (1989); Swain, chap. 5; T. Duff, Plutarch’s Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice (Oxford 1999), chap. 9; Lamberton. On Plutarch’s concern with identity see J.

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More blatantly pro-Roman was Ailios Aristeides. He came from Mysia (north-west of Prousa and also in the province of Bithynia and Pontus) and some fifty of his speeches survive. He was a devotee of the healing god Asklepios and spent many nights ‘incubating’ in the god’s temple in Pergamon (modern Bergama). He followed the cures suggested by the god, including enemas, fasts, bleeding and bathing in icy streams. He delivered a famous oration ‘To Rome’ during a visit there while Antoninus Pius was Caesar. In a similar fashion to Dion he spoke to Greek cities both on internal unity (as to Rhodes) and on inter-city rivalry (as to the provincial Assembly of Asia).50 Marcus Aurelius was himself Caesar, jointly with Lucius Verus from 161 C.E. until the latter’s death in 169 (their legislation is indicated as that of “the deified brothers” in the Justinian digest of law). After a period of governing the empire alone, he associated his son Commodus with himself in rule from 176 C.E. until his own death in 180. He spent some seven years on the northern frontiers of the empire fighting the Marcomanni, Quadi, Iazyges and other Germanic tribes. In outposts of empire such as Sirmium he wrote down in Greek a set of meditations for his own use (‘To himself’). They are particularly revealing for the kinds of unity examined in chapters 4–6: humans, gods, the universe and relations between them.51 These five writers seem to me the most significant sources for a study of the thought of Greek intellectuals on unity and disunity during the first two centuries. I have been collecting material on these writers as well as on Christian writers of the first two centuries since I began teaching at the University of

Boulogne, Plutarque: un aristocrate grec sous l’occupation romaine (Lille 1994) and R. Preston in Being Greek under Rome 88–118. 50 Dion’s speeches to Prousa and Apameia are nos. 40 and 41. Aristeides’ advice to Pergamon, Smyrna and Ephesos is contained in speech 23, that to Rhodes in 24. On Aristeides, see especially Behr and Behr’s long essay in ANRW 2.34.2 (Berlin 1994) 1140–1233; also L. Pernot in R. Goulet (ed.), op. cit. (n. 47) 1 (Paris 1989) 358–366, Swain, chap. 8 and (on the inscriptions which may relate to Aristeides) B. Puech, Orateurs et sophistes grecs dans les inscriptions d’époque impériale [Textes et traditions, 4] (Paris 2002) 138–145, 502–504. 51 On Marcus see Rutherford (cf. J. Dalfen, Gnomon 64 [1992] 313–317), Hadot (this book by P. Hadot endorsed, for example, by W. Schmid, PhRdschau 46 [1999] 303–309) and I. Hadot in R. Goulet (ed.), op. cit. (n. 47) 4 (Paris 2005) 269–280. On the autobiographical material in his meditations see P. Hadot’s edition of book 1 (Paris 1998) and J. Dalfen, GB 23 (2000) 187–211. The issue I raised in Historia 18 (1969) 570–587, reprinted with an addendum covering literature to 1978 in R. Klein (ed.), Marc Aurel [Wege der Forschung, 550] (Darmstadt 1979) 359–388 is discussed by several contributors to M. van Ackeren and J. Opsomer (eds.), Selbstbetrachungen und Selbstdarstellungen: Der Philosoph und Kaiser Marc Aurel im interdisziplinären Licht/Meditations and Representations: The Philosopher and Emperor Marcus Aurelius in an Interdisciplinary Light: Akten des Interdisziplinären Kolloquiums Köln 23. bis 25. Juli 2009 (Wiesbaden 2012): C. Gill (35–64), J.-B. Gourinat (65–85) and M. Avenarius (203–282).

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New England (Australia) some decades ago.52 However, several other writings have some prominence in this book, notably On the kosmos (earlier attributed to Aristotle but dating from the first or second century) and the Hermetic corpus. Also important are the writings of the early Christians. Some attention is paid to the New Testament (here I have not made many sallies into the vast modern literature). Next, chronologically, among Christian writers come those known as ‘the Apostolic Fathers’: 1 and 2 Clement, the letters of Ignatios and Polykarpos, the letter to Diognetos, The Teaching of the Twelve, The Shepherd of Hermas and so on. The term ‘the Apologists’ usually refers to Aristeides of Athens, Justin Martyr, Tatianos, Athenagoras, Meliton of Sardis and Theophilos of Antioch. Irenaeus wrote in Greek (he came from Smyrna), despite his residence in a Gallic province at Lugdunum (Lyon). Clement of Alexandria studied under teachers in several cities scattered between Italy and Palestine before settling in Egypt.53

52

My early work in this area is reflected in a few articles, the first two of which are mined for phraseology and references in this book: ‘The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius’, Phronesis 13 (1968) 183–195; ‘Marcus Aurelius, Emperor and Philosopher’, Historia 18 (1969) 570–587 = R. Klein (ed.), Marc Aurel (n. 51) 359–388; ‘2 Clement VII and the Origin of the Document’, C & M 28 (1967 [1970]) 314–320; ‘Sophists and Philosophers: Problems of Classification’, AJPh 94 (1973) 350–364. Note also my survey of work on Marcus Aurelius and Commodus in the decade 1962–1972 in ANRW 2.2 (Berlin 1975) 478–549. 53 For an introduction to ‘the Apostolic Fathers’, ‘the Apologists’, Irenaeus and Clement see D.J. Bingham (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Early Christian Thought (London 2010), especially the essays by C.N. Jefford, O. Skarsaune, Bingham, G.D. Dunn, H.F. Hägg and M.C. Steenberg (on unity in particular, Jefford at 109–112, Skarsaune at 130, Bingham at 147–150, Dunn at 155–156, Hägg at 181–183 and Steenberg at 242–246). The essays by R.A. Norris, Jr. in F.M. Young et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature (Cambridge 2004) are commendably clear, but evince a somewhat dated critical stance, as though they were commissioned a considerable time before publication. Useful introductions to ‘the Apologists’ are also provided by R.M. Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (London 1988) and by F.M. Young in M.J. Edwards et al. (eds.), Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews, and Christians (Oxford 1999) 82–92. A moderately comprehensive account of Irenaeus is found in the essays in S. Parvis and P. Foster (eds.), Irenaeus: Life, Scripture, Legacy (Minneapolis 2012). Succinct introductions to Clement are provided by A. Jakab, Ecclesia alexandrina: Evolution sociale et institutionnelle du christianisme alexandrin (IIe et IIIe siècles)2 [Christianismes anciens, 1] (Bern 2004) 118–123 and R.E. Heine in F.M. Young et al. (eds.), op. cit. 117–121. A focus on the trajectory of research, rather than an attempt to introduce early Christian writers, animates the essays in S.A. Harvey and D.G. Hunter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies (Oxford 2008). For a comparison of the early Christian concept πατήρ (‘Father’) with that of the Neoplatonists (cf. n. 39 above) see C.J. Markschies in id. and J. van Oort (eds.), Zwischen Altertumswissenschaft und Theologie: Zur Relevanz der Patristik in Geschichte und Gegenwart [Studien der Patristischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft, 6] (Leuven 2002) 1–30. The substantial study by S. Morlet (see Abbreviations) of harmony and concord in Greek literature as far as

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The Christian writers, especially given the antithesis between Jews (and Christians) and ‘Greeks’, were forced to determine an attitude to the culture around them. Clement of Alexandria had a broad and detailed knowledge of Greek literature – indeed, his works are the source for many fragments of writers whose works are lost. Some of his Christian predecessors had a more negative attitude to Greek culture.54 Of the other writers, Marcus Aurelius was of course thoroughly Roman, but it was natural for him to compose his meditations in Greek. Epiktetos might be regarded as removed in his own thinking from the society around him. But Dion, Plutarch and Aristeides were Greeks who had to contend with the issue of what it was to be Greek. The former two were willing to question the value of such a central institution as the gymnasion. And, of course, Hellenism now had to take into account that Greeks were no longer free to undertake foreign policy as in the past.55

Early Greek Interest in Unity Early Greek Interest in Unity

In more rigorous Greek thought interest in unity goes back to the earliest philosophers, the ‘Presocratics’. Herakleitos asserted that “out of all things there comes a unity and out of a unity all things come”. He also declared that “it is wise to agree that all things are one”. He is paraphrased as saying that there is Origen largely excludes the ‘Apostolic Fathers’ because they are more interested in structural, church-centred unity than in textual unity (14–15); he does pay due attention to the ‘Apologists’ Justin, Athenagoras and Theophilus. As is already apparent, I prefer close transliterations of Greek words, but the names of the Christian writers would not be recognised by many readers if I spelled them Ioustinos, Eirenaios and so on. This is a pity because there is even a pun on the name of Irenaeus which involves the Greek word for peace (eirene); see chap. 7 n. 38. 54 The standard work is C.N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine (Oxford 1940). See, subsequently, H. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (Oxford 1966). 55 Most contributors to a recent collection of essays on Greek cultural identity and the Roman empire face this question: S. Goldhill (ed.), Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire (Cambridge 2001); see especially the introduction by the editor and the essays by R. Preston on Plutarch (86–119) and T. Whitmarsh (269–305). See also M. Gleeson, Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome (Princeton 1995); J.-J. Flinterman, Power, Paideia and Pythagoreanism: Greek Identity, Conceptions of the Relationship between Philosophers and Monarchs and Political Ideas in Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius [Dutch Monographs on Ancient History and Archaeology, 13] (Amsterdam 1995), especially 49–51, 90–100, 117–127, 227–230; G.R. Stanton, ‘Hellenism’ in C.A. Evans and S.E. Porter (eds.), Dictionary of New Testament Background: A Compendium of Contemporary Biblical Scholarship (Chicago 2001) 464– 473.

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one common universe (kosmos here may be a later usage) for those who pay attention.56 Empedokles talked of the four elements “at one time coming together by love into one universe” and of the entire universe being penetrated by swift thoughts.57 The idea was developed by Parmenides that whatever exists must be a continuous whole; and it was made explicit by Melissos that all reality is one. Diogenes of Apollonia confirmed that all existing things are differentiated from the same thing and actually are the same thing, adding the argument that if any existing thing was different from the other in its nature and did not retain an essential identity through all change and differentiation, it would be impossible for them to interact with each other.58 Plato teased out a problem that was scarcely recognised by the Presocratics, namely that unity can have at least two meanings. When ‘a one’ is considered as one and nothing but one, it can only be described in negative terms, such as “it cannot be like 56 Note the opening statement of L.J. Apfel, The Advent of Pluralism: Diversity and Conflict in the Age of Sophocles (Oxford 2011) vii: “The ancient Greek world displays a striking philosophical tendency towards unity”. Fragments of the Presocratic philosophers are cited from H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker6 (Berlin 1951–1952) and A. Laks and G.W. Most, Early Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, MA 2016; 9 vols.). Herakleitos DK 22 B 10 = D 47 LM (καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα [literally ‘… and out of all things one and out of one all things’]), B 50 = D 46 LM (ἓν πάντα εἶναι), B 89 = R 56 LM (ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι). In B 50 = D 46 LM the logos brings people to agree that all things are one. But the assertion by R. Seaford (Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy [Cambridge 2004] 233; cf. 249) that “this conception of logos is influenced by the power of money to unify all goods and all men into a single abstract system” requires more than a demonstration that logos can mean (monetary and verbal) account. A. Finkelberg notes an underlying pantheistic vision to early Presocratic monism: Hermes 117 (1989) 257–270 at 268–269 (265–266 on B 50 = D 46 LM). G.B. Ladner points to the long influence of B 10 = D 47 LM and B 50 = D 46 LM illustrated in the late-antique inscription ἓν τὸ πᾶν in the tail-eater (ouroboros) drawing in the eleventh-century manuscript Cod. graec. 299 in the Biblioteca Marciana, Venice: God, Cosmos, and Humankind: The World of Early Christian Symbolism (Berkeley 1995) 79–80; cf. M. Berthelot and C.-E. Ruelle, Collection des anciens alchimistes grecs (Paris 1888) 1.134 with 1.132 fig. 11. 57 Empedokles DK 31 B 26.5–6, B 134.5 = D 77b.5–6, D 93.5 LM. The thoughts may be those of God, but the latest editor leaves the matter open: B. Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles2 [Phoenix Supplementary Volumes, 39] (Toronto 2001) 140, 263. 58 Parmenides DK 28 B 8, especially verses 5–6, 22–25 = D 8 LM, especially verses 10– 11, 27–30 (so in A.H. Coxon’s critical text The Fragments of Parmenides [Phronesis Supplementary Volumes, 3] [Assen 1986] 63, 67). Against the view that Parmenides means reality to have one and the same character see D. Gallop, Parmenides of Elea [Phoenix Supplementary Volumes, 18] (Toronto 1984) 16–17. Following a suggestion by G. Thomson (The First Philosophers2 [London 1961] 301), R. Seaford argues that the development of coinage in Parmenides’ lifetime provided a pure abstraction which might have encouraged the Parmenidean One: op. cit. (n. 56) 188–189, 244–265. P. Feyerabend nevertheless speaks of establishing “the uniformity of the Real World, or of Being” (Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being [Chicago 1999] 15). Melissos DK 30 B 6 = D 6 LM. Diogenes DK 64 B 2 = D 3 LM.

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or unlike either another or itself”. Much more can be said about the complex unity where ‘a one’ can be ‘one and many’. Here ‘a one’ has both unity and being: “a ‘one which is’ is both one and many, both whole and parts, limited as well as indefinitely numerous”.59 In addition to the ambiguity about unity there is also a question about the divine: is God above and beyond the world? or is God immanent in the world? Already Herakleitos in a difficult fragment seems to identify God with a universe of opposites (see the opening section of chapter 5). The Stoic theory of sumpatheia, a connectedness of all things in the universe, tended toward an immanent God, but sometimes God stood over the world and unified everything from outside. On the kosmos falsely attributed to Aristotle, a treatise to which we shall pay some attention, combines Stoic immanence with Aristotelian transcendence. Antiokhos of Askalon, who might be regarded as the founder of Middle Platonism, was influenced by Stoic ideas. But within Middle Platonism Plutarch believed in a God who is far removed from the world. He stresses the uniqueness of God, but in the end admits that there is more than one god. The founder of what we know as Neoplatonism, Ploteinos, while influenced by the Stoic idea of sumpatheia, puts forward a one which is distinguished by its simplicity and its purity: it is not a multiple one, but one and only one. But the two hypostases apart from ‘one’, mind and soul, are each ‘one and many’.60

The Educated Public and Concepts of Unity The Educated Public and Concepts of Unity

Ploteinos, writing in the third century, lies beyond the period examined in this book. It must be emphasised that there is no Plato or Ploteinos among the surviving writings in Greek of the first and second century. There is no thinker who set discussion going in a fundamentally new direction – otherwise, surely, we would have heard of that thinker from later writers.61 But there is a corre-

59 Plato spells out the possibilities of ‘a one’ particularly in the dialogue named after Parmenides (quotations from 140b, 145a). See further the discussion of early Greek thought on unity at the beginning of chap. 5. 60 Unalloyed one: Ploteinos, Enneads 3.8.9–10 (τὸ ἁπλῶς ἕν), 6.2.9 (πρώτως ἕν), 6.9.5 (ἁπλοῦν δὲ τὸ ἕν). Mind and soul: 4.8.3 (οὐ γὰρ εἷς μόνος, ἀλλ᾿ εἷς καὶ πολλοί). On the Ploteinian One see n. 39 above. E.F. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria [Texts and Studies, n.s. 3] (Cambridge 1957) 17–24 provides what is still an excellent summary of the problem of the one and the many from Parmenides to Neoplatonism. Several of the examples above are taken from Osborn’s survey. 61 Some have thought such a thinker could be found among the fragments of the Middle Platonists. On them see J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (London 1977), R.J. Mortley, From Word to Silence 2 [Theophaneia, 31] (Bonn

Possible Implications

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sponding advantage in this situation. We are a little closer to the general educated public. Not too close, one might think, when one considers the high degree of rhetorical training evinced by some of the writers whose works survive. Nevertheless, we are justified in assuming that many of the ideas propounded were ‘in the air’ at the time. Ideas of unity found in the surviving writings may well have had wide discussion in the first two centuries. The examination of concepts of unity in this book begins with the local community. What was said about unity – and even more about disunity – within the Greek city, the polis? Then, broadening the horizon a little, we shall look at relations among Greek cities, especially between two neighbouring cities. Some of our writers, Dion of Prousa, Plutarch and Ailios Aristeides, were intimately concerned with the affairs of cities in Greece and in western Asia Minor. They rail against the continual disunity, against conflict both within and between Greek cities. They recommend the dissolution of conflict and the establishment of harmony. But they were conscious of the overarching power of Rome. To what extent did they see the much larger entity, the Roman empire, as a unit? Insofar as they disseminate the idea of the unity of the Roman empire, as well as promote harmony within and among Greek cities, are they in effect acting as agents for the Roman rulers? A much broader entity than Greek cities, Roman provinces or the whole empire is all humankind. Many writers seem to give verbal approval to the idea of the unity of humankind. Some exploit the idea of being citizens of the universe to strengthen their ethical or ideological recommendations. Moreover, the relation between humans and the universe is only one of a group of related ideas. Some see humans, gods and the universe as all bound up together; some see a special link between gods and humans, amounting at times to divinisation of humanity; some emphasise a connection between gods and the universe. Finally, this largest entity, the universe, calls for separate treatment because of the amount of comment on its harmony.

Possible Implications Possible Implications

The fluidity of movement between different concepts of unity in Greek thought under Roman rule reminds us that in the modern world unity movements are in step, as it were. Movements towards regional unity and towards religious unity took off in the period when the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation were being founded. While the Christian ecumenical movement may have been provoked by attempts to unite nations, ecumenists moved beyond unity between churches to support belief in the unity of humankind and 1986); L. Fladerer, Antiokhos von Askalon: Hellenist und Humanist [Grazer Beiträge Supplementbände, 7] (Graz 1996); H.A.S. Tarrant, op. cit. (n. 36).

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to explore ways of promoting the oneness of the earth. Indeed, some ecumenists had success in influencing the commitment of the UN to protecting human rights. In some cases slogans, such as ‘One World’, have taken on a life of their own. But there is also often a gap between the rhetoric about unity (political and religious) and actual practice, whether (for example) one considers ancient attempts to create regional unity or modern attempts to create Christian union (in Great Britain or the world). Consequently, historians of ideas may find interest in what ideas of unity were current in Greek thought under the Roman peace and in the extent to which unity was promoted more strongly than disunity. From the perspective of the Roman government any emphasis on harmony among Greek cities or any ‘banner-waving’ of the idea that the Roman empire was a unity was welcome. There is also the question of the transmission of ideas. It is possible for Greek thinkers to cross the boundaries of philosophical schools, so that one who is regarded as a Platonist may be closer to a so-called Stoic than to Platonists generally. After all, Epiktetos can stand aloof from the Stoics, as if he was not one of them.62 This would seem to indicate that ideas of unity were common among writers with a rhetorical or philosophical education. Some hold on this issue should be gained by an examination of Christian writings of the first two centuries. We would expect such writers to be pursuing specifically Christian interests, such as unity among Christians or the uniqueness of their own particular god. But we might find that, despite their Christian bases of thought, they share ideas of unity with their non-Christian contemporaries. In that case we would be led in the direction of a set of unity concepts that were widely shared among educated people in the Roman world of the first two centuries.

62

I explored such issues in AJP 94 (1973) 350–364. See also P. Gordon, Epicurus in Lycia: The Second-Century World of Diogenes of Oenoanda (Ann Arbor 1996) 17–18.

Chapter 2

Greek Cities Greek Cities

Pergamon, modern Bergama in north-western Turkey, nicely illustrates the fundamental change in lifestyle brought about by the Roman peace. When, in the third century B.C.E., the family of Attalos carved out a kingdom from territory that was once loosely controlled by the famous Alexander and was then subject to depredations by the Galatians and by the generals of the Seleukid kings (based in Syria), they chose the Akropolis of Pergamon for their palaces and fortified it. It was, of course, normal for Greek communities since archaic times to fortify a citadel close to their settlement and the farming land they controlled. But this hill was exceptional. It towers so high above the town below that the modern road winds up for five kilometres before reaching the entrance to the archaeological site. There was room here not only for the palaces of the Attalids but also for the civic and commercial centre and for houses.1 The measures taken to supply Pergamon with water were extraordinary for ancient times. The top of the Akropolis is 335 metres above sea level and the Agora, on a terrace a little below the palaces of the Attalid kings, some 275 metres. Water was brought from Madra Dağ, forty-five kilometres to the north, by terracotta pipes – some 240,000 sections in all – to the spurs of the mountains opposite the Akropolis. There the water chamber was 370 metres above sea level. To bring the water down to the valley floor 150 metres below and up

1

D. Magie opened his 1600–page work Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ (Princeton 1950) with a brief description of the setting of Pergamon and the establishment of the Attalid kingdom: 1.3–11. A convenient summary is given by H. Heinen in F.W. Walbank et al., The Cambridge Ancient History2 7.1 (Cambridge 1984) 426– 432 (the setting in the Plates volume [Cambridge 1984] 46, plates 57–58); a full account by E.V. Hansen, The Attalids of Pergamon2 [Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, 36] (Ithaca 1971), chapters 2–3. See also R.E. Allen, The Attalid Kingdom: A Constitutional History (Oxford 1983) 9–65, E. Kosmetatou in A. Erskine (ed.), A Companion to the Hellenistic World (Oxford 2003) 159–174 and R. Evans, A History of Pergamum: Beyond Hellenistic Kingship (London 2012), chapters 1–2. On the palaces at Pergamon see I. Nielsen, Hellenistic Palaces: Tradition and Renewal [Studies in Hellenistic Civilization, 5] (Aarhus 1994) 102–111, 268–270. Under the joint principate of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus (161– 169 C.E.) Ailios Aristeides, in a speech which I discuss below, highlighted the Akropolis of Pergamon: “what immediately strikes the eye is this Akropolis, so immense in size, radiant from afar on every approach [to the city], like some apex common to the province” (23.13).

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to the Akropolis the Attalids used lead piping capable of sustaining twenty atmospheres of pressure. The lead piping for these last three kilometres lay on the ground, but the three terracotta pipes for the remainder of the water’s journey were buried. Once they had established peace in western Asia Minor the Romans were able to dispense with such remarkable provisions for water supply in times of threat. They simply directed an aqueduct with bridges across open country to the lower town. Remains of the second century aqueduct can be seen today in the valley to the north of the Akropolis.2 The Greek polis was generally closer to a city or a town in size but until the Makedonian conquest it had the political stature of a modern country. These small, independent entities were scattered around the Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Black Sea. While those in the western part of the Roman empire (such as Massilia, modern Marseilles) became absorbed in Latin-speaking provinces, the poleis in the Balkan peninsula, on islands in the Aegean Sea, in the Roman provinces situated in what is now Turkey (such as Asia, Pontus and Bithynia, and Galatia) and indeed further east (from Syria to Arabia) remained Greek-speaking. In view of their long tradition of treasuring their distinctiveness as Hellenes, the members of these poleis needed to redefine Hellenism for the new circumstances imposed by Roman political control. Greek cities were no longer free to make alliances, go to war with one another, overthrow tyrants or constitutions in neighbouring cities, and so on. Plutarch says as much, and

2

The arrangements for the water supply of Pergamon are described briefly on explanatory boards on the site; by H. Fahlbusch in Seventeenth Congress of the International Association for Hydraulic Research: 15 August – 19 August 1977 (Baden-Baden 1977) 6.758– 762; and by G. Garbrecht in Antike Welt 9.4 (1978) 40–49. They are studied in detail in the Mitteilungen aus dem Leichtweiß-Institut für Wasserbau der Technischen Universität Braunschweig by Fahlbusch, Garbrecht, K. Hecht, G. Holtorff and others: e.g. 37 (1973), 44 (1975), 45 (1975), 54 (1977), 60 (1978), 61 (1978), 71 (1981) 135–173. See also F. Gräber and C. Schuchhardt, Altertümer von Pergamon 1.3 (Berlin 1913) 365–412 (Roman aqueduct in Abb. 7 on 387; the setting described by A. Conze in 1.2 [Berlin 1913] 148–150) and Garbrecht in Frontinus-Gesellschaft e.V., Die Wasserversorgung antiker Städte 2 [Geschichte der Wasserversorgung, 2] (Mainz 1987) 11–47. A brief introduction to the Roman conduits is supplied by W. Brinker, Seventeenth Congress (above) 6.768–771. C.P. Jones argues that the Roman aqueduct from Madra Dağ was built in the principate of Marcus Aurelius and is celebrated in speech 53 of Ailios Aristeides: AA (1991) 111–117. A.T. Hodge points out that it is too early to give definitive answers to questions such as how exactly an aqueduct worked, despite the research being done by German scholars at the Frontinus-Gesellschaft and the Leichtweiß-Institut: Roman Aqueducts and Water Supply (London 1992) 5, 18. He also stresses that aqueducts are a luxury, the result of munificence, used to supply (Roman) baths rather than provide a water supply: 5–6. The possession of several aqueducts put cities like Ephesos, Lyon and Pergamon in the major league (6), and Pergamon eventually had eight (42).

Greek Cities

43

goes on to point out that the rôle of the Greek politician is different now.3 He is also one of the sources indicating that the cities still found much to quarrel about and constantly risked intervention by provincial governors. A rough contemporary of Plutarch, the philosopher Epiktetos, in a passage to which we shall return in the next chapter, builds a point about inner sufficiency, about not letting externals affect us (apatheia), on the accepted view that peace is maintained throughout the world by the Roman Caesars. Travel by land and sea is not restricted by the activities of bandits or pirates, let alone wars.4 There was, then, an awareness among Greek intellectuals of the changed conditions in the first and second century brought about by the Roman peace. This raises a question: if (like Epiktetos) they conceived the inhabited world as united from the rising to the setting of the sun, how did they think about unity in relation to that most basic of their institutions, the polis? Did they promote harmony within their own cities, or was their desire for political influence too strong? Did they want relations between neighbouring cities to reflect the peace of the Roman empire? Could they stop rival cities from quarrelling, or did they seriously try? For readers who do not know ancient Greek, it is important that some understanding is reached of the terms used by the Greek intellectuals. So I shall look first at the language used by Greek intellectuals to describe the tensions and conflicts, as well as the terms in which unity is recommended, then at intra-city and inter-city relationships in turn. S. Mitchell noted that inter-city disputes occurred just where cities were disturbed by internal political

3

Plu. mor. 805a–b; cf. 408b–c. In his speech at Tarsos discussed later in this chapter, Dion of Prousa compares Greek cities in their disputes to fellow-slaves (homodouloi) quarrelling with one another over glory and primacy (34.51). He does not quite say the Greeks are slaves of the Romans, unlike Iosephos in Against Apion 2.125: see T. Rajak in C. Rowe and M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge 2000) 595–596. On the polis in the Hellenistic world see E.S. Gruen in R.M. Rosen and J. Farrell (eds.), Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald (Ann Arbor, MI 1993) 339–354; R.A. Billows, Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism [Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, 22] (Leiden 1995) 70–80. On the physical infrastructure see R.A. Billows in A. Erskine (ed.), A Companion to the Hellenistic World (Oxford 2003) 196–215. See, in general, A.H.M. Jones, The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian (Oxford 1940); The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces2 (Oxford 1971); G.W. Bowersock, Augustus and the Greek World (Oxford 1965), chapter 7; P. Petit, Pax Romana (London 1976); Alcock; F.G.B. Millar in M.H. Hansen (ed.), The Ancient Greek City-State: Symposium on the Occasion of the 250th Anniversary of The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, July, 1–4 1992 [Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser, 67] (Copenhagen 1993) 232–260 = Rome, the Greek World, and the East 3 (Chapel Hill, NC 2006) 106– 135. The development of a sense of Hellenic identity is studied by J.M. Hall, who argues that it did not crystallise until the fifth century B.C.E.: Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago 2002). 4 Epikt. 3.13.9–12. See chap. 3 at n. 22 for quotation and discussion.

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turbulence.5 Moreover, in some cases we have evidence from more than one orator such as Dion of Prousa and Aristeides for the same disputatious cities in the provinces of Bithynia, Asia and Cilicia. And it may be that such quarrels were typical of the Greeks of Asia Minor in both internal and external affairs. Finally, there is the question: whose interests were served by the pronouncements of the Greek intellectuals?

The Vocabulary of Harmony and its Opposites The Vocabulary of Harmony and its Opposites

Discussion concerning human relationships in the first two centuries of the common era centred around the opposite poles of homonoia (‘harmony’, ‘concord’) and stasis (‘factional conflict’, ‘strife’). Plutarch, for example, in commenting on relationships between cities, within cities and within families, draws contrasts between such terms as homonoia, philia (literally ‘friendship’), eunoia (‘goodwill’) and sumphonia (‘concord’) on the one side and such terms as stasis, ekhthra (‘enmity’), to misein (‘hatred’) and diaphora (‘dispute’, ‘difference’) on the other.6 Plutarch’s positive values are designated not only by homonoia (and the related verb homonoein) and the other terms just mentioned, but also by a wide range of other words, such as eirene (‘peace’) and eukosmia (‘good order’).7 Similarly, the negative values are denoted by such words as dikhonoia (‘discord’), erides (‘conflicts’), akosmia (‘disorder’) and anharmostia (‘disharmony’).8 There are also several terms relating to ambition and rivalry – even strife (eris) – about which Plutarch is ambivalent. Such qualities are acceptable in some circumstances but bad in others.9

5

S. Mitchell, Anatolia: Land, Men, and Gods in Asia Minor (Oxford 1993) 1.205–206. Plu. 87e, 478f–479a, 480a–b, 483d–f, 806f–807a, Cor. 35.5, Pomp. 47.3. References such as ‘87e’ are to Plutarch’s Moralia, though occasionally ‘mor.’ is inserted for the sake of clarity (as in n. 3 above). S. Morlet (see Abbreviations) studies συμφωνία and the contrasting διαφωνία in Greek literature as far as the Christian writer Origen in the third century C .E. 7 ὁμόνοια: 70b, 166e, Per. 3.2; ὁμονοεῖν: 144c; εἰρήνη καὶ ὁμόνοια: 511c, Ages. 33.4 (cf. 166e); φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη: 254a; εὐνομία καὶ εἰρήνη: Numa 20.4; φιλία καὶ ὁμόνοια: 808c; εὐκοσμία: 228c; συμφωνία: 96e (cf. Morlet 38); εὔνοια: 483a, 806e–f; φιλοφροσύνη: 504e; ὁμοφροσύνη: 816a; τὸ εὔσχημον ... καὶ τεταγμένον: 550d. Cf. εὐταξία (frequently of women’s behaviour) in 12a (Pseudo–Plutarch), 141e, 145a, 249d, κόσμιος in 503d, 778a and κοσμίως in 521c, 746d. On 249d see P.A. Stadter, Plutarch’s Historical Methods: An Analysis of the Mulierum uirtutes (Cambridge, MA 1965) 77–79. 8 στάσις: 602b, 823f–824a, Cat.min. 71.2, Ti.Gr. 20.1; στασιάζειν: Cam. 9.2; στάσις καὶ διχόνοια: 70c; διχοστασία: 788e; διχοστασία καὶ ταραχή: 20c; διαφορά: 266b, 489b, 813a; ἔριδες: 92a; ἔχθρα: 94d, 813a; ἀπέχθεια: 439c; ἀκοσμία: 609e; ἀναρμοστία: 746c. 9 See 80b (φιλοτιμία), 84c (ζηλοτυπία), 86c (φθόνος, ζῆλος, φιλονικία), 486a–b, 713e–f (ἔρις, φιλονικία), 794a (τὸ φιλόνικον), 795a–c, 819b–c, 825d–f, Alk. 41.5, Agis 2.1–3, 23.3 6

The Vocabulary of Harmony and its Opposites

45

Plutarch provides the beginnings of a general analysis of stasis and points to one specific source of stasis,10 the activities of the leading citizens.11 The evils of stasis are made clear. Private quarrels as well as rivalry over public affairs can lead to stasis and trouble a whole city; hence it is the job of a good politician to eliminate private quarrels before they become public. Moreover, in one case “terrible stasis, hard to stop” became civil war. Stasis has badly affected cities, such as Sparta and Athens, as well as individual people. No one remembers those who triumphed in stasis over famous politicians such as Thucydides, exiled by the Athenians in the fifth century, or Androtion, an historian of the fourth century B.C.E. The Athenian tyrant Peisistratos is said to have gone so far as to yield to his sons when he heard that his enemies rejoiced at the diaphora between himself and his sons.12 By contrast homonoia and associated values have advantages. Equality (isotes) does not cause stasis. Communal association (koinonia) in a city preserves its unity (henotes). Being “a single, coherent entity (hen pragma kai sunekhes)” has similar advantages for a city as unity has for an animal or an army. It is possible for a politician to unite not only people and money but also fortunes, influences and abilities and to gain a reputation for bringing about harmony (homonoein).13 A large number of examples are cited to support the desirability of homonoia. Epameinondas of Thebes united the Arkadians in a confederacy. God delays punishment so that we will learn to punish “in an orderly and harmonious fashion (en taxei kai met’ emmeleias)”. Solon of Athens so centred his speech and action on homonoia that he was chosen lawgiver to reconcile. Kimon, in the same city a century later, established homonoia with the Spartans. Aratos of Sikyon helped the Akhaians to bring the whole Peloponnese into “one body and one force”, uniting the inhabitants with homonoia and a common citizenship. T. Quinctius Flamininus as Roman proconsul travelled from city to city in Greece urging their citizens to practise eunomia (‘good governance’), abundant dike (‘justice’), homonoia and philophrosune (‘friendliness’) towards one another.14 Other examples come from the animal (φιλοτιμία of Kleomenes), Ages. 5.5 (τὸ φιλόνικον καὶ φιλότιμον). On the positive and negative aspects of φιλονικία see P.A. Stadter in G. Roskam and L. Van der Stockt (eds.), Virtues for the People: Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics (Leuven 2011) 237–255. 10 816a–b; cf. G.W. Bowersock, Augustus (n. 3) 102–103. 11 οἱ πρῶτοι: 814e–815c; cf. Oliver 953–954 and G. Salmeri in Dio Chrysostom 75. 12 246b–c (στάσις ... δεινὴ καὶ δυσκατάπαυστος), 413f (depopulation through staseis and wars), 553d, 605c–d (Thucydides and Androtion), 613e, 779a, 804a–b, 824e–825c. On the story of the Celtic women in 246b–d see P.A. Stadter, op. cit. (n. 7) 19–20, 56–57. 13 484b (attributed to Solon), 558f–559c, 618d, 819d, Sol. 12.9; cf. the use of κοινωνία in Erotikos (757c, 763f, 769f–770a). 14 194b (so 540e), 550e–f, 805d–e, Sol. 29.2, Luc. 45.4, Phil. 8.3 (cf. Arat. 24.5–6 and E. Vimercati, Aevum 79 [2005] 61–78, especially 66–69, 72–76), Flam. 12.6. On The delay in divine punishment see G. Soury, REG 58 (1945) 163–179.

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world, the political unification of the Cretans, a Skythian king, Lykourgos the legendary reformer in Sparta, Numa and Coriolanus in Rome, the Roman general Caesar in Spain, and from relations between Scipio and Polybios and Panaitios, between Sulla and Metellus Pius, and between Pompeius and Caesar.15 If we turn to a contemporary of Plutarch’s, Dion from the Greek city Prousa in Bithynia, we find much the same set of values. Homonoia appears as an ideal – for education, for choruses, for homes, clans, alliances and nations, but most frequently for cities.16 This ready movement between disparate entities is a feature we shall find repeatedly in advisers of Greek cities such as Dion and Ailios Aristeides. Dion opposes superficial achievement of homonoia within a city.17 Value is also placed on philia, eirene, eunomia and eutaxia (‘good order’) as well as on other expressions for harmony.18 Combinations of terms recur, of which the most frequent is philia and homonoia.19 This last combination is a slogan linking two uneven terms. For homonoia is itself a term embracing a wide range of concepts, including philia, reconciliation, kinship and sibling relationships.20 As with Plutarch, a strong contrast is drawn between homonoia, 15 267c, 488c, 490b, 494d–f, 511c, 814c–d, 990c, Per. 1.1, Cor. 7.4, Caes. 12.2, 23.6, Numa 26.7, Sulla 6.9, Otho 13.6. On the ‘sacred union’ of the Cretans (490b) see J. Boulogne, RPhA 22.1 (2004) 98–99. 16 Dion 13.19; 32.37; 38.5–6, 8, 10, 15; 40.16; 41.8; cf. 27.4 (ἐμμελέστερον καὶ φιλικώτερον ξυνεῖναι ἀλλήλοις); 36.21, 55; 48.7–8. On the text of Dion’s speeches on homonoia see H. van Herwerden, Mnemosyne n.s. 26 (1898) 344–359 at 346–348 and 37 (1909) 310–321 at 317–318; on their chronology, A.R.R. Sheppard, AC 53 (1984) 157–173. On the analogy between human and cosmic orders see Russell, Dio 222–223, 227, 244. For recent bibliography on Dion, ibid. 248–253; P. Desideri in R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques 2 (Paris 1994) 841–856; S. Swain in Dio Chrysostom 279–303. For a critique see B.P. Reardon, REG 96 (1983) 286–292 and B.F. Harris, ANRW 2.33.5 (Berlin 1991) 3853–3881. 17 34.17, 20, 24. The city concerned is Tarsos: see Jones, Dio chap. 9. 18 1.73–75; 3.86–118, 128–132 (cf. von Arnim 424–430, who also athetises several sections and transposes 112–127 and 128–132; D. Konstan, SO 72 [1997] 135–138; A.M. Milazzo, Dimensione retorica e realtà politica: Dione di Prusa nelle orazioni III, V, VII, VIII [Spudasmata, 115] [Hildesheim 2007] 52–53, 75); 32.37. G. Salmeri studies the transformation of eutaxia from Thucydides and Aristophanes to the time of Dion in B. Forsén and Salmeri (eds.), The Province Strikes Back: Imperial Dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean [Papers and Monographs of the Finnish Institute at Athens, 13] (Helsinki 2008) 137–155, especially 147–148 on Dion and Plutarch. συμπνεῖν: 34.19, 24; ταὐτὰ βούλεσθαι: 4.42; 39.3, 8; μία γνώμη: 39.8; κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι: 34.17. 19 ὁμόνοια καὶ εἰρήνη: 1.6; 39.2; 49.6; cf. (Pseudo-Dion) 63.2. φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη: 17.10; 36.47; 39.2. φιλία καὶ εὔνοια: 44.2; 50.3; cf. 45.3, 46.4. φιλία καὶ ὁμόνοια: 26.8; 34.45; 36.31; 38.22; 39.2, 8; 40.36–37; 41.12; 48.2, 6, 14. 20 4.42–43; 38.11, 15–16; cf. J. Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World (London 1958) 118–132 and A.R.R. Sheppard, AncSoc 15–17 (1984–1986) 229–252. On Dion’s treatment of homonoia see B. Forte, Rome and the Romans as the Greeks Saw Them [Papers and

The Vocabulary of Harmony and its Opposites

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philia, eirene, eunoia and homophrosune on the one hand, and their opposites (stasis, ekhthra, philonikia, dikhonoia and so on) on the other.21 If anything, Dion has an even more extensive range than Plutarch of nouns and corresponding verbs with which to denote evils to be avoided.22 Stasis is considered harmful for a number of reasons. It destroys everything by leading, for example, to war. Many people actually delight in acknowledged evils such as wars and factions.23 Athens and Sparta both lost the primacy in their struggle over it. Civil strife within Athens prevented its citizens from enjoying the city’s embellishments – the Propylaia, the Parthenon, the stoas, Peiraieus – and finally led to the imposition of a muzzle by outsiders, in the form of Spartan occupation.24 People divided by civil strife (hoi stasiazontes) do not even hear one another; this applies also to cities torn by quarrels and – an interesting shift to another register – choruses in discord. Strife is dangerous in a ship or chariot and in a city strips away the advantages of wealth, large population and territory, prerogatives, fame, power and magnificent public buildings.25 Although the cause of ekhthra (‘enmity’) may not be compelling, ekhthra, misos (‘hatred’), dikhophrosune (‘discord’) and so on are to be avoided for their disagreeable consequences, which affect more than the people directly engaged in enmity. Humans are worse than animals in developing hatred, which arises from the closeness of people to one another. Enmity and hatred are never beneficial; they limit strokes of good fortune and make disas-

Monographs of the American Academy in Rome, 24] (Roma 1972) 273–275; A. Bravo García, Habis 4 (1973) 81–92; Jones, Dio 83–94; S.R.F. Price, Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor (Cambridge 1984) 129–132; A.R.R. Sheppard, op. cit. 231–234, 236–239, 241–243, 249–250; G. Salmeri in Dio Chrysostom 78–81. 21 38.8, 13–15, 22, 43; 40.26, 34; 77/78.39; cf. 34.19, 44.10, 48.6. 22 The following nouns occur individually and in various combinations: ἀπέχθεια: 7.80; 34.14, 44, 51; λοιδορία: 7.80; 32.5; διαφορά: 17.10; 34.22; 40.20, 37; 48.5, 9; τραχύτης: 34.20; ταραχή: 34.21; 48.10; ζηλοτυπία: 34.49; 77/78.14; ἀμφισβητήματα: 34.51; ἀταξία: 32.73; 34.21; δυσμένεια: 40.21. See also 11.53; 32.70 (ἀπεχθῶς ... στασιαστικῶς); 34.17– 22, 43–46, 48; 36.22, 31; 38.43, 48; 39.8; 40.22–25; 41.9; 43.8; 48.4–5; ep. 1; cf. ἀκόσμως καὶ ἀνόμως (36.13). In 6.31, 22.5, 34.19, 34.43, 38.43 and 40.22 von Arnim prefers φιλονικία or φιλονικεῖν to –νεικ– of the manuscripts; this spelling is retained by G. Krapinger at 6.31: Dion Chrysostomos, Oratio 6: Text, Übersetzung, Einleitung und Kommentar [Dissertationen der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, 104] (Graz 1996) 22, 117. P.A. Stadter begins his study of φιλονικία by denying any association with νεῖκος (‘strife’), then discusses the term in earlier writers and the rather different connotations of φιλονικία in the Moralia (almost always negative) and in the Lives (a more nuanced usage): op. cit. (n. 9) 237–255. 23 38.11 (πάντα ἀπόλλυται), 14, 16–20, 25 (cf. 27). 24 34.49–51; 38.24–25, 38; 48.12–13. On the complex feelings Dion had about the Athenians see B.H. Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton 2004) 394– 395; K. Jazdzewska, CPh 110 (2015) 252–268. 25 39.4–7; 48.9.

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ters worse. The very presence of an enemy creates problems; even a weak enemy can harm.26 Stasis and diaphora (‘discord’) involve saying and hearing many distasteful things. Eris (‘strife’) in humans is like a disease in that it is more difficult to eliminate if nurtured for a lengthy period.27 In the case of Dion’s native province of Bithynia stasis offers tyrannical power to the proconsular governors, who treat the cities like children, and creates the danger that the governors will determine the primacy. Strife is unprofitable even for a very great city quarrelling with the humblest of villages. It is thus ridiculous for Prousa to direct its hostility against Apameia, a large city with a special form of government and with prestige and influence with the proconsuls. Indeed the ties of kinship, marriage and citizenship between the two cities make the wrangling of such close neighbours seem like stasis in one city (mia polis) – and stasis should not even be mentioned.28 By contrast, homonoia is said to have worthwhile advantages. By showing that “harmony in general (he homonoia he katholou)” is beneficial for all humankind, Dion hopes to establish its benefits for individuals and, especially, for cities. As already indicated, he claims that it is a beautiful possession for homes, clans, alliances, cities and nations. It is advantageous in ships, households, chariots, human bodies and marriages.29 Homonoia keeps the universe united and is discerned among animals and among gods. The gods teach homonoia by signs; Zeus is peaceful and gentle, the kind of god to watch over a Greece not riddled by stasis and living in homonoia. The gods are likely to make it their first concern that homonoia will endure.30 Greece prospered while the cities were on friendly terms with one another. It is not only historians who agree on this point; not even the sophists break the universal agreement that homonoia is noble and salutary. For it has never damaged those who employ it; indeed, friends provide material assistance.31 Within a city homonoia gives more strength than buildings, territory or large populations; these items are 26

40.25, 31–34, 40–41; 41.11–12, 14; 44.10. 40.26; 41.9. 28 38.34–37; 40.16, 22, 27; 48.16. 29 38.5–6, 8 (τῆς ὁμόνοιας τῆς καθόλου), 14–15, 29, 48; 39.5–7; 40.16, 26; 41.12–13; 48.7, 9, 14. 30 12.74 (ἀστασιάστου καὶ ὁμονοούσης ῾Ελλάδος); 36.22; 38.11, 17–18, 51; 39.2, 4; 40.35–41; 48.15–16. On the technical use of examples in Greek rhetoric, especially with respect to the promotion of homonoia, see Jaeger 13–14, 113–114 n. 3 and M.M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians [Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie, 28] (Tübingen 1991) 39–42, 63–64, 103 and n. 228, 130–133. More generally on the use of examples see K. Berger, ANRW 2.25.2 (Berlin 1984) 1145–1148, H. Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study (Leiden 1998) 196–203 and T. Penner and C. Vander Stichele in E. Gunderson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric (Cambridge 2009) 249–250, 257. 31 34.50; 38.10; 40.26; 41.12–14; cf. 11.130. 27

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only useful to a city with homonoia. United policies and a single heart and mind give pleasure to people who speak the same language, dress alike and are fellow citizens.32 If two Bithynian cities establish harmonious relations, they will increase their power, share people, benefactors and honours, double the resources available to each city, gain the admiration accorded to brothers who share an estate, and negotiate with the proconsuls from a position of great strength. Even for a superior city dealing with an inferior one, homonoia is the best policy, as the example of Rome shows.33 About two generations later, Ailios Aristeides, another Greek politician from north-western Asia Minor, proclaims the same ideas and even the same examples. Homonoia in a general sense and its opposites, such as eris, appear as subjects in Aristeides’ works.34 The most detailed discussions occur in the speech aimed particularly at Pergamon, Smyrna and Ephesos at the koinon (general assembly) of the province of Asia (23) and that delivered to Rhodes (24). Aristeides urges on the Asian cities the choice of homonoia.35 He tells them, and the citizens of Rhodes, to have a united policy;36 mia gnome (‘one purpose’, ‘a single mind’), seen already in Dion, almost becomes a slogan.37 Harmonia is also recommended.38 Aristeides points out the advantages of homonoia, philia and harmonia and the evils of stasis, eris, philonikia (‘contentiousness’) and the like.39 Homonoia enables a city to praise others and hear its own affairs praised. For both individual cities and whole nations philia and homonoia are the cause of great benefits and stasis of the grossest evils.40 Greek history shows this divergence: for example, Sparta and Athens combined in homonoia to defeat the Persians, thus gaining common benefits; when not struggling over hegemony the Greeks gained freedom. Aristeides sums it up in another context, his speech In defence of the four (Miltiades, Themistokles, Perikles and Kimon, 32

39.3–5, 7–8. 38.34–38, 41–45; 41.8–10; cf. 39.4, 48.7, Palm 24–25 and Nörr2 48–49, 90. 34 Homonoia in the inscriptions to speeches 23 and 24; also in 23.6, 24.4, 41; cf. 23.71. Eris: 23.1; 24.13. Stasis: 24.41. For Aristeides’ birth place see C.A. Behr, ANRW 2.34.2 (Berlin 1994) 1140–1233 at 1151–1155. For bibliography see ibid. 1224–1233 and L. Pernot in R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques 1 (Paris 1989) 358–366. 35 For example, in 23.30. On this speech see Boulanger 376–381, Behr 104–105 and Swain 288–292. 36 ταὐτὰ φρονεῖν occurs, with variations, in 23.31, 42 (linked with μίαν γνώμην), 43 and in 24.6, 8, 29, 38, 49. 37 μία γνώμη: 23.31, 34, 42, 76–77; 24.6, 14, 37; cf. n. 18 on Dion. The use in the dative, “with one accord”, has a history stretching back at least to Thucydides (1.122.2, 6.17.4). 38 23.75–76; cf. the criticism of the Spartan harmosts (military governors) as anharmostoi (the regulators as ‘unregulated’) and the praise of the Roman army (impeccable harmonia) in 26.49, 84. 39 For the contrast see 23.42–55, 67, 72–73; 24.4, 10, 26, 47–48, 51. 40 Praise: 23.29. Benefits and evils: 23.53. 33

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criticised in Plato’s Gorgias): “let us not imitate ... the Greek evil of having factional conflicts over leadership”.41 If safety of a single house depends on harmony, much more is this true of a city, where it is also more difficult to discover a remedy for conflict. Everyone prefers to associate with a person who is as concordant (homonoein) with himself or herself as possible. Harmony in both houses and cities is achieved by generosity on the part of the powerful.42 The gods consider homonoia best for cities. No one prefers stasis to homonoia, though war is sometimes preferable to peace.43 Sparta, when ordered by the Lykourgan system, rose from a position of being no better than its neighbours to leadership of the Greeks. The Athenians, when they had put aside the tyrants and stasis among themselves, were able to free the Greeks and assume leadership of them. The Athenians later regained leadership when they chose to live in harmony (homonoein) and put the common safety of the city before private complaints.44 One can hardly dispute the stupidity of destroying the common body of the city by stasis instead of being in agreement. The introduction of homonoia avoids the consequences of earlier conflict. Many benefits – adornment of the countryside with farming, successful raising of children, reception of guests, even council chambers – are attributed to homonoia. Odysseus’ companions were saved when they listened to the best advice and were in harmony (homonoein), but destroyed when they differed. The Roman empire is secured by the harmonia of the soldiers. Humans please the gods by leading their cities in eunomia (‘good governance’) and homonoia.45 On the other hand, stasis and similar terms are deplored by Aristeides. Eris and philonikia appear as unmitigated evils. Tarakhai (‘disturbances’) also are a calamity.46 Strife begins with the tiniest matters, such as rivalry over primacy,

41

23.42–51, 61. Summary in 3.693: μηδὲ τοῦτό γε ἕν, κακὸν ῾Ελληνικὸν, μιμώμεθα, στασιάζοντες περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας. If Keil is right in deleting τῆς ὁμονοίας in 23.50 as a gloss, it is interesting that its originator used it to explain τοῦ σωφρονεῖν. Plutarch has concerns over the ἡγεμονία of the Romans: M. Sartre in Ruling the Greek World 162, 167–170. 42 24.8–11, 32–35. 43 24.17, 19. 44 24.24–26. The Argives are taken as an example in 24.27 and the Rhodians are urged to learn from these examples in Greek history in 24.28–29. The Rhodians were expected both to follow and to set an example: J.M. Cortés Copete in Ælius Aristide écrivain 201–203. Unfortunately for our interests, Cortés Copete is mainly interested in or. 24 as support for the authenticity of or. 25 (and on 178 the quotation attributed to or. 24 is actually from or. 25). 45 Stupidity of stasis: 24.38–39. Morlet 239 n. 8 points out that the image of the body of Pentheus being torn apart is also used by Noumenios (fr. 24 Des Places) and Attikos (fr. 1 Des Places) in the same era. Introduction of homonoia: 24.40 (cf. 45). Benefits of homonoia: 24.42. Companions of Odysseus: 24.51. Harmonia of the Roman empire: 26.84–85. Divine incentive: 24.47–48. 46 Stasis, eris and philonikia: 23.28, 38, 40; 26.20, 69, 97. Tarakhe: 24.3; 26.69, 89, 103.

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but grows into the cause of all evils.47 Stasis has disastrous, enervating effects; it is made worse by struggles for primacy; it brings slander instead of praise; it causes fear, hubris, foolishness and all other evils combined.48 Rivalry among Sparta, Athens and Thebes – their having nothing in common – led to defeat and degradation.49 Stasis destroys the benefits of peace and worsens the bad effects of war. Even war is preferable to stasis, for war makes others suffer, but stasis makes all those engaged in it suffer.50 Tyranny is more moderate than stasis, for one person harming a city is less weighty than all combined doing so; no constitution can be established or maintained by stasis.51 Consideration of Greek history shows that stasis is a threat both to each individual city and to the common affairs of the Greeks.52 As stasis is unsafe in a ship, so it causes people joined closely (sunzeugnunai) to destroy one another; in the case of Lesbos, people who surpassed the Greeks in harmonious music are in danger of being left inferior to all humankind.53 Stasis can be called the chief of humiliations and disasters; of all human things it is the least circumscribed by boundaries.54

Harmony within Greek Cities Harmony within Greek Cities

A great deal of the above discussion seems airy-fairy to modern western minds. How practical are these authors in dealing with actual disputes in Greek cities? Plutarch can be seen as reasonably practical in another area of human relationships – that of homonoia between brothers, which Plutarch recommends. (One need scarcely consider relations between brothers and sisters, given the maledominated nature of Plutarch’s society. There were, of course, exceptions: in an earlier period, the mother of the notorious Gracchi brothers disputed somewhat ineffectually with her cousin, but she was the daughter of the Scipio who had defeated Hannibal at Zama; more recently, the wife of Augustus had considerable influence, but the uniqueness of her position is indicated by Augustus’ possession of as much wealth as that of the three hundred senators put together). Plutarch is sufficiently down-to-earth to perceive that if brothers violate “that which is in accordance with nature (to kata phusin)” there must be serious reasons and that reconciliation will therefore be difficult. He does make a number of practical suggestions: share with your brother the brunt of your 47

23.12, 40, 58. 23.31–32, 38, 40–41, 53; 24.36, 41. 49 23.49–51. 50 23.54–57 (cf. 35); 24.18–19. 51 24.20; cf. Plato, Laws 4.710d–e. 52 24.24–29. 53 24.54–55. 54 23.57–58. 48

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father’s anger; take care in dividing the father’s goods; share honours with your brother, letting him appear better in some respects; share friends and enemies with your brother; give due honour to your brother ahead of a friend.55 With reference to social intercourse in general, Plutarch says that philia arises from pleasant conversation and lack of concern about one’s position. In that great arena of élite male gathering, the sumposion, the qualities of congeniality and harmony (homalotes kai sumphonia) are obviously valued; but Plutarch does not make it clear whether they are brought about by brilliant chairing or by generosity with wine.56 In his essay Political advice Plutarch lists the greatest blessings for cities. He says that as far as peace is concerned, communities do not need statesmanship (politike) in his time – the Roman rulers have imposed peace. Of freedom the communities have as much as the Romans allow. Good harvests, population increase and so on are to be sought from the gods, not humans. There remains for the statesman (politikos) the task of instilling homonoia and philia in those who live with him and of removing disputes, disagreements and all enmity (erides kai dikhophrosunai kai dusmeneia hapasa). Plutarch’s practical advice is the same as for quarrels among friends: the statesman should talk to those who feel more greatly injured and try to persuade them that by concessions in small matters they will gain overall (by having homonoia). Then he will try to instruct people individually and together about the weak state of Greek affairs, pointing out the advantages of living in peace and quiet and homonoia. Moreover, it is the task of the statesman also to pre-empt private quarrels or to remedy them before they extend to public matters. Again the method suggested is education. The statesman should notice himself and point out to others that private differences lead to public ones and small differences to great ones, if

55 Recommendation of homonoia and homophrosune between brothers: 478f–479c, 480b–c, 490d–f; extended to other members of the family in 481a, Demetr. 3.2. Reconciliation difficult: 481c. Practical suggestions: 481f–491b. Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi: Polybios 31.26.1–31.28.11; Valerius Maximus 4.4 Praef.; Plu. Ti.Gr. 8.7. Livia, wife of Augustus: according to the figures in the Appendix to the Index the total of public gifts by Augustus would have provided the necessary property qualifications for eight generations of 300 Roman senators. E.A. Judge calculates that the disbursements alone of Augustus “probably exceeded the capital value of all other senators put together by at least twice”: The First Christians in the Roman World: Augustan and New Testament Essays [WUNT, 229] (Tübingen 2008) 240. 56 Philia: 616e–617a, 621d. Role of the sumposiarkhes: cf. 156c, 504e, 620e–f (εἰς ὁμαλότητα καὶ συμφωνίαν). On the symposion in the ancient world see O. Murray (ed.), Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion (Oxford 1990) and W.J. Slater (ed.), Dining in a Classical Context (Ann Arbor, MI 1991). On the social uses of alcohol (especially in the creation of a warrior élite) in the ancient world, see Murray’s paper in Slater’s collection, 83–92.

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they are not treated.57 These proposals are certainly specific. But they are also unrealistic. One cannot expect people who have engaged in stasis for self-interested motives to abandon their side of the struggle for purely altruistic reasons. Such people require more concrete incentives. As with attempts to reduce the number of guns in private possession in twenty-first-century America, education by itself was unlikely to prove the solution to stasis in Plutarch’s world. Similarly unrealistic is the moral of the story about Herakleitos’ response to the request from his fellow citizens to put forward an opinion “on homonoia”. He mounted the rostrum but said nothing; instead he took a cup of cold water, sprinkled it on barley meal, stirred in pennyroyal, drank it, and left. One cannot expect everyone to be satisfied with what they have, as Herakleitos was, in order that cities might enjoy eirene and homonoia.58 To find Plutarch unrealistic in his advice about homonoia in city life is a serious criticism, since the point of his anecdotes about Gorgias and Philip is precisely that they have failed to achieve homonoia although they talk about it. Gorgias read to the Greeks at Olympia a speech on homonoia, but could not persuade the three members of his household (himself, his wife and a female slave) to live in harmony (homonoein); and Philip inquired about the homonoia of the Greeks when he was in a state of stasis and dikhonoia (‘discord’) with his wife and son.59 Plutarch’s thought on social relationships is further illuminated by his comments on koinonia and on the common good. Koinonia applies at many levels of social contact. Not only is there koinonia in love and marriage, but it is also necessary to know how to get on with one’s fellows in order to experience

57 824c–825f; cf. 809e, 815b, Renoirte 54–55, Palm 38–39 and Nörr2 40–42. One gets a rather different view of Plutarch’s advice if one concentrates on the opening section (798a– 806b) of Political advice, as M. Beck does in L. de Blois et al. (eds.), The Statesman in Plutarch’s Works: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of the International Plutarch Society, Nijmegen/Castle Hernen, May 1–5, 2002 [Mnemosyne Supplements, 250] (Leiden 2004–2005) 1.105–114 at 107–108, 112. I have used the word ‘statesman’ and followed it with ‘he’, ‘his’ and ‘himself’ in this paragraph not only because political leaders were all male in Plutarch’s world but also because non–sexist language seems not yet to have invented a replacement for ‘statesman’. Readers will discern in this book a degree of cynicism about ‘politicians’, so that word seems inappropriate here. Oscillation between ‘statesman’ and ‘politician’ is seen in several essays in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), The Unity of Plutarch’s Work: ‘Moralia’ Themes in the ‘Lives’, Features of the ‘Lives’ in the ‘Moralia’ [Millennium-Studien, 19] (Berlin 2008), for example those by L. de Blois (317–324) and G. Roskam (325–337). Successive essays in Part Two ‘Plutarch’s Presentation of Statesmen’ of The Statesman in Plutarch’s Works 1 (above) are entitled ‘How to Present a Statesman?’ (H.G. Ingenkamp) and ‘Do Plutarch’s Politicians Never Learn?’ (C.B.R. Pelling). 58 511b–c. 59 70b–c, 144b–c = P 20 Laks/Most. Gorgias’ speech: DK 82 A 1.4, A 7, B 7–8 = D 27, P 15, D 31–32 Laks/Most.

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koinonia in a household, city, board of officials, or way of life.60 Koinonia among all people, including people of different races, is clearly an ideal, but the examples of Alexander in joining a hundred Makedonians and Greeks in marriage to a hundred Persian brides and of Romulus in kidnapping eight hundred Sabine women and distributing them among the best of the Roman citizens can rarely be repeated (even in such imperialistic societies).61 Nor is there any practical method to be deduced from koinonia between gods and humans, harmonia and koinonia in the physical world or the koinoniai and companionships of the animal world.62 These examples can only be inspirational to koinonia. In fact, the only specific advice is that of sharing meals and, in the case of marriage, sharing concern and possessions.63 Nor is Plutarch more practical with his discussion of koinonia in the political sphere, where the word is used of political associations or co-operation in government and of the coalition between Pompeius and Caesar. Terms such as ta koina are general ones referring to public affairs.64 Plutarch writes with personal interest on The involvement of the elderly in public affairs.65 He wants activity as well as speech from elderly politicians, since taking part in public affairs (to politeuesthai or politeia) is a way of life for a social animal that lives in a polis (politikon kai koinonikon zoon). He does say that the old men should keep silent in assembly except when the common safety or the welfare of the city is concerned. But the specific advantages Plutarch attributes to the old man in public affairs – reason, judgment, frankness, wisdom – depend more on the particular personality of the man than on his long experience.66 For citizens in general Plutarch expresses a

60 Koinonia in connection with love and marriage: 138b, 439e, 752c, 757c (τὸ κοινωνικόν), 763f, 769f–770a, 770c, Alex. 47.8, Numa 25.1; cf. συμβίωσις, συμβιοῦν in 141b, 142f, fr. incerta pp. 151.16–152.7 Bernadakis = 204 Sandbach. Other contexts: 439d– e, 558f–559c. 61 Humankind: 330e, 1129b. Alexander: 329d–f. Romulus: Rom. 35.2. 62 Gods and humans: 415a; see further the fourth section of chap. 5. Physical world: 626c, 926f–927a, 946e–f, 951d; cf. κοίνωσις in 430e. Animal world: 96d–e, 979f–980a, 981b (also using φιλίαι, συμβιώσεις and συμπεριφοραί). The greatest of τὰ κοινωνικά are generation and procreation (981c). 63 Meals: 643b, 697c; cf. 707c, 726e. Concern and possessions: 140e–f (συμπαθεῖν, εὔνοια), 271e, 608c (κοινωνεῖν; cf. the occurrences in 104c, 108c–d, 478f–479a, 679c–d). 64 Political koinonia: 787e, 812d. Pompeius and Caesar: Pomp. 70.7. τὰ κοινά: e.g. 812b, Cat.ma. 11.4. τὰ κοινὰ πράσσειν (involvement in public affairs): e.g. 465f, 777f, 1127e, Cicero 4.3. Other terms of interest are πραγματεία (604d), τὰ πράγματα (779b), πολυπραγμονεῖν (817d), ἀπραγμοσύνη (604c); cf. 1043a–b (ἰδιοπράγμων, ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνη, etc.). 65 783c, 794a, 796a; cf. Cat.ma. 24.11. On the sources for the essay εἰ πρεσβυτέρῳ πολιτευτέον see C.W. Fornara, Philologus 110 (1966) 119–127; in general, cf. Renoirte 35– 36. 66 791b–c, 794d, 797e; cf. Nörr2 77.

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duty in “the social and political (to koinonikon kai politikon)”, refers to Persuasion as “the assistant of political and social life (politikes kai koinonetikes sunergos)” and asserts that there is a similarity between taking part in government (to politeuesthai) and philosophising (to philosophein): political activity (politeia), like philosophia, should permeate all one’s activities; a foolish man, although he goes through the motions of holding office and so on, does not act in a statesmanlike way, but merely delivers harangues and stirs up stasis; the person who is koinonikos, humane, patriotic, caring and genuinely politikos is always acting in a statesmanlike way and has a genuine interest in public affairs (ta koina). Plutarch also says that the humane (to philanthropikon) and the social (to koinonikon) will waste away from lack of practice.67 Elsewhere the good life is portrayed as living in a social, moderate and just manner, one loyal to friends. Similarly the common welfare is, in Plutarch’s thought, to be valued. Various historical figures are represented as acting for the common good. But the only specific advice Plutarch gives is a piece of subterfuge in which politicians pretend to be persuaded by the common good.68 In the sphere of koinonia and the common welfare it is fairly clear what Plutarch’s ideals are. What he fails to indicate are the particular actions which can be taken to accomplish the ideals. Plutarch’s contemporary, Dion of Prousa, is similarly not very practical in his general advice. There is not much guidance in the statement that philia and eirene come from respect for equality, and downright discouragement in the view (perhaps not endorsed by Dion) that the partnership of humans in the universe is of no assistance in achieving homonoia.69 But Dion comes down to earth more in speeches dealing with specific cases of stasis. In his second speech to the Tarsians he accepts the claim of Tarsos to be the leading city in the Roman province of Cilicia and a metropolis. He would disregard the foolish rivalry of Aigaiai and the envy of Tarsos engendered in other cities by Aigaiai, as well as the enmity of Mallos, were it not for the similar (hostile) disposition of Soloi and Adana. Unfortunately, his advice to Tarsos is very general: forgive the people of Mallos and be generous in your leadership of the other cities. He does urge the Tarsians to yield whatever is reasonable in their boundary dispute with Mallos, pointing out somewhat sarcastically that sand dunes and marshy

67

746a, 783e–f, 792d–e, 796d–f. κοινωνικῶς ζῆν καὶ φιλικῶς καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως: 1108c; cf. 980a, 1124e (ἄμικτος ... ὁ βίος). The common welfare is expressed by such terms as τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ κοινόν. For the value placed on it see 618b–c, 644c, 779a, 817c–d, Sol. 20.1. Historical figures: 809d–e, 1068e–f, Brut. 56.8, Arat. 31.2. Pretending to be persuaded: 813b. 69 Dion 17.10; 74.26; the latter passage contrasts with other passages in which inspiration for civic harmony is seen in the universe. On φιλοτιμία or πλεονεξία as the worst of daimones in or. 17 see E. Alexiou, RhM 156 (2013) 47–73. 68

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land are involved. But his appeal is largely to magnanimity.70 On the dispute with the general (strategos), perhaps a single official appointed by Rome (as distinct from the boards in the provinces of Asia and Bithynia), Dion’s only advice is restraint but not submission: prosecute an official if there is a genuine grievance, but otherwise do not annoy him.71 Relations within Tarsos, according to Dion, do not justify the claim of harmony, despite the temporary settlement of the disease of discord. There is disagreement between council and assembly and within these two institutions, between the associations known as “the old” and “the young”, and between private citizens, but Dion merely suggests that unity will be achieved if envy, greed and selfishness are eliminated: It is not possible ever to achieve unity (sumpnein) and choose the same policy otherwise than by being released from the evils that move and disturb people – envy, greed, contentiousness, the situation where all seek to promote their individual welfare and neglect their native land and the common interest (to koinei sumpheron).

However, he does have a concrete proposal in the case of the ‘linen-workers’, who are apparently citizens in some sense but without a vote in Tarsos. He diagnoses the circumstances whereby they are forced to stand aloof from the common interest as a cause of stasis and suggests that they all be registered as citizens and that a change be made in the timocratic qualifications for the franchise at Tarsos.72 This proposal, while not threatening the traditional control of 70 34.7, 10–11, 14, 27, 43–48; cf. 33.51, Nörr2 48–52 and A. Heller, CCG 10 (1999) 235– 254 at 244–248. For the title ‘metropolis’ see Magie 1.636–637 and Jones, Dio 74–75; cf. n. 88 below. 71 34.15, 27, 38–42; on strategoi in the cities of Asia Minor see Magie 2.1508–1509 n. 36. Jones, Dio 76–77 takes the strategos to be the provincial governor of Cilicia. However, as his own text makes clear, the references to prosecution are to more than one governor, and for these the term is the plural hegemones (34.9, 40, 42). Strategos occurs in 34.15, 27 and 38 (33.17–18 discuss Arkhilokhos’ general [fr. 114 West], on which see P.G. Toohey, Eranos 86 [1988] 1–14 and C. Bost–Pouderon, REA 105 [2003] 164–166), but never in the plural in the Tarsian speeches, contrary to the impression given by Jones. So it could refer to an official appointed by Rome. For the replacement of στρατηγός by ἡγεμών as the term for the provincial governor in the early second century see H.J. Mason, Greek Terms for Roman Institutions: A Lexicon and Analysis [American Studies in Papyrology, 13] (Toronto 1974) 145, 149 and 158. The term prutanis (34.42; cf. τὸν πρυτανεύοντα in 34.36) seems to refer to a local official; cf. A.H.M. Jones, The Greek City (n. 3) 47, 311 n. 62. 72 The claim of harmony uses such verbs as ὁμονοεῖν (34.17, 20) and συμπνεῖν (34.24). Treatment of disagreements: 34.16–24, 27, 42 (quotation from 34.19; cf. von Arnim 504– 505). Treatment of ‘linen–workers’: 34.21–23. On this speech see von Arnim 460–463, 491; Magie 1.599–600; SEHRE2 1.178–179, 2.587 n. 18, 2.620 n. 43; C.B. Welles, MUB 38 (1962) [= Mélanges offerts au Père René Mouterde, 2] 41–75, especially 44, 69–75; L. Robert, BCH 101 (1977) 88–132 at 127–128; Jones, Dio 71–72, 76–82; Desideri 423–430; B.F. Harris, ANRW 2.33.5 (Berlin 1991) 3871–3872 (also his thesis The Moral and Political Ideas of Dio Chrysostom with Special Reference to the Bithynian Speeches [Auckland 1966] 199– 204, 272–273, 277–278); A. Heller, op. cit. (n. 70) 237–239, 242–248; G. Salmeri in Dio

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the council, was a bold one for which Dion should be congratulated. By contrast, there is a marked lack of concrete proposals in Dion’s speech to a city in his native province of Bithynia, Nikaia, where the internal stasis was very real. All Dion does in that case is point out and magnify the advantages of homonoia and seek to impress on the Nikaians the desire of the gods for homonoia.73 Dion’s speech to the Alexandrians has been categorised as an exercise in “practical protreptic”. But Dion devotes much more attention to criticism than to conciliation in this speech, while one looks in vain for recommendation of positive steps to end the conflict.74 Dion was also involved in the internal politics of Prousa. Speaking to his fellow citizens shortly after his exile, when some honours were proposed for him, he compliments his native city somewhat excessively (to our taste), but takes the opportunity to warn his fellow citizens about their social or political turmoil. Prousa had quite specific aspirations, about which he gives no advice, apart from seeking to turn aside the citizens’ desire for the status of ciuitas libera (a non-taxpaying community in the Roman empire) by despising the freedom (eleutheria) which is a rather nominal gift from the Roman government and commending the true freedom which is derived from oneself. He makes the point that self-improvement is available by eutaxia (good order, orderly behaviour), represents a stable city free from uproar as an ideal of Hellenism, and attributes the greatness and distinction of Sparta and Athens to their orderly political behaviour (to kosmios politeuesthai).75 But he does not tell Chrysostom 75–76 with n. 112; C. Bost Pouderon, Dion Chrysostome: Trois discours aux villes (Orr 33–35) [Cardo, 4–5] (Salerno 2006) 1.151–170. 73 39.2–8; cf. 38.51 on the gods and homonoia. B.F. Harris (Moral and Political Ideas [n. 72] 150–151) makes the point that the eulogy of homonoia may be artificial, but the occasion of internal stasis was real enough. Nikaia was a Hellenistic foundation – its original name lasted a decade or less before Lysimakhos conquered it and re-named it after his wife – at the eastern end of an attractive lake. It owes much of its fame to the two Christian Councils held there in the early fourth and late eighth centuries. The five-kilometre circuit of the city wall is unbroken today apart from a few holes, but this wall is due largely to the choice of Nikaia as capital by Theodoros Laskaris when Constantinople was captured by the Latins of the Fourth Crusade in 1204 (Robert de Clari, Conquête 79 §79 Lauer). Strabon gave the length of the wall as (the equivalent of) three kilometres (12.4.7, 565C). 74 M.B. Trapp on or. 32 in D. Innes et al. (eds.), Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday (Oxford 1995) 163–175. “Practical protreptic”: 167; but note Trapp’s use of terms such as “censure” (171), “mocks” (171), “until they mend their ways” (172), “direct attack and more oblique disparagement” (172), “challenge and criticism” (174). 75 44.9–12. While Dion does mention the interest of individual notables in their personal behaviour and reputation, which G. Salmeri with his emphasis on the shift towards interiority illustrates largely from inscriptions (op. cit. [n. 18] 146–149, 151), Dion does promote eutaxia in this speech as a communal value (compare your community with οἱ ἄλλοι δῆμοι, 10), as indeed Salmeri shows in the Alexandrian and the two Tarsian speeches (or. 32–34; ibid. 149–150). On turmoil in Prousa compare the occasion of speech 46 (a riot over the

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Prousa how to achieve this ideal harmony. Some years later he defended his conduct with respect to his native city, referring to the concessions he had won from Trajan. He alludes to social divisions in the city and expresses his opposition to political activity by means of hetaireiai (social clubs with political interests), apparently on the ground that they tended to split a city into factions.76 But it is unrealistic not to expect people to seek their political objectives by whatever means they find most effective. The same speech expresses Dion’s desire for a sunoikismos, a political unification, not only of the district surrounding Prousa but also embracing other cities as well; Prousa would be head of this larger political community. While the modern city (Bursa) flourishes as the third largest in Turkey, and has a striking setting at the foot of Mount Olympos, Dion seems to forget the concern of other cities for their prestige and privileges. He hopes to bring together as many people as possible and actually to compel (anankazdein) other cities to join. He admits that it can be called a childish or foolish desire (eros). His models – Epameinondas uniting Boiotia with Thebes, Theseus uniting Attike with Athens, the Mytilenaians bringing all of Lesbos together into one city – demonstrate how unrealistic his proposal is, for in each case the leading city was very strong and could offer advantages such as civic rights and security to those who gave the leading city their allegiance.77 Dion does, however, offer some proposals which are both practical and realistic in another speech to the assembly of Prousa a few years later. There are indications of grievances against the upper classes. Dion calls for a united front of philia towards one another and homonoia in the newly restored assembly, particularly during the visit of the proconsul Varenus Rufus. The matters of contention should be deferred. Dion sees his task as a philosopher to be one of producing an harmonious city (homonoousan polin). He tries to shame the citizens of Prousa over their dissension and quarrelling. His discussion of celestial

price of grain during the last years of Vespasian; cf. n. 87 below); for unrealistic praise of Prousa compare 48.4 and 51.3. Speech 44 may be dated to 97 C.E.: see A.R.R. Sheppard, AC 53 (1984) 157–173 at 160–162, 172; cf. Jones, Dio 139 and Desideri 264. 76 45.3–10 (cf. von Arnim 337, 374). Dion claims on another occasion that he does not rely on any hetaireia (50.3). For Trajan’s concern with collegia and hetaeriae (ἑταιρεῖαι) in Bithynia, see Pliny the younger, Letters 10.34.1 and 10.96.7. On Trajan and Dion, see below at n. 99. 77 45.13–14. Cf. von Arnim 341–343; SEHRE2 1.257, 2.654–655 n. 4; Nörr2 50 and n. 50. E.L. Bowie notes that Philostratos (VS 1.25.539) does not identify Dion by the relatively undistinguished city of Prousa, but by the province Bithynia: in B.E. Borg (ed.), Paideia: The World of the Second Sophistic [Millennium-Studien, 2] (Berlin 2004) 68; however, in the entry on Dion himself, Philostratos begins Δίωνα δὲ τὸν Προυσαῖον … (1.7.486). On the sunoikismos attributed to Theseus see my Athenian Politics c.800–500 B.C. (London 1990) 12–16.

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bodies, bees and ants can serve only as inspiration to homonoia and philia.78 He asks that all the citizens be included in the praise offered by the assembly for the achievement to date with the uncompleted building project. It would have been justifiable for him to say that the citizens blame themselves when they criticise the council and leaders, if the latter had all been elected. But Dion assumes that they were the wealthier, “better” and more useful citizens. His point about blaming themselves may have helped to take the sting out of the dispute; he goes on to suggest a method of approach for recovering the public money which apparently found its way into private pockets. Dion personally provided some working capital by paying his fee as a councillor when it had not been requested and by gaining from the emperor approval for a revision in Prousa’s financial administration – a step which had augmented revenue. This, of course, was only a temporary means of halting the stasis. But he does suggest that negotiations take place in public, and the use of various officials in solving the dispute.79 In this case Dion makes some specific proposals which had a genuine prospect of achieving homonoia. In or about 149 C.E. Ailios Aristeides spoke about stasis among various social classes in the city of Rhodes over the repayment of borrowed money. The Rhodians ran the risk of losing the democracy, of which they were so proud, to a more direct form of control by Rome.80 Aristeides acknowledges the Rhodians’ fondness for listening, but urges them to go beyond that and apply his advice by employing unity of purpose (mia gnome) in their own affairs in future; they should cease their factious behaviour to one another. He describes Solon’s actions in mixing the common people of Athens with the influential so that both might live in the city with mia gnome, neither being too strong for the common good. But the example has very limited application: precisely what should the Rhodians do when they have not a mediator with extraordinary powers to change the constitution but rulers who have imposed their control on the city?81 Aristeides readily admits that it is not very difficult to show that stasis 78

48.1–6, 14–16. On bees and ants see also 4.62–63; 40.32, 40; 44.7. On Varenus Rufus see Magie 1.601–602, 2.1458 n. 18; Desideri 264–265, 270–272, 393–398; B.F. Harris, ANRW 2.7.2 (Berlin 1980) 884–885. 79 48.3, 9–11, 17. The forceful comparison with Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 48.13 suggests that in Prousa similarly some had been arbitrarily introduced into the Council and others driven out; cf. Magie 1.640–641. 80 Arstd. 24.8–10, 22, 29 (τοῖς ἐφ᾿ ὑμᾶς δανεισαμένοις), 32–40 (class conflict in 32, 34), 52; Boulanger 374–376; Behr 73–74; R. Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice (Farnham 2009) 159. Rhodes’ ‘apparent liberty’ (τῆς δοκούσης ταύτης ἐλευθερίας, 24.22) had twice been revoked in the previous century: see n. 104 below. 81 Application of advice: 24.5–7. Example of Solon: 24.14. For Solon’s power to change the constitution see Athenian Politics (n. 77) 34–38, with commentary on the verses to which Aristeides refers (fr. 5 West) at 44–45. For the reality of Rome’s intervention by force see below at n. 104 and F. Fontanella in Ruling the Greek World 172–175.

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is the worst of evils; the real task is to show how to get rid of stasis. Yet all he can say is that the Rhodians are weakened by desperation and divisions and that they should put away anger and strip off jealousy and greediness from each side. There are no practical suggestions. He simply urges them to imitate the pattern of a household and be zealous for homonoia. Concern for the fine possessions of the city is the only recommendation stemming from this parallel. His audience might well have asked how public buildings can be shared so as to restore balance amongst the social classes. He even puts words into the mouth of the Rhodians, but they amount to a statement of preference for unity over factionalism. He takes as examples the Rhodians’ ancestors, who agreed to live in one city instead of three, and his experience of Rhodian assemblies in former times, when they not only spoke a single dialect but also a single word (for example: “rightly”). But there is no indication as to how this situation is to be regained. Nor is it helpful to say that in their community (politeia) they let go their ancient harmonia that was truly Doric in character. All Aristeides does at the end of the speech is to urge the Rhodians to “desist from this earthquake” in shame at their temples, their tombs and the enviable name of Rhodes up to now.82 He provides inspiration and exhortation, but not practical advice. The reason why he is less practical than Dion is presumably that his rhetorical training and standing are more important to him than to Dion. The medium has squashed thought of any specific action.

Harmony among Greek Cities Harmony among Greek Cities

Is Aristeides any more practical in his advice on dissolving stasis among Greek cities and instituting homonoia? In his speech to the general assembly (koinon) of the province of Asia, a speech directed particularly at the metropoleis of Pergamon, Smyrna and Ephesos (cities that are spread over 200 km), he sets himself the task of applying his subject to a small part of the world secured by Rome, a part which is acting foolishly in his view. He suggests what the differences are: strife over the primacy and conflict over contests and money, and over temples, colonnades, walls and other public buildings.83 He does give a practical warning about annoying the successive governors of the province:

82 Admission: 24.32. Cities and households: 24.8–9, 32–34, 45. Unity rather than factionalism: 24.37. Rhodians’ ancestors: 24.49, 56. Abandonment of ἁρμονία: 24.57. Shame: 24.59. 83 23.3, 8–9, 12, 27, 32, 65, 68–69. On the rivalry among these three cities over titles, see Magie 1.636, 2.1496 n. 18 and R. Merkelbach, ZPE 32 (1978) 287–296; cf. n. 88 below. D. Kienast relates such coin legends as Σμυρ(ναίων) Περγ(αμήνων) ᾿Εφεσίων ὁμόνοια (SNG Aulock no. 1940; BMC Ionia 110 nos. 403–404; cf. ibid. 110–112 nos. 402, 405–415) to Aristeides’ speech 23 and to Dion’s speeches 38, 40 and 41 (all delivered earlier) and infers

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Whenever each group of you thinks it right to attend them more than they request, instructs them to remain with yourselves for as long as necessary, threatening that they will not be able to stand it if they do not obey, promises to render every service whether they want it or not, commands them to associate with yourselves alone or at least mostly, and thinks that it is legally not necessary to do what they decide, what would anyone say such behaviour constituted except a mixture of two divergent practices [relentlessness and fawning] ... ?84

The modern reader may baulk at the convoluted sentence, but the ancient audience presumably did not lose the point. Less practical is Aristeides’ praise for the proposal of Isokrates some 500 years earlier for homonoia among Greeks and war against the barbarians. He admits that this latter proposition is not available to the Greeks under the Roman peace, yet he fails to show how else the cities are to achieve homonoia. He finds inspiration in the Panhellenion, to which many cities, some very large, belonged; but this religious institution aided Roman control rather than Greek unity. He points out that there is eris (strife) over the appearance of Smyrna from land and sea. Such a great adornment must be shared. The whole world considers Ephesos as theirs, because of the koinotes (openness to all) of its harbours, all its other hospitalities and the feeling all have of arriving in their homeland. What Aristeides does not explain is how the benefits to Ephesos of being the common treasury of Asia or the adornments of Smyrna are to be shared in any way which will bring an end to the stasis. Yet he is aware of the need for concrete action: he acknowledges his wish for a common friendship (philia koine) of the cities with one another and expresses a desire for achievements conducive to homonoia. His that legal contracts with specific clauses about land, taxes and so on were indicated by homonoia: JNG 14 (1964) 51–64, especially 52–59; ZPE 109 (1995) 267–282. There is simply no evidence for such contracts; Kienast speculates that they were kept secret in city archives. Also unconvinced are U. Kampmann in H. Koester (ed.), Pergamon, Citadel of the Gods: Archaeological Record, Literary Description, and Religious Development [Harvard Theological Studies, 46] (Harrisburg, PA 1998) 373–393, especially 374 and n. 5, 384–385 and n. 73, and J.-P. Lotz, Ignatius and Concord: The Background and Use of the Language of Concord in the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch [Patristic Studies, 8] (New York 2007) 47–52. The prestige of the city that issued the coins should also be considered: see, for example, P. Weiß in B.E. Borg (ed.), op. cit. (n. 77) 189–190, 196 and C. Howgego in id. et al. (eds.), Coinage and Identity in the Roman Provinces (Oxford 2005) 2. The judicious remarks by A.R.R. Sheppard, op. cit. (n. 20) 231–236 are still valid. For a catalogue of the coins see P.R. Franke and M.K. Nollé, Die Homonoia-Münzen Kleinasiens und der thrakischen Randgebiete [Saarbrücker Studien zur Archäologie und Alten Geschichte, 10] 1 (Saarbrücken 1997) 1–229 with Tafeln 1–102, superseding Parte I (15–116) and Tavole I-XII in R. Pera, Homonoia sulle monete da Augusto agli Antonini: Studio storico-tipologico [Il melangolo / Università, 14] (Genova 1984). 84 Provincial governors (hegemones): 23.63–64 (quotation from 64; 23.62 for annual appointment of governors). Intervention on local matters, such as construction of a cover for a polluted stream in Amastris, could even be undertaken by the Caesar of the day: see J.M. Madsen, Eager to be Roman: Greek Response to Roman Rule in Pontus and Bithynia (London 2009) 53–57.

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only practical suggestion with respect to this desire is that praise must be shared; but there is no indication how, for example, the honour of celebrating the imperial cult is to be shared, only an exhortation to consider their common benefits and to stop fighting about matters over which no one outside fights. He does not propose anything as practical as political unification (sunoikismos) – such as Theseus’ in Athens, mentioned by Dion (above) – yet he uses such a concrete example to show the advantages of close association: if many cities (aste polla) come together, their various embellishments provide a single embellishment of the whole city (sumpasa polis).85 Sharing and co-operation constitute the most practical advice given by Aristeides. The best scheme for all Greeks is to have three or more cities together accomplishing the same end. Both in the past and at present opposition over primacy either begins a period of quarrelling or produces further stasis. Stasis is pointless when a single polis and a single house rules the whole earth; the cities can only bring harm to themselves by such behaviour. Indeed, it is embarrassing even to explain what the quarrel is about; the cities could easily annoy the proconsuls. The joint Caesars Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus are cited as a human example of homonoia, in that they rule all cities but share all cities. But there is no further practical advice in being told to follow the minds of the rulers, nor in the claim that kings lead human affairs best when they come closest to the gods, the lords of the universe. Aristeides’ drawing of the Greeks’ attention to the gods, the universe and the Caesars can only provide inspiration, not specific instruction. The speech ends with an exhortation to action. However, the exhortation does not become more practical than urging rivalry not for the primacy but for leadership in homonoia, in which contest competition for honour (philotimia) can be preserved.86

85 Isokrates: 23.2–3 (referring to his Panegyrikos 4.15–20); cf. 23.71 on Demosthenes. Panhellenion: 23.8–9; cf. A.J. Spawforth and S. Walker, JRS 75 (1985) 78–104 and 76 (1986) 88–105; D. Willers, Hadrians panhellenisches Programm: Archäologische Beiträge zur Neugestaltung Athens durch Hadrian [Antike Kunst Beihefte, 16] (Basel 1990) 54–67; Alcock 166–168; C.P. Jones, Chiron 26 (1996) 29–56; A.J. Spawforth, Chiron 29 (1999) 339–352. Swain (75) is probably mistaken in thinking that prospective members of the Panhellenion had to show Greek culture and not just Greek descent: see J.M. Hall, op. cit. (n. 3) 225–226. Adornment of Smyrna: 23.19–22. Hospitality of Ephesos: 23.23–25. Need for concrete action: 23.6; cf. ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλία in 24.15. Sharing of praise: 23.7, 11, 66. Example of sunoikismos: 23.13; on Theseus’ unification see n. 77 above. 86 Co-operation of three or more cities: 23.28, 32, 46, 65–66. Opposition over primacy: 23.32, 48, 59 (ἀφορμὴ τῆς φιλονικίας). μία πόλις and εἷς οἶκος (the latter referring to all Caesars since Nerva): 23.62–66. Embarrassment: 23.60. Annoyance of proconsuls: 23.63– 64 (cf. excerpt above). Example of Roman Caesars: 23.78–79; cf. Boulanger 381, B. Forte, op. cit. (n. 20) 410–412 and A. Heller, op. cit. (n. 70) 251–252. Rivalry for leadership in homonoia: 23.79–80; φιλοτιμεῖσθαι also in 23.28.

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In the case of Dion of Prousa, the orator was dealing with cities in his own province of Bithynia, and several of his Bithynian speeches are preserved. Indeed, he was deeply involved in the affairs of Prousa and, to a lesser extent, of other cities and he makes practical proposals for his own city in fields not involving unity.87 In Nikomedeia he takes up the delicate subject of homonoia with Nikaia. He asks what the primacy really amounts to: if Nikomedeia recovers the primacy, will Nikaia retain the collection of tribute and its other privileges? He tells Nikomedeia to forget about the title and desire to be first, to act as the metropolis it is and to show the proconsuls that it is interested in the welfare of the Bithynian people as a whole.88 He lists the factors that are conducive to philia and homonoia: trade, agreement over revenues, intermarriage, family ties, relationships of proxenia and personal alliances (philiai idiotikai). But it is abundantly clear from the speech, as Dion admits, that neither these factors nor common ancestors, gods, festivals and customs have achieved homonoia. The only really practical points are his advice that titles are unimportant and his optimism that homonoia, once achieved, will endure because of expediency and ingrained habit. There is, in fact, a radical weakness in the structure of the speech. Dion talks about homonoia in general, contrasts it with stasis and tells the sceptics how (thanks to the gods) homonoia may endure when it is achieved. But he fails to tell the Nikomedeians what they most need to know: how to come to terms with Nikaia and achieve homonoia.89 87 Involvement in Apameia: Dion 40.16–17; 41.1–3; in Nikomedeia and Nikaia: 38.1–2; 39.1; 41.2; in Prousa: 40.3–15, 18–19; 41 fin. (the abrupt ending suggests that Dion was a member of a delegation from Prousa, other members of which were to speak) and speeches 43–51 passim. An example of a practical proposal is the election of supervisors of the market in 46.14; examples of practical achievement for Prousa are given in 45.6–10. P. Desideri notes with respect to 46.14 that it was ultimately the Roman soldiers who re-established order, “protecting the well-to-do”; he sees this speech as exhibiting the town as a place where mutual quarrels intensify and “degenerate into outright hatred” (in Dio Chrysostom 98–99). For a summary of the evidence on Nikomedeia, Nikaia, Apameia and Prousa, see Magie 1.305–306, 1.588–590, 2.1184–1188 and Jones, Dio, chapters 1, 8 and 10. On Dion’s active rôle in Prousa see Jones, Dio 19–25, 95–103 and J. Hahn, Der Philosoph und die Gesellschaft: Selbstverständnis, öffentliches Auftreten und populäre Erwartungen in der hohen Kaiserzeit [Heidelberger Althistorische Beiträge und Epigraphische Studien, 7] (Stuttgart 1989) 157–161. On Bithynia under Trajan see Magie 1.596–605; B.F. Harris, Bithynia under Trajan: Roman and Greek Views of the Principate [Univ. of Auckland Bulletins, 67] (Auckland 1964) 6–16 and in ANRW 2.7.2 (Berlin 1980) 883–894. 88 38.6–7, 24–33, 39–40; cf. Nörr2 48. On the rivalry of Asian cities for titles such as ‘metropolis’, see T.R.S. Broughton, ‘Roman Asia’ in T. Frank (ed.), An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome 4 (Baltimore 1938) 708–710, 740–744; Magie 1.635–639, 2.1496–1498 nn. 17–21; L. Robert, HSCP 81 (1977) 1–39; Jones, Dio 78, 83–88; P. Debord, REA 100 (1998) 139–165; A. Heller, op. cit. (n. 70) 248–249. 89 Factors conducive to harmony: 38.22, 46–48; cf. 40.22, 41.10. Titles: 38.39–40. Permanence of homonoia: 38.49–51. τῆς ὁμονοίας τῆς καθόλου: 38.8. Contrast the view of B.F. Harris (Moral and Political Ideas [n. 72] 146–150, 175–176), who claims that Dion was not

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In addressing his native city Prousa on the subject of homonoia with the neighbouring city of Apameia, Dion expresses his desire for an official reconciliation and the establishment of philia. He does not want submission, but a favourable reaction to a choice of philia by Apameia and an end to the rivalry and disagreement. This and other statements suggest that the dispute was over material, perhaps financial, interests. What is Dion’s solution to this stasis between neighbours who, he ventures, are virtually a single city? There is, in fact, a dearth of practical proposals. Moreover, the trip today from Bursa (Prousa) to Mudanya (Apameia) consists of thirty minutes of horrific traffic followed by twenty minutes of attractive countryside. Take the traffic away and one can see that the journey was not a small one in antiquity. The only concrete suggestion Dion mentions, a formal union of the sunteleia kind, is specifically rejected as limiting the standing of the community. Dion’s advice in this speech never advances beyond the vague level of friendly relations between Prousa and Apameia.90 When speaking in the other city, Apameia, on the same subject Dion states his intention to make the cities friendly both by getting rid of past disputes (zetemata) and by turning the cities to goodwill (eunoia) and homonoia. The example of Rome merely suggests magnanimity. Nor is it helpful to list the ties of marriage, common education and festivals, similar institutions and geographical proximity which bound them. For these very factors had failed to prevent stasis.91 As with Aristeides dealing with a dispute among three metropolises in a Roman province, so Dion is not very practical in advising on conflict between two neighbouring cities. B.F. Harris is inclined to award the palm to Dion: Whereas Aristides represents the thoroughly ‘converted’ Greek with an uncritical and to some extent unhistorical view of the Roman Empire, Plutarch’s and Dio’s views are much more realistic and penetrating, and of these two it was Dio’s which were more fully tested in the tensions and turbulence of Greek provincial politics.92

at all impractical in his application of the homonoia doctrine to the Bithynian situation. A.R.R. Sheppard points to the causes of friction mentioned by Dion in 38.22, 26–31 and 34.47, such as territorial limits, revenues, and where courts will be held: op. cit. (n. 20) 233– 234. 90 40.10 (μηδὲ συντελεῖν), 16–17 (cf. δημοσίᾳ in 41.1), 23–27. For μία πόλις compare 40.27 with 41.10. Desideri 415–416, 455–456 makes the point that Dion feels the unity of the province should be based on the influence of local Roman citizens. συντέλεια seems to refer to a federation of some kind: compare 38.26 and U. Kahrstedt, RE 4A.2 (Stuttgart 1932) 1456–1457. 91 41.7–8 (cf. 40.16–18), 9–11 (cf. 38.46–48; 40.22, 27–28). In dealing with an inscription from Alexandria Troas, another Roman colony in Asia Minor, F. Pina Polo suggests that Dion played a comparable role in Apameia and delivered or. 41 in a contio: Gerión 7 (1989) 95–105, especially 102–105; on contiones in general see id., Klio 77 (1995) 203–216. 92 B.F. Harris, ANRW 2.33.5 (Berlin 1991) 3880.

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Certainly Dion dealt with real situations in the Bithynian cities. The above analysis, however, forces one to conclude that Dion is far more explicit about the nature of the stasis troubling these pairs of cities than he is about the means of achieving homonoia. And the reason why Dion and Aristeides do not get far with practical remedies is again the nature of the medium. The major purpose of the speeches is display, and rhetorical training overwhelms the need of the cities to receive explicit advice.

Greek Intellectuals and the Roman Administration Greek Intellectuals and the Roman Administration

On whose side are these Greek intellectuals when they speak about harmony within and among Greek cities? Are they simply quislings of the Roman government? Do they enable the Greek cities to increase their independence of Roman rule? Or are they speaking primarily in their own interests? From Plutarch we have not speeches, but essays giving advice to Greek politicians. He gives a clear warning about not annoying the Roman governor of a province. As C.P. Jones has shown, a widely quoted passage refers to the boots characteristic of a senator (thus a proconsul), not those of Roman soldiers, above the head of the Greek civic leader.93 On the other hand, if the investigation goes beyond the openly political advice to Greek politicians (the example chosen by S.R. Asirvatham is the pair of epideictic speeches The Fortune or Excellence of Alexander discussed in chapter 4), one can see Plutarch absorbing and revealing Roman values, such as humanitas (the civilised character a Roman homo should possess). While Alexander is presented as thoroughly Greek, in language that is classicising, his instruction to both Greeks and barbarians to consider the oikoumene as their native land reveals a Roman way of viewing the relationship between rulers and ruled: outsiders can attain Romanitas, and the inhabited earth is the communis patria (shared native land).94 J.M. Madsen 93 Plu. 813e quoted, for example, in N. Lewis and M. Reinhold, Roman Civilization: Selected Readings3 (New York 1990) 2.231. See Jones, Plutarch 133; R. Browning, History, Language and Literacy in the Byzantine World (Northampton 1989) II, especially 9–10 = T. Harrison (ed.), Greeks and Barbarians (Edinburgh 2002) 265; J.M. Madsen, op. cit. (n. 84) 55–56. It should also be acknowledged that the Roman governors depended to a large extent on local authorities for the maintenance of law and order: see, for example, C. Brélaz in B. Forsén and G. Salmeri (eds.), op. cit. (n. 18) 45–64. 94 S.R. Asirvatham, AJPh 126 (2005) 107–125, expounding Plu. 329a–d in particular; cf. F.W. Walbank, HSCPh 76 (1972) 145–168 and D.B. Saddington, ANRW 2.3 (Berlin 1975) 112–137 at 117. Romanitas is a term that occurs very rarely indeed, perhaps only in Tert. pall. 4.1 in our period: cf. J. Kramer, Die Sprachbezeichnungen Latinus und Romanus im Lateinischen und Romanischen [Studienreihe Romania, 12] (Berlin 1998) 81–82. But there is evidence that citizens of Greek and other backgrounds regarded the acquisition of Latin as an important aspect of their identity: see J.N. Adams, CQ 53 (2003) 184–205, especially

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presents a case that the Greek élite, at least in the province of Pontus and Bithynia, sought access to Roman office in the Senate and in imperial administration. Admittedly some Greek politicians openly showed their leanings toward Rome by their personal appearance. But inscriptions in which Greek provincials claim friendship with leading Romans, even the Caesar, are scarcely conclusive evidence of a readiness “to parade their affiliation to Rome, Roman institutions and the Roman sphere”. Nor is it clear that priestly office in the cult of Roma and Augustus showed political allegiance rather than a local search for prestige.95 Dion of Prousa offers a warning to the citizens of Alexandria that is very similar to Plutarch’s generic warning: disturbances which lead even to minimal violence might be answered by intervention by Roman governors or the Caesar.96 He devotes considerable attention to the question of what the Hellenic values of eleutheria (freedom) and autonomia mean for Greeks under Roman domination. He apparently abandons the old sense of independence altogether in defining true freedom (alethes eleutheria) as something which both individuals and cities obtain from within themselves by selfless conduct of their affairs.97 This may be, as B.F. Harris claims, a mature and realistic Hellenism for 188–191. On the acquisition of humanitas by provincials see G.D. Woolf, Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge 1998) 54–60. Woolf himself emphasises that Greeks remained Greek: PCPhS 40 (1994) 116–143, especially 125–131. Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights 13.17) debates whether humanitas is better reflected by φιλανθρωπία or παιδεία. Perhaps, then, τὸ φιλάνθρωπον might represent humanitas, but the Latin term should not be translated by English ‘humanity’, as B. Isaac, op. cit. (n. 24) 245 suggested. See also S.C.R. Swain in L. Holford-Strevens and A. Vardi (eds.), The Worlds of Aulus Gellius (Oxford 2004) 31 and S.M. Beall, ibid. 217 (who seems to ignore παιδεία in 13.17, to which he refers for the claim that humanitas “had by Gellius’ day lost its associations with intellectual culture”). P. Desideri doubts that the leaders Plutarch advised, the Plutarchan politicians who followed his political advice, had any hope of preserving Greek dignity against Roman imperial power: in Virtues for the People (n. 9) 89–98. 95 J.M. Madsen, op. cit. (n. 84) passim (quotation from 127). ‘Philo-Roman’ appearance: R.R.R. Smith, JRS 88 (1998) 56–93, especially 83–90, citing Dion 36.17 on 86–87; cf. G. Anderson, The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire (London 1993) 119–126 and (on 36.17) 218. J.M. Dillon is persuaded that “Plutarch was intellectually convinced of the inevitability and rightness of the Roman Empire”: in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), op. cit. (n. 57) 352, 364 (quotation) = N. Humble (ed.), Plutarch’s Lives: Parallelism and Purpose (Swansea 2010) 88, 99 (quotation). On the cult of Roma and Augustus see especially S.R.F. Price, op. cit. (n. 20). 96 Dion 32.71 (ἡγεμόνες), 95–96 (αὐτοκράτωρ). In the latter passage the prospect of further benefactions from the Caesar (πλείονα ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὰ ἐργάσεται) is offered as inducement to orderly behaviour. The disturbances (ταραχή) are further outlined in 32.41–42, 45; cf. Jones, Dio 37–39, 43–44, Desideri 72–75, 104–108 and M.B. Trapp, op. cit. (n. 74) 174. 97 See 14.1, 3–4, 8, 17–18; 15.29; 44.12 (definition, on which see P. Desideri in Dio Chrysostom 104–105); 80.3; Nörr2 87–88. Dion’s Hellenism is a major topic in the thesis by B.F. Harris (n. 72): see, for example, 3, 11, 19–23, 82–85, 122–123, 279, 285–286 (cf.

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Dion’s time, but Dion was simply admitting the loss of independence involved in acceptance of the pax Romana. Harris agrees that eleutheria in the old sense could not be recovered, but sees Dion as “an intelligent moralist and political thinker who knew by experience how to maximise his influence both with the Romans and his fellow Greeks”. However, Dion personally was able to make, and could be expected to make, little contribution to the prominence of Greeks in Roman government or to the acceptance by Romans of Hellenic ideas.98 Scholars have speculated that Dion made a bid to become Trajan’s philosophical adviser or that Dion held an influential role in the general politics of the empire, but it seems more likely that Dion exaggerates his influence with Caesars past and present in order to warn off his opponents within his own city.99 Dion was certainly more independent than his Roman contemporary Pliny, who is excessively flattering in his Panegyricus and excessively subservient in his correspondence with Trajan.100 But Dion’s picture of Rome’s imperial administration is shown to be too idealistic by evidence from other speeches by him. ANRW 2.7.2 [Berlin 1980] 867: “Freedom, then, lived on not so much in the public life of the cities in its true sense, as in the minds and the ideals of the hellenized élite”). 98 See C.S. Walton, JRS 19 (1929) 38–66; E.W. Gray, JRS 42 (1952) 123; R. Syme, Tacitus (Oxford 1958) 2.506–511; G.W. Bowersock, Augustus (n. 3) 30–41, 73–80 and JRS 58 (1968) 261–262; A.R. Birley, ZPE 116 (1997) 209–245 at 212–228; G. Salmeri in Dio Chrysostom 55–63; cf. E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (264–70 B.C.) (Oxford 1958) 158–160. For the personal response of the Julio-Claudian Caesars to Hellenic ideas see M. Kaplan, Greeks and the Imperial Court, from Tiberius to Nero (New York 1990), chaps. 5–8. For Harris’ views cited in the text see Moral and Political Ideas (n. 72) 122–123, ANRW 2.7.2 (Berlin 1980) 893 (referring to C. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate [Cambridge 1960] 167–171) and ANRW 2.33.5 (Berlin 1991) 3862 (quotation). On the way in which Greek authors like Dion explore Greekness by presentation of exotic societies on the boundaries of the Roman empire see S. Goldhill in Being Greek under Rome 158–159 and T. Whitmarsh, ibid. 288–294. 99 Philosophical adviser: J.L. Moles argues that there are sufficient ambiguities in the speeches on kingship for Dion to be offering warning and even criticism: Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar 6 (1990) [= ARCA, 29] 297–375. Political influence: P. Desideri hypothesises that Dion brought back from Rome a kind of constitutional packet and strove to re-organise the moral and political life of his city: in Dio Chrysostom 103–117; cf. Desideri 382–387. Less influence than claimed: C. Kokkinia, Historia 53 (2004) 490–500, especially 495–500, and J.M. Madsen, op. cit. (n. 84) 107–119, especially 116–118; cf. K.H. Waters in J.A.S. Evans (ed.), Polis and Imperium: Studies in Honour of Edward Togo Salmon (Toronto 1974) 233–252, especially 236–238, 250. Earlier discussion on Trajan and Dion in Bowersock 47–48, 111; Jones, Dio 115–123; also B.F. Harris, ANRW 2.33.5 (Berlin 1991) 3868–3869. 100 For comparisons of Dion’s speeches on kingship with Pliny’s Panegyricus, see F. Trisoglio, Il Pensiero Politico 5 (1972) 3–43; B.F. Harris, ANRW 2.7.2.893–894 (also his Bithynia under Trajan [n. 87] 22–26, 28–29). For Dion as more critical of Rome than Plutarch – who nevertheless as a Greek evinces an air of superiority over Rome – see S. Swain in J. Barnes and M. Griffin (eds.), Philosophia Togata 2: Plato and Aristotle at Rome (Oxford 1997) 165–174. For two contrasting views as to whether Dion had Rome in mind in or.

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They reveal poor conditions in rural areas and problems such as grain shortages in the cities of the empire.101 While Dion is realistic in perceiving that some of the old Hellenic ideals needed modification, he is out of touch with reality in some of his claims about Roman administration. Similarly with Ailios Aristeides the question arises, in view of the lack of practicality and the inconsistency revealed in his speeches on harmony within and among Greek cities, what was his aim? In my view he was serving the interests of the Roman government, but this was not his primary intention or even a conscious objective. He does not seem disposed to refer to the whole Roman empire as “us”, in the manner that Loukianos did.102 He was not under instruction from Roman officials. If he had been, one would not, for example, expect him to misunderstand the Roman attitude to military service. However, two of Aristeides’ major themes – praise of Rome and promotion of homonoia

36, especially 36.22, see M. Forschner in H.-G. Nesselrath et al., Menschliche Gemeinschaft und göttliche Ordnung: Dion von Prousa: Die Borysthenes-Rede [SAPERE, 6] (Darmstadt 2003) 146–147, 155 and Trapp 189–190. 101 Rural conditions: 7.65–80, 103; cf. 7.8, 18–22, 104–108 on the contrast between town and country and 7.36–37, 48–49; 15.3–4 on the contrast between local citizen and alien. On city and country in provinces where Greek was spoken see SEHRE2 1.247–261, 343–352; for Dion’s thought on city and country see P. Desideri in Dio Chrysostom 95–107. City problems: 7.104–113, 133–152; 46 passim (cf. von Arnim 204–210 and G. Salmeri in Dio Chrysostom 63–64); cf. 13.35 on the unemployed mass in Rome. On the evidence of speech 7 see J. Day in P.R. Coleman-Norton et al. (eds.), Studies in Roman Economic and Social History in Honor of Allan Chester Johnson (Princeton 1951) 209–235; B.F. Harris, AULLA Proceedings (9th Congress, Melbourne, 1964) 22–23; Jones, Dio 56–61; Russell, Dio 13; Alcock 29–30, 85–86; A.M. Milazzo, op. cit. (n. 18), chap. 3; D. Engster in G.A. Lehmann et al., Armut – Arbeit – Menschenwürde: Die Euböische Rede des Dion von Prusa [SAPERE, 19] (Tübingen 2012) 143–165; E. Herrmann-Otto, ibid. 213–233, especially 214–217, 231– 233; A. Billault, REG 126 (2013) 85–102. On the evidence of 12.85 for the “sadly diminished political situation of Hellenes” under Roman rule in Dion’s time see F.I. Zeitlin in Being Greek under Rome 222–223. In general, see J.A.O. Larsen, ‘Roman Greece’ in T. Frank (ed.), An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome 4 (Baltimore 1938) 259–498 at 465–483; A.H.M. Jones, The Greek City (n. 3) 259–269; SEHRE2 1.130–150, 2.586–587 n. 18, 2.654 n. 4; P.D.A. Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis (Cambridge 1988) 257–268, 275–276. 102 Loukianos, Alexandros 48 (τοῖς ἡμετέροις), Historia 5 (ἡμᾶς), 17 (ὁ ἡμέτερος ἄρχων), 29 (πολλοὺς τῶν ἡμετέρων), 31 (τὸν τριπόθητον ἡμῖν θρίαμβον); cf. Palm 54–55, C.P. Jones, Culture and Society in Lucian (Cambridge, MA 1986) 89 and R. Browning, op. cit. (n. 93) 10 = T. Harrison (ed.), op. cit. (n. 93) 265. Arstd. 26.70–71 speaks in terms of ‘you’, though the sentiment about the unlikelihood of the Romans being involved in war in the centre of the empire is similar to Historia 5, as Palm (55 n. 1) points out. However, Palm’s view (63– 74) that Pausanias was neutral in his reports on Rome has been countered by C. Habicht, Pausanias’ Guide to Ancient Greece [Sather Classical Lectures, 50] (Berkeley 1985) 119– 126 = Pausanias und seine “Beschriebung Griechenlands” (München 1985) 120–127.

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in the Greek world – were advantageous to the Roman government.103 The problem with Aristeides’ efforts in these spheres was that he was out of touch with reality. Disunity among and within Greek cities was a genuine problem. From the point of view of the Greeks, rivalry led, for example, to mismanagement of financial resources and to intervention by Rome. Rhodes was a case in point: it lost its independence in the principate of Claudius and again under Vespasian; riots in which some Roman citizens were crucified were the reason in the first case and stasis was presumably the pretext on the second occasion.104 Aristeides fails to deal with the real problems of disunity in a practical way, despite his recognition of concrete causes of stasis. This highlights the fact that the three most relevant speeches – those to Rome, to the cities of Asia and to Rhodes – are all platform performances. They are panegyrics of Rome and of homonoia and are comparable with Aristeides’ other panegyrics. Rather, what Aristeides was attempting to do by delivering these displays was to further his own career and reputation.105

103

Cf. A.R.R. Sheppard, op. cit. (n. 20) 240: “In the work of Aristides, the slogan of concord has become a basis for the justification of the realities of power in the Roman east”. Also J.A. Caballero López in Á. Sánchez–Ostiz et al., De Grecia a Roma y de Roma a Grecia: Un camino de ida y vuelta [Colección Mundo Antiguo, n.s. 12] (Pamplona 2007) 91– 116; L. Pernot, ‘Aelius Aristides and Rome’ in W.V. Harris and B. Holmes (eds.), Aelius Aristides between Greece, Rome and the Gods [Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, 33] (Leiden 2008) 175–201; E.L. Bowie in P. Desideri and F. Fontanella (eds.), Elio Aristide e la legittimazione greco dell’impero di Roma (Bologna 2013) 69–89. Military service: 26.73–75. 104 Rhodes’ loss of independence: Cassius Dio 60.24.4; Suetonius, Vespasian 8.4; J.S. Reid, The Municipalities of the Roman Empire (Cambridge 1913) 383, 483–484; Magie 1.548, 1.569, 2.1406 n. 24, 2.1427–1428 n. 9; R.M. Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age (Ithaca 1984) 219 and n. 15. The epigraphical evidence for Roman intervention in inter-city controversies of an earlier period (2nd century B.C.E.) is studied by F. Camia, Roma e le poleis: L’intervento di Roma nelle controversie territoriali tra le comunità greche di Grecia e d’Asia Minore nel secondo secolo a.C.: le testimonianze epigrafiche [Tripodes, 10] (Athens 2009). 105 He continually alludes to his own standing as an orator: e.g. 23.1, 27; 24.6, 58. For the views of Plutarch and Dion on the pursuit of glory see C. Panagopoulos, DHA 3 (1977) [= Annales littéraires de l’Université de Besançon, 202] 197–235 at 207–209 and M.-H. Quet, DHA 4 (1978) [= Annales littéraires, 225] 51–117, especially 53–54 and 84 n. 50.

Chapter 3

The Roman Empire The Roman Empire

Writing early in the first century, the Greek geographer Strabon says at the end of his work that he has laid out the disposition of the inhabited world (‘our inhabited world’, perhaps) and that the Romans possess the best and the best known part of it, having surpassed all previous rulers. He thus indicates that the Roman empire – though he does not use this term – is not in his view coterminous with the inhabited world. He goes on to give a brief account of the Romans. They acquired the whole of Italy, then the regions around Italy. Of the three continents, the Romans possess almost the whole of Europe (except that part beyond the Danube and the parts along the ocean between the Rhine and the Don); of Libya, the whole of the coast on the Greek (‘our’) sea is subject to the Romans, and the rest of the continent is uninhabited or inhabited only in a poverty-stricken or nomadic fashion; of Asia, the entire coast on ‘our’ sea is subject to them, while the interior is shared between the Romans on the one hand and the Parthians and the barbarians beyond them (Indians and others) on the other. Of this whole territory (he sumpasa khora) that is subject to the Romans some is ruled by kings, but other parts are held by the Romans and called provinces (they send governors and tax-collectors). Also there are some free cities, of which some came over in alliance (philia) and others were set free by the Romans as an honour (time). The provinces are at present as Caesar Augustus arranged them: he divided the whole territory into two sections and assigned one to himself and the other to the People (demos; that is, the populus Romanus) – the parts that needed a military garrison (the barbarian part and that adjacent) to himself, the rest to the People, insofar as it was peaceful. Some provinces are called “Caesar’s”, the others “[provinces] of the People”.1 Strabon’s way of looking at the empire of the Romans goes back at least to Polybios 1

Strabon 17.3.24–25, C839–840. Strabon refers back to his earlier discussion of the conquest of Italy (6.4.2, C286–287). E.S. Ramage comments that Strabon seems here “to have a clear concept of empire, though he does not designate it as such”: The Nature and Purpose of Augustus’ “Res Gestae” [Historia Einzelschriften, 54] (Stuttgart 1987) 55 n. 104. The closest word is χώρα, which I have rendered by ‘territory’. D. Dueck suggests that Strabon consciously presents the opposite view (“the boundaries of the empire and the limits of the oikoumene correspond to each other”) as well as the view in the text that the Parthian empire “rules over some parts of the oikoumene beyond the Roman realm”: Strabo of Amasia: A Greek Man of Letters in Augustan Rome (London 2000) 107–115 (quotations on 111, 113); cf. C. Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire [Jerome Lectures,

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in the second century B.C.E., who writes that the Romans have gained control of all the land and sea in the Greek (‘our’) part of the world, though they aimed to achieve universal rule and dominion; he soon talks of conceptualising the whole inhabited world. One of the themes in the work of Diodoros Sikeliotes, finished about 30 B.C.E., is the rise and fall of empires. But, as K.S. Sacks points out, “like his contemporary Pompeius Trogus, he does not view Rome as destined to unify the Mediterranean”. Instead, Diodoros comments that Carthage would have prevailed over Rome if Fortune had preserved Hasdrubal, the brother of Hannibal.2 Diodoros, then, may be less positive about the unifying power of the Roman empire than his younger contemporary Strabon, but the latter does concede that Rome has not brought all peoples under its control. Scholars have mined the works of Greek intellectuals who do not set out to talk about the Roman empire for information on the empire. Take the philosopher Epiktetos, for example. F.G.B. Millar collected and discussed references by Epiktetos to Epaphroditus, the ex-slave and a libellis of Nero, to political advisers of the Caesar (amici Caesaris), to senators, equestrians and provincials. P.A. Brunt sought to produce a full list of Epiktetos’ visitors and their 19] (Ann Arbor, MI 1991) 33–34, 47, 107–108. Strabon notes variations in provinces as need arises, but at first Caesar (i.e. Augustus) created two consular provinces (Africa and Asia) and ten praetorian provinces; the rest of the provinces are held by Caesar, including those where there are kings, potentates and decarchies. That the other provinces are called “of the People” is a major reason for agreeing with F.G.B. Millar’s recommendation that modern scholars abandon the illegitimate expression ‘senatorial provinces’: AncW 20 (1989) 93–97 (94 on Strabon) = Rome, the Greek World, and the East 1 (Chapel Hill, NC 2002) 314–320 (316–317 on Strabon). 2 Polybios 1.3.7, 1.3.9–10, 1.4.6. Cf. P.R. Hardie, Virgil’s Aeneid: Cosmos and Imperium (Oxford 1986) 377: “The idea of universal Roman empire over the oikumene was sown by Greek writers of the second century BC and grew steadily in the succeeding century; ... . Cicero subscribes to this universalism: Roman domination of the orbis terrarum is a perfectly natural idea to him, ... .” Diodoros on Hasdrubal: 26.24.2 (= 26 fr. 31 Goukowsky). On Diodoros’ views see especially K.S. Sacks, Diodorus Siculus and the First Century (Princeton 1990) 42–43, 132 with n. 61, 157–158 (quotation on 157). On Pompeius Trogus see O. Seel, Eine römische Weltgeschichte: Studien zum Text der Epitome des Iustinus und zur Historik des Pompejus Trogus [Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft, 39] (Nürnberg 1972) 88–93; J.M. Alonso-Núñez, G & R 34 (1987) 56–72; P. Jal, REL 65 (1987) 194–209. Trogus has the world partitioned between the Parthians and the Romans (41.1.1), despite the latter’s “unprincipled ambition of ruling the whole world (imperium ... totius orbis, 29.2.2)”: see K. Clarke in C.S. Kraus (ed.), The Limits of Historiography: Genre and Narrative in Ancient Historical Texts [Mnemosyne Supplements, 191] (Leiden 1999) 262–263; D. Dueck, op. cit. (n. 1) 114; B.H. Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton 2004) 373–374, 377–378; A. Mehl, Roman Historiography: An Introduction to its Basic Aspects and Development (Malden, MA 2011) 117–118. (J.C. Yardley regards the partition as the view of Trogus’ abridger Iustinus: in id. and W. Heckel [eds.], Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus Books 11–12: Alexander the Great [Oxford 1997] 11, 12 n. 34).

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characteristics. J.D. Court examined the tension between formal rank and social status in the records of classroom proceedings preserved by Epiktetos’ student, L. Flavianus Arrianus, and in the summary known as the Enkheiridion (Manual).3 Apart from the imperial court, Epiktetos’ comments on the Roman empire concentrate on the city of Rome itself. His rough contemporaries Plutarch and Dion of Prousa also discuss the city.4 The issues in this chapter, however, are rather different. Did Greek intellectuals under the Roman peace think of the empire as a unit? Is the empire, in their opinion, co-extensive with the inhabited world (oikoumene), or have the Romans (as Strabon intimates) merely chosen the best portion to control? Do Greek writers openly admit that there are peoples outside the Roman empire? How is the unity of the Roman empire conceptualised? What metaphors are used to indicate the unity of the empire? Is that unity stressed by beneficiaries of the Roman peace, or is it merely taken for granted? Are they, because or in spite of their rhetorical training, capable of contradicting the rosy picture they give elsewhere of a united empire? Apart from Marcus Aurelius, whose surviving work has very little to say about the Roman empire, we are not concerned with an ideology of unification developing among the ruling class in the centre, but with the attitudes of Greeks under Roman control. As in the previous chapter, Greek terminology is important for an understanding of the relevant ideas. Terms such as oikoumene will be explained at appropriate points, but for the present we should note that in Epiktetos the most common term for the ruler of the empire is Kaisar, while Plutarch and Dion freely use other terms, such as hegemon (originally ‘leader’) and basileus (the original Greek word for king, attested already in Linear B documents).5 3 F.G.B. Millar, JRS 55 (1965) 141–148, especially 143–147 = Rome, the Greek World, and the East 2 (Chapel Hill, NC 2004) 105–119, especially 110–117. P.A. Brunt, Athenaeum 55 (1977) 19–48, especially 20–23, building on the work of I. Bruns, De schola Epicteti (Kiel 1897). Brunt’s doubts that Arrianus was imbued with the Stoic values inculcated by Epiktetos have been amply fortified with respect to the peroration of Anabasis by A.B. Bosworth, From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation (Oxford 1988) 146– 156. J.D. Court, Some Aspects of Rank and Status in Epictetus (M.A. thesis, Macquarie University, 1986). For a programmatic statement by Court’s supervisor of work to be done on rank and status, see E.A. Judge, Rank and Status in the World of the Caesars and St Paul (Christchurch 1982) = D.M. Scholer (ed.), Social Distinctives of the Christians in the First Century: Pivotal Essays by E.A. Judge (Peabody, MA 2008) 137–156. 4 For reminiscences of Rome in the discourses of Epiktetos see Millar, op. cit. (n. 3) 142– 143 = Rome, the Greek World 2 (n. 3) 109–110. Plutarch: Comp.Per.Fab. 3.7 and the epideictic fragment The fortune of the Romans, especially 322e–323a. Dion compliments Rome by, for example, his statement that Aineias (Aeneas) became king of all Italy and founded the greatest city of all (11.138; cf. the references to Numa in 25.8, 49.6, 80.3). 5 On the ideology of unification see especially C. Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire [Classics and Contemporary Thought, 6] (Berkeley 2000), especially 24, 40–43, 406–412. Καῖσαρ in Epiktetos: e.g. 1.2.23–24, 2.6.20, 3.7.30, 4.4.5;

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The Empire as a Unit The Empire as a Unit

Plutarch uses three terms which denote the Roman empire as a unit; all are used in other senses as well. Arkhe also refers to empire in general, to a particular empire, to the position of a king, to government or an office.6 Hegemonia is also used of leadership in general or the position of a ruler, of a particular hegemony, of a military command, of imperial power, of another empire or of the

cf. οἱ Καισαριανοί in 1.19.19, 3.24.117 and φίλος καὶ ἐπίτροπος Καίσαρος in 3.4.2. ἡγεμών probably refers to the Caesar in 3.24.107 (cf. references to Zeus or God as ‘leader’ in 2.17.23, 3.21.11, 3.26.29); βασιλεῖς usually means ‘kings’ in general (e.g. 3.22.94, 4.1.51) but could refer to the Caesars in 1.29.9 (on which see F. Millar, op. cit. [n. 3] 148 = Rome, the Greek World 2 [n. 3] 118). Cf. Αὔγουστος in 1.19.26. – Καῖσαρ for the princeps in Plutarch: mor. 484a, 813d–e; referring to Augustus, Tiberius, Otho, Vespasian, Domitian and (probably) Trajan in (e.g.) 508a, 136d, Otho 5.9–10, 974a, 522e and 949e respectively; interchangeable with αὐτοκράτωρ in Galba 5.2. αὐτοκράτωρ in Plutarch: 123d (Titus), 172b (Trajan), Galba 2.1, Otho 15.2; used generally of the princeps in 805a, Galba 1.8; used to render imperator (of M. Antonius) in Demetr. 1.7 (cf. Béranger 50). βασιλεύς of the Caesar: 419e, but probably not 467e (cf. C.P. Jones, JRS 56 [1966] 62); ‘king’ in general: 303a–b, 1043c, Comp.Thes.Rom. 2.3; specific kings: 172b, 277f; μέγας βασιλεύς: 330b (Alexander), 190f (Persian king). ἡγεμών of the Caesar: 566e, 814e, Galba 13.3, 18.4; leader in general: 778d, 1064b; specific leaders: 330a, Comp.Arist.Cat.Ma. 1.3; Roman governor: 602c. Note also οἱ κρατοῦντες and οἱ ἡγούμενοι in 814e–f, 824c. In general on Plutarch’s treatment of the Caesars see Béranger 44–47; H. Weber, Die Staats- und Rechtslehre Plutarchs von Chaironeia [Schriften zur Rechtslehre und Politik, 16] (Bonn 1959) 34–40. – αὐτοκράτωρ in Dion: 3.2– 3, 31.107–108, 32.95, 40.5. βασιλεύς: 3.5, 7.12, 20.3, 31.150–151; also used of Alexander (1.1–2, 4.1) and of ‘king’ in a general sense (7.66, 9.9); the Persian king is described as μέγας βασιλεύς (3.37) and Zeus as μέγας βασιλεὺς βασιλέων (2.75; on the last two titles see J.G. Griffiths, CPh 48 [1953] 145–154). Dion is very interested in the concept of the ideal king (see, for example, 1.11–36; 2.65–72; 3.9–11, 25–29, 51–59, 82–118; V. Valdenberg, REG 40 [1927] 142–162; Béranger 195, 211, 248–249; Palm 26–29; J.R. Fears, Princeps a diis electus: The Divine Election of the Emperor as a Political Concept at Rome [Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome, 26] [Roma 1977] 154–158; B.F. Harris, ANRW 2.7.2 [Berlin 1980] 893–894). Καῖσαρ: 46.8. ὁ κρατῶν is used in 34.25; 44.10, 12. – pa2-si-re-u in Linear B seems to refer to people of lesser status than a king: J.L. O’Neil, Živa Antika 20 (1970) 11–14; M. Ventris and J. Chadwick, Documents in Mycenaean Greek2 (Cambridge 1973) 121–122, 409, 576; P. Carlier in R. Laffineur and W.-D. Niemeier (eds.), Politeia: Society and State in the Aegean Bronze Age: Proceedings of the 5th International Aegean Conference/5e Rencontre égéenne internationale: University of Heidelberg, Archäologisches Institut, 10–13 April 1994 [Aegaeum, 12] (Liège 1995) 2.355–364; C.W. Shelmerdine in Y. Duhoux and A. Morpurgo Davies (eds.), A Companion to Linear B: Mycenaean Greek Texts and their World 1 [Bibliothèque des Cahiers de l’Institut de Linguistique de Louvain, 120] (Leuven 2008) 135. 6 Roman empire: 316e, 508b (parallel to ἡγεμονία in 508a); empire: Demetr. 3.3, Ages. 33.4; in 542c the empire of the Spartans, in Comp.Lys.Sulla 5.5 the empire of the Athenians; in 176d the position of king; government: 779d; office: 439d–e, 816a.

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principate of a Caesar.7 ‘All things’ (ta sumpanta) is the third term.8 Basileia appears not to be used by Plutarch of the Roman empire,9 but it is used by Dion of Prousa to denote the empire as an entity.10 The same writer also uses arkhe and hegemonia, the latter term strictly of a Caesar’s principate.11 However, in the extant records of the teaching of Epiktetos there does not seem to be any term which refers to the empire as a unit. Arkhe, basileia and hegemonia are all used in other senses.12 Even more striking, perhaps, is the fact that Marcus Aurelius, for all his involvement in the administration of the Roman empire, makes a single allusion to that empire.13 After his death, however, another Greek writer, Loukianos of Samosata, speaks of participating and playing a part in “the greatest empire”. He was by that time an administrator in Egypt. Earlier he had written of Alexandros of Abonouteikhos (the ‘false prophet’) infecting “the whole empire, so to speak, of the Romans” with his robbery.14

7

Roman empire: 474f, Brut. 4.1, Galba 1.4, etc.; leadership: 189d, 336c, 780a; government: Cat.ma. 6.4; hegemony of Sparta in 345d; military command: Them. 31.6, Comp.Lys.Sulla 1.6; imperial power: Galba 6.3–4; empire: 488c–d (Persian), Comp.Kim.Luc. 2.5 (general); principates of autokratores: Galba 29.1. 8 Comp.Demetr.Ant. 1.3; cf. 410c (τὰ σύμπαντα of the universe). 9 Despite the use of βασιλεύς (n. 5 above) and of βασιλικός (‘imperial’ in 963c, ‘royal’ in 506c, 789f, etc.). βασιλεία is used for ‘kingdom’ (113f, TG 14.2), ‘kingship’ (790a, 858e– f) and ‘monarchy’ (154c, 279d). 10 21.6; cf. 38.25. This term (βασιλεία) is used generally for ‘kingdom’, ‘kingship’ (1.62, 4.44, 57.6, etc.); cf. ἡ βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήμη / τέχνη in 4.26, 49.4, 53.11; the adjective βασιλίς in 7.86; βασιλεύειν in 1.84, 7.100 and of the Roman Caesar in 21.10. 11 ἀρχή: 1.84, 21.8; used of Persian and Assyrian empires in 32.43 and 62.6 respectively, but most frequently in the general sense of government (2.79, 3.42, 38.27, etc.). ἡγεμονία: 45.4; cf. 31.128, 43.4, 56.3. 12 ἀρχή is used frequently of a beginning (e.g. 1.26.15), of a principle (e.g. 1.18.1) and of an office (e.g. 1.9.32). βασιλεία as ‘kingdom’: 2.18.28, 4.1.62, 4.8.34; as ‘position of king’: 3.22.30; with reference to a Cynic in 3.22.63, 75, 79. ἡγεμονία for ‘leadership’: 3.22.99 (cf. Béranger 248–249); for ‘governorship’: 1.29.44. ἡγεμονοῦσα has overtones of ‘imperial’ in 3.7.21. 13 M.A. 1.16.14. Marcus uses ἀρχή of ‘office’, ‘source’ or ‘principle’ (e.g. 3.6.4, 4.33.3, 5.14.2), βασιλεία of ‘monarchy’ or ‘kingdom’ in general (1.14.1, 4.32.1). N. Méthy has tried to argue that the single occurrence of the name ῾Ρώμη (6.44.6), discussed below in chap. 4 at n. 69, has a wider significance, the whole Roman empire, Marcus being the first to take a decisive step beyond traditional concepts: RBPh 72 (1994) 98–110. But, as she admits (99), ῾Ρώμη is directly associated with πόλις; and it is worrying that she thinks (101) Marcus became sole emperor in 161 C.E. We cannot claim that the totality of the empire is the city to which Marcus as Antoninus belongs (98, 100). 14 Louk. 65(Apology).12: τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦμεν καὶ τὸ μέρος συνδιαπράττομεν. For the suggestion that his current position was as eisagogeus see C.P. Jones, Culture and Society in Lucian (Cambridge, MA 1986) 20–21 and n. 80, and Swain 322 n. 81. Earlier statement: Alexandros 2 (πᾶσαν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὴν ῾Ρωμαίων ἀρχήν).

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The Empire Coterminous with the Inhabited World The Empire Coterminous with the Inhabited World

The term that is used repeatedly by Strabon in the passage at the start of the chapter and that I rendered by ‘inhabited world’ is oikoumene. It is a passive participle (‘settled’) used as an epithet, but the noun it qualifies is understood; probably ge (‘earth’) or khora (‘land, territory’) is the noun concerned. We can gain some idea of what Greek writers in our period meant by the oikoumene from the geographical writers who report on the limits of the known world. The author of The circumnavigation (periplous) of the Eruthraian Sea perhaps travelled as far east as the delta of the Ganges, for the work ends with references to the region of the Indian-Chinese border. In the other direction, the author guides the merchant down the coast of East Africa to about the latitude of Zanzibar or Dar es Salaam. Beyond the last emporia (ports of trade) on the coast of Azania lies unexplored ocean – though it is immediately obvious that people knew in the first century that the coast eventually turned west to join the western sea (the Atlantic Ocean).15 In speeches and dialogues prepared for Trajan Dion of Prousa claims the unification of all humankind (xumpantes anthropoi) under the Roman empire. This kind of claim had been made for a century, for Augustus was honoured on inscriptions as “father of his country and of the whole race of humankind”. But in other passages Dion restricts the claim to the majority of people – the most illustrious and civilised, of course. For example, he has Philip II say to his son Alexander: The poetry of Homer alone do I regard as truly noble, befitting the great and royal, poetry to which a man ought to pay attention, especially if about to rule humans everywhere, or rather the majority and those the most prominent, ... .

15 See the edition of Periplus Maris Erythraei by L. Casson (Princeton 1989) sections 1– 16, 18, 63–66. That the work is directed mainly at merchants is indicated by the articles of commerce mentioned; see the convenient lists in J.W. McCrindle (ed.), The Commerce and Navigation of the Erythraean Sea (Calcutta 1879) 11–39 and G.W.B. Huntingford (ed.), The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea [Hakluyt Society Works2, 151] (London 1980) 129–142. For example, various sources and types of slaves are mentioned: 8, 13, 31, 36, 49 (cf. Huntingford, op. cit. 141). For the identification of the author’s most southern port, Rhapta, with Dar es Salaam see L.P. Kirwan, Azania 21 (1986) 99–104. The interest evinced in diverse tribes (e.g. at 20) goes back at least to Agatharkhides of Knidos, who claims to have carefully recorded in five books the situation concerning the tribes located in the south as they were in his time (the second century B.C.E.): On the Eruthraian Sea, ed. S.M. Burstein [Hakluyt Society Works2, 172] (London 1989) 173 (5.112 = Photios, Cod. 250.110 [460b]). On ‘round-the-earth’ journeys (περίοδοι γῆς) see J.S. Romm, The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration, and Fiction (Princeton 1992) 26–31. In general see A. Dihle, ANRW 2.9.2 (Berlin 1978) 546–580 and S.E. Sidebotham, Roman Economic Policy in the Erythra Thalassa: 30 B.C.–A.D. 217 [Mnemosyne Supplements, 91] (Leiden 1986).

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Whereas the Assyrian and Persian empires extended over very large parts of the oikoumene, the Roman empire (Dion implies) is co-extensive with the oikoumene or ge (earth).16 When he recalls that Nero’s notorious ex-slave Acratus visited “virtually the whole inhabited world” to plunder votive gifts and statues and images of gods, he presumably means by the oikoumene the legal limits of the Roman empire. The address in another speech is so laudatory that it could only refer to the Caesar; the addressee is said to rule over countless thousands who stretch to the ends of the ge. This assertion is akin to one made by a princeps of an earlier period, Pompeius Magnus. In an inscription dedicating spoils to Minerva, Pompeius claimed to have freed the coast of the oikoumene in the war against the pirates (67 B.C.E.); then he listed the peoples conquered in his Eastern campaign (66-62 B.C.E.); his summary is that he “extended the frontiers of the empire (hegemonia) to the boundaries of the ge”. Elsewhere Dion describes the Caesar as having authority over all things. But he tells the Alexandrians that their city is in the centre of the oikoumene, in contrast to Ailios Aristeides who develops this theme for Rome.17 Rome does, however, receive tributes, as when Dion tells Apameia to imitate Rome. The 16 Extravagant claims in 2.71, 3.6–7, 3.45 and perhaps 1.23 (“to be king for the sake of all humans”). Augustus as πατὴρ τῆς πατρίδος (= pater patriae) καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος ἀνθρώπων γένους: IGRR I 853 (found near Olbia on the Black Sea), IV 1608b.8–9 and 1611b.6–8 (Hypaipa in Asia); cf. Galba as “the benefactor of the whole race of humankind”: I 1263.7. Dion is more realistic in 2.6 (quotation) and perhaps 1.18. For the restriction of such terms as ‘all humankind’ to all in a kingdom or all in the Roman empire, see 1.23, 41.9 and chap. 4. Assyrian and Persian empires: 3.36, 62.5 (the kingdom of Ashurbanipal extended as far as the so-called uninhabited parts of the earth). οἰκουμένη is equivalent to γῆ in 32.36. The purpose of the speeches on kingship is discussed by J.L. Moles in Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar 6 (1990) [= ARCA, 29] 297–375 (see chap. 2 n. 99); G. Salmeri in Dio Chrysostom 89–91; A. Gangloff, RH 311 (2009) 3–38; E. Amato, Traiani Praeceptor: Studi su biografia, cronologia e fortuna di Dione Crisostomo (Paris 2014) 97– 118. 17 Acratus (PIR2 A 95) visiting τὴν οἰκουμένην σχεδὸν ἅπασαν: 31.149; cf. Tacitus, Annales 15.45.1–2, 16.23.1; M. Kaplan, Greeks and the Imperial Court, from Tiberius to Nero (New York 1990) 320–321. Dion refers to the unlimited territory of the Persian king and (by implication) of Domitian in 6.56; cf. G. Krapinger, Dion Chrysostomos, Oratio 6: Text, Übersetzung, Einleitung und Kommentar [Dissertationen der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, 104] (Graz 1996) 138. Ruling over countless thousands: 62.1. Pompeius’ inscription: Diodoros Sikeliotes 40.4 (Minerva as dedicatee: Pliny, NH 7.97). τῶν ὅλων κύριος: Dion 45.4. Alexandreia as the centre of the oikoumene: 32.36 (for σχεδὸν ἁπάσης τῆς οἰκουμένης followed by τῆς ὅλης γῆς, see previous note), 47; cf. Arstd. 26.7, 10–13. Dion does allow that Rome is the first of all cities under the sun (32.35). See Jones, Dio chap. 4 on the Rhodian speech (31) and chap. 5 on the Alexandrian (32) and A. Gangloff, Dion Chrysostome et les mythes: Hellénisme, communication et philosophie politique (Grenoble 2006) 273– 278 on both. On the date of the latter speech see C.P. Jones, Historia 22 (1973) 302–309 and J.F. Kindstrand, Historia 27 (1978) 378–383; on the date of both speeches see H. Sidebottom, Historia 41 (1992) 407–419 and E. Amato, op. cit. (n. 16) 35–56.

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latter is superior to the rest of humankind in success and influence, and even more so in epieikeia (humanity) and philanthropia (beneficence); for it grants freely Roman citizenship, laws and offices. This much is acceptable, given the Greek and Roman practice of reciprocal giving, but Dion also claims that Rome considers no worthy person an alien and preserves justice equally for all. While Aristeides presses this claim at greater length (see the next section) and Plutarch may be less critical of Roman government than Dion, these claims by Dion are unrealistic. The system of patronage between Roman officials and local aristocracies ensured both that grants of citizenship were made on the basis of influence rather than merit and that justice was not available equally to all inhabitants of the empire.18 Plutarch does not come as close as Dion to stating that the Roman empire is coterminous with the oikoumene or ge. Yet he freely uses terms such as ‘the whole world’. In the dialogue The extinction of oracles he alludes to wars throughout virtually the whole oikoumene which have affected Greece adversely under Roman domination. When he says in the speech The fortune of the Romans that time, with God’s help, combined fortune and virtue to construct a hearth for all humankind, he implies that the Roman empire contains everyone. He goes on to say that contests between the greatest powers and empires among humans continued until Rome attached to herself not only the nations and peoples in her empire but also the monarchical dominions of foreign peoples. Thus stability came to the empire, for it was brought within a single orderly cycle of peace. Elsewhere Aemilius Paullus is said to have handed over to the Roman government “the ruling power of earth and sea combined” when his command ended. Plutarch reports that Scipio Africanus pointed out to the Romans that it was inappropriate for them to sit in judgment over himself,

18 Citizenship freely (ἀφθόνως) granted: 41.9–10; πολιτεία refers to citizenship also in 31.29, 49; 41.2, but to constitution or state in 3.45–50, 36.23, 39.2 and to public policy in 7.127, 38.2. On the meaning of ἐπιείκεια see S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides 1 (Oxford 1991) 431 (on Thuc. 3.40.2) and M. Menchelli, SIFC3 15 (1997) 65–80 at 73–79 (with particular reference to Dion 30.19); on that of φιλανθρωπία see J. Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World (London 1958) 102–110, 114–115; A.R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome (London 1968) 35–36, 155 n. 31. Comparison of Dion with Plutarch and Aristeides: B.F. Harris, ANRW 2.33.5 (Berlin 1991) 3880, with references to other scholars; cf. G.W. Bowersock, Augustus and the Greek World (Oxford 1965) 148. System of patronage: ibid. (passim); R.P. Saller, Personal Patronage under the Early Empire (Cambridge 1982). Grants of citizenship: Millar 479–483; R.P. Saller, op. cit. 35, 53, 169–170. On the idea of giving in anticipation of a return, A.R. Hands, op. cit., chap. 3. On differential treatment in the legal system of inhabitants of the empire see P.D.A. Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire (Oxford 1970), especially parts II and IV; T.S. Taylor in P.J. du Plessis et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society (Oxford 2016) 349–361.

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through whom they held their power to sit in judgment over all humankind.19 But more impressive statements are made about Alexander, as will be seen in the next section. Ailios Aristeides sets out to claim that the whole civilised world has been united under Roman control. Not only is oikoumene made interchangeable with ge, as in Plutarch, but oikoumene is close to arkhe (empire) in such statements as that the whole oikoumene is now firmly secured. In two passages of the Roman oration oikoumene is specifically identified with the Roman arkhe or hegemonia (as well as being interchangeable with ge).20 In his speeches on homonoia Aristeides speaks of the whole earth controlled by one city, the first and greatest, everything directed by one household and one ruler (basileus), with the whole earth common to all, laws common to all and freedom to exercise citizenship or keep silent. Rome’s basileis, excellent in all respects, provide the greatest example in human affairs of homonoia towards one another, for they have shared all the cities they rule. Just as basileis lead the affairs of people best when they make themselves like the lords of the universe, the gods – Aristeides tells his audience – so cities are led best when they imitate most closely the intention of their rulers. The identification of the Roman empire with the oikoumene, however, has to be qualified in the Roman oration by the admission that there are peoples outside the empire. But they, Aristeides implies in a manner as condescending as that of Dion, are not considered worthy of inclusion by the Romans.21 19 Terms such as γῆ πᾶσα and ὅλη ἡ οἰκουμένη: e.g. 318a, 356b, 602d, 778c (on the text, see H.N. Fowler, AJPh 56 [1935] 330–331 and G. Roskam, Plutarch’s Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum: An Interpretation with Commentary [Leuven 2009] 179–180), Ant. 56.8. On the relation between οἰκουμένη and γῆ, cf. 409e–410a, 601c, 938d, Lys. 12.5; on γῆ and κόσμος, cf. 166d, 316e–f, 745b with 746a. View in The fortune of the Romans: 316e–317c; cf. Palm 33–36, Barrow 119–128. On the idealisation of Rome with cosmological overtones in this passage and in Numa 20.3–12 see Oliver 875, 881, comparing Lyk. 27.8, 29.1, 31.1–3 (Sparta) and Arstd. 26.66, 99 (Rome). Aemilius Paullus: 474f–475a. Scipio: 540f; cf. 196f–197a; Malcovati, ORF4 4 [P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus maior] fr. 3; Polybios 23.14.1–4; Livy 38.50.7, 11–12. 20 The whole world (πᾶσα ἡ οἰκουμένη) is ruled by Rome: 26.9. Interchangeability of οἰκουμένη and γῆ (γαῖα): 26.11, 101. οἰκουμένη close in sense to ἀρχή: 23.3; 26.33. Identification of οἰκουμένη with the Roman empire: 26.59–62, 97–99; cf. 26.10 on οἰκουμένη and ἡγεμονία. Cf. Plutarch in n. 19. On authors who did and did not distinguish between orbis terrarum and imperium Romanum, see Oliver 926. See in general M. Pavan, PP 17 (1962) 85–95. 21 Direction of the earth by μία πόλις, εἷς οἶκος and βασιλεὺς εἷς: 23.62 (cf. n. 34 below), 24.31; cf. Palm 61–62, Nörr2 113–114. Rome’s Caesars as example: 23.78–79; cf. 27.39 and Boulanger 381. Qualified identification of empire with world: 26.12, 81, 99. That people outside the empire are not considered worthy is implied by the statement (26.63) that Rome sought a (citizen) complement worthy of the city. No one is a foreigner who deserves to hold office or is trustworthy (26.60).

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The Unity of the Roman Empire The Unity of the Roman Empire

Two passages reporting the teaching of the philosopher Epiktetos suggest that he believes in the unity of the Roman empire. In one of these Caesar (Kaisar) is referred to as “the one in charge of everything”. The term is paralleled in Dion of Prousa, and is used merely to indicate Caesar’s power to compel people to do something against their will. Moreover, Epiktetos styles Herakles somewhat more elaborately as “the ruler and leader (hegemon, perhaps equivalent to Roman princeps) of the whole earth and sea”. In the other passage Epiktetos speaks of the peaceful conditions in the empire: Caesar is thought to provide us with profound peace. There are no longer any wars or battles or large-scale brigandage or piracy. At any hour it is possible to travel by land or sea from the rising to the setting of the sun. Can he, then, provide us with peace from fever too, and from shipwreck, fire, earthquake and lightning?22

The assumption here is that Caesar has achieved and maintains peace in the empire. Moreover, since Caesar is considered responsible for the freedom of travel, there is perhaps an implication that the empire extends from one end of the earth to the other. The picture is consistent, but the idea of the unity of the Roman empire is not brought out fully. Marcus Aurelius as ruler was naturally concerned to keep the empire together. Thus in 175 C.E. he opposed the revolt of Avidius Cassius, a general who might reasonably have expected to be promoted to the position held by Lucius Verus until his death in 169 C.E. Instead, of course, Marcus chose to groom his son Commodus, at that time only eight years of age, for the principate. About half of Cassius Dio’s account of this short-lived revolt, as preserved by Xiphilinos, is devoted to a speech by Marcus to his soldiers. Apart from a reference to “the common good”, here apparently equivalent to ‘the state’, the major point of interest for our purposes is Marcus’ representation of the revolt as a personal affront. This highlights the fact that Marcus is acting like a normal Roman politician, securing his prestige by ensuring that his son succeeds him and thus offending Avidius Cassius who is in turn concerned in the normal way with his own self-advancement.23 As with his cosmopolitan 22

Caesar as ὁ πάντων κύριος: Epikt. 4.1.12; cf. τῶν ὅλων κύριος in Dion 45.4 and Béranger 270. L. Willms, Epiktets Diatribe Über die Freiheit (4.1) 1 (Heidelberg 2011) 142 points to the lack of a Latin equivalent (dominus is perhaps closest) for ὁ πάντων κύριος Καῖσαρ. Herakles as ἁπάσης γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρχων καὶ ἡγεμών: 3.26.32. Profound peace: 3.13.9–12 (quotation 9–10). Cf. G. Germain, Épictète et la spiritualité stoïcienne (Paris 1964) 41–42. A similar statement on freedom to travel is made by the Christian writer Irenaeus (haer. 4.30.3; cf. chap. 7 n. 6). 23 ‘The common good (τὸ κοινόν)’: Cassius Dio/Xiphilinos 71.24.3–4; cf. M.A. 3.4.1; 4.4; 4.12; 10.6.2; 11.13.4, 21; 12.20. On this revolt see my article in Historia 18 (1969) 570– 587 at 581–582 = R. Klein (ed.), Marc Aurel [Wege der Forschung, 550] (Darmstadt 1979)

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beliefs, discussed in the next chapter, there is little connection between Marcus’ philosophical ideas and his actions in the field of government and politics. The meditations of Marcus preserve a single allusion to the Roman empire, and say nothing about its unity. Even the more purely philosophical work preserved in the Aristotelian corpus, On the kosmos, to be dated somewhere between the middle of the first century B.C.E. and the end of the second century of the common era, displays more interest in the unity of an empire (the Persian) as well as in homonoia in a city.24 Plutarch also does not stress the unity of the Roman empire. He admires the great power which Rome has achieved since its foundation by Romulus. The empire has had its troubles, such as the civil war between Pompeius and Caesar or the occasion when Rome was at war with all the nations at once (in the slave war of 73-71 B.C.E.?), but the end result is the most beautiful of human achievements.25 In explaining why the oracles at Delphoi are no longer given in verse, Plutarch contrasts past conditions with present ones. In the past kings and leaders needed oracles in verse so that their enemies might not learn their plans in advance. In Plutarch’s time people ask about commonplace matters, such as should one marry, or go on a voyage, or purchase a slave. Even cities ask nothing more important than questions concerning harvest from crops, the increase of herd population or public health. Questions now put to the god are concerned with the present settled conditions which Plutarch finds very pleasant. There is profound peace and quiet, wars have ceased, there are no wanderings of peoples, no civil dissensions (staseis), no tyrannies, nor other diseases or evils requiring unusual medicines. Elsewhere Plutarch points out that his contemporaries live in communities (politeiai) free from tyranny, war and siege.26 Yet the old freedom of the Greeks has disappeared. It is necessary for contemporary politicians to realise that they are rulers being ruled, in charge of a polis governed by proconsuls, the agents of the Caesars.27 Under the Roman empire the 359–388 at 371–373, accepting the suggestion, based on Cassius Dio 71.22.2, of T.W. Africa, Rome of the Caesars (New York 1965) 198 that Avidius could have expected to replace Lucius Verus. 24 Roman empire: M.A. 1.16.14. Compare [Arist.] kosm. 396b 4–7, 398a 27 – 398b 1, 399b 12–19. 25 Plu. 316c–e, 321e, 399d, Rom. 1.1 (cf. H. Peter, Die Quellen Plutarchs [Halle 1865] 147–148), Brut. 4.1. On Plutarch’s attitude to the Roman empire, see E.D. Phillips, C & M 18 (1957) 102–106; Palm 30–43; R. Flacelière, AC 32 (1963) 28–47 and Mélanges d’archéologie, d’épigraphie et d’histoire offerts à Jérôme Carcopino (Paris 1966) 367–375; H. Bengtson, Gymnasium 71 (1964) 159–160; C.P. Jones, HSPh 71 (1966) 322–325; Barrow chap. 10; J. Boulogne, Plutarque: un aristocrate grec sous l’occupation romaine (Lille 1994) 35–54; Swain 151–173, 185–186. 26 407d–408c, 784f; cf. possible praise of the emperor in 409c (on which passage compare R. Flacelière, RPh 8 [1934] 58–63 and C.P. Jones, JRS 56 [1966] 64–65). 27 813d–e; cf. 350b, Tim. 2.2, Palm 36–37, Nörr2 85, Barrow 132–137 and Jones, Plutarch 112–113.

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affairs of Greek cities no longer include leadership in wars, nor the overthrow of tyrannies, nor the negotiation of alliances. So what provision is there for a brilliant public career (politeia)? There are still public lawsuits, embassies to the Caesar (which require courage and intellect) and some neglected tasks (which, however, Plutarch only indicates by examples from the glorious past).28 However, Plutarch contradicts this rosy picture to some extent in his essay On exile, in which he praises life in a foreign city where one does not have to wait on or entertain the governor, be concerned about who is chosen to govern the province, go on an embassy to Rome or be involved in stasis. In The extinction of oracles the debaters agree that under Roman rule Greece has suffered depopulation because of the earlier staseis and wars over virtually the whole oikoumene.29 And, as noted in the previous section, more impressive statements are made by Plutarch about Alexander. This ruler not only dared to conceive of an empire over all humankind, but he believed himself the universal governor of and mediator for all things. Those whom he could not persuade to unite with him he forced together and united, mixing together people’s lives, marriages and customs as in a great loving-cup. As ‘common leader (hegemon koinos)’ desiring to unite the things on earth he told them all to consider the oikoumene their native land.30 This comparison of Plutarch’s statements on the Roman empire with those on Alexander suggests that he did not hold strong views on the unity of the Roman empire, although he praised the empire in other respects in some of his works. The theme of the unity of the Roman empire is most prominent in a speech by Ailios Aristeides, To Rome. After referring to Rome’s dignity and greatness,

28

805a–e. πολιτεία frequently means ‘political activity’, ‘public career’ (e.g. 784a, 823c, 1100b–d, Luc. 38.2, Dem. 15.3) as well as ‘citizenship’ (37e, 1034a), ‘constitution’ (232c, Cic. 40.1, Comp.Lys.Sulla 2.1; cf. H. Weber, op. cit. [n. 5] 29–36), ‘government’ (46b, 784d) and ‘civil polity’ (Arat. 49.2); cf. πολίτευμα as ‘political action’ (784d, Alk. 16.1), ‘constitution’ (Lyk. 27.6, Ages. 20.4), ‘civil polity’ (Ages. 33.4) and the use of πολιτεία or πολίτευμα with κοσμεῖν (322e, 403e) or διακοσμεῖν (779d). Similarly πολιτικός (adj.: 545d, Cor. 15.4; noun: 801e, Comp.Lys.Sulla 2.3), πολιτικὸς ἀνήρ (795d, Phok. 3.6; cf. ἄνθρωπος in 784b) and πολιτεύεσθαι (265d, Comp.Agis.Kleom.TG.CG 2.1) refer to political activity far more frequently than to statesmanlike actions (714c, 818a; 824c–d; 796d–e; cf. πολιτικῶς in 805f); for the sense ‘of a citizen’, cf. 135b, 791c. See Barrow 146–149 for comments on Plutarch living in the past. 29 413f–414a, 602c, 604a; cf. J.A.O. Larsen, ‘Roman Greece’ in T. Frank (ed.), An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome 4 (Baltimore 1938) 259–498 at 466–467, 481–482; SEHRE2 1.253–254; Barrow 131–132. Alcock (26–27) argues that Plutarch is merely deploying a literary topos. But his reference to “3,000 armed infantry” in 414a is simply an indicator of low population, not a (mistaken) claim that Greece fought wars under the Roman peace. 30 327d–e, 329b–e, 330a, d; cf. Palm 32–33, Barrow 142–144. For Tarn’s gross exaggeration about the loving-cup, and Badian’s refutation, see n. 16 in chap. 4.

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Aristeides implies a united empire in his statement that so many hills and paddocks have been urbanised and so much territory brought under the name of one city. This city is like the snow in Homer, as it covers mountain peaks and the land to the sea; but the simile is inadequate, for Rome is also like the mountain peaks. If the empire’s cities were laid side by side, Italy would become one continuous city. When the city itself and its boundaries have been seen, there is no longer amazement that “the whole inhabited world (pasa he oikoumene)” is ruled by Rome.31 The Roman empire is, in contrast to the Persian empire, coterminous with the oikoumene.32 Places on the borders of the earth are now like courtyard walls to the house which is Rome; the whole inhabited world desires the maintenance of the empire. Its unity is expressed by the absence of intruders, revolts, differences and discord. A musical metaphor is developed to denote the harmony and artistic perfection of the empire. This is a method which occurs elsewhere in Aristeides, as well as in Dion of Prousa and the Hermetic corpus.33 The empire, or oikoumene, is kept together by letters and administered like a single city through governors. The empire is not only unique in size but in the fact that it is composed of free people who have the advantage over members of the old democracies of appeal to a higher, nonlocal court; there is equality (isotes) between humble and great, obscure and famous, poor and rich, commoner and noble.34 These claims, perhaps formulated to balance the earlier exaggerated expressions of centralisation, would be difficult to substantiate in the face of both the strong distinction between Roman citizens and non-Romans and the power of the provincial élites. The claim that Rome administers the whole oikoumene through governors chosen as it were by election is true only to the extent that proconsuls had earlier in their career been chosen as consul or praetor in elections influenced by the princeps. Even appointments to the plums for senators, Africa and Asia, were subject to 31 Dignity (τοσῷδε ὄγκῳ πόλεως) and greatness (τῆς μεγάλης ... πόλεως): 26.2–3; cf. Oliver 908. One city: 26.6–9; cf. Iliad 12.282–284. On the idea of the oikoumene as the Roman world see F. Gisinger, RE 17.2 (Stuttgart 1937) 2165–2167 and, for its background, F.W. Walbank, C & M 9 (1948) 168–182 and J.S. Romm, op. cit. (n. 15) 37–40. For the historical process of urbanisation see Klein, Einführung 2–24. 32 26.10, 16. Oliver (909) points out that Aiskhines Sokratikos fr. 1 Krauss (as preserved in Arstd. 3.348 and P.Oxy. 1608) provides the background to this claim. See also Dionysios of Halikarnassos 1.3.3 and references in Oliver 909–910. 33 26.28–32. Musical metaphor: 27.30–31, using ἁρμονία and συναυλία; Dion 4.139, 48.7; C.H. 18.14. 34 26.33 (contrast what is said of the Persian empire in 18), 36–39; Oliver 919–921. Keil and Behr deleted ‘commoner’ (ἀγεννοῦς) in 26.39, leaving “equality between the poor and the rich and noble”; the word is retained by Oliver and Klein (Romrede). An opinion comparable with 26.36 is revealed in 23.62: “who are such children or so elderly that they do not know that one city, the first and greatest, has the whole world under its control, while one house directs everything, governors come to us according to law year by year, and everything both great and small is entrusted to them to do in whatever way seems best to them?”

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interference by the princeps.35 Appointments as representative of the Caesar, legatus Augusti (whether of consular or praetorian status), to provinces of which the princeps was proconsul were determined by him.36 In the same speech Aristeides makes an apparently clear distinction between the better part of the empire’s inhabitants (the more educated, noble and influential ones), to whom Roman citizenship (ciuitas) is given, and the rest, who are subject to Roman leadership: You have caused (the word) ‘Roman’ to be the name not of a city but of a kind of common race, and that race not one out of all but one counterbalancing all the rest. For you do not now divide the races into Greeks and barbarians, nor have you made a division which is ridiculous to humankind, since you present the city as more populous than the whole Greek race, so to speak. You have divided people into Romans and non-Romans.

But in the context the identification of the empire with the oikoumene, the exaggerated claims about citizenship grants to everyone who is fit for office or trustworthy and about “a common democracy of the earth” and “a single akropolis”, and the picture of Rome receiving all who flow in “from the whole earth” all serve to obscure the fact that the inhabitants of the empire were very far from having equal rights and privileges.37 It is true that the system of double citizenship provided people of the highest standing and influence in the provincial cities who guarded their native cities for Rome. But it is not accurate to imply that the masses (all the plethe, he says) had Roman citizenship open to them and easy access to refuge from local officials, so that the empire was like a single city.38 It is only with these qualifications that Aristeides’ claim of a

35 Behr 131–133, citing (e.g.) Tacitus, Agricola 42.1 and Fronto, To Antoninus Pius 8.1. See also G. Alföldy, Konsulat und Senatorenstand unter den Antoninen: Prosopographische Untersuchungen zur senatorischen Führungsschicht [Antiquitas, 1.27] (Bonn 1977) 110– 124, especially 110, 119, 121–122, 124. For the controlling hand of the Caesars in the provinces see W. Eck, Die Verwaltung des römischen Reiches in der hohen Kaiserzeit: Ausgewählte und erweiterte Beiträge 2 [Arbeiten zur römischen Epigraphik und Altertumskunde, 3] (Basel 1997) 31–66 and 107–145, especially 48–49, 53–54, 58–66, 107–108, 115 [= (with reduced documentation) Cambridge Ancient History2 11 (Cambridge 2000) 214– 237 and 266–292, especially 225, 228–229, 231–237, 266–267, 271]. On fauor Caesarum as the key to the consulate: Apuleius, Florida 9.40. See also G. Alföldy, AncSoc 7 [1976] 263–299, especially 272, 280, 291–293, 295–296. 36 See, for example, the direct way in which A.R. Birley speaks of Hadrian sending Q. Pompeius Falco from Lower Moesia to Britain as governor: Hadrian: the Restless Emperor (London 1997) 90, 123. 37 26.59–63 (quotation from 63). Cf. 27.32; Dion 32.36 and n. 17 above on Alexandria as the trading centre for practically the whole oikoumene; Nörr2 91–92. On the text and its interpretation see Oliver 927–929 and Behr 5 n. 7. 38 26.64–65; cf. R. Böhm, Aegyptus 43 (1963) 54–67; J. Bleicken, NGA (1966) 275 n. 95; J.H. Oliver, PP 23 (1968) 50–52. On the reliability of Aristeides’ claims compare F. De Visscher, RIDA3 1 (1954) 529–531 and A.N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship2 (Ox-

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single harmonious union (mia harmonia) embracing all in the constitution may be accepted.39 But the implications of unity in the references that follow to a cluster of cities, to the dependence of all cities on Rome’s guarding forces and to the cessation of strife and trouble because Rome has settled the dispute over empire and primacy40 are reasonable. The Romans are said to show wisdom not only in their whole civil administration, but also in military arrangements. They intertwine the army and citizenship, conscripting soldiers with attention to the strain on each area and sharing citizenship as an honour; thus the Romans gain both fellow-citizens and garrisons. Rome placed her walls not around the city, but around the empire or oikoumene, thus providing a permanent source of recruits. This wall takes the form of an encamped army of men who will not flee and who have perfected their war exercises. These bind the soldiers together in harmony which is comparable with a wall and which leads to uniquely eager and united attack against the enemy. Their united discipline is compared with that of an eternal chorus, but the army is subsequently divided into regiments and ethnic groups. The army explains how one man can rule over so many.41 The Roman empire is unique in size, control, administration and the number of cities which now merge into one another, so that one can travel securely in the empire as if from one native city to another.42 Rome’s success in substituting for ethnic groups cities of people with equal rights is due to her rulers’ ford 1973) 259, 426–427. On the distinction between loci communes and Aristeides’ formulations in speech 26, see Palm 58–59 and J. Bleicken, NGA (1966) 223–277, esp. 263–265, 269–271. Aristeides alludes more than once in this speech (26.32, 37) to his own resort to higher officials in order to avoid office: see Behr 77–86 and in ANRW 2.34.2 (Berlin 1994) 1207–1212. A.R.R. Sheppard, referring to Arstd. 26.65, points out that Aristeides “could not conceal the fact that the cosmopolitan connections of the new Greco-Roman élite were balanced by a gulf separating them from the poor in their own cities”: AncSoc 15–17 (1984– 1986) 240. 39 26.66 (μία ἁρμονία πολιτείας ἅπαντας συγκεκλῃκυῖα). On the use of ἁρμονία with reference to the Roman empire, see n. 33 above and Oliver 930 and n. 23. 40 26.67–69. However, the impression Aristeides leaves in 26.67 of demilitarisation is highly inaccurate. People living in many leading cities in Asia Minor, as well as in the countryside of Phrygia and Galatia, and especially on roads to the Euphrates frontier, would have seen garrison troops on a daily basis: see S. Mitchell, Anatolia: Land, Men, and Gods in Asia Minor (Oxford 1993) 1.141–142, 230. 41 26.72–89. ἁρμονία is used in 26.84 (twice), ὁμοφρονεῖν in 85. On the concept of another circle beyond the outermost circle of the oikoumene (26.81) Oliver (937) compares Plut. Caes. 23.3 and 58.7. J.-M. Bertrand contrasts the lands at the extremity of the oikoumene envisaged by Aristeides as capable of urbanisation (26.80) with the run-down, deplorable lands in Dion 7.39: in M.-F. Baslez et al. (eds.), Le monde du roman grec: Actes du colloque international tenu à l’École normale supérieure (Paris 17–19 décembre 1987) [Études de littérature ancienne, 4] (Paris 1992) 85–92 at 87. 42 26.92–93, 100, 102–103, 106, 108. Oliver (944) interprets στενωποί in 26.93 as uici; cf. Plu. 264c.

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development of perfect monarchic rule through a mixture of all constitutions (politeiai). The claim of provincial harmony is inaccurate, as Dion’s speeches make clear, and the discussion of the constitution idealistic.43 Yet Aristeides also claims that “the whole inhabited world” has laid down arms and turned to competitive adornment, as though attending a festival; that all other rivalries (philonikiai) have left the cities; that the oikoumene is now healthy, the earth is a common native city and has benefited by such changes as the common laws for all, universal security, and organisation of the whole oikoumene as one household.44 The rule of Antoninus Pius and his partners in the empire (hoi tes arkhes koinonoi) is outstanding and hence one can pray that all people will gain benefits from this united empire.45

43 26.90–93. On conflicts between leading cities in Roman provinces see the third section of chap. 2. Although subjected to criticism from H.M. Last (JRS 15 [1925] 108–111, 17 [1927] 235–236), W.E. Heitland argued to the end that it was the policy of the Roman government to keep the provincials disunited (Last Words on the Roman Municipalities [Cambridge 1928] 11–57, especially 23–24, 52–57, and Repetita: An Unwilling Restatement of Views on the Subject of the Roman Municipalities [Cambridge 1930] 14–19) and that Aristeides’ claims in speech 26 are refuted by evidence of local abuses, administrative corruption and poor rural conditions (Last Words 66–72; cf. similar comments by M. Hammond, The City in the Ancient World [Cambridge, MA 1972] 297–299). For the view that Aristeides’ ideal constitution was a democracy as well as a mixed constitution see S.A. Stertz, ANRW 2.34.2 (Berlin 1994) 1252–1254, 1258. E.W. Gray, JHS 75 (1955) 196 suggests Tacitus, Annales 4.33 (on mixed constitutions) as a useful “antidote” to Arstd. 26.90; cf. C. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge 1960) 161–162. B. Baldwin, CQ n. s. 11 (1961) 199–208, collects evidence from Loukianos (cf. n. 14) on the cleavage between the poor and the rich and on other sources of social unrest in the provinces; cf. Swain 315–321. On the theme of the mixed constitution, see Boulanger 355–356; M. Hammond, City-State and World State in Greek and Roman Political Theory until Augustus (Cambridge, MA 1951) chaps. 2, 6, 12; K. von Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of Polybius’ Political Ideas (New York 1954); G.J.D. Aalders, Die Theorie der gemischten Verfassung im Altertum (Amsterdam 1968), especially 126–128 on Aristeides; W. Nippel, Mischverfassungstheorie und Verfassungsrealität in Antike und früher Neuzeit [Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 21] (Stuttgart 1980), Part 1. 44 26.94–95, 97–102, 104. Aristeides takes Ionia as an example in 26.95 not only because he was based in Smyrna, but also as a compliment to Antoninus Pius, who was proconsul of Asia in 134/135 C.E., under Hadrian; cf. Klein, Romrede 112. Oliver (948) compares the comment in 26.102 on organisation of the whole oikoumene into one family with what is said of the Persians in 26.36 (a household of slaves). F. Fontanella points to the reality of disharmony made very clear in or. 23: in Ruling the Greek World 177–178. 45 26.107, 109; cf. Boulanger 357. R. Klein suggests that οἱ τῆς ἀρχῆς κοινωνοί refers above all to the consilium principis: Romrede 121–122; cf. J.A. Crook, Consilium Principis: Imperial Councils and Counsellors from Augustus to Diocletian (Cambridge 1955), especially 26 and 66, and J. Bleicken, Senatsgericht und Kaisergericht: Eine Studie zur Entwick-

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Aristeides’ eulogy of the Roman empire is built up largely by comparison with other empires and hegemonies, inadequate though he feels these comparisons to be.46 The Persian empire is divided by him into tribes, cities, countries, households and peoples. He says that the result of the Persian king’s treatment of cities and peoples was hatred, plots, rebellions, civil wars, constant strife and unceasing rivalries. The Persians did not know how to govern and acted more like slave-owners than kings. Alexander overran the earth, or at least advanced over most of it, but failed to establish an empire like Rome; the territory he conquered was divided up by his successors, who acted more like robbers than kings.47 The Romans in their hegemony surpass the Persians in size of empire and resources and the Greeks in wisdom and restraint. Greek inter-state organisations were small and each of Sparta, Athens and Thebes had only temporary leadership. Sparta and Athens strove for empire and hegemony but only gained the extremities (small islands, headlands and so on), not the whole body. The Spartan harmosts created disharmony; the Athenians proved unable to control their empire and reap the benefits, even showing their allies the advantages of defecting together and thus causing a universal revolt.48 The Romans first brought about an harmonious and united empire, showing that they are the discoverers of the art of rule (to arkhein). The size of their empire and the experience of governing it continually built up one another.49 According to J.H. Oliver, Aristeides presents the Roman empire as a form of organisation acceptable to Greeks, as a league. Oliver re-interpreted nine of the sixteen sections in the speech To Rome where the adjective koinos

lung des Prozeßrechtes im frühen Prinzipat [Abh. Göttingen, Philol.-Hist. Kl.3 53] (Göttingen 1962) 85–93. If the Roman speech were shorter, it might be compared with the airport press conference given by celebrities visiting a country. 46 26.14, 40; cf. 1.238, 284–285 for Aristeides’ ambivalence about such comparing (τὸ παρεξετάζειν); J. Bleicken, NGA (1966) 234–237. 47 Persian empire: 26.15–23 (cf. the reference back to δεσπότης [26.23] in 26.32). The sub-units are ἔθνη, πόλεις, χῶραι, οἶκοι, δῆμοι. Alexander and the Diadokhoi: 26.24–27; cf. Oliver 914–915 and Klein, Romrede 75–77. 48 Greek inter-state organisations: 26.41–48. Leadership is expressed by ἡγεμονία, προστασία or ἐπιστάται. The reality of these organisations is discussed by, for example, J.A.O. Larsen, Representative Government in Greek and Roman History (Berkeley 1955); R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972); G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London 1972), especially chap. 4; H. Beck and A. Ganter (Boiotian Leagues, 132–157), K.A. Raaflaub (Peloponnesian and Delian Leagues, 439–444) in Beck and P. Funke (eds.), Federalism in Greek Antiquity (Cambridge 2015). On the interpretation of the body metaphor in terms of love spells see C.P. Jones, AJPh 85 (1964) 65. Spartan ἁρμοσταί: 26.49–50 (cf. 66). For the play on harmostai / anharmostoi in 26.49 see chap. 2 n. 38. Athenian empire: 26.51–56. 49 26.30–31, 41, 51, 57–58. On the five world empires see also 3.335, 26.91 and J.H. Oliver, ‘The civilizing power’, Trans. Amer. Philos. Soc. n.s. 58.1 (1968) 25, 143.

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(‘common’) occurs, in order to bring out a federal significance.50 P.M. Fraser countered that Oliver saw too precise a meaning in some of the occurrences of koinos and suggested that he underestimated the influence of the protective measures of the Hellenistic kings on the Amphiktyonic decrees of the Roman period.51 To these points it may be added that koinos is frequent also in the speeches on homonoia and is used in a non-technical manner (as are related terms) even when Aristeides addresses the koinon (league) of Asia.52 Moreover, it is far from certain that the word for ‘subject’ (hupekoos) has the connotations of a league (rather than an empire) that Oliver gives to it.53 Thinking along the lines expounded by Oliver is found also in B. Forte. That Aristeides is correct in seeing advantages flowing even to those who lack Roman citizenship is an idea espoused by R. Klein. N. Méthy saw Rome presented as a divine figure in To Rome. This had earlier been suggested by E. Ratti, who also saw Rome as in tune with the harmony of the universe.54 Recently S.C. Jarratt has suggested that Aristeides undermines the praise of Rome by references to Homeric imagery. But the examples are far from convincing. There is no clue in 26.68-69 that the simile of bats clinging to each other and to rocks in a cave is an allusion to one of the two passages in the Odyssey where bats are mentioned; rather, there is an explicit reference to Plato. Homer is, however, cited in several other passages. Jarratt needs to take 50 Oliver 889–892, re-interpreting 26.60, 61, 63, 65, 76, 78, 85, 100, 102 and giving special force to κοινός in 26.7, 11. κοινός also occurs in 26.32, 51, 56, 62, 104. Oliver also argues (963–980) from Roman declarations protecting Greek benefactions that Rome functioned as a kind of league government. W.E. Heitland, Last Words (n. 43) 23–24 (cf. 41–42, 55) and Repetita (n. 43) 25–27 had pointed out that the empire was in fact an aggregate of cities, not a federation. For more recent authorities see, for example, P. Petit, Pax Romana (London 1976) 69–73; P.D.A. Garnsey and R.P. Saller, The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture (London 1987) 26–32; P.A. Brunt, Roman Imperial Themes (Oxford 1990) 79, 518; Alcock chap. 4 (for Akhaia); L. Capogrossi Colegnesi in id. and E. Tassi Scandone (eds.), Vespasiano e l’impero dei Flavi (Atti del Convegno, Roma, Palazzo Massimo, 18–20 novembre 2009) [Acta Flaviana, 2] (Roma 2012) 183–205. 51 P.M. Fraser, CR n.s. 5 (1955) 163–164, pointing to κοινός in, for example, 26.7, 61. Cf. M. Pavan, PP 17 (1962) 81–84, Nörr2 82–85 and J. Bleicken, NGA (1966) 245–246 and n. 47. 52 At least nineteen occurrences of κοινός in 23 (6, 7, 36, 44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 65, 66) and thirteen in 24 (7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 39), with only 23.7 and 23.65–66 possibly technical. Compare κοινωνία in 23.16, κοινότης in 23.24 and 28, κοινοῦν in 23.46 and κοινῇ in 23.7, 24.14 (both κοινῇ συμφέρει), 24, 29, 35, 37. 53 26.59, 75, where Oliver translates ὑπήκοόν τε καὶ ἀρχόμενον by “a league under your hegemony” and ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ὑπήκοον by “over the entire league” (cf. also J.H. Oliver, Gnomon 32 [1960] 503). The word clearly means ‘subject’ in 26.22, 80. 54 B. Forte, Rome and the Romans as the Greeks Saw Them [Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome, 24] (Roma 1972) 401–402, 407; Klein, Einführung 133; N. Méthy, Latomus 50 (1991) 660–668; E. Ratti, Memorie Ist. Lombardo, Scienze mor. e stor. 31.4 (1971) 283–361.

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the reader through these passages in more detail if she wants others to see them as tainting or undermining the ‘sublime’ achievement of the Roman empire. In my view Aristeides is genuinely claiming that the achievements of the Roman empire are great, but he is often disconnected from the facts.55 A balanced view has been taken recently by S.C.R. Swain. He does not think that Aristeides necessarily believed all he said about the democratic and shared equality of the Roman empire or on the common ownership of the Roman name. Rather, he thought it natural that accomplished people like himself would be offered citizenship (so he would, like Cassius Dio, have been horrified at Caracalla’s general extension of the citizenship in 212 C.E.). Roman offices flowed easily from the grant of citizenship. The division into ‘Romans and non-Romans’ is not his own, but attributed to the Romans. However, Aristeides constantly uses the second person singular (“you send annual governors”, “you constantly care for the Greeks”), as Swain’s quotations make clear. So “you divide” is not so pointed. Swain rightly emphasises the Greek/barbarian distinction as fundamental to Aristeides’ thought. The limes that kept inhabitants of the Roman empire separate from those outside is not, in his view, to be stressed too much as a clue to a ‘them and us’ mentality. What Aristeides says of equality in To Rome is contradicted by his admonitions to the cities of Asia that they should not presume equality of the ruled. Aristeides himself sought to avoid responsibility – his gains of immunity were largely received through his friendship with Caesar – so he did not want to share in the ‘equal gains’. Swain judges Aristeides to have done a good job of “presenting an autocratic regime as a participatory democracy where the elite are all Romans by name. It would be credulous to suppose he actually believed this picture”.56 While it is doubtful that Aristeides intended to represent the Roman empire as an organisation of an acceptable Greek type or as a specimen of absolute equality, there is no doubt that he believed in the unity of the Roman empire.

55

S.C. Jarratt in Ælius Aristide écrivain 213–229, especially 223–229. Citations of Homer: Arstd. 26:7, 83, 84, 86, 89, 101, 106. It is a pity that Jarratt relies on Oliver’s translation, given (for example) the tendentious translations of κοινός to which I have drawn attention at the beginning of this paragraph. 56 Swain 274–284, especially 278–283 (quotation from 283). C.P. Jones (in B.E. Borg [ed.], Paideia: The World of the Second Sophistic [Millennium-Studien, 2] [Berlin 2004] 13– 21), rightly stressing the complexity of identities in the second century, takes this and similar comments (Swain 279–280) to lead to contradictory conclusions; but if one leaves aside the strange claim about ‘ticket holders’ in the auditorium in C. Habicht, Pausanias’ Guide to Ancient Greece [Sather Classical Lectures, 50] (Berkeley 1985) 125–126 (cf. ‘für ein zahlendes Publikum’ in C. Habicht, Pausanias und seine “Beschriebung Griechenlands” [München 1985] 128), the contradictions are more easily shown in views on Pausanias than on Aristeides. Aristeides on equality: 26.37. The claim of equality is accepted by, for example, J.M. Madsen, Eager to be Roman: Greek Response to Roman Rule in Pontus and Bithynia (London 2009) 79–81, despite his awareness of Swain’s book.

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What is the relation between this belief and practice? Aristeides himself reflects unfavourably on this belief by dividing the empire on certain occasions into tribes, cities and armies, or into geographical areas, or by Greek/barbarian distinctions. The identification of the Roman empire with the oikoumene has to be qualified by the admission that there are peoples outside the empire (whom, Aristeides implies, the Romans considered unworthy of inclusion). There is in addition the clear distinction between those with Roman citizenship and those without it.57 This last point highlights the other divergencies, noted above, between Aristeides’ theoretical picture and reality: one must challenge his claims of full equality among all classes, of equal rights for all inhabitants of the empire, of ready access to higher courts for all, of citizenship open to every capable person and of harmony throughout the provinces of the empire. There is a poor connection between theory and practice in these specific areas of Aristeides’ belief in the unity of the empire. It has also been shown that some of his vaguer statements (for example, on the constitution) are too idealistic. We must reject the view expressed by M. Rostovtzeff, which is still the prevailing one, that Aristeides has provided “a masterpiece of thoughtful and sound political analysis” and a “full and precise ... picture of the structure of the Roman Empire”, and that he praises the empire without undue exaggeration.58 Aristeides speaks more freely in universalist terms than some of the earlier writers. The question arises whether this is a result of official thinking moving to a wider universalism under Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius. But if we review the titulature of the Caesars in a selection of Greek inscriptions (Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes provides a representative sample) we find that, while phrases such as “ruler of the oikoumene” are used freely by Marcus Aurelius, Commodus and the Severan dynasty, the usage is anticipated by earlier Caesars. Trajan is called “the saviour and benefactor of the whole kosmos” (whereas Marcus is “the benefactor and saviour of the whole oikoumene”) and Hadrian is variously “saviour of the kosmos”, “saviour of the oikoumene”, “saviour of the whole kosmos and the native land of

57 Division into ἔθνη (or γένη), πόλεις and στρατόπεδα: 26.31, 67, 88 (cf. οὐ πόλις, οὐκ ἔθνος in 26.28). Other distinctions: 26.94–96; see also, on the division of humankind into Greeks and barbarians, 1.322; 24.4, 37; 26.11, 14, 41, 96, 100. Peoples outside the empire: 26.12, 81, 99. Aristeides admits the distinction between citizen and non-citizen in 26.63 (cf. 59, 100). 58 SEHRE2 1.130–131. More recently M. Hammond expressed the belief that most of the inhabitants of the empire would have agreed with Aristeides that “Rome, personified in the emperor, had succeeded in combining oecumenism with democracy”; the “concept of the empire as Aristeides’ democracy of self-governing communities under the protection and leadership of the Roman emperor” prevailed for two centuries after Augustus’ victory at Actium (The City in the Ancient World [n. 43] 301–302).

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Phaselis [place of residence of the dedicator]” and “benefactor of the oikoumene”. Indeed, the honorific terminology goes back much further: Nero was honoured as “the saviour and benefactor of the oikoumene”.59 There does not, then, seem to be a change in the way the Caesars formulate their political position. But there is a greater conformity by Aristeides than by his (also highlyeducated) predecessors to the expectations of the ‘rulers of the world’. Some of his universalist thinking has the particular purpose of promoting Athenian beneficence so that it is conferred on all humankind and not just the Greeks.60 Greek intellectuals under the Roman peace frequently give the impression that the Romans had united the whole of the inhabited world in their empire. Some (like Strabon) admit freely, others (like Ailios Aristeides) reluctantly, that there were peoples beyond the Roman frontier. Plutarch is more enthusiastic about Alexander’s empire than about the unity of the Roman empire. But Dion of Prousa goes so far in praising Trajan as to claim the unification of all humankind under the Roman empire, though he is more cautious in other contexts. The claims by Dion and Aristeides are unrealistic, that Rome regards as an alien no person who is trustworthy. Nor was justice available equally to all inhabitants of the empire. Aristeides’ claim of a single, harmonious union embracing all in the constitution can only be accepted with qualifications. So Greek admirers of the Roman empire not only contradict their most fulsome praise; they are also out of touch with reality in some of their statements. Yet peace was of course an admirable achievement on the Romans’ part.

59 Nero: IGRR I 1124. It used to be thought that Livia Augusta was honoured as τ]ὴν εὐεργέτιν τοῦ κόσμ[ου] (IGRR IV 250), but R. Merkelbach suggested that the honorand was θεὰ ῾Ρώμη (ZPE 13 [1974] 280; so I.Assos 20). However, it is said of Livia Augusta that “her wisdom saved the whole world”: A.S.F. Gow and D.L. Page (eds.), The Greek Anthology: The Garland of Philip and Some Contemporary Epigrams (Cambridge 1968) 1.276, 2.308–309 (Honestus, fr. 21); C.P. Jones, ZPE 146 (2004) 93–98 at 94–95. Trajan: IGRR IV 1153. Hadrian: III 752, 756, 757 (σωτὴρ τοῦ κόσμου); III 758, 770, 771 (σωτὴρ τῆς οἰκουμένης); III 759, 760 (σωτὴρ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου καὶ τῆς πατρίδος τῆς Φασηλιτῶν); III 896 (ὁ εὐεργέτης τῆς οἰκουμένης). Marcus Aurelius: I 1015 (ὁ κύριος τῆς οἰκουμένης), 1096 (ὁ εὐεργέτης καὶ σωτὴρ τῆς ὅλης οἰκουμένης). Commodus: I 713. Septimius Severus and Iulia Domna: IV 878. Caracalla: IV 1354. G. Fowden notes Caracalla’s fondness for such titles as “saviour of the oikoumene” and kosmokrator: Empire to Commonwealth: Consequences of Monotheism in Late Antiquity (Princeton 1993) 26. Another common title is ‘ruler of earth and sea’: I 901 (Augustus as ὁ πάσης γῆς καὶ πάσης θαλάσσης ἄρχων), III 719 (Augustus), IV 679 (Marcus Aurelius), 611 (Septimius Severus), 1109 (Caracalla). 60 As argued by S. Saïd in Greeks on Greekness 47–60, especially 52–55, referring for example to Arstd. 1.55, 83–84, 167.

Chapter 4

Humankind Humankind

The idea that all humans are one plays a part in modern politics and social thought. The old term on everyone’s lips – before non-sexist language was widely accepted – was ‘the brotherhood of man’. The concept has a long history. While it seems clear that Alexander the Great did not hold to the idea, there was firm movement towards it a century before his death. A fragment of Antiphon the Athenian sophist states: ... for by nature at least we all in all respects are constituted alike, both barbarians and Greeks. ... none of us is distinguished as barbarian or as Greek. For we all breathe into the air through mouth and nostrils; we laugh in happiness and we weep in grief; we receive sounds by our hearing and see by the eye with our vision, ... .

Whether or not Antiphon has been influenced by medical writers of the fifth century B.C.E., and whether or not he is promoting human nature in opposition to the emphasis by Protagoras and others on the development of law, he bases an argument on the universal characteristics of human beings and dismisses as false the traditional Greek distinction between Greeks and barbarians.1 1

Antiphon, fr. 44(b) Pendrick (DK 87 B 44 fr. B lacks P.Oxy. 3647, published in 1984) cols. II–III. The papyrus fragments of Truth have been republished with full bibliography and commentary by G. Bastianini and F. Decleva Caizzi in Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini 1.1 (Firenze 1989) 176–222. It used to be thought that Antiphon is making the point that we are not justified in respecting and honouring those born of aristocratic fathers and failing to honour and respect those not from a noble house. See, for example, Baldry 43–45; A. La Face, Ricerche antifontee [Vita degli antichi, 2] (Palermo 1969) 22, 57–58; G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge 1981) 154–159. Discussion since the additional piece of papyrus was added to P.Oxy. 1364 has favoured the view that Antiphon is using the concept of biological equality to give more weight to the dictates of (human) nature and less to those of law/convention: M.S. Funghi in H.M. Cockle (ed.), The Oxyrhynchus Papyri 52 [Graeco-Roman Memoirs, 72] (London 1984) 4–5; F. Decleva Caizzi, RMM 91 (1986) 291– 310 (cf. ῾Η ἀρχαία σοφιστική/The Sophistic Movement: Papers Read at the First International Symposium on the Sophistic Movement Organised by the Greek Philosophical Society, 27–29 Sept. 1982 [Athens 1984] 96–107, especially 100–103); M. Ostwald in M. Griffith and D.J. Mastronarde (eds.), Cabinet of the Muses: Essays on Classical and Comparative Literature in Honor of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer (Atlanta, GA 1990) 293–306. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (London 1979) 2.207–211 and H.D. Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics (London 1983) 64–68, 84–85 were already tending in this direction. The reading of a genitive plural participle in col. 2 line 4 leads to the supplement [τῶν τη]λοῦ οἰκ[ούν]των rather than [ἐκ φαύ]λου οἴκ[ου ὄντας] (Grenfell and Hunt) or [ἐκ μὴ κα]λοῦ οἴκ[ου ὄντας]

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Nearly 600 years after Antiphon, one man – Marcus Aurelius – had the opportunity to improve the unity of humankind in which he believed. We sometimes receive the impression from modern scholarship that all was sweetness and light in the middle decades of the second century. It has been argued, for example, that the coins of Marcus as Caesar emphasise harmonious dealings with his adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, and that the major subject of the reverses of coins for the whole principate from 161 to 180 C.E. was the harmonious relations of Marcus with Lucius Verus along with the legitimacy of the succession.2 Rather, a legend such as “harmony of the armies” constitutes an injunction that the armies on the frontiers should pull together and certainly not fight each other. Similarly we should expect an appeal for harmony to lie behind the simple CONCORDIA on coins of the joint principate. For it seems that in Marcus’ view Lucius was too indulgent, though in one case when he tried to tighten regulations he found that his old-fashioned tenets (such as the insistence on three generations of freeborn status for membership of the Council of the Areopagos in Athens) were impracticable.3 Now, Marcus Aurelius had autocratic power. He could have improved relations with people on the borders of (Wilamowitz). For the assumption in the fifth century B.C.E. in an ethnographical context that humans everywhere are the same see also the Hippokratic treatise Airs Waters Places 23. On Protagoras see M. Nill, Morality and Self-Interest in Protagoras, Antiphon and Democritus [Philosophia Antiqua, 43] (Leiden 1985) 58 and 74; E. Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric (Columbia, SC 1991) 180–181, 185; J. de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens (Oxford 1992) 115–116, 166–167, 193; L.J. Apfel, The Advent of Pluralism: Diversity and Conflict in the Age of Sophocles (Oxford 2011) 45–78, 111–112. There is no clear evidence linking Protagoras to the nomos/phusis antithesis, but it was in the air by the late 430s B.C.E.: M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens (Berkeley 1986) 260–266. R. Bilik’s denial of the authenticity of fr. 44 (Tyche 13 [1998] 29–49) has been adequately refuted by M. Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian: Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists (Austin, TX 2002) 64–65. On Alexander the Great see below, with notes 16 and 25. On the resurgence of modern debate about cosmopolitanism see n. 53 below. 2 A. Dubreuil, CEA 20 (1987) 87–104; he does recognise (91–92) the existence of military revolts under Antoninus Pius as indicated by coin reverses. For the coins from 161–180 C.E. see W. Szaivert, Die Münzprägung der Kaiser Marcus Aurelius, Lucius Verus und Commodus (161–192) [Moneta Imperii Romani, 18] (Wien 1986), especially 42–77 for the reverses; for the coins of Marcus as Caesar see H. Mattingly and E.A. Sydenham, The Roman Imperial Coinage 3 (London 1930) 77–92, 171–190. In discussing homonoia coins which link Greek cities (as distinct from concordia coins issued by the centre) A.R.R. Sheppard cautions that there may be many reasons for issuing such coins: AncSoc 15–17 (1984–86) 231–234. 3 For the editio princeps of the relevant inscription by J.H. Oliver and early discussion see my report in ANRW 2.2 (Berlin 1975) 490–492. Later discussion: W. Williams, ZPE 17 (1975) 37–56 and JRS 66 (1976) 78–82; S. Follet, RPh 53 (1979) 29–43; J.H. Oliver, Greek Constitutions of Early Roman Emperors from Inscriptions and Papyri [Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, 178] (Philadelphia 1989) 366–388, especially 386. R.P.

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the Roman empire at a time when, as E.L. Bowie has argued, the Greek/barbarian division was very persistent.4 Instead, we find him acting in accordance with traditional Roman values on glory. He changed the names of two Dacian provinces from simple ‘Upper’ and ‘Lower’ in order to honour particular cities or regions.5 It was suggested by A.R. Birley that along with the reduction of Upper Moesia to a single legion in the 170s, the status of the province was changed so that it was governed by an ex-praetor rather than an ex-consul. This has been challenged,6 but the reduction from two legions to one does suggest confidence about the lack of threat from the re-entrant of barbarian territory to the north of the province. Yet we have no evidence of negotiations with barbarians once the province needed only one legion. In the event, the Marcomannic wars were brought to a conclusion not by Marcus but by his despised son Commodus, who allowed ‘barbarians’ to settle inside the empire.7 Why could not Marcus bring himself to do this before his death? In his meditations he puts strongly the views that mind and reason are common to all Duncan-Jones, JRA 9 (1996) 108–136 at 134 has attributed Marcus’ change of mind to the repercussions of the plague that began several years earlier, but his own studies have shown a long-term shortage of eligible candidates for local office: Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy (Cambridge 1990) 163–166. The key lines of the inscription are E 57–81. 4 E.L. Bowie in S. Saïd (ed.), ῾ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΣ: Quelques jalons pour une histoire de l’identité grecque [Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg, 25–27 octobre 1989] (Leiden 1991) 195–199. Cf. E.A. Brown in S.G. Salkever (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Political Thought (Cambridge 2009) 359: “But the connections between real-world imperialism [i.e. Roman imperialism] and the doctrine of the cosmopolis are not difficult to make”. 5 C.C. Petolescu, StudClas 24 (1986) 131–138 and Germania 65 (1987) 123–134. Cassius Dio (68.17.1, 75.1.1) attributes the eastern campaigns of Trajan and Severus – 82 years apart – to the desire for glory (δόξης ἐπιθυμίᾳ in both passages). Hadot (40) points out that when Marcus views the immensity of universal Nature, “current fame and posthumous glory seem completely vain” (4.3.7–8, 8.21.2–3, 12.21). Certainly Marcus can speak as though glory fades after one’s death (4.33.3). 6 A.R. Birley in Acta Antiqua Philippopolitana: Studia Historica et Philologica (Sofia 1963) 109–112 and Septimius Severus: The African Emperor (London 1971) 113. For criticism see G.R. Stanton, ANRW 2.2 (Berlin 1975) 478–549 at 508–509 and E. Doruƫiu-Boila, ZPE 68 (1987) 247–259. 7 P. Oliva, Pannonia and the Onset of Crisis in the Roman Empire (Praha 1962) 303– 306; G. Alföldy, Historia 20 (1971) 84–109; A. Mócsy, Pannonia and Upper Moesia: A History of the Middle Danube Provinces of the Roman Empire (London 1974) 186–193 (note, e.g.: “It is impossible to guess why Marcus could not bring himself, under such circumstances, to remove the impending danger either by means of armed help or by the receptio”. [186] “The fact that the legions of Upper Moesia could be used elsewhere should indicate that this province was not in immediate danger”. [188]); G.R. Stanton, op. cit. (n. 6) 523; O. Hekster, Commodus: An Emperor at the Crossroads [Dutch Monographs on Ancient History and Archaeology, 23] (Amsterdam 2002) 40–49; P. Kovács, Marcus Aurelius’ Rain Miracle and the Marcommanic Wars [Mnemosyne Supplements, 308] (Leiden 2009) 250– 261.

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humans and that the universe is a common state. Is it possible that Marcus was not sufficiently flexible about Roman glory, despite the obvious need for peace with the northern ‘barbarians’, because he failed to see the consequences for all humans that mind and reason are common to all? If, as it seems, Marcus did not implement practical steps to achieve unity, was it because citizenship of the universe was for him (and others) an élitist idea, far removed from modern western ideas of what it might mean to be a ‘citizen of the universe’? What about other intellectuals of the first two centuries – in what direction did they develop the ideas of the unity of humankind and citizenship of the universe?

The Unity of Humankind The Unity of Humankind

Certainly writers of the first and second centuries use many terms which suggest a belief in the unity of humankind. They use ‘all’ in the masculine plural (pantes, hapantes, xumpantes), indicating all people. ‘All humans’, ‘human beings’, ‘among humans’, ‘human nature’, ‘the human race’ and so on occur widely. The adjectives ‘human’ (anthropeios, anthropinos, anthropikos) and ‘mortal’ are used repeatedly.8 The Gospel of Luke, for example, admittedly with a Semitic turn of phrase, reports Jesus as warning his audience in the temple at Jerusalem that “that day” (the day of the kingdom of God) “will come upon all (pantes) who live on the face of the whole earth”. Even earlier, Diodoros Sikeliotes opened his book with the claim that all humans (pantes anthropoi) should be very grateful to those who have composed universal histories because they have made it their ambition to help the universal life [of humans] by

8 Samples only are given of the terminology here, and then only from three authors who are discussed in this chapter. πάντες: Epikt. 2.4.6, 4.10.27; Plu. 90b, 481e; Dion 10.22, 17.15–16; ἅπαντες (πάντες, ξύμπαντες) ἄνθρωποι: Epikt. 1.4.30–31, 4.6.5; Plu. 330d, 498c– d, 963a; Dion 11.1, 20.19, 49.3. The term is an exaggeration in many contexts: e.g. Plu. 69f, 326b; Dion 3.106, 28.5. (ὁ) ἄνθρωπος: Epikt. 1.8.16, 2.4.1; Plu. 86d, 451b; Dion 8.23, 10.11. οἱ ἄνθρωποι: Epikt. 3.24.113, 4.1.42; Plu. 168a, 279a; Dion 23.3, 65.10. ἐν ἀνθρώποις: Epikt. 1.28.21, 2.11.16; Plu. 108f; Dion 1.65, 2.69. ἄνθρωποι contrasted with θεοί: Epikt. 2.20.9, 4.11.3; Plu. 90c, 414d; Dion 3.60, 11.18. κοινὸς πᾶσι (‘common to all humans’): Epikt. 1.22.1 (πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις); Plu. 362b, 377f. ἀνθρώπειος: Plu. 104e, 387e; Dion 17.11, 69.4. ἀνθρωπικός: Epikt. 1.28.25, 2.20.19–20; Plu. 135a–b, 704f. ἀνθρώπινος: Epikt. 3.1.37, fr. 1; Plu. 167f, 276a; Dion 4.29, 32.41. ἀνθρωπικῶς: Plu. 999b. ἀνθρωπίνως: Plu. 273a, Pomp. 10.4. θνητός: Epikt. 2.9.2, 4.1.77; Plu. 152b, 996b–c; Dion 1.37, 29.3. πᾶν τὸ θνητόν, ‘all humankind’, in Dion 12.53 is very uncertain and was deleted by von Arnim: see Russell, Dio 196–197 and H.-J. Klauck, Dion von Prusa, Olympische Rede oder Über die erste Erkenntnis Gottes [SAPERE, 2] (Darmstadt 2000) 140 n. 272. ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις: Plu. 495a, Kim. 2.5; Dion 29.16, 65.6. ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσις: Plu. 113c. τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος: Plu. 117d; Dion 36.31. τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος: Dion 12.34, 30.26.

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their individual labours. ... Moreover, they have made it their ambition also to bring all humans, who, while sharing kinship (sungeneia) with one another, are nevertheless separated in space and time, into one and the same system (suntaxis).

Musonius Rufus, in arguing that daughters should receive the same education as sons, concedes that within the human race (to genos to anthropinon) the physical constitution of males is stronger than that of females. His former student Dion of Prousa, in speaking at Olympia about “human opinion concerning the deity”, repeatedly uses anthropinos – of human speech and the human mind, for instance – but has strong terms for the whole race of humankind: Concerning the general nature of the gods and especially that of the ruler of the universe, first and foremost there is an opinion and common conception of the whole human race (to xumpan anthropinon genos), possessed by Greeks and barbarians alike, which is inevitable and innate in every rational being, arising in harmony with nature without the assistance of a mortal teacher and independently of the deceit of an initiator into mysteries ... .

The Jewish writer Iosephos (Josephus) objects to the ethnocentric view that the Greeks alone deserve attention in the study of the earliest history and that they alone possess a knowledge of antiquity. A papyrus letter published in the 1980s from the prefect of Egypt to district governors, which graphically illustrates Hadrian’s assumption of power without authorisation from the senate in Rome, asks for prayers and the wearing of garlands for ten days and begins with the announcement: “For the safety of the whole race of humankind (to sumpan anthropon genos) know that the rule has been taken over from the god his father by Imperator Caesar Traianus Hadrianus Optimus Augustus Germanicus Dacicus Parthicus”.9 9 Luke 21.35 (compare the division implied by the same author in Acts 17.26: “every nation of humans to inhabit the whole face of the earth” [see further chap. 8 at n. 26]; ἔθνος similarly in Paul’s mouth in 28.19, 28). Diodoros 1.1.1, 1.1.3. The latter passage was linked with Polybios 1.4.1 by K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie: Neue Untersuchungen über Poseidonios (München 1926) 184–185. For the view that the thought is not specifically Stoic, but common, see K.S. Sacks, Diodorus Siculus and the First Century (Princeton 1990) 36, 64 (against, for example, B. Farrington, Diodorus Siculus: Universal Historian [Inaugural Lecture Swansea 1937] 10). K. Clarke finds a concentration of universal historians (in the strict sense) in the latter half of the first century B.C.E.: in C.S. Kraus (ed.), The Limits of Historiography: Genre and Narrative in Ancient Historical Texts [Mnemosyne Supplements, 191] (Leiden 1999) 249–279. Musonius, fr. 4 p.16.19–17.4 Hense = p.46.7–20 Lutz (ἐν τῷ γένει ἀνθρωπίνῳ); cf. A.C. van Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe [Wijsgerige Teksten en Studies, 8] (Assen 1963) 51–53. In a thorough study M.C. Nussbaum finds Musonius’ feminism to be far from complete: in Nussbaum and J. Sihvola (eds.), The Sleep of Reason: Erotic Experience and Sexual Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome (Chicago 2002) 283–326, especially 300–313. Writing about the same time L. Hill found firm movement towards feminism: HPTh 22 (2001) 12–40, especially 19–20, 27–30, 32–33, 36–39. Dion 12.26–34 (quotation from 27; ξύμπαν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος in 34). The transposition of several lines of §17 to §26, first suggested by Emperius, produces a striking juxtaposition of “the whole human race” with renown for “the whole race” of an

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Epiktetos, who taught at Nikopolis (near the site of Augustus’ final victory at Actium) in the latter half of the first century of our era, would seem to be a good candidate for a belief in the unity of humankind. Not only is he concerned about the welfare of people, he also urges his students always to act with reference to the whole community. He is less affected by divisions of humankind than most writers whose works survive from the first or second century. Racial distinctions are made, and Greeks are contrasted with Trojans.10 But the traditional division between Greeks and barbarians is not evident in his teaching. Indeed, the word barbaros does not occur in his works. It is striking, therefore, that there does not survive in the extant records of his classroom discussions or in his Enkheiridion (Handbook) any clear statement of belief in the unity of humankind. The closest statement that I have found is the idea that the Cynic acts as the parent or sibling of all people. But this remains a piece of imagery, and the only social consequence that flows from the statement is the reproaching by Cynics of those they meet. Perhaps along the same line is the premise that slaves are descended equally from Zeus; this does not produce thoughts of the abolition of slavery, but leads to an injunction to refrain from angry violence towards one’s slave.11 Epiktetos does indeed rise above polis-centred Olympic victor, but Russell (Dio 176) finds irony in the fulsome presentation of the vanity of athletes. Iosephos, Against Apion 1.2.6, 1.3.15. P.Oxy. 3781, ed. J.R. Rea, The Oxyrhynchus Papyri 55 [Graeco-Roman Memoirs, 75] (London 1988) at 15–16. On the new prefect of Egypt who issued this letter on 25 August 117, Q. Rammius Martialis, see A.R. Birley, Hadrian: The Restless Emperor (London 1997) 79, 82–83; for the dual interests of the prefect (displaying loyalty to the new Caesar) and of Hadrian (evoking goodwill from the inhabitants of Egypt) see J. de Jong in L. de Blois et al. (eds.), The Impact of Imperial Rome on Religions, Ritual and Religious Life in the Roman Empire: Proceedings of the Fifth Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200 B.C. – A.D. 476): Münster, June 30–July 4, 2004 (Leiden 2006) 246–247. For similar phraseology, “the benefactor [Galba] who has shone upon us for the safety of the whole race of humankind”, see CIG 3.4857.7 (= OGIS 2.669.7 = SB 5.8444.2.7). 10 Racial distinctions: Epikt. 1.11.12–13, 2.9.19–20. Greek/Trojan contrast: 2.24.22, 3.22.32–34. On the interchange with an interlocutor in these dialogues see T. Wirth, MH 24 (1967) 149–189, 197–216 (167–175 on 1.11) and B. Wehner, Die Funktion der Dialogstruktur in Epiktets Diatriben [Philosophie der Antike, 13] (Stuttgart 2000), especially 39– 40 on 1.11 and 159–170 on 2.24.20–26 and 3.22.30–44. 11 βαρβαρίζειν, referring to Epiktetos’ inferior speaking style, occurs in 3.9.14. Cynic: 3.22.54, 81–82. This is directed at their individual lives, as is shown by the Cynic loving (silently) those who flog him. See also SVF 3.578–580; D.R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th century A.D. (London 1937) 193–194; M. Billerbeck, Epiktet: Vom Kynismos [Philosophia Antiqua, 34] (Leiden 1978) 119. On Stoic reactions to flogging and other personal insults see A.C. van Geytenbeek, op. cit. (n. 9) 134–142. Slaves: 1.13.2–5. It has been held that Stoic disdain for externals enabled them to avoid serious reform on slavery (P.A. Vander Waerdt, OSAPh 9 [1991] 185–211, especially 201; Dobbin 146), but A. Erskine has argued that slavery was challenged by early Stoics: The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action (London 1990) 46–58.

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thought in his approval of Sokrates refusing to say “I am an Athenian” or “I am a Korinthian” and stating instead “I am a citizen of the universe”. But this leads on to a discussion of the individual citizen of the universe (see the next section), not to a discussion of the unity of humankind.12 We might have expected a doctrine of affinity (oikeiosis) of all humans to have been developed from the idea of kinship between gods and humans, for affinity with humans is a desirable outcome in the thought of Marcus Aurelius. But in Epiktetos oikeiosis seems rather to mean ‘appropriation’.13 On one occasion Epiktetos comes 12

1.9.1–6. κόσμιος corresponds to ᾿Αθηναῖος and Κορίνθιος. Cf. ἡ οἰκείωσις in 1.19.15 with Dobbin’s discussion (177–180), οἰκειοῦσθαι (‘to be well-disposed’ [to oneself]) in 2.22.15, 3.24.11 and enkh. 30, and συγγένεια in 1.9.1, 11 (cf. 1.9.7, 13, 22, 25). On the idea of kinship between gods and humans see É. des Places, Syngeneia: La parenté de l’homme avec Dieu d’Homère à la patristique [Études et commentaires, 51] (Paris 1964), especially 154–163 on Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius. For συγγένεια between cities and between peoples see S.F. Elwyn, TAPhA 123 (1993) 261–286, O. Curty, Les parentés légendaires entre cités grecques: Catalogue raisonné des inscriptions contenant le terme ΣΥΓΓΕΝΕΙΑ et analyse critique [Hautes Études du Monde Gréco-romain, 20] (Genève 1995), especially 215–241, C.P. Jones, Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World (Cambridge, MA 1999), especially chap. 1, and S. Lücke, Syngeneia: Epigraphisch-historische Studien zu einem Phänomen der antiken griechischen Diplomatie [Frankfurter Althistorische Beiträge, 5] (Frankfurt am Main 2000), especially 119–122; for the themes of συγγένεια and ὁμόνοια in the self-presentation of Hellenistic cities see P. Herrmann, in Πρακτικὰ τοῦ Η´ Διεθνοῦς Συνεδρίου ῾Ελληνικῆς καὶ Λατινικῆς ᾿Επιγραφικῆς (᾿Αθήνα, 3– 9 ᾽Οκτωβρίου 1982) 1 (Athens 1984) 116–119. On οἰκείωσις see M. Pohlenz, Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophie [Abh. Göttingen3, 26] (Göttingen 1940) 1–47; C.O. Brink, Phronesis 1 (1956) 123–145; S.G. Pembroke in A.A. Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicism (London 1971) 114–149; P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias 1 [Peripatoi, 5] (Berlin 1973) 178–179, 208–210, 316–350; B. Inwood in W.W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus [Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 1] (New Brunswick, NJ 1983) 190–201 (making a strong distinction between social oikeiosis, a natural affinity to others, and personal oikeiosis, appropriation for oneself, and discussing Epikt. 1.19.11–15 on 197); T. Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy [Studies in Hellenistic Civilization, 2] (Aarhus 1990), especially chaps. 3–4; J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford 1993) 262–276; R. Radice, “Oikeiosis”: Ricerche sul fondamento del pensiero stoico e sulla sua genesi [Temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico. Studi e testi, 77] (Milano 2000), especially chaps. 6–7; C.-U. Lee, Oikeiosis: Stoische Ethik in naturphilosophischer Perspektive [Alber-Reihe Thesen, 21] (München 2002); C. Gill, Marcus Aurelius, Meditations: Books 1–6 (Oxford 2013) xxxvi–xxxix, 57, 178; E. Wolf, GLB 20.2 (2015) 189–198. Pembroke (op. cit. 122– 123) points out that “mankind at large is not in fact directly attested in the writings of Chrysippus as an object of oikeiosis” (but affection for one’s children is so attested). He also denies (116) Stoic usage of the active sense ‘appropriation’ offered for 1.19.15 above, but it is found acceptable (though without the connotation of the use of force) by A.A. Long for statements by Hierokles and others: in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle and After [BICS Supplements, 68] (London 1997) 13–31 at 25–29. G. Reydams-Schils makes the lack of a doctrine 13

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close to concluding that all humans, having kinship with God, are related to one another: The universe is full of friends (philoi), first gods, then humans, who have been made welldisposed to one another by nature. Some must remain with one another while others depart; while we rejoice in those who are with us, we must not grieve at those who depart.

Philoi, of course, include relatives. No emotion need be involved in the alliances between philoi and here Epiktetos deplores grief at the passing of kinfolk (and philoi). For humans (ho anthropos) are by nature capable of spurning everything outside the sphere of their moral purpose (prohairesis).14 And in general Epiktetos concentrates in his teaching on the self-sufficiency of the individual person, and on one person’s relations with a single other person, rather

of affinity in Epiktetos even more surprising in view of her argument that self-centred oikeiosis as well as social oikeiosis is fundamentally community-oriented: OSAPh 22 (2002) 221– 251, especially 222–226; revised version with some omissions in The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection (Chicago 2005) 53–82, especially 55–59. For later Christian transformation (by Origen and Gregory of Nyssa) of oikeiosis to ‘reappropriation’ of all creatures see I. Ramelli, Apeiron 47 (2014) 116–140. 14 3.24.11–12; what is said of humans is: ἀνθρώπων φύσει πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾠκειωμένων. Cf. SVF 3.43: “friendship (amicitia) is to be cultivated for its own sake; the community of humans (societas hominum), equality and justice are also to be sought for their own sake”; also (making a connection with Dion 36.30) Schofield 90–91. That φίλοι includes relatives is argued by A.M. Dale and others on Euripides, Alkestis 15–16: see G.R. Stanton, Hermes 118 (1990) 42–54 at 43 and n. 5. On prohairesis in Epiktetos see C. Cassanmagnago, RFN 69 (1977) 232–246; M. Draghona-Monahou, Φιλοσοφία 8–9 (1978–1979) 265–310 and in The Philosophy of Epictetus 112–113 and n. 1; J. Hershbell, ANRW 2.36.3 (Berlin 1989) 2159–2160; R. Dobbin, AncPhil 11 (1991) 111–135. Building on A.F. Bonhöffer’s suggestion (118–119; taken for granted in his The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus [Revisioning Philosophy, 2] [Eng. tr., New York 1996] 23, 28) that Epiktetos often uses προαίρεσις where reason (λόγος), intellect (διάνοια) or governing principle (ἡγεμονικόν) would do just as well, Dobbin argues that Epiktetos’ unified view of the place of humans in nature is encapsulated in this one word (129–134). R. Sorabji in The Philosophy of Epictetus 87–98 basically argues that prohairesis in Epiktetos is the self (but there is more than one prohairesis and more than one self), though he also uses “rational decision” (87) and “choice” (89, 92) to translate the term; see also the version of the argument in his Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death (Chicago 2006) 181–197. It might be thought, because of the juxtaposition of their papers in P. Remes and J. Sihvola (eds.), Ancient Philosophy of the Self [The New Synthese Historical Library, 64] (Dordrecht 2008) 13–56, that Sorabji and C. Gill have radically opposed views on prohairesis and related matters, but see the comments by the editors, ibid. 5–6, and by M.J.O. Verheij, CW 107 (2013–14) 169–197. Gill asked similar questions of Marcus Aurelius: in M. van Ackeren and J. Opsomer (eds.), Selbstbetrachtungen und Selbstdarstellungen: Der Philosoph und Kaiser Marc Aurel im interdisziplinären Licht/Meditations and Representations: The Philosopher and Emperor Marcus Aurelius in an Interdisciplinary Light: Akten des Interdisziplinären Kolloquiums Köln 23. bis 25. Juli 2009 (Wiesbaden 2012) at 35–64.

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than on a more complex pattern of human relationships. He apparently lacked interest in a theory of the unity of humankind. Plutarch uses terms such as ‘all mortals’ and ‘the human race’, but what is implied by a phrase such as ‘among humankind’ can elsewhere be broken into ethnic or other groups. Similarly ‘all humans’ can later be divided into “all the wise people throughout the inhabited world (kata ten oikoumenen)” and the rest, or into Greek cities and uncivilised nations. Moreover, phrases such as “practically everyone” and “all humans, so to speak” imply exceptions.15 Most of Plutarch’s statements which can be interpreted as belief in the unity of humankind occur in the epideictic speeches The fortune or excellence of Alexander. E. Badian has argued convincingly that Alexander III of Makedon did not conceive of the unity of humankind, but Plutarch puts forward the view that Alexander wanted to make ‘the things on earth’ subject to one reason and one government and to show ‘all humans’ as one people (heis demos) administered by one reason and one justice, and subject to a single leadership. He represents Alexander as a philosopher in deed, not word, a ‘leader in common’ (hegemon koinos) taming unruly and warring nations, seeking to unite things barbarian with things Greek, to provide every barbarian nation with Greek justice, peace and political experience, to civilise every continent, and to win for all humans homonoia, peace and koinonia with one another.16 The only concrete means, however, that Plutarch envisages for this task are the marriages between Persian brides and Makedonian and Greek soldiers; they were for koinonia of the

15 οἱ θνητοὶ ἅπαντες: Plu. 116a; τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος: 117d; cf. Ps.-Plu. 1131c (παντὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει). ἐν ἀνθρώποις: 378c, 555f; ethnic groups: 317b–c, 323f–324a, 377c, 377f–378d. “All humans” subdivided: 327d, 328b, e, 1068c–f, Alex. 27.10–28.1. Humankind composed of barbarians and Greeks: 369b. “Practically all humans”: 359f, 1085b, 1093a; for ὀλίγου δεῖν qualifying ἅπας or σύμπας, see also 544c, 762e, 791e. 16 E. Badian, Historia 7 (1958) 425–444, attacking W.W. Tarn’s view presented in PBA 19 (1933) 123–166 and AJPh 60 (1939) 41–70. See also the discussions by M.H. Fisch, AJPh 58 (1937) 59–82, 129–151; Baldry 113–127; and A.B. Bosworth, Ancient Society (Macquarie University) 13 (1983) 131–150. On the nature of Plutarch’s speeches περὶ τῆς ᾿Αλεξάνδρου τύχης ἢ ἀρετῆς see A.E. Wardman, CQ n.s. 5 (1955) 96–107, especially 97– 100; J.R. Hamilton, Plutarch: Alexander (Oxford 1969) xxix–xxxiii; Lamberton 97–98. Plutarch’s view: 329b–330e, 332a–c, 342a. Alexander’s actions gave effect to Zenon’s view (SVF 1.262) that all humans should be considered fellow citizens (329a–b). For Plutarch he was the greatest man of all who have lived (335f). Cf. R.H. Barrow’s summary (121): “With more far-reaching success than Plato and Socrates he had taught the barbarians Hellenic culture; he had given effective expression to the Stoic ideal of the unity of mankind”. B.H. Isaac stresses the difficulty of discerning Alexander’s attitudes from Roman sources such as Arrianos and Plutarch: The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton 2004) 298– 301.

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two most powerful races and offered the prospect of ties arising from the common children of the races.17 On the other hand, it is clear that Plutarch considered that Alexander failed to unite humankind and saw his own achievement in terms of nations and cities captured. Plutarch himself describes Alexander’s achievement in similarly divisive terms.18 If Plutarch thinks in these terms about Alexander, for whom he is making the best case possible in his epideictic speeches, it seems likely that his own belief in the unity of humankind was not strong. This suggestion is confirmed by other passages in Plutarch’s works. When he says that ‘all people’ think this or do that, in order to attack Stoics or Epicureans, he clearly excludes the considerable group of philosophers he is attacking. Indeed he continually emphasises sub-groups of humans. He divides humankind into cities, nations, races, kingdoms and empires. He thinks of Asia as a unit, of Greece or the Greeks as a unit, of “the race of barbarians” (to barbarikon genos). He distinguishes Greek from Roman, Makedonian and Athenian from barbarian, Persian from Greek.19 Most pervasive of all is his acceptance of the traditional division of humankind into Greeks and barbarians.20 These divisive tendencies strengthen the interpretation of those passages in which homognios and sungeneia occur as referring to kinship in a family, not to a belief in a wider kinship of all humankind. Although ho anthropos (‘humankind’) is found in the context of one occurrence, the point is that each 17 329d–f (γάμοις σώφροσι καὶ κοινωνίαις παίδων τὰ γένη συνάπτοντες), 338d (συνέφερε γὰρ ἡ τῶν γενῶν ἀνάμιξις). For koinonia used in connection with marriage, see 138b, 439e, 752c, 770a, c, Alex. 47.8, Numa 25.1; cf. τὸ κοινωνικόν in 757c. G.J.D. Aalders points out that, although Plutarch was convinced of the fundamental equality of men and women in arete (e.g. mor. 242f), he “does not derive from it practical consequences with regard to social or political life, at least not in normal conditions”: in I. Kajanto (ed.), Equality and Inequality of Man in Ancient Thought [Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, 75] (Helsinki 1984) 58–59. 18 Alexander: 331c (ἔθνος, πόλεις). Plutarch: 329a (μυρία ... γένη), 330d–e (τῆς γῆς ... μέρος ... ὅσον ᾿Αλέξανδρον οὐκ εἶδεν). D. Konstan points out that there is a tension in Plutarch’s account of Alexander’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ and that this tension corresponds roughly to the tension between the relativistic version of cosmopolitanism (where people are content in any polis) and the appeal to nature as providing a common denominator among all humans (“where the universal polity is based upon reason that is inherent in the cosmos itself”): in R.K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought (Oxford 2009) 473–484, especially 479–481. 19 Against Stoics or Epicureans: 1069a, 1074c, 1123a; note especially πάντες, ἂν μὴ Στωικοὶ γένωνται (1079a). πόλεις, ἔθνη, γένη, βασιλεῖαι, ἡγεμονίαι: 154f, 399d, 505a, Pomp. 25.3–5, Rom. 33.3–4, Caes. 15.5, Eum. 20.2. Asia: 180b, 330c, 532e; cf. ὅλην ... τὴν ᾿Ιταλίαν in 321f. Greece: 414a, 568a (τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ θεοφιλέστατον γένος), 856d, 1097d, Pel. 20.1. τὸ βαρβαρικὸν γένος: Them. 26.4. Greek/Roman: 119d, Dion 1.1. Makedonian/barbarian: 344f. Athenian/barbarian: 348f–349a. Persian/Greek: 714a–b, d. 20 Examples from various works: 113a, 222d, 343d, 412a, 605e, 768d–e, 824c, 856d, Them. 4.4, Alex. 28.1, Mar. 46.1; βαρβαρικὸς καὶ ῾Ελληνικός in 408f, Pel. 17.11.

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of us likes to be known by and to know those in our immediate surroundings; perhaps, however, there is an assumption that people are similar wherever they might be.21 Dion of Prousa moves easily between harmony (homonoia) in the universe and harmony among humans. Generally he employs the idea of harmony in the universe to fortify his advice about harmony among cities. In his speech at Nikomedeia on homonoia with Nikaia he asks, “And the elements, what unites them other than homonoia?” Natural events are portentous signs by which the gods teach us humans to live in harmony with one another (homonoein hautois).22 Again, in his speech at Prousa on homonoia with Apameia Dion points his fellow citizens to the eternal and majestic order, homonoia and moderation in the heaven as a whole and its components. The harmonia (tension) of the elements should be observed, he says, because they and the entire universe are preserved by their mutual philia and homonoia. If this partnership (koinonia) were ever to be dissolved and stasis ensued, the elements and the universe would be subject to destruction. To philia and homonoia is also attributed the predominance of ether (or creative fire) and its appointed periods. Peace, justice and considerateness prevent the destruction of the universe, although the risk of such destruction is contained in greediness and disagreement. Dion’s particular stress is on the application of this metaphysical theory to relations between one city and another.23 It is a point he made in his own city on another occasion: celestial bodies, although divine and great, need homonoia and philia to avoid destruction of the universe and celestial experiences are relevant to human ones.24 It is hard for us to take seriously this sliding between the universe and humans, even though there were solid Stoic ideas behind the exposition. Nor is it certain that Dion took it seriously. For a completely opposite view is put forward when he is arguing that no one, and especially someone who claims to be a friend, can be trusted. He warns against koinonia with human beings. He says that neither the entire heaven nor the partnership of humans in the universe, a koinonia in divine and great affairs, is of any assistance in achieving homonoia. He may intend this as an exposition of the intention behind the Homeric verse which he (wrongly) attributes to Odysseus. But the idea is in accord with the 21

ὁμόγνιος: 679c, 758d (cf. Dion 1.39, 12.75 on Zeus Homognios; the use of ὁμόγνιος with gods is attested as early as Sophokles, Oidipous at Kolonos 1333). συγγένεια: Sol. 32.1, Aemil. 35.1, Mar. 1.4. συγγένεια with ὁ ἄνθρωπος: 1130a–b; on this difficult sentence see G. Roskam, A Commentary on Plutarch’s De latenter vivendo (Leuven 2007) 150–154. 22 Dion 38.11 (καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα δὲ τί ἄλλο ἢ ὁμόνοια ἑνοῖ;), 17 (ἡμᾶς ὁμονοεῖν αὑτοῖς). The four elements are listed in 40.35: air, earth, water and fire. 23 40.35–39. After his encomium of the universe, Dion refers to the cities as mikra polikhnia (39), insignificant and puny poleis. On Dion’s indebtedness to Stoic ideas in this and other passages see AJPh 94 (1973) 359–361. 24 48.14; similarly 1.42–43, 3.75, 12.34; cf. von Arnim 365–367.

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thoroughly cynical, captious theme of the discourse. Perhaps one should expect contradictions with views expressed elsewhere when Dion wrote discourses both On trust and On distrust. We seem to be in a situation parallel to Plutarch’s rhetorical exercises on Alexander, where he goes so far as to argue that Fortune was so malicious that Alexander, the king and controller of the inhabited world, was almost killed not in some great battle for Sousa or Babylon, nor in close combat with Dareios the Persian king, but at some obscure and insignificant town on the outskirts of the Persian empire.25 If Dion seriously believed in the relevance of the harmony of the universe to homonoia among humans, we must admit that there is a lack of logical connection between the two ideas. He himself apologises for the apparent remoteness and lack of affinity between the universe and human affairs: “for, even if the idea seems remote to some and not at all connected with (sumpathes) you, consider that ... .”26 The flights of fancy concerning the harmony of the universe can only have the status of inspiration intended to fortify Dion’s recommendation of harmony among Greek cities under Roman rule. There are idealistic statements of the unity of humankind in Dion’s speeches on kingship and the Olympian oration. The eponyms of Zeus are expounded. He is called the god of friendship (Philios) and of comradeship (Hetaireios) because “he brings all people together and wants them to be on terms of friendship with one another”, and called protector of ties of hospitality (Xenios) because it is necessary “neither to neglect guest-friends (xenoi) nor to consider any human being an alien”.27 A degree of unity in the world is implied by the statement that we are arranged in order under one rule and law and share in the same commonwealth. Herakles is said to have ruled the whole earth and the whole race of humankind. The strongest form of this claim embraces a division into Greeks and barbarians: “Zeus entrusted him [Herakles] with kingship over the whole of the human race, ... ; so wherever he saw tyranny and a tyrant, he checked and destroyed them, among both Greeks and barbarians”. When Dion raises the possibility of one king ruling all humankind, he presumably has in

25 Warning against koinonia: 74(On distrust).4. ἡ τῶν ὅλων κοινωνία: 74.26. On pessimistic statements about humankind in Dion 74 (also 10.5) see K. Blomqvist, Myth and Moral Message in Dio Chrysostom: A Study in Dio’s Moral Thought, with a Particular Focus on his Attitudes towards Women (Lund 1989) 18. Plutarch on Alexander fighting the Malloi: 344a–c. 26 40.36. Dion alludes to the Stoic doctrine of sumpatheia, an affinity linking all parts of the kosmos and causing them to respond to one another; see S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (New York 1959) 41–42; J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 176–178; F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London 1975) 130–131; and further references in chap. 6 n. 18. 27 Zeus Philios, Hetaireios and Xenios: 1.39–41, 12.76 (the phraseology translated is identical in the two speeches). Zeus is also described as the common father, saviour and protector of humankind (12.74; cf. 1.39–40).

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mind the Caesars.28 At one point he implies that all humans are united in the Roman empire. He says that when “multitudinous cities” obey a man, “numerous nations” are governed by his judgment and “innumerable races of humans, unsociable towards one another” look to his wisdom alone, then that man becomes saviour and protector of all humankind (if indeed he be that kind of man). But elsewhere Dion reduces the prospect of ruling over all humans everywhere to the majority of humans and those the most eminent ones.29 Indeed, each of the statements of the unity of humankind is in the realm of theory and is a statement of possibility rather than of reality. Nor does Dion indicate a positive belief in the koinonia of humans with one another. This is despite his assertions of koinonia among the gods, between gods and humans, among the components of the universe and between women and men, as well as koinonia of resources between two cities.30 As we saw above, in the one speech in which the prospect of koinonia with humankind is raised, Dion strongly warns that it is dangerous because most human beings cannot be trusted. And in fact, the intellectual context of koinonia and similar terms is generally that of city life. “The common advantage” is used in explanation of Zeus protector of cities (Polieus), “the common interest” relates to affairs within a city and “uniformly beneficial to all” is restricted to ‘all’ in a certain city. The phrase “things not beneficial to humans” does not indicate a community of humankind but only some aspects of behaviour which are not in the interests of society.31 There is not in Dion’s extant works any developed theory of the affinity (oikeiosis) of all humans or an “association of the whole

28

Sharing the same πολιτεία: 1.42. Herakles as ruler τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων / τοῦ σύμπαντος ἀνθρώπων γένους: 1.60, 62–63, 84 (divided into Greeks and barbarians). On the Herakles/Trajan analogy in or. 1 see J.L. Moles in Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar 6 (1990) [= ARCA, 29] 297–375 at 323–331, 337. One king ruling all humankind: 2.71, 3.45. τὸ ξύμπαν ἀνθρώπινον γένος and κοινῇ ξύμπαν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος are used in the Olympian oration (12.27, 34). 29 Unity under one man: 3.6 (where I retain πρὸς μίαν φρόνησιν of the manuscripts, instead of von Arnim’s conjecture πρὸς τὴν). Reduction of τῶν ὅποι ποτὲ ἀνθρώπων (a term used also in 2.71) to τῶν πλείστων καὶ φανερωτάτων: 2.6 (put into the mouth of Alexander III of Makedon). 30 Among gods: 36.23 (ἡ θεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία). Between gods and humans: 36.23, 31, 38 (κοινωνία δαιμόνων καὶ ἀνθρώπων). Components of the universe: 40.36, 39 (ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα κοινωνία); 74.26. Partnership with women (γυναικῶν κοινωνία): 75.8. Cities’ resources: 38.43. 31 ἡ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους κοινωνία: 74.4, 23. κοινωνία as the duties of civic life: 22.2. τὸ κοινὸν ὄφελος: 1.40, 12.75. τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον: 34.19, 22; 38.1 (plural); cf. τῇ πόλει συμφέρον in 45.16. συμφέρον ὁμοίως ἅπασι πόλιν ὁμογνώμονα ὁρᾶσθαι: 48.7 (the last three words are suspected by von Arnim). οὐ συμφέροντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: 53.2.

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human race” such as Cicero might have recommended, even as a background to his recommendations on civic harmony.32 Dion emphasises sub-groups of humans more strongly than the unity of humankind. The division into Greeks and barbarians is basic to his thought and can be detected in the background of a variety of speeches. Dion repeatedly uses “all Hellenes and barbarians” to denote the human race. Greece or all Greeks are frequently seen as a unit; and there are examples of Italy, Europe and Asia as separate entities with their own unity.33 People are grouped by their race or nation, such as “the Bithynian nation”. They are indicated by such groups as ‘nations’ and ‘cities’, or ‘cities’, ‘races’ and ‘peoples’, or ‘communities’ and ‘nations’.34 Other human groups are mentioned. In particular there is a stress on one’s relations with one’s fellow citizens and on the city as a

32

Panaitios of Rhodes derived civic harmony from such an οἰκείωσις: Baldry 182–185 (cf. 178–179). Compare Panaitios, fr. 105 van Straaten (societas hominum inter ipsos et uitae quasi communitas); Cicero, On Duties 1.16.50 (in uniuersi generis humani societate), 1.41.149 (communem totius generis hominum conciliationem et consociationem), 3.5.21–22 (humani generis societatem; societas hominum et communitas). On the other hand, Cicero’s strong defence of property rights leads to an anti-cosmopolitan stand, despite his objections to violations of justice that undermine human fellowship: see M. Nussbaum, Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (2000) 176–206, especially 178–180, 187, 191–192, 194–197, 204–205 = S.K. Strange and J. Zupko (eds.), Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations (Cambridge 2004) 214–249, especially 216–217, 224, 229, 232–234, 243–244; cf. J.W. Atkins, Roman Political Thought (Cambridge 2018) 186–189. 33 Greek/barbarian division: 7.134, 32.56, 36.5 (where τῆς ῾Ελλάδος refers to the whole Greek world: Russell, Dio 214), 49.9, 53.8 (cf. F.I. Zeitlin in Being Greek under Rome 203– 204). The Greek/barbarian division provides a background to the Trojan discourse (e.g. 11.62–64), the Borysthenic discourse (e.g. 36.8–9, 25, 43) and a speech before the Council of Prousa (50.2). Note the patronising attitude evident, for example, in 36.8: “when βάρβαροι learn these [homosexual] practices, they naturally implement them βαρβαρικῶς” (Russell, Dio 216). πάντες (ἅπαντες) ῞Ελληνες καὶ βάρβαροι: 4.4, 12.11, 32.35, 45.1, 47.5 (most commonly παρὰ or ἐν πᾶσιν ῞Ελλησι καὶ βαρβάροις). Greece as a unit: 2.64 (cf. 20.20, 57.6, 61.6), 12.53 (reading ξυνέλεξας or ξυνήλλαξας; see also F.I. Zeitlin, op. cit. 222), 30.3. On ἑλληνισμός see B.F. Harris, ANRW 2.7.2 (Berlin 1980) 866–867, 893–894. It is difficult to see how Dion did, or could have done, much to advance Hellenism as a supra-national entity (cf. the last section of chap. 2 above, at nn. 98–100). Italy: 11.137. Italian Greeks: 49.6. Europe and Asia: 3.37, 11.51. 34 τὸ τῶν Βιθυνῶν γένος: 38.33. Makedonians are highlighted in 4.1 and 4.70, Makedonians, Thrakians and Illyrians distinguished from “all the Greeks” in 49.4. Celts, Indians, Iberians, Arabs, Babylonians: 79.5. Greeks are contrasted with Romans in 44.1 (cf. 44.10). ἔθνη and πόλεις: 4.81 (ὅλα ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις), 6.16, 20.17, 22.5, 49.1, 68.4. πόλεις, γένη and ἄνθρωποι: 25.9. δῆμοι and ἔθνη: 38.11. In 48.5 οἱ ὁμοεθνεῖς apparently refers to other Greek cities in Asia Minor. For the view that the Greek/barbarian contrast became attenuated in Dion (and Plutarch) see N. Méthy, AC 63 (1994) 173–192, especially 175 with notes.

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whole.35 This stress on sub-groups completely overwhelms the diluted cosmopolitanism that Dion may have borrowed from Musonius Rufus.36 Ailios Aristeides uses phrases such as hoi pantes anthropoi to refer to humankind as a whole. But divisions of humankind are recognised in the immediate context. Thus he says that the Athenians lost nothing by yielding the command to the Spartans on the approach of Xerxes’ army in 481 B.C.E., “for they had no less honour either among the Greeks at the time or among all humans afterwards”.37 In addition to the division of humans into ‘nations’, there is the continual contrast between Greeks and barbarians. Even when Aristeides is praising the Roman empire he uses ‘Greeks and barbarians’ where one would expect him to use pantes anthropoi in order to emphasise Rome’s unification of the inhabited world; for example: You continue to care for the Greeks as if they were your foster parents, holding a protecting hand over them and raising them as it were when laid prostrate, granting freedom and autonomy to those of them who are the best and were rulers of old, while leading the others with moderation and much consideration and forethought; whereas you continue to train the barbarians more gently or more severely in accordance with the nature peculiar to each of them, ... .38

In the same vein is Aristeides’ marked distinction between Greeks and Romans. He divides humankind into three groups according to constitution and he actually condones hostility and quarrels between Greeks and foreigners in appealing for a cessation of contentious behaviour among Greek cities. It has

35

οἱ πολῖται = fellow citizens: 19.1, 29.1, 43.4, 66.2; οἰ συμπολιτευόμενοι: 48.7, 74.3; ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις: 13.35; ἅπασα ἡ πόλις: 31.87. πόλις is defined in 36.20, 29, 31. For other groups, note σύνοδος in 27.6, πανηγύρεις in 8.6, etc. On Dion’s theory of the polis see L. François, REG 28 (1915) xlvii–xlviii, Desideri 68–75 and Schofield 61–63; cf. Nörr2 77–79. 36 Compare Dion 8.16, where the use of φυγή suggests that a person should be able to feel at home anywhere, with Musonius, fr. 9, which includes such comments as “Is not the universe the common country of all humans, as Sokrates claimed? Then you must not consider it genuine exile from your country if you go away from where you were born and brought up, but merely banishment from a particular city ...” (p.42.1–5 Hense = p.68.15–18 Lutz). On the cosmopolitanism of Musonius and the Cynics see A.C. van Geytenbeek, op. cit. (n. 9) 144. For a more complimentary view of Dion’s cosmopolitanism, see G.C. Richards, DUJ 27 (1932) 322–323; cf. J.L. Moles in R.B. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds.), The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy (Berkeley 1996) 106–107. 37 Arstd. 23.45, 24.45 (ἅπασι μὲν ἀνθρώποις ... μόνοι δὲ εἰς τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ῞Ελληνες διὰ παντός); cf. 23.43: “when all humans, so to speak (ἁπάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώπων), combined against the Greeks”. In 23.15 πάντες ἄνθρωποι is limited to all who rely on the beacons of Asklepios. 38 Nations: 1.322 (παντὰ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένη); 23.32 (παντὸς ἔθνους ... πάσαις ταῖς [πόλεσι] ἐν τῷ ἔθνει ...), 34 (ἅπασι τοῖς ἐν τῷ γένει), 53 (καὶ ἔθνει κοινῇ καὶ πόλεσι); cf. πατρίδας in 23.68. Greeks/barbarians: 24.4, 37; 26.14 (βαρβαρικῆς τινος ἀρχῆς ἢ ῾Ελληνικῆς δυνάμεως), 41. Rome’s unification of the oikoumene: 26.11, 96 (quotation), 100; cf. 26.36.

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been claimed that Aristeides does not use barbarismos in a derogatory manner, but such a claim ignores passages outside the Roman speech (below).39 In his Roman speech Aristeides holds out the claim of a common nationality, but although he approves the abolition of the division of the races into Greeks and barbarians he immediately institutes a sharp division into Roman and nonRoman. Thus the “common” nationality becomes a single nationality balancing all the rest, and “citizens” refers in a limited way to the few (Aristeides says ‘many’) who are most influential in each city and guard their countries for the benefit of the Roman élite: You have made the word Roman ... the name of a sort of common nation (genos koinon). ... You have divided the nations (gene) into Roman and non-Roman. ... In the light of this division many in each city are citizens of yours no less than of their compatriots, though some of them have not yet seen this city. There is no need of garrisons to occupy akropoleis, but the most powerful and influential people in each place guard their own countries for you. You have demonstrated best the universal saying that earth is the mother of all and the common country of all. Now, at least, it is possible for Greek or barbarian ... to travel easily wherever they wish. ... It is sufficient for one’s safety to be a Roman, or rather one of those people subject to you.40

In view of this, Aristeides’ claim that “a common democracy of the earth has been established by the one man who is the best ruler and director” should be interpreted neither as a claim that humankind has been united nor (with J.H. Oliver) as a contrast between ‘the Empire’ and the old (so-called libera) res publica, but as further praise of Caesar’s administration of an empire co-terminous with the oikoumene and as an allusion to his discussion of the freedom of the empire’s inhabitants.41 Insofar as Aristeides expresses a belief in the unity

39 Greeks/Romans: 32.30. Constitutional divisions (τρεῖς ... κατ᾿ ἀνθρώπους πολιτεῖαι): 26.90. Greek hostility to others: 23.41. βαρβαρισμός not derogatory: G.W. Bowersock in B.E. Borg (ed.), Paideia: The World of the Second Sophistic [Millennium-Studien, 2] (Berlin 2004) 57–59; cf. HSPh 97 (1995) 3–14. Using in particular inventive fictions that crossed ethnic and cultural divides, E.S. Gruen made out a similar case for Classical and Hellenistic Greek thought: in G.R. Bugh (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World (Cambridge 2006) 295–314. 40 26.63–64, 100. Compare the division of the empire into cities (poleis), provinces (ethne) and nations (gene) in 26.67. Oliver 877 compares Plato, Politikos 262d–e on the absurdity of the Greek/barbarian distinction. 41 Oliver 894. It is anachronistic to read into Aristeides’ speech the modern distinction between ‘Roman Republic’ and ‘Roman Empire’; as I have tried to show elsewhere, the passages of Tacitus to which Oliver (893) alludes have a different meaning: in T.W. Hillard et al. (eds.), Ancient History in a Modern University (Grand Rapids, MI 1998) 1.281–298. Claim about democracy: 26.60; cf. 26.38, 90. On freedom see 26.36, 46–48, 96 (quoted above at n. 38), Nörr2 85–92, J. Bleicken, NGA (1966) 247–254, J.H. Oliver, Demokratia, the Gods, and the Free World (Baltimore 1960) 164–165 and Klein, Romrede 81 n. 45.

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of humankind, it is overthrown by his framework of thought and his advice on other occasions. There are two ways in which Marcus Aurelius makes an approach to the idea that there is a unity of humankind. The former is through the concept of citizenship of the universe, the second through koinonia in a universal state. But in the first approach Marcus’ main interest is not in humans as citizens of the universe (on this, see the next section) but in the theory of the universal state. He alludes to the abundant proofs that “the universe is as it were a state” (ho kosmos hosanei polis).42 A detailed defence of this idea is found shortly after his allusion to proofs. The argument is somewhat circular, in that either the common possession of mind or the common state has to be assumed. But these assumptions were both acceptable to Stoics. The argument runs as follows: If mind (to noeron) is common to us all, then so is reason (ho logos), by virtue of which we are rational beings. If that reason is common which prompts us to do or not to do things, then law (nomos) also is common. If that is so, we are citizens (politai). If so, we share in an organised community (politeuma). But the universe is the only organised community in which the whole race of humankind (to ton anthropon pan genos) can be said to share. Thus the universe is as it were a state (polis).

Then the argument proceeds to fortify the premises: This common state is the source of our mind and reason and sense of law. For the mind (to noeron), like the earthy and watery and spiritual and fiery parts in us, must have come from somewhere.43

The conclusion of this argument, that “the universe is as it were a state”, is identical with the statement of belief quoted above. 42 M.A. 4.3.5. A very similar statement is made by Epiktetos in approving what the philosophers say: ὁ κόσμος οὗτος μία πόλις ἐστι (3.24.10); see n. 60 below. On the rest of this section see my observations in Phronesis 13 (1968) 187–190 and Historia 18 (1969) 579. 43 4.4. I have rearranged or curtailed some steps in order to make the argument proceed in a form more logical to the modern mind. The premise “the universe is the only organised community ...” is also open to criticism, but is clearly an assumption acceptable to Marcus. On this passage see also Baldry 152–153 and E. Brown, op. cit. (n. 4) 357–359, who links the metaphor of the cosmopolis with that of natural law. For the suggestion that ὡσανεί (“as it were”) in M.A. 4.3.5 and 4.4.1, like quasi in Cicero, Ends 3.64 and The nature of the gods 2.154, makes a concession (for an audience which thought of a city as something built by human hands) which the Stoics did not need to make see Schofield 74. Schofield (68 n. 13) criticises R.B. Rutherford and me for failing to point out that Marcus’ cosmic community, unlike Epiktetos’, does not include the gods. But in 10.1.4 Marcus addresses his soul as a fellow citizen with gods and humans (θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις οὕτω συμπολιτεύεσθαι); note also 8.2 (ζῴου … ἰσονόμου θεῷ). In 4.4 he is emphasising that the whole race of humankind participates in the cosmic community; he is not excluding the gods. See also Rutherford 226–227, 239–240. G. Lüderitz points out the wide range of meanings of politeuma: in J.W. van Henten and P.W. van der Horst (eds.), Studies in Early Jewish Epigraphy [Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums, 21] (Leiden 1994) 183–225.

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Secondly, there is the prominence given to koinonia, fellowship or community. Humans are principally constituted for a social end (to koinonikon); they are born for koinonia and thus koinonia is the end of a rational creature.44 Since humans are part of a social system, every act which has no relation direct or indirect to the social end (to koinonikon telos) tears their life asunder and prevents its unity. The principles of social welfare, then, should result in social acts (praxeis koinonikai). Co-operation is also to be commended as action in harmony with nature.45 The principle of koinonia, then, is well established in Marcus’ thought. But it is a koinonia of people who are rational and social beings. The reason of these people is ‘civic’ (politikos).46 Hence their community is in fact a universal state. That the unity of humankind is based on the common possession of mind is indicated explicitly by Marcus: When you are discontented with something, you have forgotten ... how strong is the kinship of a human with the whole human race (he sungeneia anthropou pros pan to anthropeion genos), for it is a koinonia based not on blood or seed, but on mind (nous).47

Fundamental to both these lines of thought is the assumption that “mind (to noeron) is common to us all”. How practical does Marcus become in his discussion of koinonia and our shared humanity? He does offer some explicit advice in arguing that the principles of social welfare should result in praxeis koinonikai: he approves of the person who does a good turn for another without being conscious of it, but he also admits that it is characteristic of social beings to be aware that they are acting in a neighbourly way. However, this should not be taken to imply that people should wait for recognition of their social act rather than simply pass 44 Social end: 7.55.3; cf. 3.4.1 (ἐπί τι κοινωφελές), 7.5.2–3, Béranger 269, Neuenschwander 52, 57–60 and Rutherford 170–171 (pointing to the contradiction beween this social end and Marcus’ insistence that he not worry about what others are doing). Koinonia as the end: 5.16.3–5; cf. 5.30, 11.19.1. Rational creatures are made by universal nature (ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις) for the sake of one another (ἀλλήλων ἕνεκεν); hence humans should benefit each other according to desert (8.26, 8.56.2, 9.1.1, 11.18.1–2). 45 Acts unrelated to social end: 9.23. Social acts: 6.30.4, 8.12, 9.16, 9.31. Co-operation (συνεργία): 2.1.4–5; cf. 6.14.2, 6.42.1–3, 7.13.1–2, Neuenschwander 39, 84. 46 Rational and social beings: 6.44.5, 7.68.3, 7.72. Logos as πολιτικός: 4.24.1, 4.29.2–3. The three epithets λογικός, πολιτικός and κοινωνικός are repeatedly linked: e.g. 6.14.2 (ψυχὴν λογικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ... λογικῶς καὶ κοινωνικῶς ἔχουσαν), 7.72 (ἡ λογικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ δύναμις εὑρίσκῃ μήτε ... μήτε κοινωνικόν). ‘Civic’ seems to come closest to serving the dual purpose of an adjective from πόλις which will sometimes be rendered by ‘social’ and sometimes by ‘political’. The double significance of πολιτικός is seen in the isolated usage of 9.12, where ὁ πολιτικὸς λόγος could mean a person’s ‘civic reason’ or ‘the reason of the state’ (whereas the second version has more point in the context of 4.29.2). 47 12.26.1. This line is anticipated in 2.1. For the assumption τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινόν see 4.4.1 translated above (after n. 42). On the series of topic statements (kephalaia) assembled in 12.26 see Hadot 37–39.

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on to a second such act. No social act should be omitted; they bring their own reward.48 This is fairly limited advice. Nor does Marcus become more practical when developing his idea of the universal state. The community (sustema) of rational beings is compared to the body in which the members co-operate in the functioning of a single, united organism. A person who is discontented with what happens or who acts in an unsocial way, and thus severs himself or herself from humankind, is like a hand or foot or head cut off and lying apart from the rest of the body, as on a battlefield. Such persons cut themselves off “from the unity that is in harmony with nature (he kata phusin henosis)”. The severed limb cannot be rejoined, Marcus implies, but God has granted to humans alone the privilege of recovering their place as a part, growing together and uniting themselves again (palin henosai seauton). Elsewhere people who separate themselves from “the reason of our common nature” are termed tumours on the universe. Those who cut off their own soul from “the soul of rational beings, which is one”, are fragments detached from the state.49 The pictorial language is vivid enough, but the actual behaviour recommended is far from explicit. In developing the metaphor of the universe-state Marcus states that people who do not recognise the essence of the universe and what is happening in it are ‘aliens’ in the universe; those who run away from the reason of the state are ‘exiles’.50 In his concluding chapter Marcus speaks of the end of life: “Mortal, you have been a citizen in this great state. What does it matter to you if for five years or a hundred?” Nature introduced us into the state; why should we mind being banished by her? While we are here, our end as rational creatures is this: to submit to the reason and law of the most venerable of states and governments.51 Perhaps there is, in the use of ‘most venerable’ (presbutatos) here, a hint that the universe is a model state and government. However, no attempt is made to work out a detailed application of the model. But at least we have one principle of behaviour – submission – and one explicit situation in which to apply it – that of facing death. 48 See especially 5.6; also 6.7, 7.74, 11.4, 12.29. This position is a long way from the ideal city of Zenon which was, M. Schofield argues, permeated by concord that is engendered by a sublimated form of love (Schofield chap. 2; A. Laks, AncPhil 14 (1994) 453 brings out that the city of love is “actually a city of friendship, to which love yields after age 28”). 49 Comparison with the body: 7.13.1–2; cf. 7.19.1 (where μέρη was emended to μέλη by Koraes), Neuenschwander 17–20, 38–39. Severing oneself from the unity: 8.34. Tumour (ἀπόστημα): 2.16.1–2 (with a verbal play on ἀπόστασις, ‘separation’ or ‘defection’), 4.29.3 (with a play on ἀφιστάμενος, ‘defecting’). Fragments detached from the universe-state (ἀπόσχισμα πόλεως): 4.29.3. The reference to the unity of the soul of rational beings ensures that polis without further qualification is seen as a reference to the universe. Compare the use of πολίτευμα in 11.8.3; see also n. 43 above. 50 4.29.1–2 (ξένος, φυγάς). On ξένος see also 12.1.5. 51 12.36.1–2 (with ἢ ἑκατόν as supplied by Haines and Dalfen); 2.16.6.

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The pattern of grand ideals and reluctance to think out precisely how those ideals are to be realised is seen elsewhere as well. Some decades earlier than Marcus Aurelius another Stoic-inclined writer, Hierokles, offered a picture of a series of concentric circles, with oneself in the first circle, one’s parents, siblings, spouse and children in the second circle, and so on. “The outermost and largest circle, which surrounds all the other circles, is that of the whole race of humankind”. There is a strong obligation on the properly taut person (ho entetamenos) somehow to bring together the circles towards the centre. People in the outer circles should be transferred zealously to the inner circle or circles. The ideal is to reduce the distance of the relationship with each person. But Hierokles stops short of saying how this may be achieved. Rather, he specifies the difficulty: the ideal may be true of enthusiastic support for an alliance (he uses the noun spoude and the verbal adjective spoudastea), but there is a lack of favourable disposition when the relative is more distant, let alone when it involves the relationship with humankind.52

Citizen of the Universe Citizen of the Universe

Cosmopolitan ideas might seem to hold out the prospect of a belief in the unity of humankind that issues in practical action.53 It is, indeed, the case that Epiktetos concentrates on the practice rather than the theory of cosmopolitan

52

Hierokles in Stobaios, Eklogai 4.27.23 (quotation from 4 p.671.24–4.672.2 Hense). A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley make it clear that the moral ‘ought’ has its full force: The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge 1987) 1.353. With my assessment compare that of N. Sherman in D. Carr and J. Haldane (eds.), Spirituality, Philosophy and Education (London 2003) 71: “Hierocles himself does not tell us exactly how we are to psychologically assimilate those in outer circles to inner ones so that we can come to identify with their circumstances”. Elsewhere Sherman suggests that the American military, in the light of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, might benefit from a stern lesson in Stoic cosmopolitanism, but her view of the latter is shaped too much by modern views of cosmopolitanism: Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy behind the Military Mind (New York 2005) 17, 172–179. 53 For contemporary ideas on cosmopolitanism see, for example, T.W. Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Oxford 2001), especially the essay by S. Caney (123–144 = Metaphilosophy 32.1–2 [2001] 113–134); S. Vertovec and R. Cohen (eds.), Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice (Oxford 2002); P. De Grieff and C. Cronin (eds.), Global Justice and Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of Globalization (Cambridge, MA 2002), especially the essay by T. McCarthy (235–274); D. Weinstock (ed.), Global Justice, Global Institutions [Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volumes, 31] (Calgary 2007); G. Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford 2009); I. Stengers, Cosmopolitics 1–2 [Posthumanities, 9–10] (Minneapolis 2010–2011) and, for an overview from ancient Greece to the present, P. Coulmas (Koulmasis), Οι Πολίτες του Κόσμου: Ιστορία του Κοσμοπολιτισμού (Athina 1997), previously published in

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ideas.54 But he does offer something approaching a definition of a “citizen of the universe”. He would apply the term (polites tou kosmou) to humans because of their ability to understand the divine administration of the universe and to take into account what follows from it. However, there immediately follows a summary of the duties that comprise the profession of the citizen (epangelia politou).55 This certainly suggests that Epiktetos is more interested in applying the idea of the citizen of the universe than in defending it. The only explicit defence of citizenship of the universe is based on the undefended assumption of the kinship of God and humans (sungeneia tou theou kai anthropon). Anyone who has made a thorough study of the administration of the universe knows that the most authoritative and comprehensive government is the one that consists of humans and God, and that humans, by virtue of their possession of logos (reason), associate with and are united with God. If, then, we are thus entwined with God, we are justified in calling ourselves citizens of the universe and children of God. Even this minimal defence leads directly to a lesson on behaviour: the relatives of God should fear nothing that can happen among humans any more than the relatives of Caesar or of any other powerful figure in Rome have reason to fear for their safety.56

German (1990) and French (1995). Several of the essays in M. Lavan et al. (eds.), Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean (New York 2016) focus attention on the balance between assimilation and subordination, as the editors intended (4–12, 22–25). M.C. Nussbaum has recently questioned the value of cosmopolitanism: The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal (Cambridge, MA 2019). 54 On cosmopolitan ideas in Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius see G.R. Stanton, Phronesis 13 (1968) 183–195; this section draws on pages 184–191 of that article and pages 579–580 of my article in Historia 18 (1969) 570–587 (= R. Klein [ed.], Marc Aurel [Wege der Forschung, 550] [Darmstadt 1979] 368–369). For a positive view of the cosmopolitanism of early Cynics see J.L. Moles, op. cit. (n. 36) 105–120 and in A. Laks and M. Schofield (eds.), Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy [Proceedings of the Symposium Hellenisticum, 6] (Cambridge 1995) 129–158. For argument that the Khrysippean cosmic city was not a utopian ideal but a present reality, a fact about the world for the Stoic sage, see D. Obbink in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford 1999) 178–195 and for a similar view of the early Stoics in general see K.M. Vogt, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa (Oxford 2008), especially chap. 2. 55 Epikt. 2.10.3–6. A.A. Long stresses that the aspects Epiktetos brings out in 2.10, such as ‘citizen of the universe’, are statements of what a human being actually is; they are identity conditions of being a human: AncPhil 3 (1983) 188–189 (= Stoic Studies [Cambridge 1996] 162–164). There are further discussions of ‘world citizenship’ in Long 150–151, 233– 236. On the duties of a citizen of the universe see the next paragraph. 56 1.9.1–7. The practical tone of the chapter is indicated by the heading: “How one might proceed to the consequences from the fact that we are relatives of God”. About half the chapter is taken up with warning gifted young students not to abandon life because of their

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If one attempts to fill out this defence with a line of thought from other chapters, it becomes clear that Epiktetos maintains an ethical and practical interest even when discussing theory.57 Thus he states that it is not sufficient for us to be able to make use of external impressions (phantasiai); we must be able to understand their use, for an adequate understanding should result in a way of life in harmony with nature. Animals can make use of external impressions (though plants cannot). An ass, for example, shows it has this ability by walking around and carrying objects for us on its back. But animals were born to serve others (in farming, for transport, as food); humans, with their ability to understand the use of external impressions are of primary importance, an end in themselves.58 It is from precisely this point that Epiktetos begins his exposition of the duties involved in the designations applied to humans: “You are a citizen of the universe and a part of it, not one of the subservient parts, but of the leading parts”. It is the duty of a citizen of the universe to direct every impulse or yearning with reference to the whole (to holon), just as a hand or foot would if it had the ability to reason and to understand the constitution of nature. On this basis Epiktetos supports the view of the philosophers that if kaloi kai agathoi (fine and good people) knew what is going to happen, they kinship with the gods; the positive theme is that philosophers find all that they need in themselves (e.g. πεποιθότες ... ἑαυτοῖς, 1.9.8; τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον ... ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, 1.9.9; ἐξ αὑτοῦ τις ἔχει, 1.9.31). The assumption of kinship between God and humans goes back at least to Plato (Protagoras 322a). For the Herakleitean origins of the idea of a community of humans and God see Schofield 74–84. The comparison between kinship with Caesar and kinship with gods to make an a fortiori argument occurs also in Epikt. 1.3.1–3 (so Dobbin 87, 124). Referring to 1.9.1–6, P.A. Brunt points out that the “community of gods and humans” (1.9.4) existed irrespective of human political organisation; Epiktetos “could never have thought that Alexander’s great conquests and boundless ambition could have benefited humanity”, nor was Rome’s dominion to be justified by the imposition of political unity on ever more peoples: Athenaeum 55 (1977) 19–48 at 47. 57 J.M. Cooper would insist that the moral improvement of Epiktetos’ young students is to be directly derived from their philosophical studies of Khrysippos and other authoritative texts, not from the ‘pep talks’ we have in the collection surviving from Epiktetos: in The Philosophy of Epictetus 9–19. By contrast, J. Annas in the same collection of essays stresses the social context in which Epiktetos’ students will be embedded, based on the extant discourses (140–152, with an exposition of 2.10.1–12 [cf. above at n. 55] on 140–143, 148– 149). 58 1.6.12–21, 2.8.1–8. On these passages see Bonhöffer 74, 138–45; Pohlenz 1.329; G. Pire, Stoïcisme et pédagogie: De Zénon à Marc-Aurèle, de Sénèque à Montaigne et à J.-J. Rouseau (Liège 1958) 137; L. Moulinier, Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines d’Aix 38 (1964) 77–78 (on φαντασίαι); A.A. Long in G. Manetti (ed.), Knowledge through Signs: Ancient Semiotic Theories and Practices (Brussels 1996) 109–131 at 116– 117. For analysis of the teleological argument in 1.6 see B.L. Hijmans Jr., PACA 2 (1959) 15–21; Dobbin 102–103, 107–109. On 1.6.15 see I. Xenakis, Epictetus: Philosopher-Therapist (The Hague 1969) 44 (alleged non-sequitur). Compare the use of the scale of nature by Marcus Aurelius (9.9.6–12) for quite a different purpose.

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would assist events that are generally feared (disease, death and maiming are the examples used), because they would perceive that these events are assigned to them by the disposition of the whole. For the whole has more authority than the part and the state than the citizen. Since we do not know in advance what is going to happen, we should so bring our will into harmony with nature that both nothing happens against our will and nothing fails to happen when we wish it to happen.59 Other references to the universal state or the citizen of the universe show a similar concentration on principles of conduct derived from these concepts. When Epiktetos refers to the universe as “this great state”, without further qualification, it is to point out that in it there is a manager who assigns each thing its place and one should not, therefore, lightly assume the calling of a Cynic. The existence of the universe as a single state (mia polis) is recalled when he challenges his interlocutor to act like an adult and a citizen rather than long for things beyond his control or worry about what others think, like a child.60 As on other subjects, Diogenes is the teacher’s example for the principles of behaviour appropriate to a citizen of the universe. Diogenes’ unique achievement of cosmopolitanism, whereby the whole earth was his country, found expression both in his concern for humankind and in his submission to God. The concern for fellow humans is necessary for a social creature who is the servant of God, while the submission to God involves the realisation that affection has transgressed its limit when we become dependent on something other than ourselves or blame either God or other people. Diogenes was not dependent on even his family, friends or country (he was a true citizen of the universe, in other words). He could let go of these, or his whole body, without pain; but that does not make him any less the type of the gentle and benevolent person who undertakes all hardships for the common good of humankind (to koinon ton anthropon). Diogenes could surrender anything with equanimity because he knew the source from which he had received everything. But he would never

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2.10.3–6, 2.14.7. ὑπηρετικά is contrasted with προηγούμενα also in 2.8.6 (n. 58 above). For the view of ‘the philosophers’ see 2.6.9–10 (SVF 3.191) and Seneca 1(On foresight).5.5. For the idea of co-operating for a single outcome (εἰς ἓν ἀποτέλεσμα συνεργεῖν) see M.A. 6.42.1. 60 ἕκαστα ὁ διατάσσων: 3.22.1–4; cf. P.E. Matheson, Epictetus: the Discourses and Manual (Oxford 1916) 1.35 and D.R. Dudley, op. cit. (n. 11) 190–191. For the text of 3.22.4, and parallels in Dion of Prousa and Marcus Aurelius (among others) see M. Billerbeck, op.cit. (n. 11) 49–50. ὁ κόσμος οὗτος μία πόλις ἐστί: 3.24.10, 53; cf. 36 (reading ἐν πόλει ἡγεμόνι with C. Schenkl). In sections 16–19 of the chapter Epiktetos rejects longing for what is absent on the ground that it is incompatible with happiness. He cannot accept the idea that Zeus does not take care of his citizens, so that they are happy as he is, since that implies that the universe is badly managed. That God created all humans to be happy and have peace of mind has already been stated (3.24.2).

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have abandoned his true ancestors, the gods, and his real country (patris). However, he did not seek a reputation for acting on behalf of the universe. It is sufficient to be aware that everything which happens has its origins there and is done on behalf of that country.61 It is clear, then, that Epiktetos consistently mentions cosmopolitan ideas in order to evoke practical precepts and he links these ideas with a framework of practical instruction rather than with a structure of philosophical thought. When we turn to Marcus Aurelius, who had the power to implement cosmopolitan ideas in society, we find that he not only failed to apply them in the field of government and politics, but that he scarcely conceived of any practical application of such ideas.62 Unlike Epiktetos, he does not use the term polites tou kosmou, but he clearly thinks of himself as a citizen of the universe: My city and country as Antoninus is Rome, but as a human, the universe. Whatever things, then, are helpful to these cities are alone benefits for me.63

Marcus’ main interest is not in the citizen of the universe but in the theory of the universal state (on this, see the previous section). But in one passage he challenges himself to live as a citizen of the universe-state. The immediate context provides no clue as to how this challenge is to be met, for although the phrase “living in harmony with nature” is parallel to it, this phrase is itself on

61

3.24.58–66, 4.1.151–158. Of course, Sokrates is also an important example: he is praised for labelling himself a citizen of the universe (kosmios) rather than an ‘Athenian’ or ‘Korinthian’ (1.9.1; cf. n. 12 above), just as he is praised by Plutarch (600f) for labelling himself kosmios on the model of ‘Rhodian’ or ‘Korinthian’. A.F. Bonhöffer believes Sokrates is given preference even over Diogenes: The Ethics (n. 14) 102; similarly A.A. Long, Stoic Studies (n. 55) 2. On Sokrates as an example see further B.E. Johnson, Ancient Philosophy 32 (2012) 125–145, comparing Herakles and slaves. On the cosmopolitanism involved in, for example, 4.1.154 see L. Willms, Epiktets Diatribe Über die Freiheit (4.1) 2 (Heidelberg 2012) 868–871. 62 Using in particular Marcus’ openness to Epicurean dicta and doctrines, J.M. Cooper argues that Marcus in general uses heartfelt appeals to himself to improve his life rather than ethical argument: Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy (Princeton 2004) 335–368, especially (on Epicurean ideas) 337–360. On Marcus’ (and Seneca’s) acceptance of Epicurean beliefs, see Hadot 152–154 and J.-B. Gourinat in M. van Ackeren and J. Opsomer (eds.), op. cit. (n. 14) 75–81. Some have claimed that Marcus’ brand of Stoicism is more a religion than a philosophy: e.g. J.M. Rist in B.F. Meyer and E.P. Sanders (eds.), Jewish and Christian Self-Definition 3 (Philadelphia 1982) 23–45, especially 43. 63 M.A. 6.44.6. Marcus does use terms such as πολίτην ... πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης (3.11.2) and πολίτου βίον (10.6.5; cf. τοῦ κόσμου in 10.6.3), and speaks of us as πολῖται in a context in which he asserts that “the universe is as it were a state” (4.4.1: ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἐστί). Note also the cautions about acting as a non-citizen of the universe: 4.29.1 (ξένος κόσμου), 12.1.5 (ξένος ὢν τῆς πατρίδος). On ξένου ἐπιδημία in 2.17.2, where the metaphor is different, see Rutherford 239–240.

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too theoretical a level to serve as an explanation.64 We can gain some idea of what Marcus had in mind with his challenge by studying oblique references to the citizen of the universe. In the context of an exhortation to view life “as an adult, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal creature”, two principles are stressed: first, that external objects cannot disturb the soul; secondly, that the universe is continually changing.65 Presumably the citizen of the universe is intended when Marcus states that nothing harms “the natural citizen” (ton phusei politen) that does not harm the city. Again we find a propensity towards assertion of belief, but there is at least implicit in these statements a practical instruction: acceptance of whatever happens, since only our opinions about what happens can perturb us. Another chapter indicates that never blaming the gods or humans is one of the most difficult achievements for a citizen of the universe: “Will you ever, [my soul,] be so fit to live as a fellow citizen with (sumpoliteuesthai) gods and humans as never to find fault with them and never to incur their reproach?”66 An earlier statement of my view that Marcus Aurelius paid little attention to the practical application of his beliefs about the unity of humankind has been challenged. P.A. Brunt, claiming that I had misconceived the matter, stressed that Marcus was not trying to influence anyone else’s conduct, but only his own. This is, indeed, close to my point: as soon as Marcus talks about social acts or co-operation, he internalises his belief in citizenship of the universe. As noted above, he believes it is characteristic of social beings to be aware that they are acting in a neighbourly way; social acts bring their own reward. The major beneficiary of a social act seems to be Marcus himself. Similarly, the spiritual exercises which P. Hadot has attributed to Marcus, if not so codified and systematic as Hadot thinks, are a formula for internalisation.67 R.J. Newman saw the purpose of meditation on the inevitability and universality of death as an incentive to live a virtuous life in the present. But, as he pointed out, constantly recurring verbs for ‘reflect’ or ‘ponder’ (ennoein, epinoein, enthumeisthai) underline the interiorisation effected by successful meditation. For example, an understanding of the nature of death reinforces the unity which

64 10.15.2; cf. 10.15.3: ἄνθρωπον ἀληθινὸν κατὰ φύσιν ζῶντα. On “living in harmony with nature” see chap. 5. 65 4.3.9–11. The interpretation of πολίτης as citizen of the universe is suggested not only by the general terms on either side of it, but by the proximity of the exposition of the universe as a state in 4.4, whose link with 4.3.5 has been indicated above (at nn. 42–43; cf. Hadot 42– 43). 66 The natural citizen: 10.33.8; cf. 10.6. Avoidance of blame: 10.1.4. 67 P.A. Brunt, JRS 64 (1974) 1–20 at 6 with n. 30. P. Hadot, BAGB (1981) 183–191 and Hadot chap. 3. Rutherford also sees hortatory passages such as 3.4 as being applied “to the author’s own conduct and social duties” (167–168); in his introduction (3) he has Marcus addressing us as one preoccupied with translating precept into practice.

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the meditator has with all other humans through the principle of oikeiosis.68 So it is clear that the meditation comes back to the theoretical belief in the unity of humankind. E. Asmis has endorsed the view of B. Hendrickx that Marcus’ writings show clearly that he was concerned with putting his philosophical beliefs into practice. But all that Hendrickx has established is that Marcus sought to apply his philosophy privately; he accepts my view that Marcus’ citizen of the universe is to work from observation to theory and not from theory to practice. What Marcus does not achieve is any transfer of behaviour from his city and country as a human, the universe, to his city and country as Antoninus. As far as Rome is concerned, Marcus acts like a Roman, with the usual high value placed on glory.69 The present examination of the contexts of all references in Marcus Aurelius to the universe as a state (in the previous section) or to the citizen of the universe (in this section) reveals only three practical instructions. The first is constant attention to social acts and co-operation. The second is acceptance of whatever happens, since external objects cannot disturb the soul; in other words, submission to the reason and law of the universe, even when death is at hand. The third is never to blame the gods or fellow humans.70 The second and 68 R.J. Newman, ANRW 2.36.3 (Berlin 1989) 1506–1515, especially 1507 and 1511– 1512. On oikeiosis see n. 13 above. 69 B. Hendrickx, Historia 23 (1974) 254–256, on which see my comment in R. Klein (ed.), Marc Aurel (n. 54) 378. Hendrickx points out that Marcus reminds himself that he is a Roman not only in 6.44.6, but also in 2.5.1 and 3.5.2. For my analysis of the legislation of Marcus and criticism of the assumption that he rather than the bureaucracy initiated it see Historia 18 (1969) 571–575. The differing views of P. Noyen and me continue to be discussed: see, for example, M. Avenarius in M. van Ackeren and J. Opsomer (eds.), Selbstbetrachtungen und Selbstdarstellungen (n. 14) 203–282, especially 203–216, 242– 257; C. Koehn in V. Grieb with C. Koehn (eds.), Marc Aurel – Wege zu seiner Herrschaft (Gutenberg 2017) 307–323 at 307–310. On Marcus’ preoccupation with glory see the second paragraph of this chapter. This concern for glory is underestimated by N. Méthy, who argues that the name ῾Ρώμη in 6.44.6, translated above, has a new meaning, the totality of the Roman empire (RBPh 72 [1994] 98–110); see my comments in chap. 3 at n. 13. E. Asmis, ANRW 2.36.3 (Berlin 1989) 2228–2252 at 2230 n. 5. Rutherford (170–172 with n. 120), with reference to 3.4, shows Marcus oscillating between concentrating solely on his own work and his implication of the unity of humankind in his talk of humans as social beings. By contrast, M.-F. Baslez concludes that, while cosmopolitan ideas found echoes in (for example) Claudius’ letter to the Alexandrians on relations between Greeks and Jews (P.Lond. 1912.98–104) or Eratosthenes’ study in Athens under the founders of Stoicism (Strabon 1.2.2, C15), they did not find any political application: L’étranger dans la Grèce antique (Paris 1984) 261–263 (with discussion of M.A. 4.29 and 6.44.6). For her it is rather the travellers who created cosmopolitan life (266–267). Cosmopolitan theory in the 1990s is assessed in terms of the actual cosmopolitanism of (especially) frequent travellers by C. Calhoun in S. Vertovec and R. Cohen (eds.), op. cit. (n. 53) 86–109. 70 Social acts and co-operation: see references in notes 45 and 48 above, especially 2.1, 5.6, 6.7, 7.74, 12.29.3. Acceptance and submission: 2.16.6, 4.3.9–12, 10.33.8, 12.36.1–2; cf.

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third of these are entirely passive; the only positive step recommended is contained in Marcus’ discussions of social acts and co-operation. Yet even here there are no concrete examples and I wonder whether Marcus formulated any in his own mind. For in his view, as indicated above, the task of the citizen of the universe is to work from observation to theory and not from theory to practice: the citizen should examine everything he or she meets in life and consider what kind of universe it is to which each thing renders service, what kind of function each thing performs, what value it has for the universe as a whole and for an individual person as a citizen of the highest state.71 One might, moreover, venture an explanation as to why Marcus’ thought on the unity of humankind finds no outworking in his control of the Roman empire. Just as the politicians who praise the idea of harmony in a Greek city are caught up in their own rhetoric (chapter 2), so rhetoric “has become the ever present companion of his [Marcus’] philosophy” – just as his tutor M. Cornelius Fronto recommended.72

The Transmission of Ideas The Transmission of Ideas

Greek writers of diverse philosophical outlook, and even attitude to philosophy, share a considerable pool of ideas relevant to the unity of humankind. On the other hand, when one examines the details of assumption and argument, there are differences between the writers who seem closest in their overall beliefs. The writers we have examined all use a range of terms which indicate humankind as a single unit, but they frequently counteract these expressions of unity by suggesting divisions of humankind. Cities, nations, races and other sub-groups of humans are continually emphasised. Plutarch, for example, assesses Alexander’s achievement in terms of cities and nations after describing his aims in terms of the unity of humankind. The traditional division into D.J. Armitage, Theories of Poverty in the World of the New Testament [WUNT, 2.423] (Tübingen 2016) 111–113. Avoidance of blame: 10.1.4. 71 3.11.2. 72 E. Asmis, op. cit. (n. 69) 2233, contrasting the presentation of philosophy in Marcus’ Meditations as the clear victor in the contest with rhetoric. On 2248 with n. 88 she points to Marcus’ frequent rhetorical use of compounds in συν- to express the notion of universal togetherness, a feature which she suggests was inspired both by Herakleitos’ example and by Stoic terminology. Cf. Rutherford 13–14, 40 (discussing passages in book 1 where rhetoric is put down) and 126–127. Fronto’s recommendation: On Eloquence 2.17 van den Hout. For an attempt to bring out all possible erotically-charged language in the correspondence between Fronto and Marcus see A. Richlin (trans.), Marcus Aurelius in Love: Marcus Aurelius and Marcus Cornelius Fronto (Chicago 2006). She points out the tension involved in Fronto’s tutoring the future ruler of the Roman empire at the same time as Marcus in his late teens casts himself as the erastes and Fronto as the eromenos (ibid. 41 n. 9, 43 n. 36, 47 n. 8). R. Fine and R. Cohen stress the limited nature of ancient cosmopolitanism in S. Vertovec and R. Cohen (eds.), op. cit. (n. 53) 137–139.

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Greeks and barbarians remains pervasive in this period; only Epiktetos shows no sign of being affected by it. Both Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius believe in the koinonia of humans with one another, though Marcus goes further in stressing the kinship of people with all humankind. Dion of Prousa makes idealistic statements about the unity of humankind, but they are statements of possibility rather than of reality. Like Plutarch, he has a limited acceptance of cosmopolitanism. His profession of belief in the unity of humankind is stronger than that seen in Plutarch or Ailios Aristeides, but his tendency to conceive of humans in divisive terms overwhelms this belief. The field of cosmopolitan ideas is a useful one for demonstrating how diverse in their ideas two writers with a similar general outlook (in this case, inclined to Stoicism) can be. Modern writers have often waxed lyrical on the influence of the ‘philosopher-slave’ on the ‘emperor-philosopher’. In recent scholarship P. Hadot is more cautious, but he argues that Epiktetos delineates three activities or operations of the soul (“the desire to accumulate that which is good, the impulse to act, and judgment on the value of things”, encapsulated in orexis, horme and hupolepseis) which are picked up by Marcus Aurelius. These operations of the soul lead to three exercise-themes in Epiktetos: we humans should renounce desires and aversions; secondly, we must impel ourselves to act in a way appropriate to our rational nature; thirdly, we should train ourselves to give assent to things of which the representation is ‘adequate’ to reality. Thus “the philosopher must intensely wish the common good of the universe and of society”. Hadot claims that the actions envisaged under the second domain “are directed exclusively toward other people, and have their foundation in that community of reasonable nature which unites humankind” and so “they must be guided by our intention to place ourselves in the service of the human community, and bring about the reign of justice”. He goes on to expound the discipline of assent (the “inner citadel” of his title), the discipline of desire and the discipline of action in Marcus Aurelius. However, he says little of cosmopolitan ideas specifically, apart from noting that for Epiktetos the philosopher is a citizen of ‘the human City’ as well as a citizen of the world.73 Both Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius attempt to defend their cosmopolitan ideas, though Marcus’ defence is far more deliberate. But the assumptions on which their respective cases are based are quite distinct. Epiktetos assumes the kinship of humans with God, while Marcus assumes the common possession of mind and the purpose of human life as koinonia.74 They both introduce the 73

Hadot chaps. 4–8, especially 69–70 (Marcus’ three rules of life [representations or judgments; desire; action] based on Epiktetos’ tripartition of judgment, desire and impulse toward action), 83–100 (quotations from 83, 87, 99), 232. Epiktetos on dual citizenship: 1.9.1, 2.5.26, 2.10.3 (Hadot 99). 74 Epiktetos: n. 56 above; Marcus Aurelius: nn. 43–44.

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belief that humans possess reason, but they use it for different ends. Epiktetos wishes to argue that this common bond of reason unites humans with God in the administration of the universe. Marcus, on the other hand, founds on this belief the argument that law is common and, by asserting that the universe is the only community (politeuma) in which all humankind can be said to have a common law, concludes that the community of rational beings is a universal state.75 Marcus has an ‘immanentist’ approach and Epiktetos a ‘transcendentalist’ approach to human citizenship in the universe. Marcus’ discussions of cosmopolitan ideas also reveal an interest which Epiktetos does not share: he devotes a good deal of his comments on this subject to developing the imagery of the universe as a body and as a state.76 A significant corollary follows from the fact that Epiktetos’ interest centres on the citizen of the universe whereas Marcus dwells on the universe as a state. The teacher’s concentration on the human aspect naturally ensures a host of practical instructions: always act with reference to the whole community; fear nothing that can happen to you; work with nature so that nothing happens against your will or fails to happen when you wish it to happen; do not lightly assume the calling of a Cynic; do not long for things beyond your control; do not be concerned about what others think of you; do not depend on anything outside yourself; do not blame God or other people; be willing to surrender anything without pain, knowing the source from which it came; submit to God; be concerned for the welfare of fellow human beings. Principles of conduct flow far less freely from Marcus’ interest in the universe as a state. Just three have emerged: constant attention to social acts and co-operation; acceptance of whatever happens, since external objects cannot disturb the soul – that is, submission to the reason and law of the universe, even when death is at hand; and never blaming the gods or other people. This last is the only precept for the citizen of the universe explicitly recommended by both thinkers.77 We should note also differences of emphasis and direction. In particular, Epiktetos has a markedly religious tendency in his discussion of cosmopolitan ideas. He takes as a basis human kinship with God; he speaks of a government composed of gods and humans, and of being children of God and servants of God. Most importantly, Epiktetos urges submission to God, while Marcus talks of submission to “the reason and law of the most venerable of states and governments”.78 Epiktetos uses religious language whereas Marcus uses ‘secular’ 75 Epikt. 1.9.4–6; M.A. 4.4, 4.29. Marcus does, however, indicate that the sharing of humans in mind is a sharing in a particle of divinity (2.1.3, with Farquharson’s comment [2.493] on νοῦ καὶ θείας ἀπομοίρας); his point here is that this sharing of mind should result in co-operation (συνεργία) between people. On co-operation see nn. 45, 59 above. 76 See, for example, M.A. 2.16.1, 4.29, 7.13, 8.34. The Aristotelian de mundo is closer to Marcus than to Epiktetos in speaking of the kosmos as “the greater polis” (400b 27). 77 Epikt. 3.22.48, 3.24.58; cf. 2.19.26, 3.10.13, Enkh. 1.3. M.A. 10.1.4; cf. 8.17.1, 12.12. 78 Epikt. 1.9.1–6, 3.22.69, 3.24.65, 4.7.20; M.A. 2.16.6.

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language. Although an average student in Epiktetos’ class, confronted with one of Marcus’ cosmopolitan theories or principles, could probably have demonstrated its logical connection with what Epiktetos taught, there are insufficient direct links to speak of strong influence from Epiktetos on Marcus’ cosmopolitan ideas. Cosmopolitan ideas provide a ground on which we can confront the objection that Epiktetos may have expounded ideas closer to those of Marcus in sections of the discourses that have not survived (it is, of course, clear from the Enkheiridion that Arrianos recorded more than we have in the present collection – perhaps another four books).79 For we have some indications of the sources of their respective ideas on citizenship of the universe. Marcus says that he received from Severus, who taught him regard for philosophy, the idea of a state founded on equality. This was certainly a quality of Marcus’ universestate: “what is in accordance with its laws is equal for everyone”.80 The identity of this Severus is uncertain: he may be the Peripatetic Claudius Severus, whose lectures Marcus attended; he may be the father of Marcus’ son-in-law, the consul of 146 C.E.; he may be both or neither. But to take only the information provided in Marcus’ tribute to Severus, we learn that the latter introduced him to Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion and Brutus. The common denominator of these famous men seems to be that they were all philosophers who took an active part in political affairs. The inclusion of Stoics in the teaching programme of Severus, even if he himself was the Peripatetic philosopher, leaves open the possibility of Stoic writers being an eventual source of Marcus’ cosmopolitan ideas. Poseidonios may well have been this source since Marcus takes from him some other central doctrines concerning the world, such as the view of the kosmos as “the perfect living creature” and the emphasis on the relation between nature as a whole and its parts, doctrines that did not stimulate Seneca as they did Marcus.81

79

Photios, Library 58 (17b 17–20 Bekker), Gellius, Attic Nights 19.1.14 (if διαλέξεων = διατριβῶν); cf. Schenkl’s Preface, pages xxxiii–liv. Hadot (63–64) points out that what is especially missing from the four books we have is systematic, technical exposition of the texts of the Old Stoics; cf. Souilhé 1.xxix–xxx. 80 Tribute to Severus: M.A. 1.14.1–3. Equality in universe-state: 12.36.1 (τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἴσον ἑκάστῳ; cf. ἰσόνομος in 1.14.2 and 8.2). 81 Peripatetic: HA Marcus 3.3. Consul of 146 C.E.: C.R. Haines on 1.14.1 (p. 11) and on Fronto, To his friends 1.1 (1.283 n. 2). A.I. Trannoy (on 1.14.1) and his successor as Budé editor, P. Hadot (1.cxiv–cxv), believe he is both. If Κάτωνα in 1.14.2 refers to Cato Uticensis, and Δίωνα and Βροῦτον are the two who form the subject of Plutarch’s parallel biographies, then three of the five are Stoics and two adherents of the Academy. Marcus says that he learned from Severus “reasonableness and constancy in valuing philosophy” (1.14.3). So a range of philosophical schools is possible in Severus’ examples. Poseidonios as a likely ultimate source: Neuenschwander, especially 12–14, 37–38, 95–97; cf. fr. 99a Edelstein/Kidd (Diogenes Laertios 7.142–143). For Poseidonios on the universe see Kidd 2.405–

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By contrast, there is evidence that Epiktetos acquired some aspects of his attitude to the universe, and in particular his advice to submit to it, from his teacher Musonius Rufus. In a fragment preserved by Stobaios Epiktetos claims that, because all physical objects, plants and animals obey and submit to the universe, it is reasonable that the only independent thing, our judgment, should do the same. For the universe has shown its superior wisdom by “administering us together with the whole”. The apparent lack of distinction between “universe” (kosmos) and “the whole” (ta hola) is overcome by understanding kosmos in this passage as a reference to God, an interpretation which is supported by the obvious personification of kosmos. Another fragment, in which Epiktetos seems to be quoting Musonius, indicates that the latter advocated submission (regarding the vast number of things not under our control) to the universe, whether this involves surrendering children, country, body or anything else. But in regard to things which are under our control, our judgment should be moulded towards being of one mind with God (sumpsephous ... toi theoi).82 In addition to this link, the manner in which Musonius associates humans and gods in his description of the universal state is akin to Epiktetos’ defence of the idea.83 The only approach to a defence of his cosmopolitan ideas which Epiktetos makes is quite different from any adopted by Marcus. There is little correspondence between the practical advice for the citizen of the universe given by the two philosophers. The sources of their ideas in this area seem to have been different. It is difficult to agree that “they distinctly stand in the relation of master and pupil”, or that “they are completely at one on all philosophical questions”, or that “no figures from antiquity agree more closely in their convictions 406. The kosmos referred to as τὸ τέλειον ζῷον: M.A. 10.1.3. ὅλον/μέρος relation: e.g. 2.3.2, 2.9. 82 Submission to the universe: Epikt. fr. 3 Schenkl (Stobaios, Eklogai 4.44.66). Personification: “when [the universe] wishes”, “[the universe] has taken better counsel for us than we can, by administering us also together with the whole”. Musonius: fr. 38, p.125.6–11 Hense = p.136.3–8 Lutz (= Epikt. fr. 4 = Stobaios, Eklogai 2.8.30). The affinity of this fragment with Epiktetos’ thought is shown by such passages as Epikt. 1.12.24, 2.10.5 (cf. n. 59 above), 2.16.42, 2.19.26. 83 Musonius, fr. 9, p.42.1–10 Hense = p.68.15–22 Lutz: the ‘reasonable’ person considers himself or herself “a citizen of the city of Zeus, which is composed of humans and gods (ἣ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν)”. Compare Epikt. 1.9.1–6, esp. 4: τὸ σύστημα τὸ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεοῦ. On the religious tendency common to Musonius and Epiktetos, see B.L. Hijmans Jr., ῎Ασκησις: Notes on Epictetus’ educational system (Assen 1959) 7. One might object that Epiktetos’ phraseology resembles more closely a description of the kosmos attributed to Poseidonios (fr. 14 Edelstein/Kidd [Diogenes Laertios 7.138]): σύστημα ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. But this statement is also ascribed to other Stoics (SVF 2.527, 528; H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci2 [Berlin 1929] 464.20–21, 465.15). My point is that both Epiktetos and Musonius think in these terms, whereas Marcus Aurelius does not.

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and in the moral tone of their thoughts” or that “Marcus Aurelius shows himself the true student and follower of Epictetus”.84 Rather, what we have are ideas which are widespread among the educated public of the eastern Roman empire. This is nicely illustrated by Diogenes of Oinoanda, whose long inscription expounding Epicurean ideas dates from about the time Marcus Aurelius was born. In a vigorous passage he attacks the kind of cosmopolitanism embraced by certain Stoics, especially the view that the universe was created for the sake of human beings. He regards it as ridiculous that a god should seek to have humans as fellow-citizens (sumpoliteutai). But he accepts that the universe is a habitation and city.85 And this underlying assumption is confirmed by a longknown fragment of the inscription in which he says that “while the various divisions of the earth give one people one country and another another, the entire compass of this world gives all people a single country, the whole earth, and a single home, the world”. M.F. Smith is surely right in his (more recent) conclusion that Diogenes has not adopted a Stoic commonplace but simply accepted a common view of his time.86 That we should act as citizens of the universe came easily to the minds of teachers, as did protestations that all humankind was one. However, there was much countervailing thought, emphasising divisions of humankind. And apart from the various recommendations for behaviour from Epiktetos summarised above, there was little by way of practical application of these ideas centring on the unity of humankind. 84 Quotations from F.W. Bussell, Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics (Edinburgh 1910) 120–121; B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (London 1946) 283–284 = 2 (London 1961) 267–268; A.A. Long, in T.J. Luce (ed.), Ancient Writers: Greece and Rome (New York 1982) 2.987; Jäkel 3–4 (referring particularly to the division of the world into two categories of things). See also A.S.L. Farquharson, Marcus Aurelius: his Life and his World2 (Oxford 1952) 60; V. Goldschmidt in É. Bréhier (tr.), Les Stoïciens (Paris 1962) 1136; M. Spanneut, IL 14 (1962) 215; G. Germain, Épictète et la spiritualité stoïcienne (Paris 1964) 151; B.A. van Groningen, Mnemosyne4 18 (1965) 44; and especially the enthusiastic outburst of M. Pohlenz on “the lame Phrygian slave and the ruler of the empire” (341). Hadot is more cautious, but he sees Marcus as adopting the whole structure Epiktetos imposed on early Stoic thought (83–84; cf. 100: “The philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius, as the distant disciple of the philosopher-slave, would magnificently develop and orchestrate these richly-harmonied themes in his Meditations”). 85 Diogenes of Oinoanda, fr. 20 Smith, especially I.1–12 (now incorporated in NF 126 + 127: M.F. Smith, AS 48 [1998] 131–133). συνπολιτευτής (NF 127.II.13–14; fr. 20.I.2–3, I.5– 6, II.8–9) is not elsewhere attested. 86 Fr. 30.II.3–11; cf. Smith 139–140. Diogenes is motivated by love of humankind (philanthropos) to assist foreigners who visit Oinoanda (3.V.4–8, 30.I.12–II.2, 119.II.4– III.4). J.M. Cooper argues that Marcus Aurelius takes some advice on moral improvement (not specifically on cosmopolitanism) from Epicurean sources: op. cit. (n. 62) 337–338; cf. 346–352 and n. 62 above.

Chapter 5

Gods, Humans and the Universe Gods, Humans and the Universe

The Greeks had a long history of woolly thinking about unity and plurality. Presocratic philosophers did not see, or did not admit, that ‘one’ and ‘many’ could each have more than a single meaning. Thus when Herakleitos of Ephesos said that “day and night are one thing”, it would be intelligible if he meant that day immediately follows night (and vice versa) – that they were ‘one’ in the sense of ‘continuous’ – but in view of his criticism of Hesiodos he evidently wished to claim that they were identical. In another fragment God is identified with “day night, winter summer, war peace, surfeit famine”, that is, with the world of opposites. Aristotle reported the view of some people that ‘unity’ and ‘being’ were used in several senses, and he himself declares that ‘one’ has many senses, referring to unity of continuity, wholeness, number and form.1 By the first century of the common era, distinct gods were sometimes combined by various expressions. For example, on papyri we find the Greek-Egyptian goddess Isis identified with many deities, such as with Aphrodite in Egyptian regions and with Artemis in the Kykladic islands, or with Nemesis on a magical papyrus. The acclamation “One Zeus Sarapis (or Serapis)” is inscribed on a quadrilateral seal ring once in Beirut and on inscriptions from as far east as Dura Europos to Spain; “the only god in heaven” on a seal ring in the Cairo 1

See M.C. Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (Washington, D.C. 1971), especially 8, 13–19, 105–106. Herakleitos: Diels/Kranz 22 B 57 = D 25 Laks/Most, on which see Stokes, op. cit. 87–88, 92–93, 98–99, 294 n. 47 (for the claim of identity, Stokes compares B 59 = R 86.4 and B 60 = D 51). T.M. Robinson claims that “the unity in question is the unity of complementarity and reciprocity, not of identity”, but he allows other interpretations: Heraclitus: Fragments [Phoenix Supplementary Volumes, 22] (Toronto 1987) 120– 121. Unity of opposites: DK 22 B 67 = D 48 Laks/Most; cf. G.S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments (Cambridge 1954) 188–189, C.H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge 1979) 276–279 and T.M. Robinson, op. cit. 127–129. Aristotle on ‘one’: On sophistical refutations 182 b 25–27, Metaphysics 10.1 (1052 a 15–b 1); cf. L. Elders, Aristotle’s Theory of the One: A Commentary on Book X of the Metaphysics [Wijsgerige Teksten en Studies, 5] (Assen 1961) 58–68. Stokes (op. cit. 8), pointing to Aristotle, On sophistical refutations 182 b 13–27 with G.E.L. Owen in H.I. Düring and Owen (eds.), Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century: Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August, 1957 [Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 11] (Göteborg 1960) 164– 165, suggests that “there was dispute even in the Platonic Academy over the analysis of unity”. For an attempt to expound the basic unity of the world in Stoic thought see J. Christensen, An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy (Copenhagen 1962) 11–22.

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Museum seems to refer to a trinity of Zeus, Asklepios and Hygeia.2 It is particularly the inscriptions of Christians that show usage in many parts of the Mediterranean world of the formula heis theos (‘one god’). As Christian liturgy developed in the fourth century heis hagios (‘the one and holy’, ‘the only holy one’) and heis kurios (‘one lord’) appear in inscriptions.3 How widespread, in the period when the Greeks scattered through the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions were ruled by the Romans, was this tendency to emphasise one god or, say, one universe? There is evidently something satisfying in human thought about reducing a multitude of things to one. But is it too dismissive of the thought of Greek intellectuals under the Roman peace to suggest that assertions of oneness are simply being used to commend something (such as a particular god)? Let us consider a passage found in the documents that survive from the Hermetic community which might be thought to take an extreme position on oneness: Humankind, the third living thing, came to be in the image of the kosmos, possessing mind in accordance with the will of the father, unlike other living things on earth, as well as having 2

Isis: P.Oxy. 1380.9, 22, 35, 38–39, etc. (Aphrodite), 84–85 (Artemis). Isis Nemesis Adrasteia: P.Lond. 121.503 (here further “of many names and many forms”); cf. J.G. Griffiths (ed.), Apuleius of Madauros: The Isis-Book (Metamorphoses, Book X) [Études préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l’empire romain, 39] (Leiden 1975) 153–154. Εἷς Ζεὺς Σάραπις: L. Jalabert, MUB 2 (1907) 311–312 no. 8; L. Vidman, Sylloge inscriptionum religionis Isiacae et Sarapiacae [Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten, 28] (Berlin 1969) nos. 363, 389 (with ῞Ηλιος), 769 (with ᾿Ιαώ); N. Belayche in One God 149–150, 157–158. μόνος θηὸς ἐν οὐρανῷ: G. Karo, AA (1901) 209–213 at 212 with 211 fig. 9; P. Perdrizet, REA 13 (1911) 236 (claiming that the inscription was cut later by a Christian or Jew); N. Belayche in One God 151; cf. A Chaniotis, ibid. 140. Trinitarian formulae are discussed with due skepticism by H.S. Versnel, Inconsistencies in Greek and Roman Religion 1: Ter unus: Isis, Dionysos, Hermes: Three Studies in Henotheism [Studies in Greek and Roman Religion, 6] (Leiden 1990), especially 212–213, 232–237, 242. 3 Much of the material mentioned in this paragraph was drawn together ninety years ago by E. Peterson in his masterly book Εἷς θεός: Epigraphische, formgeschichtliche und religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen [Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, N.F. 24] (Göttingen 1926), a book that is being revised and supplemented (largely with Jewish, Samaritan and Christian inscriptions) by C.J. Markschies (see One God 104, 150 n. 51). Various expressions for syncretic unity: Abschnitt VII (253–270). εἷς Ζεὺς Σέραπις: Abschnitt V (227–240); on Sarapis as εἷς Ζεύς (Arstd. 45.21) see also A. Höfler, Der Sarapishymnus des Ailios Aristeides [Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 27] (Stuttgart 1935) 78–80. The μόνος-formula: E. Peterson, op. cit. 196. εἷς-formulae in the liturgy: ibid., Abschnitt II (130–140). εἷς θεός in Christian epigraphy: Abschnitt I (1–130). Christian εἷς θεός inscriptions, especially in the Limestone Massif of Syria, have been discussed more recently by F.R. Trombley, Hellenic Religion and Christianization c.370–529 [Religions in the Graeco-Roman World, 115] 2 (Leiden 1994) 252–253, 256–265, 268–282, 313–315 and C.J. Markschies in M. Krebernik and J. van Oorschot (eds.), Polytheismus und Monotheismus in den Religionen des Vorderen Orients [Alter Orient und Altes Testament, 298] (Münster 2002) 209–234 at 210–215.

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not only a relation of sympathy (sumpatheia) with the second god [= the kosmos] but also a connection of thought (ennoia) with the first god. ... In sum, the kosmos was made by god and is in god, but humankind was made by the kosmos and is in the kosmos; god is the beginning, container and composer of all things.4

Is this propensity to have god(s), humans and the universe bound up together a common one? The elements of this complex union need to be examined: how are humans united with god, and god with the universe, and humans with the universe? What does it mean to live in harmony with nature? But first we shall examine claims to monotheism against the background of what appears to be belief in a plurality of gods.

Only One God? Only One God?

Some scholars, not writing specifically about the Hermetic corpus (above), have promoted the existence of monotheism among non-Christian authors. The dichotomy monotheism-polytheism leads to problems in debate, especially given the link between monotheism and western democratic values. Moreover, ‘monotheism’ tends to privilege the entity to which it is applied.5 M. Frede was particularly influential in the promotion of the idea of ‘pagan monotheism’, organising a seminar in Oxford in 1996 in collaboration with P. Athanassiadi and offering, according to the organisers, a number of important interventions in a later conference in Exeter.6 In making a detailed case for the thesis that it is extremely difficult to distinguish the Christian position, on the question whether there is one God or whether there are many gods, from that of Plato, 4 C.H. 8.5. Cf. 10.14: “There are these three, then: god, the father and the good; the kosmos; and the human. ... Because the kosmos is the son of god and the human the son of the kosmos, the human is like a grandson (ἔγγονος) of the kosmos”. 5 See C.J. Markschies in G. Palmer (ed.), Fragen nach dem einen Gott: Die Monotheismusdebatte im Kontext [Religion und Aufklärung, 14] (Tübingen 2007) 283–296 (a slightly different version in One God 100–111); N. Belayche in One God 142–143; and perhaps Frede, ibid. 54, 61. For comparable reasons (disrespect for ‘pagan’ writers) I have avoided using the term ‘pagan’ in this book, although ‘Pagan and Christian’ is hard to avoid in the titles of books such as those written by E.R. Dodds and R. Lane Fox (see Bibliography; cf. also Monotheism in the next note). S.R.F. Price questioned the alleged opposition between monotheism and polytheism and suggested that “polytheism was an attempt to understand and make sense of divine power”; “the multiplicity of gods was perfectly compatible with a sense of the oneness of being” (JRS 102 [2012] 1–19 at 12). 6 P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede (eds.), Pagan Monotheism. S. Mitchell and P. Van Nuffelen in One God viii. See also their other edited work arising from the Exeter conference, Monotheism between Pagans and Christians in Late Antiquity [Interdisciplinary Studies in Ancient Culture and Religion, 12] (Leuven 2010), in which they do draw attention to the Corpus Hermeticum at 4 n. 10; on their example (16.3) see n. 93 below and chap. 6 n. 30 (on God and the universe).

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Aristotle, Zenon of Kition, and their various followers in late antiquity, Frede offers two bases for this thesis: the Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics have other ‘divine’ beings in a diminished sense compared to ‘God’ or even ‘the God’; and early Christians have a plurality of beings who can be called ‘divine’, such as the un-fallen angels or redeemed and saved human beings. Now, it is very difficult to argue that early Christians place either redeemed humans or God’s messengers on the same level as God. But to hold his position concerning the philosophers, Frede has to deny that Aristotle uses ‘the God’ (ho theos) interchangeably with ‘divinity’ (to theion) and ‘the gods’ (hoi theoi). And what, one may ask, can ‘the gods’ indicate if not a plurality of gods?7 In a paper derived from the Exeter conference Frede seeks to establish three firm cases of monotheistic belief: Antisthenes (a follower of Sokrates), Khrysippos and Galenos. In particular, Frede does “not see any way in which one could deny that Antisthenes was a monotheist”. He is probably correct in this conclusion, though one should offer a couple of caveats. The key fragment of Antisthenes is brief and lacks context; moreover, kata phusin should mean ‘according to nature’ or ‘in harmony with nature’ rather than ‘in reality’.8 Frede’s second set of relevant passages for Antisthenes derive from Clement of Alexandria. But Clement is far from a neutral reporter, since he is intent on showing, for example, that earlier Greek authors anticipate Christian beliefs or that they derived their beliefs from the ‘Hebrews’. If we took Clement’s claims at face value we would have to conclude that Plato as well as Antisthenes believed

7 M. Frede in Pagan Monotheism 41–67, especially 43–46, 49, 51–53, 67, and (with P. Athanassiadi) 1–3, 20. Frede may have a point (Pagan Monotheism 52) with respect to Khrysippos and Kleanthes, who are said by Plutarch (mor. 1075a–c) to hold that none of the gods except Zeus alone is indestructible; that is, they have a tenuous form of immortality (51–53). But Plutarch, who is criticising the early Stoic philosophers, is thus shown to believe in a plurality of gods (below at nn. 14–18; chap. 7 at n. 111). In terms of Frede’s assertions about the early Christians, it is hard to show that “they do believe in the deification of Man” (3; cf. 59–60) or to make anything of Christian appreciation of the fact that Hebrew ’elohim is plural (3). In his recent book R.C.T. Parker talks freely about polytheistic groups in the Mediterranean: Greek Gods Abroad: Names, Natures, and Transformations [Sather Classical Lectures, 72] (Berkeley 2017), e.g. 2–3, 75–76, 171–172, 174–176; cf. his earlier book Polytheism and Society at Athens (Oxford 2005). 8 Antisthenes, fr. 39a Decleva Caizzi = 179a Prince (from Philodemos, On Piety 7); cf. F.W.A. Mullach (ed.), Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum 2 (Paris 1881) 277 and D. Obbink (ed.), Philodemus: On Piety 1 (Oxford 1996) 81–82. Frede on Antisthenes: One God 61–70 (quotation from 61; cf. 70). For κατὰ φύσιν as “in harmony with nature” see the last section of this chapter. ‘In reality’: D. Obbink (above) 143 n. 6, 359–360; M. Frede in Pagan Monotheism 45. Fr. 40 DC = 181 Prince (derived from the two Clement passages in the next note, Eus. praep. evang. 13.13.35 and Theodoret. graec. aff. cur. 1.75) similarly lacks context.

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that “the one true god is alone god”.9 As for Khrysippos, whose thought may indeed suggest that “the simple distinction between monotheism and polytheism as a matter of belief in just one god or of belief in many gods is ill-suited to capture the different positions in Greek religious thought”, it seems rather forced to argue that the ‘minor gods’ of Khrysippos are not polytheistic gods on the ground that they pass away in the conflagration. It is obvious from the Olympic pantheon that gods are not all equal. In the case of Galenos Frede admits that “Galen does appear to believe in a plurality of gods”. Although there was a temple of Zeus Asklepios in Pergamon, Galenos seems to respect at least Zeus, Apollon (at Delphoi) and Asklepios as gods.10 The push for ‘pagan monotheism’ has changed perceptions of henotheism from the earlier expositions by F.M. Müller and H.S. Versnel. However, it seems that ‘henotheism’ is a more useful term for study of the fourth and fifth centuries; if used of the first and second centuries it should perhaps be restricted to particular cultic situations where other gods are acknowledged but the god in whose honour the shrine has been set up is honoured in extravagant terms.11 Moreover, ‘the Highest’ (hupsistos, whether absolute or qualifying Zeus or another deity), promoted by S. Mitchell at both conferences as monotheism, strikes the difficulty

9 Clem. prot. 6.71.1–2. In str. 5.14.108.2–4 Clement claims that Plato virtually predicts the oikonomia of salvation with his description of the crucifixion of the righteous man in rep. 361e–362a, followed immediately by the claim that Antisthenes paraphrases the question of Isaiah (cf. 40.18, 25; 46.5) “To whom have you likened me?” with his statement that “[God] is like no one, so no one can learn about him from an image” (fr. 40a DC = 181a P). K. Algra concludes that “the Stoic conception of god is much closer to Heraclitus than to either the Neoplatonic or the Judaeo-Christian conceptions of god”: in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge 2003) 153–178 at 172. 10 Frede on Khrysippos: One God 70–75 (quotation from 74–75); on Galenos: One God 75–81 (quotation from 80). 11 Cf. R. Bloch, DNP 8.375. A. Chaniotis would prefer to use the neologism ‘megatheism’ for this phenomenon and to restrict ‘henotheism’ to the idea of the unity of God: in One God 113 and n. 2. M.V. Cerutti makes a distinction between henotheism with respect to cult practices and henotheism in philosophical sources: in Monotheism 31–32. N. Siniossoglou sees Ioulianos (Julian) and others as attempting to reconcile a philosophical religion, that tended towards monotheism, and traditional religion with its multiplicity of gods; he would label this enterprise ‘imperial [or ‘inclusive’] henotheism’: in Monotheism 127–148. C. Addey suggests that Porphyrios managed to accommodate polytheistic traditions in his henotheism: in Monotheism 149–165; she defines ‘henotheism’ as ‘the worship of a Supreme Deity which simultaneously includes the polytheistic acknowledgment and worship of many deities’ (ibid. 152). Earlier expositions: F.M. Müller, Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by the Religions of India: Delivered in the Chapter House, Westminster Abbey, in April, May, and June, 18782 (London 1882), especially Lecture 6; H.S. Versnel, op. cit. (n. 2).

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that those who made offerings and had inscriptions cut were worshipping different deities in different places.12 My own view is that we are dealing with an intellectual context where ideas of unity were used to reinforce views. There was in the Roman world of the first and second centuries a tendency to assert that there was harmony or unity when such an assertion actually went beyond the author’s beliefs. Claims about ‘one god’ (heis theos) constitute a classic example: they were frequently made by speakers and writers who wanted to promote a particular deity but who in practice accepted a plurality of gods.13 Consider Plutarch, for example. He attacks atheism, is interested in the nature of divinity, discusses various views about the gods and studies Egyptian stories concerning them, which he is prepared to accept on certain conditions.14 He believes in the gods of the lower world, discusses daimones (a kind of divinity) at some length and defines four stages of precedence, in descending

12 S. Mitchell in Pagan Monotheism 81–148 and in One God 167–208, with valuable dossiers of the documentary evidence. In Monotheism (5, 8–10) Mitchell and P. Van Nuffelen suggest that Christianity better integrated worship with theology (compared with ‘paganism’) and rejected Greek and Roman worship of idols; they admit that M.J. Edwards has made an important correction to the views of Frede and Athanassiadi (nn. 6–7 above) in S.C.R. Swain and Edwards (eds.), Approaching Late Antiquity: The Transformation from Early to Late Empire (Oxford 2004) 211–234. 13 Cf. A. Chaniotis, who sees the use of εἷς as “not exclusive – as in Christian prayers and acclamations – but competitive” and suggests that heis theos “sometimes … designates a deity as unique within a polytheistic system”: in One God 119–120, 127–128 (quotations from 128, 119). N. Belayche continues to write of ‘le polythéisme gréco-romain’ (bibliography in One God 210). See also E. Peterson, op. cit. (n. 3) 268–270 on acclamations of Men. 14 On Plutarch’s religious views see G. Soury, REG 55 (1942) 50–69; R. Flacelière, REG 56 (1943) 72–111; M. Hadas, South Atlantic Quarterly 46 (1947) 89–92; F.E. Brenk, In Mist Apparelled: Religious Themes in Plutarch’s Moralia and Lives [Mnemosyne Supplements, 48] (Leiden 1977); F.E. Brenk, ANRW 2.36.1 (Berlin 1987) 248–349; J. Opsomer in L. Van der Stockt (ed.), Plutarchea Lovaniensia: A Miscellany of Essays on Plutarch [Studia Hellenistica, 32] (Leuven 1996) 165–194 (with criticism of Flacelière at 174–176); J. Boulogne, RPhA 22.1 (2004) 95–106. Attacks on atheism: 165b, 166d, 170f–171a; cf. 360a. Nature of divinity: 108e, 375c, 382a–b; cf. 402b. Views about the gods: e.g. 381f, 420a, 763c, 1074e– 1075c. Egyptian stories: e.g. 352a, 354d, 362b, 377c–378d. On Greek and Egyptian elements in Isis and Osiris see J.G. Griffiths, CE 38 (1963) 249–250, JEA 53 (1967) 79–102 and Plutarch’s De Iside et Osiride (Cambridge 1970) passim and J. Hani, La religion égyptienne dans la pensée de Plutarque (Paris 1976). On this work in general see the edition by G. Parthey (Berlin 1850); T. Hopfner, Plutarch über Isis und Osiris [Monographien des Archiv Orientální, 9] (Praha 1940–1941); A. Torhoudt, Een onbekend gnostisch systeem in Plutarchus’ De Iside et Osiride [Studia Hellenistica, 1] (Leuven 1942); C. Fries, C & M 5 (1942) 119–127; P.R. Hardie, ANRW 2.33.6 (Berlin 1992) 4743–4787, especially 4761–4763, 4766–4769; and the editions by V. Cilento, Diatriba isiaca e dialoghi delfici (Firenze 1962), J.G. Griffiths (above) and J.-F. Nardelli, L’Osiris de Plutarque: Un Commentaire de De Iside et Osiride, Chapitres 12–19 [ANEJO, 9] (Alva 2017).

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order, from gods (theoi) through daimones and semi-gods (or heroes) to humans.15 He seems to come close to monotheism when he says that God is one (heis on), a point which he connects with the ancient address “you are one (thing)” (ei hen), and again when he says that ‘being’ must have unity (hen). But these comments relate only to Apollon, as is shown by the etymologies offered for that god’s names: Apollon (denying by the prefix a- the many [ta polla]), Ieios (demonstrating that he is the one and only [heis kai monos, one or both adjectives being taken as a synonym for ios]) and Phoibos (suggesting ‘purity’ and thus ‘oneness’ [to hen]).16 Of course, the emphasis on Apollon in the dialogues on the Delphic oracle and in the essay on Isis and Osiris, which is dedicated to a priestess at Delphoi, is as natural as the emphasis on Eros in the essay Erotikos.17 In practice Plutarch freely uses either the singular theos or the plural theoi and on occasion changes from one to the other. His polytheism is demonstrated by such opinions as that Zeus is not the only god (accepted 15 Gods of the lower world: 269f, 272d–e. Daimones: 112a; 361a–c; 415a–421e; 431a– 438d. Precedence of gods: most clearly in Rom. 28.10; see also mor. 283f–284a and 285e; 360d–e, 362e, 369d; 415a–b. Compare τὸ δαιμόνιον in 548c, 1103a, Cic. 49.6 and the θεῖος / δαιμόνιος distinction in 549e. See also G. Soury, REG 52 (1939) 51–69 at 53–58; Barrow 86–91; F.E. Brenk, In Mist Apparelled (n. 14) chaps. 4 and 6; Y. Vernière, Symboles et mythes dans la pensée de Plutarque: Essai d’interprétation philosophique et religieuse des Moralia (Paris 1977) 249–262. 16 393a–c; cf. 354f (τὴν μονάδα ... ὀνομάζειν ᾿Απόλλωνα), 381f (cf. n. 41 below), 388f (᾿Απόλλωνά τε τῇ μονώσει), 392a (the address εἶ). Zeus’ implicit loss of his primacy to Apollon in The E among the Delphians (384d–394c) is described as a form of monistic henotheism by N. Siniossoglou in Monotheism 137 (cf. n. 11 above). On the use of the alpha privative and Apollon’s becoming “the patron saint of the via negativa because of the unfortunate morphology of his name” (‘not-many-things’) see R.J. Mortley, From Word to Silence [Theophaneia, 30] (Bonn 1986) 1.155–156. F.E. Brenk points out that Plutarch may be distancing himself from the claim that God “is one and has completed eternity in a single ‘now’” (393a) by putting the statement in the mouth of Ammonios: in Plutarchea Lovaniensia (n. 14) 32–33 = id., Relighting the Souls: Studies in Plutarch, in Greek Literature, Religion, and Philosophy, and in the New Testament Background (Stuttgart 1998) 62–63. For the One in the Middle Platonists he refers to J. Halfwassen, Der Aufstieg zum Einen: Untersuchungen zu Platon und Plotin [Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 9] (Stuttgart 1992) 201–204. R.M. Grant, who quotes from 393a–c, goes on to later Platonists such as Albinos and Attikos (on whom see chap. 9 at nn. 31–35) who believe that there are at least two gods: Gods and the One God [Library of Early Christianity, 1] (Philadelphia 1986) 79–81. M.L. West points out the attraction of “having one god as the supreme guiding force” for Presokratic thinkers such as Herakleitos (above) who presented a unified universe; but also that it is difficult to find one such thinker who can be counted as a monotheist without qualification: in Pagan Monotheism 21–40, especially 24–25, 27, 30 (quotation), 34. 17 748e–771e. On this work see F.E. Brenk, ICS 13 (1988) 457–471 = id., Relighting the Souls (n. 16) 13–27 and the edition by P. Gilabert Barberà: El Erótico: diálogo filosófico sobre Eros, o la confrontación de los amores pederástico y conyugal [Universitas, 4] (Barcelona 1991). On the priestess, Flavia Klea (Isis and Osiris 351c, 364e), see B. Puech, ANRW 2.33.6 (Berlin 1992) 4842–4843 and n. 36.

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from early Stoics) and that Sarapis is a god common to all humankind – clearly one of a number of gods. When Plutarch alludes to the custom of praying to one god but mentioning all the others who share the same temple, he evidently approves of this multiplicity of gods. These practices eliminate the view that Plutarch endorses “un hénothéisme inclusif” that presents various polytheisms in a multiple unity.18 Dion of Prousa places a great deal of emphasis on Zeus as the creator and father of the universe. More than that, he is featured as highest and most perfect nature, supreme and universal king, arkhon, prytanis and father, the ruler imitated by nearly all real kings.19 Twice Dion says that Zeus is unique among the gods in being called by the names pater, basileus, polieus, philios, hetaireios, xenios and so on – names which he carefully explains.20 However, the use of “alone of gods” (monos theon) in these contexts, along with such phrases as “concerning the general nature of gods and especially of the ruler of the universe”, shows clearly that Zeus is not emphasised to the point of monotheism.21 18 As advocated by J. Boulogne, op. cit. (n. 14) 95–106, especially 101–104 (he makes no reference to 362b, 679d–e, 708c, 1075a–b). H.S. Versnel searches for henotheism (not particularly in Plutarch) and sees it already in Euripides’ Bakkhai: op. cit. (n. 2) 35–37, chap. 2 and passim. By contrast, ‘polytheism’ is freely used in the editor’s preface in R. Schlesier (ed.), A Different God? Dionysos and Ancient Polytheism (Berlin 2011) ix–xiv and in, for example, H.S. Versnel’s essay (ibid. 23–46). Alternation between singular and plural: e.g. 1092a–c, 1101c. Zeus not the only god: 1075a–b. Sarapis: 362b. Gods sharing a temple: 679d–e, 708c. On Plutarch’s ‘selective polytheism’ see further Y. Vernière, op. cit. (n. 15) 40–43, 217–219. 19 Dion 1.37–38, 44–45; 12.22; 36.35; 53.12. On the usage of the Homeric poems and Hesiod in such passages see J.F. Kindstrand, Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik: Studien zu der Homerlektüre und dem Homerbild bei Dion von Prusa, Maximos von Tyros und Ailios Aristeides [Studia Graeca Upsaliensia, 7] (Uppsala 1973), especially chap. 2; Desideri 323, 474– 80 with notes; A. Gangloff, Dion Chrysostome et les mythes: Hellénisme, communication et philosophie politique (Grenoble 2006) 290–303; P. O’Sullivan in J. McWilliam et al. (eds.), The Statue of Zeus at Olympia: New Approaches (Newcastle upon Tyne 2011) 137–154, especially 139–140, 148–151, 154. For Zeus as controller, leader, pilot (and so on) of the universe see the second last section of this chapter (at n. 80). 20 1.39–41; 12.75–77. The names I have selected refer to Zeus’ position as father, king, guardian of cities, and protector of relationships designated by the terms philia, hetaireia and xenia (on which forms of alliance see my comments in Hermes 118 [1990] 42–54 and Athenian Politics c.800–500 B.C. [London 1990] 21 n. 4, 136–137 n. 6, 140 n. 6). For a similar list of titles see On the kosmos 401a, discussed below (at n. 34). 21 1.39; 12.27, 75; 30.26. Cf. von Arnim 478–480. B.F. Harris, on the other hand, says that Dion’s view is monotheistic, in that he accepts the divinity of the kosmos and thus that Zeus and the kosmos are in essence one (The Moral and Political Ideas of Dio Chrysostom with Special Reference to the Bithynian Orations [Thesis, University of Auckland 1966] 244). H.-J. Klauck believes the modern distinction between monotheism and polytheism cannot be applied to ancient Greek thought: Dion von Prusa, Olympische Rede oder Über die erste Erkenntnis Gottes [SAPERE, 2] (Darmstadt 2000) 203–205.

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Dion demonstrates his polytheism by praying to a number of gods, including Homonoia (Harmony). He refers disparagingly to some people who maintain that Apollon, Helios (the sun) and Dionysos are the same god and to the many who even combine all the gods into a single force and power. The Epicureans are attacked not only for driving the gods out of the universe but also for their monotheistic worship of Hedone (Pleasure).22 Similarly with Ailios Aristeides, the concept of Zeus as omnipotent creator of the universe and supreme deity seems to approach monotheism. For example: Zeus is the father of all – heaven, earth, gods, humankind, and plants – and through him we see and have all that we have. He is benefactor, patron and overseer of everything, he is prutanis, hegemon and steward of everything that exists and everything coming into being, he is giver of everything, he is creator.23

It is true that special attention is given to a single god in some works, such as his speeches in honour of Zeus and Athene and the fifth Sacred Tale. But the same works illustrate his belief in a number of gods.24 C.A. Behr has aptly

22

Prayer to ῾Oμόνοια: 39.8. For worship of Homonoia in a range of Greek cities see G. Thériault, Le culte d’Homonoia dans les cités grecques [Collection de la Maison de l’Orient Méditerranéen, 26; Série épigraphique et historique, 3] (Lyon 1996), especially (on the stasis in Nikaia) 56–61. Combination of gods: 31.10–11. Epicureans: 12.36–37. It is difficult to discern any more about Dion’s attitude to Epicurean views of the gods from the opening of Eulogy of Baldness by Synesios of Kyrene (1.3 J. Lamoureux = 1 A. Garzya = 2.384 lines 16–18 G. de Budé). 23 Arstd. 43.29; see Boulanger 183–185; U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, SPAW (1925) 339; O. Kern, Die Religion der Griechen 3 (Berlin 1938) 266–267; Behr 151; N. Siniossoglou in Monotheism 135. 24 37.18–22; 43.18, 20, 25; 51.66 (cf. ὁ θεός [Asklepios], ἡ θεός [Athene] in 51.1, 25). See also 26.104–105; 48.40–41, 44 for the acceptance of a number of gods. The speeches honouring individual gods have been the subject of a number of monographs: J. Amann, Die Zeusrede des Ailios Aristeides [Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 12] (Stuttgart 1931); A. Höfler, op. cit. (n. 3); W. Uerschels, Der Dionysoshymnos des Ailios Aristeides [Inaugural-Dissertation, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität] (Bonn 1962); G. Jöhrens, Der Athenahymnus des Ailios Aristeides: Mit einem Anhang zum Höhenkult der Athena und Testimonien zur allegorischen Deutung der Athena [Habelts Dissertationsdrucke, Reihe klassische Philologie, 32] (Bonn 1981); J. Goeken in Ælius Aristide écrivain 283–303. See also R. Herzog, SPAW (1934) 753–770 [= Phil.-Hist. Kl. nr. 23], studying inscription no. 145 in C. Habicht, Die Inschriften des Asklepieions [Altertümer von Pergamon, 8.3] (Berlin 1969) from Pergamon, originally published by T. Wiegand in APAW 1932, 5 pp. 53–54; cf. E.L. Bowie, ANRW 2.33.1 (Berlin 1989) 214–220; D.A. Russell in Antonine Literature 199–215. On the rhetorical training Aristeides received from Asklepios see 50.19–20 and F. Robert in R. Poignault and C. Schneider (eds.), Fabrique de la déclamation antique (controverses et suasoires) [Collection de la Maison de l’Orient et de la Méditerranée, 55; Série littéraire et philosophique, 21] (Lyon 2016) 67–83 at 77–81; on Aristeides as a teacher see I. Israelowich in Ælius Aristide écrivain 355–371, especially 355– 359, 368–370.

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described his religious beliefs as “eclectic polytheism”.25 Even the exclamation ‘the One!’ (heis) is traditional and does not indicate divine unity.26 These writers from the rhetorical tradition, then, may emphasise a particular god, but they clearly believe in a number of gods. Some of the philosophical writers are more unambiguously polytheists. Epiktetos has a definite preference for the singular theos, but the plural theoi (‘gods’) occurs as well and there are many passages in which he moves naturally from singular to plural or vice versa. He also speaks about ‘divinity’ or ‘the divinity’ (to theion, to daimonion), terms that at times seem almost interchangeable with theos or theoi. ‘Another’ (allos) is used to refer to God or Zeus, and Zeus is predominant in some records of Epiktetos’ teaching.27 But his polytheism is demonstrated by the plural usage theoi, by the manner in which Zeus appears with other gods (or as their representative) and by references to other traditional gods, such as Here, the consort of Zeus, and Athene.28 It is true that Marcus Aurelius uses the phrase heis theos (‘one god’), but he is not a monotheist. He has a slight preference for the plural theoi over the singular theos, but he uses both freely and occasionally moves from one to the other.29 His polytheism is clear in other passages also, such as when he refers 25

Behr 22, 72–73 and especially chap. 6. 50.50; cf. O. Kern, Orphicorum Fragmenta (Berlin 1922) 102 (no. 31 line 23); A.D. Nock, Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo (Oxford 1933) 292–293; A.-J. Festugière, Personal Religion among the Greeks [Sather Classical Lectures, 26] (Berkeley 1954) 170 n. 23; Behr 158. Asklepios’ reply to Aristeides, “You are the One”, honours him above other politicians: A.-J. Festugière, loc. cit.; Behr 50; cf. P. Andersson and B.-A. Roos, Eranos 95 (1997) 26–38 at 37. M. Horstmanshoff (in B.E. Borg [ed.], Paideia: The World of the Second Sophistic [MillenniumStudien, 2] [Berlin 2004] 286–287) sees or. 50.50–51 as evidence of Aristeides’ henotheism (see above at n. 11), but those with whom he disagrees (e.g. Dodds 43–44) surely have the correct interpretation. 27 Singular θεός: Epikt. 1.6.3–7, 1.14.6–10, 1.24.1, 1.29.46–49, 2.1.25, 2.8.1–2, etc.; cf. Pohlenz 1.338. Plural: e.g. 1.1.13 (on the text see Dobbin 74), 1.12.1–5, 1.12.32. Alternation between singular and plural: 1.1.10–17, 1.4.31–32, 1.16.6–7, 2.8.10–11, 2.17.21–29, 3.24.60–63, etc. τὸ θεῖον: 1.14 tit., 2.20.22. τὸ δαιμόνιον: 3.22.53, 4.4.39, fr. 11. These terms interchangeable with forms of θεός: 1.12.1, 1.16.15–16, 2.14.11–13, 3.1.37; cf. Bonhöffer 81–82. ἄλλος: e.g. 1.25.13, 2.5.22, 3.13.13, 4.1.103, enkh. 17. Zeus predominant: e.g. 1.19.9–13, 3.22.56–57, 3.24.112–117, 4.8.30–32. 28 Zeus and other gods: 1.16.7, 2.17.25. Apollon: 3.1.16–18. Athene: 2.8.18–20. Demeter: 3.21.12. Hephaistos: 4.8.21. Here: 3.13.4. 29 Plural: e.g. M.A. 3.3.6, 4.47, 10.8.6; with the article: 1.17.1, 6.44.1, 6.44.4, 9.11.2. Singular: e.g. 3.11.4, 8.34.4, 12.23.6; with the article: 5.34.2, 8.56.2, 12.11. Alternation between singular and plural: 6.41.1–2 (μέμψασθαί σε θεοῖς ... θεῷ ἐγκαλέσαι); 12.5.1–5 (τῷ θείῳ ... τὸν θεόν ... τοῖς θεοῖς); 12.11–12. There is also this alternation in the repeated advice to follow God/the gods: 3.16.3, 10.11.4, 12.27.2, 12.31.2. M.J. Edwards also notes that ‘god’ and ‘gods’ are interchangeable terms for Marcus: in M. van Ackeren (ed.), A Companion to Marcus Aurelius (Chichester 2012) 200–216 at 203. 26

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to “the sun ... and the rest of the gods” or talks about lack of influence “among so many gods”.30 When he says “there is one universe consisting of all, one God immanent in all, one substance, one law – the reason common to all intelligent creatures – and one truth”,31 the successive uses of heis (‘one’) after the first serve to reinforce the initial statement. Marcus must insist on one universe consisting of all (kosmos … heis ex hapanton), for a number of universes is a genuine alternative held by others. There is not the same threat in a number of substances or a number of truths. As A.S.L. Farquharson points out on this passage, God and matter are mentioned as “two aspects of ὁ κόσμος [the universe], the relatively formative and active, and the relatively material and passive”. God and law penetrate the universe and preserve its unity. The use of heis does not indicate a monotheistic aberration on Marcus’ part; heis marks important aspects of the united universe.32 There are other passages where heis tends to lose its distinctive meaning and serves to indicate items the author values or wishes to stress; for example, in the New Testament: “there is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism; one God and father of all, who is over all and through all and in all”. In this case the unity which really matters to the author is the unity of the Christian community to whom he is writing (“I beg you … to make every effort to maintain the unity (henotes) of the Spirit in the bond of peace”).33 There are, however, some writers under the Roman peace who promote the belief that there is only one God. The author of On the kosmos asserts that God 30

8.19.1, 9.35.2. 7.9.2; cf. Pohlenz 1.347–348 (for the view that Marcus is strongly monotheistic here) and Neuenschwander 27–28. C. Motschmann also finds Marcus’ monotheism most clearly in 7.9, but sees ‘the gods’ in the background of his thought: Die Religionspolitik Marc Aurels [Hermes Einzelschriften, 88] (Stuttgart 2002) 54–60, especially 58–59. He catalogues Marcus’ attention to individual gods such as Sarapis (115–125) and the Eleusinian goddesses (168–169, 173–188, 192–193). 32 This includes ἀλήθεια (‘truth’): see 9.1.2–5, Farquharson’s commentary, 2.723–724, 787–788 and Neuenschwander 25. Reason and God are parallel in 12.31.2. 33 Ephesians 4.3–6. Farquharson (1.353) refers to this passage in order to point out the similarity of language and the Stoic overtones of “the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace” (4.3). For an exposition of ‘unity’ themes in Ephesians and in contemporary society see G.H.P. Thompson, The Letters of Paul to the Ephesians, to the Colossians and to Philemon (Cambridge 1967) 20–28; he denies (ibid. 61–62) that the stress in 4.3–6 lies on unity among Christian communities that were drifting apart. Further discussion on ‘oneness’ in Ephesians 4.3–6 is found in E. Peterson, op. cit. (n. 3) 214–215, 254–256; M. Barth, Ephesians [The Anchor Bible, 34–34A] (New York 1974) 2.464–472; W.A. Meeks in J. Jervell and Meeks (eds.), God’s Christ and His People: Studies in Honour of Nils Alstrup Dahl (Oslo 1977) 214; P.T. O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians (Grand Rapids, MI 1999) 279–286; A.C. Mayer, Sprache der Einheit im Epheserbrief und in der Ökumene [WUNT, 2.150] (Tübingen 2002) 61–67, 77–78. 31

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is one (heis on) and explains that God has many names according to all the natures and events which he, as “cause of all things”, produces. Some of the names are astrapaios (producer of lightning), polieus, hetaireios, philios and xenios – names that we have seen applied to Zeus by Dion of Prousa – and soter (saviour, preserver).34 The Hermetic literature also has a strong monotheistic tendency, despite the use of the plural ‘gods’ to refer to a variety of objects, including humans and the celestial bodies, in such phrases as “none of the other so-called gods or humans or divine beings (daimones)” and “there are many kinds of gods”.35 The primary God is incomparable, one and unique, and is described by such terms as ho heis kai monos (‘the one and only’) and to hen kai monon (‘the one and only [being]’).36 God’s unity and uniqueness is demonstrated by the universe. Its harmony would be impossible without the one who is pantos heis (‘one in all respects’). A single speed and a single order require a unique creator. Since matter is nothing but matter when alone and soul is nothing but soul when alone, God is the unique author of all living beings. The uniqueness of the world is sufficient to prove the uniqueness of God. For someone must be responsible for the world; that being must be one, since soul is one, life is one and matter is one – must, indeed, be the one god (heis oun theos). If one admits the kosmos to be one and the sun one and the moon one and divine nature (theiotes) one, it is unreasonable to deny the unity of God.37

34 mund. 401a 12–27. For the meaning of the epithets polieus and so on see n. 20 above. The author also gives false etymologies to the two accusative forms of Ζεύς, Ζῆνα and Δία, and quotes fr. 21a in O. Kern, Orphicorum fragmenta (n. 26) 91. The explanation of Δία in terms of διά (the preposition in the sense ‘because of’ indicating cause) goes back to Plato (Kratylos 396a); in our period it appears in Cornutus (2, p.3.8–9 Lang), Ailios Aristeides (43.23) and Diogenes Laertios (7.147). See also O. Weinreich, NJA 33 (1914) 605; Festugière 2.510–511, 4.65 and n. 1; H. Strohm, MH 9 (1952) 158–172; M.L. West, The Orphic Poems (Oxford 1983) 89–90, 218–219; R.C.T. Parker, Gods Abroad (n. 7) 3 and n. 8. On Dion 1.39–41, 12.75–77 see n. 20 above. An intermediate position is taken by Maximus of Tyre, who indicates the unity of all the gods (θεοῖς πᾶσιν) by stating that “though their names are many, their nature is one” (39.5: ὧν μία μὲν ἡ φύσις, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα); cf. 2.1 on the names of the gods. 35 C.H. 2.14: οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων λεγομένων θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε δαιμόνων τις; C.H. 10.25: τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἐπίγειον εἶναι θεὸν θνητόν; Asclep. 19: deorum genera multa sunt; Asclep. 22: cum post deos homines efficeret (cf. Scott 1.337 n. 5; Nock-Festugière 2.377 n. 186), etc. Cf. van Moorsel 15. 36 Incomparable, one and unique: C.H. 11.5. ὁ εἷς καὶ μόνος: C.H. 4.8; τὸ ἓν καὶ μόνον: 4.5, 10.14. Cf. εἷς μόνος of the demiurge in C.H. 4.1. On the co-existence of terrestrial gods with an overriding God in Asclepius see Fowden 142–143. 37 C.H. 11.8–11. See further chap. 6 at n. 28.

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The Monad The Monad

In the fourth Hermetic treatise the idea of the monad (he monas) is used to expound the theme of ‘one alone’ (heis monos) as a designation of God. The monad is the beginning of all things, it embraces all numbers and is contained by none.38 The climax of the first phase of the revelation of cosmogony in the first treatise, Poimandres, is the statement that “the unity of these things is life”. This refers not only to the union of mind and soul (life is one) but also to the union of Nous, the Father-God, and his son, the Logos (God is one).39 Another intellectual who reveals an interest in the concept of unity expressed by he monas is Plutarch, though he also gives another number (five) special attention. He discusses the role of the monad in arithmetic, geometry and music.40 He appears to accept the Pythagorean connection of to hen (‘the one [thing]’) with Apollon “because of the singleness of the monad”.41 He monas always remains once and for all to hen, the beginning of numbers and divine.42 Perhaps this is why Plutarch is prepared to consider monas as the link between life and motion.43 Unlike the Hermetic writers, he does not use the idea of the monad to promote a single God; he remains a polytheist. It is apparent that for him speculation related to the monad may increase understanding of mathematics or music; it is unlikely to have practical significance.

38

Especially C.H. 4.10–11; cf. Festugière 4.18–19. ὁ κρατήρ and ἡ μονάς are to some extent alternative titles for the treatise; the krater is an all-containing receptacle, whereas the monas is like a number which contains all its factors but is contained by none of them. Compare the comments by G.R.S. Mead, Thrice-Greatest Hermes: Studies in Hellenistic Theosophy and Gnosis2 (London 1964) 2.60, Scott 2.134–135 and Nock-Festugière 1.47. Fowden (103–104, 142) stresses the propagation of both monist and dualist strands in the Hermetic treatises. 39 C.H. 1.6, 1.10, 11.14; cf. Festugière 1.270 n. 9 and F.-N. Klein, Die Lichtterminologie bei Philon von Alexandrien und in den hermetischen Schriften: Untersuchungen zur Struktur der religiösen Sprache der hellenistischen Mystik (Leiden 1962) 93–96. 40 ἡ μονάς: mor. 387f–388a, 390d, 416b, 429c–e, 1002a, 1003e–f, 1017d–1022c (cf. P. Thévenaz, REG 52 [1939] 358–366). Five: 264a, 385d–f, 388a–e, 389c–390c, 429d–430a. 41 354f, 381f (δι᾿ ἁπλότητα τῆς μονάδος), 388f, 393b–c; cf. 370e. These passages seem to be the only ones where the monad is connected with a specific god. 42 270a, 428e–429a, 506f–507a. 43 591b. On the hierarchical structure of the universe in this passage see F.E. Brenk in Plutarchea Lovaniensia (n. 14) 49–50 = Relighting the Souls (n. 16) 79–80. On the foreshadowing of Neoplatonism in the triad monas-nous-phusis see J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (London 1977) 214–216 and D.A. Russell in H.-G. Nesselrath et al., Plutarch: On the daimonion of Socrates: Human liberation, divine guidance and philosophy [SAPERE, 16] (Tübingen 2010) 10.

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Harmony among the Gods Harmony among the Gods

Those who reject monotheism can express a belief in harmony among the gods. Dion of Prousa says that the actions of the gods are performed in ‘common friendship’ (philia koine) with all the others and that their partnership (koinonia) with one another constitutes the only really happy politeia (constitution) or polis (city). Ailios Aristeides depicts harmony and co-operation between the Greek god Asklepios and Sarapis (of Egyptian origin); the two saviour gods are parallel to the joint emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus with their “most beautiful philia”.44 However, a belief in harmony among the gods is not put forward in the extant writings of some whom one would expect to support it (Plutarch, for example). One might have expected such a belief to develop from Marcus Aurelius’ idea that humans and gods are fellow-citizens,45 but it is not attested. The idea of harmony among the gods was evidently not a popular one.

Gods and Humans Gods and Humans

A number of intellectuals in this period believe in a close relationship between gods and humans. The relationship is characterised as kinship or as partnership and quite often as both. Epiktetos, although he does not (in the extant records of his teaching) formulate a belief in harmony among the gods, represents Zeus as the father of humankind as well as of gods. The relationship is expressed both as one of sungeneia (kinship) between humans and God and as one of koinonia (partnership) with Zeus. Not only did God create humans, he also placed them in the world, provided a law for them, is present to help them and acts as their guide.46 Practical consequences flow from human souls being so 44

Dion 36.22–23; cf. G. Anderson, Sage, Saint and Sophist: Holy Men and their Associates in the Early Roman Empire (London 1994) 177. Arstd. 27.39 (cf. 27.33); for τῶν σωτήρων θεῶν see also Aristeides’ Egyptian discourse (36.124). 45 M.A. 8.2 (ἔργον ζῴου νοεροῦ καὶ κοινωνικοῦ καὶ ἰσονόμου θεῷ); 10.1.4 (θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις οὕτω συμπολιτεύεσθαι). 46 Father of humankind: Epikt. 1.3, 1.9.6 (cf. 2.16.44), 1.13.4, 3.22.82, 3.24.15–16. Sungeneia: 1.9.1–5, 2.8.11–14; cf. É. des Places, Syngeneia: La parenté de l’homme avec Dieu d’Homère à la Patristique [Études et commentaires, 51] (Paris 1964) 154–158. For inscriptions bearing on sungeneia see O. Curty, Les parentés légendaires entre cités grecques: Catalogue raisonné des inscriptions contenant le terme ΣΥΓΓΕΝΕΙΑ et analyse critique [Hautes Études du Monde gréco-romain, 20] (Genève 1995), É. Will, RPh 69 (1995) 299–325 and S. Lücke, Syngeneia: epigraphisch-historische Studien zu einem Phänomen der antiken griechischen Diplomatie [Frankfurter Althistorische Beiträge, 5] (Frankfurt 2000). Koinonia: 2.19.27; cf. κοινωνεῖν ... τῷ θεῷ in 1.9.5 and Bonhöffer 76–78. Creator of humankind: 2.23.2–3. Placement in world: 1.6.19, 1.29.29. Provision of law: 1.29.1–15; cf.

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bound up with God. The portion of God’s being which humans have received is their faculty of choice and refusal – in short, their power to use impressions. They should choose what is in harmony with nature and seek to keep their soul of one mind with God. This involves such concrete precepts as not blaming God or humans, and avoiding anger, envy and jealousy.47 Like Epiktetos, Dion of Prousa believes strongly in union between gods and humans based on kinship. Not only does he say that friendship between the ideal ruler and the gods is possible and proper, he also reports that good humans are said to be nearest of kin to the gods. He frequently quotes or rephrases the formulaic description of Zeus in the Homeric poems as “father of men and gods”.48 Although in his fourth speech on kingship Diogenes (who generally represents Dion’s views) questions whether all humans are children of Zeus, Dion states strongly elsewhere that Zeus is the common father, saviour and guardian of humankind.49 Here, in his speech at Olympia, he argues that the sources of people’s belief in deity are both an innate conception and ideas acquired from poets, lawgivers, skilled workers in the plastic arts and philosophers. The primary conception of deity common to the whole human race, to Greeks and barbarians alike, shows God’s kinship (sungeneia) with humankind.50 Rather than lead him to a belief in the unity of humankind, this idea of 2.7.13, 2.16.46. Helper: 2.8.2–17, 2.18.29, 2.19.29, 3.22.53. Maximus of Tyre uses ‘helper’ in a similar way: ἀρωγοὶ ἀνθρώποις θεοί are the opening words of 2.1. Guide: 2.7.11 (ὀδηγός), 3.24.34–35 (στρατηγός), enkh. 7 (κυβερνήτης). 47 1.1.10–12, 1.14.6 (αἱ ψυχαί … οὗτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ) 1.17.27, 2.6.9–10 (cf. SVF 3.191), 2.19.26 (ψυχήν ... ὁμογνωμονῆσαι τῷ θεῷ), 4.1.89, fr. 4 (συμψήφους χρὴ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι). In 4.1.100 the connection with Epiktetos’ teaching about moral purpose (prohairesis) is made clear. On the latter see, for example, 2.10, 2.23.16–29, 3.5, 3.18, 4.5.12, enkh. 4; Bonhöffer 118–119, 259–261; Pohlenz 1.332–334, 2.164; L. Moulinier, Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines d’Aix 38 (1964) 73–74; R.F. Dobbin, AncPhil 11 (1991) 111–135; Long 210–220; and chap. 4 at n. 14. Further literature is given by L. Willms, Epiktets Diatribe Über die Freiheit (4.1) 1 (Heidelberg 2011) 455. B. Inwood suggested that practical ethics should issue from Epiktetos’ view of the fatherhood of God: in K.A. Algra et al. (eds.), Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his Sixtieth Birthday [Philosophia Antiqua, 72] (Leiden 1996) 258–264. 48 The good nearest of kin: Dion 31.57; cf. 3.115, 4.43. πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε is quoted in 53.12, 74.27; rephrased in 2.75, 4.22, 12.22, 36.32. For parallels in Plutarch and other writers see D. Babut, Plutarque et le Stoïcisme (Paris 1969) 486 n. 1. For other connections between Epiktetos and Dion, especially their strong inclination to Cynicism and their common opposition to tyranny and championing of freedom, see B.F. Harris, op. cit. (n. 21) 231– 235. 49 4.21–22, 27 (cf. Casaubon’s emendation in 4.31); 12.74. 50 12.27, 39, 44–47, 61; cf. 30.26. On Dion’s treatment of the human conception of the deity see P. Geigenmüller, NJA 51 (1923) 212; B.F. Harris, JRH 2 (1962–63) 88–91; I. Chirassi, RCCM 5 (1963) 266–285, especially 275–276; H.-J. Klauck, op. cit. (n. 21) 123 n. 128, 201–203; M. Jackson-McCabe, Phronesis 49 (2004) 343–345. For the sources of Dion’s

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kinship is consonant with Dion’s theory of the unity of the universe, under which he seeks to harmonise the human race with the divine so as to include both in a single term. Humankind is defined as a “mortal rational animal”, then included with the gods in the whole “rational race”.51 Along with sungeneia, koinonia forms a basis of this theory. There is a “good and humane ... partnership of daimones and humans” and this entails a share in law and citizenship for all creatures with logos and phronesis (thought).52 Mortals and immortals are administered by Zeus and he is called homognios (protector of the race) because of the koinonia of race uniting gods and humans.53 Plutarch also believes in a close relationship between gods and humans. Unlike Epiktetos and Dion, he does not base the relationship on sungeneia. Nor is his attitude to the question whether the supreme God is father of gods and humans clear.54 But he does speak of God’s paternal care for the human race and of God using the medium of a soul mingled with a human body and he assumes that God governs human affairs.55 Zeus appears as forger of justice (dikes demiourgos) and saviour, his father Kronos as king of gods and humans. God gives to some people the care of “the rational and civic swarm”. Of the titles given to Zeus, boulaios, agoraios and polieus refer to his supervision of the civic life of the Greeks.56 The only contexts in which Zeus homognios and theos

exposition see the references in J.W. Cohoon’s edition, 2.30–31, 42–43. For Dion’s preference in this speech for ἐπίνοια over the usual Stoic term ἔννοια see Desideri 506–507 n. 27. It is generally accepted that Diogenes represents Dion’s views: e.g. Desideri 204, 292, 317; J.L. Moles in Leeds International Latin Seminar 6 (1990) [= ARCA, 29] 297–375 at 310, 348–349. 51 36.19–20, 23, 31 (note ξυναρμόσαι τῷ θείῳ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος), 35, 38. The single term is τὸ λογικὸν γένος, which occurs with πᾶν or ἅπαν in 36.31, 35. Although he does not discuss the Olympian speech, M.B. Trapp shows reflection of Plato’s Phaidros in the first speech on kingship and in the Borysthenic speech: Antonine Literature 143–145, 148–155; cf. his chapter in Dio Chrysostom 214–219, 227–229 and A. Gangloff, op cit. (n. 19) 359– 363. 52 36.38. Elsewhere, however, daimones are attributed to humans: 4.75, 82–139; 25.3–4. 53 1.40, 12.75, 36.32. 54 Cf. mor. 1000e–1001c. For his usage of συγγένεια see 286a, 702e, 1130b (and for the use of the term in inscriptions, cf. O. Curty, op. cit. [n. 46], with É. Will’s critique, n. 46 above and S. Lücke, op. cit. [n. 46]; also chap. 4 n. 13). 55 God’s paternal care: 117d; human body and soul: 404b, e. On the other hand priests act as intermediaries for humans with the gods (778e–f). The assumption that God governs human affairs underlies the whole dialogue The late infliction of punishment by the deity; see especially 549d and (in the reply to the Epicurean Kolotes) 1124e. 56 Zeus: 550a, 830b. Kronos: 942a. τὸ λογικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν σμῆνος: 823e–f. Titles of Zeus: 789d, 792f, 801e, 819d–e, Cor. 3.3, Demetr. 42.10. The first term refers to the Council that ran most Greek cities under Roman rule and the second to the Agora in which much of the political and social life of the cities took place.

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homognios occur57 suggest that the epithet is applied to Zeus’ patronage of kinship among humans, not (as by Dion of Prousa) to a belief in kinship between humans and gods. There is, then, no evidence that Plutarch holds the latter belief, but he does appear to agree with the views of others to the effect that there is koinonia between the gods and humans and that the kosmos is like a common city in which both should live together in happy agreement.58 Marcus Aurelius is another writer who believes in harmony between gods and humans. We have already noted his idea that they are fellow-citizens. They have logos in common, there is a bond between divine and human affairs and the gods co-operate with humans.59 Zeus has given a portion of himself to every person; it can be termed ‘the daimon’, as with Dion of Prousa, or that person’s ‘mind and reason’.60 Marcus repeatedly speaks of God – with a rather bewildering interchangeability of the terms theos, to theion (divinity) and daimon – in people.61 Harmony with the gods, as well as with one’s fellows, is valued: “Reverence and honour for your own understanding will make you acceptable to yourself, harmonious (euharmostos) with your fellow humans and in tune with (sumphonos) the gods, that is, praising whatever they assign and have ordained”. A few principles of conduct are connected with the idea of harmony between gods and humans: humility and contentment, truthfulness and justice. And there is one piece of quite specific advice, to the effect that one should change one’s prayers to the gods from the form ‘How may I sleep with that woman?’ to the form ‘How may I not desire to sleep with her?’62 While there is a slight sense of application to an individual person in such terms as ‘the divine in you’, much of this thought is on the level of gods and humans as general categories. Rather different is the approach of Ailios Aristeides, who believes in a kind of mystic union between gods and individual people. He provides a vague indication of the way he conceives his relationship 57 679c, 758d; cf. Dion 1.40, 12.75. In 757c–d Plutarch’s father expresses the view that a god is directing when humans desire marriage and alliance (φιλότης) that will lead to ὁμοφροσύνη (unity of mind) and koinonia. 58 415a, 416e–f (where Kleombrotos argues that the race of daimones are responsible for this union of koinonia); 1065e–f (θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄστυ κοινόν συννομησομένων ... ὁμολογουμένως καὶ μακαρίως; cf. SVF 2.636; 3.333, 338, 339 and E. Brown in S.G. Salkever [ed.], The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Political Thought [Cambridge 2009] 333 and n. 5). 59 Fellow-citizens: M.A. 8.2 (ζῴου ... ἰσονόμου θεῷ), 10.1.4 (θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις ... συμπολιτεύεσθαι); see n. 45 above and the second section of chap. 4 at nn. 42–47. λόγος in common: 6.35.2, 7.53. Bond (σύνδεσις): 3.13. Co-operation: 9.40.3. 60 5.27; cf. Farquharson’s commentary (2.665), Pohlenz 1.349 and Neuenschwander 23, 52. Dion on daimones in humans: n. 52 above. 61 3.5.2 (ὁ ἐν σοὶ θεός), 3.7.2, 3.12.1 (τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δαίμονα), 5.10.6, 8.45.1, 12.1.5 (τὸ ἐν σοὶ θεῖον). Terms such as ὁ ἔνδον ἑαυτοῦ δαίμων occur in 2.13.1, 2.17.4, 3.16.3. 62 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐάρμοστον καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς σύμφωνον: 6.16.10. Principles of conduct: 2.13.1, 2.17.4, 3.7.2, 3.16.3–4, 9.40.2–6. Not desiring the woman: 9.40.7.

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with Asklepios by speaking of the association of his mind, when changed, with the god and by the statement on one occasion that “I was thus wholly with the god”.63 He describes Epagathos in complimentary fashion as a man in communion with the gods.64 Of course, there are statements about humankind in general, on whom the gods may bestow favours (kharites), such as the Roman empire over which Helios watches.65 Union with God is an ideal which the Hermetic disciple should seek. One treatise says that ‘becoming divine’ (theothenai) can be achieved by those who have gained gnosis by going up to the Father and surrendering themselves to the Powers; Poimandres challenges the narrator to become a guide to the worthy, so that the race of humankind (to genos tes anthropotetos) might be saved by god through him.66 Another treatise pictures people being invited to baptise themselves in a mixing-bowl (krater) of mind (nous). However, the idea that those who have received a portion of mind can catch a glimpse of the Good by contemplation of the universe (panta) and by hastening towards ‘the one and only’ (to hen kai monon) is presented as a mere possibility. Such ascent to ‘the one and only’ (now masculine: ho heis kai monos) is difficult.67 Elsewhere the exclusive path to God is said to be piety joined with gnosis; gnosis comes from mind and heart.68 The possibility of union with God is based on koinonia between the souls of gods and human souls, on God’s willingness to associate with humankind alone of living beings, and on the considerable aptitude of

63

50.52 (συγγενέσθαι θεῷ ... συνεῖναι θεῷ); 48.23 (οὕτω πᾶς ἦν πρὸς τῷ θεῷ). ἁρμονία in 48.28 possibly refers to the relationship between the god on the one hand and Aristeides and his companions (ἅπασιν τοῖς συμφοιτηταῖς, 48.27) on the other. G. Anderson takes ἁρμονία here to refer to a closer association of Aristeides with Asklepios: op. cit. (n. 44) 23– 24, 52–53 (suggesting that Asklepios’ unscrupulous agents extracted Aristeides’ ring from him; the reference in 240 n. 151 should be to 48.27–28). 64 50.54 (ὁμιλῶν θεοῖς; cf. ὁμιλίαν θείαν of the story in 50.52). On intermediaries between gods and humans see 1.399 and J.H. Oliver, The Civilizing Power: A Study of the Panathenaic Discourse of Aelius Aristides against the Background of Literature and Cultural Conflict [Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s. 58 part 1] (Philadelphia 1968) 36, 40, 149. 65 26.105. In this case they are the χάριτες of Asklepios and the Egyptian gods. 66 C.H. 1.26; cf. G.R.S. Mead, op. cit. (n. 38) 2.18 on the need to unite with the Light and Nock-Festugière 1.25 n. 67 on 1.26. See also C.H. 4.7 on the opportunity for humans to be deified. On the δυνάμεις see Festugière 3.153–158. On the language note Dodds 74. 67 C.H. 4.4–6 (τούτου in the second sentence of 4.4 refers to νοῦς), 4.8; cf. G.R.S. Mead, op. cit. (n. 38) 2.61–63 and Scott 2.135, 140–142 on Christian parallels. See also van Moorsel 58–62 on Hermetic baptism. 68 C.H. 6.5, 7.2, 10.9–10, 10.15–25 (especially 16–21, 23); cf. 9.10 and Dodds 120–123 on reason and faith. See also F.-N. Klein, Lichtterminologie (n. 39) 117, 133–134 on gnosis of God.

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mind for uniting humans with gods and gods with humans; nothing is more unifying (henotikoteron) than mind.69 The Latin Asclepius conceives of an exclusive union with the gods (coniunctio deorum) which humans enjoy. This union is based on the blended nature of humankind: one part of it is ‘essential’ (ousiodes) or ‘divine’ (theios), the other part ‘material’ (hulikos) or ‘earthly’ (mundanus). The divinity of humans is akin to that of the gods (diis cognata diuinitate); they pass into the nature of God as though themselves gods. A rôle is played by the daimones, who can tend either toward the gods or toward humankind. A means to union with god – iungere and coniungere are freely used here – is provided by godlike piety and by acquiring the divine faculty of understanding (intellegentia) common to God and human reason alone.70 In this context philosophy is defined as striving to know the divinity by constant contemplation and holy piety. Philosophy must be kept unsullied by unintelligible sciences such as arithmetic, music and geometry. The latter are attributed contemptuously to the cunning of sophists, a view reflecting the negative attitude to sophists seen in philosophical and rhetorical writers alike. Pure philosophy is to worship God with a simple mind and soul; it depends on piety towards God alone.71 Connected with this piety is the duty of humans as the third component of the triad God-kosmos-humankind. As an imitator of God’s reason and care, humankind is created to contemplate the universe, worship the heavenly beings, and govern the universe in conjunction with God. The kosmos is God’s work; humans are recompensed for preserving its beauty.72 The treatise does recognise that few are pious, despite God’s gift to the human race of intellect, reason and knowledge. But the basic things that bind humans and gods are much the same as we have seen in Greek writings: kinship (cognatio) and association (consortium).73

69

C.H. 10.22–23, 12.1, 12.19; Asclep. 4. Asclep. 5–8. ὑλικός = mundanus, οὐσιώδης (or θεῖος) = diuinae similitudinis forma (see Nock-Festugière 2.364 n. 67, referring to C.H. 2.4–5). 71 Asclep. 12–14. On the undesirability of being called a sophist see G.R. Stanton, AJPh 94 (1973) 351–358, B.W. Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists: Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement2 (Grand Rapids, MI 2002) 54–58 (on Dion of Prousa; Winter is correct to imply by his reference to Desideri 242–243 that I gave insufficient weight to or. 35.10), T. Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation (Oxford 2001) 158–160, The Second Sophistic [Greece & Rome: New Surveys in the Classics, 35] (Oxford 2005) 17–19 and J. Vanderspoel in I. Worthington (ed.), A Companion to Greek Rhetoric (Oxford 2007) 124–138, especially 134–135. 72 Asclep. 8–11. On triads in the work see Nock-Festugière 2.295 and n. 1. 73 Asclep. 18, 22–24, 32, 37–38, 41. Compare the discussion above at nn. 46–47 of the Greek terms sungeneia and koinonia. 70

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God and the Universe God and the Universe

The natural expectation is that God will be regarded as the creator and sustainer of the universe. Epiktetos, for example, has God being responsible for the universe as its creator, administrator and overseer.74 The author of On the kosmos expounds God’s rôle by a large array of analogies: the commander of an army, the leader of a city, the great king of Persia, those who run machines or activate puppets, the chorus leader, the man at the helm of a ship, the lawgiver in the city – analogies indicating the indirect control exercised by God.75 Plutarch conceives of one or more gods as present in the universe, responsible for its creation, ordering the universe or presiding over it.76 Zeus receives such appellations as aristotekhnas (‘superb crafter’), quoted repeatedly from Pindaros, “father and creator” and “ruler and lord of the universe”. God’s responsibility for the universe is also shown in the statement that the kosmos is a “most holy temple, most worthy of a god”, into which humans are introduced through birth.77 Dion of Prousa represents the universe as the gods’ own polis and arkhe (empire) which they administer.78 He criticises the Epicureans for driving the gods out of the universe that they created. This denial of the creator is significant for Dion because he continually refers to Zeus as the creator and father of the universe, in the words of others and in his own words.79 Zeus appears as

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Epikt. 1.14 (especially 1.14.9), 2.23.42, 3.5.8–10, 4.7.6–7, etc. 398a 6–398b 28, 399a 15–30, 400b 7–35. Aerodynamics and animal similes appear in 398b 28–399a 12. Cf. Festugière 2.506–509. Maximus of Tyre offers the image of a great empire or kingdom in which all bow to one soul (11.12). 76 Present: mor. 166d (cf. Psalm 138[139].7–8 in the Old Testament), 393e–f. Creating: 719c (κοσμοποιεῖν), 720b–c (cf. R.M. Jones, CPh 7 [1912] 76–77; S.-T. Teodorsson, A Commentary on Plutarch’s Table Talks 3 [Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 62] [Göteborg 1996] 178–181), 1000e–f, 1065e–f; cf. 369d (Nature), 378e (Kronos and Aphrodite). On the calling of Aphrodite ‘Harmony’ or ‘Union’ (῎Αρμα) by the Delphians (769a) see C. Patterson, ANRW 2.33.6 (Berlin 1992) 4713 n. 17. Ordering: 377f–378a, 382a–b; cf. 362b– c. Presiding: 111d (οἱ τὰ ὅλα πρυτανεύοντες θεοί), 601a–b, 1007d–e (ἡγεμών); cf. 1050a–b, 1051b–d. The daimones are overseers in 436f. 77 ἀριστοτέχνας (Pindaros, fr. 57 Maehler): 550a, 618b, 927a–b, 1065e; cf. 807c. πατὴρ καὶ ποιητής: 718a, 927a, 1001a–b; cf. κύριος καὶ πατήρ in 413c, 426a. ἄρχων καὶ κύριος πάντων / ἁπάντων: 381d, 550a. For other terms, incorporating the idea of kingship see 371e, 601b, 811d. Osiris appears as lord of the universe in 355e, Dionysos as lord and ruler of all moisture in 365a. Kosmos as temple: 477c. 78 Dion 12.37, 36.26–30, 74.26; cf. 1.57. On the source of Dion’s religious ideas see L. François, REG 27 (1914) liii–liv and B.F. Harris, op. cit. (n. 21) 244–245. On the universe as πόλις and ζῷον see von Arnim 483–487. 79 Epicureans: 12.36–37. 12.81 quotes Pindaros, fr. 57 Maehler (cf. n. 77 above on Plutarch’s repeated quotation of this fragment); in the myth of the Magoi the production of the universe results from Zeus’ intercourse with Here (36.55–57, 59–60). For Dion’s own words see, for example, 12.82–83. Epicureans, for their part, criticised Stoics for making God the 75

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controller, leader, pilot, administrator, saviour and king of the universe. The universe is his oikos (home) and polis.80 For Ailios Aristeides, on the other hand, it is Asklepios who leads and administers the universe (to pan) and is saviour of the whole (soter ton holon).81 Behr argues, against Wilamowitz, that there is no syncretism between Zeus and Asklepios in Aristeides’ thought.82 But the attributes given to Asklepios in this passage are normally given to Zeus. The answer may lie in Behr’s suggestion that there is a tenuous union between Zeus and Asklepios through the former’s delegation of power to the latter.83 Certainly Aristeides honours Asklepios greatly in his cry of worship after an icy bath (“Great is Asklepios!”), in such addresses as ‘Lord Asklepios’, and by identifying Asklepios of Pergamon in a dream as Plato’s soul of the universe.84 creator of the universe and the providential sustainer of it: see, for example, the newly discovered fragment of Diogenes of Oinoanda (NF 126.VI + 127.I–II): M.F. Smith, AS 48 (1998) 125–170 at 132–133. 80 Zeus’ rôles: 3.50; 12.27, 34, 55; 36.31–32, 37, 50. οἶκος and πόλις: 36.36–37. Oikos and polis were already significant themes – I.C. Storey (EMC 31 [1987] 1–46 at 26) calls them ‘polar themes’ – in Aristophanes’ Lysistrate: see H.-J. Newiger, YCS 26 (1980) 228– 233 and H.P. Foley, CPh 77 (1982) 1–13, 21. 81 Arstd. 42.4. Behr (111, 130), and more especially in the notes to his translation at 2.416 n. 1, dated the Address regarding Asklepios to 6 January 177, but J. Goeken says that such precision cannot be verified and he assigns the discourse to 177 C.E.: Aelius Aristide et la rhétorique de l’hymne en prose [Recherches sur les Rhétoriques religieuses, 15] (Turnhout 2012) 478–479 and n. 38. 82 Behr 157; cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, SPAW (1925) 344–345, Der Glaube der Hellenen (Basel 1956) 2.499. 83 Behr 152, explaining the cult of Zeus Asklepios at Pergamon as simply a titular honour to Asklepios; cf. Boulanger 189–193. A dedication was found in 1963 which provides the first epigraphical support for the literary evidence (Galen as well as Aristeides) for a cult of Zeus Asklepios at Pergamon: C. Habicht, Inschriften des Asklepieions (n. 24) no. 63. αὐτοῦ in line 6 makes it clear that Zeus Soter Asklepios is a single god. See Habicht’s discussion on pp. 9–14, 103. R.M. Grant explains Aristeides’ talk as though Asklepios were Zeus as based on his experience as a devotee healed by Asklepios: op. cit. (n. 16) 119. 84 48.21, 50.51 (cf. the shout ὦ δέσποτα in 48.24), 50.56. In 50.104 ὁ τῷ ὄντι καὶ καθάπαξ ἡγεμών must refer to Asklepios, although ἡγεμών is consciously used of provincial governors in 103, 104, 106, 107. On dreams, see Behr chap. 8 and Appendix D; G. Michenaud and J. Dierkens, Les rêves dans les “Discours Sacrés” d’Aelius Aristide (IIe siècle ap. J.C.): Essai d’analyse psychologique [Éditions Universitaires de Mons: Série Sciences Humaines, 2] (Mons 1972); P. Andersson and B.-A. Roos, op. cit. (n. 26) 26–38; M. Horstmanshoff, op. cit. (n. 26) 277–290; I. Israelowich, Society, Medicine and Religion in the Sacred Tales of Aelius Aristides [Mnemosyne Supplements, 341] (Leiden 2012) 71–86, 159– 163; J. Downie, At the Limits of Art: A Literary Study of Aelius Aristides’ Hieroi Logoi (Oxford 2013), especially chap. 2. On Aristeides’ devotion to Asklepios see M. Hamilton, Incubation or The Cure of Disease in Pagan Temples and Christian Churches (London 1906) 44–62; O. Weinreich, NJA 33 (1914) 597–606; Boulanger 127–135, 199–209; E.D. Phillips, G & R 21 (1952) 23–36; A.-J. Festugière, Personal Religion among the Greeks (n. 26) 85–88, 91–104; Dodds 39–45; Behr chaps. 2–6 passim; M. Horstmanshoff, op. cit.

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We have, then, a number of intellectuals in this period who represent God as directing the universe from outside it. But some of the same people – Epiktetos, for example – do not hesitate to identify God with the universe. For Marcus Aurelius the association of the universe with God is so close as to amount to identification. The welfare of the universe is given the sanction normally associated with the welfare of Zeus. In one passage Marcus admits the alternative identifications of the whole (to holon) with God or with Chance, but only the former gives him satisfaction. In another passage the distribution of human destiny is assigned to God, though it is a task which is elsewhere attributed to the whole or to universal nature.85 Furthermore, universal nature is personified in such a way as to denote the one who controls the universe. The controller is sometimes described as reason, once as law which assigns people their lot, sometimes as nature. Consequently Marcus does not refer to God in such phrases as “the one administering the universe”. That sovereign power is in any case to be revered. Because the universe is thus personified it is quite natural to describe it as a living creature.86 The equation of the universe with God is made in similar terms by Seneca, who affirms that the names fatum (destiny), prouidentia, natura and mundus (universe) are all accurate descriptions of Jupiter.87 In the face of this identification of God with the universe by intellectuals influenced by Stoic ideas other writers insist that God is a separate and ruling entity. The author of On the kosmos portrays God as directing the whole kosmos from a remote position by his all-pervading power.88 For Plutarch the universe and its inhabitants are under one command and one leadership (hegemonia), under one king and ruler, who is identified with Plato’s God who holds the beginning, middle and end of the universe. He criticises the Epicureans in The decline of oracles because in their infinity of worlds there is not a single (n. 26) 285–287. In addition to the shout “Great is Artemis of the Ephesians!” reported in the New Testament (Acts 19.28) compare the address ὦ μεγίστη θεῶν and ὦ μεγίστη θεά to Isis in Xenophon, Ephesiaka 4.3.3, 5.13.4; cf. τοῦ μεγάλου Σαράπιδος in L. Vidman, op. cit. (n. 2) 181 no. 357. 85 Epikt. 1.14.10; cf. SVF 2.641 and Pohlenz 1.338. Marcus Aurelius on the welfare of the universe: 5.8.10; cf. Pohlenz 1.348 and Neuenschwander 24–25, 68–71. By contrast, Maximus of Tyre speaks of God’s responsibility for the preservation of τὸ ὅλον (5.4); he also has the concept of a hierarchy (τάξις) in the universe (8.8, 11.12). τὸ ὅλον identified with God: M.A. 9.28.3. Human destiny: 12.11 (ὃ ἂν νέμῃ αὐτῷ ὁ θεός); cf. 4.3.5, 5.30, 7.66.3, 8.7.1. 86 Personification of universal nature: 2.11.5–6, 7.23.1. Reason: 4.46.3, 6.1.1. Law: 10.25.2. Nature (φύσις): 7.25, 11.18.1. ὁ διοικῶν τὸν κόσμον / τὸ ὅλον: 2.4.2, 5.8.12. Reverence for the controller: 5.21.1. Living creature: 4.40 (ὡς ἓν ζῷον τὸν κόσμον), 10.1.3 (τοῦ τελείου ζῴου). 87 On Nature 2.45. See also Neuenschwander 27–28 and 124 n. 62. 88 Mund. chaps. 6 and 7 (note, for example, 398b 8: αὐτὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω χώρας ἱδρῦσθαι). Cf. R.M. Grant, op. cit. (n. 16) 78–79.

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one governed by divine reason. Khrysippos is criticised for not giving God control over everything and for attributing some aspects of the universe’s administration to chance. God is not like a child playing a game with everything (ta hola), creating the kosmos and destroying it again. It must be admitted that when Plutarch goes on to say that God’s very presence binds together the substance of the kosmos and prevents its dissolution he may allow God to be in the universe rather than directing from outside. But other imagery – God compared to a musician with authority over the harmonia and sumphonia of the world – does leave the impression that God controls from outside.89 The relationship between God and the universe is a constant topic in the Hermetic writings. God’s responsibility for the universe is reflected in such epithets as ‘the good’, ‘father of all’, ‘lord and shaper of all things’, ‘creator’ and ‘governor’. There is a hierarchy of beings: God, kosmos, humankind; or God, eternity (aion), kosmos, time, coming-to-be (genesis). God is the sole author of life, although the kosmos may be the agent of production.90 God created, formed, contains, sustains and governs the universe and produces its harmony and order.91 The kosmos is not only united (henomenos) with God; God is actually identified with it (described variously as to pan, panta and omnia). God is in the universe, not transcendent.92 Indeed, one gains knowledge of God by contemplation of the kosmos he has made; it is in his image.93 In line with the predisposition in the treatises to believe that one God is responsible for everything, the unity of the parts of the kosmos corresponds to the unity of the

89 Acceptance of Plato’s God: mor. 601a–b; Plato, Laws 715e–716a is quoted also in 781f and 1124f.; cf. Morlet 357–361. Epicureans: 420b. Khrysippos: 1051b–d (cf. SVF 2.1178), 1055d (cf. Morlet 97–98); see further chap. 6 at n. 12. God’s presence in the universe: 393e– f. Musician: 946e–f, 1030b. 90 Epithets: C.H. 2.12–17, 5.2, 5.8, 5.11, 6.1, 8.2, 10.1–4; fr. 23.50 (ὁ μόναρχος); Asclep. 2, 8–9, 16, 19, 23, 26. Hierarchy: C.H. 8.1–5, 9.8, 10.14, 11.1–4 (the alternative hierarchy); Asclep. 10; cf. van Moorsel 13–19. On the question of Stoic sources for C.H. 11 see S. Delcomminette, RPhA 20.2 (2002) 11–36, especially 12–20, 23–27. On αἰών in C.H. 11 see Festugière 4.152–162. Author of life: C.H. 4.1, 9.8–9, 10.22, 11.3–6, 11.14; Asclep. 19–20, 34. 91 C.H. 5.6–10, 8.2–3, 9.9, 11.6–10, 11.18–20; Asclep. 3. 92 United: C.H. 12.15. Identified: C.H. 5.11, 9.9, 12.23, 16.19; Asclep. 9, 29, 34, 41. God in the universe: C.H. 3 (Stoic influences as well as traces of Platonism and of the Septuagint: see Scott 2.110–112, 4.xlvii [A.S. Ferguson], Nock-Festugière 1.43). For Stoic and Platonic sources of C.H. 5 see Scott 2.156. 93 C.H. 5.1–5, 8.2, 9.5, 11.16, 12.15–16, 12.19–21, 16.3; Asclep. 1–2, 10, 29, 31–32, 41. C.H. 6.4 seems to contradict this belief: in its place is the assertion that piety joined with gnosis is the only path to God (6.5–6). Cf. Festugière 1.87–88, 1.91–92, 2.55–59; van Moorsel 27–30.

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members of God. There is a similar theme in the Latin Asclepius: God is unus et omnia, one person and all things.94 There is a surprising tendency among Greek intellectuals of our period to identify God with the universe. This is surely to be explained by the overwhelming desire to roll everything up together and have one concept of unity overlapping with another.

Humans and Nature Humans and Nature

One of the key themes in the reports of Epiktetos’ teaching is harmony with nature. In his discourse ‘Family affection’ (philostorgia) Epiktetos talks with an official who was so upset at his little daughter’s illness that he ran away. In seeking to show the man that his conduct was not an act of affection he makes these points: (i) family affection is in accordance with nature (kata phusin) and good (ii) that which is rational is good (iii) that which is rational is not, then, incompatible with family affection (iv) therefore, when two things are incompatible and one is in accordance with nature, the other must be contrary to nature (para phusin). Epiktetos then repeats the assertion that what is both affectionate and rational is both right and good. He presumes that the man does not claim that leaving one’s child when the latter is sick is rational. The question remains: is it affectionate? (v) the mother of the child, her nurse and her attendant all have affection for the child (vi) if they all went away and left the child, that would not have been affectionate (vii) if the man were himself sick, he would not wish to be left alone and deserted by his relatives and the others who loved him so much (viii) therefore, the man’s conduct was not an act of affection.95 The unstated conclusion is that such conduct is not, in fact, in accordance with nature or good. The important point for my purposes is that Epiktetos assumes that what is in accordance with nature is good. Yet he challenges the man ear-

94

C.H. 5.2 (cf. 5.8), 10.25 (ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ πάντα), 11.12–14, 12.21 (μέρη / μέλη). unus et omnia: e.g. Asclep. 20 (cf. n. 145 below); cf. 14–19 (God, matter and spirit; God and other gods), 35 (God called omniformis), 41 (unique name of God) and Nock-Festugière 2.295, 2.357 n. 6. 95 Epikt. 1.11.16–26 (cf. 1.11.4 for τὸ θυγάτριον). The conclusions in (iii) and (iv) do not necessarily follow from the premises stated. Dobbin (133–135) provides a detailed analysis of Epiktetos’ reasoning in §§16–26.

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lier: “convince me that you were acting naturally (phusikos) and I shall convince you that everything that is done in accordance with nature (kata phusin) is rightly done”. Neither side of the bargain is fulfilled. The correspondence between good things and those which are kata phusin, as well as between evil things and those which are para phusin, is simply assumed throughout.96 Before the argument summarised above Epiktetos stresses the importance of learning the means of judging those things which are in harmony with nature (to kriterion ton kata phusin); after it he emphasises the importance of examining our decisions.97 That harmony with nature is a good thing is not only a basic assumption by Epiktetos; harmony with nature is also a primary objective of his education. In evaluating his students’ progress he investigates whether they are acting in harmony with nature (sumphonos tei phusei) or out of harmony (asumphonos) with nature. It is not sufficient to have a knowledge of a treatise ‘On impulse’; the real criterion is how the students act in their impulses and repulsions, their desires and avoidances. If the students are acting in a manner that is out of harmony with nature, the teacher recommends more extensive student involvement: not merely exposition of such treatises but the production of similar treatises by the students.98 This recommendation may still leave a discrepancy between the students’ understanding and their conduct, but Epiktetos is at least making specific practical suggestions. In another statement concerning the education he provides Epiktetos stresses that philosophy professes to teach people to keep, in every situation, their governing principle (hegemonikon) in harmony with nature.99 This is expanded and explained a little in another chapter, where the ideal product of Epiktetos’ education is described, ho kalos kai agathos – an ancient term which literally means ‘the fine and good (person)’. The object of hoi kaloi kai agathoi is to maintain their own governing principle or to maintain themselves in harmony with nature, whatever their material circumstances. The two clauses “to keep one’s own hegemonikon in control of this circumstance” and “to keep oneself

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Note especially 1.11.11. Challenge to interlocutor: 1.11.5. 1.11.9–15; 1.11.27–40. A philosophical rather than a psychological explanation for the man’s behaviour is sought (cf. 1.11.28). 98 1.4.14–15. The treatise in question is presumably by Khrysippos: cf. 1.4.6–11 and SVF 3.1. See also A.F. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des stoikers Epictet (Stuttgart 1894) 11 = The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus [Revisioning Philosophy, 2] (New York 1996) 25–26; L. Moulinier, op. cit. (n. 47) 82–84. For ‘a volition [Long’s term (28) for prohairesis] that accords with nature’ as an educational objective of Epiktetos see Long 118–119. 99 1.15.4: ἐν πάσῃ περιστάσει τηρήσω τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον. A similar ideal is presented in 3.5.3, 3.6.3, 3.9.11, 3.10.11 and 4.4.43. 97

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in harmony with nature in this circumstance” are parallel and presumably intended to mean the same thing.100 These are not the only passages in which living in harmony with nature is used to explain the meaning of getting an education (to paideuesthai).101 In the Manual (enkheiridion) the principle is expressed as “keeping one’s moral purpose (prohairesis) in harmony with nature”. For example, in social relations one should maintain one’s own attitude towards others and not consider what they are doing, since that is a matter for their own moral purpose.102 The idea of harmony with nature, then, occurs frequently in Epiktetos.103 Two fragments from Stobaios, entitled ‘By Rufus from Epiktetos on friendship’, suggest that he received the idea from his respected teacher, Musonius Rufus. In another place he ascribes the principle to Khrysippos, who is presumably the ultimate source of the idea promulgated by Epiktetos.104 Twice Epiktetos speaks of keeping one’s will in harmony with what happens.105 In view of his oft-repeated assertion that externals are not under our control and that we should not be affected by them, this cannot mean that our disposition should change in accordance with the vicissitudes of life. Rather we should recognise that we cannot change the essential nature of things; but given that nature of things, we for our part should keep our wills in harmony 100

4.5.1–7, especially 6. The adjective ἴδιος is significant because Epiktetos is emphasising, on the example of that kalos kai agathos Sokrates, that no one has control over another’s governing principle. On the key term ἡγεμονικόν see also 1.20.11, 2.1.39, 2.18.8–9, 3.15.13, enkh. 38, Bonhöffer 94–112; for τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικόν see 1.26.15, 3.3.1, 3.10.16, 4.4.43, Bonhöffer 96. For the soul as hegemonikon see A.A. Long, Phronesis 27 (1982) 34–57 at 40–53 with 55–57 = Stoic Studies (Cambridge 1996) 224–249 at 232–249. On ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός see also 1.7.1–4, 1.12.4–7, 2.10.5, 2.11.23–25, 3.24.50–53, Bonhöffer 2–13, Pohlenz 1.340–341, Long 33 and, for some earlier history, K.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford 1974) 41–45. 101 The idea is expressed in different words in 1.22.9–11, where the stress on application to specific circumstances is again evident. 102 enkh. 4, 13: τὴν (ἐμαυτοῦ, σεαυτοῦ) προαίρεσιν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν τηρῆσαι (φυλάξαι); cf. 1.4.18 (σύμφωνον ... τῇ φύσει). Social relations: enkh. 30. On prohairesis see n. 47 above. 103 In addition to the passages mentioned above see 1.6.21 (σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ φύσει), 1.26.2, enkh. 6. 104 Fr. 6 (Stob. 3.20.60) and 8 (Stob. 4.44.60) = Musonius fr. 40 and 42 Hense (so also Lutz). See further below. Khrysippos: 1.4.28–29 (cf. SVF 3.144). Schenkl supplies ἀκόλουθά or the like before τε καὶ σύμφωνα ἐστι τῇ φύσει, Schweighäuser and von Arnim (in SVF 3) ἀληθῆ. M. Lapidge also suggests that Epiktetos and Dion of Prousa have learned cosmology from Musonius, citing fr. 17 [at p.90.12–15 Hense], where the claim is made that humans are most like god when living in harmony with nature: ANRW 2.36.3 (Berlin 1989) 1413– 1414, 1416. 105 1.12.17: ἵνα ... αὐτοὶ τὴν γνώμην τὴν αὑτῶν συνηρμοσμένην τοῖς γινομένοις ἔχωμεν; 2.14.7: δεῖ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν συναρμόσαι τοῖς γινομένοις; cf. σαυτὸν ... συναρμόζοντα τῇ τοῦ Διὸς διοικήσει in 2.23.42. A comparable statement is made about the mind in 2.2.21.

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with what happens. Our aim should be that both nothing which happens happens against our will and nothing which fails to happen fails to happen when we wish it to happen. In other words, our minds should be able to adapt themselves to whatever eventuates.106 This teaching illuminates a terse fragment from Musonius Rufus just mentioned: But above all it is the function of nature to bind together and harmonise one’s impulse with one’s conception of what is proper and helpful.107

The meaning of this pronouncement, in the context of Epiktetos’ discourses, appears to be that our experience of what happens serves to strengthen our moral purpose in its choice and rejection, respectively, of what is good and what is evil. Bringing one’s will into harmony with what happens is explicitly stated as an objective in being educated. It is not surprising, then, to find Epiktetos encouraging his students to study the administration of the universe (he tou kosmou dioikesis). One can learn the facts from Khrysippos; but the precepts must be put into action if we seek to be more than mere interpreters of Khrysippos.108 For example, you may try to assuage another’s grief at your absence, but not at all costs, since the other person (the mother in this case) should commit herself more completely to the teaching of the philosophers. To seek at all costs something which is not under your control is to oppose Zeus in his administration of the universe.109 The point of studying that administration is, of course, that we might acquiesce in or comply with it110 – which brings us back to the theme of bringing one’s will into harmony with what happens. Harmony with nature or with what happens is thus an important theme in the extant records of Epiktetos’ teaching. The logic by which he seeks to support his ideas in this area is not perfect, but he deserves credit for his high degree of practicality. The theory arises in response to a practical problem and it often leads on to such specific cases as anxiety over a sick child, the grief of a mother or proper attitudes in social conduct. For Marcus Aurelius, by contrast, it is theoretical speculation that interests him, although the theory does find some application in the field of personal relationships.

106 1.12.17, 2.2.21 (διάνοια), 2.14.7. Externals: 1.1, 1.15, 2.2.25–26, 2.5.4–14, 3.3.7–10, 4.7.8–11, 4.10.1–3; enkh. 13–14, 48. 107 Fr. 6 = Musonius fr. 40 Hense (one of five entitled ῾Ρούφου ἐκ τοῦ [or τῶν] ᾿Επικτήτου Περὶ φιλίας). 108 Educational objective: 1.12.17. In the other passage (2.14.7) to which reference has been made twice above, the function of philosophers is said to be to bring their own will into harmony with what happens. Studying the administration of the universe: 1.9.4, 1.10.10, 3.13.8 (ἡ θεία διοίκησις); cf. 4.7.7. Khrysippos: enkh. 49; cf. 1.10.10. 109 3.24.22–24 (θεομαχήσω, ἀντιθήσω πρὸς τὸν Δία, ἀντιδιατάξομαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ὅλα). Further specific cases are discussed in the rest of that chapter. Cf. 2.16.33. 110 3.26.18 (πείθεσθαι τῇ διοικήσει τῶν ὅλων); cf. 2.23.42, 3.11.1, 3.24.43.

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Marcus sets particular store by the idea of harmony with nature. He is grateful for his acquisition of the concept of a life in harmony with nature (ten ennoian tou kata phusin zen) which he learned, at least in part, from Sextus, a Stoic from Khaironeia who was a nephew of Plutarch.111 Human affairs are ephemeral and cheap, Marcus thinks, and hence one should pass through the short span of life in harmony with nature (kata phusin) and cheerfully lay down one’s life whenever the time comes. Marcus states his own determination to walk in the way that is kata phusin. He falls far short of being a philosopher, though this is what he has sought. Nevertheless, let him live the balance of life as nature wills.112 Adaptation to one’s environment is important, and when one’s sovereign principle is in harmony with nature, it can adapt itself easily to whatever befalls.113 Some things are indifferent and to live the highest life we should be indifferent to them. This can be achieved by examining every indifferent object as a whole and in its parts. They can only harm us if we form opinions about them to that effect. If what we examine is in harmony with nature, rejoice in it; if contrary to nature (para phusin), we should each look for what is in harmony with our particular nature and hasten towards that.114 Each person’s interest is served by what is in harmony with his or her own constitution and nature; and human nature is rational and social. Hence to care for humankind is in harmony with human nature.115 This concept gives greater meaning to the statement that by an unsociable act people cut themselves off from “the unity that is in harmony with nature (he kata phusin henosis)”. Not only does this mean that by nature a human being is a part of the whole (“you have been born a part”), but also that the unity is based on community welfare, in which any unsociable act (akoinoneton ti) has no place. But the discussion remains on this theoretical level, more concerned with the imagery than with specific actions by which one may be restored to the “unity that is in harmony with nature”.116 In a passage just noted, too, Marcus turns from the aside that to care for all people is in harmony with human nature to a maxim: the wise 111 M.A. 1.9.3, 1.17.11; Cassius Dio 71.1.2; Philostratos, Lives of the Sophists 2.9 (557); Historia Augusta Marcus 3.2; the Souda s.v. Σέξστος. The biographical data is brought together and discussed by P. Hadot in the introduction to his edition (1.xcv–xcvii). 112 4.47–48, especially 4.48.3–4 (cf. 4.51); 5.4; 8.1. In the last passage (at 8.1.3) ἡ [σὴ] φύσις σοῦ θέλει (Farquharson’s text) or οἷον δήποτε ἡ φύσις σε θέλει (Dalfen’s) is equivalent to κατὰ τὴν φύσιν in 7.56, where the point is precisely the same. 113 οἷς συγκεκλήρωσαι πράγμασι, τούτοις συνάρμοζε σεαυτόν: 6.39. τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῦον: 4.1.1; cf. 5.26 (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς σου μέρος). On hegemonikon in the thought of Epiktetos and Marcus see Bonhöffer 95–97, 108–110. 114 11.16; cf. 4.3.9–11, 4.39 and Hadot 108–110. 115 6.44.5, 3.4.7. This and the next three paragraphs include material from Historia 18 (1969) 570–587 at 577–578 (= R. Klein [ed.], Marc Aurel [Wege der Forschung, 550] [Darmstadt 1979] 359–388 at 367–368). 116 8.34. See also chap. 4 at n. 49 and chap. 6 at n. 24.

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cling to the opinion not of everyone but only of those who live in agreement with nature (hoi homologoumenos tei phusei biountes).117 This theoretical bent does not prevent Marcus talking about the value of actions which are in harmony with nature. The difficulty lies in discerning what actions are meant. If people love themselves truly, he says, they will love their own nature and follow its will. Social beings, however, must not hold their own nature in less honour than dancers do their art or misers their money. Marcus encourages himself to consider that he is worthy of every word and deed that is in harmony with nature. Avoid being diverted by the censure of others, he says, for they have their own governing principle and impulse. The path of his own and of the common nature is one.118 For a rational creature an act in harmony with nature is also in harmony with reason. Furthermore, there is nothing to fear where a task to be accomplished is in harmony with that reason which humans share with the gods.119 Again it is implied that helping others is an act in harmony with nature: No one grows tired of receiving benefits, and an act in harmony with nature is its own benefit. Do not then grow tired of the benefits you receive by benefiting others.120

But is this passage much more than a play on words? Marcus recommends social actions or actions in harmony with nature, but nowhere, as far as I can see, does he specify what these actions are. He is a little more specific in censuring actions which are not in harmony with nature (para phusin). Working against one’s fellow humans comes into this category. A judgment (hupolepsis) may be not in accord with nature (anakolouthos tei phusei).121 A number of attitudes and actions are deprecated as being para phusin or as constituting disobedience to “the legislative reason of the most venerable city and government”. Basically these attitudes and actions – an angry scowl, turning away from any human, and so on – represent a lack of acceptance of one’s destiny. However pain, provided that the person concerned is performing his or her function as a human, is not contrary to nature or evil for that person. But Marcus recognises human weakness and distinguishes this weakness from the principles of philosophy:

117 3.4.7. On τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν see J.M. Rist, Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origen [Phoenix Supplementary Volumes, 6] (Toronto 1964) 161–162. 118 5.1.5–7, 5.3. ‘Social beings’ is implied by αἱ κοινωνικαὶ πράξεις in 5.1.7. For τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικόν compare 3.4.1 and for τὰς ἰδίας ὁρμάς 11.21.4. 119 7.11, 7.53. 120 7.74. On the second clause see my comment in Historia 18 (1969) 578 n. 52 (= Marc Aurel [n. 115] 383 n. 52). 121 2.1, especially 2.1.5; 3.9.

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Remember that philosophy wills only what your nature wills, but you were willing something else which is not in harmony with nature.122

However, he stresses repeatedly that no one and nothing can prevent people living in harmony with nature; this involves doing and saying at all times what is in harmony with that nature of which they form a part.123 Marcus states with determination that he personally wills what is in harmony with the nature of a rational and social creature and that no one will prevent his doing what he wills.124 This determination not to be para phusin, a determination which leads Marcus to the extent of mentioning specific attitudes and actions, highlights a problem: how is the idea of people living contrary to nature to be reconciled with the general doctrine that all things constitute an harmonious whole? Marcus makes no attempt to resolve this problem and that suggests that he is operating at a kind of medium level, promoting certain philosophical conclusions forcefully rather than grappling with basic discrepancies or (in the other direction) describing the concrete ways in which his ideas can be applied. Marcus also recommends acceptance of one’s destiny. This is expressed in a number of ways, such as welcoming one’s fate, welcoming all that comes to pass and surrendering to Klotho who spins one’s fate.125 But the most common expression is that of welcoming what is assigned by universal nature. Just as Asklepios prescribes cures, so universal nature prescribes for humans whatever befalls in the way of sickness or loss, as being beneficial to the whole. A rational being welcomes all that is assigned by universal nature, because he or she is a part of that whole.126 Pain of any sort, or even death, should not be feared, since both are in harmony with nature.127 One consequence of Marcus’ attitude to universal nature is that he encourages knowledge and understanding of the universe and nature. A thorough knowledge of the processes of nature should lead to a correct appreciation of the seemingly insignificant and untoward events in the world. A methodical study of the essential nature of things and how they interchange should produce a greatness of mind which expresses itself in just actions and in surrender to universal nature in what comes to pass. It is a good practice, Marcus says, to go right to the heart of things and see what kind they really are – consider how he strips choice food, Falernian wine and sexual intercourse to their unadorned essentials. A proper understanding is one that contributes to the general welfare and harmony.128 Marcus’ overall view 122

5.9.3. Attitudes and actions: 2.16, 6.33, 7.24. 1.17.11 (cf. Rutherford 192–193), 2.9, 3.12, 10.33.1–2. 124 5.29.2; cf. 6.58. 125 3.4.4–5, 3.16.3–4, 4.33.4–4.34, 6.44.1–3, 7.57, 8.46; cf. 4.26.4 and Neuenschwander 83–89. 126 4.25, 5.8, 8.7, 10.6, 10.8.2, 11.13.4; cf. Neuenschwander 40, 45. 127 6.33, 10.36. 12.26.1. 128 3.2 (cf. 8.26.2, 8.52); 10.9, 10.11 (cf. 11.5); 6.13 (cf. 11.2); 7.5. 123

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of a person’s relation to universal nature has these twin principles at its centre: first, that no one can prevent your living in harmony with nature; secondly, that nothing can happen to you which is not in harmony with universal nature. The most specific that Marcus becomes in explaining these principles occurs when he gives examples of acts of impiety against that venerable goddess, universal nature: injustice (because rational creatures are created to benefit one another); lying (because it distorts the knowledge of the real nature of the things that exist); seeking pleasure and avoiding pain (because in either case a person must often blame the gods for a supposed unfair dispensation to good and bad, and blaming the gods is already established as impious).129 Both Epiktetos and Marcus value and recommend harmony with nature. Similarly, Epiktetos emphasises harmony with what happens and Marcus acceptance of one’s destiny.130 But there is a significant difference between the two in their degree of practicality. Epiktetos is concerned with practical principles of conduct, whereas Marcus continually reverts to theory. His theoretical bent is revealed also by his stress on understanding the universe. Even when he asserts the value of actions which are in harmony with nature, he fails to specify what these actions are, although he does give a few examples of actions which are not in harmony with nature. Plutarch is not much more practical than Marcus in discussing what is in harmony with nature (indicated by kata phusin or to kata phusin). The phrase kata phusin is used to explain the workings of the universe and human customs and to recommend certain practices, such as love between brothers.131 The opposite phrase, para phusin, is used to indicate unnatural conditions for plants and animals and situations for humans to avoid; also to condemn certain views on the relation between soul and body. Plutarch claims the support of common sense in asserting that it is necessary to live in harmony with nature (to zen kata phusin).132 He reveals that he agrees with the Stoics, but is eager to show their contradictions of what is commonly thought to be kata phusin. He attacks the Stoics for considering useless and indifferent things to be ta kata phusin, for failing to reach an agreement which is genuinely fitting and consonant with nature and for acting as though they were the only people to regulate nature

129

Twin principles: 5.10.6–7, 6.58. Acts of impiety: 9.1.1–9; cf. 6.16.9–10, 6.41. Epiktetos: nn. 98–103 above; Marcus Aurelius: nn. 111–113, 125–128 above. 131 The universe: 361c, 928a–c. Human customs: 119f, 268d (accepting F.C. Babbitt’s emendation). Recommended practices: 132a, 478a–481e (especially 478d–f, 481c), 793a–b, 1092a, 1096d. On the κατά construction compare 813c, 928b, 1086c, 1107d. 132 Plants and animals: 646d, 671b, Agis 2.5; cf. κατὰ φύσιν in 493d–e, 963d. For the contrast with κατὰ φύσιν see 927e–f, 1063d. Situations to avoid: 128d–e, 450e, 751c–e, 823f–824a, 995b–e; cf. 136d, 479c. Views on soul and body: 926c, Rom. 28.10, fr. p.23.21– 23 Bernadakis = fr. 178 (p.107.20–21) Sandbach. Common sense: 1060e; cf. 153d. 130

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and custom.133 But apart from health, Plutarch does not make clear what specific states are kata phusin. The phrase, in fact, tends to lose its distinctive meaning,134 as it is used as a simple means of recommending something. On the other hand, Plutarch has a practical suggestion about achieving a unified life: forgetfulness is one of the factors that does not allow our life to become a unity. By implication, we should use our memories to interweave the past with the present.135 An harmonious life is a value recommended also by Dion of Prousa. The word harmonia is used literally for harmony and a mode in music, but is applied also to life: Dion tells his listeners to make their life harmonious with what is best, for otherwise life itself is out of tune and discordant. This harmony does not appear to be one between the two components of a person, body and soul, for the organs of the body are described working harmoniously and harmony within the soul is presented as a good. Moreover, a better harmonia is achieved through education and reason.136 This is recognisable as the harmony with nature that we have seen promoted by other writers. Dion does, indeed, explicitly recommend “the harmony that is in accordance with nature” as opposed to discord and he says that political activity is kata phusin for humans.137 Again there is little practical advice as to how this ideal of harmony with nature is to be attained. When we turn to the Hermetic writings we find humans, God and the universe all bound up together. Humans are involved in the harmony of the universe. As a part of the kosmos and as the third living being after God and the kosmos, anthropos (humankind) has a general relationship with the latter. Whereas humans are linked to God by ennoia (thought), they are linked with the kosmos by sumpatheia (sympathetic connection); they are made in the image of the kosmos and possess mind. They are affected by the movement of the

133 1062c–d (τὰ κοινῶς κατὰ φύσιν), 1063d, 1069c–1070b (1069f: τὴν ἀληθῶς τῇ φύσει πρόσφορον καὶ συνῳδὸν ὁμολογίαν), 1072c–e, 1073c–d. 134 It is diluted towards φυσικῶς or φύσει: cf. 387b, 450e, 601b, 927d–e, 1092a–b. 135 473c–e (λήθη ... οὐκ ἐᾷ τὸν βίον ἕνα γενέσθαι συμπλεκομένων τοῖς παροῦσι τῶν παρῳχημένων), 474b (ἐμμελὲς τὸ τοῦ βίου μῖγμα ποιεῖν καὶ οἰκεῖον αὑτοῖς). See on this whole passage R. Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death (Chicago 2006) 39–43, 172–177. 136 Literal usage of ἁρμονία: e.g. 26.6, 33.42. Life harmonious with what is best: 68.7 (ἀνάρμοστον ... καὶ ἐκμελῆ). The σῶμα / ψυχή contrast appears, for example, in 4.112, 36.57. Harmony of the whole body: 17.19. Harmony in the soul: 32.58 (where music is thought of as the effective agent). Healthy education and reason: 4.139; cf. the phraseology used of the universe in 3.76 (harmonia), 40.35 (homonoia). 2 137 32.46 (τῆς ἁρμονίας τῆς κατὰ φύσιν), 47.2 (cf. Nörr 79 and n. 73); cf. the use of κατά in 75.4, 77/78.24.

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kosmos.138 Sexual vocabulary and the idea of a bond of love are used to describe the relationship between humankind and the universe. Humans mingle with God as well as the universe and, since God governs the universe in conjunction with them, it is their task to tend and preserve the universe in order. Thus the universe and humankind are mutual ornaments and the latter may be called mundus or, better, kosmos.139 For the Hermetic writers also humans are composed of body and soul. The body is described as a hateful, evil tunic (khiton) in which the soul is enclosed or as a house for the ‘essential’ person. The soul by contrast is akin to the soul of the kosmos and must be drawn out of the body.140 A dual responsibility falls on humans because they possess a mixture and fusion of the two natures, animus and corpus. The first task is to admire and worship the heavens, to love the divinity; this is their obsequium (worship). The second task is to tend and administer the earth, to preserve the mundus in order; this is their ministerium (service).141 Humans, then, are a mixture of body and soul, of ‘mortal’ or ‘material’ part and ‘divine’ or ‘essential’ part.142 There is also an intimate fusion in them of mind and soul, or of thought and sense. The union of mind with the senses of seeing and hearing corresponds to the union of mind (nous) and logos. Reason is God’s gift to humankind and it finds a home within the wall of the body.143 There is no death – that is, destruction – as far as body and soul are concerned. The elements of the body are formed after death into other combinations.144

138

Harmony of the universe: C.H. 1.14–16; cf. 1.26 (humankind [ἀνθρωπότης] saved by God), 10.7–8, Noumenios, fr. 11 des Places, Festugière 3.91–96 and F.-N. Klein, Lichtterminologie (n. 39) 98–99. Part of the kosmos: C.H. 8.1. Links with God and the kosmos (ἔννοια and συμπάθεια): C.H. 8.1, 8.5 (quoted at the beginning of this chapter); cf. 12.20 on the use by ὁ ἄνθρωπος of all parts of the kosmos. See also Festugière 1.213 n. 3 and Fowden 77. Movement of the kosmos: C.H. 9.5. 139 Sexual vocabulary: C.H. 1.14. Bond of love (nexus caritatis): Asclep. 6. See also C.H. 1.19 and Asclep. 21 for discussion of sexual union in relation to the universe and God. Mundus / κόσμος: Asclep. 6, 10, 11 (munde mundum seruando). On humankind as a microcosm see Festugière 1.92–94. 140 C.H. 7 (χιτών in 7.2–3), 10.5–10, 10.15, 10.19–21, 11.21; Asclep. 6; cf. C.H. 6.3, 10.11. 141 Asclep. 6, 8–9, 11–12. 142 See also C.H. 9.1–2, Asclep. 6–7, 10, 22, 41 and van Moorsel 18–19. On the ‘essential’/ ‘divine’ alternation see n. 70 above. On the Hermetic view of human nature see also C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge 1953) 25–27. 143 Note the strong terminology, such as ἡνῶσθαι, ὥσπερ συμπεπλεγμέναι and una ex bene coalescente commixtione materia, used in some of the following passages: C.H. 1.6, 9.1–2, 10.24, 12.3–4, 12.10–11; Asclep. 7, 18, 37. 144 C.H. 1.24, 8.1, 9.6, 12.18. The debt to Stoicism is noted by Scott 2.200, 204 and NockFestugière 1.92–93.

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The concepts of unity are more than usually intertwined in the case of the Hermetic writings. The unity of God is not only paralleled by the unity of the parts of the universe, but it is also demonstrated by reference to the single order and harmonious operation of the universe. There is a three-way relationship connecting God with the kosmos, the kosmos with humankind and humankind with God. The ‘essential’ part of humans, which is intimately fused with the ‘material’ part, also offers the opportunity of union with God. These concepts cannot be dismissed as the views of an exotic minority. For the Hermetic writings draw together a wide body of traditions, ranging from Platonism and Stoicism to Jewish wisdom literature,145 and yet they have a distinctive world view. Moreover, the documents have been carefully revised by several hands in a way that deprives the textual critic of a single distinguishable style. They are a reliable guide to the ideas of the Hermetic communities. A strong monotheistic tendency can be detected in the Hermetic literature and in the Pseudo-Aristotelian On the kosmos. Thus the Hermetic writers use the idea of the monad to promote a single god, whereas Plutarch does not. But most writers under the Roman peace turn out to be polytheists, despite emphasis on a particular god on some occasions or acclamations such as “God is one!”. Consequently, harmony among the gods is a theme found in some writers, such as Dion of Prousa. A close relationship between humans and gods can be based on kinship or partnership or both. If humans seek to keep their soul of one mind with God, they should avoid anger and envy. This advice, from Epiktetos, is quite concrete, as is Marcus Aurelius’ promotion of humility, truthfulness and justice. God is represented as creator, ruler, pilot, and so on, of the universe, but Epiktetos (at least) identifies God with the universe. This seems to arise from Stoic interest, for others such as Plutarch are insistent that God is a separate entity directing the universe. In recommending harmony with nature Epiktetos seeks student involvement in the exposition; but there is still a gap to actual practice, and that practice tends towards the theoretical (for example, acquiescing in God’s administration of the universe). Marcus Aurelius is even more theoretical, enjoying the imagery of parts of a whole. But he is able to censure actions which are not in harmony with nature, such as injustice and lying. We may conclude that his statements are no worse than certain other writings in remaining on a theoretical level.

145

See, for example, Scott 2.156 on C.H. 5; Nock-Festugière 1.78 on C.H. 7; E. Norden, Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede (Leipzig 1913) 246–250 on unus et omnia and similar phrases in Asclep. 1–2, 20, 29–30; M. Lapidge, op. cit. (n. 104) 1424–1425 on Asclep. 2–3, 29, 39. For the idea of συμπάθεια in Poseidonios see fr. 106 EK with K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie: Neue Untersuchungen über Poseidonios (München 1926) 248, Kidd 2.423–425 and Morlet 31 and n. 82. On the sources for the Hermetic documents in general see Festugière (passim) and van Moorsel 19–22.

Chapter 6

The Universe There was considerable discussion of the nature of the universe in the Roman empire of the first two centuries of the common era. Plutarch, for example, is interested in the creation of the universe, the elements, the place of the earth in the universe, Egyptian views of the universe, the process of change, the uniting action of gravity and the distinction between ‘this world’ and ‘the other world’. Dion of Prousa discusses the matter and the elements of the universe, its conflagration and renewal, the movement of the heavens and natural disasters such as floods. The Hermetic writings show an interest in whether the universe moves in space or in a void, in whether it is essentially bad, in whether it is a body or a living being, in its composition, in the relationships among God, matter and spirit, and in other questions. Like the meditations of Marcus Aurelius, these writings disclose a belief that the universe is continually renewing itself and thus that death is nothing but change. The harmony of the universe is generally only a part, albeit an important part, of the thought of first- and second-century writers about the universe.

The Harmony of the Universe The Harmony of the Universe

The harmony of the universe is an idea accepted and discussed by a wide range of authors under the Roman peace. The idea was part of the classical tradition. To anticipate a theme of chapter 8, we might note that the early Christian writers apparently derived their ideas about the harmony of the universe from the classical tradition and not from the New Testament.1 The first question to which Pliny the elder addresses himself in his Natural History is, “whether the universe is finite and whether it is one”. He describes as madness the belief in countless universes; it is far easier to understand the essential properties in a single universe. For Pliny the universe “is sacred, eternal, immeasurable, wholly within the whole, or rather itself the whole (totum)”. The universe could

1 There seems to be no source in the New Testament for such statements as those made by the Roman Christians in their attempt to bring about unity in the Corinthian church (1 Clem. 20) or that made by Athenagoras in talking about incentives to piety (leg. 4.2; cf. 25.3).

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not be referred to as a deity (numen) in Pliny’s view, unless there was only one.2 That Plutarch believed in the harmony of the universe is established by a number of contexts. For example, he argues that superstition leads to atheism because the ridiculous actions of the superstitious cause others to doubt the existence of the gods, not because the superstitious reach the conclusion that there is no god in the universe (to pan). Indeed, the superstitious agree with Plutarch that there is nothing discordant or disordered in the stars, or seasons, or growth of plants and animals, or revolutions of the moon, or movements of the sun around the earth. In the dialogue The face that appears in the orb of the moon Plutarch puts forward harmonia and koinonia of the universe (to pan) as a good condition.3 Plutarch also defends Parmenides’ view that the universe is one (to pan hen) against the criticisms of the Epicurean Kolotes. He asserts that Epikouros’ dictum “the universe is infinite” (to pan apeiron) implies that the universe is one and that Epikouros treats “the nature of things” as one. Hence Epicureans also should accept the view that the universe is one (hen to pan estin).4 Plutarch’s own opinion on the origin and harmony of the universe is expounded in Isis and Osiris, where he claims widespread agreement with his opinion. He rejects the doctrines of Demokritos and Epikouros, which assign the origins of the universe to inanimate bodies, and those of the Stoics, which make the creator of characterless matter one reason and one providence which controls all things. For it is impossible for anything bad to be created where God is the author of all and for anything good to be created where God is the author of nothing. After some favourite quotations from Herakleitos on harmonia of the kosmos and from Euripides on a certain mingling (sunkrasis) of good and bad, Plutarch asserts that writers on religion, lawgivers, poets and philosophers, among both Greeks and barbarians, believe that the universe is 2 Plin. Nat. 2.1–4 (quotation from 2.2); cf. 2.13, 2.27. The question an finitus sit mundus et an unus occurs in the table of contents for book 2 given at the beginning of book 1. The section quoted provides a starting-point for M. Beagon’s discussion of the divinity of mundus/natura: Roman Nature: The Thought of Pliny the Elder (Oxford 1992) 26–33; cf. J. Isager, Pliny on Art and Society: The Elder Pliny’s Chapters on the History of Art [Odense University Classical Studies, 17] (Odense 1991) 32–33, R.K. French, Ancient Natural History: Histories of Nature (London 1994) 198–201 and J.F. Healy, Pliny the Elder on Science and Technology (Oxford 1999) 28. For interest in the universe in the early second century see also Secundus p.74.22–76.1 and p.78.11–15 Perry. 3 Agreement of the superstitious: mor. 171a–b; cf. H. Erbse, Hermes 80 (1952) 296–314, especially 299–300, 303. ἁρμονία καὶ κοινωνία τοῦ παντός: 927a; cf. 746a–c. On Plutarch’s use of Empedokles in 926d–927a, see D. O’Brien, Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle (Cambridge 1969) 31–36,147–149, 153. 4 1113f–1114a; cf. DK 28 (Parmenides) A 7, 23, 25, 49 = R 13, 30/60, 47, – Laks/Most, Epik. fr. 296 Usener and R. Westman, Plutarch gegen Kolotes: Seine Schrift “Adversus Colotem” als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle [Acta Philosophica Fennica, 7] (Helsingfors 1955) 121–122, 133–134.

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not suspended without mind, reason or guidance, nor is there only one reason which controls it, but it results from two opposite principles and two antagonistic forces. He offers three reasons. First, nature brings us in life many experiences in which both good and evil are mixed together; our life is complex and so is the kosmos. Secondly, if this is not true of the whole kosmos (if the first reason is not really valid, a cynic might say), it is true of this terrestrial world next to the moon that it is heterogeneous and subject to variation. Thirdly, nothing naturally comes into existence without a cause; and if the good cannot provide a cause for evil, then nature must contain in itself the source and origin of evil as well as good. Hence the majority and the wisest of people believe that there are two gods, one the creator of good and the other of evil, called by some theos and daimon respectively.5 Plutarch’s theory of the harmony of the universe can be filled out from other works. It involves a belief in the organisation, as distinct from a haphazard mixture, of the universe out of the elements, and the union of the essence of the universe with its parts, making the essence self-contained and the universe permanent. The ordered universe thus has a composite nature. The unity (henotes) and fellowship (koinonia) of the universe is given a physical basis: the universe would be destroyed if the air between the earth and the moon were removed.6 In physical terms, again, the intelligible nature of the heavens is shown by the harmonious revolution of the kosmos, the harmonious movements of the moon, stars and planets – in general, the harmonious administration of all regions of the kosmos. Musical imagery is predominant in Plutarch’s presentation of the harmony of the universe in these statements.7 Plutarch is interested in the number of worlds – whether one or five or one hundred and eighty-three or an infinite number – but if there is more than one he apparently would insist on harmony among the worlds.8 He also allows the possibility of 5 369a–d. DK 22 (Herakleitos) B 51 = D 49 Laks/Most (with the insertion of κόσμου after ἁρμονίη) is quoted also in 473f and 1026b; Euripides, Aiolos fr. 21.3–4 Kannicht also in 25c and 474a; on the idea of mixing in Plutarch see T. Duff, Plutarch’s Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice (Oxford 1999) 89–94. The interchangeability of τὸ πᾶν and ὁ κόσμος seen in 369c is also evident in 441e–f, 928b; but τὸ πᾶν includes one or more κόσμοι in 422f–423a, 426a, 925e–f. With πᾶς ὁ κόσμος compare 316e, 745b. On the meaning of ἁρμονίη for Herakleitos and for Plutarch, see G.S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments (Cambridge 1954) 203– 221; J.G. Griffiths, Plutarch’s De Iside et Osiride (Cambridge 1970) 469–470. 6 Organisation of the universe: 43d (τὸ πᾶν διακοσμηθέν), 1055d (τὴν οὐσίαν ἡνωμένην τοῖς μέρεσι), 1077e–1078e. Composite nature: 436a, 441e–f. Physical basis: 316e–f, 416e, 1085d–1086b. 7 740b–c, 745b, 746a, 939a–b, 1029d; cf. Ps.-Plu. 1147a. For musical imagery see also 430a. In 424a–b Plutarch uses a comparison with the blending of rays of starlight. 8 Number of worlds: 389f–390a, 421f–431a (where the narrator, who perhaps represents Plutarch’s views, argues that more than one world is possible but an infinite number is impossible; see especially 423c–424c and 430e–f), 466d. Harmony among the worlds: 424a– b, 425f-426a. For criticism of Epicureans see 420b and chap. 5 at n. 79 (and below at n. 11).

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periodical disorder, but sees this as change that results in order by divine power. God is rather like a musician, with his authority over the koinonia and harmonia of colours and sounds, over the koinonia and diaphora (separation) of heat and cold – indeed, over the harmonia and sumphonia of the universe.9 Although nature is the author of koinonia and harmonia, not of war and strife, nature does use opposites to build the universe (ta hola) by placing them in a relationship of communication and co-operation. In the kosmos there is an harmonia of opposites, a single unity (mia henotes) from many dissimilar elements. Matter in its original condition is disordered, but God combined matter and form into a unity (hen ti) and from them created the kosmos. The result is that the universe has been and is being perfectly blended and harmonised.10 Plutarch’s views on the harmony of the universe are clarified by his attacks on Stoics and Epicureans. The latter are criticised not only for rejecting Parmenides’ statement that the universe is one, but also for having the infinite disordered and irrational, disrupting and confounding itself. Plutarch prefers Parmenides’ adoption of a cosmic order (diakosmos) and a category of “what exists and is one” (to hen kai on) for the sphere of the intellect. The Stoics are criticised for asserting that the universe (to pan) is neither animate nor inanimate, neither perfect nor imperfect, neither a part nor a whole, but undetermined and unordered, having no cause and being the cause of nothing; Plutarch asserts that they thus identify the universe (to pan) with nothing (to methen). In this connection he rejects the Stoic idea that the universe is neither a body nor bodiless, claiming that if the universe is not a body it has no being and hence cannot do or experience anything and that it is absurd for something not a body to have bodies for its parts.11 He apparently believes that the universe is a body with parts and a relation to the soul. There are a number of statements by Khrysippos with which Plutarch does not necessarily disagree but in relation to which he thinks Khrysippos’ arguments or order of treatment absurd. He does, however, criticise Khrysippos for not giving God control over everything and for attributing some aspects of the universe’s administration to chance.12 On the implications, for the ancient view of divination, of a belief in a finite universe, see E.R. Dodds, The Ancient Concept of Progress and Other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief (Oxford 1973) 182. 9 Periodical disorder leading to order: 373a-d, 388d-e, 424e, 927d. μετακοσμεῖν (424e, 927d) is elsewhere used in social and political contexts: 269a, 519a, Philop. 15.4. God’s rôle: 393e-f, 946e–f, 1030b. 10 370c–371a, 424e, 550d, 719d–e, 720a–c, 926f–927a, 951d–e, Ages. 5.5, Dion 10.2; cf. Plato, Timaios 29e–32c, 48e–53c, Politikos 273b. 11 Epicureans: 1113f–1114d; cf. DK 28 (Parmenides) A 34, B 8 (especially lines 53–61) = R 53b, D 8 Laks/Most and R. Westman, op. cit. (n. 4) 52–54, 234–241. Stoics: 1073d– 1074d, 1077e–1078e, 1085d–1086b; cf. SVF 2.380, 465, 525. 12 τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου: 1003a, 1025a. Khrysippos’ statements: 1035b–d, 1050a–e (cf. SVF 2.937, 1176). In dealing with the ways in which one philosophical school criticises

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Plutarch’s ideas on the harmony of the universe come in contact with ordinary human life at some points. Against the common belief that it is not in harmony with nature (kata phusin) for a father to bury his son, he offers reassurances that such an event is in harmony with the purpose of the universe and the cosmic dispensation. The harmony of the universe demonstrates the working of cause and effect and the conjunction of events; thus the earth has been given a place “for the common work” and (under Roman domination) a hearth has been formed for all humankind. Moreover, the soul of this kosmos provides a model for the human soul.13 The manner in which Dion of Prousa uses such terms as “the whole universe” (ho sumpas kosmos) suggests that he conceives of the universe as a unit, embracing humans, divine beings, gods, sun, moon, the other stars and so on. This impression is confirmed by Dion’s discussion of the administration of the universe. In his third speech on kingship Dion puts forward the leadership (hegemonia) of the universe by the first and best god as the most striking example in nature of the monarchic form of government. He also implies that the universe is united under the order (kosmos) preserved by the sun, which never deviates from its perfect harmonia, moving always along a single path. The speech delivered at Olympia in 97 C.E. presents the whole heaven and universe as a varied and wisely created piece of art which Zeus guides like a chorus leader or pilot.14 Dion reports that he spoke at Borysthenes on the divine administration, under which the whole heaven moves in concert with a single purpose and impulse. The unity of the universe is explicitly asserted in the statement that the present orderly arrangement (diakosmesis), although the whole (to pan) is divided into numerous forms of plants, animals, gods and another, S. Morlet (96–98) discusses Plutarch’s essay promoting the living of a life consistent with one’s beliefs; Plutarch leads up to the vocabulary of συμφωνία and διαφωνία. Plutarch’s criticism of Khrysippos’ placement of theology in relation to logic, ethics and physics (1035a–e) provides the springboard for G. Reydams-Schils’ attempt to delineate the connection between the three divisions of philosophy: RMM (2005, 4) 579–596. God’s control of everything: 1051b–d (cf. SVF 2.1178), 1055d, 1065a–b, 1066b–c (cf. SVF 2.1181). 13 Reassurance against common belief: 119f; cf. Per. 6.1. Place of the earth: 316e–317a, 387b–c, 618b–c. Human soul: 441e–442a; cf. Plato, Timaios 35a–37c, 69c–70d. 14 ἅπας or σύμπας with κόσμος in Dion 33.4 (where von Arnim accepts Emperius’ correction δαιμόνων in place of δαιμονίων), 36.36, 40.35; with γῆ in 4.13, 5.21, 40.38; with χθών in 33.22; with οἰκουμένη in 29.15, 32.36; with οὐρανός in 74.26. Speech on kingship: 3.50, 75–77 (contrasting κόσμος with ἀκοσμία). Speech at Olympia: 12.34; H.-J. Klauck points to similar imagery in mund. 399a 15–24, 400b 6–9: Dion von Prusa, Olympische Rede oder Über die erste Erkenntnis Gottes [SAPERE, 2] (Darmstadt 2000) 129 nn. 174–175. On this speech see also B.F. Harris, JRH 2 (1962) 85–97, especially 89–90 on the analogies used in 12.25–48; Russell, Dio, especially 184 on the overtones of τέλειος, τελετή and τελεῖν; and P. O’Sullivan in J. McWilliam et al. (eds.), The Statue of Zeus at Olympia: New Approaches (Newcastle upon Tyne 2011) 137–154 for ἔκπληξις (astonishment) in both visual and verbal arts. For δημιούργημα of the universe (12.34), see also 48.14.

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elements, is nevertheless one thing (hen) and is managed by one soul and power. Moreover, he explains that the Stoics do not literally identify the universe (kosmos) with a polis, since they define polis as an organised community of humans (sustema anthropon); they would contradict themselves if they defined the kosmos by polis as well as by zoon (living creature). However, they liken it to a polis because of the number of beings coming to or ending their existence in it and because of the disposition and orderly behaviour of its administration. The term polis is applied not to a human form of government with its stasis but to an organisation ordered by the best form of kingship, one with complete philia and homonoia. Since people show that they believe such a government and constitution (sustasis) of the universe exists by calling Zeus ‘king’ and ‘father’, they would not baulk at applying the term ‘house of Zeus’ to the whole universe. Indeed they will accept the term polis too, using the Stoic comparison, for polis is more appropriate than ‘house’ for a kingship. For if people call ‘king’ the one who is over the universe, surely they will admit that they are governed by a king and that there is a monarchical constitution (politeia basilike) of the universe (to pan). If they thus accept the application of politeia to the universe, they will probably also accept polis. These views held by Dion suggest that he would accept a number of the ideas in the allegedly Zoroastrian myth of the Magoi: for example, that the universe (to sumpan) is constantly being propelled along a single path, but that most humans do not see the revolution of the whole but only of parts such as the sun and moon; that the whole heaven and universe is ordered by the wisest and best skill; and that Zeus is responsible for the improvement of the universe, its management, government and homonoia.15 The belief in the unity of the universe is found elsewhere as well. Called upon to show that God watches over all of a person’s actions, Epiktetos takes as a starting-point the Stoic theory of ‘sympathetic connection’ (sumpatheia) of the parts of the universe. The interlocutor – presumably a pupil of a Stoic if not of Epiktetos himself – readily agrees, first, that all things (or the universe) are united (henosthai ta panta) and, secondly, that there is an interaction between (sumpathein) things in heaven and things on earth. The teacher hammers home this point, claims that if this is true of physical objects it is far more applicable to our souls, and concludes that, since our souls are thus bound up with God, he will perceive every action as a movement of his own being. This

15

Movement of heaven: 36.22, 26–29 (τῆς θείας διοικήσεως in 26 taken up in 27 by τῆς θείας εἵτε πόλεως εἴτε διακοσμήσεως). Unity of the universe: 36.30. Universe as a polis: 36.29–32, 36–37 (cf. SVF 2.1129–1130); cf. Schofield 61–63, A.A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford 2006) 346–347 and Trapp 186–190. Von Arnim suspects βασιλικήν in 36.37 because of the way the argument ends. Myth of the Magoi: 36.42, 55, 59–60 (cf. Morlet 31 and n. 84). For echoes of Plato in this speech see chap. 5 n. 51.

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teaching about the perfect guardian leads on to instructions about human conduct, such as never to find fault with anything given by God.16 The argument behind the practical instructions can be paralleled from Cicero’s work Divination (de diuinatione), where Cicero is seeking to show to his brother Quintus that entrails have no prophetic force since they have no connection with the laws of nature. The basic assumption is that all natural things are united in a harmonious whole (uno consensu iuncta sit et continens). Cicero observes that this is the opinion of the natural philosophers (physici), particularly those who have said that the universe is a unity (omne quod esset unum esse). The second step is Cicero’s concession that there is a certain contact (contagio) between the various parts of nature. But, he claims, this natural relationship (cognatio naturalis) of separate things does not prove that a particular sort of cleft in liver is prophetic of financial gain.17 Despite the vastly disparate purposes of the two passages there is a common assumption of the physical unity of the universe. In both dialogues this theory is readily accepted as a preliminary to the more specific doctrine of universal sympathy (sumpatheia). The identity of Epiktetos’ interlocutor is not revealed, but Cicero makes it clear that Quintus is defending the view of the Stoics. Epiktetos’ questioner may well be a Stoic, for Epiktetos assumes at an early stage that physical entities such as plants and human bodies are intimately connected with and are in sympathy with (sumpathein) the universe. Among his illustrations that things on earth feel the influence of things in heaven are the changes which correspond with the waxing and waning of the moon and the approach and departure of the sun. Cicero’s dialogue shows that this is a standard example. Now, Cicero’s list of examples follows after his concession that there is a certain contact between the various parts of nature. Why does he admit this? “The Stoics have collected many examples.”18 It is clear from this, as from many other passages, that the Stoics were particularly interested in this doctrine of sumpatheia and that they would readily agree to conclusions based on it. But 16 Epikt. 1.14. On the connection between Epiktetos’ theory of sumpatheia and his religious beliefs, see G. Germain, Épictète et la spiritualité stoïcienne (Paris 1964) 89–91. Long (25–26) takes Epiktetos’ ‘God’ to mean no more than cosmic order and Hadot (76; cf. 156) as nothing other than universal Reason; but some of the verbs used of ‘God’ (such as ἔνδον εἶναι in 1.14.14 and διδόναι in 1.14.16) fit ‘cosmic order’ or ‘universal Reason’ only with difficulty. 17 Cic. Div. 2.28–36, especially 2.33–34. 18 Epiktetos’ assumptions about his interlocutor’s views: Epikt. 1.14.4–5. Stoic view defended by Quintus: Cic. Div. 2.8. On the concept of sumpatheia see the notes by A.S. Pease (Urbana 1920–1923) on de diuinatione 1.5, 1.6, 1.127, 2.33, 2.124, 2.142 and especially on 2.34 (pp. 224–226 = pp. 410–412 in 1963 reprint); J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 176–178 (with particular reference to the views of Panaitios); Dobbin 148–149; V. Laurand, RMM (2005, 4) 517–535 (525–526 on Epikt. 1.14). For examples paralleled in other works see Cic. Div. 2.33–34 and Pease’s notes.

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that the Stoics were not the only ones who believed in the physical unity of the universe is hinted at in the same treatise. For the belief that all natural things are united in a harmonious whole is specifically stated as the opinion of the natural philosophers. One group of physici is particularly significant here: those who have said that the universe is a unity. An example of this group – to keep within Cicero’s thought – is Xenophanes of Kolophon. Not only would he have been recognised as the founder of the Eleatic school, but Cicero’s introduction of him as a very ancient philosopher clearly distinguishes him from the Stoics. The summary of Xenophanes’ theology by Diogenes Laertios, while consistent with Cicero’s statements, is more akin to the passage in Epiktetos. The latter alludes to the universe (ta hola) in which all things are united as God and speaks of God perceiving and watching over all things (panta).19 Two conclusions may be drawn. First, Epiktetos believes in the physical unity of the universe; the doctrine of sumpatheia is clearly specified by the corresponding verb. Secondly, this belief had wide currency and was not confined to Stoics, as the Ciceronian parallel reveals.20 As I have suggested elsewhere, the unity of the universe is an important idea for Marcus Aurelius and ‘unity’ (henosis) without further qualification usually refers to the unity of the universe.21 Thus in the passage where he presents two alternatives, “either a medley and interlacing and dispersion or a unity and order and providence”, and expresses his satisfaction with the latter, the first alternative is a cryptic reference to the Epicurean theory of atoms, the second to the Stoic theory of the physical unity of the universe. This theory is expounded in a number of passages where, for example, he talks of the concatenation (episundesis) and mutual interweaving of all things. An interesting facet of Marcus’ exposition is the almost personal relationship implicit in such phrases as “dear 19

Belief of physici in the unity of all natural things: Cic. Div. 2.33. Physici has a wide reference in Cicero’s philosophical works: see Div. 1.112 (Anaximandros, Pherekydes), 2.30 (Demokritos), 2.28 (Thales, Anaxagoras), Tusc. 5.105 (Herakleitos), Fin. 5.13 (Straton). Cicero’s introduction of Xenophanes: Div. 1.5, Ac. 2.118. Views of Xenophanes: Ac. 2.118 (unum esse omnia), N.D. 1.28. Xenophanes in Diogenes Laertios: 9.19; cf. especially Epikt. 1.14.1, 5–6 (τὰ ὅλα), 9–10 (πάντα). Diogenes Laertios attributes the belief ‘that the universe is one and this finite’ to Poseidonios and to Antipatros of Tarsos and his disciples (7.140) and the belief ‘that the universe is one’ to Zenon, Khrysippos, Apollodoros of Seleukeia and Poseidonios (7.143). See L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd (eds.), Posidonius, The Fragments 2.1 (Cambridge 1988) 102–103, 107–108, 110–112 (commenting on their Fragments 4, 6 and 8). 20 Sumpathein: Epikt. 1.14.2, 5. Cicero’s equivalents for sumpatheia are coniunctio naturae et quasi concentus atque consensus, quaedam conuenientia et coniunctio naturae and continuatio coniunctioque naturae (Div. 2.34, 2.124, 2.142; cf. N.D. 3.28). Cf. Morlet 31 and n. 82. 21 On what follows see G.R. Stanton, Historia 18 (1969) 576–577 (= R. Klein [ed.], Marc Aurel [Wege der Forschung, 550] [Darmstadt 1979] 364–366) and (on M.A. 6.10) AJP 94 (1973) 363.

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to one another” and perceptible also in “breathing together and unity (henosis) of substance”. Another passage repeats “all things are mutually interwoven” verbatim from this one and calls the common bond (sundesis) sacred. Scarcely anything is foreign to anything else, for all things have been arranged harmoniously and together constitute the same ordered universe. Then Marcus revels in the strong affirmation of his belief in the unity of the universe: For there is one universe consisting of all, one God immanent in all, one substance, one law – the reason common to all intelligent creatures – and one truth, if indeed the ideal of creatures who share the same origin and the same reason is one.

This unity is expressed in different ways. Another example is: “all bodies pass through the substance of the whole as through a torrent in winter, bodies united in nature and activity with the whole as our members are with one another”. Marcus argues that the tendency to union increases as one advances to higher orders. There is more uniting activity among irrational creatures, with their swarms and flocks, than exists among inanimate objects, such as minerals and plants. Rational creatures form political communities, friendships, households, assemblies and so on. He asserts that progress along the natural scale was able to produce unity even among things which are quite separate, such as the stars, which move in concert. ‘Sympathetic connection’ is a standard means of referring to the unity of the universe, for Marcus as for other Stoics.22 Sometimes the unity of the universe is simply mentioned in the course of argument on other matters. At other times it is the focus of attention. For example, Marcus exhorts himself to think constantly of the universe as a single living creature, comprising a single substance and a single soul. The comparison is continued: the universe has a single feeling and a single impulse which embrace all things, so that all existing things contribute to what comes to pass by a process of causal necessity. The universe controls even the four basic elements. Although the elements of spirit and fire (in humans and in the universe) naturally tend upward and the elements of earth and water naturally tend downward, yet they obey the ordering of the whole and are held in position. It seems 22

Epicurean and Stoic alternatives: 6.10. Mutual union, interdependence, etc.: 6.38, 7.9 (quotation), 7.19.1 (where Koraes suggested μέλη for the μέρη of the manuscripts, no doubt in view of Marcus’ objections in 7.13); on the theory of ‘complete interpenetration’ of the whole see the papers arising from a seminar in Bruxelles in RPhA 24.2 (2006), 25.1–2 (2007) and in particular M. Nasta, RPhA 25.1 (2007) 87–111, especially 88–89. Increasing tendency to union with higher orders: 9.9.6–12; cf. V. Laurand, op. cit. (n. 18) 533–535. In 9.9.9 the manuscript A has δύναται, which is preferred by J. Dalfen, but ‘was able’ preserves Marcus’ contrast between an earlier golden age (9.9.6–9) and the present neglect of unity by humans (9.9.10–12); ἐδύνατο appeared in the editio princeps (T), based on a manuscript now lost. Sumpatheia: 4.27, 5.26; cf. V. Laurand, op. cit. (n. 18) 522–523. In general, see Bonhöffer 59–61; Neuenschwander 14–23; M. Lapidge, ANRW 2.36.3 (Berlin 1989) 1422–1423; J.M. Cooper, Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy (Princeton 2004) 346–351.

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that Marcus wishes to emphasise that even unrelated things in the universe, such as conscious beings and material objects, are held together by the principle of unity (to henoun). The belief in the unity of the universe is so well established that Marcus’ definition of the universe is inclined towards it: the kosmos is the all-embracing unity (to hen kai sumpan) in which all things that come to pass exist simultaneously.23 It is repeatedly stated by Marcus that all things are brought to pass in harmony with universal nature, or the nature of the whole (kata ten ton holon phusin), and in one passage this leads to specific advice. Not only does everything that comes to pass happen for our sake, but also what happens to each individual contributes to the welfare, completion and very permanence of that which administers the whole. So any complaint on our part spoils the perfect whole. The harmony of the universe is a preliminary to this conclusion. Just as in a pyramid all the stones fit together (sumbainein) or unite with (sunharmozein) one another in a sort of combination, so in the whole of things there is a single connecting harmony (harmonia mia).24 Ailios Aristeides brings in the harmony of the universe when speaking about homonoia to the representatives of the cities at the provincial assembly of Asia. He recommends the dominance of harmonia as the true adornment (kosmos) of cities, their greatest safeguard, their most beautiful appearance. The last phrase provides a link with the whole heaven and universe (kosmos), which has the most beautiful appearance and name of all things. Aristeides says that we are part of the divine politeia when the whole heaven and universe is administered by a single purpose and power of friendship (mia ... gnome kai philias dunamis). He goes on to use the harmony of the universe as an example. Sun, moon, stars, time – in all their movements harmoniai are preserved and agreement is victorious. We should imitate them, to our own advantage, by considering all of ourselves as a unit (hen ti) and by acting with a single purpose (mia gnome).25 In the Roman oration Aristeides accepts the tradition of the poets that there was stasis, confusion and disorder in the universe before the rule of Zeus. Similarly there was confusion in the world, but under Rome’s presidency disturbances and staseis have ceased and order of all things has entered. J.H. Oliver argues that it is a major theme of Aristeides that the Roman empire is a 23

Universe as a single living creature: 4.40; cf. 10.1. The elements: 11.20.1. Principle of unity: 12.30, accepting with J. Dalfen M. Casaubon’s emendation τὸ ἑνοῦν for τὸν νοῦν of the manuscripts. H. Schenkl and C.R. Haines adopt T. Gataker’s τὸ νοοῦν but τὸ ἑνοῦν has the advantage of neatly concluding the series of examples: ἓν ... μία ... μία ... μία. N. Méthy makes the point that the unity of the universe has as a consequence the unity of humankind: RBPh 72 (1994) 98–110 at 104. Definition of the universe: 6.25. 24 Harmony with universal nature: 6.9, 8.5, 12.26, etc. Advice not to complain: 5.8.2–5. 25 Arstd. 23.76–77. That the speech was delivered to the koinon of Asia meeting in Pergamon is shown by 23.7, 13, 32–36, 65. On the eminence of the three cities in the province of Asia, see Boulanger 11–19.

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world parallel to the kosmos, whose creation was due to the Demiurge. This is supported by the above passage, but one must be wary of reading cosmological overtones into every occurrence of such words as arkhe (rule, empire).26 It is, however, clear that Aristeides believes in the harmony of the universe and uses it to encourage harmony among cities and to praise Roman rule. The harmony of the universe is accepted also by the work On the kosmos falsely attributed to Aristotle. To the unknown author kosmos is both a system comprising heaven, earth and the elements within them and the order and arrangement (diakosmesis) of the whole (ta hola) preserved by God. The beauty of the universe is its good order, the accurate measures of time, the arrangement of the heavens and the movements of the celestial bodies. The elements are mingled with one another, there are similarities between phenomena in the air and those on land and sea, and everything is pervaded by breath and by the single power (mia dunamis) of God which orders (diakosmein) the universe. Even unexpected changes serve to bring the universe (to pan) into homonoia and establish it.27 As indicated in the previous chapter, the Hermetic writings use the universe to demonstrate the unity and uniqueness of the primary God. The harmony of the universe would be impossible, argues one treatise, without the one who is wholly one (pantos heis). There is, in fact, a predisposition in the treatises to believe that one God is responsible for everything. The parts of the kosmos are parallel to the members of God.28 The harmony of the universe is expounded in relation to such terms as harmonia, kosmos, ordo and ‘the order of the order’. It is seen in the circular movement of the spherical kosmos, in the union of the fixed stars and planets to the cerebral membrane of the kosmos, in the ordering

26 Confusion replaced by order: Arstd. 26.103 (ἀρχή occurs three times in this section). On the contrast between κόσμος and τάξις on the one hand and ὕβρις on the other, see W. Vollgraff, L’oraison funèbre de Gorgias [Philosophia Antiqua, 4] (Leiden 1952) 44–45. Roman empire parallel to the kosmos: Oliver 874–878, 883–884 and commentary (908–953) passim. Oliver shows Plutarch (e.g. mor. 317a–c, 330d and references to Lyk. and Numa on 881) employing cosmological parallels. Although he occasionally sees allusions to Plato which seem far-fetched (ibid. 917, 929), Oliver establishes that Plato’s Laws, Timaios and Kritias were influential in the Roman oration. P.M. Fraser (CR n.s. 5 [1955] 162) doubts whether Aristeides would have borrowed from a writer in such a different field, despite Plato’s influence in general and popularity in this period. But the material presented in this chapter suggests that writers of different kinds and of varying philosophical outlooks moved easily across the same territory. 27 Kosmos: mund. 391b 9–12, 397a 5–14. Ordering of the universe: 394b 10–12, 396a 28–32, 396b 28 – 397a 2, 398b 7–11. Homonoia: 397a 19–24; cf. 397a 3–5. On the harmony of the universe in this work, see also H. Strohm, MH 9 (1952) 147–158. 28 The one God responsible for the one kosmos: C.H. 11.8–11. See further chap. 5 at n. 37. Responsible for everything: C.H. 5.8, 10.25, 11.12–14. Parts of the kosmos: C.H. 12.21.

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of the sun, moon and stars, in human involvement in the kosmos.29 Behind the order of the universe God can be discerned. Indeed, God created, sustained and made immortal the kosmos, so that the whole body, enclosed in deathlessness, might never revert to its original disorder. The universe is pervaded by spirit and mind. Again and again it is asserted that all things are one; there is one order, one soul, one matter, one God. The kosmos has an order in which all individual things are assembled into a single whole by an artist’s reason and this order produces divinely musical harmony. Thus to know music is nothing else than to have knowledge of the order of the whole universe and of whatever God’s reason has allotted. Another way of expressing the mutual connection of all things with one another is by the idea of a chain which stretches from lowest to highest (mortal to immortal, sensible to insensible). Although all things are seen separately, they are in fact a unity (unum) dependent on the One and deriving from him. The ensemble of creation obeys the supreme governor and ruler. So, too, there is a continuous chain of events presided over by destiny, which in turn is bound up with necessity and order.30

The Harmony of Opposites The Harmony of Opposites

Related to the belief that all things are united in one is the concept of the harmony of opposites. Epiktetos defines education as “learning to wish for each thing just as it happens”. This immediately raises the question, how does each thing happen? “As the one that ordains has ordained them. He has ordained summer and winter, productiveness and dearth, virtue and vice and all such opposites for the sake of the harmony of the whole (sumphonia ton holon). He has given each of us a body, parts of the body, possessions and companions.”31 29 Terminology: C.H. 1.7–8, 1.14–16, 5.5 (αὕτη ἡ τάξις τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οὗτος ὁ κόσμος τῆς τάξεως; cf. mund. 391b 11), 9.8, 12.14; Asclep. 39–40. Evidence for harmony: C.H. 1.14–16 (cf. 26), 5.3–5, 8.4, 9.7–8, 10.11; fr. 29; Asclep. 22, 30. For the planets bestowing their distinctive traits on a single human being in fr. 29, see M.D. Litwa, Hermetica II: The Excerpts of Stobaeus, Papyrus Fragments, and Ancient Testimonies in an English Translation with Notes and Introductions (Cambridge 2018) 158. 30 Discernment of God: C.H. 5.3–5, 10.23, 11.8, 12.15, 12.21; Asclep. 39. God and the universe: C.H. 8.2–3, 11.3, 11.9, 12.1, 12.8, 12.15, 16.3; Asclep. 1–3, 6, 16–17, 19. Musical harmony: Asclep. 13; cf. 38. Chain: Asclep. 19, 39–40. 31 Epikt. 1.12.15–16. There is room for more work on Epiktetos’ theory of education. I have noticed comments on educational objectives, curriculum, teacher preparation and the role of the teacher, evaluation, and attitudes to slow learners and to those who would now be called ‘drop-outs’. Few of these topics are treated by I. Bruns, De schola Epicteti (Kiel 1897), T. Colardeau, Étude sur Épictète2 (Fougères 2004) 69–195 [= Part 2], G. Pire, Stoïcisme et pédagogie: De Zénon à Marc-Aurèle, de Sénèque à Montaigne et à J.-J. Rouseau (Liège 1958) 128–144, J. Souilhé (Introduction to his edition, pp. xxx–xlii), B.L. Hijmans, Jr., ῎Ασκησις: Notes on Epictetus’ Educational System [Wijsgerige Teksten en

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But the theory that opposites are designed for the harmony of the whole is not carried too far. When such opposites are placed in factual propositions, such as “it is day” and “it is night”, the propositions are rendered meaningless when united (although they are quite meaningful when separated). The limitations that Epiktetos places on the application of the idea of the harmony of opposites are made clearer by his discussion of paradoxes. Twice in book 2 he deals with the difficulty of uniting two things which seem incompatible. Philosophers have said that “we ought to do everything both cautiously and confidently”. In this context Epiktetos states firmly that “contraries by no means exist together”. Hence if we asked that caution and confidence be employed in regard to the same things, we would be justly accused of uniting things which are incompatible. Epiktetos explains the paradox in the philosophers’ statement by reference to his key principle of moral purpose. With respect to things outside the sphere of moral purpose (ta aprohaireta), confidence should be employed; but with respect to things within the sphere of moral purpose (ta prohairetika), caution should be employed. Caution and confidence are not employed in regard to the same things and hence we can be both cautious and confident at the same time. The other set of apparently incompatible qualities to which Epiktetos directs his attention is magnanimity and carefulness. “It is difficult to combine and unite these two things: the carefulness of the person who is devoted to material things and the steadfastness of the person who is indifferent to them. Difficult but not impossible”. Again, moral purpose (prohairesis) is decisive. What happens is a matter of indifference; but what use we make of what happens is important. Externals are not under our control, but moral purpose is. Thus we must use externals carefully, because their use is not a matter of indifference, but at the same time with steadfastness and mental calm, since matter is indifferent.32 Epiktetos, then, believes in the harmony of opposites; it is not a fully developed doctrine and it is modified by his discussion of contradictions and paradoxes. Moreover, he seeks to relate this belief to practical circumstances. The author of On the kosmos is very interested in the question, if the universe is composed of ‘opposite’ principles (dry and wet, cold and hot), why has it not perished long ago? This problem is only answered by the analogy of a Studies, 2] (Assen 1959) or Hadot (but see 63 on teacher preparation, 80–82 on curriculum and 226 on drop-outs). See also the comments by M. Spanneut, IL 14 (1962) 214 and the discussion by Long 43–53, 107–125. 32 Factual propositions: Epikt. enkh. 36; cf. 1.25.11–13 and K. Seddon, Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes: Guides to Stoic Living (London 2005) 135–136. Contrast the view, much earlier, of Herakleitos of Ephesos that ‘day and night are one thing’: see the opening paragraph of chap. 5. Paradoxes: 2.1.1–7, 2.5 (especially 2.5.1–9). For αἰών as the god Αἰών in 2.5.11–13, see R. Renehan, HSCP 67 (1963) 273–275 and G. Zuntz, Αἰών in der Literatur der Kaiserzeit [Wiener Studien: Beiheft 17; Arbeiten zur antiken Religionsgeschichte, 2] (Wien 1992) 37–38.

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city: no one wonders how a polis survives, composed as it is of very opposite classes and age groups. The most surprising thing about political and social harmony (politike homonoia) is that out of many diverse principles it achieves a single, homogeneous arrangement. In fact, nature seems to like opposites, for from them nature creates the harmonious (to sumphonon), homonoia in marriage, a single harmonia in music, and mixing of vowels and consonants in language. Similarly, by a mixing of the most opposite elements, one harmonia has organised the whole universe.33 One can find a belief in the harmony of opposites in other works as well. Plutarch, as we have seen, conceives of a harmony of opposites giving the universe a composite, complex nature due to its organisation out of elements. For the Hermetic writers the harmony of the universe is in part a friendship and mingling of opposites.34

The Universe and the City The Universe and the City

The harmony of the universe is often linked with the harmony of cities. On the one hand, the harmony of the universe is used as an incentive to harmony within the city or between cities. On the other, the city (polis) or a city’s constitution (politeia) is used to illustrate the harmony of the universe. Dion of Prousa, with his interest in homonoia among cities, stresses that the universe is dependent on philia and homonoia. In his discussion at Prousa of the settlement at Borysthenes he saw the universe as a politeia or polis administered by the best and fairest of governments. In his first speech on kingship he says that humans share a common nature with the universe, are organised under one ordinance and law and participate in the same politeia. Being thus united in the universe, people are law-abiding, god-loving and orderly if they respect and maintain this politeia, but lawless and disorderly if they disturb it. This applies to both private citizens and rulers; the latter should imitate Zeus and carry out their administration fairly. Ailios Aristeides also introduces the harmony of the universe in the context of homonoia (harmony is beautiful and so is the kosmos). He accepts a divine politeia administered by a single purpose and power of philia. By contrast with Dion and Aristeides, Plutarch, educated in the rhetorical tradition as they were, seeks to ridicule the Stoic idea that the universe is a polis; he apparently prefers to think of the universe as having a soul and a

33

Mund. 396a 33–397a 5. Plutarch: above at nn. 6–10. Hermetic writers: C.H. 11.7 (ἡ γὰρ φιλία καὶ ἡ σύγκρασις τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τῶν ἀνομοίων in relation to the sun’s light); cf. 3.4 (ἡ πᾶσα κοσμικὴ σύγκρασις), 9.7–8, Asclep. 25. 34

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body with parts, thus showing an inclination towards Plato’s ideas. Marcus Aurelius expounds the idea “that the universe is as it were a state (polis)”.35 There is some interest in examining the degree of realism with which these writers relate the idea of the harmony of the universe to harmony in and among cities. Marcus Aurelius in one passage applies his theory of the unity of the universe to the unity of humans in society. Just as a branch cut off from its neighbour is also cut off from the whole tree, so a person who breaks with another has fallen away from society as a whole. The branch is lopped off by others, but people who hate their neighbour sever themselves from the whole community. This claim by Marcus would be supported by few communities. He has not brought his theoretical discussion into contact with the realities of human society; he seems to be carried away by his biological imagery. Indeed, the attempt to apply the theory conflicts with another passage in which the tendency of human minds to unite is considered such that the experience of fellowship is never broken.36 As discussed in chapter 4, homonoia in the universe is used by Dion to fortify his advice about homonoia among humans and among cities. For example, in his speech at Nikomedeia on homonoia with Nikaia he asks: “What other than homonoia unites (henoun) the elements?” This is said to be one of the signs by which the gods teach us to live in harmony with (homonoein) one another. Again, in his speech at Prousa on homonoia with Apameia he encourages observation of the eternal and majestic order, homonoia and moderation in the heaven as a whole and in its components. The preservation of the elements, the predominance of ether, its appointed periods are all attributed to philia and homonoia. If such strong and great beings as the sun, moon, stars and planets co-operate and submit to their koinonia with one another, why cannot puny towns (polikhnia) of mere mortals and weak nations do likewise? Stoic terminology is used to describe the harmony of the universe. But he himself feels the need to apologise for the apparent remoteness and lack of affinity between the universe and human affairs. We may conclude that the idea of the harmony of the universe provided no more than inspirational force in his recommendation of homonoia among cities.37 Similarly Ailios Aristeides

35

Dion: 1.42–48 (cf. 36.13 for ἀκόσμως καὶ ἀνόμως applied to a city); 36.29–38 (cf. Schofield 84–92); also the first section of this chapter with n. 15. Aristeides: above at n. 25. Plutarch: 1076f–1077a; cf. SVF 2.645 and Schofield 76 n. 23. Marcus Aurelius: 4.3.5, 4.4; see Phronesis 13 (1968) 184, 187–191, Historia 18 (1969) 579–580 (= Marc Aurel [n. 21] 368–370) and chap. 4 at nn. 42–43. 36 M.A. 11.8 contradicted by 12.30. See Historia 18 (1969) 576–577 (= Marc Aurel [n. 21] 365–366). In his critique of this article in Historia 23 (1974) 255 B. Hendrickx justifiably suggests that Marcus’ imagery is biological, not botanical. 37 Speech at Nikomedeia: 38.11, 17; the elements are air, earth, water and fire (40.35). Speech at Prousa: 40.35–39. Stoic terminology: AJP 94 (1973) 360, with reference to B.F.

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uses the harmony of the universe as an example to the cities of Asia. He also, as we have seen, uses it to praise Rome’s administration of the empire.38 All the authors mentioned in this chapter believe in the harmony of the universe. It was an idea widely accepted among the well-educated under the Roman peace. On this topic it is not easy to separate philosophical writers from writers in the rhetorical tradition, nor to make divisions in terms of philosophical outlook. Marcus Aurelius, Plutarch and some Christian writers agree on the harmony of the universe.39 The On the kosmos, Dion of Prousa and Ailios Aristeides all connect the harmony of the universe with homonoia in a city or among cities. Moreover, while writers of the same tradition may share the general notion, there are significant differences of opinion on details. The harmony of the universe is accepted not only by Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius, but also by the pseudo-Aristotelian On the kosmos. Epiktetos says that all things are united in one and that things on earth are in sympathy with things in heaven. Marcus believes in the unity (henosis) of the universe and that all things are interwoven and interdependent. He builds a complex but purely theoretical structure of unity concepts; he is not even practical when he connects the unity of the universe with the unity of people in society. But the idea of the unity of the universe is not confined to Stoics, as the evidence of Cicero demonstrates. Indeed On the kosmos, although it disagrees with the Stoics over the number of elements and creates a picture of five spherical regions,40 accepts the harmony of the universe. The cluster of ideas relevant to the harmony of the universe found in On the kosmos as well as in the works of Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius means that these ideas cannot be used to support the idea of a special relationship between the ex-slave and the emperor.41 Epiktetos is closer to On the kosmos than to Marcus on the harmony of opposites. Epiktetos accepts this idea, applies it to several practical circumstances, but does not develop it fully. As far as I am aware, Marcus only mentions the harmony of opposites once, in connection with humankind.42 The author of On

Harris, The Moral and Political Ideas of Dio Chrysostom with Special Reference to the Bithynian Speeches (Thesis, Auckland 1966) 174 and n. 5. See also 1.42–43, 3.75, 12.34, von Arnim 365–367 and chap. 4 at nn. 22–26. Apology for this tenuous connection: 40.36. 38 See the end of the first section above. 39 Examples of Christian writers: Tatian, orat. 12.2–3; Irenaeus, haer. 2.2.4, 4.38.3; Clement of Alexandria, prot. 1.4.5–1.5.3. See also E. Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church [The Hibbert Lectures, 1888] (London 1890) 209– 213. 40 Mund. 392a 6–9, 392b 30 – 393a 9. 41 I argued this view with special reference to the cosmopolitan ideas of Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius in the last section of chap. 4. See also my earlier essay in Phronesis 13 (1968) 183–195; cf. P.A. Brunt, JRS 64 (1974) 6 and n. 30. 42 M.A. 7.48.

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the kosmos, as we have seen, is very interested in the harmony of opposites, linking it with the organisation of the universe. Plutarch, Dion and Aristeides agree on the harmony of the universe but disagree strongly on whether the universe is a divine politeia. There is a divergence too in the application by these three writers of the harmony of the universe to human life. Plutarch uses the idea to explain certain human experiences. Dion uses it to support his advice about homonoia among people and among cities, but there is a lack of logical connection, of which Dion seems conscious, between the metaphysical theory and the application. Aristeides also discusses the harmony of the universe in connection with homonoia among cities, but in addition uses the idea to praise Roman rule, which is said to have brought order to the world. Linked, perhaps, with the widespread acceptance of the idea of the harmony of the universe is the ready transition from terms such as homonoia and philia to others such as koinonia. In the expositions of Dion they seem almost to be interchangeable. Moreover, there is sometimes rapid movement from harmony of the universe to harmony in human affairs, and vice versa. The parallels came easily to the minds of writers of the first two centuries.

Chapter 7

The Early Christians: Distinctive Ideas The Early Christians: Distinctive Ideas

The early Christians had an ambivalent relationship with the Roman empire in which they lived. On the surface it would seem that they should have been accepted in much the same way as the adherents of other oriental cults. Jesus of Nazareth told his followers to pay to Caesar what belonged to Caesar (Kaisar) and the author of 1 Peter urged submission to Caesar (basileus) and his representatives, the provincial governors (hegemones).1 Yet the Christians found it difficult to engage in sacrifices for the well-being of the Caesar. By the early second century the rescript of Hadrian (the Caesar) to C. Minicius Fundanus, governor of the province named Asia, was singling out Christians for special attention. Pliny the younger, although he as a special envoy consulted Trajan (Hadrian’s predecessor) more than the latter desired, nevertheless acted on his own authority to put Christians to death. For him obstinacy (pertinacia) in a provincial, such as one who declined repeated invitations to make offerings of wine and incense to the Caesar’s image, was deserving of execution. Earlier, at the time of the great fire of Rome (64 C.E.), Christians had been convenient scapegoats, some of whom willingly confessed to arson and implicated other Christians. Whereas in the time of Claudius and Nero trouble concerning a certain Chrestus might involve conflict between Jews and Christians which Roman authorities could not be expected to understand, by the time of Hadrian and Minicius Fundanus Christians were clearly distinguished from Jews.2 In many respects Christians were like other inhabitants of the eastern

1

NT Mt. 22.21 = Mk. 12.17 = Lk. 20.25; 1 Pet. 2.13–14. For the use of the term hegemones in the first two centuries see chap. 2 n. 71. 2 Trouble concerning Chrestus (c.49 C.E.): Suetonius, Claudius 25.4; cf. Nero 16.2 for the form Christiani (punishment of them in 64 C.E.). Great fire of Rome (64 C.E.): Tacitus, Annales 15.44.2 (Chrestiani as scapegoats), 15.44.4 (arrest of those who confessed and who subsequently implicated others [deinde indicio eorum]); for the clearest exposition of the position taken in the text, and speculation as to why Christians should admit to being incendiaries, see J.H. Bishop, Nero: The Man and the Legend (London 1964) 80–88. Pliny’s execution of Christians (c.112 C.E.): Letters 10.96.2–3, 5–6; for Trajan’s frustration with Pliny’s enquiries see, for example, 10.40.1 and 10.76. Rescript of Hadrian to Minicius Fundanus (c.122 C.E.; for the date see W. Eck, Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian: Prosopographische Untersuchungen mit Einschluß der Jahres- und Provinzialfasten der Statthalter [Vestigia, 13] [München 1970] 192 n. 332, 193): Eusebios, h.e. 4.9.1–3 (for the view that

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Roman provinces. They could (like Jesus) be flogged by decision of a prefect or procurator (a Roman governor who might even be an ex-slave). They could be exploited by tax collectors who could call in soldiers to support them.3 And educated Christian provincials – at least Greek-speaking ones – conceived of the empire in much the same terms as non-Christian provincials. But their loyalty to a different world showed.

Tyrannius Rufinus inserted the Latin original into his translation of Eusebios – text in volume 2.1 of E. Schwartz’s edition of Eusebios [Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, 9.1] [Leipzig 1903] 319, 321 – see J.E.L. Oulton, JThS 30 [1929] 150–174 at 158–159 with 158 n. 2; for the view that the version preserved by Justin at 1 apol. 68.5–10 is authentic and that the version in Rufinus is a translation of Eusebios’ Greek see D. Minns in S. Parvis and P. Foster (eds.), Justin Martyr and his Worlds [Minneapolis 2007] 38–49). Needless to say, there is controversy about many of these details. For outright rejection of the Roman empire see the report of an African martyr who allegedly said at his trial on 17 July 180 that “I do not recognise the empire of this world (imperium huius seculi)” (Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs 6); the issues of identity raised by the martyrs on that day (cf. especially Scillitan Martyrs 9) are explored by M.P. Jensen, Martyrdom and Identity: The Self on Trial (London 2010). For the demand by Decius in 250 C.E. that inhabitants of the empire engage in sacrifices, see the certificates (libelli) collected in J.R. Knipfing, HThR 16 (1923) 345–390 (two specimens in English translation in J. Stevenson, A New Eusebius: Documents Illustrative of the History of the Church to A.D. 337 [London 1957] 228). It is not certain that the sacrifices (made even by officials of other oriental cults) were for the well-being of the Caesar (cf. F.J. Dölger, Antike und Christentum: Kultur- und religionsgeschichtliche Studien 3 [Münster 1932] 117–127). But prayer was offered for the Caesars by Polykarpos’ time (ep. 12.3, echoing NT 1 Tim. 2.1–2) and perhaps earlier: see S. Légasse, NovT 29 (1987) 236–253 and B.E. Bowe in J.H. Charlesworth et al. (eds.), The Lord’s Prayer and Other Prayer Texts from the Greco-Roman Era (Valley Forge, PA 1994) 85–99; cf. K. Berding, Polycarp and Paul: An Analysis of their Literary and Theological Relationship in Light of Polycarp’s Use of Biblical and Extra-Biblical Literature [Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 62] (Leiden 2002) 122. 3 The procurator of Iudaea (Antonius Felix) who kept Paul in prison for two years to perform a favour for the Jews – at the same time hoping that Paul would bribe him (NT Acts 24.26–27) – was an ex-slave, brother of the influential Pallas: Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 20.137; Tacitus, Historiae 5.9.3, Annales 12.60.4; Suetonius, Claudius 28; cf. F.G.B. Millar, Historia 13 (1964) 181–182. Tax collectors such as Zacchaeus (NT Lk. 19.1–8) were ultimately backed by Roman soldiers. For ways in which adherents of other religions were affected by the Roman empire see the papers in L. de Blois et al. (eds.), The Impact of Imperial Rome on Religions, Ritual and Religious Life in the Roman Empire: Proceedings of the Fifth Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200 B.C.–A.D. 476): Münster, June 30–July 4, 2004 (Leiden 2006), especially those in Part 2; also M. Beard et al., Religions of Rome (Cambridge 1998) 1.319, 337–348.

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The Unity of the Roman Empire and Christian Exclusiveness The Unity of the Roman Empire and Christian Exclusiveness

As we saw in chapter 3, many Greek writers saw the Roman empire as an entity. Often this empire embraced the whole inhabited world, as in the reference to Augustus’ decree in the narrative in Luke’s Gospel of the birth of Jesus (see below). Others, such as Diodoros of Sicily, did not view Rome as destined to unify the Mediterranean. But hyperbole was not lacking in some. Dion of Prousa did not hesitate to proclaim (when writing for Trajan) the unification of all humankind under the Roman Caesar. Plutarch’s hearth for all humankind implies that the Roman empire embraced all people. Ailios Aristeides, like the Gospel writer, conceives of the Roman empire (as contrasted with the Persian empire in his case) as co-terminous with the oikoumene.4 Like other Greek writers of the first two centuries, the early Christians expressed, though rather tenuously, a belief in the unity of the Roman empire. What was distinctive about their approach, however, was their tendency to subvert this belief by their adherence to another polity. It would be some time before they could be feared as constituting a state within a state. But from the first generation Christians saw their citizenship as lying elsewhere, ‘in heaven’. The early Christians wrote of the Roman empire as an entity, termed basileia or arkhe. It was controlled by the Caesars, who are referred to by such terms as Kaisar, basileus and autokrator – just as we have seen in Epiktetos, Plutarch and Dion of Prousa. The occurrences of basileus seem to reflect contemporary usage rather than the New Testament.5 Beginning with the New Testament the 4

NT Lk. 2.1 (n. 6 below). Diodoros Sikeliotes: see chap. 3 at n. 2. Dion of Prousa: 2.71, 3.6–7, 3.45. Plutarch: mor. 316e–317c. Ailios Aristeides: 26.59–62, 97–99. 5 Cf. chap. 3 n. 5. Καῖσαρ is the common New Testament term: Mt 22.17, 21 (= Mk. 12.14, 16–17 = Lk. 20.22, 24–25); Lk. 2.1, 3.1, 23.2; Jn. 19.12, 15; Ac. 17.7; 25.8, 10–12, 21; 26.32; 27.24; 28.19; Phil. 4.22. Σεβαστός is equivalent to Καῖσαρ in Ac. 25.21, 25; whereas κύριος in 25.26 refers to the particular Caesar in power. Καῖσαρ is taken up by, for example, M.Polyk. 8.2, just as Caesar is natural in Tertullian (nat. 1.17.2–4; apol. 21.24, 35.3–13; Marc. 4.38.3 [cf. NT Lk. 20.24–25]). Βασιλεύς: 1 Clem. 37.3; Claud. fr.in Eus. h.e. 5.5.4 (MG 5.1295A); Just. 1 apol. 17.3; Tat. orat. 4.2, 19.1; Thphl.Ant. Autol. 1.11 (cf. Palm 114); Clem. prot. 4.49.1. In the New Testament βασιλεύς refers certainly to the Caesar only in 1 Pt. 2.13, 17 (cf. Jn. 19.15; Ac. 17.7; Rv. 17.9). It refers to some of the Herods in Mt. 2.1, 3; 14.9; Mk. 6.14, 25–27; Lk. 1.5 (βασιλέως τῆς ᾿Ιουδαίας); Ac. 12.1 (cf. βασιλικός in Jn. 4.46, 49, probably referring to one of Herod Antipas’ officers [L.L. Morris, The Gospel According to John2 (Grand Rapids, MI 1995) 256 and n. 110, G.L. Borchert, The New American Commentary, 25A: John 1–11 (Nashville, TN 1996) 219–220; cf. G. Schwarz, ZNTW 75 (1984) 138, A.H. Mead, Journal for the Study of the New Testament 23 (1985) 69–72 and U. Wegner, Der Hauptmann von Kafarnaum (Mt 7,28a; 8,5–10.13 par Lk 7,1–10): Ein Beitrag zur Q-Forschung (WUNT, 2.14) (Tübingen 1985) 57–60, 69–72]; Ac. 12.20–21); cf. ὁ τετραάρχης or τετρααρχῶν in Mt. 14.1; Lk. 3.1, 19; 9.7; Ac. 13.1. It refers to Agrippa II in Ac. 25.13–14, 24, 26; 26.2, 19, 27. αὐτοκράτωρ: Athenag. leg. 2.5, 13.1 (the vocative αὐτοκράτορες addressed to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus; cf. inscr.); Mel. fr. 1.4; Just. 1

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empire was seen as co-extensive with the world: “a decree was issued by Caesar Augustus that the whole oikoumene should be registered”. Athenagoras alludes to the unity of the empire in praising the joint rulers Marcus Aurelius and Commodus for their peaceful and benevolent administration and for the fact that individuals possess equal rights and cities share in equal honour according to their rank. Athenagoras is, of course, intent on flattering the Caesars at the beginning of his Plea, but he goes so far as to claim that the result of their actions is that the whole world (he sumpasa oikoumene) under their intelligent control enjoys profound peace. It is, as the opening sentence of the speech says, their oikoumene. Justin Martyr, however, claims that Christians are the best promoters of peace – and thus, presumably, of unity – in the empire, because of their conviction that God punishes or saves in accordance with the worth of one’s actions. The unity of the empire is implicit but not prominent in Irenaeus’ statement that those who live under the empire of the Romans, though they have never seen the Caesar (imperator) and are far removed from him, know clearly from his dominium who it is that possesses the greatest power of leadership (potestas principatus). The existence of the empire as a unit is also recognised in Irenaeus’ forecast that the imperium that now rules will be divided among the ten kings of the Apocalypse.6 This concept of the Roman empire is not confined to Greek speakers. Tertullian often mentions Rome as dominating the world, but is eager to stress (in opposition to an argument found, for example, in Cicero) that this domination has nothing to do with the Romans’ attitude to their gods. He views the world as a highly cultivated estate of the Roman empire. He explains that the shock impending over the whole world is being postponed by the continued existence of the Romanum imperium and that this provides an important reason for Christians to pray for the imperatores and the stability of the imperium.7 On the other hand, these writers are well aware that apol. 21.3, 55.7; 2 apol. 2.8, 2.16. βασιλεία: Mel. fr. 1.7. ἀρχή: Mel. fr. 1.7 (cf. Wengst 7–8 with 172 n. 3). 6 NT Lk. 2.1 (πᾶσα ἡ οἰκουμένη); cf. ὅλη ἡ οἰκουμένη in Ac. 11.28 and ἡ οἰκουμένη in 17.6, 19.27, 24.5. L.T. Johnson, The Acts of the Apostles [Sacra Pagina, 5] (Collegeville, MN 1992) 205–206, 307 stresses the political connotations of οἰκουμένη in Lk. 2.1, 4.5; Ac. 11.28, 17.6, 24.5 and translates it by ‘empire’; cf. id., The Gospel of Luke [Sacra Pagina, 3] (Collegeville, MN 1991) 74 and J. Jervell, Die Apostelgeschichte [Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament, 3] (Göttingen 1998) 434. Athenagoras: leg. 1.2. Justin: 1 apol. 12.1. Power of leadership: Iren. haer. 2.6.2. Apocalypse: haer. 5.26.1, quoting Rv. 17.12–14 in order to expound OT Dn. 2.31–45 (cf. also Dn. 7.19–24). D. Minns in M.M. Mitchell and F.M. Young (eds.), The Cambridge History of Christianity 1 (Cambridge 2006) 265 notes the surprisingly relaxed attitude of Irenaeus to the empire and points to his statement about the peace established by the Romans enabling inhabitants to travel on the roads and by sea without fear (haer. 4.30.3; cf. chap. 3 at n. 22). (For much of Irenaeus we are dependent on a Latin translation.) 7 Domination: Tert. nat. 2.17.2, 2.17.18; apol. 25; pall. 1.2. For the contrary view see Cicero, On the Response of the Soothsayers 19. Estate: Tert. pall. 2.7. Impending shock:

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the empire includes a number of kingdoms, that people have loyalty to their patria as well as to the imperium and that provinces are a unit as much as the empire is.8 Although recognising the unity of the Roman empire, many of the early Christians were more concerned with an exclusive Christian citizenship than with their membership of the empire. A certain degree of cohesiveness, and at the same time exclusiveness, is implied by ‘Christian’ as both noun and adjective and by the abstract noun ‘Christianity’ as used by Greek writers such as Ignatios, Justin and Pantainos. The plural ‘the Christians’ might be thought of as describing the free citizens of a polis, much as Dion of Prousa might refer to ‘the Alexandrians’. The beginnings of this terminology can be seen in the New Testament where, however, ‘Christian’ appears to be a pejorative term applied to the followers of Christ by their opponents.9 Christian citizenship is apol. 32.1; cf. N.L. Thomas, Defending Christ: The Latin Apologists before Augustine [Studia Traditionis Theologiae: Explorations in Early and Medieval Theology, 9] (Turnhout 2011) 82 (referring to nat. 2.17). For Tertullian’s attitude to the empire, see E.A. Isichei, Political Thinking and Social Experience: Some Christian Interpretations of the Roman Empire from Tertullian to Salvian [University of Canterbury Publications, 6] (Christchurch 1964) 28–40; L.G. Patterson, God and History in Early Christian Thought: A Study of Themes from Justin Martyr to Gregory the Great (London 1967) 60–63; R. Klein, Tertullian und das römische Reich (Heidelberg 1968) 64–73; E.F. Osborn, Tertullian, First Theologian of the West (Cambridge 1997) 84–86. 8 Kingdoms: Iren. haer. 3.21.2; Tert. apol. 25.17. Loyalty to patria and imperium: Tert. apol. 50.10. Provinces: M.Polyk. 12.2; Apollonios, fr. 4 (MG 5.1384C); Tert. nat. 1.17.4; apol. 2.6, 37.5; Scap. 5.1. Compare the frequent references to provinces in the New Testament: e.g. Mt. 4.24 (despite the use of ὅλη, Syria here may exclude Palestine: W.D. Davies and D.C. Allison, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to Saint Matthew 1 [Edinburgh 1988] 417, based on Mishnaic usage in passages cited in their n. 8); Lk. 2.2; Ac. 13.4, 18.12, 19.10, 23.34 (ἐκ ποίας ἐπαρχείας ἐστίν); 2 Cor. 1.1, 2.13; 1 Th. 1.7–8; 2 Ti. 1.15; 1 Pt. 1.1 (perhaps not provinces, since Bithynia and Pontus are separated). 9 Χριστιανός (noun): Ign. Eph. 11.2; Magn. 4; Rom. 3.2; Polyk. 7.3; M.Polyk. 3.2, 10.1, 12.1, 12.2; Just. 1 apol. 4.5, 7.4, 12.9; dial. 63.5, 110.5, 117.3; Pantainos, fr. 2 (MG 5.1332A); Ep.Lugd. 3 (MG 5.1417A). Χριστιανός (adj.): Ign. Trall. 6.1; in Iren. fr. 13 (Χριστιανῶν ... κατηχουμένων δούλους) the word could possibly be interpreted as a noun. Χριστιανισμός: Ign. Magn. 10.1, 10.3; Rom. 3.3; Philad. 6.1; M.Polyk. 10.1; cf. D. Boyarin in L. Baron et al. (eds.), The Ways that Often Parted: Essays in Honor of Joel Marcus [Early Christianity and its Literature, 24] (Atlanta, GA 2018) 309–324. Cf. L.W. Barnard, Studies in the Apostolic Fathers and their Background (Oxford 1966) 22 n. 1 and Osborn, Justin 171–173. The usage of the corresponding Latin terms can be seen in Tertullian: mart. 3.1; nat. 1.3.2; apol. 21.24, 50.13; anim. 15.3; idol. 7.1, 13.6; fug. in pers. 10.2 (Christianus as a noun); nat. 1.8.9–10; Marc. 1.3.1; anim. 1.5; ieiun. 13.6 (Christianus as an adjective); praes.haer. 7.11 (Christianismus). ‘The Alexandrians (᾿Αλεξανδρεῖς)’: Dion 32.29, 31, 65. New Testament usage: Ac. 11.26, 26.28; 1 Pt. 4.16; cf. E.A. Judge, The Social Pattern of the Christian Groups in the First Century (London 1960) 44–45 = D.M. Scholer (ed.), Social Distinctives of the Christians in the First Century: Pivotal Essays by E.A. Judge (Peabody, MA 2008) 31–32. On the term ‘Christian’ as pejorative see H.B. Mattingly, JThS n.s. 9

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a recurring theme in 1 Clement. The Corinthian Christians are praised, among other things, for their extremely virtuous and honourable citizenship in the past; but now believers do not use their citizenship in accordance with their duty to Christ. God’s benefactions (euergesiai) will become a curse unless Christians strive to be citizens worthy of God and act in harmony (homonoia). Anyone who has been the cause of stasis, eris and skhismata among the Corinthian Christians should depart, for such a withdrawal is the action of true citizens of God’s commonwealth. Polykarpos promises the Philippian Christians that those who are citizens worthy of Christ will be kings with Christ subsequently. The whole of the first parable in The Shepherd of Hermas is dependent on the idea of Christian citizenship. The slaves of God are living in a strange country; their polis is far away from this polis. The writer asks: why make large investments in property here? will you renounce the law in your own polis when it conflicts with the law of this polis?10 The Letter to Diognetos denies that Christians differ from the rest of humankind in terms of country, language or customs. The real distinction is that, although living in both Greek and barbarian poleis, they are aliens (paroikoi) even in their own native lands. The nature of their politeia is strange for they have their citizenship in heaven.11

(1958) 26–37, especially 31–32 (though the suggested scenario lacks evidence); L.T. Johnson, The Acts of the Apostles (n. 6) 205; J.H. Elliott, 1 Peter: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [The Anchor Bible, 37B] (New York 2000) 790–791; P. Trebilco, Tyndale Bulletin 53 (2002) 243, 244 n. 22, 247. E.A. Judge regards ‘Christian’ as a Latin formulation which is “mildly contemptuous” in identifying people as partisans of a political leader: Tyndale Bulletin 45 (1994) 355–368 at 363 = The First Christians in the Roman World: Augustan and New Testament Essays [WUNT, 229] (Tübingen 2008) 431–441 at 437. In a later study (Tyndale Bulletin 56 [2005] 103–117 = The First Christians 553–567) Judge argues that Roman citizens are prominent among Paul’s associates; this might support the suggestion that Χριστιανοί was a Latin formulation. 10 1 Clem. 2.8 (πολιτεία), 3.4 (μηδὲ πολιτεύεσθαι); 21.1 (πολιτευόμενοι); 54.2, 54.4 (οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον πολιτείαν τοῦ θεοῦ). In view of O.M. Bakke’s interest in political terminology it is strange that he does not pay more attention to citizenship in this letter; cf. 145–146. Polyk. ep. 5.2 (ἐὰν πολιτευσώμεθα ἀξίως αὐτοῦ [cf. 1 Clem. 21.1], καὶ συμβασιλεύσομεν αὐτῷ). Herm. sim. 1, especially 1.1–6. The investments, especially those in land, would increase one’s glory, as C.A. Osiek makes clear: Shepherd of Hermas: A Commentary (Minneapolis 1999) 158; cf. Rich and Poor in the Shepherd of Hermas: An Exegetical-Social Investigation [Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series, 15] (Washington 1983), especially 39–57. For a discussion of the non-Christian values in sim. 1 see M. Leutzsch, Die Wahrnehmung sozialer Wirklichkeit im “Hirten des Hermas” [Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, 150] (Göttingen 1989) 192– 208 and, for the world-state model, 208–210. 11 Diogn. 5.1–5, 5.9. The writer seems to say that Christians have responsibilities as πολῖται but no privileges as ξένοι (5.5). For a similar usage of πάροικος in the New Testament, see Eph. 2.19 (n. 13 below), 1 Pt. 2.11. For the inferior status of paroikoi see J.H. Elliott, A Home for the Homeless: A Social-Scientific Criticism of 1 Peter, Its Situation and

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According to Irenaeus the citizens of the new covenant have as their mother city (metropolis) the church composed of the apostles and their fellow-disciples. This is a rather different use of the metaphor, to strengthen the idea that the whole church is agreed on the unity of God. There is a reference to Christian citizenship in the phrase “the sacred harmony of our citizenship” in Clement of Alexandria. Tertullian acknowledges that Christians are citizens (ciues) of the Roman empire (dominatio), but also asserts their citizenship in heaven. Moreover, after pointing out that they are spread over the whole world, he says that they acknowledge one overall commonwealth, the world (mundus).12 Now of course the idea of a citizenship exclusive to Christians is rooted in the New Testament. While Roman citizenship is referred to by politeia and a citizen of a particular city or country by polites, Paul says that the Christians are no longer “aliens and temporary residents” but fellow-citizens with God’s people and members of God’s household; their citizenship is in heaven. The writer to the Hebrews alludes to the same concept with his use of polis, patris (native land or city) and the phrase “the festal crowd and assembly of the firstborn registered in heaven”.13 Christian exclusiveness is reflected in other ways. For example, in contrast to the usage of Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius, when the early Christians talk about ‘the common good’ they refer to the Christian community alone.14 One may ask, then, what did the Christians see themselves as having in common? Strategy (London 1990) 24–30, 50–52. However, 1 Peter lacks the cosmological contrast of ‘heaven’ and ‘earth’: ibid. 39–48. 12 Iren. haer. 3.12.5. Without much justification (ὁμοθυμαδόν refers to the church in Jerusalem, as Irenaeus soon indicates by “this church, from which every church had its origin”) Irenaeus adds tota ecclesia as the subject of ἦραν and εἶπαν in NT Ac. 4.24. See Massuet’s note in MG 7.897D (n. 87). Clem. paid. 1.8.65.3. Tertullian: apol. 37.6 (suffudisset … dominationem uestram … ciuium amissio); mart. 3.3 (politia in caelis); apol. 37.4, 38.3 (unam omnium rempublicam agnoscimus, mundum). For the use of politia for πολίτευμα of NT Phil. 3.20, and the later gloss municipatus when Tertullian uses the transliteration politeuma (Marc. 3.24.3), see T.P. O’Malley, Tertullian and the Bible: Language – Imagery – Exegesis [Latinitas Christianorum Primaeva, 21] (Utrecht 1967) 42–44, 63. 13 πολιτεία: Ac. 22.28. πολίτης of a χώρα or πόλις: Lk. 15.15; Ac. 21.39; cf. Hb. 8.11 (quoting OT Jer. 31.34). Paul: Eph. 2.19 (not ξένοι καὶ πάροικοι, but συμπολῖται τῶν ἁγίων καὶ οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ); Phil. 3.20 (πολίτευμα; cf. n. 12). πόλις: Hb. 11.10, 16; 13.14. πατρίς: Hb. 11.14. πανήγυρις καὶ ἐκκλησία πρωτοτόκων ἀπογεγραμμένων ἐν οὐρανοῖς: Hb. 12.22– 23. See Dodds 20–21 on this sense of alienation from the material world. 14 Compare Epikt. 1.19.12–13, 4.10.12 and M.A. 3.4.1, 5.35, 7.5.2–3, 7.55.3 with 1 Clem. 48.6 (ζητεῖν τὸ κοινωφελὲς πᾶσιν), Ign. Philad. 1.1 (τὴν διακονίαν τὴν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀνήκουσαν), Barn. 4.10 (συνζητεῖτε περὶ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος). For an interpretation of Barn. 16.3–4 that would suggest a date for the document c.130–132 C.E. see R. Hvalvik, The Struggle for Scripture and Covenant: The Purpose of the Epistle of Barnabas and JewishChristian Competition in the Second Century [WUNT, 2.82] (Tübingen 1996) 17–23. For an earlier dating (96–98 C.E.) see J.N.B. Carleton Paget, The Epistle of Barnabas: Outlook and Background [WUNT, 2.64] (Tübingen 1994) 17–28.

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What marked them off from the rest of the inhabitants of the empire? Ignatios sees the Christians as having a common name, a common hope, one prayer and one mind; they derive unity from sharing the same bread.15 For Justin the Christians are one soul, one synagogue and one church; they bring what they have into a common stock and ‘communicate’ to everyone in need.16 Tertullian understands from Pliny’s well-known letter to Trajan that the Christians were united by a pledge of loyalty, forbidding murder, adultery and so on. In his own thinking the churches, though so numerous, have a single tradition of the same mystery. One faith, one god, the same Christ, the same hope, the same baptismal sacraments are shared by Greek, barbarian and African churches – indeed, they are una ecclesia, divided only by the body. Two believers in a marriage have one hope, one desire, one discipline, one and the same slavery, thus amply fulfilling the biblical statement about two in one flesh.17 Clement of Alexandria says that the excellence (arete) of a man and a woman is the same; the god and instructor of both is one, their marriage an equal yoke. One gets the impression that words like ‘one’ and ‘common’ are tripping off the lips of these writers in 15

Common name and hope: Ign. Eph. 1.2. One prayer, one request, one mind, one hope: Magn. 7.1 (addressed to the Magnesians specifically). One bread: Eph. 20.2. On the common hope see C.T. Brown, The Gospel and Ignatius of Antioch [Studies in Biblical Literature, 12] (New York 2000) 149–153, 208. There has been a revival in recent years of R. Joly’s attempt (Le dossier d’Ignace d’Antioche [Université Libre de Bruxelles: Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres, 69] [Bruxelles 1979]) to place the letters of Ignatios later, when Valentinian formulations had developed. See R.M. Hübner, ZAC 1 (1997) 44–72; T. Lechner, Ignatius adversus Valentinianos? Chronologische und theologiegeschichtliche Studien zu den Briefen des Ignatius von Antiochien [Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 47] (Leiden 1999); R.M. Hübner, Der paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert [Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 50] (Leiden 1999) 131–206; W. Schmithals, ZAC 13 (2009) 181–203 (placing the corpus in the principate of Marcus Aurelius); for a summary of Hübner’s and Lechner’s arguments see J.-P. Lotz, Ignatius and Concord: The Background and Use of the Language of Concord in the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch [Patristic Studies, 8] (New York 2007) 6–10. The down-dating involves drawing a gulf between chapters 9.1 and 13.2 of Polykarpos’ letter to the Philippians (references to Ignatios’ death or impending death). But no additional evidence has been offered to make the gulf wider. Further arguments against the later dating are provided by A. Lindemann, ZAC 1 (1997) 185–194, 6 (2002) 157–161 and by A.H.B. Logan, The Gnostics: Identifying an Early Christian Cult (London 2006) 10–11, 30 nn. 14–15. 16 One soul, etc.: Just. dial. 63.5. ‘Communicate’: 1 apol. 14.2 (ἃ ἔχομεν εἰς κοινὸν φέροντες καὶ παντὶ δεομένῳ κοινωνοῦντες). E.F. Osborn makes the point that the Christians shared a pride in the name that was despised, as well as a common danger (Justin 184–185). 17 Pliny’s letter (n. 2 above): Tert. apol. 2.6. Single tradition of the same mystery: praes.haer. 20.5–9. One faith, one god, etc.: uirg.uel. 2.1–2. One and only one baptism is stressed elsewhere as well: bapt. 12.3, 15.1–16.1. On the insertion of “one church in the heavens” into NT Eph. 4.4–6 in bapt. 15 see R.F. Evans, One and Holy: The Church in Latin Patristic Thought (London 1972) 9. Two believers in marriage: uxor. 2.8.6–8; cf. OT Gen. 2.24, NT Mt. 19.5, Mk. 10.8, 1 Cor. 6.16, Eph. 5.31.

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a rather blasé manner, particularly from Clement’s lists of items in the same passage (including “one church, one moderation, one modesty” and “common grace, common salvation”), each of which is described as ‘one’ (heis) or ‘common’ (koinos) or ‘alike’ (homoios).18 Similarly, in a passage mentioned in the next chapter Clement confirms that ‘common’ has little meaning by his rather vacuous statement that “the common salvation of humankind” is koinos in the sense that the faith of those who have chosen this salvation is koinos.19 The one thing that the early Christians are adamant in denying that they have in common is spouses. Theophilos of Antioch denies the charges of cannibalism, promiscuity, incest and common wives that are made against the Christians, though he claims that the philosophers are almost unanimous in recommending these practices. His defence of his fellow-Christians rests on their high moral principles.20 Clement of Alexandria condemns community of wives for all males as a perversion of koinonia. He reports that the gnostic Christian Epiphanes talks of the universality (koinonia, koinotes) of God’s justice in such a way as to conclude that wives should be common property. Indeed he blames the Karpokratians for the calumny that Christians extinguish the lamp and engage in promiscuous intercourse, thus providing Christian evidence that some people within the Christian orbit were guilty of the non-Christian accusations rejected by Minucius Felix.21 The idea of having things in common is already present in the New Testament. The letter to the Ephesians speaks of one body, one Spirit, one hope, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all. Christians share with one another a koinonia which is based on a common faith. Shared commitment led the Christian community, at least in Jerusalem, to hold their possessions in common. There seems to be no evidence in the New Testament concerning 18

Clem. paid. 1.4.10.1–2. E.F. Osborn suggests that this unity found among humans “points Clement to the ultimate unity of God” (Clement 215). Although she makes clear that for Clement in paid. 1.4.10.1–1.4.11.2 the same moral instructor trains both men and women, D.K. Buell believes that the metaphor of teacher as father (as well as maternal metaphors) enables Clement to construe Christianity as a unified whole: Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton 1999) 107–108, 130. 19 str. 7.2.8.1. See chap. 8 at n. 20. 20 Thphl.Ant. Autol. 3.4–6, 15. On this work see W.R. Schoedel, ICS 18 (1993) 279–297; M. Marcovich (ed.), Theophili Antiocheni ad Autolycum [Patristische Texte und Studien, 44] (Berlin 1995) 3–14. 21 Perversion of κοινωνία: Clem. str. 3.2.8.4–3.2.9.2, 3.2.10.1, 3.4.27.1–3.4.28.1 (κοινωνίαν μυστικὴν ἀναγορεύουσιν ἐνυβρίζοντες καὶ τῷ ὀνόματι). Epiphanes: 3.2.6.1– 3.2.8.3, especially 3.2.6.1, 3.2.6.4 and 3.2.8.1. Karpokratians: 3.2.5.1, 3.2.10. Minucius Felix: Oct. 9.2, 9.6–7; similarly Origen, Against Kelsos 6.27, 6.40. There is also in this period the admission of Christian involvement in idolatry (Tert. idol. 3.4, 7.1, 7.3). Tertullian claims, in line with Theophilos and Clement, that the Christians share all their earthly possessions except their wives; they give up their consortium where it is practised by others, that is, in the area of community of wives (apol. 39.11–12).

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community of wives; the insistence that bishops, presbyters and deacons be “husbands of one wife” shows only that some Christian men had more than one wife.22 Related to the idea of Christian distinctiveness are two other themes: those Christian qualities which bind the Christian community together and those qualities which give the Christian an harmonious life. Christian faith and love are linked by Ignatios with unity. While he prays for a union (henosis) in the churches which consists of faith and love, he makes it clear that the unity (henotes) of faith and love is the source for other Christian qualities, including homonoia. Moreover, Ignatios speaks of the Roman Christians as united to every commandment of Christ, in flesh as well as in spirit.23 The Shepherd of Hermas recommends homonoia along with faith, love and other personal qualities, and says that the church of God had, or will have, one understanding, one mind, one faith, one love, one body, one spirit.24 Clement of Alexandria attributes the situation whereby Christians really are brothers and sisters of each 22

NT Eph. 4.4–6. koinonia: Ac. 2.42 (ἦσαν … προσκαρτεροῦντες τῇ διδαχῇ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ); 1 Jn 1.3, 1.7 (κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν μετ᾿ ἀλλήλων); Phlm. 6 (ἡ κοινωνία τῆς πίστεως). Paul’s use of κοινωνός of himself in relation to Philemon (17) may not be any stronger than his use of συνεργός in Phlm. 1 or συνεργοί of Epaphras and others in 24; cf. 2 Cor. 8.23, Plu. mor. 45e, 819c. On the use of κοινωνία (only at 2.42 in Acts) in the New Testament see H. Seesemann, Der Begriff ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ im Neuen Testament [Beihefte zur ZNTW, 14] (Gießen 1933), especially 99–103; P.C. Bori, ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ: L’idea della comunione nell’ecclesiologia recente e nel Nuovo Testamento [Testi e ricerche di Scienze religiose di Bologna, 7] (Brescia 1972) 81–119; J.M. McDermott, Biblische Zeitschrift N.F. 19 (1975) 64–77, 219–233; G. Panikulam, Koinonia in the New Testament: A Dynamic Expression of Christian Life [Analecta Biblica, 85] (Rome 1979); J. Schattenmann in C. Brown (ed.), The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology 12 (Exeter 1980) 639–644; J. Hainz, Koinonia: “Kirche” als Gemeinschaft bei Paulus [Biblische Untersuchungen, 16] (Regensburg 1982); B. Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI 1995) 224– 225; J.R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in its Graeco-Roman Context [WUNT, 2.172] (Tübingen 2003) 295–298, 307–308. On the sharing of meals in Luke-Acts see J.H. Neyrey in id. (ed.), The Social World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation (Peabody, MA 1991) 361–387, especially 371–382, 385–386. Common possessions: Ac. 2.44–45, 4.32–5.11; cf. R. Pesch, Die Apostelgeschichte [Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, 5] (Zürich 1986) 1.185–188 and B. Witherington III, The Acts of the Apostles: A SocioRhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI 1998) 204–206. μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἄνδρες: 1 Ti. 3.2, 3.12; Tit. 1.6; cf. ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή in 1 Ti. 5.9. It is not clear whether these passages discourage serial marriage or polygamy. 23 Ign. Magn. 1.2; Eph. 13.1–14.2; Rom. inscr. (ἡνωμένοις πάσῃ ἐντολῇ; cf. συνευρύθμισται ... ταῖς ἐντολαῖς of the bishop in Philad. 1). For Ignatios’ use of ὁμόνοια, with its political overtones, see Schoedel 74 and J.-P. Lotz, op. cit (n. 15) 158–173. His use of ἕνωσις is more complicated (cf. Schoedel 105; in Magn. 1.2 he appears to pray for “a union ... of Jesus and the Father”). 24 Herm. mand. 8.9; sim. 9.13.5, 9.13.7, 9.17.4, 9.18.4 (ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ in 9.18.3– 4). The personal qualities issue in practical action such as looking after orphans and the

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other to their elect creation and their oneness of character (homoetheia), as well as the nature of their deeds, which lead them to think, say and do the same good works. The gnostic character of which Clement approves unites (henoun) knowledge, faith and love, and produces an harmonious life. The unity of the community based on Christian qualities is already seen in the New Testament, where Jesus states that his followers’ love for one another will be the sign of their discipleship.25

Christian Unity Christian Unity

In view of the exclusiveness of Christians and their awareness of those characteristics which distinguished them from others and bound them together, it is appropriate to discuss two distinctively Christian concepts of unity, the unity of the Christian churches and the unity of God. The unity of the Christian church in general will be discussed first, then the unity of individual churches. Connected with these topics are some comments on the structure of the church. Finally, inter-church relations must be examined. The Apostolic Fathers conceive of an overall unity of the Christian church and give little indication of disunity. Ignatios sees the resurrection as the means by which God set up a banner for Jew and Gentile alike so that they might be in the one body of Christ’s church. He speaks of the universal church (he

disadvantaged (ὑστερουμένους) and being hospitable: see mand. 8.10 (cf. sim. 9.27.2); B.P. Prusak, The Jurist 36 (1976) 89–126 at 105–115, 118; M. Puzicha, Christus peregrinus: Die Fremdenaufnahme (Mt 25,35) als Werk der privaten Wohltätigkeit im Urteil der Alten Kirche [Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie, 47] (Münster 1980), especially (on Herm. mand. 8.9–10) 13, 161–162. 25 ὁμοήθεια: Clem. str. 7.12.76.7–7.12.77.2. Faith, knowledge and hope are joined here, whereas in 3.10.69.3 the gnostic will bring knowledge, faith and love into a single unity (ἕνωσας τὴν γνῶσιν, πίστιν, ἀγάπην) and hence be single (εἷς) in judgment and truly spiritual. “Instruction harmonises (μεταρυθμίζει) the human, and nature by harmonising (μεταρυθμοῦσα) makes [the person?]” (4.23.149.4) is a quotation from Demokritos of Abdera, who uses μεταρυσμοῖ and μεταρυσμοῦσα (DK 68 B 33 = D 403 Laks/Most). On a harmonious life (βίον ... σύμφωνον), cf. the reference to Plato, Lakhes 188d in 2.22.131.5. Righteousness, according to Clement (4.26.163.4), is the harmony (συμφωνία) of the parts of the soul. The language of harmony or συμφωνία had earlier been used by Irenaeus: see haer. 4.14.2 and J. Behr, Irenaeus of Lyons: Identifying Christianity (Oxford 2013) 189– 192, emphasising the Armenian version. Tertullian speaks of God uniting the grace of faith with patience (pat. 6.5, using composuit). He also says that Christ is the only human example of the whole collection of spiritual credentials (Iud. 9.27: uniuersitas spiritalium documentorum). Jesus’ statement: NT Jn. 13.34–35.

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katholike ekklesia) and provides evidence (quite apart from his own correspondence with several churches) of close contact between churches.26 The Martyrdom of Polykarpos recognises in its address not only the ekklesia residing (paroikousa) in Smyrna or Philomelion but also the katholike ekklesia comprising all the congregations (paroikiai) in every place. There seems to be little or no difference between several phrases denoting the universal church; the tautologous nature of some of these phrases (notably “the whole universal church throughout the world”) suggests strong emphasis.27 A long parable in The Shepherd of Hermas at some points stresses the unity of Christians but at other points the rejection of members of the church (the tower in the parable).28 Perhaps the only suggestion of disunity between churches in the surviving writings of the Apostolic Fathers is the injunction to Christians in The Letter of Barnabas to join together and seek the common good. But even this is open to other interpretations.29 After the Apostolic Fathers there is considerable evidence of disunity among Christians. Serapion of Antioch addresses his audience as “brothers and sis-

26 One body (ἓν σῶμα τῆς ἐκκλησίας): Ign. Smyrn. 1.2. Universal church: Smyrn. 8.2 (where the term can hardly mean the complete church in one city: “let the congregation be wherever the bishop appears, just as ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία is wherever Jesus Christ is”); cf. Eph. 3.2 (bishops throughout the world). On this first use of ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία see M.J. Svigel in J. Baun et al. (eds.), Studia Patristica 45 (Leuven 2010) 367–371. Close contact: Magn. 15. 27 Local/universal church: M.Polyk. inscr. Tautologous phrases: πάσης τῆς κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας (M.Polyk. 8.1), τῆς κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας (19.2); cf. τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐκκλησίων (5.1), παντός ... τοῦ γένους τῶν δικαίων (14.1). 28 Unity: Herm. sim. 9.17.4–5, 9.18.3 (ἓν σῶμα in both passages). Compare the prayer in Did. 9.4 (for the eucharist, using the unity of the bread: K. Niederwimmer, Die Didache2 [Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern, 1] [Göttingen 1993] 187–188 = The Didache: A Commentary [Minneapolis 1998] 149–150) to the effect that the church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into God’s kingdom (the parallel prayer in 10.5 has “from the four winds”). Rejection of some: Herm. sim. 9.13.7–9 (the rejected ones are identified as Christians by allusions to NT Eph. 4.4, to 2 Cor. 13.11 and other passages with τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν and to Hb. 11.33 and other passages with δικαιοσύνην ἐργάζεσθαι: see the lists in N. Brox, Der Hirt des Hermas [Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern, 7] (Göttingen 1991) 414 nn. 32–34), 9.18.3–4. On the unity of the church in Hermas see L. Pernveden, The Concept of the Church in the Shepherd of Hermas [Studia Theologica Lundensia, 27] (Lund 1966), especially 103–105. 29 Barn. 4.10 (cf. n. 14 above on ‘the common good’). F.R. Prostmeier believes the echoes of ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνερχόμενοι in the New Testament (e.g. 1 Cor. 7.5, 11.20) point to a situation within a Christian community, perhaps meeting for the eucharist: Der Barnabasbrief [Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern, 8] (Göttingen 1999) 221–222. A similar injunction is put in the mouth of the messenger of repentance in Herm. sim. 9.31.4 (preserved only in a Latin translation): be of one spirit and get rid of these evil schisms.

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ters” (adelphoi), but reveals differences of opinion over writings falsely ascribed to the apostles and claims heresy is based on some of these writings. Furthermore, he attacks the faction (taxis) known as the ‘new prophecy’ and claims a united rejection of that faction by Christians throughout the world, although the only evidence he cites is the letter of Claudius Apollinaris. Hegesippos says that the church remained uncorrupted until some preached the false knowledge. He claims that heretical sects split “the unity (henosis) of the church” with their corrupting doctrines.30 On the other hand, Dionysios of Corinth speaks of close attachment (sunkerasai) between the churches at Rome and Corinth, while Tatianos calls the Christians “in agreement (sumphonoi)” in contrast to the Greeks with their conflicting doctrines.31 Justin asserts a social unity among Christians and shared possessions despite their different tribes and former desire for possessions. As we have seen, he claims that believers constitute one soul, one synagogue, one church. He accepts Tryphon’s definition of ‘Christians’ (all who are designated such from Christ’s name) and includes the followers of Markion in it, but he censures Markion and refers to his treatise against all heresies. To Tryphon he admits that a division exists among Christians about keeping the Mosaic law and he divides Christians into three groups, including a group of so-called Christians described as “godless and impious heretics”.32 Clearly there was in reality no unity among Christians as a whole. 30 ἀδελφοί as an address occurs three times in MG.5.1373B–C (Serap.Ant. fr. 2). Differences of opinion: fr. 2. ‘New prophecy’: fr. 1. With Serapion’s use of τάξις for a Christian faction compare Justin’s use of μερίς for the whole party of Christ (dial. 64.3: ἐν τῇ τούτου μερίδι). The false knowledge (τὴν ψευδώνυμον γνῶσιν): Heges. fr. 3 (MG 5.1320B). Heretical sects: frr. 3 (especially MG.5.1317A), 5 (especially 1321A–B, 1324A). 31 Dion.Cor. fr. 3 (Eus. h.e. 2.25.8); Tat. orat. 25.3–4. For discussion of the date of Tatianos’ Address to the Greeks see R.M. Grant, HThR 46 (1953) 99–101 (suggesting 177 or 178 C.E.), G.W. Clarke, HThR 60 (1967) 123–126 (doubting such confidence); L.W. Barnard, JEH 19 (1968) 1–3 (suggesting 160 C.E. or a few years before); W.L. Petersen, Tatian’s Diatessaron: Its Creation, Dissemination, Significance, and History in Scholarship [Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 25] (Leiden 1994) 73–74 n. 120 (supporting Grant); M. Marcovich (ed.), Tatiani oratio ad Graecos [Patristische Texte und Studien, 43] (Berlin 1995) 1–3 (suggesting c. 165–172 C.E.). M.R. Crawford seeks to find a unified person from the different pictures we have of Tatianos from his works and the variety of ancient comments about him: JThS 67 (2016) 542–575. For the development from Paul’s and Dionysios’ letters to Christians in a region (rather than a city) to the concentration on large metropolises essential to the more structured Christian church of the fourth century see C.J. Markschies, Between Two Worlds: Structures of Early Christianity (London 1999) 174–177. 32 Social unity: Just. 1 apol. 14.2–3; cf. dial. 117.1, 117.5 (Christians in every part of the world, and race, but the same eucharist), Ps.-Just. coh.Gr. 8 (harmony among Christian teachers) and L.W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought (Cambridge 1967) 129– 130. One soul, etc.: dial. 63.5 (n. 16 above). Χριστιανοί: dial. 64.1 (Tryphon); 1 apol. 7.3 with 26.6 (Justin). Markion: 1 apol. 26.5. Treatise: 1 apol. 26.8. Mosaic law: dial. 47.2–3. Division: dial. 80.2–5 (quotation from 80.3), despite the phrase ‘we Christians’ in 78.10.

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Irenaeus also makes claims about the unity of Christians. The unity of faith is based on the tradition stemming from the apostles: The church, although dispersed throughout the whole world to the ends of the earth, received from the apostles and their disciples the faith in one God the Father almighty ..., and in one Christ Jesus the son of God who was made flesh for our salvation, and in the Holy Spirit ...

The consequence is that “the whole church has one and the same faith in all the world”.33 Not only is this faith consistent in itself, it is accepted by the universal church, particularly the tradition of one God. Unity is implied by several means, notably by the idea of the worldwide church.34 But one must doubt these claims in the face of other statements by Irenaeus. He approves of the refusals of John the disciple and of Polykarpos even to communicate orally with Christians whom they considered heretics. He makes a distinction between the ekklesia and the Valentinians; those who agree with him comprise the ekklesia, those who do not are heretics and like a blasphemous and impudent sophist.35 Those who reject his view of the succession from the apostles are either heretics or schismatics or hypocrites; a severe judgment is forecast for those who tear

The movement from original unity to later complexity seen in 1 apol. 7.3 and 26.1–6 can be paralleled in the claim by the Platonist Attikos that philosophy was a unity with Plato but not later (fr. 1.2.2 des Places, from Eusebios, Preparation for the Gospel 11.2.2), as R.M. Grant pointed out: Gods and the One God [Library of Early Christianity, 1] (Philadelphia 1986) 170–171. T.J. Lang detected a previously unidentified allusion to Plato (Phaidon 97c; Kratylos 400a, 413c) in dial. 4.1: JThS 67 (2016) 77–96 at 77–81. For Justin’s teaching style and the circumstances in which he taught in Rome see the complementary articles by J. Ulrich (62–74) and T. Georges (75–87) in ZAC 16 (2012). 33 Iren. haer. 1.10 (quotations from 1.10.1 init. and 1.10.3 fin.). Examples of other claims to apostolic origins of the faith: 3.3.1 (traditionem ... apostolorum in toto mundo manifestatam in omni ecclesia adest perspicere omnibus), 3.3.3 (concluding that unam et eandem uiuificatricem fidem esse quae in ecclesia ab apostolis ... tradita in ueritate), 5.20.1 (eorum ... qui ab ecclesia sunt semita circumiens mundum uniuersum, quippe firmam habens ab apostolis traditionem, et uidere nobis donans omnium unam et eandem esse fidem). For the normative rôle of the apostolic tradition see D.L. Balás, Second Century 9 (1992) 27–39, especially 38–39; for the part played by these claims in Irenaeus’ view of the economy of God see Osborn, Irenaeus 87–89, 128–129. 34 Self-consistent faith: haer. 3.12.12 (unitas and consonantia of the two covenants); cf. Thphl.Ant. Autol. 2.9.1–2.10.1. Acceptance by universal church: Iren. haer. 2.9.1, 3.4.2, 4.19.1. Worldwide church: 3.12.7, 3.17.2 (the Spirit returning separated tribes to unity [ad unitatem] and offering to the Father the first fruits of all nations), 4.8.1 (the church as Abraham’s seed; so 5.32.2, 5.34.1), 4.21.3 (one cohort of faith; cf. Morlet 229). D. Minns points out that, although Irenaeus did produce new statements of the Christian faith, he assumed the essential sameness of the church in each of its local manifestations: op. cit. (n. 6) 262– 264. 35 John and Polykarpos: haer. 3.3.4. Valentinians not part of the church: 3.15.2. Those who disagree: 5.20.2.

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asunder the unity of the church.36 Irenaeus encourages anyone who agrees with him (the “truly spiritual disciple”) to join in condemning schism-makers, who place their own advantage above the unity (henosis) of the church. Further admissions of disunity can be seen in his call for peaceful rulers of the church and in his description of the body of Christ torn apart.37 The only occasions I have found on which Irenaeus takes a conciliatory approach are in two fragments preserved by Eusebios. In one he tells Florinus that the latter’s opinions are out of harmony with the church and he points to their mutual friend Polykarpos, who was conversant with the apostles. In the other he suggests to Victor, bishop of Rome, that far from being a reason for hostile relations the difference in the day of celebration of Christ’s resurrection strengthens the harmony (homonoia) of the faith; he cites precedents of peaceful relations with dioceses which disagreed. It is evident that Irenaeus had a different approach to Christian unity from that of Victor.38 But in view of Irenaeus’ attitude to those Christians whom he considered schismatics or heretics, his claims about Christian unity appear empty. Moreover, he uses his claims about unity as a propaganda weapon to attack his opponents. He alleges that the Valentinians disagree among themselves about some texts and claims victory for his side on the ground of a unity of belief in the uniqueness of God. But this unity of belief is necessarily limited to Irenaeus’ side of the argument. And there are other cases where he uses the unity of his own side to attack gnostic Christians and other so-called heretics.39

36

haer. 4.26.2. The groups are: (i) haereticos et malae sententiae; (ii) scindentes et elatos et sibi placentes; (iii) hypocritas, quaestus gratia et uanae gloriae hoc operantes. The punishment is that of Jeroboam in OT 1 Kings 14.10–16. Cf. S.L. Greenslade, Schism in the Early Church: Being the Edward Cadbury Lectures delivered in the University of Birmingham 1949–50 (London 1953) 21 for the blurring of the distinction between schismatici and haeretici. 37 ‘Truly spiritual disciple’: haer. 4.33.1 with 4.33.7. Peaceful rulers: 4.26.5, citing LXX Is. 60.17. Body of Christ: 4.33.7. 38 Florinus: Iren. fr. 2 (Eus. h.e. 5.20.4–8). Victor: Iren. fr. 3 (Eus. h.e. 5.24.11–17); cf. Polykr. fr. 1 (Eus. h.e. 5.24.2–8). Eusebios ends (5.24.18) by commenting on how Eirenaios (Irenaeus) lived up to his name by such exhortations. Different view of Christian unity: see R. Kereszty, Second Century 4 (1984) 202–218 at 215–216 and L.C.A. Alexander in A.A. Alexeev et al. (eds.), Einheit der Kirche im Neuen Testament: Dritte europäische orthodoxwestliche Exegetenkonferenz in Sankt Petersburg, 24.–31. August 2005 [WUNT, 218] (Tübingen 2008) 46–49. 39 Valentinians: haer. 4.35.4 (non iam unum sentiunt ... ; de eisdem uerbis non consentientes. nos autem unum et solum uerum Dominum doctorem sequentes ... de eisdem semper eadem dicimus omnes). Other uses of unity claims: haer. 3.3.4 (e.g. μίαν καὶ μόνην ταύτην ἀλήθειαν), 3.24.1. For the argument that haer. 3.24.1 is the first point at which we can detect that Irenaeus has access to Theophilos’ letters To Autolykos see A. Briggman in J. Baun et al. (eds.), Studia Patristica 45 (Leuven 2010) 397–402.

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Other writings of the period reveal many of the attitudes displayed by Irenaeus. Rhodon implies that some heretics are worse than others. Apollonios attacks Themison, who boasted that he was a martyr but bribed his way out, then taught new-fangled doctrines and blasphemed against God, the apostles and the church. Polykrates writes a letter of friendly disagreement to Victor of Rome; in his support Polykrates mentions some of the Asian bishops who met together (with Victor’s approval) and with whose consent the letter was written, as well as giving his own qualifications. The letter from Theophilos of Caesarea and the other Palestinian bishops who met with him expresses a desire for unison in the celebration of the passover and it cites the agreement of Christians in Alexandria.40 But these writers show nothing of the ruthless use against fellow-Christians of the claims to unity that Irenaeus makes. Clement of Alexandria implies there is unity in the church by comparing it to a human being composed of many members and by such terms as “ecclesiastical rule”. Unity is also implied by references to the church as a whole and to the diffusion of the Christian message throughout the whole inhabited world (oikoumene). Clement speaks of one flock, one body and one assembly, and one church.41 Christian unity is based on the idea that all have the same fellowship (koinonia) with Christ and is frequently expressed by the New Testament term ‘the unity of the faith’. Love restores the gnostic ‘to the unity of the faith’; the ancient universal (or Catholic) church gathers those predestined by God

40

Rhod. frr. ap. Eus. h.e. 5.13. Apollon. fr. 3 (Eus. h.e. 5.18.5); cf. the attitude to deniers in Ep.Lugd. 13 (MG 5.1440A–B). Polykr. frr. 1–2 ap. Eus. h.e. 5.24 (MG 5.1357B–1361B; for his qualifications, ibid. 1360A–1361A). Thphl. Caes. fr. ap. Eus. h.e. 5.25 (MG 5.1369D– 1372A). 41 Body metaphor: Clem. paid. 1.6.38.2, giving a metaphorical interpretation of NT Jn. 6.53. Compare the dragnet and building metaphors at the beginning of fr. I (p.203.13–16 Stählin/Früchtel). For Clement’s attitude to the body see M. Pujiula, Körper und christliche Lebensweise: Clemens von Alexandreia und sein Paidagogos [Millennium-Studien, 9] (Berlin 2006), especially sections 3.1, 3.4, 4 and 5. ὁ ἐκκλησιαστικὸς κανών: str. 6.15.125.2–3, 7.15.90.2; ἡ ἐκκλησιαστικὴ παράδοσις: str. 7.16.95.1. But compare the stress on ecclesiastical orthodoxy in 7.16.104.1–2, where παράδοσις is again mentioned. The church as a whole: paid. 2.8.71.2 (τῆς συμπάσης ἐκκλησίας); str. 6.14.114.2 (ἡ πᾶσα ἐκκλησία). Worldwide diffusion: str. 6.18.167.3; fr. VII (p.226.4–5 Stählin/Früchtel). One flock: paid. 1.7.53.3 (quoting NT Jn. 10.16); str. 1.26.169.2; cf. prot. 9.88.2, where Stählin suggests ἀγέλην for ἀγάπην. One body and one assembly: str. 5.6.35.4 (ἓν σῶμα καὶ σύνοδον μίαν); fr. III (p.218.28–29 Stählin/Früchtel: σύνοδον πίστεως). One church: paid. 1.4.10.2 (above, at n. 18); str. 3.10.70.1 (where ἡ μία ἐκκλησία = ἡ ὁμόνοια τῶν πολλῶν; cf. ἁρμονία in fr. III [p.219.1]), 7.17.107.3.

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‘into the unity of the one faith’, this unity (henotes) deriving from the one covenant put forward in different forms by the one God.42 On the other hand, Clement readily admits the existence of Christian sects. Admission of disunity is also implicit in his encouragement to attain unity: Let us, who are many, hasten to be gathered together into one love in accordance with the unity (henosis) of the single essence (monadike ousia). Similarly, let us through performing good works pursue unity (henosis), seeking the good monad [i.e. God]. Unity out of many draws a divine harmonia from many scattered sounds and becomes one sumphonia, following one chorus-leader and teacher, the Word.

He attacks other Christians on the question of community of wives. He applies ekklesia (variously described, but often older than the sects) to his own side and asserts that heretics hold only “human assemblies”. His claim is that the true church – the really ancient church – is one. Like God it is praised for its singleness (monosis), yet heretics strive to cut it into many sects. “In substance, conception, origin and pre-eminence the ancient and universal church is alone in gathering into the unity of the one faith those ordained by God.” The preeminence of the church lies in its surpassing all other things in oneness (monas).43 Here Clement is laying it on so thickly that the terms for ‘unity’ and ‘oneness’ (henotes, monosis, monas, to hen) are almost compliments in themselves. But we note Clement using claims to unity in much the same way as Irenaeus, to attack dissenters. Clement is not alone in his age. Tertullian also makes claims about Christian unity using, for example, the body metaphor. The assemblage of Christians is the sum of its parts, being just as good or evil as its members are separately. Although he decries the word factio (clique, party) here, he elsewhere asserts

42 Unity with Christ: paid. 1.6.30.2–1.6.31.1 (going on to cite NT Gal. 3.26–28 and 1 Cor. 12.13); cf. D.K. Buell, Making Christians (n. 18) 134–135 and M. Pujiula, op. cit. (n. 41) 88–89. References to NT Eph. 4.13 (εἰς τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς πίστεως): paid. 1.5.18.3–4; str. 4.8.67.1, 4.21.132.1, 6.11.87.2 (associated with oneness, μονάς), 6.13.106.3–6.13.107.2, 7.6.34.2; cf. 5.1.2.2 on “the agreement and harmony of the faith of both [teacher and learner] (ἡ συνῳδία καὶ ἡ συμφωνία τῆς ἀμφοῖν πίστεως)”. See Osborn, Clement 161 on the importance of this verse for Clement. Restoration of the gnostic: str. 6.9.73.3 (on the importance of γνῶσις see 6.10). Catholic/universal church: str. 7.17.107.3–6. Contexts such as 7.17.106–107 are transitional, allowing the sense ‘the Catholic church’ as well as ‘the universal church’ to make the point. By contrast ἡ κλῆσις ἡ καθολική in 6.17.159.9 can only refer to the ‘universal’ calling. 43 Christian sects: str. 1.19.95.4–7, 7.17.106.4–7.17.107.1. Unity out of many: prot. 9.88.2–3 (quotation); by contrast, in paid. 1.8.71.1 God is above the monad. Community of wives: str. 3.2.5.1, 3.2.10. Ekklesia: str. 1.19.95.6 (τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ... ἐκκλησίαν), 7.17.106.3 (μεταγενεστέρας τῆς καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας συνηλύσεις πεποιήκασιν), 7.17.107.2 (ἐκ τῆς προγενεστάτης καὶ ἀληθεστάτης ἐκκλησίας τὰς μεταγενεστέρας ταύτας ...), 7.17.107.3–5 (quotation from 7.17.107.5); cf. Osborn, Clement 213–215.

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unity among Christians as part of the positive goodness of the Christiana factio. At least one practical means, the bond of hospitality, is claimed to prove their unity. Another practical step was to permit lay people to baptise, but with care, because emulation of the bishop’s office is the mother of schisms.44 But Tertullian’s clear distinctions between apostolic and heretical churches can be seen as admissions of disunity. He claims unitas for his group of Christians in their fastings, xerophagies and stations, but he is obviously arguing against another Christian group which holds fasts at the decree of its own bishop. He denies baptism to those he regards as heretics, as well as the scriptures (on the ground that they pervert the scriptures). He will not accept their use of the claim to unity, although he himself says that the number and status of the churches which agree with him demonstrate a unity of tradition, not of error.45 So, despite Tertullian’s optimistic assertions of Christian unity, there is a determined and successful division of Christians when he approaches practical instruction and action. Many of the attitudes to Christian unity displayed by patristic writers can be shown to have existed, in the same or a nuclear form, in the New Testament. The background to the second-century claim about the universality of the Christian message is Christ’s instruction to the Eleven to make all nations his disciples and Paul hints at the widespread distribution of Christians with his phrase “all those who invoke the name of our Lord Jesus Christ in every place”.46 Jesus suggests a close association among those who do the will of God (they will each be his brother, sister or mother) and tells his followers they are brothers and sisters (adelphoi) of one another. The Christians of the New Testament frequently refer to one another as ‘brothers and sisters’; the noun

44

Body metaphor: Tert. paen. 10.5 (alluding to NT 1 Cor. 12.26); res.mort. 45.7 (quoting Eph. 4.25); pudic. 16.8–9 (referring to 1 Cor. 6.15–17). For Tertullian’s use of metaphor (not including the body metaphor) see T.P. O’Malley, op. cit. (n. 12) 67–116. coitio Christianorum: apol. 39.20–40.1 (curia is more appropriate than factio, though haec secta is not considered too offensive in Scap. 5.4; on the rhetorical structure of ad Scapulam see G.D. Dunn, VChr 56 (2002) 47–55). Unity part of the goodness of the Christiana factio: apol. 39.1; cf. N.L. Thomas, op. cit. (n. 7) 74–75. contesseratio hospitalitatis: praes.haer. 20.8. Baptism: bapt. 17.1–2. 45 Apostolic vs. heretical: Marc. 3.1.2, 4.5.3. Unitas: ieiun. 13.3–5. For Tertullian’s continuing affirmation that the church is one, holy, catholic and apostolic, despite his association with the ‘new prophecy’, see D.I. Rankin, Tertullian and the Church (Cambridge 1995) 91– 110. Denial to ‘heretics’: bapt. 15.2 (baptism), praes.haer. 15–19 (scriptures; cf. E.F. Osborn, Tertullian [n. 7] 43–44 and n. 73); praes.haer. 42.6 (claim to unity). Use of tradition: praes.haer. 28.1, 3; cf. R.F. Evans, op. cit. (n. 17) 25–26 and Osborn, Tertullian 180. 46 Instruction: NT Mt. 28.19 (πάντα τὰ ἔθνη); the version in Mk. 16.15 (τὸν κόσμον ἅπαντα) is probably part of a later addition. For the comprehensiveness of ‘all nations’ – including Israel as in LXX Dan. 7.14 and NT Lk. 24.47 – see W.D. Davies and D.C. Allison, op. cit. (n. 8) 3 (Edinburgh 1997) 684. Paul: 1 Cor. 1.2.

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adelphotes (‘brother/sisterhood’) and the address ‘beloved’ have a similar connotation. There are, then, well-established precedents for the use of adelphoi by patristic writers.47 Jesus’ stress on ‘one flock’ is taken up by some of them. Some phrases in Paul’s letter to the Galatian churches, and the repeated use of hairesis (sect) and he hodos (‘the Way’), suggest the unity of Christians. There are also in the New Testament straightforward claims of unity and some signs of practical action to support it. Thus the church at Antioch sends relief to the Christians in Iudaea.48 Two metaphors strengthen this picture. The metaphor of the building in Ephesians must refer to the church; the whole building is bonded together in its foundation stone, Jesus Christ. Similarly the body metaphor, although developed in letters sent to separate churches, at times seems to refer to Christians as a whole. When Paul says that Christians, united in Christ, are like a single body with many parts, each performing a different function, the functions listed (prophecy, teaching and so on) clearly refer to the local Christian community.49 47

Close association: Mt. 12.46–50 = Mk. 3.31–35 = Lk. 8.19–21; cf. Jn. 15.14 (φίλοι). To Jesus’ followers (the crowds and his disciples): Mt. 23.8–9. ἀδελφοί: e.g. Jn. 21.23; Ac. 1.15, 11.1; 1 Cor. 5.11; Eph. 6.23; Phil. 1.14; 1 Th. 4.10; Hb. 3.1. ἀδελφότης: 1 Pt. 2.17, 5.9. ἀγαπητοί: e.g. Rom. 12.19; 2 Cor. 7.1; Hb. 6.9; 1 Pt. 2.11; 1 Jn. 2.7; Jd. 3. The combination ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί occurs in 1 Cor. 15.58; Phil. 4.1; Js. 1.16, 1.19, 2.5. Patristic writers: Serap.Ant. fr. 2 (three times); Clem. str. 7.12.77.1. The Latin usage is comparable: fratres (e.g. Tert. mart. 1.1; apol. 39.8 [Christians cause offence to others by calling one another ‘brothers and sisters’]; fraternitas (e.g. Tert. praes.haer. 20.8; uxor. 2.3.1). 48 μία ποίμνη (Jn. 10.16; cf. τὸ ποίμνιον in LXX Jer. 13.17 and Zech. 10.3) is taken up by Clem. paid. 1.7.53.3; str. 1.26.169.2; Tert. pudic. 7.4 and possibly Clem. prot. 9.88.2 (n. 41 above). Galatian churches: NT Gal. 3.28 (Paul and the Galatians both incorporated in Christ), 6.10 (those who belong to the household of faith). αἵρεσις is the Jewish term for the sect of the Nazarenes: Ac. 24.5, 28.22. Paul substitutes for αἵρεσις the word ὁδός in Ac. 24.14; cf. 9.2, 19.9, 19.23, 22.4, 24.22. Claims of unity: Ac. 4.32 (unity of heart and soul; cf. 2.1, 2.46, 5.11 [ὅλη ἡ ἐκκλησία], 6.2); Gal. 3.28 (Christianity breaks down distinctions of race and status, but a barrier is raised between Christians and non-Christians; for an example of a practical barrier, see 2 Cor. 6.14–7.1). Practical action: Ac. 2.44–45, 4.34–37 (common possessions and a distribution); 11.29–30 (Antioch sends relief); cf. Paul’s advice in Eph. 4.25. 49 Building metaphor: Eph. 2.19–22; note “members of God’s household” in 19. οἶκος sometimes indicates the existence of a local church: Rom. 16.5, 1 Cor. 16.19, Col. 4.15, Phlm. 2; sometimes the wider church: 1 Ti. 3.15; Hb. 3.6. Note also the use of οἰκία in 2 Jn. 10 and of οἱ οἰκεῖοι in Gal. 6.10 (previous note). See H.O. Maier, The Social Setting of the Ministry as Reflected in the Writings of Hermas, Clement and Ignatius [Dissertations SR, 1] (Waterloo, Ont. 1991) 4–5, 29–54; R.J. Banks, Paul’s Idea of Community: The Early House Churches in their Cultural Setting2 (Peabody, MA 1994), especially 31–33, 38, 47–50; J.R. Harrison, RThR 58 (1999) 31–47; C. Osiek and M.Y. MacDonald, A Woman’s Place: House Churches in Earliest Christianity (Minneapolis 2006). For an interpretation of the pre-Christian inscription SIG3 985 (= F. Sokolowski, Lois sacrées de l’Asie Mineure [École Française d’Athènes: Travaux et Mémoires, 9] [Paris 1955] 53–58 no. 20) as regulations for the celebration of cult in a large oikos, in which the status of women and slaves is reinforced rather

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But when he speaks of many Christians as one body, he has in mind not only the unity of the local church but also the unity between Christians in quite separate places. Christ is compared to one body composed of Christians, whether Jew or Greek, slave or free; no member is dispensable and each has its function.50 The various talents of apostles, prophets and others build up the body of Christ; the functioning of the different parts should lead to unity of the whole. Here and in other passages the position of Christ as head of the body is stressed.51 It is recognised that the church in the overall sense (for example, as Christ’s body) is composed of a number of local congregations or churches. Many of the New Testament documents use ekklesia both of the universal church and of the church in a particular locality.52 This dual usage is adopted by patristic writers and can be demonstrated in Ignatius, The Martyrdom of Polykarpos, Irenaeus, the letter from the churches at Vienne and Lugdunum,

than improved, see S.K. Stowers in A.J. Malherbe et al. (eds.), The Early Church in its Context: Essays in Honor of Everett Ferguson [Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 90] (Leiden 1998) 287–301; cf. E. Lupu, Greek Sacred Law: A Collection of New Documents [Religions in the Graeco-Roman World, 152] (Leiden 2005) 89. Body metaphor: Rom. 12.3–8. 50 One body: 1 Cor. 10.17; Col. 3.15 (members of the one body called to Christ’s peace); cf. Eph. 4.25, Col. 1.24, 3.11. Functions: 1 Cor. 12.12–31; 14.1–6 lists the gifts that are preferable. For the view that speaking in tongues in 1 Corinthians is the same phenomenon as in Acts 2 see G.J. Lockwood, 1 Corinthians (St. Louis, MO 2000) 433–438. 51 Unity of the whole: Eph. 4.1–16, especially τὴν ἑνότητα τοῦ πνεύματος (4.3), ἓν σῶμα καὶ ἓν πνεῦμα κτλ. (4.4–6), εἰς τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς πίστεως (4.13). Christ as head: Eph. 1.22 (supreme head for the church), 4.16 (the whole body dependent on the head); Col. 1.18, 1.24, 2.18–19 (the whole body, the church, receives its ligaments from and is knit together by the head). On the ‘body’ in Colossians see J.D.G. Dunn in T.E. Schmidt and M. Silva (eds.), To Tell the Mystery: Essays on New Testament Eschatology in Honor of Robert H. Gundry [Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series, 100] (Sheffield 1994) 163– 181. 52 Mt. 16.18, 18.17; Ac. 8.1, 9.31 (cf. R. Pesch, op. cit. [n. 22] 314, B. Witherington, Acts [n. 22] 326; L.C.A. Alexander, op. cit. [n. 38] 52, 56, 65, 67; against, J. Jervell, op. cit. [n. 6] 294); 1 Cor. 1.2, 15.9; Gal. 1.2, 1.13; Phil. 3.6, 4.15; Col. 1.18, 4.16. In none of these cases is there a direct contrast between ‘universal’ and ‘local’ as there is in M.Polyk. inscr. (n. 27 above) or Zosimos of Panopolis, Genuine Memoirs 1.7 (in M. Mertens, Les alchimistes grecs 4.1 [Paris 1995] p.3.56). The lack of contrast offers an explanation as to why the New Testament writers do not use qualifying terms such as καθολικός and μερικός. For a contrary view, criticising the distinction between ‘universal’ and ‘local’ church in New Testament interpretation, see E.A. Judge, RThR 22 (1963) 65–76 at 66, 74–75 = The First Christians in the Roman World (n. 9) 586–596 at 586–587, 594–595 and P.T. O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians (Grand Rapids, MI 1991) 376–378; for a more traditional view see I.H. Marshall, The Expository Times 84 (1972–1973) 359–364 at 362–363 and J.D.G. Dunn in A.A. Alexeev et al. (eds.), op. cit. (n. 38) 11–13 (see also the classification of occurrences and discussion by S. Tofană in the same volume, 33–44).

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Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian. Sometimes the two meanings are used close together.53 Concern over unity and suggestions of division are also present from the beginning of Christianity. Jesus tells his disciples to be at peace with one another; their love for one another will be a sign of their discipleship. He prays for unity among his disciples as strong as his own union with God the Father and later extends this prayer for unity to all future believers.54 One may suspect division where philadelphia (love of fellow believers) is urged on groups of Christians. Disunity is implied by “false brothers and sisters”, by the desire that the whole audience be “of one mind” and the like, and by several appeals for agape (love) and henotes (unity).55 More ruthless action against Christians who disagree with the writer is suggested in some places. If “the chosen lady” in the second letter of John refers to a Christian community, then the elder is intent on keeping out of the church (oikia) any who disagree on doctrine. The third letter shows the elder trying to interfere in the church of Diotrephes, where there is a division between the elder’s supporters and Diotrephes, who is trying 53

Ign. Eph. inscr., Smyrn. 1.2 (cf. 8.2); M.Polyk. inscr., 5.1, 8.1; Iren. haer. 1.10.1, 5.34.3; Ep.Lugd. 4 (MG 5.1420A), 13 (MG 5.1440B); Clem. paid. 2.8.71.2, str. 3.12.79.6; Tert. praes.haer. 20.4–8; pudic. 21.7. Close together: Iren. haer. 3.3.1–4; 3.12.5, 7; Clem. str. 4.9.73.5, 4.9.75.1; Tert. uxor. 2.8.3, 2.8.8; uirg.uel. 2.1–2. 54 Peace: NT Mk. 9.50. Sign of discipleship: Jn. 13.34–35. Prayer: Jn. 17.11, 20–23. On unity among Christ’s disciples and his union with the Father in this departing prayer see M.L. Appold, The Oneness Motif in the Fourth Gospel: Motif Analysis and Exegetical Probe into the Theology of John [WUNT, 2.1] (Tübingen 1976), chap. 7. J. Painter, The Idea of Knowledge in the Johannine Gospel and Epistles (Thesis, Durham 1968) 79 (cf. id. The Quest for the Messiah: The History, Literature and Theology of the Johannine Community2 [Edinburgh 1993] 50) points out the linguistic similarity between the NT phrases ὦσιν ... εἰς ἕν (Jn. 17.23) and συναγάγῃ εἰς ἕν (Jn. 11.52) and the language of the Qumran sect: lihyoth leyakhadh (1 QS 5.2), behe’aspham leyakhadh (1 QS 5.7). For the text see J.H. Charlesworth (ed.), The Dead Sea Scrolls 1 (Tübingen 1994) 18, 20; for the frequent use of yakhadh, both noun and adverb, see K.G. Kuhn, Konkordanz zu den Qumrantexten [Göttingen 1960] 87– 89 and J.H. Charlesworth, Graphic Concordance to the Dead Sea Scrolls (Tübingen 1991), especially 68, 134 and 354; cf. M.L. Appold, op. cit. 182–186 and J. Zimmermann, Messianische Texte aus Qumran: Königliche, priesterliche und prophetische Messiasvorstellungen in den Schriftfunden von Qumran [WUNT, 2.104] [Tübingen 1998] 28. As Painter stresses, the unity of the Qumran community, withdrawn as it was from the world, differed greatly from the ideal unity of Christians (cf. NT Jn. 17.20–23). 55 Rom. 12.10; Hb. 13.1; 1 Pt. 3.8 (φιλάδελφοι [below]); in 1 Th. 4.9–10 and 1 Pt. 1.22– 23 an increase in φιλαδελφία is sought. In 2 Pt. 1.5–7 exertion is to be applied to the task of producing ἀγάπη from φιλαδελφία; cf. J.H. Neyrey, 2 Peter, Jude [The Anchor Bible, 37C] (New York 1993) 161: “‘kinship affection’ [philadelphia] in the NT is in the process of becoming a distinguishing trait of disciples”. ψευδάδελφοι: Gal. 2.4. Audience to be ὁμόφρονες, συμπαθεῖς, φιλάδελφοι: 1 Pt. 3.8. ἀγάπη: Col. 2.2; 1 Pt. 2.17, 4.8; 1 Jn. 2.9–11, 3.23–24, 4.7–12; 2 Jn. 5–6. ἑνότης: Eph. 4.3; the combination with εἰρήνη also occurs in 2 Ti. 2.22.

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to expel them. The letter of Jude is clearly intended to remove certain Christians from the community. The reputation of these Christians is blackened in various ways. One of the accusations against them is that they made divisions. This, surely, shows already appearing the tactic used by later Christians of claiming the unity of their own side as a point against those factions opposing them.56 As far as the church in general is concerned, the early Christians make highly idealistic, if not extravagant, claims about its unity. From the beginning, however, there are clear indications, and often admissions, of disunity among Christians. There is some evidence of practical steps to promote unity in the New Testament and in the writings of Tertullian. Irenaeus (on two occasions), Polykrates and Theophilos of Caesarea adopt a conciliatory approach. But outweighing these factors are the devastating attacks on other Christians by Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian. The outbursts may have been spurred by the writers not being present in person. But there is a poor correlation between the claims of unity made by these writers and, on the other hand, their attitude and advice in practical situations where they are faced by Christians who disagree with them. In terms of the sequence of ideas one can perceive the basic notions of Christian unity coming from the New Testament. Indeed the constantly employed metaphor of the body and a number of specific phrases denoting the unity of the church (such as ‘one flock’ and ‘brother/sisterhood’) are derived from this source. But one can also see in the New Testament the beginnings of disunity and even a precedent for the more ruthless arguments employed by Serapion of Antioch, Irenaeus and Tertullian.

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Although there are probably references to individual churches in Justin and Tertullian, most of the evidence concerning unity in local churches comes from the letters to specific churches by the Apostolic Fathers. The letter from the church at Rome to the church at Corinth, commonly referred to as 1 Clement, displays great eagerness to intervene in the questions of dispute among the Corinthian Christians.57 After praising the latter for their many virtues, including 56 ἐκλεκτῇ κυρίᾳ in 2 Jn. 1 (οἰκία in 10). Church of Diotrephes: 3 Jn. 9–10. Jude: 4, 8, 10, 12–13, 16, 19. Divisions: Jd. 19 (οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀποδιορίζοντες). Later Christians: e.g. Serap.Ant. fr. 1; Iren. haer. 3.3.4, 3.24.1, 4.35.4; Tert. ieiun. 13.3 (cf. praes.haer. 42.6). 57 Individual churches in later writers: Just. 1 apol. 67.8 with 67.3; Tert. spect. 29.3 (societates ecclesiarum). Intervention: 1 Clem. 1.1 (περὶ τῶν ἐπιζητουμένων παρ᾿ ὑμῖν πραγμάτων ... τῆς τε ... στάσεως). Sender: ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ παροικοῦσα ῾Ρώμην (inscr.). See further W.K.L. Clarke, The First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians (London 1937) 11, 86; B.E. Bowe, A Church in Crisis: Ecclesiology and Paraenesis in Clement of Rome [Harvard Dissertations in Religion, 23] (Minneapolis, 1988) 7–23; D.G. Horrell, The

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their magnificent hospitality, their “deep peace”, their efforts “on behalf of all the sister/brotherhood” and their hatred of “all stasis and all schism”, the author says that they later succumbed to such temptations as jealousy, envy, eris (strife) and stasis. He urges obedience and humility, with many examples, on the young, foolish and ignoble members of the church who have risen up against the old, wise and renowned. The peace and harmony (eirene kai homonoia) of the universe in all its parts should be a motive for worthy Christian citizenship ‘in homonoia’. Unity can be achieved in practice if everyone does what is in harmony with God’s will and rejects strife, speaking evil of a fellowbeliever and so on.58 The comparison of an army, where soldiers obey the instructions of Caesar (basileus) and his commanders and where great and small are dependent on each other, and the simile of the body, in which all parts are interdependent and are united in a common subjection in order to preserve “the whole body (holon to soma)”, leads to the advice that each Christian should be subject to his or her neighbour.59 When they are involved in dissension (the plurals of such words as eris, dikhostasia and skhisma are used) they forget that they are members of one another (and of Christ) and that God is one. Various allusions, especially to Paul’s letter to the Corinthian church about an earlier case of factionalism (prosklisis), are pressed on the audience. The faction Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideology from 1 Corinthians to 1 Clement (Edinburgh 1996) 244–250; H.E. Lona (ed.), Der erste Clemensbrief [Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern, 2] (Göttingen 1998) 92–93, 115–119; Bakke 11–13. 58 Praise: 1 Clem. 1.2–2.8; see H.E. Lona, op. cit. (n. 57) 119–136. ζῆλος, φθόνος, ἔρις and στάσις: 1 Clem. 3.2; cf. 4.7–13, 5.2–5, 6.1–4, 9.1. O.M. Bakke discusses many of these terms, which he considers political: εἰρήνη βαθεῖα (136–139; cf. W.C. van Unnik, VChr 24 [1970] 261–279 and 26 [1972] 24–28), ἀδελφότης (140–143; cf. H.D. Betz in id. (ed.), Plutarch’s Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature [Studia ad Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti, 4] [Leiden 1978] 231–263 on φιλαδελφία), σχίσμα (143–145) and especially ἔρις, στάσις, ζῆλος and φθόνος (85–96). Examples: 1 Clem. 9.3–19.1; the call to humility is linked with the call to unity in 30.3, 37.4–38.2. Social contrasts: ibid. 3.3; cf. Jaeger 12–14, 113–114; A. Lindemann, Die Clemensbriefe [Handbuch zum Neue Testament, 17; Die Apostolischen Väter, 1] (Tübingen 1992) 33, 117; H.E. Lona, op. cit. (n. 57) 141–142; Bakke 289–298. Peace and harmony: 1 Clem. 20.1–21.1, 30.3, 33.8, 34.4–35.6. For εἰρήνη and ὁμόνοια linked by καί as a slogan-like formulation see W.C. van Unnik, Studies over de zogenaamde eerste brief van Clemens, 1: Het litteraire genre [Mededelingen der koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde 33.4] (Amsterdam 1970) 149–204[1–56], especially 162–171[14–23] and 177–181[29–33] = id. in C. Breytenbach and L.L. Welborn (eds.), Encounters with Hellenism: Studies on the First Letter of Clement [Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums, 53] (Leiden 2004) 115–181, especially 129–139 and 146–151 = W.C. van Unnik, Sparsa Collecta 4 [Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 156] (Leiden 2014) 239–305, especially 253–263 and 270– 276. 59 1 Clem. 37.1–38.2. On possible allusions to Euripides, Aiolos fr. 21 Kannicht in this passage see J.B. Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers2 1 (London 1890) 2.115–116. On the deployment of the body metaphor see 1 Clem. 46.7 and Bakke 179–184, 258.

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leaders in particular should consider the common good.60 Those on whose account stasis and eris and skhismata have arisen should declare their willingness to go away so that the flock of Christ may have peace with the presbyters set over it. Those who laid the foundations of stasis should submit to the presbyters; for all bishops or presbyters were appointed either by the apostles or with the consent of the whole church. In summary, live in harmony, love and peace from now on.61 The letters of Ignatios to the Ephesian, Magnesian, Trallian, Philadelphian and Smyrnaian churches and to Polykarpos (intended for public reading in the church at Smyrna) all urge unity in those groups of Christians. He has promoted unity on other occasions and is constantly concerned for the unity of the church he left in Antioch.62 He prays for henosis in the various churches, a unity of faith and love. He bids his hearers be united in mind, to run together, shun division, love unity and act in harmony.63 When he says “act in harmony with

60

Members of one another: 1 Clem. 46.4–9. Allusions: ibid. 46.8 (cf. NT Mt. 26.24 and Lk. 17.1–2 with synoptic parallels: see H.E. Lona, op. cit. [n. 57] 496–498), 47.1–4 (Paul’s letter), 49.5 (cf. 1 Pt. 4.8 and 1 Cor. 13.4, 7). Faction leaders: 1 Clem. 51.1; cf. 48.6, 55.2– 6. 61 Willingness to go away: ibid. 54.1–55.1. Submission: ibid. 57.1–2 with 42.4–5, 44; H. Lietzmann, Geschichte der alten Kirche4 (Berlin 1975) 1.202–203; H.O. Maier, op. cit. (n. 49) 131. Harmony, love and peace: 1 Clem. 62.2 (ὁμονοοῦντας ἀμνησικάκως ἐν ἀγάπῃ καὶ εἰρήνῃ), 63.2 (περὶ εἰρήνης καὶ ὁμονοίας); 65.1 (τὴν εὐκταίαν καὶ ἐπιποθήτην ἡμῖν εἰρήνην καὶ ὁμόνοιαν). M.J. Harris points to the two issues of internal unity and submission: ‘… it is sadly true that when Clement of Rome wrote to the church at Corinth in 96 he had to rebuke the same internal strife (1 Clement 46:5–7; 47:3–4) and rebellion against authority (44:3, 6; 54:1–2; 57:2) that had plagued the church forty years earlier’ (The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text [Grand Rapids, MI 2005] 54). On the exposition of the unity of the church see Jaeger 14–23. 62 Public occasion: see especially Ign. Polyk. 6, in the midst of instructions to the bishop. Ignatios promoted unity, for example, when he visited Philadelphia earlier (Philad. 7.1–8.1). Antioch: Philad. 10.1; Smyrn. 11.1; Polyk. 7.1. On Ignatios’ promotion of the unity of the individual church, see H. Lietzmann, op. cit. (n. 61) 1.263–264; M.P. Brown, The Authentic Writings of Ignatius: A Study of Linguistic Criteria [Duke Studies in Religion, 2] (Durham, NC 1963) 13, 17–20, 123; Schoedel 21–22; A. Brent, Ignatius of Antioch and the Second Sophistic: A Study of an Early Christian Transformation of Pagan Culture [Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum, 36] (Tübingen 2006), especially 88–90, 237–239, 254– 256, 296; J.-P. Lotz, op. cit. (n. 15), especially chap. 7; C.N. Jefford in D.J. Bingham (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Early Christian Thought (London 2010) 109–111. C. Trevett argues that Ignatios’ hopes for unity in the church in Antioch had failed: A Study of Ignatius of Antioch in Syria and Asia [Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity, 29] (Lewiston, NY 1992) 51, 203; for a summary of scholars’ arguments see J.-P. Lotz, op. cit. (n. 15) 177–185. 63 ἕνωσις of faith and love: Magn. 1.2. United in mind: Eph. 20.2; Magn. 7.1; Philad. 6.2. Run together: Eph. 3.2–4.1; Magn. 7.2; Polyk. 6.1. Shun division: Philad. 2.1, 7.2; Smyrn. 8.1. Love unity: Philad. 7.2 (τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀγαπᾶτε); cf. Polyk. 1.2 (τῆς ἑνώσεως φρόντιζε). Act in harmony: Magn. 6.1 (ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ θεοῦ σπουδάζετε πάντα πράσσειν); cf. Trall. 12.2

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God” he is not very far from Epiktetos’ phrase (“do what follows from nature”). A musical image, developed to praise the harmony of the Ephesian presbytery with the bishop, is turned on the whole church (“being harmonious in concord”) and ends in a straightforward appeal for unity (“to be in blameless unity”). The unity is expressed as being in flesh and spirit.64 The instruction to be joined together in one submission is to be interpreted in terms of the continual injunctions to submit to the bishop, to the bishop and presbytery or to the bishop, presbyters and deacons. Ignatios drops hints concerning unity at the beginning and end of letters. He commends such unity as already exists, compliments the bishops in most churches and praises the Magnesian presbyters and deacon for their subjection to the bishop. The motives suggested for striving for unity include participation in God, stronger prayer and humility, the unity of God, the example of the prophets and the avoidance of heresy.65 By definition a church must have a bishop, presbyters and deacons; attaching oneself to the bishop is equivalent to returning to the unity of the church. Ignatios recognises the importance of action as well as speech and in addition to the instructions about (διαμένετε ἐν τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ ὑμῶν). For the overtone of surveillance in such exhortations see D.M. Reis in J. Baun et al. (eds.), Studia Patristica 45 (Leuven 2010) 373–378. 64 In harmony with God: Philad. 4 (κατὰ θεὸν πράσσητε); Epikt. 1.26.1–2 (τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ φύσει πράττειν); cf. 1.4.14–15, 1.11.5–8, enkh. 30 (cf. chap. 8 n. 31). Harmony of the whole church: Ign. Eph. 4.2 (χορὸς γίνεσθε, ἵνα σύμφωνοι ὄντες ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ leading to ἐν ἀμώμῳ ἑνότητι εἶναι); cf. Philad. 1.2 (συνευρύθμισται γὰρ ταῖς ἐντολαῖς ὡς χορδαῖς κιθάρα). Flesh and spirit: Magn. 1.2, 13.2; Rom. inscr. The four sets of polarities in Magn. 13.1 are, according to W.R. Schoedel (130), intended to show the totality of the ‘prosperity’ (cf. OT Ps. 1.3) which is to be identified with the unity (ἕνωσις) of 13.2. 65 One submission: Eph. 2.2. Bishop: Magn. 3.1, 4, 6.2 (ἑνώθητε τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ), 13.2; Trall. 2.1; Philad. 2.1 (ποιμήν seems to refer to the bishop, not to Christ; cf. Rom. 9.1), 3.2; Smyrn. 8, 9.1; and (from the bishop’s side) Polyk. 4.1, 6.1. As W.R. Schoedel perhaps indicates (109), it is verging on a ruthless tactic to imply that you are not a Christian if you do not submit to the bishop (Magn. 4). For the boundary between those who are within Christianity and those who are not see the discussion by C.T. Brown, op. cit. (n. 15), chapters 4–5. On the union with Christ included in Trall. 7.1, compare the body metaphor in Trall. 11.2. Bishop and presbytery: Eph. 2.2, 20.2 and Trall. 13.2 (πρεσβυτέριον); Magn. 7.1 (πρεσβύτεροι). By contrast, Polykarpos enjoins obedience to the presbyters and deacons (ep. 5.3). On the lack of mention of a bishop see J.B. Bauer, Die Polykarpbriefe [Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern, 5] (Göttingen 1995) 33–35, 54–55. All three sets of officials: Trall. 2–3, 7.2; Philad. inscr., 7.1; Smyrn. 8.1; Polyk. 6.1. Start and close of letters: τῆς ἡνωμένης ... προσευχῆς in Magn. 14; ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ θεοῦ in Magn. 15 (cf. 6.1) and Philad. inscr.; ἐν ἑνότητι θεοῦ in Smyrn. 12.2 (cf. n. 88 below) and Polyk. 8.3; cf. A. Brent, op. cit. (n. 62) 308. Commendation of unity: Eph. inscr., 5.1; Magn. 1.1. Complimenting bishops: Eph. 6.1; Magn. 2, 13.1; Trall. 1, 3.2; Philad. 1; Smyrn. 12.2. Magnesia: Magn. 2–3. Motives: Eph. 4.2; Eph. 5; Philad. 8.1; Philad. 5.2; Trall. 7 (cf. warning against Docetic views in 9–11) and Philad. 2; using some of these passages M.C. Steenberg shows how the idea of the unity of Christ with the Father emerges in Ignatios’ letters in the context of his concern for unity among Christians: in D.J. Bingham (ed.), op. cit. (n. 62) 243, 254 nn. 3–5.

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submitting to the bishop and other church officials he offers other practical precepts: frequent meetings, one prayer from a common gathering, one eucharist and no action without the bishop. Ignatios makes considerable efforts to ensure that his beliefs on the unity of churches are translated into practice. Similarly with one of his correspondents, Polykarpos. As the Greek text breaks off and we have to rely on a Latin translation of an early text, he urges the members of the church of God sojourning at Philippi to “stand fast in these things”. After beginning a list of injunctions (such as “love the community of believers”) with echoes of New Testament phraseology, he urges that they be “united in the truth (in ueritate sociati)” and gives that phrase specific content by following up with “giving way to one another” and “despising no one”.66 Many of the features just discussed in the Apostolic Fathers can be perceived in the New Testament. The specific instructions to “avoid divisions” and “be united in mind” have precedents in Paul’s letters. Polykarpos takes the injunction to “love the community of believers” from 1 Peter and applies it to the Philippian church. The lists of items to be avoided (such as eris and dikhostasiai) are also a feature of Paul’s letters.67 Paul is concerned at the division in the Corinthian church and urges unity, peace and order. He appeals to the Philippian Christians in the name of their common life (politeuesthai) to be one in spirit and mind, contending as one for the faith of the gospel, and he specifically asks two members of the church to settle their differences. There may also have been disunity in the Thessalonian church; at least the instruction to respect the leaders of the church provides a basis for Ignatios’ appeals for submission.68 Some sentences in the letters of John indicate disunity in a local 66 ἐπὶ τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς ἐκκλησίας: Philad. 3.2. Action as well as speech: Eph. 15.1–2 (but speech has the priority: Schoedel 78). Meetings: Eph. 13.1 (with an allusion to the eucharist; cf. 20.2); Magn. 4; Polyk. 4.2. One prayer: Magn. 7.1. One eucharist: Philad. 4. Act with the bishop: Magn. 7.1; Trall. 2.2; Philad. 7.1–8.1. Polykarpos: ep. 10.1 (with echoes of NT 1 Cor. 15.58, Col. 1.23 and 1 Pet. 2.17; cf. K. Berding, op. cit. [n. 2] 101–102). 67 ‘Avoid divisions’: compare Ign. Philad. 2.1, 7.2 and Smyrn. 7.2 with NT Rom. 16.17 and 1 Cor. 1.10. ‘Be united in mind’: compare Ign. Eph. 20.2, Magn. 7.1 and Philad. 6.2 with 1 Cor. 1.10 (κατηρτισμένοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοΐ), 2 Cor. 13.11 (τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖτε), Phil. 1.27 (μιᾷ ψυχῇ συναθλοῦντες), 2.2 (τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε, ... τὸ ἓν φρονοῦντες). For μία ψυχή indicating unity of purpose see P.T. O’Brien, op. cit. (n. 52) 151–152. H.O. Maier links Ignatios’ thought with 1 Corinthians as well as with Greek philosophical and rhetorical commonplaces: in A.F. Gregory and C.M. Tuckett (eds.), Trajectories through the New Testament and the Apostolic Fathers (Oxford 2005) 307–324. ‘Love the brother/sisterhood’: Polyk. ep. 10.1 from 1 Pt. 2.17, 3.8. ἔρις, ζῆλος, θυμοί, ἐριθεῖαι, ἔχθραι, διχοστασίαι: 2 Cor. 12.20, Gal. 5.20–21; cf. 1 Clem. 3.2, 5.2–5, 9.1, 14.1–2, 46.5, 51.1, 54.2. On such vice lists see A.C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI 2000) 440–444, with references to earlier work. 68 Chapters 1–6 of 1 Corinthians are basically on the topic of divisions. See especially 1 Cor. 1.10, 3.21–23, 4.6 and for the nature of the divisions 1.10–17, 3.3–9, 11.18–22. See also 2 Cor. 13.11. Philippian Christians: Phil. 1.27–28; 2.1–5, 14. Two members: Phil. 4.2–

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church. Finally, the writer of the Apocalypse reveals divisions in the church at Pergamon, where some held doctrines of the Nicolaitans, and in the church at Thyateira; in both cases he threatens intervention by the Son of God.69 Already in the New Testament one can see similar disunity in local churches to that which existed in later times and, notably, similar methods of handling the problem.

Christian Unity: Inter-Church Relations Christian Unity: Inter-Church Relations

In the field of inter-church relations also the prelude to many later developments can be seen in the New Testament. From the beginning the churches in Antioch and Jerusalem had dealings with one another and each had contacts in areas of Asia Minor. Barnabas and Paul, with their respective companions, encouraged or set up churches in Syria, Kilikia, Phrygia, Galatia, Asia, Kypros (Cyprus), Makedonia and Akhaia. The Jerusalem church became linked up with this advance.70 There survive letters to various local churches from Paul, Paul and Sosthenes, Paul and Timothy, Paul, Silvanus and Timothy, and from Paul and the friends with him. James, Peter and Jude give more general addresses, but “the elder” and “John, your brother on Patmos” (possibly the same man) seek to proffer advice and intervene in various churches. There is fre-

3. Thessalonian church: see the general exhortations in 1 Th. 3.12, 5.14–15 and the compliment in 2 Th. 1.3. The view originating with A. Harnack (SPAW [1910] 560–578) that there were two separate groups in the Thessalonian church (see K. Lake, The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul: Their Motive and Origin2 [London 1914] 89–90) is doubted by F.F. Bruce, 1 & 2 Thessalonians [Word Biblical Commentary, 45] (Waco, TX 1982) 72 (εἰς πάντας in 1 Th. 3.12 and 5.15 refers to all humankind, not all Christians), 124 (“the paraenesis now becomes more general”), probably unnecessarily. The phrase ὁ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης (1 Th. 5.23) does not indicate the existence of divisions, but is rather a standard benediction: cf. Rom. 15.33, 16.20, Phil. 4.9, 2 Th. 3.16. In 2 Cor. 13.11, however, ὁ θεὸς τῆς ἀγάπης καὶ εἰρήνης is peculiarly appropriate to the divided church in Corinth: M.J. Harris, op. cit. (n. 61) 934–935. Respect for leaders: compare 1 Th. 5.12 with passages in n. 65 above. 69 3 Jn. 9–10 and possibly 2 Jn. 10. Rv. 2.15–16, 20–23; cf. R.H. Worth, Jr., The Seven Cities of the Apocalypse and Greco-Asian Culture (Mahwah, NJ 1999) 124–127, 162–163. 70 Antioch and Jerusalem: Ac. 11.22–23, 11.29, 15.1–35. Contact with Asia Minor: Ac. 13–14, esp. 13.1–3, 14.24–28 (Antioch); Ac. 15.23 (Jerusalem). Inter-church contacts: Ac. 15.35–21.15, especially 15.36–41, 16.6, 18.22, 19.22, 20.17 (cf. Iren. haer. 3.14.2), 21.7. E.A. Judge (RThR 22 [1963] 65–76 = The First Christians in the Roman World [n. 9] 586– 596) examines the contemporary political institutions and public attitudes on the basis of which the New Testament churches are likely to have formulated their inter-relations and internal unity. Link to Jerusalem church: Ac. 21.17–20.

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quent use of adelphoi as an address to the members of the churches concerned.71 Paul refers to the separate efforts by Apollos of Alexandria and himself in the Corinthian church as teamwork, commends Epaphroditos to the Philippian church, and sends greetings to Timothy from four named persons and “all the brothers and sisters” in Rome. A good example of practical assistance is the common fund (to which koinonia alludes) that the churches in Makedonia and Akhaia raised for the benefit of the poor Christians in Jerusalem. In prodding the Thessalonian church to greater achievement Paul says that they are in fact practising love towards all their fellow Christians in Makedonia. He also refers to the alliance existing between himself and the Philippian church, an alliance which found expression in their financial support of him in Makedonia (and again at the time of writing).72 Again there are some examples of Christian unity being put into practice. In the time of Clement the church at Rome sent a strongly-worded letter to the church at Corinth although, it seems, no request for advice had been received from Corinth. The Roman church sent three representatives and demanded immediate action so that these men could report peace, harmony and good order in the Corinthian church.73 Ignatios, bishop of Antioch, writes – 71 Paul alone writes: Rom. 1.1, 7; Eph. 1.1. With Sosthenes: 1 Cor. 1.1–2. With Timothy: 2 Cor. 1.1; Phil. 1.1; Col. 1.1–2. With Silvanus and Timothy: 1 Th. 1.1; 2 Th. 1.1. Paul and friends: Gal. 1.1–2. Interference by ‘the elder’: 2 Jn. 1 (if the ‘elect lady’ is a church); 3 Jn. 1, 9–10. John on Patmos: Rv. 1.4, 9. The seven churches are named in 1.11, 2.1, 2.8, 2.12, 2.18, 3.1, 3.7, 3.14 and referred to as “the churches” or “all the churches” a number of times in 1.4–3.22. Specific intervention is threatened in 2.16 and 2.20–23. ἀδελφοί: e.g. Rom. 1.13, 1 Cor. 3.1, 2 Cor. 8.1, Gal. 1.11, 1 Th. 2.1, 2 Th. 1.3, Js. 1.2. 72 Apollos: 1 Cor. 3.8 (ἕν εἰσιν); cf. Ac. 18.24–19.1, 1 Cor. 1.12. Epaphroditos: Phil. 2.25–30; cf. 4.18. Timothy: 2 Ti. 4.21; on the origin of the church at Rome see E.A. Judge and G.S.R. Thomas, RThR 25 (1966) 81–94 = E.A. Judge, The First Christians in the Roman World [n. 9] 442–455; P. Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus: Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries (Minneapolis 2003) 7–11; S. Spence, The Parting of the Ways: The Roman Church as a Case Study [Interdisciplinary Studies in Ancient Culture and Religion, 5] (Leuven 2004), chap. 2. Common fund: Rom. 15.26; 1 Cor. 16.1–4; 2 Cor. 8.1–4, 9.13; cf. 1 Th. 1.7–8 and BDAG s.v. κοινωνία 3; S.J. Joubert, Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and Theological Reflection in Paul’s Collection [WUNT, 2.124] (Tübingen 2000); J.R. Harrison, op. cit. (n. 22) 291–321. J.D.G. Dunn sees the organisation of the collection among Paul’s Gentile congregations as an attempt to maintain the unity of the church: in A.A. Alexeev et al. (eds.), op. cit. (n. 38) 9. Thessalonian practice of philadelphia: 1 Th. 4.10. Alliance of Paul and Philippian Christians: Phil. 1.7, 4.15–18; cf. 2 Cor. 11.9. For other paradigms of the relationship between the two parties see M.N.A. Bockmuehl, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians4 (London 1997) 34–38. For Paul’s maintenance of independence when expressing gratitude for the financial support of the Philippians see G.F. Hawthorne, Philippians [Word Biblical Commentary, 43] (Waco, TX 1983) 19, 194–195, 202–205. 73 Circumstances of letter: 1 Clem. inscr., 1.1, backed up by Iren. haer. 3.3.3, who uses the letter to show that the church in the hands of the apostles’ successors preached one God,

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often about the recipients’ internal affairs – to the churches at Ephesos in Asia, Magnesia on the Maiandros, Tralleis in Asia, Rome, Philadelphia in Asia and Smyrna in Asia as well as to Polykarpos, bishop of the Smyrnaian church.74 He speaks highly of bishops and other officials in the churches to which he writes, he adopts a humble approach to the Ephesian church and he professes familiarity and love between himself and his recipients. Not only does Ignatios encourage his readers to pray for the church in Syria, but his transmission of greetings to readers from churches which offered him hospitality reveals a developed network of inter-church relations.75 Polykarpos and the presbyters with him (in the church at Smyrna) write to the church at Philippi. He praises the Philippian Christians and shows concern for their affairs. A number of people, mainly members of the two churches but also members of other churches (especially Ignatios), are clearly well known to Polykarpos and his readers. Quite intricate arrangements are made. This and other signs show a complex pattern of inter-church co-operation since Paul’s time.76 A letter from the church at Smyrna to the church at Philomelion and to all the congregations of the catholic church assumes that these recipients will be interested in the martyrdom of Polykarpos and others. There appears to be a close link between the churches at Smyrna and Philadelphia and a vaguer link between the Smyrnaian church and the rest of the churches in the world.77 Apart from general addresses (as in

the father of Jesus Christ. Task for representatives: 1 Clem. 65.1; cf. Iren. haer. 3.3.3 (εἰς εἰρήνην συμβιβάζουσα αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνανεοῦσα τὴν πίστιν αὐτῶν). The letter can no longer be dated narrowly to the later years of Domitian; the ‘misfortunes and reverses’ of 1 Clem. 1.1 refer to strife within the church, not to persecution from outside: L.L. Welborn, Biblical Research 29 (1984) 35–54 = id. in C. Breytenbach and L.L. Welborn (eds.), Encounters with Hellenism (n. 58) 197–216; K. Erlemann, NTS 44 (1998) 591–607. On the basis of Polykarpos’ use of 1 Clement (J.B. Bauer, op. cit. [n. 65] 28–30), that letter must be dated before the 160s C.E. 74 Inscr. of each letter of Ignatios; cf. Rom. 4.1. C. Trevett (op. cit. [n. 62]) in her chapter 3 notes variations in the addresses to officials in the different letters. 75 Church officials: Eph. 6.1; Magn. 2–3, 13.1; Trall. 3.2; Philad. 1; Smyrn. 12.2. Approach to Ephesian church: Eph. 3.1, 8.1. Familiarity and love: Eph. 1, 5.1; Philad. 5.1; Smyrn. 12.2–13.2; Polyk. 8.2. Church in Syria: Eph. 21.2; Magn. 14; Trall. 13.1; Rom. 9.1; cf. Philad. 10.1, Smyrn. 11.1, Polyk. 7.1; J.-P. Lotz, op. cit. (n. 15) 177–183. Hospitality: Magn. 15; Trall. 12.1 (where ἐκκλησίαι refers to the representatives of churches), 13.1; Rom. 9.3; Philad. 11.2; Smyrn. 12.1, 13.2; cf. Polyk. 8.1. 76 Senders of letter: Polyk. ep. inscr. Praise and concern: ibid. 1, 5–6, 11. Knowledge of other churches: ibid. 9.1, 11, 13.1, 14. Arrangements: ibid. 13. Co-operation: ibid. 11.3 (Paul’s time); the commands in 10.1 (cf. 1 Pt. 2.17, 3.8) and 12.3 (cf. Eph. 6.18) suggest a hope that such co-operation will continue. 77 Interest in martyrdom: M.Polyk., esp. inscr., 1.1, 2.4–5.2, 20.1, 22.1. On the date of this document see T.D. Barnes, JThS n.s. 18 (1967) 433–437, 19 (1968) 510–514; B. Dehandschutter, ANRW 2.27.1 (Berlin 1993) 497–503; G. Buschmann, Das Martyrium des Polykarp [Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern, 6] (Göttingen 1998) 39–40; M.W.

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The Letter of Barnabas), other works show close contact between the Corinthian and Roman churches, while each of these had wider relations, expressed in some cases by financial support.78 Irenaeus is concerned to assert the derivation of all churches from the apostles, and in doing so discloses inter-church associations in the past. There is preserved a fragment of a letter which Irenaeus wrote on behalf of church members throughout Gaul. He refers to harmony in the past despite disagreement over ceremonies. The predecessors of Soter at Rome kept peace with those congregations with which they disagreed; Polykarpos and Aniketos, though holding divergent views on the observance of Christ’s death, were friendly in Rome and Polykarpos was allowed to celebrate the eucharist in Aniketos’ church.79 Letters from Polykrates of Ephesos and Theophilos of Caesarea on much the same subject refer to gatherings of Asian bishops and Palestinian bishops respectively and show contact with the churches in Alexandria and other places. Where Irenaeus sought flexibility with regard to the date and form of certain celebrations, Theophilos desired uniformity. The letter from the churches in Vienne and Lugdunum shows communication in some depth with Christians in Asia and Phrygia.80 Like Irenaeus, Tertullian stresses the derivation of all churches from the apostolic churches, but he later uses this to strengthen his own side in a division of churches. He cites examples from Greek and barbarian churches as well as from African ones.81 Of particular interest in inter-church relations is the position of the Roman church. While 1 Clement shows the Roman church or group of churches taking the initiative in giving advice about the affairs of another church, no special authority is asserted in comparison with (say) Ignatios’ letters. Nor does Ignatios give the Roman church any special honours. Indeed he tells them forthrightly what he wants them to do and not to do. There is no sense of inferiority Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers3 (Grand Rapids, MI 2007) 301–302. Link with Philadelphia: M.Polyk. 19.1; cf. 1.2 (after NT Phil. 2.4). Link with other churches: ibid. inscr., 5.1, 8.1. 78 General address: Barn. 1.1. The greeting to ‘sons and daughters’ combines the Greek formula χαίρετε with the Jewish greeting shalom alluded to in ἐν εἰρήνῃ: this is picked up in the farewell σώζεσθε, ἀγάπης τέκνα καὶ εἰρήνης (21.9): F.R. Prostmeier, op. cit. (n. 29) 145. Other documents: Heges. fr. 5 (perhaps also showing contact with the church in Jerusalem); Dion.Cor. fr. 3 (Eus. h.e. 2.25.8). Financial support: Dion.Cor. fr. 1 (Eus. h.e. 4.23.10); Eus. h.e. 4.23.1. 79 Apostolic derivation: Iren. haer. 3.3.2, 3.12.5, 4.33.8. Inter-church associations: ibid. 3.3.3, 3.14.2, 5.33.4. Letter: fr. 3 (Eus. h.e. 5.24.11–17). ὧν ἡγεῖτο κατὰ τὴν Γαλλίαν ἀδελφῶν (5.24.11) is of course Eusebios’ statement, not Irenaeus’. Harmony in the past: fr. 3, especially MG 7.1229A–1232A (Eus. h.e. 5.24.13–17). 80 Polykr. frr. 1–2 ap. Eus. h.e. 5.24.2–8. Thphl.Caes. fr. ap. Eus. h.e. 5.25. Ep.Lugd. 1. Special mention is made of Christians from Asia and Phrygia who suffered in Gaul (ibid. 5, 13). 81 Use of apostolic derivation: Tert. praes.haer. 20.2–9, 21.4–7; Marc. 3.1.2, 4.5.3. Greek and barbarian churches: uirg.uel. 2; ieiun. 13.6–8.

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in the attitude of Hegesippos and Dionysios of Corinth. Irenaeus takes the Roman church as the strongest example of succession from the apostles. It has more distinguished leadership but is not different in kind from other churches. Moreover, he challenges the position of Victor, bishop of Rome, on certain matters, as does Polykrates of Ephesos.82 For Tertullian the Roman church is fortunate and the approval of Montanus and his female associates by the bishop of Rome is important to him. But the link (a pledge of friendship) between the Roman and African churches falls short of integration with one another.83 The New Testament, then, sets the pattern for inter-church relations. From the beginning practical steps are taken to assist agreement between Christian groups and such practicality is continued to the end of the second century. The interest of patristic writers in the unity of local churches is also foreshadowed in the New Testament. Here too practical advice is given as to how to strengthen the cohesion of the various churches concerned. It is when the horizon is widened to the universal church that there is inconsistency between word and deed. On this wider canvas the second, third and fourth generations of Christians proclaim the overall unity of the church but in fact work against such an ideal by both their verbal attacks and their practical instructions. These conclusions on the degree of unity attained by the early Christians are in conflict with the views of some modern authorities. The traditional view is represented by H. Lietzmann who, for example, asserts that the church was a unity, although it was embodied in thousands of churches and hundreds of bishops. He rarely admits that this unity could be disturbed. He claims that the unity of the church was demonstrated when most of the synods called together late in the second century agreed with Victor, bishop of Rome, on the date and manner of the celebration of Easter. But the synod in Asia Minor, for which Polykrates of Ephesos was the spokesperson, is thus discounted. More recently J.S. Siker has concluded that there was a relative unity in the second and third centuries. He finds unifying factors in a common set of scriptures and a relatively unified group of bishops who advocated a generic rule of faith. But we have certainly seen bishops disagreeing with one another, and we should be wary of concluding from the argument that a particular side is unified and that

82 Ign. Rom. inscr., 2–5. Rome the greatest example: Iren. haer. 3.3.2 (e.g. maximae et antiquissimae et omnibus cognitae ... Romae fundatae et constitutae ecclesiae; on this phrase see N. Brox in W. Brandmüller and R. Bäumer [eds.], Festgabe Hubert Jedin zum 75. Geburtstag [Paderborn 1975] = Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum 7 [1975] 42–78 at 48– 50). Challenge to Victor of Rome: Iren. fr. 3 ap. Eus. h.e. 5.24.11–17; Polykr. frr. 1–2 ap. Eus. h.e. 5.24.2–8. Both Irenaeus and Polykrates represent Christian groups that are larger than individual churches. 83 Fortunate: Tert. praes.haer. 36.3. Approval: Prax. 1.5. Nature of link: praes.haer. 36.4 (contessero; cf. contesseratio hospitalitatis in 20.8 [n. 44 above]).

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opponents are in a minority, that this was in fact the case.84 A more realistic assessment, in my view, is that of S.L. Greenslade, who attacks the idea of an undivided church in the first five centuries. He is prepared to see good fruit as well as bad deriving from schism and he presents a realistic analysis of those schisms in our period with which he deals, Quartodecimanism and Montanism.85 Disunity among Christians was not only pointed out by their opponents, but is also revealed by their own works, whether one looks at the New Testament documents or the writings of Serapion of Antioch, Hegesippos, Justin, Irenaeus, Rhodon, Apollonios, Polykrates, Clement of Alexandria or Tertullian.

The Unity and Uniqueness of God The Unity and Uniqueness of God

Although non-Christian writers float the idea that God is one, they generally evince belief in a plurality of gods (chapter 5). So it is not surprising that Christian writers (like Jewish ones) are distinctive in their view of the unity of God. Moreover, this concept merges into a related one, that of the uniqueness of God. The statement that God is one includes both the idea that God is a unit, with Christ bound up in the same unit and not a separate entity, and the idea that God is unique. As a general rule, a phrase such as “one and the same God (heis kai ho autos theos)” inclines toward the ‘unity of God’ end of the continuum, while such a phrase as “the one and only God (monos heis theos)” inclines toward the ‘uniqueness of God’ end, and “God the maker of the universe is from the beginning one and alone” makes both claims.86 The balance in all cases must be determined as far as possible from the context. The Apostolic Fathers put forward claims that one Jesus Christ came forth from one Father, that God is unity (henosis), that there is one God of the universe who created and set all things in order; and that Christ, though he ate and drank with his disciples after the resurrection like one who was composed of 84

H. Lietzmann, op. cit. (n. 61) 2.41–42, 58–59, 245–246, 262–263; cf. 2.234–235, where he accepts Cyprian’s views in de ecclesiae unitate. Rare concession: ibid. 2.203–204, 262. Synods in late second century: ibid. 2.247. Compare the dismissal of gnosticism in 1.309–310, 316. J.S. Siker in P.F. Esler (ed.), The Early Christian World (London 2000) 1.231–257 at 1.253–255. 85 S.L. Greenslade, op. cit. (n. 36), especially 15–34, 37, 99–101, 108–112, 169–170. H. Chadwick more recently pointed to disunity among early Christians: The Church in Ancient Society: From Galilee to Gregory the Great (Oxford 2001) 6, 63, 69–76. 86 For the first phrase, Iren. haer. 3.12.2; for the second, Clem. str. 6.16.137.2, 6.18.163.1, 7.2.12.1 (cf. n. 100 below). εἷς οὗτος ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ μόνος ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ κόσμου θεός: Athenag. leg. 8.5. M. Simonetti examines the idea of the unity of God in Justin, Tatianos, Athenagoras, Theophilos of Antioch and Irenaeus: RSLR 22 (1986) 201–240; for Irenaeus see also Osborn, Irenaeus, chapter 2, especially 47–48.

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flesh, was in spirit united with the Father.87 The unity of God is used to curse schism, to provide a guiding principle for the unity of a church and an incentive to return to the bishop’s council, and to encourage Christians to continue under God’s episcopal protection. In addition, there are strong claims to the uniqueness of God and of Christ.88 Justin stresses that there is one God and Tryphon (who is Jewish) agrees with him on the single rule (monarkhia) of God. But Justin asserts against Tryphon that there is a single God for all humans and against Markion that there is no God beside the creator of all.89 Tatianos proclaims not only the uniqueness of God but also the Christian confidence that

87 Ign. Magn. 7.2 (ἕνα ᾿Ιησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν ἀφ᾿ ἑνὸς πατρὸς προελθόντα); Trall. 11.2 (ἕνωσις); Diogn. 3.2 (θεὸν ἕνα τῶν πάντων); Herm. mand. 1.1 (εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας καὶ καταρτίσας); Ign. Smyrn. 3.3 (πνευματικῶς ἡνωμένος τῷ πατρί; cf. ἡνωμένος ὤν in Magn. 7.1). W.R. Schoedel (76, 98–99, 157) is keen to deny the identification of God with unity, but “God promises unity, which he himself is” (Trall. 11.2) is fairly clear; in this case there may be some Valentinian influence: see H. Schlier, Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Ignatiusbriefen [Beihefte zur ZNTW, 8] (Gießen 1929) 89–90 and H.-W. Bartsch, Gnostisches Gut und Gemeindetradition bei Ignatius von Antiochien [Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, 2.44] (Gütersloh 1940) 27. One of the first Christian statements of creation out of nothing in Herm. mand. 1.1 (ποίησας ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα) is Jewish in origin (2 Macc. 7.28; Wisd. 1.14 et al.): see N. Brox, op. cit. (n. 28) 191–192, C.A. Osiek, Shepherd of Hermas (n. 10) 103 with n. 3. G. May agrees with this attribution to Jewish ways of talking but argues that there is no sign yet that the elements also were created by God, though holders of the later doctrine of divine creation ex nihilo read that into Hermas: Creatio ex nihilo: The Doctrine of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in Early Christian Thought (Edinburgh 1994) 27, 152; argument summarised in M.M. Mitchell and F.M. Young (eds.), op. cit. (n. 6) 449–450. By contrast, J.C. O’Neill argues that the doctrine already existed before the time of the Maccabean revolt: JThS 53 (2002) 449–465. J. Worthington restates the case for God’s causation ex nihilo being present already in Rom. 4.17: NTS 62 (2016) 49–59. 88 Schism: 1 Clem. 46.5–6. Council of the bishop: Ign. Philad. 8.1 (εἰς ἑνότητα θεοῦ, repeated in 9.1); cf. Smyrn. 12.2, where W.R. Schoedel (251–252) takes ἐν ἑνότητι θεοῦ καὶ ὑμῶν to indicate both the source of congregational unity (‘from God’) and its scope (‘among you’). God as bishop: Ign. Polyk. 8.3 (ἐν ἑνότητι θεοῦ καὶ ἐπισκοπῇ); cf. Polyk. inscr. (Πολυκάρπῳ ... ἐπισκοπημένῳ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ...). Uniqueness of God: 1 Clem. 59.4 (σὺ εἶ ὁ θεὸς μόνος, alluding to LXX 3 Km. 8.60, 4 Km. 19.19). Uniqueness of Christ: Ign. Eph. 15.1 (εἷς οὖν διδάσκαλος). 89 One God: Just. dial. 1.4, 5.6; cf. M.Just. 1 (MG 6.1568B). On the uniqueness of God in Justin’s thought see R.A. Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology: A Study in Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen (London 1966) 48–50. Μοναρχία of God: dial. 1.3–4; cf. the theme of Ps.-Just. mon. (especially 1, 2). M. Marcovich (on dial. 1.3) compares Thphl.Ant. Autol. 2.8.6, 2.38.7: Iustini martyris dialogus cum Tryphone [Patristische Texte und Studien, 47] (Berlin 1997) 70. Against Tryphon: dial. 11.1–2. Against Markion: 1 apol. 58.1, fr. 2 (MG 6.1592B). Justin comes close to contradicting this assertion with his talk in dial. 56 of another god and lord (θεὸς καὶ κύριος ἕτερος, 56.4) beside the one who appeared to Abraham and Moses.

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there is one God who rules and not a multiplicity of rulers.90 In answering the charge of atheism made against the Christians, Athenagoras says that Christians acknowledge one God, the maker of the universe. He tries to show that most Greek writers believe in the unity of the divine being (to einai hen to theion), with heis and monas as his trump words. With respect to God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, Athenagoras claims a general Christian belief in their power in union (henosis) and distinction in rank. Using the verb henousthai as well as the nouns henotes and henosis, he claims that there is not only unity of the Son with the Father and fellowship (koinonia) of the Father with the Son, but also union of Father, Son and Spirit and a distinction between these united three.91 The unity and uniqueness of God are recurring themes in the works of Irenaeus. He speaks, for example, of one God the creator, of one God, Lord of all, of the unique Christ Jesus and of one Son.92 God is the only uncreated and primary cause; there is one God the Father, one Word, one Spirit and one salvation.93 The Father of all is a unified, uncompounded being without diverse members; yet the Word was united with the substance of Adam’s formation, that is, with the Word’s own handiwork, to produce a human living and perfect.94 Irenaeus attacks fellow-Christians whom he considers heretics for wanting another God beside the creator of the universe. The Valentinians distinguished from the opening of John’s Gospel three entities (God, Beginning and Word) and subsequently united them in order to derive their first ogdoad of 90

Uniqueness of God: Tat. orat. 4.2, 5.1, 5.7. One ruler: orat. 14.1, 19.9–10. It was the defence of these two propositions, which demanded the proposition that matter also is created by God, that led to the doctrine of creation out of nothing: G. May, op. cit. (n. 87) 148– 154. 91 One God: Athenag. leg. 4.2, 8.1, 18.2. The unity of the divine being: leg. 5–7; εἷς: 5.2, 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 7.1; μονάς: 6.1, 6.2. The Trinity: 10.2, 10.4, 12.2, 24.1–2 (ἑνότης is used in 10.2, 12.2; ἕνωσις in 10.4, 12.2; ἑνοῦσθαι in 12.2, 24.1–2; κοινωνία in 12.2). Cf. A.J. Malherbe, JThS n.s. 20 (1969) 538–542 and R.M. Grant, op. cit. (n. 32) 157–158. D.I. Rankin stresses the logical argument constructed by Athenagoras and its affinity with the stress on first principles enunciated by Platonist writers of his time, such as Alkinoos: in D. Baun et al. (eds.), Studia Patristica 45 (Leuven 2010) 419–424. 92 unus deus conditor: Iren. haer. 2 praef. 1, 3.12.11. unus deus omnium dominus: 2.6.1; cf. 2.35.2, 4.36.5. ἕνα μονογενῆ Χριστὸν ᾿Ιησοῦν: 1.9.2. unus filius: 5.36.3. On the claims that follow see also D.J. Bingham in id. (ed.), op. cit. (n. 62) 148–150. 93 Uncreated and primary cause: haer. 4.38.3 (μόνος ἀγένητος καὶ πρῶτος τῶν ἁπάντων καὶ τοῦ εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσι παραίτιος); cf. Just. dial. 5.6 on the cause of all things. One God, etc.: haer. 4.6.7 (unus deus pater et unum uerbum et unus spiritus et una salus). On the running together of the unity of various items see Y. de Andia, NRTh 109 (1987) 31–48, especially 31 and 46, and Osborn, Irenaeus 47–48. It seems that the various unities are interdependent. 94 Unified being: haer. 2.13.3 (omnium pater … et simplex et non compositus et similimembrius). Word: 4.33.11 (τὴν ἕνωσιν τοῦ λόγου τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὸ πλάσμα αὐτοῦ), 4.34.4, 5.1.3 (adunitus antiquae substantiae plasmationis Adae uiuentem et perfectum effecit hominem).

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aions. Other groups of Christians consider Ekklesia the convocation, meeting together and union (adunatio) of the Father of all, the first human being, and other figures. They thought of Jesus and Christ as separate and if they united them, they separated them again.95 Irenaeus argues that there is no need to postulate several gods because there are varying levels of intelligence among the human population; the different manifestations of God are designed to meet this situation. By equating several aions, such as Logos (Word), Monogenes (Only Child) and Zoe (Life), he collapses the first ogdoad. He establishes the unity and uniqueness of God by equating God with the Pleroma and claiming that there can only be one Pleroma which contains all things.96 If the opponents of Irenaeus reach a conclusion that there is one true God, it is for the wrong reasons. The Valentinians concede the unity (unitas) of God with their tongues only, he alleges. But he hopes that some Valentinians will return to the only God, the creator of the universe, and thus obtain salvation. His certainty that there is only one God the creator is based not only on the words “God is one” in Paul’s letter to the Romans but also on the law, the prophets, the parables and teaching of Jesus, apostles, the scripture generally and the church throughout the world.97 Other Christians of this period also express a belief in one God: for example, Meliton of Sardis and Apelles, whom Rhodon calls a ‘heretic’ but who is distinguished from ‘heretics’ such as Potitos, Basilikos and Markion by his belief in one uncreated God.98 Theophilos of Antioch asserts that God is one (heis 95 Attack on other Christians: haer. 1.19.1 (uti ostendant dominum nostrum alterum adnuntiare patrem praeter fabricatorem huius uniuersitatis), 1.21.5–1.22.1, 2.11.1 (uirtus aliqua separata a deo), 4.6.2 (quoting a fragment of Justin: αὐτῷ τῷ κυρίῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐπείσθην ἄλλον θεὸν καταγγέλλοντι παρὰ τὸν δημιουργόν), 4.35.4 (charging his opponents with inconsistency), 5.22.1. Valentinians: 1.8.5, using unire (ἑνοῦν) and unio (ἕνωσις); cf. V. Limone, VetChr 50 (2013) 213–250 at 227–231. Ophite Gnostics on Ekklesia: 1.30.2. Jesus separate from Christ: 1.30.12, 1.30.14 (ignorantes adunitum esse Iesum Christo), attacked by Irenaeus in 3.16.1, 3.16.6, 3.17.4; cf. the Markosian view in 1.15.3. Some of Irenaeus’ arguments are unfair: see D. Minns, Irenaeus: An Introduction (London 2010) xii, 35–41. 96 Levels of intelligence: haer. 1.10.3. First ogdoad: 1.9.3; compare Irenaeus’ comments on the Hebrew names for God (2.35.3), which can only be defended in linguistic terms with difficulty. Pleroma (composed of thirty aions): 2.1. On this borrowing of a Gnostic term, despite Irenaeus’ opposition to Gnostic ideas, see Osborn, Irenaeus 22–24, 28–29. Osborn expounds haer. 2.1 on 55–57. 97 One true God: haer. 1.20.2. Valentinian concession: 4.33.3. Their return to God: 1.31.3; cf. C.J. Markschies, Valentinus Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zur valentinianischen Gnosis mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentins [WUNT, 65] (Tübingen 1992) 294. Paul in Rom. 3.30: 3.10.2, 5.22.1. Other support (what Osborn terms “all sources of truth”: Irenaeus 59) for belief in one God: 2.27.2, 2.35.2–4, 3.8.1, 3.11.7, 3.15.3, 4.1.2, 4.2.5, 4.19.1, 4.20.2, 5.21.2. For God conceived as multiplicity-in-unity (e.g. in 4.20.1–2) see M.C. Steenberg in D.J. Bingham (ed.), op. cit. (n. 62) 245–246. 98 Mel. fr. 2 Perler (= 2 Hall). Apelles: Rhod. fr. ap Eus. h.e. 5.13.1–7.

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estin theos) and that there is only God’s government (monarkhia), for which he claims the support not only of the law, the prophets and other Christians, but also of various Greek writers.99 For Clement of Alexandria God is unique: “Who has promised immortality? Only the creator of the universe, the ‘father, the supreme artist’.” The Word of God is unique in his goodness, justice and the harmonious nature of his instructions. Clement uses phraseology such as “the only truly existing god” and “the all-powerful god is one and alone” to indicate God’s uniqueness. But he finds titles such as ‘the only one’ (ho monos) and ‘unity’ (to hen) just as incomplete as ‘the Good’ or ‘Mind’.100 Clement exclaims that “God is one and beyond the one and above the monad itself”, but his most frequent claim in this area is that “God is one (hena einai theon)”, which he supports by his own interpretation of several Greek authors. Some of the key phrases are quoted from the New Testament.101 Not only does Clement claim that the Father of the universe is one, the Word of the universe is one, the Holy Spirit one and the same and the church one, but he asserts the unity of God with the Word – both are one, both god. Moreover, the Holy Spirit is combined with the Father and the Son (the Word, Instructor and Creator of the world and of humankind). One god can be perceived as the creator of all humans with one image in one substance, but only by the gnostic.102 This and the

99 εἷς ἐστὶν θεός: Thphl.Ant. Autol. 2.34.4. μοναρχία: Autol. 2.4.5, 2.28.3. The law, prophets, other Christians: 2.34.1, 2.34.4–5, 2.35.4–8, 3.9. On the consistency of the prophets see 2.9, 2.35.9. Greek writers: 2.8, 2.36, 2.38.7–10, 3.2.2, 3.7.7–9. On the agreement of the Greeks and the Bible in Theophilos see Morlet 205–208. 100 God the Father unique: Clem. prot. 10.98.2–3, paraphrasing that favourite tag of Plutarch’s, Pindaros fr. 57 Maehler. The Word unique: paid. 1.11.97.2, 1.12.100.3, 3.1.1. ὁ μόνος ὄντως ὑπάρχων θεός: prot. 10.103.1. μόνος εἷς θεὸς παντοκράτωρ: str. 6.16.137.2, 7.2.12.1; cf. 6.18.163.1 (ἕνα μόνον ... θεόν, τὸν ὄντως ὄντα παντοκράτορα), 7.13.83.2 (ἑνὸς τοῦ παντοκράτορος θεοῦ). God referred to as ὁ μόνος: paid. 3.7.37.1; as ἕν or τὸ ἕν: paid. 1.8.62.4, str. 5.12.81.6. Titles inadequate: str. 5.12.81.4–5.12.82.4. Cf. V. Limone, VetChr 50 (2013) 213–250, especially 238–240. As E.F. Osborn sees it, God is not only beyond categories, but also beyond idols and earthly things and beyond dialectic (Clement 123). 101 ἓν δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν μονάδα: paid. 1.8.71.1; on the (Platonic) use of ἐπέκεινα here see Osborn, Clement 112 n. 3. ἕνα εἶναι θεόν or equivalent: prot. 6.68.3; q.d.s. 7.1; paid. 1.4.10.2; str. 4.15.97.1, 4.26.165.4; fr. III (p.212.16 Stählin/Früchtel: unus est deus). Greek authors: prot. 6.72.4, 7.74.2, 8.77.2; str. 1.29.182.1; cf. N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst, Les citations des poètes grecs chez les apologistes chrétiens du IIe siècle [Université de Louvain: Recueil de travaux d’histoire et de philologie4, 47] (Louvain 1972) 309–310. NT phrases: paid. 1.7.53.3 (Jn. 10.16), 1.8.71.1 (Jn. 17.21–23), 2.1.10.5 (1 Cor. 8.6). 102 Father, Word and Holy Spirit each one: paid. 1.6.42.1; cf. str. 7.17.107.3–6 (God one, the Lord one, the ancient church one). Unity of God with the Word: paid. 1.8.62.3–4; fr. III (p.210.5–6 Stählin/Früchtel); H.F. Hägg, referring to Excerpta ex Theodoto 17.4, stresses that immanence and incarnation did not detract from the unity of substance of the Word and the Father: Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism (Oxford

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references to Greek writers are the only suggestions of a defence of this belief. Yet he attacks those whom he calls heretics for not accepting “one god and omnipotent lord, the creator of all”; on the other hand he also denies that the philosophers who talk of one God and praise Christ speak the truth. Linked with references to the unity of God are some practical ideals: the unity of believers, frugality, the equality of the marriage bond, the unity of humankind and a virtuous life. While one or two of these ideals are expressed in ways suggesting concrete action, the logical connection between the concept of one God and the practical ideal – for example, between ‘the unity of the one being’ and ‘the unity of the many’ (referring to believers) – is in each case so weak as to suggest that the prestige of the belief in one god is being used to apply moral pressure to Clement’s readers so that they will accept the practical ideal.103 Naturally, many of the points we have found in the early Christian writers were already expressed in the New Testament. For example, the uniqueness of God and of Christ is made clear. Jesus and ‘the Jews’ agree that there is one Father and Paul proclaims one Spirit. Jesus identifies himself with God and speaks of being incorporated in the Father.104 The mere assertion of these beliefs was insufficient: the letter of James argues that the belief that “God is one” is inadequate without action. Paul uses his readers’ acceptance of the unity of God as a basis for claiming God as god of the Gentiles as well as of the Jews. The unity of God is used as a pattern for the unity of Jesus’ disciples and subsequently of all Christians, both by Jesus and by Paul.105 It can be seen, 2006) 200–201. Holy Spirit combined with the Father and the Son: paid. 3.12.100.2– 3.12.101.2. Perception of the gnostic (μόνος ὁ ἐπιστήμων): str. 7.14.86.2. 103 ‘Heretics’ (actually ‘heresies’): str. 4.1.2.2. Philosophers: 6.15.123.3. Practical ideals: prot. 9.88.2–3 (unity of believers expressed as ἡ ... ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνωσις, unity of God in κατὰ τὴν τῆς μοναδικῆς οὐσίας ἕνωσιν); paid. 1.4.10.2 (equality of marriage yoke), 2.3.38.3 (frugality), 3.7.37 (frugality); str. 5.14.98.1–2 (unity of humankind), 5.14.102.1–2 (divinisation), 7.13.83.2 (a virtuous life). 104 Uniqueness of God: NT Mt. 19.17; Jn. 5.44, 17.3; 1 Ti. 1.17; Jd. 25. Uniqueness of Christ: Mt. 23.8, 10; Jn. 10.16 (cf. OT Ezk. 34.23, 37.24); Hb. 10.12; Js 4.12. One Father: Mt. 23.9; Jn. 8.41; cf. 1 Cor. 8.6, 1 Ti. 2.5. One Spirit: 1 Cor. 12.4–11; Eph. 2.18. Incorporation of Jesus in the Father: Mt. 4.7 (Jesus applying LXX Dt. 6.16 to himself); Jn. 1.1–2, 10.30, 10.38, 14.9–11, 14.20, 16.32. For the uniqueness of God in the New Testament see, for example, J.F. McGrath, The Only True God: Early Christian Monotheism in its Jewish Context (Urbana, IL 2009). 105 James: 2.19–20. One God for Gentiles and Jews: Rom. 3.29–30. For other statements that God is one see 1 Cor. 8.4–6; Gal. 3.20; cf. Acts 17.23–31. Unity of followers of Christ: Jn. 17.11, 17.20–23; 1 Cor. 12.4–6, leading into 12.12–31; Eph. 4.4–6, leading into 4.7–16. A parallel type of argument appears in Gal. 3.19–20, where the acceptance that God is one forms the basis for the claim that God does not need a mediator. The logic of the passage, however, has been much debated: see J.D.G. Dunn, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians (London 1993) 191–192 and J.L. Martyn, Galatians [The Anchor Bible, 33A] (New York 1997) 357–358, 365–367.

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then, that the basic elements and terminology of the Christian idea of the unity of God are found in the New Testament. However, in the face of conflict as to the exact interpretation of the biblical material, second-century Christians whose works have been preserved both refined and developed the idea. They invented such terms as trias (trinity), first found in Theophilos of Antioch,106 in order to defend their views against the extremes of dividing God into separate entities and of identifying the three persons indistinguishably. The interest, then, of these writers lay primarily in definition of ideas. However, from New Testament times through to Clement of Alexandria, we can see the moral authority of the unity of God idea being used to support practical precepts where ‘one’ is relevant (for example, ‘one’ marriage, the ‘oneness’ of believers). But in no case is the practical precept logically derived from the idea of the unity of God. All of this discussion, going back to the New Testament, is far removed from most of what we find in non-Christian writings of the same period. Plutarch, for example, may state that God is one (heis on) or that the name Phoibos suggests oneness (to hen) when talking about Apollon, but he freely admits other gods, and makes clear that Zeus is not the only God.107 Dion of Prousa stresses the uniqueness of Zeus in terms of the epithets applied to him, but this is a uniqueness among a rather elastic range of gods.108 Ailios Aristeides is rather eclectic, sometimes focussing his audience’s attention exclusively on Zeus or on Asklepios or some other god or goddess. But one can generally detect other gods in the background. While some of the philosophical writers more patently believe in a plurality of gods, Marcus Aurelius uses the phrase “one God” (theos heis), but the repeated use of heis is intended to emphasise the one universe – much as the repeated use of heis in the New Testament letter to the Ephesians serves to encourage Christian unity.109 Closest to the Christian writers, in our general period, are some anonymous authors. The treatise On the kosmos asserts that God is one (heis on) and refers various divine activities to 106 Thphl.Ant. Autol. 2.15.4, where, however, τριάς is used of God, his Word and his Sophia. The Latin term trinitas is first found in Tertullian, but it is used of (for example) the Valentinian trinity of the soul (praes.haer. 7.3; Val. 17.2; anim. 21.1, 21.4, 21.7) as much as the godhead (Prax. 2.4, 3.1, 8.7; pudic. 21.16); for Tertullian on the trinity see A.B. McGowan in id. et al. (eds.), God in Early Christian Thought: Essays in Memory of Lloyd G. Patterson [Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 94] (Leiden 2009) 61–81. More generally over the first two centuries of Christians see B. Altaner and A. Stuiber, Patrologie: Leben, Schriften und Lehre der Kirchenväter9 (Freiburg 1978) 76, 155. R.M. Grant (op. cit. [n. 32] 156) makes the point that four is as important as three in Autol. 2.15.4; however, Theophilos’ early use of τριάς is striking. 107 Apollon: Plu. mor. 393a–b. Zeus: 1075a–b. 108 Zeus unique: Dion 1.39–41, 12.75–77 (Ζεὺς ... μόνος θεῶν in both speeches). 109 θεὸς εἷς: M.A. 7.9.2; cf. NT Eph. 4.4–6 and W.A. Meeks in J. Jervell and Meeks (eds.), God’s Christ and His People: Studies in Honour of Nils Alstrup Dahl (Oslo 1977) 214.

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this single god (Zeus is in the author’s mind). The Hermetic literature describes the primary God as incomparable, one and unique, using such terms as ho heis kai monos (“the one and only [God]”). The unity of God is supported by the kosmos being one, the sun one, the moon one, and so on. But even here there are other gods in the background.110 So the Christian writers (along with Jewish ones) are distinctive in their insistence on there being only one God. As indicated at the beginning of chapter 5, the kind of stance I have taken here has been challenged by the organisers of an Oxford seminar in 1996 on ‘pagan forms of monotheism in late antiquity’. As this title suggests, they believe that monotheism “was increasingly widespread” in the first four centuries C.E. among the educated members of society in the Greek east of the Roman empire. By the time of an Exeter conference in 2006 there were scholars ready to speak against the idea of pagan monotheism (see chapter 5).111 The early Christians also give a distinctive twist to their comments on the unity of the Roman empire. They, like other Greeks under the Roman peace, saw the empire as a unit. They too sometimes made it co-extensive with the inhabited world. But while they accept the unity of the empire, it is not a prominent theme. As provincials, most of the Christians did not possess Roman citizenship – here as elsewhere Paul was an exception. So it is not surprising that they emphasised their own citizenship. Their common name, common hope, one prayer, one mind, shared bread in the eucharist were linked with their exclusive citizenship ‘in heaven’. Other commonalities are mentioned (for example, by Justin), including ‘one church’. Of course the unity of the Christian church was not of concern to others before Constantine had embraced it and insisted (as at the Council of Nikaia in 325 C.E.) that Christians must agree.112 Julian (Caesar from 361 to 363 C.E.) may well have tolerated a Christian church that was not causing conflict, even though he was opposed to Christianity. There is, however, a curious parallel between the advice of Christian writers on Christian unity and the advice of Greek writers such as Dion of Prousa and Plutarch. The former deal with conflict within a church and between churches in terms quite parallel with advice to Greek cities on internal harmony and inter-city rivalry. For example, Christians from early times decried ‘envy’ and ‘dissension’, though the lists of bad characteristics quickly turn to things more

110 mund. 401a 12–27. C.H. 11.5 (τῷ ἀνομοίῳ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ ἑνί); 4.8 (τὸν ἕνα καὶ μόνον), 11.8 (πάντως ἕνα), 11.11 (ὅτι δὲ καὶ εἷς, φανερώτατον· καὶ γὰρ μία ψυχὴ καὶ μία ζωή ... καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἕνα καὶ τὴν σελήνην μίαν ...). 111 M. Frede in Pagan Monotheism 41–67 and (with P. Athanassiadi) 1–3, 20 (quotation from 1). Exeter conference: One God and Monotheism. 112 For Constantine’s intention to insist on agreement at Nikaia see his summoning of the council in the previous year (Syriac version in Patrologia Orientalis 23 [Paris 1932] 204– 205; English translation in P.R. Coleman-Norton, Roman State and Christian Church: A Collection of Legal Documents to A.D. 535 [London 1966] 1.123).

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relevant to Christians (like slanders, base suspicions and wrangling).113 Indeed, the call for harmony can be linked with Christian citizenship: See to it, dear friends, that the benefactions (euergesiai) of Christ do not turn into a judgment on us all, should we fail to act as citizens (politeuomenoi) worthily of him and to perform in harmony (homonoia) beneficial acts that are pleasing in his sight.114

113

e.g. NT 2 Cor. 12.20: ἔρις, ζῆλος, θυμοί, ἐριθεῖαι, καταλαλιαί, ψιθυρισμοί, φυσιώσεις, ἀκαταστασίαι; 1 Tim. 6.4–5: φθόνος ἔρις βλασφημίαι, ὑπόνοιαι πονηραί, διαπαρατριβαί …; 1 Clem. 3.2: ζῆλος καὶ φθόνος, ἔρις καὶ στάσις. There are at least six lists of virtues in the New Testament with four or more items: 2 Cor. 6.6–7, Gal. 5.22–23, Col. 3.12–15, 1 Tim. 6.11, 2 Tim. 2.22, 3.10. 114 1 Clem. 21.1. On euergetism in this work see S.J. Joubert, Biblical Theology Bulletin 31 (2001) 17–25.

Chapter 8

The Early Christians: A Common Heritage The Christians of the first two centuries lived in a Mediterranean world kept peaceful and controlled by Rome and they were exposed to the ideas prevalent in that world. However, they had a different set of basic values from those held by most educated residents of the empire. What ideas concerning unity and disunity did the early Christian writers share with their non-Christian contemporaries? As well as laying out the ideas that seem to overlap with ideas we have seen in other writers, we can see whether the ideas of the early Christians go back to the founders of their religion. It will become apparent that it is often difficult to discern a precedent in the New Testament for statements made by the early Christians on unity and disunity. They must be getting their ideas from a common intellectual heritage. Three ideas of unity are particularly indicative here: the unity of humankind, union with God, and the harmony of the universe.

The Unity of Humankind The Unity of Humankind

The idea of the unity of humankind is present in the second, third and fourth generations of Christians, the so-called apostolic fathers and apologists, but it is not prominent. Just as with non-Christian writers, humans are seen as a whole in such expressions as “all who inhabit the earth” and “the creation (ktisis) of humankind”. In the latter case, the fate forecast in The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles for “the creation of humankind” – many will perish, some will be saved, at the fiery trial – shows that the expression is simply a means of saying ‘all humankind’. This comprehensive term is probably Semitic in origin.1 The Letter to Diognetos says that God loved humankind (hoi anthropoi), for whose sake he made the world and to whom he subjected all things 1

πᾶσιν τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν τὴν γῆν: 1 Clem. 60.4. ἡ κτίσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων: Did. 16.5; no satisfying emendation has been proposed for this surprising expression: W. Rordorf and A. Tuilier (eds.), La doctrine des douze apôtres (Didachè)2 (Paris 1998) 197 n. 5. The author uses οἱ ἄνθρωποι of humankind in 10.3 (where, however, the Coptic translation, which begins here, implies an original οἱ υἱοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων: see C.N. Jefford and S.J. Patterson, Second Century 7 [1989–1990] 65–75, especially 72–74; F.S. Jones and P.A. Mirecki in C.N. Jefford (ed.), The Didache in Context: Essays on Its Text, History and Transmission

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on the earth. Justin builds on this belief, asserting on the basis that God made the world for the human race (to anthropeion genos) the view that Christians play a rôle in continuing the human race so that divine doctrines may be taught.2 But there is evidence that the unity of humankind is not a belief held strongly by the early Christian writers. 2 Clement envisages the unity of all nations if they obey the commandments of God and are all of one mind, but the author clearly believes that this will not happen.3 Prior to his martyrdom Polykarpos is reported to have prayed for all people (pantes), but this may mean only those whom he had met.4

[Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 77] [Leiden 1995] 52–53, 59–60, 86). K. Niederwimmer understands τῶν ἀνθρώπων with πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις in NT Mk. 16.15 and compares Herm. mand. 7.5 and NT Col. 1.23: Die Didache2 [Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern, 1] (Göttingen 1993) 263 n. 2 = The Didache: A Commentary (Minneapolis 1998) 221 n. 2. The degree to which Didache 16 uses the Synoptic Gospels has been much debated: see C.M. Tuckett in J.-M. Sevrin (ed.), The New Testament in Early Christianity/La réception des écrits néotestamentaires dans le christianisme primitif [Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 86] (Leuven 1989) 197–230 at 200–208 = J.A. Draper (ed.), The Didache in Modern Research [Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums, 37] (Leiden 1996) 92–128 at 95–104; V. Balabanski, Eschatology in the Making: Mark, Matthew and the Didache [Society for New Testament Studies: Monograph Series, 97] (Cambridge 1997), chap. 6; W. Rordorf and A. Tuilier (eds.), op. cit. 89–91; A. Milavec, The Didache: Faith, Hope, and Life of the Earliest Christian Communities, 50–70 C.E. (New York 2003) 693–739. 2 Diogn. 10.2. For ὁ ἄνθρωπος indicating humankind see, for example, Herm. mand. 12.4.2–3, 12.5.1. E.H. Blakeney provides many references to show the widespread belief that the world was made for humankind: JThS 42 (1941) 193–195 = The Epistle to Diognetus (London 1943) 74–77. Justin: 2 apol. 4.2. 3 2 Clem. 17.3–7. τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν follows Paul (see Rom. 15.5, Phil. 4.2 and passages in n. 67 of chap. 7), but not this use of συνάγειν (17.3); cf. W. Pratscher, Der zweite Clemensbrief [Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern, 3] (Göttingen 2007) 209. On the basis of the close parallel between the apocryphal OT text in both 1 Clem. 23.3–4 and 2 Clem. 11.2– 4 (see, conveniently, W. Pratscher, op. cit. 151–153), this “hortatory address” (Donfried’s term for 2 Clement at 7, 36; “exhortation” at 13) may well have originated in Rome: see G.R. Stanton, C & M 28 (1967 [1970]) 314–320; C.M. Tuckett, 2 Clement: Introduction, Text, and Commentary (Oxford 2012) 58–64; cf. K.P. Donfried, The Setting of Second Clement in Early Christianity [Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 38] (Leiden 1974) 1–13 for a Corinthian origin. E. Baasland concludes that decisive evidence is lacking to arbitrate between a western location (such as Rome or Corinth) and an eastern one: ANRW 2.27.1 (Berlin 1993) 78–157 at 89–92; similarly B.D. Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers (Cambridge, MA 2003) 1.157–158. Egypt has more recently been favoured by scholars: for example, K. Wengst (ed.), Didache (Apostellehre), Barnabasbrief, Zweiter Klemensbrief, Schrift an Diognet [Schriften des Urchristentums, 2] (Darmstadt 1984) 226–227, 241 n. 19; R. Warns, Untersuchungen zum 2.Clemens-Brief (Marburg 1985 [1987]) 31–37, 530–544 and especially 91– 95; W. Pratscher, op. cit. 59–61. 4 Compare M.Polyk. 5.1 with 8.1.

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In his main Apology Justin asserts a social unity among Christians despite diverse ethnic backgrounds, but he does not extend this unity to all humankind.5 However, in his dialogue with Tryphon he does finally express a belief in the unity of humankind. Much of his thinking is in terms of a division into peoples, nations or races. Thus he attempts to score against his opponent by repeatedly claiming that, whereas the Jews consider themselves a separate people, Christ is for all nations (ethne). Later phrases such as “absolutely all people from every race of humans” and “in every race of humankind” indicate by their prepositional phrases a similarly ethnic orientation in his thinking.6 But he does bring all humans together in such statements as “the whole human race (pan genos anthropon) will be found to be under a curse” and “his father caused him (Christ) to suffer these things on behalf of the human race”. This interpretation is consistent with the definition of humans as ones who experience similar passions and with such claims as that the final law (Christ) is for all humans and that the virgin birth is a trustworthy sign for humankind.7 On the other hand, the Hebraic vocative expression “all the earth” in Psalm 95(96).1 is restricted in Justin’s interpretation to those who know the mystery of salvation. Elsewhere, in a highly theoretical vision based on a misinterpretation of the Septuagint version of Isaiah 53.1-2, Justin sees the many becoming subject to Christ and all (pantes) grouped together by various means: they are said to become like one child; the parallel of the body is used (many members of the body, but called one, hen); then metaphors of the community (demos) and assembly 5

Just. 1 apol. 14.2–3 (cf. chap. 7 at n. 32). His description of the Romans as adelphoi in 2 apol. 1.1 may spring from a wish that they become Christians, since he also describes them in the same clause (n. 7 below) as people of similar experience to Christians. On the whole, Romans did not reciprocate in response to such approaches, being (for example) rather exclusive with their citizenship. 6 Christ for all nations: especially dial. 18–24 (πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, from LXX Jer. 3.17, in 24.3). πάντας ἁπλῶς τοὺς ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων: 64.2. ἐν παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων: 93.1 (followed by πᾶν γένος γνωρίζον ...). 7 πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων εὑρεθήσεται ὑπὸ κατάραν ὄν: dial. 95.1 (but note that “all the nations [πάντα τὰ ἔθνη]” and “humans from every race [τῶν ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων]” follow in the same paragraph, 95.1–2). ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους: 95.2. Similarly, God created the world along with everything in it for the sake of humankind (διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον): 41.1. Humans as experiencing similar passions: 48.3, 57.3 (ὁμοιοπαθὴς πᾶσιν), 93.3 (τὸ ὁμοιοπαθὲς καὶ λογικὸν ζῷον, ὁ ἄνθρωπος); cf. 2 apol. 1.1 (ὁμοιοπαθῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀδελφῶν), Ps.-Just. mon. 1.1 (human nature originally received a union of intelligence and salvation [τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως τὸ κατ᾿ ἀρχὴν συζυγίαν συνέσεως καὶ σωτηρίας λαβούσης]; cf. 6.1: ἐπαναδραμεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς συζυγίας κοινωνίαν καὶ προσάψαι ἑαυτὸν συνέσει εἰς σωτηρίαν). The περὶ μοναρχίας attributed to Justin may belong in the third century, given that οἱ ἀνθρωποπαθεῖς ... δεσπόται, referring to Greek gods in 6.1, seems to imitate Clement’s [οἱ] θεοὶ ἀνθρωποπαθεῖς (prot. 2.36.1, str. 5.14.116.4): M. Marcovich (ed.), Pseudo-Iustinus: Cohortatio ad Graecos, de monarchia, oratio ad Graecos [Patristische Texte und Studien, 32] (Berlin 1990) 82. Final law for all humans: Just. dial. 11.2 (πάντων ἁπλῶς). Virgin birth: dial. 84.2 (τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων).

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(ekklesia) are employed.8 We may conclude that Justin also lacks a concrete, disinterested and firmly-held belief in the unity of humankind. The same mixed approach to the unity of humankind can be seen in other second-century Christian writers. Tatianos say that all humans share the same sun and the one death. He is eager to point out that his opponents were born in the same way as Christians and share in the same administration of the world. His definition of ‘human’ is similar to that of Platonic and Stoic traditions.9 Athenagoras demonstrates from the moral teaching of the Christians that they believe in a god presiding over the human race (to ton anthropon genos).10 Irenaeus repeatedly speaks of “the human race” or “the whole human race”. This concept is used, for example, to support the essential unity of the faith of Christians throughout the world, to affirm the salvation of Adam in opposition to Tatianos and to assert the universality of the new dispensation.11 Whereas

8 πᾶσα ἡ γῆ in Psalm 95: dial. 74.2–3; on the lacuna in dial. 74 see G. Otranto, Esegesi biblica e storia in Giustino (Dial. 63–84) [Quaderni di “Vetera Christianorum”, 14] (Bari 1979) 159–170. Isaiah 53: dial. 42 (in the midst of interpreting Moses’ arrangements). Justin probably used Paul (Rom. 10.16–18) as his source (rather than Jn. 12.38): O. Skarsaune, The Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr’s Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile [Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 56] (Leiden 1987) 116. On the extensive quotations from Is. 52–53 see Osborn, Justin 103 and H.W. Wolff, Jesaja 53 im Urchristentum4 (Gießen 1984) 123–129. Unless πάντας in 42.3 means ‘all humans’, this vision involves a division of humankind. ἐκκλησία linked with δῆμος should refer to a political assembly rather than to the church, as the Latin version (using conuentus) recognised (for a different view see Osborn, Justin 177). G.N. Stanton explored the tight group boundaries maintained by Justin and Tryphon in dial.: in id. and G.G. Strousma (eds.), Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity (Cambridge 1998) 263–278, especially 266–275. Communal identity is a major interest also in S.J. Wendel, Scriptural Interpretation and Community Self-Definition in Luke-Acts and the Writings of Justin Martyr [Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 139] (Leiden 2011), especially chaps. 2–3. Boundaries in Ignatios of Antioch are explored by T.A. Robinson, Ignatius of Antioch and the Parting of the Ways: Early Jewish-Christian Relations (Peabody, MA 2009), especially chap. 6. More generally see J. Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (Oxford 2004). 9 Sun and death: Tat. orat. 11.2, 26.4; cf. the idea that humans alone are the image and likeness of God in 15.3 (cf. LXX Gen. 1.26 [n. 13 below]). Same administration of the world: orat. 26.4. Definition of ‘human’: A. Orbe, Gregorianum 48 (1967) 522–576 at 526–528. J.E. Fojtik argues that Tatianos revels in his ‘barbarian’ identity as a response to the criticism that Christianity is ‘barbarian’, thus reinforcing the dichotomy between Greek and barbarian: in J. Ulrich et al. (eds.), Continuity and Discontinuity in Early Christian Apologetics [Early Christianity in the Context of Antiquity, 5] (Frankfurt am Main 2009) 23–34. On the date of Tatianos see chap. 7 n. 31. 10 Athenag. leg. 11.1–12.1. 11 ἡ ἀνθρωπότης: Iren. haer. 3.11.8, 3.12.1. πᾶσα ἀνθρωπότης: 1.10.1. humanum genus: 3.16.6 (cf. 4.28.2), 3.18.5–6, 4.20.4, 4.22.1, 4.24.1. omne humanum genus: 3.5.3, 4.40.2; cf. unum genus humanum in the final section of the work (5.36.3). Unity of faith: 1.10.1; cf. B.

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the legislation “for slavery” was for one nation only, the Jews, the legislation “for freedom” is diffused through the whole world. Christ united the circumcision and the uncircumcision. Christ’s ‘wages’ are human beings who come together from various and diverse nations into one cohort of faith.12 In his Areopagos speech Paul is alleged to have declared God the maker of one race of humans (unum genus humanum) as well as the creator of the world. God is said to have caused humans to become one with (sunhenoun) God, this union being the means by which they partake of incorruptibility; the work of the mediator lies in bringing humans and God to friendship and harmony (philia kai homonoia). Elsewhere anthropos is used in a similar broad sense for humankind.13 But Irenaeus is on other occasions determined to divide the human race. For example, Pentecost is seen as bringing together distant tribes in unity, but the simile of the loaf of bread that follows makes it clear that the unity is restricted to Christians: the water from heaven corresponds to the moisture that keeps the loaf a unity. In order to attack his rivals’ view of the union of the aions with their producer Irenaeus is prepared to claim that humans are not mixed with or united with one another (perhaps only in a strictly physical sense). The whole human race will be divided at the judgment in accordance with Christ’s statement about the sheep and the goats.14 There is in Irenaeus’ writings a strong emphasis on the separation of Christians from the rest of humankind.

Aland in O. Wischmeyer and L. Scornaienchi (eds.), Polemik in der frühchristlichen Literatur: Texte und Kontexte [BZNW, 170] (Berlin 2011) 582–583. For the unity of the faith in Clement of Alexandria see A.C. Itter, Esoteric Teaching in the Stromateis of Clement of Alexandria [Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 97] (Leiden 2009) 183–187. Salvation of Adam: 3.23.8 (omnis hominis generatio). Universality of new dispensation: 4.22.1–2 (humanum genus, omnes omnino homines). The statement that the just judgment of God reaches all humans in a similar manner (ἅπαντας ὁμοίως in 5 fr.gr. 17 = omnes aequaliter in haer. 5.24.2; cf. A. Strobel, ZKG 68 [1957] 139–143) is less strong. (For much of Irenaeus we are dependent on a Latin translation.) 12 legisdatio: haer. 4.9.2; cf. Just. dial. 18–24 (n. 6 above). Circumcision: haer. 3.5.3 (in unum collegit et uniuit eos qui longe et eos qui prope, hoc est circumcisionem et praeputium); cf. NT Eph. 2.17. Wages of Christ: 4.21.3. 13 Areopagos speech: haer. 3.12.9 (supported by a quotation from NT Ac. 17.24–31, on which see below at n. 26). φιλία καὶ ὁμόνοια: 3.18.7; the fragment from Theodoretos, eran.: flor. (p. 153 Ettlinger) begins: ἥνωσεν οὖν ... τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ θεῷ. The Ebionites are attacked for their rejection of the union of God and humans: 5.1.3 (n. 38 below). ὁ ἄνθρωπος (homo): 4.37.7, 4.38.1, 4.38.3; cf. homo in 5.24.2 and Tat. orat. 15.3 (ὁ ἄνθρωπος alone the image and likeness of God; n. 9 above). The influence of LXX Gen. 1.26 (ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾿ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾿ ὁμοίωσιν) is seen also in LXX Sir. 17.3 and Philon, Allegorical Interpretation 3.96. 14 Bread (unus panis): haer. 3.17.2; similarly distantes tribus is limited by its conjunction with primitias omnium gentium. quemadmodum homines, non admixtus neque unitus alter altero: 2.17.3 (attacking the view that aions were produced in order to be uniti ei qui emiserit [2.17.2]). Division of omne genus humanum: haer. 4.40.2, based on NT Mt. 25.31–46.

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An interesting discussion of “the race of humans (to genos ton anthropon)” occurs in Theophilos of Antioch. He speaks of the race of all humans at that time being destroyed in the flood, but Noah (or Deukalion) and seven other persons survived, so there was still one speech and one language.15 When the languages of the humans then existing were divided, those humans began to increase in number and spread over the whole earth; this division of language explains why the whole earth is now filled with inhabitants.16 God the father and creator of the universe did not abandon humankind (anthropotes), but provided a law and prophets to teach to genos ton anthropon that there is one god.17 At the end of our period Clement of Alexandria speaks of “humankind” and “all humankind”, of “all humans” and “the whole race of humans” in such a way as to suggest a belief in the unity of humankind.18 But unambiguous statements supporting this belief can be found in only two passages. A quotation from Plato is taken to imply that we are brothers and sisters, since we belong to one God and one teacher. Later the knowledgeable person (the gnostic) is said to be alone in recognising that all humans are the work of one God and invested with one image in one substance.19 Elsewhere limitations are placed 15 Thphl.Ant. Autol. 3.19 (τὸ γένος πάντων τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων), 2.31.3 (χεῖλος ἓν καὶ μία γλῶσσα). While χεῖλος ἕν picks up LXX Gen. 11.1, 6, the latter passage also uses φωνὴ μία (11.1) and γένος ἕν (11.6). The metaphorical use of χεῖλος is Semitic (see LXX Gen. 11.1–9 and Is. 28.11). 16 Autol. 2.32. On the argument concerning the origin and nature of language in 2.29–32 see A.J. Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture [Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie, 26] (Tübingen 1989) 102–108, 110–118 and F.M. Young in M.J. Edwards et al. (eds.), Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews, and Christians (Oxford 1999) 97–98. 17 Autol. 2.34.4. Other suggestions of humankind as a unit are the phrase τῆς ἀνθρώπου ποιήσεως (2.35.9) and the offhand comment that Plato spoke often of the sole government of God and of ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπου (3.7.7, introducing a point on philosophical discussion of the immortality of the soul). 18 ἡ ἀνθρωπότης: Clem. paid. 1.2.6.2, 1.6.30.2, 1.7.57.1; str. 7.2.7.3. πᾶσα ἡ ἀνθρωπότης: paid. 1.7.55.2, 1.9.83.3. πάντες ἄνθρωποι: prot. 10.106.5, str. 7.2.5.6. τὸ πᾶν ἀνθρώπων γένος: prot. 12.120.2, str. 6.17.159.9; cf. D.K. Buell, Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York 2005) 155 with 226 n. 44. σύμπαν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος: str. 4.8.63.1; cf. 2.18.86.7 (τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος) and P. Ashwin-Siejkowski, Clement of Alexandria on Trial: The Evidence of ‘Heresy’ from Photius’ Bibliotheca [Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 101] (Leiden 2010) 144. The use of ὁ ἄνθρωπος in paid. 1.3.7.1, 3.7.37.2 and str. 1.14.60.4 may also suggest ‘humankind’ (so Osborn, Clement 137, with respect to paid. 1.3.7.1). At the end of Protreptikos (12.121.1) there is a chariot image in which Jesus is said to have yoked together the team of humankind and to be driving the chariot to immortality. 19 ἀδελφοί: str. 5.14.98.1; cf. Pl. rep. 3.415a. Knowledgeable person: str. 7.14.86.1–2. ὁ ἐπιστήμων in this passage is equivalent to ὁ γνωστικός in 7.7.41.6, 7.7.49.3, 7.11.68.1 and elsewhere. Perhaps the belief in one race of gods and humans (str. 5.14.102.2; cf. 4.25.157.2

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on the belief that humankind is one. In one passage the Christian God (“the Lord”) is called the only god of both Greeks and barbarians, indeed of the whole race of humankind, but earlier God is Lord of those who know him. When the Word is looked on as the commander of the universe who brings us peacefully to “the sacred harmony of citizenship”, the adjective “sacred” indicates that this citizenship is for Christians alone. The phrase “the salvation of all” seems to mean only ‘all who are saved’, for shortly before “the common salvation of humankind” is interpreted as “common” in the sense that the faith of those who have chosen this salvation is shared in common by them. Later in Miscellanies the gnostic’s realisation that his brother or sister shares with him the same father and mother is said to lead him to help his neighbour in practical ways; but not much after this “brothers and sisters” clearly refers to the gnostic’s fellow Christians only.20 Furthermore, Clement makes a definite division of humankind in other places. The impious of Psalm 1.4-5 are said to be already condemned “so as not to be united (henothenai) with those who have lived without stumbling”. When Clement says that “the harmony (homonoia) of the many calculated from ‘the three with whom is the Lord’ might be the one church, the one human, the one race”, the reference to the New Testament and the mention of the church show that the three unities are restricted to Christians. And Christians are explicitly contrasted with the Jews and the Greeks and with the rest of humankind.21 The unity of humankind, then, is not a strongly held belief of Clement of Alexandria. [ἑνούμενον ἐν αὐτῷ]), quoted from Pindaros (Nem. 6.1–2), could be cited as a third statement supporting belief in the unity of humankind. E.F. Osborn sees an ellipse, with the two foci being God and humankind, produced from a prior ellipse of God the father and God the son: Clement 137–142, 147–149, 244. On the gnostic in Clement’s thought see E. de Faye, Clément d’Alexandrie: Étude sur les rapports du Christianisme et de la philosophie grecque au IIe siècle2 [Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études: Sciences religieuses, 12] (Paris 1906) 274–317, especially 280–291; W. Foerster (ed.), Gnosis: A Selection of Gnostic Texts 1 (Oxford 1972), chaps. 2, 5, 12–13 and 20. 20 The assertions in str. 4.23.151.3, 4.23.152.1 and 4.25.157.2 about anthropos becoming one (εἷς) or a unit (μοναδικός) probably refer to the individual person, but 4.23.151–152 clearly restricts the Pythagorean saying “that the human being should become one” (4.23.151.3) to Christians. “The Lord (ὁ κύριος)”: contrast str. 6.17.159.9 with 6.16.146.2. Sacred harmony of citizenship: paid. 1.8.65.3. On citizenship, see the first section of chapter 7. “Salvation of all”: compare str. 7.2.9.2 with 7.2.8.1; for the emphasis on faith note Clement’s twist εἰς πίστιν after ἑνοποιοῦσα in excerpta ex Theodoto 1.3 Sagnard with R.P. Casey’s comments: The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria [Studies and Documents, 1] (London 1934) 25–26, 97. See also A. Le Boulluec in M. Havrda et al. (eds.), The Seventh Book of the Stromateis: Proceedings of the Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria (Olomouc, October 21–23, 2010) [Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 117] (Leiden 2012) 50–53. Brother and sister/neighbour: compare str. 7.12.69.1–2 with 7.12.76.7– 7.12.77.6. 21 Psalm 1.4–5: str. 2.15.69.1. Allusion to NT Mt. 18.20: str. 3.10.70.1. Contrast with Jews and Greeks: str. 6.5.41.6–7. Although “Christians are a third race which knows God in

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A similar equivocation about the unity of humankind can be seen in the earliest Christian documents, those of the New Testament. Several words and phrases refer to humankind as a whole, some of them Semitic in phraseology, others equivalent to expressions in non-Christian writings.22 The New Testament writers can talk of the common predicament of humans, such as in “all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God”, or of the expectation deriving from Isaiah that “every mouth shall give thanks to you, and every tongue ..., and every eye ..., and every knee ...”. Such a prayer went back a long way in the Jewish synagogue and the verse is alluded to by Paul and Ignatios of Antioch. But it falls short of a prayer for a united humanity, as W.R. Schoedel thought. Paul says that God has broken down the enmity between Jews and Gentiles and reconciled both to God in one body. There is no question now of, for example, Jew and Greek, slave and free, male and female, barbarian, Scythian; Christ is all and in all. But the insistence in each passage on unity in Christ (for example, “for all of you are one in Christ Jesus”) simply inserts another discriminator after the common distinctions are broken down.23 The quotation a new and spiritual way” (Osborn, Clement 288), Tertullian denies the claim that the Christians are the tertium genus and points out that there are Christians in every gens: nat. 1.8.9– 10; cf. gens in 1.16.6. Christians versus the rest of humankind: prot. 9.82.7. This contrast makes it difficult for D.K. Buell to claim that “Christians, according to Clement, are not just the oldest people but are in fact the only human race”: op. cit. (n. 18) 73–74. The passage does, however, support her view that Christians claimed to be the first of humankind to have come to know God. 22 Semitic expressions: πᾶσα σάρξ (e.g. NT Mt. 24.22, Jn. 17.2, 1 Cor 1.29); πάντα τὰ ἔθνη (e.g. Mk. 13.10, Lk. 24.47, Ac. 14.16); οἱ υἱοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (Eph. 3.5). πᾶσα σάρξ is sometimes preferred to a Greek expression: for example, Paul at Rom. 3.20 replaces πᾶς ζῶν in Ps. 142(143).2 with the term. The term is also used in 1 Clem. 64.1 and Iren. haer. 1.10.1. Other expressions: πάντες ἄνθρωποι (Rom. 5.12, Tit. 2.11); πάντες (2 Cor. 5.14, 1 Ti. 2.6; for οἱ πάντες referring to all human beings in 2 Cor. 5.14 see M.J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text [Grand Rapids, MI 2005] 420–421); πάντες πανταχοῦ (Ac. 17.30); ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη (Js. 3.7); ὅλη ἡ οἰκουμένη (Mt 24.14, Rv. 3.10; cf. ὅλος ὁ κόσμος in 1 Jn. 2.2; ἡ οἰκουμένη in Ac. 17.31 [quoting a recurring expression from LXX Ps. 9.9, 95(96).13, 97(98).9], 19.27); οἱ κατοικοῦντες ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς in Rv. 3.10, 11.10, 13.8). D.L. Balch surveys the usage of such terms as τὰ ἔθνη and οἱ ἀλλόφυλοι in Jewish writers of the last two centuries B.C.E. and finds some, such as Eupolemos (ed. C.R. Holladay, Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors 1 [Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations, 20] [Chico, CA 1983] 112–135), open to contributions from foreigners, but other documents, such as 2 Maccabees and the Greek additions to Esther, hostile to non-Jews. He sees this Jewish tension reflected in Luke-Acts: in A.J. Malherbe et al. (eds.), The Early Church in its Context: Essays in Honor of Everett Ferguson [Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 90] (Leiden 1998) 22–47. 23 Common predicament of humans: NT Rom. 3.23; cf. 3.9 (᾿Ιουδαίους τε καὶ ῞Ελληνας πάντας). Isaiah 45.23 is cited or echoed in Rom. 14.11, Phil. 2.10–11 and Ign. Magn. 10.3. It is true, as Schoedel (127) says, that the prayer “Let all the inhabitants of the world perceive and know that to you every knee must bow, every tongue must swear allegiance” both is

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by James of the term “the rest of humankind” confirms the Old Testament division between Jews and Gentiles, a division which is accepted by Paul as well. The references in the Apocalypse to God’s followers in every “tribe, language, people and nation” stress the divisions of humankind rather than unity. And the first letter of Peter emphasises that the Christians are a separate “race”, “nation” and “people”.24 However, it has been claimed by W.A. Meeks that the unity of humankind was promoted in the New Testament letters to the Colossians and to the Ephesians. The case turns on the meaning of a set of cosmic symbols which he sees as connecting the communal life of early Christians to acts of power in heaven and on earth and under the earth. He identifies the hallmark of the “new human” that emerges after baptism (“putting on Christ”) as unity. According to Colossians, in his view, baptism celebrates both the restoration of human unity and a cosmic event. But the fact remains that baptism distinguishes between Christians and the rest of humankind. The unity which the Colossians are urged to cultivate is wider than the local church. The aim of the Pauline mission is to present “every human being” (pas anthropos) mature in Christ. But as Meeks makes clear, “several motifs … emphasize the separateness of the Christian group from the larger society”. The virtues that promote harmony (“seek the things that are above”) are directed at community life on earth. Another scholar who has seen more acceptance of the unity of humankind in the New Testament than I allow is D.L. Balch, who has argued that the author of Luke-Acts envisages the reception of all nations into the people of God and asserted that this approach rests not on Hellenistic principles (such as the activities of Alexander III of Makedon) but on Roman social policy whereby selected people were granted citizenship from Claudius Caesar onward. Unfortunately, such New Testament phrases as “acceptable year of the Lord” and “in every nation anyone who fears [God] and does what is right is acceptable” do not amount to “receiving all nations”. And in any case selective grants of Roman citizenship ancient (cf. T. Kronholm, Seder R. Amram Gaon 2 [Lund 1974] 70) and has a prominent place near the end of the Jewish liturgy for Morning Service for Sabbaths (cf. The Authorised Daily Prayer Book of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth3 [London 1990] 418 for contemporary usage). But the emphasis is not on the unity of humankind, but (in the words of J.H. Hertz’s marginal note in The Authorised Daily Prayer Book of the United Hebrew Congregations of the British Empire, rev. ed. [London 1976] 553) on Israel’s hope for humanity united in recognition of one God. Reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles: Eph. 2.14–16 (ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι), 3.6 (σύσσωμα). Removal of distinctions: Gal. 3.28; Col. 3.11. 24 James: Ac. 15.17, quoting Amos 9.12. Paul: 2 Cor. 11.26 (contrasting his compatriots with foreigners: ἐκ γένους ... ἐξ ἐθνῶν); 1 Th. 2.14–15 (τῶν ᾿Ιουδαίων ... πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίων). ἐκ πάσης φυλῆς καὶ γλώσσης καὶ λαοῦ καὶ ἔθνους: Rv. 5.9, 7.9 (mainly plural), 13.7, 14.6; cf. 10.11, 11.9, 17.15. For the inclusion of ἡμᾶς as the object of ἠγόρασας in Rv. 5.9 see P. Malik, ZNTW 108 (2017) 306–312. For Old Testament influence compare Jer. 1.10, Da. 3.4, 7.14. 1 Peter 2.9–10 includes a composite quotation from LXX Is. 43.20–21, Ex. 19.5–6, 23.22 and phrases from Hosea.

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were means of controlling ethnic groups such as the Zegrenses (see the beginning of chapter 9). 25 Another New Testament passage, not discussed by Meeks, may seem to espouse a belief in the unity of humankind. In speaking on the Areopagos hill Paul said: God … gives to all humans life and breath and all things. From one blood [or: ancestor] he made every nation of humans to inhabit the whole surface of the earth, and he determined the set times of their habitation and the boundaries of the regions where they would live, so that they would search for God … . Since we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the divine is like gold, or silver, or stone, an image shaped by human art and imagination. God, having overlooked the times of our ignorance, now commands humans that all of them everywhere should repent … .

There are certainly pointers to a grouping together of all humans here, in the terms “all humans (pantes)”, “the art of humankind (anthropos)” and “all humans everywhere (pantes pantakhou)”. This last term, which in itself might indicate unity in diversity, is diminished by the emphasis on “every nation (pan ethnos)” and on the boundaries of the territories that the various nations would inhabit (hai horothesiai tes katoikias auton). On balance, I see insufficient precedent in this speech for the belief in the unity of humankind found in patristic writers.26 25 W.A. Meeks in J. Jervell and Meeks (eds.), God’s Christ and His People: Studies in Honour of Nils Alstrup Dahl (Oslo 1977) 209–221 (quotation from 213). Meeks argues that the “utopian” declarations echoed in Gal. 3.28, 1 Cor. 12.13, Col. 3.11 and Ign. Smyrn. 1.2 are variations of a “baptismal reunification formula”; see also HR 13 (1974) 165–208, especially 183–189. D.L. Balch in A.J. Malherbe et al. (eds.), The Early Church in its Context (n. 22) 22–47 and especially in J.T. Fitzgerald et al. (eds.), Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe [Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 110] (Leiden 2003) 483–500 (the phrases quoted are from Isaiah 61.2, cited in Luke 4.19, and Acts 10.35). Zegrenses: references in chap. 9 n. 12. 26 Acts 17.24–30. Although the reading ἐξ ἑνός in 17.26 is found in reputable manuscripts, the longer (Western) text reading ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος finds a parallel in the succession arrangements of Tiberius and other early Caesars: see T.B. Mitford, JRS 50 (1960) 75 = V. Ehrenberg and A.H.M. Jones, Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius2, revised by D.L. Stockton (Oxford 1976) 89–90; Virgil, Aeneid 6.835 (C. Iulius Caesar addressed as sanguis meus by Anchises); P. Herrmann, Der römische Kaisereid: Untersuchungen zu seiner Herkunft und Entwicklung [Hypomnemata, 20] (Göttingen 1968) 102– 105 with n. 46, 124–125. I owe these references to E.A. Judge, who makes the point that Germanicus was not strictly of Tiberius’ blood nor Tiberius of Caesar Augustus’; Augustus Caesar, diui genus (Aen. 6.792) falls in the same category. F.F. Bruce, who did not prefer the Western text in this case, saw “the unity of the human race as descended from Adam” as “fundamental in Paul’s theology”, referring to Rom. 5.12ff., Gal. 3.28 and Col. 3.11 (see above at nn. 23, 25): The Acts of the Apostles (London 1951) 336–337. The inclusion of αἵματος probably reinforces “the biblical idea [cf. LXX Deut. 32.8] of God creating every separate nation”: see J. Rius-Camps and J. Read-Heimerdinger, The Message of Acts in Codex Bezae: A Comparison with the Alexandrian Tradition 3 [Library of New Testament

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I conclude that there is no positive statement in support of the unity of humankind in the New Testament. If so, this situation calls for explanation. Two possible scenarios are that subsequent Christian writers who accept this unity reflect a later development in Christian thought or that they reflect the heritage common to educated members of the Roman empire. The latter is shown to be more likely by the equivocation of many ancient writers on the subject; if it were a Christian tenet their belief in the unity of humankind should be stronger. Any theory that the early Christians were committed to the unity of humankind is further weakened by the constant use by these writers of terms denoting divisions among humans. The New Testament writers repeatedly think in terms of kingdoms, peoples and nations. Of particular interest is the parallel between “among the nations” and “throughout the world”. Several of the Greek patristic writers use terms similar to those in the New Testament, such as “all the nations” and “every race”.27 Humans are divided as Greeks and barbarians or by their cities and states – not to mention Irenaeus’ further division of every kingdom, city (ciuitas) and household into ten parts.28

Studies, 365] (London 2007) 334. The Authorised Version of 1611 accepted the Western text (“And hath made of one blood all nations of men …”); by contrast the Editorial Committee of the United Bible Societies’ Greek New Testament printed the shorter text ἐξ ἑνός with “a very high degree of doubt” in 1975 but with the evaluation “the text is almost certain” in 1983. D.K. Buell, who accepts the shorter text, wants to go further than I would by arguing that there is a universalising claim here which is racist as far as non-Christians are concerned: in M. Eliav-Feldon et al. (eds.), The Origins of Racism in the West (Cambridge 2009) 109– 131, especially 126–128. 27 βασιλεῖαι: Mt. 4.8 = Lk. 4.5; Mt. 24.7 = Mk. 13.8 = Lk 21.10 (cf. Is. 19.2 in Hebrew). λαοί: Lk. 2.31 (Is. 52.10); Ac. 4.25 (Ps. 2.1); Rom. 15.11 (Ps. 117.1); Rv. 7.9, 10.11, 11.9, 17.15 (cf. n. 24 above). ἔθνη: Mt. 20.25; Ac. 17.26 (πᾶν ἔθνος ἀνθρώπων, above at n. 26); references to πάντα τὰ ἔθνη in n. 22 above. In Rom. 1.13, 2 Cor. 11.26 (n. 24 above), 1 Ti. 2.7 and 2 Ti. 4.17 ἔθνη refers to Gentiles. ἐν ἔθνεσιν parallel to ἐν κόσμῳ: 1 Ti. 3.16. The parallelism evident in the six clauses justifies the editors of recent Greek texts (such as the New English Bible and Nestle-Aland28 = United Bible Societies4) in printing the verse as though a hymn or confession of faith. ἅπαντα τὰ ἔθνη: 1 Clem. 59.4 (3 Km. 8.60; Ezk. 36.23; cf. 4 Km. 19.19, Is. 37.20). πάντα τὰ ἔθνη: 2 Clem. 17.4 (cf. Is. 66.18, Dn. 3.7, K.P. Donfried, op. cit. [n. 3] 54, 172–173, 177 and E. Baasland, op. cit. [n. 3] 145); Herm. sim. 9.17.4; Just. dial. 24.3 (cf. Jer. 3.17), 31.4 (cf. Dn. 7.14), 39.7 (Tryphon speaking; cf. Dn. 7.27), 121.1 (cf. Ps 71[72].17); Ep.Lugd. 12 (MG 5.1437B). ὅλα ἔθνη (whole nations): Clem. prot. 4.54.5. γένος: Just. dial. 117.4–5, 134.5; cf. 64.2–3 (Jewish race). omnes gentes: Iren. haer. 4.19.1 (“pagan nations” in 4.30.4; cf. ἔθνη /gentiles in 5.24.2). 28 Greeks/barbarians: e.g. Diogn. 5.4 (πόλεις ῾Ελληνίδας τε καὶ βαρβάρους), Clem. str. 6.17.159.9. Cities and states: 1 Clem. 55.1; Tat. orat. 26.1, 28.1; Athenag. leg. 1.1–2. Irenaeus: haer. 5.26.1, based on his interpretation of Dn. 2.41–45, Mt. 12.25 and Rv. 17.12– 14. For an argument that, in his exposition of reconciliation, Irenaeus did not draw on the New Testament but on a broader anthropology (admittedly one heavily dependent on Genesis) see A. Orbe, Gregorianum 61 (1980) 5–50, especially 37–49.

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Moreover, the early Christian writers consciously or unconsciously extend and strengthen the idea that the Christians are a separate race. The Martyrdom of Polykarpos reports the martyr praying to the God of the whole race of the righteous. Justin calls Christians the true Israelite race. According to Clement of Alexandria all who accept faith, whether Jew or Greek or Christian, are gathered into one race of the people being saved. As noted above, Tertullian objects to Christians being called the “third race”, but he freely alludes to them as a genus, even in the same work.29 Some of the early Christians, then, to judge from what survives of their writings, believed in the unity of humankind. If we insist on more than the use of terms such as “the human race”, we can provisionally place in this category Tatianos and Theophilos of Antioch. Others, however, are more ambiguous in their attitudes to this concept, particularly those whom we can judge more accurately because more of their writings survive: Justin, Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria. There might therefore be a suspicion that Tatianos and Theophilos declared the unity of humankind but effectively denied it in writings we no longer possess. The overall effect is to place early Christian writers alongside their non-Christian contemporaries, with writers in both camps singing the praises of unity but, perhaps, undermining these claims by what they say and think in other places.

Union with God Union with God

Another theme which is common to Christian and non-Christian writers is the union of God’s followers with God. This union is expressed in a number of ways by the early Christians, so it is important to see which are close to the conception of Hermetic and other writers. For the author of 1 Clement God’s reconciliation with Christians is desirable, apparently because it aids Christian 29 Separate race: 1 Pt. 2.9–10 (cf. n. 24 above). Polykarpos praying to the God παντός ... τοῦ γένους τῶν δικαίων: M.Polyk. 14.1. ᾿Ισραηλιτικὸν τὸ ἀληθινόν ἐσμεν γένος: Just. dial. 135.3. There seems to be a hint of race in the previous paragraph (134.3) where Rachel is equated with the church and Leah with the Jewish people and synagogue. But the idea of a true Israel dominates the final paragraphs of the Dialogue and the unity of the new race of Israel is stressed; see Osborn, Justin 176–178. As E.S. Gruen argues, there is not an issue of racial divergence involved here, but the idea of supercession: in J.N.B. Carleton Paget and J. Lieu (eds.), Christianity in the Second Century: Themes and Developments (Cambridge 2017) 235–249. τὸ ἓν γένος τοῦ σῳζομένου ... λαοῦ: Clem. str. 6.5.42.2 with 6.5.41.6–7; cf. 6.17.159.9 (a universal calling to be a peculiar people of righteousness). On the use of ethnic reasoning see D.K. Buell, op. cit. (n. 18), especially (with respect to Clement) 73–74, 119– 123, 138–140. Tertullian: nat. 1.8 (above, n. 21) versus 1.2.9 and praes.haer. 20.7 (where a general statement about omne genus is used to make a claim that the numerous churches comprise a single primitive church).

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love for one another (philadelphia). Love unites us to God and the admonition that we make to one another unites us to the will of God. In this section of the letter the author is pressing on the Corinthian Christians the warning that they should be humble, seek the common good and homonoia, and accept correction.30 Ignatios asks, “how shall we be able to live apart from Jesus Christ?” He urges those who will listen to his letter in Philadelphia to act in harmony with God, just as he has recommended that they participate in one eucharist. He reports that the Magnesian deacons are in harmony with God and praises the whole Philadelphian church as being firmly established in the homonoia brought about by God. His talk of harmony with God is not far removed from that of Epiktetos about harmony with nature.31 Some idea of what Ignatios means by these abstract phrases can be gleaned from his advice to the Trallian Christians on avoiding heresy: be inseparable from Jesus Christ, the bishop and the instructions of the apostles. That union with Christ is to be interpreted in practice as union with the bishop and obedience to the apostolic commands is confirmed by the statement in the letter to the Philadelphians that all who belong to God and Jesus Christ attach themselves to the bishop and return to the unity (henotes) of the church in order to live in harmony with Jesus Christ. Moreover, repentance and return to the henotes of God is equivalent to return to the council (sunhedrion) of the bishop. As motivation Ignatios cites the salvation of the prophets “in the unity of Jesus Christ”; these may be Christian prophets, but later the patriarchs and prophets who preceded Christ as well as the apostles and the church are affirmed to be joined “in the unity of God”. Encouragement is also intended by a series of biological metaphors in which the heretic is discounted as not being “a plant of the Father” and acceptable Christians are thought of as branches of the cross and members of God’s body;

30 1 Clem. 48.1, 49.5, 56.2 (κολλᾶν for uniting in the last two passages; τὸ κοινωφελές in 48.6; ὁμόνοια in 49.5, picked up in 50.5). For the view that some non-Christian Greek and Roman writers stressed the importance of holding correct views about the gods much as Christian writers did, see T. Morgan in J.N.B. Carleton Paget and J. Lieu (eds.), op. cit. (n. 29) 200–213. 31 Ign. Magn. 9.2; Philad. 4 (with μιᾷ εὐχαριστίᾳ; cf. C.N. Jefford in D.J. Bingham (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Early Christian Thought [London 2010] 111). I am translating κατὰ θεόν in Philad. 4 and Magn. 13.1 by “in harmony with God” because of the parallel with κατὰ φύσιν “in harmony with nature” and other phrases used by Epiktetos. Philadelphian church in homonoia: Philad. inscr.; ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ θεοῦ also in Magn. 6.1, 15. For the centrality of the Eucharist for unity in the Christian community already in the New Testament see P. Vassiliadis in A.A. Alexeev et al. (eds.), Einheit der Kirche im Neuen Testament: Dritte europäische orthodox-westliche Exegetenkonferenz in Sankt Petersburg, 24.–31. August 2005 [WUNT, 218] (Tübingen 2008) 135–136, 139; D.G. Horrell (ibid. 196–197, 203) is more cautious. Epiktetos: 1.4.14–15 (συμφώνως τῇ φύσει), 1.11.5–8 (κατὰ φύσιν), 1.26.1– 2 (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν), enkh. 30 (κατὰ φύσιν).

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since the head cannot be born without the other members, God promises henosis (union, a principle of cohesion) which is himself.32 Tatianos uses terms which often refer to sexual union in urging the Greeks to seek again union with God.33 The basis of these views on the union of God with Christians may be Justin’s explicit statement that we humans have kinship (sungeneia) with God, a kinship which is evidently grounded in the common possession of a divine and immortal soul. This is quite close to the position of Epiktetos on kinship between gods and humans.34 Irenaeus and his allegedly heretical opponents appear to have agreed that a certain morsel (particula) of the Father of the universe has been deposited in human souls; for Irenaeus uses this to show the absurdity of his opponents’ claim that they were spiritual and the demiurge animal in nature. Both parties also agreed on the need for communion and union with God.35 The ancient tradition – that of the most ancient churches – believes that Jesus united humans through himself to God. The “mediator between god and humans” had to bring both “into friendship (philia) and harmony (homonoia)”; he restored to all communion with God; indeed, unless humans had been united (sunhenoun) with God, they could never have been partakers in imperishability. It is confirmed elsewhere that human imperishability and immortality stem from union and communion (adunitio et communio) with God.36 Irenaeus stresses the ideas 32 Ign. Trall. 7.1 (ἀχώριστοι; cf. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ... ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀχώριστον, “the good is indeed inseparable from God”, in C.H. 2.16); Philad. 3.2 (κατὰ ᾿Ιησοῦν Χριστὸν ζῶντες). συνέδριον τοῦ ἐπισκόπου: Philad. 8.1. Prophets, etc.: Philad. 5.2 (ἐν ἑνότητι ᾿Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ), 9.1 (εἰς ἑνότητα θεοῦ); cf. Schoedel 202, 206. Biological metaphors: Trall. 11. φυτεία πατρός alludes to NT Mt. 15.13: “every φυτεία which my heavenly Father did not plant will be rooted out”. The association of unity in the church with oneness with God has been noted by earlier scholars: see J.D.M. Derrett, ANRW 2.27.1 (Berlin 1993) 673–674 and n. 99; J.-P. Lotz, Ignatius and Concord: The Background and Use of the Language of Concord in the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch [Patristic Studies, 8] (New York 2007) 160–161, 165–166. On unity derived from Christ’s suffering, cf. Eph. inscr. and Schoedel 27–28. On God as the union (henotes) of faith and love, see Eph. 14.1. 33 Tat. orat. 15.1 (ζευγνύναι τε τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ καὶ τὴν κατὰ θεὸν συζυγίαν πραγματεύεσθαι); cf. Iren. haer. 1.6.1 (τὸ ... πνευματικόν ... τῷ ψυχικῷ συζυγέν). 34 Just. dial. 4.1–3 (διὰ τὸ συγγενές ... συγγένεια πρὸς τὸν θεόν ... διὰ τὸ συγγενές); cf. Festugière 3.168 and É. des Places, Syngeneia: La parenté de l’homme avec Dieu d’Homère à la Patristique [Études et commentaires, 51] (Paris 1964) 185–186. Epiktetos: 1.9.1. 35 particula: Iren. haer. 2.19.3 (cf. 2.30, especially 2.30.1–2 and 2.30.6 on the nature of the demiurge). communicatio cum eo et unitas: 2.18.7, attacking the story of Sophia; cf. 4.14.1 (homo indiget dei communione). On the union of God and humans see Osborn, Irenaeus 47–48, 107–108, 110–113; S.G. Hall, Doctrine and Practice in the Early Church2 (London 2005) 63–65. 36 Ancient tradition: haer. 3.4.1–2 (ipse per se hominem adunans deo). ὁ μεσίτης θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων: 3.18.7; see also above at n. 13 and Osborn, Irenaeus 112–113. Human imperishability and immortality: 5.1.1; cf. 3.19.1, 3.19.3 (where there is mixed imagery: mansiones from NT Jn 14.2 and membra in corpore from 1 Cor. 12.12).

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that Christ leads humans into fellowship and union with God, and that the Spirit given to the church is the means of communion with Christ.37 But do these ideas lead to action? One context just cited commends action but in specific terms mentions only abstention from evil deeds; another recommends that Christians should join and remain with the church in order to partake of the Spirit. Perhaps related to this is the thought that communion (koinonia) with God is dependent on the continuance of the Christian’s love towards God. The koinonia of God is life and light and those who reject God’s benefits are separated from God. The motivation offered is immortality along with the prospect of interaction and fellowship with angels and of unity with spiritual beings in the kingdom. So a rather intangible benefit is offered by Irenaeus for communion with God. On the other hand, he does reveal that one group of Christians, the Ebionites, rejected the union of God and humans.38 Given his willingness to talk in terms that became popular in Neoplatonism, such as ‘the gnostic’ and ‘the monad’, one would expect Clement of Alexandria to be more explicit than he is about union of God with Christians. But when he writes of “light having been united (henomenon) with the soul” or of gnostics by prayer and other practices uniting (henopoiein) themselves with the “divine chorus”, he does no more than imply such a belief. Other passages, mentioning for example the union (koinonia) of the Word with baptism, are more doubtful.39 Clement is, however, more explicit about union with Christ: it comes

37

Christ the escort: haer. 4.13.1 (in communionem et unitatem dei hominem ducit), 4.28.2 (particeps dei), 4.40.1 (φιλίαν καὶ ἕνωσιν συντιθέμενος), 5.14.2–3 (ad eum communionem … efficiens. … in amicitiam adduxit deo. … per eam quae est ad se communicationem, reconciliauit dominus hominem deo patri). For the view that Christ reconciles human nature rather than persons see A. Orbe, Gregorianum 61 (1980) 5–50 at 26–28, 48. Spirit the means of communion: 3.24.1 (communicatio Christi, id est spiritus sanctus), 5.1.1 (effundente spiritum patris in adunitionem et communionem dei et hominum). 38 Action commended: haer. 4.13.1 (abstinere). Joining with the church: 3.24.1. Cf. previous note. κοινωνία θεοῦ: 5.27.2 (interpreting NT Jn. 3.18–21 in terms of separation from and union with God [adunitus est … deo]); 5.28.1 (ἑνοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς τῷ θεῷ). E.F. Osborn argues that ethics is used to show how love which rejoices in truth can participate in God: Irenaeus, chapter 11, especially 238–240, 244–248. Angels and spiritual beings: see especially 5.35.1 (cum sanctis angelis conuersationem et communionem et unitatem spiritalium in regno capient). Ebionites: 5.1.3 (unitionem dei et hominis per fidem non recipientes). For the place of Adam in these schemes of union see W. Hunger, Scholastik 17 (1942) 161–177 at 166–177 and Osborn, Irenaeus 110–111, 118, 215–216. 39 φῶς ἡνωμένον ψυχῇ: Clem. str. 6.12.104.1. In paid. 1.6.28.2 Clement plays on ancient Greek φῶς ‘light’ as against φώς ‘a human, a mortal’. Gnostics: str. 7.7.49.4; on the idea of a θεῖος χορός see Plato, Phaidros 247a. κοινωνία of the Word with baptism: paid. 1.6.50.4. Doubtful passages: str. 7.7.42.2 (if “the blessed providence” refers to God); 7.11.68.1–3 (if τὸ ἕν is unity with God rather than integrated personality or unity with fellow Christians). For a brief survey of the idea of assimilation to God, with an eye to Clement, see E.F. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria [Texts and Studies, n.s. 3] (Cambridge 1957) 87–

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through his blood, for blood is the essential principle of the human body. All the powers of the Spirit collectively become one thing and terminate in Christ who, as all things, is the circle of all powers rolled and united into one. To believe in Christ and believe by Christ is to become a unit (monadikos) and to be indissolubly united (henoumenos) with him, while to disbelieve is to be separated, disconnected and divided.40 That this idea is of some importance to Clement is suggested by his strained interpretation of biblical passages. He perceives a koinonia of the Instructor of humankind in Genesis 17 and he inserts glueing (kollesis) with God into Sirach 18. When he interprets Galatians 3 (ending with “you are all one in Christ Jesus”) as the koinonia of the just and loving God with all people, “all” must be limited to those who by faith receive the universal salvation of humankind.41 He claims that God has no natural relationship with humans, who are neither his children by nature nor parts of him, since their essence is involved in evil which is alien to “the whole” in God’s system. The nature of their union with God is shown to be spiritual by a comparison with the eucharist: as wine is blended (kirnasthai) with water, so the Spirit is blended with humans, who thus become “the divine mixture” and are led to immortality by the Spirit. The only hint as to how this can be achieved is the statement, emphasising God’s part and not humans’, that the Instructor (Christ) binds Christians to himself, the teaching and all-surveying Word, by establishing them in the Church.42 One can find a similar lack of explicitness about union with God in Tertullian who, however, introduces themes later seen in Origen and Cyril of Jerusalem. For the union of the believer with Christ in his death and resurrection is implied by Tertullian’s recommendation of Easter as the most appropriate time 88; by 2005 Osborn was more open to acceptance of the idea by Clement (Clement 229–230, 256–258). 40 Christ’s blood: paid. 1.6.49.1–4; cf. D.K. Buell, Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton 1999) 174 and Osborn, Clement 256. The passage ends with a rush of philosophical terms, favoured especially by those inclined to Stoicism: προσοικειοῦσθαι, συγγένεια, συμπάθεια (1.6.49.4). Powers of the Spirit: str. 4.25.156.1–4.25.157.2; cf. 2.2.9.1 (faith as an act of assent that unites us to an invisible object). 41 OT Gen. 17.1–2: paid. 1.7.56.2–3; Jesus as the instructor of all humankind: ibid. 1.7.55.2. LXX Sir. 18.13–14: paid.1.9.81.3 (cf. κολλᾶν in n. 43 below). See H. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (Oxford 1966) 55 for a comparison with Philon of Alexandreia. Gal. 3.26–28: paid. 1.6.30.2– 1.6.31.2. 42 No natural relationship: str. 2.16.74, using τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου (2.16.74.3). A spiritual union: paid. 2.2.19.3–2.2.20.1; cf. Osborn, Clement 234 and F. Nobilio, RPhA 25.2 (2007) 3–52 at 5–18. Establishment of Christians in the church: paid. 3.12.101.3 (παρακατέθετο). The Word has already been identified with the Instructor and Creator of the world and humans in 3.12.100.2. D.K. Buell sees adoption as children as the means of overcoming the gap between divine and human natures: op.cit. (n. 18) 121. Again God’s initiative is crucial.

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for baptism. Moreover, no human imposition of hands could bring about the bodily union (concorporatio) of two spirits in baptism. Union with Christ is also implied by use of the body metaphor (“members of Christ”) and the statement that “I shall be one body, to which I shall be glued by communicating [with Christ]”. But Tertullian’s main point here is a warning against “the members of a prostitute” and the consequences of agglutination to a prostitute.43 Patristic writers use passages from the New Testament, notably one dealing with Christians being members of Christ and one spirit with him, and one dealing with the union of Christ and the church. There are other explicit discussions in the New Testament of the union of believers with God. Jesus links the unity of God (“I am in the Father”) with the union of his disciples with himself (“you are in me, and I in you”). Indeed, he tells his disciples to “dwell” in him as he does in them and warns of the consequences of a branch being separated from the vine. He conceives the unity of believers on the model of the unity of God and associates with these concepts the union of believers with God. The body metaphor is used by Paul not only to expound the co-operative functions of the various members of the Christian community but also to assert that Christians are one body in Christ and members of Christ’s body.44 Paul approves Aratos’ idea that all humans are God’s offspring; and the writer to the Hebrews bases on this belief the interpretation of “brothers and sisters” in Psalm 22 as humans to whom God’s son speaks. Union with God is also implied by other points such as the use of sumphutos (“united” to Christ’s death and resurrection) in Romans and Jesus’ warning to Peter that he will have no part in Jesus unless 43

Baptism at Easter: Tert. bapt. 19. For later reflections on the union of the believer with Christ in his death and resurrection see the developments based on NT Rom. 6.5 in Origen, hom. in Jer. 19.14 and Cyril of Jerusalem, katekh. 20.4–7. Cf. J. Daniélou, Origen (London 1955) 57. concorporatio: bapt. 8.1. Body metaphor: pudic. 16.8–9, expounding NT 1 Cor. 6.15–17 (on κολλᾶσθαι here see A.C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text [Grand Rapids, MI 2000] 466–467, rightly rejecting S.E. Porter’s view [EThL 67 (1991) 105–106] that it means “to sell oneself into bondage”, as in Lk. 15.15). The vivid language reminds one of the love spells designed to bring the enfeebled victim to the embrace of the person casting the spell: “… and make her, NN, … suffer insomnia, … be hungry, thirsty, not getting sleep, … until she comes and glues (κολλήσῃ) her female genitalia to my male ones” (PGM 36.147–151; cf. D.G. Martinez, P. Michigan XVI: A Greek Love Charm from Egypt (P. Mich. 757) [American Studies in Papyrology, 30] [Atlanta, GA 1991] 90–92; C.A. Faraone, Ancient Greek Love Magic [Cambridge, Mass. 1999] 55, 86 and, for the formulation, D.G. Martinez in M. Meyer and P.A. Mirecki [eds.], Ancient Magic and Ritual Power [Religions in the Graeco-Roman World, 129] [Leiden 1995] 352– 355 with n. 61 [I owe these references to L.C. Watson]). κολλᾶν is the verb used in Clem. str. 5.8.52.3 of union with fellow Christians and it is attributed in 3.2.8.1 to Epiphanes speaking of the mating of animals; cf. κόλλησις above (n. 41). 44 NT passages used by later Christian writers: 1 Cor. 6.15–17; Eph. 5.29–33, especially 30 and 32. Jesus: Jn. 14.20; 15.4–6; 17.20–23, especially 21 and 23. Paul: Rom. 12.3–5; 1 Cor. 12.12–31; cf. Rom. 7.4.

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the latter washes his feet. It might also be argued that the phrases eis Khriston and en Khristoi mean, respectively, “into union with Christ” and “incorporate in Christ”.45 This view of kinship between God and humans seems to be limited to kinship between God and Christians by Clement’s assertion that there is no natural relationship with humans, though Clement may not be entirely consistent on this point.46 The concept of union between God and God’s disciples is a very abstract one, expressed by metaphors ranging from that of reconciliation with God through a mediator to that of incorporation in God or Christ. It is difficult to isolate any concrete action which the early Christians considered should derive from this abstract concept. Paul and Tertullian urge Christians not to be joined to a prostitute since they are members of Christ.47 Another practical instruction associated with the concept is the maintenance of church unity. But one suspects that at least Ignatios, who makes the link most explicitly, was intent on linking union with Christ and co-operation with the bishop so that he could exert moral pressure on his audience to do what he most wanted: co-operate with the bishop.48 Some continuity of ideas can be seen in the treatment by first 45 Paul paraphrases Arat. Phain. 5 in Ac. 17.28 (the same text in Clem. str. 1.19.91.4); cf. Dion 12.27. On the setting of Paul’s speech see T.D. Barnes, JThS n.s. 20 (1969) 407– 419; C.J. Hemer, NTS 20 (1973–74) 341–350; J. Taylor, Les Actes des deux apôtres 5 [Études Bibliques, n.s. 23] (Paris 1994) 304–306; C.K. Barrett, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Acts of the Apostles 2 (Edinburgh 1998) 831–832. Ps. 22.22 (LXX 21.23): Heb. 2.11–12. σύμφυτος: Rom. 6.5. οὐκ ἔχεις μέρος μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ: Jn. 13.8. εἰς Χριστόν: Rom. 6.3; Gal. 3.27; Phlm. 6. ἐν Χριστῷ: Rom. 6.11, 8.1; 2 Cor. 5.17; Gal. 3.26, 28; Eph. 2.6, 2.13; Phil. 1.1; cf. ἐν αὐτῷ in Phil. 3.9, Col. 2.6. For a survey of ἐν Χριστῷ as an indication of union with Christ see M.J. Harris in C. Brown (ed.), The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology 3 (Exeter 1978) 1171–1215 at 1192–1193; cf. C.R. Campbell, Paul and Union with Christ: An Exegetical and Theological Study (Grand Rapids, MI 2012), especially chaps 3 and 12; and, for 1 Peter, S. Christensen, JETS 61 (2018) 339– 354, especially 341–343. B.S. Easton found Paul’s usage to border on physical union (The Pastoral Epistles [London 1948] 12); cf. J.D.G. Dunn, 1 Corinthians (Sheffield 1995) 65– 67. See also the explanation of “Emmanuel” (Is. 7.14) in Mt. 1.23, the idea of no separation from the love of God (Rom. 8.39) and the assurance of participation (koinonia) in the blood and body of Christ (1 Cor. 10.16); for communal participation in the blood of Christ signifying identification with Christ in his death see A.C. Thiselton, op. cit. (n. 43) 761–764, with references to earlier scholarship. 46 ὁ θεὸς δὲ οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς φυσικὴν σχέσιν: Clem. str. 2.16.74.1; cf. Just. dial. 4. In discussing Pindaros’ much-quoted ἀριστότεχνα πάτερ (fr. 57 Maehler; Dion 12.81; cf. Plu. 807c, 1065e and chaps. 5 n. 77 and 7 n. 100), Clement comes close to approving the idea of one race of gods and humans (str. 5.14.102.2; cf. Paul’s quotation of Aratos mentioned in n. 45 above and Morlet 244). 47 NT 1 Cor. 6.15–17; Tert. pudic. 16.8–9 (cf. nn. 43–44 above). 48 See the context of Ign. Trall. 7.1 and Philad. 3. R.A. Bower hypothesises that there was a kind of transition (in Philad. 3.2) from unity with the church and bishop to unity with Christ: VChr. 28 (1974) 1–14 at 5–6.

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Irenaeus and then Clement of the practical advice to be joined with the church and of immortality as motivation for union with God.49 Bishops, churches, a God who wants repentance and reconciliation: these are distinctively Christian institutions and ideas. Argument based on the members of the body appealed to Christians more than others. But in some respects the early Christians see eye-to-eye with non-Christian writers of their age. For example, Epiktetos and Dion of Prousa, like some early Christians, affirm the kinship (sungeneia) of God and humans. For Justin this sungeneia is based on the common possession of soul, whereas for the Hermetic writers it is the faculty of understanding common to God and human reason alone; for Epiktetos souls are bound up with God. The other major basis is koinonia, one or another kind of partnership between God and humans. Epiktetos and Dion champion this term for the union; the Hermetic writers base the union on koinonia between the souls of gods (note the plural) and human souls. Clement of Alexandria reads koinonia into Biblical passages and sees it as spiritual union. But of course the god is different. Irenaeus stresses that Christ leads humans into fellowship and union with God; koinonia with God is light and life. Epiktetos, however, thinks specifically of koinonia with Zeus. For Irenaeus the Spirit given to the church is the means of communion with Christ, so Christians should remain with the church in order to partake of the Spirit. Clement is driven to a spiritual relationship by denying a natural relationship between all humans and God. This Spirit is rather different from the daimon that Marcus Aurelius and perhaps Dion see as the portion of himself that Zeus gives to every person.50 There are some other striking coincidences. For example, Tertullian sees baptism as the occasion for the concorporation of two spirits, human and divine, while an Hermetic treatise pictures people being invited to baptise themselves in a mixing-bowl of nous, mind that can unite humans with gods and gods with humans.51 Another treatise envisages the race of humankind being saved by God, while salvation is an important topic also for Christian writers such as Clement. In general, Ailios Aristeides and the Hermetic writers see communion with God as a more mystical experience than the Christians do.52 And the Christians do have some ideas distinctive to themselves, such as God as unity to which his followers return, and some applications, such as the link to church unity, which are not relevant for non-Christian writers. 49 Irenaeus: haer. 3.24.1, 5.1.1, 5.35.1. Clement: paid. 2.2.20, 3.12.101.3 (on the hymn in this section see M.G. Bianco, Paideia 65 [2010] 181–214). On the Christian desire to leave the world and be with Christ, compare NT Phil. 1.23–24 and Tert. spect. 28.5. 50 M.A. 5.27; Dion 4.76, 79–81. 51 Tert. bapt. 8.1. C.H. 4.4–6; cf. van Moorsel 58–62. 52 Salvation: C.H. 1.26, 29 (but in 9.5 it is only those in the midst of good who are saved in their essence by God); on the doctrine of salvation in the Hermetic writings see G. Luck, Second Century 8 (1991) 31–41. Clement: paid. 1.6.30–31. Communion with God: C.H. 10.22 (communion of the souls of the gods with those of humans).

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The Harmony of the Universe The Harmony of the Universe

When early Christians discuss the nature of the universe, they strike a chord with many non-Christian writings. For example, Irenaeus believes that the universe is destined for destruction. For the present the most notable aspect of its nature is that it is always changing – a view close to that of Marcus Aurelius. This is most explicit at the end of our period. Tertullian says that the whole of nature has the function of changing its dress; diverse elements tend to unity, but change maintains their diversity. In a third-century work attributed to Athenagoras a picture is created of change under the regulation of God, a picture which enables the author to claim that resurrection is possible, even when human bodies have been consumed by animals which are later eaten by humans.53 But on other points, such as the diffusion of the spirit of God through all matter, there is disagreement. Clement of Alexandria repeatedly rejects the Stoic theory that God (to theion, ho theos) is a body permeating all matter, for matter is most degrading.54 There is, however, agreement on harmony and order in the universe, and here the early Christian writers seem to be in broad sympathy with their nonChristian counterparts. In their attempt to bring about unity in the Corinthian church the Roman Christians say that the heavens moving by God’s arrangement are subject to him in peace (eirene); the sun, moon and stars roll in their proper orbits in harmony (homonoia); even the least of the animals congregate in harmony and peace. These qualities in the administration of the creator and

53 Irenaeus: haer. 4.4.3; cf. NT 1 Cor. 7.31 (παράγει γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου), Tat. orat. 6.1 (on Tatianos’ interest in matter, in contrast to the Valentinians, see E.J. Hunt, Christianity in the Second Century: The Case of Tatian [London 2003] 45–48). Note the forecasts of the dissolution of the universe in Mt 24.35, Mk 13.31, Lk 21.33, 2 Pt 3.11–12 and 1 Jn 2.17. Marcus Aurelius: 2.3.2, 4.36, 7.18 and other passages in G.R. Stanton, Historia 18 (1969) 577 = R. Klein (ed.), Marc Aurel (Darmstadt 1979) 383 nn. 43–48. Tertullian: pall. 2.1. Tertullian dwells frequently on the harmony of opposites: see Osborn, Tertullian 65–75, 92–94, 144–145. Pseudo-Athenagoras: res. 2–8. Despite a sustained attempt in recent years by B. Pouderon (VChr 40 [1986] 226–244; Athénagore d’Athènes: philosophe chrétien [Théologie historique, 82] [Paris 1989] 62–88; and subsequent articles, for example, VChr 44 [1990] 1–5 and RSR 70 [1996] 224–239) to reinstate the traditional attribution to Athenagoras, this work must be later (see, for example, H.E. Lona, Salesianum 52 [1990] 525– 578 at 525–541 and N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst, RHE 87 [1992] 333–374). The problem raised by the chain of consumption (res. 4.3–4) is a major reason for dating the treatise no earlier than Origen’s discussion of the resurrection (Methodius, On the Resurrection 1.20.4–5): see R.M. Grant, HThR 47 (1954) 121–129. Pouderon’s study of Biblical citations in Athenagoras, however, is most valuable: VetChr 31 (1994) 111–153. 54 Clem. prot. 5.66.3; str. 1.11.51.1, 5.14.89.2–5; similarly, Athenag. leg. 22.2. For the Stoic theory see Long 21–26.

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ruler of the universe show his beneficence.55 Tatianos expounds the idea by transferring from a body simile to a musical image: the creation has order, derived from its common origin, just as the structure of the body is under one management despite the differences in function of the parts; although one part differs from another, there is the harmony of a musical concert in their arrangement.56 Clement uses a rather different musical metaphor. The Word of God is a new song which ordered the entire creation melodiously and tuned into concord the discord of the elements so that the whole universe might be in harmony with it (the new song); the reduction of the whole to harmony was in accordance with God’s purpose. Towards the end of the same work Clement uses sumphonia and harmonia as inducements to humans (those with reason) to fit in with God’s plan and be marshalled under one God and one Word of God.57 Athenagoras sees the established order, the universal harmony, the magnitude, colour, form and arrangement of the universe as incentives to piety.58 Irenaeus stresses the existence of harmony (consonantia) as well as order in the universe. By this harmonious arrangement humans are formed after the image and likeness of the uncreated One. God’s wisdom is shown in having created things as parts of a single harmonious and well-ordered whole.59 Clement says that humans have been assigned the best and most secure position by God’s orderly arrangement; the rectitude and orderliness of the arrangement inspire rectitude

55

1 Clem. 20, especially 20.1–3, 20.10–11. Beneficence is indicated by εὐεργετῶν in 20.11 and εὐεργεσίαι in 21.1. Cf. Jaeger 14–15 and his article in RhM 102 (1959) 330–340; Bakke 160–164. W.C. van Unnik argued that the chapter owes much more to Jewish sources than to Stoic: VChr 4 (1950) 181–189 = Sparsa Collecta 3 [Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 31] (Leiden 1983) 52–58; cf. A. Hall, La Ciudad de Dios 181 [1968] 682–692, D.W.F. Wong, VChr 31 (1977) 81–87 and H.E. Lona (ed.), Der erste Clemensbrief [Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern, 2] (Göttingen 1998) 271–272. The slide from cosmic harmony to civic concord is discussed by C. Breytenbach in J.T. Fitzgerald et al. (eds.), Early Christianity and Classical Culture (n. 25) 259–273 = C. Breytenbach and L.L. Welborn (eds.), Encounters with Hellenism: Studies on the First Letter of Clement [Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums, 53] (Leiden 2004) 182–196. 56 Tat. orat. 12.2–3 (musical image: κατ᾿ οἰκονομίαν συμφωνίας ἐστὶν ἁρμονία). Cf. Morlet 14–15 with n. 17. 57 Clem. prot. 1.4.5–1.5.3. The metaphor of the new song (τὸ ᾆσμα τὸ καινόν: 1.2.4, 1.4.5, 1.6.1; ἡ οὐράνιος ᾠδή: 1.4.3) is developed at length here. Cf. M.G. Murphy, Nature Allusions in the Works of Clement of Alexandria [The Catholic University of America: Patristic Studies, 65] (Washington 1941) 2–3. Συμφωνία and ἁρμονία: prot. 12.120.2–4. 58 Athenag. leg. 4.2; cf. 25.2–3. The administration of the universe is seen as an incentive to worship in Ps.-Just. mon. 1.2 (possibly third century: n. 7 above). 59 consonantia: Iren. haer. 2.2.4; 2.15.3 assumes a consonantiam quae est in creatura. Harmonious arrangement: 4.38.3 (below, n. 62). Cf. G.B. Ladner, God, Cosmos, and Humankind: The World of Early Christian Symbolism (Berkeley 1995) 81–82 and Osborn, Irenaeus 58, 159–161, 197–198.

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and orderliness in human affairs.60 He accepts the idea that the universe revolves in cycles. He uses the assumption that all the parts in the universe, though differing from one another, preserve their relation to the whole to show that barbarian and Greek philosophies preserve a fragment of truth. Thus he quotes with approval the views of Poseidonios and Plato on order in the universe. He also agrees with the assumption that all things are one, but not with the development which some Christians build on this, to the effect that unity (henotes) did not like being alone and had intercourse with the inspiration that it had created.61 Thus there are limits to the application of Clement’s basic belief in harmony in the universe. These ideas on the harmony of the universe do not lead to practical action. They constitute doctrines to be believed or arguments supporting other doctrines, such as the wisdom of God or the place of humans in the universe.62 Thus Irenaeus asserts that while God’s power and goodness are exhibited in having called into existence and fashioned things that had no previous existence, God’s wisdom is shown in having made created things parts of one harmonious and consistent whole. They are used as incentives for piety, as by Athenagoras, or for harmony in a church, as by the Roman Christians.63 But there is no logical connection between the ideas and the actions desired, merely inspiration stemming from the authority attributed to the ideas. Whereas the basic ideas of the early Christians on the relationship between God and the universe and on the nature of the universe can be traced back to the New Testament, their ideas on harmony in the universe must derive from their classical heritage. This is suggested by the relatively frequent references to earlier Greek authors, especially those such as Empedokles and Plato who were held in high regard, when the early Christians discuss the subject.64 More 60

Clem. paid. 1.2.6.5–6; cf. 1.6.25.3 (κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν προδιατύπωσιν), prot. 12.120.3–5 and M.G. Murphy, op. cit. (n. 57) 33. 61 Cycles: str. 6.11.87.3–4, 6.16.142.4–6.16.143.1, 6.16.148.2. For Clement’s interest in the heavenly bodies see A. Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea (Oxford 1991) 104–110. Barbarian and Greek philosophies: str. 1.13.57.5–6. Poseidonios and Plato: str. 2.21.129.4, 3.3.19.3–5. ἑνότης: str. 3.4.29.2–3. Clement’s contemporary Tertullian also wants to think of the universe, though composed of diverse elements, as joined in unity (apol. 48.11; pall. 2.1); cf. Osborn, Tertullian 69–70. On the popular connection of Empedokles’ theory of friendship and enmity with the doctrine of a discordia concors (as in anim. 8.1), see J.H. Waszink, Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani de anima2 [Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 100] (Leiden 2010) 156–157, where Marc. 1.16 is cited as an example of Tertullian’s defence of concordia discors against Markion. 62 Iren. haer. 4.38.3 (drawing a conclusion about ἄνθρωπος in the universe from ταύτης τῆς τάξεως καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ῥυθμῶν); cf. Clem. paid. 1.2.6.5–6 (n. 60 above) and Osborn, Clement 244. 63 Athenagoras: n. 58 above. Roman Christians: 1 Clem 20.1–21.1. 64 On the neglect of the Presocratic philosophers apart from Empedokles see N. ZeegersVander Vorst, Les citations des poètes grecs chez les apologistes chrétiens du IIe siècle

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compelling is the lack of any discussion of this kind in the New Testament. The closest statement I can find is the explanation of God’s dispensation (oikonomia) set forth in Christ to the effect that the universe, all things in the heavens and on earth, might be brought into a unity in Christ.65 The harmonious movement of the sun, moon and stars is an idea promoted by Ailios Aristeides and by the anonymous authors who wrote On the kosmos and the Hermetic treatises, just as it is in 1 Clement and Clement of Alexandria.66 Dion of Prousa, however, gives a special rôle to the sun. Often the harmony embraces antagonistic forces, as in Plutarch. Among Christian writers this is most clearly seen in Tertullian. The metaphor of the body is deployed by Tatianos as well as by the Hermetic writers. Even more common is musical imagery, found in the Hermetic writings, Irenaeus, Tatianos and Clement of Alexandria. For Irenaeus the single harmonious and well-ordered whole is a demonstration of God’s wisdom, which is not far removed from the view in the Myth of the Magoi (found in Dion’s Borysthenic speech) that the whole heaven and the universe is ordered by the wisest and best skill. Of course, some agreement is to be expected when Clement argues for the existence of truth in Greek (and barbarian) philosophers. But, naturally, there are some major disagreements. The emphasis on sympathetic connection found in Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius is not likely to be supported by Christian writers. The minority Christian view that unity (henotes) has intercourse with inspiration might perhaps have existed in Hermetic literature now lost. As far as application is concerned, the harmony of the universe serves as an incentive to Christian piety and worship and to right behaviour,67 whereas Epiktetos draws the conclusion that humans should not find fault with the dispensation. Overall, then, early Christian writers share several concepts of unity with their contemporaries. They profess from time to time a belief in the unity of humankind. But they do at least as much as non-Christian writers of their age to counteract this belief, with statements such as “the whole human race will be found to be under a curse” (from Justin) undermined by a continual division of humankind into nations and races. Commonly those who are Christians are seen (by Irenaeus, for example) as united, but sharply separated from the rest of humankind. So the support among the early Christians for a belief in the unity of humankind is lukewarm. But it is virtually non-existent in the New

[Université de Louvain, Recueil de Travaux d’Histoire et de Philologie4, 47] (Louvain 1972) 42, 153–160. For Pythagorean reminiscences in Clement of Alexandria, see M. Tardieu, VChr 28 (1974) 241–247. 65 NT Eph. 1.10: ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. 66 O.M. Bakke (164–167) draws together 1 Clement 20, Dion 40.35–37 and Aristeides 23.77. 67 Nn. 54, 57, 62 above.

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Testament documents. Consequently we conclude that the Christian writers after the New Testament are picking up the idea from their common education. Again, it is possible to see the idea of union with God in the Hermetic writings (for example) as well as in Christian writings. But the latter have some specifically Christian applications of the belief, such as Ignatios’ insistence that union with Christ entails union with the bishop and obedience to the apostolic commands. The statement by Justin, however, that humans have kinship with God is quite close to the position of Epiktetos and Dion of Prousa. Finally, as we have just seen, the harmony of the universe is an idea common to Christian writers and their non-Christian counterparts. This idea is often used as inspiration, whether for resolution of conflict between two neighbouring cities or (in the Christian case) for harmony in a church. It does indeed seem that much of the thought of early Christian writers on unity and disunity reveals patterns that we have already seen in non-Christian writers of the period.

Chapter 9

In Praise of Harmony and Unity In Praise of Harmony and Unity

Harmony and unity get a very good press in antiquity. This is perhaps not surprising, given the value attached to harmony and to unity in other cultures and periods. As I noted in the introductory chapter, even at the height of fashion of post-modernism some literary critics looked for unity in a poem or a novel.1 In the Mediterranean world of the first two centuries C.E., arguments are often based on a claim of harmony. Thus, the Jewish writers Philon of Alexandria and Iosephos (Josephus) speak of the Mosaic Law being in harmony with the universe.2 Within the orbit of Christian writers discussed in the preceding two chapters, Clement of Alexandria quotes Euripides speaking in harmony with (sunoidos) the Christian scripture in order to show the importance of nourishment from knowledge (gnosis). On the other hand, Tertullian despises all attempts to produce a Christianity amalgamated with Stoic, Platonic or other philosophies.3 Irenaeus, Clement and Tertullian all assert the unity and harmony of the old and new covenants though they differ in form. Harmony is also said to exist between the Septuagint (the Old Testament in Greek) and the apostolic tradition, between the church and the scriptures, between the scriptures and

1

For example, with reference to the Homeric poems, G.E. Dimock, The Unity of the Odyssey (Amherst, MA 1989), especially 3–4; J. Kim, The Pity of Achilles: Oral Style and the Unity of the Iliad (Lanham, MD 2000). Cf. chap. 1 at n. 36. 2 Philon, The Creation of the World according to Moses 3: τοῦ κόσμου τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῦ νόμου τῷ κόσμῳ συνᾴδοντος. Iosephos, Antiquities of the Jews 1.24: πάντα γὰρ τῇ τῶν ὅλων φύσει σύμφωνον ἔχει τὴν διάθεσιν. In Against Apion 2.179 Iosephos attributes the admirable concord (ὁμόνοια) and most beautiful harmony (συμφωνία) of the Jewish people to their unity of belief about God: see L.H. Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation of the Bible [Hellenistic Culture and Society, 27] (Berkeley 1998) 421. 3 Euripides and Christian scripture: Clem. str. 5.11.70.1–6. Christianity not to be amalgamated: Tert. praes.haer. 7.9, 7.11. This view does not prevent Tertullian using Greek philosophers in (for example) anim. 5.6, 8.1. I discussed the syntax of quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? (Tert. praes.haer. 7.9) in RhM 116 (1973) 84–90.

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events that have taken place, and (quite widely) within the scriptures themselves.4 Clement says that scripture must be interpreted according to the ecclesiastical rule, which is the harmony and symphony of both law and prophets with the covenant delivered at the coming of the Lord.5 Among the concepts of unity identified in this period are: homonoia within and among Greek cities, the unity of the Roman empire, the unity of humankind, koinonia among humans and between humans and gods, cosmopolitan ideas, the value of an harmonious life, union between gods and humans, the existence of one unique God or harmony among gods, and the unity of the universe (which sometimes involves the harmony of opposites). But – understandably – praise of harmony and unity was not inevitable. In ancient times as in modern, unity might be praised where actual union was not. The Christian writer Tatianos warns against the union of good with bad, which only produces a noxious compound. Tertullian makes the same point: there cannot be harmony between good and evil, light and darkness, sweet and bitter. By contrast, the impossibility of a union between life and death is used to support the identity of soul and spirit.6 For Tertullian bad things are inseparable: malice and folly, cruelty and unchastity, lust and gluttony – the last two so united and stuck together that stomach and genitals are found in one region of the body.7 It is clear that, as in other periods, harmony is widely used as a means of promoting the ideas of the writer or speaker. In this chapter I draw together some of the unity themes that were prominent in Greek writings under the Roman peace, consider what conclusions might be drawn about the transmission of ideas and the practicality of the writers, and go on to suggest that philosophers themselves tended to coalesce in their thinking. Despite outward antipathy, ideas were shared across the divisions between philosophical schools, and in that sense philosophical schemata tended to merge.

4 Old and new covenants: Iren. haer. 3.12.12 (unitatem et consonantiam), 4.9.1, 4.32.1– 2; Clem. str. 7.17.107.5 (τὴν διαθήκην τὴν μίαν διαφόροις τοῖς χρόνοις); Tert. praes.haer. 30.9–10 (unitus). Septuagint and apostolic tradition: Iren. haer. 3.21.3 (consonat). Church and scriptures: Tert. praes.haer. 38.4. Scriptures and events: Tert. Iud. 13.28; on the tone of this chapter, which is almost threatening, see N.L. Thomas, Defending Christ: The Latin Apologists before Augustine [Studia Traditionis Theologiae: Explorations in Early and Medieval Theology, 9] (Turnhout 2011) 5–6. The scriptures generally: Thphl.Ant. Autol. 2.9, 2.10, 2.35 (φίλα καὶ σύμφωνα; cf. Morlet 194–195 and n. 12); Clem. prot. 8.77.1 (μιᾷ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ); Tert. praes.haer. 36.5, Iud. 14.11. 5 Clem. str. 6.15.125.2–3 (ἡ συνῳδία καὶ ἡ συμφωνία); cf. Osborn, Clement 173, 177, 288 and Morlet 262–264. For συμφωνία and ἁρμονία as a stimulus to action see prot. 12.120.4. 6 No union between good and evil: Tat. orat. 18.2–3; Tert. Hermog. 13.2. Identity of soul and spirit: anim. 10.8. 7 Nat. 1.9.1 (concorporata et concreta), 1.15.7 (concordat); ieiun. 1.1 (unita atque concreta).

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Unity Themes under the Roman Peace Unity Themes under the Roman Peace

The period denoted by the term pax Romana (see the third section of chapter 1) was indeed characterised by general peace throughout the Roman empire. Epiktetos draws attention (see the beginning of chapter 3) to the assumption that one could travel from the western to the eastern limits of the empire in safety. At the end of our period, Tertullian links empire and peace, then goes on to say that harmony (concordia) helped the Romans.8 It is the case that the unity of the Roman empire is discussed by Greek writers – those who were generally inferior to Latin speakers – in this period (see chapter 3). But more often it is taken for granted. For, apart from a year of civil war in 68–69 C.E., there was unbroken peace from Augustus’ return to Rome in 29 B.C.E. to the death of Commodus in 192 C.E. Of course, there were threats on the Roman frontiers, most noticeably to the north, where various Germanic tribes were on the move, and to the east, where control of Armenia was a repeated point of conflict between the Romans and the Parthians. But there were no serious attempts to break away from the Roman empire until the revolt of Carausius towards the end of the third century. Peace did prevail. However, divisiveness developed or continued in the thinking of the Greeks. In the first place we should note that internal conflict, the stasis that had been endemic in Greek cities as far back as our evidence reaches, continued (see the second section of chapter 2). The quarrels between political factions, such as ‘the many’ and ‘the few’, were present just as they had been in the past. But it was no longer possible to overthrow the constitution by armed force, in the manner in which democracy had been replaced in Athens by a Peloponnesian-imposed oligarchy (‘the Thirty’) in 404–403 B.C.E. or Theban democrats had overthrown an oligarchy by infiltrating the city in 379 B.C.E. and capturing the Kadmeia from a Spartan garrison. Any such armed insurrection would surely attract the wrath of the Roman governor of the province. In any case, most Greek cities now had a dominant Council, with the Assembly acting more as a rubber-stamp. Factional leaders had to win their point in a small body composed mainly of people from the upper classes. Of course, even pro-democratic factions had in the past typically been headed by aristocratic, often also wealthy, leaders. But the arena for conflict had changed: speeches were now made and pyramids of supporters were now deployed in the Council rather than the Assembly.9 Parallel restrictions applied to stasis between neighbouring Greek cities (third section of chapter 2). Dion of Prousa warned his own city and the port city on the coast – he was a citizen of both – not to attract the attention of the 8

Tert. pall. 1.2 (cum concordia iuuat). pax and imperium: ibid. 1.1. The model of a set of pyramids was suggested by W.G. Forrest: see G.R. Stanton, Athenian Politics c.800–500 B.C.: A Sourcebook (London 1990) 4. 9

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Roman governor of Bithynia and Pontus by their constant disputes. Under the Roman peace the object of dispute was often different. Three leading cities of the province of Asia each wanted the appellation ‘the first’. Glory was of immense importance to the Greeks (as to the Romans). Ailios Aristeides is reasonably specific about the causes of stasis, but he might have made some concrete suggestions as to how homonoia might be achieved among these three cities, Pergamon, Smyrna and Ephesos. Again, the interest of the Roman governor lay in the maintenance of peace (final section of chapter 2). The lengths to which any opportunity for conflict was suppressed is illustrated by the instruction to a special commissioner in Bithynia in Dion’s time (Pliny the younger) from the princeps (Trajan) that no local fire brigade be established at Nikomedeia lest it become the nucleus of a political faction.10 Another area of thought in which a long-standing conceptualisation supervened is the unity of humankind (see chapter 4). Already in the Homeric poems there are hints that all people are essentially the same; they are contrasted with the gods and with other animals. Explicit formulation of the unity of humankind is attested at the end of the fifth century B.C.E. It can be seen in the plays of Menandros and the surviving fragments of the early Stoic philosophers.11 And there is certainly lip-service paid to the idea in the first two centuries of the common era. But throughout this period – from Homer through Herodotos and Isokrates to the writers of the second century – a countervailing force is prevalent. The contrast between Greeks and barbarians, to the detriment of the latter, is embedded in Greek thought and expression, and it generally overshadows the idea that all humans are brothers and sisters. Early Christian writers also seem not to hold firmly to a belief in the unity of humankind (first section of chapter 8). Even the idea of citizenship of the universe is diverted to the ends of a particular school of thought: the citizen of the universe is considered by some as confined to those inclined to Stoicism (second part of chapter 4). The idea of the unity of the Roman empire (chapter 3) is likewise bedevilled by divisive traditions. Much as Ailios Aristeides might hold up the empire as a perfect democracy, the context of his claims amply demonstrates that it was 10 Pliny the younger, Letters 10.33–34. Dion’s speeches to Prousa and Apameia are nos. 40 and 41. Aristeides mentions glory and praise in connection with all three cities in the province of Asia in 23.5–7, 12. For the importance of glory to the Romans see, recently, J.W. Atkins, Roman Political Thought (Cambridge 2018) 178–182, 184, 189–191. 11 The history of the idea down to the time of Cicero has been discussed with admirable judgment by H.C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge 1965). For what may be the first explicit statement of the idea, by Antiphon the sophist, see the opening of chap. 4 above. B.H. Isaac, who does not list Baldry’s book in his Selected Bibliography (nor does D.K. Buell in hers: Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity [New York 2005]), offers a careful discussion of key concepts such as racism, ethnic prejudice, race and xenophobia: The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton 2004) 15–39.

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otherwise. In the provinces of the empire Roman citizenship was possessed only by a small élite, and they fought hard to keep it recognised generation after generation, as a Zegrensian family in the province of Mauretania Tingitana shows by its petition to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus in 177 C.E.12 While it is striking that ex-slaves of Roman citizens obtained citizenship for their families, the vast majority of the free population of the empire remained subject to arbitrary action by Roman officials. There was a great disparity of status between those with Roman citizenship and those without. Like the idea of the unity of humankind, the idea that the Roman empire was a unity was more an image than an encapsulation of reality. This applies also to early Christian writers, many of whom were more concerned with an exclusive Christian citizenship than with the unity of the Roman empire (first section of chapter 7). The harmony of the universe (chapter 6) is an idea espoused by a large number of Greek writers under the pax Romana, including early Christian writers (final section of chapter 8). For Plutarch the universe is organised out of the elements and thus has a composite nature. Moreover, if there is more than one world, he would insist on harmony among the worlds. Dion of Prousa deploys the unity of the universe guided by one ruler (Zeus or the sun) as a commendation of the monarchic form of government. He sees the universe as a living creature and defends the image of the universe as a polis. The unity of the universe is important for other writers inclined to Stoicism as well, such as Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius. Writers such as Dion and Ailios Aristeides use the harmony of the universe as inspiration to harmony among Greek cities and, in Aristeides’ case, to praise Roman rule. By contrast, the Aristotelian On the kosmos uses the natural survival of a city to defend a universe composed of ‘opposites’. Apart from the application to inter-city relations there is not a great deal of practical advice arising from belief in the harmony of the universe. Plutarch, however, reassures readers that the loss by parents of their children is in harmony with the purpose of the universe. When we come to gods, humans and the universe (chapter 5) we can see that a less than rigid position on monotheism is taken by writers such as Plutarch who make claims about God being one but clearly believe in several gods. Those who run gods together into a singular deity are criticised by Dion of Prousa. But against the widespread polytheism there are some who insist that there is only one God, such as the author of On the kosmos and early Christian 12 See my brief report (1972) in ANRW 2.2 (Berlin 1975) 493 on the bronze tablet from Banasa published in CRAI (1971) 468–490. For later discussion see M. Euzennat in Mélanges d’histoire ancienne offerts à William Seston [Publications de la Sorbonne: Études, 9] (Paris 1974) 175–186; W. Williams, ZPE 17 (1975) 56–78; M. Christol in A. Mastino (ed.), L’Africa romana: Atti del V convegno di studio Sassari, 11–13 dicembre 1987 (Sassari 1988) 305–337 at 307–311, 336; D.J. Mattingly, Tripolitania (London 1995) 20.

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writers. Sometimes this belief is propagated by the idea of the monad. Humans are linked with God in terms of kinship or partnership. For Epiktetos this link has practical consequences, such as not blaming God or humans. For Plutarch, however, the link is more informal, based on partnership rather than kinship. For Ailios Aristeides there is a kind of mystic union between gods and individual people. The Hermetic disciples should seek union with God, based in one strand of thought on koinonia between the soul of God and human souls. While there is a long-standing Greek belief in God as the external director of the universe, writers with Stoic leanings (and some in the Hermetic tradition) do not hesitate to identify God with the universe. These writers are also strong proponents of human life “in harmony with nature (kata phusin)”. For Epiktetos it is particularly one’s governing principle or one’s will that must be kept in harmony with nature. There are concrete situations to which Epiktetos applies his thinking in this area, but for Marcus Aurelius the idea of harmony with nature leads to theoretical speculation. The latter can, however, be specific when censuring actions which are not in harmony with nature (para phusin). Marcus also recommends that humans welcome what is assigned by universal nature. There is widespread support for an harmonious life among other intellectuals of the first two centuries. Finally, the surprisingly strong tendency among Greek authors of the period to identify God with the universe must be linked with the desire to roll everything up together (seen most clearly in the Hermetic writings) and to have one concept of unity overlapping with another. Equally surprising, in the light of the hostile manner in which philosophical schools speak about each other, is the tendency of philosophical traditions to merge in our period (see the final section of this chapter). Another aspect of ancient rhetoric, if not of rigorous thinking, is to be noted. From a modern viewpoint, intellectuals of this period move disconcertingly from the unity of the Roman empire to the harmony of the universe to harmony among Greek cities. It is frequently the case that writers who embrace ideas of unity in human life – such as that we are all alike in all respects – sweep into talking about another kind of unity. Most common, perhaps, is the tendency of those with a rhetorical education to start expounding the harmony of the universe when their real subject is conflict and harmony between two Greek cities or (in the case of Christian writers) within a local church (third section of chapter 7). The second-century Christian writer Irenaeus moved easily between the unity of God, the unity of a human being and the unity of the church, though he would have claimed a philosophical connection between pairs of these ideas.13 It seems that, to some extent, ‘unity’, ‘harmony’ and the like were ‘hurrah words’, used to promote an idea as valuable. The lack of practical suggestions as to how the ideas promoted were to be carried out reinforces this suggestion. 13

See Y. de Andia, NRTh 109 (1987) 31–48 and the last section of chap. 7.

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The Transmission of Thought The Transmission of Thought

Thought about unity and disunity by Greeks under the pax Romana was not determined primarily by philosophical school or type of training. Writers crossed the boundaries between Stoicism, Platonism and so on. The same idea can be found in those highly trained in the rhetorical tradition as well as in philosophical writers. It seems that concepts of unity were generally accepted and attractive in the peaceful conditions engendered by Roman control. For example, Plutarch, Marcus Aurelius and some Christian writers agree on the harmony of the universe.14 Marcus Aurelius, the author of the pseudo-Aristotelian On the kosmos and the Hermetic writers are agreed that the universe is self-contained, that it renews forms within itself and that death is only change.15 On the unity of God, parallels have been noted between the Hermetic literature and On the kosmos and between Plutarch and Christian writers.16 In the case of union between gods and humans, not only the general notion but also specific ideas are found in both Christian and non-Christian writings. Thus one finds the idea of God actually invading a person in Hermetic as well as in Christian writings and terms such as aporrhoia and apospasma describing that which God implants in humans in Athenagoras’ Plea as well as the works of Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius.17 There are also similarities among writers of various traditions in the use of imagery. Plutarch, Marcus Aurelius and Christian writers all use the body metaphor, for example.18 14 Plutarch and Marcus Aurelius: first section of chap. 6. Christian writers: e.g. 1 Clem. 20; Tatian, orat. 12.2–3; Athenagoras, leg. 4.2, 25.3; Irenaeus, haer. 2.2.4, 4.38.3; Clement of Alexandria, prot. 1.4.5–1.5.3 (third section of chap. 8). See also E. Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church [The Hibbert Lectures, 1888] (London 1890) 209–213; M.G. Murphy, Nature Allusions in the Works of Clement of Alexandria [The Catholic University of America Patristic Studies, 65] (Washington 1941) 2–3; Jaeger 14–15 (cf. RhM 102 [1959] 330–340). 15 G.R. Stanton, Historia 18 (1969) 577 = R. Klein (ed.), Marc Aurel [Wege der Forschung, 550] (Darmstadt 1979) 366–367 (on Marcus); mund. 396a 28–32, 396b 34–397a 5, 397a 19–397b 8 (cf. Morlet 25–29 on fragments of Herakleitos); C.H. 11.15–16. 16 See Festugière 2.515 and n. 2; E. Hatch, op. cit. (n. 14) 171–180 (citing mund. 401a 12–27 on 173), 188–208, 239–267; Dodds 116–118 (citing Max.Tyr. 11.5 on universal belief in one God) for references and discussion. 17 Dodds 76–77. ἀπόρροια: Athenagoras, leg. 10.4, 24.1; M.A. 2.4.2; ἀπόσπασμα: Epikt. 1.14.6, 2.8.11; M.A. 5.27. Cf. E. Hatch, op. cit. (n. 14) 177 and n. 1; L.W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought (Cambridge 1967) 102; A.J. Malherbe, JThS n.s. 20 (1969) 538–542; J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 268–270. 18 Plutarch: mor. 426a, 636f, 1003a, 1025a, 1073e–1074a. Marcus: 7.13, 7.19, 8.34; cf. Neuenschwander 38–48. The body metaphor is already well developed in the New Testament (e.g. Romans 12.3–8, 1 Corinthians 12.12–31, Ephesians 4.1–16, 25) and patristic writers frequently refer to New Testament usage (e.g. 2 Clem. 14.2 [Ephesians 1.22–23; cf. C.M. Tuckett, 2 Clement: Introduction, Text, and Commentary (Oxford 2012) 251–252; for the

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Moreover, writers can agree on concepts of unity despite different philosophical presuppositions. One would expect Plutarch to show a preference for Platonic ideas and Dion of Prousa for Stoic ideas, and indeed Plutarch talks about “this world” and “the other world” whereas Dion discusses the Stoic theory of conflagration.19 On the subject of the harmony of the universe Plutarch specifically attacks Stoic ideas. Yet both Plutarch and Dion attribute the harmony of the universe to one or more gods and see it displayed in the harmonious movements of the celestial bodies. Of course, there are ideas subsidiary to the harmony of the universe on which these writers disagree, such as whether the universe is a divine politeia (constitution)20 and whether it is a harmony of opposites. And they differ on their application of the idea to human life. While Plutarch uses the harmony of the universe to explain certain human experiences, Dion uses it to support his advice about homonoia among humans and among cities – though there is a lack of logical connection between the metaphysical theory and the application – and Ailios Aristeides uses it to praise Roman rule, which is said to have brought order to the world. Again, Dion and Aristeides come close to monotheism in their emphasis on Zeus as supreme creator, but in the last resort they are both clearly polytheists. Plutarch is a polytheist too, although he naturally pays particular attention to Apollon because of his connection with Delphoi and his lengthy discussions of Delphic matters – much as Aristeides emphasises Asklepios. Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius are openly polytheistic. All these writers profess a belief in the unity of humankind, but there is a widespread failure to commit themselves to the idea, illustrated by the frequency with which divisions of humankind are suggested. Plutarch and Dion have a limited acceptance of cosmopolitanism, and Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius are not very practical in their discussion of the idea. A life in harmony with nature is a very widespread ideal under the Roman peace. Intellectuals in this period can also disagree on ideas concerning unity and disunity despite closely related presuppositions or similar training. Epiktetos shows some interest in the unity of the Roman empire. He is actually closer in this to the Aristotelian On the kosmos, with its interest in homonoia in a city and in the unity of the Persian empire, than he is to Marcus Aurelius, the ruler possible Roman origin of this sermon see chap. 8 n. 3]; Ignatios, Smyrn. 1.2, 11.2 [on the use of σῶμα and σωματεῖον see J.B. Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers 22 (London 1889) 2.319–320 and G.D. Kilpatrick, JThS 13 (1962) 117]; Justin, dial. 42.3 [1 Corinthians 12.12: the allusion is pointed out by M. Marcovich (ed.), Iustini Martyris dialogus cum Tryphone (Patristische Texte und Studien, 47) (Berlin 2005) 139]; Irenaeus, haer. 3.19.3, 5.6.2). 19 ‘This world’ indicated by αὐτόθι, δεῦρο and other terms (611f, 731d, 745e, 765f, 766a), ‘the other world’ by ἐκεῖ and other terms (561a, 766b, 766e, 1105c) or by τὰ ἐν ῞Αιδου (1091e–f, 1092c, 1104b–c, 1105b). Dion 55.2 and the myth of the Magi in 36.39–61. 20 Ailios Aristeides sides with Dion here: the universe is a divine πολιτεία administered by a single purpose and power of philia (23.76).

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of the Roman empire, with the latter’s single allusion to that empire.21 Plutarch, Dion and Aristeides are all writers in the rhetorical tradition; Plutarch and Dion present similarities in career, as intermediaries between Rome and Greek cities, and in their fondness for historical and literary allusion;22 the preserved speeches of Aristeides are not unlike much of Dion’s output and find a number of parallels in the items collectively known as the moralia of Plutarch. Yet Plutarch does not stress the unity of the Roman empire, while Dion and Aristeides both make it co-extensive with the oikoumene. Dion and Aristeides express a belief in harmony among two or more gods; Plutarch does not, although he is very interested in religious ideas. Both Plutarch and Dion speak of the relationship between gods and humans in terms of koinonia; but, unlike Dion, Plutarch does not use the idea of kinship (sungeneia) for this relationship. For Plutarch the title Zeus homognios refers to Zeus’ patronage of kinship among humans, whereas for Dion it denotes kinship between gods and humans. He sees Zeus as the common father of humans and gods, both groups being rational beings. Aristeides has yet another view, conceiving of a mystic union between gods and individual humans. Of course, writers with similar interests and background are frequently closer to each other than writers of diverse traditions, even when the same general notion has wide acceptance across the intellectual spectrum. Thus the idea of the ‘common good’ is applied to humankind by Epiktetos and Marcus Aurelius, but to the Christian community by some early Christian writers.23 Nevertheless, it is striking that two writers of different training and diverse philosophical outlook are sometimes closer in thought than two writers of similar training and outlook. How are we to explain these occurrences? The explanation seems to be that these ideas of unity existed in the general culture of the Roman empire in this period and were available to all educated members of the Roman world, whether trained in the rhetorical tradition or trained by philosophers, whether politicians or teachers or sophists or Christian bishops. 21 Epikt. 3.13.9–12, 4.1.12; mund. 396b 4–7, 398a 27 –398b 1, 399b 12–19; M.A. 1.16.14. On Epiktetos’ interest in the Roman empire see F.G.B. Millar, JRS 55 (1965) 141–148 = Rome, the Greek World, and the East 2 (Chapel Hill, NC 2004) 105–119. Marcus uses βασιλεία (1.14.2, 4.32.1) of ‘monarchy’ or ‘kingdom’ in general and (if A.S.L. Farquharson is right in accepting the reading reported in the editio princeps; J. Dalfen emends ἡγεμονιῶν to γενομένων) ἡγεμονίαι (7.49) of dynasties or empires of the past. Also on the harmony of opposites (second section of chap. 6) Epiktetos is closer to On the kosmos than to Marcus. 22 This point has been made by R.H. Barrow, Plutarch and His Times (London 1967) 45, 136–137; Bowersock 110–112; C.P. Jones, Dio 125–131. 23 Contrast Epikt. 1.19.12–13, 4.10.12 and M.A. 3.4.1, 3.4.4, 5.35, 7.5.2–3, 7.55.3 with Ign. Philad. 1.1 and Barn. 4.10. H. Chadwick in A.H. Armstrong (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge 1967) 159 distinguishes Seneca’s ideals of ‘universal brotherhood’ from those of Paul; cf. J.N. Sevenster, Paul and Seneca [Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 4] (Leiden 1961) 170–174, 218.

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Indeed, the ideas on unity and disunity are very widely accepted by a variety of writers. There is frequent expression of belief in the harmony of the universe, in some kind of union between god(s) and humans, in the importance of living in harmony with nature, in the value of homonoia for cities and in the unity of the Roman empire. Even writers such as Ioulios Poludeukes (Julius Pollux) and Philostratos the biographer of the sophists discuss homonoia, stasis and koinonia.24 This situation of wide acceptance of concepts of unity is not one where the wide acceptance is due to the overwhelming influence of a single thinker. Source-critical studies of the usual kind do not help here. One might compare the debate at the beginning of the twentieth century as to whether Epiktetos was influenced by the early Christians. A.F. Bonhöffer seems to have settled this debate by showing that there is no direct dependence of one on the other and yet there are many parallels of thought and expression between Epiktetos and the New Testament.25 Bonhöffer says little about concepts of unity. But it does appear that the beliefs of the early Christians in the harmony of the universe and the unity of humankind are not based on the New Testament and must derive from the classical tradition of thought. The wide dissemination of concepts of unity and the parallels which cross the boundaries of philosophical outlook and literary genre comprise strong evidence that the various writers acquired their concepts of unity from the general cultural heritage. Given the high level of education of Christian as well as non-Christian writers, this is not surprising.

24

Note especially Philostratos’ approval of Polemon for making Smyrna’s government harmonious and free from stasis (Lives of the Sophists 531 [p.42.32–43.3 Kayser]; cf. Bowersock 26). See also Pollux 1.152–153, 8.134–135, 8.152–154; Philostratos, Lives of the Sophists 493–494 (p.12.13–24 K), 500 (p.17.24–25 K), 602–603 (p.104.25–32 K); cf. Philostratos, Life of Apollonios 4.8.1 (p.128.25–32 Kayser). 25 A.F. Bonhöffer, Epiktet und das Neue Testament [Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten, 10] (Gießen 1911). His conclusions are accepted by subsequent editors of Epiktetos, W.A. Oldfather (1.xxvi–xxvii) and J. Souilhé (1.lxii–lxvii). Festugière and Neuenschwander also reveal the wide dissemination of many ideas in the Roman empire. T. Engberg–Pedersen argues from the example of NT Gal. 5.13–26 that Paul uses Stoic ideas on, for example, indifferent things, oikeiosis and apatheia to formulate the core of his theological thought: in S.K. Strange and J. Zupko (eds.), Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations (Cambridge 2004) 52–75; cf. his Paul and the Stoics (Edinburgh 2000), chap. 7. By contrast, K.L. Gaca argues for discontinuity between early Christian sexual morality (as seen especially in Tatianos and Clement of Alexandria), which she considers to be ultimately derived from the Septuagint, and Greek moral philosophy (especially as seen in the early Stoics); in so doing she contends with those such as M. Foucault (e.g. The Use of Pleasure [The History of Sexuality, 2] [London 1986] 14–15, 20–22; The Care of the Self [The History of Sexuality, 3] [London 1986] 39–43, 170, 235–237) who see a largely shared code of sexual morality: The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity [Hellenistic Culture and Society, 40] (Berkeley 2003).

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Practicality of Thought Practicality of Thought

The relationship between theory and practice, among Greek writers under the Roman peace, is often poor – at least as far as their ideas about unity are concerned. The manner in which belief can be put into practice is often not considered. There are cases of self-contradiction. And there are claims which are not consistent with reality. As I argued fifty years ago, Marcus Aurelius acts as emperor in a manner which ignores his concepts of unity.26 Statements of belief in the unity of humankind are repeatedly opposed by strong desires to conceive of humans as divided by race, nation or religion. Christian recognition of the unity of the Roman empire is qualified by a marked tendency to Christian exclusiveness and a concentration on those qualities which bind the Christian community together.27 The treatment of the unity of the Roman empire by Ailios Aristeides is out of touch with reality at several points. Of the major writers considered in this book, Epiktetos and Dion of Prousa emerge with the best record as far as practicality is concerned. Marcus Aurelius concentrates on his theoretical speculations, whether he is talking about the unity of the universe, or universal nature, or harmony with nature, or cosmopolitan ideas. Plutarch is not very practical on such topics as the achievement of koinonia and the common good or harmony with nature. He occasionally relates his views of the harmony of the universe to human experiences. In discussing homonoia he makes practical suggestions with regard to stasis between two brothers, but does not extend his ideas in a realistic way to stasis on a larger scale. Ailios Aristeides eulogises homonoia (somewhat inconsistently with his claims about the Roman empire), but is not practical either when he recommends it to Pergamon, Smyrna and Ephesos (second section above) or when he addresses himself to stasis in Rhodes. One should remember that by modern roads Smyrna (Izmir) is about 100 km south of Pergamon (Bergama) and Ephesos (Efes) is about a further 100 km south again. Dion links homonoia in the universe with homonoia among humans and among cities, but the link is not logically established and the actions by which homonoia may be achieved are not specified. He is not very practical in recommending homonoia to the Bithynian cities despite his detailed account of the causes of stasis. Indeed, one 26

Historia 18 (1969) 570–587, updated in Marc Aurel (n. 15) 359–388 at 378. A very similar conclusion about the lack of visible effects of Marcus’ philosophy on practical politics is reached by L. de Blois in M. van Ackeren (ed.), A Companion to Marcus Aurelius (Chichester 2012) 171–182, who makes no reference to my article. 27 Compare, for example, Athenagoras’ praise of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus for their intelligent control which results in the whole world (ἡ σύμπασα οἰκουμένη) enjoying profound peace (leg. 1.2) with the recurring theme of Christian citizenship in 1 Clement (2– 3, 21, 54) and Ignatios’ prayer for a union (ἕνωσις) in the churches which consists of faith and love (Magn. 1.2; the ἑνότης of faith and love is the source from which all other Christian qualities naturally come: Eph. 14).

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wonders what sort of co-operation between Prousa and Apameia was feasible. Today the trip by motor vehicle from Prousa (Bursa) to Apameia (Mudanya) takes twenty minutes of terrible traffic (Bursa is an industrial city of one million people) followed by twenty minutes of pleasant countryside ending at a harbour in a lovely setting. Dion, speaking under the bulwark of Mysia’s Mount Olympos rising immediately behind Prousa, was recommending collaboration with a city that was several hours’ walk away. Nor are Nikaia (Iznik), a Hellenistic foundation at the eastern end of an attractive lake, and Nikomedeia (Izmit) close to each other. The reason why Dion talks about concord between pairs of cities thus separated, or why Aristeides does the same for three cities spread over a distance of 200 km, seems to be that at the root of the disputes was concern over reputation and the recognition they sought with Roman authority. Although Dion often fails to make practical suggestions, or makes unrealistic proposals, for harmony between Greek cities, he does put forward proposals which are both practical and realistic with regard to the linen-workers at Tarsos and on the occasion of the impending visit by the proconsular governor to Prousa. Epiktetos concentrates on principles of conduct (for example, when dealing with cosmopolitan ideas). He pays careful attention to practical advice and his theories of unity tend either to be developed in response to a practical problem or to lead on to advice about specific actions.28 But most of the writers are not nearly as practical as Epiktetos. They contradict their lofty ideals when they become more specific or their claims are highly idealistic, if not blatantly extravagant. These writers frequently reveal a consciousness that word should be followed by action. The reader might expect some guidance as to how the various ideals of unity are to be achieved. But that expectation is rarely satisfied. Talk about unity in the Roman world of the first two centuries is more frequent than one would have expected. A surprisingly large body of material has been collected in this book. But unity rarely becomes the predominant idea. True, homonoia within or among Greek cities is the predominant theme in some of the Bithynian speeches of Dion and in two of the speeches of Aristeides (23, 24). But measured against the extant works of an author, unity is not in any instance the major preoccupation. Typically, the authors undertake to expound a variety of subjects. Concepts of unity are introduced into many of these expositions, sometimes as illustrations, sometimes because they are common ground between two sides of a debate. Concepts of unity can also be used to provide a link, frequently a superficial one, between two subjects.

28 Although addressing students at Nikopolis, Epiktetos is constantly pointing them to their re-entry to life in the world (including public life), as T. Colardeau in particular makes clear: Étude sur Épictète2 (Fougères 2004) 165–195.

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The Unity of Philosophy The Unity of Philosophy

It is striking, in view of this superficiality, that philosophical thought tended to become one. This might seem surprising in the light of the vigorous attacks made by philosophical schools on one another. Plutarch, for instance, makes highly critical comments about Stoics and Epicureans, while Epiktetos probably attacks Plutarch.29 Nevertheless, there were significant ways in which philosophical schools began to merge. For example, writers who proclaimed their allegiance to one school accepted views from other schools. Seneca objects to “the more bizarre features of Stoicism” and explicitly draws upon Epicureans as well as Stoic philosophy.30 The Platonist Attikos makes his position clear by using Stoic terminology and views.31 Albinos, another Platonist, shows Stoic influence behind his thought in using the terminology of phusikai ennoiai (natural notions).32 Now, J. Whittaker doubts that phusikai ennoiai retained much Stoic flavour. Referring to another Platonist, Alkinoos, he argues that Stoic terms such as apotelesma (finished product) and prokope (moral progress) had become part of the jargon open to all philosophers, including Platonists.33 However, the longer opening passage in Alkinoos’ Didaskalikos to which Whittaker also refers is shot through with Stoic thought. Even Alkinoos’ definition of philosophy as a striving for wisdom uses a term, orexis, which is not found in

29

In 2.20, for example. See M. Cuvigny in Association Guillaume Budé: Actes du VIIIe congrès (Paris, 5–10 avril 1968) (Paris 1969) 560–566, especially 563–565; J. Opsomer in Plutarch and his Intellectual World 24–28. It seems that Plutarch could claim that the Stoics derive their ethics from Plato (mor. 1034c) and that they contradict themselves when they diverge from Plato: see G.R. Boys-Stones in Plutarch and his Intellectual World 49–54. 30 Seneca, Letters 12.10–11, 21.7–9. See D.N. Sedley in M.T. Griffin and J. Barnes (eds.), Philosophia Togata [I]: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society (Oxford 1989) 119 and R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Skeptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy (London 1996) 2, 5, 88. The characterisation of Stoic views is by J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long (eds.), The Question of “Eclecticism”: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy [Hellenistic Culture and Society, 3] (Berkeley 1988) 4. 31 Attikos, frr. 2 (4.2), 3 (5.2), 8 (12.3–4) des Places. See J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (London 1977) 251–252, 258; cf. Dillon in id. and A.A. Long (eds.), op. cit. (n. 30) 117–119. 32 Albinos, Eisagoge 6 (p.150.33 K.F. Hermann); cf. H.A.S. Tarrant, Thrasyllan Platonism (Ithaca, NY 1993) 49–50. 33 J. Whittaker, ANRW 2.36.1 (Berlin 1987) 106, 114–117, referring to Alkinoos, Didaskalikos pp.152.6–23, 170.1–2 (ἀποτέλεσμα) and 183.18 (προκοπαί) Whittaker. Instances where two or more philosophical traditions are combined are noted by T. Göransson, Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus [Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 61] (Göteborg 1995) 110–111, 118, 132. J.-M. André sees some lessening of differences between the philosophical schools but argues that the tolerance of Marcus Aurelius for other schools is cultural rather than metaphysical: ANRW 2.36.1.51–74, especially 55–56.

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Plato.34 It is more reasonable to side with D. Glidden, who writes that “dogmatic interests tended to amalgamate eclectically around Plato’s writings, adding portions borrowed from Stoicism or Pythagorean mysticism along with bits of Aristotle and assorted contemporary interests, until the point is reached when such a label as ‘Platonism’ tends to be more heraldic than descriptive” and points out that ‘Platonic eclecticism’ is “based on tenuous connections between often incompatible philosophies”.35 This movement towards an intermingling of philosophical schools began before the domination of the Caesars established peace throughout the Mediterranean world, as a recent study of Philon of Larisa suggests. One field in which some philosophers converged in the Hellenistic period was epistemology. In the late second century B.C.E., if we can trust Noumenios of Apameia in Syria, Philon supported a universal suspension of judgment, as had Academic sceptics before him. But he shifted from this radical scepticism to a more moderate position which allowed, at least in everyday perceptions, the probable truth of some impressions. Then, in books published after he moved to Rome shortly after 90 B.C.E., Philon toyed with the Stoic term katalepsis (apprehension) and recognised a weak form of it – not, indeed, going all the way with the Stoics by believing that the kataleptic impression could not be false, but accepting the foundational Stoic conditions for a kataleptic impression. Now, this stance adopted in Rome was supported by an astounding claim on Philon’s part: this had always been the position of the Academy. That is, the Academy had never accepted the thesis of akatalepsia, which entailed the impossibility of knowledge. Such a claim to the unity of the Academy (which itself came to an end as a formal institution shortly afterwards) reminds one of the claims to the unity of the apostolic tradition made by the Christian writer Irenaeus (see the second section of chapter 7). It certainly enraged fellow Academics, notably Philon’s former student Antiokhos of Askalon. But the final position taken by Philon, although ignored by Academics in the immediate sequel, foreshadows the non-sceptical varieties of Platonism seen under the pax Romana, which culminated in what we know as Neoplatonism.36 Antiokhos

34 It is, however, found in the definition of philosophy in Horoi 414b; this work, though preserved in the Platonic corpus, derives much from the Stoics (later than Plato). On Stoic terms in the opening paragraphs of the Didaskalikos see J.M. Dillon, Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford 1993) 51–53. Whittaker himself, commenting (115) on his Budé text of Alkinoos, points out that ἀποτέλεσμα seems to have been brought into vogue by the Stoics; he suggests that Plato would have used ἔργον (Timaios 30 b 3; cf. J.M. Dillon, op. cit. 127). Whittaker also points out (144) that προκοπή and προκόπτω are Stoic terms. 35 D. Glidden in R.H. Popkin (ed.), Scepticism in the History of Philosophy: A Pan-American Dialogue [Archives internationales d’histoire des idées, 145] (Dordrecht 1996) 219. 36 Philon’s rigorous scepticism (following on Kleitomakhos as scholarch of the Academy): Noumenios, fr. 28 des Places. ‘Probable’ impressions: Cicero, Academica 2.78, 2.148.

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himself combined Academic, Peripatetic and Stoic positions. Just as Philon claimed that the Academy had been united from Plato on in its acceptance that knowledge of a restricted kind was attainable, Antiokhos would claim a unitary tradition derived from Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. His epistemology is largely Stoic and Peripatetic and his ethics is constructed from all three schools of thought. Such a conglomerate was not unreasonable: Zenon of Kition (the founder of Stoicism) had been a student of Polemon of Athens, the last head of the Academy whom Antiokhos respected.37 It was recognised even in the second century C.E. that philosophers crossed boundaries and used the ideas of other schools. Sextus Empiricus reports comments about Antiokhos to the effect that “he teaches Stoic philosophy in the Academy”.38 There has, therefore, been a temptation for modern scholars to label the first century B.C.E. and the first two centuries of the common era a period of ‘eclecticism’ and even to attribute the alleged lack of innovation in

Ironically, Arkesilaos, the initiator of Academic scepticism, argued that the Stoics were committed to universal suspension of judgment (ἐποχή, τὸ ἐπέχειν): Acad. 2.67, 2.77; cf. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 7.155–157 and G. Striker in M. Schofield et al. (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology (Oxford 1980) 54–83, especially 60–69. Katalepsis accepted in ordinary experience: Cic. Acad. 2.18; Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.235. Unity of the Academy: Cic. Acad. 1.13. A similar claim to unity of the Academy is made by the anonymous commentator on Plato’s Theaitetos: see 54.43–55.13 as edited by G. Bastianini and D.N. Sedley in Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini 3 (Firenze 1995) 412, with notes on 539–540. Reaction of Antiokhos: Cic. Acad. 2.11, 2.18. See on all this C. Brittain, Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics (Oxford 2001), especially 10–11, 22–24, 54–55, 73–76, 136–138, 145–147, 166– 173, 218–222; cf. 127–128 on Philonian/Metrodorian borrowing from the Stoics. H.J. Mette assembled the fragments of Philon: Lustrum 28–29 (1986–87) 9–63 at 14–20. On unitytheses in this period see further H.A.S. Tarrant, Scepticism or Platonism?: The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy (Cambridge 1985) 2–3, 58, 62–63, 66, 77–78, 129, 133, 171 n. 7; P. Donini in G. Cambiano (ed.), Storiografia e dossografia nelle filosofia antica (Torino 1986) 203–226, especially 220–222 (on Plutarch); C. Brittain, op. cit. (above), chap. 5. On the end of the Academy as an institution see J.P. Lynch, Aristotle’s School: A Study of a Greek Educational Institution (Berkeley 1972) 177–189; J. Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy [Hypomnemata, 56] (Göttingen 1978); D.N. Sedley, Phronesis 26 (1981) 67–75 (reviewing Glucker’s book). 37 On the syncretism of Antiokhos see J. Barnes in M.T. Griffin and Barnes (eds.), Philosophia Togata [I] (n. 30) 51–96, especially 78–89; cf. J.M. Dillon, op. cit. (n. 31) 63– 81, L. Fladerer, Antiochos von Askalon: Hellenist und Humanist [Grazer Beiträge Supplementbände, 7] (Graz 1996) 80–94 and C. Gill in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge 2003) 54–55. Zenon and Polemon: Cic. Fin. 4.3. Antiokhos’ opinion of Polemon: Cic. Acad. 2.131. On this coalescence of philosophical currents see also Morlet 82–94. 38 Sextus Empiricus on Antiokhos: Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.235. Cicero said that Antiokhos, though called an Academic, was, “if he had a changed a very few things”, a most genuine Stoic (Acad. 2.132; cf. 1.69).

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thought to the deadening influence of Roman control.39 Despite a degree of impatience with technical niceties and with extreme views, the philosophers of the period deserve more credit than this. But it is true that they freely adopted views from other schools. Thus Plutarch, while vigorously quarrelling with Stoicism, adopts Stoic elements (such as tonos) in presenting a Platonic-Aristotelian view in The Face in the Moon. At least one Hermetic treatise takes on board a Platonism that has absorbed some Stoic ideas.40 G.R. Boys-Stones argues that there had taken place by the end of the second century of the common era a revolution whereby there was a profound change in the understanding of how philosophy should be done. It began with early Stoic beliefs about the (pre-philosophical) harmony in which the first generations of humankind lived with nature. To a wider general view that primeval humans were still close to a providential god, whereas vice developed later, the Stoics added the common rationality of humans. This left the question, how could the beliefs of such primitive humans be discovered? The answer – that the philosophical ideas of the earliest humans could be retrieved through a study of (especially) theological traditions – was developed by later Stoics. Thus L. Annaeus Cornutus sees comparable beliefs about gods among Greeks and other societies; consequently, the philosophy of the privileged early humans might be discovered by analysis of their allegories.41 The Greek response to Jewish isolationism varied over time and changed in line with Stoic thought. Before the first century C.E. Greek writers such as Manethon and Lusimakhos were hostile. But Iosephos (Josephus) answers a different line of attack; for him, the sheer antiquity of the Jews was a crucial argument. When Stoics of 39 J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long rightly dismiss as evidence for such influence the recommendation by L. Gellius Poplicola that the philosophers in Athens settle their controversies (Cicero, On the Laws 1.53): op. cit. (n. 30) 2. 40 Plut. mor. 943d–e, with H. Cherniss (ed.), Plutarch’s Moralia 12 (Cambridge, MA 1957) 203 note e, 204 note a. See P. Donini in J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long (eds.), op. cit. (n. 30) 126–144. Lamberton 172–179 provides a summary of this dialogue. S. Delcomminette, building on earlier exposition by A.-J. Festugière (4.141–199), points to the discussion of active incorporeals in C.H. 11 (5, 15–18): RPhA 20.2 (2002) 11–36 at 16–20. On the other hand, M. Jackson-McCabe argues that the theory of an innate belief in gods found in Seneca (e.g. Ep. 117.6) is not a case of Stoic-Platonist ‘syncretism’, but is rooted in the Stoic concept of oikeiosis (on which see chap. 4 at n. 13): Phronesis 49 (2004) 323–347, especially 327, 341–346. 41 Boys-Stones, especially v–vii, 26–27, 41–43, 56–59. Cornutus: e.g. Introduction to Greek Theology 28, p.54.12–21 Lang (cited by Boys-Stones at 57) and 35, p.75.18–76.5 Lang (Boys-Stones 53). On Cornutus’ approach to allegorical exegesis see G.W. Most in ANRW 2.36.3 (Berlin 1989) 2014–2065, especially 2020–2023, 2027–2029, and G.R. BoysStones in id. (ed.), Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition: Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions (Oxford 2003) 189–216 at 196–210. For the idea that models (such as the likening of the universe to a temple of initiation by Dion of Prousa [12.34]) were used by Stoics as well as Platonists, ibid. 211–214.

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the first century C.E., such as Khairemon, described Jewish theology as an inferior derivative of Egyptian tradition, Jewish apologetic replied by pushing the essence of the Mosaic law back to the patriarchs. Just as a full account of primitive wisdom resided in the Torah, so Greek thinkers of the second century believed that they could reconstruct that wisdom through their own tradition. Thus the Platonist Kelsos, accepting the Stoic theory of ancient wisdom, speaks of the handing down of doctrine of great antiquity (arkhaios anothen logos). Plutarch regards certain cultic practices as primitive and thus derived from an authoritative philosophy. Platonists are believing what the later Stoics asserted.42 Now, Platonists made an appeal to Plato – or rather, to the infallible source of his doctrines – that was different in kind from the Epicurean ascription of authority to Epikouros or that of the Stoics to Zenon.43 What is being adopted by Platonists here is a method of allegorical exegesis. But they draw a further conclusion: Plato had absorbed the ancient wisdom. Others were to be studied, as recommended by Noumenios, in order to reinforce the Platonic reconstruction. Commentaries began to proliferate on Plato. Although other figures (such as Pythagoras, Orpheus and Homer) were considered sources of primitive thought, Platonists naturally concentrated on Plato. Boys-Stones concludes that the Platonists took up not only the Stoics’ belief that primeval thought had survived but also their methods of extracting it. But Platonists understandably believed that Plato had successfully used these methods and thus that the content of his philosophy was the truth.44 Of course, Christians became involved in the same kind of debate. They faced a considerable challenge: Christianity was such a recent hairesis (school of thought) that it was vulnerable to being dismissed as a divergence from a divergence (the Jewish one) from primeval truth. In response, Christian writers developed an argument that their foundation in Hebrew thought gave them an even older tradition than that of the Platonists. “[T]he wisdom handed down through Judaism was in essence the same as the wisdom passed on through Christ.” As early as the Letter of Barnabas 42

Boys-Stones 61–62, 64–68, 73–75, 85–90, 75, 95, 105–107, 111–114. Manethon: FGrH 609 F 8 (on some textual and interpretative difficulties see the brief notes in G.P. Verbrugghe and J.M. Wickersham, Berossos and Manetho, Introduced and Translated: Native Traditions in Ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt [Ann Arbor, MI 2001] 157–158) and F 10. Lusimakhos: FGrH 621 F 1. Khairemon: fr. 1 van der Horst. Kelsos: Origen, Against Kelsos 1.14; cf. M. Frede in J. Barnes and M.T. Griffin (eds.), Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome (Oxford 1997) 229–230. Plutarch: fr. 158 Sandbach. 43 On the difficulty of finding Epicureans differing with Epikouros and the co-founders of Epicureanism or finding Stoics disagreeing with Zenon see D.N. Sedley in M.T. Griffin and J. Barnes (eds.), Philosophia Togata [I] (n. 30) 97–103. 44 Boys-Stones 102–105, 111–122. Noumenios’ recommendation: fr. 1a des Places; on the revelation of truth to ancient peoples see also H. de Ley, Macrobius and Numenius: A Study of Macrobius, In Somn., I, c. 12 [Collection Latomus, 125] (Bruxelles 1972) 10–12.

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there is just one covenant, that received by Moses; but Jewish thinkers did not interpret it correctly. It might also be necessary to assert that there was just one Christian tradition, the orthodox one. On the shared assumption that unity was of central importance, Christians could thus turn the tables on pagan philosophy, asserting that there was a multiplicity of schools deriving from the teaching of Sokrates. Greek philosophy was to be shown to be dependent on Christian philosophy. Those who did not accept Christianity had diverged from the truth.45 There is a reason why the tendency of philosophical currents to merge has been obscured. In order to make one’s way a philosopher had to be aligned with one school or another – Platonism or Cynicism or Epicureanism or the like.46 Adherents of a particular school might diverge in significant ways from the views of the founder, and opponents of the school would delight in pointing out the divergences, just as Plutarch did with respect to the Stoics. There was also a tendency to claim the greatest figure of all, Plato, for one’s own school. Thus the Stoic Poseidonios not only adopted ideas in the Platonic dialogues but also put forward his own view of Plato.47 Nevertheless, the tribalism of the 45 Boys-Stones chapters 8–9 (quotation on 169). Jewish interpretation too literal: Barn. 10. Conflicting schools deriving from Sokrates: Origen, Against Kelsos 3.13. On the other hand, unity developing into diversity is countenanced by Justin, 1 apol. 26.1–6: see chap. 7 n. 32. For recent questioning of the labels ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heresy’ of Christian belief see A. Le Boulluec, La notion d’hérésie dans la littérature grecque: IIe–IIIe siècles (Paris 1985); J.B. Henderson, The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy: Neo-Confucian, Islamic, Jewish, and Early Christian Patterns (Albany, NY 1998), especially 8–10, 16–20, 39–49, 85– 87, 95–99, 104–106, 119–125, 134–141, 151–153; M. Franzmann, Heretics and Hermeneutics: Taking the Gnostic Jesus Seriously [Inaugural Lectures, 2001] (Armidale 2002) 10–16 (or, preferably, in JRH 29 [2005] 117–128); K.L. King, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, MA 2003), especially chapters 2 and 8 and the note on methodology (239–247), and in S.A. Harvey and D.G. Hunter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies (Oxford 2008) 66–84. King believes scholars “have unwittingly reified a rhetorical category into a historical entity” (What is Gnosticism? 52). By contrast, A.H.B. Logan, distinguishing between ‘sects’ and ‘cults’, sees the Gnostics as a recognisable social entity with a distinctive character: The Gnostics: Identifying an Early Christian Cult (London 2006). See also the essays in A. Marjanen (ed.), Was There a Gnostic Religion? [Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society, 87] (Göttingen 2005) and Marjanen’s essay in S.A. Harvey and D.G. Hunter (eds.), op. cit. 203–220. 46 H.A.S. Tarrant offers this, together with respect for the authority of the teacher, as explanation for the slow change in ideas in the first century B.C.E. and the first two centuries of the common era: Plato’s First Interpreters (London 2000) 4–5. On the allegiance of philosophically committed thinkers to a specific school see C. Gill, op. cit. (n. 37) 44–45. In asking what is innovative in the Stoic-inspired works on practical ethics in this period, Gill nominates their genres: ibid. 42–43. 47 For example, his interpretation of ‘all soul is immortal’ in Plato’s Phaidros (245c 5) as world soul only in fr. 290 EK: see R. Hoven, Stoïcisme et stoïciens face au problème de l’audelà [Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l’Université de Liège, 197]

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philosophical schools gave the impression that they were implacably opposed to one another. Even when a philosopher selected doctrines from a variety of schools, as Potamon did in Alexandria in the age of Augustus, it was difficult for such an ‘eclectic’ approach to gain recognition.48 One could claim, as the Sceptics did, that Plato continued to think about the subjects he discussed; he ought not, therefore, to have fixed doctrines in the manner of the Epicureans and Stoics.49 Harmony and unity, then, remained a source of inspiration for Greek writers in the first two centuries. Often it is hard to establish that there was a concrete reality behind the claims about unity. However, one specific case where schools of thought had been implacably opposed to each other – philosophy – does reveal a tendency to cross boundaries and merge.

A Final Comment on Modern and Ancient Ideas of Unity A Final Comment on Modern and Ancient Ideas of Unity

In the twentieth century the preoccupation with unity was counterbalanced by the fashionableness of individuality and creativity. At the height of the pax Romana unity was a far more prominent theme than its opposites. There was a desire to find unity in all manner of combinations. The Hermetic writings provide an extreme form of this tendency: not only is God a unity, the kosmos a unity and humankind a unity, but also God is bound up with the kosmos, the kosmos with humankind and humankind with God. There are few countervailing themes. Admittedly, terms for disunity and differences are common in Plutarch and Dion, but they are generally introduced to show their bad results and to contrast these conditions with unity and harmony. There is little awareness of the dangers of unity, such as excessive uniformity and excessive centralisation – even in the writings of Dion, who is conscious of the need to redefine (Paris 1971) 62; Kidd 2.979–981; H.A.S. Tarrant, First Interpreters (n. 46) 62–64; cf. J.M. Dillon, op. cit. (n. 31) 111–112. Poseidonios “was invariably reported in the ancient world as a Stoic without qualification” (Kidd 3.61, citing frr. 51, 55, 80, 93, 111, etc. EK). G. Reydams-Schils warns that our evidence for Poseidonios’ views has been filtered largely through a screen of Platonism: CQ n.s. 47 (1997) 455–476, especially 456, 475; cf. BoysStones 100–101 and n. 3. Poseidonios also disagreed with other Stoics, as in fr. 141 EK where limits are said to exist in reality and not (as other Stoics said) only in thought: see H. Cherniss (ed.), Plutarch’s Moralia 13.1 (Cambridge, MA 1976) 218–219; Kidd 2.531–532. 48 Diogenes Laertios 1.21. This is Tarrant’s example (First Interpreters [n. 46] 4). 49 Ibid. 11, 13. The popularity of short cuts to learning (cf. ‘a short cut to fame’ [ἐπίτομος ... πρὸς δόξαν] in Loukianos’ memorable phrase: The Sale of the Lives 11) is studied by G.N. Sandy, The Greek World of Apuleius: Apuleius and the Second Sophistic [Mnemosyne Supplements, 174] (Leiden 1997) 73–77 and (on Apuleius’ practice) chap. 5 (especially 214– 223); cf. G. Anderson, BICS 23 (1976) 59–68. Clement of Alexandria likes the phrase “short cuts to salvation” (prot. 8.77.1: σύντομοι σωτηρίας ὁδοί; cf. 10.99.4: τῇ συντομίᾳ τοῦ κηρύγματος).

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freedom. Neither Dion nor Aristeides reveals any sense of the positive advantages which debate and variety can bring to cities. Why did the thought of Greeks in this period gravitate more than one might expect towards unity? Why was this a subject suitable for platitudinous statements to crowds or for readers of moral and philosophical treatises? Is the propensity to be explained simply in terms of a desire, conscious or unconscious, to belong? These are, of course, questions to which only the most tentative answers can be offered. Even with modern sociological and psychological techniques it is easy to show that many people in western society believe that creativity is important or that there is a generation gap, but difficult to isolate the factors in that society which generate and nourish these beliefs. Of course, talk about oneness has often been aesthetically and emotionally satisfying. It gives a person a sense of freedom from awkward divisions, it fits in otherwise unaccountable details.50 The tendency to systematise everything into a glorious whole is not so prevalent today because there is greater awareness, not least because of the electronic media, of the empirical evidence for cleavage, conflict and change. A more specific clue for the first and second centuries may lie in the ready transitions made from one kind of unity to another. Writers move freely from the unity of the Roman empire to the unity of the universe or from the unity of cities to the unity of the universe; the unity of the empire is held out as an example for cities to imitate. It is possible that the peaceful conditions of the age emphasised the unity of the empire and encouraged writers to dwell on various kinds of unity. But this explanation of the penchant for unity in (especially) the second century must remain speculative. Indeed, there may be several simultaneous explanations.

50 Compare the comments on the force of the ‘monistic pathos’ by A.O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University, 1933 (Cambridge, MA 1936) 12–13.

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Index of References Old Testament Genesis 1.26 2.24 11.1–9 11.1 11.6 17 17.1–2

217. 9, 218. 13 181.17 219. 15 219. 15 bis 219. 15 bis 229 229. 41

Exodus 19.5–6 23.22

222. 24 222. 24

Deuteronomy 6.16 32.8

210. 104 223. 26

1 Kingdoms 14.10–16

188. 36

3 Kingdoms 8.60

206. 88, 224. 27

4 Kingdoms 19.19

206. 88, 224. 27

Esther additions

221. 22

2 Maccabees 7.28

221. 22 206. 87

Psalms 1.3 1.4–5 2.1 9(–10).9 21.23(22.22)

198. 64 220, 220. 21 224. 27 221. 22 231. 45

22(23) 71(72).17 95(96) 95(96).13 97(98).9 117(118).1 138(139).7–8 142(143).2

230 224. 27 217. 8 221. 22 221. 22 224. 27 142. 76 221. 22

Wisdom 1.14

206. 87

Sirach 17.3 18 18.13–14

218. 13 229 229. 41

Isaiah 7.14 19.2 28.11 37.20

231. 45 224. 27 219. 15 224. 27

40.18 40.25 43.20–21 45.23 46.5 52–53 52.10 53 60.17 61.2 66.18

127. 9 127. 9 222. 24 221. 23 127. 9 217. 8 224. 27 217. 8 bis 188. 37 223. 25 224. 27

Jeremiah 1.10

222. 24

306

Index of References

3.17 13.17 31.34

216. 6, 224. 27 192. 48 180. 13

Ezekiel 34.23 36.23 37.24

210. 104 224. 27 210. 104

Daniel 2.31–45 2.41–45 3.4 3.7 7.19–24

177. 6 224. 28 222. 24 224. 27 177. 6

7.14 7.27

191. 46, 222. 24, 224. 27 224. 27

Hosea

222. 24

Amos 9.12

222. 24

Zechariah 10.3

192. 48

Qumran documents 1 QS 5.2 194. 54 1 QS 5.7 194. 54

New Testament Matthew 1.23 2.1 2.3 4.7 4.8 4.24 7.28 8.5–10 8.13 12.25 12.46–50 13.55 14.1 14.9 15.13 16.18 18.17 18.20 19.5 19.17 20.25 22.17 22.21 23.8–9 23.8 23.9 23.10 24.7

231. 45 176. 5 176. 5 210. 104 224. 27 178. 8 176. 5 176. 5 176. 5 224. 28 192. 47 32. 45 176. 5 176. 5 227. 32 193. 52 193. 52 220. 21 181. 17 210. 104 224. 27 176. 5 174. 1, 176. 5 192. 47 210. 104 210. 104 210. 104 224. 27

24.14 24.22 24.35 25.31–46 25.35 26.24 28.19

221. 22 221. 22 233. 53 218. 14 184. 24 197. 60 191. 46

Mark 1.20 3.31–35 6.3 6.14 6.25–27 9.50 10.8 12.17 12.14 12.16–17 13.8 13.10 13.31 16.15

32. 45 192. 47 32. 45 176. 5 176. 5 194. 54 181. 17 174. 1 176. 5 176. 5 224. 27 221. 22 233. 53 191. 46, 215. 1

Luke 1.5 2.1 2.2

176. 5 176. 4, 176. 5, 177. 6 bis 178. 8

Index of References 2.31 3.1 3.19 4.5 4.19 5.7 5.10 7.1–10 8.1–3 8.19–21 9.7 15.15 17.1–2 19.1–8 20.22 20.24–25 20.25 21.10 21.33 21.35 23.2 24.47 John 1.1–2 3.18–21 4.46 4.49 5.44 6.53 8.41 10.16 10.30 10.38 11.52 12.32 12.38 13.8 13.34–35 14.2 14.9–11 14.20 15.4–6 15.14 16.32 17.2 17.3

224. 27 176. 5 bis 176. 5 177. 6, 224. 27 223. 25 32. 45 32. 45 176. 5 32. 45 192. 47 176. 5 180. 13, 230. 43 197. 60 175. 3 176. 5 176. 5 bis 174. 1 224. 27 233. 53 95. 9 176. 5 191. 46, 221. 22

210. 104 228. 38 176. 5 176. 5 210. 104 189. 41 210. 104 189. 41, 192. 48, 209. 101, 210. 104 210. 104 210. 104 194. 54 7. 7 217. 8 231. 45 184. 25, 194. 54 227. 36 210. 104 210. 104, 230. 44 230. 44 192. 47 210. 104 221. 22 210. 104

17.11 17.20–23 17.20 17.21–23 17.21 17.23 19.12 19.15 21.23

307 7. 7, 194. 54, 210. 105 7. 7, 194. 54 bis, 210. 105, 230. 44 13. 16 209. 101 230. 44 194. 54, 230. 44 176. 5 176. 5 bis 192. 47

Acts of the Apostles 1.15 192. 47 2.1 192. 48 2.42 183. 22 2.44–45 183. 22, 192. 48 2.46 192. 48 4.24 180. 12 4.25 224. 27 4.32–5.11 183. 22 4.32 192. 48 4.34–37 192. 48 5.11 192. 48 6.2 192. 48 8.1 193. 52 9.2 192. 48 9.31 193. 52 10.35 223. 25 11.1 192. 47 11.22–23 200. 70 11.26 178. 9 11.28 177. 6 bis 11.29–30 192. 48 11.29 200. 70 12.1 176. 5 12.20–21 176. 5 13–14 200. 70 13.1–3 200. 70 13.1 176. 5 13.4 178. 8 14.16 221. 22 14.24–28 200. 70 15.1–35 200. 70 15.17 222. 24 15.19–21 7. 7 15.23 200. 70 15.28–29 7. 7 15.35–21.15 200. 70

308 15.36–41 16.1 16.6 16.14–15 17.6 17.7 17.23–31 17.24–31 17.24–30 17.26 17.28 17.30 17.31 18.12 18.22 18.24–19.1 19.9 19.10 19.22 19.23 19.27 19.28 20.17 21.7 21.17–20 21.39 22.4 22.28 23.34 24.5 24.14 24.22 24.26–27 25.8 25.10–12 25.13–14 25.21 25.24 25.25 25.26 26.2 26.19 26.27 26.28 26.32 27.24 28.19 28.22

Index of References 200. 70 32. 45 200. 70 32. 45 177. 6 bis 176. 5 bis 210. 105 218. 13 223. 26 95. 9, 223. 26, 224. 27 231. 45 221. 22 221. 22 178. 8 200. 70 201. 72 192. 48 178. 8 200. 70 192. 48 177. 6, 221. 22 144. 84 200. 70 200. 70 200. 70 180. 13 192. 48 180. 13 178. 8 177. 6 bis, 192. 48 192. 48 192. 48 175. 3 176. 5 176. 5 176. 5 176. 5 bis 176. 5 176. 5 176. 5 bis 176. 5 176. 5 176. 5 178. 9 176. 5 176. 5 95. 9, 176. 5 192. 48

28.28

95.9

Romans 1.1 1.7 1.13 3.9 3.20 3.23 3.29–30 3.30 4.17 5.12ff 5.12 6.3 6.5 6.11 7.4 8.1 8.39 10.16–18 12.3–8 12.3–5 12.5 12.10 12.19 14.11 15.5 15.11 15.26 15.33 16.5 16.17 16.20

201. 71 201. 71 201. 71, 224. 27 221. 23 221. 22 221. 23 210. 105 208. 97 206. 87 223. 26 221. 22 231. 45 230. 43, 231. 45 231. 45 230. 44 231. 45 231. 45 217. 8 193. 49, 244. 18 230. 44 20. 25 194. 55 192. 47 221. 23 215. 3 224. 27 201. 72 200. 68 192. 49 199. 67 200. 68

1 Corinthians 1–6 1.1–2 1.2 1.10–17 1.10 1.12 1.29 3.1 3.3–9 3.8 3.21–23 4.6 5.11

199. 68 201. 71 191. 46, 193. 52 199. 68 199. 67 bis, 199. 68 201. 72 221. 22 201. 71 199. 68 201. 72 199. 68 199. 68 192. 47

Index of References 6.15–17 6.16 7.5 7.31 8.4–6 8.6 10.16 10.17 11.18–22 11.20 12.4–11 12.4–6 12.12–31 12.12 12.13 12.26 13.4 13.7 14.1–6 15.9 15.58 16.1–4 16.19 2 Corinthians 1.1 2.13 5.14 5.17 6.6–7 6.14–7.1 7.1 8.1–4 8.1 8.23 9.13 11.9 11.26 12.20 13.11

Galatians 1.1–2 1.2 1.11

191. 44, 230. 43, 230. 44, 231. 47 181. 17 185. 29 233. 53 210. 105 209. 101, 210. 104 231. 45 193. 50 199. 68 185. 29 210. 104 210. 105 193. 50, 210. 105, 230. 44, 244. 18 227. 36, 245. 18 190. 42, 223. 25 191. 44 197. 60 197. 60 193. 50 193. 52 192. 47, 199. 66 201. 72 192. 49

178. 8, 201. 71 178. 8 221. 22 bis 231. 45 213. 113 192. 48 192. 47 201. 72 201. 71 183. 22 201. 72 201. 72 222. 24, 224. 27 199. 67. 213. 113 185. 28, 199. 67, 199. 68, 200. 68

201. 71 193. 52 201. 71

1.13 2.4 3 3.19–20 3.20 3.26–28 3.26 3.27 3.28

5.13–26 5.20–21 5.22–23 6.10 Ephesians 1.1 1.10 1.22–23 1.22 2.6 2.13 2.14–16 2.17 2.18 2.19–22 2.19 3.5 3.6 4.1–16 4.3–6 4.3 4.4–6

4.4 4.7–16 4.13 4.16 4.25 5.29–33 5.30 5.31 5.32

309 193. 52 194. 55 229 210. 105 210. 105 190. 42, 229. 41 231. 45 231. 45 192. 48 bis, 222. 23, 223. 25, 223. 26, 231. 45 247. 25 199. 67 213. 113 192. 48, 192. 49

201. 71 236. 65 244. 18 193. 51 231. 45 231. 45 222. 23 218. 12 210. 104 192. 49 179. 11, 180. 13, 192. 49 221. 22 222. 23 193. 51, 244. 18 133. 33 tris 133. 33, 193. 51, 194. 55 181. 17, 183. 22, 193. 51, 210. 105, 211. 109 185. 28 210. 105 190. 42, 193. 51 193. 51 191. 44, 192. 48, 193. 50, 244. 18 230. 44 230. 44 181. 17 230. 44

310

Index of References

6.18 6.23

202. 76 192. 47

Philippians 1.1 1.7 1.14 1.23–24 1.27–28 1.27 2.1–5 2.2 2.4 2.10–11 2.14 2.25–30 3.6 3.9 3.20 4.1 4.2–3 4.2 4.9 4.15–18 4.15 4.18 4.22

201. 71, 231. 45 201. 72 192. 47 232. 49 199. 68 199. 67 199. 68 199. 67 203. 77 221. 23 199. 68 201. 72 193. 52 231. 45 180. 12, 180. 13 192. 47 199–200. 68 215. 3 200. 68 201. 72 193. 52 201. 72 176. 5

Colossians 1.1–2 1.18 1.23 1.24 2.2 2.6 2.18–19 3.11 3.12–15 3.15 4.15 4.16

201. 71 193. 51, 193. 52 199. 66, 215. 1 193. 50, 193. 51 194. 55 231. 45 193. 51 193. 50, 222. 23, 223. 25, 223. 26 213. 113 193. 50 192. 49 193. 52

1 Thessalonians 1.1 1.7–8 2.1 2.14–15 3.12

201. 71 178. 8, 201. 72 201. 71 222. 24 200. 68 bis

4.9–10 4.10 5.12 5.14–15 5.15 5.23

194. 55 192. 47, 201. 72 200. 68 200. 68 200. 68 200. 68

2 Thessalonians 1.1 1.3 3.16

201. 71 200. 68, 201. 71 200. 68

1 Timothy 1.17 2.1–2 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.2 3.12 3.15 3.16 5.9 6.4–5 6.11

210. 104 175. 2 210. 104 221. 22 224. 27 183. 22 183. 22 192. 49 224. 27 183. 22 213. 113 213. 113

2 Timothy 1.15 2.22 3.10 4.17 4.21

178. 8 194. 55, 213. 113 213. 113 224. 27 201. 72

Titus 1.6 2.11

183. 22 221. 22

Philemon 1 2 6 17 24

183. 22 192. 49 183. 22, 231. 45 183. 22 183. 22

Hebrews 2.11–12 3.1 3.6 6.9

231. 45 192. 47 192. 49 192. 47

311

Index of References 8.11 10.12 11.10 11.14 11.16 11.33 12.22–23 13.1 13.14

180. 13 210. 104 180. 13 180. 13 180. 13 185. 28 180. 13 194. 55 180. 13

James 1.2 1.16 1.19 2.5 2.19–20 3.7 4.12

201. 71 192. 47 192. 47 192. 47 210. 105 221. 22 210. 104

1 Peter 1.1 1.22–23 2.9–10 2.11 2.13–14 2.13 2.17

4.8 4.16 5.9

178. 8 194. 55 222. 24, 225. 29 179. 11, 192. 47 174. 1 176. 5 176. 5, 192. 47, 194. 55, 199. 66, 199. 67, 202. 76 194. 55 bis, 199. 67, 202. 76 194. 55, 197. 60 178. 9 192. 47

2 Peter 1.5–7 3.11–12

194. 55 233. 53

1 John 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.7 2.9–11 2.17 3.23–24 4.7–12

183. 22 183. 22 221. 22 192. 47 194. 55 233. 53 194. 55 194. 55

3.8

2 John 1 5–6 10 3 John 1 9–10

195. 56, 201. 71 194. 55 192. 49, 200. 69

201. 71 195. 56, 200. 69, 201. 71

Jude 3 4 8 10 12–13 16 19 25

192. 47 195. 56 195. 56 195. 56 195. 56 195. 56 195. 56 bis 210. 104

Revelation 1.4–3.22 1.4 1.9 1.11 2.1 2.8 2.12 2.15–16 2.16 2.18 2.20–23 3.1 3.7 3.10 3.14 5.9 7.9 10.11 11.9 11.10 13.7 13.8 14.6 17.9 17.12–14 17.15

201. 71 201. 71 201. 71 201. 71 201. 71 201. 71 201. 71 200. 69 201. 71 201. 71 200. 69, 201. 71 201. 71 201. 71 221. 22 bis 201. 71 222. 24 bis 224. 27 222. 24, 224. 27 224. 2 221. 22 222. 24 221. 22 222. 24 176. 5 177. 6, 224. 28 222. 24, 224.27

312

Index of References

Early Christian Writing Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs 6 175. 2 9 175. 2

10 16.3–4 21.9

Apollonios fr. 3 fr. 4

Claudius Apollinaris fr. in Eusebios h.e. 5.5.4

Athenagoras Legatio inscr. 1.1–2 1.2 2.5 4.2

189. 40 178. 8

1 Clement inscr. 1.1 176. 5 224. 28 177. 6, 248. 27 176. 5 157. 1, 207. 91, 234. 58, 244. 14 207. 91 207. 91 207. 91 bis 207. 91 207. 91 207. 91 207. 91 207. 91 207. 91 205. 86 207. 91 bis 207. 91 bis, 244. 17 217. 10 207. 91 (4x) 176. 5 207. 91 233. 54 207. 91 bis 244. 17 234. 58 157. 1, 244. 14

5–7 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 7.1 8.1 8.5 10.2 10.4 11.1–12.1 12.2 13.1 18.2 22.2 24.1–2 24.1 25.2–3 25.3 On the resurrection (Pseudo–Athenagoras) 2–8 233. 53 4.3–4 233. 53

Barnabas, Letter of 203 1.1 203. 78 4.10 180. 14, 185. 29, 246. 23

1.2–2.8 2–3 2.8 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.7–13 5.2–5 6.1–4 9.1 9.3–19.1 14.1–2 20 20.1–21.1 20.1–3 20.10–11 20.11 21 21.1 23.3–4 30.3 33.8 34.4–35.6 37.1–38.2 37.3 37.4–38.2 42.4–5 44 44.3 44.6 46.4–9 46.5–6

255. 45 180. 14 203. 78

176. 5

179 195. 57, 201. 73 195. 57, 201. 73, 202. 73 196. 58 248. 27 179. 10 196. 58, 199. 67, 213. 113 196. 58 179. 10 196. 58 196. 58, 199. 67 196. 58 196. 58, 199. 67 196. 58 199. 67 157. 1, 234. 55, 236. 66, 244. 14 196. 58, 235. 63 234. 55 234. 55 234. 55 248. 27 179. 10 bis, 213. 114, 234. 55 215. 3 196. 58 bis 196. 58 196. 58 196. 59 176. 5 196. 58 197. 61 197. 61 197. 61 197. 61 197. 60 206. 88

Index of References 46.5–7 46.5 46.6–7 46.7 46.8 47.1–4 47.3–4 48.1 48.6 49.5 50.5 51.1 54.1–55.1 54 54.1–2 54.2 54.4 55.1 55.2–6 56.2 57.1–2 57.2 59.4 60.4 62.2 63.2 64.1 65.1

197. 61 199. 67 18. 24 196. 59 197. 60 197. 60 197. 61 226. 30 180. 14, 197. 60, 226. 30 197. 60, 226. 30 bis 226. 30 197. 60, 199. 67 197. 61 248. 27 197. 61 179. 10, 199. 67 179. 10 224. 28 197. 60 226. 30 197. 61 197. 61 206. 88, 224. 27 214. 1 197. 61 197. 61 221. 22 197. 61, 202. 73

2 Clement 11.2–4 14.2 17.3–7 17.3 17.4

215. 3 244. 18 215. 3 215. 3 224. 27

Clement of Alexandria Paidagogos 1.2.6.2 219. 18 1.2.6.5–6 235. 60, 235. 62 1.3.7.1 219. 18 bis 1.4.10.1–1.4.11.2 182. 18 1.4.10 27. 35 1.4.10.1–2 182. 18 1.4.10.2 189. 41, 209. 101, 210. 103 1.5.18.3–4 190. 42 1.6.25.3 235. 60

313

1.6.28.2 1.6.30–31 1.6.30.2–1.6.31.1 1.6.30.2–1.6.31.2 1.6.30.2 1.6.38.2 1.6.42.1 1.6.49.1–4 1.6.49.4 1.6.50.4 1.7.53.3

228. 39 232. 52 190. 42 229. 41 219. 18 189. 41 209. 102 229. 40 229. 40 228. 39 189. 41, 192. 48, 209. 101 1.7.55.2 219. 18, 229. 41 1.7.56.2–3 229. 41 1.7.57.1 219. 18 1.8.62.3–4 209. 102 1.8.62.4 209. 100 1.8.65.3 180. 12, 220. 20 1.8.71.1 190. 43, 209. 101 bis 1.9.81.3 229. 41 1.9.83.3 219. 18 1.11.97.2 209. 100 1.12.100.3 209. 100 2.1.10.5 209. 101 2.2.19.3–2.2.20.1 229. 42 2.2.20 232. 49 2.3.38.3 210. 103 2.8.71.2 189. 41, 194. 53 3.1.1 209. 100 3.7.37 210. 103 3.7.37.1 209. 100 3.7.37.2 219. 18 3.12.100.2–3.12.101.2 210. 102 3.12.100.2 229. 42 3.12.101.3 229. 42, 232. 49 Protreptikos 1.2.4 1.4.3 1.4.5–1.5.3 1.4.5 1.6.1 2.36.1 4.49.1 4.54.5 5.66.3 6.68.3

234. 57 234. 57 172. 39, 234. 57, 244. 14 234. 57 234. 57 216. 7 176. 5 224. 27 233. 54 209. 101

314 6.71.1–2 6.72.4 7.74.2 8.77.1 8.77.2 9.82.7 9.88.2–3 9.88.2 10.98.2–3 10.99.4 10.103.1 10.106.5 12.120.2–4 12.120.2 12.120.3–5 12.120.4 12.121.1

Index of References 127. 9 209. 101 209. 101 239. 4, 256. 49 209. 101 221. 21 190. 43, 210. 103 189. 41, 192. 48 209. 100 256. 49 209. 100 219. 18 234. 57 219. 18 235. 60 239. 5 219. 18

Quis diues saluandus 7.1 209. 101 Stromateis 1.11.51.1 1.13.57.5–6 1.14.60.4 1.19.91.4 1.19.95.4–7 1.19.95.6 1.26.169.2 1.29.182.1 2.2.9.1 2.15.69.1 2.16.74 2.16.74.1 2.16.74.3 2.18.86.7 2.21.129.4 2.22.131.5 3.2.5.1 3.2.6.1–3.2.8.3 3.2.6.1 3.2.6.4 3.2.8.1 3.2.8.4–3.2.9.2 3.2.10 3.2.10.1 3.3.19.3–5 3.4.27.1– 3.4.28.1

233. 54 235. 61 219. 18 231. 45 190. 43 190. 43 189. 41, 192. 48 209. 101 229. 40 220. 21 229. 42 231. 46 229. 42 219. 18 235. 61 184. 25 182. 21, 190. 43 182. 21 182. 21 182. 21 182. 21, 230. 43 182. 21 182. 21, 190. 43 182. 21 235. 61 182. 21

3.4.29.2–3 235. 61 3.10.69.3 184. 25 3.10.70.1 189. 41, 220. 21 3.12.79.6 194. 53 4.1.2.2 210. 103 4.8.63.1 219. 18 4.8.67.1 190. 42 4.9.73.5 194. 53 4.9.75.1 194. 53 4.15.97.1 209. 101 4.21.132.1 190. 42 4.23.149.4 184. 25 4.23.151–152 220. 20 4.23.151.3 220. 20 bis 4.23.152.1 220. 20 4.25.156.1– 4.25.157.2 229. 40 4.25.157.2 219. 19, 220. 20 4.26.163.4 184. 25 4.26.165.4 209. 101 5.1.2.2 190. 42 5.6.35.4 189. 41 5.8.52.3 230. 43 5.11.70.1–6 238. 3 5.12.81.4–5.12.82.4 209. 100 5.12.81.6 209. 100 5.14.89.2–5 233. 54 5.14.98.1–2 210. 103 5.14.98.1 219. 19 5.14.102.1–2 210. 103 5.14.102.2 219. 19, 231. 46 5.14.108.2–4 127. 9 5.14.116.4 216. 7 6.5.41.6–7 220. 21, 225. 29 6.5.42.2 225. 29 6.9.73.3 190. 42 6.10 190. 42 6.11.87.2 190. 42 6.11.87.3–4 235. 61 6.12.104.1 228. 39 6.13.106.3– 6.13.107.2 190. 42 6.14.114.2 189. 41 6.15.123.3 210. 103 6.15.125.2–3 189. 41, 239. 5 6.16.137.2 205. 86, 209. 100 6.16.142.4– 6.16.143.1 235. 61 6.16.146.2 220. 20

315

Index of References 6.16.148.2 6.17.159.9

235. 61 190. 42, 219. 18, 220. 20, 224. 28, 225. 29 6.18.163.1 205. 86, 209. 100 6.18.167.3 189. 41 7.2.5.6 219. 18 7.2.7.3 219. 18 7.2.8.1 27. 35, 182. 19, 220. 20 7.2.9.2 220. 20 7.2.12.1 205. 86, 209. 100 7.6.34.2 190. 42 7.7.41.6 219. 19 7.7.42.2 228. 39 7.7.49.3 219. 19 7.7.49.4 228. 39 7.11.68.1–3 228. 39 7.11.68.1 219. 19 7.12.69.1–2 220. 20 7.12.76.7–7.12.77.2 184. 25 7.12.76.7–7.12.77.6 220. 20 7.12.77.1 192. 47 7.13.83.2 209. 100, 210. 103 7.14.86.1–2 219. 19 7.14.86.2 210. 102 7.15.90.2 189. 41 7.16.95.1 189. 41 7.16.104.1–2 189. 41 7.17.106–107 190. 42 7.17.106.3 190. 43 7.17.106.4– 7.17.107.1 190. 43 7.17.107.2 190. 43 7.17.107.3–5 190. 43 7.17.107.3–6 190. 42, 209. 102 7.17.107.3 189. 41 7.17.107.5 190. 43, 239. 4 Excerpta ex Theodoto (ed. Sagnard) 1.3 220. 20 17.4 209. 102 Fragmenta I III VII

189. 41 189. 41 bis, 209. 101, 209. 102 189. 41

Cyprian De ecclesiae unitate 205. 84 Cyril of Jerusalem katekh. 20.4–7 230. 43 Decian libelli

175. 2

Didakhe, The 9.4 10.3 10.5 16 16.5

185. 28 214. 1 185. 28 215. 1 214. 1

Dionysios of Corinth fr. 1 203. 78 fr. 3 186. 31, 203. 78 Epistle from Vienne and Lugdunum 1 203. 80 3 178. 9 4 194. 53 5 203. 80 12 224. 27 13 189. 40, 194. 53, 203. 80 Epistle to Diognetos 3.2 206. 87 5.1–5 179. 11 5.4 224. 28 5.5 179. 11 5.9 179. 11 10.2 215. 2 Eusebius Preparation for the Gospel (praep. evang.) 11.2.2 187. 32 13.13.35 126. 8 Church History (hist. eccl.) 2.25.8 186. 31, 203. 78 4.9.1–3 174. 2 4.23.1 203. 78 4.23.10 203. 78 5.5.4 176. 5

316 5.13 5.13.1–7 5.18.5 5.20.4–8 5.24 5.24.2–8

Index of References

5.24.11 5.24.13–17 5.24.18 5.25

189. 40 208. 98 189. 40 188. 38 189. 40 188. 38, 203. 80, 204. 82 188. 38, 203. 79, 204. 82 203. 79 203. 79 188. 38 189. 40, 203. 80

Hegesippos fr. 3 fr. 5

186. 30 bis 186. 30

Hermas mand. 1.1 7.5 8.9–10 8.9 8.10 12.4.2–3 12.5.1

206. 87 bis 215. 1 184. 24 183. 24 184. 24 215. 2 215. 2

5.24.11–17

sim. 1 1.1–6 9.13.5 9.13.7–9 9.13.7 9.17.4–5 9.17.4 9.18.3–4 9.18.3 9.18.4 9.27.2 9.31.4

2.2 3.1 3.2–4.1 3.2 4.2 5 5.1 6.1 8.1 11.2 13.1–14.2 13.1 14 14.1 15.1–2 15.1 20.2

21.2

179, 179. 10 bis 179. 10 183. 24 185. 28 183. 24 185. 28 183. 24, 224. 27 183. 24, 185. 28 185. 28 183. 24 184. 24 185. 29

Ignatios of Antioch Eph. inscr. 194. 53, 198. 65, 202. 74, 227. 32 1 202. 75 1.2 181. 15

Magn. inscr. 1.1 1.2 2–3 2 3.1 4 6.1 6.2 7.1

7.2 9.2 10.1 10.3 13.1 13.2 14 15

198. 65 bis 202. 75 197. 63 185. 26 198. 64, 198. 65 198. 65 198. 65, 202. 75 198. 65, 202. 75 202. 75 178. 9 183. 23 199. 66 248. 27 227. 32 199. 66 206. 88 181. 15, 197. 63, 198. 65, 199. 66, 199. 67 202. 75

202. 74 198. 65 183. 23 bis, 197. 63, 198. 64, 248. 27 198. 65, 202. 75 198. 65 198. 65 178. 9, 198. 65 bis, 199. 66 197. 63, 198. 65, 226. 31 198. 65 181. 15, 197. 63, 198. 65, 199. 66 bis, 199. 67, 206. 87 197. 63, 206. 87 226. 31 178. 9 178. 9, 221. 23 198. 64, 198. 65, 202. 75, 226. 31 198. 64 bis, 198. 65 198. 65, 202. 75 185. 26, 198. 65, 202. 75, 226. 31

317

Index of References Philad. inscr.

9.3

9.1 10.1 11.2

198. 65 bis, 202. 74, 226. 31 183. 23, 198. 65, 202. 75 180. 14, 246. 23 198. 64 198. 65 197. 63, 198. 65, 199. 67 231. 48 198. 65, 199. 66, 227. 32, 231. 48 198. 64, 199. 66, 226. 31 bis 202. 75 198. 65, 227. 32 178. 9 197. 63, 199. 67 197. 62, 199. 66 198. 65 197. 63 bis, 199. 67 198. 65, 206. 88, 227. 32 227. 32 197. 62, 202. 75 202. 75

Polyk. inscr. 1.2 4.1 4.2 6 6.1 7.1 7.3 8.1 8.2 8.3

202. 74, 206. 88 197. 63 198. 65 199. 66 197. 62 197. 63, 198. 65 bis 197. 62, 202. 75 178. 9 202. 75 202. 75 198. 65, 206. 88

1 1.1 1.2 2 2.1 3 3.2 4 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 7.1–8.1 7.1 7.2 8.1

Rom. inscr. 2–5 3.2 3.3 4.1 9.1

183. 23, 198. 64, 202. 74, 204. 82 204. 82 178. 9 178. 9 202. 74 198. 65, 202. 75

Smyrn. inscr. 1.2 3.3 7.2 8 8.1 8.2 9.1 11.1 11.2 12.1 12.2–13.2 12.2 13.2 Trall. inscr. 1 2–3 2.1 2.2 3.2 6.1 7 7.1

202. 75

202. 74 185. 26, 194. 53, 223. 25, 245. 18 206. 87 199. 67 198. 65 194. 53, 197. 63, 198. 65 7. 7, 185. 26, 194. 53 198. 65 197. 62, 202. 75 245. 18 202. 75 202. 75 198. 65 bis, 202. 75, 206. 88 202. 75

12.1 12.2 13.1 13.2

202. 74 198. 65 198. 65 198. 65 199. 66 198. 65, 202. 75 178. 9 198. 65 198. 65, 227. 32, 231. 48 198. 65 198. 65 227. 32 198. 65, 206. 87 bis, 245. 18 202. 75 197. 63 202. 75 bis 198. 65

Irenaeus Aduersus haereses 1.6.1 1.8.5 1.9.2 1.9.3

227. 33 208. 95 207. 92 208. 96

7.2 9–11 11 11.2

318 1.10 1.10.1 1.10.3 1.15.3 1.19.1 1.20.2 1.21.5–1.22.1 1.30.2 1.30.12 1.30.14 1.31.3 2 praef. 1 2.1 2.2.4 2.6.1 2.6.2 2.9.1 2.11.1 2.13.3 2.15.3 2.17.2 2.17.3 2.18.7 2.19.3 2.27.2 2.30 2.30.1–2 2.30.6 2.35.2–4 2.35.2 2.35.3 3.3.1–4 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.4.1–2 3.4.2 3.5.3 3.8.1 3.10.2 3.11.7 3.11.8 3.12.1 3.12.2

Index of References 187. 33 187. 33, 194. 53, 217. 11 bis, 221. 22 187. 33, 208. 96 208. 95 208. 95 208. 97 208. 95 208. 95 208. 95 208. 95 208. 97 207. 92 208. 96 bis 172. 39, 234. 59, 244. 14 207. 92 177. 6 187. 34 208. 95 207. 94 234. 59 218. 14 218. 14 227. 35 227. 35 208. 97 227. 35 227. 35 227. 35 208. 97 207. 92 208. 96 194. 53 187. 33 203. 79, 204. 82 187. 33, 201. 73, 202. 73, 203. 79 187. 35, 188. 39, 195. 56 227. 36 187. 34 217. 11, 218. 12 208. 97 208. 97 208. 97 217. 11 217. 11 205. 86

3.12.5 3.12.7 3.12.9 3.12.11 3.12.12 3.14.2 3.15.2 3.15.3 3.16.1 3.16.6 3.17.2 3.17.4 3.18.5–6 3.18.7 3.19.1 3.19.3 3.21.2 3.21.3 3.23.8 3.24.1

4.1.2 4.2.5 4.4.3 4.6.2 4.6.7 4.8.1 4.9.1 4.9.2 4.13.1 4.14.1 4.14.2 4.19.1 4.20.1–2 4.20.2 4.20.4 4.21.3 4.22.1–2 4.22.1 4.24.1 4.26.2 4.26.5 4.28.2 4.30.3 4.30.4 4.32.1–2

180.12, 194. 53, 203. 79 187. 34, 194. 53 218. 13 207. 92 187. 34, 239. 4 200. 70, 203. 79 187. 35 208. 97 208. 95 208. 95, 217. 11 187. 34, 218. 14 208. 95 217. 11 218. 13, 227. 36 227. 36 227. 36, 245. 18 178. 8 239. 4 218. 11 188. 39 bis, 195. 56, 228. 37, 228. 38, 232. 49 208. 97 208. 97 233. 53 208. 95 207. 93 187. 34 239. 4 218. 12 228. 37, 228. 38 227. 35 184. 25 187. 34, 208. 97, 224. 27 208. 97 208. 97 217. 11 187. 34, 218. 12 218. 11 217. 11 217. 11 188. 36 188. 37 217. 11, 228. 37 79. 22, 177. 6 224. 27 239. 4

319

Index of References 4.33.1 4.33.3 4.33.7 4.33.8 4.33.11 4.34.4 4.35.4

fr. 13

188. 37 208. 97 188. 37 bis 203. 79 207. 94 207. 94 188. 39, 195. 56, 208. 95 207. 92 218. 13 218. 13 172. 39, 207. 93, 218. 13, 234. 59, 235. 61, 244. 14 228. 37 217. 11, 218. 14 218. 11 227. 36, 228. 37, 232. 49 207. 94, 218. 13, 228. 38 245. 18 228. 37 187. 33 187. 35 208. 97 208. 95, 208. 97 218. 11, 218. 13, 224. 27 203. 79 177. 6, 224. 28 228. 38 228. 38 187. 34 203. 79 187. 34 194. 53 228. 38, 232. 49 207. 92, 217. 11 188. 38 188. 38, 203. 79 bis, 204. 82 178. 9

Justin 1 apol. 4.5 7.3 7.4

178. 9 186. 32, 187. 32 178. 9

4.36.5 4.37.7 4.38.1 4.38.3

4.40.1 4.40.2 5 fr.gr. 17 5.1.1 5.1.3 5.6.2 5.14.2–3 5.20.1 5.20.2 5.21.2 5.22.1 5.24.2 5.24.11 5.26.1 5.27.2 5.28.1 5.32.2 5.33.4 5.34.1 5.34.3 5.35.1 5.36.3 fr. 2 fr. 3

12.1 12.9 14.2–3 14.2 17.3 21.3 26.1–6 26.5 26.6 26.8 55.7 58.1 67.3 67.8 68.5–10

177. 6 178. 9 186. 32, 216. 5 181. 16 176. 5 176–177. 5 187. 32, 255. 45 186. 32 186. 32 186. 32 177. 5 206. 89 195. 57 195. 57 175. 2

2 apol. 1.1 2.8 2.16 4.2

216. 5, 216. 7 177. 5 177. 5 215. 2

dial. 1.3–4 1.3 1.4 4 4.1–3 4.1 5.6 11.1–2 11.2 18–24 24.3 31.4 39.7 41.1 42 42.3 47.2–3 48.3 56 56.4 57.3 58.1 63–84 63.5 64.1

217. 8, 225. 29 206. 89 206. 89 206. 89 231. 46 227. 34 187. 32 206. 89, 207. 93 206. 89 216. 7 216. 6, 218. 12 216. 6, 224. 27 224. 27 224. 27 216. 7 217. 8 217. 8, 245. 18 186. 32 216. 7 206. 89 206. 89 216. 7 206. 89 217. 8 178. 9, 181. 16, 186. 32 186. 32

320 64.2–3 64.2 64.3 74 74.2–3 78.10 80.2–5 80.3 84.2 93.1 93.3 95.1–2 95.1 95.2 110.5 117.1 117.3 117.4–5 117.5 121.1 134.3 134.5 135.3 fr. 2

Index of References 224. 27 216. 6 186. 30 217. 8 217. 8 186. 32 186. 32 186.32 216. 7 216. 6 216. 7 216. 7 216. 7 216. 7 178. 9 186. 32 178. 9 224. 27 186. 32 224. 27 225. 29 224. 27 225. 29

206. 89

coh.Gr. (Ps.–Justin, cohortatio ad Graecos) 8 186. 32 mon. (Ps.–Justin, oratio ad Graecos) 1 206. 89 1.1 216. 7 1.2 234. 58 2 206. 89 6.1 216. 7 bis Martyrdom of Justin 1 206. 89 Martyrdom of Polykarpos inscr. 7. 7, 185. 27, 193. 52, 194. 53, 202. 77, 203. 77 1.1 202. 77 1.2 203. 77 2.4–5.2 202. 77 3.2 178. 9

5.1

8.2 10.1 12.1 12.2 14.1 19.1 19.2 20.1 22.1

185. 27, 194. 53, 203. 77, 215. 4 7. 7, 185. 27, 194. 53, 203. 77, 215. 4 176. 5 178. 9 bis 178. 9 178. 8, 178. 9 185. 27, 225. 29 203. 77 7. 7, 185. 27 202. 77 202. 77

Meliton of Sardis fr. 1.4 fr. 1.7 fr. 2

176. 5 177. 5 bis 208. 98

8.1

Methodius On the Resurrection 1.20.4–5 233. 53 Minucius Felix Octauius 9.2 9.6–7

182. 21 182. 21

Origen Against Kelsos 1.14 3.13 6.27 6.40 hom. in Jer. 19.14

230. 43

Pantainos fr. 2

178. 9

254. 42 255. 45 182. 21 182. 21

Patrologia Orientalis 23.204–205 212. 112 Polykarpos Letter inscr. 1 5–6 5.2

202. 76 202. 76 202. 76 179. 10

321

Index of References 5.3 9.1 10.1 11 11.3 12.3 13 13.1 13.2 14

198. 65 181. 15, 202. 76 199. 66, 199. 67, 202. 76 202. 76 bis 202. 76 175. 2, 202. 76 202. 76 202. 76 181. 15 202. 76

Polykrates of Ephesos frr. 1–2 189. 40, 203. 80, 204. 82 fr. 1 188. 38 Rhodon frr. ap. Eus. h.e. 5.13

189. 40, 208. 98

Serapion of Antioch fr. 1 186. 30, 195. 56 fr. 2 186. 30 bis, 192. 47 fr. 3 186. 30 bis fr. 5 186. 30 Tatianos Address to the Greeks 186. 31 4.2 176. 5, 207. 90 5.1 207. 90 5.7 207. 90 6.1 233. 53 11.2 217. 9 12.2–3 172. 39, 234. 56, 244. 14 14.1 207. 90 15.1 227. 33 15.3 217. 9, 218. 13 18.2–3 239. 6 19.1 176. 5 19.9–10 207. 90 25.3–4 186. 31 26.1 224. 28 26.4 217. 9 bis 28.1 224. 28

Tertullian anim. (de anima) 1.5 5.6 8.1 10.8 15.3 21.1 21.4 21.7

178. 9 238. 3 235. 61, 238. 3 239. 6 178. 9 211. 106 211. 106 211. 106

apol. (apologeticum) 2.6 178. 8, 181. 17 21.24 176. 5, 178. 9 25 177. 7 25.17 178. 8 32.1 178. 7 35.3–13 176. 5 37.4 180. 12 37.5 178. 8 37.6 180. 12 38.3 180. 12 39.1 191. 44 39.8 192. 47 39.11–12 182. 21 39.20–40.1 191. 44 48.11 235. 61 50.10 178. 8 50.13 178. 9 bapt. (de baptismo) 8.1 12.3 15.1–16.1 15 15.2 17.1–2 19

230. 43, 232. 51 181. 17 181. 17 181. 17 191. 45 191. 44 230. 43

fug. in pers. (de fuga in persecutione) 10.2 178. 9 Hermog. (aduersus Hermogenem) 13.2 239. 6 idol. (de idololatria) 3.4 182. 21 7.1 178. 9, 182. 21 7.3 182. 21

322 13.6

Index of References 178. 9

ieiun. (de ieiunio aduersus psychicos) 1.1 239. 7 13.3–5 191. 45 13.3 195. 56 13.6–8 203. 81 13.6 178. 9 Iud. (aduersus Iudaeos) 9.27 184. 25 13.28 239. 4 14.11 239. 4 Marc. (aduersus Marcionem) 1.1.1 178. 9 1.16 235. 61 3.1.2 191. 45, 203. 81 3.24.3 180. 12 4.5.3 191. 45, 203. 81 4.38.3 176. 5 mart. (ad martyras) 1.1 192. 47 3.1 178. 9 3.3 180. 12 nat. (ad nationes) 1.2.9 1.3.2 1.8 1.8.9–10 1.9.1 1.15.7 1.16.6 1.17.2–4 1.17.4 2.17 2.17.2 2.17.18

225. 29 178. 9 225. 29 178. 9, 221. 21 239. 7 239. 7 221. 21 176. 5 178. 8 178. 7 177. 7 177. 7

paen. (de paenitentia) 10.5 191. 44 pall. (de pallio) 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.7

240. 8 177. 7, 240. 8 233. 53, 235. 61 177. 7

4.1

65. 94

pat. (de patientia) 6.5 184. 25 praes.haer. (de praescriptione haereticorum) 7.3 211. 106 7.9 238. 3 bis 7.11 178. 9, 238. 3 15–19 191. 45 20.2–9 203. 81 20.4–8 194. 53 20.5–9 181. 17 20.7 225. 29 20.8 191. 44, 192. 47, 204. 82 21.4–7 203. 81 28.1 191. 45 28.3 191. 45 30.9–10 239. 4 36.3 204. 82 36.4 204. 82 36.5 239. 4 38.4 239. 4 42.6 191. 45, 195. 56 Prax. (aduersus Praxean) 1.5 204. 83 2.4 211. 106 3.1 211. 106 8.7 211. 106 pudic. (de pudicitia) 7.4 192. 48 16.8–9 191. 44, 230. 43, 231. 47 21.7 194. 53 21.16 211. 106 res. mort. (de resurrectione mortuorum) 45.7 191. 44 Scap. (ad Scapulam) 5.1 178. 8 5.4 191. 44 spect. (de spectaculis) 28.5 232. 49

191. 44

323

Index of References 29.3

195. 57

Val. (aduersus Valentinianos) 17.2 211. 106 uirg.uel. (de uirginibus uelandis) 2 203. 81 2.1–2 181. 17, 194. 53 uxor. (ad uxorem) 2.3.1 2.8.3 2.8.6–8 2.8.8

192. 47 194. 53 181. 17 194. 53

Theodoretos eran.: flor. p. 153 Ettlinger graec. aff. cur. 1.75

218. 13 126. 8

Theophilos of Antioch To Autolykos 1.11 176. 5 2.4.5 209. 99 2.8 209. 99 2.8.6 206. 89 2.9.1–2.10.1 187. 34 2.9 209. 99, 239. 4 2.10 239. 4

2.15.4 2.28.3 2.29–32 2.31.3 2.32 2.34.1 2.34.4–5 2.34.4 2.35 2.35.4–8 2.35.9 2.36 2.38.7–10 2.38.7 3.2.2 3.4–6 3.7.7–9 3.7.7 3.9 3.15 3.19

211. 106 bis 209. 99 219. 16 219. 15 219. 16 209. 99 209. 99 209. 99, 219. 17 239. 4 209. 99 209. 99, 219. 17 209. 99 209. 99 206. 89 209. 99 182. 20 209. 99 219. 17 209. 99 182. 20 219. 15

Theophilos of Caesarea fr. ap. Eus. h.e. 5.25 189. 40, 203. 80 Zosimos of Panopolis Genuine Memoirs (ed. M. Mertens) 1.7 193. 52

Ancient Authors and Other Texts Agatharkhides of Knidos On the Eruthraian Sea 5.112 75. 15 Ailios Aristeides 1.55 1.83–84 1.167 1.238 1.284–285 1.322 1.399 3.335 3.348 3.693

90. 60 90. 60 90. 60 86. 46 86. 46 89. 57, 105. 38 140. 64 86. 49 82. 32 50. 41

23 23 inscr. 23.1 23.2–3 23.3 23.5–7 23.6 23.7 23.8–9 23.11 23.12

34. 50, 60. 83, 85. 44 49. 34 49. 34, 69. 105 62. 85 60. 83, 78. 20 241. 10 49. 34, 62. 85, 87. 52 62. 85, 87. 52 bis, 166. 25 60. 83, 62. 85 62. 85 51. 47, 60. 83, 241. 10

324 23.13 23.15 23.16 23.19–22 23.23–25 23.24 23.27 23.28 23.29 23.30 23.31–32 23.31 23.32–36 23.32 23.34 23.35 23.36 23.38 23.40–41 23.40 23.41 23.42–51 23.42–55 23.42 23.43 23.44 23.45 23.46 23.48 23.49–51 23.49 23.50 23.51 23.53 23.54–57 23.57–58 23.58 23.59 23.60 23.61 23.62–66 23.62 23.63–64

Index of References 41.1, 62. 85, 166. 25 105. 37 87. 52 62. 85 62. 85 87. 52 60. 83, 69. 105 50. 46, 62. 86 bis, 87. 52 49. 40 49. 35 51. 48 49. 36, 49. 37 166. 25 60. 83, 62. 86 bis, 105. 38 49. 37, 105. 38 51. 50 87. 52 50. 46, 51. 48 51. 48 50. 46, 51. 47 106. 39 50. 41 49. 39 49. 36, 49. 37 49. 36, 105. 37 87. 52 105. 37 62. 86, 87. 52 bis 62. 86, 87. 52 51. 49 87. 52 50. 41 87. 52 49. 40, 51. 48, 105. 38 51. 50 51. 54 51. 47 62. 86 62. 86 50. 41 62. 86 61. 84, 78. 21, 82. 34 61. 84, 62. 86

23.64 23.65–66 23.65 23.66 23.67 23.68–69 23.68 23.71 23.72–73 23.75–76 23.76–77 23.76 23.77 23.78–79 23.79–80 24 24 inscr. 24.3 24.4 24.5–7 24.6 24.7 24.8–9 24.8–10 24.8–11 24.8 24.10 24.11 24.12 24.13 24.14 24.15 24.17 24.18–19 24.19 24.20 24.22 24.24–26 24.24–29 24.24 24.26 24.27 24.28–29 24.28

61. 84 62. 86, 87. 52 60. 83, 87. 52, 166. 25 62. 85, 87. 52 49. 39 60. 83 105. 38 49. 34, 62. 85 49. 39 49. 38 49. 37, 166. 25 245. 20 236. 66 62. 86, 78. 21 62. 86 34. 50, 50. 44 bis 49. 34 50. 46 49. 34, 49. 39, 89. 57, 105. 38 59. 81 49. 36, 49. 37, 69. 105 87. 52 60. 82 59. 80 50. 42 49. 36 49. 39, 87. 52 87. 52 87. 52 49. 34, 87. 52 49. 37, 59. 81, 87. 52 62. 85 50. 43 51. 50 50. 43 51. 51 59. 80 bis 50. 44 51. 52 87. 52 49. 39, 87. 52 50. 44 50. 44 87. 52

Index of References 24.29 24.30 24.31 24.32–34 24.32–35 24.32–40 24.32 24.34 24.35 24.36 24.37 24.38–39 24.38 24.39 24.40 24.41 24.42 24.45 24.47–48 24.49 24.51 24.52 24.54–55 24.56 24.57 24.58 24.59 25 26 26.2–3 26.6–9 26.7 26.9 26.10–13 26.10 26.11 26.12 26.14 26.15–23 26.16 26.18 26.20

49. 36, 59. 80, 87. 52 bis 87. 52 78. 21, 87. 52 60. 82 50. 42 59. 80 59. 80, 60. 82 59. 80, 87. 52 87. 52 51. 48 49. 37, 60. 82, 87. 52, 89. 57, 105. 38 50. 45 49. 36 87. 52 50. 45 49. 34 bis, 51. 48 50. 45 50. 45, 60. 82, 105. 37 49. 39, 50. 45 49. 36, 60. 82 49. 39, 50. 45 59. 80 51. 53 60. 82 60. 82 69. 105 60. 82 50. 44 bis 84. 38, 85. 43, 167. 26 82. 31 82. 31 76. 17, 87. 50, 87. 51, 88. 55 78. 20 76. 17 78. 20, 82. 32 78. 20, 87. 50, 89. 57, 105. 38 78. 21, 89. 57 86. 46, 89. 57, 105. 38 86. 47 82. 32 82. 34 50. 46

26.22 26.23 26.24–27 26.28–32 26.28 26.30–31 26.31 26.32 26.33 26.36–39 26.36 26.37 26.38 26.39 26.40 26.41–48 26.41 26.46–48 26.49–50 26.49 26.51–56 26.51 26.56 26.57–58 26.59–62 26.59–63 26.59 26.60 26.61 26.62 26.63–64 26.63 26.64–65 26.65 26.66 26.67–69 26.67 26.69 26.70–71 26.72–89 26.73–75 26.75

325 87. 53 86. 47 86. 47 82. 33 89. 57 86. 49 89. 57 84. 38, 86. 47, 87. 50 78. 20, 82. 34 82. 34 82. 34, 85. 44, 105. 38, 106. 41 84. 38, 88. 56 106. 41 82. 34 86. 46 86. 48 86. 49, 89. 57, 105. 38 106. 41 86. 48 49. 38, 86. 48 86. 48 86. 49, 87. 50 87. 50 86. 49 78. 20, 176. 4 83. 37 87. 53, 89. 57 78. 21, 87. 50, 106. 41 87. 50, 87. 51 87. 50 106. 40 78. 21, 83. 37, 87. 50, 89. 57 83. 38 84. 38, 87. 50 78. 19, 84. 39, 86. 48 84. 40 84. 40, 89. 57, 106. 40 50. 46 bis 68. 102 84. 41 69. 103 87. 53

326 26.76 26.78 26.80 26.81 26.83 26.84–85 26.84 26.85 26.86 26.88 26.89 26.90–93 26.90 26.91 26.92–93 26.93 26.94–95 26.94–96 26.95 26.96 26.97–99 26.97–102 26.97 26.99 26.100

26.101 26.102–103 26.102 26.103 26.104–105 26.104 26.105 26.106 26.107 26.108 26.109 27.30–31 27.32 27.33 27.39 32.30 36.124

Index of References 87. 50 87. 50 84. 41, 87. 53 78. 21, 84. 41, 89. 57 88. 55 50. 45 49. 38, 84. 41, 88. 55 84. 41, 87. 50 88. 55 89. 57 50. 46, 88. 55 85. 43 85. 43, 106. 39, 106. 41 86. 49 84. 42 84. 42 85. 44 89. 57 85. 44 89. 57, 105. 38, 106. 41 78. 20, 176. 4 85. 44 50. 46 78. 19, 78. 21, 89. 57 84. 42, 87. 50, 89. 57 bis, 105. 38, 106. 40 78. 20, 88. 55 84. 42 85. 44, 87. 50 50. 46, 167. 26 132. 24 85. 44, 87. 50 140. 65 84. 42, 88. 55 85. 45 84. 42 85. 45 82. 33 83. 37 136. 44 78. 21, 136. 44 106. 39 136. 44

37.18–22 42 42.4 43.18 43.20 43.23 43.25 43.29 48.21 48.23 48.24 48.27–28 48.27 48.28 48.40–41 48.44 50.19–20 50.50–51 50.50 50.51 50.52 50.54 50.56 50.103 50.104 50.106 50.107 51.1 51.25 51.66 53

131. 24 143. 81 143. 81 131. 24 131. 24 134. 34 131. 24 131. 23 143. 84 140. 63 143. 84 140. 63 140. 63 140. 63 131. 24 131. 24 131. 24 132. 26 132. 26 143. 84 140. 63, 140. 64 140. 64 143. 84 143. 84 143. 84 bis 143. 84 143. 84 131. 24 131. 24 131. 24 42. 2

Aiskhines Sokratikos fr. 1 Krauss 82. 32 Albinos Eisagoge (ed. Hermann) 6 (p.150.33) 250. 32 Alkinoos Didaskalikos (ed. Whittaker) p. 152.6–23 250. 33 p. 170.1–2 250. 33 p. 183.18 250. 33 Antiphon (‘the sophist’) fr. 44(b) Pendrick 91. 1, 92. 1 DK 87 B 44 fr. B 91. 1

327

Index of References Antisthenes (ed. Prince) fr. 179a 126. 8 fr. 181 126. 8 fr. 181a 127. 9 Apuleius Florida 9.40

83. 35

Aratos Phainomena 5

231. 45

Aristophanes Lysistrate

143. 80

Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 182 b 13–27 123. 1 182 b 25–27 123. 1 Metaphysics 10.1 1052 a 15–b 1 123. 1 Arkhilokhos fr. 114 West

56. 71

Arrianos

32–33, 33. 47

Attikos (ed. des Places) fr. 1 50. 45 fr. 1.2.2 187. 32 fr. 2 250. 31 fr. 3 250. 31 fr. 8 250. 31 BMC Ionia no. 402 nos. 403–404 nos. 405–415

60. 83 60. 83 60. 83

Cassius Dio 60.24.4 68.17.1 71.1.2 71.11.4–5 71.22.2 71.24.3–4 72.4–7

69. 104 93. 5 150. 111 29. 38 80. 23 79. 23 29. 38

75.1.1

93. 5

Cicero Academica 1.13 1.69 2.11 2.18 2.67 2.77 2.78 2.118 2.131 2.132 2.148

252. 36 252. 38 252. 36 252. 36 bis 252. 36 252. 36 251. 36 164. 19 bis 252. 37 252. 38 251. 36

On Divination (De diuinatione) 1.5 163. 18, 164. 19 1.6 163. 18 1.112 164. 19 1.127 163. 18 2.8 163. 18 2.28–36 163. 17 2.28 164. 19 2.30 164. 19 2.33–34 163. 17, 163. 18 2.33 163. 18, 164. 19 2.34 163. 18, 164. 20 2.124 163. 18, 164. 20 2.142 163. 18, 164. 20 On Duties (De officiis) 1.16.50 104. 32 1.41.149 104. 32 3.5.21–22 104. 32 On Ends (De finibus) 3.64 107. 43 4.3 252. 37 5.13 164. 19 On the Laws (De legibus) 1.53 253. 39 On the Nature of the Gods (De natura deorum) 1.28 164. 19 2.154 107. 43 3.28 164. 20

328

Index of References

On the Response of the Soothsayers 19 177. 7 Tusculan Disputations 5.105 164. 19 CIG 3.4857.7

96. 9

Cornutus (ed. Lang) Introduction to Greek Theology 2, p.3.8–9 134. 34 28, p.54.12–21 253. 41 35, p.75.18–76.5 253. 41 CRAI (1971) 468–490

242. 12

Demokritos of Abdera DK 68 B 33 184. 25 Diodoros Sikeliotes 1.1.1 95. 9 1.1.3 95. 9 26.24.2 71. 2 40.4 76. 17 Diogenes Laertios 1.21 7.138 7.140 7.142–143 7.143 7.147 9.19

256. 48 121. 83 164. 19 120. 81 164. 19 134. 34 164. 19

Diogenes of Apollonia DK 64 B 2 37. 58 Diogenes of Oinoanda fr. 3.V.4–8 122. 86 fr. 20 122. 85 fr. 20.I.1–12 122. 85 fr. 20.I.2–3 122. 85 fr. 20.I.5–6 122. 85 fr. 20.II.8–9 122. 85 fr. 30.I.12–II.2 122. 86 fr. 30.II.3–11 122. 86 fr. 119.II.4–III.4 122. 86

NF 126 NF 126.VI NF 127 NF 127.I–II NF 127.II.13–14

122. 85 143. 79 122. 85 143. 79 122. 85

Dion of Prousa (Chrysostomos) 1 103. 28 1.1–2 73. 5 1.6 46. 19 1.11–36 73. 5 1.18 76. 16 1.23 76. 16 bis 1.37–38 130. 19 1.37 94. 8 1.39–40 102. 27 1.39–41 102. 27, 130. 20, 134. 34, 211. 108 1.39 101. 21, 130. 21 1.40 103. 31, 138. 53, 139. 57 1.42–43 101. 24, 172. 37 1.42–48 171. 35 1.42 103. 28 1.44–45 130. 19 1.57 142. 78 1.60 103. 28 1.62–63 103. 28 1.62 74. 10 1.65 94. 8 1.73–75 46. 18 1.84 74. 10, 74. 11, 103. 28 2.6 76. 16, 103. 29 2.64 104. 33 2.65–72 73. 5 2.69 94. 8 2.71 76. 16, 103. 28, 103. 29, 176. 4 2.75 73. 5, 137. 48 2.79 74. 11 3.2–3 73. 5 3.5 73. 5 3.6–7 76. 16, 176. 4 3.6 103. 29 3.9–11 73. 5 3.25–29 73. 5 3.36 76. 16 3.37 73. 5, 104. 33

Index of References 3.42 3.45–50 3.45 3.50 3.51–59 3.60 3.75 3.75–77 3.76 3.82–118 3.86–118 3.106 3.112–127 3.115 3.128–132 4.1 4.4 4.13 4.21–22 4.22 4.26 4.27 4.29 4.31 4.42–43 4.42 4.43 4.44 4.62–63 4.70 4.75 4.76 4.79–81 4.81 4.82–139 4.112 4.139 5.21 6.16 6.31 6.56 7 7.8 7.12 7.18–22 7.36–37 7.39 7.48–49

74. 11 77. 18 76. 16, 103. 28, 176. 4 143. 80, 161. 14 73. 5 94. 8 101. 24, 172. 37 161. 14 154. 136 73. 5 46. 18 94. 8 46. 18 137. 48 46. 18 bis 73. 5, 104. 34 104. 33 161. 14 137. 49 137. 48 74. 10 137. 49 94. 8 137. 49 46. 20 46. 18 137. 48 74. 10 59. 78 104. 34 138. 52 232. 50 232. 50 104. 34 138. 52 154. 136 82. 33, 154. 136 161. 14 104. 34 47. 22 bis 76. 17 68. 101 68. 101 73. 5 68. 101 68. 101 84. 41 68. 101

7.65–80 7.66 7.80 7.86 7.100 7.103 7.104–108 7.104–113 7.127 7.133–152 7.134 8.6 8.16 8.23 9.9 10.5 10.11 10.22 11.1 11.18 11.51 11.53 11.62–64 11.130 11.137 11.138 12 12.11 12.17 12.22 12.25–48 12.26–34 12.26 12.27

12.34

12.36–37 12.37 12.39 12.44–47 12.53 12.55 12.61 12.74

329 68. 101 73. 5 47. 22 bis 74. 10 74. 10 68. 101 68. 101 68. 101 77. 18 68. 101 104. 33 105. 35 105. 36 94. 8 73. 5 102. 25 94. 8 94. 8 94. 8 94. 8 104. 33 47. 22 104. 33 48. 31 104. 33 72. 4 161, 161. 14 104. 33 95. 9 130. 19, 137. 48 161. 14 95. 9 95. 9 95. 9, 103. 28, 130. 21, 137. 50, 143. 80, 231. 45 94. 8, 95. 9, 101. 24, 103. 28, 143. 80, 161. 14 bis, 172. 37, 253. 41 131. 22, 142. 79 142. 78 137. 50 137. 50 94. 8, 104. 33 143. 80 137. 50 48. 30, 102. 27, 137. 49

330 12.75–77 12.75

12.76 12.81 12.82–83 12.85 13.19 13.35 14.1 14.3–4 14.8 14.17–18 15.3–4 15.29 17 17.10 17.11 17.15–16 17.19 19.1 20.3 20.17 20.19 20.20 21.6 21.8 21.10 22.2 22.5 23.3 25.3–4 25.8 25.9 26.6 26.8 27.4 27.6 28.5 29.1 29.3 29.15 29.16 30.3 30.19

Index of References 130. 20, 134. 34, 211. 108 101. 21, 103. 31, 130. 21, 138. 53, 139. 57 102. 27 142. 79, 231. 46 142. 79 68. 101 46. 16 68. 101, 105. 35 66. 97 66. 97 66. 97 66. 97 68. 101 66. 97 55. 69 46. 19, 47. 22, 55. 69 94. 8 94. 8 154. 136 105. 35 73. 5 104. 34 94. 8 104. 33 74. 10 74. 11 74. 10 103. 31 47. 22, 104. 34 94. 8 138. 52 72. 4 104. 34 154. 136 46. 19 46. 16 105. 35 94. 8 105. 35 94. 8 161. 14 94. 8 104. 33 77. 18

30.26 31 31.10–11 31.29 31.49 31.57 31.87 31.107–108 31.128 31.149 31.150–151 32–34 32 32.5 32.29 32.31 32.35 32.36 32.37 32.41–42 32.41 32.43 32.45 32.46 32.47 32.56 32.58 32.65 32.70 32.71 32.73 32.95–96 33.4 33.17–18 33.22 33.42 33.51 34 34.7 34.9 34.10–11 34.14 34.15 34.16–24 34.17–22 34.17

94. 8, 130. 21, 137. 50 76. 17 131. 22 77. 18 77. 18 137. 48 105. 35 73. 5 74. 11 76. 17 73. 5 57. 75 57. 74, 76. 17 47. 22 178. 9 178. 9 76. 17, 104. 33 76. 16, 76. 17, 83. 37, 161. 14 46. 16, 46. 18 66. 96 94. 8 74. 11 66. 96 154. 137 76. 17 104. 33 154. 136 178. 9 47. 22 66. 96 47. 22 66. 96 161. 14 56. 71 161. 14 154. 136 56. 70 56–57. 72 56. 70 56. 71 56. 70 47. 22, 56. 70 56. 71 bis 56. 72 47. 22 46. 17, 46. 18, 56. 72

Index of References 34.19 34.20 34.21–23 34.21 34.22 34.24 34.25 34.27 34.36 34.38–42 34.38 34.40 34.42 34.43–46 34.43–48 34.43 34.44 34.45 34.47 34.48 34.49–51 34.49 34.50 34.51 35.10 36 36.5 36.8 36.8–9 36.13 36.17 36.19–20 36.20 36.21 36.22–23 36.22 36.23 36.25 32.26–29 36.26–30 36.26 36.27 36.29–32

46. 18, 47. 21, 47. 22, 56. 72, 103. 31 46. 17, 47. 22, 56. 72 56. 72 47. 22 bis 47. 22, 103. 31 36. 17, 46. 17, 46. 18, 56. 72 73. 5 56. 70, 56. 71 bis, 56. 72 56. 71 56. 71 56. 71 56. 71 56. 71 bis, 56. 72 47. 22 56. 70 47. 22 47. 22 46. 19 64. 89 47. 22 47. 24 47. 22 48. 31 43. 3, 47. 22 bis 141. 71 68. 100, 161–162 104. 33 104. 33 104. 33 47. 22, 171. 35 66. 95 bis 138. 51 105. 35 46. 16 136. 44 47. 22, 48. 30, 68. 100, 162. 15 77. 18, 103. 30 bis, 138. 51 104. 33 162. 15 142. 78 162. 15 162. 15 162. 15

36.29–38 36.29 36.30 36.31–32 36.31

36.32 36.35 36.36–37 36.36 36.37 36.38 36.39–61 36.42 36.43 36.47 36.50 36.55–57 36.55 36.57 36.59–60 38 38.1 38.1–2 38.2 38.5–6 38.6–7 38.8 38.10 38.11

38.13–15 38.14–15 38.14 38.15 38.15–16 38.16–20 38.17–18 38.17 38.22 38.24–25 38.24–33 38.25 38.26–61

331 171. 35 105. 35 98. 14, 162. 15 143. 80 46. 19, 47. 22, 94. 8, 103. 30, 105. 35, 138. 51 bis 137. 48, 138. 53 130. 19, 138. 51 bis 143. 80, 162. 15 161. 14 143. 80, 162. 15 103. 30, 138. 51, 138. 52 245. 19 162. 15 104. 33 46. 19 143. 80 142. 79 46. 16, 162. 15 154. 136 142. 79, 162. 15 60. 83 103. 31 63. 87 77. 18 46. 16, 48. 29 63. 88 46. 16, 47. 21, 48. 29, 63. 89 46. 16, 48. 31 46. 20, 47. 23, 48. 30, 101. 22, 104. 34, 171. 37 47. 21 48. 29 47. 23 46. 16 46. 20 47. 23 48. 30 101. 22, 171. 37 46. 19, 47. 21, 63. 89, 64. 89 47. 24 63. 88 47. 23, 74. 10 64. 89

332 38.26 38.27 38.29 38.33 38.34–37 38.34–38 38.38 38.39–40 38.41–45 38.43 38.46–48 38.48 38.49–51 38.51 39.1 39.2–8 39.2 39.3–5 39.3 39.4–7 39.4 39.5–7 39.7–8 39.8 40 40.3–15 40.5 40.10 40.16–17 40.16–18 40.16 40.18–19 40.20 40.21 40.22–25 40.22 40.23–27 40.25 40.26 40.27 40.27–28 40.31–34

Index of References 64. 90 47. 22, 74. 11 48. 29 104. 34 48. 28 49. 33 47. 24 63. 88, 63. 89 49. 33 47. 21, 47. 22 bis, 103. 30 63. 89, 64. 91 47. 22, 48. 29 63. 89 48. 30, 57. 73 63. 87 57. 73 46. 19 tris, 48. 30, 77. 18 49. 32 46. 18 47. 25 48. 30, 49. 33 48. 29 49. 32 46. 18 bis, 46. 19, 47.22, 131. 22 34. 50, 60. 83, 241. 10 63. 87 73. 5 64. 90 63. 87, 64. 90 64. 91 46. 16, 48. 28, 48. 29 63. 87 47. 22 47. 22 47. 22 47. 22, 48. 28, 63. 89, 64. 91 64. 90 48. 26 47. 21, 48. 27, 48. 29, 48. 31 48. 28, 64. 90 64. 91 48. 26

40.32 40.34 40.35–37 40.35–39 40.35–41 40.35 40.36 40.36–37 40.37 40.38 40.39 40.40–41 40.40 41 41.1–3 41.1 41.2 41.7–8 41.8–10 41.8 41.9–10 41.9–11 41.9 41.10 41.11–12 41.12–13 41.12–14 41.12 41.14 41 fin. 43–51 passim 43.4 43.8 44 44.1 44.2 44.7 44.9–12 44.10 44.12 45.1 45.3–10 45.3

59. 78 47. 21 236. 66 101. 23, 171. 37 48. 30 101. 22, 154. 136, 161. 14, 171. 37 102. 26, 103. 30, 172. 37 46. 19 47. 22 161. 14 101. 23, 103. 30 48. 26 59. 78 34. 50, 60. 83, 63. 87, 64. 91, 241. 10 63. 87 64. 90 63. 87, 77. 18 64. 91 49. 33 46. 16 77. 18 64. 91 47. 22, 48. 27, 76. 16 63. 89, 64. 90 48. 26 48. 29 48. 31 46. 19 48. 26 63. 87 63. 87 74. 11, 105. 35 47. 22 58. 75 104. 34 46. 19 59. 78 57. 75 47. 21, 48. 26, 57. 75, 73. 5, 104. 34 66. 97, 73. 5 104. 33 58. 76 46. 19

333

Index of References 45.4 45.6–10 45.13–14 45.16 46 46.4 46.8 46.14 47.2 47.5 48.1–6 48.2 48.3 48.4–5 48.4 48.5 48.6 48.7–8 48.7 48.9–11 48.9 48.10 48.12–13 48.13 48.14–16 48.14 48.15–16 48.16 48.17 49.1 49.3 49.4 49.6 49.9 50.2 50.3 51.3 53.2 53.8 53.11 53.12 55.2 56.3 57.6

74. 11, 76. 17, 79. 22 63. 87 58. 77 103. 31 57. 75, 68. 101 46. 19 73. 5 63. 87 bis 154. 137 104. 33 59. 78 46. 19 59. 79 47. 22 58. 75 47. 22, 104. 34 46. 19, 47. 21 46. 16 48. 29, 49. 33, 82. 33, 103. 31, 105. 35 59. 79 47. 22, 47. 25, 48. 29 47. 22 47. 24 59. 79 59. 78 46. 19, 48. 29, 101. 24, 161. 14 48. 30 48. 28 59. 79 104. 34 94. 8 74. 10, 104. 34 46. 19, 72. 4, 104. 33 104. 33 104. 33 46. 19, 58. 76 58. 75 103. 31 104. 33 74. 10 130. 19, 137. 48 245. 19 74. 11 74. 10, 104. 33

61.6 62.1 62.5 62.6 63.2 65.6 65.10 66.2 68.4 68.7 69.4 74(On distrust) 74.3 74.4 74.23 74.26

74.27 75.4 75.8 77/78.14 77/78.24 77/78.39 79.5 80.3 ep. 1

104. 33 76. 17 76. 16 74. 11 46. 19 94. 8 94. 8 105. 35 104. 34 154. 136 94. 8 102. 25 105. 35 102. 25, 103. 31 103. 31 55. 69, 102. 25, 103. 30, 142. 78, 161. 14 137. 48 154. 137 103. 30 47. 22 154. 137 47. 21 104. 34 66. 97, 72. 4 47. 22

Dionysios of Halikarnassos 1.3.3 82. 32 Doxographi Graeci (ed. H. Diels) 464.20–21 121. 83 465.15 121. 83 Empedokles DK 31 B 26.5–6 DK 31 B 134.5

37. 57 37. 57

Epikouros (ed. Usener) fr. 296 158. 4 Epiktetos 1.1 1.1.10–12 1.1.10–17 1.1.13 1.2.23–24 1.3

149. 106 137. 47 132. 27 132. 27 72. 5 136. 46

334 1.3.1–3 1.4.6–11 1.4.14–15 1.4.18 1.4.28–29 1.4.30–31 1.4.31–32 1.6 1.6.3–7 1.6.12–21 1.6.15 1.6.19 1.6.21 1.7.1–4 1.8.16 1.9.1–5 1.9.1–6 1.9.1–7 1.9.1 1.9.4–6 1.9.4 1.9.5 1.9.6 1.9.7 1.9.8 1.9.9 1.9.11 1.9.13 1.9.22 1.9.25 1.9.31 1.9.32 1.10.10 1.11.4 1.11.5–8 1.11.5 1.11.9–15 1.11.11 1.11.12–13 1.11.16–26 1.11.27–40 1.11.28 1.12.1–5 1.12.1 1.12.4–7

Index of References 112. 56 147. 98 147. 98, 198. 64, 226. 31 148. 102 148. 104 94. 8 132. 27 112. 58 132. 27 112. 58 112. 58 136. 46 148. 103 148. 100 94. 8 136. 46 97. 12, 112. 56, 119. 78, 121. 83 111. 56 97. 13, 114. 61, 118. 73, 227. 34 119. 75 112. 56, 121. 83, 149. 108 136. 46 136. 46 97. 13 112. 56 112. 56 97. 13 97. 13 97. 13 97. 13 112. 56 74. 12 149. 108 bis 146. 95 198. 64, 226. 31 147. 96 147. 97 147. 96 96. 10 146. 95 147. 97 147. 97 132. 27 132. 27 148. 100

1.12.15–16 1.12.17 1.12.24 1.12.32 1.13.2–5 1.13.4 1.14 1.14 tit. 1.14.1 1.14.2 1.14.4–5 1.14.5 1.14.5–6 1.14.6 1.14.6–10 1.14.9–10 1.14.9 1.14.10 1.14.14 1.14.16 1.15 1.15.4 1.16.6–7 1.16.7 1.16.15–16 1.17.27 1.18.1 1.19.9–13 1.19.11–15 1.19.12–13 1.19.15 1.19.19 1.19.26 1.20.11 1.22.1 1.22.9–11 1.24.1 1.25.11–13 1.25.13 1.26.1–2 1.26.2 1.26.15 1.28.21 1.28.25 1.29.1–15 1.29.29 1.29.44

168. 31 148. 105, 149. 106, 149. 108 121. 82 132. 27 96. 11 136. 46 142. 74, 163. 16, 163. 18 132. 27 164. 19 164. 20 163. 18 164. 20 164. 19 137. 47, 244. 17 132. 27 164. 19 142. 74 144. 85 163. 16 163. 16 149. 106 147. 99 132. 27 132. 28 132. 27 137. 47 74. 12 132. 27 97. 13 180. 14 97. 13 bis 73. 5 73. 5 148. 100 94. 8 148. 101 132. 27 169. 32 132. 27 198. 64, 226. 31 148. 103 74. 12, 148. 100 94. 8 94. 8 136. 46 136. 46 74. 12

Index of References 1.29.46–49 2.1.1–7 2.1.25 2.1.39 2.2.21 2.2.25–26 2.4.1 2.4.6 2.5 2.5.1–9 2.5.4–14 2.5.11–13 2.5.22 2.5.26 2.6.9–10 2.6.20 2.7.11 2.7.13 2.8.1–2 2.8.1–8 2.8.2–17 2.8.6 2.8.10–11 2.8.11–14 2.8.11 2.8.18–20 2.9.2 2.9.19–20 2.10 2.10.1–12 2.10.3–6 2.10.3 2.10.5 2.11.16 2.11.23–35 2.14.7 2.14.11–13 2.16.33 2.16.42 2.16.44 2.16.46 2.17.21–29 2.17.23 2.17.25 2.18.8–9 2.18.28 2.18.29

132. 27 169. 32 132. 27 148. 100 148. 105, 149. 106 149. 106 94. 8 94. 8 169. 32 169. 32 149. 106 169. 32 132. 27 118. 73 113. 59, 137. 47 72. 5 137. 46 137. 46 132. 27 112. 58 137. 46 113. 59 132. 27 136. 46 244. 17 132. 28 94. 8 96. 10 111. 55, 137. 47 112. 57 111. 55, 113. 59 118. 73 121. 82, 148. 100 94. 8 148. 100 113. 59, 148. 105, 149. 106, 149. 108 132. 27 149. 109 121. 82 136. 46 137. 46 132. 27 73. 5 132. 28 148. 100 74. 12 137. 46

2.19.26 2.19.27 2.19.29 2.20 2.20.9 2.20.19–20 2.20.22 2.22.15 2.23.2–3 2.23.16–29 2.23.42 2.24.20–26 2.24.22 3.1.16–18 3.1.37 3.3.1 3.3.7–10 3.4.2 3.5 3.5.3 3.5.8–10 3.6.3 3.7.21 3.7.30 3.9.11 3.9.14 3.10.11 3.10.13 3.10.16 3.11.1 3.13.4 3.13.8 3.13.9–10 3.13.9–12 3.13.13 3.15.13 3.18 3.21.11 3.21.12 3.22.1–4 3.22.4 3.22.30–44 3.22.30 3.22.32–34 3.22.48 3.22.53

335 119. 77, 121. 82, 137. 47 136. 46 137. 46 250. 29 94. 8 94. 8 132. 27 97. 13 136. 46 137. 47 142. 74, 148. 105, 149. 110 96. 10 96. 10 132. 28 94. 8, 132. 27 148. 100 149. 106 73. 5 137. 47 147. 99 142. 74 147. 99 74. 12 72. 5 147. 99 96. 11 147. 99 119. 77 148. 100 149. 110 132. 28 149. 108 79. 22 43. 4, 79. 22, 246. 21 132. 27 148. 100 137. 47 73. 5 132. 28 113. 60 113. 60 96. 10 74. 12 96. 10 119. 77 132. 27, 138. 46

336 3.22.54 3.22.56–57 3.22.63 3.22.69 3.22.75 3.22.79 3.22.81–82 3.22.82 3.22.94 3.22.99 3.24.2 3.24.10 3.24.11–12 3.24.11 3.24.15–16 3.24.16–19 3.24.22–24 3.24.34–35 3.24.36 3.24.43 3.24.50–53 3.24.53 3.24.58–66 3.24.58 3.24.60–63 3.24.65 3.24.107 3.24.112–117 3.24.113 3.24.117 3.26.18 3.26.29 3.26.32 4.1 4.1.12 4.1.42 4.1.51 4.1.62 4.1.77 4.1.89 4.1.100 4.1.103 4.1.151–158 4.1.154 4.4.5 4.4.39 4.4.43 4.5.1–7 4.5.6

Index of References 96. 11 132. 27 74. 12 119. 78 74. 12 74. 12 96. 11 136. 46 73. 5 74. 12 113. 60 107. 42, 113. 60 98. 14 97. 13 136. 46 113. 60 149. 109 137. 46 113. 60 149. 110 148. 100 113. 60 114. 61 119. 77 132. 27 119. 78 73. 5 132. 27 94. 8 73. 5 149. 110 73. 5 79. 22 79. 22, 137. 47 79. 22, 246. 21 94. 8 73. 5 74. 12 94. 8 137. 47 137. 47 132. 27 114. 61 114. 61 72. 5 132. 27 147. 99, 148. 100 148. 100 148. 100

4.5.12 4.6.5 4.7.6–7 4.7.7 4.7.8–11 4.7.20 4.8.21 4.8.30–32 4.8.34 4.10.1–3 4.10.12 4.10.27 4.11.3 Enkheiridion 1.3 4 6 7 13–14 13 17 30

137. 47 94. 8 142. 74 149. 108 149. 106 119. 78 132. 28 132. 27 74. 12 149. 106 180. 14 94. 8 94. 8

36 38 48 49

119. 77 137. 47, 148. 102 148. 103 137. 46 149. 106 148. 102 132. 27 97. 13, 148. 102, 198. 64, 226. 31 169. 32 148. 100 149. 106 149. 108

fr. 1 fr. 3 fr. 4 fr. 6 fr. 8 fr. 11

94. 8 121. 82 121. 82, 137. 47 148. 104, 149. 107 148. 104 132. 27

Euripides Aiolos (ed. Kannicht, TrGF) F21 196. 59 F21.3–4 159. 5 Alkestis 15–16

98. 14

Bakkhai

130. 18

M. Cornelius Fronto To Antoninus Pius 8.1 83. 35

Index of References To his Friends 1.1

120. 81

On Eloquence 2.17 van den Hout 117. 72

13 14–19 16–17 16 18 19–20 19

Aulus Gellius Attic Nights 1.2.6 13.17 19.1.14

33. 47 66. 94 bis 120. 79

20 21 22–24 22

Gorgias DK 82 A 1.4 DK 82 A 7 DK 82 B 7–8

53. 59 53. 59 53. 59

Herakleitos DK 22 B 10 DK 22 B 50 DK 22 B 51 DK 22 B 57 DK 22 B 59 DK 22 B 60 DK 22 B 67 DK 22 B 89

23 25 26 29–30 29

37. 56 bis 37. 56 (4x) 159. 5 123, 123. 1, 169. 32 123. 1 123. 1 123. 1 37. 56

Hermetica Asclepius 1–2 1–3 2–3 2 3 4 5–8 6–7 6

7 8–9 8–11 9 10 11–12 11 12–14

145. 93, 156. 145 168. 30 156. 145 145. 90 145. 91 141. 69 141. 70 155. 142 155. 139 bis, 155. 140, 155. 141, 168. 30 155. 143 145. 90, 155. 141 141. 72 145. 92 145. 90, 145. 93, 155. 139, 155. 142 155. 141 155. 139 141. 71

30 31–32 32 34 35 37–38 37 38 39–40 39 41

337 168. 30 146. 94 168. 30 145. 90 141. 73, 155. 143 145. 90 134. 35, 145. 90, 168. 30 bis 146. 94, 156. 145 155. 139 141. 73 134. 35, 155. 142, 168. 29 145. 90 170. 34 145. 90 156. 145 145. 92, 145. 93, 156. 145 168. 29 145. 93 141. 73 145. 90, 145. 92 146. 94 141. 73 155. 143 168. 30 168. 29, 168. 30 156. 145, 168. 30 141. 73, 145. 92, 145. 93, 146. 94, 155. 142

Corpus Hermeticum 1 135 1.6 135. 39, 155. 143 1.7–8 168. 29 1.10 135. 39 1.14–16 155. 138, 168. 29 bis 1.14 155. 139 1.19 155. 139 1.24 155. 144 1.26 140. 66 bis, 155. 138, 168. 29, 232. 52 1.29 232. 52 2.4–5 141. 70 2.12–17 145. 90

338 2.14 3 3.4 4 4.1 4.4–6 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.10–11 5 5.1–5 5.2 5.3–5 5.5 5.6–10 5.8 5.11 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.5–6 6.5 7 7.2–3 7.2 8.1–5 8.1 8.2 8.2–3 8.4 8.5 9.1–2 9.5 9.6 9.7–8 9.8–9 9.8 9.9 9.10 10.1–4 10.5–10 10.7–8 10.9–10

Index of References 134. 35 145. 92 170. 34 135, 135. 38 134. 36, 145. 90 140. 67, 232. 51 140. 67 134. 36 140. 66 134. 36, 140. 67, 212. 110 135. 38 145. 92, 156. 145 145. 93 145. 90, 146. 94 168. 29, 168. 30 168. 29 145. 91 145. 90, 146. 94, 167. 28 145. 90, 145. 92 145. 90 155. 140 145. 93 145. 93 140. 68 155. 140, 156. 145 155. 140 140. 68 145. 90 155. 138 bis, 155. 144 145. 90, 145. 93 145. 91, 168. 30 168. 29 125. 4, 155. 138 155. 142, 155. 143 145. 93, 155. 138, 232. 52 155. 144 168. 29, 170. 34 145. 90 145. 90, 168. 29 145. 91 140. 68 145. 90 155. 140 155. 138 140. 68

10.11 10.14 10.15 10.15–25 10.16–21 10.19–21 10.22–23 10.22 10.23 10.24 10.25 11 11.1–4 11.3–6 11.3 11.5 11.6–10 11.7 11.8–11 11.8 11.9 11.11 11.12–14 11.14 11.15–16 11.15–18 11.16 11.18–20 11.21 12.1 12.3–4 12.8 12.10–11 12.14 12.15–16 12.15 12.18 12.19–21 12.19 12.20 12.21 12.23 16.3 16.19

155. 140, 168. 29 125. 4, 134. 36, 145. 90 155. 140 140. 68 140. 68 155. 140 141. 69 145. 90, 232. 52 140. 68, 168. 30 155. 143 134. 35, 146. 94, 167. 28 145. 90 bis, 253. 40 145. 90 145. 90 168. 30 134. 36, 212. 110, 253. 40 145. 91 170. 34 134. 37, 167. 28 168. 30, 212. 110 168.30 212. 110 146. 94, 167. 28 135. 39, 145. 90 244. 15 253. 40 145. 93 145. 91 155. 140 141. 69, 168. 30 155. 143 168. 30 155. 143 168. 29 145. 93 145. 92, 168. 30 bis 155. 144 145. 93 141. 69 155. 138 146. 94, 167. 28, 168. 30 145. 92 125. 6, 145. 93,168. 30 145. 92

339

Index of References 18.14 fr. 23.50 fr. 29

82. 33 145. 90 168. 29 bis

Herodianos 1.8.2 1.8.8 1.13.4–8

29. 38 29. 38 29. 38

Hierokles in Stobaios, Eklogai 4.27.23

110. 52

Hippokratic Corpus Airs Waters Places 23 92. 1 Historia Augusta Commodus 1.7–8 3.9 4.8–6.2

29. 38 29. 38 29. 38

Marcus 3.2 3.3 24.3

150. 111 120. 81 29. 38

Homer Iliad 12.282–284

27. 36, 238. 1 82. 31

Odyssey

27. 36, 238. 1

Honestus fr. 21

90. 59

I.Assos 20

90. 59

Index rerum gestarum diui Augusti 13 28. 37 Appendix 52. 55 Inschriften des Asklepieions 63 143. 83 145 131. 24 IGRR I 713

90. 59

I 853 I 901 I 1015 I 1096 I 1124 I 1263.7 III 719 III 752 III 756 III 757 III 758 III 759 III 760 III 770 III 771 III 896 IV 250 IV 611 IV 679 IV 878 IV 1109 IV 1153 IV 1354 IV 1608b.8–9 IV 1611b.6–8

76. 17 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 76. 17 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 90. 59 76. 17 76. 17

Iosephos Against Apion 1.2.6 1.3.15 2.125 2.179

96. 9 96. 9 43. 3 238. 2

Antiquities of the Jews 1.24 238. 2 20.137 175. 3 Isokrates Panegyrikos 4.15–20

62. 85

Khairemon (ed. van der Horst) fr. 1 254. 42 Livy 38.50.7 38.50.11–12

78. 19 78. 19

340

Index of References

Loukianos Alexandros 2 48

74. 14 68. 102

Apology 12

74. 14, 78 bis

Historia 5 17 29 31

68. 102 bis 68. 102 68. 102 68. 102

The Sale of the Lives 11 256. 49 Lusimakhos FGrH 621 F1

254. 42

Macrobius In Somn. 1.12

254. 44

Malcovati (ed.), Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta 4 (Scipio Africanus) fr. 3 78. 19 Manethon FGrH 609 F 8 Marcus Aurelius 1.9.3 1.14.1–3 1.14.1 1.14.2 1.14.3 1.16.14 1.17.1 1.17.11 2.1 2.1.3 2.1.4–5 2.1.5 2.3.2 2.4.2

254. 42

150. 111 120. 80 74. 13, 120. 81 bis 120. 80, 120. 81, 246. 21 120. 81 74. 13, 80. 24, 246. 21 132. 29 150. 111, 152. 123 108. 47, 116. 70, 151. 121 119. 75 108. 45 151. 121 121. 81, 233. 53 144. 86, 244. 17

2.5.1 2.9 2.11.5–6 2.13.1 2.16 2.16.1–2 2.16.1 2.16.6 2.17.2 2.17.4 3.2 3.3.6 3.4 3.4.1

3.4.4–5 3.4.4 3.4.7 3.5.2 3.6.4 3.7.2 3.9 3.11.2 3.11.4 3.12 3.12.1 3.13 3.16.3–4 3.16.3 4.1.1 4.3.5

4.3.7–8 4.3.9–11 4.3.9–12 4.4

4.4.1 4.12 4.24.1 4.25 4.26.4 4.27

116. 69 121. 81, 152. 123 144. 86 139. 61, 139. 62 152. 122 109. 49 119. 76 109. 51, 116. 70, 119. 78 114. 63 139. 61, 139. 62 152. 128 132. 29 115. 67, 116. 69 79. 23, 108. 44, 151. 118, 180. 14, 246. 23 152. 125 246. 23 150. 115, 151. 117 116. 69, 139. 61 74. 13 139. 61, 139. 62 151. 121 114. 63, 117. 71 132. 29 152. 123 139. 61 139. 59 139. 62, 152. 125 132. 29, 139. 61 150. 113 107. 42, 107. 43, 115. 65, 144. 85, 171. 35 93. 5 115. 65, 150. 114 116. 70 79. 23, 107. 43 bis, 115. 65, 119. 75, 171. 35 107. 43, 108. 47, 114. 63 79. 23 108. 46 152. 126 152. 125 165. 22

Index of References 4.29 4.29.1–2 4.29.1 4.29.2–3 4.29.2 4.29.3 4.32.1 4.33.3 4.33.4–4.34 4.36 4.39 4.40 4.46.3 4.47–48 4.47 4.48.3–4 4.51 5.1.5–7 5.1.7 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.8.2–5 5.8.10 5.8.12 5.9.3 5.10.6–7 5.10.6 5.14.2 5.16.3–5 5.21.1 5.26 5.27 5.29.2 5.30 5.34.2 5.35 6.1.1 6.7 6.9 6.10 6.13 6.14.2 6.16.9–10 6.16.10 6.25

116. 69, 119. 75, 119. 76 109. 50 114. 63 108. 46 108. 46 109. 49 bis 74. 13, 246. 21 74. 13, 93. 5 152. 125 233. 53 150. 114 144. 86, 166. 23 144. 86 150. 112 132. 29 150. 112 150. 112 151. 118 151. 118 151. 118 150. 112 109. 48, 116. 70 152. 126 166. 24 144. 85 144. 86 152. 122 153. 129 139. 61 74. 13 108. 44 144. 86 150. 113, 165. 22 139. 60, 232. 50, 244. 17 152. 124 108. 44, 144. 85 132. 29 180. 14, 246. 23 144. 86 109. 48, 116. 70 166. 24 164. 21, 165. 22 152. 128 108. 45, 108. 46 153. 129 139. 62 166. 23

6.30.4 6.33 6.35.2 6.38 6.39 6.41 6.41.1–2 6.42.1–3 6.42.1 6.44.1–3 6.44.1 6.44.4 6.44.5 6.44.6 6.58 7.5 7.5.2–3 7.9 7.9.2 7.11 7.13 7.13.1–2 7.18 7.19 7.19.1 7.23.1 7.24 7.25 7.48 7.49 7.53 7.55.3 7.56 7.57 7.66.3 7.68.3 7.72 7.74 8.1 8.1.3 8.2 8.5

341 108. 45 152. 122, 152. 127 139. 59 165. 22 150. 113 153. 129 132. 29 108. 45 113. 59 152. 125 132. 29 132. 29 108. 46, 150. 115 74. 13, 114. 63, 116. 69 tris 152. 124, 153. 129 152. 128 108. 44, 180. 14, 246. 23 27. 35, 133. 31, 165. 22 133. 31, 211. 109 151. 119 119. 76, 165. 22, 244. 18 108. 45, 109. 49 233. 53 244. 18 109. 49, 165. 22 144. 86 152. 122 144. 86 172. 42 246. 21 139. 59, 151. 119 108. 44, 180. 14, 246. 23 150. 112 152. 125 144. 85 108. 46 108. 46 109. 48, 116. 70, 151. 120 150. 112 150. 112 107. 43, 120. 80, 136. 45, 139. 59 166. 24

342 8.7 8.7.1 8.12 8.17.1 8.19.1 8.21.2–3 8.26 8.26.2 8.34 8.34.4 8.45.1 8.46 8.52 8.56.2 9.1.1 9.1.1–9 9.1.2–5 9.9.6–9 9.9.6–12 9.9.9 9.9.10–12 9.11.2 9.12 9.16 9.23 9.28.3 9.31 9.35.2 9.40.2–6 9.40.3 9.40.7 10.1 10.1.3 10.1.4

10.6 10.6.2 10.6.3 10.6.5 10.8.2 10.8.6 10.9 10.11 10.11.4 10.15.2 10.15.3 10.25.2

Index of References 152. 126 144. 85 108. 45 119. 77 133. 30 93. 5 108. 44 152. 128 109. 49, 119. 76, 150. 116, 244. 18 132. 29 139. 61 152. 125 152. 128 108. 44, 132. 29 108. 44 153. 129 133. 32 165. 22 112. 58, 165. 22 165. 22 165. 22 132. 29 108. 46 108. 45 108. 45 144. 85 108. 45 133. 30 139. 62 139. 59 139. 62 166. 23 121. 81, 144. 86 107. 43, 115. 66, 117. 70, 119. 77, 136. 45, 139. 59 115. 66, 152. 126 79. 23 114. 63 114. 63 152. 126 132. 29 152. 128 152. 128 132. 29 115. 64 115. 64 144. 86

10.33.1–2 10.33.8 10.36 11.2 11.4 11.5 11.8 11.8.3 11.13.4 11.13.21 11.16 11.18.1 11.18.1–2 11.19.1 11.20.1 11.21.4 12.1.5 12.5.1–5 12.11–12 12.11 12.12 12.20 12.21 12.23.6 12.26 12.26.1 12.27.2 12.29 12.29.3 12.30 12.31.2 12.36.1 12.36.1–2

152. 123 115. 66, 116. 70 152. 127 152. 128 109. 48 152. 128 171. 36 109. 49 79. 23, 152. 126 79. 23 150. 114 144. 86 108. 44 108. 44 166. 23 151. 118 109. 50, 114. 63, 139. 61 132. 29 132. 29 132. 29, 144. 85 119. 77 79. 23 93. 5 132. 29 108. 47, 166. 24 108. 47, 152. 127 132. 29 109. 48 116. 70 166. 23, 171. 36 132. 29, 133. 32 120. 80 109. 51, 116. 70

Maximus of Tyre 2.1 5.4 8.8 11.5 11.12 39.5

134. 34, 137. 46 144. 85 144. 85 244. 16 142. 75, 144. 85 134. 34

Melissos DK 30 B 6

37. 58

Michigan Papyri 757

230. 43

343

Index of References Musonius Rufus Autograph fr. 4 fr. 9 fr. 17 fr. 38 fr. 40 fr. 42

95. 9 105. 36, 121. 83 148. 104 121. 82 148. 104, 149. 107 148. 104

Noumenios (ed. Des Places) fr. 1a 254. 44 fr. 11 155. 138 fr. 24 50. 45 fr. 28 251. 36 OGIS 2.669.7

96. 9

Orphicorum fragmenta (ed. O. Kern) fr. 21a 134. 34 fr. 31.23 132. 26

8 13 18 20 31 36 49 63–66

75. 15 75. 15 75. 15 75. 15 75. 15 75. 15 75. 15 75. 15

Philodemos On Piety 1 7

126. 8 126. 8

Philon of Alexandreia Allegorical Interpretation 3.96 218. 13 Creation of the World 3 238. 2 Philon of Larisa

Oxyrhynchus Papyri 1364 91. 1 1380 124. 2 1608 82. 32 3647 91. 1 3781 96. 9 Panaitios fr. 105 van Straaten 104. 32 Papyri Graecae Magicae 36.147–151 230. 43 Papyri Londinienses 121.503 124. 2 1912.98–104 116. 69 Parmenides DK 28 A 7 DK 28 A 23 DK 28 A 25 DK 28 A 34 DK 28 A 49 DK 28 B 8

158. 4 158. 4 158. 4 160. 11 158. 4 37. 58, 160. 11

Periplous maris Erythraei 1–16 75. 15

251–252, 252. 36

Philostratos Life of Apollonios 4.8.1 247. 24 Lives of the Sophists 486 58. 77 493–494 247. 24 500 247. 24 531 247. 24 539 58. 77 557 150. 111 602–603 247. 24 Photios Library 58 (17b 17–20) 110 (460b)

120. 79 75. 15

Pindaros Nemean Odes 6.1–2

220. 19

fr. 57 Maehler

143. 77, 143. 79, 209. 100, 231. 46

344

Index of References

Plato Kratylos 396a 400a 413c

134. 34 187. 32 187. 32

Lakhes 188d

184. 25

Laws 710d–e 715e–716a

51. 51 145. 89

Parmenides 140b 145a

38. 59 38. 59

Phaidon 97c

187. 32

Phaidros 245c 247a

255. 47 228. 39

Politikos 262d–e 273b

106. 40 160. 10

Protagoras 322a

112. 56

Respublica 3.415a

219. 19

Timaios 29e–32c 30b 35a–37c 48e–53c 69c–70d

160. 10 251. 34 161. 13 160. 10 161. 13

Horoi (Ps.–Plato) 414b

251. 34

Plato’s Theaitetos, Commentator on 54.43–55.13 252. 36

Pliny the Elder Natural History 1 Table of Contents 158. 2 2.1–4 158. 2 2.2 158. 2 2.13 158. 2 2.27 158. 2 7.97 76. 17 27.3 30. 40 Pliny the Younger Letters 10.33–34 10.34.1 10.40.1 10.76 10.96.2–3 10.96.5–6 10.96.7

241. 10 58. 76 174. 2 174. 2 174. 2 174. 2 58. 76

P.Lond. See Papyri Londinienses Ploteinos Enneads 3.8.9–10 4.8.3 6.2.9 6.9.5

38. 60 38. 60 38. 60 38. 60

Plutarch mor. 12a 20c 25c 37e 43d 45e 46b 69f 70b–c 70b 70c 80b 84c 86c 86d 87e 90b

44. 7 44. 8 159. 5 81. 28 159. 6 183. 22 81. 28 94. 8 53. 59 44. 7 44. 8 44. 9 44. 9 44. 9 94. 8 44. 6 94. 8

Index of References 90c 92a 94d 96d–e 96e 104c 104e 108c–d 108e 108f 111d 112a 113a 113c 113f 116a 117d 119d 119f 123d 128d–e 132a 135a–b 135b 136d 138b 140e–f 141b 141e 142f 144b–c 144c 145a 152b 153d 154c 154f 156c 165b 166d 166e 167f 168a 170f–171a 171a–b 172b 176d

94. 8 44. 8 44. 8 54. 62 44. 7 54. 63 94. 8 54. 63 128. 14 94. 8 142. 76 129. 15 100. 20 94. 8 74. 9 99. 15 94. 8, 99. 15, 138. 55 100. 19 153. 131, 161. 13 73. 5 153. 132 153. 131 94. 8 81. 28 73. 5, 153. 132 54. 60, 100. 17 54. 63 54. 60 44. 7 54. 60 53. 59 44. 7 44. 7 94. 8 153. 132 74. 9 100. 19 52. 56 128. 14 78. 19, 128. 14, 142. 76 44. 7 bis 94. 8 94. 8 128. 14 158. 3 73. 5 73. 6

180b 189d 190f 194b 196f–197a 222d 228c 232c 242f 246b–c 246b–d 249d 254a 264a 264c 265d 266b 267c 268d 269a 269f 270a 271e 272d–e 273a 276a 277f 279a 279d 283f–284a 285e 286a 303a–b 316c–e 316e–f 316e–317a 316e–317c 316e 317a–c 317b–c 318a 321e 321f 322e–323a 322e 323f–324a 326b 327d–e 327d

345 100. 19 74. 7 73. 5 45. 14 78. 19 100. 20 44. 7 81. 28 100. 17 45. 12 45. 12 44. 7 bis 44. 7 bis 135. 40 84. 42 81. 28 44. 8 46. 15 153. 131 160. 9 129. 15 135. 42 54. 63 129. 15 94. 8 94. 8 73. 5 94. 8 74. 9 129. 15 129. 15 138. 54 73. 5 80. 25 78. 19, 159. 6 161. 13 78. 19 bis. 176. 4 73. 6, 159. 5 167. 26 99. 15 78. 19 80. 25 100. 19 72. 4 81. 28 99. 15 94. 8 81. 30 99. 15

346 328b 328e 329a–d 329a–b 329a 329b–e 329b–330e 329d–f 330a 330b 330c 330d–e 330d 330e 331c 332a–c 335f 336c 338d 342a 343d 344a–c 344f 345d 348f–349a 350b 351c 352a 354d 354f 355e 356b 359f 360a 360d–e 361a–c 361c 362b–c 362b 362e 364e 365a 369a–d 369b 369c 369d 370c–371a

Index of References 99. 15 99. 15 65. 94 99. 16 100. 18 81. 30 99. 16 54. 61, 100. 17 73. 5, 81. 30 73. 5 100. 19 100. 18 81. 30, 94. 8, 167. 26 54. 61 100. 18 99. 16 99. 16 74. 7 100. 17 99. 16 100. 20 102. 25 100. 19 74. 7 100. 19 80. 27 129. 17 128. 14 128. 14 129. 16, 135. 41 142. 77 78. 19 99. 15 128. 14 129. 15 129. 15 153. 131 142. 76 94. 8, 128. 14, 130. 18 bis 129. 15 129. 17 142. 77 159. 5 99. 15 159. 5 129. 15, 142. 76 160. 10

370e 371e 373a–d 375c 377c–378d 377c 377f 377f–378a 377f–378d 378c 378e 381d 381f 382a–b 384d–394c 385d–f 387b–c 387b 387e 387f–388a 388a–e 388d–e 388f 389c–390c 389f–390a 390d 392a 393a–b 393a–c 393b–c 393e–f 399d 402b 403e 404b 404e 407d–408c 408b–c 408f 409c 409e–410a 410c 412a 413c 413f–414a 413f 414a

135. 41 142. 77 160. 9 128. 14 128. 14 99. 15 94. 8 142. 76 99. 15 99. 15 142. 76 142. 77 128. 14, 129. 16, 135. 41 128. 14, 142. 76 129. 16 135. 40 161. 13 154. 134 94. 8 135. 40 135. 40 160. 9 129. 16, 135. 41 135. 40 159. 8 135. 40 129. 16 211. 107 129. 16 bis 135. 41 142. 76, 146. 89, 160. 9 80. 25, 100. 19 128. 14 81. 28 138. 55 138. 55 80. 26 43. 3 100. 20 80. 26 78. 19 74. 8 100. 20 142. 77 81. 29 45. 12 81. 29, 100. 19

Index of References 414d 415a–b 415a 415a–421e 416b 416e–f 416e 419e 420a 420b 421f–431a 422f–423a 423c–424c 424a–b 424e 425f–426a 426a 428e–429a 429c–e 429d–430a 430a 430e–f 430e 431a–438d 436a 436f 439c 439d–e 439e 441e–f 441e–442a 450e 451b 465f 466d 467e 473c–e 473f 474a 474b 474f–475a 474f 477c 478a–481e 478d–f 478f–479a 478f–479c 479c

94. 8 129. 15 54. 62, 139. 58 129. 15 135. 40 139. 58 159. 6 73. 5 128. 14 145. 89, 159. 8 159. 8 159. 5 159. 8 159. 7, 159. 8 160. 9 bis, 160. 10 159. 8 142. 77, 159. 5, 244. 18 135. 42 135. 40 135. 40 159. 7 159. 8 54. 62 129. 15 159. 6 142. 76 44. 8 54. 60, 73. 6 54. 60, 100. 17 159. 5, 159. 6 161. 13 153. 132, 154. 134 94. 8 54. 64 159. 8 73. 5 154. 135 159. 5 159. 5 154. 135 78. 19 74. 7 142. 77 153. 131 153. 131 44. 6, 54. 63 52. 55 153. 132

480a–b 480b–c 481a 481c 481e 481f–491b 483a 483d–f 484a 484b 486a–b 488c–d 488c 489b 490b 490d–f 493d–e 494d–f 495a 498c–d 503d 504e 505a 506c 506f–507a 508a 508b 511b–c 511c 519a 521c 522e 532e 540e 540f 542c 544c 545d 548c 549d 549e 550a 550d 550e–f 553d 555f 558f–559c 561a 566e

347 44. 6 52. 55 52. 55 52. 55, 153. 131 94. 8 52. 55 44. 7 44. 6 73. 5 45. 13 44. 9 74. 7 46. 15 44. 8 46. 15 bis 52. 55 153. 132 46. 15 94. 8 94. 8 44. 7 44. 7, 52. 56 100. 19 74. 9 135. 42 73. 5, 73. 6 73. 6 53. 58 44. 7, 46. 14 160. 9 44. 7 73. 5 100. 19 45. 14 78. 19 73. 6 99. 15 81. 28 129. 15 138. 55 129. 15 138. 56, 142. 77 bis 44. 7, 160. 10 45. 14 45. 12 99. 15 45. 13, 54. 60 245. 19 73. 5

348 568a 591b 600f 601a–b 601b 601c 602b 602c 602d 604a 604c 604d 605c–d 605e 608c 609e 611f 613e 616e–617a 618b–c 618b 618d 620e–f 621d 626c 636f 643b 644c 646d 671b 679c–d 679c 679d–e 697c 702e 704f 707c 708c 713e–f 714a–b 714c 714d 718a 719c 719d–e 720a–c 720b–c 726e 731d

Index of References 100. 19 135. 43 114. 61 142. 76, 145. 89 142. 77, 154. 134 78. 19 44. 8 73. 5, 81. 29 78. 19 81. 29 54. 64 54. 64 45. 12 100. 20 54. 63 44. 8 245. 19 45. 12 52. 56 55. 68, 161. 13 142. 77 45. 13 52. 56 52. 56 54. 62 244. 18 54. 63 55. 68 153. 132 153. 132 54. 63 101. 21, 139. 57 130. 18 bis 54. 63 138. 54 94. 8 54. 63 130. 18 bis 44. 9 100. 19 81. 28 100. 19 142. 77 142. 76 160. 10 160. 10 142. 76 54. 63 245. 19

740b–c 745b 745e 746a–c 746a 746c 746d 748e–771e 751c–e 752c 757c–d 757c 758d 762e 763c 763f 765f 766a 766b 766e 768d–e 769a 769f–770a 770a 770c 777f 778a 778c 778d 778e–f 779a 779b 779d 780a 781f 783c 783e–f 784a 784b 784d 784f 787e 788e 789d 789f 790a

159. 7 78. 19, 159. 5, 159. 7 245. 19 158. 3 55. 67, 78. 19, 159. 7 44. 8 44. 7 129. 17 153. 132 54. 60, 100. 17 139. 57 45. 13, 54. 60, 100. 17 101. 21, 139. 57 99. 15 128. 14 45. 13, 54. 60 245. 19 245. 19 245. 19 245. 19 100. 20 142. 76 45. 13, 54. 60 100. 17 54. 60, 100. 17 54. 64 44. 7 78. 19 73. 5 138. 55 45. 12, 55. 68 54. 64 73. 6, 81. 28 74. 7 145. 89 54. 65 55. 67 81. 28 81. 28 81. 28 bis 80. 26 54. 64 44. 8 138. 56 74. 9 74. 9

Index of References 791b–c 791c 791e 792d–e 792f 793a–b 794a 794d 795a–c 795d 796a 796d–e 796d–f 797e 798a–806b 801e 804a–b 805a–b 805a–e 805a 805d–e 805f 806e–f 806f–807a 807c 808c 809d–e 809e 811d 812b 812d 813a 813b 813c 813d–e 813e 814c–d 814e–815c 814e–f 814e 815b 816a–b 816a 817c–d 817d 818a 819b–c 819c 819d–e

54. 66 81. 28 99. 15 55. 67 138. 56 153. 131 44. 9, 54. 65 54. 66 44. 9 81. 28 54. 65 81. 28 55. 67 54. 66 53. 57 81. 28, 138. 56 45. 12 31. 42, 43. 3 81. 28 73. 5 45. 14 81. 28 44. 7 44. 6 142. 77, 231. 46 44. 7 55. 68 53. 57 142. 77 54. 64 54. 64 44. 8 bis 55. 68 153. 131 31. 42, 73. 5, 80. 27 65. 93 46. 15 45. 11 73. 5 73. 5 53. 57 45. 10 44. 7, 73. 6 55. 68 54. 64 81. 28 44. 9 183. 22 138. 56

819d 823c 823e–f 823f–824a 824c–825f 824c–d 824c 824d–825a 824e–825c 825d–f 830b 856d 858e–f 925e–f 926c 926d–927a 926f–927a 927a–b 927a 927d–e 927d 927e–f 928a–c 928b 938d 939a–b 942a 943d–e 946e–f 949e 951d–e 951d 963a 963c 963d 974a 979f–980a 980a 981b 981c 990c 995b–e 996b–c 999b 1000e–f 1000e–1001c 1001a–b 1002a

349 45. 13 81. 28 138. 56 44. 8, 153. 132 53. 57 81. 28 73. 5, 100. 20 31. 42 45. 12 44. 9 138. 56 100. 19, 100. 20 74. 9 159. 5 153. 132 158. 3 54. 62, 160. 10 142. 77 142. 77, 158. 3 154. 134 160. 9 bis 153. 132 153. 131 153. 131, 159. 5 78. 19 159. 7 138. 56 253. 40 54. 62, 145. 89, 160. 9 73. 5 160. 10 54. 62 94. 8 74. 9 153. 132 73. 5 54. 62 55. 68 54. 62 54. 62 46. 15 153. 132 94. 8 94. 8 142. 76 138. 54 142. 77 135. 40

350 1003a 1003e–f 1007d–e 1017d–1022c 1025a 1026b 1029d 1030b 1034a 1034c 1035a–e 1035b–d 1043a–b 1043c 1050a–b 1050a–e 1051b–d 1055d 1060e 1062c–d 1063d 1064b 1065a–b 1065e–f 1065e 1066b–c 1068c–f 1068e–f 1069a 1069c–1070b 1069f 1072c–e 1073c–d 1073d–1074d 1073e–1074a 1074c 1074e–1075c 1075a–b 1075a–c 1076f–1077a 1077e–1078e 1079a 1085b 1085d–1086b 1086c 1091e–f

Index of References 160. 12, 244. 18 135. 40 142. 76 135. 40 160. 12, 244. 18 159. 5 159. 7 145. 89, 160. 9 81. 28 250. 29 161. 12 160. 12 54. 64 73. 5 142. 76 160. 12 142. 76, 145. 89, 161. 12 145. 89, 159. 6, 161. 12 153. 132 154. 133 153. 132, 154. 133 73. 5 161. 12 139. 58, 142. 76 142. 77, 231. 46 161. 12 99. 15 55. 68 100. 19 154. 133 154. 133 154. 133 154. 133 160. 11 244. 18 100. 19 128. 14 130. 18 bis, 211. 107 126. 7 171. 35 159. 6, 160. 11 100. 19 99. 15 159. 6, 160. 11 153. 131 245. 19

1092a–b 1092a–c 1092a 1092c 1093a 1096d 1097d 1100b–d 1101c 1103a 1104b–c 1105b 1105c 1107d 1108c 1113f–1114a 1113f–1114d 1123a 1124e 1124f 1127e 1129b 1130a–b 1130b 1131c [Ps–Plu.] 1147a [Ps–Plu.]

154. 134 130. 18 153. 131 245. 19 99. 15 153. 131 100. 19 81. 28 130. 18 129. 15 245. 19 245. 19 245. 19 153. 131 55. 68 158. 4 160. 11 100. 19 55. 68, 138. 55 145. 89 54. 64 54. 61 101. 21 138. 54 99. 15 159. 7

Aemilius 35.1

101. 21

Agesilaos 5.5 20.4 33.4

45. 9, 160. 10 81. 28 44. 7, 73. 6, 81. 28

Agis 2.1–3 2.5 23.3

44. 9 153. 132 44. 9

Alexandros 27.10–28.1 28.1 47.8

99. 15 100. 20 54. 60, 100. 17

Alkibiades 16.1 41.5

81. 28 44. 9

351

Index of References Antonius 56.8

78. 19

Aratus 24.5–6 31.2 49.2

45. 14 55. 68 81. 28

Brutus 4.1 56.8

74. 7, 80. 25 55. 68

Caesar 12.2 15.5 23.3 23.6 58.7

46. 15 100. 19 84. 41 46. 15 84. 41

Camillus 9.2

44. 8

Cato maior 6.4 11.4 24.11

74. 7 54. 64 54. 65

Cato minor 71.2 Cicero 4.3 40.1 49.6

54. 64 81. 28 129. 15

Comp.Arist.Cat.Ma. 1.3 73. 5 Comp.Demetr.Ant. 1.3 74. 8

Comp.Lys.Sulla 1.6

81. 28 81. 28 73. 6

Comp.Per.Fab. 3.7

72. 4

Comp.Thes.Rom. 2.3

73. 5

Coriolanus 3.3 7.4 15.4 35.5

138. 56 46. 15 81. 28 44. 6

Demetrios 1.7 3.2 3.3 42.10

73. 5 52. 55 73. 6 138. 56

Demosthenes 15.3

81. 28

Dion 1.1 10.2

100. 19 160. 10

Eumenes 20.2

100. 19

Flaminius 12.6

45. 14

Galba 1.4 1.8 2.1 5.2 6.3–4 13.3 18.4 29.1

74. 7 73. 5 73. 5 73. 5 74. 7 73. 5 73. 5 74. 7

Kimon 2.5

94. 8

44. 8

Comp.Agis.Kleom.TG.CG 2.1 81. 28

Comp.Kim.Luc. 2.5

2.1 2.3 5.5

74. 7

74. 7

352

Index of References

Lucullus 38.2 45.4

81. 28 45. 14

Lykourgos 27.6 27.8 29.1 31.1–3

167. 26 81. 28 78. 19 78. 19 78. 19

Lysandros 12.5

78. 19

Romulus 1.1 28.10 33.3–4 35.2

80. 25 129. 15, 153. 132 100. 19 54. 61

Solon 12.9 20.1 29.2 32.1

45. 13 55. 68 45. 14 101. 21

Sulla 6.9

46. 15

Themistokles 4.4 26.4 31.6

100. 20 100. 19 74. 7

Marius 1.4 46.1

101. 21 100. 20

Numa 20.3–12 20.4 25.1 26.7

167. 26 78. 19 44. 7 54. 60, 100. 17 46. 15

Otho 5.9–10 13.6 15.2

73. 5 46. 15 73. 5

Timoleon 2.2

Pelopidas 17.11 20.1

100. 20 100. 19

fragmenta (ed. Sandbach) 178 153. 132 204 54. 60

Perikles 1.1 3.2 6.1

46. 15 44. 7 161. 13

fragmenta incerta (ed. Bernadakis) p.23.21–23 153. 132 pp. 151.16–152.7 54. 60

Philopoimon 8.3 15.4

45. 14 160. 9

Phokion 3.6

81. 28

Pompeius 10.4 25.3–5 47.3 70.7

94. 8 100. 19 44. 6 54. 64

Tiberius Gracchus 8.7 52. 55 14.2 74. 9 20.1 44. 8

80. 27

Julius Pollux 1.152–153 8.134–135 8.152–154

247. 24 247. 24 247. 24

Polybios 1.3.7 1.3.9–10 1.4.1 1.4.6 23.14.1–4 31.26.1–31.28.11

71. 2 71. 2 95. 9 71. 2 78. 19 52. 55

353

Index of References Pompeius Trogus 29.2.2 41.1.1

401a 12–27 71. 2 71. 2

Poseidonios (ed. Edelstein/Kidd) fr. 4 164. 19 fr. 6 164. 19 fr. 8 164. 19 fr. 14 121. 83 fr. 51 256. 47 fr. 55 256. 47 fr. 80 256. 47 fr. 93 256. 47 fr. 99a 120. 81 fr. 106 156. 145 fr. 111 256. 47 fr. 141 256. 47 fr. 290 255. 47 Potamon

256

Pseudo–Aristotle, peri tou kosmou 391b 9–12 167. 27 391b 11 168. 29 392a 6–9 172. 40 392b 30–393a 9 172. 40 394b 10–12 167. 27 396a 28–32 167. 27, 244. 15 396a 33–397a 5 170. 33 396b 4–7 80. 24, 246. 21 396b 28–397a 2 167. 27 396b 34–397a 5 244. 15 397a 3–5 167. 27 397a 5–14 167. 27 397a 19–24 167. 27 397a 19–397b 8 244. 15 398a 6–398b 28 142. 75 398a 27–398b 1 80. 24, 246. 21 chapters 6–7 144. 88 398b 7–11 167. 27 398b 8 144. 88 398b 28–399a 12 142. 75 399a 15–24 161. 14 399a 15–30 142. 75 399b 12–19 80. 24, 246. 21 400b 6–9 161. 14 400b 7–35 142. 75 400b 27 119. 76 401a 130. 20

SB 5.8444.2.7

134. 34, 212. 110, 244. 16

96. 9

Secundus (ed. B. Perry) p.74.22–76.1 158. 2 p.78.11–15 158. 2 Seneca Letters 12.10–11 21.7–9 117.6

250. 30 250. 30 253. 40

On foresight 5.5

113. 59

On mercy 1.4.2

30. 40

On nature 2.45

144. 87

Sextus Empiricus Against the Mathematicians 7.155–157 252. 36 Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.235 252. 38 SIG3 985

192. 49

SNG Aulock no. 1940

60. 83

Solon fr. 5 West

59. 81

Sophokles Oidipous at Kolonos 1333 101. 21 Souda, The s.v. Σέξστος

150. 111

354 Stobaios Eklogai 2.8.30 3.20.60 4.27.23 4.44.60 4.44.66

Index of References Sylloge inscriptionum religionis Isiacae et Sarapiacae (ed. L. Vidman) 357 144. 84 363 124. 2 389 124. 2 769 124. 2

121. 82 148. 104 110. 52 148. 104 121. 82

Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 1.262 99. 16 2.380 160. 11 2.465 160. 11 2.525 160. 11 2.527 121. 83 2.528 121. 83 2.636 139. 58 2.641 144. 85 2.645 171. 35 2.937 160. 12 2.1129–1130 162. 15 2.1176 160. 12 2.1178 145. 89, 161. 12 2.1181 161. 12 3.1 147. 98 3.43 98. 14 3.144 148. 104 3.191 113. 59, 137. 47 3.333 139. 58 3.338 139. 58 3.339 139. 58 3.578–580 96. 11 Strabon 1.2.2, C15 116. 69 6.4.2, C286–287 70. 1 12.4.7, C565 57. 73 17.3.24–25, C839–840 Suetonius Claudius 25.4 28

174. 2 175. 3

Nero 16.2

174. 2

Vespasian 8.4

69. 104

70. 1

Synesios of Kyrene 1.3 Lamoureux 131. 22 Tacitus Agricola 42.1

83. 35

Annales 4.33 12.60.4 15.44.2 15.44.4 15.45.1–2 16.23.1

85. 43 175. 3 174. 2 174. 2 76. 17 76. 17

Historiae 5.9.3

175. 3

Thucydides 1.122.2 3.40.2 6.17.4

49. 37 77. 18 49. 37

Valerius Maximus 4.4 Praef. 52. 55 Virgil Aeneid 6.792 6.835

223. 26 223. 26

Georgics

28. 36

Xenophon of Ephesos Ephesiaka 4.3.3 144. 84 5.13.4 144. 84 Zosimos of Panopolis Genuine Memoirs 1.7 (p.3.56 Mertens) 193. 52

Index of Subjects Acratus 76 Adam 217 Aemilius Paullus 77 Agatharkides 75. 15 Ailios Aristeides 34, 34. 50, 49–51, 59– 62, 68–69, 76–78, 81–90, 105–107, 131–132, 139–140, 143, 166–167, 170–173, 176, 232, 236, 241–243, 245, 248 Akhaia (Roman province) 200–201 Albinos 250 Alexander III of Makedon 6. 6, 41, 54, 65, 73. 5, 75, 78, 81, 86, 90, 91, 99– 100, 102 Alexandria (Egypt) 66, 76, 178 Alkinoos 250–251 Ancient Greek Alliances 16–17 Ancient Greek Confederacies 17 Antiokhos of Askalon 38, 38–39. 61, 251–253 Antiphon the sophist 91, 91–92. 1 Antisthenes 126–127 Antoninus Pius 28–29, 29. 38, 85, 89, 92 Antonius Felix 175. 3 Apameia 64, 76, 101 apatheia 43 Apocalypse 177 Apollonios 189, 205 ‘Apologists’, the 35, 35. 53 ‘Apostolic Fathers’, the 35, 35. 53 Aratos of Kilikia 230–231 Aratos of Sikyon 45 Aristotle 123, 125–126 Army, Roman 84, 92 Arrianos 32–33, 33. 47, 99. 16 Artemis 123 Asia (Roman province) 44, 56, 174 Asklepios 123–124, 136, 139–140, 143, 152, 245 Athenagoras 157. 1, 177, 206–207, 217, 234–235, 244, 248. 27

Athene 131 Athens 45, 47, 49–51, 57–59, 62, 86, 105 Attikos 250 Augustus 28, 28. 37, 30, 30. 40, 51, 52. 55, 66, 70, 71. 1, 73. 5, 75, 76. 16, 90. 59, 176–177, 223. 26 Avidius Cassius 79, 80. 23 Barnabas, Letter of 180. 14, 185, 202– 203, 254–255 Benefactions 179 Bithynia (Roman province) 44, 48–49, 56, 104 Body metaphor 86. 48, 109, 236, 244 Borysthenes 170 Brutus, M. Iunius 120 1 Clement 157. 1, 178–179, 197. 61, 201, 201–202. 73, 203, 206. 88, 212–213, 225–226, 236, 248. 27 2 Clement 215, 215. 3, 244–245. 18 Caesar, C. Iulius 28, 28. 37, 46, 54, 80 Caesars, Roman 43, 61–62, 66–67, 76, 78, 80–81, 102–103, 112. 56, 174, 175. 2, 176 Caracalla 88 Cassius Dio 79–80, 88 Cato, M. Porcius 120 Christian citizenship 178–180, 212– 213, 220 Christian union with Christ 227–232, 237 Christian church, unity of the 184–195, 231–232 Church, universal 7, 184–185 Cicero 103–104, 163–164, 172, 177 Cilicia (Roman province) 44 Claudius 69, 116. 69, 174, 222 Claudius Apollinaris 176. 5, 186 Clement of Alexandria 26–27, 35–36, 180–184, 189–190, 193–194, 205,

356

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209–211, 219–220, 225, 228–229, 231–236, 238–239, 244, 247. 25, 256. 49 Commodus 28, 29. 38, 79, 89, 90. 59, 93, 177, 242, 248. 27 Common possessions 180–183 Community of spouses 182 CONCORDIA coins 92, 92. 2 Cornutus, L. Annaeus 253 Cosmopolitanism 100. 18, 110–111, 116. 69, 117. 72, 118–122, 239, 245, 249 Council of Jerusalem 7 Council of the Areopagos 92, 218, 223 Cynics 96, 105. 36, 255

Epicureans 100. 19, 131, 144–145, 158– 160, 164–165, 250, 254–256 Epikouros 158, 254 Epiktetos 32–33, 36, 40, 43, 71–72, 74, 79, 96–99, 110–114, 132, 136–137, 144, 146–149, 153, 156, 162–164, 168–169, 176, 180, 226–227, 232, 236–237, 240, 242–250 Epiphanes (gnostic Christian) 182 Eratosthenes 116. 69 eris (strife) 44, 48–51, 49. 34, 61, 179 Euripides 158–159, 238 European Union 3–5, 12–13 Eusebios 174–175. 2, 188, 203. 79 Evangelical Alliance (G.B.) 17–22

Dacia 93 Decius 175. 2 Deissmann, G.A. 13, 13. 16 Delphoi 80 Didakhe, The 185. 28 Diodoros Sikeliotes 71, 94–95, 176 Diogenes Laertios 164 Diogenes of Apollonia 37 Diogenes of Oinoanda 122, 142–143. 79 Diogenes the Cynic 113–114, 137 Diognetos, Letter to 179, 206. 87, 214– 215 Dion of Prousa 33, 33. 48, 43. 3, 46–49, 55–59, 63–68, 75–78, 82, 85, 95, 101–105, 130–131, 136–139, 142– 143, 154, 156, 157, 161–162, 170– 173, 176, 231. 45, 232, 236–237, 240–242, 245–246, 248–249, 253. 41, 256–257 Dionysios of Corinth 186, 203–204 Domitian 73. 5

Flamininus, T. Quinctius 45 Fronto, M. Cornelius 117, 117. 72 Führer, Christian 14, 14. 18

Earth Summit (Rio) 10–11, 11. 13 Economic status of early Christians 32, 32. 45 Ecumenical movement 7–14, 39–40 Education 52–53, 168–169 ekhthra (enmity) 44, 46–48 Empedokles 37, 37.57, 235 Epameinondas of Thebes 45, 58 Ephesos 42. 2, 49, 60–61, 62. 85, 241, 248

Galba 76. 16 Galenos 126–127 Glory 93 Gnostic Christians 181–182, 188–190, 205–208 God, gods 95, 97–98, 101, 103, 107. 43, 109, 111–116, 111–112. 56, 118– 119, 121–122, 125–134, 158–159, 211–212 God, uniqueness of 134–135, 205–212 God, unity of 205–212, 256 God and the universe 142–146, 243, 245, 256 Gods and humans 97–98, 111, 121–122, 136–141, 225–232, 256 Gods, harmony among 136 Gorgias of Leontinoi 53, 53. 59 Gracchi brothers 51 Greek cities and harmony 39–40, 243 Greek/barbarian division 27, 83, 89. 57, 91, 93, 96, 99–100, 104–106, 117– 118, 217. 9, 219–221, 224, 234–236 Hadrian 83. 36, 89–90, 95, 96. 9, 174 Hannibal 51 harmonia 49–50, 60, 82–84, 82. 33, 84. 41, 101, 158–161, 166–167, 170, 234 Harmony among the gods 136

Index of Subjects Harmony among worlds 159 Harmony of opposites 160, 168–170, 172–173, 239 Harmony with nature 109, 146–154, 245, 247 Hegesippos 186, 203–205, 203. 78 Hellenism 36, 36. 55, 42, 66–67 Helvidius Priscus 120 Herakleitos of Ephesos 36–37, 53, 112. 56, 117. 72, 123, 158–159, 164. 19, 169. 32 Herakles 102 Hermetic writers 31–32, 82, 124–125, 134–135, 140–141, 145–146, 154– 156, 157, 167–168, 170, 225–226, 232, 236–237, 243–244, 253, 256 Hierokles 110 Hippokratic corpus 92. 1 Homer 75, 82, 87–88, 101, 137, 241, 254 homonoia 44–53, 55, 57–65, 68–69, 78, 80, 87, 97. 13, 99, 101–102, 162, 166–167, 170–173, 183, 220, 226– 227, 233–234, 239, 241, 245, 247– 249 homonoia coins 92. 2 Humankind, unity of 9–10, 10–11. 12, 16, 16. 21, 39–40, 75–78, 81, 83, 90, 94–110, 115–118, 124–125, 214– 225, 236–237, 245, 247–248, 256 Humans united with god(s) 124–125, 136–141, 218, 225–232, 237, 244, 246–247 Humans united with universe 124–125, 154–156, 256 Ignatios of Antioch 178, 181, 183–185, 197–199, 201–203, 221, 226–227, 231, 237, 248. 27 Imperial cult 62, 66 Iosephos (Josephus) 43. 3, 95, 238. 2, 253–254 Irenaeus 35, 35. 53, 177, 180, 187–190, 193, 195, 203–205, 207–208, 217– 218, 224–225, 227–228, 231–236, 238–239, 243–245, 251 Isis 123, 124. 2 Jesus of Nazareth 174–175

357

Jewish wisdom literature 156 Jews 174, 175. 3, 184, 192. 48, 193, 203. 78, 205–206, 210, 212, 238, 253–254 Justin Martyr 175. 2, 177–178, 181, 186–187, 195, 205–206, 208. 95, 212, 214–217, 225–227, 232, 236– 237, 244, 245. 18 Karpokratians 182 kata phusin 126, 146–147, 150, 153– 154 kataleptic impressions 251 Kelsos 254–255 Khairemon 253–254 Khrysippos 126–127, 145, 147. 98, 148–149, 160 Kimon of Athens 45, 49–50 Klotho 152 koina, Greek 17, 17. 23, 87 koinonia 45, 53–55, 99–103, 107–109, 118, 136–141, 158–160, 171, 173, 228–229, 231–232, 239, 243, 246– 248 Kolotes 158 Lausanne Movement 8, 8. 9, 22–23 League of Arab States 8–9, 9. 10 League of Nations 1, 5–6 Lesbos 51, 58 ‘linen–workers’ 56–57 Livia Augusta 90. 59 Loukianos 68, 74, 256. 49 Lucius Verus 41. 1, 62, 79, 79–80. 23, 92, 136 Lusimakhos 253–254 Lykourgos of Sparta 46 Magoi, myth of the 162 Makedonia (Roman province) 200–201 Manethon 253–254 Marcomannic Wars 93 Marcus Aurelius 26, 27. 35, 34, 34. 51, 36, 62, 72, 74, 79–80, 89, 90. 59, 92–93, 107–109, 114–117, 132–133, 136, 139, 144, 149–153, 156, 157, 164–166, 171–172, 177, 180, 232, 233, 242–246, 248, 250. 33 Markion 186, 206, 208

358

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Martyrdom of Polykarpos 185, 193– 194, 202, 225 Melissos 37 Meliton of Sardis 208 Middle Platonism 38, 38–39. 61, 40, 125–126, 129. 16, 156, 217, 238, 244–245, 250–256 Minicius Fundanus, C. 174 Minucius Felix 182 Moesia, Upper 93 Monad, the 135, 156 Monotheism 123–135, 156, 245 Musical metaphors 82–83, 82. 33, 145, 159, 234, 236 Musonius Rufus 95, 105, 121, 148–149 Nemesis 123 Nero 71, 76, 90 New Testament 133, 176–180, 182– 184, 189–195, 199–201, 204–205, 209–212, 214, 220–224, 230–231, 235–237, 247 Nikaia 57, 63, 101, 249 Nikomedeia 63, 101, 249 Noumenios of Apameia 251, 254 Odysseus 50, 101 oikeiosis 97, 97–98. 13, 103–104, 115– 116 oikoumene 70. 1, 72, 75–78, 81–85, 89– 90, 105. 38, 106, 177 Old Testament 216–217, 229, 238–239 ‘One World’ slogan 24–26, 40 Organisation of African Unity 2–3, 15, 15–16. 20 Origen 233. 53 Otho 73. 5 Panaitios of Rhodes 104. 32 Pantainos 178 para phusin 146–147, 150–153, 243 Parmenides 37, 37. 58, 158, 160 Paul of Tarsos 180, 200, 230 Pausanias 88. 56 pax Romana 30–31, 30.40, 43, 52, 66– 67, 240, 242, 244, 251, 256 Peisistratos 45 Pergamon 41–42, 49, 60–61, 241, 248 Perikles of Athens 49–50

Peripatetic thought 251–252 Periplous of Eruthraian Sea 75 Persian empire 86 Persian Wars 31, 31. 42 Persuasion (Peitho) 54–55 philia, philoi 44, 46–47, 49, 52, 52. 56, 55, 58–59, 61, 63–64, 70, 98, 101, 162, 166, 170–171, 173, 218, 227, 245. 20 Philip II of Makedon 53 Philon of Alexandreia 218. 13, 229. 41, 238 Philon of Larisa 251–252, 252. 36 philonikia 47, 47. 22, 49–50 Philosophical traditions, merging of 243, 250–256 Philostratos 247 phusikai ennoiai 250 Pindaros 219–220. 19, 231. 46 Plato 37–38, 38. 59, 49–50, 125–127, 134. 34, 138. 51, 143–144, 156, 219, 235, 250–251, 255–256 Pliny the elder 157–158 Pliny the younger 174, 181 Ploteinos 38, 38. 60 Plutarch 31. 42, 33, 33–34. 49, 42–46, 50. 41, 51–55, 65, 72–74, 77–78, 80–81, 90, 99–101, 117, 126. 7, 128–130, 135–139, 142, 144–145, 153–154, 156, 157–161, 176, 236, 242–246, 248, 250, 252–256 Polemon of Athens 252 polis (Greek city) 42–43, 48, 54–55, 61–62, 162, 169–171, 242, 249 Polybios 70–71 Polykarpos of Smyrna 175. 2, 179, 181. 15, 185, 187–188, 197–199, 202– 203, 215 Polykrates of Ephesos 189, 195, 203– 205 Polytheism 125–133, 135–141, 245 Pompeius Magnus, Cn. 28, 46, 54, 76, 80 Pompeius Trogus 71 Pope Paul VI 13, 13–14. 17 Poseidonios 120, 235, 255–256 Potamon 255–256 Practicality of thought 248–249 ‘Presocratic’ philosophy 36–38

Index of Subjects prohairesis (moral purpose) 98 Protagoras 91, 92. 1 Prousa (in Bithynia) 46, 48, 57–59, 63– 64, 101, 249 Provincial governors 43, 48, 58, 60–61, 65. 93, 66–67, 70, 81–82, 83. 36 Pseudo–Aristotle, On the kosmos 35, 80, 133–134, 142, 156, 167, 172, 236, 242, 244–246 Pythagoras 135, 254 Rhodes 49, 59–60, 69, 69. 104, 248 Rhodon 189, 205, 208 Roman church 183, 186, 188–189, 195– 197, 201–204, 208 Roman empire as a unit 39, 50, 70–74, 177–178 Roman empire, unity of the 79–90, 176–178, 243, 245–248, 257 Roman government 40, 43, 49, 64–69 Romulus 54, 80 Sarapis 123, 124. 2–3, 129–130, 136 Scillitan Martyrs, Acts of the 175. 2 Scipio Africanus 77–78, 78. 19 Seneca 114. 62, 120, 144, 250, 253. 40 Serapion of Antioch 185–186, 192. 47, 195, 205 Severan dynasty 89, 93. 5 Severus, Claudius(?) 120 Sextus (Stoic) 150 Sextus Empiricus 252–253 Shepherd of Hermas, The 179, 183, 185, 206. 87 Smyrna 49, 60–62, 241, 248 Sokrates 114. 61 Sol Inuictus 29, 29. 39 Solon of Athens 45, 59 Sparta 45, 50–51, 73. 6, 74. 7, 86, 105, 240 stasis (factional conflict) 44–51, 53, 55–65, 69, 240–241, 247–248 Stoic thought 96. 11, 97–98. 13, 100. 19, 101, 101. 23, 118, 120–122, 125–126, 129–130, 138. 50, 142– 143. 79, 144–145, 150, 153–154, 155. 144, 156, 158, 160, 162–165, 170–172, 217, 229. 40, 233–234, 238, 241–245, 247. 25, 250–256

359

Strabon 70–72, 75, 90 sumpatheia 102, 102. 26, 162–165 sumphonia 139, 145, 147, 160, 168– 170, 184. 25, 234, 239. 5 sumposion/sumposia 52 sungeneia 97. 13, 100–101, 108, 111, 136–138, 227, 232, 246 tarakhe/tarakhai (disturbances) 50 Tarsos 43. 3, 46. 17, 55–57, 249 Tatianos (Tatian) 186, 206–207, 217– 218, 225, 227, 233. 53, 233–234, 236, 239, 244, 244. 14, 247. 25 Tertullian 177–178, 180–181, 182. 21, 184. 25, 190–195, 203–205, 211. 106, 220–221. 21, 225, 229–233, 235. 61, 236, 238–240 Thebes 45, 51, 58, 86, 240 Themistokles of Athens 49–50 Theophilos of Antioch 182, 188. 39, 208–209, 211, 219, 225 Theophilos of Caesarea 189, 195, 203 Theseus 58, 62 Thrasea Paetus 120 Tiberius 73. 5 Trajan 58, 63. 87, 67, 67. 99, 73. 5, 75, 89–90, 174, 181 Transmission of ideas 239, 244–247 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 26 United Nations Organisation 1–2, 14– 15 Unity movements 14, 27, 39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 11–12, 12. 14, 40 Universal state 93–94, 105. 36, 107– 109, 113–115, 119–121 Universe, citizen of the 93–94, 96–97, 107–117, 119–122 Universe, harmony of the 39, 48, 55. 69, 87, 101–102, 137–138, 157–168, 170–173, 233–237, 243–245, 247– 248, 257 Universe, renewal of 157 Universe and the city 169–173, 257 Valentinians 181. 15, 187–188, 205– 208, 211. 106 Vespasian 57–58. 75, 69, 69. 104, 73. 5

360

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Victor, bishop of Rome 188–189, 203– 204 Vienne and Lugdunum, Letter from 193–194, 203 Western European Union 3, 3. 4 Wilkie, Wendell L. 24–26 World Congress on Evangelism 15–16, 22 World Council of Churches 7–10

Xenophanes of Kolophon 164 Zenon of Kition 109. 48, 125–126, 252, 254 Zeus 96, 101. 21, 102–103, 113. 60, 121. 83, 123–124, 126. 7, 127–132, 134, 137–139, 142–144, 149, 161– 162, 166, 170, 242, 245–246