Ulrich Beck: Theorising World Risk Society and Cosmopolitanism 303089200X, 9783030892005

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Ulrich Beck Theorising World Risk Society and Cosmopolitanism Klaus Rasborg

Ulrich Beck

Klaus Rasborg

Ulrich Beck Theorising World Risk Society and Cosmopolitanism

Klaus Rasborg Roskilde, Denmark

ISBN 978-3-030-89200-5    ISBN 978-3-030-89201-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89201-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021

Translation from the Danish language edition: Ulrich Beck: en kritisk indføring i teorien om verdensrisikosamfundet by Klaus Rasborg, © Publisher 2019. Published by Hans Reitzels Forlag. All Rights Reserved.

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image by : Orbon Alija This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to extend my heartfelt gratitude to a number of colleagues who assisted me during the process with their vast knowledge, their comments and advice and by reading (parts of) the manuscript: Associate Professor Torben Bech Dyrberg, Professor Anders Ejrnæs, Professor Bo Elling, Professor Lars Fuglsang, Professor Bent Greve, Associate Professor Allan Dreyer Hansen, Professor Jesper Jespersen, Associate Professor Yvonne Mørck and Professor Hanne Warming. I would also like to thank the Board of the San Cataldo Association, which awarded me a grant that enabled me to spend July 2014 writing in the serene surroundings of the San Cataldo Monastery on the Amalfi Coast in Southern Italy. It encouraged me to continue the sometimes arduous and protracted, but also intellectually highly rewarding, work on this book. Last but not least, I would like to thank Tam McTurk for his excellent translation of this book, originally entitled Ulrich Beck: En kritisk indføring i teorien om verdensrisikosamfundet, København: Hans Reitzels Forlag 2019.

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Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 What Is Risk? 13 3 The Idea of the Risk Society 27 4 Individualisation: Beyond Class and Social Communities? 57 5 Reflexive Modernity 85 6 Changes to Family, Paid Work and Politics in the (World) Risk Society111 7 The World Risk Society as a Cosmopolitan Society?145 8 The (World) Risk Society in a Critical Light177 References207 Index223

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About the Author

Klaus Rasborg, PhD, MA  is Associate Professor of Social Dynamics and Change in the Department of Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University. His key research interests include classical and modern sociology, social differentiation, inequality, individualisation, reflexive modernity, world risk society and cosmopolitanism. He has written articles on these topics in both Danish and international journals such as Thesis Eleven, Irish Journal of Sociology and Theory, Culture & Society. He is the Danish translator of Ulrich Beck’s most influential work Risikogesellschaft (1986), which was published in Danish in 1997. He spent time in 1984/85 at the Department of Philosophy, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main and followed lectures by, among others, Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth.

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Risk and hazards 38 Table 3.2 Beck’s understanding of risk, compared with Giddens, Luhmann and Dean 52 Table 5.1 Tradition, simple and reflexive modernity 91 Table 5.2 General criteria for the ‘meta-change’ of modernity 97 Table 7.1 The relationship between methodological nationalism and cosmopolitanism, the national and the cosmopolitan vision respectively164

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The first edition of Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity was published in German in 1986. In it, he introduced the concept of the ‘risk society’, which would go on to assume huge importance not only in sociology, but also in public debate. The central thesis is that the highly developed industrial society of the post-war era has turned into a hyper-­ complex and uncertain ‘risk society’; one that Beck also sees as synonymous with the emergence of a new modernity (as per the title and subtitle). The concept of the ‘risk society’ takes the dark sides and many newfound uncertainties of the highly differentiated growth society and condenses them into a concise yet stark formula. Risk Society was Beck’s contribution to the sociological tradition of diagnosing the ‘X society’: the welfare society, service society, leisure society, experience society, network society, multi-option society, insurance society, high-speed society, performance society, recognition society and so on. Now considered a modern classic in its field, Risk Society has been translated into more than 25 languages, including English, Japanese, Chinese, Russian, French, Spanish, Italian and Polish.1 Beck subsequently wrote a whole range of other books, articles, anthologies and collections of articles, many of which have been translated into English and several other languages. Key works include Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (1995), 1  Cf. https://webarchiv-ulrich-beck.soziologie.uni-muenchen.de/biography/; accessed 10/08/21.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 K. Rasborg, Ulrich Beck, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89201-2_1

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The Normal Chaos of Love (with Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim, 1995), The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order (1997b), Power in the Global Age (2005), Cosmopolitan Vision (2006), World at Risk (2009b), Distant Love (with Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim, 2014) and the posthumously published The Metamorphosis of the World (2016). In his later works, Beck sought to refine and flesh out his analysis in relation to a number of key fields and themes in contemporary society: the welfare state, individualisation, social inequality, family, gender and the ways in which people live together, working life, politics, globalisation and the economic and political power structures that came to dominate the new international world order after the fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11. In the light of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has paralysed vital functions in virtually every country in the world since January 2020, and has cost millions of lives, Beck’s diagnosis of the times seems more relevant than ever. The corona crisis, as well as the potentially far more extensive climate crisis, clearly demonstrates that we are, for better or worse, connected in a global interdependence that Beck describes as a ‘world risk society’. In Beck’s perspective, such worldwide crises can be seen as an expression of the fact that we live in a new uncertain modernity, where ‘the state of emergency’, as he says, ‘threatens to become the normal state’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 79). Thus, the purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive introduction to all of Beck’s theoretical work—not just his original theory of the risk society and reflexive modernity, but also how he later refined his thinking and formulated theories about the ‘world risk society’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’. This approach differentiates this book from the few previous introductions to Beck, which due to their publication dates were unable to encompass the whole of his career (Mythen, 2004; Sørensen & Christiansen, 2013). I seek to remedy this by presenting all of his theories, right up to the draft for his final critical work, The Metamorphosis of the World (Beck, 2016). The scale and complexity of Beck’s body of work make it difficult to grasp in its entirety, and his often somewhat convoluted and abstract way of expressing himself can be challenging for uninitiated readers. I hope that a comprehensive presentation and interpretation of his theory will overcome both of these problems and prove useful to readers who would like to gain deeper insight into his critical diagnosis of the times. When I first started writing this book, Beck was still alive, in the best of health and fully engaged in international research. This came to an abrupt

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end on New Year’s Day 2015, when he died suddenly of a heart attack at the age of 70. While tragic, this event further suggested that the time had come to take stock of Beck’s contribution to contemporary sociology. However, my aim is not merely to introduce his theories, concepts and points of view. I also wish to discuss them and put them into perspective in the light of other relevant sociological theory and empirical research. This thread runs through all of the chapters, culminating in a critical summary in Chap. 8.2 In this sense, this book might be said to contain elements of a broader presentation of contemporary and critical sociological diagnoses of the times, albeit one consistently based and focused on Beck. As his theory has gained more and more traction, it has, quite naturally, attracted criticism from various quarters. The question is whether this criticism fundamentally undermines the theory, or merely identifies shortcomings and weaknesses that must be addressed if Beck’s theory is to serve as a plausible critical diagnosis of contemporary society. I discuss this in detail in the concluding Chap. 8. Before turning to theory, I will start at the beginning, with a brief biographical sketch of Beck’s life and academic career, in order to provide insight into the background and qualifications of this pre-eminent sociologist.3 Ulrich Beck was born on 15 May 1944  in Stolp, then part of the German province of Pomerania, now part of Poland and called Slupsk. At the end of World War II, his family fled to Hanover, where he grew up. In 1966, aged 22, Beck started studying law at the University of Freiburg. After just one semester, he changed disciplines, obtaining a scholarship and throwing himself into sociology, philosophy, psychology and political science at the Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität in Munich (LMU). In 1972, after six years of study, Beck defended his final Dissertation (the equivalent of a PhD thesis in the Anglo-Saxon university system), ‘Objectivity and Normativity: The Theory-Praxis Debate in Modern German and American Sociology’, for which he achieved the highest honours (summa cum laude) (see Chap. 8 for a more in-depth discussion of 2  This is another way in which this book differs from previous introductions to Beck, some of which shy away from a critical-discursive approach (Sørensen & Christiansen, 2013: xx). 3  The biographical information is based on the following sources: Beck’s own website, which has now been replaced by the in memoriam website Ulrich Beck zum Gedenken (cf. https://www.ls2.soziologie.uni-muenchen.de/ulrich_beck_zum_gedenken/index.html; accessed 10/08/21); Wikipedia (cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulrich_Beck; accessed 10/08/21); (Sørensen & Christiansen, 2013: 1–6).

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the thesis, later published as a book, see Beck, 1974). Beck then worked as an assistant at the University of Munich, where he participated in a research project on the theoretical foundations of sociological research into labour and professions. This resulted in his Habilitation thesis (corresponding to postdoctoral research), which he defended at the University of Munich in 1979.4 That same year, Beck received a Ruf (call) to apply for the post of Professor of Sociology at the University of Münster. He worked there until 1981, when he moved on to pastures new as Professor of Sociology at the University of Bamberg. In 1992, Beck completed the circle, returning to Munich as Professor of Sociology and Director of the Department of Sociology at Ludwig-Maximilian University. The professorship served as the basis for all of his sociology work until 2009, when he was awarded the title of Professor Emeritus at the age of 65. However, this did not mean that Beck swapped active research for the quiet life of a pensioner. On the contrary, he was still going strong as a researcher, writer and lecturer, as a guest lecturer at numerous universities around the world, and as the head of a major five-year EU-funded research project on ‘Methodological Cosmopolitanism  – In the Laboratory of Climate Change’ (for more on Beck’s concept of cosmopolitanism, see Chap. 7).5 In the course of his academic career, Beck also edited several journals, managed several major research projects, received honorary doctorates and was visiting professorships at a number of European and American universities. In 1980, he became co-editor of the German sociological journal Soziale Welt. From 1981 to 1988, he headed up a major social science research project (‘Uses of Social Science’) funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). From 1995 to 1997, Beck was a member of the Commission for Future Questions in the State of Bavaria and the State of Saxony. In 1996, he was awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Jyväskylä in Finland, and over the next few years he received similar honours from several other universities in Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Argentina and Bulgaria. In 1995–98, he was a Distinguished 4  Beck’s Habilitation thesis has never been published, but its themes are covered in Beck et al. (1980). 5  The original English title of this five-year research project (2013–18), which was funded by the European Research Council Advanced Grant (ERC) and interrupted after approximately 18 months by Beck’s death, was ‘Methodological Cosmopolitanism: In the Laboratory of Climate Change’ (the Cosmo-Climate Research Project) (cf. https://webarchiv-ulrich-­ beck.soziologie.uni-muenchen.de/en/ulrich-beck-erc-advanced-grant-methodologicalcosmopolitanism-­in-the-laboratory-of-climate-change/; accessed 10/08/21).

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Research Professor at the University of Wales. In 1997, Beck was awarded the Culture Prize of the City of Munich, followed by several other similar accolades. The same year, he was appointed guest professor—British Journal of Sociology Visiting Centennial Professor—at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), which at that time was headed by the internationally renowned sociologist Anthony Giddens. In 1994, Beck—along with his sociologist colleague Scott Lash—started working with Giddens on the book Reflexive Modernization (Beck et al., 1994) (cf. Chap. 5). Reflexive modernisation was also the subject of a major interdisciplinary research project (SB 536), funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG), for which Beck was project manager from 1999 to 2009. The project—which involved sociologists, political scientists, economists, lawyers, social psychologists, historians and philosophers—sought to further develop the theory of the risk society and reflexive modernity in relation to a range of different social spheres, and to strengthen its empirical foundation (Beck et al., 2003; cf. Beck, 2002) (cf. Chap. 5). In 2009, Beck was awarded a ‘Senior Loeb Fellowship’ at Harvard University in the US. In 2011, he was also a visiting professor at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris. As yet more evidence of Beck’s international renown, in 2014 the International Sociological Association (ISA) gave him the ‘Lifetime Achievement Award  – For Most Distinguished Contribution to Futures Research’ during the World Congress of Sociology in Yokohama, Japan. Beck was married to Professor Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, a sociologist specialising in issues such as gender, ethnicity and family. They met as students in Munich and became lifelong academic sparring partners and co-­ authors of several books (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995, 2014). After Beck’s death on 1 January 2015, newspapers in Germany and several other countries published obituaries.6 Many researchers who knew and worked with him also penned their own tributes, all of which stressed that he was not only an innovative and inspirational thinker, but also a very friendly and welcoming person with a good sense of humour and self-irony7— attributes to which I can testify based on my personal encounters with him. As Giddens so aptly puts it in his obituary in Süddeutsche Zeitung: 6  Including Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine, The Guardian, The Times Higher Education, Le Monde and The New York Times. 7  Cf. https://webarchiv-ulrich-beck.soziologie.uni-muenchen.de/obituaries/; http:// blogs.lse.ac.uk/condolences/2015/01/05/ulrich-beck/; accessed 10/08/21.

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Ulrich Beck … was the greatest sociologist of his generation. [He] was a dedicated and conscientious scholar, with an encyclopaedic knowledge of the social sciences. For such a distinguished figure he was refreshingly down to earth and approachable, highly popular with his students everywhere. I used to tease him quite often, since he never mastered the British sense of humour, with its mixture of selfdeprecation and smug superiority. More often than not though I was the one who ended up looking foolish. He had a good line in put-downs when he needed to.8

As this brief biography shows, by 1986, Beck had already published several weighty sociological works and research reports. However, the book on the risk society was his major breakthrough, not only by dint of its contribution to a critical diagnosis of the times, but also because it adopts a new perspective on post-war, highly developed industrial society. With regard to the seeming dichotomy between ‘the modern’ and ‘the postmodern’, which was on everybody’s lips at the time (cf. Habermas, 2007 [1980]), Beck posited a third possible interpretation—that we do not live in either modernity or postmodernity, but in a new, more reflexive and ‘self-critical’ form of modernity (for more on this, see Chaps. 5 and 7). In an era characterised by rapid social change, Beck sought to reformulate social criticism in a non-dogmatic manner that acknowledged the legacy of German critical social theory. While he did not see himself as part of the Frankfurt School, he did adopt one of the underlying themes in its critique of modernity—science and rationality (cf. Chaps. 3 and 5) (Beck, 1994a: 9, 33; 1994b: 177; 2009a: 12–13). Nevertheless, social criticism had to be reformulated to make it relevant to modern society. The German sociologist Wolfgang Zapf provides a very apt characterisation of how Beck fits into German critical theory—a characterisation that Beck himself quotes and with which he seems to agree: Commenting critically, I would like to say that Ulrich’s position is so fascinating because it adheres to the programme of modernization as well as to a fundamental critique of contemporary society, including the bulk of today’s sociology. Beck’s intent is to design a ‘new modernity’ and a more insightful, conscientious, reflected, in a word, a reflexive theory. It can gain the loyalty of adherents to the Frankfurt School of the 1930s and 1960s 8  Giddens’ obituary appeared in Süddeutsche Zeitung 05-6/1/2015 (for an English version, see: https://www.scribd.com/document/372147109/Ulrich-Beck-Obituary-byAnthony-­Giddens; accessed 10/08/21).

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who believe in Adorno’s statement that ‘The totality is the untrue’. It is able to take in the disappointed Marxists, whose dreams of socialism may be broken, but who are now being shown that free-market democracies also must fail from their own contradictions. It is a modernized variant of the doctrine of late capitalism, with the ecological crisis now playing the part once taken by the legitimation crisis of late capitalism. It is another theory of the ‘third way’ transcending capitalism and socialism. (Beck, 1997b: 182, note 24; cf. Zapf, 1998: 294–95)

Although Beck maintains his intention to conduct critical social science research, he emphasises that it must be done differently now than in Marx’s day, because society has changed significantly in the intervening period. According to Beck, productive forces have become destructive, and progress has become ambivalent and problematic. It is no longer possible to proclaim a particular class to be the vanguard of change for the better, since we are all affected by the destructive logics of the risk society (cf. Chaps. 3 and 6 in particular). As will become apparent, this did not make Beck a pessimist or a prophet of doom. He very much stresses both the potential for action and the importance of finding political solutions to the multilateral problems of a global risk society (cf. Chaps. 6 and 7). In a globalised world with ever closer relationships between individual nations, Beck does not consider it sufficient to think of politics, democracy and the rule of law only at the national level. He calls for an ‘active civil society’ and a ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, in which we see ourselves as part of a European community that works together to solve shared problems (cf. Chaps. 6 and 7). Beck’s social commitment and his ability to lay out new and thoughtful perspectives on contemporary society sparked debate around some of society’s most pressing problems. It is not least because of this that he attained the status of an internationally renowned sociologist, mentioned in the same breath as Niklas Luhmann, Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, Zygmunt Bauman and Richard Sennett. However, Beck’s constant desire to refine a critical theory of contemporary society raises a number of questions. What changes led Beck to talk of a ‘risk society’? Have we not always faced myriad risks? Are risks social constructions in our heads or objective realities in the world? What does Beck envisage when he refers to contemporary and relevant social criticism? Does Beck see himself as part of the tradition of normative social theory? If so, what constitutes his standpoint—the normative

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foundation—for his social criticism? How does Beck see the relationship between structure and agent? What political options for action are available to us in the global risk society, and who is the ‘subject’ of change? These and other questions are explored in the chapters to come. The various chapters are based on key themes in Beck’s analysis of modern society. This will provide readers with insight into how Beck’s views on risk influence his thinking with regard to various aspects of contemporary society. My choice of themes corresponds with the main ones that Beck himself regularly addresses in his writing and which may be divided into four main phases: (1) the original theory of the ‘risk society’ (1986); (2) the theory of the ‘world risk society’ (1996); (3) the theory of ‘cosmopolitanism’ (1996); and (4) the theory of the ‘metamorphosis of the world’ (2016) (Curran, 2018: 30; cf. Rasborg, 2018). The chapters introduce all four phases in chronological order. In addition, I incorporate two themes that Beck himself does not address, but which I consider crucial in order to illustrate the subject adequately. In Chap. 2, I outline the history of the concept of risk in order to shed light on its meaning. In a critical discussion in the final chapter, Chap. 8, I summarise whether Beck’s theory can be said to be a plausible, critical diagnosis of the times in relation to the highly developed Western societies of the early twenty-first century. To be more specific about the structure of this book, this chapter is followed by Chap. 2 with a brief outline of the history of the concept of risk, which clarifies what it means and how Beck positions himself in relation to previous risk theories. In Chap. 3, I account for Beck’s original theory of the risk society and compare it with theories propounded by a number of other prominent sociologists who also emphasise the key role that risk plays in contemporary society: Niklas Luhmann, Anthony Giddens and Mitchell Dean. In Chap. 4, I take a closer look at individualisation, one of the most controversial aspects of Beck’s theory of the risk society. According to Beck, greater individualisation is an inseparable part of the risk society and reflexive modernity. After identifying what he considers to be the particular features of individualisation, the chapter discusses the differences and similarities in relation to a number of other sociologists who also stress the key role individualisation plays in society: Thomas Ziehe, Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman. In Chap. 5, I delve deeper into Beck’s central concept of reflexive modernity, and also into modernisation, which I put into perspective based on other sociological understandings of the nature of contemporary society, namely Bruno

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Latour’s concept of ‘amodernity’ and the concept of ‘multiple modernities’ devised by Shmuel N. Eisenstadt et al. In Chap. 6, I present Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim’s views on changes to forms of family life/ways of living together, paid work and politics in the risk society, reflexive modernity and the differences and similarities with the analyses of change processes provided by Anthony Giddens, Zygmunt Bauman, Richard Sennett and Guy Standing. In Chap. 7, I show how Beck, in the course of his writings, develops his original theory of the risk society and reflexive modernity into the theory of the world risk society and cosmopolitanism. The chapter explains why Beck’s ‘cosmopolitan turn’ should be seen as part of a broader current in sociology/social theory, and how Beck is positioned in relation to this context. It also illustrates how, according to Beck, globalisation and ‘cosmopolitanisation’ make demands of contemporary sociology/social theory, by requiring that they keep up with the pace of change. In addition, it looks at Beck’s analysis of ‘cosmopolitan Europe’, in which he underlines that the EU represents a crucial step in building an ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’, which he considers indispensable if solutions are to be found to problems that transcend national borders. The chapter ends by looking at the direction Beck’s theory was taking up to his death, namely his theory of ‘the metamorphosis of the world’, which in several respects represents an exciting new departure from his ‘classic’ risk society argument. In Chap. 8, based on themes raised earlier in this book, I conclude by reviewing the main criticisms of Beck’s theory in the now reasonably extensive (international) secondary literature. In this way, the chapter also acts as a—critical—summary of the whole book, through which it will hopefully be possible for the reader to consider and evaluate the sustainability of, and critical potential in, Beck’s theories of the (world) risk society, reflexive modernity and cosmopolitanism. In conclusion, a few words about how I came to write this book. In the years 1995–97, I translated Beck’s Risikogesellschaft (1986) into Danish (Beck, 1997a [1986])—a long, arduous and sometimes painstaking task that required a high degree of empathy with Beck’s conceptual universe. I found him to be extremely interesting, and I consider him an innovator in critical German social theory, which also accounts for much of my own theoretical grounding (see, e.g. Rasborg, 1988). Ever since, I have been interested in and conducted research based on Beck’s theory and how it evolved. I have written about it in both Danish and international journals, textbooks and anthologies. For more than 20  years, therefore, Beck’s

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theory has been an important source of inspiration in my research and teaching, both at Roskilde University and in my previous teaching positions in the Departments of Sociology and Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. In addition, I have introduced Beck’s theory of the risk society to a wider audience, via radio interviews, newspaper columns, feature articles, lectures at the People’s University and many other contexts. In other words, my intellectual baggage makes it impossible for me to ‘reboot’ or ‘start from scratch’. It is unavoidable that the book is based on—and elaborates upon—some of my previous writings on the subject. It should be stressed, however, that this book is not merely a repetition of my previous writings on the subject but is based on highly extensive research into Beck’s work, as well as other relevant sociological theories. In other words, this book is an independent work in its own right, in which I seek, to the best of my abilities, to convey the insights into the structures, relationships and lines of development in Beck’s theory at which I arrived during the course of my research. Responsibility for the analyses presented here, of course, lies entirely with me.

References Beck, U. (1974). Objektivität und Normativität. Die Theorie-Praxis Debatte in der modernen deutschen und amerikanischen Soziologie. Rowohlt. Beck, U. (1986). Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt/M. Beck, U. (1992 [1986]). The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage. Beck, U. (1994a). The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization. In U.  Beck, A.  Giddens, & S.  Lash (Eds.), Reflexive Modernization. Polity Press. Beck, U. (1994b). Self-Dissolution and Self-Endangerment of Industrial Society: What Does This Mean? In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), Reflexive Modernization. Polity Press. Beck, U. (1995). Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk. Polity Press. Beck, U. (1996). World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society. Ecological Questions in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties. Theory, Culture and Society, 13(4), 1–32. Beck, U. (1997a [1986]). Risikosamfundet – på vej mod en ny modernitet. Hans Reitzels Forlag. Beck, U. (1997b). The Reinvention of Politics. Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order. Polity Press.

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Beck, U. (2002). Interview ved Mads P. Sørensen. Slagmark, 34, 125–144. Beck, U. (2005). Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2006). Cosmopolitan Vision. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2009a). Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision. Constellations, 16(1), 1–22. Beck, U. (2009b). World at Risk. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2016). The Metamorphosis of the World. Polity Press. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (1995). The Normal Chaos of Love. Polity Press. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2014). Distant Love. Personal Life in the Global Age. Polity Press. Beck, U., Bonss, W., & Lau, C. (2003). The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme. Theory, Culture and Society, 20(2), 1–33. Beck, U., Brater, M., & Daheim, H.  J. (1980). Soziologie der Arbeit und der Berufe. Grundlagen, Problemfelder, Forschungsergebnisse. Rowohlt. Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Polity Press. Curran, D. (2018). Beck’s Creative Challenge to Class Analysis: From the Rejection of Class to the Discovery of Risk-Class. Journal of Risk Research, 21(1), 29–40. Habermas, J. (2007 [1980]). Modernity: An Unfinished Project. In C. Calhoun et al. (Eds.), Contemporary Sociological Theory (2nd ed.). Blackwell Publishing. Mythen, G. (2004). Ulrich Beck. A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society. Pluto Press. Rasborg, K. (1988). Samfundskritik og normativitet  – med udgangspunkt i J.  Habermas’ kommunikationsteoretiske reformulering af fornuftsbegrebet. Forlaget Rhodos. Rasborg, K. (2018). From ‘the bads of goods’ to ‘the goods of bads’ – The most recent developments in Ulrich Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology. Theory, Culture and Society, 35(7–8), 157–173. Sørensen, M. P., & Christiansen, A. (2013). Ulrich Beck. An Introduction to the Theory of Second Modernity and the Risk Society. Routledge. Zapf, W. (1998). Entwicklung und Zukunft moderner Gesellschaften seit den 70er Jahren. In H. Korte & B. Schäfers (Eds.), Einführung in Hauptbegriffe der Soziologie. 4. Verbesserte und aktualisierte Auflage. Leske + Budrich.

CHAPTER 2

What Is Risk?

A well-established body of research into risk already existed when Risk Society was published in 1986 (cf. Breck, 2001; Rasborg, 2020). In an interview, Beck himself drew attention to the fact that he had not fully acquainted himself with this literature at the time. Only later, he says, did he realise the extent to which he broke with the ‘conventional’ understanding of risk on several key points (Beck, 2002: 125–26). In order to understand the nature of this break, it is therefore essential to understand the ‘conventional’ view. With this in mind, I will start by outlining some of the main features of the centuries-long history of risk in order to clarify how the concept ‘emerged’ historically and how it was dealt with prior to Beck’s theory of the risk society. This will help to illustrate what was so special about Beck’s understanding of risk (cf. Rasborg, 2020). The word ‘risk’ comes from risicare—Italian for ‘to dare’ (Bernstein, 1996: 8). It is about having the courage to throw yourself into the new and unknown. In other words, risk is not a matter of fate, but choice. As the American economist and financial historian Peter L.  Bernstein (1919–2009) says in his history of risk from ancient Greece until today, it is about ‘the actions we dare to take, which depend on how free we are to make choices’. According to this view, risk is a fundamental characteristic of our actions, and as such, ‘helps define what it means to be a human being’ (Bernstein, 1996: 8). In the mathematical sense, risk is linked to the probability of a given event (Bernstein, 1996: 3–4). Probabilities are neither ‘positive’ nor © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 K. Rasborg, Ulrich Beck, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89201-2_2

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‘negative’ per se, but simply a measure of how sure we are that something will happen (Bernstein, 1996: 43). Mathematically, a given probability is always greater than 0 and less than 1. A probability of 0 is synonymous with the incident not occurring. A probability of 1 is synonymous with it definitely happening—at which point, it makes no sense to talk about risk (Giddens, 1999: 21–22). Probability is therefore a method of making rational assumptions about uncertainty (Arnoldi, 2009: 21). However, we usually associate the word risk with ‘unwanted’ events (Sennett, 1998: 82–83), for example, the probability of contracting cancer, of redundancy, of dying in a road traffic accident or plane crash. In other words, the modern understanding of the term refers to the calculated probability of an unwanted event occurring (Adams, 2001: 8; Arnoldi, 2009: 21). However, in a range of cases, risk also refers to something ‘desirable’, for example, thrill-seekers who actively seek excitement via gambling, fast cars, drugs, extreme sports and so on. In macroeconomic terms, the willingness to take risks can also be seen as positive, because it is a prerequisite for entrepreneurship, innovation and economic growth (Arnoldi, 2009: 138–57; Giddens, 1999: 21–22). As the outcomes of events associated with risk necessarily unfold over time, there is an inextricable link between risk and time. Risks are by definition future-oriented—they refer to outcomes that may or may not come to pass in an uncertain future: ‘Risk and time are opposite sides of the same coin, for if there were no tomorrow there would be no risk. Time transforms risk, and the nature of risk is shaped by the time horizon: the future is the playing field’ (Bernstein, 1996: 15). Only with modernity did the desire to master or control risk truly prevail. It is a specifically modern attitude, one that represents a marked departure from the belief that our lives are ruled by fate or Providence, the outcomes of which are unavoidable: The revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between modern times and the past is the mastery of risk: the notion that the future is more than a whim of the gods and that men and women are not passive before nature. Until human beings discovered a way across that boundary, the future was a mirror of the past or the murky domain of oracles and soothsayers who held a monopoly over knowledge of anticipated events. (Bernstein, 1996: 1, 11–12)

Accordingly, risk may be considered a fundamental dynamic in a future-­ oriented society, one in which the future is seen as territory to be

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conquered or colonised. This is precisely the perspective that characterises modernity (Arnoldi, 2009: 22–23, 35; Giddens, 1999: 21–23; Hacking, 2006 [1975]: 18–20). In general, however, risk was closely associated with various forms of gambling—simple bets, dice, roulette and so on—hence the need to consider probability. Significantly, it was thinking about gambling that led to the crucial breakthrough in probability theory. Prior to this, people placed bets and played games without any knowledge of the odds or any way to estimate the probability of winning and losing—they just took risks without any concept of risk management (Arnoldi, 2009: 28–30; Bernstein, 1996: 11). Shipping also played a key role in the history of risk. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the idea of risk gained increasing traction among European explorers and traders, who would refer to ‘entering uncharted waters’ (Arnoldi, 2009: 25; Giddens, 1999: 21–22). Describing the advent of the modern perception of risk, Bernstein distinguishes between four crucial periods: (1) up to the thirteenth century; (2) the thirteenth to the eighteenth century; (3) the eighteenth to the early twentieth century; and (4) the start of the twentieth century to the present (Bernstein, 1996: vii–viii). Until 1200, it was generally believed that life was governed by Providence. In other words, people took decisions without any real concept of risk: In the medieval and ancient worlds, even in preliterate and peasant societies, people managed to make decisions, advance their interests, and carry on trade, but with no real understanding of risk or the nature of decision-­ making. Today, we rely less on superstition and tradition than people did in the past, not because we are more rational, but because our understanding of risk enables us to make decisions in a rational mode. (Bernstein, 1996: 3–4; cf. Giddens, 1999: 21–22)

A rational approach to risk based on probability theory is therefore a relatively recent innovation. According to the philosopher Ian Hacking, the modern concept of probability only emerged in the seventeenth century (Hacking, 2006 [1975]: 18–20). Despite being familiar with the concept of probability, the ancient Greeks did not venture far into the world of probability theory (Arnoldi, 2009: 25). According to Bernstein, this is partly explained by the fact that the ancient Greeks—like the Romans— depended on a number system based on the Greek alphabet, which made

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it difficult to multiply, divide, add and subtract (Bernstein, 1996: 15–16, XXXI; Hacking, 2006 [1975]: 6). This obstacle was removed when the Hindu-Arabic numeral system we know today came to the West during the period 1000–1200. However, this alone was not enough to pave the way for a modern understanding of risk, in which chance was replaced with probability and a belief that the future can be predictable—and even, to some extent, controllable. Such an understanding was unthinkable without the realisation that we do not live our lives passively, as playthings in the hands of fate or God (Arnoldi, 2009: 25; Bernstein, 1996: 3, 20, XXX–XXXI). One of the precursors to the modern understanding of risk is the work of the Italian mathematician Leonardo Pisano (1175–1250), better known as Fibonacci. In his book Liber Abaci from 1202, he demonstrates the Hindu-Arabic numerical system’s superiority over the Hebrew, Greek and Roman systems (Bernstein, 1996: XXIII–XXIV).1 While Fibonacci considered measurement the decisive factor in risk management, the book itself did not herald a real breakthrough for the modern understanding of probability and risk, because most people still believed that risk was a matter of the whims of nature (Bernstein, 1996: XXVIII). It was not until approximately 1300, the start of the Renaissance and later the Reformation, that the path was paved for the modern understanding—and mastery—of risk, which did away with notions of predestination and Providence. Mysticism gave way to science and logic, and the Catholic Church’s dominance began to diminish, providing fertile soil for the emerging awareness that we have the power to determine our own future (Arnoldi, 2009: 26–28; Bernstein, 1996: 20–21). These factors, along with the introduction of the new number system, were essential prerequisites for the new mathematics of calculating risk. They prepared the ground for the concepts of computability and calculability, which were fundamental aspects of the ‘Protestant work ethic’—which, according to the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), was a key driver in the emergence of modern capitalism (Weber, 1992 [1904/05]; cf. Bernstein, 1996: 20–21; Hacking, 2006 [1975]: 18–20). The renunciation of medieval superstition during the Renaissance therefore led to a breakthrough in probability theory and made it possible to calculate risk. This was the period in which Columbus (1451–1506) 1  ‘Liber Abaci’ means ‘book of the abacus’, which was the instrument used for calculations in those days (Bernstein, 1996: 20, XXIII–XXX).

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sailed the world, and Copernicus (1473–1543) revolutionised our view of the universe—a breakthrough only possible with advanced knowledge of mathematics. The sixteenth century saw a number of advances in mathematics, which were facilitated by the invention of printing around 1450 and the subsequent widespread dissemination of classical books on mathematics (Bernstein, 1996: 20–21). In Italy, new ideas were developed about gambling, probability and risk (Paccioli, Cardano, Galilei), which spread to Switzerland, Germany and England. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-­century France, advances in mathematics, arithmetic and algebra went far beyond previous empirical experiments (e.g. rolling dice) and laid the foundation for the practical application of probability theory in fields such as insurance, investment, medicine, heritability and molecular behaviour, warfare and weather forecasts (Pascal, Fermat, Méré) (Arnoldi, 2009: 23; Bernstein, 1996: 55). Another crucial breakthrough was the emergence of insurance—an industry based on balancing policyholders’ risks in order to indemnify individuals collectively against losses (Bernstein, 1996: 93; Boyne, 2003: 10). The growth of trade during the Middle Ages caused a parallel expansion in the financial and insurance industries. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the insurance business gained further momentum, via the increasingly popular coffee houses that sprang up in all of the major European trading cities, and which served as hubs for the exchange of news and information, especially among sailors. Lloyds, one of the most well-known British insurance companies, was founded in a coffee house opened in 1687 by Edward Lloyd (approx. 1648–1713) on Tower Street, near the River Thames. The burgeoning trade of the late seventeenth century also sparked another innovation, namely economic forecasting. This new discipline was driven by the need—depending on costs, weather conditions, prices and so on—to estimate the future profitability of investments in goods that were transported long distances by sea (Bernstein, 1996: 88–96). However, modern insurance is not only based on calculating the probability of future events (risk), but also on statistics about events that have already occurred, for example, the statistical incidence of various diseases for the purposes of health insurance, or life expectancy for life insurance and so on (Adams, 2001: 26; Boyne, 2003: 3). In the eighteenth century, probability theory began to incorporate considerations of utility, as it became clear that people assess risk differently. For example, not everybody is equally willing to take investment risks— but if nobody is willing to take them, it has a detrimental effect on

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economic activity as a whole. The key figure in this regard was the Swiss mathematician Daniel Bernoulli (1700–1782), who formulated the hypothesis that the utility value of a given increase in wealth is inversely proportional to the amount of wealth that you already possess. This introduced a subjective element into probability theory, namely the motives (willingness to take risks) of the decision-makers and laid the groundwork for modern decision-making and game theory (Bernstein, 1996: 105–06). However, while Bernoulli viewed utility in numerical (quantitative) terms, later writers saw it as a set of preferences, and emphasised that there is a difference between saying ‘I like this better than that’ and ‘This is worth x utils to me’ (Bernstein, 1996: 189). In the late eighteenth century, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) rediscovered utility theory. His utilitarian moral philosophy defines a morally good act as one that provides the maximum possible benefit or happiness for the greatest number of people (Bentham, 1970 [1789/1823]). The economists of the nineteenth century also started to adopt the concept of utility, for example, using marginal utility theory to explain phenomena such as pricing. Utility theory triggered an enthusiasm for quantifying more and more aspects of life—pleasure, pain, work, value, wealth, money, capital and so on (Bernstein, 1996: 189–91). At the same time, there was a growing awareness that risk is not only about the probability that a given event—injury or damage—will occur, but also the extent (quantity) of the event. In order to take this into account, the formula for risk calculation was expanded to: Risk = The probability of p x the magnitude of p (Adams, 2001: 8, 69). Another breakthrough came in the first half of the twentieth century, when the American economist Frank H.  Knight (1885–1972) distinguished between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ (Knight, 2006 [1921]: 19–20; cf. Adams, 2001: 25–27; Boyne, 2003: 3–17, 109–10). As the following chapters show, this distinction is crucial to understanding Beck’s concept of risk. Throughout much of the twentieth century, prior to Knight’s intervention, debate raged about the question of randomness versus statistically calculable probability (Bernstein, 1996: 213–14, 216–18). Following World War I—and later, the information society’s knowledge explosion—more and more people disputed the very idea of true knowledge and doubted that certainty could ever replace uncertainty. However, if uncertainty and imperfect knowledge are the rule rather than the exception, this presents a challenge to risk management, the underlying assumption of which is that it is possible to rationally calculate probability (Bernstein, 1996: 205–06, 213–14).

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Prior to this, neoclassical economists typically viewed the market economy as a self-adjusting system on condition of perfectly flexible prices and wages, rational agents and full information without taking ‘uncertainty’ into account.2 Knight broke with this idea of the economy as a closed system in which it is possible to calculate probability rationally, pointing out that uncertainty and unforeseen consequences are inevitable (Knight, 2006 [1921]; cf. Bernstein, 1996: 216, 219–21). In order to conceptualise this, he introduced a crucial distinction between two types of randomness—describing that for which probability can be calculated as ‘risk’ and that for which it cannot as ‘uncertainty’ (Knight, 2006 [1921]: 19–20; cf. Bernstein, 1996: 219–21; Boyne, 2003: 3). The prototypical example of Knight’s point is the financial market. The prices of stocks and bonds continually fluctuate, bearing witness to the fact that it is not a foregone conclusion that traders’ expectations will be met. In fact, there is always an element of uncertainty, which makes it difficult to calculate investment risks (Bernstein, 1996: 221–22). Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty is also found in the work of the British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946). He was also sceptical of classic economics’ foundation in laws of mathematical probability, in particular the idea that perfect knowledge was possible, and could act as the basis for decision-making (Keynes, 1948 [1921]; cf. Bernstein, 1996: 223). According to Keynes, we can never achieve perfect knowledge. This means that it is not always possible to calculate the precise probability that something will happen—instead, we are often forced to rely on guesswork. Instead of mathematical probabilities, Keynes preferred to talk about ‘assumptions’, understood as degrees of rational belief in the possibility of drawing certain conclusions from given premises (Keynes, 1948 [1921]: 4–5, 8, 15–17; cf. Bernstein, 1996: 226–27; Hacking, 2006 [1975]: 13–14). Like Knight, Keynes was highly sceptical about statistical averages and probabilities. Instead, he believed that the real world was governed by ‘uncertainty’ (Keynes, 1948 [1921]: 24–40; 1949 [1936]: 3, 33–34, 148–50, 152–53, 161–63; cf. Bernstein, 1996: 228–29; Jespersen, 2014: 22–23, 33, 41, 57–58, 64–66). In his own words: By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a  I am grateful to Professor of Economics Jesper Jespersen for his valuable comments on this matter. 2

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Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know. (Keynes, 1937: 213–14)

In the wake of Knight and Keynes, others, including proponents of game theory, have attempted to identify the cause of uncertainty by suggesting that it lies in ‘the intentions of others’. This is not to say that game theory rejects mathematical descriptions of human behaviour; on the contrary, it assumes that such descriptions ultimately influence players and help position them as ‘rational’ (Bernstein, 1996: 232, 237).

Newer Approaches to Risk Analysis In the second half of the twentieth century, the question of the calculability of risk also played a central role. This is evident in the different approaches to risk analysis in economics, psychology, sociology and political science from around 1960 to the present. More specifically, there is a distinction between (1) a technical-economic approach; (2) a psychological approach; (3) a cultural-theory approach; (4) a sociological approach and (5) a governmentality approach to the analysis of the role of risk in modern society (Breck, 2001: 30; Mythen, 2004: 4–5; Rasborg, 2020).3 In the 1960s and up until the mid-1970s, risk research was dominated by a narrow, technical-economic approach, based on statistics, probability calculus and consequence calculations. One of the key figures to adopt this approach was the American engineer Chauncey Starr (1912–2007), who was interested in finding out how much we are willing to pay for safety. In other words, he sought to answer the question, ‘How safe is safe enough?’ (Starr, 1969: 1237; cf. Breck, 2001: 30–32). Starr’s starting point is that human beings are rational, and that in order to achieve a number of benefits, we are willing to take risks—for example, driving, flying, smoking, drinking and skiing. In other words, risk is not just something imposed on 3  This is Thomas Breck’s classification of four different approaches to risk analysis in recent social and human sciences (Breck, 2001: 30), with the addition of a fifth approach, which I call the governmentality approach (cf. also Mythen, 2004: 4–5).

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us from the ‘outside’, but also something that we choose to run (Starr, 1969: 1233–34; cf. Adams, 2001: 3, 14–16). On the basis of rational choice theory and cost-benefit analyses, Starr sought to determine what constitutes ‘acceptable risk’, that is, when the benefits of a given activity outweigh the potential risks. He concluded that our willingness to take risks is directly proportional to the perceived benefit of the given activity. He also concluded that our willingness to accept ‘voluntary’ risk is about 1000 times greater than our willingness to accept ‘involuntary’ risk (Starr, 1969: 1237; cf. Adams, 2001: 65–67). The 1970s and 1980s saw increasing interest in mapping subjective experiences of risk, as it began to be recognised that there are major differences in how different people experience a given risk. A leading figure in this psychological (psychometric) approach to risk was the American professor of psychology Paul Slovic. One of his findings was that our subjective experience of risk is not necessarily consistent with the experts’ quantification of ‘objective’ risk (Slovic, 1987; cf. Adams, 2001: 9–14). According to Slovic’s studies, many people believe that not only is there more risk nowadays than in the past, but also that the future will be even riskier.4 According to the experts, however, the data shows that the opposite is the case (Slovic, 1987: 280). Slovic’s studies also showed that the subjective experience of risk is influenced by social position, education, gender, ethnicity and so on (Slovic, 2000b: 396–402). In other words, social differences—a social stratification—affect the subjective experience of risk. In addition, Slovic identified a number of paradoxes in our subjective experience of risk, which—contrary to the assumptions of the technical-­economic approach—bear witness to the fact that our approach to risk is not always rational. For example, many people are afraid to fly, but not to travel by car, even though the former is statistically a far safer mode of transport than the latter (Breck, 2001: 35–44). Our subjective perception of risk is not, therefore, always consistent with the ‘actual’ risk. Slovic does not conclude from this apparent paradox that experts are necessarily more rational than laypeople, but that both groups’ views of risk combine rational thinking, emotions and pre-existing worldviews (Slovic, 2000b: 402–04). The 1980s marked a new turning point, as studies of risk moved into a cultural theory phase, with an emphasis on the ‘social construction’ of risk 4  Thus, Beck’s thesis that we live in a ‘risk society’ can be said to be more akin to an everyday understanding of risk (cf. Tonboe, 1997: 78).

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(Breck, 2001: 47–58). In other words, the focus shifted from rational choice and subjectively perceived risk to a culturally specific interpretation framework that, it was assumed, determines what given cultures or societies perceive as risk. The main exponents of this approach are the British social anthropologist Mary Douglas (1921–2007) and the American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky (1930–1993), whose book Risk and Culture (1983) suggests that all societies are characterised by an infinite number of risks. However, since it is impossible for any society to relate to all of these risks at once, they must instead be selective. According to Douglas and Wildavsky, the interesting question is therefore how to identify and analyse the social and cultural definition processes by which a given society comes to focus on some types of risks and ignore others. A given society’s understanding of risk is culturally determined and constructed via a series of social classification processes that define the relationship between ‘risky’ and ‘non-risky’ (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983). Modern societies comprise a range of ‘risk cultures’ with different views of risk, namely, ‘individualistic’ (market), ‘hierarchical’ (state), ‘fatalistic’ (individual) and ‘egalitarian’ (civil society/social movements) risk cultures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983: 90–91, 104–05, 138–39; cf. Adams, 2001: 33–41). In the 1980s and 1990s, studies of risk took a more sociological turn, and a number of theories were propounded in which risk was perceived as closely linked to the organisation of society, technology and material production processes (Breck, 2001: 61–75). As such, the focus shifted to how risk is linked to a number of basic—both communicative and material— social structures. The key figure behind this change in thinking is Ulrich Beck, whose understanding of risk (as outlined below) is based on a number of significant developments in highly developed post-war industrial society. Other key figures are the British sociologist Anthony Giddens and the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998) (Giddens, 1990, 1991, 1994a; Luhmann, 1990, 1991). However, Luhmann’s view of risk differs considerably from that of both Beck and Giddens, in that he associates it with the way social systems observe themselves and their surroundings (see Chap. 3 for details of the differences and similarities between Beck, Giddens and Luhmann’s views of risk). The governmentality approach to risk gained ground in the 1990s and 2000s. One of the most prominent representatives of this approach is the Australian social scientist Mitchell Dean. Drawing inspiration from the French social philosophers Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and François

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Ewald, Dean points out that risk is now inextricably linked with insurance, which is all about ‘making the incalculable calculable’ (Dean, 1999: 184; Ewald, 1991: 204–05). This links risk to insurance technology and to the emergence in modern society of new forms of governance that seek to make reality calculable, and thus controllable (Dean, 1999: chapters 8 and 9) (see Chap. 3 for details of the differences and similarities between Beck, Foucault, Ewald and Dean’s views of risk).

Summary What can be learned from the history of risk, as outlined above? First, that risk is closely associated with the emergence of modern society. It is linked to the idea that the future is not determined by fate or Providence, but by probabilities. As such, it can be calculated—and managed. Secondly, that risk is not an unambiguous and objective phenomenon. On the contrary, thinking about risk has varied considerably depending on the historical and social context. In other words, risk does not exist independently of human beings. Rather, it is a concept that we have developed in an attempt to come to terms with the randomness that has always been a part of life, but which has become more prevalent due to the future-orientation and rapid pace of change that characterise modern society. As Slovic puts it: … risk does not exist ‘out there’, independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured. Instead, human beings have invented the concept risk to help them to understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life. Although these dangers are real, there is no such thing as real risk or objective risk. Even the simplest, most straightforward risk assessments are based on theoretical models, whose structure is subjective and assumption-­ laden and whose inputs are dependent upon judgment. (Slovic, 2000a: xxxvi)

As such, although risks are real, they are always embedded and interpreted in a cultural horizon. Similarly, the theoretical models with which we try to calculate or estimate risk are always based on certain prerequisites and assumptions. The historical account presented above consists of a series of propositions that have substantially contributed to our understanding of risk: (1) that risk is closely related to modernity’s secularisation and future-­ orientation, that is, the renunciation of the belief in fate, Providence and the will of God; (2) that risk, in the modern understanding of the term,

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refers to calculable chance, that is, events for which the probability can be calculated, whereas ‘uncertainty’ refers to incalculable chance, that is, events for which it is impossible to calculate the risk; (3) that risks are largely dependent on knowledge and definition; (4) that risk is not just something ‘imposed on us from outside’, but also something that we choose, as evidenced by the familiar phrase ‘taking a risk’; (5) that risk is always part of the weighing up of pros and cons of a particular action (cf. the concept of ‘acceptable risk’); (6) that our willingness to take risks depends on whether we consider there to be advantages or disadvantages of a given risk, for example, smoking, drinking alcohol, taking drugs and so on; (7) that subjectively perceived risk is not necessarily identical with ‘objective’ risk; (8) that risk is not only negative but also positive, since taking risks is a prerequisite for launching into new projects without a safety net. It may be useful to bear in mind these propositions as you read on, because they contribute to an understanding of how Beck positions himself in relation to pre-existing perceptions of risk. As will be seen, his work breaks with some of these propositions, is an extension of some and fails to take account of others. Crucially, with respect to all of these understandings of the concept of risk, Beck does not just talk about risk, but about a risk society. Chapter 3 looks at what he means by this.

References Adams, J. (2001). Risk. Routledge. Arnoldi, J. (2009). Risk. An Introduction. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2002). Interview ved Mads P. Sørensen. Slagmark, 34, 125–144. Bentham, J. (1970 [1789/1823]). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. The Athlone Press. Bernstein, P.  L. (1996). Against the Gods. The Remarkable Story of Risk. John Wiley and Sons. Boyne, R. (2003). Risk. Open University Press. Breck, T. (2001). Dialog om det usikre  – nye veje i risikokommunikation. Akademisk Forlag. Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality. Power and Rule in Modern Society. Sage. Douglas, M., & Wildavsky, A. (1983). Risk and Culture. An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers. University of California Press. Ewald, F. (1991). Insurance and Risk. In G.  Burchell, C.  Gordon, & P.  Miller (Eds.), The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality. Harvester Wheatsheaf. Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Polity Press.

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Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1994a). Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1994b). Living in a Post-Traditional Society. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), Reflexive Modernization. Cambridge. Giddens, A. (1994c). Risk, Trust, Reflexivity. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), Reflexive Modernization. Cambridge. Giddens, A. (1999). Runaway World. How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives. Profile Books. Hacking, I. (2006 [1975]). The Emergence of Probability. A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference. (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. Jespersen, J. (2014). John Maynard Keynes. Den makroøkonomiske teoris oprindelse og udvikling. Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag. Keynes, J. M. (1937). The General Theory of Employment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 51(2), 209–23. Keynes, J. M. (1948 [1921]). A Treatise on Probability. Macmillan and Co. Keynes, J.  M. (1949 [1936]). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Macmillan and Co. Knight, F. H. (2006 [1921]). Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Dover Publications. Luhmann, N. (1990). Risiko und Gefahr. In N.  Luhmann (Ed.), Soziologische Aufklärung 5. Konstruktivistische Perspektiven. Westdeutscher Verlag. Luhmann, N. (1991). Soziologie des Risikos. Walter de Gruyter. Mythen, G. (2004). Ulrich Beck. A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society. Pluto Press. Rasborg, K. (2020). Risk. In P. Kivisto (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Social Theory (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press. Sennett, R. (1998). Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism. W.W. Norton and Co. Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of Risk. Science. New Series, 236 (4799), 280–285. Slovic, P. (2000a). Introduction and Overview. In P. Slovic (Ed.), The Perception of Risk. Earthscan. Slovic, P. (2000b). Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the Risk-­ assessment Battlefield. In P. Slovic (Ed.), The Perception of Risk. Earthscan. Starr, C. (1969). Social Benefit versus Technological Risk. Science. New Series, 165(3899), 1232–1238. Tonboe, J. (1997). Sociologisk sans, moralsk forandring og princippet om kontrafaktisk fortolkning. Dansk Sociologi, 8(2), 63–81. Weber, M. (1992 [1904/05]). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Routledge.

CHAPTER 3

The Idea of the Risk Society

When Beck’s book on the risk society was first published in 1986, West Germany and many other European countries were in the throes of economic crises and beset by high levels of unemployment. Awareness of the environmental impact of industrialisation was increasing, too. The book came out shortly after the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine, in the former Soviet Union (Beck, 1986: 10–11).1 The explosion emitted radioactive material into the atmosphere, and wind and rain carried it over large parts of the western Soviet Union, Europe, Scandinavia and all the way to Canada. Not surprisingly, this triggered great uncertainty and concern about the consequences of radiation, in the form of a higher risk of cancer, genetic defects in newborns, the destruction of flora and fauna and so on. Awareness also grew—including at the political level—of the need to tackle environmental problems and human-made disasters. It was perhaps, therefore, no coincidence that 1986 was also the year that marked an ‘ecological turn’, when the media began to draw attention to environmental issues, and the Ministry of the Environment was established in Germany (Grundmann, 1999: 44). Chernobyl is just one sign that life seems to have become more uncertain and unpredictable. The many others include global warming due to 1  Here and a few other places I refer to the original German versions of Beck’s books. The reason for this is that Beck continuously revised his manuscripts with the result that the English translations differ from the original German editions in some cases.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 K. Rasborg, Ulrich Beck, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89201-2_3

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rising CO2 emissions, global pandemics, the Fukushima nuclear disaster, unprecedented weather events, rainfall and flooding, depletion of the ozone layer, the effects of harmful chemicals in industry and agriculture, deforestation, the pollution of seas, lakes and streams, the loss of biodiversity as plants and animals become extinct, genetically modified foods, antibiotic-­resistant bacteria, pesticides in drinking water, global financial crises and international terrorism. Phenomena such as these led Beck to argue that we live in a ‘risk society’. His theory revolves around the threats to human life and the environment that have arisen in the wake of industrialisation. He writes: ‘By risks I mean above all radioactivity, which completely evades human perceptive abilities, but also toxins and pollutants in the air, the water and foodstuffs, together with the accompanying shortand long-term effects on plants, animals and people’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 22). Although his starting point may be environmental problems, Beck’s theory of the risk society also encompasses a number of other key themes, which are explored in greater detail in this and subsequent chapters. His original book on the subject is built around three main interrelated theses: (1) ‘the risk thesis’, that is, the basic thesis of risk’s increasing role in contemporary society (as discussed in this chapter); (2) ‘the individualisation thesis’, that is, that another key feature of the risk society is that of greater individualisation, understood as increasing social and cultural ‘release’ (Chap. 4); and (3) the thesis of ‘reflexive modernisation’, that is, that society, not least due to new risks and individualisation, is developing new forms of reflexivity (Chap. 5) (cf. Seippel, 1998: 412–14, 424). This chapter looks at the first of these theses, the ‘risk thesis’, which asserts that a range of problems associated with the production and distribution of risk are becoming more prevalent than the traditional problems associated with the production and distribution of wealth, that is, the struggle for redistribution. Beck understands ‘risk’ as the ‘unintended consequences’, or side effects, of industrial society (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 13, 19, 22–23). According to him, the structure of industrial society means that its growth and increasing prosperity have led to a number of unforeseen consequences. These have become so wide-ranging that there is now good reason to talk about the emergence of a new type of society—a risk society. The risk society is therefore what industrial society has evolved into. Whereas industrial society is characterised by the fact that it produces and distributes ‘goods’ (in the form of wealth or welfare), the risk society is

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characterised by the fact that it produces and distributes ‘bads’ (risks) (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 19–24; 1997a: 30). However, the threats facing contemporary society are not always unintended. Some of them may even be consciously intentional, for example, international terrorism (Beck, 2002, 2003). In order to conceptualise this, in his late major work, World at Risk (2009c), Beck describes risk as ‘the anticipation of the catastrophe’, and distinguishes between ‘unintended catastrophes’ (e.g. ecological crisis, global financial crises) on one side and ‘intended catastrophes’ (e.g. international terrorism) on the other (Beck, 2009c: 9–11, 76–77; cf. Arnoldi, 2009: 49–50, 166; Rasborg, 2018). This distinction is covered in greater detail in Chap. 7. Beck’s contention is that the production and distribution of risks have become so prevalent compared to the production and distribution of social goods (welfare) that we have moved into a new type of society, one that is fundamentally different from the classical industrial age. According to Beck, we must understand this fact if we are to develop new sociological concepts, ones better able to reflect modern social change. With his theory of the risk society, Beck therefore seeks to develop a new theoretical lens through which to view the world. On the one hand, he stresses that contemporary society has changed radically compared to the stage of industrial society analysed by the early classic sociologists— Karl Marx (1818–1883), Max Weber (1864–1920), Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), Georg Simmel (1858–1918) and Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936). On the other hand, he rejects the notion that we have arrived at, as some philosophers and sociologists claim, a ‘post-modern’ cultural and social state in which all previous foundations have collapsed (cf. e.g. Lyotard, 1984 [1979]; Lyon, 1999). In Beck’s own words: I am working on a new and optimistic model for understanding our times. My argument interprets what others see as the development of a post-­ modern order in terms of a stage of radicalized (second phase) modernity, a stage where the dynamics of individualization, globalization and risk undermine the first phase of industrial nation-state modernity and its foundations. Modernity becomes reflexive, which means, concerned with its unintended consequences, risks and their implications for its foundations. Where most post-modern theorists are critical of grand narratives, general theory and humanity, I remain committed to all of these, but in a new sense. To me the Enlightenment is not a historical notion and set of ideas but a process and dynamics where criticism, self-criticism, irony and humanity play a central role. (Beck, 1999: 152)

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The next section looks at the contours of this risk society, in other words at the new social dynamics that Beck thinks undermine industrial society (modernity) and its foundations.

The Contours of the Risk Society As mentioned, the risk society can in many ways be seen as a contrast to the industrial society. In the industrial society, the privileged are ‘the haves’—the people with money, power and opportunities. In the risk society, on the other hand, the privileged are those ‘who do not have’, that is, the ones able to avoid risks. According to Beck, early industrial society was a period of scarcity with a lack of material opportunities for whole swathes of the population. The main problem, therefore, was how to overcome this material poverty. This determined industrial society’s structure and basic conflicts, which were primarily based on class (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 19–24, 106–09). Today, the struggle for better living conditions has led to the modern welfare state. In many ways, this is an affluent society in which science and technology have reached a highly advanced stage of development, and in which there are almost no limits to what we are capable of producing. However, according to Beck, the flipside of this coin is that all of these advanced methods of producing welfare have an increasing number of unintended consequences (Beck, 1997a: 129). As Beck says, ‘we are living in the age of side effects’ (Beck, 1994b: 175). In Beck’s view, the risk society has consequences for all aspects of our lives. Unlike wealth, which is unevenly distributed, risks are characterised by the fact that, at least in principle, they affect everybody (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 36–44). The pesticides in drinking water do not discriminate on the basis of social background, and CO2 emissions do not respect national boundaries. On an individual level, of course, people can take steps to reduce their own risks. For example, those who can afford to do so may buy organic food produced without pesticides and artificial additives. However, because pollution is now transnational—global—such individual risk-reduction strategies can only have a limited effect (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 35–36). In industrial society, disadvantage primarily affected a particular class (the wage-earning class), but risks affect us all, and as such are classless and equal (egalitarian). As Beck puts it, ‘poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 36). Industrial society knew about risk, of course (cf. Chap. 2), for example, the risk of unemployment, but

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according to Beck ‘the logic of wealth distribution’ dominated over ‘the logic of risk distribution’. In the risk society, however, these two ‘logics’ are reversed, and ‘the logic of risk distribution’ now dominates over the ‘the logic of wealth distribution’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 12, 19–20). The struggle to (re-)distribute wealth (‘the logic of wealth distribution’) is thus increasingly replaced by a new distribution pattern (‘the logic of risk distribution’) associated with the distribution of classless (egalitarian) risks. In this sense, Beck presents the risk society as a ‘post-class society’, the stratification of which is far more complex and diffuse than that of industrial society (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 46–50, 99–100). According to Beck, it no longer makes sense to speak, as Marx did, of a certain class, the working class, as the ‘political subject’ that is the crucial driving force for social change. Rather, in the risk society, the ‘political subject’ would be ‘everybody’, as we are all potentially affected by risks, understood as the side effects of industrial society. However, does it make sense to speak of ‘everybody’ as a political subject (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 49)? In Beck’s view, the dissolution of the class structure also altered the basis for solidarity in the risk society. In the industrial society, solidarity was based on the struggle for the largest possible share of society’s surplus product, that is, the redistribution of wealth. In the risk society, on the other hand, solidarity is increasingly based on people, more or less locally and transcending traditional lines of conflict and the political right-left divide, joining together in single-issue movements—which Beck called ‘communities of danger’—in order to avert specific risks (cf. Chaps. 6 and 7). In this way, the equality utopia of industrial society is replaced by a safety utopia (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 49–50). However, the risk society must not simply be understood as a post-­ industrial society (Bell, 1976). As Beck says, it is not industrial society’s crises, but rather its ‘successes’ that have caused a range of unintended consequences, in the form of threats to people and the environment—and that these, paradoxically, tend to both transcend and transform the very same industrial society. He proposes that a ‘silent revolution’ is taking place, in which industrial society, as it were, ‘revolutionises itself’ from the inside (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 78; 1994a: 2). In Beck’s eyes, however, the crumbling of the class edifice does not mean that risks are, in all senses, egalitarian and ‘democratic’. Especially at the supranational level, risks are still embedded in global inequality. The risk society is contradictory and complex—on the one hand, it is permeated by risks that transcend borders, while on the other hand, it creates

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new global inequalities. These new inequality structures are, inter alia, linked to the fact that rich countries export hazardous industries to poor developing ones, where poverty is rife, labour is cheap and people are more willing to take risks (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 41–42). As Beck puts it: ‘the devil of hunger is fought with the Beelzebub of multiplying risk’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 43). Globally, therefore, it is the case that ‘wealth accumulates at the top, risks at the bottom’, that is, risks go hand in hand with poverty and poor living conditions (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 35; cf. 2007; Beck & Grande, 2010: 423). In other words, according to Beck, in this sense the logic of risk distribution still echoes that of wealth distribution. However, at the same time, he also discerns a ‘social boomerang effect’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 37–38). For example, when the chemical industry in rich countries sells pesticides to poor farmers in developing countries, the risks return to the rich countries in the form of pesticides in fruits and vegetables. As a result, complex, global risk circuits emerge that, at least in principle, nobody can evade—not even those who initially create the risk. In this way, the global distribution of risk both crosses borders and creates inequality. However, for Beck, the ‘social boomerang effect’ appears to be synonymous with global risks exhibiting a long-term ‘levelling’ tendency, that is, they tend towards being ‘democratic’ (cf. also Chaps. 7 and 8).

Risk, Knowledge and Politics In the risk society, knowledge is of crucial importance. This is due to a range of additional factors that, according to Beck, distinguish risks from riches. In the industrial society, wealth, as Marx points out, is visible as an ‘immense accumulation of commodities’ (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 125). Today, this accumulation has assumed a scale and character that would probably have seemed unimaginable to Marx. In the highly industrialised ‘affluent society’, wealth materialises in the form of skyscrapers, stock exchanges, large banks and finance houses, Porsches and Ferraris, gated communities, shopping centres, exclusive fashion houses, trendy restaurants, flat-screen TVs, computers, mobile phones and so on. In many ways, wealth is concrete, tangible and immediately observable (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 21, 27, 33–34). Risks, on the other hand, are often abstract, general (global) and invisible—and therefore also possible to deny. We cannot see, taste or smell pesticides in drinking water, holes in the ozone layer or radiation. We can only detect and acknowledge them through

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scientific methods, studies and experiments. We depend on science to identify and document risks (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 26–34, Chap. 2). Beck argues that the role of science is not only to identify risks, but also to define the limits of ‘acceptable’ ones, mainly by establishing threshold values. In other words, risks are determined within knowledge frameworks, which is why they are so dependent on definitions and vulnerable to ‘definition struggles’. For example, the parties concerned—the polluters, public agencies and interested citizens—may come into conflict or enter into negotiations over threshold values (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 22–23, 29–32, 46; 1994b: 179). In Beck’s view, risks are not purely ‘objective’ or defined neutrally but dependent on knowledge generated within a complex network of societal and political interests. Accordingly, there is a close correlation between risk, (scientific) knowledge and politics. Risk’s dependence on knowledge and definition means that it always contains an element of interpretation. These interpretations invariably take place within a social and cultural context and are closely linked with economic and social interests. In Beck’s view, science is therefore not necessarily a guarantee that risks will be detected and eliminated, or at least reduced. Instead, it may legitimise the production of them (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 59–61, 64–71). He argues that science’s requirement for evidence of documentable causal relationships between, for example, hazardous substances and incidence of disease leads to a paradox—the stricter the scientific rationality (the requirement for evidence), the smaller the circle of recognised risks against which action can be taken (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 62). In addition, as risks become increasingly global, it becomes more difficult to provide causal evidence, since it will often be difficult to locate the source of contamination and assign responsibility (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 62–64, 70–71). ‘The truth criterion’ for risks is, therefore, ultimately based on practice. In other words, the risk society functions as a kind of large-scale laboratory in which we are the ‘guinea pigs’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 69). Within the logic of the wealth-generation paradigm, according to Beck, scientific thinking is designated as entirely rational; within the logic of the risk-generation paradigm, it threatens to become irrational, as it increases the likelihood that risks will grow while we ‘wait for the evidence’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 63–64). Beck argues that this also creates difficulties for critical environmental science. When presenting alternative studies and evidence, the criticism of threshold values, and so on, is dependent on the very same scientific rationality that it criticises. In other words, critical

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science must use this rationality to criticise the very same rationality (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 71–72). In the risk society, we are constantly confronted with abstract, theoretical and, as it were, ‘invisible’ entities, relationships and connections that cannot be experienced directly. This turns on its head the (inductive) experience logic of everyday thinking. Is the vaccine against COVID-19, as some claim, more of a risk than the virus itself? Is it dangerous to eat genetically modified foods? Is radiation from mobile phones carcinogenic? Should all women be screened for breast cancer, or does the process involve a risk of over-diagnosis and healthy women having mastectomies? We depend on expert knowledge to answer such questions, but often the experts do not agree. Our experience is, therefore, increasingly a ‘second-­ hand non-experience’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 71–72, 83). This leads Beck to talk of the emergence of a kind of ‘shadow kingdom’, and of us living in a ‘speculative age’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 72–74).

Risk, Danger and ‘Large-Scale Hazards’ In his original book on the risk society, Beck presents many vivid descriptions of the increasingly pervasive risks that threaten both people and the environment—descriptions that clearly bear the stamp of his own indignation and concern (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 45, 47–48, 57, 59, 62, 166, 177, 186, 200; 1995c: 95). But is any of this new? Have we not always been exposed to all kinds of threats? (cf. Kemshall, 2002: 8–9; Lupton, 2013: 110; Mythen, 2004: 2–3). In pre-modern societies, earthquakes, floods or crop failures had disastrous consequences, and epidemics killed millions of people. For example, the plague that ravaged Europe during 1347–52 wiped out 40–50% of the population, and over 50 million people worldwide succumbed to the Spanish flu in 1918–19.2 In addition, many risks— as touched upon in the previous chapter—are ones that we run willingly. We smoke, drink, have fatty and unhealthy diets, take drugs, go skiing in the French Alps, do bungee jumping and play extreme sports in which we risk breaking our arms and legs. As early as 1986, Beck sought to anticipate objections like these by arguing that the nature of risk has changed. Previously, serious threats 2  Cf. Black Death | Definition, Cause, Symptoms, Effects, Death Toll, and Facts | Britannica; influenza pandemic of 1918–19 | Cause, Origin, and Spread | Britannica; accessed 11/08/21.

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were more closely tied to natural processes—earthquakes, floods, crop failures, the plague, cholera and so on—over which humans had no influence, and which affected us more or less arbitrarily. Today, by contrast, risks are bound to modern industrial production methods and are more general in scope—in the broadest sense, they are global (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 21, 32–33, 62–64; 1992: 97–99). In Risk Society (1992 [1986]), Beck alternates between ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ and points out the difficulties of connecting given risks with specific causes (cf. above.). In the book Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (1995), he seeks instead to encapsulate the differences between ‘new’ and ‘old’, ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ risks, by distinguishing between the terminology of ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ (Beck, 1995c; cf. 1993, 1996, 2009b). At the same time, he also emphasises how risk is fundamentally dependent upon decisions (Grundmann, 1999: 48). He says: … that one should distinguish here between pre-industrial hazards, not based on technological-economic decisions, and thus externalizable (onto nature, the gods), and industrial risks, products of social choice, which must be weighed against opportunities and acknowledged, dealt with, or simply foisted on individuals. (Beck, 1995c: 77)

In other words, we must distinguish between, on the one hand, pre-­ modern dangers triggered by unpredictable natural events and interpreted as fate (earthquakes, floods, epidemics, etc.), and on the other, modern risks, which are products of modern civilisation and, ultimately, of human decisions. Unlike pre-modern dangers, modern risks are characterised by their dependency on decision-making. In the highly developed (industrial) risk society, there is also a need to distinguish between: … (industrial) risks and the return of incalculable insecurities in the form of large-scale hazards of late industrialism. The latter also emerged historically out of human deeds, so they cannot be palmed off on extra-societal forces and influences; but they simultaneously undercut the social logic of risk calculation and provision. (Beck, 1995c: 77)

In the highly developed risk society, we are therefore increasingly confronted with ‘large-scale hazards’ (Grossgefahren), that is, a series of new threats—for example, nuclear accidents, holes in the ozone layer, global warming and so on—that have the following characteristics: (1) they are

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so extensive and complex that they cannot be limited in terms of time, space and society; (2) it is difficult to identify the offender definitively and assign responsibility and (3) it is impossible to insure against them or in some other way compensate for them financially: At least a threefold disjunction separates large-scale ecological, nuclear, chemical and genetic hazards from the (enduring) risks of primary industrialization: first, the former cannot be delimited, whether spatially, temporally or socially, and thus affect not only producers and consumers but also (in the limiting case) all other ‘third parties’, including those as yet unborn; second, they cannot be attributed in accordance with the rules of causality, guilt, liability; third, in so far as they cannot be compensated (because they are irreversible and global) according to the current rule of ‘polluter pays’, they are irremediable hazards imposed upon the alarmed safety consciousness of citizens. The calculus of risk, upon which the administration of hazards founds its rationality and safety guarantees, accordingly fails. Large-scale technological-ecological hazards have undermined the accident (at least, as a temporally and spatially circumscribed event), hitherto the foundation of the calculus of risk. (Beck, 1995c: 76–77)

Based on the distinction between pre-modern dangers and modern risks, it may seem inconsistent for Beck to talk about large-scale hazards associated with the highly developed (late-modern) risk society (cf. e.g. Beck, 1995c: 79, 89–90, 95, 102–03, 107–08). However, he appears to suggest that a range of the threats in the risk society are so extensive and complex that they in effect ‘assume the character of danger’, as they appear to be a ‘natural force’ that individuals cannot evade.3 At least, this seems to be the case when he emphasises the importance of distinguishing between ‘decision-­dependent risks that can in principle be brought under control, and dangers that have escaped or neutralized the control requirements of industrial society’ (Beck, 1996: 11). Beck’s distinction between risk and danger, as evidenced by the quotes above, is based on a historical periodisation. Specifically, he associates dangers with pre-industrial society, whereas risks and ‘large-scale hazards’—as a general concept—are associated with the classical industrial and highly developed (industrial) risk society (Beck, 2009b: 293). This enables him to point out that modern risks do not necessarily differ from pre-modern 3  Another possibility, of course, is that this is due to an inconsistent use of concepts, examples of which can be found throughout Beck’s writings.

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dangers due to their size, but because they stem from decision-making. At the same time, however, he stresses that risks can rarely be traced back to individuals’ decisions, as they stem from complex processes within the framework of organisations, companies, government agencies, political parties and so on (Beck, 1992: 98). The highly developed risk society therefore represents ‘organised irresponsibility’ (Beck, 1995c: Chap. 3). Beck therefore operates on the basis of a risk concept that distinguishes between (1) uncontrollable pre-modern dangers; (2) modern (industrial) risks, which in principle you can insure against; and (3) the highly developed risk society’s large-scale hazards, for which it is increasingly difficult to provide financial compensation in the form of insurance (Beck, 1995c: 77–78; 2009b: 293). In Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (1995c), Beck summarises his tripartite concept of risk in Table 3.1. Not least with the concept of large-scale hazards, Beck can thus be said to conceptualise the uncertainty—globality, unpredictability and incalculability—that characterise contemporary crises such as the climate crisis and the corona crisis.

Risks as Both Real and Socially Constructed In Risk Society, Beck stresses, as demonstrated above, that risks are knowledge-­dependent (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 23, 26–34, 46, Chap. 2). As modern risks often cannot be experienced directly, science becomes crucially important. It might be argued that a risk only becomes a risk by virtue of the fact that we possess (scientific) knowledge of it. Sometimes, Beck even goes so far as to claim that risks are constituted in the knowledge relationship (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 23, 55, 75). Nonetheless, he frequently expresses the view that risks are very real and increasing, and as such are leading to a new type of society (Beck, 1992 [1986]:45, 47, 57, 166, 177, 186, 200; 1995c: 96).4 On this point, Risk Society seems to lack clarity. Are risks objective realities, or are they social and cultural constructs? Has there been an objective increase in risks in late modernity? Or is it a case of greater awareness of 4  Based on this, some commentators perceive Beck’s theory of risk society as an expression of scientific-theory realism, in which risk is understood as: ‘… something out there, as a thing or a property of a thing’ (Seippel, 1998: 412; cf. Alexander & Smith, 1996, Arnoldi, 2009: 49; Dean, 1999: 182).

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Table 3.1  Risk and hazards Pre-industrial high cultures Type and example Contingent upon decisions?

Voluntary (individually avoidable)?

Range: who affected Calculability (cause-effect, insurance against risks)

Hazards, natural disasters, plague No: projectable (gods, demons)

Classical industrial society

Risks, accidents (occupational, traffic) Yes: industrial development (economy, technology, organisation) No: assigned, Yes: (e.g. smoking, pre-existing driving, skiing, external destiny occupation) Rule-governed attribution Countries, Regionally, temporally, peoples, cultures socially circumscribed events and destruction Open insecurity; Calculable insecurity politically (probability neutral, because compensation) destined

Industrial risk society Self-jeopardy, man-made disasters Yes: nuclear, chemical, genetic industries and political safety guarantees No: collective decision, individually unavoidable hazards Yes and no (organised non-responsibility) Undelimitable ‘accidents’

Politically explosive hazards, which render questionable the principles of calculation and precaution

Source: Beck (1995c: 77–78) Although the table is highly generalised, readers may wonder about Beck only mentioning ‘voluntary’ risks in the early industrial society, while neglecting the ‘systemic’ risks that also existed, for example, unemployment, industrial accidents, poverty and so on. Conversely, Beck’s examples of voluntary risks in early industrial society (smoking, driving, etc.) might also be said to still exist. These definitional difficulties bear witness to the fact that risks are so complex and multi-faceted that it is not easy to assign them to more general categories

and sensitivity to risks? Beck’s answer to these questions in Risk Society seems to be ‘both-and’—our awareness of risk is increasing because there is an objective increase in risk (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 55). In his later works, however, Beck more explicitly addresses the constructivism problem (Beck, 1996, 1999, 2009c). His position can be described as a rejection of both, on the one hand, what he calls ‘naïve realism’ and, on the other, ‘naïve constructivism’. Naïve realism suggests that risks have an objective existence, independent of the observer, and therefore can be precisely determined using natural-science methods, for example, risk calculations, threshold values and so on. Conversely, naïve—or radical—constructivism suggests that risks have no objective existence

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independent of the observer, but are formed by our observations, which are specific to particular knowledge and cultural frameworks, and therefore vary. In Beck’s view, neither position is acceptable. Naïve realism does not take into account the fact that risk calculations, threshold values and so on are largely ‘definition-dependent’, that is, they are determined in a complicated interplay of knowledge, power, political and economic interests and so on (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 23, 26–34, Chap. 2; 1996). Conversely, naïve constructivism leads to a form of relativism that renders the risk devoid of any real content. Beck considers this problematic: For, among other things, we know that people in the Stone Age did not have the capacity for nuclear and ecological annihilation, and that the dangers posed by lurking demons did not have the same political dynamic as the man-made hazards of ecological self-destruction. (Beck, 1996: 4)

Instead, he advocates a kind of ‘middle position’ between these two extremes, which he refers to as ‘reflexive realism’ (Beck, 1996: 4–7). This is a more moderate (epistemological) constructivism, which maintains that although risks are interpreted differently at different times and places, they nonetheless have real content that cannot simply be reduced to a matter of interpretation (cf. Adam & Loon, 2000: 2–3). In other words, Beck stresses that ‘risks are at the same time “real” and constituted by social perception and construction’ (Beck, 1999: 143; cf. Lupton, 2013: 79–80). Late-modern risks are complex and composite and based at one and the same time on mathematical calculations, technical knowledge, culture and norms (Beck, 1999: 138). The fact that risk is both real and constructed means that it is not possible to adopt either an exclusively realist or constructivist approach: I consider realism and constructivism to be neither an either-or option, nor a mere matter of belief. We should not have to swear allegiance to any particular view or theoretical perspective. The decision whether to take a realist or a constructivist approach is for me rather a pragmatic one, a matter of choosing the appropriate means for a desired goal. If I have to be a realist (for the moment) in order to open up the social sciences for the new and contradictory experiences of the global age of global risks, then I have no qualms about adopting the guise and language of a (‘reflexive’) ‘realist’. If constructivism makes a (positive) problem shift possible and if it allows us to raise important questions that realists do not ask, then I am content (for the

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moment at least) to be a constructivist. […] I find it insufficient today, especially in the area of the sociology of risk, to restrict my analysis to one perspective or conceptual dogma only. I can be both a realist and constructivist, using realism and constructivism, as far as those metanarratives are useful for the purpose of understanding the complex and ambivalent ‘nature’ of risk in the world risk society we live in. (Beck, 1999: 134)

As risks are composite and complex, theoretical understandings of them must necessarily also be composite and complex. In Beck’s opinion, the question of which approach to use is largely a pragmatic one, which depends on what, specifically, you want to study or emphasise. In his late major work World at Risk (2009c), Beck seems to maintain his ‘reflexive realism’, which he—in a somewhat paradoxical manner— now describes as ‘constructivist realism’ (Beck, 2009c: 21, 89). On one hand, he argues, fully in line with the most radical formulations in Risk Society, that risk exists solely in our observation (radical constructivism): ‘… the objectivity of a risk is a product of its perception and its staging (also by experts)’ (Beck, 2009c: 13; cf. 12, 30–31; 2009a: 9). On the other hand, he maintains that risks are real phenomena that exist independently of observers (realism): Does the ‘staging’ of risk therefore mean that risks do not exist at all? Of course not. Nobody can deny that the fears that an intercontinental airliner will explode as a result of a terrorist attack, that a nuclear power plant will be built, that an oil tanker will run aground, or that London and Tokyo will be inundated as a result of climate change as some predict, are founded on objective realities. (Beck, 2009c: 13)

He also refers to ‘institutional constructivism’ (Beck, 2009c: 90–93), which largely consists of the idea that risks and threshold values are determined—and thus constructed socially—in a series of complex negotiated interplays between polluting companies, concerned citizens and public agencies (cf. above) (Beck, 2009c: 91). Beck’s attempt to ‘reconcile’ realism and constructivism thus seems to be synonymous with a claim that contemporary society’s ‘risk reality’ is socially constructed: ‘The reality of risk is shown by its controversial character. Risks do not have any abstract existence in themselves. They acquire reality in the contradictory judgements of groups and populations’ (Beck, 2009c: 13; cf. 127–28). On closer inspection, however, Beck’s

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‘constructivist realism’ encompasses at least three different understandings of the nature of the reality of risk, which are not always kept separate. 1. Realism: Risks are real phenomena that have agency. During the modernisation process, their (objective) characteristics change, and they increasingly become ‘large-scale hazards’ that cannot be insured against (incalculability) (Beck, 2009c: 13, 86, 89). 2. Moderate constructivism: Risks are complex constructions formed by nature, society, culture, mathematical calculations, actuarial models and so on. They are ‘composed’ of both ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ factors (‘hybridisation’, cf. Latour, 2003) (Beck, 2009c: 27, 58, 84, 90). 3. Radical constructivism: Risks are purely discursive phenomena that only ‘manifest’ once we are aware of them; in ‘(the world) risk society’, they are defined in ‘transnational discourse coalitions’ that put (observed) global threats on the public agenda (Beck, 2009c: 30–31, 86). In addition to a more ‘pure’ realism, there are therefore a variety of social constructivisms at play in Beck—from a more moderate epistemological constructivism to a radical ontological form (cf. Cottle, 1998: 10–12; Rasborg, 2012: 11–14).

Manufactured Uncertainty One of the sociologists most inspired by Beck’s diagnosis of the risk society is Anthony Giddens, who also bases his analysis of late modernity on a concept of risk (Giddens, 1990, 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999). On some points, however, he deviates from Beck’s diagnosis of the risk society, which is why parts of his work can be seen as a ‘critical corrective’ to Beck (cf. also Chap. 8). Like Beck, Giddens distinguishes between, on the one hand, pre-­ modern dangers (hazards) that are linked to nature and perceived as determined by fate (which he calls fortuna) (Giddens, 1998a: 27; 1998b: 64); and on the other, modern risks stemming from human intervention in nature and, in a wider sense, modern society’s move away from tradition and towards institutional reflexivity (Giddens, 1999: 20–23). In doing so, he emphasises that risks are a specifically modern phenomenon. According to Giddens, early modernity, which largely coincided with the emergence

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of industrial society, was dominated by ‘external risks’. These risks, firstly, were still perceived as ‘external’ to society; secondly, were so comparatively limited that it was possible to calculate them; and thirdly, therefore, could be offset financially by means of insurance (unemployment insurance, health insurance, etc.) (Giddens, 1998a: 27; 1999: 25–27). Today, however, we are confronted with new types of risks and existential uncertainty that can be attributed to late modernity’s dynamism and rapid pace of change. These change tendencies are expressed in the form of (1) a restructuring of time and space; (2) a ‘disembedding’ of expert systems and (3) greater institutional reflexivity (Giddens, 1990: 17–45). This rapid modernisation process breaks down tradition, erodes previous certainties and beliefs and exacerbates uncertainty. In other words, the pace of social change and institutional reflexivity threatens ‘ontological certainty’, that is, the basic trust that makes us ‘resistant’ to late modernity’s risks (Giddens, 1991: 36–42). Giddens argues that, in late modernity, pre-modern hazards and external risks are increasingly replaced by a ‘manufactured uncertainty’, that is, a fundamental, human-made uncertainty that emerges in societies in which traditional certainties are swept away by the end of both tradition and nature (Giddens, 1994a: 78, 152; 1998a: 28; 1999: 25–28). He also argues that we are confronted with ‘high-consequence risks’. This refers mainly to global environmental threats due to human intervention in nature (global warming, rising sea levels, floods, droughts, etc.) (Giddens, 1994a: 78, 152, 219–23). Both manufactured uncertainty and high-­ consequence risks are characterised by not being calculable. As such, they cannot be insured against, and in this respect, they resemble Beck’s ‘large-­ scale hazards’ (Giddens, 1994a: 152; 1998a: 28). Despite these new risks, Giddens does not contend that there has been an overall increase in actual risk—‘real riskiness’—in late-modern society. In fact, quite the opposite (Giddens, 1991: 114–24; 1998a: 27). Modern science and technology have enabled us to combat diseases that used to be fatal, and we have experienced significant improvements in our hygiene, standard of health, housing, nutrition, general living conditions and so on. Progress in modern science and new technology have to a great extent helped to eliminate or reduce a variety of risks that would previously have been life-threatening (Giddens, 1991: 115–16; cf. Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983: 13–14; Latour, 2003: 36). As a striking example, life expectancy in recent centuries has increased significantly in all modern industrialised nations (for more on this, see Chap. 8).

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In Giddens’ view, it would be more reasonable to discuss how the ‘risk profile’ has changed in late modern society, that is, natural hazards (deadly diseases, natural disasters, etc.) are increasingly replaced by human-made hazards (pesticides, declining biodiversity, global warming, etc.) (Giddens, 1994a: 4; 1999: 34). Whereas Beck seems to be of the opinion that the increase in human-made hazards exceeds the reduction of natural ones, Giddens thinks that the situation is the other way round, that is, that the ‘the end result’ is a risk reduction: ‘In terms of basic life security, nonetheless, the risk-reducing elements seem substantially to outweigh the new array of risks’ (Giddens, 1991: 116–17). Thus, Giddens does not view late modernity as necessarily more risky in terms of everyday life (Giddens, 1991: 123–24, 181–82). Rather, he argues that an increasingly reflexive risk assessment and management is a central part of everyday life in late modernity, which increases our awareness of risks. In his later writings, Beck increasingly supports—albeit in an ambiguous and not always clear manner (cf. above)—this (constructivist) view. He accepts the possibility that the risk society does not necessarily entail an objective increase in risk (realism), but also that this may well be just a matter of us becoming increasingly aware of—and anticipating—risks (constructivism) (Beck, 2009c: 11). Common to both Giddens and Beck is this distinction between pre-­ modern hazards and modern risks. Both also stress that a central characteristic of late modernity is the emergence of new types of risks and generalised uncertainty—large-scale hazards, high-consequence risks and manufactured uncertainty—that are not calculable, and therefore cannot be dealt with using insurance principles (Giddens, 1994a: 152; 1998a: 28).5

Risk as Observation The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann also distinguished between risk and danger (1990, 1991). However, he assigns a different meaning to risk than Beck (and Giddens), as he uses the term to refer to social systems’ observation of themselves and their surroundings.6 5  As far as the basic concepts of risk are concerned, there is therefore a high degree of correlation between Beck and Giddens. This is reinforced by the fact that Beck, in his later writings, assimilates Giddens’ concept of ‘manufactured uncertainty’ (Beck, 1997a: 278; 1996: 1, 11; 2009b). 6  Beck himself refers to Luhmann in connection with the distinction between risk and danger (Beck, 1993: 278, note 10a; 1995c: 77–78) and notes that this distinction is now

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For Luhmann, risks are basically linked to decisions (Luhmann, 1990: 136, 140; 1991: 16–17). Decisions manifest as risks when they are observed with a view to the future. They are invariably taken against an unknown (contingent) future in which the possibility—or, more precisely, the risk—of unintended consequences (counter-finalities) is always present. In Luhmann’s view, therefore, all decisions, including those aimed at ensuring security, are associated with risk (Luhmann, 1990: 135, 160). Consequently, Luhmann rejects the otherwise obvious option of positioning security as a counter-concept to risk. He views security as a reflex devoid of content in relation to risk—all that can be said conclusively is that there is no absolute security (Luhmann, 1990: 134–36; 1991: 20, 219–20; cf. Kneer & Nassehi, 1993: 175). The counter-concept to risk is therefore not certainty, but danger. According to Luhmann, the distinction between risk and danger is due to ‘attribution’, that is, to the question of who decides (Luhmann, 1990: 137–38, 148–49). For the person making a decision, the consequences of that decision are risks; whereas for those affected, who did not themselves make the decision, the consequences are dangers (Luhmann, 1990: 148–49; cf. 1991: 21–23, 26–27). Depending on the perspective of the observer, the same action can therefore appear, respectively, as either risk or danger. Smokers run the risk of contracting lung cancer, but their habit turns others into passive smokers, and exposes them to danger. If I drive without my glasses, I run the risk of crashing, but for others on the road I represent a danger (Luhmann, 1990: 149–50). It is therefore the decision that forms the basis for Luhmann’s distinction. As the decision-making processes of modern society become more complex, the more the attribution moves in the direction of risk (Luhmann, 1991: 27–28, 45–46). On the other hand, it is equally plausible to claim that, in the long term, the attribution leans towards danger, as our risky decisions become dangerous to those whom they affect, and we ourselves are ultimately affected by our own decisions (Luhmann, 1990: 167). However, this attribution presupposes that there is ‘something’—in Luhmann’s view, a social system—that observes given decisions as risks or dangers. His point is that risks should be seen in the context of modern society’s self-observation (Luhmann, 1990: 137). In his risk analysis, Luhmann wants to observe how modern society observes itself, in terms widely accepted in more recent risk sociology (cf. Giddens, 1998a; Luhmann, 1990; Ewald, 1991a, 1991b; Castel, 1991).

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of the consequences of its increasingly complex decision-making processes (Kneer & Nassehi, 1993: 170–71). This requires ‘observation of the observation’ or a ‘second-order observation’ (Luhmann, 1990: 137–38; 1991: 14–19, 21, Chap. 12). For Luhmann, risks are not objective realities, but an expression of certain ways of observing the world. In other words, they are a form of radical social constructivism (Rasborg, 2020).7 Luhmann’s risk analytics illustrate a number of paradoxes that Beck overlooks, for example the fact that there is not necessarily any connection between our own willingness to take risks and our willingness to accept others’ risky behaviour (dangers): It follows from the actual theory of attribution’s definition of the concepts that observing something as a risk and as a danger may diverge according to social systems. The willingness to accept a threatening future varies considerably depending on whether the problem is viewed in a danger schema or a risk schema. Even those highly willing to run risks in terms of their own behaviour are not prepared as a matter of course to accept the risks arising from the behaviour of others. (Luhmann, 1990: 154)

We drive cars, fly in planes, use pesticides and artificial additives and so on, and yet at the same time we demand sustainability, clean air and organic and healthy food. We demand, in other words, that each of us ‘can live riskily without danger’ (Luhmann, 1990: 163). This is a paradox—our own willingness to take risks requires a high degree of protection against other people’s willingness to take them (Luhmann, 1990: 154–55). The more such demands are directed towards, for example, the political system and its decision-makers, the more the system is placed under pressure and risks running into a crisis of legitimacy. However, Beck’s incorporation of Luhmann and other risk sociologists’ distinctions between risk and danger should not be taken as a sign that he accepts Luhmann’s systems theory in its entirety. On the contrary, he criticises systems theory for marginalising the actors (subjects) (Beck, 1997b: 82–84; 1993: 180–81, note 16), and for being too arbitrary and situation-­ dependent, since one and the same phenomenon can be thought of as a risk and a danger depending on the observer’s perspective. According to 7  Luhmann is also sceptical about the concept of the ‘risk society’, which he describes as a ‘fashion concept’ (Luhmann, 1990: 139–40). Rather than a new type of society, he sees the ‘risk society’ as an expression of a new form of self-observation, or ‘crisis semantics’ in modern society.

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Beck, this leads to a situation-dependent ‘relativism’ that makes it difficult to trace the lines of social conflict that arise from risks (Beck, 1993: 278 f., note 10c). On some points, Beck’s theory does assimilate Luhmann’s thinking, but this should not be taken as a sign of overall agreement (Seippel, 1998: 418; Rasborg, 2001).

Risk, Insurance and Governmentality According to Beck (and Giddens), risks are increasingly incalculable, and as such the risk society is not simply an ‘insurance society’ (Ewald, 1991a; cf. Rasborg, 2012). As long as risks—in the early industrial society—were still relatively limited in nature and could be calculated more or less accurately, you could insure against them (unemployment insurance, health insurance, accident insurance, etc.). The ‘risk society’ and the ‘insurance society’ were, to a great extent, two sides of the same coin. However, the risk society’s ‘manufactured uncertainty’ and ‘large-scale hazards’ represent a collapse of the insurance principle, as it is difficult to predict hazards and calculate their extent, let alone precisely define and identify both who is causing it and who is affected (Beck, 1993: 40–45; 1995c: 85, 106–10). According to Beck, the risk society’s ‘low probability, but high-­ consequence risks’ therefore lead to a paradox. Although technicians, experts and political decision-makers may claim that the risk of any given damage/accident occurring is minimal, it is nevertheless impossible to insure against them. In other words, in the highly developed risk society, the technical risk calculation collides with the insurance principle (Beck, 1997a: 52). We might describe the highly developed risk society according to Beck (and Giddens) as a ‘post-risk-calculation society’ (Dean, 1999: 183), which means that it is also largely a ‘post-insurance society’. For example, after 9/11, new restrictions imposed by insurance companies made it much more difficult and expensive for companies, organisations and government agencies to insure against the consequences of international terrorism (Arnoldi, 2009: 149–50; Bougen, 2003; Ericson & Doyle, 2004: 161–62). The question is whether it is possible to maintain Beck’s (and Giddens’) assumption of the existence of a historical period (industrial society) when it was possible to calculate and thus insure against risks, and another historical period (the risk society) in which it is more difficult to calculate and thus insure against risks. The Australian social scientist Mitchell Dean (1999) points out that this ultimately rests on a realist assumption that the

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different historical epochs or phases are dominated by different types of risks with certain inherent properties. Critique of the Realist Understanding of Risk Dean, whose work builds on that of the French social philosophers Michel Foucault (1991 [1978]) and François Ewald (1991a, 1991b), among others, is critical of Beck’s ‘stages thinking’ within the framework of a theory of modernity and what he refers to as its ‘realist’ view of risk (Dean, 1999: 181–82).8 Here, he draws on Ewald, who states: ‘Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event’ (Ewald, 1991b: 199). In other words, risk is not an inherent property of the given phenomenon, but a reflection of a certain way of observing it. Just as for Luhmann risks are decisions for which the consequences are observed in the future, for Ewald risks are given events (damage) observed from an insurance point of view. He therefore sees an inextricable link between risk and insurance (Ewald, 1991b: 198). He describes insurance as a ‘risk technology’ and argues that it is precisely this relationship that makes it meaningful to talk about risk at all. According to this insurance (actuarial) risk concept, risk has the following three characteristics: (1) it is calculable; (2) it is collective and (3) it is a capital (Ewald, 1991b: 201–05). Ewald points out that for something to be a risk, it must be possible to subject it to actuarial principles (statistics and probability calculus) (Ewald, 1991b: 201–02). It must also be possible to map how the damage is distributed across given populations (Ewald, 1991b: 202–03). Finally, it must be possible, via insurance, to provide financial compensation for injuries/damages to which it is difficult to assign a price (e.g. the loss of a body part in an accident at work). This is calculated using actuarial tables that establish how much compensation a given injury (e.g. a certain degree of disability) should trigger (Ewald, 1991b: 204–05). Insurance can, therefore, be seen as an attempt to ‘make the incalculable calculable’ (Dean, 1999: 184). In other words, Ewald argues that risk cannot be 8  Beck himself stresses the realist element in the ‘phases model’ when he says, for example: ‘The strength of realism can be seen in its clear historical sequential model, in which industrial society has gone through two distinct phases. In the first phase, class or social questions were paramount, in the second phase, ecological questions. Yet it would be a gross simplification to assume that the environmental question is supplanting the class question’ (Beck, 2009c: 86).

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understood independently of insurance, and as a result it makes no sense to talk about non-insurable risks. Three Basic Assumptions Underpinning Beck’s Theory Based on Ewald’s understanding of risk, Dean (1999: 181–82) points out that Beck’s theory of the risk society is based on three basic assumptions that Dean considers problematic: (1) the ‘totalising’ assumption; (2) an assumption of the ‘uniformity’ of risk and (3) the ‘realist’ assumption (Dean, 1999: 181–82). The first of these assumptions concerns Beck’s view of risks as an expression of a new, overarching structure created by the industrial modernisation process (Dean, 1999: 181–82).9 The second concerns Beck’s (and Giddens’) perception that it is possible to categorise risks into general types that have similar characteristics and have prevailed during different historical periods (Dean, 1999: 181–82). The third assumption concerns Beck’s point (especially in his early work) that the advent of the risk society had to do with an actual increase in risk: ‘the reason that risk is a feature of quotidian existence in this risk society, and a component of individual and collective experience and identities, is that real riskiness has increased so much that it has outrun the mechanisms of its calculation and control’ (Dean, 1999: 182). According to Dean, it is these assumptions that underpin Beck’s (and Giddens’) idea that it is possible to talk about a historical period in which risks were predominantly calculable, and another in which it is increasingly difficult to calculate them. In other words: ‘… risk is [viewed] within a general schema and narrative of phases of modernity and as a feature of the ontological condition of humans within current social forms’ (Dean, 1999: 178). However, within the framework of Ewald’s concept of risk, this idea is problematic. If risks are defined in insurance terms, then it follows by definition that they must be calculable—otherwise they would not be risks: ‘It is thus not possible to speak of incalculable risks, or of risks that escape our modes of calculation, and even less to speak of a social order in which risk is largely calculable and contrast it with one in which 9  By way of analogy, it might be said that just as Marx, in a Hegelian manner, characterises capital (‘processing value’) as an ‘automatic subject’ (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 255), Beck sees global risks as a new, overarching ‘alienation context’ from which individuals cannot escape.

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risk has become largely incalculable’ (Dean, 1999: 177). In addition, insurance technologies are largely about making the incalculable calculable, that is, putting a price on damage/injury that can be difficult to quantify (e.g. disability due to accident): ‘It is thus not possible to contrast calculable risks and incalculable risks. For insurance rationality, everything can be treated as a risk and the task of insurers has been both to “produce” risks and to find ways of insuring what has previously been thought to be uninsurable’ (Dean, 1999: 184). In Dean’s opinion, Beck’s basic assumptions are problematic because, ‘It is clear that the genealogy of risk is much more complex than the theory of risk society allows’ (Dean, 1999: 191). Dean proposes a more differentiated understanding of the concept, in which risk is seen as being associated with a variety of complex management technologies and practices in the modern welfare state (Dean, 1999: 176–77). Dean thinks inspiration can be taken from, inter alia, Foucault and Ewald, for whom ‘risk is analysed as an assemblage of practices, techniques and rationalities concerned with how we govern’ (Dean, 1999: 178). In Dean’s far more constructivist approach, risk is therefore not closely linked to scientific and technological progress. Rather, it is associated with the emergence in modern society of new, reflexive—advanced liberal or neoliberal—forms of ‘governmentality’, which are about ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Dean, 1999: 177; cf. Foucault, 1991 [1978]; Greve, 1999; Lupton, 2013: 113–14).

Summary This chapter has explained the first principal component of Beck’s diagnosis of the risk society, namely ‘the risk thesis’. In order to clarify what was particular about Beck’s position, I have drawn comparisons to three other prominent risk sociologists: Giddens, Luhmann and Dean (via Foucault/ Ewald). By way of conclusion, I will attempt to summarise the most important characteristics of Beck’s concept of risk, as seen in relation to the other risk sociologists mentioned above. In order to establish some points of comparison, I will take as my starting point five aspects that must be considered when analysing sociological theories of risk: . The explanation of the cause of the new risks 1 2. The perception of the risks’ consequences in contemporary society 3. The linguistic code or distinction by which risks are categorised

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. The implications for the general population’s perception of risks 4 5. The strategy to reduce or manage risks10 With regard to the explanation of the cause of the new risks (point 1), we have seen that pre-modern hazards, according to Beck, were due to the ‘whims’ of nature and interpreted in a framework based on fate, whereas modern risks are largely rooted in economic, scientific and technological progress—all of which are ultimately the result of human decisions. However, these factors are made more complex by the involvement of collective decision-making, which means that the individual cannot always be held responsible. This is in contrast to the early industrial society, in which risks were more readily defined and could be localised (cf. Table  3.1). Giddens points out that risks not only stem from (decisions regarding) the economy, science and technology, but also, in a broader sense, are the result of a greater institutional reflexivity that has heightened our awareness of risks. Luhmann emphasised this observation aspect even more strongly, pointing out that new risks are due to the emergence in modern society of new forms of self-observation, which are related to the increasing complexity of decision-making. Dean also points out that the cause of new risks lies in the insurance rationality that has come to define modern society, which is all about making reality calculable and thus controllable. With regard to the question of the consequences of risks in contemporary society (point 2), Beck’s view is that the risks—both ‘manufactured uncertainty’ and ‘large-scale hazards’—are now so widespread that it is impossible to define them precisely, allocate responsibility for them or insure against them. Originally, Beck’s conception of ‘the risk society’ signified an increase in actual risk. However, his later writings allow for the possibility that it is about an increased subjective perception of risk, not least as a result of media exposure. In this, Beck seems to move closer to Giddens, who points out that the ‘risk society’ is not necessarily just a matter of ‘real riskiness’—it is equally a matter of us becoming more aware of the risks as a result of late modernity’s increased reflexivity. Luhmann proceeds even further down this constructivist path. For him, risks are not predestined phenomena that exist independently of observations of social systems (first-order observations), but in fact rely on observations (second-­ order observations/constructivism). For Dean, too, risks depend on ‘observations’, in that they are associated with the spread in modern  The five aspects are inspired by Nielsen (1996: 64) but amended in several respects.

10

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society of a particular perspective, namely an insurance perspective, which is about making the incalculable calculable. With regard to the question of codes by which to categorise risk (point 3), we have seen how Beck, in his original theory of the risk society, seems to make ‘security’ the counter-concept to risk, whereas in his later writings he assimilates the distinction made by Luhmann and other risk sociologists between ‘risk’ and ‘danger’. Giddens refers to ‘ontological certainty’ (trust) as the counter-concept to risk, Luhmann uses ‘danger’, and Dean opts for ‘incalculable chance’ (uncertainty). With regard to the question of the implications for the general population’s subjective perception of risks (point 4), we have seen that, according to Beck, the invisible nature of risks means that they are often ‘repressed’ or excommunicated. This is in the interests of those who produce the risks—polluting companies and so on—as it absolves them of responsibility. We therefore rely on science (advanced measurement methods, laboratory experiments, etc.) in order to detect and guard against risks. Consequently, we rarely have first-hand experience of risks. Instead our experience is often second-hand, based on representations of risks by others (the media, experts, etc.). This makes risks abstract and associates them with considerable uncertainty. For Giddens, the perception of risk is to a higher degree connected to knowledge and (self) reflection, for Luhmann it is linked to observation, and Dean links it to the insurance perspective. With regard to the opportunities to manage risk (point 5) Beck thinks, as we have seen, that science’s demand for ‘reliable evidence’ helps to legitimise the production of risks. This is precisely why doubts about the hazardous nature of particular substances favour the manufacturers. By contrast, he proposes a precautionary principle, in which doubt favours the people and the environment. In his later works, Beck also considers how we might create better and more democratic decision-making processes for the deployment of new technology (cf. Chap. 6). Compared to Beck’s thesis of the excommunication of risks, Giddens seems to have a more optimistic view of the potential for raising awareness of risks and thus responding to them. Finally, in both Luhmann and Dean, it is difficult to spot any ‘counter-strategies’ at all in relation to risk—except perhaps ‘better risk communication’ (Luhmann) and ‘better risk management’ (Dean). Table 3.2 summarises the main points of Beck’s understanding of risk, compared with Giddens, Luhmann and Dean.

‘Second-hand non-experience’; non-knowledge Precautionary-­ principle; greater democratic control

Complexity of decision-making

Niklas Luhmann

Ontological security/trust Danger Risk reduction in terms of everyday A new ‘crisis semantics’ life and security; emergence of new high-consequence risks Reflection; knowledge Observation of decisions with a view to the future (second-order observation) Greater awareness of risks through ‘Better’ risk-communication reflection and knowledge

Detraditionalisation; institutional reflexivity; technology

Anthony Giddens

Observation of phenomena from an insurance point of view ‘Better’ risk-management

Incalculability Insurance-technology to manage risks

Governmentality-­ rationality/calculability

Mitchell Dean

Source: The table is by the author, but inspired by Nielsen (1996). In several respects, it has been amended and changed, most notably with the addition of Mitchell Dean

Strategy

Perception

Economic, technical and scientific development Distinction Security/danger Consequences Increased risks (real and/or experienced)

Cause

Ulrich Beck

Table 3.2  Beck’s understanding of risk, compared with Giddens, Luhmann and Dean

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Having considered the first main assumption in Beck’s theory of the risk society (‘the risk thesis’), I will now move on to the second—‘the individualisation thesis’.

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Giddens, A. (1998a). Risk Society: The Context of British Politics. In J. Franklin (Ed.), The Politics of Risk Society. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1998b). Interview Four: Modernity. In A.  Giddens & C.  Pierson (Eds.), Conversations with Anthony Giddens. Making Sense of Modernity. Cambridge. Giddens, A. (1998c). The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1999). Runaway World. How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives. Profile Books. Greve, A. (1999). Risikobegreber i tysk og fransk sociologi. In K. A. Nielsen et al. (Eds.), Risiko, politik og miljø i det moderne samfund. Forlaget Sociologi. Grundmann, R. (1999). Wo steht die Risikosoziologie? Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 28(1), 44–59. Kemshall, H. (2002). Risk, Social Policy and Welfare. Open University Press. Kneer, G., & Nassehi, A. (1993). Niklas Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme. Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Latour, B. (2003). Is Re-modernization Occurring – And If So, How to Prove It? A Commentary on Ulrich Beck. Theory, Culture and Society, 20(2), 35–48. Luhmann, N. (1990). Risiko und Gefahr. In N.  Luhmann (Ed.), Soziologische Aufklärung 5. Konstruktivistische Perspektiven. Westdeutscher Verlag. Luhmann, N. (1991). Soziologie des Risikos. Walter de Gruyter. Lupton, D. (2013). Risk (2nd ed.). Routledge. Lyon, D. (1999). Postmodernity (2nd ed.). Open University Press. Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester University Press. Marx, K. (1976 [1867]). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Vol. 1). Penguin Books. Mythen, G. (2004). Ulrich Beck. A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society. Pluto Press. Nielsen, T. H. (1996). Risks – In Technology, Society and the Mind. Radiation Protection Dosimetry, 68(3–4), 181–184. Rasborg, K. (2001). From Industrial Modernity to Risk Modernity? A Critical Discussion of the Theory of the ’Risk Society. In M.  Carleheden & M.  H. Jacobsen (Eds.), The Transformation of Modernity. Aspects of the Past, Present and Future of an Era. Ashgate. Rasborg, K. (2012). ‘(World) risk society’ or ‘new rationalities of risk’? A Critical Discussion of Ulrich Beck’s Theory of Reflexive Modernity. Thesis Eleven, 108(1), 3–25. Rasborg, K. (2018). From ‘the bads of goods’ to ‘the goods of bads’ – The most recent developments in Ulrich Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology. Theory, Culture and Society, 35(7–8), 157–173. Rasborg, K. (2020). Risk. In P. Kivisto (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Social Theory (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press. Seippel, Ø. (1998). Risikosamfunnet – en teoretisk og empirisk kritikk. Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning, 39(3), 411–445.

CHAPTER 4

Individualisation: Beyond Class and Social Communities?

Environmental issues may have been the starting point for Beck’s general diagnosis of the risk society, as noted in Chap. 3, but the concept is not only tied in with damage inflicted on the planet but also in a broader sense with the de-traditionalisation and individualisation of modern society. On the one hand, this process frees us from traditional ways of life and communities (the church, the local area, classes, political parties, the family, etc.); on the other hand, it exacerbates existential uncertainty, as we lose what were previously the fixed anchors in life (Beck, 1992 [1986]: part 2). This process brings us to the second key component in Beck’s diagnosis of the risk society: his ‘individualisation thesis’. In general, when sociologists use the term ‘individualisation’, they are referring to individual choices and particular ways of life gaining ground at the expense of collective action and social communities (Brannen & Nilsen, 2005; Howard, 2007a: 2). Obvious examples of this shift from the collective to the individual are high divorce rates and the rising number of people who now choose to live alone (Beck, 1995a: 41; 1997b: 184; Twenge, 2014: 224–26). Sociologists and the media endlessly discuss whether young people in particular have become a ‘generation me’ who think everything revolves around them and have a huge need to ‘be seen’ and ‘be on’ (Twenge, 2014). The narrative propagated by reality TV and talent shows like X-Factor and Britain’s Got Talent is that everybody has a ‘unique individual core’, a hidden talent—it is just a matter of finding it (Twenge, 2014: 120–22). In this culture of constant performance and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 K. Rasborg, Ulrich Beck, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89201-2_4

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striving for perfection, where ‘perfect’ seems to have become ‘the new normal’, individualisation is also very much tied in with the requirement for lifelong self-optimisation in education, work and leisure. Employers expect flexibility and adaptability (cf. Chap. 6). The education system expects young people to graduate as quickly as possible, with as high grades as possible, ready for the next dream study programme and/or job. In short, the individualised society encourages optimal performance across all parameters, be it at work, in education, in relationships, with friends, in the gym, on holiday and so on—all of which must, of course, be documented in the form of ‘selfies’ on social media (Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, etc.) (Twenge, 2014: 134–36). Paradoxically, this means that individualisation often assumes a somewhat standardised and ‘conformist’ form (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 90, 130, 132; 1995a: 107). In some cases, individualisation is also linked to neoliberalism—if we are responsible for our own successes, then we must also be to blame when things go wrong (Dean, 1999, 2003; Howard, 2007a: 3, 16–17; 2007b: 26, 42–43). Even in death, it might be argued that we are becoming more individualised, as many of us plan our own funerals in ways that present us as the unique individuals we were (Beck, 1995a: 171–74; Rasborg, 2017). In the early 1980s, the German social psychologist Thomas Ziehe introduced the concept of ‘cultural release’ as part of his analyses of the ‘cultural modernisation’ of the highly developed post-war welfare state (Ziehe, 1975; Ziehe & Stubenrauch, 1982). Although they would become key themes in the debates on late-modern individualisation, it was Beck who really drew attention to the issue—first in Germany and later in the English-speaking world (cf. Bauman, 2000b: 31; Wohlrab-Sahr, 1997: 23–24). He became the central figure in the individualisation debate, not just in Germany, but all over the world—whether you are in favour of the individualisation thesis or not, his name is unavoidable in the debate (Beck, 1983, 1992 [1986]: chaps. 3 and 5; 1995b; Beck & Beck-­ Gernsheim 2002 [1994], 2002; Beck & Sopp, 1997; cf. Atkinson, 2007, 2010; Bauman, 2000b: 31; Curran, 2013a, 2013b; Friedrichs, 1998; Levinsen, 2006; Rasborg, 2017). However, as will become evident, Beck’s concept of individualisation deviates from the standard interpretation on several points (cf. the examples above). He stresses the importance of not confusing individualisation with ‘individuation’, which is the primary and secondary socialisation process through which the individual is formed and becomes a full member of society (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 127–28; Beck & Willms, 2004: 62). By

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‘individualisation’, Beck means a structural change in the relationship between individual and society that leads to the individual taking precedence more and more often over society or social communities. It does not refer to an ‘immanent change of human consciousness and situation’, but rather to ‘a new mode of societalization, a kind of “metamorphosis” or “categorical shift” in the relation between the individual and society’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 127; cf. Beck & Willms, 2004: 62). Individualisation is not a new phenomenon that only emerged along with the risk society. On the contrary, as Beck points out, ‘individualised’ lifestyles and living conditions date back to the medieval court culture, and later the Renaissance, when the incipient secularisation of the fourteenth century led to the emergence of a new worldview that revolved around humankind—rather than God or Providence (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 127–28; cf. Junge, 2002: 31–33). This tendency towards individualisation is also reflected in sociology, where it is a key concept in both the classical and modern versions of the discipline. If we were so inclined, we could, as Beck notes, write a history of sociology by showing how both classical and modern sociologists analyse ‘individualisation’ as a key aspect of the emergence of modern society (Beck & Willms, 2004: 62; cf. Kippele, 1998: 199; Junge, 2002: 31–33). Absolutely central to Beck’s own outline for a ‘history of individualisation’ is his distinction between two different overarching phases in the development of individualisation, corresponding to the industrial society and the risk society—or, as he puts it, ‘simple’ and ‘reflexive’ modernity (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 87, 89, 95–99; 1997a: 94–97) (see Chap. 5 for an elaboration of the concepts of ‘simple’ and ‘reflexive’ modernity). For the time being, let us take a closer look at how Beck characterises these two phases.

Individualisation in the Industrial Society (‘Simple’ Modernity) For the classical sociologists—Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel and Tönnies—individualisation is associated with the transition from traditional to modern society, when individuals were ‘released’ from the bonds and dependencies of the past (cf. also Habermas, 1992). Tönnies concisely describes this process of social change as a transition from a closer and more integrated Gemeinschaft (community) to an atomised, market-oriented Gesellschaft (society or company) (Tönnies, 2001 [1887/1935]).

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As Tönnies puts it, in the pre-modern Gemeinschaft, despite myriad forms of separation, we were interconnected; while in the modern Gesellschaft, despite all our many interconnections, we are separated. Accordingly, he sees modern society as very much individualised, in which ‘everyone is out for himself alone and living in a state of tension against everyone else’ (Tönnies, 2001 [1887/1935]: 52). According to Beck, Marx also addressed the theme of individualisation, understood as capitalism ‘releasing’ peasants and serfs from feudalism and transforming them into ‘free workers’ in the labour market (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 272–73). In Marx’s day, however, this market-driven individualisation was counteracted by the working-class experience of material misery and alienation at work, which created the basis for collective solidarity. According to Beck, this explains why Marx does not extrapolate on the theme of individualisation (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 95–96). For Durkheim, the transition from traditional to modern society means the replacement of ‘mechanical solidarity’ based on strong common norms and values (i.e. a strong ‘collective consciousness’) with ‘organic solidarity’ based on complementary differences (the division of labour). According to Durkheim, the growing division of labour made individuals at once more specialised—and therefore individualised—and more dependent on each other in order to meet all of their needs (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]: chaps. 2 and 3; cf. Habermas, 1992), a process that weakens the ‘collective consciousness’ to such an extent that in the end the only collective idea left is, paradoxically, the idea of the individual (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]: 12). He believes that when it evolves normally, the modern form of the division of labour creates an organic solidarity—that is, individualisation (specialisation) and (organic) solidarity are not opposites but go hand in hand. However, if individualisation ‘gets out of control’ and becomes egoism and ‘a cult of the individual’, it can lead to ‘social anomie’ and pose a threat to social integration (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]: 122, 338). For Durkheim, individualisation is a positive outcome of functional differentiation in society, however, if it is taken too far, it may pose a threat to social integration (anomie). It is possible, therefore, to speak of a ‘positive individualisation’ perpetuated by a ‘dangerous individual’ (Schroer, 2000: 21–26).1 1  The German sociologist Markus Schroer, to whom Beck refers with regard to individualisation (Beck & Willms, 2004: 62), distinguishes between three different lines of tradition in classical and modern sociology, each representing a particular view of individualisation: (1)

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For Weber, modernisation is synonymous with the spread of instrumental action. This is a ‘monological’ type of action, in which ‘solitary actors’ (Habermas, 1984: 279–80) seek the means that will most quickly and effectively achieve their goals with the minimum of undesirable consequences (Weber, 1962 [1921/22]: 61–62). Greater instrumentalisation might, therefore, be said to accommodate individualising features because the actors are left, to a great extent, to rely on their own objectives and assessments. According to Weber, ‘the Protestant ethics’ of diligence, moderation and frugality are crucial to modern ‘rational living’, as they promote industriousness, which stimulates the emerging industrial capitalism (‘the capitalist spirit’). This leads to a radical ‘disenchantment’ (Entzauberung) of the world, as traditional certainties and systems of interpretation are replaced by rational calculation. However, Weber also asserts that there is a price to pay for this increasing (instrumental) rationalisation, as it locks individuals into an ‘iron cage of rationality’, with a consequent ‘loss of meaning’ and of ‘freedom’ (Weber, 1992 [1904–05]: 181–83). We might say that Weber identifies a ‘negative individualisation’ characterised by an ‘endangered individual’ (Schroer, 2000: 16–21). For Simmel, individualisation is linked, on an overarching level, with the fact that societies and groups grow larger during the modernisation process, which is why they are differentiated—and therefore individualised—internally. In pre-modern societies, individuals are similar to each other internally, whereas societies are clearly delimited in relation to each other externally, that is, they are individualised. In modern societies, on the other hand, individuals are differentiated and individualised internally; whereas societies and groups come to resemble each other more and more externally, that is, they become less distinct from each other (Simmel, 1983 [1888]: 53–55; 2007 [1917]: 68–69). In Simmel’s view, this means that even if individuals in given societies become more individualised, they nonetheless find it easier to feel a sense of community with individuals in a similar position in other societies. In Simmel’s words: ‘Individualisation loosens the bond to those closest to us, only to establish a new—real and ideal—one to those more distant’ (Simmel, 1983 [1888]: 55). Individualisation goes hand in hand with the rise of universalism, which in ‘positive individualisation’ characterised by a ‘dangerous individual’ (Durkheim, Parsons and Luhmann); (2) ‘negative individualisation’ characterised by an ‘endangered individual’ (Weber, Horkheimer, Adorno and Foucault) and (3) ‘ambivalent individualisation’ characterised by a ‘risk individual’ (Simmel, Elias and Beck) (Schroer, 2000).

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Simmel’s mind makes it easier to identify with more abstract cosmopolitan communities (Simmel, 1983 [1888]: 56–58).2 However, individualisation is also closely linked to the spread of the modern money economy, which may make individuals more autonomous, but also makes human relationships more anonymous and alienated (Simmel, 1983 [1896]: 79). The modern city is the centre of the money economy, and the large and more anonymous social spaces in urban areas create a breeding ground for diversity and individuality, but there is also a risk of interpersonal relationships being increasingly characterised by superficiality, indifference and latent aversion (Simmel, 1971 [1903]; cf. Honneth, 2004: 465). As for Simmel, we can therefore speak of an ‘ambivalent individualisation’ characterised by a ‘risk individual’ (Schroer, 2000: 26–32). Despite the myriad differences between the classical sociologists, Beck identifies one thing that they all have in common—they interpret the transition to modern society as a ‘release’ of the individual from traditional society. Being rooted in the early industrial society (simple modernity), the classical sociologists identified an early phase of individualisation, that is, the release from tradition. However, the transition from an industrial to a risk society (reflexive modernity) heralds a new and more radical phase for individualisation, consisting of a release from industrial society (Beck, 1997a: 94–97).

Individualisation in the Risk Society (‘Reflexive’ Modernity) In the highly developed risk society, which according to Beck is identical with reflexive modernity, scarcity is replaced by abundance, and this has led to an erosion of class solidarity and collectively organised patterns of life. Part of the reason for this is that we have more free time than ever before (shorter working days, longer holidays, earlier retirement), disposable real incomes have multiplied, we spend longer on education and training, and the welfare state’s social security systems have ‘released’ us from civil society’s collective forms of solidarity (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 91–95). Beck argues that these factors have enhanced social mobility and loosened our ties to the environments in which we grew up. We are no 2  In the context of Beck’s ‘cosmopolitan turn’, which we will look at more closely in Chap. 7, it is intriguing that Simmel identifies a link between individualisation and cosmopolitanis m/cosmopolitanisation in modern society as early as 1888.

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longer destined to follow in our parents’ footsteps—we enjoy greater opportunities to shape our own life and career. In other words, our life is not predetermined, but consists of a series of projects, and it is up to us to complete them. More and more, we are left to forge our own path—in terms of our lives, identities, careers, norms and values. Instead of the standard biography, we have, in Beck’s words, an ‘elective biography’, that is, a ‘do-it-yourself biography’ or a ‘reflexive biography’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 135; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 2–3). Beck’s contention is that individualisation has become so all-pervasive that it now encompasses: (1) the social classes, which are becoming less and less important and being replaced by a consumer-oriented, middle-class lifestyle (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 91–93); (2) social inequality, which is not reduced as prosperity in general improves but is in fact reaching new levels. Beck describes this as the ‘elevator effect’. Inequality is now several ‘floors’ higher—that is, it remains constant but is no longer embedded in a class pattern, as it is individualised, which makes it more complex and diffuse (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 91–95, 99–101; 2007; 2008; Beck, 2013b); (3) the family, which becomes a temporary ‘agreement’ or ‘negotiation’, that is, an increasingly formal framework for its members’ individual life projects (see also Chap. 6) (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 89, 129); and (4) the labour market, with new flexible and plural forms of underemployment— casual jobs, part-time work, temporary contracts and so on (see also Chap. 6) (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 140–49; cf. Sennett, 1998; Standing, 2014). Beck stresses that the individualisation of reflexive modernity is three-­ dimensional, as it constitutes a: (1) disembedding, removal from historically prescribed social forms and commitments in the sense of traditional contexts of dominance and support (the ‘liberating dimension’); (2) the loss of traditional security with respect to practical knowledge, faith and guiding norms (the ‘disenchantment dimension’); and—here the meaning of the word is virtually turned into its opposite—(3) reembedding, a new type of social commitment (the ‘control’ and ‘reintegration’ dimension). (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 128)

The first dimension refers to individualisation removing us from the predestined life of industrial society, that is, class and status, social inequality, gender roles, family, neighbourhood and so on (Beck, 1997a: 94–97; 1994: 13–16; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 2). The breaking down of collectively organised patterns of life means that, in the end, only the individual remains, as the ‘reproduction unit for the social in the

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lifeworld’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 130). Industrial society is transformed into a de-traditionalised and individualised ‘post-class society’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 100). The second dimension refers to the fact that individualisation is associated with de-traditionalisation and disenchantment (cf. Weber above). This is expressed by individuals not being influenced in the same way as before by religion, traditions and inherited patterns of life, but instead being confronted with constant choices that require justification (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 135). The third dimension refers to the fact that the ‘release’ of individualisation is not synonymous with ‘liberation’—on the contrary, it leads to individuals being reintegrated into new forms of control and dependence, for example, in the form of consumption, markets and welfare state institutions (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 90, 131–37; Beck & Willms, 2004: 63–64; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 2). In other words, release from the macro-structures of industrial society does not necessarily make us ‘freer’ because it goes hand in hand with greater institutional dependence. It is thus a highly ambivalent process, in which release from the old bonds coincides with the emergence of new forms of institutional dependence. At several points in his later writings, Beck incorporates Giddens’ concept of ‘disembedding’ (more on this anon), which Beck uses to describe late-modern individualisation as ‘disembedding without reembedding’.3 Here, he is referring to the disappearance, one by one, of industrial society’s ‘reembedding structures’—the estates, classes, families and so on— without new structures emerging to take their place (Beck & Willms, 2004: 63; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: xxii). However, it remains unclear how this ‘reformulation’ of the individualisation thesis as a ‘disembedding without reembedding’ should be viewed in relation to Beck’s own previous emphasis that in reflexive modernity individualisation (‘disembedding’) goes hand in hand with increased institutional dependence (‘reembedding’) (Atkinson, 2007: 356–57) (see also Chap. 8, in which we take a closer look at critiques of Beck). Since individualisation is an inescapable condition of reflexive modernity, we are, paradoxically, ‘condemned to individualisation’ according to Beck, playing on the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1905–1980) existentialist concept that man is ‘condemned to freedom’ (Sartre, 2007 [1946]: 29). He says:  Beck’s concept of ‘individualisation’ (liberation) and Giddens’ concept of ‘disembedding’ can to a large degree be seen as congruent concepts, even though the latter cannot be reduced simply to the former. 3

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Seen in this way, individualization is a social condition which is not arrived at by a free decision of individuals. To adapt Jean-Paul Sartre’s phrase: people are condemned to individualization. Individualization is a compulsion, albeit a paradoxical one, to create, to stage manage, not only one’s own biography but the bonds and networks surrounding it and to do this amid changing preferences and at successive stages of life, while constantly adapting to the conditions of the labour market, the education system, the welfare state and so on. (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 4; cf. Beck, 1997a: 96–97; 1994: 14)

Individualisation is not just individual self-realisation, but also an institutional requirement placed on the individual. Inspired by Parsons, Beck speaks of individualisation being an ‘institutional individualisation’, as the welfare institutions also make demands on the individual to ‘be able to individualise’, in order to be able to navigate the complexity of late modernity (Beck & Willms, 2004: 63–64; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 8, 11–12; cf. Honneth, 2004: 471–73).4 In other words, institutionalised individualisation requires active input from the individuals concerned—in the family, the education system, the labour market and so on. The greater the opportunities, the more demands are placed on the ability to navigate—plan, organise, adapt and so on— within this new and more open, but also far more complex and unmanageable late-modern landscape (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 4). Hence, institutionalised individualisation not only creates more choices, according to Beck, but also a compulsion to choose (Beck, 2007: 682). Due to its institutional and ‘forced’ nature, individualisation does not mean either individuation (personal autonomy), emancipation, individualism (as ideology), liberalism or egoism (Beck & Willms, 2004: 62; Beck, 1997b: 184–85). Nor is it necessarily the opposite of community. It describes a new—reflexive—way of relating to communities. Where we used to be part of communities because tradition dictated it, we now talk about reflexive choices. We actively choose and drop friends, partners, social networks, organisations, elements of tradition and so on. This makes 4  The concept of ‘institutionalised individualism’ originates from Parsons, who refers to the fact that (utilitarian) self-interest and solidarity (altruism) are not necessarily opposites but can in fact go hand in hand in modern society (Parsons, 1978: 321 f.). Beck, however, prefers to speak of ‘institutional individualisation’ because he wants to avoid the confusion of individualisation’s ‘objective’ dimension (individualisation) with its ‘subjective’ dimension (individualism) (Beck, 2007: 682, 702, note 6).

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it possible to describe individualisation as a reflexive—as opposed to a traditional—approach to tradition and communities. Increasingly, communities are ‘reflexive communities of choice’ (Beck, 1997b: 184). Beck does not necessarily see any contradiction between individual self-realisation and participation in communities. By doing something for and with others, I can simultaneously do something for myself and vice versa. To capture this duality, Beck speaks of the emergence of an ‘altruistic individualism’, in which ‘self-interest’ (individual self-realisation) and community orientation go hand in hand (Beck, 2002b: 162; Beck & Willms, 2004: 76–78). Beck therefore believes that individualisation constitutes a new ‘modus’ for societalisation. In effect, it establishes new conditions for the formation of communities in reflexive modernity (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 127; Beck & Sopp, 1997: 9–10, 12, 17). Basically, it is sociology’s fundamental question about the ‘social nexus’—that is, the question of what makes modern, highly differentiated societies cohesive—to which, according to Beck, it is necessary to find new answers under the new social conditions that he characterises as reflexively modern. Where Durkheim—as mentioned earlier—feared that widespread individualisation would spill over into ‘a cult of the individual’, egoism and the disintegration of society (e.g. higher suicide rates) (Durkheim, 1989 [1897]), Beck initially sounds more optimistic. Rather than necessarily pose a threat to social integration, he posits that individualisation can serve as the launchpad for a new (contentious) pattern of integration (Beck & Sopp, 1997: 17). On the other hand, it must be said that Beck’s take on the exact nature of this new pattern of integration is rather vague. For him, in the highly individualised reflexive modernity, well-known integration mechanisms such as ‘values’, ‘consumption’ or ‘national identity’ are no longer sufficient, as they refer to the ‘basic principles’ of first modernity—social communities, paid work and the nation state—which are eroding in the second (reflexive) modernity (cf. Chap. 5) (Beck, 2002a: 81–83). Integration must therefore be ‘reinvented’, in the form of what Beck describes as ‘projective integration’, that is: ‘we [must] make conscious use of this situation and try to forge new, politically open, creative forms of bond and alliance’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 18). In Beck’s view, therefore: ‘Post-traditional societies (…) can only become integrable, if at all, through the experiment of their self-interpretation, self-observation, self-­ opening, self-discovery, indeed, their self-invention. Their future, their

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ability to have and shape a future, is the measure of their integration’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 18–19). In Beck’s view, growing individualisation is therefore an inseparable part of the structural transformation of modern society, part of a social dynamic that permeates all areas of society. Nobody can avoid the ‘the individualising game’: … what is historically new is that something that was earlier expected of a few – to lead a life of their own – is now being demanded of more and more people and, in the limiting case, of all. The new element is, first, the democratization of individualization processes and, second, (and closely connected), the fact that basic conditions in society favour or enforce individualization (the job market, the need for mobility and training, labour and social legislation, pension provisions, etc.). (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 8)

Hence, for Beck, a crucial characteristic of contemporary individualisation is that it is an institutionalised expectation on all individuals and groups in society, which seems to result in an all-encompassing (‘democratising’) social dynamic that applies indiscriminately to all population groups. Thus, in Beck’s opinion, individualisation—much like borderless and classless risks (cf. Chap. 3)—tends to dissolve the class structure in the risk society or reflexive modernity (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 87, 91, 95–96; 2007, 2013a). This process breaks down the class-specific forms of life and solidarity of industrial society (e.g. traditional working-class culture), replacing them with a more individualised pattern of life that is no longer characterised by class, but focuses on lifestyle, consumption and so on. However, the erosion of class does not mean an end to social inequality but changes its nature since it is no longer unambiguously embedded in class patterns (cf. Atkinson, 2007). In other words, the individualisation dynamic ‘dissolves’ the class structure, but not—as is sometimes interpreted (e.g. Birkelund, 2000: 217)—inequality (Beck, 1992 [1986]: chapts. 3 and 5). However, a ‘revival’ of class society is not very likely in Beck’s view, as advanced individualisation means that greater inequality and poverty are seen as personal failure rather than a collective—class— ‘fate’ (Beck, 1997b: 192–96; Beck & Willms, 2004: 100–08). An insistence on trying to understand patterns of conflict and forms of inequality in risk society or reflexive modernity in class terms will, therefore, inevitably lead to problems in a social reality in which class-based

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forms of life are fading and being displaced by individualisation and de-­ traditionalisation. In Beck’s eyes, increasingly complex concepts of class theory represent tenuous attempts to maintain their applicability to a social reality that increasingly avoids structuring based on ‘macro-group categories’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 99–101). As a result, instead of adapting the theory to suit the new reality of reflexive modernity, reality is ‘adapted’ to suit the theory (Rasborg, 2003). One consequence of this is that individualisation now not only—as emphasised by a number of sociologists (e.g. Becker & Hadjar, 2015; Furlong & Cartmel, 2007; Nollmann & Strasser, 2007; Savage, 2000, 2013; Skeggs, 2004)—takes place on a conscious (‘subjective’) level, but according to Beck is a ‘really existing’ individualisation that also takes place on a social structural (‘objective’) level (Beck, 2007: 681). It is not just a matter of individuals no longer subjectively experiencing classes as classes—a kind of ‘false consciousness’ (cf. Marx)—but also that these very classes are disintegrating: ‘Disembedded individualization [also] ceases to be a subjective content to which an objective social structure, like that of system or class strata, can be opposed. Social structure can no longer be conceived of as being in principle unaffected by individual thought and action. Disembedded individualization is the social structure of the second modernity’ (Beck & Willms, 2004: 63–64). In the light of the dissolution of class-structured life patterns in the risk society/reflexive modernity caused by individualisation and de-traditionalisation, the challenge for sociology, according to Beck, is to think beyond the macro-group categories of traditional class theory. More broadly, concepts are needed that facilitate understanding of the new—global—types of conflict and forms of social inequality that arise in the second modernity and which transcend nation state-based class structures. According to Beck, we must transcend not only the class category, but also its anchoring in the nation state (Beck, 2007).5 However, this requires challenging the ‘theoretical collectivisms’ that, in Beck’s view, have characterised much of sociology—Parsons’ structural functionalism, Luhmann’s systems theory and so on—because they hinder insight into the fact that ‘individualization is becoming the social structure of second modern society itself’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: xxii). ‘Sociology will have to … change its approach from the logic of 5  The later—cosmopolitan—Beck (cf. Chap. 7) also critiques his own theory of individualisation for having been too closely tied to a nation-state perspective (Beck, 2007: 680, 687).

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self-­reproducing structures to the logic of “flows” (Appadurai) and “networks” (Castells)’ (Beck & Willms, 2004: 65). In other words, as part of his thinking about individualisation, Beck explicitly advocates what he describes as a ‘subject-oriented’ sociology, that is, a sociology based on the individuals (actors), and he sees his own theory as a contribution to the development of just such a sociology (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 12–16). Despite dismissing the concept of class, at certain points Beck nevertheless opens up the possibility that individualisation can make itself felt in differentiated (stratified) ways in reflexive modernity. It is, he says, … necessary… to check each group, milieu and region to determine how far individualization processes – overt or covert – have advanced within it. We do not maintain that this development has achieved blanket coverage of the whole population without differentiation. Rather the catchword ‘individualization’ should be seen as designating a trend. What is decisive is the systematic nature of the development linked to the advance of modernity. (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 5)

In a book of interviews with the German historian Johannes Willms, Beck agrees—at least in part—with Willms’ question regarding whether, as a result of individualisation in late-modern society, there will be a new polarisation between those who, on the basis of their education, their job choices, and their mobility, are capable of fully undertaking these experiments in individualization, and who become deeply invested in them; and those who, because of their lack of education, lack of job choices, and lack of mobility – and the lack of social imagination that often flows from such a constrained social reality – are therefore less capable of, less inclined towards, and less well-­ disposed towards this sort of individualization? (Beck & Willms, 2004: 78; cf. Beck et al., 2003: 24–25; Mills, 2007: 74–75)

Despite his recurring view of individualisation as an all-encompassing and levelling logic of development, Beck admits that it could form the basis for new forms of stratification and polarisation in reflexive modernity. The fact that he does not take these ideas any further means that considerable thought still needs to be put into the relationship between individualisation and social stratification (class) in contemporary society (cf. Atkinson, 2007, 2010; Curran, 2013a, 2013b, 2018; Rasborg, 2017).

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In his later writing, Beck expands on his analysis of individualisation by addressing how it also has an impact on religion. In A God of One’s Own: Religion’s Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence (2010)—which can almost be seen as Beck’s take on a ‘sociology of religion’—he points out that in the individualised society, individuals not only invent their own lives (Beck, 1995a), but they are also increasingly beginning to invent their own deities (Beck, 2010). Instead of believing in the traditional and church-authorised Christian god, late-modern humans are increasingly beginning to believe in their own ‘gods’, in the form of neo-religiosity (new religious movements), spiritual phenomena, various ‘self-­ technologies’, diet plans, exercise and fitness and so on (Beck, 2010: 26–30). It is not that faith and the religious dimension are weakened— they just change in nature, as they are individualised and pluralised into a number of different ‘objects of faith’ (Beck, 2010: 15–16, 29–30). Beck thereby questions the widespread view in sociology that modernisation means greater secularisation and disenchantment, cf. Weber above (Beck, 2010: 19–26). Rather than a disenchantment, we are now witnessing a ‘re-enchantment’ (Wiederzauberung), which suggests that the erosion of rationalisation and the de-traditionalisation of certainties and belief systems brings with it a need to construct meaningful new worldviews and systems of interpretation (Beck, 2010: 1–2). The culturally and ‘territorially’ (nationally) anchored god is replaced by a plurality of objects of faith that are not necessarily bound to a specific and delimited (national) cultural context. For Beck, the individualisation of religion goes hand in hand with its cosmopolitanisation (Beck, 2010: 28, 53–65, 79–85). Here, he is referring precisely to the connection between individualisation and cosmopolitanisation that Simmel identified, as we saw earlier, as characteristic of modern society (see Chap. 7 for more on Beck and cosmopolitanism).6 In summary, we can say that where the sociological classics perceived individualisation as a release from traditional society, according to Beck it is now a release from industrial society and its macrostructural contexts (Beck, 1997a: 94–97; 1994: 13–16). Thus, as with his distinction between industrial society and risk society, Beck distinguishes between two phases in the history of individualisation: (1) individualisation understood as a 6  Although Beck refers to Simmel when addressing the relationship between individualisation and standardisation (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 130–31), when it comes to the relationship between individualisation and cosmopolitanisation in modern society, he does not seem to be aware of the connection to Simmel and refers to Durkheim instead (Beck, 2010: 96).

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release from the bonds and forms of dependence of traditional society and (2) individualisation understood as a release from industrial society and its macrostructures (classes, inequality patterns, family, labour market, etc.) (Beck, 1997a: 94–97; cf. Lash, 1994: 113–14). In other words, what is special about individualisation in contemporary (reflexive) modernity is that it is entering a qualitatively new phase, in which its impact is not on the structures of traditional society but on the basic structures of modernity. Individualisation, Beck and Ziehe As mentioned, in the early 1980s, the German social psychologist Thomas Ziehe hypothesised that ‘cultural release’ is a crucial aspect of cultural modernisation, a suggestion that gave rise to a number of key themes in the individualisation debate in which Beck would later become the central figure. Conversely, not only Ziehe, but also Giddens and Bauman seem to have been inspired by a number of key points in Beck’s concept of individualisation—at the very least there are striking similarities in certain important respects. In this section, I will expound on this point in order to clarify Beck’s key role in individualisation sociology. In relation to Beck’s emphasis that individualisation reflects a structural change in modernity—a ‘meta-change of modernity’ (Beck & Lau, 2005)—Ziehe stresses that individualisation must also be seen as an expression of late-modernity’s ‘subjective impact’ on individuals’ living conditions and forms of consciousness. For Ziehe, modernisation not only concerns society’s structures and institutions (the objective reality), but also the cultural systems of meaning (the symbolic reality) and the inner mental structures of individuals (the subjective reality) (Ziehe & Stubenrauch, 1982: 31; Ziehe, 1989: 88–89, 109, 155). Modernisation is synonymous with social rationalisation and disenchantment, which leads both to a technocratisation of more and more areas of life (work, education, media, family), and a breakdown of tradition (Ziehe & Stubenrauch, 1982: 25–26). More specifically, Ziehe points to three key trends that are a consequence of cultural modernisation: (1) reflexivity, (2) malleability and (3) individualisation (Ziehe, 1989: 11–16). Like Beck, Ziehe emphasises that individualisation, understood as ‘cultural release’, means that individuals are separated from their ties to estate, class, community, gender roles, religion, political party, family and so on. Society is secularised, traditional gender roles are problematised, sexual morality becomes freer, the old sources of authority are in a state of decay,

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the traditional (Protestant) work ethic with its virtues of industriousness and frugality is crumbling, ways of living together are changing and multiplying and even the content of our consciousness, dreams and fantasies are being set free by the influences of mass media and advertising. This leads to a breaking down of traditional interpretations of human existence, which were previously based on ways of life determined by estates or classes and set relatively narrow frameworks for the meaning that individuals could assign to their own biographies. Background (estate, class, family) is increasingly losing its influence on individuals’ identities and lives (Ziehe, 1989: 14, 157). Identity is no longer something we just inherit, which is set in stone for the rest of our predetermined life. On the contrary, it is created and constantly changes as part of an ongoing reflexive process. The breakdown of tradition is therefore not only destructive, but also synonymous with new opportunities, as the individual gains the ability to create their own identity and biography to a great extent (Ziehe & Stubenrauch, 1982: 25–37). Ziehe is also firmly in line with Beck when he stresses that cultural release must not be confused with liberation, as it goes hand in hand with a ‘cultural expropriation’, which refers to the liberated forms of consciousness and life being ‘re-colonised’ by the market, mass media and advertising. For example, youth-culture phenomena (punk, grunge, hip hop, rap, etc.) often start out as avant garde countercultures, only to be commercialised and integrated into the mainstream. According to Ziehe, release is different from unlimited choice because expectations, dreams and yearning do not necessarily correspond with possibilities to fulfil them in real life (Ziehe & Stubenrauch, 1982: 32, 36–37). On the contrary, cultural modernisation has widened the gap between expectation and opportunities for fulfilment, leading to a corresponding exacerbation of the ‘subjective burden’ of living in late modernity (Ziehe & Stubenrauch, 1982: 35–36). For Ziehe, therefore, individualisation is a highly ambivalent process that not only brings greater freedom, in the form of opportunities to create our own life biographies; but also leads to an ‘existential rootlessness’, as we are not, as we once were, rooted in tradition and close social communities. In other words, individualisation has both positive and negative aspects. For this reason, Ziehe—just like Beck—distances himself from the one-sided ‘decay thinking’ that is associated with many diagnoses of late-­ modern individualisation and is considered synonymous with the emergence of a self-absorbed ‘generation me’ (e.g. Twenge, 2014). In response,

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Ziehe emphasises that individualisation cannot be reduced to ‘narrowing, loss of value, non-commitment or egocentrism’, nor is it ‘just a counter-­ concept to value communities’ (Ziehe, 1997: 129). Like Beck, Ziehe challenges the diagnoses of decay. Unlike Beck, however, he places greater emphasis on the normative content of individualisation, understood as ‘a productive/critical extension of the importance of value communities’ (Ziehe, 1997: 129, my italics). Ziehe identifies four key elements of such an understanding: First, he agrees with Beck that late-modern individualisation is not synonymous with detachment from any social context—on the contrary, it is a social and institutional expectation on the individual (Ziehe, 1997: 131). Second, Ziehe stresses that individualisation is synonymous with the ability ‘along with others’ to ‘separate myself from them’ (Ziehe, 1997: 132). As a result of late-modern society’s pluralisation of values and lifestyles, we increasingly define our identity on the basis of our belonging to a number of more or less specific (post-traditional) value communities.7 In doing so, we simultaneously differentiate ourselves from other communities and/or individuals. By distinguishing myself from others, I mark my own peculiarity (Ziehe, 2004: 101–02). Participating in social communities is an inseparable part of the formation of an identity (the process of individuation). Although Ziehe stresses the socio-psychological aspect of individuation to a greater degree than Beck, both agree that the individual and community are not opposites but in many ways preconditions for each other (cf. Beck’s concept of ‘altruistic individualism’). Third, Ziehe thinks that individualisation leads to more ‘distancing from conformity: I must be myself’ (Ziehe, 1997: 133). In late-modern society, there is a tension between specific value communities and the more abstract sense of community based in morality and law (e.g. welfare state solidarity), which creates a breeding ground for a reflexive distance to specific identities and ways of life. This increases the awareness that ‘peculiarities can also always be different’ (Ziehe, 1997: 133). The tension between the particular (communities based on values) and the general (society, law, morality) means that we are always both specific individuals 7  Here, Ziehe seems to follow Habermas’ (1997) distinction between, on the one hand, morals (norms), which relate to ‘the right’ (Kant) and can therefore be generalised and, on the other hand, ethics (values), which are about ‘the good’ (Aristotle’s ‘the good life’), which will always be bound to particular life forms and therefore cannot be generalised (Ziehe, 1997: 131).

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in communities and role bearers in society—dual roles that constantly create opportunities for both identification and distance. Fourth, according to Ziehe, individualisation is not synonymous with ‘societal and subjective ethical anomie’, but rather ‘opportunity for autonomy’ (Ziehe, 1997: 135). One characteristic of late-modern society is that it is based on the emergence of universalist assessment criteria, as well as the possibility of a reflexive approach to norms, that is, what Habermas describes as a ‘procedural moral’ (Habermas, 1997). This creates opportunities for both external and internal autonomy, as it becomes possible to question both traditional ways of life and conventions, as well as ‘internal mental peculiarities, impulses and compulsive actions’ that limit the individual’s possibilities for freedom (Ziehe, 1997: 134). Rather than resulting in anomie and decay, greater reflexivity is synonymous with enhanced competencies in learning and conflict resolution (Ziehe, 1997: 135). While Ziehe stresses the socio-psychological aspects of individualisation to a greater extent than Beck, their views on late-modern individualisation are similar at a number of crucial points. As we have seen, both stress that although individualisation is an ambivalent process, its productive potential outweighs the potential for consequences that are anomic and break down communities. Individualisation does not necessarily weaken social integration, but, in Beck’s words, it signifies a new mode of societalisation. Likewise, both point out that individualisation is not necessarily the opposite of tradition and community, rather it reflects a new, reflexive approach to them, in which we make choices based on individual preferences, which is why norms and ways of acting that have been handed down are increasingly subject to demands for justification (Ziehe, 1997: 129). In other words, in the individualised society, communities do not disappear—as is sometimes erroneously thought—but become ‘reflexive communities of choice’. Finally, both Beck and Ziehe point out that individualisation is not synonymous with being removed from all institutional context but is in fact a requirement or an expectation built into the welfare institutions (cf. Beck’s concept of ‘institutional individualisation’). In the light of these similarities, it is surprising that Beck and Ziehe do not explicitly relate to each other in their diagnoses of individualisation.8 8  While Beck does not make any explicit references to Ziehe, Ziehe occasionally refers explicitly to Beck (e.g. Ziehe, 2004: 173 and 215). For example, Ziehe states that with regard to the diagnosis of the times: ‘I am close to the concept of ‘second modernity’ in Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens’ (Ziehe, 2004: 8). One possible explanation for this

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Individualisation, Beck and Giddens As previously mentioned, Giddens is one of the sociologists who takes the most inspiration from Beck. This also applies to the problem of individualisation, even though Giddens rarely uses the actual term in his social and political theory, speaking instead of the emergence of a ‘new individualism’ (Giddens, 1998: 27, 34–37). However, this concept seems to have multiple similarities with Beck’s understanding of individualisation. Like Beck—and Ziehe—Giddens opposes the pessimistic diagnoses of the new individualism as a reflection of a process of moral decay tied in with the emergence of a ‘generation me’ and a ‘me-first’ society, which undermines shared values and responsibilities (Giddens, 1998: 35). Directly quoting Beck, Giddens stresses that the new individualism is not Thatcherism, not market individualism, not atomization. On the contrary, it means ‘institutionalized individualism’. Most of the rights and entitlements of the welfare state, for example, are designed for individuals rather than for families. In many cases they presuppose employment. Employment in turn implies education and both of these presuppose mobility. By all these requirements people are invited to constitute themselves as individuals: to plan, understand, design themselves as individuals. (Beck, 1998: 28, quoted in Giddens, 1998: 36; cf. 1994: 186–87)

Like Beck (and Ziehe) Giddens underlines that new individualism is not necessarily synonymous with egoism and opting out of communities, but reflects the emergence—especially among young people—of new, post-­ material values concerning ecology, sustainability, ethics, human rights, sexual freedom and so on (Giddens, 1998: 36). According to Giddens, the background for the new individualism should not only be sought in the disappearance from our lives of tradition and habits (e.g. as a result of globalisation), but also in the fact that the welfare state and welfare institutions help to release—or, in Giddens’ terminology, ‘disembed’—individuals from their bonds to the traditional forms of community (civil society) (cf. Beck’s argument in the quote above) (Giddens, 1998: 36–37). silence may be that Ziehe is often perceived as an exponent of a socio-psychological approach to individualisation, an approach from which Beck explicitly distances himself in an overview of research contributions to the German individualisation debate, only including sociological ones (Beck, 1995b: 186–87).

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As we have seen, the later Beck draws on Giddens’ concept of disembedding to reformulate the individualisation theorem. In Giddens’ diagnosis of the times, disembedding is—as we briefly touched on in Chap. 3—one of three crucial factors in the radical dynamics of change that he believes permeate late modernity: (1) ‘separation’ of time and space; (2) ‘disembedding’ from locally rooted social contexts and (3) greater reflexivity. The first dimension refers to greater geographical mobility (better transport) and the information technology revolution (internet, e-mail, mobile phones, etc.), which together significantly enhance our opportunities to move and communicate across great distances. As a consequence, we are, in a sense, detached from our bonds to space and (especially) place (Giddens, 1990: 16–21). The second dimension—which both presupposes and reinforces the first—refers to the fact that our social relations are ‘lifted out’ of their local contexts and reorganised across time and space, into more anonymous expert systems, welfare institutions and so on (Giddens, 1990: 16–17, 21–29). Finally, the third dimension refers to the fact that we are becoming more reflexive in the light of constant new knowledge, greater interaction with expert systems and new types of risks, which mean that, at least in principle, everything is open to question (Giddens, 1990: 36–45). According to Giddens, trust is a basic prerequisite for the reflexive disembedding process. At the same time, however, he points out that relationships of trust in society are changing, from person-­based ‘face-to-face’ relationships to more impersonal and abstract—individualised—‘faceless’ relationships (Giddens, 1990: 26, 29–36, 79–83). Based on Giddens’ diagnosis of the times, individualisation can be understood, therefore, as us becoming increasingly ‘disembedded’ (released) from traditional communities, leaving it up to us to plan, write and reflect on our life biographies (Giddens, 1990: 17–29, 36–45; 1998: 36–37). In late modernity, this makes the ‘self’ a ‘reflexive project’, as we are constantly faced with the necessity of making choices regarding life, career, lifestyle and consumption—all of which involve a risk of making the wrong choice (Giddens, 1991: 5–7, 32–34). As Giddens says, we have ‘no choice but to choose’. In other words, freedom of choice becomes, paradoxically, a coercive choice (Giddens, 1991: 81). Also central to Beck (and Giddens) is a thematisation of how individualisation affects family, gender and ways of living together, which we will discuss in more detail in Chap. 6.

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Individualisation, Beck and Bauman Zygmunt Bauman has also written about individualisation in contemporary society in ways that are reminiscent of Beck on several key points. Like Beck, he emphasises that individualisation is inextricably linked to modernity’s structural shift. Whenever talk turns to modernity, it must also turn to individualisation, and vice versa (Bauman, 2000a: 31–32). In the current phase of modernity, which Bauman describes as ‘liquid modernity’ (see Chap. 5 for more details), individualisation assumes a new character, as its starting point is no longer tradition but modernity itself (Bauman, 2000a: 31). In line with Beck—and Ziehe and Giddens—Bauman argues that individualisation in liquid modernity relates to the changing nature of identity formation. Identity is no longer something given, a role into which individuals are born, but more and more ‘a task’ that they must themselves perform. However, Bauman underlines that this is not necessarily synonymous with greater individual autonomy, as we must distinguish between a mere formal (de jure) autonomy and a real (de facto) autonomy: To put it in a nutshell, ‘individualization’ consists of transforming human ‘identity’ from a ‘given’ into a ‘task’ and charging the actors with the responsibility for performing that task and for the consequences (also the side-­ effects) of their performance. In other words, it consists in the establishment of a de jure autonomy (whether or not the de facto autonomy has been established as well). As this happens, human beings are no more ‘born into’ their identities. (Bauman, 2000a: 31–32; cf. 2002: xv)

As established social forms crumble, identity and life biographies no longer stem from a pre-determined ‘fate’ but are something individuals must constantly invent and reinvent. For Bauman, however, the constant need to construct identity does not lead to real (de facto) autonomy, as it is forced on us and ‘externally controlled’, which makes individualisation an endless spiral that exhausts the self. Individualisation does not therefore mean a reduction in ‘system coercion’; rather, the system changes nature, becoming independent and more abstract and anonymous in relation to the individual (cf. also Beck’s talk of greater institutional dependence above) (Bauman, 2000a: 209–10). Like Beck, Bauman believes that what is new about individualisation in liquid modernity is its ‘disembedding without reembedding’, as all fixed and solid ‘reembedding structures’—traditions, classes, family and local

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communities, political parties, welfare institutions and so on—are more or less dissolved. Bauman also uses Giddens’ concept of disembedding to describe modern individualisation. According to Bauman, what distinguishes today’s individualisation—in reflexive or liquid modernity—from past forms is that: No ‘beds’ are furnished for ‘reembedding’, and such beds as might be postulated and pursued prove fragile and often vanish before the work of ‘re-­ embedding’ is complete. There are rather ‘musical chairs’ of various sizes and styles as well as of changing numbers and positions, which prompt men and women to be constantly on the move and promise no ‘fulfilment’, no rest and no satisfaction of ‘arriving’, of reaching the final destination, where one can disarm, relax and stop worrying. There is no prospect of ‘reembeddedment’ at the end of the road taken by (now chronically) disembedded individuals. (Bauman, 2000a: 33–34; cf. 2002: xvi; Howard, 2007b: 35–37, 40)

As a result, according to Bauman, identity is fragmented and becomes liquid and interchangeable. For Bauman, the ‘chronically disembedded’—individualised—society is thus one in which the old communities crumble without new ones being ready to take their place. Where Beck—and, as we have seen above, Ziehe and Giddens—points out that individualisation is not necessarily the opposite of community (i.e. it is a ‘plus-sum game’), Bauman believes that freedom and security, and therefore individualisation and community too, are mutually exclusive (a ‘zero-sum game’) (Bauman, 2001: 4–5, 20). According to Bauman, greater individual freedom necessarily comes at the expense of security (community), and vice versa: ‘Promoting security always calls for the sacrifice of freedom, while freedom can only be expanded at the expense of security’ (Bauman, 2001: 20). However, this does not bode well for communities, as individualisation is a condition of liquid modernity from which there is no escape: ‘In the land of the individual freedom of choice the option to escape individualization and to refuse participation in the individualizing game is emphatically not on the agenda’ (Bauman, 2000a: 33–34). Thus, according to Bauman, contemporary communities are in dire straits, since they constantly face the threat of being undermined by the endless spiral of individualisation: ‘Today, “community” is another name for paradise lost – but for a paradise which we still hope to find, as we feverishly search for the roads that may lead us

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there’ (Bauman, 2001: 3). With his perception of the relationship between individual and community as a ‘zero-sum game’, Bauman appears to take a ‘special position’ compared to Beck, Ziehe and Giddens, who consider it a ‘plus-sum game’.

Summary While Ziehe was first to present ideas about individualisation, understood as ‘cultural release’, Beck has become the central figure in the sociology of individualisation worldwide. As we have seen, Ziehe, Giddens and Bauman have all produced ideas about individualisation (or individualism) that, in crucial respects, resemble those of Beck. These include, in particular: (1) the emphasis on the ambivalent nature of individualisation, which entails both gains and losses of freedom; (2) the rejection of the ‘decay diagnosis’ of late-modern individualisation, as the positive aspects of individualisation outweigh the negative, disintegrating (anomic) consequences; (3) the emphasis that individualisation is not necessarily the opposite of social communities, but refers to the fact that late-modern communities are reflexive—individualised—‘communities of choice’ (‘altruistic individualism’); (4) the observation that individualisation does not mean that we are detached from any institutional context, rather, it is ‘built into’ the welfare institutions in the form of a requirement or expectation that individuals will ‘be able to individualise’ (‘institutional individualisation’); and (5) the perception that the individualisation of today is a ‘disembedding without reembedding’, as society’s ‘reembedding mechanisms’ (not least, those based on class) are gradually being eroded—a view that for Beck does not align fully with his original underlining that release (disembedding) goes hand in hand with individuals’ reintegration into new forms of control and dependence (reembedding) (cf. also point 4 here). However, there are also differences between their positions on certain points, not least with regard to the relationship between individualisation and community, which for Beck, Ziehe and Giddens may well go hand in hand (a ‘plus-sum game’), whereas Bauman believes that they are mutually exclusive (a ‘zero-­ sum game’). Nevertheless, this emphasis on modernity and individualisation as two sides of the same coin indicates that Beck’s diagnosis of the times, as well as those of Ziehe, Giddens and Bauman, constitutes an expression of what the British sociologist Scott Lash has described as: ‘a very “strong programme” of individualization’ (Lash, 1994: 111). This programme is

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characterised by its focus on social change (release, actors and action), whereas sociologists such as Foucault, Dean, Luhmann and Bourdieu emphasise social reproduction (systems, structures, classes and power) (e.g. Bourdieu, 1987, 1998; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Dean, 1999, 2003; Foucault, 1991 [1975], 1979 [1976], 1991[1978]; Rasborg, 2017). As suggested several times above, Beck’s theory of individualisation is inextricably linked to his theory of modernity—the crucial feature of individualisation today being that it is not part of the modernisation of tradition but part of the modernisation of modernity. It is precisely this ‘confrontation of modernity with itself’ that is at the heart of Beck’s concept of ‘reflexive modernity’, which we will now address.

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Beck, U. (1997a). The Reinvention of Politics. Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order. Polity Press. Beck, U. (1997b). Die uneindeutige Sozialstruktur. Was heisst Armut, was Reichtum in der Selbst-Kultur? In U. Beck & P. Sopp (Eds.), Individualisierung und Integration. Neue Konfliktlinien und neuer Integrationsmodus? Leske + Budrich. Beck, U. (2002a). Overgangen fra det første til det andet moderne – fem udfordringer. Slagmark, 34, 79–93. Beck, U. (2002b). Freedom’s Children. In U. Beck & E. Beck-Gernsheim (Eds.), Individualization. Sage. Beck, U. (2007). Beyond class and nation: Reframing social inequalities in a globalizing world. The British Journal of Sociology, 58(4), 679–705. Beck, U. (2008). Die Neuvermessung der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen. SoziologischeAufklärung im 21. Jahrhundert. Eröffnungsvortrag zum Soziologentag ’Unsichere Zeiten’ am 6. Oktober 2008 in Jena. Suhrkamp. Beck, U. (2010). A God of One’s Own. Religions Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2013a) German Europe. Cambridge: Polity Press. Beck, U. 2012b ‘Redefining the Sociological Project: The Cosmopolitan Challenge’. Sociology 46(1): 7–12. Beck, U. (2013b). Why ‘class’ is too soft a category to capture the explosiveness of social inequality at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The British Journal of Sociology 64(1), 63–74. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). Authors Preface: Instutionalized Individualism. In U. Beck & E. Beck-Gernsheim (Eds.), Individualization. Sage. Beck, U., Bonss, W., & Lau, C. (2003). The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme. Theory, Culture and Society, 20(2), 1–33. Beck, U., & Lau, C. (2005). Second Modernity as a Research Agenda: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations in the ‘meta-change’ of Modern Society. The British Journal of Sociology, 56(4), 525–557. Beck, U., & Sopp, P. (1997). Individualisierung und Integration  – eine Problemskizze. In U.  Beck & P.  Sopp (Eds.), Individualisierung und Integration. Neue Konfliktlinien und neuer Integrationsmodus? Leske + Budrich. Beck, U., & Willms, J. (2004). Conversations with Ulrich Beck. Polity Press. Beck, U. (1998). The Democratization of the Family, or the Unknown Art of Free Association. In U. Beck (Ed.), Democracy without Enemies. Polity Press. Becker, R., & Hadjar, A. (2015). “Individualisation” and class structure: How individual lives are still affected by social inequalities’. International Social Science Journal, 64(213–214), 211–223. Birkelund, G. E. (2000). Modernitetens flertydighed – økende individualisme eller stabil strukturel ulikhet? Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning, 2, 215–234.

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Bourdieu, P. (1987). What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups. Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 32, 1–17. Bourdieu, P. (1998). Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Polity Press. Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Polity Press. Brannen, J., & Nilsen, A. (2005). Individualisation, Choice and Structure: A Discussion of Current Trends in Sociological Analysis. The Sociological Review, 53(3), 412–428. Curran, D. (2013a). Risk Society and the Distribution of Bads: Theorizing Class in the Risk Society. The British Journal of Sociology, 64(1), 44–62. Curran, D. (2013b). What Is a Critical Theory of the Risk Society? A Reply to Beck. The British Journal of Sociology, 64(1), 75–80. Curran, D. (2018). Beck’s Creative Challenge to Class Analysis: From the Rejection of Class to the Discovery of Risk-Class. Journal of Risk Research, 21(1), 29–40. Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality. Power and Rule in Modern Society. Sage. Dean, M. (2003). Culture Governance and Individualisation. In H. P. Bang (Ed.), Governance as Social and Political Communication. Manchester University Press. Durkheim, É. (1984 [1893]). The Division of Labour in Society. Macmillan Education. Durkheim, É. (1989 [1897]). Suicide. A study in sociology. Routledge. Foucault, M. (1979 [1976]). The History of Sexuality (Vol. 1) Allen Lane. Foucault, M. (1991 [1975]). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Penguin Books. Friedrichs, J. (1998). Die Individualisierungs-These. Eine Explikation im Rahmen der Rational-Choice-Theorie. In J. Friedrichs (Ed.), Die Individualisierungs-­ These. Leske + Budrich. Furlong, A., & Cartmel, F. (2007). Young People and Social Change. New Perspectives (2nd ed.). Open University Press. Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1994). Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy. Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1984/87). The Theory of Communicative Action (Vol. 1 and 2). Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1992). Individuation Through Socialization. On G.  H. Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity. In J.  Habermas (Ed.), Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays. Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1997). Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Polity Press. Honneth, A. (2004). Organized Self-Realization. Some Paradoxes of Individualization. European Journal of Social Theory, 7(4), 463–478.

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Howard, C. (2007a). Introducing Individualization. In C.  Howard (Ed.), Contested Individualization. Debates About Contemporary Personhood. London/New York. Howard, C. (2007b). Three Models of Individualized Biography. In C. Howard (Ed.), Contested Individualization. Debates About Contemporary Personhood. London/New York. Junge, M. (2002). Individualisierung. Campus Verlag. Kippele, F. (1998). Was heisst Individualisierung? Die Antworten soziologischer Klassiker. Westdeutscher Verlag. Lash, S. (1994). Reflexivity and Its Doubles: Structure, Aesthetics, Community. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), Reflexive Modernization. Polity Press. Levinsen, K. (2006). Individualisering og ungdom – en diskussion af Ulrich Becks individualiseringsbegreb. Tidsskrift for Ungdomsforskning, 6(2), 41–58. Marx, K. (1976 [1867]). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Vol. 1). Penguin Books. Mills, M. (2007). Individualization and the Life Course: Toward a Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence. In C.  Howard (Ed.), Contested Individualization. Debates About Contemporary Personhood. Palgrave Macmillan. Nollmann, G., & Strasser, H. (2007). Individualization as an Interpretive Scheme of Inequality: Why Class and Inequality Persist. In C. Howard (Ed.), Contested Individualization. Debates About Contemporary Personhood. Palgrave Macmillan. Parsons, T. (1978). Religion in Postindustrial America: The Problem of Secularization. In T. Parsons (Ed.), Action Theory and the Human Condition. The Free Press. Rasborg, K. (2003). Sociologien som samtidsdiagnose. In M.  Hviid Jacobsen (Ed.), Sociologiske visioner – sytten bidrag fra en sociologisk brydningstid. Systime. Rasborg, K. (2017). From Class Society to the Individualized Society? A Critical Reassessment of Individualization and Class. Irish Journal of Sociology, 25(3), 229–249. Sartre, J. -P. (2007 [1946]). Existentialism Is a Humanism. Yale University Press. Savage, M. (2000). Class Analysis and Social Transformation. Open University Press. Savage, M., et al. (2013). A New Model of Social Class? Findings from the BBC’s Great British Class Survey Experiment. Sociology, 47(2), 219–250. Schroer, M. (2000). Negative, positive und ambivalente Individualisierung  – erwartbare und überraschende Allianzen. In T. Krohn (Ed.), Individualisierung und soziologische Theorie. Leske + Budrich. Sennett, R. (1998). Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism. W.W. Norton and Co. Simmel, G. (1971 [1903]). The Metropolis and Mental Life. In D.  N. Levine (Ed.), Georg Simmel. On Individuality and Social Forms. Selected Writings. The University of Chicago Press.

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Simmel, G. (1983 [1888]). Die Ausdehnung der Gruppe und die Ausbildung der Individualität. In H. -J.  Dahme & O.  Rammstedt (Eds.), Georg Simmel. Schriften zur Soziologie. Suhrkamp. Simmel, G. (2007 [1917]). Individualism. Theory, Culture & Society, 24(7–8): 66–71. Skeggs, B. (2004). Class, Self, Culture. Routledge. Standing, G. (2014). The Precariat. The New Dangerous Class. Bloomsbury. Tönnies, F. (2001 [1887/1935]). The Theory of Gesellschaft. In J. Harris (Ed.), Tönnies: Community and Civil Society. Cambridge University Press. Twenge, J. M. (2014). Generation Me. Why Today’s Young Americans Are More Confident, Assertive, Entitled – And More Miserable Than Ever Before. Revised and Updated. ATRIA Paperback. Weber, M. (1962 [1921/22]). Basic Concepts in Sociology. Greenwood Press. Weber, M. (1992 [1904/05]). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Routledge. Wohlrab-Sahr, M. (1997). Individualisierung: Differenzierungsprozess und Zurechnungsmodus. In U.  Beck & P.  Sopp (Eds.), Individualisierung und Integration. Neue Konfliktlinien und neuer Integrationsmodus. Leske + Budrich. Ziehe, T. (1975). Pubertät und Narzissmus. Sind Jugendliche entpolitisiert? Europäische Verlagsanstalt. Ziehe, T. (1989). Ambivalens og mangfoldighed. Tekster om ungdom, skole, æstetik og kultur. Forlaget Politisk Revy. Ziehe, T. (1997). Individualisering som det kulturelt forandrede selvforhold. Social Kritik, 9(52–53), 129–135. Ziehe, T. (2004). Øer af intensitet i et hav af rutine. Nye tekster om ungdom, skole og kultur. Forlaget Politisk Revy. Ziehe, T., & Stubenrauch, H. (1982). Plädoyer für ungewönliches Lernen. Ideen zur Jugendsituation. Rowohlt.

CHAPTER 5

Reflexive Modernity

As mentioned in Chap. 1, Beck does not agree with the sociologists and philosophers who see change in contemporary society as a reflection of the emergence of a postmodern society. The risk society does not denote the end of modernity, but a new phase: reflexive modernity. Beck suggests that we are now moving not towards postmodernity, but rather—as the subtitle to Risk Society suggests—into a new or different form of modernity (Towards a New Modernity) (Beck, 1992 [1986]). From the viewpoint of a theory of modernity, the transition from an industrial society to a risk society therefore denotes a transition from simple to reflexive modernity. With his theory of the (world) risk society, Beck also seeks to make a contribution to a more general theory of a ‘meta-change’ in modernity, which he terms reflexive modernisation and reflexive modernity. In his late opus World at Risk (2009), Beck explains that his theory of reflexive modernisation and reflexive modernity consists of three interconnected theorems: (1) the theorem of risk society (which we looked at in Chap. 3); (2) the theorem of forced individualisation (which we looked at in Chap. 4) and (3) the theorem of multidimensional globalisation and cosmopolitanisation (which we will look at in greater depth in Chap. 7) (Beck, 2009: 236, note 6).1 1  Beck does not elucidate how the relationship between the concepts ‘(world) risk society’ and ‘reflexive modernity’ is meant to be understood. In his original seminal work Risk Society (1992 [1986]), he introduced the concept of ‘the risk society’ as the overall category for the diagnosis of our times (an overarching concept) (cf. the book’s title), whereas the concept of

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Where other sociologists/philosophers, Habermas (2007 [1980]) for example, are content simply to talk about ‘modernity’ or ‘the modern’, Beck seeks to distinguish between different phases of modernity. Overall, modernity can be defined as largely coinciding with ‘the project of Enlightenment’, of which Kant famously said ‘Enlightenment is the human being’s emancipation from its self-incurred immaturity’ (Kant, 2006 [1784]b: 17; cf. Habermas, 1990). A central tenet of modernity is, therefore, the belief that the path to progress and greater freedom is through humanity’s control of nature. This emphasis on the key role played by science and reason lays the foundation in modernity for a secular variant of Providence—the idea of progress (Lyon, 1999: 7). Conversely, postmodernity refers to a perception that modernity is a spent force, as the ‘grand narratives’ of progress, reason and universal liberation that characterised modernity have lost their validity and power of persuasion. Belief in progress is replaced by pessimism, which has arisen against the background of the cataclysmic events of the twentieth century, in particular two world wars, totalitarian regimes (Nazism, Stalinism), hunger and poverty in developing countries, environmental disasters and so on. The postmodern collapse of values goes hand in hand with—and can be seen as an expression of—the emergence of an extreme socio-­ cultural fragmentation in the highly developed industrial societies in the second half of the twentieth century, culminating in the idea that it is no longer possible to posit universally valid criteria for truth, validity and authenticity. In short, the postmodern condition is characterised by everything being ‘fluid’ (Lyotard, 1984; Lash, 1990; Lyon, 1999). Jean-François Lyotard, the postmodern philosopher par excellence, drawing on, inter alia, Daniel Bell and Alain Touraine, stresses that the postmodern condition primarily consists of the cultural state of post-war, post-industrial society (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv–xxv, 3, 37–38).2 The theory that industrial society has been replaced by a post-industrial service society reflexive modernisation seems to be more of a sub-concept. However, in the later major work World at Risk (2009), the concept of the risk society is described—as stated above—as a ‘sub-­ element’ (a sub-concept) in the more comprehensive theory of reflexive modernisation (an overarching concept). The two concepts seem to alternate as overarching concepts and sub-concepts. 2  The question, however, is how new these ideas of the postmodern really are. As early as 1959, some two decades before Lyotard published the above-mentioned book on the postmodern condition, the American sociologist C.  Wright Mills noted that the ‘postmodern society’ was emerging (Mills, 2000 [1959]: 165–66). It may well be that ‘the postmodern’

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as a consequence of higher post-war prosperity was first posited in 1973 by the American sociologist Daniel Bell (Bell, 1976). However, where Bell’s thematisation of post-industrialism and the information society is still tied in with the idea of progress through new technology, Lyotard sees post-­ industrialism as the societal basis for the definitive collapse of the idea of progress (Lyotard, 1984: xxiii–xxv, 37–41; cf. Lyon, 1999: 65, 91). Lyotard’s underlying idea is that when the industrial society ends and is transformed into a post-industrial society, modernity also ends and is replaced by postmodern fragmentation. In other words, for Lyotard, modernity seems to have reached its limit in the industrial society. As such, it seems that the postmodern thinkers are incapable of imagining modernity as anything other and more than the industrial society.

From Simple to Reflexive Modernity It is precisely this identification of modernity and industrial society that is challenged by Beck’s theory of reflective modernity. He does not think that modernity or the Enlightenment project has been fully realised within the framework of the industrial society. Modernity is not identical with industrial society but encapsulated within it. For him, industrial society is a ‘halved modernity’, as it only denotes one particular phase in the modernisation process, that is, simple modernisation (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 10–15, 89, 107–08, 153; 1992: 167–68; 1997: 23–28). By contrast, the risk society denotes a new phase in the modernisation process, that is, reflexive modernisation (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 10, 19–20, 107–09). We have moved from a simple to a reflexive modernity—or as Beck also puts it, from the first to the second modernity (Beck, 2002a). Under simple modernity, the belief in progress and science remained intact, which is why they could still be used to legitimise risks. Under reflexive modernity, however, the belief in progress and science crumbles as industrial society’s destructive potential becomes apparent, and risks can no longer be legitimised by either science or progress (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 12–13, 155–56, 158–63; 1997: 11–19; 1999a: 72–74). The essential difference between the two phases of modernisation is that simple modernisation signifies a modernisation of tradition, whereas reflexive modernisation is a modernisation of industrial society (Beck, is not as new a phenomenon as is sometimes claimed—instead, perhaps it has always been part of modernity, that is, as its potential negation.

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1992 [1986]: 10–11, 225; 1993: 71–72). Reflexive modernisation is thus synonymous with a ‘modernisation of modernity’, that is, modernity begins to ‘modernise itself’ (Beck, 1997: 26–28; Beck et  al., 2003: 1). This denotes a new phase in the modernisation process, in which modernity increasingly begins to relate to itself and its own results—not least in terms of risks (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 19–20). Hence, as Beck says, in the risk society, modernity makes itself both a theme and a problem (Beck, 1997: 5). And it is precisely this ‘self-confrontation’ that makes modernity more reflexive (Beck, 1997: 11–19; 1994a: 2–8; Beck et al., 2003: 1). Beck’s concept of simple (or first) modernity emphasises that modernity—despite rising prosperity, the welfare state and social security—has not been able to fulfil the Enlightenment project’s promises of progress and prosperity for all. Industrial modernity has not eliminated inequality—economic, gender, ethnic and so on. On the contrary, it has maintained and, in a number of cases, even reinforced it: ‘Individuals in this society are theoretically free and equal and their associations are voluntary. But their freedom and equality are moulded by social institutions  – for example the sexual division of labour – that are in many respects coercive’ (Beck et al., 2003: 4; cf. Beck, 1992 [1986]: Ch. 3, 4 and 6). As industrial society transforms into a risk society, modernity wriggles out of its industrial ‘straitjacket’ to become a full-blown modernity. At this point, simple (or ‘halved’) modernity—characterised by collective patterns of life, full employment, nation states, welfare states and the instrumental exploitation of nature—moves into a new phase, namely reflexive modernity, characterised by ecological crises, falling employment, individualisation, globalisation and gender revolution (Beck, 2002a: 79). Simple modernity—whose institutional structures arose in post-war Europe—is, as mentioned previously, ‘halved’, as the basic principles of modernity are constrained ‘status-wise’ within the framework of industrial society. According to Beck, simple modernity rests on a number of ‘basic premises’ or ‘institutions’ that are ‘naturalised’ and appear to be self-evident: 1. First modern societies are nation-state societies defined by territorial boundaries. 2. First modern societies distinguish themselves by a programmatic individualisation. But this is crucially bounded on several sides by patterns of collective life that are heavily reminiscent of pre-modern structures that determined one’s status by birth.

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3. First modern societies are work societies or more precisely, gainful employment societies, in their fully developed form, they are what was once called in Europe ‘full employment societies’. 4. First modern societies have a particular concept of nature founded on its exploitation. 5. First modern societies unfold themselves on the basis of a scientifically defined concept of rationality that emphasises instrumental control. 6. First modern societies understand and manage their development according to the principle of functional differentiation (Beck et al., 2003: 4–5). As simple modernity transforms into reflexive modernity, these very basic premises/institutions change, and in doing so lose their unproblematised self-evident nature (Beck et al., 2003: 2–3, 6–9). According to Beck, this change does not take place consciously—it is not planned or intended, but driven by risks, understood as the unintended consequences of industrial modernisation. Modernity thus becomes reflexive as it is confronted with its own unintended consequences. Therefore, the framework conditions that in the first modernity were assumed to be ‘natural’ are abolished—so to speak, as a consequence of the consequences (risks), that is, ‘second-order consequences’ (Beck et  al., 2003: 14). According to Beck, in reflexive modernity, the erosion of the naturalised basic premises/ institutions of simple modernity is expressed in the following dimensions: 1. Globalisation undermines the economic foundations of the first modern society and with it the idea of society as nation state. 2. From the 1960s onwards, the welfare state (and its half-private, half-­ public analogues in the USA, in health care, housing and education) has provided the basis for an intensification of individualisation. The result has been the erosion of several ascriptive patterns of collective life, each of which has gradually lost its legitimacy. 3. An important aspect of this expansion of individualisation has been the transformation of gender roles. 4. The flexible employment practices that appeared in the wake of the ‘third industrial revolution’ express, in their chronic form, a ­breakdown in the full employment society, and perhaps even in the central significance of gainful employment.

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5. Last, we must add the political dynamic that is being set in motion by the perception of a global ecological crisis, which includes the acknowledgement of limited resources (Beck et al., 2003: 6–7). At first glance, it may seem tautological to talk about modernity becoming reflexive, as ‘modernity’ is questioning tradition by definition (Beck, 2002a: 80; Beck & Lau, 2005: 550–55; cf. Elling, 2008: 117–41; Wittrock, 2000: 49). However, Beck stresses that the ‘reflexivity’ of reflexive modernity is of a special kind, as the ‘self-transformation’ of modernity is not conscious, planned and intended. As such, he criticises both Giddens (1994a) and Lash (1994) for considering reflexive modernisation to be a conscious process, the medium for which is knowledge (reflection) (Beck, 1994b: 175–77; 1999b: 119). Beck does not disagree with Giddens and Lash that knowledge plays a central role in reflexive modernity (Beck, 1999b: 110). Unlike them, however, he stresses that the medium of reflexive modernisation is as much non-knowledge, as it is driven by the unintended consequences of industrial modernisation, that is, risks (cf. Chap. 3): What distinguishes my concept of reflexive modernization from those of Giddens and Lash? To put it briefly and pointedly: the ‘medium’ of reflexive modernization is not knowledge, but – more or less reflexive – unawareness. It is this aspect of the distribution and defence of unawareness (Nicht-Wissen) that opens the horizon of inquiry for non-linear theories (of reflexive modernization). We live in the age of unintended consequences, and it is this state of affairs that must be decoded and shaped methodologically and theoretically, in everyday life and politically (Beck, 1999b: 119).

Beck thus wishes to distinguish between reflexivity, understood as modernity’s confrontation with itself and its own results (risks), and (self)-reflection, understood as possible awareness of the risk society’s self-destructive potentials (Beck, 1993: 36–40; 1999a: 73; 1999b: 109–11). Doing so allows him to stress that the transition from simple to reflexive modernity takes place in a ‘reflex-like’ way, as it is not a conscious, planned and intended process of which the actors involved are fully aware (Beck, 1993: 36–40, 71–72). For Beck, therefore, reflexivity is not necessarily synonymous with more self-reflection, in terms of greater awareness of selfdestructive potentialities, but also implies the repression of specific problems and risks (Rasborg, 2001). Hence, rather than individual

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self-­reflection, Beck’s reflexivity, so to speak, denotes a ‘structural’ or ‘institutional’ reflexivity rooted in the fact that the side-effects of industrial society question society and its institutions (Beck, 1993: 47; 1994a: 9). In Beck’s view, this suggests that instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität)— which Weber sees as the epitome of computability and calculability (Weber, 1962 [1921/22]: 61)—transcends itself and becomes a ‘post-­ Zweckrationalität’. According to Beck, this is precisely due to the tendency for risks to become incalculable (as seen in Chap. 3) (Beck, 1993: 47; 1994a: 9). With the concept of reflexive modernity, Beck can be said to transcend the classical sociologists’ (Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel and Tönnies) understanding of societal change based on a simple dichotomy, namely between tradition and modernity (as seen in Chap. 4). This dichotomy is reflected in the distinctive ‘dual concepts’ in classical sociology: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ solidarity, ‘value rationality’ and ‘instrumental rationality’, ‘traditional’ and ‘bureaucratic’ authority, ‘estate’ and ‘class’, ‘status’ and ‘contract’ and so on (Beck et al., 2003: 9; cf. Habermas, 1987 [1969]: 87–88; Frisby, 1988: 198). However, seen from the perspective of Beck’s theory of reflexive modernisation, the classical sociologists’ Gesellschaft must be said to belong to simple modernity. In other words, it was to a large extent a ‘macro-group Gesellschaft’, which in reflexive modernity is increasingly being replaced by an individualised and reflexive Gesellschaft (cf. Chap. 4). Instead of the classical opposition between tradition and modernity, we now have, as illustrated in Table 5.1, a three-part model: tradition (Gemeinschaft), simple modernity (Gesellschaft) and reflexive modernity (an individualised and reflexive Gesellschaft) (Lash, 1994: 113–14). Thus, for Beck, the limitation of the Table 5.1  Tradition, simple and reflexive modernity Tradition

Simple (first) modernity

Reflexive (second) modernity

Gemeinschaft:

Gesellschaft:

An individualised (reflexive) Gesellschaft:

An organic community (family, church, local community, etc.)

A macro-group society (welfare state, trade unions, classes, bureaucracy, etc.)

Release from the macro-structures of industrial society

‘Common values’

‘Shared interests’

‘Own interests’

Source: The table is by the author, but inspired by Lash (1994: 113–14)

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classical approach is that it theorises within the framework of a phase of modernisation that we have left behind, that is, simple modernisation/ modernity.

The ‘Modern Counter-Modern’ With his theory of reflexive modernisation, Beck argues that the bulk of previous sociology—from Marx, Durkheim and Weber through Parsons to Luhmann and Habermas—operates within the paradigm of simple modernisation. This is reflected in the fact that these are ‘linear’ theories of progressive modernisation and rationalisation. By this, Beck means theories that thematise the development of society as a continuous process that leads to still more commodification (Marx), more rationalisation (Weber, Habermas) and more functional differentiation (Durkheim, Parsons and Luhmann) (Beck, 1997: 20–28). At first glance, it might seem as if Beck himself is presenting a linear theory, insofar as the risk society is conceived as an (apparently) new stage in the development of society that follows from the preceding one (industrial society). However, Beck stresses that reflexive modernisation should be understood as a dialectic consisting of modernisation and counter-modernisation. Beck’s concept of the counter-modern refers to a number of phenomena that can be seen as regressive in relation to modernity’s ideals of reason, freedom and equality (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 12–15, 106–09; 1997: chap. 2). The term counter-modern does not imply a lack of modernisation, it is on the contrary a product of modernity. For that reason, Beck also speaks of ‘the modern counter-modern’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 107–08). As an example of counter-modernity, Beck mentions the traditional gender-­based division of labour (inequality) between men and women (cf. Chap. 6). In his view, this was a prerequisite for industrial society in early (simple) modernity, but is gradually being overcome in reflexive modernity, as it clashes more and more with the basic principles of modernity (universalism, freedom, equality, etc.) (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 104–06; 1992: 167–68). However, religious fundamentalism, neonationalism, racism, neo-tribalism and so on are also, in Beck’s sense, counter-modern phenomena that can be seen as reactions to a wide-ranging reflexivity and that indicate a need for fixed points in a largely de-traditionalised lifeworld. The process of modernisation does not necessarily mean greater progress, but always carries a risk of setbacks and a resurgence of irrationality.

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Beck’s challenge to a linear concept of progress has certain similarities with Horkheimer and Adorno’s pessimistic diagnosis in Dialectic of the Enlightenment (1997 [1944/47]), in which the Enlightenment inevitably becomes its opposite and turns into barbarism (Beck, 1993: 45, 66–67; 1997: 161). Like Horkheimer and Adorno—and Weber and Nietzsche— Beck seeks to show that modern rationality seems to accommodate a latent irrationality. Horkheimer and Adorno’s metaphor for this was Auschwitz— Beck’s is Chernobyl. The modern project of mastery of nature, which was supposed to free us from the vicissitudes of nature, paradoxically leads to a new dependency, as we are subjected to a new overarching context of alienation arising from human-made risks. In order to break this vicious circle, modernity must reflect on itself (Beck, 1994a: 54, note 19). In Beck’s view, however, irrationality must be overcome by rationality. Where for Horkheimer and Adorno this means ‘enlightening the Enlightenment’, for Beck it is about a ‘radicalisation of rationality’: It is not an excess of rationality, but a shocking lack of rationality, the prevailing irrationality, which explains the ailment of industrial modernity. It can be cured, if at all, not by a retreat but only by a radicalization of rationality, which will absorb the repressed uncertainty. (Beck, 1994a: 33)

Beck does not, therefore, call for less rationality, but rather for more or another form of rationality. Thus, in several respects, his theory of the risk society and reflexive modernity can be seen as an elaboration on basic themes in critical theory—the critique of rationality, science and civilisation—but reframed within a new social context (Beck, 1997: 182, note 24; cf. Rasborg, 2001).3 In his critique of modernity and rationality, Beck also has thematic similarities with Bauman, whose Modernity and the Holocaust (1989) seeks to show that catastrophe—in this case, the Third Reich’s massacre of six million Jews and homosexuals—is not randomly associated with modernity, but in fact modernity was a precondition for it. Just as risks, according to Beck, are side effects of industrial society, according to Bauman: ‘The Holocaust is a by-product of the modern drive to a fully designed, fully 3  I am not claiming that Beck and the early Frankfurt School agree on all points. Beck himself draws attention to these similarities, but also disassociates himself from the pessimism of Horkheimer and Adorno. He also stresses that, in his view, the subject of the critique—the ‘dialectical opposite’ (das Gegenüber)—is not ‘enlightenment’, but ‘non-enlightenment’ (Beck, 1993: 66; 1994b: 177).

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controlled world, once the drive is getting out of control and running wild’ (Bauman, 1989: 93). Thus, both Beck and Bauman highlight the dark side of modernity, in terms of latent threats that, if they come to fruition, can be disastrous. However, in their explanations of this shadow side of modernity—epitomised by Holocaust and Chernobyl, respectively— Beck and Bauman differ. Whereas Beck sees it as an expression of a ‘lack’ of rationality, Bauman perceives it as the pinnacle of instrumental (bureaucratic) rationality that, combined with greater division of labour and industrial mass production, unburdens the individual of ethical responsibility (Bauman, 1989: 13–18, 28, 73, 93–94).4 Beck’s concept of reflexive modernity makes it clear—as seen above— that what the sociological classics thematised as modernity—even though they may not have explicitly used the term—was just an early phase of this, namely simple modernity. With the transition from simple to reflexive modernity, the reflection of an epochal break therefore again gets a prominent place in sociology. However, as Beck points out, it is not a break with modernity, but rather a break in modernity. It is thus a simultaneity of continuity and discontinuity (Beck & Grande, 2007: 30–32). As a consequence, the prevailing notions and institutionalised solutions in simple modernity lose their evidence and persuasive power: in the dimension of ecological crises, the idea of exploiting nature in the pursuit of endless growth is problematised (cf. Chap. 3); in the dimension of individualisation, the idea of a preconceived community is problematised (cf. Chap. 4); in the dimension of changes in the labour market, the notion of full employment is questioned (cf. Chap. 6); in the dimension of gender relations, the idea of a ‘natural’ division of labour between the sexes is problematised (cf. Chap. 6); and in the dimension of globalisation and cosmopolitanisation, the idea of territoriality is problematised (cf. Chap. 7) (Beck, 2002a: 84). In simple (first) modernity everything changes, except the principles of change, whereas in reflective modernity the very principles of change—the basic categories and the leading ideas—are increasingly included in the dynamics of change, whereby they lose their evidential character. This is 4  It must be stressed that Bauman does not claim that the Holocaust is a necessary (irresistible) consequence of modernity and instrumental (bureaucratic) rationality, but rather that the former would not be possible without the latter. According to Bauman, the Holocaust does not herald the collapse of modernity, but is a product of modernity (Bauman, 1989: xiii, 5, 17–18).

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the discontinuity, according to Beck. Conversely, the continuity consists in the fact that reflexive (second) modernity does not denote a break with modernity as such, but only with an early phase of it (Beck, 2002a: 84; Beck et al., 2003: 2–3, 8–9; cf. Rasborg, 2003). In other words, the constitutive principles of modernity (state, rationality, work, egalitarianism, functional inclusion, separation of nature and society, etc.) remain fundamentally intact, despite all change, whereas its institutions are increasingly changing in reflective (second) modernity (Beck & Lau, 2005: 532–33).

Reconceptualisation of Sociology in Reflexive Modernity Beck’s insistence that social change takes place ‘within the continuity of modernity’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 10; 2002a: 81) distinguishes his theory of reflexive modernisation from the theories of postmodernity, in which social change is primarily described negatively on the basis of the—modern—state of society, which is negated by the postmodern condition. Culture and society are not described by what they ‘are’, but by what they are not: non-modern, non-industrial, non-homogeneous, non-unique and so on. On the contrary, Beck’s theory of reflexive modernisation seeks to provide positive answers to how the basic assumptions of the first modernity are restructured by the second modernity. Where the theories of postmodernity, as Beck says, focus on the de-structuring of the social and the de-conceptualisation of sociology, the theory of reflexive modernisation focuses on the restructuring of the social and the re-conceptualisation of sociology: The theory of re-modernization maintains that there are new rules of the game for our political and social systems, and the task of social science is to grasp them, describe them, understand them and explain them. So, whereas for many theorists of postmodernism the issue is one of the de-structuration of society and the de-conceptualization of social science, for re-­modernization it is a matter of re-structuration and re-conceptualization. (Beck et al., 2003: 3)

The aim of the theory of reflexive modernity is therefore—both theoretically and empirically—to invent the rules of the new ‘game of society’ in a context of global risks, individualisation, globalisation and cosmopolitanisation, changing gender relations, labour market flexibility and so on

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(Beck et al., 2003: 2–3; Beck & Lau, 2005). Reflexive modernity throws up new challenges for the ‘sociological imagination’ (Mills, 2000 [1959]), in terms of inventing new concepts and categories that reflect the new social reality unfolding before us. Rather than a postmodern parting with reason and science, according to Beck, there is now a need for a new and strong sociology (Beck et al., 2003: 3). However, such innovative theoretical work necessitates challenging the ‘zombie’ or ‘container categories’ that, in Beck’s view, dominate much of sociological thinking (Beck & Willms, 2004: 19; 2002b: 133). It seems as if we have not yet wrested ourselves free from modernity’s rigid forms of thinking. For Beck, therefore, the task of sociology is to break with simple modernity’s categories and ways of thinking and instead develop theories and concepts that match the social reality of reflexive modernity (Beck, 2005). In other words, Beck advocates a sociological paradigm shift, from simple (first) modernity to reflexive (second) modernity; a shift with significant implications for our understanding of key areas of society, such as paid work, social class, inequality, individualisation, family and gender, nation state, globalisations and so on (as will be further elucidated in the chapters to follow). Such a shift will take more than attempts at theoretical innovation. Light also needs to be shed on the empirical dimensions of the theory of reflexive modernity. In the major interdisciplinary research project ‘Reflexive Modernization’, which ran from 1999 to 2009 and was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG), Beck and colleagues from four German universities tried to develop criteria for studying the empirical validity of the theory of reflexive modernity in relation to a number of ‘competing’ diagnoses of the times, in particular the theories of postmodernity (Beck et al., 2003: 29, note 1; Beck & Lau, 2005: 529, 555, note 2). The basic idea is that the crucial difference between (simple) modernity, reflexive modernity and postmodernity lies in whether it is still possible to draw boundaries. According to Beck, simple modernity was an ‘either-or society’, in which it was still possible to distinguish between true and false, idea and reality, nature and society, danger and risk, knowledge and non-knowledge, health and disease, life and death, East and West, us and them, national and international, global and local, war and peace, market and hierarchy, public and private, work and non-work, family and non-family and so on (Beck et al., 2003: 18). Reflexive modernity, on the other hand, is a far more ambivalent ‘both-­ and society’, in which these boundaries have not disappeared, but are

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constantly redrawn, and as such are also endlessly negotiable. Finally, in Beck’s view, postmodernity refers to a condition in which the boundaries of modernity are blurred, as ‘everything is liquid’—which is why it is no longer possible to maintain the binary distinctions mentioned above (Beck et al., 2003: 1–19). The decisive criterion in Beck’s attempt to ‘operationalise’ the theory of reflexive modernity therefore consists—as shown in Table 5.2—of whether the boundaries of modernity are still intact (simple modernity), still negotiable (reflexive modernity) or liquid (postmodernity) (Beck et al., 2003: 19–29). In a series of detailed empirical studies, Table 5.2  General criteria for the ‘meta-change’ of modernity Simple, or first modern society

Reflexive, or second modern society

Postmodern society

The nature of boundaries

Unambiguous, institutionally guaranteed boundaries (between social spheres, between nature and society, between scientific and unscientific)

A multiplicity tending towards the dissolution of boundaries Recognition of this multiplicity

The function, nature and position of science in society

Ending debate through the discourse of scientific consensus The minimisation of side-effects and ineradicable residual uncertainty The monopoly of legitimate knowledge

A multiplicity of boundaries and fundamental distinctions Recognition of this multiplicity The necessity of institutionalising self-consciously fictive boundaries New problems of institutionalised decision-making (conflicts of responsibility and boundary conflicts) Growth of contradictory scientific camps Recognition of extra-scientific justifications Increased account taken of unexpected side-effects Debate ended through ad hoc institutional means of reaching a decision

Source: Beck et al. (2003: 22)

A lessened need for justification and the recognition of arbitrary multiplicity

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Beck and his colleagues conclude that the boundaries of modernity are not liquid but constantly renegotiated. Based on the previously mentioned ‘test criteria’, this indicates that we live in reflexive modernity, not postmodernity (Beck et al., 2001: 48–59). Bearing in mind the criteria mentioned for reflexive modernity, many modern debates can be seen as discursive battles over where lines of demarcation should be drawn: regarding food risks, between what is dangerous and harmless to our health (cf. Chap. 3); regarding global warming, between what is natural and what is man-made; regarding assisted dying, between life and death; regarding immigrants and refugees, between those who should be granted access to the welfare state and those who should not.

Reflexive Modernity, Late Modernity and Liquid Modernity As seen above, the central idea in Beck’s theory of reflexive modernity is that social change does not reflect the end of modernity but signifies a new—reflexive—phase. As he puts it, contemporary society is not postmodern, but ‘more modern’ (Beck, 2009: 55). In this way, he sets aside the dichotomy between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ and instead points to a third possibility—‘the reflexively modern’ (Beck et al., 1994: vi; Lash, 1994: 112). In doing so, he establishes a new perspective within the sociological diagnosis of the times. This approach has inspired many other sociologists who also stress that social change does not mean the end of modernity (postmodernity), but a new phase. In the previous chapter, we saw how Ziehe explicitly acknowledges his debt to Beck (and Giddens) when it comes to the diagnosis of contemporary society, which he describes as ‘hypermodern’, ‘post-auratic modern’ or ‘a second modernity’ (Ziehe, 1989: 115, 160; 2004: 8). Another testament to Beck’s influence is Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (1994), written on Beck’s initiative, in which Beck, Giddens and Lash each interpret the theme of ‘reflexivity’ (Beck et al., 1994). In their interpretations of the concept of ‘reflexive modernity’, Giddens and Lash do not necessarily agree with Beck in all respects, but they nonetheless agree that it facilitates a fruitful path out of the schism between the modern and the postmodern:

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For all of us, the protracted debate about modernity versus postmodernity has become wearisome and like so many such debates in the end has produced rather little. The idea of reflexive modernization, regardless of whether or not one uses that term as such, breaks the stranglehold which these debates have tended to place upon conceptual innovation. (Beck et al., 1994: vi)

For Giddens, this seems like a natural step, as the concepts he already deploys in his diagnosis of the times have multiple similarities with Beck’s reflexive modernity. Like Beck, Giddens stresses that we have not moved beyond modernity, but into a new phase of it, which Giddens describes as ‘late modernity’, ‘high modernity’ or ‘radicalised modernity’ (Giddens, 1990: 45–53, 147–49, 162–63; 1991: 3; 1994b: 91). On one point, however, Giddens maintains the concept of ‘the postmodern’—not in Lyotard’s sense, as describing the decay of grand narratives, but as a concept that refers to a ‘realistic utopia’ about the possibility of a ‘post-­scarcity society’, which comes after radicalised modernity and has managed to overcome its inherent conflicts and problems (Giddens, 1990: 45–53, 150, 163–73). Here, Giddens aims to wrest the concept of postmodernity free from its attachment to a resigned, pessimistic notion of the impossibility of change for the better, and instead ‘redefine’ it as a far more optimistic concept that allows for the possibility of a post-scarcity society with democratic participation at all levels, the humanisation of technology and demilitarisation (Giddens, 1990: 163–64). Lash, on the other hand, seems to have undergone a more comprehensive theoretical reorientation. In the early 1990s, he was preoccupied with the possibilities of ‘a sociology of the postmodern society’ (Lash, 1990). In the aforementioned book, however, he distances himself from the concept of the postmodern, as seen in the quotation above, and takes inspiration from Beck’s concept of reflexive modernisation/modernity (Lash, 1994). Lash argues that there is good reason to make the concept of reflexive modernity the main concept in a critical social theory for the twenty-first century: ‘I would like […] to argue […] that crucial elements of […] a turn-of-the-twenty-first-century critical theory can be found in the framework of “reflexive modernity”, which has been implicitly, when not explicitly, adumbrated in the first two sections of this book’ (Lash, 1994: 110). At the same time, however, he expounds his own interpretation of the concept of ‘reflexivity’, which places greater emphasis on the

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aesthetic—cultural and symbolic—dimensions of reflexivity in relation to Beck’s ‘structural reflexivity’ and Giddens’ individual self-reflection (cf. above) (Lash, 1994: 111–13). Bauman, too, made the postmodern the key concept in his diagnosis of the times in the 1990s (Bauman, 1992). However, like Lash, he has since put this concept behind him and instead describes the society of today as a ‘liquid modernity’ that has replaced the more ‘fixed’ and structured modernity that largely coincided with the industrial society (Bauman, 2000; cf. Lee, 2006: 357). Since postmodernity is a state in which ‘everything is liquid’, we might be lured into believing that Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’ is merely a synonym for ‘postmodernity’. However, Bauman explicitly rejects this interpretation, emphasising—in a retrospective reflection—that the concept of the postmodern was for him ‘a stop-gap notion’ that performed a necessary ‘site-clearing job’ until other and better concepts were developed. For Bauman, like Beck, the concept of the postmodern is useful for saying something about what society is not—non-modern, non-industrial, non-unique and so on—but less conducive to more positive indications of what society is. In other words, according to Bauman, the weakness of the concept is that it is purely negative and says little about the nature of the new state of society (Yakimova, 2002: 2; Bauman, 2004: 17–18). Hence, where Bauman’s position on postmodernity once differed from Beck, Giddens and (in part) Lash, he has since moved closer to their thinking. Thus, common to the concepts of ‘reflexive modernity’ (Beck), ‘late modernity’/‘radicalised modernity’ (Giddens) and ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman) is that they, in contrast to the postmodern deconstruction of the foundation of modernity, try to reinvent and rethink it. However, this does not mean that these concepts are identical (Lee, 2006). For example, Bauman has certain reservations about Beck’s concept of reflexive (second) modernity. In his view, there is a risk of the reflexivity of intellectuals being projected onto society as a whole5—a society that, according to Bauman, is characterised by a loss of ‘reflexive virtues’ as a result of its volatility and ‘social amnesia’ (Yakimova, 2002: 3; Bauman, 2004: 18). In relation to Bauman’s emphasis on the liquid, volatile and contingent, Beck’s reflexive modernity appears more ‘fixed’ and structured. As we have seen, it does not refer to a ‘deconstruction’ of the social, but to a 5  The question is, however, whether Bauman here confuses Beck’s ‘structural reflexivity’ with individual (self)-reflection—from which Beck, as we have seen, distances himself.

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‘reconstruction’, which also creates new opportunities to institutionalise—and thus ‘contain’—volatility and contingency (Lee, 2006: 365). One example of this might be Beck’s concept of ‘institutionalised individualisation’, which we covered in the previous chapter. Bauman also has reservations about Giddens’ concept of late modernity, as the word ‘late’ seems to imply that modernity is in a final phase—it would hardly make sense to speak of ‘later modernity’ or ‘post-late modernity’. This is problematic, according to Bauman, as it is impossible to know in advance whether this is the case (Yakimova, 2002: 2–3; Bauman, 2004: 18). At first glance, the concepts of first (simple) and second (reflexive) modernity seem to solve this problem, but they are not unproblematic either. The series could, in principle, be continued indefinitely—first modernity, second modernity, third, fourth, fifth and so on (cf. Carleheden, 2001)—as a result of which the concepts risk losing their specificity and analytical conciseness.

Multiple Modernities and Amodernity The question, then, is whether Beck manages to wrest himself free from the idea of ‘modernity’ as a Western project. His ‘second modernity’ stems from the ‘first modernity’, which, as we have seen, is closely connected with the ‘Enlightenment project’—or as Habermas termed it, ‘the project of modernity’ (2007 [1980])—as it was formulated in Europe in the mid-­ eighteenth century. Beck’s concept of modernity therefore seems genuinely Western in its origins, which means that we must ask whether it reflects an ‘ethno-’ or ‘Eurocentrism’ in which ‘modernisation’ and ‘modernity’ are seen as universal forms of development and society that originated in the West and then spread to the rest of the world. The question is whether there is only one path to (reflexive) modernity—the Western one—or whether it is possible to imagine other, non-Western paths (Eisenstadt, 2000: 2–3). In their thematisation of this question, a number of sociologists— including Eisenstadt (2000), Lee (2006) and Wittrock (2000)—proposed the concept of ‘multiple modernities’, which stresses that although ‘modernisation’ and ‘modernity’ are general (global) conditions to which we are all subject, there are nevertheless major differences in how modernisation takes place in different countries, depending on the culture concerned and the specific national and local context (Wittrock, 2000: 54–55). The

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‘multiple modernities’ perspective accommodates a concept of cultural diversity that challenges the universalist notion of modernisation and modernity as a purely Western ‘project’ aimed at achieving global dominance (Lee, 2006: 358, 363). In this light, the modernisation of non-­ Western societies is not seen purely as ‘Westernisation’, ‘Americanisation’ or ‘Europeanisation’, that is, not as universal but as a contextual, particular and multidimensional process that takes different forms depending on the specific cultural, national and local context (Eisenstadt, 2000: 13–14, 24; Lee, 2006: 363). For example, Lee points out that Confucianism—a form of cultural conservatism that in many ways contrasts with Western individualism (cf. Chap. 4)—plays a significant role in the modernisation and creation of economic growth in a number of East Asian countries (e.g. China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore). The form of modernity to which it leads can, therefore, be seen as unique to these countries— between which there may also be differences—as the underlying Confucian values do not play the same central role in all other countries (Eisenstadt, 2000: 15–14, 24; Lee, 2006: 364). Given the concept of multiple modernities, we need to ask whether Beck’s reflexive modernity is, first and foremost, an internal critique of modernity that excludes non-Western and non-First World perspectives (Lee, 2006: 359–60). In his late writing, Beck acknowledges this problem. He initially addresses it by conceding that the concept of reflexive modernity is ‘Eurocentric’ insofar as it refers to a Western modernity of European origin (Beck et al., 2003: 7). Having said that, he also contends that a significant part of the ‘self-confrontation’, self-problematisation and self-criticism of reflexive modernity consists precisely of challenging the notion that Western modernity, in a sense, has a ‘monopoly’ on modernity (Beck et al., 2003: 2, 7–8). According to Beck, globalisation goes hand in hand with reflexive modernity and greater awareness of the world’s openness, diversity and cultural diversity. In turn, this openness facilitates greater insight into the fact that there are multiple modernities, and that modernisation processes can assume many different forms, depending on the given social and cultural context: ‘… in the transition from the first, nation-state, age of modernity to the second, cosmopolitan, age of modernity, the Western claim to a monopoly on modernity is broken and the history and situation of diverging modernities in all parts of the world come into view’ (Beck, 2000: 87). Therefore, ‘cultural comparison’ and dialogue between

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different cultures, based on the assumption that multiple modernities exist, will also play a decisive role in reflexive modernity (Beck, 2002a: 91). Beck’s point is that the concept of reflexive modernity is not exclusionary—on the contrary, it invites reflection on the existence of multiple modernities. In other words, rather than being incompatible perspectives, the concepts of reflexive modernity and multiple modernities complement each other. One perspective that may be seen as even more of a challenge to Beck’s reflexive modernity is the French sociologist Bruno Latour’s claim that we have never been modern (Latour, 1993, 2003). While Beck, as we have seen, believes that the basic distinctions of modernity were once more or less intact but have since become pluralised and increasingly negotiable (Beck & Lau, 2005: 546–47), Latour asserts that such boundaries within modernity never really existed but are instead linked to a specific conception of the world, that is, what he describes as ‘the modern constitution’ (Latour, 1993: chap. 3; 2003: 39). According to Latour, the modern constitution is based on the idea that the modern world is divided into clearly demarcated domains—things and people, nature and society, politics and science and so on—that can be kept separate from each other. In reality, however, the opposite is true in Latour’s view, as the areas constantly overlap. Modernity and its idea of boundaries mask—and paradoxically help promote—‘hybridisation’, that is, the fact that the world of things and the social world, nature and society, politics and science and so on are ‘interwoven’ in complex ways (Latour, 1993: 10–12, 29–30, 34; 2003: 36–37). This takes place within the framework of ‘actor networks’, that is, social networks in which people and things, nature and society, politics and science and so on interact with each other, resulting in complex conglomerates that Latour terms ‘quasi-­ things’ (or ‘quasi-objects’) and ‘quasi-subjects’ (Latour, 1993: 51–55; 2003: 37–38). The peculiarity of Latour’s concept of ‘actors’, which he also calls ‘actants’, is that it includes both human, individual actors and non-human, non-individual entities (Latour, 1996: 374). Latour’s examples of hybridisation are highly reminiscent of Beck’s global risks. He mentions, inter alia, the nuclear bomb, global warming, frozen embryos, expert systems, digital devices, robots with sensors, genetically modified crops, databases, psychotropic drugs, whales with radio transmitters, gene synthesisation, viewing figures and so on (Latour, 1993: 49–50; 2003: 39). Modernity

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and its idea of separation have, according to Latour, never really existed and that is why he asserts that we have never been modern. For Latour, ‘modernity’ is not an (ontological) reality, but rather an (epistemological) idea about separation that does not correspond to reality, which on the contrary is characterised by a growing interpenetration of the human and the non-human (hybridisation) (Latour, 1993: 46–48; 2003: 38–39). If Latour is right in his assertion that modernity has never begun—and that there has never been a modern world, other than as an idea—then this has consequences not just for theories of postmodernity, but also for Beck’s theory of reflexive modernity (Latour, 1993: 46–48; 2003). If we have never been modern, then nor [can we] understand the world of today using theoretical understandings that postulate ‘late-modernity’, ‘second modernity’ or ‘post-­modernity’. For Latour, these theories are just continuations of the modern constitution, and as such are misunderstandings. For Latour, then, it is not a matter of us now being in a period ‘after’ the modern or in a radicalised modernity. We have never been – and today are less than ever – modern (Arnoldi, 2006: 8).

When it comes to identifying hybridisation, Beck is very much in line with Latour. As we have seen in Chap. 3, the late Beck describes global risks in terms reminiscent of ‘quasi-things’, that is, as complex conglomerates of materiality, norms, values, technical risk calculations and cultural interpretations. Hybridisation is not the opposite of the theory of reflexive modernity but can be seen as arising from the fact that subsystems of reflexive modernity are overlapping more and more (Beck et al., 2003: 17–18).6 The significant difference between Beck and Latour consists of their interpretations of hybridisation: where Latour sees it as a testimony of amodernity, Beck sees it as a reflection of the emergence of a second form of modernity. Latour himself mentions this difference in an article written following his visit to Munich in November 2000. As part of the research project ‘Reflexive Modernization’ (see above), he was asked to submit his thoughts regarding an empirical ‘test’ of the concept of ‘re-modernisation’ (Latour, 2003: 46, note). This is Latour’s proposed term for a more idiomatic version of Beck’s concept of reflexive modernisation, which he found a bit of 6  Beck, however, criticises Latour for going too far in his thoughts on the dissolution of boundaries and ending up in an ‘ontological monism’ (Beck & Lau, 2005: 546).

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a ‘tongue twister’ (Beck et al., 2003: 29, note 3; Latour, 2003: 36). In the article, Latour compares his amodernity theory with Beck’s reflexive modernisation to encourage discussion of the extent to which the two can be empirically verified (Latour, 2003). As Latour points out, for Beck to test his theory requires that he is able to prove that an actual societal change— from simple (industrial society) to reflexive modernity (risk society)—has taken place. In Latour’s view, this is not so easy, as there are so many different definitions of ‘modernity’ that it is almost impossible to say which features characterise the reflexive (second) modernity (Latour, 2003: 39–41). For Latour, ‘the burden of proof’ is lighter, as it would be sufficient to observe a change in collective interpretation of the world that points towards a challenge to ‘the modern constitution’. It might be said that while for Beck the ‘burden of proof’ is ‘ontological’, for Latour it is ‘epistemological’ or ‘discursive’ (Latour, 2003: 39, 41).7 Nevertheless, Latour considers Beck’s proposal that a more substantial empirical ‘test’ may be performed on the thesis of ‘re-modernisation’. Based on numerous ‘test criteria’,8 he concludes that it is difficult to find sufficient empirical evidence to support the thesis (Latour, 2003: 45–46). However, according to Latour, this does not mean that Beck’s thesis lacks validity as a description of the possible future development of society. As Latour points out, significant sociological theses, such as Weber’s thesis of rationalisation, usually take a long time to attain the status of well-­ established and empirically proven, or at least probable, theories (Latour, 2003: 46).

7  However, this should not be misunderstood Latour being a ‘social constructivist’. While Latour does not completely reject this characterisation, he nevertheless stipulates a number of reservations. For example, he emphasises that the actor-network approach does not ‘extend subjectivity to things’, but instead analyses the ways in which ‘humanity’ and ‘non-­ humanity’ (subject and object, people and things, society and nature) permeate each other (Latour, 1996: 370, 374–75). Latour’s position, as pointed out by Lash, is a reflection of an ‘immanentism’ that seeks to transcend the subject/object dualism that underlies both social constructivism and realism (Lash, 2003: 55–56). 8  Latour poses six questions as his test criteria: (1) Has ‘modern’ become a negatively charged adjective? (2) Are objects gradually being replaced by quasi-objects? (3) Is the separation between nature and society becoming blurred? (4) Does time pass differently in first, post- and re-modernisation? (5) Are subjects being replaced by quasi-subjects? (6) Has there been a shift in the economy from infra- to supra-structure? (Latour, 2003: 42–45). It should be noted, however, that Latour’s deliberations on this subject seem somewhat provisional and are not always very clear.

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Summary With the concepts of first (simple) and second (reflexive) modernity, Beck introduces a differentiation into the concept of modernity. This has both clear theoretical advantages and in-built problems. The most obvious advantage is that the concept of reflexive modernity makes it possible to transcend the rigid schism between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’. This idea inspired a number of other prominent sociologists, in particular Ziehe, Giddens, Lash and Bauman, all of whom advocate making the concept of reflexive modernisation—which they each interpret in their own way—a key concept in critical sociology. At the same time, the concept of postmodernity seems to have lost ground as a category in diagnoses of the times. However, Beck’s concept of reflexive modernity has also been challenged by a number of other perspectives on contemporary society—first and foremost, by the theory of ‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt, Lee and Wittrock), which contains an (implicit) critique of reflexive modernity for ‘Western bias’, and the theory of ‘amodernity’ (Latour), which points to a discrepancy between the self-understanding of modernity (boundaries/ separation) and its reality (hybridity). Regarding the critique of ‘Western bias’, Beck points out that the idea of multiple modernities can easily be accommodated within the concept of reflexive modernity. In other words, the two concepts are not mutually exclusive but complementary. In relation to the claim that modernity and its idea of separation are incompatible with the realities of hybridisation, and are therefore a fiction, Beck points out that hybridity is not the opposite of reflexive modernity, but on the contrary can be seen as an effect of the latter breaking down boundaries. Both Beck and Latour question the boundaries of modernity. However, while Beck believes that they were once real and have since been tendentially broken down, Latour maintains that they were never real—they were always a fiction. Seen in relation to Latour’s ‘epistemological’ or ‘discursive’ understanding of modernity, Beck almost sounds like a ‘traditional’ realist—or even a ‘materialist’, if you will—despite the fact that, as we have seen in previous chapters, he actually became more of a social constructivist as his theories developed. As we have seen in this chapter, Beck believes that the transition from simple (first) to reflexive (second) modernity brings about radical change in virtually all areas of society. In Chap. 6, we will look at how this radical process of change, according to Beck, impacts on some of the key areas in the risk society and reflexive modernity—that is, family, paid work and politics.

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References Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. (1997 [1944/47]). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Verso. Arnoldi, J. (2006). Introduktion. In B. Latour (Ed.), Vi har aldrig været moderne. Hans Reitzels Forlag. Bauman, Z. (1989). Modernity and the Holocaust. Polity Press. Bauman, Z. (1992). Intimations of Postmodernity. Routledge. Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid Modernity. Polity Press. Bauman, Z. (2004). Liquid Sociality. In N.  Gane (Ed.), The Future of Social Theory. London/New York. Beck, U. (1992). How Modern is Modern Society? Theory, Culture and Society, 9(2), 163–169. Beck, U. (1992 [1986]). The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage. Beck, U. (1993). Die Erfindung des Politischen. Zu einer Theorie reflexiver Modernisierung. Frankfurt/M. Beck, U. (1994a). The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization. In U.  Beck, A.  Giddens, & S.  Lash (Eds.), Reflexive Modernization. Polity Press. Beck, U. (1994b). Self-Dissolution and Self-Endangerment of Industrial Society: What Does This Mean? In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), Reflexive Modernization. Polity Press. Beck, U. (1997). The Reinvention of Politics. Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order. Polity Press. Beck, U. (1999a). Risk Society and the Welfare State. In U. Beck (Ed.), World Risk Society. Polity Press. Beck, U. (1999b). Knowledge or Unawareness? Two Perspectives on “Reflexive Modernization”. In U. Beck (Ed.), World Risk Society. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2000). The cosmopolitan perspective: Sociology of the second age of modernity. The British Journal of Sociology, 51(1), 79–105. Beck, U. (2002a). Overgangen fra det første til det andet moderne – fem udfordringer. Slagmark, 34, 79–93. Beck, U. (2002b). Interview ved Mads P. Sørensen. Slagmark, 34, 125–144. Beck, U. (2005). How Not to Become a Museum Piece. The British Journal of Sociology, 56(3), 335–343. Beck, U. (2009). World at Risk. Polity Press. Beck, U., Bonss, W., & Lau, C. (2001). Theorie reflexiver Modernisierung  – Fragestellungen, Hypothesen, Forschungsprogramme. In U. Beck & W. Bonss (Eds.), Die Modernisierung der Moderne. Suhrkamp. Beck, U., Bonss, W., & Lau, C. (2003). The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme. Theory, Culture and Society, 20(2), 1–33.

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Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Polity Press. Beck, U., & Grande, E. (2007). Cosmopolitan Europe. Polity Press. Beck, U., & Lau, C. (2005). Second Modernity as a Research Agenda: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations in the ‘meta-change’ of Modern Society. The British Journal of Sociology, 56(4), 525–557. Beck, U., & Willms, J. (2004). Conversations with Ulrich Beck. Polity Press. Bell, D. (1976). The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting. Basic Books. Carleheden, M. (2001). Rethinking the Epochs of Western Modernity. In M.  Carleheden & M.  H. Jacobsen (Eds.), The Transformation of Modernity. Aspects of the Past, Present and Future of an Era. Ashgate. Eisenstadt, S. N. (2000). Multiple Modernities’. Dædalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 129(1), 1–29. Elling, B. (2008). Rationality and the Environment. Decision-making in Environmental Politics and Assessment. Earthscan. Frisby, D.  P. (1988). Soziologie und Moderne: F.  Tönnies, G.  Simmel und M.  Weber. In O.  Rammstedt (Ed.), Simmel und die frühen Soziologen. Nähe und Distanz zu Durkheim, Tönnies und Max Weber. Suhrkamp. Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1994a). Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1994b). Living in a Post-Traditional Society. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), Reflexive Modernization. Cambridge. Habermas, J. (1987 [1968]). Knowledge and Human Interests. Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1990). The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Polity Press. Habermas, J. (2007 [1980]). Modernity: An Unfinished Project. In C. Calhoun et al. (Eds.), Contemporary Sociological Theory (2nd ed.). Blackwell Publishing. Kant, I. (2006 [1795]). Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. In P.  Kleingeld (Ed.), I.  Kant Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. Yale University Press. Lash, S. (1990). Sociology of Postmodernism. Routledge. Lash, S. (1994). Reflexivity and Its Doubles: Structure, Aesthetics, Community. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), Reflexive Modernization. Polity Press. Lash, S. (2003). Reflexivity as Non-linearity. Theory, Culture and Society, 20(2), 49–57. Latour, B. (1993). We Have Never Been Modern. Harvard University Press. Latour, B. (1996). On actor-network Theory: A Few Clarifications. Soziale Welt, 47(4), 369–381.

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Latour, B. (2003). Is Re-modernization Occurring – And If So, How to Prove It? A Commentary on Ulrich Beck. Theory, Culture and Society, 20(2), 35–48. Lee, L. M. R. (2006). Reinventing Modernity. Reflexive Modernization vs Liquid Modernity vs Multiple Modernities. European Journal of Social Theory, 9(3), 355–368. Lyon, D. (1999). Postmodernity (2nd ed.). Open University Press. Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester University Press. Mills, C. W. (2000 [1959]). The Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press. Rasborg, K. (2001). From Industrial Modernity to Risk Modernity? A Critical Discussion of the Theory of the ’Risk Society. In M.  Carleheden & M.  H. Jacobsen (Eds.), The Transformation of Modernity. Aspects of the Past, Present and Future of an Era. Ashgate. Rasborg, K. (2003). Sociologien som samtidsdiagnose. In M.  Hviid Jacobsen (Ed.), Sociologiske visioner – sytten bidrag fra en sociologisk brydningstid. Systime. Weber, M. (1962 [1921/22]). Basic Concepts in Sociology. Greenwood Press. Wittrock, B. (2000). Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition. Dædalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 129(1), 31–60. Yakimova, M. (2002). A Postmodern Grid of the Worldmap? Interview with Zygmunt Bauman. Critique and Humanism.http://www.eurozine.com/ articles/2002-­11-­08-­bauman-­en.html Ziehe, T. (1989). Ambivalens og mangfoldighed. Tekster om ungdom, skole, æstetik og kultur. Forlaget Politisk Revy. Ziehe, T. (2004). Øer af intensitet i et hav af rutine. Nye tekster om ungdom, skole og kultur. Forlaget Politisk Revy.

CHAPTER 6

Changes to Family, Paid Work and Politics in the (World) Risk Society

Previous chapters have shown that for Beck, global risks, individualisation and structural reflexivity constitute a new dynamic for social change that permeates all areas of contemporary society, from social class (inequality) and family, to paid work and politics. In Chap. 4, we took a closer look at his idea that radicalised individualisation erodes the class structure but not inequality. In this chapter, we will explore how he thinks the (world) risk society or reflexive modernity affects family, paid work and politics. Analysis of these processes of change played a key role in Beck’s original book on the risk society and he developed his thinking in numerous books and articles. I will start by looking at Beck’s analysis of the changes to family life and ways of living together, then his analysis of the changes in paid work and finally his analysis of changes in politics in the (world) risk society and reflexive modernity.1

Changes to the Family and Ways of Living Together Beck’s book on the risk society outlines his basic analysis of the changes to family life and ways of living together. He develops this analysis later—in collaboration with his wife, Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim—in The Normal 1  I use the term ‘the (world) risk society’ because this chapter to a certain extent ‘anticipates’ Beck’s thinking on world risk societies and cosmopolitanism, which I cover in greater detail in Chap. 7.

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Chaos of Love (1995) and Fernliebe. Lebensformen im globalen Zeitalter (2014). Beck’s starting point is ‘the deep insecurity and hurt with which men and women confront each other in the everyday reality of marriage and family (or what is left of them)’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 103). He bases this on the radical changes to the family and living arrangements brought about by the transition from the first modernity (industrial society) to the second modernity (risk society), as seen in Chap. 5. The family is a central topic in sociology, but the focus has usually been on a specific form of family that is characteristic of industrial society—that is, the traditional nuclear family, based on marriage between a man and a woman, typically with two children (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 14, 151). The American social anthropologist George Peter Murdock (1897–1985) was one of the theorists who focused on the family during the first modernity. Based on a number of cross-cultural studies, he asserts that the nuclear family—as defined by marriage, parenthood and living arrangements—is the ‘natural’ basic unit in society (Thomsen, 1998: 169). Writing from a structural functionalist perspective, the American sociologist Talcott Parsons (1902–79) also describes the nuclear family as historically and culturally invariant and therefore universal (Parsons, 1955: 8, 28). According to him, the nuclear family socialises children on the basis of certain differentiated roles and expectations. In this sense, the family also fosters broader social integration. The man’s role in the family is instrumental (result-­ oriented). He works to earn the money needed for family to reproduce. The woman’s role is expressive (relationship-oriented). She looks after the care functions in the home (raising the children, cleaning, cooking, washing, etc.) (Parsons, 1955: 13–15, 22–23). Parsons’ picture of the family reflects the male breadwinner model predominant in the industrial society of the 1950s and 1960s, before women made serious inroads into the labour market. Men earned money, women looked after the home, that is, did the unpaid domestic work (Beck, 1986: 163). Murdock’s and Parsons’ concepts of the family are, therefore, clear examples of the zombie or container categories that Beck believes are dominant in sociology, despite being obsolete and referring to a dying social era, that is, industrial society/the first modernity. According to Beck, the traditional, gender-based division of labour between men and women, which characterises the family in the industrial society, is an expression of a ‘halved modernity’, that is, a ‘feudal’ structure for (gendered) roles. He also describes these roles as ‘modern estates’. It is not, however, simply a relic from pre-modern society but rather a product of

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and a foundation for early industrial capitalism, when men did the paid work and women stayed at home to reproduce (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 104). The transition from the first modernity (industrial society) to the second modernity (risk society) in the 1960s and onwards has led to more women taking an education and going out to work, which has had a fundamental impact on the family, gender roles and living arrangements (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 92–93). The traditional male-­ breadwinner family has been replaced by the ‘dual-income family’, in which the couple both go out to work, which means women are no longer financially dependent on their husbands (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 92–93, 113). This financial independence is a crucial precondition for greater equality between the sexes, since women are no longer forced into marriage for financial reasons and divorce is feasible (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 92–93; cf. Boje & Ejrnæs, 2013: 23). However, greater equality before the law, in education and at work does not mean that gender inequality has been eradicated. According to Beck, despite this progress, a number of inequalities between the sexes have been maintained—in terms of salary, career, job security and family duties—and this has given rise to new tensions and conflicts in the family and relationships (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 103–04, 115–16). For example, Beck points out that despite a narrowing of the pay gap women still do not have equal pay with men (Beck, 1986: 169, note). Women are also at higher risk of unemployment, and hidden unemployment is higher for women too, as more and more return to the role of housewife when unable to find a job (Beck, 1986: 168–69). Career opportunities also remain unevenly distributed, as men are still more likely than women to be appointed to the highest posts. Similarly, there is a tendency for women to adapt their working lives and careers to suit those of their male partners (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 116–17). Gender differences are also still evident in who does what in the home. Men’s professed support of gender equality does not always equate to reality and women still do most of the ‘chores’ (cleaning, laundry, shopping, etc.), while men do the more ‘fun’ jobs (cooking, do-it-yourself, etc.) (Beck, 1986: 169–74; cf. Boje & Ejrnæs, 2013: 11–12). According to Beck, other symptoms of the ‘break-up’ of the family and changes in the way people live together are the high divorce rates and the rising number of people living alone or with common law partners (Beck, 1986: 163–64).2 2  In the EU the marriage rate has fallen from 7.8 per 1000 people in 1965 to 4.4 in 2017. Conversely, the divorce rate has risen from 0.8 per 1000 people in 1965 to 2 in 2017. In

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Beck’s point is that greater equality between men and women, paradoxically, raises awareness—especially among younger women—of the inequalities that still exist (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 103, 115). The young, well-educated working women of today no longer accept the traditional female role and expect greater equality and solidarity at work and in the home (Beck, 1986: 168–69). Who should do the dishes, vacuum and wash the clothes? Who should take the children to and from kindergarten or school? Who should take how much maternity/paternity leave, and when? The answers to questions like these are no longer predetermined, but the subject of disputes, constant discussions, negotiation and reflection. According to Beck, the late-modern family becomes a ‘battlefield’ for a number of new conflicts between the sexes regarding the balance between work and family life, the division of labour in the home, childcare, the principles of child-rearing and so on (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 103–05, 116–17). Beck claims that these conflicts represent something much more fundamental. The differences between the sexes do not follow the pattern of modern class antagonisms, nor are they merely a relic from tradition— they are different (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 106). Beck’s explanation of this ‘difference’ is that two epochs that complement, condition and contradict each other, and which represent different organisational principles and value systems—the modern and the ‘modern counter-modern’ (cf. Chap. 5)—‘merge’, as it were, within the frameworks of industrial society, specifically the frameworks for the family’s reproduction and for market production. In Beck’s view, the relationships between the sexes are not the result of history and chance, nor of individual psychological conditions. Essentially, they reflect ‘epochal conflicts’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 107). In other words, the family is a ‘stage’ or ‘arena’ for the basic conflicts that epitomise the industrial and risk society. On the one hand, the sexes are liberated from the traditional social forms and roles in their search for ‘a life of their own’; on the other, individualisation’s tendential dilution of general, marriage has become less prevalent in most countries of the world in recent decades, whereas unmarried relationships have become more prevalent. The same goes for single parents. Same-sex partnerships have also become more common. The Netherlands first recognised these in 2000, and since then more than 30 countries have followed suit. In highly developed Western countries, there is thus, despite differences between the countries, a general tendency towards increased pluralisation of lifestyles and forms of cohabitation (cf. Marriage and divorce statistics—Statistics Explained (europa.eu); Marriages and Divorces— Our World in Data; accessed 21/08/2021).

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social relations (cf. Chap. 4) means that individuals are forced into twosomeness in their search for happiness in a relationship (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 105, 114). According to Beck, the impact of the dynamics of individualisation on the family loosens the bonds between the individual and the family, and thus tendentially abolishes them. In contrast to the 1960s, when the nuclear family, marriage and standard (full-time) paid work were still the obvious framework for the lives of most people, there are now multiple forms of life and lifestyles. The family and marriage are ‘relativised’ due to the emergence of a plurality of (life-phase-specific) living arrangements, common-law partners, families with children from different marriages, parents with joint custody of a child, more single people, house sharing, civil partnerships and so on (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 151–52). At the same time, individualisation means that the family ‘becomes a continuous juggling act with divergent multiple ambitions involving careers and their requirements for mobility, educational constraints, conflicting obligations to children and the monotony of housework’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 111, cf. 114–15). Beck stresses that strife in the family and home is not purely individual, but also has an institutional aspect. The opportunities for balancing work and family life, and for working flexibly and at unusual hours, are based on an assumption that the opening hours of daycare institutions (nurseries, kindergartens, after-school clubs, etc.) fit in with these patterns (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 118). Together, these changes mean that the traditional nuclear family has been transformed into what Beck describes as a ‘type of negotiated provisional family’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 129), that is, one in which frameworks and conditions must be constantly planned and negotiated, both between the parents themselves (e.g. on the sharing of tasks, the principles for child-rearing, etc.) and between parents and children (e.g. on boundaries, what the children are allowed to do/not do, etc.) (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 105, 114–17). Based on his analysis of the changes in families and how people live together, Beck sets out three different future scenarios for the family, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive: (1) re-establishing the nuclear family (family conservatism), (2) greater equality between men and women (marketisation) and (3) new forms of life beyond female and male roles (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 119–26). In the first scenario, the dissolution of traditional family units is seen as an expression of an excessive individualisation that leads to social disintegration, the breakdown of civil society and so on and triggers a backlash in the form of a desire to strengthen the

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traditional nuclear family (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 119–21). In the second scenario, greater equality between the sexes is conceptualised in market terms. In other words, ‘equality’ means that the ‘labour-market society’ includes everyone, an extreme consequence of which is an extremely mobile society consisting entirely of single people (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 121–23). However, none of these scenarios resolves the contradictions between the family and the labour market. In Beck’s view, inequality between women and men is an ‘epochal inequality’ that is inherent to the basic structures of industrial society—as a consequence of the separation of market production and family reproduction, as well as the relationship between paid work and domestic (unpaid) work. As such, the issue is not resolved simply because it is now possible to choose between family or working life. Only by reflecting on and changing the fundamental institutional structures of the highly developed industrial society can we create new forms of equality that transcend traditional female and male roles. Faced with two extremes (‘family conservatism’ and ‘marketisation’), Beck sets out a third scenario—containing and modifying market relations in an attempt to create a basis for new ways of life. A prerequisite for this is institutional opportunities that facilitate a ‘reunification’ of work and family life. According to Beck, this requires (1) decoupling the expectation of mobility from the individual, for example, via the institutionalisation of forms of mobility that take family units into account; (2) loosening the link between livelihood and work, for example, in the form of universal basic income (see below); and (3) establishing new forms of housing that counteract individualisation and promote community (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 23–26). In The Normal Chaos of Love (1995), co-written with Elizabeth Beck-­ Gernsheim,3 Beck continues the analysis of changes to family life in reflexive modernity. Their analysis of the changes in family life and the home is basically the same as in Risk Society,4 but there is now a greater focus on 3  The introductory chapter seems to be the only one co-written by both authors. They are credited separately for the other chapters. Beck is listed as the author of Chaps. 1, 5 and 6, Beck-Gernsheim as the author of Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: vi). Nevertheless, the book, as the authors themselves point out, is a co-production stemming from mutual discussions and experiences (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 10). With this in mind, I refer to the book as a whole, rather than specifying the authorship of individual chapters. 4  The introductory chapter (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 11–44) consists of an expanded and revised version of Risk Society’s Chap. 4, on family, gender and living arrange-

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the strife, complications, paths and wrong turns that characterise love and intimate relationships in contemporary society—in other words, ‘the completely normal chaos of love’, as per the title of the book. Their starting point is a paradox. According to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, love has never been more necessary than today because as it serves as a ‘counter-image’ to the fragmentation of the risk and prosperity society. However, it has never been more impossible, as living arrangements have become more ambivalent, riven with conflict and ephemeral than ever before (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 2, 69–70). According to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, the modern romantic ideal of love, based on the notion of a lifelong love relationship with ‘the one’, is still alive and well. ‘You and me forever!’ as the Danish pop star Medina quite aptly sings in one of her greatest hits. Today, the expectations placed on love, as Medina’s lyrics clearly illustrate, are so high that love has almost become a new form of ‘religion’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 168–84). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim attribute this to individualisation’s tendential dilution of social relationships, which makes people seek security in twosomeness and the idea of lifelong love ‘until death do us part’. In the age of individualisation, the family, relationships and love are among the only remaining fixed points in which individuals can seek intimacy, closeness and security (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 105, 114; Beck & Beck-­ Gernsheim, 1995: 50–51, 170–71, 181). In late modernity, love has become a kind of ‘counter-individualisation’ or a ‘utopia of counter-­ individualisation’ that presents a promise of ‘meaningful twosomeness’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995:14, 181, 191). Paradoxically, it has also become more difficult than ever to realise the romantic ideal of lifelong love with ‘the one’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 1, 69–70). Again, the explanation lies in the way in which individualisation has filtered through to relationships between the sexes. In early industrial society/first modernity, only men benefitted from individualisation, as it ‘released’ them from the pre-modern society’s family-based ‘self-sufficiency economy’ and transformed them into ‘free’ workers on the labour market (cf. Chap. 4). Women, on the other hand, were still responsible for the reproduction of the family (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 56–59). Only much later, with the modernisation of the welfare state from the 1960s onwards, did individualisation also reach women, ments: ‘I am I: Gendered space and conflict inside and outside the family’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 103–26).

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when work ‘released’ them from their former ties to the family and its care functions (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 59–62). In Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s view, this creates a new situation, as the family, marriage and relationships now consist not of a single unit but of two individualised parties, both of whom have paid work and their own dreams, demands and expectations for their life together—dreams, demands and expectations that it may be difficult for them to coordinate and reconcile (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 52–66, 88). For women, however, the individualisation process differs from that of men, not only because it happens much later, but also because women, as mentioned, despite working more, are still responsible for most of the care functions in the home. As a consequence, women are exposed, to a much greater extent than men, to conflicting pressures between the demands of the labour market and of the family. In addition, according to Beck and Beck-­ Gernsheim, women are often expected to subordinate their own careers to the geographical mobility requirements associated with their male partner’s career, which also determines where families choose to live (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 96). The release of men and women from traditional gender roles also makes the family, marriage and relationships more fragile because it is now easier to end a relationship that is not working (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 2). When the external framework—based on kinship, the law and the financial situation—around the family falls away, the main glue that holds partners together is their emotions, love and sexuality. When these feelings and the mutual attraction are gone, we drift apart (Beck & Beck-­ Gernsheim, 1995: 62–63, 81–89, 98). According to Beck and Beck-­ Gernsheim, this is a significant part of the reason for the high divorce rate and high number of single people today (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 66–67, 93–95; Beck, 1997c: 184; cf. Boje & Ejrnæs, 2013: 21–22). Often, it is only concern for the wellbeing of their offspring that stops couples drifting apart and consider—possibly with the help of professional coaches or couples therapists—trying to fix their relationships (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 70–71, 105–07, 134–35). In chaotic and changeable late-modern love relationships, there is only one stabilising factor or one constant—the children (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 127). Partners come and go, but the children remain. They become a source of meaning, happiness and emotional anchoring, and as parents we feel a lifelong responsibility for them, regardless of whether they are biological

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children or ‘the children of a previous partner’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 118; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 138–39). The individualised society places the children in the centre to an unprecedented degree. This is also reflected in discussions of family, pedagogy and child-rearing. For example, we talk about ‘hothoused’ or ‘trophy children’, seen by their parents as ‘status symbols’ who are ‘mollycoddled’, pushed into the spotlight and made the centre of everything.5 According to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, intimacy and loving relationships are characterised by the paradox that expectations for love are greater than ever, while the actual conditions for love and intimacy have never been more difficult. There is a growing discrepancy between, on the one hand, the modern romantic love ideal (marriage for love, the idea of ‘the one’) and, on the other hand, the actual (late-modern) reality, which is moving further and further away from the ideal (many single people, high divorce rates, etc.) (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 2, 69–70). Ironically, however, both the romantic ideal of love and the difficulties of living up to it stem from the same source—from late-modern individualisation (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 4–5, 51). The romantic ideal of love, too, has become a zombie or container category that is maintained despite having been emptied of its original content as reality left it behind. In their other major work—which is a co-production throughout— about the paths and wrong turns love can take, Distant Love (2014), Beck and Beck-Gernsheim expand upon this perspective. They examine how, in today’s globalised and cosmopolitanised society, loving relationships have literally become cross-border and global (for an elaboration of Beck’s cosmopolitan perspective, see Chap. 7). As a result of the increased intercultural influence resulting from globalisation, greater geographical mobility and migration, there is a greater likelihood of falling in love with and living with a partner with a different religion, ethnicity and nationality (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 20–21). The place-bound love and ‘national families’ of the past are increasingly replaced by love sans frontiers and

5  However, the concepts of ‘hothoused’ or ‘trophy children’ have been fiercely debated, as they seem to represent (yet another) decay diagnosis, which suggests that children and young people today, aided and abetted by their overprotective parents, are self-absorbed narcissists (cf. Chap. 4). However, as critics point out, what is perceived in the decay diagnoses as egocentrism is instead a realisation of children and young people’s tendency to discuss, make demands and develop a critical sense, that is, to live up to their role as citizens in a democracy (cf. The Trophy Child | Psychology Today; accessed 21/08/2021).

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‘world families’ ( cf. the book’s title, Distant Love) (Beck & Beck-­ Gernsheim, 2014: 2, 4–19, 167).6 As the authors themselves put it: Our reply is that love and family lose their tie to a single place and instead seek their fortune in the diversity of the world. This gives rise to a distant love that is both geographical and cultural. Either here or there, either us or them  – both these alternatives disappear from the horizon of love. Few absolutely insuperable dividing lines remain: not the colour of one’s skin, one’s nationality or religion, or even the distances separating countries and continents. On the contrary, it is the geographically distant other that contains the alluring new possibilities of love. Love has sprouted new wings. (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 166–67)

According to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, the hitherto prevailing national ‘normal family’ typically consists of people who speak the same language, have the same passport and live in the same country and place. These are face-to-face relationships based on both parties being in the same place at the same time (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 2, 14). By contrast, the new transnational forms of family, living together and love, which according to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim are becoming increasingly prevalent, consist of several different constellations: (1) binational couples/‘global patchwork families’, where the parties have different nationalities, ethnicities, religions and so on (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: Ch. 2); (2) marriage migrants, that is, women from Eastern Europe or poor countries (Philippines, Thailand, etc.) who seek financial security by marrying wealthy men in rich Western countries (Beck & Beck-­ Gernsheim, 2014: Ch. 1 and 5); (3) (domestic) work migrants (au pairs), that is, young women from Eastern Europe or poor countries who provide help in return for a minimal wage, and are incorporated into the family structure of the rich Western countries while maintaining ‘long-distance love’ with their own families, possibly including a husband and/or children left behind in their home country. In the au pair relationship, love and care become a ‘commodity’ exchanged in a global market (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 10–11, 103–22); (4) surrogate mothers, that is, women from poor countries (e.g. India) who are paid by childless couples 6  Beck and Beck-Gernsheim emphasise that the concepts of national and world families should be understood as ideal types. In other words, these are ‘extremes’ on a continuum of types of family and ways of living together that contain many intermediate and ‘mixed forms’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 17).

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to bear children either via artificial insemination or through the implantation of a fertilised egg in their womb (so-called double donation, in which both the eggs and sperm originate from foreign donors). As Beck and Beck-Gernshem put it, what arises is a ‘fertility tourism’, facilitated by highly advanced technology, which facilitates the separation of pregnancy, birth and parenting (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 11–12, 144–65); and (5) ‘online relationships’, partly in the form of, for example, internet dating, which decouples the search for a partner from geographical place and therefore radically increases the number of potential partners, and partly in the form of long-distance relationships, that is, where the parties are geographically separated for shorter or longer periods, and ‘meet’ online via Skype, Messenger or the like. This separates what, according to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, were previously existential fixed points for the individuals—place, nation and family (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 13, 21, 45–47). ‘World families’ consist of people who either live in or come from different countries and continents. They embody the differences and contradictions in global society, for example, unrest, confusion, surprise, desire, joy, collapse and hate (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 2, 15–17, 167). In Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s view, global love and living arrangements are not less complicated—indeed, quite the opposite. In the globalised world, the ‘completely normal chaos’ of love is transformed into a ‘global chaos’ of love (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 2, 166). At first glance, it may seem obvious to consider world families and long-distance love as reflections of multiculturalism, but this would be too narrow a view. The new ways of living together not only reflect the coexistence of individuals from different cultural backgrounds, but also represent a ‘merging’ of cultural elements, which gives rise to new forms of cultural mixing—spanning countries and continents—between near and far, equal and unequal, us and them, that is, forms of hybridisation (see Chap. 7 for an elaboration of Beck’s views on multiculturalism) (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 2–3). The new transnational forms of love and living arrangements are, therefore, an indication that the ‘global other’ is in our midst, that is, they are a reflection of a ‘globalisation from within’ of intimacy, love, family, gender, housework, pregnancy, motherhood and fatherhood (Beck & Beck-­ Gernsheim, 2014: 8, 68, 75–76, 168). Long-distance love and world families are evidence of what, in Beck’s view (cf. Chap. 7), constitutes one of the most significant social changes—‘cosmopolitanisation’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 66–68). However, world families are not

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necessarily synonymous with a cosmopolitan ‘openness to the world’, as they also give rise to—counter-modern—counter-reactions, in the form of attempts to revive the traditional family, gender roles and structures for love (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 80–81, 121–22, 184–85). Nevertheless, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim assert that long-distance love raises a number of crucial questions: for example, how is it that something that does not work very well at the national (macro) level—the art of living together despite national, ethnic and religious differences—is something that we readily practice at the (micro) level of everyday life? How much distance can love endure? And how much distance does it require (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 3, 44–46)? We might well ask why Beck and Beck-Gernsheim talk about world families, given their point that the concept has become a zombie or container category. The reason is that the concept of family still plays a central role in many non-Western countries. In the families, therefore, ‘value struggles’ take place about the nature of ‘family’, who it includes and what makes a ‘good family’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 17–18). However, ‘the universalist theories of love’, which for Beck and Beck-Gernsheim include not only Giddens’ (1992) and Luhmann’s theories, but also their own, as set out in The Normal Chaos of Love (1995), are inadequate, as they fail to account for the possibility that there may be more than one potential direction of development for late-modern love and its paradoxes of freedom, that is, more than just the Western paradigm (Beck & Beck-­ Gernsheim, 2014: 2–3). In their analysis of the completely normal—and global—chaos of love, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim address many of the problems and themes that Giddens and Bauman have since addressed in their corresponding analyses of the conditions for love. In The Transformation of Intimacy (1992), Giddens points out that sexuality in late modernity has become ‘malleable’, that is, changeable and detached from reproduction. At the same time, marriage is increasingly displaced by what he describes as ‘the pure relationship’, that is, one entered into only for its own sake and maintained only as long as the parties feel that there is something in it for them individually. As a result, today’s relationships have become far more fragile (Giddens, 1992: 1–3, 58, 134–57).7 Similarly, in the book Liquid Love 7  Giddens’ view of the romantic ideal of love differs from that of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim. He points out that it both paves the way for and is also weakened by ‘the pure relationship’ (Giddens, 1992: 58).

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(2003), Bauman points out that the more firm, stable and committed love of the past has today become ‘liquid’, that is, characterised by extreme volatility and changeability. According to Bauman, the lifelong ‘until death do us part marriage’ is increasingly displaced by short-term ‘let’s see how it goes’ relationships and ‘flexible part-time partnerships’ (Bauman, 2003: 36). He claims that love has become part of the dominant ‘disposable culture’, the result of which is that partners—based on calculations of how to optimise self-interest—are also quickly selected, ‘consumed’ and replaced, almost as if they were ‘consumer goods’ (Bauman, 2003: 20–22, 44–46, 66–76). As such, longevity, security and stability, which are prerequisites for developing together in a relationship, are replaced by short-­ term hedonism, which is solely about personal gratification here and now (Bauman, 2003: viii-vii, 65–66, 89–91). However, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim do not seem quite as pessimistic as Bauman about love. As mentioned, they point not only to the negative aspects of long-distance love, but also to its potential—especially in terms of forging ties across geographical distance and cultural differences. On the other hand, they do not seem to be quite as optimistic as Giddens, who emphasises the democratising and equalising potential of the pure relationship. In his view, the collapse of the external—hierarchical—framework means that the parties have a better chance of meeting each other on equal terms (Giddens, 1992: 1–3, 146–47, 184–204). For Beck and Beck-­ Gernsheim, however, since a number of the new forms of love and living arrangements are embedded in global inequality structures, it cannot be said that there has been a ‘democratisation’ of the family and the relationship (cf. Beck, 1998b: 81).8 Overall, there are both similarities and differences between the views on love expressed by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, Giddens and Bauman. Common to them all, however, is that they emphasise that family, marriage, relationships and love are not ‘given’ and immutable. Rather, they are socially constructed phenomena subject to constant change, reflection and negotiation in the late, reflexive or liquid modern society. 8  Beck and Beck-Gernsheim stress that the new forms of family, love and living arrangements are ambivalent and have both positive and negative aspects. They note, for example, that while marriage migration from West to East is typically associated with a loss of rights and autonomy for women, the opposite is often the case with migration from East to West, in which women often enjoy better living conditions and far more rights in the new country than they did back home (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2014: 127–28).

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The Change in Paid Work (Precarious Work) According to Beck, the risk society’s individualisation, risks and new forms of uncertainty have an impact not only on the family but also on the world of work. The Risk Society (1997 [1986]) analyses in-depth the emergence of new, risk-filled forms of work in the flexible labour market, a theme he addresses again in The Brave New World of Work (2000a). The starting point for Beck’s analysis of changes to working life is the crucial role played by paid work in modern industrial society—cf. also Weber’s Protestant ethics, as discussed in Chap. 4. He describes work as the central social entity that defines our identity, affords us recognition and acts as the gateway to society, in the form of a work society, and as such functions as a key arena for integration (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 139–40). However, information technology and the modernisation of laws and society have led to a ‘constitutional change’ in the labour market, which is gradually eroding the system of paid work. This ‘systemic change in paid work’ is a consequence of the transition from industrial society/first modernity to the risk society/second modernity, and means that lifelong, standard full-time jobs are increasingly being displaced by new and more insecure types of employment (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 140–49). The advances made by technological rationalisation have increasingly rendered the human factor in the production process superfluous—fewer and fewer hands produce more and more. Economic growth is not necessarily synonymous with higher employment—indeed, it can just as well go hand in hand with higher unemployment, a phenomenon described as ‘jobless growth’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 139–41, 144–45; 1998a: 55–56, 58; 2000a: 42–44, 52, 91). The highly developed risk society can, therefore, be described as a system of ‘capitalism without work’ (Beck, 1998a: 56). Beck’s basic view of paid work and the labour market in the risk society or reflexive modernity can therefore be described as a variant of the direction in sociology that speaks of ‘the end of the work society’, that is, the claim that the total volume of work at the disposal of society is declining due to the rationalisation and automation of work and production processes in both the manufacturing industry and the service sector (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 139–41, 144–45; 2000a: 13–14). In the twentieth century, Beck says: ‘All these indicators point to a shrinking of the wage labor society in this century (and, to varying degrees, in all Western industrial societies)’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 150, note 3). In the early 1980s, this view was expressed strongly by André Gorz, in Farewell to the Working Class (1982)

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and Paths to Paradise (1985), and other sociologists and economists, such as Claus Offe (1985), Jürgen Habermas (1985, 1990), Oskar Negt (1984) and Jeremy Rifkin (1995), echoed the point. For example, Habermas claims that, as a result of technological rationalisation, paid work has ‘built-in a telos of its own abolition’ (Habermas (1985: 69). According to Beck, the changes to paid work are reflected in three dimensions: (1) working hours, (2) the work site and (3) labour law (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 142). According to Beck, working time ‘integrates’ technologically conditioned unemployment into the labour market, in the form of flexible, plural and decentralised forms of ‘underemployment’, that is, various forms of casual work, part-time jobs, temporary contracts and so on. This makes the boundaries between work and non-work liquid (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 142–43). The idea is that unemployment is not abolished, but instead distributed among all of us, in the form of part-time work and temporary forms of employment (project work, temporary positions, freelancers, etc.) (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 146–49). In terms of the work contract, the general scarcity of paid jobs and rise of work-related insecurity are synonymous with the emergence of a much more deregulated labour market, with poorer pay and working conditions, less job security and so on (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 143–45; 2000a: 77–78, 84–86, 91). The labour market is polarised between secure, full-­ time jobs and precarious part-time jobs and temporary forms of employment. According to Beck, the standardised ‘normal labour market’ of industrial society—based on a binary distinction between employed and non-employed—has not been completely displaced, but ‘overlaid with’ or undermined by an increasingly de-standardised and risk-filled system of general ‘underemployment’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 144). As far as the workplace is concerned, flexible work, according to Beck, means that paid work loses its ‘factory nature’. In the Fordist mass production of the industrial society, paid work was done outside the four walls of the home, in large factory halls, that is, production (work) and reproduction (of the family) were separated in time and space. In the risk society, however, the information technology revolution, not least the advent of the internet and e-mails, has made it possible to work from home, particularly in a number of ‘symbol-analytical’ jobs in the service sector, which do not produce physical products (goods), but instead produce, process and disseminate information (research, consulting firms, lawyers, translators, etc.) (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 142–43, 147). This kind of work, which can be done online at home, is therefore detached from its spatial

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link to the industrial production process. As Beck puts it, ‘This separation of domestic and wage labor is reversed once again in the risk society [by relaxations of attendance regulations, electronic networking of decentralized work sites and so on]’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 144; cf. 2000a: 73). However, he also points out that this is an ambivalent process. On the one hand, ‘distance work’ improves the opportunities to balance work and family life and reduces the environmental impact of commuting between home and work (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 143–49; 2000a: 80–82). On the other hand, it means that the divide between work and leisure becomes liquid, that is, work becomes ‘borderless’ and you are never completely off duty, which entails a higher risk of stress and burnout. In addition, just as the work situation and working conditions are individualised, so are the risks to physical and mental health, as work at home is not covered by ‘ordinary’ rules regarding health and safety at work, the working environment and so on (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 143–44; 2000a: 77–78, 82–83). In The Brave New World of Work (2000a), Beck refines his analysis of the changes in working life, introducing the concept of ‘precarious work’ to describe the new risks involved in the world of paid work, and refining the concept of ‘the end of the work society’ by proposing ‘a society beyond full employment’ (Beck, 2000a: 38). Beck describes these new, precarious forms of work as a ‘Brazilianisation’, as they lead to a deregulation and de-standardisation of the labour market, as happened in Brazil (Beck, 2000a: 1, 92–109). He describes this ‘Brazilianisation’ as manifesting in three ways: (1) a growth in direct unemployment (Beck, 2000a: 42–43), (2) a fall in the total ‘volume of work’ in the highly developed society (Beck, 2000a: 42, 57–58) and (3) a growth in part-time jobs and temporary forms of employment (‘non-standard work’) (Beck, 2000a: 50–51, 55–56). As a new departure, Beck now looks beyond the nation state and views the transformation of paid work in a broader European context, where the average unemployment rate at the time was almost 10% (Beck, 2000a: 1, 32–33).9 Beck points out that the high unemployment rate in Europe is a serious problem, not only because of the consequences for those affected but also because there is a close link between work and democracy. In Europe, democracy was born as a ‘work-democracy’, which is why high unemployment at European level could pose a serious threat to the 9  Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7895735/3-02032017-­ AP-­EN.pdf/8a73cf73-2bb5-44e4-9494-3dfa39427469; accessed 21/08/2021.

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‘­historical alliance’ between capitalism, the welfare state and democracy (Beck, 2000a: 4, 13; 1998a: 58–59). If this trend is allowed to continue, Beck argues that there is a risk that every second person in the workforce at European level will be subject to ‘Brazilianisation’, that is, they will be employed in changing, temporary and poorly paid jobs (Beck, 2000a: 1–2, 110–20). In other words, a range of widespread deregulation tendencies will assert themselves in the European labour market (Beck, 2000a: 123). According to Beck, this trend is already noticeable in Germany, where from 1970 until 1995, there was a relative decrease in the proportion of full-time employees in the workforce, and a corresponding increase in the proportion of casual workers, temporary employees and so on (Beck, 2000a: 1–2, 104). However, Beck does not confine himself to identifying the many new risks and problems associated with the de-standardisation and greater flexibility of paid work, but also attempts to propose a solution, outlining a vision of what he describes as an active, European ‘civil society’ (Bürgergesellschaft) that has moved beyond the ‘work society’ (Beck, 2000a: Ch. 8). In Beck’s view, higher growth rates no longer lead to higher employment, which means that traditional strategies will not reduce unemployment at European level. Instead, he puts forward the idea of ‘citizen work’ (Bürgerarbeit), which he proposes recognising on an equal footing with traditional paid work. Instead of passively receiving money from the welfare state, the unemployed would, for example, work for their benefits in a voluntary organisation or similar. However, this presupposes that ‘citizen work’ is legally and socially recognised on a par with ‘ordinary’ paid work (Beck, 2000a: 126–31). Beck envisages the introduction of citizen work going hand in hand with an overall reduction in weekly working hours, just as—with a view towards gender-neutrality—he envisaged a general redistribution of all tasks in society, including domestic work. Instead of redistributing unemployment, he wants to redistribute work (Beck, 2000a: 145–46). Citizen work would not replace ordinary paid employment—rather, it would be a (self-determined) supplement to it. According to Beck, it is a matter of both realising and making positive use of the fact that the scarcity of paid work also reflects an abundance of time (Beck, 2000a: 5, 145–46). A prerequisite for this, however, is that everybody is guaranteed a minimum income, regardless of their links to the labour market, that is, a universal basic income corresponding to the level of unemployment benefit or social security (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 149; Beck, 2000a: 126–27, 130–31,

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143–44). This will create the prerequisites for democracy despite the end of the era of full employment and provide the basic security required to ‘make the insecurity of freedom productive’ (Beck, 2000a: 144). Beck believes that, in order to devise adequate political responses to unemployment in Europe, we need new political structures at European level and ‘transnational civil movements and parties’ as the cornerstone of a democratic, strong and united Europe (Beck, 2000a: 173–79). We need to consider how democracy is possible in a ‘post-work society’ (Beck, 2000a: 5, 52, 66, 76; 1998a: 55). For Beck, the transformation and development of Europe are two sides of the same coin, indicating that a ‘political society with a cosmopolitan intent, in a new everyday sense, takes the place of the work-centred society – as a guiding idea’ (Beck, 2000a: 125). These ideas herald the ‘cosmopolitan perspective’, which becomes central to his late writing (cf. Chap. 7). A basic point in Beck’s analysis of the changes to paid work is that although the risk society prefigures the end of a society based on full employment in the traditional sense, we are nevertheless still dominated by the Protestant work ethic, in the sense that it is primarily through paid work that we form our identities and achieve social recognition (Beck, 2000a: 10–11). Lifelong standardised paid work is still intact as an integration norm—both institutionally and in our general perception of working culture—even though it is no longer grounded in social reality (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 139–40; Beck, 1998a: 56–57). In Beck’s view, paid work has also become a zombie or container category. According to Beck, a break with first modernity’s way of thinking about paid work is needed if we are to develop adequate strategies for integration and work in the second modernity. Faced with the second modernity’s tendencies towards greater flexibility and de-standardisation of paid work, the challenge for sociology is to break with the ‘categorical hegemony’ of the Protestant work ethic of the first modernity. This will enable the development of a concept of work that accounts for its myriad forms, and to think of new, differentiated forms of social integration that are not inextricably linked with the norm of paid work (Beck, 2000a: 91). Only then, according to Beck, can labour shortages be transformed into ‘time sovereignty’; only then can ‘new free spaces be secured in the coordination of work, life and political activity’ (Beck, 2000a: 7). With his analyses of precarious work, Beck paves the way for a key discussion in recent sociology regarding the flexibilisation of working life and its consequences for pay and working conditions, the physical and mental

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working environment, the potential for balancing work and family life and so on. Other key contributors to this discussion include the American sociologist Richard Sennett (1998), Bauman (1998) and the British economist and sociologist Guy Standing (2014)—all of whose thoughts on the changes to paid work are reminiscent of Beck’s in a number of respects. In The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism (1998), Sennett addresses how the flexibility of working life is inextricably linked to the emergence of a new ‘short-term capitalism’ in which ‘no long-term’ is the rule rather than the exception, and where we are never allowed to ‘rest on our laurels’ after performing a given task, as we are always ‘on our way somewhere else’ (Sennett 1998: 18–19, 25–26, 87, 133–34). According to Sennett, the three key elements of flexible work are: (1) discontinuous reinvention of institutions, (2) flexible specialisation and (3) concentration without centralisation (Sennett, 1998: 47). In Sennett’s view, flexible work corrodes the character, as the constant demand to be available and adaptable to ever-shifting working conditions undermines social ties and continuity in life, which are prerequisites for long-term values such as trust, loyalty and mutual commitment (Sennett, 1998: 24, 26–27). Like Beck, Sennett emphasises that flexible capitalism’s replacement of ordinary full-time jobs with part-time work and temporary forms of employment means deteriorating pay and working conditions, as well as a pronounced drop in job security (Sennett, 1998: 22–23, 118–20). Making explicit reference to Beck, Sennett states that risk becomes a permanent condition that more and more employees have to live with (Sennett, 1998: 80). Paid work’s ‘modern risk culture’ is characterised by a requirement to be in constant motion, as standing still is associated with a lack of willingness to take risks and an inability to advance at work (Sennett, 1998: 87, 90). Similarly, the fear of failure is becoming more prevalent, not only in the working class, but also in the middle class (Sennett, 1998: 118–20). Beck and Sennett’s diagnoses of flexible work, therefore, share many similarities. However, unlike Beck, Sennett’s diagnosis of the flexibility of working life is not tied to a thesis of ‘underemployment’. While Sennett thematises the risk of exclusion from the labour market, his focus is primarily on the consequences of flexibility for the employees. As we have seen, Beck focuses on how the generalised insecurity of the flexible labour market is synonymous with paid workers being constantly pulled back into and pushed back out of the world of work, alternating between periods of full-time employment, part-time employment, temporary employment,

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unemployment, leave, workfare, training and so on. As a result, according to Beck, work biographies become more individualised and discontinuous as the risk of short- or long-term exclusion from the labour market increases (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 149). Another prominent social theorist whose analyses of flexible work are strikingly similar to Beck’s analyses of ‘paid work’s risk regime’ on a number of points is the British economist and sociologist Guy Standing. In recent years, he has received a great deal of attention for his theory of the ‘precariat’, which he, in the subtitle of the book of the same name, describes as the ‘new dangerous class’ (Standing, 2014).10 ‘Precariat’ is a portmanteau of the adjective ‘precarious’ and the noun ‘proletariat’ and refers to the ‘class’ of paid workers who have been subject to—using Beck’s terminology—‘Brazilianisation’, that is, they are in precarious forms of employment (Standing, 2014: 11–12). According to Standing, the precariat is a heterogeneous group (or class) consisting of, for example, young students who have not yet established a foothold in the labour market, older unskilled workers at high risk of unemployment, women in part-time jobs, immigrants, refugees, migrant workers and so on. However different these groups may be, they have one thing in common—they often work in casual and insecure jobs with low pay and poor working conditions, little chance of mobility, no job security and so on. According to Standing, the precariat consists of paid workers who do not have the protection and security at work bestowed upon the traditional working class by virtue of the safeguards of ‘industrial citizenship’, in the form of (1) labour market security, (2) employment security, (3) job security, (4) work security, (5) skill reproduction security, (6) income security and (7) representation security (Standing, 2014: 17). In his description of the labour-market-related risks and the fundamental uncertainty that characterises the precariat’s living conditions, Standing draws on a concept of risk that is strikingly reminiscent of Beck’s: ‘the precariat is dealing with uncertainty since they are faced by uninsurable “unknown unknowns”’ (Standing, 2014: 301). However, the precariat is not an ‘underclass’, consisting of those excluded long-term from the labour market, but is instead a class that is at the bottom of the class 10  While the concept of ‘the precariat’ is Standing’s, it is nevertheless somewhat reminiscent of Beck’s concept ‘precarious work’, as presented in The Brave New World of Work (2000a). Standing has, therefore, a great deal in common with Beck thematically, although at no point does he explicitly refer to Beck.

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hierarchy, that is, under the traditional working class, which to a greater extent retains the aforementioned forms of security at work (Standing, 2014: 13). The precariat is a distinct socio-economic category according to Standing, but not a homogeneous and static class ‘in itself’. Rather, it is a heterogeneous and dynamic class ‘for itself’, that is, a class that is in the process of constituting itself as a class (a class in the making) (Standing, 2014: 11–12). According to Standing, the background for the growth in casual and insecure forms of employment and thus for the growth of the precariat is the ever-increasing competition, efficiency and individualism of the global market economy (Standing, 2014: 43). Like Beck, Standing believes that unemployment and ‘underemployment’ in the flexible labour market are ‘camouflaged’ by the growth of part-time and casual jobs. He cites the example of Germany: ‘The growth in part-time jobs has helped conceal the extent of unemployment and underemployment. Thus, in Germany, shifting more people into “mini-jobs” has maintained the illusion of high employment and led some economists to make foolish claims about a German employment miracle after the financial crash’ (Standing, 2014: 26). Standing does not share the view that there is only a certain—fixed and unchanging—amount of work in society. Jobs are not disappearing; they are just lower paid and less secure (Standing, 2014: 305). However, he agrees with Beck that uncertainty can be remedied by converting the existing social security system into one based on universal basic income, which will have a destigmatising effect and act as a breeding ground for the development of a deliberative democracy (Standing, 2014: 295–99). There are, therefore, a number of striking similarities between Beck and Standing when it comes to their analyses of precarious work. One crucial difference, however, is that where Beck (as seen in Chap. 4, for example) believes that the new risks associated with paid work are at one and the same time both generalised and individualised, and as such are classless, Standing insists that they are still embedded in a class structure, as some groups in the labour market—younger, older, poorly educated, unskilled, immigrants and so on—are at a higher risk than others of being affected by ‘precariatisation’ (cf. Taylor-Gooby, 2004, 2008; Ejrnæs & Rasborg, 2019). In other words, Standing does not share Beck’s view that the concept of class is no longer relevant to the understanding of the new risks linked with paid work and associated forms of uncertainty and inequality. Bauman, as mentioned, also addresses the theme of flexible work, understood as the growing dominance of casual and insecure forms of

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employment (Bauman, 1998: 27–28, 41). He shares Beck’s view that ‘the work society is eroding’ and that we are moving towards a (liquid-­modern) society in which paid work does not play the same role as before (Bauman, 1992: 46–48; Bauman, 1998: 24–28, 36–37, 71). However, unlike Beck—and Sennett and Standing—Bauman stresses that today’s society can be seen as a ‘consumer society’, in which the basic integration mechanism has shifted from ‘work’ to ‘consumption’ (Bauman, 1992: 46–48, 223; Bauman, 1998: 26–32, 37). As a result, the Protestant work ethic loses its central importance (Bauman, 1992: 46; 1998: 37).11 Thus, according to Bauman, the ethics of work, which are about duty and delayed gratification, are replaced by the aesthetics of consumption, which are about desire and instant gratification (hedonism) (Bauman, 1998: 32–33). As a result, consumption and lifestyle replace class and paid work as people’s key ‘identity markers’ (Bauman, 1998: 17–24, 34–37). The ability to consume becomes a sign of success, inability to consume a sign of failure, marking you out as a ‘defective consumer’ (Bauman, 1998: 37–38). Beck and Bauman thus agree that the work society is de facto eroding. However, while Beck believes that standardised full-time employment nevertheless remains an integration norm, both institutionally and in the awareness of individuals, Bauman believes that ‘consumption’ now occupies this role to a large extent. We can, therefore, say that Bauman, in his thinking about the ‘consumer society’, goes further than Beck in his ‘confrontation’ with the ‘work society’.

Changes to Politics (Sub-politics) According to Beck, the risk society (or reflexive modernity) is giving rise to significant changes not just in the family and paid work, but also in the overarching field of governance, that is, the domain of politics. We see, therefore, the emergence of not only a new pattern of stratification and conflict, linked to the classless distribution of risks (cf. Chaps. 3 and 4), but also a new political pattern. In Risk Society, Beck presents an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of this new pattern (Beck, 1992 [1986]: chap. 8). In the conventional sense, politics, according to Beck, is about 11  However, this does not mean that the Protestant work ethic has completely exhausted its role in the ‘consumer society’. According to Bauman, it still has an important ideological function in connection with the effort to separate the ‘real’ from the ‘fake’ poor, and the ‘worthy’ from the ‘unworthy’ (Bauman, 1998: 37, 71).

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‘the defence and legitimation of domination, power and interests’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 235, note 2; cf. 1997a: 135–36). However, this concept is too narrow if we are to understand the political changes of today. Beck therefore advocates a rethinking of politics, based on a broader conceptual foundation, namely, ‘the structuring and changing of living conditions’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 235, note 2). Beck’s attempt at this is based, firstly, on pointing out that the fundamental determinant, or driving force of politics, shifts from welfare to risk, in line with the transition from industrial to risk societies. Hence, risks become: ‘the motor of the self-­ politicization of modernity in industrial society; furthermore, in the risk society, the concept, place and media of politics change’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 183; cf. Beck et  al., 1999: 10). While politics in the industrial society primarily focused on the optimisation of welfare, politics in the risk society increasingly has to do with the reduction or management of risk (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 47). The key concept in Beck’s understanding of this new political pattern is the concept of ‘sub-politics’, which refers to an ‘unbinding of politics’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 183–86, 191, 231). In contrast to representative democracy’s traditional ‘politics from above’, Beck’s ‘sub-politics’ refers to the emergence of new forms of ‘politics from below’ (Beck, 1997b: 48). Thus, sub-politics refers to an ‘explosion of politics’, that is, the fact that—secondly—the place of politics (topos) is also shifting. This means that, politics is increasingly displaced from the central, formal and institutionalised level (parties, parliament and government) to a decentralised, local level (companies, research laboratories, social movements, the political consumer, etc.). As a result, according to Beck, new decentralised, informal and non-institutionalised forms of politics are emerging. These exist in a kind of ‘grey zone’ between politics and non-politics—in other words, sub-politics (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 185–86). Thirdly, the subject (actor) of politics is also relocated from classes, parties and government to ‘media publicity, citizens’ initiatives, new social movements, critical engineers and judges’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 223). In Risk Society (1992 [1986]) Beck focuses on the more implicit and ‘concealed’ forms of sub-politics, which are linked, on the one hand, to economic and technological development and, on the other, to science, in particular medicine, which he uses as an illustrative case study. A key characteristic of economic, technological and scientific action systems is that they are not subject to democratic control and legitimation. This is evident in companies’ investment decisions and choice of new technologies, as well

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as medical science’s development of advanced reproductive technologies (biotechnologies, foetal diagnostics, etc.) (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 204–23; 1997d; 1999: 324). According to Beck, belief in progress is now ‘the secular religion of modernity’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 214). As a consequence, ‘progress’—economic, technological and scientific—becomes an objectified, self-reinforcing logic of development that is seldom questioned. For example, economic growth is perceived as unconditionally good, even though—as we have seen—it can just as well lead to technologically driven unemployment. The development of screening technologies and foetal diagnostics for the in utero detection of chronic diseases (e.g. Down’s syndrome) is perceived as indubitable progress, despite the risk that children with less serious diseases or simply ‘undesirable’ characteristics (e.g. sex, sexuality, appearance) may fall victim to it. According to Beck, this opens up a ‘slippery ethical slope’ that may ultimately lead to a new form of ‘eugenics’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 206; 1995: 30–32; 1997a: 153–56). His basic point is that the complex decisions made within these systems are not political per se, as they are made in the private sphere (the market). Nevertheless, they have a number of unintended consequences, which have at least as great an impact on the development of society as the decisions taken in the sphere usually understood as ‘political’—that is, parties, parliament and government, operating within the democratic public sphere. However, unlike in the public sphere, the decisions of the markets, companies and research laboratories are not subject to democratic influence and control. As a result, developments in society can be seen as unintended consequences of complex decision-making processes that are rarely traced back to accountable individuals (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 183–87, 223–24; 1999: 324, 332). The consequence of this, according to Beck, is that ‘progress replaces the democratic vote’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 183–84), giving rise to a ‘democratic halving’ of the development of society, in which formal politics and sub-politics relate to each other just as the modern relates to the (modern) counter-modern (cf. Chap. 5) (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 184). We can, therefore, speak of a more implicit, hidden and ‘passive’ sub-politics (Holzer & Sørensen, 2003: 82, 87, 90).12 12  Based on the usual political philosophy distinction between citoyen (the public person), bourgeois (the economic person) and hommes (the private person), we might also say that ‘sub-politics’, in Beck’s sense, indicates a political shift from the citoyen (state) to the bourgeois (market) and the hommes (civil society). Beck himself uses these terms in his argument, for example, when he speaks of the fact that sub-politicisation means that the bourgeois becomes a ‘political bourgeoisie’ (Beck, 1997d; cf. 1992 [1986]: 183–84, 207).

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According to Beck, increasing sub-politicisation goes hand in hand with an ‘erosion’ of the formal political system, that is, traditional ‘politics from above’. Instead, political institutions are increasingly required to ‘become the administrators of a development they neither have planned for nor are able to structure, but must nevertheless somehow justify’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 186–87; cf. 187–90, 224–25; 1999: 322). Sub-­ politicisation is therefore tantamount to ‘the political becoming non-­ political’, or at least being depoliticised, while at the same time ‘the non-political becomes political’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 184). Nevertheless, the idea that ‘politics’ is identical with what goes on in the formal political system lives on. In other words, the concept of politics, too, has become a container or zombie category that refers to a past form of society, namely, industrial society/simple modernity (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 192, 199; 1997d). However, if we only think of ‘politics’ in terms of what goes on in parliament, we lose sight of the fact that, for example, young people’s (apparently) diminished interest in traditional (party) politics and associations does not necessarily mean that they are less politically engaged. Rather, their commitment has shifted towards post-material values concerning, for example, individual self-realisation, gender, sexuality, the environment, ethics, ecology, sustainability, animal welfare and so on (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 133; 2002a, 2002b; Beck et al., 1999: 9). In The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order (1997a), as well as in a number of other works (cf. especially Beck, 1996, 1997b, 1997d, 1999; Beck et al., 1999), Beck elaborates his analysis of the changes in politics, now with a focus on more explicit and obvious forms of sub-politics, linked to (allegedly) new ways of exerting political influence that are not—or at least not primarily—channelled through the formal political system. His main examples of this are single-­ issue movements—environmental organisations, local environmental groups, citizens’ groups, and so on—as well as the political consumer who ‘votes with the wallet’ when environmental and ethical requirements are not met (Beck, 1996, 1997b, 1997d; Beck et  al., 1999). As these are active participants who protest and consciously seek to exert their influence, we can speak of a more explicit, obvious and ‘active’ form of sub-­ politics (Holzer & Sørensen, 2003: 84–87). Beck’s two favourite examples of this kind of sub-politics are the Brent Spar controversy in 1995 and the French nuclear tests in the Pacific in 1995–96. As far as Brent Spar was concerned, the Shell Group’s plans to sink its obsolete oil storage platform in the Northeast Atlantic were thwarted by a

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combination of protests by the environmental organisation Greenpeace, an intense media campaign and a subsequent consumer boycott of Shell petrol in a number of European countries—especially in Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. When France conducted subterranean nuclear tests on the small Pacific island of Mururoa, we saw how the risks this posed for both people and the environment led to protests in a number of other countries, including Denmark, where French wine was boycotted and demonstrations staged in front of the French embassy (Beck, 1996: 18–24; 1997b; 1997d; 2000b: 68–72; cf. Grolin, 1998). In both cases, people used consumer boycotts to exert political pressure on companies, governments, politicians and experts (‘active sub-politics’). In this context, sub-politics denotes a kind of ‘direct democracy’ from below, in which people seek to assert their influence outside the channels of influence of the formal political system—first and foremost, the democratic electoral system. As Beck himself puts it: ‘citizens are discovering that the act of purchase can be a direct ballot that they can always use in a political way. Through the boycott, an active consumer society thus combines and allies with direct democracy  – at a world level’ (Beck, 1997d: 64; cf. 1997b: 54; 2000b: 70). According to Beck, sub-politics is, then, a reflection of a new and more individualised pattern of participation, characterised by people banding together in single-issue movements, transcending traditional political dividing lines (class, right/left, gender, age, etc.). Whereas in the industrial society we joined trade unions and political parties in order to achieve something, such as better living conditions and social security, in the risk society we band together in ‘danger communities’ (Gefährdungsgemein samkeiten) to avoid something, to avert particular risks (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 46–50). We protest—increasingly on social media, for example, Facebook—against the noise from major building projects, against motorway building or against the incomprehensible deportation of well-integrated people from other ethnic backgrounds. As a result, politics is losing its class base, and solidarity is becoming more local and ad hoc. Today, as Beck says, people manage at one and the same time: ‘to join forces with local residents in protests against noise pollution by air traffic, to belong to the Metalworkers Union, and yet – in the face of impending economic crisis – to vote conservative’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 101). Thus, industrial society’s (class-based) policy coordinates, first and foremost based on the political right/left divide, are replaced by new coordinates: (1) certain/ uncertain, which refers to the uncertainty and non-knowledge; (2) inside/

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out, which refers, for example, to the increasing migration and flows of refugees (see next chapter); and (3) political/apolitical, which refers to the liquid boundaries between politics and non-­ politics (Beck, 1997a: 9, 149–50). Sub-politicisation also takes place in parallel with a change from rule-based (simple) to rule-changing (reflexive) politics, which Beck terms ‘politics about politics’ (Beck, 1997a: 133–36). In other words, the political rules of the game become ever more reflexive and changeable, as they are problematised and debated in the public sphere (cf. Beck, 1992 [1986]: 196–97). These new, more reflexive forms of politics challenge Luhmann’s theory that social systems are ‘subjectless’ and self-referential (autopoietic); on the contrary, Beck asserts that they are increasingly interdependent, and dependent on the consent of individuals due to the emergence of ‘code syntheses’ and ‘specialization in the context’ (Beck, 1997a: 112, 124–26; 1999: 307–08). Social systems are kept going by individuals, and if they withdraw their consent, these systems crumble. In risk modernity, the legitimacy of society’s systemic and institutional contexts is under increasing pressure. They are constantly confronted with, and tend to be destabilised by, risks and new forms of ‘manufactured uncertainty’ (Beck, 1997a: 112, 125–26, 156–58, 168–69; 1997d; cf. Grolin, 1998). During the Brent Spar controversy, we saw how political consumers—along with Greenpeace and the media—forced Shell to abandon the idea of just sinking the platform at sea. This despite the fact that the company had already secured the support of both the UK government and a number of experts and NGOs who—based on a balanced assessment of costs, environmental considerations, health and safety concerns and so on—concluded that dumping in the sea, rather than scrapping on land, would be the least detrimental outcome (Grolin, 1998). In his reflections on the changes to politics in the risk society/reflexive modernity, Beck does not confine himself to just diagnosing problems but also proposes solutions. Given the rapid social and technological change that characterises contemporary modernity, he believes that we need to ‘stop’ and ‘think about it one more time’ before embarking on experiments that may lead to irreversible shifts in the very foundation of human life, for example, new biotechnologies. Beck argues that ‘slowing down’ and deliberation are required if we are to be able to counteract the risk-­ generating logics that we ourselves ultimately initiated (Beck, 1997a: 107–09, 118–19). As an example, he points to (involuntary) ‘queues’, which are the equivalent in the risk society of strikes in the industrial

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society. Here, he is not just referring to the traffic jams that bring crowded motorways to a standstill, but also other forms of ‘information constipation’, technological crashes and ‘institutional inertia’. Such events, while initially undesirable and signs of a dysfunctional society, may nevertheless open up ‘spaces for critical reflection’ capable of answering Beck’s call for ‘self-limitation’ and ‘self-control’ (Beck, 1997a: 108). For example, imagine that all forms of social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.) went offline at once. Many people would at first be panic-stricken, but after some time, we might rejoice in our newfound free time, which could be used for contemplation and activities of our own choosing. In the terminology of the German sociologist Hartmut Rosa, it might be said that Beck advocates (‘dysfunctional’ or ‘intentional’) ‘deceleration’ as a response to developments that otherwise seem to be running wild in the ‘risk-’ or ‘high-speed society’ (Rosa, 2010: 33–41). More specifically, with a view to exercising greater democratic control over new technologies, Beck proposes the ‘roundtable model’, which consists of a number of public forums that give ordinary people a chance to make their voices heard on issues concerning the environment, technology and so on (Beck, 1997a: 108, 121–24). Several prerequisites need to be in place for the ‘roundtable model’ to be a success: (1) that the experts’ ‘monopoly’ on truth is broken, (2) that no decisions are made in advance and (3) that there is open (public) dialogue between the participating parties (Beck, 1997a: 122–23). That this is not just a distant ‘utopian’ idea is proven by the fact that the roundtable model has actually been practiced in a number of countries, including the USA and Denmark (cf. Giddens, 1998b: 76–77). As mentioned several times in this and the previous chapters, there are many striking parallels between Beck’s and Giddens’ diagnoses of society. This also applies to their view of the changes in politics in contemporary society. Here, Giddens’ thoughts in many ways resemble those of Beck, but also differ in some respects, as I will briefly illustrate. Central to Giddens’ understanding of politics is his distinction between ‘emancipatory politics’ that prevails in the industrial society, and ‘life politics’ that is gaining influence in the risk society. According to Giddens, ‘emancipatory politics’ is about creating life opportunities through ‘radical engagements concerned with the liberation from inequality or servitude’ (‘freedom from’) (Giddens, 1990: 156). ‘Life politics’, on the other hand, is about making life decisions through ‘radical engagements which seek to further the possibilities of a fulfilling and satisfying life for all’ (‘freedom to’)

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(Giddens, 1990: 156). Where emancipatory politics is about eliminating coercion and material deprivation through the collective struggle for better living conditions, life politics is about individual self-realisation and the many choices—regarding partners, children, job, career and lifestyle— with which we are confronted every day in a post-traditional context where nothing is given anymore, and everything is up for discussion (Giddens, 1991: Ch. 7; 2000). What Beck’s ‘sub-politics’ and Giddens’ ‘life politics’ have in common is that both refer to the emergence of new, decentralised, informal and non-institutionalised forms of politics rooted in individuals’ everyday lives (Beck, 1999: 310).13 Giddens also agrees with Beck that a new political agenda is emerging in the risk society, one that is not about the distribution of welfare, but the distribution of risks. According to Giddens, risks create a new uncertainty—not only for ordinary people but also for experts and politicians, who are increasingly caught in a dilemma between downplaying risks (covering up) and exaggerating them (scaremongering). In the first case, politicians will be accused of not exercising due diligence; in the second, of generating unnecessary fear (Giddens, 1998b: 59–64; 1998a: 29–30; 1999: 29–30). At the same time, new risks, for example, lifestyle-related diseases, lead to a necessary shift from the welfare state’s classic ‘reactive’ politics, which intervened only once the damage had been done, to what he describes as ‘generative’ policy, that is, preventive (proactive) welfare policies aimed at avoiding the damage being done in the first place. Generative policies are, therefore, preventive welfare policies that seek to create the best possible frameworks for people to make their own life choices regarding jobs, careers and lifestyles. Giddens also describes this as ‘positive welfare’ (Giddens, 1994: 15, 18, 93–94; 1998b: 100–01, 111–18). Both Beck’s ‘sub-politics’ and Giddens’ ‘life politics’ are extensions of the concept of ‘politics’. This term refers not only to what goes on within the formal political system (parliament, government and parties), but also everyday life’s (reflexive) choices, which become ‘political’ because they are influenced by, and in turn affect, the institutional framework conditions of the welfare state—and, more broadly, global society. In other words, they have implications that stretch far beyond the individual (Beck, 13  In The Reinvention of Politics (1997a), Beck himself explicitly stresses this similarity between his own sub-politics and Giddens’ life politics, which he ‘renames’ ‘life-and-death politics’ (Beck, 1997a: 152–56).

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1999: 324, 332). Everyday ‘political’ choices are necessarily associated with reflexivity, but as seen in the previous chapter, there is a difference between Beck’s and Giddens’ understanding of reflexivity. Beck’s ‘structural’ reflexivity seems to be primarily associated with ‘passive’ sub-­politics, whereas Giddens’ individual self-reflection is more conducive to ‘active’ sub-politics.

Summary This chapter has looked at the crucial changes that Beck identifies in the areas of family life, work and politics in the (world) risk society/reflexive modernity. One common thread has been the attempt to show how, in Beck’s view, late-modern individualisation and globalisation impact on these areas, and how, as a result of social change, sociology’s traditional concepts of family, work and policy become zombie or container categories. As we have seen, according to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, the family becomes an individualised ‘negotiating unit’, in which the romantic ideal of love—not least in the form of the idea of ‘the one’—remains intact, despite being increasingly elusive in reality due to the conflicts built into late-modern relationships and families, which are not only required to strike a balance between work and family life, but also between the individualised parties’ multiple different wishes, demands and expectations of the relationship. At the same time, the family, love and ways of living together are greatly affected by globalisation, as seen in the emergence of new, transnational and transcultural forms of love and living arrangements (‘long-distance love’, ‘world families’)—which on the one hand broaden the horizon of love, but on the other are not immune to the structures of global inequality. In the labour market, lifelong, standardised, full-time paid jobs are being replaced by individualised, flexible and de-standardised forms of ‘underemployment’. As a result of this deregulation and de-­standardisation of paid work, more and more people work in precarious conditions, which Beck calls a ‘Brazilianisation’ of paid work. This happens because the ‘work society’ eventually ‘runs out of work’, so the scarce jobs are redistributed among all of us, in the form of casual and flexible employment conditions. As growth has become ‘jobless’, the notion of a ‘full employment society’ seems increasingly illusory. In Beck’s view, the shortage of paid work can, therefore, only be remedied by a more equitable distribution of society’s existing workload, in the form of a general reduction in working hours combined with some form of universal basic income.

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Finally, the risk society is characterised by an increasing sub-­politicisation, in the form of the emergence of a new and more individualised pattern of political participation, linked partly to society’s economic, technological and scientific action systems (implicit/passive sub-politics), partly to single-­issue movements and the political consumer who reacts if environmental and ethical requirements are not met (explicit/active sub-politics). Sub-politics is therefore synonymous with a ‘decentralisation’ of politics, which means that the risk society/reflexive modernity can also be described as a ‘polycentric society’, in which social systems do not become more autonomous (Luhmann), but increasingly interact with each other (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 194–96, 230–31; Beck et al., 1999: 10–11). In summary, sub-politics is characterised by changes: (1) to the fundamental determinant of politics: from welfare (wealth) to risks; (2) to the subject of politics: from parties and classes to individuals and ad hoc groups (the political consumer, ‘danger communities’) and (3) to the place of politics (topos): from centralised, formal and parliamentary to decentralised, local and extra-parliamentary. As a result of these crucial changes in family, paid work and politics, sociology’s traditional understandings—of the family as identical with the nuclear family; of paid work as identical with standardised full-time jobs; and of politics as identical with representative democracy—become, in Beck’s view, zombie or container categories; that is, ‘empty’ concepts, devoid of validity, which refer to a bygone era, namely, industrial society/ simple modernity. The task for a critical sociology is therefore—as mentioned in this and the previous chapters—to rethink the basic concepts of sociology in ways that reflect contemporary society. In his late writing, Beck seeks to do just that when he refines the theory of the risk society into a theory of ‘world risk society’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, to which we will now turn.

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Giddens, A. (1992). The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1994). Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1998a). Risk Society: The Context of British Politics. In J. Franklin (Ed.), The Politics of Risk Society. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1998b). The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1999). Runaway World. How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives. Profile Books. Giddens, A. (2000). The Post-traditional Society and Radical Politics: An interview with Anthony Giddens. In L. B. Kaspersen (Ed.), Anthony Giddens: An Introduction to a Social Theorist. Blackwell Publishers. Grolin, J. (1998). Corporate Legitimacy in Risk Society: The Case of Brent Spar’. Business Strategy and the Environment, 7, 213–222. Habermas, J. (1985). Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates und die Erschöpfung utopischer Energien. In J. Habermas (Ed.), Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit. Suhrkamp. Habermas, J. (1990). The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Polity Press. Holzer, B., & Sørensen, M. P. (2003). Rethinking Subpolitics. Beyond the ‘Iron Cage’ of Modern Politics? Theory, Culture and Society, 20(2), 79–102. Negt, O. (1984). Lebendige Arbeit, enteignete Zeit: Politische und Kulturelle Dimensionen des Kampfes um die Arbeitszeit. Campus Verlag. Offe, C. (1985). Work: The Key Sociological Category? In C.  Offe (Ed.), Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics. Polity Press. Parsons, T. (1955). The American Family: Its Relation to Personality and to the Social Structure. In T. Parsons & R. F. Bales (Eds.), Family, Socialization and Interaction Process. The Free Press. Rifkin, J. (1995). The End of Work. The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era. G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Rosa, H. (2010). Alienation and Acceleration. Towards a Critical Theory of Late Modern Temporality. NSU Press. Sennett, R. (1998). The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism. W.W. Norton and Co. Standing, G. (2014). The Precariat. The New Dangerous Class. Bloomsbury. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004). New Risks and Social Change. In P. Taylor-Gooby (Ed.), New Risks, New Welfare. The Transformation of the European Welfare State. Oxford University Press. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2008). The New Welfare State Settlement in Europe. European Societies, 10(1), 3–24. Thomsen, K. (1998). Familie og livsfaser. In H.  Andersen (Ed.), Sociologi  – en grundbog til et fag (2nd ed.). Hans Reitzels Forlag.

CHAPTER 7

The World Risk Society as a Cosmopolitan Society?

The ‘Cosmopolitan Turn’ in Beck’s Theory This chapter takes a closer look at one of Beck’s most crucial reorientations—his ‘cosmopolitan turn’, which began in the mid-1990s and went on to be increasingly important in his work (cf. Beck, 1996, 2000c, 2002b, 2005a, 2006, 2009a, 2009c, 2011, 2012a, 2016a, 2016b; Beck & Grande, 2007, 2010; Beck & Sznaider, 2006a, Beck & Levy, 2013). Since Beck’s cosmopolitan perspective does not stand on its own and should be considered part of a broader cosmopolitan turn in the social sciences, I will start with a brief introduction to what makes his cosmopolitanism notable. Beck is one of a number of prominent theorists, including Giddens (1998), David Held (2010), Mike Featherstone (2002) and Gerard Delanty (2006, 2009), to point out that the cosmopolitan perspective may be a highly productive one to adopt when seeking to understand the new globalised conditions under which we live today (for a literature review, see Beck & Sznaider, 2006b). Where Habermas (1984/87) advocates a ‘linguistic turn’, and Honneth (2005 [1992]) a ‘recognition turn’, the sociologists mentioned, each in their own way, advocate a ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in social theory. The word ‘cosmopolitan’ stems from the Greek cosmos (world) and polites (citizen) or ‘world citizen’. It is not a new concept, and can be traced back to the Stoics, Roman republicanism and even Confucianism (557–479  BCE) (Beck & Grande, 2007: 11–12; Pichler, 2009: 706). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 K. Rasborg, Ulrich Beck, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89201-2_7

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During the Enlightenment, the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was one of the most prominent advocates of cosmopolitanism. In his short book Perpetual Peace (2006 [1795]), he points out that if wars and conflicts are to be put aside and reason is to prevail, it will be necessary to ‘form a state of peoples (civitas gentium), which, continually expanding, would ultimately comprise all of the peoples of the world’ (Kant, 2006 [1795]: 81; cf. 2006 [1784]). The societies of today have become, as Kant points out, so interconnected that ‘the violation of right at any one place on the earth is felt in all places’ (Kant, 2006 [1795]: 84). Globalisation— which is essentially what Kant is reflecting on here, even though he was writing in 1795—means that the world community cannot turn the other cheek if one particular country is guilty of, for example, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide, torture or human rights violations in general. To deal with this situation, Kant calls for ‘world citizen law’ to form the basis, along with national and international law, for human rights (Kant, 2006 [1795]: 84). In other words, Kant proposes a genuinely cosmopolitan idea of a ‘global legal order’, which seems even more relevant than ever in the light of recent wars, crises and international conflicts. Events such as the wars in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, the civil war in Syria and so on have led to countless violations of the kind mentioned above. When Beck says, regarding modern wars and conflicts, ‘make law, not war’ (Beck, 2003: 56–58; 2005a: 294), he is therefore expanding on Kant’s cosmopolitan thinking. Both classical and modern sociologists address the theme of cosmopolitanism. In classical sociology, as Simmel points out, and as seen in Chap. 4, individualism and cosmopolitanism go hand in hand in modernity. Tönnies, too, addresses the theme of cosmopolitanism (Inglis, 2009). In modern sociology, we encounter it in, for example, the American sociologist Robert K. Merton (1910–2003). In his major work Social Theory and Social Structure (1968 [1949]), as part of an analysis of American local communities, he distinguishes between ‘locals’ who were ‘preoccupied with local problems’ and ‘cosmopolitans’, who ‘oriented significantly to the world outside’ (Merton, 1968 [1949]: 447; cf. Pichler, 2009: 706). The concept appears in several different forms in the ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in contemporary sociology and social theory (Binnie et  al., 2009: 308–10; Vertovec & Cohen, 2002: 1, 20). The British social scientists Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (2002) note that ‘cosmopolitanism’ is an ambiguous concept that can refer to, respectively: (1) a socio-cultural

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condition (e.g. globalisation); (2) a philosophy or worldview (e.g. normative ideas about human rights, equality and global justice); (3) a multidimensional (institutional or identity-political) political project (e.g. the EU); (4) an attitude or disposition (e.g. the view of ‘the strangers’); and (5) a practice or competence (e.g. intercultural competences) (Vertovec & Cohen, 2002: 8–4; cf. Pichler, 2009: 705). The British social scientist Gerard Delanty also talks about a cultural— and critical—cosmopolitanism, which refers to culturally embedded normative visions of ‘another society’, based on ideas about mixed forms of the global and the local (e.g. diaspora cultures), openness to the world, change and self-problematisation (Delanty, 2006: 32, 35; 2009). Although self-problematisation (reflexivity) has always been associated with modernity, according to Delanty it is reinforced in its late phase by globalisation and greater intercultural influences. The resulting ‘cultural relativisation’ heightens awareness of the changeability of culture and society, which makes space for a transformative—and therefore critical—element in cosmopolitanism (Delanty, 2006: 39–40). More often than not, these different types of cosmopolitanism appear in various ‘mixed forms’ rather than their pure form. In other words, they are best understood as ideal types or analytical distinctions. Common to all of them, however, are a number of ‘cosmopolitan core values’, such as ‘openness to the world’, ‘global consciousness’, ‘loyalty to humanity’ and ‘the recognition of diversity’ (Pichler, 2009: 705). Although Beck’s cosmopolitanism contains elements from all of the forms mentioned above, he identifies primarily—as seen below—with the first variant. In his view, cosmopolitanism is inextricably linked to the emergence of a new socio-cultural condition—the ‘world risk society’.

World Risk Society and Cosmopolitanism As early as his original diagnosis of the risk society, Beck emphasises (as seen in Chap. 3) that risks are not based on class and borders, but are, in the broadest sense, global. To illustrate the point, he introduced the concept of the ‘world risk society’ in the mid-1990s (Beck, 1996, 1998a, 2009c). His concept of the ‘world risk society’ should not be seen as a break with his previous theory per se, but as Beck expanding on his own point that the risks inherent in modernisation are global in nature (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 13, 36–38). The concept of the ‘world risk society’ seems,

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in a sense, to be merely a terminological consequence of an idea that has always been present in Beck’s diagnosis of the risk society. He does, however, make a number of crucial changes and adjustments to his theory, of which he presents an overall account in World at Risk (2009c)—a book that is in many ways his second major work, and which summarises and refines his overall theory. In the book, Beck argues that, in the light of developments in the intervening two decades or so, his first diagnosis of the risk society was almost an understatement. For example, the original book did not take into account the phenomenon of terrorism—most notably 9/11, but also countless other attacks in the West and elsewhere. It may seem obvious, therefore, to include international terrorism in the diagnosis of the (world) risk society (Beck, 2009c: vii, 3–4, 9–11; cf. Beck, 2002b, 2002c), but it does not fit easily with Beck’s original definition of risks as the unintended consequences of industrial society (cf. Chap. 3). Terrorist attacks are conscious, intentional and ‘live off’ the fear they generate. With this in mind, Beck adjusts his concept of risk, defining it as ‘the anticipated catastrophe’ (Beck, 2009c: 9–11). Having previously referred to the risk society as a ‘catastrophe society’,1 he now emphasises that the world risk society is not a ‘catastrophe society’, but a society in which anticipation or awareness of the catastrophe has consequences that are at least as far-reaching as the actual catastrophes. This leads to insecurity, fear and demands for security that can exacerbate tendencies to regulate everything in society and ultimately threaten freedom and democracy (Beck, 2009c: 9–11, 14; cf. Høilund, 2010). Beck presents his ‘new’ definition of risk concisely: ‘we have to understand the key distinction between risk and catastrophe. Risk does not mean catastrophe. Risk means the anticipation of catastrophe. Risks exist in a permanent state of virtuality, and only become ‘topical’ to the extent that they are anticipated. Risks are not ‘real’, they are ‘becoming real’’ (Beck, 2009b: 292). According to this ‘new’ concept, risk can be said to ‘exist’ in the ‘gap’ between the anticipation of the event and the event as a reality. This enables Beck to include international terrorism in the diagnosis of the world risk community, as it becomes possible to distinguish between unintended catastrophes (e.g. environmental and financial risks, corresponding to the original definition of risk) and intended catastrophes 1  Previously it was put as: ‘The risk society is […] a catastrophic society. In it the state of emergency threatens to become the normal state’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 78–79; cf. 1989: 90).

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(e.g. international terrorism) (Beck, 2009c: 13–14). Beck thus outlines three main types of global risks, which combine to constitute the world risk society: ecological, financial and terrorist risks (Beck, 2009c: 13–14). This typology is somewhat idealised, of course, as the various forms of global risks overlap and are ‘interwoven’ in complex ways in social reality (Beck, 2009b: 293; cf. Rasborg, 2018). The world risk society does not just create new global risks, however, it also heightens awareness of the need to find collective solutions to cross-­ border problems. According to Beck, this creates fertile ground for the emergence of a ‘cosmopolitan society’ (Beck, 1996, 2002b, 2005a, 2006, 2009c; Beck & Grande, 2007). As problems are not limited to the nation state, they cannot be solved at national level either. We need to establish trans- and/or supranational political structures such as the EU. In Beck’s view, this promotes the idea of ‘world citizens’ in a cosmopolitan ‘world citizens’ society’. In the cosmopolitan society, we are, as Beck says with reference to Kant, both ‘citizens’ (polis) and ‘world citizens’ (cosmos) (Beck, 2002b: 18). It is therefore a ‘nation state and world citizens society’ based on ideals of humanity, democracy, human rights, recognition of diversity and so on, as well as a closer cooperation between European countries on matters of joint interest (e.g. the refugee crisis) (Beck, 2005a, 2006; Beck & Grande, 2007, 2010; Beck & Sznaider, 2006a). The cosmopolitan society should not be understood as a fully realised state of society, but as Beck’s vision of an alternative to market-driven globalisation—an alternative he believes is possible in the light of society’s current trajectory (Beck, 2005a: 211–12, 236–37). In the early 2000s, Beck unfolds his analysis of world risk societies and cosmopolitanism in three comprehensive works, which he describes as his ‘cosmopolitan trilogy’ (Beck & Grande, 2007: xii–xiii): (1) Power in the Global Age (2005a), (2) Cosmopolitan Vision (2006) and (3) Cosmopolitan Europe (2007) (co-authored with Edgar Grande). In parallel, Beck presented the main results of these studies in a large number of articles in international sociological journals (e.g. Beck, 1996, 2000c, 2002b, 2009a, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2016b; Beck & Grande, 2010; Beck & Sznaider, 2006a, Beck & Levy, 2013). As Beck’s theory of the world risk society and cosmopolitanism is complex, convoluted at times and not always easy to follow, I will now try to pare the trilogy to the bone and clarify the main points.

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Power and Counter-Power in the Age of Globalisation In Power in the Global Age (2005a), Beck presents a comprehensive analysis—based on insights into sociology, political science, economics and social philosophy—of the global power structures and patterns of conflict that characterise the new world order since the fall of the Berlin Wall. His basic thesis is that the old order dominated by the nation state is changing fundamentally. The underlying assumption is that politics and democracy are taking on new forms that point in the direction of a ‘cosmopolitan state’ and a ‘cosmopolitan democracy’. According to Beck, the global economy has created new conditions for the establishment of transnational—and, in the broadest sense, global—political structures. In the world risk society, the boundaries between economy, politics and society are liquid. For Beck, this forms the basis of a new struggle for ‘power and counter-power’ between global capital, nation states and civil society. His analysis of the new economic and political structures in the world risk society seeks to uncover the strategies pursued by these actors in their power struggles. In other words, Beck seeks to describe the emergence of what he calls a new world political ‘meta-power game’, which is about ‘the foundations and basic rules of power and domination in the transition from the first to the second modernity’ (Beck, 2005a: 311–12, note 2). This ‘meta-power game’—which Beck, in line with his general ideas on political change (cf. Chap. 6), also terms ‘politics about politics’—has the following characteristics: (1) it changes rules, in contrast to the old world politics that simply apply rules (Beck, 2005a: 2–3); (2) it does away with a ‘state monopolistic’ concept of politics, as it also involves non-state, global actors in the themes and power strategies of ‘meta-politics’; and (3) it signifies a dialectic between ‘cosmopolitanisation’ and ‘anti-cosmopolitanisation’, which transcends not only the distinction between national and international, but also internal national dichotomies (Beck, 2006: 100–01). In extension of this, Beck raises the question of how power, political authority, politics and the state can be redefined in a manner befitting the twenty-first century (Beck, 2005a: 34). Essentially, it is a matter of how to legitimise political authority in a post-national era of global interdependence (Beck, 2006: 142; Beck & Grande, 2007: xii). It might be said that Beck picks up the thread from Weber’s classical analyses of legitimate norms and political authority (Weber, 1970 [1921/22]) but relocates it to a new social context, which he calls the world risk society.

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In his analysis of this ‘meta-game’, Beck points out that capital pursues a number of different strategies, each of which are based on an interest in the nation state: (1) being easily changeable, which he describes as ‘autarchy strategies’; (2) being in competition with as many comparable nation states as possible, which he terms ‘substitution strategies’; (3) internalising the ‘neoliberal world regime’, which he calls ‘strategies of reduction of competition’; and (4) demonstrating market conformity while also maintaining a degree of autonomy, which he describes as ‘preventive strategies of dominance’. Capital now operates globally, which means that companies move to countries where corporate taxation and wages are lowest. As a result, the welfare state loses both tax revenue and jobs. The power of global business is therefore rooted in an ‘exit mechanism’, that is, a latent threat of relocating investment and production to other countries if the welfare state fails to provide the optimal conditions for business. There is, as Beck puts it, a kind of ‘politics of the no’, a kind of ‘no man’s authority’, where politics assumes the character of ‘side effects’—in other words, it becomes a global sub-politics (cf. Chap. 6) (Beck, 2005a: 117). Conversely, nation states find themselves under pressure from capital’s exit power, lose tax revenue and bear the social costs of lost jobs. In Beck’s view, the threat of exit heightens competition between nation states to create the optimal conditions for business (substitution power), which can, in turn, lead to lower wages, poorer working conditions, lower environmental standards, the privatisation of national assets in welfare states (hospitals, railways, telecommunications) and so on. On the one hand, global business has an interest in a level playing field for the competing nation states. However, since it also tries to play them off against each other in terms of tax, wages and so on, it also—paradoxically—has an interest in perpetuating differences. Since the nation states, unlike capital, are still territorially anchored, they are forced on the defensive by this global politics of divide and conquer. In an attempt to reduce competition between them, they are nonetheless developing countermeasures in the form of what Beck terms ‘specialisation strategies’, ‘hegemonic strategies’, ‘transnational cooperation strategies’ and so on (Beck, 2005a: 188–206). Facing off with global business and the ‘translegal authority’ by nation states—which, according to Beck, is neither legitimate nor illegitimate but a reflection of a decline in legitimation—is the counter-power of global civil society. The key players are the social movements, the NGOs and, in particular, the political consumer, whose power (as we saw in Chap. 6) is also based on an exit mechanism. Like capital, the ‘global consumer’ has

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the ‘global power to say no’, the power not to consume. In other words, the consumer boycott constitutes a ‘countermeasure’ to which companies are highly sensitive. However, one weakness of this form of power is the lack of organisation by consumers, as well as the dependence on the news media paying attention (Beck, 2005a: 337–39). As mentioned previously, human rights are paramount in the cosmopolitan regime. However, as Beck points out, this can be a double-edged sword, as human rights can also be used as a pretext for superpowers carrying out politically motivated military interventions abroad. One example of this is the war in Iraq in 2003, which was justified by the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction (Beck, 2003: 58). Here, human rights are used to legitimise encroachment on popular sovereignty, which Beck quite aptly describes as ‘militant humanism’ (Beck, 2002b: 37). We need to be able to distinguish between violations of the law (cf. Kant above) that are so serious that the human rights perspective takes precedence over sovereignty, and cases where the breach of human rights seems to provide a pretext for military adventurism that may in fact be driven by other concerns (geopolitical interests, raw materials, economic interests, etc.). In other words, we need to be able to distinguish between ‘true’ and ‘false’ cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2005a: 137–39, 142–44; Beck & Grande, 2007: 221). According to Beck, the trends he identifies do not indicate the end of politics but a ‘change of the concept and form of the political’ (Beck, 2005a: 249). Politics is dislocated and spread out through the global community in a new way. In other words, sub-politics become global, just as the boundaries between national and international, centre and periphery, domestic and foreign policy, right and left become liquid. Beck identifies several future scenarios (or ‘state typologies’) for the second modernity— ‘the ethnic state’, ‘the neoliberal state’, ‘the transnational state’ and ‘the cosmopolitan state’. In his view, the crucial dividing line between these scenarios seems to be whether we accept the current market-driven globalisation, which generates poverty, inequality and potential ‘surveillance states’, or whether we pursue a second globalisation in a second modernity, in the form of a genuinely ‘cosmopolitan democracy’. He calls for a new ‘architecture of transnational power’, based on a ‘global version of the New Deal’ comprising, inter alia, ‘transnational courts’, new ‘transnational parties’ (‘world citizens’ parties’), ‘transnational civil rights’ and even a ‘global parliament’ (Beck, 2005a: 211–12, 216–17, 308).

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The Cosmopolitan Vision In The Cosmopolitan Vision (2006), Beck develops his analysis of world risk societies and cosmopolitanism in an attempt to outline the basic elements of ‘a cosmopolitan Enlightenment’ (Beck & Grande, 2007: xii). He distinguishes between three different forms of cosmopolitanism, namely: (1) normative-philosophical cosmopolitanism, which focuses in particular on cosmopolitanism as a set of normative ideals regarding the design of society (e.g. Kant, Habermas, Derrida); (2) analytical-empirical cosmopolitanism, which emphasises that cosmopolitanism is not a purely ideological phenomenon, but a ‘really existing cosmopolitanism, i.e. a cosmopolitanization of reality’ that arises on the basis of global risks (side effects) (e.g. Beck himself); and (3) institutional cosmopolitanism, which concerns the institutionalisation of cosmopolitanism in trans- and/or supranational political structures and forms of regulation, for example, the EU, the European Court of Human Rights, the UN and NATO (Beck, 2006: 17–18, 131). Beck places himself in the category of analytical-empirical cosmopolitanism, which becomes evident when he emphasises the importance of distinguishing between ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘cosmopolitanisation’ (Beck, 2006: 18–19, 44). He describes the cosmopolitanisation of today as really existing, that is, it expresses a new, objective social condition that has arisen in the light of the unintended consequences of modernisation, and which exists whether people are aware of it and want it or not. Cosmopolitanisation, in Beck’s view, is not something that we are free to opt in to or out of at will, but is inextricably linked to the emergence of ‘global interdependence risks’, which he also describes as ‘side-effect cosmopolitanisation’ (Beck, 2006: 19, 33–36; cf. Beck & Grande, 2007: 85–86, 199–200, 203–05). While Beck (cf. Chap. 3) generally places more and more emphasis on constructivism (cf. also Beck & Grande, 2007:85–86, 199–200, 203–05), this is, oddly enough, an example of clear realism, which emphasises that phenomena in society have an objective existence, independent of the individuals’ awareness of them (cf. e.g. Marx’s view that classes have an objective existence irrespective of whether individuals are aware of them). However, cosmopolitanisation is not only a socio-structural phenomenon, it is also embedded in culture and everyday life. Beck therefore speaks of a ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ that ‘unfolds beneath the surface or behind the façades of persisting national spaces, jurisdiction and labelling, while

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national flags continue to be hoisted and national attitudes, identities and consciousness remain dominant’ (Beck, 2006: 19–20, 40–44; cf. Beck & Sznaider, 2006a: 8). Here, Beck is referring to the British sociologist Michael Billig’s (1995) concept of ‘banal nationalism’, which describes the implicit ‘nationality markers’ that are culturally embedded in the routines and habits of day-to-day life. For example, we implicitly denote our nationality when we have a beer over the hedge in the allotment garden, sit down to a Sunday roast or cheer on the national football team. Similarly, Beck’s concept of ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ refers to the implicit ‘cosmopolitanism markers’ embedded in the increasingly multicultural routines and habits of everyday life (Beck, 2002b: 28–30; 2006: 41–42). Globalisation and the prevalence of intercultural influences have led to increasingly multicultural and cosmopolitan preferences and habits, as witnessed by changes to eating habits, travel, fashion, art and culture (Beck, 2006: 41–42). Language is also affected by cosmopolitanisation, especially in major cities like Berlin, London and New York, where ‘diaspora cultures’ have emerged from immigrants mixing the culture and habits of their country of origin with those of their new home (Beck, 2002b: 28). Cosmopolitan Europe Beck concludes his ‘cosmopolitan trilogy’ with Cosmopolitan Europe (2007), co-authored by German professor of comparative politics Edgar Grande. In it, they refine the analysis of cosmopolitanism in a European context. Based on the theory of reflexive modernisation (cf. Chap. 5), Beck and Grande set out to analyse the economic, social and political processes of change in today’s Europe. Overall, they call for a reimagining of Europe, both theoretically and politically, that sets aside the false binary— either the nation states or Europe—in favour of a third option, namely a cosmopolitan Europe (Beck & Grande, 2007: 5–6). The idea of a cosmopolitan Europe is defined by, firstly, this break with the either-or logic of Europeanisation; secondly, a break with the national gaze; and thirdly, a break with methodological nationalism (Beck & Grande, 2007: 5–6). What do we even mean by ‘Europe’? Somewhat paradoxically, Beck and Grande’s answer to this question is that, regardless of whether Europe is perceived as identical with the EU and its member states or with a larger geographical and political space, Europe does not exist! What does exist is ‘Europeanisation’, that is, an ‘institutionalised process of permanent change’, of which the ‘institutional core’ is the EU (Beck & Grande,

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2007: 6, 10). Internally, according to Beck and Grande, Europeanisation means an ever-increasing transfer of competence from the member states to the EU. Externally, it means that the circle of EU countries expands at regular intervals, as we saw in the context of the enlargement in 2004, when ten new Eastern European countries joined, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Beck & Grande, 2007: 10).2 Beck and Grande assert that, given the complex and dynamic nature of Europeanisation, it is crucial to examine how social and political integration can be achieved at European level through cosmopolitanisation. This requires detaching the basic concepts of the social and the political—society, state, politics, social inequality, mobility, ethnicity, justice, solidarity and so on—from ‘national orthodoxy’ and redefining them in a cosmopolitan perspective (Beck & Grande, 2007: 5). Only then will it be possible to understand ‘Europeanisation’ as a social and political process that is based—at least in part—on an ‘institutionalised cosmopolitanism’ (Beck & Grande, 2007: 42, 46–47). At the same time, however, Beck and Grande stress that Europeanisation is synonymous not only with institutionalisation, but also with a deformation of cosmopolitanism. In other words, it is characterised by numerous conflicts and encompasses many different spheres, subjects and actors who—with or without formal participation in the EU—are fighting for hegemony in the context of the ‘discourse on Europe’ (Beck & Grande, 2007: 5). Beck and Grande distinguish between ‘economic’, ‘nationalistic’ and ‘bureaucratic’ deformations of cosmopolitanism—deformations that, in their view, can only be overcome by the continued cosmopolitanisation of Europe (Beck & Grande, 2007: 136, 150–54). Analysing this complex, ambivalent and conflict-riven field in its entirety requires ‘a new critical theory of European integration’. Beck and Grande see their book on cosmopolitan Europe as a contribution to such a theory (Beck & Grande, 2007: 27). They take as their starting point, as mentioned, the theory of reflexive modernisation (cf. also Chap. 5). In Beck and Grande’s view, the reflexive modernisation of Europe signifies a transition from the nation state Europe of the first modernity to the transnational Europe of the second modernity. This transition is not a conscious and intentional process, but one driven instead by the unintended consequences of the modernisation 2  Today, however, we also see examples of the opposite, in particular the UK’s withdrawal (Brexit) from the EU on 31 January 2020 and the entry into force of an agreement on the future relationship between the UK and the EU on 1 January 2021.

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process (cf. Chap. 5). The Europe of today can therefore be understood as a ‘side-effect Europe’ (Beck & Grande, 2007: 6–7, 35–40, 136). However, that is not to suggest that Europe was not, and is not, the subject of strategic action. On the contrary, like globalisation, Europeanisation must be understood as a strategic game of power, that is, as a ‘meta-power game’, which—as previously discussed—is about redefining the very rules of political power (Beck & Grande, 2007: 136). As seen in Chap. 5, a crucial feature of the transition from first to second modernity is that ‘the logic of uniqueness’, that is, an ‘either-or’ model for politics and society, is replaced by ‘the logic of ambiguity’, that is, a ‘both-and’ model (Beck & Grande, 2007: 29–30). The Europe of the first modernity is characterised by relations between nation states operating on the basis of well-established dichotomies: ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign policy’, ‘friend’ and ‘foe’ and so on, that is, an ‘either-or’ logic. In the second modernity, Europe is characterised by transnational relationships, in which the nation states are radically reformed and woven back together in new ways, that is, a ‘both-and’ logic (Beck & Grande, 2007: 28–31). The EU plays a key role in this process, of course. It can be viewed as an institutionalised form of cosmopolitanism, which is all about establishing trans- and/or supranational political structures and forms of regulation that are capable of acting on cross-border environmental, economic and terrorist risks (Beck & Grande, 2007: 76). However, the EU does not replace the European nation states (an ‘either-or’ perspective), but rather presupposes them (a ‘both-and’ perspective). For this reason, according to Beck and Grande, it is wrong to consider the EU and the nation state as opposites (Beck & Grande, 2007: 21–23, 33–35). The fact that nation states surrender (legal) sovereignty to the EU does not necessarily amount to a loss of (material) sovereignty. In fact, it might enhance national autonomy if, for example, EU cooperation improves opportunities to combat global environmental problems, cross-border crime, international terrorism and so on. According to Beck and Grande, the surrender of sovereignty can, paradoxically, lead to a gain in sovereignty. In other words, the relationship between nation state and EU should not be considered a zero-sum game (in which greater sovereignty to one means less to the other), but as a plus-sum game (in which both enjoy greater sovereignty) (Beck & Grande, 2007: 77–79, 220). For Beck and Grande, cosmopolitanism does not imply ‘altruism’ or ‘idealism’, but realism, as the ‘reflected self-interest of the transnational states’ goes hand in hand with an ‘internal cosmopolitanisation of the national’ (Beck &

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Grande, 2007: 82, 220). The EU is thus neither ‘a superstate’ nor ‘a federation of states’, but something else. It is important to define this something else in greater detail—and the traditional concept of the state is not up to the task (Beck & Grande, 2007: 50–51, 54). Thus, according to Beck and Grande, it is only possible to reach an adequate understanding of the Europe of today by transcending the ‘either-or’ thinking of the national gaze. In order to establish this new understanding, they propose the concept of ‘the cosmopolitan empire’, that is, the new Europe, which they see as currently evolving: ‘The emerging order to be comprehended and developed is a nova res publica: the cosmopolitan empire of Europe’ (Beck & Grande, 2007: 50).3 What are we to understand by a ‘cosmopolitan empire’, and how does the concept of empire differ from the traditional concept of the state? In their attempt to answer this question, Beck and Grande take as their starting point the fact that ‘state’ and ‘empire’ represent two fundamentally different forms of exercising political power: Following Max Weber, we define a state as a permanent political association based directly on the formal power of command over those subject to it. By empire, by contrast, we mean a mode of exercising power whose defining characteristic, bluntly put, is that it permanently strives for control over non-­ subjects. In contrast with a state, the subjects of a state retain a certain degree of formal independence. More precisely, empire combines direct and indirect, formal and informal modes of the exercise of political authority. An empire is not simply a territorially extensive state; it differs from the latter through a fundamentally different logic and fundamentally different techniques of political authority. But it is not a matter of purely informal relations of power either. (Beck & Grande, 2007: 56)

According to Beck and Grande, there are three main reasons why the concept of empire is, in their view, more suitable than the traditional concept of the state for analysing cosmopolitan Europe. Firstly, it allows for the 3  In purely terminological terms, Beck and Grande talk about both ‘empire’ and ‘imperium’. Both words/concepts are derived from the Latin imperium, which means ‘kingdom’, ‘empire’ or ‘dominion’. Beck and Grande specifically use the word ‘empire’ to describe the new cosmopolitan political structures that, in their view, are evolving in Europe today. On the other hand, they use ‘imperium’ to describe the great political and colonial forms of rule of the past, for example, the Roman Empire and the British Empire. I have attempted to maintain this terminological difference as far as possible and it is hopefully obvious from the context whether the term is used in the ‘traditional’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ sense.

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emergence of new forms of political integration beyond the nation states, while at the same time it detaches the analysis of the exercise of political power from its state fixation. Secondly, it paves the way for an analysis of the real asymmetries of power between the states, that is, it breaks the illusion that they are equal in terms of sovereignty. Thirdly, it places into historical context the separation between national and international, thereby calling into question basic axioms in politics and political science (Beck & Grande, 2007: 55–56). Drawing on the concept of empire, Beck and Grande set out to analyse the political and institutional dimensions of ‘the European political exercise of power’. However, this should not be understood in the traditional (nation state) meaning of the word; on the contrary, they emphasise that the cosmopolitanisation of the European states is synonymous with the emergence of a new, post-hegemonic political structure. Unlike the empires of the nineteenth century, which were based on national borders and conquest, the new post-hegemonic empire, emerging in Europe in the latter half of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, is characterised by transcending national borders, voluntariness, consensus, transnational relations and the ‘political added value’ that stems from them (Beck & Grande, 2007: 53–57). The new Europe is a ‘Europe of difference’, which is why the integration process at European level must be a form of ‘differentiated integration’ that allows member states to join the Union and retain their differences. One example of differentiated integration that enables ‘an EU at several speeds’ mentioned by Beck and Grande is the single currency (the euro), which at the time of writing has been adopted by 19 of the (then) 28 EU member states (Beck & Grande, 2007: 50, 58–60, 242–48).4 Unlike the political philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s (2001) use of the concept of empire as a term for a new, postmodern global system of political authority, Beck and Grande stress that the concept must be seen today as a reflection of a new phase of modernity—that is, reflexive modernity. In other words, we need to distinguish between how empires are formed in the first and the second modernity. Today, the concept is 4  The UK’s withdrawal from the EU (cf. note 2) reduced the number of member states from 28 to 27. At first glance, Brexit seems to contradict Beck and Grande’s ideas of a ‘cosmopolitanisation of Europe’. Nevertheless, it does confirm their emphasis that the process is by no means a linear ‘automatic development’, but is conflict-riven, discontinuous and has no predetermined outcomes.

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seen as manifesting new, post-hegemonic forms of political authority, which arise in (reflexive) modernity and are a prerequisite for the cosmopolitanisation of Europe (Beck & Grande, 2007: 53–54, 60–62). According to Beck and Grande, the fact that newly formed empires are not postmodern but (reflexive) modern is due to the constituent elements still being nation states and to the concept of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, they represent a ‘structural break’ in modernity in that their political authority transcends the nation state and its sovereignty. In Beck and Grande’s view, it is only a ‘postmodern empire’ if the basic principles of the modern state are abolished (cf. Chap. 5) such that the constitutive elements of the empire are no longer states, but other organisational forms designed for the exercise of political power (Beck & Grande, 2007: 62). They emphasise that, in reflexive modernity, the cosmopolitan empire can take both ‘despotic’ and ‘emancipatory’ forms, corresponding to what they term, respectively, ‘reflexive fundamentalism’ (attempting to re-­ establish old truths and values) and ‘reflexive pluralism’ (rejection of the possibility of unambiguous and definitive truths and solutions) (Beck & Grande, 2007: 71; Beck et al., 2001: 48–49). One central feature of cosmopolitanism is, as seen above, the recognition of diversity. While repressive/despotic forms of empire also acknowledge diversity, they nevertheless attempt to contain it within the context of the empire’s political authority. By contrast, emancipatory forms of empire are characterised by the fact that the recognition of and emphasis on diversity create the basis for individual and collective autonomy (Beck & Grande, 2007: 71). However, the liberating potential is not necessarily realised in the structure of the European empire. In Beck and Grande’s view, one of the most important tasks for a theory of the European cosmopolitan empire is to map out the conditions for this to happen (Beck & Grande, 2007: 71). This also shows that how Europe develops is not predetermined, but open, and subject to political influence, making it possible to envisage numerous scenarios for the future: (1) a ‘decay scenario’, (2) a ‘stagnation scenario’ and (3) a ‘cosmopolitanisation scenario’ (Beck & Grande, 2007: 226–28). The ‘decay scenario’ predicts that the European project will more or less collapse as a result of its internal contradictions; the ‘stagnation scenario’ suggests that it will stall as differences between member states obstruct the integration process (Beck & Grande, 2007: 226–27), and the ‘cosmopolitanisation scenario’—in which Beck and Grande place their trust—reflects the perception that the Europe of today is in need of renewal. However, this entails challenging Germany’s dominant role in

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the EU (Beck, 2013),5 and more generally requires that the United States participates in a ‘cosmopolitan world order’, based on the recognition of diversity (Beck & Grande, 2007: 227–28). Beck and Grande also point out that any ‘renewal of Europe’ must be based on four pillars: 1. first, strengthening European civil society based on universally shared constitutional norms; 2. second, the transition to a new postnational model of democracy that, instead of incapacitating the European citizens, accords them an active role in the European decision-making process; 3. third, introducing a new, cosmopolitan approach to integration that is no longer geared to ‘harmonising’ rules and overcoming (national) differences, but to acknowledging them; 4. fourth, establishing Europe as the driving force of a global cosmopolitanism and as a member of a new transatlantic security community (Beck & Grande, 2007: 228).

A New Critical Sociology with a Cosmopolitan Outlook The new global political and economic structures that characterise the world risk society are—as discussed in Chap. 5—in a general sense a reflection of the fact that the first modernity, which was a nation-state modernity (industrial society), is being replaced by the second modernity, which is globalised, transnational and increasingly cosmopolitan (world risk society) (Beck & Lau, 2005). In an actor perspective, the ‘national gaze’ is 5  In the short German Europe (Beck, 2013), Beck sharply criticises Germany’s dominant role in the EU. For example, he looks at the conditions attached to the loans to Greece’s crisis-stricken economy and sees them as a form of interference with a member state’s democratic right to determine its own economic policies. Referring to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s central role in this (neoliberal) austerity policy, Beck speaks—with an ironic allusion to Machiavelli—about the ‘Merkiavelli model’ (das Model Merkiavelli). In other words, he accuses Germany of a strategic, power-oriented approach to politics, which ultimately puts its own national interests above all else (Beck, 2013: 45–65). In doing so, Beck picks up from the author Thomas Mann, who as early as 1953, in the shadow of World War II, argued for the need to replace a ‘German Europe’ with a ‘European Germany’ (Beck, 2013: vii–viii). In other words, Germany must be ‘contained’ within European cooperation, in which the EU is a crucial element.

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increasingly replaced by a ‘cosmopolitan gaze’, as we become increasingly globally oriented in all our relationships—in terms of work, education, cohabitation and so on. We work globally, we educate ourselves globally, we eat globally, we fall in love globally and so on (Beck, 2002b: 31; Beck & Grande, 2007: 36; 2010: 427; Beck & Sznaider, 2006a: 391). Whereas the first modernity, according to Beck, was to a large extent the era of the nation state, globalisation in the second—transnational— modernity signifies new conditions, characterised by society bursting out of its nation-state framework and being thrust into global interdependence, that is, being de-territorialised. In sociology, there has been a tendency to perceive society as identical with the nation state (Beck, 2000b: 21, 24–26; Beck & Willms, 2004: 12–14, 180–81). In the age of globalisation, however, the national does not remain national, but is revolutionised from within. Behind the national façades, companies are more and more transnational and cosmopolitan. All of our life relationships—economics, politics, social movements, cohabitation, research and so on—are increasingly cosmopolitan (Beck & Willms, 2004: 180). The ‘cosmopolitan society’ is thus Beck’s term for a new global state of society and horizon of experience (Beck, 2002b: 17, 28–30, 2006; Beck & Sznaider, 2006a: 389, 393–95; Beck & Grande, 2010). However, in sociology, globalisation continues to be thought of as an increasing interdependence between still-intact nation states (Beck & Willms, 2004: 181; Beck, 2002b). In other words, sociology has yet to leave behind the ‘methodological nationalism’ that, according to Beck, has been characteristic of the discipline hitherto (Beck & Willms, 2004: 13–14; Beck, 2005a: 22–24; Beck & Grande, 2010: 412).6 According to Beck, the task of sociology, from the scientific-observation perspective, is to attempt to rethink the concept of society and make it possible to understand the ways in which, in the second modernity, society breaks out of the territorial nation-state shell and becomes more transnational. He sees this endeavour being pursued within the framework of a new, critical social theory with a cosmopolitan perspective (Beck, 2005a: 22–34). However, a critical sociology of the second—reflexive—modernity must also do away with the ‘zombie’ or ‘container categories’ (cf. Chap. 5) that have dominated the majority of sociological thinking (Beck & Willms, 2004: 6  However, Beck himself points out that the idea that the theory of society has so far been purely and simply characterised by ‘methodological nationalism’ is not the whole truth (Beck et al., 2003: 30, note 6). For more on this, see Chap. 8, which looks at critiques of Beck.

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19; Beck, 2003: 133–34; 2005a: 23, 43–50; Beck & Sznaider, 2006a: 386). In Beck’s view, we have not yet freed ourselves from the entrenched ways of thinking that epitomises the first modernity. We still think of society as identical with the nation state, even though it has been de-­ territorialised (Beck, 2002a: 132). We still think of the family as identical with the nuclear family (mum, dad and 2 kids), despite the fact that it has been replaced by numerous different ways of living together (common law partnerships, serial monogamies, more single people, civil partnerships, etc.) (Beck & Willms, 2004: 21–22). We still imagine that economic growth will bring full employment, even though it has been proven that it is just as likely to lead to technologically conditioned unemployment (‘jobless growth’) (Beck, 1998b, 2000a, 2002a: 132). Hence, in the second modernity, sociology’s basic categories—nation state, family, paid work and so on—have been drained of content. Beck calls, therefore, for a break with the categories of the first modernity and for new theories and concepts better suited to understanding the social reality of the second modernity. A prerequisite for this, however, is that methodological nationalism is replaced by a new paradigm, which Beck terms ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’, a concept that will enable us to comprehend the ‘globalisation from within’ of the nation states, which Beck believes is characteristic of today’s—increasingly cosmopolitan— social conditions (Beck, 2002b: 17, 2011; Beck & Sznaider, 2006a, Beck & Grande, 2010). Thus, characteristic of the sociology of the first modernity, as Beck sees it, is that it conceives societal interdependence as additive, that is as an interaction between nation states that retain their internal structures. In other words, international relations are seen simply as the ‘sum’ of interactions between nation states. However, this view becomes obsolete as ‘territoriality’ loses its validity as the ‘organising principle’ of the social order (Beck, 2002a: 137). A cosmopolitan sociology of the second modernity is, as Beck puts it, all about seeing societal interdependence as substitutive, that is, as a form of interaction between nation states that does not leave them as before but radically transforms their internal structures and connects them to each other in new ways (Beck, 2006: 88–89, 73–74). For Beck, a new cosmopolitan social science must take into account the new ways in which societies are connected to each other—beyond the nation state—as a result of the second modernity’s increasing social and cultural interdependence (Beck, 2006: 33–44). It must also analyse the emergence of new forms of global inequality that are not closely linked to

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the nation state and class (Beck & Grande, 2004: chap. 6; Beck, 2008), for example, new flexible and plural forms of paid work, which reduce job security in the global labour market (Beck, 2000a); new plural and increasingly ‘transnational’ forms of family and living arrangements (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995, 2014); and new patterns of political participation, primarily in the form of a global sub-politics (Beck, 1996, 1997b, 1997d). One illustrative example of ‘methodological nationalism’—which, strangely, Beck himself does not mention—is found in the work of the American sociologist C.  Wright Mills. In his sociological neoclassic The Sociological Imagination (2000 [1959]), he notes that the nation-state structure is sociology’s basic unit of analysis: In choosing the national social structure as our generic working unit, we are adopting a suitable level of generality: one that enables us to avoid abandoning our problems and yet to include the structural forces obviously involved in many details and troubles of human conduct today. Moreover, the choice of national social structures enables us most readily to take up the major issues of public concern, for it is within and between the nation-states of the world that the effective means of power, and hence to a considerable extent of history-making, are now, for better or for worse, tightly organized. (Mills, 2000 [1959]: 135)

Mills is, of course, aware that sociologists do not always limit themselves to the study of national structures. Nevertheless, he maintains that: ‘… the nation-state is the frame within which they most often feel the need to formulate the problems of smaller and of larger units’ (Mills, 2000 [1959]: 135). He is also aware that nation states interact with each other, but nonetheless emphasises that: ‘… that is true of any sizable unit we might choose for social study. Moreover, especially since World War One, every nation-state capable of it has become increasingly self-sufficient’ (Mills, 2000 [1959]: 136). Thus, according to Mills, even if nation states interact with each other, they interact with each other as nation states, that is, they do not change fundamentally as a result of the interaction. Another striking example of ‘methodological nationalism’ is found in the work of the British sociologist Thomas H.  Marshall (1893–1981), whose short but important book Citizenship and Social Class (1992 [1950]) analyses the emergence of modern citizenship. According to Marshall, social citizenship consists of three basic types of rights developed in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that is, civil,

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political and social rights (Marshall, 1992 [1950]: 8–17). However, an underlying premise of Marshall’s understanding of citizenship is that it is linked to the nation state. Therefore, only citizens of the nation state, that is, nationals, have the said rights. As Marshall himself puts it: ‘the citizenship whose history I wish to trace is, by definition, national’ (Marshall, 1992 [1950]: 9). However, this nation state premise is increasingly unsustainable in the globalised and cosmopolitanised societies of today, where closer EU integration allows EU citizens to work and obtain benefits (child benefit, student grants, unemployment benefits, etc.) in member states other than their country of origin (Beck & Grande, 2007: 42–44). In other words, social rights are no longer exclusively bound to the nation state. For that reason, it is now necessary to transcend the understanding of nation-state citizenship and think instead of ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ (Delanty, 2009: 111–31). One of the characteristics of cosmopolitan citizenship is precisely the fact that rights are not obtained by virtue of nationality, but by virtue of residence (Delanty, 2009: 122, 124–26), for example, the previously mentioned welfare benefits conferred by EU citizenship, which are detached from their territorial (nation state) binding and apply across national borders. When analysing cosmopolitanism, it is important, Beck says, to distinguish between an observer perspective and a participant perspective. Whereas the observer perspective relates to scientific reflection on real cosmopolitanisation, the participant perspective relates to the individuals’ reflection on and awareness of real cosmopolitanisation (Beck, 2006: 1–2; Beck & Grande, 2007: 17–18). When Beck talks about methodological nationalism and cosmopolitanism in philosophy and the social sciences, we are thus at the level of the observer; and when he talks about the national and cosmopolitan vision, we are at the level of the participant (cf. Table 7.1). Table 7.1  The relationship between methodological nationalism and cosmopolitanism, the national and the cosmopolitan vision respectively

Observer−/structure perspective Participant−/actor perspective

First modernity

Second modernity

Methodological nationalism The national vision

Methodological cosmopolitanism The cosmopolitan vision

Source: The table is by the author, but inspired by Beck (2005a: xv–xvi, 5–6, 22–24; 2006: 18–27, 32–33)

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Beck underlines that there is no logical (necessary) relationship between the two perspectives or levels, only a historical one. In the first—national— modernity, cosmopolitanism existed largely only as an idea (observer perspective), but not as a reality (participant perspective). In the second modernity, on the other hand, cosmopolitanism is increasingly a reality (participant perspective) (cf. the concept of real cosmopolitanisation). However, the latter is not reflected to the same degree by the social sciences, which in terms of thinking and ideas remain trapped in methodological nationalism (observer perspective) (Beck, 2006: 19). Beck also underlines that real cosmopolitanisation does not necessarily do away with national (and local) forms of identification and understanding; on the contrary, it can go hand in hand with or even reinforce them. In Chap. 5, we saw how, according to Beck, the ‘counter-modern’ should not be understood merely as relics of the pre-modern not (yet) eliminated by the modern but as products of modernity, hence his term ‘the modern counter-modern’. In the same way, in Beck’s view, cosmopolitanisation does not eradicate the national (and the local) but can in some cases be seen as a reaction to it, thus generating an ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’—for example, in the form of growing nationalism, right-wing populism, xenophobia and so on—that is fuelled by the cosmopolitanisation itself (Beck, 2006: 18–19; Beck & Grande, 2007: 16, 107–08). These phenomena do not necessarily disprove cosmopolitanism and can, in fact, be an expression of it.7 In other words, cosmopolitanism and nationalism are not mutually exclusive, but interact in complex ways in reflexive modernity. A cosmopolitan social science must therefore try to understand how the cosmopolitan is, so to speak, ‘inherent’ in the national, so that the national is not simply national, but is itself influenced and characterised by cosmopolitanism (Beck & Grande, 2007: 16; Beck & Levy, 2013: 5–6, 9, 14).

Cosmopolitanism, Universalism and Multiculturalism As we have seen, Beck’s cosmopolitanism stresses humanity, tolerance and human rights (universalism) on the one hand, and the recognition of diversity (particularism/contextualism) on the other (Beck & Grande, 2007: 11–12). Is it possible to reconcile these two extremes? We saw 7  However, this leads to a paradox, that is, that regardless of whether trends can be empirically identified as forms of cosmopolitanisation, or vice versa (nationalism, religious fundamentalism, etc.), Beck sees them as confirming his cosmopolitan perspective.

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above, for example, how universal human rights can clash with national sovereignty, that is, the right to national self-determination. In What is Globalization? (2000), Beck points out that the strength of universalism is its inclusivity; its weakness that it excludes diversity. Conversely, the strength of contextualism is its recognition of cultural diversity; its weakness is its relativism (Beck, 2000b: 82). Both positions have strengths and weaknesses, which is why Beck emphasises that this, too, is not an ‘either­or’ but a ‘both-and’. Hence, he attempts to identify a middle position capable of ‘mediating’ between the two extremes. His proposed solution is the concept of ‘contextual universalism’, which does not simply write off universalism, but ‘contextualises’ and ‘de-universalises’ it, by pointing out that universalist norms never apply unconditionally but are always embedded in a specific historical and social context (Beck, 2000b: 83–84). A more specific example of this is when Beck and Grande point out that although European cosmopolitanism in principle professes a ‘colour-blind universalism’ that purports to abolish all differences—based on class, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, sexuality and so on—in a ‘cosmopolitan legal system’, it does not apply unconditionally, but is always bound to certain conditions (e.g. the convergence criteria for accession to the EU). Beck and Grande also emphasise that a cosmopolitan Europe is potentially universalist, as in principle it includes all countries (see Kant above). However, this is a very distant form of utopia, as a significant part of EU policy consists of defining the criteria for membership, that is, drawing borders (cf. Chap. 5) (Beck & Grande, 2007: 86–87). Thus, in Beck and Grande’s view, cosmopolitanism is a way of dealing with diversity that corresponds to the second modernity and is characterised by the fact that it simultaneously acknowledges the equality of the other(s) (universalism) and their diversity (particularism)—in other words, a ‘both-and’ principle. This contrasts with the first modernity’s nationalism and (strong) universalism, which in the name of equality and the collective tends to marginalise differences internally within the nation state but emphasise them externally in relation to other nation states (an ‘either­or’ principle) (Beck & Grande, 2007: 11–16, 259). Beck and Grande thus challenge strong universalism à la Kant (Beck, 2002b: 35; 2005a: 283–84; cf. Delanty, 2006: 27), but not every form of universalism. Rather, they note that cosmopolitanism itself presupposes a series of ‘universalistic basic norms’ or a ‘universalistic minimum’ (Beck & Grande, 2007: 258–59; Beck & Levy, 2013: 9–10).

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Similarly, Beck and Grande question strong universalism, challenging the idea that there is only one path to a cosmopolitan Europe, namely the first modernity’s Enlightenment project. In line with the concept of ‘multiple modernities’ (cf. Chap. 5), they emphasise that the process of modernisation and cosmopolitanisation can take many different forms depending on the given historical and societal context, for example, the integration of several post-communist, Eastern European countries into the EU (Beck & Grande, 2007: 116–17, 193, 225, 257–58; cf. Delanty, 2006: 27). Given that the acknowledgement of diversity plays a key role, it would seem obvious that Beck’s cosmopolitanism should also include multiculturalism. However, whereas acknowledging diversity can refer to both the collective and the individual, for Beck and Grande, multiculturalism refers first and foremost to collective categories of difference, in the form of homogeneous groups within the frameworks of the nation state. Multiculturalism is, therefore, at odds with both individualisation and transnationalisation. Cosmopolitanism, however, recognises both—and therefore opens our eyes to the idea that seemingly unambiguous ethnic boundaries and territorial ties are increasingly liquid at both national and transnational levels. In other words, the idea is that all people, at one and the same time, are recognised as both equal and different (Beck & Grande, 2007: 14; cf. Beck, 2006: 66–67; 2005a: 284–88). Beck and Grande are therefore critical of an additive understanding (cf. above) of multiculturalism, in which cultures are seen as delimited, more or less self-dependent entities that exist side by side without necessarily influencing each other. Rather, they advocate a substitutive understanding (cf. above) that makes it possible to observe how different cultures and cultural elements influence each other and are interwoven in cosmopolitan society (cf. e.g. diaspora cultures).

Metamorphosis, Emancipatory Catastrophism and Global Imagined Risk Communities Towards the end of his life—as part of the research project ‘Methodological Cosmopolitanism – In the Laboratory of Climate Change’ (cf. Chap. 1)— Beck developed his theory of the world risk society and cosmopolitanism into a theory of ‘the metamorphosis of the world’, which is characterised by ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ and the emergence of ‘imagined communities global risk communities’ (Beck, 2015, 2016a). Late Beck’s

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theory of ‘metamorphosis’ is an extension of the theory of the (world) risk society, but in some respects also moves ‘beyond’ its core ideas (Beck, 2015: 75, 78–79; 2016a: 4).8 On the one hand, the theory of metamorphosis (and ‘emancipatory catastrophism’) is inextricably linked with the theory of a world-risk society, cosmopolitanism and individualisation— and therefore also with reflexive modernisation and the second modernity (Beck, 2016a: 21, 40). On the other hand, as I will try to illustrate in the concluding part of this chapter, it also goes beyond the classic (world) risk society argument, as it represents a new view of the relationship between the (world) risk society’s goods and bads (Beck, 2015: 78; cf. Rasborg, 2018). The aim of the theory of ‘metamorphosis of the world’ is, as Beck says in one of his characteristically paradoxical formulations, to understand why we cannot understand the world of today, in which change occurs so rapidly that what was unthinkable yesterday is now possible (cf. the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, the financial crisis, Fukushima, 9/11, the fall of the Berlin Wall and so on) (Beck, 2016a: xi). The word ‘metamorphosis’ itself stems from the Greek meta (change) and morphe (form), that is, transformation (Verwandlung) or ‘transfiguration’ as opposed to ‘refiguration’ (Beck, 2016a: 6, footnote). Beck sees ‘metamorphosis’ as a more suitable concept than ‘social change’ to describe the radical nature—in terms of dynamics, speed, intensity—of changes to society, in which the first modernity’s ‘change in society’ has been replaced by the second modernity’s ‘metamorphosis of the world’ (Beck, 2016a: xi, 6 author’s italics). However, this raises a crucial question that Beck’s theory of metamorphosis must be able to address if it is to be plausible: How does ‘metamorphosis’ differ from other forms of conceptualisation of social transition, such as ‘social change’, ‘social evolution’, ‘social transformation’ and ‘revolution’? Beck’s answer is that unlike social evolution, which is an ongoing, steady change that—in his interpretation—has a purpose, metamorphosis is an open and unfinished process with no end goal. Unlike revolution, which is intentional and follows an ‘either-or’ logic in the form of a class antagonism, metamorphosis is unintentional and follows a ‘both-­ and’ logic (cf. Chap. 5) (Beck, 2015: 77). In contrast to social change and transformation, which in social theory is typically thought of as a 8  The concept and (a seed of) the idea of ‘metamorphosis’ show up at points in Beck’s original theory of the risk society (Beck 1992 [1986]: 14, 81), but only in his later work does it become a key concept or theory (cf. above).

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continuous and predictable process, metamorphosis is discontinuous and unpredictable (Beck, 2016a: xi). While social change, according to Beck, is characterised by the fact that everything changes except the principles of change itself, metamorphosis is characterised by the principles of change themselves being included in the dynamics of change, that is, they too are changed and destabilised (Beck, 2015: 78; 2016a: xi). Metamorphosis is therefore about a change in the dynamics of change in ‘the age of the unintended consequences’ (Beck, 2015: 78; 2016a: 20). In other words, like reflexive modernisation (cf. Chap. 5), metamorphosis is not conscious, intentional and desired, but takes place in a ‘reflex-like’ way. According to Beck, this reflects the fact that societal change in the (world) risk society/ reflexive modernity has the character of unintended consequences (global risks) (Beck, 2015: 78, 81; 2016a: 63,123). Regarding the supposed radicalism and unpredictability of metamorphosis, Beck argues that large parts of sociology—not least Durkheim, Parsons, Foucault, Bourdieu and Luhmann—fall short, as they focus excessively on systems, structures and social reproduction, rather than individuals, actors and social transformation (metamorphosis): ‘the major theories of a Foucault, a Bourdieu or a Luhmann, as well as rational choice theories, notwithstanding all their differences, have one thing in common: they focus on the reproduction, and not on the transformation, let alone the metamorphosis, of social and political systems’ (Beck, 2016a: 50; cf. 70). In line with his critique of sociology’s ‘theoretical collectivisms’ (cf. Chaps. 4 and 8), Beck is thus sceptical of the focus on social reproduction, which in his opinion prevents insight into the radicalism of the contemporary process of change, and instead advocates a change-­oriented sociology. In Beck’s view, ‘theorising metamorphosis’ therefore necessitates a ‘metamorphosis of theory’, that is, it requires a ‘scientific revolution’ (cf. Kuhn) that replaces ‘methodological nationalism’ with ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ (Beck, 2015: 78; 2016a: 20, 71). At the same time, however, Beck emphasises that not all change can be described as metamorphosis. Nonetheless, in relation to what he considers sociology’s excessive focus on social reproduction, or on social change within the framework of social reproduction (Beck, 2015: 77; 2016a: 19), Beck wants to explore the relationship between metamorphosis, change and social reproduction; the mutual weight of these factors, however, cannot be determined theoretically, but is, according to Beck, an empirical question. Beck’s intention is thus not simply to replace, but rather to complement existing theories of social change (Beck, 2016a: 19). Beck also

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emphasises that metamorphosis is not a universal process that has a uniform impact around the world. On the contrary, it is a complex, differentiated one that takes place at local, national, regional and global levels (see also Chap. 5) (Beck, 2016a: 20). In other words, it is an open concept that says nothing about whether change is negative or positive, but instead points out that the (world) risk society can lead both to catastrophes and to what Beck describes as ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ (Beck, 2016a: 20). Metamorphosis is therefore a descriptive concept not a normative one (Beck, 2015: 81; 2016a: 18). With the concept of ‘emancipatory catastrophism’, which is closely linked to the concept of metamorphosis, Beck aims to conceptualise the transformative potential of the world risk society, which is connected to ‘the hidden emancipatory side effects of global risk’ (Beck, 2015: 75). This brings us to probably the most significant theoretical reorientation in Beck’s late writing. Namely his emphasis that while the classical risk society argument is about ‘the negative side effects of goods’, emancipatory catastrophism is about ‘the positive side effects of bads’—which creates a normative horizon of ‘common goods’, for example, in terms of normative ideals regarding equality, justice and humanity (Beck, 2015: 75, 78–79; Beck, 2016a: 4, 116). As Beck himself puts it: Global risk is about the co-production and co-distribution of goods and bads. […] In this article I go an important step further. I argue that the talk about bads produces ‘common goods’. As such, the argument goes beyond what has been at the heart of the world risk society theory so far: it is not about the negative side effects of goods but the positive side effects of bads. They are producing normative horizons of common goods. (Beck, 2015: 78-79)

According to Beck, this leads to a cosmopolitan view that transcends the nation state (Beck, 2016a: 4). Global risks are therefore not only ‘cosmopolitanising’, but also ‘emancipatory’ (Beck, 2015: 79). Beck thus turns his concept of risk upside down, as it no longer only denotes something ‘undesirable’ (negative), but, oddly enough, also something ‘desirable’ (positive). Consequently, in contrast to an ‘apocalyptic’ or ‘technocratic catastrophism’, Beck’s ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ is, paradoxically, a ‘liberating’ one, based on three main elements: (1) the anticipation of a global catastrophe violates unwritten norms concerning human existence and

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civilisation, which (2) creates an ‘anthropological shock’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 14), that is, a ‘shaking’ of our basic notions of the world, or—in Giddens’ sense—a destabilisation of our ‘ontological security’, which in turn (3) enables a ‘social catharsis’, that is, a ‘mental reset’ that affords the possibility of the emergence of a new worldview, hence the ‘liberating’ element (Beck, 2015: 75, 79; 2016a: 117–18). One of the examples of this that Beck mentions is Hurricane Katrina, which devastated much of northern Cuba, Florida and New Orleans in 2005, leaving more than 1800 people dead in its wake. In Beck’s view this led to a ‘social catharsis’, as Katrina linked hitherto separate phenomena—climate catastrophe and social/racial inequality—thereby creating the basis for the emergence of a new normative horizon on global justice (Beck, 2015: 79–81; 2016a: 118–20). With this shift in focus from ‘the bads of goods’ to ‘the goods of bads’, Beck’s late work emphasises the transformative capacity of the world risk society, pointing to a ‘cosmopolitanising’ and even ‘emancipatory’ potential of global risks that might even herald a ‘rebirth of modernity’ (Beck, 2015: 79, 85; 2016a: 117). In his very latest works, Beck also focuses more on the role of the mass media in the discursive ‘staging’ of global risks. In his view, the media play a central role in how states, individuals, social movements, NGOs and so on act in relation to risks in the world society. This is happening within the framework of a global public sphere, which Beck and Grande say is not based on decisions, but rather on the (unintended) consequences of decisions. The public sphere thus becomes a ‘side-effect publicness’, in which the media’s reporting on these unintended consequences, in terms of global risks, plays a central role (Beck & Grande, 2007: 209–10; Beck & Levy, 2013: 12; Beck, 2016a: 130–34). In this way, the media plays a decisive role in the global public’s perception of risk. The perception of what constitutes the ‘current threat’ is largely dependent on what the media chooses to focus on (Beck & Grande, 2007: 209–10). The consequence of this is that, in the world risk society, politics is less locally embedded (the ‘topos’ of politics) and is instead shifting to global electronic mass media—that is, it is being ‘mediatised’. At the same time, the transnational advocacy movements, which provide the framing for latent threats disseminated by the mass media, become the key political actors (the ‘subject’ of politics) (Beck & Grande, 2007: 210). According to Beck, in the light of global risks, the media helps to create ‘cosmopolitan events’ that have a potentially explosive impact, are experienced globally and cause ‘strangers to become neighbours’ (e.g. terrorist

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attacks, nuclear accidents, climate disasters, etc.) (Beck, 2015: 81; 2016a: 123). This creates a basis for the emergence of what Beck terms ‘imagined global risk communities’, that is, cosmopolitan communities constituted around the perception of global risks (Beck & Levy, 2013: 17–19, 23; Beck, 2016a: 164–74). These can include both cosmopolitan institutions (e.g. the UN, EU, WTO) and civil society-based global NGOs (e.g. Greenpeace, Attac, Occupy Wall Street). However, the basis for these new ‘cosmopolitan communities’ is not altruistic solidarity or Christian charity but (utilitarian) self-interest, that is, the interest in survival (Beck & Levy, 2013: 16–17, 23; Beck, 2016a: 44, 170). Significantly, Beck formulates what he terms ‘the cosmopolitan imperative’—simply, ‘cooperate or fail!’ (Beck, 2012b: 104; 2016a: 171; 2016b: 261). Ultimately, it seems to be the interest in survival that makes us join forces with others in a collective attempt to address global risks: ‘the interest in everyone’s survival becomes the individual’s self-interest’, and vice versa (Beck, 2012b: 106; 2016a: 44, 170). Beck’s ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’ is thus not an ‘idealistic’, but rather a ‘realist’ and even, in a sense, a ‘forced’ solidarity, which stems from the inherent imperatives of the world risk society (Beck, 2012b: 104; Beck & Levy, 2013: 17, 23).

Summary In a number of ways, Beck’s theory of the world risk society, cosmopolitanism and metamorphosis, as seen above, represents a new theoretical orientation in relation to his original theory of the risk society. In his theory of the world risk society, Beck adjusts the concept of risk in order to distinguish between ‘unintended catastrophes’ (e.g. environmental risks, financial risks) and ‘intended catastrophes’ (e.g. terror risks), which enables him to incorporate the threat of international terrorism into the diagnosis of the risk society. This also makes it possible to thematise the fact that the awareness, or fear, of catastrophe can have consequences for society that are at least as far-reaching as the catastrophe itself, as they give rise to demands for security and a more thoroughly regulated society, which may pose a threat to the rule of law (e.g. anti-terrorism legislation) (Sunstein, 2005; Høilund, 2010). In this sense, Beck seems to some extent to approach the theories of ‘the culture of fear’ (Glassner, 1999; Furedi, 2006), albeit without relating explicitly to them at any point. With his theory of the world risk society as a cosmopolitan society, Beck also thematises how global risks not only pose worldwide threats, but also

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bind us together in the attempt to avert them—via, for example, new cosmopolitan communities (global environmental organisations, community groups, protest movements, etc.). Beck distinguishes between normative ‘cosmopolitanism’ and really existing ‘cosmopolitanisation’, which he also describes as a ‘globalisation from within’ of nation states, the internal structures of which are not left untouched by the process of globalisation but radically changed. As a result of cosmopolitanisation, society transcends its nation-state framework and is thrown into a global interdependence, that is, it is de-territorialised. As such, societies today do not relate to each other as autonomous, delimited entities, but are interwoven in complex new ways. Cosmopolitanisation also has an institutional impact, in the form of the growing importance of supranational forms of governance and regulation—not least, the EU. If we are to understand these significant processes of societal change, in Beck’s view it is necessary to bring about a sociological paradigm shift, from ‘methodological nationalism’ to ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’. Last but not least, Beck introduces the concept of ‘metamorphosis’ in an attempt to draw the contours of a new conceptuality that is better suited than sociology’s well-known concept of ‘social change’ to understand the radicalism, intensity and dynamics that characterise change in the society of today. With the accompanying concepts of ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ and ‘imagined global risk communities’, Beck further underlines that the theory of the world risk society is not a pessimistic doomsday prophecy, but a quite optimistic theory based on a belief in the possibility of changing society for the better. Having now presented and put into perspective Beck’s theories of (the world) risk society, reflexive modernity and cosmopolitanism, in the next—and final—chapter of the book I look at the critique of his work and make an overall assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of his contribution to contemporary sociology and social theory.

References Bauman, Z. (2000). Ethics of Individuals. In T. Krohn (Ed.), Individualisierung und soziologische Theorie. Leske + Budrich. Beck, U. (1989). On the Way to the Industrial Risk-Society? Outline of an Argument. Thesis Eleven, 23, 86–103. Beck, U. (1992 [1986]). The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage.

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Beck, U. (1996). World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society. Ecological Questions in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties. Theory, Culture and Society, 13(4), 1–32. Beck, U. (1997b). Weltrisikogesellschaft, Weltöffentlichkeit und globale Subpolitik. Picus Verlag. Beck, U. (1997d). Subpolitics. Ecology and the Disintegration of Institutional Power. In Organization and Environment 10(1), 52–65. Beck, U. (1998a). World Risk Society. Polity Press. Beck, U. (1998b). Capitalism Without Work, or the Coming of Civil Society. In U. Beck (Ed.), Democracy without Enemies. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2000a). The Brave New World of Work. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2000b). What Is Globalization? Polity Press. Beck, U. (2000c). The cosmopolitan perspective: Sociology of the second age of modernity. The British Journal of Sociology, 51(1), 79–105. Beck, U. (2002a). Interview ved Mads P. Sørensen. Slagmark, 34, 125–144. Beck, U. (2002b). The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies. Theory, Culture and Society, 19(1–2), 17–44. Beck, U. (2002c). The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited. Theory, Culture and Society, 19(4), 39–55. Beck, U. (2003). Make Law, Not War. Der Spiegel, 2, 56–58. Beck, U. (2005a). Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2005b). How Not to Become a Museum Piece. The British Journal of Sociology, 56(3), 335–343. Beck, U. (2006). Cosmopolitan Vision. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2008). Die Neuvermessung der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen. SoziologischeAufklärung im 21. Jahrhundert. Eröffnungsvortrag zum Soziologentag ’Unsichere Zeiten’ am 6. Oktober 2008 in Jena. Suhrkamp. Beck, U. (2009a). Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision. Constellations, 16(1), 1–22. Beck, U. (2009b). World Risk Society and Manufactured Uncertainties. Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate, 1(2), 291–299. Beck, U. (2009c). World at Risk. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2011). We Do Not Live in an Age of Cosmopolitanism But in an Age of Cosmopolitisation: The ‘global other’ Is in Our Midst. Irish Journal of Sociology, 19(1), 16–34. Beck, U. (2012a). Redefining the Sociological Project: The Cosmopolitan Challenge. Sociology, 46(1), 7–12. Beck, U. (2012b). Kosmopolitanisme som forestillede globale risikofællesskaber. Dansk Sociologi, 23(1), 97–114. Beck, U. (2013). German Europe. Polity Press.

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Beck, U. (2015). Emancipatory Catastrophism: What Does It Mean to Climate Change and Risk Society? Current Sociology, 63(1), 75–88. Beck, U. (2016a). The Metamorphosis of the World. Polity Press. Beck, U. (2016b). Varieties of Second Modernity and the Cosmopolitan Vision. Theory, Culture and Society, 33(7–8), 257–270. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (1995). The Normal Chaos of Love. Polity Press. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2014). Distant Love. Personal Life in the Global Age. Polity Press. Beck, U., Bonss, W., & Lau, C. (2001). Theorie reflexiver Modernisierung  – Fragestellungen, Hypothesen, Forschungsprogramme. In U. Beck & W. Bonss (Eds.), Die Modernisierung der Moderne. Suhrkamp. Beck, U., Bonss, W., & Lau, C. (2003). The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme. Theory, Culture and Society, 20(2), 1–33. Beck, U., & Grande, E. (2007). Cosmopolitan Europe. Polity Press. Beck, U., & Grande, E. (2010). Varieties of Second Modernity: The Cosmopolitan Turn in Social and Political Theory and Research. The British Journal of Sociology, 61(3), 409–443. Beck, U., & Lau, C. (2005). Second Modernity as a Research Agenda: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations in the ‘meta-change’ of Modern Society. The British Journal of Sociology, 56(4), 525–557. Beck, U., & Levy, D. (2013). Cosmopolitanized Nations: Re-imagining Collectivity in a World Risk Society. Theory, Culture and Society, 30(2), 3–31. Beck, U., & Sznaider, N. (2006a). Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda. The British Journal of Sociology, 57(1), 1–23. Beck, U., & Sznaider, N. (2006b). A Literature on Cosmopolitanism: An Overview. The British Journal of Sociology, 57(1), 153–164. Beck, U., & Willms, J. (2004). Conversations with Ulrich Beck. Polity Press. Billig, M. (1995). Banal Nationalism. Sage. Binnie, J., Holloway, J., Millington, S., & Young, C. (2009). Cosmopolitanism. In R.  Kitchin & N.  Thrift (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of Human Geography. Elsevier. Curran, D. (2016). Risk Society and Marxism: Beyond Simple Antagonism. Journal of Classical Sociology, 16(3), 280–296. Delanty, G. (2006). The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory. The British Journal of Sociology, 57(1), 25–47. Delanty, G. (2009). The Cosmopolitan Imagination. Renewal of Critical Social Theory. Cambridge University Press. Featherstone, M. (2002). Cosmopolis. An Introduction. Theory, Culture and Society, 19(1–2), 1–16. Furedi, F. (2006). Culture of Fear Revisited. Risk-taking and the Morality of Low Expectation (2nd ed.). Continuum.

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Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy. Polity Press. Glassner, B. (1999). The Culture of Fear. Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things. Basic Books. Habermas, J. (1984/87). The Theory of Communicative Action (Vol. 1 and 2). Polity Press. Hart, M., & Negri, A. (2001). Empire. Harvard University Press. Held, D. (2010). Cosmopolitanism. Ideals and Realities. Polity Press. Høilund, P. (2010). Frygtens ret. Hans Reitzels Forlag. Honneth, A. (2005 [1992]). The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Polity Press. Inglis, D. (2009). Cosmopolitan Sociology and the Classical Canon: Ferdinand Tönnies and the Emergence of Global Gesellschaft. The British Journal of Sociology, 60(4), 813–832. Kant, I. (2006 [1784]). Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective. In P. Kleingeld (Ed.), I. Kant Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. Yale University Press. Kant, I. (2006 [1795]). Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. In P.  Kleingeld (Ed.), I.  Kant Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. Yale University Press. Marshall, T. H. (1992 [1950]). Citizenship and Social Class. Pluto Press. Merton, R.  K. (1968 [1949]). Social Theory and Social Structure (The 1968 Enlarged Edition). The Free Press. Mills, C. W. (2000 [1959]). The Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press. Pichler, F. (2009). “Down-to-Earth” Cosmopolitanism. Subjective and Objective Measurements of Cosmopolitanism in Survey Research. Current Sociology, 57(5), 704–732. Rasborg, K. (2018). From ‘the bads of goods’ to ‘the goods of bads’ – The most recent developments in Ulrich Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology. Theory, Culture and Society, 35(7–8), 157–173. Sunstein, C. S. (2005). Laws of Fear. Beyond the Precautionary Principle. Cambridge University Press. Vertovec, S., & Cohen, R. (2002). Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism. In S.  Vertovec & R.  Cohen (Eds.), Conceiving Cosmopolitanism. Theory, Context, and Practice. Oxford University Press. Weber, M. (1970 [1921/22]). Class, Status, Party. In H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (Eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. .

CHAPTER 8

The (World) Risk Society in a Critical Light

So far, this book has presented and put into perspective the main ideas in Beck’s theory of the (world) risk society, reflexive modernity, cosmopolitanism and metamorphosis. This final chapter attempts to provide a more critical overview of his theory. It starts, however, with a few words about Beck’s view of science, knowledge of which is a prerequisite for any critical consideration of his social theory. For example, before criticising Beck for failing to live up to certain theoretical and methodological requirements and ideals, it is useful to know whether or not he actually endorses them.

Beck’s View of Sociology as a Science In Chap. 3, we have already looked at the science-theory aspects of Beck’s concept of risk (his ‘reflexive realism’), so I will not dwell further on this. Instead, I will focus on his views on (1) the relationship between science and value; (2) the requirement for representativeness; (3) the relationship between structure and actor; (4) the relationship between macro, meso and micro and (5) the role of criticism and ethics in the sociology of the second modernity. Science and Value In his dissertation, Objektivität und Normativität (Beck, 1974), which was mentioned in passing in Chap. 1, Beck discusses, based on modern © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 K. Rasborg, Ulrich Beck, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89201-2_8

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German and American sociology, the relationship between (value-free) science and value. While some sociologists think that it is possible for sociology/social science to be completely objective and neutral—that is, value-free (e.g. Weber, 2012 [1913])—others view this as impossible, because sociology/social science is always driven by certain values and knowledge interests (e.g. Habermas, 1987 [1968]). Beck would counter that the perceived dichotomy between (value-free) science and value is a false one, and only one single element in a broader sociological ‘normativity control’ that determines sociology’s relationship to practice (Beck, 1974: 38, 226–28). Each stage of the research process involves an element of ‘selection’ and choice, in the wording of research questions, hypotheses, definitions and operationalisation of key concepts, the answers given and so on (Beck, 1974: 228–30). These choices are not purely subjective but are determined by the context in which sociology develops and is applied—in other words, by its relation to practice. Although this ‘selectivism’ is unavoidable, according to Beck this does not necessarily mean that sociological research is ‘predetermined’ in a particular direction that either ‘preserves’ or ‘changes’ society. Rather, it depends on the context in which the research is applied, which can only be identified by a ‘methodical critique of the selection process’ (Beck, 1974: 226–28, 229–31).1 Beck also argues that this contradiction between (value-free) science and value is false, as it is an expression of a ‘normativity-technological monism’. Instead, he advocates a more complex sociological normativity, the outcome of which is not predetermined but depends on the social context— in other words, a ‘normativity-technological pluralism’ (Beck, 1974: 228–29). It therefore seems that Beck wants to replace the ‘either-or’ in the discussion about value freedom—either (value-free) science or value— with a ‘both-and’. Even at this early stage of his career, he approaches a way of thinking—‘either-or’ versus ‘both-and’—that we have encountered elsewhere in this book, and which would come to play a key role in his sociology.

1  By way of example, Beck mentions inter alia that ‘emancipatory sociology’ can promote both ‘social change’ and ‘the status quo’. Depending on the context, the change perspective may be thought of as a ‘threat’, which gives rise to attempts to preserve the status quo (Beck, 1974: 229).

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The Requirement of Representativeness In Risk Society (1992 [1986]), Beck breaks with a methodological ideal that has dominated much (quantitative) sociology, namely the requirement for representativeness. Rather than a rigid requirement that valid sociological knowledge must be representative in the statistical sense, Beck sought to adopt a more experimental ‘projective social theory’, which deliberately magnifies and extrapolates a range of trends. Phenomena that are just seeds today could tomorrow be in full bloom and exert a crucial influence on the structure of society as a whole. Beck is fully aware of the potential errors inherent in such an undertaking. As he puts it: ‘In times of structural transformation, representativity enters an alliance with the past and blocks our view of the peaks of the future that are intruding onto the horizon on all sides. To that extent, this book contains some empirically oriented, projective social theory—without any methodological safeguards’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 9). Especially during a phase of theoretical innovation, there may be a point in not rigidly enforcing the requirement for empirical evidence, as doing so may constrain the attempt to understand changing trends in contemporary society. In this regard, Beck echoes Horkheimer, who says: The constant warning against premature conclusions and foggy generalities implies, unless properly qualified, a possible taboo against all thinking. If every thought has to be held in abeyance until it has been completely corroborated, no basic approach seems possible and we would limit ourselves to the level of mere symptoms. (Horkheimer in Mills, 2000 [1959]: 122–23)

This does not imply that critical sociology is not obliged to consider the question of whether it is possible to substantiate theories and assertions empirically. On the contrary, Beck stresses that the sociology of the second modernity is a ‘new reality science of the transnational’, the aim of which is to develop empirical ‘test criteria’ in order to verify or falsify the trends identified by the analysis (Beck et  al., 2003: 3, 19–22). As covered in Chap. 5, this was precisely what the research project ‘Reflexive Modernization’ (1999–2009) sought to achieve.

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Structure and Actor As seen in previous chapters, Beck’s diagnosis of the times focuses heavily on the overall socio-structural process of change. This might tempt us to assume that he was primarily a structure-oriented sociologist, but his individualisation thesis, as seen in Chap. 4, points in a different direction. Formulated in terms of structures and actors, it appears to be synonymous with the thesis that actors are increasingly released from structures in late-­ modern society. However, in his original book on the risk society, Beck emphasises that this release is not synonymous with greater individual freedom, because people are reintegrated into a number of new control structures. In his later reformulation of the individualisation thesis as a ‘disembedding without reembedding’, Beck stresses that the existing ‘reembedding structures’—social position, class, family and so on—gradually wither and die in reflexive modernity. In other words, the structural aspect is toned down (cf. Chap. 4). As such, individualisation is not a phenomenon purely of consciousness—paradoxically, it is the actual structure of society that is individualised in reflexive modernity (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: xxii; cf. Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 14). In order to understand this, Beck posits the necessity of replacing sociology’s ‘theoretical collectivisms’ (as proposed by Durkheim, Parsons, Foucault, Luhmann and others), which have become a ‘system metaphysics’, with an actor- or subject-oriented sociology of the second modernity (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 12, 14; cf. Rasborg, 2017). Beck’s sociology is therefore generally characterised by a strong actor orientation that attributes primacy to the individual in relation to society (Beck et  al., 2003: 10; Beck & Beck-­ Gernsheim, 2002 [1994]: 12–16). Macro, Meso and Micro As the preceding chapters have made clear, Beck often conducts his analyses at macro-theoretical level—see, for example, his risk society diagnosis in general, his individualisation thesis and reflexive modernisation. Beck is therefore usually considered a macro-oriented sociologist (Elliott, 2002: 310–12; Mythen, 2007: 803, 807–08; Seippel, 1998: 435). On the other hand, he is, as we have seen, sceptical about ‘grand theory’, that is big ‘linear’ and ‘universalist’ social theories (à la Parsons, Luhmann and Habermas), as he wants to conduct a more empirical ‘science of reality’.

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As a result, some writers consider Beck’s late cosmopolitan sociology a ‘middle-range-theory’ (Blok, 2015). According to Merton (1968 [1949]: 39, 68–69), this approach is more empirical, and operates on the meso level, between macro and micro. Beck agrees—perhaps mainly programmatically—with this interpretation, but stresses that ‘we have to go with Merton beyond Merton’ (Beck, 2015b: 124).2 In other words, a larger theoretical framework, comprising a whole series of mutually interrelated concepts, is necessary in order to theorise about the conditions of current (cosmopolitan) society. Even though Beck is critical of big ‘linear’ and ‘universalist’ social theories, there can be little doubt that the majority of his writings are aimed at developing precisely this kind of larger theoretical framework by generating concepts that function at the macro-theoretical level of analysis—‘the meta-change of modernity’—with a relatively limited and more ‘ad hoc’ empirical foundation. Critique and Ethics According to Beck, and as seen in Chap. 3, more risk also leads to a critique of the risks of modernisation. Corresponding to the distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘reflexive’ modernisation, Beck distinguishes between ‘simple scientification’, in which science has a ‘preserving’ function in relation to the production of risk (cf. Chap. 3), and ‘reflexive scientification’, in which science is increasingly aware of its own role and employs self-critique, including of progress, experts and technology, in order to identify and process risks (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 160). Beck’s theory of the risk society can in itself be seen as part of such a critical ‘counter-science’. However, unlike Habermas, who considers it an explicit requirement that critical social theory should be able to account for its own normative foundations (Habermas, 1984/87; cf. Rasborg, 1988), Beck’s ‘concept of criticism’ is more ‘immanent’. It operates ‘between the lines’, without being systematically explained and made explicit. In other words, Beck rarely foregrounds his own critical standpoint—rather, he lets it become apparent in a more indirect manner. His critique is not something intended to be ‘applied to the object from the outside’, but rather should be understood as the object’s

2  The concept of ‘middle-range-theory’ is also used in the broad sense in the interpretation mentioned above (Blok, 2015: 111).

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own—self-transcending—self-criticism. This is what Beck means when he refers to the risk society as ‘a self-critical society’: In this sense, the risk society is potentially also a self-critical society. Reference points and presuppositions of critique are always being produced there in the form of risks and threats. The critique of risks is not a normative critique of values. Precisely where traditions and hence values have deteriorated, risks come into being. The basis for critique is less the traditions of the past than the threats of the future. What is needed to recognize toxic substances in the air, the water and food, is not so much established values as, rather, expensive measuring instruments and methodological and theoretical knowledge. (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 176)

Beck points out, in a way that clearly echoes his earlier discussion of the problem of value freedom in sociology (cf. above), that: ‘Determinations of risk thus oddly straddle the distinction between objective and value dimensions. They do not assert moral standards openly, but in the form of a quantitative, theoretical and causal implicit morality’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 176). In other words, statements about risks are in reality moral statements, because ‘reference points and objects of critique, the possibility of discovering and grounding (…) are themselves produced in the modernization process on a large and small scale’ (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 176). He therefore argues that the concept of risk functions like ‘a probe’ that makes it possible to study civilisation in its entirety, with a view to identifying potentially self-destructive effects (Beck, 1992 [1986]: 176). Consequently, Beck is also sceptical about attempts to establish positive ethics for the risk society, as even the best ethics encounter forces with which they cannot compete: ‘In this context ethics is like a putting bicycle bell on a 747. You can tinkle warnings all you want, and technology will continue roaring ahead on autopilot. The only conceivably effective route is to make the technological process, which is both a scientific and a political process, into a self-reflexive process’ (Beck & Willms, 2004: 204). However, his late thinking on ‘metamorphosis’ and ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ (cf. Chap. 7) paves the way for a new normativity, as he points out that ‘the positive side effects of bads’ create a normative horizon of ‘common goods’, in the form of, for example, global justice (Beck, 2015a: 78–79; 2016a: 4). Accordingly, Beck sees his cosmopolitan sociology as ‘a new variant of critical theory’, which does not itself set the normative horizon, but extrapolates it from empirical analyses of the ‘normative horizon of the self-critical world risk society’ (Beck, 2015a: 83).

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Critique of Beck Following the above outline of some key elements in Beck’s overall vision of sociology as a science, I will now address some criticisms of Beck’s theory. I will structure this around the central elements of his diagnosis of the times, as presented in the preceding chapters: (1) the general diagnosis of the risk society; (2) individualisation; (3) reflexive modernity; (4) family and how people live together; (5) paid work; (6) sub-politics and (7) cosmopolitanism. In order to avoid this section becoming too unwieldy and confusing, I only include what I consider the most relevant points raised by his critics. The General Diagnosis of the Risk Society As touched on in Chap. 3, one of the most obvious objections to Beck’s general diagnosis of the risk society is that it makes no sense to speak of a ‘risk society’, because, as Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) point out, all societies are confronted by what is, in principle, an infinite number of risks. However, no society can relate to all risks at the same time. Some form of risk selection is necessary, which means that society addresses some risks and ignores others. The interesting question from a sociological point of view, therefore, is how to identify the mechanisms that inform this selection process (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; cf. Rasborg, 2001). Similarly, the American sociologist Jeffrey C. Alexander has criticised Beck for failing to acknowledge the overall systems of cultural meaning that regulate modern society’s self-perception, and as such define its view of risk (Alexander & Smith, 1996). Luhmann, via his systems-theory perspective, emphasises that risk is primarily about modern society’s self-­ observation, and therefore what Beck calls a ‘risk society’ should instead be seen as a symptom of a new ‘crisis semantics’, that is a new form of self-observation (or) in post-war modern society (Luhmann, 1990, 1991; cf. Harste, 1999, Nielsen, 1996). In extension of Douglas and Wildavsky’s cultural-theory approach to risk, Beck has also been criticised for seeing the subjective perception of risks as a reflection of an objective increase in them (Alexander & Smith, 1996: 254; cf. Elliott, 2002: 300). However, this downplays the importance of cultural factors—norms, values, everyday life and practical consciousness—in the subjective experience of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Lash, 1994a: 111; Wynne, 1996; Tonboe, 1997; Halkier, 1999;

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Breck, 2001; Mythen, 2004: 105–06). By extension, Beck has also been criticised for not paying sufficient attention to the role of modern mass media in the subjective experience of risk (Boyne, 2003: Chap. 2; Ekberg, 2007: 351; Mythen, 2004: Chap. 4; Mythen, 2007: 801). Thus, sociological theories of ‘the culture of fear’ point out that the mass media’s heavy coverage of, for example, environmental disasters, food contamination, violence and crime can trigger a level of fear disproportionate to the actual threat. Whereas Beck in his original theory of the risk society says that the risks are excommunicated (cf. Chap. 3), that is, ‘under-­ communicated’, the theory of the fear society asserts that risks are often ‘over-communicated’, not least due to excessive media exposure (Bauman, 2006; Furedi, 2006; Glassner, 1999; Sunstein, 2005, Svendsen, 2008; Rasborg, 2003). Beck has sought to address these criticisms by redefining risk as ‘the anticipated catastrophe’, and though his thinking about ‘imagined global risk communities’ (cf. Chap. 7). However, this has given rise to criticism that is it unclear how his ‘new’ definition of risk relates to previous definitions of both risk and catastrophe (Curran 2013b, 2016a). We also find an implicit criticism of Beck in Giddens, who (as we saw in Chap. 3) questions whether it makes sense to claim that life today is riskier than it was in the past. Giddens cites factors such as lower child mortality, improved disease control, better sanitary conditions, improved living conditions, diet, hygiene, housing and so on in the highly developed industrial society, which have led to a marked increase in life expectancy in recent centuries (Giddens, 1991: 114–24; cf. Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983: 13–14). Thus, in Europe, life expectancy in the last two centuries increased from 34 to over 79 years: that is we can expect to live more than twice as long as our ancestors. However, there are still marked inequalities in life expectancy, as women live longer than men and the highly educated people live longer than the less well-educated people (cf. below).3 Developments in medical science, health, technology and general living conditions have made a significant contribution to eliminating or reducing a variety of risks that would previously have been life-threatening. In Giddens’ view, the ‘risk society’ is therefore not necessarily synonymous with a significant increase in ‘real riskiness’. Rather, it is that we, as a result of late modernity’s increased reflexivity, are more aware of risks (cf. Chap. 3). In his later writings, Beck—despite some ambiguities—moves 3  Cf. Max Roser, Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Hannah Ritchie 2019: Life Expectancy (Life Expectancy – Our World in Data); accessed 13/08/21.

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closer to this view, and points out that the decisive criterion for whether we live in a risk society is not necessarily that there is an objective increase in risk (realism), but that risks are an increasingly important part of the social agenda (constructivism) (Beck, 2009c: 11). Nevertheless, it is still open to debate whether this ‘discoursification of the risk society’ is a satisfactory solution to the problem of risk’s epistemological and ontological status (social constructivism versus realism). Indeed, Beck himself has repeatedly pointed out that the unintended consequences of industrial society represent a level of potential threat that is very real and historically unprecedented. In extension of Giddens’ argument about risk reduction, Beck can also be criticised for ‘counterfactual interpretation’, as he sees danger where there is, in fact, greater security. Paradoxically, therefore, it can be argued that it is precisely enhanced security that makes us more aware of risks. In a similar manner to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, attaining a certain level of security means that we demand even more of it, because it makes us more aware of the risks still faced. Beck fails to make this connection, and as such his position may be criticised for simply being ‘an extension of the anxious general everyday consciousness and its counterfactuality’ (Tonboe, 1997: 78). As seen in Chap. 3, Beck’s—and Giddens’—concepts of risk are based on a perception that industrial society’s calculable risks are increasingly being replaced by the highly developed risk society’s ‘manufactured uncertainty’ and ‘large-scale hazards’, which are incalculable and therefore we cannot insure against them. In theoretical terms, as we have seen, this has been criticised by Ewald and Dean in particular. They point out that risk is by definition about making the incalculable calculable—and thus manageable—and therefore it makes no sense to talk about risks that cannot be calculated or insured against. In the light of this understanding of risk, which is based on theories of power and control, Dean criticises Beck’s theory of the risk society for: (1) ‘totalising’ risk; (2) ‘homogenising’ risk and (3) ‘ontologising’ risk, while overlooking the power and control aspects (cf. Chap. 3). For Dean, it is instead a matter of analysing risk as associated with a number of specific governmentality rationalities and action technologies that seek to ‘normalise’ and reintegrate risk groups into society (long-term unemployed, marginalised, criminals, drug addicts, etc.) (Dean, 1999; Ejrnæs & Rasborg, 2019). Following on from Dean’s perspective, Beck has been criticised on the grounds that summing up the nature of society on the basis of a single

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category is tantamount to an over-generalisation of a single trend in the late-modern era, that is, risk (Curran, 2016b: 289; Rasborg, 2001, 2012). Beck’s focus on ‘systemic’ (involuntary) risks also overlooks the fact that risks are also something that we run ourselves (voluntarily). Our willingness to take risks depends on us constantly weighing the pros and cons of a given action (cf. Chap. 2). He also overlooks the fact that risk is not only negative (about avoiding harm), but also positive, as some level of risk-­ taking is a prerequisite for economic, technological and scientific progress (Ekberg, 2007: 362; Furedi, 2006: 26; Giddens, 1999: 22–26; Mythen, 2007: 801, 806). Beck’s later theory of ‘metamorphosis’ and ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ may be largely said to defuse this criticism, as his focus shifts from ‘the bads of goods’ to ‘the goods of bads’—in other words, the ‘positive’ aspects of risks are increasingly emphasised (cf. Chap. 7). Beck’s (and Giddens’) view that risks are increasingly uninsurable (international terrorism, floods, etc.) has also attracted criticism. A number of commentators point out that insurance companies hedge their exposure via ‘reinsurance’, and that the state often acts in the role of ‘guarantor’ for damages in connection with events such as climate catastrophes (Bougen, 2003; Ericson & Doyle, 2004, O’Malley, 2003; cf. Rasborg, 2020).4 As seen in Chap. 3, Beck thinks that the risk society is a ‘post-class society’ because global risks potentially affect everybody, regardless of social position. However, his assertion that risk is ‘democratic’, that is, classless and equal, is clearly problematic given that many risks are still unequally distributed depending on class or social position (Taylor-Gooby, 2004, 2008, Bonoli, 2007, Pintelon et  al., 2013, Curran, 2016a). It is well documented that a number of risks follow familiar patterns of inequality. For example, health risks are unevenly distributed depending on social conditions (upbringing, social position and the consequences of illness) (Diderichsen et al., 2011: 7, 26–28; Eikemo et al., 2016; Ersbøll et al., 2020). Economically disadvantaged (low-skilled) social groups generally  One example of this from Denmark is the Storm Council, an independent government agency that pays damages to homeowners hit by torrential rain, floods and so on. The Council is financed by a levy on all insurance policies that include fire insurance and has paid out hundreds of millions of kroner in damages connected with torrential rain (Ask, Urd, Bodil and other storms). However, if the costs become too high, as was the case after Storm Bodil in December 2013, the state steps in and acts as guarantor (lender) (cf. To stormfloder har tømt stormflodspuljen – politiken.dk; accessed 13/08/21). 4

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have a higher risk than the well-off (highly educated) of contracting chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), heart disease, dementia, cancer and depression. Together, these conditions account for a large part of health inequality, which is reflected in shorter life expectancy (Diderichsen et al., 2011: 7). As seen above, life expectancy has generally been increasing, but that does not mean that it has risen equally among all social groups. Large inequalities in life expectancy exist not only by gender, but also by socioeconomic status, no matter how it is measured (education level, income or occupational group). If we take level of education as a measure, inequalities in life expectancy are generally larger among men than women. On average across the EU countries, 30-year-old men who have not completed an upper-secondary education can expect to live about eight years fewer than those with a tertiary education (a university degree or the equivalent). The difference among women is smaller, at about four years. This education gap in life expectancy is explained by higher mortality rates among the least educated at different ages, which is in turn due to the higher incidence of fatal diseases (cf. above).5 This striking—and constant—inequality in life expectancy does not therefore support Beck’s thesis of ‘democratic’—classless and equal—risks. Beck might respond that it is not social risks that are democratic, but primarily environmental ones.6 However, this is also problematic, as empirical studies show that environmental risks, such as air pollution, are also unevenly distributed, as they interact with (exacerbate) a number of diseases (e.g. COPD, asthma and cardiovascular disease) that the economically disadvantaged have a higher risk of contracting (Diderichsen et al., 2011: 85). Similarly, in an article in the respected British Journal of Sociology, the British sociologist Dean Curran argues that opportunities to protect yourself against or escape from threats such as floods, torrential rain and hurricanes—which climate scientists link to anthropogenic global warming—are dependent upon financial wherewithal, and as such are socially stratified. In other words, risks are not classless, but interact with class—indeed, they can mutually reinforce each other. Curran describes this relationship via the concept of ‘risk position’ (Curran, 2013a, 2016a,  Cf. OECD iLibrary | Home (oecd-ilibrary.org); accessed 13/08/21.  This counter-argument is not plucked out of thin air. Beck himself posited it in personal communication with the author of this book. 5 6

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2018: 36). In response, Beck largely reiterates his argument that although the risks in many cases are embedded in global inequality, the trend is nevertheless towards them becoming so widespread and global that they transcend class positions (cf. for example, global warming). He also emphasises that the world risk society, as seen in Chap. 7, is not a ‘catastrophe society’, but one characterised by increasing anticipation of potential catastrophes, which is a common condition in reflexive modern society (Beck, 2013: 69; cf. 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). In a concluding remark, Curran criticises Beck’s refinement of the concept of risk, describing it as unclear. He states that as long as Beck is unable to suggest a plausible alternative for how to explain the pattern of global inequality, the concept of class must be retained, because it remains the best explanation (Curran, 2013b).7 Hence, despite Beck’s lack of agreement with Curran, it must be said that there is a solid basis for claiming that ‘smog’ is not, as Beck claims, ‘democratic’, but ‘hierarchical’. The risk society is not, as Beck claims, a ‘post-class society’, but is still socially stratified according to the individual’s upbringing and current living conditions (social position, class). More generally, Beck’s overall approach has been criticised for ‘intelligent speculation’ (Seippel, 1998: 411). He often deploys an essayistic and linguistically acrobatic style and has a predilection for presenting theses and concepts at a more general level of analysis, without considering much in the way of empirical evidence (Alexander & Smith, 1996; Seippel, 1998; Grundmann, 1999; Mythen, 2004, 2007: 803). However, as mentioned several times in this book, Beck did put considerable effort into trying to develop a stronger empirical foundation for the theories of risk society and reflexive modernity (Beck et  al., 2003; cf. Sørensen & Christiansen, 2013: 135–37). Nevertheless, this work may still be categorised as fairly provisional, and following Beck’s death it remains to be seen whether it will ever be completed. 7  In his reply to Curran, as well as in later writings, Beck uses the concept ‘risk class’ to interpret Curran’s point of view (Beck, 2013: 63, 68; cf. 2015b: 78, 85; 2016a, 2016b: 84–86, 94–96). Nevertheless, Beck maintains that ‘the risk logic’ (which he describes as ‘RISK class’) is becoming increasingly prevalent in relation to ‘class logic’ (which he describes as ‘risk CLASS’) in contemporary society (Beck, 2013: 67–68; 2016a: 84–86, 94–96). He appears to consider the two logics to be contradictory, rather than as interdependent (Curran, 2018: 37). In other words, he seems to insist on thinking about the relationship between risk and class—and between individualisation and class—as ‘either-or’ rather than ‘both-and’, and as such does not adhere to his own general recommendation on this point (Rasborg, 2017).

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Individualisation As discussed in Chap. 4, Beck thinks that increasing individualisation, understood as liberation from the industrial society’s social structures and communities, is an inherent tendency in both the risk society and reflexive modernity. Individualisation is undoubtedly one of the most discussed theorems in Beck’s work and has given rise to analysis and discussion in countless articles, books and anthologies. One of the most frequently raised criticisms of Beck’s concept of individualisation is that it is not an unambiguous and well-defined concept, and as such it is difficult to operationalise in empirical studies (Birkelund, 2000; Brannen & Nilsen, 2005; Dawson, 2012; Friedrichs, 1998; Levinsen, 2006; Rasborg, 2017). However, this has not stopped sociologists from attempting to do so in empirical studies employing a range of variables. For example, a Danish social attitudes survey operationalised individualisation on the basis of 11 variables.8 It concluded that since correlations cannot be established over time, there do not seem to be any common points of reference from which to discuss increasing individualisation during the period covered by the survey (1981–2008) (Gundelach, 2011: 16). However, it also concludes that the process of individualisation may have been so well advanced prior to 1981 that it had reached a ‘saturation point’ by the time of the survey (Gundelach, 2011: 16–17). One methodological problem with studies of this type is that the variables do not necessarily capture the multifaceted meaning of Beck’s individualisation concept. For example, in many of the variables, the criterion for ‘individualisation’ seems to be ‘less collectively orientated’ (Gundelach, 2011: 16). However, as seen in Chap. 4, for Beck, individualisation does not necessarily mean withdrawing from the collective, but rather entering into it in a new and more ad hoc way, such that collectives become ‘reflexive communities of choice’. Beck’s individualisation concept has also been criticised because individualisation and class are not, as he claims, necessarily mutually exclusive. 8  In the study, ‘individualisation’ is perceived as synonymous with the diminishing role of social background factors (place of residence, family, sex, etc.) in people’s values. The 11 variables are: (1) whether both parents had happy childhoods; (2) the importance of doing socially useful work; (3) attending church; (4) pride in being a Dane; (5) satisfaction with life; (6) self-positioning on the left-right spectrum; (7) approval of cannabis; (8) institutional trust (defence, police and justice); (9) materialism versus post-materialism; (10) political activity and (11) general trust (Gundelach, 2011: 15; cf. Levinsen, 2002: 170). Other studies combine a measure of ‘attitude to equality versus inequality’ with one for ‘attitude to individual liberty versus community’.

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On the contrary, they can be said to interact in different ways in contemporary society (Atkinson, 2007, 2010; Furlong & Cartmel, 2007; Savage, 2000; Skeggs, 2004). More specifically, critics point out that, when it comes to meeting the requirements of ‘institutional individualisation’ (cf. Chap. 4), it may be assumed that people living in late-modern society have socially differentiated opportunities that are dependent on their resources, that is, social, economic and (especially) cultural capital (Rasborg, 2017). For example, studies have shown increasing individualisation and ‘academisation’ as important factors in the high dropout rate in vocational schools and colleges, as non-academic students find it difficult to meet the requirements for putting together and navigating their own course of study (Koudahl, 2005; Olsen, 2007). Other studies, adopting a more micro-sociological perspective, show that the degree of individualisation—operationalised on the basis of the respondents’ perceptions of whether changes in their lives are conditioned by ‘external’ or ‘internal’ factors—varies according to class. In other words, individualisation is more pronounced towards the top of the class pyramid and vice versa. In these studies, unlike in Beck, individualisation is perceived as a matter of consciousness that ‘masks’ an intact class structure (Nollmann & Strasser, 2007; cf. also Becker & Hadjar, 2015; Furlong & Cartmel, 2007; Rasborg, 2017). Reflexive Modernity In Chap. 5, we looked at Beck’s perception of the (world) risk society as expressing a new phase of modernity—a ‘second’ or ‘reflexive’ modernity—that entails modernity confronting itself and its consequences in a new way. One obvious objection to Beck’s concept of reflexive modernity and modernisation is that it seems tautological to speak of ‘reflexive modernity’, because modernity is by definition reflexive. It specifically refers to a challenge to tradition that means everything can be problematised and put up for discussion (Elling, 2008: 117–41; Seippel, 1998: 433). We find a more radical critique of the very notion of modernity— and therefore also the notion of reflexive modernity—in Latour, who, as seen in Chap. 5, questions whether we have ever been modern (Latour, 1993, 2003). The theory of ‘multiple modernities’ can also be taken as an (implicit) criticism of Beck’s theory of reflexive modernity for being too ‘ethno-’ or ‘Eurocentric’, since it implies that there is only one path to the new (reflexive) modernity: via the Enlightenment (Eisenstadt, 2000; Lee,

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2006; Wittrock, 2000). As we have seen, Beck took this criticism into account, arguing that there is not one path to reflexive modernity, but many, and as such the concept is not incompatible with multiple modernities (cf. Chap. 5). We might also, as Lash does, criticise Beck’s concept of reflexivity for primarily being a ‘structural reflexivity’, which does not adequately address reflexivity’s aesthetic dimensions (Lash, 1994a, 1994b, 2003). Family and How People Live Together As covered in Chap. 6, Beck (and Beck-Gernsheim) sees family and personal relationships as a condensed expression of the contradictions and conflicts inherent in the risk society/reflexive modernity. Their primary concern is dual-income families’ problems in balancing work and family life, especially the various conflicting demands on women, who still do most of the care work in the family but are expected to participate in paid labour on an equal footing with men. The emphasis is therefore on resourceful families in which both parents are well educated and working. For this reason, Beck (and Beck-Gernsheim) may reasonably be criticised for not sufficiently addressing different family types, and for not taking into account the differences between economically advantaged and disadvantaged family situations and opportunities (Dencik, 1996; Olsen, 2007). Nor do Beck (and Beck-Gernsheim) fully address the fact that family models in European countries are very different depending on the nature of the welfare state in the different nations (Taylor-Gooby, 2004, 2008, Bonoli, 2007, Boje & Ejrnæs, 2013). Finally, their reflections on ‘long distance love’ and ‘world families’ can be said to have weak empirical foundations. Paid Work In Chap. 6, we looked at Beck’s assertion that the risk society involves a ‘Brazilianisation’ of paid work, that is, a deregulation and de-­standardisation of the labour market, which leads to generalised uncertainty in the form of temporary and more precarious forms of employment. However, seen in a European context, one basic problem is that Beck tends to generalise from conditions in the German welfare state to the other European welfare states, without taking into account the differences between the various European welfare models.

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Based on the parameters Beck sets for ‘Brazilianisation’—an increase in temporary and more precarious employment conditions, growth in direct unemployment and rising part-time employment (cf. Chap. 6)—the change in paid work at European level can, in short, be described as follows. Regarding unemployment, due to the financial crisis in 2008, unemployment rose in the EU countries to 11.5% in 2013, after which it fell to 6.5% in 2019. In mid-2020, it increased to almost 8% due to the corona crisis, but subsequently fell again. In the same period (2005–2019), the employment rate, that is employment as percentage of the population aged 20–64, has remained relatively stable around approximately 70% with a slight decrease in the period 2008 to 2013, after which it increased to 73.1% in 2019, which is the highest employment rate ever recorded in the EU (E-27) since 2005. In the wake of the corona crisis the EU employment rate fell to 72.1% in the second quarter of 2020 but went up again to 72.4% in the third quarter of 2020. The figures, nevertheless, cover large differences between the countries. Many EU countries, such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany and Czechia, have reached or even exceeded the Europe 2020 strategic target of raising the employment rate to at least 75%. While other countries, such as Italy, Spain and Greece, lie at the other end of the scale with an employment rate below 70%.9 As for part-time employment, 43 million people aged 15 to 64 in the European Union worked part-time in 2017, which corresponds to one in five (19.4%) employees (EU-28). Part-time employment as a percentage of total employment has increased from 15.6% in 2002 to 19.4% in 2017, after which it has decreased slightly to 19.1% in 2019. The proportion of part-time employment is much higher among women (31.7%) than among men (8.8%). There are also significant differences between the countries. The highest share of part-time jobs is found in the Netherlands (49.8%), followed by Austria (27.9%), Germany (26.9%), Denmark (25.3%), the United Kingdom (24.9%), Belgium (24.5%) and Sweden (23.3%). At the opposite end of the scale, we find, among others, Bulgaria (2.2%), Hungary (4.3%) and Croatia (4.8%), Slovakia (5.8%), the Czech Republic (6.2%) and Poland (6.6%). 9  Cf. fc360f72-ff0d-ecc0-df77-2bd9c7549825 (europa.eu); Employment—annual statistics—Statistics Explained (europa.eu); 88648.pdf (europa.eu); accessed 15/08/2021.

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More than a quarter (26.4%) of part-time employees have not chosen this form of employment themselves. The highest shares of involuntary part-time work are found in Greece (70.2% of people employed part-­ time), Cyprus (67.4%), Italy (62.5%), Spain (61.1%), Bulgaria (58.7%), Romania (55.8%), Portugal (47.5%) and France (43.1%). In contrast, the lowest shares are found in Estonia (7.5%), Belgium (7.8%), the Netherlands (8.2%), Czechia (9.1%) and Malta (9.6%).10 Concerning job insecurity/precarious work, in Europe as a whole, temporary employees made up 14.1% of the total workforce aged 15–64 in 2018. Despite small fluctuations, the share has been relatively stable since 2007 (EU-28). The proportion of temporary employees is significantly higher among younger employees. Among 15–24-year-olds, the proportion is 43.3% compared to 12.1% among 25–54-year-olds and 6.6% for the 55–64-year-olds. There are slightly more women than men among the temporary employees, namely 14.7% against 13.6%. However, there are quite significant differences between the individual countries. The highest numbers of people in temporary jobs are in Spain (26.9%), Poland (24.3%) and Portugal (22.09%), while the number is lower in Denmark (11.1%) and the United Kingdom (5.4%). In general, ‘insecure work’ is more commonplace in southern European (Mediterranean) countries such as Spain than in Nordic welfare states such as Denmark, where the ‘flexicurity model’ also ensures a high degree of (numerical) flexibility and relatively generous benefits for anybody who loses their job (Ejrnæs & Rasborg, 2019: 199).11 All in all, in a European context, there are both pros and cons to Beck’s thesis of ‘Brazilianisation’ and ‘precariatisation’ of paid work. With regard to employment, apart from expected economic fluctuations, there is no indication that there has been a marked decline in the number of people integrated into the system of paid work at European level. In terms of part-time work and short-term employment, on the other hand, the empirical support for Beck’s thesis seems to be relatively strong, although there are significant differences between the countries depending on the extent to which the welfare systems protect people from the risks inherent in paid work. 10  Cf. How common—and how voluntary—is part-time employment?—Products Eurostat News—Eurostat (europa.eu); accessed 15/08/2021. 11  Cf. Temporary employment: 14.1% of employees—Products Eurostat News—Eurostat (europa.eu); accessed 15/08/2021.

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Sub-politics In Chap. 6, we saw how Beck’s concept of sub-politics suggests that, in the risk society, politics is becoming decentralised and devolved to local actors and the political consumer. As critics have pointed out, it is only within a relatively narrow conception of politics that sub-politics can be argued to represent something truly new (Loftager, 1999; Nielsen, 1999; Andersen & Tobiasen, 2001: 7–8). It is therefore notable that, in this context, Beck does not relate to theorists such as Michel Foucault, Mitchell Dean and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who challenge the idea that power is locatable and has a centre, and instead favour an understanding of power and politics as ‘ubiquitous’ (Dean, 1998, 1999, 2003; Foucault, 1979 [1976], 1991 [1978]; Laclau & Mouffe,1985). Nor does Beck relate to recent political-science theories on ‘hollowing out the state’ and ‘governance without government’, which also break with a narrow, ‘power-centric’ understanding of politics (Rhodes, 1997; cf. Loftager, 1999). One weakness of Beck’s concept of sub-politics is that it focuses exclusively on the decentralisation of power/politics. In doing so, it loses sight of the fact that the locus of power/politics today has not only shifted downward, to the ‘everyday decision-maker’ and the political consumer, but also outward, to a range of political actors and collaborative networks, and upward to a number of trans- and supranational political structures and institutions, for example, the EU, UN, NATO, WTO and so on. However, Beck’s (and Grande’s) later theories of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ largely address this oversight (cf. Chap. 7). A further problem with the concept of sub-politics is its particularism. In contrast to representative democracy’s universalism (the majority principle, combined with the protection of minorities), it entails a risk that sub-politics becomes a ‘mood democracy’, in which different actors do little more than pursue their own particular interests (Nielsen, 1999: 151–53). Beck himself is aware of this problem. For example, he expresses his concerns in his analysis of the Brent Spar conflict, noting that today it is Greenpeace, but: ‘Perhaps it would be the Moonies’ turn tomorrow, and then of a third private organization hoping in its way to make the rest of the world happy’ (Beck, 1996: 18). The day after tomorrow, we might add, it could be left-wing radicals, neo-nazis, right-wing nationalists, religious fundamentalists and so on. To a great extent, these problems seem to point towards an inadequate definition of the concept of politics in

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Beck. In other words, he does not provide a sufficiently clear definition of what it means to say that something—for example, consumption—is ‘political’ (Andersen & Tobiasen, 2001, Halkier, 1999). Cosmopolitanism As noted in Chaps. 3 and 7, the fact that risks, according to Beck, transcend class and borders and are ultimately global makes the risk society a ‘world risk society’. This in turn paves the way for the emergence of a cosmopolitan society. However, the idea of cosmopolitanism is not new. Rather, as seen in Chap. 7, it dates back to ancient Greece and Rome. The idea was revisited during the Enlightenment, especially by Kant. In classical and modern sociology we also find significant thematisations of cosmopolitanism, in particular by Tönnies, Simmel and Merton (cf. Chaps. 4 and 7). Beck asserts that sociology hitherto perceived society as identical to the nation state, which he terms ‘methodological nationalism’. The sociologist Brian S.  Turner problematises this notion. He points out that the subject field for classical sociology in the broad sense is ‘the social’, and as such its concept of society is far more wide-ranging than just the nation state (Turner 2006). If there is any empirical basis for Beck’s thoughts on cosmopolitanism, then we might expect to find ourselves increasingly becoming cosmopolitan citizens of the world, who not only orient ourselves towards the national and/or local, but also the global.12 However, the findings of a series of major representative surveys do not provide clear support for this. Rather, the Eurobarometer surveys show that most EU citizens primarily identify with their nationality, that is, they do not have a particularly strong European identity (European Commission, 2000; Gundelach, 2001; Eurobarometer 93 2020). This is supported to a great extent by the British sociologist Florian Pichler’s quantitative studies of cosmopolitan identity (sense of belonging to the local, national, European and global) 12  It should be borne in mind that Beck’s concept of cosmopolitanism—like his concept of individualisation—is sufficiently complex and ambiguous that it is very difficult to operationalise. Beck is, of course, aware that in all of the European countries there has been a marked increase in nationalism and right-wing populism. In his view, however, this does not refute his cosmopolitanism thesis, as nationalism and right-wing populism must be seen precisely as a reaction to increasing globalisation and cosmopolitanisation. Paradoxically, therefore, Beck asserts that both signs of cosmopolitanisation and indications to the contrary can be seen as confirming the cosmopolitanisation thesis.

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and cosmopolitan attitudes (preoccupation with other people’s conditions, attitudes towards immigration and tolerance of Muslims, Jews and Roma) (Pichler, 2009a, 2009b). According to Pichler’s studies, cosmopolitan attitudes are not especially widespread among Europeans. Many (about 88%) have reservations about immigration, while conversely very few (about 7%) support the unlimited right to immigration (Pichler, 2009a: 718). However, there are a number of differences between EU countries. Sweden, Spain and Portugal are among the most cosmopolitan, Poland, Slovakia and Lithuania among the least, while Denmark lies somewhere in between (Pichler, 2009a: 720). The studies confirm that for most people, nationality is the primary affiliation, and it is their views of the global and the local that differentiate cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans (Pichler, 2009a: 721). The figures also show that women, the young and the educated, as well as people from the higher social groups, are the most cosmopolitan. The biggest attitudinal differences, however, are found between manual and non-manual occupations (Pichler, 2009a: 722–25). Rather than a general cosmopolitanisation, the figures thus seem to indicate that the population of Europe, roughly speaking, is divided between highly educated ‘cosmopolitans’ on one side and low-skilled ‘nationalists’ on the other (cf. Gundelach, 2001: 70–71). In other words, cosmopolitanism appears mainly to find support among the young and educated, whereas the older and less educated parts of the European population seem to be more resistant (cf. Hobolt, 2016). The same pattern is confirmed by the most recent Eurobarometer 93 survey, which, among other things, maps European citizen’s attachment to the local, the national, Europe and EU. It should be noted, however, that a not insignificant ‘minority’ of Europeans identify positively with the supranational level (Europe/EU), which can be seen as a measure of ‘cosmopolitanism’ (Eurobarometer 93, 2020). In a European context, therefore, empirical evidence in support of Beck’s cosmopolitanism thesis appears to be rather limited. However, it is important to remember that the national and the local do not necessarily exclude the global and cosmopolitan. Moreover, Beck is not describing a fully realised state of society, but a trend, that is, a progressive cosmopolitanisation. In the long run, it can thus not be ruled out that more Europeans will orient themselves towards Europe, the EU and the world.

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Summary As the above discussion of the major criticisms of Beck’s theory of the world risk society and cosmopolitanism has also served as a (critical) overview of this book’s main themes, I will in this final summary attempt to ‘close the circle’ and return to our starting point. In Chap. 2, I began by looking at how Beck’s theory of risk and the (world) risk society position themselves in relation to different directions and traditions in risk research. In doing so, my purpose was to raise awareness of what was specific about Beck’s position compared to a series of other significant theories and concepts of risk. As seen in Chap. 2, throughout much of history, risk has been understood as ‘calculable chance’, that is, chance to which probability calculus can be applied in order to predict and therefore control the future. In the first half of the twentieth century, two prominent economists, Knight and Keynes, challenged this position. They were sceptical of the idea that probability theory could be used to predict and therefore control the future. Rather than ‘risk’ (calculable chance), they prefer therefore to speak of ‘uncertainty’ (incalculable chance). As I have hopefully shown in this book, it is precisely this idea of uncertainty that forms the basis for Beck’s (and Giddens’) notion that risks are becoming increasingly incalculable and therefore cannot be insured against.13 Conversely, Ewald and Dean point out that it makes no sense to talk about risks that cannot be calculated and are therefore not insurable, and in this way they can be said to maintain the prevailing understanding of risk as calculable chance. To the extent that generalised talk of an ‘x-society’ has any meaning, what Beck (and Giddens) thematises is not a calculable ‘risk society’, but the emergence of an ‘uncertainty society’ that is increasingly characterised by ‘incalculable chance’ (Rasborg, 2020). Based on Beck’s own understanding of risk, Uncertainty Society might therefore have been a more ­appropriate title for his international sociological bestseller.14 This is not 13  At several points in his later writings, Beck mentions the importance of Knight and Keynes for the understanding of uncertainty and non-knowledge in modern society. However, he does not develop this in more detail in relation to his own concept of risk (Beck, 2009c: 16–19; 2014: 84–85). 14  In an interview, Beck himself concedes—as mentioned in Chap. 2—that he had not conducted a comprehensive study of the history of risk when he wrote Risk Society. He also points out that he wanted to describe modern society’s incalculability, but that Danger Society would not have been a good title (Beck, 2002: 125–26). Nonetheless, taking into

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just terminological pedantry—rather, it suggests that Beck, as a result of the lack of clarity in his terminology, ‘underplays’ his own discovery of ‘uncertainty’ as the most central feature of the (reflexive) modern society. It is this discovery that brings him (and Giddens) in line with Knight and Keynes. As seen in the criticisms discussed above, Beck cannot be said to have delivered a ready-made social theory that provides answers to everything and is free from problems, gaps and internal contradictions—but what social theorist ever has? Beck’s aim was not to come up with an all-­inclusive ‘grand theory’, à la Parsons, Luhmann and Habermas, but to present a series of useful propositions that others can take up and build on. In his later years, Beck adopted Merton’s concept of ‘middle-range theory’, albeit stressing the need to also look beyond it. Nevertheless, adopting it can be seen as an expression of recognition by Beck that his theories of world risk society and cosmopolitanism (still) face major challenges when it comes to connecting macro-theoretical analyses to the meso- and micro-­ sociological levels, which would facilitate more precise testing of the various sub-elements of his theory (Elliott, 2002; Mythen, 2007; Rasborg, 2012; Seippel, 1998: 435). Beck, along with several other social scientists, engaged in a number of research projects that sought to strengthen the empirical foundation for the sociology of the second modernity, but there is still a long way to go before this work can be said to be complete. However, the criticisms of Beck do not alter the fact that, taken together, his theories of the world risk society and cosmopolitanism provide a lens through which to understand our age, which is characterised not only by global pandemics but also by a potentially far more threatening climate crisis that is the very epitome of ‘uncertainty’. He has enriched sociology with a number of new and refreshing perspectives on the kind of society in which we live and where it is heading. Beck’s innovative sociological thinking made a key contribution not only to the understanding of contemporary society’s nature, but also to a more fundamental theoretical discussion of the sociological concepts that are most suited to understanding our society (Woodman et  al., 2015). With the concept of the risk society, Beck has given us a new language or a special lens that enables us to better understand contemporary society’s complexity and its myriad human-made uncertainties. In addition, his concepts of reflexive account the history of risk, I believe that Uncertainty Society would have been the most apt title, even if it may not sound so eloquent either.

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modernity and modernisation have made it possible to overcome the barren and rigid dichotomy between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’. Finally, with his recent ideas about ‘metamorphosis’, ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ and ‘cosmopolitan risk communities’, Beck introduced what is perhaps his most significant change of theoretical direction, stating once and for all that the theory of world risk society is not a pessimistic doomsday prophecy, but a hopeful theory that constantly seeks opportunities for changes for the better (cf. Chap. 7). As I have tried to show in this book, a number of prominent sociologists—in particular, Giddens, Lash, Bauman, Sennett and Dean—have been inspired by Beck’s thinking, and have, both constructively and critically, expanded upon his ideas. For many other sociologists around the world, Beck’s theory has acted as a catalyst for countless discussions in sociological books and journals about some of the discipline’s most central areas. Ultimately, the greatest testimony of the value of a sociological theory is that other sociologists relate to it, either constructively or critically.15 With his sudden and unexpected death on 1 January 2015, Beck is, of course, unable to further refine his theory and answer the many challenging sociological questions that it raises. We must now try to find the answers ourselves. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that his theories of the (world) risk society, reflexive modernity, cosmopolitanism and metamorphosis—which I have attempted to cover comprehensively in this book—will echo through sociological circles for many years to come. We will take these productive and fruitful propositions as starting points in our attempts to provide answers to contemporary society’s most burning problems, contradictions, challenges and opportunities—and in our aspirations for a better and more sustainable future.

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15  Some sociologists have even argued that it is precisely the criticisms of Beck that have driven the development of sociological theory (Curran, 2018). However, this seems to overlook Beck’s independent contributions to the development of sociological theory, which I have sought to summarise above.

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Index1

A Adorno, Theodor W., 7, 61n1, 93, 93n3 Alexander, Jeffrey C., 37n4, 183, 188 B Basic income, 116, 127, 131, 140 Bauman, Zygmunt, 7–9, 58, 71, 77–79, 93, 94, 94n4, 100, 100n5, 101, 106, 122, 123, 129, 131, 132, 132n11, 184, 199 Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth, 2, 5, 9, 58, 63–69, 111, 112, 115–123, 116n3, 116n4, 120n6, 122n7, 123n8, 140, 163, 180, 191 Bernoulli, Daniel, 18 Bernstein, Peter L., 13–20, 16n1 Billig, Michael, 154

Biography elective, 63 do-it-yourself, 63 reflexive, 63 Both-and/either-or-society, 38, 96, 156, 166, 168, 178, 188n7 Bourdieu, Pierre, 7, 80, 169 Brent Spar, 135, 137, 194 controversy, 137 Brexit, 155n2, 158n4 C Calculability, 16, 20, 91 Capitalism, 7, 16, 60, 61, 113, 124, 127, 129 flexible, 129 Catastrophism apocalyptic, 170 emancipatory, 167–173, 182, 186, 199 technocratic, 170

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 K. Rasborg, Ulrich Beck, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89201-2

223

224 

INDEX

Category container, 96, 112, 119, 122, 128, 135, 140, 141, 161 zombie, 96, 112, 119, 122, 128, 135, 140, 141, 161 Chernobyl, 27, 93, 94 Citizenship, 163, 164 Class, 7, 30, 31, 47n8, 57–80, 91, 96, 111, 114, 129–133, 136, 141, 147, 153, 163, 166, 168, 180, 186–190, 188n7, 195 Climate crisis, 2, 37, 198 Cohen, Robin, 146, 147 Constructivism, 38–41, 43, 45, 50, 105n7, 153, 185 Consumption, 64, 66, 67, 76, 132, 195 Container category, 96, 112, 119, 122, 128, 135, 140, 141, 161 Contextualism, 165, 166 Corona crisis, 2, 37, 192 Cosmopolitanization, 9, 62n2, 70, 70n6, 85, 94, 95, 121, 150, 153–155, 158, 158n4, 159, 164, 165, 165n7, 167, 173, 195n12, 196 Cosmopolitanism analytic-empirical, 153 institutional, 9, 153 methodological, 162, 169, 173 normative-philosophical, 153 Counter-modern, 92–95, 114, 122, 134, 165 Counter-power, 150–152 COVID-19, 2, 34, 168 Curran, Dean, 8, 58, 69, 184, 186–188, 188n7, 199n15 D Danger, 23, 31, 34–37, 39, 41, 43–45, 43n6, 47, 51, 96, 185

Dean, Mitchell, 8, 22, 23, 37n4, 46–52, 58, 80, 185, 187, 194, 197, 199 Decisions, 15, 35, 37, 39, 44, 47, 50, 65, 133, 134, 138, 171 Delanty, Gerard, 145, 147, 164, 166, 167 De-traditionalisation, 57, 64, 68, 70 Disembedding, 42, 63, 64, 64n3, 76–79, 180 Disenchantment, 61, 63, 64, 70, 71 E Empire, 157–159, 157n3 Enlightenment, 29, 86–88, 93, 93n3, 146, 153, 167, 190, 195 Europe, 27, 34, 88, 89, 101, 126, 128, 154–160, 157n3, 158n4, 166, 167, 184, 192, 193, 196 Europeanisation, 102, 154–156 European Union (EU), 9, 113n2, 147, 149, 153–158, 155n2, 158n4, 160, 160n5, 164, 166, 167, 172, 173, 187, 192, 194–196 Ewald, François, 22–23, 44n6, 46–49, 185, 197 F Family negotiating, 140 nuclear, 112, 115, 116, 141, 162 world, 120–122, 120n6, 140, 191 Featherstone, Mike, 145 Flexicurity, 193 Foucault, Michel, 22, 23, 47, 49, 61n1, 80, 169, 180, 194 Fundamentalism, 92, 165n7

 INDEX 

G Gemeinschaft, 59, 60, 91 Game theory, 18, 20 Gender, 2, 5, 21, 63, 71, 76, 88, 89, 94–96, 112, 113, 116n4, 118, 121, 122, 135, 136, 166, 187 roles, 63, 71, 89, 112, 113, 118, 122 Gesellschaft, 59, 60, 91 Giddens, Anthony, 5, 7–9, 14, 15, 22, 41–43, 43n5, 44n6, 46, 48–52, 64, 64n3, 71, 74n8, 75–79, 90, 98–101, 106, 122, 122n7, 123, 138–140, 139n13, 145, 171, 184–186, 197–199 Globalization, 2, 9, 29, 75, 85, 88, 89, 94–96, 102, 119, 121, 140, 146, 147, 149–152, 154, 156, 161, 162, 173, 195n12 Global warming, 27, 35, 42, 43, 98, 103, 187, 188 Gorz, André, 124 Governmentality, 20, 20n3, 22, 46–49, 185 Grande, Edgar, 32, 94, 145, 149, 150, 152–167, 157n3, 158n4, 171, 194 H Habermas, Jürgen, 6, 59–61, 73n7, 74, 86, 91, 92, 101, 125, 145, 153, 178, 180, 181, 198 Hacking, Ian, 15, 16, 19 Hardt, Michael, 158 Held, David, 145 Honneth, Axel, 62, 65, 145 Horkheimer, Max, 61n1, 93, 93n3, 179 Human rights, 75, 146, 147, 149, 152, 165, 166 Hybridisation, 41, 103, 104, 106, 121

225

I Identity, 48, 63, 72, 73, 77, 78, 124, 128, 154, 195 Incalculability, 37, 41, 197n14 Individualization ambivalent, 61n1, 62, 72, 74, 79 condemned to, 64, 65 institutional, 65, 65n4, 74, 79, 190 negative, 61, 61n1, 72, 79 positive, 60, 61n1, 72, 79 Individualism altruistic, 66, 73, 79 institutionalized, 65n4, 75 new, 75 Individuation, 58, 65, 73 Industrial society, 1, 6, 22, 28–32, 36, 38, 42, 46, 47n8, 50, 59–64, 67, 70, 71, 85–88, 91–93, 100, 105, 112–114, 116, 117, 124, 125, 133, 135–138, 141, 148, 160, 184, 185, 189 Inequality, 2, 31, 32, 63, 67, 68, 71, 88, 92, 96, 111, 113, 114, 116, 123, 131, 138, 140, 152, 155, 162, 171, 184, 186–188, 189n8 Insecurity, 35, 112, 125, 128, 129, 148, 193 Insurance, 1, 17, 23, 37, 42, 43, 46–51, 186, 186n4 Integration political, 155, 158 projective, 66 K Kant, Immanuel, 73n7, 86, 146, 149, 152, 153, 166, 195 Keynes, John M., 19, 20, 197, 197n13, 198 Knight, Frank H., 18–20, 197, 197n13, 198

226 

INDEX

L Labour market, 60, 63, 65, 71, 94, 95, 112, 116–118, 124–127, 129–131, 140, 163, 191 Laclau, Ernesto, 194 Large-scale hazards, 34–37, 41–43, 46, 50, 185 Lash, Scott, 5, 71, 79, 86, 90, 91, 98–100, 105n7, 106, 184, 191, 199 Latour, Bruno, 9, 41–43, 103–106, 104n6, 105n7, 105n8, 190 Life politics, 2, 138, 139, 139n13 Love long-distance, 120–123, 140, 191 Luhmann, Niklas, 7, 8, 22, 43–47, 43–44n6, 45n7, 49–52, 61n1, 68, 80, 92, 122, 137, 141, 169, 180, 183, 198 Lyotard, Jean-François, 29, 86, 86n2, 87, 99 M Marriage, 112, 113, 113–114n2, 115, 118–120, 122, 123, 123n8 Marshall, Thomas H., 163, 164 Marx, Karl, 7, 31, 32, 48n9, 59, 60, 68, 91, 92, 153 Media, 27, 50, 51, 57, 71, 72, 133, 136, 137, 152, 171, 184 Merton, Robert K., 146, 181, 195, 198 Metamorphosis, 8, 9, 59, 167–173, 177, 182, 186, 199 Mills, C. Wright, 69, 86n2, 96, 163, 179 Modernity a, 9, 101–106 first, 66, 88, 89, 94–96, 101, 112, 113, 117, 124, 128, 155, 156, 160–162, 166–168

late, 37, 41–43, 50, 65, 71, 72, 76, 98–101, 104, 117, 122, 184 liquid, 77, 78, 98–101 reflexive, 2, 5, 8, 9, 59, 62–80, 85–106, 111, 116, 124, 132, 137, 140, 141, 158, 159, 165, 169, 173, 177, 180, 183, 188–191, 199 second, 66, 68, 74n8, 87, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 104–106, 112, 113, 124, 128, 150, 152, 155, 156, 158, 160–162, 165, 166, 168, 177, 179, 180, 190, 198 simple, 59–62, 87–89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 135, 141 Mouffe, Chantal, 194 Multiculturalism, 121, 165–167 Multiple modernities, 9, 101–106, 167, 190, 191 Murdock, George Peter, 112 N Nationalism, 165, 165n7, 166, 195n12 methodological, 154, 161–165, 161n6, 169, 173, 195 Nation state, 29, 66, 68, 68n5, 88, 89, 96, 102, 126, 149–151, 154–156, 158–164, 166, 167, 170, 173, 195 Negri, Antonio, 158 Negt, Oskar, 125 O Observation, 39, 40, 43–46, 50, 51, 79 Offe, Claus, 125

 INDEX 

P Paid work, 9, 66, 96, 106, 111–141, 162, 163, 183, 191–193 Parsons, Talcott, 61n1, 65, 65n4, 68, 92, 112, 169, 180 Pichler, Florian, 145–147, 195, 196 Pisano, Leonardo (Fibonacci), 16 Politics, see Sub-politics Pollution, 28, 30, 136, 187 Populism, 165, 195n12 Post-industrialism, 87 Poverty, 30, 32, 38, 67, 86, 152 Precarious work, 124–132, 130n10, 193 Probability, 13–20, 23, 24, 46, 47, 197 Q Quasi-thing, 103, 104 R Rationalisation, 61, 70, 71, 92, 105, 124, 125 Rationality instrumental, 91 value, 91 Reembedding, 63, 64, 77–79, 180 Reflexive realism, 39, 40, 177 Reflexivity, 28, 41, 42, 50, 71, 74, 76, 90–92, 98–100, 100n5, 111, 140, 147, 184, 191 Religion, 64, 70, 71, 117, 119, 120, 134, 166 Risk communities, 148, 167–173, 184, 199 Rosa, Hartmut, 138 S Sartre, Jean-Paul, 64, 65 Schroer, Markus, 60–62, 60–61n1 Secularisation, 23, 59, 70

227

Security, 43, 44, 51, 62, 63, 78, 88, 113, 117, 120, 123, 125, 127–131, 136, 148, 160, 163, 172, 185 ontological, 171 Self-reflection, 51, 90, 91, 100, 100n5, 140 Sennett, Richard, 7, 9, 14, 129, 132, 199 Sexuality, 118, 122, 134, 135, 166 Simmel, Georg, 29, 59, 61, 61n1, 62, 62n2, 70, 70n6, 91, 146, 195 Slovic, Paul, 21, 23 Societalisation, 59, 66, 74 Solidarity mechanical, 60, 91 organic, 60, 91 Standing, Guy, 9, 129–132, 130n10 Starr, Chauncey, 20, 21 Sub-politics, 2, 7, 9, 32–34, 103, 106, 111–141, 150–152, 154–156, 158, 160n5, 161, 171, 194 active, 135, 136, 140, 141 passive, 134, 140, 141 T Terrorism, 28, 29, 46, 148, 149, 156, 172, 186 Threshold values, 33, 38–40 Tönnies, Ferdinand, 29, 59, 60, 91, 146, 195 Touraine, Alain, 86 Trust, 42, 51, 76, 129, 159, 189n8 Turner, Brian S., 195 U Uncertainty, 1, 14, 18–20, 23, 24, 27, 37, 42, 43, 51, 57, 93, 124, 130, 131, 136, 139, 191, 197, 197n13, 198 manufactured, 41–43, 43n5, 46, 50, 137, 185

228 

INDEX

V Value freedom, 178, 182 Vertovec, Steven, 146, 147

Welfare state, 2, 30, 49, 58, 62, 64, 65, 73, 75, 88, 89, 98, 117, 127, 139, 151, 191, 193 Wildavsky, Aaron, 22, 42, 183, 184 Willingness to take risks, 14, 18, 21, 24, 45, 129, 186 Willms, Johannes, 58, 59, 60n1, 64–69, 96, 161, 162, 182 Work citizen, 127 society, 89, 124, 126, 127, 132, 140 World risk society, 2, 8, 9, 40, 41, 85, 85n1, 111–141, 145–173, 177–199

W Weber, Max, 16, 29, 59, 61, 61n1, 64, 70, 91–93, 105, 124, 150, 157, 178

Z Zapf, Wolfgang, 6, 7 Ziehe, Thomas, 8, 58, 71–75, 74–75n8, 77–79, 98, 106

Underemployment, 63, 125, 129, 131, 140 Unemployment, 27, 30, 38, 42, 46, 113, 124–128, 130, 131, 134, 162, 164, 192 Universalism, 61, 92, 165–167, 194