UNEF: The Yugoslav Contingent. Yugoslav Army Contingent in the Sinai Peninsula, 1956-1967 9781915070227

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CONTENTS Acknowledgements2 Abbreviations2 Introduction2 1 2 3 4 5 6

The Creation of UNEF and the Yugoslav Contingent – the “Odred”3 Over the Sea and Far Away: the Odred Arrives in Egypt 7 Deployment to Sinai 13 Inside the Yugoslav Contingent 23 The Six-Day War and the Withdrawal of UNEF 52 Conclusion  59

Bibliography61 Notes61 About the Author

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Helion & Company Limited Unit 8 Amherst Business Centre, Budbrooke Road, Warwick CV34 5WE, England Tel. 01926 499 619   Email: [email protected]   Website: www.helion.co.uk Twitter: @helionbooks   Visit our blog http://blog.helion.co.uk/ Published by Helion & Company 2019 Designed and typeset by Farr out Publications, Wokingham, Berkshire Cover designed by Paul Hewitt, Battlefield Design (www.battlefield-design.co.uk) Printed by Henry Ling Ltd, Dorchester, Dorset Text © Bojan Dimitrijević 2019 Photographs © as individually credited Colour profiles © David Bocquelet & Anderson Subtil 2019 Colour map © Tom Cooper 2019 Every reasonable effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright material. The author and publisher apologize for any errors or omissions in this work, and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprints or editions of this book. ISBN 978-1-915070-22-7 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the express written consent of Helion & Company Limited. For details of other military history titles published by Helion & Company Limited contact the above address, or visit our website: http://www.helion.co.uk. We always welcome receiving book proposals from prospective authors.

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank two gentlemen and well-known Serbian military photographers; Radovan Popović and Zoran Milovanović for allowing the outstanding opportunity to research in the Medija Centar Odbrana of the Serbian MoD Belgrade. Radovan Cukić from the Museum of Yugoslavia in Belgrade for his extraordinary assistance, deputy director Dragana Milunović of the National Library of Serbia for privileges during research in the library depot, and Snežana Jovanović (Serbian MoD) for assistance with official literature. And, to the deputy director of the Croatian State Archive (HDA) in Zagreb, Dr Amir Obhođaš. Finally, to Colonel Goran Petković who kindly helped with the collection of his father, the late Colonel Stojadin Petković, member of the UNEF 1965/66. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank Aleksandar Smiljanić (Serbia) Lieutenant Colonel Matjaž Bizjak, Blaž Torkar (Slovenia) and Steve Zaloga (USA) for allowing the use of photographs from their collections.

ABBREVIATIONS ADL ATU HQ JNA MAP MDAP MP NATO NCO ONUC RCAF RCEME UAR UN UNEF UNTSO UNYOM

Armistice Demarcation Line Air Transport Unit Headquarters Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija / Yugoslav People’s Army Military Assistance Pact Mutual Defence Aid Programme Military Police North Atlantic Treaty Organisation non-commissioned officer United Nations Operation in the Congo Royal Canadian Air Force Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers United Arab Republic United Nations United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation United Nations Yemen Observation Mission

INTRODUCTION During the Cold War, Yugoslavia, lead by its undisputed ruler Marshal Josip Broz Tito, played a much more important part than its real size and power would suggest, mostly thanks to its unique position for much of the Cold War. Such a position was achieved after Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948, siding with the NATO Allies after 1951, and establishing firm ties with so-called Third World states, later known as the Non-Aligned Movement. Being a communist state but not behind the “Iron Curtain”, Tito’s Yugoslavia was sometimes portrayed in the West as a model and example for many developing countries and even more so as a crack in the monolith of the Communist world. With such a reputation, after the Suez Crisis in November 1956 Yugoslavia was welcomed to dispatch a formidable unit to the peacekeeping operation on the Sinai Peninsula. Following its initial steps within the policy of non-alignment, in the middle of the 1950s Tito’s Yugoslavia became involved with Middle Eastern affairs following its proclaimed path of social revolution and national liberation. Such a policy, with some initial offer of economic and military assistance, quickly found a positive

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reception among some Arab states, especially Egypt, and President Nasser and Marshal Tito developed close personal ties in the mid1950s. Tito’s pursuit of this “overseas” policy brought his army to involvement in the aftermath on the Suez Crisis in 1956. Yugoslavia offered a contingent to the United Nations Emergency Force – UNEF – that was formed to secure implementation of the peace agreement between Egypt, Israel and its allies over the Suez Canal and Sinai Peninsula. It was the first such mission for the Yugoslav Army and the first deployment of a communist force equipped with US supplied equipment on a peacekeeping operation. Deployment of the Yugoslav peacekeeping contingent to the Sinai Peninsula became an interesting Cold War episode. Paradoxically, the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s brought UN peacekeeping forces to its shattered and destroyed provinces. After the Yugoslav wars were over, Tito’s peacekeeping efforts attracted new attention in the former Yugoslavian states. It was a reminder of the previous Yugoslav influence in worldwide political matters, their unique “foreign” experience and a possible example for the new former-Yugoslav states and militaries that emerged from the ashes of Tito’s Yugoslavia of how to participate in the contemporary multinational operations. The author had originally researched this subject many years ago, but other subjects became a priority in his work. In autumn 2008, in the Military Archive in Belgrade, he discovered the General Staff Operational Department report in a still restricted part of the Yugoslav Army archive (svežanj 3280, “Izveštaj o formiranju, zadacima i stanju u Odredu JNA u UAR”) which was a summary of the initial deployment of Tito’s Peacekeepers in Sinai. A couple of years later, the author of this volume was invited by the kind people from the Medija Centar Odbrana of the Serbian Ministry of Defence to assist in the preparation of photos for the United Nations web page. It led to the idea for this book. The quantities of photos taken in the initial deployment years of 1956-1958 led the author to conclude that this subject was worth publishing for a wider military history audience. The other “trigger” was the valuable collection of friend and colleague Colonel Goran Petković who provided the author with the photo collection and notes of his father who served with UNEF in 1965-1966 as a lieutenant. Most of this book was based upon original Yugoslav Army archival documents and the contemporary military magazine Narodna armija, which provided regular news on the Odred’s activities in UNEF. In the open section of the Military Archive are several files that contained the facts and figures for the Yugoslav contingent of UNEF in 1956-1967. It is also necessary to mention the work of our two colleagues who have dealt thoroughly with this subject before. First, the work of young professor Aleksandar Životić from Belgrade University, who researched this subject some ten years ago and produced several articles and an outstanding historiographical monograph in 2011. The other is Slovenian colleague Nikola Barzić with his BA thesis from the University of Koper that was written in 2010. Both provided valuable research on this subject. Životić, by researching in the Belgrade based Military Archive and Barzić adding several interviews with notable Yugoslav officers of Slovenian origin that had served with UNEF. It was very helpful to be able to use the United Nations archival sources on its web page which proved fruitful for the general story of UNEF, as well as Sand Dune, a force magazine which was made available by a Brazilian researcher. Our intent is to provide an in-depth and capsulated history of the Yugoslav Army’s engagement in UNEF from 1956 to 1967 and to show its visual appearance: ranging from uniforms to vehicles

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

and equipment, and to provide a general insight to those troubled years in the Middle East. The author hopes that Helion’s readers will find this subject an interesting gem of Middle Eastern and Cold War history.

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THE CREATION OF UNEF AND THE YUGOSLAV CONTINGENT – THE “ODRED” No matter what the war in Sinai in 1956 was called: Suez Crisis, Second Israeli–Arab War or Tripartite Aggression, it was an important milestone in both the history of the Middle East and that of the Cold War. The Israeli attack on Egypt, followed by AngloFrench action to regain control over the nationalised Suez Canal and topple the government of the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser marked the involvement of four superpowers – Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR/Soviet Union) – as well as the United Nations in the affair. It would soon lead to the development of the large UN peacekeeping operation which is the subject of this volume. As a consequence of the entrance of Israeli troops in the Sinai on 29 October and the following military action taken by French and British troops, the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly was held on 4 November 1956. Just after midnight, the Assembly adopted a proposal which had been put forward jointly by Canada, Columbia and Norway, calling for the establishment of a “United Nations Command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities” between Egypt and Israel. This resolution also appointed “on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation [UNTSO], Major general E. L. M. Burns as Chief of the Command.” Out of the 76 countries which at that time were members of the United Nations, 57 voted in favour, none against, and 19 abstained.1 The decision was immediately followed by efforts to organize a temporary interim headquarters of the new force by using the available officers of UNTSO in Jerusalem. This staff took off from Lydda airport on 12 November and proceed to Cairo.2 In marathon political-legal negotiations from 15–18 November, the Egyptian authorities and the UN personnel, headed by SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjold, tackled the terms of the deployment of UNEF on Egyptian soil. President Nasser was most insistent on clarifying the consent issue; UNEF’s length of stay; the areas of deployment of the international force (the administrative line and the Canal Zone); the composition of the contributing countries to the force and their positions toward the conflict; and finally, the overall operational terms of reference of the force.3 The accord hammered out in Cairo became known as the Good Faith Agreement. The principles of the agreement were included in an “Aide-memoire on the basis of the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt.” The aide-memoire was submitted to the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1956. The General Assembly approved the document in Resolution 1121 (XI) on 24 November 1956. The Status of Forces Agreement followed the Good Faith Agreement and was finalized on 8 February 1957. It was made retroactive to the date of the arrival of the first UNEF units in November 1956.4 The name proposed for the international force was not free

of controversy, as Hanny Hilmy suggested. The UN Secretariat suggested the names “Emergency International United Nations Force” for the force and “Chief of Command” for the leader of the troops. The “emergency” description was deliberately used to indicate that the force was deployed to deal with a temporary situation and was not as a permanent occupation force. It was the force’s first commander who suggested the name change to “United Nations Emergency Force”, and also proposed to change his own title from the proposed “Chief of Command” to “Commander”. Both suggestions were adopted by the UN on 8 November 1956.5 The size of the force was to be determined by the Commander in consultation with the Secretary-General and in the light of the functions to be performed. The original estimate by the Force Commander of the manpower needed to perform those tasks was the equivalent of two combat brigades, or about 6,000 men. It was decided that the national contingents should be sufficiently large to be relatively self-contained and that the force should have adequate support units, including a light air-unit. From the point of view of balance, it was desirable that the differences in the size of the units should not be so great as to lead to excessive dependence on any one state.6 UNEF as it was organized bore little relation to the army-corpsdivision-brigade structure as we know it, or to the army, command or area organization. The headquarters of the UNEF was unwieldy for what was virtually a brigade headquarters, but it should be remembered that in many matters it exercised powers normally reserved for higher echelons.7 The first ‘Commander’ of UNEF was the Canadian General E.L.M. Burns. The ‘Egyptian Chief Liaison Officer’ with the international force was General M. Amin Hilmy II.8 General Burns and his group of UNTSO military observers arrived in Cairo on 12 November 1956 and set up a temporary headquarters there.9 Ten participating countries formed the combined strength of UNEF, totalling over 6,000 troops. The countries contributing to UNEF were Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. The first contingents flew to the Egyptian air base in Abu Suweir, near Ismailia in the Canal Zone, on 15-16 November 1956, a mere eight days after the UN General Assembly endorsed the SecretaryGeneral’s second report. On 15 November 1956, at 09:35, a Danish unit of 45 men were flown in while seventy minutes later a group of Norwegians arrived. On 16 November, the first Columbians landed at Abu Suweir and on the following day the advance Yugoslav unit landed. 546 Indians were airlifted into Egypt on 20 November and the first Swedes arrived on 21 November. Initially the UN Force was airlifted by USAF and RCAF airplanes and continued to Egypt using the RCAF and ‘neutral’ Swissair airline. 10 The extent of the area to be covered by UNEF called for highly mobile reconnaissance. This need was met by Yugoslavia, which provided a complete reconnaissance battalion (referred to by Yugoslavs as an “Odred”). Canada later supplied a fully equipped light-armoured squadron. The Indian contingent was given responsibility for the supply depot and the service institute; Canada and India provided units for transport, the Provost Marshal and signals; Norway and Canada covered the medical needs. The Canadian contingent was also made responsible for the ordnance depot and workshop, the base post office, engineering, the dental unit, movement control and air support.11 The strength of 5,601 men was reached on 1 February 1957 after the Brazilian battalion had arrived at Port Said by sea. Contingents from Finland and Indonesia had also previously arrived.12 With the appointment of

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staff officers selected from the participating countries, the UNTSO military observers returned to their normal duties in Jerusalem.13

The UNEF was one of the most remarkable rapid deployment operations. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld began planning on 4 November, anticipating implementation. The General Assembly authorized the force on 5 November and implemented on the 7th of the month. Troops began landing on 15 November. By mid-December, a credible force was in place. UNEF went from a non-existent entity to a military organization on the ground and in contact with hostile forces within forty-five days. UN members showed remarkable cooperation.14 THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE’S ARMY IN THE MID-1950s The later stages of the Second World War saw the Yugoslav Army change its partisan-guerrilla profile and start to become a huge peacetime organisation, with growing Soviet influence and control from the summer of 1945. Despite the fact that the Yugoslav Army was created and intended to be very independent, the Soviet influence started to grow. The turning point in Yugoslavia’s policy after the Second World War occurred in 1948, when the Tito-Stalin dispute came into the

open with the expulsion of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau in June 1948. After the first suspicions as a result of the 1948 conflict, the Allies started to realize that it could be useful to support Yugoslavia, primarily for its military potential. The Military Assistance Pact (MAP) was finally signed between the officials of the Yugoslav and the US governments in Belgrade on 14 November 1951. According to this Pact, Yugoslavia was introduced to the framework of the Mutual Defence Aid Programme (MDAP).15 The equipment deliveries under the MDAP framework enabled the Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA (The Yugoslav People’s Army; the term “People’s” was introduced on 22 December 1951) a qualitative and quantitative growth during the 1950s. The normalisation of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1955 started a process of re-activation in their political, economic and even military contacts. On the other hand, this led to much cooler relations with the West. This process was reflected in the progress of MDAP deliveries which now became much slower and with more delays. Following its initial steps within the policy of non-alignment, in the middle of the 1950s Marshal Tito’s Yugoslavia became involved with the Middle East’s affairs following its proclaimed path of social revolution and national liberation. President Nasser and Marshal Tito developed close personal ties. It is important to note that on 1 November 1956 the Yugoslav Army (JNA) was placed on the highest level of combat readiness following the events in Hungary coupled with the joint British-French attack on Egypt. Most of its combat forces and air force were deployed closer to the Hungarian border and combat units were activated and prepared for defence and to answer any provocation that may have come from the Hungarian or Soviet side. The Yugoslav Air Force maintained its US-built jet fighters in QRA status No. 2. The whole JNA engagement was entitled as “Exercise Tara”.16 The decision to deploy with the UN peacekeeping force in Sinai came during this state of alert.

STRUCTURE AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ODRED

Egyptian President Nasser visited Yugoslavia in 1956. In his honour, Marshal Tito organised a large military parade at Belgrade Airport. (Medija centar Odbrana/MCO)

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The Organisational Depart­ ment of the Yugoslav General Staff (III Department) had difficulties in creating the structure of a unit that was unknown to previous JNA practice. Yugoslav army

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Column of eight M-8 Greyhound armoured vehicles selected for the Yugoslav Odred. (Steve Zaloga Collection)

units were of a classical type, grown from the combination of the organisational experiences of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Partisan Movement practice, post 1945-Soviet influence, and MDAP support since 1951-52. The JNA did not have expeditionary units or any kind of coalition warfare experience. There were no light armoured units (cavalry), or motorised reconnaissance units larger than a reconnaissance company in its structure. On the other side of the equation, UNEF had not previously existed, and there were no patterns or requests that the JNA could follow in this matter. Moreover, JNA planners had only a few days to cope with the organisation of the unit, and the other General Staff departments’ couple of days more to organize the assembling of the unit. It may be concluded that the Yugoslav Army peacekeeping contingent was formed in a great rush in mid-November 1956. The General Staff of the JNA ordered its creation and all necessary steps from 18 November. The HQ of the Fifth Military District in Zagreb was ordered as the gathering point and its staff were tasked to coordinate all necessary steps in organising the peacekeeping unit and providing the men, vehicles and equipment. The First and Seventh Military District (Belgrade and Sarajevo) were each ordered to dispatch a single motorised rifle company for the unit. Upon 21 November, the Odred (as this unit was entitled) was created. It received military unit number VP 6000. In the Yugoslav military parlance of the 1950s an Odred (roughly: detachment) was a tactical unit, usually sized between company and battalion size, with a temporary character. This Odred was a reinforced motorised reconnaissance battalion and that is how it was recognized and titled later while in Sinai within the UNEF. Since it was larger than a regular JNA infantry battalion, featuring many support elements, and because of the specific military-political task, it was commanded by an officer with the rank of colonel. All of these exceptions lead to the term Odred remaining in use throughout its existence. The Odred consisted of:

• HQ and staff unit, • Two motorized rifle companies (1st, 2nd), each consisting of an HQ, two motorised rifle platoons and an armoured car reconnaissance platoon, • Moto-mechanized company (3rd), consisting of HQ, supply section, two motorised rifle platoons and two armoured car platoons, • Recoilless gun company with HQ, staff section and two fire support platoons, • Engineer company, consisting of HQ, supply section, two pioneer platoons and platoon of engineer machines (bulldozer, crane and compressor), • Communications company, consisting of HQ, supply section, radio platoon and telephone line platoon, • Technical and supply company, • Medical platoon, (two sections), • Reconnaissance platoon, (three recce sections), and • Military police platoon, (three MP sections). In total there were seven companies and four platoon sized units.17 Besides these, there was also a small Yugoslav staff cell tasked to join UNEF HQ, which was in the first part of the Odred HQ. The Odred was manned with conscript soldiers and equipped with MDAP supplied vehicles, including armoured reconnaissance vehicles. Ten years later, General Borojević, who was the Odred commander’s aide for moral and political issues, remembered the problems of quickly assembling the troops for the unit: Companies were gathering, soldiers did not know the other soldiers. Commanders did not know their subordinates… Further on we were establishing the platoons, in the break for photographing for necessary documents, delivery of personal weapons and medical examinations, the commander of a company steps out in front of his soldiers, introduced himself, introduced

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Table 1: UNEF Yugoslav Contingent Vehicles upon Arrival in Egypt in 195622 UNIT

VEHICLES

Armoured Vehicles

8 M8 Greyhound, 17 M3A1 White Scout Car

All-terrain Vehicles

27 Willys jeeps, 8 Jeeps with radio station, 7 Dodge 3/4t, 1 Dodge WC-54 ambulance, 6 Dodge 1.5t and 1 Dodge 1.5t with radio station

Lorries

43 GMS CCKW 353 2.5t, 3 GMC 2.5t kipper, 2 GMS 2.5t tanker, 5 GMC 2.5t workshop (radio, electro, mechanics, machine, and locksmith), 1 GMC 2.5t Le Roi compressor, 1 Kenworth/La France (Continental) recovery vehicle, 1 Ford Ham (refrigerator), 1 Federal Tractor Truck with trailer, 1 Corbitt/White crane with trailer

Trailers

20 GMC 1t, 1 bakery and 1 kitchen

Motorcycles

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organisation of the armoured car platoons it was planned that the platoons would have five vehicles with eight soldiers. Actually, nobody in the Ministry or in the General Staff was aware that two seats within the M3A1 vehicles were occupied with the radiostations. It was necessary to quickly add one more vehicle per company.19 The other problem was the operational serviceability of the The soldiers of the Odred were armed as the JNA regular first- vehicles. Most of them were taken out from the so-called “war line infantry. They had 415 M-48 7.9mm rifles (the Yugoslav version reserve” or were from units that had sent their problematic vehicles. of the Mauser 98), 29 M-53 7.9mm machineguns (Yugoslav version None of the 0.50in machine guns mounted on the vehicles was of the MG-42), 160 Soviet PPSh 40 Shpagin sub-machineguns and serviceable, and parts of the equipment or spare parts were missing. 207 Soviet M-33 pistols. For anti-tank purposes there were US It was expected that the Odred would have the best quality vehicles, 60mm Bazookas and M-20 75mm recoilless guns. There were no but it turned out that some JNA units actually used this opportunity to get rid of problematic and incomplete vehicles.20 heavier calibres in the Odred. The most potent weapon of the Odred were M-8 Greyhound The other vehicles included the standard range of Jeeps to armoured cars, known as Blinda. The other type in use was the different ¾t and 1.1/2t Dodges to a fleet of GMC CCKW 353 M3A1 White Scout Car (known as Skautka or Skautkar). In total lorries. The Odred had a number of specialised vehicles such there were eight Greyhounds and 17 Scout Cars within the Odred, as fuel-tankers, dumpers, workshops, a recovery vehicle, crane, all received through MDAP in 1952. The Greyhounds were part of bulldozer and different trailers.21 They were added to the Engineer the two platoons within the 3rd Moto-mechanized Company, and or Technical-supply companies. each of the two Motorised Companies (1st and 2nd) had six White None of the vehicles were specialised for usage in the desert, Scout Cars at their disposal. The Reconnaissance Platoon had three though they were regarded as reliable all-terrain vehicles. This more M3A1s and finally the Technical and Supply Company had belief would turn out to be a problem when they faced intensive two more, which made a fleet of 17 Scout Cars. usage in the desert conditions. A good illustration of the problems in the organisation of the Besides the vehicles, the Odred had taken a quantity of Odred was the “Scout Car problem”. In the preparing of the ammunition, fuel, some spare parts and maintenance tools to Sinai. The other equipment included radios of different frequencies and ranges for communication with Yugoslavia (SCR 300), with the UNEF HQ (MK 2) and among the Odred’s units (SCR 300 and AN/GRC-9), as well as telephones of different kinds (MIP 10, PTI 49) and 12 kilometres of telephone cable. Necessary pioneer equipment and various tools were also included. At the beginning of its deployment, and altogether with the advance party, the Yugoslav Odred had 75 officers, 110 NCOs and 573 soldiers, in total 758 JNA servicemen. Their level of training was different since they came from Soldiers from many different JNA units were selected to join the Odred. (MCO) different units. the platoon commanders stating that they could trust them since they were best in this or that regiment, or that his bravery was witnessed in the previous war. The platoon commanders then had the task to immediately get acquainted with their section commanders and gunners. Especially gunners, since we knew what that particular man meant when all hell broke loose.18

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UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Table 2: Servicemen in Yugoslav Odred within UNEF UNIT

OFFICERS

NCOs

Soldiers

TOTAL:

HQ

31

9

0

40

Staff Unit

1

4

24

29

1 MT Coy

5

11

86

102

2 MT Coy

5

11

86

102

3 MTM Coy

6

14

85

105

Recoilless Gun Coy

4

7

35

42

Engineer Coy

5

12

72

89

Communications Coy

5

15

36

56

Technical-Supply Coy

8

16

93

117

Recce Plt

1

3

17

21

MP Plt

1

6

20

27

Medical Plt

3

2

19

24

TOTAL

75

110

573

758

Members of the Yugoslav Odred were dressed in the standard Yugoslav uniforms. According to the photos, there were no particular differences in their appearance except that the officers were issued with mountain shoes, and that the members had applied the title ‘Yugoslavia’ and the symbol of the UN on the left sleeve of their greatcoats.

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OVER THE SEA AND FAR AWAY: THE ODRED ARRIVES IN EGYPT THE YUGOSLAV VANGUARD ARRIVES Prior to deployment of the Yugoslav Odred, a vanguard was created on 14 November 1956 which was tasked to reach Egypt. The small outfit was manned by 44 men of all ranks led by experienced Colonel Radovan Vojvodić, former Partisan commander and military attaché in London and Athens. Vojvodić was ordered to be the Yugoslav representative within the UNEF HQ in Cairo. Four Douglas C-47s belonging to the 119th Transport Regiment took off during the night of 16 November, and reached Abu Suweir in Egypt, via Athens, on the next day.1 It was a demanding task, since such long over-flights with troops aboard were not routine for Yugoslav Air Force pilots at the time. The Yugoslav pilots were used to flights up to the large US/MDAP Depot at Chatereaux in France, but flights to Egypt were yet to be conquered. The initial party was mostly manned by the men from the Belgrade-based 4th Guards Division and they were greatly surprised to be welcomed at Abu Suweir airport by journalists from all around the world.2

The Odred advance guard being briefed prior to movement, 14-15 November 1956, Topčider barracks, Belgrade. (MCO)

One of the officers issues passports to the soldiers of the Yugoslav advance guard, at Topčider barracks. (MCO)

FAREWELL IN ŠIBENIK, WELCOME IN PORT SAID At midnight on 21 November 1956, the Odred was alerted. The units were gathered, and the column was set up. At 05:00 the column started movement to downtown Zagreb. In the barracks of the 181st Guards Regiment, during the ceremony held at 07:00, ColonelGeneral Rade Hamović, Commander of the Fifth Military District, presented the Odred’s standard to its commander Colonel Nikola Radošević. The Odred was lined up in the barracks. The sight was impressive, especially considering the fact that this was just the

third day since the unit’s creation. After the ceremony, the Odred moved in march column through Zagreb’s streets to Samobor, a small picturesque town at the administrative border with Slovenia and returned back. After lunch, the Odred was loaded into trains at the Zagreb suburb railway station, heading for Šibenik, a harbour on the Adriatic coast.3 The Odred was loaded on to three railway transports, but the movement was hampered by a snow storm during the night in the

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Soldiers are loaded into one of the four C-47 which will take them to Sinai, Belgrade airport, 15 November 1956. (MCO)

Inside one of the C-47s. Yugoslav soldiers with full gear, including the Yugoslav helmets which would never be used in Sinai. (MCO) Šibenik harbour, 24 November 1956: mother and sister say farewell to one of the young Odred soldiers. (MCO)

One of the company commanders boarding Partizanka, being saluted by the Yugoslav Navy Military Police. (MCO)

Lika region.4 It arrived at Šibenik on 22 November 1956, and there it would be loaded onto the waiting merchant ships Partizanka and Triglav from Jadrolinija and Čelik from the Brodospas Company.5 Experienced Captain Ivo Šiševic, who commanded Partizanka, wrote in his diary of the experiences from this unusual voyage. This ship, which belonged to the Jadrolinija Company, was in maintenance at Korčula Island harbour. The captain was alerted on 20 November to sail to Šibenik but was not instructed as to what kind of mission awaited his ship and crew. When Partizanka sailed into Šibenik harbour, the loading of vehicles onto Čelik was already taking place. All of the captains who commanded the three vessels were summoned to the harbour where they, as well as their aids on each

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Colonel Nikola Radošević, commander of the Odred, with his aides prior to boarding Partizanka on 24 November 1956. (MCO)

of their particular ships, were promoted to the ranks of reserve naval officers. Their crews were mobilised, the ships were turned into auxiliary ships of the Yugoslav Navy, and navy flags were hoisted. The commander of the convoy was Commodore Petar Vidan who commanded Galeb, a training ship which had been used by Marshal Tito since 1953 in his overseas voyages. The experienced Vidan was aboard Triglav, commanded by Captain Marjan Pavešić, while Šiševic – promoted to a Navy Reserve Lieutenant was his deputy aboard Partizanka.

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

On 24 November, the loading of the Odred’s personnel started in Šibenik harbour. The vehicles and equipment had been loaded on Čelik the day before and it had sailed immediately – since it was the slowest in the convoy. The dock was crowded with the people gathered to say farewell to the soldiers. Rear Admiral Stanko Parmač, along with chiefs of the local community, was present and Young Pioneers gave flowers to the officers of the Odred. Around 12:30, the first troops started boarding Partizanka and then Triglav. The large light-blue UN flag was hoisted on each of the ships. Finally, at 15:00 Partizanka started its engines and set sail to the sound of the ship-sirens and hails from the crowd. It was followed by Triglav sometime later. At 22:00 they met at the rendezvous point off the mid-Dalmatian islands and continued the journey as a convoy. A north-western wind blew strongly and rocked the ships. Very few of the soldiers had ever experienced sailing aboard ship in the open sea, but it was remarked by the crews that they managed to bear Armed with a Soviet PPSh-41 Shpagin, a Yugoslav solider proudly guards the UN flag that was hoisted aboard Partizanka. (MCO) the difficulties. Later the weather stabilized, the sea became calm, and the ships were “escorted” further by the sun. The route of the Yugoslav convoy passed near to the low-lying Italian coast, passing Brindisi, crossed the Bay of Otranto, and further into the Ionian Sea passed by the Peloponnese and western horns of Crete. Level with Sapienza lighthouse in the Peloponnese, Partizanka and Triglav caught up with Čelik, which had left first from Šibenik. Now, the Yugoslav convoy was complete and continued towards Port Said. Unusually compared to earlier times, this route usually crowded with tankers and merchant ships, was empty due to the conflict in Suez. The only ship that passed the Yugoslav contingent up to Port Said was the French La Marseillaise, surprisingly painted in white with distinctive red crosses, most likely carrying wounded French troops back home. Captain Šiševic wrote Map of the Yugoslav UNEF Odred’s routes to Sinai, late November 1956. (Odred mira) that the appearance of that ship and crew, stating that the forthcoming peacekeeping mission would with red crosses left a serious impression upon the crew. The trip to Egypt was a useful opportunity for everybody in the be fulfilled with success and that the Yugoslav people and Tito could Odred to get to become better acquainted. The personnel were be proud of it. At 07:00 next morning, the lighthouse of Port Said was spotted, assembled from different units from all over Yugoslavia and the voyage was a good opportunity to strengthen their bonds. Days followed by the contour of the harbour and many vessels. Soon, on board were also used to inform the troops of the geopolitical Yugoslav ships were boarded by a British naval officer – a pilot importance of the mission and the role of Yugoslavia in it. On the from minesweeper HMS Aldington – who took them deeper into the crowded harbour.6 The Yugoslav convoy entered a restricted other hand, no one actually knew what the mission would be. On the evening of 28 November, a ceremony to celebrate part of the harbour with Royal Navy and French Navy warships. To Yugoslav Republic Day was organised. The soldiers gathered on the Yugoslav surprise, the masts were adored with Yugoslav naval and deck of Partizanka. After the national anthem, Colonel Borojević, state flags! who was the Odred’s assistant for morale, made a speech, followed Finally, at 10:00 the Yugoslav convoy anchored at Ismail pool, by a party for the soldiers and sailors. On the eve of Republic Day, a at the far periphery of Port Said harbour, and was fenced with telegram was sent to Marshal Tito in front of the whole contingent barbed wire which separated it from the rest of the city. 7 A boat

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Fully loaded with Odred troops, Partizanka is near ready to start sailing for Egypt. (MCO)

Triglav seen after entry into Port Said harbour on 29 November 1956. (MCO)

Odred vehicles unloaded from Triglav waiting at Port Said harbour. (MCO)

10

was brought down from Triglav to ferry Canadian General E.L.M. Burns, the commander of UNEF, to the ship, where he met the commander of the Yugoslav Odred Colonel Radošević. Debarkation of the Yugoslav Odred took four days. In the beginning, the local workers were only allowed to work up to 15:00 due to the curfew at 17:00, but due to the urgency, it was allowed that the unloading could be continued without stopping. The Yugoslav troops were also engaged in the continuous work. The stubborn attitude of the Yugoslavs not to ask for help from the Royal Navy was soon to change. Since British cranes were the only means to unload the armoured vehicles, they were asked to allow that their cranes be used for unloading of the heaviest vehicles aboard Čelik. The Yugoslavs soon discovered that Port Said was held by British troops and that the other side, Port Fuad over the channel, was held by the Foreign Legion and other French troops. Almost everything was closed, and the locals were hardly to be seen. Generally, the locals showed a positive attitude toward the Yugoslavs, many repeating the slogan “Nasser-Tito!”8 In the meantime, the Yugoslavs made contact and exchanged visits with the Norwegian-Danish battalion. The British and French military authorities maintained a belligerent standpoint towards them, however, and they complained about the Yugoslavs still wearing the red stars on their caps and not the UN markings. They also prevented journalists from visiting the area where the Yugoslav contingent was, totally in contrast to the Yugoslav political wish that its Odred in UNEF should be well publicised.9

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Colonel Radošević with his aides passing by a Corbit-White (Brockway) Crane and Federal tractor-truck, Port Said harbour. (MCO)

movement. It was an impressive sight: over 170 different vehicles, from armoured cars to ambulances and workshops, the column extended for almost five kilometres.11 The Yugoslav Odred proceeded on the highway which followed the Suez Canal to el-Balah, where the first camp would be. They noted the positions of the British troops on the west side of the road and the British organised checkpoints where they would count Yugoslav vehicles and troops. The first stop was Al Qantarah. In the vicinity, the Yugoslavs were able to see

The column of Odred vehicles seen leaving Port Sad harbour, carefully observed by British servicemen on 3 December 1956. (MCO)

A Dodge 1.1/2t and M3A1 Scout Car being transferred from Triglav to the shore. (MCO)

THE MOVE TO EL-BALAH UNEF’s primary function was the creation of a buffer or a “neutral zone” separating the Arabs and the Israelis. In a letter dated 1 December, the representative of Israel advised the SecretaryGeneral that on the morning of 3 December, Israeli forces would be removed from a wide belt of territory (about 50 kilometres) in proximity to the Suez Canal along its entire length. Elements of UNEF immediately entered the evacuated area.10 The Yugoslav troops left their ships in the early morning of 3 December. After a short inspection by Colonel Radošević, the soldiers boarded their vehicles which were already at the harbour. At 09:00, headed by the commanding personnel, the Odred started its

Following the Suez Canal, the Yugoslav Odred headed towards el-Balah, 3 December 1956. Here we see a Corbit-White Crane and a Federal truck. (MCO)

the demarcation line with Israeli forces where the Indian UNEF contingent was already deployed. The Yugoslavs continued on to territory held by the Egyptian Army. Here they were cheered by the locals with inevitable shouts of “Nasser-Tito!” In the afternoon, Yugoslav troops entered camp in el-Balah, which was already guarded by troops from the Yugoslav vanguard and Colonel Vojvodić.12

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

The head of the Odred column passes a British Military Police patrol on its way to el-Balah. (MCO)

At el-Balah, the Yugoslav Odred became a definitive part of the UNEF: it was subordinated to the HQ and included into the system of the central logistic base of the mission. Although all contingents were requested to arrive with supplies to cover the first two weeks in Egypt, only the Canadian and Yugoslav troops were self-sufficient in their first days on the ground.13 The el-Balah camp was constructed during the Second World War by British and ANZAC troops and used after the war by the Egyptian Army until the 1956 war. The Yugoslavs were unpleasantly surprised to see that the accommodation in el-Balah is far from what they expected, though since they were ordered to advance further into Sinai, there were not too many complaints.14 On 12 December, UNEF HQ was moved from Garden City in Cairo to el-Balah.15 Commander of the UNEF General Burns arrived that same afternoon to visit the Yugoslav Odred and issued further orders. The Odred was tasked to monitor the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Al Qantarah to el-Arish on the north Sinai coast, and from Ismailia to el-Auya in central Sinai. On the next day, 4 December, 1st and 3rd Yugoslav companies returned to Al Qantarah and proceeded over to Sinai with the assigned task.16 The other unit

The view of this Scout Car reveals that the Yugoslav Odred was issued with blue helmets in Port Said, though at that point, no one among the soldiers was wearing them. (MCO)

crossed the Suez Canal and continued to the centre of Sinai. On 7 December, the UNEF HQ ordered that the Yugoslav Odred should send the third group over the Suez Canal towards the Mitla Pass and further on to the demarcation line.

UNEF Commander Canadian General Burns, most likely in one of the earliest visits to the Yugoslav Odred, inspects the honorary company, December 1956. (Muzej Jugoslavije/MJ)

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UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

3

DEPLOYMENT TO SINAI DASH TO DESERT UNCERTAINTY The Yugoslav contingent received the difficult task of entering the Sinai Peninsula just after the retreating Israeli forces and to reach the demarcation lines. At that moment, the other parts of UNEF were in Port Said in the process of arrival, while the Indian Battalion was deployed west of the Canal as a buffer between the Israelis and Egyptians. Since the Yugoslav Odred was the largest fully motorised unit, it received the most important task.1 The orders of the UNEF commander were clear in general. However, nobody in UNEF knew anything about the positions of the Israeli troops, the status of the roads – possibly destroyed – or the location of any minefields expected. The commander of the Odred accepted Burns’ orders without any complaint and in military fashion, as if it was from any superior JNA HQ. It was soon to be discovered that the task was more than demanding. The Yugoslavs were preoccupied and impressed by the fact that they were in a foreign land, in the desert, and in a real war zone. They had no experience of any foreign operations and surely none of desert operations whatsoever.2 Ten years later, Colonel Radošević relived some of the initial experiences of the Sinai dash: The movement through the desert was slow. We did not have documentation on minefields, and we had mines in front of us. Two companies advanced on one way, replacing each other… In general, every metre of our advance was covered by the Yugoslav and worldwide press. I would like to say that the company commanders Ahmed Dedić, Djuro Klarić, Dragutin Srbobran, Sreten Stankić… were bold and professional commanders of their companies. Engineers were deployed in separate platoons as the forerunners of each column, in combat order, making the way through minefields and recovering the desert roads. A Scout Car company [was] on the move… Dedić [commander] – constantly in the vehicles, mostly in the one which is in the front. When the company stopped, he was among soldiers. There he slept, ate, sat near the fire, lived with the company. That is why the men loved him. And when he reported that his company was ready for movement and that the assignment was clear to him, you knew that besides those words was material fact: men, weapons, and conciseness. They competed for who would reach a certain perimeter, which would discover or disarm more land mines. Even a cook, who was a private, during the breaks, joined the pioneers and took eight anti-tank mines in one day. 3

The dash to Sinai during the early days of December 1956 was heavy going: Yugoslav Willys Jeeps stuck in the sand. (MCO)

Yugoslav Odred vehicles stuck in the sand 4-5 December 1956. (MCO)

The companies which headed into the Sinai desert discovered that the advance was a serious challenge. Soon after the movement began, they faced destroyed bridges and communications, and mine fields. The commander of the 3rd Company, which advanced into Sinai on 4-6 December, Captain Dedić wrote: … Column moves very slowly, since there are a lot of holes on the road. On the right side of the road we have discovered the minefields with barbed wire. On the 14th kilometre – the road is totally destroyed… On the left side of the road are railway tracks. On the junctions the tracks were torn apart… Until 17:00 we have advanced barely five kilometres. On the second kilometre, a GMC and “Blinda” (M-8) remained stuck. Wheels turned around in a single place, digging the vehicles deeper and deeper,

Company commanders confer with Colonel Radošević, in the light overcoat, on the matter of further advance during a sandstorm. (MCO)

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

throwing the clouds of sand behind. Vehicles moved forward when the soldiers started to push ...

Dedić’s company was accompanied by Major Muller from General Burns’ HQ. He warned Dedić to stop, but the Yugoslav captain remained firm in his decision to reach Gilbane, which finally, at 19:00 hours, the company entered. The Yugoslav soldiers were surprised: there were no traces of the village except for a halfburned road sign! The whole settlement was destroyed. Dedić continues: Dry rations for dinner, too. Accommodation: vehicles and nearby sand. Captain Grgić secures the perimeter with guards and patrols. Major Muller leaves us to report to General Burns that he is satisfied with our advance. Troops caught a nap around 21:00 hours. Guards and patrols are on their dispositions. The officers and photo-reporter of Narodna armija, Lieutenant Duško Radašinovic gathered their rations and dined together with appetite, exchanging the experiences from the previous day.4

Seeing his soldiers sleeping near the vehicles, Dedić ordered his quartermaster to share 20 more blankets for soldiers and all the drivers’ coats for those who were on watch. The severe cold of the night was another surprise for the Yugoslavs. On the morning of 5 December, the 3rd Company continued its advance towards the village and small railway station of Balluza which was 12 kilometres from their night bivouac. Sand drifts and mine fields were around, and the maps that they had received were almost useless due to the movements of the sand. The company managed to reach three kilometres in front of Balluza, and around 28 kilometres from Al Qantarah. Dedić reported to the Odred commander on the day’s achievements and received the order to stop any further advance until next daylight. The soldiers dig their beds deeply in the sand so that it would be warmer. The armoured platoon made tents from their tarpaulins between the vehicles. They welcomed the other soldiers who managed to flock in such tents. The rations of for the next day arrived. It was cooked food. Quartermasters have sent timber, which we brought from Yugoslavia. Fuel-tanks with water and gasoline also arrived. Cooks started to improvise the field kitchen. Soldiers had eaten their last dry ration before… The officers were ordered to sleep in the back of one GMC lorry…

On 6 December, the Yugoslav company continued its advance, but it was much heavier going than anybody could imagine; in the first three hours of movement only a kilometre was covered. The company continued until reaching its 29th kilometre of movement. Captain Dedić ordered a halt for a short break and meal. Soon the Odred commander ordered that the company should stop until further orders were received. The engineers destroyed piles of landmines discovered and dug-out. Captain Stankić, who commanded the Engineer Company took one example of each – most of them totally unknown in Yugoslav practice – of British, Czech or Israeli origin. No orders were sent to the company on the morning of 7 December. After some journalists visited the company, around 12:00 Colonel Radošević arrived with his aides. They went some two kilometres further on though this was very difficult. Radošević remarked that the movement was an achievement indeed. He ordered that company personnel should be replaced and taken back

14

A platoon of Scout Cars on the advance. (MCO)

Most of the desert roads were covered with mines. Seen here in the early phase of initial deployment of the Odred in Saini, Yugoslav pioneers search the road. (MJ)

The Israeli Air Force observed the movement of the UNEF forces over Sinai, which sometimes made Yugoslav troops tense. (Author Collection / AC)

to el-Balah for a short leave, while the vehicles were taken over by the personnel of another company, who proceeded with the advance. The replacements did not arrive until 8 December, the company with the pioneers of Captain Stankić collected land mines and destroyed around 40 of them. On 10 December, General Burns arrived on the perimeter held by the Yugoslav 3rd Company. Captain Dedić was sent from elBalah to welcome the UNEF commander. Around 11:30, General Burns with colonels Radošević and Vojvodić and aides from both HQs arrived. After examining the situation, Burns also concluded that further advance was almost impossible. They were followed by journalists from different press agencies worldwide.5 After the guests left the Yugoslav company which was stuck in the sand, Captain Dedić arrived at the idea that the advance could be continued by using the nearby railroad. He ordered that soldiers mount one GMC lorry and an M-8 armoured car on it. No matter the tremendous shaking while driving over the railway thresholds it was the only possible way to continue the advance. However, the

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

commander of the Odred did not approve such an advance, and nor did General Burns. Another problem was how the company would receive food, water and other supplies if it continued further. After two days of discussion in el-Balah camp, the order was given that the Yugoslavs should move forward. The commanders of the 3rd and Engineer Company returned to the desert and the engineers went forward pouring sand over the railway thresholds. They were followed by the armoured cars and lorries of the company at Colonel Radošević with his aides inspecting the advance of the Odred companies. (MCO) a speed of three kilometres per hour. “So, it is possible!” concluded Captain Dedić in his diary.6 On 11 December, Israel announced that it was ready to make a further withdrawal of troops in the Sinai Peninsula in order to enable UNEF to extend its occupation eastward.7 The third Yugoslav party headed towards the Mitla Pass and further east on the 9 December. It managed to advance some 30 kilometres up to the pass. The Israelis destroyed the roads and made this advance difficult and vehicles only slowly moved further.8 The Egyptians were mostly interested that UNEF’s Yugoslav troops should also be deployed towards at-Tur on the Men of the 3rd Company taking a sleep in the desert near their M-8 armoured cars. (MCO) south-western coast of Sinai and were afraid that the Israelis may destroy their oil fields in that area. The Egyptians contacted General Burns met with General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli the Yugoslavs on this matter, while General Burns did not have commander, on the morning of 16 December. They agreed on instructions from New York or even knowledge of the situation in specific arrangements for a first phase of withdrawal, and UNEF that area. The approval was granted on the next day, so the Yugoslav troops moved forward to within five kilometres of the new Israeli Odred dispatched a fourth unit towards at-Tur. Along this route, positions. Regarding further withdrawals, General Dayan informed Yugoslav troops reached the area of Sudr/Ras Sedr on 13 December, the UNEF commander that, according to his instructions, the an advance of some 50 kilometres.9 Israeli forces were to withdraw from the remainder of the Sinai at It was a heavy burden on the Odred’s capabilities, as the Odred an approximate rate of 25 kilometres each week during the next four HQ was not able to deploy a sufficient number of troops along weeks. This plan was considered by General Burns to be inadequate. every one of the requested routes. The Odred HQ soon reached Consequently, at his request, a new withdrawal proposal was the conclusion that its main orientation should be in the northern submitted by the Israeli Government on 21 December. The new direction, which was much preferable for the Yugoslavs.10 Following proposal envisaged that the remaining Israeli withdrawal would take this course, the Yugoslavs made a 40 kilometre advance up to 12 place in two phases. The second phase would involve a full Israeli December. Here the advance was equal to the withdrawal of the withdrawal behind the armistice lines at an unspecified date.12 Israeli troops: as the Israelis were going back towards the demarcation On 22 December 1956, the British and French forces abandoned line, the Yugoslavs were able to make further advances. On 13 Port Said. On the next day, 23 December, the UNEF forces were December the advance was stopped, since the further withdrawal of redeployed. The Yugoslav contingent was ordered to concentrate Israeli forces would have to be negotiated.11 on the “northern course” and to abandon the three courses in the

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

Sinai Peninsula. The Yugoslavs were replaced with other UNEF contingents and they now concentrated on the much easier path in the north of the Sinai. It may be considered as a kind of reward for the first phase of deployment where the Yugoslavs played a crucial part and opened the roads deeper in Sinai Peninsula without any losses in personnel or equipment.13 During 23-24 December, the Odred was transferred from Al Qantarah to el-Arish. It enabled better communication and logistical support to the parts of the Odred in the advance. The road between the 10th and 93rd kilometre from the Suez Canal was totally destroyed, so the Yugoslavs were forced to advance through the desert. A total of 26 minefields were discovered in the area and which were de-mined or bypassed. At the 89th kilometre from the Suez Canal, Yugoslavs managed to extract 53 mines from a single minefield. Yugoslav troops advanced the whole distance of the agreed 25 kilometres in just one day, and then waited for another six days to continue their advance. They followed the Israeli forces step-by-step.14

INTO EL-ARISH

Further withdrawal of Israeli forces took place on 7 and 8 January 1957 to a north-south line roughly following meridian 33 degrees, 44 minutes, leaving no Israeli forces west of el-Arish. On 15 January, the Israeli forces withdrew eastward for another 25 to 30 kilometres, except in the area of Sharm el Sheikh, “the strip on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba which at present ensures freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf ”. This phase involved the entry into el-Arish and St. Catherine’s Monastery of the United Nations Emergency Force, which had closely followed the withdrawing Israeli troops.15 On 1 January 1957, Yugoslav spearheads reached the former railway station of Mazzar, some 110 kilometres from Al Qantarah. They set up a temporary camp, waiting for further orders for the advance to el-Arish.16 On the 12 January 1957, the Yugoslav Odred was ordered to enter the city of el-Arish. After some preparations, the whole Yugoslav Odred moved on 14 January from the railway station at el-Bardawil and entered into el-Arish on 15 January. On the same morning the last Israeli units withdrew further east, after 75 days in the city. Local inhabitants gathered on the main street and spontaneously gave a tremendous welcome to Tito’s soldiers. They mobbed the vehicles shouting slogans and hails to Nasser and Tito. Children mounted the vehicles and women standing aside made a ‘strange warble sound’.17 The situation was chaotic, but the Yugoslavs enjoyed such a welcome. They managed to establish control over the town and calm down the euphoria, until the arrival of the Egyptian police on the next day.18 Entry to el-Arish was an important step in the whole UNEF mission, and The Yugoslav Odred advances towards el-Arish, January 1957. Its commander, Colonel Radošević, is in one the jeeps generally regarded by the at the head of the column. (MCO) Yugoslavs as a success after the extended advance from the Suez Canal through the desert with the main road completely destroyed. Further advances towards Gaza would be much easier since the road was not destroyed, and the surrounding area was not as severe. In his study of the Yugoslav Odred at Sinai, Aleksandar Životić suggests that this warm welcome was not liked by General Burns. So, after the events in el-Arish, UNEF HQ decided to switch the Yugoslav Odred away from the northern course and into central Sinai. Since the Odred was motorised it was also expected that the Yugoslavs would cope with the rough terrain much better War-torn Sinai settlements were everywhere. Here, M-8 armoured car No 4210 passes a destroyed Sinai town while than other contingents. The heading for el-Arish. (MCO) commander and the HQ of the

16

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

The UN flag hoisted on a GMC lorry at the back of a column seen advancing to the el-Arish, early January 1957. (MCO)

During the advance to el-Arish, a column reached the Mediterranean. Here, cheerful Yugoslavs wash their jeep in the sea. (MCO)

Yugoslav Odred accepted Burns’ order with discipline, although aware of the hardships in front of them.19 On the northern course they were replaced by Norwegian-Danish and Colombian battalions which remained in reserve in el-Arish, and from 20 January by the Swedish battalion which continued to advance towards Gaza. South from the Yugoslav Odred was an Indonesian battalion, and much further south towards Sham el-Sheik, was an Indian contingent. A Brazilian battalion and Finnish company remained in the area of the

Suez Canal.20 Only the 1st Company remained with the rear of the Odred in el-Balah. After the talks with General Burns, the Yugoslavs soon discovered that they had to reach the border between Egypt and Israel and establish control over a much wider area than was expected. The Yugoslav Odred was stretched over almost all of the desert border.21 The area which was allotted to the Yugoslavs was the most difficult in Sinai, two of the existing roads were destroyed, unmarked minefields were almost everywhere. The Yugoslav Odred was ordered to patrol not just in the border area, but in the depth of the territory, regardless of destroyed roads. On one of those desert paths two Yugoslav lieutenants were severely injured when their 3/4ton Dodge was destroyed by an antitank mine.22 The mine was set up some time prior to the arrival of the vehicles and the path lead to the border with Israel.23 The commander of the Odred and its staff were ill disposed towards the current position. The Odred had a difficult burden; establishing and maintaining the posts on the border, patrolling over insecure terrain with destroyed communications, with additional tasks given to its Engineer Company to de-mine the area of el-Arish and maintain the northern communication. The Odred HQ officially protested, pointing out that the Odred was the only UN contingent with four different tasks at that time and that the written orders were in discordance with the orders given by General Burns when he visited the Odred in el-Arish on 19 January 1957. The complains were transferred by Colonel Vojvodić to the UNEF Chief of Staff, Swedish Colonel Lundquist and later to General Burns.24 The response from UNEF HQ insisted on the previous orders, stressing the importance of the patrols in the border area.25

THE PROBLEM OF GAZA AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE YUGOSLAV 3rd COMPANY

After the UNEF forces entered el-Arish and reached the border and Armistice Demarcation Line, there were no further advances of the UNEF forces towards Gaza. There was standstill until the further political negotiations. The Gaza strip is about 40 miles long and about five miles wide. It is bounded by Israel on the north and east, by the Mediterranean on the west and by the Sinai district of Egypt on the south. It is a part of the old Palestine, placed under Egyptian administration because of the thousands of Arab refugees who steamed into this area as a result of the war between Israel and the Arab nations in 1948. Its boundaries are defined by a narrow ditch, but these have never been accepted by Egypt as the very existence of Israel was denied by the Egyptian authorities.26 On 2 February 1957, the General Assembly, after receiving the SecretaryGeneral’s report, adopted two resolutions. Resolution 1124 (XI), deplored the failure of Israel to complete Local inhabitants of el-Arish warmly greeted the Yugoslav Odred, 15 January 1957. (MCO) its withdrawal behind the

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Armoured vehicles of 3rd Moto-mechanized Company in Gaza Strip, 6-8 March 1957. (MCO)

18

Armistice Demarcation Line and called upon it to do so without delay. With resolution 1125 (XI), the Assembly, recognizing that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions which required the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line.27 On 1 March, the Foreign Minister of Israel announced in the General Assembly the decision of their Government to act in compliance with the request contained in Assembly Resolution 1124 (XI) to withdraw behind the Armistice Demarcation Line. The same day, the Secretary-General instructed the Commander of UNEF as a matter of utmost urgency to arrange for a meeting with the Commanderin-Chief of the Israeli forces in order to agree with him on arrangements for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israel in accordance with the Assembly’s decision. On 4 March, the declaration of 1 March was confirmed by the Israeli Government. The same day, General Burns met at Lydda with General Dayan. Technical arrangements were agreed upon for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the entry of UNEF troops into the Gaza Strip during the hours of curfew on the night of 6-7 March. Agreement was also reached for a similar takeover of the Sharm el Sheikh area on 8 March. 28 Following those political decisions, the UNEF forces started to prepare to enter Gaza. Norwegian-Danish, Swedish, Columbian and Indian battalions were ordered for this operation.29 The Yugoslav contingent remained on the previous assignment, but its area of responsibility was widened in the north all the way to the Mediterranean, reaching thus a total of 100 kilometres.

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

They replaced Danish and Swedish units, which were ordered to Rafah and further into Gaza. The Yugoslav Odred, which in the meantime had established its HQ in the camp east of el-Arish, also received the task of guarding all UNEF posts around el-Arish. Such a disposition remained a burden for the Odred. Its HQ had a difficult task just to organize regular supply of water to the units sometimes over 70 kilometres away from its main base.30 For the operations towards Gaza, Colonel Lundquist ordered that the Odred should provide its 3rd Motomechanized Company as the UNEF HQ’s mobile reserve and 15 lorries with trailers for the transport of the Indian battalion. No matter the Yugoslav complaints, the designated company was removed from previous positions and remained in the base for a short rest.31 Then, the Yugoslav company moved up to Dahr Al Balah, passing columns of refugees. In that eastern Gaza suburb, the Yugoslavs met Swedish troops who established their camp.32 On 6 March, the operation was carried out according to plan and without incident. By 04:00 hours, all Israelis had withdrawn from the Strip with the exception of an Israeli unit at Rafah Camp. By agreement, that last Israeli element was to be withdrawn at 16:00 hours on 8 March (and full withdrawal from the Sharm el Sheikh area would take effect at the same time). These withdrawals took place as agreed and thus the Secretary-General was able to report to the General Assembly on 8 March 1957 full compliance with its resolution 1124 (XI) of 2 February 1957. As of 8 March 1957, UNEF was deployed on the western side of the Armistice Demarcation Line along the Gaza Strip, along the International Frontier between the Sinai and Israel, as The 3rd Moto-mechanized Company enters Gaza, 8 March 1957. (MCO)

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at the – mostly – Scandinavian UNEF forces. The later were forced to make use of gas and live ammunition – fired over the heads of protesters – to restore order. The Yugoslav company was rushed back to re-enter Gaza and the situation calmed down: it remained there until withdrawn on 16 March 1957.35 It was immediately apparent that an Egyptian administrative presence would be necessary to maintain calm in Gaza.36 It was time to summarize the experiences from initial deployment. In the first six months the Yugoslav Odred made an advance of around 200 kilometres of desert; it repaired or made useful again around 170 kilometres of desert roads; and its vehicles logged some 675,000 kilometres and used 225,000 litres of fuel. Moreover, the unit de-mined around 25 minefields, taking out about 800 different mines in the process.37 Generally it was a great success for the Yugoslav Odred, which arrived in the theatre without any kind of international or desert warfare experience. Three wounded servicemen and a couple of damaged vehicles was the price paid for obtaining this initial experience. Every other contingent (smena or shift, rotation – in the Yugoslav military parlance) would have a much easier task. Locals in Gaza cheering the Yugoslav peacekeepers during their entry to the city. (MCO)

well as in the Sharm el Sheikh area.33 After the UNEF forces entered Gaza, spontaneous demonstrations occurred in the city to celebrate the Israeli forces’ withdrawal. The UNEF HQ became very concerned that this massive gathering should not become an uncontrolled incident. The Yugoslav 3rd Company was alerted to intervene in the city. The Odred’s HQ approved the orders but stressed to the company commander to avoid any kind of clash with the civilian population, and even to refuse orders if they were given to engage against the civilians.34 The situation from el-Arish was repeated; the Yugoslav company was welcomed by the gathered masses who started to shout proNasser-Tito slogans when they discovered that the soldiers were from Yugoslavia. The situation in Gaza calmed down, and the Yugoslavs started to withdraw from the city. But, after the Yugoslavs went away, the locals started to gather again and now showed anger

20

TOWARDS REGULAR PEACEKEEPING DUTIES

When the UNEF forces entered the Gaza Strip and reached the Armistice Demarcation Line, the general pattern of carrying out regular tasks started to change. Since the UNEF troops had reached all of the designated perimeters, now the tasks became oriented to guarding the outposts, patrolling and observing the International Frontier and Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL). Now UNEF troops could have a break, and possibility turn to a much-relaxed daily life, including some sports or leisure activities. Daily life for the UNEF contingents, including the Yugoslav, became much easier than in the first four to five months of deployment. After the completion of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Egyptian territory, the main objective of UNEF was to supervise the cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. Its basic functions were to act as an informal buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces along the ADL and the International Frontier in order to

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Map of the Yugoslav Odred advance from December 1956 to March 1958. (Odred mira)

Colonel Radošević gives orders for further advance in Sinai, alongside the International Frontier. (MCO) Yugoslav medical team with its Dodge WC 54 ambulance supports an exchange of prisoners. (MCO)

avoid incidents, prevent illegal crossings of the line by civilians of either side for whatever purposes, and to observe and report on all violations of the line whether on land, sea or in the air. To perform these functions, UNEF troops were deployed on the western side of the ADL and the International Frontier, covering a distance of 273 kilometres. The Sinai coast, from the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba to the Strait of Tiran, a further distance of 187 kilometres, would be kept under observation by UNEF air reconnaissance.38

THE SECOND SHIFT ARRIVES At the farewell ceremony of the 1st Contingent – or shift – of the Yugoslav Odred, General Burns praised the Yugoslav soldiers. The

An M-8 armoured car being pushed through the sand dunes by the crew and other soldiers during the advance to the International Frontier. (MCO)

21

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

A column of M3A1 Scout Cars stuck in the sand during the advance to the International Frontier. (MJ)

Although deployed for possible fire support, the Recoilless Gun Company found itself without a purpose. It was deployed by platoons with other companies. (MCO)

One of the initial watch-posts of the Yugoslav Odred somewhere on the ADL in spring 1957. (Aleksandar Smiljanić collection) The 2nd Contingent seen in Rijeka harbour. Soldiers are checked by Military Police prior to sailing to Egypt. (MCO)

Colonel Radošević issues the orders to his company and the independent platoon commanders, spring 1957. (MCO)

general mentioned that he had a chance to see Yugoslav volunteers in the First World War and praised their combat capabilities. He made comparisons with Yugoslav UNEF troops, saying that they were like their fathers and grandfathers: excellent soldiers and they proved it again in Sinai. The UNEF magazine Sand Dune also praised the first Yugoslav contingent by listing its exploits from Suez, over the Mitla Pass, and el-Arish to Gaza.39 The 2nd Contingent, or shift, arrived in May 1957. It was remarked that their soldiers acclimatised quickly and easily to summer daily temperatures between 40 and 60°c.40 Up to autumn 1957, Yugoslav engineers had worked alongside Indian, Brazilian,

22

The second shift arrives in el-Arish camp in May 1957. (AC)

The handover between two contingents at a desert outpost. (MCO, AC)

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Exchange between 1st (left) and 2nd (right) contingents at the railway station in Port Said. Colonel Radošević – in summer uniform – speaks to his soldiers. (AC)

deployed on the International Frontier from Rafah to Sharm el Sheikh alongside the Canadian contingent.43 The 1st Motorized Company controlled some 80 kilometres of the border. It set up the observation posts at the positions marked as tt. 267 and tt. 449, a one-hour jeep ride or 20 kilometres away from each other, and sent patrols towards el-Kuila and el-Batur.44 The 2nd Company took over the positions around el-Auya, a totally destroyed settlement which remained on Israeli territory. This position was some 100 kilometres away from the base at el-Arish, passing the destroyed settlement of Abu Ugeyla where a lot of abandoned Egyptian vehicles and military equipment were scattered in the desert. This company controlled some 80 kilometres of the International Frontier using a system of patrols. The company camp was surrounded with minefields which were later marked by Yugoslav soldiers. Platoons were in separated camps, such as el-Sabha. Some 100 kilometres to the south were an Indonesian contingent. The patrols and platoon commanders met on a daily basis.45

4

INSIDE THE YUGOSLAV CONTINGENT GUARDING THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The 1st Contingent arrives in the homeland, seen here after disembarking from the ship Yugoslavia. (MCO)

A commander of the 2nd Contingent gives orders to his company and platoon commanders, May-June 1957. (MCO)

Canadian and Swedish pioneers but the mines remained a problem for movement alongside the International Frontier and deeper in Sinai. There were mines not just from the 1956 campaign, but also those which were laid in the war of 1947-48. Yugoslav engineers had to cope with different types mines, made of all kind of materials, most of them unfamiliar. Some of them remained marked to be avoided by the UN troops or locals, but there were many which were not. It made all movements very difficult.41 In the region of Gaza, during the summer of 1957, the Yugoslav Recoilless Gun Company took over the observation posts and checkpoints. This was the area where most incidents occurred. Here, both sides were populated: on the Egyptian side were shepherds with their goats and sheep, and on the Israeli side peasants and workers from kibbutz. 42 In mid-1957, Yugoslav companies of the 2nd Contingent were

The period after initial deployment in the summer of 1957 led to mainly static duties for the UNEF in general, not just the Yugoslav Odred. The prime task was guarding the ADL and international border to prevent any incidents between the two warring parties of 1956. Rules of engagement were strict. In the performance of their duties, UNEF soldiers were not authorized to use force except in self-defence. They were never to take the initiative in the use of force but could respond with fire to an armed attack upon them. UNEF maintained close liaison with the two parties, particularly with the Egyptian authorities as representatives of the host government. 1 To guard the peace between Egypt and Israel the UNEF developed a system of observation posts, patrols and ambushes created by General Burns and his HQ. In addition to ground observers, the entire length of the International Frontier was also patrolled by reconnaissance aircraft on a daily basis, later reduced to three times a week. Any suspicious activity seen from the air could be checked by ground patrols dispatched from the outposts. The Yugoslav Odred also adopted these methods for guarding the peace in Sinai. 2 Being a member of the Military Police Company, General Marjan Kranjc who served as young Military Police lieutenant in the 12th Contingent in 1962, wrote that the he and his policemen took part in aerial control of the border and Sinai, together with his Canadian MP superiors from UNEF HQ. “Aerial control was really effective, since from the air it was possible to see each step in the sand.” He noted that Israeli commandos who intruded into Sinai used to wipe their traces in sand.3 A Canadian officer who was part of UNEF in 1958 regarded guarding the armistice line as “boring”, adding: “There were no major incidents to the best of my knowledge during the year I was there. Men would sit in observation posts, training their binoculars on Israel. Occasionally a few sheep would violate the border. Troops were rotated frequently...” UNEF enjoyed full freedom of movement in the Gaza Strip and between the Sinai posts, UNEF headquarters and the units deployed along the Armistice Demarcation Line. This

23

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

A Yugoslav patrol in a destroyed Sinai village in early 1957. (MCO)

An armoured reconnaissance platoon seen during a patrol, late 1957 or early 1958. (MCO)

By the beginning of the 1960s, new types of vehicles were being used by the Yugoslavs such as Canadian produced M-38 jeeps and British Land Rovers. (MCO)

A Yugoslav patrol consisting of a Scout Car and two 1.½ ton Dodges. The vehicle in the middle had not been repainted in white. Sinai 1958-59. (RJ)

included freedom of flight over the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip for UNEF aircraft, as well as the manning of Gaza airport by UNEF. 4 The activities carried out by UNEF following its deployment along the Armistice Demarcation Line and the International Frontier, and the methods followed in this regard, remained virtually unchanged until the withdrawal of the force in May 1967.

24

Jeep patrols remained standard the practice of securing the International Frontier. Here the patrol of consisted of M-151 jeeps. Mid-1964. (MJ)

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Its area of operations, which had been one of the most disturbed areas in the Middle East, became remarkably quiet. Incidents, such as crossings of the ADL/International Frontier, firing across the line and air violations, naturally continued to occur, but they were relatively infrequent and generally of a minor nature. Virtually uninterrupted peace prevailed in the area, thanks to the presence and activities of UNEF. 5

UNEF CONTINGENTS After the initial deployment the headquarters of UNEF was located in Gaza, while the headquarters of the maintenance area was housed in an old British Army Camp at Rafah. The RCAF air transport unit was based at el-Arish. Staff officers were recruited from Types of UNEF soldiers, as portrayed by Sand Dune. (Sand Dune) all contingents. Insufficient knowledge of English and staff procedures led to the promulgation of ambiguous orders, some of which it was impossible to implement. Canadian procedures, due to the lack of any others, were largely adopted.6 At the turn of 1957-58 the eight remaining contingents of the UNEF were responsible for guarding sectors of the Armistice Demarcation Line from north to south as follows: • DANOR Battalion (composite battalion made up of Danes and Norwegians) based on Beit Hanun, • Swedish Battalion based on Gaza, • Indian Battalion based on Deir-el-Ballah, • Colombian Battalion based on Khan Yunis, • Brazilian Battalion based on Rafah. The International Frontier was patrolled by a squadron of the El-Arish was also the base of the 115th Air Transport Unit of the RCAF, Canadian 1/8th Hussars from their base at Rafah, and by the Yugoslav operating DHC-3 Otter and DHC-4 Caribou light transport/observer aircraft, supporting UNEF operations, as seen here on 25 December 1957. Odred (Reconnaissance Battalion) based in el-Arish. From el-Arish (A. Smiljanić collection) east to the Gulf of Aqaba on the Red Sea, aircraft of the RCAF based in el-Arish undertook this task, aided by desert outposts manned by area to examine the possibility of further reductions. In accordance the Yugoslavs. There was a small garrison of the UNEF located at with its recommendations, the strength was further brought down to 3,378 at the time the force began its withdrawal in May 1967.8 Sharm-el-Sheikh. 7 The governments of Indonesia and Finland, which had agreed Besides the military force, there were some 1,700 locals employed to participate in the force only for a limited period, withdrew their on various tasks, mostly for logistical purposes. The national contingents were under the command of the contingents in September and December 1957, respectively. The Colombian government withdrew its contingent in December 1958. contingent commanders, who were appointed by their respective The other contingents continued to serve with UNEF until the governments. These contingents remained part of their respective withdrawal of the force in 1967. The deployment and assignment national armed forces but, during their assignment to UNEF, they of the contingents were changed from time to time according to the owed international allegiance and were placed under the operational control of the United Nations. This control was exercised through requirements of the operation. The strength of the force remained at the authorized level of the contingent commanders, who received their instructions from about 6,000 until the end of 1957. In the following years, it was the Force Commander. The officers and soldiers of each contingent gradually reduced because the situation in the area of operations continued to wear their national uniforms but with United Nations remained quiet and also because of financial difficulties. There were insignia. The blue beret and helmet were created by Secretary5,341 all ranks with the force in 1960, 5,102 in 1963, 4,581 in 1965 General Hammarskjöld during the formative days of UNEF.10 and 3,959 in 1966. In November 1965, a survey team was sent to the Morale was generally high, accounted for by the facts that their

25

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

Table 3: Numbers of UNEF Members by State 1956-19679 State/year

1957

1959

1961

1963

1965

1967

Brazil

545

648

625

616

438

433

Canada

1,172

983

936

904

954

795

Columbia

522

Denmark

424

548

562

563

491

2

Finland

255

India

957

1,174

1,251

1,252

1,269

978

Indonesia

582

Norway

498

603

614

494

495

61

Sweden

349

659

463

529

426

530

Yugoslavia

673

719

708

708

503

579

TOTAL

5,977

5,334

5,159

5,102

4,581

3,378

strengths contained a high percentage of conscripts who might as well be in Egypt as at home, pay was higher than the national scales, the tour of duty in many cases was for only six months, and their light tasks enabled them to make full use of leave quotas and welfare trips to Jerusalem in Jordan. 11 During its existence the commanders of the UNEF were: • Canadian General E.L.M. Burns (November 1956 to December 1959), • Indian General P.S. Gyani (December 1959 to January 1964), • Brazilian General Carlos Paiva Chaves (January to August 1964), • Yugoslav Colonel Lazar Mušicki (acting commander August 1964 to January 1965), • Brazilian General Syseno Sarmento (January 1965 to January 1966) and finally, • Indian General Indar J. Rikhye (January 1966 to June 1967).

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE YUGOSLAV ODRED, OTHER CONTINGENTS AND THE LOCALS Relations among most of the UNEF contingents were cordial and collegial. The Yugoslavs always stressed friendly relations with the Third World contingents such with those from Indonesia or India and Brazilian General Sarmento took over the command of UNEF in February the Yugoslavs treated them as true friends. “Indonesians are modest 1965 from acting commander Colonel Mušicki. (Sand Dune) and careful people. Language, of course, represents a huge obstacle for understanding, but mutual camaraderie was shown with doings much more than words.” On the other side “Indonesians liked [the] true cordial attitude of the Yugoslav soldiers”.12 The Yugoslav lack of language skills and lack of experience in a multinational environment produced many misunderstandings in everyday life. The lack of language skills was regarded as the greatest weakness of the Yugoslav contingent in general. The specific isolation of the Yugoslav contingent Chief of Staff of UNEF Colonel Lazar Mušicki with Yugoslav and Indian officers, May 1965. (Goran Petković collection) caused by the task of guarding

26

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Indonesian and Yugoslav lieutenants shaking hands after a visit to one of the UNEF camps. (AC)

UNEF fraternity: an Indian and a Yugoslav officer working together in the same premises. (AC)

the International Frontier led to a situation where such shortages were never improved.13 The language problem was also visible in the relations with UNEF HQ during the command of General Burns, especially with his chief of staff, the Swedish Colonel Lundquist, during the initial deployment. Continuous practice and later Yugoslav contingent adjustments greatly eased those relations. Relations with UNEF HQ improved in 1960 when Indian General Gyani took over the command of the UNEF.14 The Yugoslavs were regarded as militarily reliable, very modest in requests and generally of high morale and to be disciplined soldiers.15 They were regarded as troops of the highest quality, but outmatched in military education by Canadian, Nordic and Indian troops. The other problem was that members of the Canadian and Nordic contingents regarded Yugoslav contingents as “Communists”, which also produced initial mistrust. The practice of contingent deployment differed from army to army. Some of the armies, such as Yugoslavs or Brazilians, gathered each contingent from different units. On the contrary, the Indian or Canadian Army deployed complete formations. Among the Scandinavians were active reservists, the Canadians were professionals. The Yugoslavs were mostly surprised to discover that the Canadians were a fully professional force. Higher salaries and other benefits were something that Yugoslav officers could not compare with. Another surprise was the working hours of the Canadian officers, after which they “can do whatever they want”, and drink as they like, no matter the other ranks in their

One of several local orphan boys who found shelter among the Yugoslav Odred camps seen here with soldiers. Several Yugoslav newspaper articles focused on such fortunes of war, stressing the excellent relations with locals in Sinai. (MCO)

company, as Yugoslav Lieutenant Zorc noticed.16 On the other hand, Canadian opinions of the Yugoslavs varied. While praised for their self-sufficiency in UNEF’s early days, the Canadian recce squadron ran into some difficulties dealing with them on a day-today basis. Part of the problem stemmed from the way Canadians were sequestered when visiting the Yugoslav camp and all business was conducted under the watchful eye of the political officer. When meeting in the field in an unofficial capacity, relations were amicable enough, though even the most hardened Canadian trooper found the mandatory shot of slivovitz – a type of plum brandy described as having “a bite like a camel” – difficult, especially early in the morning.17 The Yugoslavs always noted the good relations with the locals. Cases of abandoned children that were cared for by the troops were frequent in the 1957 contacts with Bedouins and other civilians in the vicinity of the bases and camps and made good articles for the newspapers. Yugoslav troops were always willing to share their food or cigarettes with people that were encountered in the desert. Soldiers tried to communicate by saying a few Arab (or Turkish) words, or even some French or English word. Most of the talking was with hands or gestures. Yugoslav soldiers expressed their interest in the locals, but in most cases they could not understand what they were doing, how they fed themselves or where they lived.18 The Odred’s relations with the local Egyptian and military authorities were cordial due to the excellent personal and political relations between Marshal Tito and President Nasser, which then turned into generally good relations between the two states. Episodes from the advance after the initial deployment of UNEF and the warm welcome for the Yugoslav soldiers from Port Said to el-Arish just added to the confidence of the Egyptians in the Yugoslav Odred. This was highlighted when the Yugoslav 3rd Company entered the city of Gaza in March 1957, after the clashes with the first UNEF troops. In a further deployment, Yugoslav troops generally regarded the locals in a friendly manner. Most of their camps alongside the international border were visited by various local inhabitants and many Bedouin tribes. Yugoslav soldiers in many cases provided them with water, food or with medical assistance, especially in the first years of the deployment. The articles in Narodna armija detailed such relations and anecdotes. The phrase “Tito – Nasser! Sava – Sava!” became a kind of password of mutual understanding between Yugoslav soldiers and Arab locals.

27

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

On the other hand, dealing with the civil and later military authorities from local to the highest levels were in many cases different. The general Yugoslav conclusion was that there was a lack of coordination among the Egyptian players on the ground. There were excellent initial relations with General Hilmy, who was the main coordinator from the Egyptian side on the deployment of UNEF in 1956-57. Later, there were different issues on the ground, even the setting of mines by Egyptian commandos, which overshadowed such relations. After 1959, relations with the Egyptian Army were established. Again, the Yugoslavs noticed different services and branches and their uncoordinated work on Sinai.19

THE ODRED – AFTER THE REDEPLOYMENT IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1957 Upon the orders of General Burns issued on 1 August 1957, the tasks and locations of the Yugoslav Odred were reorganized. It had taken over positions with two of its motorised companies (other companies such as the Recoilless Gun Company were attached by platoons) on the southern parts of Egyptian-Israeli border from Al Quseima, Abu Suwan to the Gulf of Aqaba. Yugoslav units were already in the area of Abu Uyaylah. They took over positions in the border area around Ayn Al Qusaymah, Al Kunitllah and to the Ras el Naqb from the Canadian contingent. From the last outpost they could observe the Gulf of Aqaba, which was regarded as a unique experience among the soldiers. The main base of the Odred remained in the vicinity of el-Arish. The order of battle of

Map of the Sinai with UNEF camps that were manned by the Yugoslav Odred. (Odred mira)

28

the Yugoslav Odred initially brought some uncertainty since regular supply was a demanding job but once the UNEF HQ organized a regular and safe supply system for the isolated Yugoslav units, it gradually became a daily routine.20 Such disposition of the Yugoslav contingent would remain until the end of the deployment in 1967. The supply difficulties were caused by the road from el-Arish over Al Quseima and Al Kunitlah to the Gulf of Aqaba, being difficult to cross. There were sections where vehicles moved only at the speed of a walking man and others where 20 kilometres per hour was a success. Later, Yugoslav units were supplied by air transport. Every second day, or three times a week, a Canadian transport plane commuted between el-Arish and Al Quseima and Al Kunitlah.21 The practice was established that one company would remain in el-Arish while two others were deployed at the posts on the International Frontier, one covering Al Quesin and el-Amr, the other one Ras el Naqb and Al Quntilah.22 From 1958, it became regular practice that the Odred would maintain outposts (in Yugoslav Odred parlance known as a “platoon camp” or simply ček-post) alongside the International Frontier and would rotate the units on a 45-day basis. For example, in late August the camps that were deployed in June would be replaced. The new shift was then dispatched from el-Arish.23 To get acquainted with the situation, the commanders of the forward Yugoslav bases (the “platoon camps”) arrived five days ahead of their troops. They had the task of observing the situation in the camp/base area of responsibility, the situation on the International Frontier and in the camp itself. They had to check the accommodation for the soldiers and the supply and communication line with the main base.24 In July 1960, the situation in Congo required the deployment of large UN forces. The Swedish battalion from UNEF was ordered to leave for Congo and the other contingents took over its tasks. One of the Yugoslav companies from the 8th Contingent was sent to Gaza to replace the Swedish unit in the tensest area of UNEF responsibility. In March 1957, Yugoslav troops had been cheered by the locals when they arrived in the city of Gaza.25 The Yugoslav contingent entered a routine pattern of rotations, starting with the spring of 1958. The practice was established that

The 6th JNA contingent in Zagreb barracks, preparing for deployment, spring 1959. (HDA)

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

only the best officers, NCOs and soldiers would be chosen for the deployment in UNEF. Later, in the 1960s, it started to become a matter of reward since the deployment could bring earnings and other benefits. There was medical selection and checks for the troops, and finally, vaccination.26 In this period the Yugoslav Odred could count 690-715 servicemen. What is visible from the numbers is that none of the contingents/shifts maintained the same number of engaged officers and other ranks. Every shift had a different number of officers (50-65), NCOs (90-110) and soldiers (530+). Most likely it did not relate to a changing structure or new assignments but to problems with assembling the men for the Odred in Yugoslavia. The contingents, or shifts, The arrival of a new Yugoslav shift at el-Arish camp monitored carefully by “old bones” from the previous contingent. (MCO) were exchanged in May/June and November/December. The exchange of the contingents was a problematic issue in many ways in the initial years of deployment. Gradually, the procedures were developed, and the contingent replacement was improved. Each exchange of the shift was marked with small ceremonies between old and new contingents which were held at el-Arish for officers and Port Said harbour for soldiers.27 When the new contingent reached el-Arish, officers and NCOs of the previous contingent held A postcard showing Jugoslavija was issued to the 19th Contingent’s members to write home to their families. (G. lectures for the new arrivals, Petković collection) from platoon and company commanders to soldiers, on the experiences from their tour.28 established regular sorties to el-Arish. The flights were carried out by It was organised that part of the Odred (around 300 men) should the Douglas C-47s of the 119th Transport Regiment from Belgradebe replaced first and then a month later, the other part arrived Zemun Air Base with Athens as a regular halt for the flights. The arrival of each Yugoslav “Douglas” was a regular occurrence and replaced the remaining troops (also around 300 men). It was necessary to introduce the inexperienced shift in parallel with the for the members of the Odred as it brought news and newspapers, older shift. For example, in the turnover between 18th and 19th mail, additional supplies and some new faces, usually from the contingents, one company and part of the HQ of the old contingent higher commands.31 From the late 1950s – from the 5th Contingent remained until the new contingent had taken charge.29 onward or possibly earlier – the new commander of the Odred The ship Jugoslavija was used to ferry the new contingents from and some of the officers were transferred to Sinai by C-47 prior to Rijeka harbour in Yugoslavia to Port Said and they were then moved the arrival of the Odred main party. They would be welcomed at further by train to el-Arish. After the arrival in Rijeka of returning el-Arish airfield and then introduced to the matters of the Odred troops, they were transported to Zagreb, from where they were daily routine.32 The 22nd Contingent’s initial part landed in Cairo returned to their previous units, or into civilian life – if they were and was then ferried by RCAF aircraft to el-Arish.33 The HQ and conscripts.30 officers used to return with the YAF Douglas to Yugoslavia via a Soon after the Odred’s deployment, the Yugoslav Air Force fuel-stop in Athens.34 In the same period, shifts and replacements

29

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

The passenger ship Jugoslavija was used for exchanges of Yugoslav contingents throughout UNEF deployment and is seen here in Rijeka dock bringing the 1st Contingent to the homeland shore, May 1957. (MJ)

It became practice that a command party of the Odred would arrive prior to the main body aboard Jugoslavija. As seen here, the new commander and his staff land in el-Arish and are welcomed by the officers of the old contingent. (A. Smiljanić)

to decorate the members with UNEF medals prior to finishing their tour. General Burns continued such practice in 1959 where he personally decorated the members of the 6th Contingent.38 Later it was conducted by all UNEF commanders followed by a ceremony and small medal-parade of the assembled units.

THE ODRED RE-EQUIPMENT AND REORGANISATION OF 1965

A small handover ceremony between the 7th and 8th contingents in Port Said harbour, spring 1960. Jugoslavija can be seen anchored in the background. (UN 147107)

The Yugoslav Air Force established frequent transport flights to the airfield in el-Arish with its C-47s. They used to bring smaller supplies, newspapers, letters, and VIPs and other guests to the Odred. (MCO)

from el-Arish to distant camps such as Ras el Naqb or Sharm elSheikh were ferried by the Canadian DHC-4 Caribous. 35 The UN General Assembly decided on 7 November 1957 that a medal for service in peace as part of the UNEF would be introduced.36 In June 1958, General Burns decorated 377 members of the JNA that were part of the UNEF. Later, in mid-October, UNEF medals were delivered for the members of the contingent that had to leave for Yugoslavia.37 It became the standard practice

30

The Yugoslav Odred was fully motorised with MDAP-supplied US-made vehicles, mostly produced in the Second World War years and delivered to the JNA from 1951, and served in Sinai for several years. The Odred was subordinated to UNEF and most probably the Yugoslavs started to request – in mid-1959 – the replacement of vehicles, since replacements were not organized with the JNA. It was most likely the reason why General Burns inspected the vehicles of the Odred in 1959.

According to the available photographs, different types started to enter the Odred inventory in this period and these included M-35 Reo lorries in 1958 and Bedford RL lorries in 1960. By the beginning of the 1960s there were M38A1, M38A1CDN or M151 jeeps, Vauxhall Victor, Ami-6 andVW vans. It is most likely that by 1962 a large number of the vehicles brought in 1956 had been replaced by the vehicles supplied by UNEF. The Yugoslav armoured vehicles were a matter of dispute with the UNEF HQ. They had brought 25 armoured cars, but UNEF did not plan to replace them by introducing new types, since there was a Canadian armoured unit with Ferret armoured vehicles as part of the force. The Yugoslavs obviously understood the standpoint of the UNEF HQ (General Burns in particular) as the intention was to downscale the Odred and turn it into an infantry battalion, as were the other contingents in UNEF. The explanation of the HQ was that the Yugoslav contingent was engaged as a peacekeeping unit on the International Frontier with no need for armoured vehicles, as were the other contingents. 39 The structure of the Yugoslav Odred remained mostly unchanged until 1964-65. In the November 1964 rotation some changes were made in the structure of the Yugoslav contingent. As it was called by UNEF, the 17th Yugo Battalion had decreased its strength by 100 officers and men. The new battalion strength was 508 officers and other ranks.40 Due to the crisis in the finances of the UNEF and pressure on its HQ, the Odred was reorganized into a standard infantry battalion, losing its “reconnaissance” status. It now consisted of:

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Most of the veteran Willys jeeps brought by the Yugoslav contingent were replaced in the 1960s with the Canadian M-38A1CDN type, here, seen used by 21st Contingent in 1966-67. (MJ) M-35 standard US Army lorries (REOs, pronounced as “Rio” by the Yugoslavs) entered the inventory of the Odred to replace ageing GMC lorries in 1958. (MCO)

Hidden in the shade of large desert trees are M-151 jeeps and a Vauxhall Victor staff car, 1964. (MJ)

• HQ with Odred Staff and staff unit, communications platoon, pioneer section, military police section, club, military band. Another type that entered the Yugoslav Odred inventory by 1960 was the • Three infantry rifle companies with three rifle platoons each, British Bedford RL medium lorry which remained in the use until end of communications section and medical team. deployment. (MJ) • A logistical company consisting of four platoons: technicalmaintenance, automobile, quartermaster and medical.41 Such structure was much better suited for the borderguarding duties which were the only task for the Odred during the 1960s. In 1964-65, the Canadian 8th Hussars provided the armoured recce patrols along the International Frontier, with one of its squadrons being rotated on an annual basis.42 The Yugoslav armoured vehicles had most likely been taken out of service at this time. Such reorganisation was mirrored in downsizing of the 17th-19th contingents which numbered just over 500 servicemen. In this last period of the deployment, Yugoslav contingents (20th-22nd Yugo Battalions) were rotated in the same way that had been established in 1957-58. Half of the contingent, ranging from 250-260 men, with their new commander, reached Egypt in May or November, replacing the first part of the contingent, and the other part of the contingent, Organisational diagram of the Yugoslav Odred (Yugo Bn) between 1965 and 1967. (G. Petković collection) of similar size, arrived in June or

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new locations in its area of responsibility. First, it was ordered to take over the camp at el-Batur on the International Frontier, which was part of the sector of the Canadian battalion and 8th Hussars. The handover occurred on 5 February 1966.44 Later, on 13 February 1966, the Yugoslavs took over the camp at Sharm el Sheik, at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, from the Swedish battalion. Finally, in March, the Yugoslavs took over the guard duties at elArish airfield from the Indian battalion which had guarded it previously.45 Enlargement of the area of responsibility led to the necessity that 19th Contingent was reinforced in March with a party of troops from the homeland. This group was sent to their posts between 24 and 31 March 1966.46 It also brought about a rise of UNEF units in Gaza parade in front of Colonel Mušicki late 1964. Here, Yugoslav unit consists of infantry and M-151 the number of 20th – 22nd jeeps. Just visible on the left is a Ferret of the Canadian 8th Hussars. (UN 346468) contingent members. At a ceremony held on 17 November 1966 in el-Arish, troops of first part of the 21st Contingent and the second part of the 20th Contingent were gathered to mark the ten-year anniversary of the UNEF deployment. The letter of congratulations send by Defence Minister Army General Gošnjak was read to the troops, and flowers were laid on the monument for the members of the Odred that had lost their life in the line of duty.47 The last contingent –22nd Yugo Bn – had only its first part of Odred on the scene at the time of the new war, the other part of this contingent never arrived from Yugoslavia, as the Six Day War had already started.48 As General Rikhye noted in April 1966 at the farewell The eight M-8 Greyhounds (“Blinda”), one of which is seen here on UNEF parade in late 1958, provided the Yugoslav ceremony to the 19th Odred a formidable asset compared to other UNEF contingents. (MCO) Contingent: “Your battalion December. The exchange usually took place in Port Said, while it was have the most difficult sector alongside almost whole International traditional that the remaining part of the outgoing battalion hosted Frontier with additional tasks in Sharm el Sheikh and el-Arish”49 “a Masalama party” for members of the other UNEF contingents and new-arrivals. Then, the new “Yugo Bn” took over the camps on HEADQUARTERS AND BASES the International Frontier.43 Since March 1957, the camp near el-Arish was the HQ of the By late January 1966, the Yugoslav contingent received three Yugoslav contingent. The camp was known later as Mala Jugoslavija

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UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Changeover in Sharm el-Sheik camp, February 1967: Yugoslavs of the 19th Contingent taking control over the camp from a Swedish unit, seen on the left. (G. Petković collection)

Camp at Sharm el-Sheik, spring 1966. (G. Petković collection)

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Observation post at Sharm el-Sheik, still sporting Swedish and Nordic flags from the previous contingents. (G. Petković collection)

Yugoslav officers of the 19th Contingent with an M-38A1CDN Jeep stuck in the sand. (G. Petković collection)

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UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

A group of Yugoslav 19th Contingent’s officers headed by Lieutenant Petković at Sharm el-Sheik, next to a Canadian M-38 jeep, spring 1966. (G. Petković collection)

Officers and NCOs of the 19th Contingent posing with UNEF chief of staff, Colonel Mušicki, and their commander, Lt. Colonel Stoiljković, at the end of their tour in May 1966. All of them proudly sporting UNEF medals (G. Petković collection)

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Yugoslav guard detail returns to the RCAF base at el-Arish in March 1966. (Milan Dragojević collection/Paluba)

An overview of the camp of the UNEF DANFOR and Swedish contingents at Sharm el-Sheik. Both contingents were replaced by the Yugoslavs in February 1966. (G. Petković collection)

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UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

UNEF medal issued at the end of the tour to its members (G. Petković collection)

Pined badge of the Odred issued occasionally. Here are variations issued in 1959 and 1963. (M. Bizjak collection)

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General Eedson L. M. ‘Tommy’ Burns, First Commander, UNEF Seen here while reviewing his troops in the Gaza Strip, General Tommy Burns wears the Canadian officer’s working dress uniform clearly influenced by the British design. General Officer’s gorgets and the golden shoulder marks clearly stand out. As a veteran of two world wars, he carries an impressive set of ribbons, each referring to a decoration. Interestingly, he wore no UN insignia on this occasion: instead – and like many senior officers of the Commonwealth – he is shown holding a classic swagger stick in his hand. (Artwork by Anderson Subtil)

Yugoslav Peacekeeper, elArish, 1961 By the 1960s, UN-forces deployed in the Middle East had received clothing better suited to desert conditions. This peacekeeper is shown wearing a long-sleeve shirt, without any insignia, and Bermuda shorts, probably made from regular uniform trousers. The insignia clearly identifies him as a UN peacekeeper, and included two armbands (one with the UN insignia, the other with the flag and title ‘Jugoslavija’), and the UN metal badge. (Artwork by Anderson Subtil)

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Yugoslav Officer, UNEF, Cairo, 1960 Easily recognized by the shoulder straps with two golden stars, this Lieutenant is shown while wearing the classic officer uniform of the JNA, including the Sam Browne belt and holster for his Soviet M-33 pistol. In addition to the blue beret with the UNEF metal badge, his uniform sported the shoulder title ‘Jugoslavija’, and the first version of the UN identification brassard. (Artwork by Anderson Subtil)

Private 1st Class, Yugoslav Battalion, UNEF Standing watch at an observation post on the armistice line between Egypt and Israel, this peacekeeper wears the Yugoslav uniform of the time, of reinforced fabric blouse and trousers, brown leather webbing, gaiters and rubber-soled boots. Two items that stand out are his blue-painted M1 helmet of US origin, with UN insignia, and the German-made Carl Zeiss 1925 binoculars. His firearm was the 7.9mm Zastava M48 rifle, the Yugoslav version of the German Karabiner 98k. (Artwork by Anderson Subtil)

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

M3A1 White Scout Car, JNA-serial 1402, UNEF-serial 872, as deployed in the Sinai in early 1958. (Artwork by David Bocquelet)

M8 Greyhound armoured reconnaissance car, JNA-serial unknown, UNEF-serial 866, as deployed on the Sinai in October 1958. (Artwork by David Bocquelet)

M38 Jeep of the Yugoslav Platoon of the UNEF HQ MP Company, late 1958. (Artwork by David Bocquelet)

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A map of the Sinai Peninsula with the deployment of UNEF contingents, 1956-1967. (Map by Tom Cooper)

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UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

(Small Yugoslavia). It was situated some ten kilometres east from the city, covering both sides of the road and railroad which heads to Gaza. On the left side was the HQ, cinema, club and guards, while on the right side were the soldiers’ tents, mess, military kitchen, ambulance, sport stadium and parking.50 In summer of 1957 there were some hundreds of barracks and tents organized in military manner and a shooting range and areas for driver and engineer training.51 By the middle of January 1958, works on new facilities started with material from the UNEF supply base at Rafah. The communications company and medical platoon were accommodated in the new area near the elArish – Gaza road. Within the reconstructed camp, the Yugoslavs gave distinctive names to the different areas and “streets”. 52 Later, in 1958-59, a local radio station was built and along with an open cinema and screen.53 In the summer of 1961, a bakery was brought from Yugoslavia, which was established in the camp by the beginning of October, together with storage, as well as a new canteen, and a terrace was built on the beach by the Odred engineers, enabling gatherings or other ceremonies of the Odred personnel to be held there. In September, a drinking water station was established with 3,000 litres of capacity and four large refrigerators were brought. It enabled the regular deliveries of water to personnel in el-Arish camp as well as the possibility of drinking cold water.54 As General Marijan Kranjc (who was a member of the 12th Contingent as a lieutenant) remembered, the bed bugs were a problem for the Yugoslavs in the mala Jugoslavija camp no matter what disinfections and other improvised attempts were made to deal with them. The other issue was separated messes Map of Yugoslav Odred’s area of responsibility in 1966-1967. (G. Petković collection) as was the case in NATO or other contemporary armies; officers, NCOs and soldiers dined separately according to the rules that existed in UNEF. NCOs used to complain about this practice, since they dined together with the officers in JNA units at home. Food was the same for both groups, which somewhat relaxed the differences. The camp used part of the beach, where guards were posted to monitor the appearance of sharks and there was a small villa (the “Beach Villa”) for VIP guests, mostly top brass from the homeland. Two gates were guarded by the Yugoslav Military Police.55 The Yugoslav contingent also guarded the nearby airfield, where the RCAF 115th Air Officers of the 19th Contingent received UNEF medals from the overall commander, Indian General Rikhye, in late April 1966, who took this opportunity to take photo with them. (G. Petković collection) Transport Unit (ATU) was

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Initial conditions in el-Arish camp were modest, as seen here in spring 1957. (MCO)

Yugoslav Military Police secured el-Arish with armed patrols at the beginning of their deployment. (MCO)

located, with one separate platoon. In late 1964, the Yugoslavs were replaced in this duty by the Indian contingent.56 In 1966, the Yugoslav contingent resumed the assignment of guarding the airfield. Besides the HQ at el-Arish, the Yugoslav Odred maintained “Platoon camps” and “Section camps” along the International Frontier at el-Amr, el-Sabha, Al Quseima, Al Kunitlah and Ras el Naqb. Later in 1966, a camp at Sharm el Sheikh was also added to this list. El-Amr was the northernmost Yugoslav camp towards Israel, at the 37th kilometre on the road from el-Arish to Al Quseima. It was a former Canadian base, later taken over by the Yugoslavs. A visitor would leave the road and continue into the desert, following the tracks of the previous vehicles, reaching a point 1,500 metres from the border with Israel. It was a platoon camp and the only settlement in that location except for a couple of Bedouin tents which moved constantly. The Bedouins used to remain around the camp since

Odred vehicles parked in el-Arish, seen during a sandstorm, in 1958. (MCO)

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A Yugoslav military policeman of the 9th Contingent guards the Odred (Yugo Recce Bn) HQ of the el-Arish camp, April 1961. (MJ

Soldiers’ tents in el-Arish, spring 1958, adored with slogans: “Long Live Tito” and “Long Live the VII Congress of SKJ [Yugoslav Communist Party]”. (AC)

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Section camp at el-Quseima, mid 1966. (M. Dragojević collection /Paluba)

the maps showed an inhabited settlement, actually there was none. The camp consisted of several tents, barracks, parking for vehicles, two sport-fields, a field bathroom and water-tank. The main feature of this locality was a deep well. Water was a significant luxury for the Yugoslav UNEF troops, since they had the opportunity to have a real bath and to use the facilities daily. Water was the greatest asset of Al Kunitlah and all of the local Bedouins used to visit the well with their camels, sheep or goats. There was an airstrip marked with the two large letters “UN” made from stones by Yugoslav troops. The Canadian planes commuted from el-Arish to this base on a regular basis. The camp was also surrounded by marked minefields, and by a small trench to prevent scorpions from entering the camp.62 Since the summer of 1957, the Yugoslav contingent manned the observation post at Ras el Naqb, overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba, some 240 kilometres far from el-Arish. The area was rocky and deserted and parts of Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia could be seen from the outpost. Patrols in vehicles were dispatched from this post on a regular basis. This had been a Second World War airfield with tents, five barracks, a sport-field and bathroom. Water was ferried from Al Kunitlah in the later period by the Canadian tankers. The patrol route was 35 kilometres, leading near the International Frontier up to the Al Kunitlah unit area of responsibility. In the vicinity of the camp was an Egyptian police tent, which used to control the UNEF

the soldiers provided them with security and food. There was no electricity in the camp that consisted of several large tents, a sport field and observation post with the outdated inscription “Welcome Young Sinaites” (Sinajci or Sinaites, a nickname for the Yugoslav soldiers serving with UNEF). The surrounding terrain was flat, and sound could be heard even at 30 kilometres distance. There were no water springs around, and the water was fetched from el-Arish every day.57 Following the International Frontier from el-Amr on to the south, next was el-Sabha. It was located on a hill some 400 metres high. This small camp consisted of an entrenched tent and observation post and was manned by the section from Al Quseima. A shift there lasted for 24 hours and then the soldiers would return to base for rest. 58 The camp near the deserted town of Al Quseima (el-Quesima) was regarded as one of the most pleasant and beautiful camps of the Yugoslav Odred. There was plenty of water, and palm and eucalyptus trees – which kept away mosquitoes – a sports ground, swimming pool and nearby airstrip. In late 1957, the Yugoslav 2nd Company replaced the Canadians there. Beside the Yugoslav company there were also other UN observers including Canadians, Indians, Norwegians, and Belgians. The Yugoslavs also organized a bakery at this post. The town itself was initially empty and without a single inhabitant, and later had only five Egyptian policemen.59 From this camp the Yugoslavs maintained their 15-kilometre patrol route with UNbannered jeeps dispatched with an officer and soldiers to patrol. The Yugoslavs called this the “hungry seven day route”, although it lasted for only three hours of slow and difficult driving over rugged terrain that in many cases caused problems for the vehicles, and very sweaty men.60 In 1966, this camp remained regarded as the most comfortable camp on the International Frontier, no matter that it had most difficult and longest patrol routes that covered 250 kilometres.61 The camp at Al Kunitlah (el-Kunitlla) was situated on a slope, above the Al Queseima – Ras el-Nagb road. Although Yugoslav camp and observation post at Ras el Naqb, late 1950s. (Radojko Janković collection)

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In the late 1950s, RCAF 115th ATU conducted supply and observation duties with DHC-3 Otters. This photograph was taken in one of the Yugoslav Odred camps in 1958. (MCO)

During the 1960s, RCAF DHC-4 Caribous commuted from el-Arish to distant bases over Sinai providing supplies on an almost daily basis. (G. Petković collection)

Members of the 21st Contingent arrive on the “shift” with a DHC-4 Caribou. (MJ)

36

activities and possible contacts with nearby Israelis. No matter that it was forbidden, the Yugoslav soldiers used to feed the Egyptian policemen in their camp.63 Finally, in February 1966, the Yugoslavs took over the camp at Sharm el-Sheik at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. It was the most distant camp from el-Arish and even more so from the Gaza UNEF HQ. This camp remained under the supervision of the UNEF HQ, and the Yugoslav platoon was strengthened with a Canadian infantry section and rotational medical staff that from other UNEF contingents. The Canadians also treated Sharm el-Sheikh as a rest camp for their troops. The platoon in this camp maintained the 30-kilometre distant section camp at Ras Al Nasrani, which was used to monitor the traffic at sea and reports were radioed to UNEF HQ during the seven-day shift there.64 In autumn of 1961, work on the new observation posts at the camps was conducted. There were six new watch towers built: two in el-Amr and el-Quseima and one each in Al Kunitlah and Ras el Naqb. Besides this, works on the replacement of whole water and electricity lines were conducted in el-Amr and Al Quseima.65 As early Yugoslav analyses showed, observation caused a lot of strain and fatigue for the engaged personnel of the Yugoslav Odred. The soldiers needed time to adapt to unfamiliar conditions in the Sinai desert. Huge zones, high temperatures, sandstorms, reptiles and scorpions, unclear boundary lines and fata morgana effects (mirages) caused a lot of strain to the Yugoslav troops while on observation. Ambushes were also set up along the line and frontier. Foot or vehicle patrols were much more efficient and less of a strain and the soldiers liked these much more since

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

movement brought much better opportunities to observe and reduced boredom, although, mines, harsh roads and sandstorms were a problem.66 As noted in 1959, the heaviest burden was supplying these posts with water.67 Water-tankers were used daily to ferry drinking water to each of the separated units and it was estimated that each person had an average of 30 litres per day.68 Huge storms with heavy rain occurred in late February and the beginning of March 1959 and flooded and damaged nearly all of the Yugoslav forward camps at el-Amr, el-Sabha, Al Quntilah and Ras el Naqb.69 Again in December 1964, heavy rain made life in the outposts difficult, just after the shift between 16th and 17th Contingent. The new arrivals had to deal with desert paths and lanes destroyed by the storms, and it led to difficulties in re-establishing routine duties.70 Throughout the years, the situation changed. Shifts at the camp were no longer as problematic. To get a first-hand impression of living conditions and problems in the platoon camps along the International Frontier, a group of staff officers led by Major Potrebić spent four days visiting Yugoslav soldiers along the frontier in 1965. They found the soldiers happy, in good health and very willing to successfully carry out their tasks even in the face of difficulties. Their good work was largely due to the briefing and training they had received before their assignment to the frontier. No matter that duties along the International Frontier were beset with many problems such as sand drifts which blocked the existing “roads” at el-Amr, ditches caused by heavy rain at el-Quseima, and flooded barracks at Ras el Naqb.71

language skills which remained an issue of the JNA engagement in the peacekeeping operations. The number of English-language speakers available among JNA personnel was limited. Those who had learned the language on courses in Yugoslavia or abroad, were mostly oriented to the air force, diplomacy, or intelligence and very few ground forces officers were available or interested in taking staff duty with some international staff in the Middle East, such as UNEF was. It is interesting to note that during the existence of the Odred within UNEF, the Yugoslav General Staff did not create a single section for the issues of the peacekeeping operations or for the care of Odred needs. The Odred was treated in personnel and material issues in most cases just as any other JNA unit, no matter its military and political importance. It may be presumed that such interest may have existed in the first year of deployment, but the switch to regular peacekeeping duties and the taking over of command and logistics by UNEF HQ influenced the JNA General Staff to disregard such needs. The most senior Yugoslav officer within UNEF was Colonel Lazar Mušicki. Born in 1923, a young Partisan who remained in the post-war Yugoslav Army and finishing staff college in Britain, he was UNEF Chief of Staff from April 1964 to May 1966. In the period between August 1964 and January 1965 he was acting commander of UNEF. At that time the commander of the UNEF, Brazilian Major General Carlos F. Paiva, suffered a sudden stroke during the inspection of the leave centre in Beirut. After Paiva, who

YUGOSLAV OFFICERS IN UNEF HQ There were several Yugoslav officers with the UNEF HQ in Gaza. In May 1959, there were four: chief of the personnel department and one of his aides, one officer in the automobile section and deputy chief of the UNEF vacation centre. During the 1960s, UNEF HQ was always manned by several Yugoslav Staff officers in the UNEF HQ in Gaza. (AC) officers tasked with different duties. The UNEF HQ Military Police Company had a platoon of Yugoslav military policemen, although as part of the Odred, the Yugoslav MP Platoon was subordinated to the UNEF HQ Canadian MP Company in Gaza. 72 Yugoslav MPs used the Canadian jeeps.73 Considering the size of the Odred inside UNEF, it may be expected that a much larger number of Yugoslav officers would be engaged in UNEF’s HQ. The limited number of Yugoslav staff officers was mostly due to the lack of General Burns (second from left, in the first row) with the UNEF HQ at Gaza. (AC)

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Such language and communication limitations of the Yugoslav contingent led to many misunderstandings during the deployment and probably some orders which provoked the Yugoslavs to conclude that they were discriminated against in different ways. It also produced almost daily problems in communication with the Canadian contingent whose 115th Air Transport Unit was supplying the Yugoslav outposts The Yugoslav Odred contained a Military Police Platoon which was part of the Canadian MP Company assigned to in the desert and with those the UNEF HQ. Here, a section of Yugoslav MPs parade next to a Canadian M-38A1. (MCO) parts of the Odred guarding was a Second World War veteran of the Italian front, returned to its base at el-Arish airfield.79 In air patrolling over the International his homeland for further recovery, Mušicki took charge as acting Frontier and Sinai, Canadian crews used to have fun with Yugoslav commander.74 In late January 1965, Mušicki waited at Beirut military police officers that didn’t speak English, performing airport for the newly appointed UNEF commander, another Italian acrobatic manoeuvres in the aircraft without warning them campaign veteran, Brazilian Major General Syseno Sarmento. beforehand, or cursing them to their faces as “red communists.”80 Mušicki turned over to him the command post for the force in a Since early January 1960 – the 9th Contingent – there were small ceremony held at Gaza.75 courses in the English language in the Odred at two levels: basic Colonel Mušicki returned to Yugoslavia in late April 1966.76 After and intermediate. At the beginning there were 60 students, but we his arrival in Belgrade, the question of the UNEF commander was do not know the result of such courses.81 A specialized military debated amongst the JNA’s top brass. Since 1956, commanding school in Belgrade taught official English language courses for generals had come from Canada, Brazil and twice from India. officers, which lasted up to 10 months.82 After 1960, the problem Concerning the size of the deployed contingents, the Yugoslavs of translators was solved through the engagement of the UN to and Scandinavians were neglected in this matter. While on duty in pay civilian translators. In addition, those JNA officers who spoke UNEF’s HQ, Mušicki had already proposed that Indian General English or French were encouraged to join the Odred, as well as the Rikhye could be replaced in 1967 by a JNA general. Such an idea conscript soldiers with a knowledge of languages.83 would be supported not just by some of the states that had deployed No matter the improvement in English skills in the later Yugoslav contingents to UNEF but by the Egyptians too. Since Secretary- contingents, understanding at the scene was not easy. Major General General U Thant extended Rikhye’s assignment and the UNEF Milovan Zorc, who was a lieutenant in the 22nd Contingent, ceased its mandate prior to the new war, the idea of sending a remembers that the greatest difficulties in understanding were with Yugoslav general would not be fulfilled.77 Much later in 1989, the representatives of the Indian contingent and the local Egyptian Yugoslavs would have their general as the commander of another authorities. One could imagine how such conversations looked. On the contrary, understanding the Canadians was easiest, as Zorc mission. observed.84 Finally, the paperwork and military bureaucracy in the English POOR LANGUAGE SKILLS As we noted, the language skills of the Yugoslav Odred were generally language was also a heavy burden for the Yugoslav logistical and poor. This problem remained obvious during its deployment. The technical staff. UNEF HQ requested proper administration on, need for communications in English was mostly neglected by the amongst other things, the serviceability of vehicles, usage of fuel, JNA authorities since the initial days of UNEF and it seemed that logged kilometres, and spare parts requests.85 they believed that it was enough to send a large force and that would No matter the need that the commander, his aides and all of the be sufficient to impress the host state and any other participating Odred staff officers should know the English language, this was state. never actually achieved. Colonel Mušicki, the most senior Yugoslav Siding with NATO and participating in the MDAP and Balkan officer in UNEF, criticised the JNA failure to develop language Pact improved English language skills in the Yugoslav Army, but not skills among the personnel that were dispatched to UNEF. His in sufficient quantity. The number of available English-language estimate was that the Yugoslav Odred was the lowest in terms of speakers among JNA active personnel was limited and were mostly language skills among all the engaged contingents.86 non-existent among the conscripts. Dedicated translators were in the Odred from the beginning, however, in the early days there were TRAINING FOR THE MISSION few of them. It was soon to be discovered that the number was not The first contingent of the JNA Odred in UNEF did not have sufficient for the everyday needs for communications with UNEF any specific training or even adaptation period. After it was HQ, with the Egyptian authorities, locals and other contingents. assembled in Yugoslavia, the Odred was rushed to Egypt. All of Besides Yugoslav military efforts in the field, the administration of the experiences gained were first-hand. From sailing with the ship the Odred was regarded as the weakest and slowest in the whole across the Mediterranean, deployment, discovering the challenges force, with constant delays in necessary communication. It led to in the immediate post-war country and marching in the desert, to open criticism by the UNEF commander General Burns.78 manning the bases and outposts, and initial peacekeeping duties.

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Yugoslav troops in UNEF were regarded as well-disciplined. (Blaž Torkar collection)

The 2nd Contingent had some kind of transition, since it was mainly deployed and re-deployed to the forward bases and observing camps alongside Sinai. However, it did not have any specific training in Yugoslavia either, and experience had to be gained in the desert. From late 1957, and arrival of the 3rd Contingent, the situation became much more stable and rotations of the contingents/shifts became regular. Initial training for the new shifts was organized after the arrival in Sinai, in the main base in el-Arish, however this resulted in a situation where the Odred would have a reduction in its capability every six months. Moreover, since the personnel were assembled from many different units, it produced different problems for accommodation with each of the units. Mistrust and individual differences were noticed among the officers, NCOs and soldiers alike. Moreover, conscript soldiers were inexperienced in the handling of weapons, driving, and maintaining the vehicles and other equipment in such conditions and these remained a constant problem for nearly every contingent at the beginning of their deployment.87 Prior to deployment of the 19th to 22nd Contingents, their members were sent to a “Preparation Centre” or “Gathering Centre” in the 4 July Barracks in the Belgrade suburb of Voždovac. There they were prepared for the mission with UNEF in 30 days. Preparation included: basic military and English language training, orientation, pioneer and medical training, rules for guard duty, training of the commanding staff in operating with AN/GRC-9 radio sets and aerial reconnaissance on a sortie from Belgrade to the Adriatic Sea and back. After the completion of training, the contingent paraded in front of a general who represented the JNA General Staff and assigned the Odred commander, and then they were ferried by train to Rijeka where they boarded Jugoslavija. Each Odred would carry its personal weapons with it from Yugoslavia.88 Each of the earlier contingents started in el-Arish from basics. The training was organized in el-Arish and continued in the forward camps, sometimes alongside deployment and regular peacekeeping tasks which were ongoing. The training subjects included additional live-shooting, observing, patrolling, ambushes, de-mining and other necessary skills. It was the same problem with the conscript drivers. They were trained briefly in Yugoslavia in quite different driving conditions and then rushed to Sinai. There, they had to continue their training while carrying out serious duties in difficult desert terrain. The official documents insisted that emphasis should also be put on the physical condition of the troops. Colonel Petković, a platoon commander in the 19th Contingent, wrote that in 196566 that the emphasis of training was “on motorised patrol”: its movement, patrolling, observing and de-mining if mines were

An unknown major inspects the 9th Contingent. (MJ)

discovered.89 The individual, section and platoon training, and regular exercise became tactical exercises with the intention to train for emergency situations such as the outbreak of new hostilities. The most frequent tactical exercise was evacuation of the forward base/camp in case of war or a tense situation between Israel and Egypt. Another training subject was “securing of the supply convoy” which headed from the main base to distant camps or between camps. Yet another theme that was trained for was the reaction of the Odred from its main base in response to, and evacuation of a distant camp, in case of, hostilities. These were necessary steps in training to adopt procedures for unexpected situations, which were thought to be a likely outcome of the situation in Sinai. In all cases, the Yugoslavs expected that any threat would be from the Israeli side.90 Besides the poor language skills, as Aleksandar Životić suggested, training and preparation of personnel were the leading problem of the Odred, which hampered its combat readiness and jeopardized the image of the Odred among other contingents in UNEF.91

THE ODRED’S LOGISTIC ISSUES It can be concluded that at the beginning the Yugoslav Odred with UNEF had organised logistics and equipment to the standards of the JNA for use in conventional and European terrain. Soon after the deployment to Sinai many logistical shortcomings appeared. As with the choice of personnel, the logistical support was organized in a rush prior to the Odred sailing for Egypt. A total of five days was ordered for all of the logistical preparations! This period included assembling the personnel and taking care of their clothes, personal kit and health, to the preparing and gathering of vehicles, equipment, ammunition, food, fuel and everything else. Most of the equipment was not even checked but just assembled in packages and send via train to ship without allocation to a specific unit of the Odred, the only exception to this latter point was for vehicles. It was left for those who went to Egypt to discover the actual status of the equipment. During the trip to Sinai, fuel and ammunition were allotted to specific units “on paper”. Everything else remained packed and stored without any specific order. After arrival at el-Balah Camp, when it was ordered that one of the Yugoslav units should start deployment immediately, the problems suddenly became all too apparent. It was difficult to discover where any particular item was among the 400 tons of equipment. Regardless of the fact that the Odred possessed most of the necessary equipment and materials, the main characteristics

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Mealtime during initial deployment in Sinai. Soldiers were served with cooked meals and the inevitable “Yugoslav style” baked bread. (MCO)

The medical service of the Odred was organized to take proper care of the health of soldiers. This photograph shows the vaccination of Yugoslav soldiers of the 1st Contingent somewhere in Sinai. (AC)

of the initial period were of improvisation and confusion. The conditions were unusual and not familiar to the Yugoslavs. Bases were established in abandoned military camps in which the Odred’s equipment could not be unpacked and sorted. The units were on the move and ranging up to twenty to a hundred kilometres from the Odred main party, in deserted and war-torn foreign territory, which put the logistics under an instant pressure. After proper settlement into el-Arish, all of the logistical equipment and materials were sorted and recorded into a new inventory. The losses were written off. It turned out that mostly canned and other food was missing, which had actually been delivered to the troops without plan or stolen in Port Said harbour by locals. The Odred modified the rules of material and financial management that had been valid back in Yugoslavia. It adapted to the immediate needs of the deployment, which were near to war conditions. After the initial phase of the deployment, the UNEF HQ took over the complete logistics of the Yugoslav contingent. But since the logistical base of UNEF was only slowly built up, for some time the Yugoslavs depended on their own reserves, especially in supplying the separated units or those that were moving.92 The Yugoslav Odred quartermaster service had reserve food supplies for 38 days, and 10 days of rations, known as “dry daily meal”. The Odred used fresh meat and vegetables while aboard ship. After the arrival at el-Balah it was expected to rely on the UNEF logistical base in Abu Suweir but since it was still in the process of setting up, the Yugoslavs continued to use their food as their main meal, and to use the much smaller UNEF rations as additions for the soldiers. Since they were available in larger quantities, fresh potatoes, onions and carrots prevailed in the menu for some time, since the vegetables brought from Yugoslavia were not eaten. Soon after, the main body of the Odred relied fully on UNEF food supplies, except for the bakery which was established with the Odred.93

40

During the deployment to Sinai, the ADL and the International Frontier, conditions were not always appropriate for preparing food. This scene is a good example of the improvisation at the perimeter. (MCO)

The Yugoslav bakery at el-Balah produced bread for the Yugoslav contingent and RCAF 115th ATU. The other contingents depended on the bakery at Rafah.94 The bread was made as back home in Yugoslavia, which was a unique feature of the bakery at el-Arish. Bakery ovens needed to be modified since they were designed to burn wood, however, in the desert they had to be converted to oil. At the camps, several improvised bakeries were created using old barrels, and produced fresh bread in the Yugoslav style for soldiers.95 The units which were on separate duties, and later in the platoon camps or out on the perimeter, used 25-litre field kitchens. For such units, supplies of groceries and meat were allotted for several days, while water was dispatched every second day in two tankers. After the initial deployment of 1957 was completed, the most demanding task was supplying the separated units. This supply was carried out from the main base at el-Arish, first by the Yugoslav lorries, later the Canadian transport planes.96 Finally, the Odred maintained a canteen where additional articles could be purchased at regular prices.97 Water was a special problem. Most of the Yugoslav Odred units were supplied with water which was moved in lorries/tankers and this proved difficult during the deployment when the units were scattered almost everywhere, and even el-Arish camp was without regular water supplies. Water-tankers commuted between Yugoslav units on a daily basis and some of the drivers logged several thousands of kilometres just ferrying water. Another problem was

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

the storage of water in camps or at the perimeters. The water, when it arrived with the units was often so hot that it was not drinkable at all. 98 It was very difficult to follow regular patterns of service in the first days of the Odred. Food and water were necessary for the soldiers who were constantly on the move. The inexperienced Yugoslav logistics had to adapt and improvise as soon as possible.

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AND VEHICLES The prime characteristic of the Yugoslav Odred was that it was fully motorized. It was its combat advantage, but it also represented a logistical nightmare in the beginning of the deployment in Sinai. The vehicles were mostly taken out of “war reserve” and were not tested or prepared for extensive usage. Half a dozen vehicles had different malfunctions in the first leg of the movement from Port Said to el-Balah camp and it became necessary in el-Balah to check the whole contingent’s vehicles, and to discover their real status and shortcomings.99 The further deployments just added a burden to the vehicle usage. The vehicles were tested while on the move in Sinai. Many drivers were young and inexperienced, and nearly 60 percent of the failures were actually caused by them. The challenges in advancing over the destroyed or sand roads were enormous: transmissions and axels were exposed to damage, oil and fuel was supposed to be poured into the tanks carefully to avoid sand damage to the engine, pressure in the tyres needed to be lower than usual and sometimes another pair of tyres was mounted on the front wheels.100

The Odred had a single Federal truck with low-bed trailer. It was used to transport the Odred’s bulldozer and armoured vehicles. (MCO)

The inexperience of the Yugoslav drivers caused a lot of accidents in the early phase of deployment. (MCO)

Conditions for technical maintenance in el-Arish camp in the early contingents were difficult. The sand was everywhere. This photograph shows maintenance of the Yugoslav GMC lorry fleet. (MCO)

The Odred deployed a total of 35 Willys Jeeps in 1956 – most of them of Second World War vintage. Due to their constant use, they were exposed to many technical challenges caused by the desert. (MCO)

The Odred’s officers and NCOs, mostly from the infantry branch, were without the proper technical knowledge and heavily relied on the drivers. It was the same case with the technical branch, even with several contingents that were in Sinai later.101 Even in 1957-1959, the problem of inadequate drivers remained. Several incidents were caused by conscript drivers who did not have much driving experience, from poor maintenance of their vehicles to causing silly incidents where vehicles or trailers were destroyed, or even by entering minefields. 102 When General Burns inspected the Odred’s vehicles and drivers in summer 1959, it was discovered that 80% of the divers could not properly start and move their vehicles from parking! Such experiences led to later generations of drivers that arrived from Yugoslavia, being carefully picked and tested before deploying to UNEF.103 It was soon discovered that vehicles had a much shorter life span in the Sinai than in Yugoslavia. Sensitive parts were more fragile or exposed to rust. Sand mixed with the oil and fuel and penetrated the engines. Malfunctions of the electrical installations were frequent. After a few years of experience, it was concluded that inspections were necessary at 700 to 1,000 kilometres, depending on the vehicle. Knowing that some of the vehicles managed to log 300 kilometres per day, while transporting water and supplies to distant outposts and camps, maintenance sometimes became a heavy burden. Fuel/ water tanker lorries were especially exposed to hardships, and Yugoslav technical staff did everything that they could to keep the water tankers serviceable. 104 Another problem that became frequent in the earlier shifts was not repairing the vehicles which were unserviceable when the contingents changed over. For example, the 8th Contingent counted that 14 vehicles and all of the generators were out of order after the

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

General Burns inspected the vehicles, their maintenance and the driving skills of the Odred in 1959. (MCO)

Yugoslav pioneers during a break in the desert. Behind them is a Le Roi compressor on a GMC chassis. (MCO)

courses were organized, beside regular daily activities and in the 9th Contingent there were around 70 NCOs and soldiers on this course.107 This practice was continued in further contingents and attracted many of the officers and other ranks to it. It was conducted beside the regular duties for 2-4 hours per day. For the officers who already had a driving licence, the additional driving hours were organized to improve their knowledge of driving in desert conditions.108 In September 1964, 21-year-old private Milorad Milosavljević was awarded with a UNEF Gold Medal for hitting the 100,000 trouble-free kilometre mark. The medal was awarded after a strict inspection by the Canadian RCEME team and the Yugoslav soldier managed to maintain his Dodge lorry operational no matter the challenges of daily routes all over the international boundary.109 It was a clear sign that Yugoslav drivers were better prepared in the homeland before deployment and continued to improve their skills while in Sinai. Members of the RCEME (Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers) taking parts from two scrapped ¾ ton Dodges that belonged Sand Dune had written in February 1965 of the Yugoslav drivers to the Yugoslav Odred. Behind are numerous GMC lorries also withdrawn that daily ferried the water supplies to the camps at the International from service. (UN 140816) Frontier, no matter the weather conditions or current floods. According to these statistics, they logged about 500 kilometres previous contingent left.105 But gradually the situation improved over the years. By the daily, or about 15,000 kilometres per month. They transported beginning of 1959, the Odred HQ organized a drivers’ course in around 70 tons of water per day, which made some 2,100 tons of el-Arish for the soldiers and NCOs. It improved the mobility of the water each month. The UNEF newspaper praised “the endeavour Odred since “almost all of the soldiers and commanding personnel of these drivers, their determination and conscientiousness.”110 know how to drive vehicles”.106 In 1960, three-month driving For example, in four months of its deployment the vehicles of the 8th Contingent logged some 600,000 kilometres.111 Later in 1965, vehicles of 17th Contingent logged around 558,000 kilometres in the whole of its deployment.112 The supply of spare parts and fuel from UNEF came much later, after its establishment of the base in Rafah. In 1957, the Odred had to rely on its own spare parts and supplies. They had also brought spare fuel from Yugoslavia, which remained later as a useful A single Kenworth/La France recovery vehicle, referred to by the Yugoslavs as a “Continental” due to the engine’s reserve.113 manufacturer, was also part of the Odred. Behind it is an excellent view of the other Odred vehicles parked in elArish base. (MCO) General Kranjc, who was

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UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Probably the most important vehicles in UNEF after the initial deployment were water/fuel tanks. Here, a GMC fuel tanker is being repaired for another mission at el-Arish vehicle park. (MCO)

commander of the MP Platoon, wrote that besides regular security duties it was tasked to improve the traffic regulations in order to reduce the number of road accidents caused by the ill experienced Yugoslav drivers, since they had six in the first month of deployment! Unsuitably high speed was one of the main causes of incidents. One of the Yugoslav drivers killed a Bedouin on the road, and although the driver was not found guilty, Yugoslavia had to pay his family a significant sum of money. In another case, the driver of a bulldozer killed a cow belonging to a Bedouin tribe. The driver barely escaped with his life by shouting “Nasser- Tito!” and “Sava-Sava!” (Friends). The tribe sued the Yugoslavs for a sum six-times larger for the dead cow than in the previous case of the unlucky Bedouin.114

CHANGE OF UNIFORMS As noted earlier, the Odred was issued with standardized uniforms and personal gear in Zagreb. Due to the problems with British and French forces in Port Said, the Yugoslav headgear with red stars soon disappeared, giving way to various UN headgear. Photographs show that Yugoslav troops received some of the light blue UN helmets immediately on arrival in Port Said. Later, Yugoslav troops received elements of uniform from UNEF, such as side-pocketed trousers, service-caps and berets. The first Yugoslav troops were dressed in standard Yugoslav uniforms. Gradually they combined these with UNEF items, so that on the posts Yugoslav troops usually wore a mix of the Yugoslav uniform, UN baggy trousers with gaiters and UN headgear. Earlier Yugoslav contingents discovered that the UN light blue “plastic” helmets were light and offered better protection from the sun than any other headgear.115 Generally most of the UN items were discovered to be much more practical than similar Yugoslav items. By the beginning of the 1960s, uniforms with Yugoslav and UN markings and light blue berets were delivered to Yugoslavia prior to deployment.116 The UN items were used much more during the 1960s, though for ceremonial occasions and on leave Yugoslav servicemen used standard Yugoslav uniforms. For the Yugoslavs, unusual items included sunglasses and shirts with short sleeves, which were delivered to the troops.117 Serving with the 22nd Contingent, (the later) General Zorc described that they arrived in Sinai in their Yugoslav uniforms, where they exchanged them for UNEF uniforms: olive uniforms, linen trousers, fine shirts, blue berets and helmets. Zorc explained

The typical appearance of the Yugoslav servicemen in UNEF during the late 1950s was in total contrast to the uniforms used in the homeland. (UN 146020)

A Yugoslav captain issues the official post to a razvodnik (lance corporal) on a motorcycle. Both wear UNEF service caps and distinctive markings on their uniforms. (MCO)

that most of this type of uniform was produced in India, and that were problems with smaller sizes which were in short supply. Size adjustments were carried out by an old Arab and his sons who had served as a tailor, amongst other duties, in the Yugoslav camp since its establishment.118

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

President of Yugoslavia Tito met with the delegation of the Odred in 1958 while in Port Said. Commander of the 4th Contingent, Lt Colonel Ožbolt, shakes hands with his Supreme Commander. (MJ)

A Yugoslav officer and solider at an observation post on the International Frontier. Both have UNEF style uniform, helmets and are without gaiters. (MCO)

VISITS TO THE ODRED: UN GENERAL SECRETARY, MARSHAL TITO AND OTHER NOTABLES The UNEF mission was an important step not just for the UN but for several states which participated in the mission. It was a good opportunity for the leaders, politicians and generals to visit the troops in Sinai. The UN Secretary-General Dag Hamarskjold visited the Odred’s units twice. The first time was in December 1957 at the camp at Al Quseima. Hamarskjold arrived with General Burns and was welcomed by the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Korićanac.119 The next occasion was in December 1958 in its main base at elArish. In both visits, Hamarskjold praised the Yugoslav troops for the successful completion of their tasks.120 Next, Secretary-General U Thant visited the Odred in 1962. He dined with the Odred HQ and continued to Ismailia, on the Suez Canal, escorted by the Yugoslav military police.121 Senior UN diplomat and Nobel Peace Prize winner Dr Ralph Bunche made a four-day tour of UNEF in the summer of 1962. He was escorted by General Gyani and UNEF HQ staff officers including Yugoslav Colonel Branko Jerkić during the visit to the Yugoslav contingent. After a detailed inspection of el-Arish camp, Bunche addressed the gathered officers of UNEF HQ and the Yugoslav 12th Contingent stating that he was “deeply impressed with the discipline and standard which was created for your unit.” He stressed the difference and improvement of the camp since his first visit three years ago. The “Great confidence which we have towards your unit is visible in the fact that we have assigned you [the] most difficult task on Sinai.” He asked the Odred commanders to share Bunche’s “deep impressions to [the] soldiers on their behaviour and dedicated service to the peace.” 122 Doctor Bunche made another visit to the Yugoslav Odred’s 20th Contingent in July 1966, upon its arrival with UNEF. He visited the camp at el-Arish and inspected the Odred with General Rikhye.123

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Another visit by Tito to Egypt in April 1961 was a chance to meet with the Odred HQ. Here, officers of the 10th Contingent, headed by Colonel Sovilj, describe the map of the Yugoslav area of responsibility in Sinai to Tito. (MJ)

Indian Prime Minister Nehru, accompanied by UNEF’s second commander General Gyani, visited the Yugoslav Odred in May 1960. (MJ)

During the deployment of the Yugoslav Odred within the UNEF, Marshal Tito was the champion of the emerging nonaligned policy. He started to maintain frequent contact with several post-colonial state leaders in Yugoslavia or during his “Travels of Peace”, as they were portrayed to the Yugoslav public. Tito met with

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

General Burns arrives in el-Arish to visit the Yugoslav Odred. (MCO)

Odred members four times: in 1958, 1961, and 1962 and in 1964.124 In his trip to Asia aboard the ship Galeb, Tito met with representatives of the Odred in Port Said harbour. On 5 December 1958, he met both commanders: Lieutenant Colonels Jože Ožbolt, commander of the leaving 4th Contingent and Mirko Žutić commander of the newly arrived 5th Contingent.125 On 19 February 1962, Tito was welcomed at Cairo railway station by the commander of the 11th Contingent, Colonel Nikola Batinić, followed by Lt. Colonel Nikica Pilipović from UNEF HQ and Lt. Colonel Kadija Vučković, Yugoslav military attaché in Egypt. There was also a group of Odred members who were on vacation in Cairo, and they also met Tito. Batinić presented the salutations of the members of the Odred and an album of photographs, Tito replied with best wishes to all of the Yugoslav soldiers in the Odred. Batinić later toured his units’ camps and informed the soldiers of the meeting with Tito.126 In 1964, Tito was present at the second conference of the nonaligned states, held in Cairo. He met with the delegation of the Odred and showed interest in their daily activities, relations with the other contingents and local Egyptian authorities and other related questions.127 Although he visited Egypt in March 1965, Tito did not pay a visit to, or receive one from, the Yugoslav contingent in UNEF. It is interesting that Marshal Tito never took the opportunity to visit the Odred HQ in el-Arish. All of the visits took place in Port Said, with only the commanding personnel and chosen individuals. On the other hand, Yugoslav ambassador to Egypt, Josip Djerdja, was a kind of political coordinator for the initial deployment of the Odred to Sinai and he occasionally visited the Odred. In May 1959 he visited el-Arish and Al Quntilah, and Djerdja summarized the Yugoslav political expectations from the Odred with UNEF: “I am fully convinced that Odred JNA as a part of the UN forces is one of our greatest affirmations in this part of the world.”128 General Burns and later UNEF commanders were the most frequent visitors to the Odred. He was a frequent guest of each shift of the contingent and at “Medal Parades”. On 19 June 1959, General Burns visited and inspected the Yugoslav Odred (6th Contingent – that had arrived in May/June). He was welcomed at the el-Arish airfield by Lieutenant Colonel Rade Ranilović. For this purpose, the whole Odred was gathered in el-Arish for ten days, and Burns inspected all of the armament, vehicles and other equipment.129 The second commander of the UNEF, General Gyani, visited the Odred with his aides, after taking over the duty.130 Later, from October 1960, Gyani used to visit the Yugoslav contingent twice a year for the presentation of medals and to bid the soldiers farewell.131

General Gyani during the visit to the Yugoslav camp at el-Amr on 18 January 1962. Note the inevitable Marshal Tito portrait that adorned all of the Yugoslav premises. (MJ)

General Gyani inspects the Yugoslav 8th Contingent, 1960. Behind him is the commander of the contingent, Colonel Lt. Colonel Kržišnik. (UN 147108)

In April 1962, Gyani visited the Yugoslav camps at Al Quntila and Ras el Naqb and praised the morale of the Yugoslav soldiers:132 On arrival at el-Arish General Gyani took the salute and then in keeping with the Yugoslav Army tradition, he said “Zdravo vojnici”, meaning “Hello soldiers!” The soldiers replied “Zdravooo!” After inspecting the troops, Gen Gyani congratulated the men for their good work … [the] General presented [the] UNEF medal to the Yugoslav soldiers [actually to the commander and staff officers, and the Yugoslav Company commanders later to each of the soldiers] for successfully accomplishing their task and said: “it has been a great pleasure and an honour for me to have had you in UNEF and under my command, I have been very impressed with your high standard of discipline and efficiency and your enthusiasm and cooperation both on duty and in the various other UNEF activities and sports.133

Gyani paid his farewell visit to the Odred on 3 January 1964. His host was the commander of the 15th Contingent, Colonel Sareski. Gyani praised the Yugoslav contingent and stressed the good cooperation that he had with them during his tour of duty. Sareski, in response, thanked Gyani for the consideration which he showed to the contingents of the JNA that were part of UNEF.134 Brazilian General Saramento visited the Odred main base in elArish at the beginning of February 1965.135 General Rikhye made his

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

first visit to the Yugoslav Odred on 19 February 1966. He inspected the Yugoslav Odred main base, and the camps at Al Qunitlah and Ras el Naqb on 23 March 1966, showing his satisfaction at what he had seen in those camps and also visited Sharm el-Sheikh on 24 April 1966.136 Both generals would be present at each shift of the contingent and to distribute medals to the officers of the Odred. Other guests occasionally visited the Odred and its forward outposts, such as the Swedish ambassador to Egypt (1963), the ambassador of the United Arab Republic to the UN and the former liaison officer between the Egyptian government and UNEF, Amin Hilmy (1964).137 Interestingly, the Yugoslav top-brass were occasionally guests, but much less than would be expected.138

OFF DUTY It should be noted that the Yugoslav Army was created as the military arm of the Communist Partisan movement during the Second World War. The Communist organisation existed in the post-1945 army as an important ideological factor and in the first post-war decade almost as a parallel chain of command. In the 1956, when the Odred was deployed to UNEF, the Communist organisation was an important tool for maintaining the initial cohesion among the troops gathered in such a rush for this deployment. Later, the Yugoslav military authorities counted on the Communist Party organisation to be core to the life in the Odred, not just on duty, but even in their free time. At the beginning of the Odred’s deployment, specific emphasis was paid to political work with its members. Most of the free time of the first contingent was given over to political information and propaganda work explaining the situation in the Middle East and the role of the Yugoslav contingent in the peace process after the campaign of 1956.139 Later, as the deployment became routine and liaison with other contingents allowed a much easier approach to daily free time, other activities slowly became part of the everyday activities of the Yugoslav soldiers. Generally, Yugoslav soldiers started their working day at 06:00. On the hot summer days, work was organized in two shifts, from 07:00 to 10:00 and 17:00 to 19:00 hours.140 There was lots of free time for Tito’s soldiers living in the main camp in elArish. In the first period of the deployment of the Yugoslav Odred there tended to be organized free time. It included different sport activities, matches of all kinds and cultural activities such as

An improvised Odred band preparing folk music and revolutionary songs for the troops in el-Arish. (AC)

A folk band performs by the el-Arish camp radio. (AC)

Soldiers used empty cans and beer bottles to make a slogan in the sand “Long Live Comrade Tito” at el-Arish in 1957. (MJ)

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improvised theatre, and watching Yugoslav cinema.141 Following the general pattern of the socialist state and ideology, the army magazine Narodna armija always noted the activities and successes of the Odred members in various sports. The magazine also covered political activities and commented on events in the homeland, especially various Yugoslav communist party congresses and other assemblies, Tito’s foreign policy travels and meetings, and commemoration of the events from the Partisan revolutionary past. Yugoslav officials proudly pointed out that there were no cases of depression in the Odred, as was the case in some other contingents, and that its members’ focused on military discipline, carrying out the assigned tasks and missions, and spending free time in improving living conditions or in various cultural activities.142 In the distant camps, there was not much amusement besides the regular tasks of patrolling and observing the International Frontier. In the main base in el-Arish there were plenty of other activities, especially in the evening where gatherings and nightly film showings

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Even this traditional kolo dance in 1964 was adorned with Tito’s portrait. (MJ)

were organized. Besides the organized courses for driving, language, and photography, sport was encouraged and was the most practiced way of spending free time. It seems that film showings were the most appreciated way of spending the evenings, no matter that in most cases there were no subtitles. In the 1958, entertainment with music and funny sketches from Odred daily life was organized on three Saturday evenings per month. The Odred also had a camp radio program every evening. The library had some 300 books in 1958 and later in 1959 some 450.143 Soldiers of the Odred would also listen to Radio Belgrade or Radio Skoplje – which had a special broadcast for the Odred each Friday night. News and Yugoslav music were always welcome.144 As well as supplies, newspapers, mail, and the films were also taken from el-Arish or Rafah to the distant outposts manned by the Odred.145 In the summer of 1964, a group of Yugoslav artists led by renowned Zagreb musician Stjepan Mihaljinec, and female singers and dancers visited UNEF. They performed 14 concerts and shows for members of all of the contingents. Upon their return to Yugoslavia, the UNEF gazette Sand Dune commented:

Evening gatherings with quantities of beers unknown in Yugoslavia were a standard form of amusement on desert evenings. (AC)

The lively Yugoslav entertainers who have been singing and dancing their way through the hearts of UNEF’s lonely soldiers returned to Belgrade [on] Saturday, leaving behind them a number of sweet memories. Yugo entertainment groups always have been popular for their simple, charming and unsophisticated approach.146

The most favoured way of spending free time was to engage in sport activities. Yugoslavia placed enormous stress on chess and collective sports at this contemporary time. Articles in the Yugoslav military weekly Narodna armija reported the achievements of the Odred members in the sports competitions. In the 1960s, UNEF organised bi-annual sports competitions in Deir el Balah camp that usually lasted for several days.147 No matter the real degree of success of the players, the Yugoslavs always praised their sporting successes and the cups and medals won.148 On each 22 December, the Yugoslav contingent organized a celebration of its Army Day at el-Arish camp. This was usually a cocktail party and lunch followed by music, in many cases from a band that had come from the homeland to play “music for invitees to dance”.149 There were a whole line of holidays and important days throughout the year which were celebrated by the members of the Odred: the Day of the Republic (29 November), May Day (1 May), Day of the Uprising in 1941 (4 July), Days of the various Socialist Republics that Yugoslavia was made up of (7, 13, 22 and 27 July, 11 October). Even the International Day of Women was

A group of Yugoslav entertainers toured UNEF in the summer of 1962 and was welcomed by all of the troops for obvious reasons. (Sand Dune)

celebrated on 8 March at el-Arish with dance, songs and speeches celebrating female figures from the Partisan and revolutionary struggles.150 Finally, there was the celebration of New Year’s Eve. All of these “days” were occasion for celebrations with an ideological slant, but also offered an opportunity to invite the members of other contingents as guests. And vice versa. The Yugoslavs frequently visited the Indian contingent from the camp at Dahr el Balah in the Gaza Strip on

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

Yugoslav and Finnish troops heading for leave in Cairo or Beirut. (MCO)

spend free time and to get much more acquainted with the Middle Eastern culture and tradition. For contingents – except maybe for the 1st or 2nd – excursions were organised to the Pyramids in the vicinity of Cairo, and to other Egyptian cities: Alexandria, Ismailia, Port Said, Gaza and even Luxor. Visits were also organized to Beirut and Damascus. Later on, all of the members had seven days of mandatory vacation which was spent in Cairo or Beirut.155 Yugoslav contingents used to visit the monument at el-Shat, where during the Second World War there was a refugee camp for Yugoslavs, mostly from Dalmatia. In Cairo, under the rules of UNEF, officers, NCOs and soldiers were separated into different hotels, which were paid for by UNEF. Officers had the opportunity to enjoy their leave in civilian clothes, contrary to other ranks.156 In Beirut there was a hotel run by Georges Awadi who separated part of his establishment into a so-called “Yugo Villa”. From 1962, Yugoslav servicemen would use this villa for a mandatory vacation. They were ferried by RCAF transport planes over the sea directly to Beirut, avoiding Israeli territory, sometimes landing in Gaza to pick up other UNEF members.157

CHALLENGES TO COMMUNIST MORALE

A letter from home. (MCO)

every celebration of the Indian Day of Independence.151 The UN day was also celebrated annually at the Gaza camp on 24 October. Each of the contingents dispatched a unit for this ceremony, for example, the Yugoslav Odred sent a company of 81 men to this celebration in 1961. 152 To relieve the monotony of the daily routine, opportunities were made to visit other contingents. The Yugoslav contingent organized vesele večeri (Funny Evenings) with anecdotes and music. The Swedish contingent organized “Bengal Fires” for their contingent, and the others as well, with singing and barbecue.153 Every Saturday the Brazilians held a “Gaucho night” complete with barbecue and music from guitars. There were functions on all “national days” some of which were impressive. The Norwegians, on the occasion of King Olav’s birthday, obtained infantry uniforms dating from the early nineteenth century from their military museum in Oslo, and dressed a guard-of-honour in those. The events were always colourful, the Indians in “blues” with coloured turbans, the Brazilians, Canadians, Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes in khaki, and the Colombians and Yugoslavs in grey. ‘The pipe-band from the Indian parachute battalion, in scarlet and tartan, playing “The Road to the Isles” and other Scottish airs seemed incongruous, but was effective.’ The accent in the UNEF was on co-operation, and social affairs such as these promoted tolerance and understanding.154 Occasional excursions and visits to other contingents or to different cities or historical sites in Egypt were a good opportunity to

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One of the problems regarding free time which the authorities of the Yugoslav HQ had to face was prostitution. It was a challenge to the proclaimed values of Tito’s soldiers and back home in Yugoslavia prostitution did not openly exist. Now the Yugoslav soldiers were faced with a real challenge. In some of the towns that they visited, soldiers were openly invited by a simple offer of “Zigi, Zigi?” When on leave in some Middle East cities, they were an attraction for prostitutes who looked upon them as inevitable customers. The JNA officials had a dilemma: to ban such contacts or to take preventative action. As General Kranjc remembered, the Odred HQ tried to prevent the men from making use of the prostitutes’ services when on leave, by explaining the negative consequences. First, the commander’s aides explained that prostitution was alien to the morals of socialist army soldiers. Then they informed the men about cases of other UNEF members robbed or attacked while on “sexual leave” – as those endeavours were called in UNEF. Finally, a doctor – who was the chief of the Odred medical service – informed the soldiers and NCOs about various sexually transmitted diseases that they may catch on the streets of Cairo or Beirut; then he distributed to each man a package of condoms explaining how to use them. This last step was most effective as it actually caused most of the soldiers to lose their desire for sexual exploits.158 Kranjc writes that he had took his platoon on the leave in Beirut to the hotel the Yugoslav contingent used for its servicemen. As they were going into the city, they stopped in one of the best French brothels. The madame introduced Tito’s soldiers to the different types of ladies available in her premises. When she asked who wanted to use the services of her ladies, there was silence: nobody “volunteered”! She asked Kranjc from which country they came, and he showed the Yugoslav red-star flag on the sleeve. The madame waved her hand, cursed the communists and turned her back to the surprised soldiers. Kranjc wrote that his soldiers much preferred the strip-tease or can-can dance in “Casino du Lebanon” rather than the brothel.159 A captain of the 5th Contingent, Nikola Barzić, remembers that one of the soldiers of the Engineer Company was caught inside a suspicious brothel and during an attempt to rob him was severely beaten, such that he was later returned to Yugoslavia as incapable for further service.160 No matter the proclaimed socialist values of the Yugoslav Army, amongst the regular duties in a decade of service it was soon

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

Lieutenant Petković of the 19th Contingent amused by magazines that were unknown in Yugoslavia at that time. (G. Petković collection)

discovered that some of the NCOs and soldiers – mostly drivers – used the canteen to buy cigarettes or sprits, and hid them in their vehicles to sell them on at five-times the price to the locals. General Kranjc, who was chief of the Military Police Platoon was tasked to investigate such activities. The chief of the canteen in the 12th Contingent was an NCO, belonging not to the quartermaster corps as it should be, but to military security. He noted which NCO or soldier brought what, and passed the information to the Odred’s military police, who stopped the vehicles of the noted drivers at the exit of el-Arish camp. The smugglers were punished with confinement to the camp prison on the next day, but the punishments were read aloud to the soldiers during evening roll-calls and this much reduced the smuggling activities. Kranjc wrote that to their general surprise the Odred commander, Colonel Berberina, was actually the main smuggler. He went in “business” in an illegal trade of so-called Montgomery raincoats from a merchant in Beirut, earning several thousands of dollars. He was arrested after the ship with the 12th Contingent arrived in Rijeka harbour.161 For most of the Odred soldiers serving with the UNEF, this was a chance to go abroad, mostly for the first time. To see and experience the sea, travel by ship or aircraft, to communicate with different people from all around the globe… For some of them, who were part of the first or the last contingent, even to witness the war or its consequences. No matter the attempts at ideological control over the daily routine and, moreover, the soldier’s free time, the impact and influences of the “free world” were visible from films and music that were seen in the possibility to purchase modern technical

Service with UNEF soon became a kind of privilege for the JNA servicemen, due to larger salaries and the possibility of obtaining different goods and technical devices still rare in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Here, the return of a contingent in the late 1950s shows soldiers and NCOs with additional baggage filled with such purchases that were being taken back home. (RJ)

devices and improve foreign language skills. Finally, to get used to small luxuries at that time unknown in Tito’s Yugoslavia, such as ice in drinks, drinking previously unknown and different beverages and beers – Danish most notably – different kind of juices and finally, Coca Cola.162 Since the JNA maintained the Odred with UNEF for a whole decade, participation in later contingents became a kind of reward for younger officers, NCOs or soldiers. Back at home members of the contingent received their usual salary with a bonus for those with family for “separated life.” In UNEF they received monthly payment in Egyptian pounds. No matter the fact that Yugoslav officers in later contingents were downgraded by one rank in order to save foreign currency, General Kranjc, who served with UNEF in 1962, wrote that his colleagues already knew that officers could earn enough money to buy a modest new car, NCOs to buy motorcycle, and soldiers a bike. Kranjc wrote that he managed to spare enough money to buy a new DKW Junior automobile. Members of the Yugoslav contingent could also obtain a range of different appliances or technical devices for home and clothes for them or their spouses and families. Kranjc wrote that besides the car he had purchased a typewriter, shaver, transistor-radio, magnetophone, and TV set – all made by Phillips – and a refrigerator, stove, and vacuum cleaner all made by AEG, as he summarized the benefits of his seven month tour in Sinai.163

MISSION TO YEMEN (UNYOM) While in UNEF, the Yugoslav contingent did have one redeployment to another mission, and this was a frequent practice

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Arabia to end activities in support of the royalists in Yemen and the intention of Egypt to withdraw its troops from that country.165 The Yugoslav Odred in Yemen was formed on 24 June 1963.166 It consisted of 118 servicemen, including 22 officers, 17 NCOs and 79 soldiers, both from UNEF and the JNA in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. The preparations for the JNA officers were as brief as were those for the already deployed members of UNEF. It was considered that taking personnel that were already in UNEF was a good idea, since they already had some kind of experience. The news that arrived from Yemen about the uncertainty of the situation caused some dilemma among the UNEF Yugoslav personnel, who hesitated to go on an unsafe mission. After some pressure and further explanations, the Odred was ready for deployment. Generally, as was the case in 1956, the decision on the Yugoslav participation was brief, and the UNYOM Odred sailed for Yemen without clear knowledge of what they should expect in this country.167 The merchant ship Zemun, which sailed from Rijeka, brought armament, vehicles and equipment for the UNYOM Odred, sized as reconnaissance company. It was boarded by the Odred in Egypt and the ship proceeded to Hodeida in Yemen. During the sailing, the preparations continued. After unloading, the Odred was deployed over the buffer zone: HQ and one platoon in Najran, another platoon at Sadi and third in Gizan in Saudi Arabia.168 The Yugoslav reconnaissance troops and the Canadian air contingent of two Caribous and three Otters were all in place by 20 July 1963.169 The full strength of this mission was 189 military personnel, including 25 military observers, 114 officers and other ranks from the Yugoslav reconnaissance unit, and 50 officers and other ranks of the Yugoslav Major Popović (second from left), Commanding Officer of the Najran detachment of UNYOM, is seen Canadian air unit; supported holding a meeting at the conclusion of an air patrol in June-July 1963. (UN 159703) by international and local civilian staff. The contributing states were: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ghana, India, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden and, as we see by the figures, mostly Yugoslavia. The force commanders where Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn (Sweden) between July and August 1963, Colonel Branko Pavlović (Yugoslavia) (Acting) from August to September 1963, LieutenantGeneral P.S. Gyani (India), from September to November 1963. They were followed A Yugoslav UNYOM patrol aboard Zastava/Fiat AR-55 Campagnolas, leaving the Najran camp. (UN 159704) by chiefs of staff, acting as for other UNEF contingents, too. On 21 June 1961, a contingent consisting of Yugoslav Air Force personnel was dispatched to Congo and took part in the ONUC mission.164 This mission had no connection with the Yugoslav contingent in UNEF, no matter that the Canadian air transport unit from el-Arish was engaged. In 1963 however, the Yugoslav contingent within UNEF would redeploy in part to the UN mission that was organized in Yemen, after the clashes between two fractions supported by United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. The official date of the implementation of United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was established on 4 July 1963. The function and authority of UNYOM as defined in the agreement were considerably more limited than in the case of other United Nations observation missions. Its establishment was not based on any ceasefire agreement and there was no ceasefire to supervise. The tasks of UNYOM were limited strictly to observing, certifying and reporting in connection with the intention of Saudi

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UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

commanders: Colonel Branko Pavlović (Yugoslavia) in November 1963 and Colonel S.C. Sabharwal (India), between November 1963 and September 1964.170 The task of the Yugoslav Odred/Recce Company was to monitor and stop infiltration from Saudi Arabia, which supported the Yemeni royalists. The buffer zone was 20 kilometres wide from either side of Saudi-Yemen border, and 300 kilometres long. It was immediately realised that the Odred would not be sufficient for the scope and size of the mission and territory.171 UNYOM used a system of mobile recce patrols manned by the Yugoslav troops and air observation performed by the Canadian air unit. Yugoslav patrols consisted of 3-4 vehicles with 15-18 troops, including communications, engineers and medical personnel. Average patrol distances were around 120 kilometres. The conditions were not in favour of the mission. The Yugoslavs discovered daily transfers of weaponry from Saudi Arabia carried out by vehicles, camels or donkeys. The weapon and equipment delivered was from all parts of the Western world, which was contrary to UN decisions. The Saudis disliked the Yugoslav peacekeepers, since they were treated as the allies of the Egyptians. On the other hand, the Yugoslav Odred tried to maintain the standpoint formulated in UN resolutions, and to show that they were not biased towards any side in their mission.172 The living conditions at Quizan and Najran were described as primitive. At Quizan the men were billeted in a former meteorological office and subjected to intense heat. At Najran, tents were used for accommodation and the men suffered from “constantly blowing sand and dust”. The Yugoslavs provided the messing for both units and the food was “reported to be good”. The headquarters contingent and crews of the Caribous were billeted in a former hotel at Sana’a but in very crowded living conditions. Their messing was hard rations supplemented by soft rations. The Canadian UNEF 115th ATU and crews from UNOC were in Yemen only six months – but a long 6 months – then flew back to el-Arish. It was said by those who “served and suffered” in Yemen that the camp at el-Arish was a “sight for sore eyes”.173 Contrary to the UNEF mission, where the JNA Odred was completely equipped with MDAP/US vehicles, in this mission, the Yugoslav Army decide to use their locally produced vehicles and equipment. The UNYOM Odred was equipped with 35 Zastava (FIAT) AR-55 Campagnola all-terrain vehicles, 24 one-tone trailers, field kitchens and tents. Camagnolas were not prepared for usage in the desert, which caused a range of problems in their extensive daily usage. The Odred did not have a mobile workshop – which meant that maintenance was extremely difficult. The weaponry suffered mostly from corrosion due to the high level of humidity. The Yugoslav-made field-kitchen used timber, which was lacking in the desert, and the tents were not suitable for the desert and almost literally turned into ovens in the daily sun. Water was scarce and the possibility of bathing was limited. Food was also simplified and mostly dry, which also influenced morale and affected digestion among the non-acclimatised Yugoslav soldiers. Finally, the Odred developed a medical station for its own and the Canadian air unit’s purposes and also served the local population.174 The mandate of UNYOM ended on 4 September 1964 and its personnel and equipment were withdrawn.175 According to all sources, it turned out to be a mission with difficult conditions and a discouraging outcome.

ODRED CASUALTIES As a whole, UNEF suffered 110 fatalities over the course of its deployment in Egypt and Gaza. The casualties occurred as a result of land mines, mistaken exchange of fire with Egyptian or Israeli units, road accidents, and at the end of the mission in the fighting during the 1967 War.176 Although deployed over Sinai immediately after the withdrawal of Israeli forces, moving through the unknown terrain and facing the threat of minefields, the 1st Contingent of the Yugoslav Odred did not have any casualties during deployment. Unexpectedly, most of the incidents occurred after the initial deployment during 1957. The first incident occurred on 26 March 1957 when a Dodge,

A Yugoslav Dodge 3/4t destroyed in an incident at ADL around Rafah. Both officers were heavy wounded. (MCO)

Wounded officers in the Canadian hospital. (AC)

Wounded JNA servicemen were transferred back to Yugoslavia. Here, at Belgrade airport in 1957. (MCO)

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them 19 were wounded in minefields and the rest of them in other incidents, mostly traffic.181

Table 4: Yugoslav Odred/Battalion Commanders

A GMC lorry, assigned to the Engineers Company, which was hit a land mine on 18 June 1957. It was the worse incident involving the Yugoslav Odred during its whole deployment. (MCO)

Arrival of the aircraft carrying the body of Yugoslav solider Ranko Milić, killed in an accident that occurred on 18 June 1957. (MCO)

which was taking rations for the soldiers at a check point near elBatur, hit a land mine. Both soldiers were contused but survived, while the Dodge was severely damaged.177 On 20 May 1957, a vehicle carrying JNA Captain Vuksanović and observer Major Morgan was dispatched to check the area around Rafah where Israeli soldiers had crossed ADL. The vehicle hit a land mine and both officers were heavy contused, and the vehicle destroyed.178 A month later, on 18 June 1957, the most serious incident occurred when a GMC lorry of the Engineer Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Marković, hit two mines in the frontier area. In the blast from the mine, one Yugoslav soldier was killed, while six were heavily wounded and eight more lightly injured. Another Dodge was damaged when it hit a mine on the road towards Al Quntilah. Nobody was hurt, luckily.179 In total, the Yugoslav Odred lost eight servicemen: two officers and six soldiers up to the end of the deployment. Lieutenant Branislav Gavrilović from the 19th Contingent was killed in an air crash that occurred at 10:45 on 25 April 1966 on the International Frontier. The aircraft, which was patrolling from el-Arish over el-Quntila to Ras el Naqb, crashed soon after taking off from elQuntila camp, killing three of the four on board.180 Previously, in 1961, another lieutenant had committed suicide. Three soldiers died in separate incidents in 1960 – one drowned in the sea, one killed in a blaze and third in a traffic incident – and two more in 1965 – one hit by lightning and another died from cancer. A total of 56 Yugoslav servicemen were injured in the 11 years of service: five officers, five NCOs and 46 soldiers. Among

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Commanding Officer

Odred

Colonel Nikola Radošević

1st

Colonel Bogdan Korićanac

2nd

Colonel Ljubomir Kljakić

3rd

Lt Col Jože Ožbolt

4th

Lt Col Mirko Žutić

5th

Lt Col Rade Ranitović

6th

Lt Col Jovan Kokot

7th

Lt Col Ljubo Kržišnik

8th

Lt Col Vlado Simić

9th

Colonel Dušan Sovilj

10th

Lt Col Nikola Batinić

11th

Colonel Djuro Berberina

12th

Colonel Mišo Martinović

13th

Colonel Branko Pavlović

14th

Colonel Zdravko Tajević

15th

Colonel Čedo Djukić

16th

Lt Col Ivan Japeli

17th

Colonel Milo Čubrilo

18th

Lt Col Miloje Stoiljković

19th

Colonel Nikola Crevar

20th

Colonel Srdjan Pražić

21st

Colonel Slavko Djurdjević

22nd

5

THE SIX-DAY WAR AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF EGYPT FORCES UNEF TO LEAVE1 May 1967 brought a rise in the tensions between Israel and the Arab states and on the borders where troops were concentrated. As a member of the last contingent, the 22nd, Lieutenant Zorc remembered that after the arrival of this contingent, tensions were already high and that Sinai became an Egyptian military zone, where its army deployed troops, tanks and armoured vehicles along the International Frontier and alongside some UNEF units. UNEF radio-communications were monitored by both sides and there was no routine leave allowed.2 Israel started to mass its forces at the border with Egypt and this was followed by intense political activities in the international community. Both superpowers also engaged; the Soviets backed the Egyptians while the United States alerted its Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Tito’s Yugoslavia also joined the diplomatic efforts. Tito and Nasser were close collaborators for many years and Yugoslavia played an active part in wider negotiations. The United Nations called for peace. These events would mark the beginning of the withdrawal of the UNEF forces. In some locations, Egyptian troops took up positions in the

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

“immediate vicinity” of the observation posts of the Yugoslav troops or near UNEF deployment camps in el-Sabha, el-Amr and el-Qusaima, causing some friction and uncertainty. General Rikhye’s immediate intervention to persuade the Egyptian troops to keep their distance from the UNEF detachments – which they did – and Egypt’s close friendship with Yugoslavia kept a potentially dangerous situation from leading to a possible military confrontation.3 On the evening of 16 May, UNEF Commander General Rikhye received a request from the Egyptian Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces for the withdrawal of “all UN troops which installed OPs [observation posts] along our borders”. The general who handed the message to the force commander told him that UNEF must order an immediate withdrawal from el-Sabha and Sharm el Sheikh, commanding the Strait of Tiran and therefore access to the Red Sea and southern Israel, and both controlled by the Yugoslav contingent. Rikhye replied that he did not have authority to do that. The Secretary-General, on being informed, gave instructions to the Commander to be “firm in General Rikhye salutes the Yugoslav troops belonging to the 21st Contingent prior to their return to Yugoslavia, maintaining UNEF positions after their gathering in el-Arish between 20 and 23 May 1967. (MJ) while being as understanding and as diplomatic as possible in your relations with local UAR had occupied the UN observation post at el-Sabha and that the [United Arab Republic] officials”.4 Yugoslav camps at el-Quseima and el-Sabha were now behind the General Rikhye sent a note on the development of the situation positions of the Army of the United Arab Republic. Rikhye informed to the Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant, and ordered the the Chief of the UAR Liaison Staff of these developments, expressing commander of the Yugoslav Odred to begin a build-up of combat his serious concern at them. The UAR general agreed to the request readiness. The commander of the departing 21st Contingent, Lt for the immediate evacuation of the observation post at el-Sabha Colonel Pražić, was still in charge. The Yugoslav Odred should by UAR troops and shortly thereafter reported that orders to this remain in its positions but avoid any kind of incident with Egyptian effect had been given by their military authorities. He requested, forces and was not to use force in case the Egyptians forced them to however, that to avoid any further misunderstandings, the Yugoslav observation post at el-Sabha should be withdrawn immediately to leave the posts. They could contact Rikhye at any time.5 On 17 May at 08:00 hours, General Rikhye reported that, on el-Quseima camp. Rikhye replied that any such withdrawal would the morning of 17 May, thirty soldiers of the Army of the United require the authorization of the Secretary-General. Two hours later, at 12:00, the Chief of the UAR Liaison Staff at Arab Republic had occupied el-Sabha in Sinai and that United Arab Republic troops were deployed in the immediate vicinity of the this time conveyed to General Rikhye a request from General Mohd UNEF observation post there. Three armoured cars of the United Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the UAR Armed Forces, for the withdrawal Arab Republic were located near the Yugoslav camp at el-Sabha and of the Yugoslav detachments of UNEF in Sinai within twentydetachments of fifteen soldiers each had taken up positions north four hours. He added that the UNEF Commander might take “48 hours or so” to withdraw detachment from Sharm el-Sheikh. The and south of the Yugoslav contingent’s camp at el-Amr. At 10:30 Rikhye reported that troops of the United Arab Republic Rikhye replied that any such move required instructions from the

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Fraternity that the new war in June 1967 would erase in just a few days: Yugoslav UNEF and Egyptian troops posing together in Sinai. (Matjaž Bizjak collection)

Secretary-General. At this date he held an informal meeting in his office with the representatives of countries providing contingents to UNEF to inform them of the situation as then known. Early on 18 May, the UNEF sentries attempting to man the normal observation post at el-Sabha in Sinai were prevented from entering the post and from remaining in the area by UAR soldiers. The sentries were then forced to withdraw. They did not attempt to make use of force because they had no mandate to do so. At 11:00, UAR soldiers forced Yugoslav UNEF sentries out of their observation post on the International Frontier in front of el-Kuntilla Camp. One hour later, United Arab Republic officers arrived at the water point and asked UNEF soldiers to withdraw the guard. At 12:10, the UAR officers landed aboard a helicopter near the Yugoslav camp at Sharm el-Sheikh and informed the Commanding Officer that they had come to take over the camp and the UNEF observation post at Ras Nasrani, demanding a reply within 15 minutes. The contingent commander replied that he had no instructions to hand over the positions. Ten minutes later, at 12:20, the UAR soldiers entered the UNEF observation post on the International Frontier in front of el-Amr Camp and forced the Yugoslav soldiers to withdraw. Later, two United Arab Republic officers visited el-Amr Camp and asked the Yugoslav platoon to withdraw within fifteen minutes. Sometime later, around 14:30, the Yugoslav detachment at elQuseima Camp reported that two artillery shells, apparently ranging rounds from the United Arab Republic artillery, had burst between the Yugoslav camps at el-Quseima and el-Sabha. At 16:00 the Secretary-General received the following message from Mr. Mahmoud Riad, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, via the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic: The Government of the United Arab Republic has the honour to inform Your Excellency that it has decided to terminate the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force from the territory of the United Arab Republic and Gaza Strip. Therefore, I request that the necessary steps be taken for the withdrawal of the force as soon as possible.6

In the meantime, the Egyptian Foreign Minister in Cairo summoned the representatives of the nations with troops in UNEF to inform them that UNEF had terminated its tasks in Egypt and the Gaza Strip and must depart forthwith. The governments of India and Yugoslavia decided that, whatever the decision of the SecretaryGeneral, they would withdraw their contingents from UNEF.7

54

Formal instructions relating to the withdrawal of UNEF were sent to General Rikhye by the Secretary-General on the night of 18 May.8 Upon receiving these instructions, the Yugoslav Odred started to withdraw its forces on the 19 and 20 May from their five posts. Small ceremonies were held in the camps alongside the International Frontier. At Al Kunitlah, a ceremony was held near the monument which marked the place where Lieutenant Gavrilović was killed in the crash of the Canadian aircraft observation flight several years earlier. The light blue UN flag was taken down and Yugoslav troops packed their belongings and headed toward the main base at el-Arish through the positions of the already deployed UAR forces. The Egyptians provided additional vehicles for the evacuation of camps in all cases.9 In their reports, the Yugoslavs continued to approve Egyptian political and military movements and explained that they were still surrounded by “hospitality and respect” (!). They firmly believed that their status would provide them “full safety in every respect, and [the] status of guest which is extremely valued”. They claimed that they could continue to move freely and without limits over Sinai, since they had built relations on a “firm friendly basis in mutual interests to preserve peace.” Yugoslav military officials tried to explain the UAR decision to the members of the Odred and to the Yugoslav public, as their sovereign and legitimate right to react to the deployment of the Israeli forces on their territory. They concluded that it was not caused by the “weakness and inefficiency” of UNEF. Yugoslav expectations were two-fold: that some kind of balance of power should be established in the forthcoming days or that in case of Israeli attack, they would be faced with the “excellently armed well trained and disciplined forces of UAR. Especially forces of the Palestinian Liberation Army.” The departure of the last UNEF member was expected to occur around 20 June 1967.10 It is fascinating how the Yugoslav military authorities did not register the changes in the situation on the ground and firmly backed every UAR military-political movement. A group of world-wide journalists, among them a few Yugoslavs, were taken to Sinai to observe the preparations and combat readiness of UAR forces that were deployed in Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Generally, the impressions of the UAR forces were positive and a picture was created that their army was strong, Sinai and Gaza were under firm Egyptian control and that the Arabs would easily manage to cope with any Israeli threat. Although the population was belligerent towards journalists, shouting Nasser’s name and slogans against the Unites States and Israel, the word “Tito” caused most of them to frenetically shout “Tito-Nasser” slogans. The Yugoslav journalists came to the firm belief that the Egyptians “could not be surprised.”11 Up to 4 June, the Yugoslav Odred consisted of the second half of the 21st Contingent and first half of the 22nd Contingent. On that day, 2/21st Contingent left Port Said and headed to Yugoslavia.12 The 1/22nd Contingent remained in el-Arish. Prior to this evacuation, the members of the Odred spent the last days of May in building trenches and cover and laying telephone wire alongside the perimeters of their camp. The members of the Odred trained to rush to the trenches and cover in the night and without lights, taking just personal weapons and water.13 This would turn out to be a life-saving measure in forthcoming days. On the evening of 4 June it was agreed that a total of 310 Yugoslav troops would be evacuated on 19 June from Port Said aboard Jugoslavija. Commander of the Odred, Colonel Djurdjević prepared for farewell gifts to be exchanged with other UNEF contingents!14

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

THE YUGOSLAV ODRED CONFINED TO CAMP DURING THE SIX-DAY WAR At 07:15, 5 June 1967, while the Yugoslav soldiers were carrying out their routine morning duties, Israeli aircraft flew over the el-Arish camp. The Egyptians in their nearby air base opened fire with antiaircraft weapons. The Yugoslavs were alarmed, and soldiers rushed to the trenches and available cover. The Officer of the Day reported: “It was not clear what was going on.” The telephone connection was cut at 11:15, just as the Odred HQ reported to Belgrade on the situation.15 A new Israeli-Arab War had just started. The Israeli Air Force launched a massive attack on UAR air bases over Sinai and across the Egyptian mainland. No matter the growing tensions, nobody in the Yugoslav UNEF contingent expected that war would break out so suddenly and that Israel would make such a decisive move. Even more so, it was a total surprise for Yugoslav military representatives in Cairo and the Military Intelligence Service in Belgrade, no matter that the Odred had been deployed for almost eleven years on the Egyptian-Israeli border.16 During the cease-fire, lunch was served to the confused Yugoslav soldiers. Suddenly, during the meal, Israeli forces opened machinegun fire on the Egyptian soldiers at the other side of the UNEF camp. “Most of the [Yugoslav] soldiers were really frightened!” Machinegun fire quickly turned into artillery fire and Israeli tanks started to shell the Egyptians, damaging Yugoslav vehicles and hitting a fuel truck. Yugoslavs observed as Egyptian soldiers took off their uniforms and fled to their rear wearing civilian clothing. Later in the afternoon, word came over the radio about casualties among the Indian UNEF contingent at Rafah. During the night Israeli forces continue to shell the Egyptians, while the Yugoslavs

remained in their trenches.17 Upon the initiation of the Israeli air and ground attacks on UNEF positions, causing serious casualties, General Rikhye sent a cable to the Israeli chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin, via the UN office in Jerusalem, asking him to “order your forces, especially your aircraft, to take special care to avoid inflicting further unnecessary casualties on UNEF personnel.”18 As General Zorc (at that time a lieutenant in the Odred HQ) recalls, he was maintaining radio-communication with UNEF HQ at Gaza and with the Indian camp in Rafah. He reported on the movements and clashes around the el-Arish camp and recommunicated the news from the Indian contingent, with whom UNEF HQ had lost the radio connection. Zorc was the one who reported on casualties among the Indians caused by the Israeli advance. He remembered that the Yugoslav soldiers moved back off the road which passed through the el-Arish camp to a much more distant part of the camp. The idea was to avoid being caught in the exchange of fire and to remain out of reach of passing armoured vehicles. The Yugoslavs dug in to the sand with what they had at their disposal. Vehicles and other properties remained in the middle of camp and were destroyed or looted. Since part of the Odred HQ and commander Djurdjević remained in barracks, the Yugoslavs started to paint large letters “UN” or “We are in” on the side of the barracks and on the wooden roofs. Water started to run out and since there was no electricity, the refrigerators did not work. Cans of beer and other beverages almost boiled in the heat.19 During the afternoon, the battle between Israeli and UAR forces raged near by the camp. Some of the buildings and many vehicles were hit or damaged by Israeli fire. Colonel Djurdjević had the most difficult task: he did not know what the situation was and where

Yugoslavs digging-in in the sand at the beginning of June 1967. (Odred JNA na Sinaju)

Making improvised shelters. (Odred JNA na Sinaju)

Warnings painted on the barracks for the Israeli Forces: “UN”, “Don’t Shoot” and “We are in.”, 5-6 June 1967. (Odred JNA na Sinaju)

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the front – if any – was. He commanded young soldiers who had just passed their initial training and were deployed to Sinai just a few weeks ago. He ordered his officers to gather for instructions at 17:00. When they gathered, sudden artillery shelling forced Djurdjević to order his officers “Into shelters!” Sometime later, Israeli tanks opened fire on the camp entrance, forcing the Yugoslav soldiers who were on duty to run for cover. On the other side of the camp, another soldier who was on watch was disarmed and briefly kept in custody until the Israelis were assured that he was really a Yugoslav.20 At 18:25, the Yugoslavs tried to dispatch a column of their vehicles to Rafah to collect a 15-day ration of fuel, oil and food. Low flying Israeli aircraft forced the column to return back to camp. After 20:00, an Israeli armoured column destroyed an Egyptian supply unit some 500 metres east of the camp. They continued to shell the camp and destroyed more of the Yugoslav Odred’s vehicles, including two fuel/water tankers. Colonel Djurdjević was ordered by Belgrade to take all precautions for the personnel’s security and to keep his soldiers unhurt. He was even tasked to organize the air defence of the camp! The merchant ship Dalmacija, which was in Port Said harbour, was ordered to remain and await the evacuation of the Odred. During the night, General Rikhye called the Odred HQ and suggested that the Yugoslav contingent should withdraw to some safer UNEF camp. The Yugoslav commander refused suggestion. Rikhye than proposed that the Yugoslav contingent abandon its camp and move to the beach of the Mediterranean to avoid further shelling and to await ships for evacuation. However, the Yugoslavs turned down this proposal too. Instead, the troops remained in their trenches, with limited knowledge of the wider situation and with ever decreasing water supplies. In the early morning of 6 June, Israeli troops entered the UN camp in el-Arish and remained for some time at the Odred’s football ground. Some of their troops opened fire on the barracks. This incident was followed by the passage of several Israeli armoured columns during the following hours. Yugoslav officers avoided any contact with Israeli officers who appeared and offered some assistance: instead, the troops remained in their trenches where a meal was served. It was estimated that there was enough food and water for two days longer.21 The camp was in the middle of an exchange of fire between Israeli and Egyptian positions. When Israeli forces started their advance, Colonel Djurdjević made a determined move, he abandoned the trenches and went out in front of the advancing Israeli column. It was at great risk and showed personal courage, but it proved a necessary measure to prompt the Israelis to stop firing at the camp. Of course, no matter what was agreed with one commander, almost every other tank column that passed by el-Arish opened fire at the camp – at least with machine guns. It was pure good fortune that none among the Yugoslav soldiers was wounded.22 Colonel Djurdjevic was subsequently highly praised by the soldiers for his behaviour; he repeatedly faced the Israeli troops with the intention of stopping them, while preserving the dignity of his unit.23 The Yugoslavs later complained about the behaviour of the Israeli Defence Force, which obviously failed to pay attention to the status of the peacekeepers; they took away the UN flag from elArish camp, forcing the Yugoslav troops to re-raise it several times. A sign with the inscription “Yugoslav Reconnaissance Battalion” was riddled with bullets and the Israelis attempted to seize the entire camp and to capture the Odred’s radio station – which the Yugoslavs managed to prevent.24

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Damaged Yugoslav vehicles in el-Arish camp, 5-8 June 1967. (Odred JNA na Sinaju)

A fire-damaged Yugoslav Bedford RL lorry, 5-8 June 1967. (Odred JNA na Sinaju)

Lieutenant Zorc remembered that the problem with the Israeli forces was that they were advancing further, and the majority of their columns had to pass the el-Arish camp because this was situated on the main road from Gaza to Suez. Advancing Israeli forces noted from a distance that this was some kind of military camp and in most cases approached – and, sometimes, entered – in combat order. Thus, the Yugoslav officers were forced to establish contact with each of the advancing Israeli columns to explain that they were UN forces waiting to be evacuated. Zorc would leave the dunes and talk with the officers leading each column. The questions were always the same: Who’s there? Why you are there? What are you doing? Are there Egyptian soldiers in the camp? It was a dangerous

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

task since no one could tell if someone from the advancing column would just ‘pull the trigger’. The other problem was the fact that Yugoslavia’s Tito had already condemned the Israeli aggression. Zorc said that after the first surprise and some misunderstanding, Israeli officers generally acted in a professional manner; they did always ask about hidden Egyptian soldiers, though. He recalled one dramatic moment during the negotiations: [The] whole procedure lasted [a] long [time] and in one moment it happened that someone opened fire on the Israelis from the rear of our camp. It really looked like that we [Yugoslavs] opened fire. It was whole hell… We all hit the ground. I was angry: who the hell was doing it? Ours will not order something like this and Israelis as well. “Look, you said that yours will not open the fire!? Look! Yours are firing upon us!” I said “No, mine are not shooting. For sure: No! There is no reason to open fire, since we are not enemies. We are not taking part in war. It was fire from behind the camp.” [The other Israelis] also confirmed that the firing was from several positions behind. Finally, the Israeli Air Force combat aircraft and helicopters seen over the camp at el-Arish, 5-8 June 1967. (Odred JNA na Sinaju) Israeli commander decided to send a group of soldiers up there, and they returned after 20 minutes with three or four afternoon, after an intensive firefight nearby, the Israelis captured 15 captured Arabian soldiers…25 Egyptian soldiers: they took their clothes off and sent them in just

Later in the afternoon, the Israeli forces abandoned part of the UNEF camp and continued their advance. But after dusk, they returned to the UNEF camp and looted whatever they had discovered in the contingent’s stores: cigarettes, whisky and other spirits, uniforms, personal belongings, before settling for the night outside the camp. Next morning, 7 June, the Yugoslavs were awakened by the continuous artillery fire which covered part of their barracks. One Yugoslav soldier was sent to the Israeli unit to inform them that UNEF forces were still there. On the way back he was caught in the crossfire but managed to return unhurt to his fellows. Yugoslav soldiers asked their superiors for information on the situation and demanded a meeting where the withdrawal of the Odred could be discussed. The HQ of the Odred remarked that no matter the difficult situation, the morale of the soldiers was good. Later on, some six Egyptian soldiers appeared asking for water. In the

their underpants towards el-Arish. Finally, the Yugoslavs installed loudspeakers and started to warn the Israelis not to open fire on their barracks.26 The Odred HQ estimated that rations and drinking water were about to run out. Most of the vehicles were damaged or destroyed no matter their white paint and UN markings.27 On the same day, the new Yugoslav Defence Secretary-General Ljubičić sent a telegram to the Odred praising their conduct while on the peacekeeping duties.28 On the morning of 8 June, the situation was calm. A group belonging to the Yugoslav Odred arrived from Rafah camp with food supplies. Information from General Rikhye’s HQ reached the Odred that a ship for evacuation would arrive in Gaza. In the afternoon, groups of Israeli soldiers entered the camp to look for whatever useful items they could discover. The following night was calm and saw no exchanges of fire. The standstill continued into the morning of 9 June. Suddenly, one Israeli Lieutenant-Colonel

57

MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

arrived and simply requisitioned part of the barracks for his unit: Israeli troops soon crowded into the former UNEF barracks before arresting an old Arab nicknamed “Colonel” and his two sons that had worked in the camp for years. Zorc said that they learned later that the three Arabs were released.29 Incidentally, a Yugoslav Warrant Officer was heavily injured while setting the records ablaze. This complicated the situation, because there were no doctors in the camp; he was the only Yugoslav peacekeeper injured during the war. 30

On 10 June, the Odred begun preparations for movement towards the expected ship. In the meantime, the Israeli forces turned the camp into a service station. The word came that Tito had been to Moscow and should have influenced the “improvement” of the Odred’s treatment by Israeli troops.31 After the war had passedover el-Arish, the situation became calmer. Nevertheless, the Israeli forces did not allow the Yugoslavs to leave their camp and it was soon obvious that no ship would arrive in el-Arish as the local port was too shallow.

The last contingent of the Yugoslav Odred (1/22nd) embarking onto the ship Istra at Ashdod, 11 June 1967. (Odred JNA na Sinaju)

WITHDRAWAL OF THE ODRED On 8 June at 16.00, the Yugoslav ship Istra sailed from Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, to evacuate the Odred from Gaza harbour, three days later. The ship was loaded with huge quantities of food, fruit, beverages and medical supplies, and carried a team of notable medical specialists with the task of recovering the besieged peacekeepers. As obvious from the different press releases, Yugoslav soldiers were not just at el-Arish; some were in Port Said, others in Cairo and Alexandria (all commanded by Colonel Veljko Premet), and another group were in Gaza (commanded by Major Hinić). It was ordered that those who were not with the Odred should be evacuated later. The Odred doctor was with a group of soldiers at Rafah in the UNEF medical centre, and it was not possible for them to return to el-Arish. They would join the Odred during its withdrawal.32 The Odred left its camp in a single column on 11 June at 08.30. All of the surplus equipment and damaged vehicles were left behind. The Yugoslavs boarded the remaining serviceable vehicles – and a few vehicles borrowed from the Israeli Defence Force – and then moved north along the road full of dead Egyptian soldiers and civilians. The air smelled of the burned human flesh, and Zorc concluded that, ‘it was a horrible sight!’. The movement was slowed down by a large number of mines, strewn almost everywhere along the road.33 In Rafah and Gaza the troops saw many more dead bodies, abandoned and burned armoured vehicles, lorries and equipment. Finally, the Odred crossed into Israel and headed towards Ashdod harbour. On the Israeli side, the Yugoslavs noted that nobody was to be seen on the streets, indicating, ‘everyone is mobilised…wheat not harvested’.34 Finally safe, Tito’s soldiers reached Ashdood, where they met the Indian troops that were about to be evacuated to Cyprus.35 General Rikhye said farewell to the Yugoslavs who boarded Istra, ‘We are all calm but excited. We are safe’.36 A total of 286 members of the Yugoslav contingent embarked the merchant ship and were gone by 13 June. The force commander General Rikhye and a small group of staff officers followed four days later.37

In the following days Tito’s Yugoslavia ceased its diplomatic relations with Israel. Later in June, a Yugoslav-headed group of non-aligned states submitted a resolution to the UN demanding that Israel withdraw from occupied territories. This was vetoed by the USA. After the arrival in Yugoslavia, the Odred was immediately disbanded and the troops returned to their respective units. The

58

The last Contingent (1/22nd) seen after its return from Egypt, mid-June 1967, at Rijeka docks. In the foreground is the Odred standard issued before initial deployment in November 1956. (HDA)

Minister of Defence praised the Odred’s behaviour and conduct while in the battle zone. There was no further intention of the JNA General Staff or MoD to allow them to gather and share their experiences or to allow the personnel to recuperate from their recent near-combat experience.38 The initial conclusion was that the troops showed, “high combat readiness and moral-political qualities’. The last commander of the Odred, Colonel Djurdjevic, was praised for doing a ‘tremendous job’, while remaining ‘cold-blooded…securing the troops and taking them out of the combat zone without a single loss’. The Odred did not return fire even once even though fired upon repeatedly: the commander managed to negotiate with Israeli forces and stalling their idea of seizing the el-Arish camp until the last minute. During the short negotiation, Colonel Djurdjevic remained calm and was able to find an agreement even when his unit was ‘surrounded by aggressors’. In turn, his cool-headiness influenced the soldiers to have confidence that the outcome would be good. Another factor was the improvement of the fortifications to protect the troops while under fire. The whole Odred remained disciplined no matter

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

the serious challenges. It was concluded that Israeli forces damaged or destroyed total of 38 of the Odred’s vehicles – which was nearly all the unit had – including the two water tankers, which were considered the greatest loss. 39 Later on, a commission of the Department for Moral and Political Education of the Yugoslav Ministry of Defence examined the consequences of those experiences which were unique for Yugoslav military planners. The idea of the Yugoslav top brass was to gather information on the troops under these unique war conditions and to discover their patterns of behaviour.40 Generally, all of the members of the contingent were surprised by the sudden outbreak of the war, and in the beginning they mostly had to act by their own estimations, since the Odred was left without any reliable information. Most of the Yugoslav troops were confident that the Arabs would prevail in the conflict. Following the Yugoslav foreign policy orientation, the contingent had become “emotionally linked” to the Egyptians.41 It was noted that motives for going on the UNEF mission were different. For the conscript soldiers it was an opportunity to discover and see unknown lands and to represent their state and army. Contrary to them, the motive of nearly half of the officers and NCOs was to earn and spend money. Later, during the combat operations, those who were motivated by personal profit became much more unstable while under fire. Analysing the appearance of fear, it became evident that the soldiers were more exposed to stress and were much more afraid than the officers. Most of them feared that this would become the Third World War and were afraid for the fate of their families back in Yugoslavia in case of a wider

world war. The fear among the soldiers rose once they were aware of the casualties among the Indian contingent, but they were also concerned by the lack of ammunition and the disappearance of the Odred’s doctors in the key days of the conflict. The inactivity of the Odred produced a further sense of fear and uncertainty. It was remarked that “the role of the neutral observer in the middle of the conflict burdened the position of the Odred”.42 Although not engaged, the Yugoslav UNEF troops unintentionally gained war experience. Thus, the 22nd Contingent became the first JNA unit which was exposed to real war experience after the Second World War.

CONCLUSION No matter the sudden withdrawal in the Six Day War, the UNEF was a remarkably effective peacekeeping operation. Its rapid organization and deployment in November 1956 was an astounding achievement. The success in separating Anglo-French and Egyptian forces far exceeded what could reasonably be expected of this ad hoc organization. The deployment of UNEF began in association with the withdrawal of the invading troops from the Suez Canal area first, then moving to Sinai, and into the Gaza Strip, followed by Sharm el-Sheikh, and finally the length of the Armistice Demarcation line and International Frontier. Following a remarkable deployment, by the beginning of 1957, UNEF established a long-term peacekeeping operation in an extremely austere desert environment which may be regarded as another remarkable achievement. English was the official language of the UNEF but apart from this

Table 5: Yugoslav Contingent Troop Strengths, 1956-196743 CONTINGENT

OFFICERS

NCOs

MIL.SERV.

CIVILIANS

SOLDIERS

TOTAL

1

56

96

1

4

560

71744

2

55

83

3

5

531

677

3

55

64

5

6

552

702

4

59

91

6

10

525

691

5

49

83

8

12

532

684

6

50

91

5

13

547

706

7

54

98

5

13

530

700

8

51

107

/

1

537

696

9

58

106

3

4

531

702

10

62

102

3

1

547

715

11

61

105

3

2

532

703

12

65

106

3

3

533

706

13

65

108

3

4

533

713

14

75

116

4

4

599

798

15

64

100

5

1

517

687

16

50

91

3

1

458

603

17

49

76

3

1

377

506

18

44

72

6

2

380

504

19

46

78

4

/

375

503

20

44

90

5

1

564

704

21

45

87

6

1

422

561

1/22

25

44

5

3

210

287

TOTAL

1,178

2,014

89

92

10,892

14,265

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

there was scarcely any common denominator. National uniforms were worn by contingents, and even berets of UN blue were not in general use, the Indian parachute battalion having insisted on wearing turbans and berets of traditional maroon. National ration scales were adopted which varied from contingent to contingent, leading to obvious complications in procurement and supply. Not all components were members of NATO so that there was a divergence in professional standards and procedures. Social customs were bound to differ in a force recruited from the Americas, Europe, and Asia. Despite these difficulties, it was easy to see on arrival that much had been attempted to achieve cohesion between the components of the force. Much remained to be accomplished.45 For over a decade, UNEF had indeed been successful in the task of maintaining the Armistice Agreement.46 But in the absence of a complementary peace-making effort, the root cause of the conflict between Egypt and Israel remained unresolved. Moreover, because Israel refused to accept UNEF on its territory, the force could be deployed only on the Egyptian side of the border, and thus its functioning was entirely contingent upon the consent of Egypt as the host country. Once that consent was withdrawn, its operation could no longer be maintained.47 The UNEF is a telling example of the importance of United Nations peacekeeping forces and their limitations. Ten years of peace followed in the Sinai. Despite the best efforts of the peacekeepers, the overall mission was a failure. The bizarre circumstance of their withdrawal, and the subsequent tragedy of the 1967 war, reflects poorly on the diplomatic underpinning of the mission48 The UNEF experience was the first international deployment of the young army of the Socialist Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Army contingent was formed in a rush and deployed to Egypt in late November 1956. According to its structure, it was a reinforced motorised reconnaissance battalion, manned with conscript soldiers and equipped with MDAP supplied vehicles – including armoured reconnaissance vehicles. The Yugoslav contingent received a difficult assignment to enter the Sinai Peninsula just after the retreating Israeli forces and reach the demarcation lines. As the “communist” force it was perceived by some of the UNEF contingents with suspicion, but it was warmly welcomed by the Arab inhabitants. The most difficult task was given to the 1st, and to a lesser degree to the 2nd Yugoslav contingents which served in 1956-1957. This is actually the core of the Yugoslav UNEF story. The participation of the first two contingents was a very important military-political duty, where the representation of Yugoslavia and achievement of the peacekeeping tasks was very important. Later contingents had much simpler tasks which changed little in the following ten years. They ensured that the peace accord remained unchallenged and maintained their observation posts. At the outbreak of the new Israeli-Arab War in 1967, the Yugoslav contingent was squeezed by the advancing Israeli forces and was evacuated in a great hurry, leaving all equipment and vehicles behind. The Yugoslav Odred remained in the zone of very intense fighting. Its personnel witnessed heavy clashes around the camp but suffered no direct casualties. The Yugoslavs were regarded as militarily reliable, very modest in requests, generally high morale and to be disciplined soldiers. Lack of language skills was regarded as the greatest shortcoming of the Yugoslav contingent in general. The prime characteristic of the Yugoslav Odred was that it was fully motorized. It was a combat advantage, but it also represented a logistical nightmare in the beginning of the deployment in Sinai. But gradually this situation improved over the years. For many Yugoslav soldiers serving with

60

UNEF it was a chance to travel abroad, mostly for the first time, to see and experience the sea, travel by ship or aircraft, and to have communications with different people from all around the globe. In the eleven years of the Odred’s existence there were up to 14,500 engaged servicemen (though even official figures differ). There were a total of eight fatalities and 56 wounded or injured during its deployment. Peacekeeping under the “foreign” command and with rotational shifts actually brought a unique experience to Yugoslav Army, which perceived itself as a force for nationalliberation and revolution, rather than the expeditionary force which its UNEF contingent actually was for many years of deployment.

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967

BIBLIOGRAPHY ARCHIVAL SOURCES

Vojni Arhiv, fund JNA, otvorena i zatvorena građa (Military Archive, Yugoslav People’s Army, Belgrade, Serbia, open and restricted documentation) Muzej Jugoslovenskog Ratnog Vazduhoplovstva, fund Jedinice RV i PVO (Yugoslav Air Force Museum, Belgrade Airport, Serbia, Yugoslav Air Force Units) Muzej Jugoslavije (Museum of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Serbia), photo collection Personal archive of Colonel Stojadin Petković (JNA, retired) Online Sources: Jenkins, G., ‘History of 115 Air Transport Unit (ATU) RCAF, March 1957 to 29 May 1967’, http://www.115atu.ca/Files/115ATU%20 RCAF%20History%20-%20RevApr2012.pdf, 2018 Kiser, Major R. R., USA: The History of Peacekeeping in the Sinai Desert, 1956-2002, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, http://www.dtic.mil/ dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a416934.pdf, 2003 Kranjc, General-Major M. F., Odred JLA na Sinaju (Egipt) – UNEF, prva mirovna misija OZN https://vojastvo-military.si/wp-content/ uploads/UNEF-Odred-JLA-v-Egiptu12.pdf, 2018 United Nations, Peacekeeping: Middle East – UNEF I, Background, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html, 2018 ‘Some lmpressions of UNEF. 1957 to 1958’, Memorandum by Capt J.A. Swettenhani, RC.E. Report No. 78, Historical Section (G.S.), Army Headquarters, 2 January 1959 http://www.batalhaosuez.com. br/UnefSomeImpressions.htm, 2018 Military magazines and newspapers: Narodna Armija, Odredski vesnik, Front, Krila armije.  Sand Dune, UNEF Weekly (http://www.batalhaosuez.com.br/ UnefTheSandDune.htm) Monographs and Articles Baržiċ, Nikola, Mala Jugoslavija na Sinaju, Misija Jugoslavanske ljudske armade pri UNEF I (First United Nations Emegrency Force) v Egiptu 1956-1967 (thesis, Koper, Univerza na Primorskem, 2010). Carroll, K. M., Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009; ISBN: 978-0-7748-1581-9). Dimitrijeviċ, B., Modernizacija i Intervencija, Jugoslovenske Oklopne Jedinice 1945-2006 (Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2010). Dimitrijeviċ, B., Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija 1945–1959 (Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2014). Goncin, M., Plavi Slemovi (Novi Sad: Progres, 1963). Hilmy, H., ‘Sovereignty, Peacekeeping, and the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), Suez 1956-1967: Insiders’ Perspectives’ (Victoria: University of Victoria, 2015). JNA, Odred Mira: Zbirka Reportaza (Beograd: Narodna Armija, 1959). JNA, Razvoj Oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945–1985, Volume 13 (Vojnoobaveštajna Služba), (Beograd: VIZ, 1986–1991). Lošiċ, Colonel A., Odred JNA na Sinaju u vreme Izralesko-arapskog sukoba 1967: Moralno-politicki i psiholosko-socioloski aspelti drzanja i ponasanja pripadnika odreda (Beograd: Uprava za moralno-politicko vaspitanje, Drzavni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu, 1968). Niksiċ, R., Istorija 119. vazduhoplovnog transportnog puka (manuscript, Zemun, 1993). Torkar, Dr. B., Jugoslovanski Odred v Mirovni Operaciji Združenih Narodov na Sinaju (1956-1967), (GEA, 10/2016, https://vojastvo-military.si/ wp-content/uploads/SINAJ-Torkar_4-1.pdf). Zivotiċ, A., Forsiranje Peska: Odred JNA na Sinaju (Beograd: MC Odbrana, 2011).

NOTES Chapter 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Sand Dune, January 11, 1965, p. 5. Sand Dune, January 11, 1965, p. 5. Hilmy, p. 158. Hilmy, pp. 160 and 162. Hilmy, p. 163. LL Text, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html (accessed 12 August 2018). Some lmpressions of UNEF. Hilmy, pp. 173-174. LL Text, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html Sand Dune, January 11, 1965, p. 6. LL Text, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html Sand Dune, January 11, 1965, p. 6. LL Text, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html Kiser, pp. 18-19. Dimitrijević (1997), pp. 19-33. Dimitrijević (2014). VA, fond: Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (JNA), k.558, f. 5/14; VA, JNA k.567, f.2 5/14- 18. Narodna armija, Belgrade, 29 November 1966. VA JNA (zatvorena građa), svežanj 3280 “Izveštaj o formiranju, zadacima i stanju u Odredu JNA u UAR”; Dimitrijevic (2010), p. 92. Dimitrijević (2010), p. 92. VA JNA svežanj 3280; VA JNA (otvorena gradja) k.567, f.2 5, 19, 20 and 23. VA JNA, svežanj 3280.

Chapter 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Narodna armija, 21 November 1958; Niksic, pp. 91-92; Muzej Jugoslovenskog ratnog vazduhoplivstva (MJRV), Godisnje istorije Komande JRV: Po­da­ci za isto­ri­jat za 1958. go­di­nu (9. sep­tem­bar); Odred mira, p. 176. Narodna armija, 29 November 1966. Točkiċ, p. 9; “Secanja na prvu smenu – Izvodi iz dnevnika potpukovnika Ahmeta Dedica, tadasnjeg kapetena I klase i komandira 3. motomehanizovane cete” Narodna armija, 29 November 1966. Zivotiċ, p. 75. “Secanja na prvu smenu – Izvodi iz dnevnika potpukovnika Ahmeta Dedica.” Točkiċ, p. 13. Other sources stated that part of the port was named Sheriff (Točkiċ, p. 17). Notes of Captain Ivo Šišević, (copy in possession of the author). Zivotiċ, p. 79. https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html Notes of Captain Ivo Sisevic, (copy in possession of the author). “Secanja na prvu smenu – Izvodi iz dnevnika potpukovnika Ahmeta Dedica.” Carroll, p. xxi. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.561, f.3, 7-16. Sand Dune, January 11, 1965, p. 6. “Secanja na prvu smenu – Izvodi iz dnevnika potpukovnika Ahmeta Dedica.”

Chapter 3 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Narodna armija, 21 November 1958. VA, JNA, k.558, f.1, 31 and 32; Zivotiċ, Forsiranje peska, pp. 82-83. Narodna armija, 29 November 1966. The author and his friend, notable Belgrade collector, Aleksandar Smiljanić discovered Radašinović’s UNEF photos at one of Belgrade’s markets in 2016. Most likely after Radašinović died, his relatives threw all of his photos away. Luckily, some of them have found their way to this book. “Secanja na prvu smenu II”; VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA JNA, k.558, f.1, 31, 5. “Secanja na prvu smenu II”, Narodna armija, 2 December 1966. Initial withdrawal of the Israeli forces: November 1956—mid-January 1957 (https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html, accessed 12 August 2018) VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.558, f.1, 3/11; Točkiċ Mehmed, “Dva susreta Anta Borovine sa El Satom”, Odred mira, p. 39. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.558, f.1, 3/11, 7/5 and k. 567, f.1 9/9. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.567, f.3. 5/11; Zivotiċ, Forsiranje peska, p. 84. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.567, f.1 9/9; Zivotiċ, Forsiranje peska, p. 86. Initial withdrawal of the Israeli forces: November 1956—mid-January 1957 (https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html, accessed 12 August 2018) VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.567, f. 3 1/8 and k.558, f.1, 26/1. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.558, f.1, 26/1; k.567, f. f.4, 13/1 and k.561, f.1 1/3. Točkiċ Mehmed, “Logor u stanici Mazar” Odred mira, pp. 28, 32. Initial withdrawal of the Israeli forces: November 1956—mid-January 1957. Točkiċ, “Logor u stanici Mazar”, Odred mira, p. 27. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.558, f. 5, 31/1 and k.561, f. 2, 2/1; Točkiċ Mehmed, “Pod zastavom odreda”, Odred mira, pp. 42-48. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.561, f. 1, 7/23.

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45

Zivotiċ, Forsiranje peska, pp. 88-89; VA JNA, k.561, f. 1, 4/1. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.559, f. 8, 11. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.558, f. 7, 23/1, and 24/9. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.558, f. 6, 9/1. Zivotiċ, Forsiranje peska, p. 91. VA JNA, svežanj 3280;VA, JNA, k.558, f. 11, 11/2, and k.559, f. 5, 9/1. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.559, f. 5, 9/1. Some lmpressions of UNEF. 1957 to 1958 Memorandum by Capt J.A. Swettenhani. https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.559, f. 1, 3/18, 19 and 21. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.567, f.3, 1/8. Goncin, p. 106; VA JNA, k.559, f. 4, 17/10, 11. Točkiċ, “I u Gazi deca pustaju zmaja”, Odred mira, p. 50. https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.559, f. 4, 17/16. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.559, f. 4, 17/22; Točkiċ Mehmed, “Pod zastavom odreda”, Odred mira, p. 52. Kiser, The History of Peacekeeping In The Sinai Desert 1956-2002, p. 24. Narodna armija, 21 November 1958; Odred mira, p. 179; VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.567, f. 1, 6/1.

Ceroviċ Vasilije, “U podnožju trigonometra 267”, Odred mira, pp. 81-82. Ceroviċ, “Pod pustinjskim suncem”, Odred mira, p. 69. Ceroviċ, “U podnožju trigonometra 267”, Odred mira, pp. 82. The mines were dug into sand were much deeper than the soldiers had trained for in Yugoslavia. Storms complicated the discovery of the mines. Some of them were in Bakelite boxes, which were totally unknown to Yugoslav pioneers. Upon those experiences the technical service of the Odred produced longer sticks with metal tips for detecting and discovering mines (pipalice) in the sand. VA, JNA, k.567, f.2, 5. Ceroviċ “U podnožju trigonometra 267”, Odred mira, p. 80. Carroll, p. 133. Ceroviċ, “Na demarkacionoj liniji“ Odred mira, pp. 54-55. Ceroviċ, “Kod El Audze” Odred mira pp. 59-64.

Chapter 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

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https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html VA, JNA, k.567, f.2, 5/38-42; https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/ unef1backgr2.html Kranjc, p. 10; https://vojastvo-military.si/wp-content/uploads/UNEFOdred-JLA-v-Egiptu12.pdf, accessed 12 August 2018). https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html Some lmpressions of UNEF. 1957 to 1958 Memorandum by Capt J.A. Swettenhani. Some lmpressions of UNEF. 1957 to 1958 Memorandum by Capt J.A. Swettenhani. For the further details in other UNEF contingents in 1962-1966 see: Sand Dune, http://www.batalhaosuez.com.br/UnefTheSandDune.htm LL Text, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html (accessed 12 August 2018). Barziċ, p. 23. LL Text, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr2.html Ceroviċ, “Kod El Audze” Odred mira pp. 59-64. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA k. 557, f. 10, 15. VA JNA, svežanj 3280; Zivotiċ, Forsiranje peska, pp. 133-134. Odredski Vesnik, XI, 113, April 1966, p. 9. Barziċ, p. 94. Carroll, p. 151. Odred mira, passim. Zivotiċ, pp. 143-145. VA JNA, k.567, f. 2, 5/37 – 38; Ceroviċ,“Pod pustinjskim suncem“, Odred mira, p. 71; Ceroviċ, “Cetvoromedja“ Odred mira, pp. 74-75. Ceroviċ, “Pod pustinjskim suncem“, Odred mira, p. 70. Narodna armija, 22 February 1963 and 31 May 1963. Narodna armija, 22, 31 August and 14 September 1962. Zivotiċ, pp. 107-108. Narodna armija, 19 August 1960. Kranjc, p. 4, https://vojastvo-military.si/wp-content/uploads/UNEF-OdredJLA-v-Egiptu12.pdf ; See also: Trokar, and https://vojastvo-military.si/wpcontent/uploads/SINAJ-Torkar_4-1.pdf (accessed 12 August 2018) Kranjc, pp. 4-5. Narodna armija, 23 November 1962 and 31 May 1963. Colonel Stojadin Petković’s report on 19th Contingent, pp. 3-4; Narodna armija, 14 December 1962. Narodna armija, 15 May, 13 and 20 June, 14 November, 9 December 1958, 3 July and 20 November 1959. Jovan Radovanovic, “Daglas leti na Sinaj”, Odred mira, pp. 101-103. Barziċ, p. 69; Narodna armija, 8 June 1962, 31 May 1963, 6 December 1963, 4 December 1964. Barziċ, p. 91. Kranjc, “Odred JLA na Sinaju (Egipt) – UNEF”, p. 14.

35 36 37 38 39 40

Narodna armija, 10 August 1962. Narodna armija, 17 April 1964. Narodna armija, 13 June and 17 October 1958. Narodna armija, 23 Ocotber 1959. VA, JNA, k.556, f.3, 4/1. Sand Dune, Vol VII, No 51, December 12, 1964, p. 3; http://www. batalhaosuez.com.br/UnefTheSandDune.htm (accessed 14 October 2018) 41 Colonel Stojadin Petković report, p. 9 (table), VA JNA, k.567, f.2, 5/19; Zivotiċ, Forsiranje peska, pp. 69-70. 42 Sand Dune, Vol IX, No 2, February 1 1965, p. 6. 43 Sand Dune, Vol X, No 8, June 8 1966, p. 7. 44 Odredski vesnik, XI, 111, February 1966, p. 3 45 Colonel Stojadin Petković report, pp. 6-7; Odredski vesnik, XI, 111, February 1966, p. 4. 46 Odredski vesnik, XI, 113, April 1966, pp. 1-2. 47 Narodna armija, 2 December 1966. 48 Baržič Nikola, “Mala Jugoslavija na Sinaju”, p. 91. 49 Narodna armija, 4 May 1966. 50 Barziċ, 69-70. 51 Ceroviċ “U podnožju trigonometra 267”, Odred mira, p. 78. 52 Narodna armija, 10 and 20 April 1958, 18 July 1958. 53 Odred mira, p. 179. 54 Narodna armija, 21 August, 22 September and, 13 October 1961. 55 Kranjc, pp. 3-4, 8-9. 56 Sand Dune, Vol VI, No 43, October 26, 1962, p. 13 and Vol IX, No 1, January 11, 1965, p. 4. 57 Gavrio Terzic, “Logori u pustinji”, Odred mira, pp. 151-154. 58 Ibid, p. 155. 59 Ceroviċ, “Cetvoromedja”, Odred mira, pp. 75-77; Radovanovic, “Garnizon u El Kuseimi” Odred mira, pp. 88-93. 60 Sand Dune, Vol VII, No 35, August 22, 1964, p. 6. 61 Narodna armija, 21 January 1966. 62 Radovanovic, ”Ceta na kamenu” Odred mira, pp. 97-99. 63 Colonel Stojadin Petković report, pp 5-6; Narodna armija, 25 September 1959; CEROVIĊ, “Cetvoromedja”, Odred mira, p. 74; Radovanovic, “Iznad akapskog zaliva”, Odred mira, pp. 108-109. 64 Colonel Stojadin Petković report, p. 4-8. 65 Narodna armija, 6 October 1961. 66 VA, JNA, k.567, f.2, 5/39-40. 67 Narodna armija, 25 September 1959. 68 Ceroviċ, “Pod pustinjskim suncem”, Odred mira, p. 69. 69 Narodna armija, 3 April 1959. 70 Narodna armija, 4 December 1964. 71 Sand Dune, Vol IX, No 2, February 1 1965, p. 7. 72 VA JNA, svežanj 3280; Narodna armija, 15 May 1959. 73 Kranjc, p. 8. 74 Sand Dune, Vol VII, No 39, September 12, 1964, p. 3 and No 40, September 19, 1964, pp. 3-4. 75 Sand Dune, Vol IX, No 2, February 1 1965, p. 3 and No 3, February 9 1965, pp. 1-2. 76 Odredski vesnik, XI, 113, April 1966, p. 7. 77 VA, JNA, k.557, f.15, 15. 78 VA, JNA, k.556, f.3, 4. 79 Jenkins, History of 115 Air Transport Unit (http://www.115atu.ca/ Files/115ATU%20RCAF%20History%20-%20RevApr2012.pdf, accessed 12 August 2018). 80 Kranjc, p. 10. 81 Narodna armija, 27 January 1961. 82 Kranjc, p. 3. 83 A. Zivotiċ, p. 111. 84 Barziċ, p. 93. 85 VA JNA, k 556, 3, 4. 86 Odredski vesnik, XI, 113, April 1966, p. 9; VA JNA, k.557, f. 15, 15. 87 VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA JNA, k.556, f.3, 4. 88 Colonel Stojadin Petković report, pp. 1-3; Narodna armija, 2 November 1965. 14 June 1966, 11 November 1966. 89 Colonel Stojadin Petković report, p. 4-5; VA JNA, k.567, f. 2, 5. 90 Colonel Stojadin Petković report, p. 4-5; VA, JNA, k.550, f. 4, 1, Zivotiċ A, p 109-110. 91 Zivotiċ, Forsiranje peska, p. 110. 92 VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.561, f.2, 1/3-21. 93 VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.567, f. 6, 8/38, 39. 94 Sand Dune, Vol VI, No 43, October 26, 1962, p. 4. 95 VA, JNA, k.567, f.2, 5. 96 VA, JNA, k.550, f.3, 1, 22. 97 VA, JNA, k.558, f.10, 7. 98 VA, JNA, k.567, f.2, 5. 99 VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.550, f.9, 9. 100 VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.558, f. 15, 22 and VA JNA, k.567, f.2, 5. 101 VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.558, f.14, 18 and k. 561, 2, 1. 102 VA, JNA, k.556, f.3, 4.

UNEF: THE YUGOSLAV ARMY CONTINGENT IN THE SINAI PENINSULA, 1956-1967 103 VA, JNA, k.556, f.3, 4. 104 Narodna armija, 20 January 1961. 105 Narodna armija, 5 August 1960. 106 Narodna armija, 16 January 1959. 107 Narodna armija, 27 January 1961. 108 Narodna armija, 27 September 1963. 109 Sand Dune, Vol VII, No 40, September 19, 1964, p. 6. 110 Sand Dune, Vol IX, No 3, February 9 1965, p. 9. 111 Narodna armija, 11 November 1960. 112 Narodna armija, 13 June 1965. 113 VA JNA, svežanj 3280; VA, JNA, k.561, 2, 1. 114 Kranjc, pp. 7-8. 115 Ceroviċ, “Pod pustinjskim suncem”, Odred mira, p. 69. 116 Kranjc, p. 3. 117 Torkar, Jugoslovanski odred v mirovni operaciji združenih narodov na Sinaju (19561967). 118 Barziċ, p. 96. 119 Narodna armija, 9 January 1958. 120 Odred mira, p. 180. 121 Kranjc, “Odred JLA na Sinaju (Egipt) – UNEF”, pp. 7-8. 122 Narodna armija, 6 July 1962. 123 Narodna armija, 18 July 1966. 124 Muzej Jugoslavije (MJ), 1958_98_0072 and 0073, 1961_164_0098 to 0101 and 1962_191_0050 to 0052. 125 Narodna armija, 12 December 1958; MJ. 1958_98_0072 and 0073. 126 Narodna armija, 26 February and 23 March 1962. 127 Narodna armija, 16 October 1964. 128 Narodna armija, 8 May 1959. 129 Narodna armija, 3 July 1959. 130 Narodna armija, 19 February 1960. 131 Narodna armija, 16 October and 2 November 1962. 132 Narodna armija, 27 April 1962. 133 Sand Dune, Vol VI, No 45, November 9, 1962, p. 1. 134 Narodna armija, 10 January 1964. 135 Narodna armija, 6 March 1965. 136 Odredski vesnik, XI, 111, February 1966, pp. 5 and 113, April 1966, p. 7; Narodna armija, 5 April 1966. 137 Narodna armija, 22 March 1963 and 28 February 1964. 138 Odredski vesnik, 111, 1966, p. 1. Report of the Yugoslav Chief of Defence General Hamovic visit on 25 February 1966. 139 Zivotiċ, Forsiranje peska, pp. 121-123. 140 Narodna armija, 3 July 1959. 141 Ceroviċ, “U podnozju trigonometra 267”, Odred mira, p. 83. 142 Narodna armija, 27 April 1962. 143 Narodna armija, 10 September 1958, 14 March 1959. 144 Narodna armija, 27 March 1959; Radovanovic, “Iznad akapskog zaliva”, Odred mira, pp. 108-109. 145 Radovanovic, “Garnizon u El Kuseimi”, Odred mira, p. 93. 146 Sand Dune, Vol VII, No 35, August 22, 1964, pp. 1-3; Narodna armija, 21 August 1964. 147 Sand Dune, Vol VII, No 39, September 12, 1964, p. 7-8. 148 Narodna armija, 10 April 1959. 149 Sand Dune, Vol IX, No 1, January 11 1965, p. 10. 150 Narodna armija, 15 March 1963. 151 Narodna armija, 6 February 1959; Terzic, “Indijci o svojoj zemlji”, Odred mira, p. 147. 152 Narodna armija, 13 October 1961. 153 Milorad Goncin, “Vojnicke bengalske vatre” and “Nezaboravne veceri”, Odred mira, pp. 122-127. 154 Some Impressions of UNEF. 1957 to 1958 Memorandum by Capt J.A. Swettenhani. 155 Colonel Stojadin Petković report, pp. 5-6; RADOVANOVIC, “Poznanstvo s piramidama”, Odred mira, pp. 117-121 and 179. 156 Barziċ, p. 77. 157 Colonel Stojadin Petković report, pp. 5-6; Narodna armija, 18 October 1964 and 30 December 1966. 158 Kranjc, p. 11. 159 Ibid, p. 11. 160 Barziċ, p. 77. 161 Kranjc, pp. 13-14. 162 Narodna armija, 24 July 1959; Kranjc, p. 6 & Torkar. 163 Kranjc, pp. 3-4 and 13. 164 Krila armije, July 1961. 165 https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unyom.htm, accessed 7 October 2018 (accessed 12 August 2018). 166 Zivotiċ, pp 115-116. 167 VA, JNA, k 559, 1, 1. 168 VA, JNA, k 559, 1, 1. 169 History of 115 Air Transport Unit (ATU) RCAF March 1957 to 29 May 1967, By Gordon Jenkins, pp. 33-34. 170 https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unyom.htm 171 Zivotiċ, p. 117.

172 VA, JNA, k 559, 1, 1. 173 History of 115 Air Transport Unit (ATU), pp. 33-34. 174 Zivotiċ, pp. 118-119. 175 https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unyom.htm 176 Hilmy, p. 206. 177 VA, JNA, k.567, f.2, 5/50. 178 VA, JNA, k.567, f.2, 5/50a. GONCIN Milorad, Plavi slemovi, Progres Novi Sad 1963, pp. 164-174. 179 VA, JNA, k.567, f.2, 5/51. 180 Odredski vesnik, XI, 113, March 1966, p. 1; Narodna armija, 29 April 1966. 181 Zivotiċ, p. 114.

Chapter 5 and Conclusion 1

2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

Alija Lošiċ, pukovnik, Odred JNA na Sinaju u vreme Izralesko-arapskog sukoba 1967. Moralno-politicki i psiholosko-socioloski aspelti drzanja i ponasanja pripadnika odreda, Uprava za moralno-politicko vaspitanje Drzavni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu, Beoghrad 1968 (za sluzbenu upotrebu), pp. 131-135. Barziċ, p. 97. Hilmy, Sovereignty, Peacekeeping, and the United Nations Emergency Force, p. 256. “UNEF withdrawal” (https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/ unef1backgr2.html); Hilmy, pp. 272-274. Barziċ, p. 50-51. “UN Emergency Force (UNEF): Report of the Secretary-General on UNEF Withdrawal (June 26, 1967)” https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ report-of-the-secretary-general-on-unef-withdrawal-june-1967 (accessed 12 August 2018). “UNEF withdrawal”, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/ unef1backgr2.html “UN Emergency Force (UNEF): Report of the Secretary-General on UNEF Withdrawal (June 26, 1967).” “Oprostaj sa Sinajem”, Narodna armija, 26 May 1967; Baržič, pp. 51-52. “Oprostaj sa Sinajem”, Narodna armija, 26 May 1967. “Na borbenoj liniji”, Narodna armija, 2 June 1967. Baržič, p. 53. Narodna armija, 23 June 1967. “Postojano i dostojanstveno”, Narodna armija, 9 June 1967. “Postojano i dostojanstveno, Narodna armija, 9 June 1967; “Preko njih je presao rat”, Narodna armija, 16 June 1967. Razvoj OS SFRJ 1945-1985, volume 13 (Vojno-obavestajna služba), Beograd 1990, p. 239. Lošiċ, p. 136. Hilmy, pp. 272-274. Baržič, pp. 97-98. “Preko njih je presao rat”, Narodna armija, 16 June 1967 “Postojano i dostojanstveno”, Narodna armija, 9 June 1967. “Preko njih je presao rat”, Narodna armija, 16 June 1967. Lošiċ, pp. 34, 38. “Preko njih je presao rat”, Narodna armija, 16 June 1967. Baržič, p. 98 and 100. Lošiċ, pp. 8-11. “Postojano i dostojanstveno”, Narodna armija, 9 June 1967. “Priznanje odredu”, Narodna armija, 9 June 1967. Baržič, “Mala Jugoslavija na Sinaju”, p. 98. Lošiċ, pp. 136-137. Ibid, pp. 136-137. “Postojano i dostojanstveno”, Narodna armija, 9 June 1967. Baržič, p. 101. “Preko njih je presao rat”, Narodna armija, 16 June 1967; LOŠIĆ, Odred JNA na Sinaju u vreme Izralesko-arapskog sukoba 1967, p. 137 Baržič, “Mala Jugoslavija na Sinaju”, p. 102. Lošiċ, p. 137. “UNEF withdrawal”,

Lošiċ, pp. 8-11, 55. “Na visini odgovornog zadataka”, Narodna armija, 23 June 1967. Lošiċ, pp. 8-11. Ibid, pp. 51-62. Ibid, pp. 20-23, 65, 70 and 115. Zivotiċ, p. 231. Note the number difference with the 1st Contingent. It seems that in this table, JNA authorities did not count members of the JNA advance party which arrived prior to the Odred deployment. Some lmpressions of UNEF. 1957 to 1958 Memorandum by Capt J.A. Swettenhani. Hilmy, p. 293. “UNEF withdrawal” https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/ unef1backgr2.html Kiser, pp. 28-29.

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MIDDLE EAST@WAR VOLUME 25

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Bojan Dimitrijevic is a historian working as Deputy Director of the Institute for Contemporary History in Belgrade, Serbia. Educated at the Universities of Belgrade and Novi Sad, CEU Budapest and the University of Bradford, he was the custodian of the Yugoslav Aviation Museum before, in 2003-2009, serving as advisor to the Minister to the Serbian MoD, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the President of Serbia, and as Assistant to the Minister of Defence. He has researched the military history of the former Yugoslavia, and the Balkans in the Second World War, the Cold War, and diverse conflicts since, and has published over 50 books and 100 scientific articles in Serbia and abroad. This is his second instalment for Helion’s @War series.

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