Unequal Treaties and China 9781623200664, 9781623200220

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Volume 1

Wang Jianlang

Unequal Treaties and China

UNEQUAL TREATIES AND CHINA Volume 1

WANG JIANLANG

Published by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. Suite 208 Davies Pacific Center 841 Bishop Street Honolulu, HI, 96813 Website: www.enrichprofessional.com A Member of Enrich Culture Group Limited Hong Kong Head Office: 11/F, Benson Tower, 74 Hung To Road, Kwun Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China China Office: Rm 309, Building A, Central Valley, 16 Haidian Middle Street, Haidian District, Beijing, China Singapore Office: 16L, Enterprise Road, Singapore 627660 Trademarks: SILKROAD PRESS and related trade dress are trademarks or registered trademarks of Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the United States and other countries, and may not be used without written permission. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Chinese original edition © 2000 Jiangxi People’s Publishing House By Wang Jianlang English edition © 2016 by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. With the title Unequal Treaties and China Volume 1 Translated by Li Tong Edited by Li Tong and Phoebe Poon All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without prior written permission from the Publisher. ISBN (Hardback) ISBN (pdf)

978-1-62320-022-0 978-1-62320-066-4

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.

Contents Introduction Diplomatic Legacy of the Late Qing Dynasty ............................... 1 Chapter 1

Diplomatic Predicaments in the Early Years ............................... 15 of the Republic of China

Chapter 2

The Paris Peace Conference and ................................................... 40



the Washington Naval Conference

Chapter 3

The Establishment of New Sino-Russian Relations and .............96



the Anti-imperialistic Program of the Guangzhou Government

Chapter 4

Diplomatic Efforts of the Northern Beiyang and ...................... 133



Southern Nationalist Governments

Notes

............................................................................................................197

Bibliography

............................................................................................................215

Index

............................................................................................................226

Introduction

Diplomatic Legacy of the Late Qing Dynasty

UNEQUAL TREATIES AND CHINA VOLUME 1

A Web of Unequal Treaties The Opium War concluded with the Qing rulers being forced into the Treaty of Nanjing, the first in a line of unilateral treaties imposed by war, or under threat of war. The unequal treaties — as they are referred to by the Chinese — formed a closely-knit system which eroded Chinese sovereignty in political, economic, judicial, and military terms. By the late Qing Dynasty era, Western powers had gained considerable control in China. Their many privileges commonly included extraterritoriality, control over tariff rates, concessions, spheres of influence, coastal and river navigation rights, rights of garrison, and unilateral most-favored-nation treatment. In addition to these treaty-based privileges, there were those that had not been granted by the treaties, and those that were extended far beyond the original treaty stipulations. Many works have explored the imposition and accretion of the unequal treaties.1 Some of the extraterritorial provisions — such as those on tariff control and rights of garrison — were more self-explanatory than others. The more complicated ones allowed some flexibility under different circumstances. The revision and abrogation of China’s unequal treaties made up a lengthy and gradual process of repetitive negotiations. To understand the value and significance of these negotiations first requires a brief look back into the extraterritorial privileges.

Extraterritoriality Of the many privileges given to the Western powers, extraterritorial rights appeared the most complicated. Note that there are broader and narrower conceptions of extraterritoriality: in the broader version, the extension of a nation’s laws to its citizens abroad is implied, and thus some degree of exemption from local jurisdiction is implied. This grants the people legal immunities and consular jurisdiction that diplomats and authorized foreign personnel enjoy in their receiving states. This immunity from local law enforcement is recognized under international law to be reciprocal between countries. This is not the scope of this book. Consular jurisdiction, on the other hand, and on which this book will mainly focus, developed into a narrower, exploited version of extraterritoriality that hampered the exercise of Chinese judicial and administrative sovereignty. This asymmetrical privilege was a violation of international law. Western extraterritoriality in China came to be generally known as consular jurisdiction; but in fact the term covered a wider spectrum of rights. Legal trials for foreigners in special courts of their own nationality, for example, were clearly

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beyond the scope of consular jurisdiction. Article 13 of the General Regulations of Trade regarding the Five Ports of July 1843 read: Regarding the punishment of English criminals, the English Government will enact the laws necessary to attain that end, and the Consul will be empowered to put them in force; and regarding the punishment of Chinese criminals, these will be tried and punished by their own laws.2 This clause drew the first line of jurisdiction between China and the Western powers, which was further elaborated on and extended in later treaties. Eventually, the partition of jurisdiction as defined in the treaties was as follows: cases between foreigners were handled by the consul of the country to which the defendant belonged. In cases where the defendant belonged to a country that had not concluded treaties with China or that had no consular jurisdiction, a Chinese magistrate would hear the case. For cases in which the plaintiff happened to be a Chinese citizen, and the defendant was a national of a treaty power, were taken to the relevant Consular Court. In the case of the opposite situation, the case was tried by a Chinese magistrate, but the foreign consul retained the right to attend the proceedings. Consular jurisdiction was over time extended to all cases involving foreigners within Chinese territory. In observing a trial, the foreign consul could not only speak freely, but also dispute the proceedings, as well as summon and cross-examine witnesses. The right to a joint trial was assumed to be reciprocal; however, little by little, Chinese officials gave up that right and that became the norm. Generally speaking, extraterritoriality existed in three jurisdictional forms: • Consular Courts, where foreign consuls applied the law of their home states and prescribed penalties over their own citizens. • Mixed Courts within Shanghai’s French and international settlements and the Gulangyu International Settlement, where foreign consuls had the right to sit in on or order a joint trial for cases not brought to the consular courts but which involved subjects of their nationality. Similar courts were set up in several other concessions. They were intended as an exclusive judicial organ of the Chinese government, until treaty powers wrested away control of the proceedings and extended extraterritorial jurisdiction to cases involving Chinese only. • Special Courts. British Supreme Courts for China were established in 1865 and 1904 with full-time judges on circuit. After that, British consular jurisdiction was limited to civil cases of 1,500 yuan value and below, and

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criminal cases where the maximum sentence was one year in jail and a fine of no more than GBP100. After the American Court for China’s establishment in 1906, American consular jurisdiction was limited to civil cases not exceeding 500 yuan in value, and criminal cases involving not more than 60 days’ imprisonment or a 100 yuan fine. No treaty basis existed for the British Supreme Courts and American Court for China.

Concessions Concessions in China were a result of exploited treaty rights. These territories originally served as residences for foreigners, until they became practically states within a state as inhabitants gradually acquired control over urban planning, administration, police matters, and judicial discretion. Table I.1

Foreign concessions in China, 1911

Concession

Area (mu)

Shanghai International Settlement

33,503

Gulangyu International Settlement

2,000

Shanghai French Concession

2,135

British Concession in Tianjin

6,149

French Concession in Tianjin

2,360

German Concession in Tianjin

4,200

Japanese Concession in Tianjin

2,150

Russian Concession in Tianjin

5,474

Belgian Concession in Tianjin

740.5

Italian Concession in Tianjin Austro-Hungarian Concession in Tianjin

771 1,030

British Concession in Hankou

795

German Concession in Hankou

630

Russian Concession in Hankou

414

French Concession in Hankou

400

Japanese Concession in Hankou

2,150

British Concession in Zhenjiang

156

British Concession in Xiamen

24.6

British Concession in Guangzhou

264

French Concession in Guangzhou

66

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(Cont’d) Concession

Area (mu)

British Concession in Jiujiang

150

Japanese Concession in Hangzhou

900

Japanese Concession in Suzhou

483.9

Japanese Concession in Chongqing

701.3

Source: Figures in this table and the following paragraphs are based on Fei, A History of Concessions in China. Note: Some of the concessions were later expanded.

At this point, 2 international settlements and 22 exclusive concessions were carved up among the 8 largest capitalist countries besides the United States: • • • • • •

Japan, with 5; Britain, with 6; France, with 4; Germany, with 2; Russia, with 2; and Belgium, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, each with 1.

The United States and a number of other countries were granted extraterritorial rights in international settlements. Multiple Chinese cities were forced into concessions: • • • • •

8 in Tianjin; 5 in Hankou; 2 in Shanghai; 2 in Guangzhou; and 1 each in Xiamen, Zhenjiang, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Chongqing, Gulangyu Island, and Jiujiang.

Western encroachment of Chinese sovereignty was even more evident in Beijing’s Legation Quarter, where foreign powers seized administrative, judicial, and other privileges, and forbade the Chinese from residing in the area.

Leased territories and spheres of influence The powers enjoyed even more privileges in leased territories than they did in concessions. The leased territories were geographically much larger. But more

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importantly, the treaty stipulations retained — although only nominally — Chinese sovereignty, administrative authority, and police power in foreign concessions. In leased territories, on the other hand, this authority and power were exercised by the lessee state within the lease period. The lessee state exercised effective jurisdiction over and stationed troops in the leased territory as it did over its own land. Most concessions were run by an extraterritorial government, municipal council, or consulate of the concession holder. The highest officials in most concessions were appointed by their home governments. The agencies they ran were directly responsible to their home states. The powers established colonial rule in their leased territories. In 1911, there were five leased territories. Table I.2

Leased territories in China, 1911 Leaseholder

From

Term

Germany

March 1898

99 years

Kwantung (Guandong)*

Japan

March 1898

25 years

Guangzhou Bay

France

April 1898

99 years

Kowloon

Britain

June 1898

99 years

Weihaiwei

Britain

September 1898

25 years

Jiaozhou (Kiautschou) Bay

* Formerly a Russian concession, until occupied by Japan as a result of the Russo-Japanese War.

There was more encroachment on Chinese sovereignty along the Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchurian Railway, along which the Russians and Japanese established administration and assigned police and troops, thereby detaching the regions from Chinese control. A sphere of influence describes an even more spacious region, defined not by explicit legal instruments, but by the dominance and exclusivity of influence. Within its sphere, a state enjoys commercial privileges as it minimizes participation from countries outside the sphere. When the British handed the Zhoushan Islands back in 1847, they demanded as part of the handover that the Qing government promise its nonalienation to any other country.3 In 1897, a similar agreement was reached with France regarding Hainan Island. The next year, China promised France to not cede or lease to another country parts of the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi and along the Yunnan-Annamese borderlands. In addition to that, France was granted privileges for mining in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan. In 1898, China agreed not to lease, mortgage, or cede any territory in the Yangtze basin except to Britain. Germany was granted commercial privileges in Shandong. In the same year, Japan extracted from the

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Qing government a promise of non-alienation of Fujian and its coastal neighbors, and a privileged position in building railroads. Some treaty powers apportioned to themselves spheres of influence without the consent of the Chinese government.

Right of garrison The foreign powers started by securing the right for their warships to be stationed in Chinese waters. The Sino-British Treaty of the Bogue, concluded in 1843 in order to supplement the previous General Regulations of Trade, read in Article 10: “At each of the five Ports to be opened to British Merchants one English Cruiser will be stationed….”4 Thus the British gained the right to garrison China’s coastal ports. That right was extended to other Western powers in the Sino-French Treaty of Tianjin, following the end of the Second Opium War: “His Majesty the Emperor of the French may station a warship in the principal ports of the Empire where its presence is judged necessary....”5 Here the principal ports referred not only to the coastal treaty ports, but also to those along the interstate rivers opened after the war. Article 52 of the Sino-British Treaty of Tianjin read: British Ships of War, coming for no hostile purpose or being engaged in the pursuit of Pirates, shall be at liberty to visit all ports within the dominions of the Emperor of China, and shall receive every facility for the purchase of provisions, procuring fresh water, and, if occasion require, for the making of repairs. The Commanders of such Ships shall hold intercourse with the Chinese authorities, on terms of equality and courtesy.6 Its ambiguity allowed for Britain’s liberal interpretation. Naturally, the Qing government intended for the words “all ports within the dominions of the Emperor of China” to mean the treaty ports; but the powers insisted on interpreting that to cover treaty and nontreaty ports. Thus, foreign warships expanded their scope of operations to China’s internal rivers. Territorial leasing provided the first treaty-based legitimization for foreign military to be stationed on China’s soil. Thereafter, the lessee states were allowed to maintain land and naval forces in their leased territories. The Boxer Protocol legitimized Western powers’ rights to introduce their garrisons into the Chinese capital. Article 7 of the Protocol read: “China recognized the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defense of its legation. Under Article 9, the Chinese Government and the protocol powers should “occupy certain points, to be determined by an agreement between them, for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea.”7

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Thus the powers obtained the right to garrison Beijing’s Legation Quarter and the railway that ran from Beijing to Shanhaiguan via Tianjin. The Protocol conceded the occupation of 12 places including Huangcun, Langfang, Qinhuangdao, and Shanhaiguan. The foreign troops did not always keep within their own territory. The 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident was an example of the Japanese military breaching the garrison area set by the Boxer Protocol. In the Shanghai International Settlement there was an armed voluntary force, mostly Japanese and Russian troops. Russia stationed 70,000 men along the Chinese Eastern Railway. Japanese troops were stationed not only along the South Manchurian Railway, but also in the northeastern provinces, and as a result imperial sovereignty was severely compromised in the region even before its occupation.

Tariff control China was obligated by Article 10 of the Sino-British Treaty of Nanjing to establish for British merchants “a fair and regular Tariff of Export and Import Customs and other Dues, which Tariff shall be publicly notified and promulgated for general information.”8 The treaty provided no agreement on British interference in Chinese tariffs. A year later, however, Qing officials, in a negotiation for the General Regulations of Trade, asked for British consent to a 5% ad valorem tariff. The negotiation became the first de facto tariff negotiation. The Treaty of Wangxia, signed shortly thereafter, stipulated: “If the Chinese Government desire to modify in any respect the said Tariff, such modifications shall be made only in consultation with Consuls or other functionaries thereto duly authorized on behalf of the United States, and with consent thereof.”9 Thus was another privilege handed down.

Right of coastal trade and navigation on inland rivers The 1844 Sino-American Treaty of Wangxia secured for the United States the right of coastal trade, although this trade was limited to foreign merchandise: “The citizens of the United States are permitted … to proceed at pleasure with their vessels and merchandise to and from any Foreign port and either of the said five ports, and from either of the said five ports to any other of them.”10 Foreign trade of Chinese goods was a violation of treaty rights until this was ratified by another treaty made in the 1860s. The 1858 Sino-British Treaty of Tianjin opened China’s inland rivers to foreign navigation. Article 10 read: “British merchant ships shall have authority to trade upon the Great River [Yangtze].”11

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Only three ports on the Yangtze were opened for trade. As more ports became available to foreign traders, their ships were permitted on more and more harbors along the upper Yangtze, and were eventually granted the privilege to stop, load, and unload cargo at nontreaty ports. Still the foreign merchants were not satisfied. Having forced open the Yangtze ports, then having gained access to the Suzhou Creek, Pearl River, and the canals, they went as far as to demand full access to China’s inland rivers. In accordance with an imperial decree in 1898, foreign commercial vessels were permitted, with registration at Meiguan, to freely sail upon China’s inland waterways. At this point, all of China’s navigable inland waterways were opened to foreign ships. This arrangement was confirmed by the Sino-British Treaty of 1902.

Unilateral most- favored-nation treatment Different from other treaty-based arrangements, the most-favored-nation (MFN) status did not by itself inflict harm on any particular national right. Contrary to popular assumptions, it turned out to have been the most detrimental encroachment upon Chinese sovereignty. The 1843 Sino-British Treaty of the Bogue provided: Should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased to grant additional privileges or immunities to any of the subjects or Citizens of such Foreign Countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended to and enjoyed by British Subjects….12 This marked the earliest form of the foreign powers’ MFN treatment in China. After that, European and Latin American countries followed suit in making similar arrangements. By these clauses other powers were entitled to claim whatever rights or privileges were granted to any one power. The way MFN status was used in China violated international law in two different senses: 1. No Reciprocity. The reciprocal granting of MFN treatment has consistently been an international norm. But in return for the MFN status it granted, China received reciprocal treatment from only a few South American and small European countries. 2. Overgeneralization. MFN treatment is an instrument of trade policy within specified economic sectors. In modern China, however, MFN treatment was seen not only in every economic respect, but also political terms. Privileges that threatened Chinese sovereignty — such as consular jurisdiction, concessions, leased territories, and access to inland waterways — were

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granted as part of MFN benefits. In the end, the MFN concept was made into an overly encompassing umbrella of general obligations, from which the powers had easily derived huge benefits while gravely harming Chinese sovereignty. Not only did this result in the privileges conceded to one treaty nation being extended to other treaty nations but later Chinese attempts to revoke the privileges met resistance from all treaty powers. When the Qing government fell from power, 18 nations had entered into treaty relations with China: Britain, the United States, France, Russia, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Italy, AustriaHungary, Peru, Brazil, Portugal, and Mexico. The first six were the biggest invaders and grabbers of privileges. In most cases, other nations then availed themselves of all the rights and privileges obtained by these powers, by means of the equal treatment clause in their treaties.

Calls for the Revision and Repeal of the Unequal Treaties The erosion of Chinese sovereignty was not solely due to foreign chicanery, but also ignorance on the part of Qing officials. Recent studies found that certain privileges were actually voluntarily conceded. Consular jurisdiction, MFN treatment, tariff negotiation — these modern forms of national sovereignty were alien to longsecluded, imperial China.13 The nation had just opened its doors; little could it realize the cost that the seemingly trivial concessions would take. That said, the Chinese showed stiff resistance against the treaties from day one. At first, opposition was focused on treaties that, even to the most traditional of minds, undermined Chinese sovereignty. The people resented the concessions and indemnities imposed upon their nation, and the arrival of foreigners into their cities. Guangzhou, for example, led a lengthy campaign after the Treaty of Nanjing to resist the entry of foreigners into the city. Rational criticism against the treaties first arose among the early reformers. This more open-minded community had seen more of the outside world than their peers had. New knowledge of international law allowed them to understand modern concepts of sovereignty, and thus enabled them to see the unfairness in the treaties. Xue Fucheng argued, regarding extraterritoriality: “Merchants should be subject to the legal jurisdiction of the authorities of their nation and place of residence, in addition to international law.” Foreign nationals in China were, however, subject to the legal jurisdiction of their own governments only: “Their exemption from local jurisdiction obstructs our handling of various affairs.”

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Extraterritoriality proved defective in practice and resulted in unfair punishments for crimes. In murder cases, any Chinese citizen would have suffered an equal punishment for that crime. On the other hand: Foreign law-breakers never bore an equal punishment for their actions. Their officials implemented various protections which allowed the escape of these criminals back to their home countries. It is no question why there is not even the slightest law we can invoke to hold them accountable. There is no law we can enforce upon them! There is no other explanation but the lack of authority. As for MFN, he described its essence as: Whatever was granted to one power was enjoyed by the others. Whatever demand one power had, others rushed to its aid. This is nothing but a drive to make the Western states band up against us…. This has been our biggest mistake.14 Aware of the gap in power between China and foreign powers, they did not propose repealing the treaties, but came up with plans of changing and disabling the way the treaties were applied. They suggested new laws be made, or, in order to abolish consular jurisdiction, subjecting foreigners to their own laws. Reformers such as Xue Fucheng and Zheng Guanying called for efforts to consolidate Chinese and foreign laws into a single, well-grounded, fair, and mutually agreed upon legislation which, they believed, would leave no maneuvering room for the powers.15 Some proposed taking back control of the tariffs by amending the rules to impose a heavier duty on foreign traders than locals. Ma Jianzhong noted: “Tariff addition is a natural right of ours.” He suggested the tariff be raised with every new treaty signed, so that: In less than a decade, China will have no less variety of taxes than European countries. Our merchants will be rich. Our food and resources will be abundant. When these circumstances come together, China will move from a shortage to a surplus, and emerge from underdevelopment to being a world power.16 Early reformers advocated a general MFN standard applicable to all treaties with China that would stop the powers’ endless extortion and extension of privileges. Their early concepts and ideas, while not without flaws, nevertheless revealed the unfairness of previous treaties, criticized the ignorance of the Qing court in

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foreign affairs, and disseminated knowledge of international law. Their work inspired later struggles against the unequal treaties. The reformers’ attention on international law brought about important social changes in China. The Qing court began to realize the importance of international law in diplomacy. The Imperial Foreign Language Institute published translations of about 20 foreign works on law and legal studies. The study of international law gained considerable support from the Westernization reformists. This was motivated by two concerns: first was the fact that Western powers had often ignored international law. China, however, had little reason to argue against that due to its lack of legal specialists, and had therefore been the weaker side in diplomatic negotiations. Second was the desire to nurture legal specialists, in order to create new laws and regulations that would help recast sovereignty. In 1871, Japan demanded from China the same privileges that other nations had enjoyed. The demand was turned down. Eventually the fair-minded Sino– Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty was signed. China attempted to put a time restraint on the free-riders of the treaty benefits. The 1881 Sino-Brazilian Treaty provided: “If, later, the Chinese government sees fit to establish, in agreement with the foreign Powers, a unique code to regulate the matter of jurisdiction relative to foreign subjects in China, Brazil shall have an equal share in this agreement.”17 A clearer definition of this protocol was provided in the 1899 Sino-Mexican Treaty of Amity and Commerce: Should the Chinese Government think, proper, hereafter, to establish, in accord with foreign powers, a code for the purpose of settling the matter of jurisdiction over foreign subjects in China, Mexico shall have an equal share in said agreement.18 The 1908 Sino-Swedish Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation contained more explicit provisions for the termination of extraterritorial rights: “However, as China is now engaged in reforming her judicial system, it is hereby agreed that as soon as all other Treaty Powers have agreed to relinquish their extraterritorial rights, Sweden will also be prepared to do so.”19 These provisions eliminated any possibility of foreign resistance against China’s revision to the treaties. In 1902, during negotiations for the renewed treaty of commerce, Britain was told that the exemption of British nationals from local jurisdiction did not exempt them from the Chinese law. “For the sake of fairness, British nationals in China shall be subject to all prohibitions applicable to Chinese citizens.”

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Britain requested permission for British merchants to live and trade in all parts of China. Chinese delegate Sheng Xuanhuai demanded the abolition of British extraterritoriality in return as a condition of the grant and added that China would grant that right when foreigners had submitted to Chinese justice.20 At the negotiations in July 1902, Chinese delegate Zhang Zhidong demanded that Britain surrender its extraterritorial privileges and other rights in China once reforms in its legal system had been completed: “All foreigners in China shall abide by the Chinese law after its revision.”21 As a result, the treaty provided in Article 12: China having expressed a strong desire to reform her jurisdiction system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extra-territorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for their administration, and other considerations warrant her in so doing.22 Britain was the first to conditionally agree to relinquish its extraterritorial rights. The subsequent treaties with the United States and Japan had provisions to the same effect. Britain added conditions to the provision which China could not control. Despite the agenda behind it, the conditional consent meant, after all, a new step for China. The loud calls for the relinquishment of extraterritoriality among Chinese society had grown too loud to be ignored by the British government. This provision was perhaps the only worth-mentioning result of the Qing’s many efforts to limit and revise extraterritoriality. The corrupt and weak Qing government had failed at the task of recovering sovereignty; it left behind a tangled web of unequal treaties. The Qing’s diplomatic incompetence called into existence a group of revolutionaries who sought to overthrow the foreign-controlled government. Anti-Manchu revolutionary and campaigner Chen Tianhua wrote, in An Alarm to Awaken the Age: Do you people think China is still under the Manchu government? It has been taken over by foreigners! Financial authority, railway control, and appointment powers were put on their plate. The foreigners didn’t have to move a muscle. Whatever they desired, the Manchu government obeyed on order. They say China is not being divided up amongst the powers, but the truth is that it has been divided for decades.

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The Western states, as he put it, “retained the Manchu government as their puppet, while they pulled the strings from behind.” The Qing’s vulnerability to foreign aggression was the fault of its reluctance to reform: “Today, China is beyond a cure…. Our nation is on the brink of demise.”23 Some in China at the time felt that the only way to save the country from external forces was to overthrow the Manchu regime.

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Chapter

Diplomatic Predicaments in the Early Years of the Republic of China

UNEQUAL TREATIES AND CHINA VOLUME 1

On October 10, 1911, the Wuchang Uprising broke out, and upon its success, the revolutionaries established the Military Government of Hubei of the Republic of China. This first successful uprising was followed by a succession of anti-Qing revolutions in other provinces, which finally led to the collapse of the Qing dynasty. In retrospect, the end of the dynastic system and the establishment of the republican government that followed were to bring unprecedented, epochal changes to China’s domestic and diplomatic affairs. However, these were more long-term changes than immediate effects: China was still afflicted with foreign threats. Therefore, same as the Qing rulers, the revolutionaries had to struggle with diplomatic predicaments — a situation in which China was barred from exercising national self-determination. With the unfavorable external environment and the instability of the new regime, the revolutionaries, who had criticized the Qing rulers for their corruption and incompetency, did not have much more success either in their quest to free China from the shackles of unequal treaties.

Recognition of Unequal Treaties and Diplomatic Recognition The provisional government: Follow the old practice for now, solve problems in the future The first and foremost goal of the 1911 (Xinhai) Revolution was to overthrow the Qing dynasty. To safeguard the first fruits of the revolution, the military governments newly established in different provinces adopted a peaceful attitude towards the Western powers, avoiding conflicts as much as possible. Only two days after the outbreak of the uprising, the Hubei military government already dispatched diplomatic missions to the British, Russian, French, German, and Japanese concessions in Hankou to communicate to their consuls the new government’s diplomatic policy. The military government pledged to maintain harmonious and friendly relations with foreign countries “for the maintenance of world peace and the wellbeing of mankind.”1 The diplomatic note included seven diplomatic principles that manifested the inheritance of all unequal terms signed by the Qing dynasty. The first four were: (1) All treaties entered into by the Qing dynasty would remain effective. (2) All external debts owed by the Qing court would be paid off by the provincial military governments in due time. (3) All property and belongings owned by foreign residents in regions occupied by the military governments would be protected. (4) All concessions granted by the Qing government to foreign countries would be protected.2 In addition, to prevent the

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Qing government from seeking foreign help by conceding more sovereign rights, the military government denied in advance all possible treaties that the Qing court might sign with the foreign powers, which formed the final three principles: (5) All treaties, granting of interests, and debts between the Qing government and foreign countries that took place after the dispatch of the note would be repudiated. (6) Any country that assisted the Qing court against the military government would be treated as an enemy. (7) All items taken from the Qing court that could be considered weapons would be confiscated.3 In fact, the above diplomatic principles were not drawn up by the leaders or diplomats of the Hubei military government, but were modified based on the “External Manifesto” of the Tongmenghui’s “Revolutionary Strategy.”4 The government’s recognition of the treaties signed by the Qing dynasty was out of strategic concerns. In a nutshell, it was to ease the foreign powers’ apprehension about the revolutionaries, win their sympathies and recognition, and avoid possible foreign interference of the ongoing revolution. And this strategy did serve its aims. After the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising, the Qing officials also sent diplomatic notes to the consulates in the five Hankou concessions in request of naval patrolling on the Wuhan section of the Yangtze River to forestall revolutionary attack of Hankou.5 Meanwhile, the Hubei military government spared no effort to urge the consuls in Hankou to officially acknowledge it as a belligerent, so that it could no longer be treated as rebel forces but gain equal footing with the Qing court and enjoy the rights of a belligerent. This would also to some degree eliminate the possibility of foreign assistance to the Qing government. In response, on October 13 and 16, the five foreign powers convened two joint-consulate meetings discussing their stances, and they agreed to stay neutral, although the German consul insisted on supporting the Qing court. On October 17, the British representative visited Li Yuanhong, the military governor of the Hubei government, and proclaimed that the consuls in Hankou appreciated the New Army’s valiance as well as their civilized and protective attitudes towards foreign nationals. In the note the consuls promised neutrality during a war between the Qing court and the revolutionary army. The Hubei government saw this as a success of their foreign policy and immediately responded with a note of gratitude.6 The Shanghai military government followed Hubei in foreign policy. On November 3, the day that the uprising in Shanghai broke out, the Shanghai military government sent a diplomatic note to the British consul general in Shanghai in which it pledged to help to maintain safety and order in the foreign concessions. In the Notice of the Shanghai Military Government published on the same day, the government again requested that foreign countries stay neutral. Shanghai was

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the center of foreign interests in China, so the Shanghai revolutionaries were particularly prudent in handling external relations. The foreign powers seemed to be rather satisfied with the revolutionaries’ conduct. As John Jordan, the then British minister in China, wrote to the British Foreign Office in a telegram: “A satisfactory guarantee for the protection of the settlements seems to be afforded by the fact that Shanghai is evidently the head-quarters of the central machinery of the rebel Government.”7 However, the British minister was reluctant to show optimism about the future of the Qing dynasty: “It is not apparently a very hopeful task that has been committed to Yuan Shih-kai [Yuan Shikai].”8 Although the Shanghai military government had shown friendliness to the foreign powers, against the wish of the revolutionaries and the sovereign rights of the rising regime, the foreign powers were more proactive in extending their rights in Shanghai than in Hankou. For instance, with the aim of expanding their concession, the British sent the Shanghai Volunteer Corps to occupy the Shanghai Railway Station on the pretext that the Shanghai–Nanjing Railway was built by the British and thus should be operated under the supervision of the British. This received strong opposition from the Shanghai military government, with which the corps finally retreated from the station. On January 1, 1912, the revolutionaries finally managed to establish some form of central government in Nanjing: the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, and Sun Yat-sen assumed the office of provisional president. In his very first announcement, Sun elaborated on the internal and foreign policies of the new government. The statement regarding foreign relations included: The Provisional Government shall, upon its establishment, shoulder the responsibilities of a civilized nation in order to enjoy the vested rights of a civilized nation. The Republic shall cleanse the nation of all the shameful measures and xenophobia of the Manchu Government. The Republic advocates pacifism and strives for harmonious relations with friendly foreign nations, in order to earn the respect of international society and contribute to the fostering of a utopian world.9 On January 5, Sun published the “Manifesto from the Republic of China to All Friendly Nations,” where he stated the government’s policies on foreign relations: All treaties entered into by the Manchu Government before the date of the Revolution will be continually effective up to the time of their termination; but any and all entered into after the commencement of the Revolution will be repudiated.

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Diplomatic Predicaments in the Early Years of the Republic of China

All foreign loans or indemnities incurred by the Manchu Government before the Revolution will be acknowledged without any alternation of terms; but all payments made to and loans incurred by the Manchu Government after the commencement of the Revolution will be repudiated. All concessions granted to foreign nations or their nationals by the Manchu Government before the Revolution will be respected; but any and all granted after the commencement of the Revolution will be repudiated. All persons and property of any foreign nation within the jurisdiction of the Republic of China will be respected and protected.10 Wu Tingfang, the minister of justice of the provisional government and an outstanding diplomat, said: I feel deeply distressed whenever the loss of sovereign rights during the Qing dynasty is mentioned. Now that the new government has been established, it should find ways to remedy the situation. However, this is not a suitable time to raise conflicts with the foreign powers because there are still numerous and complicated internal military affairs waiting to be dealt with. Except for principal issues, we should follow the old practice for now and leave the problems to be solved in the future. This is an inevitable choice given the current situation.11 And most of other officials in the provisional government also took this view. Although the republic thought that China’s sovereignty was infringed as the administrative, policing, and judicial rights in the foreign concessions were controlled by foreign countries, it still stuck to the principle of “redeeming them after the situation becomes more stable.” In practice, the government required that “Chinese nationals shall not make rash resistance or act recklessly within foreign concessions,” and that the Chinese military personnel and civilians shall not make arrests, launch raids, or bear arms within foreign concessions, or conduct searches of foreign freighters or military vessels. It was apparent that the government wanted the Chinese people to abide by the old rules in foreign concessions. Moreover, in terms of the Mixed Court in Shanghai coheld by the foreign powers and the Manchu government from 1864 and taken over by the foreign powers during the revolution, the government thought it “particularly urgent and essential to get it back,” and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would negotiate with related consuls to deal with the issue. However, it also insisted: “Before an agreement is reached, armies and civilians of our country shall not make defense to cause trouble.”12

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Although some officials in the government did propose reclaiming sovereign rights, they did not gain much support because the provisional government hoped that a friendly attitude would help to avert foreign hostility to the new Republic and even win their recognition. Thus, the government had not put the reclaiming of sovereign rights at the top of its agenda. As Sun Yat-sen stated during an interview with China Press (Dalubao 大陸報) on the issue of the abolition of consular jurisdiction: “It must be relinquished. As soon as the goals of reform are achieved, the government will set out to realize this…. Nowadays, the most imperative and urgent task is to reform the legal system.”13 The answer implied that the revolutionaries did not prioritize the task of abrogating unequal treaties, even though they were opposed to the continual effectiveness of these treaties. The provisional government did what they promised to the foreign powers: to recognize the validity of the old treaties. But in spite of this, the foreign powers still recognized the Manchu government as the only legitimate government of the country, and the diplomatic ministers were still residing in Beijing. What the provisional government could negotiate over with the foreign consuls were only regional issues.

The Yuan Shikai Government: Strictly abide by the terms of the old treaties Soon after the initial success of the revolution, Yuan Shikai took power from the hands of the revolutionaries. On February 12, 1912, the Qing emperor announced abdication of the throne, and on the next day, Sun Yat-sen, as promised in the deal with Yuan for his support of the Manchu abdication, resigned from the position of provisional president. On February 15, the Nanjing Parliament elected Yuan as the new provisional president. Yuan wanted his government to be acknowledged by foreign countries as soon as possible, but the powers would not show their recognition easily. Theoretically, the problem of diplomatic recognition should not have bothered Yuan that much because from the perspective of international law, there were not two antithetical governments in China then, and the rise of the republic and the fall of the Qing dynasty were China’s internal affairs. However, lacking self-confidence from his somewhat inglorious political maneuver, Yuan needed foreign recognition to assure himself of the legitimacy of his government. This gave foreign powers the opportunity to acquire more interests in China. Not surprisingly, they used diplomatic recognition as a bargaining chip to coerce Yuan to succumb to the old treaties.

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Diplomatic Predicaments in the Early Years of the Republic of China

On February 21, the Japanese government drew up a memorandum in relation to the recognition of Yuan Shikai’s provisional government, with which it asked other foreign powers for their advice. In it was stated: “In view of the present condition of things in China it is necessary for the Powers at this time to consider matters relating to such recognition.” “The continuation under the new order of affairs, of the rights, privileges and immunities which foreigners now enjoy in China,” in the opinion of Japan, was “quite essential.”14 Considering that not all of the rights, privileges, and immunities mentioned in the memorandum were based on treaties, as many of them were derived from Qing and foreign laws and international practices, the Japanese government added: “It seems advisable, therefore, for the Powers at the time of recognition to secure from the new Government, as a measure of repose, a formal confirmation of those rights, privileges and immunities, and it would also be well for them to obtain from the said Government at the same time a formal engagement regarding the foreign indebtedness of China.”15 Japan also suggested foreign nations to reach a consensus on this issue. Except for the United States, all foreign powers assented. With British approval, Japan proposed a draft titled Details Regarding the Conditions for the Recognition of the Chinese Government after one month to be sent to Britain, the United States, and France. In the draft, Japan stated that only after nations ensured that the new Chinese government was qualified and stable enough to shoulder its international obligations should they acknowledge its legitimacy. In addition, Japan also spelled out the demand that the Chinese government promise respect for the countries’ rights and privileges in China. The draft read: 1. The new government shall ratify all the existing treaties and agreements, and the regulations and ordinances (including emperors’ edicts) made to fulfill the treaties and agreements. At the same time, none of the regulations and ordinances shall be altered or abrogated without the permission of related countries. 2. The new government shall continue to shoulder all the obligations and responsibilities in relation to the actually existing foreign loans incurred by the old government, or by the provisional government and local governments which have existed de facto, and continue to fulfill the terms of the agreements and contracts in relation to the foreign loans incurred by the mentioned governments. 3. The new government shall, in addition to the loans mentioned in the above article, continue to fulfill all other actually effective compacts, contracts, obligations, responsibilities, preferential treatment, and transfers concluded

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or established by the old government or local governments with foreign countries, groups, or individuals. 4. The new government shall recognize the extraterritorial rights and consular jurisdiction which have been comprehended by the Chinese nationals and which have been practiced, and also the rights, privileges, and immunities which have been actually enjoyed by foreign governments, groups, and nationals in China.16 The internal and external environments faced by Yuan were harsh. Explicitly, the southern provinces and the provisional parliament were firmly controlled by the revolutionaries, and during the political turmoil after the outbreak of the revolution, some foreign powers extended their spheres of influence in China’s border areas, such that crises were emerging in the southwestern, northwestern, and northeastern provinces. Therefore, to stabilize the situation, Yuan assented to the conditions without much hesitation. On March 10, Yuan assumed the position of provisional president in Beijing. On March 11, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to foreign governments, declaring the formal establishment of the “unified Provisional Government of the Republic of China.” In the note, it also stated that all the international treaties entered into by the Manchu government would be continually fulfilled by the government of the Republic of China, and that all the finished, unfinished, and upcoming negotiations would be taken over by the provisional diplomatic envoys of the government.17 In addition to Japan, Britain was also rather proactive in the “deal” of diplomatic recognition and treaty acknowledgement. On July 5, the British Foreign Office sent Lew Yuk-lin (Liu Yulin), the Chinese minister in London, a diplomatic note, stating that the British recognition of the republic would depend on the government’s ability to command the local governments to respect her treaty rights, and especially demanded transferring certain xenophobic officials in western Yunnan to other places.18 To avoid undesirable consequences, on July 12, Yuan Shikai ordered provincial military governors and local officials to “supervise their subordinate officials, soldiers, and people to respect and abide by the terms of the treaties and make sure that no one violate[d] them lest any defiant action should lead the whole country into danger.”19 The foreign powers were not unanimous in the recognition of the new Chinese government. The United States and some Latin American countries were among the first countries that acknowledged the legitimacy of the Republic of China. In January, 1913, the U.S. Congress passed the proposal for the recognition of the new Chinese government. In March, Woodrow Wilson, whom some called an idealist,

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Diplomatic Predicaments in the Early Years of the Republic of China

was inaugurated as president of the United States. In April, the U.S. government notified China as well as other countries that it would officially recognize the government of the Republic of China as a legitimate government after it formed its formal parliamentary organ. On April 8, the National Assembly of the Republic of China was inaugurated in Beijing. On May 2, the U.S. government declared its recognition of the Beiyang government of the Republic of China. Before this, Brazil and Peru had granted their recognition to the Beiyang government in April, followed by Mexico and Cuba. However, countries like Japan, Britain, and Russia still insisted that the Yuan government give a clear promise of the continual effectiveness of the old treaties. On September 30, the diplomatic corps formed by these countries arranged a meeting in Beijing. During the meeting, Japan’s minister to China, Yamaza Enjiro, proposed that the president of the Republic of China add a statement regarding the continual effectiveness of foreign rights in his inauguration address and that this address be sent to the foreign embassies in advance, after which they would acknowledge the legitimacy of the Chinese government. Japan even submitted a self-drafted statement to the diplomatic corps. The proposal received unanimous approval and the diplomatic corps entrusted Japan with the task of sending a delegate to discuss the details of the statement to be included in the inauguration with Beijing. On October 6, Yuan Shikai was elected as the president of the Republic of China. On the same day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China attached the president’s upcoming address on foreign relations in a note sent to the foreign embassies, and 13 countries including Japan, Britain, Russia, France, and Germany immediately announced their recognition. On October 10, Yuan pronounced in his inauguration address as promised: I hereby declare, therefore, that all treaties, conventions and other engagements entered into by the former Manchu and the Provisional Republican Governments with foreign governments shall be strictly observed, and that all contracts duly concluded by the former governments with foreign companies and individuals shall also be strictly observed; and further that all rights, privileges and immunities enjoyed by foreigners in China by virtue of international engagements, national enactments and established usages are hereby confirmed.20 The above statement was totally drafted according to Japan’s suggestions. It is obvious from the outset that Yuan’s government would yield to foreign powers easily in terms of diplomatic affairs, sacrificing national interests for their recognition and support. While it might appear that Yuan’s compromise was

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quite consistent with Sun’s, there were distinctive differences in the motives and strategies of their pledges. To be specific, as mentioned before, the revolutionaries had clearly stated that their ultimate goal was to abolish foreign privileges in China, just that the time for abolition had not yet come, so they temporarily accepted the effectiveness of the old treaties. In addition, reading the relevant statements of the two governments carefully, one would notice that while the revolutionaries asserted the termination of the treaties after their expiry dates, Yuan had never shown any determination to finally abrogate or revise the unequal treaties. Therefore, for rather a long period, China had to continue to suffer great losses for Yuan’s acquiescence.

Negotiations on Tariff Rates and the Shanghai Mixed Court Yuan did make some diplomatic efforts after he acknowledged the continual effectiveness of the old treaties, trying to fight for certain benefits for the nation under the limitation of the terms of the treaties and resume some of China’s sovereign rights which the foreign powers had encroached upon beyond the treaty stipulations. The negotiations on tariff rates and the handover of the Shanghai Mixed Court, which unfortunately ended in failure, were specific examples of these efforts.

Negotiations on tariff rates According to the Mackay Treaty signed in 1902, the terms regarding the import tariff could be revised after 10 years of execution, with notification to related countries six months in advance. On August 14, 1912, the Beiyang government sent a diplomatic note to 14 countries including Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan, stating its wish to revise the terms in relation to the import duty. Noting that the 5% tariff laid down in 1902 was determined based on the value of goods in 1897 to 1899, it demanded: “Until now, ten years have elapsed, and in view of the fluctuations in values of the various kinds of merchandise, it should be revised in due time so as to make it agreeable with the original agreement of an effective 5% ad valorem.”21 On October 14, 1913, the Beiyang government reiterated its desire to revise the terms of the import duty to the ministers of the same countries: “As the Government of the Chinese Republic is now again maintaining its formal and perfect relations with the friendly Powers, foreign trade in China is bound to flourish. Therefore, this aforesaid Tariff should

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Diplomatic Predicaments in the Early Years of the Republic of China

be revised accordingly to the advantage of our revenue collection as well as to foreign commercial intercourse.” 22 Regarding China’s request, William J. Calhoun, the U.S. minister to China, showed in his note to Sun Baoqi, the minister of foreign affairs of China, sympathy to China’s desire to revise the terms. Likewise, the British minister John Jordan replied positively, while the Belgian and Dutch ministers also expressed their permission.23 However, China’s request met with resistance from some other countries, which even attempted to take the opportunity to extend their influence in China. For instance, Alexandre R. Conty, the French minister responded: “… there will be no reasonable ground for objection to the proposed revision, if suitable compensation can be given therefore … and further discussion of the matter must be delayed until compensations to the losses and damages sustained by France in the Chinese Revolution shall have been fairly and satisfactorily settled…”24 The Beiyang government refused this demand. Sun Baoqi replied in opposition: “French commerce in China is also flourishing daily; and it is only fitting and proper that France should give it her sincere support as the justification for extra demands for something which ought to be done purely in accordance with treaty stipulations.”25 Sun also mentioned that the compensation for the damages inflicted on France during the revolution was being investigated by a committee and would be settled in the future; however, “this question bore no relation to the revision question at all, and being entirely two different things, one should not be arbitrarily associated to the other as a condition.”26 He urged the French government to reconsider China’s request. Italian Minister Count Sforza replied that if the Chinese government permitted other countries to expand their concessions in Hankou or granted other countries the rights exercised in the vicinity of their concessions, Italy should be given the same treatment. Again, this demand was refused by the Beiyang government. Sun expressed disappointment to Italy: “It is anticipated that the Italian Government will be glad to give its sincere support to this project … and will not propose extra demands for an undertaking which is expressly provided and sanctioned by Treaty.” He also explicitly informed Sforza that the British, Russian, German, French, and Japanese requests for an expansion of their concessions in Hankou had been turned down by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this incident could not be “arbitrarily associated with the question of the Tariff revision and made a condition for consent.”27 Russia and Japan were more aggressive and resistant. In April, 1914, the Russian minister M. Krupensky stated the following conditions: (1) The maritime tariff could be increased, while tariff of goods transported via the northern Manchurian

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route should still be levied according to the 1902 treaty, and Russian goods that were not included in the 1902 treaty should also be taxed at the same tariff rate. (2) The Russian government should be compensated for its “concession” by two additional terms: (a) Following the practice for the Port of Dalian (Dalny) Bay, all goods transported between inland China and Manchuria through Vladivostok should be regarded as “goods in transit” and charged half duty as coast trade duty only, not the import or export duty. (b) The Chinese government should promise not to demand the Mongolian government to concede its taxation rights on goods from China in its upcoming tripartite meeting with Russia and Outer Mongolia.28 Different from other foreign countries, Russia’s trade with China was sustained by rail transportation. If the import tariff on goods transported via land were not changed, then China would continue to benefit little from her trade with Russia. Naturally, the Chinese government refused the Russian minister’s demands. Sun Baoqi reasoned that the terms on the import tariff were concluded and signed by the countries concerned in the 1902 Mackay treaty, and it was stipulated that these terms could be revised after 10 years, so Russia’s assertion that the maritime tariff could be revised while the customs tariff on goods carried via the northern Manchuria route could not was unreasonable.29 Sun also rejected the other two additional conditions, but in a more euphemistic and tactful way. More detailed reasoning was given in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ letter to Minister to Russia Liu Jingren, where the demands were condemned as “unreasonable and coercive”: The revision of the Tariff is expressly provided in the Treaty and there is no ground for making demands.… It is the Russian government who are taking advantage of the Question and asking for compensations for the purpose of extending its influence in Mongolia and Northern Manchuria. It is, therefore, very necessary that we should conjointly, that is both internally and externally, refute and resist its demands in order to put a stop to its dangerous designs.30 Obata Yukichi, the acting Japanese minister, claimed that it was unfair that Chinese machine-manufactured goods were protected by the preferential policies of the Chinese government and therefore could be exempt from likin and other taxes, while foreign goods of the same category had to be taxed. To seek “equal treatment of imported goods with native goods,” the minister demanded: In all that concerns any privilege, favor, advantage or exemption in the matter of internal taxation of every kind and in all other matters, which are

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now or may hereafter be accorded by China, to or in favor of machine made goods in foreign style manufactured in China, no less favorable treatment shall likewise be accorded to foreign goods of the same or similar style, when imported into China.31 Regarding this, Sun Baoqi rejected on the ground that although there were precedents of granting equal treatment to imported foreign goods in commercial treaties, there were more cases in which countries imposed the highest rate of tax on imported goods to protect native goods while granting on discretion specific types of imported goods equal treatment with native goods in exchange for the same treatment, and China’s current commercial conditions with other countries would not permit Japan’s demands.32 Soon after, the First World War broke out. The Western powers could not spare any more attention to the discussion of China’s import tariff, and while Japan and Russia continued to have diplomatic exchanges with China, they firmly insisted on their proposals and left little space for further discussion. In this way, the negotiations were suspended without a conclusion.

Negotiations on the return of the Mixed Court Apart from the revision of the import duty, Yuan’s government also made some efforts to reclaim the Mixed Court in the Shanghai International Settlement, which was originally a Chinese judicial organ. During the Qing dynasty, the main power of the court was in the hands of Chinese judges, although foreign consuls or their representatives could attend or participate in adjudications. However, after the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution, the Chinese judges and other Chinese officials fled. The foreign powers thus seized the opportunity to take over the court. They also changed the management rules and judicial procedures, which rendered the Mixed Court under complete foreign control. Among the changes, the most important ones were: (1) The power of the appointment of judges was transferred from the authorities of the Shanghai Circuit to the consular corps in Shanghai. (2) Foreign assessors (vice consuls) were authorized to participate in the proceedings of the civil actions involving only Chinese, which previously were tried by Chinese magistrates independently. (3) The court’s power in the proceedings was increased. Previously, major criminal cases were referred to the surveillance commissioner (niesi 臬司) by way of the magistrates of Shanghai County, and the Mixed Court could accept criminal cases in which the criminals were sentenced to imprisonment of five years or below, while after being controlled by the consular corps, the court independently accepted and

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heard cases in which criminals were sentenced to 20-year imprisonment. (4) The jurisdiction was also expanded. Previously, the court only had jurisdiction over Chinese cases (in which both the plaintiff[s] and the defendant[s] were Chinese) that happened in the foreign concessions, while after the takeover, its jurisdiction was extended to Chinese cases that happened outside the concessions. (5) The employment and administrative rights were transferred to the foreign powers, and the court was funded by the Shanghai Municipal Police, a mixed police force, but not the Chinese government any more. In this way, the Mixed Court was turned into a judicial organ that was totally in the control of the foreign powers, and although there were still Chinese judges, they had no actual power. In 1912, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded from the consular corps the return of the Mixed Court. In December, 1913, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Cao Rulin sent another note to the consular corps, initiating discussions about the return of the Mixed Court. In June 1914, after numerous consultations with other diplomatic ministers, British Minister John Jordan, who headed the diplomatic corps, replied the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they could return the Mixed Court to the Chinese government if they were promised that the “reforms” on the court following the Xinhai Revolution would be kept and continually implemented. To be specific, Jordan proposed five conditions: 1. Status of the Mixed Court. The Chinese Government are to confirm the four magistrates of the Mixed Court to act in concert with the foreign assessor…. The magistrates are to be appointed by the Chinese Government, with the approval of the Consular Body. The chief Mixed Court magistrate to have the rank of and to be placed on a similar footing to that of the Judge of the Kao Teng Shen P’an T’ing [gaodeng shenpan ting 高等審判廳, High Court ]. The Chinese Government to recognise the presence of foreign assessors in purely Chinese civil cases sitting as assessors for the Consular Body. 2. Competence of the Mixed Court in Criminal Cases. The Court to have power of dealing with all criminal offences committed in the settlement including those deserving more than five years’ imprisonment. The Court to have the power of sentence of death in murder cases…. 3. Procedure. The prison attached to the Mixed Court are to be under the charge of the municipal police. All orders, summonses and warrants issued by the Mixed Court are to be executed by the municipal police. The old system of Court runners is to be definitely abolished. Lawyers are to be allowed to attend purely Chinese civil cases….

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4. Appeals. In mixed civil cases the old system of appeal to the Kuan Ch’a Shih [guanchashi 觀察使, Surveillance Commissioner] and the consul concerned to be maintained. In case of disagreement the joint judgment of the lower Court to stand. In Chinese civil cases the Court of Appeal to be composed of the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and the consul of the assessor who heard the case in the Mixed Court. In the event of disagreement between the commissioner and the consul the joint judgment of the Lower Court to stand. 5. Administrative Work and Financial Supervision of the Court. The administrative and financial work of the Mixed Court will be entrusted to a foreign registrar and a clerical staff. The duties of the registrar are to superintend the whole staff and to exercise proper supervision over the Court’s finances. The registrar and the administrative staff shall be appointed by the Chinese Government on the recommendation of the Consular Body….33 It was evident that the ultimate end of the consular corps was to continually

control the Mixed Court and thereby legalize their unauthorized takeover. These conditions were so humiliating that even the ever-ready-to-concede Beiyang

government could not accept. On July 22, 1914, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs counter-proposed five suggestions:

1. All employees of the Mixed Court, including the magistrates, to be appointed by the Chinese government without the interference of the consular corps,

and the Chinese government to notify the consular corps of these employees’ names.

2. The head of the Mixed Court to enjoy the same nominal rank as the president of the municipal court.

3. Adhering to the Rules for the Mixed Court established in 1869, civil cases involving only Chinese to be tried by Chinese magistrates independently according to Chinese law; there would be no need for foreign jurors to attend and participate in the trials of these cases.

4. The verdicts of any criminal cases in which the criminals were sentenced to imprisonment of 10 years or above or to death to be referred to the Chinese Ministry of the Justice for approval.

5. The Chinese government to agree to keep the old system where litigants

could appeal to the circuit intendant and the consuls concerned. However, if the verdicts of the circuit intendant and consuls contradicted each other, a

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third party, which could be the consul of a third country, should participate in the final verdict. The consular corps’ proposal that the former verdict of the Mixed Court would be kept if the circuit intendant and consuls disagreed with each other would render the appeal meaningless.34 In terms of the management and financial issues, the Chinese government proposed that they should be under the charge of the zhubu 主簿 (assistant magistrate) and his clerks rather than a foreign registrar. It did not specify the nationality of the zhubu, acceding that he would be recommended by the consular corps and appointed by the Chinese government. In addition, the Beiyang government did not raise an objection to the condition with respect to the management of the prison affiliated to the court. However, after numerous negotiations, the two parties still could not reach an agreement. In August, 1915, the Beiyang government made some concessions. It agreed that the appeals would be retried by a different magistrate of the Mixed Court, and if the plaintiff or the defendant did not accept the verdict of retrial, they could appeal to the circuit intendant and the consuls concerned, and if the circuit intendant and consuls held different views on the verdict of the appeal, then the retrial verdict would be final. In terms of the appointment of judicial assistants, the Chinese government insisted that they should be appointed by China, and China would notify foreign consuls of these appointments.35 However, the consular corps added one more condition: to expand the International Settlement, at which China broke off negotiations. Because of the fruitless negotiations, the Mixed Court had been in the control of foreign powers until the mid-1920s, when the Beiyang government made great endeavors in the revision or abrogation of unequal treaties. Before the mid-1920s, to exercise some restraint on the power of the Mixed Court, the Supreme Court (dali yuan 大理院) announced that China did not acknowledge the validity of the verdicts of the Mixed Court and relevant authorities of the Chinese government had no obligation to assist in the execution of the court’s verdicts. The Supreme Court also authorized Chinese courts outside the foreign concessions to accept and hear controversial cases that had been tried by the Mixed Court. Although there were numerous diplomatic failures during this period, the Beiyang government did secure limited achievements. The Treaty of Amity concluded with Chile could be considered an equal treaty. In the treaty negotiations, China stated that businessmen should not be eligible for the post of Chilean consul in China because of possible conflicts of interests. This proposal was accepted by Chile. On February 18, 1915, the Chinese and Chilean ministers in Britain signed

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Diplomatic Predicaments in the Early Years of the Republic of China

the treaty in London. The treaty stipulated that diplomatic agents, and consuls of the two countries should enjoy equal rights and treatment, as well as the same privileges and immunities with the diplomatic agents from other nations.36

New Unequal Treaties During the period when Yuan was in power, the Beiyang government achieved nothing in the resumption of sovereign rights. Worse, it signed new unequal treaties, particularly the 1915 secret treaties with Japan derived from the Twenty-One Demands. At the end of July 1914, the First World War broke out. The Entente Powers of Britain, France, and Russia entered into war with the Central Powers comprising Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy. On August 6, the Beiyang government announced its neutrality in the war. To seize Germany’s interests in China, Japan declared war on Germany soon after the war broke out. On August 15, Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany, demanding that German warships retreat from or disarm themselves in the Sea of Japan and China’s territorial waters, and that Germany unconditionally give her Jiaozhou Bay concession to Japan, so that Japan would be able to “return” it back to China.37 The ultimatum was ignored, and on August 23, Japan declared war on Germany. The Beiyang government was aware of Japan’s ulterior motive. To stop Japan from extending her sphere of influence in China’s territory, it specially designated a combat zone in Shandong for Japan and Germany, attempting to make it the only area within which they could fight in China. In fact, as a neutral country, China had every right to prevent any belligerent from combating in Chinese territory; it was thus rather shameful for the Beiyang government to offer a piece of land to be ravaged by Japan and Germany. Obviously, Japan would have no mercy for the weak regime. Ignoring China’s neutrality and sovereignty, Japanese forces landed at Longkou, which lied outside the assigned combat zone, and moved further west to occupy the Jinan Railway Station, successfully grabbing the Jiaozhou– Jinan Railway. Worse, this implied that Japanese troops were now stationed in Jinan. The Japanese did not attack Qingdao, where most of German forces were based in, until the end of October. But having taken hold of it, the Japanese government was determined to include Qingdao in its sphere of influence. It ignored China’s demand of retreat from Qingdao. Later, public opinion in Japan started to proclaim Jiaozhou Bay as Japan’s war spoils and should not be returned to China. Likewise, the Japanese minister for foreign affairs claimed that Japan had never ever signed any agreement in terms of the return of Jiaozhou Bay, and the Japanese declaration in the ultimatum to Germany could not be regarded as a promise in any way.

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Disregarding basic diplomatic norms and morality, Japan insisted on occupying Jiaozhou Bay. Japan’s unabashed behavior and her atrocities in other parts of China caused public outrage in China. Liang Qichao, reformer and the leader of the Progressive Party, proposed an urgent motion in the Council of State (canzhengyuan 參政院) to question Japan’s disregard for China’s neutrality, and during the discussion, the counsellors asserted that if the Chinese government still kept silent on Japan’s moves in Shandong, then China would completely lose the province, just as she had lost Manchuria to Russia and Japan. Unanimously, the Council of State passed the petition, which was presented to Yuan Shikai. Under such great pressure, Yuan declared to Japan and Britain on January 7, 1915 that China would cancel the combat zone. Ironically, Japan censured China for being unilateral and arbitrary and proclaimed that she would not be bound.38 Knowing that the European powers were entangled in the war and having her owned armed forces stationed in Shandong, Japan proposed the Twenty-One Demands on January 18, 1915, which severely threatened China’s sovereign rights. These demands were divided into five groups: 1. Group I consisted of four articles covering issues related to Shandong, demanding China to give her full assent to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions that Germany possessed in Shandong to Japan; not to cede or lease any territory within Shandong to any powers thereafter; to permit Japan to finance the railway connecting Longkou or Chefoo (now Yantai) with the Qingdao–Jinan Railway; and to open important cities and towns in Shandong for foreign trade and residence. 2. Group II concerned the Northeast. The seven articles demanded China’s agreement to extend the terms of lease of Port Arthur and Dalian, as well as the terms of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung–Mukden Railway for a further period of 99 years; to hand over the control and management of the Kirin–Chungchun Railway to Japan for a term of 99 years from the signing of the treaty; and to grant Japanese nationals the liberty to enter, reside, travel, and lease and own land in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. 3. Group III was made up of two articles with regard to the Hanyehping Company, which Japan demanded to be jointly operated by China and Japan. The proposed terms prohibited China from disposing of any interest or property of the company or allowing anyone outside the company to work its mines without Japan’s consent. 4. The single article of Group IV demanded that no Chinese coastal harbors, bays, or islands be ceded or leased to any other powers.

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5. Group V were overarching terms: the Chinese central government should agree to engage influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers; grant Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools within the territory of China the right to own land; put the police of certain places under the joint administration of China and Japan, or employ Japanese police officers; and acquire from Japan at least half of China’s arms or establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese and Chinese management.39 Even Yuan Shikai could not accept such harsh conditions. He disclosed Japan’s scheme to the public to seek foreign sympathy, hoping foreign interference would make Japan concede. Being at war, however, the Western powers were unwilling and unable to stop Japan. What was worse, to win Japanese cooperation against Germany so as to relieve their pressure in Europe, France and Britain secretly reached agreements with Japan on her takeover of German interests in China. Yuan never received the support that he expected. Threatened by Japan, Yuan could not display resolute defiance, although he tried to play delaying tactics. At first, the Chinese negotiators only assented to the first two groups of treaties; however, under the pressure of Japan, they successively agreed to discuss the third and fourth groups as well as the most significant term of Group V, which was related to Fujian. During the discussion of specific terms, the Chinese delegation also made numerous concessions. On May 7, 1915, Japan delivered an ultimatum that proclaimed the deletion of the Group V demands, and mobilized its ground and naval forces. On May 9, the Beiyang government conceded to Japan’s ultimatum. On May 25, China and Japan signed the Treaty Respecting the Province of Shangdong and the Treaty Respecting Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and also the Exchange of Notes Respecting the Matter of Hanyehping, the Exchange of Notes Respecting the Restoration of the Leased Territory of Jiaozhou Bay, and the Exchange of Notes Respecting the Fujian Question. These treaties and notes are commonly known to the Chinese as the “Treaties of the Fourth Year of the Republic” (minsi tiaoyue 民四 條約). Through these treaties, Japan not only “inherited” the German interests in Shandong, but also obtained some exclusive rights such as the promise that no land in Shandong would be leased or ceded to other powers and the permission to build railways and open treaty ports in Shandong, paving the way to turn Shandong into the next South Manchuria. Meanwhile, South Manchuria was increasingly colonized, as Japan secured the extension of the terms of lease of her concessions and the terms of the railways, the right to own and use land, the right to conduct agricultural, industrial, and commercial activities, mining rights in 10 mining

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areas, the privileges to get involved in China’s police employment and benefit from China’s taxation, and consular jurisdiction. In Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan obtained a series of rights including consular jurisdiction as well as the privileges to open treaty ports, trade, collect taxes, and benefit from China’s loans with other foreign powers. Also, the terms regarding the Hanyehping Company gave Japan the total control of the company. In addition to all these, Fujian became Japan’s sphere of influence because of China’s consent that whenever foreign capital was needed in connection with the railways, mines, and harbor works (including dockyards) in Fujian, Japan would be consulted first. Threatened by Japan and afraid of provoking conflicts, the Beiyang government had no choice but to sign the Twenty-One Demands. However, according to international law, any treaties signed under military threat would be illegitimate. After the conclusion of the treaties, V. K. Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun), the counsellor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, drafted a declaration describing the negotiations and China’s struggles in the process. The declaration was an explanation of the Beiyang government to the Chinese people, and it also paved the way for the Chinese protests at the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Naval Conference in the time to come.

The First Breakthrough in Abrogating Unequal Treaties The First World War provided an opportunity for Japan to extend her influence in the Far East as well as for China to achieve diplomatic success. The conflict among the foreign powers made possible China’s desire to get rid of the elaborate edifice of unequal treaties. Originally, the war between the Allies and the Central Powers that happened in Europe did not concern the Chinese. However, some voices in China begin to hold that China should side with the Allies and declare war on the Central Powers as they saw the increasing victorious momentum of the Allies and the opportunity of enhancing China’s international status by entering the war. However, it took a long time for China to deliberate on whether to severe diplomatic links with the Central Powers and enter the war or to continue staying neutral because of disagreements in China’s political circle and the opposition of some foreign powers. In early March of 1917, a French boat carrying 500 Chinese workers was bombarded by a German submarine and sank. On March 3, the Beiyang government summoned a cabinet meeting in which it decided to break off diplomatic relations with Germany and drafted a document stating China’s conditions for participating in the war on the side of the Allies. These conditions were:

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Diplomatic Predicaments in the Early Years of the Republic of China

1. The German and Austrian shares of the Boxer Indemnity would be cancelled, while payments to the Allied countries would be suspended for 10 years, and after 10 years, China would pay the original sum year by year without any added interest. 2. China’s import tariff would be increased by half with immediate effect, such that it would be revised to 7.5% ad valorem, and after the cancellation of likin, the import tariff rate would be increased to 12.5%. Moreover, the transit tax would no longer apply to local Chinese goods. 3. The terms jeopardizing China’s defense against Germany in the Boxer Protocol and its related treaties — for example, that no Chinese army could be garrisoned within 10,000 meters of Tianjin as well as other terms relating to Chinese garrisons around embassies and along railways — would be cancelled.40 Afterwards, the document was sent to the ministers of the Allied countries in China. Then, on March 10 and 11, the Legislation Court (canyiyuan 參議院) and the House of Representatives (zhongyiyuan 眾議院) of the Beiyang government successively passed the motion to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. On March 14, President Li Yuanhong made the corresponding public announcement and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent notes to the German minister as well as other foreign ministers in China about the decision. Later, the Beiyang government announced the nullification of some of Germany’s privileges in China such as its garrison right, concessions, and indemnities. To terminate Germany’s garrison right in China, the Beiyang government ordered the Chinese army all over the country to disarm, detain, or expel the German garrisons. All German properties that has military utility, whether public or personal, were closed off or forfeited. The government authorized provincial officers to search all Germans and their residences, and it ordered the police to enter the German concessions in Tianjin and Hankou to resume Chinese sovereignty, changing these concessions into “special areas.” On March 15, Huang Rongliang, the commissioner to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tianjin, along with Tianjin’s Police Chief Yang Yide, entered Germany’s Tianjian concession with 300 policemen to negotiate a takeover; soon, China’s national flag was raised in the concession.41 On the same day, Commissioner to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hubei Wu Zhongxian and the military governor of Hankou entered the Hankou concession with Chinese policemen to declare that China would resume her sovereignty over the concession and the staff of the German consulate should leave Hankou in 48 hours.42 On March 28, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Beiyang government published the Rules of Procedure Governing the Assumption of Control of German

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Concessions, which stipulated that Hankou and Tianjin would be governed as Special Areas and there would be provisional administrative bureaus handling police and administrative affairs. The ministry also appointed Tianjin’s and Hankou’s chiefs of police as chiefs of the bureaus. The Customs and the Salt Administration Department were ordered to stop paying the principal and interest of the debts and indemnities that China owed to Germany. On March 18, the Ministry of Finance announced that according to international practices, the relationship between China and Germany as debtor and creditor no longer existed. In addition, the Beiyang government commanded the confiscation of German ships moored in Shanghai, Xiamen, and Guangzhou ports, and announced in April that no German ships were allowed to travel in China’s inland waterways. However, the consular jurisdiction enjoyed by Germans in China was not relinquished. China was afraid that the cancellation of Germany’s consular jurisdiction would provoke strong reaction from other countries. Therefore, China agreed that the Dutch minister in China would be responsible for hearing cases involving Germans and defending the benefits of Germans in China. The diplomatic ministers of the Allies in China tried hard to persuade China to declare war on Germany. They promised that as long as China agreed to participate in the war, they would guarantee its status as a major country after the war. However, the Japanese minister strongly opposed China’s participation in the war, and to win Japan’s support, Britain and France promised Japan that they would acknowledge the legitimacy of Japan’s rights and privileges in China. On the side of the domestic political circle, internal power struggles finally ended in the victory of the pro-war Duan Qirui faction, and Li Yuanhong stepped down from his presidency, to be succeeded by Feng Guozhang. On August 2, the government decided to declare war on Germany and Austria-Hungary. On August 14, the Beiyang government published a “Presidential Proclamation,” declaring from 10 a.m. of August 14, 1917 “a state of war … between China on the one hand and Germany and AustriaHungary on the other,” and that according to the laws of nations and international practice, all previous treaties, agreements, and conventions signed between China and Germany, and between China and Austria-Hungary, and the parts of all other international protocols and agreements involving China and Germany or AustriaHungary would be abrogated.43 Treaties and terms announced to be abrogated included the Sino-Prussian Treaty of 1861, the treaty revision between China and Germany in 1880, the Sino-Austrian Treaty of 1869, and the terms involving these three parties in the Boxer Protocol and other multilateral treaties. To deal with the administrative problems arising from the abrogation of the treaties, the Beiyang government introduced some policies, among which were

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the Provisional Regulations Governing the Trial of Enemy Subjects in Civil and Criminal Cases, where the main clause read: “For the duration of the War all civil and criminal cases in which enemy subjects are concerned shall be tried by the Chinese Courts of Justice.”44 The government also informed the Dutch minister that the Chinese courts would exercise full rights over cases involving Germans. This marked the complete cancellation of Germany’s consular jurisdiction in China. On the same day, China also detained the Austro-Hungarian soldiers garrisoned at Austria’s consulate in Beijing, took over Austria’s concession in Tianjin to be administered as a special area, detained all Austro-Hungarian ships moored in China’s ports, and confiscated Austria’s barracks in Dagukou. Germany’s barracks at Beidaihe were likewise seized. In addition, with the Regulations Governing the Bureaus for the Municipal Administration of the Special Areas, the government put the Special Areas in Hankou and Tianjin, which were originally governed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly, under the local administrative system. Meanwhile, the government and the Chinese Army successively published several regulations in terms of the treatment of Germans and Austro-Hungarians as well as their weapons and captives. As the Dutch consulate was responsible for the custody of the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary in China, the cancellation of their rights in China received strong opposition from the Dutch minister. He expressed his dissatisfaction in two notes to China on August 18 and September 5 in terms of the Provisional Regulations Governing the Trial of Enemy Subjects in Civil and Criminal Cases. And China replied: The reason the Chinese Government enacted the said Regulations was that the treaty of 1861 between China and Germany and the treaty of 1869 between China and Austria-Hungary have both been abrogated by the declaration of war. Consequently, it is a matter of course that the legal status of the German and Austrian residents in China who have heretofore enjoyed extraterritoriality administered by their respective consuls in accordance with the said treaties should be clearly regulated. For this reason, the said Regulations were made by which all civil and criminal cases affecting enemy subjects, are to be tried by the Chinese Law Courts.45 In addition to this, the Dutch minister also sent protesting notes to China regarding her takeover of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and cessation of loan repayment to Germany. The Dutch minister stated that the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank was a private bank and it had no financial relationship with the German government, so China should stop the “illegal” takeover. The minister also blamed

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China for “nonperformance of her financial obligation, which she would “not be able to disclaim.”46 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, China and Germany were at war, and therefore it was justifiable, whether according to the Hague Conventions or the “precedent set by other countries,” that all German banks in China, no matter private or governmental, should be confiscated or sequestered. It also maintained that all previous treaties entered into by China and Germany should be considered as invalid because of the declaration of war, and that according to this, China had every right to stop paying back the interest of loans issued by Germany.47 While it might seem puzzling that the Netherlands would stand up for Germany, this was a reflection of how the foreign powers’ interests in China were intertwined: they shared the same vested interests in China even though they had conflicts of interest in other regions of the world or in other issues. The foreign powers maintained the sanctity of treaties as a basis of their privileges; therefore, China’s abrogation of previous treaties with Germany was the last thing they wanted to see, even during this unusual period. Of course, the Allies would not totally agree with the conditions China proposed, although they successively assured China of the status and privileges of a major country in the international community after the war.48 In terms of the conditions, the Allies made the following concessions based on China’s proposal on September 7: 1. China could postpone the payment of the Boxer indemnities to the Allies without any added interest except for Russia, who only agreed to postpone some of the indemnities. The indemnities to Germany and Austria-Hungary would be revoked hereafter. 2. China’s tariff would be increased to 5% ad valorem. A special committee would be established to discuss detailed adjustment method. 3. Chinese armies would be allowed to be garrisoned within 10,000 meters of Tianjin for the surveillance of Germans and Austro-Hungarians residing in China. In addition, the Allies also made some extra demands. For example, they forbade China to have commercial relationships with the enemies, and demanded she detain specific enemies according to the orders of the Allies and confiscate the shops of the enemies. More importantly, they requested China to issue a general tariff rate for nontreaty countries and change the German and Austrian concessions into international settlements. China agreed to cooperate with the Allies in the war and to issue the general tariff rate for nontreaty countries, but rejected the

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term on international settlements, only assenting to changing the German and Austrian concessions into self-developed commercial zones governed by a special administrative system which allowed foreign nationals to enjoy generous commercial interests. It has to be pointed out that while the Beiyang government tried hard to get rid of the unequal treaties, it allowed Zhang Zongxiang, the Chinese minister in Tokyo, to conclude two treaties that totally went against such efforts. On June 13, 1918, Zhang signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Swiss minister in Tokyo, which gave Switzerland equal consular jurisdiction with the ministers of the most favored nations until China’s completion of her judicial reform.49 This was the first treaty that accorded consular jurisdiction to a foreign country after the establishment of the Republic of China, which was not seen in the 1915 treaty with Chile. It was both baffling and frustrating that China would sign a new unequal treaty with a small European country under no concrete threats or restraints. Zhang was strongly criticized by the Chinese people. Fortunately, this turned out to be the last ever treaty that accorded consular jurisdiction to foreign countries. In addition to this, Zhang also exchanged confidential notes with Goto Shimpei, the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, in September 1918, on the question of Shandong. Japan had been coveting the right to finance the construction of the Jinan–Shunde and Gaomi–Xuzhou railways in Shandong. Desperate for loans, the Chinese government yielded on the condition that Japanese forces retreat from along the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway to Qingdao. According to Goto’s secret proposal on September 24, all Japanese troops stationed along the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway would be moved to Qingdao, except for those stationed in Jinan. The responsibility of guarding the railway would be shouldered by the Chinese patrol team; however, there must be Japanese in these teams. Upon deciding the ownership of the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway, it would be under Sino-Japanese joint operations. Zhang replied that the Chinese government was “pleased to agree” to all these conditions.50 The confidential exchanges happened in the second half of 1918, when the war was about to end. As a part of the victorious Allies, China would have been able to directly take back Shandong from Germany. However, at this critical time point, China submissively acknowledged Japan’s privileges in Shandong and along the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway, which placed multiple obstacles to China’s resumption of sovereignty over Shandong in the near future.

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2

Chapter

The Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Naval Conference

The Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Naval Conference

After 80 years of humiliation and subjugation, at the end of the First World War, China’s diplomacy began to take an upward turn. Internationally, the First World War totally changed the scene of international relations. Before the war, the foremost

principle in the international arena was the survival of the fittest: to invade the weak and expand territories. Under this principle, the powerful became more

powerful by annexing the weak, and power politics became a universal political belief. However, after the war, international society came to value the stability of

the world order. Thanks to this trend, concerted diplomacy rose to the mainstream, and although power politics still bore its influence, aggressive schemes had to be

hid beneath legal and legitimate veils. International law and agreements played an indispensable role in terms of maintaining international relations. This easing

of the external environment provided more opportunities for colonialized and semicolonialized countries to regain sovereign diplomacy.

Domestically, after the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty and the establishment

of the Republic, public opinion could be heard through multiple channels,

and political pluralism gained ground, allowing the growth of an intellectual enlightenment movement, which profoundly influenced China’s way of handling domestic and foreign affairs. Nationalism developed in all classes of Chinese society, as for the first time, China’s general public could have their voices heard

and even influence the decision-making process of national strategies, breaking into the previously mysterious field of diplomacy, forming an unprecedented

“people’s diplomacy.” A new generation of Western-educated diplomats appeared.

Compared with the diplomats of the Manchu court, they were not yielding or submissive, and were more daring and capable in negotiating with the Western

powers. With their knowledge of universally recognized international law, they fought for the restoration of Chinese sovereign rights, and the Paris Peace

Conference became the stage on which their first spark of light shone through the world.

The Paris Peace Conference and the Awakening of China Wilson’s Fourteen Points On January 8, 1918, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson proposed his famous Fourteen

Points, which were to become the basis of postwar international relations, in his

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speech to Congress. Wilson’s program covered open and frank diplomacy, free navigation of the high seas, removal of economic barriers, arms reduction, selfdetermination, political and territorial independence, and equal rights for all nations. For the maintenance of lasting peace after the war, Wilson elaborated: “It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.”1 Wilson’s unprecedented speech rejuvenated the oppressed Chinese with a glimpse of new hope. Circulated in print, the speech became immensely popular in China overnight. The Chinese intellectuals felt particularly inspired. Echoing Wilson’s plan, one of the most influential scholars in the New Culture Movement, Chen Duxiu, pointed out that Germany infringed freedom and equality of other countries with her advanced technology and powerful weapons, and the defeat of such a country and the victory of the Allies demonstrated that universal truth would finally triumph over might. Chen went as far as to praise the speeches of Wilson as generally “frank and reasonable” and the man “the first kind man in the world.” According to him, Wilson’s program could be summarized into two points: that no country could infringe international equality and freedom by might, and that no government could infringe its people’s freedom and equality by might, which together illustrated how “justice would triumph over might.”2 The First World War concluded with the victory of the Allies, and for some time, the Chinese people basked in the optimism that “justice would triumph over might”. The Chinese saw Wilson as the incarnation of justice, and some students in Beijing even took to the streets with lanterns, chanting “Long live President Wilson” in front of the U.S. embassy. Leading academic Cai Yuanpei thought the influence of the First World War was on par with that of the French Revolution. Addressing the victory celebration at Tiananmen Square, he remarked: “About 130 year ago, the French Revolution swept away all darkness of political inequalities; now as the World War has concluded with the victory of the Allied Powers, it will undoubtedly eliminate the darkness of all international inequalities and replace it with light.” Cai believed that Wilson’s proposal of arms reduction and frank diplomacy was to put an end to German-type aggressive external policies. In the concluding remarks, he pronounced emotionally: “This is the end of militarism and the new millennium of populism …. Isn’t it an opportunity for the advancement of Great Unity?”3 The aim of the Paris Peace Conference held in January 1919 was to establish a new world order. As one of the Allies and Associated Powers, China held high hopes of resuming some of its sovereign rights through the negotiations during the conference. The Ministry of Justice sent emergency telegrams to the provinces to

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collect advice for the abrogation of consular jurisdiction, and experts from multiple sectors actively provided suggestions. Even Kang Youwei, the fallen political icon who had been involved in the Manchu Restoration of July 1917, was excited by the conference, and he suggested that China should try to resume her sovereignty over the concessions and leased territories, abrogate extraterritorial rights, cancel the Boxer Indemnity and the Twenty-One Demands, and revise the terms in relation to the import tariff. The Chinese diplomats also made ardent preparations for the conference. Wellington Koo, the Chinese minister to the United States, organized a research committee before the end of the war to collect materials with the aim of defending China’s post-war legal interests. According to Koo, China had been under the bonds of unequal treaties, and the upcoming conference would be an extraordinary opportunity for China to air her grievances and resume some lost sovereign rights. Koo also thought that China should seek equal treatment with other countries in the world to right the wrongs that had lasted for a half century, and that China should raise the abrogation of unequal treaties, including the prewar ones signed with European countries as well as those signed with Japan under threats during the war.4 He sent the reports of the research team back to China and suggested the government to consider these questions as early as possible. In December 1918, Xu Shichang, the president of the republic, organized a Committee of Foreign Affairs in his own residence to collect suggestions in terms of the principles and measures for attending the Paris Peace Conference. In the speech he delivered in the inaugural meeting, Xu said that the Paris Peace Conference would “determine the future international order, resolve the major dangerous international issues, and open a new era for the international world.” He added, “our country is honored to have been able to participate in the war, and we can hardly refrain from placing hopes in the peace talks.”5 Moreover, some nongovernmental organizations, such as the Society for Supporting the League of Nations (guoji lianmeng tongzhi hui 國際聯盟同志會) and the People’s Diplomacy Association (guomin waijiao xiehui 國民外交協會), were established during this period and actively organized activities. The Chinese delegation for the conference consisted of more than 50 people, among whom Minister of Foreign Affairs Lou Tseng-Tsiang (Lu Zhengxiang) was the chief plenipotentiary, while the other plenipotentiaries included Minister to the United States Wellington Koo, Minister to Britain Alfred Sao-ke Sze (Shi Zhaoji), C. T. Wang (Wang Zhengting) from Sun Yat-sen’s opposition government in Guangzhou, and Minister to Belgium Wei Chenzu.6 In addition, the Beiyang government also hired five foreign advisors to sit on the delegation. Domestic political icons gathered at Paris to show their support, among which were Wang

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Jingwei, Zhang Jingjiang, and C. C. Wu (Wu Chaoshu) from the Kuomintang (KMT), Liang Qichao, Jiang Fangzhen, and Zhang Junmai from the Research Clique, and Ye Gongchuo from the Communications Clique. The missions of the delegation were: (1) to abrogate all German privileges and rights in Shangdong and prohibit Japan from inheriting them; (2) to cancel all or part of the terms of the 1915 treaties relating to the Twenty-One Demands; (3) to abolish all foreign privileges in China such as consular jurisdiction and tariff control; (4) to abolish the political and economic rights of Germany and Austria in China. Before Koo’s departure from Washington for Paris, he met with President Wilson and presented him a memorandum outlining China’s goals for the conference, which included: (1) The relations between China and other countries should be based on the principle of equality thereafter. (2) China’s sovereignty and independence should be respected by all signatories of the peace agreement. (3) Even if the Boxer Protocol could not be totally cancelled, it should be revised. (4) All foreign garrisons stationed around the embassies and along the Shanhaiguan Railway should be removed. (5) In exchange for China’s cancellation of likin, China’s tariff rate should be increased to 12.5%, and before the agreement over this was reached, a 5% tax rate should apply to all foreign goods. During their discussion, Wilson expressed his sympathy for China and reiterated the principles from his Fourteen Points speech, adding that he was planning to establish an organization — the League of Nations — to defend world peace, and he hoped China could support this cause at the conference.7 After arriving at Paris, Koo immediately met with Sze to discuss the strategies of the Chinese delegation and draft a list of issues to be proposed to the conference. These included: (1) The Twenty-One Demands and the Shandong question; (2) the restoration of leased territories; (3) the abolition of consular jurisdiction; (4) the restoration of foreign concessions; (5) the removal of foreign garrisons; (6) the abolition of foreign postal agencies; (7) the abolition of tariff control.8 However, from the very beginning, there were signs that the Chinese delegation would face countless obstacles. The first blow came from unequal representation in terms of the number of plenipotentiaries. According to the provisions of the conference, as principle Allies, Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan could each send five plenipotentiaries; countries that had provided effective assistance to the Allies, such as Brazil, were entitled to send three plenipotentiaries; the rest could only be represented by two such delegates. China was among the third category. Obviously, this arrangement would impair China’s status at the conference. As mentioned, the Chinese government had designated five plenipotentiaries, who, faced with such arrangements, had to attend the meetings in rotation.

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On January 18, 1919, the opening session of the Paris Peace Conference was officially convened at the Palace of Versailles. The conference involved 27 countries. On top of the plenary session, the “Big Five,” namely, Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan formed the Supreme Council, also known as the Council of Ten, that comprised their heads of state (or his representative) and foreign ministers. Later, as Japan dropped out, the meetings were dominated by the heads of Britain, the United States, France, and Italy, namely the “Council of Four.” In fact, every important decision of the conference was made by the Council of Ten or Council of Four. The governing and executive bodies of the conference were also controlled by the Big Five. French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau was appointed the chairman; and U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, and Japanese plenipotentiary Saionji Kinmochi were appointed vice-chairmen. A French delegate held the post of secretary general, and the posts of secretaries as well as members of the Credentials Committee and Drafting Committee were also held by Big Five delegates.

Japan’s inheritance of German rights in Shandong In the First World War, China was a victorious nation and Germany a defeated one. Whether by common sense or legal principles, Germany should have relinquished her rights and privileges in China. However, as Japan had taken over the German rights in Shandong by forcing the Beiyang government to sign treaties, it was Japan — which sat among the Big Five — but not Germany — a fallen power — that China had to negotiate with. This was almost a mission impossible because Japan’s primary aim at the conference was to seize control of Shandong. On January 27, 1919, Japanese plenipotentiary Makino Nobuaki proposed at the conference that Japan should unconditionally inherit the German rights in Shandong because it was the Japanese army that destroyed and occupied the German military base in Shandong, which was a great contribution to the victory of the Allies. In addition, China had granted Japan permission to negotiate with Germany regarding the German rights in Shandong in the 1915 Treaty Respecting the Province of Shandong, and further confirmed Japan’s rights in Shandong in the 1918 exchanges of notes. Makino also revealed the secret agreements that Japan had made with Britain, France, Russia, and Italy about their sanction of the transfer of the German rights in Shandong to Japan. Koo immediately responded that since the Shandong question was of vital importance to China, foreign powers should hold back their decision until the

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Chinese view had been heard. On the following day, Koo began his contention by stating the following arguments: 1. Shandong was considered “a Holy Land for the Chinese,” with 36 million people who were “of Chinese in race, language and religion.” It was the birthplace of the Chinese philosophers Confucius and Mencius, and the Chinese people saw it as the cradle of Chinese civilization. If the foreign powers transferred China’s territories to other countries, then they would be “sowing the seed of discord for the future.” 2. The 1915 treaty that Makino referred to was forced upon China by an ultimatum, which meant that it was signed under illegal threats. Moreover, the treaty was induced by war. Therefore, the Chinese government just saw it as “provisional and subject to revision by the peace conference.” 3. All leases and rights obtained by Germany from China had become invalid because of China’s declaration of war on Germany. Moreover, the lease on Jiaozhou Bay had clearly stipulated that Germany’s rights could not be transferred to other countries; therefore, even if the lease treaty was not invalidated, China should have the right to the restoration of Shandong.9 In the meeting, Makino did agree to return Shandong to China on the condition that a transfer was made first from Germany to Japan. However, Koo replied that while he was pleased with Japan’s agreement, “there was a choice between direct and indirect restitution,” and “of the two China would prefer the first” because “it was always easier to take one step than two if it led to the same place.”10 Koo’s impassioned speech won many countries’ sympathy. Wilson and Lloyd George commented that Koo’s statement was an excellent outline of China’s proposals. Local papers of Paris reported that the Chinese statement received unanimous appreciation of all delegations except that of Japan. In China, the president, prime minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provincial governments, and other government leaders also sent congratulatory telegrams to the Chinese delegation. The Chinese people were highly expectant of the return of Shandong. However, the Chinese were overoptimistic. The fact remained that international disputes are not settled by justice and reason, but by the match up of power between the disputants, and the interwoven interests of associated countries. Because of the strong opposition between China and Japan, the discussion on the Shandong question soon reached an impasse. In the meetings between February and April, the Japanese and Chinese delegations both tried their best to win the support of the majority. At first, wanting to limit Japan’s influence in China, Western powers such as the United States and Britain did not intend to approve Japan’s requests; however, they

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became increasingly alarmed as the tide of proletarian revolution and riots in the aftermath of the 1917 Russian October Revolution began to spread to Europe. In addition, a purpose of the Wilsonian proposal of the League of Nations was, apart from building a new world order, to contain the impact of the 1917 Revolution. And as a powerful country in the Far East, Japan would be an indispensable pillar of the League. Therefore, to win Japan’s support for the organization, Britain and the United States became more and more inclined towards endorsing Japan’s rights in Shandong. With full knowledge of the international situation, Japan decided to take an uncompromising stance. On April 16, 1919, U.S. delegate Lansing proposed at the meeting of the Council of Ten that Germany’s rights to build railways and exploit mines and other privileges she enjoyed in Shandong be returned to China, along with her leased territory in Shandong; and, in terms of the procedures of restitution, the conference could provisionally take over these rights and territory, to be returned to China after she opened Qingdao and other important cities of Shandong as commercial ports. This proposal was strongly opposed by Makino, who insisted that even if the rights and territory should be restituted to China, they should be restituted by Japan other than the conference. Lansing responded that the question should be resolved through the peace treaty with Germany, so if Japan thought that the rights and leased territory should be immediately restituted, this should be done via the conference, and if otherwise, they should be retained by the conference but not Japan alone. The British, French, and Italian delegates, however, remained silent, and again, the question was dropped.11 On the following day, the U. S. delegates proposed at the Drafting Committee that Germany’s rights in Shandong be placed under the joint custody of Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. Again, the Japanese delegates said no to this proposal, holding that Japan had “special interests” in China and these interests should not be shared by other countries.12 On April 21, the Japanese minister of foreign affairs wired his delegation, notifying it to hold back from signing the Covenant of the League of Nations if Japan’s claims on Shandong were not approved. Unable to persuade Japan to make concessions, the Western powers turned to make China compromise. On April 22, the heads of Britain, the United States, and France met with the Chinese delegation and asked China to make concessions on the ground of respect for the agreements she signed with Japan previously. Wilson communicated that Japan was rather persistent in the Jiaozhou question, while China had indeed reached agreements with Japan in May 1915 and September 1918; further more, Britain and France had agreed to defend Japan’s inheritance of Germany’s rights in Shandong. Wilson then proposed that Japan first inherit

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Germany’s leased territory of Jiaozhou as well as other German rights, and then return the leased territory to China while keeping other economic rights, including those regarding the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway.13 The Chinese delegation expressed disappointment to the proposal and pointed out that the 1915 treaty was forced upon by Japan’s ultimatum, an unwillingly compromise in order not to break the peace of East Asia, while the 1918 confidential agreement was a derivative of the 1915 treaty. However, Lloyd George questioned China for signing such an agreement with Japan in September of 1918, when the victory of the Allies was a foregone conclusion. He then asked that China abide by either of two choices: to fulfill the agreements that China signed with Japan or to accept the new proposal of letting Japan inherit the German rights. Clemenceau expressed complete agreement with Lloyd George. The Chinese delegation protested that both choices were unfair for China and would impair world peace, arguing that Japan’s inheritance of the German rights in Shandong would only help her scheme of building an empire in the Far East which would make her capable of wrestling for interests with the Western powers. Wilson said that it was not that Britain and France did not want to help to maintain justice, but they were unfortunately restrained by previous agreements; fortunately, the upcoming establishment of the League of Nations would defend national independence and territory integrity, and China, as a member of the organization, would be eligible to seek help from fellow members if she were bullied or threatened in the future. Wilson’s statement was a hollow promise for China, and the Chinese delegates responded that preventive measures would be better than remedial ones, and although the League of Nations aimed high, China doubted whether it could change the proposals passed by the conference.14 Apparently, the secret exchanges of notes in September 1918 were to China’s disadvantage. As an unsigned telegram from a Chinese observer of the conference at Paris noted, when the confidential exchanges of notes were publicized, “foreign countries were taken aback, thinking the Chinese government voluntarily reassured Japan of the Twenty-One Demands, which gave Japan a perfect excuse.” The writer of the telegram continued to question the Chinese government: “Ever since Japan’s occupation of the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway, China has been adopting a principle of opposition, holding fast to giving no recognition to Japan’s inheritance of the German rights. Out of what intention then in last September, when Germany was on the verge of defeat, did the government sign such a treaty to bind itself?” To find a way out, he suggested: “The government can only have the one who signed the treaty bear the responsibility and make amends, hoping that the situation can be remedied and a new page can be turned. Otherwise, it would be a great pity that the golden opportunity shall be ruined by a person or two.”15

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The situation was so disadvantageous for China that she had to make concessions. On April 24, the Chinese delegation sent a petition to the heads of Britain, the United States, and France, proposing the following terms: (1) For the restoration of Jiaozhou, the territory to be temporarily kept by the Big Five. (2) Jiaozhou to be returned to China one year after the signing of the peace treaty. (3) China to pay part of the military costs that Japan spent on the takeover of Jiaozhou from Germany, and the amount would be decided by the Big Four (less Japan). (4) Jiaozhou Bay to be opened as a commercial port, and nationals of the treaty signatories could reside or do business in a specific area.16 For China, the proposal was already a big compromise. However, the Japanese delegates were still dissatisfied and threatened to quit the conference. At that time, the Italian delegation had just quitted the conference because it did not acquire the interests it demanded. If Japan too quitted, then the chance of establishing the League of Nations would be dismal. Therefore, the Western powers refused to accept China’s proposal. On April 30, the Council of Three accepted Japan’s proposal, which stated: (1) Germany’s rights in Jiaozhou and the rest of Shandong would be transferred to Japan. (2) Japan would return the Shandong Peninsula, with its full sovereignty, to China, while keeping Germany’s economic rights in Shandong and the right to turn Qingdao into her special settlement. (3) Special police teams staffed by Chinese persons could be set up for the railways in Shandong, but they should be coached by Japanese appointed by the Chinese government. (4) The Japanese army would withdraw from Shandong as soon as possible.17 On May 1, the delegates of the Big Three informed China of the proposal. The Chinese delegation was rather upset and disappointed, but knowing that the situation was hard to change, the Chinese delegates could only strive to demand a definite pledge and a specific date of restitution from Japan and the Western powers. Initially, the United States was strongly supportive of China’s request and insisted that Japan set an exact date for the restitution of Shandong. However, Makino held that the request was made with the presumption of Japan’s bad credibility and rejected it out of national dignity, agreeing only to give a verbal pledge to the Council of Three but not a written statement. For this, according to a Chinese observer at Paris, Lansing once “pressed Makino so hard that they almost broke off with each other.” However, on the other hand, rumors that Japan would refuse to join the League but rather form another organization with Germany and Russia were vexing Wilson, who compromised once more and approved Japan’s proposal without demanding an exact date.18 On May 3, the five Chinese plenipotentiaries telegraphed the Beiyang government requesting resignations. They remonstrated: “The Peace Conference still lets power rule. Justice yields before might. We have exhausted our strength

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and wits only to disappoint our nation and fall short of our mission.”19 The government replied that China’s failure could not be ascribed to the delegates and asked them to remain at their posts.

Proposals for the abolition of foreign privileges in China and the Twenty-One Demands Even before the opening of the conference, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had informed the U.S. embassy that China would submit a proposal in relation to the abolition of foreign privileges in China at the conference. During the conference, the Chinese delegation had in-depth discussions with the U.S. delegation about the issue, which covered consular jurisdiction, leased territories, spheres of influence, railway rights, and Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The U.S. delegation showed a supportive attitude. Interestingly, Japan also encouraged China in these respects. This was because they knew that China’s requests would not be granted; moreover, China’s discussion with the Western powers would divert the latter’s attention away from the Shandong question. In April, China submitted a memorandum to the peace conference to officially present China’s wish of abolishing the privileges enjoyed by foreigners in China. To prevent the proposal from being excluded from discussion with the excuse of irrelevancy to the theme of the conference, its opening statement emphasized that although such privileges were not derived from the war, a purpose of the conference was to establish a new world order based on justice, equality, and the respect for the integrity of sovereignty; and if the problem of foreign privileges in China could not be settled at the conference, the seed of disputes would be sown.20 In the statement, China outlined seven kinds of foreign privileges that she hoped to abolish, which covered: 1. Spheres of influence. China hoped that foreign nations would declare that they did not presently, or intend to, own any spheres of influence or interests in China, and for previous agreements, contracts, treaties, and exchanges of notes that granted territorial interests, priorities, and privileges to foreign countries that jeopardized China’s sovereignty, manifest willingness to discuss revisions with China. 2. Foreign troops and legation guards stationed in China. The conference to announce the abrogation of the seventh and ninth terms of the Boxer Protocol, and within one year after the announcement, all legation guards and foreign troops garrisoned in China to be withdrawn.

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3. Foreign post offices and telegram services. All foreign post offices to be withdrawn from January 1, 1919. After that, no foreign telegram service, wired or wireless, should be established without the permission of the government, and existing telegram services would be acquired by the Chinese government. 4. Consular jurisdiction. China promised to issue five law codes and establish judicial organs in every town by the end of 1924. In return, foreign countries to promise to abolish their consular jurisdiction as well as special courts in China. Before the cancellation of consular jurisdiction, foreign consuls and representatives should quit the trials of criminal and civil cases in which the defendants were Chinese, and the summons, arrest warrants, and other court orders issued by Chinese courts to be executed within foreign concessions or residences would not have to be examined and approved by foreign consuls any more. 5. Leased territories. After the return of the leased territories, China was to be responsible for the protection of the estate in and the administration of the territories. 6. Foreign concessions. Foreign countries to promise the restitution of their concessions to China by the end of 1924, after which the protection of the estate within the concessions would be taken over by China. Before the restoration, the regulations on the administration of the concessions should be revised. 7. Tariff control. Foreign countries and China to jointly set a deadline beyond which China could freely adjust her tariff rates, and before that, China should be allowed to freely exchange agreements with foreign countries that guaranteed import duties of no less than 12.5% for necessity merchandise. Before the conclusion of such new agreements, the current tariff rate should be abolished, and China would abolish likin as soon as new agreements were made.21 For the Western powers, the purpose of the conference was to solve problems in relation to the peace treaties with Germany and Austria, which did not cover China’s unequal treaties. Therefore, regarding China’s proposals, Wilson only expressed his moral support and responded that foreign countries should relinquish their privileges in China and treat China in a more equal way; however, China’s requests would not be considered until after the establishment of the League of Nations. He promised that once the organization was established, the United States would try her best to improve China’s international status, eliminate unequal treatment for China, and help China to be an independent country.22 France and Britain

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reacted negatively to China’s proposals, while Japan held that she was prepared to relinquish the privileges as soon as the other countries did so. Therefore, the Council of Four decided that China’s proposals would be discussed at a more appropriate time in the future. In addition to this, China also wanted to abrogate the 1915 treaties and notes with Japan, that is, the Twenty-One Demands. At the initial stage of the conference, the foreign powers put most of their energy in the drafting of the peace treaty with Germany, and so other than the Shandong question which involved the relinquishment of German rights in China, they could not be concerned with the Sino-Japanese treaties. Aware of this, the Chinese delegation did not propose the abrogation of the 1915 treaties until mid-April, when the drafting of the peace treaty with Germany was more or less completed. The justification raised in the statement of proposal had been put forward in the earlier discussions about the Shandong question, which was that China was forced to sign the treaties under Japan’s ultimatum, and given China’s position at that time, she had no freedom to negotiate or dispute with Japan for the terms drafted. Specifically, during the forced negotiations, Japan sent large troops to occupy South Manchuria and Shandong, threatening that these troops would not be withdrawn until a “satisfying” result was seen. Therefore China issued a declaration after signing the treaties in 1915, stating: “Although China has, under threats, unwillingly recognized the conditions laid down in the ultimatum, those which run counter to China’s independence, territorial integrity, and equal opportunities in commerce and industry as held by other nations shall not be recognized by any means.” Thus, the Chinese delegation pointed out that the signing of the treaties should not deprive China of her right to ask for revisions.23 The Chinese delegates also argued in terms of the relevance of the issue to the conference. They held that the principle of the conference was to settle disputes with justice and to decrease the possibility of war, while the Sino-Japanese treaties were against this principle. Attempting to appeal to Britain, France, and Italy, they contended that the powers should not be bound by their confidential agreements with Japan in terms of the transfer of Germany’s rights in Shandong in early 1917 because circumstances changed greatly in August, 1917, when China joined the Allies and the failure of Germany could be anticipated.24 The Japanese delegation, however, seized upon the phrase “pleased to agree” in the 1918 exchange of note, asserting that even if the 1915 treaties were invalidated by China’s declaration of war on Germany, the 1918 secret agreements made afterwards would still be effective. In addition, Japan held that clausula rebus sic stantibus should only be considered with “extreme prudence” because international

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relations changed constantly, and if every country could deny her previous treaties with this excuse, all international treaties would be rendered vein. This argument sounded persuasive to the Western powers, which were insistent about the sanctity of treaties.25 On May 14, Clemenceau, who chaired the conference, replied officially to China that the Supreme Council had received China’s proposals regarding the abrogation of foreign privileges and the 1915 Sino-Japanese treaties, and while it recognized the importance of the claims, it considered them beyond the scope of the peace conference.26 Thus, the proposals did not make their way to the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference, and China’s hopes were dashed by the indifferent rejection of the major powers.

China’s refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles On May 3, 1919, the Chinese delegation found out that Japan’s proposal was completely adopted for the clauses regarding the German rights in Shandong in the draft peace treaty, and that the draft treaty did not mention a word about the exact date of the restoration of Shandong. Infuriated, Lou Tseng-Tsiang expressed in a telegram to the Chinese government that “the conference was unprecedentedly authoritarian,” and the Chinese delegates “definitely [could] not sign” the peace treaty.27 On May 4, the Chinese delegation launched a formal protest to the Council of Three. The major arguments read: The declaration of war by China against Germany and Austria-Hungary on August 14, 1917, expressly abrogated all treaties, agreements and conventions between China and those Powers, a fact which was officially notified to, and taken cognizance of, by the Allied and Associated Powers. By this declaration, the rights and privileges formerly enjoyed in the Province of Shantung became null and void and China, as the sovereign power in that province, became automatically revested of them. It is difficult to see on what ground these rights can be taken from China and transferred to Japan. Japan has presumably based her claim on the agreements of 1915 and on the notes of 1918 with China. The 1915 agreements were however concluded by China under the coercion of a Japanese ultimatum threatening war. The Chinese Government was obliged to exchange the 1918 notes because the continued presence of the Japanese troops in the interior of Shantung and the unauthorized establishment of Japanese administrative bureaus which attempted to govern Shantung as Japanese territory, roused such popular

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indignation and opposition that no other course seemed open to the Chinese Government to rid the province of their presence. If the Shantung peninsula is to be restored in full sovereignty, according to the proposed settlement, to China, the reason does not appear clear why recourse should be had to two steps instead of one, why the initial transfer should be made to Japan and then leave it to her to “voluntarily engage” to restore it to China.28 On May 5, Lou went to Stéphen Pichon, the French minister of foreign affairs and asked for the minutes of the Council of Three regarding the Shandong question to be used as a guarantee of Japan’s return of Shandong. But Pichon responded that minutes had not been taken and now that Japan had made her verbal pledge, the governments of the Big Three would be able to guarantee it. Lou questioned if the minister’s assurance meant they would supervise Japan in fulfilling her promise, on which the minister denied and clarified that the Big Three would pay attention to the problem. The Chinese delegation was dissatisfied with the answer. Lou further requested a written promise to be at least included as a clause in the peace treaty to be a guarantee, in case Japan went back on her word. Pichon again rejected, explaining that the conference was facing many obstacles in reaching consensus, and the draft treaty had been endorsed by the Council of Three, so any revision of the treaty would need the joint approval of the three countries, which could hardly be achieved.29 On May 6, when the draft peace treaty was announced at the plenary session, Lou again protested: The Chinese Delegation is constrained to express the deep disappointment which it feels at the settlement proposed by the Council of Prime Ministers for the settlement of the questions of Kiao-chow and Shantung. For that settlement seems to have been taken as the sole basis for the clauses in the draft Treaty of Peace with Germany just read to us which are concerned with the disposal of German rights in that Chinese province. The Delegation is convinced that its disappointment will be felt just as keenly by the Chinese nation as a whole. The proposed settlement seems to have been adopted without sufficient account having been held of the considerations in regard to Right, Justice, and the national security of China…. In the event of such a revision not appearing possible, it regards it as its duty to make here and now reservations in regard to the above-mentioned clauses.30 Lou was right: the decision stirred a wave of protests in China. The Chinese people had great expectations for the conference, and when they heard the news,

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they were extremely furious and disappointed. On May 3, students of Peking University as well as other universities agreed to stage a demonstration on the next day. The People’s Diplomacy Association also decided to call a popular assembly on May 7, urging the government to take an intransigent stance and recall the delegates if their demands were unheeded. On May 4, over 3,000 students gathered at Tiananmen Square, chanting slogans such as “Return Shandong to us,” “Abrogate the Twenty-One Demands,” “Boycott the Treaty of Versailles,” and “Strive for national sovereignty, punish the traitors.” They also marched to the residence of Cao Rulin, the pro-Japan minister of communications who signed the Twenty-One Demands, beat up Zhang Zongxiang, the minister to Japan and Cao’s houseguest, and burned down the house. The Beiyang government suppressed the protest and arrested 30 students, only to fuel the public outrage. As a result, people from all walks of life, including merchants, shopkeepers, and industrial workers, responded to the protests of the Beijing students by a general strike in major cities all over the country. This was the famous May Fourth Movement, the watershed event in China’s national history. Under overwhelming pressure, the Beiyang government sent a telegram to the Chinese delegation in Paris on May 5, instructing it not to sign the peace treaty. However, the wording of the telegram was rather ambiguous and the delegation did not know whether to reject the whole treaty or just the terms regarding Shandong. On May 8 and 14, Lou cabled the Beiyang government twice and asked it to clarify what the delegation should do if China’s demand of a reservation on Shandong could not be met. Lou said in the telegram on May 14: I have already signed the 1915 treaties. Anyone with a heart and dignity would not resign himself to signing another insulting treaty. However, before being dismissed from the position of Delegate, I certainly shoulder responsibility in regard to the international situation. The current public denunciation is no doubt daunting, but even more so is the evaluation of posterity.31 The conflicting pressure from both domestic public opinion and international realities bore heavily on the diplomat. In fact, both the Beiyang government and the Chinese delegation in Paris suffered from a great dilemma. If they signed the treaty, then Japan’s illegal takeover of Shandong would be legitimized, but if they refused to sign, then China would be accused as uncooperative in the collective defense against Germany.32 The Western powers which China still had to look upon for support would feel offended and China’s future membership of the League of Nations would be endangered.

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Meanwhile, the National Assembly also strongly opposed the signing of the peace treaty. On May 12 and 13, the State Council launched two discussions at the National Assembly, and all members unanimously demanded rejecting the peace treaty. Later, the State Council sent confidential telegrams to the regional military leaders, and warlords of the Anhui and Zhili cliques alike replied in favor of a rejection. For example, Tian Zhongyu, the military governor of Chahar Province from the Anhui clique, stated in his telegram: The Qingdao question is so important that it concerns the life and death of the nation. Especially amidst this high tide of emotions in the public, if the Government signs the Treaty presently, there will be an upsurge of national outcry, and if this causes other disturbances, the situation will be even more knotty. Thus weighting the consequences, I opine that temporary refraining from signing and seeking subsequent remedial actions appear more appropriate.33 And Chen Guangyuan, the military governor of Jiangxi Province from the Zhili clique, expressed a similar opinion: Shandong is our territory and this matter concerns our national sovereignty. How can the Peace Conference possibly dispose of it freely without taking into account the opinion of our delegation? … Whether Shandong is restored has a direct bearing on our national survival. The Government must defend it to death and not take half a step back. If protests still did not work, then we could only resort to refusing to sign the treaty.34 Local organizations and parliaments also sent telegrams to the Beiyang government to petition for rejecting the peace treaty. The Hunan Parliament, along with the commercial, agricultural, and educational associations in the province demanded: “We were a member of the Allied Powers and Shandong should naturally be directly restituted to us from Germany. Japan is betraying the principle of peace and making up excuses to seize Shandong. The whole nation is incensed. We implore that Mr. Lou, Mr. Wang, and Mr. Koo firmly reject the Peace Treaty.” The telegram also denounced Cao Rulin, Zhang Zongxiang, and Lu Zongyu for “voluntarily selling off the nation” and asked the government to dismiss them immediately.35 Likewise, the Shandong Parliament and Shandong Chamber of Commerce stated: “On hearing the bad news, everyone was shocked and dismayed.… In regard of the remedial action, this must be tackled by making compensation and

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repudiating the treaties concerned. The Shandong people volunteer to raise funds for the compensation despite the consequence of bankruptcy.”36 However, public pressure was not enough to persuade the government to act resolutely. The decision makers of the government were actually disposed to sign the peace treaty but hesitated only because of the overwhelming national fury. As Chen Lu, the acting vice-minister of foreign affairs stated in his telegram to Lou: “The public anger is so overwhelming that if the Government instructs signing the Peace Treaty, there definitely will be an uproar. For the future of the nation, it is impossible to not sign the Treaty; however, for the stability of the nation in the meantime, it is absolutely impossible to sign the Treaty.”37 In the face of this dilemma, Lou suggested signing the treaty only with a reservation on Shandong accepted by the foreign powers. According to Lou, this could exempt China from acknowledging Japan’s illegal takeover while ensuring China’s membership of the League of Nations. In addition, Lou asked the government to dispatch another plenipotentiary to Paris to sign the treaty because he himself did not want to be the scapegoat again. And the Beiyang government took Lou’s advice. Therefore, the Chinese delegation started to campaign for a reservation on Shandong. The Chinese delegates expressed multiple times to the British, U.S., and French delegates the dire straits in which the Chinese government was caught due to public anger about the decision on Shandong. However, the delegates of the Big Three repeatedly rejected China’s request. According to them, the conference was not able to meet every country’s demands and China was not the only country that felt dissatisfied, and if the conference acceded to China’s request, then all displeased countries would follow China’s example, and in this way, the draft treaty would be ruined. Among the Big Three, only Lansing from the United States said that China could theoretically sign with reservations, but he also added that it would be President Wilson who had the final right to decide the U.S. stance. On May 27, Lou and Koo visited Wilson to put forward another appeal. Wilson expressed sympathy to China’s cause and stated that he had tried hard everything he could to help China, admitting that the result was far from his initial ideals. He explained that it was for assuring China of the final return of Shandong that he made Japan verbally promise to voluntarily return Shandong to China, which, while he understood China would not be satisfied with, should serve as a guarantee to be overseen by the to-be-established League of Nations. Wilson also told the Chinese delegates that in fact, the powers all had sympathy for China, and France and Britain would stand by China after the establishment of the League. Moreover, he advised that as Japan’s rights in China were also enjoyed by other nations, the League would do China the best service by assisting

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with the abolition of unequal privileges like foreign spheres of influence and consular jurisdiction in China.38 In terms of the reservation on Shandong, Wilson showed his disagreement. He insisted that China’s rejection of the peace treaty would not only undermine the collaborative efforts against Germany, but also the safety of China. If China did not endorse the Shandong clauses, then the League of Nations would not be able to supervise the execution of the terms regarding Shandong and Japan would be exempt from fulfilling her promise.39 On May 28, the Chinese delegation held an internal meeting regarding the signing of the treaty. Among the delegates, some, such as C. T. Wang, Wellington Koo, and Alfred Sze held that if the foreign powers did not allow China to make a reservation on Shandong, China should not sign the treaty. Their reasons were: (1) Germany was not to be feared as she had enough trouble herself; Britain, the United States, and France would not punish China for her refusal to sign the treaty; Japan would not be concerned whichever decision China made because this would not influence her ambition in China. (2) A rejection of the treaty would reunite the Chinese people against Japan, and China could appeal to the League of Nations in terms of the Shandong question in the future. However, Minister to Italy Wang Kouang Ky (Wang Guangqi), Minister to France Hu Weide, Minister to Spain Dai Chenlin, and Advisor of the State Council C. C. Wu insisted that China should sign the peace treaty with Germany because it, as well as that with Austria, acknowledged the restitution of certain rights lost to Germany and Austria such as spheres of influence, concessions, and leased territories, and if China did not sign the treaty, these rights would altogether be denied. They also doubted whether China would be invited to sign the treaty with Austria and whether she would lose the membership of the League of Nations. Moreover, Japan would not be swayed even if China did not sign the treaty, and if Japan was determined to threaten China by force in the future, China would need the support of the Big Three. While most of the members of the delegation advocated accepting the treaty, their influence was limited compared to C. T. Wang and Wellington Koo, who were opposed to signing the treaty. Although Lou Tseng-Tsiang was the chief plenipotentiary, he did not make known his position. Brought up under traditional Chinese education, Lou was relatively conservative by training and rather temperate in character. The eloquent Koo and audacious Wang, however, were educated overseas and more open minded. In addition, among the five plenipotentiaries alone, Wang, Koo, and Sze already constituted the majority. Moreover, Lou had always seen Wang as the second plenipotentiary after him; in fact, he valued Wang’s opinion as much as to have expressed to the government that if Wang did not agree to sign the treaty, he himself would not bear the responsibility alone.40

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Back in Beijing, the Beiyang government found a clearer stance in late May. On May 24, the State Council notified the provincial governments: “After much deliberation, the Government has decided that the first step to be taken is to campaign hard for a reservation in order to make allowance for the future. If this turns out to be unfeasible, the Chinese delegation shall submit to signing the Peace Treaty.”41 In early June, the Beiyang government wired the provincial governments again: “If the Government appeases public anger by rejecting the Treaty to show determination, harmful consequences will appear one after another … [and] it will be extremely difficult to remedy afterwards. In addition, after the signing, the Treaty will still have to be voted by the National Assembly and approved by the President, which will give us some wiggle room then.”42 At the same time, the Beiyang government started to suppress protests and shut down newspapers in order to remanipulate public opinion. Some local cliques that had opposed signing also changed their minds and advocated accepting the treaty. However, the government’s suppression provoked more protests, and the rage of the masses shocked the government. On June 10, the government had to dismiss Cao Rulin, Lu Zongyu, and Zhang Zongxiang to appease public anger. On June 13, Premier Qian Nengxun resigned. Xu Shichang, the president, also submitted his resignation but it was not accepted by the National Assembly. Wu Peifu, a powerful general from the Zhili clique, issued a circular telegram jointly signed by 61 high-ranking generals, stating that China must reject the peace treaty even at the risk of a war with Japan, for which they would not hesitate to command their troops in support. The telegram was rather influential and aroused patriotism among the Chinese people. Faced with such a situation, the Beiyang government did not dare to insist on accepting the treaty any more, and it started to shirk its responsibility of making the final decision. On June 20, President Xu went so far as to say to a group of protesters from Shandong who petitioned outside his residence through his secretary: “We have now adopted the cabinet system; therefore, such important decisions are all made by the cabinet. I truly have no opinion.”43 Similarly, Acting Premier Gong Xinzhan answered the same group that he did not know whether the Chinese delegates had signed the treaty, because as he informed the press earlier, the Chinese delegates “shall deliberate on the situation and make the final decision on their own.”44 It was unheard of for a government to act so irresponsibly in such decisive matters. On June 24, Koo visited the secretary general of the conference, Paul Dutasta, and expressed China’s hope of signing the treaty with a reservation on Shandong. However, Koo was replied that according to international practice, a country could either accept or reject a treaty, and there was not a third choice. Koo responded

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that the Swedish delegation had successfully persuaded the Congress of Vienna to pass its reservation in the 1815 Treaty of Paris, which was an antecedent. Koo later proposed the compromise of making a reservation in a letter to the president and fellow participants, but whatever Koo proposed, the conference always insisted that China had only two choices and there was no possibility for the conference to accept her reservation.45 Having no alternative choice, Koo rested his last hope in the United States. In the meeting on the evening of the same day, President Wilson said he himself did not advocate attaching a reservation on Shandong to the treaty; however, China could prepare a separate declaration stating that she reserved the right to initiate continuing discussions regarding the Shandong question in a more appropriate occasion in the future. Wilson said he was not an expert in international law, but China could discuss the details of the announcement with Lansing and the French minister of foreign affairs.46 On June 26, the French minister of foreign affairs, Pichon, invited Koo to discuss the details of the reservation as commissioned by the Supreme Council of the conference. Koo mentioned the dilemma of the Chinese government under domestic pressure and expressed his sincere request that the reservation be placed at the end of the peace treaty, if it was not possible to include it in the treaty. However, Pichon thought that placing such a declaration at the end of the treaty would still render it part of the treaty, which the conference could not accede to. Therefore, he replied Koo that he had to discuss China’s request with the delegates of the Big Four.47 On June 27, Pichon informed Koo that China was allowed to issue a declaration after her signing, but before China signed the treaty, the conference would not give consent to any form of reservation. In despair, Koo stated that China had already made the greatest concession possible, and if even this would not win the consent of the conference, China would have to reject the treaty.48 On June 28, the day on which the signing ceremony of the Treaty of Peace with Germany was to be held in the Palace of Versailles, the Chinese delegation decided to make its final attempt, pleading for the following prepared declaration of reservation to be read before the signing: In proceeding to sign the Treaty of Peace with Germany today, the undersigned, plenipotentiaries of the Republic of China, considering as unjust Articles 156, 157, and 158 therein, which purport to transfer the transfer of the German rights in the Chinese Province of Shantung to Japan instead of restoring them to China, the rightful sovereign over the territory and a loyal co-partner in the war on the side of the Allied and Associated Powers, hereby declare, in the name and on behalf of their Government, that

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their signing of the Treaty is not to be understood as precluding China from demanding at a suitable time the reconsideration of the Shantung question, to the end that the injustice to China may be rectified in the interest of permanent peace in the Far East.49 Again, the conference rejected China’s final plan. Even at this time, the powers still believed, given China’s historical cowardice, that she would eventually sign the treaty, especially when it would be signed by so many countries, and that her only aim of threatening not to sign was to bargain for better conditions. To their surprise, the seats of the Chinese delegation were empty and China did reject the treaty. On the same day, the Chinese delegation issued a statement to the Parisian press describing the sincere efforts that China had made to resolve the dispute and explaining the delegation’s decision: After failing in all these earnest attempts at conciliation, and after seeing every honorable compromise rejected, the Chinese Delegation had no course open to them except to adhere to the path of duty to their country. Rather than accepting by their signatures article 156, 157, and 158 in the treaty, against which their sense of right and justice militated, they refrained from signing the treaty altogether. The Chinese plenipotentiaries regret having had to take a course which appears to mar the solidarity of the Allied and Associated Powers; but they were firmly of opinion, however, that the responsibility for this step rests, not with themselves, who had no other honorable course to pursue, but rather with those who, it is felt, unjustly and unnecessarily deprived them of the right of making a declaration to safeguard against any interpretation which might preclude China from asking for a reconsideration of the Shantung question at a suitable moment in future…50 The delegation also reported to the Chinese government about the negotiation process and the reason why they finally rejected the treaty: We have made repeated concessions in the matter, proposing from initially an inclusive reservation within the text of the treaty, to an attached reservation at the end of or outside the text, and then a mere declaration instead of a reservation, all of which were rejected. Having no other course, we in the end conceded to an ad hoc letter to declare our signing of the treaty is not to preclude our nation from demanding a reconsideration of the Shandong

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question in the future, but to our deep disappointment, by noon, even this had been rejected. The question is inseparable from the territorial integrity and future security of our nation…. It is utterly unacceptable and outrageous that the conference arbitrarily disregarded the dignity of our nation. The diplomatic efforts of weak nations had, in the past, undesirably failed to endure to the end. If we again surrendered and signed the treaty this time, then the future diplomacy of Our Nation would be totally doomed.51 In fact, China’s rejection of the treaty did not cause her diplomatic troubles. On the contrary, American public opinion became more sympathetic to China, criticizing Wilson for the concessions he made to win Japan’s support for the establishment of the League of Nations. John C. Ferguson, an American advisor of the Beiyang government commented from Washington in a telegram to Beijing that Wilson really made a big mistake because he did not expect China to win so much sympathy with the American public.52 Criticism also prevailed among the U.S. Senate. Senator William Borah, for example, said that America had betrayed her Chinese friends because China had entered the war out of the U.S. promise to defend Chinese rights at the peace talks, while Senator George W. Norris criticized Japan’s secret undertaking with Britain, France, Italy, and Russia as disgraceful.53 The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also proposed an amendment concerning Shandong to the Treaty of Versailles, which was to change the word “Japan” into “China” in the clauses concerned in order to directly restore Shandong to China. While the amendment was not passed by the Senate, it was altered into a reservation and adopted as follows: “The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.”54 It could be said that the Shandong question was quite a vital factor in the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles after debate. Because of China’s rejection of the peace treaty, Japan’s takeover of Shandong was not legitimized, and in this way, China reserved the right to revisit the question and restore Shandong, which formed the basis for the rediscussion of the Shandong question in the Washington Naval Conference later. Moreover, in view of the fact that for almost a century, China’s diplomacy had been a history of submissive concessions, with China always signing unequal treaties proposed by foreign powers after futile struggles, the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles was a great diplomatic success for China as an unprecedented firm “no” in terms of treaty conclusion. The May Fourth Movement triggered by the Paris Peace Conference, apart from arousing the oft-discussed nationalistic intellectual awakening, also affected

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China’s mode of diplomacy. In China’s modern history, her foreign relations had long been controlled by a highly centralized government, the Manchu court, or a group of high-ranking officials, who, without legitimacy with the people, made the nation’s already-disadvantaged diplomatic position even weaker. During the Paris Peace Conference, however, a new trend of “people’s diplomacy” quickly spread over China. For the first time, Chinese public opinion successfully influenced the decision of officials in authority. This was also noted by U.S. Minister to China Paul S. Reinsch, who recalled: “Thus out of the evil of the Paris decision came an inspiring national awakening of the Chinese people, a welding together for joint thought and joint action.”55 In addition, Reinsch was disappointed with Wilson’s concessions to Japan and he was determined to resign from the position of minister to China. In the speech at his farewell dinner, he spoke highly of the rise of people’s diplomacy in China: “During the past year there has been witnessed in China a great awakening of national opinion. This in itself is a marked step forward.” He continued, “Viewed as a whole this awakening of China’s public opinion gives us the definite knowledge that in China important affairs will in the future be handled with very much consideration of the opinion, judgment and needs of the people…. A government can be strong only as it rests upon the broad foundation of public understanding and support.”56 As one of the most influential icon in the Chinese delegation, C. T. Wang also commented on the influence of the Paris Peace Conference on China: It was at the Paris Peace Conference that after countless failures of over a century and under the suppression of imperialistic powers, China’s diplomacy finally welcomed its rebirth and began a new era. Although we did not successfully gained our claim at the conference, our spirit of national self-determination and the strong will expressed in our people’s diplomacy have been demonstrated to the world, as a result of which the foreign powers have become aware that our nation is not short of diplomatic policy, self-determination, or an independent spirit. We are not to be disdained or scorned anymore. The effect has been tremendous. According to Wang, through China’s experience in the Paris Peace Conference, the Chinese people understood that the foreign powers were not so formidable, and that they should seek justice, independence, and the abrogation of previous unequal treaties.57 In fact, such awareness and attitude had won the respect of foreign countries. Through the conference, China’s voice for abrogating or revising her previous treaties with the foreign powers was heard by the world for the first time, effecting in the first diplomatic breakthrough in modern Chinese history.

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The abrogation of Sino-German and Sino-Austrian unequal treaties At the conference, China submitted its memorandum to have the territories and rights that Germany and Austria-Hungary had seized from China through violence and threat revested. Specifically, nine terms were raised for Germany: 1. Together with the treaties that they were based on, which had been nullified as China entered into war against Germany, all rights, privileges, and favored treatments enjoyed by Germany in China to be abrogated, especially the lease territory of Jiaozhou and the rights for building railways and mining in Shandong, while China would open Qingdao and other suitable cities for foreign residence and commercial activities. 2. All Sino-German treaties thereafter to be based on the principle of equality, and Germany to relinquish her most-favored-nation treatment in China. 3. Germany to relinquish all rights and privileges obtained from the Boxer Protocol. 4. All German public properties in China except those of her consulates and diplomats to be ceded to China, while China would return to the Germans their private property taken over after the declaration of war. 5. Germany to compensate for the losses China suffered from the war. 6. China reserved the right to claim reparations from Germany. 7. Germany to repay the fees of accommodating and feeding German refugees. 8. Germany to return the astronomical instruments and art objects seized in 1901. 9. Germany to accept the International Opium Convention signed in 1927 at the Hague.58 Except for the eighth term, China’s claims on Austria were basically the same as those on Germany. As mentioned previously, the Shandong question was one of the focuses of the conference, and the foreign powers did not assent to direct restitution by Germany. Many of the other terms were accepted. For example, Article 128 read: “Germany renounces in favour of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901/5 and from all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto. She likewise renounces in favor of China any claim to indemnities accruing thereunder subsequent to March 14, 1917.” Apart from the Shandong question, Article 130 stipulated: “Germany cedes to China all the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property belonging to the German Government, which are situated

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or may be in the German Concessions at Tientsin [Tianjin] and Hankow [Hankou] or elsewhere in Chinese territory.” In Article 131: “Germany undertakes to restore to China within twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty all the astronomical instruments which her troops in 1900–1901 carried away from China,” and in Article 132: “Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin are now held.”59 Not all the Chinese claims on Germany were accepted, though. For example, the conference decided that without the consent of other signatories of the Boxer Protocol, China could not take over any German property in the Beijing Legation Quarter, no matter public or private. Moreover, Britain and the United States had demanded turning the German concessions in Hankou and Tianjin into international settlements, and after China’s bargaining, the powers agreed to have China open up those territories for foreign residence and trade, with the guarantee that the rights and property of foreign nationals from the Allies within these concessions would not be affected. The peace treaty also specified that all German property on the British Shamian Island in Guangzhou would be owned by the British government and the German school in the French concession in Shanghai would be jointly owned by France and China.60 In early August, Austria proposed amendments to the draft treaty, among which some were related to China’s requests. Austria’s counterproposals contained the following terms about China: 1. To renounce those rights and interests gained from the provisions of the Boxer Protocol from August 1917 only, but to be apportioned the portion of the Boxer Indemnity payable to Austro-Hungarian Empire according to the proportioning of property division between Austria and Hungary. 2. Austrians in China to be guaranteed equal treatment with nationals from other member-states of the League of Nations. 3. Public property of the Austro-Hungarian government to be ceded to China only under fair compensation, of which Austria was to receive an appropriate portion, the residential and office buildings of the Austrian diplomatic agents and the barracks of the Austro-Hungarian navy excluded. 4. The ownership of the property of Austrians residing or trading in the concession to remain unchanged after Austria relinquished her concession in Tianjin. 5. China to compensate Austria for Austrian private property sold, persons detained and deported, and ships confiscated.61

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These amendments would revise all relevant clauses drafted by the Allies, and were strongly opposed by the Chinese delegation. Koo reasoned with the British commissioner on the following grounds: 1. If Austria’s claim on a portion of the Boxer Indemnity was accepted, then other countries which took over territories of the disintegrated AustroHungarian Empire, such as Italy, Romania, and Poland, would also follow suit, and if China granted the claim of an enemy-state, it would be even harder for her to reject similar claims from her allies. In this way, China’s request for the cancellation of the Boxer Indemnity would become pointless. 2. If the Austrians residing in China were to be treated in the same way as foreigners from other member-countries of the League of Nations, then Austria’s most-favored-nation treatment in China would not be abrogated, which totally went against China’s proposal. 3. It went against the principles of the peace treaty that Austria should be compensated for the public property ceded to China. The Austrian barracks, as the base of her withdrawn legation guards, were built on Chinese territories and should naturally be restored to China. 4. As the properties in Austria’s Tianjin concession were mostly owned by Austrians, China could not allow the ownership of Austrian private properties within the concession to stay unchanged. 5. As with Germany, China would not grant the compensation requested by Austria.62 The conference consented to China’s views and rejected Austria’s amendments. On August 19, the Supreme Council, then meeting as the Council of Heads of Delegation, formally decided to keep the original clauses concerning China in the peace treaty with Austria.63 For China, there was yet another incident that interfered with the disposition of Austrian rights. During the discussions on the treaty with Austria, Italy attempted to lay claim to Austria’s concession in Tianjin for two reasons: that the Italian concession in Tianjin, which was the smallest of all countries, was densely populated and it was adjacent to the Austrian concession, with which Italy could develop business; and that the Austrian concession was surrounded by marshy ground, which was undesirable to hygiene, and Italy desired to ameliorate it with the reparations gained through the peace treaty with Austria. In fact, this was not the first time that Italy showed its desire for the Austrian concession. During the war, Italy had already proposed to the Beiyang government the transfer of the concession, but it was rejected. This time, the major powers did not consent

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to Italy’s request either. However, Italy did not drop the idea easily, and soon proposed another plan for the cession of a small part of the concession instead, and to show some respect for China’s sovereignty, she suggested stating the cession in an additional clause without altering the original term regarding the full restitution of the Austrian concessions to China in the treaty.64 This request, too, was rejected by the special committee. On September 10, 1919, Lou Tseng-Tsiang signed the Treaty of Saint-Germainen-Laye with Austria, indicating that Austria’s privileges in China were abrogated. Because China had rejected the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, the two countries remained in a state of war de jure. To terminate such a situation, the Beiyang government issued a presidential proclamation on September 15, declaring that the state of war between China and Germany was terminated.65 And on October 25, Sun Yat-sen’s opposition government in Guangzhou also made the same announcement. In March, 1920, the German government sent a diplomatic note to the Beiyang government, expressing its hope to restore its commercial relationship with China. China replied that if Germany acknowledged China’s rights as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, China would agree to restore her commercial relationship with Germany and a German representative could be sent to China for negotiation. Arrangements were soon made for the readmission of Germans into China, and in July, Herbert Von Borch came to China to negotiate the restoration of Sino-German relations on behalf of the German government. However, because China had to follow the economic sanction imposed by the Allies and she refused Germany’s request of compensating for the losses of the Germans who had held bonds of Chinese railways, it took a long time for the two countries to arrive at an agreement. On May 20, 1921, finally, China and Germany entered into the Agreements Regarding the Restoration of the State of Peace. According to the agreement, China and Germany would establish consulates and vice consulates in each other’s territories, and both countries’ diplomatic agents would enjoy the privileges and immunities acknowledged by international law. Moreover, by Article 3 of the agreement, which also included provisions on settlement, commerce, and taxation, Germany renounced her consular jurisdiction in China: The nationals of either of the two Republics residing in the territory of the other shall have the right, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country, to travel, settle, and carry on commerce or industry in all places where nationals of any other nation are entitled to do so. In respect of their persons and property, they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts, and must comply with the laws of the country in which they reside.

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They shall pay no duties, taxes or contributions in excess of those paid by the nationals of that country. The agreement also prohibited tariff control between the two countries, providing: “… all matters relating to Customs shall be regulated solely by the internal legislation of the respective parties. Nevertheless, no duties higher than those paid by nationals of the country shall be charged on products, whether raw or manufactured, coming from one of the two Republics or from another country, where such products are imported, exported or in transit.”66 In addition to the main articles, the agreements also contained an explicit declaration of Germany’s renunciation of all her rights, titles and privileges conferred by the Sino-Germany treaty of March 6, 1898 and all other acts concerning Shandong, as well as her consent “to the abrogation of consular jurisdiction in China.”67 Moreover, the exchange of notes between Von Borch and W. W. Yen (Yan Huiqing), the Chinese representative, attached to the set of documents gave supplementary explanations in response to enquiries between the two governments. In answering the German queries over the security of private property, China promised to “grant full protection to the Germans in the peaceful exercise of their profession” and not to confiscate their property unless under conditions permitted by international law and China’s local law, so long as the German government did the same to the Chinese people residing in Germany. In terms of legal guarantees, China promised to try and hear cases involving Germans “before the newly-established courts, with right of appeal,” “in accordance with the regular procedure,” and with permission of “German barristers and interpreters, officially accredited to the courts” as counsel. As for the German cases received by mixed courts, China would “seek a solution as regards the future which shall be just to all parties.”68 In other words, the new Sino-German agreements had terminated all unequal terms in treaties previously concluded between the two countries. After the First World War, China had also established new diplomatic relations with other countries such as Bolivia, Persia, and Mexico, and all these relations were based on the principle of equality. On December 3, 1919, China’s chargé d’affaires to Japan, Tchuan King-ko (Zhuang Jingke), and Bolivia’s minister to Japan signed a Treaty of Friendship in Tokyo, in which both governments pledged to establish “perpetual peace and unchangeable friendship” and grant each other equal rights. According to the Article 2 of treaty, the diplomatic agents and consuls of the two countries shall “enjoy the same rights, privileges, favors, immunities, and exemptions … accorded to the Diplomatic or Consular Agents of the most favored nations.”69 This, however, excluded consular jurisdiction, as the two representatives explicitly prescribed in supplementary exchange of notes.

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On June 1, 1920, China’s minister to Italy, Wang Kouang Ky, signed a Treaty of Friendship with Persia’s minister to Italy in Rome. The treaty directly stated that the ministers and ambassadors of the two countries would enjoy the same rights and treatment as the most favored nations “except in regard to rights in connection with consular jurisdiction.” Moreover, for nationals of the two countries residing or traveling in the other country, there was the provision that they “shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the country … in which they are residing or travelling, as regards legal proceedings, disputes, law-suits, or as regards crimes and offences which they may commit.”70 On September 26, 1921, Mexico’s minister of foreign affairs exchanged diplomatic notes with China’s minister to Mexico, Ouang Ki-tseng (Wang Jizeng), in terms of the extension of the 1899 Sino-Mexican Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation as well as the immigration of laborers to the two countries, and the Mexican minister assured: “My Government is willing to express on one of the amendments of the above-mentioned Treaty the renouncement that will be made by Mexico to the consular jurisdiction in China.”71

The Washington Naval Conference and the NinePower Treaty The focus of the Treaty of Versailles was the postwar order of Europe, but the question of the Far East was far from settled: the Western powers’ interests were still under threat because of the rise of Japan, which made it increasingly pressing for them to rebuild the order in the Far East and the Pacific. Therefore, Britain and the United States discussed initiating a disarmament conference for the Pacific region. In June 1921, the U.S. Congress passed the proposal for convening the conference and in the following days, the United States set out to inquire countries’ views on participation.

The principles regarding the foreign powers’ interests in China When China was informed about the meeting, she thought this would be a precious opportunity to end all the diplomatic inequality she had suffered. On July 16, 1921, Wellington Koo, then serving as minister in London, sent a telegram to the State Council, stating that the major aim of the conference was to rebuild the world order in the Far East, and China was the center of the Far Eastern question; therefore, the meeting was more important for China than the Paris Peace Conference. Koo suggested China to propose not only specific issues

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but also principles. Accordingly, in terms of principles, China should call for foreign powers’ respect for her sovereignty and territorial integrity, demand the relinquishment of unequal terms in the treaties concluded with China, declare her support for nations’ commercial and industrial equality in China, and proclaim China’s plan for future development. In terms of specific issues, China should negotiate for detailed measures to guarantee foreign nations’ respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the settlement of the Shandong question and the Twenty-One Demands, and the foreign powers’ consent to the abolition of the seven kinds of privileges raised at Paris in April 1919.72 China’s other resident ministers also wired Beijing to express their opinions. Minister to Mexico Ouang Ki-tseng asked the government to propose the unresolved Sino-Japanese problems during the meeting, as well as the abrogation of foreign privileges, including spheres of influence and leased territories, which were detrimental to China’s development and which were often sources of conflict.73 Minister to France Chen Lu opined that all problems that went against the principle of peace and might cause conflicts of interest could be raised, and these problems covered the questions of Shandong, Manchuria, and Tibet, as well as the abrogation of foreign privileges in the areas of tariffs, the administration of ports, postal service, consular jurisdiction, and wireless telegraphy.74 In August 1921, the U.S. government formally invited Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China, and three other countries to Washington to discuss problems relating to disarmament and the interests in the Far East and the Pacific. China gladly accepted the invitation on August 17, with the remark that “the American Government by declaring that it is not its purpose to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East gives evidence of its readiness to be fair to all without any preconceived bias,”75 in opposition to Japan’s earlier counterproposal to the U.S. government to discuss only the disarmament issue but not the Far Eastern question. On August 18, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Beiyang government established a preparatory committee for the meeting. In addition, on September 20, community concern groups for the conference, such as the Comrade Support Group for the Pacific Question (Taipingyang wenti houyuan tongzhi hui 太平洋問題後援同志 會), Washington Conference China Support Group (Huashengdun huiyi Zhongguo houyuan hui 華盛頓會議中國後援會), International Research Society (guoji yanjiu she 國際研究社), and Pacific Conference Discussion Group (Taipingyang huiyi taolun hui 太平洋會議討論會) held a joint conference in Beijing and formed the Union for People’s Diplomacy (guomin waijiao lianhe hui 國民外交聯合會) to support and supervise the government.

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In previous international conferences, the Chinese delegation was often looked down upon and disregarded by foreign powers for China’s internal conflicts and bureaucratic corruption. To avoid being taunted again in the upcoming conference, China’s diplomatic ministers jointly sent a circular telegram to the Beiyang government, provincial governments, military leaders, and community organizations, stating: The Far East question is, by nature, questions relating to China. It is undoubtedly a precious opportunity for our nation to be invited to the Conference; however, as the opening of the Conference is nearing, given the current state of our internal rifts, how do we explain to the foreign nations that our political strife has increased rather than subsided? At this critical time of survival, the entire nation should express deepest sincerity to strengthen ourselves and to grieve misfortunes. We ask that all provincial powers cease fire immediately and negotiate for unified governance so as to constitute a strong and undivided backing force for countering the outside world. Only in such a way will we be given room to speak at the conference; otherwise, if our nation is constantly torn by internal disturbances, we fear that the foreign powers will interfere in our affairs on the pretext of maintaining world peace and our nation will not be sustained.76 On October 6, the Beiyang government appointed Minister to the United States Alfred Sze, Minister to Britain Wellington Koo, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (daliyuan大理院) Wang Chonghui, and C. C. Wu from the Guangzhou government as plenipotentiary delegates. The government also hired the former U.S. Secretary of State Lansing, the former U.S. Minister to China Reinsch, and the legal adviser of the Beiyang government Westel W. Willoughby as advisors to strengthen China’s relationship with the United States and win U.S. support. Japan did not want to discuss the Shandong question at the conference, so she tried to negotiate with China directly beforehand. On September 7, Japan drew up the “General Principles for the Readjustment of the Shandong Questions” in a memorandum to be handed over to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Obata Yukichi, Japan’s minister in Beijing, and later published the proposal in Japanese newspapers. Japan’s intention was to manifest: if China refused to settle the question with Japan, then the responsibility of rejecting the negotiations would be shouldered by China, and Japan would get the excuse to ignore it in the Washington Conference. On October 5, China replied to Japan that the new proposal was “still incompatible with the repeated declarations of the Chinese Government, with the hopes and expectations of the entire Chinese people, and with the principles laid down in

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treaties between China and the foreign Powers.” The replying memorandum continued: “If these proposals are to be considered the final concession on the part of Japan, they surely fall short to prove the sincerity of Japan’s desire to settle the question.” China counter-proposed that Jiaozhou be wholly and unconditionally returned to China; the control and management of the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway be completely handed over to China, with half of its value bought back by China in a fixed period; and the Japanese troops in Shandong be completely evacuated. In closing, China added that due to the “marked difference of opinion between the two countries, and apprehending that the case might long remain unsettled, China reserve[d] to herself the freedom of seeking a solution of the question whenever a suitable occasion present[ed] itself.”77 And China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also ordered Sze to copy the reply to Charles E. Hughes, the Secretary of State of the United States in order to stay in contact with the United States. On November 12, 1921, the opening session of the Washington Naval Conference, or the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, was held, and it was attended by the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium. The American delegation was led by Charles Hughes, the British delegation Lord President of the Council Arthur Balfour, and the Japanese delegation Secretary of the Navy Kato Tomosaburo and Minister to the United States Kijuro Shidehara. The conference was organized into two main committees, the Committee on Limitation of Armaments and the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, and China only attended the discussions of the latter. On November 16, China’s chief plenipotentiary Sze proposed Ten Points as general principles for dealing with the questions relating to China: 1. (a) The Powers engage to respect and observe the territorial integrity and political and administrative independence of the Chinese Republic. (b) China upon her part is prepared to give an undertaking not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any Power. 2. China, being in full accord with the principle of the so-called open door or equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations having treaty relations with China, is prepared to accept and apply it in all parts of the Chinese Republic without exception. 3. With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and maintaining peace in the Pacific and Far East, the Powers agree not to conclude between themselves any treaty or agreement directly affecting China or the general peace in these regions without previously notifying China and giving her an opportunity to participate.

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4. All special rights, privileges, immunities or commitments, whatever their character or contractual basis, claimed by any of the Powers in or relating to China are to be declared, and all such or future claims not so made known are to be deemed null and void. The rights, privileges, immunities and commitments, now known or to be declared, are to be examined with a view to determining their scope and validity and, if valid, to harmonizing them with one another and with the principles declared by this Conference. 5. Immediately or as soon as circumstances will permit, existing limitations upon China’s political, jurisdictional and administrative freedom of action are to be removed. 6. Reasonable, definite terms of duration are to be attached to China’s present commitments which are without time limits. 7. In the interpretation of instruments granting special rights or privileges, the well-established principle of construction that such grants shall be strictly construed in favor of the grantors, is to be observed. 8. China’s rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in future wars to which she is not a party. 9. Provision is to be made for the peaceful settlement of international disputes in the Pacific and Far East. 10. Provision is to be made for future Conferences to be held from time to time for the discussion of international questions relative to the Pacific and Far East, as a basis for the determination of common policies of the Signatory Powers in relation thereto.78 The Beiyang government’s recognition of the open door policy implied that it intended to maintain the balance of power in China in order to thwart Japan’s aggressive attempts. Moreover, the recognition of the policy, which had been advocated by the United States, was aimed to win U.S. support. The Ten Points covered China’s promises as well as requests. Specifically, the requests could be categorized into four groups, among which No. 1 laid down the general principles of respect for territorial integrity and political independence; No. 3, 7, and 8 tackled forward agreements, including the prohibition of confidential treaties, the interpretation of treaties, and respect for China’s neutrality during wartimes; No. 4 to 6 concerned past treaties with respect to their openness and effective dates; and No. 9 to 10 demanded the establishment of a collective restraint mechanism for settling the Far Eastern questions. It was clear that these principles were based on justice and equality, and all countries were satisfied with China’s recognition of the open door policy, so these

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policies were agreed upon by the foreign powers, such that even Japan had to accede. Without significant disputes, the conference recommended U.S. delegate Elihu Root to draft the principles in relation to China. Based on China’s Ten Points, Root proposed four principles on November 21, which were: 1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. 2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government, overcoming the difficulties incident to the change from the old and longcontinued imperial form of government. 3. To safeguard for the world, so far as it is within our power, the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China. 4. To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.79 In the discussion, Sze questioned if the word “respect” in the first principle covered the meaning of “observe” because both words were used in Sze’s Ten Points. In Chinese, Sze expressed, “respect” indicated a stance or attitude while “observe” suggested actual obligations. And Root replied that “respect” was a stronger word than “observe.”80 Moreover, Japan asked whether the respect for China’s “administrative integrity” would affect the privileges already granted to foreign countries. Root ingratiated himself with Japan by stating that respect for China’s administrative integrity “did not affect any privileges accorded by valid or effect grants,” although he stated that this “required respect for the things that [were] done in the exercise of its full sovereignty by an independent State”;81 that is to say, foreign powers’ respect for China’s sovereignty and administrative integrality was conditional. Later, the conference passed the four principles with slight modifications of words and incorporated them into the first article of the Nine-Power Treaty. Compared with China’s Ten Points, the Root principles emphasized the execution of the open door policy in China and worded the obligations of the foreign powers in China more in principle terms. No. 4, 5, and 6 of China’s Ten Points, which touched on more specific issues, were omitted for fear of arousing conflict, and this foretold that China would meet numerous difficulties in terms of the relinquishment of foreign privileges.

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That said, the principle of respect for China’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity endorsed by the conference meant a lot to China, and it was a progress that this principle was incorporated into an international treaty. As Hughes, the chairman, had explained, No. 5 of China’s Ten Points might be covered by the first of the Root principles, but while the restrictions on China’s sovereignty were based on treaties and could not be relinquished without the agreement of the signatories, “it was not contemplated to preclude discussion of any question relating to China; that China was a sovereign and independent state, and had her administrative autonomy except as limited by restrictions which [might] have been placed upon it through valid engagements; that it might be possible for the committee to remove or modify some of these restrictions, but those would be particular questions.”82

Discussions on the cancellation of foreign privileges After deciding the principles, the conference started to discuss specific questions, and China proposed a series of requests which included: the restoration of tariff autonomy, the abolition of extraterritoriality, the return of leased territories, the abolition of the 1915 Sino-Japanese treaties, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the termination of foreign wireless telegraphy and postal services in China, and the disclosure of treaties relating to China.

The restoration of tariff autonomy The restoration of tariff autonomy was one of the priorities of China’s proposals. The Beiyang government was stuck in a financial crisis and it urgently needed a sum of money to disembarrass itself from the dire strait, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a telegram to the Chinese delegation: “Since the financial resources of the Central Government are in extreme exhaustion, hard pressed by internal and external debts and owing months of salaries to the civil servants and soldiers, it is in urgent need of funds to arrest the dangerous situation and bring security.”83 However, in the eyes of foreign diplomats, what China pursued was more the restoration of sovereign rights. On November 23, Koo officially proposed the subject in the fifth plenary session of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, asking “on behalf of the Chinese delegation for the recovery by China of the right to tariff autonomy” because “in the first place the existing regime in China constituted an infringement of the Chinese sovereign right to fix the tariff rate at her own discretion — a right enjoyed by the States throughout the world.” Koo explicated the undesirability of the flat tariff rate to China in five aspects: (1) undermining China’s sovereign rights;

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(2) going against the principle of equality and mutuality; (3) failing to differentiate between luxuries and necessaries and thus disregarding the socioeconomic and the financial needs of the people; (4) reducing China’s tax revenue; (5) the great difficulty of revising the tariff. However, to reduce opposition from the foreign powers, Koo said that “the Chinese government entertained no desire to interfere with the present administration of the maritime customs, which was generally considered to be efficient and satisfactory, nor to interfere with the devotion of the funds of the maritime customs to the liquidation of foreign loans secured thereon.”84 Koo also added that China was not claiming an immediate restoration of tariff autonomy, which would be achieved “only after a period to be agreed upon” because she knew this could not be achieved overnight. What China hoped was that foreign countries would agree to a maximum import tariff rate and allowed China to have full control of differentiating rates within the limit. However, as negotiation for this matter would still take time, China requested that the import tariff first be raised to 12.5% from January 1, 1922.85 The maximum tariff rate was discussed along with other specific proposals in the first meeting of the newly appointed subcommittee on November 29. Koo made six proposals: (1) The tariff rate to be immediately raised to 12.5%. (2) The foreign powers to agree to certain surtaxes upon China’s abolition of likin on January 1, 1924. (3) A new customs regime to be negotiated within five years based on a maximum rate of 25% ad valorem under which China would be free to regulate her import tariff schedule. (4) The tax reductions on goods imported and exported by land to be abolished. (5) The treaty provisions regulating the customs duties, transit dues, and other imposts entered into with foreign countries to be abrogated at the end of 10 years from the date of agreement. (6) China would voluntarily declare no intention to effect fundamental changes in the existing customs administration system or disturb the customs revenue devoted to repaying foreign loans.86 In fact, the discussions were all about a new negotiated tariff rate rather than complete tariff autonomy, and the foreign delegations all opposed China’s proposal of immediately increasing the rate to 12.5%. The U.S. delegate, Oscar Underwood, supported an increase of China’s tariff in principle, but held that the exact rate of increase should be determined based on the Chinese government’s needs after investigations. The British delegation only agreed to increase the import duty from the currently effective 3.5% to 5% immediately, with progressive increases in the ensuing years and after the cancellation of likin, to 12.5%. The Japanese delegate, Hanihara Masanao, was most adamant in his opposition, refusing even the 5% proposal, allowing a mere 25% or 30% increase, which would at most bring up the import duty to 4.7%. Even the Belgian delegate criticized the Japanese proposal

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for its bad principle.87 Later, Koo made a concession and proposed increasing the current tariff rate to 7.5%. However, Japan still would not accept it and insisted that that rate should only be reached after several years, while although Britain gave consent to the rate, she demanded China to limit the use of the increased taxation to productive enterprises. After the second meeting on November 30, the subcommittee had to be adjourned for some time because of Japan’s stubborn attitude. Back in China, the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance sent a joint telegram to the Chinese delegation, ordering it to fight for the restoration of tariff autonomy within three years and giving assent to the 7.5% proposal of the powers, which the government demanded to take effect on January 1, 1922 until tariff autonomy was recovered.88 The delegation replied that the three-year goal was unfeasible, reporting that they had expressed China’s hope to abolish all treaty provisions regarding customs within 10 years but it was neglected, and instead, the powers persuaded China to temporarily give up the idea on the ground of her domestic instability. Therefore, “considering that no hope of settlement was seen after repeated debates, it appears a mission impossible to make the three-year proposal at this point.”89 Meanwhile, the delegations had informal discussions with one another, and the Chinese delegation basically arrived at a consensus with the British and U.S delegations. On December 27, the subcommittee resumed, and the British representative, Robert Borden, proposed a draft agreement in terms of the adjustment of China’s tariff rate. Its main contents can be summarized as follows: (1) A special conference would be established for the speedy abolition of likin and China could raise her tariff rate to 12.5% after fulfilling the conditions laid down in the 1902 and 1903 Sino-British, Sino-American, and Anglo-Japanese treaties. (2) The tariff rate would be immediately increased to 5%. (3) After the abolition of likin, China would levy a uniform 2.5% surtax on most goods, and a 5% surtax on certain luxuries. (4) The current system of customs administration would remain unchanged. (5) The reductions of duties on goods imported and exported by land would be abolished.90 As the most disputable questions were left to a future special conference, the discussion of the British proposal proceeded rather smoothly. It was adopted by the subcommittee in its sixth meeting on January 4, 1922, and then the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions in its 17th meeting on the next day. On February 6, the nine countries attending the conference officially signed the Treaty between the Nine Powers Relating to Chinese Customs Tariff. The treaty terms were not far from the British proposal, providing for the convention of a tariff revision

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commission to revise the tariff rate to 5% effective as soon as possible, and a special conference within three months to discuss the abolition of likin and the levying of the surtax.91 Although China successfully increased her tariff rate through the conference, no promise was made as to the restoration of tariff autonomy. Therefore, Koo stated in the January 5 meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions when it adopted the British proposal that the Chinese delegation had not desired to give up the pursuit of tariff autonomy and intended to “bring the question up again for consideration on all appropriate occasions in the future.” He also made it clear in the declaration that the Chinese government would not at that moment effect any change to disturb the existing administration of the maritime customs; however, this “obviously could not be reasonably constructed to preclude China’s legitimate aspirations gradually to make this important branch of the Chinese government more national in character.” In response to Koo’s statement, Underwood showed willingness to see China regain her tariff control, given that her domestic situation became more stable.92

The abolition of extraterritoriality On November 25, 1921, Wang Chonghui proposed the abolition of extraterritoriality in the sixth meeting of the Committee of the Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. Wang drew attention to the fact that when China granted extraterritorial rights to the foreign powers, she had only opened five treaty ports; however, as time passed, there were then more than 50 ports in China, which meant an increasing number of persons over which China was “almost powerless” and which was seriously hampering local administration. Wang pointed out the ills of extraterritoriality: (1) It infringed China’s sovereign rights and was considered by the Chinese people to be a national humiliation. (2) The multiplicity and interrelation of courts created a perplexing situation to the lawyers. (3) In commercial transactions between persons of different personalities, the rights and liabilities of both parties became unpredictable because lawsuits would be tried according to the law of the defendant’s nationality. (4) The fact that foreigners who were accused of had to be tried by their consul made the attendance of witnesses or production of evidence more difficult because of the distance from the original location of the case. (5) Foreigners evaded taxes under the shield of extraterritoriality, which led the Chinese to despise their government and envy the foreigners. Wang then remarked that the powers had promised in various treaties to relinquish their extraterritorial rights after China reformed her judicial system, whereas now China’s judicial reform had made great progress, as evident by the hiring of foreign experts to compile new law codes and the establishment of a new law court system where only those who had

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received legal training were eligible as judges. Wang also appealed to the foreign powers by addressing to their wish of the opening of China’s inland territories, saying that “it would be inexpedient for China to open her entire territory to foreign trade and commerce” until the system of extraterritoriality was “abolished or substantially modified.” His proposal was for the foreign powers to negotiate for a “progressive modification and ultimate abolition” of this system in China.93 However, Hughes the chairman stated that an inquiry into the existing judicial conditions of China would have to be carried out before they made a decision. A subcommittee was thus appointed to discuss China’s proposals and to draft resolutions. On November 29, the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions adopted the Resolution Regarding Extraterritoriality in China in its ninth meeting. On December 10, it was adopted at the fourth plenary session of the conference. According to the resolution, the powers were “sympathetically disposed towards furthering in this regard the aspiration to which the Chinese delegation gave expression on November 16, 1921, to the effect that ‘immediately, or as soon as circumstances [would] permit, existing limitations upon China’s political, jurisdictional, and administrative freedom of action [were] to be removed’”; however, considering that before they took any concrete action, an inquiry would have to be made into China’s laws and judicial systems as well as judicial administration, the conference would organize a special commission to “inquire into the present practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, and into the laws and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration of China,” as well as give recommendations on improvements and reforms which would warrant the powers to relinquish their extraterritorial rights “either progressively or otherwise.” Moreover, the resolution specified that the commission be constituted within three months after the closing of the Washington Naval Conference, and investigation reports and recommendations be presented to the governments within one year after the first meeting of the commission. However, the suggestions of the special commission could not impose any constraint on the foreign governments because they “shall be deemed free” whether to accept the suggestions or not.94

The return of leased territories On December 3, 1921, Koo put forward the request for the restoration of the leased territories to the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. His reason was that the foreign powers had seized the leased territories by forceful occupation or at the excuse of maintaining the balance of power in the Far East, but 20 years had passed since then; by that time, Germany and Russia could no longer menace the peace of the Far East, while the Manchu regime had collapsed, so the excuse

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of preserving a balance of power became invalid. In addition to this, Koo pointed out that the existence of leased territories had jeopardized the peace in China; for example, the Russian lease of Port Arthur and Dalian caused the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and Germany’s occupation of Jiaozhou Bay eventually spread the European war to the Far East. Moreover, Koo argued in the interest of the foreign powers, the economic domination by the lessee nations over the adjoining regions went against the principle of commercial and industrial equality. Koo asked the foreign nations to terminate the leases and return the leased territories, with the remark that China would respect the legitimate interests of foreigners in the leased territories.95 The powers held diverse views over the issue. Upon receiving the proposal, the United States immediately showed a supportive view because she did not have any leased territories in China. Balfour representing Britain, which owned two such territories, namely Weihaiwei in Shandong and Kowloon adjacent to Hong Kong, expressed in one meeting British willingness to return Weihaiwei if the two countries could reach an agreement on the conditions of the return.96 The British agenda behind her seeming generosity was obvious: First, in 1898 Britain primarily leased Weihaiwei for countering the Russian influence in Port Arthur and Dalian, which had by then been taken over by Japan. Her lease of Weihaiwei would expire in July 1923, and the renewal would have to be approved by China, which would be hard to achieve; she would rather propose the return voluntarily to win favor. Second, the strategic importance of Kowloon to her interests in Hong Kong made Britain ready to sacrifice Weihaiwei to keep Kowloon. Balfour especially differentiated Kowloon and Weihaiwei as two kinds of leases, holding that the latter was leased primarily for the sake of fighting against economic domination in the Far East, and to accelerate the process of solving the Shandong question, she would return Weihaiwei, but Kowloon was of pivotal importance for the security of Hong Kong and thus could not be returned currently.97 Japan also had two leased territories in China. Hanihara said that Jiaozhou Bay could be returned to China through negotiations, but Port Arthur could not be because Japan had sacrificed a lot for the occupation of the territory, which was close to Japan and thus indispensable to Japan’s national security, and which had become an important part of Japan’s economic life with numerous commercial and industrial interests.98 The French delegation had expressed the desire to return Guangzhouwan, France’s only leasehold, given that all the other powers took the same step. Knowing the Japanese and British reservations, however, it expressed the need to reconsider the question.99

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Koo refuted the Japanese and British claims in the December 7 meeting. He pointed out that Japan’s lease of Port Arthur and Dalian would expire in 1923, and although Japan extended the lease term to 99 years through the 1915 treaties, the legitimacy of the treaties was still debatable. Debunking Japan’s claim on the territories by geographical proximity, he defended China’s sovereignty over them and demonstrated their paramount significance in terms of national security, economic life, and population settlement to Manchuria. Regarding Kowloon, Koo acknowledged the necessity to protect the trade in Hong Kong, but asserted that the retention of Kowloon was not the only solution to the problem.100

The abolition of the 1915 Sino-Japanese treaties and notes As early as December 14, 1921, China had submitted the proposal on the cancellation of the 1915 treaties and notes arising from the Twenty-One Demands; however, this was suspended until the second last meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Question on February 2, 1922 because of Japan’s uncooperative attitude. On February, 2, Shidehara insisted on the legal validity of the 1915 treaties, stating that they had undergone all formalities and would therefore remain effective until they were cancelled. He added that no nation would voluntarily give up her territorial or sovereign rights, and “if it [were] once recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent [would] be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations.” After affirming the complete effectiveness of the agreements, he nonetheless made some concessions: (1) Japan would give up her exclusive right to loan for constructing railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. (2) Japan would no longer insist on her preferential right concerning the hiring of Japanese advisors on the political, financial, military, and police matters in South Manchuria. (3) Japan would give up the right to negotiate for the terms in Group V of the Twenty-One Demands in the future.101 On the following day, the Chinese delegation refuted Japan’s arguments. Wang Chonghui contended the allegation about the abolition of the 1915 treaties forming a “dangerous precedent” by condemning Japan’s action of seizing valuable concessions from her neighbor while she was militarily unprepared and the Western powers were silent, neither for settling disputes nor for a fair exchange, as “a still more dangerous precedent.” Moreover, the abolition of the 1915 agreements would not challenge the authority of international treaties; in Wang’s words: “No apprehension need be entertained that the abrogation of the agreements of 1915 will serve a precedent for the annulment of other agreements, since it is

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confidentially hoped that the future will furnish no such similar occurrences.” Finally, Wang also presented four reasons for an impartial examination as regards the abrogation of the treaties: (1) They only demanded concessions on the part of China but did not include quid pro quo on the part of Japan. (2) Some of their terms violated other treaties between China and other nations. (3) They went against the principles adopted by the Washington Naval Conference. (4) They created constant misunderstandings between China and Japan, and would hinder the future development of Sino-Japanese relations.102 However, the discussion was raised as the conference was drawing to a close. Except for the United States, which expressed opposition to the Twenty-One Demands, the powers had not even made their positions known. At last, Hughes suggested that the views of the Japanese, Chinese, and U.S. delegations be entered in the records of the conference, and accepted the Chinese delegation’s reservation of the right to seek a solution to the issue in the future.

The withdrawal of foreign troops and the abolition of foreign wireless stations On November 28, 1921, Alfred Sze presented at the eighth meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions the following proposition: Each of the Powers attending this Conference … severely declare that, without the consent of the Government of China, expressly and specifically given in each case, it will not station troops, or railway guards or establish and maintain police boxes, or erect or operate electrical communication installations, upon the soil of China; and that if there now exist upon the soil of China such troops or railway guards or police boxes or electrical installations without China’s express consent, they will be at once withdrawn.103 In response to China’s proposal, the Japanese delegation refuted that the stationing of Japanese troops entertained no aggressive purposes or encroachment of China’s sovereignty, and defended each case one by one. Japan agreed to remove her garrisons in some areas under certain conditions, for example: (1) The troops in Hankou were deployed during the Xinhai Revolution to protect the Japanese residing in China, and afterwards the region had been in constant unrest; they could only be withdrawn if China could guarantee the safety of foreigners. (2) The Japanese troops garrisoned along the Chinese Eastern Railway were connected to an agreement of the Allies for supervising Siberia, and could be withdrawn as soon as order was restored. For the withdrawal of the troops along the South

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Manchurian Railway, however, Japan gave a firm refusal, stating that they were stationed according to the provisions of the 1905 treaty, and as bandits were rampant in Manchuria, without the protection of the Japanese forces, people living in the area would suffer. Regarding the Japanese police in Manchuria, Japan added that because the Chinese police was not granted the right to search the houses of the Japanese residents, the Japanese police in fact played a positive role in reducing the crimes committed by the Japanese. For this, Sze argued that international law did not permit one country to deploy police forces to other countries, and what Japan should do was to withhold Japanese lawbreakers at the source rather than send her police to China.104 Later, on December 12, the British delegation suggested that China and the rest of the nine powers, following the practice for the matter of extraterritoriality, conduct a joint inquiry into the situation of foreign troops and police garrisoned in China which were not based on treaty rights, with a report to be submitted to the nine governments for their consideration of whether to accept or reject the report in whole or in part. When the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed of the suggestion, it was rather irritated because what China requested was the withdrawal of all foreign troops and police forces, but the British proposal was just targeted at troops not based on treaty rights. In addition, the ministry was opposed to the inquiry by nature, holding that the question of the evacuation of foreign troops was a different matter from the abolition of extraterritoriality, the latter being entirely imposed by treaty provisions but not the former. It observed that except for Japan and Britain, no foreign countries had stationed troops in China, but the lives and property of their subjects were likewise protected, showing that the Japanese and British troops could be dispensed with. Moreover, an inquiry on local public security, which was subject to unpredictable factors, would be less scientific than that on the judicial system, where performances tended to be more stable. If the report supported the need of maintaining troops in China, not only would Japan and Britain not withdraw their troops, but the other countries might also follow their example; and even if the report turned out to be favorable to China, it would be of no binding force. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the Chinese delegation to state a fundamental rejection to the British proposal.105 Accordingly, on January 3, 1922, Koo protested against the British proposal. In the end, the foreign powers conceded by adding the condition “whenever China shall so request” to the proposed inquiry. That is to say, the inquiry would be conducted only at China’s voluntary request. However, even though this gave China the power to cancel the inquiry, her request for the withdrawal of foreign troops went unheard.

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On January 5, 1922, the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions adopted the Resolution Regarding Foreign Armed Forces in China, which was then adopted by the plenary session on February 1. According to the resolution, the powers had declared their intention to withdraw troops which were not authorized by any treaties whenever China could guarantee the protection of the lives and property of the foreigners residing in China. Since China had shown her intention and capacity in this respect, it was resolved that the diplomatic representatives in Beijing of every country at the conference would, upon the request of China, conduct an inquiry into the matter along with three Chinese representatives, and after the inquiry, a copy of a report containing suggestions for the problem would sent to every government, which “shall be deemed free to accept or reject all or any of the findings of fact or opinions expressed in the report.”106 It was obvious that the report would be unenforceable. As for the discussion on electrical communications installations, it was only limited to wireless stations. The Chinese delegation had demanded the abolition of all telegraph stations belonging to the legation guards, but later it acceded to the retention of these stations as long as the foreign countries promised not to send or receive commercial telegrams. In terms of telegraphy service within leased territories, the British and Japanese representatives insisted that as the lessees they had the right to establish wireless telegraph stations, while Koo refuted that the radio waves involved extended beyond the territories. Moreover, the Japanese and French delegates also respectively protested that the stations along the South Manchurian Railway and within the French concession in Shanghai should not be surrendered. The debate went so intense that the committee finally resorted to an ambiguous resolution. On February 1, 1922, the plenary session officially adopted the Resolution Regarding Radio Stations in China, and Accompanying Declarations. The part of the resolution concerning the controversial territories read: “If any question shall arise as to the radio stations in leased territories, in the South Manchurian Railway Zone or in the French Concession in Shanghai, they shall be regarded as matters for discussion between the Chinese Government and the Government concerned.” And China declared in the statement attached to the resolution: “The Chinese government does not recognize or concede the right of any foreign Power or of the nationals thereof to install or operate, without its express consent, radio stations in Legation grounds, settlements, concessions, leased territories, railway areas or other similar areas.”107 In terms of the radio stations within the legation grounds, the resolution prescribed that they “shall be limited in their use to sending and receiving governmental messages and shall not receive or send commercial or personal

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or unofficial messages, including press matter.” However, the same clause also mentioned that in case other stations went wrong, those belonging to the legations could receive or send private telegrams under the permission of the Chinese government as an interim measure. Moreover, the resolution provided that those radio stations authorized to operate in China by treaties or concessions should strictly abide by the rules of relevant agreements in the messages sent and received, whereas any radio station maintained in the territory of China without the authorization of the Chinese government should be acquired by the Chinese government at market value as soon as the Chinese Ministry of Communications could effectively operate the same service.108

The abolition of foreign postal services The only substantive outcome that the Chinese delegation achieved at the Washington Conference was the abolition of foreign (alien) postal services in China. On November 25, 1921, Sze submitted the related propositions to the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. He opened by stating that the maintenance of foreign post offices in China was the violation of a sovereign right not even provided by treaties. He then elaborated that foreign postal services lacked the necessity of existence because China’s postal service had covered the entire country, and it was cheap, reliable, centrally administered, and not affected by political changes, such that its development had not been interrupted despite the domestic disturbances. However, Sze noted, there were still numerous foreign postal establishments in China (12 from Britain, 13 from France, 1 from the United States, and 124 from Japan), and their existence undermined China’s sovereignty, reduced China’s tax revenue, and hindered the postal development of less important areas in the country because they were only located in flourishing big cities, while allowing parcels and mails to bypass customs examination.109 As the United States only owned one post office in China, the U.S. delegation acceded to China’s request forthrightly. Hughes expressly declared that the United States would be ready to withdraw her post office in China simultaneously with other countries and that the foreign post offices had no basis in treaties and indeed undermined China’s sovereign right, while Root echoed that even though these post offices were of necessity at the very beginning of their establishment, they were no longer justified by then.110 The British and French delegations also did not oppose China’s request; however, they expressed the hope that China would not dismiss the French co– director general for a certain period because he had made great contributions to the development of China’s postal system and his departure might lead to slack

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service, which would result in requests for the reestablishment of foreign post offices.111 The Japanese delegation showed a much more uncompromising attitude. Hanihara stated that there were 50 times as many Japanese as the nationals of any other countries, and Japan would have to ensure that China’s postal service was reliable and trustworthy after a period of examination before she withdrew her post offices.112 Sze affirmed the British and French argument that foreign experts had indeed made contributions to China’s postal service development. He also added that China did not intend to make radical changes to her postal system immediately. For Japan, Sze criticized her excuse as incompetent with international law, and asked Hanihara for a specific time for the Japanese withdrawal; however, Hanihara still insisted that the Japanese post offices in China were the fruit of Japan’s years-long endeavors and could not be cancelled immediately. The question was then referred to a subcommittee for further discussions and the drafting of the resolution.113 At the subcommittee, it was resolved that the abolition of foreign postal services would take to effect from January 1, 1923, before which the countries concerned would allow China to check foreign postal matter to ascertain whether they contained any dutiable or contraband. Of note is that due to Japanese demands, the parenthetical remark of “excepting ordinary letters” was added; however, China later raised objection at the meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions for the reason that even ordinary envelopes could be stuffed with illicit drugs. After negotiation, the clause was modified into: “The four Powers concerned severally undertake to afford full facilities to the Chinese customs authorities to examine in those agencies all postal matter (excepting ordinary letters, whether registered or not, which upon external examination appear plainly to contain only written matter) passing through them, with a view to ascertaining whether they contain articles which are dutiable or contraband or which otherwise contravene the customs regulations or laws of China.”114 On February 1, 1922, the plenary session adopted the Resolution Regarding Foreign Postal Agencies in China. The resolution recognized “the justice of the desire expressed by the Chinese Government to secure the abolition of foreign postal agencies in China, save or except in leased territories or as otherwise specifically provided by treaty” and stipulated that the four powers concerned agreed to withdraw their post offices in China before January 1, 1923. However, the resolution also mentioned two additional conditions for the abandonment: (1) China would keep an efficient postal service; (2) China would not change her present postal administration insofar as the status of the foreign co–director general was concerned.115

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The disclosure of treaties relating to China The Chinese delegation asked for the disclosure and examination of all treaties and agreements relating to China for the reason that the confidential treaties involving foreign powers’ interests in China of which China was not notified had seriously undermined China’s sovereign rights, and the disclosure of these treaties could prevent further harm of secret diplomacy. However, the conference rejected the demand about the examination, but just agreed to the submission of treaties relative to China that were still valid to the conference for filing. The Resolution Regarding Existing Commitments of China or With Respect to China adopted on February 1, 1922 provided that the powers represented in the conference other than China shall file with the secretariat general of the conference at their earliest convenience lists of two types of agreements: (1) all treaties, conventions, exchanges of notes, or other international agreements with China or with other powers in relation to China which they deemed still in force and upon which they desired to rely; (2) all contracts between their nationals and the Chinese government or its administrative subdivisions or local authorities which involved any concession, franchise, option, or preference with respect to railway construction, mining, forestry, navigation, river conservancy, harbor works, reclamation, electrical communications, or other public works or public services, or for the sale of arms or ammunition, or which involved a lien upon any of the public revenues or properties of the Chinese government. The secretariat general would transmit the lists to the powers. Going forward, the governments concerned shall notify the other powers for similar agreements and contracts within 60 days after their conclusion, while China would also notify the powers of information about such agreements and contracts.116

The controversy over the Chinese Eastern Railway At the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions there was also a discussion on the ownership and management of the Chinese Eastern Railway initiated by Hughes on January 18, for the United States had been worrying about Japan’s takeover of the railway after the decline of Russian influence in Manchuria. A subcommittee of experts was appointed to give recommendations on the issue. The United States had been considering placing the railway under the joint operation of the powers, and her representative had raised the proposal with the Chinese delegation before the first subcommittee meeting on January 19; however, after much dissuasion from the Chinese delegation, the U.S. expert refrained from explicitly proposing joint operation. Instead, the subcommittee made the following suggestions: (1) A finance committee to be established in Harbin to raise funds and

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to take charge of the management of the railway as a trustee. (2) The committee would not be involved in the technical operation of the railway. (3) The salaries and the control of the railway police force would also be shouldered by the committee. The proposal was opposed by the Chinese delegation, but the representatives from all other countries voted for it.117 By then, the new Soviet government had renounced the Russian rights respecting Chinese Eastern Railway (see chpater 3). The Beiyang government thus only desired to discuss the ownership of the railway with Russia rather than surrender it to the joint management of the powers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the Chinese delegation, stating: The railway is a matter between China and Russia, and now that Russia is absent from the Conference, it is inappropriate for the topic to be put forward, not to mention that the railway lies within Manchuria, which concerns our territorial sovereignty. As for the suggestion of the Committee Member of the United States, even though the first and third measures do not specify joint operation, they do provide for joint operation in effect, which violates our sovereignty right and shall not be recognized.118 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the Chinese delegation to negotiate with the foreign delegations, and if no consensus could be reached, make a declaration of rejection. Finally, because of China’s objection, the proposal of the technical committee was dropped. The resolution adopted only contained two clauses, requiring “better protection … to the Railway and the persons engaged in its operation and use, a more careful selection of personnel to secure efficiency of service, and a more economical use of funds to prevent waste of the property”; and reserving for the foreign powers the right “to insist hereafter upon the responsibility of China for performance or nonperformance the obligations toward the foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company.”119 China only acknowledged the first clause, and it turned out that thereafter, the foreign powers were never ever given the opportunity to exercise such a right.

The adoption of the Nine-Power Treaty On February 6, 1922, the final plenary session of the Washington Naval Conference adopted a Treaty between the Nine Powers Relating to Principles and Policies to be Followed in Matters Concerning China, or the Nine-Power Treaty as it is commonly known, which constituted the most important document outlying the

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principles regarding China. The document consisted of a total of nine articles, of which the Root principles as discussed formed the first. Article 2 read: “The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article 1.” The third to fifth articles concerned the Open Door principle, equality of opportunity in China, and the rejection of spheres of influence. Article 4 specified in particular: “The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.” Article 6 respected China’s right to remain neutral at war. Article 7 accentuated “full and frank communication” between the contracting powers in case any situation that would call for the application of the treaty arose, while the last two articles discussed questions relating to the addition of signatory powers and the ratification and coming into effect of the treaty.120

The restoration of Shandong China had always wanted to raise the Shandong question at the Washington Conference, hoping to bring Japan under U.S. and British pressure, while Japan had insisted on having the issue settled by China and Japan alone. At the beginning of the conference, the Chinese delegation proposed that the Shandong question be included in the agenda; however, China did not receive the support she had hoped for. Britain, as a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles, considered that if the Shandong question was to be discussed at the conference, she would either be bound to support Japan or deny the Shandong clauses of the treaty. For the United States, even though she did not sign the Versailles Treaty, she did not want to see a situation in which she alone backed China while all signatory powers supported Japan, and she was also worried that the Sino-Japanese dispute would ruin the conference altogether. Therefore, except for China, none of the powers in the conference agreed to include the topic into the agenda. The Chinese delegation then set out to look for chances of “peripheral” discussions alongside the conference. On November 17, Koo met with Balfour the British delegate and told him that the Chinese public preferred to bring the topic to the conference rather than direct Sino-Japanese negotiation. Balfour suggested that the Chinese and Japanese delegations try to reach a consensus by “conversations” outside the conference, and then submit the consensus to the conference to be adopted as a resolution. Understanding that there was no hope for the Shandong question to be discussed at the conference, Koo expressed the wish for the

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conversations to be initiated by Britain and the United States. On November 29, Sze and Koo asked for the presence of Hughes and Balfour at the first of the SinoJapanese conversations, and thereafter, that of representatives from their countries, in order to draw in Britain and the United States to mediate anticipated disputes. Sze also made it clear that any agreement reached during the conversations would have to be reported to the conference, and if any dispute went unsolvable, it would still have to be included in the agenda of the conference. Hughes and Balfour accepted the proposal of the Chinese delegation. On November 30, Hughes announced in the meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions that China and Japan’s disagreement over Shandong had been a long outstanding problem and to solve the problem, he and Balfour offered to mediate in the Sino-Japanese conversations.121 Thus, the Chinese and Japanese delegations began their “conversations” regarding Shandong outside the conference on December 1 with the participation of British and U.S. “observers.” The two major disagreements regarding the Shandong question were the restitution of the leased territory of Jiaozhou Bay and of the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway. The negotiation regarding the first dispute went more smoothly because Japan already agreed to the return of Jiaozhou Bay at the Paris Peace Conference. During the conversations, the Japanese delegation had requested compensation for and joint operation of public property in the leased territory. They categorized public properties into three groups: (1) those originally belonging to China and transferred to Germany at the time of lease; (2) those acquired or built by Germany during her lease, and (3) those acquired or built by Japan during her occupation. The Japanese delegates agreed to return the first group of property unconditionally, but asked for compensation for the return of the property in the second and third groups except for the consulate premises, a public cemetery, public schools, shrines, and jailhouses, which were to remain with the Japanese. Japan would also transfer infrastructural facilities such as roads, waterworks, parks, drainage, and sanitary equipment to China, conditioned by the establishment of a mixed committee for the maintenance and management of these facilities. The Japanese delegation also proposed that businesses of electric lights and telephone be operated by joint corporations with Chinese and foreign shareholders.122 The Chinese delegation expressed opposition to the principle of compensation, holding that compensation would render the action one of acquisition rather than restoration, but if Japan was willing to give up on the principle of compensation, then China could consider some exceptional public properties for the use of the Japanese residents. Eventually, the Chinese delegates conceded to the involvement of foreign residents in the municipal management of public utilities.123

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The Chinese and Japanese delegates had much fiercer debates in terms of the return of the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway because it was intertwined with other interests and thus was an important factor of continuing Japanese intervention in Shandong. At the beginning of the conversations, the Japanese delegates proposed that the railway be placed under the joint operation of the two countries; however, the Chinese delegates insisted on having China buy it back to operate on her own. The discussion thus shifted to the details of payment and the rights to which Japan were entitled before the redemption. The Japanese representatives advised China to borrow a loan from Japan, obviously intending to retain control over the railway until China paid off the loan. The Chinese delegation refused the proposal and insisted that China could pay in cash. Koo criticized that any country which forced any other to borrow unnecessary loans from her would be unreasonable.124 Later, considering China’s financial situation, the Chinese delegates proposed paying in installments with treasury notes. Regarding the repayment period, the Japanese delegates proposed 23 years, with an option of paying off the outstanding amount after 15 years, before which China would employ the chief engineer, chief accountant, and traffic manager recommended by the Japanese debtors. The Chinese delegates found the term too long and wanted to pay off the money in 10 years the latest, with allowance of full repayment after 3 years.125 The maximum compromise the Japanese delegates made was a 20-year term and the possibility of full repayment after 10 years, the proposal of treasury notes considerable, but the Chinese delegates insisted on their original proposal.126 Another sticking point was with the staffing of the posts of traffic manager and chief accountant, which both countries wanted taken up by their own subjects. Unable to make the Chinese delegation yield in Washington, Japan started to pressure the government in Beijing, or more precisely, the new cabinet under Liang Shiyi’s leadership. On December 27, Minister Obata in Beijing gave the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs an “admonition,” asserting that the assent to a Japanese loan for redeeming the railway was already the great concession possible, and the demand to employ Japanese as chief engineer and traffic manager were but common practice in railway loans. Obata questioned whether the intransigence of the Chinese delegation was backed by the Chinese government, and he asked the Beijing government to instruct the Chinese delegates to accommodate Japan’s desires for the sake of the overall good and early settlement.127 Liang consented to the Japanese loan proposal. Immediately, the Chinese delegates in Washington receded, agreeing to borrow a loan from Japan rather than pushing the installment plan. As soon as the news was disclosed, the Chinese people were indignant, and in no time Liang was ousted from power. The Chinese delegation then announced that they would not obey Liang’s order. However,

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as the Japanese attitude increasingly hardened, the two parties deadlocked. The Chinese delegates decided to seek mediation from the U.S. and British delegates. On January 9, 1922, Hughes and Balfour unofficially offered four proposals for China and Japan, with which both parties made some compromises. In another informal interview on January 22, based on the third proposal, which the Chinese delegates found more acceptable, the Japanese delegates came up with the following “compromise formula”: (1) China could redeem the railway by treasure notes over a term of 15 years, while after 5 years the whole outstanding liability could be settled. (2) The traffic manager would be Japanese, while there would be two chief accountants, one being Japanese and the other Chinese, of equal functions and responsibility. This plan, of course, was by no means satisfying to the Chinese delegates, especially the arrangement of a single Japanese traffic manager. However, Hughes and Balfour considered it a significant step back and persuaded the Chinese delegates to accept it in order to break the impasse.128 U.S. President Warren G. Harding, whom Sze called on January 25, also persuaded the Chinese delegates to accept the last proposal. He stated that China had agreed to the joint operation of the railway in the 1918 exchanges of notes, and it was out of U.S. opposition that Japan made a concession, which he believed to be maximal. China need not worry, according to Harding, about Japan’s domination of the management of the railway, because the Japanese traffic manager and the whole railway staff would be under the control of a Chinese director, and five years were in fact shorter than the period of Japanese occupation of Shandong. Harding also made Sze understand that if China rejected the proposal, then it would not be only five years until which China could drive off Japan.129 Meanwhile, in Beijing, the U.S. and British ministers to China worked to get the same message across the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that the prospect promised by the Hughes-Balfour proposal would be much better than the current situation in which Japan held Jiaozhou Bay and the mines in the railway zone, and that if China missed this chance, it would be no difference from giving up on the secured interest, and there would not be another conference that could help China again.130 On January 26, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorized the Chinese delegation to accept the proposal if there was no room for negotiation. It nonetheless emphasized that the final agreement must be reported to the Washington Conference, so as to make it a Washington resolution over which all participating countries had the responsibility to guarantee enforcement.131 After 36 meetings, China and Japan finally arrived at an agreement on January 31, 1922. On February 1, the Chinese and Japanese delegates reported to the .

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conference at its fifth plenary session, and Hughes, the chairman, read out the terms of settlement, annexes, and minutes of the Sino-Japanese conversations. After some final amendments in wordings, on February 4, the Chinese and Japanese delegates signed the Treaty for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shandong, which comprised 28 articles, an annex of 6 articles, and the Agreed Terms of Understanding Recorded in the Minutes of the Japanese and Chinese Delegations Concerning the Conclusion of the Treaty for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shandong. According to the treaty, Japan was to restore to China the former German leased territory of Jiaozhou, as well as transfer to the Chinese government all public properties, whether possessed by the German authorities or purchased or constructed by the Japanese authorities, including land, buildings, works or establishments in Jiaozhou, with the exception of properties required by the Japanese consulate or for the benefit of the Japanese community, including public schools, shrines, and cemeteries. China would not compensate for the transfer of public properties, but would refund a proportion of the expenses incurred by Japan for properties purchased, constructed, or renovated by the Japanese authorities. Foreign residents in Jiaozhou would be represented in the management and maintenance of the transferred public works, and public utilities were to be run by commercial companies formed under Chinese laws. Regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops, the troops stationed along the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway and its branches were to be withdrawn as soon as the Chinese police and military force took over, possibly within three months and no later than six months from the signature of the treaty, whereas the garrison in Qingdao was to be withdrawn simultaneously with the restoration of Jiaozhou to China or within 30 days the latest. The Custom House of Qingdao was to be made part of the Chinese Maritime Customs, with which the provisional Sino-Japanese agreement of August 6, 1915 relating to the Qingdao customs would be annulled. The Chinese government would permit Japanese traders to communicate with the Qingdao customs in Japanese and would consider the “diverse needs” of the trade in Qingdao in the employment of customs staff (which was an ambiguous assent to the Japanese demand for more Japanese members). China declared by the treaty the opening of the entire area of the former German leased territory to foreign trade and residence, as well as the respect for “vested rights lawfully and equitably acquired by foreign nationals,” while Japan renounced the preferential rights in foreign assistance in terms of persons, capital, and material stipulated in the 1898 Sino-German treaty. Concerning postal and electrical communications, Japan would transfer all her wireless stations in Qingdao and Jinan in exchange

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for some compensation at the withdrawal of Japanese troops from those areas, and also withdraw all her post offices in Jiaozhou at the same time of its restoration. Finally, with regard to the most contentious railway question, Japan was to transfer the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway and its branches, along with their properties, to China, which was to reimburse to Japan the 53,406,141 gold marks assessed for the original properties left over by Germany plus an amount equivalent to Japan’s spending on improvements or additions less allowance for depreciation. The transfer was to take place within nine months after the treaty came into effect, simultaneously with China’s payment by treasury notes, which were to be guaranteed by the properties and revenues of the railway and run for a term of 15 years; but China had the choice of repaying the outstanding sum at the end of five years. Before the redemption of the treasury notes, China had to appoint Japanese to be traffic manager and co-chief accountant, the latter of which had coordinate functions with a Chinese counterpart; but they were all to be placed under the “direction, control and supervision” of a Chinese managing director, who had the power to replace them and appoint their subordinate staff not necessarily from the Japanese. Upon the takeover of the railway, the retention and removal of the present Japanese employees would be at the full discretion of the Chinese authorities. The mines in the railway zone for which Germany had been granted mining rights were to be handed over to a newly formed company with the portion of Japanese capital not exceeding that of Chinese capital.132 The opposition government in Guangzhou was severely disappointed and critical of the Beiyang government’s concession. On February 9, the Guangzhou government announced rejection of the treaty, and on the following day, Wu Tingfang, the minister of foreign affairs of the Guangzhou government, wired Ma Soo (Ma Su), its representative in Washington, instructing him to proclaim at the conference that the Guangzhou government would not recognize the new treaty on the ground that the Jianzhou–Jinan Railway was constructed by the Germans, which, as China had declared war on China, should then belong to China along with all other German properties; Japan had no right to inherit German properties and China had no obligation to redeem them for Germany.133 In December 1922, the Japanese troops withdrew from Qingdao. In late January, 1923, Japan transferred the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway to China. In May, the Japanese soldiers stationed along the railway also withdrew, and Shandong, a Chinese territory that had been occupied by Japan for over seven years, was finally returned to China. The restoration of Shandong invalidated the Shandong clauses in the 1915 agreements. But Japan insisted that the rest of the agreements were still effective. According to the 1898 Sino-Russian treaty relating to the lease of Port Arthur and

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Dalian and the 1905 Sino-Japanese treaty relating to Manchuria, the 25-year lease term of Port Arthur would expire in March 1923; however, the 1915 agreements prescribed that the lease be extended to 99 years. Based on this, Japan insisted that Port Arthur should not be retroceded until 1997. Japan’s attitude aroused strong opposition in China. On November 1, 1922, the House of Representatives of the Beiyang government passed a motion regarding the declaration of annulment of the 1915 agreements. On January 9, 1923, the Legislation Court also passed the motion and pressed the government to take corresponding action. What followed were mass rallies throughout the country, and a panoply of telegrams and declarations from community organizations. On March 10, the Beiyang government declared to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese minister in Beijing the cancellation of the 1915 agreements, together with a call for the restoration of Port Arthur and Dalian, to which Japan promptly rejected.

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Chapter

The Establishment of New Sino-Russian Relations and the Antiimperialistic Program of the Guangzhou Government

The Establishment of New Sino-Russian Relations and the Anti-imperialistic Program of the Guangzhou Government

While the western powers were bargaining with China on the relinquishment of their privileges, the new Soviet regime in Russia decided to take a leap forward and voluntarily abrogate the unequal treaties the former Tsarist Empire had entered into with China. The renunciation tore open the web of unequal treaties that had tightly bound China. Internally, it also had significant ramifications on China’s domestic political situation.

The Abrogation of Sino-Russian Unequal Treaties The slow reaction of the Beiyang Government towards the two Soviet manifestos In November 1917, the Bolshevik October Revolution broke out, and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was established. Upon its establishment, the new Soviet government issued a “Decree on Peace,” announcing its cessation of secret diplomacy. Soon, it declared the annulment of all confidential treaties concluded by the Tsarist Russian Empire with China, Japan, and other Allies, and the desire to return to the Chinese people everything that was taken from them by the Tsarist government. It also offered to negotiate with China the abrogation of the 1896 Li-Lobanov Treaty, the terms regarding Russia in the Boxer Protocol, and all Russo-Japanese agreements regarding China concluded from 1907 to 1916. However, in the early days, the diplomatic corps of the Allies thought that the Bolsheviks could not represent the whole Russia, nor were they sure that the rule of the Bolsheviks could last long. Therefore, the Allies did not immediately recognize the Soviet regime and only maintained unofficial communication with it when necessary. The Beiyang government also took a similar stance. To avoid diplomatic meetings with the Soviet government, China’s minister to Russia Liu Jingren merely sent the secretary of the embassy to informally contact Soviet diplomatic officials. In February 1918, following the decisions of the Allies, the Beiyang government withdrew its minister from Russia. Soon, the unofficial contact between the two governments also lapsed. On July 4, 1918, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Goergy V. Chicherin explicated the Soviet policy to the Eastern nations at the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, proclaiming that Soviet Russia was ready to give up her privileges in East Asia and would work together with the Far Eastern peoples to eliminate inequality and make it possible for them to regain their lost freedom. In relation to China, he vowed to “renounce the conquests of the Tsarist Government in Manchuria and … restore the sovereign rights of China in this territory, in which lie[d] the principle

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artery — the Chinese Eastern Railway,” to “recall all military consular guards,” and to “renounce all indemnities” from China.1 In the summer of 1919, the Red Army routed Alexander Kolchak’s White Army and marched to Siberia and the Russian Far East. To wipe out the White Army and break out of the isolation from the West, the Soviet government decided to rebuild Sino-Russian relations. On July 25, 1919, it publicized a “Declaration to the Chinese Nation and the Governments of Southern and Northern China,” signed L. (Lev) Karakhan, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs — the first Karakhan manifesto — stating that Soviet Russia would relinquish the Chinese Eastern Railway and all mining concessions, forestry, and gold mines seized from China “without compensation of any kind” and “renounce the receipt of the Boxer Indemnity.” As far as extraterritoriality was concerned, it was stipulated: “The Soviet Government abolishes all special privileges and gives up all factories owned by Russian merchants on Chinese soil. No one Russian official, priest, or missionary shall be able to interfere in Chinese affairs, and if he commits a crime, he should be subject to the justice of the local courts. In China there should be no authorities and no courts except the authorities and courts of the Chinese people.” Finally, the Soviet government also suggested that China send plenipotentiaries to Russia to “discuss all other questions” and establish friendly relations.2 Because of communications hurdles posed by the occupation of the White Army in Siberia, coupled with the economic blockade and military intervention of the Western powers, the manifesto did not reach China until the Red Army marched to Siberia and took hold of Irkutsk. On March 3, M. Yanson, a Soviet representative from the People’s Republic of Siberia and the Far East, conveyed a French version of the manifesto in a diplomatic note to the Chinese consulate in Irkutsk, which was received by the Beiyang government on March 26. Meanwhile, Soviet Russia also published the manifesto in newspapers and handed it to the Chinese consular in Vladivostok and Zhang Silin, a lieutenant general in Harbin under the Frontier Defense Bureau (duban bianfang chu 督辦邊防處).3 After the frustration at Paris, the Chinese people were rather thrilled at the news, and numerous organizations sent telegrams of gratitude to the Soviet government. The Chinese Industrial Association (zhonghua shiye xiehui 中華實業協 會) hailed emotionally: “This accomplishment, unprecedented in world history, is so great that it shall wipe off all international crimes in the world and lay a broad foundation for solidarity and cooperation among all nations.”4 Many Chinese newspapers praised the manifesto, and called for the Beiyang government to “retrieve all rights restored by the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government according to its diplomatic note,” and “officially build friendly relations with the Russian

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Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and cooperate with the people of Russia in endeavoring to eliminate international subjugation as well as national, racial, and class disparities.”5 However, the Beiyang government was not half as enthusiastic. It had its own concerns. As an important official commented: “The diplomacy of weak countries is for want of strength per se, and is highly dependent on the relations of international powers. In the present situation, there are many obstacles to taking isolated action, which may land China in a disadvantaged position.”6 The deepest fear of the Beiyang government was an undesirable response from Japan. The Chinese consular in Vladivostok, Shao Hengrui, once expressed to a Soviet official that China would be glad to build friendly relations with Russia, but China’s international position was different from other countries and her every move was the under close surveillance of Japan.7 Aside from these concerns, the Beiyang government was also skeptical about the Soviet offer. As its State Council stated in a telegram to the provinces on April 29, 1920: Even though the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government has issued in its diplomatic note a manifesto that offers to restitute all rights … it remains questionable whether it is dependable, and we are now carefully investigating the matter. If the Government truly has full power and its offer is indeed authentic, we should definitely seize the opportunity to negotiate with it in the hope of recovering our national rights.8 Moreover, some officials considered the Soviet offer unnecessary and meaningless because the Soviet government was simply relinquishing what did not belong to it at all. Chen Lu, the then acting vice foreign minister once expressed to the Japanese minister in Beijing who came to inquire the Chinese attitude: As far as the items in the manifesto are concerned, take for example the Boxer Indemnity: there is no point in waiting for the faction to relinquish it as it should not in any case be paid it; as for consular jurisdiction, it is equally pointless to discuss at the present stage whether or not they will be subject to Chinese law as any member of the faction shall not in any circumstance be permitted to enter Chinese territory. He also told the Japanese minister that the Chinese government would not respond to the Soviets in an explicit way.9 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as demonstrated in its wire to Wellington Koo on April 7, was of the opinion that the Soviets’ aim

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of relinquishing the Boxer Indemnity was to cut off the diplomatic financial source of the old government, and for consular jurisdiction: “although it is in accord with the principle of equity, the influence of the Party has yet to reach the Russian merchants and officials in China, making it hard for the offer to be effectuated in the meantime.”10 While the Beiyang government was still hesitant, the local government of Xinjiang in Ili had already started negotiations with the Soviets. On May 27, 1920, representatives from the Turkestan Soviet Republic and Xinjiang signed a commercial agreement based on 10 resolutions adopted by a conference held in Ili, providing for the establish of an organization for bilateral commercial and foreign affairs. In addition, for movement of merchandise between Ili and Russia, duty was to be paid to the Chinese Customs according to the Xinjiang Combined Tax Regulations; and commercial disputes or other civil and criminal cases involving both Chinese and Russians would “uniformly be decided and disposed of in accordance with the law of the country in which they reside[d].”11 Thus, Russian tariff control and extraterritoriality was officially put to an end in Xinjiang. To assess the situation, the Beiyang government decided to send an unofficial mission to Russia. In June 1920, a mission headed by Lieutenant General Zhang Silin, dispatched by the Frontier Defense Bureau, arrived in the pro-Bolshevik Far Eastern Republic, and although Zhang was not accredited as plenipotentiary representative by the Beiyang government, the mission was warmly received by the Far Eastern government. After that, Zhang was invited by the Soviet government to visit Moscow. Zhang reached in Moscow in September. Again, the delegation was greeted with high-level reception, led by Chicherin himself, despite the lack of plenary powers. Observing the urgent desire of the Soviet government to establish friendly relations with China, he suggested many times that the Beiyang government seize the precious opportunity. In a telegram to the Office of the Commissioner of Border Affairs on September 15, he said that the international status of Soviet Russia had been strengthening, and countries like Italy had already signed provisional commercial treaties with the Soviet government. He also noted that China, as a country bordering Russia, had experienced how Russia had been “an infamously tough nation in negotiations,” and now that the new Russian government was eager to express its goodwill and “would not hesitate to accede to all kinds of compromises,” China should take advantage of the opportunity as it depended on “just one present move to recover the lost sovereign rights.” Not vested with plenary powers, he asked the Beiyang government to send over full written credentials as soon as possible “lest the opportunity should be lost.”12

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In addition, Zhang also noticed that Outer Mongolia and the Hui people of Xinjiang had secretly sent representatives to Russia and thought the situation suspicious. On September 18, Zhang wired Beijing, urging it to conclude agreements with the Soviet government: “China stands every chance to gain from the Soviet offer to cancel all old Russian treaties. If we refuse [to accept the Soviet offer], not only will we let slip a golden opportunity but the Soviets will think we are too cowardly. If they change their policy and ally with Mongolia, and sign pacts with other countries to plot against China’s interests, the danger would be even greater.”13 However, all that Zhang received from the Beiyang government was an order to return to China immediately. Unaware of the limited power of the Chinese delegation, the Soviet government was nonetheless dissatisfied. Hoping to accelerate the process of negotiation, Karakhan presented a second manifesto to the Chinese delegation on September 27, 1920, addressed “To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Republic,” furthering the principles laid down in his first manifesto. It was given in eight points: 1. The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics declares as void all the treaties concluded by the former Government of Russia with China, renounces all the annexations of Chinese territory, all the concessions in China, and returns to China free of charge, and forever, all that was ravenously taken from her by the Tsar’s Government and by the Russian bourgeoisie. 2. The Governments of the two Republics shall apply all the necessary means as to immediate establishment of regular commercial and economic relations. Eventually a special treaty shall be concluded, involving the principle of most favored treatment for both contracting parties. 3. The Chinese Government undertakes: (1) not to render any assistance to private persons, groups or organizations of the Russian counterrevolutionaries, and not to tolerate their activities on its territory; and (2) to disarm, intern and deliver to the Government of the RSFSR all the troops and organizations fighting the RSFSR or its allies, and found on the territory of China at the moment of the signing of the present treaty, and to hand to the Government of the RSFSR all their arms, provisions and property. The Government of the RSFSR undertakes similar obligations in regard to persons or organizations carrying on mutinous activities against the Chinese Republic. 4. All citizens of Russia residing in China must abide by all the laws and regulations in force in the territory of the Chinese Republic and shall not enjoy any rights of extraterritoriality whatever; Chinese citizens, residing in

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5.

6.

7.

8.

Russia, must similarly abide by all the laws and regulations in force on the territory of Russia. The Government of the Chinese Republic undertakes: (1) immediately upon the signing of the present treaty to discontinue relations with the individuals claiming for themselves the titles of diplomatic and consular representatives of the State of Russia and having no credentials from the Government of the RSFSR and to deport them from China; and (2) to return to the State of Russia, as represented by the Government of the RSFSR, all the buildings of the Embassy and consulates belonging to Russia in the territory of China as well as other property and archives of the Embassy and the consulates. The Government of the RSFSR declines to receive any compensation, payable by China for the Boxer Rebellion, provided that the Government of the Chinese Republic will not distribute the said payments to the Russian consuls or any other persons or Russian organizations unlawfully claiming them. Immediately upon the signing of the present treaty reciprocal diplomatic and consular representation of the Chinese Republic and the RSFSR shall be established. The Russian and the Chinese Governments agree to conclude a special treaty as for the rules and regulations of exploitation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for the needs of the RSFSR. In the making of said treaty, besides China and Russia, the Far Eastern Republic shall also participate.14

Against the wishes of Zhang and the Soviet government, the Beiyang government insisted on recalling the Chinese delegation. The Soviets, though disappointed, demonstrated their enthusiasm by honoring the Chinese representatives with a grand farewell; even Lenin was present. Zhang brought the original copy of the Karakhan note back to China, but the Beiyang government did not reply the Soviet government until February 1, 1921, when it expressed willingness to look for opportunities of negotiation. At about the same time Zhang was visiting Soviet Russia, the Far Eastern Republic also sent a delegation to China, headed by Ignatius L. Yurin (Yourin), for establishing trade relations. However, when it arrived in Kyakhta in July 1920, the Beiyang government, then controlled by the Anhui clique, was afraid of annoying the foreign powers, especially Japan, and refused to issue entry documents to the Russians. Later, a turning point was brought by a coincidental change in power as the Zhili clique defeated the Anhui clique and gained control of the government, which began to get rid of Japanese influence in Sino-Russian relations. By then, Britain and Italy had commenced commercial negotiations with Soviet Russia, and

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the Beiyang government finally agreed to receive Yurin informally as commissioner for trade. Not all powers were positive about the Sino-Russian contact, though. For instance, French Minister to China Auguste Boppe warned China against any political negotiation with Soviet Russia and insinuated that the aim of the Yurin mission was to persuade China to recognize the Soviet government. The Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that Yurin was coming as a commissioner for trade and therefore the Chinese government would only negotiate with him on economic matters, reassuring that China was of the same stance as other countries in terms of the recognition of the Soviet government. Japan, as expected, was most resistant in raising objection. Obata, the Japanese minister to China, protested to Beijing that China should not receive any Soviet representative but should take exactly the same stance as the other Allies. In reply, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied any obligation to be bound by the Allies’ decision succeeding the signature of the peace treaties and argued that negotiations with Russia were essential because the two countries adjoined each other.15 On August 26, the Yurin mission arrived in Beijing. The purposes of the mission, as presented by Yurin, were mainly related to the improvement of trade relations, but he did make mentions of the revision of treaty terms, the renunciation of treaty rights, and denied the status of the Tsarist diplomatic and consular officials.16

Foreign powers’ opposition to the cancellation of the rights of Tsarist Russia After close to three years watching from the sidelines, the Beiyang government finally decided that the Tsarist Empire would never again be restored, and it also found many problems with the administration of the Russians residing in China by the diplomatic and consular officials of the moribund regime. Therefore, the Beiyang government decided to take action to restore some of its sovereign rights from the Russians. On September 21, 1920, the Ministry of the Interior issued two sets of rules and regulations regarding the administration of the Russians residing in China and the takeover of the Russian concessions in Tianjin and Hankou. Accordingly, the Russians living in China were to obey the existing and future laws, rules, and regulations of China. The police chiefs of Tianjin and Hankou were to be the acting supervisors of the Russian concessions, taking charge of all police and administrative affairs, executing police and administrative penalties, and supervising matters pertaining self-government; any decision of the meetings of self-government of the concessions had to be approved by them. Moreover, all the existing rules and

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regulations governing the concessions, including the police regulations and rules of taxation, were to remain in force, but those that were in conflict with the present Chinese laws were to be terminated or revised.17 On September 23, the Beiyang government issued a presidential mandate, in which it stated that Sino-Russian diplomatic relations could not be restored for the time being because Russia had for a few years been torn by hostile camps and internecine warfare without being able to form a central government, and hence the original Russian minister and consular officials in China, who had “long since lost the competency to represent their county and [could] no longer continue to perform the duties which [were] charged with responsibility,” would ceased to be recognized. As an additional note, the Beiyang government also expressed: In regard to Russia’s internal strife, we shall continue to maintain a strict neutrality, and assume the same attitude towards her as the Allied and Associated Powers. As to all matters in connection with the Russian Settlements, the Railway Zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and Russian subjects in this country, they shall be dealt with by the Ministries and the Chief Officials of the Provinces concerned.18 At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the provincial authorities by wire about the termination of recognition for all Russian consuls: “The current Russian consular officials were all sent by the old Russian government. In pursuance of the Mandate of the President, all Provinces shall cease to treat all local Russian Consular Officials as such, while all matters pertaining the protection and governance of Russian subjects in China shall be maintained by local special commissioners or negotiators.”19 For the administration of the Russian concessions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to appoint commissioners to take the place of the Russian consuls. From then on, all disputes and civil and criminal cases involving Russians were to be tried by Chinese courts, with a modus vivendi to be drafted separately by the Ministry of Justice.20 In its telegram to the Manchurian chief officials, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically instructed: “The administration of the Railway Zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be restored immediately…. A declaration shall be made immediately to close the Russian Inspection Hall.”21 With this, the provincial governments set out to take over the Russian consulates, and Russian consular jurisdiction in China was abolished. In late September, the Zhili and Hubei governments assumed control of the Russian concessions in Tianjin and Hankou. On September 27, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent Huang Rongliang, its special negotiator for Zhili, and Yang Yide, the Zhili police chief, to the Municipal

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Council of the Russian concession in Tianjin. Huang announced that he was there to execute the command of the Beiyang government to restore the concession under Chinese rule. As symbolic acts, the Russian flag hoisted above the clock tower of the Municipal Council was replaced with that of the Republic of China, and the guards originally under the charge of the Municipal Council changed into the uniforms of the Chinese police. The Beiyang government also dispatched additional hundredor-so security guards to the concession to help maintain order.22 However, the takeover of the Russian concession in Hankou was not as smooth. The Russian consular general in Hankou, Andrew Beltchenko, asked the Chinese government to permit his continuing administration until a new consulate was set up by a Russian government recognized by the powers. When the Chinese negotiator, Wu Zhongxian, arrived to carry out the handover, Beltchenko refused to submit, claiming support from local Russians, until the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dispatched a representative to supervise it. In late October, the Chinese government established a Temporary Office for the Administration of the Russian Concession, appointing Wu to be the chief; Zhou Ji Yun, the police chief, to be the deputy chief; and Beltchenko to be the advisor.23 To prevent the Chinese Eastern Railway zone from being a Russian battleground, the Beiyang government had dispatched troops to the area and disbanded the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies in Harbin by the end of 1917. In March 1920, the Chinese government further disbanded all Russian political authorities in the railway zone as well as the railway guards, restoring Chinese administrative rights over the area. In addition, China also restored part of her jurisdiction of the railway zone, such that all Chinese cases related or unrelated to the railway were to be tried by Chinese courts, mixed cases were to be tried by the county magistrate concerned according to the corresponding procedure law, and cases involving only Russians would remain under the jurisdiction of Russian consuls. After recognition for Russian diplomatic and consular officials was withheld, in October, China completely restored her jurisdiction over the railway zone and established several courts to replace the Russian ones. Hostile towards Soviet Russia, the Western powers were trying to thwart the emerging regime by military intervention and economic sanction. At the same time, they were clearly unhappy with China’s actions, not so much because they were sympathetic towards Russian interests as they were worried about the loss of vested treaty rights. While they could accept the Chinese abrogation of the treaties with Germany and Austria out of declaration of war, China’s unilateral abolition of Russian treaty rights struck a sensitive nerve: the powers were alarmed by the prospect of a fundamental challenge to the treaty system in the near future.

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On September 25, 1920, French Minister Boppe visited Chinese Foreign Minister W. W. Yen, requesting that China discuss with other countries before cancelling the diplomatic status of the Russian minister and consular officials and have all issues concerned handled by Chinese officials together with relevant consuls from other countries. Yen did not give a direct answer, only replying that China had no intention to alter the status of the Russian concessions and would continue to protect foreigners’ life and property, and China would be willing to discuss with the powers in case of any dissatisfaction in the future. This amounted to a rejection of the French demand.24 On October 1, Wellington Koo called on the U.S. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and explained that China had to suspend the Russian minister and consuls because for one thing, the Russian consuls were incapable of administrating the Russians in China, and for another, the expenses of the Russian consulates had been completely dependent on the Boxer Indemnity, which China was not sure the new government would acknowledge. China therefore decided to stop paying the indemnity. However, the Department of State opined that even though China’s concerns were justifiable, she might not benefit from abrogating the Russian rights granted by treaties in times of Russia’s plight as this would deter foreign investors. He also added that a foreign minister had proposed joint administration of the Russian rights in China until the Russian political situation was stabilized, which the United States did not favor, but China’s current action would provide an excuse for such a plan. Koo replied that China had no intention of impairing Russians’ rights or confiscating Russian property and capital in China, and the only change was with the consular jurisdiction.25 Indeed, China’s abolition of the Russian rights was met with the opposition of the diplomatic corps in Beijing. To begin with, on October 2, the diplomatic corps arranged a meeting regarding the management of the property of the Russian legation. The meeting resolved that according to the Boxer Protocol, the Legation Quarter was a special zone and China had no right to take over Russian property in the Legation Quarter, which should be temporarily managed by the diplomatic corps before being handed over to a universally recognized new Russian government when it sent its mission to China. The diplomatic corps decided to place the Russian legation under the trusteeship of the Tsarist minister, Prince Nikolai A. Kudashev, until he left Beijing. On October 4, Spanish Minister to China and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps Luis Pastor de Mora informed W. W. Yen about the decision of the meeting and the Beiyang government accepted it.26 Next, the diplomatic corps interfered in the takeover of the Russian consulates in China. According to the diplomatic corps, the Russian consuls had lost their power and functions, so they had no right of transferring the consulate premises,

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which were the properties of the Russian government, to China. It also held that some of the Russian consulates lied within other foreign concessions, over which Chinese officials had no power of direct control. On November 11, Pastor de Mora proposed to Yen that all properties of the Russian consulates be recorded in a list and transferred to the diplomatic corps, and then the consular corps in treaty ports for restitution to local Chinese officials; and properties in places where local Chinese authorities were not available would be under the temporary custody of the consular corps, while where no consular corps was present, local Chinese officials could handle the transfer on behalf of the diplomatic corps. China accepted the proposal.27 On November 17, Yen communicated to the British acting minister that China had no desire to question the voluntary transfer of any Russian consulate not yet taken over by China to the diplomatic corps by the Russian consuls, although those that had already been taken over by China would be retained as they were.28 The diplomatic corps also protested against the replacement of Russian courts in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone and the Chinese takeover of police affairs in the Russian Tianjin concession. According to the diplomatic corps, it was a most significant jurisdictional treaty right that any civilian or criminal cases involving Russians were tried according to Russian laws, but the Regulations Relating to the Courts in the Special District of the Three Eastern Provinces issued on October 31, by placing Russians under the jurisdiction of Chinese courts, aimed at the cancellation of extraterritoriality in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone. Likewise, the diplomatic corps viewed the control of police forces in foreign concessions as an important aspect of administrative power of the municipal councils, and China’s direct control of the police in the Russian Tianjin concession as a brutal violation of rules, which might give rise to misunderstanding on the part of other foreign residents in the concession that they could also be affected. To remedy, it demanded that the police forces of the Russian concessions be administered by their original municipal councils, which would continue to function according to the existing system, and as far as extraterritoriality was concerned, all Russian employees of the Russian courts be retained and the Russian courts exercise their judicial power in the name of the Republic of China following Russian laws, for trying cases involving Russians. The principle of the diplomatic corps was to preserve extraterritoriality.29 The Beiyang government generally acceded. On December 29, Yen gave assent to the continuation of all rules and regulations of the Municipal Council of the Russian Tianjin concession. As for the Hankou concession, Beltchenko retained his administrative and police powers despite his loss of diplomatic status, while the Russian legation premise went under the charge of Dutch Minister Plenipotentiary William J. Oudendijk after the departure of Prince Kudashev in January 1921.30

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The 1924 Sino–Soviet Agreement As mentioned before, when the Yurin mission arrived in China, the Beiyang government was not quite enthusiastic. Yurin’s request of meeting Yen was turned down, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs just arranged for Liu Jingren, the former minister to Tsarist Russia, to meet unofficially with Yurin. The first unofficial meeting did not take place until November 30, 1920. On that day, Yurin sent the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs a diplomatic note in which he stated five points as the basis for negotiation, namely: 1. All unequal treaties and agreements between China and Tsarist Russia to be abrogated, all nonreciprocal privileges should be cancelled, and diplomatic relations between the two countries should be built completely on the principle of equality. 2. New consulates of the Far Eastern Republic to be set up in China as soon as possible. 3. China to deny the claims of the Russo-Asiatic Bank on the Chinese Eastern Railway. 4. A commercial treaty to be signed to provide for commercial activities between the two countries. 5. Sino-Russian diplomatic relations to be restored. With regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway, Yurin stated that the interests, rights, and obligations of the railway should be “fully guaranteed in accordance with the principle of mutual justice.”31 This implied that the Soviets did not intend to relinquish these rights. The informal negotiations carried on until February 1921 and ended without achieving any significant result. In April 1921, the negotiations were resumed at the request of Yurin. By then, Soviet Russia had achieved considerable diplomatic successes, having concluded treaties of friendship with Persia and Afghanistan as well as a commercial agreement with Britain. Therefore, the Beiyang government decided to have Yen officially receive the Yurin mission. On April 30, Yurin proposed a draft commercial agreement between China and the Far Eastern Republic. In the negotiation on May 13, Yen expressed agreement to Yurin’s draft in principle. In terms of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Yurin stated that after the conclusion of the commercial treaty, it might be either completely returned to China or jointly operated by China and the Far Eastern Republic, which did not necessarily have to inherit all rights to the railway from the moribund Tsarist government. Asked whether the Soviet government would object to the handling of the Far Eastern Republic, Yurin reassured Yen that it “would not disagree.”32

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All seemed to be smooth and promising until Yurin was abruptly recalled on May 18 to take the office of minister of foreign affairs. To complicate the situation further, in June, the troops of the Far Eastern Republic and Soviet Russia entered Outer Mongolia in pursuit of the White Army without seeking China’s permission, and in July, they occupied Urga in collaboration with the Mongolian Revolutionary Army. The Beiyang government, which had wanted to keep Mongolia under its rule from the outset and opposed Mongolian independence, was clearly displeased. Therefore when Yurin visited Beijing again as the Far Eastern Republic’s foreign minister on July 23 to resume negotiations for the commercial treaty and for establishing diplomatic ties, he fell much out of favor with the Chinese government. Despite his repeated urge for the early establishment of commercial relations between the two countries, Yen made it plain that if the Mongolian and Chinese Easter Railway questions were settled soon, it would not take more than two or three weeks to resolve the commercial terms.33 However, because the Far Eastern Republic refused to withdraw its troops from Outer Mongolia, the negotiation failed to make any substantial progress. In October, Yurin returned home. Although the Far Eastern Republic was a buffer state largely controlled by Soviet Russia, Soviet Russia was not completely at ease to have a Far Eastern Republic representative negotiate with China about the Russian rights, especially when it came to important topics such as the Chinese Eastern Railway. Even during Yurin’s first stay in China, Moscow cabled Beijing via the Chinese consul: “Yurin is a Representative of the Far Eastern Republic, which is only a neighboring state of the Soviet Workers and Peasants Republic, and has no right to represent the Soviet Workers and Peasants Republic; nor has he been so instructed. My government hereby declares that it negotiates directly with other powers.”34 The Soviet government proposed sending a representative to directly negotiate with China. However, the Beiyang government insisted that the representative could only be an unofficial one and could not inherit the title of the former Russian minister, and his delegation could not propagate doctrines that were “incompatible with Chinese social life.”35 It was at the end of half a year of negotiation that the two countries reached an understanding: in October 1921, the Beiyang government consented to the reception of a Soviet trade representative. Immediately, on October 24, Soviet Russia dispatched her first plenipotentiary extraordinary to China, Aleksandr K. Paikes, who, despite his overt identity as chief of a trade mission, was vested with the responsibility of bringing up the trickiest questions between China and the Soviet state. In December, Paikes arrived in Harbin and said to the press about Outer Mongolia:

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Soviet Russia never had nor has any aggressive designs. The advance of Soviet forces into Mongolian territory was imperative owing to the necessity of suppressing the threatening White Guard bandits, as the Chinese Government was not in a position to cope with them in spite of its promise. It goes without saying that our forces will be withdrawn as soon as the danger from organizations in Mongolia, which are hostile to Soviet Russia, is removed. He also remarked on the Chinese Eastern Railway, saying that the Soviet government “recognize[d] the sovereign rights of China over the railway as well as the entire railway zone.”36 What Paikes did not mention was that the Soviet government secretly signed a secret treaty with Outer Mongolia on November 5 which recognized it as the “sole legal authority of Mongolia.”37 The negotiation between Paikes and the Beiyang government started in January 1922. The topic that concerned the Beiyang government most was China’s sovereignty in Outer Mongolia; it was in its firm belief that the settlement of this question was the precondition for further talks, which was evident from the fact that Beijing appointed its commissioner for restoring Urga, General Li Yuan, to be the negotiator. As for Paikes, he was most eager to settle the dispute regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, anxious that the other powers would intervene at the concurrent Washington Naval Conference. The pace of negotiation, as it turned out, moved far slower than Paikes would have desired because the Beiyang government was domestically tangled up in factional conflicts between the Zhili and Anhui cliques while externally busy reclaiming Chinese rights at Washington, such that no formal talks had been arranged by the end of March. In April, the Beiyang government secured substantive details about the Soviet-Mongolian treaty of November 1921; and on May 1, it launched a solemn protest to Paikes against the Soviet government’s secret diplomacy with Outer Mongolia, for “[breaking] faith with its previous declarations,”38 and later suspended the unofficial negotiations. As Paikes failed to make a breakthrough, the Soviet government decided to dispatch another representative to Beijing in July 1922: Adolph A. Joffe, an experienced and iconic diplomat, plenipotentiary at the negotiation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Joffe met with Wellington Koo, then the new minister of foreign affairs, to discuss the start of official negotiations as soon as he arrived in Beijing in August. Koo held that the Red Army’s immediate withdrawal from Outer Mongolia would be the prerequisite for official talks, but Joffe insisted on an immediate commencement of official discussions, where the Mongolian question and other unsettled issues could be put forward.

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In September, Joffe left for Changchun to negotiate with the Japanese about the evacuation of Japanese troops in the Russian Far East, without success. Shortly after returning to Beijing, in October, Joffe refused to receive guests on the pretext of sickness, and although he continued to communicate with the Chinese government through diplomatic notes and dispatches, the chasm between the two parties remained wide. While China insisted on an immediate and unconditional retreat of the Soviet troops, Joffe maintained that the time for a withdrawal had yet to arrive because the White Army was still a menace. In terms of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Koo urged the Soviet government to fulfill its two manifestos and return the railway to China without demanding compensation; however, Joffe contended that the Soviet government had never given such a promise. At this, Joffe gave a new interpretation to the Karakhan manifestos, holding that it would be a “misunderstanding” and “quite wrong” to infer from the manifestos the Soviet government’s promise to renounce all the Russian interests in China, and that while the Soviet government renounced the “predatory and violent policy” of the Tsarist government, it did not annul Russia’s “legal and just interests in China” such as those pertaining the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was, according to Soviet Russia, “a portion of the Great Siberian Railroad.” Particularly noteworthy is that Joffe threatened for the first time: “unless the Chinese Government discontinues its ignoring of the Russian interests, Russia will, perhaps, after all, be obliged to consider herself free from those promises which she voluntarily gave.”39 Later, speaking of the railway question in his address presented at a Beijing banquet for celebrating the Soviet October Revolution, Joffe stated outright that the Soviet government “must inevitably accept this only heritage of the Tsar’s regime.”40 As negotiations with the Beiyang government stalled into January, Joffe excused himself “for reasons of health” and went to Shanghai with the real agenda of meeting Sun Yat-sen.41 On January 26, the two signed the “Joint Manifesto of Sun Yat-sen and A. A. Joffe,” the only fruit of the Soviet envoy’s visit to China, and on the day following its publication, Joffe went to Japan to settle the SovietJapanese disputes. It was now the Beiyang government’s turn to be eager to strengthen connections with the Russian Soviet government, now victorious from the civil war and established as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was alarmed that SovietJapanese amity would result in secret diplomacy against China’s interests. In March, the Beiyang government set up a Sino-Russian Negotiation Commission, appointed former Minister of Foreign Affairs C. T. Wang as director general, and cabled the Soviet government inviting Joffe to return to Beijing. However, there was no sign of Joffe’s return.

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In July, the Soviet government finally responded. It dispatched to China the author of the two Karakhan manifestos, who, still holding the office of the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was prestigious both in the Soviet Union and China. Two days after his arrival in Beijing, on September 4, he issued a third declaration to the local press, repeating what he had said in the interview on September 2. Once again he reaffirmed the 1919 and 1920 manifestos as the guiding principles of Soviet policy to China; however, the unreserved generosity of his previous statements was now overshadowed by an additional note: “not in any measure do we renounce our interests in China so far as these do not infringe upon the sovereignty and interests of the Chinese people.”42 It is apparent that the Soviets’ stance on Russian rights in China had changed, and this was connected with the improvement in the overall Soviet diplomatic situation, which gave the stabilized regime more leverage vis-à-vis China. The first months of the Karakhan mission very much replicated the Yen-Joffe deadlock, except that in 1923, China was no longer the only party putting forward prerequisites for the commencement of formal negotiations. On September 7, Karakhan called on Koo and asked that China first recognized the Soviet government. Koo refused, and insisted that all outstanding differences be settled beforehand.43 Subsequently, Karakhan mailed Wang time and again, pressing for the normalization of relations to provide “a proof of sincerity and friendliness on the part of China prior to the beginning of the conference.”44 The Beiyang government, seeing that the Soviets’ only purpose was to gain China’s recognition, feared a complete reversal of the Soviet attitude towards the outstanding SinoSoviet questions if they secured their primary goal. To Karakhan, however, to have his government resolve the disputes before an official recognition was to make it pay a cost for the recognition, to which his government would never compromise.45 Nor would the Chinese government, which quoted Joffe’s earlier agreement to the resolution of the disputes ahead of diplomatic normalization. As a result, the negotiation reached an impasse. The proceedings of the informal talks and exchanges between Karakhan and Wang would reveal that apart from the recognition issue, China and Soviet Russia also held divergent views on the questions of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Outer Mongolia, and the Boxer Indemnity. Especially in terms of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Wang asked the Soviet government to fulfill its promise of relinquishing all railway rights without compensation according to the manifesto China received in March 1920, but Karakhan retorted: “Never and nowhere could I have said that all the rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway belong to China.”46 He denied the manifesto passed by Yanson, insisting that the version published in the Russian press shall hold.

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In December 1923, Karakhan republished the English translations of his two manifestos in the English papers in Beijing, deleting the statements on the Soviets’ voluntary relinquishment of rights relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway, and requested the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to revise the manifestos accordingly. The Beiyang government strongly protested against Karakhan’s action and insisted that it would still take the original versions as standard. “It is true that the text received by my Government was in the form of a telegram,” Wang replied Karakhan, “but the same was signed and certified as a true copy by Mr. Yanson, Delegate Plenipotentiary for Foreign Affairs of the Council of Commissaries of the Peoples’ Republic of Siberia and the Far East.”47 The division between China and Soviet Russia was so huge that negotiations were at one time suspended. The Chinese people were rather upset and dissatisfied with the deadlock. Since his arrival in China, Karakhan had been rather active in socializing and building ties with the Chinese media as well as the local political and cultural intelligentsia, regularly hosting banquets, organizing press conferences, and making public speeches. Therefore, he did manage to establish profound influence in Chinese society, so much so that the Beiyang government had to yield to public pressure and restart talks with Karakhan in late February 1924. This time, both sides conceded a little. China proposed giving official recognition provided that the representatives of the two countries met informally to draft up the general principles for resolving the long-standing disputes, and upon China’s declaration of recognition for Soviet Russia, Karakhan expressed agreement to discuss these disputes according to general principles in a formal conference initiated right after. With Karakhan’s assent, the foremost difference was ironed out. With the first obstacle surmounted, the negotiations then went on rather smoothly. By March 14, the Chinese and Soviet representatives had reached a consensus on the drafts of an Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and an Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, together with a secret protocol, four declarations, and a set of exchange of notes. The general principles for the settlement of Sino-Soviet questions can be summarized as follows: 1. The two governments would reestablish diplomatic and consular relations upon the signing of the agreement. 2. A conference would be held within one month after the signing of the agreement to discuss detailed arrangements for settling the questions according to the principles in the agreement. 3. All treaties concluded between China and Tsarist Russia would be annulled and replaced with new treaties based on the principle of equality at the conference.

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4. All treaties concluded between Tsarist Russia and a third party, and between China and a third party that affected the sovereign rights or interests of Soviet Russia or China would be null and void. The two countries would not sign any treaties that prejudiced each other’s sovereign rights or interests thereafter. 5. The Soviet government would recognize Outer Mongolia as an integrate part of the Republic of China and respect China’s sovereignty in it. The Soviet government would declare that as soon as an agreement regarding the conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia (time limit of the withdrawal and measures to ensure the interests of the safety of the frontiers) was reached at the conference, all Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Outer Mongolia. 6. The two governments would not permit activities in their own territories aiming to “struggle by acts of violence” against each other. 7. The two governments would redemarcate their national boundaries at the conference according to Article 2 of the agreement. 8. The two governments would regulate questions relative to navigation on the basis of equality and reciprocity at the conference. 9. The two governments would settle the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway according to the following principles: (1) The Chinese Eastern Railway was a purely commercial enterprise; except for matters pertaining to business operations, all matters relating to the sovereign rights of China would be managed by the Chinese authorities. (2) The Soviet government would allow China to redeem the railway and all appurtenant properties with Chinese capital. (3) Pending the redemption, the railway would be managed according to the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. 10. The Soviet government would agree to relinquish the special rights and privileges relating to all concessions, leased territories, trade areas, and barracks in China that the Tsarist government gained by treaties. 11. The Soviet government agreed to renounce the Russian portion of the Boxer Indemnity. 12. The Soviet government agreed to relinquish extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction. 13. In the commercial treaty to be concluded at the conference, the customs tariff would be drawn up according to the principles of equality and reciprocity. 14. The two governments would discuss questions relating to the claims for the compensation of losses at the conference.48

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In the secret protocol, the two parties agreed that pending the conclusion of new treaties, agreements, and so on, all the old conventions, treaties, agreements, protocols, contracts, and so on would not be enforced.49 In two of the declarations, they agreed to “hand over to each other all the real estate and movable property owned by China and the former Tsarist government and found in their respective territories,” and China would transfer the buildings and landed property of the Russian Orthodox churches to the Soviet Government.50 However, when the draft agreement signed by Wang was referred to the Beijing cabinet for approval, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly opposed against three points: (1) The draft agreement made no mention of the treaty between the Soviet government and Outer Mongolia, which implied a silent agreement to the effectiveness of that treaty. (2) The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia should be unconditional, and the permission of Soviet troops to remain until conditions of withdrawal were agreed upon was equivalent to tacit acknowledgement of the legality of the Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia. (3) The agreement to the return of the property of the Russian Orthodox churches would create an undesirable precedent that encouraged other foreign countries to claim ownership in China.51 With these concerns, the Beiyang government ordered Wang to rediscuss with Karakhan to revise the agreement. Karakhan refused. On March 16, he sent an urgent diplomatic note to Wang: Hereby I have the honor to bring to your cognizance and request you to convey same to the Government of the Republic of China, that I am willing to wait for three days, beginning from today, for the confirmation on the part of the Chinese Government of the agreements signed by me and yourself. Upon the expiration of which days, I shall not consider myself bound by the same. I have at the same time the honor on behalf of my Government to communicate that it will hold responsible for the breaking off of the negotiations and the breaking up of the agreement the Government of the Republic of China alone, and will also lay on it the responsibility for all the ensuing consequences.52 The tone adopted was apparently one of an ultimatum. Wang immediately replied that the signing of the draft did not mean that the negotiations had been completed, and that the three-day deadline went entirely against the spirit of Karakhan’s two manifestos. But on March 19, Karakhan sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on behalf of his government. The note made it clear that the Soviet government refused to revise the draft agreement that

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had been signed, and that after the previously set time limit was expired, it would “not consider itself bound by the agreement,” it would “reserve its full right of freely establishing the conditions of future treaties with China,” and China would not be able to resume negotiations with it until had “without any agreements and unconditionally established normal official relations” with the Soviet Union.53 On March 20, the Beiyang government issued a circular telegram to describe the situation of the Sino-Soviet negotiations, where it expressed being “much surprised” by the three-day limit. It continued to declare: “It was … decided by the Cabinet that the Chinese Government would not acknowledge such a limitation of time in giving its answer. The negotiations were thus broken off, and the Russian authorities must be held fully responsible.”54 On the same day, the Beiyang government dismissed Wang and closed the Commission for Sino-Russian Affairs, putting Sino-Russian negotiations under the direct charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In response, Wang sent three circular telegrams to report the negotiating procedures and defend his position. According to him, the three proposed revisions as raised by the government were meaningless: As regard the Soviet-Mongolian treaty, the agreement had clearly stated that Soviet Russia should recognize Outer Mongolia as an integrate part of China, which made the Soviet-Mongolian treaty effectively null. As for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the agreement to discuss the conditions for complete withdrawal at the upcoming conference was in fact no difference from the cabinet’s demand for prompt withdrawal and for the questions of exact time and frontier safety to be dealt with later in the conference; moreover, the demand for quick withdrawal would be unrealistic. Finally, the concern that foreign countries would follow Russia’s example and claim ownership was unnecessary because only Russian churches in China were state owned, and even if the powers really asked for the same treatment, China could ask them to relinquish consular jurisdiction and treaties jeopardizing China’s sovereign rights as Soviet Russia did.55 Wang also blamed the Beiyang government for missing the golden opportunity when Soviet Russia issued the first two manifestoes, which he described as “agonizing.” In addition, he asserted that through the draft agreement, the Soviet government had agreed to relinquish consular jurisdiction and discuss the customs tariff according to the principle of equality, which were achievements that China had strived strenuously for but failed to secure at the Washington Naval Conference, so she should resolutely seize the opportunity to restore sovereign rights and also make this an example to push forward the elimination of oppression by other foreign powers. He also criticized the authorities as shortsighted and haggling over trifles; thus China was “one step short of success,” and the painstaking efforts

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that he and his colleagues spent over the years were wasted while the rights that the nation was about to reclaim subject to uncertainty.56 His views were shared by military governors such as Wu Peifu, Liu Zhenhua, and Sun Chuanfang, who urged the Beiyang government to sign the agreement immediately by cable one after another. Wu Peifu enunciated: It is plain fact that since we established relations with foreign countries, all external treaties we have concluded are detrimental to our sovereign rights and humiliating to our country. Although the present Agreement with Russia is by no means perfect and inevitably marred by flaws, compared with the past treaties, it is really an unprecedented case, and to evaluate it in the present situation, it is definitely an opportunity not to be missed, which, if used timely, will restore to the Republic of China considerable interests, rights, and honor. He also warned that if otherwise, China might be subject to gruesome consequences: “To assess the diplomatic conditions requires an examination of the domestic situation as well as the external environment. Looking at the situation in the Far East makes one shudder. If we do not devise for ourselves and someone acts ahead of us, superseding our place in making decisions, it will be too late to regret.”57 China’s future would be threatened and the situation in the Far East might deteriorate if the Soviet government allied with Japan. Among those who tried hard to sway the government were the Chinese intellectuals. They saw the Beiyang government’s procrastination as a sign of acquiescence to the opposition and manipulation of the Western powers, campaigning for the recognition of the Soviet government unconditionally. Some students took to the streets to champion their cause. In the meantime, the Soviet government was accelerating negotiations with Japan while strengthening relations with Sun Yat-sen’s Guangzhou government and Zhang Zuolin’s regime in Manchuria. Hard pressed from all sides, the Beiyang government decided to restore contact with Soviet Russia. On April 1, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a diplomatic note to Karakhan, conveying that if the Soviet government agreed to revise the three terms in the agreement as proposed, then the Beiyang government would immediately prepare for signing it, and if it was not convenient to make changes to the text of the agreement, the revisions could be stated separately in exchanges of notes.58 In fact, the Soviet Union did not want to see the negotiations breakdown either. The three-day ultimatum was more Karakhan’s venting of his anger than a carefully deliberated stance on the part of the government. Now that his initial rage

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was cooled and China expressed her wish to rekindle discussions, Karakhan paid Koo a visit at his residence while the latter was sick, and the two agreed to have the negotiations on the revisions carried out in secret, as a face-saving solution for Karakhan that too accommodated China’s requests. The Chinese negotiators held discussions behind the doors at Koo’s residence in the day and went to Karakhan’s to exchange opinions in the evening. Finally, the two parties arrived at a consensus. On May 31, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a signing ceremony in which Koo and Karakhan signed the revised documents as plenipotentiary representatives. The documents included a 15-article Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, an 11-article Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a secret protocol, seven declarations, and a set of exchange of notes. The revisions made were: 1. The addition of a declaration as an explanatory statement for Article 4 of the Agreement on General Principles, which read in part: “it is understood that … the Government of the Republic of China will not and does not recognize any treaty, agreement, etc., concluded between Russia since the Tsarist regime and any third Party or Parties affecting the sovereign rights and interests of the Republic of China.”59 That is to say, the treaties concluded by the Tsarist government, the provisional government, and the Soviet government, including the Soviet-Mongolian treaty, would be included. 2. The text regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia in Article 5 of the Agreement of General Principles was revised into: “as long as the questions for the withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia — namely, as to the timelimit of the withdrawal of such troops and the measures to be adopted in the interests of the safety of the frontiers — are agreed upon at the Conference as provided in Article 2 of the present Agreement, it will effect the complete withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia.”60 The word “conditions” was replaced with “questions.” 3. Regarding the property of the Russian Orthodox Church in the second declaration, the explicit stipulation on the transfer was modified into the vaguer clause of “will be jointly determined” at the Sino-Soviet conference “in accordance with the internal laws and regulations existing in China regarding property-holding in the inland.” However, different treatment was prescribed for the church property in Beijing and Badachu, which the Chinese government would “take steps to immediately transfer same as

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soon as the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [would] designate a Chinese person or organization, in accordance with the laws and regulations existing in China regarding property-holding in the inland.61 On the same day, China reopened diplomatic relations with Russia. Admittedly, except for the term regarding the transfer of Russian church property, the other revisions did not bring any substantial change in effect. The first revision was almost meaningless in terms of imposing new restraints because the Agreement on General Principles itself had already provided for the Soviet government’s recognition of Outer Mongolia as an integrated part of China. If the Soviet government would not be bound by the original term, adding an additional declaration would not constitute a greater binding force. The second revision, worse still, was no more than a change in terminology. In retrospect, the trivial modifications were definitely not worth the trouble they had caused. Compared with the abrogation of the Sino-German unequal treaties, the cancellation of the Sino-Russian ones had a much greater significance for China, for the latter case was achieved because of the Soviet Union’s voluntary relinquishment, in spite of her inconsistent attitude. As a result, the Chinese people were motivated by the friendly action of the Soviet government and became more confident in their campaign for abrogating the unequal treaties with the other powers. After the signing of the agreement, China’s restoration of the Russian concessions gained a legal basis. China was determined to get rid of the board of directors that had been in charge of the affairs of the former Russian concessions, abrogate the right to self-government of the Russians living in China, and place the concessions under the Bureaus of Municipal Administration of Special Areas instead. On July 1, 1924, the Wuhan local authorities declared the cancellation of the Municipal Council and the Police of the Russian Hankou concession as well as replaced the temporary office established in 1920 with a Provisional Management Office for the Restoration of the Russian Concession. In March 1925, the concession was changed into the Second Special Area in Hankou, after the ex–German concession in the city.62 For Tianjin, on August 6, 1924, Zhu Xingyuan, the special negotiator from Zhili, read the decree from the governor of Zhili Province for the restoration of the Russian Tianjin concession, announcing the immediate restitution of the concession and the annulment of Regulations of Board of Directors. The Board of Directors of the Municipal Council of the concession was thus dismissed, and its power was handed over to the newly established Office of the Third Special Area in Tianjin, following in the footsteps of the German and Austro-Hungarian concessions.63

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According to the newly concluded Sino-Soviet agreement, a conference must be held within one month after the signing of the agreement. However, for multiple reasons, the conference was delayed. There were interruptions from the foreign diplomatic corps, which refused to give up the Russian legation, and Karakhan insisted on resolving the transfer question before convening the conference. Not until October 1924 could Karakhan move into the legation. In addition, the Soviet Union signed a convention with Japan shortly after, in which the recognition of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 provoked the Beiyang government. Another factor had to do with China’s own political instability, as the Second Zhili-Fengtian War broke out in the north while Sun Yat-sen’s Guangzhou government became more powerful, making the Soviet government less enthusiastic about negotiating with the Beiyang government. More importantly, for the Soviet Union, her aim of breaking the diplomatic deadlock and establishing relations with China had been achieved, and the resolution of the outstanding questions was bound to be hard. This gave the Soviet government little motivation to continue negotiations. In March 1925, the Beiyang government reappointed C. T. Wang, this time as the supervisor of the Sino-Soviet conference. Wang started preparations for the conference; however, Karakhan kept delaying it with various excuses. It was only on August 26, the eve of Karakhan’s return to the Soviet Union to report his work, that he unwillingly attended a purely symbolic opening ceremony of the conference. All negotiations were suspended again once Karakhan departed. Some informal meetings were held a few days before his return as late as December 1925, which lasted a few months and yet failed to achieve any solutions. Between July and August 1926, the Beiyang government requested the Soviet government many times the replacement of Karakhan. In September, Karakhan was finally recalled, but the Sino-Soviet conference ended without settling any disputes.

The First United Front and the Guangzhou Government’s Customs Surplus Fight The CPC’s anti-imperialist commitments The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the May Fourth Movement deeply impacted China’s domestic political developments. To some extent, they catalyzed the birth of a communist party in China. With the generous promises of the two Karakhan manifestos arriving in the high tides of nationalism, the seed of communism quickly sprouted in China. To some, Marxism was the new solution that would bring China out of the abyss of semicolonialism. Under such a

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background, the Communist Party of China (CPC) came into existence, upholding the banner of anti-imperialism and the emancipation of the Chinese people. In June 1922, the CPC issued its first “Statement on the Current Situation,” in which it proposed the immediate aims of “reform of the tariff system,” “abrogation of extraterritoriality and the special privileges of foreign powers,” “elimination of railway subsidies made to China by foreign capital,” and “immediate transfer of all railways to state management.”64 In July, 1922, the CPC issued a manifesto at its Second National Congress, pointing out that China had been reduced to a “common colony” of the imperialistic powers, which had “grabbed China’s vast territories … to be their new-style colony and seized a great many important ports to be their concessions, dividing China into several spheres of influence for themselves to develop monopolized industries.” Moreover, the manifesto continued to criticize, China’s tariff system was also controlled by foreign powers, and the powers had exacted consular jurisdiction and stationed troops and police in China. To remedy, the CPC demonstrated its aim to “overthrow the oppression of international imperialism and attain the complete independence of the Chinese nation.”65 A year later, in its Third National Congress held in July 1923, the CPC made the “abrogation of all unequal treaties concluded between the imperialistic powers and China” the first minimal goal in its Draft Party Platform.66 The CPC knew well enough that the strength of the “proletariat” was yet too weak to achieve its anti-imperialistic cause alone, and it would have to unite other political groups to beat imperialism and domestic warlordism. The Communists turned their sight on the revolutionaries-led Kuomintang (KMT) in the south. The Second National Congress of the CPC adopted the Resolution Concerning the Democratic United Front, which overrode the decision of the First National Congress to ban all connections with other political parties. Based on this resolution, prominent Communist advocates Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao started to build contacts with Sun Yat-sen. At that time, the KMT also was arriving at a turning point. After countless frustrations, Sun understood that it was impossible to end China’s warlordism and achieve national independence by allying with foreign powers. As he sought to free China from the control of Western powers, the emerging Soviet Union caught his attention. In his letter to Chicherin in August 1921, he expressed admiration for the work of the Soviets, noting in particular the Soviet organization, troops, and educational organization.67 Apparently, he saw valuable lessons in the Soviet practices. As mentioned, in January 1923, Sun issued a joint manifesto with Joffe. Although the document made no mention of cooperation with the Soviets, it did

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reveal Sun’s intention of such cooperation, and Joffe expressly stated that the Soviet Union would support China in her national unification. In the same month, the KMT issued a separate manifesto, declaring: “In accordance with the Principle of Nationalism our Party will continue to work for the removal of all inequalities of status between our nation and foreign powers and we shall continue to work also for the integration of all the people of our country as a single Chinese nation”; and furthermore: “We must employ every effort to accomplish revision of the treaties in order to restore our nation to a position of freedom and equality within the international community.”68

The Guangzhou government’s customs surplus fight In 1922, Sun Yat-sen was expelled from Guangzhou by the warlord Chen Jiongming, who had previously backed the Sun government. After driving out Chen with the help of Tang Jiyao, Sun returned to Guangzhou from Shanghai in February 1923 and reestablished the Guangzhou regime in March as the Headquarters of the Generalissimo of the Military Government of the Republic of China. Sun now displayed a more resolute attitude in fighting against imperialistic domination, and the first conflict of the reestablished regime with foreign powers was related to the customs surplus. The so-called “customs surplus” referred to the remainder of the customs revenue after deducting the payments for foreign loans and indemnities. It was an important source of revenue for China. However, the control of the Chinese Customs, which entailed the power of handing over the customs surplus, was held by foreign inspectors, allowing the powers to use the customs surplus to intervene in China’s domestic politics. Earlier in 1917, after the Constitutional Protection Movement, Sun’s old Guangzhou regime had successfully claimed 13.7% of the customs surplus from the diplomatic corps in Beijing, and the money was designated to be collected by Wu Tingfang, then the financial minister cum foreign minister of the military government. However, in March 1920, the military government was split, and Wu left Guangzhou with the official seal of the premier of the state council. The foreign powers then decided to give the entire surplus to the Beiyang government. When Sun defeated the Guangxi clique which dominated Guangzhou and restored the military government in October, he requested the foreign powers to return the Guangzhou government’s portion of the surplus; however, the diplomatic corps refused his claim.

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Sun renewed his claim upon the establishment of the new military government. On July, 29, 1923, Minister of Foreign Affairs C. C. Wu visited Japanese Consul General in Guangzhou Amau Eiji, asking Japan to propose to the diplomatic corps and the inspector general of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service the resumption of customs surplus payments to the Guangzhou government. On September 5, the Guangzhou government sent an official note to the diplomatic corps via the consulates in Guangzhou, stating that the handling of the customs surplus was entirely China’s domestic affair and foreign powers should have no right to interfere beyond collecting the share to be paid towards foreign debts. The government also requested that all the arrears due to it from March 1920 be returned.69 The attitudes of the powers, which were rather diverse, were very much dependent on their varied vested interests in China, including their relations with the Chinese military cliques. At that time, Sun had formed an alliance with proJapanese Zhang Zuolin and Duan Qirui, to fight against the Zhili clique, which was supported by Britain and the United States, in the north. Therefore, Amau did not want to reject Guangzhou’s request. In addition, Amau worried that Sun would risk seizing the Guangzhou Customs by force if his request was not granted. To play safe, the Japanese consul advised the Japanese minister in Beijing and foreign minister back home against a strict rejection. But he added that the portion of the surplus to be distributed to the Guangzhou government should be rediscussed, as the previous 13.7% was assessed according to the size of the government’s controlled areas, which had by then shrunk considerably. Britain, however, had other concerns. With all her interests in the south, she had been discontent with Sun’s Guangzhou government for its relatively radical attitude towards foreign powers. Therefore, she responded indifferently to its request at best. James W. R. Macleay, the British minister in Beijing, believed that the Guangzhou government should negotiate with the Beiyang government itself, and if they could not reach an agreement, the distribution should be determined by the diplomatic corps. Francis A. Aglen, the British inspector general of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, was even more relentless, denying any room for further discussion. On November 19, Wu warned James W. Jamieson, the British consul general in Guangzhou, tentatively that if the foreign powers refused the Guangzhou government’s request, it would have to use the “last resort.” Jamieson threatened Wu in return, that if Guangzhou really did so, Britain would implement an embargo.70 On November 23, Sun’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent another note to the diplomatic corps demanding an immediate transfer of the customs surplus, declaring that if otherwise, the government would collect the money from the

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Guangzhou Customs itself. This vexed the British, who were prepared to put up tough opposition. Macleay proposed sealing off the Port of Guangzhou, and although this did not win the support of other ministers, on December 1, the diplomatic corps decided in a meeting to refuse Guangzhou’s request and intimidate the government by “forcible measures” if Guangzhou seized the Customs.71 The decision was communicated by Jamieson to Wu two days later. On December 5, the Guangzhou government replied Jamieson that the Chinese Maritime Customs Service was ultimately a Chinese agency, and the customs office within the areas controlled by the Guangzhou government should follow the order of the Guangzhou government. Arguing that Beijing would only spend the customs revenue on their military expenditure, the Guangzhou government stated its wish to immediately order the customs officials not to turn over the revenue from the Guangzhou Customs to Beijing. But to show respect for the diplomatic corps, it gave the ministers another two more weeks to respond before taking any further action.72 To browbeat the unflinching Guangzhou government, the powers resorted to gunboat diplomacy. On December 7, Britain, the United States, France, and Japan staged a naval demonstration of nine vessels on White Goose Pond at the Pearl River. Sun did not flinch. On the same day, he told the local English-language North China Daily News that the Guangzhou government was prepared to seize its share of the customs surplus, threatening to replace the inspector general if he would not follow Guangzhou’s order. Admitting that his government was of no match with the foreign powers in terms of might, he expressed the determination to take pride even in defeats.73 On December 14, together with Minister of Finance Ye Gongchuo, Wu sent a letter to Inspector General Aglen, repeating their request. They particularly held that the Beiyang government was illegitimate and unrecognized by the Chinese people, and therefore had no right to dispose of the customs revenue in areas governed by the Guangzhou government.74 However, instead of backing down, the foreign powers heightened their naval presence on the Pearl River, and by December 16, 17 foreign warships had been assembled. The naval commanders even landed troops in Guangzhou, threatening to bombard the city. Ironically, contrary to the aim of the powers, their gunboat policy triggered a backlash of the Guangzhou people and consolidated the people’s support for their government. On December 16, over 20,000 people rallied to protest against the foreign powers’ gunboat policy, laying claims on China’s customs autonomy, and decided to boycott British and American goods. After an assembly, the demonstrators marched to Shaji. At the same time, they petitioned to the

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Guangzhou government for resolute measures to take back the customs surplus. On December 24, over 70 independent organizations, including the Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions and the New Students’ Society (xin xuesheng she 新 學生社), instigated another demonstration, denouncing foreign aggression and demanding the restoration of tariff autonomy. The support from the Guangzhou people strengthened Guangzhou government’s determination to press on. In the meantime, the Guangzhou government had never given up its effort in soliciting external support. Sun dispatched his diplomatic advisor Eugene Chen (Chen Youren) to visit Reginald Stubbs, the governor of Hong Kong who had displayed appreciation to Sun’s pursuits at the establishment of the Headquarters of the Generalissimo, to persuade Stubbs to mediate between Guangzhou and the British government. Stubbs thought Sun’s claim was justifiable and expressed opposition to the British embargo, promising to convey Sun’s request to the British government and the British minister in Beijing.75 Sun also tried his best to win the sympathy of American public opinion. On December 17, he published an open message addressed “To My Friends, the American People,” where he said: America was the inspiration and example when we started the revolution to abolish autocracy and corruption in high places and to establish the Republic of China. We might well have expected that an American Lafayette would fight on our side in this good cause. In the twelfth year of our struggle towards liberty there comes not a Lafayette but an American Admiral with more ships of war than any other nation in our waters to join those who wish to crush us, so that the Republic of China would perish. Has the country of Washington and Lincoln forsworn its high faith in freedom and turned from a liberator to an oppressor of a people struggling to be free?76 The diplomatic corps gave no reply at the end of the two-week grace period given by the Guangzhou government. On December 22, Sun ordered Ye and Wu to issue the inspector of the Guangzhou Customs another 10-day ultimatum to hand over the customs surplus, after which the Guangzhou government would dismiss the customs officials;77 and on December 24, Sun proclaimed a similar declaration to the inspector general, titled the “Manifesto Concerning the Customs Question.”78 Finally, on December 28, the Guangzhou Customs replied on behalf of the inspector general that he would only obey the orders of the Beiyang government. On January 19, 1924, the Guangzhou government wired Aglen once again, declaring its plan to establish a formal government (i.e., the Nationalist Government) and urging him to command the Guangzhou Customs to obey the orders of Guangzhou.

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In fact, faced with the Guangzhou government’s intransigence, the foreign powers did realize that intimidation by force was no longer effective. For Britain, an embargo on Guangdong would actually do the harm of cutting off the connection between Hong Kong and the Chinese continent, thus impairing British economic interests in Hong Kong. For Japan, her interests were centralized in northern China, and so she was the least willing to sour relations with Sun for this issue. As the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had instructed its minister to China, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, earlier on: As regard the Guangzhou customs issue, although it has been prescribed that our Country will act along the line of other powers, we must respect China’s sovereign rights no matter what and hold fast to the principle of noninterventionism in China’s domestic affairs. Should there be any action which is fundamentally opposed by the Washington Nine-Power Treaty on China, we should evade it. Since our Country has intrinsically different relations with China from the Western powers, we have no choice but to adopt such an attitude.79 So the foreign powers had to concede. It was U.S. Minister to China Jacob Schurman who took the initiative to go to Guangzhou to mediate the dispute in early January. In his meeting with Wu, Schurman suggested proposing to the powers that they consider giving Guangzhou its share of the customs surplus to be used for river conservancy.80 Such gave both parties a ladder to climb down, and the Guangzhou government accepted. After some exchanges, in late March, Britain and the United States came to an agreement about handing the customs surplus to Guangzhou for river conservancy.81 On April 9, 1924, the diplomatic corps resolved in an official meeting to end the naval demonstration,82 and on the same day, the powers to withdraw all the foreign vessels moored at the Port of Guangzhou, putting an end to the dispute. The resolution of the conflict in Guangzhou’s favor not only alleviated the government’s financial difficulties, but also inspired it in its ongoing antiimperialistic struggles.

The First United Front In January 1924, the reorganized KMT held its First National Congress in Guangzhou, where it resolved to ally with the Soviet Union and the CPC as well as support farmers and workers. Moreover, the congress laid down the external policy of anti-imperialism and internal policy of anti-warlordism. The manifesto of the congress denounced warlordism as follows:

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The warlords, whose interests are intrinsically contrary to the masses’, are unable to stand on their own feet, and so necessarily conspire with foreign imperialists. The so-called republican governments, controlled by the warlords, abuse the authority of the government to serve the pleasure of foreign powers. In return, the foreign powers, by lending the warlords funds to finance unremitting civil war in China, obtain special privileges and secure their spheres of influence. From this it can be perceived that the foreign powers definitely had a role in China’s civil wars.83 This explained the party’s program of eliminating warlordism and imperialism in a row. The 1924 manifesto put forward a strongly anti-imperialistic external policy centered on the abrogation of unequal treaties. The first point under foreign policy read: “All Unequal Treaties are to be abolished: foreigners’ leased territories, consular jurisdiction, foreigners’ management of customs duties, all political powers exercised by foreigners in China at the cost of Chinese sovereignty. New treaties are to be concluded based on recognition of China as an equal and sovereign nation.” And other points in the section included: “Any nation voluntarily surrendering special rights and abrogating all treaties which violate Chinese sovereignty will be accorded status as “most favored nation”; “Any and all treaties harmful to China’s interests will be examined and revised under the guiding principle of removing any commitments injurious to the sovereignty of any of the signatory powers.” Also of note was the demand that the Boxer Indemnity be “entirely appropriated as a fund for education.”84 In fact, the Nationalists were not of a single mind about such a firm and radical stance. The Review Committee of the declaration had suggested taking away specific anti-imperialistic claims such as abolishing unequal treaties and consular jurisdiction as well as restoring leased territories and customs autonomy. However, as Sun proclaimed at the congress: “Now is the time to introduce an explicit imperialistic revolutionary platform to arouse the people to fight for China’s liberty and independence; otherwise, this will be an aimless, pointless revolution that will never ever be successful.”85 And the congress took his argument. The Guangzhou government decided to launch a Northern Expedition to overthrow the Zhili clique–controlled Beiyang government. In his “Manifesto on Northern Expedition” of September 18, 1924, Sun proclaimed that the aim of the expedition was “not only directed against militarism, but against imperialism, whose support ha[d] made the existence of militarism possible.” He continued to state: “We shall then demand the revision of unequal treaties and the abolition of all special privileges in order to protect our national interests in foreign relations

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and to eradicate the imperialist influence in China. New treaties will be concluded in accordance with the principles of international equality and mutual respect for sovereignty.”86 In October 1924, Feng Yuxiang, a general from the Zhili clique initiated a coup and overthrew Cao Kun’s Beijing government. On October 25, Feng invited Sun to Beijing to discuss state affairs, and Duan Qirui and Zhang Zuolin also published a telegram that welcomed Sun to Beijing. Though fully aware of the continuing power struggles between the warlords, Sun accepted the invitation nonetheless. On November 10, he issued the “Manifesto on Going to Beijing,” calling for not only the abolition of unequal treaties and eradication of militarism, but also the convention of a national assembly in which all classes would be represented in the discussion of current affairs. On November 13, Sun sailed from Guangzhou for the north on the cruiser Yongfeng. Of note is that Sun’s idea on a national conference was first proposed by the CPC. As early as July 1923, the CPC had initiated in its second “Statement on the Current Situation” to have the KMT which bore the “historical mission of the National Revolution” call a national assembly that consisted of representatives from the country’s chambers of commerce, agricultural unions, workers’ unions, student organizations, and other professional unions. The reason given was: “The parliament in Beijing being the tool of the feudal militarists and being not recognized as the representative of the people, the National Assembly as true representative of the whole nation will take upon itself the task of drafting the constitution, unifying the country and establishing the new Chinese Government.”87 When Sun set off for Beijing in November 1924, the CPC published its fourth “Statement on the Current Situation,” in which it reiterated its hope of a national assembly summoned by the KMT, and further proposed the calling of a national assembly preparatory conference to serve as a provisional government before a new one was founded. The CPC also drafted a total of 13 minimum demands on the National Assembly, the first of being the restoration of the Customs, which it described as the “only key to the external economic liberation of the whole nation.”88 From the “Manifesto on Going to Beijing,” it is apparent that Sun had accepted the CPC’s proposals. On November 17, Sun arrived in Shanghai, but the local foreign media was rather hostile to him. The North China Daily News went as far as to publish an article that said: “Now we would plainly say that Shanghai does not want Dr. Sun Yat-sen, that it has no business to admit him and that it is to be hoped the authorities will prevent his landing here.”89 And the authorities of the French concession ordered that Sun should not undertake any political activities within the concession and arrested organizers of activities welcoming Sun.

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It appeared that if such unfriendliness had exerted any effect on Sun, it would have been to strengthen his will to abrogate unequal treaties and restore China’s sovereignty in foreign concessions. In defiance of foreigners’ hostility, Sun said to a Japanese journalist as soon as he landed on Shanghai: “Shanghai is a territory of China, our country, and I am the host of this territory, while they are guests. The host, exercising his power, can do whatever he wants in the territory.” Quoting this conversation, Sun reaffirmed the twin goals of the proposed Northern Expedition in his speech to the Shanghai press on November 19: The root of the present chaos in China should be attributed to militarism as well as imperialism, which assists with it. As we try to solve the problems of China, the first and foremost step to be implemented by the National Assembly will be to crush militarism, and the second step to crush imperialism, which assists with militarism. Only when these two things are crushed will China achieve peaceful unification and enjoy lasting political stability. He expressed that militarism had been crushed, and what was left was to abolish unequal treaties, restore customs autonomy and foreign concessions, and abolish consular jurisdiction, all of which he was determined to attain.90 After a few days of stopover in Shanghai, Sun travelled to Japan en route to Tianjin. On his way to Japan, he vigorously advocated the abrogation of unequal treaties in order to solicit support from the Japanese people. On November 24, Sun spoke to a Japanese journalist about national unification aboard the Japanese steamship Shanghai Maru: The reason why China has not been able to achieve unity is not because of the Chinese themselves but because of foreigners.... The existence of the Unequal Treaties between China and the foreign Powers has enabled foreigners to enjoy special privileges in China. Of late, they have not only enjoyed special privileges from such treaties but have misapplied and abused those privileges in stirring up disorders in China…. Each one considers himself an emperor. He may utilize a militarist or a group of men to carry out what he dictates…. This ignorance on the part of the Home Governments has led them to leave their nationals to act as they please, thus entailing great suffering on the part of the Chinese.91 At this, the journalist pursued what method Sun would adopt to secure the abrogation of the unequal treaties given that they all “had their history and basis” and “were all signed in return for certain privileges.” Sun did not answer directly,

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but rather elaborated on the “conscience” of foreigners, holding that “foreigners with a clear conscience were fair in their views” and citing evidence from the British Mackay Treaty and the Washington Conference. He also emphasized Japan’s importance in helping China abrogate unequal treaties: “The key to the question whether such Treaties can be abolished lies in the hands of no others but the Japanese people. If they are sympathetic, the Treaties can be immediately abolished; if they are not, then nothing can be done for the time being.” And he tried to convince the Japanese to look beyond the immediate loss that would be caused by the abrogation of China’s unequal treaties with Japan and take a “long view” of the “immense and unlimited” benefits from the friendship of the Chinese people by giving China a helping hand.92 On November 25, Sun enunciated the importance of abrogating unequal treaties again in a welcome reception held by the KMT branches in Tokyo, Osaka, and Kobe: To prevent foreigners from stirring up disturbances in China, it is necessary to first strip foreigners of their power to act freely in China. To strip foreigners of their power to act freely in China boils down to the abrogation of unequal treaties. Only through the abrogation of Unequal Treaties can China restore or revoke the foreign concessions, her customs, and consular jurisdiction, be freed from foreign restraints, and regain the freedom that her people once owned.93 On December 1, Sun said in an interview with the Japanese press that he had no intention to be the president of the Republic of China because for the moment, China was the colony, and the Chinese people the slaves of more than 10 countries, and serving as the president would mean he had to communicate with more than 10 masters, with whom he was doomed to run into conflict; he would only consider the question when China had successfully abrogated the unequal treaties and freed herself from slavery. Asked which treaties with Japan he wanted to see abolished, Sun frankly replied that any treaties that impaired China’s sovereign rights should be abrogated, including the Twenty-One Demands.94 Sun arrived in Tianjin on December 4 in the cheerful hospitality of an enthusiastic crowd. However, he had fallen ill on the way and by the time he arrived in Tianjin, got too sick to make his presence at the public assembly scheduled for the same day in the National Hotel, which Wang Jingwei attended in his place. Sun’s efforts were not in vain, though. After his vigorous propaganda and the collaboration between the KMT and the CPC, numerous organizations stood up to support the

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convention of a new national assembly. In many places, there established advocacy groups for this cause, with hundreds of thousands of members in total. Unfortunately, Duan Qirui and Zhang Zuolin, who had invited Sun to Beijing, were not quite supportive. Back on November 24, Zhang made Duan chief executive of a new provisional government, and at that time, the Duan government was eager to gain the recognition of foreign powers, which had Duan respect the treaties with them. Therefore, Duan strongly opposed the abrogation of unequal treaties. He even vowed to “honor the nation’s credibility to foreign countries” (wai chong guo xin 外崇國信) in a public statement and said to the Japanese press: “The abrogation of unequal treaties as proposed by Sun Wen is too idealistic, and I absolutely do not agree.”95 Duan’s attempt to put a damper on Sun’s ideals undoubtedly agitated Sun, and when meeting with Duan’s delegates on December 18, Sun indignantly questioned: “What sense does it make that while I’m fighting for the abrogation of unequal treaties outside, you people in Beijing advocate respecting them? If you want to get promotions and strike it rich, fear those foreigners, and feel like respecting them, why would you have invited me in the first place?”96 On December 21, Sun arrived in Beijing, welcomed by tens of thousands of people on the streets despite the chill. Gravely ill by then, he devoted his last efforts for the establishment of a national assembly and the abrogation of unequal treaties. A few months later, on March 12, 1925, he died of liver cancer in Beijing. The will that Sun signed on February 24, 1925 was a pithy political testament. He began: “I have served the cause of the People’s Revolution for forty years, during which time my object has consistently been to secure liberty and equality for our country.” He also reemphasized: “Recently I have proposed the convening of a national people’s assembly and the abolition of unequal treaties; you should especially work toward the realization of these aims within the shortest possible period of time.”97 And on May 24, the Third Plenary Session of the KMT Central Executive Committee adopted and announced the Resolution for Accepting Sun Yat-sen’s Will, which stated that the party would inherit Sun’s dream and continue to struggle for the independence and freedom of the Chinese people. It declared: “All countries and nations in the world that respect the equality of our Nation and independence of our Country are cordial friends; otherwise, they are our enemies.”98 As for the CPC, it published a letter to the Chinese people in which it stated: “… the CPC has always been sympathetic to the Chinese national liberty movement led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the KMT. In the days that follow, the CPC will, together with the workers and farmers of the nation, continue to support the KMT and

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the national movements led by it, which will not be changed by Dr. Sun’s death.” In closing, the party appealed to the people for “double efforts” in pursuing the convention of a national assembly and abrogation of unequal treaties.99

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The powers had promised the relinquishment of some of their rights in China in the Washington Naval Conference. However, after the conference, they did not really fulfill their commitments. As far as leased territories were concerned, although China and Britain had reached a draft agreement on the return of Weihaiwei, Britain changed her mind and held the draft in abeyance taking advantage of the internal strife of the Beiyang government, while France did not even enter into any negotiations on the restoration of Guangzhou Bay. As for the anticipated international tariff conference and extraterritoriality commission, they were postponed indefinitely. After the May 30th Incident, a series of anti-imperialistic campaigns erupted in China and antiforeign sentiments prevailed. Availing itself of the public outrage, the Beiyang government made a series of treaty revision initiatives. As a result, the postponed tariff conference and extraterritoriality commission became realities, although no satisfying results were achieved in the end. During its negotiations with foreign powers in the revision of unequal treaties, the Beiyang government took an unprecedentedly tough stance, unilaterally abrogating several treaties for the first time. However, divided and corrupt, the government was too impotent to put its diplomatic efforts into effect. And with its downfall, the movement on treaty revision faded into oblivion.

The Aborted Rendition of Weihaiwei At the Washington Naval Conference, Britain agreed to return Weihaiwei to China with some conditions. The conditions, as Balfour put forth in his letter to Alfred Sze on February 3, 1922, were: to make arrangements to permit British ships to continue to use Weihaiwei as a summer camp, and to land, store, and ship supplies as well as retain properties for naval use; to settle questions relating to naval training on nearby waters and the protection of foreign property rights; and to make provision for the representation of foreign interests in municipal affairs.1 After the conference, British Minister to China Beilby F. Alston raised the conditions to Beijing in specific terms: that British ships should be permitted to be docked at Liugongdao (Liugong Island) in the summer; that a commission comprising Chinese and British representatives should be organized to manage the municipal affairs of Waihaiwei; and that the rights of foreigners should be safeguarded.2 On April 27, Beijing appointed M. T. Liang (Liang Ruhao), who had served briefly as foreign minister in the early days of the republic and who was high adviser to the Chinese delegation to the Washington Conference, to be director general of the Bureau for the Rendition of Weihaiwei. In September, he was made chief

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commissioner for the retrocession of Weihaiwei negotiations, and in October, SinoBritish negotiations over Weihaiwei commenced. On October 2, the negotiations started in Weihaiwei. Britain’s primary aim was to renew the lease of Liugongdao. For a long period of time, the island had been the summer camp of the British navy as well as its base and supply station in northern China. Britain therefore asked for extending the lease of the island for another 10 years, with a right of renewal upon expiration — a term which would grant her an infinite lease. China strongly opposed this proposal and demanded that after the 10-year lease expired, the territory only be renewed under mutual agreement. Both sides would not move half a step and the negotiations did not make any progress at all. In February 1923, the negotiations were moved to Beijing. After 34 meetings, with Liang’s concessions, the British and Chinese representatives came up with a Provisional Agreement for Rendition of Weihaiwei to China on May 31, and the main terms covered: • A list of the properties on Liugongdao were to be loaned to the British navy free of charge for a period 10 years, with the option of renewal on the same terms until they reverted together with the land to China when both governments agreed that the loan shall terminate. • The Chinese and British navies were to each appoint one representative to an advisory board to the administrator of Liugongdao. • British warships and auxiliaries would be accorded the use of the waters of Liugongdao every year from April to October. • The Port Edward area in Weihaiwei was to be maintained as an area for international trade and for municipal government, and an advisory committee comprising no fewer than two foreigners and no more than five Chinese would be established. • Foreigners in Weihaiwei could exchange their title deeds for renewable 30year leases without fee. British government lands and buildings could also be leased for a renewable period of 30 years free of charge.3 Liang’s concessions, which in effect offered the British permanent rights to the lease of part of Liugongdao and of properties in Weihaiwei, went too far than could be accepted by the Chinese. The draft was most strongly opposed by the Shandong people, who had always wanted the unconditional restoration of Weihaiwei. Upon the release of the draft, they accused Liang of being a traitor of the country, demanded the penalization of Liang and renegotiations with the British, and sent representatives to petition in Beijing. The Shangdong people

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cautioned against opening an unfavorable precedent, and the Weihaiwei Chamber of Commerce submitted a petition to the National Assembly, criticizing: “Liang and his associates retreated at every point while Britain made inordinate demands, desiring to return the land in name and yet retain it in substance, such that there will be no difference whether or not to retrocede it. Once a convention is concluded to affirm its forfeiture, Weihaiwei will be beyond redemption.” They pressured the Beiyang government to announce the draft invalid.4 In fact, the Beiyang government was not satisfied with the draft either. Foreign Minister Wellington Koo had been concerned that the requirement of British agreement in the termination of the lease of Liugongdao at its expiration would render British occupation of the island permanent, and he had argued with Liang over this. Liang was impressed by the British initiative of returning Weihaiwei, and thought it not a big deal to do the British a favor by leasing them a small island for anchorage in the summer. Koo, however, thought that the question pertained China’s policy of restoring all her lost lands, so even though the island was small, its strategic importance was superior. Koo also worried that such an arrangement would become precedential and would affect future negotiations with France and Japan about the restitution of Guangzhou Bay, Port Arthur, and Dalian.5 In April, 1924, Liang resigned, and Koo took over the negotiations with new British Minister Macleay. At the center of contention was the renewal of the lease of Liugongdao. Koo demanded the deletion of the clause that required mutual agreement in the termination of the lease, which Macleay firmly rejected. It took the two no fewer than 10 sessions of discussion to find common ground, and eventually, they agreed on a Draft Convention for Retrocession of Weihaiwei. The new draft consisted of 29 articles in total. It was more precise than the old draft, by specifying the immediate abrogation of the Convention for the Lease of Weihaiwei concluded on July 1, 1898, and by stipulating the exact times of the retrocession of Weihaiwei and the withdrawal of the British navy. Apart from these changes in wordings, which would forestall unnecessary troubles during the handover, the most important revision was the deletion of the provision for mutual agreement for the return of Liugongdao.6 However, the deletion was not unconditional. The two countries reached an understanding that if they could not reach a consensus on the renewal of the loan after it expired, then they would seek international arbitration. That was to put off the question for another 10 years. It was stated in an exchange of notes attached to the draft that if the British government asked for renewal of the loan at the end of 10 years, the Chinese government would not reject it “without reasonable cause.”7 The postponement of the Liugongdao question in favor of the immediate retrocession of Weihaiwei was apparently more beneficial to China than Liang’s

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plan. It was possibly the greatest compromise the Chinese government could have asked of the British given its limited bargaining power. On October 23, the Beiyang government passed the draft convention. Meanwhile, Macleay also informed the Beijing minister of foreign affairs of the endorsement of the British government. The official signing was scheduled for November 28. However, the coup in October by which Feng Yuxiang ousted President Cao Kun brought a dramatic change to the scene. Members of the original cabinet including Koo left Beijing for fear of their safely. Although C. T. Wang, the new foreign minister, pushed for the signature, the British procrastinated, giving no definite reply. The agreement was never signed until the Beiyang government collapsed. The mission of restoring Weihaiwei was to be pursued later by the Nanjing Nationalist government, which completed it in 1930.

The Special Tariff Conference and the Dismissal of Aglen China’s struggle for tariff autonomy Shanghai in 1925 was in the throes of labor upheaval. In May 1925, fuel was added to the fire by Japanese suppression of a labor riot in their No. 8 cotton mill, which cost the life of a protester named Gu Zhenghong. Mass protests and strikes were provoked throughout the international settlement. Then on May 30, a student demonstration near the Laozha Police Station on Nanjing Road escalated into a tragedy as a British inspector fired into the demonstrators, followed by more policemen, leaving scores of protesters either dead or wounded. In the aftermath, a massive anti-imperialistic movement broke out. Resentment over foreign institutions in foreign concessions led to urgent petitions for restoration of these territories, cancelation of extraterritoriality, and abrogation of unequal treaties. The CPC and KMT in the South, along with many other interest groups and community organizations, were supportive of the movement. For the CPC, the aim of the movement had to go beyond the punishment of murderers, compensation, and apologies, to the abolition of unequal treaties and all imperialistic privileges in China. According to the party, not until the superior goals were attained would the lives and freedom of the Chinese people be protected from being trampled by the imperialistic powers.8 In a similar vein, the Central Executive Committee of the KMT adopted a resolution that attributed the violence of imperialism to unequal treaties and proclaimed: “only by making the abrogation of unequal treaties the

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center of all anti-imperialistic campaigns would this incident of violence be resolved fundamentally, and would similar violent acts be extinct ever after in China.”9 Among the other groups, the Shanghai General Labor Union (Shanghai zong gonghui 上海總工會), the Shanghai Federation of Street Unions (Shanghai gelu shangjie zong lianhe hui 上海各路商界總聯合會), the Student Union of the Republic of China (Zhonghua minguo xuesheng lianhe zonghui 中華民國學生聯合總會), and the Shanghai Student Union (Shanghai xuesheng lianhe hui 上海學生聯合會) published a joint declaration, ascribing the cause of the May 30th Incident to “the existence of extraterritoriality,” which “barred the seeking of justice for the workers murdered without cause and for the arrested students.” Therefore, their list of 13 conditions proposed for the settlement of the incident included the return of the Mixed Court, the abolition of consular jurisdiction, and the permanent withdrawal of British and Japanese troops from Shanghai.10 The Beiyang government, taking advantage of the nationalist sentiments, decided to initiate a campaign for treaty revision, through which it hoped to improve its international status and divert public attention from its unsatisfying governance. This started with a diplomatic note asking for the revision of unequal treaties addressed to the Washington Conference treaty power legations on June 24, 1925. The note asked for “a readjustment of China’s treaty relations with foreign Powers to bring them more in line with the generally accepted conceptions of international justice and equality and more in conformity with existing conditions in China,” arguing that the existence of the “inequalities and extraordinary privileges” provided for by treaties had been “causes of disaffection” which would “produce friction and disturb the cordial relations and good understanding between China and the foreign Powers.” The note also complained that contrary to what the powers had assured, China’s international status had not improved and was “in some respects even inferior to that of the defeated nations,” where extraterritorial courts, foreign concessions, leased territories, and an externally imposed conventional tariff did not exist.11 The Beiyang government also requested the foreign powers to convene the long overdue Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff and the Commission on Extraterritoriality as soon as possible. According to the resolutions of the Washington Naval Conference, these conferences should have been held within three months after the conference; however, they were held up until then because of the so-called Gold Franc Controversy between China and France springing from the payment of the Boxer Indemnity. The controversy, in a nutshell, arose in 1922 when France demanded Beijing to pay the French share of the indemnity in the gold franc instead of franc notes, which experienced a severe depreciation after the First World War. China duly refused because it would cost her an extra 60 million silver

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dollars, but France postponed her ratification of the Nine-Power Treaty in order to coerce Beijing to submit. After three years of disputes, China at last gave way in 1925 in favor of the convention of the tariff and extraterritoriality conferences. With the growing tide of nationalism in China, the foreign powers knew that the two conferences could not be postponed anymore. In July 1925, the United States called the other powers to open the conferences as soon as possible.12 In the opinion of Secretary of State Frank Kellogg: “I believed then and I believe now that such action will go farther toward alleviating the anti-foreign sentiment in China than anything else.” He added towards the end of the same telegram as the above comment: “I am not, of course, prepared to say that it is wise for us to declare for unconditional surrender of conventional tariffs and extraterritoriality at once. We may be driven to this position if the Powers are not willing to make reasonable concessions.”13 To appease the anti-imperialistic sentiments of the Chinese people, other foreign powers accepted the U.S. proposal. On August 5, the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty exchanged their ratification documents for a series of agreements reached at the Washington Conference, indicating that the last obstacle to the opening of the tariff conference was cleared. On August 18, the Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent invitations to the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty, to the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff scheduled for October 26 in Beijing. The invitation stated on the one hand that the conference was called according to the treaty relating to the Chinese customs tariff signed at Washington, but on the other hand that China was not to be completely bound by the treaty because it failed to address her wish for tariff autonomy. In the words of the foreign ministry: In connection with the said Treaty, it may be recalled that on January 5th, 1922, at the 17th meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions of the Washington Conference, the Chinese Delegation, in giving their assent thereto, declared that it was their intention to bring up again the question of the restoration to China of her tariff autonomy for consideration on all appropriate occasions in the future. In pursuance of the above declaration the Chinese Government proposes that the said question be also brought up at the forthcoming conference and expects that some arrangement will be made to remove the tariff restrictions hitherto imposed on China.14 On September 2, invitations were also extended to Denmark, Spain, Sweden, and Norway, which were not among the Nine Powers.

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There was not much pleasant surprise in the replies of the powers, which accepted the invitation. In their identic note to Beijing on September 4, they simply repeated the Washington consensus that any revisions to existing treaties must wait until the Chinese authorities were willing and able “to fulfill their obligations and to assume the protection of foreign rights and interests now safeguarded by the exceptional provisions of those treaties.” As far as the cancellation of extraterritoriality was concerned, they held fast to an inquiry into China’s judiciary system.15 The Beiyang government made full preparations for the conference. On September 3, it established a tariff commission that comprised 12 members, including the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of finance, the minister of agriculture and commerce, the minister of communications, the director general of the Taxation Bureau, and the director general of the National Tobacco and Wine Affairs Office, and six other diplomatic and financial personalities. On September 23, it issued the nine-article General Principles of Tariff Autonomy drafted by Chief Commissioner Liang Shiyi. The main principles were: • China to exercise tariff autonomy in accordance with the principle of complete sovereign right in taxation. Any international treaties that went against China’s tariff sovereign right should be revised. • Any terms in current treaties on China’s internal taxes, such as those relating to production, manufacturing, and sales should be annulled, and China’s internal taxes should be set by the Chinese government. • China to abolish likin, transit duties, and all duties levied on goods passing through the country. Internal taxes should be levied thereafter on Chinese and foreign nationals at the same rates. • China to set her own tariff schedules. Tariff rates for imports and exports should both be determined autonomously based on China’s own inquiry into current prices, amendable of her own accord. • The current customs administration to be reformed.16 In addition to this, on October 24, the Beiyang government issued a new Customs Tariff Law and a Law Regulating the Import Duty on Tobacco and Wine. According to the Customs Tariff Law, the highest rate of import duty should be 40% of value of goods and the lowest should be 7.5%; ad valorem duties should be fixed based on the wholesale prices prevailing at the port of entrance, while non–ad valorem duties should be fixed based on the average prices of the goods prevailing during the preceding year. It also provided that if Chinese goods were subjected to less favorable treatment than those of other countries, China would impose an extra import duty on goods from that country; and if foreign goods were dumped in

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China, China might impose an extra duty equal to the proper prices.17 The issuing of these laws were preparations to strive for China’s tariff autonomy before the start of the conference. On October 26, the conference opened in Jurentang, Zhongnanhai, Beijing. Representatives from 13 countries, namely, all of the Nine Powers plus Denmark, Spain, Sweden, and Norway, attended the conference. The Chinese plenipotentiaries were Minister of Foreign Affairs Shen Ruilin, W. W. Yen, C. T. Wang, Alfred Sze, Huang Fu, Tsai Ting Kan (Cai Tinggan), Chen Jintao, and Wang Chonghui (the later Wang was a late addition). Delegations of other countries were all headed by the ministers in Beijing. In the opening session, C. T. Wang submitted five proposals regarding the restoration of Chinese tariff autonomy: 1. The participating Powers formally declare to the Government of the Republic of China their respect for its tariff autonomy and agree to the removal of all the tariff restrictions contained in existing treaties. 2. The Government of the Republic of China agrees to the abolition of likin simultaneously with the enforcement of the Chinese national tariff law which shall take effect not later than the 1st day of January, 1929. 3. Previous to the enforcement of the Chinese national tariff law, an interim surtax of 5% on ordinary goods, 30% on A grade luxuries (namely, wine, tobacco) and 20% on B grade luxuries shall be levied in addition to the present customs tariff at 5% ad valorem. 4. The collection of the above-mentioned interim surtaxes shall begin three months from the date of signature. 5. The decisions relative to the above four articles shall be carried into effect from the date of signature.18 On the following day, three committees were established to discuss three topics separately. Committee One was responsible for discussions on tariff autonomy and the abolition of likin, Committee Two discussed the provisional measures before China’s resumption of tariff autonomy, and Committee Three discussed other issues such as the certificates of the origin of foreign goods, the storage of customs revenue, and the tariff regime. On October 30, Committee One, the Committee on Tariff Autonomy, held its first meeting, where members discussed the first two of Wang’s proposals. Wang expressed China’s determination to abolish likin, arguing that it “prejudice[d] the economic growth of the Chinese people” and that China’s productive energy would be furthered with its abolition. Notwithstanding this, he noted that for a rather long

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period of time, likin and similar taxes had been the main source of revenue for the provinces, and therefore advocated against an immediate abolition and suggested abolition in steps. Specifically, he proposed that starting from December 1925 provincial governments prepare reports and the central government investigate the situation of provinces, after which the central government would provide a special fund for provinces to offset the financial losses caused by the abolition. This fund would be sourced from the increased customs revenue derived from the surtaxes in the interim period, while after China resumed her tariff autonomy, funds would be appropriated from the customs revenue itself. Such measures of compensation were provided, Wang pointed out, so that the provincial revenues would not be affected and likin could actually be abolished. Following Wang’s plan, the abolition would be completely executed in late February 1928.19 As mentioned before, foreign powers had changed their attitude towards China because of the nationalist tides in China. At this stage, they no longer bluntly opposed China’s request for tariff autonomy. However, they did not accept China’s proposals unconditionally either. For example, Japan on the one hand agreed that China should enjoy full tariff autonomy, but on the other hand proposed that China’s new national tariff law should only be effective after China abolished likin, and during the transition period, China should conclude new treaties incorporating reciprocal conventional tariffs, which would continue to be in force for a certain period simultaneously with China’s new national tariff, with foreign powers to replace the old ones.20 The existence of likin was closely related to China’s warlordism and disintegration. As early as in the late Qing period, the government had attempted to get rid of likin; however, this was never enforced as local authorities disobeyed the rule and continued to levy the duties. Even the Qing court, under (relatively) centralized rule, could do little to cure the ills of likin, let alone the Beiyang government which was surrounded by warlords. Having witnessed the Qing’s failure in earlier days, the foreign powers were in total awareness that likin would not be abolished as long as warlords continued to dominate. Therefore, to make tariff autonomy contingent on the abolition of likin was just an empty promise. In addition, Japan’s proposal on the simultaneous effectiveness of new treaties of reciprocal conventional tariffs and the national tariff necessarily turned the former into a prerequisite of the latter, which, in the case of China and Japan, would be difficult given the conditions of Chinese and Japanese industry and commerce back then. The United States adopted similar tactics. To China’s agreement of abolishing likin, she added “other related internal taxes which may be agreed upon.” Among her other propositions were: “If requested by a majority of the contracting powers

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before January 1, 1928, China shall convene on May 1, 1928, a conference of representatives of the contracting powers, for the purpose of declaring whether likin has been abolished and of negotiating any further agreements that may need to be arrived at.”21 Thus compared with Japan’s proposal, the United States’ was more offensive because by considering all inland taxes to be on a par with likin, she expanded the scope of intervention into China’s domestic affairs, and her proposal for the establishment of another conference would give foreign powers a bargaining chip for coercing China. Committee Two, the Committee on Provisional Measures, had its first meeting on November 6, to discuss questions relative to surtaxes in the interim period. C. T. Wang submitted the “Proposals of the Government of the Republic of China on the Rates of the Interim Surtaxes on Dutiable Commodities Imported into China,” which reiterated the same requests as in paragraph 3 of the October 26 proposals. He particularly drew attention to the fact that the Washington resolution that China could impose a surtax of 2.5% ad valorem on ordinary goods had been postponed for four years, while the financial embarrassments of the Chinese government had become more acute, giving it no choice but to levy this surtax which would “facilitate the task of likin abolition and pave the way for the readjustment of China’s loan obligations.” To support the proposed surtax rates on A grade luxuries, Wang pointed out that all participating countries levied strict duties on wine and tobacco; for example, the Japanese duty on tobacco was 335%, while the British duty on tobacco leaves was 465%, prepared tobacco 500%, and Brandy, 800%. In China, Wang continued, whereas tax rates on domestic wine and tobacco could go up to 80%, their imported foreign counterparts were only levied a 5% import duty and a 2.5% transit duty, which was “lacking in justice and equality.” Wang also added that the 2.5% surtax specified in the Washington Conference had not taken the compensation for the abolition of likin into consideration, but compensation would indeed be necessary because the abolition would inflict a loss of millions of silver dollars on provincial governments.22 However, the powers, especially Japan, strongly opposed the proposals. Japan was the top exporter to China, meaning that she would be the most affected by China’s proposed surtax increases. Japan saw the earlier endorsed 2.5% as the maximum acceptable surtax rate. In addition, she also demanded that China restrict the uses of the surtax revenue to compensation of likin, debt consolidation, and subvention of administrative expenses.23 To mediate, the British delegation presented a compromise plan, which proved to be too favorable to Japan for the incensed Chinese people to take. The Chinese public, offended by the foreign powers’ general attitude at the tariff conference,

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cried for the unconditional recovery of tariff autonomy. Under immense domestic pressure, the Chinese delegates toughened up and read a rather unyielding declaration to the committee on November 14, presenting the following conditions: (1) China’s tariff autonomy to be specified in the treaty to be concluded with the contracting powers; (2) the abolition of likin as China’s voluntary proposal, not a quid pro quo for her tariff autonomy; (3) discussions on surtaxes to come after the settlement of the tariff autonomy question.24 China’s sudden toughening of its stance caught the powers by surprise. Still, British delegate Macleay insisted on providing in treaty that China’s tariff autonomy be restored after the abolition of likin was completed. The atmosphere in the meeting room was charged. Tension was only broken by Dutch and Swedish mediation, with which it was decided that a subcommittee would be set up to draft the resolution regarding tariff autonomy and the abolition of likin. Eventually, the powers made concessions at the subcommittee, agreeing not to link the two matters in explicit terms. China’s assent to a separate clause to provide for her announcement of the abolition of likin on her own too was a concession in reality, for its mere existence in the same resolution as the tariff autonomy clause would naturally invite an association between the two. Thus on November 19, Committees One and Two adopted the following resolution at the fourth Committee Two meeting: The Contracting Powers other than China hereby recognize China’s right to enjoy tariff autonomy, agree to remove the tariff restrictions which are contained in existing treaties between themselves respectively and China, and consent to the going into effect of the Chinese National Tariff Law on January 1st, 1929. The Government of the Republic of China declares that likin shall be abolished simultaneously with the enforcement of the Chinese National Tariff law and further declares that the abolition of likin shall be effectively carried out by the First Day of the First Month of the Eighteenth Year of the Republic of China (January 1, 1929).25 Although the Chinese did make some concessions, the adoption of the resolution was yet considered quite an achievement after China first lost her tariff autonomy to foreign powers some eight decades ago. The three-year interim period was a rather long wait, but it at least meant an anticipatable time put down in black and white, laying down a legal basis for the eventual restoration of Chinese tariff autonomy, predicting the demise of the treaty tariff regime.

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The ongoing surtax negotiations The Beiyang government attached great importance to the negotiations on surtaxes during the interim period because of its own financial stress. However, for the foreign powers, after their concessions on tariff autonomy, they would not yield easily again. In addition to this, with the treaty tariffs to be soon forgone, they were desperate to make the most of what remained exploitable during the interim period. All these posed daunting challenges to the Chinese delegates. The negotiations proceeded in two subcommittees: one on surtax purposes and the other one on surtax rates. Although the purposes of tax revenue should have been a domestic affair, the Beiyang government was too eager to get the money to quibble with the powers about the sovereign right matter. On November 21, the Chinese delegation proposed at the Subcommittee on Purposes a specific plan for the purposes of the surtax proceeds. Accordingly, the expected annual surtax revenue would be 100 million yuan, among which 30 million yuan would be devoted to the compensation for likin abolition, 30 million yuan constructive purposes, yet another 30 million yuan the readjustment of internal and foreign debts, and the rest 10 million yuan subvention of administrative expenses of the central government. The British and Japanese delegates held that the top priority should go to foreign debt refunding. As regard the compensation for likin abolition, the foreign delegations were of the opinion that compensation should be made for one year maximum and should exclude those charges that had not been authorized by the central government.26 The fact was that most of the likin charges were imposed by local governments alone without any superior authorization. More than half of the likin charges were unauthorized, meaning that without compensation, more obstacles would be created for the abolition of likin. The discussions on surtax rates, which commenced on November 23, were no less difficult. Even though the Beiyang government made a concession, lowering the rate on A grade luxuries to 27.5%, the foreign powers still insisted on the Washington formula. To expedite the collection of surtaxes, Beijing had proposed first implementing the agreed 2.5% surtax on ordinary goods, from April 1, 1926, and 5% on luxuries, from June 1, 1926, before a decision on rate adjustments was reached; however, even this was postponed due to procrastination of the foreign powers. In the meantime, the Chinese people would not sit idly by. Public outcry for complete tariff autonomy intensified day after day. Soon, dissatisfaction with foreign interference in the purposes and rates of Chinese surtaxes spilled onto the streets. On November 22, over 30 organizations staged a “Tariff Autonomy Demonstration Campaign Assembly” (guanshui zizhu shiwei yundong dahui 關稅自

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主示威運動大會), where tens of thousands of people turned up and resolved to restore tariff autonomy unconditionally. In the event where foreign delegations refused to acknowledge the Chinese decision, the angry crowd put forth, China shall announce the abrogation of all tariff treaties and take tariff autonomy into her own hands. The mass assembly was also directed against the Beiyang government, which the protesters denounced as traitor, and whose tariff resolution they denied. The demonstrations eventually erupted into violent conflict with the police. Police stations along the protest route were vandalized. The plaque of the Capital Police Board ( jingshi jingchating 京師警察廳) was seized. On the other hand, the Beiyang government was nothing but faltering, as yet another outbreak of civil war put the provisional regime on the verge of collapse. Beijing had been in the hands of Feng Yuxiang since the October 1924 coup, but in November 1925, Guo Songling, who defected from Zhang Zuolin, joined Feng in an expedition against Zhang, which ended in Guo’s own defeat and Feng’s withdrawal from Beijing. Domestic turmoil rendered the Beijing government diplomatically dysfunctional. The Chinese delegates often could not present themselves at the conference, leading to its suspension. With the Anti-Fengtian War against Zhang over, Duan Qirui did not want the tariff conference to be aborted just like that. In February 1926, the conference was reopened. Negotiations on the surtax rates continued, and this time, the Chinese delegation proposed imposing seven-level tax rates ranging from 2.5% to 27.5%, with the estimated surtax revenue amounting to 900 million yuan. In March, the foreign powers agreed on a formula of seven-level rates from 2.5% to 22.5%, which would allow China to raise 900 million yuan from the surtaxes.27 The delegations also ascertained the proportions to be borne by each power: Japan, 19%; Britain (including British Hong Kong), 37.5%, the United States, 28.8%, and France, 2.4%. The Beiyang government accepted this proposal.28 However, before an official resolution was adopted, China’s political scene was reshuffled again: the Zhili and Anhui cliques, which had been enemies, now joined forces against Duan. In April, C. T. Wang resigned from the position of foreign minister, causing the negotiations on surtax rates to be suspended again. Although Hu Weide was appointed shortly to takeover Wang’s office, on April 20, Duan was deposed. Seeing China’s domestic turmoil, the foreign powers retracted the seven-level rate plan and restored the 2.5% and 5% Washington resolution. In May, both foreign and Chinese delegates left the anarchic Beijing and the tariff conference was adjourned. Due to political instability in Beijing, the foreign delegations met at the Dutch legation on July 1, 1926, deciding to postpone the tariff conference until the

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Chinese delegates were able to resume discussion.29 Soon, the Zhili and Anhui cliques formed a new government in Beijing, and on July 14 appointed a delegation headed by Tsai Ting Kan, requesting the reopening of the conference.30 Meanwhile, changes were creeping in from the South. The Guangzhou Nationalist government had started its Northern Expedition, and it was worried that if Beijing reached an agreement with the foreign powers, the warlords would direct the newly gained customs revenue into military spending. On July 14, the Guangzhou government sent an identic note to the local foreign consuls, asking them to convey its opposition of the resumption of the tariff conference to their legations in Beijing. Guangzhou held that the conference involved issues which “only a Central Government, representative and competent to speak and act in the name of the Chinese nation,” would be warranted to discuss, while “the mockery of a government in Beijing was a creation of a brace of mediaeval militarists and a bunch of Mandarin states boys and states coolies.” Arguing that allowing Wu Peifu and Zhang Zuolin to gain increased customs revenue would be to “enable them better to fight and attempt to destroy the greatest centre of Chinese Nationalist thought and activity” (which referred to Guangzhou), the note denounced any loans to be extended to Wu and Zhang on the security of the promised surtaxes, and warned that if the situation deteriorated, it might become “imperative for the principle of repudiation to be extended to other loans contracted in the interests of reaction and militarist and mandarin exploitation and plunder.”31 On July 24, the U.S. consul general replied the Guangzhou government at the instruction of the U.S. minister, expressing an interest to the matter while stating vaguely that the American government had in view “the benefit of China as a whole and not of any individual military or political faction.”32 The Guangzhou foreign minister addressed a reply note to the U.S. consul general, declaring that the Nationalist government would view the resumption of the tariff conference as “a deliberate attempt on the part of the United States and other interested powers to convert the Chinese Maritime Customs from a politico-fiscal organ into an engine of war finance and foreign intervention in China’s civil war, or rather revolutionary wars,” at which it would be “compelled to take certain defensive measures.”33 As the North and the South were engaged in an internecine fight, foreign powers were relieved to maintain their status quo for a while, enjoying their interests in China for as long as events would allow. Losing all interest of further discussions with Beijing, the foreign delegates refused Beijing’s request for the resumption of the tariff conference with the excuse of hot weather. In this way, the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff was indefinitely adjourned.

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Beijing’s unilateral imposition of surtaxes Seeing that the completion of surtax negotiations would be hopeless, the Beiyang government, now even more impoverished from its fights with the Guangzhou government, decided to take independent action to alleviate its financial woes. On January 3, 1927, it decided not to wait for the reopening of the tariff conference but immediately levy the 2.5% and 5% surtaxes on ordinary and luxury goods, respectively. On January 12, a presidential mandate was issued to announce the levying of the surtaxes from February 1, 1927, and the cabinet instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to push for the resumption of the tariff conference to discuss the interim surtaxes.34 On the following day, Wellington Koo, as minister of foreign affairs, informed the legations concerned by a circular note that China’s economic and financial situation was in severe difficulty and the Chinese government had to impose the surtaxes immediately.35 Despite the fact that the surtax rates fixed by the Beiyang government were in accord with the Washington treaty, that the powers had defended these rates during the Special Tariff Conference, and that Britain assented in a memorandum to the Washington treaty powers on December 18, 1926 to the “unconditional grant of the Washington surtaxes” in order to eliminate the adverse consequences arising from the failure of the tariff conference,36 the foreign powers were deeply offended by the unilateral action of the Beiyang government. Among the powers, Japan displayed the strongest reaction, and she advocated a joint protest on the part of all foreign powers to the Beiyang government. The opinion of U.S. Minister John Van A. MacMurray was more reflective of the prevailing view, which was that while the arbitrary action of Beijing was not to be approved of, the powers could be lenient to China and signify assent to the levying of the surtaxes through unilateral action on their own part, instead of letting Beijing announce the imposition itself.37 His proposal gained the support of all the ministers, except Japanese Minister Kenkichi Yoshizawa, in the meeting of the diplomatic corps on January 20. The meeting resolved to draft a joint declaration to the Beiyang government.38 On the next day, the Japanese ambassador in Washington called on U.S. Secretary of State Kellogg, maintaining that the Japanese government was opposed to the “proposal to consent to putting into effect of surtaxes by China without due negotiation as provided by the Washington treaty,” and that making the declaration as proposed by MacMurray would “amount to formal acceptance of abandonment of [the] Washington Conference treaty by China,” which would be seen by the Chinese as a sign that the powers would “accept the unilateral denunciation by China of the tariff and extraterritorial provisions of the treaties.”39

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After that, Japan addressed notes of protest to the other Washington signatory powers. Thus under the strong opposition of the Japanese government, the diplomatic corps met again on January 27 to discuss the matter and decided not to comment on the action of the Beiyang government, resorting to tacit acceptance.

The dismissal of Aglen Although the powers acquiesced to the imposition of the surtaxes, there was still another obstacle for the Beiyang government, namely, the uncooperative Francis Aglen, inspector general of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. Ever since China lost control of its Customs, the post of inspector general had been held by foreign officials. The Briton Aglen had been serving at the Chinese Customs since 1888, and his over 40 years of service not only emboldened him to act arrogantly in front of Chinese officials, but also caused him to be treated in awe by British diplomats. His tenure as inspector general of customs started after the Xinhai Revolution, lasting for 17 years up until 1927. During these years, frequent changes in power in the Chinese government(s) formed a stark contrast to Aglen’s invincibility; his firm and continuous control of China’s financial lifeline vis-à-vis the constantly replaced Beijing government emboldened him even further. For example, back in August 1926, when the Beiyang government needed Aglen’s signature to issue a bond secured on the part of customs revenue that had been designated for the renounced Austrian share of the Boxer Indemnity, the inspector general put off the matter by an extended stay in Britain. To ensure that the local warlords would have no chance to detain the money, the new surtaxes would have to be centrally levied by the Customs. However, Aglen defied Beijing’s order once again, returning a wire that said he could not obey the order. The Beiyang government was at the end of its tether with Aglen’s arrogance. It decided to dismiss him from his position and appoint another Briton, Arthur H. F. Edwardes, adhering to the Sino-British treaty requirement that as long as the volume of British trade with China ranked first among other countries, China shall appoint a Briton as inspector general of the Chinese Customs. The unilateral removal of such an influential foreign official was unprecedented. Chinese press celebrated it with favorable editorials. Ta Kung Pao praised this as “an unprecedented achievement ever since the position of Inspector General of Customs was held by foreigners,”40 while The Morning Post wrote: Aglen has been nicknamed Grand Supreme Finance Minister (taishang caizheng zongzhang 太上財政總長). Not only did he keep a firm grasp of the Customs, but he also held responsibility over the safekeeping of China’s

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internal and external debts, manipulating finances and interfering with government spending. Authorities throughout these times were all forced to follow his breath. His pledges could affect the life and death of a cabinet, his words the value of government bonds…. Indignation in the hearts of the whole nation did not surge overnight. In this instance everyone is thrilled at the authorities’ decisive act to dismiss him.41 As one would have expected, the foreign powers, especially Britain, felt offended. New British Minister to China Miles W. Lampson successively interviewed Koo and Zhang Zuolin, at once imploring and coercing the Chinese government to retract the order. At the same time, he instructed Edwardes not to take office while inviting concerted action of other powers. On February 4, diplomatic ministers of foreign powers held a meeting at the British legation and decided to issue a memorandum of protest to the Beiyang government.42 On February 7, the letter was handed to Koo in an official call by the diplomatic corps. The memorandum wrote in part: This removal from office arises from the fact that it is a physical impossibility for the Inspector General to carry out the order to levy upon foreign imports certain taxes which do not rest upon treaty basis, and to which not all the Governments concerned have given their consent, and the attempt to execute such an order would constitute a danger to the very existence and functioning of the Customs Administration, thus affecting the trade of all foreign countries and impairing the security of China’s contractual obligations.43 Koo was at first unmoved by the arguments of the diplomatic corps, but learning that the Nationalists would take action to “impair the integrity of the Customs Administration” if the latter attempted to collect surtaxes for Beijing, he agreed to have the cabinet reconsider the question.44 The Beiyang government could not suffer its own dignity by rescinding the order of dismissal, but at the same time it had to let Aglen save face. Therefore, it first released plans to appoint Frederick W. Maze, who acted more independently of the British government, as new inspector general if Edwardes felt hesitated to take office, understanding that Lampson would not favor Maze and would move a step back. Under such conditions, Wang Chonghui was sent to negotiate with Lampson, and the two reached an agreement that were acceptable for both sides: Aglen, nominally remaining as inspector general, was to be granted a year of home leave while Edwardes would be acting inspector general “with the understanding

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that he would assume responsibility for service of existing domestic loans but for no further ones,” and the Beiyang government “would not enforce the order requiring the Customs to collect surtaxes.”45

The Commission on Extraterritoriality and the Rendition of the Shanghai Mixed Court China’s proposals on the abolition of extraterritoriality Like the Special Tariff Conference, the Commission on Extraterritoriality was not convened until late. In the first place, it was the Beiyang government which, in April 1922, proposed a delay until the winter of 1922 so that it could spare more time to translate the new law codes concerned and collect statistics. In 1923, when it was fully prepared for the inquiry and sent out invitations to the powers, it was caught in the Gold Franc Controversy with France. Not until the May 30th Incident did public sentiments push the inquiry onto the agenda again. The first session was thus set for December 8, 1925, but then civil war broke out between warlords in Northern China and the railroad between Beijing and Tianjin was broken down, which left some foreign delegates stranded in Tianjin. Aside from another forced postponement, the repeated delays themselves revealed the instability and feebleness of the Beiyang government to the disdain of foreign delegates, and this made the possibility of the abolition of extraterritoriality even fainter. On January 12, 1926, the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China finally met in Jurentang, Beijing. Delegates from 13 countries attended the commission, namely, the Nine Powers and Spain, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; that is to say, except for Peru, Mexico, Brazil, and Switzerland, all of the countries that enjoyed consular jurisdiction in China (16) participated.46 Beijing accredited prominent jurist and former Minister of Justice Wang Chonghui as plenipotentiary commissioner. The chairman of the commission was elected at the opening session. The Chinese delegation had tried to nominate Wang for the post, but the foreign delegations would not endorse it. Instead, they elected Silas Strawn, the U.S. commissioner, as chairman, and out of face-saving considerations, gave Wang the nominal position of honorary president only.47 China, though displeased, acquiesced because of her weak bargaining power. On January 15, Wang submitted the English and French translations of 23 existing Chinese law codes for the review of the commission. On February 1, the foreign commissioners visited Beijing’s jailhouses as well as the Supreme Court (daliyuan 大理院), the High Court, and the district courts. On March 23,

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Wang submitted a memorandum on his views concerning the present practice of extraterritoriality in China. According to him, the discussion and inquiry should not be confined to consular jurisdiction because the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by foreign powers, whether by “express treaty stipulations,” “of an unwarranted interpretation of such stipulations,” or “even without treaty sanction,” went far beyond consular jurisdiction. To be specific, Wang held that the following eight types of extraterritorial rights were detrimental to China’s sovereignty and should be studied by the commission: 1. Consular jurisdiction. Apart from infringing China’s sovereign right, the present system of consular jurisdiction created the problem of “a multiplicity of courts administering in the same locality laws of different nationalities,” which was extremely inconvenient. Wang criticized this system as an “anomalous regime” which was “out of harmony with presentday conditions.” 2. Trial of mixed cases between Chinese and foreigners having extraterritorial rights. In cases where a foreigner enjoying extraterritorial rights sued a Chinese in a Chinese court, treaty provisions regarding the presence of a foreign official at the trial differed. Some foreign countries were given the power to have a foreign official watch the proceedings, while some were not. Moreover, some powers claimed that the official present at the trial was entitled to sit as a cojudge by treaty, but the Chinese government had “consistently resisted” these claims on the ground that this was not warranted by the text of the treaty. 3. Trial of cases between foreigners having extraterritorial rights and (a) foreigners having no extraterritorial rights, or (b) foreigners of countries having no treaty relations with China. Cases of (a) were supposed to be tried by Chinese judges; however, the consuls of some of these countries had often claimed the right to be present at the trial, which China persistently rejected because that was not provided by treaty. For (b), the practice in the Shanghai International Settlement was to have the case tried by the Mixed Court with an official of a treaty power being an assessor. Some countries even ignored Chinese protests and claimed jurisdiction over these foreign defendants. The Chinese government was opposed to joint consular hearings in these cases on the ground that nationals of nontreaty countries should be “fully subject to Chinese jurisdiction and without the presence of a foreign assessor.” 4. Mixed courts. From the Chinese point of view, mixed courts had de facto been turned into a foreign court completely. For the Shanghai Mixed Court in particular, according to the regulations concerned, civil cases involving

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only Chinese should be tried by the Chinese magistrate, but now these were also attended by the foreign assessor; for criminal cases, the Mixed Court was supposed to only give up to five years of imprisonment, but in reality, such a limit was not imposed. The system of appeal to Shanghai Daotai and the consul or consul general of the foreign litigant concerned no longer functioned, so litigants had nowhere to appeal to even if they found the verdict unfair. Moreover, after the 1911 Revolution, the appointment of the Chinese commissioner went from the Chinese government to the consular corps. 5. Quasi right of asylum in premises occupied by foreigners and on foreign ships. Some Sino-foreign treaties provided that if Chinese offenders took refuge in foreign houses or foreign ships, they should be delivered upon the request of the Chinese authorities to the consul concerned. Some treaties went further to require the presentation of proof of the guilt of the person to be arrested. China found that this right was being abused. 6. The issue of foreign nationality certificates to Chinese citizens. By obtaining foreign nationality certificates or by registering with foreign consulates, some Chinese nationals, Chinese ships, and Chinese companies managed to claim exemption from Chinese jurisdiction. This essentially extended the scope of extraterritorial rights. 7. Claims of foreigners to exemption from taxation. No treaty between China and foreign countries had specifically provided for exempting foreigners from taxation. However, foreigners often found excuses to evade taxes, and some Chinese nationals living in foreign concessions or railway zones also found ways of tax aversion. This not only impaired Chinese sovereignty but also reduced China’s tax revenues. 8. Special areas, namely, foreign settlements, leased territory, the Legation Quarter, and railway zones. The administrative, jurisdictional, and law enforcement rights of these areas had all fallen into the hands of foreigners, making them quasi-foreign territories, which severely impaired China’s sovereignty.48 After some discussion, the foreign commissioners only had consensus about the inclusion of the first four matters. For the remaining items, most commissioners found the fifth to seventh considerable but the eighth out of the scope of their inquiry. The reason for turning down the eighth item was that it involved diplomatic and political rather than judicial matters. In response, Wang submitted another memorandum on April 28, reiterating the severity of the first four matters in violating Chinese jurisdictional rights and refuting the strict distinction of political and diplomatic matters from judicial matters.49

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The investigation report on extraterritoriality in China A Traveling Committee was appointed to carry out a tour of inspection of courts, prisons, and detention houses in China, planned for the last two weeks of March. However, due to the outbreak of civil war, the tour did not begin until May. From May 10 to June 16, the tour spanned 4,200 miles, covering places such as Hankou, Jiujiang, Nanjing, Shanghai, and Manchuria. The committee visited 7 high courts, 13 district courts, 1 branch district court, 2 special Chinese courts in Harbin, 5 foreign and mixed courts, 14 prisons, 15 detention houses, and 9 foreign and mixed court prisons and detention houses. Some commissioners participated from the beginning to the end, while others only followed part of the tour.50 During its travel, the tour was met with various forms of opposition from the Chinese people. For example, industrial and commercial personalities in Shanghai declined the commission’s invitation for a post-inspection reception as a protest against what they viewed as an insult to China’s sovereignty and judicial independence. Originally, Guangdong and Taiyuan, Shanxi were also included in the itinerary; however, the Nationalist government refused to admit the commission. In addition, Taiyuan, Zhangjiakou (Kalgan), Guihua, Baotou, and Ningxia were taken out from the itinerary because of political instability or inconvenience of transportation. After the commissioners returned to Beijing, the extraterritoriality commission was resumed on June 22 to discuss the results of the inspection and draft the investigation report. Completed in September, the final report covered four parts: (1) present practice of extraterritoriality in China; (2) laws and judicial and prison system of China; (3) administration of justice in China; (4) recommendations. The report spent large parts on the deficiencies of China’s judicial system, among which the most fatal one was the absence of fundamental legal provisions. In terms of this, the report said: In the early years of the Republic, considerable progress was made in the attainment of these objects, but they have been in recent years largely impeded by civil strife, which has prevailed intermittently in China since the establishment of the Republic and which, since 1924, has resulted in the discarding of the Constitutions and the weakening of the authority of the Central Government. Thus, at the present time, the rights and duties of the citizens of the Republic, the separation of the powers of the legislative, administrative, and judicial officials, and these powers themselves, are no longer founded on a firm constitutional basis. This has resulted in an encroachment upon

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the powers of the legislature and the judiciary by frequently changing administrative officials, who are, in a great number of cases, nominees of the military leaders, and in a corresponding diminution of attempts to give popular sanction to the law and their administration. Further, it has brought into greater prominence the military law and the military courts with their drastic penalties and procedure at the expense of the civil law and civil courts.51 In addition, the report also commented on the deficiency of China’s laws and regulations relating to civil matters: Until recently Chinese lawmakers did not find it necessary to differentiate between criminal and civil law, which were formerly, under the Ching [Qing] Dynasty, dealt with in one code. Although about fifteen years have elapsed since the institution of the new Chinese legal system, no statutory provision has yet been made for a civil code and only in a few civil matters has definite legislation been provided. A similar state of affairs exists in respect to commercial matters.52 At that time, the organization of China’s judicial system could be divided into three types of courts: modern courts, transition courts, and magistrates’ courts. Modern courts were relatively scanty. Under the Supreme Court in Beijing were 23 high courts, 26 branch high courts, 66 distract courts, and 23 branch divisions of district courts.53 Transition courts were, as stated in the report, “established by the Chinese Government in an attempt to bring the procedure of the old magistrates’ courts into more harmony with that of the modern courts,” using a mix of old and modern judicial systems and procedures. The prevailing type of these were judicial offices attached to the district magistrate and placed under the joint administration of the chief judge and the magistrate, with the former responsible for trying cases while the latter taking charge of all matters relating to detection of crime, arrest, investigations, transfer of prisoners, and the execution of sentences. There were a total of 46 such judicial offices throughout China at that time, while in Inner and Outer Mongolia there were similar judicial departments and in Xinjiang, a judicial preparatory department left over from the Qing dynasty for the same purpose of transitioning to the modern judicial system.54 Finally, magistrates’ courts were magistrates’ offices which had charge of judicial affairs and which the commission regarded as “practically only judicial forums.” Having centuries of history in China, they still constituted the main body of China’s judicial organization. As the report pointed out: “There are still about 1,800 such courts in China as against about 150

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modern courts and judicial offices acting as courts of first instance, from which it is evident that by far the larger part of litigation in China is still in the hands of these courts.”55 In addition to the three mentioned types of courts, there were also some special courts (i.e., the courts in the Special Areas of Manchuria and special mixed courts in Shanghai, Amoy, and Hankou), military courts, an administrative court, and police tribunals.56 The report particularly drew attention to the insufficient number of modern courts. It was calculated that with only 91 courts of first instance among the 139 modern courts in China, only one such court was available for every 4,400,000 of the population.57 However, among the three major types of courts, it was the magistrates’ courts that attracted most criticism. According to the report: The magistrates’ courts are admittedly unsatisfactory, since the magistrate, acting as procurator and judge, is discharging judicial functions which should on no account be performed by an administrative official.… In such courts where right of legal counsel is most necessary, we find it denied.… The magistrates are exempt from delivering a written judgment in local court cases although such cases may involve imprisonment up to five years.58 Militarist interference into the administration of justice was unacceptable by Western standards and invited widespread dissatisfaction from the foreign commissioners. They criticized: “These military leaders, possessing, as they do, their own armies engaged in constant warfare, exercise almost unrestrained authority over the lives, liberty, and property of the people in the areas which happen for the time being to be within their control.” In addition, military leaders also interfered with civil administration under the guise of martial law “declared without regard to legal provisions on the subject.” Moreover, under Chinese law, they were “immune from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts,” and their actual power in fact guaranteed them immunity from all courts.59 The report also listed 11 cases where reporters, judges, and politicians were shot to death by the military without the formalities of trials.60 Just as unacceptable to the commission was “violence or cruelty against the defendant” against the Provisional Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Regulations, particularly the use of torture to extract confessions of guilt and to punish criminals, and also the maltreatment of prisoners, which had been “perpetuated by the military, the magistrates, and the police.”61 As for the environment of the prisons, the commission spotted the problems overcrowding, unhygienic and unhealthful conditions, shortages of food, and malpractices that led to the death of prisoners.62

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The dark state of China’s judicial system disappointed the foreign commissioners. Their conclusion requires no guesswork: extraterritoriality in China could not yet be abolished. The Chinese, of course, saw it differently: however flawed the Chinese judicial system might be, this should not make extraterritorial rights any more justifiable. The communist organ The Guide Weekly, while admitting the “darkness” of a judicial system maintained by warlordism and the “landlord bourgeoisie,” used the May 30th Incident as evidence to retort that foreign judicial systems were not exactly “torchbearers of justice” as the powers claimed. The communists questioned, “By what right can imperialism interfere in China’s judiciary and administration, can it use the improvement of the Chinese judiciary and administration as the condition for relinquishing consular jurisdiction?”63 At the end of the report, the commission provided some recommendations, listed in two points, regarding China’s judicial system. The first point read: “The administration of justice with respect to the civilian population must be entrusted to a judiciary which shall be effectively protected against any unwarranted interference by the executive or other branches of the Government, whether civil or military.” The second point mentioned the laws that the Chinese government should complete and put into force: civil code; commercial code (including negotiable instruments law, maritime law, and insurance law); revised criminal code; banking law; bankruptcy law; patent law; land expropriation law; and law concerning notaries public. The rest of point two read: “it should establish and maintain a uniform system for the regular enactment, promulgation, and recession of laws, so that there may be no uncertainty as to the laws of China”; “it should extend the system of modern courts, modern prisons, and modern detention houses with a view to the elimination of the magistrates’ courts and of the oldstyle prisons and detention houses”; “it should make adequate financial provision for the maintenance of courts, detention houses, prisons, and their personnel.”64 Two other recommendations were given to the powers, as to the abolition of extraterritoriality: It is suggested that, prior to the reasonable compliance with all the recommendations above mentioned but after the principal items thereof have been carried out, the powers concerned, if so desired by the Chinese government, might consider the abolition of extraterritoriality according to such progressive scheme (whether geographical, partial, or otherwise) as may be agreed upon. And:

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Pending the abolition of extraterritoriality, the governments of the powers concerned should consider Part I of the report with a view to meeting the observations there made and, with the cooperation of the Chinese government wherever necessary, should make certain modifications in the existing systems and practice of extraterritoriality.65 A day before the report was adopted by the commission, Wang Chonghui read a declaration, stating that in the past 20 years, China had been endeavoring to reform her legal, judicial, and administrative systems, pleading once again that the powers immediately relinquish their extraterritorial rights in China.66 It needs no explanation that this could do little to change the minds of the foreign commissioners, whose views had been evident in the report. On September 16, the report was officially signed by the participating commissioners. On behalf of China, Wang signed with reservations to the first three parts of the report.

The rendition of the Shanghai Mixed Court During the Xinhai Revolution, the judges and Chinese officials of the Shanghai Mixed Court fled their posts, and foreign powers seized the opportunity to take over the institution, rendering it virtually a foreign court. For a time, after several unsuccessful negotiations by the Beiyang government, this was accepted as fait accompli. However, the court’s flagrant arrest of students during the May 30th protests again stirred up public resentment. As a result, the Shanghai people made a unanimous call for the handover of the Shanghai Mixed Court. Under such circumstances, the Beiyang government reopened negotiations with the diplomatic corps. However, the tough stance of the diplomatic corps against the Beiyang government’s proposals for the administration of the Court’s tribunal to be fully compatible with Chinese law led the negotiations to stagnate. In addition, the Anti-Fengtian War between the Nationalist Army of the KMT and the Fengtian-Zhili alliance swept the Beijing and Tianjin area in 1926 spring, complicating the political situation. Negotiations were constantly interrupted. Unwilling to leave the fate of the Mixed Court with Beijing, the Shanghai public started campaigning for the negotiations to be placed under the charge of the Jiangsu provincial government. This proposal gained the support of Sun Chuanfang, the military leader of the so-called “League of Five Provinces” who had newly taken control of the Jiangsu-Shanghai region. Eager to win the support of the locals, he made the ambitious move of setting up the Director General’s Office of the Shanghai and Wusong Port (Songhu shangbu duban gongshu 淞滬商埠督 辦公署), serving as director general (duban 督辦) himself and inviting intellectual V.

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K. Ting (Ding Wenjiang) to be principal director (zongban 總辦). Under the Director General’s Office were five bureaus, among which was the Foreign Affairs Bureau headed by Shanghai Commissioner for Foreign Affairs G. F. Hsu (Xu Yuan). Sun appointed Ting and Hsu to deal with the rendition of the Mixed Court. Meanwhile, the diplomatic corps was displeased with the tough conditions opened by the Beiyang government and saw transferring the negotiations to Shanghai a feasible alternative. The negotiations were moved to Shanghai and undertaken by the Shanghai consular corps, which was represented by British Consul General Sydney Barton, U.S. Consul General Edwin S. Cumingham, and Japanese Consul General Yada Shichitaro. At first, Jiangsu representatives insisted on retrieving four powers from the foreigners, namely, trial of all civil cases, joint hearings of criminal cases involving foreigners, foreign consuls’ issuing of summons and arrest warrants, and prosecution, which the consular body strongly opposed. To accelerate the negotiation process, Sun twice ordered Ting to “concede a little.”67 After four rounds of talks, the two parties came to a basic consensus: the powers would only completely relinquish their consuls’ right to issue arrest warrants and summons, with concessions on both sides regarding the other three matters. Of course, Beijing would not be satisfied with the compromised plan, and it asked Sun to reconsider his position. Yet given the limited power of the Northern government, preparations for the conclusion of a rendition agreement went on despite Beijing’s futile protest. On August 31, Jiangsu signed the nine-article Provisional Agreement for the Rendition of the Shanghai Mixed Court with the consul generals in Shanghai. The more significant achievements on the part of China through the agreement are: • The Shanghai Provisional Court would be established to replace the Mixed Court in the Shanghai International Settlement, handling all civil and criminal cases except for those which “in accordance with the treaties involve[d] the right of consular jurisdiction”; but cases that involved imprisonment of 10 years or above or death sentence were to be reported to the Jiangsu government for approval. • All laws and ordinances which were applicable in Chinese courts at present and which might be enacted and promulgated in the future were to be also applied in the Provisional Court. • The president and judges of the Provisional Court were to be appointed by the Jiangsu government. • The proceedings of Chinese criminal cases which “directly affected the peace and order of the International Settlement” and in which the accused

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was an employee of a foreigner having extraterritorial rights were to be watched rather than jointly heard by a consular deputy. This meant that “the concurrence of the deputy shall not be necessary for the validity of the judgment” of the Chinese judge, and the deputy “shall not … put any questions to the witnesses or prisoners without the consent of the judge.” • The prosecutor’s office was to be transformed into a chief clerk’s office (registry) taking charge of administrative work.68 The Jiangsu representatives also made considerable compromises. To begin with, the system of joint hearings was not abolished. In the provisions of the agreement: “In cases in which a foreigner having extraterritorial rights or the Shanghai Municipal Council is the plaintiff in a civil action and in criminal cases in which a foreigner having extraterritorial rights is the complainant, the Consul of the nationality concerned or the Senior Consul may send an official to sit jointly with the Judge in accordance with the provisions of the treaties.” Moreover, the judicial police of the Provisional Court would continue to be sent by the Municipal Police, which was also given the authority to take charge of the prisons attached to the Provincial Court; and the chief clerk would still be recommended by the consular corps though appointed by the provincial government, the consent of the consular corps necessary for his dismissal. As far as the laws and ordinances are concerned, established rules of procedure of the Mixed Court were to be considered alongside Chinese law.69 Even worse was the extension of the jurisdiction of the Provisional Court, by the attached exchange of notes, to “mixed criminal cases arising on foreign property, including Municipal roads outside the limits of the Settlement but within the districts of Shanghai and Paoshan [Baoshan]” and also “mixed civil cases arising in the surrounding areas within the districts of Shanghai and Paoshan.” In addition, foreign lawyers were allowed to appear for either party in civil cases in which a foreigner having extraterritorial rights was the plaintiff and a foreigner without extraterritorial rights was the defendant.70 On January 1, 1927, a ceremony was held for the rendition of the Mixed Court in the Shanghai International Settlement, and the Provisional Court was established. The mixed court in the French concession, too, was reorganized following the Provisional Agreement, retaining the name of mixed court.

Beijing’s Attempts to Revise and Terminate Expiring Treaties The treaties between China and foreign powers could usually be revised upon the request of the signatories every 10 years. Instead of seeking a blanket solution to all

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treaties, the Beiyang government decided to implement the tactic of negotiating for the revision of expiring treaties one by one. In 1926, China’s treaties with France, Japan, and Belgium (and in 1927, Spain) were due to expire. Considering Belgium’s relatively weaker national power, the Beiyang government decided to test out its new policy on Belgium before going to the other powers.

The 1865 Sino-Belgian Treaty On April 16, 1926, while the Special Tariff Conference and Commission on Extraterritoriality were still meeting in Beijing, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu Weide notified Belgian Minister Le Maire de Warzee d’Hermalle of the Beiyang government’s desire to terminate the 1865 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, which would reach its sixth 10-year term in October, and expressed willingness for negotiations in order to conclude a new treaty for the “mutual interest of both parties concerned.”71 However, the treaty contained a term that was extremely unfavorable for China. Article 46 stipulated: If hereafter the Government of His Majesty the King of the Belgians should consider it advisable to effect modifications in certain of the clauses of the present treaty, it will be free in this respect to open negotiations after a period of ten years has passed, as from the day of the exchange of ratifications, but, six months before the expiration of the ten years, it must make known officially to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of China its intention of effecting modifications, and wherein they will consist. Failing this official notification, the treaty will remain in force without alteration for a new term of ten years, and so on from ten years to ten years.72 Such a provision, which in effect guaranteed the renewal of the treaty for as long as Belgium pleased, was rarely seen even among the treaties between China and other powers. Given Belgium’s weaker position compared with greater powers like Britain and France, it fully revealed the ignorance of the Qing government, which only had in mind the prevention of frequent Belgian proposals for revisions. The term gave Belgium legitimate reason to reject China’s claim. On April 27, de Warzee wrote Hu a rejection citing Article 46 of the treaty while adding that Belgium “would not refuse … to discuss a modification” of the treaty clauses “as soon as the political situation in China permit[ted] it” and after securing information about “the conclusions to be drawn from the work of the Special Customs Conference and the Commission of Inquiry into Extraterritoriality.”73

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The Belgian government obviously believed that the old treaty should stay valid during the negotiations for the new treaty, but the Chinese government thought this would cause no end to the negotiations. It set a six-month time limit for the negotiations, and on July 24 informed de Warzee that if a new treaty could not be concluded by October 27, it would “study the possibility of finding a provisional modus vivendi which, while safeguarding the legitimate interests of Belgium, [would] in no way impair the inherent rights of China.”74 On August 4, de Warzee communicated to new Minister of Foreign Affairs Tsai Ting Kan Belgium’s sole right to revise the treaty again and threatened to submit the case to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.75 In the meantime, Belgium also sought British and American intervention. On August 21, the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent official notes to the British and U.S. embassies, warning that the issue concerned not only Belgium as China would soon adopt “an identical attitude toward the other Powers with treaties.”76 In the face of Belgium’s threat, the advice of Chinese Minister to Belgium Wang King-ky (Wang Jingqi) was to ignore it. His proposed strategy was to draft the provisional modus vivendi as soon as possible, and if Belgium kept being unreasonable, China could break off negotiations and abolish the old treaty on her own. If Belgium protested against the abrogation, Wang proposed that China cut off diplomatic relations with Belgium and recall her diplomatic mission in Belgium. As regard to the trial at The Hague, Wang enunciated: “Since this abrogation of the treaty is the first step to our national liberation, it has tremendous implications. Even if we have to lose at the court, or be absent from the hearing, or refuse to the implementation of the court’s order, or even withdraw from The Hague and the League of Nations because of this, weighing the benefits and harms, I still deem the abrogation fit and appropriate.” He suggested demanding the withdrawal of foreign judges from countries having unequal treaties with China — who constituted the majority of The Hague judges — on the ground of conflict of interest, thereby inhibiting the case from being brought to the court.77 On September 2, the Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed a provisional modus vivendi consisting of five articles. Articles 2 and 3 began as follows: “The principle of tariff autonomy for each country is hereby recognized”; “The principle of territorial jurisdiction for each country is hereby recognized.” To make the provisions more conciliatory to Belgium, Article 2 went on to permit Belgian imports to continue to enjoy “tariff rates generally applied to foreign imports into China” provided that Belgium would also grant Chinese imports “the minimum rates applied to foreign imports into Belgium,” whereas Article 3 consented to “tolerate temporarily the maintenance of the status quo of the consular jurisdiction of Belgium in China” if Belgium agreed to renounce her consular jurisdiction in

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China in the new treaty. The question of the Belgian Tianjin concession was left to be decided during the negotiations of the new treaty. The provisional modus vivendi was set to be effective for no more than six months.78 Belgium had insisted on the effectiveness of the old treaty during the negotiations of the new treaty. However, as Britain and the United States did not give strong support, Belgium softened her stance and agreed to the invalidation of the old treaty, but demanded written provisions for the maintenance of her consular jurisdiction and most favored nation treatment. On September 29, de Warzee submitted an aide-memoire to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offering to “enter without delay” into negotiations with China for treaty revision while reserving the right to have the recourse to The Hague.79 In October, the Beiyang government changed hands and Wellington Koo became minister of foreign affairs and acting premier. The new cabinet largely retained the old Belgian policy, but the cabinet meeting on October 17 decided to, instead of announcing the cancellation of the unequal terms of the old treaty, let them be superseded by new treaty provisions. The cabinet also had no dispute with the provisional modus vivendi, only emphasizing that the old treaty must be annulled upon expiration and that the new treaty must be concluded within six months. The reason for imposing such a time limit was to prevent the perpetual extension of Belgian privileges. Involuntarily acceding to the conclusion of a new treaty, Belgium nonetheless bargained over the conditions of the provisional modus vivendi. On October 23, de Warzee proposed in an aide-memoire to the Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs a new basis for drafting the provisional modus vivendi, which constituted the granting of most favored nation treatment for Belgian goods, the status of Belgian nationals in China, and navigation; maintenance of Belgian consular jurisdiction according to the recommendations of the extraterritoriality commission; and extension of the effective date of the provisional modus vivendi until the conclusion of the new treaty.80 Beijing’s reply was that most favored nation treatment should be granted reciprocally; the question of consular jurisdiction should be worked out jointly between the two governments during the period of negotiations; and the old treaty would cease to be effective upon expiration while the new treaty must be concluded within six months.81 On October 26, Belgium agreed to the abolition of the old treaty and reciprocal granting of most favored nation treatment; however, she insisted on extending the period of effectiveness of the provisional modus vivendi until the coming into force of the new treaty. The October 26 aide-memoire also asserted the right to restore the old treaty as signatory of the Boxer Protocol and the Washington Nine-Power Treaty if negotiations subsided,82 but Beijing would not be swayed.

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It was evident that their major point of divergence was the period of effectiveness of the provisional modus vivendi rather than its actual provisions. Belgium wanted to maintain her rights until an acceptable new treaty came into force, but for Beijing, any concession without a time limit would risk it the infinite extension of the modus vivendi. On October 27, de Warzee tried to persuade Beijing to accept the extension of the provisional modus vivendi for another six month upon threemonth notification by either of the contracting parties if a new treaty could not be concluded in time, and so on until the coming into force of the new treaty.83 This apparently brought no change in substance, for it implied that the provisional modus vivendi would be indefinitely extendable without China’s approval. Therefore the Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to put forth another tweak on October 28, so that if a new treaty could not be concluded within six months, the modus vivendi could be renewed upon mutual agreement, but it could also be terminated upon three months’ prior notice by either of the contracting parties.84 This proposal, which the Chinese foreign ministry proclaimed as the greatest concession that it could make, would give Beijing the control over the term of effectiveness of the provisional modus vivendi. To support Beijing’s negotiations with Belgium, overseas Chinese in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium held a rally in Brussels on October 20, organizing a “delegation” for the abolition of the Sino-Belgian Treaty. On October 27, the day on which the treaty was due to expired, they went on a public demonstration, which was brutally suppressed by the Belgian police. The news sparked public outrage in China, triggering fervent demands on the government to take immediate action. The Alliance of the Chambers of Commerce in China (Zhonghua quanguo shanghui lianhe hui 中華全國商會聯合會) held a council meeting on October 30, where it resolved to champion for the complete abrogation of the old treaty, full transparency of the new treaty, and opposition to the provisional modus vivendi. The alliance also declared in a letter addressed to Koo: “If the government ignores public opinion, we vow to deny [its decision].” Likewise, the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce (Shanghai zong gonghui 上海總工會) published a declaration calling for the confident abrogation of the Sino-Belgian Treaty. The press vehemently attacked the feeble stance of the Beiyang government. Amidst Chinese nationalist sentiments in Europe, on October 27, Minister to Belgium Wang decided to side with the Chinese emigrants and act ahead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He sent a diplomatic note to the Belgian Foreign Office, declaring that according to the Chinese government’s opinion on April 16, the 1865 Sino-Belgian Treaty had terminated on that day and the provisions of the treaty would be considered null and void thereafter.85 Of course, lacking the likes of “upon the instruction of my government,” the note was an unofficial action.

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To China’s disappointment, Belgium continued to refuse to stipulate a time limit as to the conclusion of the new treaty in the negotiations on the first day after the expiration. On November 4, the Beiyang government sent an ultimatum to the Belgian legation, expressing disappointment and declaring, The Chinese Government … sincerely hope that the Belgian Government will see its way to accepting the proposal of the Chinese Government without further delay; and this they expect all the more earnestly, since failing to receive it within a reasonable period which cannot but be a very short one in view of the great urgency of the situation, they will be confronted with the necessity of making a public declaration of their attitude vis-a-vis the Treaty of November 2, 1865. This amounted to an ultimatum that if a satisfactory reply was not given within one day, the Beiyang government would announce unilaterally that the treaty had become null and void.86 Naturally, Belgium saw no reason to step back. On the following day, the Belgian minister turned in an aide-memoire of rejection, announcing the suspension of negotiations and submission of the question to The Hague.87 The Chinese diplomats were not to be deterred, knowing that unilateral rights are invalid in international law. Koo believed that the Belgian claim would be contrary to the point of view of international law experts at that time, who were paying more emphasis on the doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus, or fundamental change of circumstances; thus China could well argue for revising the treaty on the ground of changed circumstances compared with the time at which it was first concluded.88 On November 6, the Beijing cabinet decided to announce that the 1865 SinoBelgian Treaty had ceased to be effective after long deliberation. The Beiyang government issued a presidential mandate announcing the termination of the treaty and instructing the minister of foreign affairs to “negotiate and conclude a new treaty with the Belgian Government as speedily as possible on the basis of equality and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty” in order to promote friendly relations with Belgium. The presidential mandate also ordered the local authorities to “extend full and due protection” to the Belgian legation, consulates, nationals, products, and ships in China.89 On the same day, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a long statement to explain the government’s decision. Prefaced by elaborating China’s stance as regard her treaties with foreign powers, the statement in fact addressed the whole treaty system beyond the controversy of the Sino-Belgian Treaty. The familiar claim

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on equal footing with other powers was renewed in light of the developments in international circumstances: “In an age which has witnessed the coming into existence of the League of Nations and the birth of the ‘spirit of Locarno,’ there does not seem to be any valid reason to justify international relations which are not founded on equality and mutuality.” Beijing’s treaty policy was, expressly, raising the revision of unequal treaties on the one hand, and being “refrained from concluding new treaties unless they were based on equality, reciprocity, and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty” on the other hand. Having argued that the move of terminating the Belgian treaty was in line with the policy “to revise the existing treaties which [were] as a rule terminable by notice after a certain period,” the statement then described the process of negotiations with Belgium and criticized the Belgian moves during the past months. It drew attention to Belgium’s last reply on November 5 which asserted that as soon as the United States, Britain, France, and Japan had concluded new treaties with China in the matter of jurisdiction, she “would accept the same depositions as might be agreed upon between China and any of those Powers,” and rebutted that if every power held the same position, “a vicious circle would be completed and there would be little hope of China’s being able to bring into existence new treaties so essential to the common interests of China and the foreign powers.” Regarding the Belgian decision to ask the international court to interpret Article 46 of the Sino-Belgian Treaty, the statement justified the Chinese insistence upon a definite period for the conclusion of the new treaty first as “in obedience to the unanimous wish of the Chinese people, to free China from the state of inequality to which she [was] at present subjected by the Treaty of 1865 in her relations with Belgium,” adding that this question of “national aspiration” was “scarcely suitable subjects for adjudication.” It then argued from a legal point of view, that Article 46 as defined by the Belgian government would render the provision unilateral and unjust, and hence “manifestly incompatible with the spirit of a treaty based on equality and mutuality which Belgium expressed herself as being ready to conclude.” In closing, the statement demonstrated confidence that “an impartial review of her action which [took] into account the feelings of an entire nation resolutely aspiring to a place to which it [was] justly entitled” would not hold China responsible for her termination of the 1865 treaty.90 On November 9, the cabinet set up a Treaty Investigation Commission to prepare for treaty revision under the leadership of Koo, who was made chairman, and Huang Chonghui, vice chairman. Soon, the cabinet proposed general principles for administering Belgians in China, according to which Belgian consular jurisdiction would be temporarily suspended and cases involving Chinese and Belgians would be settled in accordance with Chinese law. To enforce this, the Ministry of

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Foreign Affairs instructed the Shanghai commissioner for foreign affairs to notify the Shanghai Mixed Court about the termination of consular joint hearings of Belgian cases. On November 25, the Beiyang government promulgated the Revised Regulations Governing the Trial of Nonextraterritorial Nationals in Civil and Criminal Cases and ordered the provincial Commissions of Foreign Affairs to apply the regulations in cases involving Belgians thereafter. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also announced plans to retrocede Belgian administrative control in the Tianjin concession on the ground that it was granted by Article 12 of the Sino-Belgian Treaty. Belgium had, in the meantime, softened her tone. The Belgian foreign minister had told Wang King-ky that if China simply announced the abrogation of the treaty without executing it immediately, Belgium would temporarily refrain from bringing the question before The Hague. By then, the Shanghai Mixed Court had announced the order to terminate Belgian consular joint hearings. The Belgian minister thus asked China for a written declaration on the suspension of the execution of the treaty abolition, but it was rejected by Wang.91 Seeing that China had no intention to make concessions, on November 26, Belgium officially filed a lawsuit with The Hague, requesting the court to announce that China had no right to unilaterally abolish the treaty. Despite all the confident demonstration before that, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was yet in a dilemma as to whether to appear at the hearing: appearing would bind China to the court’s decision even if it turned out to be unfavorable, but not appearing would convey the message of being contemptuous of international treaty obligations. Therefore, it sent telegrams to ask the advice of its diplomatic envoys. Most of the envoys suggested not appearing at the court. Minister to France Chen Lu said: As our country has announced the termination of the treaty in accordance with public opinion and changes in the political circumstances, we should press on with it. While not appearing at The Hague may be regarded as contempt of international law by other powers, we may not have to be concerned as foreigners have long been contemptuous of international law by carrying out activities beyond the scope of treaty provisions in China over the years.92 Chargé d’affaires in Switzerland Shao Jirong asserted: The Belgian Treaty, as an Unequal Treaty, hinders our survival, and is thus itself against the principles of international law. Announcing the

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ineffectiveness of a treaty is an exercise of absolute sovereign right by any independent country, which is not to be restricted by the clauses in a treaty…. As the reason for abrogating the treaty falls outside the treaty clauses, any interpretation of the clauses shall not hold. It appears that we should decline an appearance on account of the lack of a valid subject of litigation.93 Minister to Portugal Wang Yanzhang believed that China was bound to fail the case, and proposed taking strong action instead: If Belgium refuses to conclude a new treaty, we can temporarily cancel her favorable treatment, following the example of the Portuguese-French commercial treaty negotiations which broke off in 1923, at which Portuguese trade unions asked their government to show opposition by replacing the French Ambassador to Portugal and increasing the import duties to three to six times above the maximum duty, and soon the treaty was concluded.94 Chinese representative to the League of Nations Zhu Zhaoxin, however, suggested submitting the dispute to the Assembly of the League, which Koo supported. The merit of this measure, as they believed, was that unlike The Hague, which was controlled by a handful of big powers, the Council of the League was composed of a considerable number of representatives from weaker powers, including legal experts from whom China might gain more support. The Treaty Commission decided to submit the case to the Assembly of the League in the following year and not appear at The Hague. Unsurprisingly, The Hague announced on January 8, 1927 that before the final verdict of the Sino-Belgian case, certain articles in the treaty concerning the extraterritorial rights of Belgians in China, the protection of missionaries in the interior of China, and Belgian property and navigation rights shall remain effective. Although this was not yet the final verdict, it showed that The Hague was clearly disposed towards Belgium. However, in the meantime, dramatic changes in China’s domestic situation helped shake the Belgian position. To begin with, the Northern Expedition by the Southern government, flying an anti-imperialistic banner, was making progress northwards. Then, in January 1927, a succession of conflicts between the Chinese people and the authorities of the British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang led to the Wuhan Nationalist government’s takeover of the concessions, forcing the British government to negotiate with the Chinese. Observing the British setback, on January 5, de Warzee visited Koo in a private capacity. He conveyed that if China would offer Belgium some preferential

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treatment in customs tariff and the legal status of Belgian subjects in China, then Belgium would consider dropping the lawsuit and concluding a new treaty with China. To be specific, he said that Belgium did not demand the maintenance of consular jurisdiction, but would not accept the same legal status for Belgians as for Germans and Austrians. His hope was that China could grant preferential legal measures for Belgians in China and most favored nation treatment for Belgian goods for an appropriate period before a new treaty was implemented, with no definite connection between such preferential treatment and the new treaty. Koo replied that China would give friendly consideration to de Warzee’s proposals.95 On January 12, de Warzee told Koo that the Belgian government was ready to discuss with China the new treaty and had informed The Hague to terminate the litigation, asking Koo to “render full assistance” as regard his earlier requests about the preferential treatment for Belgians in China. In response, Koo said he had talked with the minister of justice and they were drafting up substantial measures for preferential treatment to Belgians, which would be superior to the treatment of not only Germans and Austrians but also Soviet Russians. De Warzee even revealed that in order to show sincerity, the Belgian government was prepared to restitute the Belgian Tianjin concession, but requested Koo to keep this secret until Belgium made the official announcement after the resumption of negotiations.96 The corresponding announcement, that Belgium would renounce all interests attached to the Belgian concession in Tianjin, was made on January 17, when SinoBelgian negotiations were reopened. Theoretically, with the abolition of the treaty, Belgian consular jurisdiction and treaty tariff should be cancelled together. However, since the Beiyang government had yet to promulgate its national tariff law, Belgian goods exported to China still enjoyed conventional tariff rates; and since the Beiyang government made concessions when Belgium remonstrated against the abolition of consular joint hearings in the mixed courts, in cases involving Belgians the Belgian consul would be consulted before the Chinese judge announced the verdict. As for the Belgian Tianjin concession, although a commission had been formed for the retrocession, action was in the end suspended because the Beiyang government could not afford the constructive expenses claimed by the Belgian government for compensation. Although the limited achievements of the Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs did win it back some public confidence, these could not stem the tide of history and save the life of the crumbling government. Its destiny was foreshadowed by the successive victories of the advancing National Revolutionary Army. With Central and Eastern China falling, the Beiyang government was now a paper tiger at the receiving end of the diplomatic — alongside military — war wedged by the Nationalist government firmly established in Wuhan. To the attaché of the Belgian

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legation in China who visited Wuhan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Wuhan Eugene Chen raised objection against any negotiations between the legation and Beijing, attacking the Beiyang government as an illegitimate government. Chen made it clear that any power concluding any official treaty with Beijing would be in a hostile position against the Nationalist government, and warned that if the Belgian government concluded a new treaty with Beijing, the Chinese would be offended, which would be to the disadvantage of Belgian trade and interests in China.97 Under this circumstance, Belgium was pleased to adopt a wait-and-see attitude and suspend the newly resumed negotiations with Beijing. The new treaty was aborted.

The 1864 Sino-Spanish Treaty Undergoing a similar trajectory were the negotiations for the revision of the 1864 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation with Spain, which would expire on May 10, 1927 from the Chinese point of view. On November 10, 1926, six months in advance of the expiration of the treaty, the Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified Spanish Minister in China Justo Garrido y Cisneros of its desire to terminate the old treaty and conclude a new one on the basis of equality. The Spanish government expressed its willingness to revise the treaty, but only the tariff and commercial articles.98 In his reply on February 25, 1927, Spanish Premier Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja insisted on the continual effectiveness of the social, political, and diplomatic clauses of the old treaty pending the conclusion of the new treaty and demanded that the treatment of Spanish in China would not be inferior to that of other foreign nationals with most favored nation treatment. As regard extraterritorial rights and other special privileges, he postponed the renunciation to a time when new Chinese law was implemented.99 In addition, Spain had held that the expiry date of the old treaty should be November 10, 1927 rather than May 10, 1927, a point at which China made a concession.100 The negotiations started in August 1927, between Counsellor of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wang Cengsi and Garrido. Right from the beginning of the talks, Garrido exhibited divergent understanding with Wang on the definition of “equality” which the new treaty should be based on. For reference, China mentioned the examples of the Sino-German, Sino-Austrian, and Sino-Finnish treaties as being concluded on the basis of equality; however, Garrido responded that Germany and Austria capitulated only because they were defeated countries desperate to reopen trade with China, and expressed that he did not understand why Finland would have “blindly assented.” Similar discussions proceeded until late October without much success in ironing out differences.101

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The negotiations remained in an impasse nearing the expiration of the treaty. To find an interim solution, on November 2, the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, then served by Wang Yintai, met with Garrido and proposed the drafting of provisional regulations pending the coming into force of the new treaty. However, Garrido rejected it for the reason that China had extended the expired Japanese treaty and demanded the same treatment before a new treaty was concluded.102 The proposed provisional regulations were handed over to Spain nonetheless. Unable to have its disagreements with Spain settled, the Beiyang government unilaterally declared the termination of the old treaty on November 10 and asked the local officials to “extend full and due protection to the Spanish Legation, consulates, and the persons and property of Spanish nationals in China, in accordance with the rules of international law and usage.”103 On November 14 and November 17, Garrido sent two notes of protest against the unilateral renunciation. In the lengthier protest on November 17, he criticized China’s action as “lacking in friendship towards Spain not only in view of the consideration shown to the Chinese Republic during the civil war, but also having regard to the conciliatory policy of Spain in agreeing that the new negotiations should be conducted in accordance with the principles desired by the Peking Government and having declared that Spain would renounce the Capitulations when the state of peace and order in China should permit.” At the close of the note, it was expressed that the Spanish government would reserve “its rights and full liberty of action.”104 By then, the Beiyang government was in its last gasp. The Nationalists had taken firm hold of the Yangtze River region and started advancing north. Aware of Beijing’s weaknesses, Spain let the negotiations lapse after Beijing’s declaration of the termination of the old treaty. The weakening government had no recourse other than to howl futile protests.

The Sino-French Conventions of 1886, 1887, and 1895 In implementing its policy of treaty revision, the Beiyang government was much more conciliatory towards the stronger powers of France and Japan than with Belgium and Spain. For France, three commercial agreements were to be expired on August 7, 1926: the Convention of Tianjin of 1886, the Additional Commercial Convention of 1887, and the Complementary Convention to the Supplementary Convention of 1887. In March 1926, the Beiyang government informed France that China had no intention to renew the three conventions, and was prepared to terminate the reduced tariff arrangements for goods passing through the SinoAnnamese frontier.

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By August, the Special Tariff Conference had virtually come to an end, but in early August, the French Foreign Office proposed starting negotiations for a new convention a year later in order for it to assess the conclusions of the tariff conference. Beijing resolutely rejected the proposal. On August 6, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the provincial Commissions of Foreign Affairs the three conventions had ceased to be effective. In response, the French Foreign Office addressed a note to the French minister in Paris on September 2, stating that the conventions of 1885 and 1886 did not confer on China the right to denounce, but only demand the revision of the agreements; thus the conventions would remain in force until they were revised. The French government also warned that China would be held responsible for any misunderstanding caused or any measures taken by the Annamese government. However, France did retract her position of postponing the negotiations until a year later, and showed that she was willing to enter into negotiations with China under certain conditions. The conditions were passed by the French minister in Beijing to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 5.105 The Beiyang government accepted the conditions and on November 22, informed Yunnan Province, which bordered with Annam, to temporarily maintain the status quo with Annam in tariff arrangements during the negotiations for a new convention. This implied a revocation of the annulment and the forgoing of a time limit for the conclusion of a new agreement. Formal negotiations started at the end of 1926. It could be anticipated that a real breakthrough would not come soon.

The 1896 Sino-Japanese Treaty Similarly, China’s negotiations with Japan on the termination of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation also ended fruitlessly. Concluded in 1896, the treaty would reach its third decennial term on October 20, 1926. On August 13, the Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the Chinese minister in Japan by cable to inform the Japan foreign ministry that the old treaty would cease to be effective upon expiration and the two countries should negotiate to conclude a new treaty on the basis of equality and reciprocity. On October 20, the day of expiration, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed an identic note to the Japanese minister in Beijing and the Japanese government announcing that the treaty had come to an end, and demanding that the 1896 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation be “fundamentally revised” together with the subsequent exchanges of notes, the Protocol concluded in the same year, and the Supplementary Treaty

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of Commerce and Navigation of 1903 and its annexes. The note argued that thirty years had elapsed since the treaty was put into force in 1896, and the many economic, commercial, and social changes in the two countries over the years made it “obviously … unsuitable” to regulate their relations “on the basis of such an antiquated treaty.” It also reiterated that Article 26 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation provided for revision to be effected within six months after its expiration, and threatened that if no new treaty was completed in the period, the Chinese government would be “confronted with the necessity of determining and declaring its attitude vis-à-vis the existing treaties.”106 Unsurprisingly, Japan did not accept such a radical and threatening proposal without question. Though expressing that Japan did not reject in principle the Chinese request for treaty revision, Minister of Foreign Affairs Shidehara Kijuro communicated strongly to Chinese Minister in Japan Wang Rongbao that his country could not tolerate the language used of the Chinese position if a new treaty could not be completed within the six-month period and demanded deletion of the paragraph. Japan did change her tone a little after Beijing’s denunciation of the Sino-Belgian Treaty on November 6, not permitting herself to be brought under a similarly awkward situation. On November 10, the Japanese legation sent the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note, assuring its government’s willingness to “consider sympathetically” the wish of the Chinese government even though Japan had not expected China to demand a fundamental revision beyond the “tariffs and commercial articles” of the 1896 treaty. However, the note was clear that Japan found the Chinese government’s six-month threat not “entirely in line with the spirit of mutual confidence and helpfulness.”107 On January 21, 1927, the negotiations started. In the following months, Japan made a series of demands which would expand her interests in Manchuria, such as the rights to build new railways, to rent land for commercial uses, and to establish an additional consulate. Such were in fact akin to the terms of the 1915 treaties and deemed unacceptable to the Chinese. The gap between the two parties was so wide that the negotiations died out with the Beiyang government. Of all the attempts of the Beiyang government to revise unequal treaties, its approach with Japan was the most acquiescent. It never publicly declared the abrogation of the expired treaty as in the cases with Belgium and Spain. Nor did it allow the treaty to remain de facto in force after making such an announcement. Rather, it repeatedly consented to the extension of the old treaty for periods of three months while the negotiations were deadlocked. The last extended period was effected on April 20, 1928, outlasting the Beiyang government by a month and a half.

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New Austrian and Finnish treaties Before the collapse of the Beiyang government, it had concluded treaties on an equal basis with Austria and Finland. On October 19, 1925, the Sino-Austrian Treaty of Commerce was signed in Vienna. Compared to the 1920 Sino-Persian Treaty of Friendship, which was also concluded according to the principle of equality, the treaty with Austria was another step forward for China in the sense that it did not grant the Austrian diplomatic agents the same rights as the other powers (i.e., including consular jurisdiction). To be specific, it prescribed that the diplomatic agents of China and Austria “shall enjoy reciprocally in the countries of their residence all liberties and immunities accorded to them by the law of nations,” and the consular agents of both countries “shall enjoy reciprocally the immunities, rights, privileges, and courtesies as accorded by international law and usages.”108 For comparison, corresponding passages of the earlier treaty with Persia provided that the ambassadors or ministers of the two countries, “except in regard to rights in connection with consular jurisdiction, shall enjoy in every respect the same privileges and immunities” as the ambassadors or ministers of the most favored nations, and similarly, their consular agents, “except as regards the rights of consular jurisdiction … shall enjoy the same privileges as the consular representatives of the most favored nations.”109 The Austrian treaty also stipulated that all civil and criminal cases involving Chinese or Austrians in each other’s country would be under the jurisdiction of the country where they resided. There was also a term on customs duties, which said that they “shall be governed exclusively by the interior legislation of each.”110 On October 26, 1926, the Sino-Finnish Treaty of Amity was concluded with a declaration in Helsingfors. According to the treaty, the diplomatic and consular agents of the two countries “shall enjoy the same rights, privileges, favors, immunities, and exemptions which [might] be accorded to similar foreign agents in accordance with the principles of international law.” This was the first treaty apart from those with Germany and Austria in which China accorded rights to foreign diplomats according to international law. Concerning the obligations of their own nationals in each other’s countries, the treaty specified: “The nationals of each of the Two High Contracting Parties residing in the territory of the other are subject to the jurisdiction of the local tribunals both in respect to their persons and their property. They … are required to pay customs duties, taxes, or contributions decreed by the laws or regulations.” In the appended declaration, it was agreed that “litigation involving Finnish citizens in China shall be brought before the newly organized tribunals,” and for lawsuits brought before the mixed tribunals

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involving Finnish subjects, China pledged to “seek to arrive at a solution equitable to all parties.”111

The Evolution of the Nationalist Treaty Abrogation Policy The high banner of treaty abrogation While the Beiyang government did show some determination in its policy to revise expiring treaties, the policy was advanced through negotiations with foreign powers and rarely challenged the legitimacy of the old treaties. The Southern Nationalist government took a much more radical stance: that all unequal treaties were illegitimate and should be abrogated rather than revised. As Beijing called for the convention of the Special Tariff Conference and the Commission on Extraterritoriality as well as treaty revision on June 24, 1925, the Central Executive Committee of the KMT responded by a “Declaration on Abrogation of Unequal Treaties” directed against the Beiyang government’s “treaty revision” policy four days later: Our Party cannot bear to see China being reduced into a semicolony and therefore has been advocating a National Revolution in order to wrestle with the imperialists. The abrogation of Unequal Treaties has been the first and foremost aim of our wrestle…. However, eager to win the recognition of the diplomatic corps, the Beijing Provisional Government had no qualms about using respect for Unequal Treaties as a quid pro quo. As a result, the late Premier [i.e., Sun Yat-sen] was not able to cooperate with it in advancing national unification, and to our great pity and agony, his plan for the abrogation of Unequal Treaties had to be put aside. Since the late Premier passed away, the imperialists have become even more unrestrained…. And immediately we saw the ultimatum of the Beijing Provisional Government to the Beijing Diplomatic Corps on the 25th in request of treaty revision. On the surface, the Beijing Provisional Government seems to have realized that the abrogation of Unequal Treaties has become an irreversible trend of the National Revolutionary Campaign, and hence has no choice but to succumb to it; but in reality, this is absurdly wrong, for our Country has repeatedly implored the Powers to agree to the revision of the Treaties…. Not only did this bring no fruit to the fundamental abrogation of Unequal Treaties; even the subsidiary matter of the Conference to Increase Tariff Duties has

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been postponed until today. With such precedents in sight, the outcome of requesting treaty revision so to speak shall not be hard to foresee. Would the Beijing Provisional Government not know it is most ludicrous to ask a tiger for its hide? It is only, seeing that the abrogation of Unequal Treaties is the unanimous wish of the nation, forced to employ this less desirable tactic, trying to delay the implementation of the National Revolution by putting on the appearance of following the majority will…. The KMT especially distinguished between the “abrogation” and “revision” of unequal treaties while reaffirming its commitment to the former and warning the public not to be deceived by the Beiyang government’s latter scheme.112 Shortly after the Nationalist government was established in Guangzhou in lieu of the Generalissimo’s Headquarters, on July 11, its Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu Hanmin issued an open letter to the peoples of the world, asking them to support China in abrogating unequal treaties. The letter criticized the treaties imposed on China since the Opium War as “unequal,” “unjust,” and “inhumane,” and ascribed the internal strife between the warlords to extraterritoriality and the support of imperialism.113 As for the Special Tariff Conference, the Nationalist government did not initially take a completely opposing position, only pointing out the inadequacy of Beijing’s requests and demanded more substantial results. It was as the conference proceeded and Guangzhou observed that the foreign powers had no intention to restore tariff autonomy to China, while Beijing’s real aim was to increase its revenues in order to sustain its rule that Guangzhou changed its view, hence its protests to the Guangzhou consuls in July 1926 after the commencement of its Northern Expedition. It also made a public declaration of its stance on August 3, contending that Beijing’s shallow aim of the 2.5% surtaxes not only amounted to the permanent forfeiture of China’s tariff autonomy, but, because of its rigidity, would add to the people’s burden without serving the aim of protecting industries. It once again proclaimed denunciation to all resolutions of the conference.114 The Guangzhou government was also opposed to the Commission on Extraterritoriality. According to Hu Hanmin, the view that extraterritoriality could only be abolished after complete improvements were seen in China’s legal and judicial systems was fundamentally wrong because it was consular jurisdiction, extraterritoriality and unequal treaties that had been impeding China’s progress. He also opined that the very act of foreigners investigating into China’s judicial conditions was a violation of China’s sovereignty. For this reason, the Guangzhou government did not allow the tour of inspection of the commission to enter its control area.115 Worthy of note is that although the Nationalists were vociferous in campaigning for the fundamental abrogation of unequal treaties, after they gained control of the

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whole nation, “abrogation of unequal treaties” was more a slogan than an actual policy. In fact, as far as these treaties were concerned, it adopted a strategy of negotiation almost identical to that of the Beiyang government. What was different was that the Nanjing Nationalists had managed to establish themselves in a much stronger position than the Beijing militarists, and therefore had a greater say vis-àvis foreign powers.

The repossession of the British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang At the time when Beijing was campaigning for treaty revision, Guangzhou was getting ready to advance north. In July 1926, the KMT issued its “Declaration on Northern Expedition,” which marked the beginning of its military campaign against the northern warlords in collaboration with the CPC.116 In August, the National Revolutionary Army reached Changsha, and on August 20, Chiang Kaishek made another proclamation targeting the foreign powers, warning them not to interfere with their operations and promising to protect the lives and property of foreigners who kept out of the way of his army.117 The victory of the National Revolutionary Army was sweeping, and on October 10, it captured Wuchang, an important town in Central China. In the same month, the KMT Central Executive Committee held a conference with its branch representatives to analyze the situation and decided to continue the expedition. Observing that although warlordism was on the verge of collapse, China was still under the oppression of imperialistic powers, the conference resolved to adopt a list of policies, among which were principles on foreign relations, including: (1) abrogation of unequal treaties; (2) conclusion of new treaties with foreign countries that would fully respect the sovereign rights of China; (3) introduction of regulations with respect to investment of foreign capital in China such that the exploitation of China would not be furthered; and (4) restoration of tariff autonomy.118 After the Nationalists took over Wuhan, conflict arose between the National Revolutionary army and the authorities of the British concession in Hankou due to the former’s crossing of the concession. On multiple occasions, British Consul General in Hankou Herbert Goffe protested to the Hubei commissioner for foreign affairs that this violated the regulations of the concession, but no understanding was reached. On November 19, British Acting Consul General in Guangzhou J. F. Brennan sent the Guangzhou government a letter of protest, warning that if the Nationalist army continued to intrude into the British concession, it might clash with the police and troops in the concession and bring about a serious international incident. Nonetheless, he made allowance for Nationalist troops to cross the

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concession with prior notification to the British consul general of Hankou so that the latter could inform the police of the concession.119 However, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugene Chen simply replied that the entire Regulations on the Hankou Concession were self-governing laws permitted under Chinese sovereign rights, and there constituted no question of legality for a sovereign state over the laws for which it had granted permission.120 The Nationalist government’s determination to claim sovereign rights beyond treaty constraints was evident. In response to the changes in China’s political circumstances, Britain was also reassessing her China policy. While some British officials were not quite receptive to the Nationalists, others began to realize that the Southerners were gaining ground and the old policy of dismissal and deterrence would not hold for long. In Brennan’s opinion, the KMT was “the greatest political force now actuating the Chinese people,” and he believed it to be “likely to increase in power as the only party placing a practicable ideal before the people and working for the welfare of the state rather than the pockets of individuals.” He observed that the KMT would certainly resist any special privileges held by foreigners, but on the other hand he also commented: “If any Government could establish itself sufficiently to restore even a moderate amount of law and order in the country, the expansion of trade would more than compensate for the loss of the precarious privileges now enjoyed.”121 Likewise, British Consul General in Shenyang Frederick E. Wilkinson was of the opinion that Britain might have to consider the recognition of the Southern government in a short period of time.122 After considerable discussion, the British cabinet adopted a declaration on its China policy on December 1, in which it set forth a pacifying policy towards China. The document was then modified into a memorandum titled “Proposals Concerning China” and presented at the diplomatic corps meeting on December 18. It pointed out that while China was torn by political disintegration, this disintegration had been “accompanied by the growth of a powerful Nationalist movement, which aimed at gaining for China an equal place among the nations, and any failure to meet this movement with sympathy and understanding would not respond to the real intentions of the Powers towards China.” For this reason, the British government proposed that the powers issue a joint declaration stating their readiness to negotiate on treaty revision and other outstanding questions as soon as an authoritative government was formed in China, with a “constructive policy” which would “go as far as possible towards meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese nation.” The proposed declaration as the British proposed would also express the powers’ readiness to recognize China’s tariff autonomy as soon as she promulgated a new national tariff.

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With respect to the treaties with China, the British suggested: While calling upon China to maintain that respect for the sanctity of treaties which is the primary obligation common to all civilized States, the Powers should yet recognize both the essential justice of the Chinese claim for treaty revision and the difficulty under present conditions of negotiating new treaties in place of the old, and they should therefore modify their traditional attitude of rigid insistence on the strict letter of treaty rights…. Every case should be considered on its merits and the declaration should show that the Powers are prepared to consider in a sympathetic spirit any reasonable proposals that the Chinese authorities, wherever situated, may make, even if contrary to strict interpretation of treaty rights, in return for fair and considerate treatment of foreign interests by them. Britain also agreed to the immediate levy of the 2.5% Washington surtaxes.123 New British Minister to China Lampson visited Hankou from December 8 to December 20, during which he had six talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Guangzhou government Eugene Chen surrounding the questions of diplomatic recognition and the revision of unequal treaties. At that time, the Nationalists had yet to gain official recognition from any power, so even though Lampson was not yet in the position to enter into any formal agreement with them, his visit did imply a gesture of goodwill on the part of the British government. At first, Chen held fast to the substitution of existing treaties by new ones based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, but with Lampson’s opposition that this would radically affect the position of foreigners in China, Chen adjusted his position to asking for the “alteration” instead of “substitution” of old treaties. Chen tried repeatedly to persuade Lampson to open official negotiations on the alteration of Sino-British treaties, and the British minister assured that he himself or Owen O’Malley would return to Wuhan to have further conversations later.124 However, the British conciliatory gestures could not change the long-lasting image of Britain as the archenemy to Chinese revolution in southern China. AntiBritish sentiments among the southerners grew amidst the continuation of friction in Hankou. After the Nationalists formally put the retrocession of the British Hankou concession onto their agenda on December 22, on December 26, the Hankou masses organized an anti-British assembly to protest against British intervention in China’s revolutionary movement, and their resolution called for the immediate retrocession of the British concession which “hampered revolutionary work.”125 On December 31, gunfire was exchanged between a division of the National Revolutionary Army and the British marines when the former was stopped as it

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approached the British consulate, foreboding a series of bloodshed and populist campaigns. With antiforeign sentiment on the rise, any small conflict could erupt into major incidents. This moment came quickly. From January 1 to 3, 1927, official celebrations of the relocation of the Nationalist capital to Wuhan and the initial victory of their Northern Expedition joined by patriotic pickets and onlookers heated up enough to disturb the British. On January 3 afternoon, as a crowd of thousands responded to impassioned anti-imperialistic speeches by a propaganda team from the Central Political-Military Academy (renamed from the Whampoa Military Academy after being moved to Wuhan) with frequent ovations at the square in front of the Hankou Customs House at the edge of the British concession, the British authorities dispatched the Corps of Royal Marines to disperse the crowd. During the armed confrontation, five Chinese were injured, among whom two were severely wounded.126 When the incident took place, the KMT was in the middle of its central partygovernment conference. Upon hearing the news, it immediately sent representatives to the square to persuade the masses to leave with order. Simultaneously, Eugene Chen called on the British consul and the British rear admiral in demand of the speedy withdrawal of the British marines and voluntary corps. On the same day, the First Workers’ Representative Congress of Hubei, which was meeting in Hankou, published a telegram making six demands: (1) that the government retrocede the British concession on its own part; (2) that Britain withdraw barricades made from electric wire and sandbags, and refrain from interfering with the freedom of the press, of speech, of assembly, and of making public addresses of the Chinese pending the rendition of the concession; (3) that all British warships be withdrawn from China, including the British Hankou concession, and that Chinese police be installed in lieu of foreign troops; (4) that the British compensate for the late injuries, deaths, and losses; (5) that the British government apologize for the opening of fire and promise no such events would ever happen again; and (6) that the assailants be transferred to the Chinese government for punishment.127 The congress also announced an immediate boycott of British goods and readiness to seal off the British concession and start a general strike against British employers. The calls were followed on by over 200 organizations and labor unions from agricultural, commercial, industrial, and academic sectors, which held a joint conference in Wuhan to discuss the outrage on January 4. They gave a list of eight demands, among which were a solemn protest to the British government; compensation and apology by the British government and punishment of the British culprits; demilitarization of the British police in the concession; and Chinese administration of the British concession.

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To prevent the situation from deteriorating into gruesome tragedies, the British withdrew their marines, voluntary corps, and police troops back to their warships and asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist government to send troops to guard the concession. The Municipal Council of the concession also renounced power voluntarily. In response, the Wuhan Garrison Command sent three companies of troops to garrison the concession, and the Hubei Labor Union sent another 300 guards to assist in maintaining order. Agitation was not yet quelled. On January 5, nearly 300,000 people gathered in a rally headed by Communist leaders within the KMT, which concluded with eight demands on the British government and a telegram pressing the Nationalist government to immediately restore foreign concessions and the Customs administration, cancel British rights to navigate in the interior of China, and abolish British consular jurisdiction so as to prevent similar tragedies from happening again.128 Within the concession, administration had been paralyzed since all British police and civil servants had evacuated. On this same day the Wuhan government established a Provisional Committee of five — composed of the foreign, finance, and communications ministers and representatives from the Wuhan Garrison Command and the Wuhan KMT, with the foreign minister as the head — to take charge of municipal and police affairs, and protect the lives and property of foreigners and Chinese in the concession.129 Symbolically, the British flag over the building of the Municipal Council was lowered and the flag of the KMT raised. Chinese police and Wuhan garrison forces officially assumed responsibility for the security of the concession, while the British consulate building was given to the Hubei Labor Union as its new headquarters. The Wuhan British concession was thus taken over by the Chinese Nationalist government. No sooner had the Hankou crisis been resolved than disturbances burst out in Jiujiang. On January 6 when, during a strike by the Jiujiang dock workers, a British steamship hired additional workers to carry goods for it, pickets of the Chinese strikers who went up to stop the ad hoc workers clashed with the latter. As the British marines landed and beat up some of the pickets, the brawl quickly spread and heightened. On the British side, the warships moored in the harbor fired warning cannons into the air, while on the Chinese side, an angry mob flooded into the British concession in Jiujiang in the evening. Hundreds of British marines now landed to garrison the concession. The British cannons boomed again. Not wanting the situation to grow out of control, General He Yaozu, commander of the second division of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army and the Jiujiang garrison forces led a small troop to calm the crowd; and he, together with Minister of Finance T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen), who happened to be in Jiujiang on an official

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mission at that time, went to negotiate with the British consul and requested the British marines and police troops to withdraw back to their ships, to have Chinese troops maintain order in the concession instead.130 On the next day, the mob spiralled out of control. At the consul’s request, the National Revolutionary Army and the strike pickets marched into the Jiujiang concession to keep order. After that, the Nationalist government set up a Provisional Administrative Committee for the British Jiujiang concession. When order was restored in Hankou, the British attempted to resume control over their concession. On January 10, Goffe and the British rear admiral interviewed Eugene Chen and proposed restoring British administration in the concession so that British civilians could return to their homes. Chen rejected with no hesitation, maintaining that the British government had given up its concession and it was a fait accompli that the control of the territory had been restituted to China. Although the two British officials tried to deny having forfeited the concession, Chen retorted them by common law principles, holding that no one Briton had remained on that piece of land to prove their claim.131 Throughout the unfolding of the events, the Wuhan Nationalist government had been cautious not to provoke the British further, lest they should join with other powers in reacting against its reclamation of the concessions. To placate the British, it proclaimed orders to strictly protect the lives and property of Britons in the reclaimed concessions. On January 10, Chen met with representatives from the Anglo-American Chamber of Commerce in Hankou and assured them that his government would maintain the peace and order of Wuhan. In addition to this, he also pacified the consuls of France and Japan by saying that although Wuhan insisted on the unconditional restitution of all foreign concessions in principle, it had no intention to take back the French and Japanese concessions for the time being.132 The powers’ primary concern was apparently that the Chinese antiforeign resentment might spill over and threaten their interests in China. For Japan, her coping strategy included renewing her China policy, which, as Minister of Foreign Affairs Shidehara announced to the Diet on January 18, consisted of the following principles: 1. To respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, and scrupulously to avoid all interference in her domestic strife. 2. To promote solidarity and economic rapprochement between the two nations. 3. To entertain sympathetically and helpfully the just aspirations of the Chinese people and cooperate in their efforts for the realization of such aspirations.

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4. To maintain an attitude of patience and toleration in the present situation in China, and at the same time to protect Japan’s legitimate and essential rights and interests by all reasonable means at the disposal of the Government.133

Further British withdrawal The patriotic movement in Hankou and Jiujiang were a serious challenge to Britain’s new China policy. But embarrassed as she might be, Britain no longer resorted to military action, for she understood that circumstances had changed and the tides of Chinese nationalism could not be turned. Instead, British officials expressed the desire to seek resolutions by diplomacy while adding that though prepared to take a conciliatory approach towards Hankou and Jiujiang, Britain would consider taking “appropriate measures” if Shanghai was affected.134 On January 11, British Charge d’Affaires Owen O’Malley went to Hankou as the representative of the British minister to China to discuss the settlement of the Hankou and Jiujiang incidents. On the next day, he met with Eugene Chen and proposed that the Chinese troops and police forces first retreat from the Hankou concession. Chen strictly refused, replying that the reason why the Chinese forces had entered in the concession in the first place was that a particular incident had occurred in which many Chinese were injured or killed and that what the British government should do were to punish the offenders and express full apology to the Chinese. In addition, Chen pointed out that the very existence of the concession was an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, which should be rectified so as to accommodate the new situation of the Chinese national revolution. On this ground, Chen counterproposed basing their negotiations on the fait accompli rather than the circumstances in the past; that is to say, the Nationalist government was determined to keep the British concession.135 The British Foreign Office accepted the Chinese proposal, and formal negotiations were immediately opened. During the negotiations, Chen issued a statement to the powers on January 22, which answered the British memorandum of December 18, 1926 and enunciated the Nationalist policy on the Hankou incident. He declared: “The question then is not what Great Britain and the other Powers may wish to grant China to meet ‘the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese nation’ but what Nationalist China may justly grant Great Britain and the other Powers, whose regime of international control is now definitely sharing the fate of all systems of political subjection.” On the other hand, Chen expressed willingness to settle all questions left behind by the disintegrating system by peaceful means: It is, however, the view of the Nationalist Government that the liberation of China from the yoke of foreign imperialism need not necessarily involve

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any armed conflict between Chinese Nationalism and the foreign Powers. For this reason, the Nationalist Government would prefer to have all questions outstanding between Nationalist China and the foreign Powers settled by negotiation and agreement…. In order to prove that this is no idle statement of policy the Nationalist Government hereby declares its readiness to negotiate separately with any of the Powers for a settlement of Treaty and other cognate questions on a basis of economic equality and mutual respect for each other’s political and territorial sovereignty. Emphasizing that the Nationalist government had never departed from this peaceful policy, the statement justified the establishment of the commission for the administration of the concessions by reasoning that it was the consequence of the British marines’ provocation of “a bloody clash with a patriotic Chinese crowd” and “the abdication by the British Municipal Council of its powers.”136 The statement did ease the other powers a little, with some of them dispatching representatives to Hankou to find out about the situation. On January 27, Lampson and O’Malley, respectively, handed the Beijing and Wuhan governments a memorandum proposing that if a “satisfactory settlement” could be reached regarding the Hankou and Jiujiang concessions, and if the Nationalist government could assure that it would not “countenance any alteration, except by negotiation, of the status of the British Concessions and International Settlements,” the British government would be “prepared to concede at once and on lines indicated in the enclosure” part of what was desired of it by the KMT. The enclosure here consisted of seven articles, which read: 1. His Majesty’s Government are prepared to recognize the modern Chinese Law Courts as competent Courts for cases brought by British plaintiffs or complainants, and to waive the right of attendance of a British representative at the hearing of such cases. 2. His Majesty’s Government are prepared to recognize the validity of a reasonable Chinese Nationality Law. 3. His Majesty’s Government are prepared to apply as far as practicable in the British Courts in China the modern Chinese Civil Commercial Codes — apart from procedure Codes and those affecting personal status — and duly enacted subordinate legislation as and when such laws and regulations are promulgated and enforced in Chinese Courts and on Chinese citizens throughout China. 4. His Majesty’s Government are prepared to make British subjects in China liable to pay such regular and legal Chinese taxation not involving

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discrimination against British subjects or British goods, as is in fact imposed on, and paid by, Chinese citizens throughout China. 5. His Majesty’s Government are prepared, as soon as a revised Chinese Penal Code is promulgated and applied in Chinese Courts, to consider its application in British Courts in China. 6. His Majesty’s Government are prepared to discuss and enter into arrangements according to particular circumstances at each port concerned for the modifications of Municipal Administration of British Concessions, so as to bring them into line with the administration of Special Chinese Administrations set up in former Concessions, or for their amalgamation with former Concessions now under Chinese control, or for the transfer of police control of Concession areas to the Chinese authorities. 7. His Majesty’s Government are prepared to accept the principle that British missionaries should no longer claim the right to purchase land in the interior, that Chinese converts should look to Chinese Law and not to Treaties for protection, and that missionary educational and medical institutions will conform to Chinese laws and regulations applying to similar Chinese institutions.137 As O’Malley declares, the memorandum indicated British willingness to concede, and for the first time, Britain voluntarily offered to renounce the right of attendance in British cases, to bring British in China under Chinese taxation, and to alter the administration and police control of its concessions. The transfer of administrative and police powers would effect a fundamental change in the nature of the concessions, implying close to a retrocession of the territories. Therefore Chen, though recognizing that the British proposals were not satisfactory or adequate, agreed to take them as a basis for further negotiations. Like O’Malley, Chen expressed willingness to make concessions, pledging to tackle modifications respecting foreign concessions and settlements in China by negotiation instead of by force.138 Negotiations proceeded smoothly, and by January 29, basic agreement on the Hankou and Jiujiang concessions had been reached. However, at the same time as O’Malley was instructed to negotiate with Chen, another British official was sent to investigate the situations in Shanghai and Hankou: Vice Admiral and newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the China Station Reginald Tyrwhitt. Having completed the investigation tour, he submitted a report titled “Appreciation of the Political Situation in China” to the British government, in which he arrived at the conclusion that the Hankou incident was a “carefully organized attempt” by the Nationalists, and more menacingly, Soviet Russia, the latter of which desired “the destruction of the British Empire.” Tyrwhitt

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warned with great urgency: “There is every reason to suppose that a situation similar to that at Hankow [Hankou] will be engineered”; “ The Northerners have already hinted at the possibility of their taking over the British concession at Tientsin [Tianjin]”; and “There is definite evidence to show that Soviet Russia is the brain and driving force behind the Cantonese army and Government.” The Soviet schemes as he inferred were, first, to drive the “ultimate expulsion” of Britain from China and the rendition of Hong Kong through such means as boycotts and strikes, which would be followed by similar campaigns in South East Asia; and second, to force Britain into an unpopular war by incidents similar to that in Hankou. He also reported secret sources which revealed that the Soviets had been notified to anticipate a Nationalist advance against Shanghai.139 While the British government had largely switched to a conciliatory approach towards the Nationalists, the preservation of British interests in China had always remained the chief concern behind British China policy. To defend the locus of British interests in China, Britain quickly deployed a fleet of cruisers from the Mediterranean to China, followed by land forces from England and India to Shanghai. In addition, Britain also sought joint protection of the International Settlement from the United States, Japan, and France. The concentration of British troops in Shanghai thus became a point of contention within the Wuhan government, which was under the great influence of Comintern agent Mikhail Borodin.140 As the events developed, Chen finally decided to issue a statement on January 30, the day set for the signature of the drafted agreement, protesting against the concentration of British forces — known as the “Chinese Expeditionary Force” — in Shanghai, criticizing it as “an act of coercion directed against Chinese nationalism” and stating that Nationalist China would not sign any agreement concerning Hankou before a British withdrawal. The statement reminded Britain that their proposals “envisaged only a fragmentary revision of some of the Treaty servitudes affecting China,” and recalled that the Nationalist government would only consider them as a basis of settling the differences between the two countries if the negotiations “took place in an atmosphere free from intimidation necessarily involved in the concentration by the British of fighting forces.”141 As mentioned, Britain had proposed military cooperation from other foreign powers; however, the powers all politely declined the British proposal. For example, Shidehara found it too soon to discuss the danger of a Nationalist attack of Shanghai, reasoning that the distance between Japan and China was close enough for Japan to dispatch troops to China when it was really necessary, while the Japanese ambassador in London noted that sending troops to China at that time might actually strengthen the solidarity of the Chinese against Japan, which would not only harm the Japanese in China but also Japanese interests in northern China.142

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Nor was the United States prepared to amass great forces in Shanghai. A glimpse of U.S. China policy can be obtained from Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg’s earlier statement on China’s tariff autonomy and the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights on January 27, 1927. A China-friendly position was manifested at the outset of the declaration: “The United States has always desired the unity, the independence, and the prosperity of the Chinese Nation. It has desired that tariff control and extraterritoriality provided by our treaties with China should as early as possible be released.” It was professed that the U.S. government had been prepared to enter into negotiations with any Chinese government or delegates who could “represent or speak for China not only for putting into force the surtaxes of the Washington treaty but entirely releasing tariff control and restoring complete tariff autonomy to China.” The United States was also prepared to immediately put into force the recommendations of the extraterritoriality commission as well as to negotiate the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights as soon as China was “prepared to provide protection by law and through her courts to American citizens, their rights, and property.” Kellogg recounted at length the U.S. enthusiasm and efforts in the extraterritoriality commission and tariff conference since the Washington Conference, and made it clear that the U.S. government was ready then and now to continue negotiations on the questions. “The only question,” said Kellogg, was “with whom it shall negotiate.” Mindful of possible threats to American interests in China, Kellogg did not forget to remind China of “the right of American citizens in China to protection for life and property during the period of conflict for which they [were] not responsible” and justify the U.S. naval presence in China: “In the event that the Chinese authorities are unable to afford such protection, it is, of course, the fundamental duty of the United States to protect the lives and property of its citizens. It is with the possible necessity for this in view that American naval forces are now in Chinese waters.” Kellogg’s closing remark further defended that although his government had no concession in and had never displayed an imperialistic attitude towards China, it hoped that “its citizens be given equal opportunity with the citizens of the other Powers to reside in China and to pursue their legitimate occupations without special privileges, monopolies, or spheres of interest or influence.”143 This made a balanced statement that asserted both friendliness on the part of the United States as distinguished from the British and defense of U.S. interests in case they were violated. The powers’ desire to stay off the Anglo-Chinese conflict forced Britain to back down from her firm stand and compromise. On February 10, Secretary for Foreign Affairs Austen Chamberlain’s tone was significantly softened when he addressed the House of Commons regarding China. There he emphasized that the

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troops were dispatched to Shanghai only to “protect British lives and interests,” that Britain had “never contemplated the use of troops for any purpose except such protection” and would “land only such numbers as are necessary for this purpose,” and that the troops would not be moved outside the settlement except under “grave emergency.” He also announced that if the Hankou agreement was signed, only the troops that had already left for Shanghai from India would be landed in Shanghai, and those going from the Mediterranean and England would be concentrated in Hong Kong and would not proceed to Shanghai unless they were “required by the emergence of fresh or greater danger.”144 The Wuhan government accepted the concession and reopened negotiations with O’Malley, despite continued protest that the landing of British troops in Shanghai was “without legal justification.”145 On the same day, an agreement relative to the British Hankou concession was signed. It was agreed that the Annual General Meeting of Ratepayers would be summoned on March 15, after which the British Municipality would be dissolved and the administration of the concession would be formally handed over to a new Chinese Municipality. From the signature of the agreement to March 15, the policing of the concession and the management of the public works and sanitation would too be conducted by the Wuhan government. The Chinese Municipality was to be “modelled on that of the Special Administrative District,” to carry out administration according to new regulations communicated to the British minister to China which would “remain in force until such time as arrangements [had] been negotiated for the amalgamation of the five Hankow concessions and former concessions into one unified municipal district.”146 The agreement was accompanied by a declaration on the part of the Wuhan government assuring that the Hankou arrangement was uniquely made “with special reference to the facts of the new status quo” in the area and not to “serve as precedent for the settlement of the future status of any British or other Concessions elsewhere in China.”147 Yet this declaration did not apply to Jiujiang, which was to be considered along similar lines as Hankou. On March 4, the Wuhan government issued the Regulations of the Municipal Bureau of the Special Administrative District No. 3 of Hankou with reference to those of the first special area. The regulations provided that the British Hankou concession was to become the Special Administrative District No. 3 of Hankou and placed under the direct control of a Municipal Bureau, whose director would be selected and appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Wuhan government. Accordingly, the director of the Municipal Bureau was to serve as the ex officio chairman of a council for the management and administration of the district, which consisted of six more members, half of whom were Chinese and the rest British. The chairman of the council had a casting vote when there was an equal division of votes.148

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The Municipal Bureau was established on March 15. In this way, the Wuhan government officially recovered the British Hankou concession, and in the meantime, the British authorities retained their participation in the municipal affairs of the Special Administrative Area. Following the framework of the Hankou arrangement, on February 20, Chen and O’Malley signed an agreement on the Jiujiang concession. The agreement was short and simple, summed up by the opening paragraph: “A settlement on similar lines to that concluded in the case of the Hankow concession will immediately be made in the case of the concession at Kiukiang.” The only difference lied with the ensuring remark that the Wuhan government was to compensate for “any direct losses due to the action or negligence of the agents of the Nationalist Government … suffered by British subjects during the recent disturbances at Kiukiang.”149 However, the Jiujiang people were not to acquiescence to even this. Pressured by public dissatisfaction, Wuhan renewed negotiations with the British again, and eventually succeeded in securing more favorable terms than in the case of Hankou. On March 2, O’Malley declared in a letter to Chen, “His Majesty’s Government will cancel the British Municipal Regulations and hand over unconditionally the administration of the concession area at Kiukiang to the Nationalist Government, as from March 15 next.”150 Thus on the said date, the Jiujiang concession was unconditionally restored with the British giving up all participation in the municipal affairs of the area. In addition to the Hankou and Jiujiang concessions, the Wuhan government also took over the Guling Estate at Lushan, Jiangxi. Situated among the Lushan mountains, Guling was a popular summer resort town for foreigners. Part of Guling had been leased to foreigners, at first only privately. However, later, due to the weakness and inaction of the local authorities, foreigners managed to establish their own administrative office, that is, the Guling Estate, as well as police force in the area. The Guling Estate had a council for local administration served by multinational members under the instruction of the consular corps in Hankou. In this way, the place was very much like an international concession though without the name. With the retrocession of the Hankou and Jiujiang concessions, the Guling Estate understood that their control would not last long, and therefore in March 1927 requested the Police Department of Lushan to take over the police affairs of Guling. However, at that time the Lushan Police was undergoing a change of the chief, and did not report the situation until July, when the Wuhan government canceled the Guling Estate and replaced it with a Provisional Office to administer the Guling Special Area. Meanwhile in Jiangsu, the National Revolutionary Army took Zhenjiang on March 23, which the locals celebrated with a parade on the following day. On

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the morning of March 24, the British consul in Zhenjiang communicated to the Jiangsu Commission for Foreign Affairs that Britain would remove her police from the Zhenjiang concession at noon and asked the Chinese police to maintain order. Hence Chinese policemen were sent to take over the police administration. Major staff of the British Municipal Council, too, left Zhenjiang on the same day. On May 20, the British Consulate in Zhenjiang was cancelled at the instruction of the British minister, and all issues regarding the British in Zhenjiang were thereafter to be handled by the British Consulate in Shanghai. On July 30, the Zhenjiang authorities sent commissioners to ask the British to notify their citizens in Zhenjiang that the Chinese authorities would take responsibility for the protection of the lives and property of foreign nationals in the former concession, and public utilities like water work and electricity would remain as in the past, but under the protection of the Chinese government. In this way, the Zhenjiang concession was practically — though not yet officially — returned to China.151 Significant influence was brought by the retrocession of the British concessions to the Nationalist government to bear upon the Beiyang government in the north. To demonstrate its strength, the latter established a commission for the retrocession of the foreign concessions in Tianjin. For the British concession in particular, the authorities of the concession raised two demands: (1) that the British be guaranteed perpetual leases of the land and property they were currently holding or leasing, and (2) that the municipal affairs of the concession be placed under joint administration of China and Britain. In March 1927, Chinese and British delegates began to negotiate for the retrocession of the concession. After nine rounds of talks, the two parties agreed on the joint control of the concession under a joint committee. A draft of Regulations on the Purple Bamboo Grove Municipal Administration (Purple Bamboo Grove refers to the British concession, describing the concession’s location) was even drawn up. However, before modifications were made to Beijing’s satisfaction, the political situation in Northern China had deteriorated so much that the question was left unresolved.152 Thus, up to the end of the first Northern Expedition, three concessions, all from the British, together with one summer resort, had been restituted to the Nationalist government. This was the first time in modern history that China took the initiative to recover foreign concessions. Yet at the same time, rather than top-down, planned campaigns directed by the Nationalist government, it was the result of more spontaneous upsurges of patriotic nationalism combined with anti-imperialist agitation growing ever since the 1911 Xinhai Revolution and with the unfolding of events, especially the advancement of the Northern Expedition upheld as “national revolution.” As an oft-quoted report by the Comintern agents in Shanghai demonstrated: “Nobody foresaw the events of January 3. The

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occupation of the concession by the Hankou workers took place spontaneously, without any leadership or instigation either from the government, from the Kuo Min Tang or from our party. They were all confronted by an accomplished fact by a spontaneous act of the masses, and all of them had to reckon with it.”153 Indeed, Chinese public sentiments were a decisive factor in British decisions. The policy of “revolutionary diplomacy” propagated by Eugene Chen was put into practice by the agitated masses, whose action went so antagonizing that the Nationalist government constantly had to bring back order and stability as it tried to win foreign sympathy for China’s nationalistic cause.

The foreign policy of the Nanjing Nationalist government after the KMT-CPC split On April 12, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek staged a purge of the Communists in Shanghai and the KMT split with the CPC, while rightist Nationalists under Chiang’s leadership set out to expunge the Communists from the KMT. With this, Chiang established a new Nationalist government in Nanjing, in opposition to the leftist Wuhan Nationalist government which stayed with the CPC. On May 10, C. C. Wu was appointed minister of foreign affairs of the Nanjing government. In his inaugural address, Wu announced the three principles of Nanjing’s foreign policy: (1) no violence; (2) the proposal of abrogation of unequal treaties at an appropriate time; and (3) elimination of xenophobia in anti-imperialism. By denouncing specifically the kind of “imperialism that advocated aggression against China” rather than indiscriminating antiforeign agitation,154 Nanjing broke away from the violent, selfisolating foreign policy advocated by the Communists to adopt a more moderate, conciliatory approach. On the following day, Wu declared his government’s policy of abolishing unequal treaties by “appropriate means,”155 which apparently referred to diplomatic negotiations as opposed to such populist movements as those seeking to take back Hankou and Jiujiang. In the meantime, the foreign policy of the Wuhan Nationalist government was also affected. Faced with an opponent in Nanjing, Wuhan feared antagonizing foreign powers and losing their recognition, and hence softened its stance in its handling of the Hankou Incident of April 3, 1927. This incident was sparked off when a Chinese rickshaw puller was stabbed to death by a Japanese marine in the Japanese concession in Hankou on April 3. The Chinese masses in Hankou were enraged and held demonstration at the boundary of the concession, which very much recalled the protest against the British in January. However, unlike the British Empire which was in decline, Japan was actively expanding its influence in China, and there was no way the country

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would concede to the Chinese populists. Japan might also have learned from the British lessons that the price of conciliation would be high. The Japanese thus ruthlessly opened fire to deter the demonstrating masses, which killed nine people and wounded eight. At first, the Wuhan government was rather unyielding before Japan, but with the establishment of the Nanjing government, it gradually backed down, putting bans on illegal demonstrations organized by local labor unions and repeatedly promising to protect the lives and property of the Japanese. The late shift of Wuhan’s policy failed to change the impression of the powers which it had alienated, however. So long as Wuhan remained tolerant to the radical Communists, foreign powers found Nanjing, which had carried out its purge, more welcoming. On May 9, Chamberlain announced in a speech addressed to the House of Commons: “The Nationalist Government at Hankow has lost its dominating position and is at present little more than the shadow of a name.”156 And on May 14, Britain broke off diplomatic relations with the Wuhan Nationalist government and instructed O’Malley to leave Hankou. Not long after, in July, Wuhan followed in the footsteps of Nanjing in splitting with the Communists, and after some internal strife, Wang Jingwei brokered a deal to merge with Chiang’s Nanjing regime. To prepare for the revision of old treaties, Nanjing established a Treaty Commission under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.157 The Nationalists decided to start with reclaiming tariff autonomy. The views of prominent KMT members Cai Yuanpei and Tan Yankai, including that the conventional tariff and extraterritoriality were the most damaging of all treaty obligations, were set forth in their proposal at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Second Central Committee of the KMT in August 1927, and they urged the government to implement a new national tariff from January 1, 1928.158 Earlier on July 20, 1927, the Nanjing government issued a proclamation to account for and announce its plan to abolish likin and resume tariff autonomy from September 1, 1927. The proclamation opened: The increasingly deplorable economic condition of our people is due not only to the defects of our political institutions, but also externally to the limitations imposed by a conventional customs tariff in force since the past few decades, and internally to the oppressive system of likin, which has resulted in impeding the free circulation of goods and the development of industry…. The Nationalist Government is also convinced that the customs tariff contained in the unequal treaties is incompatible with a nation’s sovereignty, and that tariff autonomy should immediately be put into force as an initial measure towards securing an equal status in the family of nations.

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The Nationalist government planned to completely abolish “all levies of whatever description that [were] in the nature of a transit duty,” including all native customs duties, tongjuan 統捐, tongshui 統稅, huowushui 貨物稅, railway huojuan 貨 稅, parcel post likin, transit dues in lieu of likin, coast-trade duty, duty on goods from one Chinese port to another, and all principal and miscellaneous levies in the nature of tax on goods in transit, in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi. Simultaneously, the government would impose a new national tariff on all imported goods along with an excise duty on goods manufactured by domestic factories in order to realize equalization of taxation.159 On the same day, Nanjing promulgated relevant laws such as the Law on the Abolition of Internal Transit Duties, the Provisional Law on National Import Tariff, and the Law on Excise Duty. For the national import tariff, from September 1, additional duties would be levied on top of the existing 5% import duty according to the following percentages: 7.5% on ordinary goods, 15% or 25% on luxuries according to classification, and 57.5% on alcohol and tobacco.160 Unsurprisingly, the plan was strongly opposed by foreign powers. When Japanese Minister in China Yoshizawa visited Nanjing on August 8, he clearly informed General Chiang and Minister Wu that Japan would not permit Nanjing’s collection of the new tariff duties. Later, he even threatened in Shanghai that if the Nanjing government was determined to enforce tariff autonomy on September 1, 1928, Japan would take “some adequate counter-measures.”161 Some foreign merchants went so far as to bring charges against the Chinese Customs to British, American, and Japanese courts in Shanghai. As it turned out, the British Supreme Court decided that the British shipper only had to pay the conventional 5% import duty and the 2.5% Washington surtaxes; in the case of the Japanese Consular Court, the shipper only had to pay the 5% import duty and not even the Washington surtaxes; although the American Court for China dismissed the case on the ground of a lack of jurisdiction over political questions.162 To demonstrate their protest, some of the powers assembled warships near China’s customs houses. The diplomatic corps in Beijing met to discuss concerted action against Nanjing’s enforcement of the new tariff, but the powers failed to come to a consensus as to the action to be taken, with U.S. minister MacMurray preferring a wait-and-see attitude towards as the Chinese political scene unfolded.163 The commercial sector in the control area of the Nanjing government did not welcome the hasty abolition of likin. Moreover, after the merger of the Wuhan and Nanjing governments, the KMT leadership continued to be torn by internecine crisis. In August 1927, Chiang Kai-shek stepped down, and a week later, the National Revolutionary Army was heavily defeated in Shandong and was forced to retreat to Xuzhou. The Nationalist government was struggling to hold

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itself together against political instability and the military setback. Under such unfavorable circumstances, it had no choice but to suspend the abolition of likin and levying of new duties. A new proclamation was issued on August 29, which while upholding “the power to establish the customs and levy duties” as “one of the inherent sovereign rights of an independent state,” announced the suspension of the implementation of the three newly promulgated laws due to the difficulty of putting them into force as military operations were going on and inland territories were coming under the control of Nanjing. It nonetheless conveyed adherence to the resumption of tariff autonomy on September 1.164 As regard the question of unequal treaties in general, on November 2 and 24, 1927, C. C. Wu made two similar statements outlining the Nanjing government’s principles regarding existing and future treaties: 1. As there is no reason for the existence of the unequal treaties and agreements concluded between former Chinese Governments and the Governments, corporations and individuals of foreign States, they shall be abrogated by the Nationalist Government within the shortest possible period. 2. Those treaties and agreements whose term has expired have, as a matter of course, become null and void. 3. Any treaty or agreement purporting to be made by any Chinese authority with any foreign government, corporation or individual without the participation or sanction of the Nationalist Government is of no validity whatsoever. 4. No treaty or agreement relating to China, to which the Nationalist Government is not a party, shall be deemed binding on China.165 The reaction of the Beiyang government to the expiring 1864 Sino-Spanish Treaty has been discussed earlier. Following Beijing’s announcement of the termination of the treaty on November 10, to take independent action and demonstrate itself as the legitimate government of China, Nanjing notified the Spanish legation in Beijing that the treaty had become null on November 24. And on December 2, it issued the following Provisional Regulations Pending Conclusion of New Treaty between China and Spain: 1. The Diplomatic and Consular representatives of Spain in China shall receive the treatment accorded to such officials by general rules of international law. 2. The persons and property of Spanish subjects in China shall receive protection according to Chinese law. 3. Spanish subjects resident in China shall be amenable to Chinese law and subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese courts.

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4. Civil and criminal actions in China involving Spanish subjects shall be dealt with according to the procedure governing nationals of nontreaty countries. 5. Imports into China from Spain or by Spanish subjects and exports from China destined for Spain shall be subject to the customs tariff as applied to nontreaty countries and their nationals. 6. Spanish subjects in China shall pay such taxes and dues as are paid by Chinese citizens. 7. All matters not specifically covered by the above provisions shall be dealt with adjusted according to the general rules of international law and according to Chinese law.166 Spain did not give any more cooperative response to the Nanjing government than it did to the Beiyang government. In the following year, as Huang Fu succeeded as minister of foreign affairs of the Nanjing government, on February 21, he made a statement in which he put forward six principles that the government would stick to in its future negotiations with foreign powers: 1. With a view to arrangements for early abrogation of China’s treaties now universally recognized to be unequal, the Nationalist Government will make all necessary preparations in the hope of opening negotiations at the earliest possible moment with the friendly powers for the collaboration of new treaties on the basis of equality and mutual respect for sovereignty integrity. 2. Pending the nature [sic] of such new treaties, the Nationalist Government is prepared to maintain and defend friendly relations with the powers in such a manner as to be able to meet the altered circumstances of the present times and to remove all sources of difficulties and misunderstanding between the Chinese people and foreigners. 3. The Nationalist Government is prepared to protect to their fullest ability the lives and property of foreigners in China in accordance with international law and usage. … 5. The Nationalist Government is prepared to settle important outstanding cases, at any appropriate occasion, in a spirit of fairness and mutual understanding. 6. As for those foreign powers who seek to interfere with China’s domestic affairs or impair her status quo ante institutions, the Nationalist Government, for the purpose of self-preservation, feels constrained to adopt and consider all suitable measures to deal with the situation.167

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In April 1928, the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1887 was due to expire, and on April 16, the Nanjing government notified the Portuguese minister in Beijing that the treaty was void and requested the conclusion of a new treaty on the basis of equality and respect for territorial sovereignty. Portugal had agreed. However, after May 3, the Nanjing government became preoccupied by the Jinan Incident, an armed conflict between the Japanese army and the National Revolutionary Army which killed thousands of Nationalist soldiers and Chinese civilians, and the anticipated negotiations with Portugal were dropped. During its second Northern Expedition, the Nanjing government had not given up its banner of abrogation of unequal treaties. However, most of its energy had to be channeled towards the ongoing civil war and leadership consolidation, and little was achieved in terms of restoring Chinese sovereign rights.

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Notes Introduction 1.

Several dozen publications and research studies have been produced on this subject, the most systematic of these being Li Yumin, Treaty System in Modern China.

2.

Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States, vol. 1, 388.

3.

Ibid, 401.

4.

Ibid, 394.

5.

Chinese and French text, ibid, 529. English translation from China’s External Relations – A History, http:// www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/162.

6.

Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States, vol. 1, 419.

7.

Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919, 282–83.

8.

Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States, vol. 1, 355.

9.

Ibid, 678.

10. Ibid. 11. Ibid, 408. 12. Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States, vol. 1, 393. 13. See Mao, The Collapse of the Celestial Empire: A Reanalysis of the Opium War, chapter 7; Guo, “The Establishment of Unilateral Most Favored Nation Treatment in early Modern China”; Guo, “Another Cause of the Loss of Sovereign Rights and Interests in early Modern China: A Study of the Establishment of Extraterritorial Consular Jurisdiction.” 14. Xue, “Preliminary Proposals Concerning Foreign Affairs,” 528–29. 15. Zheng, “On Change,” 186. 16. Ma, “Reply to the Proposal from Prime Minister Li about the Negotiations with Foreign Officials for Policies about Exemption for Imports,” 79–80. 17. Chinese, French, and Portuguese text, Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States, vol. 2, 820. 18. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919, 219. 19. Ibid, 745. 20. 21 articles proposed by China on the Convention of Commerce and Navigation, Commercial Treaty Negotiations in the Aftermath of the Boxer Protocol, 13; Minutes of the meeting for the revision of SinoBritish treaties, January 10, 1902, ibid, 21. 21. Ibid, 137. 22. Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States, vol. 1, 557. 23. Chen, An Alarm to Awaken the Age, 125, 113.

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Notes

Chapter 1 1.

Military Government of the Republic of China to Consuls in Hankou, October 12, 1911, Association of Chinese Historians, ed., 1911 Revolution, vol. 5, 152–53. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. The first four articles regarding foreign relations in “Revolutionary Strategy” were: (1) All treaties previously concluded between China and foreign countries shall remain effective. (2) All outstanding foreign debts shall continue to be borne and repaid in full by the Customs of the treaty ports in the provinces. (3) Protection shall be extended to all vested rights and interests of foreigners. (4) Protection shall be extended to all foreign nationals and property in areas occupied by the military government. (Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, vol.1, 310–1.) 5. “Wuhan” refers to Wuchang, Hankou, and Hanyang, all lying in the province of Hubei, as they are collectively known. — Ed. 6. Li, Records of the Wuchang Uprising of 1911, 129. At that time many in the military government thought that the powers had recognized the government as a belligerent, so do some researchers of later generations. Such was a mistake. 7. Jordan to Edward Grey, No. 37, November 6, 1911, Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of China, 1912, Cd. 6148. 8. Ibid. 9. Presidential manifesto, January 5, 1912, Association of Chinese Historians, ed., 1911 Revolution, vol. 8, 17. 10. Dingle, China’s Revolution: 1911–1912, 18. 11. Rules of the Republic of China Respecting Foreign Concessions for the Yunnan Military Governor Office, January 12, 1912, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, vol. 2, 9–10. 12. Rules of the Republic of China respecting foreign concessions, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, vol. 2, 10–11. 13. “Interview with Journalists of China Press in Nanjing,” in Hao, ed., Uncollected Works of Sun Yat-sen, 160. 14. Memorandum of the Japanese government, February 21, 1912, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Supplement to 1911 & 1912: On the Qing Incident (1911 Revolution), 608–9. 15. Ibid. 16. Detailed Conditions on the Recognition of the New Government of China (Draft), March 23, 1912. Japanese text, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1912, vol. 2, 11–12. 17. Eastern Miscellany, vol. 8, no. 11. 18. “Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Beiyang Government,” in Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, vol. 3, 41. 19. Provisional President, Proclamation, “At present, the various nations are standing off with each other…” Government Gazette, no. 74 (July 13, 1912): 55. 20. Inaugural Address of the President, Yuan Shih-K’ai, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, 82–86.

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Notes

21. Lou Tseng-hsiang to John Jordan etc., August 14, 1912, Diplomatic Documents: Tariff Revision, 1912– 15, 1–2. 22. Sun Baoqi to Jordan etc., October 14, 1913, ibid, 7. 23. Calhoun to Sun, December 20, 1913, ibid, 22–23; Jordon to Sun, December 23, 1913, 24–25. 24. As quoted by Sun in Sun to Conty, January 18, 1914, ibid, 32. 25. Ibid, 32–33. 26. Ibid. 27. Sun to Sforza, May 28, 1914, ibid, 59–60. 28. Krupensky to Sun, April 1, 1914, ibid, 42–43. 29. Sun to W. Grave (Acting Russian Minister in Beijing), April 14, 1914, ibid, 47–48. 30. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affair to Liu, April 14, 1914, ibid, 52. 31. Obata to Sun, June 8, 1914, ibid, 62–63. 32. Sun to Obata, June 16, 1914, ibid, 67. 33. Jordan to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 11, 1914, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, pt. 2, ser. E, 355–56. 34. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jordan, July 22, 1914, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, vol. 3, 79–81. 35. Ibid, 78–82. 36. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919, 1190. 37. Posterior events proved that Japan had little intention to restore Jiaozhou Bay to China. On the same day, Britain proposed that Japan specify her guarantee of the retrocession of Jiaozhou Bay in their joint note to China respecting the declaration of war, but Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Kato Takaaki rejected outright on the ground that Japan had made great sacrifices to gain Jiaozhou Bay and demanded the extension of certain interests in exchange for a retrocession. 38. Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), History of Japan’s 70-Year Aggression towards China, 152–53. 39. Manchuria: Treaties and Agreements, 164–67. 40. Wang, China and Japan over 60 Years, vol. 7, 88–89. 41. Tianjin Chronicle Editorial Committee, Tianjin Chronicle, Annex: Foreign Concessions, 62. 42. Wuhan Chronicle Editorial Committee, ed., Wuhan Chronicle — Foreign Relations, 54. 43. Presidential proclamation, August 14, 1917, Official Documents Relating to the War (For the Year 1917), 13. 44. Wang Daxie (Ta-Hsieh) to Jonkheer Frans Beelaerts van Blokland, August 14, 1917, ibid, 153. 45. Wang to Beelaerts, September 15, 1917, ibid, 181. 46. Beelaerts to Wang, August 18, 1917 ibid, 169; and Beelaerts to Wang, October 13, 1917, ibid, 187. 47. Wang to Beelaerts, August 28, 1917, ibid, 176; Wang to Beelaerts, October 24, 1917, ibid, 190. 48. Envoy of the United States to the Republic of China, Note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Gazette, no. 571 (August 18, 1917): 533. 49. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919, 1430. 50. Zhang to Goto Shimpei, September 24, 1918, The Shantung Question: A Statement of China’s Claim Together with Important Documents Submitted to the Peace Conference in Paris, 142.

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Notes

Chapter 2 Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 1, 155–62. Foreword to the first edition of Weekly Comments, in Selected Works of Chen Duxiu, 71. “The Waxing and Waning of Light and Darkness” (address at the celebration for the Allied victory at Tiananmen Square), November 15, 1918, Complete Works of Cai Yuanpei, vol. 3, 215–18. 4. Memoirs of V. K. Wellington Koo, vol. 1, 162, 164. 5. “President’s Address to the Committee on Foreign Affairs” [Zongtong zai waijiao weiyuanhui zhi yanshuo 總統在外交委員會之演說], in Morning Post, December 20, 1918. 6. Wang was appointed among the plenipotentiaries to give an appearance of domestic unity to the outside world. Due to the fact that the second plenipotentiary could exercise the power of the chief plenipotentiary when the latter was absent, the Beiyang government, which did not have full faith in Wang, desired the sequence of the delegates to be Lou, Koo, Wang, Sze, and Wei; however, Lou did not accede and reported the name list to the conference in the sequence of Lou, Wang, Koo, Sze, and Wei, which caused discord between Koo and Wang. 7. Memoirs of V. K. Wellington Koo, vol. 1, 170–1. 8. Ibid. 9. V.K. Wellington Koo to the “Council of Ten”, January 28, 1919, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: The Paris Peace Conference, vol. 3, 755–57. 10. Ibid. 11. Lou’s telegram from Paris, April 18, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 130–1. 12. Ibid. 13. Lou’s telegram from Paris, April 22, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 131–33. 14. Ibid. 15. Enclosure of some important figure’s telegram from Europe in Lou’s telegram from Paris, April 22, 1919, ibid, 133. 16. Lou’s telegram from Paris, April 24, 1919, ibid, 134. 17. Lou’s telegram from Paris, April 30, 1919, ibid, 135. 18. Lou’s telegram from Paris, May 1, 1919, ibid, 136– 37. 19. Telegram of Lu et al from Paris, May 3, 1919, ibid, 146. 20. Diplomatic Gazette, no. 8. 21. Lou’s telegram from Paris, May 7, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 153. 22. Ibid. 23. Wang, China and Japan over 60 Years, vol. 7, 297–301. 24. Ibid. 25. Gallagher, America’s Aims and Asia’s Aspirations, 304–5. 26. Clemenceau to Lou, May 14, 1919, Diplomatic Gazette, no. 8. 27. Lou’s telegram from Paris, May 3, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 146–47. 1. 2. 3.

200

Notes

28. Lou to Council of Three, May 4, 1919, Millard, The Shantung Case at the Conference, 35–36. 29. Lou’s telegram from Paris, May 5, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 148–49. 30. Lou’s statement, May 6, 1919, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. 3, 383. 31. Lou’s telegram from Paris, May 14, 1919, Wang, China and Japan over 60 Years, vol. 7, 336–37. The same telegram is also collected in Records of Confidential Documents, but there the quoted text has been edited out, probably out of respect for Lou. However, it is this paragraph that captures Lou’s dilemma. 32. Ibid. 33. Tian to State Council, confidential telegram, May 14, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Archives of the May Fourth Patriotic Movement, 322. 34. Shun Pao, May 27, 1919. 35. Telegram of the Hunan Parliament demanding the dismissal of Cao Rulin, Lu Zongyu, and Zhang Zongxiang, May 14, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Archives of the May Fourth Patriotic Movement, 333. 36. Telegram of the Shandong Parliament demanding the restoration of Shandong, May 14, 1919, ibid, 333. 37. Chen to Lou, telegram, May 14, 1919, quoted in Deng, “China’s Rejection of the Treaty of Versailles.” 38. Lou’s telegram from Paris, May 27, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 213–14. 39. Ibid. 40. Lou’s confidential telegram, May 19, 1919, Wang, China and Japan over 60 Years, vol. 7, 339. 41. “Government Campaigns for Agreement to Treaty,” Morning Post, June 8, 1919. 42. Ibid. 43. “Shantung Representatives Urge “No” to Treaty,” The Morning Post, June 21, 1919. 44. Quoted in Deng, “China’s Rejection of the Treaty of Versailles.” 45. Lou’s telegram from Paris, June 25, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 219–21. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Lou’s telegram from Paris, June 25, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 222–23. 49. Proposed reservation of Lou and C. T. Wang to Clemenceau, June 28, 1918, Millard, Shantung Case at the Conference, 38. 50. Chinese delegation to the press in Paris, June 28, 1919, ibid, 40. 51. Lou’s telegram from Paris, June 28, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 233. In fact, to shirk its responsibility and avoid being accused, the Beiyang government played tricks with time. It did not explicitly inform the delegation to reject the treaty until the afternoon of June 28, when the delegation had already refused to sign the treaty. In this way, it could win the credit for denouncing the treaty if the powers did not display too strong reaction, and at the same time would not be blamed even if the delegates had signed the treaty before the instruction arrived. Seeing into the government’s intention, the Chinese delegation did not publicize its order until the session had convened.

201

Notes

52. Ferguson’s telegram from Washington, July, 1919, ibid, 226. 53. Yung Kwai (Chargé in Washington)’s telegram, July 7, 1919, ibid, 226; telegram from Chinese Embassy in Washington, July, 1919, ibid, 230. 54. Millard, The Shantung Case at the Conference, 61. 55. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China, 373. 56. Reinsch’s remark at a farewell reception given by Chinese organizations, September 6, 1919, Millard’s Review of the Far East, September 13, 1919, 59. 57. “China’s Diplomacy in the Past 25 Years” [Jin ershiwu nian Zhongguo zhi waijiao 近二十五年中國之 外交], in Collection of Dr. C. T. Wang’s Recent Speeches, 138, 145–46. 58. Memorandum on terms to be included in the peace treaty with Germany, March 8, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 110–2. 59. Treaties and other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949, vol. 2, 108–9. 60. Ibid, 109–110. 61. Koo’s telegram from Paris, August 12, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 246–47. 62. Koo’s telegram from Paris, August 13, 1919, ibid, 248. 63. Lou’s telegram from Paris, August 19, 1919, ibid, 249. 64. Lou’s telegram from Paris, July 15, 1919, ibid, 117–20. 65. Wang, China and Japan over 60 Years, vol. 7, 361. 66. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1919–1929, 49. 67. Ibid, 48. 68. Ibid, 50–51. 69. Ibid, 22. 70. Ibid, 26. 71. League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 13, 202. 72. Koo’s telegram, July 16, 1919, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 333–4. 73. Ouang’s telegram, July 21, 1919, ibid, 335–6. 74. Chen’s telegram, July 25, 1919, ibid, 337. 75. Alfred Sze to Charles Hughes, August 17, 1921, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, vol. 1, 59–60. 76. Joint telegram of Chinese diplomatic ministers, September 13, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 340. 77. Chinese memorandum, October 5, 1921, Wood, The Shantung Question: A Study in Diplomacy and World Politics, 223–26. 78. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., 1922, S. Doc. 126, pt. 2, serial 7976, 444. 79. Ibid, 454–55. 80. Ibid, 455. 81. Ibid.

202

Notes

82. Ibid, 456. 83. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Washington delegation and Chinese Ministers in London, Paris, and Tokyo, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 420. 84. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 469–71. 85. Ibid, 471. 86. Ibid, 546; First Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Chinese Revenue, 4–5, Minutes (Uncorrected) of Committee Meetings, vol. 9. 87. Second Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Chinese Revenue, 10, Ibid. 88. Chinese State Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Finance to Washington delegation, telegram, December 10, 1921, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 423–24. 89. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, December 18, 1921, ibid, 423–5. 90. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, December 27, 1921, ibid, 450. 91. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1919–1929, 95–97. 92. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 595, 597. 93. Ibid, 475–76. 94. Ibid, 98–99. 95. Ibid, 539–40. 96. Memoirs of V. K. Wellington Koo, vol. 1, 349. 97. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, December 7, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 438; Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 542–43. 98. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, December 7, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 438; Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 541. 99. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, December 7, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 438; Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 540. 100. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, December 8, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 438–39; Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 551–52. 101. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, February 5, 1922, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 501–2; Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 754. 102. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, February 7, 1922, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 503–6; Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 777. 103. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 501. 104. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, November 30, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 433–34; Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 512–13. 105. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Chinese delegation, telegram, December 15, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 447–48. 106. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 834–35. 107. Ibid, 836. 108. Ibid, 835.

203

Notes

109. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, November 29, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 426; see also Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 480– 85. 110. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, November 30, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 427; Conference on the Limitation of Armament, see also Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 488–89. 111. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, November 30, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 427; see also Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 489– 490. 112. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, November 30, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 427–28; Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 490–91. 113. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, November 30, 1921, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 428; see also Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 491– 92. 114. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 497, 502. 115. Ibid, 833–34. 116. Ibid, 684–85. 117. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, January 20, 1922, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 469; see also Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 640–41. 118. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Chinese delegation, telegram, January 24, 1922, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 470. 119. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 862. 120. Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, vol. 2, 377–79. 121. The government’s statement regarding the Shandong problem, Diplomatic Gazette, no. 7; see also Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 526. 122. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, December 8, 1922, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 473; see also Conversations between the Chinese and Japanese representatives in regard to the Shantung Question, 22–23 123. Ibid. 124. Memoirs of V. K. Wellington Koo, vol. 1, 228. 125. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, December 16, 1922, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 479; see also Conversations between the Chinese and Japanese representatives in regard to the Shantung Question, 132–46. 126. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, December 18, 1922, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 479; Ibid, December 19, 479; see also Conversations between the Chinese and Japanese representatives in regard to the Shantung Question, 477–78. 127. Wang, China and Japan over 60 Years, vol. 8, 44. 128. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, January 22, 1922, Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed., Records of Confidential Documents, 495–96.

204

Notes

129. Sze, Koo, and Wang’s telegram from Washington, January 25, 1922, ibid, 497. 130. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Chinese delegation, telegram, January 26, 1922, ibid, 497. 131. Ibid. 132. Full text, Conversations between the Chinese and Japanese representatives in regard to the Shantung Question, 384–91. 133. Wang, China and Japan over 60 Years, vol. 8, 49.

Chapter 3 Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924, 28–29. Ibid, 269. It is noteworthy that different from the version handed over by Yanson, the Russian text published in the Soviet papers Izvestia and Pravda on August 26, 1919 did not contain the paragraph “The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people without compensation of any kind the Chinese Eastern Railway, and all mining concessions, forestry, and gold mines which were seized from them by the government of Tsars, that of Kerenski, and the outlaws Horvath, Semenov, Kolchak, the Russian generals, merchants, and capitalists.” However, according to the recollection of Liu Zerong, president of the Association of Chinese Workers in Russia, even the manifesto passed to the association by Soviet People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs did contain that paragraph. A Chinese translation of this version of the manifesto had appeared in the association’s publication Datongbao. (Liu, “My Experience in Soviet Russia during the October Revolution.”) In fact, that same paragraph existed in V. Vilenskii’s Kitai I Sovetskaia Rossiia (China and Soviet Russia), published by the Soviet Russia’s state press, on which Whiting’s translation was partly based. At the beginning of the Sino-Soviet talks, Soviet representatives did not deny the offer about the Chinese Eastern Railway; it was at a later stage that the Soviets denied the promise. For Chinese discussion of this question, see Fang, “On the Questions of the Two Karakhan Manifestos and the Abrogation of Unequal Treaties”; Xue, “A Discussion of the Changes in the Contents of the First Karakhan Manifesto.” Cf. Whiting, “The Soviet Offer to China.” 4. La Jeunesse, vol. 7, no. 6. 5. Republican Daily News (Shanghai), April 14, 1920. 6. Cheng, ed., Diplomacy and International Law of Modern China, 214. 7. Telegram of Shao, April 23, 1920. Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on Sino-Russian Relations (1920): Russian Diplomatic Tests on China, 32. 8. “Record of China’s Major Events,” (Zhongguo da shi ji 中國大事記), in Eastern Miscellany, vol. 17, no. 10. 9. Conversation between Chen and Obata Yukichi, April 7, 1920, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on Sino-Russian Relations (1920): Russian Diplomatic Tests on China, 19–20. 10. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Koo, telegram, April 7, 1920, Xue, Compilation of Documents on Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1924, 64. 11. Soviet Treaty Series: A Collection of Bilateral Treaties, Agreements and Conventions, Etc., Concluded Between the Soviet Union and Foreign Powers, vol. 1, 47. 1. 2. 3.

205

Notes

12. Zhang to Chinese Frontier Defense Bureau, telegram, September 15, 1920, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on Sino-Russian Relations (1920): Russian Diplomatic Tests on China, 100–1; part of the translation from Zhang, China in the International System, 1918–20, 170. 13. Zhang to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, September 18, 1920, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on Sino-Russian Relations (1920): Russian Diplomatic Tests on China, 99; English translation from Zhang, China in the International System, 1918–20, 171. 14. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 272. 15. Conversation Chen Lu and Boppe, August 13, 1920, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on Sino-Russian Relations (1920): Russian Diplomatic Tests on China, 78; conversation between Chen Lu and Charles R. Crane, August 18, 1920, ibid, 84; Wang, Prologue to SinoSoviet Relations, 127. 16. Chinese State Council to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 1, 1920, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on Sino-Russian Relations (1920): Russian Diplomatic Tests on China, 106. 17. Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on Sino-Russian Relations (1920): Discontinuation of Recognition of the Russian Minister and Consuls, 36–38. 18. China Year Book, 1921–22, 626. 19. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Provincial Military and Civil Governors, circular telegram, September 23, 1920, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on SinoRussian Relations (1920): Discontinuation of Recognition of the Russian Minister and Consuls, 40–41. 20. Ibid; China Year Book, 1921–22, 632. 21. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Provincial Military and Civil Governors, circular telegram, September 23, 1920, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on SinoRussian Relations (1920): Discontinuation of Recognition of the Russian Minister and Consuls, 40–41. 22. Huang to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 25, 1920, Ibid., 45. 23. Wuhan Chronicle Editorial Committee, ed., Wuhan Chronicle — Foreign Relations, 55. 24. Conversation between Boppe and Yen, October 1, 1920, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on Sino-Russian Relations (1920): Discontinuation of Recognition of Russian Minister and Consuls, 66–7. 25. Koo to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, October 1, 1920, ibid, 73–4. 26. Pastor to Yen, October 4, 1920, ibid, 76. 27. Pastor to Yen, November 11, 1920, ibid, 187–88. 28. Exchange between Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Robert H. Clive (Acting British Minister), November 17, 1920, ibid, 194. 29. Pastor to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 18, 1920, ibid, 206–208. 30. Wuhan Chronicle Editorial Committee, ed., Wuhan Chronicle — Foreign Relations, 55. 31. Wang, Prologue to Sino-Soviet Relations, 158–59; Millard’s Review of the Far East, January 1, 1921, 238–39. 32. Annals of the Republic of China Editorial Committee, Academia Historica, ed., Annals of the Republic of China — January to June, 1920, 449–50.

206

Notes

33. Talk between Yen and Yurin, October 3, 1921, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Historical Materials on Sino-Russian Relations (1921): General Relations, 549–50. 34. Chen Guangping to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, April 29, 1921, ibid, 268. 35. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Chinese Embassy in London, April 12, 1921, quoted in Elleman, Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1927, 43. 36. North China Herald, December 24, 1921, 824. 37. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 132, 854–57. 38. Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paikes, May 1, 1922, China Year Book, 1923, 680. 39. North China Herald, November 18, 1922, 421. 40. Ibid, November 18, 1922, 426. 41. China Year Book, 1924, 864. 42. Declaration of Karakhan, September 4, 1923, Xue et al, ed., Compilation of Documents on Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1924, 193–5; Far Eastern Times, September 6, 1923. 43. Pollard, China’s Foreign Relations, 1917–1931, 181; China Year Book, 1924, 867. 44. Karakhan to Wang, November 23, 1924, China Year Book, 1924, 874. 45. Li, Sino-Soviet Relations, 112. 46. Karakhan to Wang, November 30, 1924, China Year Book, 1924, 875. 47. Wang to Karakhan, January 9, 1924, ibid, 878. 48. Text, ibid, 880–83. 49. Quoted in Elleman, Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1927, 100. 50. China Year Book, 1924, 1196. 51. These were detailed in a circular to the provincial officials later on March 20, 1924. See ibid, 883–84. 52. Karakhan to Wang, March 16, 1924, ibid, 879. 53. Karakhan to Koo, March 19, 1924, ibid, 880. 54. State Council’s circular telegram, March 20, 1924, ibid, 883–84. 55. Wang’s third circular telegram” Eastern Miscellany, vol. 21, no. 9, 135. 56. Ibid. 57. Wu’s fourth circular telegram”, ibid, 136. 58. Koo to Karakhan, April 1, 1924, China Year Book, 1924, 885–87. 59. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1919–1929, 137. 60. Ibid, 134. 61. Ibid, 136–37. 62. Wuhan Chronicle Editorial Committee, ed., Wuhan Chronicle — Foreign Relations, 55–57. 63. “Tianjin’s Russian Concession Repossessed”, Eastern Times, August 10, 1924; Tianjin Chronicle Editorial Committee, Tianjin Chronicle, Annex: Foreign Concessions, 64. 64. “Statement of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation” [Zhongguo gongchandang dui shiju zhi zhuzhang 中國共產黨對時局之主張], Xianqu, no. 9; English translation from Saich, Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, 37–38. 65. Institute of Modern History, CASS, ed. Selected Records of the Second and Third National Congresses of the CCP, 94–5, 105.

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Notes

66. Ibid, 179. 67. Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, vol. 5, 593. 68. Li, Political History of China, 1840–1928, 448. 69. Statement of the Guangzhou government on the customs surplus question, Cheng, Zheng, and Rao, ed., Selected Records on the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China, 1919–1931, 300. 70. Amau to Ijuin Hikokichi (Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs), telegram, Japanese text, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1923, vol. 2, 600–601. 71. Quoted in Jacob Gould Schurman, U.S. envoy to China (Beiyang Government), to Charles Hughes, telegram, December 1, 1923, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, vol. 1, 557–59. 72. Statement of the Guangzhou government on the customs surplus question, Cheng, Zheng, and Rao, ed., Selected Records on the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China, 1919–1931, 330–1. 73. Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, vol. 8, 490–1. 74. Generalissimo Government Gazette, no. 41, 75–76. 75. See Stubbs to Victor Cavendish (Colonial Secretary), telegram, December 11, 1923, CO129/481, 447; Stubbs to Sun, letter, December 11, 1923, CO129/481, 508; Stubbs to Colonial Secretary, confidential letter, December 19, 1923, CO129/481, 500. 76. Sun Yat-sen to American People, December 18, 1925, Decimal File 89351/4520, RG59. 77. Republican Daily News (Shanghai), April 14, 1920. 78. Statement on the customs question, December 24, 1923, Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, vol. 8, 551. 79. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Yoshizawa, telegram, December 8, 1923, Beiyang Government Archives Collection of the Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 14. 80. Peking Times, February 25, 1924. 81. Macleay to British Foreign Office, telegram, March 20, 1924, FO371/10231, 4. 82. Macleay to British Foreign Office, telegram, April 10, 1924, FO371/10231, 47–48. 83. Rong, ed. Records of the Kuomintang’s National Congresses and Plenary Sessions, vol. 1, 12; English translation adapted from Li, Political History of China, 451. 84. Li, Political History of China, 456. 85. Party History Research Center, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, ed., History of the Communist Party of China, vol. 1, 99. 86. Manifesto on Northern Expedition, September 18, 1924, Hsü, Sun Yat-Sen: His Political and Social Ideals, 143–45. 87. “Statement of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation” [Zhongguo gongchandang dui shiju zhi zhuzhang 中國共產黨對時局之主張], in Xianqu, No.24. English version available as “Statement of the Communist Party of China on the Present Political Situation” in Sneevliet Archive No. 281, quoted in Saich, Origins of the First United Front in China, 661–67. Slight changes to the translation made, notably the use of “National Assembly” instead of “National Congress” as advised by Saich. 88. “Statement of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation”, Guide Weekly, no. 92, November 19, 1924. 89. North China Daily News, November 17, 1924.

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90. Speech to the Shanghai Press, November 19, 1924, Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, vol. 11, 331–41. 91. Exchange between Sun and Japanese journalists at a press interview aboard the Shanghai Maru at Kobe, November 24, 1924. Sun, China and Japan: Natural Friends –– Unnatural Enemies, 131–32. 92. Ibid, 132–34. 93. “Causes of China’s Internal Strife” (speech at the welcoming reception of the Kobe branch of the KMT, November 25, 1924, Speeches of Sun during His Journey from Shanghai to Japan, 54. 94. Geming wenxian, vol. 10, 87–90. 95. Reported in Shanghai News, December 9, 1924. 96. Conversation of Sun with Ye Gongchuo and Xu Shiying, December 18, 1924. Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, vol. 11, 500–501. 97. Will of Sun, February 24, 1925, Hsü, Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals, 43. The word “conference” in Hsü’s translation is changed to “assembly” for the same reason given in n71. 98. Geming wenxian, vol. 11, 268. 99. “Proclamation of the CPC to the Chinese People on the Death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen”, Guide Weekly, no. 107, March 25, 1925.

Chapter 4 1. British and Foreign State Papers, 1922, vol. 116, 435. 2. Eastern Miscellany, vol. 19, no. 8. 3. Text, China Year Book, 1924, 831–37. 4. Weihai Chronicle Office, ed., Weihai Chronicle, 55. 5. Memoirs of V. K. Wellington Koo, vol. 1, 352. 6. Text, Zhu, China Year Book, 1924, 837–39. 7. Koo to British Minister, Zhu, The Weihai Question, 48. 8. “Proclamation of the CPC to the People of the Whole Nation on Resistance of the Barbaric and Brutal Massacre by the Imperialists”, Guide Weekly, no. 117, June 6, 1925. 9. Geming wenxian, vol. 18, 61. 10. “Declaration of the Shanghai Federations of Student, Labor, and Trade Unions,” June 7, 1925, Eastern Miscellany, May 30th Incident special issue. 11. China Year Book, 1926–7, 934. 12. Kellogg to Ferdinand L. Mayer, telegram, July 1, 1925, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925, vol. 1, 767–68. 13. Kellogg to MacMurray, telegram, September 12, 1925, Ibid, 849–50. 14. China Year Book, 1926–7, 1108. 15. MacMurray to Shen Ruilin, September 4, 1925, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925, vol. 1, 831. 16. Wu, Tariff Question, 125–26. 17. Quoted in MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, October 28, 1925, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925, vol. 1, 867–69. 18. China Year Book, 1926–7, 1115.

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19. Ibid, 1123. 20. Ibid, 1126–28. 21. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, November 4, 1925, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925, vol. 1, 877–78. 22. China Year Book, 1926–7, 1130–32 23. Ibid, 1134–35. 24. Wu, Tariff Question, 139–40. 25. China Year Book, 1926–7, 1136. 26. Wu, Tariff Question, 142. 27. Usui Katsumi, Japan and China: The Taishō Period [Nihon to Chūgoku: Taishō jidai 日本と中国： 大正時代] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo), 247, quoted in Wu, A Diplomatic History of China: The Period of the Republic of China, 1911–1949, 113. 28. Usui , Japan and China, 249, quoted in Wu, A Diplomatic History of China: The Period of the Republic of China, 1911–1949, 113. 29. China Year Book, 1926–7, 1141. 30. Ibid, 1142. 31. Eugene Chan to MacMurray, July 14, 1926, ibid, 1143–44. 32. Douglas Jenkins to Chan, July 24, 1926, ibid, 1145. 33. Chen to Jenkins, July 28, 1926, ibid, 1146. 34. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, January 13, 1927, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, vol. 2, 372. 35. Identic note from Wai-chiao Pu to interested ministers, February 2, 1927, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, pt. 2, ser. E, 149. 36. Austen Chamberlain to Lampson, telegram, December 18, 1926, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926, vol. 1, 929. 37. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, January 18, 1927, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, vol. 2, 374. 38. Mayer to Kellogg, telegram, January 21, 1927, ibid, 375–76. 39. Kellogg to Mayer, telegram, January 24, 1927, ibid, 377. 40. “On the Dismissal of Aglen”, Ta Kung Pao, February 5, 1927. 41. The Morning Post, January 8, 1927. 42. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, February 5, 1927, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1927, vol. 2, 458. 43. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, February 5, 1927, ibid, 460. 44. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, February 8, 1927, ibid, 461. 45. MacMurray to Kellogg, telegram, February 10, 1927, ibid, 462–23. 46. Of the four remaining powers, Switzerland and Mexico had expressed willingness to renounce extraterritoriality. Switzerland declared along with the conclusion of its 1918 Treaty of Amity with China that she would be ready to give up consular jurisdiction together with other treaty powers, while Mexico promised in an exchange of notes with China on September 26, 1921 to insert a clause that renounced

210

Notes

consular jurisdiction in the future amendment to her 1899 treaty. (Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, 10.) 47. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 110. 48. Memorandum of the Chinese Commissioner on the Present Practice of Extra-territorial Jurisdiction in China, March 23, 1926, China Year Book, 1928, 448–53. 49. Additional Memorandum of the Chinese Commissioner on the Present Practice of Extra-territorial Jurisdiction in China, April 28, 1926, ibid, 453–55. 50. Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, 149. 51. Ibid, 51. 52. Ibid, 39. 53. Ibid, 55. 54. Ibid, 66–67. 55. Ibid, 68. 56. Ibid, 69–74. 57. Ibid, 100. 58. Ibid, 81. 59. Ibid, 91. 60. See ibid, 92–97. 61. Ibid, 99. 62. Ibid, 103–104. 63. “Yet another Imperialist Scam: The Commission on Extraterritoriality”, Guide Weekly, no. 143, January 26, 1926. 64. Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, 107–8. 65. Ibid, 108. 66. Declaration by the Chinese Commissioner at the conclusion of the commission, September 15, 1926, China Year Book, 1928, 447–55. 67. Shi, The Diplomatic History of the Republic of China, 240. 68. Text, Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929, 168–71. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid, 174. 71. Hu to de Warzee, April 16, 1926, China Year Book, 1928, 770. 72. Belgian Foreign Office to American Embassy, August 21, 1926, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926, vol. 1, 987. See footnote of text. 73. De Warzee to Hu, April 27, 1926, China Year Book, 1928, 771. 74. Cai Tinggan to de Warzee, July 24, 1926, ibid, 772. 75. De Warzee to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 4, 1926, ibid, 773. 76. Belgian Foreign Office to American Embassy, August 21, 1926, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1926, vol. 1, 989. 77. Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, vol. 3, Foreign Relations, 968.

211

Notes

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to de Warzee, September 2, 1926, China Year Book, 1928, 773–74. De Warzee to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aide-memoire, September 29, 1926, ibid, 774. De Warzee to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aide-memoire, October 23, 1926, ibid, 775–76. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to de Warzee, aide-memoire, October 23, 1926, ibid, 776. De Warzee to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aide-memoire, October 26, 1926, ibid, 776–77. De Warzee to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aide-memoire, October 27, 1926, ibid, 777–78. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to De Warzee, aide-memoire, October 28, 1926, ibid, 778–79. Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, vol. 3, Foreign Relations, 968–69. 86. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs de Warzee, November 4, 1926, China Year Book, 1928, 779. 87. De Warzee to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 5, 1926, ibid, 779–80. 88. Memoirs of V. K. Wellington Koo, vol. 1, 356–7. 89. Presidential order (to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,” November 6, 1926, China Year Book, 1928, 782. 90. Ibid, 766–69. 91. Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, vol. 3, 971–72. 92. Ibid, 991. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid, 992. 95. Conversation between Koo and de Warzee, January 12, 1927, Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, vol. 3, 981. 96. Ibid. 97. Institute of History, Hubei Academy of Social Sciences, ed., Selected Records on the Repossession of the British Concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang, 101. 98. China Year Book, 1928, 1403. 99. Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, vol. 3, Foreign Relations, 1004–5. 100. China Year Book, 1928, 1403. 101. Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, vol. 3, Foreign Relations, 1016–17. 102. Ibid, 1022–23. 103. Statement of the Chinese government explaining the termination of the Sino-Spanish Treaty of October 10, 1864, November 10, 1927, China Year Book, 1928, 1403. 104. Garrido to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 17, 1927, ibid, 1404. 105. Henry Cosmé to C. T. Wang, September 10, 1928, China Year Book, 1929–30, 830–31. 106. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Yoshizawa, October 20, 1926, China Year Book, 1928, 786–87. 107. Japanese Legation to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1926, ibid, 787–88. 108. Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929, 165. 109. Ibid, 26–27. 110. Ibid, 166–67. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

212

Notes

111. Ibid, 185–86. 112. Cheng et al., eds, Selected Records on the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China, 1919–1931, 321–22. 113. Nationalist Government Gazette, no. 2. 114. Wang, Records of the Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government, 1926–1929, 55–56. 115. Geming wenxian, vol. 18, 136–37. 116. Ibid, no. 12, 49–52. 117. Ibid, no. 12, 178. 118. Ransome, The Chinese Puzzle, 183. 119. Gao, ed., Documents on Revolutionary Diplomacy during the Guangzhou and Wuhan Periods, 37–38. 120. Ibid, 37. 121. Brennan, memorandum, “The Kuomintang,” November 23, 1926, FO371/12456, 90–91. 122. Wilkinson to O’Malley, telegram, November 17, 1926, FO405/252, 200. 123. Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929, 186–92. 124. See Lampson’s telegrams to Foreign Office in FO371/11663, especially of December 11, 1926, 17–20; December 12, 1926, 35–39; and December 16, 1926, 127–28. 125. Geming Wenxian, vol. 14, 23–43. 126. Chen to relevant military and political agencies, telegram, January 12, 1927. There was no definite conclusion on the exact casualty number of the incident. Some reports recorded deaths and others said dozens or hundreds of people were injured, possibly making exaggerations to manipulate public agitation. As Chinese representative in the negotiations, Chen was unlikely to have underreported the figures, which were also documented in C. T. Wang’s Diplomatic Records of the Nationalist Government for the Past Three Years (1926–1929). These figures are thus adopted here. 127. Republic Daily News, January 6, 1927. 128. Institute of History, Hubei Academy of Social Sciences, ed., Selected Records on the Repossession of the British Concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang, 15. 129. Republic Daily News January 8, 1927. 130. Peking Times, January 13, 1927. 131. Wuhan Chronicle Editorial Committee, ed., Wuhan Chronicle — Foreign Relations, 141–42. 132. Peking Times, January 10, 1927; January 11, 1927. 133. Japan Year Book, 1926, 2–3. 134. Shun Pao, January 11, 1927. 135. Lee, “China’s Recovery of the British Concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang in 1927,” 15. 136. China Year Book, 1928, 763. 137. Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929, 197–98. 138. Pollard, China’s Foreign Relations, 302. 139. Tyrwhitt, “Appreciation of the Political Situation in China,” January 18, 1927, encl. 3 in his report on 22 January 1927, FO 371/12404, 110–12. 140. See Lee, “China’s Recovery of the British Concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang in 1927,” 19. 141. China Year Book, 1928, 738–39.

213

Notes

142. Chamberlain to Tilley, telegram, January 24, 1924, FO 405/252A, 112. 143. Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929, 193–97. 144. Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 202 (1927), cols. 326–27. 145. Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929, 204. 146. Ibid, 203. 147. Ibid, 204. 148. Ibid, 205–8. 149. Ibid, 213. 150. Ibid, 214. 151. Wang, Records of the Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government, 1926–1929, 12. 152. Tianjin Chronicle Editorial Committee, Tianjin Chronicle, Annex: Foreign Concessions, vol. 6, 67. 153. “The Letter from Shanghai,” in Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution, 402. 154. “External Declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Nanjing Nationalist Government,” in Cheng, Zheng, and Rao ed., Selected Records on the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China, 1919–1931, 410. 155. Research Institute of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, ed., Records of Sino-Japanese Relations after the Northern Expedition, 1–2. 156. Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 206 (1927), cols. 21. 157. “Decree of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the establishment of the Treaty Commission”, June 2, 1927, in Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Compilation of Archival Materials of the Republic of China, vol. 5, 7. 158. Zeng, “The United States and Tariff Autonomy of the Nanjing Government,” 247. 159. Proclamation of the Nationalist government of the Republic of China, July 20, 1927, China Year Book, 1928, 1068. 160. Ibid, 1069. 161. China Weekly Review, vol. 41, August 13, 1927, 290. 162. Pollard, China’s Foreign Relations, 334; North China Herald, vol. 164, September 3, 1927, 419–20; Ibid, vol. 165, October 1, 1927, 28; China Year Book, 1928, 1075. 163. Lee, The Nationalist China’s “Revolutionary Diplomacy,” 1925–1931, 115; Eastern Miscellany, vol. 24, no. 19, 134. 164. Proclamation of the Nationalist government of the Republic of China, August 29, 1927, China Year Book, 1928, 1068. 165. Statement issued by C. C. Wu, November 24, 1927, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, pt. 2, ser. E, 401. 166. China Year Book, 1929–30, 854–55. 167. Quoted in Edwin S. Cunningham, U.S. Consul General in Shanghai, to Kellogg, telegram, February 28, 1928, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, vol. 2, 406.

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English materials

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Japanese materials

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 外務省, ed. Nihon Gaikō Bunsho 日本外交文書〈第45卷 · 第2冊〉 [Vol. 2 of Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1912]. Tokyo: United Nations Association of Japan, 1963. ———. Nihon Gaikō Bunsho 日本外交文書〈大正十二 年 · 第2冊〉 [Vol. 2 of Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1923]. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1979.

225

Index Aglen, Francis A. 123–25, 149–50 Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Questions between China and the Soviet Union, 1924 and related agreements 108–19 Agreements Regarding the Restoration of the State of Peace, 1921 67 Allies 34–36, 38, 42, 44–45, 48, 52, 56, 65– 67, 82, 97, 103 Balfour, Arthur 72, 80, 89–90, 92, 134 Beltchenko, Andrew 105, 107 Boppe, Auguste 103, 106 Borah, William 62 Borch, Herbert von 67 Borden, Robert 77 Boxer Protocol 7–8, 35–36, 44, 50, 64–65, 97, 106, 163 Brennan, J. F. 177–78 Cai Yuanpei 42, 192 Calhoun, William J. 25 Cao Ruilin 28, 55–56, 59 Central Powers 31, 34 Chamberlain, Austen 187–88, 192 Chen Duxiu 42, 121 Chen, Eugene (Chen Youren) 42, 122, 170, 179–80, 182–83, 185–86, 189, 191 Chen Lu 57, 70, 99, 167 Chiang Kai-shek 177, 191–93 Chicherin, Goergy V. 97, 100, 121 Chinese Eastern Railway 6, 8, 82, 87–88, 98, 102, 104–5, 107–14, 118 Chinese government Northern (Beijing, Beiyang) 23–25, 30– 31, 33–36, 55–57, 59, 70–71, 91–92, 97–113, 115–17, 120, 122–25, 134, 226

136–40, 145–51, 158–61, 163–65, 169–77 Southern: Guangzhou, 43, 67, 71, 94, 96, 98, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 112, 122– 28, 147–48, 154, 175–77; Wuhan, 168–70, 181–84, 186, 188–91, 192; Nanjing, 1912, 18, 20; Nanjing, 1927, 137, 191–96 Clemenceau, Georges 45, 48, 53 Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions 70, 72–73, 75, 77–79, 82, 84–87, 90, 139 Communist Party of China (CPC) 121, 126, 128, 130–31, 137, 157, 177, 191–92 consular jurisdiction 2–3, 9–11, 22, 34, 36, 39, 51, 69–70, 99–100, 116, 127, 129–130, 152, 162–63, 174. See also extraterritoriality Conty, Alexandre R. 25 Convention for Retrocession of Weihaiwei (draft), 1924 134–37 for the Lease of Port Arthur, Dalian Bay, and the Adjacent Waters, 1898 95 for the Lease of Weihaiwei, 1898 136 of Tianjin, 1886 and related conventions 171–72 customs surplus 122–26 Dalian (Dalny) 26, 32, 80–81, 95, 136 de Warzee d’Hermalle, Le Maire 161–64, 168–69 Duan Qirui 36, 123, 131, 146 Exchange of notes, Sino-Japanese, 1918 39, 45, 47–48, 52–53, 97

Index

extraterritoriality 2–3, 10–13, 22, 75, 78–79, 83, 98, 100–1, 107, 137–39, 151–54, 157–58, 160–61, 175–76, 187 Extraterritoriality, Commission on 134, 138, 151, 154, 161, 163, 175–76, 187 Far Eastern Republic 102, 108–9 Feng Yuxiang 128, 137, 146 First World War 27, 31, 34, 41–42, 45, 68, 139 Fourteen Points 41, 72–75 Fujian 7, 33–34, 193 Garrido y Cisneros, Justo 170–71 General Regulations of Trade, Sino-British, 1843 3, 7, 8 Gold Franc Controversy 138, 151 Goto Shimpei 39 Guling 189 Hague, The 64, 162–63, 165, 167–69 Hanihara Masanao 76, 80, 86 Hankou concession German 35–37, 65, 82 Russian 103–5, 107, 119 British 168, 177–86, 188–89, 191–92 Hong Kong 80–81, 125–26, 186, 188 Hu Hanmin 176 Hu Weide 58, 146, 161 Hughes, Charles E. 72, 75, 79, 82, 85, 87, 90, 92–93 Jamieson, James W. 123–24 Jiaozhou Bay 31, 33, 46, 48–49, 64, 72, 80, 90, 92–94 Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway 39, 48, 72, 90–91, 93–94 Jiujiang, British concession 168, 181–85, 188–89, 191 Joffe, Adolph A. 110–12, 121–22 Jordan, John 18, 25, 28

Karakhan, Lev 98, 101–2, 112–13, 115, 117– 18, 120. See also Karakhan manifestos Karakhan manifestos 111–12, 120 Kellogg, Frank B. 139, 148, 187 Koo, Wellington V. K. (Gu Weijun) 43–46, 56–60, 66, 69, 75–81, 83–84, 89–91, 106, 110–12, 118, 136–37, 150, 164– 66, 168–169 Krupensky, M. 25–26 Kuomintang (KMT) 44, 121–22, 128, 130– 31, 137, 158, 175–78, 180–81, 184, 191–92 Lampson, Miles W. 150, 179, 184 Lansing, Robert 45, 47, 49, 57, 60, 71 League of Nations 43–44, 47–49, 51, 55, 57–58, 62, 65–66, 162, 166, 168 Legation Quarter 5, 8, 65, 106, 153 Li Yuanhong 17, 35, 36 Liang, M. T. (Liang Ruhao) 134–36 Liang Qichao 32, 44 Liang Shiyi 91, 140 likin 26, 51, 76–78, 140–45, 192–94 Lloyd George, David 45–46, 48 Lou Tseng-Tsiang 43, 53–58, 67 Lu Zongyu 56, 59 Macleay, James W. R. 123–24, 136–37, 144 MacMurray, John Van A. 148, 193 Makino Nobuaki 45–47, 49 Manchuria 6, 8, 25–26, 32–33, 50, 52, 70, 81, 83–84, 87–88, 95, 97, 104, 117, 154, 156, 173 May Fourth Movement 55, 62, 120 May 30th Incident 134, 137–38, 151, 157, 158 Mongolia, Outer 101, 109–110, 112, 114– 16, 118–19, 156 most favored nation 9–11, 39, 68–69, 127, 174

227

Index

national assembly 23, 56, 59, 128–29, 131– 32, 136 National Revolutionary Army 169, 177, 179, 182, 189, 193, 196 Nationalism, Chinese 41, 120, 122, 139, 183–84, 186 Northern Expedition 127, 129, 147, 168, 176–77, 180, 190, 196 Obata Yukichi 26, 71, 91, 103 O’Malley, Owen 179, 183–85, 188–189 Ouang ki-tseng (Wang Jizeng) 69, 70 Paikes, Aleksandr K. 109–10 Paris Peace Conference 34, 40–46, 48–50, 52–54, 56, 58, 60, 62–64, 66, 68–70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 90 Pastor de Mora, Luis 106–7 Pichon, Stéphen 54, 60 Port Arthur 32, 80–81, 94–95, 136 Qing dynasty 3, 5, 7, 9–14, 16–20, 22, 27, 142, 155, 161 Qingdao 31, 39, 49, 93–94 recognition of China, foreign 16, 20, 22, 179 Reinsch, Paul S. 63, 71 Revolution, Chinese 13, 16–20, 22, 24–25, 27–28, 82, 125, 127–28, 131, 147, 149, 153, 158, 175–77, 179, 190 Rivera y Orbaneja, Miguel Primo de 170 Root, Elihu 74, 85. See also Root principles Root principles 74–75, 89 Russia rights of Tsarist 103–8 Soviet 88, 97–103, 105, 108–14, 116–17, 185–86. See also Soviet Union Sforza, Count 25 Shandong question, the 31–33, 39, 44–50, 52–62, 64, 68, 70–72, 80, 89–92, 94 228

Shanghai International Settlement 3, 8, 27, 137–38, 152, 160, 183, 185–88 Mixed Court 19, 24, 27–30, 138, 151–53, 158–160, 167 Shidehara Kijuro 72, 81, 173, 182, 186 Soviet Union 111–13, 116–22, 126 111, 113, 118–19 Special Areas 35–37, 153, 188 Special Tariff Conference 77–78, 137–39, 143, 146–48, 151, 161, 172, 175–76, 187 Sun Baoqi 25–27 Sun Yat-sen 18, 20, 24, 111, 121–31, 159, 175 surtaxes 76–78, 141–46, 148–151, 176, 179, 187, 193 Sze, Alfred Sao-ke (Shi Zhaoji) 43–44, 58, 71–72, 74, 82–83, 85–86, 90, 92, 134, 141 tariff autonomy 75–78, 125, 137, 139–42, 144–46, 162, 176–78, 187, 192–93 conference. See Special Tariff Conference rates 2, 24–27, 35, 38, 43–44, 51, 75–78, 140, 143, 162, 193. See also surtaxes Tianjin concession German 35–36, 65 Austrian 37, 65–66 Russian 103–5, 107, 119 Belgian 163, 167, 169 British 190 Treaty and Additional Agreement Relating to Manchuria, 1905 95 between the Nine Powers Relating to Chinese Customs Tariff, 1922 77, 139, 148, 187 for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shandong, 1922 93–94

Index

Mackay, 1902 9, 12–13, 24–26, 130 Nine-Power, 1922 69, 74, 88, 126, 139, 163 of Amity and Commerce: Sino-Mexican, 1899, 12; Sino-Swiss, 1918, 39 of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation: Sino-Belgian, 1865, 161–70; SinoBrazilian, 1881, 12; Sino-Spanish, 1864, 170–71 of Amity: Sino-Chilean, 1915, 30–31; Sino-Finnish, 1926, 174 of Commerce and Navigation: SinoJapanese, 1896 and related agreements, 172–73; Sino-Portuguese, 1887, 196 of Commerce, Sino-Austrian, 1925 174 of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Sino-Swedish, 1908 12 of Friendship: Sino-Bolivian, 1919, 68; Sino-Persian, 1920, 69, 174 of Nanjing, 1842 2, 8, 10 of Portsmouth, 1905 120 of Saint-Germain en-Laye, 1919 65–67 of Shimonoseki, 1905 83 of the Bogue, 1843 7, 9 of Tianjin, 1858: Sino-British, 7–8; SinoFrench, 7 of Versailles, 1919 53–62, 65–67, 69, 89 of Wangxia, 1844 8 Respecting the Province of Shandong, 1915 45–46, 48 Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade, 1871 12 Soviet-Mongolian, 1921 110, 115–16, 118 Twenty-One Demands 31–34, 43–48, 50, 52–53, 55, 70, 81–82, 93–95, 129, 173. See also Treaty Respecting the Province of Shandong, 1915 Tyrwhitt, Reginald 185–86

Underwood, Oscar 76, 78 United Front, First 121, 126–27 Wang, C. T. (Wang Zhengting) 43, 56, 58, 63, 111–13, 115–16, 120, 137, 141–43, 146 Wang Chonghui 71, 78–79, 81–82, 141, 150–53, 158 Wang Jingwei 130, 192 Wang King-ky (Wang Jingqi) 162, 164, 167 Wang Kouang Ky (Wang Guangqi) 58, 69 warlords 56, 121, 127–28, 142, 147, 151, 157, 176–77 Washington Naval Conference 34, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 62, 68–72, 78–80, 82, 84– 86, 88–90, 92, 134, 138–139. See also Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions Weihaiwei 80, 134–36 Wilson, Woodrow 22, 41–42, 44, 46–49, 51, 57–58, 60, 62 Wu, C. C. (Wu Chaoshu) 44, 58, 71, 123–26, 191, 193–94 Wu Peifu 59, 117, 147 Wu Tingfang 19, 94, 122 Xinjiang 100–1, 155 Yanson, M. 98, 112–13 Yen, W. W. (Yan Huiqing) 68, 106–9, 112, 141 Yoshizawa Kenkichi 126, 148, 193 Yuan Shikai 18, 20–24, 27, 31–33 Yurin, Ignatius L. 102–3, 108–9 Zhang Silin 98, 100–2 Zhang Zongxiang 39, 55–56, 59, 100–2, 131, 146–47 Zhang Zuolin 117, 123, 128, 131, 146–47, 150 Zhenjiang concession, British 189–90 229

A Thorough Review of China’s Endeavors to Abrogate Unequal Treaties “Unequal treaties” — the result of China’s unsuccessful defense against foreign aggression in the final century of imperial rule — forced China to grant foreign powers access to treaty ports and inland waters, tariff authority, land leases, concessions, extraterritoriality, and troop presence, severely damaging China’s sovereignty. Unequal Treaties and China reviews Republican and Communist China’s endeavors to abrogate and reverse the damaging legacy of unequal treaties amidst the power changes in the warlord-dominated government in Beijing, the national unification efforts of the Southern revolutionary government, and the ascendancy of the Chinese Communist Party, with detailed and solid materials researched from domestic and foreign records. Volume 1 covers the period from the early years of the Republic of China to the late 1920s by highlighting: • The passivity and the failure of the Provisional and Beiyang governments in abrogating unequal treaties after the 1911 Revolution

• The struggle for the restoration of China’s sovereignty in Shandong and the repeal of foreign privileges in China at the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Naval Conference • The establishment of new Sino-Soviet relations, CPC-KMT collaboration, and the Southern government’s diplomatic tussle for its share of customs surplus

• The Special Tariff Conference, the Commission on Extraterritoriality, and the separate efforts of the Beiyang and Nationalist governments in treaty revision and abrogation

Wang Jianlang is the President and Dean of the Graduate School at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, specializing in the modern history of China’s foreign relations. He recently served as the Secretary-General of the Association of Chinese Historians. His major works include The International Relations of the Far East from 1937 to 1945 and The Diplomatic Strategy and Foreign Policy of the KMT Government after the Outbreak of the Pacific War.

Chinese Historical Studies