United States and Two Gulf Wars: Prelude and Aftermath 9781463215422

This incisive study by historian Lester Brune examines the background and implications of the two conflicts. Considering

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Table of contents :
Contents
Guide to Notes & Bibliography
Preface & Acknowledgements
1. Prologue
2. The First U.S.-Iraqi War
3. Policy of Containment 1991 to 2001
4. Preparing for War Again 2000-2003
5. The Second U.S.-Iraqi War
6. Searching for Banned Weapons & Reviewing the Intelligence Processes
7. Creating an Interim Iraqi Government
8. Internal Security & the Insurgency
9 Tribulations & Trials
10. Awe & Shock
11. Electing an Iraqi Government
12. Reverberations on the Home Front
13. Epilogue
Notes
Select Bibliography
Index
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United States and Two Gulf Wars: Prelude and Aftermath
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The United States and Two Gulf Wars

CONFLICT AND TRADE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 2

The United States and Two Gulf Wars Prelude and Aftermath

LESTER H. BRUNE

GORGIAS PRESS 2008

First Gorgias Press Edition, 2008 Copyright © 2008 by Gorgias Press LLC All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. Published in the United States of America by Gorgias Press LLC, New Jersey

ISBN 978-1-59333-591-5 ISSN 1941-6199

GORGIAS PRESS 180 Centennial Ave., Piscataway, NJ 08854 USA www.gorgiaspress.com

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standards. Printed in the United States of America

Contents Contents������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ v Preface & Acknowledgements ���������������������������������������������������  vii Selected Chronology������������������������������������������������������������������  viii Guide to Notes & Bibliography ���������������������������������������������������� x

1

Prologue ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1

2

The First U.S.-Iraqi War ����������������������������������������������������� 19

3

Policy of Containment 1991 to 2001 ����������������������������47

4

Preparing for War Again 2000-2003 ����������������������������71

5

The Second U.S.-Iraqi War ����������������������������������������������� 105

6

Searching for Banned Weapons & Reviewing the IntelligenceProcesses ����������������������� 133

7

Creating an Interim Iraqi Government ��������������������������� 155

8

Internal Security &the Insurgency  ��������������������������������� 185

9

Tribulations & Trials:

From Abu Ghraib to Saddam in the Dock ������������������������� 225

10 Awe & Shock:

Occupation & Reconstruction Costs ��������������������������������� 255

11 Electing an Iraqi Government  ����������������������������������������� 279 12 Reverberations onthe Home Front ����������������������������������� 303 13 Epilogue ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 325 Notes ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 333 Select Bibliography�������������������������������������������������������������������� 375 Index�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 385

Guide to Notes & Bibliography Abbreviations Used For Notes And Bibliography AAA American Arab Affairs ACT Arms Control Today AP Associated Press AWST Aviation Week and Space Technology BAS Bulletin of Atomic Scientists BW Business Week CD Congressional Digest CJR Columbia Journalism Review CQW Congressional Quarterly Weekly CQWR Congressional Weekly Quarterly FA Foreign Affairs FBIS NES Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East FP Foreign Policy IS International Security JOD Journal of Democracy LAT Los Angeles Times MEJ Middle East Journal MEI Middle East Insight MPI Middle East Policy NA Nation NI National Interest NR New Republic NREV National Review NW News Week NY New Yorker NYRB New York Review of Books NYT New York Times TI Time USNWR U.S. News and World Report WAJ Wall Street Journal WP Washington Post WPNW Washington Post National Weekly

Preface & Acknowledgements The positive reception given the publication of my book America and the Iraqi Crisis, 1990-1992 inspired me to continue researching events related to the troubled relations between the United States and Iraq.1 Like other scholars, I did not expected the United States to suffer the disasters of 9/11 or to subsequently invade Iraq. Rather, initially my focus was on the U.N. Security Council’s imposition of economic sanctions and its inspection team’s search for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Readers of this book may find the extensive endnotes for each chapter as well as the select bibliography useful to amplify particular events. Writing contemporary history is a joy but it requires me to thank the friendly staff at Bradley University’s Cullom-Davis Library. Also, I have sought to utilize the books and memoirs written soon after the events and they are cited in endnotes and bibliography. Last but never least, I wish to thank my friend and publisher Richard Dean Burns for his constant help with my book projects and my ever-patient wife Joan who helps me more than she knows. While these and other people have assisted me, I alone am responsible for any mistakes found in this volume. Lester H. Brune Professor of History Emeritus Bradley University

1

Prologue

M

odern Iraq emerged after World War I as an artificial state comprised of three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire that was home to three different ethnic and religious groups who were held together by forceful leaders. Arab Sunni Muslims occupied the central regions, Shiite Muslims dominated in the south and Kurdish (not Arab) Muslims prevailed in the north. The British attempted to unify the three regions under a political structure headed by a monarchy until it was overthrown in 1958. Later, the Sunni Arabs became the dominant force in Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s brutal dictatorship. From Hussein’s consolidation of power in 1979 to the aftermath of the Second U.S.-Iraq War of 2003, the Iraqi people have been subjected to more than twentyfive years of internal and external conflict.

Saddam Hussein’s Rise to Power Following the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War of June 1967, Iraq’s Baathist Party came to power under General Hassan al-Bakr who was assisted by Saddam Hussein al-Takriti. A large, physically strong man, Hussein was described as possessing “exceptional selfconfidence and a ruthless will to succeed.” After being little more than the leader of a gang of thugs, Hussein’s experiences during the 1958 revolution that overthrew King Faisal II showed him how political violence could achieve power by disposing of opponents. During the 1960s and 70s, he “single-handedly defined an entirely new form of Arab leadership, dependent neither on birth nor position nor assumption of religious authority but on the use of force and his personal skills in political manipulation…to exploit disorder and instability to his advantage.”1

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Al-Bakr became Iraq’s nominal president while Hussein headed Iraq’s important Department of Internal Security where he used his position to “purify” the Baath Party and the Iraqi military establishment by eliminating those who opposed him in what Samir al-Khalil called the “Republic of Fear.” Claiming they were spies for “Zionist and imperialists,” Hussein showed no tolerance for his opponents—driving some into exile while torturing or executing those who stayed. On this, as on future occasions, Hussein revealed a predilection for killing anyone he perceived as a threat. Finally on July 16, 1979, Hussein assumed power during a session of the Baath Party’s Revolutionary Council after President Bakr resigned for “health reasons” and the Council named Hussein as President of the Republic of Iraq. After taking charge, Hussein sought to establish himself as a dominant Arab figure and Iraq as a leading military power in the Middle East. He upgraded the army with aid from the Soviet Union, including modern tanks and artillery, and the air force with French Mirage fighter-bombers. Seeking the recognition of other Arab leaders, Hussein articulated many of their complaints against Zionists and Western imperialism and declared he would evict all their enemies.2 America’s first encounter with Iraq’s Baathist Party came in 1979 when Hussein persuaded members of the Arab League to ostracize Egypt because Anwar Sadat had signed the Camp David Accords. This 1978 agreement, engineered by President Jimmy Carter, had committed Egypt to make peace with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. In return, Egypt would regain the Sinai Peninsula that Israeli forces had occupied in 1967.3 Hussein’s assumption of power in July 1979 came barely five months after Iran’s Shiite cleric the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had deposed Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. After taking control in Iran, Khomeini labeled Hussein an atheistic leader and urged the Shiites in southern Iraq to overthrow Hussein and his Sunni Arab supporters. Arab leaders were shaken by Khomeini’s declaration on February 11, 1979, in which he said: “We will export our revolution to the four corners of the world because our revolution is Islamic.”4 Thus, Khomeini’s challenge to Hussein led other Sunni Arab rulers especially in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to support Hussein in opposing the new Iranian leader.5



Prologue

3

Like Saddam Hussein, President Jimmy Carter found himself at odds with Iran on November 4, 1979 when Iranian radicals took 60 Americans hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. A month later on December 28, the Soviet Union’s armed forces entered Afghanistan to protect Afghan communists from the threatening mujaheedin rebels. Given these unsettling Middle Eastern events, President Carter on January 23, 1980 warned both Moscow and Tehran that the Persian Gulf was a “vital American interest” and an attempt by any nation to gain “control of the Persian Gulf region” would be resisted by any means necessary “including military force.” Saddam Hussein rejected the “Carter Doctrine” and, on February 8, promulgated the “Hussein Doctrine” as a “Pan-Arab Charter” demanding all foreign powers leave the Persian Gulf.6

The Iraq-Iran War, 1980-1988 Hussein had two major grievances with Iran’s government. First, in 1975 when he was Iraq’s foreign minister, he had to yield to Tehran’s demand for a favorable realignment of their mutual frontier on the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Hussein’s concession of territory in the south was balanced by Iran’s agreement to end support of the Kurds who had rebelled against the Baghdad government. Secondly, Hussein came to realize in 1979 that he could never placate Khomeini. He had tried to mollify the Ayatollah by proposing a policy of “mutual respect and non-interference in internal matters” and by seeking to demonstrate that he was a true Muslim by his public prayers at Iraq’s Shiite shrines in Kajaf and Karbala. But Khomeini continued to denounce Hussein as an atheistic leader and urged Iraqi Shiites in Iraq to contest his authority. Speaking before Iraq’s National Assembly, Hussein demanded that Iran return the Shatt al-Arab just before he ordered the Iraqi army to invade Iran on September 22, 1980. Attempting to emulate Israel’s success during the June 1967 war, he launched Iraq’s Mirage fighter-bombers in a surprise attack against ten Iranian airfields hoping to destroy the Iranian air force. Hussein was disappointed as most of Iran’s planes not only survived, but struck back that same day against Iraqi air and naval forces as well as oil depots.

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Iraq’s surprise attack resulted in the army quickly occupying Iran’s Shatt al-Arab outlet and the southern Kuzistan province. Having achieved his initial objectives, Hussein, who had assumed command of Iraq’s forces, ordered the army to pause and prepare defensive positions expecting the disorganized Iranians would offer to negotiate. He was wrong. While Hussein correctly assessed Khomeini’s disruptive impact on Iran’s regular military forces, he miscalculated the Ayatollah’s ability to transfer religious zeal to young Iranians who volunteered for a holy war against the Iraqi infidels. By May 1981, the Iranians had regrouped and launched a counteroffensive. The tide began to shift in November as Iranian human wave attacks, carried out by untrained youths, challenged Iraqi minefields and machine gun fire. By the spring of 1982, Iranian forces had seized thousands of Iraqi prisoners and were preparing to attack Basra and Najaf in southern Iraq. Slowly recovering from the shock of Iran’s mass attacks, the Iraqi army began to erect layers of defense fortifications. Although the Iranians continued their offensive operations, they gained little new ground between 1982 and 1984, while suffering heavy casualties. The fighting had degenerated into a war of attrition. Iraq was in danger of losing the war due to financial pressures, primarily because it could no longer export its oil. Iran’s battlefield victories and Hussein’s financial plight prompted Sunni Arab leaders in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab oil states to loan Iraq large sums of money. Employing these new financial resources and playing on western fears of the Tehran government, Hussein soon obtained sophisticated military equipment from the Soviet Union, France, England and the United States.7 President Ronald Reagan sent Donald Rumsfeld to Baghdad on December 19, 1983, as his special representative to renew diplomatic relations with Iraq that had been broken in 1968. Rumsfeld asked Saddam Hussein how Washington might assist his military campaign against Iran. After their discussions, Rumsfeld cabled the White House that “the development of U.S.-Iraqi relations” could benefit America’s “posture in the region.”



Prologue

5

Following Rumsfeld’s visit to Baghdad, the U.S. Department of Defense sent Iraq 60 modern helicopters, satellite military intelligence, sophisticated technology for radios, graphic terminals, machine tools, computer mapping and tons of chemicals suitable for making mustard gas. At the same time, the U.S. Department of Commerce extended Iraq $1 billion in loans and credits for food, but Hussein diverted most of the loans to buy military weapons. In addition, France sent Iraq 64 Mirage fighter-attack planes and 30 interceptor air-borne Exocet missiles and Italy dispatched American-designed helicopters and anti-tank missiles. England provided desert-weight military uniforms, computer equipment and air defense material, while the Soviet Union sent Scud and Frog-7 missiles, T-72 tanks and MIG combat planes.8 American sales to Iraq increased from $571 million to $3.6 billion between 1983 and 1989. By 1986, the Pentagon’s attempt to stop “dual use” technology from being sold to Iraq was often overruled by the State and Commerce departments. A presidential administration suspicious of a ruthless thug would evaluate a “dual use” differently than an administration wanting to moderate a client state. Reagan’s policy reflected the latter decision, and it was continued under the first Bush administration until 2 August 1990. As Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) recalled in the mid-1980s, “our position was that Saddam was a good fellow we could work with.”9 The Iran-Contra Affair. While Reagan openly aided Iraq, his administration made secret deals with Iran to exchange weapons for the return of American hostages held by pro-Iranian rebels (Hezbollah) in Lebanon. In a so-called “Iran-Contra Scandal”, Reagan’s sales to Iran included 200 spare parts for Hawk antiaircraft missiles and 2,004 TOW anti-tank missiles. Some of the American arms were probably sold to Iran as early as 1981, but additional arms sales definitely took place after 1985. The Lebanese magazine Al-Shiraa disclosed the sales to Iran, on November 3, 1986, indicating that the profits from the sale were being used to illegally arm Nicaraguan Contra-rebels. According to Al-Shiraa, Reagan’s former National Security Council (NSC) Advisor Robert McFarlane, Oliver North and three other Americans

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visited Tehran in May 1985. They carried Irish passports and offered to send Hawk and TOW missiles to Iran if its Lebanese surrogate, Islamic Jihad, released its American hostages. Indeed, three hostages were released before November 3—Benjamin Weir, Lawrence Jenco and David Jacobsen. Initially, McFarlane called Al-Shiraa’s reports “fanciful” and President Reagan denied there was a deal with Iran. Reagan later insisted that the arms sent to Iran simply helped Iran to be a bulwark against the Soviets. He also claimed the weapons sent to Iran “could easily fit into a single cargo plane;” but this incorrect information was supplied by NSC Advisor John Poindexter. At a November 25 press conference, Reagan announced Poindexter had resigned and North was relieved of his NSC post. The president also said he believed “our policy goals to be well founded,” but “information brought to my attention yesterday convinced me that…implementation of the policy was seriously flawed in our efforts to get the hostages free.” When a reporter asked “Did you make a mistake in sending arms to Tehran?” Reagan replied “No, and I’m not taking any more questions.” Later reports indicated Iran paid Enterprise, a dummy corporation operated by Richard Secord and Albert Hakim, for the armaments. Enterprise received $48 million from the arms sale and private contributions, but its operations cost only $35.8 million. Of this amount, about $3.8 million was diverted to the Nicaraguan Contras by Oliver North and about $4.4 million was paid as “commissions” to Secord, Hakim and an associate Thomas Clines. The balance was in Swiss banks when Enterprise ceased operations in 1986. Reagan apparently permitted North to divert money to the Contras because Congress had approved Edward Boland’s amendment to the 1985 budget that prevented CIA and Defense Department funds being used directly or indirectly to support military operations to “overthrow the government” of Nicaragua. Reagan signed the law but his legal counsel, with dubious reasoning, claimed the law did not cover NSC actions.10 Warships Protect Gulf Traffic. When Iran’s 1982 offensive action forced Saddam Hussein to take defensive strategies, his offensive objective in 1984 was to strike at Iran’s oil tanker ships in the



Prologue

7

Persian Gulf and its oil facilities such as those on Kharq Island. Iran retaliated, often hitting Kuwaiti or Saudi Arabian shipping, because Iraq used other nation’s ships and pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia to export its oil. Both Baghdad and Tehran restrained their raids on Gulf shipping to avoid involving other Gulf States, the Soviet Union or the United States in the war. However, after an Iranian offensive thrust into southern Iraq in late 1986 that resulted in the capture of Fao, Iraq began more extensive air raids on Iran’s cities and its Gulf shipping. The capture of Fao brought Iran’s armies fifty miles from Kuwait’s borders and the attacks on Gulf shipping raised insurance rates on oil tankers, especially endangering Kuwait because it depended on oil shipments. Both Iran’s and Iraq’s activities now threatened the oil exports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to Europe and Japan.11 As the Gulf attacks increased in December 1986, Kuwait asked the U.S. to protect their ships from Iran by permitting them to fly the American flag. Kuwait also hedged on this request by asking Moscow permission to do the same. While Reagan delayed his response, the Soviet Union agreed to lease three Soviet tanker ships to Kuwait. Four days later, on March 7, 1987, Reagan announced that Kuwaiti ships could fly the U.S. flag. Some reports indicate Reagan agreed because Saudi Arabia and Kuwait threatened to sell their large holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds that could have caused chaos in the American economy. The Reagan administration’s tax cuts and huge defense expenditures depended on foreign purchases of U.S. bonds that in turn made the United States the world’s largest debtor nation.12 Whatever Reagan’s reasons for helping Iraq, the U.S. decision to aid Kuwait would isolate Iran. While Soviet and U.S. naval vessels protected Kuwaiti shipping, Britain, France and other nations sent an armada of naval vessels to the Gulf—especially minesweepers and escort ships—to join the array of U.S. Navy warships. Among the many Gulf incidents during 1987-1988, two were most notable. On May 17, 1987, an Iraqi jet plane fired a French Exocet missile that damaged the U.S. frigate, U.S.S. Stark, killing 37 U.S. sailors. Iraq apologized for the accident and Reagan told reporters that Iran was to blame because it refused to end the Gulf

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War.13 If Reagan’s reaction to the Stark incident demonstrated his support for Saddam Hussein, the second incident on July 3, 1988, showed the depths of American feelings against Iran. As an Iranian commercial airliner flew in an air corridor across the Gulf of Hormuz to Dubai, a U.S. Navy cruiser, the U.S.S. Vincennes, apparently mistook the Airbus for an Iranian combat plane and shot it down. Although many of the 290 passengers and crew were not Iranians, U.S. public opinion supported Congress in rejecting the idea of paying compensation to their families. However, on July 17, 1989, the Bush Administration offered to compensate each of the victims’ family a sum of $250, 000. Earlier, a U.S. Navy board claimed that the error on the Vincennes occurred because of combat stress experienced by its crew.14 Iraq Employs Chemical Warfare. In early 1984, an Iranian night attack resulted in the seizure of the Majnun Islands, near Basra. Despite numerous attempts the Iraqis could not dislodge the Iranians. One consequence of this episode was Saddam Hussein’s decision to disregard the Geneva Convention of 1925 that prohibited the use of chemical weapons. At plants in Salman Pak and Samarra, the Iraqis had produced mustard gas, a blistering agent first used in World War I, and Tabun, a nerve agent developed by the Nazis for use in gas chambers at concentration camps. For a variety of reasons, notably changing humidity and wind conditions, protective clothing and antidotes, chemical weapons are unreliable in combat situations as the Iraqis soon discovered. Because Iraq’s use of chemical weapons violated the Geneva Convention of 1925, UN inspectors toured the battlefields after the war in response to Iran’s complaints. Their report indicated Hussein had violated the ban and it turned many of his former supporters against him. While Hussein stopped using chemical weapons against Iran in 1987-1988, he used chemical agents against the Kurds in March 1988 at Halabjah. These gases were spread by Americansupplied Bell helicopters and were responsible for the deaths of about 5,000 Kurdish civilians. As late as July 1990, the first Bush administration continued the sale of advanced technology to Iraqi research facilities—technology that could be used in developing chemical and nuclear weapons.15



Saddam Hussein al-Takriti

Prologue

9

Dept. of Defense Photo

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Iraq-Iran War Ends. The eight-year war concluded principally because of the new military power that Saddam Hussein employed during the spring of 1988. Between March and July 1988, Iranian losses and Iraqi gains on the battlefields reached a point where they induced Ayatollah Khomeini to accept U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar’s offer of a cease-fire. Iraq had recaptured Fao on April 2 and soon after regained all of the Iraqi territory that Iran had occupied between 1983 and 1988. Although Khomeini accepted the cease-fire on July 22, Hussein delayed his acceptance in order to assist a rebel Iranian incursion into southern Iran. He supported the Iranian Anti-Khomeini National Liberation Army (NLA) as it advanced about sixty miles into Iran, proclaimed its desire to overthrow Khomeini and tried to rally other opponents of Khomeini. But an Iranian counterattack defeated the NLA’s inexperienced troops routing the rebels. Tehran claimed to have killed 4,500 NLA and Iraqi troops between July 26 and 29. By 1988, Iraq’s massive arms build-up had enabled it to turn back Iranian attacks and launch its own offensive. At the war’s end, Iraq’s army totaled 1.5 million men, 5,500 tanks, 3,500 artillery, 655 combat aircraft and a variety of missiles. Finally on August 8, Iraq accepted the cease-fire. Using the good offices of the UN Secretary General, Iran and Iraq signed an agreement making the cease-fire official on August 20, 1988. Following the war, conservative Western estimates of casualties were 262,000 Iranians and 105,000 Iraqis for a total of 367,000 deaths. In contrast, Iranian and Iraqi official counts differed greatly. Iran’s Minister of Islamic Guidance stated that 123,000 of its combatants died; 60,711 were missing in action; and 11,000 civilians lost their lives. Iraqi officials accepted the Western figure of 105,000 Iraqi combatant death, but claimed that 800,000 Iranians had died.16

Aftermath of Iraq-Iran War The cease-fire became official in August 1988 and the Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989 at the age of eighty-seven. But Saddam Hussein, even though he proclaimed victory, was displeased. While the wealthy Arab rulers praised his efforts against Iran, they refused to accept him as the leader of all Arabs that he aspired to



Prologue

11

become. Only the less wealthy Arab leaders such as in Jordan, the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Northern Yemen welcomed his role.17 In particular, Hussein wanted Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to recognize him as the Arab leader who defended them from Iran’s fundamentalist threat. When Kuwait’s representative visited Baghdad, Hussein was angered because Kuwait’s Emir Al-Sabah questioned his demand for $35 million in addition to forgiving Iraq’s wartime loans. Unwilling to negotiate his monetary demands with Kuwaitis, Hussein conjured up evidence of an imperialistZionist plot against Iraq and emphasized Iraq’s grievances against Kuwait for refusing to lease the two strategic islands of Warba and Bubiyan to Iraq and for waging an economic war against him. Although he accepted U.S. aid during the war against Iran, Hussein believed President Reagan’s secret arms for hostages deal with Iran, disclosed in 1986, was a “Zionist-American” plot to weaken all Muslim nations.18 In March 1990, three events prompted Saddam Hussein to issue warnings against an alleged U.S.-Israeli conspiracy. One was the report of a rapid increase of Soviet Jewish immigrants arriving in Israel, with an estimated one million expected to seek homes that might displace Palestinians in the West Bank. Second, General Gerald Bull, who had helped Iraq develop a new super gun capable of firing shells 425 miles, was assassinated in Belgium on March 22. Hussein was convinced that Israel’s Mossad intelligence agents killed Bull to preempt the Iraqi threat of possessing artillery weapons able to strike Israel. Third, six days after Bull’s death, American and British customs agents arrested five Iraqis, accusing them of smuggling nuclear detonator-capacitors to use for atomic weapons.19 Saddam Hussein responded to these events on April 1 by denouncing the United States and Great Britain, and by threatening Israel. During a speech, he said Iraq would use its new binary chemical weapons if Israel tried to launch another air raid on Iraq as it had when it destroyed Iraq’s nuclear plant in 1981. Hussein said, “We will make the fire eat up half of Israel if it tries anything against Iraq.”20

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Between April 1 and August 2, Hussein deplored other anti-Iraq and pro-Israel actions by Americans. On April 12, the U.S. expelled an Iraqi diplomat accused of plotting to murder two Iraqi exiles that opposed the Baath regime. The same day, the U.S. cancelled a trade mission to Baghdad that was expected to advance U.S.–Iraq commercial exchanges and aerospace investments. On April 24, the U.S. Congress passed a non-binding resolution urging President Bush to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel even though such action violated previous UN Security Council resolutions. On May 7, the U.S. used its veto power in the UN Security Council to reject a proposal that condemned Israel for building Jewish settlements in occupied territory of the West Bank. On May 21, the U.S. Commerce Department delayed a $500 million food commodity credit for Iraq’s purchase of American wheat. And in June, Bush abandoned the most recent U.S. attempt, launched in December 1988, to negotiate an PLO-Israel peace arrangement.21 Saddam Hussein was also dismayed because the wealthy Arab states, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, refused to assist in reconstructing Iraq’s war-damaged economy. During the May 28 Arab League meeting, Hussein reportedly asked privately for funds to alleviate Iraq’s economy. He wanted $27 million from Kuwait and said that the United Arab Emirates had violated OPEC quotas by lowering its oil prices. These violations, he said, cost Iraq billions of dollars. Following the Arab League meeting, Hussein continued to urge OPEC to raise oil prices while Iraqi officials asked Kuwait and other Arab oil states for more money. For example, they asked Kuwait for $10 billion but Kuwait only offered $300 million over three years, an amount Hussein believed was insulting.22 Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Dispute. In addition to the $10 billion, President Hussein wanted to rectify the Kuwait-Iraq national boundary where oil fields overlapped. Since the 1920s, when Britain drew the Iraq-Kuwait boundaries, there had been disputes about the north-south border and Kuwait’s acquisition of the two islands of Warba and Bubiyan. The north-south border became critical after 1938 when oil explorers found the 50-mile long Rumalia oil field crossing the border, about 90 percent of the field being in Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait allegedly used slant-drilling in



Prologue

13

the Rumalia sector, a tactic which enabled Kuwait to “steal” several billion dollars worth of Iraqi oil. After 1988, however, Kuwait rejected Hussein’s claim to these windfall profits and refused to pay Iraq for the disputed oil. The border issue also involved a seaport, as well as oil, because Hussein wanted to buy or lease all or part of Warba and Bubiyan islands to obtain a secure Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr. Since 1975, Iraq had planned a new naval base there, but on every occasion, Kuwait refused its request for a lease. In 1989, Kuwait again rejected the request, announcing its desire to build a recreation area on Bubiyan.23 According to G. Henry Schuler, the CIA may have encouraged Kuwait’s refusal to negotiate border changes and to stop Iraq from building a naval base, a project that could have harmed the American interests in the Gulf. Schuler indicated that in October 1990, Iraq released a November 1989 report taken from Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry file that described a meeting of CIA Director William Webster with Kuwaiti officials. Webster asked them to put pressure on Iraq to recognize Kuwait’s existing borders. Although the CIA denied Iraq’s accusation, Schuler’s information may explain why Jordanian officials told Milton Viorst of the New Yorker that Kuwaiti officials had acted “very cocky” in dealing with Iraq. Kuwaitis informed the Jordanians, “the United States would intervene if there was trouble with Iraq.”24 Falling Oil Prices. Whether or not the CIA was involved, most reports indicated that Kuwait refused to make concessions to Iraq either on the boundary questions or on Iraqi complaints that Kuwait violated the oil production quotas set by OPEC. World oil prices had fallen from $39-$40 per barrel in 1980 to $18-$20 by 1988. This was partly due to Britain’s development of its North Sea oil production, but OPEC quota violation had been exceeded by Kuwait as well as by other oil states. Kuwait’s oil ministry wanted more sales at low prices to gain immediate wealth while Hussein wanted strict quota regulation so that oil prices would rise to at least $25 per barrel. On July 17 and 18, Saddam Hussein publicly charged Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates with helping the Zionist plot. He claimed that certain Gulf rulers plotted with the U.S. to keep oil

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prices low through overproduction and singled out Kuwait and the UAE as helping the “imperialist-Zionist plan”. Furthermore, he said, Kuwait had stolen $2.4 billion of Iraqi oil from fields bordering on the two countries. To repay Iraq, Hussein wanted his Arab neighbors to eliminate all of Iraq’s debts and Kuwait to repay Iraq for stolen oil. Kuwait’s Emir Sheik Jabir al-Ahmadi Al Sabah responded by seeking help from other Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Although he put Kuwait’s small 20,000-man armed forces on alert, no Arab leaders rushed to champion Kuwait probably because, as Hussein told U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, Kuwaitis were widely unpopular among the Arabs. Al-Sabah’s appeal for mediation efforts did not succeed. On July 23, Iraq’s foreign minister met with Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and Jordan’s King Hussein, and agreed to hold direct talks with Kuwait at Jidda, Saudi Arabia, on July 31, 1990.25 Meanwhile, the OPEC oil ministers met in Jidda to adopt higher target prices for oil. The OPEC members agreed to raise prices from $18 to $21 per barrel and to permit Iraq to enforce production quotas if any nation violated them. The new oil agreement did not placate Hussein, however, because two days after the OPEC meeting, Kuwait’s oil minister disavowed the new prices. On July 25, Hussein told the American ambassador that he considered the Kuwait-UAE quota violations an act of war. He said that he had told the Arab League that “some brothers are fighting an economic war against us” and that “not all wars use weapons and we regard this kind of war a military action against us.” A lack of oil income, Hussein complained, robbed Iraq of revenue that weakened its army and “this could encourage Israel to attack us.” His final words to Glaspie were that Iraq had agreed to confer with Kuwait in Jidda on July 31.26 When the Jidda talks began, however, tensions between Iraq and Kuwait were high and Iraq had massed over 100,000 troops along Kuwait’s border. Iraq opened the talks with demands that Kuwait wanted to negotiate. Iraq again insisted Kuwait write off the loans made to Iraq during the recent war and demanded that Kuwait and



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the UAE provide $14 billion to Iraq for violating their oil quotas. Finally, Kuwait was told to turn over the islands of Bubiyan and Warba to provide a better seaport for Iraq. Following the two-hour session during which the Iraqis stated these demands, Kuwait’s delegate asked for overnight time to respond. The next morning, Kuwait proposed changes in Iraq’s offer but the Iraqis demanded total acceptance or nothing. Although Kuwait said a deal could be worked out, such as leasing the two Gulf islands, the Iraqi delegates walked out, refusing to negotiate. In retrospect, some analysts believe Saddam Hussein had already decided to invade Kuwait unless his demands were immediately accepted.27

Bush Fails to Recognize Danger Again and again from January to August 2, 1990, U.S. State Department personnel and President George H.W. Bush tried to deflect Saddam Hussein’s extreme statements by asserting that the U.S. sought better relations with Iraq. But, as Don Oberdorfer indicates, this approach prevented Bush and his advisors from correctly reading the meaning of Hussein’s statements and actions in early 1990. Ignoring these indicators, Bush failed to modify U.S. diplomacy in order to moderate Saddam Hussein’s demands or to strongly warn him against the direction he was taking. Two events before August 2, 1990 illustrated Hussein’s extreme statements against the U.S. and Bush’s failure to grasp their significance. On February 24, 1990, Hussein told the Arab Cooperation Council conference that Arab peoples would suffer because the Soviet armed forces had grown weaker under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and that made the United States the predominant force in the Middle East. Hussein wanted to limit U.S. power by having America withdraw its naval vessels from the Persian Gulf and by having wealthy Arab states withdraw their oil money from United States investments and reinvest the money in Soviet, Western and Eastern European companies. All “good” Arabs, he said, would do this and only the “faint hearted” would say the United States was the superpower and we “have no choice but to submit.”

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Egypt’s Mubarak, who was present in Jordan for the February Arab Cooperation Council meeting, disavowed Hussein ‘s speech and promptly left the sessions. In Washington, the Bush administration hardly reacted at all to Hussein’s anti-American tirade. The U.S. ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, believed Hussein was upset either because a Voice of America broadcast had criticized him or because the State Department’s recent report on human rights had described Iraq’s record as abysmal. Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly visited Hussein on February 12 to tell him the United States saw him as a “force for moderation” in the Gulf region and warned him to expect the department’s negative human rights report. Nevertheless, neither Kelly nor Glaspie perceived Hussein’s February 24 speech as a challenge to the United States.28 The second example of the administration’s inability to comprehend Hussein’s intentions came on July 25 when Glaspie met with him soon after the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute became critical. Although she had been in Baghdad for nearly two years, Glaspie had never met privately with President Hussein before their session on July 25. At this meeting, Hussein complained to Glaspie that Kuwait was a lackey of America. He claimed that since the May 30th Arab League meeting, Kuwait had “waged economic warfare” against Iraq. To Hussein’s complaints about Kuwait’s unwillingness to help Iraq and observe its oil quotas, Glaspie’s response was feeble. She said there had not been sufficient time to answer his complaints and assured Hussein that President Bush wanted Iraq’s friendship and stability in the Gulf area. She said the United States had no defense treaties with Kuwait, nor any defense or security commitments with Kuwait. But, she stated, diplomatic measures could best answer Iraq’s problems with Kuwait. In reporting to Washington, Glaspie observed that Hussein seemed sincere and recommended the U.S. relax its public criticism of Iraq. Subsequently, President Bush asked Glaspie to deliver a letter on July 26th to Saddam Hussein. Bush’s message was designed to placate the Iraqi leader and he said he wanted a peaceful solution to Iraq’s problems with Kuwait. His concerns about Iraq, Bush wrote, were sent in a “spirit of friendship and candor.”



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Later Glaspie’s visit and Bush’s letter would become controversial. On July 13, 1991, the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times published excerpts from Glaspie’s official report to the State Department and from Bush’s July 26 letter. The excerpts of these documents indicated President Bush failed to warn the Iraqi leader of the United States’ determination to protect the Gulf region’s stability or the need to solve the Kuwait dispute peacefully.29 American policy initially in 1981 had perceived Saddam Hussein as a necessary ally and, later after the Iraq-Iran war, had incorrectly seen him as someone who could be easily placated. In the beginning Arab leaders’ fear of Iranian Shiite radicalism, as indicated by Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, was sufficient to make Hussein’s ambitions appear less threatening. On August 2, 1990, both Bush and moderate Arab leaders finally realized they were confronted with someone capable of wrecking havoc in the Middle East.

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n August 2, 1990, Iraq’s army, considered at the time to be the world’s fourth largest, led by Soviet-manufactured tanks overran the Emirate of Kuwait’s few defenses in four hours. But Hussein miscalculated because he failed to anticipate that President H.W. Bush’s response would be to ask King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to permit the mobilization of U.S. forces on Saudi soil. The Bush administration also gained the United Nation’s Security Council approval in forming an American-led coalition with the authority to use military force, if necessary, to evict Iraq’s forces from Kuwait.

President Bush Responds News of Iraq’s invasion reached Washington about 9 p.m. on August 2, 1990. President Bush immediately issued a statement that condemned Iraq and ordered the Treasury Department to freeze all of the financial assets of Iraq and Kuwait in the United States. In New York, a late night session of the UN Security Council approved Resolution 660 demanding the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, a resolution that passed 14-0 with Yemen abstaining. Next, Bush assembled a team of four key advisors to review events in the Middle East: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State James Baker and Secretary of Defense Richard “Dick” Cheney. Although none of these advisors were experts on the Middle East, they viewed Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait as a threat to Saudi Arabia and agreed the United States must defend the Saudi oil fields from a possible Iraqi attack.1

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George Bush Presidential Library President Bush with Brent Scowcroft organizing the Coalition

Bush now had to convince King Fahd that Saudi Arabia faced a potential danger from Hussein’s forces in Kuwait. On August 4, the president told the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Ibn Sultan Bandar, that the United States was prepared to deploy a strong defensive force to guarantee Saudi security. After seeing satellite photos of Iraqi troops approaching the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, Bandar contacted King Fahd who invited U.S. military advisors to visit Riyadh and provide specific information about Iraq’s threat to its neighbor. On August 6th, Defense Secretary Cheney and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, head of the U.S. Central Command for the Middle East, met with Fahd. Cheney and Schwarzkopf showed Fahd their satellite photos of three Iraqi armored divisions close to the Saudi border. Fahd countered that these pictures did not agree with



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the data collected by his advisors about Iraqi forces being near the Saudi Arabian border; yet, he was concerned about the “accidental incursions” of Iraqis into Saudi territory. Fahd and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak also knew that Hussein had deceived them by failing to respond to their requests for information regarding his plans toward Kuwait. With the approval of his Wahhabi ulema, Fahd agreed to welcome U.S. military forces to Saudi territory and accepted Cheney’s offer for U.S. help in defending Saudi Arabia from Iraq. Fahd also asked Cheney to invite Arab forces from Egypt, Morocco and other Gulf States to form a defensive coalition. Morocco’s King Hassan had offered Fahd support even before the U.S. team arrived at Riyadh. On the return to Washington, Cheney met Egypt’s Mubarak and Hassan who both agreed to commit their armed forces to protect the Saudis. In addition to the 55,000 armed troops sent by the Gulf States of Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, Egypt dispatched 40,000 forces while Syria sent 21,000 troops to Iraq’s western border. By the end of August 1990, the U.S. led United Nations coalition was joined by token forces from Pakistan, Senegal, and Bangladesh. General Schwarzkopf’s first military problem was to deploy ground, naval and air force contingents before a possible Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. Until these forces arrived, there were eight U.S. and five British warships in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. also had the carrier Independence and its battle group in the Indian Ocean and the Eisenhower carrier group in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, while the battleship USS Wisconsin was quickly deployed to the Gulf area to enforce UNSC Resolution 661 that had levied economic sanctions on Iraq.2 On August 8, President Bush’s televised address announced that King Fahd accepted the U.S. proposal for a “wholly defensive” mission called Desert Shield. That same day, the first U.S. F-15 fighter planes, AWAC aircraft and 2,300 paratroopers began arriving at Saudi bases. During the next three months, the United States and United Nations allies assembled 200,000 soldiers, plus high-tech aircraft and other modern weaponry in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and Turkey.

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In a television address on August 8, Bush compared Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler who had committed “naked aggression against his neighbor [i.e. Poland]” in 1939. While the Hitler analogy appealed to the older generation, Bush sought to assure younger Americans that this campaign would not result in another Vietnam because the U.S. would, if necessary, employ its full military power against Iraq.3 Just as President Harry Truman in 1950 gained support in defense of South Korea, Bush and Secretary of State Baker undertook to gain United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval for pressuring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Even before he decided to send troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush had gained the support of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. On August 4, Bush met with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who readily agreed to strong action against Hussein. By coincidence, on August 2nd Secretary Baker had met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at Irkutsk, Siberia. Although Hussein had been befriended by Moscow since 1969, he had failed to inform Moscow about his decision to invade Kuwait. Thus Shevardnadze denounced Iraq’s actions and, on August 3, urged Baker to use the United Nations Security Council to justify any action required to obtain Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.4 Between August 2 and November 29, the Security Council passed a flurry of resolutions, in addition to Resolutions 660 and 661, condemning the invasion of Kuwait and calling for economic sanctions against Iraq. The most crucial resolutions, 665 and 670, authorized enforcement of naval and air embargoes against Iraq.5

Bush Prepares for Offensive Action When Operation Desert Shield was launched in August 1990, General Schwarzkopf’s Central Command War Plan 90-1002 for the Persian Gulf only called for naval aircraft carrying out retaliatory raids against the aggressor. Although the carrier-based planes could inflict punitive damages on Iraqi targets, these raids could not be maintained for a long period. The second phase of the Plan called for a buildup of Army, Marine and Air Forces that required moving 200,000 American personnel and their equipment



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7,000 air miles or 12,000 sea miles to Middle East bases. Besting the estimated timetable, essential defensive forces were in place by mid-October 1990. Just as Schwarzkopf was feeling comfortable in October, President Bush ordered him to develop plans for offensive operations. As Bob Woodward reported, General Powell told Bush that sanctions were just becoming effective and that “a dirty and bloody” offensive might be avoided. The president replied, “I don’t think there’s time politically for that strategy.” Consequently Schwarzkopf and his Chief of Staff, Major General Robert B. Johnston, were asked to prepare for offensive operations against Iraq. Their plan, which reached Washington on October 10, asked for 400,000 troops including the Army’s well-trained VII Corps stationed in Germany and the “Big Red” mechanized Infantry Corps in the United States. The plan projected three or four weeks of massive air attacks on Iraq followed by a large-scale ground assault launched from Saudi Arabia. Johnston met with Bush and his four advisors on October 30 and the president told General Powell to give Schwarzkopf everything he wanted. Offensive preparations began on November 1 and eventually involved 527,000 forces from all service branches. Bush did not announce the offensive build-up until November 8 because he wanted to avoid controversy before the November 6 congressional elections.6 Throughout October 1990, Bush escalated his public rhetoric about Hussein’s “evil actions”, but was hampered when Israeli soldiers killed 21 Palestinians and the Soviet Union’s Yevgeni Primakov attempted to negotiate a diplomatic solution with Saddam Hussein. The Israeli incident alarmed the White House because it threatened to divert attention to Hussein’s claim that Israeli’s military occupation of the West Bank was comparable to Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. It also endangered UN unity because seven Third World nations on the Security Council introduced a resolution that deplored Israel’s violence and sought a Council mission to visit the area and recommend methods to protect Palestinians. The Bush administration faced the dilemma of vetoing the Security Council’s resolution backed by America’s Arab allies and fearing the Council’s mission would try to investigate all Jewish-Palestinian conditions on the West Bank. Finally, a British compromise

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resolution defused Washington’s dilemma by calling for U.N. Secretary General Perez, not the Council, to investigate conditions on the West Bank. While the British resolution was approved, Israel refused to cooperate with the secretary general, but world attention had been diverted from the plight of the Palestinians.7 Washington was also disturbed when Gorbachev sought to negotiate with Hussein, a position Bush studiously sought to avoid. To maintain the Soviet support offered in August by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, Bush met with Gorbachev at Helsinki, Finland, on September 9, 1990. The two leaders repeated their denunciation of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and called for Iraq’s unconditional evacuation from Kuwait. While Moscow would not aid Hussein, Gorbachev told Bush, the Soviets would explore their contacts with Baghdad to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. Soon after the Helsinki meeting, Gorbachev was confronted by pro-Iraq advocates in Moscow who opposed Shevardnadze’s close cooperation with Bush. To placate them, Gorbachev sent Yevgeni Primakov, rather than Shevernadze, to visit Baghdad, Washington and London. Primakov hoped to get Hussein’s approval for 7,830 Soviet experts and their families to leave Iraq, if they wished, and to persuade Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait by stressing the hopelessness of his situation if he refused to comply with the UN resolutions. On October 5, Primakov quickly got Hussein’s permission for 1,500 Soviets to obtain exit documents, but he failed to persuade Hussein to leave Kuwait. Hussein told him “If I have to fall to my knees and surrender or fight, I will choose the latter.” Hussein did say that he held to the August 12 offer to withdraw if the IsraelPalestinian issue was negotiated and indicated he would be flexible in linking Kuwait negotiations with Palestinian talks. Primakov thought Hussein’s offer opened the prospects for a compromise with Washington and London that allowed Hussein to “save face” without an unconditional surrender. Primakov did not find a receptive audience in Washington. At the State Department on October 18, Secretary Baker showed some interest in his ideas about Israel but it was clear the Israelis would never accept any peace talks tied to the Kuwait crisis. Primakov



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received less attention at the White House in meetings with Bush and his National Security Council members. Bush simply told Primakov to make sure that Saddam Hussein understood the “uncompromising position of the United States.” In London, Prime Minister Thatcher was more hawkish than Bush in describing Hussein’s treachery and explaining why Iraq’s military and industrial potential should be destroyed. Despite negative reactions in Washington and London, Primakov returned to Baghdad on October 24 where he found Hussein more conciliatory, but unwilling to withdraw unconditionally.8 In spite of Primakov’s October failure, Soviet hardliners continued to criticize Shevardnadze’s tactics. Nevertheless, Shevardnadze retained Gorbachev’s trust during November when the Security Council approved a deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal. In mid-December 1990, Shevardnadze resigned as foreign minister and was replaced by Alexander Bessmertnykh.9 While Primakov searched for diplomatic solutions during October, Bush planned offensive military action and sought a Security Council resolution establishing January 15 as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait or risk the consequences. Although Bush’s General Assembly address on October 1 had suggested that Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait might allow solution of “all conflicts between Arabs and Israeli,” his speech did not result in any U.S. diplomatic contacts with Baghdad.10

Reports of Iraqi Atrocities

Meanwhile, during October, Washington offered new arguments to support a military offensive that emphasized the brutal treatment of hostages being held by Iraq, atrocities committed by Iraqi troops in Kuwait and Hussein’s quest for nuclear weapons. Since August 2, Iraq had quartered some foreign hostages on military bases to act as human shields to deter air raids. This action prompted Bush and Secretary Baker to claim the U.S. struggle was “between good and evil, right and wrong.” Also, Baker decried Hussein’s use of over 100 Americans as human shields, forcing them to sleep on “vermin-ridden concrete floors” and reducing their meals to “two a day.”

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On October 30, Bush met with a bipartisan group of 15 congressmen to discuss the possibility of the UN coalition taking the offensive against Iraq. He described how Iraqis captured one “foreign family” and “shot the children in front of the parents and then shot the parents.” Bush continued to cite the hostage’s plight until mid-December 1990 when Hussein released all foreign detainees in Iraq and Kuwait. Since meeting on September 28 with Kuwait’s Emir Shiekh Jabir Al-Ahmed, the president often stressed reports of Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait. Although the Emir and other prominent Kuwaiti exiles now lived at luxurious Saudi hotels, they claimed that the Iraqis had killed an estimated 15,000 Kuwaitis and engaged in sadistic tortures and rapes. In addition, the Iraqis were charged with looting Kuwaiti museums and the Royal Palace, and shipping Kuwait’s gold reserves to Baghdad. Without investigating the validity of these claims, Hill and Knowlton, a public relations firm hired by the Kuwait emir, widely publicized the charges of atrocities. The actual extent of the Iraqi atrocities was uncertain because Iraq had evicted all journalists from Kuwait in August 1990, thus the atrocity reports were received from Kuwaiti exiles or other refugees and passed on to Hill and Knowlton and Amnesty International. The most imaginative allegation was Bush’s claim to reporters on October 9th, that Iraqi forces had disconnected the incubators of 312 premature babies in a Kuwait City hospital. The incubator story gained more attention on October 10 when a tearful 15-year-old girl, identified only as Nayirah, told the televised hearings of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus how she saw Iraqi soldiers turned off the incubators of 15 babies who were laid on the “cold floor to die.” Dr. Ibrahim Bahbahani told the Security Council on November 29, that he had supervised the burial of 120 newborn babies and had buried 40 babies taken from their incubators. Later, a December report of Amnesty International cited anonymous sources as indicating a total of 312 babies died because Iraqis had stolen their incubators. After the war, investigators discovered the incubator stories were false. On March 15, 1991, ABC news reported an interview with



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Kuwait’s Director of Health, Dr. Mohammad Matar, who said any children who died in the hospitals did so because nurses and other hospital personnel abandoned them and fled the country. In April 1991, Amnesty International retracted its December 1990 story. On February 6, 1992, Middle East Watch issued a report based on a thorough investigation of the incubator story including interviews with medical and hospital officials who stayed in Kuwait during the war. The report concluded that while Iraqi troops did commit many atrocities in Kuwait, there was “no basis to the allegation that Iraqi troops took babies from their incubators in Kuwaiti hospitals, causing them to die.” The report said 15 year-old Nayirah was the daughter of Kuwait’s ambassador to the United States and had probably fled Kuwait early in August. Dr Bahbahni, who was previously identified as a surgeon in November 1990, was actually an orthodontist who had no knowledge of the maternity wards. Moreover, when Watch officials visited the maternity hospital in March 1991, they found that all incubators were still there.11 From November 1990 to January 15, 1991, the Bush administration stressed another reason to justify war—Iraq’s nuclear potential. During Bush’s visit with American troops in Saudi Arabia on Thanksgiving Day, he claimed Hussein must be prevented from obtaining nuclear arms. In a scenario that would be echoed a decade later by his eldest son, Bush argued that experts “who would measure the time table for Hussein’s atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of that situation and the gravity of that threat.” Bush asserted that each day “brings Saddam one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear arsenal.” Furthermore, Bush concluded: “He had never possessed a weapon that he didn’t use.” A New York Times editorial suggested that Bush harped on this theme because an opinion poll showed a majority of Americans supported war if Iraq were a “nuclear threat.” Often unheard, most U.S. scientists thought Iraq needed two to ten years to obtain the most basic type of A-bomb.12

UN Sets a Deadline for Iraqi Withdrawal Meanwhile, Bush and Baker pressed for a Security Council resolution that established a deadline for Iraq to withdraw or face

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President Bush visits coalition forces, Nov. 22, 1990

Dept. of Defense Photo

the UN coalition. Gaining approval from Britain, Canada and France posed no problem and the European Conference on Security and Cooperation lined up support from 33 other European countries, including Finland and Romania. Meanwhile, China agreed to abstain on a Security Council resolution. To obtain Third World nations’ support, Baker offered “friendly” nations on the Council inducements consisting of American trade agreements, economic or military aid. Although officially denied, the details of these inducements were widely rumored. By the end of November, Baker had gained the votes of Colombia, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, Malaya and Zaire. Only Yemen rejected Baker’s overtures and, after it voted “no”, the U.S. cut off $70 million of previously allocated aid. Although Cuba had approved six of the previous ten UNSC resolutions, Havana’s representative indicated Cuba would vote no because it desired to avoid the war that would follow.13 Baker’s final task was to ensure the cooperation of Moscow. He and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed on a Council resolution that would set a deadline of January 15 for Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait or the UN coalition would “use all means necessary” to



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evict Iraqi forces. As a result of the U.S.-Soviet agreement, Security Council Resolution 678 passed on November 29 by a vote of 12 to 2, with Cuba and Yemen opposed and China abstaining.14

Is War Necessary? Would Sanctions Work? In the United States, the deadline escalated debate between proponents of war and advocates of continuing economic sanctions until Hussein withdrew. After Bush announced an expanded military build-up on November 8, these discussions took place throughout the nation: in town forums, at college teach-ins, on editorial pages and via the media. The principal stage was Capitol Hill where congressional committees aired the pros and cons of “Bush’s War” from late November until the debate reached the floor of Congress just before the January 15 deadline. Although the administration initially claimed that the sanctions were effective, once the offensive build-up began Bush insisted that sanctions alone would not get Iraq out of Kuwait. After the withdrawal ultimatum was set, the administration’s only concession to the peace process was to offer to inform Iraqi leaders that unconditional surrender was necessary and that the coalition would definitely launch its attack after the deadline.15 During congressional hearings on December 5-6 Secretary of State Baker and Defense Secretary Cheney told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that sanctions had some negative effects on Iraq but that Kuwait’s people were suffering from the occupation. Sanctions also injured coalition allies, Cheney said, for Turkey lost income with the closing the of oil pipeline from Iraq and Czechoslovakia lost $1.5 billion a year in trade with Iraq. He also asserted that Hussein controlled all Iraqi resources and could continue his military build-up even if Iraqi people suffered. In similar fashion, Baker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “nobody can tell you that sanctions alone will ever be able to impose a high enough cost on Saddam Hussein to get him to withdraw….I am personally pessimistic that they will.”16 Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs Admiral William S. Crowe and General David C. Jones appeared in support of the sanctions before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and advocated

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more time for them to work. Crowe thought 12 to 18 months of sanctions might be required, but the success of sanctions would prevent bloodshed. “It is curious that some expect our military to train soldiers to face hostile fire,” Crowe observed, “but doubt its ability to train them to occupy ground and wait patiently.” Jones’ testimony generally agreed with Crowe’s assessment. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger also spoke to the committee on behalf of sanctions. He thought the probability of sanctions persuading Iraq to leave Kuwait was “very, very high if we stick with the original objectives,” rather than seeking the destruction of Iraq’s military power as Prime Minister Thatcher desired.17 Although Bush hoped to avoid using the 1972 War Powers Act or asking Congress to declare war, public opinion polls in December showed more than two-thirds of Americans wanted the legislators to examine the issue. The so-called “Weinberger Doctrine”, enunciated by Reagan’s Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, warned that a president should obtain legislative approval before undertaking military action abroad so a domestic political crisis, such as over Vietnam, not be repeated. Consequently, Bush sent a letter to Congress on January 8, 1991 requesting the authority to employ American forces after January 15th should Hussein ignore the UN deadline. From January 10 to 12, Congress debated resolutions to restrict or permit the president’s right to launch an attack. The discussion in each house focused on whether the president should be given a “blank check” or told to allow more time for the sanctions to work.18 In the Congressional Quarterly, Pamela Fessler described the emotions that members of Congress experienced in preparing to cast a vote involving the life or death of American combat personnel. “Members said over and over again, whether they had been in Congress for two days or 22 years, in all their time they had never seen debate quite like the one that began on January 10 at 11:40 a.m. in the Senate and at 4:10 p.m. in the House…. For the first time in anyone’s memory, the U.S. Congress was debating openly and extensively whether the president should be authorized to take the country unprovoked by direct attack, into war.”19



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On January 12, Congress approved a resolution authorizing the president to use force after January 15 “ if necessary.” The House vote was 250 to 136 in favor; the Senate vote was 52 to 47. Overall, the vote was the closest margin of support for war since June 1812 when Congress divided on President James Madison’s request for war against Great Britain. (In 1812, the vote was 79 to 49 in favor in the House and 19-13 in the Senate.) Unlike 1812, when Federalist opponents continued to oppose war, opposition Democrats in 1991 endorsed Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) who declared: “We may disagree in this chamber but when the vote is over…we are going to stand united.”20

Last Minute Diplomatic Efforts On November 30, 1990, President Bush offered to talk to Saddam Hussein or Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to ensure they understood the United States was committed to fulfilling the Security Council’s resolution by using all necessary means to evict Iraq from Kuwait. The president’s offer was largely to show the American public that he had “gone the last mile” for peace, but his offer did not include any suggestion of a possible compromise. Saddam subsequently caught Bush off guard by agreeing to meet with Secretary of State Baker in Baghdad on January 12. Because this day was too close to the deadline, confusion ensued about when a meeting could be held.21 If Hussein was unlikely to withdraw unconditionally, the Bush administration’s nightmare was that Saddam would withdraw from part or all of Kuwait but keep Iraq’s military forces nearby for possible future action. Fortunately for Bush, Saddam did not consider this option nor did he listen to the appeals of Arab leaders from Egypt, Syria, Libya, Sudan and other small Arab states.22 Some European leaders were concerned by what they perceived as Bush’s rush to war. In particular, France’s President Francois Mitterand offered to promise Hussein that Iraq would not be attacked if its forces left Kuwait, contingent upon an informal agreement for an international conference on Middle East problems sometime later. Twelve members of the European Community adopted Mitterand’s suggestion, but Britain’s new Prime Minister

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John Major, whose government remained a staunch supporter of Bush, opposed it. The French effort also failed to gain a receptive hearing in Baghdad. On January 3, 1991, Hussein told Maurice Vauzelle, a close friend of Mitterand, “I know I am going to lose. At least, I will have the death of a hero.” Vauzelle’s meeting led French Foreign Minister Ronald Dumas to cancel his January 12 visit to Baghdad and ended European efforts for a compromise.23 Hussein did make one concession toward a prevention of hostilities. On December 5, he asked Iraq’s National Assembly to order the release of all foreigners who had been detained since August 2. The “peace gesture” released 4,000 hostages including 450 Americans, but President Bush was not impressed. After the detainee’s were released, he told reporters: “I’m in no negotiating mood.”24 As a result, the only direct U.S.-Iraq talks before the deadline took place in Geneva on January 9 when Secretary Baker joined Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in fruitless discussions. Baker gave Aziz a letter from Bush that repeated the Security Council’s demand for Iraq to withdraw by January 15. Aziz read the letter from Bush and said it was not “appropriate” for a head of state and refused to deliver it to Hussein. During the talks, Aziz insisted that the invasion of Kuwait was a defensive act against “an alliance among the U.S., Israel and the former rulers of Kuwait to destroy Iraq.” Again and again, Aziz sought to link the invasion with the problems between Israel and the Palestinians. Baker responded to these claims by saying “no one in the world would buy your explanation” that you “acted in self-defense.” Following these talks, Baker informed the president “they didn’t give an inch.” When meeting with the press, Baker said “in over six hours I heard nothing that suggested to me any flexibility whatsoever on complying with the United Nations Security Council resolutions.” After the Geneva meeting, Barzan Takriti, Hussein’s half-brother who accompanied Aziz, told Hussein the Americans were weak and would not fight. The same day, Hussein told a meeting of the Baath Party that Iraq was ready to do battle. “If the Americans are involved in a Gulf conflict,” he boasted, “you will see, we will make them swim in their blood.”25



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Hussein’s final chance to back down came on January 13 when UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar flew to Baghdad. Perez met with Hussein for two and one-half hours but found him to be fatalistically waiting for war. Hussein offered a deal for regional peace that Perez could not accept. After the meeting, Perez said he was “pessimistic” about the future.26

The 38 Day Air Blitz: January 17 to February 23 As General Schwarzkopf had decided in August 1990, the UN coalition’s air forces initially struck Iraq’s command and control facilities, plus its military logistical infrastructure, with bombs and missiles. These air raids carried out the coalition’s goals of destroying Iraq’s military command structure and isolating its southern military forces.27 On January 17, the UN coalition’s intensive air operations began the 38 days of bombing during which 284 U.S. Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles and bombs from 100,000 aircraft sorties struck Iraq and parts of Kuwait. During the first three days of the blitz code-named “instant Thunder”, bombers, cruise missiles, together with army and navy helicopter gunships, hit Iraq’s “center of gravity.” Targets not only included Iraq’s missiles launchers, nuclear materials bases and biological weapons plants, but also the Tall King radar facilities, Baath Party headquarters, Iraq’s Defense Ministry, air bases, electrical facilities, and telephone and radio communication centers. Aerial assaults on these strategic centers continued less intensively throughout the war, but after January 20 the second phase of air warfare was extended to the southern areas between Basra and Kuwait where Iraq’s elite Republican Guard had defensive encampments. Attack helicopters joined the bombers and cruise missiles in targeting Iraq’s armored battalions, highways, bridges and defense networks. During the first week of battle, a few Iraqi fighter planes ventured aloft to defend the nation, but after 10 Iraqi pilots lost their aerial duels, about 700 Iraqi aircraft stayed out of harm’s way by hiding in underground bunkers in northern Iraq. In late January, the Pentagon estimated that 140 of Iraq’s most advanced aircraft flew to

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Iran where the Islamic Republic interned the planes. On February 20, General Schwarzkopf reported that Iraq’s military forces were on the verge of collapse. He said Iraq lost about two tank battalions a day, its defenses were soft, and its command and control facilities destroyed.28 Although allied commanders said the air raids were designed to avoid collateral damage and civilian deaths, reports from Iraq indicated that many civilians were killed and non-military targets were destroyed. On January 24, a television report showed a Baghdad “baby formula” factory that had been destroyed. The Pentagon claimed the building was a biological weapons plant but the TV picture showed a sign outside the building that said “Baby Milk Plant” in Arabic and English. CNN reporter Peter Arnett, who the Bush administration criticized for staying in Baghdad, claimed on-the-scene-evidence showed baby formula was made in the building—a fact confirmed by a French contractor who built the factory and New Zealand technicians who saw canned milk powder produced there in May 1990. The other highly publicized collateral damage was the bombing of a Baghdad bunker in which 100 men, women and children were killed when two laser-guided bombs hit the shelter on February 13. Hussein claimed this was an air raid shelter but the Pentagon said it was a shelter upgraded to a command center with extra protection from electromagnetic impulses, a camouflaged roof and chain link fencing. Arnett and other Western newsmen visited the shelter and agreed with the Pentagon. Iraq civilians were in the shelter but the fence and computer conduits in the building indicated it had been a communication center.29 Iraq’s Unorthodox Retaliation. During the 38 day allied air campaign, Hussein resorted to several unorthodox tactics to injure his enemies and limit the risks of Iraqi military losses. First, on January 18, two Iraq Scud “Al-Hussein” ballistic missiles with conventional bombs hit Israeli cities. Israel was not a member of the UN coalition but was targeted because Hussein hoped to entice Israel to retaliate. If Israel struck back, Arabs might abandon the coalition and support Iraq. The first Scud missiles hit Tel Aviv and Jaffa but caused little damage. Twelve people had minor injuries,



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but three Israeli elderly women and a three-year old Arab girl suffocated in the gas masks issued by Israel because the Scuds were expected to carry chemical weapons. These and other Scud attacks failed to goad Israel into retaliation. President Bush had anticipated the Scud attacks and persuaded Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir not to strike back because it would weaken the UN coalition. He promised Shamir that American aircraft would seek out the Scud missile launchers. In addition, Bush ordered the U.S. Army to send two U.S. Patriot anti-missile batteries and other anti-aircraft missiles to help protect Israel. Although the Patriots were militarily ineffective, they achieved the political objective of keeping Israel out of the Gulf conflict. Iraq also fired Scud missiles at Saudi Arabian targets defended by other U.S. Patriot batteries. Out of 86 Scud attacks on Saudi targets, the only deaths resulted when a Scud exploded over Dhahran and fell on an American Army barracks. The explosion killed 28 soldiers from the 14th Quartermaster Company, Greensburg, Pennsylvania and wounded 480 other people.30 A second unconventional method Iraq employed was to damage Kuwait’s oil resources. On January 26, Iraqi forces reportedly began spilling oil from Kuwaiti pipelines into the Persian Gulf causing an environmental hazard. American planes bombed the pipelines in an attempt to stop the spill and Norway sent anti-pollution ships to clean up the Gulf. Eventually, the millions of barrels of oil extended 350 miles along the Gulf shore prompting Kuwait and other Gulf states to protect their endangered water desalinization equipment and wildlife along the spillway. After the war, analysts learned the spills were exaggerated and allied bombings caused some of the mess. More critical, Iraqi forces on January 23 began to torch Kuwait’s oil facilities, sending thick black clouds into the atmosphere. By the time Kuwait was liberated on February 28th, 732 oil wells were on fire and another 98 damaged. The last fire was not extinguished until early November 1991.31 Hussein’s third tactic was to parade allied prisoners of war before television cameras, forcing some prisoners to denounce their multinational leaders for bombing Iraq. On January 20, seven allied airmen, including three Americans, appeared on TV looking

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exhausted, some with bruised faces. The prisoners reassured their families they were safe and several made stilted confessions that belied their anti-war messages. The next day, twenty more prisoners appeared on television and the Iraqi government said they would be placed as human shields to protect Iraq military targets from allied bombing. Not only was this treatment of POWs contrary to the Geneva Convention, but world opinion reacted negatively. For example, India’s government remained neutral during the war, but condemned Iraq’s treatment of prisoners.32

Iraq’s Offensive Effort: Khafji During the war, Iraqi forces made only one concerted attack on the UN coalition’s positions in Saudi Arabia. On January 29, nine brigades of Iraq’s 5th mechanized division launched a three-pronged attack against the coastal city of Khafji, six miles south of Kuwait’s border. Although Hussein claimed it was a “victory,” it ended as a dismal failure when Iraq’s forces had retreated back to Kuwait by February 3. Alerted before Iraq’s offensive began, the U.S. 1st Marine division halted the first Iraq brigade as it crossed the border in Qatar. A Qatari tank unit destroyed Iraq’s second tank brigade. Using captured Kuwaiti missile attack ships, Iraq’s third brigade tried to move down the Gulf coastline but were detected by a British frigate and destroyed by American and British aircraft before they reached their objective. Only one Iraqi mechanized infantry and a tank brigade reached Khafji. The city had been abandoned before the war but Saudi and Qatari forces, and a few U.S. Marine support groups, were located outside the city. These allied forces isolated the Iraqi infantry as they entered the city and concentrated on targeting the 80 Iraqi tanks intended to protect the infantry. After the tanks were destroyed, the allied units used artillery against the Iraqi infantry before engaging in a house-to-house search that netted the surrender of 400 Iraqi soldiers. Finally, it is notable that Saddam Hussein’s units did not use chemical or biological weapons against the coalition forces. The allies had predicted Iraq would use these weapons, thus coalition forces were equipped with gas masks and other protective gear.



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Most likely, the Iraqis feared retaliation if they used these types of weapons.33 Soviet Attempts to Negotiate Peace. After Saddam Hussein rejected a February 10th peace proposal offered by Iran’s President Hashim Rafsanjani, Gorbachev sent Primakov to Baghdad the next day. As in October 1990, Primakov’s optimism led him to ignore Hussein’s conditions for withdrawing from Kuwait. Hussein wanted the Security Council to withdraw all of the resolutions placed against Iraq, but Primakov told reporters that Iraq only sought an “equitable and honorable” solution, a solution that Presidents Bush and Gorbachev saw as meaningless. On February 17, Gorbachev met in Moscow with Iraq’s Foreign Minister Aziz. After the session, the Soviet leader telephoned President Bush to say Aziz offered a plan in line with the fulfillment of the Council’s resolutions. After considering the plan, Bush called back and told Gorbachev that Aziz still wanted too many concessions. Bush especially disliked the request to relieve Hussein from any responsibility for the war and his refusal to accept an unconditional surrender. After consulting with French, British and Arab leaders, Bush gave Iraq twenty-four hours to begin withdrawing from Kuwait; that is, until noon of February 23. If the withdrawal began by that day, Iraq would have seven days to complete its exit. If the withdrawal did not begin by that date, allied forces would move to liberate Kuwait. Hussein replied by calling Bush’s ultimatum “shameful” and refused to order a withdrawal.34

The 100 Hour Ground War Although the coalition’s full-scale ground attack began at 4 a.m. on February 24 (Kuwaiti time), General Schwarzkopf had ordered preparatory measures four days earlier. On February 20, coalition helicopters crossed the borders of Iraq, destroyed five tanks, and captured 500 prisoners. The same day, allied planes began extensive raids on Iraqi positions beginning with 2,900 sorties on February 20, the greatest number on a single day during the war. Two days later, U.S. Marines and aircraft attacked Iraqi emplacements to prepare for the penetration of Iraqi minefields and defensive obstacles. At

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the same time, allied aircraft dropped leaflets urging Iraqi soldiers to surrender and enjoy the hospitality of Saudi Arabia. For the ground war, General Schwarzkopf planned a daring “Hail Mary” maneuver that deployed 200,000 British and American forces along the Saudi-Iraq border up to 300 miles from the Gulf. When the invasion began on February 24, these forces made a wide left-hook movement north and east into Iraq, some of them ending up near Basra where they engaged Iraq’s elite Republican Guard. The sweep’s objective was to stop all Iraqi military action and supply movements coming down the highways from Baghdad and to divert the Republican Guard’s reserve forces from supporting front-line Iraqi troops in Kuwait. With the assistance of U.S. paratroopers, French forces captured the junction town of As Salam and destroyed the Iraqi infantry division holding that city. Simultaneously, 400 helicopters airlifted the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division 60 miles northward into Iraq to form an operations base. These helicopter flights included

Dept. of Defense Photo President George H.W. Bush and First Lady Barbara Bush wave as they stand in the back of a vehicle during a visit to a desert encampment. The president and his wife are paying Thanksgiving Day visits to U.S. troops who are in Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Shield



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U.S. female Army pilots, one of many instances of the enhanced military role given American women during the Iraqi conflict. At the same time as the “Hail Mary” plan began, American and British mechanized and armored units struck just north of the Kuwaiti border with Iraq to hold Republican Guard units in that area. Yet, the main allied attack on February 24 was directly across the Kuwait-Saudi border. Two U.S. Marine divisions and a U.S. Army brigade invaded across the heavily defended border on a direct eastern route while Saudi and Pan-Arab troops struck up the Gulf coast from the south. Other Arab divisions from Egypt and Syria moved across Kuwait’s northwest border. In the Persian Gulf, Allied warships pounded the coastal defenses while the presence of amphibious U.S. Marine units kept Iraqi defensive forces on the coast. The allies breached Iraq’s defenses more easily than anticipated, largely because nearly 30,000 Iraqi’s surrendered the first day. Some Iraqi’s waved the leaflets that had been dropped and many of the POWs were sick, thirsty or starving. They often reported being terrorized by roving Iraqi thugs who shot or hanged soldiers suspected of wanting to desert. The POWs helped the allies locate land mines or explosive traps planted by Iraqi forces. On February 27, Kuwait City was liberated while allied troops reached Basra and the northern border of Kuwait where one of the war’s extensive firefights ensued with 800 American tanks engaging 300 Iraqi tanks of the Republican Guard. Although the Americans said the Guard fought well, the American M1A1 tanks proved superior to Iraq’s Soviet T-72 tanks, due to the U.S. firepower, maneuverability and long-range cannons. A Soviet general later noted that Iraq did not have the Soviet Union’s most advanced tanks. With Iraq forces generally defeated, Hussein announced on February 26, that his army would withdraw from Kuwait City, praising his “brave forces” for withstanding an unprecedented attack by 30 nations. Bush and Schwarzkopf refused to recognize Hussein’s speech as a proper withdrawal, claiming Hussein wanted to regroup his forces. Subsequently, when a large number of Iraqi tanks and trucks moved northward out of Kuwait City, American

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Navy aircraft attacked them from all directions, causing a three-mile long traffic jam. The carrier USS Ranger extended its air sorties into the afternoon devastating the fleeing columns. Although Hussein should have ordered a proper surrender, critics claimed the constant air attacks caused needless deaths. Later, it was found that Iraqi forces leaving Kuwait City had laden their trucks with items looted from Kuwait—dying like the proverbial miser clinging to bags of gold as he drowns. On February 28 at 5 a.m. Kuwaiti time, President Bush declared a cease-fire, unilaterally ordered the suspension of hostilities and offered to halt the conflict. Saddam Hussein accepted the offer and approved the signing of formal terms on March 3, 1991. Baghdad’s radio falsely claimed the Republican Guard had “forced” a ceasefire on the allied leaders. The U.S. chose to end the war on Iraqi soil and met with their delegates at an Iraqi air base near Safwan on March 3. General Schwarzkopf informed Iraq’s General Sultan Hasim Ahmed of the instructions prepared by the Security Council for Iraq to fulfill. These instructions included ways to avoid accidental military engagements, exchanging POWs, giving data on missing soldiers and locating land mines. The initial terms included economic sanctions and indicated that final terms would be decided by the UN later in March.35

Bush’s Decision to End the War Bush’s decision to halt military operations without totally destroying Iraq’s military forces, seizing Baghdad and removing Saddam Hussein became a topic of debate after the war. During a TV interview with David Frost on March 27, Schwarzkopf revealed his inclination was to first destroy all of Iraq’s military power. “We were 150 miles from Baghdad,” he said, “and nothing stood in our way.” Yet, Schwarzkopf had agreed with Bush and thought the president had made a courageous and “very humane decision.” The criticism that some Republican Guard units were allowed to remain ignored the fact these forces had been reduced to largely policing units and unable to challenge neighboring states. Agreeing with Bush, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell, pointed



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to the fact that although the U.S. took the lead, the international coalition had been charged with a defined mission. This was the liberation of Kuwait and it had been accomplished. Furthermore, Powell notes, members of the coalition—especially the Arab states—did not want Iraq invaded which might result in its dismemberment. The general noted U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Charles Freeman, had cabled Washington prior to the fighting concerned about the geopolitical consequences of military action. “For a range of reasons,” Freeman wrote, “we cannot pursue Iraq’s unconditional surrender and occupation by us. It is not in our interest to destroy Iraq or weaken it to the point that Iran and/ or Syria are not constrained by it.” It would not enhance Middle Eastern stability, Powell commented in his memoirs, “to have Iraq fragmented into separate Sunni, Shia, and Kurd political entities.” Yet, he wrote, it was “hard to drive a stake through the charges that the job was left unfinished.”36

Postwar Uprisings by Shiites & Kurds In a victory speech on March 6, Bush said he hoped other Iraqi military leaders or anti-Hussein groups could overthrow Saddam Hussein, a miscalculation that would have grievous consequences. The president’s statement encouraged Shiite religious opponents in the south and Kurdish groups in the north to rebel as soon as the cease-fire was announced. On March 2, Shiite opposition around Basra challenged Baghdad’s rule, but lacked the military equipment needed to combat Hussein’s Republican Guard, failed to unite under one imam and expected aid from the Bush administration or Iran’s Shiites that never arrived. Republican Guard units attacked Basra and other Shiite strongholds while Bush ordered American forces occupying southern Iraq to avoid engaging the Guard. By March 25, Hussein’s forces quelled the Shiites with many rebels fleeing to exile in Iran, some Shiites stayed to fight as best they could in the southern marshlands. Because Iraq continually staged air attacks against the Shiites, Bush decided on August 26, 1992 to restrict Iraq’s raids. After consulting with Britain, France and Saudi Arabia, Bush announced that allied forces had created a “no-fly zone” below the 32nd parallel

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of Iraq where they would shoot down any Iraqi aircraft trying to attack the Shiites.37 Unlike the Shiites, the Kurds of northern Iraq had rebelled against Iraq on several occasions since 1920. Several tribal leaders created a unified central command and, as in the south, the Kurd’s offensive began after the cease-fire was announced. In two weeks, the Kurds captured many northern cities including Mosul and Kirkuk in the hope of creating an autonomous region. On March 21, Hussein transferred the Republican Guard from the south to the northern front. Using their superiority in tanks, heavy artillery and helicopters, Iraqi forces drove the Kurds back into their northern provinces. By April 2, up to 1.3 million Kurdish refugees streamed into the mountains bordering on Turkey and Iran. After the Security Council voted to condemn Iraq’s repression of the Kurds on April 5, France, Britain and the U.S. sent 12,000 soldiers to guarantee the safety of Kurdish refugees. Four days later, the Council’s Resolution 688 authorized a 1,440-member UN observation team to monitor a safety zone north of the 36th parallel, near Mosul. The United States, France and Britain also

George Bush Presidential Library Bush participates in a Joint Chief of Staff briefing, with Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and General Colin Powell at the Pentagon



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began “Operation Provide Comfort” that airlifted food, clothing, blankets and medical aid to the refugees. The Kurdish refugee problem brought new problems for Turkey in 1992. The Kurdish rebels now sought to establish an autonomous state in Turkey.38

The War’s Casualties The number of Iraqi deaths have been difficult to tally, in part, because of the Shiite and Kurdish deaths during March 1991 and thereafter. Yet, in May 1991, the Pentagon responded to a Freedom of Information Act request by estimating that 100,000 Iraqi soldiers died but said the margin of error was about 50 percent. It also estimated that about 300,000 Iraqis were wounded. The Greenpeace International Military Group reported that by July 1991, the postwar civil strife caused 90,000 Iraqi deaths. In September 1992, a group of American public health experts estimated that more than 46,900 Iraqi children under five years of age died between January and August 1991.39 In August 1991, the Pentagon’s final count of the number of American casualties were 148 combat deaths, 458 wounded, 120 non-combat deaths, 11 female combat deaths, 4 female non-combat deaths and 13 additional deaths after February 28. The Pentagon also reported that of these totals, 35 deaths and 72 wounded resulted from friendly fire, largely due to the speed and mobility of high tech weapons. American friendly fire also caused the death of nine British soldiers.40

UN & Peace Terms for Iraq Following extensive discussions between the United States and its coalition members, the Security Council approved Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991. Under Hussein’s direction, Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council and Iraq’s National Assembly ratified the treaty terms on April 5, 1991. Nonetheless, Saddam Hussein and his ambassador to the UN complained that the treaty terms were harsh and unjustified. Resolution 687 reaffirmed that Iraq must comply with the 13 Resolutions passed between August 2 and November 29, 1990,

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Dept. of Defense Photo Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney; Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander, U.S. Central Command, during an award ceremony prior to the Welcome Home parade honoring the coalition forces of Desert Storm. 10 Jun 1991

and expanded Iraq’s punishment. The new demands of Resolution 687 were: 1. Iraq agrees to destroy its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. UN inspection teams would oversee the fulfillment of these actions and conduct regular future inspections. 2. Iraq must destroy its missiles and launchers with a range over 90 miles. 3. After cease-fire terms were fulfilled, an arms embargo would prevent Iraq from obtaining offensive weapons and dual-use technologies. 4. A UN Commission would oversee payment of reparations to Kuwait from Iraq’s oil revenues. 5. UN economic sanctions on Iraq would remain in force until the Security Council decided Iraq fulfilled all its terms. 6. Iraq must condemn terrorists and not supply them. 7. A UN peacekeeping force would replace the coalition forces that occupied parts of Iraq.41



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Bush’s Call for a New World Order In his victory speech on March 6, President Bush proscribed a new order enabling the United Nations to fulfill its historic vision based on principles of justice and fair play with the strong protecting the weak. In particular, Bush outlined an American program to stabilize the Middle East by seeking an Arab-Israeli peace process, creating shared security arrangements, fostering economic development in the Gulf region and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Of these four proposals, only one was advanced when a Middle East Peace process was initiated by an international conference at Madrid, Spain, on October 30, 1991. The other three objectives achieved mixed or no success.42 Bush and Secretary of State Baker focused their efforts on convening the Madrid Conference. To achieve the meeting, Baker adopted an incremental approach in which Madrid would host the first of a series of discussions so that subsequently there would be agendas on a nation-to-nation basis. This was no simple task and it took Baker eight months to persuade Israel and the various Arab

George Bush Presidential Library Bush’s advisers review military successes. (l-r) General Colin Powell, Governer Sumumu, Secretary Cheney, Vice President Quayle, Bush, Secretary Baker, General Scowcroft, Robert Gates, CIA

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nations to face each other across the table at Madrid. First, Baker obtained an agreement to attend from Syria, Jordan and Egypt before facing the issue of Israel accepting Palestinian delegates. Eventually Israel’s Shamir agreed to attend after the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed to send Hanan MikhalAshrawi and Haidar Abdul-Shafi rather than Yasir Arafat.43 The Madrid Conference met from October 30 to November 3, 1991 with the best public performance coming from the Palestine delegates. After Syria’s Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa made a harsh, unyielding attack on Israel and Shamir replied in kind, Palestine’s Shafi and Mrs. Mikhail-Ashrawi were conciliatory and showed TV audiences a new image of the PLO. In fact, the PLO delegates made the only substantive concessions during the three days at Madrid. They said they would accept a limited Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories as means to later independence, an offer the PLO previously rejected. The Palestinians did so well, one Israeli official commented: “We made a mistake. We should have let Arafat come.”44 Baker’s attempt at an incremental series of conferences lasted until the summer of 1992 but faded during the last months of the year because of PLO-Israel differences over Jewish settlements on the West Bank.

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Policy of Containment 1991 to 2001

B

oth Presidents George H.W. Bush and William Clinton faced post-war problems with Iraq. After the U.S. and Iraqi delegates signed the cease-fire on March 3, 1991, Hussein ordered his forces to put down uprisings by northern Kurdish tribes and southern Shiites. On April 9, Security Council Resolution 688 authorized the formation of a 1,440-member UN observation team to oversee a “safety zone” for the protection of Kurds north of the 36th parallel and just south of Mosul. At the same time, “Operation Provide Comfort” airlifted food, clothing, blankets and medical aid to the Kurdish refugees. This undertaking prevented a major human disaster during the winter of 1991-1992. After withdrawing from northern Iraq in September 1991, the United States, France and Britain established a “no-fly zone” above the 36th parallel that allowed allied aircraft to shoot down any Iraqi aircraft attacking the Kurds. Later, on August 26, 1992, Bush announced a “no-fly zone” below the 32nd parallel that allowed American, British and French aircraft to protect the Shiites.1

Hussein’s Challenges to Peace Terms On April 5, 1991, Iraq accepted the Security Council’s Resolution 687 that placed economic and military sanctions against Iraq until it fulfilled all the peace terms. Additionally, this resolution passed on November 29, 1991, required Iraq to admit inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to determine that Iraq had destroyed all its weapons of mass destruction. While the IAEA inspectors would search for nuclear weapons materials, UNSCOM

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teams would seek-out any chemical and biological weapons as well as any SCUD missiles capable of carrying a warhead beyond 90 miles. On April 18, 1991, Iraq officials gave the commission a list of its weapons of mass destruction but, on May 15, inspectors found the list to be inadequate and it had to be revised. As they visited factory installations on their first search, the inspectors uncovered documents with details about Iraq’s weapons programs and the global network that supplied Hussein with nuclear, chemical and biological materials. The Iraqi documents surprised inspectors who learned that Iraq’s destructive weapons stockpile had been ten times larger than prewar U.S. intelligence estimates. U.S. intelligence underestimated Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological programs because Iraq had learned from the satellite data given to them during the war with Iran how to hide their facilities. General William Odom, former director of the U.S. National Security Agency, believed the Reagan administration’s data enabled Iraq to develop counter-measures that prevented American satellites from locating Iraq’s weapons facilities. Saddam Hussein also had shared the American data with Soviet experts, thus both countries gained insights into the U.S.’s satellite operations. After 1984, Iraq buried its military telephone lines, using fiber optic lines to make them more surveillance proof.2 As soon as the inspections began in 1991, the inspection teams faced what became a pattern of deliberate confrontations with the Iraqis. For example, in June Iraqi security guards stopped the inspectors from entering a factory for an entire week. During this time, Iraqi workers drove away trucks loaded with machinery suspected of being capable of producing weaponry. After photo-surveillance by U.S. intelligence satellites disclosed the truck movements, President Bush and UN commission leaders gave Hussein a July 25 deadline to cooperate or be penalized. Hussein complied with the deadline and provided full disclosure of all facilities where Iraq produced its banned weapons. Two September incidents prompted Bush to issue further warnings to Iraq. First, in early September, Iraqi troops prevented



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the UN teams from using helicopters to facilitate their inspections. On September 22nd, the Security Council ordered Iraq to let its teams employ helicopters and Hussein agreed. Three days later, Iraqi troops detained UNSCOM leader, Dr. David Kay and 44 members of the IAEA in a Baghdad parking lot to keep them from obtaining certain documents. Again, the Security Council had to pass a resolution ordering Iraq to allow the UN team to enter the building where inspectors found 40,000 documents containing Iraq’s nuclear plans and payment receipts revealing the foreign sources of Iraq’s nuclear technology. However, Iraqi officials resisted complying with the council’s resolution until Kay agreed to make an inventory of the documents the inspectors took. In this instance, Kay’s team obtained only a portion of the documents on Iraq’s nuclear plans because its program leader, Dr. Khalid Ibraham Sa’id, did not know that some documents had already been removed. It was later learned that before Kay’s group arrived, Iraqi nuclear scientist, Mahdi Obeidi, had already taken documents describing Iraq’s centrifuge production materials and machinery. IAEA inspectors did acquire documents showing Iraqi scientists possessed an alternative technique to make nuclear weapons by using equipment that was considered to be outmoded by newer technology standards. Iraq employed a World War II Manhattan Project machine called a cauldron that generated less enriched uranium than the state of the art methods of the 1990s. Thus, Iraq’s nuclear program could only produce bombs similar to the atomic bombs that America dropped in 1945 on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although these devices would cause less damage than the thermonuclear warheads the U.S. and the Soviet Union had later developed, Iraq had devised the means to deliver atomic warheads via ballistic missiles rather than by aircraft. In 1991, UN inspectors estimated Iraq might have completed a “crude explosive device” within 12 months, but would have needed two to three years to construct a nuclear arsenal and the missiles to carry them. At the time of this estimate, the inspectors lacked Dr. Mahdi’s documents describing modern centrifuges that might increase the production of enriched uranium needed for a more powerful bomb. Before Kay’s team arrived in February 1992, Uday Hussein

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instructed Mahdi to hide the documents and, complying, he buried them in his garden near a lotus tree. The hidden documents contained a complete set of plans and drawings needed for building and assembling the centrifuges. In addition to documents, Mahdi’s buried container held four prototypes of a centrifuge’s metal parts such as ball bearings on which a centrifuge rotor rested. During the 1991 war, U.S. bombers succeeded in damaging a cafeteria at al-Atheer, but failed to destroy Iraq’s nuclear complexes. On April 14, 1992, UN and IAEA teams found and supervised the destruction of Iraq’s largest nuclear complex at al-Atheer and another complex at al-Hateem.3 During 1991 and 1992, UN teams located and destroyed many of Iraq’s unconventional weapons. They eliminated an artillery super gun and four incomplete super guns. They located 46,000 chemical weapons, four times the expected number, which required two years to safely destroy. They also found nearly 11,000 unfilled shells and bombs designed to carry chemical and biological weapons as well as 4,600 nerve gas weapons previously unreported. Another blow to the Pentagon’s claim of wartime successes came in June 1992 when the UN inspectors disclosed that the U.S. Air Force attacks had not destroyed a single Scud missile launcher despite many attempts. During the war, the Pentagon had claimed all Iraq’s Scud launchers were knocked out, but on June 24, 1992 UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter, a former U.S. marine captain, told the New York Times that “No mobile Scud launchers were destroyed” and 14 were only slightly damaged. Ritter said the UN inspectors supervised the destruction of 28 Iraqi fixed launchers, including damaged ones, and all 20 of their located mobile Scud launchers.4 Although American intelligence officials claimed Iraq had 816 Scud missiles before the war, inspectors found only a few intact missiles. They continued their search for additional missiles although Iraq had fired several hundred Scuds during the war. In July 1992, the missile search resulted in a confrontation when a UN team sought to inspect Iraq’s Agricultural Ministry building for additional data. Although Hussein finally yielded, the inspectors did not find the desired missile information.5



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Dept. of Defense Photo Lt. Gen. Khalid Bin Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, commander of Joint Forces in Saudi Arabia, and Defense Secretary Richard Cheney watch the proceedings while Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaks with Charles Freeman, U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and Gen. Norman H. Schwarzkopf, commander-in-chief, U.S. Central Command, speaks with another dignitary, during a meeting regarding the Allied military coalition during Operation Desert Shield. May 14, 1992

Clinton and Iraq After becoming president in January 1993, William Clinton continued George H.W. Bush’s policy of joining Britain and France in patrolling Iraq’s two no-fly zones and supporting the UN inspectors in Iraq. Clinton’s first attack on Iraq was an air raid on June 26, 1993 in response to Hussein’s assistance to 13 Iraqis who had participated in an attempted assassination of his predecessor during an April visit to Kuwait. Before Clinton ordered the raid, FBI investigators concluded that two members of Iraq’s General Intelligence Service, Mohammed Jarwad and Abd al-Iman, had recruited 11 Iraqis and three Kuwaitis for the assassination attempt. On April 13, the recruits drove a Toyota Land Cruiser and a Chevrolet Suburban across Kuwait’s border. In their vans, there were pistols, grenades, remote control devices and 180 pounds of Semtex plastic explosives as well as 12 cases of whiskey to disguise the operation. In addition, Kuwait

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recruit Wali Ghazali wore a suicide belt in case their bomb failed to explode. The assassination plot failed because the Iraqis had recruited amateurs who did not know what to do when on April 14, the Bush entourage changed its route between the airport and Kuwait City. On June 27, Iraq’s UN Ambassador Nizar Hamdun denied Iraq’s involvement but U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright provided the Security Council evidence from satellite photographs of a van carrying 170 pounds of explosives and bomb components to demonstrate Iraq’s involvement in the plot. Based on this evidence, Clinton ordered an attack by 23 Tomahawk missiles launched from naval ships in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Three missiles missed

White House Photo President Clinton with Secretary of State Madeline Albright



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their target and killed eight civilians in nearby homes, but 20 hit Iraq’s General Intelligence Service headquarters in downtown Baghdad. Kuwaiti police had captured 14 men charged with the assassination plot. During their trial, Iraq’s role was clearly identified and the men were found guilty. On June 4, 1994, six men were sentenced to death and eight received prison terms. On July 20, 1995, a Kuwait court confirmed the death sentences for two Iraqis but commuted the death sentences for four others.6 From June to November 1993, Hussein resisted the UN inspectors’ requests to install cameras at Iraqi military sites to monitor their potential for making banned weapons. After negotiations with the UN’s chief inspector Rolf Ekeus, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz agreed on November 23 that the inspectors could install cameras. Apparently, Hussein hoped the camera agreement would end the Security Council’s economic sanctions, but this was not part of the Ekeus-Aziz agreement.7 On March 18, 1994, Clinton was troubled when Hussein sent Republican Guard units to the no-fly zone on Kurdistan’s border. At first U.S. observers assumed Hussein simply showed his anger at the Security Council for refusing to abolish economic sanctions. Whatever Hussein’s reasons, on April 14th U.S. Air Force F-15 planes flew to examine Iraq’s intentions when a tragedy occurred. The U.S. airplanes mistakenly shot down two U.S. army helicopters carrying UN officials on a humanitarian mission to help Kurdish tribes in Northern Iraq. In the crash, 26 UN officials and workers were killed, including 15 Americans. In August 1994, U.S. Air Force officials charged the combat pilots with negligent homicide, but a year later a court-martial exonerated the pilots. Five crewmembers of the AWAC radar plane were charged with dereliction of duty for not informing the F-15 pilots that U.S. helicopters were in the area.8 Meanwhile on July 18, 1994, the Security Council again refused Iraq’s demand to end economic sanctions. This decision prompted Hussein to deploy 20,000 Republican Guard soldiers near Basra, a city 40 miles from Kuwait’s border. On October 12, Clinton

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learned of Iraq’s deployment and ordered additional U.S. Navy and Marine forces to the Persian Gulf. On October 15, the Security Council condemned Iraq’s troop movement and ordered Hussein to remove his troops from the Basra region. After Secretary of State Warren Christopher gained approval from members of the old 1991 wartime alliance, Hussein finally agreed. On October 16, he moved the Republican Guard back to bases near Baghdad, however, his actions, in part, persuaded the Security Council on November 14 to again refuse Hussein’s request to lift the economic sanctions.9 Later it would become known that Iraq, with the collusion of western companies, was circumventing the oil sanctions. The Clinton administration was pleasantly surprised in August 1995 when Iraq’s General Hussein Kamel al-Majid and his brother Colonel Saddam Kamel al-Majid defected to Jordan with their wives who were Saddam Hussein’s daughters. In Jordan, the two men called for Saddam Hussein’s overthrow and Hussein Kamel gave the UN’s Rolf Ekeus valuable data about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. As leader of one part of Iraq’s program, General Kamel informed Ekeus that all VX chemical gas and biological weapons programs and most of its Scud missiles were destroyed after the war. Equally important, Kamel explained how Iraq’s Republican Guard units would conceal their weapons from UN inspectors and how Iraqi officials lied about destroying all of its ballistic missiles in the summer of 1991. Special Republican Guard units had hidden data on two Russian Scud missiles and about Iraq’s program for nuclear weapons on computer disks. In an effort to preempt General Kamel’s disclosures, Saddam Hussein gave Ekeus’ inspection team documents that he had previously denied possessing. As a result, the inspectors received about 1.5 million pages of documents that Ekeus thought were “one of the most significant breakthroughs” in four years of UN operations in Iraq. The documents listed some of Iraq’s banned weapons that were located on Kamel’s chicken farm southeast of Baghdad. On August 22, 1995, UN inspector Dick Spertzel led a team to find out more about the information disclosed by General Kamel. The inspector’s subsequent October 1995 report to the Security Council provided information related to Iraq’s biological weapons



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program. Based on Kamel’s declarations and documents, the report may be summarized as follows. 1. Iraq began a biological weapons program in 1974 at the al Hazen Ibn Haytham Institute near Salman Park but the project closed in 1978 after it achieved nothing of value. 2. In 1982, a prominent Iraq microbiologist suggested that more work on biological and chemical weapons might be successful. In 1985, Iraq scientists began their work at the Iraq’s Muthanna State Establishment. In 1986, Iraq obtained bacterial strains from overseas and began research on anthrax that is an animal disease but can infect humans and cause death. From overseas, Iraq also received botulinum toxin, a substance that causes muscular paralysis and will result in the death of humans. With little success in research on an anthrax or botulinium weapon, their work ended in 1987 due to administrative reasons. 3. In May 1987, the Muthanna program moved to Salman Park to again search for possible biological weapons. At Salman Park, the scientists tested biological agents in 1988 on sheep, donkeys, monkeys and dogs. From these tests, studies began on anthrax by using either 7 or 14-liter laboratory fermenters to produce anthrax as a warfare agent. In 1989, about 16 production runs produced 150 liters of concentrated anthrax. 4. After a new research facility was built at Al Hakem, production of anthrax and botulinium toxin for weapons began in 1989. In 1990, Iraq scientists were able to produce 8,425 liters of anthrax and 6,000 liters of botulinium toxin. 5. In 1988 at Salman Park, samples of ricin were obtained from a Samarra Drug Factory and toxicology tests helped scientists to prepare ten liters of concentrated ricin, a toxin that results in human deaths when it is inhaled. When the test of ricin as a weapon in an artillery shell failed, the project was abandoned. 6. After Iraq occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Iraq’s biological weapons program was intensified. Between November 1990 and January 1991, about 5,400 liters of concentrated toxin had been produced but the production of anthrax as a weapon was delayed because anthrax could not be put in the fermenters that previously held botulinium.

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The United States & Two Gulf Wars 7. In summary, Iraqi documents showed it had 19,000 liters of botulinium toxin with 10,000 liters placed in munitions; 8,500 liters of concentrated anthrax with 6,500 in munitions; and 2,200 liters of concentrated aflaxtoxin with 1,580 liters in munitions. Iraq had begun work on aflaxtoxin in 1988, but it was only considered to be able to induce cancers in humans.

Initially, Saddam Kamel and Hussein Kamel hoped to join Iraqi exiles who wanted to oust Saddam Hussein, but the London exiles led by Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) refused to accept the brothers for any future Iraqi government. Dismayed by the INC reaction, the two brothers decided to return home. When they told Baghdad about their decision to return, Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council approved their return and forgave them for departing. On February 20, the Kamel brothers and their families returned to Baghdad in a convoy of limousines. Two days later, the Iraqi News Agency reported their wives had divorced the Kamel brothers. Two hours later, Iraqi television reported members of the al-Majd clan had slain the two brothers in order to cleanse the stain of treason from their family honor. Hussein Kamel’s defection had tremendous repercussion on Mahdi Obeidi’s life because it changed the course of Iraq’s weapons inspections. Kamel had revealed that Mahdi led the centrifuge program at the Engineering Design Center in Rashdiya assisted by German firms. UN inspectors found seven crates of documents on Iraq’s weaponry that were hidden at Kamel’s chicken farm in the Baghdad suburb of Haidar, but Foreign Minister Aziz claimed Kamel acted on his own without Saddam Hussein’s knowledge. Later, the inspectors saw the ashes of about 100 other crates of documents that had been burned by the Iraqis. The burning of these crates would backfire in December 2002, because it meant Iraq did not have documents to show inspectors concerning the destruction of this weaponry. Mahid’s hidden centrifuge documents were not found until he told inspectors about them after he came to America in August 2003. The Kamel brothers’ cousin, Major Izz al-Din Muhammad Hassan ‘Abd al-Majid, also defected to Jordan but later refused to return to Iraq. Having been a member of the Special Republican



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Guards, Izz al-Din informed the UN’s Rolf Ekeus that two molds for ballistic missiles were hidden at his farm and provided information regarding Hussein’s security system. Later, Izz al-Din disclosed privately to Scott Ritter that the Special Republican Guard had buried missile molds, tools and dies and liquid propellants for longrange missiles engines at another farm at Auja, west of Baghdad. In December 1996, Ritter’s UN inspection team visited the Auja farm where they found remnants of missile parts and propellants under a garage floor. This discovery forced Iraqi officials to admit they had not destroyed all ballistic missile parts in the summer of 1991 as previously stated.10

UN Oil-for-Food Program From September 1991 to 1995, Saddam Hussein had rejected the Security Council’s proposal that Iraq sell its petroleum and use the proceeds to buy food and medicine for its people. During these years, the news media often reported how the Council’s economic sanctions had caused the suffering of Iraqi women and children. In contrast to these charges, the U.S. State Department insisted that Hussein was to blame for the suffering of the Iraqi people. The State Department argued that he had used Iraq’s resources to build lavish palaces, import anti-tank weapons from Bulgaria and T-72 tanks from Russia and China, and to rebuild a chemical weapons factory and two missile facilities destroyed during the 1991 war.11 In early 1996, Foreign Minister Aziz announced that Iraq was ready to accept an oil-for-food program, but balked at the Security Council’s requirement that Iraq must first approve the UN’s request to place camera monitors in “sensitive” buildings where Iraq might produce weapons of mass destruction. After Hussein agreed to install the cameras late in July 1996, the Council approved the sale of $2 billion of Iraq’s oil to purchase food and medicine. The UN oilfor-food program was designed to relieve the suffering of ordinary Iraqis by providing food and medicine, but Hussein actually used much of the proceeds from oil sales to build new palaces.12 The 1996 oil-for-food program was approved while Clinton campaigned for reelection, but the president seldom focused attention on foreign policy matters. In September, however, Clinton

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confronted new issues with Iraq that he could not ignore because Iraqi armed forces joined with Kurdish leader Mustafa Massoud Barzani’s army to attack Kurds who were loyal to Jalal Talabani. Since 1991, Bush and Clinton had tried to unite Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) but mutual hatred kept the two groups divided. In early 1996, CIA agents believed the two leaders had improved their relations but they had failed to uncover Barzani’s secret deal to cooperate with Saddam Hussein. In July 1996, fighting broke out between Barzani’s Democratic Party and Talabani’s Patriotic Union, an event that Clinton first chose to ignore. On August 31, Barzani’s army was reinforced by 40,000 of Iraq’s Republican Guard forces to attack a Patriotic Union enclave in Irbil. After Iraqi troops entered Irbil, Barzani loyalists helped Iraqi secret police (mukabarat) arrest PUK members who were tortured and killed. Iraqi forces also destroyed PUK’s television, radio and military installations. Finally, on September 2, Clinton assisted the Patriotic Union by ordering the U.S. navy to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles and Air Force planes from Turkey to strike at the invading Iraqi forces. The U.S. attack forced Republic Guard units to leave Irbil on September 14. Despite Barzani’s treachery, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau was able to arrange a cease-fire with the Patriotic Union in October 1996. Barzani agreed to reconcile his differences with Talabani and to support Kurdish unity.13 Although the Security Council had approved an oil-for-food plan, Iraq’s attack in Irbil delayed its implementation. During the next three months, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali negotiated a revised oil-for-food program that the Council approved on November 25. After Hussein complained that the program interfered with Iraq’s internal affairs, Boutros-Ghali established the UN Office of Iraq Programs (UNOIP) that allowed Iraqi officials to sell oil and purchase food and medicine under UN supervision. In 1997, the UN appointed Benon V. Sevan to head the UNOIP.14 Sevan immediately discovered that he was dealing with Iraqi bureaucrats who were not only inefficient, but duplicitous as they



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skimmed money from the oil sales. He was also dismayed that the program received less media publicity than TV pictures of Iraq’s suffering women and children. Seven told one reporter “When you show on television a child malnourished with hollow eyes, it’s a very strong statement. Yet, you have been very poor in showing all that we have done in order to take care of little children.” Moreover, TV failed to show Hussein spending oil money for military equipment, palaces and luxuries for wealthy members of his loyal Baath following. In 2002, a United Nations investigation disclosed how Hussein and Western companies collaborated to create an oil-forfood scandal.15 (See Chapter 9)

Inspections & Economic Sanctions Questioned Clinton’s 1996 decision to use force against Barzani and Iraqi forces prompted French repercussions. Ever protective of France’s identity as a great power, President Jacques Chirac challenged U.S. primacy in the Security Council by opposing the continuance of Iraq’s economic sanctions and condemning the U.S. air raids on Iraqi forces that joined the attack on Irbil. The Clinton administration was not surprised when Chirac announced that after December 31, 1996, French aircraft would no longer assist British and U.S. planes based in Turkey to maintain the no-fly zones and the Kurds’ Operation Provide Comfort.16 Russia and China joined France in 1997 in advocating an end to the UN’s inspections and economic sanctions. Their dispute with the Americans and British provided Hussein with an opportunity to exploit divisions among Security Council members. On October 27, 1997, Hussein had Iraq’s Parliament pass a resolution that would prevent UN inspectors from rotating their teams back to Iraq until the Security Council set a timetable to end all economic sanctions. Two days later, Hussein claimed that all current American and British UN inspectors were spies and must leave Iraq within seven days. Later it was confirmed that many of the U.S. inspectors were associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. UNSCOM’s Executive Officer Richard Butler, who had replaced Rolf Ekeus, ignored Hussein’s charge and insisted that his UN teams consisted of members from three-dozen nations and that their

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mandate came from the United Nations. Butler therefore suspended all United Nations inspections until Americans and British members were allowed to return. At the Security Council, France, Russia and China vetoed a proposal offered by the American Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson and by Britain’s Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock to take strong action against Hussein’s tactics. The Clinton administration believed France, Russia and China wanted to end economic sanctions in order to expand and profit from their trade with Iraq. After objecting to the Security Council’s failure to approve a strong resolution on November 10, Clinton prepared a military response against Iraq should Hussein not cooperate with UN inspectors as required by Security Council resolutions. The president sent U.S. reconnaissance aircraft for surveillance of Iraq, dispatched four additional F-16 combat aircraft and five KD-135 tanker airplanes to the U.S. airbase in Turkey and deployed the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz to the Persian Gulf. He delayed an attack on Iraq because Hussein seemed to be ready to yield. On November 20, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, an old friend of Hussein, worked out an agreement that permitted American and other UN inspectors to return to Iraq. The White House adopted a “wait-and-see” policy should Hussein violate his promise to Primakov to cooperate with the inspectors. On December 12, 1997, Iraqi officials again stopped UN teams from visiting “sensitive sites” that Hussein claimed were solely under Iraqi sovereignty. Hussein also wanted French, Russian and Chinese diplomats to accompany UN inspectors whenever they visited the “sensitive sites.” On January 13, 1998, Hussein again interrupted UN inspections when he charged that all members of Scott Ritter’s team were spies from the U.S. and U.K. and they must leave Iraq. Although Hussein continued to obstruct the inspections, the Security Council allowed Iraq to sell $2 billion oil as part of its oil-for-food program under a plan it approved on December 27, 1997. Although Iraq profited from the sale of oil, Hussein continued his opposition to UN inspections in 1998.17 After French and Russian officials visited Baghdad in January 1998, Russia’s Foreign Minister Primakov met with Secretary of State



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Albright in Geneva where he reported that Hussein was willing to cooperate “unconditionally” with UN inspectors. The Geneva “unconditional” agreement worked for about two months before there were new disagreements over the inspections of “presidential sites” in Iraq. In response, U.S. and British Security Council delegates argued that current UN supervisors, such as Butler and Ritter, were more experienced than French and Russian diplomats in knowing what critical sites had been barred from inspectors and what questions Iraqi officials must answer. After French President Chirac and Russian President Yeltsin refused to change their positions, President Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair again threatened to use military force unless Hussein cooperated. After their tough talk, Clinton and Blair relented when Secretary General Kofi Annan decided to visit Baghdad to talk with Iraqi leaders. After meeting with Hussein and Foreign Minister Aziz, Annan announced on February 22, 1998 that the Iraqi leaders had signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) that provided for Iraq’s cooperation with UN inspectors. Reluctantly, Clinton and Blair accepted Annan’s compromise even though it created new obstacles. In particular, inspectors could visit “sensitive sites” only when accompanied by Special Commission members that included diplomats from France, Russia, China or other nations appointed by Annan. To make the MOU official, UN Security Council Resolution 7158 endorsed the agreement.18 Annan’s memorandum satisfied those Americans who were critical of the recent bombings of Iraq. Early in February 1998, hundreds of protestors demonstrated in New York City’s Times Square. On February 18, 1998, other protestors demonstrated in Columbus, Ohio. During a public forum inside an Ohio State University building, many protestors in the audience were so loud that they drowned out voices of Secretary of State Albright, Defense Secretary Cohen and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger who tried to make the case for forcing Iraq to allow UN inspections. As Albright complained, the protestors’ intentions were “lofty” but “their information was not as good as their lungs.” Most of the protestors did not see the TV footage of Hussein’s attacks on the Kurdish village of Halabja in 1988 that killed five thousand

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men, women and children with poison gas. Nor had the American protestors talked with Kuwaiti family members who disappeared during Iraq’s occupation in 1990. The protestors even “insisted, facts notwithstanding, that our embargo included food and medicine.” Yet, protestors at Ohio State University significantly detracted from the story that Albright, Cohen and Berger hoped to give to Americans. In Ohio, New York and else where in America, the protestor’s had only seen Iraq’s TV pictures that Hussein regularly staged in Baghdad to show the suffering of the Iraqi women and children. But as usual major U.S. TV channels failed to show Hussein’s luxurious palaces and the military weapons that he purchased from the oil sale profits. Nor, as Benin Sevin pointed out, did TV report the contributions of United Nations and other relief agencies in southern Iraq because Hussein declared these areas off-limits to American and British TV cameras. At Security Council meetings, Secretary Albright showed satellite photos of Iraq’s palaces and arms purchases, but American TV stations failed to transmit those pictures. As groups protested in America, Hussein was constructing another expensive vacation resort 85 miles south of Baghdad. The resort was a secret until May 8, 1999 when Iraq’s state television broadcast Hussein receiving a key to the new city. The city, called Saddamiat al-Tharthar, was on the artificial Lake Tharthar and its gateway featured a 30-foot high bronze statue of Hussein and represented yet another sign of Hussein’s extravagant spending while many Iraqis suffered. In addition, the Coalition for International Justice reported that between 1997 and 2002, Iraq received an average of $6 billion per year in civilian goods under the oil-for-food program, its only legitimate income. Iraq’s $6 billion of income from selling oil for food was six times the amount of “humanitarian aid” received at that time by Bosnia, post-war Afghanistan or Rwanda. However, a large share of these funds was used to import military equipment and luxuries for loyal Baath Party members. Saddam Hussein continued to permit many ordinary Iraqis to suffer a lack of food and medicine. Additionally, Hussein obtained another $2 billion per year from illegal oil that Iraq smuggled to Turkey, Lebanon and Persian Gulf states with most of the Iraqi profits spent on their military weapons.



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On November 2001, President George W. Bush’s Secretary of State Colin Powell persuaded the Security Council to adopt “smart sanctions” that permitted imports of food, medicine and other nonlethal materials but prohibited weapons-related materials. Yet, most Arab states, even Kuwait no longer backed the Security Council’s economic sanctions. 19

The End of UNSCOM Meanwhile, UN inspection teams had made considerable progress despite Iraq’s obstructionist tactics. According to Dr. Mahdi’s memoir, the IAEA had “removed or incapacitated all of the machines, raw materials, and facilities of the centrifuges” needed to build nuclear weaponry. Inspector Scott Ritter agreed that UN inspectors had accounted for, destroyed or removed 90 to 95 percent of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, leaving Hussein with nothing but “documents and scraps of material, and seed stock” for any future “reconstitution effort.” Mahdi and other key Iraqi scientists were no longer working on weapons programs, but were building such items as a new ammunition factory in Karbala or “six oil refineries across Iraq.” Hussein’s continued defiance of Security Council resolutions, however, aroused the suspicion that he was hiding dangerous weapons. From March to December 1998, the Clinton administration faced problems in the Balkans as well as in Iraq. To halt the Kosovo conflict, Clinton and NATO engaged in protracted negotiations with the Serbs that achieved a cease-fire in October 1998. (The October ceasefire was broken in early January when Clinton and NATO began bombing Serbia until Slobodan Milosevic surrendered on June 9, 1999.) Meanwhile to obtain Hussein’s cooperation, Clinton urged Richard Butler who was UNSCOM’s chief executive to avoid intrusive inspections and “go-slow” on surprise “challenge” inspections, while building a definitive case against Iraq’s failure to provide full information about its weapons programs. After the Security Council adopted Annan’s February 1998 Memorandum of Understanding, both Clinton and Secretary of State Albright were cautious about raising questions although Hussein interfered with three UN inspection teams including

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Ritter’s team 255. On August 7, Butler withdrew all UN inspectors to protest Hussein’s failure to cooperate as he had promised in Annan’s Understanding and to oppose Clinton’s go slow policy. Soon after Ritter resigned and complained to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs that Clinton was not aggressive enough against Iraq, a charge denied by Albright and Butler. Republican Party members on the Senate Committee, however, backed Ritter and praised him for reporting Clinton’s alleged weakness in dealing with Iraq.20 In September 1998, Hussein again promised to “fully” cooperate with UN inspectors, but new inspections lasted barely one month before Hussein again challenged the inspectors’ right to work in Iraq unless Security Council’s economic sanctions were lifted. Hussein also demanded the removal of Butler as UNSCOM’s director in favor of an executive official from France, Russia or China. While the Security Council delayed its response to Hussein’s demands, Clinton prepared a military response and sought a strong Council resolution that emphasized Iraq’s failure to fulfill its promises. Although France, Russia, China and most Arab states supported the U.S. request, Secretary General Annan interfered by sending Hussein a letter on November 14th requesting his cooperation. After Hussein promised to cooperate, Clinton and Blair accepted Annan’s action but indicated that if Hussein again interfered with UN inspectors, American and British aircraft would punish Iraq.21 On November 18, UN inspectors returned to Iraq, but almost immediately Iraqi troops kept the inspectors from entering a building and receiving the documents they had requested. For three weeks, Butler tallied instances where Iraq failed to cooperate before he issued a report to the Security Council on December 15, 1998. Being briefed in advance about Butler’s report, Clinton and Blair prepared an attack on Iraq the following day. Citing Iraq’s obstructionist tactics and previous Security Council resolutions that were ignored by Iraq, Clinton and Blair announced their decision to bomb Iraq. On December 16, American and British aircraft launched Operation Desert Fox striking Iraq’s military targets.



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The bombing continued until December 18, the first day of Islam’s holy month of Ramadan. Although initial reports were skeptical about the success of Desert Fox, analyst William M. Arkin reported on January 28, 1999, that the bombing had weakened Iraq’s command and control centers, air defense systems and its weapons production. Assisted by British and American intelligence, plus UN inspection reports, forty-nine of Desert Fox’s bombs hit Iraq’s military targets, transportation agencies, Basra’s oil refinery complex, secret palaces and Baath Party headquarters. Nevertheless, Arkin calculated Iraq could rebuild most of these facilities within a year. Critics of Clinton were harsh in their evaluations, even as late as 2004, frequently denigrating his policies as a sham and the bombings as destroying empty buildings. David Kay’s post-invasion interviews with leading Iraqis, however, indicated that the bombing had been far more effective than understood in Washington or London. It had demoralized those Iraqi officials in charge of producing weapons to such an extent they never attempted again to start up production.

Clinton Presidential Materials Project A foreign policy meeting, Dec. 16, 1998, regarding unsettling affairs with Iraq. Seated around the table from left to right are an unidentified military person, George Tenet, unidentified, Secretary Albright, Sandy Berger, Secretary William Cohen (Defense Department), General Henry Shelton, Donald Kerrick, Leon Fuerth, President Clinton and John Podesta.

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“They realized,” Kay said, “that they’d never be able to reestablish the type of industrial facility they were aiming at.” The bombing brought home the fact that large programs, such as missile or other programs that required testing, would necessarily have readily observed facilities that aerial surveillance could easily identify. After bombing Iraq, the U.S. admitted that Ritter and other Americans on UN inspection teams had installed secret devices to monitor Iraqi security and military communications. Ritter’s 1999 memoir revealed that from 1992 to June 1996, he worked with a CIA agent anonymously called Moe Dobbs and his team of paramilitary operatives. His final experience with Dobbs was to check on information given to UN inspectors by defector Hussein Kamel. Ritter also obtained data from British and Israeli agents to help U.S. inspectors interpret communications of Iraq’s Republican Guard and security operations.22 After Desert Fox, the Clinton administration became involved in three foreign interventions. First, from February to June 1999, Clinton, Blair and NATO focused on a bombing campaign against Serbia’s repressive activity in Kosovo. Second, U.S. and U.K. aircraft continued to shoot down Iraqi aircraft and destroy Iraq’s antiaircraft batteries in “no-fly zones” of northern and southern Iraq. From January to May 1, 1999, the U.S.-U.K. flights destroyed 70 Iraqi tanks, some located only 30 miles from Baghdad. The third U.S. effort revived activities by Iraqi exile groups opposed to Hussein. In November 1998, the U.S. Congress passed, and Clinton signed, the Iraq Liberation Act that allocated $97 million to Chalabi’s London-based Iraqi National Congress (INC) to rebel against Hussein. However, the INC was too weak to challenge Hussein and Chalabi was unwilling to take any risks without backing from U.S. military forces.23 Following Operation Desert Fox, humanitarian experts in the office of UN Secretary General Annan issued a report stating that Hussein was more to blame for the suffering of Iraq’s women and children than the Security Council’s economic sanctions. Hussein, the report said, blamed sanctions as the cause of Iraqi suffering in order to arouse opposition to sanctions around the world. From 1996 to the end of 1998, the report indicated Iraq’s oil-for-food program



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showed that about 50 percent of the $540 million earned from oil sales either disappeared into Iraq’s bureaucracy or was diverted to other purposes by Iraq’s government. As for the remaining 50 percent, Iraq’s bureaucrats allegedly failed to provide the medical clinics and food nutrients sought for women and children. In 1999, the Security Council removed all limits on Iraqi oil sales up to $10 billion of revenue that were again designed to meet Iraq’s humanitarian needs. Yet, Baghdad continued to obstruct and undermine the food and medicine programs. For example, food remained in Baghdad warehouses and was withheld from women and children who suffered from illness and malnutrition.24

Establishing a New Inspection Commission After Hussein refused to admit additional inspectors in 1999, the UN reduced its inspection staff whose work now consisted of updating computer data regarding the status of Iraq’s weaponry. At the same time, Security Council members prepared proposals for an inspection system to satisfy the U.S. and Great Britain as well as France, China and Russia. Following months of discussion about inspections, the Security Council approved Resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999. The resolution replaced UNSCOM with a United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC). Notably, the resolution vote was 11 to 0. Russia, France, China and Malaysia abstained because they favored Iraq but wanted some type of inspection system to enable the Security Council to lift Iraqi sanctions when Hussein cooperated with the new inspection commission. The UNMOVIC’s mandate contained four features that differed significantly from the previous organization. First, the UN Secretary General would direct inspection activities after appointing an executive director approved by the Security Council. Second, the resolution established a Board of UNMOVIC Commissioners consisted of diplomats who, unlike previous inspectors, were not experts in detecting weapons of mass destruction. Third, UN inspectors would receive “cultural training” to make them “sensitive” to Iraqi feelings about their presence. Fourth, the Commission would list the disarmament requirements Iraq must

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fulfill before economic sanctions could be lifted. In the interim, Iraq was required to demonstrate it was willing to cooperate with UN inspectors. Initially, Annan nominated Rolf Ekeus as the new UN Commission’s chief executive, but Russia and France vetoed the choice because Iraq opposed Ekeus who had headed UN inspection teams from 1991 to 1997. In January 2001, Annan named former IAEA chief Hans Blix as the Commission’s chief executive. The Council approved Blix, but Hussein still refused to allow inspectors to enter Iraq. The UN Commission was not able to send inspectors to Iraq until the Security Council approved resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002.25 Circumstances changed in 1999 but Saddam Hussein continued to defy Washington. He flaunted UN sanctions, allowed foreign airplanes to land at Baghdad’s airport, revived trade relations with France, Russia, China and other nations who opposed economic sanctions. These nations also sold Iraq conventional weapons for its armed forces while Hussein profited from the oil-for-food program and the sale of oil smuggled through Turkey, Syria and Jordan. Hussein’s profits failed to provide food and medicine needed by Iraq’s women and children.26 Iraq also benefited from the Israeli-Palestine conflict that escalated after September 24, 2000. In particular, Israel’s fight against Palestine’s Second Intifada enhanced Iraq’s relations with other Arab nations especially Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In a televised address celebrating Iraq’s survival and reconstruction after 1991, Hussein urged all Arabs to take up arms against the “Zionists” and to liberate Palestinian land “from the river to the sea,” an allusion to Israel’s total destruction.27

George W. Bush and Iraq On January 20, 2001, one hour before President Clinton yielded his office to George W. Bush, an Iraqi surface-to-air missile fired on an American jet patrolling the no-fly zone. Two U.S. jets retaliated by firing missiles to destroy an Iraqi antiaircraft battery and radar sites. Such responses by American and British aircraft occurred frequently but this attack apparently sent a message to the son of



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George H.W. Bush who had led international forces against Iraq in January 1991. If Iraq’s attack was symbolic, President George W. Bush soon showed he agreed with Clinton’s no-fly zone policy in Iraq. On February 16, 2001, Bush ordered American and British aircraft to strike Iraq and they bombed Iraq’s alleged weapons facilities near Baghdad in a raid similar to the 1998 Desert Fox attack. As in 1998, the French, Russians, and Chinese criticized the Americans and British for their actions. Arab nations such as Egypt also denounced the attacks because they feared a larger war in the Middle East after Ariel Sharon’s election victory over Barak on January 20, 2001.28 Although President Bush ordered the bombing of alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction sites near Baghdad on February 16, 2001, he would soon reverse Clinton’s dual containment policy toward Iraq by planning the overthrow of Hussein’s regime.

4

Preparing for War Again 2000-2003

P

resident-elect George W. Bush visited President Clinton at the White House on December 19, 2000 where, according to Clinton’s memoir, they “talked about the campaign, White House operations, and national security.” Clinton listed, in order, what he considered the major security problems: “Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda; the absence of peace in the Middle East; the standoff between nuclear powers India and Pakistan, and the ties of the Pakistanis to the Taliban and al-Qaeda; North Korea; and then Iraq.” But, he noted, Bush was already “putting together an experienced team from past Republican administrations who believed that the biggest security issues were the need for national missile defense and Iraq.”1 Subsequently, Vice-President-elect Richard Cheney arranged for Bush, and future key advisors—National Security Council (NSC) Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld—to visit Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William A. Cohen and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on January 10, 2001. Cohen and JCS Chief General Hugh Shelton described the no-fly zones that extended from the 32nd parallel in the south to Baghdad’s outskirts and the northern zone from the 36th parallel near Mosul to Turkey’s border. Since these zones were established in 1991 and 1992, American and British aircraft had completed 150,000 flights without any U.S. or U.K. pilots having been lost due to Iraqi anti-aircraft fire. Cheney asked Cohen about the Iraq Liberation Act of November 1998 that allocated $97 million for a rebellion against Saddam Hussein.

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Cohen said the State and Defense departments had disagreed over whether to give money to the Iraqi National Congress (INC) or to Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. During the meeting Cheney nodded off to sleep at times and Rumsfeld asked the speakers to talk louder, according to Bob Woodward. Later, a Joint Chiefs member remarked: “We’re off to a great start. The vice president fell asleep and the defense secretary can’t hear.”2 Key Bush advisors had long advocated Saddam Hussein’s removal and had been members of a neoconservative group formed 1997 under the rubric of the Project for a New Century (PNAC). On June 3, 1997, a PNAC “Statement of Foreign Policy Principles” criticized Clinton’s hesitant, “incoherent policies.” In contrast, the PNAC advocated a “military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States global responsibilities.” On January 26, 1998, the PNAC published an “Open Letter to President Clinton” demanding he oust Hussein from Iraq’s presidency. The letter said: “We are writing because we are convinced that current policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War.” Since his “containment” policy failed and UN inspectors cannot ensure Iraq does not have weapons of mass destruction, Clinton must terminate Hussein’s regime. “This means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing.” If Clinton continued to “accept a course of weakness and drift, we put our interests and future at risk.” Of the 18 signatories to the PNAC letter, 11 joined the Bush administration in January 2001. They were Donald Rumsfeld, the NSC director for the Near East Elliot Abrams, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Undersecretary for Global Affairs Paula Dobrinsky, Special Envoy for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad, Chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter W. Rodman, Chairman of the



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Pentagon’s Science Board William Schneider, Jr., Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoelick.3 Bush discussed the Middle East situation with his National Security Council on January 30, 2001. During the session, Bush said: “We’re going to correct the imbalance of the previous administration on the Mideast conflict. We’re going to tilt it back toward Israel….” Although Secretary Powell objected to the tilt toward Israel, Bush replied: “Maybe that’s the way to get things back in balance. Sometimes a show of strength by one side can really clarify things.” Then Rice focused on the destabilizing role of Iraq and asked Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet for a briefing. Tenet displayed a large photo of an Iraqi factory, taken by a surveillance satellite, that he claimed produced biological and chemical materials for Iraqi weapons. After looking at the picture, Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill said he had seen many similar factories. “What,” he asked Tenet, “makes us suspect that this one is producing chemical or biological agents for weapons?” Tenet cited circumstantial evidence such as round-the-clock shipments in and out of the plant; however, he admitted the CIA had no “confirming intelligence” on the materials being produced. Tenet’s next photos showed where U.S. aircraft patrolling no-fly zones had shot down an Iraqi plane and pictures of antiaircraft fortifications surrounding Baghdad, an area outside no-fly zones. O’Neill inquired about a U.S. combat plane’s ability to destroy Iraqi antiaircraft batteries and other military installations. In reply, Tenet indicated U.S. intelligence was so poor for the antiaircraft targets that “we’d be going in there blind.” Before the next NSC meeting on February 1, 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld sent Secretary O’Neill a memo outlining a budget the U.S. military required to meet the future dangers to America. Rumsfeld’s memo said the military must protect the U.S. and its allies from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Russia and China. During the February 1st meeting, Rice asked about plans for Iraq’s economic and political resulting from the United Nations

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Security Council’s economic sanctions levied between 1991 and 2000. Four days later, Rice chaired a high-level meeting to review options for ousting Saddam Hussein. In addition to Rice, those attending were Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld, and the CIA’s Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin who filled in for Tenet. The conferees acknowledged Hussein received international support by emphasizing that the economic sanctions were the reason why thousands of Iraqi women and children suffered. Powell agreed with Rice that economic sanctions were playing “into Saddam’s hands and losing support among the Iraqi people.” To correct these sanctions, Powell wanted to revise the sanctions by abolishing those on humanitarian items like food and medicine while still prohibiting military imports; a proposal called “smart sanctions.” Bush agreed and told Powell to work out details of smart sanctions. With the help of UN’s inspection chief, Hans Blix, Powell subsequently persuaded the Security Council to adopt smart sanctions for Iraq on November 29, 2001 as Resolution 1382.4

9/11 Terrorist Attacks & Afghanistan Invasion While the Security Council considered Powell’s smart sanctions, Rumsfeld explored military plans to remove Hussein, however, this activity was interrupted by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Following 9/11, Cheney and Rumsfeld proposed that U.S. forces should attack Iraq as well as al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, but Powell opposed an immediate invasion of Iraq because it would inflame America’s Arab allies in the Middle East. The Chairman of the JCS General Henry B. Shelton supported Powell arguing that the war against the Afghan terrorists should be completed before launching other military campaigns. The president accepted Powell and Shelton’s advice and delayed plans to attack Iraq. By early October, Bush and Powell had rallied most of the world’s nations to support a military assault upon the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The initial conflict was brief and casualties few as American-led forces seized control of Kabul by December 2001 and made Hamid Karzai head of the Afghan’s interim government.



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Bush’s major disappointment was the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and eliminating al-Qaeda as a threat.5 Following the easy military successes in Afghanistan, the president’s State of the Union message to Congress on January 29, 2002 shifted attention to Iraq. After celebrating the Afghan victory, Bush said: “What we found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning.” He said Americans must be patient with the government’s efforts in shutting down terrorist camps, disrupting their plans and bringing them to justice. The administration also needed to prevent attacks by terrorist regimes “who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons” to threaten “the United States and the world.” After citing North Korea, Iran and Iraq as nations exporting terrorism and having weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Bush concluded: “States like these and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the world.” The U.S. “can’t stop short—leaving terror camps intact and terror[ist] nations unchecked….”6

White House Photo President George W. Bush addresses the nation on the War on Terrorism from The Citadel, the military college of South Carolina. 11 Dec 2001

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Pentagon’s Secret Disinformation Office The Bush appointees had hardly taken control of the Pentagon when Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith began creating a “cell” that became the vanguard of what can only be described as an Iraqi disinformation campaign. Both men were neoconservatives and had been active in the Project for a New Century. Wolfowitz lamented that the U.S. had not seized Baghdad in 1991 and was outspoken in his belief Saddam Hussein must be eliminated. Feith was active among hawkish Zionist groups and believed Israel had parallel security interests in seeking Hussein’s ouster. Following the 9/11 attacks, Wolfowitz and Feith were determined to demonstrate a relationship between Al Qaeda and Iraq even though virtually all anti-terrorist experts discounted the possibility. Career Pentagon personnel who “weren’t sufficiently enthusiastic” about the anti-Iraq crusade that Wolfowitz and Feith desired were promptly replaced. The CIA’s reporting was discounted as too cautious for a unit seeking “Feith-based intelligence.” Consequently, Feith’s group spent its time searching various intelligence reports for any “nuggets of information linking Iraq, Al Qaeda, terrorism and the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.” In September 2002, Feith created a secret Special Plans Office (SPO), under the direction of Abram N. Shulsky. It continued to sift through intelligence reports but, according to Greg Thielmann of the State Department’s intelligence staff, failed to apply “strict intelligence-verification standards to its findings.” The SPO nonetheless soon rivaled George Tenet’s CIA, the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and State Department officials with its direct pipeline to high-ranking administration officials. It fed the vice president and president bits and pieces of unproven “intelligence” that often appeared as inaccurate, disputed sound bites in their speeches. According to Seymour Hersh, the SPO’s influence in 2002 was accompanied by the declining influence of the CIA and DIA. Feith distrusted anyone who was not 100 percent with him. As a former CIA expert told Hersh, Feith’s SPO team has “a high degree



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of paranoia. They’ve convinced themselves that they’re on the side of the angels, and everybody else in the government is a fool.”7

Debate Over Iraq Sharp differences over how to deal with Iraq pitted Secretary Powell against Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. Cheney and Rumsfeld pointed out that the UN’s sanctions against Iraq and its weapons inspections for over the past ten years had failed to remove or damage Hussein’s regime and that diplomacy was a waste of time and money. In contrast, Powell said the Security Council’s newly approved “smart sanctions” would weaken Saddam Hussein’s control because the stronger sanctions would not only restrict Iraq’s weapons imports but also would help retain U.S. alliances with Arab nations. Powell wanted to sponsor a Security Council resolution requiring Iraq to admit UN inspectors, which Saddam had denied since 1999, to investigate claims of banned weaponry. The administration, meanwhile, continued to press for a more aggressive policy toward Hussein from European and Arab leaders. At a February 2002 Conference on Security Policy at Munich, NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson welcomed the American delegates. He stressed that our mutual security became stronger when we recognize our “sense of common destiny, and our commitment to our common security.” The Americans spoke directly to the purpose of their mission. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) told the delegates: “The next front is apparent and we should not shrink from acknowledging it. A terrorist resides in Baghdad with the rich resources of the entire state” and is “proud of a decadelong record of falsifying the international community’s demands that he come clean on his programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.” Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) added: “There is more than enough evidence to lead us to reach a conclusion that Iraq under Saddam Hussein constitutes a clear and present danger.” The senators’ hawkish positions shocked the European delegates. House of Commons member, Menzies Campbell, said Britain supported a stronger position against Iraq, but London “would require inconvertible evidence in order to justify” a military

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operation. A member of the German Parliament (Reichstag), Gert Weisskirchen, wanted a “multilateral approach in U.S. policy” toward Iraq, arguing America must involve its allies in planning and executing any battles ahead. In an evasive response, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz indicated the NATO meeting was part of a U.S. dialogue with its allies as Washington had not yet decided on a war against Iraq.8 A month later Bush and British Prime Minister Blair agreed that they should challenge terrorists in countries who had not cooperated with the U.S.’s war on the Taliban. During their March 2002 meeting, Bush insisted that Iraq must permit intrusive inspections of all its weaponry. A “Secret Downing Street Memo,” dated July 23, 2002, made public in June 2005, summarized the status of Blair’s partnership with Bush. It declared recent talks in Washington had concluded: Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam through military action, justified by the conjunction of

Dept. of Defense Photo Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith (background left) and Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld (background right) at Pentagon, May 2, 200



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terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion of the aftermath of military action. War plans included three options for Britain: 1. “Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.” 2. The above with “maritime and air assets in addition.” 3. As above, “plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.” Since Britain’s attorney general had indicated the desire for regime change “was not a legal base for military action,” the memo continued, there remained “three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation.” The prime minister added that if Hussein refused to admit UN inspectors this could provide legal grounds for action. During a July 23 session, the British principals concluded it could be assumed they would take part in any military action once American planning was known. In addition, they would begin British military planning, check on the role of UN inspectors, seek out the positions of Turkey and EU members and obtain a complete intelligence update on Iraq.9 In a speech at the U.S. Military Academy on June 1, 2002, Bush argued that “new threats” required “new thinking…. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge…. Our security will require all Americans…to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.” Finally he said: “We will not leave the safety of America at the mercy of a few mad terrorists and tyrants.” While he did not mention Iraq, most observers correctly concluded Bush was ready to attack Iraq. His preemptive war concept became formal policy on September 20, 2002, as part of U.S. National Security Strategy to disarm Iraq unilaterally and by force if necessary. Although Powell accepted the notion of preemptive war, he believed the president should first clarify differences among members of his administration. In August 2002, these differences came to a head while Bush’s speechwriter prepared the president’s

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UN General Assembly speech scheduled for September 12th. Early in August 2002, Powell was able to convince most European and Arab leaders that Iraq must permit UN inspections and fully comply with the Security Council’s sanctions before Washington would advocate a war.10 Advisors to former President George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft and Baker opposed an invasion of Iraq. Former NSC advisor Scowcroft argued there was “scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations” because Hussein has little in common with terrorists. He opposed an Iraqi war that would divert American military activity “from our war on terrorism.” About the same time, former Secretary of State James Baker conceded a military attack could force Hussein out of office, but insisted “unless we do it the right way, there will be costs to other American foreign policy interests, including our relations with practically all Arab countries,” as well as “our top foreign policy priority, the war on terrorism.” Baker wanted “a simple and straightforward” Security Council resolution demanding intrusive inspections in Iraq with authorization to use “all necessary means to enforce it.” Both Scowcroft and Baker opposed the use of military force unless the “Big Five” permanent Security Council members agreed as they did in 1990.11 In early September 2002, President Bush signed a top secret memorandum, titled “Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy,” that declared U.S. goals were to “free Iraq in order to eliminate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and associated programs,” to reduce Iraq’s danger to the region, terminate Iraqi links to international terrorism and assist Iraq in creating a society based on democracy. Next, the memo’s purpose was to “conduct policy in a fashion that minimizes the chance of a WMD attack against the United States, U.S. field forces, our allies and friends.” Other objectives were to “deter Iran and Syria from helping Iraq and to minimize disruption in international oil markets.” The Strategy section stated the U.S. would employ “all instruments of national power to free Iraq,” including diplomacy, the military, the CIA and economic sanctions. The U.S. would work with the “Iraqi opposition to demonstrate that we are liberating,



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not invading Iraq, including the preparation of a new constitution.” Finally, the administration would pursue “our goals and objectives with a coalition of committed countries, if possible, but acting alone if necessary.”12 Since UN Secretary General Annan, most European and Arab leaders, and American public opinion polls favored an attack on Iraq only if the UN approved an American-led operation as in 1991, Bush agreed to a Security Council resolution demanding UN inspectors search Iraq. His September 12 speech to the UN General Assembly emphasized that since 1991 Iraq had not fulfilled its promises to permit intrusive UN weapons inspections. He listed five conditions Saddam must meet if he wanted peaceful relations. First, Hussein must “unconditionally foreswear, disclose and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long range missiles and all related material. Second, he “will immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it….” Third, he “will cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shi’a, Sunni, Kurds, Turkomans, and others….” Fourth, he “will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown” and “return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait….” Finally, Hussein must “end all illicit trade outside the oil-forfood program” and accept UN “administration of funds from that program, to ensure that the money is used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.” Bush concluded: “If Iraq’s regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account.”13

Iraq Again Agrees to UN Inspections On September 16, Baghdad informed Secretary General Annan that it would “allow the return of United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions.” This was “the first step towards an assurance that Iraq no longer possesses weapons of mass destruction” and toward a solution to questions of sanctions and other issues. Hans Blix told Annan that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) could begin inspections in two months; meanwhile, the Security

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Council began preparing a resolution to govern the forthcoming Iraqi inspections. Initially, Blair and Powell offered a resolution to require Iraq’s unconditionally admission of inspectors to all sites without previous notification, including those at “sensitive sites” such as Saddam’s eight palaces. Their resolution could have the five permanent Security Council members represented on any inspection team and contained a clause to permit the use of “any means necessary”—i.e., military action—if Iraq tried to block inspectors from any site. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov subsequently proposed two separate resolutions to deal with Iraq. The first would authorize inspections based on Secretary General Annan’s February 1998 Memorandum of Understanding that restricted surprise inspections of “sensitive sites” such as Saddam’s palaces. Their second resolution threatened possible war if Iraq failed to comply with the inspections.14 Chief UN inspector Blix and International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Director ElBaradei persuaded Powell, Blair, de Villepin and Ivanov to accept a modified proposal that granted no special rights to Security Council members, but clarified how UN and IAEA inspections would take place. The resolution stated that if Iraq committed a “serious breach that would end a cease-fire” and that if Iraq made any “false statements or omissions” in disclosing its weapon sites, it would be “a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations.” On November 8, 2002, the Security Council adopted the modifications as Resolution 1441 by a vote of 15-0. The delegates continued to disagree, however, with interpretations of important parts of the resolution. America’s UN ambassador John D. Negroponte insisted: “Non-compliance is no longer an option” and any material breach would be “a serious matter.” In contrast, China, Russia and French delegates demanded that weapons inspectors first report to the Security Council who would decide what action to take if Iraq created a “material breach” of the agreement. France, especially, wanted the inspectors’ reports to spell out Iraqi violations before a second Security Council resolution would approve either a threat of, or the use of, force against Iraq.15



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Congress Grants Permission to Attack Iraq When Congress convened on September 4, President Bush invited 18 key Senate and House leaders to the White House. He said: “Iraq is on a lot of people’s minds” and, while there were many disagreements, he expected “Congress to be part of any decision.” Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and Thomas Daschel (D-SD), the Democratic Senate Majority leader, could not understand the case for war: what evidence was there that Iraq has nuclear missiles and why do senior military officials have “deep concerns about an Iraqi war?” The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of December 2000 was updated for the Senate Intelligence Committee in October 2002. The 2000 NIE suggested Iraq had up to 100 metric tons of chemical warfare agents and might have 200 metric tons in the future. It also stated Iraq was working on biological weapons, but had none ready for use. On October 2, 2002, CIA director had issued a report that claimed “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons,” but the 2002 NIE admitted that analysts had only seen “a portion of Iraq’s WMD efforts.” The CIA report expressed a belief that “Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, cyclosarin” and other gases but did not know if Iraq was actually able to use them. The national estimate agreed, “we have little specific information on Iraq’s CW stockpile” but it is possible Hussein has stockpiled “as much as 500 metric tons of CW agents.” Regarding Iraq’s nuclear weapons, the new NIE had “moderate confidence” Iraq does not have “a nuclear weapon or the fissile material” to construct one before 2007 or 2009. Despite its many caveats on Iraq’s weapons programs, the 2002 NIE—often unread, but selectively quoted—was the turning point in persuading members of Congress to authorize the president to attack Iraq. Later, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld briefed the members of Congress but presented no evidence to prove Iraq was more dangerous in 2002 than during the 1990s. He also refused to answer critical questions from some members of Congress regarding the Bush administration’s claim that Iraq harbored al-Qaeda terrorists.16

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Despite congressional concerns, the president asked both houses of Congress for authority to use “all means he determines to be appropriate, including force” to disarm Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. Bush said: “If the United Nations Security Council won’t deal with the problem, the United States and some of its friends will.” On October 7, Bush made his case for preventive war against Iraq at Cincinnati’s Union Terminal Museum. He declared Iraq “was the most serious danger of our age” that “only grows worse with time” even though there was no evidence of immediate peril. But, he said, “we cannot wait for the final proof, for the smoking gun, that would come in the form of a mushroom cloud”—a reference to his claim Iraq had nuclear weapons. After some compromises, the House Joint Resolution 114, entitled “Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” claimed “members of al Qaida [sic], an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States…. are known to be in Iraq.” A second part refers to Iraq’s “willingness to use weapons of mass destruction…to launch a surprise attack on the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so….”17 Immediately after Democratic Senator Tom Daschle and Republican Trent Lott introduced a resolution approved by the White House, Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) asked, on October 4, if the secretaries of state and defense had information about Iraq “that is new today that you did not know three months ago or six months ago?” America’s elected representatives, Byrd continued, “are not supposed to follow any president, whether he is a Democrat or Republican, meekly and without question.” During the ensuing debate, Senator John Kerry (D-MA) agreed to vote for the resolution to disarm Iraq because Hussein’s “deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands [sic] is a threat, and a grave threat, to our security.” Kerry said he expected President Bush “to fulfill the commitments he has made to the American people in recent days—to work with the United Nations Security Council to adopt a new resolution…and to act with



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allies at our side if we have to disarm Saddam by force.” Senators Charles Hagel (R-NB) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) were concerned that Bush preferred a preemptive strike rather than first forming a UN coalition to challenge Iraq. Daschle wanted a vote after the November congressional elections but the Republicans insisted Bush needed an immediate vote.18 Several arguments made for an Iraqi war. For example, Congressman James Bunning (R-KY) said: “The case against Saddam Hussein is clear. We can no longer tolerate him and the threat he poses not only to us but to his neighbors, the Middle East and the entire world.” While Senator Frank H. Murkowski (R-AK) supported Bush claiming America had an “increasing dependence on Iraqi oil” and Iraq’s “oil is funding terrorism.” Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) opposed the resolution because Bush was shifting his focus from al-Qaeda’s continuing resistance and the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Kennedy agreed Hussein was dangerous but argued the president failed to show that Iraq was an “imminent threat to our national security” or that “a unilateral preemptive American strike and an immediate war is necessary.”19 Eventually, the Senate discarded its resolution and considered the House version as Joint Resolution 114. After the House voted 296 to 133 to approve Joint Resolution 114 on October 8, 2002, the Senate concurred on October 10 by a margin of 77-23.20

UN & IAEA Inspections After Security Council Resolution 1441 was approved on November 8, 2002, Iraq’s parliament voted to reject any Iraqi inspections, but President Saddam Hussein overruled his parliament and extended an invitation to the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission [UNMOVIC] and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to resume inspections. He insisted Iraq no longer possessed any weapons of mass destruction or missiles as proscribed by the Security Council in 1991. Between November 25 and 28, the first 12 inspectors reached Baghdad to begin the initial inspections.

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During the first week, teams from the UN commission and IAEA conducted 20 inspections, including Baghdad’s Al Sayad Palace where IAEA inspector Dimitri Perricos’ team was not initially admitted. After ten minutes, Perricos called the IAEA center and, at that moment, Iraqi guards permitted his inspectors to enter. Iraq’s Vice President Taha Yassim Ramadan complained to Blix that the Palace incident was staged to provoke Iraq into committing a breach of Resolution 1441. In the first week, UN inspectors failed to find any Iraqi biological or chemical weapons but did discover 12 artillery shells containing mustard gas at a previously identified building, the first evidence of Iraq’s illegal weapons.21 The inspectors learned to walk in the garden of the Al Rasheed Hotel while discussing their work because Iraqi technicians had bugged the hotel rooms and lobbies with listening devices. When inspectors initially conducted searchs for weapons up to five “minders” accompanied each inspector, perhaps because Iraqis sought to learn in advance what buildings would be inspected to avoid “surprise” inspections at “sensitive” sites. Blix asked Iraqi officials to reduce the number of “minders” and, almost at once, the ratio dropped to one minder per inspector.22 As required by Resolution1441, Iraq’s Major General Hassam Muhmmad Amin gave Blix and ElBaradei the Iraqi declaration about its weapons and missile programs on December 8, 2002— some12,000 pages of text with supporting documents. There were 3,000 new pages of relevant information together with 5,000 pages of supporting documents. The other pages were reprints of declarations made to UN inspectors between 1991 and 1998. The new documents from 1999 to 2002 described Iraq’s ballistic missiles and what the Iraqi’s called “peaceful use of biological ingredients for pharmaceutical use.” Amin claimed the documents verified Iraq’s compliance with UN inspectors’ demands between 1991 and 1998 by destroying all prohibited weapons. UNMOVIC and IAEA teams analyzed the declaration contents and, as agreed previously, Blix and ElBaradei had the permanent five Security Council members and the Federal Bureau of Investigation eliminate any information other nations might use to make nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. After the ten non-permanent



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Security Council members had read the declaration, Blix and ElBaradei briefed the full Council on December 19, 2002. In general, Blix thought Iraq’s declaration did not resolve all disarmament questions about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Secretary Powell insisted that Iraq’s declaration sought to deceive the Security Council by leaving unanswered questions about anthrax, mobile laboratories producing biological agents, long-range ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, VX nerve gas, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In response, Blix said he could neither confirm nor deny Powell’s claim but there were “some inconsistencies and issues that will need clarification.”23 While inspections proceeded, President Bush and CIA Director Tenet ordered CIA personnel to monitor the inspectors’ activity because their findings were vital to any decision on war. Moreover, Bush, Cheney and Rice feared Blix was not aggressively pressing the search for weapons. After a more extensive examination of Iraq’s declaration, Blix and ElBaradei informally briefed Security Council members on January 9, 2003. Blix reported that Iraq’s declaration yielded little new data about its weapons of mass destruction but his inspectors had found no “smoking gun” to show Iraq had any prohibited weapons. ElBaradei said IAEA teams had conducted 109 inspections at 88 locations and interviewed several Iraqi scientists. In particular, he said the IAEA’s analysis of Iraq’s imported aluminum tubes indicated they were only used to make rockets and not modified as centrifuges for uranium.24 Soon after, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld informed Bush that the essential U.S. and U.K. troops were deployed in the Gulf region and ready for war. Meanwhile, Bush met with Iraqi exiles on January 10 and told them if Saddam Hussein doesn’t disarm “we will remove him.” One of the delighted exiles declared the “people will greet troops with flowers and sweets.” On January 11, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Chairman of the JCS General Richard Meyers asked Saudi Arabia’s ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan for permission to move U.S. soldiers and planes through Saudi territory on their way into Iraq as in 1991; this time they promised Saddam would be removed. Subsequently, Prince

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Bandar obtained approval for the use of Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan Air Base by Lt. General T. Michael (Buzz) Moseley to direct the coalition’s air command and control facilities over Iraq. But the Saudi denied U.S. and coalition forces the use of Saudi seaports, Saudi territory or Saudi air bases to launch combat operations against Iraq. Two days later, Bush indicated he believed “the inspections are not getting us” anywhere and told Powell: “I really think I’m going to have to do this.” Powell responded, “You’re sure?” Bush then asked Powell, “Are you with me on this?” Powell replied, “I’ll do the best I can. Yes sir, I will support you. I’m with you, Mr. President.” British Prime Minister Tony Blair held a two-hour conversation with Bush on January 31, 2003. According to the “extremely sensitive” five page memo written by Blair’s foreign policy advisor David Manning, the two agreed: “Our diplomatic planning had to be arranged around the military planning.” Manning’s memo also indicated an agreement that an attack on Iraq would commence on March 10 when the bombing of Iraqi targets would begin. The memo states that the two leaders believed there would be a quick victory and that Bush thought, “it was unlikely there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups.”25 Meanwhile, Blix and ElBaradei provided the Security Council with a second report on January 27, 2003, after IAEA teams had inspected 230 sites and UN inspection teams had searched over 300 sites. The most significant item inspectors found was an undeclared crate containing 11 warheads designed for use with chemical weapons at the Ukhaiden storage area in northwestern Iraq, but no signs of chemical agents were at the site. Iraq meanwhile had given inspectors a list of 500 Iraqi scientists to be interviewed about Iraq’s weapons programs. Even so, Blix declared: “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance—not even today—of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.” He criticized Iraq for not provide documents or evidence to prove it had destroyed its prohibited weapons of mass destruction.



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Blix indicated inspectors did not know whether or not Iraq had biological, chemical or nuclear weapons; but they lacked evidence that it did. He thought there were “strong indications” Iraq produced more anthrax than declared, but there was no compelling evidence that Iraq desired to activate anthrax. Inspectors had found four empty chemical warheads at a declared site and some nuclearrelated documents in a scientist’s home. Finally, he said Iraq had tested Samoud-2 missiles with a range of more than the permitted range of 90 miles (150 km) set by the 1991 Security Council resolution. Blix also claimed inspectors experienced “disturbing incidents and harassment,” including charges that inspectors were spies. He wanted more Iraqi cooperation in the search for weapons, including additional documents about weapon programs and private interviews with Iraqi scientists. El Baradei stated IAEA inspectors visited a scientist’s private home where they found 2000 pages of undeclared documents dealing with laser technology to guide old style Scud missiles and lasers to enrich uranium. IAEA teams also located aluminum tubes at a new building but no evidence those tubes could enrich uranium or that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program. In addition, the IAEA desired information about the American and British claim that Iraq imported uranium from Africa or had other types of nuclear explosives. IAEA inspectors were prepared to search for nuclear weapons using advanced sensors and were encouraging private interviews with Iraqi scientists. Finally, Blix said UNMOVIC and IAEA investigations would continue their search with approval from the Security Council, a view ElBaradei shared as “a valuable investment in peace.” Powell’s assessment of Blix’s report was negative. “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it,” he noted, and that Iraq admitted it violated missile restrictions but did not explain where it stored chemical and biological weapons. “The issue,” he said, “is not how much more time the inspectors need to search in the dark. It is how much more time Iraq should be given to turn on the lights and come clean.”26

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Powell’s Speech to the Security Council President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union message to Congress claimed, among other things, “the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” He added, “The world has waited twelve years for Iraq to disarm. Americans will not accept a serious and mounting threat to our country, our friends and our allies.” To correct this, Bush would ask the Security Council to convene on February 5 and consider facts about Iraq’s defiance. “If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people, and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.” As Bob Woodward later noted, Bush’s reference to African uranium should have been deleted because CIA Director Tenet knew this was false, but he had not reviewed Bush’s speech.27 The issue of African uranium, however, would continue to be an issue. Secretary Powell was selected to present the administration’s case at the Security Council’s special February 5th session. He used satellite photographs, intercepted telephone messages and accounts of defectors as evidence that military action would be necessary to destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and to sever Saddam’s link with al-Qaeda terrorists. Powell claimed Iraq constantly moved its biological and chemical weapons, while its ballistic missiles remained hidden from inspectors. Moreover, he said, U.S. sources indicated “that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads have been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape detection.” “We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program,” Powell declared. “On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons.” Iraq only needs “sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium” and Saddam has made “repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 countries, even after inspections resumed.” Powell



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admitted the aluminum tube issue was controversial, but “Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium.” Saddam, Powell insisted, considered any scientist who talked with inspectors—or left the country to be interviewed—to be a spy, meaning the scientist and his family could be executed. Finally, Powell called the Council’s attention to signs that Iraq had links to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. He claimed Iraq “harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” a collaborator with “Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenants.” Powell said that after the U.S.-led coalition forced the Taliban to leave Afghanistan, “the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosives training camp. And this camp is located in northeastern Iraq.” Powell concluded that Iraq’s links to al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction required the Security Council to approve a preemptive war against Iraq. After Powell’s speech, Blix told inspectors to reexamine sites Powell mentioned even though the UN teams had visited many locations Powell cited at least four times since November 2002 without finding any evidence of prohibited activity. For instance, Powell’s picture of a ballistic missile factory with cargo trucks moving missiles two days before inspections began was listed in Iraq’s December 8th declaration. Inspectors searched the site and found al Samoud-2 missiles with the illegal range of more than 90 miles but Iraq agreed to destroy these missiles by March 7, 2003. Blix was perplexed by Powell’s taped telephone conversations between Iraqi officials who claimed they removed or eliminated certain nerve gas agents. Powell did not reveal who and what role people on the tapes had in Iraq. Were they defectors? Were they disloyal Iraqi’s in Baghdad? Powell simply said some sources were technical defectors, some from “intercepted phone conversation,” some from “people who risked their lives.” Powell said, “I cannot tell you everything.” But Powell did say: “My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.”28

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Powell’s attempt to link Iraq with al-Qaeda groups in northern Iraq was based on American reports that claimed British M16 intelligence had found out about Ansar al-Islam, a deadly terrorist group that produced poisoned agents. But after Powell’s speech, Ansar officials (a militant Kurdish group) showed reporters alleged camps in northern Iraq where they had nothing but living quarters and a radio. British reporters used “classified documents” from a British M16 report written in January 2003 that found no links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Their report said there had been contact between al-Qaeda and al-Zarqawi but “any fledgling relationship foundered due to mistrust and incompatible ideologies.” Also contrary to Powell’s claim, the July 2004 Commission on 9/11 found no factual evidence of any connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq existing before the war. Nevertheless, the Bush administration sought to support its claim Iraq was linked to al-Qaeda by releasing a taped speech of Osama bin Laden on February 11, 2003. Bin Laden said: We stress the importance of martyrdom operations against the enemy, the attacks that have scared Americans and Israelis as never before….We are following with utmost concern the Crusaders’ preparations to occupy the former capital of Islam [Baghdad], loot the fortunes of Muslims and install a puppet regime…. We advise about the importance of drawing the enemy into long, close and exhausting fighting….Fighting should be for Allah alone not to support nationalism or pagan regimes, including Iraq….This war concerns the Muslims, regardless of whether the socialist party and Saddam remain or go.

His words had many interpretations, but there is no specific reference to Iraq as an ally; however, it validated warnings from various Arab leaders that Islamic extremists would exploit a war in Iraq to inflame the Middle East.29 Security Council delegates from France, Germany, China, and Russia countered that if Powell were correct, it simply showed that the UNMOVIC and the IAEA should increase the number of inspection teams. More inspections, they said, will enhance inspection results and bring better assessments from Blix and El Baradei on February 14, 2003.



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Inspections Continue, U.S. Dissatisfied After Powell’s presentation, Blix and ElBaradei urged Iraqi officials to document what weapons were destroyed after the 1991 Gulf War. For example, Blix wanted documents to prove Iraq eliminated biological and chemical agents in the 1990s, while ElBaradei sought evidence that Iraq no longer had an active nuclear program. Iraq established two special commissions: one to assist UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors in their search for documents and evidence that Iraq had no chemical or biological weapons; the other to look for documents to verify it had not revived its nuclear program. Iraq also permitted scientists to be interviewed without “minders” present if a scientist chose to do so, but opposed a request for U-2 flights to assist inspections. Blix hoped Iraq’s positive signs of cooperation would satisfy UNSC members. According to Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, interviewed on February 12, Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate agreed to private interviewers provided tape recordings were made so Western inspectors could not add false information. Regarding Iraq’s purchase of highquality magnets, aluminum tubes and other centrifuge parts after 1998, Mahdi stated the quality of magnets Iraq obtained were for industrial uses and had no duel use. He pointed out the diameter of the aluminum tubes Iraq purchased was 81 millimeters, the specification for Iraq’s artillery rockets, while the centrifuge rotors Iraq acquired in the 1980s were twice that diameter—about 162 millimeters—for “carbon fiber rotors.” “We would have found it nearly impossible to work with aluminum rotors.” On February 14, Blix told the Security Council there were no dramatic “breakthroughs” with Iraq, but he was more positive after Iraq appointed two commissions to assist UNMOVIC and IAEA. He also said UN inspectors found no evidence confirming Powell’s claim that U.S. intelligence identified trucks working to decontaminate chemicals at the munitions depot. Because Powell’s pictures of trucks were taken two weeks apart, Blix concluded Iraq’s moving munitions may have been routine work. Blix said that in no instance in over 230 inspections did inspectors find “convincing evidence that the Iraq side knew in advance that we were coming.” Contrary to Powell’s claim about Iraqi scientists never agreeing

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to interviews because of Saddam’s threats against their families, Blix said three scientists were interviewed privately without any “minders” and gave important information to inspectors. Likewise, ElBaradei contradicted Powell’s statements about Iraq’s nuclear program. The IAEA inspectors, he said, had found “no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq.” Notably, just before the February 14 report, Saddam complied with two of Blix’s demands. First, he approved Blix’s request for American U-2 planes to aid inspectors with high-altitude surveillance flights. In addition, French and Russian low altitude planes plus German drone aircraft could assist inspectors. Second, Saddam Hussein issued a presidential decree to prohibit any future construction or importation of weapons of mass destruction. Secretary Powell dismissed Saddam’s decree because he believed Iraq had not offered full cooperation with inspectors. “More inspectors—sorry, it’s not the answer,” he replied. “What we need is immediate cooperation.” Powell said that inspections cannot be “endlessly strung out” and urged the Council to consider the “serious consequences of the kind intended by 1441.” In contrast, France’s de Villepin believed inspectors were beginning to make progress and the number of inspectors should increase. He did not exclude the possible use of armed force some day but, if so, the international community should act together. Germany’s Fischer declared, “The inspectors have been able to score some successes…and have substantially diminished the danger emanating from Iraq.” China’s Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan supported Fischer: “The latest visit to Baghdad by the two chief inspectors has achieved some positive results…. China believes that the inspection process is working and the inspectors should be given the time they need so as to carry out Resolution 1441.” Russia’s Ivanov, who also wanted inspections to continue, urged Security Council members to provide Blix and ElBaradei with lists of the “key remaining disarmament tasks.” Such lists would provide the means to measure Iraq’s cooperation with inspectors.30 Before Blix issued a quarterly report on February 28 to the College of Commissioners, he reported Iraq was cooperating “immediately,



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unconditionally and actively with inspector’s to a greater extent than before.” For example, Iraq allowed American, French and Russian surveillance aircraft to monitor Iraq’s ground activity and transport inspectors to all Iraqi locations. In addition, Iraq destroyed mustard gas, began to destroy al-Samoud-2 missiles, identified “two aerial R-400 bombs, as well as remnants of what it states to be 118 R-400 bombs.” Yet, Blix said: “Iraq could have made greater efforts to find proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items. The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far.” Finally, Blix asserted UNMOVIC has a list of remaining disarmament issues and measures Iraq must take to resolve them. This list will “serve as a yardstick against which Iraq’s disarmament actions under Resolution 1441 (2002) may be measured.”31 French, Russian and German officials focused on the positive aspects of Blix’s report that showed some results such as destroying missiles and listing what Iraq must do now. In contrast, the Bush administration insisted on discounting anything positive the inspectors had to say. President Bush’s spokesman, Ari Fleisher, said Iraq must disarm and change its regime by having Saddam and all Baath Party leaders go into exile. Washington’s emphasis upon “regime change” prompted some perceptive critiques that were ignored at the time. The New York Times’ Patrick E. Tyler wrote on March 1, 2003, “The United States and its ‘coalition of the willing’ may face their own kind of isolation if they topple Mr. Hussein and then tumble into a long and costly period of nation-building that takes years longer and tens –maybe hundreds—of billions of dollars more than predicted.”32 In addition to Tyler’s prediction, many Middle East experts thought Fleisher’s comment about Iraqi leaders being exiled could result in “high risk” of strife after a change of regime or an American victory in a war. These experts claimed a violent civil war could erupt among Iraq’s divided ethnic and religious groups of “Kurds, Arabs, Sunni Muslims and Shiite Muslims.” Any American general who ruled after a war would not be popular among the “proud” Iraqi people.33

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Washington Ignores Inspection Reports In late February, UNMOVIC inspectors discovered Iraq’s Al Samoud-2 missiles exceeded the 90-mile (150 km) range limit placed on Iraqi missiles in 1991. Blix informed Iraqi officials on February 21st that all Al Samoud-2 missiles and associated parts must be destroyed whether fully or partly assembled. After some disagreement, Iraq had destroyed 70 Al Samoud-2 missiles by March 7 under UN supervision. Blix thought Iraq’s missile destruction was “a substantial measure of disarmament” but Secretary Powell brushed his claim aside, “we don’t know how many there are” and “whether or not the infrastructure to make more exists or has been broken up.”34 Before the Security Council’s March 7th meeting, Foreign Ministers De Villepin of France, Ivanov of Russia and Fischer of Germany issued a Joint Memorandum that said: “Our objective remains the full and effective disarmament of Iraq…. We consider that this objective can be achieved by the peaceful means of the inspectors.” The memorandum called on Iraq to speed up its cooperation with UNMOVIC and the IAEA because “inspections cannot continue indefinitely” and asked the inspectors to give Iraq a list of remaining issues with a timeline to fulfill its terms. The memo asserted that France and Russia as permanent members of the Security Council would “not let a proposed resolution pass that would authorize the use of force.”35 Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf, meanwhile, raised the issue of Iraq’s UAV drone aircraft ability to deliver cluster bombs filled with chemical or biological weapons on enemy forces. He said American intelligence found the UAV drone had a “substantial range” that was in violation of the prescribed 90-mile range for aircraft. In response, Blix reported that Iraq had purchased cluster bombs from South Africa a “long ago” and that these bombs had a short life span. They were nothing but scraps of metal without traces of chemical or biological agents when found at an old factory store. The inspectors did not consider drones relevant because Iraq was testing the drone’s range. Subsequently, the New York Times called it “farcical” to say the drone was a serious issue because the UAV was powered by a two-stroke motorcycle engine with a ground



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control range of eight kilometers, a payload of 20 kilograms, and carried a video camera for reconnaissance. The UAV wings were made of balsa wood and held together by duct tape.36 Employing the same faulty U.S. intelligence, President Bush agreed with Powell and Wolf that Iraq failed to disarm as required by Resolution 1441. He told a press conference on March 6, that we “have arrived at an important moment in confronting Saddam Hussein and his weapons of terror. Iraq’s dictator has made a public show of proceeding to destroy a few missiles…. Yet, Iraqi operations continue to hide biological and chemical agents to avoid detection by inspectors. In some cases these materials have been moved to different locations every 12 to 24 hours, or placed in vehicles that are in residential neighborhoods.” Bush believed that “People of good will must also recognize that allowing a dangerous dictator to defy the world and harboring weapons of mass destruction and terror, is not peace at all, it is pretense.”37 The day of Bush’s news conference, Blix told the Security Council that inspectors made good headway in disarming Iraq. It was, Blix said “a substantial measure of disarmament—indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s.” Iraq not only destroyed its illegal Samoud-2 missiles but was also “pro-active” in disclosing new information. Blix refuted Powell’s claim that Iraq used trucks to move weapons from place to place to avoid detection and stated there was no evidence of mobile labs producing biological weapons as Powell had alleged. More important to opponents of war, ElBaradei declared his IAEA nuclear experts had concluded Iraq’s aluminum tubes were, as Mahdi said, definitely used for rocket engines and that there was no evidence that Iraq sought uranium from Niger, Africa. While ElBaradei believed that the U.K. and U.S. had made their claims about Niger’s uranium in “good faith”, post-war accounts show Bush and Blair ignored contrary facts since the Washington Institute for Science and International Security had confirmed the IAEA’s findings related to the aluminum tubes. The Institute’s February 2003 report indicated the U.S. Department of Energy experts had told Secretary Powell’s staff that anodized coatings on the tubes was essential if they were to be used for centrifuges.

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Institute President David Albright said: “Despite being presented with the falseness of his claims, the [Bush] administration persists in making misleading arguments about the significance of the tubes.” In response, Powell’s spokesman said the secretary had consulted experts on the tubes but he could not identify who those experts were.38 On March 7, U.K. Foreign Minister Straw offered an amendment to his February 24th proposal. The amendment would list six benchmarks Iraq would have to meet to avoid war: (1) Saddam must go on Iraqi television to declare he had WMDs and tried to conceal them. (2) Iraq must surrender its mobile facilities in where it produced biological and chemical weapons. (3) He must account for Iraq’ anthrax. (4) He also must account for Iraq’s VX chemical agent. (5) He must admit to U.S-U.K claims about Scud missiles and the UAV aircraft. (6) He must promise to cooperate with UNMOVIC’s plan to interview scientists with their families outside Iraq. Finally, Straw gave Iraq until March 17 to fulfill the six items. Although Security Council delegates from Spain and Bulgaria endorsed Straw’s benchmarks, his proposal was found unsatisfactory by France, Germany and Russia. On March 16, France’s Villepin offered a resolution giving Iraq until April 15 to comply, but U.S. Ambassador Negroponte summarily rejected his proposal. France, Russia and China would not accept a British and American proposal that if Iraq did not fully comply with Security Council Resolution 1441 “all necessary action” [i.e. military action] should be taken against Iraq.39 Having been stymied by French, Chinese and Russian members who could veto any Security Council resolution, Negroponte withdrew a final U.S. proposal without asking for a vote. Instead, Bush held a summit at Portugal’s Azores Islands on March 16 with Prime Minister Blair of Britain, Jose Maria Aznar of Spain and Jose Manuel Durao Barroso of Portugal. During their meeting, the four leaders agreed: “The responsibility is his. If Saddam, even now, refuses to cooperate fully with the United Nations, he brings on himself the serious consequences foreseen in UNSC Resolution 1441 and previous resolutions.”



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Dept. of Defense Photo Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso (left); British Prime Minister Tony Blair; US President George W. Bush; and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, meet during a one day emergency summit, at Lajes, Azores. 16 Mar 2003

After their meeting, Bush told reporters: “We concluded that tomorrow is a moment of truth for the world…. The Iraqi regime will disarm itself, or the Iraqi regime will be disarmed by force.” A reporter asked does this mean war? Bush replied the decision was Saddam’s. Bush stated there was not a way for the United Nations to be involved and placed the blamed on France. Because Blair faced more trouble at home, he insisted that “the key point,…is our responsibility to uphold the will of the United Nations set out in Resolution 1441 last November.” Thus, as Bob Woodward noted: “The coalition had designated itself the enforcement arm of the United Nations Security Council. The leaders were, in effect, issuing an ultimatum to the UN and its process at the Security Council. It highlighted the problem of preemptive war and seemed to lay bare the paradox of coercive policy.”40

Opposition to War with Iraq President Bush’s universal support for the war in Afghanistan disappeared quickly in 2002 when protest movements escalated in

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opposition to his “Axis of Evil” speech and his call for a preemptive war against Iraq. Many European and Arab nations saw Bush’s reference to evil nations as thwarting the use of diplomacy to solve problems with Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Excepting Britain and Spain, NATO members and previous Arab allies believed Bush had not provided any real evidence of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, most European leaders were upset with his administration’s unilateral decisions to reject the Kyoto Protocols on the environment, the International Criminal Court, the 1972 ABM Treaty, a Biological Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.41 Between February 2002 and March 17, 2003, Bush fostered opposition among some stalwart members of the Republican Party and European, Arab and Asian leaders. Before the war, Republicans such as his father’s Secretary of State James A. Baker III and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft urged George W. Bush to obtain a coalition similar to the one the Security Council approved in 1990. Richard Nixon’s former counsel John W. Dean thought Bush’s “hidden agenda could not be more troubling” in the matter of war and peace. He claimed most American were not aware of “Bush and Cheney’s radical national security policies, and not even experts fully understand what this administration is doing.”42 Some American conservatives joined Dean in opposing the war. Patrick J. Buchanan, who had opposed the war against Iraq in 1991, argued in the October 2002 issue of The American Conservative against the new American “imperial” war because Arab leaders who backed Bush in 1991 would oppose a war in 2003. In the same American Conservative issue, Eric S. Margolis opposed Bush’s “road to folly” by refusing to seek “accommodation with Iraq rather than war.”43 These anti-war views were echoed by college and high schools students who protested against the war on over 400 hundred campuses, including at the universities in Arkansas, Chicago and Southern California. In January 2003, high school students left classrooms to protest the war at such places as Boulder, Colorado’s Fairview High School and Hollywood’s Fairfax High School. Among protests in December 2002 and early 2003, more than 1000 people



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protested in Manhattan while thousands rallied against the war in San Francisco. During protests in San Francisco, police arrested Warren Langley, an Air Force Academy graduate and former president of the Pacific Stock exchange and Eric Johanson, a Vietnam War Veteran who led Veterans Against the Iraq War. Other U.S. groups protesting a war with Iraq were the AFL-CIO Union’s executive committee, National Council of Churches, Catholic Bishops Conference and American Friends Association.44 The most unusual anti-war protests were staged by a Chicago based pacifist group called Voices in the Wilderness. The Voices was formed in 1996 for members to protest against Security Council’s economic sanctions on Iraq levied in April 1991. In October 2002, twelve members of the Voices visited Baghdad whose officials let them stage protests against sanctions and Bush’s threat to wage war on Iraq. Other Voices members demonstrated in Chicago, Indianapolis and New York where they carried signs saying “No UN Blank Check for Bush.” Like others opposing sanctions, the Voices failed to mention Saddam’s sadistic treatment of Kurds and Shiites or his spending oil-for food money to build lavish palaces.45 European disapproval exceeded American protests against the war. Unlike American protests, the Europeans were angry when Bush unilaterally abandoned Clinton’s talks with North Korea, rejected treaties such as the Kyoto protocols and the International Criminal Court, and the “Axis of Evil” speech. Despite NATO’s help in the Afghan war, Bush had not asked for NATO help in Iraq because Secretary Rumsfeld thought it would slow down the military action. In September 2002, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was the first European leader to declare Germany would not wage war against Iraqi under any circumstances. In the midst of an election campaign, Schroeder realized most Germans wanted arms inspections and diplomacy, not war, as the best way to reconcile Iraq’s bad behavior. By the time Schroeder was reelected on September 22, 2002, French protests joined with Germans and most other Western European nations in holding wide spread protest movements. Notably, Poland and Romania supported Bush but sent no soldiers until the war ended.46

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Europe’s continental opposition to war was echoed in the U.K. despite Prime Minister Blair’s alignment with Bush in advocating a preemptive war on Iraq. Blair claimed “the threat posed by the current Iraqi regime is real. Either he [Saddam] starts to function in a completely different way or the Regime changes.” On September 24, he recalled Parliament to debate the Iraq crisis. Unlike Bush, Blair did not mention “regime change” but instead emphasized that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction must be eliminated. During the debate, Labour member Alan Simpson remarked that President Bush was like a drunk who could not “satisfy his thirst for power and oil,” a situation he wanted Blair to restrain. On February 15, 2003, over one million people marched through London’s streets; the largest demonstration ever held against a war. On February 21, Labour Party member Chris Smith proposed an amendment to a House motion that was approved by 122 Labour Party members. Smith’s amendment said: “…this House finds the case for military action against Iraq as yet unproven.” Many Parliament members would support Blair if a second Security Council resolution was introduced and approved for action. The French rejection of Straw’s earlier resolution, listing six conditions for Iraq to avoid war, may have saved the prime minister because Blair could blame France for obstructing the UN process.47 China, Japan and South Korea had problems with Bush’s policies. In 2002, China and Japan sponsored negotiations with North Korea on nuclear issues but Bush rudely rebuked Kim Jong Il. North Korea responded in December 2002 by expelling IAEA inspectors and declaring it would renew its nuclear and long-range missiles programs. The South Koreans were unhappy with Bush because their “sunshine policy” had made headway in improving relations with North Korea, but rather than approve the “sunshine policy,” Bush refused to continue Clinton’s negotiations with regard to North Korea’s long-range missile and nuclear programs. The Chinese thought the Bush administration viewed China as an “enemy state” because the Pentagon provided Taiwan modern weapons and conducted an aerial surveillance of China’s coastline. In addition, Chinese officials dismissed Washington’s claim that construction of a U.S. missile defense system in Alaska was aimed



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against North Korea and believed the new missile system targeted Beijing’s nuclear deterrent.48 Finally, Bush lost support of some Islamic nations who had backed the U.S. led coalition in 1990-1991 and during the 2001 terrorist war on Afghanistan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for example, wondered about Bush’s motives for attacking Iraq, opposed his strong backing of Israel in the Palestinian conflict and questioned the administration’s efforts to create Middle Eastern democratic societies. At a February 2003 meeting of 116 non-aligned nations, Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahatir claimed the U.S. was not just fighting a war against terrorism, but sought to dominate world affairs. He said the U.S. does not understand the Islamic world’s frustration with Washington’s unyielding support for Israel’s mistreatment of Palestinians. As Clyde Prestowitz noted: “This was the same Mahatir who had been feted at the White House less than a year previously for his staunch support of the United States on fighting terror.”49 Despite opposition to the war, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair ordered their armed forces to attack Iraq and the first bombs fell on Baghdad on March 19, 2003.

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resident George W. Bush employed the doctrine of “preemptive war” to justify the United States’ invasion of Iraq. In his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002 he declared: “All free nations have a stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks. We are asking them to join us, and many are doing so. Yet the course of this nation does not depend on others. Whatever action is required, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.” The president subsequently alluded to a “preemptive” strategy several times during the summer before he signed the Pentagon’s Nuclear Policy Review on September 20, 2002 that endorsed such a policy and coupled it with a pending preemptive strike against Iraq. 1 After 15 months of preparations for war, President Bush and the “coalition of the willing” launched intensive air raids on March 19, 2003 aimed at Baghdad and other Iraqi targets. The invasion soon followed.

Planning for the Second Iraqi War General Tommy Franks, who headed the United States Central Command, was preparing to return from Kabul on November 27, 2001—where he had installed Hamid Karazi as Afghanistan’s interim president—when he received an unexpected call from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. President Bush, Rumsfeld said, wanted Franks to develop plans for the invasion of Iraq. After reviewing the existing plans designed in 1991 to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Franks realized that occupying the entire country required a substantial updating of prospective military operations. On December 4th, Franks discussed options for an Iraqi war with

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Rumsfeld. They agreed upon two objectives: (1) to end Saddam’s regime, and (2) to destroy all of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional arms except for those a new government would require to defend Iraq from its neighbors. Franks and Air Force General Gene Renart visited President Bush on December 27, 2001, who was vacationing at his Crawford, Texas ranch. The next day, Franks, Renart and Bush conducted a videotelevision conference with Rumsfeld, Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, CIA Director George Tenet, and National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice. Franks informed the group that the out-of-date OPLAN 1003 needed to be substantially revised for a future invasion of Iraq because Iraq’s current armed forces were about one-half the size of what they had been in 1991. “Does it mean it is only half as effective?” Cheney asked. Franks did not believe that smaller necessarily meant weaker. Rather, he said: “The Republican Guard, for example, had dropped from ten to six. But those units are well manned and well armed—what we call combat ready. Four of them are heavy divisions with upgraded T-72 tanks. Iraqi military doctrine would probably position them as a defense-in-depth force around Baghdad.” Between Franks’ December 27 meeting with Bush and midSeptember 2002, members of Franks’ war-planning team made a variety of changes in the invasion plan that ended as Hybrid OPLAN 1003V. The hybrid plan combined what Franks called the “Generated and Running Start” concepts that consisted of deploying a smaller number of ground forces than in the 1991 plan, but anticipated its ground forces, in a fast-paced campaign, could be victorious in less than 90 days. Initially, Colin Powell, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was the only official to question Franks’ decision to employ 250,000 troops for the campaign. He argued Franks should use an overwhelming force of 500,000 to secure long supply lines for the troops, assure Saddam’s defeat and guarantee the establishment of a new Iraqi government. Franks dismissed Powell’s critique by focusing exclusively on his plan’s military operations. Franks claimed Hybrid’s “Running Start” tactics would apply a “military mass simultaneously at key points, rather than trying to push a



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broad, slow conventional advance,” so we may “throw the enemy off balance.” This will allow us to “put our forces deep into the enemy’s territory, moving so quickly that the Iraqis will not have time to react. When they finally do move, they become targets for the air component and precision artillery fires.” “Speed and momentum,” he insisted, “are the keys.” It is symptomatic of future woes that Franks gravely underestimated the military requirements for a successful occupation force. In mid-September 2002, Franks’ final plan had four components. Phase One included “a massive air lift using the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet to augment our military transport facility.” The airlift would bring thousands of troops to the war zone in one week where they would be protected by some 800 cruise missiles and combat aircraft available on American and British aircraft carriers in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Phase Two would launch air strikes and send Special Forces into Iraq to destroy key targets such as Iraqi Scud missiles and to prepare for deploying heavy armored units. In Phase Three, the heavy units would employ a maximum of 250,000 troops whose “Running Start” tactics would destroy Iraq’s military forces and clear away all enemy forces along the way to Baghdad in about 90 days. Finally, Phase Four would be what Franks called “Stability Operations.” These operations were for a post-war reconstruction phase that Franks believed would be the key to the war’s success. Phase Four would include creating a new Iraqi army and constabulary to represent the nation’s “tribal, religious and ethnic mix.” The postwar withdrawal of coalition troops would “be tied to effective governance by Iraqis, not to a timeline.” Franks’ estimates would prove to be only partially correct. Coalition forces reached Baghdad in less than the estimated 90 days; but the quick military victory did not create the desired stability. The occupying forces almost immediately ran into trouble because there were insufficient troops to occupy Iraq’s vast numbers of munitions dumps and to halt the wide spread violence and looting that prevented prompt reconstruction of an Iraqi government and economy.

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Some have questioned Franks’ claim that Secretary Rumsfeld approved his final plans for the military operations. They pointed out that Rumsfeld and his top civilian advisers insisted on a bolder approach that used more Special Forces and “agile ground forces.” Thus, after Rumsfeld’s modifications, the initial military results would be spectacular, but the lack of a realistic post-invasion strategy would leave the occupation unprepared to prevent a costly insurgency.2

U.S., Turkey & Kurds Franks’ war plans required the resolution of two problems. The first concerned NATO and Turkey’s willingness to allow U.S. troops to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq from the northwest.



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The second issue was to find some way to unify Iraqi exile groups, especially the Kurds, who would assist in the invasion and in the establishment of a democratic, unified government in Iraq. In November 2002, Franks visited Ankara, only to discover that the situation was more complicated than he anticipated. He was informed that future Turkish elections would determine whether the U.S. would be allowed to base its military forces on Turkish soil for operations against Iraq. The administration had formally requested Turkish participation, but Turkey was a member of NATO and France, Germany and Belgium opposed NATO’s involvement in an Iraqi invasion. American and British delegates finally succeeded on February 16, 2003 in getting NATO’s reluctant members to designate its Defense Planning Council, a group that excluded France, to prepare for the defense of Turkey during the forthcoming hostilities. The Council’s intervention enabled the U.S. to send AWAC surveillance aircraft, Patriot defensive missiles and a biological warfare defense team to Turkey.3 In addition to NATO’s preparations for the defense of Turkey, Franks’ plans called for stationing American and British attack aircraft, as well as 64,000 combat troops and their equipment, on Turkish soil to participate in the invasion of Iraq. His plans, however, became caught up in Turkey’s domestic politics and required the approval of political leaders including the Parliament. Because a substantial majority of Turkey’s public opposed the invasion of Iraq, President Bush invited Turkish leaders to the White House on December 10, 2002. Bush, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, who led Turkey’s dominant political party, reached an understanding that would provide the United States with much of what it desired, but it required the approval of Parliament. In February 2003, Gul and Secretary Powell worked out the details, approved by Gul’s cabinet members, which asked Parliament to approve the deployment of up to 62,000 American troops, with their equipment, in Turkey for a six-month period. In return for Parliament’s approval, Washington would provide Turkey with $15 billion in grants and loans. Prime Minister Gul presented the U.S. deal to Turkey’s 533member Parliament on February 25th. Following extensive debate,

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the Turkish Parliament voted to reject the American proposal. The Parliament’s rejection appeared to be grounded on two basic factors: opposition to the invasion of Iraq by the vast majority of Turks and opposition to the restrictions that would be imposed on Turkey by International Monetary Fund loans. IMF austerity measures would require Turkey to cut farm subsidies, decrease workers’ wages, lay off many government workers and cut funds for popular public works projects. While Franks’ original plan was rejected, Turkey would allow some military activity once hostilities began. On March 20 and later, Turkey permitted U.S. and British planes to fly over Turkish territory as well as having U.S. Army units deliver food, water and other non-lethal supplies over a Turkish land route to northwestern Iraq.4 Washington’s other problem was that of persuading various groups of Iraqi dissidents in Kurdistan to unify their efforts. Throughout these discussions the dissident Moslem Kurds had two major concerns. First and foremost, they feared that Turkey’s participation in an invasion of Iraq might result in the Turks thwarting their ultimate ambition for a Kurdish state. Secondly, they were currently engaged in a conflict with radical Islamic Arabs. Between December 2002 and March 17, 2003, Bush’s Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and CIA officials used various tactics to unite those dissidents who might provide some of the leadership needed to quickly establish a new Iraqi government after Saddam Hussein was overthrown. Khalilzad, however, was unable to unify the Kurdish factions despite the fact that they lived in an area of northern Iraq that had been protected by U.S. and British aircraft enforcing Iraq’s no-fly zones since 1991-1992. Nonetheless, Iraqi Kurds had to deal with the militant, Talibanlike Islamic group, Ansar al-Islam, that some observers claimed was an al-Qaeda cell. In December 2002 and again in February 2003, Ansar al-Islam militants attacked the Kurds. On December 5, 2002, the Kurds repelled an Ansar attack and forced the militants to withdraw from areas that Ansar had seized earlier. On February 9, 2003, the surviving militants assassinated a Kurdish leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Shawkat Haijji, and on February 26,



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an Ansar suicide bomber killed himself and three Kurdish soldiers guarding a checkpoint in northern Iraq. The Iraqi Kurds were relieved when Turkey’s Parliament refused to approve plans to locate American soldiers and their equipment on Turkish soil or to use a Turkish force in the invasion. Thus to augment its forces in northern Iraq, the Pentagon had to bypass Turkey and employ the 80,000-strong Kurdish militia, making this group the second largest member of Bush’s “coalition of the willing.” On March 24, the United States 173rd Airborne Brigade would be dropped onto a Kurdish airfield 30 kilometers north of Irbril to guarantee Hussein’s troops faced a northern front.5

Prewar Preparations When Franks’ Hybrid 1003V war plans were ready in September 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Britain’s Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon began deploying army, navy and air forces to the Mediterranean Sea, Kuwait, Qatar and the Persian Gulf. The Pentagon also called up U.S. reserve units for support functions and transferred 600 U.S. army soldiers with Pac-3 Patriot missile batteries to 27 Middle East locations in Israel, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The new Patriot Pac-3 batteries were to protect U.S. and British aircraft from Iraq’s Scud Ababil100 missiles. The U.S. Army also began training about 3,000 Iraqi exiled volunteers at Tazar, Hungary.6 In September, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld ordered the elements of the Third Infantry Division to Kuwait where they engaged in desert training. By late November, General Franks’ forwardbased theater command headquarters in Qatar was ready for tests involving simulated exercises. Rumsfeld also dispatched an entourage of destroyers to go with the American aircraft carriers USS Harry S. Truman and USS Theodore Roosevelt in the eastern Mediterranean while the aircraft carriers USS Constellation and USS Abraham Lincoln were operating in the Persian Gulf. Twelve submarines and support ships provided naval warning and air defense systems that used radar to assist U.S. combat planes, B-1 and B-2 bombers and Tomahawk cruise missile systems. In addition, Britain’s Royal Navy task group would use cruise missiles

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and aircraft from the carrier HMS Ark Royal that joined with the British helicopter carrier HMS Ocean, two destroyers and the nuclear powered submarine HMS York. Finally, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division with its mechanized units, which was initially scheduled for deployment in Turkey, was rerouted via a sealift to assume duties in southern Iraq in early April 2003.7 The U.S. drew from an arsenal of psychological techniques designed to disrupt the normal routines of Iraqi soldiers and civilians. In October 2002, an American radio show was readied for the EC-130 Commando Solo planes that would broadcast Iraqi folk music, European pop music and an Arabic language news program. The basic message was Americans did not consider the Iraqi people enemies, they were using military force only to overturn Saddam Hussein’s evil regime. A sample from the news broadcast was, “People of Iraq. The standard of living for Iraqis has dropped drastically since Saddam came to power. How much longer will this corrupt rule be allowed to exploit and oppress the Iraqi people?” In addition to radio broadcasts, U.S. aircraft began dropping leaflets in October and increased distribution of the leaflets during February 2003. The leaflets instructed Iraqi soldiers on how they could surrender to coalition forces and warned Iraqi civilians against potentially dangerous actions. “Iraqi military fiber optic cables have been targeted for destruction” one leaflet read. “Repairing them places your life at risk.” Beginning in September 2002, American Special Forces used electronic devices to collect Iraqi radio and radar signals that had regularly jammed allied radars over the Iraqi no-fly zones. An American RC-135, flying at 30,000 feet, became a “listening post” with high-powered computers and electronic sensors manned by specialists who spoke Arabic or Farsi. They intercepted conversations between Iraqi military links and sent them to the U.S. National Security Agency. The U.S. also recruited collaborators who were sent into Iraq to learn of Hussein’s plans and capabilities. By March 2003, some Iraqi Republican Guard officers and secret police had been won over.8 Before the war began on March 19, 2003, American, British and Australian Special Operations Task Force 20 entered Iraq’s western



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deserts where they shut down Iraq’s scud missiles, prevented Iraq from receiving supplies from Syria, and mobilized Kurds for war. Other Special Forces in the south, especially those from Australia, prevented Iraqis from destroying all but nine of their 1,057 oil wells. About 13,000 American and British soldiers at Kuwait’s Ali Ala Salem Air Base near Iraq’s border augmented the Special Forces. Using pilot-less Predator aircraft and the Army’s RC-12 intelligence planes, British and U.S. forces intercepted Iraqi electronic transmissions as they conducted military exercises. American Apache helicopters practiced firing at targets and Patriot Pac-2 and Pac-3 anti missile batteries prepared to defend against Iraq’s upgraded Al-Samoud-2 and Scud Abibla-100. When the war began, there were more than 210,000 United States military personnel in the Gulf region. Washington identified 31 coalition members but only three offered military support—Britain 41,000 troops; Australia 2,000 and Poland 200. The other coalition members providing non-military backing were: Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Germany Assists U.S. Prewar Planning. The New York Times reported in February 2006 that German intelligence agents in Baghdad obtained a copy of Saddam Hussein’s plan to defend the Iraqi capital and gave it to the U.S. military in February 2003, a month before the invasion. German intelligence also apparently provided the Americans with information about Iraqi plans for the deployment of Saddam’s most loyal troops. The Time report indicated that Egypt gave U.S. aircraft access to refuel while Saudi Arabia allowed American Delta and Special Forces to initiate attacks from their territory. The day after the Times article appeared, Germany’s government spokesman Ulrich Wilhelm said: “The New York Times allegations are wrong in all their details. The German government,” he said, “were unaware of such a plan until now.” Despite Wilhelm’s claim, Germany’s Parliamentary Control Commission—the agency that oversees intelligence agents—

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reported that German intelligence had provided some information to the U.S. before the invasion. The report claimed, however, that most of the information related to mosques, synagogues and hospitals that the U.S. should avoid bombing. The German government launched an investigation to learn what German intelligence did or did not do in cooperating with U.S. military forces. Russian Aid to Iraq. While German intelligence apparently helped the U.S. in the invasion of Iraq, Russia had found a way to assist Saddam Hussein. Bob Woodward reported that Russia provided Iraq with night-vision goggles and Global Positioning System data. In addition, Russian experts helped Iraq’s Mukhabarat (secret service) to evacuate its Baghdad headquarters and remove key Iraqi archives to Moscow, especially documents concerning Russian cooperation with Baghdad. Assessing Saddam’s Perspective. Following the war, the U.S. Joint Forces Command commissioned a study about the behavior of Saddam Hussein’s regime in the months leading up to the coalition’s attack. Based on partly declassified documents and interviews with captured senior Iraqi officials, the study indicated Hussein thought the Americans would never invade or if they did his regime would somehow survive. Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz described Saddam Hussein as being “very confident” that the United States would never invade but, if they did, their coalition would be easily defeated. In part, Saddam believed that both France and Russia, who had received “millions of dollars worth of trade and services” from Iraq, would veto any UN attempt to launch an attack. France and Russia, of course, did oppose a Security Council resolution authorizing going to war but that did not stop the Bush administration’s decision to launch a “preemptive” attack.9 Clearly, Hussein was unable to grasp Washington’s determination to oust him from power.

The Second U.S.-Iraqi War On a March 17th televised speech, Bush said: “My fellow citizens, events in Iraq have now reached the final days of decision.” For



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more than a decade the United States and other nations have tried “honorable” means to disarm Iraq without war. Peaceful efforts have failed again, he said, because “we are not dealing with peaceful men.” Iraq, he warned, continues to “conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.” Therefore, Bush claimed, “The danger is clear. Using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of innocent people in our country or any other.” Bush continued: “Many nations do not have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to peace” and “The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.” Bush declared “Saddam and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict. Commenced at a time of our choosing.” He concluded by telling Iraqi people that the war was not against them but “against the lawless men who rule your country…. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near.” Two days later, Bush again addressed the nation, saying: “My fellow citizens, at this hour Americans and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.” Bush concluded by saying, “Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly—yet, our purpose is sure. The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder.”10 Earlier, following Bush’s speech on March 17, the State Department had notified Blix and ElBaradei it was time to withdraw their inspectors from Iraq. Aerial Campaigns. On March 19 at 10 p.m. the CIA was 99.9 percent certain that Saddam Hussein and his family members were hiding in an underground center at Dora Farms just outside Baghdad. Air Force Major General Renart had studied the satellite photos of the site and was convinced that they indicated sites of an underground command post. Because the Baghdad area was protected by surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery, the

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U.S. planes would have to “fly into the teeth of Iraqi defenses.” It was unlikely that an air attack would catch the Iraqis off-balance and, while the F-117s that would be employed were hard to detect by radar, they were not invisible. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General Richard “Dick” Myers, who was waiting with Bush to decide on whether to launch an attack on the Dora Farms complex called the field commander with the president’s one question: “Can you get the pilots out?” Bush was told, “I can get them to the target,” but “I don’t know if I can get them back.” After hearing this response, Myers was informed they could “strike.” Two F-117s took off with Lieutenant Colonel Dave Toomy in one plane and Major Mark Hoehn in the other and they arrived at their target at 5:36 a.m. Baghdad time. Thus the U.S. Air Force’s first strike was against the Dora Farms and its reported underground complex near Baghdad where U.S. intelligence believed Hussein, his sons Uday and Qusay and family members were meeting. In an attempt to eliminate Iraq’s leaders, the two Air Force F-117s each dropped two 2,000-pound bombs on the compound. Several hours later, however, Hussein appeared on Iraqi TV wearing his army uniform and spoke for seven minutes, leaving U.S. officials to wonder if Saddam had previously taped his message before the attack. After the fall of Baghdad, American forces examined the Dora Farms site, but found no underground bunker—the bombs had landed on an empty field. Iraq responded by firing a Chinese-made Seersucker missile carrying a 1,000-pound bomb toward the Faw Peninsula. Flying low at 100 feet, the Seersucker crossed into Kuwait and landed at Camp Commando, headquarters of the Marine Expeditionary Force that was to be the lead force into Iraq. The Marines suffered no casualties, but Iraq had suggested what American forces might expect. The same day, Iraq fired two Ababil-100 surface-to-surface toward the 101st Airborne Division and Camp Doha in Kuwait. Before the Iraqi missiles reached their targets, American Patriot missiles intercepted and destroyed the two Ababil–100s.11 Unlike the 1991 air campaign that lasted 38 days before ground forces launched their attack, Operation Iraqi Freedom’s air campaign



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coincided with ground attacks from Kuwait north toward Basra and Baghdad and from northern Iraq’s Kurdish territory south toward Tikrit and Baghdad. In addition, the United States and British aircraft had a huge arsenal of precision weapons, guided to their targets by Joint Surveillance and Target Systems and Global Positioning Systems, that the Pentagon had developed under the Clinton administration. Aided by these systems, the coalition’s Central Command headquarters directed its aircraft to bomb previously selected sites on the Master Target List, to assist coalition ground forces or to strike targets of opportunity. As soon as the invasion began, coalition forces quickly achieved air supremacy because American and British aircraft had previously destroyed most of Iraq’s surface-to-air defense missiles and antiaircraft guns. Many of these sites had been hit during 12 years of “protecting” no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, but these attacks had been intensified between September 2002 and March 2003. During the brief 2003 air war, Iraq’s remaining air defenses found it difficult to locate attacking coalition aircraft because the U.S. Air Force and Army’s pilot-less drones dropped chaff that confused Iraq’s radar. Also, during daylight hours Predator drones attracted Iraq’s radar and shifted it away from the paths of coalition planes. Thus during the ensuing “shock and awe” aerial campaign, the coalition did not lose a single aircraft to enemy fire.12 Following the March 20 bombing attempt to kill Hussein, coalition aircraft targeted and destroyed Iraq’s command and control centers during the daylight hours. For example, American B-1 aircraft precisely bombed a telecommunications switch about 200 meters from Baghdad’s Rashid Hotel where Iraq had its command and control center. Without a communication switch, Iraqi commanders could not send messages to Republican Guard units or to Hussein’s loyal fedayeen paramilitary groups. Beginning the night of March 21-22, the coalition’s “shock and awe” air campaign employed F-117s, B-2s, and B-1s, plus fighter planes and Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. and British aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. Among their many targets, the aerial campaign focused on the Baath party headquarters and other government buildings in Baghdad, seeking the quick collapse

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of Saddam Hussein’s government. There were more than 500 sites on the Master Target List, but some were later removed in order to reduce civilian casualties. Two other former targets had a considerable influence on the war. First, Iraq’s television and radio stations were not destroyed but allowed the old regime to continue broadcasting propaganda that appeared to show Hussein was still in charge. Second, Iraq’s electrical grid was left untouched, which meant that all of Baghdad’s lights remained lit against the background of constant explosions from coalition bombs striking targets around the city.13 Iraq meanwhile reportedly fired at least 23 ballistic and cruise missiles, but did not launch any Scud missiles that had proved to be a problem during the 1991 war. The results of attempted intercepts of Iraqi missiles by the U.S. Army’s Patriot batteries were mixed at best. The Army reported that the batteries had destroyed allUSS the Iraqi missiles (nine for nine) they fired at, but they also shot down two friendly aircraft and locked on a third. According to an unofficial report, “of the 14 Iraqi missiles not engaged by Patriots, four were reported as outside the range of any Patriot system and one exploded shortly after launch. No official explanation [has been] given for why the other nine Iraqi missiles were not fired upon.” None of the cruise missiles were intercepted, which could pose problems for the Patriot system in the future.14 The Initial Ground Campaigns. American and British forces launched the ground campaign when they moved out of Kuwait toward their ultimate destinations of Baghdad and Basra. As part of a two-pronged attack, the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division left Kuwait on a northwestern route that would go through Samawah, Najaf and Karbala toward Baghdad. Meanwhile, the 1st Marine Division took a northeast route that would pass through Nasiriyah and Kut, headed for Baghdad. As American forces moved toward Baghdad, commando units of the British Royal Marines, aided by U.S. Navy Seals and British Chinook helicopters, were directed to seize the oil fields on the Al Faw Peninsula. Within four hours of landing, British forces had control of Al Faw from where Iraq shipped the oil from its Rumalia oil fields to tankers in the Persian Gulf.



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Dept. of Defense Photo USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) launches the first tomahawk missile to be fired in Iraq, 20 Mar 2003

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As the British were taking Al Faw, Fox Company of America’s 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, captured the southern port town of Umm Qasr, adjacent to Al Faw. To reach Al Faw, the Marines moved through a gap cut by British engineers in a sand barricade where they immediately received fire from Iraqi artillery. To break through Iraqi forces, the Marines’ Abrams tanks entered the fray and forced the surrender of about 50 Iraqi soldiers. The Marines soon secured Umm Qasr although Iraqi irregular forces posed problems for several days.15 The Siege at Basra. Also in the south, Britain’s 7th Armored Brigade, the 16th Air Assault Group and three commando units were deployed to lay siege at Basra. Using conventional tactics, Britain’s commander, Air Marshall Brian Burridge, had his troops monitor movements of civilians in and out of Basra and gathered intelligence from MI6 agents inside the city. After the 1991 war, MI6 had embedded agents in Basra who now reported that Ali Hassan al-Majid—known as Chemical Ali after he used poison gas against Kurdish villagers in 1988—commanded Basra’s Baathist police and paramilitaries as well as radical Islamic militants (fedayeen) who had gathered from such Arab nations as Morocco, Syria, Tunis and Algeria. Al-Majid used these forces to maintain a tight control over the Shiite population in Basra. The Shiites still remembered March 1991 when President George H.W. Bush urged them to rebel but refused to let American forces join in the fight to assist them against the Republican Guards. Hussein’s forces reestablished control of the Basra region by putting down the Shiite uprising and inflicting severe casualties on the rebels. In March 2003, the British planned to seize Basra and, at the same time, hoped to regain Shiite goodwill by minimizing civilian losses. During the siege of Basra, General Burridge had sniper teams slip into the city to kill as many Baathist and fedayeen irregular combatants as possible. He also sent Challenger II tanks accompanied by small groups of soldiers to probe al-Majid’s defensive lines for weaknesses. On April 6, Burridge decided it was time for an assault and ordered the 7th Armored Brigade to attack Basra from the south, east and west. The British assault scattered the Baathist



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Dept. of Defense Photo Army General Tommy Franks (left) speaks with Air Force Brigadier General Rick Rosborg, Commander, 379 Air Expeditionary Wing, during Operation Enduring Freedom. Mar 12, 2003

paramilitary and fedayeen that were either killed or forced to flee the city. The remaining fedayeen militants made their final stand on April 7 in the buildings of the University of Basra. The final phase of the struggle found British soldiers undertaking a room-by-room search of the buildings and killing any of the Islamic “martyrs” who refused to surrender. While General Burridge’s tactics took more time than planned, they cleared the city of the paramilitaries and gained the initial confidence of the populace. After learning the British forces would remain in the liberated city, the Shiite citizenry joined British troops in celebrating the victory.16 Liberating Baghdad. After engaging Iraqi forces at Umm Qasr, America’s 1st Marine Division separated from the British and moved northeast toward Nasiriyah and Kut, while the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division struck from the west toward Samawah, Najaf and Karbala. When they reached Nasiriyah, the main body of the Marines secured the bridges across the Euphrates River and Saddam Canal before heading for Kut. Marine Task Force Tarawa, consisting of the 2nd Marine Regiment, the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (helicopters), a combat engineer battalion and a company of

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Abrams tanks, was assigned the task of seizing control of the city of Nasiriyah. Their mission was to protect the two bridges and keep open the roadways for ammunition, food and other supplies to reach advancing American forces. Coalition officials believed that the Shiite population of Nasiriyah would not only welcome their arrival, but would assist them in liberating the city. They were mistaken because, as at Basra, the Shiites were intimidated by Baathist police and Iraqi forces under the command of Ali Hassan al-Majid. Consequently, the Task Force was engaged in several fierce battles with Iraq’s 11th Infantry, Baath loyalists and a large contingent of fedayeen militants including some foreign Arabs who had volunteered to fight the invaders. The 507th Maintenance Corps’s attempt to join up with the Task Force became one of the celebrated mishaps of the campaign. Unfortunately its trucks took a wrong turn off Highway 1 that sent them toward the center of Nasiriyah where they were fired on by the fedayeen and forced to turn around. One member of the Maintenance Corps, Private Jessica Lynch, who had been in the back of a Humvee that crashed into an Army truck during this maneuver, was knocked unconscious and injured. She was

Dept. of Defense Photo Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit



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Dept. of Defense Photo Marine from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit advances at Az Zubayr, Iraq, 23 Mar 2003

subsequently captured and taken to an Iraqi hospital. During her nine days at the hospital an Iraqi doctor probably saved her life with emergency surgery and blood transfusions. After an Iraqi “walk-in” informed the marines about Lynch, she was rescued by a group of Marines, Navy Seals and Army rangers. Publicity about her capture and rescue—manipulated by the U.S. military for its propaganda value—made Lynch an instant “hero” of the war. She always downplayed her role in the firefight, however, insisting the people who rescued her were the real heroes. Meanwhile, Task Force Tarawa continued trying to dislodge the remaining Iraqi forces and fedayeen from Nasiriyah—an undertaking that took until early April to complete. Finally, the coalition’s supply routes were secured and trucks could move along them without fear of an ambush. The liberation of Nasiriyah came just after the end of a three-day sandstorm and the 1st Marine Division and the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division could be supplied with the food and ammunition essential to their moving northward toward Baghdad.17 To defend Baghdad from coalition forces, Iraqi generals created a “Red Zone” surrounding the city that contained four Republican

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Guard units to the south and three units to the north of the capital. Lieutenant General Paad Majd al-Hamdani instructed a company of Iraqi Special Forces to station a demolition team ready to destroy the al-Kaed bridge should the Americans try to seize the bridge. As it happened, the al-Kaed bridge had a southern span that was three lanes wide and a northern span that was much smaller. After the Iraqis set off a series of bombs, the southern span which suffered little damage, could still hold traffic, but the northern span had a large hole in the middle of the bridge. The 1st Marine Division employed the southern span to send elements into Baghdad’s central city, After British troops had trouble with the fedayeen and Baathist loyalists at Basra and U.S. Marines encountered similar problems at Nasiriyah, Iraq’s leaders shifted the four Republican Guard units further south and moved the northern units closer to Tikrit, about 50 miles from Baghdad. These maneuvers left those units susceptible to intensive coalition bombing raids which destroyed much of their combat effectiveness. Coalition air attacks had also given special attention to targeting Iraq’s command and communication facilities, including telephone lines, which made it impossible for Iraq’s central command to quickly provide their field officers with information about the position of coalition forces. Heavy air raids in and around Baghdad on March 31 softened enemy positions in preparation for coalition ground attacks. On April 2nd the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division advanced through the Karbala Gap, and later Karbala proper, into Baghdad. The same day, the 1st Marine Division crossed the Tigris River at Numaniyah before moving on to Kut. To protect Army and Marine supply routes from the Iraqi fedayeen and other irregulars, the 101st Airborne took control of Najaf and the 82nd Airborne supplanted the Marines at Nasiriyah and Samawah. A taxi driver’s suicide bomb at Najaf and repeated attacks by Iraqis in civilian clothes—a hint of things to come—meant that the U.S. soldiers had their fingers on “triggers, not on trigger guards.” After defeating the Republican Guard’s Medina and Hammurabi Divisions, the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Army Division captured their first key target, Baghdad’s Saddam Hussein International Airport



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on April 3, 2003. Aided by reports from U.S. Special Forces who infiltrated into Baghdad, Task Force 1-64—from the Army’s 2nd Brigade—used 40 Abram tanks and Bradley mechanized personnel vehicles to execute a twenty-five mile daytime raid into the center of Baghdad. They began at the south end of the city and, battling through various Iraqi forces, circled around to end at the airport. The “Thunder Roll” raid was not intended to hold ground, but to disrupt the Iraqi forces and, hopefully, prevent a major urban battle. East of Baghdad, the 1st Marine Division found itself engaged in several firefights with the fanatical fedayeen, mostly Egyptians and Jordanians, whose ambushes knocked out an Abrams tank. The Marines pressed forward, however, engaging in several fierce battles against the Republican Guard’s Al Nida Division before crossing the Tigris River to seize the Rashid air base. By April 9, the Marines advancement had brought them to Baghdad where they linked up with the Army’ 3rd Infantry. The following day organized resistance ended in the Iraqi capital. Republican Guard units around Baghdad had melted away, according to unconfirmed reports in London’s Daily Express and The Observer, because the commander of the Republican Guard, General Mahar Syfran, and other senior officers received “huge payments in cash and gold,” to allow the allies to take Baghdad “virtually without a fight.” While U.S. forces were occupying Baghdad, General Franks’ Central Command provided American forces with revised decks of playing cards, with photos, to help identify the “Most Wanted” high ranking Iraqi officials. The first card was the ace of spades with Saddam Hussein’s picture on it.18 The Battle for Kirkuk. When it became clear that Turkey would not allow any U.S. troops on its territory, NATO Commander General James Jones authorized sending the Italian-based U.S. 173rd Airborne and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit into Kurdistan. Thus on March 26, 2003, about 1,000 soldiers of the 173rd took off from Aviano, Italy and parachuted onto an air strip at Bashur where they were met by Kurdish militia, CIA operatives, and Special Forces soldiers. Four days later, about 2,160 soldiers and 381 pieces of equipment were on the ground at Bashur. They now had a “modest” number of army tanks, armored personnel carriers,

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and artillery. As a result, Iraqi officials knew there was a northern front with Kurds as the U.S. ally. Before U.S. troops could move south against the Iraqis, they had to deal with Ansar al-Islam, an affiliate of al-Qaeda and a small Iranian-backed Islamic Group of Kurdistan. The Islamic Group was also a threat to Jalal Talabani’s Peshmerga (Kurdish) militia that was stationed along the Turkish-Iranian border. On the morning of March 26, the operation was launched by cruise missile attacks on both segments of the opposition. Following the attacks, a Kurdish contingent of 6,500 men, led by Nasrudin Mustafa, attacked the Ansar and Islamic Group using six different mountain routes. With U.S. air strikes and attacks by deadly AC-130 gun-ships, Mustafa’s soldiers succeeded in defeating their enemies after four days of battle and forcing some to flee across the border into Iran. Meanwhile, other U.S. Special Forces and Kurdish units advanced steadily southward against Iraqi positions forcing the Iraqis to fall back to defensive lines on the outskirts of Kirkuk. Lieutenant General Henry “Pete” Osman hoped to get Iraqis’ little motivated troops to surrender, but there were so many Saddam loyalists among them that his effort failed. Because the Kurds lacked military training, the U.S. Special Forces called for the intense bombing of Iraqi forces at Kirkuk. The conflict’s worst incident of losses caused by friendly fire occurred here. Trying to speed up the air strikes on April 6, a Special Forces controller contacted two Navy’s F-14s and told them the enemy was at a crossroads in front of his position but provided no clear target identification. As a result of this poor information a Navy F-14 dropped a 2,000 pound bomb amongst the Specials Forces and Kurds, who looked like retreating Iraqis. One American, 17 Kurds and a translator for the BBC were killed, while Major Eric Howard was injured. Later, after American F-14s and F/A-18s struck Iraqi positions around Kirkuk, followed by additional U.S. B-52s bombing runs, Iraqi defenses gave way. The northern Iraqi army retreated or deserted as Kurds and U.S. Special Forces occupied Kirkuk. With Special Forces directing aircraft to specific targets, subsequent air raids dislodged Iraqi forces from Mosul on April 11.19



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The same day, elements of the 1st Marine Division launched probes northward and encountered enemy resistance. After receiving information about an ambush from a local Iraqi, a U.S. Air Force F-16 and other support aircraft reduced the Iraqi threat. General Steve Ferrando reported discovering two trailers in a palm grove that resembled the mobile germ warfare lab that Colin Powell cited in his February 5th report to the Security Council. Ferrando thought he could verify Powell’s comments, but when Marines examined the trailers they found nothing but Russian-made field kitchens. Marines Occupy Tikrit. As the Marines struck north from Baghdad they met no opposition at Samarra, instead they found abandoned Iraqi armor and artillery. At dawn on April 13 the Marine

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units advanced to the outskirts of Tikrit, in a region that provided Saddam Hussein with his major source of political support. After a raid on Highway 1 near Bayji north of Tikrit, the Marines captured five of Saddam’s bodyguards, the chief of the Iraqi air force, and several members of Saddam’s inner circle. At dawn on April 14, the Marines task force, with air support, began to enter Tikrit. When the Marine unit entered Tikrit, they faced only “spotty” gun battles and were surprised by the number of abandoned weapons and ammunition depots in and around the city. On April 24, soldiers from the 82nd Airborne took up positions in the Sunni city of Fallujah near a schoolhouse. During a Sunni protest demonstration on April 30 shots were fired. Members of the 82nd shot back, killing 17 Iraqis and wounding about sixty. The Sunni regions that the Americans had hoped to control later became a battleground when the insurgency began.20 Major Combat Operations End. The American casualties from the war were as follows. The total deaths were 199, of these deaths 108 were from hostile action; 5 deaths from non-hostile action; 3 deaths were from friendly fire; and 83 deaths were from accidents, including 22 helicopter accidents. The British and Australian losses totaled 42, including 19 deaths from accidents.21

The Media Views the War Some 600 journalists were “embedded” in U.S. military units during the 43-day war. The extensive embedding process had its initial test during the Afghanistan campaign with both the military and the media satisfied with the results. Each of the journalists was dependent on his host unit for food, transportation, security and access to sources—which usually enabled them to write detailed, often vivid, accounts about American troops in action. In addition, the major newspapers assigned several unattached reporters and photographers to cover the broader face of the war, including combat zones, that those cloistered with their designated units could not see. This included reporting and analysis of the Iraqi government’s activities, resulting civilian casualties, coalition



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military strategy, the views of domestic supporters and critics and the attitudes of various foreign governments. The Iraqi campaign was “reported superbly by newspapers,” according to Stephen Hess at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “The stories have been rich in variety, coming at this form so many different angles.” Only some 30 percent of the public read the newspapers, however, while the rest of Americans turned to the electronic media for information about the conflict. Cable and broadcast TV provided vivid images of soldiers in combat and bombs falling on Iraqi targets. Unfortunately, American electronic media stressed the “shock and awe” features of the campaign, as Michael Massing has pointed out, and focused on “tales of American bravery and derring-do.” The public’s favorite, Fox News, in Jacqueline E. Sharkey’s view, took an “overtly patriotic approach” and gained large increases in rating, while Michael Massing was appalled by MSNBC’s “mawkishness and breathless boosterism.” Early in the war graphic pictures of death and suffering failed to appear on cable and broadcast TV. Sharkey noted, “about half the reports of embedded journalists showed combat action, but not a single story depicted people hit by weapons. As the war continued, the networks did show casualties, usually from afar. The footage was much less graphic than still photographs shown in newspapers and magazines.” Britain’s BBC, which put two hundred people in the field, offered in Massing’s opinion, “no-nonsense anchors, tenacious correspondents, perceptive features, and a host of commentators steeped in knowledge of the Middle East, in contrast to the retired general and colonels we saw on American TV.” Their reporters “were not afraid to challenge the coalition’s claims.”22 Few American commentators presented their audiences with a realistic view of what the future held for the victors.

Bush Declares Victory Although some minor hostilities continued, Franks informed Secretary Rumsfeld, “Major combat operations are over” and “there’s never been a combat operation as successful as Iraqi

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Dept. of Defense Photo: President George W. Bush gives the thumbs up to the press after arriving at the St. PetersburgClearwater International Airport for his visit to thank the America II Electronics Company for their corporate responsibility. The company was chosen for a presidential visit because they did not reduce their work force after the September 11, 2001, attack on America



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Freedom.” Also, Franks hoped the president would acknowledge the coalition forces’ accomplishments. Heeding Franks’ request, President Bush flew as co-pilot of a Navy S-3B “Viking” jet from San Diego to the deck of the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln 30 miles off shore. The words “Navy One—George W. Bush, Commander in Chief” were painted on the side of the Viking jet and on the Abraham Lincoln a banner displayed the words “Mission Accomplished”. Bush arrived dressed in a Navy aviator’s combat gear for the politically orchestrated photo-op and TV coverage that followed. In addressing the Abraham Lincoln’s officers and crew, Bush declared, “major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and its allies have prevailed. Now our coalition will be engaged in reconstructing Iraq.” Bush’s claim that “combat operations” ended in Iraq became a measuring stick by which American casualties have been measured. General Franks later wrote that while he “was grateful on the first of May for the President’s words. Little did I know the criticism he would face for doing what I had recommended.” The same day Bush celebrated the end of the Iraqi war, Secretary Rumsfeld in Kabul, Afghanistan emphasized: “We’re at a point where clearly we have moved from Afghan combat to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activity.”22 Both Bush and Rumsfeld were mistaken. After Tikrit was occupied, Lt. General Jay Garner (ret.) arrived in Baghdad as the U.S. civilian head of the Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance for Iraq. Garner’s first shock was the looting that erupted in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq that gravely impaired future reconstruction efforts. Also, Saddam loyalists and foreign Arab volunteers were organizing an insurgency aimed at forcing the U.S. led coalition to leave Iraq.23

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D

uring the months before the war, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair hammered away at the theme that Iraq was an imminent threat because it possessed an arsenal of Scud missiles able to deliver various weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Bush administration made its claims in the September 2002 National Intelligence Estimate and emphasized them in Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003 speech at the UN Security Council during which he offered “evidence” of Iraq’s possession of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. Blair approved a September 2002 British intelligence report that claimed Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were available “within 45 minutes of an order to use them.” After Iraq was occupied, both Bush and Blair pressed the search for Iraq’s banned weaponry to silence critics of the invasion. Their concern was intensified because Iraqi forces never employed any so-called “dangerous weapons” during the war and in the first days after the occupation neither U.S. nor British troops could locate any of the weapons of mass destruction. American combat soldiers invaded Iraq in March 2003 carrying pocketbook copies of the “WMD Facility, Equipment and Munitions Handbook” to identify any suspected or unusual weaponry and were instructed to call for

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an Iraqi Site Survey team to verify any suspicious equipment or weapons.

Initial Inspection Activities The Americans had established four Iraqi Site Survey teams comprised of special weapons inspectors who were equipped to test any suspected WMD material for chemical, biological or nuclear components. In addition, the Pentagon gave the Survey Teams a list of 100 possible, high priority WMD sites to examine. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Allison who led Iraqi Survey Team-3, for example, received a call on the third day of the war, March 22, from a Marine unit near Basra that it may have found anthrax in an abandoned building. Allison expected this call because Secretary Colin Powell claimed in his February 5 speech at the UN that Iraq was unable to account for at least 16,500 liters of anthrax. Allison and his team flew from their base in Kuwait to the Basra location where a Marine showed Allison a white powdery substance in a tightly sealed bottle and a sheet of paper written in Arabic, a language no one on the team could read. Allison’s two tests of the powdery substance showed it was not anthrax or any other toxic substance. Later in Kuwait, an Army specialist translated the Arabic document and discovered that the sealed bottle contained an Iraqi high school student’s project. By the end of April, the Iraqi Survey teams had investigated all of the 100 “top-sites” but failed to find any weapons of mass destruction.1 Nevertheless, from March through May 2003 Prime Minister Blair joined President Bush, Secretary Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz in continuing to assure their supporters that sooner or later the inspection teams would find Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. On May 31, Bush repeated the claim that Hussein had biological laboratories producing weapons even though a Pentagon spokesman acknowledged there was no evidence of their existence. Powell told Fox News: “I’m sure more evidence and more proof will be found as we go down this road.” The Secretary emphasized that before his February 5, 2003 speech at the UN, he had “spent four days and four nights going over everything they [the CIA] had” to get “solid information” about Iraq’s weaponry.2



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Basis of Intelligence Estimates As weeks and months passed and the search for weapons of mass destruction floundered, the media and public began to question whether high officials were victims of faulty information or guilty of deceit and lying to promote their goals. Increasingly, intelligence agencies came under fire as questions arose: had political pressure dictated intelligence assessments or was the intelligence process flawed and in need of overhaul? Inquiries were launched. As additional information gradually surfaced, the background of intelligence claims about Iraq’s weapons became more apparent. For example, the New York Times reported in March 2006, that from 2001 until March 2003, Iraq’s Foreign Minister Naji Sabri received more than $100,000 from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to provide data on Iraq’s weapons via French intelligence. Sabri reportedly told the CIA that Iraq had no nuclear weapons but was “aggressively and covertly” attempting to develop them. He informed the CIA that Iraq had stockpiled chemical weapons to use against any invaders or Israel. Sabri’s information that Iraq did not have an active nuclear weapons program was correct, but his other claims regarding chemical weapons were erroneous.3 Some misinformation arrived at American intelligence agencies from friendly sources, but another contributing factor was that these agencies tended to reject reports that stated Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction no longer existed. Israeli Misinformation. Another source of misinformation about Iraq’s weaponry was Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. An ad hoc intelligence unit in the prime minister’s office that bypassed Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, passed questionable assessments to select U.S. agencies during the months before the invasion. Sharon frequently provided the director of the Pentagon’s Special Plans Office, Abram Shulsky, with alarming reports about Hussein’s weaponry, which were passed on to senior officials in the Bush administration. Tel Aviv’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies reported in November 2003, “on the eve of war, Israeli sources resembled their counterparts in the United States and other Western countries. [However] it had not received any information regarding

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weapons of mass destruction and surface-to-surface missiles for nearly eight years.” Israel’s Knesset launched an investigation in March 2004 to determine the source of its faulty intelligence. Led by Likud Party member, Yuval Steinitz, the investigators concluded that the Israeli intelligence assessments were not based on facts, but on questionable assumptions and speculation. The Knesset’s report indicated Sharon knew Iraq’s threat was limited but “didn’t want to spoil President Bush’s scenario.” Former UN inspector Scott Ritter who served as a liaison official with Israeli intelligence headquarters confirmed that the Israelis had known that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction.4 Prewar Iraqi Informants. In addition to Sharon’s alarming reports, the Pentagon’s Special Plans Office relied on information provided by Iraqi defectors, including those belonging to the London-based Iraqi National Congress headed by Ahmad Chalabi. Among those providing data were Khidhir Hamaz who defected in 1994 and Ibsan Saeed al-Haideri who fled Iraq in 2001. Al-Haideri claimed to have seen 20 sites where Iraq had stored chemical and biological weapons. Included among his alleged 20 hidden storage sites was a hospital under which chemical or biological weapons were supposedly hidden—a claim that found its way into Secretary Powell’s February 5 speech. When prewar UN inspectors examined the hospital, they failed to find any weapons here or at any other of al-Haideri’s 19 locations. Another defector claimed that Iraq trained the 9/11 terrorists at Salam Pak, a city just south of Baghdad. Because the Bush administration widely publicized this defector’s story, a U.S. opinion poll in February 2003 revealed that 72 percent of Americans erroneously believed Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the New York and Pentagon attacks of September 11, 2001. During their prewar searches, UN inspectors investigated places identified by various defectors but found no evidence to support any of their claims. In early 2004, CIA Director George Tenet acknowledged that the al-Haideri episode exemplified his problems with Iraqi exiles.



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If American intelligence agencies were particularly receptive to information that reinforced their suspicions of illegal Iraq activity, they tended to ignore reports to the contrary. In August 2002, Doctor Sawsan Alhaddad agreed to visit her brother Saad Tawfiq who, according to the CIA, lived in Baghdad and was a “key figure” in Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program. Since certain CIA analysts believed Hussein had revived his nuclear program but lacked hard evidence to substantiate their claims, they encouraged the Sawsan’s visit to gain information about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. When her brother refused to defect, Sawsan handed him a list of questions provided by the CIA. How close Iraq was to having a nuclear warhead? How much weapons-grade fuel did Iraq have? And where are the nuclear weapons factories located? Tawfiq informed his sister that Iraq’s nuclear program had been dead since 1991. He said U.S. aircraft destroyed Iraq’s nuclear facilities in 1991 and later Security Council sanctions prevented Iraq from reviving its program. He also confirmed that no uranium had been obtained from Niger, Africa; thus, Iraq could not perform nuclear weapon research. Finally, Doctor Alhaddad asked her brother if he had any information about a former Iraqi scientist who defected and told the CIA that Iraq had a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. Tawfiq replied that the “guy was a phony and never knew anything.” After her ten-day visit in Iraq, Doctor Alhaddad informed the CIA that her brother said that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapons program and that he wondered where the CIA got its crazy list of questions. The CIA’s reaction was that Saad Tawfiq was lying about the nuclear program and did not want to tell his sister what he was doing. Another 30 Iraqi families with scientists in Iraq also apparently reported that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, but the CIA simply ignored them.5 Postwar Iraqi Informants. While U.S. Army survey teams were searching designated Iraqi sites, Hussein’s “nuclear mastermind,” Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, was trying to find an American in Baghdad who could understand the importance of documents about Iraq’s nuclear projects that he had buried in his garden in 1992. In early May 2003, a former UN inspector David Albright, who Dr. Mahdi knew

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from the 1995 inspections, agreed to “lobby” Washington to bring Mahdi and his family to the United States, but was not immediately successful. A CIA agent and two U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency officers, in the meantime, spoke with Mahdi but they did not understand the information he tried to convey. With Albright’s help, Mahdi, his wife and family were finally flown to the United States where, in August 2003, he told U.S. weapons inspectors that Saddam never had nuclear weapons, but that the documents in his garden could have been useful in a future start-up.6 Reporters from Time magazine interviewed “Iraqi weapons scientists, middle men and former government officials” between June and September 2003. These people all made “the same claim that Iraq’s once massive unconventional-weapons program was destroyed or dismantled in 1992 and never rebuilt; that officials destroyed or never kept the documents that would prove it.” Subsequently, and most unfortunately, Iraqi scientists and officials could not produce documents for UN inspectors in 2002 that verified the destruction of banned materials. Iraqi engineer Nabil al-Rawi, who worked on Iraq’s nuclear program before 1991, told Time the nuclear program was not resumed after the nuclear facilities were destroyed following the 1991 war. Between 1991 and 1998, UN inspectors supervised the destruction of Iraq’s remaining weapons of mass destruction. After 1991, Mahdi became the director of an engineering company and al-Rawi worked on electrical controls for unmanned drones, on detection radar for U.S. stealth bombers and on antiaircraft systems in buildings formerly used for nuclear weapons projects. To Time’s questions about Iraqi secrecy toward the UN inspectors, former Minister of Industry and Minerals, Muyassar Raja Shalah said the reason officials took objects out the back door was to hide them because Iraq wanted to keep its legal “military secrets” from the inspectors. Time reporters also learned that Iraq retained small quantities of some weapons grade chemicals. Sa’ad al-Rawian, a captain of the Mukhabarat (Secret Police), conceded that small amounts of VX and mustard gas were kept for experimental purposes. He seemed to confirm part of Rumsfeld’s speculation when he said these and



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other small quantities of potential chemical weapons were destroyed just before the war began in March 2003. Time concluded that its findings offered “a glimpse into the challenges faced” by the postwar investigators searching for Iraq’s prohibited weaponry.7

Administration Claims Invalidated Shortly after Time’s July 2003 report appeared, CIA Director Tenet appointed David Kay to head teams of experts charged with unearthing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Kay had been a member of a UN inspection team from 1991 to 1995 and Tenant expected the teams of weapons specialists would locate Iraq’s suspected WMD. After more than two months of searching in Iraq, Kay issued an interim report on October 2, 2003 that said, in essence, the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) had not found any significant signs of, or information about, Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. Pulitzer Prize winning author and reporter, Thomas Powers, compared 29 of the specific charges Secretary Powell had made in his February 5 UN speech with Kay’s October 2 report. In 18 instances, the Iraqi Survey Group could not find a single itemized item. The Group failed to find Powell’s cited “100-500 tons” of deadly sarin and mustard gases or 25,000 liters of anthrax, “few dozen” Scud missiles, the “wherewithal to develop smallpox,” cars full of “key files” driven around by Iraq’s intelligence agents or “warheads containing biological weapons…hidden in large groves of palm trees.” In his speech, Powell had displayed a chart purporting to show “biological weapons on wheels” and claimed, “we know Iraq had at least seven of these.” In contrast, the Iraqi Survey Group had “not yet been able to corroborate” the existence of any mobile laboratory. Powell also stated that Iraqi scientists who revealed secrets about Iraq’s aluminum tubes and centrifuges would be executed; however, Kay’s teams did not find any aluminum tubes or centrifuges capable of producing fissionable material for atomic weapons. The Iraqi Survey Group could not substantiate Powell’s claim that an eyewitness saw 1,600 death row prisoners who were “tied down to beds” during experiments with chemical and biological weapons and “autopsies performed to confirm their effects.” However, Kay

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did locate “a prison laboratory network, possibly used in human testing for BM agents,” but this was only “possibly.” He also found a “key area” where Iraq “may have engaged in proscribed or undeclared activity…including research on a possible VX stabilizer.” But the Iraqi Survey Group found no actual VX or “weapons for delivery” for these agents. Consequently, while the interim report did provide some evidence of banned weaponry, Powers dismissed it was “paltry and tentative.” Finally, Powers cites instances where the report “almost declares flatly” that certain items will not be found. Kay reported, for instance, that Iraq had not possessed a chemical weapons program since 1991 before hedging his statement by saying that his conclusion about chemical weapons was based on “multiple sources with varied access and reliability.”8 Secretary Powell remained optimistic, as indicated by an October 2003 Washington Post editorial he wrote, declaring the interim report made “two things abundantly clear: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was in material breach of its United Nations obligations before the Security Council passed Resolution 1441 last November, and Iraq went further into the breach after the resolution was passed.” He insisted the report “describes a host of weapons of mass destruction that ‘should have been declared to the UN’.” Although Kay admitted he found no “stocks of weapons,” Powell said that the Iraqi Survey Group will “press ahead in the months ahead with their important and painstaking work.”9 Even without the uncovering of banned weaponry, President Bush continued to be positive about results of the Iraqi invasion. He said that Kay’s report had found active research on Iraqi missiles proving “Saddam Hussein was a danger to the world.” Using Kay’s testimony to Congress, and a classified annex provided to the White House and lawmakers, the president claimed the “interim report said that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program spanned more than two decades.” Bush continued: “Iraq’s program involved thousands of people, billions of dollars and was elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Thus, he declared that Hussein had been “a serious danger.”10



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Alleged Niger Uranium Deal President Bush’s charge in his January 2003 State of the Union Address that a British dossier indicated Iraq had obtained uranium for a nuclear weapon from Niger, a small West African country, later became quite contentious. On July 6, 2003, former ambassador, Joseph C. Wilson, declared in a New York Times article that the CIA had known before the speech that there was no Iraq-Niger uranium deal. He stated that in February 2002, the CIA asked him to check on an intelligence report about Niger’s alleged sale of yellow cake uranium to Iraq. Wilson subsequently visited Niger where U.S. Ambassador to Niger Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick told him she had already informed Washington that the report about Niger sending uranium to Iraq was false. The Niger story surfaced in the fall of 2001 when Italy’s Military Intelligence Security Service paid an informer for a thick packet containing codes and letters alleged to contain agreements between Niger’s president and Iraq’s offer to buy uranium. Eventually, the Italian documents were passed to Britain’s MI6 and the CIA. The CIA was not interested in uncorroborated third-hand data, but Feith and Shulsky’s Pentagon group accepted the report as indicative of Iraq’s intention to build an atomic weapon. Feith forwarded the information to Vice President Cheney who passed it on to Secretary Powell. At a later meeting with the House International Relations Committee, Powell stated, “With respect to the nuclear program, there is no doubt that the Iraqis are pursuing it.” In September 2002, the British government published a white paper that claimed Saddam purchased uranium from an “African state.” Finally in the January 20, 2003 State of the Union message, President Bush declared, “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” These sixteen words would follow Bush after the war. Bush and Powell would have known of the phony report of a Niger deal if they had seen a State Department’s secret memorandum written in early 2002 that stated that the sale of uranium from Niger to Iraq was “unlikely” due to many economic, diplomatic

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and logistical obstacles. The State Department’s analyst pointed out that Niger would have been required to send “25 hard-toconceal 10-ton tractor trailers” across 100 miles and at least one international border to deliver the uranium. The State Department’s memorandum was declassified in January 2006 as part of the Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by Judicial Watch, a conservative legal group.11 The Valeria Plame Affair. After Wilson publicly disavowed the alleged CIA report endorsing a connection between Iraq and Niger, an article by columnist Robert D. Novak stated, “Wilson never worked for the CIA but his wife Valeria Plame, is an agency operative on weapons of mass destruction. Two senior administration officials told me his wife suggested sending Wilson to Niger to investigate the report [italics added].” After Novak named Plame, the CIA asked the Justice Department for a criminal indictment of the individual of leaked the information because the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (1982) made it a felony for any official with access to classified information to disclose the identity of any covert American agent. Thus, on September 30, the Justice Department initiated an investigation of the Novak case and the White House told its staff to preserve any records related to the case. Chicago’s Federal Attorney Patrick J. Fitzgerald led the investigation to find out who the two senior officials were in Novak’s report. Beginning in October 2004, Fitzgerald’s team interviewed President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Bush’s political advisor Karl Rove, and other members of the White House staff. At the same time, Fitzgerald held Grand Jury hearings in Washington, DC, during which the judge sentenced the New York Times Judith Miller and Time magazine’s Matthew Cooper to prison for refusing to name their sources in the Plame case. Although Miller and Cooper appealed to a Federal Appeals Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, they lost. Finally on July 6, 2005, Cooper agreed to testify after he received a waiver from his source (Karl Rove). Time editor-in-chief, Norman Greenstein, gave the Grand Jury Cooper’s confidential e-mails and notes in which he wrote that he “spoke to Rove on double super secret background.” Rove said on July 11, 2003 it was not the



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CIA but Wilson’s wife (Plame), an undercover agent for the CIA, who authorized Wilson’s trip to Niger. When Cooper later asked Cheney’s chief of staff, I. “Scooter” Lewis Libby, if he had heard about Wilson’s wife sending Wilson to Niger, Libby replied, “Yeah I’ve heard that too.” Miller also agreed to testify after Libby released her from a promise of confidentiality. After Cooper and Miller testified, Fitzgerald announced that Libby had been indicted on one count of obstructing justice, two counts of making false statements to FBI investigators, and two counts of lying to the Grand Jury. In January 2007, the trial of “Scooter” Libby was underway. In November 2006, Bob Woodward of the Washington Post said his source for the Palme affair had freed him from the confidentiality agreement provided he did not publicly disclose the Bush official’s name. Woodward met with his source on June 27, 2003, who did not say “Valerie Plame” but referred to her only as “Wilson’s wife” who worked for the CIA as an analyst for weapons of mass destruction. He also told Fitzgerald he had “no recollection” about discussions on “Wilson’s wife” before Robert Novak’s column appeared on July 14, 2003. After obtaining Woodward’s deposition, Fitzgerald informed a federal judge that he would begin proceedings before a new Grand Jury because the 18-month term of the previous jury had expired. While the new Grand Jury began its work, more information appeared on the Plame case on April 7, 2006 when the Washington Post reported that President Bush had authorized Libby to disclose “sensitive intelligence” and had approved the release of new data in an attempt to discredit Wilson. Fitzgerald’s court filing placed Bush and Vice President Cheney at the center of Libby’s testimony and collaborated his testimony that Cheney said Bush authorized the declassification of the information.Libby, subsequently found guilty of perjury and obstruction of justice and sentenced to serve two and a half years in jail.12

The Continued Search for WMD Although his teams had previously failed to find evidence that pre-invasion Iraq had possessed weapons of mass destruction, Kay

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insisted in November 2003 there was “much more work left to do before any conclusions can be reached on the state of possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program efforts.” The Bush administration provided him with $600 million to oversee 1,400 experts for an expanded search for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Kay’s Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) returned to Iraq to search for weapons of mass destruction from October to January 2004. Again the Survey Group found nothing to substantiate the administration’s claim that Iraq’s weaponry and its government had posed an imminent threat to America or its allies in March 2003. In January 2004, Kay announced that rather than continuing his search in Iraq, he had resigned as ISG director. On January 28, Kay told the Senate Armed Services Committee that stockpiles of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction never existed and it was “important to acknowledge failure.” Moreover, he said “an outside inquiry” was needed to determine what went wrong and to assure the Committee and the American people that Bush and his intelligence officials now understood why and where they were wrong.13 To replace Kay, the CIA appointed Charles A. Duelfer to lead the Iraq Survey Group teams because the administration believed that some solid indication of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction might still be found.

Investigations into Intelligence Failures While Duefler’s teams renewed their search in Iraq, a Senate committee openned hearings into how the administration arrived at its prewar claims of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The White House resisted the investigation of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, but the Senate Select Intelligence Committee pressed ahead with its investigation. CIA Director Tenet’s earlier Senate testimony on February 12, 2003, and National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice’s March 6, 2003 letter to Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), stated that UN inspectors were informed of “every high or medium priority” site “the U.S. intelligence community had identified” as hosting “weapons of mass destruction, missiles and U.A.V.s [umanned aerial vehicles].” Later,



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Tenet clarified his statement. Rather than all high value Iraqi sites, UN inspectors were given data on about 84 of the 105 sites that U.S. intelligence suspected contained most of Iraq’s illicit weapons. In all probability, the UN’s chief inspector, Hans Blix, was not told of every site because the additional data would have required more UN inspections—which, at that late date, the administration did not desire. Senate Intelligence Committee’s Report. Members of the Senate Intelligence Committee requested copies of Bush’s daily intelligence briefings by Tenet but, because they were covered by executive privilege, members gained only limited access to them. While the Committee’s final report contained documents from the CIA briefings, the Agency had withheld certain classified material citing the needs of national security. The White House also refused to release the one page of each CIA daily report that summarized the usual report’s 40 or more pages—the single page the president would read. The Senate Committee’s final Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq received bipartisan approval on July 7, 2004. The lengthy document essentially blamed CIA analysts for supplying the false information used by the Bush administration to justify the invasion of Iraq. The Committee concluded that prewar positions, such as the October 1, 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, were either “overstated or were not supported” by intelligence data. The report indicated that the CIA had presumed Iraq was actively developing weapons of mass destruction, but did not stress to policy makers the uncertainties behind their judgments. Also, the CIA was faulted for failing to share information with other intelligence agencies. While the National Intelligence Estimate was issued one week before Congress approved the invasion of Iraq, panel chairman, Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), told reporters Congress might not have approved going to war if they had known the dubious evidence behind its claims. Deputy chairman, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), had no doubt that Congress would have rejected Bush’s request to invade Iraq.

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The Committee’s report contained several examples about how members of the Bush administration developed their conclusions about prewar intelligence on Iraq. The Defense Intelligence Agency’s Christina Shelton found CIA records from the early 1990s alleging an Iraq connection to al-Qaeda, which in August 2002 her boss, Douglas J. Feith, and the Pentagon’s Near Eastern Bureau believed provided “solid evidence of senior level contacts between Iraq” and al-Qaeda. State Department analysts dissented from the October 2002 Intelligence Estimate report that the aluminum tubes found in Iraq could be used to create an atomic bomb, but Secretary Powell overruled his analysts. The Senate Committee found that information from interviews with relatives of Iraqi scientists, in which CIA agents were told that Iraq had ceased developing weapons of mass destruction, was never forwarded to White House officials. The CIA also failed to report that the Security Council’s 1990s economic sanctions had weakened Iraq’s military forces to a point where Iraqi forces were no longer considered an immediate threat to its neighbors or the United States. The Senate report cited the use of an informant, code-named “Curveball” as another example of poor performance. CIA officials apparently accepted Curveball’s claims that Iraq possessed a mobile biological weapons program even though they did not personally interview him or otherwise verify his claims. This led Tenet and later Powell to argue that Iraq “had an active biological weapons program.” Later, five senior German Federal Intelligence officials who controlled the informant said, in interviews with the Los Angeles Times on November 21, 2005, that “Curveball” never claimed Iraq had produced biological or other germ weapons and never saw anyone else who did. Perhaps, the Senate Committee’s most important finding concerned President Bush’s claim that Iraq’s greatest danger was “the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud”—an atomic bomb. On September 8, 2002, the same day New York Times’ Judith Miller and Michael Gordon reported that Iraq “has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons,” National Security Advisor Rice told CNN that “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.” Since reports of Hussein’s nuclear weapons



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had to come from the CIA, the Senate Committee asked Tenet about the October 2002 claim that the agency had “high confidence” that Iraq’s nuclear program was a “gathering threat.” The CIA’s claim rested on its belief that since Iraq possessed the necessary fissionable material (yellowcake) from Niger, the aluminum tubes for a centrifuge, the magnets, balancing machines and machine tools, Hussein could have an atom bomb “in months to a year.” For each of these CIA suppositions, the Senate Committee found, the evidence was thin or non-existent and suggested the agency had ignored or dismissed any evidence contrary to its belief about Iraq’s potential nuclear threat. Lord Butler’s Report. A week after the Senate Committee made public its findings, Britain’s Lord Butler issued an Intelligence Report on the run-up to the Iraqi invasion. The British report was less critical of Blair than the Senate account was of the Bush administration. “We have no reason, found no evidence to question the prime minister’s good faith,” Butler stated, “because there was no deliberate attempt on the part of the government to mislead.” Nonetheless, his report included four findings that showed British intelligence had erred. First, it said evidence of Niger’s uranium was based on forged documents. Second, it stated—contrary to the government’s claims—Iraq had no significant chemical or biological weapons, and had not developed plans for using them. Third, the report noted unreliable human intelligence was “passed from one agent to another” and more credence given to “untried agents than would normally be the case.” Fourth, it said the British government had falsely claimed in 2002 that Iraq could “deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to use them.”

Hussein Linked to al-Qaeda? President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair had justified the Iraqi war, in part, by claiming Saddam Hussein’s regime had links to Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network and was ready to provide al-Qaeda weapons of mass destruction to launch future attacks. Sabah Khodada, a former Iraqi Army captain in exile, told a New York Times reporter on October 14, 2001 that Iraqi officers had trained terrorists to hijack planes. Another Iraqi exile indicated

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foreign Arab students were taught how to hijack a Boeing 707 at an Iraqi training facility near Salman Pak south of Baghdad. The London Times reported that an Iraq defector saw al-Qaeda terrorists being trained to use biological and chemical weapons in Iraq. After the invasion, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh revealed that British intelligence had set up these Iraqi training sites in 1986 after terrorists hijacked an Iraqi civilian airline and the British trained Iraqis to prevent terrorists from hijacking aircraft. Soon after 9/11, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz asserted that Iraq had links with al-Qaeda and instructed his assistant, Douglas J. Feith, to have members of his staff sift out evidence of possible ties. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld accepted his deputy’s assertions as valid: “We do have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have what we believe to be a reliable reporting of senior level contacts going back a decade, and of possible chemical—and biological—agent training.” President Bush reiterated this claim in his January 2003 State of the Union address—”Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaeda.”15 UN Security Council investigators appointed to investigate the alleged al-Qaeda link reported on June 26, 2003, that they had found no evidence to link Iraq and al-Qaeda. The monitoring group’s chairman, Michael Chandler, noted the absence of any affirmative evidence regarding an al-Qaeda-Iraq connection. It may exist, he said, but so far his monitors found no support for the claim of alQaeda activities in Iraq before the war.16 Subsequently, two different U.S. investigations—the 9/11 Commission Report and the Joint Inquiry of the House/Senate joint committee on Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001—concluded that al-Qaeda had no links with Iraq before March 2003. These reports only referred to Iraq where CIA Director Tenet expressed doubts about any involvement. Tenet, for example, suggested that September 11 member, Mohamed Atta, “may have traveled” to Prague for a meeting with an Iraqi intelligence officer, Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, “although we are still working to corroborate this.” The CIA also said it had been told “Iraq had



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formed a suicide pilot unit that it planned to use against British and US forces,” but had dismissed the claim “as highly unlikely and probably disinformation.” Eventually, on December 12, 2003, the New York Times obtained a report, classified in September 2002, which offered evidence that al-Ani did not meet Atta in Prague.17 On October 27, 2003, Feith submitted a document to the Senate Intelligence Committee containing allegations of “50 points on intelligence reporting on the relationship between Hussein and Bin Laden.” However, President Bush had admitted in September 2003 he had no proof of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda before ordering the invasion of Iraq. Secretary of State Powell also admitted, on January 8, 2004, there was no “smoking gun” proof about a prewar link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.18

Duefler’s Investigation While the Senate Committee and Lord Butler’s hearings were underway, the new head of the Iraqi Survey Group, Charles Duefler, believed he would soon find out when and how Iraq’s stockpiles of weapons were eliminated because of his relationship with Iraqi scientists as a former UN inspector between 1993 and 2000. He was convinced that these Iraqi scientists would assist the on-going search to determine what happened to Iraq’s banned weapons after 1991. Meanwhile, after Iraq’s interim government took charge on June 28, 2004, the new Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari invited IAEA inspector ElBaradei to check on Iraq’s nuclear facility at the Tuwaitha south of Baghdad. Before accepting the invitation, the IAEA wanted the Security Council to endorse their activity. From February to December 2004, the Survey Group again searched for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction but found nothing. Duelfer issued a preliminary report on September 30, but could cite no new information about Iraq possessing illegal weapons. Four months after beginning his search for prohibited weaponry, Duelfer’s follow-up October interim report to Congress “contradicted nearly every prewar assertion about Iraq made by top Bush administration officials.” The Survey Group’s teams talked

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to many Iraq scientists and other Iraqis about such weaponry but they all told the same story—Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction had all been destroyed in the 1990s and not replaced, which Dr. Mahdi had confirmed in August 2003. Duelfer’s October 2004 interim report to the Senate Armed Services Committee essentially verified Iraq’s illicit arms had been destroyed during the 1990s under the supervision of UN and IAEA inspectors. Saddam Hussein may have wanted to reconstitute Iraq’s banned weaponry but, Duefler said, there was no evidence Iraq had launched any such programs. Apparently Hussein had destroyed this weaponry in 1991 hoping to get economic sanctions lifted, but they were not and the nuclear program had “progressively decayed.” Duefler also reported Iraq’s chemical weapons were destroyed in 1991 and the storage depot cited by Secretary Powell in February 2003 was not related to chemical weapons. Likewise, Powell’s allegation of trailers designed to produce biological weapons were found to be exclusively intended to generate hydrogen. The biological weapons plant, Al Hakem, had been destroyed in 1996 and there was no evidence Hussein restarted the project. Finally, the report stated that Iraq had no Scud missiles when it was invaded in March 2003. Although Hussein had plans for missiles with a range from 250 to 620 miles, they “had not progressed to production.” Despite these negative findings, Duelfer said the 1,200 members of the Iraq Survey Group would continue its search for banned weapons. Duelfer and his staff continued their searches and interviews with Iraq scientists until December 2004 when they returned to Washington with plans to publish a final report in 2005. Although the CIA refused to authorize any official information on the weapons hunt, its spokesman did confirm that Duelfer had returned to Washington and would not be replaced. One of Duelfer’s intelligence officials told the Washington Post that there was little or nothing left for the Iraqi Survey Group to do and that the Group’s final report would address as many “outstanding questions as possible.” The Survey Group’s final report to Congress, consisted of nine pages, with a 103-page appendix, and indicated that Iraq had none of the



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biological, chemical or nuclear weapons that Bush administration officials earlier claimed.19 After reviewing all of the various accounts, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Bush administration picked from raw intelligence only data suggesting Iraq had weapons of mass destruction to make its public case for war. A few analysts may have been pressured to reshape their findings, but the larger problem was that while lower ranking analysts might privately disagree with their superior’s assessments, they were reluctant to openly challenge their seniors. Indeed, the entire intelligence apparatus apparently understood what kinds of data administration officials desired and few wanted to appear to be sabotaging the president’s policies. The end result was an improper, unhealthy commingling of policy and intelligence.20

Administration Shifts Its Position As noted above, during the weeks following the capture of Baghdad, the president and senior administration officials continued to express confidence in their prewar claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. President Bush’s May 29, 2003 assertion on Polish television that U.S. forces had actually “found the weapons of mass destruction” was the most pointed and dramatic. He was referring to two small trailers captured by U.S. and Kurdish forces and thought to be the long-sought mobile “biological laboratories”. The previous day, the CIA had released a white paper, which also bore the Defense Intelligence Agency’s seal, declaring its analysts were “confident” that the trailers were used for “mobile biological weapons production.” For nearly a year, this claim was repeated by top administration officials: Secretary Powell stated in late June that the “confidence level is increasing” that the trailers were intended for weapons production and Vice President Cheney insisted in September 2003 that the trailers were “mobile biological facilities” and that they could have produced anthrax or small-pox. The president, as well as the others, were apparently unaware of, or unwilling to accept, a May 27, 2003 three-page field report by a secret Pentagon-sponsored technical mission that was

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“unequivocal in its conclusion that the trailers were not intended to manufacture biological weapons.” Three weeks later a 122page final report, titled “Final Technical Engineering Exploitation Report on Iraq Suspected Biological Weapons-Associated Trailers,” followed—both were marked “secret” and filed. According to the Washington Post’s April 2006 article—the first public account—the Defense Intelligence Agency had chosen nine U.S. and British civilian scientists and engineers with “extensive experience in all the technical fields involved in making bioweapons” to conduct the investigation. Although the reports remained classified, the Post’s account, which was compiled following interviews with six informed officials, reported that one expert found “There was no connection to anything biological.” According to another specialist, the trailers were often referred to as “the biggest sand toilets in the world.” While questions have been raised as to whether the White House manipulated intelligence prior to the March invasion, this episode poses anew questions about whether intelligence agencies tended to discount or reject postwar evidence that challenged the administration’s views regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. In 2005 these agencies were criticized by the presidential commission on intelligence for ignoring evidence that contradicted the administration’s positions on Iraq’s banned weaponry both prior to and after the invasion.21 Down Playing Prewar Claims. Confronted with the Iraq Survey Teams’ continuing failure to find any of the banned weapons after the invasion, the White House began to blame American intelligence agencies for faulty analysis and to modify its exaggerated prewar claims. Responding to critics, John Bolton, then undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, argued before the House International Relations Committee on June 4, 2003 that Iraq “desired” to possess weapons of mass destruction, and had the capability to produce them, thus justifying U.S. military actions. In a brief June 9th discussion with the press, President Bush backed away from claiming that actual weapons of mass destruction were likely to be found. In a subtle shift, he insisted that Iraq “had a weapons program” and that “I am absolutely convinced, with time, we’ll find out that they did have a weapons program.” This change



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of emphasis would allow the administration to focus on seized Iraqi documents that discussed possible weaponry. Occasionally, the president also renewed the administration’s erroneous claim that the war had links between Saddam’s Iraq and al-Qaeda. In Charleston, South Carolina, Bush ignored questions about Iraq’s lack of weapons of mass destruction and, instead, emphasized that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was the invasion’s positive accomplishment. “Knowing what I knew then and knowing what I know today,” he said in early February 2004, “America did the right thing in Iraq. If some politicians in Washington had their way, Saddam Hussein would still be in power. All of the Security Council resolutions and condemnations would still be issued and still be ignored—scraps of paper amounting to nothing.” Three days later on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” Bush argued he had used “all of the best intelligence possible to make the decision to go to war…. There was no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein was a danger to America.” When asked “in what way,” Bush answered: “because he had the capacity to have a weapon, make a weapon.” Then Bush changed the subject by saying, “I’m dealing with a world in which we have gotten struck by terrorists with airplanes, and we get this intelligence saying that, you know, we want to harm America.” Bush concluded with, “And the president of the United States’ most solemn responsibility is to keep this country secure.” A year later, in January 2005, when the U.S. had ended the hunt for Hussein’s alleged weaponry, Bush conceded that they had not existed. “I felt like we’d find weapons of mass destruction—like many here in the United States, many around the world,” he said. “We need to find out what went wrong in the intelligence gathering.” When questioned as to whether the failure to find the weaponry would undermine American credibility, he shifted the main emphasis on the reasons for which the U.S. undertook the war. “The credibility of this country is based upon our strong desire to make the world more peaceful,” he declared, “and the world is now more peaceful” after the removal of Hussein. Bush now insisted the

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rationale for the war was the removal of a brutal dictator, expanding democracy in the Middle East and, combining the previous two, making the world a more peaceful place.22

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resident Bush’s May 1, 2003 claim that major combat operations were over was true but, unfortunately, the administration’s postwar planning, grounded on overly optimistic expectations, failed to provide for sufficient military forces to establish and sustain Iraq’s internal security. Also, the occupation’s failure to move quickly to rebuild Iraq’s economy and refurbish facilities that supplied basic daily needs, especially electric and water systems, fueled domestic dissatisfaction. As a result, this dissatisfaction fed a growing insurgency that would have deadly consequences for coalition forces and Iraqi citizens. The administration’s effort to build a postwar democratic Iraq quickly became more complicated than Washington expected, in part, because of Iraq’s festering sectarian differences.

Pentagon’s Ineffective Postwar Planning Before the invasion began, Colin Powell’s State Department and Tommy Franks’ Central Command team differed with regard to restoring postwar Iraq. Frank’s plan for the reconstruction of Iraq, labeled Phase IV, was taken over by Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s blessing. About the same time, Powell appointed Thomas S. Warrick of the State Department’s Northern Gulf Affairs bureau to coordinate State’s “Future of Iraq Project”. After the State Department’s Drew Erdman analyzed American reconstruction projects from World War I to Bosnia and Kosovo,

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he concluded that success in rebuilding a defeated nation depended on international support and internal security. To guarantee Iraq’s internal security, he believed, would require that a substantial number of U.S. and allied troops remain in Iraq for some time after the war. Warrick adopted Erdman’s findings and, in April 2002, consulted with more than 240 exiles—representing Shiites, Sunni, Kurds, Turkmen and smaller Iraqi ethnic groups—who listed postwar needs ranging from “electricity grids to the justice system.” During the next seven months, other Iraqi ethnic groups meeting in London offered diverse opinions about Iraq’s future that greatly concerned the Bush administration. The exiles had concluded that forming a democratic Iraq would be an expensive project and would involve the U.S. and allied forces for many years. In brief, the State Department’s final planning report offered a detailed, “sobering” view of Iraq’s postwar political, physical and human needs. In September 2002, Secretary Powell gave copies of State’s postwar planning report to Vice President Richard Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Powell later said he did not know if any of these people read the report. Since none of them raised questions about it, Erdman subsequently remarked, “Maybe it wasn’t read.” In fact, Rumsfeld ignored State Department’s postwar plans and embraced the programs devised by Feith and his deputy, William Luti, from the Pentagon’s Office of Special Planning. Feith and Luti did not discuss the pessimistic long-term scenario sketched by State with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any senior military officers because it challenged their plan to quickly withdraw U.S. troops after achieving the military victory. Feith and Luti believed a quick withdrawal was the best way to gain the public support of postwar Iraq. Later, as the war’s conclusion neared in April 2003, former Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White told a reporter that Feith believed “reconstruction could be short lived.”1 Feith’s postwar expectations were based on discussions with Ahmad Chalabi, an Iraqi Shiite, who with other Shiite exiles, told Feith that the Iraqi people would greet their American liberators with “sweets and flowers” while Iraqi soldiers and police would transfer their loyalty to an American-sponsored government as



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a new Iraqi security force. In brief, the exiles told Rumsfeld and Feith exactly what they wanted to hear—that U.S. forces could be recalled after appointing Chalabi and other exiles to take charge of Iraq’s new government. Thus, the Feith-Rumsfeld plan would require only about 150,000 U.S. soldiers to wage the war and briefly oversee Iraq’s postwar security in contrast to the 250,000 (or more) proposed by Powell and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Bush signed National Security Directive No. 24 on January 20, 2003, granting the Defense Department control of postwar Iraq. Next, Rumsfeld appointed a team led by retired Army Lt. General Jay Garner that consisted of soldiers and civilians who became the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Garner’s credentials included heading “Operation Provide Comfort” in April 1991 that provided humanitarian aid to the Kurds following the first Iraqi war. On February 21, 2003, the ORHA group—consisting of representatives of the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, and Agriculture, delegates from the Office of Budget Management, and officials from Great Britain and other allies—met at Washington’s National Defense University. Feith’s first order of business was to introduce Garner as director. As the meeting progressed, Professor Gordon W. Rudd of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College noticed that one man “was better informed than we were. He had worked the topics while the guy on stage [Garner] was a rookie.” Rudd referred to the State Department’s Warrick. When Rumsfeld learned about Warrick’s presence, he ordered Garner to remove him as an ORHA member. In Warrick’s absence, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Ryan C. Crocker served the group as political expert on Iraq.2

Garner Arrives In Baghdad In mid-April 2003, Garner and 169 members of his organization arrived in Baghdad; however, the populous did not greet them with “sweets and flowers”. Instead Garner’s team and the overwhelmed U.S. forces were unable to stop the “liberated” Iraqis from committing violent acts against each other and engaging in countrywide looting of all types of unprotected government

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Dept. of Defense Photo Major General Jay Garner, USA

facilities, including Baghdad’s ministry buildings, hospitals and the national museum. Garner set up his headquarters at Baghdad’s Republican Palace although the coalition’s bombing and widespread civilian looting had left the palace without doors, windows, electricity or water. Thus, the agency’s first major activity was to



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rebuild the Republican Palace into what became the “Green Zone” complex isolated from the rest of Baghdad by barbed wire and a 15foot high concrete fence. After July 31, 2003, Garner’s workers and, later, Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority resided in homestyle comfort inside the Green Zone with such amenities such as a swimming pool, fast food and a big screen TV for sporting events. Upon seeing the lavishly refurnished palace, artist Elzain remarked: “It’s like I never left America. Sometimes you felt really homesick despite the fact that everything here is American.”3 While Feith stayed in Washington, his postwar decisions hampered the ability of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to establish an independent Iraqi council. On April 18, Garner had flown with Chalabi and 700 of his Shiite militia by military aircraft to Baghdad where the exiles took over choice property sites. These Shiites resisted Garner’s effort to include local resident Iraqis on the council because Feith had told them that they should control Iraq’s council. Despite objections from the exiles, Garner met local Iraqi leaders who were concerned about the role of religion in a future government. While the local leaders disagreed on the future role of the Islamic religion, they stated a “federal system” should be established by the Iraqi people that would be elected and not “imposed from outside.”4 Garner attempted to form a local council that represented all Iraqi groups, but he could not, in part, because he was unable to gain the approval of Chalabi and the other exiles. Iraq’s electricity could not work because looters pilfered underground cable lines. Looters carted off computers that regulated distribution of electrical power, stole 25 of the electrical power commission’s 30 cars, emptied warehouses of spare parts, pulled down transmission lines for telecommunications and carried away pieces of archaeological finds. They took $500 million from Iraq’s Central Bank as well as the bank’s desks, light fixtures and all movable objects from Iraqi government buildings.5 The war had barely ended in April before the diverse groups in Iraq sought to evict the “coalition of the willing” from Iraq. Violent actions were launched against not only U.S. and U.K. soldiers but also personnel from coalition members such as Bulgaria, Thailand,

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Poland, Italy and Spain. Although the Pentagon had planned to withdraw most American forces from Iraq by mid-June 2003, the insurgency’s growth in numbers and strength put this decision on hold. Apparently, Saddam had issued an order in January 2003 for Iraq’s secret police (Mukhabarat) to “do what’s necessary after the fall of the Iraqi leaders to the American-British-Zionist Coalition forces.” He also may have told the Mukhabarat to stockpile weapons throughout Iraq for the insurgents’ future use. On April 7, 2003, Saddam’s secret police participated in the looting of museums, burning government buildings, schools and universities, sabotaging power plants, assassinating imams, stealing weapons from Iraqi citizens and creating general mayhem. There were too few U.S. forces prepared to halt the looting, criminal activity and insurgent violence throughout Iraq or to guarantee internal security. Major General Buford Blount, commander of the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division (the 3rd.I.D.) who devised the tactics for his soldiers to quickly seize Baghdad and end the war, was awaiting redeployment home and unprepared for the subsequent chaos. “Never, from the first day that we ever started planning this until we got to Baghdad, in all the processes, rehearsals—nobody ever mentioned the word ‘looter’,” Blount recounted. As scores of looters appeared, then hundreds and thousands, he resisted ordering his troops to employ deadly force. Blount figured these people had suffered greatly and were engaged in a little street justice. When he did send patrols to secure hospitals, the power infrastructure, and other basic facilities, it was too late—the looters had gotten there first. In Washington, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld appeared unconcerned, remarking on April 24, “You don’t go from despotism to freedom on a feather bed.” Freedom was, he noted, rather “untidy.” Following the looting in April and early May 2003, the lawlessness changed to car thefts, kidnappings for ransom and revenge killings against Baathists responsible for executions during Saddam Hussein’s regime. At the same time, insurgents gradually increased their attacks on coalition forces. Two months after the end of the war, Rumsfeld’s deputy Paul Wolfowitz reluctantly conceded “There’s a guerrilla war there, but…we can win it.”6



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Bremer Replaces Garner In mid-May 2003, President Bush abruptly dismissed Garner and sent L. Paul Bremer III to Iraq as his Special Envoy. After Bremer’s appointment, an anonymous Pentagon official noted that Garner did what Rumsfeld wanted but “was a fall guy for a bad strategy” doomed to failure. After arriving in Baghdad, Bremer persuaded some of Garner’s staff to work with his new Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and an interim Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). From May 16 to July 12, Bremer worked diligently with the seven exile groups in order to form a council that represented women as well as all ethnic groups. Finally on July 13th, Bremer allowed the United Nations representative in Iraq, Sergio de Mello, to introduce the 25 members chosen for the council from a list of prominent Iraqi exiles. The list included Shiites such as Ahmad Chalabi, Kurds such as Jala Talabani, Sunnis such as Adnan Pachachi, and a woman, Dr. Raja Khuzai. The Council could send diplomats abroad, establish a new currency, draft a constitution and establish a war-crimes court to try members of Hussein’s former regime.

Dept. of Defense Photo Secretary Rumsfeld is flanked by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, left and US Army (USA) Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander of the Combined and Joint Task Force 7. Sept. 6, 2003.

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Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) areas in Iraq

Meanwhile, Bremer abolished the Iraqi Army, outlawed 2.5 million members of the Baath Party, had the Council approve his decision to expel three top-level leaders of the Baath Party who had served Saddam, and disarm the militia that exiles such as Chalabi brought to Iraq. He had less success in disarming local militias. His effort to eliminate all former Baath Party members from the new government was limited because many of them had altered government files in April 2003 to demote themselves. One way or another, many top-level Baathists escaped Bremer’s purge. Bremer’s inability to remove all Baathist officials from all high positions was evident in Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, where the 82nd Airborne Division was in control. Among senior Baathists who remained in their positions were former Iraqi Army officers with the rank of Brigadier General or higher, 120 university professors and



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987 teachers and administrators in Mosul’s public school system. Airborne commander, Major General David H. Petraeus, said the professors at Mosul University reviewed the background of Baath members before Petraeus gave 65 percent of them a reprieve. As a result, critics who in May and June 2003 blamed Bremer for firing government officials who were members of the Baath Party were, at best, limited in their judgement.7 Shiites advocate an Islamic Republic. After the American-led invasion, Sheikh Emad al-Din al-Wadi emerged as the main advocate of a Shiite Islamic Republic. He had spent ten years in an Iraqi prison where he formed a clandestine group that demanded an Islamic state. After U.S. forces gained control of Baghdad on April 12, al-Wadi learned Baathist civil servants were trying to destroy all prisoner and execution documents. The Sheikh and his followers saved this evidence by moving carloads of document files and microfilms to al-Wadi’s home in a Shiite district of Baghdad. Throughout the summer of 2003, crowds of Iraqi men and women searched the documents to find information about their missing husbands, sons, cousins or other relatives. Thus, al-Wadi’s activity endeared him to Bremer’s Authority, but did not end the Sheikh’s desire for an autonomous Islamic state within Iraq. To assist him, al-Wadi courted a former Iranian Ms. Elahe Sharifpour-Hicks but failed to receive her favor. Sharifpour-Hicks was a human rights worker at Baghdad’s UN office but she had been in Iran in 1979 and had observed how Khomeini broke his promise to bring freedom and democracy to Iran. Feared the Bush administration underestimated Shiite power, she wanted to make sure Iraqi’s would not lose their freedom and democracy to Iraqi Shiite clerics. Moktada al-Sadr was a young ambitious Shiite cleric who also desired to establish an Islamic republic. The son of a Shiite cleric who had been murdered by Saddam Hussein, al-Sadr organized a militia of young unemployed Iraqi men and took control of the populace in Baghdad’s Sadr City, formerly Saddam City. AlSadr and his militia staged anti-American rallies outside the holy Shiite Mosque in Najaf and, in October 2003, al-Sadr claimed to be the leader of a new Iraq government—a claim Bremer quickly

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denounced. After this set-back, al-Sadr temporarily softened his anti-American rhetoric and Bremer decided not to arrest him. Bremer’s religious advisor, Hume Horan, warned Bremer that taking al-Sadr into custody could make him a Shiite martyr. When asked about the chances Iraq might become an Islamic theocracy, Horan replied “Absolutely zero. Not a chance in the world”—a prophecy that awaits Iraq’s future.8 Al-Wadi and al-Sadr were only mid-level Shiite political activists. The most powerful Shiite religious leaders were the grand ayatollahs in Iraq’s southern holy cities in Najaf and Karbala, especially the Grand Ayatollahs Bashir Najafi and Ali Sistani. As Bashir’s son and spokesman, Ali Najafi asserted, “The grand ayatollahs will always be the highest spiritual guide in everything—economics, politics and social life. They will be the fathers, the leaders and the advisers.” Hussein’s overthrow enabled repressed Shiite leaders to honor their grand ayatollahs by naming Iraqi streets, bridges and public squares with their names. Shiite homes and mosques also flew the Muslim’s green flag and displayed portraits of the grand ayatollahs and Shiite martyrs. The cities of Najaf and Karbala once again hosted thousands of Shiite pilgrims, a situation that enhanced the ayatollahs’ power. Every day, pilgrims would go to Sistani’s or Bashir’s offices to seek answers to various questions about their daily lives. Is it proper to use birth control pills? May men and women swim in the same swimming pool? The answer to the first question was “Yes”; to the second, it was “Absolutely not permissible, as a precaution.” In October 2003, Grand Ayatollah Sistani challenged Bremer’s plan for a “federal” transitional government that would establish Iraq as a secular state and opposed Bremer’s decision to delay elections until April 2004. He also issued a fatwa insisting on democratic elections in which the electorate voted directly for their leaders, a method that should guarantee a Shiite majority in the new Iraqi government. Sistani opposed Iraqi legislation that contradicted Islamic law, a situation that would allow Muslim clerics to decide the validity of any secular legislation. To achieve their religious goals, Sistani and other Shiite clerics opposed Bremer’s election plan to create separate election districts where diverse minority groups lived.9



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Bremer and Reconstruction Despite his problems with Shiite leaders, Bremer seemed to be personally popular in Iraq. A September 2003 Gallup opinion poll found two-thirds of Iraqis approved Bremer’s role while President Bush had more detractors than supporters. Each day, Bremer spoke on Iraqi TV and radio to update Iraqis on what and why events were happening. He tried to explain why Iraq’s electricity and running water worked sporadically or not at all. This was due, he argued, to sabotage by Iraqi criminals or the lack of money to rebuild bombed and looted facilities. In reality, Moises Naim’s review of Imperial Life in the Emerald City revealed that Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) suffered from “massive incompetence, patently unfeasible schemes, naïve expectations and arrogance fueled by ignorance.” Apparently the Pentagon drew on the ultra conservative Heritage Foundation as a personnel resource. Unfortunately, examples of incompetence, petty partisanship, patronage, nepotism and corruption abound in the book, such as six twenty-something young men, unencumbered by experience being given the responsibility of managing Iraq’s $13 billion budget. Or a Christian anti-abortionist, grounded in social work, being placed in charge of Iraq’s health service or a personal injury lawyer trying to resolve Baghdad’s traffic jam by translating Maryland’s motor vehicle code into Arabic. Bremer liked to employ statistics to emphasize the assistance the U.S. was providing for Iraq. While visiting a hospital in Diwaniyah, for example, he told doctors and nurses about his agency’s assistance with health care. “In May,” he said, “five hundred tons of drugs were shipped in. Last month, we shipped in thirty-five hundred tons, a seven hundred percent increase in three months.” Bremer’s statistics, however, did not satisfy Dr. Jean Bernard Bouvier of the British charity Merlin who claimed that Iraq’s Ministry of Health lacked both central control and an inventory of its warehouses for a central pharmacy. Bouvier and members of the UN’s World Health Organization proposed an Emergency National Distribution Plan for Drugs, but Bremer rejected their plan. Thus, when Bremer said five or six tons of drugs were shipped in, he never stated what those drugs were used for or where they were stored.

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This prompted Bouvier to retort, “If it’s twelve trucks of I.V. fluid, I don’t give a damn” because that is almost useless in Iraq. He also cited a case when “16 tons of drugs where dropped off at one clinic where the stacks of boxes left little or no room for patients.”10 Women in Postwar Iraq. While traveling in Iraq, the New Yorker’s George Packer met Assel Hatem Shouket, a computer programmer at Baghdad University. She told him “We must get out of Iraq. We must travel. We must visit America.” Packer learned that Shouket feared kidnappers who had captured her friend and from whom she barely escaped. Now, she felt like a prisoner because the “danger is still in the streets.” She and other women believed Bremer’s agency treated a woman’s problem “as an extracurricular activity at best.” Like Shouket, most Iraqi women became afraid to go into the streets after Saddam Hussein released many criminals from prison in 2002 and who, after the U.S. invasion, flourished due to the absence of law enforcement. Under Hussein, women worried about husbands and sons who disappeared and frequently ended up in mass graves or torture chambers but, Iraqi women said, Hussein’s police had kept the streets safe. After the U.S. invasion, the absence of reliable law enforcement in Iraq resulted in a vast increase in criminal activity. For example, 18-year-old Zianab and 14-year-old Hanaa (not their real names) were abducted and gang-raped by former neighbors. Zainab finally escaped but Hanaa spent the next week blindfolded while her abductors tried to sell her to people in northern Iraq. Zainab went to the police who found and impounded the white car used to abduct the girls. Yet, the police investigator refused to admit the girls were kidnapped because he knew their captors who lived in the neighborhood, one of whom was a “prominent Baathist’s son.” When her abductors learned Zainab had gone to the police, they released Hanaa at her home after warning her not to tell anyone or they would murder her entire family. A member of Iraq’s intelligentsia, Amal Al-Kaider recalls that before Baathists took power in 1968, freedom from rape was an Iraqi heritage. He insisted that only during recent wars have women been “covered, stay inside, do not speak their minds, this is not… the real Iraq.” In 2003, the Women’s League and the Organization



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for Women’s Freedom in Iraq indicated women were allowed to speak freely but not about rape because they feared the “newly empowered religious authority” and the insecure environment. Lieutenant Colonel Ra’ad Heider, whose thinking represented the old school, believed “Iraqi society has customs and traditions that keep us very well served. No American values practiced here. Things that have to do with women, rape, that kind of thing—we will never follow American values.” The U.S. media seldom reported that Moktada al-Sadr’s Shiite followers had adopted the tribal patriarchy practice of “honor killing” of women who have been raped. This old tribal code allowed uncles, brothers or other male relatives to murder a rape victim.11

Bush Seeks UN Assistance By the fall, Washington found it necessary to amend its unilateralist approach toward Iraqi affairs. On September 9, 2003, Secretary Powell attempted to persuade estranged European governments to accept an American draft of a Security Council resolution regarding the UN’s role in assisting the U.S. and its allies transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi people. He soon discovered French President Chirac, German Chancellor Schroeder and Russia’s Foreign Minister Ivan S. Ivanov objected to the administration’s view that a UN resolution should simply extend the authority of U.S. military officers and Bremer’s agency to administer Iraq’s political and economic affairs.12 Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke first at the UN General Assembly on September 23. “The last 12 months have been very painful for those of us who believe in collective answers to our common problems,” he said. Not only has there been violence in the Middle East, Africa and the Korean peninsula but also in August 2003, the UN headquarters in Baghdad “suffered a brutal and deliberate assault in which the international community lost some of its most talented members.” This organization, Annan continued, has previously dealt with “threats to the peace through containment and deterrence by a system that is based on collective security and the United Nations Charter.” Now, he said, some say that rather than wait for an attack, “states have the right to attack

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preemptively.” However, he believed these “concerns must be addressed effectively through collective action.” “We have come to a fork in the road,” he concluded. “This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself when the United Nations was founded.” Following Annan, President Bush avoided referring to the UN as not “living up to its responsibilities” as he had in March 2003. Instead, Bush reminded the Assembly that just two years ago, “New York City became a battlefield and the graveyard and the symbol of an unfinished war.” The war against Iraq, he argued, has not only prevented a tyrant from “cultivating ties to terrorists while it built weapons of mass destruction” but also was part of the war against terrorists in Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Jerusalem. “America is working with friends and allies,” Bush said, “on a new Security Council resolution which will expand the UN role in Iraq.” The new Security Council resolution “should assist in developing a constitution, in training civil servants, and in conducting free and fair elections.” In conclusion, he suggested, “Helping Afghanistan and Iraq to succeed as free nations in a transformed region, cutting off the avenues of proliferation, abolishing modern forms of slavery—these are the kinds of great tasks for which the United Nations was founded.” The next speaker was French President Jacques Chirac who was more direct than Annan in accusing the United States of forcing the UN to “weather one of its gravest trials in its history.” The debate, he said, turned on respect for the UN Charter and the use of force. “The [U.S.-Iraqi] war,” Chirac argued, “embarked on without Security Council approval, has undermined the multilateral system.” Nevertheless, he wanted the UN to provide legitimacy in the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq. “We must,” he insisted, “stand united in ensuring the universality of treaties and the effectiveness of nonproliferation regimes. We must strengthen our means of action in order to insure compliance.” The chief responsibility for this lay with the Security Council, Chirac said, and that body should be enlarged to include not only Germany and Japan but also leading countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.13 On October 16, 2003, the Council voted unanimously (15 to 0) to approve Resolution 1511 that urged UN member nations to provide



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military and financial aid to Iraq. Russian President Vladimir Putin had persuaded Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to vote “yes” because of their mutual concern about growing violence in the Middle East and their awareness that Bush would make no more concessions. After the vote, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin told reporters the deteriorating Middle East situation made it important “to send a message to the Iraqi people that we also want the best conditions for the reconstruction of Iraq.” At the same time, Chancellor Schroeder explained to reporters that while he, Chirac and Putin supported Resolution 1511 they had authorized a joint statement declaring they would not aid Iraq militarily and would limit their financial aid to what was already agreed upon.14

Returning Sovereignty to Iraq President Bush, in accord with UNSC 1511, subsequently announced that a timetable was in place to transfer power to the Iraqis by July 2004. Rather than asking the Iraqis to write a new constitution before holding elections, Bush said Bremer would have the Iraqi Governing Council draft an interim constitution to be called the Transitional Administrative Law. After the Administrative Law was drafted, an interim government of “elites” would be chosen and sovereignty would be granted by June 30, 2004. Then in July 2004, Iraq’s interim government would prepare a constitution to be approved in an October 2004 referendum. Finally, Iraqi elections for a permanent National Assembly would be held in early 2005. Bush hoped his plan would create a secular state by allowing Chalabi’s exile group and other Shiites to govern while the Sunni minority and former Baath leaders acted as an opposition group to the Shiite-dominated government. After hearing about Bush’s plan, many conservatives in the Republican Party opposed it because they insisted that winning the war on terror meant “never again to cut and run.” Apparently, these conservatives did not understand the powers Iraq’s interim government would possess. Other critics, especially Democrats, claimed the president’s plan to have the government by June 2004 was essentially calculated to help Bush’s reelection campaign for November 2004.

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When the Grand Ayatollah Sistani learned about Bush’s plan, he again advocated democratic elections with all Iraqi’s voting for members of an interim constitutional assembly—a proposal that would give the Shiite majority control of writing Iraq’s new constitution. In response, Bremer and other U.S. officials suggested to Sistani’s delegates that surveys showed that all Shiites might not be monolithic in their beliefs. If some Shiites favored an Islamic theocracy, others opposed Iran’s style of government that created an ayatollah as its dictator. In addition, Bremer claimed Sunni Muslims and the Kurds also wanted a role for Islam that differed from Sistani’s concept.15 For Bush’s fast track plan to be effective, local Iraqi councils appointed by Bremer in May 2003 would retain their leading role in choosing a “transitional assembly.” The Baghdad councils, for example, consisted of more than 800 men and women who served on 88 neighborhood councils, on nine district councils and on various city councils. While previously the councils possessed no authority, budgets or powers, other than to discuss local problems with Bremer’s associates, now they would be able to choose an assembly. In November, Major General Charles H. Swannah, Jr., commander of the 82nd Airborne anticipated Bush’s desire to speed up the transfer of authority by granting power to local councils in Ramadi whose residents had cooperated with the Americans. But, Swannah did not grant similar authority to Sunni councils in Fallujah and other towns in the so-called “Sunni triangle” west of Baghdad because they usually refused to cooperate with the Americans and often supported local insurgents. Excepting Ramadi, American commanders west, south and northwest of Baghdad extended some authority to local groups of Kurds, Christians and Shiities. The U.S. commander in Iraq, General Ricardo Sanchez, thought Baghdad’s new police force was ready to go to work in November 2003. Having been trained in the United States and Europe, Police Director Brigadier General Ahmed Ibrahim’s first order was for his men to raid a black-market center for cigarettes and stolen goods in the Fadhil section of Baghdad. Ibrahim claimed his men extended Iraq’s new rules “with honesty, truth and respect” to those arrested



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during the raid.16 Local police were not able, however, to control the insurgency and halt the almost daily bombings in Baghdad. In Washington it was hoped that getting the Iraqis more involved in working out their own destiny might substantially reduce the activities of insurgents.

Preparing an Interim Government President Bush’s plans for establishing a democratic government in Iraq called for preparing an interim constitution that would lead to an interim government. On November 15, 2003, the president asked Paul Bremer to set a timetable for an Iraqi interim government. The schedule called for a Governing Council (IGC) to prepare an interim constitution by February 28, 2004 and after the constitution was completed, council members would establish a transitional parliament and elect a prime minister with limited sovereignty by June 30, 2004.17 At the same time, Bremer had to contend with an escalation of insurgent attacks on the occupation forces and local citizens. He feared these deadly attacks might have a definite impact on Iraqi politics and the elections scheduled for January 30, 2005. Transitional Administrative Law. To meet the February 28th 2004 deadline for a constitution, the Iraqi Governing Council’s committee headed by Adnan Pachachi, began in December 2003 to prepare a so-called Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) to serve until an elected Iraqi National Assembly could prepare a permanent constitution after July 2004. After Pachachi’s committee presented a draft Transitional Law to Bremer, he agreed it should include a bill of rights for individuals, including the right to free speech. The deliberations over the Administrative Law focused on several major issues. Basically, Council members disagreed over the role of Islam and the division of power between Iraq’s central government and regional provinces. The Kurds desired a form of federalism that would protect the political and social differences among Shiites, Sunnis, secularists, and Kurds. Compromises by all Iraqi factions resulted in the signing of the Administrative Law on March 8, 2004, that guaranteed Iraq’s freedom of religion, with a “nod” toward Islam but did not base

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the entire state on Islamic principles. In addition, it provided for an interim government headed by a prime minister, a three-person presidency and a legislature with veto power. Before signing the Administrative Law, Kurdish representatives insisted on an Article 61c provide that any three provinces, with a two-thirds vote, might reject a final constitution in a referendum. Article 61c disappointed the Shiite majority in Iraq, but Shiite Ayatollah al-Sistani said Shiites would accept the compromise, but pledged to later amend the disputed article. Because the Administrative Law’s approval was delayed until March 8, there was no time for a public debate on the document. This led many Shiites and Sunnis to denounce it as being “unfair, unrepresentative and a dictatorship of the minorities.” Consequently, many Iraqis came to distrust Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority and the Governing Council. When a debate on Administrative Law was scheduled in April, it was interrupted by the violence in Fallujah and by al-Sadr’s militants.18 The Brahimi Mission. Although the Transitional Administrative Law had been approved, Bush’s proposals for elections in 2004 clashed with Shiite Ayatollah Sistani and Sunni clerics’ demand for direct elections rather than Interim Governing Council caucuses held by local provincial councils that had been appointed by Bremer in June 2003. When these disputes began, Bush decided to ask United Nations’ negotiators to take over in order to gain support from all ethnic and religious factions in Iraq. After UN Secretary General Kofi Annan met with Bush’s National Security Advisor Rice, he agreed the UN should play a role in Iraq even though the president had once referred to the UN as being “irrelevant” to today’s problems. Annan initially dispatched a four-man security team to make certain an election team, led by Lakhdar Brahimi as his personal representative, would be safe in Iraq. He feared insurgents might again attack UN offices as they had in August 2003.19 After UN security experts reassured Annan, Brahimi arrived in Iraq where he obtained Bremer’s promise that the Coalition Provisional Authority would cooperate with the UN mission. Next, Brahimi scrapped the Iraqi Governing Council’s caucus plan and convinced Sistani that “credible” direct elections would require at



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least eight months to set up, a delay that might prevent Iraq from gaining full sovereignty by June 30, 2004. After Sistani agreed, Brahimi gained agreements from Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish leaders to accept appointed interim representatives. The postponed elections for a transitional Iraqi parliament, a prime minister and cabinet were to be held no later than January 31, 2005.20 Between April and early June 2004, Brahimi had to convince Bremer and Rice that Interim Governing Council members should not automatically be given key positions in the new government, but only be one part of the new government and its constituencies. In the end, President Bush’s special envoy Robert Blackwill overruled Brahimi and named Council member Ayad Allawi as Iraq’s interim prime minister. Brahimi was able to appoint other cabinet members, including six women who most Iraqis considered competent. From the Council, two Kurdish party members became deputy prime ministers and one deputy president on a three-member presidency. A Shiite Dawa Party member was another deputy president while a member of the Shiite Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq became Minister of Finance. Two prominent Council members who failed to be named to any post were Adnan Pachachi and Ahmed Chalabi, the latter having lost Bush’s support in April.21 UN Resolution 1546. American and British delegates offered the Security Council a draft resolution on May 24, 2004 designed to reestablish Iraq’s sovereignty. The draft was satisfactory to most Council members but French and German delegates thought it omitted a needed timetable for foreign troops to leave Iraq. Following two weeks of talks to satisfy France, Germany and other council members without an announced withdrawal timetable, the Council unanimously approved Resolution 1546. In addition to extending Iraq international support, there were 11 important parts of Resolution 1546 that: (1) endorsed formation of an interim Iraqi Government with “full sovereignty” by June 30; (2) called for a national conference of political, tribal and religious representatives in July to select a consultative council to advise the interim government; (3) pledged national assembly elections no later than January 31, 2005 that would form a transitional government to draft a permanent constitution leading to direct elections for a full-

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Dept. of Defense Photo

term government by December 31, 2005; (4) empowered a U.S. led multinational force “to take all measures necessary” to maintain Iraqi security in “partnership” with the Iraqi government; (5) placed the multinational force at the request of the Iraqi government that can ask its withdrawal when Iraqi police and military forces become responsible to the respective ministers; (6) provided for “close coordination and consultation” between Iraqi commanders and the multi-national command on security affairs; (7) reviewed the mandate for the multinational forces at the request of the Iraqi government in January 2005 and have the multinational forces term expire after the full-term government elected by December 31, 2005 takes power; (8) provided for the Security Council’s creation of a separate force within the multinational force to protect UN personnel and call on member nations to contribute troops; (9) called for the multinational forces to assist in recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring and monitoring Iraqi forces; (10) gave sole authority to the Iraqi government for distributing oil and gas revenues; (11) provided for UN personnel to advise governmental bodies on developing civil and social services, on coordinating relief and reconstruction, on the protection of human rights, and



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US Air Force photo: The United States Ambassador to Iraq, the honorable L. Paul Bremer, signs the Iraqi Sovereignty document which transfers full governmental authority to the Iraqi Interim Government, in Baghdad.

Dept. of Defense Photo Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Alawi speaks at a ceremony celebrating the transfer of governmental authority to the Iraqi Interim Government, 28 Jun 2004

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to give assistance in planning for a census, elections and drafting a permanent constitution.22

New Interim Government Challenged Following the passage of Resolution 1546 and the appointment of an interim government, Iraqi police and American forces experienced fewer attacks because al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and other rebel forces cooperated with the new government. After al-Sadr formed a political party to participate in Iraq’s new electoral process, Ayad Allawi, Iraq’s interim prime minister, permitted Sadr’s Hawaz newspaper to resume publishing. While Sadr assisted Allawi, thousands of ethnic Kurds were displacing Arabs who had settled on Kurdish land after Hussein’s military forces expelled Kurds in 1991. Although Bremer’s CPA had plans to resettle Kurds and Arabs, he did nothing until May 2004 when he tried to persuade Kurds to accept an orderly transition in the return of their ancestral lands. Before Bremer could put into place a satisfactory program, however, Kurds began expelling many Arab families often using violence to displace them. The Kurds’ actions violated the interim Administrative Law that explicitly forbade the forcible displacement of the Arabs, but American occupation officials were not able (or willing) to stop the Kurds. American officials estimated about 100,000 Arabs fled their homes and settled in squalid camps to await food and water from relief organizations, while the new Kurdish families also apparently lacked sufficient food and water. Despite the Kurds’ violation of Iraq’s interim constitution, Bremer and Prime Minister Allawi agreed to acknowledge Iraq sovereignty two days before June 30. Allawi accepted this change in dates because the Iraqi Governing Council feared insurgents would disrupt the interim government’s assumption of power on June 30. Although Bush was at a NATO meeting in Istanbul, Bremer replaced the Coalition Provisional Authority with Iraq’s interim government on June 28. At the same time, John D. Negroponte became the U.S.’s ambassador to Iraq replacing Bremer. The U.S. embassy was housed in the heavily guarded Green Zone. After being told about Iraq’s transfer of power, Bush told NATO members: “Let freedom ring. After decades of brutal rule by a terror regime, the Iraqi people have their country



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Dept. of Defense Photo General George W. Casey, left, Commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq walks with Polish Armed Forces Major General Andrzej Ekiert, Commander of Multi-National Division CenterSouth during a visit to Camp Babylon, Iraq, 22 Jul 2004

back.” Bush also urged NATO to join Iraq’s multinational force, but France and Germany agreed only to train Iraqi forces and to increase their NATO troops in Afghanistan.23 Allawi Declares Martial Law. When the transition to Allawi’s government took place in June 2004, the U.S. had 138,000 troops in Iraq, while coalition forces numbered some 25,000. Not surprisingly, determined insurgents rejected the interim government as “American-made.” Meanwhile, Prime Minister Allawi consulted lawyers and experts on human rights before declaring martial law that established curfews in Iraqi cities and checkpoints to search cars for weapons. Iraqi security forces requested and received U.S. military assistance in carrying out the new regulations. According to Bekhtiar Amin, Iraq’s Minister of Human Rights, the new law was “very similar to the Patriot Act in the United States,” an act that was being criticized in America because of limits on civil liberties.24 Al-Sadr Challenges Prime Minister Allawi. In addition to insurgency, Prime Minister Allawi’s interim government faced a political adversary when al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army seized an Iraqi

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police station in Najaf on August 5 because Sadr claimed the right to control the city. In response, Iraqi National Guard units joined with Marine units to evict al-Sadr’s 3,000 Mahdi militia from inside the Imam Ali Mosque and the neighboring Valley of Peace cemetery. American aircraft and helicopters bombed and strafed the insurgents while Marine and Iraqi National Guard units sought to evict them. On August 14 the fighting was ended after Iraq’s National Security Advisor Muwaffak al-Rubaie led a delegation of Iraqi leaders to negotiate a cease-fire with Sadr’s representatives. These talks failed because Sadr’s delegates demanded that coalition forces must first withdraw from Najaf, terms that would give al-Sadr control of the city. Sadr vacillated between accepting a cease fire and calling on all Shiites to fight American occupation forces. Although U.S. and Iraqi forces had killed and wounded hundreds of al-Sadr’s Shiite followers, other Shiite rebels continued to attack U.S. and Iraqi soldiers in Basra, Nasiriyah, Karbala and Baghdad’s Sadr City.25 Prime Minister Allawi faced the difficult choice of losing Shiite support by having U.S. forces launch a full-scale assault on the Imam Ali Shrine or accepting a Pyrrhic victory by letting al-Sadr take control of Najaf. Sadr was wounded in the fighting, but Allawi did not want him to become a martyr to the Shiite cause. The American forces had already abdicated power in Fallujah, Ramadi and Samarra, but General Sanchez did not want to give up Najaf or other Shiite cities. On August 25, Sistani rescued Allawi from his dilemma when he returned from a hospital stay in London and immediately called upon Sadr to join Shiites in all Iraqi cities to bring peace to Iraq. The next day, al-Sadr and Sistani agreed on four terms. First, Najaf and Kufa would be free of weapons. Second, all foreign troops would leave Shiite cities and Iraqi police would take charge. Third, Allawi’s government would compensate Shiites who were wounded in the fighting. Fourth, a census would be taken for the January 2005 elections. While Allawi’s State Minister, Qassim Dawood, agreed to the terms, American officers in Iraq resisted because al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army was not required to disarm. U.S. officials had hoped to disarm



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all Shiite militia in Baghdad’s Sadr City. While Rubaie and Sistani’s representative approved a plan for Iraqi police to provide security for Sadr City, Allawi rejected the agreement. Speaking anonymously, an American diplomat said Allawi wanted to humiliate al-Sadr with harsh terms because he feared any action that might improve the political chances of Sadr and Shiites in the January elections.26 Forming an Interim National Assembly. While insurgent attacks continued, 1,100 delegates convened on August 15 in Baghdad’s Green Zone to select national assembly members, a group that would oversee Allawi’s interim government until the January 2005 elections. Because 19 of the 100 assembly members were reserved for Iraqi Governing Council members, the delegates would only select 81 members. After the delegates registered their complaints about the fighting in Najaf and other Iraqi cities, they chose the 81 assembly members on August 18. Not all delegates were pleased with the conference’s choices because their provinces were not represented. A critical New York Times editorial complained, “The conference largely failed to achieve the crucial purpose” of planning for “a transition to a workable democracy.” The delegates should have provided a broader base for governance and a compromise that would replace Allawi’s “narrow, exile dominated cabinet.” This was not done, the Times editors said, because the conference had a “familiar cast of characters, drawn from the same narrow sources as the first American appointed Iraqi Governing Council.” Thus, the meeting “squandered” Allawi’s chance to “draw disaffected Iraqis into the peaceful politics in advance of next year’s elections.”27 After the August 15 conference, Iraqi insurgents continued to attack the coalition forces and their Iraqi collaborators threatening the process of creating a workable Iraqi government. Firefights with insurgents occurred around Fallujah and a September U.S. intelligence report revealed the militants controlled the city. This created a situation that had to be dealt with so that Sunnis in Fallujah and Ramadi could take part in the 2005 elections. In an effort to bring peace to Fallujah and other Sunni areas, delegates from the new Iraqi National Assembly opened negotiations with Fallujah’s tribal and religious leaders in mid-September.

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Iraqi’s Election System Nearly 14 million Iraqis registered to vote on January 30, 2005 to elect the 275-member National Assembly. Paul Bremer’s agency had planned the election with the cooperation of the UN’s representative, Carina Perelli. The election would use a proportional voting system that differed from the direct system used to elect an American congress. They also had decided on a nationwide election rather than provincial elections, which in retrospect might have better served Iraqi democracy. Bremer subsequently found that the nationwide election system had discriminated against the 20 percent of Sunni minority voters in such provinces as Tikrit. Moreover, Bremer’s plans did not provide for voting by Iraqi exiles but due to pressure from exile leaders, Bremer agreed the Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq should revise its plans to allow an estimated one million exiles to participate in the election. To assist the Electoral Commission, the UN affiliated International Organization for Migration agreed to oversee the exiles’ registration and voting. To register, an exile must present evidence they were born in Iraq or were children of a father born in Iraq. Eligible exiles were scattered across 14 countries, including Britain, the Netherlands, Australia and the United States. In the United States, they could register and vote in Chicago, Detroit, Nashville, Los Angeles and Washington DC. When the deadline for registration closed on January 15, about 255,000 had signed up, one quarter of the expected number. In Iraq’s election, voters would cast ballots for one of the 111 listed political parties that had prioritized its candidates in an order from the number one on the list to the last party candidate. For example, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), favored by the Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, listed Shiite Abdul Aziz al-Hakim as its #1 candidate, Ahmad Chalabi its #10 candidate and continued down the list to candidate #228. In contrast, some parties listed only 50 candidates with names going successively from #1 to #50. A total of 7,700 candidates appeared on the ballots. Another Commission rule was that a woman candidate must be one of the party’s top three candidates and one woman for every three listed candidates. Thus, if a party has six candidates, a woman must at least be listed as #3 and #6. The winning candidates were selected by a proportional



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voting system that meant a party’s percentage of votes determined how many assembly seats that party received. For example, if the UIA list received 40 percent of the votes, it would get 110 seats in the assembly with 37 seats going to women. The Election Commission had to establish some 5,500 voting stations in Iraq and provide them with 90,000 cardboard kits and 60 million individual ballots. The Commission also trained 200,000 poll workers to tabulate the choices of an estimated 14 million eligible voters. At each voting station there would be four Election Commission staff members. A controller at the station’s entrance would check to see if a voter has indelible ink on his finger to avoid repeat voters. Next, an identification officer will check a voter’s ID with the registration list. Third, an officer will issue one ballot for the national election and a second ballot for a local election. After the vote is cast, a fourth officer marks the voter’s finger with indelible ink. With preparations complete on January 29, two questions remained: would the insurgents’ threats keep voters away from polling stations? And would Sunni Arabs boycott the election or vote in sufficient numbers to have a legitimate election to show the outside world?28

The January 2005 Elections On the eve of the election, estimates were that 80 percent of the votes would go to three leading parties. These three were the UIA led by Shiite Arab Abdul Aziz al-Hakim; the Iraqi List led by the interim prime minister Ayad Allawi; and the Kurdistan Alliance made of the two main Kurdish parties and led by a Sunni Kurd Jalai Talabani. The final 20 percent was expected to go to nine other parties such as the Iraqi Party led by a Sunni Sheik Ghazi al-Yawar; or Popular Union (Communist) headed by Hamid Majead Moussa. On January 28, Iraq exiles began to vote in the United States, England and 12 other countries outside Iraq. The next day on January 29, American and Iraqi forces made final checks on security measures to prevent rebels from sabotaging the elections. In early January 2005, the U.S. increased its number of soldiers from 138,000 to 150,000, to support Iraqi police and Special Forces at each polling

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station. In addition, Iraq’s government banned all civilian car traffic in Iraq and designated areas at each station as no parking zones for cars in hope of stopping suicide car bombers. With these measures in place, millions of Iraqis voted on Sunday, January 30, 2005, while insurgent activity was relatively quiet—an estimated 44 to 50 Iraqis were killed and were called martyrs to the cause of democracy in Iraq. Tragically, a Royal Air Force Hercules transport plane crashed 25 miles north of Baghdad killing at least 15 British soldiers. An investigation showed it was an accident. The next step was to count the millions of votes cast in Iraq and at exile polling places so the election could be approved by the UN sponsored International Mission for Iraqi Elections. Led by Canada’s chief election officer Jean-Pierre Kingsley, the International Mission was stationed in Amman, Jordan, with a team of 129 foreign monitors located in Baghdad’s Green Zone. The U.S. Democratic Institute and the EU’s Elections Support Group had trained 50,000 Iraqis to oversee Iraq’s various polling places. The International Mission in Jordan could be called upon, as necessary, to rule on complaints from monitors or other Iraqis.29 While the International Mission did not received any complaints on election day, later a few problems arose that delayed the final election report until February 13, 2005. The complaints that subsequently arose included Iraqis being unable to vote due to a polling station’s mistake. For example, at a northern Iraqi voting station the necessary voting materials failed to arrive in time for people to cast their ballots. Perhaps the most serious flaw took place when about 350 Shiites said they could not vote because they were returning from a holy pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). First, their flight home was diverted from its expected landing location and, after they landed, some airport buses were diverted due to security measures on election day. Despite these and a few other irregularities, the Independent Election Commission of Iraq certified that most problems were overcome and that about 8.5 million Iraqis cast votes—a turnout of 58 percent of eligible voters. As expected, the United Iraqi Alliance of major Shiite parties won 48 percent of the votes to give them 140 seats in parliament. The Kurdistan Alliance earned 26 percent to gain 75 seats and the Iraqi List, led by interim Prime Minister



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Allawi and made up of Shiites and Sunnis, won 14 percent with 40 seats. Nine smaller parties won sufficient votes to gain from 1 to 5 seats in the assembly, including 5 seats for the Iraqi Party, the only Sunni group that did not boycott the election, and 2 seats for the communist Popular Union Party. About 5.3 percent of votes were for parties with too few votes to be represented in the assembly.30 Although the election was successful, the new assembly members soon began to bicker over the more vital offices in Iraq’s government creating an extended delay. The second phase in establishing a functioning Iraqi government was underway.

Dept. of Defense Photo General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief-of-Staff of the Army and USA Major General David H. Petraues, Commander, 101st Airborne Division as they conduct a foot patrol in Mosul, Iraq, 21 Aug 2003

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hat began as postwar looting and assorted criminal activities soon mutated into attacks on occupation personnel, foreign aid volunteers and Iraqi citizens associated with the coalition forces. The mounting insurgency dashed Washington’s hopes of quickly establishing a new democratic Iraqi government and withdrawing its military forces. The major challenge to American and coalition leadership became one of providing internal security, but developing an effective counterinsurgency strategy proved elusive. The extensive, varied insurgent assaults on occupation forces by June 2003 saw an average of 15 coalition soldiers being killed a week. When President George W. Bush was asked on July 3rd about the increasing number of attacks on American troops, his arrogant response was, “bring them on. We’ve got the force necessary to deal with the security situation. “ A year later the Islamic Jihad Army reminded the president of his off-hand remark: “Have you another challenge?” Bush would acknowledge in 2005 that his glib “bring them on” remark had not been thought out and had gone too far.1

Iraq’s Security Forces Most pre-invasion assumptions by the U.S. military rested on using Hussein’s Iraqi military forces to maintain internal order. A conference at the Army War College consisting of some two-dozen experts military and intelligence officers, Middle Eastern specialists,

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and diplomats held on December 10-11, 2002 urged that the Iraqi army be kept intact because it could hold the country together. “In a highly diverse and fragmented society like Iraq, the military”is one of the few national institutions that stresses national unity as an important principle,” the experts wrote. “To tear apart the army in the war’s aftermath could lead to the destruction of one of the only forces for unity within the society.” Additionally, they warned against a general “de-Baathification” because it could disrupt professional services. While many U.S. generals agreed with these recommendations, neither General Tommy Franks’ Central Command nor Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s office indicated they took them seriously. Indeed, Rumsfeld’s later actions indicated he ignored them. De-Baathification/Dissolving Iraqi Military. Before leaving Washington on May 9, 2003 to take charge of the occupation, Bremer received his orders in a memo from Rumsfeld. The memo stated, in part, “The Coalition will actively oppose Saddam Hussein’s old enforcers the Baath Party, the Fedayeen Saddam (the irregular fighters that had harassed our forces on the march to Baghdad), etc. We will make it clear that the Coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam’s regime.” The possible de-Baathification of Saddam’s officials was discussed first during a December 2002 meeting of a group of Iraqi exiles chaired by Zalmay Khalilzad. At that time, Iyad Alawi wanted to limit the number of Baath members eliminated and thought some would quickly switch sides by backing the Coalition forces. In contrast, Ahmed Chalabi advocated a complete de-Baathification policy. Although Khalilzad preferred Alawi’s proposal, his influence ended because Bremer refused to have him as a partner in Iraq. On May 9, 2003, the undersecretary of defense, Douglas Feith, showed Bremer a draft order for the “De-Baathification of Iraqi Society.” He told Bremer: “We’ve got to show all the Iraqis that we’re serious about building a New Iraq. And that means that Saddam’s instruments of repression have no role in the new nation.” Bremer knew that General Franks had outlawed the Baath Party in his April 16 “Freedom Message.” Franks believed this order would



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rid Iraq of the small group of true believers at the top of the Baath Party and wipe the country clean of the Baath Party’s ideology. Initially, Feith wanted Jay Garner to issue the “De-Baathification” order but Bremer persuaded him to wait: “I agree it’s a very important step, so important that I think it should wait ëtil I get there.” Feith agreed and told Bremer to issue the order as soon as possible “even if implementing it causes administrative inconvenience.” Bremer claimed the “De-Baathification” order was cleared by the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department. After he reached Baghdad on May 16th, Bremer released Order No. 1 on “De-Baathification,” in its English and Arabic version to the Iraqi press and television stations who ran the “story nonstop.”2 Bremer knew Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army had treated rebellious Iraqi citizens harshly, he thought many former army draftees, especially the Shiites who had deserted and fled to their farms and families after the U.S.-led coalition attacked in March 2003, would willingly join a new Iraqi army. To locate these potential recruits, Bremer asked Walter Slocombe, his senior advisor for defense and security, and his first deputy, Clay McManaway, to help him locate the Iraqi deserters Shiites as well as Kurds and Sunnis to form a representative New Iraqi Army. One immediate problem was that of the estimated 400,000 largely Shiite deserters, few had been officers. Despite such problems, Slocombe believed Bremer could recruit an all-volunteer New Iraqi Army that included carefully vetted officers from Hussein’s army while excluding the top four ranks of the Baath Party and Iraq’s other security force members. After accepting Slocombe’s advice, Bremer recommended to Secretary Rumsfeld on May 12, 2003, the dissolution of the Iraq Defense Ministry and its “related entities”. By eliminating those entities, Bremer proposed to show Iraqi citizens that neither Hussein nor “his gang are coming back.” Following Douglas Feith and Rumsfeld’s review of the memo, Bremer claimed that both Rumsfeld and President Bush authorized him to carry out his proposal. Consequently on May 23, Bremer signed the Order No. 2, “Dissolution of Entities” and distributed it to the media for publication in Arabic and English. Order No. 2 dissolved the Defense Ministry, related national security ministries, the Republican

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Guard, the Special Republican Guard, Baath Party Militia and the “fedayeen Saddam”. As he terminated all members of Iraq’s former military, Bremer announced the Coalition Provisional Authority planned to establish a New Iraqi Army for a “free Iraq.”3 Training the New Iraqi Army. Following the issuing of Order No. 2, Bremer and Slocombe sought to recruit the demobilized Iraqi conscripts, especially in the Shiite heartland south of Baghdad. Slocombe expected to have a full division of about 12,000 soldiers trained and operational in one year and another three divisions a year later. To achieve these goals, Bremer hoped to enlist about 10,000 members of the Shiites’ Badr Corps into the New Iraqi Army. The New Iraqi Army, Bremer indicated, was being trained as quickly as possible for external duties to protect the country from external enemies along Iraq’s borders with Syria and Iran not for internal security. He also declared the new army would be under civilian control and would be “professional, non-political, militarily effective and representative of all Iraqis.” Bremer, of course, cited the ideal for a new Iraqi military, but such aspirations turned out to be very difficult to achieve. Bremer relied on Walt Slocombe for the training of a new army who found old army barracks and other facilities had been destroyed and would need to be rebuilt. Slocombe’s initial goal was to have a division of 12,000 soldiers trained and operational within a year. Supported by Bremer, he began recruiting and vetting Iraqi officers and noncommissioned officers and sought out Kurdish and Shiite, as well as anti-Hussein resistance groups, who eventually would comprise his projected four army divisions. Bremer announced a program to pay monthly stipends to former soldiers, except about 8,000 senior Baathist officers. He also visited Shiite leader Sayyid Abdul Aziz Hakim who he hoped would permit some of his 10,000-member Badr Corps militia to join the new army. After Sayyid asked who the commander of the New Iraqi Army would be, Bremer responded by saying: “I promise you this Sayyid, the commander of the first battalion will be a Shiite.” Later, Bremer kept his promise.



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By mid-August 2003, Bremer faced another issue regarding the New Iraqi Army when CENTCO Commander, General John Abizaid, proposed to send a brigadier general to “synchronize, coordinate, and focus” the new army, police and border patrol. Apparently, Abizaid’s memo was in response to Rumsfeld’s desire to accelerate and expand the Iraqi army’s training program in order to create 27 battalions in one year, rather than Slocombe’s original two battalions. Slocombe already had established an “expanded” training center for a 500-man battalion under Major General Paul Eaton at the Kirkush base northeast of Baghdad. By September 12, Secretary Rumsfeld was searching about for a way to deal with the insurgency. In a two paragraph memo to Bremer, he wrote: “Our goal should be to ramp up the Iraqi numbers, try to get some additional international forces and find ways to put less stress on our forces, enabling us to reduce the U.S. role. The faster the Iraqi forces grow, the lower the percentage will be of U.S. forces out of the total forces.” In his reply, Bremer noted that the recruiting and training of a professional army was labor intensive and time-consuming, thus there was no guarantee that the revised goal of 27 battalions could be met in one year.4 On October 22, Bremer finally had something to feel good about when he attended the graduation ceremonies of 500 Iraqi soldiers who had been trained as light infantry for eight weeks by Paul Eaton at the Kirkush base. This first battalion would be attached to the U.S. 4th Infantry Division that patrolled the Iranian border. As Bremer had promised Abdul Aziz Hakim in May, the commander of this first battalion was a Shiite. For Bremer, this was a milestone for his strategic training plans. The next day, Bremer met with General Abizaid who told him his senior officers in Iraq have been “a bit too conservative on their intervention against the bad guys. I encouraged them to be more aggressive.” Later, Abizaid told Bremer that he was fed up with Walt Slocombe’s opposing the hiring of Sunni field-grade army officers. Abizaid said, “We need experienced Iraqi commanders who can lead troops. And I’m sick of reading his opinions on the subject in newspapers.” Bremer replied that he agreed with Slocombe about not bringing back colonels and generals unless they were

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individually vetted and passed that test. “We can’t be reinstalling Baathist leaders or killers,” he said. “And as long as unnamed ‘senior military officers’ and ‘Pentagon officials’ are trying to hang us in the press, we’ll be forced to respond.” In his response, Abizaid was blunt. “I’ve always told you that I opposed disbanding the army, but I’ve never gone to the press with my opinion.” With regard to bringing back senior Baathist officers, Bremer told Abizaid, “I appreciate your position but I disagree with it. All my conversations with Shia and Kurdish leaders since arriving convince me that bringing back Saddam’s army would have set off a civil war here. If you think we’ve got problems now, imagine what they would have been.”5 On November 6, 2003, Vice President Richard Cheney called Bremer asking about the security situation in Iraq. Bremer replied that Iraq’s internal security was deteriorating with roadside bombs killing U.S. troops and civilian contractors being kidnapped. “In my view, we do not have a military strategy for victory in Iraq,” he told Cheney. “It seems to me that our policy is driven [more] by our troop rotation schedule than by a strategy to win.” Bremer feared

Dept. of Defense Photo George W. Casey with Donald Rumsfeld



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the insurgency would reverse everything the U.S. had achieved and ignite a civil war with Sunni Baathists fighting Kurds and Shiites. Finally, he told Cheney that “with all the talk of reducing American force levels, throwing Iraqis into the mix, and pushing for a quick end to the occupation” the insurgents think “we won’t stay the course.” “My impression is that the Pentagon’s mind-set is that the war’s over and they’re now in the ‘mopping up’ phase,” Cheney offered. “They fail to see that we’re in a major battle against terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere.” Nevertheless, he told Bremer that the U.S. must get more Iraqis involved in the process. “We’ve said all along that defending Iraq must eventually be Iraq’s responsibility,” Bremer agreed, “But adding unprofessional Iraqi security forces can’t substitute for a military strategy.”6 With the return of sovereignty to Iraq in mid-2004, there were two major changes. John D. Negroponte replaced Bremer, becoming the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, and Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus arrived to supervise the training of Iraqi security forces. Negroponte shifted $2 billion from Iraq’s reconstruction projects to the Army training program for more equipment for its soldiers before Iraq’s January 2005 elections. Despite training Iraqis in counterinsurgent methods, ethnic tensions between Sunni and Shiites continued to plague the program. Surprisingly, the White House appeared reluctant to focus on the training of Iraqi forces. President Bush’s Special Assistant for training Iraqis, Meghan O’Sullivan, had never visited Iraq as of November 2005 nor made any speeches about the war. Perhaps because of O’Sullivan’s lack of involvement, the U.S. commander in Iraq George W. Casey ordered a school be established at the Taji military base where Iraqi and coalition officers would receive instruction on counterinsurgency tactics. At the Taji school, General Petraeus adopted an Army field guide that emphasized soldiers must decentralize fighting, build better relations with local Iraqis and define areas where insurgents might be training or recruiting. Moreover, coalition troops should make every effort to avoid alienating Iraqi civilians.7

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Training of Iraqi security forces was usually behind schedule. Following Iraq’s January 30, 2005 elections, Washington agreed to assign some 5,000 American troops to hasten the training of Iraqi units. To increase the size of Iraq’s army, interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi transferred 38,000 Iraqi National Guard troops. Now Iraq’s National Guard’s duties would include military missions away from their home base. On February 22, NATO agreed to train Iraqi personnel, but only largely as a “symbolic display of unity” because France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Spain would only train the Iraqi police and military forces outside Iraq.8 By the end of October 2005, the U.S. military sought to lower its visibility by redeploying thousands of its troops from installations in Najaf, Karbala, Tikrit and other relatively stable cities and turning control over to Iraqi forces who were conducting patrols. In all, 27 of its 109 U.S. bases had been transferred to Iraqi authorities when American officials announced the next major facility to be turned over would be Saddam Hussein’s former palace complex in Tikrit. This latter decision, according to a state department official in Tikrit, where significant insurgent activity persisted, would “put an Iraqi face on things. Everyone thinks that if we move away from the cities, this will make the violence go down.” With the Iraqi army reaching 100,000 of its planned 135,000 force by the end of November, these transfers could be the beginning of a U.S. exit program. With many Iraqi units still not combat ready, critics questioned whether they and the other Iraqi security forces would be able to control large areas, especially where ethnic or sectarian militias operated. “The militias are a difficult issue,” Iraq’s National Security Adviser Mowaffak Rubaie acknowledged. When Iraqi security forces are able to control the country, he said, the government “will implement a detailed disarmament program. A weapons hand-over is the answer, but these conditions are flexible.” Critics, however, raised two serious questions regarding the reliability of Iraq’s security forces. First, the bulk of these forces were comprised of Kurds and Shiites despite extensive U.S. efforts to achieve a more sectarian balance. And secondly, the militias had infiltrated Iraq’s security forces carrying with them local loyalties. To enhance the reliability of Iraq’s army units, a determined effort had been



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undertaken to recruit men, even entire units, of the old army. In fact, by the time Bremer’s agency was dissolved in June 2004, former members of Hussein’s army made up 80 percent of the officers and enlisted men in the new army. The Iraqi army, nonetheless, continued to be plagued with critical deficiencies. In November 2005, the Pentagon admitted that less than one-third of Iraq’s previously trained security forces were able to tackle dangerous missions in Iraq. At the end of April 2006, U.S. field commanders estimated the Iraqis would require another year to be ready for serious missions. Iraqi units lacked a logistical support system and, consequently, in mid-2006 were relying on U.S. forces for all necessities including food, transportation, weapons, uniforms, drinking water, etc. Even more damaging to morale, they had to rely on Americans to deliver their pay, and that could be six months late. Not surprisingly, the desertion rate in the new Iraqi army was generally high, in some outlying units as much as 40 percent. The training problems confronting American military officials was highlighted by the actions of Iraqi soldiers in early January 2006 when the U.S. turned over control of its 136-building complex, including 18 former Hussein palaces, in Tikrit. Within days, looters, including soldiers, had ripped out doors, air conditioners, ceiling fans and light switch plates leaving only the walls and electric wiring. Military discipline was certainly lacking.9 Retraining Iraqi Police. Shortly after General Garner’s advisory group arrived in Baghdad, Robert Gifford’s 34-member assessment team investigated Iraq’s law enforcement needs. He found most Iraqi police to be corrupt, unprofessional and not trustworthy. Because of Gifford’s findings, Garner recommended that 6,663 police advisors be sent to Iraq. Before the war, the Bush administration had considered but rejected the Justice and State Department’s request for 5,000 U.S. law enforcement personnel. Instead, the administration chose to rely on Iraqi forces, law enforcement offices from other countries or several hundred U.S. contractors who could be sent to Iraq if the need arose. Looking back on these events, an expert in peacekeeping, Robert Perito, confirmed that the administration “did not have a training mission to go.” Without a

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training mission, he claimed, “it loses you the first six months of the operation. The doctrine on peace operations is that the initial month or so is crucial.” After Bremer took over he met on August 8 with his senior police advisor, Bernard Kerik, formerly chief of New York City’s police force, to review how they stood on the problem of Iraqi police training. Bremer wanted a professionally trained and wellequipped Iraqi police force to be a “top priority” in maintaining order and safety in Iraq. From late May to August, Kerik undertook a “shoestring program to retrain” Iraqi police, who had served during the Hussein regime, in the “basics of modern policing and respect for citizens’ human rights.” From this start, Kerik expected to train more than 15,000 police. He calculated that security for all Iraqi people required “a policeman for every 300 to 350 inhabitants.” As of August 2003, Iraq still needed somewhere between 65,000 to 75,000 police. At the moment, Kerik told Bremer, “we’ve got at best, about 32,000” who were of “very poor quality. Some of these guys may be okay. But they don’t have any real training, lack equipment, and sure as

Dept. of Defense Photo General John Abizaid



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hell are not attuned to modern police techniques.” He concluded on a discouraging note, “if we have to train another 40,000 officers from the cadet level to the street and do it here in Iraq, it’ll take almost six years.” Bremer wanted to know how the training might be completed within one or two years. Kerik mentioned an unused air base in Hungary where there were mess halls, classrooms, barracks and firing ranges that could train about 16,000 policemen every year. Training in Hungary would cost Bremer about $750 million during the first year, he estimated. The major cost would be for international police trainers and “we’ve gotta figure out where to get them.” Meanwhile, Kerik would continue training some police in Iraq on “a shoestring” budget. The deal with Hungary never materialized because the Hungarian Parliament members wanted to study the issue and could reach no decision before the end of 2003 or early 2004. To replace Hungary’s training camps, Bremer asked Clay McManaway and Kerik’s deputy, Britain’s Doug Brand, to see if Jordan would provide training camps for Iraqi police recruits. By mid-September 2003, Jordan agreed to train up to 1,500 police per month, but Jordan’s necessary construction of a training camp delayed training of Iraqi police until November 2003. After Jordan’s training camp opened, Bremer expected to have about 25,000 professionally trained police in 15 months.10 Bremer understood that Iraqi security would ultimately depend on Iraqi forces, but he wanted the police to be professionally trained and police experts said that this usually takes a year of schooling. Bernard Kerik reported that 38,000 Iraqi police officers were on duty with a minimum of another 35,000 required. Yet, Kerik also believed that about 40 percent of those police would have to be washed out for incompetence or human rights violations. Thus, Bremer feared a professional police force was “a long way off.”11 In mid-September 2003, Bremer was surprised when General John Abizaid recommended that the U.S. commander in Iraq, Ricardo Sanchez, take over the program to train the Iraqi police. Bremer objected to the proposal. “We’ve been around this track before,

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John. I am fully on board with moving as fast as we can to stand up Iraqi security forces.” Then Bremer went on to say that he was not convinced the Army knew how to train professional police, and now that he had the “Jordanian option worked out, I don’t want to switch tracks again.” Although Abizaid and Sanchez did not respond, Bremer suspected that they planned to replace U.S. troops with unprepared Iraqi police by the spring of 2004. The next afternoon, Bremer received a call from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld who told him the police training program advocated by General Abizaid for March 2004 would allow him to pull a division of American troops out of Iraq. “We have to be realistic,” Bremer replied. He informed Washington that about 40,000 Iraqi police were currently on duty, but they were only street police with a three-week refresher course and that Kerik estimated about half of those had been washed out as suitable police. Bremer stated that the Jordanian training program would result in 25,000 professional officers in 15 months. He tried to impress upon Rumsfeld and his assistant, Paul Wolfowitz, that America was not going to “succeed in Iraq in the long run unless we leave behind a professional police force.”12 While training for the New Iraqi Army appeared to be going well, Bremer had to deal with a continuing dispute over police training. During a meeting with an American congressional delegation, General Sanchez gave what Bremer thought was an “overly optimistic” briefing when he stressed the progress in recruiting and training for Iraq’s Civil Defense Corps and police that had placed almost 54,000 members on duty across the country. Bremer believed the three-week refresher course for police offered by the coalition forces could not be equated with the extended training in Jordan of 40,000 police. Following Sanchez’s briefing of the congressional delegates, Bremer asked Doug Brand if he knew how Sanchez arrived at the figure of the 54,000 police officers on patrol in a month. “Apparently General Sanchez is operating under an order from General Abizaid to recruit 30,000 police in 30 days,” Brand responded. “The Army is sweeping up half educated men off the streets, running them through a three-week training course, arming them, and calling them ‘police’. It’s a scandal, pure and simple.”



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While trying to find out about the authorization Sanchez used, Bremer received a call from Secretary Rumsfeld who wanted to find some “newsworthy item” regarding political authority from the Iraqis. When Rumsfeld referred to General Abizaid’s search for an “Iraqi role” in security as a positive for the Iraqi people, Bremer said, “Mr. Secretary, I have to be frank with you. You’re seeing inflated numbers on police rosters. We shouldn’t kid ourselves thinking that the Iraqis are better prepared than they are. We needed a professional police force here, one that’s trained to a high standard. That’s the whole point of the program in Jordan.” Rumsfeld was not convinced and said it was better to get the “process started quickly” by having the Army bring in extra police. After Bremer told him about the Army pulling guys off the street for a “short” training program, Rumsfeld said he would “push back” on the police numbers when his office announced them next week. The first test of the new Iraqi police and the five battalions of the new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps took place in April 2004 when U.S. forces had to fight insurgents in Fallujah at the same time that they tangled with Shiite al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Sadr City and southern Iraq. In Fallujah, the Marines faced insurgents who used machine guns, mortars and snipers who fired on them from schools, hospitals and apartment buildings. As the Marines entered the city, most of the Iraqi police and five battalions of the Civil Defense Corps members who were to back up the Marines chose to abandon their positions or like one local police commissioner, went over to the rebel side. Marine officers also found that those Civil Defense Corps members who reported for work proved to be useless. In addition, about one-half of the first battalion of the New Iraq Army deserted on their way to Fallujah. In Sadr City, one-third of the Civil Defense Force in Baghdad did not report for duty and about 80 percent of the other battalions were absent from duty. All over the south, Iraqi policemen were absent, passive or refused to fight. The unreliability of many Iraqi units persuaded General Abizaid to delay the departure of other U.S. units providing General Sanchez about 20,000 more troops for the crisis.13

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By December 2005, Bremer’s decision to enlist the Badr Corps would be regretted by U.S. officials after Shiite Iraqi police, who were paramilitary members, were alleged to have committed illegal arrests, torture and killings. Many of their victims were Sunni Arab Muslims, sometimes thought to have ties with the insurgents. The nearly 700 U.S. military personnel and private contractors, involved in training Iraq’s police forces that grew from 31,300 in 2004 to 111,000 in December 2005, were frustrated by the Shiite Minister of Interior’s lack of cooperation and his alleged ties to the Badr militia. U.S. officials indicated that the two largest Shiite paramilitary forces, each about 10,000-members strong, were the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army. Both were supposed to be disbanded under Coalition Provisional Authority Order 91, but remained intact. Several members of various militias had infiltrated the police forces, which operated independently after the transfer of sovereignty in 2004. Members of the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army could be found in the Baghdad police forces and especially in the 15,000strong special police forces or “commandos” that were believed to be largely responsible for the violence against Sunnis. Interior Ministry Inspector General Nori Nori acknowledged that the basic problem within his Ministry was that there were individuals “whose loyalties lay not with the nation, but to their political organizations.” As reports of sectarian violence mounted, U.S. authorities tried to establish some military oversight of the Iraqi police, as existed with the army, and to revamp police training. They admitted that they had made several mistakes: the growth of the Interior Ministry’s forces and tangled lines of communication; relying on the unqualified U.S. army personnel as instructors; not having a sufficient number of instructors; and underestimating the number of police officers required to establish order. There was the additional question regarding the actual number of Iraqi police officers available for duty since it appeared that corrupt Iraq administrators listed “ghost recruits” to collect training funds. Also, investigation was underway into what happened to the $1.2 billion in supplies and equipment distributed to the police forces, since some $500 million worth of materials could not be located.14



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While the new trainers sought to change the police culture so that they could fight crime, not just terrorists, the military in 2006 wanted more emphasis on counterinsurgency. The trainers were concerned that this would result in heavy-handed tactics that would alienate the populace and eventually create more terrorists. Outsourcing War: Corporate Mercenaries. Because there were insufficient coalition forces to secure all of the occupation’s assets, protect senior personnel or to conduct the training of Iraqi security forces, highly paid private security contractors became commonplace as the insurgency expanded. They operated outside the U.S. chain of command, laws or military discipline and constituted a small private army of between 15,000 to 20,000 individuals, mostly Iraqi, with at least 6,000 recruited from the U.S., South Africa, Fiji and other nations. These “trigger pullers”, as they were often called, were about equal to the non-American combat forces in the coalition and had cost the U.S. some $1 billion by early 2006. They performed two basic services training and personal security. Contractors were initially in charge of training Iraqi forces, however, the refusal of an Iraqi army battalion to join U.S. forces in combat in early 2004 prompted a review of their procedures. It was determined that the Vinnell Corporation was conducting a numbers game with more emphasis upon the quantity of trainees rather than their quality. Other companies were contracted to train and supervise Iraqis charged with guarding oil refineries and pipelines, as well as other installations. Contract employees also served as bodyguards for high-ranking officials. Coalition Provisional Authority chief, Paul Bremer, among others, traveled with a contingent of private bodyguards. (For other contract services, see Chapter 10.) The actions of the private security contractors were often controversial. They were accused of showing little regard for Iraqi citizens, often running them off the road and even shooting at them without cause. There was no system for holding them accountable for these actions. Then too, there was often friction between the “rich” private contractors and the military. In one instance, a Marine unit detained a security detail from Zapata Engineering, consisting of 16 Americans, for shooting indiscriminately at Iraqis and U.S. troops and, after three days, deported them. In other cases, contractors

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charged that they were frequently fired upon by U.S. troops, indeed, twenty incidents were noted between January-May 2005 but there were undoubtly several others that went unreported.15

The Insurgency Is Underway The real war in Iraq, it can be argued, began on August 7, 2003 when a car bomb was detonated outside Jordan’s Embassy in Baghdad, killing 11 people and wounding 50 others. Nearly two weeks later, on August 19, a suicide truck bomber killed 23 people at Baghdad’s United Nations Headquarters, including chief envoy Sergio de Mello, prompting the withdrawal of UN personnel. Then ten days later another car bomb killed 95 individuals at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, including Ayatollah Muhamad Bakr al-Hakim. Insurgent attacks—bolstered by foreign recruits—would steadily escalate and become better organized.16 By mid-2006, the insurgency also increasingly took on a sectarian nature with its continued attacks on coalition forces, Iraqi security personnel and unsuspecting citizens. There were some successful countermeasures, such as the elimination of Saddam Hussein’s sons, Hussein’s capture, the capture or surrender of most of his senior officials and the removal of al-Qaeda’s chief strategist in Iraq. Ingredients for an Insurgency. A nascent insurgency requires weaponry, financial support and recruits. The Iraqi insurgency had few obstacles in any of these areas due, in large measure, to the lack of a thought out, agreed upon post-invasion American strategy. Obtaining weapons proved to be no problem for insurgents. Iraq was, as one writer put it, “a land awash in weaponry and explosives, both in small collections” scattered about by Hussein’s government prior to the invasion and “in huge dumps, some the size of small cities.” The invading coalition forces did not have the manpower to secure the larger munitions dumps, let along try to seize the small ones. Nor, as they passed them by, were they willing to detonate the dumps for fear of releasing clouds of the toxic chemicals that Hussein had supposedly hidden away. It might have been possible to use the Iraqi army to guard these munitions had it not been disbanded.



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Finance presented a more complex picture. When, before and during the invasion, U.S. spy ware observed large numbers of trucks and cars leaving Baghdad for Syria it was suspected that they were carrying banned weaponry or technical manuals for their construction. Later assessments suggest that these vehicles were probably transporting high ranking Baathists, their families, and funds that would later be used to support the insurgents. Recruitment was the area where American policies civilian and military indirectly provided the greatest assistance. In the early months, when the insurgency was in its infancy, the Coalition Provisional Authority ordered the de-Baathification of public agencies resulting in the disenfranchisement of a large number of Iraq’s professional class and civil servants. This purge, often not as complete as advertised, provided the insurgency with an abundance of leaders. A second order, disbanding the Iraqi army, provided the insurgency with additional manpower a large pool of angry, unemployed soldiers. In the early months of the insurgency, the guerrillas were often comprised of Baath party officials, former army and Republican Guard soldiers, disaffected Iraqis, disgruntled tribesmen and young unemployed Iraqis. There were no confirmed al-Qaeda links before the invasion but, by the end of the year, young Muslim recruits had begun trickling into Iraq.17 The Rise of Zarqawi. Jordanian born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who began as a petty criminal and traveled to Afghanistan in the late 1980s to join the fight against the communist government in Kabul, became a terrorist mastermind in the insurgency. In a Jordanian prison for plotting against the government during the early 1990s, Zarqawi was transformed from a timid semiliterate vagabond into an infidel-hating bully noted for his violent temper and loathing of all Shiites. Freed in the late 1990s, he returned to Afghanistan and apparently received training in al-Qaeda camps but did not swear allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Instead, he established his own terrorist group whose goal was to kill the Jordanian king and establish an Islamic nation. When the American forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Zarqawi and his remaining followers crossed Iran to the mountains in

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northern Iraq, beyond Saddam Hussein’s control, where they joined the Ansar al-Islam. His activities with the Ansar militants in Iraq’s Kurdish region in 2002 caught the attention of Pentagon officials who devised a plan to bomb the Ansar camp and “take out” Zarqawi, but the White House withheld approval. The administration planned to exploit Zarqawi in a different fashion. In his speech to the United Nations, Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted that Hussein “harbors” a “deadly terrorist network” led by a Jordanian whom he branded a “collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his alQaeda lieutenants.” In early 2003, the Kurds and American Special Forces defeated the Ansar forces prompting Zarqawi to move on; later in 2004, the Ansar al-Islam united with Zarqawi’s Tawhid Wal Jihad (Unity and Holy War) operatives. Meanwhile, Zarqawi joined the Iraq insurgency. Soon his group was sending out suicide bombers against Americans and Iraqis, as well as kidnapping hostages and often beheading them. The beheadings branded him a monster, but his vanity, lust for blood and desire for power would result in his being feared by Shiite foes and Sunni friends alike. While Zarqawi’s visibility was enhanced by Washington to put an al-Qaeda face on the insurgency, his reported “successes” encouraged foreign admirers and attracted recruits for the holy war against occupation forces. Zarqawi’s primary goal was to stir up sectarian violence by pitting Sunni against Shiite. In August 2003, Zarqawi ordered the bombing of Jordan’s Baghdad embassy and the UN’s Baghdad headquarters which prompted the UN to leave Iraq. The first suicide bombing by his group occurred on August 29, 2003 when a bomb exploded killing 95 Iraqis outside a Shiite mosque in Najaf. On October 27, suicide car bombers also struck near Baghdad’s International Red Cross and three police stations, killing 35 Iraqis. Soon such bombings became a regular occurrence. On February 14, 2004, his insurgents killed 15 Iraqi policemen in order to free the police station’s prisoners, leaving behind a black flag imprinted with the words “Unity and Holy War” or Tawhid Wal Jihad. On March 2 and 3, 2004, suicide car bombers struck Shiites in Najaf, Karbala and Baghdad, killing a total of 325 people and wounding many other Iraqis. These spectacular but deadly attacks



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led thousands of Iraqi civilian to stage protest demonstrations against the U.S. led coalition for not protecting Iraqi civilians even though U.S. officials claimed they had successfully averted other insurgent attacks. Contrary to the early claims of Powell and American neoconservatives, Zarqawi was never an ally of Saddam or initially of bin Laden. Only much later, when he emerged as a major figure in the insurgency, did al-Qaeda hasten to designate Zarqawi an “emir”. With this recognition he formally aligned himself with bin Laden and renamed his group al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia.18 The Insurgency Escalates. Via an audiotape on January 4, 2004, Osama bin Laden urged Muslims to continue their holy war in Iraq and other Middle East regions rather than cooperate with the United States and other “big powers”. After referring to Saddam’s capture in December, bin Laden said: “My message is to incite you against the conspiracies, especially those uncovered by the occupation of the Crusaders in Baghdad under the pretext of weapons of mass destruction.” His objective was to maintain the insurgent’s war against all Iraqis until the U.S. occupation had ended and an Islamic Republic was established.19 By early 2004, the insurgents had escalated their attacks on U.S. and coalition forces as well as Iraqis who collaborated with the coalition. They often took coalition civilians as hostages and threatened to kill them unless their governments removed their troops from Iraq. The insurgents also had refined their tactics: they were able to shoot down U.S. helicopters, employ suicide and car bombings against U.S. and Iraqi targets, and sabotage the electrical power grids, oil wells and pipelines to disrupt Iraq’s economy. Martial law imposed by Iraq’s newly appointed Prime Minister Allawi in June 2004 did little to halt the insurgency. In addition to suicide bombings, Zarqawi’s Unity and Holy War group took hostages and occasionally beheaded them unless their demands were fulfilled. Between May 11 and June 22, 2004, he was involved in the beheading of American businessman Nicolas Berg and a South Korean hostage Kim Sun Il. On July 11, the Philippine government withdrew its 50 military members from Iraq to save a Filipino truck driver who had been taken by group calling itself the Islamic Army

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Khaled bin al-Waleed Corps. As of mid-July 2004, various insurgent cells had seized sixty-eight hostages. Even with martial law, Iraqi and U.S. military units were unable to stop the attacks. On July 15, the governor of Nineveh province in Mosul, Osama Kashmoula, and his two bodyguards were ambushed and killed by Zarqawi’s group. Three days later insurgents assassinated Iraq’s Defense Minister Essam al-Dijaili. After militants killed more than 100 people in coordinated attacks on June 24, the United States posted a $25 million reward for Zarqawi’s capture. Even so, the continued insurgent attacks seemed endless during the summer of 2004.20

American Occupation Strategies Neither the White House, nor the Pentagon, nor General Franks were prepared for the real war to control of Iraq. Because they had not anticipated a serious insurgency, the number of troops in Iraq was not sufficient to establish control throughout the entire country. Although the administration later argued that no one foresaw this difficulty, such was not the case. Among the several individuals calling for sizeable occupation forces, Army chief of staff General Eric Shineski’s authoritative testimony on February 25, 2003 before the Senate Armed Services Committee stands out. When pressed by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) for a figure, Shineski said it would require “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” in order “to maintain a safe and secure environment” because Iraq was a large country divided by ethnic tensions. Some evidence exists that Hussein and leading Baathists may have recognized they would not be able to halt the invasion forces and attempted to stockpile weapons and transfer people and cash to Syria to support a subversive rear guard action. However, a review of U.S. military records and interviews with military personnel indicated, as noted below, that policy miscalculations and errors greatly strengthened the insurgency. These included: the lack of a postwar plan for reconstruction, disenfranchisement of Baathists, demobilization of the army, inability to monitor weapons dumps and the failure to establish a clear chain of command with a single individual responsible for civil and military activities.



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Lesson Lost: Counterinsurgency. Further hampering the situation was the U.S. Army’s relationship with the Iraqi people. Army leaders, drawing on their recent experience in Bosnia, believed that they could maintain internal security best with soldiers showing “presence” or, in Army jargon, “boots on the ground.” This involved patrols of heavily armed soldiers on foot or in armored vehicles demonstrating to the Iraqis that American forces were in the area. Major General Ricardo S. Sanchez, then a division commander, told one of his subordinates in May 2003, “Your business is to ensure the presence of the American soldier is felt, and it’s not just Americans zipping by.” To critics this Army practice tended to exacerbate rather than diminish the mounting insurgency because, as local public opinion started to shift, the Iraqis began to see Americans less as liberators and more as occupiers. At this point the presence of troops on patrol frequently became a source of tension. “Few U.S. soldiers seemed to understand the centrality of Iraqi pride,” once critic has written, “and the humiliation Iraqi men felt in being overseen by this Western army.” Another problem was, again, that officials in Washington and Baghdad did not want to acknowledge an insurgency existed. Consequently, when all of the seasoned troops were pulled out of Iraq early in 2004, the new forces had to experience anew the lessons veterans had learned. Also, field commanders had no desire to revamp their approach and put into practice the methods necessary to deal with a guerrilla war. The counterinsurgency lessons of Vietnam had been discarded and were only belatedly brought back. Frustrated by the Army’s failure to alter its tactics, the senior commander in Iraq, General George W. Casey, Jr., established in mid-2005 an academy to instruct incoming U.S. officers in the requirements of counterinsurgency. Attending the classes was required for officers prior to being given command of a unit. While recognizing the value of the academy, one of his officers wondered whether it was too little, too late. Some U.S. commanders had been more successful than others in dealing with the insurgency. The 101st Airborne Division conducted

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an effective counterinsurgency campaign in the troublesome northern Iraqi city of Mosul during 2003. An Army War College study the following year considered Major General David H. Petraeus’ cordial but firm approach to be the “most successful in terms of jump-starting the economy and the political process.” Apparently, Petraeus’ approach was neither fully understood nor appreciated at the time by other commanders. President Bush finally acknowledged the need for a change in strategy during a November 30, 2005 speech at Annapolis. “We will increasingly move out of Iraqi cities, reduce the number of bases from which we operate, and conduct fewer patrols and convoys.”

Major Campaigns & Symbolic Successes “Cumulatively, the American ignorance of long held precepts of counterinsurgency warfare impeded the U.S. military,” Thomas Ricks has written, for “again in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 U.S. forces launched major new operations to assert and reassert control in Fallujah, in Ramadi, in Samarra and in Mosul.” Rand Corporation terrorist expert, Bruce Hoffman agreed: “In Iraq, we fought the war we wanted to fight, not the war that was.”21 But there were some early symbolic successes, including the elimination of Hussein’s sons and the capture of the former dictator whom they presented to the new Iraqi government for trial. Death of Saddam’s Sons. In July 2003, the U.S. occupation forces located Saddam’s sons. Uday and Qusay had arrived in the Kurdish town of Mosul on June 30 and expected to have a safe place in Nafaw al-Zaidan’s four story villa that was saved from postwar looting by flying the yellow flag of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Zaidan, after consulting with his son Shahlan, decided to accept America’s 15 million dollar bounty for information about Uday and Qusay and on July 21 told the local U.S. commander about his guests. The next morning, paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division and commandos of Task Force 20 arrived at Zaidan’s house. As planned, they first arrested Zaidan and his son Shahlan before cordoning off the villa. As commandos prepared to break in, firing erupted from the first floor wounding four U.S. soldiers. To avoid



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Dept. of Defense Photo Vice President Richard Cheney speaking to the troops headed for Iraq, Apr. 9, 2004

more casualties, the U.S. commander employed grenades, rockets and heavy machine gun bullets and a Kiowa CH helicopter’s rockets. In a second attack, American soldiers entered the ground floor where again they came under intense gunfire before withdrawing. Next, an assault team fired twelve TOW anti-tank missiles. Finally at 2 p.m., American soldiers entered the house where they found the bodies of Uday, Qusay and his 14-year son Mustafa plus their bodyguard Abdul Samad. Eleven days later, the two sons and Mustafa were buried near Auja where Saddam’s mother was interred. A family member claimed they were martyrs “killed in a glorious battle against a foreign invader.” In Washington, President Bush said the death of Saddam’s sons proved the regime “will not be coming back.” In Iraq, U.S. Commanding General, Ricardo Sanchez, believed the death of the sons would help curb insurgent attacks on U.S. soldiers. With a more accurate assessment than Sanchez, a Fallujah police officer Muhammad Jasim Ali declared, “If Uday and Qusay

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A roadside bombing

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were killed, we will take our revenge. The attacks, of course, will increase.”22 Capture of Saddam. On December 13, 2003 members of the Army’s First Division’s Raider Brigade captured Saddam Hussein. They found Saddam in an eight-foot deep underground “spider” hole located in al-Dawr, a small town 15 miles from Tikrit. Paul Bremer announced his capture to reporters: “We Got Him.” When captured, Saddam had $750,000 in $100 bills but refused to tell them where the rest of Iraq’s money was located. He also insisted Iraq did not have any illicit weapons and that he did not direct any guerrilla activity. In Washington, President Bush told reporters Saddam’s capture was “good riddance” but warned there will be “more violence because I believe there’s holdovers that are frustrated” and that “foreign terrorists cannot stand the thought of a free Iraq emerging in the Middle East.” Terrorist attacks did intensify. Regarding Hussein’s trial, Bush said: “the Iraqis need to be very much involved”. They were the people that were brutalized by this man. He murdered them. He gassed them. He tortured them.”23 In addition to Saddam’s capture and his sons’ death, six prominent Iraqi leaders surrendered or were captured by the end of 2003. They were deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz; Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha, known as “Dr. Germ” the inventor of anthrax weapons in 1988; vice-president Taha Yassim Ramadan; the armed forces Chief of Staff Ibrahim Ahmad al Sattar Muhammad; Ali Hassan al-Majid known as “Chemical Ali” for ordering poison gas attacks on Kurds in 1988; and Iraqi Defense Minister General Sultan Hashe Ahmad al-Tai. Yet when Saddam Hussein went on trial in 2005 for the massacre of Iraq’s Kurds in 1988, none of these people were listed as Saddam’s co-defendants. Later, many of Saddam’s confidants were released, including Dr. Germ and Huda Salih Ammash, known as Mrs. Anthrax.24 First Assault on Fallujah. Beginning March 26, 2004, U.S. Marine units tried to regain control of Fallujah a town of about 300,000 inhabitants by surrounding and attacking rebellious Sunni Muslims in that city. Initially, the Marines’ search for insurgent leaders

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A car bomb explodes

Dept. of Defense Photo

resulted in an all day firefight during which 15 Iraqis and one Marine were killed but no al-Qaeda suspects were arrested. On March 31, four U.S. private security guards from Blackwater USA, who were protecting a convoy through downtown Fallujah, were ambushed and killed. The guards were savagely mutilated and their bodies burned, with two left hanging from a bridge girder crossing the Euphrates River. Six hours after the convoy’s attack, members of an Iraqi security unit dispersed Sunni crowds near the bridge and retrieved the bodies. To avenge the four Americans, Marine commanders were ordered to attack the city. They organized Operation Vigilant Resolve that was to involve over 1,500 Marines, some U.S. Special Forces, about 2,000 Iraqi security troops, and 50 U.S. trained Iraqi Commandos. After their payday on April 1, however, most of the Iraqi commandos and security forces disappeared rather than participate in the attack. Nevertheless on April 5, the Marines and other American military units encircled Fallujah to prevent reinforcements from reaching Iraqi militants after the battle began. Marine commanders reported the Iraqi militants fought tenaciously. Marines and Special Forces engaged in street-to-street fighting, killing many insurgents and perhaps 3,000 civilians, according to a report from one Iraqi



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hospital. In one area of the city, hit by 5,000 pound American bombs, insurgents ran out firing their AK-47s and the Marines found it difficult to separate insurgents and fleeing civilians. Marine snipers were alleged to have killed everyone within their range, including ambulance drivers, women and children.25 On April 9, the Marines issued a unilateral ceasefire and opposing sides negotiated, buried the dead and distributed food and medical supplies. Intermittent fighting continued until an April 20 ceasefire when the U.S. and tribal leaders allowed insurgents to bring more food and medical equipment into Fallujah, but even then the insurgents refused to disarm as required by terms of the ceasefire. On April 26, the Marine units combined attacks of heavily armored tanks with air support from Cobra helicopters and began joint patrols of the city with an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. Casualties mounted on both sides and the hope for a lasting ceasefire disappeared. From April 28 to May 1, American commanders ordered coordinated air strikes and ground attacks in a final attempt to kill as many insurgents as possible before turning Fallujah over to an Iraqi force. When the Marines finally left Fallujah at the

Dept. of Defense Photo Outside of gate three of the Green Zone in Baghdad, Iraqi Police are supported by a US Army M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT), as they investigate an explosion charred site caused by a Vehicle Born Explosive Device (VBED). 14 July 2004

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end of April, General Ricardo Sanchez turned to Major General Jassim Mohamed Saleh, who commanded a Fallujah Brigade of about 1000 Iraqi troops, to operate city checkpoints and conduct patrols to maintain the peace. As Saleh’s brigade entered the city, insurgents waved old time Iraqi flags and claimed victory in their struggle against Americans. Two days later, General Mohammed Latif replaced Saleh. On September 6, a suicide car bomb hit a convoy of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers near Fallujah, killing seven Marines and three Iraqi security guards. This and other Fallujah firefights showed that the insurgents, not the Iraqi troops, controlled Fallujah. In September 2004, U.S. intelligence reported al-Zarqawi’s militants controlled the city creating the need for a second assault on Fallujah in October.26 Sadar’s Mahdi Army Launch Attacks. Meanwhile, soon after the Marines launched their first attack on Sunni insurgents in Fallujah, Bremer ordered U.S. forces on March 6, 2004 to shut down Moktada al-Sadr’s al-Hawaz newspaper because it advocated violence against the Americans. Bremer also wanted to arrest Sadr and his deputy Mustafa Yaqoubi. The al-Hawza newspaper had aroused Bremer’s displeasure by advocating violence against Americans who al-Sadr blamed for not aiding the Shiites during their 1991uprising against Hussein. In addition, an Iraqi judge charged al-Sadr and his top deputy Mustafa Yaqoubi with being involved in the April 2003 killing of Shiite cleric Abdl-Majid Khoei, recently returned from exile. Bremer did not execute the arrest warrants until March 26, 2004 for fear of damaging relations with Iraqi Shiites when he shut down al-Sadr’s newspaper and arrested Yaqoubi al-Sadr managed to escape. These actions precipitated large scale Shiite protests in Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Kufa, Nasiriyah, Basra and Kut. After Bremer ignored the protests, al-Sadr urged all Shiites to abandon protests as a “losing card” and seek ways to “terrorize your enemy, as we cannot remain silent over its violations.” Shiite militants promptly took over police stations and government buildings in Najaf, Baghdad’s Sadr City and Kut where they overwhelmed American, Polish, Bulgarian and British troops.



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Several attempts by Iraqi clerics and Bremer’s officials to obtain a ceasefire with al-Sadr failed until June 2004. During the preceding two months of fighting with the Mahdi Army over control of the Shiite cities, 19 American soldiers were killed, scores of others were wounded, and an estimated 1,500 insurgents were killed. Iraqi civilians, as well as soldiers from the Ukraine, Poland, El Salvador and Britain also suffered casualties during the struggle. The fighting ended on June 16, when al-Sadr decided to accept a political role in Iraq’s interim government that was scheduled to take over specific responsibilities on June 30, 2004.27 Second Assault on Fallujah. Iraqi and the U.S.-led coalition forces continued to face rebel attacks within the so-called Sunni Triangle that centered on Fallujah. Zarqawi’s insurgents ignored Iraqi General Latif’s brigade as they increased their attacks against U.S. forces and Iraqi collaborators. By July 8, Fallujah had become a haven for Zarqawi’s “Unity and Holy War” forces who frequently launched rockets against American marines stationed outside the city. On October 30, a suicide car bomber rammed his vehicle into a military convoy near the Abu Ghraib prison. The explosion killed

Dept. of Defense Photo Iraqi Police Force from the city of Dibbis, Iraq, and US soldiers walk down a street in the village of Qarah Tappah, Iraq, during a search conducted to locate and confiscate any illegal contraband,18 Apr 2004

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eight Marines and wounded nine others, the deadliest attack in six months. The October 30 attack came while the First Marine Expeditionary Force, charged with controlling Fallujah, were awaiting the approval of Prime Minister Allawi to enter the city. Although the Marines’ preparations were complete on the eve of the November 2nd presidential elections in America, Allawi waited until President Bush won the election before approving the Fallujah assault on November 8, 2004. By the time of the Marines’ attack, Zarqawi and other insurgent leaders had left the city together with most of the estimated 5,000 insurgents and about 70 percent of the city’s 300,000 people who sought refuge outside the city. The remaining militants who stayed behind in Fallujah were Jihad Muslims dedicated to becoming victors or martyrs en route to paradise. Often fighting to the last man, they faced Air Force fighter-bombers, helicopter gunships, four U.S. Marine regiments, two U.S. Army infantry regiments and Iraqi Special Forces. The American attacks began on November 8 when U.S. aircraft dropped 500 or 1,000 pound bombs on various parts of Fallujah, the heaviest bombing since the “shock and awe” campaign of March 19, 2003. This intensive assault was followed by six days of engaging the insurgents in street-to-street, house-to-house and room-toroom fighting. Insurgent snipers located on roof tops inflicted many casualties among advancing American and Iraqi soldiers. On November 14, U.S. officials declared all of Fallujah cleared of insurgents, despite the fact that some still remained in the ruined city to continue the fight while other rebels escaped to seek targets in areas north of Fallujah.28 Insurgent Attacks in the North. The next insurgent attacks to surprise U.S. commanders were in the northern city of Mosul where there had been few incidents for several months. On November 11, three days after the U.S. offensive began in Fallujah, insurgents took over a police station in Mosul, killing several Iraqi policemen and persuading all but 800 of the city’s 4,000 police officers to desert. Zarqawi’s rebels and Ansar al-Islam’s insurgents continued attacks on Mosul and Kurdistan during and after the U.S. gained control of Fallujah. In their attacks, the rebels targeted Iraq’s police,



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Special Forces and National Guardsmen, killing and beheading them as a sign they had collaborated with the “enemy.” No one tallied how many Iraqis died, but during November 2004 about 135 U.S. soldiers were killed the most in one month since April 2004. Various groups had taken 150 hostages by the end of October 2004 of which 40 were executed while some others were released after ransoms were paid.29 In order to launch coalition offensive strikes against rebels south of Baghdad and to maintain control in Mosul and Ramadi, the Pentagon sent an additional 12,000 troops to Iraq to augment the additional 800 British Black Watch infantry. This show of strength, U.S., Britain and the “coalition of the willing” hoped, would quiet the insurgency before Iraq’s January elections. During December, however, rebels attacked American and Iraqi units in Mosul, Samarra and Ramadi. After insurgents struck several Mosul police stations, most of the remaining Iraqi police left their jobs. The insurgents’ most successful attack on the Americans was on December 21 when a suicide bomber set off an explosion in a mess tent at the Army’s Forward Operating Base in Mosul. The explosion tore a foot wide hole in a concrete floor, killing 22 people 15 U.S. soldiers and seven civilians who worked for the Halliburton Company of Houston. At first it was thought rebel mortar fire had caused the destruction, but later it was found to be the work of a lone suicide bomber, in an Iraqi military uniform, employed in the mess tent with explosives strapped around his waist. After the attack, Sunnis in Zarqawi’s cell claimed this bomber had fulfilled a “martyrdom operation” that made him a Muslim hero. Administration officials had hoped the October 15, 2004 Iraqi referendum on a constitution (see Chapter 11) would bring an end to the insurgency, but their expectations were short lived. Previously, the No. 2 al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, told al-Zarqawi, “our planning must strive to involve the Muslim masses in the battle” and bring the “movement to the masses and not conduct the struggle far from them.” It was estimated at the time that foreign nationals comprised only four to ten percent of the estimated 30,000 insurgents. Judging by

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312 such individuals captured between April and October 2005, most foreigner insurgents had come from Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Algeria or Saudi Arabia. The foreigners received the most media attention because they were the suicide bombers who usually inflicted casualties on coalition forces and on Iraqi citizens.30 Attempting to Close the Syria Border. From October to December 2005, American commanders sought to seal Iraq’s border with Syria to stop al-Qaeda and other foreign recruits from joining al-Zarqawi’s forces. To achieve this goal, U.S. forces attacked rebel strongholds on the Syrian border, sometimes engaging in firefights with Syrian troops. On October 28, Syria’s Major General Amin Soliman Charabeh showed reporters his soldiers stringing eightfoot high barbed wire for many miles along the border with Iraq. He claimed these measures would help stop the smuggling of weapons to insurgents and prevent foreign recruits from crossing the Iraqi border. Even so, General Charabeh warned that Syria could not adequately patrol the hundreds of miles along their border with Iraq. A series of U.S. attacks, beginning on November 5, resulted in the killing or arresting of many insurgents near border towns such as Hit, Karabila and Ubaydi. The American tactic was, after the initial sweep, to withdraw U.S. and Iraqi soldiers from the area. That, however, enabled insurgents to regroup and renew their attacks, especially in Iraq’s western Anbar province where many Sunni Arabs lived. On November 30, about 1,500 U.S. Marines, 500 U.S. soldiers and 500 Iraqi soldiers began another sweep against the insurgents near the town of Hit on the Syrian border. Following this campaign, it was announced that Marines and Iraq troops would maintain a permanent presence in the border cities. American and Iraqi soldiers were to build and maintain permanent garrisons and each of these towns would be staffed by at least two platoons of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers until Iraqi soldiers were able to take complete control.31

Bombings & Kidnappings Continue Attacks of roadside and suicide bombers became so routine that media reports usually gave more attention to kidnapped nonIraqis.



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On November 26, 2005, four members of the Christian Peacemaker Teams were captured in Iraq and their captors said they would be killed unless U.S. and Iraqi officials released all prisoners from their jails. After U.S. and Iraqi leaders refused to release the prisoners, an American peace activist Tom Fox was killed on March 11. Ten days later, a multinational military force, acting on a tip from a recently captured detainee, stormed a house in Baghdad and rescued the other three Peacemakers. They were Canadians James Loney and Harmeet Singh and a Britain Norman Kember. The establishment of a new Iraqi government in 2005 failed to deter suicide bombers linked to al-Zarqawi. The Shiite’s Golden Dome of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra about 65 miles north of Baghdad was destroyed, although no casualties were reported, but it was the most destructive attack on a Shiite shrine since March 2003. Apparently, al-Zarqawi wanted to draw the Sunni Arabs and Shiites into a civil war. Fighting began between rival Sunni Arab and Shiite sects during which more than 100 people, including several Sunni clerics were killed on February 23, 2006. After the bombing of the shrine, al-Sadr said his Mahdi Army would protect the holy Shiite shrines. This led a Western diplomat in Baghdad to say: “I think the worst has passed.” Unfortunately the “worst” violence had not ended as attacks by both insurgent and ethnic groups continued in Baghdad and elsewhere. On April 17, 2006, Iraqi troops aided by U.S. forces sealed off the “hard-line” Sunni’s in northern Baghdad’s Adhamiya district. Sectarian fighting prompted more than 100,000 Iraqi people to leave their neighborhood to find shelter with family members or friends. The Sunni families left because they feared being detained, tortured or killed by Shiite militia or police squads shielded by government officials. This Sunni minority argued that they would not be safe in their homes until the new Minister of the Interior halted Shiite attacks.34 Another result of sectarian violence was that Sunni neighborhoods formed self-defense forces to keep the Shiite’s Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade militants off their streets. The Sunnis barricaded the streets and stationed men on rooftops and street corners from midnight to six a.m. They used flashlights or cell phones to alert

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each other whenever they saw suspicious people who were not members of their neighborhood. When unknown individuals appeared, the Sunnis asked the Iraqi Army or U.S. soldiers to stop and check these persons, arresting any one who had illegal guns or other weapons. Although Iraq’s President Jala Talibani planned to integrate all Iraqi security forces under a single commander in Baghdad, he had to deal with the Shiites’ Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade whose leaders resisted his efforts to have them join with Sunni groups. Hoping to ease sectarian violence, Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali alSistani ordered the Shiite Zubayr Mosque to be closed for prayer services on Friday and Saturday. Sistani did this out of sympathy for the Sunni cleric Sheik Khaled al-Sadoun and two of his guards who had been killed after leaving their mosque on May 10, 2006.35 About the same time a Sunni Arab tennis coach and two of his Shiite players were shot and killed by Islamic extremists because they were wearing short pants. The Islamic extremists claimed they distributed leaflets warning fellow citizens “it violates the principals of Islamic religion” to expose “forbidden parts of the body.” Sunni cleric Eid al-Zoubayi denounced the attack saying he believed Islamic teachings permitted wearing shorts if they do not reveal forbidden parts of the body. Nonetheless, the three deaths were seen as a sign that Islamic extremism was spreading. (See Chapter 12 for discussion of casualties, coalition and Iraqi) Journalists Are Victims. On January 7, 2006 the Christian Science Monitor revealed that reporter Jill Carroll had been abducted and her interpreter, Allan Enwiyah, shot and killed. Carroll was on her way to interview a Sunni Arab politician Adnan al-Dulaimy. Her captors said she would be killed unless all women in Iraqi jails were released. When Jill Carroll appeared on a Kuwaiti television video on February 9, she appealed to her supporters to “Please do whatever they want, give them whatever they want.” Despite the fact that U.S. and Iraq authorities refused to release woman prisoners, Carroll was released in Baghdad on March 31, 2006. Later, her captors released an interview where Carroll denounced the “lies” told by the American government and said insurgents



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would defeat all Americans in Iraq. Upon returning to the United States, Carroll said her captors had released her on the condition that she made those prior statements about American “lies.” Now she declared, “Things that I was forced to say while captive are now being taken by some as an accurate reflections of my personal views. They are not.” She also said her captors had promised not to air the interview about the American “lies” but they “broke their word.” A car bomb explosion in central Baghdad on May 30, 2006, killed two CBS crewmembers, their Iraqi interpreter and a U.S. soldier. Also the network’s correspondent Kimberly Dozier, who had been in Iraq since 2003, was seriously wounded. She was rushed to a Baghdad hospital where doctors said they were “cautiously optimistic” that she would recover. The next day, Dozier was flown to the U.S. military hospital in Landstuhl, Germany where she had surgery to remove shrapnel from her skull and legs. Subsequently, she was flown to the U.S. then released from a rehabilitation facility on August 3 to continue her prolonged recovery. The two British members of Dozier’s crew who were killed were identified as cameraman Paul Douglas and soundman James Brolan. Their deaths raised the total number of journalists killed in Iraq from March 2003 to 2006 to 93, plus 37 media support personnel. These deaths were greater than the 63 journalist deaths in Vietnam, 17 in Korea and 69 during World War II.36

British Counterinsurgency Efforts at Basra On May 6, 2006, an insurgent’s antiaircraft rocket brought down a British Lynx helicopter over Basra killing five servicemen. After the helicopter was down, local Basra residents cheered as they threw stones and Molotov cocktails setting a British vehicle on fire. The men responsible for attacking the British soldiers were apparently from al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. After four hours of mayhem, British soldiers used plastic bullets to regain control of Basra’s streets. This episode was in sharp contrast to the previous two and a half years of British control of Iraq’s second largest city. When the British moved into Basra during March 2003, they applied a gentle touch that they thought could win the hearts and minds

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of its uneasy citizens. The British soldiers spoke a few words of Arabic, wore berets instead of helmets, took their sunglasses off when speaking with locals and drove about in open vehicles with weapons placed carefully out of sight. While Americans faced roadside bombs, suicide bombers and drive-by shootings in Baghdad, Basra appeared to be oasis of calm. The British bragged about their achievements. Indeed, Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster publicly criticized American operations in Iraq against suspected guerrilla strongholds as “offensive operations” that demonstrated a “cultural insensitivity” amounting to “institutional racism.” By summer 2006, however, the British approach to counterinsurgency was challenged as insurgent groups launched several assaults. Between January and the end of May, the insurgents employed 30 roadside bombs killing 13 soldiers. Additionally, it appeared that certain members of the Basra police were involved in daily killings of citizens that, depending upon which source one chooses, ranged from 24 a day to 100 a month. This escalation of violence has prompted two views as to its possible cause. One view holds that Prime Minister Tony Blair’s decision, in response to domestic pressure, to reduce British troops from 30,000 in 2003 to 10,000 in May 2006 had given the guerrillas room to operate. America’s senior officer in Iraq, General George W. Casey, Jr., joined in the criticism suggesting this withdrawal of troops was responsible for the increase in violence. The other view questioned whether the British were aggressive or intrusive enough during the early months of the occupation. They acquiesced in the Iraqis’ selection of police officers in such cities as Basra and Al-Amarah with the result that members of the Badr Brigades and other political and religious groups were hired. The result, according to Basra’s police chief General Hassan al-Suadi, was that uniformed members of rival groups were free to attack their enemies. He complained that he could not fire these individuals because, “They’ll be jobless, and they’ll turn into criminals. The force is now 15,000 and I’m stuck with it.” While the British believe that the vast majority of Basra’s citizens oppose the guerrilla organizations, they recognize that their three



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years of occupation has not seen the creation of enough new jobs or the completion of needed reconstruction. The Iraqis had hoped the British would bring improvements but, like their American counterparts, they failed to improve living conditions in the south. In the end, the British concluded—as Americans had—that training and deployment of Iraqi troops were necessary to eliminate the insurgency and restore order.37

Death of al-Zarqawi The Bush administration’s first success in many months came after U.S. intelligence on June 8, 2006 located a house in Baqubah, north of Baghdad, where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was staying. Almost immediately, two Air Force F-16s dropped two precisionguided 500-pound bombs that killed al-Qaeda’s Iraqi leader alZarqawi. The deaths of Zarqawi and six of his followers resulted from the cooperation between Jordanian, U.S. and Iraqi intelligence groups who learned about Zarqawi’s network from a captured but anonymous al-Qaeda member. He told U.S. intelligence to follow Zarqawi’s spiritual adviser Abu Abdul-Rahman al-Iraqi to a house near the village of Hibhib where he planned to meet with Zarqawi. Having located the exact place where Zarqawi was staying, the U.S. bombs that killed him and Abdul-Rahman, also killed four other people including an unknown woman and child. After Zarqawi’s death was announced, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki said the $25 million bounty for locating Zarqawi would be paid. Despite President Bush and Prime Minster Blair’s comments welcoming Zarqawi’s death, they knew that Iraqi insurgents would strike again. Bush told a press conference: “We can expect the terrorists and insurgents to carry on without him.” And Blair told a London news conference: “We should have no illusions. They will continue to kill. There will be fierce attempts, with the formation of the [Iraqi] government,” to avenge the death of al-Zarqawi. Following the attack on al-Zarqawi, the U.S. and coalition forces raided 17 locations in and around Baghdad where they obtained a “treasure trove” of information about terrorist operations in Iraq. Many of these locations had previously been used to monitor suspected safe houses. Anticipating his death, al-Zarqawi had

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created many other insurgent cells in Iraq to independently carry out terrorist operations. In fact, just after his death was confirmed, an explosion in a Shiite market place killed about 19 people and wounded 40 other people. Some counterterrorism analysts believed al-Zarqawi had become isolated in the past year because many al-Qaeda members were not comfortable with his killing of hundreds of Muslims, mainly Shiites, with suicide bombers. These analysts believed al-Qaeda would continue to operate in Iraq because there were other leaders in the various networks for example, Abu Abdul Rahman al-Iraqi, a deputy assistant to Zarqawi, Abu al-Masri, an Egyptian-Afghan veteran, and other Iraqi insurgent groups led by Abdullah ibn Rasheed al-Baghdadi. In addition, Saudi Arabian and Algerian alQaeda cells would continue to pose a serious threat to Iraqis and the U.S. led occupation forces.38

Iraq Study Group Urges More Iraqi Training The Iraq Study Group’s (ISG) report issued on December 6, 2006 emphasized the need to employ more U.S. troops to advise Iraqi security forces to enable reducing the number of coalition troops by early 2008. The ISG urged that the current 5,000 advisors/ instructors be increased to at least 20,000, but some cautioned that drawing heavily on combat units could be self-defeating. There is a concomitant need to employ combat patrols to prevent the violence from getting out of hand during the shifting of responsibility from U.S. units to Iraqi ones. The Army had begun transforming Fort Riley, Kansas, into a vast training area for military advisors with the initial class beginning the 60-day training course in June. Officials hope the program will be graduating some 2,000 advisors per class by March 2007. At Camp Pendleton, California, the Marines have underway their own 120-day advisor training course that included language and cultural classes, together with special instruction on how deal with the issues of being embedded with Iraqi units. The graduated Marine advisors/trainers were to be assigned to Iraqi units. “They will live with them”they will patrol with them, they eat together, they do everything together,” according to Colonel Jeff Vold.



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In the past the U.S. military’s efforts to advise/train Iraqi units have had mixed results. The problems range from poor preparation to a lack of basic necessities such as interpreters, office supplies, vehicles and fuel. The oral histories of former advisor collected by the Army were severe in their criticism of team selections, no translators or ones that did not understand English, preparation by instructors who had not been to Iraq and poor logistics. Iraqis also have been critical of the advisors, especially being trained by officers far junior to them who had not seen combat. “Numerous teams have lieutenants”to fill the role of advisor to an Iraqi colonel counterpart,” the Lessons Learned report said, even though the Iraqis had fought in several wars. There was concern about the reliability of Iraqi personnel and units, as insurgents had infiltrated many units. Threats to the families of Iraqi soldiers and officers often caused them to desert even brigade commanders. It was not unusual for up to 75 percent of the soldiers in a unit failing to show up for a mission, claiming it was too dangerous; but they usually returned in time to be paid. Officials generally held that small teams of advisors embedded with Iraqi units and police for a year at a time, would allow the U.S. to hand over the responsibility for security sooner. However, many former advisors were not so optimistic. A Marine officer and advisor team leader believed that the Iraqis would not be ready next spring or even the next one. “I don’t think a year will be long enough to break their bad habits,” Lt. Colonel Mark Winn feared. “It gets pretty frustrating when you’re hitting it every day [and] your not making more progress”39

9

Tribulations & Trials

From Abu Ghraib to Saddam in the Dock

T

o cope with the escalating insurgency, coalition forces placed increasing emphasis upon gathering intelligence about the plans and operations of their opponents that resulted in the detention and, often, the violent interrogation of hundreds of Iraqis. According to a United Nations Human Rights report some 28,700 detainees eventually were held in American and Iraqi detention facilities in Iraq. These actions may have added to the ranks of the insurgents whose increasingly deadly attacks on occupation personnel and Iraqis resulted in mounting casualties. Friendly fire and coalition forces’ misdeeds by beleaguered, unschooled troops resulted in additional Iraqi deaths.

New Interrogation Policies The task of generating intelligence in Iraq was daunting at best, given the language barriers and inadequately trained personnel. It was further complicated by the Bush administration’s reinterpretation of the rules on the use of torture to extract intelligence. Additionally, the traditional 1949 Geneva Conventions on War, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners, were frequently ignored. During debates within the administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell argued that these Conventions should apply to members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban because to do otherwise would “reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops, both in the specific conflict and in general.” Moreover, to ignore these Conventions carried a “high cost in terms of negative

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international reaction, with immediate adverse consequences for our conduct of foreign policy.” Powell also added other vital reasons: the Treatment of Prisoners Convention “preserves our flexibility under both domestic and international law” and “it maintains POW [prisoner of war] status for U.S. forces, reinforces the importance of the Geneva Convention, and generally supports the U.S. objective of ensuring its forces are accorded protection under the Convention.” White House counsel Alberto Gonzalez and the Department of Justice insisted that the war on terrorism was a “new kind of war” and, therefore, suspected members of the Taliban, al-Qaeda or the Iraqi insurgency were “enemy combatants” not prisoners of war. President George W. Bush decided to bypass prior international agreements and chose to support Gonzalez’s interpretation. This decision led the administration to consider what tactics American interrogators might use when questioning prisoners captured in the “new kind of war” against terrorists. To determine interrogation methods that could be used or avoided, Gonzalez sought legal opinions from the Department of Justice. The Justice Department’s Legal Counsel wrote on August 1, 2002, that illegal torture would be that which inflicted physical pain the “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily functions and even death.” Unschooled in legal jargon, military intelligence officers as well as untrained military police from Army reserve units, easily believed almost any type of pain for example, broken bones, dislocated bones, psychological abuse and sleep, food and/or water deprivation was permitted to gain information about plans of terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. To obtain information from detained unlawful combatants, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s office approved, among other things, the use of dogs and the removal of prisoners’ clothes to break down their resistance to interrogations. Later, after investigations of various charges of abuse, Rumsfeld rescinded his approval and, finally in 2006, the Army issued a revised field manual committed to adhering to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The administration’s initial endorsement of Gonzalez’s position meant Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners at Afghanistan’s Bagram Air



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Force Base or Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, could be held indefinitely and would not be treated as POWs. New arrangements appeared only later when Iraqi prison abuses were aired on TV and the administration was confronted with a disturbed public and an outraged Senate.1

From Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib In November 2002, Army Major General Geoffrey Miller became commander at Guantanamo where he immediately ran into conflict with the International Committee for the Red Cross who reported prisoners were kept in open-air cages and were not properly processed for early release. In response, Miller declared U.S. interrogations were not the concern of the Red Cross. Later reports disclosed that Miller also deprived Guantanamo prisoners of sleep, submitted them to extremes of hot and cold, and placed them in “stress positions” for agonizing lengths of time. In August 2003, Miller was transferred to Iraq and carried with him the Secretary of Defense’s April 16, 2003 policy guidelines for Guantanamo and gave them to the U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. General Ricardo S. Sanchez. Miller’s arrival was apparently followed by increased pressure on prison guards to “soften up” prisoners for interrogators.2 Rounding Up Iraqi Detainees. The widespread military operations in the fall and winter of 2003 resulted in the detention of thousands of Iraqis, many of whom could provide little or no useful intelligence, who jammed prison facilities staffed by ill trained personnel. Unfortunately, some commanders failed to see that these operations, if poorly planned, would not provide needed intelligence and could be detrimental to the occupation’s overall objectives. Retired Army Colonel Stuart Herrington advised the senior intelligence officer in Iraq that: “Conducting sweep operations in which many persons are detained who probably should not be detained, and who then wind up incarcerated for three to six months, is counterproductive to the Coalition’s efforts to win the cooperation of the Iraqi citizenry.” “Some divisions are conducting operations with rigorous detention criteria,” he wrote approvingly, however, “some the 4th ID [Infantry Division] is the negative example are

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sweeping up large numbers of people and dumping them at the door of Abu Ghraib.” In another critical review of these tactics, Major General George Fay wrote, “Large quantities of detainees with little or no intelligence value swelled Abu Ghraib’s population and led to a variety of overcrowding difficulties. Already scarce interrogator and analyst resources were pulled from interrogation operations to identify and screen increasing numbers of personnel whose capture documentation was incomplete or missing. Complicated and unresponsive release procedures ensured that these detainees stayed at Abu Ghraib even though most had no value.”3 The process of arresting detainees often found American soldiers and military police sweeping down on suspected Iraqi homes, kicking in doors and carrying off many male prisoners a number that reached 8,000 by the fall of 2003. Of those arrested, the International Red Cross believed that 70 to 90 percent were “arrested by mistake” and gradually released. The Iraqi prisoners retained as suspected “high level” terrorists were frequently subjected to abusive tactics by soldiers, military police and civilian interrogators. Many of these prisoners were brought to Saddam’s notorious Abu Ghraib prison located 20 miles west of Baghdad. After it was looted by Iraqis in April 2003, Bremer’s agency cleaned and painted prison cells, repaired toilets and constructed a medical center. Even with these improvements, neither the physical facilities nor the illtrained guards were adequate to handle its expanding number of inmates. When the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported prisoners were abused and sometimes dying during interrogations at Abu Ghraib, occupation authorities paid little attention. After photos of the abuse were shown on television in April 2004, the Bush administration could no longer ignore the complaints.4 U.S. Abuse at Abu Ghraib. A report, aired by CBS’s “60 Minutes” on April 28, 2004, showed pictures that stunned viewers around the world of American soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison. The shocking pictures included one of Private Lynndie



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England giving a thumbs up sign while pointing at the genitals of an Iraqi man wearing nothing but a bag over his head. Other pictures showed a hooded man standing on a box with arms stretched out and hooked up to electric wires, a female soldier taunting a naked Iraqi prisoner being held on a leash, naked Iraqi prisoners stacked in a human pyramid and male prisoners positioned to simulate sex acts. Information of this behavior initially surfaced on January 13, 2004 when a computer disc with pictures of guards abusing naked detainees was turned over to a member of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was informed about reports of prisoner abuse on January 16 and, three days later, the U.S. commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, sent Major General Antonio M. Taguba to conduct a secret investigation. In keeping with the Army’s history of covering up such episodes in Vietnam and the administration’s insistence on secrecy, no information about prisoner abuses was revealed until April 28, 2004 after the CBS TV program. The Taguba Investigation. Major General Taguba concluded his investigation on February 26, 2004 and issued a classified report, which became public knowledge when journalist Seymour M. Hersh obtained a copy in April. The guards at Abu Ghraib prison were members of an Army reserve unit from New York the 327th Military Police (MP) Company, 800th Military Police Brigade. In late May-early June 2003, the brigade was placed in charge of the Iraqi penal system that included Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex/Camp Cropper. Initially, members of the brigade thought they would be going home following the cessation of major ground combat; consequently, morale suffered with the new assignment. The soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib had few amenities no dining halls, PX, barbershop or entertainment facilities and they faced numerous mortar and random rifle attacks that posed a serious threat to them and the detainees. Over time, the brigade had become severely undermanned and suffered serious logistical problems. According to the report, the entire 800th Military Police Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski, was

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inadequately trained for an interrogation mission. Consequently, the brigade lacked the “basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal and command requirements.” Procedures for handling detainees were in chaos since military intelligence officials often wanted the MPs to soften up prisoners for interrogation. Among the illegal abuses Taguba cited were pictures of MPs keeping prisoners naked for days at a time, forcing them to masturbate while being photographed and having dogs without muzzles intimidate and frighten them. He recommended disciplinary action and further investigation against a dozen officers and civilians but none higher than Karpinski.5 Congressional Investigations. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees began holding hearings on May 7, 2004 regarding Iraqi prisoner abuses. During the hearings, Secretary Rumsfeld apologized for the abuses and vowed to punish the few people who committed them. At subsequent hearings, Committee members learned that the abuses were more extensive than Rumsfeld had acknowledged. Although Senate Committee Chairman John W. Warner (R-VA.) wanted to continue the hearings to identify all people responsible for abuses, his Republican colleagues were reluctant to pursue the issue to that end. With the Bush reelection campaign celebrating the military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Republican majority in the House brought its investigations to a virtual halt on July 15, 2004. In July 2004, the Senate Armed Forces Committee heard from the Army’s inspector general, Lieutenant General Paul T. Mikolashek, who criticized Army policy toward detainees as a relic of the Cold War and better suited to handling Soviet prisoners on an Eastern European battlefield. He testified that there were serious problems in the training, organization and policies for military detention that contributed to abuses. He also indicated there was poor leadership, inadequate training for military jailers and a lack of medical care for Iraqi prisoners. But, he said, abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan were “not representative of policy, doctrine or soldier training.” These abuses were by a “few individuals, coupled with the failure of a few leaders to provide adequate monitoring, supervision and leadership.”6 Rumsfeld’s Independent Panel. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld commissioned a so-called Independent Panel in June 2004 to



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review the Department of Defense’s global detention operations. Chaired by former defense secretary, James R. Schlesinger, the panel included Harold Brown, Tillie K. Fowler, retired Air Force General Charles A. Horner and executive director Dr. James L. Blackwell, Jr. The Panel’s final report, issued on August 24, 2004, cited a series of failures that led up the Pentagon’s chain of command, including Secretary Rumsfeld, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Richard Myers, thehead of Central Command General John P. Abizid and the U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. General Ricardo S. Sanchez. The report claimed these officials failed to provide sufficient military police when the insurgency escalated after the war and were slow to respond to Red Cross complaints in October and November 2003. Sanchez also failed to have photographs of abuse promptly distributed up the chain of command. The Panel substantiated 66 cases of abuse, including the deaths of five detainees eight at Guantanamo, three in Afghanistan and 55 in Iraq. The report stated many abuses were evidently “just for the fun of it” and were due to inadequate training, leadership and oversight. Panel members did not think there was undue pressure on interrogators by senior officials, however, the eagerness of senior officials to find out about insurgent plans may “have been perceived by interrogators as pressure.” Additionally, the report questioned the holding of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, which was in the middle of a combat zone and subjected to frequent insurgent attacks. Overall, the Panel members said the soldiers who committed the abuse were directly responsible, but indirect responsibility lay at the door of the White House and the Pentagon where officials established conditions for abuses. The Panel’s recommendations called for an overhaul of how American military handled prisoners in the future. The Panel also heard complaints against General Sanchez’s lower level officers in Iraq. These officers included Sanchez’s deputy, Major General Walter Wojdkowski, and his intelligence officer, Brigadier General Barbara G. Fast, who failed to advise Sanchez of the need for more military police. (Thomas Ricks in Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq treats General Fast more generously.) Other officers were cited as weak and ineffective leaders with no

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experience or proper training in interrogation methods or proper policies needed for interrogation.7 Fay-Jones Report. In August 2004, Major General George R. Fay and Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones investigated the role of intelligence officers during detainee interrogations. Their final report laid much of the blame for abusive interrogations on Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz who assigned the U.S. troop level in Iraq that was inadequate to control the postwar looting or the rise of insurgents. By October 2003, the U.S. occupation force had provided only 92 military police guards to control 7,000 prisoners at Abu Ghraib. In these circumstances, Fay reported, there was disorganization and poor supervision at Abu Ghraib leading to resentment by the guards and interrogators. Moreover, two U.S. soldiers were killed and 11 wounded in a mortar attack on the prison in September 2003. There were additional mortar strikes throughout the fall and winter leading to an April 2004 insurgent assault that killed 22 prisoners and wounded 80. These attacks not only demoralized soldiers and detainees at Abu Ghraib, but convinced the military police and intelligence personnel that they were “the forgotten outpost receiving little support from the army.” Finally the report said there was confusion about lines of authority between military police guards, military intelligence, civilian intelligence and the CIA. Such chaotic conditions, the report found, provided an opportunity for “a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised soldiers and civilians” to commit sexual and physical abuse of the prisoners. Despite these and other abuses, Fay recommended only administrative actions for the officers involved. The Fay-Jones report cited 44 cases of abuse at Abu Ghraib and found military intelligence officers played a major role in directing and carrying out the abuses of Iraqi prisoners.8 Resolution of Charges. None of the defendants were able to summon high-ranking officers for questioning because the Army judge, Colonel James Pohl, ruled that their actions had no bearing on the reservists’ conduct. Thus, on January 12, 2006, Major General Miller invoked his right not to give testimony that might



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incriminate him and refused to testify in the case of soldiers accused of using dogs to terrify detainees at Abu Ghraib. He had recommended in 2003 that military dogs be used to help maintain order in Iraq. After Colonel Thomas Pappas was granted immunity, he testified that dogs could be used in interrogations without the approval of the U.S. commander in Iraq. When asked if Miller’s invoking his self incrimination rights made him culpable, Rumsfeld said: “I’m certainly not going to inject myself into the middle of any of these activities.” Although some abuse cases were still under scrutiny in 2006, the completed trials were limited largely to low ranking soldiers. On January 15, 2005, Charles A. Graner, Jr. was found guilty of assault and indecent acts, demoted, discharged dishonorably and sentenced to 10 years in prison. On February 1, 2005, Roman Krol pleaded guilty to maltreating detainees and was sentenced to 10 months in prison. On February 4, 2005, Sgt. Javal S. Davis pleaded guilty to battery and making false statements and was discharged for bad conduct and sentenced to six months in prison. On May 17, 2005, Specialist Sabrina Harman was found guilty of maltreating detainees, discharged for bad conduct and sentenced to six months in prison. On September 27, 2005, a jury found Private First Class Lynndie R. England guilty of maltreating detainees and indecent acts. She was dishonorably discharged and sentenced to three years in prison. On March 22, 2006, Sergeant Michael J. Smith was found guilty on six of 13 counts, including conspiring with another Army dog handler to frighten detainees. He was demoted, sentenced to six months in jail and discharged for bad conduct. In addition to Sergeant Smith, additional soldiers previously convicted were Army Specialist Jeremy C. Sivits, sentenced to one year in prison after he pleaded guilty to charges of abuse; Specialist Armin J. Cruz, Jr., sentenced to eight months; Staff Sgt. Ivan I. “Chip” Frederick II who received eight years in prison, was reduced to private and forfeited back pay and was dishonorably discharged; and Specialist Megan M. Ambuhl who pleaded guilty to dereliction of duty, was demoted and lost a half months’ pay. As critics have noted, the court martial trials of lower grade soldiers contrast sharply with the failure to court martial any high

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ranking army officers or intelligence officials who instead usually drew administrative reprimands. Indeed, some high ranking officers such as General Ricardo S. Sanchez and General George W. Casey, Jr. were promoted. The cases of three other Americans involved at Abu Ghraib were decided in May 2005. Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski, whose MP company was in charge at the prison, was demoted to colonel for dereliction of duty. She claimed to be a scapegoat for her superior officers. Neither Colonel Thomas M. Pappas, in charge of military intelligence at the prison in 2003, nor Major General Geoffrey D. Miller who “set the conditions” for enhancing prisoner interrogations were tried by a military court for their role in detainees abuse at Abu Ghraib. Pappas was simply issued a letter of reprimand and fined. In July 2005 the Army recommended that Major General Miller be reprimanded for not properly overseeing interrogations of “high-value” prisoners at Guantanamo.9

A Flashback: It Sounds Like Vietnam Cases of American troopers abusing Iraqi civilians often were not reported to senior officers because often the “whistle-blowers” were ignored or discredited. Even those examples that have surfaced, often belatedly, were frequently cited as isolated cases by a few “bad apples”. This was not a new situation. The failure of senior officials to confront the matter of detainee abuse, newly declassified records have shown, has its roots in the Vietnam conflict. Army investigators, looking into charges by Lt. Colonel Anthony B. Herbert in 1969 that U.S. and South Vietnamese soldiers were guilty of war crimes, discovered cases of torture and mistreatment that exceeded even what he listed. Their reports were never made public and few of the individuals responsible for committing or covering up these crimes were punished. A Vietnam veteran who served on the Army task force looking into the 1968 My Lai massacre, Brig. General John H. Johns, argued that the newly unearthed documents provide a valuable lesson for Iraq. “If we rationalize it as isolated acts, as we did in Vietnam and as we’re doing with Abu Ghraib and similar atrocities,” he said,



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“we’ll never correct the problem.” Colonel Herbert, who left the Army feeling harassed and discredited by his superiors, commented: “If they’d really taken action about the bad apples and been honest about it”then they wouldn’t be arguing about Abu Ghraib and different places today.” A September 24, 2005 report from Human Rights Watch (HRW) based on interviews with Captain Ian Fishback, a 26-yearold West Point graduate, and two sergeants, offered a firsthand account of the torture of Iraqi detainees from 2003 through 2004 at Forward Operating Base Mercury, near Fallujah in central Iraq. Their accounts included such daily practices as hitting detainees with baseball bats, breaking limbs, forcing them to form human pyramids, dousing them with cold water, depriving them of sleep, food and water. Fallujah residents nicknamed the U.S. troops “the Murderous Maniacs”. While the Army announced it would investigate the charges, a Pentagon spokesman labeled them politically motivated. Lt. Colonel John Skinner denounced the report as an attempt “to advance an agenda through the use of distortions.” In a remarkable stretch of fact, another Pentagon spokesman Paul Boyce claimed, “The Army does not tolerate detainee abuse.” The sergeants’ accounts underscored the widespread confusion among soldiers regarding the legal standards applicable to detainees and challenged the administration’s denial that military and civilian leadership played a role in abuses. “[W]e didn’t know we were supposed to be following” the Geneva Conventions, one of the sergeants noted in the report by Human Rights Watch. Furthermore, he said, “we were never briefed on the Geneva Conventions.” Capt. Fishback’s letter to Senator John McCain (R-AZ) in 2005, listing many of the abuses of detainees he had witnessed, helped persuade McCain, himself a former tortured prisoner of war, to seek a ban on torture and improved treatment of detainees.

Congress Takes a Stand Such incidents as Abu Ghraib, which badly damaged America’s reputation, prompted Senator McCain to lead a bipartisan campaign

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to clarify the rules governing the military’s treatment of its detainees. On October 5, 2005, the Senate voted to prohibit many of the methods for obtaining information from a detainee that had previously been condoned by Gonzalez and Rumsfeld. Both Democratic and Republican Party members of congress accepted Senator John McCain’s provisions to codify the treatment of military detainees and to establish legal rights for terrorist suspects. To keep Bush from vetoing the resolution, it was added to the defense policy reauthorization bill for 2006.9 A year later, on September 6, the Army finally issued a revised field manual that stated, “All detainees will be treated consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.” Overcoming objections of senior Pentagon officials, the manual prohibits torture and cruel treatment of all detainees whether traditionally uniformed or irregular combatants. The new guidelines eliminate the confusion; one critic of the administration’s policies concluded, this presents “a clear message to soldiers about what is acceptable and what is not.” Experienced CIA interrogators could still use “harsh” or extreme measures, a senior administration official insisted, to extract information from “a certain category of high-level alQaeda members.” Frustrated lawmakers on Capital Hill were upset because they were not informed of what measures were still permissible for the CIA to employ. Apparently, military and civilian intelligence officers will have separate guidelines for conducting interrogations. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives and the Senate between November 15 and 19, 2005, had resolved that the year 2006 should be a “period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty” in order to create “the conditions for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq.” The resolution required the White House to provide Congress with an unclassified report every 90 days with details of U.S. policy for military operations.10

British Prisoner Abuse The British government did little regarding three of their soldiers who abused Iraqi prisoners after they captured Basra in May 2003.



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In January 2005, there was a loud public protest in London after the appearance of 22 pictures of British soldiers forcing naked Iraqi’s to simulate sex acts with one another and threatening to beat them. Prime Minister Blair was able to persuade members of both parties in Parliament that the abuses were the work of a tiny minority. In France and Germany, however, many individuals were critical of British leaders for largely smoothing the affair over. After reproducing the British pictures, France’s Le Figaro called this Britain’s Abu Ghraib, a comparison also used by Madrid’s El Mundo. The editors of Berlin’s Tageszeitung simply asked “How many eggs do you need in order to describe the entire basket as bad?” Other German papers said little about specific accusations because the British soldiers were on trial in Osnabruck, Germany. Twenty months after the episode, the Royal Military police still had not been able to determine which soldiers were responsible for stripping the Iraqis and forcing them to “put on a sex show” that simulated acts of oral and anal sex for the camera. Of the four men charged with the crime, Gary Bartlam, had earlier pleaded guilty to taking the pictures. He received immunity for his testimony at the trial of three other British soldiers. The three were convicted of abusing Iraqi prisoners and dismissed with disgrace from the army by a court martial panel. Additionally, Corporal Daniel Kenyon, the most senior of the three, was sentenced to 18 months and Lance Corporal Mark Cooley to two years in prison. Lance Corporal Darren Larkin, who pleaded guilty to assaulting an Iraqi prisoner, was to serve 140 days. Several senior officers, who were accused of misconduct by defense lawyers, have since been promoted. Following the court’s decision, General Sir Mike Jackson, the army’s chief of staff, said: “I apologise on behalf of the army to the Iraqis that were abused and the people of Iraq as a whole.”11

Iraqis Abuse Prisoners The Iraqi government’s Interior Ministry, which was Shiite controlled, appeared to be using its policing functions to imprison, torture and, occasionally, to kill Sunni Arabs. Certainly this was

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the view of the Sunni minority and it was reinforced when, on November 13, 2005, soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Division found 173 detainees being abused in the basement of a bomb shelter used by the Interior Minister. Of the 173 detainees who were being tortured by Shiite police officers associated with Badr Brigade, 169 were Sunni Arabs. Among the methods used were the beating of inmates while suspended from the ceiling and subjected to electrical shocks. When the detainees were discovered, one or two were paralyzed, others had their skin pealed away from their bodies and a few had been killed. Iraq’s Interior Minister Bayan Jabr claimed the reports of torture were exaggerated. He told a New York Times reporter the reports were nonsense, because “Only a few detainees were punched and hit and it wasn’t a secret bunker.” Jabr also claimed he had dismissed at least 200 officials involved in these cases. After learning of the torture incidents, Prime Minister Ibrahim promised a thorough investigation would be made regarding conditions in detention centers, but as of December 1, 2005 he had failed to meet the twoweek deadline set for his report. Al-Jaafari claimed more time was needed, to which Sunni spokesman Harith al-Obeidi responded, “We believe that the government is part of this case, so we do not expect that it would try to reveal the truth.” The Interior Ministry had another secret prison for detainees in a museum basement at Madaen, located 10 miles south of Baghdad. Detainees being held at the museum were apparently hung by the hands, beaten with cables and deprived of food and water. Although a Madaen police captain claimed a U.S. commando unit had its base at the museum, a U.S. military official, who insisted on anonymity, indicated the commando unit had left the museum early in 2005 when it was turned over to the Iraqi police. Some former prisoners said their Shiite captors tried to keep them hidden from American officials. Detainee Sadiq Abdul Razzaq Samarrai, who was transferred from the museum to a Baghdad prison and released on November 1, said he hoped the Americans would investigate torture at the Madaen museum. Although the Interior Ministry continued to deny American reports of its abuse of Sunni prisoners, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq,



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Zalmay Khalilzad, said “I want to let the Iraqi people know we are committed to looking at all facilities” run by the Interior Ministry. “It was unacceptable,” he said, “for this type of abuse to take place.” By December 25, 2005, the number of Iraqi held detainees had risen to 14,590. Because a number of detainees were being abused, Major General John D. Gardner refused to turn detention centers over to the Iraqis until American officials were certain Iraqi jailers could meet American standards for the care and custody of detainees. Gardner announced, “we will not pass on facilities until they meet standards we define and are using them today.” In the following months, at least six joint U.S.-Iraqi inspections took place at many of the 1,000 detention centers, most of them controlled by the Shiite dominated Interior Ministry. These inspections continued to turn up examples of abuse at all of the centers, in some instances, severe abuse. According to one U.S. inspector, they found many Iraqis with “numerous bruises on the arms, legs and feet” and others with “separated shoulders and problems with their hands and fingers too. You could also see the strap marks on some of their backs.” “I was not in charge of the team who went to the sites. If so, I would have taken them [the detainees] out,” the inspector concluded. “We set a precedent and we were given guidance,” General Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed, “but for some reason it is not being followed.” In an earlier November 29, 2005 news conference with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Pace had stated, “It is absolutely the responsibility of every U.S. service member, if they see inhumane treatment being conducted, to intervene to stop it.” When Rumsfeld interjected, “I don’t think you mean they have an obligation to physically stop it; it’s to report it.” “If they are physically present when inhumane treatment is taking place, sir,” Pace responded, “they have an obligation to try to stop it.” U.S. troops apparently did remove to treatment facilities a small number of the most severely abused detainees. Iraqi inspectors wanted all the detainees removed, however, arguing that those not moved were vulnerable. “They tell us, ‘If you leave us here, they will kill us’,” one noted. “I want them to do what General Pace

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said,” he declared, the Americans should do the right thing. “Don’t be intimidated by the Iraqi politicians,” he argued. The Americans had suspended their policy of removing abused prisoners, the Iraqi official was informed, out of concern that the political impact of more disclosures of abuses by the Interior Ministry might negatively impact the December 15 national elections. Unfortunately, he noted, the election passed but the Americans continued to leave abused prisoners at the detention sites. On September 2, 2006, the U.S. returned control of Abu Ghraib prison to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice. Earlier, many of the Sunni detainees were either released by Prime Minister Nouri Maliki or were transferred to other detention centers. At this time the U.S. still held at least 13,000 prisoners, while the Iraqi government’s prisons held more than 15,000 inmates.12

Iraqi Deaths from Friendly Fire As insurgents grew bolder, coalition soldiers came under more frequent attacks often involving heavy aerial and ground fire. It is the nature of guerrilla warfare that the enemy is difficult to identify and, consequently, mistakes are made. Although no evidence exists of prewar connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgents, bin Laden believed his group would profit from the American “crusaders” plight in Iraq where the U.S. military’s unfamiliarity with the Arabic language and customs would sometimes cause them to fire on friendly forces. Innocent local Iraqis, who were only hiding from the mayhem created by insurgents and coalition troops or celebrating in a fashion unfamiliar to Americans, often became casualties. Such an incident occurred at Samarra, where U.S. soldiers shot and killed three Iraqi teenagers and injured 10 others. The Americans claimed that it was a firefight, but a local Iraqi hospital official said the teenagers had only fired into the air to celebrate a wedding an Iraqi custom. Although Bremer’s office banned such celebrations, his poor lines of communication did not extend to Samarra. One occupation official commented: “We don’t even get copies of Bremer’s decrees.”



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Another occasion of friendly fire occurred on January 11, 2004, when American soldiers patrolling Kirkuk mistakenly killed two members of the Iraqi police force whom they had previously trained. In a similar incident, U.S. soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade shot and killed three armed men who were later discovered to be Iraqi police. Two days later, U.S. soldiers killed a father and his 10-year-old son. The father was driving a dark blue station wagon behind a convoy of U.S. Humvees when a roadside bomb exploded about 300 yards away. After the bomb went off, jittery Americans in the Humvee fired at the blue car, killing the boy and his father and wounding the boy’s mother, aunt, a brother and a sister. After the attack, Iraqi policeman Lt. Muhammad Ali told a reporter: “I’ll tell you the truth. The Americans did this. I know after this conversation they will fire me from my job, but that’s what happened.”13 American troops shot and killed Nabiha Nisaif Jassim,a 35-yearold pregnant woman, and her cousin Saliha Mohammed Hassan as they were speeding toward a maternity hospital in Samarra on May 31. American military officials said Jassim’s car was in a prohibited area and the troops fired to “disable” it. But, of course, their shots proved fatal to the two women in the car. Doctors at the hospital tried but failed to save Jassim’s baby.14 Fortunately, not all U.S.-Iraqi encounters resulted in such deadly consequences.

Coalition Forces’ Misdeeds: Homicide & Rape Other violent incidents involving mistreatment by coalition forces of Iraqis have come to light that raise serious questions as to whether the rules of engagement have been violated. In some instances, those individuals involved have insisted their actions followed recognized procedures. The administration has not been particularly forthcoming about their investigations into possible misdeeds. Some 100 members of the military apparently have been court martialed as a result of 600 charges of abuse since the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The Defense Department officials claimed they did not have all the numbers, but indicated

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that 250 military personnel were “held accountable” for abusive behavior a number that included administrative punishments. Of the 20 odd service members charged with the deaths of Iraqis during the insurgency, most have been acquitted or convicted of lesser charges. The Haditha Incident. News reports appeared in the spring of 2006 charging members of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines Regiment with the massacre of 24 Iraqi men, women and children on November 19, 2005 in the Iraqi town of Haditha. Time magazine first reported these killings on March 27, 2006, but more public attention was paid to the event after reports from an independent Naval Criminal Investigative Service was published in May 2006. The November 19th events began at 7:15 in the morning when a convoy of four Marine Humvees were driving down Haditha’s Hay al-Sinnai Road and an improvised explosive device exploded beside the fourth Humvee, killing Lance Corporal Miguel Terrazaz and wounding two other Marines. The Marines in the other Humvees were suspicious of five men in a nearby taxi and when the suspects ran, the Marines shot and killed them. Next, the Marines went through four nearby homes where they killed a total of 19 men, women, and children. The day after the Marines had killed the 24 civilians, an Iraqi journalist Taher Thabet videotaped the scenes at the local morgue and at the four homes where the shooting took place. Among other bits of information, a video that Time’s Tim McGirk obtained from Thabet’s Hammurabi human rights group indicated that only one of the 19 Iraqi civilians killed in the four homes was armed. It also revealed that the Marines smashed furniture and tore down wall hangings in all the homes. After combining the video’s information with eyewitness reports, McGirk provided Colonel Barry Johnson, the chief military spokesman in Baghdad, with an account of the killings on February 10, 2006. McGirk’s report prompted Johnson to inform Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli about the Haditha incident and Chiarelli ordered Army Colonel Gregory Watt to undertake a preliminary investigation into the events. After his investigation, Watt recommended on March 3 that General Chiarelli request a full-scale investigation. Seven days later, Chiarelli told Defense Secretary



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Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter Pace about the killings. After Rumsfeld informed President Bush about the events, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service team began an investigation of Haditha’s events on March 13, 2006. Three days later, Time reporters were briefed about the Naval team’s findings before publishing their account on March 27, 2006. In Baghdad, Chiarelli assigned Major General Eldon Bargewell to investigate and forward the Marines’ reports up the chain of command. As a result of Bargewell’s investigation, three Marine officers were relieved of their command on April 7, 2006. About a month later, Congressman John Murtha was briefed about Haditha’s internal investigation. Following his briefing, Murtha said that the information he received demonstrated the Marines had killed the innocent Iraqi civilians “in cold blood.” More to the point, the New York Times reported on May 29, 2006, that at least one witness, Hiba Abdullah, survived the Haditha killings but seven other people in her father-in-law’s home did not. In addition, an Iraqi writer and historian (his name was withheld to keep him safe) interviewed four other people who witnessed the Haditha killings of the Iraqi civilians. In June 2, the Naval team sought to exhume the bodies of some of those who were killed in order to find forensic evidence about the caliber of bullets and the angles of shots fired that could supplement witnesses’ statements. The victim’s relatives refused to grant permission to exhume the bodies because Islamic teachings prohibit anyone from removing dead bodies from their graves. On May 31, President Bush, in his first public comment about Haditha, said he was troubled by the news and “those who violated the law, if they did, will be punished.” Lawyers for three Marines who had been relieved of duty told Washington Post reporters that the Marines were following the proper rules of engagement at Haditha. In particular, Neal A. Puckett, who represents Staff Sgt. Frank D. Wuterich, insisted: “It will forever be his position that everything they did that day was following their rules of engagement and to protect the lives of Marines. He’s really upset that people believe that he and his Marines are even capable of intentionally killing innocent civilians.”

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In December 2006, four Marines were charged with murder: Staff Sgt. Frank D. Wuterich, Sgt. Sanick P. Dela Cruz, Lance Cpl. Justin L. Sharratt, and Lance Cpl. Stephen B. Tatum. Also four officers were charged with failing to investigate and providing a full report of the incident: Lt. Col. Jeffrey R. Chessani, Capt. Lucas M. McConnell, Capt. Randy W. Stone and Lt. Andrew A. Grayson.15 The Hamandiya Incidents. Six members of 2nd Platoon, Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Division have been charged with the April 26, 2006 death of Hashim Ibrahim Awad in Hamandiya, west of Baghdad. Lance Cpl. Saul H. Lopezromo, Pfc. Derek I. Lewis, Lance Cpl. Henry D. Lever, Sgt. Lawrence G. Hutchins III, Cpl. Trent D. Thomas, and Lance Cpl. Jerry E. Shumate Jr., along with Petty Officer 3rd Class Melson Bacos, were charged with in the affair. Hutchins, Thomas and Shumate also faced charges of murder, kidnapping and conspiracy in connection with the April 26 incident and were being held in the base brig. The Marines, conducting a search for an insurgent, entered Awad’s house but found it empty. They then went next door where they found Awad, took him outside and, allegedly, without provocation, shot him. To make him appear to be an insurgent found trying to plant a roadside bomb, the Marines placed an AK-47 and a shovel near Awad’s body. In an earlier incident, Marine Lance Cpl. Saul H. Lopezromo, Pfc. Derek I. Lewis and Lance Cpl. Henry D. Lever have been charged with the April 10th assault of an Iraqi civilian in Hamandiya. Sgt. Lawrence G. Hutchins III was charged with assaulting three civilians during the April 10th episode. Sgt. Hutchins, Cpl. Trent D. Thomas and Lance Cpl. Jerry E. Shumate, Jr. were indicted for murder, kidnapping and conspiracy in the April 26th incident.16 Ishaqi Incident. During a U.S. night raid on a house about sixty miles north of Baghdad, one suspected insurgent and perhaps 12 civilians were killed. The raid targeted an al-Qaeda operative believed to be in the residence when a firefight ensued. The soldiers returned fire and called in an air strike, which destroyed the building. U.S. commanders said the troops acted in accordance with established rules of engagement.



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A local Iraqi police commander claimed autopsies of the bodies performed at a hospital in Tikrit indicated the victims had bullet shots in the head and all bodies were handcuffed. The photographic evidence, while extremely graphic, did not corroborate his accusation; indeed, from visual observations, it could not be concluded that the wounds were the result of gunshots. A subsequent Army investigation of the claims that the soldiers had intentionally killed the civilians at Ishaqi, cleared the soldiers of misconduct and questioned whether the charges were made to discredit the coalition forces. Tharthar Lake Incident. During a May 10, 2006 raid, by troops of the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne on a small island in Tharthar Lake, three unarmed Iraqi detainees were shot. Hearings to determine if Staff Sgt. Raymond L. Girouard, Pfc. Corey R. Claggett, Spc. William B. Hunsaker and Spc. Juston R. Graber should face a court martial for the deaths were held at 101st Airborne headquarters near Tikrit. An eyewitness from the brigade stated he watched four U.S. soldiers shoot the three Iraqis as they ran, with their blindfolds down, toward “a tractor, cow, couple of sheep, that was it.” Army prosecutors claimed that the prisoners were released from their handcuffs and the accused soldiers staged the escape to justify the shootings. Denying the allegations, the four soldiers insisted that the prisoners broke loose from their plastic handcuffs, stabbed one of them, hit another in the face and were shot trying to escape. As the hearings proceeded, the role of the accused commanding officer, Col. Michael Steele, aroused interest. Steele had a reputation for being a tough, potentially reckless, leader who apparently rewarded U.S. soldiers who killed insurgents with knives. Just before the raid began, a witness claimed that Steele and other officers ordered them to “engage and kill all military age men.” Whether or not a verbal command was issued, most members of the brigade apparently understood that was what Steele wanted. This information launched an investigation into the commander’s role. Meanwhile, a preliminary hearing, the military’s equivalent of a grand jury, found that the four soldiers charged with the deaths of the three Iraqis must face a court martial. If they were convicted, they could be eligible for the death penalty.17

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Murder and Retribution? On March 12, 2006, soldiers of the 1st Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment were drinking alcohol in violation of orders and apparently decided to assault a young Iraqi girl who had passed through their checkpoint at Mahmoudiya, south of Baghdad. The girl and her family lived nearby. The soldiers allegedly went to the house where they raped the 14-year-old girl then shot her, her father, mother and fiveyear-old sister. Prosecutors claim that the soldiers then set the 14year-old’s body on fire in an effort to hide the crime. Subsequently, four soldiers Spc. James P. Barker, Sgt. Paul E. Cortez, Pfc. Bryan L. Howard and Pfc. Jesse Spielman and one former soldier Steven D. Green were charged with committing rape and homicide, while another soldier Sgt. Anthony W. Yribe was charged with failing to report the incident. Fellow soldiers told of losing several comrades while patrolling for bombs and that the morale of the unit had greatly declined to the point that many of them were “full of despair.” They also testified that all of them had taken to taking painkillers, drinking cough syrup and consuming whiskey. A preliminary hearing concluded that these four soldiers should face a court martial and if convicted could receive the death sentence. Attorney David Sheldon, defending Barker, acknowledged his client’s guilt, but claimed Green, who had been discharged for a “personality disorder”, led Barker astray. “The brigade wants to remove its own responsibility in putting these soldiers in a position where they were compromised,” Sheldon said. Three months later, on June 16, one U.S. soldier was killed and two others kidnapped from a checkpoint. The two, Pfc. Kristian Menchaca and Pfc. Thomas L. Tucker were later killed, Menchaca had his throat slit and Tucker was beheaded. The insurgents posted pictures of the mutilated bodies on the Internet, claiming the three were killed as retribution for the rape and the murder of the family. Were the two incidents connected? Army investigators insisted there was no connection between the two episodes, but some family members of the accused soldiers believe there probably was some



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connection. A mother of one of the charged soldiers noted that of the men in the squad, three were dead and five others charged with rape and murder.18

Saddam Hussein at the Dock Saddam and his co-defendants were placed on trial for the killing of about 148 men and young men at Dujail, in the Kurdish region of Iraq in 1988. Hussein’s seven co-defendants were: Ali Dayim Ali, who rounded the victims up in Dujail; Saddam’s half brother Barazan Ibrahim al-Tikrit, who led Iraq’s secret police and was the commander in charge at Dujail; Abdullah Kazim Ruwayyid, who arrested 687 Shiites in Dujail; his son Mizhar Abdullah Ruwayyid, who was accused of carrying out the killings; Awad Hamed alBandsar, who headed the court issuing the death sentences; Taha Yassin Ramadan, who was vice president of Iraq; and Mohammed Azawi Ali, who arrested the other men in Dujail. In their first court appearance in early August 2004, Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants faced four judges and the presiding Judge Raid Juhi al-Saadi. In his opening remarks, Saddam declared: “It’s a game, as you’ll see. I am a prisoner of the Iraqi government, but that government was appointed by the Americans.” He then badgered Judge Raid: “When do I see my lawyer? Is it right that I only see my lawyer when there is a hearing, and that I know there will be a hearing only when I am already in it? Is this the law?” Raid replied: “We have been listening to you for 25 years. We are an independent court. We have not yielded to pressure from any one. The people elected the government.”19 Again on October 19th, Saddam challenged the court: “My identity is as the president of Iraq. And I ask, who are you, and what are you? Who are these judges?” One judge replied that you are the “former president of Iraq, born in 1937.” On October 22, Sadoun al-Janabi, the defense lawyer representing Awad Ahmad al-Bandsar, was killed. Although no arrests were made for his killing, the prime suspects were members of al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Critics of the court proposed that an International Tribunal should try Saddam rather than the Iraqi judges, but neither the judges nor the Bush administration endorsed the idea.

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Baath party members revealed on November 12, 2005, that Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, a wanted member of Hussein’s inner circle, had died of leukemia.20 When the court convened on November 28, the presiding judge permitted a U.S. lawyer Ramsey Clark to join the defense team. In his remarks to the court, Clark emphasized that an Iraqi court was not legitimate under international law, but the Iraqi judges simply ignored Clark’s assertion. The first prosecution witness was a “Mr. Sheik” whose testimony verified that Hussein had ordered the death sentences of the Dujail prisoners. But he also testified: “I did not hear anything direct from Saddam Hussein,” and that neither Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikrit nor Taha Yassin Ramadan played any role in the arrest or interrogation of men at Dujail. Clark called the killing of defense attorney Janabi evidence that Saddam and his co-defendant’s attorneys did not have sufficient protection and declared that Janabi was “a hero to truth and justice.” U.S. and Iraqi officials claimed they were as well protected as any other Iraqi involved in the trial. The first prosecution witness, Ahmad Hassan Muhammad, who was 15 years old in 1988 told

Dept. of Defense Photo Former President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, makes a point during his initial interview by a special tribunal, where he is informed of his alleged crimes and his legal rights. 1 July 2004



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about seeing 350 people being arrested. From his prison window, Muhammad said he saw a meat grinder with human hair and blood and his brother being tortured by electric shocks; however, his testimony could not directly link Saddam with these events. Defense attorney Barzan Ibrahim challenged Muhammad’s details in cross examination as inaccurate and called him a “nobody” who “should act in the cinema.” The second prosecution witness was Jawad Abdul-Azziz Jawad, who was 10 years old in 1988. He told of Iraqi helicopters attacking Dujail, bulldozers destroying a farmer’s field and Iraq security forces killing three of his older brothers. The next day, three men and two women, while hidden behind a beige curtain and using disguised voices to protect their identities, testified. One woman, called “Witness A” who was 16 years old in 1988, told of electric shocks used by an agent of President Hussein. “I was forced to take off all my clothes, and he raised my legs up and tied my hands,” she said. “He continued to administer electric shock and whipping me and telling me to speak.” She said the man who did this was Wadah al-Sheik who had died of cancer in November 2004 while in American custody. When the court convened on December 21, Saddam listened for eight hours as six men testified how their family members were killed and tortured in a variety of ways. The next day, after hearing witnesses tell about boys and girls as young as six years old being put in prison, Hussein claimed anyone who was six or eight years old at that time could not testify because the Koran stated that it violated the innocence of youth. He denounced the court officials and witnesses as “blasphemers” and cursed President Bush.21 Shortly there after the presiding judge resigned because he was fed up with critics who wanted him to be tougher on Hussein. Prime Minister Jaafari chose a Kurd, Raouf Rasheed Abdel Rahman, as the new chief judge. When the trial resumed on January 29, 2005, Judge Rahman appointed four new defense lawyers to represent the co-defendants. Next, Rahman declared, “We will not abide any political speeches by anyone. This is a court to impose justice and right only.” After Hussein accused Rahman of being a “pawn” of the U.S. government, the judge responded by saying to “Hell with Americans. This is an Iraqi court formed by an Iraqi law.” 22

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On February 28, the prosecution displayed documents that U.S. officials had found after the war. The documents were death warrants signed by Saddam Hussein to execute 148 Shiite men and boys 96 men were hanged at Abu Ghraib prison, 42 died under torture, and 10 adolescent boys were executed in 1989 after they reached legal age. International experts verified the handwriting as being that of Saddam Hussein. Later, Awad al-Bandsar, a defendant and judge in Hussein’s Revolutionary Court, testified that the 148 Shiites had received a fair trial during which they confessed that they had attempted to assassinate Hussein at the urging of Iran’s rulers. Prosecutor Jafar Musawi offered the court documents indicating 46 of the victims were “liquidated during interrogation” before Saddam’s Revolutionary Tribunal sentenced them to death. When al-Bandsar was asked why the documents did not mention defense lawyers for the 148 Shiites, he replied: “The typist must have made a mistake.” Muhammad Azawi Ali claimed he was at Baath Party headquarters in Dujail on the days in question. Ali said he was illiterate and did not understand the investigators’ questions. Saddam Hussein also took the witness stand on March 15 and began by asking all Iraqis to unite in fighting the Americans. During 90 minutes of testimony, Saddam refused to talk about the Dujail executions. When the Dujail trial reconvened on April 5, 2006, Hussein said he had reviewed the Revolutionary Tribunals’ evidence about the Shiites attempt to kill him in 1988 and found sufficient evidence to punish them with death for the attempt on an Iraqi president’s life.23 The eight defendants, including Saddam, began a hunger strike to demand security for their defense lawyers after Khamis al-Obeidi became the third of the lawyers to be assassinated. After two weeks, Judge Rahman ordered defendants be taken to a hospital where they were fed nutrition via a tube. The last day of the trial for the Dujail killings took place on July 27, 2006. At that time, Judge Rahman said that he and four other judges would announce their verdict on October 16, 2006. Saddam Hussein’s second trial, this one for genocide against the Kurds, began on August 21, 2006. He was charged with the



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destruction of 2,000 villages and the deaths of more than 50,000 Kurdish men, women and children in 1988. Judge Raid Juhi al-Saadi said documents, plus the discovery of Kurdish bodies in mass graves, would substantiate that Hussein was guilty of genocide.24 For over two years, a team of forensic scientists from around the world was organized by the U.S. Department of Justice and called the Regime Crimes Liaison Office. These scientists had examined evidence about the massive killings of Kurdish people in 1988. The team had excavated nine massive graves out of more than 200 scattered around the country while searching for bones, clothes, identity papers, and spent bullet casings to make a criminal case against Saddam Hussein. The prosecutor cited documents with an order from one of Hussein’s top aides that told military commanders to rid the villages of every “human and even animal presence.” He claimed that Iraqi troops not only used helicopter and artillery strikes against the Kurds, but also raped women, killed men and women and buried them in mass graves in the southern desert near Samawa and the northern town of Hatra. One who described the carnage was Mosa Abdullah Mosa, 50 years old, who admitted to being a pesh merga fighter at the time of the chemical attacks in 1988. Defense lawyers asserted that Mosa had worked with Iranian’s during their war with Iraq. Mosa, who currently lived in Tennessee, said he was only a guard in the First Brigade headquarters. When asked why he did not use weapons against Iran, Mosa said: “Our goal was liberation, to have Kurdish identity, democracy and peace.” Consequently, the defense claimed Kurdish and Iranian armies had cooperated against Iraq in 1987 and 1988.25 Early in September, a prosecutor asked Prime Minister Nuri Kamal Maliki to remove Judge Amiri because he showed a bias toward Saddam Hussein. Subsequently, on September 19, al-Maliki fired Judge Amiri after being pressured by Kurds and “others” to oust Amiri for suggesting Saddam was not a dictator. The newly appointed judge was Amiri’s assistant Muhammad al-Uraibi, a Shiite Arab. In response to the decision, human rights advocates

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condemned Maliki’s political interference for undermining the tribunal’s credibility and for telling other judges to toe the line or risk being removed. Indeed when al-Uraibi took over on September 20, Saddam’s lawyers withdrew from the case. Before leaving the courtroom, defense lawyer Wadood Fawzai criticized the “flagrant interference of executive authorities to guide this trial.”26 While the prosecutor would continue to call witnesses, off and on, for several more weeks, Saddam’s Anfal genocide trial soon became moot. Sentenced and Hanged. On November 5, 2006, Iraqi Shiites and Kurds celebrated in the streets because the Iraqi Tribunal’s Chief Judge Raouf Rasheed Abdel-Rahman pronounced Saddam guilty of crimes against humanity for the torture and killing of 148 boys and men at Dujail in 1982. In addition, the Tribunal sentenced to death Saddam’s half-brother Barazan Ibrahim al-Tikrit and Awad Hamed al-Bandsar former judge of the Revolutionary Court. The former Iraqi vice-president Taha Yassin Ramadan was sentenced to life in prison. Three former Baath Party officials, Mizhar Abdullah Ruwayyid, Abdullah Kazim Ruwayyid and Ali Dayim Ali were sentenced to 15 years in prison while defendant Muammad alAzawi was acquitted due to insufficient evidence. The verdicts—of Saddam, his half brother Barzan and al-Bandar—would be reviewed by a nine-judge appellate court and should that court approve, their sentences must be carried out in 30 days. While President Bush called the Tribunal’s verdicts a “landmark event” in Iraq becoming a democracy, critics claimed Saddam’s verdict, which should have been announced in mid-October, was a “November surprise” in that it came just two days before the November 7th congressional elections. But the “November surprise” did not influence the results of the election as Democratic party won control of the House of Representatives and the Senate.27 Worldwide, Saddam’s death sentence was celebrated by some as justice deserved, but criticized by others. Both the Vatican’s spokesman Cardinal Renato Martino speaking for Pope Benedict XVI and the European Union, including Prime Minister Tony Blair, welcomed the verdict but condemned the death sentence as an “eye for an eye” throwback of vengeance. Elsewhere Islamic leaders warned the Bush administration that executing Saddam



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could undermine America’s Middle East policies and inspire terrorists to attack. A respected Muslim cleric in Thailand Vitaya Wisethrat said: “The hanging of Saddam Hussein will turn to hell for the Americans.” In contrast, Australia and other British leaders welcomed that verdict they had expected. British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett said: “Appalling crimes were committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. It is right that those accused of such crime against the Iraqi people should face Iraqi justice.”28 The hanging of Saddam would not be the first to take place in Iraq. Although L. Paul Bremer had suspended all capital punishment for criminals following the invasion in 2003, Iraq’s Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi reinstated the death penalty in 2004. Since that time, about 90 prisoners convicted of murder or kidnapping have been hung in a Baghdad prison built by American contractors after the war. Because the Iraqi government refuses to release the names of those who are hung, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights wondered if those convicted had a fair trial with the essential appeals process. Thus, the U.N. Commissioner asked the Iraqi government to commute all present death sentences, but Maliki’s government replied that suspending any death sentences would “undermine our policy on crime.”29 By December 29, the appeals court had approved Saddam execution. Thus, in the early morning of December 30, Saddam was taken from the American military prison at Camp Cropper near Baghdad’s airport and handed over to Iraqi officials. They took him to a former military intelligence building in northern Iraq where 14 Iraqi officials attended the hanging. Shiites attending the room began to chant “Moktada, Moktada, Moktada” in honor of the antiAmerican Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr. Munqith al-Faroun who had prosecuted Hussein called out: “The man is facing execution. Please don’t,” and the room fell quiet. At 6:10 a.m. Iraq’s state run television announced that Saddam had been hanged. If Saddam’s hanging angered many Kurds because his trial for Kurdish victims in the Anfal genocide had ended, President Bush said Hussein received “the kind of justice he denied the victims of his brutal regime.” Bush also said: “Fair trails were unimaginable under Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical rule.” Saddam, Bush said,

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“received a fair trial. This would not have been possible without the Iraqi people’s determination to create a society governed by the rule of law.” The day after Saddam’s hanging the country was relatively calm as many Iraqis watched a video on their TV screens showing Saddam being led to the gallows by masked executioners. On January 3, Iraqi Premier Maliki condemned the use of the cell phone camera and the Shiites taunting Saddam just before his death. The next day, Iraqi authorities arrested a security guard who had used the cell phone camera and another guard who taunted Saddam plus the Shiite official who had supervised the hanging Maliki’s adviser Sadiq alRikabi said the release of the video footage was “a mistake. It was not something proper or acceptable. This execution was not an open event, to have been seen by the people all over the world.” On January 15, 2007, Hussein’s half-brother Barzan Ibrahim and the chief judge of Hussein’s Revolutionary Court were hanged at the same place where Saddam met his demise.30 [The human toll of the occupation is reviewed in Chapter 12.]

Dept. of Defense Photo Iraqi soldiers training at Tadji, Iraq, June 2, 2004

10

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Occupation & Reconstruction Costs

T

he awe of seeing billions of dollars flow from the U.S. treasury to pay for the Iraqi occupation and reconstruction was later replaced by the shock of how little it had bought and how the cost kept increasing each year of occupation. The sight of Washington lobbyists lining up corporate clients to cash in on the world’s largest reconstruction project and the administration’s handing private contracts to five select companies was indeed awesome. The shock set in when it was realized that many contracted projects were mismanaged and left uncompleted, that audits could not track expenditures amounting to millions of dollars and that cases of fraud were starting to pile up. Miscalculations during prewar planning accounted for most of the mounting costs, especially the optimistic assumption that after a successful military campaign a functioning Iraqi government could quickly be established and American troops withdrawn. Consequently, the cost of conducting the protracted occupation consumed by far the largest portion of the expenditures and, as long as a large number of U.S. troops were required to continue battling the insurgency, the costs continued to mount. Postwar planning, such as it was, also grossly underestimated the fragile nature of Iraq’s basic infrastructure that had been under funded and mismanaged for years by Hussein’s regime. Most of Iraq’s essential facilities electric, water, sewage, etc. were inadequate for its citizens’ needs and in desperate need of repair before the Americans arrived. Even the oil fields and refining facilities, which

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had been Iraq’s major source of income, had been allowed to deteriorate and, after the invasion, required substantial upgrading to be able to continue or expand production. The situation confronting unprepared Americans entering postwar Baghdad was indeed daunting.

Initial Reconstruction Efforts The head of the Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (OHRA) for Iraq, Lt. General Jay Garner (ret.), received very little direction regarding reconstruction of Iraq from the Pentagon. Garner envisioned his task as that of attaching advisers to Iraqi ministries and managing the country until a government could be put in place. He expected that cheering Iraqis would hail their liberators and then go back to work under the direction of his advisers. In this regard, Garner’s view of his job was similar to what National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice had advanced, “we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything

Dept. of Defense Photo Marines talk with local Iraqi children during a routine security patrol of the neighborhood. The Marines, part of 2nd Marine Division, were conducting security and stabilization operations in the Al Anbar Province on 20 Apr 2005



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from the ministries to police forces. You would be able to bring new leadership but we were going to keep the body in place.” At the same time, Garner did not anticipate that he, personally, would be taking on the job of dealing with the political and physical rebuilding of Iraq. Rather, he counted on finding an Iraqi partner in the new government to perform that task. In mid April, Lawrence Di Rita, a close aide to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, arrived to join Garner’s team. He told them that the Secretary wanted to avoid such open-ended commitments as President Bill Clinton had made in Bosnia and Kosovo and he wanted to withdraw most American troops in three to four months. Apparently Rumsfeld believed that with the Defense Department in charge of Iraq, everything would function more smoothly. As a member of Garner’s inner circle, Colonel Tom Gross, recalled: “The main theme was that the DOD would be in charge, and this would be totally different than in the past.” At another meeting with the OHRA team, Di Rita rejected Garner’s preliminary estimate that Iraq’s repair and rebuilding would require at least $3 billion in reconstruction costs. Rather, Di Rita declared, “We don’t owe these people a thing. We gave them their freedom.” As early as September 2002, White House economic advisor Lawrence B. Lindsey, was chastised for predicting that a war with Iraq would likely cost between $100 and $200 billion dollars. Administration officials, such as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, insisted the costs would be much smaller. He insisted that the government official, who estimated that the invasion and occupation could cost the U.S. $95 billion, did not know what he was taking about. On February 27, 2003, Wolfowitz told the Congressional Budget Committee. “I am reasonably certain that they [the Iraqis] will greet us as liberators,” he said, “and that will help us keep requirements down.” Wolfowitz did not claim to know what would be required, but he insisted “with reasonable confidence” that there would not be need of “hundreds of thousands of American troops” remaining in Iraq.

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In a similar optimistic vein, Wolfowitz assured the committee that Iraq’s oil exports could be expected to pay for most of the postwar reconstruction. “It’s got already, I believe, on the order of $15 billion to $20 billion a year in oil exports,” he stated, “which might finally be turned to good use instead of building Saddam’s palaces. There is a lot of money there.” A month later before another congressional committee, Wolfowitz repeated that Iraq “can really finance its own reconstruction.” Garner’s Team Arrives in Baghdad. Garner’s team flew to Baghdad on April 18, 2003 where they stayed at the Abu Ghraib North Palace before moving to the Republican Palace that would later be known as the “Green Zone”. When he toured Baghdad, Garner found to his dismay that the ministries that he hoped would run the country had already been looted and the personnel were scattered. This was only an introduction to the problems he faced. American bombs had disabled Baghdad’s communication and twelve telephone systems, the electrical grid had been shut down by Iraqis and could not be switched back on and looting had disabled two of the three sewage treatment plants. It was becoming evident that the task of reconstruction was going to be much more involved than he had anticipated. The breakdown of internal security not only complicated Garner’s initial efforts, but soon a growing insurgency would hamper subsequent reconstruction. Not only were there an insufficient number of U.S. troops to maintain order, he soon learned that most Iraqi police were inept and unreliable. As invasion forces appeared, the Iraqi police forces had abandoned their stations to looters who picked them clean of electrical wires, light fixtures and even door jambs. Early in May, Prime Minister Tony Blair sent Ambassador John Sawyers to Iraq to evaluate postwar conditions. Following four days of observing the situation in Iraq, he send a confidential cable to Blair, the British Foreign Office, the British Ministry of Defence and the British International Aid Agency titled “Iraq: What’s Going Wrong.” Sawyers distressing report claimed, “the problems are worst in the capital, and it’s the one place we can’t afford to get it wrong. But the troops here are tired, and are not providing



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the security framework needed. We need a clear policy on which Baathists can return, a more concerted effort on reconstruction and an imaginative approach to the media.” He thought, “Garner’s outfit, ORHA, is an unbelievable mess. No leadership, no strategy, no coordination, no structure, and inaccessible to ordinary Iraqis.” Moreover, Sawyers said, Baghdad’s untreated sewage poured into the Tigris River, garbage piled up and the U.S. contractor Bechtel moved far too slowly.1

Contractors & Lobbyists Although the Defense Department had the basic responsibility for internal security and reconstruction, contracts were issued for such a vast array of basic tasks that some critics have labeled it the “out-sourcing” of a war. These contracts paid for the training of Iraqi police and Iraqi forces to secure the oil fields, for bodyguards for senior U.S. officials and contractors doing fieldwork and for logistical support for U.S. troops in Iraq. Additionally, contracts were issued to rebuild or update electric, oil and gas facilities, water systems, transportation and communication networks, agriculture and education, and health care. Receiving these assignments have been private contractors, small and large. In a run-up to the war, the administration invited a handpicked group of American corporations to bid for billions of dollars in contracts for work in postwar Iraq. Among the companies submitting bids were Halliburton’s Kellogg, Brown & Root Division, the Bechtel Group, Parsons Corporation and Fluor Corporation, all of whom had contributed substantial funds to Republican candidates from1999 to 2002. Vice President Cheney, of course, previously had been president of Halliburton. Slighting of companies from the European Union, as External Affairs Minister Chris Patten called ignoring ABB Ltd and Siemens, was “exceptionally maladroit.” The administration’s unhappiness with “old Europe’s” refusal to join the Coalition of the Willing for the invasion was obvious in Washington’s selection of contractors. The lure of billions of dollars being made available for the reconstruction of Iraq greatly stimulated lobbyists in the capital. Washington insiders former congressmen, government officials and

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military officers quickly organized to seek out corporate clients and assist them in landing contracts. Occasionally lobbyist and corporate pressure assisted in determining the guidelines for large contracts such as, a $200 million contract being issued by the American governing authority in Baghdad for wireless phone towers. U.S. officials urged bidders to utilize Qualcomm’s wireless system, although all other Middle Eastern countries used a different cell phone system. Specifications for the bids also limited government ownership and required international experience, thus eliminating most of the Middle East’s current wireless companies. Congressman Darrel Issa (R-CA) who lobbied for the California based company justified the use of Qualcomm’s system since any technology paid for by American taxpayers should “also benefit the American people and the American economy.” Thomas Foley, director of the Private Sector In Iraq, undertook to persuade private capital to invest in Iraqi businesses. Soon after arriving in Baghdad, he persuaded Paul Bremer to issue Order 39

Dept. of Defense Photo Iraqi subcontractors, involved in a reconstruction project at the Zahko Military Academy, located just outside of Zahko, Iraq, enjoying their lunch break. Reconstruction project is funded and under the supervision of the US Army Corps of Engineers, 21 Aug 2005



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on September 19, 2003. Except for Iraq’s oil industry, Order 39 allowed foreign investors to “fully own Iraqi companies with no requirements for reinvesting profits back into the country.” The next month, Bremer accompanied Foley to a meeting with 15 Iraqi businessmen at the Al-Hambra Hotel. Bremer stated that his top priority was to find ways to get credit and capital into the hands of “responsible businessmen.” In line with Bremer’s message, Foley said that after reviewing documents on Iraq’s state-owned enterprises, he believed many Iraqi businessmen could survive in a private market. To attract investors in October 2003, Foley proposed to complete the privatization of Iraq’s state-owned business within the next seven months. His plan would sell off companies such as cement factories, fertilizer operations, the airline and automobile tire makers. However, Foley’s plans did not work well. The first disaster came after American experts stopped Iraq’s Company for Vegetable Oils’ state subsidies and allowed the company to fire redundant Iraqi workers, purchase raw materials and sell its finished products. The company’s director Faez Ghani Aziz was initially ecstatic as he fired dozens of workers before he was shot and killed on his way to work. The assassination prompted Iraq’s Ministry of Industry to put all privatization plans on hold. By December 2003, Foley was telling reporters that privatization was a long way off and that “my guess is that most of these businesses will end up being owned by Iraqis.” Foley gave up in February 2004 after Iraq’s Governing Council rejected his privatization plans. He returned to his home in Connecticut the following month.2 By 2006, questions were being raised regarding the performance of private contractors and complaints of incompetence, corruption and over billing were leveled.

U.S. & Reconstruction The Bush administration’s vague plans for restoring Iraq’s economy, and meeting its citizens’ basic needs, were undermined by several factors some unforeseen and others of their own making.

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Foremost among unforeseen factors was the run-down condition of Iraq’s prewar infrastructure and the subsequent insurgency that increasingly targeted electrical facilities, pipelines and refineries that caused the shifting of fiscal resources to bolster the security at reconstruction projects. Other unanticipated factors included the failure to promptly establish an Iraqi government that could direct reconstruction and the inability to produce sufficient oil to provide needed income for reconstruction. Occupation officials in Washington and Baghdad often let their optimism over-shadow reality. A case in point was Bremer’s boast on March 24, 2004 to Baghdad’s City Council: “When liberation came, water, electricity, sewage, schools and much more were in a shambles.” But, he said: “What a difference a year can make in the life of the Iraqi people.” Bremer then listed 12 examples to demonstrate the occupation’s success. Among these were: “Iraq has more electrical power than before liberation”; over 3 million Iraqi children have been vaccinated against polio and other diseases; and “Iraq’s new currency has gained 29 percent since it was introduced just a few months ago.” The reality in Baghdad, however, was an absence of police control, the lack of electricity at nightfall and streets overflowing with garbage. The administration’s failure to quickly recognize the unanticipated problems and take decisive actions to meet them resulted in the loss of initiative and provided a boost to the insurgency. In mid May 2004, the Pentagon’s project management office in Baghdad reported that 24,279 Iraqis were employed in reconstruction; that was less than one percent of Iraq’s seven million workforce. Moreover, the lack of planning and leadership to promptly put to use the billions of dollars Washington had made available for reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure, delayed the launching of needed projects. Private contractors who were employed to undertake specific reconstruction projects often added to the administration’s woes. While some rebuilding assignments were successfully carried out, many others remained incomplete when the funding period ran out. Failure to provide the basic essentials electricity, clean water and adequate sewage disposal greatly diminished the public’s morale. All in all, many congressional leaders, as well as disillusioned Iraqis,



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concluded that the reconstruction efforts could have been much more efficiently run. Funding for Reconstruction. From vague prewar planning to early postwar days in Baghdad, American officials believed that the cost of reconstruction could be met with Iraqi funds. After L. Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority gathered Iraq’s oil revenues, funds remaining in the UN’s Oil-for-Food program, money located in bank accounts and cash discovered in Saddam’s palaces and in other hidden caches, the agency controlled more than $20.7 billion which was deposited in an account labeled Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). Bremer, the U.S. administrator of the Authority, announced that these funds would be used “for the benefit of the Iraqi people.” At about the same time, Congress appropriated an additional $18.4 billion in U.S. funds for Iraq’s reconstruction bringing the initial total available to slightly over $39 billion. American officials authorizing the rebuilding of needed roads, bridges and health facilities drew initially on the DFI because these monies carried fewer restrictions than the congressional fund. In June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority turned the control of the DFI over to the newly established Iraqi government. By that time, about $14 billion of the fund had been used to pay for reconstruction projects and the Authority’s administrative costs. One bit of good news arrived in 2005 when the Club of Paris which included France, Russia, the United States, Japan and other European Union members agreed to gradually forgive all previous Iraqi debts.3 Saudi Arabia, which held a large share of Iraq’s previous debts, did not join the forgiveness program. Oil Production. Compared to its prewar production of 2.5 million barrels a day, Iraq produced 2.3 million barrels in February 2004, but only 1.8 million barrels in February 2006. The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that Iraq’s oil sales brought in $58 billion in 1980 (in constant U.S. dollars), but its oil sales in 2004 amounted to only about $15 billion. This was not at all what Washington officials had expected prior to the March 2003 invasion when the Bush administration expected the sale of Iraqi oil to pay most of the reconstruction costs.

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Despite the allocation of $2 billion from U.S. reconstruction funds to help pay for the postwar recovery of Iraq’s oil industry, prewar expectations were never met. Among the several reasons for this failure was the fragile condition of the oil fields, a weak infrastructure, inept management and frequent destruction of segments of the pipelines by insurgents in the north-central region that slowed the export of oil through Turkey. The number one problem was the lack of adequate security to protect the oil pipelines. From the March 2003 invasion until the end of January 2006 there had been more than 300 attacks that cost Iraq billions of dollars in lost revenue. Moreover, these attacks resulted in the diversion of funds and manpower from other reconstruction projects. Early American projections had failed to take into consideration the industry’s weak underlying infrastructure. During the IraqIran war in the 1980s many of Iraq’s crude oil storage facilities were destroyed and never replaced. This required the pumping of oil back into the ground, when pipelines were destroyed or tankers were late, which damaged the natural underground reservoir. Later, during the interwar period when economic sanctions were imposed, Iraq’s refineries were allowed to decay. Postwar inept management by Iraqi and American officials frequently made the situation worse. Their efforts to increase oil revenues resulted in “stressing” the reservoirs by employing such damaging practices as injecting unused crude and refinery waste back into the fields. “I don’t think the Americans deliberately mismanaged it,” a former International Energy Agency economist observed, “but they were in a difficult position of wanting to get the oil economy going after the war, to get all the revenues coming in that they could. So in practice they continued to operate under conditions no different than Saddam did under sanctions.” There were other problems. After the expenditure of more than $255 million of U.S. funds on the Qarmat Ail water pumping system, repair efforts were behind schedule. Pumping water into wells to fill the void left by the extraction of gas and oil was vital to sustain an oil reservoir’s life. While the complex near Basra was operating at 75 percent of capacity in early 2006, its pipelines



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that carried water to the wellheads were failing and, consequently, placing some of Iraq’s largest oil fields in serious jeopardy. The U.S. had hoped to have Iraqi wells pumping 3 million barrels a day that would provide sufficient funds to modernize the oil fields, pipelines and refineries. Analysts warned, however, that a substantial increase in funding the World Bank estimated $8 billion would be required to reach 3 million barrels a day which Iraqi fields last exceeded in 1979. To increase the output to 5 million barrels could require upwards of $35 billion. Many private oil companies who might have invested in Iraqi oil extraction were concerned not only about security problems, but also about political and legal issues. While new laws relating to private investors were confusing and vague, there were added political risks because Iraq’s new constitution appeared to give more power to provincial governments than to the national oil company. This concern became a reality in late 2005, when Kurdish leaders in Kirkuk signed a contract with the Norwegian company DNOASA that set up a Chinese rig to drill for oil near the tiny village of Tawke. The Kurds also signed drilling deals with two Turkish companies. All of these transactions took place without central government participation. In March 2005, Iraq was importing one-half of its gasoline and heating oil, cooking gas and refined petroleum products, a situation that resulted, in part, from the Iraqi government’s policy, dating from the days of Hussein, of subsidizing these products. Gasoline, for example was selling at five cents a gallon, which helped to sustain millions of Iraqis who subsisted on less than $1 a day. The government of the outgoing Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari began raising the price of gasoline with the expectation that it would eventually reach that of the other Gulf States. The public’s pain at the pump prompted considerable protest and slowed the price increases. By June 2006, however, the Iraqi government continued to subsidize gasoline prices at about 65 cents per gallon. At the same time, Iraq also continued to import oil because of insurgents’ damage to oil pipelines and refineries. Additionally, the low price of petroleum in Iraq encouraged smugglers to reship imported oil to neighboring countries where they could sell it for a much higher price.4

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Electrical production. Prewar Iraq produced an estimated 4,000 average megawatts of electricity, compared to 4,100 megawatts in February 2004 but only 3,700 megawatts in February 2006. Several factors contributed to the problem: the poor conditions of Iraqi generating facilities; the unchecked Iraqi demand for electrical power; poor decisions by occupation officials; and the increased security requirements. A decade of sanctions and Hussein’s preference for new palaces resulted in the gradual degrading of Iraq’s aging, subsidized electrical system. Occupation officials’ failure to charge private consumers of electricity had encouraged the middle and upper class Iraqis to buy air conditioners, refrigerators, heaters and other energy using products resulting in an ever growing power demand that soared far beyond supply. Reconstruction decisions also contributed to the problem. “The money was not [used] effectively,” according to Iraq’s Minister of Electricity Muhsin Shalash. “The contracting was wrong. The whole planning was wrong.” Expanding Hussein’s previous program, the U.S. spent hundreds of millions of dollars to install dozens of natural gas driven generators since Iraq had an abundance of unused gas. Only later did occupation officials realize that pipelines to deliver the gas did not exist. The funds allocated to build the gas pipelines had been shifted to boost oil production to supply the Iraqi government with needed revenue. Thus only seven of the 26 natural gas turbines actually received natural gas, the remaining generators were reconfigured to use heavy fuel oil which gradually destroyed the generators and required replacement. When it became evident that the Iraqis were unable to complete the replacement of the generators, the Army returned to the task in January 2005. Under a U.S. funded plan, labeled Project Phoenix, a joint U.S.-British firm added 700 megawatts to the grid but, as noted above, it still did not meet Iraqi needs.5 Water and Sanitation. Few basic infrastructure projects were more important to the Iraqi people than those dealing with repairing, rebuilding and upgrading water and sanitation facilities. Arriving in Iraq, the Americans found facilities around the country in a deplorable state with leaking pipelines and run down treatment plants. The water network, consisting of brittle cement pipes, was



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built in Baghdad twenty-five years earlier with a life expectancy of twenty years. With every bomb blast or heavy tank rumbling down the street, the water system suffered additional damage. Because of the cracked pipes, Lt. Col. Otto A. Busher, III, the U.S.’s chief expert on water issues in the city, estimated that only 40 to 60 percent of the water leaving Baghdad’s purification plants reached city faucets. Not only that, he noted, the purified water was contaminated by sewage “on a daily basis.” The World Bank estimated that $5.8 billion would be required to upgrade Iraq’s water and sanitation facilities by 2007. Congress originally had set aside $4.6 billion for this task but, according to a September 2005 U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) report, the State Department had reduced the figure to $2.6 billion in order to shift the savings to meet security needs and other priorities. The original target that called for the delivery of potable water to 90 percent of the Iraqi people was, however, lowered later to 50 to 60 percent. Testifying before Congress in February 2006, Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, reported that a shortage of reconstruction funds had limited the completion to only 49 of the planned 136 large water projects. “Most of the projects planned in sewerage, irrigation and drainage, major irrigation and dams,” he reported, “have been canceled.” Upon learning of the report, U.S. officials in Iraq complained that they were not getting credit for their accomplishments. The director in Iraq for the Agency for International Development, Dawn Liberi, pointed to her agency’s restoration of treated water to 3.5 million Iraqis and sewer service to 3.2 million. She expected by the end of 2006 that this number would be doubled. The U.S., she explained, “never meant to do this whole job by itself” because about $40 billion more would be “needed for the entire job to be done.” Because Iraqis were demoralized with the delays in reconstruction, the United States Army engineers launched several reconstruction programs on the eve of the January 30, 2005 elections. The Army began a program on January 9th in Baghdad’s Sadr City to repair and rebuild sewage lines in order to get rid of the blue-green

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puddles of raw sewage on the city’s streets and sidewalks. Other Sadr City projects scheduled for the next year included repair and reconstruction of water treatment plants, reservoirs for clean tap water and reliable electrical grids. There were continuing problems, however. A GAO report in October 2005 expressed concern that the billions of dollars expended on repairing Iraq’s infrastructure could be wasted because of the “limitations in the Iraqis’ capacity to maintain and operate reconstructed facilities.” According to the report, “as of June 2005, approximately $52 million of the $200 million in completed large scale water and sanitation projects either were not operating or were operating at lower capacity due to looting of key equipment, and shortages of reliable power, trained Iraqi staff, and all required chemicals and supplies.” Basra, like Sadr City, also required reconstruction programs for water treatment plants and waste sewage drains. Unfortunately, these were postponed in September 2004 when construction money was diverted to Iraq’s security needs.6

Assessing Reconstruction There were, not surprisingly, successes and failures. By mid-2006, the United States had completed 82 percent of its planned projects at the cost of $15 billion. These successful projects, according to a report by Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, included increasing oil and electricity production, providing five million more people with treated water and constructing some 1,200 public buildings such as fire and police stations. Status Report* % complete

Electricity Oil & Gas Water Security/Justice Transportation/ Communications

% ongoing

% not started

48 38 55 86

22 58 38 10

30 4 7 4

54

35

11



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Agriculture/Education/ Private sector development Health care

90 82

9 17

1 1

* Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

American officials had to decide by September 30, 2006 which of the more than 500 “not started” projects to finance with the $2 billion of remaining funds. After September 30th they would begin to gradually turn the rehabilitation process over to the Iraqi government. Misgivings arose about the future because the Americans apparently had no coherent plan for the transfer. Although there had been some successes with Iraqi contractors that had taken over from American companies, who were fired from projects for poor performances, it was uncertain who in the new government, plagued as it was by corruption, would handle these new responsibilities. Among the successes, there were some significant failures. So far only 20 of the targeted 140 primary health-care centers had been constructed. In Baghdad, Iraqis had only about eight hours of electricity per day less than prewar availability although in other parts of the country power supplies were increasing. The critical pipeline that could have increased oil sales by some $15 billion for the new Iraqi government remained some two years behind schedule. It was evident to reconstruction officials that accomplishments were going to fall below what had been targeted. The short fall was due in part to the ever-mounting security costs, but Bowen’s office acknowledged that mismanagement and poor planning also had contributed. Confusion in understaffed offices, seeking to meet short deadlines, marked the initial phase of reconstruction when contracts for billions of dollars were signed with little or no competition at all. Rules and regulations were designed in ad hoc fashion, with little adequate monitoring to ensure accountability. The largest U.S. contractors in Iraq, those who received in excess of $1 billion for their work, were criticized for not finishing major projects. The list of companies included Halliburton, its subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root, Bechtel and Parsons. For example, the

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United States provided $200 million for reconstruction projects in the Shiite holy city of Najaf. In April, Najaf’s maternity hospital received $8 million to refurbish the hospital, but in September the hospital director Dr. Liqaa al-Yassin claimed that each day she signed in 80 workers and “sometimes I see them, sometimes I don’t.” Dr. Yassin identified the hospital contractor as the Parsons Corporation of California. On April 3, 2006, the Washington Post reported that Parsons had repaired the hospital’s water purification system and one of the four hospital elevators, but little else. Moreover, Parsons’ repair of the one elevator was so shoddy that U.S. Army officials would not certify it for use. A Parsons’ spokesman said the work would soon be completed and blamed the insurgents for any delay; yet, Najaf had had no insurgent activity for over a year. While the Parsons Corporation was cited for hospital delays, several Iraqi government employees were investigated for criminal activity. The Commission on Public Integrity was investigating 399 cases for wrong doing and had issued arrest warrants for 44 Iraqi government employees on criminal charges. Additional questions regarding the expenditure of American funds designated to rebuild Iraq’s postwar facilities were raised between November 5, 2005 and April 2006. In one case, the United Nations International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq recommended that the U.S. repay the Iraqi government about $208 million for contract work done by Halliburton’s subsidiary Kellogg, Brown and Root. The auditing board said that Kellogg, Brown and Root received funds from Iraqi oil income for work that was either over priced or poorly done. Later reports indicated there appeared to have been widespread conspiracies among Iraqi contractors who used bribes, kickbacks and their spouses’ names to obtain construction contracts. In Washington, lawmakers were decidedly unhappy with the fact that the reconstruction project had failed to meet their expectations. “This story is a very disappointing one. Everywhere you look, goals have not been achieved,” stated a disappointed Senator Susan Collins (R-ME), chair of the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, who conducted the hearings. “I don’t think



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we can ever get back the billions of dollars that have been lost to poor planning, outright fraud and corruption.” “We paid for air conditioning and ended up with a ceiling fan,” Senator Byron L. Dorgan (D-ND) said, and he blamed the contractors for not delivering promised work. “You had a big pot of money and you had a lot of hogs in the creek wallowing and shoving and grunting, trying to get some of it,” he complained. “It looks like they were a lot more effective at getting the money than they were at doing reconstruction.” Efforts to Recover Illegal Payments. Investigations by the special inspector general’s office had led to criminal charges filed against five individuals by mid 2006, and investigations were underway in 60 additional cases involving alleged fraud and corruption in Iraq. These cases dealt with funds from both U.S. and Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) accounts. Apparently an additional seven cases had been filed against contractors in U.S. civil courts under the federal False Claims Act. A series of audits conducted in 2004 and 2005 by the special inspector general revealed that the Coalition Provisional Authority had failed to establish essential controls and accounting procedures to track the expenditure of Iraqi funds. According to an April 2005 report, the inspector general’s review of files dealing with 198 individual contracts determined that 154 of the files held no evidence of promised goods or services ever being received. In some instances, the contractors were paid twice for the same tasks, while in others instances they received payment for work not done. Legal efforts to recover funds illegally claimed faced different obstacles. For instance, an Iraqi law established by the Coalition Provisional Authority in the early days of the occupation, prior to returning sovereignty to Iraq in June 2004, provided American contractors with immunity from prosecution in that country. This in effect, turns Iraq “into a ‘free-fraud zone’,” according to Virginia attorney Alan Grayson. The federal False Claims Act may eventually assist the U.S. treasury to reclaim funds, but it will be of no use to the Iraqi government. In March 2006, a federal judge in Virginia said the law only protects the U.S. government from

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fraud and that the U.S. had no direct economic loss from fraud that involved DFI funds. In one fraud case, whistle blowers claimed Custer Battles received $3 million of U.S. funds and $12 million from the DFI account for a delivery of unusable trucks and old, repainted Iraqi cranes that it claimed were new imports. The jury determined the company should pay triple damages and, while the company continued to deny the charges, the judge held that Custer Battles was required to repay the U.S. government but ruled that it need not return any of the $12 million to the DFI fund.7 Individual Cases. Philip H. Bloom who controlled three companies contracted for $3.5 billion work in Iraq was charged with conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering and the interstate transportation of stolen goods. The complaint against Bloom was filed on November 16, 2005 in the Federal District Court of Columbia and cited two unnamed co-conspirators who worked for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2004. These officials and their spouses were alleged to have received illegal payments. Apparently, one of the co-conspirators, Robert J. Stein cooperated with the prosecution. Mr. Stein had been the financial officer for the CPA and controlled $82 million in cash for Iraq rebuilding. He and his wife received at least $200,000 a month in bribes, kickbacks and gratuities to steer contracts to Bloom’s companies. The list of charges against Stein includes a $140,000 bribe from Bloom to buy real estate in North Carolina, $65,762.63 to buy cars for Stein and his wife, $44,471 for Stein’s home improvements, $48,073 for jewelry, and $258,000 to Stein’s account at the Bragg Mutual Federal Credit Union. When reporters looked into Stein’s background, they discovered he had been convicted on federal fraud charges in the mid-1990s and was being sued in a suspected embezzlement scheme by a former employer. Stein had used some of the money he had received to pay part of a fine in the fraud conviction and to pay towing charges to get back his cars that had been impounded. In another case, it was announced on December 16 that a reservist in a civil affairs unit, Lt. Colonel Debra Harrison, had been arrested and charged with receiving bribes. She had been given a Cadillac



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Escalade, many illegal weapons, a hot tub and a deck for her home in Trenton, New Jersey and up to $100,000 for providing reconstruction contracts to an American company. Harrison allegedly had received funds that were diverted from a library in Karbala and a police academy south of Baghdad.8

The Iraqi Oil-For-Food Scandal While reconstruction activities were underway in Iraq, it became public knowledge that certain American and European oil companies had been assisting Saddam Hussein in violating the UN’s Oil-forFood program. After a 2004 U.S. General Accounting Office audit that raised serious questions about Iraq’s UN sponsored Oil-forFood program, Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Paul A. Volcker to lead a full-scale investigation. The GAO report claimed Saddam Hussein’s regime had obtained $4.4 billion in cash from illegal surcharges on food delivered by Iraq’s customers and another $5.1 billion from the illegal sale of oil outside the UN program. As chairman of the Independent Inquiry Committee, Volcker, together with committee members Richard Goldstone of South Africa, Mark Pieth of Switzerland and a staff of 60 investigators began work on April 17, 2004. Their activities received little public attention until they issued a final report on October 27, 2005. The Inquiry Committee’s 623 page report documented the manipulation of the oil-for-food program by Hussein, including $1.8 billion diverted from “the humanitarian purposes” of the program. Volcker claimed that “by the year 2002, the use of kickbacks and surcharges by the Iraqi regime” brought the “emergence of front companies and international trading concerns prepared to engage in these illicit payments.” At this point he said, “the gatekeepers of the Programme, the Secretariat, the Security Council and UN contractors failed most grievously in their responsibility to monitor the integrity of the Programme.” Although conceived as a temporary program to provide food and medicines to the Iraqi people, the program lasted for seven years with transactions involving $64 billion in oil sales and $39 billion for food. During the sales and purchases, companies from about 66 UN member states received illicit kickbacks while illicit surcharges

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on oil purchases came from some 40 UN members. The oil-for-food program was just three years old when Hussein began “to demand illicit payments from its customers. The oil overseers passed their concerns over to the Secretariat and Security Council, but little action was taken.” The Banque Nationale de Paris, S.A., selected to hold and service the escrow for the program’s proceeds and payments to suppliers, “did not recognize” their responsibility to inform the United Nations. This failure resulted in the $1.8 billion of illicit payments in violation of the UN sanctions. These serious failures allowed Saddam Hussein’s regime to derive more revenues “from smuggling oil ‘outside’ the Programme than from its demands for surcharges and kickbacks” from the companies contracted by the program. The value of smuggled oil was estimated to have been nearly $11 billion as opposed to the illicit revenue of $1.8 billion from Hussein’s manipulation of the program. An American, Oscar Wyatt, was the first person who agreed to illegally “purchase oil and arrange for a vessel to lift the oil through his company, Coastal Petroleum Company, based in the United States.” Other oil companies following Wyatt’s initiative included Turkey’s A.S. Tupras; Russia’s Alfa Eco, Lukoil Petroleum Ltd, Machinoimport, and Zarubezhneft; Spain’s Repsol Petroleo S.A.; France’s SOCAP International and Total International Limited; and the U.K./Netherland’s Shell Oil Company. At the same time, Iraqi leaders denied American, British and Japanese companies direct oil allocations because their countries had opposed lifting sanctions. But Iraq gave “preferential treatment to France, Russia and China because these countries” advocated the lifting of sanctions. The Iraqi government’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) and the Ministry of Oil began the surcharge scheme in the fall of 2000. By December 2000, SOMO allowed oil sales to front companies “backed financially and technically by several international trading companies willing to facilitate surcharge payments.” SOMO would then collect these surcharges through Lebanon’s Fransabank or Jordan’s National Bank (Ahli Bank). “Iraq’s largest source of illicit income,” the report continued, came from kickbacks paid to obtain contracts for humanitarian aid that were disguised by “subterfuges and were not reported to the United



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Nations by Iraq or the participating contractors.” These kickbacks gave Iraq over $1.5 billion. This activity began in mid 1999 when Iraq demanded payment for transporting food and medicine from its seaport at Umm Qasar to inland destinations. Of course this type of payment was not authorized, but it “was an easy matter for Iraq to impose” transportation fees that exceeded the actual costs. By mid 2000, Iraq increased its kickback fees to 10 percent of all humanitarian contracts in addition to the transportation fees. The after sales service fees inflated prices and allowed “contractors to recover from the United Nations escrow accounts amounts they had paid secretly to Iraq in the form of kickbacks.” Volcker’s committee estimated that over 2,200 companies worldwide paid Iraq transportation and after-sales-service fees.9 After the Volcker report was issued, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey V. Lavrov claimed many documents were forged. At the same time, Mikhail Margelov, a member of Russia’s parliament (Duma), said the “fabrications” of evidence actually “cast a shadow” on how the investigation was conducted. Sweden and Germany also rushed to join Russia in their complaints about the report. Sweden’s Volvo construction division said that it made payments to Iraqi officials, but they did not consider them a bribe. In Germany, Siemens A.G. claimed it found no evidence of its French, Turkish and Middle Eastern subsidiaries having paid kickbacks. In contrast, Switzerland froze the assets of four people involved in the oil-forfood scandal, but none of them were Swiss citizens. In New York, both Secretary General Annan and the Security Council were blamed for not responding to complaints of corruption. The U.S. Ambassador to the UN, John R. Bolton, said the oil-forfood program shortcomings should bring change even though some nations involved were “in a state of denial.” Bolton added: “We need to reform the UN in a manner that will prevent another oil-for-food scandal.” Although some U.S. Republican congressmen called for Annan to resign, the Secretary-General’s spokesman, Stephave Dujarric of France, stated Annan intended to complete his term that ended in December 2006. On September 7, Annan told the Security Council members that he took full responsibility for management failures in the oil-for-food program. He said: “The

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report is critical of me personally, and I accept that criticism,” but it also is embarrassing to all of us in the organization.10 After the oil-for-food report was released, a New York Federal Court Grand Jury indicted Oscar S. Wyatt, Jr. the Texas oil trader mentioned in the report as having paid secret surcharges for Iraqi oil through Swiss intermediaries and overseas front companies. Also in New York, an American company, Midway Trading, based in Reston, Virginia, pleaded guilty to grand larceny for having paid more than $440,000 in kickbacks to Iraq under the oil-for-food program. Midway lost about $625,000 on these oil sales but had to pay a $250,000 fine. In contrast to criticisms of the oil-for-food program, Ian Williams indicated that when compared to the 2005 catastrophe caused by hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, the Volcker report showed the oilfor-food program fulfilled its mandate to feed the “bulk of the Iraqi population.” Moreover, the UN sanctions prevented Hussein from acquiring any weapons of mass destruction. Ironically, the program was deemed sufficiently successful that the U.S. asked the UN to maintain it for the first six months of the occupation of Iraq. The oil-for-food investigation continued into 2006 when a South Korean lobbyist Tongsun Park was arrested in Mexico who expelled him on January 6, 2006. Park had been called to testify to a grand jury in New York on January 26, 2006. It would appear that the last word about the oil-for-food scandal has not been heard.11

Hidden Costs of the War The Bush administration grossly underestimated the monetary costs of the Iraq invasion. By 2006, Congress had approved five emergency spending measures amounting to $282 billion since September 11, 2001 for Iraq and Afghanistan, with Iraq gaining the majority of those funds. In 2006 the monthly bill for Iraq and Afghanistan was almost $10 billion, up from the previous year’s $8.2 billion. By comparison, the yearly costs of maintaining the military in Iraq easily exceeds the $61 billion a year America spent in Vietnam. Along with other funds expended on the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, it is estimated that more than $400 billion



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would be spent or allocated by the end of 2006 and that the U.S.’s eventual bill could exceed a half a trillion dollars.12 A major portion of the increased costs was the hidden or delayed expense the Pentagon never anticipated. These cost were required to repair, rebuild and replace military equipment. “We did not predict early on that we would have the number of electronic jammers that we’ve got,” Army Chief of Staff Peter J. Schoomaker told the Senate Armed Services Committee in the spring of 2006. “We did not predict we’d have as many [heavily] armored vehicles that we have, nor did we have a good prediction about what our battle losses [of equipment] would be.” During the first years of the Iraqi occupation, Army and Marine units being rotated back to states left their equipment for their replacements. By 2006 all of their equipment, even the items in working condition, were being sent back to one of the Army’s five depots for upgrading. This included 600 helicopter engines upgraded in 2005, 700 to be recycled and refurbished in 2006; 318 Bradley Fighting Vehicles refurbished in 2005, with 600 units repaired in 2006. In 2005 some 5,000 Humvees were returned for replacement engines and transmissions to carry heavier armor, in 2006 it was nearly 9,000. The list goes on tank tracks, M1A1 Abrams tanks, machine guns, etc. The Army depots worked 11 million labor hours in 2001; by 2006 the hours had more than doubled to 24 million. Additionally, routine maintenance and repair of lightly damaged equipment was being done in and around Iraq, employing some 52,000 contractors. These equipment costs will rise as the U.S. units permanently withdraw from Iraq and are fully re-equipped and upgraded. The Army, General Schoomaker estimated, would require $36 billion over six years to complete the upgrading process if the withdrawal began in July 2006 and was completed by 2008. This timetable was too optimistic for Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) who suggested a longer stay in Iraq could triple Shoomaker’s figure. As part of “out-sourcing” the war, the Halliburton Corporation’s subsidiary Kellogg, Brown and Root was given the exclusive right to provide logistical support to U.S. troops. This work involved a wide

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range of activities including providing food for soldiers worldwide, providing them with shelter and keeping them in communication with the family back home. Since 2002, Halliburton received more than $14.5 billion for these services, but not without questions raised about its billing practices. A government audit wanted to discuss more than $1 billion of what it considered excessive charges. Other complainants charged the company with billing $45 for a case of soda, double billing of meals and permitting soldiers to bathe in contaminated water. Halliburton officials promptly denied these allegations. The Army that lauded the company’s service under often quite difficult times, later moved to place less reliance on a single contractor. The new Pentagon plan called for open bidding in the fall of 2006, to find three companies to take over Halliburton’s tasks and another company to audit the performance of the three.13

Dept. of Defense Photo The Transitional National Assembly (TNA) met in Green zone for its 4th session in Baghdad, Iraq and has chosen Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani as the country’s new president and his deputies will be former President Ghazi Yawer, a Sunni Arab, and Finance Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, who is Shia, 6 Apr 2005

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raq’s elections on January 30, 2005 resulted in a large voter turnout that elected a National Assembly dominated by Shiites and Kurds. Sunni Arabs won five seats because many Sunni’s boycotted the election. This result required the Shiites and Kurds to find a way of enlisting support of senior Sunni leaders so that all ethnic factions could have an important role in preparing a new constitution. The constitution was subjected to a referendum on October 15, 2005 after which the Iraqi voters elected a permanent Council of Representatives (parliament) on December 15. Then the new parliament selected a prime minister and other cabinet members.1

The National Assembly The new National Assembly faced three major tasks. First, the Assembly must choose a president, agree upon a prime minister and approve cabinet members. Second, the Assembly needed to create a commission to draft a constitution by August 15, and prepare for a referendum vote on the document by October 15. Third, it would have to conduct elections on December 15 in order to form a permanent government by December 31, 2005.2 When the National Assembly finally met on March 16, several of its leaders displayed their ethnic and sectarian loyalties. This was particularly true of Kurdish and Shiite members who held 215 of the 275 assembly seats. Sami Alwan, a technology graduate student, expressed his disappointment. “I thought all our problems would be solved after the election…. But I didn’t know the differences among them were so deep. The only loser in this dispute is the Iraqi people.”3

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Disputes between the Kurds and Shiites delayed the approval of senior officials until May 3 when the Assembly approved Shiite Ibrahim al-Jaafari as prime minister, Kurdish Rowsch Nouri Shaways as a deputy prime minister and Shiite Ahmad Chalabi as a second deputy prime minister. Later, the Sunni’s Ghazi Yawher became a third deputy prime minister. Other Shiite cabinet positions were Finance Minister Ali Allawi, Interior Minister Bayan Baqir Jabr, Housing and Construction Minister Jassim Mohammed Jaafar, Justice Minister Abdel Hussein Shandai and Minister of State for National Security Abdul Karim al-Inazi. Kurdish cabinet posts were Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Trade Minister Abdel Basit Karim, Planning and Development Minister Barham Salih and Communications Minister Jwan Fouad Massoum. Sunni Arab positions went to Defense Minister Saldoon al-Dulaimi, Minister of State for Women’s Affairs Azhar AbdelKarim, Minister of State for Provincial Affairs Saad al-Hardan and Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum as Minister of Oil. The only Christian cabinet member was Science and Technology Minister Bassim Youssef, one of six women given a cabinet post.4

Drafting a New Constitution A serious issue confronting delegates beginning preparation of an Iraqi constitution was the Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s desire to base it on strict Shiite Islamic interpretations that imposed severe restrictions on how women dressed and, indeed, the entire social life of Iraqis. Although Shiite assembly member, Adel Abdul Mahdi, believed secular Iraqis must not let Sistani or other Shiite clerics impose strict rules of conduct, many Iraqis feared the Shiites’ central role in drafting the new constitution would favor Sistani’s position. Some Iraqi Shiites wanted to impose a form of Islamic rule as had Shiites in Iran.5 On May 11, 2005, Primer Minister al-Jaafari began selecting the 55-member commission to prepare the constitution. The selection of Shiite and Kurdish members was quickly accomplished, but choosing Sunni Arabs became a problem because Shiites such as Deputy Prime Minister Chalabi refused to approve a former Baathist Party member. After a compromise between Sunni leaders



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and the Shiite-Kurdish assembly members, Sunnis received an additional 15 seats plus 10 advisors to expand the commission to 71 members. The June 16 agreement also stated approval of the constitution must be by a consensus of all 71 members rather than by a majority vote.6 Despite compromises, the commission could not offer a final draft until August 28, 2005. The proposed constitution created a decentralized state with the central government having control only of foreign affairs, defense policy, monetary policy and fiscal policy except for taxation. Moreover, the document failed to satisfy most Sunnis, women and secular Iraqis who complained that major parts of the draft gave Shiites and Kurds special rights. Sunni critics cited a section permitting Kurdistan to become a federated state in the north and the Shiites a federated state in south. In each case, the Kurds and Shiites would control Iraq’s oil resources and leave Sunnis in central Iraq without a share in those profitable enterprises. Additionally, women and secular Iraqis opposed Article 14 under which Islamic law (Shariah) placed limits on women’s equality in such matters as divorce and family inheritance of property. These sections of the draft on Federalism and the Role of Islam stated: Federalism: “Regions are formed of one province or more, and two provinces or more have the right to organize themselves into a region and maintain their own Regional Guards as a military force. One province or more can form a region through a request for a referendum, presented by either a third of the assemblies of the provinces involved, or a 10th of voters in the provinces involved.” Role of Islam: “Islam is the official religion of the state, and it is a main source for legislation. No law can be passed that contradicts the fixed principles of Islam’s rulings. Iraqis of all faiths, confessions and otherwise, are free to conduct family issues according to their beliefs.”

When the draft constitution was presented to the National Assembly on August 28, Sunni leaders urged their constituents to vote against the charter on October 15. Should two-thirds of the Sunni voters oppose the constitution in three Sunni provinces, it

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would become invalid and require the election of a new Assembly and a new constitution panel. Among Shiite leaders, only Moktada al-Sadr opposed the constitution because his control of Baghdad’s Sadr City would not benefit if Shiite leaders established a federated state in the south.7 The Bush administration sought to assist in gaining the constitution’s approval. To help protect voters, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sent two battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division to Iraq thereby increasing the number of U.S. troops from 138,000 to 160,000. National Security Advisor Steven Hadley indicated U.S. officials would print and distribute copies of the constitution throughout Iraq, encourage international support for its ratification and ask Sunni Arab countries to urge Iraqi Sunnis to approve the draft. Finally in early August, President Bush dispatched Zalmay Khalilzad, as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, where he played a vital role in arranging a compromise to obtain Sunni support for the constitution.8 After the constitution was approved for publication on September 13, 2005, copies were printed and distributed. Meanwhile, Khalilzad negotiated with Sunni leaders in an effort to obtain “yes” votes in the referendum. On October 12, the National Assembly approved his proposal to allow the parliament elected in December 2005 to amend the constitution. These amendments must be approved by a majority of the National Assembly within four months of its formation and, with the Assembly’s approval, there would be another referendum on the amendments. This tactic gained the support of some Sunni leaders but many Sunni groups continued to oppose the constitution despite the amending process.9

The Referendum Vote While the October 15 referendum voting was a peaceful experience, President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice prematurely hailed the vote as a success which dismayed both Iraqi and Western officials who monitored the voting from Jordan. The Independent Iraqi Electoral Commission counting the votes cautioned that provisional results would not be known before October 20. Meanwhile, the Commission sent special teams of investigators to



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check on the “unusual” high number of voters, especially in three provinces dominated by the Sunni community. Despite its earlier concerns, the Electoral Commission announced on October 25 that the constitution had been ratified. The Commission reported 63 percent of eligible voters went to the polling stations with over 78 percent of voters approving the constitution. As expected, Sunni voters rejected the constitution in Al Anbar and Salahaddin provinces, but in the key province of Nineveh, only about 55 percent opposed the constitution—short of the two-thirds required for disapproval. Apparently, the last minute authorization to amend the document convinced enough Sunnis in Niveveh to accept the constitution. In the Kurdish and Shiite provinces the charter was approved by an overwhelming 90 percent of the votes. On November 12, 2005, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Iraq to give legitimacy to the referendum and the future December 15 elections. His visit took place just after the Security Council extended the mandate of the U.S. led coalition forces to December 2006.10

The Cairo Reconciliation Conference The Arab League sponsored a reconciliation conference from November 19 to 21, 2005 that was attended by some 100 Iraqi Sunni, Shiite, Kurdish and Assyrian Christian leaders. Problems arose early when, for example, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim who led the largest Shiite political party refused to attend because members of Saddam Hussein’s administration had been invited. While the League hoped to promote Iraq’s national unity, the opening session was marred by arguments between Iraq’s three major ethnic groups. Iraq’s Kurdish President Jalal Talabani blamed extremist supporters of Hussein’s regime for the continued violence in Iraq that prevented national unity. In response, a Sunni official, Harith al-Dhari, complained “the American occupation still continues, and that is what Iraqis know.” Dhari said the violence would continue until Washington agreed to a schedule for leaving the country.

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Despite early disputes in Cairo, the four Iraqi factions joined in signing a closing memorandum that “demands a withdrawal of foreign troops on a specified timetable, dependent on an immediate national program for rebuilding Iraq’s security forces.” This was a partial victory for the Sunni politicians who had long advocated a schedule for the departure of foreign forces. The memo also included concessions to Shiite politicians by condemning Sunni terrorist acts against Shiites and the Sunni theologians who justified such attacks. “We now clearly see that Sunnis have entered politics, and this meeting won’t change that,” Shiite cleric Sheik Human Hamoudi observed. The solution, he said, was “that the Sunnis entered politics, then they enter government, then we deliver services to their areas, and then we build a strong government.” Although the United Nations, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the United States and European officials praised the reconciliation effort, most of those attending the conference feared, correctly, that it would have no immediate impact on the violence in Iraq.11

The Parliamentary Elections By October 28, Iraqi political parties had formed coalitions for the December 15, 2005 election of a Council of Representatives or parliament. The United Iraqi Alliance was a Shiite coalition led by Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari’s Dawa Party that also included groups led by Moktada al-Sadr and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. The Kurdish coalition united the Democratic Kurdistan Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The Iraqi List consisted of secular parties led by interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi who hoped to remain in office. Tribal leaders led by Ahmad Chalabi formed a coalition called the Iraqi National Congress. Other coalitions were the Independent Iraqi Competent Gathering headed by Ali Dabagh, the southern Hezbollah Iraqis led by Shiek Abdul Karim alMuhammadawi and the Gathering For the Future of Iraq formed by Oil Minister Muhammad Bahr al-Uloum. Perhaps most important, three Sunni groups formed a coalition called the Iraqi Concord (or Consensus) Front. Members of Iraq’s parliament were elected from a party list with an assigned number. For example, the Shiites’ United Iraqi Alliance was number 555. Seats in parliament were allocated by



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the percentage of votes each list received and according to each party’s ranked candidate list. On list number 555, Ibrahim Jaafarri was ranked first. In addition to 230 seats allotted to each province, there are 45 “compensatory and national seats” for parties that failed to get provincial seats or that won a proportion of votes nationwide.12 Campaigning Gets Underway. During the election campaign, candidates and parties employed tactics that varied from tearing down an opposition’s campaign banners, to shooting, throwing stones or other objects at their opponents. As early as October 27, Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army killed a Sunni Arab candidate that they claimed had killed a Mahdi member. Thousands of poor Iraqis supported al-Sadr and his anti-American policies; for example, a recent story in al-Sadr’s Hawaz publication had the headline: “Bush Family: Your Nights Will Be Finished.” Another article stated the al-Sadr program was to get rid of American-backed Iraqi politicians who “rip off the heads of the underprivileged and scatter the pieces of their children and elderly.” In contrast to al-Sadr, Ahmad Chalabi visited Washington in November 2005 to meet with members of the Bush administration—a tactic he hoped would endear him to Iraqi voters. When reporters asked about his meetings with Secretary of State Rice, Vice President Richard Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, his spokesman Adam Ereli replied that as a deputy prime minister of Iraq, Chalabi was an official government visitor and American interests were “well served” by his meetings. Chalabi’s return to Washington reminded some Americans about his erroneous claims regarding Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction. Speaking to a friendly audience at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), he responded to questions about Saddam’s weaponry by saying “It is not useful to comment on it” and “This is an urban myth.” His principal Shiite rival, Adel Abdul Mahdi also an Iraqi vice president, visited the same people except for the AEI. He was reported to have had a “good meeting” with Bush administration members. The campaigns of Ayad Allawi and Sunni Arab candidates dealt with more problems than the Shiite and Kurdish groups. When Allawi visited the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, mobs of Shiites threw

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stones, dirt and shoes at him while several shots were fired inside the mosque. Later, Allawi told Sharqiya, an Arabic language television station, that as he was praying 50 men with pistols surrounded him. One fired his pistol and missed him because he “didn’t control the pistol well because he was scared” and “because of the good luck” no one was injured. Allawi implied the gunmen in the mosque might have been from Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Some Sunni candidates met with more serious situations in their campaigns. In early November, gunmen seriously wounded candidate Fakhri al-Qaisi as he drove his car toward western Baghdad. On November 28, the prominent Sunni candidate, Sheik Ayad al-Izzi, was shot and killed by masked men using Kalashnikov rifles. Sunni leaders blamed al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army for the killing, but al-Sadr denied the charge. Tarik al-Hashimi, who headed the Sunni coalition, claimed he had received threats since October saying, “Your name is atop the assassination list.” Despite such violence, Sunni candidates campaigned in perilous parts of Iraq seeking votes for their Iraqi Concord Front. Some Shiite candidates also faced problems because there were few campaign rules to govern participants and the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq did not have enough money to investigate all the complaints they received. Shiite candidate, Hamid Kifai, spent all of his $50,000 campaign funds to put up 100,000 posters promoting his political party across Iraq only to discover that they all had been removed, even those placed on the front of his campaign headquarters. Other campaign posters used negative messages. Among the thousands of posters on Baghdad’s walls, there were some smearing Allawi by putting his face next to Saddam Hussein’s face with the words “Who does this man remind you of?” Also, money was spread unevenly among candidates and political parties. Unlike Hamid Kifi who spent his only funds on posters, Allawi had sufficient resources to publish his own newspaper and to pay for television and radio time. Critics of Allawi accused him of taking American money for his campaign and critics of Shiites claimed their funds came from Iran. Both sides denied these charges, but their sources of money remain unknown.13



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The December 15 Election On December 12, the first votes were cast by those working in hospitals, by Iraqi soldiers and by prisoners who had not yet been convicted of the crimes for which they were suspects. The next day, Iraqi expatriates began voting in London, Tehran, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, Detroit, Chicago, Washington and Nashville. In America, 28,486 ballots were cast out of an estimated 240,000 eligible voters—a figure that was 4,000 higher than cast in the previous election. All the exile ballots were sent to Baghdad to be counted. Four days before voting began in Iraq, the Iraqi Electoral Commission said experts auditing voter lists found mistakes in the registration of voters in Kirkuk Province, the region where Kurdish militants had been seeking to gain control. The commission said Kirkuk’s average voter registration showed a 45 percent increase in the region compared to an average 8.19 percent in all of Iraq. Due to such irregularities, the commission distributed a list of 81,000 individuals whose forms were rejected. Those people were not allowed to vote unless they offer extra documentation to prove their identity. The 81,000 are part of the estimated 690,000 registered voters in the Kurdish province. On December 13, Iraqi border police trained by Americans seized a tanker truck at the Iraqi town of Badra after it crossed the IraqIran border. Inside the truck, they found several thousand partially completed ballots and the driver told them that at least three other trucks filled with ballots had crossed from Iran at different places. U.S. & Iraqi Forces Protect Voters. To protect voters from insurgents before the December 15 referendum, American commanders deployed about 225,000 Iraqi police and soldiers, backed up by 150,000 U.S. soldiers, at polling stations around the country. For example, in and around the suburb of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, Iraqi soldiers supported by Americans provided security at polling places for the mainly Sunni Arab population. In addition, the Iraqi Electoral Commission granted responsibility for security to tribal leaders who provided about 20 security guards

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and poll workers for the ten polling stations in Ramadi and 25 stations in the suburbs. As in Ramadi, American and Iraqi troops joined with local Iraqi guards to provide security for Sunni Arab voters at 19 polling stations in Tikrit and 33 polling stations in areas surrounding that city. Although 48 Sunni groups were on the ballots, the most popular Sunni Concord’s candidate was Mishaan al-Jubouri, a tough candidate who claimed “a vote for me will rid Iraq of Americans” or “I will thwart plans of Shiite and Kurds.”14 December 15 saw little violence as about 11 million out of 15.5 million eligible Iraqi voters went to the polls—exceeding October’s referendum vote. When polls opened at 7 a.m., a mortar struck near the Green Zone in Baghdad and a roadside bomb exploded in Ramadi, but the only casualty reported was a hospital guard killed in Mosul. When voting began in Kirkuk Province, long lines of people waited to vote. Most were Kurds who celebrated by waving Kurdish flags and chanting Kurdish songs. Despite their celebration, between 7 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., the electoral officials at two schools in Altun Kopri had turned away 400 people whose names were not on the voter lists. Altun Kopri was one of five Kurdish areas where fraud was suspected.15 Claims of Fraud. Even before the votes were counted, Sunni political leaders complained about fraudulent stuffing of ballot boxes favoring the dominant Shiite and Kurdish parties. The Sunnis also complained about the so called “Independent Electoral Commission”, because it had decided that 90 Sunni candidates for election would not be able to serve in parliament if elected. The Commission’s last minute excuse was that these 90 candidates had ties to Hussein’s Baathist Party. Although the Electoral Commission sent its investigators to examine the Sunnis’ 50 complaints of fraud, they reported there was insufficient evidence to change the election results. Not surprisingly, the investigator’s report led to further complaints and protest demonstrations in Baghdad by thousands of Sunnis. The Shiites also rejected a deal offered by Sunni leader Noori al-Rawi to give Sunnis at least 10 Shiite seats in the new parliament.16



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On December 16, both General George W. Casey, the American commander in Iraq, and Ambassador Khalilzad urged Shiite and Kurdish leaders to join with Sunni Arabs to bring unity to Iraq’s government. This was the first, but not the last time American leaders in Baghdad and Washington expressed their preference for a government with Sunnis occupying key positions as the best way to avoid an Iraqi civil war. Whatever government posts Sunnis might be given, two days after the election, Shiite and Kurdish political leaders began arguing over which individuals would have leading roles in the future government—such as president, prime minister and minister of the interior. When early election results were reported on December 19, the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, led by Sabdul-Aziz al-Hakim, appeared to have won 130 seats in the parliament. The Alliance could ally with the Kurdish Party of Jamal Talabani, as they had after the January 2005 elections, and dominate the parliament. Based on early votes, Washington’s desire for Sunni Arabs to be part of a coalition government seemed unlikely. Indeed, Sunni Arab political leaders and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s Iraqi National List staged demonstrations and threatened to boycott parliament unless their complaints of irregular voting were satisfied. Among the 1,250 complaints made to Iraq’s Electoral Commission were accusations of fraud in Shiite balloting, intimidation of Sunni voters, a shortage of ballots at Sunni voting stations and multiple voting by Shiites. Of the 1,250 complaints, Iraq’s Electoral Commission only acknowledged 25 to be serious. The United Nations’ Electoral Assistance Division in Iraq led by Craig Jenness, a Canadian diplomat, said the number of complaints was less than one for every 7,000 voters. Thus, Jenness claimed on December 28 that the election had been fair. The Canadian was new at his position and had not led the UN team in the January 2005 election or October 15 constitutional referendum. On December 29, a group based in Jordan called the International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE) conducted a final review of the results of the parliamentary elections. The IMIE had two Arab League representatives, one Canadian Association of Former Parliamentarians member and one European member. Both

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Sunni Arabs and Allawi’s secular Shiites welcomed the IMIE’s announcement of their role in Iraq while Secretary General Annan welcomed the IMIE because “it is critical that those Iraqi groups who have complained about the conduct of the election are given a hearing.”17

Searching for a United Government On January 19, 2006 monitors from the IMIE reported that some “vote-rigging had been documented” but praised the election for being held under difficult conditions. After IMIE had reviewed about 2,000 complaints on election fraud, it said 99 percent of the ballots cast were valid. Despite the one percent of flawed ballots, it refused to endorse the call for new elections as some Sunni officials requested. On February 10, 2006, Iraq’s Independent Electoral Commission released the final election results. The election results for the 275 members of the National Assembly were as follows. The United Shiite Alliance religious coalition led by Abdul Aziz Hakim and Ibrahim Jaafari claimed 128 seats. The Kurdish Coalition List led by Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani obtained 53 seats. The Sunni Concord Front led by Adnan Dulaimi, Khalaf Elayan, and Tarik Hasimi received 44 seats. The Shiite/Sunni secular coalition led by Ayad Allawi won 25 seats. The Islamic Union of Kurdistan won five seats. The Sunni’s Hewar National Iraqi Front received 11 seats. The Sunni’s Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering earned one seat. The Progressive Party of Moktada al-Sadr won two seats. The Iraqi Turkmen Front received one seat. The Christians Mithal Rafidain List had one seat.

An Islamic religious group, Al Yazidi Movement for Progress and Reform, claimed one seat.



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Because the Constitution required a two-thirds majority vote in the National Assembly to approve a government, a Shiite-Kurdish coalition was one vote short of the 182 required votes. After the certification of election results, a timetable was set to establish a government. These deadlines called for the National Assembly to meet on February 25 and elect a Speaker of the House and two deputies. In another 15 days (March 12), a president and a prime minister must be chosen. Thirty days later, April 11, the prime minister needed to select cabinet members. Unfortunately, these goals could not be met. On February 12, the 130 members of the Shiites United Iraqi Alliance and Moktadr al-Sadr’s Progressive Party nominated two people for prime minister: the current prime minister, Ibrahim alJaafari, and former deputy president, Adel Abdul Mahdi. Jaafari was selected as prime minister by a vote of 64-63, with al-Sadr’s Progressive Party providing the one vote difference.18 The formation of a new Iraqi government was delayed for two months because Kurdish and Sunni leaders refused to accept alJaafari as prime minister. Finally on April 20, 2006, al-Jaafari stepped aside in favor of another Shiite leader, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, who was acceptable to the Kurd and Sunni delegates. Also approved for the new Iraqi government were the Kurd’s, Jalal Talabani, for president and the Sunni, Tariq al-Hashemi, and the Shiite, Adel Abdul Mahdi, as vice presidents. The speaker of parliament was a Sunni, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, and deputy speakers were a Shiite, Khalid al-Attiya, and a Kurd, Aref Tayfour.19

Forming an Iraqi Government On May 2, Iraqi legislators created a committee to establish rules and procedures before the National Assembly or Council of Representatives was formally called to order. Initially, Sunni leaders pressed for the constitution to be amended in order to prevent federal states from being established in the northern Kurdish provinces and in the southern Shiite provinces. In response, Speaker al-Mashhadani said constitutional amendments would be considered after all the new cabinet members were selected.20

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Dept. of Defense Photo Iraqi Pesident Jalal Talabani with Donald Rumsfeld

Meanwhile, Iraq’s prime minister designate, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, selected several cabinet ministers, but delayed naming anyone to Iraq’s security posts. He selected the Kurd’s Hoshyar Zebari to continue as Foreign Minister and Barham Saleh as a deputy prime minister. One day before his May 22 deadline, al-Maliki named temporary heads of several cabinet posts—the ministers of the Interior, Defense and National Security. After the 275 parliamentary members assembled, Speaker alMashhadani described procedures for accepting or rejecting each cabinet member. Before finishing his remarks, however, he was interrupted by a Sunni Council member Saleh al-Mutlak who asked to delay the swearing-in ceremony until the three permanent security positions had been approved. After al-Mashhadani overruled him, al-Mutlak, joined by 10 other Sunni delegates, walked out of the session in protest. Prime Minister al-Maliki then announced his candidates for the 37 cabinet posts. After each position was announced, members of the Council of Representatives raised their hands to signify their approval. al-Maliki’s final cabinet choices were temporary ones. He assumed the position of acting Minister of the Interior, and



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nominated the Sunni Deputy Prime Minister, Salam Zikam alZubaie, for acting Defense Minister and the Kurd Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Saleh, for acting Minister of State for National Security. As acting Minister of the Interior, al-Maliki would face the critically important task of ending sectarian violence. This involved, foremost, dealing with Shiiite and Sunni militants, especially around Baghdad. As acting Defense Minister, Zubaie assumed command of an Iraqi army that had yet to prove its ability to operate independently. Four other permanent cabinet members who had been approved for key cabinet posts also confronted difficult tasks. Minister of Electricity Kariem Wahied needed to restore Iraq’s electrical output to the levels that would exceed prewar levels and meet current needs. Unless the availability of electricity improved, he, and possibly the government, would lose the support of ordinary Iraqis. Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani faced retaining the popular subsidies for gasoline for Iraqi citizens even though the program encouraged smuggling. He also inherited the difficult task of protecting Iraqi oil pipelines and refineries from insurgent attacks. The Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr depended on Shahristani’s revenues from oil exports in order to balance the government’s budget. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hoshyar Zebari, held another vital cabinet post. In May 2006, 46 countries had established foreign missions in Iraq despite the risk of insurgent attacks or kidnappings. Zebari’s task was to convince other nations that it was safe to send their representatives to Baghdad to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq. Following the swearing-in ceremony, al-Maliki outlined his administration’s major objectives. “This government,” he said, “faces three major challenges namely, terrorism and terrorists who are killing the people at random without any respect for the loss of life [and] corruption at all levels by those who are stealing the country’s wealth. The third challenge is to provide services for the people.”

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While the prime minister and the parliament were approving cabinet members in the heavily protected “Green Zone” on May 20 and May 21, violence took place throughout the rest of the country. Sectarian strife involving car bombs and shootings continued in Baghdad’s Sunni district of Adhamiya and Sadr City, in Babel Province and in Qaim near Syria’s border. Ironically, at the same time these attacks were taking place, al-Maliki was informing reporters about his proposal to create a “special security force” of soldiers and police officers to end the sectarian killings and restore order. (See Chapter 8) “We are aware of the scale of the security challenges,” he told reporters, and we will combine the use of “maximum force” in confronting the terrorists with “an effort to build bridges” to restore confidence among the nation’s various groups. Since promises to confront the insurgents as well as the private Shiite and Sunni militias had been made before, many Iraqis were dubious of alMaliki’s ability to carry out his program.21 The internecine conflict between Iraq’s Shiite and Sunni militants was not the only serious violence that Prime Minister al-Maliki found alarming. After the Haditha affair of November 19, 2005— where Marines allegedly killed 24 Iraqi civilians—became public knowledge, he was forced to confront the increasingly serious problem of other violent acts committed by coalition forces against Iraqi citizens. Even before the Haditha affair, other incidents had prompted the prime minister to accuse occupation troops of misconduct. The multinational forces, he asserted, had “no respect for citizens, smashing civilian cars and killing on a suspicion or a hunch. It’s unacceptable.” (See Chapter 9) Al-Maliki hoped to calm Sunni and Shiite tensions by announcing plans on June 6, 2006, to release up to 2,500 detainees. He stressed that those people released would not be “Saddamists or terrorists” who had committed violent attacks. Earlier, on December 19, Iraqi lawyers indicated 24 former Baath Party officials were to be released from American military detention centers as it was agreed that they no longer posed a threat to Iraqi security. Among the 24 Baath Party members dismissed were four people involved in Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction program. They are: Dr. Huda Salih Mahdi



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Ammash (Mrs. Anthrax); Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha (Dr. Germ); Dr. Humam Abdel Khaliq al-Ghafur, the chief of Iraq’s atomic energy group; and Hossom Muhammad Amin, a general who had headed the group monitoring UN inspectors after the 1991 war. Even so, according to a UN Human Rights report, about 28,7000 detainees remained in American and Iraqi detention facilities.22 Prime Minister al-Maliki alleviated some Sunni concerns on June 8 when he asked Iraq’s parliament to approve his choices to replace the temporary ministers of defense, interior and the national security agency. For Minister of Defense he chose the Sunni Arab, General Abdul-Qader Mohammed Jessim al-Mifarji. As Interior Minister he named the Shiite Jawad al-Bolina and as the Minister of State for National Security another Shiite, Sherwan al-Waili. General al-Mifarji, who had graduated from an Iraqi military academy in 1969 and would lead Iraq’s new army, was not affiliated with any Sunni political party. Moreover, Saddam Hussein had sentenced him to seven years in prison for criticizing the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. An aeronautical engineer, Interior Minister al-Bolina was a member of the United Iraqi Alliance but apparently not affiliated with the Shiite militias. The Minister for National Security al-Waili, a graduate of Iraq’s military school of engineering, was associated with the Dawa Party.23

Corruption and Incompetence Fears Iraqi lawmakers have come under increasing criticism for their actions and inaction. Many citizens complained that they “only think about their salaries” while violence, fuel shortages and lack of electricity continued. The legislators provided themselves with a three-day week, a $5,000 per month salary and a $7,000 monthly allowance for drivers, guards and staff members. Also, many lawmakers lived in government supplied villas and apartments within the secure Green Zone where the electricity was readily available. A member of parliament, Wael Abdul Latif, echoed the complaints of citizens when he described the previous session as “A long time but few accomplishments.” That five-month session passed only four minor laws, two dealing with government employment.

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When, on September 5, 2006, the parliament was to reassemble after a month-long vacation, only 180 of the 275 legislators answered roll call. This prompted renewed disapproval from citizens and even clerics. The Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani revealed his disappointment. “Citizens expect, and they are right to do so,” he said in a statement, “that parliament and high ranking officials share their agony and hardship.” As the parliament discussed the proposed 2007 national budget, many items in it contributed to the dissatisfaction of the sectarian groups. In the $42 billion budget there was considerable potential for abuse and outright corruption. At the time foreign governments were balking at throwing more money into what they consider a black hole, nearly $2 billion was to be allocated to agencies outside the scrutiny of the central government. Also, most ministries were to receive millions of dollars in discretionary funds for “social benefits” with little oversight. The budget did not include some unspent $8 billion allotted in 2006 to various ministries for reconstruction projects. It also failed to incorporate monies donated by the international community and the United States. “Many key ministries have been unable to expend budget resources on capital improvements and are running large surpluses due in part to an ineffective procurement process and the inability to carry out fair, competitive contracting,” according to a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office.24

Strained Relations with Washington Shortly after Iraq’s al-Qaeda leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was killed, President Bush and a small group of aides made a surprise visit to Baghdad during the night of June 13. After Air Force One landed at Baghdad’s airport, Bush and his aides boarded a helicopter for a ten-mile journey to the Green Zone where Prime Minister alMaliki was surprised to see the president in person. “Our military will stay on the offensive,” Bush informed the prime minister. “We will continue to hunt down people like Mr. Zarqawi and bring them to justice.” In response, al-Maliki thanked the president for bringing freedom to the Iraqi people “for the first time” in their history. Then he said: “God willing, all the suffering will soon be over and all the coalition soldiers can return to their countries.”25



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It was not to be so. In the months that followed, attacks increased on Iraqi civilians and coalition forces without the Baghdad government able to bring the insurgency under control. Sectarian strife in the capital during July and August resulted in more than 5,100 civilian deaths, according to UN statistics. By September, the violence verged on civil war with Sunni Arab rebel bombs indiscriminately killing Shiites and Shiite death squads murdering Sunnis despite some 8,000 additional U.S. troops sent to patrol Baghdad. There was rising dissatisfaction with the Iraqi prime minister for his impeding efforts to allow the U.S. military to go after Shiite militias that were blamed for much of the rising death toll. The two most deadly Shiite militias, the Al Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade, had systematically kidnapped and killed thousands of Sunnis in the past several months. American military commanders wanted to expand their operations in Baghdad neighborhoods such as Sadr City, a base of support for anti-U.S. Shiite Muslim cleric Moktada al-Sadr, and disarm his Al Mahdi Army. “We have to fix this military issue,” declared Army Lt. General Peter W. Chiarelli, commander of day-to-day operations. “We can’t have armed militias competing with Iraq’s security forces. But I have to trust the prime minister to decide when it is that we can do that.” The basic problem was that al-Sadr controlled 30 parliamentary votes and several government ministries, while the Badr Brigade was the military element of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq that held 30 parliamentary votes. The prime minister, who needed these votes to stay in power, was in a difficult position. He garnered sufficient support to announce on October 2, 2006 the creation of a “team effort” by the key political leaders to establish committee to monitor police activity and to establish check points in Baghdad. Unfortunately, these efforts did not stem the violence. Frustration with the inability of the Iraqi government and coalition forces to stem the killings heightened the prime minister’s fear that U.S. officials were undermining his position. In a telephone conversation with President Bush on October 16, al-Maliki sought reassurance that Washington was not going to abandon him. Apparently he had been upset by the public comments of congressional officials and the co-chairmen of the Iraq Study Group

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who thought perhaps a change in the Iraqi government might bring the violence in Baghdad under control. Bush responded that he had “total confidence” in al-Maliki’s government and he believed the prime minister was doing all he could to stabilize his nation. In Baghdad and Washington, officials acknowledged that al-Maliki headed a weak government divided along sectarian lines and that his powers were limited. The months of car bombings, death squads and economic failures had cost al-Maliki the public’s confidence and forced him to rely on narrow ideologically focused groups. In heated discussions with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, al-Maliki refused to accept deadlines for his government to achieve specified goals. Indeed, he criticized what he construed to be the condescending attitude American toward the Iraqi government and warned the ambassador to respect Iraq’s sovereignty. “I’m a friend to the United States,” al-Maliki declared, “but not America’s man in Iraq.”26 Earlier in late November 2006, as President Bush, Vice President Cheney and Secretary of State Rice left for the Middle East to visit Saudi Arabia and Jordan, National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley gave the president a report of his October 2006 visit with Prime Minister al-Maliki. The memo said al-Maliki desired to reconcile Sunni, Kurdish and Shiite factions in order to end sectarian fighting but “was having difficulty in figuring out how to do so.” The memo thought “there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear if Maliki is a witting participant.” Hadley believed “the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggest Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, he is misrepresenting his intentions, or his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.” He concluded, “We should waste no time in our efforts to determine Maliki’s intentions and, if necessary, to augment his capabilities.” Al-Maliki met with Bush in Jordan on November 30. When the two held a news conference, President Bush hugged the prime minister and said, “See how close we are.” Perhaps, the most important statements were al-Maliki’s claim that his government would be ready to take command by June 2007, while President Bush’s pledged, “We’re



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going to stay in Iraq to get the job done as long as the government wants us there.” Meanwhile in Baghdad, ordinary Iraqis were dismayed by what they heard Bush and Maliki say in Jordan. For example, a Shiite taxi driver Ahmed Khalaf said, “It’s useless! It’s wasting time! Nothing will happen, and we will get no results and no solutions. We need a strong state that can make decisions, that can beat the bad guys, can beat the militias. This meeting is just for the media, and it’s not useful.” In a different way, Sana al-Nabbani was unable to watch the news from Jordan on the television because her home had no electricity that day and she could not find any gasoline to run her generator. When told about the conference by a reporter, she said: “Is that all? Was that even worth the fuel consumed by their airplanes?” During the same period, Vice President Cheney flew to Riyadh for discussion with Saudi King Abdullah and leaders of the Saudi armed forces. While Cheney’s spokeswoman would not comment on his discussions with the Saudis, Nawaf Obaid’s op-ed article in the Washington Post was informative. An adviser to the Saudi government currently in Washington, Obaid noted that in February 2003 Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal warned President Bush that if he removed Saddam from power he would be “solving one problem and creating five more.” Now, people in Egypt, Jordan and other Arab nations were calling for Saudi Arabia to protect the Sunni community in Iraq against Iran’s influence. King Abdullah had worked to ease sectarian problems in Iraq and promised Bush he would not meddle in Iraq; but he may do so when and if American forces begin to withdraw. Saudi Arabia was the birthplace of Mohammad the Prophet and, as leader of the Sunni community, will have both the “means and religious responsibility to intervene.” Cheney’s visit to Riyadh showed the “preeminence of Saudi Arabia in the region and its importance to U.S. strategy in Iraq. But if a phased troop withdrawal does begin, the violence will escalate dramatically” and Saudi Arabia cannot stand on the “sidelines.”27

Baghdad & Bush’s New Strategy While in Washington administration officials awaited the Iraq Study Group’s report, in Baghdad Iraqi leaders moved ahead with

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their own plans. On December 5, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki reiterated his intention to develop cooperative initiatives with Syria and Iran despite President Bush’s refusal to deal directly with either nation. In his January 12th State of the Union speech, where the president announced his plan to send additional troops to Iraq, Bush also declared, “If the Iraqi government does not follow through on it promises, it will lose the support of the American people.” Moreover, he added, “The prime minister understands this.” Emphasizing his independence, the next day al-Maliki appointed a virtually unknown officer to a sensitive, top military post in Baghdad over General George W. Casey’s recommendation of a better-qualified person. Other Iraqi leaders complained that alMaliki had chosen Lt. General Abud Qanbar, a former naval officer under Saddam Hussein, without consulting them. American’s were concerned because they knew virtually nothing about Qanbar because he had not worked with them. A Kurdish lawmaker who questioned the choice noted, “It’s very dangerous if it turns out that he has affiliations” with radical Shiites. To ease Washington’s concerns, the prime minister agreed to a complex command system that placed the senior U.S. commander in a layer between Qanbar and al-Maliki. While asking for additional training and equipment for Iraq’s security forces, the prime minister promised on January 17 to get tough with both Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents. Appearing to align his government with Bush’s new “surge” proposal, al-Maliki declared, “We will not allow any politicians to interfere with this Baghdad security plan.” The prime minister was disappointed and frustrated that his efforts at political negotiation had not brought the warring factions together and said “once military operations start in Baghdad” all discussions will cease. Moreover, he predicted that his newly trained and equipped forces could “within three to six months” dramatically reduce “our need for the American troops.” However, there remained a widening gap in the relations between Washington and Baghdad as revealed by al-Maliki’s unhappiness with the Bush administration’s criticism of his performance. Secretary of State Rice may believe “the [Iraqi] government is



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on borrowed time,” he commented. But he noted, “I understand and realize that inside the American administration there is some kind of a crisis situation, especially after the results of the last election.” Washington officials were surprised and skeptical when Moktada al-Sadr, noted for his fiery anti-American speeches, indicated at the end of January 2007 that he backed the new Iraq security plan. The motivation for this change of direction was not immediately clear. Some Americans viewed the new posture as temporary, while Iraqis close to al-Sadr found other reasons. Perhaps the realities of power, since his faction controlled several ministries including Health and Transportation, had mellowed him. But while patronage and resources had become available to al-Sadr, it also made him answerable to the government’s inadequacies, corruption and brutalities.28 As 2007 got underway, Iraq’s democratically elected government still faced three difficult problems. First, it must find a way to end sectarian violence and maintain unity among the various factions. Second, it must oversee the proper reconstruction of Iraq for its economic future. Third, it must recruit and train Iraqi police and security forces in order to end the American occupation and survive on its own.

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hile the United States’ role during the Iraq-Iran war and the first Gulf war in 1991 appeared to serve the nation’s interests, the motives and objectives of George W. Bush’s administration in launching an invasion of Iraq have been increasingly challenged. When the president declared “mission completed” on May 1, 2003, teams of U.S. inspectors were fanning out across Iraq expecting to locate secret caches of weapons of mass destruction that would confirm the administration’s charges that Saddam was secretly concealing banned weaponry. When the final inspection unit reported to Congress, it had failed to uncover any weapons of mass destruction and, thus, “contradicted nearly every prewar assertion about Iraq made by top Bush administration officials.” In the heady moments of victory in May 2003, many in Washington anticipated the quick establishment of a replacement government and prompt withdrawal of American troops. Instead the invasion ignited “defensive” jihad-minded Muslims throughout the world. “Thank you for your jihad and may God help you,” a pleased Osama bin Laden declared in an October 18, 2003 message. “Be glad of the good news: America is mired in the swamp of the Tigris and Euphrates. Bush is an easy prey.... Oh youth of Islam everywhere, especially in [Iraq’s] neighboring countries, jihad is your duty.” President Bush’s decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein had opened the door to terrorist activity not only in Iraq but also in other places around the world including Bali, London and Madrid. Indeed, a September 2006 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)

entitled “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,” suggested that the invasion and occupation of Iraq had accelerated the recruitment of terrorists and provided them with a training ground. An elected Iraqi government was not chosen until December 15, 2005 and by that time the U.S. was engaged in a protracted occupation and a war with insurgents. From 2006 until early 2007, Iraqi society experienced eruptions of sectarian violence that verged on a civil war while its government tried to improve relations among the country’s three ethnic factions. During these last months, the Bush administration consulted with various agencies within the government seeking to provide American commanders in Iraq with a formula to contain the violence. Even though Saddam Hussein had been executed and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had been persuaded to resign, President Bush still was not in an enviable position his public approval rate declined precipitously while he confronted restless former supporters and a newly elected Democratic Congress. Even so in early 2007, both President Bush and his vice president stood by the original decision to invade Iraq. In an interview for CBS’ “60 Minutes,” Bush maintained that his “decision to remove Saddam Hussein was the correct decision [because] he was a significant source of instability.” Moreover, he added, “The Iraqi people owe the American people a huge debt of gratitude.” Interviewed by Wolf Blitzer on January 24, Vice President Cheney told CNN’s “Situation Room” audience that “what we did in Iraq in taking down Saddam Hussein was exactly the right thing to do; the world is safer for it.” If the U.S. had not acted, “Saddam Hussein would still be in power. He would, at this point, be engaged in a nuclear arms race with Ahmadinejad, his blood enemy next door in Iran.” Cheney’s remarks prompted Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-Il) to observe that the vice president was “out of touch with reality” for claiming that the administration had achieved “enormous successes in Iraq.”1



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Public & Political Dissent The American public had generally supported the decision to invade Iraq, but many Democrats and Independents, along with some Republicans, changed their minds after it became evident that Saddam Hussein did not possess weapons of mass destruction and the insurgency began taking an increasing number of American lives. There were no mass Vietnam-style demonstrations, perhaps because without a national draft the fighting was borne by a coalition of the obligated an all-volunteer military, reserves and the National Guard. Cindy Sheehan, a grieving mother of a son killed in Iraq, rallied the nascent antiwar movement when she camped outside Bush’s ranch near Crawford, Texas, in August 2005. “Mr. President, I want to tell you face to face how much this hurts,” Sheehan said in a TV ad airing in Waco aimed at the ranch. “How many more of our loved ones need to die in this senseless war?” Upset by antiwar protests, the administration created the Pentagon’s domestic surveillance program to monitor the dissidents. According to documents released to the American Civil Liberties Union, following a Freedom of Information Act request, the Defense Department had filed more than 2,800 reports involving Americans participating in at least 186 antiwar protests. Groups such as Veterans for Peace, Military Families Speak Out, Code Pink, the American Friends Service Committee and the War Resisters League were monitored. After the documents’ release, Pentagon officials acknowledged that the material on antiwar groups should not have been collected. “I don’t want it, we shouldn’t have had it, not interested in it,” Daniel Baur, the acting director of the Defense Department’s counterintelligence field activity unit, told the New York Times. “I don’t want to deal with it.” Experts on government spying, however, cautioned that the documents revealed other government agencies were also involved in the spying. A USA Today/Gallup poll, taken on July 21-23, 2006, showed only 37 percent of Americans approved of Bush’s handling of the war’s aftermath. Democratic politicians began to feel the pulse of the rising antiwar sentiment by mid-2005, but they had difficulty

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agreeing on an alternative to the administration’s policy of “staying the course.” For example, an early Democratic supporter of the invasion and decorated war veteran, Congressman John P. Murtha (D-PA), was the most blunt about his changed position: “Our troops have done everything that has been asked of them. The U.S. cannot accomplish anything further in Iraq militarily. It’s time to bring the troops home.” When Vice President Cheney labeled critics “irresponsible” in calling for withdrawal, Murtha responded, “I like guys who got five deferments [during the Vietnam War] and have never been there and send people to war, and then don’t like to hear suggestions about what needs to be done.” Many Republican supporters of the war, such as House Speaker J Dennis Hastert (R-IL), rejected immediate withdrawal. “Rep. Murtha and Democratic leaders have adopted a policy of cut and run,” he said. The administration responded with the November 2005 publication of a “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” that essentially reiterated Bush’s pledge to hold on in Iraq and urged the American people to stay the course.2 The November 2006 mid-term elections revealed the depths of public dissatisfaction with the war and resulted in a surprising victory for the Democratic party 233 seats to the Republicans’ 202 in the House of Representatives and a 51-49 majority in the Senate. An early casualty of the Republicans’ political defeat, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld resigned on November 8. President Bush replaced him with Robert Gates who was approved by the Senate in a vote of 95-2 on December 6. Although the Democrats did not take control of Congress until January 2007, Bush sought to gain bipartisan support something he had largely ignored during the previous six years for his forthcoming revised Iraqi policies. On November 11, he met with the incoming Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and the next Senate majority leader Harry Reid (D-NV). Senator Levin suggested Bush “make it clear to the Iraqis that we cannot save them from themselves. They must make the political compromises that only they can make.” Levin also thought there would be bipartisan support in Congress if there was some sort of timeline for withdrawal of U.S. troops based



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on the Iraqi government’s ability to provide for its own security. For his part, Senator Reid suggested that President Bush should convene a bipartisan meeting with Congress on Iraq, which Bush apparently thought “was an interesting” suggestion. In contrast to Levin’s proposal, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) told an NBC audience that “the present situation is unacceptable” but any withdrawal would cause chaos in the Middle East. McCain did say that Premier Maliki must “understand that we need to put down” Moktada Sadr’s Mahdi Army, and “we need to stop the sectarian violence that is on the increase.” McCain added, “the best way to assure that is for him to know that we will do what’s necessary to bolster,” train and equip the Iraqi army.3

Neoconservatives Have Second Thoughts The administration found many of its ideological supporters having second thoughts about the Iraqi invasion as a number of neoconservatives who had initially endorsed forcibly deposing Saddam Hussein began publicly recanting in 2006. Robert D. Kaplan wrote that he had believed Saddam possessed banned weaponry and, given his “crimes against humanity, invading Iraq constituted a moral intervention of the first order.” However, given the administration’s incompetence in handling postwar affairs, Kaplan now wondered if “the invasion was a flawed idea to begin with.” Other insiders, including Richard N. Perle, who was regarded as one of the intellectual godfathers of the Iraqi war, also recanted. By late 2006, Perle had come to believe that Hussein probably could have been prevented from developing weapons of mass destruction “by means other than a direct military intervention.” Moreover, he said, “If I had known that the U.S. was going to essentially establish an occupation, then I’d say, ‘Let’s not do it’.” He went on to complain that “huge mistakes” had been made in the management of the war’s aftermath, for which he blamed senior members of the administration. Kenneth Adelman, who initially thought the Iraqi invasion would be “a cakewalk,” also has had second thoughts: “The three individuals L. Paul Bremer, General Tommy R. Franks and CIA Director George J. Tenet, who got the highest civilian medals the president can give, were responsible for a lot of the debacle that was Iraq.” Additionally, he sharply criticized Bush’s national security

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team, headed by Condoleezza Rice, as “the most incompetent” of the past 50 years. Francis Fukuyama, a prominent neoconservative, who initially endorsed the invasion because it was morally right to remove Hussein, has subsequently questioned “whether it was prudent to do so given the possible costs and potential consequences” and whether it was “legitimate” for America to act unilaterally as it did. He was critical of neoconservatives, such as Charles Krauthammer, that remained tied to “a failed policy” because “unilateralism and coercive regime change cannot be the basis for an effective American foreign policy.” In turn, Krauthammer challenged Fukuyama’s perspective on the Iraq war in a 2004 issue of the National Interest. Claiming to be a defender of “democratic realism,” Krauthammer argued that the war against Iraq was a risky task but it was essential for victory in the war against terrorism. “Today,” he wrote, the danger is “Arab/Islamic radicalism” and “where it really counts today is in that Islamic crescent stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan.” He failed to mention that U.S. actions had accelerated its expansion to Britain, France, Spain, India, the Philippines and a few other places.4 While some neoconservatives claimed to be “realists”, they failed to grasp that fundamental foreign policy realism is grounded on calculations of the necessities, possibilities and boundaries of actions related to peace and war because the cost of miscalculation often is exorbitant. Pre-invasion foreign policy realists who criticized the Bush administration’s unilateral decision to oust Hussein did not view Iraq as a threat to the stability of the Middle East, to U.S. security or to its economic interests. Nor did America’s allies in Europe and the Middle East. Moreover, realistic observers recognized that the fragile makeup of Iraq’s diverse sectarian entities would cause serious problems when Hussein’s government fell and that the consequences could be disastrous to Middle Eastern stability.

The Iraq Study Group Reports The Iraq Study Group (ISG) was created when Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VI) earmarked $1 million for a committee to offer



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“fresh eyes” on the events in Iraq. Approved by President Bush, the study group was led by co-chairmen James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton and included Vernon E. Jordan Jr., a former Clinton adviser; Edwin Meese III, an attorney general under Reagan; Sandra Day O’Connor, a former Supreme Court justice; Lawrence S. Eagelburger, former secretary of state; Leon E. Panetta, a former chief of staff for Clinton; William J. Perry, defense secretary under Clinton; Charles S. Robb, former Democratic senator from Virginia; and Alan K. Simpson, former Republican senator from Wyoming. Although many of its key points had been made public earlier, the Iraq Study Group’s full report was presented to the White House and Congress on December 6, 2006. “The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved,” the Executive Summary began. “The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality. Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability.” Moreover, Iraq’s democratically elected government “is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering essential services.” If changes were not made, Iraq’s government might collapse and “Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of operations.” The panel believed that the best way to stimulate the Iraqi government to do a better job of providing for its own security would be for the president to announce a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces. Additionally, the report called for Washington to open talks with Syria and Iran who were seen as fueling the insurrection and to take an active role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.5 Since the ISG report essentially repudiated the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq and its approach to Middle East issues, its reception was largely predictable. Most Democrats and the American people, if the polls were accurate, approved of its recommendations. Bush indicated he would give the ISG report “serious study” but would not accept the ISG proposal to hold direct talks with Syria and Iran, nor would he withdraw any combat

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brigades from Iraq during the next 15 months. Ardent supporters of the war viewed the report with dismay. The conservative New York Post printed a cartoon response that labeled the panel “surrender monkeys,” while other right wing conservatives denounced the recommendation that Washington should engage Iran and Syria in discussions to try and solve Iraq’s problems. Danielle Pletka, a vice president of the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute, complained that the report contained “very few deep ideas. And there were very, very few plans for victory.” Nor were Israel’s government or Iraq’s political leaders pleased with the ISG’s report. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert disputed the Study Group’s contention that Iraqi problems were connected to Israel’s conflict with Arab neighbors. “The attempt to create a linkage between the Iraqi issue and the Mideast issue we have a different view.” The prime minister agreed with Bush that Syria’s activities do not “create a picture of the possibility for talks in the near future.” Despite Olmert’s criticism, he had, in fact, previously urged diplomatic efforts with Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and praised a Saudi plan calling for full diplomatic relations between Israel and all Arab states. In Baghdad, Iraqi leaders had diverse opinions about the ISG report. Prime Minister Maliki was pleased the report wanted Bush to support the Iraqi government, that Iraqi leaders should engage in diplomacy with neighbors and that 140,000 U.S. soldiers should be moved from combat activity to a support role for the Iraqi Army. In contrast, Kurdish leaders said their autonomy over oil income from Kirkuk should not be delayed because the central government must not control all oil revenues. Jalal Talabani also criticized the report’s recommendation to train more Iraqi security forces because the government failed to question its Shiite members about their loyalty to the state. In addition, he said the U.S. training of the Iraqi Army and police had not only been a failure, but these forces also had subverted Iraq’s sovereignty. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs were dismayed by the ISG proposal to draw down the number of U.S. troops because they feared Shiite security forces would increase their attacks on the Sunni population. Sunni political leader Ayad al-Sammarai claimed, “it is a report to solve American problems, and not to solve Iraq’s



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problems.” One of Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr’s parliamentary associates, Nasar al-Rubaie, declared: “We are capable [of arming] our security and military forces. If the Americans withdraw from Iraq today, the next day there will be security in all of Iraq.” The Sunnis, of course, did not share Al-Rubaie’s view since they were frequent victims of al-Sadr’s militia.6

Bush Searches for a New Strategy At mid-November hearings before the Armed Services Committees, General John P. Abizaid warned that a phased pullout of American troops over six months would increase sectarian killings and harm any Iraqi attempt to secure the country. He indicated an increase in the number of U.S. troops for Iraq could be helpful because U.S. military forces had been stretched too thin for a long time. For the first time in public, Abizaid admitted that the American situation in Iraq was undermined because the administration failed to deploy a larger force to stabilize the country in 2003. “I think you can look back,” he said, “and say that more American troops would have been advisable in the early stages of May, June, and July.”7 Meanwhile, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace had decided to review America’s military options in Iraq. On November 20, a preliminary report outlined three options. The first was called “Go Big” and would send several thousand more troops to Iraq to break the cycle of sectarian and insurgent violence. Option two, “Go Long” would cut U.S. combat actions but would expand and lengthen the training and advising for Iraqi forces. A third “Go Home” option would be a swift withdrawal of American troops but this might cause an Iraqi civil war. The most likely option was a mixture of “Go Big” and “Go Long.” The hybrid plan would add up to 30,000 troops to the present 140,000 in Iraq. If this plan worked it might end sectarian violence while informing Iraq’s government that future cuts in U.S. troops (about 60,000) would not mean a complete withdrawal.8 Meanwhile, the number of coalition forces had dwindled from the original invasion force of 315,230 to 146,680 regulars in early 2007, plus some 48,000 private military contractors. For example,

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the U.S.’s initial 250,000 troops positioned for the invasion were reduced to 132,000 for the occupation; Britain’s 45,000 were gradually reduced to 7,200; South Korea’s 3,300 to 2,300; and Australia’s 2,000 to 1,300. A brief summary of the countries that had troops in Iraq at one point but have since pulled out includes: Nicaragua (230 troops, left Feb. 2004); Spain (1,300, Apr. 2004); Dominican Republic (302, May 2004); Honduras (368, May 2004); Philippines (51, July 2004); Thailand (432, Aug. 2004); New Zealand (161, Sept. 2004); Tonga (45, Dec. 2004) Portugal (128, Feb. 2005); The Netherlands (1,345, Mar. 2005); Hungary (300, Mar. 2005); Singapore (192, Mar. 2005); Norway (150, Oct. 2005); Ukraine (1,650, Dec. 2005); Japan (600, July 17, 2006); Italy (1,600, Nov. 2006). Poland (2,500 troops) extended the stay of its contingent through at least mid-2007. In late December, the Bush administration reviewed the military’s study and considered three options for its new strategy. These options were: 1) to add between 15,000 and 30,000 more troops to secure Baghdad and accelerate training of Iraqi forces; 2) to direct American military activity away from the sectarian strife and focus on hunting al-Qaeda members; or 3) to focus political attention on backing the Shiite majority and abandon their attempts to help the Sunni minority. Some members of the administration preferred to shift all problems to the Iraqi government. Secretary of State Rice summed it up: “None of us see the situation in Iraq as favorable. We all see it as extremely difficult.” Thus, President Bush decided to delay his announcement of a new strategy until January 2007 so that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates could be part of the decision on Iraq. On January 10, 2007, the president informed the nation of his new strategy for Iraq. He said Iraq’s situation was “unacceptable” and admitted, “Where mistakes were made, the responsibility rests with me.” Bush said more than 20,000 new troops would go to Iraq to assist their troops in bringing security to Baghdad and Anbar Province. He argued that, “Our past efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons. There were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops that we did have. Our military leaders have reviewed the new Iraqi



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plan to ensure that it addressed these mistakes. They report that it does.” Bush also said: “I have made it clear to the prime-minister and other Iraqi officials” that the American “commitment is not openended.” If Iraq’s government did not carry out its promises, it would lose the support of the American and Iraqi people. Finally, he addressed the need for economic assistance as part of his security plan for Baghdad. “Ordinary Iraqi citizens,” Bush said, “must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities.” To achieve this, Bush said more than $1billion was essential for programs to create jobs and help reconstruction in areas secured by U.S. and Iraqi forces. He also “vowed” to “interrupt the flow of support” from Iraq’s two key neighbors, Iran and Syria.9

Reaction to Bush’s “Surge” Plan The president’s plan was questioned by Democrats and Republicans in Congress and by some 70 percent of the American people, according to an overnight poll. Only one member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee extended support for the new strategy, while others indicated considerable skepticism. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NB) thought the president’s surge program was “the most dangerous policy blunder in this country since Vietnam.” Defense Secretary Gates found it difficult to sell the president’s new strategy to the House Armed Services Committee. He was asked what would happen if the Iraqi government failed to meet the new benchmarks Bush had established? “If, at the end of day, they don’t keep their commitments that they have made to us”we would clearly have to re-look at the strategy,” Gates replied. Within a week after Bush announced his new Iraqi strategy, a bipartisan resolution was introduced in the Senate opposing the plan to dispatch additional troops. The resolution sponsored by Joseph R. Biden (D-DE), Carl Levin (D-MI) and Chuck Hagel (R-NB) argued it was not in America’s interest “to deepen its military involvement in Iraq” by sending additional troops. It also called for a time-line for handing over security responsibilities to the Iraqi government.

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Other resolutions opposing the president’s plan were also being considered, including one advanced by Republicans, led by Senator John Warner (R-VA), which was later combined with the earlier measure. While seeking approval of his proposal to increase troop levels in Iraq by some 20,000, Bush insisted he had the authority to do so despite congressional opposition.10 A New Military Approach for Iraq. To implement his new strategy, Bush reassigned several of his officials. He moved John D. Negroponte from director of National Intelligence to deputy secretary of state under Secretary Rice, while J. Michael McConnell replaced Negroponte. The current ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan C. Crocker, was sent to Iraq after Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed ambassador to the United Nations in place of John R. Bolton. In Iraq, General John P. Abizaid of the Central Command turned his position over to Admiral William J. Fallon. But most significantly, General David H. Petraeus became the new military commander in Iraq, relieving General George W. Casey, Jr.11 Controversial, highly competitive and the Army’s recognized intellectual with a doctorate from Princeton University, General Petraeus had spent two and half years in Iraq before his new assignment. During those two tours, the first as commander of the 101st Airborne Division and the second as head of the MultiNational Security Transition Command that trained Iraqi security forces, he introduced at Mosul and in northern Iraq (as noted in Chapter 8) a successful counterinsurgency strategy and became its premier advocate. Even still, many senior officers fear that Petraeus has been “given a losing hand. I say that reluctantly,” General Barry R. McCaffrey said. “The war is unmistakably going in the wrong direction.” However, he added, “The only good news in all this is that Petraeus is so incredibly intelligent and creative” that he represents the last best hope for success in Iraq. During the two years prior to his new job, Petraeus oversaw the development of the Army’s new field manual that emphasized counterinsurgency. The manual argues against large-scale offensives if they can be avoided, giving preference to limited operations. “Killing every insurgent is normally impossible,” the manual states. “Attempting to do so can be counterproductive in



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some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.” How his counterinsurgency strategies would play out in Baghdad was unclear, but he viewed the situation as “dire” but “not hopeless.” There were indications that he supported a “gated communities” approach to monitor and control the flow of people in and out of a secured area. To make this strategy work, Petraeus said American forces would need to assess their companion Iraqi units, listen to local leaders and discover the sectarian issues specific to their particular location. Security measures need to be matched by economic improvement jobs, housing, medical and school facilities, adequate supplies of electricity and water, etc. He pointed out that this approach had worked well in such Iraqi cities as Fallujah and Tall Afar. However, Petraeus emphasized that there was no quick fix, but that the American people and Congress would have to be patient. “None of this will be rapid,” he told Senate leaders. “In fact, the way ahead will be neither quick nor easy, and there undoubtedly will be tough days.”12

The U.S.-Iraq-Iran Nexus Iran’s desire to see a Shiite government in Iraq, its murky role in Iraq’s sectarian violence and its determination to continue developing nuclear facilities which Tehran claimed was for civilian usage, but Washington feared was for nuclear weapons presented White House policymakers with difficult decisions. In September 2006, amidst heated rhetoric denouncing Iran’s nuclear program, Congress quietly passed and President Bush signed the Iran Freedom Support Act, a resolution similar in spirit to the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. The new resolution established sanctions against any nation assisting Iran’s nuclear program, even activities or material permissible under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Was this the beginning of a campaign to gain public support for military action to prevent Iran’s from becoming a nuclear weapons state? The Pentagon created a new “Iran directorate” employing several of the people that had worked in the Office of Special Plans, which had manipulated raw intelligence to support the administration’s decision to invade Iraq. Joining the outcry

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over Iran’s nuclear activities, the neoconservative group, National Security Strategy, claimed Iran had supplanted Iraq as the single greatest threat to the United States. A senior member of Vice President Cheney’s staff argued “there can be no settlement of the Iraq war without regime change in Iran.” Once again Washington officials appeared willing to ignore on site International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who believed that Iran was years away from having a nuclear bomb. “People confuse knowledge, industrial capacity and intention,” Mohamed ElBaradei, director of IAEA, noted. “A lot of what you see about Iran right now is assessment of intentions.”13 The Bush administration did not favor direct discussions between Baghdad and Iran and Syria even though British Prime Minister Blair favored such talks because Washington claimed those two countries had financed and shipped arms and ammunition to Iraqi insurgents. Nevertheless, in early September 2006, Iraq’s Prime Minister al-Maliki visited Tehran for talks with Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Following their meeting, al-Maliki told reporters: “We had a good discussion with Mr. Ahmadinejad. Even in security issues, there is no barrier in the way of cooperation.” Then Iran’s president declared, “Iran will give its assistance to establish complete security in Iraq, because Iraq’s security is Iran’s security.” The two leaders were not clear about what Iran might do or how al-Maliki would explain Iran’s status to U.S. officials, especially since U.S. Ambassador Khaililzad claimed Iran had provoked the violence in Iraq. Next, al-Maliki invited Syria’s foreign minister to visit him in Baghdad on November 20. During their meeting, Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem condemned “all the terrorism taking place in Iraq.” Then he said: “The security and stability of Iraq is vital for the security and stability of Syria.” He also urged al-Maliki to set a timetable for American troops to leave Iraq saying it “would contribute to reducing the violence in Iraq.” Before leaving Iraq, al-Moallem agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Iraq by establishing a Syrian embassy in Baghdad.14 When the president pointedly ignored the Iraq Study Group’s suggestion to approach Iran for its assistance in reducing the sectarian



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violence in Iraq, Tehran’s ambassador in Baghdad retorted that there was no need for talks with the United States. “We have our own well-defined policies about Iraq,” Ambassador Hassen Kazemi-Qomi declared. He noted that Iran currently supplied Iraq with refined petroleum products, some 140 megawatts of electricity, access to its Persian Gulf ports and were willing to arm and train Iraq’s military. Why would Iran desire to destabilize Iraq, he asked? “Security in Iraq will strip foreign troops of any pretext to prolong their presence in the country.” Indeed, the Iran consul in Basra claimed that the chaos in Iraq was spilling over into Persian Iran’s ethnically Arab province of oil-rich Khuzistan. He claimed that British and American forces ignored the smuggling of arms and illegal material into the Khuzistan and other Arab regions of Iran.15 On January 11, American forces raided an Iranian consulate in Irbil and seized six diplomats irritating Kurdish officials who demanded the Iranians be released. “The people of the Kurdistan region protest against and reject this action, which violates our internal sovereignty,” their statement read. “We do not accept that disputes with our neighboring countries should be brought onto our soil.” This detaining of Iranian diplomats followed a similar action in Baghdad three weeks earlier. Ignoring the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation to seek the assistance of Iraq’s neighbors to reduce violence, President Bush declared the next day that coalition troops would “interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria” and “destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.” To ease public uncertainty, the White House sought to tone down its harsh rhetoric toward Iran by assuring lawmakers that the administration had no intention of launching another war in the Middle East. Seeking clarification, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE) asked Secretary of State Rice whether the president had any “plans to cross the Syrian and/or Iranian border.” Without answering directly, Rice replied, “Obviously, the president isn’t going to rule anything out to protect our troops, but the plan is to take down the networks in Iraq.” Testifying before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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General Peter Pace did little to ease anxieties. While Gates and Pace indicated that American forces in Iraq would not enter Iranian territory, they reiterated Rice’s point that the U.S. planned to interrupt supply networks within Iraq. “I continue to believe what I told you at the confirmation hearing,” Gates continued, “that any kind of military action inside Iran itself, that would be a very last resort.” However, Gates and Pace insisted they believed the Iranians were responsible for the deaths of American troops. “As the situation in Iraq has deteriorated,” Gates said, “that mixed record of Iran”has become very one-sided.”16 Despite Bush, Gates, Pace and other officials’ assertions that Tehran was contributing to the destabilization of Iraq by supplying arms and training to the insurgents, little actual evidence of Iranian involvement had surfaced. Yet senior American intelligence officers claimed they were confident of Iran’s involvement in the sectarian violence. “I’ve come to a much darker interpretation of Iranian actions in the past 12 to 18 months,” CIA Director Michael V. Hayden told a congressional committee. However, a high-ranking official acknowledged that intelligence data lacked “fidelity” as it was difficult to trace the movement of weaponry and personnel. There were reports of mortars and mines with Iranian markings but the White House was not providing documentation. “We do have intelligence which suggests that weapons and ammunition are being smuggled in from Iran. We don’t always manage to find any,” British Major David Gell said. It was not so much a question of whether Iranian weapons found their way into Iraq, but whether it could be determined that it was the result of an approved Iranian government policy. Skeptics had problems with the administration’s Iran charges given its inaccurate Iraqi “intelligence” claims. “To be quite honest, I’m a little concerned that it’s Iraq again,” Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said.17

Costs of the Iraqi Intervention The protracted conflict has resulted in an extraordinary monetary cost, substantial deaths and severe injuries to occupation forces, and a great number of casualties among Iraqi security personnel and



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citizens, especially the latter. The numbers of American losses in Iraq have been carefully tallied; but the Defense Department has not attempted to track those of Iraqi citizens. Generally unrecognized by the American media, nearly one million Iraqis have been displaced by the war and subsequent insurgency. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees released a report in late October 2006 that concluded there were some 754,000 displaced people in Iraq while tens of thousands of others had fled the country. While some 800,000 had left their homes at the beginning of the aerial bombings, about 365,000 more people became refugees as a result of the sectarian fighting. Unlike the casualty figures that have been quite controversial, the statistics regarding internally displaced people have not been challenged. U.S. & Coalition Forces. There were 140 American deaths in the initial invasion of Iraqi; however, the casualties continued to mount during the subsequent insurgency reaching slightly more than two deaths each day. The total numbers of American troops killed reached 1,000 in September 2004, 2,000 in October 2005, 3,000 as of December 31, 2006 and 3,080 as of January 31, 2007. Of these deaths 68 were female personnel. Often overlooked, with the focus on the number of dead, were the nearly 47,700 non-mortal injuries to American forces as of January 31, 2007. Of these, 22,900 received hostile injuries with 10,142 unable to return to duty within 72 hours and 6,670 requiring medical air evacuation. The other nearly 31,500 non-mortal casualties included 6,640 non-hostile injuries and 18,200 individuals suffering from diseases, both requiring medical air transport. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs), most frequently planted along the roadside, accounted for nearly sixty percent of the casualties. One reason the death toll was so low was due to heavy body armor and prompt evacuation to medical facilities; in Vietnam about 25 percent of the seriously wounded died, in Iraq about 10 percent. That such a large number survived the critical “golden hour” after being seriously wounded was due to prompt action by air evacuation pilots and expert teams of battlefield medics, nurses and surgeons.

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The veterans confronted several problems once they returned home. Many of the seriously wounded were permanently disfigured, while some six percent had amputations. The unpredictable nature of insurgent warfare contributed to at least one of eight veterans returning being diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. About 35 percent of the returnees have sought mental health care, but some experts expect the percentage to increase in the future because stress disorders often take months or years to appear. Redeployed veteran soldiers with mental health issues have resulted in higher suicide rates. For example, in 2005, 22 soldiers in Iraq killed themselves, several of whom exhibited signs of significant psychological distress. The 22 represented nearly one-fifth of the non-combat deaths that year. Coalition forces’ death toll was some 250: 130 being British. Those incurring the next greatest losses were: Bulgaria 13, Italy 33, Poland 18, Spain 11 and Ukraine 18. Casualties among private contractors working for U.S. based companies, which are difficult to assess because of lack of reporting, included some 390 killed and 7,760 wounded perhaps 153 dead and 800 wounded were American citizens. Journalists, too, paid a heavy price. Although statistics vary, there were at least 93 journalists and 37 media support personnel killed from March 2003 to December 31, 2006. Iraqi Losses. The administration has demonstrated little interest in maintaining a tally of Iraqi casualties. For example, as Brig. General Mark Kimmitt’s advice to Iraqis who were dismayed at the television images of occupation forces’ actions resulting in civilian casualties ”Change the Channel.” Consequently, estimates of Iraqi casualties civilians, policemen, security personnel, hospital personnel, bodyguards and government officials have varied widely. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that without a reliable government and police structure, body counts were nearly impossible. “Everyone counts casualties according to their own public interests,” he said, not to mention the employment of vastly different methodologies that often can’t even decide on good definition of the city limits of Baghdad, let alone an accurate count.



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The 2006 losses, for example, included the Iraq Body Count’s (IBC) estimate that 24,500 civilians died; but they stressed that their numbers were low since they likely missed deaths in remote parts of the country. The Associated Press’ tally for 2006, based on daily reports from hospitals and police, stood at nearly 13,700 a figure that did not cover the entire country. Gathering data from morgues, hospitals, and municipal authorities across Iraq, the United Nations concluded that 34,452 violent civilian deaths occurred in 2006. Total civilian deaths since March 2003 were estimated to be 100,000 to 150,000 by Iraq’s Health Minister in November 2006, based on the rate of 100 deaths per day recorded in hospitals and morgues. These figures included war-related deaths (civilian and non-civilian) and deaths from criminal activities. At the end of January 2007, British researchers for the IBC placed the number of civilian deaths, from coalition and insurgent military action, sectarian violence and increased criminal violence, between 55,300 and 61,000. The IBC figures’ included only those reported in English-language media (including Arabic media translated into English) up to 24 January 2007; consequently, the IBC believes its figures underestimate total deaths since, “It is likely that many if not most civilian casualties will go unreported by the media.” It was estimated that over 6,000 of those killed were Iraqi security personnel. In September 2006 the British medical journal The Lancet, an independent and authoritative journal, published a highly controversial report by Iraqi physicians and overseen by epidemiologists at Johns Hopkins University’s Bloomberg School of Public Health that claimed Iraqi mortality rates were much higher than generally believed. This study estimated that 654,965 “excess” Iraqi deaths, including 601,027 from violence, had occurred in Iraq since March 2003. Of the total 655,000 estimated “excess deaths,” 601,000 resulted from violence and the rest from disease and other causes leading to about 500 unexpected violent deaths per day countrywide. The same investigators in 2004 estimated roughly 100,000 deaths occurred in the first 18 months after the invasion figure much higher than expected. Both this and the earlier study were the only ones to estimate mortality in Iraq employing a

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technique, called “cluster sampling” that has been used to estimate mortality in famines and after natural disasters. Ronald Waldman, an epidemiologist at Columbia University who worked at the Center for Disease Control and Prevention for many years, called the survey method “tried and true,” and added that “this is the best estimate of mortality we have.”18 Monetary Costs. The growing price tag for the Iraqi conflict, which was approaching near historic figures and expected to pass Vietnam’s cost in 2008, finally has caught the attention of Congress. The expenses are expected to increase from a “burn rate” of $4.4 billion a month for fiscal 2003 to $8.4 billion a month in 2007. According to Pentagon spokesmen, the increasing cost reflects the necessity to replace lost, destroyed and aging military equipment (see Chapter 10). Fiscal conservatives, both Republicans and Democrats in Washington, have questioned the Bush administration’s refusal to include the war cost in the regular Pentagon budget. Instead, the administration has been requesting Congress to authorize emergency-spending bills, thereby, by-passing many of the normal review procedures for appropriating funds. “Mutating and undermining the legitimacy of the congressional role in funding is,” Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) has complained, “”undermining to some degree the commitment to the war effort itself.” Administration officials argued that its approach was necessary because it was not possible to determine in advance what was required for the war at the beginning of each fiscal year. That may have been true in the initial years of the occupation, critics responded, but certainly by 2006 costs should be much more predictable. In 2006, Congress included a provision in the annual Pentagon authorization bill that called for the administration to put its request for war funds in the basic bill where it could be reviewed with the entire Congress. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) who authored the provision stated, “Neither the White House nor the Congress is making the tough decisions about how we are going to pay for the ongoing [Iraq and Afghanistan] wars. Adding hundreds of billions of dollars that are more conveniently designated as emergency expenditures so they do not have to be budgeted for along with



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other national priorities is only making our fiscal problems that much greater.” If Congress had been reluctant to confront the fiscal issue, concentrating instead on human costs, President Bush’s proposal to send an additional 21,500 troops to Iraq brought the financial issue to the forefront. Some, such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), suggested that Congress block the “surge” plan by withholding the needed funds for troop expansion. That method was employed late in the Vietnam conflict when Congress prohibited funds for operations in Cambodia, but this method poses its own dilemmas. “If you cut off funding, you’re cutting off support for the troops,” Representative C.W. Young (R-FL) said. “Whether you support the battle they’re involved in or not, the vast majority of the American public is still very supportive of our troops.”19 Nonetheless, questions have been raised regarding the handling of previously allocated funds, as noted in Chapter 10. As early as May 2004, a Washington Post/ABC poll revealed that a majority of the American people did not believe defeating the insurgency in Iraq was worth the cost in blood or treasure. Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni agreed: “I have seen this movie. It was called Vietnam.”

Dept of Defense Photo Secretary of State Rice at U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, May 15, 2005

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olicy blunders contributed substantially to the growth of the Iraqi insurgency. General Franks and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s concentration on tactical operations for the invasion of Iraq and their failure to develop postwar strategic plans created a vacuum during which the momentum created by toppling Saddam Hussein was allowed to slip away. There was little realization of the amount of resources needed for reconstruction or the force requirements for internal security. Nor was there a plan for how to establish a new governing structure of Iraq. Moreover, there were few Americans involved in the postwar period who spoke the languages or possessed an understanding of the Iraqi culture in which they would find themselves. And, initially, they had no clear idea as to whether they were to be liberators or occupiers. The resilience and effectiveness of the insurgents caught civilian and military officials in Baghdad and Washington unprepared. Not until August 5, 2004 was a campaign plan for Iraq finally issued calling for controlling insurgent attacks, training Iraqi security forces, rehabilitating the economy and persuading the Sunnis by coercion and cooperation to stop supporting the violence. The eventual retraining of American units for counterinsurgency for example, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 4th Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne indicated that the military was trying to adjust its strategy. The dependability of the Iraqi army and police units for internal security improved only slowly. Nevertheless, since 2005 the insurgency intensified as the number, frequency and power of bomb attacks increased.

It soon became evident that America’s primary mission should be the recruiting and training of an Iraqi security force capable of maintaining order and containing the insurgency so coalition forces could withdraw. “Until the Iraqi state achieves that level of coherence and capacity, international forces,” Larry Diamond argued, U.S. forces would be needed as a “bulwark against a total breakdown of order and a possible descent into civil war.”1 By 2006, many senior U.S. military and diplomatic officials viewed the heavily armed militias as a serious challenge to Iraq’s internal security. Order 91, issued by Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority, outlawed the militias and demanded that nine such groups, which included the Badr Battalion but not the Mahdi Army, relinquish their weaponry and offered to enroll them in the new security forces. The offer to enroll elements of the militias into the security forces did not turn out well, as many observers charged them with fueling the insurgency. The militias had not been disarmed by early 2007, but some as members of the local and national police forces, continued to pursue their own agendas. While the Iraqi government recognized the threat militias posed to their authority, the fragile nature of Iraqi politics made it questionable whether Baghdad officials would openly challenge the militias. In 2007, the Bush administration sought to revise its strategy, banking on a new version of counterinsurgency and a young, energetic commander in the hope of yet retrieving victory.

Vietnam, Again? Much of what transpired in the four years of the Iraqi occupation has gradually invoked images, which the administration had tried to ignore and the military did not wish to recall, of the Vietnam quagmire. In the congressional debates of late 2006 and 2007, both sides have repeatedly invoked America’s longest war. “In Vietnam, the White House grew increasingly obsessed with victory, and increasingly divorced from the will of the people,” Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) declared in a speech to the National Press Club on January 20, 2007. “There was no military solution to that war,” he went on, “echoes of that disaster are all around us today.” Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) observed, “I think we all learned a lesson, whether we went or didn’t go, whether we were for it or



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against it, [that] no foreign policy can be sustained in this country without the informed consent of the American people.” Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA) noted that the U.S. was able to withdraw from Vietnam and still won the Cold War. “We were able to walk away from Vietnam,” Senator John McCain (R-AZ), a prisoner of North Vietnam for over five years, retorted, “If we walk away from Iraq, we’ll be back, possibly in the context of a wider war in the world’s most volatile region.” There are serious dangers in emphasizing a comparison because the situations in Iraq and Vietnam differed considerably. If the particulars of the two cases appeared quite dissimilar, there seem to be some similarities in the fashion Washington officials have dealt with them. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, who wrote The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, have suggested that “Bush now faces [President] Johnson’s dilemma, that of a war in which defeat is unthinkable but victory unlikely”. In both cases, despite talk of ‘victory,’ the overriding imperative became simply to avoid defeat.” In both Vietnam and Iraq, the U.S. forces invested considerable time, energy and expense in training national armies. Without doubt South Vietnamese forces received more and better equipment and were more effective than the current Iraqi units. Despite Washington’s support of local political leadership, in both instances the governments America put in place were inadequate. “Unlike their opponents, neither Saigon nor Baghdad gained the legitimacy to inspire their troops,” Gelb and Betts argue, “At bottom, this was always the fundamental problem in both wars. Americans hoped that time would help, but leaders such as South Vietnam’s Nguyen Van Thieu and Iraq’s Nouri al-Maliki were never up to the job.” Viewed in a slightly different light, Robert Kaiser who spent 18 months in Vietnam as a correspondent has written: “Both times, we put our fate in the hands of local politicians who would not follow U.S. orders, who did not see their country’s fate the way we did, and who could not muster the support of enough of their countrymen to produce the outcome Washington wanted.” “My country has done it again,” Kaiser lamented. “We twice took a huge risk in the hope that we could predict and dominate events in a nation whose history we did not know, whose language few of

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us spoke, whose rivalries we didn’t understand, whose expectations for life, politics and economics were all foreign to Americans.”2

Whither Iraq? As sectarian violence continued, the questions became: when will coalition forces be withdrawn? Is there a civil war? Will Iraq be partitioned into three states? The Bush administration has refused to establish a timetable to withdraw American forces and the Iraqi government has not urged withdrawal. Although, some informal benchmarks apparently were discussed with the Iraqi government in late 2006 and early 2007, the administration continued to refused to publicly establish deadlines. The pivotal question regarding an U.S. withdrawal was, when would the Iraqis be ready to assume responsibility for the internal order of the country? On September 7, 2006, the U.S. “formally” turned over control of Iraq’s armed forces to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government as a half-dozen bombs went off in Baghdad. American officers still held command of nine of Iraq’s ten divisions—the majority of the nearly 130,000 troops. There was no indication at the ceremony as to when America’s 145,000 forces would be leaving. A month earlier, General George W. Casey, Jr., the senior U.S. commander in Iraq, indicated that he could “see over the next 12 to 18 months the Iraqi security forces progressing to a point where they can take on the security responsibilities with very little coalition support.” As the civilian death toll continued to climb, President Bush announced in January 2007 his plan to send some 20,000 additional troops to Iraq in the hope this force increase (“surge”) would restore order, increase security and, thus, stabilize the Iraqi government. Bush’s “surge” program failed to receive much public or political support, as the public opinion polls revealed around 70 percent of the American people disapproved of his handling of the Iraqi venture. The new Democratic majorities in the House and Senate opposed the surge program and wanted benchmarks established that pointed to an American withdrawal of its forces.



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The Specter of Civil War. The Pentagon’s September 1, 2006 quarterly report painted a grim picture. Iraqi deaths and injuries in August had exceeded 3,000 a month, creating “conditions that could lead to civil war.” The report revealed that the number of insurgent attacks had almost doubled since the spring of 2004. The most serious problem was seen to be the “unprofessional and, at times, criminal behavior” of certain national police units. Added to this fear were reports that leaders of the Iraqi militias may be losing control over their members. In early August 2006, senior U.S. generals were not quite sure where the insurgency was heading. “Sectarian violence is probably as bad as I’ve seen it, in Baghdad in particular and that if not stopped,” the senior U.S. commander in the Middle East, General John P. Abizaid told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “it is possible that Iraq could move toward civil war.” The suggestion of a civil war in Iraq drew a prompt denial from the administration officials, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice insisted the “Iraqis haven’t made the choice for civil war.” Many Iraqis disagreed with Rice’s assessment and feared the threshold to civil war had been crossed. In retrospect, the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra on February 22, 2006, launched a civil war. There was no loss of lives in twin explosions, but the destruction of the Shiite Muslin shrine unleashed a frenzy of vengeance by Shiites and Sunnis that has resulted in the killing of thousands of Iraqi civilians. A UN report, drawn from Health Ministry statistics, shows that 35,452 Iraqi’s were killed in 2006. (See Chapter 12) “What is happening in Iraq is a disaster and a tragedy,” Adnan Dulaimi, a Sunni Arab leader, told reporters. “It’s bloodshed and killing of the innocents, killing the elderly and women and children. It’s mass killings. It’s nothing less than an undeclared civil war.” “Iraq is witnessing a grave escalation in violence,” the Iraqi Islamic Party, warned. The largest Sunni Arab political organization called on Iraqis “to return to their senses instead of slipping into the abyss.” In the early months of 2007, it was difficult to ascertain if or when the sectarian violence could be contained.3

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Partitioning of Iraq? The idea of partitioning Iraq into three federal regions surfaced again in mid 2006 ostensibly as a means of separating the warring parties. The impetus for this suggestion came from leaders of Iraq’s important Shiite political groups, some of whom were talking of dividing Baghdad with the Tigris River becoming sort of a Berlin Wall separating a largely Shiite east and a mostly Sunni west. “Federalism will cut off all parts of the country that are incubating terrorism from those that are upgrading and improving,” declared Shiite Khudair Khuzai, Minister of Education. “We will do it just like Kurdistan. We will put soldiers along the frontiers.” Assumed in these formulas was that most of the violence was the product of Sunni insurgents, but facts indicated that various Shiite militias were responsible for attacking Sunnis as well competing Shiite factions. The Kurds, of course, already had created a de facto autonomous enclave by pulling together three northern provinces and establishing its own military, intelligence network and prime minister. Its oil ministry continues to claim ownership of 40 percent of Iraq’s productive fields. In September 2006, the Kurdish regional president, Massoud Barzani, banned the flying of Iraqi flags atop government buildings on the grounds it symbolized the years of oppression and bloodshed under Saddam Hussein. The Kurdish enclave has flourished with new apartment houses, commercial buildings and international airports. Since much of the region has been free of terrorist attacks, it has received a growing influx of Kurdish expatriates and Iraqi Arabs fleeing the violence-torn cities. Undoubtedly the Kurdish example encouraged many Shiites to put forth proposals of their autonomy in the south. Abedelaziz Hakim, head of Iraq’s political party the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution, has offered his plan for partition. He wants to create a nine-province district in the basically peaceful south, which would control the other 60 percent of the nation’s proven oil reserves. Therein lay one of the obstacles—access to the revenues from the oil and gas production. Since much of the Sunni’s region lies to the west and northwest and consists of arid desert without oil or



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gas deposits to exploit, they see talk of partition as nothing more than greed. “Controlling these areas [with the oil reserves],” Adnan Dulaimi, a prominent Sunni Arab politician said, “will create a grand fortune that they can exploit. Their motive is that they are thirsty for control and power.” The separating of Shiites and Sunnis would be a daunting task since the major tribes each have both sects in their various branches with a great number of cross-sectarian marriages. Even so, compromises could be achieved that would guarantee the safety of various ethnic enclaves and that would provide an oil-sharing settlement. Turkey poses another obstacle. With restless Kurdish minorities residing in both of their borderlands, neither country would likely view kindly a separate Kurdish state as they fear that Kurds in their border providences would demand to be joined to an independent Kurdistan.4 Improved Iraqi-Iranian Relations? The Iraqi government invited representatives from Iran, Syria, the UN, the U.S., Jordan, the Arab League, Bahrain, Egypt, Russia, France, Britain and China to meet in March 2007. The main topic discussed was the Iraqi government’s plea for conference members to help reduce the violence in that counry. Prime Minister Maliki told them that conforting terrorism “requires ceasing any form of financial and media support and religious cover, as well as logistical support,” for these arms are “killing our children, women and elders and bombing our mosques and churches.” U.S. and Iran delegates did little more that shake hands; they did not hold any face-to-face meetings. While Iraqi officials have acknowledged that some Iranians have engaged in Iraq’s sectarian violence, they do not want their country to become a battleground for the rivalries of foreign powers. Saudi rulers, because of their links with Iraqi Sunnis, have been increasingly worried about the Iraqis opening formal discussions with Shiite Iran or even developing some kind of working agreements. The Saudis fear that their desert kingdom may be pulled into the sectarian struggle, by tribal and family connections, as Iraq’s Shiite factions attack and kill increasing numbers of Iraq’s Sunni Muslims. Alarmed hard-line Saudis have considered

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organizing and funding Iraqi Sunni militias to carry the battle to the Shiites. Indeed, one Saudi official acknowledged, that should the situation in Iraq get “out of hand,” they “absolutely would” feel compelled to enter into the struggle. There is little doubt but many Saudis in Riyadh consider the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq to have been a strategic disaster.5 On May 17, 2007, the U.S. and Iran announced plans for a faceto-face meeting in Bagdad in ten days. Both sides indicated the talks would only deal with the situation in Iraq and not deal with Iran’s nuclear program. Subsequently, on May 28, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan C. Crocker, and Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad, Hassan Kazemi Oomi, conducted the first formal talks between the two nations in nearly 30 years. Although there were no “breakthroughs,” Oomi told reporters, “The two sides dealt with issues in a very frank and transparent and clear way.” Crocker reported, “There was pretty good congruence right down the line—support for a secure, stable, democratic federal Iraq, in control of its own security, at peace with its neighbors.” He also noted that he had told Oomi that the U.S. was “looking for results” and wanted a “change in Iranian behavior.”6 As a dreary 2007 moved on, what the future held for Iraq and America’s commitment was difficult to predict. But it was evident that former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s warning to the president, which likened the proposed invasion of Iraq to a Pottery Barn notice, had been validated—If you break it, you own it.

Notes Prologue 1. John Keegan, The Iraq War (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 36-37. 2. Marion Farouk-Slugett and Peter Slugett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987): 107-122; 203-205 and 255-257; Samir al-Khalil, The Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of Saddam’s Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 1989): entire. 3. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: A Memoir (New York: Bantam Books, 1982): 326-412; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983): 226-231; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1983): 235-272; 426-451. 4. R.K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Revolution and the Persian Gulf,” CH (January 1985): 5-8 ff; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991): 32-33. 5. Farouk-Slugett, Iraq Since 1958, 201-215; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post Sadat Era,” FA (60 (Spring 1982): 769788; Adel Darwish and Gregory Alexander, Unholy Babylon (New York: St. Martin’s Press: 228-240. 6. Carter, Keeping Faith, 480, 524-532; Vance, Hard Choices, 384-395; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 401-402 and 426-451; Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf (New York: Times Books, 1990): 107-108. 7. Keegan, The Iraq War, pp. 58-63. 8. James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Penguin Books, 2004): 123-126; Hiro, Longest War, 114-128; Galia Golan, Moscow and the Middle East (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992): 47-51; Darwish and Alexander, Unholy Babylon, 85-196; Michael T. Klare, “Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East,” BAS 47 (Jan./Feb. 1991): 19-26; “The World’s Most Dangerous Man,” USNWR 108 (4 July 1990): 38-51. 9. “When the Enemy is Us,” USNWR 110 (18 Feb. 1991): 36-88 includes Congressman Hamilton’s quote; also see Thomas B. Allen, et al., CNN: The War in the Gulf (Atlanta, GA: Turner Publishing 1991): 40-50. 10. Hiro, Longest War, 215-221; a critical account is Jonathan Marshall, et al., The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Cover Operations in the Reagan Era (Boston: South End Press, 1987): 7-166; Mann, Vulcans, 150-156; John K. Cooley, Payback: America’s Longest War in the Middle East (New York: Brassey’s, 1991): 22-46. 11. Theodore Draper, “American Hubris: From Truman to the Persian Gulf,” NYRB 34 (16 July 1987): 29-36; James H. Noyes, “Through the Gulf Labyrinth: Naval Escorts and U.S. Policy,” AAA #29 (Summer 1989): 1-19.

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12. Hiro, Longest War, 223-230; Allen, CNN: The War, 30-39. 13 Anthony Cordesman, “The Attack on the U.S.S. Stark: The Tragic Cost of Human Error,” Armed Forces [London] 6:10 (October 1987): 447-450. 14. George C. Wilson, “Navy Missiles Down Iranian Jetliner Over Gulf” WP (4 July 1988): A-1. 15. Keegan, pp. 65-66; Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and Failure of Good Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 2003): 188-189. 16. Hiro, Longest War, 243-250. 17. Stanley Reed, “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,” FA 69(Winter 1990-91): 21-35; Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Crisis, 2nd edition (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992): 291-300; Mohammad Wahby, “The Arab Cooperation Council and the Arab Political Order,” AAA #28 (Spring 1989): 60-67; Oussama Romdhani, “The Arab Maghreb Union Toward North African Integration,” AAA #28 (Spring, 1989): 42-48. 18. On Hussein’s policies, see Efraim Karsh and Imari Rautsu, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: Free Press, 1991): 198-216 and Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest For Power and the Gulf Crisis (New York: John Wiley, 1991): 196-199. 19. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998): 305-308; “A Flood of Immigrants to Israel Raises Hopes and Tensions,” Business Week (Mar. 5, 1990): 45; D. Makovsky, “A Palestinian View: Jews Settling in the West Bank and Gaza,” USNWR 108 (May 7, 1990): 46-47; K. Toolis, “The Man Behind Iraq’s Supergun,” NYT Magazine (Aug. 26, 1990): 46-50ff. 20. For Hussein’s speech see FBIS-NES 90-9064: 32-34; Jill Smolowe, “Stumbling Toward Armageddon,” Time 135 (April 16, 1990): 30-31; James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995): 267-269. 21. Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 305-306; Francis A. Boyle, “George Bush on Jerusalem,” AAA #32 (Spring 1990): 121-122; “Yasser Arafat and the U.N. Security Council,” 25 May 1990) AAA #33 (Summer 1990): 161; Joseph Neff, “U.S., Iraq, Israel and Iran,” AAA #34 (Fall 1990): 37-38. The U.S. veto of the May 1st UNSC Resolution was 14-1 and caused the Arab League’s envoy to say “This is a sad day for Arab moderates. Israel has shown it still has a stronghold on American policy.” Facts on File Yearbook, 1990 (New York: Facts on File, 1991): 396. 22. Alan Cowell, “Iraq Takes Hard Line at Meeting,” NYT (May 29, 1990): A-3 and “Arab Leadership Seeking One Voice,” NYT (May 31, 1990): A-13; for text of Arab Summit statement see FBIS NES-90-105 (May 31, 1990): 1-5. 23. Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State, 186-199; Judith Miller and Mylorie, Saddam Hussein, 14-20. 24. G. Henry Schuler. “Congress Must Take a Hard Look at Iraq’s Charges Against Kuwait,” LAT (2 December 1990): M-4 and 8; Milton Viorst, “The House of Hashem [Jordan],” New Yorker 66 (7 January 1991): 32-37ff. The Kuwaiti document of 22 November 1989 is reprinted in Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent, Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War (New York: Penguin, 1991): 235-241.



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25. Economist, “Kuwait, How the West Blundered,” 20; Facts on File 1990 Yearbook (27 July 1990): 549-550; Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, “Bush’s Secret Efforts Helped Iraq….” LAT (Feb. 23, 1992): 12; George Lardner, Jr. “The U.S.-Iraqi Courtship,” Nation 254 (June 1, 1992: 740-741; for defense of Bush see Brent Scowcroft, “We Didn’t Coddle Hussein, WPNW (Oct. 19-25, 1992): 29; Oberdorfer, Was War Inevitable,” 19ff. 26. Phyllis Bennis and Michael Moushebeck, eds. Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader (Brooklyn, NY: Interlink Publishing, 1991): 391-396. 27. U.S. News editors, Triumph Without Victory (New York: Random House/Times, 1992): 25-26; and Miller and Mylroie, Saddam Hussein, 19-20; see the Jidda meeting in Salinger and Laurent, Secret Dossier, 71-77. 28. Don Oberdorfer, “Was War Inevitable?” WP Magazine (17 March 1991): 19ff; for a defense of Bush’s policies see Brent Scowcroft, “We didn’t Coddle Hussein,” WPNW (19-25 Oct. 1992): 29. 29. Ambassador Glaspie’s conversation with Saddam Hussein became controversial after Iraq released a transcript of the meeting in September 1990, NYT “Excerpts from Iraqi documents…,” (23 Sept. 1990): 13. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s hearings on the Glaspie-Hussein meeting, see NYT, “Envoy to Iraq Faulted in Crisis, Says She Warned Hussein Sternly,” (21 March 1991): 1 and “U.S. Revises Image of Envoy to Iraq,” (22 March 1991): 2. When the Senate Committee obtained State Department copies of Glaspie’s reports in July 1991, however, the ambassador appeared to have deceived the committee, see Elaine Sciolino, “Envoy’s Testimony on Iraq is Assailed,” NYT (13 July 1991): 1, 4 and Pamela Fessler, “A Tough Stance Against Iraq,” CQWR 49 (20 July 1991): 29 ff. After the war, Tariq Aziz told Milton Viorst that Glaspie’s response did not affect Hussein’s policy decision, Viorst, “Report from Baghdad,” New Yorker 37 (24 June 1991): 66-67 as he had already decided to attack if Kuwait did not yield, see Kursh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 1-5 and 204-216. On Bush’s giving a “green light” to Hussein, see Janice G. Stein, “The Challenge of the Persian Gulf Crisis,” Peace and Security 5 (Winter 1990/91): 2-5; Efraim Karsh and Imari Rautai, “Why Saddam Invaded Kuwait,” Survival 33 (January/February 1991): 26-28; and Michael R. Gordon “Pentagon Objected to a Message Bush Sent Iraq Before Invasion,” NYT (25 Oct. 1992): 1, 8.

Chapter 2 The First U.S. - Iraqi War 1. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991): 35-42; George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998): 319-324; H. Norman Schwarzkopf, The Autobiography: It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam, 1992): 302-307; U.S. News Editors, Triumph Without Victory (New York: Random House/Times, 1992): 97-100 indicated Bush lacked hard evidence Iraq would attack Saudi Arabia; Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent, Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War (New York: Penguin, 1991): 96-114 and 137-147; John K. Cooly, “Pre-War Gulf Diplomacy,” Survival 33:2 (Mar./Apr. 1991): 128-135; Jean Edward Smith, George Bush’s War (New York: Holt, 1992): 63-95; Efraim Karsh and Imari Rautsu, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: Free Press, 1991): 217-222.

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2. Woodward, Commanders, 240-273; Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 340-341; Schwarzkopf, Take a Hero, 319-326; Friedman, Desert Victory, 87107. 3. Bush’s August comments, Public Papers of the Presidents, George Bush 1990 (Washington: GPO, 1992): II: 1083-1085, 1097-1098, 1100-1102; Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 326-339; on the Hitler analogy, see Otto Friedreich, ed. Desert Storm (Boston: Little Brown, 1991): 12, 17, 125-127; Bush’s critics, see George Katsificas, “Vietnam and the Persian Gulf’s Historical Parallels,” Z Magazine 4:1 (Jan. 1991): 28-32 and Alexander Cockburn, “Iraq and the Last Temptation of George Bush,” WSJ (Aug. 16, 1990): A-1, 24; on the role of conservatives see Michael Massing, “The Way to War,” in Middle East Reader (New York: New York Review of Books, 1991): 157-160; for a right-wing view, see “The Gulf Crisis,” Global Affairs, 6:1 (Winter 1991): 212-225. 4. James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam, 1995): 1-16, 278-283; Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (New York: Free Press, 1991): 99-104; Phyllis Bemis, “False Consensus: George Bush’s United Nations,” in Bemis, Beyond the Storm, 112-125; Kenneth Archincloss and Daniel Pedereson, “The Staunchest Ally,” Newsweek 116 (Oct. 8, 1990): 2526; Richard Falk, “Twisting the U.N. Charter to U.S. Ends,” in Hamid Mowlana, et al, eds. Triumph of the Image (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992): 175-180. 5. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 277-282; Friedman, Desert Victory, 67-73. 6. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 300-303; Schwarzkopf, Doesn’t Take a Hero, 353-374; Woodward, Commanders, 41-42, 302-314; Thomas Friedman and Patrick Tyler, “The Path to War,” NYT (Mar. 3, 1991): 12; Harry S. Summers, On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell, 1992): 157-160; Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti, In the Eye of the Storm: The Life of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1991): 230-232. 7. Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 378-379; U.S. News, Triumph, 153155; Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War (New York: Routledge, 1992): 208-220. 8. Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 362-366; Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 291-294; Robert Levgold, “The Gulf Crisis and the Future of Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy Revolution,” The Harriman Institute Forum 3:10 (Oct. 1990): 1-8; George D. Church, “A New World Summit,” Time 136 (Sept. 17, 1990: 20-24; Olga Alexandrova, “Soviet Policy in the Gulf Crisis,” Aussen-Politik [English edition]: 231-240; Schwarzkopf, Doesn’t Take a Hero, 375-388; Yevgeni Primakov, “The Inside Story of Moscow’s Quest for a Deal,” Time 137 (Mar. 4, 1991): 40-48; Ammom Kapeliocik, “The U.S.S.R. and the Gulf Crisis,” Journal of Political Science 20:3 (Spring 1991): 70-78; “Interview with Yevgeni Primakov,” in Foreign Policy Bulletin 1:3 (Nov./Dec. 1990): 52-55. 9. Graham E. Fuller, “Moscow and the Gulf War,” FA 70:3 (Summer 1991):55-76; Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 377-378; Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 396-400; Shevardnadze, Future Belongs, 104-111. 10. Bush’s Oct. 1, 1990 address to UN, “The UN: World Parliament of Peace” (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Current Policy No. 1303). 11. Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 374-376, 389-391, 427-428; Woodward, Commanders, 197, 315-318, 343-344; Middle East Watch

Newsletter, “Kuwait’s Stolen Incubators,” Newsletter 4:1 (Feb. 1992) entire issue; Naseer Aruri, “Human Rights and the Gulf Crisis: The Verbal Strategy of George Bush,” in Bemis, Beyond the Storm, 312-318; see exchange with Cockburn, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, in Nation 252 (Apr. 8, 1991): 434, 461-464; on Hill and Knowlton, see Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV War (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992): 67-71. 12. Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 411-412; Friedman, Desert Victory, 44, fn. 1; Richard Wilson, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Case of Iraq,” JPS 20:3 (Spring 1991): 5-15; Bush on Saudi Arabia in Public Papers of President George Bush, 1990, II: 171-174. 13. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 304-325; Woodward, Commanders, 321, 333; U.S. News, Triumph, 173-183; Victor Shichor, “China and the Middle East Since Tianamen,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 519 (Jan. 1992): 86-100. 14. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 325-328; Woodward, Commanders, 333335; Bemis, “False Consensus,” 119-121; Carla Ann Robbins, “All for War Say Aye,” USNWR 109 (Dec. 3, 1990): 28-29; on the January 15 date, see Elaine Sciolino, “An Arbitrary Diplomatic Deal Becomes an Eminent Threat,” NYT (Jan. 15, 1991): A-10. 15. Fred Barnes, “The Hawk Factor: G. Bush,” NR 204 (Jan. 28, 1991): 8-9; Woodward, Commanders, 335-337; CQW, “Administration Makes its Case But Fails to Sway Skeptics,” 48 (Dec. 8, 1990): 4082-4085, 4113-4116; Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 339-344; Peter Rodman, “Waiting for Sanctions,” NR (43 (Jan 28, 1991): 44-45. 16. CQWR, “Gulf Defense Poses Quandry,” (Dec. 1, 1990): 4008-4010; Walter Pincus and Ann Devroy, “Two Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Urge Bush to postpone Action,” NYT (Nov. 29, 1990): A-1, 46; Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 416-423; Woodward, Commanders, 33-40, 331-332. 17. Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 443-446; Hrach Gregorian, “Assessing Congresses’ Involvement in Foreign Policy: Lessons of the PostVietnam Period,” Review of Politics 46:1 (1984): 91-94. 18. Kurt Anderson, “The Watchword is Wariness: Weinberger Outlines Six Criteria for Sending Troops into Combat,” Time 129 (Dec. 10, 1984): 31; Richard Sobol, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 148-157. 19. Fessler, “Members Solemn Over Crucial Choice….” CQWR 49 (Jan. 12, 1991): 66. 20. “Even Votes of Conscience Follow Party Lines,” CQWR 49 (Jan. 12, 1991): 190-204; House and Senate votes in CQWR 49 (Jan. 12, 1991): 135-137. 21. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 346-353; U.S. News, Triumph, 184-185; Friedrich, Desert Storm, 32; Lisa Beyer, “Options for Peace,” Time (Dec. 17, 1990): 28-31; Also see Public Papers of President, George Bush-1990, Vol. II: 1719-1727. 22. Michael Kramer, “Deadline January 15,” Time (Dec. 10, 1990): 2627; R.W. Apple, “U.S. Nightmare Scenario,” NYT (Dec, 19, 1990): A-16; Bill Javetski, “Peace Won’t Come Cheap,” BW (Dec. 24, 1990): 18-20. 23. Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 437-438, 441-443; Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 367-372; Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis (New York: Wiley, 1991): 20-31; European

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peace efforts, see JPS 20:3 (Spring, 1991): 133-134, 136, 181-190; Alan Riding, “For the Europeans; Wary that War Could Hit Home,” WP (Jan. 13, 1991): E-2 and “French Maneuvering: Taking the Lead for Europe,” WP (Jan. 16, 1991): 4. 24. Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 423; Beyer, “Options for Peace,” 29; Alessandra Stanley, “Hostages had Shared Anxiety,” NYT (Dec. 11, 1990): A-1, 16; Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 302-308. 25. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 355-365; Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 437-443; a White House version, U.S. News, Triumph, 198-206; also interview with Browning,” American Arab Affairs #36 (Spring 1991): 118-124. 26. Bemis, “False Consensus,” 121-122; Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm, 302-308; Salinger and Laurent, Secret Dossier, 212-217. 27. Schwarzkopf, Doesn’t Take a Hero, 295-296, 414-416; Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 446-452; Friedman, Desert Victory, 120-146; Patrick E. Tyler, “Battle Plans Are Deadly Simply: The Strategic Weapon is Politics,” NYT (Feb. 10, 1991): E-1, 5. 28. Schwarzkopf, Doesn’t Take a Hero, 416-421; Thomas F. Allen, et al., CNN Reports: War in the Gulf (Atlanta, GA: Turner, 1991): 115-177; Richard Hallion, Storm Over Iraq (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992) has Air Force version; Friedman, Desert Victory, 147-196 is Navy version; Harry J. Summers, Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell, 1992): has Army version. A British version of the war is Bruce Watson, et al., Military Lessons of the Gulf War (London: Greenhill, 1991). 29. Allen, CNN Reports, 154-155; Friedrich, Desert Storm, 54-56; Sciolino, Outlaw State, 256; U.S. News, Triumph, 272-275. 30. Schwarzkopf, Doesn’t Take a Hero, 416-422; Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 451-456, 468; Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 384-390; Friedrich, Desert Storm, 155-166; Allen, CNN Reports, 149-158; U.S. News, Triumph, 130-133, 208-211, 244-250; Friedman, Desert Victory, 191-195; Hallion, Storm Over Iraq, 182-184. On the Patriot ineffectiveness see Thomas Postol, “Lessons From the Gulf War With the Patriot,” IS 16:3 (Winter 1991/92): 119-171 and John Conyers, “The Patriot Myth,” ACT 22 (Nov. 1992): 3-10; Richard Dean Burns and Lester H. Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses: 1944-2003 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2003): 138-143. 31. Schwarzkopf, Doesn’t Take a Hero, 481-482, 453; Allen, CNN Reports, 160-162; Friedrich, Desert Storm, 197-202; Penny Kemp, “For Generations to Come: The Environmental Catastrophe,” in Bemis, Beyond the Storm, 325334. 32. Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 458-459; Allen, CNN Reports, 159; Los Angeles Times Staff, Witness to War (Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles Times, 1991): 24-26; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996): 508-513. 33. Schwarzkopf, Doesn’t Take a Hero, 424-440; Tom Clancy and General Fred Franks, Jr., Into the Storm: A Study in Command (New York: Berkley Books, 1997): 207-209, 309; Friedman, Desert Victory, 197-203; Friedrich, Desert Storm, 71-72. 34. Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 470-487; Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 402-410; Schwarzkopf, Doesn’t Take a Hero, 436, 445-446; Primakov, “The Inside Story,” Time, 40-41; Bennis, “False Consensus,” in Beyond the Storm,



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122-124; Friedrich, Desert Storm, 207-209; Allen, et al., CNN Reports, 187189. 35. Schwarzkopf, Doesn’t Take a Hero, 451-491; Clancy and Franks, Into the Storm, 246-452; John T. Carney and Benjamin F. Schemmer, No Room for Error: The Covert Operations of America’s Tactical Units from Iran to Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine, 2002): 224-236; Allen, CNN Reports, 190-215; Friedrich, Desert Storm, 61-96; U.S. News, Triumph, 294-398; Douglas Waller, “Secret Warriors,” Newsweek, 117 (June 17, 1991): 20-29; H. Schwarzkopf’s briefing in Summers, On Strategy II, 268-294. Stephen Sackur, On the Basra Road (London: Review of Books, 1991) and Ramsay Clark, et al., War Crimes: A Report on U.S. War Crimes Against Iraq (Washington, DC: Maisonneuve Press, 1992): 90-93. 36. Schwarzkopf, Doesn’t Take a Hero, 447-500; Bush and Scowcroft, Transformed, 484-490; Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 436-438; U.S. News, Triumph, 400-402; Douglas Waller, et al., “The Day We Stopped the War,” Newsweek 119 (Jan. 20, 1992): 16-25; see John Lancaster, “Cutting the Iraqi Army Down to Size,” WPNW (Mar 4-10, 1992): 11. 37. Bush’s March 6 speech in Public Papers of the Presidents, George Bush-1991, I: 218-222; Elaine Sciolino, “Iraq is Left to the Mercy of Saddam Hussein,” NYT (Apr. 7, 1991): A-1, 3; Stephen Hubbell, “The Iraqi Opposition: From Babel to Baghdad,” Nation 252 (Apr. 15, 1991): 477-480; Judith Miller, “Show of Force on Iraq,” NYT (Aug. 30, 1992): A-5; for a summary of the insurrections, see Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm, 400-404. 38. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 431-438; on Kurds initial success, see Lisa Beyer, “Getting Their Way,” Time 137 (Apr. 1, 1991): 34; on Kurds failure, Clyde Haberman, “Fault Lines,” NYT (Apr. 14, 1991): A-1,2 and “The Kurds in Flight Once Again,” NYT Magazine (May 15, 1991): 33-36 ff.; on Operation Comfort, Carney and Schemmer, No Room for Error, 236-244; Peter Galbraith reported to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Civil War In Iraq, 102 Cong. 1st Session, 8 Part 10-2-27 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991; Patrick Tyler, “U.S. to Help Retrieve Data on Iraqi Torture of Kurds,” NYT (May 17, 1992): A-3; Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm, 404-411 and for text of resolution 688, see pages 548-549. 39. “How Many Iraqi [Soldiers] Died,” Time (June 17, 1991): 26; Holly Sklar, “Deliberate Damage,” Z Magazine 4:11 (Nov. 1991): 25; U.S. News, Triumph, 406-407 estimates from 6,500 to 18,000 Iraqis were killed; Barton Gellman, “Truth Telling Can be Fatal Professionally,” WPNW (Mar. 16-20, 1992): 3132 reports a U.S. Census Bureau demographer was fired after estimating Iraqi deaths were 86,194 men, 39,612 women, and 32,195 children. 40. Bruce Van Voorst, “They Didn’t Have to Die,” Time (Aug. 26, 1991): 20; Barton Gellman, “A Grim Tally that Has Grown,” WPNW (Aug. 19-25, 1991): 33; U.S. News, Triumph, 373 indicates there were 11 to 18 additional “friendly fire” deaths over the 35 reported by the Pentagon; on British deaths by U.S. friendly fire see William J. Eaton, “U.S. Urged to Atone for ‘Friendly Fire’,” LAT (July 27, 1991): A-14. 41. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 438-441; Patrick Tyler, “Contradictions in U.S. Policy,” NYT (Mar. 31, 1991): A-1, 3 and Tyler, “‘Unjust’ U.N. Condition for a Cease-fire,” NYT (Apr. 7, 1991): A-1, 12-13; Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm, 408 and text of Resolution 687, pages 540-548.

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42. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 443-469, 487-509; Phyllis Bennis, “Palestinians Look For a Way In,” Nation 253 (Nov. 4, 1991): 546-549. 43. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 510-515; Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2004): 46-78; Yossi Beilin, Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accords to a Final Agreement. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999): 42-46; Jackson Diehl, “A Shotgun Peace Party in Madrid,” WPNW (Oct. 28-Nov. 3, 1991): 13 and “Yitzhak Shamir: A Rock in a Sea of Change,” WPNW (Nov. 4-10, 1991): 16. 44. Ross, Missing Peace, 79-82; Joel Brinkley, “In the Mideast, Just Talking Beats the Odds,” NYT (Oct. 27, 1991): A-1, 4; Sari Nusseibeh, “A Palestinian Perspective and “Interview with Israeli’s Chief Negotiator,” MEI 8:3 (Jan./Feb. 1992): 9-14; Thomas Friedman, “Amid Histronics,” NYT (Nov. 3, 1991): A-1, 4.

Chapter 3

Policy of Containment, 1991-2001

1. On Kurds see Clyde Haberman, “The Kurds in Flight Once Again,” NYT Magazine (May 15, 1991): 33-36ff; Lisa Beyer, “Walking the Beat in Iraq,” TI 137 (May 13, 1991): 30-34; Christopher Hitchens, “Struggle of the Kurds,” National Geographic 182 (Aug. 1992): 32-62; on Shiites see, Patrick Tyler, “Contradictions in U.S. Policy,” NYT (Mar. 31, 1991): A-1, 3; on no-fly zones see Dilip Hiro, Iraq In the Eye of the Storm (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002): 45-49. 2. Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein (New York: Harper, 1999): 94-97, 105-107; Patrick E. Tyler, Baghdad Formally Agrees to ‘Unjust” U.N. Conditions for Permanent Cease-Fire,” NYT (April 7, 1991): A-1, 12-13; William Scott Malone, “Like Playing Poker With Our Cards Face Up,” WPNW (Nov. 11-17, 1991): 22-23; Murray Waas and Douglas Frantz, “U.S. Gave Data To Iraq 3 Months Before Invasion,” LAT (Mar. 10, 1992): A-1, 12. On Bush’s involvement in Iraq as vice president and president, see Waas and Frantz in LAT for Feb.23, 1992, pp. 1, 3; Feb. 24, pp. 1, 12-13; Feb. 25, pp. 1, 10-11; Mar. 10, pp. 1, 12; Mar. 22, pp. 1, 20-22. Rolf Ekeus, “Unearthing Iraq’s Arsenal,” ACT 22 (Apr. 1992): 6-9; Jon Wolfsthal, “Iraq Detains UN Inspectors,” ACT 21 (Oct. 1990): 32-32; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “Iraq’s Quest for the Nuclear Grail: What Can We Learn,” ACT 22 (July-Aug. 1992): 3-11. 3. Rolf Ekeus, “Unearthing Iraq’s Arsenal,” ACT 22 (April 1992): 6-9; Michael Duffy, “Can Bush Keep Saddam from Building an Atom Bomb?” TI 138 (July 22, 1991): 16-17; Mahdi Obeidi, The Bomb In My Garden: Secrets of Saddam’s Nuclear Mastermind (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004): 6-8 and 144154; reports on UNSCOM and IAEA inspections, see David Albright and Mark Hibbs in BAS, Vol. 47 (Mar. 1991): 16-28; (Sept. 1991): 14-23; (Oct. 1991): 7-9; and Vol. 48 (Jan. 1992): 30-48; (Apr. 1992): 27-37; (June 1992): 8-10. 4. Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2002): 36-37; Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Claims on Scud Disputed,” NYT (June 24, 1992): A-6; also see Mark Miller, Spectacle: Operation Desert Storm and the Triumph of Illusion (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992).



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5. Jon Wolfstal, “Iraq Agrees to Destroy Missiles,” ACT 22:3 (April 1992): 18; Ann Devroy, “UN and Iraq End Inspection Standoff,” WP (July 17, 1992): A-1, 13; Ritter, Endgame, 41-46. 6. Warren Christopher, Chances of a Life Time: A Memoir (New York: Scribner, 2001): 232-235; Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax, 2003): 273-274; Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999): 158161 and 201; Seymour Hersh, “A Case Not Closed,” NY (Nov. 1, 1993): 80-92; Tim Weiner, “Attack is Aimed at Heart of Iraq’s Spy Network,” NYT (June 27, 1993): A-1, 13. 7. Paul Lewis, “Iraq Agrees to Allow the UN to Monitor Weapons Industries,” NYT (July 20, 1993): A-1, 7 and “Bowing to UN, Iraq Will Permit Monitors,” (Nov. 27, 1993): A-1, 5; Tim Trevan, “Ongoing Monitoring and Verification,” ACT 24 (May 1994): 11-15 and Trevan, Saddam’s Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq’s Hidden Weapons (London: Harper/Collins, 1999): 225-233. 8. Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999): 230-235; Michael Gordon, “U.S. Jets over Iraq Attack Own Helicopters in Error,” NYT (April 15, 1994): A-1, 12. 9. Douglas Jehl, “Clinton Sends More Planes to Mideast, Saying He Sees No Sign of Iraq Pullback,” NYT (Oct. 11, 1994): A-1, 11; Barbara Crossette, “Security Council Condemns Iraq’s Threat to Kuwait,” NYT (Oct. 16, 1994): A-17. 10. Ritter, Endgame, 46-52; Dilip Hiro, Iraq: In the Eye of the Storm (New York: Thunder Mouth’s Press, 2002): 95-97; Cordesman, Iraq: Sanctions, 213215; Cockburn, Out of the Ashes, 192-210; Mahdi, Bomb in My Garden, 162172 on Kamel’s defection. Compare Jeff Stein, Saddam’s Bombmaker (New York: Scribner’s, 2000): 321-323 with Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command (New York: Harper Collins, 2004): 212-214 about Hamza’s unpublished work: “Fizzle: Iraq and the Atomic Bomb.” For October report see Trevan, Saddam’s Secrets, 332-345. 11. Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, 79-80; for U.S. documents on Iraq’s non-compliance and Resolution 706, see Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:3 (Nov./Dec. 1991): 707-715; James Fine, “The Humanitarian Imperative in Iraq,” MEI 8:2 (Sept./Oct. 1991): 44-45. 12. Albright, Madam Secretary, 273-276; Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, 81-83; Ritter, Endgame, 147-150, 193-198. 13. Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, 231-234; Hiro, Iraq: Eye of the Storm, 84-89; Cockburn, Out of the Ashes, 235-250; Cordesman, Iraq: Sanctions, 206-207; on Kurds see Kanan Makiya, “The Politics of Betrayal,” NYRB (Oct. 17, 1996): 8-12. 14. Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, 284-287; Ritter, Endgame, 149150. 15. Interview with Benon V. Seven, “Oil for Food: The Programme in Action,” MEI (Sept./Oct. 1998): 13-17; Mahdi, Bomb In My Garden, 175, 182; Elizabeth Rubin, “The Battle Within [on Saddam’s architect],” NYT Magazine (Oct. 12. 2003): 88-91; for criticism of economic sanctions, see Geoff Simons, Targeting Iraq: Sanctions & Bombing in US Policy (London: Saqi Books, 2002): 233-239; for Saddam’s expenditures: Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam,

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158-172; Susan Blaustein, “Saddam Hussein’s Billions,” WPNW (Aug. 12-18, 2002): 26. 16. Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, 118-119; Hiro, Eye of the Storm, 141-142. 17. Madeline Albright, Madam Secretary, 276-280; Ritter, Endgame, 180; Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Growing Crisis of Global Security, rev. ed., (New York: Public Affairs, 2001): 118-120; Cordesman, Iraq: War of Sanctions, 217-231 and day by day events, 231-242. 18. Ibid., 242-253; Butler, Greatest Threat, 127, 135-145 includes MOU text; Ritter, Endgame, 180-182; Russell Watson and Bill Powell, “Yeltsin’s War Games [aid Iraq],” NW (Feb. 23, 1998): 34-38; Barton Gellman, Dana Priest and Bradley Graham, “As the Threat of Force Grew, So Did the Doubts,” WPNW (Mar. 9, 1998): 15-16; Bruce W. Nelan, “Can This Deal Work?” and “Dealing with Saddam,” interview with Kofi Annan, TI (Mar. 9, 1998): 54-64; Hiro, Iraq: Eye of Storm, 116-117. 19. Albright, Madam Secretary, 282-284; Hiro, Iraq: Eye of the Storm, 115; Bruce Nelan, “Selling the War Badly [at Ohio State],” TI (Mar. 2, 1998): 2632; Steven Erlanger, “Arabs See Double Standard in U.S. Backing for Israel,” NYT (Feb. 21, 1998): A-5; Josef Joffe, “Europe Displays Ambivalence Toward a Military Showdown,” WPNW (Feb. 18, 1998): 21; Ritter, Endgame, 182189, 218-219 and Ritter, Frontier Justice (New York: Context Books, 2003): 31; Mahdei, Bomb in My Garden, 174-175; on “smart sanctions,” see Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2004): 56-57; Geoff Simons Targeting Iraq: Sanctions and Bombing in US Policy (London, UK: Saqi Books, 2002): 209-231 had details about ‘smart sanctions.” 20. Lester H. Brune, United States & the Balkan Crisis (Claremont: Regina Books, 2005): 41; Albright, Madam Secretary, 283-284 does not name Ritter but he had resigned, see Ritter, Endgame, 15-29, 218-219. Ritter, Endgame, 181-182 and Ritter, Frontier Justice: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Bushwacking of America (New York: Context Books, 2003): 31; Butler, Greatest Threat, 39-45, 51-52, 178-183; Mahdi, Bomb in My Garden, 174-184. 21. Butler, Greatest Threat, 185-212 details UNSCOM’s last inspection; Johanna McGeary, “The Whites of His (Saddam’s) Eyes,” TI (Nov. 23, 1998): 42-48. 22. Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004): 833-834; Albright, Madam Secretary, 283-287; Butler, Greatest Threat, 195-212 has details preceding bombing; Cordesman, Iraq: Sanctions, 269-382 includes day by day data; Richard S. Newman, “Bombs Over Baghdad,” USNWR 125 (Dec. 28, 1998): 32-37; William Arkin, “Desert Fox’s Real Mission,” WPNW (Jan 29, 1999): 22; Kay quoted in Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006): 20-21; Bruce W. Nelan, “Bugging Saddam,” Time (Jan. 18, 1999): 42-43. Seymour M. Hersh, “Saddam’s Best Friend: Has the C.I.A. Made it a Lot Easier for the Iraqi Leader to Rearm?” New Yorker (April 5, 1999): 32-41; Ritter, Endgame, 131-146. 23. Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000): 227-284; Albright, Madam Secretary, 405-421; Clinton, My Life, 849-861; Butler, Greatest Threat, 222-228; Steven Lee Myers and Tim Weiner,



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“Weeks of Bombing Leave Iraq’s Power Structure Shaken,” NYT (Mar 7, 1999): A-4. 24. Agence France-Presse, “Iraqi Official Defies Sanctions with Flight to Damascus,” NYT (Nov. 16, 2001): A-6; Howard Schneider, “In Iraq, It’s Almost Business as Usual,” WPNW (March 5, 2001): 15; David Cortright, “A Hard look at Iraq Sanctions,” Nation (Dec. 3, 2001): 20-24; summary of Iraq sanctions, David Reiff, “Were Sanctions Right?” NYT Magazine, July 27, 2003): 41-46; Simons, Targeting Iraq, 233-238 is critical of any sanctions. 25. Butler, Greatest Threat, 222-228; Sarah Graham-Brown and Chris Toensing, “Backgrounder on Inspections and Sanctions,” in Michah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds. The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Touchstone/Simon & Schuster, 2003): 165-173; Blix, Disarming Iraq, 44-53. 26. Agence France-Presse, “Iraqi Official Defies Sanctions with Flight to Damascus,” NYT (Nov. 16, 200): A-6; Howard Schneider, “In Iraq, It’s Almost Business as Usual,” WPNW (March 5, 2001): 15; Steven Lee Myers and Eric Schmitt, “Iraq Rebuilt Bombed Arms Plants, Officials Say,” NYT (Jan. 22, 2001): A-1, 6. 27. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2004): 788-790; Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002): 201-207. 28. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2004): 14-15; Michael Ignatieff, “Bush’s First Strike,” NYRB (Mar. 29, 2001): 6-10; Michael R. Gordon, “New Bush, Old Team Vs. Saddam Hussein,” NYT (Feb. 18, 2001): A-8; Jamal Halaby, “U.S. Allies Condemn Air strike on Iraq,” AP wire (Feb. 18, 2001).

Chapter 4

Preparing for War Again

1. Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004): 935-936; Richard Clark, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004): 227-231. 2. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004): 9-13. 3. Scott Ritter, Frontier Justice: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Bushwhacking of America (New York: Context Books, 2003): 71-74; PNAC, “An Open Letter to President Clinton,” in Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents and Opinions (New York: Touchstone, 2003): 199-201; see Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Gideon Rose, “The Rollback Fantasy (Iraq),” FA (Jan./Feb. 1999): 24-41. 4. Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004): 7086, 96-97; Geoff Simons, Targeting Iraq: Sanctions and Bombing in US Policy (London, UK: Saqi Books, 2002): 216- 231; Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2004): 55-57; Woodward, Plan of Attack, 13-16. 5. Woodward, Plan of Attack, 18-27; Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002):49, 60-61, 83-88.



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A-11; House Joint Resolution 114 in Sifry and Cerf, Iraqi War Reader, pp. 378383. 18. Robert C. Byrd, Losing America: Confronting a Reckless and Arrogant Presidency (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004): 160-177, speech of Oct. 10, pp. 230-235; Byrd’s Oct. 4 speech in Sifry and Cerf, Iraq War Reader, 375-377. Drew, “War Games,” NYRB: 67-68; Woodward, Plan of Attack, 203-204. For excerpts of House debate of JR 114, see Sifry and Cerf, Iraqi War Reader, 359366. 19. “Excerpts from Senate Debate on Authorization to Use Force Against Iraq,” NYT (Oct. 5, 2002): A-9; also see: Sifry and Cerf, Iraqi War Reader, 359366, 370-374. 20. David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “House, in 296-133 Vote, Backs Bush Using Force Against Iraq,” NYT (Oct. 11, 2002) A-1, 14; Neil A. Lewis, “Congress Lets Slip the Dogs of War,” NYT (Oct. 13, 2002): A-5. 21. Romesh Ratnesar and Andrew Pervis, “To Catch a Cheat,” TI (Nov. 25, 2002): 28-32; James Dao, “Arms Inspectors are Set to Begin in Iraq,” NYT (Nov. 25, 2002): A-1, 14; “Letter (and Translation) from Iraq: Let the Inspectors Come to Baghdad,” NYT (Nov. 14, 2002): A-14; Blix, Disarming Iraq, 95-97; John F. Burns, “Test of Power: Inspectors Tour An Iraqi Palace [al Sayoud],” NYT (Dec. 4, 2002): A-1, 16. 22. John F. Burns, “U.N. Team Gets to Work, Wary of Both Iraq and U.S.,” NYT (Dec. 4, 2002): A-1, 14. 23. Blix, Disarming Iraq, 99-109; John F. Burns, “Iraq Says Report to the U.N. Shows No Banned Arms,” NYT (Dec. 8, 2002): A-1, 17; Patrick E. Tyler, “Showing ‘Talons of the Dove,’ Powell Presses for Compliance by Iraqis;” “In Powell’s Words;” and “The U.S. Catalogs ‘Material Omissions,” NYT (Dec. 20, 2002): A-12 and A-14. Neil MacFarquhar, “Iraq Insists U.S. Experts are Rushing to Judgment,” NYT (Dec. 20, 2002): A-12. 24. Woodward, Plan of Attack, 239-240, 244-256; Blix, Disarming Iraq, 111-114, 232-233; Julia Preston, “U.N.’s Inspectors Fault Iraq Data For Arms Program,” NYT (Jan. 10, 2003): A-1, 10, “Inspectors Find Empty Warheads in an Iraqi Depot,” NYT (Jan. 17, 2003): A-1, 10. Michael R. Gordon, “Agency Challenges Evidence Against Iraq Cited By Bush,” NYT (Jan. 17, 2003): A-10, “Report of Nuclear Quest [ElBaradei],” (Jan. 10, 2003): A- 10; Neil MacFarquhar, “Iraq Says It Will Reply to U.N. Arms Queries,” NYT (Jan. 10, 2003): A-11. 25. Woodward, Plan of Attack, 228-231, 256-274, 347-349, 375-376, 394396. Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr. The Iraqi War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003): 73-74. Wesley Clark, Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire (New York: Public Affairs, 2003): 21-23; Don Van Natta, Jr. “Bush Was Set on Path to War. Memo by British Adviser Says,” NYT (Mar. 27, 2006): A-1, 10. 26. Blix, Disarming Iraq, 117-118, 139-141; Julia Preston, “U.N. Weapons Inspectors Criticizes Iraq’s Cooperation,” (Jan. 28, 2003): A-1, 8, A-8, 10-11. 27. Sifry and Cerf, Iraq War Reader, 479-181 reprints Paul Lashmar and Raymond Whitaker, “M16 and CIA: The New Enemy Within,” Independent (Feb. 9, 2003). Bush’s speech, “President’s State of the Union Message to Congress and the Nation,” NYT (Jan. 29, 2003): A-12, 13, “Democrat’s Response to Bush’s Address to Congress” and Carl Hulse and Sheryl Gar Stolberg, “Democrat’s Say

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the Nation Heads ‘in the Wrong Direction,’” p. 13. Woodward, Plan of Attack, 294-295; Dan Eggen and Susan Schmidt, “Bin Laden Calls Iraqis to Arms,” WP (Feb. 12, 2003): A-1, 14; see Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004): 212-214. 28. Powell’s speech in Craig R. Whitney, ed., The WMD Mirage: Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War (New York: Public Affairs, 2005): 77-106; Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003): 158-160; Woodward, Plan of Attack, 297-312; Eric Schmitt and Julia Preston, “U.S. Ready to Back New U.N. Measure,” NYT (Feb. 7, 2003): A-1, 10, “Powell Speech at U.N. Compared With Data From Prior Intelligence,” p. 11. Richard W. Stevenson, “France and China Rebuff Bush on Support for Early Iraq War,” NYT (Feb. 8, 2003): A-1, 8; Craig S. Smith, “France and Germany Pushing for Extended Iraq Inspections,” NYT (Feb. 10, 2003): A-10. Blix, Disarming Iraq, 152-157. 29. On Al-Qaeda link, see The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004): 334-338; Douglas Jehl, “Tracing Connections,” in The 9/11 Report: With Reporting and Analysis by the New York Times (New York: St. Martin’s, 2004): lviii-lix, 477-484. Sarah I. Yall, “Britain Admits That Much of Its Report on Iraq Came from Magazines,” NYT (Feb. 8, 2003): A-8. The British Independent article about al-Zarqawi in Sifry and Cerf, Iraq War Reader, 479-481. “Bin Laden Urges Muslims to Attack—Excerpts of tape,” WP (Feb. 12, 2003): A-14. David Johnston, “Top U.S. Officials Tell Lawmakers of Iraq-Qaeda Ties,” NYT (February 12, 2003): A-1, 16. Christopher Scheer, et al., The Five Biggest Lies Bush Told Us About Iraq (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003): 42-64. 30. Blix, Disarming Iraq, 161-166, 175-181; Mahdi Obeidi, The Bomb In My Garden (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004): 192-194; Julia Preston, “Powell Calls for Security Council to Act Against Iraq,” NYT (Feb.15, 2003): A-1, 6. Steven R. Weisman, “Powell Says More Inspectors in Iraq Are ‘Not the Answer’,” and Ian Fisher, “Hussein Issues Decree to Ban Weapons of Mass Destruction,” NYT (Feb. 15, 2003): A-7. For Powell’s comments and inspector’s reports see: NYT (Feb. 15, 2003): A-8. 31. Blix, Disarming Iraq, 198-203; “In Blix’s Words,” NYT (Mar. 1, 2003): A-7; Whitney, The WMD Mirage, 125-139. 32. Felicity Barringer and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Says Hussein Must Cede Power to Head Off War,” and Patrick E. Tyler, “Adding Exile to Iraq Mix,” NYT (Mar. 1, 2003): A-1, 7. 33. Ian Fisher, “Experts See High Risk of Strife In Iraq if Hussein Is Deposed,” NYT (Mar.1, 2003): A-8. 34. Blix, Disarming Iraq, 188-190; Mahdi, Bomb in My Garden, 197-198; Julia Preston and Eric Schmitt, “Experts Confirm New Iraqi Missile Exceeds U.N. Limit,” NYT (Feb. 23, 2003): A-1, 17. “Blix’s List: “Missile Parts Marked For Destruction,” NYT (Feb. 22, 2003): A-8. 35. Blix, Disarming Iraq, 206-207; foreign ministers’ Memorandum is in Sifry and Cerf, Iraq War Reader, 501-502.



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36. Blix, Disarming Iraq, 215-236; Steven R. Weisman and Felicity Barringer, “Powell Attacks Validity of the Work by Weapons Inspectors in Iraq,” NYT (Mar. 6, 2003): A- 15, and “Powell’s Words: Saddam Hussein Remains Guilty,” NYT (Mar. 7, 2003): A-1, 9. 37. Bush text in Whitney, The WMD Mirage, 140-151; David E. Sanger and Felicity Barringer, “President Seems to Prepare Nation for Imminent War,” NYT (Mar. 7, 2003): A-1, 11. 38. Whitney, The WMD Mirage, 152-165; Blix, Disarming Iraq, 210-213; Felicity Barringer, “U.N. Split Widens as Allies Dismiss Deadline on Iraq,” NYT (Mar, 8, 2003): A-1, 7. 39. For U.S.-British resolution, see Sifry and Cerf, Iraq War Reader, 499502; Straw’s amendment, Blix, Disarming Iraq, 212-213 and 242-248. Steven Gray, “Chirac Says Give Iraq A Deadline of 30 Days,” WP (Mar. 17, 2003): A-13. 40. Woodward, Plan of Attack, 356-372; Blix, Disarming Iraq, 243-250, 252-253.; Karen DeYoung, “Bush, Allies Give Diplomacy 24 More Hours,” WP (Mar. 17, 2003): A-1, 12, with “Statement of the Azores Summit.” Text of Mar. 17 in Whitney, The WMD Mirage, 140-151. 41. Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 2003): 128-136; 143-156; Douglas Kellner, From 9/11 to Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003): 1-7, 213-216 and ft. 19, p. 300. Elizabeth Becker, “U.S. Issues Warning to Europeans on Dispute Over New Court,” NYT (Aug. 26, 2002): A-8. George Perkovick, “Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation,” FA (Mar./April 2003): 2-8. 42. John W. Dean, Worse than Watergate: the Secret Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Little Brown, 2004): 131-136. 43. Patrick Buchanan, “After the War,” and Eric Margolis, “Iraq Invasion: The Road to Folly,” The American Conservative (Oct. 2, 2002): 6, 10-13. 44. Lynette Clemetson, “Thousands Gather in Capital to Protest Iraq War Plans,” NYT (Jan. 19, 2003): A-12; Dean E. Murphy, “On Day of Their Own, Thousands Rally in San Francisco,” NYT (Feb. 17, 2003): A-10; Leslie Eaton, “High School and College Students Rally, Skipping Class for Peace (and Frisbee),” NYT (Mar. 6, 2003): A-12. Editors, “Dissents and Disconnects,” NA (Mar. 24, 2003): 3. 45. John F. Burns, “12 Americans Stage a Protest Hussein Is Happy to Allow,” NYT (Oct. 27, 2002): A-8. 46. Prestowitz, Rogue Nation, 230-244; Philip H. Gordon, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide,” FA (Jan./Feb. 2003): 70-83. Steven Erlanger, “For Now, Trading Allies for Votes,” NYT (Sept. 15, 2002): A-4. Erlanger, “Bush-Hitler Remark [by Schroder] Shows as U.S. Issue in German Election,” NYT (Sept. 20, 2002): A-1, 8; Ignacio Ramonet, “Servile States: Puppets not Partners,” La Monde Diplomatique in World Press Review (December 2002): 7-8; James Graff and Bruce Crumly, “France is Not a Pacifist Country,” an interview with Jacques Chirac, TI (February 24, 2003): 32-33. Richard Bernstein, “European Union Says Iraq Must Disarm Quickly and Fully,” NYT (Feb. 18, 2003): A-11. Eric Alterman, “USA Oui! Bush NON!” NA (Feb. 10, 2003): 11-18. Timothy Garton Ash, “Anti-Europeanism in America,” NYRB (Feb. 21, 2003): 32-34.

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Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver Unbound: America’s Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq (New York: Roman & Littlefield, 2004): 1-17; Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West (New York: Random House, 2004): 55-63. 47. Martha Kearney, “Blair’s Gamble,” in Sara Beck and Malcolm Downing, eds., The Battle for Iraq: BBC News Correspondents on the War Against Saddam (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2003): 79- 91; Sifry and Cerf, Iraq War Reader, 502; Rovert J. McCartney, “Blair Braces for War’s Political Cost,” WP (Mar. 17, 2003): A-13. 48. Prestowitz, Rogue Nation, 244-264; Richard D. Burns and Lester H. Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses, 1944-2003 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2003): 165-167, 196-199; James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, “How To Deal With North Korea,” FA (Mar./April, 2003): 16- 30; David E. Sanger “Asia’s Splits Deepen Korea Crisis,” NYT (Dec. 29, 2002): WK 1-10; James Dao, “Powell Seeks China’s Help, And, at U.N., Its Abstention,” NYT (Feb. 24, 2003): A-9; Keith Bradsher, “Seoul Rallies Highlights a Generation Gap,” NYT (Mar. 2, 2003): A-13. 49. Prestowitz, Rogue Nation, 261-264; John Waterbury, “Hate Your Politics, Love Your Institutions,” FA (Jan./Feb. 2003): 58-68; Jane Perlez, “Arabs By Degrees, Oppose American Attack on Iraq,” NYT (Sept. 6, 2002): A-10 and “Among Nations in the Region, Jordan Could Suffer Most From a U.S. Assault on Iraq,” NYT (Sept. 15, 2002): A-13; Anthony Shadid, “To Many in the Arab World, Hussein’s No Hero,” WPNW (Feb. 24/Mar. 2, 2003): 15 and “Scholars Urge Jihad in Event of Iraq War,” WP (Mar. 11. 2003): A-12; Clyde Prestowitz, “America vs. the World,” WPNW (July 15, 2002): 23.

Chapter 5 The Second U.S.-Iraqui War 1. Raffi Khatachadouian, “Relearning to Love the Bomb.” NA (April 1, 2002): 24-27; Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb, “Preemption as a Defense,” WPNW (June 17-23, 2002): 29; Michael Elliott, “Strike First and Explain Yourself Later,” TI (July 1, 2002): 29; Peter Slevin, “The Presidents’ New Doctrine of Preemption,” WPNW (Sept. 30/Oct. 6, 2002): 9. Also, see “History and Understanding the Iraq War,” Passport: Newsletter of Society for Historians of Foreign Relations (Dec. 2004): 13-21. 2. For war plans, see Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, An American Soldier: General Tommy Franks (New York: 10Regan Books, 2004): 328-397; Wesley K. Clark, Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire (New York: Public Affairs, 2003): 9-11; Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced By War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 63-65 and Bacevich, “A Modern Major General,” New Left Review (Sept./Oct. 2004): 123-134. 3. Franks, American Soldier, 404-407; Dexter Filkins, “U.S. Demands for Help Roil Turkey’s Government,” NYT (Dec. 21, 2002): A-10; Richard Bernstein and Steven R. Weisman, “NATO Settles Rift Over Aid to Turks in Case of War,” NYT (Feb. 17, 2003): A-1, 8; Weisman, “Powell Patches Things Up, As Turkey Consents to Help,” NYT (April 3, 2003): B-9. 4. Franks, American Soldier, 428, 500-501; Barry Schweid, “Powell Works



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on Turkish Dispute,” AP (Feb. 20, 2003); Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Rebukes the U.N. and NATO on Iraq Approach,” NYT (Feb. 9, 2003): A-1, 11; Dexter Flikins, “In Defeat of U.S. Plan, Turks See a Victory for Democracy,” NYT (Mar. 5, 2003): A-11; Philip P. Pan, “Turkey Lets U.S. Use Airspace,” WP (Mar. 21, 2003): A-24. 5. Jim Muir, “The Northern Front and the Kurds Endgame,” in Sara Beck and Malcom Downing, eds, Battle for Iraq: BBC News Correspondents on the War Against Saddam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003): 159-165; Janine di Giovanni, “The Enemy of Our Enemy” NYT Magazine (Feb. 20, 2000): 46-49; C.J. Chivers, “U.S. Said to Ready Iraqi Kurdish Areas for Possible War,” NYT (Dec. 2, 2002): A-1, 16; Chivers, “Repulsing Attack by Islamic Militants, Iraqi Kurds Tell of Atrocities,” NYT (Dec. 6, 2002): A-14; Chivers, “Iraqi Opposition is Uneasy Over Delays and War Plans,” NYT (Feb. 14, 2003): A-12. Judith Miller and David Rohde, “Regional Squabbling Scuttles an Iraqi Opposition Meeting,” NYT (Feb. 25, 2003): A-11; Chivers, “4 Are Killed in Suicide Bombing at Checkpoint in Northern Iraq,” NYT (Feb. 27, 2003): A-11; Agence France-Presse, “Iraqi Groups in Opposition to Hussein Show Fissures,” NYT (Mar. 2, 2003): A-11; Rhode, “For Kurds, Big Menace is an Invasion by Turkey,” NYT (Mar. 7, 2003): A-9; Daniel Williams, “Kurdish Militias Eager to Join U.S. in Northern Assault,” WP (Mar. 21, 2003): A-24. 6. Franks, American Soldier, 466-468; Clark, Winning Wars, 9-21; Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003): 71-73; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003): 20-22; Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Sends 600 troops and Antimissile Systems to Defend Israel if Iraq Attacks,” NYT (Jan. 16, 2003): A-10. 7. Franks, American Soldier, 413-417; Clark, Winning Wars, 21-26; Michael Gordon, “U.S. Is Striking Iraqi Sites that Threaten Kuwait,” NYT (Mar. 2, 2003): A-1, 12; Warren Hoge,” Britain Sending 26,00 More Troops to the Gulf,” NYT (Jan. 21, 2003): A-9. 8. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Testing Missiles and Spy planes In the Gulf Buildup,” NYT (Dec. 23, 2002): A-12; Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “ U.S. Military Set to Provide Aid to Iraq People in the Event of War, Commander Says,” NYT (Feb. 11, 2003): A-11 and “Firing Leaflets and Electrons, U.S. Wages Information War,” NYT (Feb. 19, 2003): A-1, 7. Michael Ware, “The Secret Collaborators,” TI (Oct. 20, 2003): 31-36. John Shaw, “Australia Dispatches First Forces to Persian Gulf,” NYT (Jan. 27, 2003): A-10. “In The Coalition,” WP (Mar. 19, 2003): A-16. 9. Clark, Winning Wars, 21-26; Michael Gordon, “U.S. Is Striking Iraqi Sites that Threaten Kuwait,” NYT (Mar.2, 2003): A-1, 12; Romesh Ratnesar, “Can This War Be Avoided?” TI (Jan. 20, 2003): 42-45; Woodward, Plan of Attack, 401. Michael R. Gordon, “German Intelligence Gave U.S. Iraqi Defense Plan, Report Says,” NYT (Feb. 27, 2006): A-1, 9; Richard Bernstein and Gordon, “Berlin File Says Germany’s Spies Aided U.S. in Iraq,” NYT (Mar. 2, 2006): A-1, 12; Bernstein, NYT (Mar. 3, 2006): A-12, NYT (Mar. 7, 2006): A-6, NYT (Mar. 12, 2006): A-9; on Russia: Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004): 315, 366-337; Yossef Bodansky, The Secret History

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of the Iraq War (New York: 10Regan Books, Harper Collins, 2004): 15-18; Thom Shanker, “U.S. Inquiry Finds Russians Passed Spy Data to Iraq in ‘03,” NYT (Mar. 25, 2006): A-7; Scott Shane, “Iraqi Official, Paid by the C.I.A., Gave Account of Weapons,” NYT (Mar. 22, 2006): A-10; Ann Scott Tyson and Josh White, “Russians Helped Iraq, Study Says,” WP (Mar. 25, 2006): 1-3. Kevin Wood, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: The View From Inside,” FA (May/June 2006): 2-26; Murray and Scales, Iraq War, 69-71. 10. For text of Mar. 17 and 19 speeches, see Whitney, The WMD Mirage, 166-172; Woodward, Plan of Attack, 359-361. 11. On Hussein and sons, see Franks, American Soldier, 450-461; Murray and Scales, Iraq War, 154-156; Paul Adams, “Shock and Awe: An Inevitable Victory,” in Beck and Downer, Battle for Iraq, 105-107. 12. Murray and Scales, Iraqi War, 157-165; Michael O’Hanlon, “Clinton’s Strong Defense Legacy,” FA (Nov./Dec. 2003): 126- 134; Pauline Jelinek, “Bomber Hits Iraqi Defenses,” AP (Feb. 1, 2003). 13. Murray and Scales, Iraqi War, 166-169; Adams, “Shock and Awe,” 107110; David Von Drehle, “For ‘Shock and Awe’ Author, Concern,” WP (Mar. 22, 2003): A-26. 14. Richard Dean Burns and Lester H. Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses, 1944-2003 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2004): 204-205. 15. Clark, Winning Wars, 31-33; Clive Myrie, “Al Faw Peninsula: Securing the Oil Fields,” and Adam Mynott, “Umm Qasr- Assault on a Port Town,” in Beck and Downing, Battle for Iraq, 19-25; Murray and Scales, Iraq War, 131133, 138-144; Scott Pelley, “Friend or Foe,” in CBS News, America at War: The Battle for Iraq: A View From the Frontlines (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003): 84-85. 16. Adams, “Shock and Awe,” 29-32, 113-115; Murray and Scales, Iraq War, 144-153; Origins of “shock and awe”, see Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, Behind the War on Terror: Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for Iraq (British Columbia, Canada: New Society Publications, 2003): 278-282. 17. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, 88-126; Patrick E. Tyler, “Bridge Seized, Clearing a Northern Approach–New Casualties,” NYT (Mar. 23, 2003): A-1, B-3; Michael Wilson, “At an Airfield in the Desert, Artillery Meets ‘Red Rain’,” NYT (Mar. 23, 2003): B-3. Nancy Gibbs, “The Private Jessica Lynch,” Time (Nov. 17, 2003): 24-46; Dana Priest, Willian Booth and Susan Schmidt, “Saving Private Lynch,” WPNW (June 23-29, 2003): 8-10. 18. Clark, Winning Wars, 58-83; Franks, American Soldier, 488-492; Murray and Scales, Iraq War, 203-233. Rageh Omaar, “A Baghdad Diary,” in Beck and Downing, Battle for Iraq, 121-132; Ahmed, Behind the War, 290-292. U.S. Central Command, “Following the Military’s Hunt for Most Wanted Iraqi Officials,” NYT (April 14, 2003): B-5. 19. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, 185-202; Clark, Winning Wars, 76-77, 82-83; Jim Muir, “The Northern Front and the Kurds’ Endgame,” in Beck and Downing, Battle for Iraq, 158-169. 20. Franks, American Soldier, 531-560. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003): 97, 115, 172. Clark, Winning Wars, 87, 157. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 463-477. Karen DeYoung, “Bush Proclaims



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Victory in Iraq,” WP (May 2, 2003): A-1, 24. Dana Milbank, “The Military is The Message: Strong Image for ‘04 Election,” WP (May 2, 2003): A-24. Todd Pitman and Kathy Gannon, “Rumsfeld: Afghan Combat Ended,” AP (May, 2, 2003). 21. Cordesman, The Iraq War, 236-239. 22. “The Media’s Iraq War: A Survey of Recent Articles,” Wilson Quarterly (Summer 2003): 97-99. 22. Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 149-151; Franks, American Soldier, 524-530; Clark, Winning Wars, 91-92. 23. Allan Butler, “Promise and Fear—Iraq’s Future in the Balance,” in Beck and Downing, Battle for Iraq, 194-204; Danny Schechter, “Looting Erupts, Baghdad in Chaos as Soldiers Watch,” in Schecter, Embedded : Weapons of Mass Deception (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003): 191-198.

Chapter 6 Searching for Banned Weapons & Reviewing the Intelligence Process 1. Barton Gellman, “Hunt for Iraqi Arms Erodes Assumptions,” WP (April 22, 2003): A-1, 13 and Gellman, “The Weapons Mirage,” WPNW (May 26-June 1, 2003): 6-8; Michael Duffy, “Weapons of Mass Disappearance,” TI (June 9, 2003): 28-32; Bruce B. Auster, Mark Mazzetti and Edward T. Pound, “Truth and Consequences,” USNWR (June 9, 2003): 14-18; David Corn, “Now They Tell Us: Postwar Truth and Consequences,” NA (May 19, 2003): 11-13. 2. Paul Lashmar and Raymond Whitaker, “M16 and CIA: The New Enemy Within,” Sifry and Cerf, Iraq War Reader, 479-481; Bamford, A Pretext for War, 307-314; James Dao and Thom Shanker, “Powell Defends Information He Used to Justify Iraq War,” NYT (May 31, 2003): A-6; Eric Schmitt, “Rumsfeld Echoes Notion that Iraq Destroyed Arms,” NYT (May 28, 2003): A-13; for a detailed account on intelligence and WMD until July 2003, see: Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003): 405-470. 3. Scott Shane, “Iraqi Official, Paid by the C.I.A., Gave Account of Weapons,” NYT (Mar. 22, 2006): A-10. 4. Hersh, “Selective Intelligence,” NY (May 12, 2003): 44-51; Hersh, Chain of Command, 184-187, 214-224; James Bamford, A Pretext for War, 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies (New York: Doubleday, 2004): 307-314. 5. Douglas Jehl, “Stung by Exiles’ Role, C.I.A. Orders a Shift in Procedures,” NYT (Feb. 13. 2004): A-10; Douglas McCollam, “The List: How Chalabi Played the Press,” CJR (July/Aug. 2004): 31-37; James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006): 85-107 includes more detail. 6. Mahdi Obeidi, The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam’s Nuclear Mastermind (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004): 206-227. 7. Nancy Gibbs and Michael Ware, “Chasing a Mirage,” TI (October 6, 2003): 38- 42; also see, Charles J. Hanley, “Ex-inspectors Say ‘Unaccounted For’ Iraqi Weapons May be Bookkeeping Glitches,” AP (Sept. 8, 2003); Mahdi, Bomb in My Garden, 175-181.

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8. Thomas Powers, “The Vanishing Case for War,” NYRB (Dec. 4, 2003): 12-17; Raymond Bonner, “U.S. Can’t Locate Missiles Once Held in Arsenal of Iraq,” NYT (Oct. 9, 2003): A-1, 12; Whitney, The WMD Mirage, 179-197 for Kay’s report. 9. Douglas Jehl and Judith Miller, “Draft Report Said to Cite No Success in Iraq Arms Hunt,” NYT (Sept. 25, 2003): A-1, 10; Colin L. Powell, “What Kay Found,” WPNW (Oct. 13-19, 2003): 27; Risen and Miller, “No Illicit Arms Found in Iraq, U.S. Inspector [Kay] Tells Congress,” NYT (Oct. 3, 2003): A-1, 12; Jehl, “For Leader of Arms Hunt, Report is A Test of Faith,” NYT (Oct. 3, 2003): A-12 includes list of “What Inspector’s Saw, and Didn’t See.” 10. David E. Sanger and James Risen, “President Says Report on Arms Vindicates War,” NYT (Oct. 4, 2003): A-1, 6; Mahdi, Bomb in My Garden, 3-8, 150-152 and 204-224. 11. Bamford, Pretext for War, 298-307; Wilson, “What I Didn’t Find in Africa,” NYT (July 6, 2003): WK-9; Wilson, The Politics of Truth (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004); Eric Lichtblau, “2002 Memo Doubted Uranium Sale Claim,” NYT (Jan. 18, 2006): A-8. 12. Bamford, Pretext for War, 298-307; Wilson, “What I Didn’t Find in Africa,” NYT (July 6, 2003): WK-9; Douglas Jehl, “Iraq Arms Critic Reacts to Report on [Wilson’s] Wife,” NYT (Aug.8, 2003): A-9; Eric Lichtblau and Richard W. Stevens, “A Top Bush Aide Didn’t Identify C.I.A. Agent, White House Says,” NYT (Sept. 30, 2003): A1-11; Elizbabeth Bumiller, “C.I.A. Chief Is Caught in Middle By Leak Inquiry,” NYT (Oct. 5, 2003): A-1, 18; Richard Leiby, “On the Eye of a Storm [Wilson],” WPNW (Oct. 6-12, 2003): 7. Michael Duffy, “Leaking With a Vengeance,” Time (Oct.13, 2003): 26-37; Barton Gellman, “Iraq’s Thwarted Nuclear Ambition,” WPNW (Nov. 3-9, 2003): 1011; Richard W. Stevenson and David Johnston, “Bush Interviewed in Leak of a C.I.A. Officer’s Name,” NYT (June 25, 2004): A-8; Wilson, The Politics of Truth (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004); Scott Shane, “First, a Leak; Now, a Jam” NYT (April 8, 2006): A-1, 11; Sanger and Johnston, “Bush Ordered Declassification, Official Says,” NYT (April 10, 2006): A-14; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Bush Authorized Secret’s Release, Libby Testified,” WP (April 7, 2006) A-1 at washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/06. Jim VandeHei and Carol D. Leonnig, “Woodward Was Told of Palme More Than Two Years Ago,” WP (Nov. 16, 2005): A-1, 8; Nancy Gibbs and Viveca Novak, “Woodward Unveiled,” TI (November 28, 2005): 51; Richard B. Schmitt, “Libby Term Poses Dilemma,” LAT (June 6, 2007): A-1. 13. Whitney, The WMD Mirage, 198-201; David Kay, “The Hunt for Iraq’s Weapons,” WPNW (Nov. 10-16, 2003): 26; James Risen and Judith Miller, “Officials Say Bush Seeks $600 million to Hunt Iraq Arms,” NYT (Oct. 2, 2003): A-1, 15; Scheer, et al., Five Biggest Lies. 65-89; Richard W. Stevenson, “Remember ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction”? For Bush, They are a Nonissue,” NYT (Dec. 18, 2003): A-14; Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank, “Kay Backs Outside Probe of Iraq Data,” WP (Jan. 29, 2004): A-1, 18; Glenn Kessler and Pincus, “A Flawed Argument in the Case for War,” WP (Feb. 1, 2004): A-1, 26. George A. Lopez and David Cortright, “Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,” FA (July/August, 2004): 90-103. 14. Text of Senate report in Whitney, The WMD Mirage, 202-246; Douglas Jehl, “Dispute Prompts Scrutiny of Bush’s Daily Reading,” NYT (Feb. 14, 2004):



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A-6; Jehl and David E. Sanger, “C.I.A. Admits It Didn’t Give Weapons Data to the U.N.,” NYT (Feb. 21, 2004): A-7; Douglas Jehl “C.I.A. Classifies Much of its Report on its Failings,” NYT (June 16, 2004): A-9; John H. Cushman, Jr., “Panel Describes Long Weakening of Hussein Army,” NYT (July 11, 2004): A-1, 8; Alan Cowell, “British Report faults Prewar Intelligence But Clears Blair,” and Christopher Marquis, “British Critique Echoes the Americans, but Is More Kind,” NYT (July 15, 2004): A-6; Thomas Powers, “How Bush Got it Wrong,” NYRB (Sept. 23, 2004): 87-93 an analysis of the Senate report; Bob Drogin and John Goetz “CIA Was Warned On Iraq Source,” Los Angeles Times (Nov. 21, 2005): A-10, 11; Curveball is also mentioned in James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006): 115-119. 15. Dilip Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 9-10; Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (New York: Harper/Collins, 2004): 207-224; On Wolfowitz: Woodward, Bush at War, 99; on Rumsfeld: Purdum, Time of our Choosing, 56. 16. Timothy L. O’Brien, “U.N. Group Finds No Hussein-al-Qaeda Link,” NYT (June 27, 2003): A-12. 17. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: Norton, 2004) and excerpts in Steven Strasser, ed., The 9/11 Investigations (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): 376-526. For NYT analysis see “The Complete Investigation The 9/11 Report (New York: St. Martin’s, 2004); David Johnston, “Lack of Pre-9/11 Sources Is to Be Cited as a Failure Of Intelligence Agencies,” NYT (July 17, 2003): A-11; James Risen, “Iraqi Agent Denies He Met 9/11 Hijacker in Prague Before Attacks on the U.S.” NYT (Dec. 13, 2003): A-8. 18. Raymond Bonner, “On Alert For Al Qaeda in Iraq, U.S. is Tracking 2 Suspects,” NYT (Sept. 28, 2003): A-13; Christopher Marquis, “Powell Admits No Hard Proof in Linking Iraq to Al Qaeda,” NYT (Jan. 9, 2004): A-18; Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda (New York: Other Press, 2005): 99105; Douglas Jehl, “More Proof of Iraq-Qaeda Link, or Not?” NYT (Nov. 20, 2003): A-14 and Stephen F. Hayes, “Making an Iraq-Al Qaeda Link,” Los Angeles Times (Nov. 26, 2003): B-13. 19. Excepts of Duelfer report of October 2004 in Whitney, The WMD Mirage, 247- 327; Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Report Finds Iraqis Eliminated Illicit Arms in 90’s,” NYT (October 7, 2004): A-1, 22; Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank, “Arms Hunt In Iraq to Get New Focus,” WP (Jan. 24. 2004): A-1, 14; Dafna Linzer, “No Longer Looking for Iraq’s WMDs,” WPNW (Jan. 17-23, 2005): 16. 20. See Paul R. Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” FA 85:2 (Mar.-Apr. 2006): 15-28. 21. Judy Warrick, “Evidence to the Contrary: U.S. Officials Pushed the Notion of Iraqi Bioweapons Factories in Trailers,” WPNW (April 17-23, 2-006): 10-11. 22. Greg Miller, Bush Tempers Talk of Weapons,” LAT (June 10, 2003): A1, 3; Arms Control Today (July/Aug. 2003): 17; Edwin Chen, “Bush Defends Iraq War, Intelligence Agencies,” LAT (Jan. 28, 2004): A-9; Mike Allen, “Bush Stands Firmly Behind His Decision to Invade Iraq,” WP (Feb. 6, 2004): A-19; Richard W. Stevenson, “President Bush Offers Defense on Iraq and the Economy,” NYT (Feb. 9, 2004): A-1, 19; LAT, “U.S. Ends Hunt for Hussein’s Weapons,” (Jan. 13,

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2005): A-3; Warren Vieth, “Bush Urges Patience for Iraq Mission,” LAT (Dec. 19, 2005): A1, 18.

Chapter 7

Creating an Interim Iraqi Government

1. Franks, American Soldier, 330, 362, 375-376, 545 on his relations with Feith; for details on Future of Iraq Project, see David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2005): 3544, 77-102, 121-131. George Packer, “War After the War: What Washington Doesn’t See in Iraq,” NYT (Nov. 24, 2003): 60-62. Eric Schmitt and Joel Brinkley, “State Department Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq,” NYT (Oct. 19, 2003): A-1, 12. Brinkley and Schmitt, “ Iraqi Leaders Say U.S. Was Warned of Disorder After Hussein, but Little Was Done,” NYT (Nov. 30, 2003): A-16. David Reiff, “Blueprint for a Mess,” NYT Magazine (Nov. 2, 2003): 28-33 ff. On White’s problems see: Bradley Graham, “Firing Back at Rumsfeld,” WPNW (Sept. 29-Oct. 5, 2003): 29. 2. Judith Miller, “U.S. Officials Review Plan To Rebuild Iraq After a War,” NYT (February 23, 2003): A-12. Karen DeYoung and Peter Slevin, “Top Officials Don’t Agree on Who Will Run Postwar Iraq,” WPNW (April 7-13, 2003): 7. Packer, “Dreaming of Democracy,” NYT Magazine (March 2, 2003): 44-49 ff. and “War After the War,” NYT (Nov. 24, 2003): 62. 3. Packer, “War After the War,” 63-65; Ariana Eunjung Cha, “A Bit of America in Baghdad,” WPNW (Dec 15-21, 2003): 18; Michael Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006): 464-465. 4. Phillips, Losing Iraq, 134-141; Rajiv Chandraskaran, “Thanks for Ousting Hussein, ‘Now Please Go Home”,” WP (April 22, 2003): A-9; Monte Reel, “Garner Arrives in Iraq To Begin Reconstruction,” WP (April 22, 2003): A-1, 10; Douglas Jehl, et al., “U.S. Backed Iraqi Exiles Return to Reinvent Nation,” NYT (May 4, 2003): A-1, 14; Patrick E. Tyler and Edmund L. Andrews, “U.S. Overhauls Administration to Govern Iraq,” NYT (May 12, 2003): A-1, 13. 5. Susan Sachs and Edmund L. Andrews, “Iraq’s Slide Into Lawlessness Squanders Good Will for U.S.,” NYT (May 18, 2003): A-1, 15; Andrews, “Iraqi Looters Tearing Up Archaeological Sites,” NYT (May 23, 2003): A-1, B-1; Tim Judah, “Welcome to al-Sadr City!” NYRB (May 29, 2003): 30-32; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003): 132-133; Daniel Byman, “Constructing a Democratic Iraq,” IS (Summer 2003): 47-78. 6. Phillips, Losing Iraq, 143-154, 169-172; Packer, “War After the War,” NYT (Nov. 24, 2003): 66-67; Patrick E. Tyler, “In Reversal, Plan For Iraq Self-Rule Has Been Put Off,” NYT (May 17, 2003): A-1, 8; Peter J. Boyer, “Downfall,” The New Yorker (Nov. 20, 2006): 11-12. 7. L. Paul Bremer III with Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006): 2129; Scott Johnson and Evan Thomas, “Still Fighting Hussein,” NW (July 21, 2003): 22-24; Mark Danner, “Iraq: The New War, NYRB (Sept. 25, 2003): 8891, reprinted in Danner, Torture and Truth (New York: NY Review of Books, 2004): 53-59. On Coalition Provisional Authority, see Purdum, Time of Our



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Choosing, 248-250; Susan Sachs, “Baathists, Once Reviled, Prove Difficult to Remove,” NYT (Nov. 22, 200): A-7. 8. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 121-122, 129-131; data on Iraq’s religious groups is in Cordesman, Iraq War. 536-538; Neil MacFarquhar, “Questions Whether Diverse Populations Can Come Together in Iraq,” NYT (Sept. 2, 2003): A-12; Packer, “War After the War,” 73-77; Glenn Kessler and Dana Priest, “Postwar Power Struggles,” WPNW (April 28- May 4, 2003): 10; Max Rodenbeck, “The Occupation,” NYRB (Aug. 14, 2003): 13-16. 9. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 94-95, 163-167; Anthony Shadid, “Iraq’s Power Brokers,” WPNW (Dec. 8-14, 2003): 8; Packer, “War After the War,” 78-79; Judah, “Welcome to Sadr City!” 32; Sabrina Tavernise, “In Spite of His Shadowy Past, Iraqi Remain Power Broker,” NYT (May 11, 2003): A-1, 11; Susan Sacs, “Cleric Advocates Pluralistic Self-Government in Iraq,” NYT (May 25, 2003): A-14; Kessler and Priest, “Postwar Power Struggles,” 10; for Muslim theology and law see: Sydney Fisher and William Ochsenwald, The Middle East: A History, 4th ed. (New York McGraw-Hill, 1990): 85-98. 10. Packer, “War After the War,” 78-82; Alex Berenson, “Anti-U.S. Cleric Harangues, but Iraq’s Shiites Heed Four Ayatollahs,” NYT (Oct. 22, 2003): A-6. 11. Christian Parenti, The Freedom: Shadows and Hallucinations in Occupied Iraq (New York: The New Press, 2004): 22-29; Nazila Fathi, “Iraqi Career Women Ponder a Future Under Shiite Rule,” NYT (May 25, 2003): A-15; George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Strass & Giroux, 2005): 251-254 or Packer, “War After the War,” 82-83; Lauren Sandler, “Women Under Siege,” NA (Dec. 29, 2003): 11-15. 12. Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Now Signals it Might Consider U.N. Force in Iraq,” NYT (Aug. 28, 2003): A-1, 10; Felicity Barringer, “Envoys Urge U.S. to Cede More Power to U.N.,” NYT (Sept. 6, 2003): A-5; Steven R. Weisman, “U.S.French Rift Reopened as Powell Arrives for Talks [in Geneva],” NYT (Sept. 13, 2003): A-7. 13. Steven R. Weisman, “Bush, at U.N., Defends Policy Over Iraq,” NYT (Sept. 24, 2003): A-1, 10; Elizabeth Bumiller, “Tense Opening Day at World Gathering,” NYT (Sept. 24, 2003): A-1, 11 with Annan’s and Chirac’s remarks; Felicity Barringer, “Bush’s Remarks Draw Skepticism,” NYT (Sept. 24, 2003): 12. 14. Felicity Barringer, “Europeans Offer Plan to Speed Rule By Iraqis,” NYT (Sept. 10, 2003): A-9; Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Is Working to Isolate France in U.N. Council,” NYT (Sept. 19, 2003): A-9; Barringer, “Unanimous Vote By Security Council Adopts Iraq Plan,” NYT (Oct. 17, 2003): A-1, 10; John Tagliabue, “Concern Over Mideast Prompted European to Accept U.S. Move,” NYT (Oct. 16, 2003): A-19; see “Excerpts from Speeches,” Facts on File (Sept. 25, 2003): 742-743. 15. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 224-235; David E. Sanger and Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Move to Speed Up Iraqi Vote and Shift of Power,” NYT (Dec. 13, 2003): A-1, 11; Michael Hirsh, Rod Norland and Mark Hosenball, “About Face in Iraq,” NW (Nov. 24, 2003): 31-35; Joel Brinkley and Susan Sachs, “Iraqi Leaders Seek Power Before Drafting a Charter,” NYT (Nov. 13, 2003): A-11; Weisman and Carl Hulse, “In U.S., Fears Are Voiced for a Too-Rapid Iraq

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Exit,” NYT (Nov. 14, 2003): A-10; on conservatives opposition, Peter Beinhart, “Whiplash,” NR (Dec. 1, 8, 2003): 6; Weisman, “Sensing Shiites Will Rule Iraq, U.S. Starts to See Friends Not Foes,” NYT (Nov. 20, 2003): A-14; Alex Berenson, “Iraq’s Shiites Insist on Democracy. Washington Cringes.” NYT (Nov. 30, 2003): WK-5. 16. Dexter Filkins, “A U.S. General Speeds the Shift in an Iraqi City,” NYT (Nov. 18, 2003): A1, 10. Joel Brinkley. “Iraqis Learn Bureaucracy at Town Hall Meetings,” NYT (Nov. 30, 2003): A-14. Susan Sachs, “Joy and Jeers as New Police Patrol Baghdad,” NYT (Nov. 15, 2003): A-1, 7. 17. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 224-228; Phillips, Losing Iraq, 185-194; Diamond, “What Went Wrong In Iraq,” 50-54; Dexter Filkins, “Panel Starts to Draw Up Constitution For Short Run,” NYT (Feb. 3, 2004): A-8, and “Iraqi Council, With Reluctant Shiites, Sign Charter,” (Mar. 9, 2004): A-1, 11. 18. Phillips, Losing Iraq, 182-185; see Bremer, Year in Iraq, 269-273, 286308 for details. 19. Phillips, Losing Iraq, 182-185; Bremer, Year in Iraq, 280-282, 289-290, 310-311; Joel Brinkley and Ian Fisher, “U.S. Plan to Shift Control Hits a Major Snag,” NYT (Nov. 27, 2003): A-1, 8; Warren Hoge, “U.N. Will Send Team to Iraq To Prepare for Possible Return,” NYT (Jan. 14, 2004): A-11; Robin Wright, “Annan: U.N. To Help End Iraq Impasse,” WP (Feb. 4, 2004): A-18. 20. Packer, Assassins’ Gate, 317, 324, 332; Dexter Filkins, “U.N. Team Arrives in Iraq to Study Plans For Elections,” NYT (Feb. 4, 2004): A-11; Fisher, “Iraq Ayatollah Insists on Vote By End of Year,” NYT (Feb. 27, 2004): A-1, 10; Hoge, “U.N. Chief Says Elections Could Be Held Within a Year,” NYT (Feb. 24, 2004): A-6. 21. Phillips, Losing Iraq, 205-210; On Brahimi, see Bremer, Year in Iraq, 326328, 333-335, 348-350 and 355-356; Bill Powell and Vivienne Walt, “The Man [Brahimi] With a Plan,” TI (June 7, 2004): 30-34; Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Henry Holt, 2005): 246-262. 22. Warren Hoge, “Security Council Backs Resolution on Iraq Turnover,” NYT (June 9, 2004): A-1, 9 including 11 key points. 23. Bremer, Year in Iraq, 377-382; Phillips, Losing Iraq, 210-214; Diamond, Squandered Victory, 271-274; Edward Wong, “Shiite Cleric is Forming a Party That May Play role in Elections,” (June 14, 2004): A-7; Ian Fisher, “Iraq Gives Order to Reopen Paper G.I.’s Had Closed,” NYT (July 19, 2004): A-1, 10; Dexter Filkins, “Kurds Advancing to Reclaim Land in Northern Iraq,” NYT (June 29, 2004): A-1, 12; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “U.S. Hands Authority to Iraq Two Days Early,” WP (June 29, 2004): A-1, 16; Eric Schmitt and Susan Sachs, “NATO Agrees to Help Train Iraqi Forces,” NYT (June 29, 2004): A-12; Hannah Fairfield, “Report Card on the Occupation,” NYT (Jan. 29, 2004): A-12. 24. David E. Sanger, “Fresh Starts: One for Iraq, One for Bush,” NYT (June 29, 2004): A-1, 11; Edward Wong, “ Around Iraq, Fighting and Bombs Create Grisly Scenes,” NYT (June 3, 2004): A-12; Wong, “Iraqis Defend Power to Declare Martial Law,” (July 8, 2004): A-10. 25. Johanna McGeary, “The Lessons of Najaf,” (Aug. 30, 2004): 30- 33; Sabrina Tavernise, “U.S. Helicopter Shot Down Over Baghdad (Sadr City),” NYT (Aug. 9, 2004): A-6; Tarvernise and John F. Burns, “U.S. Officers Say Two-



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Day Battle Kills 300 Iraqis,” NYT (Aug. 7, 2004): A-1, 6; Alex Berenson and Burns, “8-Day Battle for Najaf: Attack to Stalemate,” NYT (Aug. 17, 2004): A-1, 12; Berenson and Tavernise, “Cleric in Najaf Refuses to Meet Iraqi Mediators,” NYT (Aug. 18, 2004): A-1, 12; Tavernise, “Cleric Maintains His Hold of Najaf Shrine, Even While Saying He’ll Turn It Over,” NYT (Aug. 22, 2004): A-4; Amatzia Baram, “Praying for Sistani’s Good Health,” NYT (Aug. 22, 2004): WK-5. 26. Dexter Filkins and Alex Berenson, “Ayatollah Calls for Rally to End Fighting in Najaf,” NYT (Aug. 26, 2003): A-1, 11; Filkins and John F. Burns, “Tentative Accord Reached in Najaf to End Fighting,” NYT (Aug 27, 2004): A-1, 11; Berenson, “After the Siege, A City of Ruins, Its Dead Rotting,” NYT (Aug. 28, 2004): A-1, 7; Filkins, “The Riddle of Najaf: Who Won?” NYT (Aug. 29, 2004): WK- 1, 6 and “Residents of a Shattered City Begin to Pick Up the Pieces,” NYT (Aug. 29, 2004):A-10. 27. John F. Burns, “Iraq Conference on Elections Plan Sinks into Chaos,” NYT (Aug.16, 2004): A-1, 8; Sabrina Tavernise, “Iraqi Conferees Decide to Send a Delegation to Embattled City,” NYT (Aug. 17, 2004): A-10 and “In Climax to a Tumultuous 4-Day Debate, Iraq Chooses an Assembly,” NYT (Aug. 29, 2004): A-12; Editors, “Politics of Exclusion in Iraq,” NYT (Aug. 22, 2004): WK-8. 28. Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. is Haunted By Initial Plan for Iraq Voting,” NYT (Jan. 9, 2005): A-1, 8; Alan Cowell, “Overseas Iraqi Get More Time to Register,” NYT (Jan. 23, 2005): A-12; James Glanz, “Logistical Challenges Remain Before Iraqis Cast Ballots,” NYT (Jan. 20, 2005): A-8; Edward Wong, Hannah Fairfield and Archie Tse, “The Leading Tickets and Some of Their Top Candidates,” NYT (Jan. 30, 2005): A-16. 29. Rod Nordland and Christopher Dickey, “Tribe Versus Tribe,” NW (Jan. 24, 2005): 44-45; Christian Hauer and Shanker, “Voters in Mosul Need Shield of Snipers,” NYT (Jan.28, 2005): A-1, 9; Pamela Constable, “Iraqi Communists Make a Comeback,” WP (Jan. 29, 2004): A-1, 19; Parenti, The Freedom, 28-33; Dexter Filkins, “Defying Threats, Millions of Iraqis Flock to Polls,” NYT (Jan. 31, 2005): A-1, 8; Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Security Efforts Hold Insurgents Mostly at Bay,” NYT (Jan.31, 2005): A-1, 9; Hassan M. Fattah, “Foreign Observers, Watching From Safe Distance, Approve,” A-9 and Alan Cowell, “Toll Uncertain After Crash of British Plane,” A-10; Edward Wong, “The Iraqis Who Died While Daring to Vote are Mourned as Martyrs,” NYT (Feb. 2, 2005): A-1, 11. 30. James Glanz and Christine Hauser, “Iraqi’s Report a Variety of Complaints About Irregularities On Election Day,” NYT (Feb. 2, 2005): A-10; John F. Burns and Glanz, “Iraqi Shiites Win, But Margin is Less Than Projections,” NYT (Feb. 14, 2005): A-1, 11 has complete voting information.

Chapter 8 Internal Security and the Insurgency 1. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006): 172. 2. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 39-45; Gordan and Trainor, Cobra II, 475-479; Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006): 72-73, 158-161.

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3. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 53-58; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 481-484; Ricks, Fiasco, 161-166. 4. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 53-59, 150-151, 162-163; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 482-484. 5. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 150-151, 223-224. 6. Ibid., 221-223. 7. James Fallows, “Why Iraq Has No Army,” Atlantic Monthly (Dec. 2005): 66-74. Also see ibid., Nir Rosen. “If America Left Iraq,” 42-46; Eric Schmitt, “U.S. To Intensify It’s Training in Iraq to Battle Insurgents,” NYT (Nov. 2, 2005): A-12. 8. Mark Thompson, “Where Are the New Recruits?” TI (Jan. 17, 2005): 3638; Eric Schmitt, “General Seeking Faster Training of Iraq Soldiers,” NYT (Jan. 23, 2005): A-1, 10; Elaine Sciolino, “NATO Agrees on Modest Plan for Training Iraqis,” NYT (Feb. 23, 2005): A-9; Schmitt, “Iraqi Army Is About to Add National Guard to Its Ranks,” NYT (Feb. 24, 2005): A-10; Noah Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building (New York: Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004): 126-131. 9. Solomon Moore, “U.S. Is Ceding More Control to the Iraqis,” LAT (Oct. 29, 2005): A-1, 8; Borzou Daragahi, “Skewed Loyalties in Security Forces,” ibid. (Dec. 12, 2005): A-10; Ellen Knichmeyer, “Old Army, New Army,” WPNW (Nov. 29-Dec. 4, 2005): 15-16; Moore, “Self-Sufficiency Still Eludes Iraqi Army,” LAT (Apr. 30, 2006): A-1, 22; “Iraqi Soldiers Blamed in Palace Looting,” ibid. (Jan. 13, 2006): A-8. 10. Gordon and Trainor, Corbra II, 466-467; 8; Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 126-129; 157; 162-63; 168-170; 180-184. 11. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 162-163. 12. Ibid., 167-169; 180-184. 13. Ibid., 327-333; Ricks, Fiasco, 338-341. 14. Solomon Moore, “Killings Linked to Shiite Squads in Iraqi Police Force,” LAT (Dec. 29, 2005): A-1, 8-9; Louise Roug, “U.S. to Restrict Iraqi Police,” ibid. (Dec. 30, 2005): A-1, 4; Solomon Moore, “U.S. Expands Training to Address Iraqi Police Woes,” ibid. (Mar.9, 2006): A-1, 4. 15. Ricks, Fiasco, 370-373; also see P.W. Singer, “Outsourcing War,” FA (Mar./Apr. 2005): 119-133. 16. Mark Danner, “Delusions in Baghdad,” NYRB (Dec. 16, 2003): 92-97; Daniel Williams, “An ëUpside Down’ World,” WPNW (Aug. 18-24, 2003): 17; Dexter Filkins and Richard A. Oppel, Jr. “Huge Suicide Blast Demolishes U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad,” and Neil MacFarquhar, “Amid Blood and Rubble, A Sense of Helplessness,” NYT (Aug. 20, 2003): A-1, 8-9; MacFarquhar and Oppel, Jr., “Car Bomb in Iraq Kills 95 at Shiite Mosque,” NYT (Aug. 30, 2003): A-1, 6. 17. Ricks, Fiasco, 190-191; Packer, “War After the War,” 66-67; Hiro, Secrets and Lies, Operation “Iraqi Freedom” and After (New York, Nation Books: 2003): 312-315; Mark Danner, “Iraq: The New War,” NYRB (Sept. 25, 2003): 88-91. 18. Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda (New York: Other Press, 2005): 126-132 on unity of groups, 139-145 on hostage strategy; Jeffrey Gettleman, “Zarqawi’s Journey: From Dropout to Prisoner to an



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Insurgent Leader in Iraq,” NYT (July 13, 2004): A-8; see also Evan Thomas and Rod Nordland, “Death of a Terrorist,” Newsweek (June 19, 2006): 24-38; John M. Burns, “Iraqi Policemen Tied to Killing of Two Americans,” NYT (Mar. 5, 2004): A-1, 8; For summary of car bombings see “Attacks Throughout Iraq.” NYT (Mar. 3, 2004): A-10; John Burns, “As Fighting Rages, Insurgents in Iraq Kidnap 3 Japanese,” NYT (Apr. 9, 2004): A-1, 10. 19. AP, “Tape Attributed to bin Laden,” NYT (Jan. 5, 2004): A-11. 20. Julie Rawe, “The Sad Tale of Nick Berg,” TI (May 24, 2004): 42-43; Carlos H. Conde, “Manila Signals Troop Pullout,” NYT (July 13, 2004): A-9; “But Attacks Persist,” WP (June 2, 2004): A-21; Jeffrey Gettleman, “Militant Group Takes Credit for Killing Iraqi Governor,” (July 17, 2004): A 5; Sengupta and Fisher, “Iraqi Defense Aide Killed, 9 Die in Baghdad Bombing,” NYT (July 20, 2004): A-8. 21. Ricks, Fiasco, 97, 184, 228-229, 369-371, 470 and “Vietnam’s Lessons, Ignored,” WPNW (July 31-Aug. 6, 2005): 10-11. 22. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 118-119; Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 333-336; Purdum, Time of Our Choosing, 279-280; Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Defends Move to Storm House Where Hussein Brothers Were Hiding,” NYT (July 24, 2003): A-11; Romesh Ratnesar, “And Then There Was One,” TI (Aug. 4, 2003): 28-31. 23. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 247-251; Nancy Gibbs, “Ladies and Gentlemen, We Got Him,” TI (Dec. 22, 2003): 15-19; James Risen and Thom Shanker, “Hussein Tells Interrogators He Didn’t Direct Insurgency,” NYT (Dec. 16, 2003): A-1, 21; David E. Sanger, “With ëGood Riddance’ to Hussein, Bush Vows Resolve,” NYT (Dec. 16, 2003): A-1, 20. 24. Steve Coll, “Hussein Was Sure of Own Survival [says Aziz],” WP (Nov. 3, 2003): A-1, 15; Pauline Jelinek, “ “Dr. Germ Surrenders,” AP (May 13, 2003); John Tierney, “Iraqi Vice-President Caught,” NYT (Aug. 20, 2003): A-9; Robert F. Worth, “Senior Aide to Hussein Is In Custody,” NYT (Aug. 22, 2003): A-12; Ian Fisher, “Former Defense Minister Turns Himself In,” NYT (Sept. 20, 2003): A-5; Louise Roug, “U.S. Frees 2 Regime Officials”,” LAT (Dec. 20, 2005): A-3. 25. Phillips, Losing Iraq, 195-198; Bremer, Year in Iraq, 316-317; Eric Schmitt, “Iraq Rebels Seen Using More Skill to Down Helicopters,” NYT (Jan. 18, 2004): A-1, 8; John F. Burns, “Fighting Halts Briefly in Fallujah, U.S. Convoy Hit Near Baghdad,” NYT (Apr. 10, 2004): A-7 and “Troops Hold Fire For Negotiations at 3 Iraqi Cities,” (Apr. 12, 2004): A-1, 6; John Kifner, “In the Besieged City, the Marines Look Ahead Uneasily to Join Patrols With Iraqis,” NYT (Apr. 27, 2003): A-11 includes chart of Fallujah events from March 31 to April 25. 26. Bremer, Year in Iraq, 316-318, 341-346; Jeffrey Gettleman, “Marines in Fallujah Still Face and Return Relentless Fire,” NYT (April 15, 2004): A-8; John Burns, “U.S. Pummels Rebel Positions As Fierce Clash Shakes Fallujah,” NYT (Apr. 28, 2004): A-10; Edward Wong, “Marines Keep Up Pressure with Attacks on Fallujah,” NYT (Apr. 29, 2004): A-12; John Kifner and Wong “ Marines Transfer Fallujah Positions to An Iraqi Force,” NYT (May 1, 2004): A-1, 5; Nir Rosen, “Letter From Fallujah: Home Rule,” NY (July 5, 2004): 48-53; Eric Schmitt, “In Iraq, U.S. Officials Outline Hurdles in Fight,” NYT (Oct. 31, 2004): A-1, 12.

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27. Bremer, Year in Iraq, 318-323, 336-340; Johanna McGeary, “New Thugs on the Block,” TI (April 19, 2004): 46-50; Jeffrey Gettleman, “A Radical Cleric’s Anti-U.S. Wrath is Unleashed,” NYT (April 5, 2004): A-1, 10; For a summary of the Shiite uprising: Scott Wilson, “Over 60 Days, Troops Fought Adaptive Enemy,” WP (June 26, 2004): A-1, 16; Christine Hauser, “Iraqi Uprising Spreads: Rumsfeld Sees It As a ‘Test of Will’,” NYT (April 8, 2004): A-1, 10; John F. Burns, “Troops Hold Fire For Negotiation at 3 Iraqi Cities,” NYT (Apr. 12, 2004): A-1, 6 and “Iraqi Shiites Urge Cleric to Desist,” NYT (May 5, 2004): A-1, 13; Edward Wong, “U.S. Troops Start Major Attacks On Shiite Insurgents in 2 Cities,” NYT (May 6, 2004): A-1, 15; Paul Quinn-Judge, “Heeding the Call of the Cleric,” TI (May 31, 2004): 34-35; Somini Sengupta and Wong, “Radical Cleric Orders His Fighters To Put Down Their Arms and Go Home,” NYT (June 17, 2004): A-8. 28. Babak Dehghanpisheh, “This Ain’t Over Yet,” NW (Nov. 22, 2004): 4042; Robert F. Worth, “In Fallujah, Ruins, Big Plans and a Risk of Chaos,” NYT (Dec. 1, 2004): A-1, 12; Miles Schuman “Fallujah’s Heath Damage,” NA (Dec. 13, 2004): 5-6. 29. Edward Wong, “Rebels Keep Up Attacks in Sunni Dominated Cities of Central and North Iraq,” NYT (Nov. 21, 2004): A-16; James Glanz and Wong, “U.S. is Expanding Iraqi Offensive in Violent Areas,” NYT (Nov. 24, 2004): A-1, 12; Appel and Glanz, “More Iraqi Army Dead Found in Mosul,” NYT (Nov. 30, 2004): A-12; Stephen Manning, “135 U.S. Troops Die in November,” AP (Dec. 1, 2004); Rod Nordland, “A Market in Human Lives.” NW (Oct. 18, 2004): 42-43. 30. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. to Increase Its Force in Iraq by nearly 12,000,” NYT (Dec. 2, 2004): A-1, 13; Richard A. Oppel. Jr., and Schmitt, “Suicide Bombing is Now Suspected in Mosul Attack,” NYT (Dec. 23, 2004): A-1, 10; Oppel “Iraqi Governor Slain by Gunman: Bombing Kills 10,” NYT (Jan. 5, 2005): A-1, 12; Dexter Filkins, “31 American Die as Marine Helicopter Goes Down,” NYT (Jan. 27, 2005): A-1, 13; Brisard, Zarqawi, 131-144; Douglas Jehl and Neil A. Lewis, “U.S. Said to Hold More Foreigners in Iraq Fighting,” NYT (Jan. 5, 2005): A-1, 6. Dexter Filkins, “Foreign Fighters Captured in Iraq Come From 27, Mostly Arab Countries,” NYT (Oct. 21, 2005): A-10. Jonathan Finer, “Among Insurgents in Iraq: Few Foreigners are Found,” WP (Nov.17, 2005): A-1, 17. 31. Also see: Tim McGirk, “Killers in the Neighborhood (Shiites vs. Sunnis),” TI (Aug. 29, 2005): 36-37. Chris Tomlinson, “Suicide Bombings Fall in November,” AP (Dec. 2, 2005). Hamza Hendawi, “Iraq Misses Torture Probe Deadline,” AP (Dec. 1, 2005). Robert F. Worth, “U.S. Forces Strike Rebel Stronghold Near Syria,” NYT (Oct. 2, 2005): A-8. James Risen and David E. Sanger, “G.I.’s and Syrians In Tense Clashes on Iraqi Border,” NYT (Oct. 15, 2005): A-1, 7. Martin Slackman, “On Iraq Border, Syrians Present Show of Security,” NYT (Oct. 29, 2005): A-1, 8. Kirk Semple and Edward Wong, “U.S.Iraqi Assaults Meets Resistance Near Syria Border,” NYT (Nov. 15, 2005): A-8; Semple, “U.S. Forces Try New Approach: Raid and Dig In,” NYT (Dec. 5, 2005): A-1, 10. 32. Kirk Semple, “Iraq is Struck by a New Wave of Abductions,” NYT (Nov. 30, 2005): A-1, 10; Reid, “Arab Clerics Plead for Lives of Four Christian Hostages,” AP (Dec. 10, 2005); Semple, “Kidnappers Tortured Slain American



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Peace Worker, Iraq Says,” NYT (March 12, 2006): A-8 and “A Military Raid Frees 3 Hostages Held in Iraq,” NYT (Mar. 24, 2006): A-8. 34. Ellen Knickmeyer and K.I. Ibrahim, “Bombing Shatters Mosque in Iraq,” (Feb. 23, 2006), Bassam Sebti, Joanathan Finer and Knickmeyer, “Sectarian Surges After Shrine Bombing” (Feb. 23, 2006) and Finer and Sebti, “Sectarian Violence Kills over 100 in Iraq” (Feb. 24, 2006); Edward Wong, “Sunni District in Baghdad Is Sealed Off,” NYT (April 18, 2006): A-6; Kirk Semple, “Iraqi Troops Move to Tame a Sunni District in Baghdad,” NYT (April 19, 2006): A-10; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “100,000 Families Are Fleeing Violence, Iraq Official Says,” NYT (April 30, 2006): A-6; Ellen Knickmeyer, “More Torture in Iraqi Jails,” WPNW (May, 1-7, 2006): 16. 35. Richard A. Oppel, Jr, “At Least 14 Are Killed by Car Bombs In Baghdad and Karbala,” NYT (May 8, 2006): A-10; Tavernise, “Alarmed By Raids, Neighbors Stand Guard in Iraq,” NYT (May 10, 2006): A1, 9; Sabrina Tavernise, “As Violence Grows Shiite Closes Town’s Mosques,” NYT (May 12, 2006): A-16. Ian Bremmer, “A Civil Provocation,” NI (Summer 2006): 58-61; Kim Gamel, “Iraqi Athletes Shot for Wearing Shorts,” AP (May 28, 2006). 36. Glen Johnson, “Jill Carroll Returns to United States,” AP (April 3, 2006); John F. Burns, “2 at CBS News Die in Baghdad on Bloodey Day,” NYT (May 30, 2006): 1, 8; Bill Carter, “Deaths of 2 CBS Newsmen Lead to Painful Reassessments [on Dozier],” NYT (May 31, 2006): A-10. 37. Joshua Hammer, “The Brits Thought They Knew Counter-insurgency Better: What Went Wrong?” Newsweek (May 29, 2006): 32-33. 38. 23. Bill Powell and Scott MacLeod, “How They Killed Him;” Mike Allen and James Carney, “Funeral For Evil,” and Aparisim Ghosh, “The Apostle of Hate,” TI (June 19, 2006): 29-37; John F. Burns, “After Long Hunt, U.S. Bombs Kill al-Qaeda Leader in Iraq;” and Dexter Filkins, et. al., “How Surveillance and Betrayal Led to Hunt’s End,” and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Terrorist Leader Zarqawi Lived a Brief, Shadowy Life:” and Sabrina Tavernise, “Zarqawi Is Gone, But Weary Iraqis Fear the Violence Won’t Subside,” NYT (June 9, 2006): A-1, 8, 10, 11; Evan Thomas and Rod Nordland, “Death of a Terrorist,” Newsweek (June 19, 2006): 24-38; Mary Anne Weaver, “Inventing Al-Zarqawi,” Atlantic Monthly (July/August 2006): 87-100 has details about the role of Jordanian intelligence. 39. Thomas E. Ricks, “Falling Short,” WPNW (Nov. 27-Dec. 3, 2006): 15; Julian E. Barnes and Peter Spiegel, “Recommended: More Advisors,” LAT (Dec. 7, 2006): A-10; Molly Hennessy-Fiske, “Trainers Skeptical on Training,” LAT (Dec. 23, 2006): A-8.

Chapter 9 Tribulations and Trials: From Abu Ghraib to Saddam in the Dock 1. Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror (New York: New York Review of Books, 2004): 73-214; on Rumsfeld’s rescinded orders see Danner, 183. For other quotes cited see Danner, 75-76, 8390, 108-110; Editorial, “End the Abuse,” WPNW (Oct. 17-23, 2005): 25. 2. Tim Golden and Eric Schmitt, “General [Miller] Took Guantanamo Rules to Iraq For Handling of Prisoners,” NYT (May 13, 2004): A-1, 12.

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3. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006): 259-260; ibid., Fay’s quote at p. 261. 4. Danner, Torture and Truth, 251-275 for Red Cross’ entire report. 5. Hersh, Chain of Command, 1-41 and “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” New Yorker (May 10, 2004): 42-43; Mark Danner, Torture and Truth, 1-7; Craig R. Whitney, “Introduction,” in Steven Strasser, ed. The Abu Ghraib Investigations (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): xii-xiii; Danner, “Torture and Truth,” NYRB (June 10, 2004) 46-50 and Taguba report reprinted in his Torture and Truth, 279-328; on Taguba: Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, “Army Discloses Criminal Inquiry on Prison Abuse,” NYT (May 5, 2004): A-1, 11. 6. Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Rumsfeld Accepts Blame and Offers Apology for Abuse.” NYT (May 8, 2004): A-1, 6; Carl Hulse and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Lawmakers View Images From Iraq,” NYT (May 13, 2004): A-1, 10; Hulse, “Senator’s [Lindsay Graham-South Carolina] Pointed Questions Get to the Heart of the Matter,” NYT (May 16, 2004): A-12; Helen Dewar and Spencer S. Hsu, “A Maverick Republican [Warner],” WPNW (June 14, 20, 2004): 10; Schmitt, Congress’s Inquiry Into Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners Bogs Down,” NYT (July 16, 2004): A-10; Don Van Natta Jr., “Interrogation Methods in Iraq Aren’t All Found in Manual,” NYT (May 7, 2004): A-11. 7. Hannah Fairfeld, “In the Wake of Abu Ghraib, a Flood of Reports,” NYT (Aug. 29, 2004): WK-6; Steven Strasser, ed., The Abu Ghraib Investigations, Craig B. Whitney, “Introduction,” xviii-xxiii, entire Independent Panel Report, pp. 1-101; Danner, Torture and Truth, 329-402; Ricks, Fiasco, 258-261. 8. Strasser, Abu Ghraib, xiii-xviii and Fay’s report,109-171. Jones and Fay complete report in Danner, Torture and Truth, 409-579. Mark Danner, “Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story,” NYRB Oct. 7, 2004): 44-46 and “The Secret Road to Abu Ghraib” in Torture and Truth, 26-49; Howard Freil and Richard Falk, The Record of the Paper: How the New York Times Misreports US Foreign Policy (New York: Verso, 2004): 151-161 regarding Michael Ignatieff’s “lesser evil.” 9. For a summary of convictions see Eric Schmitt, “Army Dog Handler (Smith) Convicted of Abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison,” NYT (March 22, 2006): A-1, 16; Thom Shanker and Dexter Filkins, “Army Punishes 7 With Reprimands For Prison Abuse,” NYT (May 4, 2004): A-1, 6; Adam Liptak, et al., Accused G.I.’s Try to Shift Blame in Prison Abuse,” NYT (May 16, 2004): A-1, 11; M.S. Embser-Herbert, “A Woman’s Face of War’s Brutality,” WPNW (May 24-30, 2004): 22; Kate Zernike, “The Woman With the Leash Appears in Court on Abu Ghraib Abuse Charges,” NYT (Aug. 4, 2004): A-8; Eric Schmitt, “General In Prisoner Abuse Case Declines to Testify Further,” NYT (Jan. 13, 2006): A-3; Schmitt and Carolyn Marshall, “Before and After Abu Ghraib, A U.S. Unit Abused Detainees,” NYT (Mar. 19, 2006): A-1, 6. 10. Deborah Nelson and Nick Turse, “A Tortured Past: Documents Show Troops Who Reported Abuse in Vietnam Were Discredited,” LAT (Aug. 20, 2006): A-1, 8-9; Richard A Serrano, “Officer’s Road Led Him Outside Army,” ibid. (Sept. 25, 2005): A-3; “Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division,” Human Rights Watch, Vol. 17, no. 3(G) (Sept. 25, 2005); Julian E. Barnes, “ Army to Use Geneva Rules for Detainees,” LAT (Sept. 6, 2006): A-1,18; Julian E. Barnes,



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“CIA Can Still Get Tough on Detainees,” LAT (Sept. 8, 2006): A-1, 20; Carl Hulse, “Senate Presses Administration for Iraq Plans, NYT (Nov. 16, 2005): A-1, 15; Eric Schmitt, “Uproar in House as Parties Clash on Iraq Pullout,” NYT (Nov. 19, 2005): A-1, 19; David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “As Calls for an Iraqi Pullout Rise, 2 Political Calendars Loom Large,” NYT (Nov. 28, 2005): A-1,7. 11. Alan Cowell, “Britain Tries to Tone Down Debate Over Abuse,” NYT (Jan. 21, 2005): A-10; Richard Bernstein, “British Major Says Looting Led to Abuse,” NYT (Jan. 22, 2005): A-6; Juergen Voges, “Senior British soldier Denies Prison Abuse,” AP (Feb. 12, 2005); Audrey Gillan, “Four Guilty, But Questions Remain,” (Feb. 24, 2005): 1ff and “Soldiers in Iraq Abuse Case Sent to Prison,” The Guardian (Feb. 26, 2005): 1ff. 12. Edward Wong and John F. Burns, “Iraqi Rift Grows as Secret Prison Enrages Sunnis,” NYT (Nov. 12, 2005): A-1, 14; Sabrinia Tavernise, “Sunnis Tell of Abuses in Iraqi-Run Detention Sites,” NYT (Nov. 17, 2005): A-14; Edward Wong, “Torture Charges Deepen Right Between U.S. and Iraqi Leader,” NYT (Nov. 18, 1005): A-10; Burns, “Iraqi Minister Brushes Off Allegation of Torture Center,” NYT (Nov. 22, 2005): A-13; Kirk Semple, “Iraqi Official Denies Captives Were Abused,” NYT (Dec.13, 2005): A-1, 21; Burns, “To Halt Abuses, U.S. Will Inspect Jails Run by Iraq,” NYT (Dec. 14, 2005): A-1, 15; Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Citing Abuse in Iraqi Prisons, Hold Detainees,” NYT (Dec. 25, 2005): A-1, 12; Ellen Knickmeyer, “More Torture in Iraqi Jails,” WPNW, May 1-7, 2006; Solomon Moore, “U.S. Hands Prison Back to Iraqis,” LAT (Sept. 3, 2006): A-7. 13. Brian Bennett and Michael Ware, “Life Behind Enemy Lines,” (Dec. 15, 2003): 28-35; Michael Elliot, “Occupational Hazards,” Time (June 9, 2003): 34-41. Edward Wong, “U.S. Soldiers Kill Two Members of Iraqi Police In Gun Battle,” NYT (Jan. 11, 2004): A-6; Neela Banerjee, “A Roadside Bomb Kills 3 American and 2 Iraqi Soldiers,” NYT (Jan 18, 2004): A-6; Wong, “G.I.’s Fire on Family in Car, Killing 2, Witnesses Say,” NYT (Jan. 13, 2004): A-12. 14. John Burns, “U.S. Troops Kill 2 Women, And Iraqi Death Toll Grows [pregnant woman],” NYT (June 1, 2006): A-14. 15. Julian E. Barnes, “CIA Contractor Guilty in Beating of Detainee,” Los Angeles Times (Aug. 18, 2006): A-18; Tim McGirk and Aparisim Ghosh, “One Morning in Hadith,” TI (Mar. 27, 2006): 34-36; Michael Duffy, “The Shame of Kilo Company,” TI (June 5, 2006): 30-32; McGirk, Duffy and Ghosh, “The Ghosts of Haditha,” TI (June 12, 2006): 26-35; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. and Mona Mahmoud, “Witness Accounts Tie Marines to Killings of 24 Iraqi Civilians,” NYT (May 29, 2006): A-1, 8; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “ In First Comments on Case, Bush Promises Justice in Military Investigation,” NYT (June 1, 2006): A-14; Josh White and Thomas E. Ricks, “Investigators of Haditha Shootings Look to Exhume Bodies,” June 2, 2006: A-16; Josh White, “Death in Haditha,” WPNW (Jan. 15-21, 2007): 9-11 offers a detailed summary. 16. Tony Perry, “Six Marines Charged with Criminal Abuse in Iraq,” LAT (Aug. 4, 2006): A-15. 17. Josh White, “Military Cleared in Raid on Iraq House [at Ishaqi],” WP (June 3, 2006): A-8; Jeffrey Fleishman, “At Hearing, Witness Says Troops Fired at Fleeing Iraqis,” LAT (Aug. 4, 2006): A-17; Borzou Daragahi and Julian E.

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Barnes, “Officers Allegedly Pushed ëKill Count’,” ibid. (Aug. 3, 2006): A-1, 8; Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, “4 Soldiers Eligible for Execution if Convicted,” ibid. (Sept. 3, 2006): A-1, 20. 18. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, “4 Recommended for Court-Martial in RapeMurder Cast,” LAT (Sept. 5, 2006): A-5; Sonya Geisand and John Pomfret, “When Violence Become Personal in War,” WPNW, July 24-30, 2006: 30-31. 19. John F. Burns “Trials of Some of Hussein’s Aides to Start,” NYT (Feb. 10, 2005): A-6; Edward Wong, “Charges Presented Against 5 Former Allies of Saddam Hussein,” NYT (Mar. 1, 2005): A-11; Burns, “First Court Case of Hussein Stems from 82 Deaths,” NYT (June 6, 2005): A-1, 9; Christopher Drew, “Desert Graves Yield Evidence to Try Hussein,” NYT (June 7, 2005): A-1, 10; Burns, “Hussein Jousts With Iraqi Judge Over His Rights in a Court Hearing,” (July 22, 2005): A-10. 20. Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999): 91- 93; John F. Burns, “Defiant Hussein Lashing Out at U.S., Goes on Trial,” NYT (Oct. 20, 2005): A-1, 8 and Burns, “Lawyer’s Slaying Raises Questions of Hussein Trial,” NYT (Oct. 22, 2005): A-1, 8. 21. Robert F. Worth, “At Trial in Iraq, Witnesses Tell About Torture,” NYT (Dec. 6, 2005): A-1, 13. On Ramsey Clark see John F. Burns, “In Defending Hussein, An American Contrarian Seeks to Set the Historical Record Straight,” NYT (Dec. 6, 2005): A-13; Robert F. Worth and Burns, “Hussein, at Lectern, Delivers Diatribe About U.S. and His Prison Treatment,” NYT (Dec. 7, 2005): A-22; Burns, “Iraqis Take Stock of a Trial Where the Accused Holds Court,” NYT (Dec. 23, 2005): A-12. 22. Robert F. Worth, “Frustrated by Critics, Judge in Hussein’s Trial Offers Resignation,” NYT (Jan. 15, 2006): A-8; Christopher Albritton, “Saddam’s Trial: Behind the Scene,” TI (Feb. 13, 2006): 50-51. 23. Robert F. Worth, “Prosecutors in Hussein Case Tie Him to Order to Kill 148,” NYT (Mar. 1, 2006): A-1, 8 and “Ex-Judge Under Hussein Defends Death Sentence for Shiites,” NYT (Mar. 14, 2006): A-14; Wong, “Hussein Admits He Ordered the Execution of 148,” NYT (April 6, 2006): A-10. 24. Kirk Semple, “Bodies Yield Evidence of Hussein-Era Killings,” NYT (Aug. 17, 2006): A-11; Edward Wong, “As Trial Nears, Poison Attack Haunts Kurds,” NYT (Aug. 21, 2006): A-1, 9; Wong, “Hussein Charged With Genocide in 50,000 Deaths,” NYT (April 5, 2006): A-1, 6; and Iraq’s poison gas attack of Kurds may have been done by Iranians according to Naseer Aruri, “Human Rights and the Gulf Crisis: The Verbal Strategy of George Bush” in Phyllis Bennis and Michael Moushabeck, Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991): 311-312; For details on the poison gas attack see Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993). 25. Paul von Zielbauer, “Hussein Trial Resumes; Sectarian Attacks Continue in Streets,” NYT (Sept. 9, 2006): A-12. Qais al-Bashir and Jamal Halaby, “Saddam Lashes Out During Genocide Trial,” AP (Sept. 13, 2006). 26. Paul von Zielbauer, “Judge Tells Hussein, You Are Not a Dictator,” NYT (Sept. 15, 2006): A-10; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “After Remark, Judge in Trial of



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Hussein Loses his Post,” NYT (Sept. 20, 2006): A-10; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. and Qais Mizher, “Judge Postpones Hussein Trial As Lawyers Continue Boycott,” NYT (Sept. 27, 2006): A-8; Bushra Juhi and Jamal Halaby, “Guards Buried Detainees Alive,” AP (Oct. 10, 2006). 27. John F. Burns and Semple,”Hussein Is Sentenced to Death By Hanging,” NYT (Nov. 6, 2006): A-1, 8; Julia Preston, “Hussein’s Trail Was Flawed but Reasonably Fair, And Verdict Justified, Legal Experts Say,” NYT (Nov. 6, 2006): A-8; Nagourney and Jim Rutenberg, “Bush Trumpets Verdict in Iraq As Some Polls Lift G.O.P. Spirit,” NYT (Nov. 6, 2006): A-1, 16; Sabrina Tarvernise, “In a Divided Iraq, Reaction to Saddam’s Death Sentence Conforms to Sectarian Lines,” NYT (Nov. 6, 2006): A-9. Sudarsan Raghavan and Slih Dehema, “Reactions to Verdict Reflect Shifts in Iraqis’ Fortunes,” WP (Nov. 6, 2006). 28. John F. Burns, “Hussein Displays Courtesy After Death Sentence Fury,” NYT (Nov. 8, 2006): A-6; Hassan M. Fattah, “Europeans Oppose Death Sentence For Hussein,” NYT (Nov. 7, 2006): A-6; William J. Kole, “World Split on Sentence,” AP (Nov. 6, 2006). 29. Brian Bennett, “Iraq’s Secret Death Chambers,” TI (Nov. 20, 2006): 4546. 30. John F. Burns and Marc Santora, “Iraq Mainly Calm, Riveted By Video of Hussein Death,” NYT (Dec. 31, 2006): A-1, 1; Hassan M. Fattah, “For Arab Critics, Hussein’s Execution Symbolizes the Victory of Vengeance Over Justice,” NYT (Dec. 31, 2006): A-13. Christopher Torchia, “Execution Faces Scrutiny,” AP (Jan. 3, 2006). AP, “Angry Protests in Iraq Suggest Sunni Arabs Shift to Militants,” NYT (Jan.2, 2007): A-9. Joshua Partlow, “Guard At Hanging Blamed for Covert Video of Hussein,” WP (Jan.4, 2007); Joshua Partlow, “Saddam Hussein’s Co-Defendants Hanged,” WP (Jan. 15, 2007).

Chapter 10 Awe and Shock: Occupation & Reconstruction

Costs

1. On election see Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War (New York: Henry Holt, 2005): 391-398. 2. Steven Weisman, “U.S. Avoids Role of Mediator as Iraqis Remain Deadlocked,” NYT (Mar. 20, 2005): A-8. 3. Edward Wong, “Iraqi Assembly Opens as Negotiations Over a Government Drag On,” NYT (Mar. 17, 2005): A-14. 4. 10 Robert F. Worth, “Iraq’s Assembly Accepts Cabinet Despite Tension,” and James F. Burns, “A Crucial Window For Iraq: 15 Weeks to Pull Together,” both in NYT (April 29, 2005): A-13; Worth and Richard A. Oppel, Jr. “Cabinet Sworn in But 6 Iraqi Posts Remain Unfilled,” NYT (May 4, 2005): A-1, 12; Alendra Zaviz, “ Government Sworn In,” AP (May 4, 2005); Oppel, “A New Setback for Iraq’s Cabinet,” NYT (May 9, 2005): A-11. 5. Dexter Filkins, “Shiite Offers Secular Vision of Iraq Future,” NYT (Feb. 2, 2005): A-1, 6; Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Officials [Cheney and Rumsfeld] Say a Theocratic Iraq Is Unlikely,” NYT (Feb. 7, 2004): A-8; Rod Nordland and Babak Dehghanpisheh, “What Sistani Wants,” NW (Feb. 24, 2005): 24-27; James Glanz, “U.S. Walls Off Its Corner of Baghdad,” NYT (July 5, 2005): A-8. 6. John F. Burns, “Iraqi Legislators Set up Panel to Draft and Constitution,”

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NYT (May 11, 2005): A-9; Edward Wong, “Dozens of Sunnis Expected to Help Draft Iraq Constitution,” NYT (June 6, 2005): A-9; Sabrina Tavernise, “Sunnis To Accept Offer of a Role in Constitution,” NYT (June 17, 2005): A-1, 10. 7. Edward Wong, “Draft for New Iraqi Constitution Includes Curbs on Women’s Rights,” NYT (July 20, 2005): A-1, 8; Kirk Semple, “Thorny Issues Remain on Draft of a new Constitution for Iraq,” NYT (July 23, 2005): A-5; AP, “Iraqi Talks Are Stalled Over Oil and Role of Islam,” NYT (Aug. 21, 2005): A-8; Dexter Filkins and James Glanz, “Iraq’s Assembly Is Given Charter, Still Unfinished,” NYT (Aug. 23, 2005): A-1, 8; For quotes from Constitution, see Filkins, “Secular Iraqis Say New Charter May Curb Rights,” NYT (Aug. 24, 2005): A 1, 6; Glanz, “Sunnis on Constitution Panel: Determined But Impugned,” NYT (Aug. 25, 2005): A-10; Filkins and Glanz, “Charter Talks In Iraq Reach Breaking Point,” NYT (Aug. 26, 2005): A-1, 6; Filkins and Glanz, “Shiites and Kurds Halt Talks With Sunnis,” NYT (Aug. 27, 2005): A-1, 6; Worth, “Sunni Arabs Rally to Protest Proposed Iraqi Constitution,” NYT (Aug. 27, 2005): A-6; Filkins and Robert F. Worth, “Leaders In Iraq Sending Charter to Referendum,” NYT (Aug. 29, 2005): A-1, 8; Worth, “Sunni Opposition to Iraqi Draft Constitution Intensifies,” NYT (Aug. 30, 2005): A-6; Filkins, “ExRebel Kurd (Massoud Barzani) Savoring Victory in Iraq’s Politics,” NYT (Sept. 2, 2005): A-1, 10; Craig S. Smith, “The Man (al-Sadr) Who Would Set Shiite against Shiite,” NYT (Sept. 11, 2005): WK-7; Scott Johnson, “Our Mr. Fix-It in Iraq (Khalilzad),” NW (Aug. 29, 2005): 32-33. 8. David S. Cloud, “U.S. to Send 2 Battalions to Iraq to Help To Protect Vote,” NYT (Aug. 24, 2005): A-6; Richard W. Stevenson and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Seeks to Aid Iraqi Charter, at a Distance,” NYT (Aug. 31, 2005): A-6; Peter Galbraith, “Last Chance For Iraq,” NYRB (Oct. 6, 2005): 20-22; For Zalmay Khalilzad’s career see, Jon Lee Anderson, “American Viceroy,” New Yorker (Dec. 19, 2005): 54-65. 9. Robert F. Worth, “Amended Version of Charter Approved for Publication,” NYT (Sept. 14, 2005): A-8; Kirk Semple, “Iraqi Rivals Trying to Fine-Tune Constitution for Voter Approval,” NYT (Oct. 11, 2005): A-8; Worth, “Leaders in Iraq Agree To Change in Constitution,” NYT (Oct. 12, 2005): A-1, 6; Edward Wong, “Some Sunnis Now Support Constitution, Splitting Opposition,” NYT (Oct. 14, 2005): A-13; Aparisim Ghosh, “Faces of Resistence,” TI (Oct. 17, 2005): 51-52; Kirk Semple, “Marine is Killed in Ambush in Iraq-Syria Border,” NYT (Nov. 7, 2005): A-8; Tavernise and Semple, “Deadliest Suicide Bombing Against G.I.’s,” NYT (Nov. 8, 2005): A-11. 10. Richard Galpin, “Referendum Crisis Looms in Iraq,” BBC News (Oct. 22, 2005) internet at news.bbc.co.uk; Edward Wong, “Baghdad Quiet as Vote Begins on Constitution,” NYT (Oct.15. 2005): A-1, 6; Dexter Filkins and John F. Burns, “Iraqis Cast Votes of Constitution, Turnout is Mixed,” NYT (Oct.16, 2005): A-1, 4; Sabrinia Tavernise and Wong, “Two Sides of the Sunni Vote: Deserted Polls and Long Lines,” NYT (Oct. 16, 2005): A-1, 4; Filkins and Worth, “Monitors in Iraq Review ‘Yes’ Vote,” NYT (Oct. 18, 2005): A-1, 12; Wong, “Iraqis Begin Audit of Heavy ‘Yes’ Vote,” NYT (Oct. 19, 2005): A-10; Filkins, “Iraq’s Sunnis Voted in Larger Numbers This Time,” NYT (Oct. 21, 2005): A-10; Reuters, “Iraqi Election Panel Reports Finding No Serious Fraud in Constitution Vote,” NYT (Oct. 23, 2005): A-4; Wong, “Iraqi Officials Declare



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Charter Has Been Passed,” NYT (Oct. 26, 2005): A-1, 12; Steve Negus, “Iraq: Yes, By A Nose,” Middle East International (Oct. 28, 2005): 8-9; Burns and Wong, “Annan Visits Iraq,” NYT (Nov. 13, 2005): 11; Warren Hoge, “U.N. Extends Mandate In Iraq For U.S. Troops,” NYT (Nov. 9, 2005): A-6; for a critique of the constitution, see Kana Makiya, “Present at the Disintegration” NYT (Dec. 11, 2005): WK- 13. 11. Hassan M. Fattah, “Iraqi Leaders Quarrel in Cairo Along the Usual Factional Lines,” NYT (Nov. 20, 2005): A-6; Fattah, “Iraqi Factions Seek Timetable for U.S. Pullout,” NYT (Nov. 22, 2005): A-1, 12. 12. Jim Muir, “Iraqi Parties Form Elections Blocs,” (October 28, 2005) internet at news.bbc.co.uk; Joe Klein, “Look Who’s Back (Ahmad Chalabi),” TI (Oct. 31, 2005): 29; Robert W. Worth, “Former Prime Minister is Seeking Allies (Ayad Allawi),” NYT (Oct. 2, 2005): A-10; Edward Wong, “Allawi Tries to Regain Office With a Non-Theocratic Bloc,” NYT (Oct. 31, 2005): A-8; Dexter Filkins, “3 Sunni Parties Form Bloc to Take Part in Iraq Vote,” NYT (Oct.27, 2005): A-14; Sabrina Tavernise, “A New Sunni Party Raises Hopes Of More Political Participation,” NYT (Nov. 7, 2005): A-8; Kirk Semple, “Alliances Form as Candidates Meet Deadline,” NYT (Oct. 29, 2005): A-8; Wong and Semple, “2 Rival Shiite Leaders Meet in a Gesture of Reconciliation,” NYT (Nov. 9, 2005): A-8; Hanna Fairfield and Archie Tse, “Electing a Parliament,” NYT (Dec. 15, 2005): A-16. 13. Wong, Iraq’s Powerful Shiite Coalition Shows Signs of Stress,” NYT (Dec. 9, 2005): A-16; Wong, Marc Charney and Bill Marsh, “Seven to Watch in Iraq’s Election,” NYT (Dec.11, 2005): WK-5; Wong, “Sunni Candidates in Iraq Find Enemies on All Sides,” NYT (Dec. 5, 2005): A-1, 10; Semple, “At Najaf Mosque, Mob attacks Allawi,” NYT (Dec. 5, 2005): A-8; Worth and Wong, “Politics, Iraqi Style: Slick TV Ads, Text Messaging and Gunfire,” NYT (Dec. 11, 2005): A-1, 17; Dexter Filkins, “Iraqi Deputy, Back in U.S. Strives to Rebuild Reputation,” NYT (Nov. 10, 2005): A-14; Richard W. Stevenson and Douglas Jehl, “A Reminder of How Debate Over Prewar Intelligence Continues to Haunt Bush,” NYT (Nov. 15, 2005): A-23; Edward Wong, “Defiant Shiite Cleric Uses Violence and Political Popularity to Increase Power,” NYT (Nov. 27, 2005): A-6; Dexter Filkins, “Police Seize Forged Ballots Headed to Iraq From Iran,” NYT (Dec. 14, 2005): A-14; Kirk Semple, “U.S. Forces in Ramadi Leave Security to Iraqis to Raise Voter Turnout,” NYT (Dec. 15, 2005): A-18; Edward Wong, “Sunni Bastion of Tikrit Now Turning to Ballot Box,” NYT (Dec. 14, 2005): A-1, 14. 14. Sameer N. Yacoub, “Iraqis Go To Polls World Wide,” AP (Dec. 14, 2005); Greg Risling, “Iraqi Expatriate Vote In U.S. Far Less Enthusiastic,” AP (Dec. 17, 2005); Dexter Filkins, “11 Million Go to Polls to Pick Parliament,” NYT (Dec. 16, 2005): A-1, 14; Kirk Semple and Qais Mizher, “High Sunni Turnout Suggests a Deal For an Election Day Truce,” NYT (Dec. 16, 2005): A-13; Edward Wong, “A Celebration of Kurds’ Hopes For their Region,” NYT (Dec. 16, 2005): A-13; Wong, “Iraqi Officials Report Mistakes In Voter Registration in Kirkuk,” NYT (Dec. 12, 2005): A-1; Wong, “In North, Kurdistan Comes First, Iraq Comes Second,” NYT (Dec. 15, 2005). 15. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. “Iraqi Court Bars at Least 90 Candidates for Parliament,” NYT (Dec. 25, 2005): A-12; Patrick Quinn, “Shiite Alliance Rejects

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Calls for a New Vote,” Chicago Tribune (Dec. 25, 2005): A-3; Sabrina Tavernise, “Sunnis Protest Iraqi Vote, and Offer Deals,” NYT (Dec. 26, 2005): A-8; 16. John F. Burns, “ 2 Top Americans in Baghdad Urge Unity After Vote,” NYT (Dec. 17, 2005): A-1, 9; Edward Wong, “While Iraq Counts Votes, Politicians Vie for Leverage,” NYT (Dec. 18, 2005): A-24; Wong, “Religious Groups Take Early Lead in Iraqi Ballots,” NYT (Dec. 20, 2005): A-1, 14, “Sunnis Reject Early Iraq Elections Results, Calling for Inquiry,” NYT (Dec. 21, 2005): A-14, “Turnout In the Iraqi Elections Is Reported at 70 Percent,” NYT (Dec. 22, 2005): A-10; Patrick Quinn, “Iraq Parties Unite Over Election Complaints,” AP (Dec. 22, 2005); Sinan Salaheddin, “Iraqis Threaten To Boycott,” AP (Dec. 23, 2005); Tavernise, “Thousands of Sunnis Protest in Baghdad, Charging Fraud in Election,” NYT (Dec. 24, 2005): A-5 and “U.N. Observer in Baghdad Calls The Voting Valid,” NYT (Dec. 29, 2005): A-1, 12; Oppel, “Monitoring Group Says Team Will Review Voting Results,” NYT (Dec. 30, 2005): A-6; John F. Burns, “24 Ex-Hussein Officials Released From U.S. Custody,” NYT (Dec. 20, 2005): A-14. 17. Robert F. Worth, “Iraqi Voting Found To be Flawed but Mostly Fair: Sunnis Are Skeptical,” NYT (Jan. 20, 2006): A-10; Worth, “Shiite-Kurd Bloc Falls Just Short in Iraqi Election,” NYT (Jan. 21, 2005): A-1, 6; Nelson Hernandez and Omar Fekeiki, “Shiites Keep Control of Iraqi Parliament, Official Election Results are Announce; Negotiations Begin,” WP (January 21, 2006); Sabrina Tavernise, “Iraqis Certify Election Results on A Day of More Violence,” NYT (Feb.11, 2006): A-6. 18. Nelson Hernandez, “Shiites Nominate Jafari to New Four-Year Term,” WP (Feb.12, 2006); Bassam Sebti, Joanathan Finer and Knickmeyer, “Sectarian Surges After Shrine Bombing” (Feb. 23, 2006) and Finer and Sebti, “Sectarian Violence Kills Over 100 in Iraq,” (Feb. 24, 2006); Joe Klein, “Will Some Lend this Guy (Khalilzad) a Hand?” TI (Feb. 20, 2006): 23; Robert F. Worth and Sabrina Tavernise, “Radical Cleric Rising as a Kingmaker [al-Sadr] in Iraqi Politics,” NYT (Feb. 16, 2006): A-14. 19. Sabrina Tavernise, “Iraqi Parties Want Jaafari Out of Prime Minister Race,” (Mar. 2, 2006): A-12; Robert F. Worth, “Shiites Get Demand: Drop Jaafari From Race,” NYT (Mar. 3, 2006): A-12; Edward Wong, “Bush Opposes Iraq’s Premier, Shiites Report,” NYT (Mar. 29, 2006): A-1, 10 and “Beleaguered Premier Warns U.S. To Stop Interfering in Iraq’s Politics,” NYT (Mar. 30, 2006): A-12; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Iraq Leaders Try To End Deadlock as Violence Goes On,” NYT (April 20, 2006): A-11; Kirk Semple and Oppel, “Shiite Drops Bid to Keep His Post as Iraqi Premier,” NYT (April 21, 2006): A-1, 10; Oppel, “Shiites Nominate A Top Party Aide as Iraqi Premier,” NYT (April 22, 2006): A-1, 5; Semple, “Ending Jam, Iraq Fills Government Posts,” NYT (April 23, 2006): A-4; David Ignatius, “In Iraq’s Choice (Maliki), a Chance for Unity,” WPNW (May1-7, 2006): 5; Tavernise, “A Novice Known for Toughness,” NYT (April 23, 2006): A-4; Steven R. Weisman, “Rumsfeld Learns to Curb His Enthusiasm,” NYT (April 30, 2006): WK-3. 20. On the Council members, see Richard A. Oppel, Jr. “16 Police Recruits Killed in Iraq,” NYT (May 4, 2006): A-11; Oppel, “Iraqis Are Close to Filling Several Top Post, but Roadblocks Remain,” NYT (May 9, 2006): A-12. 21. Dexter Filkins and Richard A. Oppel, “Iraqis Form Government, With Crucial Posts Vacant,” NYT (May 21, 2006): A-1, 12; John F. Burns, “Wary



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Americans Hope New Cabinet Aids Stability,” plus “Challenges Facing Key Ministries,” NYT (May 21, 2006): A-14; Nelson Hernandez, “Two Cabinet Posts Yet Undecided,” WP (May 20, 2006); Burns, “On a Violent Day, Iraq’s New Leaders Unveils Idea for Tackling Security Challenges,” NYT (May 22, 2006): A-10. 22. Sabrina Tavernise and Qais Mizher, “Iraq’s Premier Seeks to Control a City [Basra] in Chaos,” NYT (June 1, 2006): A-1, 14; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Premier Accuses U.S. of Attacking Civilians in Iraq,” NYT (June 2, 2006): A-1, 8; Nir Rosen, “Killing Fields: Iraq is the Republic of Fear, Once Again,” WPNW (June 5-11, 2006): 21; Aparisim Ghosh, “The Tightrope Walker [Maliki],” and Ghosh, “Streets of Blood,” TI (June 12, 2006): 36-38; Kim Gamel, “Al-Maliki Promises to Free 2,500 Prisoners,” AP (June 7, 2006); Dexter Filkins, “Hundreds of Iraqi detainees Get First Taste of Freedom,” NYT (June 8, 2006): A-6; Fekeiki and Nelson Hernandez, “Iraq’s Premier Planning to Free 2,500 Detainees,” WP (June 7, 2006). 23. John F. Burns, “Iraqi Cabinet Complete,” NYT (June 9, 2006): A-8; AP, “Approval of Ministers Breaks Impasse over Security Posts,” USA Today (June 9, 2006): A-11; Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Key Security Ministers Approved,” AP (June 9, 2006). 24. Louise Roug, “A Third of Lawmakers in Iraq Skip Session,” Los Angeles Times (Sept. 6, 2006): A-4; Borzou Daragahi and Louise Roug, “Iraq’s Planned Budget Divisive Too,” LAT (Jan.19,2007): A-3. 25. John F. Burns and Dexter Filkins, “Bush Makes a Surprise Visit to Iraq to Press Leadership,” NYT (June 14, 2006): A-1, 10. 26. Solomon Moore, “Iraq Impeding Efforts to go after Shiite Militias, U.S. Military Says,” LAT (Sept. 26, 2006): A-1, A8 and “Iraqis Plan a Team Effort to End Violence,” LAT (Oct. 3, 2006): A-8; Paul Richter and Borzou Daragahi, “U.S. Officials Undermine Baghdad, Leader Says,” LAT (Oct. 17, 2006): A-10; Borzou Daragahi, “Not America’s Man in Iraq, Premier Says,” LAT (Oct. 28, 2006): A-1, A-8. 27. Michael R. Gordon, “Bush’s Adviser’s memo Cites Doubts About Iraqi Leaders,” NYT (Nov. 29, 2006): A-1, 8 plus full text of Hadley’s memo on A-10; John M. Broder and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Bush In Meeting on Iraq, Reject’s a Quick Pullout,” NYT (Dec. 1, 2006): A-1, A-6; Stolberg, “Facts and Body Language Bring Clues and Questions at Bush-Maliki Meeting,” NYT (Dec. 2, 2006): A-5: Nawaf Obaid, “Stepping Into Iraq,” WPNW (Dec. 4-10, 2006): 26. 28. Alexandra Zavis and Solomon Moore, “Looking to Themselves for Solutions,” LAT (Dec. 6, 2006): A-9; Louise Roug and Peter Spiegel, “ Iraqi Leader Goes Own Way to Fill Top Post,” LAT (Jan. 13, 2007): A-1, A-17; Louise Roug, “Maliki Pledges to Treat Militants with an Iron Fist,” LAT (Jan. 18, 2007): A-1, A-5; Borzou Daragahi, “Cooperative Tone of Sadr Surprises U.S.,” LAT (Jan. 24, 2007): A-1, A-5..

Chapter 11 Electing and Iraqi Government 1. Michael Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006): 463476; Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New

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York: Penguin, 2006): 97-98; Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003): 149-151; Franks, American Soldier, 524-530; Clark, Winning Wars, 91-92; Allan Butler, “Promise and Fear Iraq’s Future in the Balance,” in Beck and Downing, Battle for Iraq, 194-204; Danny Schechter, “Looting Erupts, Baghdad in Chaos as Soldiers Watch,” in Schecter, Embedded : Weapons of Mass Deception (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003): 191198. 2. Editorial, “Cronyism and Rebuilding,” LAT (Mar. 24, 2003): B-12; Michael Scherer, “K Street on the Tigris,” Mother Jones (Nov.-Dec. 2003): 17; Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 199-201; Pratap Chatterjee, Iraq, Inc.: A Profitable Occupation (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004): 12, 178-182. 3. Chatterjee, Iraq, Inc., 178-182; Farah Stockman, US Firms Suspected of Bilking Iraq Funds”,” The Boston Globe (Apr. 16, 2006): A-1; Elaine Sciolino, “Top Iraqi’s Visit Helps France to Mend Several Fences,” NYT (Jan. 15, 2005): A-8. 4. Chris Kraul, “Decline in Oil Output Dims Iraq’s Recovery,” Los Angeles Times (Jan. 25, 2006): A-1, 4; James Glanz, “Derelict Plants Are Crippling Iraq’s Oil Industry,” NYT (Mar. 3, 2005): A-1, 12; Aparisim Ghosh, “Oil But No Gasoline, Rivers Bring No Water,” TI (July 11, 2005): 39; on oil pipeline to Turkey, see Glanz, “Thanks to Guards, Iraqi Oil Pipeline Is Up and Running, On and Off,” NYT (Sept. 9, 2005): A-6; Nelson Hernandez, “Major Oil Refinery in Iraq Reopens,” WP (Jan. 2, 2006): 16-17; Louise Roug and Borzoi Daragahi, “Iraqis Pummeled at the Pumps,” LAT (Dec. 28, 2005):A-1, 8; James Glanz and Robert W. Worth, “Attacks on Iraq Oil Industry Aid Vast Smuggling Scheme,” NYT (June 4, 2006): A-1, 8. 5. T. Christian Miller, “U.S. Missteps Leave Iraqis in the Dark,” Los Angeles Times (Dec. 25, 2005): A-14; James Glanz, “Iraqis Simmer as Demand Outstrips Electricity Supply,” NYT (July 23, 2005): A-5, “Iraq Untilities Are Falling Short of Prewar Performance,” NYT (Feb. 9, 2006): A-12 and “Iraqi Utilities are Falling Short of Prewar Performance,” NYT (Feb. 9, 2006): A-12. 6. John Ward Anderson and Bassam Sebti, “Billion-Dollar Start Falls Short in Iraq,” WP (Apr. 16, 2006): 16; Eric Eckholm, “G.I. Mission in Sadr City: From Sewage to Showcase,” NYT (Jan. 11, 2005): A-10; Glanz, “U.S. Army to Expand Role In Iraq’s Civil Engineering,” NYT (Jan. 14, 2005): A-8; Eckholm, “Rebuilding of Basra Progresses, But It’s Harder Than Expected,” NYT (Jan. 19, 2005): A-1, 8; Glanz, “New Election Issues: Electricity and Water,” NYT (Jan. 26, 2005): A-8. 7. Andy Mosher and Griff Witte, “Leaving the Work Undone,” WPNW (Aug. 7-13, 2006): 16; Ellen Knickmeyer, “U.S. Plan to Build Iraq Clinics Falters,” WP (April 3, 2006); James Glanz, “U.S. Should Repay Millions To Iraq, a U.N. Audit Finds,” NYT (Nov. 5, 2005): A-1, 5 also see, Griff Witte, “No More Exclusive Deals,” WPNW (July 17-23, 2006): 21; Farah Stockman, “U.S. Firms Suspected of Bilking Iraq Funds,” Boston Globe (April 16, 2006): 13. 8. James Glanz, “American Faces Charge of Graft For Work in Iraq,” NYT (Nov. 17, 2005): A-1, 10. Glanz, “Issuing Contracts, Ex-Convict Took Bribes in Iraq, U.S. Says,” NYT (Nov. 18, 2005): A-1, 12. Glanz, “U.S. Aide Accussed of Graft in Iaq Had a Shadowy Past,” NYT (Nov. 19, 2005): A-8.



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9. Facts on File, “Annan Appoints Volcker,” (2004): 287-288; Warren Hoge, “U.N. Is to Detail Who Paid Bribes in Iraq Oil Sales,” NYT (Oct. 27, 2005): A-1, 10 and “The Many Streams That Fed the River of Graft to Hussein,” NYT (Oct. 28, 2005): A-10; Andrew Zagorin, “Saddam & Co,” TI (Nov. 7, 2005): 18. For critics of the oil-for-food program’s operations see: Geoff, Simons, Targeting Iraq: Sanctions and Bombing in U.S. Policy (London: Saqi Books, 2002): 85-105; for information about the Volcker Investigation, the three committee members and the final report of October 27 see the Committee’s website under press releases, members, and documents. 10. Andrew Kramer, “Evidence Cited in Oil Report Was Forged, Russia Says,” NYT (Oct. 29, 2005): A-8; Warren Hoge, “U.N. Chief Admits Oil-ForFood Missteps,” NYT (Sept. 8, 2005): A-10. 11. Julia Preston and Simon Romero, “Oilman Indicted Over Kickbacks to Iraqi Regime,” NYT (Oct. 22, 2005): A-1, 4; Preston, “U.S. Company Admits Oil-For-Food Bribes,” NYT (Oct. 21, 2005): A-12; Ian Williams, “Oil-for-Food: It Worked,” NA (Oct. 24, 2005): 8-9; Simon Romero, and Preston, “ Lawyer Says Korean Was Originally Seized in Mexico,” NYT (Jan. 11, 2006): A-12; Preston, “Prosecutor Calls Oil-For-Food Suspect a Flight Risk,” NYT (Jan. 18, 2006): A-5. 12. Mark Mazzetti and Joel Havemann, “Bush’s Bill for War Is Rising,” LAT (Feb. 3, 2006): A-1, 11. 13. Jonathan Weisman, “More Shock and Awe: $94 Billion,” WPNW (Apr. 24-30, 2006): 16; Griff Witte, “No More Exclusive Deals: The Army is Ending a Controversial Contract with Halliburton”,” WPNW (July 17-23, 2006): 19.

Chapter 12 Reverberations On the Home Front 1. James Bamford, A Pretext for War, 307-314. Thomas Powers, “The Vanishing Case for War,” NYRB (Dec. 4, 2003): 12-17; David L. Philips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco, 35-44, 77-102, 121-131; Sabrina Tavernise, “Sectarian Fighting Divides Iraq, Despite Advances,” NYT (May 21, 2006): A-12; David Savage and Solomon Moore, “Bush Sees Errors, Stands by Invasion,” LAT (Jan. 14, 2007): A-7. 2. Michael A. Fletcher, “Cindy Sheehan’s Pitched Battle,” WP (Aug. 13, 2005): A-1; Aaron Glantz, “U.S. Military Spied on Hundreds of Antiwar Demos,” (Jan. 25, 2007); Maura Reynolds, “Democratic Hawk and War Veteran Wants U.S. Troops Out of Iraq Now,” LAT (Nov. 18, 2005): A-1ff. 3. Jeff Zeleny and Megan Thee, “Exit Polling Shows Independents, Citing War, Favored Democrats, NYT (Nov. 8, 2006): A-1, P.9; J Carl Hulse and Thom Shanker, “Democrats, Engaging Bush, Vow Early Action Over Iraq,” NYT (Nov. 11, 2006): A-1, 12; Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Jim Ruthenberg, “Rumsfeld Resigns and Bush Pledges to Work With Democratic Majority,” NYT (Nov. 9, 2006): A-1, P-7. 4. Francis Fukuyama, “The Neoconservative Moment,” NI (Summer 2004): 57-68, Charles Krauthammer, “In Defense of Democratic Realism,” NI (Fall, 2004): 15-25. Fukuyama, “Why Shouldn’t I Change My Mind,” LAT (Apr. 9, 2006): M-1.Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001): 283-288;

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Pete Spiegel, “Perle Says He Should Not Have Backed Iraq War,” LAT (Nov. 4, 2006): A-11. Also see Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Movement,” FA (Winter 1990/91): 23-33; Fukuyama, American at The Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006): 70-71. 5. David Sanger, “Panel Urges Basic Shift in U.S. Policy,” NYT (Dec. 7, 2006): A-1, 21; William Branigin, Josh White & Robin Wright, “Iraq Panel Calls Conditions Grave and Deteriorating,” WP (Dec. 6, 2006). 6. Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Kate Zernike, “Bush Backs Away From 2 Key Ideas on Panel On Iraq,” NYT (Dec. 8, 2006): A-1, 14; Greg Miller, “Return Fire from the Right,” LAT (Dec. 8, 2006): A-1, A-11; Greg Myre, “Israel Leader Rejects Link Between Iraq and Mideast Woes,” NYT (Dec. 8, 2006): A-16; Edward Wong and Abdul Razzaq al-Saiedi, “In Iraq, Reaction to Report Runs From Relief to Anger,” NYT (Dec. 7, 2006): A-23; Kirk Semple, “Iraqi President Denounces U.S. Strategy on Security,” NYT (Dec. 11, 2006): A-12. Glenn Kessler and Thomas E. Ricks, “An Acknowledgment of Reality,” WPNW (Dec.11-17): 6-7. 7. Jim Rutenberg and David E. Sanger, “White House to Delay Shift on Iraq Until Early in 2007,” NYT (Dec. 13, 2006): A-1, 12; David S. Cloud, “Bush Won’t Be ‘Rushed’ on Iraq, but Says He’ll Press Maliki,” NYT (Dec.14, 2006): A-16. Robin Wright and Peter Baker, “Iraq Strategy Review Focusing on Three Main Options,” WP (Dec. 9, 2006); Michael Fletcher, “Bush Delays Speech of Iraq Strategy,” WP (Dec. 13, 2006); Michael R. Gordon and Mazzetti, “General Warns Of Risks in Iraq if G.I.’s Are Cut,” NYT (Nov. 16, 2006): A-1, 14. 8. David S. Cloud, “U.S. Considers Large, Temporary Troop Increase in Iraq,” NYT (Nov. 21, 2006): A-11; Michael Abramowitz and Thomas E. Ricks, “Studying the Options,” WPNW (Nov. 20-27, 2006): 6-7; Michael R. Gordon, “Military Team Undertakes a Broad Review of the Iraq War,” NYT (Nov. 11, 2006): A-8. 9. Michael Abramowitz and Robin Wright, “Bush To Add 20,000 Troops in an Effort to Stabilize Iraq,” and Thomas E. Ricks and Ann Scott Taylor, “Intensified Combat on Streets Likely,” WP (Jan.11, 2007). 10. Paul Richter and Julian E. Barnes, “Bush’s Plan for Iraq Comes Under Fire from Both Parties,” LAT (Jan. 12, 2007): A-1, A-14; Noam N. Levey, “Congress Unleashes Antiwar Proposals,” LAT (Jan. 18, 2007): A-19 and ibid, “Iraq Buildup Draws New Challenge,” LAT (Jan. 23, 2007): A-8. 11. Michael R. Gordon and Thom Shanker, “Bush to Name a New General to Oversee Iraq,” NYT (Jan.5, 2007): A-1, 6; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Bush is Expected to Shift U.S. Ambassador in Iraq to U.N.,” NYT (Jan. 5, 2007): A-7; Mark Mazzetti, “In Shift, Director For Intelligence in State Department Post,” NYT (Jan.4, 2007): A-1, 8. 12. Rick Atkinson, “Can He Fix It?” WPNW (Jan. 15-21, 2007): 8; Louise Roug and Peter Spiegel, “Iraqi Leader Goes Own Way to Fill Top Post,” LAT (Jan. 13, 2007): A-9; Julian E. Barnes, “General tells Senate Iraq ëNot Hopeless’,” LAT (Jan. 24, 2007): A-10. 13. Jon Sawyer, “War with Iran? Congress says Ok,” LAT (Aug. 29, 2006): M-1, M-6; see also, Seymour M. Hersh, “The Next Act,” New Yorker (Nov. 11, 2006).



Notes

373

14. Nazila Fathi and Edward Wong, “In Iran, Iraqi is Offered Aid in Trying to Quell Violence,” NYT (Sept. 13, 2006): A-11; Alan Cowell, “Blair Urges Strategy Change in Mideast, Spotlighting Iran,” NYT (Nov. 14, 2006): A-11; Kirk Semple, “Syrian Foreign Minister, in Baghdad, Calls for Timetable on U.S. Troop Withdrawal,” NYT (Nov. 20, 2006): A-12; Sabrina Tavernise, “Syria and Iraq Restore Ties Severed in the Hussein Era,” NYT (Nov. 21, 2006): A-11. 15. Borzou Daragahi, “Iran Forging Ahead in Iraq Without U.S.,” LAT (Dec. 22, 2006): A-10; ibid, “Iranian Sees Border Dangers,” LAT (Jan. 23, 2007); A-4. 16. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, “U.S. Forces Detain 6 Iranian Envoys” LAT (Jan. 12, 2007): A-8; Julian E. Barnes, “White House Softens Iraq Tone,” LAT (Jan. 13, 2007): A-4. 17. Alexandra Zavis and Greg Miller, “Scant Evidence Found of Iran-Iraq Arms Link,” LAT (Jan. 23, 2007): A-1, A-4. 18. AP, “914,00 Iraqis Displaced by War, U.N. Says,” LAT (Oct. 21, 2006): A-8; Rosa Brooks, “The 2,000 dead aren’t the Only Victims,” LAT (Oct. 29, 2005): B-15; David Zucchino, “Bring Back the Wounded With Heart, Soul and Surgery,” a 3-part series, LAT (Apr. 2, 2006): A-1, 24-25 (Apr. 3, 2006): A-1, 14-16 (Apr. 4, 2006): A-1, 12-15; Jia-Rui Chong and Thomas H. Maugh II, “Study Details Mental Health of War Veterans,” LAT (Mar. 1, 2006): A-10; Lisa Chedekel and Matthew Kauffman, “U.S. Redeploying Troops with Mental Health Issues,” LAT (May 14, 2006): A-34; Ricks, Fiasco, 371, 424; Robert F. Worth, “950 Die in Pilgrim’s Stampede on Baghdad Bridge,” NYT (Sept. 1, 2005): A-1, 8. Louise Roug and Doug Smith, “War’s Iraqi Death Toll Tops 50,000,” LAT (June 25,2006); Sabrina Tavernise, “Iraqi Death Toll Exceeded 34,000 in ë06” NYT (Jan. 17, 2007); Gilbert Burnham, et al., “Mortality after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq,” The Lancet (Oct. 11, 2006); David Brown, “Study Claims Iraq’s ‘Excess’ Death Toll Has Reached 655,000,” WP (Oct. 11, 2006): A-12. 19. “Iraq War Costs to Hit $8.4 Billion a Month,” LAT (Jan. 19, 2007): A-3; Joel Havemann, “War Costs are Hitting Historic Proportions,” LAT (Jan. 14, 2007): A-9; Ricks, Fiasco, 362, for Zinni quote.

Chapter 13 Epilogue 56.

1. Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” FA (Sept./Oct. 2004): 34-

2. Noam N. Levey, “Vietnam Surfaces on Both Sides of Iraq Debate,” LAT (Jan. 21, 2007):A-4; Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, “The Endgame in Iraq,” WPNW (Jan. 22-28, 2007): 21-22; Robert G. Kaiser, “Trapped by Hubris, Again,” WPNW (Jan. 22-28, 2007): 22. 3. Patrick J. McDonnell, “Iraq Begins to Take Formal Control of Its Armed Forces,” LAT (Sept. 8, 2006): A-5; Louise Roug and Julian E. Barnes, “Iraqi Forces Not Ready Yet, U.S. General Says,” LAT (Aug. 31, 3006): A-8; Barnes, Pentagon Issues Grim Iraq Report,” LAT (Sept. 2, 2006): A-1, 9; Noam N. Levey, “The Spector of Iraq Civil War Riles Senator,” LAT (Aug. 7, 2006): A-4; “In Iraq, Civil War All But Declared,” LAT (July 19, 2006): A-1ff. 4. Borzou Daragahi, “Shiites Press for a Partition of Iraq,” LAT (Aug. 9, 2006): A-1ff; Borzou Daragahi, “In Kurdistan, Iraq Seems a Million Miles

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Away,” LAT (Sept. 4, 2006): A-1, 6. 5. Paul Richter, “Iraq Plans Summit with Iran and Syria,” LAT (Feb 2, 2007): A-9; Megan K. Stack, “Hands-off or Not? Saudis Wring Theirs Over Iraq,” LAT (May 24, 2006): A-28; Alissa J. Rubin, “Neighbors and Others Arrive in Baghdad Seeking Peace,” NYT (Mar. 10, 2007): A-6 and Rubin, “Iraq Leader Asks for Region’s Aid to Curb Violence,” NYT (Mar. 11, 2007):A-1,10. 6. David S. Cloud, “In Rare Turn, U.S. and Iran Schedule High-level Security Talks in Baghdad,” NYT (May 18, 2007): A-10; John Ward Anderson, “U.S. Iran Open Dialogue on Iraq,” WP (May 29, 2007) as www. washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/28.

Select Bibliography General Ash, Timothy Garton. Free World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West. New York: Random House, 2004. Fisher, Sydney and William Ochsenwald. The Middle East: A History, 4th ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 1990. Goldschmidt, Arthur, Jr. A Concise History of the Middle East, 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, 2nd ed. New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 2004. MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World. New York: Random House, 2001. Makiya, Kanan. Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World. New York: W.W. Norton, 1993. Ross, Dennis. The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2004. Zakaria, Rafik. The Struggle Within Islam. New York: Penguin Books, 1988.

Israeli-Palestine Conflicts Beilin, Yossi. The Path to Geneva: The Quest for a Permanent Peace, 1996-2004. New York: RDV Books, 2004. Beilin, Yossi. Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accords to a Final Agreement. London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999. Cheshin, Amir S., Bill Hutman and Avi Melamed. Separate and Unequal: The Inside Story of Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. Enderlin, Charles. Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002. Trans. by Susan Fairfield. New York: Other Press, 2003. Ross, Dennis. The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for a Middle Peace. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2004. Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 3rd ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

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Terrorism

The 9/11 Commission Report. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon. The Age of Sacred Terror. New York: Random House, 2002. Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon. The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right. New York: Henry Holt, Times Book, 2005. Bergen, Peter L. The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda’s Leader. New York: Free Press, 2006. Clarke, Richard. Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror. New York: Free Press. 2004. Clarke, Richard A. et al. Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action. New York: Century Foundation Press, 2004. Gerges, Fawaz A. The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Miles, Steven H. Oath Betrayed: Torture, Medical Complicity, and the War on Terror. New York: Random House, 2006. Scheuer, Michael (“Anonymous”). Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror. Washington DC: Brassey’s, 2004.

Iraq

Cleveland, William. The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati al-Husri. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971. Darwish, Adel and Gregory Alexander. Unholy Babylon. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. Farouk-Slugget, Marion and Peter Slugett. Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 1987. Golan, Galia. Moscow and the Middle East. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992. Hiro, Dilip. The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. New York: Routledge, 1991. Khaduri, Majid. Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1978. Metz, Helen Chapin. Iraq: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990. Sanir al-Khalil. The Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989.



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377

Sati al-Husri. The Day of Maysulun. Trans. by Sydney S. Glazer. Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 1966. Tibi, Bassam. Arab Nationalism. Trans. by Marion and Peter Slugett. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990.

United States

Baer, Robert. See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism. New York: Crown Books, 2002. Bacevich, Andrew J. The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced By War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Brune, Lester H. Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations. Vol. 3. New York: Routledge, 2002. Cooley, John K. Payback: America’s Longest War in the Middle East. New York: Brassey’s, 1991. Freil, Howard and Richard Falk. The Record of the Paper: How the New York Times Misreports US Foreign Policy. New York: Verso, 2004. Lodal, Jan. The Price of Dominance: The New Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Challenge to American Leadership. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2001. Marshall, Jonathan, et al. The Iran-Contra Connection. Boston: South End Press, 1987.

Personalities

Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary: A Memoir. New York: Miramax Books, 2003. Baker, James A., III. The Politics of Diplomacy. New York: Putnam Sons, 1995. Bremer, L. Paul III with Malcom McConnell. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. Bush, George H.W. and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1998. Cannon, Lou. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. 2nd ed. New York: Public Affairs, 1999. Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York:

Bantam Books, 1982.

Christopher, Warren. Chances of a Lifetime: A Memoir. New York: Scribner’s, 2001. Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004.

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Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York: Touchtone, 1996. Schultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993. Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983. Talbott, Strobe. The Russian Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy [Clinton]. New York: Random House, 2002.

First Iraq War General

Bennis, Phyllis and Michael Mousabeck, eds. Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader. New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991. Brune, Lester H. America and the Iraqi Crisis. Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1993. Cockburn, Andrew and Patrick Cockburn. Out of the Ashes: The Resurrections of Saddam Hussein. New York: Jarper Prennial, 1991. Gerges, Fawas A. “Regional Security After the Gulf Crisis: the American Role.” Journal of Palestine Studies (Summer 1991): 55-58.

Military Activity

Clark, Wesley K. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. Freedman, Lawrence and Efrain Karsh. The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Hiro, Dilip. Desert Shield to Desert Storm. New York: Routledge, 1992. Judah, Tim. Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. Miller, Mark. Spectacle: Operation Desert Storm and the Triumph of Illusion. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.

Interwar Decade

Arnove, Anthony, ed. Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000. Butler, Richard. The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Growing Crisis of Global Security. New ed. New York: Public Affairs, 2001.



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Cordesman, Anthony. Iraq and the War of Sanctions. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. Graham-Brown, Sara. Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999. Hiro, Dilip. Iraq: In the Eye of the Storm. New York: Thundermouth’s Press/Nation, 2002. Lopez, George and David Cortright. “Containing Saddam: Sanctions Worked.” Foreign Affairs (July/Aug. 2004): 90-103. Ritter, Scott. Endgame: Solving the Iraq Crisis. 2nd ed. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. Simons, Geoff. Targeting Iraq: Sanctions and Bombing in US Policy. London: Saqi Books, 2002.

Second Iraqi War General

Byrd, Robert C. Losing America: Confronting a Reckless and Arrogant President. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. Clark, Wesley K. Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire. New York, Public Affairs, 2003. Dallder, Ivo H. and James M. Lindsay. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. Dean, John W. Worse Than Watergate: The Secret Presidency of George W. Bush. New York: Little, Brown, 2004. Fukuyama, Francis. America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006. Gaddis, John Lewis. Surprise, Security and the American Experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. Hoffman, Stanley. Gulliver Unbound: America’s Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Kellner, Douglas. From 9/11 to Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy. New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Prestowitz, Clyde. Rouge Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions. New York: Basic Books, 2003. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. War and the American Presidency. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. Todd, Emmanuel. After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order. Trans. by C. Jon Delogu. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

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Wilson, Joseph C. The Politics of Truth. New York: Carroll & Graff, 2004.

The Road to War

Ahmad, Nafeez Mosaddeq. Behind the War on Terror: Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for Iraq. British Columbia, Canada: New Society Publications, 2003. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. “Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush: Historical Comparisons of Ends and Means in Their Foreign Policies.” Diplomatic History (June 2006): 509-543. Bamford, James. A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies. New York: Doubleday, 2004. Blix, Hans. Disarming Iraq. New York, Pantheon, 2004. Danner, Mark. The Secret Way to War: The Downing Street Memo and the Iraq War’s Buried History. New York: New York Review Books, 2006. Hiro, Dilip. Secrets and Lies: Operation “Iraqi Freedom” and After. New York: Nation Books, 2003. Kaplan, Lawrence F. and William Kristol. The War Over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission. San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003. McCollam, Douglas. “The List: How Chalabi Played the Press.” Columbia Journalism Review (July/Aug. 2004): 31-37. Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. New York, Viking, 2004. Powers, Thomas. “How Bush Got it Wrong.” New York Review of Books (Sept. 23, 2004): 87-93. Rai, Milan. War Plan Iraq: Ten Reasons Against War on Iraq. New York: Verso, 2002. Risen, James. State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration. New York: Free Press, 2006. Schechter, Danny. Embedded: Weapons of Mass Deception. Amherst, MA: Prometheus Books, 2003. Scheer, Christopher, Robert Scheer and Lakshmi Chaudhry. The Five Biggest Bush Told Us About Iraq. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003. Sifrey, Micah and Christopher Cerf. The Iraqi War Reader: History, Documents and Opinions. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Suskind, Ron. The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Woodward, Bob. Bush At War. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2003.



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381

———. Plan of Attack. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2004.

The Invasion

Anderson, Jon Lee. The Fall of Baghdad. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. Atkinson, Rick. In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat. New York: Henry Holt, 2004. Bacevich, Andrew. “A Modern Major General [Franks].” New Left Review (September/October 2004): 123-134. Beck, Sara and Malcolm Downing. The Battle for Iraq. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. CBS News. America at War: The Battles for Iraq, A View from the Frontlines. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iraqi War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Cordesman, Anthony H. The War After the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies Press, 2004. Franks, Tommy with Malcolm McConnell. An American Soldier: General Tommy Franks. New York: 10Regan Books, 2004. Gordon, Michael and Bernard E. Trainor. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006. Katovsky, Bill and Timothy Carlson. Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq. Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2003. Murray, Williamson and Robert H. Scales, Jr. The Iraqi War: A Military History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. Purdum, Tom, et al.Time of Our Choosing: America’s War in Iraq. New York: Times Books, Henry Holt, 2003. Wright, Evan. Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America and the New Face of American War. New York: Putnam, 2004.

Search for Banned Weapons

Obeidi, Mahdi with Kurt Pitzer. The Bomb in my Garden: The Secret of Saddam Hussein’s Nuclear Mastermind. Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley, 2004. Ritter, Scott. Frontier Justice: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Bushwacking of America. New York: Context Books, 2003. Whitney, Craig R., ed. The WMD Mirage: Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War. New York, Public Affairs, 2005.

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Occupation of Iraq

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Imperial Life in the Emerald City. New York: Knopf, 2006. Chatterjee, Pratap. Iraq, Inc: A Profitable Occupation. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004. Coleman, Isobel. “Women, Islam, and the New Iraq.” Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 2006): 24-38. Danner, Mark. “Delusions in Baghdad.” New York Review of Books (Dec. 16, 2003): 92-97. Diamond, Larry. Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq. New York: Henry Holt, 2005. ———. “What Went Wrong in Iraq.” Foreign Affairs (Sept./Oct. 2004): 34-56. Feldman, Noah. What We Owe Iraq: War and The Ethics of Nation Building. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Gettleman, Jeffrey. “The Re-Baathification of Falluja.” NYT Magazine (June 20, 2004): 50-55. Glanz, Aaron. How America Lost Iraq. New York: Penguin, 2005. Kaplan, Fred. “Hunkering Down: A Guide to the U.S. Military’s Future in Iraq.” Atlantic Monthly (June 2006): 34-37. Nordland, Rod and Christopher Dickey. “Tribe versus Tribe.” Newsweek (Jan. 24, 2005): 44-45. Nordland, Rod and Babak Dehghanpisheh, “What Sistani Wants.” Newsweek (Feb. 14, 2005): 24-27, Packer, George. The Assassins’ Gate: American in Iraq. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2005. Parenti, Christian. The Freedom: Shadows and Hallucinations in Occupied Iraq. New York: The New Press, 2004. Pillar, Paul R. “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq.” Foreign Affairs (Mar./Apr. 2006): 15-27. Phillips, David L. Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2005. Powell, Bill. “Into the Cauldron.” Time (Apr. 12, 2004): 26-33. –––. “No Easy Options.” Time (Apr. 19, 2004): 33-37. Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: Penguin, 2006.



Select Bibliography

383

Rosen, Nir. “Letter from Falluja: Home Rule.” New Yorker (July 5, 2004): 48-53. Singer, P.W. “Outsourcing War [in Iraq].” Foreign Affairs (Mar./Apr. 2005): 119-132. Tucker, Robert and David Hendrickson. “Iraq and U.S. Legitimacy.” Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec. 2004): 18-32. Waller, Douglas and Sally B. Donnally. “The Way Out.” Time (Jan. 31, 2005): 33-37. Ware, Michael. “Into the Hot Zone.” Time (Nov. 22, 2004): 31-42. Woodward, Bob. State of Denial: Bush at War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.

Rise of Insurgency

Biddle, Stephen. “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2006): 2-14. Brisard, Jean-Charles with Damien Martinez. Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda. New York: Other Press, 2005. Packer, George. “War After the War: What Washington Doesn’t See in Iraq.” New Yorker (Nov. 24, 2003): 60-62.

Abu Ghraib & Other Detainees Danner, Mark. Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib and the War on Terror. New York: New York Review of Books, 2004. Duffy, Michael and Mitch Frank. “The Torture Files: Who Gets Punished.” Time (Jan. 17, 2005): 42-44. Greenberg, Karen J. and Joshua L. Dratel, eds. The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Hersh, Seymour M. Chain of Command: The Road From 9/11 to Abu Ghrabi. New York: Harper/Collins, 2004. ———. “Torture at Abu Ghraib.” New Yorker (May 10, 2004): 4243. Strasser, Steven, ed. The Abu Ghraib Investigations. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

Index A Abdul-Shafi, Haidar 46 Abizaid, John, General 189, 190, 194197, 231, 311, 314, 329 Abu Ghraib prison 213, 225, 227-235, 237, 240, 250 Afghanistan 3, 62, 72, 74-75, 91, 99, 101, 103, 106, 113, 128, 131, 168, 177, 201, 226, 230-231, 241, 276, 308, 322 Ahmed, Sultan Hasim, General 40 Aircraft 21-22, 33, 35-38, 40, 42, 47, 53, 59-60, 64, 66, 68-71, 73, 94-98, 107, 109, 110-117, 126-127, 137-138, 148, 159, 178, 214 Al Faw Peninsula 116, 118, 120 Albright, Madeleine, secy. of state 52, 61-65 Algeria 120, 216, 222 Allawi, Ayad 173, 176-181, 183, 192, 203, 214, 253, 280, 284-286, 289290 Aluminum tubes 87-93, 97, 139, 146, 147 Ammash, Huda Salih (Mrs. Anthrax) 209, 295 Amnesty International 26-27, 228 Anbar Province 216, 256, 283, 287, 312 Annan, Kofi, UN secy.-general 61, 6364, 66, 68, 81-82, 167-168, 172-275, 283, 290 Ansar al-Islam 92, 110-111, 126, 202, 214 Anthrax 55-56, 87, 89, 98, 134, 139, 151 Arab Cooperation Council 15-16 Arab-Israeli conflict 12, 45, 68, 309 Arab League 2, 12, 14, 16, 283, 331 Arnett, Peter 34 As Salam 38

Ashrawi, Hanna Mikhail 46 Australia 112-113, 128, 180, 253, 312 Aziz, Tariq 31-32, 37, 53, 56-57, 61, 114, 209 Aznar, Jose Maria 98, 99 B Baath Party 1-2, 12, 32-33, 59, 62, 65, 95, 117, 120, 122, 124, 160-163, 166, 169, 186-188, 190-191, 201, 204, 248, 250, 252, 259, 280, 288, 294 Badr Brigade 198, 217-218, 220, 238, 297, 326 Bahbahani, Ibrahim 26, 27 Bahrain 21, 111, 331 Baker, James A. 19, 22, 24-25, 27-29, 31, 32, 45-46, 80, 100, 309 al-Bakr, Ahmad Hasan 1-2 Bandar Ibn Sultan, prince 20, 87, 88 Barzani, Mustafa Massoud 58-59, 290, 330 Basra 4, 8, 33, 38-39, 41, 53-54, 65, 117-118, 120-122, 124, 134, 178, 212, 219-220, 236, 264, 268, 317 Bechtel corp. 259, 269 Belgium 11, 109, 192 Berg, Nicolas 203 Bessmertnykh, Alexander 25 Biden, Joseph, senator 313, 317, 326 bin Laden, Osama 71, 75, 85, 91-92, 147, 149, 201-203, 226, 240, 303 Biological weapons 33-36, 44, 48, 50, 54-55, 73, 75, 83, 86, 89, 93, 96, 133-136, 139, 146-152 Blackwater USA 210 Blair, Tony, prime minister 78, 82, 88, 97-99, 102-103; Operation Desert Fox 61, 64, 66; Iraqi invasion 103, 133-134, 147, 220-221, 237, 252, 258, 316

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Blix, Hans 68, 74, 81, 82, 86-97, 115, 145 Blount, Buford, Major General 160 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, UN secy.-general 58 Brahimi, Lakhdar 172, 173 Bremer, L. Paul 159-167, 169-176, 180, 186-191, 193-199, 209, 212-213, 228, 240, 253, 260-263, 307, 326 Brown, Harold 231 Bubiyan and Warba Islands 11-13, 15 Buchanan, Patrick 100 Bulgari 57, 98, 113, 159, 212, 320 Bull, Gerald 11 Bush, George H.W., president (see Operation Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Desert Fox) 8, 15, 21-26; assassination attempt, 51-52; UN, 8, 12, 19, 23, 27; Saudi Arabia, 19-20, 22, 27, 41; new world order, 45 Bush, George W., president (see Operation Iraqi Freedom) 68-69; “axis of evil” speech 75, 100, 101; leading to invasion, 71-103; “Mission Accomplished” 131, 303; “surge” plan, 300, 313-315, 323, 328 Butler, Richard 59-64, 147, 149 C Cable News Network 34, 146, 304 Cairo Reconciliation Conference 283284 Canada 28, 182, 289 Carter, James E., president 2, 3 Carroll, Jill 218, 219 Casey, George W., General 177, 190191, 205, 220, 234, 289, 300, 314, 328 Central Command for the Middle East 20, 22 Central Intelligence Agency 6, 13, 45, 58-59 66, 73-74, 76, 80, 83, 87, 90, 106, 110, 115, 125, 134-148, 150151, 232, 236, 307, 318 Chalabi, Ahmad 56, 66, 136, 156-157, 161-162, 169, 173, 180, 186, 280, 284, 285

C ivic V oice

Chemical weapons 8, 11, 35-36, 115, 133-140, 147-148, 150-151; destruction of, 44, 48, 50; mustard gas 5, 8, 83, 86, 95, 138, 139 Cheney, Richard, vice president, 19-21, 29, 42, 44-45, 51, 71-72, 74, 77, 87, 100, 106, 141-143, 151, 156, 190191, 207, 259, 285, 298-299, 304, 306, 316 China 28-29, 57, 59-61, 64, 67-68, 73, 82, 92, 94, 98, 102, 274, 331 Chirac, Jacques, president 59, 167-169 Christopher, Warren, secy. of state 57 Civilians, abuse of 241-247, 294 Clark, Ramsay 248 Clinton, William, president 47, 57-64, 71, 72, 101, 102; bombing of Iraq 5152; Operation Desert Fox 64 Club of Paris 263 Coalition forces 81, 88, 90-91, 95, 99, 103, 105, 107, 111-114, 117-118, 122-124, 131, 149, 151, 225, 240241, 245, 259, 303, 311-312, 317, 319, 328; members 113, 312; death toll 320 Coalition Provisional Authority 159162, 165, 176, 188, 198-199, 201, 263, 271-272, 326 Contractors 190, 193, 198-199, 253, 255, 259-266, 269, 271-273, 277, 296, 311, 320 Cooper, Matthew 142, 153 Cordesman, Anthony 320 Cost of war 199, 255-259, 276-277, 318, 322 Counterinsurgency 185, 191, 199-200, 205-206, 219-220, 314-315, 325-326 Crocker, Ryan C. 314, 332 Crowe, William, Admiral 29, 30, 157 Custer Battles 272 D De Mello, Sergio 161, 200 Development Fund for Iraq 263, 270271 De Villepin Dominique, foreign minister 82, 94, 96, 98, 169

I ndex Dozier, Kimberly 219 Duelfer, Charles A. 144, 149, 150 Dumas, Ronald 32 E Egypt 2, 14, 16-17, 21, 31, 39, 46, 6869, 103, 113, 216, 299, 310, 331 ElBaradei, Mohamed 82, 86-89, 92-94, 97, 115, 149, 316 El Salvador 113, 213 Ekeus, Rolf 53-54, 57, 59, 68 England, Lynndie, Private 228-229, 233 Erdman, Drew 155-156 European Community 31, 77, 80-81, 100-101, 167, 259, 263 European Conference on Security and Cooperation 28 F Fahd, Ibn Abdul Aziz, king 17, 19-21 Fallujah 128, 170, 172, 178-179, 197, 206, 209-214, 235, 315 Fao 7, 10 Federal Bureau of Intelligence 51, 86, 143 Feith Douglas 76, 141, 146, 148-149, 155-159, 186, 187; Special Plans Office 76, 135-136 Fluor Corp. 259 Fox, Tom 217 France 2, 4, 5; 1991 war 7, 28, 31, 4142, 47, 51, 59-61, 64, 67, 68; opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedom, 82, 92, 94, 96, 98-99, 102; occupation 109, 114, 173, 177, 192, 237, 263, 274-275, 308, 331 Franks, Tommy, General 105-111, 121, 125, 129, 131, 155, 186, 204, 307, 325 Freedom of Information Act 43, 142, 305 Freeman, Charles, ambassador 41, 51 “Friendly Fire” 43, 126, 128, 225, 240241 G Gallup Polls 165, 305

387

Garner, Jay, Lt. General 131, 157-161, 187, 193, 256-259 Gates, Robert M. 45, 306, 312-313, 317318 Germany 23, 92, 94, 96, 98, 101, 109, 113-114, 168, 173, 177, 192, 209, 237, 275; intelligence 113-114, 146 Glaspie, April, ambassador 14, 16-17 Gorbachev, Mikhail, president 15, 2425, 37 Great Britain 4, 5, 12-13; 1991 war 7, 11, 22, 28, 31, 41-43, 47; post-1991 war 51, 67, 60, 67; Operation Iraqi Freedom 77, 79, 98, 100, 111, 113, 120, 133, 141, 147-149, 152, 182; occupation 157, 180, 213, 215, 258, 266, 274, 312, 317, 320-321, 331; prisoner abuse 236, 237 Greece 192 Greenpeace International Military Group 43 Green Zone 159, 176, 179, 182, 211, 258, 278, 288, 294-296 Guantanamo Prison 227, 234 Gulf Cooperation Council 284 H Haditha 242-243, 294 al-Hakim, Sabdul-Aziz 180-181, 283284, 289-290 Halliburton corp. 215, 259, 269-270, 277,-278 Hamandiya 244 Hamdun, Nizar 52 al-Hashemi, Tariq 286, 291 al-Hawaza newspaper 176, 212, 285 Hitler analogy 22 Hoffman, David 206 Human Rights 16, 25; occupation 163, 174, 177, 194-195, 225, 242, 251, 253 Human Rights Watch 228, 235 Hungary 111, 113, 195, 312 Hussein, Saddam 1-2, 11, 36; and AlQaeda, 178-179; appeal to Arabs 15, 68; capture 200, 203, 206, 209; ex-

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ecution 253-254; “Hussein Doctrine” 3; Israel 11, 14, 68; Kurds 3, 47; invasion of Kuwait 19-33; trial 206, 209, 247-253 Hussein, Qusay & Uday (sons) 49, 116, 200, 206-207, 209 I Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz 51 Intelligence 48, 50, 65, 73, 76, 79, 83, 91-93, 96-97, 113, 116, 120, 135, 137-138, 142-148, 151-153, 179, 185, 212, 221, 225-234, 236, 253, 305, 314-315, 318; National Security Agency 48, 112; satellite photographs 20, 52, 62, 73, 90, 115 International Atomic Energy Agency (see ElBaradei, Mohamed) 47, 49-50, 63, 68, 82, 85-89, 92-97, 102, 149150, 316 International law and treaties 226, 241, 243 International Mission for Iraqi Elections 182, 289 International Monetary Fund 110 International Committee for the Red Cross 202, 227-228, 231 Instant Thunder 33 Insurgency 108, 128, 131, 155, 170-172, 176-182, 185, 189, 191, 199-206, 225-226, 231-232, 240, 242, 244246, 255, 258, 262, 264-265, 270, 287, 294, 300, 304-305, 309, 311326, 329-330; hostages/kidnappings in Iran 3, 5, 6, 11; in Iraq 25, 32, 160, 166, 190, 202-204, 215-217, 244, 246, 253, 293, 295, 297; Iraqi victims 218, 228, 297, 321, 325 Iran, U.S. hostages 2, 3, 5, 6, 17; Operation Desert Storm 34, 37, 4142; Operation Iraqi Freedom 73, 75, 80, 100, 126; Iraqi occupation 188189, 201, 250-251, 280, 286-300, 305, 309, 310, 313, 315-318, 331, 332 Iran-Contra Affair 5 Iran-Iraq War 3-10, 264 Iraq (see Hussein, Saddam) atrocities

C ivic V oice

25, 26, 27; casualties 43, 118, 120, 128, 318-321, 329; civil war 190, 191, 217, 289, 297, 304, 311, 326329; corruption 165, 193, 198, 269, 271, 287, 293-296, 301; exiles/defectors 2, 12, 54-66, 87-91, 109, 111, 136, 137, 147-148, 156-162, 169, 179-182, 287; Kuwait border & oil dispute 12-14; looting/looters 157160, 165, 185, 193, 206, 228, 232, 258, 268; prisoner abuse 226-241 Iraq, nuclear potential 8, 11, 25, 27, 4750, 71, 75, 83-90, 93-94, 97, 102, 115, 133-138, 141, 144, 146-147, 149, 150-151 Iraq Site Survey Teams 134, 152 Iraq Study Group 222, 297, 299, 308, 309, 316, 317 Iraqi Survey Group 139-140, 144, 149150 Iraq’s constitution 161, 168-173, 176, 215, 279-283, 289, 291; federalism 159, 171, 281, 330 Iraq’s elections 164, 168-172, 176-182, 191-192, 214-215, 240, 267, 279296; referendums 169, 172, 215, 279283, 287-289 Iraq’s security forces new Army 187189, 196; National Guard 178, 192, 215, 305; Police & Civil Defense Corps 194-198, 211, 325-326; Iraq’s National Congress 56, 66, 72, 136, 284 Iraqi National Assembly 169, 171, 173, 179-180, 278-282, 290-291 Israel 12, 73, 76, 92, 103; and Iraq 11, 14, 23, 24, 34-35, 66, 76, 68, 111, 135-136, 310; 199l war 23, 24, 34, 35, 45-46, 66 Islamic Jihad 6, 185 Italy 5, 113, 125, 141, 160, 312, 320 Ivanov, Igor 82, 94, 96 Ivanov, Ivan S. 167 J al-Jaafari, Ibrahim, prime minister 238, 249, 265, 280, 284-285, 290-291 Japan 7, 102, 113, 168, 263, 274, 312

I ndex Jidda Conference 14-15 Johnston, Robert B., Maj. General 23 Jones, David C., General 29, 30 Jordan 54, 56, 111; ACC meeting 15-16; Hussein 11, 68; Iraq-Kuwait dispute 13, 14; Iraq occupation 182, 195-197, 190, 201-202, 221, 282, 289, 298299, 310, 331 K Kajaf 3, 192, 202, 212 Karbala 3, 63, 118, 121, 124, 164, 178, 273 Karpinski, Janis L., Brig. General 229230, 234 Kay, David 49, 65-66, 139-140, 143-144 Kerik, Bernard 194-196 Khafji 36 al-Khalil, Samir 2, 148 Khalilzad, Zalmay 72, 110, 186, 239, 282, 289, 298, 314 Khomeini, Ruhollah Ayatollah 2, 4, 10, 163 Kirkuk 42, 125, 126, 241, 287-288, 310 Kufa 178, 212 Kurds 1, 72, 81, 92, 95, 101; Hussein 3, 47, 61 & use of chemical weapons 8, 61-62, 120; “No-fly” zone 47, 53; Operation Provide Comfort 43, 47, 53, 58, 59; Operation Iraqi Freedom 108-113, 117, 120, 125-126, 151; uprising 41-43, 47 Kurdistan 53, 58, 110, 125, 181-182, 206, 214, 281, 284, 290, 317, 330, 331 Kut 118, 121, 124, 212 Kuwait 2, 4, 7, 11-16, 44, 51, 53, 55, 63; border and oil dispute 12-17; Iraqi invasion 19, 20, 21, 22, 26-27, 35; Operation Desert Shield & Desert Storm 21-25, 51, 53, 63; Operation Iraqi Freedom 105, 111, 113, 116118, 134 L Libby, I. “Scooter” Lewis 143 Luxembourg 192

389

Lynch, Jessica, Private 122-123 M McLaughlin John E. 74 Madrid Conference 45-46 Mahdi Army 176-178, 197, 198, 212213, 217, 218-219, 247, 285-286, 297, 307, 326 al-Majid, Ali Hassan (“Chemical Ali”) 56, 120, 122, 209 al-Majid, Hussein Kamel 54 al-Majid, Saddam Kamel 54 Major, John 32 Malaysia 28, 67, 103 Maliki, Nouri Kamal, prime minister 221, 240, 251-254, 291-300, 307, 310, 316, 327, 328, 331 Matar, Mohammad 27 Media 26-27, 29, 32, 35-36, 57, 59, 128129, 167, 187, 190, 218-219, 228, 237, 259, 299, 319, 320; casualties 128-129, 135, 216, 218-219, 299, 320 Miller, Geoffrey, General 227, 232-234 Miller, Judith 142, 143, 146 Missiles (also Patriot system) 5,7, 207; Samoud-2 89, 91, 95-97, 113; Scud 5, 34-35, 48, 50, 54, 89, 98, 107, 113, 118, 133, 139, 150; Tomahawk 33, 52, 58, 111, 117, 119 Mitterand, Francois 31-32 Morocco 21, 120, 168 Mosul 42, 47, 71, 126, 162-163, 183, 204, 206, 214-215, 288, 314 Mubarak, Hosni 14, 16-17, 21 Munich Conference on Security Policy 77 N Najaf 4, 118, 121, 124, 163, 164, 178179, 192, 200, 202, 212, 270, 285 Nasiriyah 118, 121-124, 178, 212, NATO 63, 66, 77-78, 100-101, 108-109, 125, 176-177, 192 Negroponte, John D. 82, 98, 176, 191, 314

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Neoconservatives 72, 76, 307-308, 310, 316 Niger incident 97, 137, 141-143, 147 “No-fly” zones 41-42, 47, 51, 53, 59, 66, 68-71, 73, 110, 112, 117 Novak, Robert D. 142-143 Nunn, Sam, senator 31 O Obeidi, Mahdi 49-50, 56, 63, 93, 97, 137-138, 150 Odom, William, General 48 Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 131, 157, 159, 256 Oil the Iran-Iraq War 3, 4, 6, 7; IraqKuwait 12-14, 15, 16; Operation Iraqi Freedom and after 113, 118, 174, 199, 203 Oil-for-Food Program 57-60, 62, 66, 68, 81, 101, 263, 273-276 Oman 21 Operation Desert Fox 64-69 Operation Desert Shield (see Bush, George H.W.) 19-33; Operation Desert Storm (see Bush, George H.W.) 22, 33-44; cease-fire 40, 44, 47; coalition forces 28, 36, 37, 44; costs 34-35, 43; Israel 34-35, 45-46; new world order 45 Operation Iraqi Freedom (see Bush, George W.) 109-131; bombing 114, 116, 117, 118, 124, 126; casualties 122-123, 126, 128; Israel 111, 135, 136; Kuwait 105, 111-118, 134; Saudis 111, 113 Operation Provide Comfort, see Kurds Opposition to invasion 99-103, 169, 135, 304-308 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 12, 13, 14 P Pace, Peter, General 239, 243, 311, 318 Pachachi, Adnan 161, 171, 173 Pahlevi, Muhammad Reza shah 2 Pakistan 21, 71, 314

C ivic V oice

Parsons Corporation 259, 269, 270 Patriot anti-missile system 35, 109, 111, 113, 116, 118 Perez de Cuellar, Javier 10, 24, 33 Perle, Richard 72, 307 Petraeus, David H., Lt General 163, 183, 191, 206, 314-315 Philippines 113, 203, 308, 312 Plame, Valeria 142-143 Poland 22, 101, 113, 160, 213, 312, 320 Powell, Colin, General, secy. of state 19, 23, 40-42, 44-45, 51, 63, 71, 7374 77, 79-80, 82, 87-94, 96-98, 106, 109, 127, 133-136, 139-141, 146, 149-151, 155-157, 167, 202-203, 225-226, 332 Powers, Thomas 139-140 Primakov, Yevgeni 23-25, 37, 60 Prisoner abuse 226-241 Prisoners-of-war 8; allied 35, 36, 40; Iraqi 4, 37, 39, 40; status/treatment 36, 39, 225-226, 235-236 Project for a New Century 72, 76 Protests against wars 61-62, 99-102, 237, 305 Putin, Vladimir 169 Q al-Qaeda (see bin Laden, Osama & alZarqawi, Abu Musab) 71, 74-76, 83, 85, 90-91, 110, 126, 146-149, 153, 200-203, 210, 215-216, 221-222, 225-226, 236, 240, 244, 296, 309, 312 Qatar 21, 36, 111 Qualcomm 260 R Rafsanjani, Hashim 37 Ramadi 170, 178-179, 206, 215, 287288 al-Rawi, Nabil 138 Reagan, Ronald, president 4-8, 11, 30, 48 Reconstruction (see Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian

I ndex Assistance and Development Fund for Iraq) 131, 155-156, 165, 169, 174, 191, 204, 221, 255-273, 293, 296, 301, 313, 325 Refugees 26, 42, 43, 47, 214, 319 Renart, Gene, General 106, 115 Republican Guard 33, 38-42, 53-58, 66, 106, 112, 117, 120, 124-125, 188, 201 Rice, Condeleezza, secy. of state 71, 7374, 87, 106, 144, 146, 156, 172-173, 256, 282, 285, 298, 300, 308, 312, 314, 317-318, 329 Ritter, Scott 50, 57, 60-66, 136 Romania 28, 101, 113 Rove, Karl 142 Rumalia oil fields 12-13, 118 Rumsfeld, Donald, secy. of defense 4, 5, 71-74, 77-78, 83, 87, 101, 105108, 111, 129, 131, 134, 138, 148, 155-157, 160-161, 186-190, 196-197, 226, 229-233, 236, 239, 243, 257, 282, 285, 292, 304, 306, 325 Russia (see Soviet Union) 57, 59, 60, 61, 64, 67, 68, 114; Iraqi invasion 73, 82, 92, 94, 95, 96, 98, 114, 127; Iraqi occupation 167, 169, 263, 274, 275, 331 S Sabri, Naji 135 Sadr (Saddam) City 163, 178-179, 197, 212, 267- 268, 282, 294, 297 al-Sadr, Moktada 163-164, 167, 172, 176-179, 197, 212-213, 217, 253, 282, 284-286, 290-291, 297, 301, 307, 311 Sa’id, Dr. Khalid Ibraham 49 al-Sabah, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed, emir 11, 14, 26 Samarra 8, 55, 127, 178, 206, 215, 217, 240-241, 329 Samawa 118, 121, 124, 251 Sanchez, Ricardo, General 161, 170, 178, 195-197, 205, 207, 212, 227, 229-231, 234 Sanctions on Iraq (see UN)

391

Saudi Arabia 2, 4; Iran-Iraq war 7, 1112; Operation Desert Shield 19-33; Operation Desert Storm 35, 36, 38, 39, 41; Operation Iraqi Freedom 87, 88, 103, 111, 113; occupation of Iraq 168, 216, 222, 263, 298, 299, 310, 331, 332 Schlesinger, James, secy. of defense, 30, 231 Schroeder, Gerhard 167, 169 Schwarzkopf, Norman, General 20-23, 33-34, 37-40, 44, 51 Scowcroft, Brent, General 19, 20, 45, 80, 100 Sevan, Benon V. 58 Shamir, Yitzhak, prime Minister 35, 46 al-Sharaa, Farouk 46 Shatt al-Arab 3, 4 Shaways, Rowsch Nouri 280 Shevardnadze, Eduard, foreign minister 22, 24, 25, 28 Shiites Muslims 1-2, 41-43, 47, 95, 101, 120-122, 310, 312, 315; death squads and militias 297-298, 309, 330, 331; & Iran 2, 3, 17, 280; 1991 uprising 41, 42, 43, 47; occupation 156, 159173, 178-183, 187-192, 197-198, 201-202, 212-213, 217-218, 222, 237-239, 247, 250-254, 270, 279300, 310, 312, 315, 329-332 Sistani, Ali 164, 170, 172-173, 178-180, 218, 280, 289, 296 Slocombe, Walter 187, 188-189 South Korea 22, 102, 113, 276, 312 Soviet Union (see Russia & Shevardnadze, Eduard) 2-4, 5, 7, 15, 48; Desert Storm 19, 22-25, 29, 34, 37, 39; support for Iraq 2, 4, 5, 7, 19, 39 Spain 45, 98, 100, 113, 160, 192, 274, 308, 312, 320 Stark, U.S.S. 7-8 Stein, Robert 272 Straw, Jack, Foreign Secy. 98, 102 Sunni Muslims 1, 2, 4, 41, 81, 95, 128, 331; occupation 156, 161, 169-173,

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179-182, 187-191, 198, 202, 209217, 237, 238, 240, 279-300, 309312, 325, 329-332 Syria 46, 68, 113, 120; Operation Desert Storm 21, 31, 39, 41, 80; occupation of Iraq 188, 201, 204, 216, 294, 300, 309-310, 313, 316-317, 331 T Taguba, Antonio M., Major General 229, 230 Taha, Dr. Rihab Rashid (“Dr. Germ”) 209, 295 Talabani, Jalal 58, 126, 161, 181, 218, 278, 283, 289, 290, 291, 292, 310 Taliban 71, 74, 78, 91, 110, 225, 226 Thailand 159, 253, 312 Tharthar Lake 62, 245 Thatcher, Margaret, prime minister 22, 25, 30 Television (see Media) 26, 34-36, 40, 59, 116, 129, 131, 151, 165, 187, 227-229, 320 Tenet, George 65, 73-76, 87, 90, 106, 136, 139, 144-148, 307 Terrorism (see al-Qaeda, Insurgency) 4475-85, 90-92, 97, 103, 115, 226, 236, 253, 284, 293-294, 303-304, 308; Sept. 11 74-76, 136, 148, 153316, 330, 331 Tikrit 117, 124, 127, 128, 131, 180, 192, 193, 209, 245, 288 Torture 2, 26, 58, 166, 198, 209, 217, 225, 226, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 249, 250, 252 Transitional Administrative Law 169, 171-172, 176 Turkey 7, 21, 29, 42, 43, 58, 59, 60, 62, 68, 71, 79, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 125, 126, 264, 274, 331 U Ukraine 213, 312, 320 Umm Qasr 13, 120, 121, 275 Unilateralism 40, 79, 85, 100, 101, 167, 211, 308 United Arab Emirates 12-15, 21

C ivic V oice

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (see Russia and Soviet Union) United Nations, observation teams 42, 47, 58; Independent Iraqi Electoral Commission 180-182, 282-283, 286-290; Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission 67, 81, 85-89, 92-98; Resolutions 660 18, 22; 661 21-22; 665, 670 22; 678 28; 687, 688 43-44, 47; 1441 82, 8586, 94-95, 97-99, 140; 1382 74, 77; 151, 168, 169; 1546 173, 176; U.S. and 12, 31, 37, 42, 167, 236; sanctions against Iraq 21-34, 29-30, 40, 44, 47, 53-54, 59-68, 74, 77, 8081, 101, 137, 146, 150, 264, 266, 274, 276; “smart sanctions” 63, 74, 77; Security Council 2, 5, 12, 19, 22, 32, 73-74, 77, 80-102, 114-115, 127, 133, 137, 140, 146-150, 167168, 173-174, 273-275; Special Commission 47-50, 59, 63-64, 67 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 87, 96-98, 144 United States 3, 5-6, 28; Congress 18, 66, 75, 90, 180, 252, 303-304, 306307, 309, 313, 315, 323; debates on invasion 25-26, 29-31, 83; expenditure and budgets 6, 8, 257, 263, 267, 276, 322, 323; Iraq Study Group 222, 297, 299, 308, 309, 316-317; National Intelligence Estimate 83, 133, 144, 145, 146, 303; National Security Council 5, 6, 25, 71, 72, 73, 79, 80; National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 190, 306; prisoner abuse 230232, 235, 236; preemptive war 79, 85, 91, 99-100, 102, 105, 114, 168; war powers 30 U.S. Air Force 21, 22, 50, 53, 111, 116117, 127, 130, 214, 221 U.S. Army 22-23, 35, 38-39, 53, 110114, 122-125, 137, 196-198, 205, 209, 214, 222-223, 226, 229-237, 245-246, 266-267, 277-278 U.S. Dept. of Commerce 5, 12 U.S. Dept. of Defense (see Rumsfeld, Donald) 5-6, 19, 33-34, 42-43, 50, 72-73, 78, 99, 102, 105, 111, 117, 134-136, 141, 146, 151, 155-156,

I ndex 160-166, 187, 190-193, 202, 204, 215, 231, 235-236, 241, 256-257, 277-278, 305, 319, 322, 329; Iraqi postwar planning & reconstruction (see Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and Development Fund for Iraq) 107-108, 155-156, 204, 255-278, 293, 296, 301, 307, 313, 325; Special Plans Office (see Feith, Douglas) U.S. Dept. of State (see Powell, Colin & Rice, Condeleezza) 16-17, 24, 57, 72, 141-142, 146, 156, 187, 193, 267; Future of Iraq Project 155 U.S. Government Accounting Office 267, 268, 273, 296 U.S. Marine Corps 22, 36-39, 50, 54, 116, 120-128, 157, 178, 197, 199, 209-216, 222, 242-244, 256, 277 U.S. Navy 7-8, 21, 33, 40, 52, 54, 58, 118, 123, 126, 242-243 V Vincennes, USS 8 Vinnell Corporation 199 Voice of America 16 Volcker, Paul A. 273, 275-276 W al-Wadi, Sheikh Emad al-Din 163-164 War Powers Act 30 Warrick, Thomas S. 155-157 Wars (see Iran-Iraq War, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom) Weapons inspections/inspectors (see UN, Iraqi Site Survey Teams) 8, 44, 47-50, 54, 56,72, 74, 77-82, 85-97, 101, 102, 105, 134, 136-150, 295, 303 Weapons of mass destruction 45-48, 54, 57, 63, 67, 69, 72-77, 80-81, 84-88, 90-91, 94, 97, 100, 102, 106, 133153, 203, 276, 285, 294, 303, 305, 307 Weapons proliferation 45, 73 Weinberger Doctrine 30 Wilson, Joseph C. 141, 142, 143

393

Wolfowitz Paul 73, 76, 78, 96-97, 134, 148, 160, 196, 232, 257-258 Women 39; casualties 34-35, 43, 57, 59, 62, 66-67, 74, 163, 166-167, 211, 221, 241-242, 251, 319, 329, 331 World Bank 265, 267 World Health Organization 165 Y-Z Yeltsin, Boris, President 61 Yemen, North & South 11, 19, 28-29, 216, Zapata Engineering 199 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab 91-92, 201-204, 212-217, 221-222, 296 Zebari, Hoshyar 149, 280, 292-293