Understanding the Person 9783631854235, 9783631857014, 9783631857960, 9783631857977, 3631854234

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Understanding the Person

EUROPEAN STUDIES IN THEOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF RELIGIONS Edited by Bartosz Adamczewski

VOL. 29

Grzegorz Hołub

Understanding the Person Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available online at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. This publication was financially supported by the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow.

ISSN 2192-1857 ISBN 978-3-631-85423-5 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-631-85701-4 (E-PDF) E-ISBN 978-3-631-85796-0 (EPUB) E-ISBN 978-3-631-85797-7 (MOBI) DOI 10.3726/b18557 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Berlin 2021 All rights reserved. Peter Lang – Berlin ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙ Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

Contents INTRODUCTION ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9 CHAPTER I: TOWARDS THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN PERSON ���������������������������������� 13 Introduction ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13 Man in Wojtyła’s Realist Approach to Philosophy �������������������������� 14 On the Threshold of Personalist Thinking �������������������������������������� 17 Concluding Remarks ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 22

CHAPTER II: HOW TO KNOW THE PERSON? ��������������� 25 Introduction ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 25 Wojtyła on Experience: A Preliminary Approach ���������������������������� 26 Unity of Experience ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 29 Human Experience: A Rival Naturalistic Approach ������������������������ 32 Human Experience: Phenomenological vs Phenomenalistic Approach ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 37 Concluding Remarks ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 40

CHAPTER III: THE STRUCTURE OF THE PERSON �������� 43 Introduction ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 43 3.1. AGAINST DUALISM ������������������������������������������������������������� 43 Initial Dilemmas ��������������������������������������������������������������������� 43 Descartes and His Thinking about the Human Being ������������� 45 Karol Wojtyła’s Understanding of Man ���������������������������������� 47 The Person and the Nature: Two Integrated Faces of Human Existence ������������������������������������������������������������������� 53 Concluding Remarks �������������������������������������������������������������� 57

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3.2. METAPHYSICS OF THE PERSON ��������������������������������������� 58 Old Notions in Contemporary Philosophy ����������������������������� 58 Wojtyła and Metaphysics ������������������������������������������������������� 59 Personhood and Suppositum �������������������������������������������������� 63 Critical Look at the Project and Its Further Developments ����� 69 Concluding Remarks �������������������������������������������������������������� 74

CHAPTER IV: THE PERSON AND HIS FACULTIES ���������� 77 Introduction ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 77 4.1. TO RESCUE THE INTERIORITY OF THE PERSON ���������� 77 Thinking on the Subject ��������������������������������������������������������� 77 The Cartesian Subject under Siege ������������������������������������������ 79 Wojtyła on the Human Subject ����������������������������������������������� 86 Subject and Interiority: Comparing the Two Approaches ������� 89 Looking for a Common Platform ������������������������������������������� 91 Concluding Remarks �������������������������������������������������������������� 95 4.2. WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS? ���������������������������������������������� 96 The Person and Consciousness ����������������������������������������������� 96 Against the Idealistic Approach to Consciousness ������������������ 98 The Boethian Definition of the Person and Its Inadequacy ���� 101 The “Physiognomy” of Consciousness and Personhood ������� 105 Further Clarifications and Final Conclusions ������������������������ 110 Concluding Remarks ������������������������������������������������������������ 115 4.3. CONSCIOUSNESS AND EMOTIONS �������������������������������� 116 Persons, Emotions, and Reason �������������������������������������������� 116 Consciousness under the Influence of Emotions �������������������� 117 Consciousness Overwhelmed by Emotions ��������������������������� 119 Self-​Knowledge in Its Operations ����������������������������������������� 123 Self-​Knowledge as the Guardian of Consciousness ��������������� 126 Concluding Remarks ������������������������������������������������������������ 129

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CHAPTER V: THE PERSON IN ACTION ��������������������������� 131 Introduction ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 131 5.1. PERSONAL CAUSATION ��������������������������������������������������� 131 Causation in the Ethical Thinking of Scheler and Kant ��������� 131 Personal Causation in Ethics: Critical Look ������������������������� 137 Acting Person and Efficacy ��������������������������������������������������� 139 Final Look at Efficacy ����������������������������������������������������������� 142 Concluding Remarks ������������������������������������������������������������ 145 5.2. THE PERSON IN DIALOGUE �������������������������������������������� 146 Persons and Dialogue ����������������������������������������������������������� 146 Persons in the Philosophy of Dialogue ���������������������������������� 148 The Social Face of the Person in Wojtyła’s Thought ������������� 152 Dialogue Creating the Person ����������������������������������������������� 159 Concluding Remarks ������������������������������������������������������������ 162

CHAPTER VI: DIGNITY OF THE PERSON ����������������������� 165 Chapter Introduction �������������������������������������������������������������������� 165 Wojtyła’s Thinking about Dignity ������������������������������������������������� 166 Some Further Clarifications on Dignity of the Person ������������������� 172 Concluding Remarks �������������������������������������������������������������������� 176

FINAL CONCLUSIONS ������������������������������������������������������������� 177 BIBLIOGRAPHY ������������������������������������������������������������������������� 181 Index of Names ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 191

INTRODUCTION Karol Wojtyła’s philosophy of the human person is an important part of his thought. He gave much of his time and intellectual energy to analyse the human being who has a face of the human person.1 This attempt has both ethical and anthropological versions. In the book, we are mostly concerned with the latter because it seems that in the conceptual order a good understanding of the person is an indespensible starting point for any ethical investigations. Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology was basically formulated roughly in 1954–​1978. Besides the anthropological projects of some contemporary philosophers like for example Emmanuel Levínas, Wojtyła’s proposal is an example of a relatively novel approach to the human being worked out by European thinkers concerned with the condition of man in the times of great cultural and ideological uphevals. Wojtyła’s philosophy of the human person can be approach in two ways. The first one is about linking his ideas with other philosophers and philosophical schools. It is also about establishing a conceptual coherence and clarity of his vision of the human person in comparison with other personalistic projects. At any rate, this draws on a methodological move typical for the history of philosophy (and the history of ideas). As it is being advanced, it has some merits but also limitations. The second approach tries to place Wojtyła’s ideas in the context of the contemporary philosophy, in a sense to make him one of the current interlocutors discussing the reality of the person, including various philosophical problems associated with it. This stance in its mature realization does not exlude the achievements of the

1 While Wojtyła was preparing his main anthropological book on the person (The Acting Person) he wrote a letter to a famous French theologian Henri de Lubac. In this letter he confessed: “I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to my heart and is devoted to the metaphysical sense and mystery of the person. The evil of our time consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed in a pulverization, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person.” Quotation after J. F. Crosby, The Personalism of John Paul II, (Steubenville: Hildebrand Press, 2019), p. 9.

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first but draws on them. However, it goes further and undertakes more complex task. The author of this book is convinced that the second approach is more appropriate. Thus, it tries to demonstrate what new can Wojtyła with his thinking about the person suggest to other (not only personalistic) philosophers, and –​vice versa –​what modifications of and developments in Wojtyłan project can be achieved as a result of postulates submitted by some philosophers. The latter methodological move is facilitated by Wojtyła himself who declared, a number of times, that some of his ideas have preliminary characters and need further refinement. Moreover, it is a part of the author’s deep convition that Karol Wojtyła himself would have preferred this approach: not to be only admired and praised but actively engaged in contemporary problems and dilemmas. He worked out a huge intellectual potential and it seems that it is appropariate to use it in contemporary debates. Many philosophers have tried to analyse Wojtyła’s understanding of the human person like Kenneth L. Schmitz,2 Rocco Buttiglione3 and Jarosław Kupczak,4 to name only a few prominent figures. They have presented main ideas of the Polish thinker and clarified many conceptual complexities in his position. Nevertheless, we still need to investigate in-​depth what original had Wojtyła contributed to the personalistic philosophy by taking into account all his works, including those that have been published recently. Additionally, to make Wojtyła a participant of ongoing philosphical debates, we need to look at his ideas concernig the human person in a creative way. The context of the contemporary philosophy has changed since the times of Wojtyła’s scholarly activities and that is why we need to figure out anew how his philsophical resources can be used in this contemporary mindset. 2 K. L. Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama. The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla/​John Paul II, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1994). 3 R. Buttglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, trans. P. Guietti, F. Murphy (Grand Rapids –​Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997). 4 J. Kupczak, Destined for Liberty. The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/​John Paul II, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000).

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In this book, only selected issues of Wojtyła’s personalism will be mentioned and analyzed. However, the author is convinced that they constitute the philosopher’s core thinking about the person. Firstly, we try to establish Wojtyła’s beginning of philosophy of the human person, namely how he moved from a strictly Thomistic approach to the human being to the personalistic position. Secondly, we are going to analyse how Wojtyła presents an epistemological side of his anthropology, namely how we can get to know the person. This aspect of Wojtyła’s position is analysed in comparison with a naturalistic proposal, which is today a popular model of thinking especially in the English-​speaking philosophy. Thirdly, the structure of the person will be presented in two steps: in a critical discussion with a Cartesian model of the human being and by directly analysing the metaphysics of the person. Fourthly, the interiority of the person and her faculties like consciousness and emotions will be shown forth. The former will be presented against a background of philosophers who deny or are sceptical as to the existence of interiority. Wojtyła’s thesis –​in its specificity –​that there is indeed such a sphere of the human person and it plays a vital role in the personal existence will be shown as a claim that can eliminate or at least attenuate a sceptical approach to that. Furthermore, there will be presented an original model of consciousness elaborated on by Wojtyła and there will be analysed a secenario when there is a kind of collision between consciousness and emotions, which the philosopher calls the emotionalization of consciousness. Fifthtly, the person in action will be analyzed. It will mainly concentrate on a personal causation emphasizing its original model worked out by Wojtyła. It will also shed light on the dialogue of the person and its concequences for the constitution of the person and his maturtion. In the last chapter, dignity of the person will be analyzed drawing both on Wojtyła’s remarks and on ideas of other personalists close to the philosopher’s position. The method applied in the book consists in detailed analyses of Wojtyła’s ideas as well as in looking for other ideas complementing his thinking about the person. The latter are mainly supplied by philosophers who are personalists themselves or are simpathetic with this approach to the person. In many other places the philosopher’s position is compared and contrasted with ideas that cannot be strictly considers as personalist but can play positive roles in advancement of Wojtyła’s thinking. Moreover, the book

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attempts to show the possible impact of Wojtyła’s original ideas on long-​ standing philsophical debates concerning particularily the human subject. The majority of chapters have been already published in various philosophy periodicals. Chapter 2: “The Experience of Human Being in the Thought of Karol Wojtyla” (co-​author: P. S. Mazur), Filosofija. Sociologija 28/​1 (2017), pp. 73–​83; ­chapter 3: “Karol Wojtyla and René Descartes. A Comparison of the Anthropological Positions,” Anuario Filosofico 48/​2 (2015), pp. 341–​358, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, ISSN: 0066-5215; “Karol Wojtyła on the Metaphysics of the Person,” Logos i Ethos, Vol 2 (2015), pp. 97–​115; ­chapter 4: “The Human Subject and Its Interiority. Karol Wojtyła and the Crisis in Philosophical Anthropology,” Quién. Rivista de Filosofía Personalista 4 (2016), pp. 47–​ 66; “Wojtyła on Persons and Consciousness,” Forum Philosophicum 19/​1 (2014), pp. 43–​60; “The Relation between Consciousness and Emotions in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła,” The Person and the Challenges 5/​2 (2015), pp. 149–​164; ­chapter 5: “Persons as the Cause of Their Own Action: Karol Wojtyla on Efficacy,” Ethical Perspectives 23/​2 (2016), pp. 259–​275; “The Person in Dialogue, the Person through Dialogue,” Filosofija. Sociologija 27/​1 (2016), pp. 3–​13.

CHAPTER I: TOWARDS THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN PERSON Introduction Karol Wojtyła’s interest concerning “who the human being is” has a long story. It is deeply rooted in his curriculum and education. We can point to some important moments of his intellectual and character formation, which affected this issue. Firstly, the years when he was a student of classical gymnasium and later, just before the Second World War, when he undertook studies of Polish literature at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. Secondly, the time during the War, when Wojtyła was developing his humanistic interest by a participation in an underground theatre, where he was fascinated with the power of words being able to penetrate the deepest spheres of human life. Finally, a discovery of his priestly vocation was very much about getting to know better who the human being is and how to assist him on his way to self-​fulfilment. However, a systematic and theoretical approach to the search on the human being is associated with Wojtyła’s scholarly activities. His studies at the University of Angelicum in Rome constitute an important step in his leaning on the human spiritual condition. His PhD thesis in theology, later published as a book,1 reveals the meaning and role of human interiority both in an aspect of human-​divine relationship and in an underscoring of the complexity of the human being himself. Later, Wojtyła’s interest in philosophy was fully associated with inquiring about the human being both in the realm of ethics and in the philosophical anthropology. In this long process we can perceive a kind of evolution as to how the human being is understood, conceived and presented by Wojtyła. This is a shift from a philosophy of the human being into a philosophy of the human person. Showing this conceptual transition is the aim of this chapter. In doing so

1 K. Wojtyła, Faith According to Saint John of the Cross, trans. J. Aumann (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981).

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we will be basically (but not exlusively) interested in the early works of Karol Wojtyła which reveal with a progressing intensity his consciousness of the human person.

Man in Wojtyła’s Realist Approach to Philosophy A whole approach of Karol Wojtyła to philosophy, at whatever stage of its development, can be called realist. Roughly speaking, in his position he tries to avoid two extremes: on the one hand, an idealist stance associated with some modern schools of German and French philosophy; on the other, a monistic materialism represented in his time by the Marxist philosophy. In a serious of lectures, which Wojtyła was delivering to university students gathered in a Polish version of the Newman chaplaincy, starting from 1949, he makes his epistemological and metaphysical position clear.2 His anti-​ idealistic attitude is manifested straightforwardly in such pronouncements, “our mind attains to extra-​mental realities and is capable of grasping their essence,” or “our cognition discovers a plurality of beings (pluralism) in that reality, not multiple manifestations of some single being (monism).”3 His anti-​materialistic approach comes to the fore when Wojtyła declares as follows, “it would be wrong to claim that the total and proper object of our cognition is matter. That object is simply being or, rather, beings in their whole richness and diversity.”4 Wojtyła elaborates on a realist epistemological stance. He is not the kind of rationalistic philosopher rejecting or attenuating a role of experience. Nevertheless, accepting validity of the latter he stresses the essential role of the human reason in any process of cognition. When, associating his position with cognitive realism, he points out that “our cognition attains to reality, it touches it in the entire rich complex of its manifestations that directly thrust themselves upon our cognition.”5 Thus, manifestations-​phenomena 2 Those lectures were recently discovered and published in a booklet: Considerations on the Essence of Man/​Rozważania o istocie człowieka, (Polish-​English Edition), trans. J. Grondelski, (Lublin-​Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu –​ Società Internazionale Tommaso D’Aquino, 2016). 3 K. Wojtyła, Considerations on the Essence of Man/​Rozważania o istocie człowieka, pp. 17, 19. 4 Ibid., p. 19. 5 Ibid., p. 21.

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are given to us as factors that in a sense impose themselves on us. However, the human subject is not enclosed in mere phenomena but possesses a cognitive ability to ‘go further’ and reach the very being. In this move we can easily perceive not only a continuation of the pre-​modern approach to cognition but more importantly an anti-​Kantian epistemological stance. Wojtyła, as a Thomist, directly acknowledges that we human beings can indeed grasp the being (thing-​in-​itself) and that being is a proper reference point of our human reason. Although in the whole process of cognition the human reason plays an important role, the cognition is not concentrated on the subject but rather on the object; in a sense it revolves around the object; it is the object-​centred undertaking. This is interestingly shown by Wojtyła when he provides us with a short description of how such cognitive process proceeds. He describes that in the following way, “a kind of ‘pulling in’ of the object into the subject takes place in the act of cognition, an assimilation of the object; in the act of desire and aspiration, we have rather an ‘attracting’ by the object towards which the subject in some way goes out. Cognition is directed to the thing itself, to the object.”6 Such a complex process of cognition is possible because of the participation of both sensory and metal powers in their mutual cooperation; in describing this process Wojtyła relies completely on the Thomistic philosophical tradition.7 Of course, the subject can also be made into an object of cognition but the former in its cognitive activities is not ‘imprisoned’ in itself and naturally goes out to outer beings. What is a balance between the scope of inner and outer cognition is not resolved in the philosophy of early Wojtyła. Later on, when he has developed his personalist position more maturely, his important claim would be that whenever the subject gets to know an outer object, he also gets to know himself. The human being who is able to perform such advanced cognitive operations must be constituted by adequate structures, which are usually at the centre of attention of metaphysics. Fundamental tenets of Wojtyła’s theory of the human being are of Aristotelian and Thomistic origin. The human

Ibid., p. 51. 6 7 Ibid., p. 53.

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being is composed of matter and form, which are understood correspondingly as body and soul, and in comparison to the Platonic tradition, are very strictly intertwined. Thanks to that, our cognition is simultaneously sensual and mental, and more generally –​any other human undertaking engages our bodily and mental spheres. However, Wojtyła –​in accordance with the Thomistic tradition –​goes deeper and shows that at the beginning of all activities is the soul, which should be considered as the principle of causality. He claims that “the soul is that first cause of all human acts, experiences, and manifestations of life, we also by this accept that they all come from it, flowing from it, as from a source and leading to it as their proper and first cause.”8 Wojtyła assumes, on the one hand, that the soul is not a semi-​autonomous subject, which will be later a recurring topic in his fully-​fledged philosophy of the human person. On the other hand, he stresses that the human soul is not a mere derivative of matter and its processes. He puts it this way, “the fundamental element, giving life to man, constituting the first source and principle of all his acts, does not allow itself to be entirely reduced to animating energies or powers residing in the matter of the human organism itself, nor can it be entirely identified with them.”9 Although the soul is the principle of the whole human existence, including its material dimension, it possesses its spiritual character. Wojtyła stresses that perspective by claiming that “in the final analysis, the human soul shows itself as a spiritual being, as a dynamic structure and thus as if the source of a specific concentration of cognitive (reason) and appetitive (will) spiritual energy.”10 This is entirely congruous with the hylomorphic conception of the human being and the Polish philosopher openly acknowledges it.11 There are also other elements in the thought of Wojtyła which are important for his early understanding of the human being. The philosopher points out, in the way typical for the realist tradition, that human nature is the essence of the human being inasmuch as that essence is understood as the

Ibid., p. 31. 8 9 Ibid., p. 119. 10 Ibid., p. 125. 11 Ibid., p. 149.

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basis for his entire activity.12 Because those activities are very complex, they reveal that human nature should be conceived very broadly. Hence, this nature cannot be understood as the sole nature of the thinking subject nor as an exclusive nature of the physical body. Human nature is given in potency and only through activities manifests itself and in consequence the human being becomes more himself, in a sense advances in a self-​fulfilment. Moreover, as many Aristotelians and Thomists, Wojtyła stresses the fact that in becoming itself is contained the fundamental good. In general, the Polish thinker understands the good as that “which evokes appetition, which stirs it to activity.”13 Thus, the good is an end to which all human endeavours tend. To become itself, the human being needs many goods because of the multi-​faceted character of his nature. Wojtyła expresses this classical thesis in this way, various kinds of goods become the telic end of his aspirations and activities to the extent that they contribute to man’s becoming more perfect in one or another respect. Some goods, for example perfect his organism by augmenting his powers, while others perfect his intellect by broadening his knowledge. Among all these goods only moral good perfects the very humanity of man: through the moral good a man becomes simply a better man, he becomes better as a man –​he actualizes the potency slumbering within him to become a better man.14

On the Threshold of Personalist Thinking The understanding of the human being in the Aristotelian and Thomistic thought has been associated with the concept of the person for a long time. Since Boethius and Thomas Aquinas similar philosophical categories are referred both to the human being and to the human person. For example, such metaphysical concepts as substance, substantial form or rational nature are used to characterize both the human being and the person. Wojtyła in his early writings goes along the same path. He perceives the human person as a proper subject of metaphysics because he wants to

12 K. Wojtyła, Ethics Primer/​Elementarz etyczny, (Polish-​English Edition) trans. H. MacDonald, (Lublin-​Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu –​ Società Internazionale Tommaso D’Aquino, 2017), p. 63. 13 Ibid., p. 65. 14 Ibid., pp. 65–​67.

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stand for its integral picture and avoids a reduction of its being to other realities: on the one hand, to society (Marxism), on the other hand, to some human faculties as consciousness (Descartes). At that time Wojtyła repeats the Thomistic approach to the person, which is evident when he declares, “what is peculiar to the human person, however, is that this person has a rational nature only because of a spiritual soul, which is the substantial form of the body. This fact is of basic importance for understanding the whole uniqueness of the human person, as well as for explaining the structure of the human person.”15 However, in this early period of Wojtyła’s philosophizing there is a growing consciousness that the approach to the person must be modified and enriched. The person cannot be only understood as one of the members of the human family; it is reasonable to claim that the personal reality is deeper, richer, and more complex. This kind of realization is revealed when our philosopher tries to explain what the person is at the beginning of his book Love and Responsibility. He claims that “the term ‘person’ has been coined to signify that a man cannot be wholly contained within the concept ‘individual member of the species,’ but that there is something more to him, a particular richness and perfection in the manner of his being, which can only be brought out by the use of the word ‘person.’ ”16 Wojtyła’s approach to discovery of that ‘more’ in the human being started many years before he proposed his own original concept of the person and it is good to accentuate these important moments. Karol Wojtyła’s scholarly career started when he worked on his PhD thesis on the theological and mystical thought of St John of the Cross. Following this great saint, he inquired into how the Christian faith is given

15 K. Wojtyła, Thomistic Personalism, in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community. Selected Essays, trans. T. Sandok, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), p. 168. 16 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, transl. H. T. Willetts, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981), p. 22. A similar belief is voiced in Considerations on the Essence of Man. Here, it is put this way, “the feature of the person –​proper exclusively to the human being among the beings in the surrounding visible world –​causes that every person, though he finds himself within the boundaries of the human species, however at the same time surpasses in some way those boundaries, in order to constitute each for himself a separate world of experience, creativity, and goals.” K. Wojtyła, Considerations on the Essence of Man, p. 159.

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in a subjective experience while not loosing its objective content. Rocco Buttiglione points out that at that time Wojtyła studied a ‘phenomenology of mystical experience’ and that phenomenology –​as proposed by St John of the Cross –​led to an irreducible centre of the person showing its self-​ transcendence.17 Thus, Wojtyła’s investigative attitude to the human being was formed not so much by a structural consideration of whom or what he is but by practical and existential insight into an inner and dynamic sphere of human existence. A further step is done when Karol Wojtyła embarks on the ethical thought of Max Scheler. He tries to determine whether the project of phenomenological ethics elaborated by the German philosopher was adequate to explain Christian ethics. Although Wojtyła’s conclusions are negative, it is good to ponder on some remarks made by him in the course of his critical discussion with and evaluation of Scheler’s proposals. The Polish philosopher considers Scheler’s approach to values and to the person as being dominated too much by emotions. As a result, the person appears only as a “unity of experiences” and there is a difficulty with grasping how such a person undertakes his actions and particularly ethical acts. According to Wojtyła, in Scheler’s position the person is conceived as too weak a reality, which is exacerbated by a rejection of the thesis that the person is a substantial being. We do not know how such a person is the author of his undertakings, that is, there is a problem with understanding his operativity.18 However, Karol Wojtyła does not reject the phenomenological method of the German philosopher. He considers it useful as far as it can bring with it a great help in investigating ethical facts, which for the Polish philosopher are part of inner human experience.19 In this way, the appreciation of human

17 R. Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyła. The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, trans. P. Guietti, F. Murphy, (Gran Rapids –​Cambridge (UK): William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), ch. 3. 18 K. Wojtyła, Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maxa Schelera (On the Possibility of Creating a Christian Ethics Based on the Assumptions of the System of Max Scheler), in K. Wojtyła, Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności (Issue of the Moral Subject), T. Styczeń, J. W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek (eds.), (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe KUL, 1991), pp. 120–​121. 19 Ibid., p. 123.

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experience and Wojtyła’s turn to subjectivity seem to constitute new avenues in approaching the personal reality. In his book Love and Responsibility the philosopher, while dealing with the person, employs straightforwardly such categories as “a specific inner self,” ‘an inner life,”20 which seem to be borrowed from St Augustine’s philosophy.21 Nevertheless, they are not intended to replace Thomistic categories but to enrich them. A strong signal that this is the case is provided when Wojtyła declares, “a person is an objective entity, which as a definite subject has the closest contacts with the whole (external) world and is most intimately involved with it precisely because of its inwardness, its interior life.”22 Thus, in this brief definition besides categories stemming from the Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy (e.g. ‘an objective entity’), there are new categories (inwardness, interior life), which, in order to be properly explored and understood, need more than tools provided by the metaphysical thinking. In this way, Wojtyła opens up a space for a fully-​fledged phenomenological investigation. Showing how these two philosophical approaches to the person can be reconciled and used for the sake of its better understanding will be a task of further analyses carried out by Karol Wojtyła. Beside Thomistic, phenomenological, and Augustinian borrowings, Wojtyła draws on the thought of a further philosopher who plays an important role for him, namely Immanuel Kant. Although reference to his thought is done mostly within ethical investigations, it also reveals its anthropological profile. Wojtyła undertakes Kant’s second imperative and formulates his own version in a following way, “whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not treat that person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but must allow for the fact that he or she, too, has or at least should have, distinct personal ends.”23 The person according to this formula is always to be treated as an end and never only as a means. This signals that the person is an entity, which has not only axiologically and ethically a high position among other entities, but its metaphysical and anthropological importance is also high. In Wojtyła’s understanding

0 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 22. 2 21 See e.g. Augustine, Confessions, bk. VII, ch. X. 22 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 23. 23 Ibid., p. 28.

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of the person its goodness (axiological subjectivity) is strictly associated with its existence (metaphysical subjectivity); he never separates these two subjectivities. In general terms it means for the philosopher that what is an existing entity possesses at the same time a value (later we will elaborate on a relationship between good and value in Wojtyłas’s approach). This presupposition will play an important role when we will be analysing the topic of personal dignity. Moreover, due to his adherence to the Thomistic philosophy, the Polish philosopher takes into account the understanding of the subject, which seems to differ from that employed by Kant. The latter is a refinement of the Cartesian concept and is primarily associated with the thinking center of the person. In the second imperative,24 the German philosopher uses the terminology of “humanity” and “person,” which suggests a broader reference; but that is only seeming and not real. There are following reasons for that assertion. For Kant, while talking about predispositions, there are in the human nature three spheres: animality, humanity and personality. Only humanity (in the person) possesses the objective absolute worth; it is not indeed animality,25 or we can just say the body. Thus, the latter seems not to be a proper part of the worthwhile subject, and consequently the scope of the subject itself is clearly narrower. The Wojtylian subject in turn encompasses all that belongs to the human life, including its bodily constitution.26 It goes well beyond a thinking subject or the subject who is primarily inclosed to the human interiority (in our further analyses we will shed more light on this important issue). The passage from the philosophy of the human being to the philosophy of the human person is also well presented when Wojtyła sketches two types of man, namely the cosmological type and the personalistc one. He claims that the cosmological type concentrates on the objectivity of 24 Kant’s formula goes as follow, “so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4: 429. 25 A. W. Wood, Kantian Ethics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 88. 26 Wojtyła puts it very clearly, “a human person … has a body and in a certain sense ‘is a body.’ ” K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 23.

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the human being and as such is associated with its reduciblity. The philosopher underlines that in a long history of that cosmological approach to man “objectivity … was connected with the general assumption of the reducibility of the human being.”27 It means that the human being was explained with a help of tools that served to explain also other non-​human realities, for example the world of animals. The personalistic type in turn is more concerned with subjectivity of the human being understood in a close relation to the human interiority and the sphere of experience. Wojtyła points out that “subjectivity is … a kind of synonym for the irrudicible in the human being.”28 Understandably such subjectivity is strictly a human property, and its exploration may reveal uniqueness of the human being. However, these two types of the human being, although seem to be in tension, do not have to exclude each other. If we tend to sketch an integral picture of the human being, and this was a clear intention of Karol Wojtyła, we need both, namely objective and subjective approach to the human reality. Wojtyła makes it clear that “the personalistic type of understanding the human being is not the antinomy of the cosmological type but its complement.”29 In following analyses, we will be exploring the complexity of what is objective and subjective in the human being from the works of Karol Wojtyła.

Concluding Remarks Karol Wojtyła’s philosophy of the human person is deeply rooted in his multifaceted interest in the human being. It was present and maturing in his literary, artistic, theological, and finally, philosophical activities. Hence why Wojtyła uses many resources to talk about the human person. At this early stage of our philosophical analyses, it looks as if Wojtyła draws upon various philosophers. However, he does not spend too much energy establishing how they fit each other. His interest is directed more to the reality of the person and thus he looks for various tools enabling him to

27 K. Wojtyła, Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being, in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community. Selected Essays, p. 211. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid., p. 213.

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grasp, describe and understand this important reality. Hence, the philosopher does not move on the meta-​philosophical level but on the object-​ centred one. This entails some consequences, including a lack of precision in some concepts he uses. In following parts of the book, we will have to deal with this problem in a number of places. As to his main philosophical approaches –​i.e. Thomistic and phenomenological –​Wojtyła tries to harmonize them and not use one at the expense of the other. Thus, his phenomenology is to complement the Thomistic metaphysics and not to replace it, whereas the latter serves as a kind of destination. This is associated with his anthropological methodology where phenomena are treated as “departure points” and the core of the personal existence is “the point of arrival;” thus, we obtain a brief characterization of Wojtyła’s method: “from phenomenon to foundation.’ Other philosophical ideas such as those provided by Augustine or Kant, and others, serve as tools helping to grasp various aspects of personal life. The philosophy of the human being constitutes a starting point for Wojtyła, and it leads him to the philosophy of the human person. However, the latter does not exludes the former and they partly overlap. At this stage of our investigations, we can put yet a stronger conclusion: the philosophy of the human being is absorbed by the philosophy of the human person to such an extent that they are indenspensible for each other. In other words, there are not two separate levels of analyses concernig the human being but various aspects, which in the end constitue a large personalistic project. Thus, Wojtyła’s thinking about the human being is characterized by inclusion of all relevant ideas that lead us to a better and fuller understanding of the reality of being human.

CHAPTER II: HOW TO KNOW THE PERSON? Introduction A good part of modern as well as contemporary philosophy is deeply involved in inquiry concerning human being. This path of philosophical investigation is very complex and has its dynamics, which are tellingly featured by the title of Robert Solomon’s book concerning a history of western philosophy, namely Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self.1 The concept of experience plays an important role in these anthropological discussions. A dividing line, roughly speaking, goes between the inner, subjective experience and the outer, objective one. Some thinkers concentrate on and develop the former, claiming that what we really need in order to understand the world and acquire a proper approach to it, is the experience of oneself from within. Others in turn highlight the latter, pointing to the validity and a fundamental role of the experience given from without. Both sides seem to have good reasons supporting their positions, which results in a situation that there is a tension and even a conflict between them. This tension, of course, is not an invention of philosophers but has its deep roots in human existence itself. On the one hand, inner experience constitutes our personal world, and our self-​identity depends on it to a considerable extent. Thus, it seems, we cannot play it down or reduce it to something else. On the other hand, outer experience leads us to many inventions and discoveries; in a sense, it guarantees our control over the world. Hence, we cannot easily get rid of that. However, as a result, we are torn between one and the other and very often we are disoriented as to a main compass in our lives. Thus, unless we sort out this issue and establish harmonious correlations between these two kinds of experience, there tensions and misunderstandings will always appear.

1 R. C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self, (Oxford-​New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

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Such tensions and misunderstandings take place –​at least prima facie –​ when the human being, the person is the subject of the investigation.2 The dilemma is the following: which experience is more important to discover the truth about myself –​inner or outer? In this chapter we want to concentrate on both experiences as lived out by the human being and show the essential relationship between them. An interesting proposal concerning this issue was sketched by Karol Wojtyła in his book The Person and the Act.3 Our intention is to follow and advance his analyses showing the indispensability of both experiences in their mutual and complex relations.4 In this way, we want to prove that these two versions of experience are complementary and even necessary for each other. Proving that will be possible when we take into account details of the naturalistic concept of human being and corresponding experience, which is mentioned by Wojtyła but never fully elaborated on.

Wojtyła on Experience: A Preliminary Approach A fundamental concept, which seems to be a cornerstone of Wojtyła’s philosophy of the human person, is the term “the experience of human being.” Explaining this term, the philosopher points to a “cognitive contact with

2 In this chapter concepts of “the human being” and “the person” are used interchangeably. Later in the book more light will be shed on relations between them. 3 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” in Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne [The Person and the Act, and the Other Anthropological Studies] (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1994), pp. 43–​ 344. The English translation of the book: The Acting Person, trans. A. Potocki. A.-​T. Tymieniecka, (Boston: Reidel, 1979). We draw on the Polish original of The Acting Person because our intention is to grasp Wojtyła’s analyses and remarks in their exactness. As far as the English translation of Osoba i czyn is concerned, there are some doubts concerning its adequacy. See Th. Sandok (translator’s remarks), in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community. Selected Essays (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), p. 207. 4 Generally speaking, it is important to notice that a proper understanding of the person in Wojtyła’s thought is impossible when we do not take into account a so-​called lived experience. Thus, the concept of experience is a key notion in Wojtyła’s anthropology. See D. Savage, “The Centrality of Lived Experience in Wojtyła’s Account of the Person,” Roczniki Filozoficzne LXI (4) (2013), pp. 19–​51.

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myself.” However, what is interesting here is that that contact has also an experiential character.5 The combination of these two aspects of contact with the human and personal reality is a result of the phenomenological approach.6 However, such an account can be problematic. Many philosophers, especially modern and contemporary ones, respect the separation between what is cognitive and what is experiential. Thus, the cognitive approach to human being seems to be distinguished from the experiential one. Wojtyła does not confuse them but reasons along the line that it is not easy to separate them, especially when a reality as complex as human being is the subject of inquiry. All in all, he is convinced that cognition and experience always accompany each other. However, the philosopher specifies the relationship between a cognitive and experiential aspect. He claims that “the experience of a human being (a human being who is me) lasts so long as the immediate cognitive contact takes place, where I am a subject, on the one hand, and an object, on the other.”7 Thus he makes clear that one must be in cognitive contact with oneself in order to experience himself. This thesis, however, does not mean that cognition and experience belong to two different stages of inquiry, coming one after another. Rather, it reveals the correlation between them and even their interdependence, i.e. one depends on the other and one is needed for the other. As a result, Wojtyła claims that “any experience is at the same time a kind of understanding.”8 Hence, there is no cognition of myself without a component of experience and any experience of myself is accompanied by self-​knowledge and understanding.

K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 51. 5 6 At the beginning of the chapter, it should be remarked that Wojtyła should not be considered as someone who is in a mainstream of the classical phenomenology. Although he draws on a phenomenological method, which he mastered while studying Max Scheler and Edmund Husserl, in fact he is a personalist. It means two things: first, he is not limited by presuppositions accepted by the Fathers of phenomenology (e.g. Wojtyła rejects a thesis that consciousness has an intentional character); second, the Polish thinker introduces some ontological theses that typical phenomenologists may be unwilling to accept. 7 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 52. 8 Ibid.

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What is interesting in Wojtyła’s position is the conviction that any process of experience is at the same time a kind of self-​experience, and hence a self-​knowledge. He claims that “experience of any thing, which is outside a human being, is always associated with a kind of experience of the human being himself. A human being never experiences something outside himself without experiencing, in a sense, himself in that experience.”9 Thus, preliminarily, we can point to a thesis that there is no pure external experience. The latter quote indicates that external experience always engages the inner experience of the experiencing human subject. Correspondingly, knowledge concerning external and objective realities of various kinds contributes something to the knowledge of myself. For instance, it can be the knowledge about myself as an inventor that is the knowledge that deepens and strengthens (confirms) my understanding of me as the researcher. What about a pure inner experience? Is it possible to penetrate my interior in a direct way without any intermediaries? In the order of pure possibilities, it seems possible. I am always with myself and I have an exclusive access to myself. However, in practice it is a non-​starter especially as far as mature self-​experience is concerned. The latter is possible only when there is a distance between me as the experiencing subject and me as the inner object of my experience. This distance is acquired and advanced in the course of my contacts with external realities. The experience of inner-​outer relations makes me ready to realize that I myself am also in a relation with me and I am disposed to experience my inner objects. In other words, without the inner distance I will be unable to discriminate between me and my inner objects. This leads us to an important distinction between a subject and an object of experience. Human experience, correspondingly to human cognition, has its subject and object. The former is the human being himself, whereas the latter encompasses many realities, including humanness itself. In the realm of the experience of human being, there are two vital experiences. In the first, the object is the experiencing subject, in the second –​other human beings. They differ because I get an exclusive insight into my own “I,” which is not the case when I try to experience the humanity of the other. Wojtyła claims

9 Ibid., p. 51.

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that there is a natural disparity10 between them but at the same time they have much in common. In one as well as in the other, I experience what belongs to humanness. In a sense there is one object of these two activities and hence, Wojtyła introduces a concept of “unity of the object of experience.”11 The difference in turn is revealed in the relationship between the subject and the object that is, in the case of experiencing myself the object is “closer” and more immediate than in experiencing the other.

Unity of Experience As mentioned above, it is difficult to separate inner experience from outer. Nevertheless, at first glace, we have some reasons to claim the opposite. Inner experience is strictly connected with memory, consciousness, self-​ knowledge, and reflection. The outer in turn depends, to a considerable extent, on activities of senses. Thus, we have some cognitive resources with which to discriminate between these two approaches. Epistemologically we cannot question that. However, Wojtyła as a personalist avoids this narrow distinction and even doubts its viability. Can we really separate the sense experience from other inner experiences, where the reason plays a vital role? The answer he gives is rather negative. No one knows what pure sense experience is about and what its character and scope are. We human beings are not animals in our cognition. We are not limited to activities of the senses as is the case of animals. The participation of reason in any experience leads to a situation where “a stabilization in the realm of the object of experience” is guaranteed by reason not by the senses. Thus, what we experience –​be it inner or outer objects –​goes through “mental classifications and distinctions.”12 Wojtyła acknowledges a complex yet integral approach to human being as far as experience is concerned. He claims that there is no way to artificially detach human experience from the sets of cognitive acts, which have the human being as the object. All sets of cognitive acts directed to the human being, whom I am but also any other is, has both the empirical

0 Ibid., p. 54. 1 11 Ibid., p. 53. 12 Ibid., p. 54.

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HOW TO KNOW THE PERSON? character and the intellectual one. One is in the other, one influences the other, one draws on the other.13

Thus, what we can see is an attempt to associate and even unify various manners of human cognition and experience. In a sense, they operate simultaneously in their own right but at the same time they complement each other and bring support for one another. Wojtyła worked out such a broad concept of experience being aware at the same time that particular experiences are not symmetrical and –​as we already noticed –​there is a kind of disparity between them. However, he was convinced that even if we inquire into particular and deep structures of human being all corresponding experiences are not misleading us. We are still experiencing human being as such, i.e. in his essence and existence. As the Polish thinker claims, the integral experience in its simplicity reigns over its complexity. In other words, in any particular and limited experience, we do have the experience of the whole human being. That wholeness of experience is, in a sense, made up of various particular elements coming from a personal experience of human being as well as from the experience of others; it is also a result of the inner and outer experience. Wojtyla concludes in a following way, “all those [elements] in the cognition ‘comprises’ the one whole rather than bring about the ‘complexity’.”14 Still, we can enquire into the reason for that integral picture of experience. What renders the philosopher unwilling to yield to a fragmentary approach to human being? Why is he so resistant to give a privileged role to any particular experience concerning human life? There may be a couple of answers, but one seems particularly striking. Wojtyła as a phenomenologist was convinced that any reality has its exclusive manner of cognition and experience. The reality of human being is one of them. Thus, we are in possession of integral cognitive and experiential methods of investigating human being. This is something, which goes far beyond methods applied to investigating things or inanimate objects. It encompasses not only objective aspects of human being but also subjective ones. In this vein Wojtyła claims, “I, for myself, am not only the ‘interiority’ but also the ‘exteriority;’

3 Ibid., p. 56. 1 14 Ibid.

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I remain the subject of both experiences: given from interior and from exterior.”15 And correspondingly, to know myself I should concentrate on both kinds of experience, which in fact constitute the integral experience of human being. The thesis about an integral experience of the person finds in Wojtyła’s thought an interesting elaboration when he considers two possible understanding of induction. He claims that in looking at the person I assert not only a bundle of separate traits but a whole personal being.16 In contrast with the concept of induction as advanced by John Stuart Mill (and other empirically-​ oriented philosophers), the Polish thinker proposes an Aristotelian notion that consists in “an intellectual grasp of unity of meanings in the plurality and complexity of phenomena.”17 Referred to human individual such an “induction leads to a simple experience of the human being, which we state despite her complexity.”18 Thus understood, induction does not exhaust the process of getting to know the person. In order to arrive at a more complete conception of the person, we need to explain the corresponding phenomena in terms of their underlying principles. This is why Wojtyła points to a second necessary epistemological move, which he names “reduction.” Of course, it does not consist in reducing or

5 Ibid., p. 55. 1 16 A similar claim is shared by many contemporary philosophers of the school of phenomenology. For example, Shaun Gallagher puts it this way, “just as I don’t experience my brain as causing my actions, I don’t experience my mental states per se as causing my actions; rather I experience myself as controlling my actions. It is not the brain that acts; nor is it the mind that acts; it is the person that I am who engages in action.” S. Gallagher, “Introduction: A Diversity of Selves,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, S. Gallagher (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 18. 17 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 63. Aristotle considers induction, inter alia, in Prior and Posterior Analytics, in particular in ­chapter 19 of the latter (Aristotle, Prior and Posterior Analytics, W. D. Ross (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), ch. 19). The ancient philosopher developed a so-​called “intuitive induction,” as W. David Ross puts it. David W. Hamlyn summarizes Aristotle’s idea in this way: “This is a seeing of the general principle from and in particular cases, and the process of getting to the insight in this way is epagoge or induction” (D. W. Hamlyn, “Aristotle’s Epagoge,” Phronesis Vol. 21, No. 2 (1976), p. 167). 18 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 63.

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simplifying anything, as it is traditionally understood. Rather it consists in explaining the content of the experience of the person by looking for an adequate reason (or reasons) for those specific exeriences. In all these investigative startegies, as a phenomenologist, he stresses a necessary fidelity to an unfolding reality. Thus, he claims that “explaining, we follow after the object, which is given in experience; and we follow in such a way as this is given.”19 This strategy is particularily important when we try to unfold the complexity of the human being. It seems to convey an essential methodological indication: “let the human being himself speaks to us on who he is.”

Human Experience: A Rival Naturalistic Approach Wojtyła makes a distinction between his approach to experience and an approach typical for naturalism. His position is close to a phenomenological stance, whereas the naturalistic position is called a phenomenalistic one. The philosopher is rather critical of the latter and directs some important questions to it, namely “what is it given in a direct way? Is it only a ‘surface’ of the being –​enquired by senses –​which we call human being or human being as such? Whether and under what conditions is this a proper ‘I’ [understood] as human being?”20 We cannot answer these questions until we have investigated at least some selected proposals of naturalistic concepts of the person, which make part of contemporary philosophy. Wojtyła does not mention any specific naturalistic projects but it seems reasonable to make reference to some of them in order to determine what kind of experience of human being is presupposed in them. Is that a pure sense experience only or maybe a kind of experience less evident and more complex? In the naturalistic thinking there is a tendency to introduce a distinction between human biological life and life of the person.21 Let us accept 9 Ibid., p. 65. 1 20 Ibid., p. 57. 21 The position of philosophical naturalism is quite complex. There are many representatives of that, and it is not possible, in this brief sketch, to refer to all of them. Basically, we are going to draw on ideas presented by those who are active in the field of the contemporary bioethics. However, there are many others involved in discussions taking place, for instance, at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive sciences.

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it at least for the sake of the present analyses. For instance, Peter Singer uses this distinction claiming that the former amounts to “member of the species Homo sapiens.”22 Consequently it brings with it a set of tools necessary to experience and acquire knowledge about human being. As Singer points out, “whether a being is a member of a given species is something that can be determined scientifically, be an examination of the nature of chromosomes in the cells of living organisms.”23 In terms of Wojtyła’s discrimination of various experiences, belonging to the species Homo sapiens is given via external and objective experience. Singer undertakes a second understanding of the term “human being” and this is associated with personal life. He recalls a figure of Joseph Fletcher who worked out a set of personal features, which in turn seems to be a further elaboration of John Locke’s thinking about the person.24 These features include intelligence, self-​awareness, self-​control, sense of time, sense of futurity, sense of the past, capacity to relate to others, concern for others, communication with other persons, control of existence, curiosity, change and changeability, balance of rationality and feeling, idiosyncrasy, and neocortical function.25 Other philosophers, to mention only a few figures, who are naturalists or sympathizers with this approach, add further characteristics such as a capability of valuing one’s own life,26 a possession of the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and a belief that one is such an entity.27

2 P. Singer, Practical Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 85. 2 23 Ibid. 24 John Locke said that the person “is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it.” J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1996), bk. II, chap. XXVII, sect. 9. 25 J. Fletcher, “Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man,” The Hasting Center Report 2 (5) (1972), pp. 1–​4. 26 J. Harris, The Value of Life, (London: Routledge, 1985), p. 15–​17. 27 M. Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” in Applied Ethics, P. Singer (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 82. The naturalist approach, in general, rejects the classical concept of substance and subscribes to the bundle concept of that. Thus, the person is understood here as the constellation of

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In the light of these proposals, it is not easy to get to know what kind of experience helps us to be acquainted with the person: internal or external. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to claim that a special role is given here to internal experience. All mental, psychological and moral characteristics and attitudes are basically subjects of experiences from the inside. We cannot acquire them and have a control over them unless we have access to essential values and qualities in the subjective dimension of our being. On the other hand, in the case of other people, what we have is only an objective access to them; we can judge them only from outside. Thus, we can preliminarily contend that both experiences are somehow present and operating here. From Singer’s remarks we can infer a claim that a more important role should be given to inner experience. This philosopher is convinced that comparing these two faces of humanity, the person is “a real human being.”28 It manifests what is perfect and especially precious in human life. Hence, all methods of reaching out to this aspect of humanness should be emphasized and appreciated. In contrast, to be a member of the species is merely a matter of a biological fact. It helps us to notice that a human being is an organism among many others. Correspondingly, inner experience gives us an access to this human fullness and is a tool of strengthening and developing this unique potential. Outer experience seems to be unable to touch and affect the latter. It concentrates on the objective side of human existence with its tools and modes of inquiry. However, such reasoning is not exact and does not reflect the main point of naturalistic perception and experience concerning human being. Singer as a typical naturalist states that “these two senses of ‘human being’ overlap but do not coincide.”29 It happens that they occur together but at the same time we cannot identify one with the other. In other words, the beginning and the end of human life of the member of the species and of the human person differ. Trying to determine this difference, we must say

psychological characteristics. See G. Hołub, “Human Enhancement, the Person, and Posthuman Personhood,” Ethics & Medicine. An International Journal of Bioethics 32 (3) (2016), pp. 174–​176. 28 P. Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 86. 29 Ibid.

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that the human organism is the reality, which usually subsists longer than the reality of the person. The reason supporting this claim is that personhood is constituted by personal characteristics and these appear not at the beginning of biological life and in many cases disappear before a biological death.30 Thus, what we have are two manners of experiencing human life and they are definitely asymmetrical. The experience of human organism is given longer in terms of time and has rather external character. The experience of the person in turn is shorter quantitatively but deeper qualitatively (it goes clearly beyond what is grasped by senses) and hence reaches –​as Singer put it –​“a real human being.” Let us concentrate on the latter experience. As we have already said, it seems to draw upon intellect, will and moral sense. Traditionally they have been understood as higher powers and faculties. They constitute the bedrock of the rationalistic approach to human being. In fact, when we take into account objects of intellect, will and moral activities, we are assured that sense perception is limited here. Nevertheless, in the naturalistic approach to human being these activities play essential roles and find their sui generis explanations. Basically, naturalist philosophers are interested in them as in actual phenomena. In other words, they are taken into account as capacities, which can be easily exercisable but not as parts of underlining potentialities.31 As a result, a massive attention is paid to the fact whether they obtain in a given situation and can be currently verified. Thus, it is an attempt to grasp what is internal through the lenses of the external, i.e. in the light of the methodology of the external (empirical, sensual). We can still enquire into what real inner experience is. In fact, the problem revolves around the real existence of the human interiority. If there is such a sphere, the claim concerning a corresponding experience is 30 It is interestingly put by Mark Cherry, “once beings permanently lose the cognitive capacities that sustain personhood, they become beings, if not things, which have the character of being former persons. Without such essential capacities, beings cannot, even in principle, participate in self-​conscious, self-​ reflexive moral agency.” M. Cherry, Kidney for Sale by Owner. Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), p. 22. 31 M. Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 149–​156.

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strong and quite credible. However, if there is no such real interiority, the corresponding experience will be a projection of something else or even an illusion. To solve this problem, we must first ask what the origin of those personal characteristics is, according to a pattern of naturalistic thinking. In this approach one thing can be excluded at once: that interiority is not extra-​natural sphere. There is no such independent reality as spirit, self or the “I.” They are unavailable for empirical tools and there are no resources within the naturalist methodology to inquire into them. Nevertheless, there is still a concept of self but understood as something associated with a bundle of various characteristics.32 Basically, those characteristics will be closely associated with the higher brain and the nervous system, and we can consider them as emergent properties of the cortex and nervous systems.33 Hence, the higher brain plays an essential role in the existence of the person

32 The question is whether we can consider seriously the existence of the self or the “I” at all. In the bundle theory of substance there is no distinction between a subject and its attributes. All elements seem to constitute such a bundle equally and there is no element of higher order organizing the whole. In the case of human being, it is hard to point to the self or the “I” that precedes its constituents and makes them into a complex and ordered human individual. In other words, there is no “the single owner” of those constituents making up the bundle. See R. Sorabji, Self. Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality Life, and Death, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 260. 33 For instance, Christian Smith presents personal characteristics as emergent properties. Firstly, he sets out an understanding of the process itself, “emergence refers to the process of constituting a new entity with its own particular characteristics through the interactive combination of other, different entities that are necessary to create the new entity but that do not contain the characteristics present in the new entity.” Ch. Smith, What Is a Person? Rethinking Humanity, Social Life, and the Moral Good from the Person Up, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 25–​26. Then, he claims that human beings possess casual capacities, which are emergent from the human body, particularly from the human brain. Finally, Smith is convinced that “personhood is emergent from them” (i.e. from casual capacities). Ibid., pp. 42–​43. For more elaborate assessment of his views see G. Hołub, “The Person as an Emergent Reality. Some Critical Remarks,” in The Person at the Crossroads, J. Beauregard, G. Gallo, C. Stancati (eds.), (Wilmington: Vernon Press, 2020), pp. 149–​161.

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as such.34 The interiority here –​if we can speak about such a sphere at all –​ is rather a derivative reality, and so should be considered a possible internal experience. However, they are both ontologically weak realities and there are doubts whether we can take them seriously into account.35

Human Experience: Phenomenological vs Phenomenalistic Approach Now we can return to the questions put by Wojtyła. In the naturalistic position what is given in a direct way are foremost empirical features. On the one hand, they consist in biological and neurobiological systems. On the other, they are made up of emergent proprieties coming from complexes of material structures. The latter have unclear ontological character. The naturalistic position considers them within a non-​reductive naturalist theory. Thus, they are not non-​natural features but should be accredited with the status of derivates of natural realities. If we ask whether personal characteristics promoted by the naturalistic stance can be called a “surface” of human being, the answer –​given from Wojtyłan perspective –​will be positive. There are several reasons justifying this opinion. Biological and neurobiological systems can be successfully inquired into by methods of sense experience. There is a growing body of empirical tools helping us to get to know our cells, neuronal cells and systems grouping these factors. The problem is with personal characteristics. Firstly, it is hardly believable that they arise from material reality. They are essentially connected with abstract concepts and intentions, and the latter in principle

34 To give a couple of examples, we can point to Joseph Fletcher. He declares that “without the synthesizing function of the cerebral cortex, … the person is nonexistent.” J. Fletcher, “Four Indicators of Humanhood: The Enquiry Matures,” The Hastings Center Report 4, (6) (1974), p. 6; or, in this same vein, Mark Cherry, “removal of the higher brain demonstrably destroys the necessary conditions for the embodiment and existence of the person.” M. Cherry, Kidney for Sale by Owner. Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, p. 25. 35 In the naturalistic position one important thing is unclear and unexplained, namely what is an origin of content of personal characteristics, often associated with abstract ideas and intentions. We cannot adhere to the thesis that they are produced by natural processes, occurring in the brain and nervous systems. Thus, the naturalistic stance seems to assume more than it declares.

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cannot be products of natural processes. Secondly, there is a real problem to explain how casual capacities or combination of natural systems initiate the appearance of personal characteristics. Christian Smith adhering to the emergent view of the human person acknowledges this openly36 as do other philosophers.37 Finally, we remain at the surface of the human being because there is not an extra-​empirical self or an “I.” The naturalistic position operates within the third-​person-​perspective and talking about a sphere that is beyond that or in the background of that is rather pointless. Wojtyła is convinced that in the case of the human being the first-​person-​ perspective is irreducible. This perspective is anchored in the “I” or the self who is a primary reality and the subject of other powers and faculties. Thus, personal characteristics belong to the “I” and are his manifestations. The experience of the human being cannot overlook this primary reality because otherwise inner experience has no object. Nevertheless, he does not exclude the third-​person-​perspective, important for the scientific and objective approach to the world. Wojtyła’s methods, belonging to the realist phenomenology, enable him to combine the first-​person-​perspective with the third-​person-​perspective. We can even claim that such a combination seems indispensable in the light of his anthropological presuppositions. In

36 “How the brain interacting with the rest of the body gives rise to the mental capacity to, for example, creatively imagine possibilities that do not yet exist, is absolutely mysterious” (Ch. Smith, What Is a Person? Rethinking Humanity, Social Life, and the Moral Good from the Person Up, p. 43). 37 E.g. Thomas Nagel observes, “if the emergence is the whole truth, it implies that mental states are present in the organism as a whole, or in its central nervous system, without any grounding in the elements that constitute the organism, except for the physical character of those elements that permits them to be arranged in the complex form that, according to the higher-​level theory, connects the physical with the mental. That such purely physical elements, when combined in a certain way, should necessarily produce a state of the whole that is not constituted out of the properties and relations of the physical parts still seems like magic even if the higher-​order psychophysical dependencies are quite systematic.” T. Nagel, Mind & Cosmos. Why the Materialist Neo-​Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, (Oxford-​New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 55–​56.

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other words, these two perspectives need each other, depend on each other and in the final analyses –​cannot exist independently.38 Our earlier analyses revealed that the person cannot employ a purely objective perspective. He, as the subject, is always present in all undertakings experienced and as Wojtyła mentioned above, the experience of his outer reality is always associated with the experience of his inner reality. This participation of the “I” in a seemingly non-​personal acts (e.g. a scientific enquiry) is sometimes not obvious. However, because Wojtyła’s understanding of the “I” is far from Cartesian res cogitans, namely it is not an extra-​worldly subject (we will undertake this topic in our further analyses), there is no separation (or a gulf) between what is inside and what constitutes the exteriority. Correspondingly, any contact (cognitive and experiential) with the latter has its direct consequences for the former. Wojtyła’s claim that external experience is strictly connected with internal experience finds its confirmation in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive sciences.39 What about the first-​person-​perspective? Is it possible to limit our human activity to what is going on inside (cognitively, experientially)? As we have already said, there is no separate sphere in human being: the exteriority is vitally connected with the interiority, and vice versa. Wojtyła is unwilling to give a totally autonomous status to reason or consciousness. He remarks quite directly that he is very far from “the absolutization of

38 Sticking to the third-​person-​perspective only is a non-​starter in any philosophical and scientific enterprise. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi put it this way, “There is no pure third-​person perspective, just as there is no view from nowhere. To believe in the existence of such a pure third-​person perspective is to succumb to an objectivist illusion.” S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 40. 39 E.g. Gallagher and Zahavi point out that, “On a very basic level one might argue that all reports given by subjects, even if directly about the world, are in some sense, indirectly, about their own cognitive (mental, emotional, experiential) states.” S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, p. 15. Or, “the usual opposition of first-​person versus third-​person accounts in the context of the study of consciousness is misleading. It makes us forget that so-​called third-​person objective accounts are accomplished and generated by a community of conscious subjects.” Ibid., pp. 18–​19.

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consciousness.”40 The inner sphere, although important for the emphasizing of what is specifically personal in human beings, remains in an essential relationship with the exteriority and even, to a certain extent, depends on it. As to the former, we can rightly claim that the waking up of the inner sphere goes through a contact with what is external, especially through contact with other people. Any experience given in such an encounter helps one to realize that he is a separate subject and his being is unique and unrepeatable. Although we are potentially creatures disposed to exhibit the first-​person-​perspective, such a sphere is activated only because we are in a sense compelled to employ the third-​person-​perspective in the first place. Also maturation of this former sphere depends, to a huge degree, on the quality of these external relationships. Thus, the third-​person-​perspective is a kind of in-​built ingredient of the first-​person-​perspective. In the order of ontological thinking, we can contend that there is no pure, spirit-​like, extra-​worldly interiority (we will return to this aspect of Wojtyła’s thought in our subsequent analyses). The latter is a kind of entity even an object. Of course, it is a very special object in many respects. In the realistic perspective, the “I” is not a projection (or derivative) of any other reality but has its independent existence. Wojtyła –​as his commentator claims –​adheres to a belief that “subjectivity is something that exists objectively in the world.”41 It has various powers including intellectual and volitional ones and as such can be considered a reality participating in the ontological plurality of the world. Thus, the first-​person-​perspective, which encompasses the third-​person-​perspective, and corresponding complex experience should be accepted as irreducible elements of the world we live in.

Concluding Remarks Wojtyła’s approach to human experience is typical of the personalistic and phenomenological stances. He combines the internal experience with the external in order to grasp the full meaning and importance of human being. He is aware that no simplistic mode of inquiry is adequate and a confrontation

0 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 79. 4 41 J. Merecki, Corpo e transcedenza. L’antropologia filosofica nella teologia del corpo di Giovanni Paolo II, (Siena: Edizioni Cantagalli, 2015), p. 37.

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with naturalistic concepts makes that evident. The experience of human being should encompass its object in all aspects and dimensions. Wojtyła is convinced that human being is not a one-​dimensional reality, hence the experience connected with his existence is complex and rich. Particularly, he proves how the internal experience is intertwined with the external one, and how they complement each other. Thus, the stabilization of the internal experience is achieved through the external one, and the latter is always saturated with the former.42 In this way, we can exclude two extremities from the concept of experience, namely subjectivism and pure objectivism. The naturalistic approach to human being does not share these conclusions. Basically, it draws on sense experience and what is empirical. However, activities of reason and will are somehow hidden in this method. It is thus because, it would be impossible to understand adequately personal characteristics without the mind and other internal powers. Although naturalists try to explain them as emergent properties (sometimes as epiphenomena), there are justified doubts as to the adequacy of such reasoning. Wojtyła’s suspicion that naturalism offers a phenomenalistic approach to human being and that there is no access to its interiority seems justified. However, it is only when we take into account the main tenets of naturalistic thinking about human being, that we realize the extent of this claim. The reason why naturalists remain at the “surface” of the human reality results from rejection of the non-​empirical self or the “I.” Thus they tend to inquire into human being primarily from without. However, such an attitude leads to a paradox, namely that they try to explain the reality of human being by excluding the experience of being human.

42 Conclusions of this chapter are close to a personalist epistemology worked out by Juan Manuel Burgos. Drawing on Karol Wojtyla’s ideas, he proposed the concept of comprehensive experience. Main theses of this project are following: “1) experience is a primary action of the person with a cognitive dimension; 2) experience is both objective and subjective; 3) the cognitive dimension of experience is a unitary process performed by intelligence and sensitivity; 4) experience objectifies itself in understanding.” See J. M. Burgos, “Comprehensive Experience (experiencia integral): A New Proposal on the Beginning of Knowledge,” International Conference on Persons, Boston University, 3–​7 August 2015; also see J. M. Burgos, La experiencia integral. Un método para el personalismo, (Madrid: Palabra, 2015).

CHAPTER III: THE STRUCTURE OF THE PERSON Introduction The personalistic position advanced by Karol Wojtyła offers the concept of the person stemming from various philosophical traditions. Bascially, it draws on the resources worked out by the medioeval philosophy (Boethius, Augustine, Acquinas), as was mentioned in the first chapter. However, many elements in this project are also taken from the modern and contemporary philosophy. Wojtyła goes through all these proposals and examines many ideas relevant for the understanding of the person but at the same time he has his own grasp of the person. His approach consists in using the potential of the former in order to formulate his own original contribution. Thus, Wojtyła borrows a numer of anthropological ideas from great philosophers and complemeting them with his own ideas tends to sketch his own project of the person. If we assume that a kind of breakthrough in thinking about the human being took place at the beginning of the modern philosphy, we may ask to which epoch Wojtytła’s concept of the person tends to lean: a pre-​modern or modern? In this chapter, we are going to compare Wojtyła’s understanding of the person to René Descates’ one. The latter, as the father of modern philosophy, opened up a new way in approaching the person, and we want to establish how much ‘cartesian’ Wojtyła’s person is. In other words, to what extent the latter’s project suscribes to the Cartesian tradition. In the second part, we are going to analyse the very structure of the person as understood by the Polish thinker, where a whole plethora of ideas reveal their roles, including those belonging to the pre-​Cartesian philosophy.

3.1. AGAINST DUALISM Initial Dilemmas It is not easy to penetrate the motivational background of a philosopher. It is not easy to establish with a high precision what prompted a thinker to formulate a particular theory or what resources have been drawn upon.

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Occasionally we meet someone who straightforwardly gives us a glimpse of his inspirations, intellectual adherences and preferences. Then we can relatively smoothly classify the person into this or that philosophical school or set of ideas. What about Karol Wojtyła, the later pope John Paul II? Do we really know what kind of philosophy he was involved in? In Poland, the country of his birth and the place of his philosophical activity, a discussion took place on whether he was a Thomist or a phenomenologist. The conclusion was far from clear: he had drawn upon both philosophical traditions. Thus, some commentators consider him a phenomenologically-​ oriented Thomist while others just an original phenomenologist accepting some parts of the Thomistic doctrine. In Wojtyła’s writings we can find reasons for both interpretations.1 Along this line of inquiry, we can ask other questions concerning his philosophical adherences. We can for instance inquire: was he Cartesian? Or more broadly, was he a thinker operating in the Cartesian tradition? As far as we know from his declarations, Wojtyła did not describe himself in this fashion, nor did he entertain a special sympathetic attitude towards the works by René Descartes. We know this from reading Wojtyła’s work. Thus, we may say –​without committing a major error –​that our philosopher 1 This dispute was taken up and advanced by many philosophers and Wojtyla’s commentators, not only Polish ones. Among them we can point to: J. Gałkowski, J. Kalinowski, Ph. Jobert, J. P. Dougherty, J. de Finance, A. Reimers, to name only a few. See P. Guietti, F. Murphy, Translator’s Afterword, in R. Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II (Grand Rapids (MI)/​Cambridge (U.K.): William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 323 ff. Also, one of the first interpretations of the issue, in the international arena, was put forward by Rocco Buttiglione in the mentioned-​ above book. This issue is still important and returns in recent publications on Karol Wojtyla/​John Paul II. E.g. see A. Reimers, Truth about the Good: Moral Norms in the Thought of John Paul II (Ave Maria, Florida: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2011), pp. 44 ff. Recently, this topic was also undertaken be a Spanish philosopher Juan M. Burgos. He points out that “what Wojtyla is searching is a re-​elaboration of Thomistic gnoseology that considers the advances of Modernity and mostly the possibility offered by the phenomenology of directly accessing to the subjectivity of the person.” See J. M. Burgos, “The Method of Karol Wojtyla: A Way Between Phenomenology, Personalism and Metaphysics,” Analecta Husserliana Vol. 104 (2009), A.-​T. Tymieniecka (ed.), p. 110.

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was not a Cartesian. Nonetheless, we can still ask: was he “Cartesian?” There are some premises allowing us to make such an investigation and they will be spelled out below. Moreover, we want to establish how strongly Descartes influenced Wojtyła’s philosophical activity. Maybe, without full realization, our thinker was a covert “Cartesian” or someone who was unable to detach himself from the philosophical legacy of the French philosopher? Answering this question, or at least trying to do that, we can pave a firmer way to establishing Wojtyła’s philosophical originality. All in all, this section is an attempt to compare the anthropological positions of these two philosophers. René Descartes is considered the father of the modern philosophy. He inspired many thinkers but also caused great opposition in philosophical circles. We can even venture into a thesis that he “produced” as many followers as adversaries. In a sense he influenced many other philosophers, even if only in an indirect way. We do not intend to pursue this line of investigation. Our goal is much more modest. We want to investigate, on a limited scale, a similarity, a vicinity and finally a divergence of two thinkers: René Descartes and Karol Wojtyła. There is a good reason for doing this: both were involved in the philosophy of the human person and were attempting to shed some light on the complexities of human nature. They faithfully tried to read out a fundamental human condition and give it a coherent interpretation. In this chapter we will be trying to prove that despite similar starting points, they differ substantially. At the end of their investigations, they present us with two various pictures of the human person and consequently the human being.

Descartes and His Thinking about the Human Being The French thinker employed in his philosophical activity a method different from what had been used at that time. As it is widely known, his was a method of critical doubting. Applied to the human being, it yielded important results. Even if the human being was commonly perceived as a complex entity, Descartes cast doubt on its basic coherence and inner integration. His objection was centered on a dilemma: Does the material component of human existence get along well with the spiritual existence and is it really complementary to it? What struck Descartes was the fundamental

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difference between the two as far as their “morphologies” are concerned. The extended thing: the body is comprised of particular organs and parts. They can not only be distinguished but also separated from each other and “taken” as such. In short, the body is divisible even if it makes up a whole biological organism. The thinking thing: the mind exists differently. It cannot be treated and perceived as the former. As Descartes puts it very clearly, “when I consider the mind, … I can distinguish in myself no parts, but I very clearly discern that I am somewhat absolutely one and entire.”2 The mind is a unified reality and has nothing in common with the space and operations typical for it. The extended thing and the thinking one look like two separate realms of human life. Descartes was not at ease when he tried to describe the relationship between them. Actually, his major problem concerning the human being was to put forth a credible interpretation of how the body interacts with the mind. On the one hand, he declared that what is going on with the body and in the body has a slight or almost nonexistant impact on the mind. In this approach we hear him say, “although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any other part is cut off, I am conscious that nothing has been taken from my mind.”3 On the other hand, there is a kind of unity and interaction between them. For example, the mind is associated with the body and somehow influences it. Descartes acknowledges that by saying, “the soul must be more closely united with the body than the helmsman is with his ship, because if it is to make up a real man it must have not only the power to move the body but also feelings and appetites like ours.”4 The mind and the body constitute a human being, but a kind of duality is manifest in it all the time. How did Descartes interpret that duality? Was he able “to get out” of it in the long run? He tried some strategies to reconcile these two various realms of human existence. However, he was unable to find an inner connection between the extended thing and the thinking one. They accompany each other, somehow influence each other, and even make up a real man, this we know from our practical experience and insight, but the substantial R. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, m. 6, no. 19. 2 3 Ibid. 4 R. Descartes, Discourse on the Method, ch. 5.

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connection is beyond us: it is somehow incomprehensible for us. The body is murky, and how it relates to the mind is far from clear.5 What we know definitely is the thinking thing with its ideas. Descartes stresses this point so decisively that finally from an epistemological stance he moves to a strong metaphysical thesis. He builds up on what is cognitively obvious for him, has clear representations in his thinking, and declares, “I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind, understanding, or reason.”6 Or, “this taught me that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which doesn’t need any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this me –​this soul that makes me what I am –​is entirely distinct from the body, and would still be just what it is even if the body didn’t exist.”7 The distinction between res extensa and res cogitans seems to be a lasting legacy of Descartes’ thinking about the human being. Of course, we cannot exclude or play down his further and original contributions to philosophical investigations, but the dualistic outlook does constitute his hallmark. As a consequence, to carry out a philosophical reflection on a human individual, we must take this or that stand towards Descartes’ project. That stand can be either utterly critical and dismissive or positive and creative. A third way seems to be less plausible. Of course, there are some thinkers, involved in the philosophy of the human person, who do not make any direct reference to the French philosopher. However, because of the important position of the latter, the former will probably be read and interpreted through the lenses of Descartes. Especially when a structure of the human being is the center of attention, and a relationship between the body and soul is a subject of philosophical investigation. This seems to be the case of Karol Wojtyła.

Karol Wojtyła’s Understanding of Man When we embark on Wojtyła’s understanding of man we cannot skip at least some essential differences between him and René Descartes. Firstly,

5 Of course, we can always say that the only concept of the body, or to be precise the idea of extension is distinct and clear. 6 R. Descartes, Meditations on the First Philosophy, m. 2, no. 6. 7 R. Descartes, Discourse on the Method, ch. 4.

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they lived in different times and had different scientific knowledge regarding the human being. It goes without saying that it gives an edge to the former. Secondly, they were involved in philosophy with different “professional sympathies:” Descartes was unwilling to engage in scholastic philosophy and through his own method intended to find new insights into the human being;8 Wojtyła accepted some Thomistic and scholastic principles (metaphysical, anthropological) but wanted to enrich and modify them. Thirdly, Wojtyła was better positioned epistemologically due to a phenomenological method he had mastered; Descartes was a talented rationalistic thinker9 but understandably had no idea about phenomenology.10 Finally, the basic philosophical methods they employed were also different: Descartes, as we already mentioned, drew upon critical doubting, whereas Wojtyła represents an attitude of wonder towards the human being.11 Despite these and other differences, they were determined to inquire into the human being and the human person, and shed some light on the intricacies of human existence.

8 Some of Descartes’ commentators suggest that he was unable to detach himself completely from scholastic thinking. However, the French philosopher was personally opposed to the latter and criticized some important segments of it, e.g. the concept of substantial form. His correspondence with Henricus Regius reveals this attitude. See The Correspondence between Descartes and Henricus Regius, E.-​J. Bos (ed.) (Utrech: The Leiden-​Utrecht Research Institute of Philosophy, 2002) AT III, pp. 505, 115. 9 Wojtyla as John Paul II acknowledges that René Descartes is at the beginning of Modern rationalism. He even stresses that “all rationalism of the last century –​as much in its Anglo-​Saxon as in its Continental expression in Kantianism, Hegelianism, and the German philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries up to Husserl and Heidegger –​can be considered a continuation and an expansion of Cartesian position.” See John Paul II, Crossing the Threshold of Hope (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), p. 51. 10 Of course, we can point to different concepts of phenomenology and Descartes as a phenomenologist or a non-​phenomenologist. In a broader sense, we can claim that analysis of the content of consciousness as a starting point for philosophical activity is a kind of phenomenology. In this sense, the French philosopher closely resembles a phenomenologist. However, in a strict sense, phenomenology is connected with Edmund Husserl and his specific method of cognition. Here we have no basis to call Descartes phenomenologist, whereas this is the case of Karol Wojtyła. 11 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 70.

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At the beginning of his investigation concerning the human being, Karol Wojtyła notices a duality underpinning any human existence. There is something active and passive in us; something which engages us as persons, and something which seems to take place beyond our personhood. The Polish philosopher considers that distinction using two fundamental expressions: “man acts” which in my personal experience is given as “I act,” and “something happens in man” which in my personal reception is made into “something happens in me.” The former is marked by my clear personal involvement in a sense that I do know that I initiate an act, I am actively present while carrying it out, and I can take all consequences stemming from the act. The latter is less connected with my “I.” I experience the act as a kind of activity that takes place in me or with me, but I have no power over it or this power is very limited. We can easily refer the expression ‘I act’ to a conscious and free center of my being, namely to my person; whereas the reality of ‘something happens in me’ to my body and all physiological and biology-​based processes in it. In short, the latter seems to belong utterly to a bodily causation. This duality, which is manifest with these various dynamisms shows that in a human being there are two realms, which can hardly be reconciled with each other. When we measure them by a depth of personal involvement, only “I act,” is it something which engages me as a person. “Something happens in me’ seems to belong to a non-​personal objectivity that merely accompanies that of the personal. Wojtyła even concedes that “ ‘human being acting’ structure and ‘something happens in man’ one seem to divide the human being into two worlds.”12 However, the philosopher does avoid a dualistic interpretation and goes in the opposite direction. He makes it clear that although they are different and even diverse, they explain each other.13 How to understand that position? Let us first concentrate on preliminary similarities between them. Wojtyła underlines that ‘I act’ and ‘something happens in me’ stem from within, from an inner sphere of the human being. Putting aside an occurrence “something happens with me” which is usually caused by an outer factor, “I

2 Ibid., p. 121. 1 13 Ibid., p. 112.

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act’ –​my doing and “something happens in me” stem –​as put it Wojtyła –​ from the same dynamic subject.14 They are examples of “dynamic activity” and “dynamic passivity” pertinent to any human being.15 Our philosopher provides us additionally with a reference to a couple of Aristotelian notions: agere –​pati. “I act’ is an example of agere but “something is happening in me” –​pati. Wojtyła points to a source of unity, which enables us to treat the human being as one ontological entity. He employs the notion of “dynamic subject” which has its origin in the Latin concept of suppositum. We introduce this term in this place because it brings with it some help in our current analyses; however, we are going to put this concept under a more in-​depth examination in the next chapter. Suppositum is basically understood as the subject of existence (esse) and of various activities (operari). It is the ground of the personal existence and conveys a general idea of the person as an existing and acting entity. Wojtyła is convinced that we need something more to bring out the richeness and complexity of the person. Thus, he introduces the concept of the personal subject. It is not a separate structure as if attached to suppositum, but it is deeply rooted in the latter. In other words, suppositum is a basis for the personal subject and is manifested in that; but for the latter to come to be the essential role is also played by experience.16 Thus, the person on the one hand is determined as to its ontological structure but on the other it is an open and dynamic reality. In this perspective, the person is complex but highly integrated, and hence we can distinguish theoretically various spheres of his existence, but we cannot separte them (in practice). Wojtyła decidedly stresses that to be the person is something more than to be individuated nature. Such a scenario could apperar on the horizon when we concentrate too much on suppositum at the expense of the personal subject. However, the person stands for something that goes beyond a meaning of “individual of the human kind.” As Wojtyła puts it emphatically, “The term ‘person’ has been coined to signify that a man cannot be wholly contained within a concept ‘individual member of the species,’ but 4 Ibid., p. 114. 1 15 Ibid., p. 115. 16 K. Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being,” p. 212.

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that there is something more to him, a particular richness and perfection in the manner of his being, which can only be brought out by the use of the word ‘person.’ ”17 The person does possess in itself a kind of fullness, which goes beyond an attribute of human nature namely its specificity. It rather embraces uniqueness and unrepeatability as its constitutive elements. Our philosopher makes a reference to a Polish word osoba (person), which takes its roots from a Polish adjective osobny (in rough translation into English it is close to the word “separate”). Osoba is someone but not something.18 That is why the understanding of the person’s suppositum must bring out that difference between someone and something. Wojtyła claims that “the person is a suppositum but so different from others which surround man in the perceptible world. That difference … permeates into a root of being itself.”19 This root of being, as we already indicated, consists in its esse. If then constitutive elements of the person are rooted in its esse, it means that the latter must be understood analogously in each case. Thus, any human individual has a different esse. It does not only introduce numerical differences into the world of persons, as some philosophers suggested20 but brings about something more. Wojtyła puts it this way, The person, man as a person, is a suppositum, that is a subject of existence and action. However, its existence (esse) is personal but not only individual like in a case of individuated nature. Following this, operari –​understood as a whole dynamism of the man (including actions and occurrences which obtain in him) is also personal.21

17 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, trans. H. T. Willetts (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981), p. 22. 18 In Love and Responsibility, our author puts it this way: “As an object, a man is ‘somebody’ –​and this sets him apart from every other entity in the visible world, which as an object is always only ‘something’.” See K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 21. 19 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 123. 20 If we do not introduce a difference on this very fundamental level of existence, we can be prone to accusation expressed by John Macmurray. From the side of the philosophy of dialog, he claimed that “there is a multiplicity of individual thinkers. Each is ‘I,’ an Ego, a Self. However, their distinctness is purely numerical; qualitatively they are identical.” See J. Macmurray, Persons in Relation (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), p. 23. 21 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 123.

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The question that arises when we read Wojtyła’s analyses is: What is the exact difference between individuated human nature and the person who is characterized by uniqueness and unrepeatability? Reasonably we can say that it is a difference of degree: a personal existence puts a deeper mark on human existence than individuated nature. Or it can be a difference of kind: to be a person is a new quality of existence. If we accept the latter, then we have resources to explain why there are various kinds of persons: human, angelic, divine (maybe animal). The person assumes this or that nature as a metaphysical terrain –​a domain where it comes to be and fulfills himself. Of course, such answers have a metaphysical character. Wojtyła does not avoid or play down the metaphysics, as it is already obvious for us, but nonetheless it seems that his reply to our question would have a more phenomenological character. He stresses quite often in his writings that what reveals a uniqueness of the person is his interiority (the sphere of spiritual and mental life).22 What is strictly associated with that is lived experience.23 In turn, this introduces us to a great variety of human individuals because everyone experiences himself uniquely and in a way that cannot be repeated by anyone else. Moreover, the uniqueness of any person is guaranteed by his actions. In Love and Responsibility Wojtyła stresses that what is typical for that interiority is “the power of self determination, free will.” Hence “no one else can want for me. No one can substitute his act of will for mine.”24 As an acting individual entity, the person is someone who experiences himself uniquely, and so acquires his knowledge, including self-​knowledge. He carries out his acts of will in specific, unrepeatable ways and as a result of that can be accredited with a title of the incommunicable and the inalienable reality.25 Thus answering our question, we can say that individuated human nature is not yet the person, although it participates in its structure. The former is a terrain, which with its resources creates a

22 For instance, in one place our philosopher claims: “who man is in himself is over all associated with his interiority.” See K. Wojtyła, “Człowiek jest osobą,” in K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia, p. 418. 23 K. Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible,” p. 212. 24 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 24. 25 Ibid.

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favorable sphere for personal reality. However, to be a person means to transcend the mere domain of human nature, even individuated one.

The Person and the Nature: Two Integrated Faces of Human Existence Similar to René Descartes, Karol Wojtyła was aware of the tension and even the opposition between the person and its nature. He considers that topic within a so-​called phenomenological reduction. ‘Reduction’ is understood by him as an attempt to make evident a given content.26 In this approach the man is perceived as a dynamic wholeness. ‘Nature’ encompasses that dynamic wholeness because it is given as a result of being born. Its features are established by belonging to a human family; hence, they are given but not chosen by an agent. As the Polish philosopher observes in this context, “nature points to the dynamism of subject, that is, it points to this kind of activity which is entirely included in the dynamic readiness of this subject.”27 Such dynamism is not in need of a personal causation because it works through an actualization of its own, non-​personal “potentiality.” Thus, Wojtyła concludes that nature, in such an understanding, reveals itself through the structure of “something happens in me.”28 As we already mentioned, this sphere of human existence is not only beyond our human causation but also, to a considerable extent, beyond our control. In this sense it is opposed to the human person who reveals himself chiefly through purposeful and intentional actions, in which operativity/​efficacy plays an essential role.29 Hence, only about the person can we say that he is an author of these actions and because of that can take a responsibility for his deeds. Nevertheless, Wojtyła is convinced that we can say something more about man. The above-​presented grasp of nature is justified in its own right but in a broader picture is one-​sided. It underlines a manner of operation (modus) but not a subject of that operation. The Polish philosopher points out that we have a stronger experience concerning the human being. The

6 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 127. 2 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid., pp. 115 ff.

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experience consists in a simple and fundamental grasp of man where what is given is the subject “man” marked out by unity and identity. Together with that we can carry out a synthesis of action and occurrence, the structures of “I act” and “something happens in me,” a synthesis of causation and a subject of causation on the ground of one and the same suppositum.30 How is it possible? The Polish philosopher points out that the sole idea of suppositum introduces us to thinking in terms of the unity and identity of man. All our intentional and purposeful doings, as well as occurrences taking place in us belong to a personal subject. Wojtyła uses here the word “ownership:” a personal “someone” does have them. Despite differences in causation, as the former so the latter have a personal subject at their beginnings. What is interesting in this context is a distinction, introduced by our philosopher, between an experience of personal causation and an experience of inner identity.31 Within the structure “something happens in me” I do not go through a feeling that I am a cause of what is going on, and I am indeed not a cause of it, but nevertheless I do experience a kind of inner identity of the happening within myself, and that it is dependent exclusively on me. The experience of identity is justified by the same source as all strictly personal acts; thus, a personal subject must have a different character than a Cartesian mind. Suppositum is definitely a diverse and more complex ‘platform’ for various human phenomena than the mind. The distinction between the person and human nature is sustained in this philosophical position but it does not mean any separation and exclusion from each other. Thus, an attempt to integrate one into another is not meant by our philosopher as a reduction of one into another or a deduction of the person from nature (as we already suggested –​the person is not an instance of individuated human nature), or vice versa. The distinction can be something novel in English-​speaking philosophy because there is a tendency (e.g. in naturalism) to mix one with another and to consider man rather within a category of personhood. Wojtyła underlines that this distinction is justified by the moment of causation. To be the person is to be a cause of action

0 Ibid., p. 128. 3 31 Ibid.

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where the essential role is played by such factors like deliberation, rational intention, free will, and personal responsibility. To be a person, in short, is to manifest operativity/​efficacy. To have human nature in turn, perceived within a phenomenological reduction, is to be dependent on physiological and emotional elements. In the literal sense, these two faces of any human being are distant from each other, and we can even classify them into two various categories (adequately into mind and body). Nevertheless, we have strong reasons to capture them within a unified theoretical scheme. A hylomorphic concept of man, which seems to underpin Wojtyła’s thinking, provides us with such a conceptual space. Our philosopher, though familiar with this metaphysical orientation, keeps it for a next stage of his analyses and at this one tries to provide us with a phenomenological justification. He points to an experience of man as a tool of the final confirmation of his unity. He declares, “the experience of unity and identity of my ‘I’ is objectively prior, and at the same time more fundamental, to the experiential differentiation between action and occurrence, causation and non-​contradiction of the ‘I’.”32 Thus, although we have plenty of experiences given, we have at the same time an ability to discriminate between them: some of them strike us as more fundamental than others. The experience of the unity of man seems to be of this former sort. At a further stage of his analyses, Wojtyła undertakes a second attempt to integrate the person with nature within a so-​called metaphysical reduction. Here a vital role is played not by a phenomenological insight but by metaphysical thinking. Firstly, the Polish philosopher offers a different understanding of human nature: for him its meaning is close to an essence of humanhood. He advances that topic saying, “nature in a metaphysical grasp is somehow the same as an essence. Thus, the nature amounts to the whole ‘humanness,’ however understood not statically but dynamically; that is, humanness as a foundation of all dynamism typical for the human being.”33 Secondly, at this stage Wojtyła reemploys a medieval adage “operari sequitur esse.” It contains a couple of important meanings some of which were mentioned above. It says that in order to act, something must first

2 Ibid., p. 129. 3 33 Ibid., p. 130.

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exist. However, action is comprehended here as something different to existence, although both can be reconciled in the same man who exists and acts. Furthermore, operari can be referred as to “I act” as well as to “something happens in me.” In a sole adage there is no clear distinction between these two dynamisms. However, such a broadly conceived action is associated with human existence per accidens; the former is just an accidens of the latter. However, what arouses a special interest in Wojtyła is the relationship between action and an acting subject in the order of essence (whereas previous relations belong rather to the order of existence).34 Our philosopher stresses in the adage the word sequitur, which is an expression pointing to a coherence between action and a doer. This coherence can only be grasped and set out by the nature. Wojtyła asserts, “nature is a foundation of essential coherence between a subject of dynamism and a whole dynamism of this subject.”35 What is excluded here is a grasp of nature as only one aspect of man, or more precisely, as one manner of making him dynamic. It means that here we are far from an identification of the nature with the human body and its biological mechanisms. The nature concerns the whole human being, namely as his strictly personal center as well as his bodily constitution. Our philosopher points out that coherence obtains always and everywhere when any operari follows (sequitur) a human esse. Foundation of this coherence is human nature, that is humanness permeating into a whole dynamism of man, and dynamically shaping this dynamism as human.36

As mentioned above, to be the person is something more than to have individuated human nature. In the adage “operari sequitur esse,” the esse must be a source of various human dynamisms, including these strictly personal ones. Wojtyła puts it even stronger pointing to esse as a factor responsible for personal existence (“the sole subject is the person because he possesses personal existence [esse]”37). It means that although the esse contains different potentialities, it is chiefly marked by a unique way of existence. Nature then is something that joins and enriches the subject 4 Ibid. 3 35 Ibid., p. 131. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., p. 132.

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and its various dynamisms. Our philosopher goes even further claiming that if any dynamism is associated with humanness, by the same token it is indeed personal.38 It leads to two conclusions. On the one hand, if the personal in the esse is the “highest” dynamism of the human being, it also encompasses the “lower” ones and makes them all into the one integrated being –​the human person. On the other hand, to exist as a person is enabled by the “terrain” which is humanness. As the Polish thinker puts it, “humanness, human nature, is equipped with such properties which enable a given human being to be the person: exists and act as the person.”39 If we accept such a perspective, then to be a person is neither a human mind (the Cartesian approach) nor a bundle of personal characteristics (a naturalistic approach) but a human being who is integrated in himself to such an extent that he is simultaneously bodily and spiritual.

Concluding Remarks Answering the preliminary questions from the introduction, we can say that Karol Wojtyła must be somehow perceived as a post-​Cartesian philosopher. He conducted his analyses as a thinker who operated between a medieval paradigm of philosophy and a modern one.40 That means that he must have mustered a good deal of the latter, especially a phenomenological approach which has its share in post-​Cartesian rationalism. Nevertheless, it does not mean that he was Descartes’ follower. The truth is indeed the opposite. Both inquired into the basic structures of human existence struggling with

8 Ibid. 3 39 Ibid. Such a connection between human nature and the person paves a way to an expression “the body expresses the person” which in turn brings a vital support when we ponder a special status of the former. See John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006), p. 26. 40 Wojtyła discribed himself as a someone whose philosophical activity takes place between the philosophy of being and the philosophy of consciousness. He compared himself to a translator who is between two languages. Consequently, he tended to uncover (explain) one way of philosophizing through the other, and not to cover, that is not to exclude any of them. See K. Wojtyła, “Słowo końcowe w dyskusji nad ‘Osobą i czynem,’ ” Analecta Cracoviensia V–​VI (1973–​1974), p. 258.

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the duality that marks man’s condition. However, only one of them can be depicted as a dualist, and that is the case of René Descartes. Wojtyła undertook an effort to prove that factors such as the fundamental experience of the human being, and the concept of suppositum inform us about a unity and integrity of man. Of course, he was far from any monistic positions and his proposal must be understood as an exposition of the unity in complexity. Thus, to our main question ‘Was Karol Wojtyła Cartesian?” we must answer negatively. He was not a “Cartesian” of any sort despite some similarities with the French philosopher. The Polish thinker was interested in understanding of reality, especially the human reality. In order to do that, he drew upon various ideas and methods. Thus, we can call him a man of dialog open to a creative exchange of ideas, especially when they served a better exploration of the human person. In such an investigative attitude we can also perceive the philosophical originality of Karol Wojtyła.

3.2. METAPHYSICS OF THE PERSON Old Notions in Contemporary Philosophy Karol Wojtyła’s personalism, though original and novel, is associated with and even rooted in several modern philosophical projects. In this way the Polish philosopher conducted a kind of intellectual conversation with various thinkers of the past and constructed his own philosophical stance. However, it does not mean that Wojtyła uncritically accepted the philosophical vocabulary used by previous thinkers. Indeed, he had his own personal message to convey, worded in his own specific language. This is why he used various concepts and terms coined by great figures in the history of philosophy but attempted to work out a new perspective and, at times, a whole new meaning for some of them. In his philosophical language there are some notions, which underwent a kind of serious sematic shift. The concept of suppositum is one of these. The meaning of suppositum is close to the meaning of subject, but it has a clearly metaphysical character. Thus, when we refer this notion to the human being, we are going to claim that the human being is the subject of its own existence and actions, and as such can be investigated within a theory of being. Wojtyła was aware that a human person cannot be adequately explained within the sole concept of suppositum, but at the same time, he

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hoped that this notion brings with it an important message concerning the nature of personhood. Although the term is a part of ancient and medieval heritage, it plays a vital role in a contemporary thinking of the human person. Having said that, we must point to one important circumstance: the employment of the concept of suppositum carried out by Wojtyła was not a literal transmission of the pre-​modern way of philosophizing into the contemporary philosophy. Keeping its original significance, the notion is perceived through the prism of modern and contemporary knowledge about the person. And this circumstance allows us to claim that suppositum is remade and enriched by Wojtyła’s attempts. In this subchapter, we would like, firstly, to sketch Wojtyła’s approach to metaphysics. Secondly, we would like to penetrate the meaning of the term and its place in the philosophy of the human person advanced by the Polish thinker. Finally, we will be trying to look critically at Wojtyła’s endeavor and ask how its understanding and content can be strengthened by an original concept of substance worked out by W. Norris Clarke. Both Karol Wojtyła and Norris Clarke were adherents of Thomistic philosophy, although in various degrees. Clarke is more metaphysically-​oriented so he can bring some help to Wojtyła whose writings seldom directly address metaphysical themes. The general aim of the subchapter is not only to sketch Wojtyła’s thinking about suppositum but also to contribute some insight into the metaphysics of the person.

Wojtyła and Metaphysics When we look at ideas set out by John Paul II concerning a need for metaphysics, we have no doubt that he appreciated the role of a first philosophy in a broader culture, and specifically in the philosophy of the human person. In his encyclical letter Fides et ratio, the “later Wojtyła” underlines without hesitation “the need for a philosophy of genuinely metaphysical range, capable, that is, of transcending empirical data in order to attain something absolute, ultimate and foundational in its search for truth.”41 Such a first philosophy is not opposed to a genuine reflection on the human being but can be helpful and complementary. As he claims,

41 John Paul II, Fides et ratio, no. 83.

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THE STRUCTURE OF THE PERSON metaphysics should not be seen as an alternative to anthropology, since it is metaphysics which makes it possible to ground the concept of personal dignity in virtue of their spiritual nature. In a special way, the person constitutes a privileged locus for the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical enquiry.42

In the light of these clear declarations, Wojtyła can be perceived as a strong metaphysician, or at least someone who decisively favors a metaphysical approach in philosophy as such. However, what about the “earlier Wojtyła?” Was he equally determined to promote this kind of philosophizing, and, if so, how successful was he in this respect? As a young student of theology Karol Wojtyła was impressed by Thomistic philosophy, and especially by Thomistic metaphysics. Talking about it later in his life, he acknowledged that studies in first philosophy had helped him to acquire “a new vision of the world” and led him to a discovery, which “has remained the basis of intellectual structure in his life.”43 This discovery underpinning his intellectual endeavors appeared from time to time in Wojtyła’s early works. His first scholarly achievement was concerned with the question of faith in the thought of St John of the Cross. Metaphysics was indirectly present here because contact with God and an endeavor to understand it presupposes the question of being. Later, Wojtyła turned to moral theology. In his work on Max Scheler and the suitability of his ethics for Catholic moral theology, the Polish thinker made reference to metaphysical issues, for instance when he put Scheler’s failure to recognize the ‘substance’ of the person under critique.44 When he crossed the threshold into philosophical ethics, Wojtyła quite often undertook metaphysical analyses in order to shed some light on categories needed in ethical investigation. Thus, we notice that he gave some scholarly attention to such concepts like nature45 and the 2 Ibid. 4 43 A. Frossard, “Be Not Afraid:” Pope John Paul II Speaks Out on his Life, his Beliefs, and his Inspiring Vision for Humanity, trans. J. R. Foster, (New York: The Bodley Haed Ltd., 1984), p. 18. 44 K. Wojtyła, “Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniu system Maxa Schelera,” in K. Wojtyła, Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności, (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego,1991), p. 120. 45 E.g. see K. Wojtyła, Elementarz etyczny, (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1999), pp. 33 ff.

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good.46 Or when talking about the sexual drive, he pointed to metaphysics as the final ground for its proper understanding.47 Generally, he was convinced that the philosophy of consciousness must be supplemented by the philosophy of being. He voiced this when he talked about a realistically understood consciousness connected with the person’s being which is a condition of not making this being into an autonomous, enclosed in itself subject of activity.48 However, through this entire period, although conscious of the importance of first philosophy, Wojtyła did not develop a systematic project of metaphysics in general, nor the metaphysics of the human person in particular. Some scholars claim that Karol Wojtyła never attempted to formulate his own concept of metaphysics of the person.49 This is probably true but only to a point. On the one hand, the Polish philosopher did not write a paper, let alone a book, which was entirely dedicated to the philosophy of being. This suggests that he was basically involved in other ways of philosophizing. His analyses on the person are basically conducted along a phenomenological path, and the issue of being is here presupposed but not adequately explained. This raised some criticism at the very beginning, when his main work The Acting Person was published for the first time.50 However, on

46 E.g. see K. Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1985), pp. 141–​144. 47 In his Love and Responsibility he states the following, “but if the sexual urge has an existential character, if it is bound up with the very existence of the human person –​that first and most basic good –​then it must be subject to the principles which are binding in respect of the person.” See K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 52. 48 K. Wojtyła, “In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism in Ethics,” in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community. Selected Essays, p. 54. 49 See e.g. A. J. Reimers, “Karol Wojtyła’s Aims and Methodology,” in Christian Wisdom Meets Modernity, K. Oakes (ed.), (New York: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2016), p. 133. 50 Polish philosopher of Thomistic orientation Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec commenting on the book denied that Wojtyła had managed to formulate an adequate philosophical anthropology. He pointed to the lack of analyses of human activities in essential contexts of human life. Krąpiec called Wojtyła’s enterprise “an aspect anthropology,” “anthropology for the use of ethicist and moralist,” “ethical anthropology.” See M. A., Krąpiec, “Książka kardynała Karola

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the other hand, he was convinced of the need and even the necessity of metaphysics in the philosophy of the human person. In this subchapter we will be trying to demonstrate and analyze some passages where attempts at carrying out this need and necessity are undertaken. Preliminary we can ask about Karol Wojtyła’s sources of metaphysical formation. We are interested in these circumstances, specifically as far as the concept of suppositum is concerned. There is no doubt that our philosopher was educated in Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy, dominant at that time in his environment. As the “later Wojtyła” mentioned to André Frossard, he had studied metaphysics from a book by Kazimierz Wais, a Thomistic philosopher in prewar Poland. Let us treat this position as a prime source of the metaphysical knowledge entertained by Wojtyła in his later activities. In this book on ontology and metaphysics we find some basic concepts, including notions referring to the human being. As was the custom of traditional Thomistic philosophers, Wais distinguishes the concept of the individual (individuum) from the notion of the person –​ individual with reason. The latter is also called suppositum rationale, but a sole suppositum is equivalent to the term individua substantia (also appearing in the Boethian definition of the person). Understandably the notion of suppositum is broader than suppositum rationale because –​as Wais observes –​“any person is an individual but not every individual is a person.”51 In the anthropological analyses of Wojtyła, there is a sole concept of suppositum without a qualifier rationale. It is thus because the philosopher is basically concerned with human subjects and has no doubt as to their rational powers and faculties. Nevertheless, the suppositum as a person is for him merely a starting point and we can underline two reasons explaining this attitude. Firstly, Wojtyla tries to demonstrate the insufficiency of the metaphysical approach to the human individual, that is, to prove that without experience we cannot achieve the complete picture of the person. Secondly, the suppositum itself is a richer reality than classic

Wojtyły monografią osoby jak podmiotu moralności,” Analecta Cracoviensia V–​VI (1973–​1974), pp. 57–​58. 51 K. Wais, Ontologja czyli metafizyka ogólna, (Lwów: Towarzystwo “Biblijoteka Religijna,” 1926), p. 140.

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scholastic analyses reveals. In this chapter, we will be basically concerned with the latter.

Personhood and Suppositum In this part of our analyses, we will be following Wojtyła’s expressions concerning the concept of suppositum as far as the structure of personhood is concerned. Firstly, we will focus on negative expressions, namely expressions by which our philosopher proves an insufficiency of the notion for an adequate understanding of the person. Secondly, we will try to sketch a positive role of suppositum in the constitution of the person. In this part, we will also point to the further development of the concept as set out by Wojtyła in his later works, namely papers published after The Acting Person. To be a person is something more than to be a suppositum. Such is the first and foremost part of Wojtyła’s philosophical account of the human being (mentioned above already). The suppositum is a subject of existence and action and this thesis stems from a long philosophical tradition to which our philosopher subscribes. However, this kind of subjectivity points only to an objective meaning of the subject, and all spheres of subjective experience are put aside. The Polish philosopher expresses this view quite openly, saying that, the notion of suppositum passes over an aspect of consciousness due to which a particular human being –​a subject being an object –​experiences himself as a subject. Thus, he experiences his subjectivity and this experience provides him with a ground to term himself with a pronoun ‘I.’52

In other words, the latter is not a reality separate from the suppositum but encompasses it as its own part. The integrally understood “I” besides an ontic subjectivity (the suppositum), consists of the experienced subjectivity.53

52 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 93. Later, Wojtyła specifies that the term ‘experience’ includes semantically ‘consciousness.’ He claims, “if this being, that is a real individual object in its basic ontic structure, is equivalent to a reality which in traditional philosophy was called the suppositum, then without consciousness this suppositum cannot be constituted as ‘I.’ ” Ibid., p. 95. 53 Ibid., p. 93.

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In short, the complete subjectivity of the person goes well beyond the suppositum alone. The meaning of ontic subjectivity is close to the concept of individual substance or individuated nature, which make part of the Boethian definition of the person. Another important feature of this substance is that it has a rational nature. These theses about the person –​as Wojtyła claims –​are necessary but insufficient.54 The person possesses in herself a kind of fullness, which cannot be adequately explicated by metaphysical terms alone. They merely introduce into the reality of the person and as such are important. However, they provide too general a framework, which is basically insufficient for the depth and complexity of the person. Nevertheless, the suppositum can be perceived from a positive and constructive side. Having in mind all previous remarks on its insufficiency, we can also emphasize the important role it plays in the constitution of the person. This role, as we mentioned above, is quite complex. Wojtyła is aware of it and unfolds this role gradually. The Polish philosopher points initially to a way of how it is given epistemologically to a subject. He claims that the human being has a kind of basic experience allowing her to establish that she is a subject of existence and action. This kind of experience has a very fundamental and holistic character. Wojtyła expresses this conviction this way, “any human being, including myself, is given in a whole that is a simple experience as the individual real being, as the subject of existence and action (that is as the suppositum).”55 Thus we can argue that the suppositum is not so much inferred from other concepts but has experiential foundations. Of course, a subsequent proper understanding of the notion engages our rational powers and faculties, and its mature comprehension is the fruit of our sophisticated analyses. Suppositum cannot be understood as an abstract ground upon which personal characteristics are inserted. It does have its vital participation in a personal constitution of any human individual. Even if we can ascribe an analogous suppositum to other non-​human entities, the human suppositum is a suppositum of “who” but not of “what.” As our philosopher emphatically

4 Ibid., p. 123. 5 55 Ibid., p. 94.

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underlines, “the person is the suppositum but very different from others surrounding the human being in a perceptible world. This otherness, this proportion or rather disproportion indicated by pronouns ‘who’ and ‘what,’ permeates into the very root of being who is the subject.”56 Wojtyła is convinced that, in a family of entities, there are wide varieties and even when we claim that many beings can be characterized in terms of suppositum, at the same time, we must employ analogous thinking.57 A factor, which introduces the vital difference between the human suppositum and others, is the way of existing (esse). It has a clear personal mark and goes beyond a “marker’ of existence of individuated nature. The human suppositum reveals and manifests a kind of fullness typical for the person in all his uniqueness and unrepeatability. Wojtyła, taking into account our cognitive abilities, claims that “the person allows to identify himself as the suppositum when an adequate analogy is employed. The suppositum of ‘who’ reveals not only similarity but also a difference and distance from any suppositum of ‘what.’ ”58 The personal suppositum reveals its specific character when we take into account personal dynamism. On the level of various dynamisms, we obtain a clear picture of the unique profile of the person’s metaphysical subjectivity. Thus, the latter is the ground of both “happenings” and “personal acts.” A complex potentiality initiating two fundamental activities in the suppositum of the person is present: first, what takes place despite someone’s rationality and freedom, and second, efficacy/​operativity, which stems from a free and rationally informed self-​determination.59 What is important here is to point to a kind of coherence of these two dynamisms, despite their differences concerning personal and intentional involvement. Wojtyła would tend to characterize this binding suppositum as a 6 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 123. 5 57 Miguel Acosta commenting on Wojtyła’s anthropology puts that in the following way, “metaphysical subjectivity in the sense of suppositum belongs to everything that in any way exists and acts; it belongs to different existing and acting beings according to an analogy of proportionality.” M. Acosta, A. J. Reimers, Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy. Understanding Person & Act, (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), p. 140. 58 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 123. 59 Ibid., p. 124.

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common source for the whole person. For him, it is a principle of unity and non-​contradiction. We have mentioned about it while showing a difference between Wojtyła’s anthtopology and the anthropology of Descartes. Nevetheless, we need to return to this topic in order to accentuate a fundamental role of suppositum. Its unifing and integrating role is presented by our philosopher in the following way, on the ground of suppositum difference and opposition between someone’s acts and happenings … yield because of the obvious unity and identity of the human being. It is he who acts. And when something happens in him, he –​a personal ‘somebody’ –​does not act, but nevertheless all dynamism of happenings is equally his property as well as the dynamism of acts. He –​a personal ‘somebody’ –​remains at the beginning of the happenings taking place in him as well as at the beginning of acts which he carries out as a perpetrator.60

In further developments of the meaning of this concept, Wojtyła clearly stresses both a continuation of the ancient and medieval heritage, and a modern and contemporary contribution to the understanding of suppositum. The former factor seems to be already obvious for us. The latter demands some comments and analyses. Many philosophers drawing on concepts that originated in ancient and medieval philosophy do this in the context of projects developed by modern and contemporary philosophy. This seems to be the case of the Polish thinker. He considers the notion of suppositum taking into account essential Kantian distinctions. This is especially evident when Wojtyła undertakes a new attempt to describe and define this ancient notion. He asserts: “this concept serves to express the subjectivity of the human being in the metaphysical sense. By ‘metaphysical,’ I mean not so much ‘beyond-​the-​phenomenal’ as ‘through-​the-​phenomenal,’ or ‘trans-​phenomenal.’  ”61 The suppositum is not like a Kantian thing-​in-​itself (noumenon) unknown and beyond our experience. It is indeed something that is given through phenomena, in a sense, present in phenomena. That is why facing various human phenomena, we also have a chance to perceive and grasp the suppositum itself. Wojtyła underlines this important moment saying,

0 Ibid., p. 128. 6 61 K. Wojtyła, The Person: Subject and Community, in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community, p. 222.

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through all the phenomena that in experience go to make up the whole human being as someone who exists and acts, we perceive –​somehow we must perceive –​ the subject of that existence and activity. Or better, we perceive that the human being is –​must be –​that ‘sub-​ject.’62

The metaphysical subject, constituting the foundation of the human being and “manifesting’ itself through her various activities, plays a vital role in the identity of the person. Talking about identity we mean a kind of basic sameness of the human individual. In contemporary philosophy, especially of the English-​speaking provenience, very complex discussions on this topic are conducted. Wojtyła does not delve into them but offers his own proposal. In doing this he does not hesitate to point that, “metaphysical subjectivity, or the suppositum, as transphenomenal and therefore the fundamental expression of the experience of the human being, is also the guarantor of the identity of this human being in existence and activity.”63 Thus, the suppositum guarantees the sameness of the person in two dimensions: in her coming to be and in her enduring through time as well as in her various activities, including acts and happenings. Generally comparing this proposal to ideas of some modern and contemporary thinkers, we must observe that the identity of the person is guaranteed here by a primary dimension of the human being but not by a secondary one(s). The latter would be the case when consciousness, memory and further personal characteristics came into play as main factors. The suppositum as an expression of metaphysical subjectivity is not detached from a personal subjectivity. Wojtyła tries to sketch what kind of relation is between them. Assuming that the human person is an integrated entity, these two instances of subjectivity must be connected with each other, in an essential way. The Polish philosopher observes that the self constitutes itself through actions, including strictly personal acts and other psychosomatic dynamisms that simply happen in her. However, this development of the self is possible “because it already is and has been constituted in an essential and fundamental way as a suppositum.”64 The personal subjectivity then depends, to a considerable extent, on the metaphysical

2 Ibid., pp. 222–​223. 6 63 Ibid., p. 223. 64 Ibid., p. 225.

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subjectivity. The instances of the former do not come from the void but stem, in a sense, from a well “established source.” From the other side, this relation is made clear when Wojtyła declares, “the suppositum humanum must manifest itself as a human self: metaphysical subjectivity must manifest itself as personal subjectivity.”65 This essential relation leads to some important consequences. As the Polish philosopher points out, “the human being is a person ‘by nature.’ The subjectivity proper to a person also belongs to the human being ‘by nature.’ ”66 The suppositum tends “naturally” to become the person in a strict sense, and vice versa: the personal subjectivity is firmly anchored in the human subjectivity. This thesis, of course, can be at times problematic. There are known examples of people who do not reach a threshold of personal life due to various diseases or health abnormalities (e.g. unecephalic children). They do not display typical personal characteristics, for example self-​consciousness and the faculty of verbal communication. Then, can we wonder whether the relation between these two instances of subjectivity is indeed so stringent and necessary? Wojtyła himself deals with this inquiry claiming that a factual manifestation of the relation is not so important. Personal characteristics –​as he claims –​“reside within the essentially human suppositum.”67 This residence should be understood metaphysically and not empirically. To make it clear, we can employ a distinction between potentiality and ability. The latter is concerned with a current readiness of the human being to manifest personal characteristics due to the proper development of certain vital organs, for example the brain and nervous system. In turn, potentiality points to a very fundamental orientation to produce such characteristics, which can be subscribe to the human being as such despite her level of development and maturity. Thus, we can conclude that Wojtyła draws a relation between the metaphysical subjectivity and

5 Ibid. 6 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. In other place he points out that typically personal features like in-​selfness and inwardness of human activity and existence are part of the definition of “what is contained virtually in the notion of suppositum humanum.” See ibid., p. 227.

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the personal one on the level of potentiality not ability, and hence on the level of metaphysics and not phenomenological insight.

Critical Look at the Project and Its Further Developments Wojtyła’s approach to the concept of suppositum is not systematic. There is no separate treatise of his on the issue. In order to reconstruct the philosopher’s thinking in this respect, it is necessary to refer to various places in his writings. As we have seen above, remarks and analyses on the issue are scattered and fragmentary. Nevertheless, the notion itself plays quite an important role in Wojtyła’s understanding of the person. In fact, it would be difficult to speak about the metaphysics of the person without a notion like this. Consequently, the suppositum is necessary to comprehend adequately personal subjectivity as well as the integral picture of the person and her acts. Nevertheless, the notion of metaphysical subjectivity demands some further clarifications in order to serve its purpose. Introducing this concept, Wojtyła intended to provide a firm foundation for the project of the person. This project in turn was to be a theoretical framework for a reality who is rich in her various phenomena, including rational and free undertakings as well as non-​intentional happenings. In short, the person –​ in his thought –​is a highly dynamic reality. If it is the case, then we need to point to its adequate foundation. There are two reasons that speak to this necessity. Firstly, for Wojtyła, to be a person is not to be an emergent reality, as it is understood in contemporary non-​reductive naturalism. It means that the person cannot be treated as a reality that arises out of some basic constituents but is richer and more complex in its being and at the same time irreducible to them. Secondly, for Wojtyła the foundation of the person is somehow present in further activities: as we mentioned above, the suppositum is transphenomenal. Hence, if phenomena in themselves are rich and diverse so must be their foundation. That is why we need to sketch the understating of metaphysical subject as a highly dynamic reality, which has a vital relation with the whole activity of the person. In order to do that, we need an adequate and a well-​defined concept of substance. Wojtyła himself does not provide us with such a piece of theory because –​as

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we mentioned earlier –​he was not a fully-​fledged metaphysician. We should turn in another direction for this vital support. In this respect, an interesting contribution is made by the American philosopher W. Norris Clarke. It seems that his original interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’s thought can bring some help to our investigation of the person. Wojtyła and Clarke were contemporaries, and both received inspiration from Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic philosophical tradition but in different ways. Wojtyła was an ethicist and a thinker involved in the philosophy of the human person. Clarke was a metaphysician entertaining a vivid interest in the reality of the human person. Both were also open to non-​Thomistic philosophical ideas, especially modern and contemporary ones. Clarke openly makes references to Wojtyła’s ideas concerning the person and finds them interesting, novel, and worth of pursuing.68 Although Wojtyła did not make explicit reference to Clarke’s works, we can employ ideas of the American philosopher and in this way ponder whether we can complement and strengthen the anthropological project of the Polish thinker. At any rate, Clarke has something important to offer Wojtyła, especially as far as the metaphysical foundations of the person are concerned. In the Acting Person, Wojtyła acknowledges that the metaphysical subject is a dynamic reality. He directly indicates that “the suppositum is not only inserted (‘lays’) under a whole dynamism of the human being –​the person –​but also constitutes this dynamism as a dynamic source.”69 As we have set forth above, the Polish philosopher indicates that such a character of the metaphysical subject influences significantly the personal subject and her acts. The problem is that we do not know any further details concerning of how this happens. We need to determine the dynamic character of the suppositum itself and its relation to the personal subject. 68 W. N. Clarke, Person and Being, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1993). He also makes other references to the thoughts of the Polish thinker. See W. N. Clarke, “John Paul II: The Complementarity of Faith and Philosophy in the Search for Truth,” Communio 26 (1999), pp. 557–​570. W. N. Clarke, “The Integration of Personalism and Thomistic Metaphysics in Twenty-​First-​Century Thomism,” in W. N. Clarke, The Creative Retrieval of St. Thomas Aquinas. Essays in Thomistic Philosophy, New and Old, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), pp. 226–​231. 69 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 124.

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Norris Clarke, in his reading of Aquinas, points out that the medieval philosopher understood each living entity as a dynamic and self-​manifesting being. In this understanding, there is no place for a passive existence enclosed in itself, limited to its inner sphere and to mysterious, unknowable enduring. If this were so, “there would be no way for anything else to know that it exists; it would make no difference at all to the rest of reality; practically speaking, it might just as well not be at all –​it would in fact be indistinguishable from non-​being.”70 Clarke underlines the close and essential relation between existence and action. As he puts it, “to be and to be active, though conceptually distinct, are inseparable.”71 The activity here is comprehended very broadly, including very basic manifestations of existing things, but taking place at all levels of its existence. The American philosopher is even convinced that “the full meaning of ‘to be’ is not ‘to be present,’ but ‘to be actively present’.”72 At any rate, existence is a dynamic process and hence we have no better means to grasp and characterize it as by a description of a set of actions, which make it up. Such an understanding of the existence enables us to formulate a concept of substance. Both Wojtyła and Clarke recognize a helping role of the concept in the philosophy of the human person, which is not a typical attitude in contemporary philosophy. As it is widely known, there is great skepticism among thinkers as to the suitability of the notion in an inquiry on the human being. Nevertheless, the substance is understood here not as a passive and inert reality (a kind of substratum) –​which is a common objection directed to it –​but as a highly dynamic one. Clarke straightforwardly declares that “to be in the world of real existence is to be substance-​in-​ relation.”73 The dynamic character of the existent is instantiated by various relations, which a given being establishes. These relations are directed to itself as well as to others, because –​as Clarke puts it –​“it exists both as in-​itself and as towards others.”74 0 W. N. Clarke, Person and Being, pp. 12–​13. 7 71 Ibid., p. 13. 72 Ibid. 73 W. N. Clarke, To Be Is to Be Substance-​in-​Relation, in W. N. Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics. Being. God. Person, (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 114. 74 Ibid., p. 108.

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In the tradition of Thomistic metaphysics this way of philosophizing can be problematic. There is a clear distinction here between meaning and roles of substance and relation. While talking about the existence of a thing, a language of substance plays an essential role, whereas it is not so in the case of relation language. Generally, relation is considered as accidental to a given thing. This logic applies to persons as well. Thomas Aquinas, while pondering about God as a person, points out that the word person is the idea of a ‘first’ substance. Therefore this word person signifies a ‘first’ substance, than which nothing is more absolute, since it is self-​ existent. Therefore the word person does not signify a relation, but something absolute. … If then person signifies substance which is a self-​existent being, it cannot signify a relation.75

Although according to Aquinas, in God relations are absolute (“in God relation is really the same as the essence”), the distinction between the person-​ substance and a relation applies to all human persons. Therefore, Clarke’s claim “to be is to be substance in relation” must be specified. In order to do that, we should distinguish between various relations, say, external and internal. External relations, which seem to be on Thomas Aquinas’s mind, are indeed secondary. It is not so with internal relations, namely relations which are constitutive for the person-​substance itself. Now we can return to Wojtyła’s concept of suppositum. The question is whether we can apply Clarke’s analysis to the understanding of a metaphysical subject and if so, how helpful is it? The Polish philosopher directly introduces a distinction between the metaphysical subject and a personal one. Clarke does not operate such a distinction limiting his undertaking to discrimination between nature and the person. Nevertheless, it does not amount to a major obstacle. We can argue that if the understanding of the substance as a dynamic entity is referred to the person, it is referred to the whole being, including her metaphysical and personal subjectivity, and the level of the nature as well as the level of the person. In other words, both the former and the latter are in relation, though in different ways. Let us focus on the notion of the human substance, which can be characterized by dual subjectivity. If the metaphysical and personal subjects, 75 Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God (Questiones Disputatae de Potentia), q. IX, a. IV.

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considered together, constitute a highly dynamic reality it means that it establishes a set of “inner” as well as “outer”relations. In this sense it would live up to Clarke’s postulate of existing in-​itself and towards others. The inner relations then would have intra-​being characters and are established when the human being comes to be and is developing and maturing according to her proper telos. These relations exist between the metaphysical and personal subject. Although the former tends to constitute the latter (to express itself in the latter), and what is ontologically given is “taken over’ by the personal, there still remains a slight difference and contrast between them. Many personalists point out that the term “substance’ contains in itself something cosmological (appearing in various forms) which is not totally congruent with the personal (understood as a complex sphere).76 In Wojtyła’s analyses this duality is underlined when he considers the cosmological, which is reducible, and the personal, which is irreducible, as we have mentioned in I chapter. The Polish thinker is aware that the personal does not ‘absorb’ the cosmological completely, but they “need’ one another, and hence they remain mutually in relation.77 Thus, there is not a complete fusion between suppositum and the personal subject and that is why they remain related within the human substance. The outer relations are towards other subjects. They provide the person with opportunities to actualize and manifest herself in all her personal richness and complexity. They create a sphere of ‘social between’ where

76 See J. F. Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996); M. J. Burgos, El personalismo. Autores y temas de una filosofía nueva, (Madrid: Ediciones Palabra, S.A, 2003), ch. V. 77 This theme is widely analyzed by Wojtyła in his influential paper, Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being, in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community, pp. 209–​217. There appear suggestions that allow us to talk about these inner relations when the philosopher points to an insufficiency of the metaphysical definition of the person. He reasons as follow, “the Boethian definition mainly marked out the “metaphysical terrain” –​the dimension of being –​in which personal human subjectivity is realized, creating, in a sense, a condition for “building upon” this terrain on the basis of experience.” Ibid., p. 212. Or in another place, Wojtyła points out that what is personal is complementary to what is cosmological suggesting an inner relationality in the person. Ibid., p. 213.

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the person can unfold her many potentialities. However, these relations are accidental and secondary in the logical (absolute) order that is as far as the structure of the person is concerned. In this sense Aquinas was right excluding relation from a strict definition of the person. Outer interactions cannot constitute the personal being, but they are helpful in her manifestation in the social sphere (we will return to this topic below). However, when we look from the latter standpoint, we can claim that this is a sphere where we get to know the person in the first place. Hence, in the phenomenal (epistemological) order –​which was so important for Wojtyła –​outer relations can be considered primary and necessary.78

Concluding Remarks The concept of suppositum has a long philosophical pedigree, especially in Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy. Karol Wojtyła accepted that as a part of the philosophical environment within which he was educated. Nevertheless, he was not uncritical. On the one hand, the Polish philosopher was aware of the positive and constructive role the concept can play in the exploration of the human person. On the other, Wojtyła intended to bring out all possible implications connected with the concept of the metaphysical subject and, at the same time, was cautious and avoided some metaphysical “extremities.” Thus, for example, the suppositum is not like the Cartesian self-​enclosed and self-​sufficient substance. Neither is it the Lockean inert, unknowable substratum. Wojtyła’s thinking of the suppositum is also far from the notion of a bundle of personal characteristics. The latter easily leads to a thesis that the personal subject can exist without the metaphysical one. Understandably such a solution would be unacceptable for him. The Polish philosopher tries to reconcile two essential attributes concerning the person, namely that she is both substantial and dynamic reality. He did not explain in detail how they fit together, but drawing on the ideas of Norris Clarke, we can solve this nexus pointing to a notion of relation. Here, the inner relations, necessary and essential, are especially helpful. They shed some light on the association of the suppositum with the personal

78 W. N. Clarke, Action as Self-​Revelation of Being: A Central Theme in in the Thought of St. Thomas, in W. N. Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics, p. 47.

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subject. They amount to intra-​being connections, which are fundamental for the person and without which there is no possibility of inter-​being, inter-​personal relations. Summing up we can argue that the concept of the dynamic metaphysical subject, in an advanced form, can be vital in supporting the philosophy of the human person. Considered together with the personal subject, it uncovers two pillars in the mature understanding of the human being: substantiality and relationality. Substantiality due to its inner relationality makes the human being a highly dynamic reality.

CHAPTER IV: THE PERSON AND HIS FACULTIES Introduction The dynamic character of the human person concerns his basic structure as well as his various faculties. As we have shown thus far, one realm of that is strictly associated with the other; in a sense one conditions the other. This conditioning means, on the one hand, that powers and faculties possessed by the person, which are usually manifest and perceptible in the intrsubjective sphere are anchored in and dependend on the inner reality of the person. On the other hand, there is the fundamental conviction entertained by Wojtyła that the knowledge as to how the person acts conveys a lot on who the person is in himself (“from phenomenon to foundation”). In this chapter we are going to concentrate on the person understood by Karol Wojtyła as a real, existing subject, who possesses his interiority and exteriority. This part of our investigations will be carried out against the background of critical and often sceptical discussions in the modern and contemporary philosophy as to the existence and fundamental character of the human subject. In the second part of the chapter, we are going to analyse two spheres of personal activities, which find their interesting elaboration in the main work of Wojtyła, namely consciousness and emotions. Thus, the intersection of the person as subject and his faculties will be undertook in this chapter in order to shed more light on the dynamism of the person.

4.1. TO RESCUE THE INTERIORITY OF THE PERSON Thinking on the Subject Karol Wojtyła’s thinking about the human person is strictly connected with the concept of the subject. The term “subject” often appears in his works –​ especially in those in the field of philosophical anthropology. Moreover, the one notion seems so tightly bound to the other that the understanding of persons would be extremely difficult without a proper grasp of the term “subject.” Nevertheless, the latter, taken by itself, is far from clear. If we

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read Wojtyła’s works while focusing on the subject and the person, we encounter a problem in determining the source of his thinking and consequently do not know, at least to begin with, how to interpret the subject itself. The theory of the human subject, in the contemporary understanding of the term, is a fruit of modern philosophy. Pre-​modern (medieval) philosophy approached the human being from a different angle. The notion of “subject” is present there, but it is basically considered in terms of beings. Wojtyła seems to maintain a middle ground: to some extent at least, he employs the terminology of modern philosophy, and his thinking is partly in tune with it, but at the same time he keeps in mind many elements typical of pre-​modern philosophy, and these play an important role in his investigations. When thinking in terms of the subject was initiated in modern philosophy, one of the main characteristics associated with it was interiority. Ever since then, the philosophy of the subject has presented this as a reality –​as its inner existence. It has usually been contrasted with the subject’s exteriority and transcendence. The language of interiority also appears in the works of Karol Wojtyła –​so he, too, may be said to have a stake in the modern philosophical approach. Nevertheless, in modern philosophy the subject is undergoing vigorous criticism (maybe because of the so-​called abuses of the subject), to the extent that we are even witnessing its radical deconstruction. If Wojtyła had adhered fully to this modern understanding, his insistence on the existence of the subject and its main characteristic, namely interiority, would share such a fate. It would mean that rejecting the subject, as a strong metaphysical structure, leads to the substantial weakening of personhood. This negative scenario seems alien to Wojtyła’s philosophizing. Nevertheless, we need to outline and clarify what is distinctive about his own approach. The Polish philosopher’s analyses –​as we mentioned above –​cannot be confined within the boundaries of modern philosophy nor its understanding of the subject. He did, it seems, propose his own concept of the subject, and we should investigate how this approach is (or is not) immune to the process of its being deconstructed. In so doing, we will also try to establish Wojtyła’s originality in this respect. In this subchapter, we are going, first, to sketch an attack on the Cartesian subject, which seems to be a modern paradigm of this category. It is chiefly

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characterized by its inner, extra-​worldly existence, and this is the main subject of criticism. Secondly, we will try to analyze Wojtyła’s works in order to discover his understanding of the subject and its interiority. Thirdly, we will attempt to establish how his approach differs from (but is also similar to) the Cartesian tradition. Finally, we will try to sketch a possible place for dialogue between these two perceptions of the human subject that are at variance with one another.

The Cartesian Subject under Siege Descartes was a subject of our investigation in one of the previous chapters. However, now we need to mention him particularily as far his ideas associated with a pure subject are concerned. His res cogitans bears all the marks of such a category. We can characterize it as an entity which thinks, understands, wills, imagines, and feels. In other words, thinking encompasses both mental and psychological acts. Moreover, the subject cannot be identified with the body, or with any other substance (of any other sort) within the body. Neither can it be identified with any other thinking substance, wholly or partially. The subject has an ability to discriminate between itself and the other. In other words, due to its fundamental attribute, namely thinking, the subject knows how to distinguish itself from other thinking and corporeal substances. In this sense, it is a world enclosed in itself, which knows itself (along with other clear ideas, e.g. the idea of God), and as such is able to identify itself as itself with a high level of certitude.1 These basic tenets of the Cartesian philosophy of the human person have been subjected to strong criticism for a long time. Various objections have been formulated against them. We are not going to examine all of them but will point to an established model of criticism. This mainly concerns the existence and character of an “inner” subject, the self or “I.”2 Hence, we

1 These fundamental theses can be found in the main works by René Descartes, namely Meditations on First Philosophy, meditation 2, no. 27–​28; meditation 6, no. 78 and Discourse on the Method, ch. 4. 2 In this subchapter I am only going to sketch a certain pattern of criticism directed at the Cartesian subject, appealing only to a select number of philosophers. The discussion of the subject has advanced a long way, so it is not possible to present all possible forms of criticism. I have chosen those voices that make reference to

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are going to present some voices that are critical of such an understanding of the subject –​ones that have arisen in the course of modern, and especially contemporary, philosophy.3 In post-​Cartesian philosophy, the most notable expression of skepticism concerning the existence of the “I” was that offered by David Hume. As an empirical philosopher looking for and paying attention to natural occurrences, he had a problem with something that transgresses the boundaries of the natural (empirical) realm. He registers his own mode of inquiry in this way, for my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but perception.4

If we treat Hume’s “myself” as a Cartesian res cogitans, it cannot be grasped as such because no empirically available perceptions are associated with it. Within such an epistemological approach, we might easily be led to conclude that it simply is not there at all. In broader terms, we might claim that human interiority –​if it exists at all –​is basically furnished by sensory experiences and their outcomes (ideas).5 However, then this

a Cartesian extra-​worldly subject –​that is, a subject which can be characterized by its inner sphere and sometimes can even be identify with interiority itself. 3 An interesting overview of this process has been presented by one Polish philosopher K. Gurczyńska-​Sady. K. Gurczyńska-​Sady, Człowiek jako słowo i ciało. W poszukiwaniu nowej koncepcji podmiotu, (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Universitas, 2013). In subsequent parts of this paper, I draw on some remarks and comments presented in her book. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, b. I, part IV, section vi. 4 5 Hume’s approach seems to be at least ambivalent. What we can easily notice is that there is an “I” who is performing the inquiry, but at the same time that “I” cannot find itself. As a couple of critical commentators have pointed out, the self that the English philosopher admits to not being able to find is the one he himself finds to be a stumbling block. Cfr. H. Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940), pp. 5–​6; R. Chisholm, “On the Observability of the Self,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1969), pp. 7–​21.

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interiority is nothing more than the aftermath of exterior activities (sensory experiences).6 In contemporary philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein questions the possibility of perceiving his own self and determining its localization. In his Philosophical Investigations he grapples with the phenomenon of consciousness, which, for Descartes, was first and foremost a power of res extensa. We hear him saying, but what can it mean to speak of ‘turning my attention on to my own consciousness?’ This is surely the queerest thing there could be! It was a particular act of gazing that I called doing this. I stared fixedly in front of me –​but not at any particular point or object. My eyes were wide open, the brows not contracted … No such interest preceded this gazing. My glance was vacant; or again like that of someone admiring the illumination of the sky and drinking in the light.7

The Cambridge thinker, following rules of observation set by empirical philosophy, is unable to say something definitive and positive about the self, the “I” and his own internal sphere, which can easily lead –​within this paradigm of philosophy –​to the assertion that there is no such thing as human interiority. Things exist, and are perceivable, because of their empirical qualities, e.g. their localization in space. If they cannot be described in this way, they easily slip (with some exceptions) into non-​existent realities. Again, as in the case of Hume, it looks as if interiority is being measured against exteriority using cognitive tools typical of the latter rather than the former. The difficulty with grasping the “I” and its interiority is not limited to empirical philosophy. It also arises in philosophical projects located at the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum. Jean-​Paul Sartre, arguing from the stance of existentialism, underlines the undetermined character of the Cartesian subject. He considers this when comparing an object of consciousness with its subject, and gives us the following account of his observation, “but as soon as we wish to grasp this being, it slips between

6 In this sense, the distinction between “interior” and “exterior” reflect less a particular locational demarcation, and more the possibility or impossibility of being objectified using empirically oriented methods. 7 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), § 412.

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our fingers, and we find ourselves faced with a pattern of duality, with a game of reflection. For consciousness is a reflection, but qua reflection it is exactly the one reflecting, and if we attempt to grasp it as reflecting, it vanishes and we fall back on the reflection.”8 It seems that when it is active and reflecting on something, the subject is obvious, but when we try to grasp it as a reality existing-​in-​itself we fail to do so and are left with its sole activity –​that is, reflection itself. The ground of this reflective power slips away, disappears –​or maybe does not exist at all. However, if we want to sustain its existence, the subject with its being and interiority must be identified with the flow of inner activities. Of course, the latter option has its price, associated with the difficulty of establishing viable criteria of personal identity. Max Scheler also undertook an investigation concerning the human subject. He understood it in two dimensions, namely internal and external. On the one hand, the person is a spirit inhabiting its various intentional acts and investing them with a kind of unity.9 On the other, the human being constituted by that spirit is also constituted by the body and the psyche. Despite the fact that these latter retain their own specificity, they still make up parts of that same life process –​being aspects of it. Scheler also pointed out the different spheres in which a person exists: namely, the intimate and the social. Within this latter realm we may consider social interactions to be factors constitutive of its very being. He declares that “a man tends, in the first place, to live more in others than in himself; more in the community than in his own individual self.”10 He then acknowledges the presence of “a phenomenon, which is directly based upon the fact that the individual begins by living in the community to a much greater extent than he does

J.-​P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. S. Richmond (London: Methuen & Co LTD,1957), pp. 75–​76. 9 The philosopher does not put it clearly, namely that the person is a spirit, but we find some passages in his main work suggesting such a thesis. See M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-​Formal Ethics of Value; A New Attempt towards the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, trans. M. S. Frings, R. L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 383, 386. 10 M. Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. P. Heath (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD, 1954), p.247. 8

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in himself.”11 This priority of the social environment leads him to stress the presence of what is alien in us, and to establish how it conditions our self-​perception. His claim goes as follows, “it will also be evident from this how largely the actual direction of self-​perception at any time, the selection of what we shall or shall not observe in ourselves, is dependent upon the prevailing fields of attention which the environment imposes upon us.”12 Scheler is far from claiming that a human person is to be characterized by a substantial self.13 However, the spiritual self he points to, connected with the body-​psyche sphere of life, is somehow exposed to social interactions. If we are to recognize ourselves, we must be immersed in a society, with its tools of communication and cooperation. For example, the language of a given society enables a human individual to name its inner experiences, which in turn provide it with a platform for actualizing its person. Without this tool there would only be a stream of undifferentiated experiences, which would not be of any substantial benefit to the individual human life. Despite the existence of a spirit that transcends the body-​psyche realm and can rightly be referred to as the interior sphere of the subject, exteriority still plays an essential role, with its resources. The actions of persons are vitally dependent on language, which is a product of a given culture. Sartre, who was mentioned above, also directs our attention to the social sphere and its role in self-​constitution. In the absence of any possibility of cognitively grasping my substantial “I,” the only field for research is my active consciousness. The French philosopher limits his interest to this sphere, but also shows how it is shaped by encounters with other human beings. Thus, he points out that, in the field of my reflection, I can never meet with anything but my consciousness which is mine. However, the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. … Thus, the Other has not only revealed to me what I was; he has established me in a new type of being which can support new qualifications. This being was not in me potentially before the appearance of the Other.14

1 Ibid., p. 248. 1 12 Ibid., p. 252. 13 M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-​Formal Ethics of Value: A New Attempt towards the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, p. 371. 14 J.-​P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, p. 222.

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As we have already mentioned, this new being should be understood as a new state of consciousness. It can only come into existence in the dialectics of human interactions. However, still, there is no such thing as a subject with an interior sphere prior to any encounters with other human beings. Social exteriority comes first, and interiority seems to be a consequence of what goes on in a realm outside of the subject. Deconstructing the subject and her interiority is also a typical feature of postmodern philosophy. We can point to many examples of this approach, but for the sake of brevity let us concentrate on the ideas of one prominent figure of postmodernity, namely Michel Foucault. His reasoning goes as follows, I shall abandon any attempt … to see discourse as a phenomenon of expression –​the verbal translation of a previously established synthesis; instead, I shall look for a field of regularity for various positions of subjectivity. Thus conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined.15

Abandoning the concept of discourse as a manifestation of interiority for the sake of the notion of its dispersion shows that we as persons exist in ourselves only at the very beginning. The more we progress in our development, the more the character of our person is modified. Being a person with one’s own interiority gradually gives way to being an entity that enters into various interactions and in this way acquires a new “nature.” As one of Foucault’s commentators claims, “for Foucault subjectivity is not some thing we are, it is an activity that we do. Subjectivity is relational, dynamic, and restless, potentially unruly and unpredictable.”16 We can thus only really ask what the main activity responsible for constituting a human person is. Karlis Racevskis gives us an answer, while providing us with an interesting explanation of the formation of subjectivity as a whole.

15 M. Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, (London-​New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 60. 16 E. Mcgushin, Foucault’s Theory and Practice of Subjectivity, in Michel Foucault. Key Concepts, D. Taylor (ed.), (Durham: Acumen, 2011), pp. 134–​135.

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By acquiring a language, a human being becomes an entity in a familial, social, and cultural context; he acquires a familial, social, and cultural identity. However, it must be noted again that a cultural individuality is acquired at the cost of further alienation from oneself, since the language into which we are born, which serves as a vehicle for a mass of social and cultural information, is not ours. In acquiring a language, we become its subjects and further separate ourselves from our essential, intimate, pre-​linguistic selves. The socially or culturally determined subject is therefore to be understood not as a plenitude or as a unified consciousness but as a dispersion along the three axes that structure the domain of human perception: the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real.17

If we put such emphasis on the role of language in the formation of subjectivity, then it makes sense to examine the main conclusions entailed by this. Firstly, the process of development is a gradual departure: from oneself as metaphysically understood, to oneself as socially constructed. Secondly, over the course of this passage it is language –​construed as a social phenomenon –​that is the principal factor. The more we master it, the more we become social creatures. A primitive interiority must then give way to a socially constructed one, which generally comes from outside. Thirdly, the identity of the subject is not so much modified as essentially changed: it is no longer organized around the unity of the being, but around its dispersion instead. If we understand identity as an inner connectedness between various aspects of the person, which can be characterized by such attributes as rational complexity, harmony among its many constituents, and so on, then such a passage effecting a dispersion is nothing less than a wholesale deconstruction of identity. At least, we can arrive prima facie at such a conclusion.18 The main objections directed towards the existence of an inner subject come from a part of empirical as well as non-​empirical philosophy. In the realm of sensory and emotional experiences, the above-​mentioned philosophers are unable to detect anything that precedes live experiences and can provide a foundation for them. The method of investigating sensory 17 K. Racevskis, The Discourse of Michel Foucault: A Case of an Absent and Forgettable Subject, in Michel Foucault. Critical Assessment, B. Smart (ed.), Vol. I, (London-​New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 143. 18 We would not exclude the possibility of a new integration occurring after such a state of dispersion has been arrived at, but we do think that postmodern thinkers must themselves shoulder the burden of demonstrating the viability of this.

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and emotional elements is not, then, an effective tool for pointing to the existence of a subject with its own inner, independent interiority, and thus it is that, in the opinions of these philosophers, such a reality does not exist. Moreover, a similar conclusion may be reached by thinkers who rely solely on self-​reflection. Apart from active thinking about the self, they are unable to detect any metaphysical ground that could underpin it and make it possible. However, some phenomena of the subject are striking and do call for an explanation; but this can be provided by pointing to the exteriority of the individual, where the social environment, with its culture and inter-​ human interactions –​especially via language –​play decisive roles. If the above characterization of the modern story of the subject is true, we must face the following consequences: there is no interiority possessed by persons; the human being is a social creature and society, together with its cultural forms, defines his nature; the person comes to be by entering into various relations and acquiring a mode of communication, namely language; if we are to advocate the existence of interiority at all in the context of this new paradigm, it will have to be an internalized exteriority. This leads us to a more general conclusion: from a methodological point of view, there is no need to pursue ontology or philosophical anthropology anymore. They seem to have been entirely replaced by the sort of analyses that are typical of cultural theory.19

Wojtyła on the Human Subject Wojtyła himself uses the terms “subject” and “subjectivity” in various contexts. One of these arises when he is contrasting a subject with an object. For instance, the human being is, for herself, a subject and an object at the same time. This mode of expression has a rather epistemological character. However, in the center of our attention is a different approach: we are interested in a metaphysical understanding of the term. Thus, we are more concerned with the mode of existence of the subject. Wojtyła inherited some ideas and methods from modern philosophy, but at the same time he rejected many others. For instance, he accepted the

19 K. Gurczyńska-​Sady, Człowiek jako słowo i ciało. W poszukiwaniu nowej koncepcji podmiotu, p. 64.

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necessity of turning to consciousness, but rejected the tendency to absolutize it. This means that even if consciousness is important for characterizing the subject as such, it does not mean that the latter is a pure incarnation of the former. Reading him, we hear him declare, “as soon as we begin to accept the notion of ‘pure consciousness’ or the ‘pure subject,’ we abandon the very basis of the objectivity of the experience that allows us to understand and explain the subjectivity of the human being in a complete way –​but then we are no longer interpreting the real subjectivity of the human being.”20 Consciousness is one way to understand the subject, but not a unique and exclusive one. How, then, does Wojtyła present and unfold the concept of the subject? In his writings, we find several important clues for clarifying his understanding; some of them have been mentioned already. Firstly, he points to the so-​called metaphysical concept of the subject: namely, as suppositum. Secondly, Wojtyła coins the notion of the personal subject. Thirdly, the thinker considers some essential human dynamisms, which can be perceived as helpful tools in understanding the human subject: namely operativity and semi-​personal subjectivity. The subject is for Wojtyła a complex reality and –​as we have already shown –​consists in the metaphysical subject and the personal one. Its specificity as a human subject is present yet at the meatphysical level because human suppositum is essentially different fro other non-​human supposita. One of the aspects of this differneces is that it possesses potentially an interior sphere where all kinds of conscious experiences and volitional acts can take place. Futher, as the personal subject is formed, it comes to its matury and becomes due to an active experience an indespensible part of the personal life. The interiority is also proper for each human individual and in this sense is unique. We mentioned above that to be the person means more than to be an indivudated human nature. The person is indivudal, unique and unrepeatable mainly thanks to his interiority. Let us elaborate more on these theses.

20 K. Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community: Selected Essays, p. 222.

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This special character of the person is something that, in the first instance, concerns the order of being. Due to its rational nature, which encompasses various potentialities and abilities, the human being exists as an extraordinary creature in nature. Nevertheless, consciousness, will and the sphere of the emotions offer privileged spaces in which these can manifest themselves. And we can take these factors as a synonym for interiority. For example, when Wojtyła writes about one function of consciousness, namely reflexive consciousness, he claims that “due to this function of consciousness the human being exists as if ‘towards his interior’ as well as in the full dimension of his mental (rational!) existence.”21 Interiority is here understood as a sphere to which all human achievements and experiences are referred. However, it also plays the opposite role: namely, that of being the source of the person’s various activities. When the person undertakes some free and rational course of action, this represents a highly dense concentration of elements stemming from her interiority. Operativity/​efficacy is not, then, a simple instance of blind causation, as with non-​human nature, but instead is underpinned by a complex prior interaction of such personal elements as knowledge, self-​knowledge, consciousness, deliberation, and the experience of moral values. In further parts of our study, we will shed more light on this claim and advance it. In the thought of Karol Wojtyła, there is one more category, which sheds some light on the human subject. It appears when the philosopher considers operativity. The latter is contrasted with semi-​personal subjectivity. We already know that the former is a dynamics typical for the person and that it reveals the person in her fullness through her personal acts. What, then, is subjectivity? If it is to be contrasted with operativity, then it, too, must be a kind of human dynamism. Nevertheless, this dynamism has a different character: i.e. it exists and is activated outside of the strictly personal sphere. Wojtyła describes it as when “something happens in man,” or points out that “subjectivity is shown forth as structurally associated with happening.”22 Later, in our analysis we will elaborate on this topic. For now, suffice it to say that this semi-​active dynamism also belongs to the person.

1 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 95. 2 22 Ibid., p. 121.

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In effect despite these two different dynamisms pertaining to the person, she still remains an integrated and unified being. Her set of personal characteristics is not substantially detached from her semi-​personal subjectivity, and this is only possible because Wojtyła has embraced the concept of the metaphysical subject: namely, suppositum. As he says, on the ground of suppositum difference and opposition between acting and happening, between operativity proper to acting and subjectivity proper to happening, taking place in the human being, yield before an obvious unity and identity of this human being. … When something happens in him, he –​this personal ‘someone’ –​does not act, but nevertheless a whole dynamic of happenings is equally his property as the dynamism of acts. He –​this personal ‘someone’ –​is there at the beginning of these happenings as well as at the beginning of these acts, which he carries out as their doer.23

Thus, the personal subject encompasses various dynamics, which belong to her and help her express herself. Wojtyła is convinced that the structural differences between these dynamics do not cancel out the dynamic unity of the subject, but rather serve to show its complex nature.24 Personal interiority, though primarily connected with personal characteristics, is by no means alien to the sphere of subjectivity as a whole.

Subject and Interiority: Comparing the Two Approaches The concept of the subject present in Karol Wojtyła’s work is basically different from the understanding stemming from the Cartesian anthropological tradition. Of course, there are certain similarities, and it is worth underlining these before proceeding any further here. Firstly, both approaches point to thinking as a vital activity of the subject. Hence, the investigation of mental processes can be very instructive as regards discovering the fullness and perfection of the person. Secondly, the human subject is supposed to be characterized with reference to its interiority, in which the uniqueness of the person unfolds. Nevertheless, Wojtyła’s comprehension of the subject differs substantially from that of both Descartes and his critics. The subject is not an extra-​ worldly reality, to be reached through special procedures and exertions. 3 Ibid., p. 128. 2 24 Ibid., pp. 138–​139.

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Hence, complaints to the effect that it cannot be straightforwardly localized are misplaced. Wojtyła perceives the subject as a reality that possesses its own interiority as well as its own exteriority. Within the project of suppositum, the latter is vitally connected with the former. Despite differences between these concerning the kinds of dynamism they possess, the subject cannot be reduced to just one or the other, and one facet cannot be treated solely as a vehicle for the other. Thus, in Wojtyła’s project, there is no place for the concept of a pure subject operating as a ghost in the machine. Wojtyła’s approach to the subject is governed by the thesis that there is, indeed, a primitive positive reality in human beings that is not a derivative of anything else. Thus, we cannot claim that special interventions coming from human interactions or culture or language are factors that constitute the subject and its interiority in the first place. The subject indeed interacts with them, and they provide it with the possibility of expressing itself, so these elements can be helpful as far as the unfolding of the activity of the subject is concerned. There is no doubt that all these factors play their role at the “awakening” stage of the subject, and later on, in the context of the carrying out of its various expressions. However, in the metaphysical order, when we take into account the subject’s coming to be, all the external factors are secondary. Wojtyła’s subject cannot be identified with a bundle of mental activity or other processes. The subject is not a sequence or stream of psycho-​physical events taking place in the human individual. Rather, it must be characterized by a metaphysical structure, which precedes all acts and happenings. This structure, which is the basic framework for the entirety of human existence, plays a quite essential role. If there is a unity of the many facets making up the subject –​as Wojtyła himself directly maintains –​the subject must itself ultimately be the cause of it (we will elaborate on this thesis later in the book).25 Of course, this structure cannot be detected by concentrating on a particular thought or sensory experience. Only by taking into account 25 This unifying function of the subject is often underlined. For instance, Richard Sorabji voices this thesis while speaking about self-​awareness. He points out that “if there is unity in one’s self-​awareness, the unity is supplied by the single owner of that awareness, not by the owner’s using a single faculty” (R. Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 260). Wojtyła’s thesis about

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many further thoughts and experiences can we arrive at the claim that there is, indeed, some ground common to both of them. And Wojtyła is far from understanding this ground as a passive substratum. He is convinced, rather, that the metaphysical subject (suppositum) not only guarantees and sustains various phenomena, but is also present in them, and thus is itself participating in their dynamics, all the time –​hence Wojtyła’s above-​mentioned thesis to the effect that the metaphysical subject must manifest itself as personal subjectivity. Comparing these two approaches to the human subject makes us realize that what we are in fact dealing here with is an encounter between two philosophical traditions. On the one hand, there is the modern understanding of the subject and its interiority and, consequently, its systematic critique and even deconstruction. On the other, we have a project that draws on some modern and contemporary philosophical inspirations and methods but remains at heart a pre-​modern conception of the subject. In this sense, we must agree with Juan Manuel Burgos, who characterizes Wojtyła’s general approach to philosophy in the following terms, “what Wojtyła is searching for is a re-​elaboration of Thomistic gnoseology that considers the advances of Modernity and mostly the possibility offered by the phenomenology of directly accessing the subjectivity of the person.”26

Looking for a Common Platform The modern approach to the subject, especially in its later developments, stands at odds with Wojtyła’s position. Thus, one possible conclusion would be that any discussion occurring between these two understandings will hardly be promising. However, while such an impression may be justified prima facie, it is rather superficial and shortsighted. On the one hand, modern and contemporary insights can indeed become a partner to the discussion and bring with them some valuable suggestions for Wojtylian thinking. On the other, Wojtyła, and the philosophical traditions from

the suppositum provides us with a strong argument for why the owner should herself be considered a real and fundamental reality. 26 J. M. Burgos, “The Method of Karol Wojtyła: A Way Between Phenomenology, Personalism and Metaphysics,” Analecta Husserliana Vol. 104 (2009), p. 110.

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which he draws, do have some explanatory potential, and can suggest some solutions to dilemmas entertained by modern deconstructionists of the subject. Even if we disagree with the progressive dissolution of the subject, and with attempts to explain its interiority by recourse to external factors, we can still remain in a dialogue with such adversaries. At the same time, there are some sticking points between these two stances –​ones that can serve as a starting point for further investigations. On the one hand, if we embrace a much weaker interpretation of the modern and contemporary approach to the subject –​namely, that the latter does exist, but is not an isolated and extra-​worldly reality –​then we are establishing common ground with Wojtyła’s philosophy. With such an approach, though, we must point to a multifaceted dependence of the subject on various external elements: we might, for instance, feel obliged to take into account two kinds of elements of this sort: linguistic ones and social ones. The subject, then, is in some sense dependent on, and to some extent formed by, language, culture, and social interactions. On the other hand, we can find in the writings of Wojtyła some other premises that tend to go in the above-​mentioned direction. When considering self-​knowledge, which is an active power of the subject, he offers his own short description. According to him, “self-​knowledge centered on one’s own ‘I’ as its proper object goes with it into all of the domains which this same ‘I’ itself permeates.”27 From this perspective, it is obvious that the “I” enters into a vital encounter with various external environments, be they human or non-​human. In other words, the subject, with its interiority and proper powers, enters into contact with what is outside of itself.28 This leads to two general consequences. Firstly, as we mentioned above, these external elements can act as “activators” of the subject, who then discovers itself as a separate and independent entity. Secondly, these external factors leave their mark on the subject and its interiority. This means that although the coming-​to-​be of the subject is independent of what is outside of it, its inner “shape” and quality is influenced by this outer environment.

7 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 88. 2 28 We undertake this issue in the section dedicated to a relationship between consciousness and emotions.

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Applying Wojtyła’s phenomenological approach further, we should point to the subject (and its interiority) that constitutes a subject-​in-​context. In other words, going beyond the concept of the pure subject, we should embark on an understanding of the subject in vital contact with the outside world via language and via its involvement in society. Thus, both language and participation in society reveal this subject and, at the same time, influence its maturing. In many places Karol Wojtyła expresses his interest in the relation between the human being and society. For example, this becomes obvious when he takes up the topic of participation in his main work, The Acting Person. Here he considers an activity of the human being carried out with others. His approach has a personalistic character. Thus, participation is not any type of collaboration whatever with other human subjects, but keeps its own character. Wojtyła ascribes to it two important characteristics: transcendence and integration. The human being acting together with others carries out an act which –​from an objective point of view –​benefits other human beings and society as a whole (in causing an effect without), and which at the same time fulfills the human being herself (via integration of the subject within).29 In other words, her act has both transitive and intransitive effects. This interaction within society is then understood as an undertaking proper to persons. In his later philosophical work, Wojtyła tries to shed some more light on the phenomenon of persons in relations. He uses the language of “I-​thou,” which is typical for dialogue-​oriented philosophers (e.g. Martin Buber). Referring to the “I” entering into relation with the “thou,” he claims that, “the thou assists me in more fully discovering and even confirming my own I: the thou contributes to my self-​affirmation. In its basic form, the I-​thou relationship, far from leading me away from my subjectivity, in some sense more firmly grounds me in it.”30 Here two words are important: namely, “discovering” and “confirming.” With the former the philosopher points to the revealing of the subject, whereas with the latter he underlines the process of strengthening its structure.

9 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” pp. 308 ff. 2 30 K. Wojtyła, The Person: Subject and Community, p. 243.

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Elsewhere, Wojtyła writes about the possibility of experiencing oneself in a new way as a result of an “I-​thou” relationship.31 We can interpret this in the following way: subjectivity as a potential state, getting into a personal encounter with the other, is activated and leads on to a new perception (discovery) of myself. Because I get into many personal encounters with various individuals who differ among themselves, it provides me with the possibility of experiencing myself anew many times over. Every meeting can awaken something new in me and confirm my own “I” in a new manner. It seems that this is the pattern of how a personal identity is forged and built up (at least from the personalistic perspective).32 What role here is played by language? If we assume that the person is a multidimensional entity, then so must be its relationships with others, too. And one of these relationships will be its cognitive relationship to them. Of course, in Wojtyła’s understanding there is no ‘pure’ cognitive activity embracing a sphere consisting solely of facts. The latter, as he claims, are always connected with values, “for we must take into account the fact that the different objects which we encounter in our immediate sensory experience impinge on our attention not only as having content but as having value.”33 Language is a vital instrument of cognition and, as such, can be considered a tool for communicating facts and values (we will elaborate on this thesis in following sections). Having this in mind, let us concentrate on a single aspect of fact-​communication. What can this activity tell us about the subject? Wojtyła did not pay too much attention to language philosophy. He rather operated within the phenomenological and Aristotelian traditions. Nevertheless, phenomenology must not be divorced from language analyses, and the various roles of language should be appreciated in this philosophical tradition. A good example of this attitude is presented by Robert Sokolowski. As a philosopher involved in the Aristotelian and the phenomenological traditions, he shows how analyses of the functions of language can

1 Ibid., p. 244. 3 32 Later in the book, we will undertake Wojtyła’s analyses on the dialogue between persons and prove that they contribute something important to the philosophy of dialogue. 33 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 103.

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help us better understand the human person. He assumes that the human being is an “agent of truth”34 and –​following David Braine –​adds that when that being thinks, she does so in the medium of words (“thinking in the medium of words”).35 Thus, tending to the truth and using language are inextricably connected. The phenomenologist declares that “the human person acts as such, as a rational animal and as an agent of truth, especially in his use of language, when he thinks in the medium of words.”36 If such presuppositions are correct, then we can point to some important consequences. The human subject is someone endowed with a rational nature, and this expresses itself primarily in the tendency to attain truth. This tendency can be realized only when adequate tools are acquired, e.g. language. Thus, through language the subject manifests its specificity and, more fundamentally, its existence as a specific entity. Nevertheless, language is not entirely a private enterprise. Its syntax and semantics are fruits of a given culture and community. Hence, tending to the truth through words and thinking (which depends heavily on words), the subject must be mentally “incorporated’ in a language system, and this means that as an agent of truth it can only realize its nature through society. The latter provides it with a set of tools that will make possible its self-​manifestation and fulfillment. Viewed from the other side, however, we may note that society can itself to some extent influence the structure of the subject through language. Tending thus towards manifestation and self-​realization, the subject makes itself open to what is external.

Concluding Remarks Karol Wojtyła has an “unclear” philosophical background. His writings cannot be unequivocally classified as pre-​modern or modern (let alone postmodern) ways of philosophizing. He is someone trying to draw on the strong points of both philosophical traditions, as we mentioned above. At the same time, he highlights differences (and sometimes oppositions) 34 R. Sokolowski, Phenomenology of the Human Person, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 31. 35 D. Braine, The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, (Notre Dame: The University of Notre DamePress, 1992). 36 R. Sokolowski, Phenomenology of the Human Person, p. 31.

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with respect to them. These similarities and differences constitute a good starting point for an interesting discursive exchange of ideas. Although his concept of the human person is far from complete,37 it is the fruit of such an exchange and discussion, and this brings to philosophical anthropology a certain “freshness.” To sum up, let us point to two final conclusions concerning the subject and its interiority. We should not accept the radical thesis that the external constitutes the internal. It will suffice, instead, to say that there is a kind of interdependence: the one cannot be properly grasped without the other. If that is the case, then two solutions to the problem of the subject certainly seem false: on the one hand, a subjectivism resulting in a kind of solipsism, and on the other, a pure objectivity that would annihilate all traces of the subject as a sui generis reality.

4.2. WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS? The Person and Consciousness Karol Wojtyła employed an original approach to investigating the human person. As a real personalist thinker, he was interested in the whole picture of the person; but at the same time, he realized that one of the ways of attaining that wholness leads through enquiring into particular traits and personal characteristics. Thus, although the human person is a complex and dynamic entity, he is revealed through various activities –​especially through intentional and free acts. These activities show up as proper manifestations of the person. Indeed, it is a condition of their being executed that they have, vested within them, precisely what is unique and unrepeatable with respect to that person’s being: i.e. their subjectivity and, more particularly, the appropriate esse or manner of existence.38

37 J. Kupczak, Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/​John Paul II, (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), p. 80. 38 In his book Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła points out that intentional and free acts belong to that particular person and cannot be carried out by anyone else. As he claims: “no one else can want for me. No one can substitute his act of will for mine.” See K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 24.

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These unique and unrepeatable elements of the person have various characteristics and can be highlighted in various ways. However, they become especially evident when we analyze just that dimension of human persons that is specifically concerned with their lived experience and consciousness.39 As we mentioned above, experience for Wojtyła is pivotal to understand the person and so is with consciousness. In the course of our investigation, we shall observe some links between them. In the case of consciousness itself, while we can certainly point to a common structure possessed by all persons, it remains the case that it finds its own realization in each individual. In other words, all persons exhibit a similar formal structure of consciousness, but considered materially (qualitatively), the latter still assumes a unique shape and realization in each and every human being. Wojtyła presented his original conception of consciousness in his principal work, The Acting Person. He also returned to this topic in his other writings, underlining the importance of conscious activities in the self-​constitution of the person. It is important that, right from the very outset of our investigation, we stress the difference between Wojtyła’s approach to consciousness and those approaches that are typical where other ways of philosophizing are concerned. Firstly, our philosopher is not interested in any kind of so-​called “pure” consciousness. He is not a thinker operating within the idealist paradigm of philosophy, and in many places explicitly distances himself from any such approach. This will be shown in the first section (subchapter) here. Secondly, Wojtyła is not interested in propounding an empirical genesis for consciousness. Hence, he does not delve into the structure of the human brain, and neither does he attempt to resolve the mystery of the nature of the connection between the latter and our conscious acts. He employs his own way of dealing with the issue. On the one hand, he treats consciousness as a given fact, which is a sui generis phenomenon in the life of the person and should be accepted with an attitude of wonder. On the other,

39 The concept of ‘lived experience’ is quite complex. In Wojtyla’s thought it has intellectual, sensory, and moral aspects, and consciousness, too, is part of this experience. See, for example, D. Savage, “The Centrality of Lived Experience in Wojtyła’s Account of the Person,” Roczniki Filozoficzne, Vol. LXI, No. 4 (2013), pp. 19–​51.

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consciousness must be explained by and integrated into the whole scheme of human existence. As we mentioned above, consciousness is the hallmark of the person and must be set forth as such. In this chapter, several tasks are to be undertaken. Firstly, following Wojtyła’s analyses of consciousness, we shall try to show how he remained a realistically oriented thinker who sought to distance himself from idealistic positions. Secondly, we shall attempt to establish why it was that the Polish philosopher wished to supplement a certain pure, metaphysical notion of the person –​of the sort typical for the Aristotelian philosophical tradition and finding its culmination in the famous Boethian definition –​with something else. Thirdly, we shall outline Wojtyła’s original thinking on the topic of the structure of consciousness. Fourthly, we shall seek to show how the latter may be of help to us in achieving an integrated picture of the human being and identifying the role consciousness plays in the self-​constitution of the person. Although we chiefly intend to sketch Wojtyła’s original thinking about the person and consciousness, we shall also be trying to establish how it is conditioned by all his presuppositions and his manner of philosophizing. Finally, at the end of the subchapter, some critical remarks will be presented in order to test the strength and originality of the project.

Against the Idealistic Approach to Consciousness Wojtyła treats consciousness in a complex way, but one thing concerning this issue does seem clear: he is very cautious about approaching it as a separate subject, existing on its own and perceiving the surrounding reality as a semi-​autonomous center. As he himself stresses, he is far from reducing what is real to the sheer data given to consciousness, in the sense of identifying esse with percipi (esse = percipi).40 The realm of what exists is vast, diversified, and basically independent in its being from consciousness. The latter has an ability to encompass, in a way, the former, but it is not the reality wherein various objects come to be in the first place. Wojtyła fears that the opposing scenario would not only be a position alienating us from a world where things exist independently (i.e. not as mere projections of our mental states), but could also lead to an understanding of consciousness

40 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 107.

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as something which lacks contact with reality itself. As he warns, in such a situation “consciousness itself ceases to be something real and becomes a subject of content which is only a thought.”41 When he comes to conduct his own proper analyses with respect to human beings and, more particularly, persons, Wojtyła strongly distances himself from the idealistic position.42 His basic presupposition is that the human being does exist and act consciously, but neither existence nor acting has their own source in consciousness.43 The latter then, can and should be treated as a subject of anthropological investigation, but the idea of regarding it as a separate subject or (semi-​)autonomous substance and power is decisively rejected. Consciousness is to be considered strictly in relation to persons and their acts and, in particular, as an essential factor of their efficacy/​operativity. Thus, consciousness is not an independent realm producing its own content but a dimension of personal being, one which “takes” its content entirely from the person’s reality, their various undertakings, and the surrounding reality. This issue is one to be pursued in the course of our further inquiries. Consciousness, then, will be considered here in a broader context, where the central role is played by the human being understood both as a whole and as an independent entity. At this point, we may pause for a while, and try to determine how the former is connected with the latter. This will be addressed in a more extensive fashion later on, but as a preliminary step we may already point to a specific and complementary connection. Wojtyła sets out consciousness not as a rival to the objective existence of the person, but as a tool that may be of service to the latter. In other words, it does not subsume or encompass a personal being but, on the contrary, brings help with unfolding and revealing the personal realm “into the interior” –​as he 1 Ibid. 4 42 Wojtyła departs from the position of idealism, but at the same time subscribes to the view that a dividing line between idealism and realism is not sustainable anymore. He claims that “the line of demarcation between the subjectivistic (idealistic) and objectivistic (realistic) views in anthropology and ethics must break down and is in fact breaking down on the basis of the experience of the human being.” See K. Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being” in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community. Selected Essays, p. 210. 43 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 79.

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puts it.44 This means that consciousness sheds some essential “light” on the unrepeatability and uniqueness of the person: we therefore get a chance to discover the person as a sui generis creature. Hence, as Wojtyła continually emphasizes in his writings, what distinguishes human persons from other creatures is their interiority and subjectivity. Of course, human subjectivity must not itself be confused with subjectivism.45 Wojtyła, as a realistic thinker or, at least, as someone wishing to defend the middle ground,46 pays some attention to this distinction. He intentionally distances himself from the position of subjectivism, which is an instance of the idealistic stance. However, Wojtyła is aware that embarking on the exploration of consciousness need not necessarily lead to subjectivism. The reality of consciousness is a perfect example of human subjectivity and, as such, is an integral part of human existence. Thus, Wojtyła’s investigative attitude, focused on the whole human being, is intensely interested in that inner sphere: any justifications he offers are deeply rooted in his understanding of persons and their acts. He claims that persons exists as subjects, but at the same time also experience themselves as such. Without consciousness, the latter would be impossible. Furthermore, the dynamic relationship obtaining between the person and their act unfolds within human subjectivity. Thus, only through an analysis of consciousness can we single out particular components of that dynamic. Wojtyła underlines here the special role of human causation. The act as such can only take place when there is an acting human being: the person. As was already mentioned, we may call the ability to initiate any such act one’s efficacy/​operativeness. The latter is strictly a human feature and so cannot be attributed to other, non-​human creatures and their activities.47

4 Ibid., p. 95. 4 45 The position of subjectivism that he rejects would maintain, for instance, that a subject is entirely constituted by consciousness. 46 This position of his is emphasized by him recurrently. Let us give at least one clear example of it: “It is better to attempt a kind of coordination and unity between two aspects [of the human being], namely the aspect of being and the aspect of consciousness, the aspect of act and the aspect of experience.” See K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” pp. 105–​106. 47 Non-​human creatures, e.g. animals, do not fulfil the criteria for attributions of agency. They are basically driven by instincts and a rudimentary form

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However, if it is thus, then this means that such efficacy/​operativity is strictly connected with a distinctively human rationality and consciousness and, what is more, with the will. Many scholarly works have been recently dedicated to exploring differences between human consciousness and, for example, apes’ consciousness. Suffice it to say that a distinctively human function of consciousness is exemplified by a reflexive consciousness (i.e. the consciousness of consciousness).48 The complex structure of the latter constitutes a part of subjectivity itself, and this, as Wojtyła claims, becomes the proper ground where any such efficacy/​operativity shows up as a fact (that is cognitively graspable) and, moreover, can be fully experienced.49

The Boethian Definition of the Person and Its Inadequacy Wojtyła is a philosopher who moves within the Aristotelian philosophical tradition but at the same time tends to enrich it with the achievements of modern and contemporary philosophy. This being “in-​between” leads sometimes to confusion as to what his original position is, and his analyses concerned with consciousness aggravate this dilemma. At any rate, the correlation between the Aristotelian aspect to Wojtyła’s thinking and its modern and contemporary ones is evident when we follow his analyses concerning the notion of the human person. Aristotle’s notion of the human being was based on a formula: homo est animal rationale. Human beings were characterized there as belonging to the family of living beings, and by their own more specific feature –​namely, the possession of reason. Wojtyła examines this anthropological approach and claims that, at first glance, it “excludes … the possibility of accentuating the irreducibility in the human being.”50 Taking the Aristotelian way of thinking about human beings as our basis for comprehending them brings us close to thinking of them as just one kind of being amongst others, or as an entity easily reducible to that which constitutes others. Wojtyła calls such an understanding of consciousness. We cannot ascribe to them fully-​fledged consciousness or rational will. 48 J. F. Kavanaugh, Who Count as Persons? Human Identity and the Ethics of Killing (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001), pp. 42–​44. 49 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 105. 50 K. Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being,” pp. 210–​211.

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“cosmological.”51 We have described this model of the human being in I chapter pointing out to its reductionist character. It is however worth underlining that the human being is indeed a richer reality than our objectifying tools allow us to ascertain, and that richness is conveyed by the term “person.”52 It is for this reason that Wojtyła directs our attention to a “personalistic” model of the human being where this complementary sphere is accenuated. This also has been previously analysed. However, we need to return to this topic to underscore the importance of the human interiority. This sphere can easily be identified with human subjectivity: in a sense, we may even treat these terms as being synonymous. It is something which distinguishes us as human beings from other living creatures and which, by its very nature, is not like an object that could be divided, analyzed scientifically, or turned into the typical elements of a sensory experience. It not being reducible to any empirical factors, he quite correctly calls it “the irreducible.”53 Nevertheless, he still maintains that it is objective. So how are we to make sense of such a position?

51 Ibid., p. 211. Of course, this remark demands a certain qualification. Considering the human being only as a living creature can be an example of reduction. However, the claim that this creature is endowed with reason introduces a vital distinction and hence limits a reductionist approach. Reason, after all, is a realm which cannot be easily –​if at all –​reduced to other empirical qualities, and which indeed makes us humans different, compared to all other living creatures. Wojtyła is aware of this simplification, and that is why he uses such qualifying expressions as “when taken simply and directly” or “at least at first glance.” Thus, the message he seems to be conveying is along the following lines: When we do not make an effort to unfold the richness and variety of different functions covered by the term “reason,” human beings are left rather less distinguishable (epistemologically) from other beings than they should be. 52 Aristotle was not concerned with the problem of personhood. The problem itself only arose in early medieval philosophy. Wojtyła, commenting on the ancient philosopher’s thought, aims to incorporate the latter’s ideas into a personalist project. Although being a person is something more than being a rational animal, a realist understanding of the former nevertheless incorporates the latter. In other words, to be a person is also (but not only) to belong to a certain species or group of living entities. 53 Ibid.

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Wojtyła emphasizes in many places that human subjectivity and its typical representations are, in a sense, objective. Of course, the objectivity of which the philosopher is thinking is something different from strict scientific objectivity. Firstly, claiming that something is objective involves the thesis that it is an object of our human capacity for knowing. To be sure, subjectivity is not beyond the range of our cognitive capacities, although empirical tools have limited access to it.54 However, we can subject a set of our own inner experiences –​mental or emotional –​to rational examination, and draw some vital (valid, universal) conclusions from such an inquiry. In so doing we may trace some contours and characteristics of our subjectivity common to all human individuals as human beings. In short, the ability to discover and philosophically penetrate the transcendental sphere proves that subjectivity is not something elusive and wholly reserved for private contemplation. And thus, it is that Wojtyła points to some elements that will prove helpful when maintaining such a thesis. He mentions such factors as human experience in general, but also, specifically, the experience of agency: the experience of the relation of the person to their action when their efficacy/​operativity is exercised, and the experience of moral value. As he clearly underlines, “these are objective facts, but they get their objectivity and reality only and exclusively in human subjectivity.”55 They are components of our subjectivity which permanently constitute our being. Hence, we can rightly characterize them as objective, too. Having said that, we may also point out that Wojtyła’s understanding of objectivity is really quite specific: it is not something that places limits on the perception of the human being, but rather has an inclusive character. “Objectivity,” in this sense, is something only to be revealed when we employ an approach that cognitively encompasses all of the essential aspects of human existence. On the other hand, the Aristotelian tradition itself may furnish a different suggestion: treating human individuals as beings can cause some thinkers to claim that this is an example of making

54 This topic is currently the subject of various controversies, due to findings in the cognitive sciences. However, viewing these critically, we can at least argue that some regions of human subjectivity are beyond the reach of any empirical method. 55 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 106.

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them into just one sort of object amongst others. Wojtyła undertakes a critical polemic against such a misconception, claiming that it is an unjustified simplification. He makes it clear that “the objectivity of the conception of the human being as a being itself required the postulate that the human being is 1) a separate suppositum (a subject of existence and action) and 2) a person (persona).”56 The latter postulate clearly goes beyond objectivity in the strict sense (i.e. empirical objectivity). Even so, we can still ask whether a description of human beings utilizing such general and metaphysical terms as “suppositum” or “substance” is not too far-​fetched, as far as its objectivity (in a modified sense of this term) is concerned. For instance, one doubt concerns the Boethian definition of a person as rationalis naturae individual substantia. Generally, Wojtyła accepts this formula, and is appreciative of its role in thinking about persons: properly understood, it introduces a fundamental line of demarcation between human beings and other creatures. As he claims, “the fact that a person is an individual of rational nature –​or an individual of whose nature reason is a property –​makes the person the only subject of its kind in the whole world of entities.”57 Nevertheless, the individual and substantial nature of the person is not something which decisively differentiates the latter from other living creatures. We can ascribe similar features to other animals: e.g., apes. This difference is indeed introduced by invoking the adjective “rational,” but –​as we mentioned above –​it calls for further exploration. Wojtyła emphasizes that when it comes to personal reality, it is more appropriate to characterize it by pointing to the uniqueness of the subjectivity involved: every person is unique, and this can be revealed when we take into account his or her unique structure of subjectivity, including all rational powers and abilities. Thus, the Boethian definition, though important for the philosopher we are considering here, is not complete –​at least as far as capturing the proper essence of the person is concerned. He accepts this formula in his investigation, but as a starting point. He openly declares, which we also have signalled before, that “the Boethian definition mainly marked out the ‘metaphysical terrain’ –​the dimension of being –​in

6 K. Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being,” p. 212. 5 57 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 22.

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which personal human subjectivity is realized, and so constituted, in a sense, a condition for ‘building upon’ this terrain on the basis of experience.”58

The “Physiognomy” of Consciousness and Personhood In engaging with the realm of consciousness, Wojtyła is not departing from the Aristotelian tradition altogether. Of course, the issue did not figure as a separate topic in that philosophical tradition, but neither was it completely unknown. Thus, we can ascribe to modern philosophy a special concentration on consciousness tantamount to granting it privileged treatment, but not its fundamental discovery. Ancient and medieval philosophers knew, in a sense, that human beings are rationally aware of themselves and the world around them. Wojtyła himself gives us two examples to shore up this thesis. On the one hand, consciousness was implicit in the “rationality” whose significance is being emphasized in the aforementioned formulas (i.e. “homo est animal rationale” or ‘persona est rationalis naturae individual substantia”). On the other hand, a certain facet of consciousness was already included in the concepts of rational will (appetitus rationalis) and free action (voluntarius).59 Wojtyła is not satisfied with this treatment of consciousness, which is rather fragmentary and indirect, and so aims to give it a more systematic and direct exposition. Consciousness is, for him, an essential and constitutive aspect of the whole dynamic structure, which itself corresponds to both the person and their act.60 In the context of such an approach, his conception of consciousness unfolds as something quite complex, but unfortunately, we cannot expect, within the confines of this chapter, to exhaustively cover all interesting aspects of such an intricate project. In our analysis we 58 K. Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being,” p. 212. Of course, subjectivity can be considered in two ways. Firstly, it should be understood as the structure of personal subjectivity common to all human persons. (We may add here that the current chapter is basically concerned with this meaning.) Secondly, subjectivity is to be comprehended as the unique interiority of this or that particular person (the latter meaning also figures in this chapter.) 59 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 79. Voluntarius –​in Wojtyła’s reasoning –​is not only an attribute of the will but has something of reason to it. Free action, in order to be such, must be associated with consciousness and reason. 60 Ibid.

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shall be concentrating only on the main pillars of the edifice, all the while considering how this way of thinking about consciousness may help us to better understand the human person. Wojtyła is well versed in twentieth-​century phenomenology, but on some points, he departs from it decisively; or rather, his approach can at least be characterized as unorthodox. One particular thesis he proposes makes clear what his conception of consciousness amounts to. He affirms, on the one hand, that consciousness is always a consciousness of something. However, on the other hand he rejects the claim that it has an intentional character.61 In our subsequent analysis we shall try to show that Wojtyła’s argument speaks in favour of the latter position, but for now let us limit our remarks to emphasizing that for the classical phenomenologists the thesis of the intentionality of consciousness was something quite essential. For instance, Edmund Husserl’s famous formula states that “under intentionality we understand the own peculiarity of mental processes ‘to be consciousness of something’.”62 In the light of this declaration, Wojtyła introduces a differentiation between the concept of intentionality and the understanding of consciousness as a consciousness of something. In short, they do not go hand in hand. For Wojtyła, consciousness is not a separate reality, let alone a whole subject. It is a power or property, to be regarded as inseparable from the agency, dynamism and efficacy/​ operativity inherently associated with it –​that is, in terms of the whole person. It is the latter that constitutes the proper subject, and consciousness, so to speak, works for its sake. Consciousness has two vital functions: one is its “mirroring” of what has become known, while the other is its bringing about of a certain kind of interiorization of conscious content, making it a part of the self of the person.63 The first function kicks in when it receives various items of cognitive data that have first been “discovered” and elucidated by means of other active rational powers, such as knowledge and self-​knowledge. This

1 Ibid., pp. 80–​81. 6 62 E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Vol. I, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague/​Boston/​Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), § 84, 200. 63 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 83.

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mirror-​like consciousness, then, is an empty structure unless and until filled out by the cognitive data delivered by our rational tendency –​directed towards either the outside world or our interiority, or both –​to acquire knowledge. Only when filled out in this way can consciousness penetrate a given content, or even conduct a kind of mental “X-​ray.” Wojtyła claims that this particular function has nothing in common with active processes of reasoning or meaning constitution. It is like keeping a known object or state (coming from outside or inside of the person) that has been captured, “in the light of the mind.” In this sense it does have a kind of cognitive function, but it is always a secondary one.64 The second, interiorizing function of consciousness is one whose observation represents a somewhat more original insight, in that it is not so frequently noted by philosophers: it helps to turn a given cognitive content into a kind of personal experience. In Wojtyła’s personalistic philosophy, there is no such thing as purely cognitive content. Everything that is a subject of the person’s cognition is, at the same time, a subject of extra-​rational experience. We get to know something, but at the same time form a kind of attitude towards it, liking or disliking it. In this way, it is not only the case that our intellect confronts the factual data, but also that our emotions and will are involved, making contact with some good that is present in, or associated with, a given object. It would appear that the latter function of consciousness takes up this extra-​rational (but not irrational) mode of operation.65

64 Ibid., pp. 80–​82. This description of consciousness helps us understand why it has a non-​intentional character. Andrzej Półtawski points to the formative influence of Aristotelian thought in respect of this view of Wojtyła’s. He claims that “an intentional act is for him [for Wojtyła] an actus in the traditional, Aristotelian sense of the word; therefore ‘the act of consciousness’ has, for him, a derived, improper sense; it is a mere projection in consciousness of the act proper; an aspect of its result.” See A. Półtawski, “Ethical Action and Consciousness,” Analecta Husserliana Vol. VII (1978), p. 119. 65 This aspect of experience is brought out when the philosopher points out that “a fundamental role of consciousness is to form experience,” or when he gives the example of a mountainous landscape given in the mirroring function of consciousness as having a purely cognitive character and the same landscape given in experience, but on the basis of mirroring. In a complete picture of consciousness,

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The data delivered to consciousness in respect of its twofold functions can come –​as we have mentioned above –​from outside the person, from the surrounding world. However, it can also come from within the person. In this latter case a vital role is played by self-​knowledge, which amounts to cognition of oneself of a sort that brings with it all the burdens of particularity. As Wojtyła himself emphasizes, “in self-​knowledge a subject is its particular, own ‘I.’ ”66 Thus self-​knowledge touches on my subjectivity and enables the interiorizing function of my consciousness to experience me myself, in all my richness and variety. It refers, in a way that carries special significance, to my own acts, which engage my will and my capacity for self-​determination. Consciousness not only reflects all of the parameters involved in my agency, my acts themselves and their outcomes, but also helps me experience them as my own. The latter reveals how the interiorizing function of consciousness is related to personhood. Generally speaking, we can point to a kind of passage from what is taking place objectively within the person to what is taking place subjectively there. It occurs in the following way: we can reasonably claim that all that is gathered and X-​rayed by the receptive function of consciousness has an objective character. Even my own interior states are visualized here as objects, at least for my cognition, although they come from within. However, when the interiorizing function comes into play, two events take place. Firstly, all of the content of consciousness becomes, to a greater or lesser degree, an experience for the subject: I like it or dislike it, it acquires this or that emotional flavuor for me. Secondly, this content is directly referred to the person and, as Wojtyła himself puts it, even “comes ultimately into the circle of the proper subjectivity of any human self (‘I’).”67 The experienced and “personalized” content we are speaking of here does not change the ontological structure of a person’s being –​their suppositum. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which it fulfills and enriches it.68 As such,

of course, they will accompany each other and even overlap with each other. See K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 91. 66 Ibid., p. 88. 67 Ibid., p. 91. 68 In one place he declares: “One could also say that the human suppositum becomes a human self and appears as one to itself because of consciousness.”

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it has diverse forms of realization. These stem from the fact that every human person has their own cognitive profile and mode of experience.69 We can shed light on these forms of realization by viewing them both from “without” and from “within.” It becomes obvious in the light of the former that, taking into account all of the similarities between our lives, we live in different settings: something by which our cognition must, to a considerable extent, be affected. Hence, the fruits of this mode of cognition bear the distinguishing marks of our specific environments. In the light of the latter, just how we phenomenalize (e.g. visualize) a given cognitive content will evidently be something quite unique and typical only for us. No one else has direct access to this sphere, and any attempt to make comparisons between human individuals in this respect is inadequate. Moreover, our levels of emotional sensitivity with respect to that content will differ and, indeed, are actually incommensurable between persons. That same uniqueness, considered from within, finds its ultimate ground in the uniqueness of esse. However, the effect which appears at the intersection of the “without” and the “within” makes the personhood (and, with this, the personality) of every human individual different, unique, and unrepeatable. As we have seen, an essential (but not exhaustive) role is played here by the activity of the complex structure of consciousness. As we have mentioned above, Wojtyła is convinced that human consciousness and subjectivity must be considered together with other elements constituting the reality of the person. One of them is free will and the ability to initiate free, responsible, and morally positive acts –​namely, their efficacy/​operativity. When we start to wonder about the nature of the relationship between these aspects or facets –​between consciousness and subjectivity on the one hand, and free agency on the other –​we realize that there is, here, a deep interdependence. Free action is only possible when we

See K. Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community” in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community: Selected Essays, p. 227. 69 Of course, these individual profiles of cognition and experience are not utterly detached from what is common to all human beings. They do include common features of cognition and experience, but in their further developments and configurations they are unique. Without this common ground, communication between persons would be impossible.

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recognize what the good is that is to be realized through it, and whether the will is adequately informed about its object and the means of achieving it. Moreover, such efficacy/​operativity above all comes into play when knowledge about the good is deeply “ingrained” in the person, making it a part of their fundamental moral attitudes, and thus constituting a part of their very self. All these conditions are premised on the activity of consciousness: they show up in place when one’s personal receptive consciousness is filled with rational knowledge and discernment, delivered by intentional and active cognition or self-​cognition. Once acquainted with this knowledge, consciousness implements its mental X-​ray. In the context of the second function of consciousness, a given cognitive content becomes the subject of the person’s experience and is introduced into the circle of his or her inner self. Knowledge, including moral knowledge, is made into a new rational basis for their powers of discernment: in a sense, once “absorbed” by the person, “it sheds some rational light on the will,” enabling it to perform an act that will instantiate their efficacy/​operativity. This completed process of interiorizing provides the person with a new starting point for decision-​making, including moral decision-​making.70

Further Clarifications and Final Conclusions The concept of consciousness presented by Karol Wojtyła is, as was previously emphasized, strictly associated with the notion of the person and his or her agency. The philosopher formulated these two vital concepts drawing upon pre-​modern, modern, and contemporary philosophy. From the former he took an understanding of the person as a substantial being that can be characterized as involving a certain view of objective existence and activity. A lasting legacy of this thinking is the thesis that the person is a suppositum –​a metaphysical subject of existence and action. Nevertheless, this outlook is insufficient because there is no place here to analyze and appreciate lived experience, including the activity of consciousness. Wojtyła 70 For the benefit of English-​speaking readers, we may note that the relation between consciousness and efficacy/​operativeness in the thought of Karol Wojtyła as been extensively treated by Jarosław Kupczak. See J. Kupczak, Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/​ John Paul II, pp. 95–​112.

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made this clear himself, while assessing the notion of the person elaborated by Thomas Aquinas;71 hence his turn to modern and contemporary philosophy. In making such a move, though, he is not uncritical: he maintains a certain distance from these philosophies, allowing him to penetrate the phenomena of lived experience and consciousness. For instance, while describing the views of René Descartes, Wojtyła uncovers a controversial thesis on the part of the French philosopher. He points to “a gradual process of a kind of hypostatization of consciousness,” stating that, as a result of this, “the tendency arises to identify the person with consciousness,” where this, in turn, finally ends up with the view that “consciousness and self-​consciousness constitute the essence of the person.”72 Of course, he is critical of such an approach, and rejects it as amounting to an idealistic reduction of the person. He rather subscribes to a view –​mentioned above several times –​that “the term ‘I’ … joins in itself a moment of lived subjectivity with ontic subjectivity.”73 The latter must correspond to some sort of metaphysical terrain then to be “built upon” –​and, after our analyses, we ourselves are in a position to know that the “material” in question is “delivered” by the penetration of our human subjectivity. A special role is played here by consciousness, which seems to be the focal point of the whole of human interiority, together with its dynamics. Wojtyła’s understanding of consciousness stands between two philosophical traditions. On the one hand, it seems to take up what has been the hallmark of modern and contemporary philosophy, from René Descartes to twentieth-​century phenomenology. On the other hand, it is most definitely connected with a substance-​based conception of the human person, for which consciousness is an aspect of rationality and the rational will. He moves between the extremes stemming from these two contrasting 71 K. Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community. Selected Essays, pp. 170–​171. 72 Ibid., pp. 169–​170. Such an assessment of the French philosopher is shared by many other contemporary philosophers. For example, Anthony Kenny points out that what really counts for Descartes, as far as the human subject is concerned, is mind; the latter is identified with consciousness and then with self-​consciousness. See A. Kenny, The Metaphysics of Mind, (Oxford-​New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. I. 73 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 93.

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philosophical traditions. Thus, he attempts to extricate consciousness from the sphere of rationality, but at the same time opposes making it into a separate subject. Hence, it is not consciousness that performs acts, but the person. Wojtyła also works hard to present the vital role consciousness plays in the constitution of the person, but even so, he still considers it no more than the background to active and intentional acts of cognition and knowledge.74 Compared to the latter, consciousness seems to be a passive aspect of human rationality, though one that is important and complementary to the active functions. Such a reading of Wojtyła’s project leads us to conclude that although he appreciated the valuable and enriching character of modern and contemporary philosophies of the human person, he remained at heart a thinker in the Aristotelian and Thomistic modes. Wojtyła’s concept of consciousness brings with it some controversies. The main one seems to concern its non-​intentional character. Possessing that form, it prompts some questions about its relationship to knowledge and self-​knowledge, as well as about its inner division into a receptive consciousness and an experiencing/​interiorizing one. These questions were voiced in the early 1970s, after The Acting Person was published in Poland for the first time. Stanisław Grygiel formulated the objection that, in denying the thesis that consciousness is intentional, we blur the line between the object and the subject. If we allow this to happen, we run the risk of identifying the receiver with what is received, or the subject who mirrors with the object mirrored. Grygiel claims that only through intentionality can we retain a known content as a distinct object in consciousness –​which, as such, forms part of a subject, the person.75 Grygiel also points to some difficulties arising when we accept the triple distinction of knowing, mirroring, and experiencing/​interiorizing. His main suspicion is that sooner or later this will lead to “a play in infinitum.”76 He reasons as follows: self-​knowledge objectifies what has been mirrored and experienced/​interiorized by consciousness, but before self-​knowledge itself offered this content to consciousness. In turn, consciousness mirrors and

4 Ibid., p. 86. 7 75 S. Grygiel, “Hermeneutyka czynu oraz nowy model świadomości,” Analecta Cracoviensia V–​VI (1973–​1974), pp. 148–​149. 76 Ibid., p. 149.

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interiorizes this new product of self-​knowledge, and again self-​knowledge starts its activity, and so on. We are faced with an in infinitum process, which could be compared to the effect of two mirrors put in front of each other. In order to avoid such an effect, we should –​in Grygiel’s view –​ ascribe to consciousness the faculty of intentionality.77 Another difficulty stemming from Wojtyła’s conception of consciousness as devoid of intentionality concerns the relationship between a receptive consciousness and an experiencing/​interiorizing one. This concern was initially voiced by another Polish philosopher, Antoni Stępień, who reasons as follows: if consciousness is directed at an object, this means that it is engaged in a process of objectification. However, if it does not objectify, then consciousness is not intentional; but then it cannot at the same time be considered a power conducting some sort of mental reflection upon this object: it cannot carry out the function of rational X-​raying. As Stępień concludes, if that were to be the case, then such a consciousness would itself be nothing more than an experience.78 In other words, if we accept Wojtyła’s thesis that consciousness is not intentional, it follows that it loses its rational character and is reduced to the level of experience (or an experiencing, semi-​passive subject). Karol Wojtyła was aware of these difficulties, and certainly tried to address some of them. However, even when he did so, he did not retreat from his main thesis concerning the non-​intentionality of consciousness. He took up the objection to “a play in infinitum:” in his opinion, such a play was not an inevitable consequence of the relation between self-​knowledge and consciousness. Wojtyła points here to a certain kind of continuity between the activity of the former and that of the latter. This continuity guarantees a mutual balance within the rational nature of the human being.79 He does not, however, elaborate on this topic any further. Even so, taking into account his other writings, we can comment on this by saying that Wojtyła was convinced that a rational human nature is an ordered structure which

7 Ibid. 7 78 A. B. Stępień, “Fenomenologia tomizująca w książce ‘Osoba i czyn,’ ” Analecta Cracoviensia V–​VI (1973–​1974), pp. 156–​157. 79 K. Wojtyła, “Słowo końcowe,” Analecta Cracoviensia V–​VI (1973–​1974), pp. 255–​256.

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is balanced in itself and does not allow major contradictions to take place within it. In fact, even if the sequence knowing-​mirroring-​experiencing/​ interiorizing can be repeated many times in reference to the same object, each time it happens on a different level. Thus, one cycle of the sequence will produce some knowledge and a new state of the person (effects within his personhood), while another subsequent one will “work” on the basis of this previously worked through “material,” so that it may lead in turn to different mental (cognitive) and personal results. Hence, the passage through a sequence of such cycles can prove constructive and fruitful for the person in question. Finally, for the purposes of reflection, we should perhaps place Stępień’s objection alongside Grygiel’s first one (namely, that a blurring between object and subject results from rejecting intentionality). Wojtyła did not address the problem of a possible blurring of the line between a receptive and an experiencing/​interiorizing consciousness. He assumed that the former is a distinct rational function within the broader framework of consciousness. As we mentioned before, an object captured cognitively either by knowledge or self-​knowledge is kept –​according to Wojtyła’s conviction –​“in the light of the mind” by the receptive consciousness. This thesis, however, is unclear, and calls for further explanation. This reflects the fact that on the one hand he wants to say that such consciousness is not intentional, and that “a being … is not constituted in and through consciousness but instead somehow constitutes consciousness,”80 which makes the latter seems passive, while on the other hand he also holds that receptive consciousness does indeed play some kind of active role. It carries out a process of reflection on the given content: a kind of X-​raying of it. In broader terms, then, the self may be said to be constituted through consciousness, and here Wojtyła even speaks of “the mediation of consciousness.”81 Understandably, we must classify these roles as kinds of activity of consciousness. Hence, consciousness itself is not wholly passive, even if, at the same time, it is not intentional. So we may ask: what kind of rational power is it, then? The aforementioned Stanisław Grygiel pointed to the Aristotelian notion of

0 K. Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” p. 226. 8 81 Ibid., p. 227.

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the passive intellect as a possible locus of explanation for this.82 However, in the light of our analysis here, we must correct this view: consciousness has something of the passive intellect to it, but also some features of an active one, too. Nevertheless, it remains conceptually unclear, and this is because of the various and distinct functions which have traditionally been ascribed to these two Aristotelian aspects of the intellect. One thing seems clear: we can continue to grant consciousness the status of being a part of the intellect rather than experience (understood in a strict sense) –​and, consequently, that of being a given object as distinct from an experiencing subject. However, we still need a better explanation of consciousness within the sphere of rationality.83

Concluding Remarks In Wojtylian personalistic position we should consider consciousness as a property of the whole person. It means that although various rational elements play here essential roles, the person himself is conscious in its real nature, or in other words –​by its nature. This personalistic claim sheds some light on the contentious issue of intentionality of consciousness. Thus, we can point out to the person himself who is intentional and uses his faculties as knowledge and self-​knowledge as tools (in a sense delegates 2 S. Grygiel, “Hermeneutyka czynu oraz nowy model świadomości,” p. 147. 8 83 This explanation depends greatly on how we undestand the mind. Wojtyła himself did not eleborated on this issue. However, it seems reasonable to claim that his underlining although not expressed clearly comprehension was close to the Aristotelian philosophical tradition but not to the Cartesian one. As Anthony Kenny remarks, the latter puts in the center the concept of consciousness whereas the former understand the mind as a set of faculties. Kenny himself gives a definition of the mind that draws on pre-​Cartesian philosophy and is in tune with the Aristitelian and Thomistic approach, “the mind itself can be defined as the capacity for behaviour of the complicated and symbolic kinds which constitute the linguistic, social, moral, economic, scientific, cultural, and other characteristic activities of human beings in society.” See A. Kenny, The Metaphysics of Mind, p. 7. If we emphasize that the mind is not here an autonomous or semi-​autonomous subject but concerns the human being in his integrity then this definition can be of some use for shedding light on the dilemmas stemming from Wojtyła’s philosophy. Particularily, if the intellect is one of those radical capacieties then consciousness must be considered as a part of that too.

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knowledge and self-​knowledge) to carry out a task of acquiring information (data). Consciousness is one of the aspects of the person; it does not participate in “delegating” those faculties but in a sense is in “a waiting” for their achievements (to process them further). All in all, consciousness cannot be considered as an autonomous mental/​spiritual faculty because it is a different and more fundamental structure of the person. However, in an association with intentional faculites, consciousness “works” for the sake of the person. Thus, in the personalistic position of Karol Wojtyła the perfecteness of the person is revealed, advanced, and consequently strengthened thanks to mature consciousness. To claim that the person is a special entity in this world is possible, inter alia, due to the presence and complexity of human consciousness.

4.3. CONSCIOUSNESS AND EMOTIONS Persons, Emotions, and Reason Dealing with emotions, especially when they are strong and seem to overwhelm us, is a real challenge. It becomes even harder when these emotions accompany a moment when we are to make an important decision. Then, we are forced to fight as if on two “front lines:” first, to curb our emotions and second, to think logically with maximum precision in order to prepare the ground for an adequate decision. Over the centuries many thinkers and sages have given us various clues and strategies of how to win the day, that is, how to remain rational and steadfast versus irrational and strong emotions. Today, this topic is also often undertaken by many scholars, not only because of its importance in practical behaviour but also because of its significance for the understanding of human nature. We are still interested in the sphere of reason and the sphere of emotions, and in the relationship between them. The relation between the human intellect and emotions has been at the center of attention for many psychologists as well as philosophers for a long time. In the case of the former, the topic has been considered, for example, within a series of books written by Daniel Goleman and others, with the telling title Emotional Intelligence.84 In the latter, various 84 D. Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ, (New York: Bantam Books, 2005); D. Goleman, Working with Emotional

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philosophers85 including many phenomenologists86 entertained a vivid interest in the intersection of these two human powers. One of them was Karol Wojtyła. In his main work of philosophical anthropology, the Polish philosopher took up the relation between consciousness and emotions. Let us treat consciousness as one of the instantiantions of the intellect and reason (as we have stated in a previous subchapter). Wojtyła gives some scholarly attention to the influence of emotions on consciousness, and in doing so he is far from underestimating the positive role of the emotions in the life of the person. However, he is also aware that at times emotions are able not only to modify positively (e.g. empower) the activity of consciousness but also to deform it. In this sense, they do not play a creative role in the scheme of personal existence and even interfere in personal fulfillment. This topic will be the subject of our attention in this subchapter. We will also be concerned with possible remedies for this negative scenario.

Consciousness under the Influence of Emotions Wojtyła’s understanding of consciousness is very original. Thus far, we have described its structure and operations; we have also pointed to some dilemmas associated with its understanding. Undertaking roles of emotions in operations performed by consciousness, we are going limit our Intelligence, (New York: Bantam Books, 2000); L. Lantieri, Building Emotional Intelligence: Practices to Cultivate Inner Strength in Children, (Boulder: Sounds True, 2008). 85 Many proposals have been put forward by various philosophers to determine this relation. Let us only point to one interesting example. Peter Goldie sees emotions strictly intertwined with reason. He claims that “feeling towards is thinking of with feeling, so that your emotional feelings are directed towards the object of your thought.” P. Goldie, The Emotions; A Philosophical Exploration, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 19. Generally literature in this respect is enormous. Let us mention several examples: G. Corradi Fiumara, The Mind’s Affective Life: A Psychoanalytic and Philosophical Inquiry, (New York: Francis & Taylor Inc, 2001); G. F. Schueler, Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action, (Cambridge MA: A Bradford Book, 1995); Thinking about Feelings: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions, ed. R. C. Solomon, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 86 E.g. M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-​Formal Ethics of Value: A New Attempt towards the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, pp. 253–​264.

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understanding of the latter to Wojtyła’s proposal that is, we are not going to draw on other models of consciousness, which are developed by so many contemporary philosophers and neuroscientists.87 Thus Wojtyła’s approach to consciousness we are going to treat in our analyses as a standard model of consciousness. According to our previous investingations, once the experiencing/​interiorizing cicle of consciousness is completed the person possesses not only a new rational idea but it also has an emotional and subjective link with it. Moreover, the newly acquired object enriches the personal interiority –​in a sense it expands the personal “I.” The subject then can claim, for instance, that “I” do have it as my personal possession, and it provides me with an additional space for self-​expression. In this way we can spell out the aforementioned term “ontological building up of the person.” When the whole process is uninterrupted, the emotional color of a given content is adequate to its significance and importance. However, this sequence of knowing and experiencing can be impaired or distorted. The Polish philosopher calls this event “the emotionalization of consciousness.” In the next section we will turn to this issue. However, first some light must be shed on a certain fundamental issue, the important of personalism as such. Now we should delve into Wojtyła’s general understanding of the relation between cognition and valuing, which is in some connection with our analyses. What is important here is that his stance is typical for a broader personalistic approach to the issue. A basic presupposition governing this relation is that there is not a sharp distinction between “fact” and “value,” or more fundamentally –​between “being” and “good.”88 Of course they are not the same, but they also are not alien or contrary to one another. However, having said that, we must acknowledge that we get acquainted with them and have access to them by various human powers and abilities. The mere content of a given fact or object is penetrated by an intentional power of knowledge (or self-​knowledge), “whereas in an emotion we are

87 A body of literature on this topic is enormous. Main concepts are characterized, for example, in W. Searger, Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment, (New York: Routledge, 2016). 88 We are going to return to the topic of good and value in the chapter on the dignity of the person.

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reacting to a value which we find in that object.”89 The Polish philosopher points out that these activities of knowledge and emotions complement each other and even are inseparable (we will elaborate on this later). Hence his explanation, “for we must take into account the fact that the different objects which we encounter in our sensory experience impinge on our attention not only as having content but as having value.”90 Let us assume that whenever we face an object of whatever kind, we acquire the data about it. However, let us treat this data broadly, that is, also including a value aspect.91 Then we can divide that data into the data about facts, data-​F, and the data about values, data-​V. This distinction can help us in our subsequent analyses because consciousness has an active participation in this double registering of objects, including inner ones, that is, states and experiences taking place within the human person alone.

Consciousness Overwhelmed by Emotions Karol Wojtyła considers emotions within his basic distinction, concerning all human activity, between happenings and acts. The latter engage the person in her full freedom and intentionality, whereas the former just take place in the human being. Emotions or emotional facts, as perceived by the Polish philosopher, have characters of happenings. Nevertheless, as such they are subjects to rational powers, including self-​knowledge and consciousness.92 They also influence these powers depending on various circumstances and factors. As far as consciousness is concerned, emotions play a role in reference to both of its functions. Emotions interfere in a

9 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, pp. 102–​103. 8 90 Ibid., p. 103. 91 In a strict sense, the data stems from an empirical experience. In a broader sense, however, it also mirrors a moral experience. Of course, this broader grasp may not be widely accepted, especially by empirical philosophers. However, for the present analyses –​conducted within a personalistic stance –​let us assume this dual structure, namely that the data is made up of an empirical facet as well as an axiological one. 92 In this sense, we cannot treat emotion as a kind of ‘surd’ or an irrational event. Although it has its own source, for Wojtyła emotion or a whole sphere of emotions is in a relation to the mind, that is, it can be grasped by self-​knowledge and mirrored by consciousness. We will elaborate on this topic below.

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mirror-​like function as well as in an interiorizing one. In a basic scenario, consciousness and its accompanying powers keep control over emotions. This means that they are objectified by self-​knowledge and, in a sense, put in front of the receptive (X-​raying) consciousness and then interiorized. In this non-​problematic scenario, the human being as a rational subject keeps a kind of distance from extra-​rational factors. Additionally, the will also plays an essential role in exerting real control over emotions, but we are not going to consider this aspect to a large extent in this subchapter. The problem begins when consciousness loses its distance from emotional facts. The standard model of consciousness is then undergoing a kind of critical test. Wojtyła, as we mentioned above, calls this situation “the emotionalization of consciousness.” It is usually connected with distortions of functions typical for subsequent stages of consciousness. Thus, self-​ knowledge is not able to grasp emotional facts in their meaning; the receptive, mirror-​like consciousness does not mirror these facts as what they are; the interiorizing consciousness does not refer their content to the self of the person in an adequate way. This breaking down of the structure of consciousness is a direct result of the breaking down of self-​knowledge (or knowledge). Its inability to grasp rationally the meaning of a given emotional fact brings about further stages of consciousness as dysfunctional and hence non-​constructive for the person. The center of the problem consists of the collapsing of self-​knowledge. As Wojtyła put it, “the breaking down of the objective relation of consciousness to feelings, as they ‘are happening’ in the human being …, comes from the fact that self-​knowledge stops objectifying. It does not establish meaning and as a result, it does not hold emotions in intellectual dependency.”93 We can ask why self-​knowledge stops carrying out its vital function. The Polish philosopher offers two explanations. Firstly, self-​knowledge can be overwhelmed by a power of an ongoing emotional fact. This can be the case when external factors are so strong and compelling that they cause a state of shock in the human subject. Or the subject is oversensitive and prone to experience feelings very intensely and disproportionately. Secondly,

93 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 102.

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self-​knowledge is not competent enough to cope with emotional pressure and can easily undergo a kind of dysfunction. Wojtyła claims that self-​ knowledge plays an essential role in the emotionalization of consciousness because only this cognitive power can be more or less developed in its activity. Consciousness itself –​as he points out –​can be, at most, more or less mature.94 Self-​knowledge is, then, the main factor responsible for objectifying any emotional facts. In a normal course of action (in the standard model of consciousness), a subject is in possession of cognitive premises and abilities to control them. Those emotional occurrences are made into known facts and so become adequate for the human being as a rational creature. Of course, it is not equivalent to full control over the emotions, because, as a philosopher put it, “emotions are somewhat recalcitrant to reason.”95 Hence –​as was mentioned above –​real control over them cannot be exerted without the active engagement of the will.96 Nevertheless, if we accept the presupposition that an act of the will must be adequately informed in order to initiate a typically human action (the act) towards a given fact, the process of objectifying of the fact is the first step in exerting real control over it. The above mentioned concept of “intellectual dependency” must be construed this way. Now let us look at the process of the emotionalization of consciousness in some detail. It will help us to realize how the standard model of consciousness is made dysfunctional. Let us consider the influence of emotional facts on two essential functions of consciousness. When we take into account the receptive and mirror-​like function, we realize that the pressure of emotional facts –​which crosses a threshold typical for a mature and balanced individual –​makes consciousness weaker in its natural role. It reflects those facts as something, which happens in a subject, but a link with the self is lost or substantially weakened. It is thus, because when a subject keeps control over emotions, she experiences them as her own feelings, as

94 This distinction is in fact discrimination between a fully active power of self-​ knowledge and a semi-​active power of consciousness. 95 P. S. Greenspan, “Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/​Body,” in Philosophy and the Emotions, A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 115. 96 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” pp. 102–​103.

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happenings belonging to herself and having a common ground in her being. In this way, the human being is able to discern both their cognitive unity and diversity: they have something in common with each other, but at the same time they differ. Thus, due to an existing link with a subject, emotional facts can somehow be identified. This advantage is lost once self-​knowledge stops objectifying and grasping the particular meanings of those facts. They are mirrored by the first instance of consciousness but without cognitive control over them, that is without a full realization of what they are. The second function of consciousness is also influenced by this process. As at the previous stage, we face the emotionalization of cognitive mirroring; thus, at this stage we are before the emotionalization of experience. In other words, the emotionalization of experience concerns how the flow of strong emotions distorts the emotional reception of any given data breaking the natural rhythm of experiencing it. This results in a kind of emotional overpowering. Emotional facts function in the person semi-​ autonomously. In other words, there is a slight link between them and the subject. The person is the arena for them, however, her involvement in what is going on is minimal. Loss of control over emotions leads to experiencing them as raw and primitive facts. Wojtyła underlines that such emotional facts are experienced in a heteronomous and non-​personal way.97 It is, as if they were taking place next to the person but not in the person itself. We will elaborate more on this later on. This is, of course, a situation which does not live up to the status of the person. In other words, the person participates in something, which is “below” its dignity. The Polish philosopher is convinced it is thus because any experience entertained by the human being, in order to live up to the requirements of personhood, must be unified with her to such an extent that it clearly contains the experience of her subjectivity. As Wojtyła points out, “adequate to the person is this experience, within which the experience of the subjectivity of her own ‘I’ can be marked out.”98 The emotionalization of experience is quite disadvantageous for the person and the person’s life. Wojtyła observes that an “invasion of emotions’

7 Ibid., p. 104. 9 98 Ibid.

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weakens the human subject because it loses some control over an essential set of feelings. It is like giving way to strong factors, which dominate not only the thinking but also the experience of personal integrity and identity. The philosopher is convinced that the “I” plays a central role in all acts of the subject, including the emotional ones, and the ordinary course of the subject’s life revolve around that center.99 It means that the “I” is not only a final destination of these various factors but also present in all of them. Hence –​as we mentioned above –​adequate experiencing of an emotional fact has as its constituent the experiencing of the subject. When the power of emotions is overwhelming, the “I” is put aside, and, so to speak, removed from the center of what is going on. She can only “observe” the set of happenings as if from outside. Wojtyła describes it in this way, “the human being … only lives with her emotions, allows them to live in her according to the measure of their primitive subjectivity. However, she does not live them out subjectively in such a way, that in this experience the personal ‘I,’ as the authentic center of experience, was highlighted.”100 Remarks presented by Wojtyła are based on the presupposition –​mentioned above –​that all experiences given to the person must be referred to the personal center of her being. Only then are they made into a real part of her life. Of course, questions arise in this context: are personally experienced emotions parts of personhood or personality? Or, in other words, do human beings become more mature persons or personalities after a series of properly experienced feelings? It seems that the Polish philosopher does not delve into such a distinction. He seems to adhere to the thesis that current experiences grasped by self-​knowledge, the mirror-​like, and the experiencing/​interiorizing consciousness lead to the fuller maturity of the whole interiority of the person (including her psyche, mind, conscience, etc.).

Self-​Knowledge in Its Operations The emotionalization of consciousness can be avoided in various ways. It can be a job for the psychologist who helps a given person to control

9 Ibid. 9 100 Ibid.

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her emotions. Consequently, it will be the task of that person to work on her emotions and not let them dominate her cognitive abilities. However, Wojtyła, in dealing with the emotionalization of consciousness, goes the other way. He does not put the emphasis on the psychological side but rather on the philosophical one. He points to self-​knowledge as a tool in preventing the emotionalization of consciousness scenario. It is worth mentioning that the discussion about self-​knowledge has had a long tradition. It started in ancient philosophy but since the beginning of modern philosophy self-​knowledge, its acquisition and its extent, has been keeping a special position in epistemological investigations. In contemporary philosophy it has different faces, including a discussion between the rationalistic and the empirical approach so as to a more reliable tool of its acquisition.101 However, we are not going in this direction with our analyses and hence we limit them to a range of interest entertained by the Polish philosopher. Thus, let us now look closely at Wojtyła’s understanding of self-​knowledge in order to find some clues concerning how to make it stronger and more adequate. Self-​knowledge is the active power of the person. As we mentioned already, it embraces cognitively some essential elements like the person, her “I” (at least to some extent), her acts and actions, including emotional facts, consciousness of these acts as well as consciousness of the person herself, and makes them into objects of cognition. Self-​knowledge accompanies the “I,” made into an object of cognition, in all circumstances where it operates. As Wojtyła puts it, “self-​knowledge centered on the own ‘I’ as her proper object, goes with it into all domains in which this own ‘I’ permeates.”102 Self-​knowledge carries out an objectification of these domains but not for the sake of themselves. It is done only for the sake of the own “I.” Because the “I” is understood as multi-​dimensional, the “regions” it can possibly enter are many. Consequently, self-​knowledge acquires an opportunity to penetrate them and gain some data about them, but always the data with a strict reference to the “I.” The Polish philosopher gives us some examples of such specific self-​knowledge: moral self-​knowledge, religious

01 See e.g. B. Gertler, Self-​Knowledge, (New York: Routledge, 2011). 1 102 K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” p. 88.

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self-​knowledge, and social self-​knowledge.103 Following these examples, we can add additional variations, such as, scientific self-​knowledge, cultural self-​knowledge, and historical self-​knowledge, to name only a few. Wojtyła stresses the fact that self-​knowledge aims at one’s own, particular “I.” This is the proper object of the cognitive power. However, the Polish philosopher is aware that self-​knowledge remains the proper knowledge all the time. This means that it naturally tends to “work out” the integral picture of the person. It is not a power overwhelmed and limited by varieties of particulars taking place in the person. Self-​knowledge always tends towards general concepts. Of course, such generalities concern this particular person and are basically known to her alone. Wojtyła gives us two examples of such generalities, pointing to the general view of self and a moral assessment of self. Self-​knowledge is then equally concerned with a cognitive aspect of the “I” as well as with its axiological facet.104 As we earlier noticed, the data-​F always accompanies the data-​V so, and at the end, they contribute to various aspects of a picture of the same person. The Polish philosopher goes further with the characterization of self-​ knowledge. The person is the main object of this cognitive power, although the power itself draws upon the personal experiences of a given individual. As he puts it, “a whole cognitive work goes exclusively from self-​experience to self-​understanding.”105 The person is first an object of experience and only later an object of knowledge. What is the role of general knowledge of the human being in this scheme? Wojtyła notices that there is a passage from an outer knowledge of the person to an inner knowledge. “Self-​knowledge –​ he claims –​uses the knowledge about the human being, i.e. various views of the human being as well as the knowledge gained from experienced relationships with other people, in order to understand better her own ‘I’.”106 Nevertheless, this outer knowledge is, all the time, an additional and a helpful tool only. Self-​knowledge is not directed towards the human being as such, but to this particular person; thus, any general understanding of the former plays its role only when it sheds some light on the latter.

03 Ibid. 1 104 Ibid., pp. 88–​89. 105 Ibid., p. 89. 106 Ibid.

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Self-​Knowledge as the Guardian of Consciousness Wojtyła is aware that self-​knowledge determines the boundaries of consciousness. As we pointed out above, consciousness is not an autonomous subject creating its own content. It is not an intentional power going out to things, including the person itself, and capturing new essences. Consciousness is exclusively “fueled” and “equipped” by knowledge and self-​knowledge. This dependency leads to two consequences. Firstly, self-​ knowledge establishes the boundary line for consciousness. The latter works exclusively on the data delivered by the former, including the data-​F and the data-​V. As Wojtyła observes, this fact helps to secure a realistic profile of consciousness: it is always centered on the “being” (and the ‘good”).107 In other words, consciousness is not left alone as a “producer” of its own content. Secondly, however, consciousness can be easily deformed by a wrongly operating self-​knowledge. And this is the case in the emotionalization of consciousness. Thus, self-​knowledge plays quite a fundamental and essential role. Strengthening it and making it more adequate can substantially strengthen the person in her vital operations. It seems that there are two ways of doing this: the first we can call “internal,” and the second –​“external.’ The former concerns the “natural” path that self-​knowledge follows. As mentioned already presenting the standard model of consciousness, it is directed to objectify the person and everything taking place in her. Looking chronologically, self-​knowledge intentionally captures all acts of the person as well as happenings, including emotional facts. Then, it converts them into pieces of information (although value-​laden), which are in turn delivered to the mirror-​like consciousness. When that bit of information is received and ‘absorbed’ by the second function of consciousness, namely the experiencing/​interiorizing one, it is introduced into the circle of personal life –​enriching and expanding it. However, the result of this process is again made into a subject of self-​ knowledge. In other words, self-​knowledge is concerned not only with the “input’ but also with the “output” of consciousness. If it is thus, then it brings with it some important consequences.

107 Ibid., p. 86.

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Self-​knowledge should become mature and more adequate by itself. Comparing the input with the output should be very instructive for its operations. The quality of the output of consciousness is vitally dependent on the quality of its input. Poor output should work as a stimulus for the whole cognitive power and should result in a better approach to the process of acquiring knowledge, which, in turn, would lead to an improved quality of a new input. Self-​knowledge should correct itself in order to be more efficient and in this way become enhanced by its very functions all the time. It also seems that self-​knowledge has an ‘in-​built’ function of reflexivity, that is, it can make its own mode of operation into an object of cognition. Hence, this power can follow reflexively its own way of intentional going out to an object, its objectification, and the final deliverance of the data to the threshold of consciousness. This, additionally, should be helpful in correcting and amending its manner of acquiring the data. However, if self-​ knowledge does not improve itself by itself, or when this improvement is poor, what can we do? We can observe, from time to time, that there are some individuals who do not improve substantially the level of their self-​knowledge. At least, we can infer this from their external behavior. What can we propose in order to bring them some help? Can we suggest being more introspective, more attentive to all acts and happenings taking place in their person, or maybe something else? The problem is how to improve the process of objectifying the facts and in this way to make it more acute, sharp, and precise. The solution proposed here is to put an emphasis on the use of language.108 Self-​knowledge seems to be more efficient if it is able to name adequately

108 This proposal can be a part of the stance called “the language-​reality problem.” It essentially deals with the dilemma as to whether we have access to objective knowledge about existing reality. What is important for our investigation is a conviction that “the expression language-​reality problem is used on the assumption that there is no knowledge of essential importance for this problem which for various reasons cannot be expressed by means of language.” See N. O. Bernsen, Knowledge: A Treatise on Our Cognitive Situation, trans. H. Vohtz, (Odense: Odense University Press, 1978), p. 117. In the case of Karol Wojtyła we have language-​reality realism (as opposed to language-​reality idealism), namely a position advocating for a thesis that we do have access to the objective knowledge concerning existing reality.

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captured internal objects. If a person possesses a large vocabulary and has a good understanding of it and also masters all the other aspects of language (i.e. grammar, practical usage), there is a greater chance to formulate just categories for various internal experiences. These categories, of course, include not only particular words but also whole expressions and even elaborated narratives, because emotional facts can be quite complex and not easy to express in simple propositions. A good command of language, as a whole structure, can bring with it the powerful help in the process of objectifying internal and subjective experiences. Powerlessness, or a lack of sophistication in this respect, results in imprecise or faulty data delivered to the consciousness. At any rate, the internal data is of high quality and seems to be ready for further operations when it is adequately linguistically grasped. The external way of improving self-​knowledge hinges on acquiring knowledge in the various contexts and circumstances externally related to the “I.’ As we mentioned above, self-​knowledge goes with the “I” to all domains and regions where the latter operates or is influenced. We pointed to various versions of self-​knowledge as the result of the presence of the “I” in different contexts and dimensions. Thus, the human subject can acquire some specific knowledge when entering into the sphere of morality, religion, social interactions, culture, scientific or historical circles. Cognitive familiarity with these domains can deliver specific insights and –​connected with them –​opportunities for the “I” to realize that it lives and develops in specific circumstances and is, to some extent, conditioned by external factors. Of course, a mere study of these external domains can be done in a very objective way, that is, for the sake of acquiring pure knowledge. Hence something more is needed here, namely a steady attempt to refer this knowledge to the process of self-​understanding. Only then can we not only realize various contexts of our existence but also perceive ourselves as if from outside.109 This proposed attitude is a combination of being itself and looking at itself as

109 Even psychologists point in this direction claiming that looking at myself from an external perspective, that is, through someone else’s eyes, can be a fruitful way of increasing my self-​knowledge. See T. D. Wilson, E. W. Dunn, “Self-​ knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement,” Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 55 (2004), pp. 507 ff.

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if through the prism of otherness. As a result, it leads to strengthening itself by a confrontation with that which is not itself. Assuming that the “I” tends to a kind of self-​preservation, we have always the same “I” looking from a numerical point of view but a modified one looking from a qualitative point of view. A new knowledge modifies our “self,” the “I” but does not change it substantially. At any rate, the more knowledge in these particular spheres and dimensions is learnt by the person and referred to herself (i.e. to her interiority), the more mature self-​knowledge should be. Acquiring knowledge means, to a great extent, to learn a new specific language. Thus, linguistic abilities can expand potentialities of self-​knowledge from outside but also, after a process of internalization, from inside.110

Concluding Remarks The emotionalization of consciousness is a negative phenomenon for the person. Wojtyła describes such a scenario as a distortion of the process of human cognition. His attention in reversing the emotionalization of consciousness is directed to self-​knowledge and its role in this process. At the same time, he is aware that other powers must be actively employed, like a strong will, in order to contain the excessive influence of emotions on consciousness. He does not elaborate on this aspect, limiting his analyses to the intellectual factor in dealing with emotions. The term ‘intellectual dependency’ concerning the relation between mind and emotions draws the line of his interests. At the same time, it touches on the core of the problem of the emotionalization of consciousness. Wojtyła, following Aristotle, is convinced that the mind plays a major role in the life and activity of the human being. The person is foremost an animal rationale. As mentioned above, it does not mean that other powers, including emotions, are less important. Nevertheless, in order to live them out in a really human way they are to be put in strict relation to the mind (even in a kind of dependence on the mind). 110 In Wojtyła’s works we can also find other clues about how to make self-​ knowledge stronger and more adequate. One of them concerns art and especially poetry. The Polish philosopher himself was a poet and appreciated a role of poetic language in naming the internal states experienced by the person. Thus, a relationship between Wojtyła’s poems and their cognitive role, and the concept of self-​knowledge is worthy of further investigation.

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Wojtyła’s suggestion of how to avoid the emotionalization of consciousness arises then from the idea of the strengthening of rational powers. In his writings, however, we are put before the problem but not offered its solution. The only thing we are given is a direction of approach. Thanks to this we are prompted to further investigation and can exercise various strategies, which subsequently can become a part of a broader philosophical picture. At any rate, over the history of philosophy many thinkers and philosophers have offered various proposals and methods of improving self-​knowledge because since Socrates (“know thyself”) the issue has been at the center of attention. Our proposal supplementing this lack is a turn towards language. It plays indeed an essential role in acquiring new knowledge, including self-​ knowledge. Thus, three aspects of the theory of language seem to be important for our investigation: sematic, syntactic, and pragmatic one. An ability to name properly the internal states of the person hinges on a wide knowledge and good understanding of vocabulary, grammar, and the practical usage of the language. However, it goes much deeper. Those spheres of the language deal with various relatioships between ideas and words, words and objects and persons, etc. Hence, they should be approached with methods going well beyond the filed of linguistic analyses. Consequently, the language that can bring with it help to curtail or eliminate the emotionalization of consciousness is rather a field of philosophical investiagation. Thus, we can present two final conclusions. Firstly, a real attempt at improving self-​knowledge sends us back to theoretical philosophy. An increasing awareness on how language works, in various dimensions, can bring us great help in knowing ourselves better. Secondly, working on self-​knowledge leads the person from her interiority to exteriority: to the encounter with objects, persons, and ideas worked out in inter-​subjective exchanges; and only then back again. Generally, the “I” who encountered and passed through “alien fields” has a greater chance to discover and sustain her identity, namely, that among other existing things and elements I am a separate entity but, at the same time, I am in some relation to them and can understand myself better only with their help. Fending off the emotionalization of consciousness is, in the final approach, the matter of caring for the life of reason, where acquiring knowledge in various contexts is constantly associated with deliberation and thoughtfulness.

CHAPTER V: THE PERSON IN ACTION Introduction Philosophy of the human action is a well established branch of the contemporary, especially English-​speaking philosophy. There is a huge body of literature on this matter1 and debates undertake such particular topics like agency, causation, intention, normativity, and others. Very often the philosophy of the human action is a part of analytical philosophy. Karol Wojtyła was also interested in human action to such an extent that his main book takes the analysis of the human action as a starting point for disclosing the person. Thus, the Polish thinker was also involved in those particular issues making up the core of discussions on human action, but he approached them rather from Thomistic, phenomenological and finally –​personalistic postions. His understanding of intentionality was set out in the previous chapter. In this chapter we are going to concentrate on some selected issues. We will be concerned with the problem of personal causation, which –​in the personalistic perspective –​acquires its unique and untypical form. In the second part of the chapter, we are going to investigate how the activity of human beings who get in a dialogue influences the personal reality. Thus, we are going to be concerned here with a kind of intersubjective causation.

5.1. PERSONAL CAUSATION Causation in the Ethical Thinking of Scheler and Kant In the early stages of his philosophizing, Karol Wojtyła engaged in a study of the ethical thought of Max Scheler, as well as Immanuel Kant. He was interested in how these great philosophers understand morality and the moral act. The theory of personalistic ethics, formulated later by the Polish thinker, comprises many elements of phenomenological and Kantian

1 It is not possible here to present even main works on the human action. However, it is necessary to point at least to a work, which lies at the root of the philosophy of human action, namely D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

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thought. Nevertheless, this positive outcome was not a result of peaceful acceptance of all the tenets of their philosophy but rather stemmed from a dialectical exchange of ideas. In other words, Wojtyła’s analyses led him first to a critical discussion with Scheler and Kant because, while appreciating the contribution these figures had made to ethical thinking, the philosopher from Kraków found many elements with which he could not agree.2 One of them was their inadequate understanding of the moment of efficacy. Efficacy, as such, is a part of anthropological investigation. Determining the role it plays and how strong it is sheds some essential light on the ontology of the human being. Thus, a clear-​cut concept of this category brings with it vital help in emphasizing the character of the human person, particularly in that she is a being who is a primary cause of her own actions and undertakings. However, this anthropological understanding is somehow hidden in ethical considerations. Following Wojtyła’s analyses, this thinking should be brought to the fore and assessed in a critical manner. This line of investigation would seem to be justified by the assumption that any ethical project has, in its background, an anthropological project. This is true not only in regard to Wojtyła’s philosophical activity but to Scheler’s and Kant’s as well.3 Let us start with Scheler’s thinking. If we intend to investigate personal efficacy, the first thing that must be determined is his concept of the person. Scheler rejects a metaphysical understanding of the person claiming that “the person must never be considered a thing or a substance.”4 At the

2 Wojtyła’s dealings with Scheler and Kant have a specific character. We assume that one might disagree with the way Wojtyła comments on their ideas and with the conclusions he draws. Nevertheless, Wojtyła’s analyses are well grounded and seem credible. 3 These philosophers assume various understandings of a person. Wojtyła steers between the Aristotelian and Thomistic approach, and the post-​Cartesian comprehension of the person (see K. Wojtyła, Love and Responisbility, pp. 21 ff). Following analyses will reveal further details of this approach. 4 M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-​Formal Ethics of Value. A New Attempt towards the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, p. 371. In his thought there is a dualistic comprehension of human being. On the one hand, human being is a person who is the centre of out attention; on the other, human being is a living thing subject to various natural processes.

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same time, he states his own definition of the term: “the person is, rather, the immediately coexperienced unity of experiencing;” and saying that he stresses that “the person is not a merely thought thing behind and outside what is immediately experienced.”5 The person then lives in her immediate lived experience and only in this actuality, as we can maintain, does she exist. Such a thesis can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, that the person is a set of ongoing acts, or a kind of collection of personal acts. However, later in his analyses Scheler questions and even rejects such an interpretation.6 Secondly, the person is a kind of entity who lives in and through her acts alone. The philosopher points to the person as a subject enduring in his existence (maybe he is a kind of spirit?)7 but there is no certainty as to his final character.8 According to Scheler, human being is attuned to values, which are called material values. They are discovered through emotions, which the German philosopher names “intentional feelings.” Emotions are experienced at all levels of human existence (i. e., on the varying levels of his sensibility) but on a basic level they are connected with the senses and only exist as an emotional state. At other levels of human existence, however, emotions are directed to specific objects, namely higher material values, and hence they become intentional feelings. Generally, feelings have priority in the process of cognition: first, we as human beings feel value and only later do we get an insight into the structure of that value.

Ibid. 5 6 The German philosopher points out that, “the conclusion that the person must be only an ‘interconnective complex’ of acts is quite false.” Ibid., p. 385. 7 Scheler claims the following, “the whole person is contained in every fully concrete act, and the whole person “varies” in and through every act –​without being exhausted in his being in any of these acts, and without “changing” like a thing in time.” Ibid., p. 385. 8 One of the commentators claims that the German philosopher is unclear as to this issue. The latter uses terminology, which does not allow to reach a clear-​cut conclusion. One thing seems sure: Scheler wants to avoid two extremities –​on the one hand he rejects a thesis that the person is a substance; on the other, he denies that he is a constellations of acts (see M. Dupuy, La philosophie de Max Scheler, Vol. I, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), pp. 341–​342).

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What is important in Scheler’s conception of ethics is that the person is immersed in material values, experiences them and even is herself a value but she is not a starting point for them.9 At the beginning the values are given to the person in experience and only in this way they may become goals for her. These goals are made conscious in mental representations. As Wojtyła points out –​commenting on Scheler’s project –​in this moment we can also talk about an appearance of the willingness to follow these values within the person.10 Here the question to be posed is whether the attempt to realize a given value stems principally from the value itself or from a human subject. The German philosopher did not give a clear answer to this question but –​as Wojtyła observes –​we can conclude from Scheler’s entire system of thinking that the former is true, namely that the person gets the inspiration and energy to follow a value from experiencing the value itself.11 Thus, from a phenomenological point of view the emphasis is placed on the values and their experience but not on the person as a doer of various activities. As Wojtyła put it, “the person remains only a subject of experience, a passive subject, but is not a cause of the acts, he does not act.”12 The objection that Wojtyła directs towards Scheler’s ethical and anthropological thinking is this: the person is an entity who lives in the world of values but has a limited influence on them. The person experiences values but does not experience herself as a cause of these values. Acts of awareness and the will accompany acts of value experience but not as primary causes. It looks as if values were the factors that prompt and stimulate the person to act but not the person himself. What then is his role in the entire process? Of course, he is not an utterly passive and inert reality. Besides emotional states and intentional feelings taking place in him, the person is conscious of what is going on and through his will he gives a kind of consent. Thus, he participates in the entire process of causation. However, as we mentioned,

9 K. Wojtyła, “O możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach system Maxa Schelera”in K. Wojtyła, Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego), p. 28. 10 K. Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1986), p. 28. 11 Ibid., pp. 28–​29. 12 Ibid., p. 33.

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activities of consciousness and the will are secondary, and the accent is put on the unfolding and development of the value in its dynamics.13 Wojtyła’s discussion with Immanuel Kant’s approach to efficacy must be preceded by a question concerning the understanding of the human being. The German philosopher assumes that the human being lives both in a phenomenal and noumenal world. In the former, deterministic laws of nature obtain and natural human inclinations play important roles. In the latter, however, there is a place for the unfolding of such human powers as reason and free will. These two dimensions are well illustrated when Kant describes various “predispositions” that constitute any human being, namely animality, humanity and personality.14 The animality contains the capacities for survival for both the individual and the species, having a character of instinctual tendency. Thus, it determines this aspect of human existence, which is under natural influences. Humanity is connected with the capacity to set ends and find means to attain them. It also contains a tendency to rational self-​love leading us to form the concept of our own happiness, and to follow it. Personality is strictly connected with our capacity to legislate moral law for ourselves, and then to impose it and obey it. Humanity understood as the ability to set ends according to reason is the manifestation of freedom, so it is similar to personality, and together they make up –​as Scheler put it –​“Kant’s homo noumenon.”15 Wojtyła comments on Kant’s distinction and introduces his own proposal: “lower man” (homo phaenomenon) and “higher man” (homo noumenon).16 Only the “higher man” is a subject of freedom, reason, and morality. The main role is played here by the reason, which imposes an imperative on the will according to an aprioric practical form, namely moral law. Proposing such a solution, Kant wanted to exclude all other factors as premises of moral actions. Particularly, he rejected various experiences and 13 For instance, Wojtyła points out that Scheler’s act of the will is “an epiphenomenon of emotional life.” Ibid., 37. If this is true, then the act of the will is not only secondary, but also has no substantial casual power over emotions. 14 I. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, b. I, § 1; A. Wood, Kantian Ethics, p. 88.) 15 M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-​Formal Ethics of Value. A New Attempt towards the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, p. 380. 16 K. Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, p. 42.

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other natural states as sources of morality and stressed that only the reason has an authority to dictate actions constituting moral conduct. Thus, almost all experiences, including feelings of values, are excluded as inappropriate causes of moral actions (with the exception of reverence for moral law). In commenting on Kant’s position –​in a way typical of Scheler –​Wojtyła pointed to a moral act as an undertaking constituted primarily by a clear personal moment but not by a material content.17 What is for Kant this personal moment all about? And why is it contrasted with a material content of any sort? The former consists in the activity of reason that recognizes moral law and imposes it on the will. In this way, the will becomes the only causal power prompting a subject to act, at least prima facie. This of course means that the subject, acting on moral law, must struggle with all factors and circumstances making up the phenomenal man, including emotions, bodily tendencies, external stimuli. However, because the subject possesses a free will, he can act on the sole imperatives coming from the reason. In such a way, moral action reveals that it is a proper domain of the person.18 Factors that can be characterized by material content, say, material values cannot have any share in moral action, even an indirect one. They belong to a phenomenal sphere, whereas morality takes place only within the noumenal. This means that if the will tends to fulfil an obligation dictated by the reason, but any emotion or other non-​rational factor participates in it, such conduct cannot be considered as morality, although it lives up to a standard of legality.19 Morality is a pure derivative of reason. Wojtyła appreciates the role of the will in Kant’s conception of morality. In this way, morality gains a more subjective character, that is, the subject is presented as the cause of his moral actions. Especially the reason and the will manifest the subject in moral causation, namely in efficacy. However, Wojtyła is not uncritical towards this conception. He points to at least two doubtful moments. Firstly, he observes that Kant’s moral law is formal and has no clear-​ cut

7 Ibid., p. 48. 1 18 Ibid., p. 46. 19 I. Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, ch. 3.

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content.20 Secondly, Wojtyła concentrates on the relationship between the reason and the will, and points to an asymmetry between them. The former plays the main role, whereas the latter is secondary and is kept in subjection. It leads to a situation –​as Wojtyła notices –​that the reason is a power that dominates the will, and the latter becomes a passive or semi-​passive element compared to the former.21 The Polish thinker draws a surprising conclusion from this: losing a dynamic character, the will ceases to be a cause of moral action and constitutes “a passive element in the structure of humanness.”22

Personal Causation in Ethics: Critical Look Wojtyła is involved in a philosophical dialogue with Kant and Scheler but he also puts forth his own conception concerning human efficacy. In the course of his dialogue, he accepts some ideas and rejects others. As we have seen, Wojtyła appreciates the category of value, promoted by Max Scheler, but is disappointed by the secondary role of human efficacy in the course of the manifestation and unfolding of values. Also, he accepts Kant’s emphasis on the role of the reason and the will but cannot agree with the interpretation of these powers and the relationship between them. Thus, he is aware that a dominant role of value and a one-​sided understanding of reason and the will cannot adequately explain personal agency, especially in the moral realm. Values are important in human efficacy but more important is the subject who discovers and realizes them. Also, the reason, equipped with formal imperatives, influencing a passive will, and tending against all natural inclinations, does not reflect the whole truth about the personal origins of action. It would be risky to claim that an outcome of personal efficacy, namely the moral act, is a result of a conflict taking place within an agent (between the reason and natural inclinations). Finally, which is

20 If any, such content is established by a rule of universalization. However, there is no content of morality at the starting point, that is, something that is given to the reason and the will to respect at the very beginning of their activity. 21 In fact, in Scheler’s position the will is also treated secondarily. Thus, Scheler’s approach to the will resembles that of Kant’s. See J. Kupczak, Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla/​John Paul II, pp. 37–​38. 22 K. Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, p. 65.

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important for Wojtyła, value and imperative do not exclude each other, as follows from Scheler and Kant, taken separately. Values are essential in a person’s action: they stimulate the will from the material side. However, this stimulation, given in their experience, is not a necessity but a premise for the acting person.23 In other words, it does not compel the person to carry out an act.24 It is indeed the person who acts, and his dominant role is here indispensable. Wojtyła introduces here the concept of the “efficacious self-​determination of the personal ‘I.’ ”25 It refers to both objective and material, as well as subjective and personal elements. Objective and material elements, as we said, include values that are basically not projections of the subject but are discovered by her (hence, the person acts according to a given value). The latter encompasses such personal powers as the reason and the will. This subjective side is essential because some values can be discovered and incarnated (Wojtyła uses the expression “give birth to values”) only due to an active engagement of the person. As an example, Wojtyła points to the value of the person herself; in other words, an active engagement in some values gives birth to the value of the person herself.26 The will –​in a contrast to Kant –​is understood differently here. Following the analyses of Thomas Aquinas, this power is not considered a passive one but contains something essential for personal efficacy. It is a kind of inner dynamics called motio understood as a tendency to act.27 23 As Adrian Reimers puts it, “for the acting person intends not only to have certain experiences (indeed, he may not directly intend the experiences at all) but to set himself in motion to attain some end.” A. Reimers, Truth about the Good. Moral Norms in the Thought of John Paul II (Ave Maria, Florida: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2011), pp. 88–​89. 24 Of course, we can still distinguish two approaches of the subject to values: subjective and objective. The former amounts to the person’s commitments to values. It is an effect of interiorizing of these values. The latter, in turn, is associated with a process of recognizing values by the subject. However, the subjective mode of dealing with values does not replace the subject himself. It can enrich him, strengthen him axiologically but it cannot change radically his nature as a doer and perpetrator. 25 K. Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, p. 60. 26 Ibid., p. 37. 27 In a number of places, Wojtyła makes a reference to Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on the will. The concept of motio is twofold and is similar to two dimensions of the will described by the psychology of the will: its actual-​dynamic and its

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Wojtyła –​spelling out Aquinas’s moral thinking –​attempts at showing how the dynamic will cooperates with reason. The latter generates a kind of order directed to the will (imperium). The will, in turn, brings about a kind of move (motio). Nevertheless, a relationship between one and the other is slightly complex. The Polish thinker points out that the order of the reason brings about the move of the will because it is already inserted in the act of the will and the latter is present in the former. It means that the act of the will has a rational character and what is typical for the will (motio) is somehow present in the act of the reason.28 Thus the will must contain ‘grains’ of rationality (hence a rational will) and the reason must have a kind of dynamic in itself. In the whole structure of the person, it is more understandable: the reason is not an extra-​worldly reality detached from other spheres of human existence (as seems to be the case in Kant); the will, in turn, is not a blind power acting upon random impulses and whims but basically is disposed to be informed by the highest faculty of the person, that is, by the reason.

Acting Person and Efficacy In his later works Wojtyła turned to personal efficacy in a wider context, namely in reference to the acting person. In his view, the human being undertakes various actions (or undergoes various processes). Not all of these actions seem to have a moral character29 but nevertheless they almost always reveal that the human being exists as a special entity. The person is thus shown as a result of her acts and undertakings. This idea is a primary thread in Wojtyła’s anthropological reflection.

motive. The former is associated with a spontaneous move of the will due to its directedness to any kind of good. The latter is connected with a move to a concrete good, which is presented to it by the intellect (see J. Kupczak, Destined for Liberty. The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla/​John Paul II, pp. 36–​37). 28 K. Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, p. 65. 29 Some acts performed by the person engage his reason and will but seem to be neutral, at least prima facie. For example, it may be difficult to say, at first glance, why study and acquiring knowledge is a moral action.

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He introduces the distinction between acts and happenings. We mentioned about them earlier but now it is necessary to elaborate on them more in-​depth. Different sorts of causation can be ascribed to these dynamisms. Acts have characteristics of the pursuits initiated by the person in strict relation to the reason and the will. They encompass moral actions when the subject operates strictly on a horizon of moral values or moral goods. However, they also take place when an action seems to be morally neutral, but equally engages the subject’s intellect and will. However, in Wojtyła’s personalism any action is in a certain relation to the person, as it will be shown below. Hence all acts should be classified as undertakings promoting the good of the person or weakening that good.30 Furthermore, acts can make an objective change (i.e. without) but also a change within the subject itself. As Wojtyła claims, “in turning towards a variety of ends, objects, I cannot help but also in my conscious activity turn towards myself as an end, for I cannot relate to different objects of activity and choose different values without thereby determining myself (thus becoming the primary object for myself as a subject) and my own value.”31 Hence, we can distinguish two versions of efficacy: efficacy to-​ the-​object and efficacy to-​the-​subject. The former has a transitive character, whereas the latter has an intransitive one. This distinction reflects the other discrimination worked out by the Thomistic thought between transitive and immanent actions. Let us turn to a kind of efficacy resulting in self-​determination (to-​the-​ subject). Wojtyła gives some attention to this topic. He is aware that no undertaking has a solely objective character. As he mentioned in the above quotation, any involvement of the person in different external objects, processes, and values is strictly connected with self-​determination. The person as a whole is engaged in her activities and any action leaves a mark on the doer and even transforms her. The person carrying out any act constitutes herself and reveals itself as a special kind of entity. We can then point to

30 Thus, in Wojtyła’s project, there are no neutral acts. All acts are either morally good or evil. If the person is a value, then any act which strengthens or weakens her has a moral character. 31 K. Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community” in K. Wojtyła, Person and Community: Selected Essays, p. 230.

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two profiles where this takes place: a formal profile and a material one. The formal profile concerns every human being in a general way. Here we can say that every human being is a person. The material profile is associated with diversity within this sameness (conveyed by the formal profile). Hence, although everyone is a person and acts as the person, at the same time they are each different in their personhood. This difference concerns the order of existence as well as the order of action. Self-​determination, which is a tool in this latter respect, is strictly connected with self-​possession and self-​governance. When self-​determination is disclosed self-​possession and self-​governance are also revealed.32 Happenings or “what happens in me” contain a different kind of causation. There is no direct link between them and the reason and the will. The person experiences these happenings but basically has no influence on them. They are parts of bodily or psychological dynamics and that is why they seem to be independent of personal efficacy. Of course, post factum, the subject can think about them and even enquire about their sources. In this way, a slight mental control over them can be acquired. Happenings in contrast to acts seem to come from the sub-​personal sphere of existence. However, Wojtyła is far from relegating them to such a region. He attempts at showing that happenings cannot be excluded from a personal realm. Wojtyła employs a concept of the metaphysical subject, suppositum, in order to prove an integral belonging of happenings and their inner dynamics to the person. We have analysed this concept above but here we need to evoke it in order to understand the person’s dynamics. Let us quote again this important passage, where Wojtyła writes, on the ground of suppositum difference and opposition between someone’s acts and happenings … yield because of the obvious unity and identity of the human being. It is he who acts. And when something happens in him, he –​a personal ‘somebody’ –​does not act, but nevertheless all dynamism of happenings is equally his property as well as the dynamism of acts. He –​a personal ‘somebody’ –​remains

32 Ibid., pp. 230–​231. Generally, personal efficacy –​as Wojtyła presents it –​“brings to light the subjectivity proper to the person” (Ibid., p. 230). Although, it is an important part of the philosopher’s project, we are not going to delve –​to a larger extent –​into this aspect. Our intention is –​in the present c­ hapter –​to concentrate on various types of personal causations and show how they fit together into a picture of the acting person.

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at the beginning of the happenings taking place in him as well as at the beginning of acts which he carries out as a perpetrator.33

In the light of this concept of the metaphysical subject, both spheres of the human being, namely a strictly personal self and a bodily-​psychic realm, form personhood. Wojtyła is convinced that the person is at the beginning of acts as well as happenings. Such a thesis is troublesome and needs further clarification. Wojtyła is aware that in the experience of one’s own self, “I” is the climax of all human experiences. The self is shown forth fully in act and only then her efficacy is fully manifested. When, however, a happening takes place, she is not a doer, or perpetrator of it but –​as Wojtyła puts it –​“experiences inner identity between the happening and the self, and at the same time experiences a dependence of the happening exclusively on this self.”34 The happening is a property of the subject and the philosopher points to a basic human experience strengthening this relationship. Thus, we have a twofold way of proving that both acts and happenings belong to the person, and that personal causation encompasses a strictly personal efficacy and sub-​personal dynamics: thinking underpinned by the concept of suppositum and thinking in the light of the experience of integrity and wholeness of the human being.

Final Look at Efficacy In Karol Wojtyła’s works we can find various factors that are candidates for causes of actions. Thus far, we have singled out moral values, the reason, the will, and natural bodily and psychic states and processes. The philosopher is, however, unwilling to credit any single factor with the full power to initiate a really human action. In his view, they are not independent subjects acting on their own; they belong to the human subject who –​at the same time –​is an owner of them all and uses them (actively or passively) as his tools. Thus, we cannot properly understand human causation without the concept of the subject as a non-​determined (although conditioned by various elements) originator of action. All in all, Wojtylian efficacy is the

3 K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 128. 3 34 Ibid., p. 129.

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efficacy of the person and not a causation of random forces or elements working as a consequence of something else, e.g. as is the case within an unspecified chain of events (presupposed in a naturalistic stance). What is important to notice here is that the person uses these factors and their tendencies but basically imposes her own goals and hence directions of actions. It means that the person can occasionally yield to this or that natural or other tendency, which does not live up to her full status (the measure of who she is) but she is indeed in possession of the ability to integrate them on a higher level, that is, in the light of higher aims. Wojtyła’s approach to personal causation is complex and depends on a project he tries to carry out. As the ethicist, he emphasizes a strictly personal efficacy because only as such does it have a bearing on a moral assessment of action. Thus, the person is at the centre of attention and values, reason, and other human powers are only treated secondarily here. This perception is slightly changed once Wojtyła employs a wider picture of the human person. She still remains a moral subject, but another kind of causality appears. This causality is far from a strictly personal one, but it is not alien or external to the person altogether. Although caused by bodily and psychic dynamics, and in this way originating outside the reason and the will, this sort of causality is considered as an integral part of the personal causality. Adhering to such a view, Wojtyła widens a range of factors participating in a personal efficacy. Nevertheless, the person is the same subject in all her undertakings, be they moral or extra-​moral.35 Her efficacy, including bodily and psychic dynamics, shows forth her complexity but at the same time proves that she is the real originator of her manifold actions. As mentioned earlier, the Polish philosopher explains this complexity by employing the concept of 35 Being a real originator of various actions does not mean that the person is equally responsible for them. Moral accountability for acts differs from moral accountability for happenings. It stems from the fact that the person –​with his higher powers and faculties –​is differently involved in one than in the other. However, this discrepancy does not change an anthropological thesis that the person is “at the beginnings” of all his actions and –​using the terminology of Richard Sorabji –​he should be considered “the single owner” of those actions. See R. Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death, p. 260.

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the metaphysical subject (suppositum) and by pointing to a genuine human experience. It seems that we need further explanation supporting this approach and premises to it are already given in Wojtyła’s philosophizing. Wojtyła was far from proposing that the human being should be segmented. He never adhered to a thesis that the human being is only a bodily creature or a spiritual self, nor merely a moral being or a rational creature. Following Aristotle, Wojtyła still perceived the human being as an animal rationale. This was interestingly demonstrated when he distinguished two approaches to the human being: a cosmological and a personal. And then he subscribes to a thesis that –​although they differ –​they are not opposed but, in fact, complement each other.36 For our analyses this means that personal efficacy cannot be limited to a strictly personal sphere: it must encompass and integrate into itself the animal dynamics of human being. On closer inspection some elements can be singled out that may be at odds with tendencies of the personal life, namely to the truth and to the good. However, we can also point to many other elements of the same kind that cooperate with higher personal goals. Even if a bodily causation works through various instincts, we cannot deny that they are, in a sense, rational, or at least that a kind of rationality –​with all its limitations –​is somehow inscribed in them. Thus, following these instinctual tendencies, the person partly carries out her nature as an animal rationale.37 Of course, these various versions of efficacy, taken together, correcting each other, and in a sense, cooperating with one another, lead –​in Wojtyła’s conviction –​to an integral fulfilment of the human person. He has a broad understanding of the notion of fulfilment. Thus, for him it is not limited to the rational realm nor only to the moral realm let alone, to that of the body. Of course, its moral aspect plays a special and dominant role but not at the expense of others. It is not similar to Kant’s theory where being moral 6 K. Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being,” p. 211. 3 37 The human being always remains a “frontier being” as Norris Clarke puts it (see N. W. Clarke, “Living on the Edge: The Human Person as “Frontier Being” and Microcosm,” International Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 2 (1996), pp. 183–​199) or as presented by James Reichmann, “a citizen of two worlds, the biological and the meta-​biological.” See J. Reichmann, Evolution, Animal ‘Rights,’ and the Environment, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), pp. 80–​81.

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means following reason and rejecting emotions or other feelings. Neither is it morality equivalent of following emotions primarily, as in Scheler’s project. In his Lublin Lectures, the Polish philosopher openly declares that, “if human being is oriented towards bonum honestum, eo ipso integration of the human entity is realized.”38 This means that efficacy, which is revealed in moral actions, opens up and provides a place for other kinds of efficacy, and finally leads to their integration for the sake of the integral good of the person. Thus, although there are various faces to human efficacy, when integrated they can play an indispensible role in existence and development of the person.

Concluding Remarks The concept of personal efficacy promoted by Karol Wojtyła conveys several points. Firstly, a complex understanding of the subject emerges from this thinking. It begins with a sort of common sense approach to human being that is, this thinking grasps each being in its basic phenomena, but later tries to account for them separately. Thus, the subject is a bodily creature, one among other living entities and, at the same time, manifests something more, namely his rational nature, the ability to experience values and finally an ability to perform acts of the will. Moreover, human being is aware of his own ability to perform these acts of the will and experiences herself as an existing and acting subject. Such complex phenomena demand various tools in order to carry out their adequate interpretation. These tools are taken from reservoirs of both the realist and idealist philosophies, especially from a classical Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics, and from twentieth century phenomenology. Employing these tools, Wojtyła points out that the subject is multidimensional but at the same time remains an integrated and dynamic entity, namely a person. The latter has a stronger metaphysical structure than the person presupposed by Scheler and Wojtyła is more on the realist side in his comprehension than Kant with his approach to the person.39 In general, Wojtyła offers the understanding of human

8 K. Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, p. 287. 3 39 This approach of Wojtyła to the human action is considered creadible by some philosophers just because of its realistic character. See e.g. T. Duma, “The

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being, which is not consonant with mainstream notions,40 although it is well rooted in a tradition of the Western philosophy. Secondly, Wojtyla’s analysis of efficacy starts from ethics and finds its completion in ethical thinking. However, his understanding of ethics has a vital connection with the other way of investigating human being, namely with philosophical anthropology. From this follows the third point, that the subject’s efficacy is not a one-​dimensional causation but an intentional coordination of various forces and powers, be they natural or non-​natural ones.41 Thus, finally, we stand before a project that is between a traditional divide (realist vs. idealist philosophy), and it is therefore prone to criticism from both sides. At the same time, this type of conception provokes a philosophical discussion and that is why it is promising.

5.2. THE PERSON IN DIALOGUE Persons and Dialogue The philosophy of dialogue is a well-​developed branch of continental philosophy: it has its own terminology, method and set of fundamental theses, and as a philosophical approach has also accumulated a very substantial body of literature. In this subchapter, we aim to explore one specific thesis advocated by this philosophy: namely, that the person is constituted by, and exists in, dialogue. Although this thesis was originally formulated

Foundations of the Human Person’s Dynamism in Karol Wojtyła’s Anthropology. A Study in Light of The Acting Person,” Verbum Vitae 38/​2 (2020), p. 455. 40 Jonardon Ganeri points to three dominant depictions of human being in the contemporary philosophy. They include “the pictures that we are immaterial souls associated with but separable from our animal bodies; the picture that we are nothing but especially complex networks of neuronal circuits; and the picture that we are simply casual flows of consciousness.” See J. Ganeri, The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-​Person Stance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 1. 41 Wojtyła is far from reductionism as far as the person, his will and causation are concerned. In this sense, he is prone to criticism from a dominant naturalistic approach. Nevertheless, there are other contemporary philosophers who prove that naturalism is not our unavoidable destiny. See e.g. T. O’Connor Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

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by philosophers of dialogue, it has subsequently been taken up by other thinkers, too –​thinkers who cannot, strictly speaking, be classified as belonging to this school. Firstly, we will seek to establish how this belief is understood by philosophers of dialogue themselves, or by those sympathetic to this philosophy, taking into account the main threads in their thinking, and in this part, we will only be drawing on some selected proposals set out by Martin Buber, John Macmurray and Calvin Schrag. Secondly, we shall investigate similar ideas developed by a philosopher who did not formally subscribe to this philosophical stance: namely, Karol Wojtyła.42 Wojtyła was a thinker who was interested in the theory of personhood and tried –​as we mentioned earlier –​to describe the person by analyzing his or her actions. We can already point to some preliminary similarities between this Polish philosopher and the philosophers of dialogue: firstly, all of these acknowledge that the person is a dynamic reality, and secondly, for all of them it is the case that personhood cannot be properly grasped from within the position of solipsism –​the person should be understood as an entity belonging to a community of persons, or as someone who remains in a vital relation with another person.43 Towards the end of this subchapter, we will concentrate on how Karol Wojtyła can help us to solve the dilemma embodied in this, our principal question: How should we understand the thesis that a person is constituted and exists in dialogue? Moreover, we will try to make a short comparison between Wojtyła on the one hand, and Buber, Macmurray and Schrag on the other.

42 In this chapter, we shall limit our inquiry concerning the person to the philosophical side of Karol Wojtyła’s activities; we will not concern ourselves with his theological works. Of course, it is reasonable to claim that his philosophy of the human person is completed by his theological investigations. Nevertheless, for methodological reasons we will be limiting ourselves to his philosophical accomplishments. 43 These similarities are accompanied by many dissimilarities and even contradictions between these thinkers. Thus, we can compare their ideas concerning the person only to a limited extent.

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Persons in the Philosophy of Dialogue In using the term ‘person’ in connection with analyses of the philosophy of dialogue, we are not going to define, at least at the beginning of this chapter, the character of personhood assumed by philosophers subscribing to this stance. We are aware that it has its own specificity and may differ from Wojtyła’s understanding of this term. Later in the chapter, though, it will certainly have to be clarified. For now, then, let us assume that both sides, when talking about the person, mean the human being, who is a special entity endowed with higher spiritual powers and who cannot be reduced to any crudely material or otherwise reductively one-​dimensional reality. This entity is, moreover, a highly dynamic creature, albeit with various aspects of this dynamism brought to the fore. These presuppositions are signaled by the terminology pertaining to persons appearing both in the philosophy of dialogue and in Wojtyła’s investigations: namely the “self” or “I,” and “you” (or “thou”). Our overview of ideas about the person-​in-​relation is limited to two renowned dialogue-​oriented thinkers, Martin Buber and John Macmurray, and one philosopher who seems sympathetic to this approach, Calvin Schrag. This, of course, does not exhaust the wide range of important thinkers addressing this topic, but it does shed sufficient light for our purposes on the dialogical approach to persons and relations. At least, pursuing the thoughts of these figures will allow us to in some sense grasp a pattern of thinking typical for the philosophy of dialogue more generally. Martin Buber has a special place in dialogical thinking due to his seminal work I and Thou, but also thanks to What Is Man? Basically, he was convinced that the human being is not an isolated reality but a part of the social fabric. Special emphasis was given to the encounter that takes place between human individuals. Such an encounter is brought to light in his fundamental expressions, “I-​Thou” and “I-​It.” Although they must be considered together, we are going to put special emphasis on the former. The “I-​Thou” relationship is not connected with experience but has the character of a pure encounter: it happens by itself and cannot be planned beforehand. This stands in contrast to the “I-​It” relation, where experience plays a vital role. What is important in Buber’s remark is that the “I” of the fundamental “I-​Thou” term is a person. As he stresses, “the stronger the

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I of the primary word I-​Thou is in the twofold I, the more personal is the man.”44 As far as their being a person is concerned, these two I’s depend on each other. In Buber’s main work (I and Thou), we can find important declarations concerning the encounter between human beings, such as the following, “in the beginning is relation;”45 “all real living is meeting. The relation to the Thou is direct. No system of ideas, no foreknowledge, and no fancy intervene between I and Thou;”46 “Through the Thou a man becomes I.”47 If meeting and relation are absolutely fundamental rules of reality, then the human being cannot come into existence and fulfill himself apart from them. The very essence of the person seems to be constituted not from inside, but from outside. This latter is a kind of ‘between-​reality,’ which has the power to establish and sustain a personal being. In his work What is Man?, Buber puts it very straightforwardly, “the sphere of ‘between’ … is a primal category of human reality.”48 This, of course, is a problematic and controversial thesis, but we are not going to question it here. For the sake of the present analysis, we shall accept it as true, at least for some aspects of personal life. An “I-​Thou” relationship is a meeting of two subjects wherein they constitute each other. However, in such a setting they do not lose their identity: they do not fuse into a person-​less “We.” They keep their distinctness and sameness because a constituting dialogue takes place in the sphere of “between.” Buber stresses that what unfolds between them is, above all, love. “Love –​as this philosopher claims –​does not cling to the I in such a way as to have the Thou only for its ‘content,’ its object; but love is between I and Thou.”49 Thus dialogue between persons leads to a kind of personal bond, wherein the “I” and the “Thou” neither remain as isolated

44 M. Buber, I and Thou, trans. R. Gregor-​Smith, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937), p. 65. 45 Ibid., p. 18. 46 Ibid., p. 11. 47 Ibid., p. 28. 48 M. Buber, What Is Man? in M. Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. R. Gregor-​ Smith, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 241. 49 M. Buber, I and Thou, pp. 14–​15.

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individuals nor as elements of collective reality. Hence, we can say that love contributes to becoming persons. John Macmurray is known in the English-​speaking world as a philosopher who promoted a version of the philosophy of dialogue. Engaging in polemics with René Descartes, he was convinced that the human being must be primarily characterized not as a thinker but as an active agent, or doer. Human action, moreover, is not itself understandable in isolation. As he put it, the Self must be conceived, not theoretically as subject, but practically, as agent. Secondly, human behavior is comprehensible only in terms of a dynamic social reference; the isolated, purely individual self is a fiction. In philosophy this means … that the unity of the personal cannot be thought as the form of an individual self, but only through the mutuality of personal relationship.50

He rejects a Cartesian identification of the person with res cogitans –​that is, with an extra-​worldly reality whose basic characteristic is thinking. The human being manifests himself through action, which means that he or she is neither an isolated reality nor a semi-​passive subject. Macmurray actually goes further. He claims that a social sphere is not just a ‘home base’ for the person, but a place where the person comes to be. He reasons in the following way, that “any ‘self’ –​that is to say, any agent –​is an existing being, a person. … Any agent is necessarily in relation to the Other. Apart from this essential relation he does not exist.”51 The philosopher is aware that any relation presupposes two sides, i.e. two agents. And they must represent the same kind of entities, namely persons. Macmurray points out that “the Other in this constitutive relation must itself be personal. Persons, therefore, are constituted by their mutual relations to one another. “I” exists only as one element in the complex ‘You and I’.”52 The latter thesis seems amply to explicate the dialogical conviction that interpersonal dialogue is a sphere where persons, as partners participating in dialogue, start out on their very existence. In a sense, the dialogue itself creates them.53 0 J. Macmurray, The Self as Agent, (New York: Humanity Books, 1991), p. 38. 5 51 J. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, (New York: Humanity Books, 1998), p. 24. 52 Ibid. 53 In the thought of Macmurray, there seems to be an unclear moment: at the starting point of meeting there must be two persons, and at the same time,

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A third thinker who sheds some light on persons-​in-​relation is Calvin Schrag. Although we cannot consider him a fully-​fledged philosopher of dialogue, he nevertheless does help us to better understand the dynamic character of interpersonal meeting. Schrag is known as a philosopher who discusses postmodernity54 and the postmodern onslaught on the philosophy of the human subject in critical terms. Formulating his proposals, he started from the phenomenon of speech and verbal communication between human individuals. He claims that it is within … [the] economy of discourse that the self is called into being, and it is called into being as the who that is speaking and listening, writing and reading, discoursing in a variety of situations and modalities of discourse.”55 Because these forms of language use are manifold, the self has a fertile ground on the basis of which it can arise and grow. Schrag points to “a self as emergent, a self emerging from the panoply of communicative practices in which it always already finds itself implicated, an accomplice in the utterances of speech acts and in the significations of language.56

Schrag also engages in an attempt to demonstrate precisely how the meeting of people and their linguistic communication lead to the creation of the human subject. The philosopher points out that the otherness of the other needs be granted its intrinsic integrity, so that in seeing the face of the other and hearing the voice of the other I am responding to an exterior gaze and an exterior voice rather than carrying on a conversation with my alter ago. I do not create the discourse and the action of others. I encounter the entwined discourse and action of the other and respond to it, and in this encountering and responding I effect a self-​constitution, a constitution of myself, in the dynamic economy of being-​with-​others.57

Schrag is aware that a conversation with another person is a meeting with otherness, so that I cannot reduce that other person to myself. The otherness

persons come to be in such a meeting. Hence, this necessary being-​in-​relation, at the very outset, must be considered in some terms other than those of one’s becoming the person in relation. Otherwise, we face a contradiction. 54 C. O. Schrag, The Resources of Rationality; A Response to the Postmodern Challenge, (Bloomington-​Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992). 55 C. O. Schrag, The Self after Postmodernity, (New Haven-​ London: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 17. 56 Ibid., pp. 26–​27. 57 Ibid., p. 84.

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must be acknowledged in its inner “physiognomy,” and must be respected. Responding to it, I build myself up as a person. Always, the sphere in which I exert an effect upon myself is “the dynamic economy of being-​with-​ others” –​that is, the sphere of “dynamic between.” We can hear, in the voices of philosophers of dialogue, some important ideas about human beings. Firstly, a human being is not an isolated reality creating itself on its own initiative and with its own powers. Secondly, the sphere of ‘between’ is constitutive for the person, because only a meeting of two such personal entities leads to something that is in itself new. Thirdly, mutual interaction through language and communication are examples of spheres where the personal self comes to be constituted and to exist. Thus, it is always a coming-​to-​be-​in-​meeting-​with-​others and in-​existence-​with-​others.

The Social Face of the Person in Wojtyła’s Thought Wojtyła’s interest initially focused on the person as a moral subject, and only later on the person as an agent –​that is, as a subject engaged in carrying out all sorts of actions.58 As a personalist, he was also interested in the community of persons, acknowledging that the person is not a kind of monad, enclosed in itself and totally incomprehensible. He does exist as an independent entity, but at the same time is a member of the community-​family that includes other entities of the same sort.59 That is why, in his main anthropological work The Acting Person, Wojtyła embarked upon a project focused on participation, aimed at determining the mutual correlations within such a community.

58 From the personalistic standpoint these two characterizations of the person –​namely, that he or she is both an acting and a moral subject –​are strictly connected. We cannot radically isolate one from the other, although we may well do so for the sake of philosophical analysis. 59 This social aspect of personalism was developed by a number of varous philosophers. In Poland where Wojtyła conducted his philosophizing, it was a common trend, especially among the Lublin personalists, e.g. Wincenty Granat, Czesław Stanisław Bartnik. See M. Kosche, “The Human Person as a Social and Interpersonal Being according to the Most Significant Representatives of the Lublin Personalism,” Collectanea Theologica 91 (2012) 1, 5–​24.

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The starting point for the concept of participation is the person, who subsists and acts. In many cases this acting is carried out with other persons, in a society and in various communities. The person, when acting, “goes beyond himself,” because the effects of one’s actions affect others. In this sense, the person transcends himself or herself. We might call this the “transitive” aspect of participation. However, there is also another, “intransitive” aspect. Wojtyła points out that in acting with others, and often for the sake of others, the person undergoes a kind of inner integration.60 The act, on the objective side, demands from the person his or her engagement –​i.e. that one employ one’s higher powers and abilities (e.g. reason, consciousness, will, language). As a result of this, on the subjective side, one is oneself affected as a person, undergoing a kind of inner transformation –​something that “remains in oneself” and leads to one’s flourishing. Wojtyła puts it this way, “in acting together with others, persons carry out actions and in doing so fulfil themselves.”61 Wojtyła takes up and develops the issue of dialogue in subsequent works. However, his approach to the topic is original and complex. He distinguishes between a personal subject and its relations. In the spirit of classical philosophy (in line with Thomas Aquinas, for example), the latter are considered accidents, which should not be confounded with the former –​ namely, with a substance.62 The person enters into an encounter with others as a substance, and as such continues as one and the same structure: no dialogue whatsoever will bring about changes to the person. In other words, dialogue does not bring with it any substantial change to one’s personal life. During and after dialogue, the person remains the same kind of entity, even though something important happens to him or her. In the analyses of Wojtyła’s thought that follow below, we hope to bring out precisely this dimension of newness.

0 K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, pp. 309–​310. 6 61 Ibid., p. 310. 62 Thomas Aquinas, in On the Power of God, states very clearly that “If … person signifies substance which is a self-​existent being, it cannot signify a relation” (Thomas Aquinas, “On the Power of God,” (“Questiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei,” q. IX, a. IV). Although it is not applied to God (“in God relation is really the same as the essence”), it is indeed applied to human persons.

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Wojtyła attempts, in his philosophy, to join together the methods typical of pre-​modern and modern philosophy, as we have already mentioned above. This is especially evident in his approach to the philosophy of the human person. Thus, the person is, for him, a separate suppositum, a metaphysical subject of existence and action. This is the manner in which medieval philosophy understood the person, and this is conveyed in, among other places, the Boethian definition (rationalis naturae individua substantia). Although to think in terms of substance is to hold that the person exists independently and is not an appendage of something else, and that they have a rational nature, it does not tell us much about their specific character. It is therefore only a preliminary treatment of this important realm. More specifically, Wojtyła observes that the definition is mute as far as the uniqueness of the subjectivity of the person is concerned. We must approach the person from the other side using different methods. He thus points out –​as we have analysed it extensively above –​that we must take into account lived experience, if we are to say something more about the person. Of course, the latter need not replace the former –​i.e. the metaphysical terrain and particularly the supporting role granted to the concept of suppositum –​but rather can complement it, as we have mentioned before in our analyses. The metaphysical terrain of the person, as a constitutive sphere of their existence, is not a result of dialogue. It finds itself involved in dialogue but cannot be changed and modified by it. From a realist perspective,63 moreover, without such a suppositum dialogue would be altogether impossible. The former constitutes the very basis of human subjectivity –​making it possible for there to be someone, in fact, who can enter into dialogue.64

63 The realist perspective means here that Wojtyła adheres to Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophical tradition, especially as far as the concept of substance is concerned. 64 At the very starting point of dialogue there must be creatures who count ontologically as persons. Otherwise, a relation between them would not have a dialogical character. W. Norris Clarke explains this necessity in the following way, “we cannot literally bring into being another person that was not there before simply by relating to the thing that is there with attentive love. Try doing this with a rock, a tree, or a rattlesnake! The being to which we relate must already be of the type that can respond to such an invitation by intrinsic powers already

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Nevertheless, outside of the realm of metaphysical subjectivity, the person is constituted by personal subjectivity, and it remains the case that the latter is formed, to some extent, by lived experience. This category opens up a space for encounter65 and dialogue because even though persons can be granted some experience in the private sphere, lived experience still seems associated in a quite special way with interpersonal meeting.66 As a relationship between two persons, the ‘I-​Thou’ relation assumes that these persons are equal partners. As Wojtyła claims, “the thou is some other I,” but adds “one different from my own I.”67 This initial declaration is meant to underline the fact that persons enter relationship and dialogue as entities of the same kind –​in other words, as equal subjects. Despite their structural similarities, though, they exist independently and differ one from the other. Thus, we cannot treat the “Thou” as a projection of the “I,” or vice versa. Wojtyła, thinking about the relationship, points to its dual function: namely, to a separation and a connection that it introduces. This leads him to the assertion that “in thinking or speaking of a thou, I express a relation that somehow proceeds from me, but also returns to me.”68 This bi-​directional move plays an important role in Wojtyła’s thinking about encounter and dialogue between persons.

within it.” W. N. Clarke, Person and Being, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1993), pp. 58–​59. 65 In classical philosophy, which Wojtyła draws upon, there is a concept of transcendental relations, which occur between beings, including persons. They are primordial and come ahead of any intentionally initiated encounters. Thus, the relations we are discussing in this paper should be considered categorical. 66 The concept of lived experience is highly important for Wojtyła. Basically, lived experience concerns the person’s subjectivity and Wojtyła, as we have mentioned earlier, calls it “the irreducible,” i.e. something that is “not directly apprehended by … a metaphysical interpretation and reduction.” K. Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Person,” p. 212. In this subchapter, we are going to limit our analyses to one aspect of the concept, which is considered in the context of encounters and dialogue. For a fuller exposition of this topic, see, for example, the analyses of Deborah Savage. See D. Savage, The Centrality of Lived Experience in Wojtyła’s Account of the Person, p. 19–​51. 67 K. Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” p. 241. 68 Ibid.

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As we said earlier, Wojtyła assumes that the metaphysical subject constituting the person enters into a relationship with another person, but it is not constituted in or by this event. Nevertheless, such a personal relationship has some bearing on this basic dimension of the person. Wojtyła gives us an account of this influence, “the thou assists me in more fully discovering and even confirming my own I: the thou contributes to my self-​affirming.”69 A dialogical partner brings with him or her some help in discovering who I am and, in a sense, helps to ground me in the conviction that issues from this. That is why the first effect of an encounter is something within and not without. Wojtyła underlines this thesis in the following way, “in its basic form, the I-​thou relationship, far from leading me away from my subjectivity, in some sense more firmly grounds me in it. The structure of the relation is to some degree a confirmation of the structure of the subject and of the subject’s priority with respect to the relation.”70 Nevertheless, a personal relationship leads to new effects, and Wojtyła is fully aware of this. He points in this direction when he claims that “through this activity directed objectively towards the thou, the subject I not only experiences itself in relation to the thou, but also experiences itself in a new way in its own subjectivity.”71 Now, we should certainly investigate what this newness is all about. Preliminarily, we may say that the person who enters into encounters and dialogue must activate his or her mental and psychological abilities and powers in order to cross the threshold of personal communication, be it verbal or extra-​verbal. An effort to meet this condition receives (or does not receive) confirmation from the other. It is in this way that we should understand Wojtyła’s words (quoted above) that “a relation … proceeds from me but also returns to me.” Nonetheless, the Polish thinker also goes somewhat further in his analysis: he brings to light this dimension of newness while talking about the community that results from the “I-​Thou” relationship. Wojtyła claims that the relationship between persons takes on reality by virtue of the fact that they tend to reveal themselves to one another. This mutual disclosure concerns “their personal human subjectivity and … all 9 Ibid., pp. 242–​243. 6 70 Ibid., p. 243. 71 Ibid., p. 244.

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that goes to make up this subjectivity.”72 He elaborates on this further, saying that “the thou stands before my self as a true and complete ‘other self,’ which, like my own self, is characterized not only by self-​determination, but also and above all by self-​possession and self-​governance.”73 Although these elements of subjectivity are common to all persons, this is the case only in a formal sense. In fact, every person, every participant of encounters and dialogue, has his or her own manner of realization. Hence, their disclosure –​i.e. the revelation of their material side –​is possible only in the context of a mutual meeting of one another and of interpersonal dialogue. According to Wojtyła, the community that provides the locus for such an exchange “has a normative meaning as well.”74 Members of the community must reveal themselves to one another in order to make this community genuine and real. As he puts it, “there ought to be a mutual self-​revelation of persons: the partners ought to disclose themselves to each other in their personal subjectivity and in all that makes up this subjectivity.”75 Wojtyła adds that this revelation must be done in truth and it should also lead to acceptance and affirmation of the other in truth.76 Thus, interpersonal meeting and dialogue amount to something more than a cognitive revelation. Persons go beyond the level of objective relations: they meet each other at a deeper level –​as personal subjects. This leads to a kind of personal bond, where new qualities can appear, like trust and a giving of oneself, depending on the strength of the mutual acceptance and affirmation.77 In other words, interpersonal meeting and dialogue find their fulfillment in love. Wojtyła paid close attention to love in his earlier work Love and Responsibility, claiming that “man’s capacity for love depends on his willingness consciously to seek a good together with others, and to subordinate himself to that good for the sake of others, or to others for the sake of that good. Love is exclusively the portion of human persons.”78 What is important to note here is that love does not come about 2 Ibid., p. 245. 7 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 29.

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spontaneously, but it is a result of mutual striving to find a good and subordinate oneself to that good. Although we cannot exclude a spontaneous surge of love, basically –​as Wojtyła claims –​“love in human relationships is not something ready-​made. It begins as a principle or idea which people must somehow live up to in their behaviour.”79 The community, which is constituted by an interpersonal bond as a result of love, bears responsibility. Wojtyła puts it like this, “within the context of the I-​thou relationship, by the very nature of interpersonal community, the persons also become mutually responsible for one another.”80 Responsibility, which is primarily a measure of the quality of community life, is also a path that leads members of that community to personal self-​ fulfillment.81 Such an understanding of meeting and dialogue can thus help us to integrate both the personal and social dimensions of the human person into a single coherent project. Summing up, we may observe that in Wojtyła’s approach to interpersonal encounters and dialogue two essential spheres of action can be distinguished: namely, those which are internal and external. The former consists in the discovery of the subject corresponding to the participant (the “I”), which is essentially dependent on being aided by a partner in dialogue –​that is, by the “Thou.” It also includes confirmation of that subjectivity –​and, once again, this is strengthened by the presence and activity of the other “I.” These actions lead to an “awakening” of the subject, and its building up of itself, as if “towards his or her interior.” In the external sphere of action, the subject reveals himself or herself and forms a bond with the other human subject. These two essential moves (stages) make the subject into a being-​ toward-​others. Only then can a sphere of “between” be developed and a community of persons constituted. Consequently, this sphere develops the person as if “towards his or her exterior.”82 Wojtyła stresses that this is not 9 Ibid. 7 80 K. Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” p. 246. 81 Ibid. 82 Thus, we can point to the two “faces” of the person, namely an internal and an external one. While the former is basically guaranteed by the suppositum, the latter can be achieved via experience, through encounter and dialogue with others. In this sense the external face represents a greater task to be carried out than the internal one. However, encounters and dialogue benefit both of them.

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a causally determined realm, and that its proper shape is characterized by a mutual commitment finding its highest point in an attitude of love and responsibility. Thus, the real community of persons is not just a subject of interest for philosophical anthropology, but for ethics as well.

Dialogue Creating the Person Wojtyła’s solution to the problem of the person in dialogue is far from simple. Reading his ideas and trying to understand them, we cannot simply assert that the person, as a whole, is created in dialogue, or vice versa. We can give two answers, which seem to contradict each other: namely, that the person is not created in dialogue, and that he or she is indeed the fruit of that dialogue. However obvious the contradiction may seem; it is not real. On the one hand, we have many premises that claim that in some respect or other the person enters into dialogue as a person, and so exists before the dialogue and should be considered prior to it. On the other hand, many other premises lead us to conclude that the person is created and fulfilled only through staying in dialogue. From what has been said above, we know firstly that as a metaphysical subject –​a suppositum –​the person is not created in dialogue, and, moreover, that being such a subject is a vital condition of dialogue. Secondly, we should also be aware by now that the personal subject finds fertile ground to develop on the basis of experience, and this is greatly aided by encounters and dialogue with other persons. Thus, the person is to some extent created in dialogue and without it cannot become who he or she really is.83 Now let us examine the positions regarding persons in dialogue presented above with a view to revealing their similarities and dissimilarities. Martin Buber, John Macmurray, Calvin Schrag and Karol Wojtyła all talk about the person in the context of dialogue. Thus, it seems as though we might easily be able to compare their proposals and establish how they complement each other. However, this is not in fact so easy, because each of them 83 Thus, persons who do not engage in a dialogue like Robinson Crusoe on a desert island remain personal beings because looking metaphysically they are such entities (personal supposita). However, a lack of dialogue puts them in a less advantageous position as far as the fulfillment of their personal potential is concerned.

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has in mind a different understanding of the nature of personhood. Wojtyła, as we have seen, combines insights that are typical of the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions with a phenomenological approach. Schrag draws on a variety of thinkers, but he intentionally rejects the idea that the person can be understood through the prism of metaphysical categories.84 Macmurray was an original philosopher who did not subscribe to any established philosophical schools and was roughly classified by his commentators as adhering to the ideas of Plato and Aristotle.85 However, in his approach to the person he does not employ a metaphysical method. Buber’s understanding of the person is rooted in Neoplatonic notions (especially in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa),86 which is far from an Aristotelian approach to human beings. Despite these differences, we may assume that a philosophical dialogue between them is still possible, and although we cannot grasp their proposals as a unified project, they can suggest some ideas and even possibly furnish solutions for each other. Buber, Macmurray and Schrag present a kind of personhood which –​ from Wojtyła’s point of view –​must be identified with personal subjectivity. Buber and Macmurray emphasize that the person exists in dialogue, and that dialogue is a real necessity for the person. While Wojtyła stresses the role of experience in becoming a person, he also has to acknowledge that the mature form of that experience can only be acquired in the context of an interpersonal meeting. Some consequences stem from this. Discovering and affirming one’s metaphysical subjectivity is not only associated with cognition, but also with an experience of oneself. Thus, this “inner face” of the person needs a mature form of experience. The “external face,” in turn, needs it even more. Interacting with others, the person does not merely exchange bare information, but also communicates values. The latter, to

84 He clearly asserts that “the who of discourse is not a ‘thing,’ a pre-​given entity, a ghost in a machine, or whatever.” C. O. Schrag, The Self after Postmodernity, p. 33. 85 A. R. C. Duncan, On the Nature of Persons, (New York: Lang, 1990), p. 2. 86 S. Scott, “An Unending Sphere of Relation: Martin Buber’s Conception of Personhood,” Forum Philosophicum 19 (1) (2014), pp. 5–​25.

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a great extent, are given through emotional experience. Both reason and emotion come into play here.87 Interacting with others and communicating values find their proper sphere in the attitude of love. Buber and Wojtyła stress love as a mature form of dialogue. Of course, there are differences between them as to the understanding of love. For Buber, it is a happening, which cannot be foreseen or prepared for, whereas for Wojtyła it is the result of conscious attempts on the part of persons. Nevertheless, both thinkers acknowledge that the person can be fully constituted and unfolded in the ethical sphere.88 Thus to be the person is not only to be a special kind of being (entity) but also to be a special good or value. Language is also an important tool in forming the interpersonal encounter. Through communication it makes us into agents, whose actions go beyond the sphere of inner reality, res cogitans. This dimension of linguistic activity is stressed by Macmurray. For Wojtyła, meanwhile, language understood as a tool for communicating facts and values plays an important role where personal agency is concerned. For both thinkers, language engages not merely the mental side of the person, but rather the whole person. Although coming to this from different directions, Macmurray and Wojtyła maintain that the human being is the acting person, and that his or her actions contribute not only to a personal sphere but also to an interpersonal and communal one. Calvin Schrag has introduced the idea of “a self emerging from the panoply of communicative practices.”89 From Wojtyła’s point of view, 87 Of course, there may well be a divergence between Wojtyla and Buber as to what power has priority. In Wojtyła’s thinking reason plays such a role, which is clearly emphasized when he considers the relation between reason and emotions, and the topic of the emotionalization of consciousness. See K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn,” pp. 99–​105. 88 One commentator on Buber points out that an ‘I-​Thou’ relation has two dimensions: an epistemological and an ethical one. The epistemological dimension is meant “to establish a parallel between relations with other people and relations with God,” while the ethical one is intended to reflect Buber’s convictions about how we should treat other people in the world. See S. Charmé, “The Two I-​Thou Relations in Martin Buber’s Philosophy,” Harvard Theological Review, 70 (1–​2) (1977), pp. 161–​173. 89 C. O. Schrag, The Self after Postmodernity, pp. 26–​27.

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this assertion is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is not true, because as a suppositum the person is not constituted by communicative practices but makes them possible. On the other hand, it seems to be true when we consider it from the side of the personal subject. Communication is a way in which encounters between persons occur, and through communication dialogue is carried out. Of course, we can imagine other ways through which dialogue can take place, but communicative practices seem to possess a privileged status. Schrag gives us examples of such practices, pointing to “speaking and listening, writing and reading, discoursing in a variety of situations and modalities of discourse.”90 These activities are manifestations of the ‘external face’ of the person, who –​e.g. for Wojtyła –​exists not only in-​relation-​with-​others, but also in himself or herself. Thus, linguistic practices are themselves produced by persons, acquiring their mature form in their contact with others, but also returning to the persons and contributing to their perfection too.

Concluding Remarks Wojtyla observes that “it is sometimes said that the I is in a sense constituted by the thou. This superb intellectual synopsis needs to be unraveled and developed.”91 In the course of his analysis he gives us an original explanation of this phrase, which summarizes the main threads of his thinking about persons. Wojtyła’s attempt at clarifying this synopsis has many elements in common with philosophers of dialogue, but at the same time differs from them. Putting aside those differences which basically arise from their varied philosophical backgrounds, we may say that the reality of the person is open to being explored by a range of approaches to philosophizing.92 At the same

0 Ibid., p. 17. 9 91 K. Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” p. 241. 92 James Beauregard makes an interesting series of distinctions within the stance of personalism. He points to versions of this philosophical approach that may be said to be communitarian, dialogical, American, Hindu, British, Islamic, classical, and neo-​personalistic. For instance, Buber represents dialogical personalism, Macmurray the British kind, and Wojtyła neo-​personalism. See J. Beauregard, “Neuroscientific Free Will: Insights from the Thought of Juan Manuel Burgos and John Macmurray,” Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics

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time, the person is a unifying principle for all of them. Thus, discovering a person in dialogue also allows us to explore his or her richness and complexity, and to find out that he or she is a communal creature: i.e. someone called to relation, and consequently to love as the fulfillment of relation. However, we are also led to discover that despite their differing philosophical sympathies and credentials, the philosophers engaged in this exploration are able to find their own way to a dialogue between themselves.

3 (1) (2015), pp. 36–​37. Wojtyła thus cannot be considered a philosopher of dialogue, whereas Buber and Macmurray can be classified as personalists.

CHAPTER VI: DIGNITY OF THE PERSON Chapter Introduction The thesis of the dignity of the human person is a fundamental pillar of personalistic thinking. Many personalists analyzing the structure of personhood, in all its richness and complexity, stress at the same time that something more should be pronounced about the person, namely its axiological importance. This importance can be understood twofold. On the one hand, as a special value or as an outstanding preciousness referring to the whole personal existence. Thus, dignity can be considered as a kind of holistic axiological state of the person. On the other hand, dignity can be understood as something stemming from intentional acts and involvements. These two theses demand some clarification and further explanation. There are some personalist philosophers who have made an attempt at explaining this highly important aspect of the person (e.g. Josep Seifert, Robert Spaemann, Adam Rodziński). Thus, we can find further advanced personalistic remarks of the human dignity but at the same time this topic is still open and can be approached in new ways. Karol Wojtyła was convinced that the dignity is a topic of paramount importance.1 However, in his philosophy of the human person, we are not offered a ready answer as to the question of what human dignity is all about. This philosopher seems to assume this axiological category as an indispensable part of his approach to the person –​in anthropological and ethical analyses –​but does not offer its complete picture. Nevertheless, Wojtyła left many ideas and premises, which can help to formulate that dignity project. In this chapter, we will be trying to gather together those pieces of his thinking on dignity and investigate how they fit into each other, and how that can be complemented by ideas of other personalistic philosophers.

1 Writing of John Paul II, which include not only activities of Karol Wojtyła, the philosopher but also worldwide mission of the Pope, John Crosby puts it this way, “he has become a kind of prophet of personal dignity, like no other world leader.” J. F. Crosby, The Personalism of John Paul II, p. 1.

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Wojtyła’s Thinking about Dignity Wojtyła’a attempt to sketch a complexity of the person leads us to the thesis that he is a special entity. All analyses conducted thus far have revealed that intricate picture and, in a sense, allows us to pronounce a thesis that to be the person is to possess a special importance and validity. The latter includes the person’s dignity. Wojtyła does not introduce a precise distinction between the anthropological and axiological order. He seems to assume that the former contains in itself the latter, and we cannot easily separate one from the other. The reason, which may justify this situation is Wojtyła’s conviction that in the approach both to the person and to values we need to draw on experience. Moreover, the person –​as we have mentioned above –​ is never given as a set of pure facts but also as the good. In revealing the person’s dignity, Wojtyła employs a twofold strategy: a comparison of the person to his surrounding world and a comparison of the person himself to his works. Such an approach is especially employed by him in his brief work “On the Dignity of the Human Person.” The Polish philosopher claims that “the human being holds a position superior to the whole of nature and stands above everything else in the visible world.”2 He is convinced that this claim is backed by our human experience and shared by all people. It plays an important role in the life of the individual as well as the social life of human communities. Wojtyła does not confront this claim with a growing tendency which is among contemporary philosophers to look for common elements, but he concentrates more on similarities between the human being and some higher animals. He sticks to a traditional stance that humans perform operations that are beyond the possibilities of any non-​human animals and this is constantly confirmed and verified in practice. He argues that “our distinctiveness and superiority as human beings in relation to other creatures is constantly verified by each one of us, regardless of how inferior we might feel because of our physical and spiritual deficiencies.”3

2 K. Wojtyła, “On the Dignity of the Human Person,” in Person and Community. Selected Essays, p. 178. 3 Ibid.

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Wojtyła has on his mind all the achievements of human history, culture, production, and technology. The person performs acts, and their transitive effects introduce real changes to the non-​human world. In many instances they transform nature in a purposeful manner. The person transforms intentionally the world, and this reveals who he is, as Wojtyła claims, “the effects of human activity in various communities testify to this dignity. A being that continually transforms nature, raising it in some sense to that being’s own level, must feel higher than nature –​and must be higher than it.”4 This declaration may sound anthropocentric but there is no certainty that Wojtyła would agree with the anthropocentric stance, especially with its strong version. The conviction concerning the dignity of the person does not exclude the thesis that other non-​human creatures possess independent (suitable for them) values (i. e. something that is not a result of human valuation). In other words, a special value on the side of human persons does not play down respective values of animals. The world is pluralistic not only ontologically but also axilogically. Dignity of the person is then of top value in comparison to other values. The second approach employed by Wojtyła concerns showing the basis of personal dignity within the human being. The philosopher distinguishes the person himself from his achievements. Thanks to reason and free will the human being produces various works possessing their respective preciousness. They partly reveal who their creator is and with what value he is endowed. Nevertheless, this is not a full revelation of the person’s worth, and it cannot alone be identified with his dignity. As Wojtyła puts it, “to acknowledge the dignity of the human being means to place people higher than anything derived from them in the visible world.”5 It means that the person is always above what he does and creates. It possesses its intrinsic value which is prior to any values associated with his activities. This intrinsicness of dignity is signalled by Wojtyła when he declares that “who the human being essentially is derives primarily from within that being.”6

Ibid. 4 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.

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Some more light is shed on the latter disinction when we take into account a discrimination made by the philosopher between “the value of the person” and “the particular values present in the person.”7 The former concerns the person as such, that is a given entity who came to being as the human person. In this sense the value is inborn and lasts as long as the person lives. The latter are values given to the person or created by him, or naturally present in him, which in an effect can strengthen his activities and enrich him as the whole. However, their absence has no bearing on the value of the person himself. In the reference to this distinction, Wojtyła explains that the value of the person means the value “of the person as a person, and not of a distinct nature individualized in a way all of its own, independent then of particular physical or psychic characteristics.”8 When we recall, as mentioned earlier in our analysis, the bundle concept of the person typical for naturalistic thinking, we can say that the value of the personal characteristics, so much emphasised by naturalistically oriented philosophers, does not constitute the whole value of the person. However, the personal characteristics and their respective values are important and, in a sense, they are the starting points for assessment of a given individual. For example, when we say that this individual is precious and noble, we usually mean that a set of his personal characteristics is striking and exemplary. Of course, those characteristics, which lead us to such an assessment, concern not only the human body and psyche but very often they have a spiritual character. Thus, the particular values in the person stand for all of the values present in the person’s activities at all levels of his existence. Karol Wojtyła gives an example of such a personal characteristic, which is in a strict association with dignity, namely “to act in the truth.” In recently published essays on St Paul’s speech before the council of the Areopagus,9 Wojtyła developes many strictly philosophical topics; one of them concerns the person and his relationships to the truth. The philosopher claims –​in the line with a long philosphical tradition –​that “all beings are given to

K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 122. 7 8 Ibid., p. 298. 9 K. Wojtyła, Teachings for an Unbelieving World, (Notre Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press, 2020).

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man in terms of truth: as the truth.” In his analysis he expresses a conviction that human rationality should be understood broadly, namely as not only a sensual cognition of things but as possessing a task (and ability) of “communing” with them in truth. The ability to relate with everything in truth and through truth is –​in Wojtyła’s view –​a feature of spirituality going beyond a realm of cognition typical for the senses.10 The truth about everything, which is given cognitively (including a transcendent world and God) decides about human dignity. As the philosopher puts it, “the disposition to listen to the Truth (that is, obedience), and the readiness to act in the Truth constitute the true dignity of the human person.”11 Such a perception of the human person through the prism of truth, although rare nowadays,12 is an underlining of one of the essential features of human nature specifically. It shows its uniqueness among other creatures endowed with their respective natures, because none of the living non-​human entities (bodily ones) tends to acquire the truth and live by it. Orientation to the truth and a tendency to acquire it is exclusively a human feature. Thus, this “hunger” for truth places the human person in a special position in the existing order and has its axiological aspect expressed in the thesis of dignity. In the first chapter while describing Wojtyła’s philosophical borrowings, we pointed to Immanuel Kant and his second imperative. In this formula the person is presented as an end in contrast to a means. To be the person is to remain always an end in itself and be never reduced to a sheer means. Wojtyła following Kant was aware that the person is sometimes treated as a means and in everyday human relationships it is unavoidable. However, that circumstance requires that the person must be treated, at the same time, as an end meaning by that his irreducubility to objects and useful tools. Thus, to possess personal dignity means belonging to the order of existence that goes well beyond the category of things (to be part of “the kingdom

0 Ibid., p. 22. 1 11 Ibid., p. 36. 12 We can point to Robert Sokolowski as a philosopher who advocates a similar approach. He claimes that “the human person” can be considered as “the agent of truth” meaning by that that “the human person is defined by being engaged in truth, and human action is based on truth.” R. Sokolowski, Phenomenology of the Human Person, p. 1.

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of ends”). To possess the human dignity is then equivalent to possessing a basic good and even more –​to be that basic good. Karol Wojtyła is a follower of St Thomas Acquinas’s concept of good. He generally suscribes to the thesis that being and good are convertible (ens et bonum convertuntur),13 even though the person constitues a unique being and consequently a special good.14 Thus, if the person is the good in itself and an end in itself, then he must be considered as the highest good (bonum honestum). It of course does not exlude that sometimes the person is also a useful good (bonum utile); the latter stands for a means. If this is a case, then we can reformulate Wojtyła’s imperative in the following way, “whenever

13 Thomas Acquinas reasons as follows, “existence itself, therefore, has the essential note of goodness. Just as it is impossible, then, for anything to be a being which does not have existence, so too it is necessary that every being be good by the very fact of its having existence, even though in many beings many other aspects of goodness are added over and above the act of existing by which they subsist. Since, moreover, good includes the note of being, as is clear from what has been said, it is impossible for anything to be good which is not a being. Thus, we are left with the conclusion that good and being are interchangeable.” Thomas Aquinas, Truth (Questiones Disputatae de Veritate), q. 21, a. 2, reply. 14 Such a conviction accompanies Wojtyła’s approach to the person in all his writings. However, only his collaborators brougt it out and elaborated on it by formulating the rule “persona est affirmanda propter se ipsam,” that emphazises the central role of the person as the good. It was done in a dispute, which took place within Lublin’s school of philosophy. Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec and Wojciech Feliks Bednarski, famouse Polish Thosmistic philosophers, sustained that a basic ethical rule should be “bonum est faciendum.” Followers of Karol Wojtyła, Tadeusz Styczeń and Andrzej Szostek, claimed in turn that “persona est affirmanda propter se ipsam” is a better candidat for such a rule. It is obvious that the former encompasses a broader range of goods (as starting points for moral actions) than the latter. Thus, “the persona est affirmada” rule may be accused of commiting the pars pro toto error. The personalists advocating for this rule reply that it reveals that special position of the person among other creature and even if it takes part for the whole it is a better part; as a result, it is melior pars pro toto. See T. Biesaga, Spór o normę moralności (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, 1998), pp. 254–​259. Nevertheless, it seems that Wojtyła would have accepted both rules. In the realm of intepresonal dealings “persona est affirmanda” would be an adequate formula, whereas in other dealings, for example, between human and non-​human world the “bonum est faciendum” formula would be useful.

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a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not treat that person as only the useful good [leading] to an end, as an instrument, but must allow for the fact that he or she, too, has or at least should have, distinct personal highest good.” Although it was never expressed in this way by the philosopher himself, nevertheless it is in tune with his thinking about good and the person. Earlier we have mentioned that personal dignity is specified as a value not as good. In contemporary philosophy there is a tension between these two categories. Values appeared in philosophical language and investigations relatively late. The philosophy of good, in turn, is well rooted in the history of philosophy, especially in the ancient and medieval thought. Karol Wojtyła does not delve into a complex philosophical dispute, for example: is something good because it is valuable or the opposite –​valuable because good? He presents his own version of how values relate to the good. In his Ethics Primer, he claims that “man experiences various values, but with his acts he realizes the good. This is the good of his own being, the objective perfection of his person.”15 Thus, we can say that values are strictly associated with the good and can be considered as ways of personal experiencing (and then carrying out) of that good. In other words, values are treated here as ways leading us to the good with a significant participation of experience. As Wojtyła agrues, “values always occur in a certain hierarchy, some of them being higher and others lower. Man values the higher ones more, which implies the conviction that these bring him closer to the objective good, that they have in themselves more of this good.”16 Thus, the personal dignity is the value, which reflects the objective good of the person and the latter is always a reference point for the former. In one of the latest philosophical works, Wojtyła remains faithful to this approach concernig the personal dignity. In Man in the Field of Responsibility, he claims that “the ‘dignity’ of man as a person means above all a property or fundamental quality –​and in this sense the ‘value’ of the person as such: value which

5 K. Wojtyła, Ethics Primer/​Elementarz etyczny, p. 147. 1 16 Ibid.

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belongs to man because he is a person and for which, therefore, man ought to strive.”17

Some Further Clarifications on Dignity of the Person Wojtyła’s understanding of personal dignity needs some comments and clarifications. Firstly, we need to analyse more in-​depth the value of the person as applied to one person and then to many persons. Secondly, we need to better understand a relationship between the value of the person and values present in a person. Preliminarily, Wojtyła ascribes to the former an inborn character and to the latter an acquired one. At the same time, he is convinced that “they are linked to the whole structure of human existence.”18 Such declarations are quite important, but they also open up various interpretive ways and thus we should examine them separately. Two philosophers will accompany us in this enterprise: Robert Spaemann and Adam Rodziński. Many personalistic thinkers consider personal dignity as something that cannot be wholly defined. Robert Spaeamann, for example, claims that “what the word ‘dignity’ means is difficult to grasp conceptually because it denotes an indefinable, simple quality.”19 This difficulty usually leads us to a conclusion that dignity can be only stated (in a kind of experience) and acknowledged; then can it be only unfolded and shown forth.20 This set of claims is true but only partly. We can, for example, argue that dignity is a fundamenal good (and value) and it conveyes an outstanding axiologiacal quality possesed by the person. As Spaeamann rightly points out, “the preciousness of the human being as such … renders her life something holy, giving the concept of dignity an ontological dimension which is in fact its sine qua non. Dignity signals something sacred.”21

17 K. Wojtyła, Man in the Filed of Resposibility, trans. K. W. Kemp, Z. Maślanka Kieron, (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2011), p. 36. 18 K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 122. 19 R. Spaemann, Essays in Anthropology: Variations on a Theme, trans. G. De Graaff, J. Mumford, (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2010), p. 52. 20 E.g. J. Seifert, What Is Life? The Originality, Irreducibility, and Value of Life, (Amsterdam & Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997), p. 98. 21 R. Spaemann, Essays in Anthropology: Variations on a Theme, p. 57.

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We can indeed grasp human dignity as a kind of experience. This methodological move is typical for the phenomenologist and Wojtyła would willingly subscribe to it. This experience concerns the whole human life, in a sense it is an intuitive reception and overview of the whole human state of this or that human person. However, specifically personal characteristics (properties) play here their indispensable roles, in particular rationality and freedom, and we cannot ignore them.22 It means that observing the person’s action saturated by various forms of rationality and being witness to his free acts, we conclude that he possesses dignity, namely that the person as such is a bearer of dignity. Of course, we cannot follow this investigative method when a given human individual does not show forth respective acts, like embryos or comatose patients. Then, Spaemann proposes that we establish dignity on the basis of our personhood, namely by singling out what a typical human person possesses, and in this way: how his dignity is normally revealed. Assuming that all human beings are persons, we are “ascribing personal dignity to all members of the species homo sapiens –​including those who don’t visibly possess rationality and freedom such as embryos, small children, the disabled or the severely mentally handicapped.”23 Thus, dignity which is clearly revealed in paradigmatical cases of personhood allows us to apply it to less paradigmatical cases.24 Wojtyła would probably agree with this way of reasoning because if we assume that personal charactersitics and properties are phenomena of the person, then by analysing them we should reach their foundation. And vice 22 Taking into account these two ways of approaching the dignity of the person, namely how it exists and is experienced and what its content is, we can analyze it both in existentialist and essentialist aspects. See e.g. G. Hołub, “Human Dignity. Between the Existentialist and the Essentialist Approaches,” Filosofija. Sociologija T. 30, Nr 3 (2019), pp. 206–​214. 23 R. Spaemann, Essays in Anthropology: Variations on a Theme, p. 61. 24 As we earlier have made clear, the person is not constituted by personal charactersitics; the latter only reveal and communicate the person. Spaemann puts it using a concise expression, “all empirical properties are only the outward expression of a substance that does not show itself as itself.” Ibid. In the personalist thinking we should distinguish “the being of the person” from “the persons’a actions;” the latter includes activity of all his powers and faculties. E.g. see G. Hołub, “Being a Person and Acting as a Person,” Forum Philosophicum Vol. 13, No. 2 (2008), pp. 261–​276.

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versa, a lack of those phenomena –​which reveal the personal subject –​does not prove that the metaphysical subject, suppositum humanum, is not in place.25 Thus, dignity seems to be primarily associated with an ontological structure of the person, and in this way considered as an ontological value.26 It means that whenever the structure of the person is in place there appears personal dignity; and as long as the person exists, its dignity lasts. Although dignity indispensably belongs to the personal world, it always finds its proper realization in the lives of individual persons. If we consider the dignity of the person as an ontological value, we must still clarify to what extent this thesis is valid. Are all values associated with the person parts of that ontological value? Or, as Wojtyła mentioned, should the ontological value be distinguished from values present in a person? To elaborate on such a distinction is important because it is obvious that we as persons experience many values as changeable and hence cannot be literally considered as part of the ontological value of the person. Polish philosopher Adam Rodziński presented a theory of dignity, which can bring with it a vital help. It is worth mentioning that Rodziński was a scholar at the Catholic University of Lublin in times when Wojtyła lectured there. Thus, they knew their personalistic ideas and –​as we can suppose –​ they influenced one another, at least to some extent. Rodziński introduces concepts of personal dignity and dignity of personality.27 The former has a character of the ontological value, as we have already mentioned, but

25 If a phenomenal part of personhood is not in place, there is still available its metaphysical account. 26 The claim that the personal dignity is an ontological value is suggested by Wojtyła’s use of the term “the nature of the person.” One of its understandings is associated with a basic value of the person, as it is pointed out by Polish editors of Love and Responsability. This remark appears only in further editions of the Polish version and consequently is not included in a first translation of the book into English. The second translation done by Grzegorz Ignatik, gives us that important clarification. Thus, the nature of the human person can be understood as “the specificity or constitution of the person’s strictly personal subjectivity (possessing relational, axiological provenience) that is proper to the person as person (and not as substance).” See K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, trans. G. Ignatik, (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2013), p. 10. 27 A. Rodziński, “U podstaw kultury moralnej,” Roczniki filozoficzne Vol. XVI, No. 2 (1968), pp. 43–​49.

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the latter is associated with activities of personal characteristics and their results. In a sense dignity of personality is dignity in action. Understandably, it is changeable, and we can influence it in positive or negative ways. For example, an attempt to work on own character can result in a heightened dignity of personality, whereas not paying attention to attitudes and virtues will certainly result in a weakened dignity of personality. Dignity of personality is something what strikes us first when we deal with people on a daily basis, and usually on this kind of dignity we evaluate a value of a given individual by talking, for example, about a great personality.28 Personal dignity, in turn, is more fundamental and we discover it in a different way. It is given in a live relationship with a person, in a kind of basic experience. This experience is about grasping a whole being of the person “from a distance,” i. e. with slightly putting aside (taking in brackets) personality-​related characteristics. Usually, such dignity is at the centre of attention when we talk about such issues as a right to life.29 Although Wojtyła did not single out these versions of dignity, we can suppose that he would be sympathetic with them. As we have mentioned above, Wojtyła was convinced that the value of the person and values in a person are linked. Thus, we can formulate a thesis that dignity of personality (values in a person) should work for and strengthen personal dignity (the value of the person) and vice versa –​only a strong dignity of personality manifests, in a sense, an axiological richness and preciousness of the person. In other words, only when we are witnesses to a strong and good and harmonious personality are we inclined to declare that it reveals an ontological richness of the person as such, namely who in fact the person is and who he should be in his further development. Nevertheless, weak dignity of personality (even extremely weak) does not entitle us to claim that a person is devoid of personal dignity. The latter –​as 28 John F. Crosby gives us an example of how we can understand this distinction, “there is the dignity of each person in virtue of which we owe respect to persons; but then there is the goodness and lovalbeness of a person which, once seen and experienced, awankes something like a love of friendship, or perhaps a spousal love, for that person.” J. F. Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), p. 67. 29 John F. Crosby talking about this fundamental kind of dignity uses a term ‘ontological nobility.’ Ibid., p. 71.

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we have mentioned –​is the ontological value and it remains as long as the person exists.

Concluding Remarks Karol Wojtyła is aware that the concept of the dignity of the person is a key concept for personalism. It demands appreciation of a very basic and holistic approach to the person, which goes against its fragmentation typical, for example, for analytical philosophy.30 Thus, it is impossible to ponder personal dignity without the metaphysics of the person, which draws not only on the concept of being but also on the concept of good. In that spirit, the Polish thinker acknowledges that the person must possess an irreducible spiritual dimension and cannot be completely subjected to technology, civilisation, and culture. Also, the person must remain a subject who is perceived as a primary reality endowed with its own intrinsic purposes. The main leading purposes of the person –​according to the philosopher –​are about pursuing truth and the good.31 Furthermore, Wojtyła is aware that acknowledging the human dignity is a complex enterprise and thus far undertaken attempts to shed some light on it are but preliminary. He claims that “the matter of the dignity of the human person is always more of a call and a demand than an accomplished fact, or rather it is a fact worked out by human beings, both in the collective and in the individual sense.”32 Hence, we are still invited to enquire into what the dignity of the person really is. In this task the attitude of discovery should prevail over the attitude of creation, that is, an inborn dignity should be acknowledged first as a foundation of any other aspect of dignity (i. e. acquired and changeable).

30 In a broader perspective, such a task is typical for a teistic philosophy as it was interestingly indicated by Alasdair MacIntyre. See A. MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition, (Lanhan: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), p. 18. 31 K. Wojtyła, On the Dignity of the Human Person, p. 179. 32 Ibid.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS The personalistic philosophy is not a matter of the past. It has its stouch supporters and adherents, and –​what is more important –​it has its own role to play today in solving vital problems and dilemmas. That is why we need not only to deepen a personalistic thinking as to its inner coherence and theorethical soundness but also to consider how it can be applied to deal with a growing number of contemporary problems in personal and social spheres of life. There are many signs proving that personalism is adequately prepared for such challenges.1 Although personalism represents an open project, which can and should be further refined and developed, it already possesses a great potential to deal with many problems that arise in our communities and societies.2 On the account of what has been done in this book, we can claim that Wojtyła’s personalism is an interesting project of the person3 and has its own strong sides. Hence, it is important to bring them out and acknowledge their validity. Its main achievement is that it avoids extremes and takes

1 Personalism has its many versions and developments; its influence is not restricted to a particular country or culture. Generally, it is a quite coherent and well-​advanced school of philosophy. E.g. see J. M. Burgos, An Introduction to Personalism, trans. R. T. Allen, (The Catholic Univeristy of America Press: Washington, D. C., 2018). 2 Many such attempts have been already undertaken by various personalists. E.g. see J. N. Mortensen, The Common Good. An Introduction to Personalism, trans. B. M. Dalton, (Wilmington: Vernon Press, 2017); G. Hołub, “Human Enhancement, the Person, and Posthuman Personhood,” Ethics & Medicine: An International Journal of Bioethics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2016), pp. 171–​183. 3 Juan Manuel Burgos compares Wojtyła’s personalism to other established versions of this stance: Anglo-​ American Personalism, Phenomenological, Communitarian, Dialogical, and Thomistic. His conclusion is that Wojtyła’s approach cannot be identified with any of them. Burgos claims that we should name the position of the Polish thinker as Integral Personalism. See J. M. Burgos, “Wojtyła’s Personalism as Integral Personalism. The Future of an Intellectual Project,” Quaestiones Disputatae Vol. 9, No. 2 (2019), pp. 91–​111. Even if this opinion deserves our attention, Thomistic and phenomenological influences dominate Wojtyła’s approach to the person.

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strong points both from the realist and idealist philosophical traditions. The philosopher knew how to draw on resources of both traditions and use them for the sake of better exploration of the personal reality. In this methodological strategy, Wojtyła is primarly focused on the person itself and borrows various ideas and concepts to bring out and clarify its complexity and richness. However, he should not be accused of eclectic approach to the person because various premises and ideas he uses serve as tools to explore the person, who is primordially given in experience, i. e. in a kind of source experience. In other words, Wojtyła looks for new avenues leading him to unfold and make evident who the person is. However, such a methodology, if it is justified (the author is convinced that the answer is positive), actually allows for further borrowings because the person is a reality who constantly intrigues us and demands further inquiry. New tools are in a sense required and “dictated” by what is a subject of the ongoing investigation. Of course, those borrowings must be carried out with respect for (or at least not contradicting with) intentions of those philosophers who formulated and worked out them in the first place.4 Wojtyła’s personalism is also the project that needs its further refinement and development. In dialogue with other personalists and philosophers, some issues must be more elaborated on, including consciousness and the role of emotivity in the structure of the person; more time and attention sholud be given to the issue of the personal subject too. In our analyses, we touched on the structure of consciousness according to Wojtyła. His approach to this topic is original but also unfinished. We need to know more about consciousness, and maybe a comparison and dialogue between the philosopher’s proposal and contemporary concepts of consciousness developed within cognitive sciences would bring us closer to some new developments and interpretations. Also, there is an urgent need to show forth a clear sphere of emotivity in the realm of the personal life. Although Wojtyła considers the presence and role of emotions while talking about the interiorizing function of consciousness, nevertheless, it seems that such an important set of activities like emotions constitute their 4 For further arrempts presenting the validity of Wojtyła’s philosophy in contemporary cultural context see G. Hołub, “The Validity fo Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy Today,” Logos i Ethos 1 (56) (2021), pp. 75–​85.

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own sphere, and that is why it must be treated separately within an in-​depth investigation. Thus, while anlyzing the structure of the person, we should indicate the clear space where emotions come to be and from where they influence other spheres of the personal existence. It seems that Dietrich von Hildebrand with his concept of heart can bring here a vital help. The concept of the personal subject presented by Karol Wojtyła seems to be not completed and that is why it is demanded more analyses aimed at showing its richness and complexity. If we assume that experience plays an important role in its full coming to be –​as Wojtyła himself underlines –​ then we should concentrate on various aspects of the experience more closely. Although the Polish philosopher specifies a category of experience, acknowledging that both cognition and feeling belong to it, more can and should be done in this respect. For example, we can draw on a rich tradition of existentialist philosophy helping us to bring out and unfold various aspects of inner experience of the person and ponder what role they play in the process of constitution of the personal subject. The philosophy of the human person as presented by Karol Wojtyła is an important contribitution to the contemporary personalism. It has two general interesting features: it possesses a realist leaning and is open for further developments. These traits prove that it is not an aprioristic and closed system of thinking about the human person but deeply rooted in human experience and various philosophical projects. As mentioned by other scholars and commentators, Wojtyła’s personalism has a great potential to deal with difficult problems of the present world.5 Most of them are rooted in the understanding of the human being. Thus, the debate on the human person becomes a “battlefield” where we must confront those problems and embark on elaborating solutions for them.

5 George Weigel and Jarosław Kupczak refer to Karol Wojtyła/​John Paul II as someone who attempted to deal with a new phase of barbarism. It has many faces, but its antichristian imprint is rather evident. Wojtyła with his anthrolological project indended to supply tools to oppose this cultural change (see J. Kupczak, Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/​John Paul II, p. 152).

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Index of Names A Aristotle  31, 101, 102, 129, 144, 160 Augustine  20, 23, 43 Acosta, Miguel  65 B Buttiglione, Rocco  10, 19, 44 Boethius  17, 43 Burgos, Juan Manuel  41, 44, 73, 91, 162, 177 Buber, Martin  93, 147, 148, 149, 159–​163 Braine, David  95 Beauregard, James  36, 162 Bernsen, Niels O.  127 Bartnik, Czesław Stanisław  152 Bednarski, Wojciech Feliks  170 Biesaga, Tadeusz  170 Bos, Erik-​Jan  48 C Clarke, Norris W.  59, 70–​74, 144, 154, 155 Crosby, John F.  9, 73, 165, 175 Cherry, Mark  35, 37 Chisholm, Roderic  80 Charmé, Steward  161 Corradi Fiumara, Gemma  117 D Descartes, René  5, 12, 18, 44–​ 48, 53, 57, 58, 66, 79, 81, 89, 111, 150 Dunn, Elizabeth W.  128 Davidson, David  131

Dupuy, Maurice  133 Duma, Tomasz  145 Duncan, A. R. C.  160 F Fletcher, Joseph  33, 37 Foucault, Michel  84, 85 Finance de, Joseph  44 Frossard, André  60, 62 G Grygiel, Stanisław  112–​115 Goleman, Daniel  116 Guietti, Paolo  10, 19, 44 Gałkowski, Jerzy W.  19, 44 Gallagher, Shaun  31, 39 Gurczyńska-​Sady, Katarzyna  80, 86 Goldie, Peter  117 Greenspan, Patricia S.  121 Gertler, Brie  124 Ganeri, Jonardon  146 Granat, Wincenty  152 H Husserl, Edmund  27, 48, 106 Hamlyn, David W.  31 Heidegger, Martin  48 Hume, David  80, 81 Hildebrand, Ditrich von  179 Harris, John  33 Hołub, Grzegorz  34, 36, 173, 177, 178 I Ignatik, Grzegorz  174

192

Index of Names

J John Saint of the Cross  13, 18, 19, 60 John Paul II  9, 10, 19, 44, 48, 57, 59, 60, 70, 96, 110, 137, 138, 139, 165, 179

N Nagel, Thomas  38 Nicholas of Cusa  160

K Kant, Immanuel  7, 15, 20, 21, 23, 48, 66, 131, 135–​139, 144, 145, 169 Kupczak, Jarosław  10, 96, 110, 137, 139, 179 Kalinowski, Jerzy  44 Krąpiec, Albert Mieczysław  61, 170 Kavanaugh, John F.  101 Kenny, Anthony  111, 115 Kosche, Michał  152

P Price, Henry  80 Półtawski, Andrzej  107 Plato  16, 160 Paul St.  168

L Levínas, Emmanuel  9 Lubac de, Henri  9 Locke, John  33, 74 Lantieri, Lidia  117 M Murphy, Francesca  10, 19, 44 Mazur, Piotr S.  12 Marx, Karl  14, 18 Mill, John Stuart  31 Merecki, Jarosław  40 Macmurray, John  51, 147, 148, 150, 159–​163 Mcgushin, Edward  84 MacIntyre, Alasdair  176 Mortensen, Jonas N.  177

O O’Connor, Timothy  146

R Rodziński, Adam  19, 165, 172, 174 Ross, David W.  13 Reimers, Adrian J.  44, 61, 65, 138 Reichmann, James  144 Regius, Henricus  48 Racevskis, Karlis  84, 85 S Schmitz, L. Kenneth  10 Sandok, Theresa  18, 26 Scheler, Max  82, 83, 117, 131–​ 133, 135, 137 Styczeń, Tadeusz  19 Szostek, Andrzej  170 Solomon, Robert C.  25, 117 Savage, Deborah  26, 97, 155 Singer, Peter  33–​35 Sorabji, Richard  36, 90, 143 Smith, Christian  36, 38, 149 Sartre, Jean-​Paul  81–​83 Sokolowski, Robert  95, 169

Index of Names

Stępień, Antonii Bazyli  113, 114 Schueler, Georg F.  117 Searger, William  118 Socrates  130 Schrag, Calvin O.  147, 148, 151, 159–​162 Scott, Sarah  160 Seifert, Joseph  165, 172 Spaemann, Robert  165, 172, 173 T Tymieniecka, Anna-​Teresa  26, 44 Tooley, Michael  33, 35 Thomas Aquinas St.  17, 70, 72, 111, 138, 153, 170

193

W Wojtyła, Karol  9–​23, 26–​33, 37–​41, 43–​45, 47–​74, 77–​79, 86–​115, 117–​127, 129, 131, 132, 134–​148, 152–​163, 165–​176 Wood, Allen W.  21, 135 Wais, Kazimierz  62 Wittgenstein, Ludwig  81 Wilson, Timothy D.  128 Weigel, Georg  81 Z Zahavi, Dan  39

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