Ubuntu and Western Monotheism: An Axiological Investigation 9780367693404, 9780367694210, 9781003141747

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Ubuntu and Western Monotheism

This book offers a unique comparative study of ubuntu, a dominant ethical theory in African philosophy, and western monotheism. It is the first book to bring ubuntu to bear on the axiology of theism debate in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. A large motivating force behind this book is to explore the extent to which there is intersubjective ethical agreement and disagreement between ubuntu and Western worldviews like monotheism and naturalism. First, the author assesses the various arguments for anti-theism and pro-theism on the assumption that ubuntu is true. Ubuntu’s communitarian focus might be so different from the Western tradition that it completely changes how we evaluate theism and atheism. Second, the author assesses the advantages and disadvantages of the truth of ubuntu for the world. Ubuntu and Western Monotheism will be of interest to scholars and advanced students specializing in philosophy of religion, African religion and philosophy, and ethics. Kirk Lougheed is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Faith and Human Flourishing at LCC International University. He is also a Research Associate at the University of Pretoria. He is author or editor of 4 books, and over 25 articles appearing in such places as Philosophia, Ratio, and Synthese.

Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion

God and Goodness A Natural Theological Perspective Mark Wynn Divinity and Maximal Greatness Daniel Hill Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God William Hasker Consciousness and the Existence of God A Theistic Argument J.P. Moreland The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings Michael J. Almeida Theism and Explanation Gregory W. Dawes Metaphysics and God Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump Edited by Kevin Timpe Divine Intervention Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles Evan Fales For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/Routledge-Studies-in-the-Philosophy-of-Religion/book-series/SE0427

Ubuntu and Western Monotheism An Axiological Investigation

Kirk Lougheed

First published 2022 by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2022 Kirk Lougheed The right of Kirk Lougheed to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this title has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-69340-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-69421-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-14174-7 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747 Typeset in Sabon LT Std by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

For Al, Chris, Dallas, Iggy, and James, I’m glad we met.

Contents

Acknowledgementsxvii Prefacexix Chapter Summariesxxi How to Read this Bookxxv A Note on Stylexxvi PART I

Setting the Stage 1 Introduction to the Comparative Project 1.1 Introduction 3 1.2 The Comparative Project 4 1.2.1 The Current Comparison: Western Monotheism and Atheism 4 1.2.2 Understanding the Current Comparison 5 1.2.3 Axiological Judgements Versus Rational Preference 6 1.2.4 Expanding the Contrast Class: The Axiology of Ubuntu 6 1.3 The Axiology of Theism: The Current Debate 6 1.4 Motivating the Project: Intersubjective Ethical Disagreement 8 1.5 What Is African Philosophy? 10 1.6 Conclusion 12 2 What Is Ubuntu? 2.1 Introduction 15 2.2 Preliminaries 16 2.2.1 Language 16

3

15

viii  Contents

2.3

2.4 2.5

2.6 2.7

2.2.2 Religious Versus Non-Religious Conceptions 16 Personhood Accounts of Ubuntu 17 2.3.1 Personhood as an Evaluative Term 18 2.3.2 Community as Intrinsically Valuable 21 2.3.3 Community as Instrumentally Valuable 22 2.3.4 Concluding Thoughts on Personhood Conceptions of Ubuntu 22 Cosmopolitan Accounts of Ubuntu 23 Relational Accounts of Ubuntu 24 2.5.1 Metz and Friendliness 24 2.5.2 Metz on Identity 25 2.5.3 Metz on Solidarity 25 2.5.4 Identity and Solidarity Together 26 2.5.5 The Capacity for Ubuntu 26 2.5.5 Friendliness and Impartiality/Partiality 27 2.5.6 Friendliness and Principles of Right Action 28 The Concept of Ubuntu Going Forward 28 Conclusion 29

PART II

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism 3 Ubuntu and Anti-Theism 3.1 Introduction 37 3.2 Meaning in Life 37 3.2.1 The Meaningful Life Argument 37 3.2.2 Evaluation of the Meaningful Life Argument from Ubuntu 39 3.3 Privacy 40 3.3.1 The Privacy Argument Narrow Personal for Anti-Theism 40 3.3.2 Evaluation of the Narrow Personal Privacy Argument on Ubuntu 41 3.3.3 The Privacy Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Theism 42 3.3.4 Evaluation of the Wide Personal Anti-Theism Privacy Argument for Anti-Theism on Ubuntu 43 3.3.5 The Value of Privacy 43

37

Contents ix 3.4

Dignity 44 3.4.1 The Dignity Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism 44 3.4.2 Evaluation of the Dignity Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism on Ubuntu 45 3.4.3 Ubuntu and the Wide Personal Dignity Argument for Anti-Theism 46 3.5 Sacrifice 46 3.5.1 The Genuine Sacrifice Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism 46 3.5.2 Evaluation of the Genuine Sacrifice Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism on Ubuntu 47 3.6 Understanding 48 3.6.1 The Understanding Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism 48 3.6.2 Evaluation of the Understanding Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism on Ubuntu 49 3.6.3 Ubuntu and the Understanding Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Theism 51 3.7 Why Atheist Worlds Are Necessarily the Best 51 3.7.1 The Superior Atheist Worlds Argument for Anti-Theism 51 3.7.2 Evaluation of the Superior Atheist Worlds Argument for Anti-Theism on Ubuntu 52 3.8 Intrinsic Versus Relational Goods 52 3.9 Conclusion 53 4 Ubuntu and Pro-Theism 4.1 Introduction 57 4.2 Infinite Intrinsic Value 57 4.2.1 The Infinite Value Argument for Narrow Impersonal Pro-Theism 57 4.2.2 Evaluation of the Infinite Value Argument for Narrow Impersonal Pro-Theism on Ubuntu 58 4.2.3 Intrinsic Value and Vitality 59 4.2.4 Intrinsic Value and the Capacity for Friendliness 60 4.2.5 Intrinsic Value and Personhood 60 4.2.6 The Infinite Value Argument for Wide Impersonal and Personal Pro-Theism 61

57

x  Contents

4.3

4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

4.8 4.9

4.2.7 Evaluation of the Infinite Value Argument for Wide Impersonal and Personal Pro-Theism on Ubuntu 61 No Gratuitous Evil 62 4.3.1 The Argument from No Gratuitous Evil for Pro-Theism 62 4.3.2 Evaluation of the Argument from No Gratuitous Evil for Pro-Theism on Ubuntu 63 Morally Good Agents 63 4.4.1 The Morally Good Agents Argument for Pro-Theism 63 4.4.2 Evaluation of the Morally Good Agents Argument for Pro-Theism on Ubuntu 64 Cosmic Justice 64 4.5.1 The Cosmic Justice Argument for Wide Personal Pro-Theism 65 4.5.2 Evaluation of the Cosmic Justice Argument for Wide Personal Pro-Theism on Ubuntu 65 Afterlife 65 4.6.1 The Afterlife Argument for Wide Personal Pro-Theism 65 4.6.2 Evaluation of the Afterlife Argument for Wide Personal Pro-Theism on Ubuntu 66 Relationship with God 67 4.7.1 The Relationship with God Argument for Pro-Theism 67 4.7.2 Evaluation of the Relationship with God Argument for Pro-Theism on Ubuntu 68 Intrinsic Versus Relational Goods 68 Conclusion 68

PART III

The Axiology of Ubuntu 5 The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 5.1 Introduction 73 5.2 Sacrificing Justice for Reconciliation 74 5.2.1 The Justice Argument for Anti-Ubuntu 74 5.2.2 Evaluation of the Justice Argument for Anti-Ubuntu 75 5.3 Sacrificing Individuality for Community 76

73

Contents xi

5.4

5.5

5.6

5.3.1 The Individuality Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Ubuntu 76 5.3.2 The Individuality Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Ubuntu 78 5.3.3 The Individuality Argument for Wide ‘All Persons’ Personal Anti-Ubuntu 80 5.3.4 Evaluation of the Individuality Arguments for Anti-Ubuntu 81 5.3.5 Why Think that Liberalism Is True? 81 5.3.6 Legitimate Individual Life Pursuits can’t (Truly) Conflict with the Community 81 5.3.7 Community as Instrumentally Valuable 82 5.3.8 Community and Individuality Have Equal Moral Standing 83 5.3.9 Friendliness Towards Oneself 84 Sacrificing Economic Prosperity 85 5.4.1 The Economic Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Ubuntu 85 5.4.2 The Economic Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Ubuntu 87 5.4.3 Evaluation of Economic Arguments for Anti-Ubuntu 87 5.4.4 Economics and Counterfactuals 87 5.4.5 Competing Accounts of Flourishing 88 Inappropriate Appeals to Authority and Tradition 88 5.5.1 The Authority Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Ubuntu 89 5.5.2 The Authority Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Ubuntu 90 5.5.3 Evaluation of the Authority Arguments 91 5.5.4 Moral Considerations Always Outweigh Epistemic Considerations 91 5.5.5 Ubuntu Does Allow Challenges to Authority and Tradition 92 Ubuntu Relies Too Much on Human Actions 93 5.6.1 The Reliance Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Ubuntu 93 5.6.2 Reliance on Humans and Disadvantages 95 5.6.3 The Reliance Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Ubuntu 96

xii  Contents

5.7 5.8 5.9

5.6.4 Evaluation of the Reliance Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism 97 Intrinsic Versus Relational Goods 97 Supernatural Ubuntu and Naturalistic Ubuntu  98 Conclusion 98

6 The Advantages of Ubuntu 101 6.1 Introduction 101 6.2 Reconciliation 101 6.2.1 The Reconciliation Argument for Pro-Ubuntu 102 6.2.2 Evaluation of the Reconciliation Argument for Pro-Ubuntu 103 6.3 Shared Identity 103 6.3.1 The Shared Identity Argument for Narrow Personal Pro-Ubuntu 104 6.3.2 Evaluation of the Shared Identity Argument for Narrow Personal Ubuntu 105 6.4 Solidarity 106 6.4.1 The Solidarity Argument for Narrow Personal Pro-Ubuntu 106 6.4.2 Evaluation of the Solidarity Argument for Narrow Personal Pro-Ubuntu 107 6.5 Friendliness 107 6.6 Consensus-Based Decision-Making 108 6.6.1 The Consensus-Based Decision-Making Argument for Pro-Ubuntu 108 6.6.2 Evaluation of the Consensus-Based DecisionMaking Argument for Pro-Ubuntu 110 6.7 Intrinsic Goods Versus Relational Goods 112 6.8 Conclusion 114 7 The Axiology of Theism and Differences Between Supernatural Ubuntu and Secular Ubuntu 7.1 Introduction 116 7.2 Supernatural Ubuntu and Western Monotheism 117 7.3 Traditional African Religion 118 7.3.1 God 118 7.3.2 The Spirit World 119 7.3.3 The Universe 120 7.3.4 Ancestors and the Afterlife 120 7.3.5 Morality 122

116

Contents xiii

7.4

7.5

7.6 7.7

Arguments for Pro-Theism and Supernatural Ubuntu 122 7.4.1 Cosmic Justice 122 7.4.2 Afterlife 123 7.4.3 Relationship with God 124 7.4.4 Sub-Conclusion: Pro-Theism and Supernatural Ubuntu 125 Arguments for Anti-Theism and Supernatural Ubuntu 125 7.5.1 Privacy 126 7.5.2 Dignity 126 7.5.3 Genuine Sacrifice 127 7.5.4 Understanding 128 7.5.5 Sub-Conclusion: Anti-Theism and Supernatural Ubuntu 130 Secular Ubuntu and Western Atheism 130 Conclusion 131

8 The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 8.1 Introduction 134 8.2 Arguments for Anti-Tradition African Religion 135 8.2.1 Witchcraft and Magic 135 8.2.2 Objections to the Witchcraft Argument for Anti-Traditional African Religion 137 8.2.3 The Scope of the Witchcraft Argument for Anti-Traditional African Religion 139 8.2.4 Life Force 139 8.2.5 Expanding the Scope of the Life Force Argument 142 8.2.6 Objections to the Life Force Argument 143 8.2.7 Fate 145 8.2.8 Expanding the Scope of the Argument from Fate 147 8.2.9 Sub-Conclusion for Anti-Traditional African Religion 148 8.3 Arguments for Pro-Traditional African Religion 149 8.3.1 Post-Mortem Family Relationships 149 8.3.2 Traditional Medicine 150 8.3.3 Rejecting the Traditional Medicine Argument 151 8.4 Conclusion 152

134

xiv  Contents 9 The Advantages of Traditional African Religion in Atheist Worlds 155 9.1 Introduction 155 9.2 Experience of Goods Versus Goods Obtaining 155 9.3 The Current Debate: Are Atheists Worlds Necessarily the Best? 156 9.3.1 Kahane’s Argument for Superior Atheist Worlds 157 9.3.2 Defence of Premise (3) 157 9.3.3 Problems with Kahane’s Argument 158 9.4 The Axiology of Theism, Traditional African Religion, and Kahane’s Argument for Superior Atheist Worlds 162 9.4.1 Cosmic Justice 162 9.4.2 Afterlife 163 9.5 The Unique Advantages of Traditional African Religion and Kahane’s Argument for Superior Atheist Worlds 163 9.5.1 Post-Mortem Family Relationships 163 9.5.2 Traditional Medicine 163 9.6 Conclusion 164 PART IV

Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism 10 Ubuntu and the Axiology of Ultimism 169 10.1 Introduction 169 10.2 What Is Ultimism? 169 10.2.1 Evolutionary Religion 169 10.2.2 Ultimism 171 10.2.3 Religious Inquiry and Taking Risks 172 10.3 Ubuntu and Anti-Ultimism 172 10.3.1 The Meaningful Life Argument 173 10.3.2 The Privacy Argument 173 10.3.3 The Dignity Argument 174 10.3.4 The Sacrifice Argument 174 10.3.5 The Complete Understanding Argument 175 10.3.6 Sub-conclusion: Ubuntu and Anti-Ultimism 176 10.4 Ubuntu and Pro-Ultimism 176 10.4.1 The Infinite Value Argument 177 10.4.2 The Argument from No Gratuitous Evil 177 10.4.3 The Morally Good Agents Argument 178

Contents xv 10.4.4 The Cosmic Justice Argument 178 10.4.5 The Afterlife Argument 179 10.4.6 The Relationship with God Argument 180 10.4.7 Sub-conclusion: Ubuntu and Pro-Ultimism 180 10.5 The Problem-Solving Argument for Pro-Ultimism 180 10.5.1 The Problem-Solving Argument for Pro-Ultimism 181 10.5.2 Evaluation of the Problem-Solving Argument for Pro-Ultimism 182 10.6 Conclusion 183 11 Ubuntu and the Axiology of Pantheism 11.1 Introduction 185 11.2 What Is Pantheism? 185 11.3 Pantheism and the Categories of Axiological Judgements 187 11.4 Ubuntu and Anti-Pantheism 189 11.4.1 The Meaningful Life Argument 189 11.4.2 The Privacy Argument 190 11.4.3 The Dignity Argument 190 11.4.4 The Sacrifice Argument 190 11.4.5 The Complete Understanding Argument 191 11.4.6 Sub-conclusion: Ubuntu and Anti-Pantheism 191 11.5 Ubuntu and Pro-Pantheism 191 11.5.1 The Infinite Value Argument 192 11.5.2 The Argument from No Gratuitous Evil 193 11.5.3 The Morally Good Agents Argument 194 11.5.4 The Cosmic Justice Argument 195 11.5.5 The Afterlife Argument 196 11.5.6 The Relationship with God Argument 196 11.5.7 Sub-conclusion: Ubuntu and Pro-Pantheism 197 11.6 The Inconsistent with Reality Argument for Anti-Pantheism 197 11.6.1 The Inconsistent with Reality Argument 197 11.6.2 Evaluation of the Inconsistent with Reality Argument 198 11.7 Conclusion 199

185

xvi  Contents 12 Conclusion: The Future of Global Axiological Investigations 201 12.1 Introduction 201 12.2 Main Conclusions 201 12.3 Summing It Up 202 12.4 Intersubjective Disagreement and the Future of Global Axiological Investigations 202 Index

205

Acknowledgements

This book was made possible by generous postdoctoral funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I’m grateful to the Canadian taxpayer. Philosophy requires paid research time, and this funding gave me the time to write this book. I would like to thank my editor at Routledge, Andrew Weckenmann. He was excited about this project from the first moment I pitched the idea to him. I’m thankful that he was open to a book plausibly construed as comparative philosophy, something not all editors are willing to take a chance on. Allie Simmons at Routledge has provided helpful logistical support along the way. The number of people who were able to comment on this manuscript was limited by Covid-19, as people’s time became consumed by other things. However, I would like to thank Guy Kahane and Klaas Kraay for numerous discussions on topics related to this book. Their work on the axiology of theism has influenced much of my thought. I would also like to thank Perry Hendricks who provided helpful comments on various parts of the manuscript. His feedback often arrives one or two days later and so he has proven to be an invaluable sounding board for me. Three anonymous referees wrote extensive reports on the proposal for this book. I’m especially grateful to the referees who pushed me to write a standalone chapter on ubuntu, making sure I did justice to the nuances of African philosophical thought. On a more personal note, I would like to thank all of my friends and family who have supported me during the Covid-19 pandemic. Living alone I have faced extreme isolation, especially during the first lockdown in Canada. The phone calls, text messages, and video chats helped me get through that time. My parents, Stephenson and Diane Lougheed remain constant sources of encouragement. I would particularly like to thank Tim, Samantha, and Theo Blank who formed a bubble with me once Covid-19 restrictions lifted in Canada. Being able to have real-life human interaction a few times a week helped me to feel a small sense of normalcy during a difficult situation.

xviii  Acknowledgements I originally approached Thaddeus Metz about postdoctoral supervision because of his influential work on the meaning of life, which has important connections to the axiology of theism. At some point along the way I started reading his work in African philosophy, particularly in ethics, and the idea for this book was born. It remains unclear to me whether this was an intentional bait and switch on his part. Either way, Thad has proven to be an incredibly supportive mentor and advisor. He has offered comments on most parts of the book, and they have proven invaluable. In particular, he has been an outstanding resource in African philosophy, an area in which he has a masterful command of the literature. Thad has also been an encourager as my position in the discipline was precarious at the beginning of this project. That I have a found a permanent job in philosophy is in no small part because of him. I dedicate this book to my Indigenous Canadian friends who all tragically suffered premature deaths, leaving their friends and family heartbroken. Al, Chris, Dallas, Iggy, and James taught me much about loyalty and friendship. In different ways each of them exemplified a spirit of ubuntu. I wish they had experienced a more just world.

Preface

The idea for this book was born during the process of putting together a fellowship application to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada in the summer and fall of 2019. The council chose to offer me funding, allowing me to take up a two-year position as a postdoctoral fellow under the supervision of Thad Metz in the department of philosophy at the University of Pretoria. However, with the Covid-19 pandemic beginning in the winter of 2020, things did not go as planned. I was unable to relocate to South Africa (from Canada) where I had planned to write the majority of the book. I thought (and still do) that it made good sense to write this book while situated in an African context at the University of Pretoria. But instead of abandoning the project because I couldn’t relocate, I decided to write the book while working remotely from Canada. I have done my level best to research thoroughly and to receive feedback on various sections of the book from philosophers I hold in high regard. However, I do not know the ways in which the book would have been different (and presumably improved) had I been able to write it while interacting with more philosophers familiar with the African philosophical tradition. It seems inevitable that I would have had such interactions while working at the University of Pretoria. I likewise do not know the ways in which the book would have been different (and presumably improved) had I been able to present parts of it at conferences, particularly in South Africa. Given the uncertainty surrounding Covid-19 and relocating, I thought it better to write the book now, than to wait and risk never writing it at all. As I will explain in Chapter One, this book is fundamentally a work in comparative philosophy. When I began drafting the fellowship application that would turn into the proposal for this book, I was only just beginning to learn about African philosophy. Again, I lament the fact that I was unable to continue learning about it while living in South Africa, especially given the critical mass of philosophers there now working on African philosophy. And again, I have done my level best in light of these circumstances to learn all that I can about African philosophy while being forced to work at a distance from the continent.

xx  Preface I don’t offer these remarks to excuse what may be errors in what follows. (Although I do hope that any admonitions will be slightly less harsh in light of the circumstances in which this book was written!) Instead, I write them to encourage the Western reader who is unfamiliar with African philosophy and might be doubting their ability to become familiar with it in a Western context. It is possible. Contemporary African philosophy is primarily conducted in English and only just began in the 1960s with the decline of colonization and the rise of literacy rates on the African continent. This makes the African philosophical canon (relatively) small and accessible. I encourage those who are curious about it to start reading up on it. Earlier in my philosophical career, I never thought I would philosophize about a non-Western tradition. I never thought I would philosophize about religious traditions that aren’t Western monotheistic. To say that doing these things has expanded my philosophical horizons is a great understatement. Indeed, learning about the African philosophical tradition has made my life fuller and richer. Kirk Lougheed Calgary, Alberta

Chapter Summaries

Part I: Setting the Stage Chapter One, “Introduction to the Comparative Project,” primarily introduces the reader to the motivation for the book. The current arguments in the axiology of theism literature have only been conducted within the Western analytic philosophy of religion. Some of the motivation for this book is to explore how those arguments are evaluated from an influential African ethical view known as ubuntu. Thus, a consequence of the book is that it is an investigation into the extent to which there is intersubjective agreement amongst people with very different worldviews about value judgements. I also outline the basic contours of the axiology of theism literature to date and conclude by explaining some of the debate over what constitutes ‘African’ philosophy. Chapter Two, “What is Ubuntu?” explains the concept of ubuntu that will be used to evaluate the current arguments in the axiology of theism literature. I begin by explaining personhood accounts of ubuntu which focus on developing one’s character through exercising other-regarding virtues. After briefly explaining cosmopolitan accounts of ubuntu, I turn to my preferred relational account of ubuntu as found in the work of Thaddeus Metz. According to Metz, an action is right if and only if it promotes solidarity with others in addition to helping to identify with others.

Part II: Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism Chapter Three, “Ubuntu and Anti-Theism,” begins the comparative axiological investigation by evaluating arguments for anti-theism on the assumption that ubuntu is true. Arguments for anti-theism that are examined include the Meaningful Life Argument, the Privacy Argument, the Dignity Argument, the Genuine Sacrifice Argument, the Understanding Argument, and the Superior Atheist Worlds Argument. I conclude that all of these arguments are more difficult to establish on the assumption that ubuntu is true, than in the Western context in which they were

xxii  Chapter Summaries originally offered. I hypothesize that this might be explained by the fact that the goods appealed to by anti-theists are typically intrinsic, while goods valued by ubuntu tend to be relational. Chapter Four, “Ubuntu and Pro-Theism,” takes much the same format as Chapter Three but instead explores arguments for pro-theism on the assumption that ubuntu is true. The arguments investigated include the Infinite Value Argument, the Argument from No Gratuitous Evil, the Morally Good Agents Argument, the Cosmic Justice Argument, the Afterlife Argument, and the Relationship with God Argument. I argue that many of these arguments fare better from the perspective of ubuntu than do the arguments for anti-theism. I suggest that this is because, at least in part, many of the goods associated with pro-theism are relational.

Part III: The Axiology of Ubuntu Chapter Five, “The Disadvantages of Ubuntu,” begins the axiological investigation into ubuntu itself. I suggest that neither considerations about sacrificing justice, nor about sacrificing individuality for communality can be leveraged to establish anti-ubuntu. However, I do argue there are some disadvantages of ubuntu with respect to economic prosperity, and also regarding inappropriate appeals to authority and tradition. I conclude that one of the most significant disadvantages of ubuntu is that it relies too much on (unreliable) humans in order for the benefits associated with it to be achieved. Chapter Six, “The Advantages of Ubuntu,” continues the axiological investigation of ubuntu itself by exploring the purportedly unique advantages associated with it. These advantages include ubuntu’s focus on reconciliation, shared identity, solidarity, and friendliness. I also explore the advantages of consensus-based decision-making. While I do identify a number of different ways that one might push back against some of these advantages, I conclude that they do offer some support for pro-ubuntu. Chapter Seven, “The Axiology of Theism and Differences Between Supernatural Ubuntu and Secular Ubuntu” explores axiological differences between supernatural and secular versions of ubuntu. In order to accomplish this, I begin the chapter by offering more details about Traditional African Religion. I then suggest that given the differences between Western monotheism and the monotheism of Traditional African Religion, many of the arguments for pro-theism already found in the literature do not apply seamlessly to religious versions of ubuntu. However, with the exception of the Genuine Sacrifice Argument, the arguments for anti-theism do indeed apply seamlessly to Traditional African Religion. I conclude that at least within the context of the current axiology of theism literature that there is reason to think that secular versions of ubuntu are axiologically superior to religious versions.

Chapter Summaries xxiii Chapter Eight, “The Axiology of Traditional African Religion,” examines axiological differences between secular and religious versions of ubuntu apart from the current axiology of theism literature. I thereby develop a number of arguments for anti-Traditional African Religion, including ones based on the existence of witchcraft and magic, life force, and on being assigned a (bad) fate. I conclude that these arguments are more promising than ones that can be developed for pro-Traditional African Religion. I thereby conclude that this is evidence to favour a secular understanding of ubuntu even outside of the context of the already established arguments in the axiology of theism literature. Chapter Nine, “The Advantages of Traditional African Religion in Atheist Worlds,” focusses on an argument offered by Guy Kahane which claims that atheist worlds are among the very best worlds. I argue that one problem with Kahane’s argument is that he only focusses on showing that the advantages typically associated with theism can obtain in atheist worlds but says nothing about whether the disadvantages of theism can be simultaneously avoided in those worlds. I tentatively conclude that Kahane’s argument fares better when the monotheism in question is Traditional African Religion because the type of cosmic justice, afterlife, post-mortem family relationships, and traditional medicine describe by Traditional African Religion can likely obtain via impersonal mechanisms and/or luck.

Part IV: Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism Chapter Ten, “Ubuntu and the Axiology of Ultimism,” seeks to expand the axiological investigation beyond monotheism by exploring the value of the ultimate. After explaining ultimism as described in the work of J.L. Schellenberg, I explore whether the current arguments for anti-theism and pro-theism can be applied to it, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. I first conclude that none of the anti-theistic arguments successfully apply to the ultimate with the possible exception of the Genuine Sacrifice Argument. I then suggest that there is some reason to think that the Cosmic Justice Argument, the Infinite Value Argument, and the Argument from No Gratuitous Evil appeal to the ultimate. One unique argument for pro-ultimism is based on the idea that if it is true, we will likely discover new and better ways to solve problems. However, all of the conclusions in this chapter must be held tentatively as there is much that we do not know about ultimism. Chapter Eleven, “Ubuntu and the Axiology of Pantheism,” continues expanding the investigation beyond monotheism by exploring the axiological status of pantheism. After defining the type of pantheism that I have in mind, I follow the same format as Chapter Nine in applying the various arguments already on offer to pantheism. I conclude that none of

xxiv  Chapter Summaries the arguments for anti-theism, at least in their current forms, can be used to successfully establish anti-pantheism on the assumption that ubuntu is true. On the other hand, I suggest that two arguments for pro-theism, the Morally Good Agents Argument and the Argument from no Gratuitous Evil likely apply to it. I conclude by exploring the merits of the unique argument for anti-pantheism based on the idea that if pantheism is true, then humans’ experience of the world is inaccurate. Chapter Twelve, “Conclusion: The Future of Global Axiological Investigations,” concludes the book by summarizing the main conclusions from each section. It notes that if there isn’t significant intersubjective agreement about value judgements, then the existential questions about which worldview is in fact true become far more important. It concludes with a call for Western philosophers to continue to expand their horizons beyond the Western philosophical tradition.

How to Read this Book

In order to understand this book as a unified whole, it is important to read Chapter One (especially 1, 1.2, 1.4). Readers unfamiliar with African philosophy in general, and ubuntu in particular, will need to read Chapter Two. However, those already familiar with these topics need only read 2.6 where I explain my preferred understanding of ubuntu. Chapters Three and Four will be of most interest to those already working on the axiology of theism literature or those interested in that topic. The reader interested in the axiology of theism will benefit from them even if they aren’t concerned with my larger comparative project. Chapters Five and Six are companion chapters that ought to be read together. They will be of most interest to those looking for ways to expand the current discourse in the axiology of theism and to those already familiar with African philosophy. Chapters Seven and Eight are companion chapters that will again be of interest to those wanting to expand the axiology of theism literature. In particular, they will be useful to those wishing to learn about a little-known monotheistic religion, Traditional African Religion. Part III, which contains Chapters Five through Nine will ultimately be of most interest to those readers wanting to see a comparative project in philosophy of religion in general, and one involving African ethics and religion in particular. Chapters Ten and Eleven seek to expand the conversation even further by exploring ultimism and pantheism. While I do make connections in them to other places in the book, they perhaps can serve as standalone chapters better than any of the others.

A Note on Style

The terms such as ‘ubuntu’, ‘ubuntu ethic’, ‘African communitarianism’, and ‘traditional African worldview’ are often used interchangeably throughout this book. However, this is not meant to imply that they are always used as synonyms for each other elsewhere. The numbering of premises begins and ends within each chapter for the sake of simplicity. I use three levels of headings. The first number of each heading refers to the chapter, the second number refers to the section, and where applicable the third number refers to the subsection.

Part I

Setting the Stage

1

Introduction to the Comparative Project

1.1 Introduction The primary goal of this book is to bring ideas from the analytic philosophy of religion and African philosophy into fruitful dialogue with one another. I will accomplish this with a unique comparative study between ubuntu (a dominant theory in African thought) and monotheism (a dominant view in contemporary philosophy of religion). Any project examining two distinct traditions is bound to be quite ambitious. The terrain in dealing with just one sub-tradition in something like Judeo-Christian conceptions of monotheism is still huge. I have thus chosen to narrow my study to a current subfield in the philosophy of religion known as the axiology of theism. Contemporary analytic philosophy of religion has been dominated by discussions of monotheism.1 The specific version of monotheism in question is usually Christianity, even if this is not explicitly acknowledged. Anyone with a tertiary knowledge of the discipline can easily see this to be the case. There have been a number of recent calls from prominent philosophers of religion wanting the discipline to expand its horizons to include non-monotheistic and non-Western traditions (e.g., Draper and Schellenberg 2018). Some of these calls note that over three-quarters of philosophers working in the field are white Christian men and so worry about the pernicious impact that cognitive biases might have on the field (Draper and Nichols 2013; Bourget and Chalmers 2014). Religion is closer to the heart than many other areas of inquiry in which a philosopher might be engaged, and the stakes are particularly high given that one’s eternal destiny is (allegedly) on the line. All of this should make one especially suspicious of inappropriate biases in the philosophy of religion. Other calls focus less on the potentially negative aspects of the narrow focus in the philosophy of religion and simply observe that there are additional philosophical insights to be gained from expanding the discipline to include other traditions. My own view is that a field having a narrow focus isn’t in itself (morally) bad. What is potentially harmful is if there is dogmatism against DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-1

4  Setting the Stage expanding the field (i.e., no principled reason for keeping it narrowly focused). I won’t argue for this conclusion; I’m simply going to assume that expanding the contemporary analytic philosophy of religion to include other traditions is a good idea because it is extremely likely that there are many philosophical insights to be gained from doing so. 2 Notice that this is an epistemic reason to expand, not a moral one. This shouldn’t be understood as a call to replace discussion of JudeoChristian monotheism, but rather as a push to add to the current list of traditions discussed in the philosophy of religion. Furthermore, the only way to discover new insights from other traditions is to undertake the exploratory work itself. This book is an attempt to expand the philosophy of religion by bringing it into conversation with African philosophy. The main way I will accomplish this is by a comparative study between the axiological statuses of ubuntu, Western monotheism, and atheism.3 I will also evaluate other views including Traditional African Religion, ultimism, and pantheism. This chapter is stage-setting for the rest of the book. The purpose of it is to outline the general framework and motivation for this specific comparative project. For it’s one idea to want to expand the philosophy of religion and another to know exactly how to carry out such a project. I’m thus going to offer more details about the nature of the comparative project I plan to pursue. In what follows I briefly introduce the reader to the current debate in the axiology of theism. I then examine the most pressing general objection to this project in the form of ethical disagreement. I argue that there is an important sense in which this objection should really be taken as the motivation to write a book like this one as opposed to a reason to disengage. I conclude by addressing questions about what constitutes African philosophy. In Chapter Two I will introduce the reader to the African communitarian worldview known as ubuntu. After that I will be in a position to begin the axiological comparison between ubuntu, monotheism, and atheism. And finally, I will then evaluate other views including African Traditional Religion, ultimism, and pantheism.

1.2  The Comparative Project In this section I explain the specific comparative study that I will undertake in this book. This means offering more details about the topics that I will compare with one another. 1.2.1  The Current Comparison: Western Monotheism and Atheism The axiology of theism generally addresses the following question: what value impact, if any, does (or would) God’s existence have on the world? The literature to date has almost exclusively focused on comparisons

Introduction to the Comparative Project  5 between Western monotheism (i.e., the Judeo-Christian tradition) and atheism (i.e., metaphysical naturalism). The comparison in question is typically understood to be between two possible worlds differing from each other only with respect to God’s existence. In the article credited with starting the axiology of theism literature, Guy Kahane explains the method of worldview comparison as follows: Which possibilities are we considering or comparing when we ask whether it would be good and better if God exists and bad, and worse, if He does not? We are not asking theists to conceive of God’s death – to imagine that God stopped existing. And given that theists believe that God created the universe, when we ask them to consider His inexistence we are not asking them to conceive an empty void […] I will understand the comparison to involve the actual world and the closest possible world where […] has the opposite truth value [with respect to God’s existence]. (Kahane 2011, 676)4 This is the axiological comparison that philosophers of religion have focused on thus far. 1.2.2  Understanding the Current Comparison Some worry that the axiological question cannot be sensibly asked because on a Lewis-Stalnaker semantics counterpossibles are trivially true (Lewis 1973; Stalnaker 1987). This is thought to be problematic because God is usually understood to be a necessary being, and hence one that exists in every possible world. Thus, any conditional where the antecedent is ‘If God exists’ is trivially true. But there are numerous problems with this worry (Lougheed 2020, 8–17). For example, this worry also represents a challenge for many other comparisons routinely made in the philosophy of religion. Kahane writes that “we see no problem about asking comparative evaluative questions about God’s existence and inexistence when we consider Pascal’s wager, or when we debate the problem of evil. We do so even though we are aware that, on some views, it might be impossible for God to exist – or not to exist” (Kahane 2011, 36). So, this is not a problem unique to the axiology of theism, though it is rarely raised in other contexts. Additionally, it’s worth noting that if one insists on maintaining a Lewis-Stalnaker semantics that the relevant comparison can be plausibly understood as one between epistemically possible worlds, not metaphysically epistemically possible worlds. Provided a theist isn’t epistemically certain that God exists, then ‘for all she knows’ it might turn out that God does not exist. Hence, it’s epistemically possible that God does not exist. 5 This is all that’s required for the

6  Setting the Stage debate to proceed Finally, I count it as a strike against a Lewis-Stalnaker semantics that it cannot make sense of such comparisons, instead of a reason for thinking that such comparisons themselves are unintelligible. 1.2.3  Axiological Judgements Versus Rational Preference When making the relevant axiological comparisons, the judgements are typically taken to be ‘objective’ (I will say more about objectivity toward the end of this chapter). However, it’s worth observing that such axiological judgements do not always match rational preferences. For instance, “some authors have cautioned that it can be rational, in certain cases, to prefer the worse to the better. If this is possible […] then the debate about rational preference is, after all, distinct from the axiological discussion” (Kraay 2018, 20). I will be attempting to answer questions about value in this book with axiological judgements, not rational preferences. For the sake of simplicity, I will treat axiological judgements and rational preferences as if they align perfectly with each other unless I explicitly state otherwise. I of course do not deny that these can indeed come apart. 1.2.4  Expanding the Contrast Class: The Axiology of Ubuntu In this book I seek to expand the current contrast class in the axiology of theism to include the African communitarian ethic of ubuntu. A common slogan of this view is, roughly, that ‘there can be no I without we.’ Ubuntu represents a comprehensive worldview, especially with respect to morality. I will explain what I mean by ubuntu in more detail in Chapter Two. For now, it’s sufficient to note that I will be comparing three different types of worldviews: ubuntu, Western monotheism, and atheism. Later when I discuss axiological differences between secular and religious conceptions of ubuntu, I will examine the axiological status of Traditional African Religion. There are two primary ways in which I will accomplish this comparative task. First, the axiology of theism has thus far asked whether it is (or would be) good, bad, or neutral if God exists. I am now asking the additional question of whether the current evaluations in the axiology of theism literature will hold on to the assumption that an ubuntu ethic is true. Second, I am also asking about the value impact, if any, the truth of ubuntu has (or would have) on the value of the world.

1.3  The Axiology of Theism: The Current Debate There are at least five general answers to the axiological question about God’s existence that have been identified thus far in the literature. Protheism is the view that God’s existence does (or would) have a positive

Introduction to the Comparative Project  7 value impact on the world. Anti-theism, on the other hand, is the view that God’s existence does (or would) have a negative value impact on the world. These are by far the two most common answers to the axiological question about the existence of God discussed by philosophers to date. Recently, Klaas J. Kraay has highlighted three other additional possible answers (Kraay 2018, 13–-14). Agnosticism is the view that the question is in principle answerable, but we currently don’t possess the answer. Kraay explains that “[t]he positive agnostic holds that, at present, there is insufficient evidence and arguments to justify any preference. And the withholding agnostic simply withholds judgement, even about the statement ‘agnosticism about which preferences concerning God’s (non)existence are reasonable is the most defensible position’” (Kraay 2018, 20). Neutralism is the view that says God’s existence makes no difference to the axiological status of the world.6 Either God’s existence has no value or maybe the advantages or disadvantages are of equal weight. Finally, quietism is the view that questions about the value of God’s existence or non-existence are unintelligible (Kraay 2018, 13). One reason for holding this view is due to worries about incomparability and incommensurability across possible worlds. While my focus will be on arguments for pro-theism and anti-theism, as I proceed, I will make note of these other answers when applicable. It is also possible to further subdivide these general answers in at least four additional ways. Indeed, these subdivisions have become very relevant to assessments of arguments for both pro-theism and anti-theism. Wide axiological judgements are about overall value impacts. Narrow axiological judgements are about value impacts in some particular respect. An axiological judgement is said to be personal if it concerns the specific value impact on persons. Lastly, impersonal axiological judgements are about value impacts without reference to persons.7 Kraay observes that these subdivisions generate 12 different variations of each 5 of the general answers mentioned above, thereby making 60 different answers to the axiological question about God’s existence (2018, 12). I don’t pretend that these are the only possible answers, but they should start to give the reader a sense of the extremely large terrain in the axiology of theism (and of course, as this moves beyond Judeo-Christian monotheism the terrain becomes even larger). Finally, notice that existential and axiological judgements can cut across one another. For example, an atheist who denies that God exists could be a pro-theist who thinks it would be good if God exists. Alternatively, a theist could be convinced that God exists but hold that the world is worse off because of this fact.8 Finally, I should note that I have intentionally not outlined specific arguments for anti-theism and pro-theism in this section. This is because in Chapters Three and Four I will outline such arguments in detail in order to evaluate them on the assumption that ubuntu is true.9

8  Setting the Stage

1.4 Motivating the Project: Intersubjective Ethical Disagreement An important question regarding the plausibility of axiological judgements asks from whose perspective should such judgements be made? For instance, a theistic ethical framework might be primed to favour advantages associated with theism and hence already primed in favour of pro-theism. The converse, of course, could be true of atheism and anti-theism. Furthermore, it’s not as if there is one general ethical framework for each of these views. For example, the ethical analyses in question may vary quite significantly, say, between divine command theorists and natural law theorists even though both are firmly grounded in the theistic tradition. Outside of theism, the ‘big three’ ethical theories in consequentialism, deontology, and virtue theory may also yield competing judgements. Likewise, it’s not as if each of these theories also doesn’t come in a number of different (and sometimes competing) variants. This isn’t even to mention other theories such as relativism, egoism, or debates at the metaethical level between moral realism and anti-realism. Do individuals have to be committed to the same ethical framework in order to understand and sensibly debate axiological judgements with each other? One view is that the axiology of theism can proceed without worrying about whether there is agreement between parties at the level of general ethical frameworks (Lougheed 2020a, 21–22). Here’s one simple reason for this: at the level of right action there is general agreement between ethical theories even if at the (metaethical) level of analysis the explanations differ widely. In the axiology of theism, most arguments tend to focus on the purported advantages and disadvantages of theism. Perhaps most ethical theories will agree on what constitutes an advantage or disadvantage even if their subsequent explanations as to why that is the case differ from one another. If this is right, then there is enough intersubjective agreement about these matters to make progress on axiological questions about God’s existence even if individuals endorse different ethical frameworks (Lougheed 2020a, 21–22). In becoming more familiar with ubuntu I have started to wonder whether the above strategy in affirming this level of intersubjective agreement is too quick. Specifically, some might worry that it will be much harder to find such agreement when comparing Western traditions to non-Western traditions. Some of the motivation for this project, then, is to explore the extent to which an ubuntu ethic will reject or accept various axiological judgements that have been made thus far in the literature. Thus, part of this book is really exploring whether ubuntu can be included in the above strategy of appealing to intersubjective agreement

Introduction to the Comparative Project  9 In discussing the implications of ethical disagreements between cultures, Allen Wood suggests that: [O]ne widely circulating opinion on the topic is that cross-cultural differences somehow demonstrate that there is no such thing as objective good at all – that each culture has its own conception of what is good, right, permitted, forbidden, and so on, and the differences are so wide that anyone at all familiar with this, can no longer take seriously the idea that there could be any ‘objective’ values underlying such varied systems. (Wood 2007, 37)10 Wood argues that because individuals typically affirm attitudes only inasmuch as they have good reasons for them that this is evidence in favour of moral objectivity. The existence of moral disagreement, therefore, doesn’t entail moral relativism. On the contrary, it should prompt individuals to question their current ethical beliefs because disagreement offers them a reason to think they might be mistaken. This supports the idea that there is such a thing as objective morality but also that we should recognize our fallibility about such judgements (Wood 2007, 38–39). Thaddeus Metz, however, observes that even if morality is objective it might not be universal in scope (i.e., apply across societies). He further worries that [i]t is possible that Africans denote one sort of property with ‘morality,’ namely, a certain kind of communal relationship […] and that Westerners pick out another property, probably respect for the dignity of an individual’s agency” (Metz 2007b, 371). Additionally: [I]n order for cross-cultural differences in moral beliefs to give one culture a reason to suspect that their views are mistaken, both cultures have to be co-referring with the term ‘morality’ (and similar terms). Moral facts must be not only mind-independent but also universal in scope, in order for moral difference to give us epistemic pause. (Metz 2007b, 371) Therefore, engaging in cross-cultural comparisons won’t just enable philosophers to discover whether there are good reasons in support of objective morality (e.g., widespread consensus), such comparisons will also bring to light whether morality is universal in scope (i.e., applies across cultures) (Metz 2007b, 372). In some sense, this specific problem about ethical disagreement is representative of the more general problem of objectivity. The problem of objectivity is perhaps the problem in philosophy. Are philosophers able to get at true descriptions of the world without being inappropriately tethered to their own situations? I don’t claim to have an answer to this question here. But as I explore the

10  Setting the Stage axiological implications of theism, atheism, and ubuntu, all from the assumption that ubuntu is true, many areas of both agreement and disagreement will naturally emerge. Thus, a larger consequence of this book is that it may point to answers regarding objectivity and universality in ethics. And this may well be accomplished through the narrow project I plan to pursue here. I trust the reader will keep this issue in the back of their mind as I proceed.

1.5  What Is African Philosophy? Somewhat related to the above section on the scope of intersubjective agreement and disagreement are a series of methodological questions about the nature of African philosophy. In his influential book, Philosophy and an African Culture, Kwasi Wiredu derides what he calls folk or traditional African philosophy as uncritical and far too reliant on tradition and authority (1980, Ch.1–Ch.4). He argues that it is unfair to compare this type of traditional worldview to Western philosophy which has been produced by professional philosophers for centuries. I’m sympathetic to Wiredu’s concern here and as I will explain in Chapter Two, I will primarily work from the contemporary literature on ubuntu (and African philosophy more generally) which has been produced in English by contemporary philosophers (indeed, much more has been produced since Wiredu wrote these concerns some 40 years ago). Yet there remains debate about what should constitute African philosophy. Wiredu notes that it makes little sense to speak of an ‘African physics’ or an ‘African engineering’ (1980, 26). Rather, a uniquely African approach to such disciplines is to take their universal knowledge and methods and apply them as solutions to specifically African problems (Wiredu 1980, 26). However, Wiredu contends that there is no universal philosophical knowledge as such. By this he means that there is little agreement over philosophical method (which in turn implies little agreement over results) (Wiredu 1980, 26). Wiredu suggests there are two main possible responses to the view that there is a lack of a common body of knowledge and methodology in philosophy. The first is the universalist line which says to learn philosophy (perhaps mostly from the Western canon though certainly not exclusively so) and then apply it to African problems. The other is the anti-universalists response which Wiredu calls the nationalist response (1980, 27). This approach appears to be one in which African philosophy is built from the ground up on its own without interacting with other more developed philosophical traditions. Indeed, “[i]t might […] be held that the attitude of the African universalist boils down simply to an unthinking willingness to submit himself to instruction in the philosophies of other cultures before attending to those of his own. Why may he not reverse the order?” (Wiredu 1980, 27).

Introduction to the Comparative Project  11 Wiredu argues against the nationalist approach because it means studying a pre-scientific tradition, which is passed down from elders, much of which amounts to sayings of wisdom without any reasons in their favour. However, he is careful to note that this isn’t a uniquely African problem. For every culture had pre-scientific philosophy in this sense, it’s just no longer studied in the West, for example (Wiredu 1980, 27–30). Though it’s fair to contest whether it follows from the fact of widespread disagreement that there is no common body of knowledge in philosophy, Wiredu’s more basic point is correct. Given the lack of consensus in philosophy, both conceptually and methodologically, it is much less straightforward to apply a ‘universal’ philosophy to African problems. However, as professional philosophy has expanded in Africa in the last 40 years many Africans have indeed been trained in (mostly) Western philosophy and are now successfully applying concepts and methods to African problems with great rigour. The universalist approach, even if it turns out to be misguided, has forwarded much philosophical discourse in Africa. Another question asks not only whether it makes sense to speak of African philosophy, but further asks about the requirements for something to be properly considered African in the first place. Has not ubuntu been introduced and perhaps even co-opted by the West that when a Western scholar like myself writes about it, I have no right to claim that I am writing about something African? Here I follow Thaddeus Metz when he writes that: The term ‘African’ has been employed in a variety of ways. Here is one, theoretically useful way to use the term, and those like it such as ‘western’: to refer to features that have been salient in a locale over a substantial amount of time. In general, I use geographical labels to pick out properties that have for a long while been recurrent in a place in a way they have tended not to be elsewhere. They denote long-standing characteristics in a region that differentiate it from many other regions.” (Metz forthcoming)11 Thus, a thing’s African-ness is something that comes in degrees. This understanding also does not entail that the thing in question can never be found in other places. Finally, while some may worry that labelling something as African is derogatory because in different times (particularly during the height of colonialism) it was used to denigrate, it doesn’t follow that is how the term is used today. Consider that “nowadays many people in Africa, and particularly those in the field of philosophy, are happy to label themselves ‘African’ and for public purposes. They do so without disparaging connotations, without expecting white people to avoid the word, and without invariably failing to be aware of differences among individuals and peoples” (Metz forthcoming).

12  Setting the Stage I don’t want to belabour these sorts of methodological concerns about whether ubuntu and related ideas are truly African. But I wish to be clear with the reader in saying that I am writing this book from what Wiredu would call the universalist perspective. However, I don’t believe that this somehow privileges Western thought. As Wiredu observes, philosophy can be universal, but this is not to say that much of it currently is universal (1980, 33). And I take myself to be writing on a topic in ubuntu that is appropriately understood as ‘African’ even if it isn’t exclusive to the African continent. While I no doubt approach the topic of this book through the lens of a Western philosopher it is my hope that what I say is true (i.e., universally true). Furthermore, I hope that at least some of this book will be of interest to those who are sceptical about my approach and methodology. For someone can still take the conception of ubuntu I use throughout this book on its own terms even if she is ultimately uncomfortable with labelling it ‘African.’

1.6 Conclusion Comparative projects are inherently difficult at least in part because of their large scope. It’s important for the reader to keep this in mind. I’m not comparing the Western tradition to the African tradition. Framing this type of project in such general terms is unhelpful in a number of ways. It implies that there is just one Western philosophical tradition or just one African philosophical tradition. Given the plurality of views in both traditions such sentiments couldn’t be further from the truth. It also implies that such a general comparative project is even possible. Yet it’s difficult to imagine how such a project could ever be accomplished. My main goal is therefore much more modest in that it is to bring one small subset of literature in contemporary Western philosophy of religion (i.e., the axiology of theism) into conversation with African ethics (i.e., ubuntu). While this might initially appear like a rather narrow focus, I believe the reader will become convinced that this topic is itself quite enormous. I am now ready to explain ubuntu in more detail before beginning the axiological investigation which will be my focus throughout the rest of the book.

Notes 1. By contemporary I mean post W.W.II. 2. I’m also not denying that any progress has been made in this regard. For example, there is growing discussion about pantheism and panentheism in Western philosophy of religion. Likewise, the journal Sophia regularly publishes articles in philosophy of religion about Eastern traditions (especially Hinduism and Buddhism). 3. Of course, I am very open to the possibility that this project also expands African philosophy itself. However, I approach this book as a philosopher trained in analytic philosophy with an expertise in the philosophy of religion. So it is the tradition I am most familiar with that I will aim to expand.

Introduction to the Comparative Project  13 4. Axiological questions can be asked which do not involve comparisons. However, the axiology of theism literature fundamentally involves comparative judgements because the question is about comparing different states of affairs to each other. 5. For a nice model of epistemic possibility see Chalmers 2011. 6. A related view is apatheism (Kraay 2018, 14). See also Hedberg and Huzarevich 2017. 7. While these four categories have become somewhat standard in the literature since Kraay and Dragos 2013, it’s noteworthy that Kraay forthcoming moves away from his original position and rejects the personal/ impersonal distinction. 8. This is not universally accepted as some have argued that anti-theism entails atheism. See Tooley 2018 and Schellenberg 2018. 9. If the reader wishes for a more comprehensive survey of the literature see Kraay 2018 and Lougheed 2019a. 10. The context of Wood’s remarks is in a commentary on Metz’s “Toward an African Moral Theory” (2007a). 11. Metz also notes that Gyekye (1995, 191) holds a similar view about makes something African.

Bibliography Bourget, David, and David J. Chalmers. 2014). “What Do Philosophers Believe?” Philosophical Studies 170(3): 465–500. Chalmers, David J. (2011). “The Nature of Epistemic Space.” In Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Draper, Paul, and Ryan Nichols. (2013). “Diagnosing Bias in Philosophy of Religion.” The Monist 96(3): 420–446. Draper, Paul, and J.L. Schellenberg. (eds.). (2018). Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gyekye, Kwame. (1995). An Essay on African Philosophical Thought. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Hedberg, Trevor, and Jordan Huzarevich. (2017). “Appraising Objections to Practical Apatheism.” Philosophia 45: 257–276. Kahane, Guy. (2011). “Should We Want God to Exist?”  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXII(3): 674–696. Kraay, Klaas J. (2018). “Invitation to the Axiology of Theism.” In Kraay Klaas J. (ed.), Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. pp. 1–36. __________. (forthcoming) The Axiology of Theism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kray, Klaas J, and Chris Dragos. (2013). “On Preferring God’s Non-Existence.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43: 157–78. Lewis, David. (1973). Counterfactuals. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lougheed, Kirk. (2020) The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Metz, Thaddeus. 2007a). “Toward an African Moral Theory.”  The Journal of Political Philosophy 15(3): 321–341.

14  Setting the Stage __________. (2007b). “Ubuntu as a Moral Theory: Reply to Four Critics.” South African Journal of Philosophy 26(4): 369–87. __________. (forthcoming). A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and beyond the Continent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schellenberg, J.L. (2018) “Triple Transcendence, the Value of God’s Existence, and a New Route to Atheism.” In Klaas J. Kraay (ed.), Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. pp.181–191. Stalnaker, Robert. (1987). Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT Press. Tooley, Michael. (2018). “Axiology: Theism Versus Widely Accepted Monotheisms.” In Klaas J. Kraay (ed.), Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. pp. 46–69. Wiredu, Kwasi. (1980). Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wood, Allen. 2007). “Cross-Cultural Moral Philosophy: Reflections on Thaddeus Metz: ‘Toward an African Moral Theory.’” South African Journal of Philosophy 26(4): 336–346.

2

What Is Ubuntu?

2.1 Introduction The main purpose of this book is to bring the African concept of ubuntu to bear on current discussions in the axiology of theism. “Ubuntu” is often used as a catchword to refer to an African-inspired communitarian ethic. However, there are a number of different philosophical approaches to it and such differences matter inasmuch as they affect the axiological judgements I am seeking to make in this book. It is thus important to be precise about my preferred understanding of ubuntu. Certain versions of ubuntu are connected to supernatural metaphysical pictures of the world and as such it makes sense to speak of it as a broader worldview, instead of just an ethical theory. However, both religious and secular versions of ubuntu are first and foremost ethical frameworks. Unless stated otherwise, references to an ubuntu worldview should be understood as focused on its ethical dimensions. After some preliminary remarks about language and religion, I will explain three prominent approaches to ubuntu. They are: (i) personhood accounts; (ii) cosmopolitan accounts; and (iii) relational accounts. I don’t claim that these are the only three ways of categorizing the different understandings of ubuntu currently on offer. However, these general categories offer enough detail for the reader to grasp the basic differences between the various approaches. After I outline these different understandings of ubuntu, I will briefly focus on a relational approach to ubuntu, particularly the one on offer from Thaddeus Metz (forthcoming). While in many places I will flag differences throughout the book, I hope that much of my assessments will be consistent with all three different approaches to ubuntu. Finally, it is important to stress that this chapter is not intended as a defence of ubuntu in general, or as a defence of my preferred understanding of it. While it’s essential to be clear about the interpretation of ubuntu that I have in view, the purpose of this book is not to defend ubuntu or any particular version of it as such. Rather, my project is fundamentally about the application of a plausible DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-2

16  Setting the Stage interpretation of ubuntu to a certain set of axiological questions in the Western philosophy of religion.

2.2 Preliminaries 2.2.1  Language Before delving into the descriptions of ubuntu, a few preliminary remarks about language are in order. My description is necessarily limited to work on ubuntu that has been conducted in English. However, there is a strong oral tradition about ubuntu, particularly in the Bantu languages. For example, Augustine Shutte explains that “[t]he concept of Ubuntu was originally illustrated in songs and stories as well as being embodied in traditional customs and institutions, and in a whole ethos or lifestyle” (2009, 85). Having said that, I’m confident that enough academic theorizing about ubuntu has been conducted (particularly in the last 30 years) that there is a sufficiently representative body of work on it. Likewise, there is now a critical mass of academics in Africa (and elsewhere) writing on ubuntu in English. On one common understanding, “the term ubuntu has its roots in the SA [South Africa] Nguni-Bantu oral traditions, and is made up of the prefix ‘ubu-’ meaning being in potency, or an enfolded being, and stem ‘ntu’ – meaning being in actuality or unfolded being” (Ewuoso and Hall 2019, 96).1 Slightly differently, Edwin Etieyibo says that “if we break down the word Ubuntu in these expressions what we will end up with is the notion of beingness or being-a-person. This is because ubu and ntu generally translates to ‘being’ and ‘person’ respectively” (Etieyibo 2017, 142). However, there also appears to be a general agreement that ‘ubuntu’ cannot be translated into English with perfect accuracy (e.g., Tutu 1999, 33). The closest literal translations consistently found in the literature are ‘personhood’ and ‘humanness’ or ‘humanity’ (Shutte 2001, 2; Battle 2009, sec. 32; Ewuoso and Hall 2019, 96). Additionally, Ramathate Dolamo suggests that the term ‘humanness’ may be misleading because it is not intended to refer to humankind, but rather a person’s inner core or essence (Dolamo 2013, 2). And finally, “[t]he antithesis of ubuntu is ‘into’, meaning a thing. Into results when an individual distances himself/herself from, or engages in acts that compromise the unity of, the community” (Ewuoso and Hall 2019, 96).2 Such acts are thought to make one less of a person, a mere animal.3 2.2.2  Religious Versus Non-Religious Conceptions Traditional African Religion has slowly begun to be recognized as a legitimate world religion which ought to take its rightful place as an option amongst the other major monotheistic religions in Christianity,

What Is Ubuntu?  17 Judaism, and Islam. While ubuntu is sometimes framed in naturalistic and hence secular terms, it is also sometimes intimately connected with supernaturalism, the ontology of which is equivalent to African Traditional Religion. Ramathate Dolamo explains that: There are five main assumptions that make up the African religious view: (a) God is the creator and sustainer of life; (b) there are spirit beings such as those in nature, superhuman beings and founders of clans; (c) there are spirits of long-departed humans; (d) there are animal and plant spirits; and (e) there are spirits of objects without biological life. (2013, 5) These five assumptions are typically built into any religious understanding of ubuntu.4 However, ubuntu can also be characterized in a way that is entirely secular and naturalistic. For most of the book, my description will focus on the ethical aspects of ubuntu and as such I will offer a secular version of ubuntu. I do this, in part, to remain as neutral as possible between religious and non-religious versions. Many Western philosophers will be suspicious of a metaphysic that isn’t naturalistic, and I don’t want to unnecessarily lose readers along the way.5 For those insistent on attaching ubuntu to a religious metaphysics, I’m hopeful that the following descriptions are consistent with religious understandings of ubuntu. Scholars of ubuntu sometimes suggest that the relationship between individuals and other humans is horizontal while an individual’s relationship with god(s) is vertical. I am thus mostly focused on the horizontal relationships, though again my hope is that much of what I say can be applied seamlessly to vertical relationships. However, it might be countered that in offering a secular theory I retain Western readers at the cost of losing African readers who attach a supernatural metaphysics to ubuntu. I thus flag for the reader that Chapters Seven and Eight are devoted to exploring potential axiological differences between supernatural and secular versions of ubuntu.6

2.3  Personhood Accounts of Ubuntu In contemporary African philosophy, personhood is one of the most commonly discussed and debated concepts. On the one hand, every human is a person inasmuch as they are part of the species of homo sapiens and are thereby entitled (arguably) to certain basic rights. But on the other hand, and more important for my purposes, is the idea that many African scholars use ‘personhood’ as a term of moral assessment.7 It is thus a normative term. Indeed, many philosophers take talk of ubuntu to be talk of personhood in this latter sense. To say that someone has

18  Setting the Stage ubuntu is to say that they are a person and to say that someone is a person is to imply they have ubuntu. For example, in his book, An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics, Motsamai Molefe explains that: I will take the talk of ubuntu to be the same as a talk of personhood. I say so because at the heart of the idea of ubuntu is the idea of personhood. The idea of ubuntu is captured in terms of the maxim – a person is a person through other persons. The italicised word – person – refers to the normative idea of person salient in African philosophy. At the heart of ubuntu is the idea of a human being achieving personhood […]. As such, the reader should not be shocked at instances where I use these words interchangeably. To say one has ubuntu is the same thing as to say they achieved personhood, and vice versa. (2019, fn.8, p. 12, last emphasis mine) Additionally, in various places throughout his book, Molefe equates ‘African ethics’ literally with ‘ubuntu’ (e.g., 2019 8, 58). So, one popular interpretation of ubuntu falls under what I call ‘personhood accounts’ and these equate personhood (i.e., positive moral status) with ubuntu (or possessing ubuntu). Finally, much of contemporary African philosophical literature on personhood has to do with its relationship to the political realm.8 Probably the most famous debate is between Ifeanyi Menkiti who advocates for a radical communitarianism and Kwame Gyekye who defends a moderate communitarianism (one that, contra Menkiti, gives equal status to both the individual and the community).9 These debates are ongoing and far beyond the scope of this book, and as such I’m only focusing on the moral dimensions of personhood as opposed to the broader implications of the debate, particularly for political philosophy. In the rest of this section, I’m going to explain in slightly more detail the type of moral assessments associated with the concept of personhood in African philosophy. After that I focus on explicating two different understandings of personhood as a moral concept. The first says that community or relationality is intrinsic to personhood while the second holds that they are only instrumental to achieving personhood. 2.3.1  Personhood as an Evaluative Term Ifeanyi Menkiti (1940–2019) was one of the first African scholars to distinguish the African normative understanding of personhood from Western understandings such as those about personal identity or biology. In his influential chapter, “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought,” he explains that according to “the African view

What Is Ubuntu?  19 it is the community which defines the person as person, not some isolated static quality of rationality, will, or memory [… w]ithout incorporation into this or that community, individuals are considered to be mere danglers to whom the description ‘person’ does not fully apply” (Menkiti 1984, 172). Molefe further explains that “[t]he idea of a person […] is a moral concept assigning ‘high praise’ to the conduct of the human individual” (2019, 39).10 Furthermore, “[t]he high praise arises as a moral response to the quality of the performance of the agent in the light of the norms prescribed by society” (2019, 39).11 Thus, in the African tradition, if someone is called a non-person, this isn’t meant to deny that they have a set of basic rights or are owed respect just in virtue of being human. Instead, it is a claim that the person has acted immorally, that they have failed to live up to the standard of what it means to be a true or fully human (Molefe 2019, 39).12 Polycarp Ikuenobe explains that: There are two plausible conceptions of personhood. One is the descriptive, physical-metaphysical and the other is the normative, moral-social. In many African traditions, the idea of a person has both descriptive (physical and metaphysical) and normative (social, moral and aesthetic) dimensions. (Ikuenobe 2016, 144, quoted in Molefe 2019, 39) It is only human beings that are capable of personhood in this latter normative sense. Furthermore, in this tradition, human beings are moral ‘blank slates’ at birth.13 A natural question is what axiological criteria are used to evaluate the degree to which an individual is a person in this normative sense. The strong emphasis on communality and relationality in the African tradition are clues in this regard. Molefe explains that “[t]he African metaphysical view is that a human being is believed to be essentially communal by nature. In other words, on this view, social relationships are not optional or escapable. To be human just is to be involved in social relationships” (2019, 41).14 Human nature, or at least its valuable dimension, is in some way fundamentally social. This means that “human beings by nature are wired for relationships or are equipped to enter and continue relationships. Without, and outside of relationships the human project is not possible at all or will be severely handicapped” (Molefe 2019, 41). In this context personhood is thus a moral achievement. This is why African scholars talk of personhood as something that is acquired or as something the individual could fail to achieve (Molefe 2019, 43).15 Throughout the course of one’s life, an individual ought to work on acquiring moral virtue which is what’s required for personhood. Indeed, that this is a long process is part of the reason why elders are especially

20  Setting the Stage revered in many traditional African societies (Molefe 2019, 43).16 And finally: The important conclusion that can be drawn about this approach to African ethical thought qua personhood is that the call for the individual to aspire to attain personhood is an invitation to develop those morally relevant facets of her nature, or, more specifically, to develop a morally virtuous character. (Molefe 2019, 44) This is the way in which the normative conception of the person should be understood. Before proceeding to examine the relationship between community and personhood, it’s noteworthy that according to Molefe personhood is a character or virtue-based ethics. This is distinct from many Western approaches that focus on right action.17 On character-based approaches “morality is not a function of actions per se (though actions are important), but actions are a function of the quality of the character of the agent” (Molefe 2019, 45). So, personhood conceptions of ubuntu are agent-centered. Molefe also suggests that there’s an important sense in which personhood theories are egoistic. This is because the goal of personhood is for an agent to increase and attempt to perfect her own humanity (Molefe 2019, 46). And it is the agent alone who is ultimately responsible for perfecting her humanity (Molefe 2019, 46).18 In this way, “[t]o call one a non-person is to downgrade her, not in terms of the fact that she is no longer human and therefore loses out on her basic and ineliminable respect, but to specify that she is living below what is expected of a human being, morally speaking” (Molefe 2019, 46).19 While personhood theories of ubuntu are egoist, they can also be construed as perfectionist because they connect personhood to human excellence (Molefe 2019, 47). In sum, “[t]he idea of personhood imagines a (deontological) egoistic perfectionist moral theory that requires agents to perfect or realise their capacity for virtue as far as is possible without violating the dignity of human beings” (Molefe 2019, 50). The virtues typically associated with personhood (i.e., ubuntu) are relational or other-regarding virtues. Examples include hospitality, friendliness, caring, group solidarity, conformity, and collective unity (e.g., Mokgoro 1998, 3; Tutu 1999, 35; Molefe 2019, 51). Thus, “the moral achievement of character perfection, while being an achievement of the individual, manifests through the exhibition of other-regarding duties or virtues” (Molefe 2019, 51). 20 Before concluding this section on personhood, it’s important to observe a further subdivision in such accounts. There is debate about the way in which community (or ‘relationality’ or ‘sociality’)

What Is Ubuntu?  21 is required for achieving personhood. Many argue that community is intrinsically valuable in the sense that personhood is literally equivalent to engaging in positive relationships. Others like Molefe suggest that the community is instrumentally valuable in that engaging in relationships is the means by which one increases and perfects their own personhood. In what follows I examine each of these views in turn. One caveat is important before proceeding: African philosophers writing on personhood tend not to be explicit about this distinction with respect to the value of community. As such, some accounts of personhood are rather slippery in this regard. While the distinction between intrinsic value and instrumental value is binary, I realize that some of the thinkers I refer to below could be interpreted differently. For my purposes, getting clear on the different categories is what’s most important. 21 2.3.2  Community as Intrinsically Valuable In this section, I examine accounts of personhood that hold community as intrinsically valuable. This equates personhood with positive social relationships. So positive social relationships are the end that ought to be pursued (Molefe 2019, 55). According to Augustine Shutte, “[a]t the centre of ubuntu is the idea that umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, persons depend on persons to be persons” (2001, 3). He explains a contemporary version of ubuntu by appealing to freedom (an idea he takes from the European tradition) and the African idea of community. For Shutte, people act freely “when we deliberately choose to do something we have judged worthwhile, we are self-determining, free from being completely influenced by causes other than ourselves” (2001, 3). This involves self-determination, determining the sort of person one is becoming. Furthermore, this is a capacity to be developed. The freer a person is, the more of a person she is becoming. On the other hand, with respect to community Shutte says that “a person depends on personal relations with others to exercise, develop and fulfil those capacities that make one a person” (2001, 12). One becomes more of a person through their interaction with others. It is in this sense that personhood is appropriately considered a gift from other persons (Shutte 2001, 12). In Chapters Seven and Eight, when I explore the axiological status of religious versions of ubuntu I will spend more time explaining the concept of life-force. Briefly, however, it’s worth observing that this is essential to Shutte’s view. We can increase or decrease life force in both ourselves and others depending on the degree to which we exercise ubuntu. 22 Thus, a person must exercise their own free will to become a person while at the same time being unable to develop as a person apart from others.

22  Setting the Stage 2.3.3  Community as Instrumentally Valuable The alternative view of the value of social relationships says that they are instrumentally valuable inasmuch as they help individuals to achieve personhood. Molefe defends this view in part by rejecting the alternative. For example, he seems to think that having relationality as the end itself will entail that people have to make counterintuitive trade-offs, wrongly placing interpersonal relationships over oneself (Molefe 2019, 60). For instance, one might not be justified in spending one’s own money on her education if it is not better for the community. 23 Thus, “[t]he point […] is to recognise that the communal view exaggerates the role of social relationships. And, secondly, it misses the basic point that the focus of personhood is ultimately personal development” (Molefe 2019, 61). This is because “the goal of personhood is for the individual to achieve a sound character; and the social relationships serve as incubators where individuals carve out their personhood” (Molefe 2019, 61). 24 Finally, Molefe’s “perfectionist egoistic moral theory locates the good in what the agent achieves (moral perfection) and it posits relationships as the single most important instrument to achieve such an end” (2019, 62). Social relationships help cause the development of personhood because they involve other-regarding virtues. Exercising such virtues is the way to enter into positive relationships with others (Molefe 2019, 62). 25 Social relationships are the way in which individuals can develop as persons. Molefe emphasizes the fact that “it is ultimately the individual that achieves personhood. In the light of the provisions made available by the community, the individual is expected to try, to exert herself, to fight temptations, to deal with limitations in her society, to make something out of herself morally speaking” (2019, 63). 2.3.4  Concluding Thoughts on Personhood Conceptions of Ubuntu I have explained that in the African tradition the term ‘personhood’ is often normative. It is an evaluative term used to assign moral praise and blame. For some, ‘personhood’ is equivalent to ‘ubuntu.’ To say that someone has achieved personhood is equivalent to saying they have ubuntu and vice versa. Personhood is developed within the context of community, in particular, by positive social relationships. Whether community is the end itself and hence equivalent to personhood or is instead only instrumentally valuable in achieving personhood remains a matter of debate. However, both positions share the view that personhood is developed by exercising other-regarding virtues. On this view, then, to have ubuntu is to have a character that prioritizes such virtues.

What Is Ubuntu?  23

2.4  Cosmopolitan Accounts of Ubuntu A different interpretation of ubuntu focuses on its cosmopolitan nature. Here I briefly explicate ideas found in Edwin Etieyibo’s “Ubuntu, Cosmopolitanism, and Distribution of Natural Resources” (2017) and from Mvuselelo Ngcoya’s “Ubuntu: Toward an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism?” (2015). Both of these accounts are personhood-focused and seem to take community as intrinsically valuable. For example, Ngcoya explains that “[p]ersonhood is not something intrinsic that you are born with – it is achieved and is subject to degrees of one’s fulfillment of obligations to the self, the household, community” (2015, 255). Likewise, Etieyibo says that “[Ubuntu] is roughly about human kindness and what it is that makes one a person […] for Ubuntu an individual is a human being or person […] or exists as a human through other persons” (2017, 141). However, their views focus on cosmopolitanism in ways not found in other personhood accounts which is why I consider them separately here. What is cosmopolitanism? According to Etieyibo, cosmopolitanism “takes all human beings to belong to a single community. That is for cosmopolitanism, we are one people of a one world” (2017, 143). First and foremost, people are global citizens and hence not bound (morally) by local or national considerations. What makes ubuntu cosmopolitan is that “it takes everyone to belong to one human family and takes our duty towards others as grounded on the notion of human-ness” (Etieyibo 2017, 146). Etieyibo defends what he calls a ‘strict’ cosmopolitanism because he argues that our duty to each other can never be partial. Moral obligations are never stronger towards locals or compatriots (Etieyibo 2017, 144). 26 Alternatively, Ngcoya takes an approach he refers to as ‘emancipatory cosmopolitanism.’ This is a contextual or situated cosmopolitanism in that moral norms ought not to be divorced from their contexts. 27 For many of the “cosmopolitan arguments fail to take account of the plurality of political idioms and ethical considerations which motivate differently situated individuals and from whence communities source their concepts of a common humanity and social justice” (Ngcoya 2015, 253). While it is not entirely clear from Ngcoya’s account, he does seem to leave open the possibility for an ethic where partiality is permitted, if not recommended. What both of these accounts have in common is their agreement that a truly cosmopolitan ubuntu would have the current government, corporate, and other social institutions restructured such that resources would be more fairly distributed. These accounts do not necessarily diverge from some of the personhood accounts where community is intrinsically valuable. In this way, they thus don’t offer a distinct alternative to those approaches. However, I mention them here because these two accounts raise important questions about partiality and impartiality. A common criticism

24  Setting the Stage of the communitarian nature of African ethics is that it is overly partial. Ubuntu, specifically, has also been the target of such criticisms. The worry is that it only generates obligations for one’s extended family and clan, not to the wider world. But Etieyibo provides a set of resources to deal with such objections. In his view, every human is bound up with every other human and so the duty to establish humane relations with one another is not localized. While it’s far from uncontroversial, it’s important to see that there is a personhood account of ubuntu that does indeed maintain an impartial ethic. 28

2.5  Relational Accounts of Ubuntu Perhaps the most well known statement of ubuntu, particularly on the global stage comes to us from Desmond Tutu in his book, No Future without Forgiveness (1999). Tutu’s secular interpretation of ubuntu focuses on relationality and communality. Another similar statement can be found in Peter J. Paris’s The Spirituality of African Peoples: The Search for a Common Moral Discourse (1995). Additionally, Munyaradzi Felix Murove offers a relational religious description of ubuntu set against the backdrop of the Shona ethic of Ukama (2004; 2007). 29 However, the most systematic defence of a relational account of ubuntu comes from the work of Thaddeus Metz (e.g., 2007; forthcoming). In various places, it’s clear that Metz has been inspired by the work of Tutu. But I’m going to focus on explicating Metz’s account because it is the most in-depth and systematic work to date and will particularly appeal to Western analytic philosophers. Metz’s account is also secular and thus consistent with my goal of offering an account of ubuntu that will appeal to the widest possible audience. For the rest of this section, I explain Metz’s view with priority given to his most recent and systematic statement found in his book, A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and Beyond the Continent (forthcoming).30 2.5.1  Metz and Friendliness In his book, Metz systematically develops an African ethic that can be (explicitly) considered a legitimate competitor to longstanding western moral theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism.31 While Metz doesn’t say his theory is a theory of ubuntu, it can certainly be interpreted as one. The fact that he never explicitly says as much is perhaps to fulfil his goal of making his theory more palatable to a wider global audience. When he focuses on identity and solidarity, two mainstays in his relational theory, it is clearly possible to interpret it as an account of ubuntu. Finally, whether Metz himself would ultimately want his relational theory labelled as a theory of “ubuntu” is irrelevant since for my purposes it can be labelled and consistently employed as such.32

What Is Ubuntu?  25 There are two key components of Metz’s relational ethic. The first is that “harmonious or communal relationship of a certain kind is ultimately what should be pursued as an end” (Metz, forthcoming). The second is that harmony/communality are equivalent to friendliness, as exhibited in identity and solidarity. The capacity for friendliness serves as the basis for human dignity. This requires much further explanation. In what follows, I outline Metz’s theory with an emphasis on friendliness and then I explain why a theory of right action is best suited for my purposes in this project. Metz explains friendliness in terms of identity and solidarity, and he understands each of these in terms of ‘cognition, emotion, volition, and motivation.’ 2.5.2  Metz on Identity With respect to the cognition of identifying with others, Metz explains that this means thinking of oneself as a member of a group or as part of a relationship. This will often mean taking on the perspective of others. Thus, “[t]he key point is that cognitively identifying with others means not viewing them as separate from oneself, and instead considering them as members” (Metz, forthcoming). The emotion of identity involves being glad to be in the presence of others and feeling a sense of belonging when with others. Likewise, it implies being proud or embarrassed by the action of others since they are viewed as part of the ‘we.’ Regarding volition, Metz explains that “joint activity is the central idea” (145). Helping others to achieve their goals and accommodating one’s own goals in light of others is of central importance. Finally, concerning motivation Metz says that “one participates in cooperative endeavours for reason beyond mere prudence” (forthcoming). Thus, an individual does not co-operate with others only in order to realize her own ends. Rather there is something right about identifying with others. Metz further explains that the opposite of identifying with others is creating division (forthcoming). And lastly, the stance of neither identity nor division is perhaps alienation (e.g., living as a hermit) (Metz, forthcoming). 2.5.3  Metz on Solidarity According to Metz, expressing solidarity with others fundamentally involves acts of service (forthcoming). The cognitive aspect of solidarity involves having empathy for others. This means “knowing what moves [the other…] person and more generally what makes him tick, even if he does not fully recognize it” (Metz, forthcoming). Understanding someone in this way helps to build emotional solidarity. Volition about solidarity entails that “one acts to improve another’s condition” (Metz, forthcoming). This involves helping others to become better people, not simply helping others to advance their own self-interests. With respect

26  Setting the Stage to the motivation behind solidarity, Metz explains that “one’s helping action is prompted by the prior conditions of roughly empathetic cognition and sympathetic emotion” (forthcoming). He further notes that the opposite of solidarity is ‘ill will.’ Finally, the expression of neither solidarity nor ill will is indifference (i.e., one neither helps nor harms others) (Metz, forthcoming). 2.5.4  Identity and Solidarity Together Metz argues that identity and solidarity do not work well on their own as complete explanations of morality. For example, members of the South African Nationalist Party that enforced apartheid likely identified with one another. Yet they hardly promoted solidarity amongst everyone living in South Africa. Likewise, according to Metz solidarity without identity permits intuitively wrong forms of paternalism (forthcoming). Metz says that while it is common for African theorists to ground morality on communality (or friendliness) as good for its own sake (i.e., as intrinsically valuable), this approach cannot adequately capture certain rights we intuitively possess (forthcoming). For instance, such approaches cannot accommodate the intuition that violence in self or other defence is permissible (if not sometimes required) (Metz, forthcoming). Additionally, “[i]f harmony were merely a goal to be promoted, then it would be unjustifiable to use a discordant means such as deadly force against aggressors, when doing so would protect innocent victims but fail to maximize harmony in the long run” (Metz, forthcoming). Finally, it cannot account for common-sense intuitions about how to distribute scarce lifesaving resources. This is because “[i]f African morality were just a matter of strengthening the bonds with one’s family or community, then many humans would be left out of moral consideration thereby flouting powerful cosmopolitan or impartial intuitions” (Metz, forthcoming). It is the focus on the capacity for friendliness or harmony (i.e., for identity and solidarity) instead of on friendliness as the good or end in itself as the basis for morality that separates Metz’s account from other relational understandings of ubuntu (e.g., from Paris and Tutu). Thus, Metz says that “[i]instead of deeming relationships of identity and solidarity themselves to be a highest good to be promoted, I take the capacity to be party to them to have a superlative non-instrumental value and to warrant respectful treatment” (forthcoming). 2.5.5  The Capacity for Ubuntu Metz’s relational ethic differentiates itself from other African theories in focusing on the capacity for relationship, instead of on the value of community itself. He explains that his “view is not that communal

What Is Ubuntu?  27 relationship itself has a moral status, nor that only those who are in such a relationship have one, but rather that those who in principle could relate in that way have a moral status” (Metz, forthcoming).33 One can exemplify this capacity in virtue of being a subject or an object of friendliness. If an agent is a subject of friendship, then she herself exhibits solidarity and identifies with others. Being an object of friendship means that other human beings consider that object “as part of a ‘we’, advance its goals, benefit it, and act for its sake out of sympathy” (Metz, forthcoming). This does not entail that the object of such friendly engagement would respond to it. Likewise, to be capable of such engagement means being able to participate (in principle) without changing one’s nature. And finally, “the more a being is capable of relating communally, the greater its moral status, where only large differences of degrees count” (Metz, forthcoming).34 In sum, “individual entities are bearers of moral status, but they are so in virtue of a modal relational property, their ability to commune with others, which contrasts with intrinsic properties such as the capacity to feel pleasure or act autonomously” (Metz, forthcoming). 2.5.5  Friendliness and Impartiality/Partiality Metz claims that his theory provides a way to understand impartial intuitions and partial intuitions as ‘complementary rather than contradictory’ (forthcoming). Remember that “[a]ccording to the principle of rightness as friendliness, what gives us a dignity is our capacity to befriend others and to be befriended by them” (Metz, forthcoming). Notice that this nicely accounts for impartial intuitions because any agent capable of relationality has dignity and is thereby entitled to be treated in a friendly manner by others to at least some degree. But Metz’s theory also accommodates certain partial intuitions because it implies that “when an agent has been in a friendly or communal relationship with others, she has some moral reason to maintain and enrich that relationship and hence to participate with and help them more than those with whom she has not so related” (forthcoming). For when one has actually participated in relationships with others, the duties towards them become stronger. Thus, “[t]he longer and stronger the communal relating, the more of a duty to protect and develop it” (—Metz, forthcoming). Metz concludes that: [I]t is not divine energy that grounds impartiality and it is not blood ties that ground partiality […] these two facets of morality flow from the same source of communality. On the one hand, the capacity to relate communally in a person gives any agent some moral reason to commune with her, while, on the other hand, having related communally with a given person gives a particular agent extra moral reason to continue doing so.(forthcoming)

28  Setting the Stage Thus, Metz’s theory is able to accommodate characteristically African intuitions about partiality and also characteristically Western intuitions about impartiality. 2.5.6  Friendliness and Principles of Right Action In light of this discussion, this understanding of ubuntu can be captured by the following principles: •

An act is right if and only if it respects individuals in virtue of their capacity to be party to harmonious ways of relating.

•

An act is wrong insofar as it degrades those with the capability of relating communally as subjects or objects.

•

An action is permissible if it treats beings as special in accordance with their ability to be friendly or to be befriended.

•

An action is impermissible to the extent that it disrespects beings with the ability to be part of relationships of identity and solidarity (Metz, forthcoming).

2.6  The Concept of Ubuntu Going Forward Recall that the main purpose of this book is to bring ubuntu to bear on the current debate in the axiology of theism literature. I’ve now shown that there are at least three subcategories of ubuntu in versions that focus on personhood, cosmopolitanism, and relationality. Of course, there are even further nuances to be found in each of these three general subcategories that I have only touched on here. This is because my goal is not to evaluate and defend a specific conception of ubuntu. However, since I want to apply ubuntu to various ideas in the rest of the book it’s important to be clear on the particular conception that I have in view. I’m going to proceed with Metz’s capacity approach to ubuntu which says, roughly, that an action is right inasmuch as it is friendly. There are a number of reasons for my choice. First, Metz’s theory is action-centred. Thus, it will be easier to apply his theory to arguments in the axiology of theism than personhood accounts which tend to be agent-centred.35 A long-standing objection to character/virtue approaches in ethics (approaches that are clearly agent-centred) is that they provide no guidance with respect to action. I am not endorsing such an objection except to say that it’s related to the claim here that it’s easier to apply an action-centred approach to the arguments in the proceeding chapters. Second, while I will not always do this, in various places I will highlight where Metz’s approach and personhood accounts yield the same verdicts about the arguments in the axiology of theism literature. While Metz

What Is Ubuntu?  29 focuses on the capacity for solidarity and identity, on many personhood accounts of ubuntu these are often recognized as other-regarding virtues that need to be cultivated in order for an individual to achieve personhood. This overlap suggests that they will yield identical or similar verdicts in at least some places. Moving forward when I discuss personhood accounts, I will not distinguish between those that hold community is intrinsically valuable and those like Molefe who say it is instrumentally valuable.36 Again, this is because they will yield identical or similar verdicts, except perhaps with respect to extreme trade-offs between the individual and community. Third, many African ethicists reject the notion of human rights, whereas in Metz’s view human rights violations occur when people’s capacity to relate harmoniously are severely degraded.37 Any ethical theory which rejects even a minimalist account of human rights will be very unpalatable to most Western philosophers. Fourth, Metz’s theory is able to accommodate considerations in favour of both partiality and impartiality, thereby avoiding a tension that often arises between African ethical theories and Western ethical theories. Again, this will help prevent me from unnecessarily losing readers along the way. Though my goal is not to defend ubuntu (or African relational ethics more generally), I want to work with an account of it that will not be dismissed out of hand. As stated, I think that when it comes to evaluating the arguments in the axiology of theism, most of these different conceptions of ubuntu are going to yield identical or similar verdicts. I will try to highlight places where interesting potential differences in axiological evaluation arise.

2.7 Conclusion The word ‘ubuntu’ literally means person or humanity. To say that someone has ubuntu is to say that they are a person in the African normative sense of the term. Both secular and religious conceptions of ubuntu have been defended in various places. Personhood understandings of ubuntu are the most common in the African philosophical tradition. They say that an individual can only become a person by developing and practising other-regarding duties. This is accomplished in the context of community. Cosmopolitan accounts of ubuntu tend to focus on the idea that ubuntu should bring about changes to various social institutions including governments and businesses. Metz’s relational account focuses on the idea that people are valuable inasmuch as they have the capacity to be the subject and/or object of friendliness. An action is right inasmuch as it is friendly. Moving forward I will use Metz’s account to evaluate the current arguments on offer in the axiology of theism literature. I will sometimes highlight places where such an evaluation may differ from the ones made using personhood accounts of ubuntu.

30  Setting the Stage

Notes









1. The equivalent of ‘ubuntu’ in Shona is ‘hunhu’ (see van Binsbergen 2001). 2. See also Mnyaka and Motlhabi 2005; Mabovula 2011. 3. These remarks about personhood will be further explained in 2.3. 4. With respect to terminology, Christian African thinkers often use ‘supernatural’ and ‘spirits’ while indigenous thinkers tend to prefer ‘imperceptible agents.’ The former tend to denote qualities such as transcendence or atemporality which do not fit within Traditional African Religion. Thanks to Thaddeus Metz for this observation. 5. My methodology here follows that of Metz forthcoming. 6. For more on African religion see Mbiti 1970, 2015 and Ng’weshemi 2002. 7. However, Molefe does remind us that some African philosophers do seem to think that personal identity is entirely made of up social relationships (2019, 4). For example, see Mbiti 1969 and Menkiti 1984. I am not concerned with such extreme forms here, especially since I am trying to explore the ethical or normative connotation behind ‘personhood’ itself in African philosophy. 8. Molefe 2019, 18. 9. For example, see Filosofia Theoretica 2018, vol. 7, iss. 2 and Eiteyibo and Ikuenobe 2020. Molefe (2019, 6) also points to two noteworthy alternatives in Matolino 2014 and Ikuenobe 2016, 2017. 10. See also Tutu 1999, 35. 11. See also Presbey 2002. 12. See also Wiredu 1996, 159. 13. This stands in stark contrast to the Christian doctrine of original sin (Molefe 2019, 40). 14. He further cites Tutu 1999, 35; Gyekye 1992, 104; Dzobo 1992, 132 as supporting this view too. 15. Molefe points to Menkiti 1984, 173 and Ramose 2003, 438 as two prominent African philosophers who clearly share this view too. See also van Niekerk 2007. 16. See also Menkiti 1984, 172–176. 17. Below in 2.5 we’ll see one understanding of ubuntu from Thaddeus Metz that does indeed focus on right action. 18. Molefe notes that similar ideas are found in Wingo 2006 and Agada 2018, 149. However, I believe this would be contested by Menkiti. 19. See also Behrens 2013. 20. While I’ve stated from the outset that at least for this part of the book I’m most interested in secular theories it’s interesting that Molefe argues ethical theories that focus on personhood are fundamentally humanistic. This is because, according to Molefe, they focus on human nature as the basis of morality and thus are not religious (Molefe 2019, 51–52). 21. This isn’t to justify carelessness regarding interpreting the work of others. It’s just to say that this distinction doesn’t always feature in accounts of personhood and as such certain philosophers are rather vague about it. Molefe 2019 discusses it at length and so is a notable exception. Metz 2013a, 145 also rightly complains that much of literature isn’t sufficiently clear on this distinction. 22. Metz 2012 offers a secular version of life force in the form of ‘vitality.’ 23. Metz has criticized what he calls self-realization views, which are similar to the ones advocated for by Molefe and others in Section 3. See Metz 2007a and also 2013a,b. Molefe (2019, 58–61) responds. 24. See also Bujo 2001, 88.

What Is Ubuntu?  31 25. See also Wiredu 1992, 200; Gyekye 1992, 192; Lutz 2009, 314. 26. Related to Etieyibo’s strict cosmopolitan account is Leonhard Praeg’s critical humanist approach (2017). I recommend it to readers interested in continental approaches to ubuntu. See also Tschaepe 2013. 27. Here Ngcoya follows Appiah 2006 and Pieterse 2006. 28. Two other examples of impartiality can be found in Wiredu’s doctrine of sympathetic impartiality (1992) and Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism (1997, Ch.2). For an African-based critique of impartiality see Molefe 2016. 29. The ethic of Ukama focuses on the interconnectedness of everything in the universe, and in particularly that of between humans. One of the motivations for Murove is to apply the ethic of ubuntu as a solution to the ecological crisis in Africa. 30. Metz has published an enormous amount on African ethics in recent years and trying to synthesize his work is far beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it’s noteworthy that he takes his recent book to be his definitive statement on African ethics (see Metz forthcoming). 31. My definition of ‘African’ was inspired by what Metz says in this book. He doesn’t claim that Africans have explicitly held the theory he develops, but rather that the theory he develops is African inspired (and more properly considered African than the other main ethical theories currently on offer). 32. In one place Metz writes that he “does not attempt to seek clear and distinct analyses of the myriad properties that a particular people associates with the word ‘ubuntu’ or cognate terms. Instead, [Metz’s theory] draws on that collection of properties selectively in order to construct and defend a general moral principle” (forthcoming). It is thus perhaps more precise to say that Metz’s ethic is inspired by ubuntu. But again, for my current purposes, this is neither here nor there. 33. Metz observes that in light of this it’s fair to characterize his theory as a modal view. See Horsthemke 2015, 85–92 and Samuel and Fayemi 2020. 34. Metz further says that an upshot of his view is that the vast majority of humans have full moral status. One implication of his view is that the severely disabled have at least partial moral status since they can be the objects of relationality. It’s not important to evaluate whether this is a positive or negative feature of his view here. However, it’s noteworthy that it appears to do better at capturing the intuition that the severely disabled have moral value than Kantianism or utilitarianism, two theories that notoriously struggle in this regard. For more see Metz (forthcoming). 35. Of course, one virtue of certain African moral theories is that they are both action-centred and agent-centred. For example, Metz’s theory is consistent with agent-centred approaches inasmuch as he could say an agent develops her personhood through friendliness. Thanks to Motsamai Molefe for discussion. 36. Elsewhere I argue that Molefe’s view faces an unpalatable dilemma where one solution is just to concede that community is intrinsically valuable. Lougheed Unpublished Manuscript. 37. Though many do affirm that all humans are valuable and have dignity. So this may well amount to a merely verbal difference.

Bibliography Agada, Ada. (2018). “Language, Thought, and Interpersonal Communication: A Cross-Cultural Conversation on the Question of Individuality and Community.” Filosofia Theoretica 7: 141–161.

32  Setting the Stage Appiah, Kwame A. (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Battle, Michael. (2009). Ubuntu: I in You and You in Me. New York: Seasbury Publishing. Behrens, Kevin. (2013). “Two ‘Normative’ Conceptions of Personhood.” Quest 25: 103–119. Bujo, B. (2001). Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality. Kenya: Pauline’s Publications Africa Dolamo, R. 2013). “Botho/Ubuntu: The Heart of African Ethics.”  Scriptura 112(1): 1–10. Dzobo, N.K. (1992). “Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors and God.” In K. Gyekye and K. Wiredu (eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies I. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 223–242. Etieyibo, Edwin. 2017). “Ubuntu, Cosmopolitanism, and Distribution of Natural Resources.” Philosophical Papers 46(1): 139–162. Etieyibo, Edwin, and Polycarp Ikuenobe. (eds.). (2020). Menkiti on Community and Becoming a Person.. Lexington Books. Ewuoso, C., and S. Hall 2019). “Core Aspects of Ubuntu: A Systematic Review.” South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 12(2): 93. Gyekye, Kwame. (1992). “Person and Community in African Thought,” In K. Wiredu and K. Gyekye (eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies I. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 113–21. __________. (1995). An Essay on African Philosophical Thought. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. __________. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. Horsthemke, Kai (2015) Animals and African Ethics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ikuenobe, Polycarp A. 2017). “The Communal Basis for Moral Dignity: An African Perspective.” Philosophical Papers 45(3): 437–469. __________. (2016). “Good and Beautiful: A Moral-Aesthetic View of Personhood in African Communal Traditions.” Essays in Philosophy 17(1): 124–163. Lougheed, Kirk. “Molefe on the Value of Community for Personhood.” Unpublished Manuscript. Lutz, David. (2009). “African Ubuntu Philosophy and Global Management.” Journal of Business Ethics 84: 313–328. Mabovula, N.N. 2011). “The Erosion of African Communal Values: A Reappraisal of the African Ubuntu Philosophy.” Inkanyiso: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3(1): 38–47. __________. (2014). Personhood in African Philosophy. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Mbiti, J.S. (1970). Concepts of God in Africa. London: SPCK. __________. (1969). African Religions and Philosophy. New York: Doubleday and Company. __________. (1984). “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought.” In Richard A. Wright (ed.), African Philosophy: An Introduction. 3rd. ed... Lanham, MD: University Press of America. pp. 171–181.

What Is Ubuntu?  33 Metz, Thaddeus 2007). “Toward an African Moral Theory.”  The Journal of Political Philosophy 15(3): 321–341. __________. (2012). “African Conceptions of Human Dignity: Vitality and Community as the Ground of Human Rights.” Human Rights Review 13(1): 19–37. __________. (2013a). “The Western Ethic of Care or an Afro-Communitarian Ethic? Specifying the Right Relational Morality.” Journal of Global Ethics 9: 77–92. __________. (2013b). “Two Conceptions of African Ethics in the Work of D.A. Masolo.” Quest 25: 7–15. __________. (forthcoming). A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and beyond the Continent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. __________. (2020)“A Relational Theory of Human Rights.” Unpublished Manuscript. Mnyaka, Mlulwki, and Mokgethi Motlhabi. 2005). “The African Concept of ubuntu/botho and Its Socio-Moral Significance.”  Black Theology 3(2): 215–237. Mokgoro, J.Y. (1998). “Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa.” Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1: 1–11. Molefe, Motsamai. 2016). “African Ethics and Partiality.”  Phronimon 17(1): 104–122. __________. (2019). An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Murove, Munyaradzi Felix (2004) ‘An African Commitment to Ecological Conservation: The Shona Concepts of Ukama and Ubuntu’, The Mankind Quarterly, 45: 195–215. ––––– (2007) ‘The Shona Ethic of Ukama with Reference to the Immortality of Values’, The Mankind Quarterly, 48: 179–89. Ngcoya, Mvuselelo. (2015). “Ubuntu: Toward an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism?” International Political Sociology 9: 248–262. Ng’weshemi, A.M. (2002). Rediscovering the Human: The Quest for a ChristoTheological Anthropology in Africa. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc Paris, Peter J. (1995). The Spirituality of African Peoples: The Search for a Common Moral Discourse. Minneopolis: Augsburg Fortress Pieterse, Jan N. 2006). “Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Towards an Agenda.” Development and Change 37(6): 1247–1257. Praeg, Leonhard. (2017). A Report on Ubuntu. Grahamstown, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Presbey, Gail. (2002). “Maasai Concepts of Personhood: The Roles of Recognition, Community, and Individuality.” International Studies in Philosophy 34: 57–82. Ramose, M.B. (2003). “The Ethics of Ubuntu.” In P. Coetzee and A. Roux (eds.), The African Philosophy Reader. New York: Routledge. pp. 324–331. Samuel, Olusegun and Fayemi, Ademola (2020) ‘A Critique of Thaddeus Metz’s Modal Relational Account of Moral Status’, Theoria, 67: 28–44. Shutte, Augustine (2001) Ubuntu: An Ethic for the New South Africa, Cape Town: Cluster Publications. Shutte, Augustine. (2009). “Ubuntu as the African Ethical Vision.” In Munyaradzi Felix Murove (ed.), African Ethics: An Anthology for Comparative and Applied Ethics. Grahamstown, South Africa: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press. pp. 85–99.

34  Setting the Stage Tschaepe, Mark. 2013). A Humanist Ethic of Ubuntu: Understanding Moral Obligation and Community  Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 21(2): 47–61. Tutu, Desmond. (1999). No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Random House Canada. Van Binsbergen, W.M.J. 2001. Ubuntu and the Globalisation of Southern African Thought and Society, Quest – An African Journal of Philosophy vol.XV no.1–2. van Niekerk, Jason. 2007). “In Defence of an Autocentric Account of Ubuntu.” South African Journal of Philosophy 26(4): 364–368. Wingo, A. (2006). “Akan Philosophy of the Person.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford. edu/archives/sum2017/entries/akan-person/. Wiredu, Kwasi. (1996). “Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective.” Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. __________. (1992). “Moral Foundations of an African Culture. In Wiredu, K., and K. Gyekye (eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies I. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 192–206.

Part II

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism

3

Ubuntu and Anti-Theism

3.1 Introduction Anti-theism is the view that the world is (or would be) better if God does not exist. In Chapter One we saw that this view can be further subdivided by the categories of narrow/wide and personal/impersonal. In this chapter I’m going to examine a number of arguments for anti-theism on the assumption that ubuntu is true. This approach will help uncover the degree to which there is intersubjective agreement about some of the axiological judgements made thus far in the literature. Arguments for anti-theism typically attempt to show that some good is either logically impossible on theism or obtains to a much lesser degree on theism than on atheism (Lougheed 2020). Different arguments focus on different goods, e.g., the goods of meaning, privacy, dignity, understanding, and sacrifice. In what follows I survey these arguments and evaluate them from the perspective of ubuntu. At times the reader may be tempted to evaluate the merits of these arguments from their own preferred ethical understanding. But it’s important to keep in mind that the goal here is to evaluate them from the perspective of ubuntu. My descriptions will therefore assume that the arguments in question are successful at least from the Western perspective from which they were first offered.1 I tentatively conclude that anti-theism turns out to be more difficult to defend if ubuntu is true.

3.2  Meaning in Life Meaning in life was one of the first goods appealed to in order to defend anti-theism. To have a meaningful life is, prima facie, quite valuable while on the other hand it is a severe drawback to have a meaningless life. In this section I show how it has been used to defend personal versions of anti-theism. 3.2.1  The Meaningful Life Argument An oft-quoted remark from Thomas Nagel is typically credited with sparking initial interest in the axiology of theism. Nagel writes, “I hope DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-3

38  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that” (Nagel 1997, 130).2 In trying to understand the best way to interpret this remark, Guy Kahane gestured towards a specific argument for anti-theism. He writes: If a striving for independence, understanding, privacy and solitude is so inextricably woven into my identity that its curtailment by God’s existence would not merely make my life worse but rob it of meaning, then perhaps I can reasonably prefer that God not exist […] The thought is that in a world where complete privacy is impossible, where one is subordinated to a superior being, certain kinds of life plans, aspirations, and projects cannot make sense. I suspect that certain actual life plans, aspirations, and projects that revolve around these values do not make sense, if the world is like that […] Theists sometime claim that if God does not exist, life has no meaning. I am now suggesting that if God does exist, the life of at least some would lose its meaning (Kahane 2011, 691–692) This is considered the first statement of what has come to be known as the Meaningful Life Argument for Anti-theism (Penner 2015). Myron A. Penner has criticized the argument by suggesting that because people are sometimes mistaken about what constitutes a meaningful life, that this is a reason to doubt a person’s life really will lose meaning if God exists (2015). But unless Penner wants to reject the goods mentioned by Kahane (e.g., independence, understanding, privacy, and solitude), he can’t appeal to human fallibility about what constitutes a meaningful life to sidestep the argument (Lougheed 2017). Finally, Penner claims that the goods in question don’t obtain in a full sense on atheism either. Yet the relevant goods nevertheless obtain to a lesser degree on theism and this is all the anti-theist needs to avoid Penner’s objection (Penner 2018, Lougheed 2020a). Notice that the Meaningful Life Argument is consistent with many different conceptions of what constitutes a meaningful life, with the obvious exception of supernatural theories which say God’s existence is necessary for a meaningful life (Lougheed 2020a, 46–47). Furthermore, note that this argument as described in the Kahane quote only supports narrow personal anti-theism, the view that God’s existence is (or would be) worse for certain individuals with respect to meaning. However, if meaning in life is so important and if losing it is entailed by God’s existence, then wide personal anti-theism is true (i.e., the view the God’s existence does, or would, make things worse for certain individuals overall). Now, remember my goal here is to evaluate this argument from the perspective of ubuntu. In order to accomplish this, the following

Ubuntu and Anti-Theism 39 two questions need to be answered: (i) according to ubuntu what constitutes a meaningful life? And (ii) is such a conception compatible with the existence of God? I take each question in turn.

3.2.2  Evaluation of the Meaningful Life Argument from Ubuntu Recently, Thaddeus Metz offers a synthesis of the main African theories of meaning in life which are currently less systematized than many other areas of inquiry in African scholarship. 3 He identifies two theories, the first of which is most consistent with ubuntu. This first view says that a life is meaningful inasmuch as it promotes community with others (Metz forthcoming). For instance, according to Gessler Muxe Nkondo: If you asked ubuntu advocates and philosophers: What principles inform and organise your life? What do you live for? What motive force or basic attitude gives your life meaning?….the answers would express commitment to the good of the community in which their identities were formed, and a need to experience their lives as bound up in that of their community (Nkondo 2007, 91 quoted in forthcoming) ‘Promoting other people’s good’ and ‘caring for other’s quality of life’ are the main ways to foster community (Metz 2020a). Here is Metz’s formal statement of the Communal Theory of Meaning: “A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she cares for others’ quality of life and shares a way of life with them” (Metz 2020a, 117; emphasis mine). The second African theory of meaning in life Metz explores is based on vitality or liveliness. According to the Vitalist Theory of Meaning: “A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she promotes liveliness in herself and others” (Metz 2020a, 120). Notice the communal nature of this theory too; the meaning in one’s life is partly connected to how much she helps others. I have followed Metz in describing these two theories in completely secular or naturalistic terms. However, Metz rightly notes that many Africans would include supernatural entities in their descriptions about what makes life meaningful. Such entities include God, spirits, ancestors, and the living dead.4 For example, with respect to vitality, Metz writes that “[t]raditionally, it has been conceived as being an imperceptible energy that has come from God and that inheres in everything in the universe in varying degrees and complexities” (2020a, 119). While I have stated from the outset that I will work with a secular theory of ubuntu that I hope is compatible with many religious conceptions of it,

40  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism this seems to be a place where the two necessarily come apart (at least with respect to this axiological investigation). For on relational theories of meaning in life (either communal or vitality) which include God in their ontology, it cannot be the case that one’s life will lose meaning if it turns out that God exists. For these are relational theories of meaning which include God as a candidate in the community to enjoy such relationships. At this point someone could ask whether God is necessary for such communal theories. For Metz has described both theories quite coherently in completely naturalistic terms. Why do these theories need God? But remember this is not the sort of question under consideration. The question isn’t whether God or other supernatural entities should be part of an ubuntu conception of meaning in life. Instead, the question is whether (on the assumption an ubuntu conception of meaning in life is true) God’s existence could be thought to hinder or altogether prevent one from having a meaningful life. And, it doesn’t seem like God’s existence would limit or altogether preclude meaning in life on either the communal or vitality theories of meaning. For God is a perfectly legitimate candidate to be part of the community on these theories. It’s therefore doubtful that from an ubuntu perspective, considerations about the meaning of life could be used to support anti-theism. In what follows I explore arguments based on some of the individual goods for anti-theism, many of which were first mentioned by Kahane within the context of the Meaningful Life Argument. For these goods could support versions of anti-theism even if not connected to meaning in life (Lougheed 2020a, Part II). One advantage of this strategy is that in evaluating these goods separately from meaning it allows the anti-theist to leverage them even if she can’t successfully appeal to them regarding considerations about meaning in life.

3.3 Privacy Privacy has been considered as a reason for anti-theism since the first series of articles on the axiology of theism (e.g., Kahane 2011; Lougheed 2017; Penner 2015, 2018). Roughly, a person has privacy inasmuch as she is able to control access to personal information about herself (Lougheed 2020a, Ch. 3).5 The first formulation of the argument defends narrow personal anti-theism while the subsequent versions attempt to widen the scope. 3.3.1  The Privacy Argument Narrow Personal for Anti-Theism If God exists, then God necessarily violates the privacy of all humans at all times. This is simply a logical consequence of the fact that God is all-knowing and all-powerful. God knows where every individual is in

Ubuntu and Anti-Theism 41 time and space along with their thoughts and even their unique phenomenological experiences. Some might object that even if this is the case humans aren’t really aware of God constantly violating their privacy. However, while it’s true that humans may often have the experience of privacy even if God exists, it doesn’t follow that they in fact have privacy.6 Furthermore, as my example below will demonstrate, there’s little reason to hold that the experience of privacy is just as valuable as actual privacy. Finally, some have wondered whether we should really be concerned if God violates our privacy since God, being morallyperfect, won’t use the information about us for ill. However, this response is problematic for a number of reasons. To see why none of the above objections will do consider the following example: imagine a perfect voyeur (Doyle 2009). This voyeur loves to spy and collect photos of people when they are in the privacy of their home. The voyeur is perfect because they never get caught and they never use the information for ill. It brings the voyeur great pleasure to take and possess the photos but that is where the malfeasance ends. Also imagine that the voyeur lives many light years away on a distant planet and is thus operating at a completely different time from when the invasions of privacy are taking place on earth (Doyle 2009, 181–187).7 The point of this example is to show that what the voyeur does is wrong and still constitutes a privacy violation even if the people spied on are never directly harmed by it.8 In light of this, I submit that it doesn’t matter that God does not use the information about us for ill, it is still a harm. Remember too, I’m not claiming that this is God’s fault since God’s character is immutable and this violation of privacy simply falls out of the fact that she is all-knowing and all-powerful. But it remains that this is a disadvantage of God’s existence. These considerations establish narrow personal anti-theism, the view that a world with God is worse than a world without God at least for certain individuals with respect to privacy, and for certain individuals. 3.3.2  Evaluation of the Narrow Personal Privacy Argument on Ubuntu If ubuntu is true it is again less clear that considerations about privacy can be leveraged to support anti-theism. Does a privacy violation promote shared identity or instead division? Does it promote solidarity or instead ill will? On an ubuntu ethic it appears that, contrary to what the argument says above, it really does matter what is done with the information in question. If the information accessed is used to promote a shared identity and foster solidarity then maybe privacy violations are permissible, if not obligatory. On the other hand, if privacy violations were to harm relationality by fostering division and ill will then such violations would be impermissible.

42  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism Humans are hardly morally perfect (indeed usually far from it) and so maybe we are rightly wary of other people gaining private information about us without our consent. We just can’t ever be sure what they’ll do with it. As such maybe on an ubuntu ethic a reason against such privacy invasions is just the mere possibility that it could be used to foster division and ill will. On the other hand, God, as a morally perfect being may use the knowledge to promote shared identity and solidarity between humans with each other and also towards God. We can all be assured that God knows everything about us, thereby sharing a life with us, having our best interests at heart, caring for our quality of life, etc. We would be closer to God and God would be closer to us in a way many people conceive of heaven. If God is the final judge (as the Judeo monotheistic religions claim) then we can all be assured of a fair hearing since God has all the relevant information required to fairly judge each individual. On ubuntu (and again this is consistent with at least some monotheistic traditions), God’s complete knowledge would also foster forgiveness and reconciliation between humans and God. On ubuntu, another relevant difference between the perfect voyeur case and God is based on the different ways in which they are members of the community. As a morally perfect being, God doesn’t flout the value of sharing a way of life with humans. The lack of privacy between God and humans perhaps fosters the type of social co-operation so important on ubuntu and hence fosters a greater sense of togetherness with humans. The voyeur, on the other hand, exhibits anti-social behaviour. She learns about us without our consent and unlike God, she could do otherwise. Hence the voyeur does not exhibit solidarity or identity (the two most important aspects of ubuntu) with the people she spies on. In discussing similar examples, Metz further explains why such actions are wrong on an ubuntu ethic. He writes: [P]art of what is involved in a communal relationship is engaging in mutual aid, acting so as to improve others’ quality of life, but another part is sharing a way of life, where this includes experiencing a sense of togetherness and participating in common activities. It is these latter values that would be flouted by the present actions. To genuinely share a way of life with others requires transparency about the way one is interacting with them. To relate to others without their informed consent is to treat the value of community, or those individuals capable of it, with disrespect and hence is incompatible with developing one’s personhood (Metz 2013a, 159)

3.3.3  The Privacy Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Theism One way of expanding the privacy argument to include wide (i.e., overall) judgements is by connecting it to considerations about the meaning

Ubuntu and Anti-Theism 43 of life (Lougheed 2020a, 78–83). If an individual’s life pursuits and hence meaning is so intimately connected to privacy that her life will be meaningless without it, then a world without privacy is worse overall than one with it (at least for the individual in question). Hence, for certain individuals, a world where God exists is worse overall than a world where God doesn’t exist. So, wide personal anti-theism is established, at least with respect to certain individuals. Some might object that while a meaningful life is quite valuable, there are certain goods that outweigh it. For example, an eternal (good) afterlife is more valuable than a meaningful life (Lougheed 2020a, 89–90). However, it’s plausible that a world where individuals have a meaningful life is always better than a world where they do not, no matter what goods are offered in conjunction with a meaningless life (Lougheed 2020a, 95–98). Finally, even if this argument cannot support the axiological judgement about wide personal anti-theism, this could be a place where axiological judgements and rational preferences come apart. It might be rational for an individual to prefer a meaningful life to one in which she has eternal life even if she recognizes that eternal life is objectively better. Remember too that my aim here is not to evaluate these arguments on their own. I’m simply assuming that these arguments succeed on the previous Western framework I had in mind while developing them. I’m only evaluating them from the perspective of ubuntu. 3.3.4  Evaluation of the Wide Personal Anti-Theism Privacy Argument for Anti-Theism on Ubuntu As discussed above it’s difficult in the first place to motivate the privacy argument for narrow personal anti-theism on ubuntu. Furthermore, I’ve already shown that it’s difficult to defend the Meaningful Life Argument if ubuntu is true. The community is of central importance for life’s meaning on ubuntu. On ubuntu, it is bizarre to think that one could have a meaningful life apart from a thriving community. If an individual has meaning inasmuch as she is in harmony with others, or is increasing the vitality of others, then it’s doubtful that considerations about privacy can connect to meaning on ubuntu. I’ve already shown above that at least with respect to God, lacking privacy might not be bad on ubuntu. Inasmuch as this doesn’t promote discord then on ubuntu it cannot be said that a person’s life would lose meaning if they lacked privacy from God. Expanding the scope of the argument doesn’t rescue it from any of these considerations. 3.3.5  The Value of Privacy I close this section on the Privacy Argument by noting a more general worry for the argument. While I’ve been attempting to take the argument

44  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism on its own terms and just grant that privacy is valuable, this might seem like a rather unrealistic concession, especially to African scholars. This is especially so when one considers personhood accounts of ubuntu. On such accounts, an individual cannot develop their personhood outside of the community. Inasmuch as privacy isolates an individual, it prevents her from achieving personhood (in the African normative sense of the term). And anything that prevents someone from achieving personhood ought to be avoided. Persons (again in the normative sense) cannot exist out of the community and thus cannot exist without lacking what is likely a significant degree of privacy. Furthermore, even on the capacity for friendliness approach to ubuntu, the capacity itself cannot be exercised apart from other people.9 Again, to have such interactions at least some degree of privacy must be sacrificed. In general, the communal nature in general of many African communities is such that strong considerations about privacy will not factor into axiological judgements. Thus, even though I am trying to evaluate these arguments within their original framework inasmuch as possible, granting that privacy is valuable may be a concession that those who endorse ubuntu are unwilling to embrace. If this is right, then the Privacy Argument does not even get off the ground if ubuntu is true.

3.4 Dignity Another good sometimes associated with anti-theism is dignity. If the existence of God causes individuals to lack dignity, this would be a negative feature of God’s existence. In this section I outline two arguments for anti-theism with different scopes, evaluating them each on an ubuntu ethic. 3.4.1  The Dignity Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism Dignity has been gestured at as a reason in defence of narrow personal anti-theism (Lougheed 2020a, 121–122).10 The specific worry about dignity is nicely summarized by a principle Metz explores in his work on the meaning of life. This principle says that: “[I]t is disrespectful to create a person for any purpose other than to pursue its own purposes” (Metz 2013b, 103). We rightfully cringe at parents who push their children to accomplish ends the child does not desire to fulfil. Consider the Canadian father who pushes his son to play competitive ice hockey when he has no desire to do so. The problem for theism is that if these considerations are correct, then God’s existence results in a loss of dignity for each person. This is because God necessarily creates humans for her own purposes. Judeo-Christian monotheism tends to affirm the idea that the sole end of humankind is to worship and bring glory to God or perhaps to be in perfect union/relationship with God. Furthermore, even if God

Ubuntu and Anti-Theism 45 allows humans to pursue their own ends, this allowance would be what God desires. The result of this is to say that God’s existence constitutes a serious dignity harm. One tempting response to this argument is to say that God could create humans to pursue their own ends. Consider that supportive parents are often said to be the ones that support their children in pursuing their own purposes (within certain parameters). The parents create the children with the purpose of allowing them to pursue their own ends. However, there are reasons to be suspicious of this analogy. Humans are highly fallible and as such parents may not be very well positioned to choose the best purpose for their children. Furthermore, humans are very bad at predicting outcomes, which is another reason to doubt a parent’s ability to choose purposes well. But God doesn’t suffer from such deficiencies. The purposes she would assign to humans are necessarily perfect and hence necessarily better than any purposes humans could arrive at on their own. In any case, such considerations are thought to establish narrow personal anti-theism (Lougheed 2020a, 122–126). 3.4.2  Evaluation of the Dignity Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism on Ubuntu What does an ubuntu worldview say about arguments for anti-theism based on concerns about dignity? It seems less clear that proponents of ubuntu would take these concerns to constitute legitimate dignity harms. There are at least two reasons why this is the case. First, it is much more common in African culture in general, and on an ubuntu ethic in particular, to hold that it is wrong to fail to procreate children through marriage (Metz 2007, 27). The proponent of ubuntu is, therefore, less likely to think that procreation, in general, is wrong, let alone that it is wrong for reasons other than so the created person can fulfil their own ends. On this view, procreation is rather viewed as benefitting the entire community; it helps to promote a shared identity and solidarity amongst community members. Likewise, on personhood accounts of ubuntu, individuals cannot morally develop apart from the community since doing so requires the exercise of other-regarding virtues. Instead of focusing on the dignity of the individual being created, ubuntu prompts focus on the dignity of the individual through community. Finally, an African ethic that focuses on increasing vitality in oneself and others places importance on procreation since it is a way to create a being with vitality. Second, Metz’s friendliness conception of ubuntu explained in Chapter Two says that an individual’s dignity is the result of her capacity for friendliness (i.e., her capacity for solidarity and identity). This version of dignity is not about the specific ends that individuals are able to pursue, even if those ends happen to be communal. Rather, the idea is that an

46  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism individual only has dignity because of her capacity to relate to others in positive ways. For example, Tutu writes that “[w]e are different so that we can know our need of one another, for no one is ultimately self-sufficient. The completely self-sufficient person would be subhuman” (1999, 214). There would be something fundamentally ‘undignified’ about the person who has the capacity for friendliness but chooses never to exercise it. It is therefore unlikely that the conception of dignity used in support of the above argument for anti-theism is compatible with what an ubuntu ethic has to say about dignity. 3.4.3  Ubuntu and the Wide Personal Dignity Argument for Anti-Theism Given the difficultly of establishing narrow personal anti-theism based on considerations about dignity, it is unlikely that considerations about dignity and the meaning of life could be leveraged to expand the argument’s scope to wide personal anti-theism. But briefly, here is how such an argument might go: if God’s existence entails that individuals have no dignity (or less than they otherwise would), then this is a reason to think God’s existence makes the world worse overall. Perhaps dignity is such a great good that it supersedes the advantages associated with theism. Or, if dignity is necessary for a meaningful life, then this is yet another way in which God’s existence would hinder people’s ability to have a meaningful life. Furthermore, the scope of the ‘personal’ here applies to ‘all-persons’ since if God exists, then necessarily every individual was created for another’s purposes. The problem, however, in attempting to expand the argument in this way is that all of the considerations which suggest that the argument fails to establish narrow personal anti-theism from an ubuntu perspective apply equally here as well. One’s dignity and hence meaning in life is not threatened by the existence of God on ubuntu.

3.5 Sacrifice 3.5.1  The Genuine Sacrifice Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism Suppose that, roughly, agent A makes a genuine sacrifice for agent B if her well-being is inalterably compromised because she helped B.11 With this understanding of sacrifice in mind, another argument for anti-theism says that the world is better with respect to sacrifice if God doesn’t exist. This is because there is a sense in which genuine sacrifice is impossible if Western monotheism (along with a few other plausible assumptions) is true (Lougheed 2020a, 144–145). Here’s why: many theists hold that God’s existence logically entails that there are no instances of gratuitous

Ubuntu and Anti-Theism 47 evil.12 Likewise, many theists also hold more specifically that the evil cannot be gratuitous for the individual that experiences it. For example, in order for God to permit agent A to experience an evil, it can’t just be that it leads to an otherwise unobtainable good for someone else. It has to be the case that agent A herself receives the otherwise unobtainable good (or some greater evil is prevented from occurring to her). These assumptions, so the argument goes, combine to entail that there can’t be genuine sacrifice on theism. This is because agent A will necessarily benefit from helping agent B otherwise God couldn’t permit the action. If agent A is unalterably compromised, then the action would be a gratuitous evil for her. There are many different ways this argument can branch out, so I only examine a few here. Consider that it might not be better for agent A, the individual making the sacrifice, to not be compensated for her action. For it might be a better state of affairs for agent A to avoid the greater good by not making a genuine sacrifice in the first place. However, it’s unclear to me whether this is also a better state of affairs for other individuals. Is it better for agent B if A makes a genuine or only apparent sacrifice? While intuitions are likely to vary about this case, I believe that for others it is a better state of affairs for agent A to have made a genuine rather than apparent sacrifice. Why? A genuine sacrifice is a great act of love and a world where such acts occur (or could possibly occur) is better than worlds where they don’t (or cannot) occur. So it is better, at least for some individuals (even if not for the individual making the sacrifice), that the world contains genuine sacrifice (or at least allows for the possibility of such sacrifices). If successful, this line of thought establishes narrow personal anti-theism. 3.5.2  Evaluation of the Genuine Sacrifice Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism on Ubuntu Ubuntu’s emphasis on community makes it difficult to employ considerations about genuine sacrifice in an argument for anti-theism. The above discussion is framed in terms of one individual sacrificing for the sake of another individual. Those who endorse ubuntu are unlikely to understand this sort of sacrifice, particularly in the limited context in which it is described here. On ubuntu the health and vitality of the community is of prime importance. Remember that on personhood accounts of ubuntu there can be no individual persons (in the normative sense) without the community. Likewise, even on the capacity for friendliness approach, actions are evaluated in relation to other people and hence always within the context of community. In this way such sacrifices as described above are unlikely to be understood as an individual giving something up for someone else or for the group. For no individual can flourish apart from the group such that it’s not really a matter of Agent

48  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism A sacrificing for others. The sacrifice is just as much for Agent A as for anyone else. Furthermore, those who endorse ubuntu are less likely to understand the value of an individual sacrificing for another individual without reference to the benefit of the community. They’re unlikely to interpret this as a great act of love in the first place, even if it isn’t parsed out in terms of who it helps the community to flourish. The Argument from Genuine sacrifice is yet another argument for anti-theism which is more difficult to establish if ubuntu is true. Finally, analogous reasoning to that made in Section 4.2 can be made here with respect to attempting to expand the Genuine Sacrifice Argument to support wide personal anti-theism. All of the same considerations mentioned here will apply equally to this broader version too.

3.6 Understanding 3.6.1  The Understanding Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism Understanding is another good that has been gestured at in defence of anti-theism (Penner 2015; Maitzen 2018; Oppy 2020; Lougheed 2020a, 156–157). If theism is true, then the universe is fundamentally unknowable in at least two important ways. The first is that it is impossible for humans to have a complete understanding of God. Myron A. Penner writes that “many theistic traditions will affirm in some sense the notion of God as an infinite being, the complete comprehension of whom is impossible […] God’s existence would entail that this good [i.e., complete understanding] could never be achieved” (Penner 2015, 332). The second way that many versions of theism negatively impacts understanding involves human inquiry. Consider that in the Judeo-Christian tradition there exists more than the physical world and therefore more than what can be known through the normal methods of human inquiry. Moreover, this is a common aspect of all of the major monotheistic traditions in Traditional African Religion, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Graham Oppy puts this point nicely when he writes that: [On theism] things are not as they seem. Very roughly speaking, what is distinctive of naturalism is that, in the causal domain, it is committed to just those kinds of things for which there is expert agreement on their existence. Were it not for the fact that we are not all experts on all subject matters, what would be distinctive of naturalism, in the causal domain, is that it is committed only to those kinds of things to which everyone is committed. Thus, there is a sense in which naturalism is the yardstick for how things seem to us: naturalism is committed to just those kinds of things that is seems to us, considered collectively, that there are. Consequently, in that

Ubuntu and Anti-Theism 49 same sense, non-naturalists are committed to the claim that things are not as they seem: there are nonnatural kinds of entities whose existence evades a significant proportion of the experts among us and yet are known to those non-naturalists (Oppy 2020, 89) These considerations represent ways in which understanding is possible only to a lesser degree on theism than on atheism. Minimally, these ideas support narrow personal anti-theism. For inasmuch as an individual values the good of complete understanding, a world with God is worse than a world without God, at least with respect to understanding. 3.6.2  Evaluation of the Understanding Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism on Ubuntu In exploring the appropriate ends that could justify a (publicly funded) African university Metz identifies the five candidates most discussed in the literature: Foster development (i.e., socio-economic improvement); Support culture (i.e., preservation and transmission); Rectify Injustices; Promote personhood (in the African sense of character traits) and; Realise the Majority’s Aspirations (Metz 2009, 185–187).13 Metz rejects the final two ends and instead suggests that they should be replaced with: Realize Equal Opportunity; and Facilitate Co-operation (2009, 191–192). My reason for drawing attention to this discussion about education is to show that nowhere does the idea that knowledge and understanding is inherently valuable enter into the typical justifications of African universities. On most African traditional worldviews, and even on contemporary interpretations of ubuntu more generally, understanding and knowledge simply aren’t valuable for their own sakes.14 If this is right, considerations about understanding cannot be used to formulate an argument for anti-theism from the perspective of ubuntu. That knowledge and understanding are valuable is the most basic assumption required in order for any version of this argument to get off the ground. Recently, however, Metz argues that there are ways that understanding and knowledge could be considered inherently valuable on ubuntu. This is admittedly a non-standard view, but inasmuch as Metz’s suggestion is successful it is a way to save the Understanding Argument to at least some degree. Metz suggests that pursuing knowledge for its own sake can often confer meaning on one’s life (2019, 11–13). He observes that “the focus of a sub-Saharan account of right action is on people’s needs, understood either biologically and psychologically, on the one hand, or socially, on the other. My proposal is that an additional sort of human need, under-theorized in the African tradition, is existential” (Metz 2019, 14). People don’t just value self-realization through right

50  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism relationships with one’s community, something greatly prized in African thought; they also value accomplishments that merit lasting admiration. Thus: If people’s dignity gives us moral reason to go out of our way to help them, then the help should include assistance in achieving what is particularly worth having in life, which includes meaning. And if part of caring about people’s good is indeed a matter of enabling them to live meaningfully, and if that includes understanding certain objective truths about humanity and the world in which we live, then it follows that we have some reason to promote some knowledge for its own sake. (Metz 2019, 14) If Metz’s suggestion is right, then even from the perspective of ubuntu, understanding and knowledge could be rightly considered intrinsically valuable. The natural follow-up question to this is what impact God’s existence has on this conception of knowledge and understanding which is meant to be consistent with ubuntu. Here I hold that many of the considerations mentioned in the original argument will apply. Full knowledge of God is impossible, and the world is also fundamentally mysterious in important ways. This, then, is perhaps one argument for anti-theism that can be treated favourably on ubuntu; at least if Metz’s suggested defence of knowledge and understanding for its own sake is correct. For if gaining a complete understanding of the universe would increase the meaning in life for at least certain individuals, then it is an act of solidarity and identity with those individuals when others help them achieve knowledge and understanding. If helping others in this way is indeed an act of solidarity and identity, then God’s existence makes things worse with respect to knowledge and understanding. For as stated, God is something fundamentally inscrutable. Likewise, normal methods of inquiry don’t apply to the supernatural world.15 One worry we might have for Metz’s account is that, supposing that theist world and atheist world are identical apart from God’s existence, there’s actually more potential knowledge in a theist world. The theist world contains God and so there is an additional item in the theist world about which humans can learn.16 This worry shows that in order to successfully leverage Metz’s account, I require an additional assumption. It doesn’t only need to be the case that gaining knowledge is good; it also needs to be the case that lacking knowledge (i.e., ignorance) is inherently bad. For while it’s true there is an additional thing one can learn about in theist worlds there is also more potential ignorance in such worlds. This is because while we might learn some things about God’s nature, there is much that we will necessarily remain ignorant about with

Ubuntu and Anti-Theism 51 respect to God. Thus, the assumption that ignorance is bad is required to successfully appeal to Metz’s account. 3.6.3  Ubuntu and the Understanding Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Theism Notice that the considerations in 3.6.2 nicely lend themselves to support a version of the understanding argument that can defend wide personal anti-theism. This is because part of Metz’s defence of the value of knowledge for its own sake is that it can contribute to meaning in a person’s life. If meaning in life is a great good such that it swamps other considerations, then at least for the individuals in question (i.e., the ones who value knowledge) their lives lose meaning (or have less meaning) if God exists. Again, the reason that this is consistent with ubuntu is because on an ubuntu ethic the community has an obligation to help enable the individuals within it to have meaningful lives. If certain individuals value knowledge, then the community has at least some reason to promote knowledge for its own sake. Unlike the other arguments for anti-theism considered thus far, the Understanding Argument appears to get a sympathetic hearing from ubuntu, albeit on a new and non-standard approach to it.

3.7  Why Atheist Worlds Are Necessarily the Best In this section I examine a more general argument for anti-theism that doesn’t appeal to the quality and quantity of specific goods like all of the arguments discussed above. Inspired from recent work by Guy Kahane (2018) this argument says that the best atheist worlds are necessarily better than the best theistic worlds. 3.7.1  The Superior Atheist Worlds Argument for Anti-Theism Briefly, the reasoning for this is as follows: atheist worlds are only necessarily worlds where God doesn’t exist. They aren’t necessarily naturalistic worlds even though ‘atheism’ and ‘naturalism’ are often conflated in contemporary philosophy of religion. Once this distinction is acknowledged it’s easy to see why the best atheist worlds are always better than the best theist worlds. For an atheist world could contain a very powerful supernatural being that ensures many of the advantages of theism are obtained without any (or as many) of the disadvantages of theism. Or there could be multiple supernatural beings that are able to ensure this occurs. Even in a purely naturalistic world, maybe an impersonal mechanism ensures goods such as cosmic justice and a good afterlife, etc. In light of such considerations it’s possible to conclude that while the very best worlds (the ones that contain the advantages of theism and atheism

52  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism but not the disadvantages) are atheistic. Since the very best worlds are just that, i.e., the best, anti-theism is established. And furthermore, wide personal anti-theism is established since it would be better for every person to have all of the advantages associated with theism while simultaneously avoiding all of the disadvantages.17 3.7.2  Evaluation of the Superior Atheist Worlds Argument for Anti-Theism on Ubuntu On the assumption that ubuntu is true, the strength of this general argument is at least somewhat weakened. Recall I suggested above that while the arguments for anti-theism based on goods such as privacy, dignity, and genuine sacrifice are more difficult to establish on the assumption that ubuntu is true. If it turns out that these aren’t that valuable on ubuntu, then to say that an atheist world avoids them is not thereby to indicate that the world in question has a high positive axiological status. This argument appeals to the cumulative value of the goods associated with atheism, but that value is lessened from the perspective of ubuntu. In order to fully evaluate this argument, we need to know how ubuntu evaluates the advantages typically associated with theism which will be discussed in the next chapter. Much more remains to be said, but as it stands the success of this argument is called into question once it is evaluated from the perspective of ubuntu.

3.8  Intrinsic Versus Relational Goods The final topic in this chapter that I want to address from the perspective of ubuntu has to do with the categories used to distinguish between different types of judgements. Defences of anti-theism that appeal to the advantages mentioned above typically defend personal versions of anti-theism. However, many arguments for both anti-theism and pro-theism are ambiguous about the scope of ‘personal’ (Lougheed 2020a, 98–99). For it’s often not clear whether ‘personal’ refers to just one person, some persons, or all persons. Perhaps for some of these arguments, the scope doesn’t much matter. For example, if an individual values her privacy, then God’s existence does (or would) make the world worse in that respect. Framing this as a conditional allows the proponent of the argument to make no claims about how many people the antecedent applies to in the real world (if at all). Still, I think proponents of the above arguments are inclined to say these are disadvantages of God’s existence for everyone even if there are people who fail to recognize that this is the case. My reason for drawing attention to the appropriate treatment of ‘personal’ is because the way in which these goods are conceived on western frameworks is importantly different from how they are conceived on an ubuntu ethic. On personhood accounts, the individual ought to strive

Ubuntu and Anti-Theism 53 to develop a virtuous character which she can only achieve by relating well with others. Likewise, in Metz’s approach that humans have dignity in virtue of their capacity to relate well with others. In this way, ‘personal’ goods are still quite important on ubuntu, though they are always framed within the context of community and hence quite different from typical western understandings. These goods are rightly considered as final values, but they are extrinsic. These observations point to a fundamental difference between intrinsic goods and relational goods.18 Both fall in the category of personal goods, but the atheistic goods discussed in this chapter are intrinsic, not relational goods. This is so even though it is right to consider the goods in question as final ends. Does the distinction between intrinsic and relational goods matter for axiological assessments? For instance, it has been observed that while atheistic goods tend to be personal and theistic goods tend to be impersonal, without a principled reason to favour one type of good over the other this distinction cannot be used as a reason to support either anti-theism or pro-theism (Lougheed 2019). However, this observation was made from a Western perspective, and one that certainly didn’t have a communitarian ethic like ubuntu in view. If ubuntu is true, there might well be a principled reason to prefer personal relational goods to personal intrinsic goods. This is because it is personal relational goods that enable one to develop other-regarding virtues (as emphasized in personhood accounts) and to exercise the capacity for friendliness (as emphasized in Metz’s account). In other words, the personal relational goods are more important because of the primacy given to the community. This distinction thus helps to explain why it has been difficult to establish anti-theism on the assumption that ubuntu is true. I will say more about this distinction when I consider the axiology of ubuntu in Part III.

3.9 Conclusion This chapter represents the first attempt to bring ubuntu to bear on arguments for anti-theism so I will refrain from drawing any strong conclusions. However, this first attempt does make it clear that the anti-theistic arguments are more difficult to establish if ubuntu is true. At the very least, they seem to have much less force than they do when evaluated from the original Western perspective from which they were first offered and evaluated. A noteworthy point of difference is the distinction between intrinsic and relational goods. An ubuntu ethics simply doesn’t place as much value on the intrinsic atheistic goods such as understanding, privacy, sacrifice, and dignity. For the way these advantages of atheism are typically discussed have to do with isolated individuals, and not about how such individuals relate to others. Though this conclusion is tentative it is quite important. Recall that much of the motivation for this book is

54  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism to explore the extent to which my previous claim about intersubjective ethical agreement is accurate. If the assessments in this chapter are correct, they begin to show that my claim about intersubjective agreement may well not extend to a non-Western worldview like ubuntu. In the next chapter I analyze arguments for pro-theism on the assumption that ubuntu is true before turning to an axiological assessment of ubuntu itself in Part III.

Notes 1. The reader should see Lougheed 2020a if she wishes to evaluate these arguments in their original context. 2. This quote quite clearly inspires Kahane 2011 and Penner 2015. 3. Metz draws a distinction between ‘meaning of’ and ‘meaning in.’ The former is about the broad general purpose of humanity while the latter is about meaning for particular individuals. On this view, the Meaningful Life Argument is about meaning in life, though I use the phrases interchangeably. See Metz forthcoming b. 4. Metz cites Wiredu 1996 and Gyekye 1997 as two such influential accounts. 5. As I note in Lougheed 2020a, 57–60 there a number of different understandings of privacy. What I say here is intended to be consistent with any of the main conceptions of privacy. For more on privacy see Inness 2003. 6. For more on the difference between the experience of a good and the actual in the context of the axiology of theism see Lougheed 2018 and Hendricks and Lougheed 2019. 7. I discuss this example at length in Lougheed 2020a, 84–89. 8. Doyle is quite clear that inasmuch as privacy violations are likely to cause harm, we should adopt policies against them. He writes that “[i]f voyeurism is like drunk driving, then our response should be strong, vigorously enforced penalties, where the severity of the punishment varies according to how serious the voyeurism is” (2009, 188). 9. In private correspondence Metz says he is unsure whether in his view individuals should be thought of having duties towards themselves. If they do, then perhaps the capacity for friendliness could be developed (to some degree) in isolation from others. 10. While some point to a lack of autonomy as a reason for anti-theism, there is no clear way in which God violates human autonomy. The intuitions behind this thought are better construed as dignity harms. See Lougheed 2020a, 117–119. 11. This is modified from Lougheed 2020a, 146. 12. Indeed, this point has been made in connection to pro-theism. See Kraay and Dragos 2013. 13. For more on this see Seepe 1998, 2004; Wiredu 2004; van Wyk and Higgs 2004 14. Thanks to Thad Metz for helpful discussion. 15. In 3.6, I note that this is an important place where the axiological assessments of a religious ubuntu and secular ubuntu come apart since complete understanding is more difficult on the former than the latter. 16. Thanks to Perry Hendricks for bringing this objection to my attention.

Ubuntu and Anti-Theism 55 17. Elsewhere I challenge the assumption that all of the theistic disadvantages can be avoided while all of the advantages had in the same possible worlds. See Lougheed forthcoming. I will discuss this argument in more detail in Chapter Nine. 18. Thanks to Thad Metz for brining this distinction to my attention.

Bibliography Doyle, Tony. (2009). “Privacy and Perfect Voyeurism.” Ethics and Information Technology 11: 181–189. Gyekye, K. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York: Oxford University Press Hendricks, Perry, and Kirk Lougheed 2019). “Undermining the Axiological Solution to Divine Hiddenness.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 86(1): 3–15. Inness, Julie C. (1996) [Online 2003]. Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kahane, Guy. (2011). “Should We Want God to Exist?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82: 674–696. __________. (2018). “If There Is a Hole, It Is Not God-Shaped.” In Klaas J. Kraay (ed). Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. pp. 95–131. Kraay, Klaas J., and Chris Dragos. (2013). “On Preferring God’s Non-Existence.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43: 157–178. Lougheed, Kirk. (2020). The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan. __________. (forthcoming). “Are Atheist Worlds Really the Best?” Religious Studies. Lougheed, Kirk (2017). “Anti-Theism and the Objective Meaningful Life Argument.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 56(2): 337–355. Maitzen, Stephen. (2018). “The Problem of Magic.” In Klaas J. Kraay (ed.), Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. pp. 132–146. Metz, Thaddeus. (2007). “Toward an African Moral Theory.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 15(3): 321–341. __________. (2009). “The Final Ends of Higher Education in Light of an African Moral Theory.” Journal of Philosophy of Education 43(2): 179–201. __________. (2013a). “Two Conceptions of African Ethics in the Work of D.A. Masolo.” Quest 25: 7–15. __________. (2013b). Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press. __________. (2019). “Pursuing Knowledge for Its Own Sake Amidst a World of Poverty: Reconsidering Balogun on Philosophy’s Relevance.”  Filosofia Theoretica 8(2): 1–18. __________. (forthcoming b). A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and beyond the Continent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. __________. (forthcoming b). “African Theories of Meaning in Life: A Critical Assessment.” South African Journal of Philosophy. Nagel, Thomas. (1997). The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

56  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism Nkondo, Gessler Muxe. (2007). “Ubuntu as a Public Policy in South Africa: A Conceptual Framework.” International Journal of African Renaissance Studies 2: 88–100. Oppy, Graham. (2020). “Commentary on ‘The Axiology of Theism: Expanding the Contrast Classes’.” In Kirk Lougheed (ed.), Four Views on the Axiology of Theism. New York: Bloomsbury. Penner, Myron A. (2015). “Personal Anti-Theism and the Meaningful Life Argument.” Faith and Philosophy 32(3): 325–337. Penner, Myron A. (2018). “On the Objective Meaningful Life Argument: A Response to Kirk Lougheed.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 57: 173–182. Seepe, S. (1998). Black Perspective(s) on Tertiary Institutional Transformation. Florida Hills: Vivlia Publishers. Seepe, S. (2004). Towards an African Identity of Higher Education. Pretoria: Skotaville Media. Tutu, Desmond. (1999). No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Random House Canada. van Wyk, B., and P. Higgs. (2004). “Towards an African Philosophy of Higher Education.” South African Journal of Higher Education 18: 196–210. Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington: Indiana University Press __________. (2004). “Prolegomena to an African Philosophy of Education.” South African Journal of Higher Education 18: 17–26.

4

Ubuntu and Pro-Theism

4.1 Introduction This chapter follows much the same format as Chapter Three. However, instead of examining arguments for anti-theism, it focuses on arguments for pro-theism. Thus, this chapter will outline the most common arguments for pro-theism and then assess them from the perspective of ubuntu. The arguments for pro-theism that I will examine are based on the following considerations: all worlds with God are infinitely valuable; there is no gratuitous evil if God exists; morally good agents add values to states of affairs and God is one such agent; cosmic justice is guaranteed by God; there is a good eternal afterlife if God exists; a relationship with God is valuable; and God is the source of meaning. My analysis will demonstrate that unlike in the case of arguments for anti-theism, many of the arguments for pro-theism receive a favourable evaluation on the assumption that ubuntu is true. This is because many of the advantages associated with them can be understood as relational goods, even if they weren’t originally interpreted in this way. As it stands, then, ubuntu appears to support pro-theism more than anti-theism. According to an ubuntu ethic, it would be better if God exists rather than if God does not exist.

4.2  Infinite Intrinsic Value One underdeveloped consideration in favour of pro-theism is based on the idea that God is infinitely valuable. 4.2.1  The Infinite Value Argument for Narrow Impersonal Pro-Theism A helpful way of understanding this idea of infinite value is with the concept of intrinsic value. Scott A. Davison explains that “[t]he intrinsic properties of a thing are those that it possesses by itself, apart from any relationships it has to other things” (2018, 39). Assume that states DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-4

58  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism of affairs and concrete objects can both have intrinsic value. Further assume that intrinsic value comes in degrees. Given that God is a maximal being, it follows that “if God did not exist, there would be nothing that possessed anything like this degree of intrinsic value” (Davison 2018, 43). As a maximal being, then, God is infinitely intrinsically valuable. Furthermore, even if one rejects the idea that God is infinite, God is still the most intrinsically valuable thing that exists. These considerations can be used to establish the relatively modest conclusion of narrow impersonal pro-theism. It’s impersonal because intrinsic value is not had in relation to anything else, including other persons. It’s narrow because the claim is that God’s existence is better than God’s non-existence just with respect to intrinsic value. Maybe God exists in a world where free creatures go wrong with respect to every choice that they make such that it’s plausible to think that the world in question is worse overall than a godless one where such creatures usually choose the good. 4.2.2  Evaluation of the Infinite Value Argument for Narrow Impersonal Pro-Theism on Ubuntu One might think that this is a natural place where religious and secular versions of ubuntu come apart. With respect to infinite intrinsic value, wouldn’t theistic versions of ubuntu that posit the existence of a maximal God have a clear advantage over their secular counterparts? Wouldn’t the very same reasoning used above apply equally here? The answer, however, is not so clear. We first need more clarity about what it means for something to be intrinsically valuable. While Davison definition of intrinsic value includes relationality, following Christine Korsgaard (1983) a better focus is on the location of value. According to Korsgaard to say that something is intrinsically valuable is for goodness to be located in the thing itself. This is sometimes mistakenly contrasted with instrumental value. However, it is more accurately contrasted with extrinsic value which locates the value of a thing outside of itself (Korsgaard 1983, 169–170). This leaves open room for another pair of helpful contrasting distinctions. For a thing to have a final value is to say that it’s valued for its own sake. This is contrasted with instrumental value: the value a thing has when it is valued for the sake of something else. (Korsgaard 1983, 169–170). In this subsection I’m first going to explore a secular version of ubuntu that has a concept of intrinsic value found in what’s called vitality. This will show that there is a way to endorse the above argument from a secular version of ubuntu. After that I will examine this argument from the perspective of Metz’s capacity for friendliness approach and personhood accounts of ubuntu. I suggest that these views are more easily compatible with final value, instead of intrinsic value. I conclude by exploring whether the Infinite Value Argument can be reformulated to accommodate this fact.

Ubuntu and Pro-Theism 59 4.2.3  Intrinsic Value and Vitality We will see below that on ubuntu it’s likely easier to have final value as opposed to intrinsic value. However, one idea that is consistent with various accounts of ubuntu says that humans have dignity inasmuch as they have vitality, which can be understood as liveliness (Metz 2012, 25). On this view, “what makes us more special than plants and animals, for instance, is roughly that we have a much greater liveliness or creative power than they” (Metz 2012, 25). This includes the capacity to exercise autonomy and rationality, but it isn’t limited to them. In light of this, “[d]eeming our dignity to inhere in the capacity for creative power means that according human rights is to treat this capacity of others with respect, and, correspondingly, that violating human rights is to severely degrade this capacity” (Metz 2012, 25). Notice that the value here is located inside a person and is therefore plausibly construed as intrinsic. Not only can this understanding of intrinsic value be preserved when applied to God, but this vital account is actually a secularized version of life force, a grounding for dignity found in African Traditional Religion.1 On this religious conception: Life force is traditionally interpreted as a valuable, spiritual or invisible energy that inheres in physical or visible things. Everything in the universe, even an inanimate object such as a rock, is thought to be good by virtue of having some degree of life force, with animate beings hav[ing] a greater share of it than inanimate ones, human beings having more than plants and animals, ancestors, whose physical bodies have died but who live on in spiritual realm, having even more than human beings, and God, the source of all life force, having the most. (Metz 2012, 24; emphasis mine) With this in view, the Infinite Value Argument for pro-theism clearly succeeds on conceptions of ubuntu that can accommodate vitality/life force. For in any world in which God exists, necessarily, the being with the most life force will exist. Since life force is intrinsically valuable, then any world with God has the most such intrinsic value. This may come apart from the above argument in two ways. First, it is unclear that a world with God where every other thing (both animate and inanimate) has a very low amount of life force will really be considered a good world. On the face of it, it seems that such a world would be a very bad world on both religious and secular understandings of life force. Second, and related, it’s unclear that the concept of infinite can be applied to life force (or other concepts in African thought and African Traditional Religion more generally). It’s true that God has the most life force, and so any world with God will have some intrinsic value. But this isn’t ever

60  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism understood in terms of infinite value. And this is important because it’s the fact of infinite value that is supposed to outweigh any other bad things in the world in question. Without this, the argument seems to lose its broad scope. A world with God is still valuable, but God’s existence wouldn’t serve to guarantee that such a world is more valuable than a Godless world. 4.2.4  Intrinsic Value and the Capacity for Friendliness On Metz’s conception of ubuntu, it is a thing’s capacity to be the object and subject of friendliness that makes it intrinsically valuable. The value of an agent is located in its capacity for friendliness and this is found within the agent. As such, on Korsgaard’s definition, it makes sense to identify this as an intrinsic value. This is different from locating intrinsic value in vitality, but it does enable us to sensibly ask whether God is intrinsically valuable on Metz’s account. The answer here is clearly ‘yes.’ For as a maximal being, God will have the highest or best possible capacity for friendliness. So, intrinsic value is located in God just in the same way that it is located in humans. Of course, understanding God in this way is different from the divine attributes often emphasized in the Judeo-Christian tradition. It’s beyond my scope here to investigate the extent to which ‘friendliness’ is an attribute consistent with the other divine attributes. But there is at least no prima facie reason for denying this to be the case. As such Metz’s account of ubuntu is consistent with the Infinite Value Argument for Narrow Impersonal Pro-Theism. 4.2.5  Intrinsic Value and Personhood On personhood accounts of ubuntu, it is less clear that the argument in question succeeds. On such accounts, what constitutes intrinsic value? The most obvious answer is to say that something is intrinsically valuable inasmuch as it relates well with others. But notice that value based on relating well with others is not intrinsic. Rather, it is extrinsic because the value in question is located outside of the agent. The value is found in the act of relating. However, this is where Korsgaard’s analysis is useful in helping us to avoid conflating extrinsic value with instrumental value. For once these are separated, we can see that even though the value of persons on this account is extrinsic, the value of relating well with others is still a final value. Hence, relationality is valuable for its own sake (and so not merely instrumentally valuable). Where does this leave us with respect to the Infinite Value Argument? On this analysis, God probably cannot be said to be intrinsically valuable. The value of God on this view isn’t located within God. If God were in a possible world with nothing else but God, then according to personhood accounts of ubuntu, God would not be intrinsically

Ubuntu and Pro-Theism 61 valuable. Relating well with others is extrinsically valuable and so occurs outside of God. So, on personhood accounts of ubuntu, the Infinite Value Argument must be rejected. However, since relationality is a final value, in our world God is plausibly the best agent at achieving this final value. For inasmuch as God is a perfectly good being, God will relate positively with others. So, while one argument for pro-theism is lost, a different one can be leveraged on this account of ubuntu. All else being equal, God’s existence is good in worlds where there are other social beings because God will necessarily relate well with them. 4.2.6  The Infinite Value Argument for Wide Impersonal and Personal Pro-Theism A different and much stronger version of the Infinite Value Argument says that every world with God is better than every world without God because every theistic world is infinitely intrinsically valuable. Since God is the only maximal being, she is the only thing that could be infinitely intrinsically valuable. Since the value in question is infinite it swamps any other value in the world; any world with God is infinitely intrinsically valuable. From this it follows that any world with God is more valuable than worlds without God. Such an argument would establish wide and impersonal and personal pro-theism. 2 The world is overall better with God than it would be without God, without reference to persons. Furthermore, it is better overall with respect to persons since whatever evil they do or however much they suffer it is swamped by the value of an intrinsically maximal God. 4.2.7  Evaluation of the Infinite Value Argument for Wide Impersonal and Personal Pro-Theism on Ubuntu On the vitality approach, this far-reaching argument doesn’t necessarily receive a positive endorsement. This is because the vitality of the other creatures in the worlds in question very much matters to the overall value of said worlds. Similar considerations apply to Metz’s capacity approach. Possible worlds that contain God but also creatures with morally significant freedom who are constantly unfriendly towards one another will be considered bad worlds. Again, the distinction between intrinsic value and final value is helpful here. On the vitality and capacity views, it’s possible to understand God as having intrinsic value. However, on these views, communality and relationality are considered very important final values. The overall axiological status of any world must include the extent to which such final values are realized. Thus, worlds in which humans constantly treat each other poorly such that they lower one another’s vitality, or consistently exercise their capacity to be unfriendly are bad worlds. Of course, on personhood accounts of

62  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism ubuntu, the final value of relating well within the context of community is of the utmost importance. So again, worlds where this final value isn’t achieved are bad. None of this is meant to minimize God’s great capacity for relationality. It’s just to say that the modal scope of this expanded argument is far too wide. For it includes worlds, which on any conception of ubuntu, are bad because the final value of positive relationality and communality isn’t achieved. In sum, the Infinite Value Argument for Narrow Impersonal Pro-Theism succeeds on various readings of ubuntu, while the expanded Wide version of it fails.

4.3  No Gratuitous Evil Another consideration in favour of pro-theism says that a world with God is better than a world without God because God’s existence entails that there are no instances of gratuitous evil. This is because many theists hold that God’s existence is logically incompatible with the existence of gratuitous evil. In this section I explain and evaluate the argument for anti-theism based on this consideration. 4.3.1  The Argument from No Gratuitous Evil for Pro-Theism Klaas J. Kraay and Chris Dragos were the first to develop this line of argument explicitly in connection to the axiology of theism (2013). They explain that: Philosophers typically maintain that while it may be morally acceptable for God to permit some evil to occur, God cannot permit any gratuitous evil to occur: on theism, any evil that occurs is permitted either for the sake of obtaining a sufficiently significant, otherwise-unobtainable good, or for the sake of preventing a sufficiently significant, otherwise-unpreventable evil […]. This […] is generally taken to be a logical consequence of the essential divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness. (Kraay and Dragos 2013, 166–167) Furthermore, it has been claimed that the guarantee of no gratuitous evil is such a great good that it makes establishing wide versions of anti-theism difficult (if not impossible) (Kraay and Dragos 2013, 167). Consider that according to this view any evil or bad-making feature in an atheist world would either disappear or be guaranteed not to be gratuitous if it occurred in a theistic world. In order for it to not be considered gratuitous, such an evil would have to lead to an otherwise unobtainable greater good (or perhaps prevent an even worse evil from occurring). If successful, this argument would establish wide personal pro-theism. It’s better both overall and for all persons that there are no instances of gratuitous evil.

Ubuntu and Pro-Theism 63 4.3.2  Evaluation of the Argument from No Gratuitous Evil for Pro-Theism on Ubuntu The guarantee of no gratuitous evil is also good from the perspective of ubuntu. Indeed, it’s difficult to see how any plausible worldview could deny that this is the case. However, what constitutes an evil in general and gratuitous evil in particular, may differ from worldview to worldview. So what constitutes an evil on ubuntu might be different from what is considered evil according to Western theists. For example, on ubuntu, the most heinous evils are those that promote discord and strife within the community. To participate in such actions dehumanizes (quite literally) the actor in question. The perpetrator is hurt just as much as the rest of the community. On Western worldviews, evils tend to be more strongly associated with violations of individual rights. For instance, the explanation as to why murder is wrong has to do with the fact that it violates an individual’s right to life and bodily autonomy. But on ubuntu, the wrongness of murder is also explained by the fact that it (permanently) cuts an individual off from the community, and simultaneously dehumanizes the murderer. The perpetrator acts in an extremely unfriendly manner and promotes disharmony. These differences aren’t necessarily intended to show that the claim about no gratuitous evil can’t support pro-theism from the perspective of ubuntu. Rather, they show that the analysis of evil has to be expanded to clearly not only include, but also to emphasize, harms to the community. Inasmuch as the conception of evil can be successfully expanded to include these evils, without losing the more individual ones the Western theist likely has in mind, then that there is no gratuitous evil on theism can indeed support pro-theism on ubuntu.

4.4  Morally Good Agents The idea that morally good agents tend to add value to states of affairs has also been leveraged in support of pro-theism. 4.4.1  The Morally Good Agents Argument for Pro-Theism This argument for pro-theism says that God’s existence is good inasmuch as morally good agents tend to add value to states of affairs (Penner and Lougheed 2015). All else being equal, when a good agent is introduced to a state of affairs, the value of that state of affairs increases. Since God qua God is a morally perfect being, God’s existence necessarily adds value to any state of affairs in which she exists. Hence, all else being equal, worlds with God are more valuable than worlds without God. An important difference between this argument and the Infinite Value Argument is that this one focuses on the actions of morally good

64  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism agents, particularly in relation to other humans. God adds value to states of affairs in virtue of the actions she will perform in light of being a perfect being, and not simply in virtue of being infinitely intrinsically valuable. This argument establishes wide personal anti-theism because it focuses on God’s interaction with other persons. God’s actions aren’t limited by insufficient knowledge or power and so it’s plausible to think that God’s actions will make the world better off overall. Additionally, the argument can be said to establish wide impersonal anti-theism inasmuch as a morally good agent would have a positive effect on, say, the natural world. 4.4.2  Evaluation of the Morally Good Agents Argument for Pro-Theism on Ubuntu Given the shift in focus from infinite value to contributing value to states of affairs via performing actions, this argument even more clearly receives a positive evaluation from the perspective of ubuntu. As a morally perfect agent, God’s actions will contribute positively toward the community. A morally good agent will promote solidarity and shared identity amongst community members. God will therefore exercise her maximal capacity for friendliness. This is, evidently, very beneficial for any community of which God is a part. An important caveat here is that the major monotheistic traditions (apart from Traditional African Religion) sometimes appeal to retributive conceptions of justice as explanations of God’s justice. If such understandings of God’s justice are correct, then from the perspective of ubuntu God’s acts of retribution are not good. Indeed, they will be thought to harm the community. Retribution is ‘unfriendly’ on Metz’s account of ubuntu. On personhood accounts of ubuntu, it is dehumanizing. African accounts of justice tend to focus on reconciliation and a good outcome for all parties involved, including perpetrators. As such, the details about the sort of justice entailed by the divine attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc., matter greatly in assessing this argument from the perspective of ubuntu. As it stands, inasmuch as God’s action will contribute to a sense of solidarity and identity in the community, then God’s existence is positive. Agreement about the details of God’s actions between Western theists and understandings of God on supernatural versions of ubuntu (i.e., Traditional African Religion) would have to be established in order to offer a definitive assessment of this argument.

4.5  Cosmic Justice Cosmic justice is another good that has been gestured at in defence of pro-theism.

Ubuntu and Pro-Theism 65 4.5.1  The Cosmic Justice Argument for Wide Personal Pro-Theism The perpetrators of evil in our world often go unpunished. Victims often aren’t believed and even when they are, they usually do not receive just compensation. As a morally perfect being, God’s existence is sometimes said to ensure that there is cosmic justice. One suggestion is that there must be some sort of afterlife in order for people to receive appropriate punishments, compensation, and rewards for their actions in their earthly lives. However, the details about how such cosmic justice is ultimately obtained are not important since the claim is often that this justice is simply a logical consequence of God’s existence. 4.5.2  Evaluation of the Cosmic Justice Argument for Wide Personal Pro-Theism on Ubuntu Whether cosmic justice is a positive feature of the universe on ubuntu very much depends on the details in the same way as discussed in Section 4.4.2. As mentioned earlier, many times when Western theists speak of justice the idea in view is about retribution. The perpetrator, who has done wrong, needs to be punished to the same or greater degree as their wrongful act. This is what justice demands. But this and similar understandings are not consistent with any understanding of ubuntu. Indeed, from the perspective of ubuntu, if this type of justice is enforced, the world would be a worse place. Ubuntu conceptions of justice focus much more on ensuring a good outcome for all parties, including both the victim and perpetrator. A good outcome for the broader community is also prized. Again, inasmuch as this latter type of justice is guaranteed by God’s existence, then ubuntu can endorse this argument for pro-theism. However, it might well be the case that this requires a revision of traditional (Western) theistic conceptions of justice.

4.6 Afterlife A positive afterlife has often been mentioned in discussions of the benefits of (Western) theistic religions. It’s therefore natural that it has been gestured at in defences of pro-theism. 4.6.1  The Afterlife Argument for Wide Personal Pro-Theism The existence of a good afterlife has also been posited as a reason in favour of pro-theism. If God’s existence entails that people receive a good afterlife this is typically thought to be a strong consideration in favour of pro-theism.3 Consider that even if only those who deserve it receive a good afterlife that it’s still a great good. For it might be a matter

66  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism of justice and fairness that those who are undeserving do not get a good afterlife. Likewise, while it might be personally bad for individuals who do not enter heaven, it could still be impersonally overall good if this fact is taken to be a matter of justice. This line of argument can also be used to established wide personal pro-theism even if the scope of ‘personal’ is limited only to those individuals who enter heaven. Even if one denies that this type of afterlife would make the world better overall, it still establishes narrow personal pro-theism; God’s existence would be better with respect to an afterlife, at least for certain individuals. Additionally, consider that the existence of an afterlife is even stronger support for theism if universalism is true (e.g., Mawson 2005). Universalism is the view that every person (eventually) gets to enter heaven.4 If this is right, then it supports a version of personal pro-theism where the ‘personal’ applies to every individual. Inasmuch as an afterlife is a very great good it further supports a wide version of personal pro-theism. 4.6.2  Evaluation of the Afterlife Argument for Wide Personal Pro-Theism on Ubuntu Considerations about the afterlife do indeed provide a reason for pro-theism that can be endorsed on the assumption that an ubuntu worldview is true. Religious versions of ubuntu already affirm the existence of life beyond bodily death in the form of ancestors.5 But what would ubuntu say about a more traditional Western theistic picture of heaven? Inasmuch as solidarity and shared identity are promoted by the existence of heaven (and indeed promoted eternally), then this type of afterlife is a great good on ubuntu. On the other hand, if the conception of the afterlife in question included the existence of hell this will be considered bad inasmuch as it promotes discord. Furthermore, the idea of hell also seems to align closely with retributive theories of justice which are inconsistent with ubuntu understandings of justice that focus on reconciliation. Thus, an ubuntu perspective may ultimately reject the idea that heaven is good for certain individuals while hell is what certain bad individuals deserve. Remember that from an ubuntu perspective an individual cannot flourish unless everyone in the community is flourishing. Thus, the individuals in heaven cannot flourish unless everyone is flourishing.6 And it’s difficult to see how someone consigned to eternal torment in hell could be thought to be flourishing. Whether a doctrine like universalism is true, then, very much matters in assessing the value of an afterlife on theism. If universalism is false, then it’s doubtful that an afterlife can be good according to ubuntu. Even if there is no hell and individuals who are not permitted to heaven are annihilated or reincarnated on earth, the fact that not all get to participate in this good casts doubt on whether it is genuinely good at all

Ubuntu and Pro-Theism 67 from the perspective of ubuntu. Here an objector might say that the idea of an afterlife can still be used to support impersonal pro-theism from the perspective of ubuntu since with respect to justice an afterlife with heaven and hell is what’s best. But again, such a claim tends to assume that justice requires retribution. In light of this discussion, I conclude that the argument for pro-theism based on an afterlife is only successful if universalism is true. On this view everyone (eventually) gets to heaven and hence the entire community benefits (and so each individual within it). Universalism is hardly an uncontroversial position within philosophical theology, but it appears to be what’s required in order for this argument to succeed from the perspective of ubuntu. Finally, while a purely secular and naturalistic version of ubuntu will deny the existence of an afterlife, it’s still consistent for proponents of such versions to hold that a good afterlife is valuable if one were to exist (again on the assumption that universalism is true). This is what is required for a good afterlife to be a reason for pro-theism on ubuntu.

4.7  Relationship with God The last consideration I evaluate in favour of pro-theism is based on the idea that a personal relationship with a maximal being is a very great good. 4.7.1  The Relationship with God Argument for Pro-Theism If a relationship with God is a great good, then this supports pro-theism since such a relationship cannot be had apart from the existence of God. This is evidenced, in part, by the fact that considerations about the good of a relationship with God have actually been leveraged in support of an argument for atheism. The fact that a relationship with God appears to be unavailable to certain individuals (through no fault of their own) is evidence that God doesn’t exist. For the very first premise in J.L. Schellenberg’s influential argument for atheism from divine hiddenness is: “There exists a God who is always open to a personal relationship with any finite person” (Schellenberg 2015, 54). Schellenberg describes a personal relationship as “the general and familiar idea of positively meaningful interaction between persons that they are aware of experiencing” (2015, 54). Part of the reason that a relationship with God is so valuable is that the type of love exhibited by such a relationship is perfect. It is not the sort of love that could be exhibited between humans. Schellenberg explains that “[p]erfect love […] is here taken to be the best, the greatest, the deepest love that could possibly be realized in God. It’s ultimate love […] if God possesses love at all, then this love must be unsurpassably great – more sublime than that of any mere mortal and

68  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism indeed expressed in an ultimate way” (2015, 54). These considerations establish, minimally, personal narrow pro-theism. 4.7.2  Evaluation of the Relationship with God Argument for Pro-Theism on Ubuntu This argument for pro-theism also appears to receive a positive assessment from the perspective of ubuntu. For if God exists, then God is another candidate member of the community. Inasmuch as a relationship with God offers the unique benefits described above, these are benefits that can be gained by the entire community. A relationship with God can properly be considered a communal good on ubuntu since it is available to every member of the community. Furthermore, given the nature of the relationship itself (i.e., one with perfect love), it has the possibility to promote solidarity and shared identity in ways unavailable in relationships between humans. On personhood accounts of ubuntu, such a relationship could be beneficial inasmuch as it helps individuals to develop their personhood (in the normative sense of the term).

4.8  Intrinsic Versus Relational Goods In the previous chapter I noted the distinction between personal relational goods and personal intrinsic goods. I suggested that this distinction helps to explain why establishing anti-theism from an ubuntu perspective proved difficult. Most of the advantages associated with atheism have to do with intrinsic goods while ubuntu typically values relational goods. These relational goods are final goods, but they are extrinsic. This distinction is also helpful in explaining why pro-theism has turned out to be easier than anti-theism to establish on ubuntu. For the advantages of theism such as no gratuitous evil, cosmic justice, eternal life, and relationship with God are able to be interpreted as relationally positive (even if they weren’t originally described in those terms). So, this distinction proves important when evaluating the current arguments for pro-theism and anti-theism from the perspective of ubuntu.

4.9 Conclusion If ubuntu is true, the current arguments for pro-theism have an advantage over the arguments for anti-theism. This is a particularly interesting result as it highlights an important difference between relational and intrinsic goods. On ubuntu it’s quite clear that relational goods are more important than intrinsic goods (at least the ones considered in the arguments for anti-theism). Here is a chart that brings these distinctions to light:

Ubuntu and Pro-Theism 69 Anti-Theistic Goods Type of Good

Pro-Theistic Goods

Type of Good

Meaning

Intrinsic

Intrinsic Infinite Value

Intrinsic

Privacy

Intrinsic

No Gratuitous Evil

Relational

Dignity

Intrinsic

Morally Good Agent

Relational

Sacrifice

Intrinsic

Cosmic Justice

Relational

Understanding

Intrinsic

Afterlife

Relational

Relationship with God Relational

While this categorization could be debated, notice that it best represents how the goods are construed given how they are represented within the various arguments I’ve examined thus far. Furthermore, observe how neatly it explains the difference in assessment of anti-theism from pro-theism on ubuntu. All of the goods associated with anti-theism are personal, but intrinsically valuable. Five of the six goods associated with pro-theism are personal, but relationally valuable. This discussion raises a more general question about which set of goods is more valuable from a more neutral point of view, if there is one. Answering this question would begin to have us evaluate whether ubuntu or a more Western individualistic outlook is true. As stated from the outset of this book, assessing the truth of these different worldviews is not my aim. Where does this conclusion leave us with respect to assessing the degree to which there is intersubjective agreement across cultures and worldviews? Well, at the very least it has been established that ubuntu yields some different verdicts from the Western framework in which axiological questions about God have been initially asked. This is particularly so with respect to assessments of anti-theism. This is significant evidence that my previous claim about the scope of intersubjective agreement needs to be substantially narrowed (Lougheed 2020a). This naturally raises the following question: if different worldviews assign different values to the existence of God, how should we proceed with such axiological evaluations? I don’t intend to make this a book that addresses questions about ethical and metaethical disagreement, however one answer is initially forthcoming: this result might push us to switch focus from axiological questions to questions about which worldview is in fact true, which are the questions that philosophers have traditionally been concerned with answering. As we continue our axiological comparison the degree to which this question is pressing will become clearer.

Notes 1. See, for example, Tempels 1959 and Dzobo 1992. Also noteworthy is that religious understandings are found long before their secular counterparts.

70  Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism 2. Marshall Naylor uses a similar idea to criticize multiverse theorists who claim that God created a multiverse containing only those universes that pass some minimum threshold of goodness (forthcoming). See also Kraay 2010. 3. Elsewhere I have suggested that even if the afterlife is a great good, it is clearly defeasible (e.g., a finite meaningful life is more valuable than an infinite meaningless life). See Lougheed 2020a, 95–98. 4. Mawson has argued that theism logically entails universalism. See Mawson 2005. 5. I will discuss this conception of the afterlife in more detail in Chapters Eight and Nine. 6. There are questions here about what constitutes a community. But all that is needed for this claim to work is the idea that some in a community (no matter how small) would end up in heaven while others would end up in hell.

Bibliography Davison, Scott A. (2018). “God and Intrinsic Value.” In Klaas J. Kraay (ed.), Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. pp. 39–45. Dzobo, N.K. (1992). “Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors, and God.” In K Wiredu and K Gyekye (eds.), Person and Community; Ghanaian Philosophical Studies 1. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 223–240. Korsgaard, Christine. (1983). “Two Distinctions in Goodness.” The Philosophical Review 92(2): 169–195. Kraay, Klaas J. (2010). “Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse.” Philosophical Studies 147: 355–368. Kray, Klaas J and Chris Dragos. (2013). “On Preferring God’s Non-Existence.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43: 157–78. Lougheed, Kirk. (2020a). The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Mawson, T.J. (2005). Belief in God. Oxford: Oxford University Press Metz, Thaddeus. (2012). “African Conceptions of Human Dignity: Vitality and Community as the Ground of Human Rights.” Human Rights Review 13(1): 19–37. Naylor, Marshall. (forthcoming). “Satisfactory Accounts of Divine Creation.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Penner, Myron A, and Kirk Lougheed. (2015). “Pro-Theism and the Added Value of Morally Good Agents.” Philosophia Christi 17(1): 53–69. Schellenberg, J.L. (2015). The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God. New York: Oxford University Press Tempels, Placid. (1959). Bantu Philosophy, 2nd edn. King C (tr.) Paris: Présence Africaine.

Part III

The Axiology of Ubuntu

5

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu

5.1 Introduction The focus of the book now shifts gears, and we turn inward to examine the axiological status of ubuntu itself. One way to expand the current axiology literature was to evaluate the current arguments for pro-theism and anti-theism from a different perspective. This was accomplished in Part II of the book. But another way to expand the axiology literature is to enlarge the contrast class itself to include additional worldviews. The purpose of Part III of the book, then, is to take up this latter strategy. In this chapter I will explore disadvantages that are particularly unique to ubuntu in comparison to Western monotheism and naturalism. My goal is thus to develop a series of arguments for anti-ubuntu. Some of the arguments for anti-ubuntu I explore include the idea that ubuntu sacrifices justice for reconciliation, individuality for communality, and relational goods for economic prosperity. I also explore the disadvantages associated with uncritical deference to elders, in addition to the worry that the advantages of ubuntu are too dependent upon human co-operation. For each argument I present I will also examine the strongest possible objections to it. The primary purpose of this chapter is exploratory. To conclude I will investigate the ways in which the current categories of wide/narrow and personal/impersonal might not seamlessly apply to arguments for anti-ubuntu. For the rest of the chapter we can assume, roughly, that anti-ubuntu is the idea that a world where ubuntu is true is worse than a world in which it is false. A number of qualifications are in order. This is a general description that says nothing about the scope of the anti-ubuntu in question. As we proceed, I will note when the wide/narrow and personal/ impersonal distinctions are possibly relevant. Notice that introducing ubuntu adds a third worldview to the current contrast class in the axiology of theism literature which changes the discussion in important ways. The current literature generally only compares Western monotheism (i.e., Judeo-Christianity) to atheism (i.e., metaphysical naturalism). The current discussion has thus been between comparing only two DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-5

74  The Axiology of Ubuntu different worldviews. Adding ubuntu means the relevant comparison class now contains monotheism, atheism, and ubuntu. In previous discussions, when a claim about pro-theism was made it was understood as a comparative claim about a Western monotheistic world and an atheistic world. While this is rarely stated explicitly, it’s doubtful that defenders of pro-theism had literally every other major worldview in mind when they made such comparative axiological judgements. All of this is to say that unless I state otherwise, anti-ubuntu represents the general claim that all else being equal a world where ubuntu is true is worse than a world where Western monotheism is true and also a world where atheism is true.1

5.2  Sacrificing Justice for Reconciliation The first argument I’m going to examine in support of anti-ubuntu is based on the idea that because of its focus on reconciliation, ubuntu sacrifices satisfying the requirements of justice. I begin by offering a standard form of the argument I have in mind followed by analysis. I’ll conclude that it’s difficult to establish an argument for anti-ubuntu on the basis that it sacrifices justice. 5.2.1  The Justice Argument for Anti-Ubuntu Here’s a standardized version of the argument that I have in mind: (1) All else being equal, worlds with more justice are better than worlds with less justice. (2) Worlds where ubuntu is true sacrifice justice for reconciliation. (3) With respect to justice worlds where ubuntu is false are better than worlds where it is true. Therefore, (4) Narrow personal anti-ubuntu is true. For the sake of argument let’s assume that premise (1) is true. (3) follows from (1) and (2). (4) follows from (1) – (3). It is premise (2) that requires explanation. In 6.2, I will discuss these ideas in more detail. Briefly, however, this premise relies on the idea that reconciliation, which tends to focus on a good outcome for both the victim and perpetrator, is not a genuine form of justice. A genuine form of justice requires that the perpetrator of a crime receive retribution in the form of a punishment just as severe as the crime committed. If this is indeed the right way to think about justice, then premise (2) is true. If successful, this argument establishes, minimally, narrow personal anti-ubuntu. For persons,

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 75 with respect to considerations of justice, a world where ubuntu is true is worse than a world where it is false. I will not examine whether this argument can be used to establish wide personal anti-ubuntu. Doing so requires figuring out where justice ranks amongst other possibly competing values and also the degree to which it is connected to those other values. A final caveat about (2) is in order. With regards to theism and atheism, many of the purported disadvantages and advantages do not rely on human behaviour. But notice that ubuntu could be true and yet many of the advantages do not obtain because people do not live by an ubuntu ethic. For now, let’s simply assume that if ubuntu is true the requisite actions are being taken by a sufficient number of people such that the advantages and disadvantages obtain. But later in 5.6 I will discuss reasons for holding that this feature of ubuntu is in itself a disadvantage. 5.2.2  Evaluation of the Justice Argument for Anti-Ubuntu Much more work would have to be done to establish premise (2) of the Justice Argument. The defender of such an argument needs to defend a particular theory of justice and show why it is at odds with the emphasis that ubuntu places on reconciliation. For as the argument is currently formulated it assumes a very particular (Western) conception of justice as retribution. But this is a controversial assumption that needs to be defended. To simply assume it is to beg the question against the proponent of ubuntu about justice. As it currently stands, premise (2) should really read: (2*) Worlds where ubuntu is true sacrifice retribution for reconciliation. But (3) and (4) don’t follow from (1) and (2*) so the argument fails. Premises (1) and (3) need to be modified as follows: (1*) All else being equal, worlds with retribution are better than worlds with reconciliation. (3*) With respect to retribution worlds where ubuntu is false are better than worlds where it is true. Call this second argument the Retribution Argument for Anti-Ubuntu. Not only can I see no way of defending (1*) but I also think that it is probably in fact false. A world with reconciliation is better than one with retribution instead. Furthermore, accepting an ubuntu worldview where solidarity and shared identity are supremely important isn’t necessary to see that (1*) is false. However, I’m not going to argue for this at length.

76  The Axiology of Ubuntu I simply note that anyone wishing to defend this argument will have to provide substantive arguments for (1*). As it stands, these arguments ultimately fail because they simply assume retributive accounts of justice are true. But doing so begs the question against the truth of ubuntu. What this discussion does serve to highlight is that current debates in ethics and political philosophy have direct implications for axiological questions. 2

5.3  Sacrificing Individuality for Community The next argument for anti-ubuntu that I address focuses on the potential conflict between individual and community level interests. 5.3.1  The Individuality Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Ubuntu According to personhood accounts of ubuntu, an individual can only flourish if they are in the right relationship with the rest of their community. An individual flourishes inasmuch as their community flourishes. If certain members of the community are struggling, then other individuals cannot be thought of as successful (e.g., Molefe 2019). In Metz’s approach, friendliness and harmony are the virtues that ought to be promoted (Metz forthcoming, a). It’s a truism to say that ubuntu emphasizes community much more than many other Western worldviews. In this section I explore the possibility of developing an argument for anti-ubuntu on the basis that it over-emphasizes the community to the detriment of individuality. Here’s a standardized version of how this argument might go: (5) All else being equal, worlds where individuals are required to make unpalatable trade-offs between their own well-being and that of the community’s are worse than worlds where such trade-offs are not required. (6) Worlds where ubuntu is true require individuals to make unpalatable trade-offs between their own well-being and that of the community. So, (7) Worlds where ubuntu is false are better than worlds where it is true, at least with respect to individuality. Therefore, (8) Narrow Personal anti-ubuntu is true.

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 77 Premise (5) requires some important clarifications. In the West expressions such as ‘be yourself’ are quite common in popular culture. However, the superficiality and ambiguity of such expressions make them of little help to us here. The best way to understand individuality in (5) is that it refers to an individual’s freedom to pursue whichever conception of the good life she deems fit to pursue. There are different ways of filling out the criteria with respect to what constitutes legitimate conceptions of the good life. One of the more permissive accounts of the relevant criteria which is indeed popular in the West comes in the form of classical liberalism. On this understanding, any conception of the good life is permissible provided that the conception in question does not harm anyone else (Mill 1859 [2003], 80–81). By harm, John Stuart Mill seems to have only meant physical harms. A less permissive liberalism would include psychological and emotional harms as genuine harms. Either way, the basic idea is that individuals should be free to live however they want to provided that they aren’t hurting anyone else. The worry represented in (5), then, is that individuals will, perhaps necessarily, sometimes have to sacrifice their conception of the good life in order to satisfy the needs of the community. So, premise (5) can be interpreted as claiming that worlds in which individuals are able to pursue their preferred conception of the good life (within certain constraints) are better than worlds in which they cannot. Premise (6) is the most controversial premise because it says that such unpalatable trade-offs are in fact required on ubuntu. Remember that right now we’re assuming that worlds in which ubuntu are true also contain a sufficient number of people who believe and live out ubuntu. So let’s suppose that we’re examining (6) from the perspective of an individual living in a society where ubuntu is widely believed and practiced. The proponent of this argument could suggest that (6) is true because if ubuntu is true, then an individual is not free to pursue whatever version of the good life she so desires. Whatever flexibility there is on ubuntu for people to pursue different ends, there is none with respect to the idea that an individual could flourish apart from the community. Recall that Molefe worries about such trade-offs when he states that certain personhood accounts of ubuntu make it impossible for an individual to pursue education if it doesn’t benefit the community, to name just one example (2019, 60). One might also rightly worry that there is little flexibility on Metz’s capacity approach too. This is because while they are perhaps not the only goods worth pursuing, the very best ones will be the ones that are the friendliest (i.e., those that promote solidarity and shared identity). Notice that both of these conceptions of ubuntu are much more limited with respect to what sort of life an individual can pursue when compared with the minimal limitations imposed by classical liberalism. Additionally, this premise isn’t suggesting that there is no room for individuals to distinguish themselves from one another. It has been pointed out that ubuntu does not deny the importance of

78  The Axiology of Ubuntu individuality (e.g., Molefe 2019). Nonetheless it remains true that fewer conceptions of the good life can be legitimately pursued if ubuntu is true. This explanation provides the basis for the truth of (6). (7) follows from (5) and (6). (8) follows from (5) – (7). This argument establishes the modest conclusion for narrow personal anti-ubuntu. For certain individuals and in certain respects a world where ubuntu is false is better than a world in which it is true. 5.3.2  The Individuality Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Ubuntu Before evaluating the above argument, I’m first going to explore how it might be expanded in order to defend wide personal anti-ubuntu. For this to be accomplished the above argument would have to be modified in a number of ways. The most obvious change is that (7) would have to be modified to: (7*) Worlds where ubuntu is false are overall better than worlds where it is true. The overall condition is what’s required in order to establish a wide axiological judgement. From (5), (6), and (7*) it can be established that: (8*) Wide personal anti-ubuntu is true But here an objector might wonder whether this conclusion really follows from the above modifications. As it stands (5) has a ceteris paribus clause and it could be argued that not all else is equal with respect to establishing wide axiological judgements. This is because in order to establish wide judgements it has to be the case that the disadvantage in question (i.e., limited individuality) makes the world overall worse. But then it has to be measured against all of the relevant advantages (and disadvantages) of ubuntu. Thus, in order for (5) to be true it also has to be the case that: (9) Limited individuality is a great disadvantage such that it if it occurs makes the world overall worse (at least for certain individuals in question). More needs to be said regarding (9). There are at least three different routes we could take to establish its truth. First, one method is to survey all of the advantages and disadvantages of ubuntu and weigh them against each other. But an immediate problem with this approach is that completeness appears impossible, in addition to the likelihood of having to revise the relevant weightings in the future. Maybe some advantages

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 79 or disadvantages have been missed or haven’t yet been discovered. So this method can at best only be used to establish (9) quite tentatively. Second, one could try to create a list of disadvantages and advantages of ubuntu that are representative of all such disadvantages and advantages. Provided this list really is sufficiently representative then it would not matter if it is incomplete and hence avoids the problems associated with the first method. However, I can see no procedure by which to create a representative list of advantages and disadvantages. And I’m not optimistic about the prospects of discovering such a procedure. Of course, it remains an option for those who think they do have a way to create a sufficiently representative list. Third, the simplest way to establish (9) is to demonstrate that individuality is so valuable that there are no advantages of ubuntu that could ever outweigh it. This method has been used to defend various arguments for anti-theism by connecting disadvantages of theism to the loss of a meaningful life (Lougheed 2020a, Part II). A similar strategy could also be employed to help establish (9). The first part of this strategy is to add the following: (10) For certain individuals, a limiting of their individuality entails a loss of meaning in their life. Recall that I defined individuality as the freedom to pursue whatever conception of the good life one sees fit to pursue (within certain liberal constraints). It seems fairly uncontroversial that a person’s ability to pursue, live out, and achieve her desired conception of the good life will be intimately connected to the meaning in her life. Consider the following example: Ahmed is an investigative journalist who derives great value from reporting the truth about human rights abuses to the world. He thinks that this type of reporting is one of the ways in which governments can be held accountable in its treatment of people. Ahmed has devoted his entire life to this type of reporting and couldn’t imagine doing anything else. His conception of the good life is intimately connected to his work as a journalist. Indeed, if Ahmed could no longer investigate and report, his life would lose its meaning. This and other similar examples could certainly be obtained in the real world. However, one might protest that Ahmed’s conception of a meaningful life is rather narrow. Could he really not find meaning in a life where he couldn’t practice journalism? I think all that is needed for the rest of the argument to succeed is that in this scenario Ahmed’s life would lose a significant amount of meaning. However, for the sake of

80  The Axiology of Ubuntu simplicity (and because it’s a slightly stronger argument) in what follows I will refer to a complete loss of meaning. From these considerations we can establish that: (11) For certain individuals, their inability to pursue their preferred conception of the good life (i.e., their individuality), leads to a loss of meaning in their life. The final connection to be made is: (12) For certain individuals, a world with a meaningful life is always better than a world without a meaningful life. (12) is the claim that certain individuals are reasonable to always prefer a meaningful life to a meaningless life. This premise would be more difficult to establish if it made a universal claim about all people, though I have defended such a claim elsewhere (Lougheed 2020a, Ch. 3). As it stands, it just means that for certain individuals there are no goods that can outweigh the great good of a meaningful life. This argument, then, establishes wide personal anti-ubuntu. Notice, however, that I have explicitly qualified (10) to (12) with ‘for certain individuals’. This means that the ‘personal’ here is limited in scope and hence the argument really only establishes wide some persons’ personal wide anti-ubuntu. Thus, for certain individuals, worlds where ubuntu is true are worse overall than worlds where ubuntu is false because they would be unable to pursue their preferred conception of the good life which entails that their lives would not be meaningful. 5.3.3  The Individuality Argument for Wide ‘All Persons’ Personal Anti-Ubuntu The last way to expand the scope of this argument would be to change ‘some persons’ to ‘all persons’. (10) through (12) would have to be modified in the following way: (10*) For all individuals, a loss of individuality entails a loss of meaning in life. (11*) For all individuals, their inability to pursue their conception of the good life (i.e., their individuality), leads to a loss of meaning in their life. (12*) For all individuals, a world with a meaningful life is always better than a world without a meaningful life. I’m optimistic that (12*) or something close to it is true (see Lougheed 2020a, Ch. 3). However, I won’t spend time defending it here. This is

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 81 because I’m doubtful that (10*) and (11*) are true. They may well be true for a significant number of individuals (and indeed I think they are true for many individuals). But for someone who embraces ubuntu and lives in a community with ubuntu I very much doubt (10*) and (11*) are true. For such a person may not see her loss of ability to pursue her own preferred conception of a good life as very important. Furthermore, on ubuntu the idea of separating the pursuit of the good life from the community is confused (something I’ll discuss more below). The person with ubuntu may not even recognize what these premises are getting at since their conception of the good life is so intimately wrapped up in that of the community’s. There appear to be at least some people to which this argument doesn’t apply. 5.3.4  Evaluation of the Individuality Arguments for Anti-Ubuntu There are a number of potential replies to these arguments. Here I examine four different replies, the final two I think offer particularly promising ways forward for the defender of ubuntu. 5.3.5  Why Think that Liberalism Is True? The first way to respond to these arguments is to challenge the assumption of classical liberalism. The unpalatable trade-offs mentioned in (5) and (6), for instance, are the result of individuals having conceptions of the good life that compete with their community’s interest. But what legitimizes these differing conceptions in the very first place is classical liberalism. On this view, any conception of the good life is permissible provided that it does not violate Mill’s harm principle. But no specific arguments were offered in favour of classical liberalism. As with the conception of justice in view in Section 2, debates in ethics and political philosophy are relevant here. Still, it’s worth observing that something as strong as political liberalism need not be defended in order to preserve the claim that ubuntu might require unpalatable trade-offs between individuals and the community. All that is required here is for there to be cases where an individual’s pursuit of the good life conflicts with her community’s interest. Classical liberalism isn’t required for these types of conflicts to occur. 5.3.6  Legitimate Individual Life Pursuits can’t (Truly) Conflict with the Community A stronger response to these arguments says that not only is political liberalism false, but it is simply false that an individual can have a legitimate life pursuit that conflicts with the community. As mentioned at

82  The Axiology of Ubuntu the end of 3.3, one potential reply is that it is mistaken to think that any individual who truly embraces ubuntu would ever have a conception of the good life that conflicts with her community. For on personhood accounts of ubuntu an individual can not exist as a person (in the normative sense of the term) apart from the community. An individual cannot develop as a person and flourish apart from the community. So, there is simply no scenario in which an individual could want to pursue a conception of the good life that would conflict with her community. On this view, then, any such conflict would merely show that the pursuit in question is illegitimate. To attempt to disentangle individuality from the community, as these arguments do, is fundamentally misguided. An upshot of this response is that it rightly highlights the significant difference between a communitarian worldview and the stringent individualism often found in the West. However, I submit that it is naïve to say that an individual could never have a legitimate aim that conflicts with the community, even on the assumption that any one of the versions of ubuntu we’ve discussed is true. 5.3.7  Community as Instrumentally Valuable In Chapter Two when I explained personhood accounts of ubuntu I noted the distinction between those that hold community is intrinsically valuable and so in some way is equivalent to personhood and those that hold it is only instrumentally valuable in that it helps enable individuals to achieve personhood (see 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.4). For instance, Molefe insists that community is only instrumentally valuable because to say otherwise would require individuals to make unreasonable sacrifices for the community. He writes that: [S]uppose one can either pay for their own educational fees or they can use money to advance themselves educationally (this example must be imagined in the context of a trade-off). On the[Molefe’s view], the agent does well by investing the money in her own education for the sake of developing herself. On the communal view [which says community is intrinsically valuable], things are not as simple as that because the most important consideration is the interpersonal relationship itself, which constitutes personhood. The focus of the communal view is not on the agent herself, in the first place, but the communal relationships that constitute personhood. If both the agent and the other require education, it is difficult to see how the agent should resolve this tension on the communal view. (Molefe 2019, 60) My purpose here isn’t to evaluate Molefe’s view.3 Rather, the point is that there is at least one account of ubuntu to which the above arguments do

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 83 not apply. For Molefe’s account does not require an individual to make unpalatable personal sacrifices for the sake of her community. Molefe further clarifies that: [I]f the goal of the agent is to realise her true humanity, what should the agent do should the good of the social relationship clash with the good of the individual (for example, in the context where there is a scarcity of resources to pursue the collective goals of ‘we’ or to pursue that goal as an individual)? The point, again, is to recognise that the communal view exaggerates the role of social relationships. And, secondly, it misses the basic point that the focus of personhood is ultimately personal development. (Molefe 2019, 60–61) Thus, Individuality Arguments for anti-ubuntu fail on Molefe’s personhood account of ubuntu which says that community is instrumentally valuable inasmuch as it is the means by which individuals can achieve personhood (in the normative sense of the term). 5.3.8  Community and Individuality Have Equal Moral Standing What about Metz’s capacity for a friendliness approach? Are there resources within it to help avoid the Individuality Arguments? It’s first important to note that Metz explains that it is mistaken to hold that: African values forbid individuality, creativity, or nonconformity; indeed, tolerance is typically regarded as an important virtue, and aiming to improve the lot of another person requires one to ‘exercise individual care for each member of the community’ (e.g., Bujo 2001: 93). However, it does mean that some weight in moral thinking should be given to whether one’s behaviour would be downright disruptive or otherwise disrespectful of core norms in terms of which one’s society identifies itself(forthcoming). Recall the debate referenced in 2.3 between Menkiti and Gyekye about radical versus moderate communitarianism. While Individuality Arguments might have traction on Menkiti’s extreme communitarianism which seems to altogether deny individual rights, Gyekye says that: [I]n view of the fact that neither can the individual develop outside the framework of the community nor can the welfare of the community as a whole dispense with the talent and initiative of its individual members, I think that the most satisfactory way to recognize the

84  The Axiology of Ubuntu claims of both communality and individuality is to ascribe to them the status of an equal moral standing. (Gyekye 1997, 41; see also 67, quoted inMetz forthcoming, b) Thus, in Gyekye’s view, one that probably has community as intrinsically valuable, there is still room for individuality. Accordingly, there are presumably options available on this personhood account of ubuntu to avoid the Individuality Arguments too. And finally, another prominent African philosopher in Wiredu claims that: To adjust the interests of the individual to those of the community is not to subordinate the one to the other. The relationship is a purely symmetrical [one]. We could just as well have described it as the adjustment of the interests of the community to those of the individual. Moreover, we must not hypostatize the notion of the community. The community is simply a certain contextualization of individuals with respect to their locations and to their perceptions of their interests and of those of others. Communitarianism and individualism are both just different ways of arranging the pursuit of the interests of individuals. (Wiredu, 2008, 334, quoted in Molefe 2017, 52) It thus appears that there are some resources on both Metz’s relational account and also on other personhood accounts which say community is instrumentally valuable (contra Molefe), to maintain individuality. 5.3.9  Friendliness Towards Oneself The last response I consider to the Individuality Arguments comes from Metz’s capacity for friendliness approach to ubuntu. Metz’s work is by and large focused on other-regarding duties in his description of what constitutes friendliness (a focus which of course tends to be the norm in African philosophy). However, he does observe that: While the existence of a category of self-regarding duties is more controversial, […] one may read the relational moral theory [i.e. Metz’s theory] as entailing them. A corollary would be that whatever it is about the capacity of others to relate communality that demands respect can also be found in oneself and similarly merit respect. (Metz, forthcoming, b) Thus, when Metz says that an action is right inasmuch as it is friendly, or grounds basic human dignity on the basis of the capacity for friendliness,

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 85 these can be understood as also applying to oneself. Since one has the capacity for friendliness, one is valuable and has dignity. As such one has self-regarding duties of friendliness towards oneself. In some sense, then, one ought to exhibit solidarity and identity with oneself. Understanding Metz’s approach as entailing self-regarding duties is a nice way of avoiding the Individuality Arguments. For on this view an individual is not forced to let her interests be completely subsumed by the community when doing so would be unfriendly towards herself. None of this is to say that significant conflicts or dilemmas won’t arise between the individual and community. Maybe there are instances where being friendly towards oneself entails being unfriendly towards the community. But notice that I needn’t explain how to resolve such tensions in order for this account to successfully avoid the Individuality Arguments. For the point remains that in deciding which conception of the good life to pursue, individuals must not only be friendly towards the community but also towards themselves. In sum, while it’s a truism to say ubuntu is more community oriented than most Western frameworks, we’ve seen that there are resources on multiple accounts of ubuntu such that there is still room for a significant amount of individuality. This is so even if considerations of community matter much more than they are typically on many Western frameworks.

5.4  Sacrificing Economic Prosperity A different way to establish anti-ubuntu is based on considerations about economic prosperity. Of course, it’s important to be clear about what constitutes economic prosperity and why it is valuable, but for now, set these aside as I will clarify them later. Commentators on ubuntu have sometimes pointed out that regardless of its purported benefits in other areas, economic prosperity suffers in communally focused societies. The thought is that while ubuntu might have been appropriate for smaller, closed communities, a free market that fosters competition is better for economic flourishing in today’s world. If ubuntu is true (and remember for now we’re assuming that if it’s true, then it is practised), then a disadvantage of it is that it sacrifices economic prosperity. 5.4.1  The Economic Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Ubuntu An initial standardized argument based on economic sacrifice looks something like this: (13) All else being equal, worlds where individuals flourish economically are better than worlds where individuals do not flourish economically.

86  The Axiology of Ubuntu (14) Worlds where ubuntu is true tend to sacrifice economic prosperity for the sake of communal goods. So, (15) All else being equal, worlds where ubuntu is true are worse than worlds where ubuntu is false, at least with respect to economic flourishing. Therefore, (16) Narrow Personal Anti-Theism is true. (13) is relatively straightforward but still requires additional details. The ceteris paribus clause is important for a number of reasons. It can’t be the case that a number of other goods are sacrificed in order to achieve economic prosperity. If this occurred, then not all else would be equal. Likewise, it needs to be a sufficiently large enough number of people who prosper economically and do so not because other people suffer. So, the economic flourishing here should be understood only as flourishing that doesn’t entail that other people suffer. (14) is probably the most controversial premise in the argument. The relevant comparison class here is not one where just any other economic model is in question. Rather, the relevant comparators are alternative economic models that tend to promote free-market competition. Ultimately, this premise rests on an empirical claim which says that competition is better for economic flourishing than a system like ubuntu which strongly discourages this type of competition. I am neither a social scientist nor an economist and thus won’t offer extensive evidence in support of this empirical claim. However, the idea that embracing ubuntu has negative economic impacts has been defended in a number of places. For example, Metz explains that: In the economic arena, to compete with fellow citizens on labour and consumer markets with an eye to maximizing self-interest is of course not to act for the sake of others, and hence is not an instance of good-will. That is so, even if invisible hand effects turn out to be indirectly beneficial for society. Ubuntu so understood also clearly rules out miserliness when it comes to distributing wealth; its goodwill element prescribes generosity, forbidding a stingy reference to individual rights to keep goods regardless of whether they are unneeded by the possessor and others need them. (Metz 2007, 339) Notice too, that the claim isn’t that people are bound to go hungry if ubuntu is followed with respect to economics. Rather, the claim is that

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 87 when compared to more competition-based models, ubuntu fares much worse. Finally, (15) specifies the scope of the argument. A lack of economic flourishing is, of course, just one purported disadvantage of ubuntu. Additionally, this argument only makes the modest claim that this advantage is relevant to certain individuals. While it might be objected that everyone should see economic flourishing as an advantage, this isn’t necessarily the case. Some individuals may have taken a vow of poverty and hence their conception of the good life in no way includes economic prosperity. Below I will examine potential ways to expand the scope of the argument. (16) follows from (13) to (15). 5.4.2  The Economic Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Ubuntu In order to expand the scope of the Economic Argument to defend wide personal anti-ubuntu (15) has to be modified to: (15*) All else being equal, worlds where ubuntu is true are worse than worlds where ubuntu is false, overall and for certain individuals. I suspect that some will contest whether economic flourishing is really a good in the first place. And I think that even more will doubt that considerations about economic flourishing could support wide axiological judgements. I won’t try to offer reasons in support of (15*) here. Instead, I simply note that anyone wishing to defend (15*) will have to show that it swamps all other purported goods and I’m doubtful that this can be accomplished. 5.4.3  Evaluation of Economic Arguments for Anti-Ubuntu In this section I examine two worries for the Economic Argument. The first is about the type of knowledge needed to successfully run this style of argument. The second is about the fact that the argument assumes a fundamentally different conception of flourishing from the one found in ubuntu. 5.4.4  Economics and Counterfactuals One issue which ought to make any argument along these lines necessarily tentative is that we lack knowledge of important counterfactuals we ultimately need to definitively establish it. Africa became known to the rest of the world (mostly) through colonization.4 In the 19th century as ships became bigger, faster, and more reliable frequent contact by

88  The Axiology of Ubuntu outsiders with Africa was inevitable.5 With the advent of flight in the 20th century avoiding contact with the outside world would have been impossible. However, difficult as it may be to imagine, contact could have been made by outsiders (particularly Westerners) with Africa in a way not involving colonization. Had this happened, it’s difficult to know how those with an ubuntu ethic would have fared in a more Westernstyle economy. Colonization certainly didn’t help those with an ubuntu ethic to succeed economically in the wider world. Thus, in order to complete the Economic Argument, we would have to know what would have happened had those Africans with ubuntu been introduced to the rest of the world in a fairer way.6 This sort of counterfactual knowledge simply isn’t available. 5.4.5  Competing Accounts of Flourishing A more important objection rests on the idea that the Economic Argument assumes a conception of flourishing that is at odds with any plausible account of ubuntu. Indeed, to describe economic wealth in terms of flourishing is wrongheaded on an ubuntu ethic. For an individual to be flourishing on personhood accounts of ubuntu they are developing personhood in the context of community. This involves exercising other-regarding virtues. Likewise, on the capacity for friendliness approach, flourishing involves exercising one’s capacity for friendship. A basic level of physical needs probably has to be met in order to flourish in these senses, but not the type of wealth generated in a free market. Part of the reason for the stark contrast here has to do with the fact that the Economic Arguments appear to rely on a form of consequentialism. They assume that the consequences of increased wealth are good and thus something that ought to be desired as an end. But ubuntu is very much not a consequentialist ethical theory, and even if it were it’s doubtful that wealth would be one of the consequences thought worthwhile to pursue. This is another area that highlights the intersubjective disagreement between different worldviews rather than diminishes it. Those with an ethical worldview other than ubuntu may well rightly be persuaded by the Economic Argument. However, those who hold to an ubuntu ethic are unlikely to see its merit. Whether there is an independent standard by which we can adjudicate these competing accounts is something I will continue to explore moving forward.

5.5  Inappropriate Appeals to Authority and Tradition The next argument I examine for anti-ubuntu is based on the idea that ubuntu inappropriately appeals to and relies on authority (especially in the form of elders) and tradition. This worry is ultimately epistemic; in worlds where ubuntu is true, people will ultimately be worse off

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 89 epistemically than otherwise. They will have less knowledge or true beliefs (or whatever epistemic end one prefers) 5.5.1  The Authority Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Ubuntu The standardized version of this argument looks like this: (16) All else being equal, worlds where individuals have true beliefs are better than worlds where they have false beliefs, at least with respect to their epistemic standing.7 (17) Appeals to authority and reliance on tradition are inappropriate when they lead to (or tend to promote the acquisition of) false beliefs. (18) Worlds where ubuntu is true, leads individuals to inappropriately appeal to and rely on authority and tradition. So, (19) In worlds where ubuntu is true, individuals tend to have more false beliefs than they would in worlds where it is false and so they are epistemically worse-off. Therefore, (20) Narrow Personal Anti-Ubuntu is true. I’m not going to spend time defending (16) but it is worth noting that it assumes some version of epistemic consequentialism. This is the view that the epistemic norms one ought to follow are those that produce knowledge (or true belief or justified true belief or understanding). (See Lougheed 2020b, 96–100). There might be other ways to structure this argument that need not assume epistemic consequentialism, but I won’t pursue them here. If (16) is true, then (17) is true. For if (16) is true then any method of acquiring beliefs that leads to false beliefs, all else being equal, ought to be rejected (or avoided when possible). They lower the epistemic standing of the individual in question. Premise (18) is the most controversial one that needs defending. In his classic text, Philosophy and an African Culture, Kwasi Wiredu provides numerous reasons for thinking that something like (18) is true (1980). It should be noted from the outset that Wiredu is writing about the typical Ghanaian worldview, and in particular that of the Akan people. However, much of what he writes seems applicable to a wider African context. Here I assume the issues he raises can apply to those who embrace ubuntu.8

90  The Axiology of Ubuntu According to Wiredu, part of the reliance on tradition and authority in traditional African cultures (including those who embrace ubuntu) is because “[h]ardly any premium was placed on curiosity in those of tender age, or independence of thought in those of more considerable years” (Wiredu 1980, 4).9 Wiredu holds that by relying on tradition and authority the skill of critically evaluating ideas isn’t developed. And the assumption here is that anyone who isn’t able or willing to critically evaluate the ideas they receive is more likely to end up with false beliefs. Here is an example that Wiredu uses to illustrate his concern: That our departed ancestors continue to hover around in some rarefied form ready now and then to take a sip of the ceremonial schnapps is a proposition that I have never heard rationally defended. Indeed, if one were to ask a traditional elder, ‘unspoilt’ by the scientific orientation, for the rational justification of such a belief, one’s curiosity would promptly be put down to intellectual arrogance acquired through a Western education. (Wiredu 1980, 42) (19) follows from (16) to (18). (16) – (19) establishes (20) and hence narrow personal anti-ubuntu. This argument applies to any individual who values gaining true beliefs (or any such relevant epistemic goods). Inasmuch as every individual ought to care about achieving good epistemic results, then the scope of the ‘personal’ here is ‘all persons’. Finally, the ceteris paribus clause in (16) is just meant to acknowledge that there could be times, though perhaps rare, where other considerations override epistemic ends. For example, there might be cases where moral reasons or practical reasons should take precedent over epistemic reasons (we’ll see in Section 5.3 that an objection relies on this idea). So, there might be cases where not all else is equal. 5.5.2  The Authority Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Ubuntu The next version of the Authority Argument I examine attempts to establish wide personal anti-ubuntu. In order to establish a wide axiological judgement, it has to be the case that: (16*) All else being equal, worlds where individuals have true beliefs are overall better than worlds where they have false beliefs. In order for (16*) to be true, epistemic goods need to be more valuable than any of the other goods associated with ubuntu. Again, the worldview from which one assesses something like (16*) may dictate whether one is inclined to accept it. The ceteris paribus clause is important too.

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 91 Western worldviews, and in particular Western philosophers, might be inclined to value epistemic goods much more than other worldviews tend to value it. On ubuntu, the flourishing of the community is likely more important than epistemic goods, though this doesn’t mean such goods are not valued at all. Finally, notice that rejecting (16*) doesn’t mean rejecting epistemic goods. If a worldview led to its proponents having all false beliefs and no true beliefs this would be a very great disadvantage of the worldview. It would likely make things worse overall. But that scenario is not what’s at stake here. Rather what is in question is the tendency of a worldview to promote true beliefs over false ones. Even if ubuntu fares worse than other worldviews in this regard, I think it would be difficult to establish this makes a world where ubuntu is true worse overall since all of its advantages also have to be considered to establish the overall judgement. 5.5.3  Evaluation of the Authority Arguments I now examine two objections to the Authority Argument for antiubuntu. The first says that the argument fails because moral considerations always swamp epistemic ones. I argue that this objection fails. The second seeks to show that at least some versions of ubuntu allow for a degree of challenging authority and tradition. I conclude that this objection weakens the Authority Argument but doesn’t defeat it. 5.5.4  Moral Considerations Always Outweigh Epistemic Considerations The first objection I wish to examine here again hinges on competing worldviews. For an objector who holds an ubuntu ethic may say that moral considerations always outweigh epistemic considerations. The way in which an individual can develop her personhood is by promoting harmony within the community. Doing so means sometimes relying on tradition and authority in ways that are epistemically harmful. But challenging tradition and authority will not promote harmony and as such will not help an individual to develop her personhood. Likewise exercising one’s capacity for friendliness will not involve challenging tradition and authority since doing so is unfriendly. These ideas do not suggest a universal ban on challenging authority and tradition, but they do strongly discourage it. In the majority of cases one ought to simply rely on tradition and authority. However, there are at least two issues with this objection. First, notice that even if this objection is correct, the Authority Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Ubuntu is still successful. For the argument is only trying to establish that with respect to epistemic standing, individuals are worse off if ubuntu is true. The truth of this conclusion is

92  The Axiology of Ubuntu perfectly consistent with the claim that moral reasons ought to always take primacy over the epistemic. Second, this objection conflates moral reasons with tradition and authority. For there are cases where there are moral reasons to challenge tradition and authority. Additionally, even in cases where there are moral reasons not to challenge tradition and authority, it doesn’t follow that there can’t be other reasons not to challenge tradition and authority. If these cases occur regarding different traditions and authorities, then no conflict emerges. However, if there are moral reasons both for and against challenging a tradition and/or authority, then they must be weighed against each other. Consider that there are strong moral reasons to oppose female genital mutilation given that each person has a basic dignity even if such opposition still cuts against the grain of certain traditions and authorities even today. 5.5.5  Ubuntu Does Allow Challenges to Authority and Tradition The second objection to the Authority Argument, and more to the point, is that there does appear to be space on certain versions of ubuntu to challenge tradition and authority. Consider what Metz says about accepting tradition: Note that since my conception of communal relationship includes cooperation, it is only practices that have been voluntarily adopted that merit moral consideration. So, for example, clitoridectomy imposed on girls is a tradition that does not merit respect insofar as minors are not competent to make free and informed decisions to undergo the procedure. Furthermore, the relational moral theory does not entail that voluntarily adopted customs should never change – for the solidarity element can sometimes provide all things considered reason not to do what identity would prescribe. Since, for all we can tell, killing innocent people did not in fact serve the function of appeasing the gods, considerations of communality on balance entail that the practice was right to challenge and overturn, even if everyone had been accepting of it for a long while(forthcoming). Metz rightly observes that co-operation is a two-way street. It’s true that an individual who may wish to challenge a particular authority or tradition needs to consider the degree to which doing so promotes solidarity and identity (i.e., friendliness). However, it’s equally true the rest of the community needs to consider the said individual when considering whether to continue a tradition or rely on an authority. In this way it’s possible that continuing to rely on authority and tradition

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 93 could be unfriendly. Furthermore, the most important question on Metz’s view in general is whether an action is friendly, not whether it preserves authority and tradition. Remember too, that Metz allows for what would otherwise be considered unfriendly actions in order to preserve basic human rights. This is one account of ubuntu, then, where at least some challenges to tradition and authority are perfectly legitimate. Notice also, that on personhood accounts of ubuntu there is reason to think that at least some challenges to authority and tradition are permissible. Remember that for Molefe community is instrumentally valuable inasmuch as it enables individuals to achieve personhood. Practicing traditions and relying on authorities that would hinder an individual from developing their personhood can therefore be rejected. Indeed, elsewhere Molefe has argued that African ethics has wrongly been interpreted as communitarian and should instead be understood as individualistic (2017). While this is an incredibly controversial claim, it’s noteworthy that if he’s correct, it provides even more reason for thinking that challenges to authority and tradition are acceptable on ubuntu.

5.6  Ubuntu Relies Too Much on Human Actions Recall that earlier in this chapter I stated that in order for the above arguments to even get off the ground we simply have to assume that in worlds where ubuntu is true a sufficient number of people embrace and practice it. For the sake of argument, I therefore assumed a tight connection between the truth of ubuntu and individual actions. Yet when explored further this assumption, in itself, might constitute a reason in favour of anti-ubuntu. This is because, in order to reap the advantages of ubuntu (which will be discussed in Chapter Six), humans must behave in certain ways. This is a disadvantage inasmuch as humans are reliable and furthermore, the advantages associated with Western monotheism and atheism are not similarly reliant on human actions. In what follows I standardize this argument and add more detail by explaining each of the premises. 5.6.1  The Reliance Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Ubuntu (21) All else being equal, it is a bad-making feature of a worldview if gaining the advantages associated with it is dependent on the actions of humans. (22) Many of the advantages associated with ubuntu only obtain if a significant number of humans adopt and live out an ubuntu ethic.

94  The Axiology of Ubuntu So, (23) It is a bad-making feature of ubuntu that its advantages are dependent on human action. Therefore, (24) Personal narrow anti-ubuntu is true. (21) is, I think, fairly intuitive but I will offer more by way of explanation. In worlds where humans are all morally perfect actors, this premise might not have very much traction. But we’re asking axiological questions about our world (or the nearest possible world in which the worldview under evaluation is true), where humans are typically quite far from perfect. Since humans are not wholly reliable, it’s worse to rely on them to gain the benefits of a worldview than to not rely on them for those same benefits. One need not accept an extremely low view of human nature to endorse this premise. All that is required is the idea that humans are not wholly reliable. Consider some of the advantages most frequently associated with Western monotheism: cosmic justice, an afterlife, a relationship with God, etc. And now consider the ones often connected to atheism: privacy, dignity, understanding, and meaning. Notice that these advantages do not require particular actions from humans in order to obtain. They simply exist in virtue of God’s existence or God’s non-existence. The problem this premise is pointing to is that this is not the case with respect to the advantages of ubuntu. The advantages associated with ubuntu do not automatically obtain in worlds where ubuntu is true and we ought to adopt it. The strength of (21) surely increases as one’s view of human nature decreases. For example, if humans consistently fail to live by an ubuntu ethic, even if it is the ethic by which they should live, then the benefits of ubuntu will hardly ever obtain. Finally, that the advantages of ubuntu are dependent on human action is, in itself, a reason in favour of anti-ubuntu. We have some reason to think that this fact is a bad-making feature. Here I suggest that at the very least it is comparatively bad because the advantages associated with Western monotheism and atheism do not typically rely on human co-operation. This is enough because recall that in 1.2 I explained that the axiology literature is most fundamentally concerned with comparative judgements. Premise (22) is the claim that many of the advantages of ubuntu are in fact dependent on human behaviour. The advantages of ubuntu tend to be had within the context of community. For instance, the benefits of identifying with others, having solidarity with others, developing as a person, etc., are all had within the

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 95 context of other people. If others refuse to adopt an ubuntu ethic and so refuse to participate it will be far more difficult, if not impossible, to reap the same benefits. Consider the most famous example of ubuntu in Nelson Mandela forgiving the perpetrators of the apartheid and associated crimes against humanity. In doing so he likely helped to prevent a full-scale civil war and thus facilitated to ensure a much more peaceful transition to the post-apartheid era in South Africa. On his own Mandela, could certainly have forgiven his oppressors and inasmuch as possible sought to reconcile with them. However, I submit that the real benefits occurred because many of the black South Africans followed Mandela’s lead in being open to forgiveness and to seeking reconciliation with their white oppressors. A relatively peaceful transition occurred because so many black South Africans exemplified ubuntu, not just Mandela.10 (23) follows from (21) and (22). (24), the conclusion follows from (21) to (23). The ‘personal’ here clearly refers to ‘all-persons’ since if it is worse to depend on human actions to gain the advantages of a view, it is worse for everyone. So, for every individual, worlds where ubuntu is true are worse with respect to the advantages of ubuntu being reliant on human action. 5.6.2  Reliance on Humans and Disadvantages An interesting expansion of this argument could try to show that the disadvantages of ubuntu do not rely on human actions. Thus, on ubuntu, we rely on humans for the advantages but no matter what we will automatically have the disadvantages. The additional premises in question would be something like: (25) All else being equal, it is a bad-making feature of a worldview if the disadvantages associated with it do not rely on human action. (26) Many of the disadvantages associated with ubuntu cannot be avoided by the actions of humans. These could constitute a distinct argument for anti-ubuntu, but for now I’ll include them as additional support for: (23*) It is a bad-making feature of ubuntu that its disadvantages are not dependent on human action. This makes the case for (24) stronger than the first iteration of the Reliance Argument. The key premise to defend is (26) and this can be done by evaluating the abovementioned disadvantages of ubuntu. The concerns I raise above about individuality and the appropriateness of

96  The Axiology of Ubuntu pursuing different conceptions of the good life are indeed reliant on human behaviour. Such disadvantages require that humans accept ubuntu. The same is true with respect to the Economic and Authority Arguments. They both rely on the assumption that individuals committed to ubuntu will take up certain actions and adopt a certain way of life. Thus, even if (25) is true it doesn’t apply to ubuntu, and hence (26) and (23*) are false. The Reliance Argument, then, only applies to the fact that the advantages of ubuntu are reliant on human action (or inaction). A natural next question is whether the scope of this argument could be expanded to defend wide personal anti-ubuntu. 5.6.3  The Reliance Argument for Wide Personal Anti-Ubuntu In order to expand the scope of the Reliance Argument the following premise needs to be modified: (21*) All else being equal, a worldview where the advantages of it are dependent on human action is overall worse than worldviews where this isn’t so. Defending (21*) requires showing that (22) entails that worlds with ubuntu are worse overall when compared to Western monotheism and atheism. One way of accomplishing this would be to argue for a very low view of human nature and perhaps also understanding. If humans constantly fail to do the right thing then even if ubuntu is true, most of the advantages of it cannot be gained. In light of this, one could say the truth of ubuntu makes the world overall bad since we are unlikely to experience the advantages. However, this approach is limited in that it will only be accepted by those who also endorse the relevantly low view of human nature. Likewise, as mentioned in 2.3.1, ubuntu takes a ‘blank slate’ approach to human nature. To assume a very low view of human nature one likely needs to assume the truth of a competing worldview and therefore risks begging the question about the truth of ubuntu. This is because ubuntu typically understands human nature as neutral, that is, as neither good nor bad. A different approach, and one I take elsewhere in developing structurally similar arguments for anti-theism, is to show that if (21*) is true, then certain individuals would have meaningless lives (e.g., Lougheed 2020a, Ch. 3). I’m doubtful of this strategy can be successful as it simply reduces to questions about the specific disadvantages discussed above and their potential connections to the meaning of life. Those are difficult arguments to establish in their own right and framing them in the context of reliance on human action is of little help. At best, then, the Reliance argument establishes narrow personal anti-ubuntu.

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 97 5.6.4  Evaluation of the Reliance Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism The Reliance Argument for Narrow Personal Anti-Theism is, I think, one of the stronger arguments I’ve examined in favour of anti-ubuntu. I won’t rehearse the reasons just offered in defence of it since I think they’re correct. However, I want to close this section by noting the fact that this type of argument applies to ubuntu and not Western monotheism or atheism can possibly be explained by the distinction between relational and intrinsic goods. Relational goods by definition require the co-operation of others (to some degree) while intrinsic goods do not. Thus, if the Reliance Argument above is sound, the distinction between relational and intrinsic goods actually serves to support anti-ubuntu.

5.7  Intrinsic Versus Relational Goods Recall that in 3.8 and 4.8 I noted the distinction between personal intrinsic goods and personal relational goods. Specifically, in 3.8 I noted that this distinction might explain why it is difficult to establish anti-theism from the perspective of ubuntu. I further observed that if a principled reason could be discovered to favour relational goods that could be used as leverage to establish that worlds where ubuntu is true are better than worlds where atheism (i.e., metaphysical naturalism) is true. However, as I near the end of this chapter there is some reason to think that the exact opposite is true. If some of these arguments for anti-ubuntu are true, they could indicate that personal relational goods are inferior to personal intrinsic goods. Consider the updated chart of the goods I’ve discussed thus far: Anti-Theistic Goods

Type of Good

Meaning

Intrinsic

Pro-Theistic Type of Goods Good

Intrinsic Infinite Value Privacy Intrinsic No Gratuitous Evil Dignity Intrinsic Morally Good Agent Sacrifice Intrinsic Cosmic Justice Understanding Intrinsic Afterlife

Intrinsic

Anti-Ubuntu Considerations

Type of Good

Justice

Relational

Relational Individuality

Intrinsic

Relational Economic Prosperity

Extrinsic

Relational Authority and Relational Tradition Relational Reliance on Relational Human Action Relationship Relational with God

98  The Axiology of Ubuntu However, as stated I think the strongest argument for anti-ubuntu is that it relies on human action. While this is clearly relational, it is just one instance of relationality being a potential downside of ubuntu and so not part of a larger cumulative case (at least at this point in my investigation).

5.8  Supernatural Ubuntu and Naturalistic Ubuntu I have stated from the outset that in this book I am mostly concerned with secular understandings of ubuntu. However, the reader may fairly wonder after reading this chapter whether there are significant axiological differences between supernatural and secular versions of ubuntu. I take up this question in Chapters Seven and Eight. To close this chapter, I note that when it comes to the arguments for anti-ubuntu developed above, they are consistent with both supernatural and naturalistic versions of ubuntu. In other words, the arguments can be successfully developed on either understanding of ubuntu.

5.9 Conclusion This chapter is not intended to provide anything by way of definitive conclusions regarding the axiological status of ubuntu. Rather it’s intended as the first statement and development of arguments for anti-ubuntu. As with both pro-theism and anti-theism, arguments that are narrow and personal in scope where the ‘personal’ refers to just one individual, are relatively straightforward to establish. It’s difficult to think of any worldview, religious or otherwise, that doesn’t make things worse in certain respects for at least some individuals. But as soon as the scope of ‘personal’ is expanded, things become more complicated. I argued that the Justice Argument, the Individuality Argument, and the Economic Argument all fail in establishing anti-ubuntu. The Authority Argument perhaps provides some reason in support of anti-ubuntu. However, as mentioned there are clearly versions of ubuntu that allow for some challenges to authority and tradition. Whether these strike a better balance between individuality and authority/tradition than is typically found in the West is an open question. As it stands, the Reliance Argument is the strongest one examined here and successfully supports narrow personal ‘all-persons’ anti-ubuntu. That the co-operation of humans is needed to reap the benefits of ubuntu is indeed a genuine downside of the view. Finally, I haven’t examined any arguments for impersonal versions of anti-ubuntu, and given its emphasis on relational goods, it’s an open question whether arguments for impersonal versions of it could ever be successful.

The Disadvantages of Ubuntu 99

Notes 1. Of course, things are really more complicated than this too. For religious versions of ubuntu are consistent with monotheism and secular versions of it are consistent with atheism. But for now let’s consider them as mutually exclusive options. 2. I make a similar observation in Lougheed 2020a, Ch. 10. 3. Indeed, elsewhere I offer some criticisms of it. See Lougheed, Unpublished Manuscript. 4. Of course, I mean here the sub-Sahara. The north of Africa interacted with the rest of the world consistently much earlier. 5. I also mean contact that wasn’t primarily about the slave trade which occurred exclusively in port cities. The Atlantic slave trade started as early as the 15th century while the Arab slave trade started in the 7th century. 6. Metz makes a similar point when discussing land claims in South Africa (2020). 7. True beliefs can be replaced with whatever epistemic end one prefers (e.g. justified true belief, knowledge, understanding, etc.). 8. The reader who is sceptical that the scope of Wiredu’s claim can be expanded in this way can read it in the more restricted sense. 9. Wiredu also says that “Paradoxically the authoritarianism mentioned above is closely connected with one of the strongest points of culture, namely, the great value it places on what we might call communal belonging” (1980, 5). I will discuss the value of the emphasis that ubuntu places on community in the next chapter. 10. Of course, I don’t claim that the transition was perfect, nor do I deny that there remain significant social and institutional challenges in South Africa which are largely a result of apartheid.

Bibliography Bujo, Bénézet. (2001). Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality, McNeil, Brian (tr.), New York: Crossroad Publishers. Gyekye, Kwame. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. Lougheed, Kirk. (2020a). The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. __________. (2020b). The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement. Switzerland: Springer. __________. “Molefe on the Value of Community for Personhood.” Unpublished Manuscript. Molefe, Motsamai. (2017). “Individualism in African Moral Cultures.” Cultura 14(2): 49–68. __________. (2019). An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Metz, Thaddeus. (2007). “Toward an African Moral Theory.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 15(3): 321–341. __________. (2020). “Must Land Reform Benefit the Victims of Colonialism?” Philosophia Africana 19(2): 122–137.

100  The Axiology of Ubuntu __________. (forthcomingb). A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and beyond the Continent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. __________. (forthcominga). “Virtue in African Ethics as Living Harmoniously.” In Li, Chenyang, and Dascha Düring (eds.), Harmony and Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. Mill, John Stuart. (1859) [2003]. On Liberty. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wiredu, Kwasi. (1980). Philosophy and an African Culture. New York: Cambridge University Press. __________. (2008). “Social Philosophy in Postcolonial Africa: Some Preliminaries Concerning Communalism and Communitarianism” South African Journal of Philosophy 27(4): 332–339.

6

The Advantages of Ubuntu

6.1 Introduction In this chapter I continue to focus on the axiological status of ubuntu itself. I now turn to examine arguments in favour of pro-ubuntu, the view that a world where ubuntu is true is better than a world where it is false. As I did in the previous chapter I will also note when the personal/ impersonal and wide/narrow distinctions are relevant to specific arguments. Again, the relevant comparison class is between a secular version of ubuntu, Western monotheism (i.e., Judeo-Christianity), and atheism (i.e., metaphysical naturalism). As with Chapter Five this chapter is also intended to be primarily exploratory in nature. This is the first attempt to offer arguments for pro-ubuntu, at least within the context of the axiology literature in the Western philosophy of religion. The main arguments I will discuss are based on the value of reconciliation, shared identity, solidarity, and consensus-based decision-making.

6.2 Reconciliation Metz explains that African societies “largely eschew retribution as the primary response to wrongdoing […] Although retributive sentiments are not entirely absent from the behaviour of people in African societies, it is not the dominant philosophical theme when it comes to how a government or society ought to respond to wrongdoers” (Metz, forthcoming). Instead, when it comes to justice reconciliation tends to be the focus (e.g., Gyeke 1997, 2004; Ikuenobe 2006). Metz explains that “sub-Saharan philosophers generally believe that the proper function of criminal justice is forward-looking one of mending a broken relationship between the offender, his victim, and the broader community […] on this score, talk of ‘reconciliation’ or restoring harmony’ is common. Apology and compensation are central to such an approach” (Metz forthcoming). Furthermore, an acceptance of ubuntu is often what underpins these considerations (Metz forthcoming). One of the most famous examples of this approach comes DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-6

102  The Axiology of Ubuntu from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-apartheid South Africa. Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu are well known for advocating that black South Africans forgive and reconcile with white South Africans, some of whom committed many atrocities and crimes against humanity (Tutu 1999; Bell 2002). It is widely thought that seeking reconciliation prevented a large-scale civil war which would have resulted in far many more deaths and additional suffering. In the West, considerations of justice tend to focus much more exclusively on retribution where an offender is punished according to the severity of their crime. One argument in support of pro-ubuntu is based on the idea that reconciliation appears to be better for both the victim and offender. The victim is supposed to receive just compensation for their suffering but is also meant to be reconciled with the perpetrator such that they are able to live in harmony with each other moving forward. 6.2.1  The Reconciliation Argument for Pro-Ubuntu Here’s a standardized version of how considerations about reconciliation could be used to support pro-ubuntu: (1) With respect to justice, ubuntu uniquely promotes reconciliation over retribution.1 (2) Reconciliation is better than retribution for both victims and offenders. Therefore, (3) A world where ubuntu is true is axiologically superior to a world where it is false. 2 Now, it is right to wonder about the specific scope of (3). These considerations clearly establish narrow personal pro-ubuntu. With respect to reconciliation, for certain individuals, a world where ubuntu is true is better than a world where it is false. Since ubuntu has to do with persons this thought can’t be used to establish impersonal axiological judgements. However, it can still be asked whether it can establish wide personal axiological judgements. Is it better overall for individuals if ubuntu is true? I won’t attempt to answer this question but observe that the answer will depend on how much one values reconciliation in relation to the other advantages and disadvantages of ubuntu. Of course, perhaps on their own, considerations about justice cannot establish wide personal pro-ubuntu. Yet this wouldn’t preclude reconciliation from being a part of a cumulative case for wide personal pro-ubuntu.

The Advantages of Ubuntu 103 6.2.2  Evaluation of the Reconciliation Argument for Pro-Ubuntu In order for this argument to succeed premise (2) has to be defended. The first way to accomplish this is through philosophical analysis, while the second way is with empirical data. I take each method in turn. Recall that on Metz’s account of ubuntu, an action is right inasmuch as it is friendly. So, one way of evaluating (2) is to ask whether reconciliation is more or less friendly than retribution. Since friendliness is understood in terms of identity and solidarity, we need to ask which out of reconciliation and retribution better promotes them. I think it’s clear that reconciliation is much friendlier than retribution. For it invites open dialogue between victims and offenders, and importantly asks offenders to take on their victim’s perspective. Alternatively, personhood accounts of ubuntu focus on the development of personhood. Remember that this is typically thought to be accomplished by practicing other-regarding virtues. I submit that reconciliation better enables one to practice such virtues than does retribution. Again, reconciliation demands that individuals pay close attention to the other. If these considerations are correct, they serve to support (2). However, part of the difficulty in using this method to establish (2) is that it employs an ubuntu ethic in order to evaluate one of the advantages of adopting an ubuntu ethic. So, an objector may rightly complain that this method begs the question against the opponent of ubuntu. Furthermore, this discussion yet again highlights the difficulty in making axiological judgements from a neutral perspective that can be adopted by all or most of us. And finally, this further underscores that some of the issues discussed in this book may well reduce to questions about which view is in fact true. This is because assessing the axiological advantages of a theory may turn out to be necessarily connected to questions about the truth-value of the theory in question. The second way to establish (2), and one that does not run into the same worry about begging the question as the first method, is to point to empirical data. What, if anything, does social-scientific data tell us about (2)? I won’t attempt to answer this question here as there has not been sufficient research conducted into the psychology of reconciliation. While there has been substantial research on the psychology of forgiveness, it’s doubtful the conclusions will apply seamlessly to reconciliation since they are two different concepts. Until such research is undertaken it is simply an open question whether social scientific data would support (2).

6.3  Shared Identity In following Metz’s understanding of ubuntu I have emphasized the fact that part of what makes an action friendly is the degree to which

104  The Axiology of Ubuntu it promotes a shared identity amongst individuals. Recall from 2.5.2 that “[t]he key point is that cognitively identifying with others means not viewing them as separate from oneself, and instead considering them as members” (Metz, forthcoming). Likewise, it implies being proud or embarrassed by the actions of others since they are viewed as part of the ‘we.’ Helping others to achieve their goals and accommodating one’s own goals in light of others is of central importance. Finally, concerning motivation Metz says that “one participates in cooperative endeavours for reason beyond mere prudence” (forthcoming). While Metz doesn’t interact with the psychological literature on shared identity, and indeed much of it has to do with very practical matters such as team or workplace success, at least some of it appears to offer tentative support for ubuntu. In other words, certain psychological data points to the benefits of shared identity. Example benefits include more effective communication between individuals (Greenaway et al. 2015), and better health outcomes (Khan et al. 2015). Interestingly, and related to the above, is that shared identity tends to promote restorative justice, which is closely related to reconciliatory justice (Gromet and Darley 2009; Wenzel et al. 2010). While these empirical studies have not been conducted with explicitly testing the effects of ubuntu in view, inasmuch as they are applicable to Metz’s conception of shared identity, they provide at least some support in favour of its benefits. 6.3.1  The Shared Identity Argument for Narrow Personal Pro-Ubuntu These considerations can be standardized into an argument: (4) A world where individuals have a shared identity is better than a world in which individuals do not have a shared identity. (5) Worlds with ubuntu promote shared identity between individuals. Therefore, (6) Narrow personal pro-ubuntu is true. Recall that the comparison in this book is between ubuntu, Western monotheism, and naturalism. So (6) implies that ubuntu is axiologically superior to Western monotheism and naturalism with respect to fostering a shared identity between individuals. The best reason for thinking that this is true is that shared identity is constituent of the analysis of right action on ubuntu. The same is not true of monotheism or naturalism. Only a very specific version of monotheism or naturalism that endorses this type of ethic could possibly make

The Advantages of Ubuntu 105 a similar claim. Likewise, such versions would have to also capture all of the general features of monotheism and naturalism that I am evaluating in this project in order to be applicable here. Thus, a lot of work has to be done in order to show that this feature is not unique to ubuntu. This argument necessarily establishes a ‘personal’ version of ubuntu because the good of shared identity is something that occurs between individuals. The scope of the ‘personal’ here is ‘all-persons.’ This is because it is better that individuals participate in shared identity. Additionally, though, a world in which individuals participate in shared identity is better for everyone, even for those individuals who may not participate a great deal in it. These considerations on their own, however, cannot be used to expand the scope of the argument to defend a wide version of ubuntu. For in order to accomplish this it would have to be shown that the existence of shared identity makes the world a better place overall than it would be without it. But as will be discussed below, shared identity on its own isn’t always a good thing. Again, this doesn’t preclude it from being part of a cumulative case for wide pro-ubuntu.

6.3.2  Evaluation of the Shared Identity Argument for Narrow Personal Ubuntu One of the main reasons for rejecting this argument is based on the worry that there can be ill effects from shared identity. Consider the numerous cases where shared identity appears to be an axiological downside rather than an axiological advantage. Members of the Ku Klux Klan clearly have a shared identity. This is derived from a shared hatred of people of colour, Jews, and homosexuals. During the apartheid era in South Africa, many whites had a shared identity in affirming the racist policies of the South African Nationalist Party. It seems to very much matter, then, the object of the shared identity in question. Recall too, that Metz is well aware of this issue and argues that this is why shared identity works best in tandem with solidarity (forthcoming). 3 These considerations aren’t a definitive reason to reject the Shared Identity Argument. However, they do highlight the fact that the object of the shared identity very much matters. Racism as an object of shared identity is different from developing a vaccine for COVID-19 as the object of shared identity amongst a team of scientists. In 5.3, I discussed the purported disadvantage that ubuntu inappropriately leaves little room for individuality. While I noted that there are interpretations of ubuntu that do not completely reject individuality one might worry that too much focus on having a shared identity also wrongly subsumes the individual to the group. Again, this worry

106  The Axiology of Ubuntu can be partly addressed in that shared identity is not to be taken as a good solely on its own.

6.4 Solidarity Recall that for Metz friendliness involves not only shared identity but also solidarity. This latter phenomenon is best expressed through acts of service. Cognitively, it entails having empathy for others. This means “knowing what moves [the other…] person and more generally what makes him tick, even if he does not fully recognize it” (forthcoming). Understanding someone in this way helps to build emotional solidarity. Volition about solidarity entails that “one acts to improve another’s condition” (forthcoming). This involves helping others to become better people, not simply helping others to advance their own self-interests. Solidarity can be leveraged into a structurally similar argument for pro-ubuntu to the one above based on shared identity. 6.4.1  The Solidarity Argument for Narrow Personal Pro-Ubuntu Here’s the argument based on solidarity for pro-ubuntu: (7) A world where individuals exhibit solidarity with each other is better than a world in which individuals do not exhibit solidarity. (8) Worlds with ubuntu encourage individuals to exhibit solidarity with each other. Therefore, (9) Narrow personal pro-ubuntu is true. One way to defend this argument would be to bolster (7) with evidence from the social sciences. As with reconciliation, not enough research has been conducted on solidarity that is clearly applicable enough to this argument to make any definitive judgements one way or the other. Still, it seems as if there is prima facie strong reason to value a world in which individuals are empathized with and have their goals furthered by those around them. Finally, the scope of this argument is the same as the Shared Identity Argument. ‘Personal’ refers to all persons since it is better for every person either to experience solidarity with others, or at least to live in a world where such solidarity occurs. And while solidarity on its own is unlikely to establish wide pro-ubuntu, it can plausibly be included in a cumulative case for it.

The Advantages of Ubuntu 107 6.4.2  Evaluation of the Solidarity Argument for Narrow Personal Pro-Ubuntu The Solidarity Argument suffers from some of the same problems as the Shared Identity Argument. The value of solidarity seems very dependent on the type of people that have solidarity with each other. For example, a group of neo-Nazis who empathize with each other and helps to further one another’s goals is not something that adds positive value to the world. Recognizing what makes a neo-Nazi tick and supporting them is not an instance of solidarity that makes the world better. As with shared identity, then, the object of solidarity very much matters with respect to assessing its axiological value. None of this is intended to completely nullify the force of the argument; some forms of solidarity are certainly valuable. But it does place serious constraints on the strength of the argument. And again, to be fair to Metz, he is insistent that solidarity works better in conjunction with shared identity.

6.5 Friendliness One way to avoid the worries faced by the Shared Identity and Solidarity Arguments is to combine them into an argument for pro-ubuntu, based on what Metz calls friendliness. (10) A world where individuals exhibit friendliness (i.e., solidarity and shared identity) towards each other is better than a world where individuals are unfriendly towards each other. (11) Worlds with ubuntu encourage individuals to exhibit friendliness towards each other. Therefore, (12) Narrow personal pro-ubuntu is true. For further explanation of Metz’s conception of friendliness, the reader should consult 2.5. Notice that this argument relies on the fact that not only is an ubuntu ethic true, but there are a sufficient number of individuals enacting it such that the advantages are gained (and thereby it contributes positively to the axiological status of theism). In 5.6, I suggested that one of the stronger arguments in support of anti-ubuntu is based on the necessity of human participation in order to gain the purported benefits of ubuntu. This stands in stark contrast to both the advantages and disadvantages typically associated with Western monotheism and metaphysical naturalism. Yet one facet of Metz’s theory that does not involve human co-operation is his explanation of where moral value lies,

108  The Axiology of Ubuntu or more precisely, why humans have inherent dignity (or ‘rights’). Recall that Metz says that individuals are valuable inasmuch as they have the capacity to be the subject and/or object of friendliness. Almost every human has the capacity to be both the subject and object of friendliness, along with (to some extent) certain animals. Thus, on this account of ubuntu, almost all humans are inherently valuable given their capacity for friendliness. A natural follow-up question here is what sort of axiological status this particular account of human dignity, if true, has on the world?4

6.6  Consensus-Based Decision-Making The final advantage of ubuntu I consider is the priority it places on consensus-based decision-making. In traditional village life, decision-making involved everyone (or at least all the male elders). Decisions were not made until consensus was reached. Discussion of the relevant issues would simply continue until consensus was reached or the matter would be given up. African scholars have taken up this idea of consensus and applied it to contemporary political theory (Metz forthcoming). For example, one common proposal is for voters to select members of parliament by way of majority as happens in many democracies today. However, the members of parliament themselves would have to reach a consensus on all decision-making, including all proposed legislation. One purported benefit of consensus-based democracies over majoritarian democracies is that they afford more protection to minority groups (something which is typically otherwise left to the constitution and judiciary). Of course, these suggestions are not explicitly ubuntu-based forms of government. However, given that ubuntu is prominent in the consciousness of many Africans south of the sub-Sahara I submit there is reason to think these ideas are influenced by ubuntu. Let’s assume for the sake of argument that if there are axiological advantages to consensus-based decision-making that they are at least partly the result of ubuntu. In what follows I offer a standardized version of an argument for pro-ubuntu based on these considerations. 6.6.1  The Consensus-Based Decision-Making Argument for Pro-Ubuntu (13) Worlds in which consensus-based decision-making occurs are better than worlds in which other decision procedures are utilized (including majoritarian procedures). (14) Worlds in which ubuntu is true tend to utilize consensus-based decision-making procedures over other ones.

The Advantages of Ubuntu 109 Therefore, (15) Narrow personal pro-ubuntu is true. Recall that an assumption in this argument is that ubuntu is at least partly behind the motivation for consensus-based decision-making found in African traditional cultures. I’m therefore not going to spend time defending (14). With respect to the scope of the argument, the ‘personal’ in (15) refers to all persons since the idea is that it is better for society as a whole when decisions are made via consensus. Why this is so will become clearer in my defence of (13). Furthermore, the argument is necessarily personal because representation is a good having to do with persons. Finally, it establishes narrow pro-ubuntu because the conclusion is only that ubuntu is superior with respect to its decision procedure. I won’t explore ways to expand the scope to defend a wide version of pro-ubuntu but remember that even if it cannot be successfully expanded, the considerations mentioned here could still be part of a cumulative case for wide pro-ubuntu. Before outlining some reasons in favour of (13) a few details are in order regarding its modal scope. It’s not always entirely clear the strength of the claim that African scholars would endorse regarding consensus-based decision-making. One way of interpreting (13) is that it is a modal claim the scope of which covers all possible worlds. On this view there are no better decision procedures (and there can never be any better ones). More modest is the claim that it is the best procedure in the actual world; perhaps it is the best one that will ever be available to humans in this world given our rather limited imaginations, power, knowledge, etc. However, in other possible worlds (albeit very distant ones from ours), humans are able to use better decision procedures. Yet even more modest is the claim that it’s currently the best decision procedure that we have in the actual world, but it’s possible that down the road we discover better ones in the actual world. A reason for this ambiguity about scope is because many of the defences of consensus-based decision-making are put forward in the context of rejecting majoritarian democracies as found in the West. If this is the context of (13) the scope is even smaller. It is simply the claim that consensus-based decision-making is always (or almost always) better than majoritarian-based decision-making. I’m going to defend the claim that it’s currently the best-decision procedure available we have and thus at least right now makes the world a better place. However, much of what I will say in what follows applies to stronger modal claims and all of it applies to the weaker claims. Additionally, much of what I say will be in comparison to majoritarian democracy as this is often the context of such discussions.

110  The Axiology of Ubuntu What are some of the reasons for thinking that (13) is true? Kwasi Wiredu explains that even though consensus-based decision-making has a long history in Africa, it is not justified by appealing to tradition. Instead, he claims that there is a principled reason for consensus-based decision-making (Wiredu 2000, 1–10). The principled reason, according to Wiredu, is that every human has a fundamental right to be represented. This representation is more robust than what is typically meant by it in political discussions in the West. It means that individuals have a right to be directly represented on any and every issue of importance to them. This right to representation implies that majoritarian democracy is illegitimate because, as is well known, it deprives minorities of representation on issues of importance to them. Again, this isn’t to deny the fact that minorities are unable to vote or have representatives within Western democracies. It’s simply the claim that these votes do not matter, nor do their representatives, inasmuch as their interests do not align with the majority’s interest. They, therefore, fail to ensure the sort of robust representation that Wiredu believes is a fundamental human right. 5 So, one of the most important benefits of consensus-based decision-making is that it helps to safeguard the right to representation. However, I haven’t defended the claim that representation is a human right beyond these somewhat vague remarks from Wiredu. A more robust defence of this argument would require further defence of this claim. 6.6.2  Evaluation of the Consensus-Based DecisionMaking Argument for Pro-Ubuntu A clear advantage of this argument is that it successfully shows why minority interests are better protected by a consensus-based decision procedure than, say, in a majoritarian democracy. The one problem with this argument I want to explore in this section is based on the worry that it needs each individual’s interests to ultimately end up the same. The theme that individual interests and the community’s interests are ultimately the same is quite common in African thought; and if true it serves to legitimize decisions by consensus. Consider again what Wiredu says about the interests of community versus the interests of the individual: To adjust the interests of the individual to those of the community is not to subordinate the one to the other. The relationship is a purely symmetrical [one]. We could just as well have described it as the adjustment of the interests of the community to those of the individual. Moreover, we must not hypostatize the notion of the community. The community is simply a certain contextualization of individuals with respect to their locations and to their perceptions of

The Advantages of Ubuntu 111 their interests and of those of others. Communitarianism and individualism are both just different ways of arranging the pursuit of the interests of individuals. (Wiredu 2008, 334, quoted in Molefe 2017, 52)6 A belief that the interests of each individual are important makes it easy to see why consensus-based decision-making procedures were often embraced in the traditional African context. In explaining consensus decision-making in traditional Akan society (of Ghana) Wiredu explains that: [T]his adherence to the principle of consensus was a premeditated option. It was based on the belief that ultimately the interests of all members of society are the same, although their immediate perceptions of those interests may be different. This thought is given expression in an art motif depicting a crocodile with one stomach and two heads locked in struggle over food. If they could but see that the food was, in any case, destined for the same stomach, the irrationality of the conflict would be manifest to them. But is there a chance of it? The Ashanti answer is: ‘Yes, human beings have the ability eventually to cut through their differences to the rock bottom identity of interests.’ And, on this view, the means to that objective is simply rational discussion. Of the capabilities of this means the Ashantis are explicit. ‘There is,’ they say, ‘no problem of human relations that cannot be resolved by dialogue.’ (Wiredu 2000, 12) But the claim that the interests of every individual are ultimately the same is false. A general insight to be taken from the African communitarian tradition is that human interests are perhaps more often the same than is typically acknowledged in the West. Still, the justification for consensus-based decision procedures appears predicated on the idea that they always perfectly align. Here’s just one counterexample, among many, that could be offered against this claim. Consider that there are, say, 50,000 professional philosophers in the world (and this is a rather high estimate) and that there are approximately 7.5 billion people on the planet. This means that professional philosophers make up roughly 0.0000066667% of the world’s population. Even allowing that there are perhaps a total of 500,000 people with a serious interest in philosophy on the planet (again a rather high estimate) this would still mean that they comprise only 0.0000666667% of the world’s population. For further evidence of the rather limited interest in philosophy consider that most academic monographs sell under 1,000 copies, meaning only a minuscule percentage of the population has an interest

112  The Axiology of Ubuntu in such books. And finally, consider that a book in philosophy is considered a ‘smash hit’ if it sells 10,000 copies (a feat that is incredibly rare). Now, from the fact that so few people are interested in philosophy, it does not follow that philosophy is not important. It also does not follow that philosophy doesn’t have a wider influence on culture (primarily through undergraduate teaching). However, the numbers just mentioned should be evidence enough that the interests of philosophers are often quite different from other people with little interest in philosophy. And inasmuch as doing philosophy is interwoven into the identity of the philosophers themselves, such interests are fundamental to them. To claim that a primary school teacher, bus driver, medical doctor, etc., who further still, live in different parts of the world, could have the same fundamental interests (beyond the basic biological needs of all humans)7 is bizarre. I don’t believe that limiting the scope of ‘community’ will be of help to rescue the argument. Perhaps Wiredu and others might say that the community they have in mind is much smaller and localized. If one attempts this approach, I submit that problems regarding just how to delineate the relevant community will quickly emerge. The temptation will be to define community in such a way as all members have the same interests but to do so begs the question against the objector. Instead, I think a better rejoinder comes in what Wiredu refers to as the aims of the decision-making procedure in question. He asks: [C]an consensus always be had? As already noted, the Ashantis seem to have thought that it could, at least in principle. But suppose this is not the case. Even so, it can always be aimed at, and the point is that any system of politics that is seriously dedicated to this aim must be institutionally different from a system based on the sway of the majority, however hedged around with ‘checks and balances.’ (Wiredu 2000, 15) So one way to help preserve the Consensus-Based Decision-Making Argument is based on the idea that it is better if consensus is the genuine aim of any decision-making procedure. This approach allows room for the intuitive claim that people do in fact have divergent interests while also maintaining that consensus is a better ideal to strive for than a mere majority.

6.7  Intrinsic Goods Versus Relational Goods It will come as no surprise to the reader that the goods discussed in this chapter are all relational. To give a complete picture of where we are thus far, we can add them to the chart from the end of the previous chapters:

Type of Good

Pro-Theistic Goods

Type of Good

Anti-Ubuntu

Type of Good

Pro-Ubuntu

Pro-Ubuntu

Meaning

Intrinsic

Intrinsic Infinite Value

Intrinsic

Justice

Relational

Reconciliation

Relational

Privacy

Intrinsic

No Gratuitous Evil

Relational

Individuality

Intrinsic

Shared Identity

Relational

Dignity

Intrinsic

Morally Good Agent

Relational

Economic Prosperity

Extrinsic

Solidarity

Relational

Sacrifice

Intrinsic

Cosmic Justice

Relational

Authority and Tradition

Relational

Friendliness

Relational

Understanding

Intrinsic

Afterlife

Relational

Reliance on Human Action

Relational

Consensus

Relational

Relationship with God

Relational

The Advantages of Ubuntu 113

Anti-Theistic Goods

114  The Axiology of Ubuntu

6.8 Conclusion In this chapter I developed a number of arguments defending various versions of personal ubuntu. Specifically, I examined arguments based on the advantages of reconciliation, shared identity, solidarity, and consensus. While the strength of these arguments varies, they do establish at least some support in favour of pro-ubuntu. It is also noteworthy that as with other arguments, establishing whether certain advantages (or in other cases disadvantages) are in fact genuine, likely turns out to be intimately connected to questions about the truth value of the view in question. Furthermore, this continues to highlight the challenges in establishing the claim that there is widespread intersubjective agreement on ethical matters. Finally, Chapters Five and Six have continued with my secular approach to ubuntu. At various points, the reader may have rightly wondered whether there are axiological differences between secular and religious versions of ubuntu. I take up potential axiological differences between secular and religious versions of ubuntu in the next chapter.

Notes 1. Of course, retribution is not the only alternative form of justice to reconciliation. But since it is one of the most common in the West, I focus on it here for the sake of simplicity. 2. Recall that for the sake of simplicity I’m assuming that the truth of ubuntu entails that a sufficient number of people enact it. 3. Metz also claims that on its own, shared identity can permit intuitively wrong forms of paternalism (forthcoming). 4. Addressing this would take me too far afield, but presumably the answer would involve comparing and contrasting Metz’s account of dignity with alternative accounts. 5. Admittedly, Wiredu’s reasons for thinking representation of this sort is a fundamental human right are somewhat cryptic. The points about colliding interests and reconciliation I mention below provide, at best, are only a partial set of reasons for his view. 6. This quote is in the context of Molefe arguing that even African Communitarian ethics is at its base, about the individual. 7. Likewise, despite the crocodile example, it seems clear enough that basic biological needs are not really what Wiredu has in mind.

Bibliography Greenaway, Katharine H., Ruth G. Wright, Joanne Willingham, Katherine J. Reynolds, and S. Alexander Haslam. (2015). “Shared Identity Is Key to Effective Communication.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 41(2): 171–182. Gromet, Dena M, and John M. Darley. (2009). “Retributive and Restorative Justice: Importance of Crime Severity and Shared Identity in people’s Justice Responses.” Australian journal of psychology 61(1): 50–57.

The Advantages of Ubuntu 115 Gyeke, Kwame. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. __________. (2004). Beyond Cultures: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, III. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Ikuenobe, Polycarp. (2006). Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions. Lanham, MD: Lexington. Khan, Sammyh S., Nick Hopkins, Stephen Reicher, Shruti Tewari, Narayanan Srinivasan, and Clifford Stevenson. (2015). “Shared Identity Predicts Enhanced Health at a Mass Gathering.” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 18(4): 504–522. Metz, Thaddeus. (forthcoming). A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and beyond the Continent. Oxford University Press. Molefe, Motsamai. (2017). “Individualism in African Moral Cultures.” Cultura 14(2): 49–68. Wenzel, Michael, Tyler G. Okimoto, Norman T. Feather, and Michael J. Platow. (2010). “Justice Through Consensus: Shared Identity and the Preference for a Restorative Notion of Justice.” European Journal of social psychology 40(6): 909–930. Wiredu, Kwasi. (2000). “Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: A Plea for a Non-Party Polity.” Polylog 2. http://them.polylog.org/2/ fwk-en.htm. __________. (2008). “Social Philosophy in Postcolonial Africa: Some Preliminaries Concerning Communalism and Communitarianism.” South African Journal of Philosophy 27(4): 332–339.

7

The Axiology of Theism and Differences Between Supernatural Ubuntu and Secular Ubuntu

7.1 Introduction In Chapters Three and Four I evaluated current arguments for anti-theism and pro-theism from the perspective of ubuntu. I concluded that if ubuntu is true, then pro-theism is at least somewhat easier to establish than anti-theism. I used a secular (i.e., naturalistic) version of ubuntu in this evaluation which means I focussed almost exclusively on the ethical dimensions of ubuntu, as opposed to the metaphysical dimensions. Then, in Chapters Five and Six I switched gears to focus on the axiological status of ubuntu itself. I refrained from offering definitive conclusions and instead chose to develop a series of arguments for both anti-ubuntu and pro-ubuntu. Again, I focussed on evaluating a secular version of ubuntu. This meant, for the most part, examining the consequences of the ethical dimensions of ubuntu, and in particular the emphasis that it places on relationality. Thus, to this point in the book, I have focussed on the ethical dimensions of ubuntu. However, in this chapter I turn to evaluate the metaphysical dimensions of ubuntu. In particular, I want to discover whether there is a significant axiological difference between supernatural versions of ubuntu and secular versions of ubuntu. If there is, then we can’t make sweeping claims about the value of ubuntu in general without being more specific about the particular metaphysical picture we have in mind. Now, one might rightly wonder whether we can simply refer to the current axiology of theism literature to discover any differences between supernatural ubuntu and naturalistic ubuntu. For the current literature focusses on the axiological statuses of monotheism and naturalism. Since supernatural ubuntu is monotheistic and secular ubuntu is naturalistic, can’t we just apply the current evaluations to axiological questions about God’s existence to these different versions of ubuntu? If supernatural ubuntu is identical to Western monotheism, then yes, the current arguments in the axiology of theism can be applied seamlessly to it. Likewise, if naturalistic ubuntu is identical to Western naturalism, DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-7

The Axiology of Theism 117 then yes, the current arguments in the axiology of theism can be applied seamlessly to it. I believe, however, that there are important differences between supernatural ubuntu and its Western counterpart, particularly with respect to their conceptions of God. In this chapter I’m first going to outline in more detail the differences between supernatural ubuntu and Western monotheism. I will then argue that some of these differences imply significant axiological differences between the two views (or at the very least I show that current arguments for pro-theism don’t necessarily apply to supernatural versions of ubuntu). I then examine potential differences between secular versions of ubuntu and Western naturalism. I argue that there are fewer differences between these two views than their supernatural counterparts (at least at the metaphysical level). As I proceed, axiological differences between supernatural ubuntu and secular ubuntu will become clearer.

7.2  Supernatural Ubuntu and Western Monotheism What are the differences between these supernatural ubuntu and Western monotheism? Briefly, let’s say that the supernatural version of ubuntu affirms both the ethical and metaphysical dimensions of ubuntu. Of course, the ethical dimension I have focussed on says that an action is right only inasmuch as it promotes a shared identity and solidarity. I will discuss the metaphysical dimensions below. The secular version of ubuntu affirms only the ethical dimensions, though it should be emphasized that this doesn’t make it any less of a comprehensive worldview by which one’s life can be guided. What are the axiological differences between the two views? Well, inasmuch as the supernatural version of ubuntu in question is monotheistic in precisely the same way as Western monotheism, then necessarily it will have all of the same axiological consequences of Western monotheism. The purported advantages and disadvantages of God’s existence already explored in the literature (see Chapters Two and Three) will all apply to it. Thus, the arguments for pro-theism and anti-theism might just transfer seamlessly over to supernatural versions of ubuntu. The key question, however, that needs to be answered here is whether the ubuntu conception of God, among other things, is relevantly and sufficiently similar enough to Western (i.e., Judeo-Christian) conceptions of God in order for the arguments to transfer. Before delving into specific differences, I remind the reader of what I said in 2.2.2 regarding Traditional African Religion (TAR). While there are important dissimilarities amongst religious beliefs across the African continent (or the sub-Sahara at least), there are enough similarities that

118  The Axiology of Ubuntu many scholars now believe it is appropriate to speak of one ‘African Religion’ which can take its place amongst the major world religions (e.g., Magesa 1997; Lugira 2009; Mbiti 2015). For example, Aloysius M. Lugira writes that: [I]n spite of their differences from each other and from many world religions, [African religions] share with each other and with most other faiths the goal of guiding individuals safely through the passages of life, from birth and puberty, marriage and maturity, to death and ancestorhood. They mark not only the seasons of life each with its particular responsibilities and duties. (Lugira 2009, 25) The supernatural version of ubuntu I describe below is thus one and the same with the core tenants of Traditional African Religion. Supernatural versions of ubuntu just are versions of Traditional African Religion.1

7.3  Traditional African Religion 7.3.1  God African Religion is monotheistic, and this is supported by the fact that “[m]ost African oral traditions have pointed to the existence of a power above which there is no other power, a Supreme Being, Creator, and Originator of the World” (Lugira 2009, 36). In many African languages the closest literal translation to ‘God’ is ‘Creator’ (Mbiti 2015, 35). God rules over the physical (visible) and non-physical (invisible) world (Mbiti 2015, 35). Other common attributes of God include the claims that God is the absolute controller and sustainer of the universe, provider, and possessor of what he has created (Lugira 2009, 36). 2 God is typically thought to be outside or beyond the universe (Mbiti 2015, 43). God has placed humans at the centre of the universe and creation is an ongoing process that will never end (Mbiti 2015, 35). We can also add attributes of God that resonate with much of the JudeoChristian tradition. These include the idea that God is good towards all, merciful, kind, holy, pure, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-present, limitless, self-existing, the first cause, immaterial, and unchanging (Mbiti 2015, 55–59). God is also fundamentally unknowable. Mbiti writes that “[a]bove all, it is believed that God cannot be explained, he cannot be fully known. African peoples have long known this, and God has names which mean ‘the Unknown’, ‘the Unexplainable’, ‘the Fathomless Spirit’” (Mbiti 2015, 59).

The Axiology of Theism 119 7.3.2  The Spirit World In African Religion the spirit world is extremely large. God is typically thought to not involve herself in the day-to-day of human affairs and instead delegates such tasks to lesser spirits (Lugira 2009, 46). Lugira explains that: The spirit world is made up of superhuman beings, beings that occupy the spiritual universe between gods and humanity, the space between heaven and Earth. They invisibly tread the Earth so that they are continually present. It is to these lesser gods that people turn in times of joy and sorrow. It is to them that they make requests concerning their needs and desires, and to them that they make offerings and sacrifices for health and happiness, successful crops, the birth of healthy children, and protection from evil. (Lugira 2009, 46) One major group of spirits is known as Nature spirits and includes both sky spirits and earth spirits. Nature spirits are commonly associated with natural forces. They are “largely the personifications of natural objects and forces. This means that people give ‘personal’ characteristics to these objects and forces of the universe, regarding them as if they were living, intelligent beings of the invisible world” (Mbiti 2015, 71). There is a hierarchy of nature spirits with what are considered as divinities at the top. Furthermore: African people feel the power and energy of the spirit world that is all around them. They experience the actions of gods and ancestors in everything they do. African people are deeply aware of the powerful force of creation that put them on the Earth and guides their footsteps. They are closely attuned to the mystical and mysterious superhuman powers in their lives. In addition to their sense of vital force of the universe, Africans recognize other types of forces that are neither superhuman nor simply human but lie somewhere between. These mystical forces include magic, witchcraft, and sorcery. Like spiritual forces, they affect people’s lives and the lives of their community. (Lugira 2009, 96). Witchcraft is a major cause of misfortune and is dreaded amongst many religious Africans. Lugira explains that “[a] sizable population of Africans at all levels of society believe in witchcraft. They hold witchcraft responsible for such misfortunes as failure to bear children, diseases,

120  The Axiology of Ubuntu failure in life, illness and death” (Lugira 2009, 98). Being a witch is usually a trait that is inherited, though some also think the power can be learned. Healers, also known as ‘witch doctors’ are relied on to combat the negative effects of witchcraft” (Lugira 2009, 98). Sorcery is magic that is used to do harm and in this way is similar to witchcraft. The difference between them is in kind and degree. This is because “[w]itchcraft may be defined as mystical and innate power, which can be used by its possessor to harm other people, whereas sorcery is evil magic against others” (Lugira 2009, 101). As with witches, sorcerers are considered evil and people appeal to healers to help defend against them. 7.3.3  The Universe According to Traditional African religion, the universe is interconnected in that every individual has a life force and the power to influence other forces (Magesa 1997, 46). In this way, “[c]ausation flows all directions to maintain life in the universe, but the seriousness and depth of its effects normally depend on the quality of having life and primogeniture (Magesa 1997, 46). The older animate creatures have the strongest force and should be respected by the younger. All life ultimately flows from God (Magesa 1997, 47). In sum, “all life forces, that is, all creation, are intended to serve and enhance the life force of the human person and society” (Magesa 1997, 51). In Traditional African Religion, “[t]he universe is considered to be unending in terms of both space and time” (Mbiti 2015, 37). The universe is ordered and remains in harmony provided the order is not disturbed. John Mbiti explains that there the order occurs in different places. There is order in the laws of nature, moral order among people, religious order, and mystical order (witchcraft, traditional medicine, etc.) (Mbiti 2015, 40–41). 7.3.4  Ancestors and the Afterlife Traditional African Religion posits that all human life continues after death in the form of the ‘living dead.’ The number of human spirits is therefore quite numerous (Mbiti 2015, 75). Contrary to common misconceptions, “Africans do not worship their dead ancestors, but they do venerate and respect them” (Lugira 2009, 50; see also Mbiti 2015, 18).3 God is considered the ancestor par excellence since God exists first (Magesa 1997, 47). Magesa explains that “[m]ore than any other force, the ancestors are the protectors of the society as well as its most feared direct critic and source of punishment” (Magesa 1997, 48). Finally, some hold that ancestors enforce and convey the moral rules that are passed to them by God.

The Axiology of Theism 121 Many Africans believe that once deceased a person must take a journey and cross the river into the land of the dead (in traditional African society rivers were often used as borders). Once this journey is over, the ancestor joins “a society which replicates the political order of premortem society to the extent that rulers in the one retain their status in the other” (Wiredu 1992, 137). They thus remain very much part of the community (Menkiti 1984, 174; Mbiti 2015, 77). For instance, they continue to be referred to by their first names and hence retain individual personal identity. Mbiti explains that: It is true that departed relatives are believed to continue to live and to show interest in their surviving families. These families may show their belief by building shrines for the departed and placing bits of food or drink there or on the graves, and sometimes mentioning them in their prayers. But these acts of respect for the departed do not amount to worshipping them; they show people’s that the departed of up to four or five generations should not be forgotten. (Mbiti 2015, 18) Likewise, “the living feel not only beholden to the ancestors for their help and protection, but also positively obliged to do honor to them and render service to them as appropriate” (Wiredu 1992 138). While ancestors are typically most concerned with their own families, “[i]f an ancestor is a ruler, the scope of his activities goes beyond his own family to the whole of his town or kingdom” (Wiredu 1992, 137). According to Mbiti, “Africans believe that there is a force or power or energy in the universe which can be tapped by those who know how to do so, and then used for good or evil towards other people” (Mbiti 2015, 18, 19). Thus, these spirits are capable of both good and evil and people go to great lengths not to displease them (Mbiti 2015, 78–79). However, “after several generations, the ancestors cease to be remembered by their personal names; from this comment on they slide into personal non-existence, and lose all that they once possessed by way of personal identity. This, for the traditional African world-view, is the termination of personal existence” (1984, 174). In some sense, this is a collective rather than individual immorality. However, the collective is not comprised of individuals that have maintained personal identity. Menkiti explains that: They no longer have an adequate sense of self; and having lost their names, lose also the means by which they could be immortalized. Hence, it is better to refer to them by the term the nameless dead, rather than designate their stage of by such a term as ‘collective immortality’, thereby opening up the possibility of describing them as ‘collective immortals’, which they are certainly not. (1984, 175)

122  The Axiology of Ubuntu 7.3.5  Morality It’s interesting to note that some have argued the ethic of ubuntu is what underlies the morality of all the variations of Traditional African Religion (Lugira 2009, 107). Morality in African Religion posits a strong duty of hospitality. For example, “[t]here are morals concerned with hospitality to relatives, friends and strangers. It is held to be a moral evil to deny hospitality, even to a stranger. Therefore, when people travel they may stop anywhere for the night and receive hospitality in that homestead” (Mbiti 2015, 176). And, echoing the ubuntu ethic, “[w[hat strengthens the life of the community is held to be good and right. What weakens the life of the community is held to be evil and wrong” (Mbiti 2015, 176). Finally, in Traditional African Religion, God and the spirit world are thought to punish people and as such, there is a conception of cosmic justice. However, unlike many other religions, much of this justice is thought to occur during our earthly lives instead of in the afterlife. For instance, “[i]f there is a large-scale natural calamity such as a serious drought, flooding, or a devastating earthquake, people often interpret it as a punishment from God upon the community or society concerned as a result of increased moral offences” (Mbiti 2015, 179).

7.4  Arguments for Pro-Theism and Supernatural Ubuntu I rehearsed the arguments for pro-theism in Chapter Three when I examined their soundness from the perspective of ubuntu. Thus, I will not outline them again in any detail here. Instead, in this section, I want to examine the degree to which the arguments for pro-theism apply to supernatural ubuntu (i.e., the basic elements of Traditional African Religion). The arguments I examine here are those based on cosmic justice, an afterlife, and a relationship with God. 7.4.1  Cosmic Justice Cosmic or final justice has been cited as an advantage of theism. As a maximal being, God’s existence ensures that there will be justice in the end, even if in our earthly lives we don’t experience it. Do similar considerations apply to the supernatural version of ubuntu described above? There is a strong conception of justice in Traditional African Religion; however, there is a sense that it occurs in people’s earthly lives instead of being something that is guaranteed in the hereafter. Likewise, in the JudeoChristian tradition, God is understood as the final arbiter and indeed the one who doles out justice whereas in Traditional African Religion it appears lesser spirits are often responsible for ensuring justice occurs. In other words, justice in Traditional African Religion is delegated to other beings as God is not often directly involved in human affairs.

The Axiology of Theism 123 Inasmuch as spirits, and particularly ancestors, ensure justice in individuals’ earthly lives then if the fact of justice is an advantage of Western monotheism it should also be considered an advantage of supernatural ubuntu. Notice, however, that part of what motivates the original argument for pro-theism is the idea that people often don’t get what they deserve in their earthly lives. Perpetrators often go unpunished and victims fail to receive just compensation. Even on a relational ethic such as ubuntu which stresses reconciliation and a good outcome in matters of justice, there are many cases where this sort of justice isn’t achieved either. Thus, anyone who wants to appeal to cosmic justice as a reason in favour of pro-supernatural ubuntu is under pressure to show that justice is usually (if not always) achieved in everyone’s earthly lives. Alternatively, they would have to show that if this metaphysical system existed it would be better (i.e., somehow more just) than the western theistic story of justice. This involves answering the following question: is it better to experience cosmic justice in one’s earthly life, or is it better to experience in the afterlife? Intuitions may well vary about this case, and I find it difficult to see why one of these scenarios is axiologically superior to the other. Thus, while I’m doubtful that either of these strategies can be successfully employed, at the very least this discussion shows that a lot of work remains to be done in order to defend such an argument. In other words, a lot of work needs to be done to show that cosmic justice really is an advantage of supernatural versions of ubuntu. 7.4.2  Afterlife Related but distinct from cosmic justice in defences of pro-theism is the idea of an afterlife. Suppose that everyone (or all those deserving) receive a good eternal life if Western monotheism is true. Inasmuch as this is a good, it provides evidence in favour of pro-theism.4 While both Western monotheism and Traditional African Religion clearly have conceptions of the afterlife, as should be evident from the above description of supernatural ubuntu, they differ significantly. Here are some additional points of difference: consider that in the Christian tradition immortality was lost during the fall or never existed (Mbiti 2015, 189). God had to take action in order to restore it. On the other hand, however, Africans typically associate eternal life with having offspring in order to carry on the family line (Wiredu 1992a, 142). Consider the doctrine of the resurrection of the body in the Christian tradition. Wiredu says that: One way or another, dead individuals will be reconstituted by body and soul being put together again in such a way as to recover their pre-mortem personal identities, with the one pleasant exception that

124  The Axiology of Ubuntu the new editions of their bodies will be so vastly improved as not to be susceptible to any physical disabilities or carnal cravings. (Wiredu 1992a, 141) Christians will be resurrected on the ‘day of judgment’ whereas in the African land of the dead, there is no waiting period. In African Religion there is also no distinct soul which is thought to constitute a person’s essence.5 Wiredu continues: The African land of the dead, then, is not heaven in the Christian sense. The life of the ancestors is pictured as one of dignity and serenity, rather than of bliss. There are, of course, no temptations or tribulations in that life, but neither are there any excitements. The one preoccupation of that existence is with the good of the living wing of the family and clan. It is upon their ability to achieve this aim that the importance of the ancestors is predicated. Beneficial interaction with the community of the living, thus, is the first law of their being. (Wiredu 1992a, 144) While the continuation of one’s life is accepted in Traditional African Religion, recall that after a number of generations, ancestors typically lose their personal identity. In the first few generations after death, they are remembered as distinct family members and interacted with as such. But this doesn’t last indefinitely. Furthermore, this is quite distinct from the western idea of a soul which is the essence of a person and continues to exist forever.6 On this latter view, personal identity remains forever. Indeed, I suspect that part of what makes the afterlife such a great good for many western theists is based upon the idea that personal identity is maintained forever. Without personal identity over time, many westerners will express scepticism about the advantages of an afterlife. Note that I’m not here making an axiological assessment of the African conception of the living dead. Rather, I’m claiming that arguments for pro-theism which appeal to the afterlife as an advantage of theism cannot seamlessly apply to supernatural versions of ubuntu. Arguments for pro-supernatural ubuntu based on an African understanding of the afterlife need to be offered independently of the current arguments found in the literature. 7.4.3  Relationship with God Another consideration in favour of pro-theism is based on the great good of the possibility of a relationship with God. In different ways, all of the other major monotheistic religions apart from Traditional African Religion in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all place great emphasis on developing and maintaining the right sort of relationship with God.

The Axiology of Theism 125 Indeed, the fact that this relationship isn’t (apparently) available to individuals (through no fault of their own) has been utilized as leverage in arguments for atheism (i.e., arguments from divine hiddenness). In African Religion there is a lot of interaction between people and the spirit realm. Indeed, the distinction between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ isn’t really made in the same way that it is in the west. The boundaries between the two just aren’t distinct for many Africans. However, in African Religion there does not appear to be the same emphasis place on individuals having a direct relationship with God. Africans strive to be in right relationships with ancestors to avoid ills and punishment but there is not the same emphasis on communing directly with God. As such, arguments for pro-theism based on the unique value of a relationship with a maximal being in God cannot be leveraged to support similar arguments for pro-supernatural ubuntu. The unique interaction with the spirit world which is offered on supernatural ubuntu is what would have to be appealed to in order to raise arguments based on relating to the spiritual realm. I suspect such arguments are bound to be weaker because part of the force of the arguments for pro-theism is based on the idea there is something uniquely important and valuable in communing with a maximal being. 7.4.4  Sub-Conclusion: Pro-Theism and Supernatural Ubuntu The arguments for pro-theism discussed here do not apply seamlessly to supernatural ubuntu. Notice that this is not, in itself, an indictment of supernatural ubuntu. Furthermore, it doesn’t show that a secular ubuntu is better than a supernatural ubuntu. Rather, the conclusion to be drawn is simply that the original arguments for pro-theism cannot be used to support pro-supernatural ubuntu. More discussion is needed to discover whether there are significant axiological differences between secular and supernatural versions of ubuntu.

7.5 Arguments for Anti-Theism and Supernatural Ubuntu This section will mirror the above section but instead of examining arguments for pro-theism, it will focus on arguments for anti-theism. In this section I thus explore the extent to which the current arguments on offer for anti-theism apply to supernatural ubuntu. I won’t spend very much time detailing the arguments as I already did so in Chapter Three. In that chapter I concluded that it’s more difficult to establish the arguments for anti-theism because many of the purported goods they appeal to are not as valuable from the perspective of an ubuntu ethic.7 This is because anti-theistic goods tend to be intrinsic, while the goods ubuntu most values are relational. However, in what follows I set such

126  The Axiology of Ubuntu considerations aside and suppose that when it comes to Western monotheism the arguments for anti-theism are sound. The question to answer, then, is whether they also apply to supernatural ubuntu. 7.5.1  Privacy Recall that considerations about privacy loss establish at least some versions of anti-theism. I’ve further suggested that it need not matter what is done with the knowledge accessed about oneself. It is a disadvantage to lack control over what one reveals about oneself (Lougheed, 2020 Ch. 3). Given that the characteristics ascribed to God in Traditional African Religion include omniscience and omnipotence it seems that these considerations in favour of anti-theism apply seamlessly to supernatural ubuntu. Hence, they can also be used to establish arguments for anti-supernatural ubuntu. For if God is all-knowing, then God knows every fact about every person. Furthermore, God knows what it is like, phenomenologically, to be each individual. For if God did not, then there would be knowledge God lacked which is impossible.8 Notice that even if the consequences of possessing such knowledge differ between Western monotheism and African Religion, this distinction is insignificant if I am right that part of what constitutes the disadvantage is the very possession of the knowledge itself. Thus, it will not do for an objector to say that the God of Traditional African Religion is less involved in human affairs and so possessing this knowledge is less of a harm. This disadvantage of monotheism simply falls out of the definition of God on both Western monotheism and Traditional African Religion. 7.5.2  Dignity There is also a sense in which God’s existence necessarily constitutes a dignity harm to humans. Sometimes philosophers have tried to argue that God’s existence somehow violates our autonomy, but I suggest that this isn’t right. This is especially so given that many theists (at least in the western tradition) claim that humans are libertarian free and do so partly because they think it is required for humans to be morally responsible (and hence required for God to fairly act as our judge) (Lougheed 2020, Ch. 4). However, the general motivation behind this line of reasoning is better understood as involving dignity harms. This line of thought says that, necessarily, it is a harm to be created for any purposes other than to fulfill one’s own purposes and that God, by definition, cannot but create us for his purposes (Lougheed 2020, 122–126).9 In Traditional African Religion God is quite clearly understood as a creator. As noted above, in many indigenous African languages the closest literal translation of ‘God’ is ‘creator’ (7.3.1). The argument for anti-theism based on dignity applies equally to supernatural versions of

The Axiology of Theism 127 ubuntu. Again, if the original argument is correct it doesn’t matter why God creates the world, even if the purported reasons are significantly different from those offered by Western monotheism. The fact that a maximal being is responsible (ultimately) for human existence constitutes, in itself, a dignity harm. This argument thus applies seamlessly to supernatural versions of ubuntu. 7.5.3  Genuine Sacrifice Another argument for anti-theism is based on the idea that only apparent, rather than genuine sacrifice is possible on theism. On the assumption that there is a good eternal afterlife that one is entitled to, genuine sacrifice is not possible. For any sacrifice made in one’s earthly life, including even giving up one’s own life, will be more than compensated for in the afterlife (Lougheed 2020, 144–154). This doesn’t entail that the existence of eternal life is bad, but it does imply that certain types of self-sacrificial love are impossible in a world with an afterlife. I’m going to first present considerations in favour of the idea that this argument does not apply quite as seamlessly to supernatural versions of ubuntu as the above two arguments based on privacy and dignity. After that I’ll explain why such considerations may turn out to be wrong. Initially, one might think that genuine sacrifice is indeed possible on supernatural versions of ubuntu because while there is an afterlife on this conception (i.e., the living dead), personal identity is lost after a handful of generations. And as discussed in 7.4.2, maintaining personal identity over time is a key element in explaining why a good eternal afterlife is such a great good. Now, I haven’t said definitively that losing personal identity after a few generations greatly diminishes the value of the afterlife had on Traditional African Religion. After all, maybe the importance placed on personal identity is mere western bias. Rather than defend the value of personal identity here, let’s just suppose maintaining personal identity is indeed an important feature in explaining the value of the afterlife. If this is right, then the sort of genuine sacrifice I’ve suggested is impossible on Western monotheism is possible on supernatural ubuntu. For after a handful of generations as part of the living dead, one will indeed go out of existence (again on the assumption that personal identity over time must be maintained). There is also significantly less emphasis in Traditional African Religion on the afterlife as being a place where people are rewarded or compensated for their earthly lives; instead, this is something that happens when people are alive. Thus, there is also less reason to suppose that if one makes sacrifices in the here and now that they will be compensated in the afterlife. So on this line of reasoning, arguments for anti-theism based on the claim that genuine sacrifice is impossible on Western monotheism do not apply seamlessly

128  The Axiology of Ubuntu to supernatural versions of ubuntu, even though such versions affirm life after death. However, this analysis is too quick. For an important objection to it is the claim that a handful of generations is all that’s needed to sufficiently compensate for the sacrifice. If this is right, then this consideration against western monotheism may well also count against African religion. Consider that with respect to finite sacrifices one makes on one’s earthly life that such a sacrifice, necessarily, doesn’t cost more than a generation. As such, even living just one additional generation more than compensates for it. One might object that this is only a partial response because it doesn’t account for the ultimate sacrifice of giving up one’s own life. However, when compared to naturalism, I think that it still follows that this ultimate sacrifice is not really possible on supernatural versions of ubuntu. This is because even if someone sacrifices for their life, they will live at least one more generation as an ancestor (indeed, they get five or six more generations). So, they aren’t losing anything as such. Whether with respect to sacrifice supernatural ubuntu or Western monotheism is better is not what’s at issue here, so it need not concern us even if there are significant axiological differences between the two in this regard. For in the initial context in which these arguments were given, the debate is between Western monotheism and naturalism. 7.5.4  Understanding The final argument for anti-theism I wish to examine is based on understanding. If Western monotheism is true, then the universe is, at least in certain ways, fundamentally unknowable. The physical laws of nature can never offer a complete picture of causes and effects in a universe where there is a God who interacts with his creation. The scientific method cannot be used to discover and understand God’s actions. Furthermore, God himself is a being that is in many ways fundamentally unknowable. Minimally, we could never come close to knowing what it is like to be God. Inasmuch as (the possibility of) complete understanding is valuable, atheism is better than theism. This disadvantage of Western monotheism applies equally, if not more so, to Traditional African Religion. The spiritual world in African Religion is arguably much more complex than that of Western monotheism (at least as the latter is typically understood in contemporary terms). In Traditional African Religion, consider that humans in the form of witch doctors, witches, etc., can all interact with the spiritual realm. The spiritual world contains numerous spirits itself, including ancestors, all of whom interact with the physical world. This makes studying causes and effects in this world via normal methods of inquiry, including the scientific method, much more difficult. A complete understanding of the world appears to be just as difficult, if not more so, on supernatural ubuntu than as it is on Western monotheism.

The Axiology of Theism 129 On the other hand, Mbiti says that: [B]elief in the existence of spirits provides people with the explanation of many mysteries which they find in the universe. This could be considered as a major benefit to people, where no other explanations are available or satisfactory. In the African view of the universe, the spirits fill up the area between God and man. This too can be a beneficial contribution to people’s understanding of their own existence and that of God and the universe at large. (Mbiti 2015, 81) But notice that for Mbiti to be correct there needs to be no other ‘available or satisfactory’ answers to the questions in view. There thus needs to be no other way to explain the effects of the various phenomena in the world. However, the scientific method and other means of systematic inquiry have indeed provided alternative explanations of causes and effects. The natural question, I suppose, is whether these alternative non-religious explanations are more satisfactory than the traditional ones. Here one might object that this argument assumes a Western conception of understanding which is grounded in systematic inquiry and the scientific method. But why think that this is the best or only method of arriving at understanding? For example, oral tradition passes down the knowledge of Traditional African Religion. Elders are relied on as sources of information. In other words, there are ways of understanding the spirit world in African Religion, even if not by methods that most Westerners would describe as normal ways of inquiring. My response to this worry is threefold. The first is simply to admit that the argument for anti-theism based on understanding does indeed assume a Western conception of understanding. Having said that, inasmuch as this western conception of understanding is objectively valuable, the argument still holds. Just because it may be a Western conception, it does not follow from this fact alone that the argument is unsound. Admittedly though, this defence would involve spelling out in more detail precisely what it is about this conception of understanding that is valuable, and as such I won’t pursue this strategy further. The second way to respond to this worry is by pointing to a distinction between private knowledge and public knowledge. Perhaps with respect to private knowledge, a world where African Religion is true (or indeed, any other supernatural religion is true) does not fare any worse than a world where naturalism is true. The understanding of various causes and effects might not be publicly available for anyone to inquire into; however such knowledge is possessed by designated experts. Such understanding in a naturalistic world, however, is publicly available in the sense that anyone can inquire into the various causes and effects that are observed. There are no hidden or obscure sources of knowledge.

130  The Axiology of Ubuntu With this distinction in view, it’s fair to say that naturalism fares better than African Religion at least with respect to the ability to have a public understanding of things like causes and effects. Finally, a third response might be to concede much of this objection with the exception of understanding about God. For it’s still true on Traditional African Religion’s conception of God that complete understanding of God is impossible. What is it like to be all-knowing or allgood or all-powerful? Such attributes are so far from the realm of human experience there is a very real sense in which God will always be unknowable to us. In order to know perfectly what it is like to be God, one would have to actually be God, something that is logically impossible. 7.5.5  Sub-Conclusion: Anti-Theism and Supernatural Ubuntu Unlike the arguments for pro-theism, it seems that with the exception of genuine sacrifice, the arguments for anti-theism do indeed apply to supernatural ubuntu. Some of the explanation for this is again the result of the distinction between intrinsic goods and relational goods. The arguments for pro-theism tend to rely on relational goods which is why they get a sympathetic reading from the perspective of ubuntu. But the arguments for anti-theism tend to rely on intrinsic goods and hence aren’t treated as sympathetically from an ubuntu ethic. However, when applying these arguments to supernatural ubuntu the opposite conclusion is true. It’s difficult to apply the arguments for pro-theism seamlessly to supernatural ubuntu yet much easier to do so with the arguments for anti-theism. Another reason for this is that the arguments for anti-theism tend to rely on the logical consequences of God’s existence. So inasmuch as Western monotheism and Traditional African Religion offer the same descriptions of ‘God,’ the arguments are bound to cut across both traditions evenly. The same methodology (of simply examining the logical consequences of theism) isn’t relied on quite as much in the arguments for pro-theism. Recall too, that in Chapter Five I argued that one of the strongest arguments in favour of anti-ubuntu is based on the idea that the benefits of ubuntu are dependent upon human co-operation. In this chapter I have discovered that the disadvantages of religious versions of ubuntu are not dependent on human action (which coincides with the original axiological discussion of Western monotheism in the literature). Thus, with respect to religious conceptions of ubuntu, the advantages of it (which apply to both religious and non-religious versions) are reliant on humans which is a drawback, in addition to the disadvantages of it not relying on humans (which may also be viewed as an additional drawback in itself).

7.6  Secular Ubuntu and Western Atheism In this section I turn to the question of whether naturalistic versions of ubuntu are relevantly similar to western conceptions of atheism. To

The Axiology of Theism 131 begin, it’s worth noting that in the literature there appear to be fewer arguments for pro-atheism than for anti-theism. The reason for this is, I think, the fact that many of the purported benefits of atheism are discussed in the context of the arguments for anti-theism (e.g., Lougheed 2020). Now, the question here is whether metaphysical naturalism (as understood in the West) is relevantly and sufficiently similar to secular versions of ubuntu such that the advantages of atheism considered in the literature also apply to secular versions of ubuntu. So, what I want to know is whether the current considerations in favour of pro-atheism (which is understood here as naturalism) apply seamlessly to naturalistic versions of ubuntu. Indeed, the secular versions of ubuntu and Western atheism are relevantly and sufficiently similar. For secular versions of ubuntu simply affirm its ethical dimensions while rejecting the metaphysical claims that would otherwise be attached to it in the form of Traditional African Religion. Atheism in the west is the denial of God’s existence. In the axiology of theism literature, it is most often also intended to denote metaphysical naturalism (although these two terms technically represent distinct views). Metaphysical naturalism is the view that only the natural causes and effects exist; there is no supernatural or spiritual realm. This (arguably) does not commit a naturalist to any particular ethical framework, and it is consistent with a number of different understandings of ethics.10 Given that the advantages of atheism are typically found in the arguments for anti-theism, the relevant work required for my conclusion was completed in the above section. Thus, the advantages of privacy, dignity, genuine sacrifice, and understanding apply to secular versions of ubuntu too.

7.7 Conclusion At the beginning of this chapter, I stated that I wanted to discover whether there are significant axiological differences between supernatural ubuntu and secular ubuntu. I further suggested that inasmuch as supernatural versions of ubuntu (i.e., Traditional African Religion) are similar to Western monotheism, we can simply turn to the current arguments for pro-theism to help in evaluating it. However, after explaining key concepts from Traditional African Religion in more detail I concluded that the arguments for pro-theism do not apply seamlessly to arguments for pro-supernatural ubuntu. In itself it certainly isn’t a strike against supernatural versions of ubuntu, but it leaves us no closer to answering the initial question of the chapter. On the other hand, I suggested that many of the arguments for anti-theism do indeed apply seamlessly to supernatural ubuntu and so can be used to make the case for anti-supernatural ubuntu. Furthermore, inasmuch as there are unique arguments for pro-atheism (though they are rarely stated explicitly) I argued that they apply seamlessly to secular

132  The Axiology of Ubuntu versions of ubuntu. This is so because both secular ubuntu and Western atheism are relevantly and sufficiently similarly naturalistic. At this juncture it might therefore be tempting to conclude that secular versions of ubuntu are axiologically superior to supernatural versions of ubuntu. However, drawing this conclusion right now would be too quick. This is because thus far the comparison between the two different versions of ubuntu has only been made in the context of the current arguments in the axiology of theism literature. In light of this, only the following conclusion can be drawn: •

Secular ubuntu is axiologically superior to supernatural ubuntu when evaluated using the current arguments in the axiology of theism literature.

However, this broader conclusion cannot be established based on this chapter: •

Secular ubuntu is axiologically superior to supernatural ubuntu.

In order to establish this broader, more general conclusion, there needs to be an axiological comparison made between secular and supernatural ubuntu simpliciter, apart from the already established arguments in the axiology of theism. Furthermore, notice that the arguments for antiubuntu and pro-ubuntu explored in Chapters Four and Five respectively cannot be used to help here. This is because both secular and supernatural ubuntu affirm the ethical outlook of ubuntu which constituted the primary target of evaluation in those chapters. At this point, I have established an ubuntu reading of the current arguments for pro-theism and anti-theism (Chapters Three and Four), developed novel arguments for anti-ubuntu and pro-ubuntu (Chapters Five and Six) using a metaphysically neutral version of ubuntu, and have explored differences between supernatural ubuntu and secular ubuntu using current arguments. In the next chapter I will examine possible axiological differences between secular and supernatural ubuntu on their own, apart from the current axiology of theism literature.

Notes 1. Note too that this understanding of a unified Traditional African Religion does not come from cultural anthropologists or outside observers. Indeed, many of the scholars who advocate for this type of understanding are Indigenous African thinkers. It’s also noteworthy that this unified conception of Traditional African Religion began to gain much more traction in the post-colonial era. 2. The literature on Traditional African Religion refers to God using male pronouns, so I maintain that usage here. With respect to Western monotheism it is now widely acknowledged that God isn’t gendered and as such

The Axiology of Theism 133







if gendered pronouns are used, they are not intended to signal anything deep about God’s identity. Whether this is also so in Traditional African Religion is not an issue I’m going to explore here. 3. W.D. Hammond-Tooke calls this ‘Ancestor Religion’ and does use the term ‘worship’ to refer to various practices surrounding the living dead. However, much of what he says it ultimately consistent with my account here. See Hammond-Tooke 1985, 1994. 4. Elsewhere I’ve argued that it’s far from clear that an eternal afterlife is good but remember that we’re not evaluating the arguments for pro-theism here. See Lougheed 2020, 95–98. 5. However, there is perhaps a life force that survives bodily death though it is not a soul qua substance. 6. Of course, monotheism does not logically entail the existence of souls (or an afterlife). But remember that I’m considering the version of Western monotheism typically assumed by philosophers of religion. This version is Judeo-Christian and though some theists are physicalists, it’s safe to assume that many affirm the existence of an immaterial soul that survives bodily death. 7. Much of my book, The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews is devoted to developing the arguments mentioned here. 8. I’ve suggested that a helpful way to understand this is by appealing to the divine attribute of omnisubjectivity (Lougheed 2020a, 71–75). For more, see Linda Zagzebski 2013. 9. For discussion see Metz 2013, 103. 10. Indeed, Derek Parfit noted that philosophical work on non-theistic, naturalistic ethics is only in its infancy when compared to other more longstanding areas in philosophy.

Bibliography Hammond-Tooke, W.D. (1985). “Who Worships Whom: Agnates and Ancestors Among Nguni.” African Studies 44(1): 47–68. Lougheed, Kirk. (2020). The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Lugira, Aloyslus M. (2009). African Traditional Religion. 3rd edn. New York: Chelsea House Publishers Magesa, Laurenti. (1997). African Religion: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life. New York: Orbis Books. Mbiti, John S. (2015). Introduction to African Religion. 2nd edn. Long Grove: Waveland Press, Inc. Menkiti, Ifeanyi. (1984). “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought.” In Richard A. Wright (ed.), African Philosophy: An Introduction. 3rd. edn. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, pp. 171–181. Metz, Thaddeus. (2013). Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wiredu, Kwasi. (1992). “Death and the Afterlife in African Culture.” In Persons and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies I. Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, pp. 137–152. Zagzebski, Linda. (2013). Omnisubjectivity: A Defense of a Divine Attribute. Wisconsin: Marquette University Press.

8

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion

8.1 Introduction In the previous chapter I explored differences between secular and religious understandings of ubuntu by examining Traditional African Religion (TAR) in light of the most common arguments in the axiology of theism literature. When compared against this backdrop I concluded that secular versions of ubuntu are axiologically superior to religious versions of ubuntu, where the religious view in question is TAR. However, I also noted that in order to reach any stronger conclusions about the axiological comparison between secular versus religious ubuntu in general, that they would also have to be evaluated on their own, apart from the current axiology of theism literature. This is the task that I take up in this chapter. The focus, then, becomes on the unique advantages and disadvantages of TAR since this is the religious view associated with religious versions of ubuntu. Focussing on TAR will allow me to highlight differences between it and secular versions of ubuntu (which I take for the sake of simplicity to be metaphysical naturalism held in conjunction with an ubuntu ethic). Finally, at different points, I will also highlight axiological differences between TAR and western versions of monotheism that didn’t emerge in the previous chapter. The temptation in such a chapter will be to dismiss certain views because one deems them to be false (perhaps obviously so). But remember that this is not the aim of this chapter (nor the aim of this book). Rather the relevant question in this chapter is whether a world where TAR is true is better than a world where TAR is false. Since I offered a description of TAR in the last chapter, I won’t rehearse those details here. Instead, I’ll explore arguments for both pro-TAR and anti-TAR and offer critical commentary along the way. As in Chapter Seven I tentatively conclude that secular ubuntu is axiologically superior to religious ubuntu.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-8

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 135

8.2  Arguments for Anti-Tradition African Religion In this section I offer a series of arguments for Anti-Traditional African Religion, the view that the world is (or would be) better if TAR were false. Consequently, these arguments support the conclusion the world is (or would be) better if religious ubuntu were false. I conclude that individually they provide support for certain versions of anti-Traditional African Religion, and that jointly they start to form a powerful cumulative case. 8.2.1  Witchcraft and Magic The first disadvantage I discuss in support of Anti-Traditional African Religion is due to the fact that it posits the existence of witchcraft and magic.1 It is uncontroversial that witchcraft and magic make up an essential aspect of Traditional African Religion. For example, Laurenti Magesa writes that: In the African mentality, everything wrong or bad in society and in the world, and, most particularly, various afflictions, originates in witchcraft. There is no kind of illness or hardship at all that may not ultimately be attributed to witchcraft. When natural or religious explanations fail to satisfy, the social explanation – witchcraft – is invariably invoked. (1997, 182)2 Magesa further sums up the African sentiment towards witchcraft with the expression ‘Witchcraft is the enemy of life’ (1997, 186). With respect to how witchcraft actually works, John Mbiti writes that “it is believed that witchcraft and bad magic are combined and work evil whether deliberately or involuntarily on the part of the witch or magician” (Mbiti 2015, 167). Often the methods employed by witches appear to indicate clear intentionality.3 The practice of witchcraft includes “incantations, words, rituals and magic objects” (Mbiti 2015, 167). To cast spells a witch “may use nails, hair, clothes, or other possessions of the victim which she burns, pricks or wishes evil to” (Mbiti 2015, 167). Finally, “[i]t is also believed that the witch may send flies, bees, other insects and certain birds or animals, to take harm to the victim so that when they touch him or he sees them, he will fall sick or meet the intended misfortune” (Mbiti 2015, 167).4 Based on this description of witchcraft, the following argument can be offered. The Witchcraft Argument for Anti-Traditional African Religion (1) Traditional African Religion posits the existence of witchcraft. (2) Worlds in which there is witchcraft (as described in TAR) are arbitrary.

136  The Axiology of Ubuntu (3) Worlds that are arbitrary are worse than worlds that are not arbitrary. Thus, (4) All else being equal, worlds where TAR is true are worse than worlds where it is false. Therefore, (5) All else being equal, worlds where a religious version of ubuntu is true are worse than worlds where a secular version of it is true. Premise (1) is descriptive and uncontroversial. Premises (2) and (3) are the ones that require additional explanation. Regarding (2), why think that a world with witchcraft is arbitrary? It is arbitrary because a world in which witchcraft exists is not (at least not entirely) governed by the laws of nature. When a person’s life is affected by witchcraft it is not for any foreseeable reason, i.e., it is not because they acted immorally in some way that might explain the misfortune that has befallen them. This sometimes happens in cases where someone has upset a departed ancestor. But a witch simply wields their powers to do evil, not to mete out just punishment. It is in this sense that a world with witchcraft is arbitrary. However, showing that the world is arbitrary does not in itself lower its axiological status. We thus need reason to think that (3) is true. There are at least two important ways in which a world that is arbitrary is worse than a world that is not arbitrary. First, a world that is arbitrary in this way is more difficult to understand. That a theistic world is more difficult to understand than a naturalistic world has already been offered as a reason in favour of anti-theism (Lougheed 2020, 154–163). Likewise, I noted in 7.5.4 that such considerations apply equally, if not more so, to TAR. A theistic world is more difficult to understand for two reasons: (i) God is in some ways fundamentally unknowable to humans; and (ii) the universe cannot be fully comprehended through the scientific method (and other normal methods of inquiry). Depending on the degree to which God intervenes in the universe, the scientific method may be wholly unreliable (Lougheed 2020, 157–160). Since the connection between God and understanding was discussed in the last chapter, we need not discuss it again here. My point is rather that much of the same considerations with respect to (ii) also apply equally, if not more so, to witchcraft. Witchcraft is fundamentally unknowable in a publicly accessible way such as through the scientific method. Magic and sorcery violate the laws of nature, or perhaps operate outside of them. There is no clear way that the causes and effects of witchcraft could be studied and understood through the scientific method. Thus, one of the

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 137 disadvantages of the fact that witchcraft is arbitrary is that it means the world is more difficult to understand than it would be otherwise. 8.2.2  Objections to the Witchcraft Argument for Anti-Traditional African Religion One potential objection to this line of argument might appeal to the following description: Belief in these mystical powers helps people to find explanations when things go wrong. They are not satisfied with knowing only how misfortunes occur or diseases are caused. They want to know also who caused them to happen as they did, when they did and to whom they did. By putting the blame on the practice of magic or sorcery or witchcraft by someone in the community, people are able to reach an answer which appears to them satisfactory. Such an answer harmonizes with the view of the universe which recognizes that there are many invisible forces at work and that some of them are available to human beings. (Mbiti 2015, 168) The thought here is that witchcraft does indeed offer an explanation. It might not offer an explanation in scientific terms which is about how such events occur, however, it does offer an explanation in terms of who causes them. But notice that this does nothing to block the claim that the world is less knowable through science. Furthermore, witchcraft as an explanation offers agency but it tells us little about why the agents act as they do. So, there is still a significant sense in which knowing that a witch caused a certain misfortune does not really explain why it occurred, and I submit that the world is worse for it. Another way of seeing this, and one that hasn’t yet been discussed in the axiology of theism, is with respect to morality. In Western theism, God might punish people who sin but typically they understand why they are being punished (or ought to understand why). However, the existence of witchcraft on TAR offers no similar explanation since witches are not morally good agents who can justly punish people. A world with witchcraft is therefore not only more difficult to understand from a scientific perspective, but more difficult to understand morally. And it compares unfavourably not only to naturalism in this regard but also to Western monotheism. Again, this is part of the reason why it is bad that a world is arbitrary. Another possible objection is that a naturalistic world is just as morally random as a world where there is witchcraft. A naturalistic world offers little explanation as to why cancer ravages a child’s body, though if an ill befalls a person at the hands of a witch they can at least point to her as the cause (even if the witch has no justifying reason for harming

138  The Axiology of Ubuntu the person). Of course, why cancer is harmful and how it spreads can be understood scientifically, but such explanations tell us nothing about moral reasons. One might attempt to reply to this worry by claiming that it doesn’t follow from the fact that if similar considerations apply to naturalism that arbitrariness is still not indeed an axiological disadvantage of TAR. However, as stated from the outset, my axiological investigation is fundamentally comparative. So, if the two worldviews we are comparing both suffer from some downside, then the downside in question doesn’t tell us much about the axiological difference between the worlds in question. But one way in which the world with witchcraft clearly is morally inferior, even if naturalistic worlds are similarly arbitrary, is that an agent is the cause of ill. Consider what Mbiti says: When something goes wrong in the welfare of the individual or his family, he immediately wonders who has caused it to happen. It is not enough to answer how it went wrong. In most cases he will suspect that someone has used evil magic, sorcery or witchcraft against him or his household, animals and fields. This belief is found in all African societies. (2015, 166) Likewise, Elvis Imafidon writes that: Every event, happening, or phenomenon experienced in the community is caused by a causal agent – physical or nonphysical. All beings in an African community are capable of being regarded as causal agencies, and events in the community are attributed to them. Beings and their interaction are therefore the basis for the explanation, predication, and control of events in the community. (2014, 66) In a naturalistic world it is impossible to blame supernatural causes for evil. The best that humans can do is attempt to understand the natural world through science so as to prevent as much evil as possible (i.e., seek to discover a cure for cancer). However, in the world with witchcraft, there are sometimes agents who are responsible for causing evil. Intuitions may vary about this case, but I think it is far worse that an agent who (presumably) could freely cease and desist from their harmful activities continues to hurt other humans. Such a world is even less predictable than a naturalistic one, and I submit, far more terrifying because we have so much less control over it. Throughout the history of philosophy and often in literature too, one finds complaints about the cold indifference of the naturalistic world. But such a world would surely come as a relief when compared to the alternative world full of witches, sorcery, and magic.5

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 139 8.2.3  The Scope of the Witchcraft Argument for Anti-Traditional African Religion To conclude this section, I briefly examine the scope of the argument. That the world is arbitrary and hence more difficult to understand means that it is worse for humans. With respect to the impersonal/personal distinction, then, the argument clearly supports personal anti-Traditional African Religion. Whether the argument applies to just one, some, or all individuals is probably more controversial. Inasmuch as there are any individuals who value the sort of why explanations discussed above, the argument establishes some persons personal anti-Traditional African Religion. However, I submit that this argument also successfully establishes all persons personal anti-Traditional African Religion because it is better for every individual if the world is not arbitrary in the ways discussed here. The type of why explanations in question are intrinsically valuable (the value is contained in themselves) and also valuable as final ends (not valuable for anything else).6 Finally, there are also pragmatic reasons that seem to apply to every individual. We’re better able to control the environment, the more scientific and moral understanding (i.e., in the why sense discussed above) that we possess. As it stands, however, this argument cannot be used to establish wide personal anti-Traditional African Religion. This is because in order to accomplish this it would have to be shown that the disadvantage of arbitrariness outweighs all of the advantages associated with Traditional African Religion. I thus conclude that this argument only establishes narrow personal anti-Traditional African Religion. It remains to be seen whether arbitrariness can be included in a cumulative case along with other disadvantages that could be combined together to establish wide personal anti-Traditional African Religion. 8.2.4  Life Force In Chapter 4.2.3, we discussed the idea of vitality or liveliness as an explanation of intrinsic value. In Chapter 7.3.3, we briefly discussed its religious counterpart in life force to explain the African emphasis on the interconnectedness of everything in the universe.7 Indeed, Mutombo Nkulu-N’Sengha writes that “[t]he African notion of vital force transcends the Aristotelian categories of substance and accidents. Vital force is not mere biological life, but that fundamental and original vital impulse that constitutes existence and is the property that underlies all things” (2009, 493). Here I expand the religious description of life force and show that there are ways in which it can be leveraged to support anti-Traditional African Religion. I will use ‘vitality’ and ‘life force’ interchangeably, but in this chapter it only refers to the religious conception. Thaddeus Metz and Motsamai Molefe explain that:

140  The Axiology of Ubuntu Vitality, here, of course involves being alive, that is, being a biological organism in the perceptible realm or exemplifying the right sort of (roughly, homeostatic) energy in an imperceptible realm. However, vitality includes much more than being a living individual, which could well be a binary property. In addition, it is normally understood in the African tradition as a gradient property, with God having the maximum degrees of strength, creativity, synthesis, growth, vibrancy, activity, self-motion, and reproduction. (Metz and Molefe forthcoming) Everything in the perceptible world, including inanimate objects, has some degree of life force (Metz and Molefe forthcoming). Metz and Molefe continue: God is standardly construed as utterly good, where intuitively we humans would prefer to exhibit for their own sake vitalist features such as health, creativity, self-motion, development, courage, and confidence, as opposed to disease, passivity, submission, decay, insecurity, and depression. Finally, a morally perfect person, it is reasonable to suggest, is one disposed to produce liveliness of these kinds and to reduce the corresponding disvalues […], perhaps using punitive measures on occasion as necessary to achieve these ends. (Metz and Molefe forthcoming) In sum, “its thesis that the world is ultimately composed of interdependent vital forces that affect one another in the manner of a spider’s web” (Metz and Molefe forthcoming).8 Elvis Imafidon stresses that “[t]he beings or entities existing in these two realms of existence are lively and active in varying degrees because they are vitalized, animated, or energized by an ontological principle or essence or force, given them by the Supreme Being” (2014, 38). Polycarp Ikuenobe further adds that: In the traditional African view, reality or nature is a continuum and a harmonious composite of various elements and forces. Human beings are a harmonious part of this composite reality, which is fundamentally, a set of mobile life forces. Natural objects and reality are interlocking forces. Reality always seeks to maintain an equilibrium among the network of elements and life forces … Because reality or nature is a continuum, there is no conceptual or interactive gap between the human self, community, the dead, spiritual or metaphysical entities and the phenomenal world; they are interrelated, they interact, and in some sense, one is an extension of the other. (Ikuenobe 2006, 63–64, quoted in Imafidon 2014, 39)

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 141 Perhaps most importantly for my purposes is Imafidon’s claim that the existence of life force and hence the interconnectedness of all things implies the following: a It implies a principle of the connectedness of all entities based on common essence, and b It also implies a principle of harmony based on the organic solidarity and complementarities of all forms (Imafidon 2014, 39). Each individual emits a unique force in their causal interactions with the universe (Imafidon 2014, 39).9 These considerations can, I think, be successfully appealed to in order to establish an argument for (a limited version) of anti-Traditional African Religion. Here is the argument I have in mind in standard form: The Life Force Argument for Anti-Traditional African Religion (6) All else being equal, worlds where individual well-being is connected to and dependent upon numerous factors beyond one’s control (i.e., a world with life force) are worse than worlds where this isn’t the case. (7) The existence of life force suggests that an individual’s well-being is connected to and dependent upon numerous factors beyond one’s control. Thus, (8) Worlds with life force are worse than worlds without it, at least with respect to well-being. Thus, (9) All else being equal, worlds where TAR is true are worse than worlds where it is false, at least with respect to well-being. Therefore, (10) All else being equal, worlds where a religious version of ubuntu is true are worse than worlds where a secular version of it is true, at least with respect to well- being. A lot of work needs to be done in order to establish (6), which is by far the most controversial premise of the argument. In particular, what constitutes well-being and also what counts as beyond one’s control must be established in order to know whether (6) is true. We might define well-being, albeit tersely, as having one’s needs met, and perhaps also as

142  The Axiology of Ubuntu flourishing. We can understand flourishing as the achieving of aims that one deems important. This understanding is consistent with a dominant line of welfarism found in African thought, including in the influential work of Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye. For example, Wiredu says that: [A]nyone who reflects on our traditional ways of speaking about morality is bound to be struck by the preoccupation with human welfare: What is morally good is what befits a human being; it is what is decent for a man – what brings dignity, respect, contentment, prosperity, joy, to man and his community. And what is morally bad is what brings misery, misfortune, and disgrace. (Wiredu 1980, 6) Here one might observe that this understanding of well-being is humanistic, with many contemporary African philosophers bristling at the idea that it requires supernaturalism (e.g., Gbadegesin 1991; Wiredu 1996; Gyekye 1997; Bewaji 2004). However, this observation actually serves to bolster premise (6). For the spirit realm as posited in TAR is less under one’s control (in fact not at all) than one’s reciprocal relationships with other humans. The activity of demons or evil spirits can sometimes decrease an individual’s life force through no fault of their own. This type of interdependence on the spiritual realm for one’s own well-being thus makes a person less well off. Likewise, though relationships with other humans are much more clearly reciprocal, consider that individuals still do not always exercise great control over their life force given the interconnectedness of life force to other people. For example, a witch intent on harming others could diminish a person’s life force through no fault of their own. Or a non-person (in the normative sense) could have such a bad character that they seek to harm whomever they meet. That one’s life force and hence well-being is affected in this way by others, without any consent, control, or influence, makes a world where TAR is true worse than one in which it is false. It thus shows that a secular conception of ubuntu is to be favoured over a religious understanding of it. 8.2.5  Expanding the Scope of the Life Force Argument The scope of the Life Force Argument for Anti-Traditional African Religion is all-persons personal and narrow. The argument shows that a world where TAR is true is worse for each individual only with respect to well-being. It includes all individuals because on TAR’s ontology every individual has a life force that is interconnected with literally everything that exists. There are no exceptions. However, the argument only specifies that the world is worse with respect to well-being and hence it only establishes narrow anti-Traditional African Religion. One

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 143 way to possibly expand the argument to wide anti-Traditional African Religion, which would mean the truth of TAR makes the world overall worse, is by a further appeal to well-being. Well-being is a central feature of African moral thought, with some scholars claiming it is the central feature. If a life cannot be said to be worthwhile or meaningful without well-being, then this might establish that to have one’s well-being hurt or diminished does indeed make one worse off overall. The following premises would thus have to be established: The Life Force Argument for Wide Personal All-Persons AntiTraditional African Religion (11) Well-being is so important in the African understanding that worlds in which individuals have their well-being hurt or diminished makes their lives meaningless (or not worthwhile). (12) In every possible world it is better to have a meaningful life than a meaningless life. (13) In worlds where TAR is true, then, given life force, each individual has a meaningless life. Thus, (14) Worlds where TAR is true are overall worse than worlds where it is false. Therefore, (15) All else being equal, worlds where religious versions of ubuntu are true is overall worse than worlds where a secular version of it is true. Above I have already gestured at ways in which (11) might be defended in the African tradition. (12) is controversial and elsewhere I have defended it (Lougheed 2020, 79–83). Briefly, suppose that an individual has two choices. She can either have a meaningful life or a meaningless life. I submit that no matter what other goods or benefits might come along with the meaningless life that she should always choose the meaningful life. Still, I don’t endorse this argument as I hold that more work would need to be done to establish (11). Establishing a connection between well-being and meaning is, I suspect, one of the best ways to go about defending a wide version of this argument. 8.2.6  Objections to the Life Force Argument One objection to this argument says that African communitarianism in general, and the versions of ubuntu discussed in this book in particular,

144  The Axiology of Ubuntu do not maintain that the kind of interdependence ascribed by life force is negative. On this objection, while (7) is true, (6) is false. It simply isn’t a disadvantage to be interconnected to other people in this way. In reply, remember that the purpose of this chapter is to establish whether there is a significant axiological difference between secular and religious versions of ubuntu. While life force has been described in secular terms (e.g., Metz forthcoming; 4.2.3), such a description necessarily lacks the supernatural ontology of TAR. This type of secular life force has been described as promoting a kind of liveliness or vitality in others (and perhaps also within oneself). The appropriate question to ask regarding the success of this objection, then, is what, if anything, is the axiological difference between religious or secular versions of life force? I have already described the existence of life force above so here is slightly more detail regarding the secular version. Metz describes a secular version of life force as “vitality that: is construed in terms of force not substance, is thought to be perishable, as opposed to eternal; comes in different degrees or kinds; and plausibly varies in value depending on the quantity or quality of it” (124).10 On this view, exhibiting strong vitality is associated with a “superlative degree of health, strength, growth, reproduction, creativity, complexity, vibrancy, activity, self-motion, courage, and confidence” (124–125). On the other hand, a reduction of vitality is typically correlated with “disease, weakness, decay, barrenness, destruction, disintegration, lethargy, passivity, submission, insecurity, and depression” (125).11 Metz calls this kind of secular vitality ‘liveliness.’12 I submit that a secular version of life force (i.e., liveliness) is axiologically superior to a religious version for two reasons. First, while liveliness does not deny the interconnectedness between humans, such relationships are far more reciprocal (at least possibly so) than those had with spiritual entities. The liveliness of people is impacted by the way they interact with other individuals. Second, the sort of secular liveliness described here is far more predictable than religious life force in a number of different ways. For instance, humans typically know the actions they can take to foster liveliness in themselves and, more importantly, in other people. As such, they know what actions to take to support the health of the community. However, on the religious conception of life force an individual’s liveliness is impacted by spiritual forces that are far more difficult to understand. Thus, in response to this objection one can concede that interconnectedness in itself is not necessarily the bad. The question is how the kind of interconnectedness posited by TAR’s understanding of life force axiologically compares to a secular understanding of liveliness. For the reasons discussed above, I submit that there is some rationale for holding that the secular understanding of liveliness is axiologically superior. Thus, this gives some reason to prefer a secular version of ubuntu to a religious one.

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 145 8.2.7  Fate The ancient Greek tragedy “Oedipus Rex” by Sophocles is one of the earliest and best-known stories about being assigned a bad fate in the Western tradition. Despite his best efforts, Oedipus can’t avoid his assigned fate of murdering his father and marrying his mother. However, the West is not the only culture with a notion of fate, and it turns out to play an important role in TAR. In this section I’m going to develop what I take to be the strongest argument for establishing the claim that a secular version of ubuntu is axiologically superior to a religious version. This argument is based on the idea that TAR posits that every individual has a fate or destiny (I will use these terms interchangeably). Furthermore, that some individuals are assigned a bad fate is often a matter of sheer bad luck. That in at least some cases a bad fate is inescapable and unavoidable constitutes a significant axiological downside of TAR and hence also of a religious understanding of ubuntu. I begin by offering a standardized version of the argument, followed by a defence of the premises which will include more detail about what fate is and why having one is bad. The Bad Fate Argument for Anti-Traditional African Religion (16) All else being equal, worlds where certain individuals are assigned a bad fate are worse than worlds where individuals are not assigned a bad fate. (17) In worlds where TAR is true, certain individuals are assigned a bad fate. Thus, (18) Worlds where TAR is true are worse than ones where it is false, at least with respect to fate. Therefore, (19) All else being equal, worlds where a religious version of ubuntu is true are worse than worlds where a secular version of it is true, at least with respect to fate. The premise that requires defence is (16) and I begin by explaining in more detail the concept of fate in TAR. Peter J. Paris explains that in TAR: [I]n contrast to those who are born with good destinies, it is widely believed that some people are bearers of various types of bad destinies. Some of them are capable of modifications; others not. In either

146  The Axiology of Ubuntu case, with the combined help of professional diviners and much concentrated effort on their own part, humans may, to a certain extent, overcome many aspects of a bad destiny. Thus the notion of destiny, whether good or bad, does not imply human passivity. Instead it informs persons about the possibilities that they are either capable or incapable of realizing. (Paris 1995, 132) The first thing to notice with this quote is that contra- what is implied in the Oedipus Rex story, certain destinies are at least partly avoidable. However, while Paris does say certain aspects of a bad fate can be overcome with great effort, he is also quite clear that in certain cases this is impossible. Some bad fates, then, are inescapable. Part of the reason that a bad fate is unavoidable is that “[i]t is supposed to be chosen by himself or herself pre-natally (while he was still ‘with Heaven above’) and therefore to be already effective from his birth” (Fortes 1987, quoted in Paris 1995, 105). Importantly, Paris also notes that “[t]he African understanding of destiny precludes any radical individual autonomy in human action either in its initiation or its consequences. Since all matters pertaining to destiny are governed by the ancestors, they alone are ultimately responsible for the person’s actions and achievements” (1995, 106). One finds different statements about the degree to which one is responsible for their actions in TAR often in conflict with each other. Paris explains this tension well with his suggestion that at best an individual’s actions are mutually regulated in conjunction with ancestors (1995, 106). A good moral character is required to maintain a good destiny, while a bad character can cause one’s destiny to worsen (Paris 1995, 108). Again, this indicates some degree of control over one’s destiny. And he also says that: Clearly persons may rightly blame their destiny for things that go awry in their lives. In that respect, destiny relieves the individual of complete responsibility for any particular moral crisis while ensuring the participation of the whole family, including the ancestors, in its expiation. In all of this the communal nature of person is made fully apparent. (Paris 1995, 108) Thus, a person’s family will have to be involved in any successful attempt to improve one’s destiny. There are two key takeaways from this description of fate or destiny that serve to support (16). First, there are at least some cases where individuals, through no fault of their own, are unable to change a bad fate that was assigned to them. Being assigned a bad fate is clearly bad for the person who has a fate. For their life is worse than it might have

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 147 otherwise been through no fault of their own. They will experience suffering through no fault of their own. Furthermore, they can hardly be thought responsible for what happens to them. This flies in the face of commonsensical moral intuitions about justice for a number of reasons. It’s unfair to be assigned a bad fate through no fault of one’s own. It’s also unfair to be held accountable for one’s life if one were assigned a bad fate that they couldn’t change. If justice is at least partly of the matter of getting what one deserves, then a world with this kind of fate is worse for its injustice.13 Second, even in cases where an individual is able to exercise some control over their bad fate such that they can change it (to some degree), I submit that worlds where bad fates exist are still worse than worlds where they don’t exist. Why? Because it’s still worse to be assigned a bad fate that one has to work to change and can only change partially, than had one not been assigned a bad fate in the first place. To start with a neutral or good fate is better than to start with a bad fate, even if it can be changed. These are strong reasons to think that (16) is true and since (17) is merely a true description of TAR, they are ultimately reasons to hold that the Bad Fate Argument for AntiTraditional African Religion is sound. All else being equal, then, worlds with a secular version of ubuntu are axiologically superior to worlds where religious ubuntu is true. 8.2.8  Expanding the Scope of the Argument from Fate With respect to scope, this argument pretty clearly establishes narrow some persons personal anti-Traditional African Religion. For any individual who is assigned a bad fate, their life is worse than it would be otherwise, at least with respect to their fate. Given that fate is literally about the whole of one’s life, it also establishes wide some persons’ personal anti-Traditional African Religion. Consider that it makes little sense to claim that an individual who has a bad fate that they cannot change has an on balance good life or has an overall good life. Indeed, an individual who has been assigned a bad fate has an overall bad life. Remember too, that this is a comparative judgment and in this case it is being compared to a life in which that same individual is assigned a positive or neutral fate. Finally, I think that this argument might even be able to establish the very strong position of wide all-persons personal anti-Traditional African Religion. This is the position that it is worse for every individual and overall if TAR is true. This means it would apply to those who are assigned a neutral of good fate. Why think their lives would be overall worse? It is still worse for them than being in a world where people are not, through any fault of their own, assigned a bad fate. For such a world where people are assigned a bad fate through no fault of their own is less just than it would be otherwise. These considerations lead to the following expansion of the argument. While thus far I’ve focussed on

148  The Axiology of Ubuntu the idea that bad fates are an axiological disadvantage, the existence of fate in general supports anti-Traditional African Religion. Consider the following: The Argument from Fate for Anti-Traditional African Religion (20) All else being equal, a world where individuals are assigned fates is worse than a world where individuals are not assigned fates. (21) In a world where TAR is true, every individual is assigned a fate. Thus, (22) A world where TAR is true is worse than one where it is false. Therefore, (23) All else being equal, a world where a religious version of ubuntu is true is worse than a world where a secular version of it is true, at least with respect to fate. The scope of this argument is, I submit, wide all-persons personal anti-Traditional African Religion. Premise (20) is the main premise that requires defence. Similar considerations about the problems with arbitrariness mentioned regarding the Witchcraft Argument apply here too. A world in which individuals are assigned a fate prior to their birth is arbitrary. Individuals are not aware of the fate they choose pre-natally; personal identity does not hold across pre-birth into one’s earthly life. This type of arbitrariness doesn’t just make the world less understandable; it also has significant moral implications. It makes the world less fair. That an individual is assigned a good fate without having earned it is a negative feature of such a world. This kind of moral randomness flies in the face of many of our most basic commonsensical moral intuitions. Above I claim that an individual might not be able to be held morally responsible for negative outcomes associated with their bad fate and notice also that an individual cannot be praised for positive outcomes if they are merely the result of a good fate. All else being equal, then, it is better overall for every individual to live in a world that isn’t morally arbitrary in this way. 8.2.9  Sub-Conclusion for Anti-Traditional African Religion I don’t claim to have offered a decisive defence of anti-TAR in the above. However, I have developed arguments for narrow some persons personal anti-Traditional African Religion, all of which I think are sound. To my mind, the best chance of expanding the scope to include all persons and wide axiological judgments is with the Bad Fate Argument and Argument from Fate. For a world in which every individual is assigned a

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 149 fate through no fault of their own, that cannot necessarily be changed, is arbitrary in an unpalatable way. Whether the advantages of TAR can be ultimately shown to outweigh such considerations remains to be seen in the next section.

8.3  Arguments for Pro-Traditional African Religion In this section I turn to examine the unique axiological advantages of Traditional African Religion. Remember that the advantages of theism already discussed in the axiology of theism literature and that also apply to TAR were examined in the previous chapter. Those are advantages associated with the Judeo-Christian (i.e., Western) conception of God. But here I want to examine some potential advantages uniquely associated with TAR that do not necessarily apply to Western monotheism. 8.3.1  Post-Mortem Family Relationships As already explained, when a member of the family dies, they cross over into the realm of the living dead to become what is commonly referred to as an ancestor. They are often a conduit for God and thought to be responsible for some of the misfortune and fortune that befalls people. If an ancestor is displeased one must take appropriate measures to appease them or risk punishment. Family members remain in contact with ancestors by paying respect (often in the form of leaving food) at shrines for the departed. While in the previous chapter I noted that the good of an afterlife associated with theism is lost on TAR, because after a handful of generations personal identity is lost (7.4.2), one possible benefit of TAR’s afterlife is that people are able to have meaningful contact with family members even after they die. In many ways, they aren’t considered dead, but simply having moved on to the next stage of life. Given the value of familial relationships, this is at least to some extent an axiological advantage of TAR. And it’s one not had in worlds where TAR is false, because for the purposes of our comparison such worlds are naturalistic. Here’s the standard version of this argument: The Extended Family Relationships Argument for Pro-Traditional African Religion (24) All else being equal, longer family relationships are better than shorter ones. (25) TAR entails that family relationships are extended beyond death. Thus, (26) A world where TAR is true is better than a world where it is false, at least with respect to the extension of family relationships

150  The Axiology of Ubuntu Therefore, (27) All else being equal, a world where a religious version of ubuntu is true is better than a world where a secular version of it is true. The ceteris paribus clause in (24) is designed to eliminate those family relationships that are toxic or abusive. However, for most individuals, their family relationships are typically some of their most important and valuable relationships. To be able to extend the time in which one can maintain such relationships is thus valuable. At best, however, this argument secures narrow personal pro-Traditional African Religion. Extending important family relationships is valuable and can be made part of a cumulative case for pro-TAR, but on its own, it does not outweigh the disadvantages of TAR discussed above. It thus cannot be used to establish wide pro-TAR. 8.3.2  Traditional Medicine The other feature of TAR that constitutes a unique axiological advantage is traditional medicine. People use traditional medicine in order to “put right what has gone wrong, to heal, to cure, to protect, to drive away evil, and to counteract or neutralize the evil use of the mystical forces” (Mbiti 2015, 170). Not only can medicine be used to cure sickness or remove misfortune, but it can be used more proactively in order to “bring good fortune, success, favour, promotion, the passing of examinations and so on” (Mbiti 2015, 171). I now offer a standardized version of the argument before evaluating it further: The Traditional Medicine Argument for Pro-Traditional African Religion (28) All else being equal, worlds that are able to be understood and offer safety are better than worlds that are less understandable and less safe. (29) Traditional African Religion offers a world more easily understood and also a safer world than competing worldviews. Thus, (30) Worlds where Traditional African Religion is true are better than worlds where it is false, at least with respect to safety and understanding. Therefore, (31) All else being equal, a world where a religious version of ubuntu is true is better than a world where a secular version of it is true.

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 151 8.3.3  Rejecting the Traditional Medicine Argument While (28) is true, the argument is unsound because (29) is false. Here I explain possible reasons in support of (29) and show they are lacking. The claim about understanding is epistemic. I have suggested that on theism the world is actually less susceptible to understanding, at least through normal scientific inquiry. I have also suggested above that the existence of witchcraft in TAR doesn’t answer the why question about evils. So in what sense does the truth of TAR entail that the world is easier to understand? Belief in traditional medicine and more broadly, magic: [H]elps people to find explanations when things go wrong. They are not satisfied with knowing only how misfortunes occur or diseases are caused. They want to know also who caused them to happen as they did, when they did and to whom they did. By putting the blame on the practice of magic or sorcery or witchcraft by someone in the community, people are able to reach an answer which appears to them satisfactory. Such an answer harmonizes with the view of the universe which recognizes that there are many invisible forces at work and that some of them are available to human beings. (Mibti 2015168) The type of understanding available on this worldview, however, is axiologically inferior to the understanding available on a secular worldview. Knowing who caused misfortune (or fortune in the case of medicine) does not really explain why the individual acted as they did. The worries that I mentioned above regarding the arbitrariness of witchcraft apply equally here. The second way this argument claims that worlds where TAR is true are valuable is with respect to safety for two reasons. First, in a world with magic individuals are more likely to act rightly, at least according to Mbiti. He writes that “once people fear that their neighbour or relative may apply magic and witchcraft against them, they are likely to refrain from certain offences like stealing, rudeness, committing crimes, or deliberately offending their neighbors and relatives” (Mbiti 2015, 168). In light of this, Mbiti concludes that “the belief [in magic] becomes a factor for stabilizing relations among relatives, neighbours, and members of the community” (Mbiti 2015, 168). The other sense in which a TAR world is safer is that individuals can appeal to the help and protection of a medicine man. In some sense, then, there is a person designated that one should appeal to when misfortune occurs. I identify problems with each of these types of safety in turn. Regarding the first, Mbiti makes a psychological claim about moral motivation. However, it appears to be mere speculation as he provides no evidence that the belief in magic is what (partly) motivates people to

152  The Axiology of Ubuntu act rightly. Furthermore, even if one could show that individuals who believe in magic tend to act rightly more than those who do not, this would not demonstrate the necessary cause and effect. For it would still not show that that the belief in magic is what causes the right behaviour. Correlation does not equal causation. With respect to the second, the safety provided by the medicine man or healer is only necessary because a TAR world contains magic that can cause harm in the first place. While it’s true that in such a world the medicine man does indeed provide safety, this doesn’t mean that a world without magic at all is less safe. For these reasons, the Traditional Medicine Argument for ProTraditional African Religion is unsound.

8.4 Conclusion The previous chapter examined the differences between secular and religious conceptions of ubuntu within the context of the current arguments for the axiology of theism. This meant applying the already established arguments for pro-theism and anti-theism to Traditional African Religion. In this chapter I sought to identify axiological differences between secular and religious conceptions of ubuntu apart from those arguments. As such, I explored the unique disadvantages and advantages of Traditional African Religion. By now it should be clear to the reader that I identified more disadvantages with TAR than advantages. The Witchcraft and Life Force Arguments both provide some reason to favour a secular conception of ubuntu. I suggested that the Argument from Fate stands the best chance of establishing a wide version of anti-Traditional African Religion. With respect to advantages, the Extended Family Relationships Argument supports pro-Traditional African Religion, however only a narrow version. Finally, I suggested that the Traditional Medicine Argument is unsound. This and the previous chapter represent the first attempt to bring TAR into conversation with the axiology of theism literature. As such, it would be premature to draw any strong conclusions. However, given that the previous chapter also showed secular ubuntu to be superior I think we have the beginnings of a strong cumulative case in its favour. It remains to be seen whether there are objections to the arguments I haven’t anticipated or whether there are additional advantages that are unique to TAR that I have overlooked.

Notes 1. Some argue that the English word ‘witchcraft’ doesn’t quite capture all that is meant by the term in Bantu languages. I try to elaborate sufficiently on the concept to avoid this worry. See Magesa 1997, 178–179. 2. See also 7.3.2 and Lugira 2009, 98–101. 3. This is one instance where translation into English is possibly difficult. For instance, Magesa claims that a major difference between sorcerers and witches is that sorcerers are more intentionally evil. Individuals will

The Axiology of Traditional African Religion 153









seek out a senior sorcerer to teach them and then target people directly. They may choose to stop practising sorcery at anytime, and indeed would stop if they were concerned with pleasing God (Magesa 1997, 180–181). I won’t worry about this distinction here and will assume that there is at least some intentionality behind witches’ actions. 4. For an early study of witchcraft see Evans-Pritchard 1937. For more on witchcraft in Africa in general see Oluwole 1992. 5. Note that technically magic itself is not good or bad. Rather it is what the agent in question chooses to do with it that confers it with moral status. (Mbiti 2015, 166) 6. To claim that this type of understanding is intrinsically valuable is admittedly uncommon in the African tradition. However, recall that in Chapter 3.6.2 I discuss some reasons offered by Metz for thinking that understanding and knowledge are intrinsically valuable coheres with an ubuntu ethic. 7. Placid Tempel’s classic text Bantu Philosophy is often criticized for overgeneralizing. However, he did rightly emphasize the great importance of life force in the indigenous African worldview (1959). See also Okafor 1982 and Magesa 1997. 8. See also Nkulu-N’Sengha 2009 and Imafidon 2014. 9. For more on life force see Brown 2004; Nel 2008 and; Sogolo 1993. 10. With Metz, I favour an other-regarding approach to liveliness where one’s main duty is to promote the liveliness of others. However, Metz rightly notes that another plausible interpretation is respect-based, where to degrade liveliness is to degrade dignity (forthcoming; see also: Iroegbu 2005; Molefe 2015). 11. See also Dzobo 1992, 227. 12. Here Metz cites: Kasenene 1994: 140; Bujo 1997: 27; Magesa 1997: 57, 58. 13. Notice that this is consistent with different understandings of what constitutes just desserts.

Bibliography Bewaji, John Ayotunde Isola (2004) ‘Ethics and Morality in Yoruba Culture’, in A Companion to African Philosophy, Wiredu, Kwasi (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 396–403. Brown, L. M. (2004). “Understanding and Ontology in African Traditional Thought.” In L. M. Brown (ed.), African Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bujo, Bénézet. (1997). The Ethical Dimension of Community. Nganda, Cecilia Namulondo (tr.), Nairobi: Paulines Publications. Dzobo, Noah. (1992). “Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors, and God.” In Wiredu Kwasi and Kwame Gyekye (eds.), Person and Community; Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, I. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 223–40. Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1937). Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon Press Fortes, Meyers. (1987). Religion, Morality and the Person: Essays on Tallensi Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gbadegesin, Segun. (1991). African Philosophy: Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and Contemporary African Realities. New York: Peter Lang.

154  The Axiology of Ubuntu Gyekye, Kwame. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. Ikuenobe, Polycarp. (2006). Philosophical Perspective on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions. London: Lexington Books. Imafidon, Elvis. (xx). “On the Ontological Foundation of a Social Ethics in African Traditions.” In Ontologized Ethics: New Essays in African Meta-Ethics. (eds) Elvis Imafidon and John Ayotunde Isola Bewaji. Plymouth: Lexington Books. Iroegbu, Pantaleon. (2005). “Right to Life and the Means to Life: Human Dignity.” In Iroegbu Echekwube (ed.), Kpim of Morality Ethics. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books. pp. 446–49. Kasenene, Peter. (1994). “Ethics in African Theology.” In Villa-Vicencio Charles and John de Gruchy (eds.), Doing Ethics in Context: South African Perspectives. Cape Town: David Philip. pp. 138–47. Lougheed, Kirk. (2020). The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Lugira, Aloyslus M. (2009). African Traditional Religion. 3rd edition. New York: Chelsea House Publishers. Magesa, Laurenti. (1997). African Religion: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life. New York: Orbis Books. Mbiti, John S. (2015). Introduction to African Religion. 2nd edn. Long Grove: Waveland Press, Inc Metz, Thaddeus. (forthcoming). A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and beyond the Continent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Metz, Thaddeus and Motsamai Molefe. (forthcoming). “Traditional African Religion as a Neglected Form of Monotheism. The Monist. Molefe, Motsamai. (2015). “A Rejection of Humanism in African Moral Tradition.” Theoria, 62: 59–77. Nel, P. J. (2008). “Morality and Religion in African Thought.” Acta Theologica, 2: 33–47. Nkulu-N’Sengha, Mutombo. (2009). “Ontology.” In Molefi Kete Asante and Ama Mazama (eds.), Encyclopedia of African Religion. Los Angeles: Sage. pp. 492–94. Okafor, S. O. (1982). “Bantu Philosophy: Placide Tempels Revisited.” Journal of Religion in Africa 13–2: 84–85. Oluwole, Sophie. (1992). Witchcraft, Reincarnation and the God-Head (Issues in African Philosophy). Kerala, India: Excel Publishers. Paris, Peter J. (1995). The Spirituality of African Peoples: The Search for a Common Moral Discourse. Minneopolis: Augsburg Fortress. Sogolo, Godwin. (1993). Foundations of African Philosophy: A Definitive Analysis of Conceptual Issues in African Thought. Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press. Tempels, Placide. (1959). Bantu Philosophy. 2nd edn. Translated by Colin King. Paris: Présence. Wiredu, Kwasi. (1980). Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge University Press. __________. (1996). Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

9

The Advantages of Traditional African Religion in Atheist Worlds

9.1 Introduction To conclude Part III, I’m going to explore a topic that I have so far intentionally set aside. Wading into it earlier would have distracted from the main focus of figuring out which advantages and disadvantages ought to be associated with the different worldviews under investigation. The topic in question is whether it’s possible that the advantages associated with monotheistic worldviews can actually obtain in atheist worlds. If the disadvantages of atheism can be simultaneously avoided in those worlds, then there is definitive reason to think that the very best worlds are atheistic (even if they are also supernatural). It’s an interesting project to explore whether the benefits of Traditional African Religion could be had in atheist worlds because doing so has broader implications for the axiological differences between theist and atheist worlds, and also between supernatural and naturalist worlds. I begin by setting the stage of the current debate about whether atheist worlds are necessarily the best before turning to Traditional African Religion.

9.2  Experience of Goods Versus Goods Obtaining Before continuing it is necessary to highlight an important distinction between the experience of a good versus the good in question actually obtaining. Consider the good of privacy. It’s possible to experience a high degree of privacy while not in fact having very much privacy. For example, Susan might be the target of a spy agency (or marketing company) and have all of her electronic and online activities monitored, though entirely unbeknownst to her. There could be cameras set up in her home, on the streets she traverses, at her place of work, etc. Maybe there are secret agents following her every move. However, if Susan is completely unaware of all of this spying, then she experiences a much higher degree of privacy than the low degree of privacy that she has in reality. Why does this distinction matter? Well, it’s possible that it could have an impact on the axiological status of worlds. For example, it might be DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-9

156  The Axiology of Ubuntu tempting to think that theistic worlds where God hides are better than both atheistic worlds and also theistic worlds where God’s existence is obvious. This is because in worlds with a hidden God, individuals get the experience of many of the atheistic goods associated with anti-theism (e.g., privacy, dignity) in addition to the theistic goods themselves, which are logical entailments of God’s existence (Lougheed 2018). These considerations have even been offered as a novel solution to the problem of divine hiddenness. God might hide in order for humans to be able to experience many of the goods associated with atheism while simultaneously having the actual benefits of theism (Lougheed 2018). However, parallel claims could be made regarding atheist worlds. For many of the goods associated with theism could be experienced in an atheistic world. For example, Susan could have the experience of a relationship with God by attending religious ceremonies and through prayer, even if she cannot in fact have a relationship with God because God doesn’t exist (Hendricks and Lougheed 2019). As it stands, more would have to be done to show that when it comes to experiencing goods, theism or atheism has a significant advantage. So, in what follows I’m only going to focus on questions about whether the advantages or disadvantages associated with a worldview actually obtain, instead of whether they are experienced. There is also another reason why it’s important to keep the discussion limited to whether the advantages and disadvantages actually obtain. While the experience of some goods is valuable, Robert Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment shows that more than just experiences matter with respect to value and hence also with respect to axiological judgements (1971, 1974). Anyone who says that they would not enter the experience machine implies that they believe there is value beyond merely positive experiences. The point of this observation, in part, is to say that goods like privacy or cosmic justice are valuable when they obtain even if they aren’t necessarily experienced by people. This is another reason why in what follows I will stick with axiological assessments of advantages and disadvantages regardless of whether they are experienced.

9.3 The Current Debate: Are Atheists Worlds Necessarily the Best? In this section I explain the current debate regarding the claim that atheist worlds are necessarily the best because it’s possible that the goods typically associated with theism in them obtain. This particular debate is shaped by Guy Kahane’s recent chapter, “If there Is a Hole, It is Not God Shaped” (2018). His goal is to show that it’s possible to get many of the goods that are typically exclusively associated with Western monotheism in atheist worlds.

Advantages of Traditional African Religion 157 9.3.1  Kahane’s Argument for Superior Atheist Worlds1 Here’s his standardized argument: (1) If God had existed, this would necessarily make things better in important respects. (2) If God had existed, this would necessarily make things worse in other important respects. (3) All (or at least most) of the benefits under (1) could be had without God. Therefore, (4) There are possible atheist worlds that offer all (or most) of the benefits of God’s existence but without the costs. Therefore, (5) Some atheist worlds are overall the best, or among the best, and are superior to all theist alternatives. Therefore, (6) The worlds we should most prefer are atheist worlds (Kahane 2018, 103; premise numbers mine). Kahane’s conclusion is with respect to rational preference; however, I take him to really be making a claim about objective axiological values. Notice that the basic point of the argument is quite simple: the advantages associated with God’s existence “do not inherently require God’s existence” (Kahane 2018, 102). The key premise to defending this argument is (3). It has to be shown that it is indeed possible to get the theistic goods without God. 9.3.2  Defence of Premise (3) Here are some representative theistic goods along with the ways in which they might be obtained in an atheistic world. With respect to cosmic justice, there could be a species of very powerful aliens who have enough wisdom and power to enforce cosmic justice (Lougheed 2020a, 181–182). So, God isn’t required for cosmic justice. God’s existence also doesn’t appear to be logically necessary for immorality either. There’s nothing logically impossible about humans having immaterial souls even if God doesn’t exist. Alternatively, it’s logically possible that a person’s consciousness could be uploaded onto a CPU such that they continue

158  The Axiology of Ubuntu to live after their body dies (Lougheed 2020a, 182). While the good of divine intervention is impossible by definition in worlds where God does not exist, it is still possible to get the value of divine intervention (or something very close to it) in atheist worlds. Again, a very powerful alien species, or supernatural being (who is lesser than God), could aid humans in ways otherwise unavailable to them. So, the value of divine intervention is still conceivable in atheist worlds (Lougheed 2020a, 183). It’s also possible that there are no instances of gratuitous evil in an atheist world. Again, a very powerful alien species might ensure that for any evil that comes about, some otherwise unobtainable greater good occurs. Or it could be a matter of sheer luck that no instance of evil turns out to be gratuitous (Lougheed 2020a, 184). Or perhaps even there is an impersonal mechanism in the universe that somehow ensures no evil is gratuitous. Finally, while a relationship with God isn’t possible in a world where God doesn’t exist, just as with divine intervention, something very similar to it is possible. An individual could have a relationship with a being only slightly lesser than God, such that the qualitative difference in the relationship is negligible. Alternatively, the powerful alien species could be quite friendly and desire a relationship with humans (Lougheed 2020a, 185). These are just some of the ways in which goods typically associated with God’s existence can obtain in atheist worlds. Remember, the claim here isn’t that the actual world is an atheist world where all of this obtains. Rather, what’s at stake is whether the very best possible worlds are atheistic, even if such worlds are quite distant from the actual world. Thus, the key to defending (3) is just establishing that it’s logically possible to get all (or most) of the goods typically associated with theism in an atheist world while simultaneously avoiding the costs. 9.3.3  Problems with Kahane’s Argument In criticizing Kahane’s argument (and indeed, my initial endorsement of it), I have suggested that he only focusses on showing that goods associated with theism can obtain in atheist worlds (Lougheed, forthcoming). However, he fails to mention that it also has to be the case that the disadvantages of theism are also avoided in those same worlds. So, the question is really this: are there possible worlds where God does not exist, but all (or most) of the advantages of theism obtain while all (or most) of the disadvantages of theism are avoided? In the context of the current argument, which is Western monotheism, the answer is ‘no’ (at least tentatively so). This doesn’t rule out the conclusion that atheist worlds are among the very best possible worlds; it merely rules this conclusion out on the basis of Kahane’s Argument for Superior Atheist Worlds. I now offer some reasons for thinking the sort of worlds Kahane has in mind are probably impossible.

Advantages of Traditional African Religion 159 Consider that a being only slightly less powerful than God (e.g., a being that didn’t create the world or couldn’t simply will things out of existence) might be able to guarantee many of the theistic goods in question. However, an appeal to a being only slightly lesser than God is probably not helpful to Kahane, since many of the disadvantages associated with God’s existence would (almost) equally apply to this lesser being too. In order for God to ensure perfect justice, we might think that God has to be omniscient. She has to know all of the facts regarding our actions, including intentions and consequences. She might even have to know our subjective mental states in order to be a perfectly fair judge that ensures cosmic justice. In order for a slightly lesser being to ensure cosmic justice, she will have to possess almost identical knowledge to God. The problem with this, however, is that such a being is also going to violate our privacy in the negative ways that have been attributed to God (3.3). Something similar can be said about divine intervention. A being that is going to be powerful enough to offer assistance that is qualitatively similar to divine intervention is going to have to be extremely powerful. Likewise, just imagine the sort of power and knowledge required to steer and interact with the world in such a way so as to ensure that there are no instances of gratuitous evil. The same applies to the value of a relationship with God. Part of the benefit of a relationship with God stems from the fact that God is both all-knowing and all-powerful, but most importantly from the fact that God is maximally loving. In order to reap the advantages of a similar relationship, the being in question will also have to possess something very close to the divine attributes typically attributed to God. In describing a being who is only slightly lesser than God, it’s the case that such a being will be close to impossible for humans to fully comprehend. So, the Understanding Argument for Antitheism would also likely apply to such a being (3.6). Furthermore, such a being would also have to be intervening in the world in order to have the equivalent good of divine intervention. But then the world itself is more difficult to understand through normal methods of inquiry such as the scientific method. If this lesser being did not create humans, then the Dignity Argument for Anti-Theism is weakened because it means they could not have been created for that being’s purposes (3.4). However, it would still be the case there is a being incredibly greater than humans such that humans will always be in an asymmetrical relationship with it. This in itself could constitute a type of dignity harm. This discussion should start to bring into clearer focus the difficulties of describing an atheist world where the advantages often associated with theism obtain while the disadvantages of it do not obtain. An afterlife is perhaps the easiest good typically associated with Western monotheism that does not appear to require God’s existence or even a being similar to God in order for it to obtain. We could be

160  The Axiology of Ubuntu immaterial substances that exist in an immaterial realm after our physical bodies die. Theism is not logically necessary for the universe to be that way. Still, that’s just one good, and for Kahane’s argument to go through it has to be the case that all (or most) of the theistic advantages obtain without all (or most) of the disadvantages obtaining too. Likewise, if there is a good afterlife in the atheist world, then the Genuine Sacrifice Argument for Anti-Theism probably applies to it (3.5). What does this tell us about the alien species used as an example above (9.3.2)? The alien species described would have to be, at least cumulatively (even if the aliens had different individual characteristics), only slightly less than God in order for the benefits of theism to obtain. So, pointing out that a group of beings, instead of just one being slightly lesser than God, could get the job done with respect to theistic goods does not, I submit, help save Kahane’s argument. One underexplored strategy that could be employed to defend Kahane’s argument is based on the distinction between personal and impersonal mechanisms. In describing a being slightly lesser than God, or a group of aliens, I have described other types of ‘persons’ that might exist in atheist worlds. 2 I have thus been describing atheist worlds where the goods of theism obtain via personal mechanisms. But one strategy that hasn’t been fully developed says that many of the theistic goods can be achieved through impersonal mechanisms. For instance, Michael Tooley observes that atheist worlds are “also worlds of the sort that the Buddha believed in, where there are immaterial souls, along with reincarnation and karma, so that good deeds and evil deeds affect how good one’s state is in the next life” (2018, 48, quoted in Lougheed, forthcoming). Toby Betenson writes that: [A]n anti-theist might (must) accept that God’s existence makes the world better than it would otherwise be, because, due to the existence of God, sufferings in this life are compensated in the next. However, they might still prefer that the world be such that sufferings in this life are compensated in the next, but not because of God – perhaps they prefer the idea of some kind of purely naturalistic process, or karma. These do not seem to be unreasonable preferences. (2018, 172, quoted in Lougheed forthcoming) Kahane also observes that Karma and reincarnation can exist in atheist worlds, claiming that cosmic justice does “not inherently require God’s existence. The Karmic cycle is one mechanism of cosmic justice that could easily also operate in a godless world” (Kahane 2018, 102, quoted in Lougheed forthcoming). Yet Karma might not be a legitimate form of justice given that personal identity does not carry across from one life to the next (Lougheed, forthcoming). But let’s consider whether some of the other advantages

Advantages of Traditional African Religion 161 typically associated with theism could be achieved through an impersonal mechanism. Much of the good of divine intervention exists because a stronger, more capable being, steps in to help. This powerful agent helps less capable human agents. It’s difficult to imagine how this good could obtain via an impersonal mechanism. Likewise, a qualitatively similar relationship to the one with God can presumably not be had with an impersonal force. Part of the value of this relationship is that it is to some degree reciprocal in nature. Again, it’s difficult to see how this could be the case in a world without a great personal being. For in such a world with whom would humans have such a relationship? Regarding gratuitous evil, it’s possible that the universe just happens to have an impersonal mechanism that somehow guarantees that no instances of evil are gratuitous. I will explore this thought in more detail but first I want to make an observation regarding this impersonal universe. The disadvantages typically associated with Western monotheism, such as a loss of privacy, dignity, and understanding may well be avoided in an atheist world with the type of impersonal mechanism in view here. For there would be no maximal being that violates a human’s privacy, or stands in a necessarily asymmetrical relationship to humans, or is inherently difficult to understand. If this is the type of world Kahane has in mind, then he has indeed succeeded in avoiding many (or most) of the disadvantages associated with theism. However, such a world loses out on theistic goods such as divine intervention and a relationship with God. And this may turn out to be quite significant to our axiological assessments. A different atheist world than one with the impersonal mechanism of something like Karma is one in which goods like cosmic justice and the existence of no gratuitous evil obtain through sheer luck. Imagine that metaphysical naturalism is true. Suppose that in this world it’s just a matter of luck that each individual receives her just desserts. It just so happens that good actions/intentions are appropriately rewarded while bad actions/intentions are appropriately punished.3 When evil does occur, it’s never gratuitous. It just so happens that any evil that transpires always leads to an otherwise unattainable greater good or prevents an otherwise unpreventable greater evil. If this world is logically possible (and I see no reason to think it’s not) there is a world that contains none of the disadvantages associated with theism and at least two of the advantages typically associated with it in cosmic justice and no gratuitous evil. However, in order to know whether such a world is one of the very best theist worlds, we need to know the value impact of losing out on goods like divine intervention and a relationship with God. The axiology of theism literature has often made a case for some individual advantage or disadvantage justifying a form of personal narrow pro-theism or anti-theism. Sometimes the discussion is expanded to defend personal

162  The Axiology of Ubuntu wide pro-theism or anti-theism on the basis of that specific advantage or disadvantage (e.g., Lougheed 2020a, Ch. 3). But rarely have the advantages and disadvantages been weighed against one another to create a cumulative case for either pro-theism or anti-theism. It matters in this instance because, in order to know whether the best theist worlds really are worse than this atheist world, we need to know whether the theistic advantages all have the same (or similar) value or whether they significantly differ. If divine intervention or the good of a relationship with God are significantly more valuable than cosmic justice or no gratuitous evil, then we cannot conclude that an atheist world where such goods obtain via sheer luck is necessarily better than the very best theist worlds. I don’t take this section to have offered a definitive objection to Kahane’s Argument for Superior Atheist Worlds. However, I have shown that a lot more work needs to be done in order to successfully show that the very best worlds are indeed atheistic. This section should also give the reader a sense of the current debate about this topic before we ask similar questions about Traditional African Religion.

9.4 The Axiology of Theism, Traditional African Religion, and Kahane’s Argument for Superior Atheist Worlds In this section I examine whether the advantages of Traditional African Religion that I discuss in Chapter Seven can obtain in atheist worlds. Specifically, in this section I will examine whether the theistic goods of cosmic justice and of the afterlife could be had in the way that they are on Traditional African Religion but in atheist worlds. For in the context of Western monotheism, these are two goods that can be had in atheist worlds. 9.4.1  Cosmic Justice Recall that in TAR justice is often meted out during people’s earthly lives by spirits and ancestors (7.4.1). While I raised doubts about the possibility that this type of justice always obtains or even ever obtain in the actual world, I did suggest that if it occurred it may well be better than the type of justice had on Western monotheism that often doesn’t happen until the afterlife. What’s interesting here is that on TAR, God is viewed as quite distant from humans, having little direct interaction with them. This actually helps to support the idea that the type of justice that exists on TAR is possible to have without God, and hence possible to have in atheist worlds. For it’s logically possible that similar spirits and ancestors can exist in a world without God. So, it’s possible that they could mete out justice in atheist worlds. This is one theistic advantage that, if TAR does indeed have it, is possible to get in atheist words.

Advantages of Traditional African Religion 163 9.4.2  Afterlife I have suggested that part of what makes a good afterlife so attractive to (many) in the West is not only that it is eternal, but that personal identity persists between an individual’s earthly life and their afterlife (7.4.2). However, according to TAR, if one becomes an ancestor, personal identity is still lost after a handful of generations. So, in the Western understanding, this is not a genuinely eternal afterlife. However, TAR’s understanding of the afterlife may still well be an axiological advantage if extending a person’s life is valuable, even if only for a few generations. Supposing that this is indeed a positive, there is little reason to think that TAR’s conception of the afterlife isn’t logically possible in an atheist world. Metaphysical naturalism would be false in such a world, but it still could be atheistic.

9.5 The Unique Advantages of Traditional African Religion and Kahane’s Argument for Superior Atheist Worlds In this section I examine whether the unique advantages of Traditional African Religion that I discuss in Chapter Eight can obtain in atheist worlds. They are post-mortem family relationships and traditional medicine. 9.5.1  Post-Mortem Family Relationships In Chapter Eight, I argued that the existence of relationships with one’s family members after they die is an advantage of TAR (8.3.1). Individuals are not immediately cut off from their deceased family members. Indeed, the deceased are typically viewed as continuing to live, just as ancestors. This explains why ancestors are sometimes called the ‘living dead.’ Again, I can see little reason why it is not logically possible that this could happen in an atheist world. I have already argued above that TAR’s conception of the afterlife is logically possible in atheist worlds (9.4.2). Thus, this is a unique good associated with TAR that is possible in an atheist world. 9.5.2  Traditional Medicine In Chapter Eight I developed an argument for pro-Traditional African Religion on the basis of traditional medicine (8.3.2). However, I ultimately rejected the argument because it’s not clear that a belief in magic really does motivate people to act rightly, and also because while medicine men or healers offer protection against harmful magic, they are only required because a world with TAR contains such magic in the first place. However, for the sake of discussion suppose that my development of this argument had been successful. Could the advantages of traditional medicine obtain in an atheist world? The answer is clearly

164  The Axiology of Ubuntu ‘yes.’ A world where traditional medicine is real but is also one where God doesn’t exist is logically possible. So, this is another unique good associated with TAR that could exist in an atheist world.

9.6 Conclusion It’s tempting to conclude definitively that since TAR’s conception of cosmic justice and the afterlife, along with the unique goods of post-mortem family relationships and traditional medicine can obtain in atheist worlds that Kahane’s Argument fares quite well when applied to it. However, remember that it also has to be the case that in the same world the disadvantages of theism are simultaneously avoided. One reason to think this isn’t so is that I have suggested that most of the current arguments for anti-theism apply to TAR (7.5). Now, the natural reply to this is that in atheist worlds the disadvantages of theism necessarily don’t obtain. But in our discussion of Kahane’s argument above we saw that things might be more complicated. A being only slightly lesser than God or a very (cumulatively) powerful alien species will come with much of the same disadvantages associated with God. Yet cosmic justice and an afterlife (as described by TAR) might be able to exist due to an impersonal mechanism. Or it could just be a matter of luck that there are post-mortem family relationships and traditional medicine in an atheist world. Inasmuch as these are possibilities, then there is some reason to conclude that Kahane’s Argument fares well when applied to TAR. Finally, one last worry is that I’ve assumed that things like justice meted out through spirits and ancestors, an afterlife as described by TAR, and traditional medicine are all possible in an atheistic (albeit supernatural) world. However, if these things somehow inherently require the undergirding of God or a God-like being, then it’s impossible to get these advantages without also the disadvantages. I can’t see a way of establishing that these things are logically dependent on God (or a Godlike being). But I leave it open as a potential strategy for showing why Kahane’s Argument for Superior Atheist Worlds cannot be successfully applied to TAR. As it stands, however, there is some reason to think we can get the goods associated with TAR in an atheist world, while simultaneously avoiding the disadvantages associated with it. When TAR is factored into the discussion, and not just Western monotheism, there is thus more reason to think that the very best worlds are atheistic.

Notes 1. My explication of Kahane here mostly follows my Lougheed 2020a, 179–180. 2. Many theists also hold that God is a type of ‘person.’ 3. I intend this to be consistent with different theories of justice.

Advantages of Traditional African Religion 165

Bibliography Betenson, T. (2018). “Recasting Anti-Theism.” In Klaas J. Kraay (ed.) Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. pp. 164–177. Hendricks, Perry and Kirk Lougheed. (2019). “Undermining the Axiological Solution to Divine Hiddenness.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 86 (1): 3–15. Kahane, Guy. (2018). “If There Is a Hole, It Is Not God-Shaped.” In Klaas J. Kraay (ed). Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. pp. 95–131. Lougheed, Kirk. (2018). “The Axiological Solution to Divine Hiddenness.” Ratio 31 (3): 331–341. Lougheed, Kirk. (2020a). The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews. Palgrave Macmillan. Lougheed, Kirk. (forthcoming). “Are Atheist Worlds Really the Best?” Religious Studies. Nozick, Robert. (1971). “On the Randian Argument.” In J. Paul (ed.), Reading Nozick, Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld, pp. 206–231; reprinted in R. Nozick, Socratic Puzzles, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. pp. 249–264. __________. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Tooley, M. (2018). “Axiology: Theism Versus Widely Accepted Monotheisms.” In Klaas J. Kraay (ed.) Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. pp. 46–69.

Part IV

Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism

10 Ubuntu and the Axiology of Ultimism

10.1 Introduction Thus far in this book I have evaluated the arguments for the axiology of theism on the assumption that ubuntu is true (Part II) and then turned to explore the axiological status of ubuntu itself (Part III). In this final part of the book, I now turn to evaluate the axiological status of the non-monotheistic worldviews, from the assumption that ubuntu is true. In this chapter I evaluate the position known as ultimism which has been offered by J.L. Schellenberg. I first apply some of the current arguments in the axiology of theism literature to ultimism and evaluate them based on ubuntu. I then do the same for a unique argument for pro-ultimism. This chapter tentatively concludes that as it currently stands there are more reasons in support of pro-ultimism than of anti-ultimism.

10.2  What Is Ultimism? 10.2.1  Evolutionary Religion Ultimism is a view embedded in J.L. Schellenberg’s philosophy of religion, in particular what he calls evolutionary religion (2005, 2007, 2009, 2013). The former is developed out of the latter, in part, by what Schellenberg calls deep time. People sometimes think that in evolutionary terms that the human species is quite old. The earth has been around for 3.5 billion years and Homo sapiens for 200,000 years. However, Schellenberg suggests that given there is the potential for 1 billion years of evolutionary development in front of us that we are actually an incredibly young species. He writes that: [O]ne needs to think hard about the fact that the perhaps 200,000year history of H. sapiens is wedged between three and a half billion years of evolutionary development on one side – life’s past – and another billion on the other – life’s potential future. Consider especially the second figure. A billion years is a period of time ridiculously DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-10

170  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism longer than the 50,000 years of thinking and feeling that, on a generous estimate, our species has put into religion so far… Even if we restrict ourselves to the possible future of our own species, the numbers are staggering. H. sapiens, though manifesting its religious inclinations and symbolic powers a bit earlier, has at most 6,000 years of organized and systematic religious inquiry to its credit. (Schellenberg 2013, 3) In light of the deep future, we are a very intellectually immature species and it’s reasonable to think that we have much to discover about philosophy and religion (Schellenberg 2013, 9–14). Indeed, given this immaturity, we can’t fathom the sort of intellectual developments that might occur in the future. Schellenberg explains that: A deep time perspective on inquiry, in which we trade our human timescales for those of the universe, should have a decided impact. In particular, it’s going to seem rather plausible that it might take a lot longer for human intelligence to get anywhere really interesting than we had thought. Many deep layers of matured thought, developed only after much difficult collaboration over unbelievably long periods of time, may need to be laid down before we are in a position to see the deep truth of things (if we ever are). (Schellenberg 2013, 47) Schellenberg appeals to these considerations to motivate a specific type of religious scepticism. He suggests that given our temporal location, we are in a poor epistemic situation with respect to assessing the truth of religious claims. Indeed, “[t]here are simply too many glaring deficiencies in our relevant development so far and – given the depth and difficulty of matter involved – too many epistemically possible changes and intellectual enrichments in our future to make such a claim justified” (Schellenberg 2013, 67). Four important features of this view should help to be optimistic about the future of religious inquiry in particular, and religion in general. The first feature is religious diachronism which means a willingness to think about the future, instead of only the past and present. We shouldn’t ignore the reality of the deep future in our religious inquiry (Schellenberg 2013, 75–76). Given our current epistemic situation (i.e., we are a young and intellectually immature species) there is little reason to think we’re well-positioned to learn the truth value of specific religious claims (Schellenberg 2013, 77–78). The second feature is a kind of religious scepticism. Due to our intellectual immaturity coupled with the existence of deep time, we should disbelieve controversial claims, including specific religious claims (Schellenberg 2013, 75). However, this scepticism is consistent with taking a weaker stance such as acceptance

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Ultimism 171 towards religious claims. It’s thus possible to have a positive doxastic attitude regarding religious claims while disbelieving them (Schellenberg 2013, 82). The third feature is religious developmentalism which entails looking forward to greater religious maturity instead of being caught with “the past and depending on the authority of founding figures” (Schellenberg 2013, 75). The fourth and final feature is religious pragmatism which involves “thinking about how religion itself might help us evolve toward ever greater maturity in all areas of human life, in particular functioning as part of the solution to our evaluative immaturity of part of the problem” (Schellenberg 2013, 75). 10.2.2  Ultimism Schellenberg calls the object of evolutionary religion, ultimism. This is a minimalist conception of the divine which says there is something ‘more’ “not just (i) in factual terms but also (ii) in value and (iii) in what we might term importance, by which I mean its value for us. In philosophical terms: the first sort of transcendence is metaphysical transcendence, the second axiological transcendence, and the third soteriological transcendence” (Schellenberg 2013, 94). What Schellenberg calls triple transcendence obtains if (i)–(iii) obtain. Monotheism entails ultimism, and in some ways can be understood as a more detailed version of it. However, Schellenberg only thinks we are justified in believing in a minimalist concept like the ultimate, and not something more specific like Western monotheism or Traditional African Religion. He explains that: Ultimism refers quite generally to the accessibility of an ultimate good springing from something ultimate in reality and value, rather than specifically to salvation found in a personal relationship with a perfect creator who loves us like a parent, or to any other extant religious details. Given its breadth and our immaturity, we must admit that ultimism may well be true… even if we think that many existing attempts to fill it out, including traditional theism, are provably false. In part this is because many other detailed ways of filling it out may well remain undiscovered. Ultimism invites doubt rather than disbelief. (Schellenberg 2013, 99–100) Schellenberg concludes that ultimism should inspire imaginative faith. This is akin to imagining and acting as if the world is a particular way, though one does not believe it. Imaginative faith is “content with possibility… In having faith that ultimism is true, I train my thought on the idea that what is deepest in the nature of things is also unsurpassably the greatest and that its wonders are in some way transformatively accessible to me and the world” (Schellenberg 2013, 105–106).

172  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism 10.2.3  Religious Inquiry and Taking Risks One important consequence of Schellenberg’s view is that, given its sensitivity to deep time and our epistemic position, it is a pure form of faith seeking understanding. For an openness to further inquiry is part of the very fabric of the religious life. Evolutionary religion also has positive implications regarding the future. It’s likely there may well be innovative ways of solving problems that we can’t yet discover (or even yet comprehend) (Schellenberg 2013, 109). According to Schellenberg once we start to internalize evolutionary religion, we begin to desire goods that are more enduring than material possessions (Schellenberg 2013, 109–110). Evolutionary religion implies too, that it is reasonable to sometimes take risks that one otherwise wouldn’t take. This is because: [I]f ultimism is true, then what might otherwise appear as unduly risk-taking behavior on behalf of the good in fact only more fully aligns us with the deepest nature of reality. It follows that we act on our faith that ultimism is true if we leave our comfort zone and move out into a world still rich in chaos and calamity, involving ourselves in (what would be called) risk-taking behavior on behalf of the good when the opportunity to do so arises. (Schellenberg 2013, 110) For example, we should take risks to help others as a possible way of connecting with the divine reality. Notice too, that negative risk-taking such as terrorism isn’t justified on ultimism because such acts tend to be the result of much more specific religious views that aren’t epistemically justified (Schellenberg 2013, 111). In sum, it is “through imaginative evolutionary faith we are best able to express and honor and also further develop and support into the future the beautiful but fragile, multi-faceted and value-laden complexity that can be seen in the process of becoming human, as realized at various levels in individuals, communities, and the species at large” (Schellenberg 2013, 156).

10.3  Ubuntu and Anti-Ultimism Now that we have a working description of ultimism it’s time to evaluate it from the perspective of ubuntu. In order to accomplish this, in this section I examine some of the main arguments for anti-theism in an attempt to discover whether they can be used to successfully establish anti-ultimism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. These arguments include the Meaningful Life Argument, the Privacy Argument, the Dignity Argument, the Sacrifice Argument, and the Complete Understanding Argument. I conclude that most of the arguments fail to successfully establish anti-ultimism, at least given our current epistemic position in light of deep time.

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Ultimism 173 10.3.1  The Meaningful Life Argument The Meaningful Life Argument for anti-theism says that for certain individuals, godless worlds are better than God worlds because in the latter their lives would be meaningless (3.2). If the meaning of an individual’s life is so wrapped up in goods like privacy, understanding, dignity, etc., then they may well only be able to have meaningful lives in atheistic worlds. In my previous examination of ultimism and this argument, I argued that we simply aren’t in a good epistemic position to know whether this argument can be successfully applied to ultimism. This is because given the existence of deep time we don’t yet know whether supernaturalism or naturalism is true and this argument only succeeds if naturalism is true (Lougheed 2020a, 203–204). With respect to the Meaningful Life Argument and ubuntu, recall that in Chapter Three (3.2.2) I argue that it fails. The reason for this is that African theories of a meaningful life such as the Communal Theory and Vitalist Theory are perfectly consistent with the existence of God. But that discussion was in the context of Western monotheism and atheism. The question before us now, however, is whether the Meaningful Life Argument can be used to establish anti-ultimism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. It appears that given the existence of deep time, we aren’t in a good epistemic position to make any definitive assessments. For we don’t yet know whether the ultimate is supernatural or naturalistic, though Schellenberg appears less sympathetic to the idea that it’s naturalistic. Likewise, consider that in light of what we currently know about the ultimate, it is indeed something that could be related to communally with (the Communal Theory), or something that could increase our vitality (the Vitalist Theory). Indeed, these African theories of meaning may well be consistent with an entirely naturalistic understanding of the ultimate too. So, unless it could be demonstrated that the ultimate is naturalistic and that it can’t be related to nor increase one’s vitality, the Meaningful Life Argument cannot be used to establish anti-ultimism from the perspective of ubuntu. As it stands, it also seems doubtful that our future discoveries about the ultimate will show us that the Meaningful Life Argument can establish anti-ultimism. 10.3.2  The Privacy Argument The Privacy Argument for anti-theism appeals to considerations of privacy to establish anti-theism. Since God is all-knowing and all-powerful, God necessarily knows everything about every individual, including their mental states and phenomenology. Inasmuch as privacy is valuable, that God violates our privacy constitutes a disadvantage of Western monotheism (3.3). But we currently don’t know enough about the ultimate to think that the Privacy Argument can be applied to it. For example, we

174  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism do not even yet know whether the ultimate is personal or impersonal, and as such we have no idea whether the ultimate violates our privacy (and if it does to what degree it does so) (Lougheed 2020a, 204–205). In Chapter Three I claim that it is much more difficult to establish the Privacy Argument for anti-theism on ubuntu. This is because on ubuntu it tends to matter much more what is done with the information about us. If the information about us is used to foster shared identity and promote solidarity (or alternatively to help us develop our personhood), then it’s difficult to see why God possessing the information is negative. This is consistent with it being bad for morally imperfect humans to have the same information. Attempting to leverage this argument for anti-ultimism from the perspective of ubuntu is not any easier. All of the same considerations just mentioned equally apply here. We don’t know enough about the ultimate to know whether it violates our privacy in the same way as God. Likewise, even if it does, it’s doubtful that this is negative inasmuch as God would foster communal values prioritized by the African tradition. 10.3.3  The Dignity Argument The Dignity Argument for anti-theism suggests that it is morally problematic to be created for someone else’s purposes. And if God exists, then necessarily, humans were created for God’s purposes (3.4). Again, I suggested that it’s less likely that this argument succeeds on ubuntu. As mentioned in Chapter Three, procreation is typically favoured on an ubuntu ethic. It’s viewed as beneficial to the entire community. The dignity of the person is wrapped up in her capacity for friendliness, and necessarily with the specific ends that she is able to pursue (3.4.2). In evaluating whether the Dignity Argument can establish anti-ultimism I claimed that the answer lies in whether the ultimate is the cause of the universe. If it is, then the very same considerations that were mentioned regarding Western monotheism apply to it as well (Lougheed 2020a, 205–207). However, on the assumption that ubuntu is true, the same analysis of the argument I offered in Chapter Three applies here too. The relevant conception of dignity on ubuntu is such that it does not constitute a dignity harm to have been created for another’s purposes. 10.3.4  The Sacrifice Argument The Sacrifice Argument for anti-theism claims that genuine sacrifices are not possible if Western monotheism entails a good afterlife. Whatever sacrifice an individual makes for another person; they will always receive the great good of a good afterlife. This greatly diminishes the value of any earthly sacrifices (3.5). This argument too, is

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Ultimism 175 more difficult to establish on ubuntu. For individuals don’t view themselves as entirely distinct from the community, and as such there are unlikely to understand the sort of sacrifice in view as giving something up that does in turn benefit oneself (since the individual is part of the community too). Yet in Chapter Seven I also observed that there are significant differences between religious and secular versions of ubuntu with respect to the Sacrifice Argument. For at most, an individual who sacrifices their life for another loses (the greater part) of a generation. But ancestors live on indefinitely and maintain personal identity for a handful of generations. This is enough to nullify the possibility of genuine sacrifice on religious conceptions of ubuntu too (7.3.4). Still, I think that it remains the case that on both religious and secular versions of ubuntu the concept of sacrifice in this argument is difficult to decipher. While in his description of ultimism Schellenberg is noncommittal about the possibility of an afterlife (at least as understood in the Western theistic tradition), he does write that “[i]f [ultimism] is true, then given the obvious fact of deeply damaged Earthly lives or Earthly lives cut short, there must be some sort of second chance for at least some of us” (Schellenberg’s 2013, 107). This description seems to suggest that if an individual were to make sacrifices such that their earthly life is damaged or cut short, they would be given another chance. Hence, genuine sacrifice is impossible on ultimism too (Lougheed 2020a, 207–208). However, when evaluated on the assumption that ubuntu, the same conclusions that I offered in Chapter Three hold here as well. In African Communitarianism the individual is not understood as existing apart from the community. To make a sacrifice for another member in the community is not just to benefit a distinct individual. It benefits the health of the community and hence also the person who makes the sacrifice. It therefore remains difficult to see how the Sacrifice Argument could be used to establish anti-ultimism on the assumption that ubuntu is true. 10.3.5  The Complete Understanding Argument The Complete Understanding Argument suggests that one disadvantage of Western monotheism is that such a world is more difficult to understand than a naturalistic world. This is so for at least two reasons. First, a theistic world contains God, a being that is in many ways in principle impossible to fully comprehend. Second, depending on the degree to which God intervenes in the world, a theistic world may be less understandable through the scientific method (3.6). In Chapter Three I explained that on the assumption ubuntu is true, this argument doesn’t work because in African thought, understanding and knowledge simply aren’t intrinsically valuable. I explain that one way to say understanding and knowledge are intrinsically valuable that is consistent with

176  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism an African perspective is if such goods are greatly prized by certain individuals. In such cases it would be right for the community to help those individuals achieve them (3.6.2). So there is one interpretation of ubuntu, albeit an atypical one, on which the Complete Understanding Argument might succeed. Then in Chapter Seven I suggested that while the Complete Understanding Argument may not apply to secular (and naturalistic) versions of ubuntu, it applies even more to religious versions. This is because of the extremely large supernatural ontology that is posited by Traditional African Religion (7.4.4). With respect to ultimism, I have suggested we currently don’t have any reason to think that the Complete Understanding Argument applies to it (Lougheed 2020a, 208). Given deep time and our place on the evolutionary timescale we aren’t in a good epistemic position to tell whether the ultimate is in principle unknowable in certain ways. Indeed, Schellenberg consistently expresses optimism about the future of religious inquiry. Again, evaluating this as an argument for anti-ultimism on the assumption that ubuntu is true does not change the analysis. If indeed there is a way on ubuntu of holding that knowledge and understanding are intrinsically valuable, then the Complete Understanding Argument is unsuccessful in establishing anti-ultimism. 10.3.6  Sub-conclusion: Ubuntu and Anti-Ultimism It appears that on the assumption ubuntu is true, none of the Meaningful Life Argument, the Privacy Argument, the Dignity Argument, nor the Complete Understanding Argument can be leveraged to successfully establish anti-ultimism. Depending on the details, a religious version of ubuntu is possibly consistent with using the Sacrifice Argument to establish anti-ultimism. However, to firmly establish such an argument we need to know more about what Schellenberg intends by ‘second chance.’ Indeed, given the existence of deep time, this is something we might not discover until much later in human history.

10.4  Ubuntu and Pro-Ultimism In this section I turn to the main considerations in favour of pro-theism, exploring whether they can be applied to ultimism on the assumption that ubuntu is true. Such advantages of theism include the Infinite Value Argument, the Argument from No Gratuitous Evil, the Morally Good Agents Argument, the Cosmic Justice Argument, the Afterlife Argument, and the Relationship with God Argument. I conclude that while the Infinite Value Argument and Argument from No Gratuitous Evil can likely be used to defend pro-ultimism on the assumption that ubuntu is true, we simply aren’t in a good epistemic position to decide about the other arguments.

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Ultimism 177 10.4.1  The Infinite Value Argument Recall that the Infinite Value Argument for pro-theism says that since God is intrinsically infinitely valuable, then any monotheistic world is better than an atheistic world, at least with respect to God (4.2). I suggested that this argument is perfectly consistent with a secular approach to life force, understood as vitality (4.2.3). Likewise, the argument succeeds on Metz’s relational ethic which says rightness is friendliness, since as a perfect being God will have the greatest capacity to be the object and subject of friendliness (4.2.4). On personhood accounts of ubuntu this argument is likely lost as relating well with others is extrinsic, not intrinsic. However, positive relationships are a final value, so a pro-theistic argument based on final value is still available (4.2.5). Can this argument be successfully applied to ultimism? The answer here is probably ‘yes,’ at least given what we currently know about the ultimate. If ubuntu is true, and the ultimate is something more with respect to value, it’s reasonable to think that the ultimate is maximally intrinsically valuable. Even if the value of the ultimate is not infinite, it will be the highest possible value. However, on personhood accounts of ubuntu, the argument is again lost as relating well with the ultimate remains extrinsic, not intrinsic. Again, however, such relationality is still a final value that therefore ought to be sought out for its own sake. Yet there is still a degree to which we need to suspend judgement about the success of this application. For we currently aren’t in a good epistemic position to know whether the ultimate is personal or impersonal. If the ultimate turns out to be impersonal then it probably doesn’t make sense to speak of it as exhibiting a maximal capacity for friendliness, as the best object and subject of friendliness. Likewise, personhood accounts of ubuntu focus on the importance of positive relationships between persons. If the ultimate is impersonal, then this ethic will have difficulty applying to it. The epistemic humility implied by epistemic position in light of deep time thus has to make this analysis necessarily tentative. 10.4.2  The Argument from No Gratuitous Evil That God’s existence logically entails that no instances of evil are gratuitous has been cited frequently as a reason for pro-theism (4.3). While I noted that a further analysis of what constitutes evil would be helpful, no plausible worldview would deny that this is indeed a good, including any account of ubuntu (4.3.2). What does ultimism say about the existence of gratuitous evil? Schellenberg writes that: If [ultimism] is true, then given the obvious fact of deeply damaged Earthly lives or Earthly lives cut short, there must be some sort of

178  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism second chance for at least some of us. (For there is clearly no possible world in which a child whose life is filled with suffering and then cut short has already achieved all that ‘soteriological ultimacy’ could sensibly be claimed to include for her. (Schellenberg 2013, 107) While this statement is definitive, it does hint that the ultimate protects against at least some types of gratuitous evil (Lougheed 2020a, 214–215). This argument also clearly applies to the pro-ultimism from the perspective of ubuntu. As stated, any plausible worldview will not deny that no gratuitous evil is good, even if there are disagreements about what constitutes ‘gratuitous’ and ‘evil.’ Inasmuch as the ultimate entails that there is not gratuitous evil, then this constitutes support for pro-theism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. 10.4.3  The Morally Good Agents Argument The Morally Good Agents Argument for pro-theism says that good agents tend to add value to states of affairs. Since God is a maximally good agent, God adds to any state of affairs in which she exists (4.4). In Chapter Four I argue that this argument clearly receives a positive evaluation on ubuntu. This is consistent with Metz’s friendliness account of ubuntu since God would be the paradigmatically friendliest being. Likewise, on personhood accounts, God would be a maximal person, relating perfectly with all other individuals. However, I also noted that to fully endorse this argument on an ubuntu ethic there would have been agreement on at least some of the divine attributes (i.e., agreement between Western monotheism and Traditional African Religion). We currently cannot use this argument to establish pro-ultimism. For as stated above (9.4.2), we cannot definitively say that the ultimate is personal or even an agent. We are simply too early on in our religious inquiry to offer a detailed enough description of the ultimate to reasonably know whether this line of argument could apply to it. 10.4.4  The Cosmic Justice Argument The idea of cosmic justice has been appealed to with some frequency in defences of pro-theism. The main thrust of the argument is that God’s perfect goodness entails that, regardless of the specific details, there will be final or cosmic justice. Things will be made right (4.5). In Chapter Four I suggested that the details very much matter in deciding whether this argument holds on the assumption that ubuntu is true. With respect to justice, ubuntu focusses far less on retribution and far more on a good outcome. Only if God’s existence were to ensure the latter could this argument be successful on ubuntu. However, in Chapter Seven, I argued

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Ultimism 179 that it is far from clear that either type of justice is ensured in the world offered by Traditional African Religion (7.3.1). As with considerations about gratuitous evil, I don’t think a definitive statement can be offered regarding the plausibility of this argument when applied to ultimism. Schellenberg hints at at least some type of cosmic justice suggesting that at least some people get a second chance. Again, even if ultimate does guarantee justice in a way consistent with the initial formulations of the Cosmic Justice Argument, it would still have to be checked against an ubuntu ethic. 10.4.5  The Afterlife Argument Another consideration in favour of pro-theism is the existence of a good afterlife (4.6). If universalism is true, then we can say (with some reservation) that inasmuch as God’s existence entails a good afterlife, a strong argument for pro-theism has been offered. In Chapter Seven I suggested that these considerations would indeed be met with approval on an ubuntu ethic (4.6.2). Yet this argument cannot apply seamlessly to religious versions of ubuntu in that they affirm Traditional African Religion’s understanding of the afterlife. On this view, the afterlife at best lasts a handful of generations after one dies, while one lives as a departed ancestor. After that, personal identity is lost and so it cannot be considered an afterlife in the way the term is used here (7.3.2). Regarding the possibility of an afterlife on evolutionary religion, Schellenberg writes that: Precisely because of what we know about our ignorance concerning consciousness (presently a hugely controversial subject) and what we don’t know about how deep that ignorance is (more generally, what we don’t know concerning how ignorant we may be about our own nature and, not unrelatedly, about the ultimate structure of reality) – because of all this, denying the afterlife today instead of accepting skepticism on that vexed subject is more like denying that any model of string theory scientists will conceive can be made to work than it is like, say, denying a theory of evolution without natural selection. (Schellenberg 2013, 126) Here we have a clear answer from Schellenberg regarding the possibility of an afterlife. We aren’t in a good epistemic position to judge whether there is an afterlife, and as such we should suspend judgement about it (Lougheed 2020a, 216). So, we ought to suspend judgement about whether the afterlife exists on ultimism and hence whether it can be appealed to in order to establish pro-ultimism. If ultimism entails the existence of an afterlife that would allow one to continue to relate positively with others or to continue to exemplify and develop their personhood, then an afterlife would remain positive on an ubuntu ethic.

180  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism 10.4.6  The Relationship with God Argument As stated in Chapter Four, that a relationship with God is strong consideration in favour for pro-theism is evidenced by the fact that the inability to have such a relationship is sometimes claimed to be evidence for atheism (4.7). For the type of love exhibited by God towards humans is necessarily perfect love and this is a great good. I suggested that this argument indeed succeeds on ubuntu. God would be a welcome member of any community (4.7.2). However, in Chapter Seven I signalled that the Relationship Argument cannot be used in defence of a religious version of ubuntu. This is because according to Traditional African Religion, God is distant from humans and is thought to have little interaction with them, a difference from the concept of God often found in the West (7.3.3). Whether considerations about a relationship with the ultimate could be used to support pro-ultimism is not a question we are well-positioned to answer. As it stands, we simply don’t have enough information about the ultimate, particularly whether it is personal or impersonal, in order to know whether this argument could apply. However, if one could indeed have a positive relationship with the ultimate there is little reason to suppose it would not receive a positive evaluation from ubuntu. 10.4.7  Sub-conclusion: Ubuntu and Pro-Ultimism The main difficulty in attempting to figure out which, if any, of the arguments from pro-theism can be used to defend pro-ultimism (on the assumption that ubuntu is true), is that we currently aren’t in a good epistemic position with respect to the details of ultimism. With more time to inquire into religion and philosophy, we might discover enough details to give more definitive answers. As it stands, we ought to suspend judgement regarding the Morally Good Agents Argument, The Afterlife Argument, and the Relationship with God Argument. There is some evidence the Cosmic Justice Argument could be applied to ultimism, but it is far from decisive. Given what we currently know, the two arguments that can probably be leveraged to defend pro-ultimism on the assumption that ubuntu is true are the Infinite Value Argument and the Argument from No Gratuitous Evil.

10.5  The Problem-Solving Argument for Pro-Ultimism In this section I examine a unique argument for pro-ultimism which appeals to the idea that it promotes problem-solving and inquiry in ways not typical of other worldviews (Lougheed 2020a, 209–213). I first outline the argument before examining whether it is still plausible on the assumption that ubuntu is true. Here’s the standardized version:

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Ultimism 181 10.5.1  The Problem-Solving Argument for Pro-Ultimism Assumption: all else being equal, it is better to prefer a state of affairs where successful problem-solving occurs to one where it does not occur (or occurs less frequently). (1) If ultimism is true, then humans are [more] likely to discover new and better ways of solving problems. (2) Ultimism is true. [Assumed for comparison] So, (3) Humans are likely to discover new and better ways of solving problems. (4) All else being equal, for certain individuals a state of affairs in which new and better ways to solve problems is better than a state of affairs in which this doesn’t occur. Thus, (5) All else being equal, with respect to new and better ways to problem solve, for certain individuals it is better that ultimism is true than false (Lougheed 2020a, 210). As it stands, this argument only establishes narrow some persons personal pro-ultimism. As I’ve suggested throughout the book, narrow and personal axiological judgements are the easiest to establish. I’m thus going to explain the version of the argument that is broader in scope before exploring whether it can be defended on ubuntu. In order to expand the scope, (4) and (5) have to be adjusted to overall judgements: (*4) All else being equal, for individuals a state of affairs in which there are new and better ways to solve problems is better overall than a state of affairs in which this doesn’t occur. (*5) All else being equal, for individuals it is better overall that ultimism is true than that is false (Lougheed 2020a, 211). If sound, this argument establishes wide some persons’ personal pro-ultimism. One way to do this is by demonstrating that at least for certain individuals, the meaning of their life is intimately connected to problem-olving. This means adding: (6) For certain individuals, new and better ways of solving problems are intimately connected to the meaning of their lives. (7) All else being equal a world in which there are meaningful lives is better than a world in which there are meaningless lives (Lougheed 2020a, 212).

182  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism I’ve already briefly gestured at ways to defend (7) (8.2.5; see also Lougheed 2020a, 79–83). In order to motivate (6) consider the following example: Ahmed is a research scientist. He specializes in genetics research and his current grant is funding him to explore possible genetic indicators for autism. He conducts his research in southern Ontario where the prevalence of autism among children is considered a major health crisis. Ahmed finds great fulfillment in his work. He loves solving problems and the cause of autism (let alone the greatly increasing number of cases) remains unknown. Ahmed enjoys the research process and would also find great value in helping to discover whether there is a genetic link to autism. In order for Ahmed’s life to be meaningful he needs to have a problem to solve (Lougheed 2020a, 212) But nothing on atheism and or theism entails that solving problems cannot be done. What is really important here is that ultimism lends itself to new and improved methods of solving problems in ways that other worldviews do not (Lougheed 2020a, 213). So, it really needs to be the case that: Ahmed finds great meaning in discovering new and improved techniques and tools to study genetics. Instead of exploring what a rigorous defence of this argument would entail, I’m simply going to assume that it’s one of the more promising arguments for pro-ultimism that appeals to a unique advantage of it. What is more important for our purposes is the type of evaluation this argument would receive from the perspective of ubuntu, and this is what I explore in what follows. 10.5.2  Evaluation of the Problem-Solving Argument for Pro-Ultimism Recall that on traditional African worldviews knowledge and understanding are not intrinsically valuable (3.6.2; 9.3.5). The value of epistemic goods like knowledge and understanding are not intrinsic for traditional African worldviews because they are typically only considered good if they are able to help solve a problem or accomplish some task. Their value is thus located outside of them and is hence extrinsic. It’s fair to say, then, that on traditional African worldviews, knowledge and understanding are practically valuable. But notice that while these considerations might make it more difficult to defend the Understanding Argument for Pro-Theism (3.6), it actually shows how

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Ultimism 183 well the Problem-Solving Argument for Pro-Ultimism fits from the perspective of ubuntu. Evolutionary religion suggests that there will be new ways of solving problems and that it will foster a certain attitude. Schellenberg explains that: [T]he complexities of reality are such that there may be a huge variety of ways in which what appear as infinitely knotted problems are capable of dissolving into new and meaningful perspectives which add layers of depth to one’s life. In evolutionary faith one is constantly teaching oneself to be more open to such things, to look for them, to expect them, and to take advantage of them when they appear. A certain patience as well as a sensitive, discriminating awareness might be expected to be among the results. (2013, 109) Here I don’t think we need to read Schellenberg as suggesting that knowledge is only extrinsically valuable. However, his position is certainly consistent with that view. As such, the Problem-Solving Argument for Pro-Ultimism receives a positive evaluation from the perspective of ubuntu. Notice too, that I have already explicated a way that is consistent with an African worldview to hold that knowledge and understanding are indeed intrinsically valuable (3.6.2). While this interpretation is admittedly non-standard, it is one to preserve this argument for pro-ultimism if one were to insist that problem-solving was only intrinsically valuable.

10.6 Conclusion This chapter explored the axiological status of an alternative worldview to monotheism known as ultimism. Given an evolutionary timescale and our place within deep time, we aren’t in a good epistemic position to know the truth value of religious claims. However, there is reason to be optimistic about the future of religious inquiry, given that we are extremely early on in the process. For now, we can say that the ultimate is more in terms of knowledge, value, and meaning. Some arguments for anti-theism and pro-theism have already been applied to ultimism (Lougheed 2020a, Ch. 7). But the purpose of this chapter was to explore whether those arguments could be applied to ultimism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. With respect to the arguments for anti-theism, I tentatively concluded that only the Sacrifice Argument can be successfully used to defend anti-ultimism on an ubuntu ethic. Regarding the arguments for pro-theism, we ought to suspend judgement regarding the Morally Good Agents Argument, The Afterlife Argument, and the Relationship with God Argument. There is some evidence the Cosmic Justice Argument could be applied to ultimism, but it is far from decisive.

184  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism The two arguments that can probably be leveraged to defend pro-ultimism on the assumption that ubuntu is true are the Infinite Value Argument and the Argument from No Gratuitous Evil. I concluded by examining a unique argument for pro-ultimism, the Problem-Solving Argument. This receives a positive evaluation on an ubuntu ethic, since on indigenous African worldviews knowledge and understanding are primarily viewed as extrinsically valuable because they can help to solve problems. In light of this discussion, the reasons in favour of pro-ultimism appear stronger than those in favour of anti-ultimism. However, any conclusions about the axiological status of the ultimate are necessarily tentative as there is much that we still have to learn about it.

Bibliography Lougheed, Kirk. (2020a). The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews. Palgrave Macmillan Schellenberg, J.L. (2005). Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press __________. (2007). The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. __________. (2009). The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. __________. (2013). Evolutionary Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

11 Ubuntu and the Axiology of Pantheism

11.1 Introduction The final axiological exploration of this book examines pantheism. To begin I will define the version of pantheism I have in view. After that I’ll highlight some of the problems associated with the categories of personal/impersonal and narrow/wide judgements when applied to pantheism. This will set the stage for me to explore whether the arguments in the axiology of theism literature can be used to support anti-pantheism or pro-pantheism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. I conclude the chapter by examining a unique argument for anti-pantheism.1

11.2  What Is Pantheism? Pantheism, like most other types of theism, does not pick out a unique description agreed upon by all who use the term. I therefore begin with a basic description that most will agree on before moving to the more specific version I intend to examine in this chapter. William Mander says that “[a]t its most general, pantheism may be understood positively as the view that God is identical with the cosmos, the view that there exists nothing which is outside of God, or else negatively as the rejection of any view that considers God as distinct from the universe” (2020). There are two ways to understand this identity claim. The first way is dialectical identity which rejects the classical logic of identity. Pantheists who endorse this view deny that either A and B are identical, or they are not identical, and thus claim that God and the universe are at once both identical and not identical (Mander 2020). The second way is partial identity, which might say that God is a proper part of nature or that nature is a proper part of God. Thus, they overlap with each other but are distinct. However, in order to be considered genuinely pantheistic, the overlap must be substantial. I’m going to follow Travis Dumsday’s chapter, “The Axiology of Theism: Expanding the Contrast Classes” (2020) for three reasons. The first is for DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-11

186  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism simplicity; there are numerous versions of pantheism and so for pragmatic reasons I must narrow the field in order to keep this chapter manageable. The second is that, in light of the first, it makes sense to choose a version of pantheism that is explored in the context of the axiology of theism literature. Dumsday’s chapter is the only place I know of where this occurs. Third, Dumsday takes the version he explicates to be closest to what religious pantheists actually hold and I’m most curious in exploring the axiology of worldviews that people actually believe (2020, 62–64). Dumsday takes his understanding of pantheism from T.L.S. Sprigge: The natural world the multiplicity of conscious beings is an illusion, or at least a mere presentation, given to itself by a single Absolute which may be called ‘God’ or at least plays something of the role of God for this point of view Salvation consists in consciously realizing one’s identity with this Absolute. The world of daily life, both physical nature and all its conscious inhabitants, are an illusion which one ultimate spiritual reality gives itself. Our salvation consists in our grasping the illusory nature of the world and of our separate existence and experiencing our identity with the One from which we were never really separate. This is the positive of Advaita Vedanta as elaborated by Sankara. It is also the view of Erwin Schordinger and in effect that of the almost forgotten but highly interesting, Christian evolutionary pantheist Allanson Picton. (Sprigge 1997, 194, quoted in Dumsday 2020, 64) Dumsday explains that: This version of pantheism, represented by a major school of Hindu thought, is itself open to multiple interpretations on several fronts […] I will also assume (in keeping with the standard interpretation of Advaita Vedanta doctrine) that the Absolute is to be conceived as nonpersonal – that it cannot literally be ascribed personhood, insofar as it exceeds our finite conceptual distinctions between the personal and the impersonal. (2020, 64) Finally, notice that this description of pantheism is supernatural (or at least non-natural). There might be versions of pantheism consistent with naturalism, but I focus on a religious version here which is believed by a significant number of people. While this description is brief, it should be sufficient to proceed with an axiological investigation of pantheism. However, before doing so, I wish to discuss the categories of axiological judgements.

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Pantheism 187

11.3 Pantheism and the Categories of Axiological Judgements It should be apparent that the judgments of wide/narrow and impersonal/ personal do not necessarily apply seamlessly to pantheism (Lougheed 2020a, 222–226). As Dumsday observes the distinction between impersonal and personal disintegrates if every object is part of the absolute and the absolute is part of every object (via transitivity) (2020, 65). Notice that this doesn’t just dissolve the distinction between impersonal and personal, but also between one person, some persons, and all persons. This is also true for the distinction between narrow and wide axiological judgements. If a lack of privacy is a disadvantage for an individual, then it is a disadvantage for every individual since every individual is identical to the universe. Likewise, judgements about one feature of the universe are judgements about every feature (Lougheed 2020a, 222). It’s unclear, then, whether the way that the axiological judgements are typically categorized is of any help in axiological assessments of pantheism. Another worry is that any individual value judgement turns out to necessarily affect the overall axiological judgement of the universe. For example, Dumsday writes that “if for instance I am awed by the vast grandeur of our galaxy, and (plausibly) interpret that response as indicative of some objective value possessed by our galaxy, then the fact that I am in some sense identical with the galaxy may mean that my own value-status is thereby heightened” (2020, 65). However, Dumsday also observes that “[o]n the other hand, I might reflect on the fact that in comparison with Reality itself I am merely an illusion, such that it would be a good thing for world overall (and for me?) were I finally to realize this illusion and thus rid the world of my strictly (strictly illusory) identity” (2020, 65). The entire value of the world appears to go up and down with such judgements. This explains why Sprigge says that “in its own way [such observations] levels all things either up or down to the same value, up if the world is seen as through and through equally divine, down if the world is seen as an illusion to be transcended in our quest for unity with the undifferentiated One of Sankara’s vision” (Sprigge 1997, 202, quoted in Dumsday 2020, 65). These considerations can be standardized as follows: (1) Everything that exists is identical to the Absolute So, (2) Every agent is identical with every good. (3) The value of every agent is increased by any and every good. (4) The value of agents is connected to overall world value (i.e., the existence of flourishing agents adds value to the world.)

188  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism Thus, (5) The existence of goods and flourishing agents increases the value of the world (Lougheed 2020a, 223–224). In light of this we might add the following to formulate an argument for pro-pantheism: (6) That an agent’s value is increased by any and every good is an additional separate value to that agent flourishing and the good existing itself. Therefore, (7) Worlds where pantheism is true are axiologically superior to worlds where it is false. (Lougheed 2020a, 224). But (7) does not follow from (1) to (6). We cannot conclude from this that a pantheistic world has a positive axiological status because a structurally similar argument can be used to establish the exact opposite conclusion. Consider: (1) Everything that exists is identical to the Absolute. So, (*2) Every agent is identical with every bad. (*3) The value of every agent is decreased by any and every bad. (*4) The value of agents is connected to overall world value (i.e., the existence of suffering agents decreases the value of the world). (*5) The existence of evils and suffering agents decreases the value of the world. (*6) That an agent’s value is decreased by every evil is an additional and separate disvalue to that agent flourishing and the bad existing itself. Therefore, (*7) Worlds where pantheism is true are axiologically inferior to worlds where it is false (Lougheed 2020a, 224–225). With respect to the fact that everything is identical to the Absolute, a key claim of pantheism, it appears impossible to defend either anti-pantheism or pro-pantheism. One way of responding to this is that we should be agnostics about the axiological status of pantheism. This does not mean

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Pantheism 189 axiological questions about pantheism are in principle unanswerable, but only that we don’t currently possess enough information to answer them. I am open to this possibility; however, I have stated elsewhere that I see little reason to be optimistic that there are lots to discover about pantheism that would clarify its axiological status and that remains my assessment (Lougheed 2020a, 225). On the other hand, this argument could show that we ought to be quietists regarding axiological assessments of pantheism. This is the view that such axiological questions about pantheism are indeed in principle unanswerable. While such an answer is tempting, a different way forward says that the above discussion only justifies neutralism about pantheism, the view that its axiological value is neutral (Lougheed 2020a, 225). Supposing the amount of good and evil in the world is (roughly) equivalent, one way of proceeding is to bracket the axiological status of the identity relation in pantheism and simply proceed to explore the value of pantheism apart from it (Lougheed 2020a, 226). This is the method that I have used below in exploring whether any of the arguments we’ve examined thus far can be appealed to in order to defend either pro-pantheism or anti-pantheism. Doing so makes it possible to explore the axiological status of pantheism without focussing on the axiology of the identity relation posited by it. I do not deny that assuming the amount of good and evil in the world is (roughly) equivalent is a significant assumption, but I will not focus on defending it here. I believe that one of the most promising ways with respect to making progress on the axiology of pantheism is to grant this assumption, bracket the identity relation, and proceed. I leave it as an open question whether there are better ways of inquiring into the axiological status of pantheism, in addition to questions about whether the method I pursue here is legitimate.

11.4  Ubuntu and Anti-Pantheism In this section I examine the main arguments for anti-theism and explore whether any of them can be used to defend anti-pantheism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. However, I will not spend time explicating the details of the arguments since this has already been done in numerous places throughout the book (e.g., Chapter Three and Chapter Nine). In this section I tentatively conclude that none of the current arguments for anti-theism can be leveraged to defend anti-pantheism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. 11.4.1  The Meaningful Life Argument In order for the Meaningful Life Argument to successfully establish anti-pantheism it would have to be shown that, at least for certain individuals, their lives would lose meaning in worlds where pantheism is true.

190  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism This would minimally establish personal anti-pantheism, and depending on the value of meaning, wide personal anti-pantheism. However, the original formulation of the Meaningful Life Argument mentions goods like privacy, autonomy, and understanding as being lost on monotheism. So, in order to discover whether this general argument can be applied to pantheism, we need to know whether the specific goods connected to meaning are lost on pantheism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. I examine these goods in what follows. 2 11.4.2  The Privacy Argument In Chapter Three I argued that the Privacy Argument for anti-theism is much more difficult to establish if ubuntu is true. If the information about us is used to promote harmony and communality, something a perfect being like God would do, then a loss of privacy isn’t bad (3.3). This assessment does not change when applied to pantheism. Indeed, the argument becomes even less plausible. For on pantheism, every individual person is one with the universe and the universe is one with every person. In this sense, then, there are no individual persons. As such it makes little sense to speak of an individual losing privacy (Lougheed 2020a, 226–227). So, not only is a loss of privacy (from God) not bad on ubuntu, but it’s difficult to see how humans have a genuine loss of privacy on pantheism in the first place. 11.4.3  The Dignity Argument An important claim in the dignity argument is that God creates humans, and necessarily creates them for her own purposes (3.4). This argument is more difficult to run on Metz’s relational understanding of ubuntu since, on his view, humans have dignity given their capacity for friendliness, not given their ability to pursue particular ends (3.4.2). Moving from monotheism to pantheism doesn’t appear to make this argument any easier to establish on an ubuntu ethic. On pantheism, we cannot say that a distinct entity created God for her own purposes, since on pantheism the divine just is the universe. In light of this, it makes little sense to speak of individual persons being created for God’s purposes. There are no genuinely individual persons. Likewise, any purposes of the universe (if this even makes sense on pantheism), are also the purposes of every individual since every individual is identical to the universe. There are no real individuals on this view of the universe (Lougheed 2020a, 229–230). 11.4.4  The Sacrifice Argument Recall that for the Sacrifice Argument to succeed it has to be the case that when an agent makes a sacrifice for another agent that her well-being is

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Pantheism 191 irrevocably compromised. This is an irrevocable harm. In stating why this argument doesn’t easily apply to either secular versions or religious versions of ubuntu (3.5; 7.3.4), it becomes apparent why it can’t establish anti-pantheism either. For while on ubuntu individuals do not view themselves as separate individuals who can thrive apart from the community, on pantheism there literally are no separate individuals. An individual cannot sacrifice herself for another individual on pantheism since every individual is identical with the universe and hence every individual is identical to every individual. 11.4.5  The Complete Understanding Argument In Chapter Three I explained that although knowledge and understanding aren’t typically thought to be intrinsically invaluable, that there is a plausible way of interpreting ubuntu that allows one to say that they are indeed intrinsically valuable (3.6.2). Let’s assume that this interpretation works and so there is a way that the Complete Understanding Argument can still be applied to monotheism, even on the assumption that ubuntu is true. Can it also be applied to pantheism? On the one hand, a pantheistic universe may be difficult for us to understand. As I will discuss below (10.6), a pantheistic universe does fly in the face of much of our experience of the world. However, for the Complete Understanding Argument to apply to pantheism it has to be the case that the universe is more difficult for individuals to understand. But on pantheism, there are no individuals as such. For I am identical with the universe. 11.4.6  Sub-conclusion: Ubuntu and Anti-Pantheism In this section I have argued that none of the Privacy, Dignity, Sacrifice, nor Complete Understanding arguments can be successfully leveraged to establish anti-pantheism. This implies that the Meaningful Life Argument, at least in its current form, also cannot establish anti-pantheism. This is because we’ve now discovered that the goods typically associated with meaning (at least in this argument) either still obtain on pantheism or simply aren’t important enough that losing them makes the world significantly worse. As it stands, then, novel arguments are needed to defend anti-pantheism.

11.5  Ubuntu and Pro-Pantheism In this section I examine the main arguments for pro-theism and explore whether they can be applied to pantheism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true.

192  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism 11.5.1  The Infinite Value Argument The Infinite Value Argument appears to apply, at least in some way to pantheism. Consider that William Mander explains that: Historically the majority of pantheists have regarded the universe as Infinite, metaphysically perfect, necessarily existent, and eternal (or some subset thereof) and – taking these attributes as the characteristic marks of divinity – that has formed one very important reason for thinking that the universe itself is in fact God. (2020) This description is consistent enough with the reasons typically offered for thinking that the monotheistic God is infinitely valuable, that the argument applies to Pantheism too. But the application is slightly more complicated when considered from the perspective of ubuntu. For example, recall that in Chapter Four I argued that this argument is consistent with an African ethic that focusses on life force or vitality (4.2.3). This is because the monotheistic God is the being with the highest amount of life force. On this view each distinct entity, both animate and inanimate, contains a certain amount of life force. The extent to which these considerations can be applied to pantheism is an open question. On the one hand, the fact that everything contains life force seems to cohere well with the pantheistic idea that what appear to be distinct entities are really identical to the universe. They are both similarly unifying. However, on the other hand, while the African concept of life force is attributed to everything, and is in some sense unifying, it still very much the case that there are distinct entities in indigenous African thought. Humans are not thought to be identical to God just because they both possess life force. More comparative work needs to be done in order to give a definitive answer regarding life force and pantheism in the context of the Infinite Value Argument. More important is whether the Infinite Value Argument can apply to pantheism on Metz’s relational ethic and to personhood accounts of ubuntu. With respect to the former, again the fact that each individual is really identical to the universe complicates the potential application. For the focus of rightness as friendliness is that people ought to promote solidarity with others and also strive to identify with them. But if person A is identical to the universe and person B is identical to the universe, then person A is also identical with person B (via transitivity). This implies that if person A relates well with person B, there is a sense in which she is just relating well with herself. The reason I said this argument applies to monotheism is because God could be understood as the perfect embodiment of friendliness (4.2.4). Yet on pantheism, there is no distinct God that can be said to be relating well with other individuals. I’ve explored

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Pantheism 193 the idea that Metz’s theory is consistent with duties to oneself. If this is the case, then even if relating well with another person is just relating well with oneself on pantheism, the duty still makes sense. Perhaps all of one’s relationships are really just interactions with oneself on pantheism. Whether this can be understood as infinite or maximal or perfect in the way that the monotheistic God’s interactions with humans are, is an open question. The answer to it will dictate whether the Infinite Value Argument can apply to pantheism on the assumption that Metz’s relational ethic is true. While I denied that this argument could apply to personhood accounts of ubuntu, I suggested a similar one could be formulated based on final value (4.2.5). However, I think that all of the same questions about identity just stated in reference to friendliness as rightness will also apply here too. As it stands, then, it’s doubtful that the Infinite Value Argument applies seamlessly to pantheism, on the assumption that an ubuntu ethic is true. Whether there are modifications that can be made to the argument and applied to plausible interpretations of pantheism I leave as an open question. 11.5.2  The Argument from No Gratuitous Evil I’ve explained that many monotheists take God’s existence to logically entail that there are no instances of gratuitous evil. While there might be disagreement between different worldviews on what would count as a gratuitous evil, there is little doubt that any plausible interpretation of ubuntu will agree that a guarantee of no gratuitous evil is a great good. The question now before us is whether pantheism offers the same guarantee. In examining this same question, but apart from the context of ubuntu, I concluded that “[p]antheism doesn’t appear to offer any such guarantee against the existence of gratuitous evil. There is no omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being whose very attributes ensure that there can be no gratuitous evil” (Lougheed 2020a, 233). However, I believe that my assessment was too quick. For while it’s clear that if pantheism is true, there are instances of evil, it’s less clear that the apparently gratuitous ones are in fact gratuitous. Mander reminds us that: Spinoza […] regards both error and evil as distortions that result from the fragmentary view of finite creatures; phenomena real enough to the finite beings who experience them but which would disappear in the widest and final vision of God […] if we could see the world as God does, as the perfectly harmonious embodiment of the logos, we would recognise how its apparent defects in fact contribute to the goodness of the whole (2020).3 Such a view is posited to show that what appears evil is not really evil, because otherwise God (i.e., the universe) would contain evil which is

194  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism impossible. But notice that it is much stronger to deny that evil really exists than to deny that the apparent instances of evil we see are gratuitous. It seems even easier for the pantheist to establish the latter. For the claim isn’t that if we could see the perfect harmony of the universe we wouldn’t consider the apparent evil a genuine evil. The claim only has to be that what appears to be a gratuitous evil is not in fact gratuitous because it contributes to the perfect harmony of the universe. Whether this strategy is successful largely depends on whether it is consistent with the version of pantheism I described at the beginning of the chapter. As it stands, there is at least some positive reason to think that the Argument from No Gratuitous Evil applies to pantheism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. 11.5.3  The Morally Good Agents Argument In Chapter Nine I suggested that we aren’t in the right epistemic situation to know whether the Morally Good Agents Argument applies to the ultimate because we don’t yet have enough details about the ultimate (9.4.3). We don’t know whether the ultimate is personal or impersonal or perhaps even somehow transcends those categories. However, with respect to pantheism, it’s tempting to say that we do indeed have enough information to make an accurate judgement. This is because a key difference between the type of monotheism affirmed in the Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, and the pantheism explored in this chapter is that the former is personal while the latter is impersonal (e.g., Levine 1994). However, Mander informs us that things are far more complicated (2020). Not all pantheists deny the claim that God is personal. The Stoics believed God was the mind of the world and that the cosmos was her body (e.g., Baltzly 2003; Mander 2020). Mander explains that on this view, “[l]ike a vast biological individual, to them God was a conscious rational being, exercising providence over life and to whom we might approach in prayer” (2020). Regarding one of the best-known versions of pantheism as found in the work of Spinoza, he writes that: Spinoza’s God is an “infinite intellect,” (Ethics 2p11c) all knowing, (2p3) and capable of loving both himself – and us, insofar as we are part of his perfection. (5p35c) And if the mark of a personal being is that it is one towards which we can entertain personal attitudes, then we should note too that Spinoza recommends amor intellectualist dei (the intellectual love of God) as the supreme good for man (5p33). (Mander 2020) Here it should be observed that there is an important difference between personal and agency. There may well be an important sense in which

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Pantheism 195 these versions of pantheism are personal and yet lack the relevant agency required for it to be applied to the argument. In order to apply to the Morally Good Agents Argument, the pantheistic God has to be able to act in the world so as to add value to states of affairs. Yet again, there is some reason to think this is the case on at least some forms of pantheism. The Stoics have God as ‘exercising providence.’ Mander also explains another model of pantheism that has the requisite level of agency as found in the work of Timothy Sprigge (2005) and Gustav Fechner (1946). He writes that: Timothy Sprigge who maintains that that the only conceivable form of reality consists in streams of experience, such as we know ourselves to be, all of which must be thought of as included together within a single all-embracing experience; which we may call God or the Absolute […] Against the idea that God is some type of all-embracing spirit or person it is often complained that this would undermine the autonomous personhood of finite individuals; for can one person be part of another? Fechner suggests as a model for understanding this the way in which our different sense modalities (sight, smell, touch, etc), each inaccessible to each other, combine together into one unified consciousness. (Fechner 1946, 144) While to extend such a model beyond the merely receptive to the active aspects of personhood, we might think of the way in which the agency of an organisation is exercised through the agency of its individual members. (Mander 2020) Here is another model of pantheism where agency is clearly exercised. One might rightly wonder whether this model can be applied to the Morally Good Agents Argument given all of the evil enacted by individual people. In deciding whether this objection succeeds, it’s worth noting that it might not be relevantly different from the standard problem of evil levelled against monotheism. Remember, the question here isn’t whether pantheism is in fact true, but it is instead about the value impact of pantheism on the assumption it is true.4 In light of this discussion it’s fair to conclude that there are some interpretations of pantheism that do seem to posit the relevant kind of agency necessary for the Morally Good Agents Argument. If this is right, then similar reasoning to that found in Chapter Four applies here too, and the argument would indeed receive a positive evaluation on ubuntu (4.4). 11.5.4  The Cosmic Justice Argument In Chapter Four I suggested that the Cosmic Justice Argument only holds on ubuntu if and only if the type of justice ensured by God is consistent

196  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism with ubuntu (4.5). I then argued that it wasn’t clear whether cosmic justice was ensured on Traditional African Religion (7.3.1). In exploring its application to pantheism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true, one thing that remains the same is that this argument will only work if the justice guaranteed by pantheism is consistent with the understanding of justice as had on ubuntu. Is there reason to think that this type of justice is guaranteed on pantheism? I have dismissed the idea that there could be cosmic justice on pantheism because there is not a unique individual God who could guarantee it. I also argued that strongly held intuitions about individual justice do not make sense on pantheism. However, here again I think I may have been too quick (Lougheed 2020a, 242). For as stated above there is reason to hold that there are no instances of gratuitous evil on pantheism (10.5.2). Part of the reasoning for this was that what might appear gratuitous is actually not when viewed from the perspective of the entire universe. Along these lines, we might also say that there is cosmic justice in a pantheistic universe since such conceptions typically conceive of the universe or the divine as wholly good. Again, we might not be able to see how there could be cosmic justice unless viewing the entire universe as a whole. Likewise, given what was just said about agency, the sort of agency needed to ensure cosmic justice might well exist if the universe is pantheistic (10.5.4). I don’t claim this to be definitive, but it begins to suggest that there may well be ways to apply the Cosmic Justice Argument to pantheism. 11.5.5  The Afterlife Argument Pantheism doesn’t typically posit the type of afterlife one finds in the monotheistic traditions. In order for the Afterlife Argument to apply to it, the afterlife in question must be one in which the individual retains personal identity throughout the afterlife (4.5). While pantheists sometimes understand the afterlife as a kind of going back to nature, where one’s body decays, becomes soil, and remains part of the earth, this is simply not the version of the afterlife regarding the Afterlife Argument. As it stands, the benefits associated with the afterlife only obtain if personal identity obtains. So, this argument does not apply to pantheism. However, this still leaves open the possibility of constructing an argument for pro-pantheism on the basis of its own conception of the afterlife. 11.5.6  The Relationship with God Argument The Relationship with God Argument focusses on the benefits that are achieved through being in a relationship with an all-loving being (4.7). Here again the difference between personal and impersonal appears important. The goods associated with a relationship with God are had

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Pantheism 197 because God is personal. So, on the one hand, this makes it very difficult to see how this argument could apply to pantheism, which is impersonal. On the other hand, we have seen that there are conceptions of pantheism that clearly posit agency. While it’s doubtful that humans can have the same type of relationship with an impersonal agent as they can with a personal agent, there may well still be benefits to such relationships. There’s also something strange with thinking of an individual person as having a relationship with God on pantheism. For on pantheism persons just are identical with the universe. Thus, while the current version of the Relationship with God Argument cannot apply to pantheism, there might be other goods associated with recognizing that one is identical with the universe. 11.5.7  Sub-conclusion: Ubuntu and Pro-Pantheism This section explored whether the current arguments for pro-theism could be leveraged to defend pro-pantheism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. I concluded that there are versions of the Morally Good Agents Argument and the Argument from no Gratuitous Evil that both apply to pantheism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. The Cosmic Justice Argument possibly applies, though more work is required to make the application. I also concluded that in their current forms, the Infinite Value Argument, the Afterlife Argument, and the Relationship with God Argument do not apply seamlessly to pantheism. Whether successful alternatives to these arguments could be formulated remains to be seen.

11.6 The Inconsistent with Reality Argument for Anti-Pantheism In this final section I outline a unique argument for anti-pantheism and explore whether it is successful on the assumption that ubuntu is true. 11.6.1  The Inconsistent with Reality Argument I begin by stating the standardized version of the argument: (1) All else being equal, it is better for human experience to be consistent with reality. (2) If pantheism is true, then human experience is inconsistent with reality. Therefore, (3) All else being equal, it is better that pantheism be false (Lougheed 2020a, 235).

198  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism The idea behind (1) is really just that it is better to form true beliefs than false beliefs. It is not only better epistemically speaking, but also practically. I need to be able to rely on the testimony of others to function in the world. I need to be able to trust my senses when physically navigating the world (Lougheed 2020a, 235–236). There are numerous ways this premise could be defended but I will not spend more time on it as I think it is the least controversial premise in the argument. Rather, (2) is the premise that we need to spend more time explaining. Here’s a sub-argument that seeks to establish it: (4) If humans experience the world as phenomenologically unique individuals, then on pantheism their experience is inconsistent with reality. (5) Humans experience the world as phenomenologically unique individuals. So, (2) If pantheism is true, then human experience is inconsistent with reality (Lougheed 2020a, 236). (5) is the key to defending this sub-argument, and I hope that it is intuitively obvious. We each experience the world as phenomenologically unique individuals. While we cannot access the minds of other people (or perhaps even prove there are such minds!), we have ample evidence, from testimony, that this is the case. If it turned out that there aren’t other individual minds that have unique experiences, this discovery would shatter our experience and conception of the world. Such a discovery would at least make things worse for me (Lougheed 2020a, 237). 11.6.2  Evaluation of the Inconsistent with Reality Argument In order for this argument to succeed, the details of the version of pantheism in question matter greatly. Recall that in discussing agency on pantheism that one analogy suggests that “we might think of the way in which the agency of an organisation is exercised through the agency of its individual members” (Mander 2020). On this understanding of pantheism, it still might be expected that individuals do indeed experience the world as phenomenologically unique, even if there is a sense in which they are identical with the universe. To make the argument succeed, it would have to be shown that discovering you are identical with the universe, part of a larger whole, is inconsistent with reality. Supposing this challenge can be overcome we still need to know how it would be evaluated from the perspective of ubuntu. On an indigenous

Ubuntu and the Axiology of Pantheism 199 African worldview, it turns out this argument may have even more force. This is because testimony is not considered to be a legitimate means of arriving at genuine knowledge (see Metz forthcoming). In order for an agent to genuinely know something, she needs to perceive it for herself. If an individual’s unique perception of the world turned out to be completely wrong, this would perhaps be even a more crushing blow to the person with an indigenous African worldview.

11.7 Conclusion In this chapter I examined whether some of the main arguments for pro-theism and anti-theism can be expanded to apply to pantheism (instead of just monotheism), on the assumption that ubuntu is true. With respect to anti-theism, I concluded that none of the Privacy Argument, the Dignity Argument, the Sacrifice Argument, and the Complete Understanding Argument can be successfully leveraged to establish anti-pantheism. This further implies that the Meaningful Life Argument, at least in its current form, also cannot establish anti-pantheism. Regarding pro-theism, I concluded there are versions of the Morally Good Agents Argument and the Argument from no Gratuitous Evil that both apply to pantheism. The Cosmic Justice Argument possibly applies, though more work is required to make the application. I also suggested that in their current forms, the Infinite Value Argument, the Afterlife Argument, and the Relationship with God Argument do not apply seamlessly to pantheism, on the assumption that ubuntu is true. To conclude the chapter, I explored a unique argument for anti-pantheism, the Inconsistent with Reality Argument. However, I suggested that there may be versions of pantheism that need not deny that humans have unique phenomenological experiences. Yet inasmuch they do, the argument may well be more devasting if an indigenous African worldview is true. This is because on such a worldview genuine knowledge is only had via direct perception, not testimony. This chapter, along with Chapter Nine, are the most exploratory and tentative of the book. Further explorations of the arguments would include examining the scope of the arguments in question, something I typically refrained from doing for the sake of simplicity. Additionally, attempts could be made to add more detail to the potential modifications I only gestured at in various places.

Notes 1. While much of the structure of this chapter follows the Lougheed 2020a, Ch. 8, the aims of this chapter in bringing pantheism into conversation with ubuntu are unique. 2. I make a similar methodological point in Lougheed 2020a, 226. 3. Interestingly, Leibniz makes a similar point in his Theodicy.

200  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism 4. Indeed, atheists who endorse the problem of evil as a reason for their atheism may well be committed to pro-theism because they implicitly accept the idea that the world would contain much less if in fact God existed. See Penner and Arbour 2018.

Bibliography Baltzly, D. (2003). “Stoic Pantheism.” Sophia 42(2): 3–34. Dumsday, Travis. (2020). “The Axiology of Theism: Expanding the Contrast Class.” In Kirk Lougheed (ed.), Four Views on the Axiology of Theism: What Difference Does God Make? London: Bloomsbury. pp. 59–78 Fechner, G. (1946). Religion of a Scientist. Selections from Fechner. Edited and translated by Walter Lowrie, New York: Pantheon Books. Levine, M.P. (1994). Pantheism; A Non-Theistic Concept of Deity. London: Routledge Lougheed, Kirk. (2020a). The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Mander, William. (2020). “Pantheism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . Penner, Myron A. and Benjamin H. Arbour. (2018). “Arguments from Evil and Evidence for Pro- Theism.” In Klaas J. Kraay (ed.), Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge. pp.192–202. Sprigge, T.L.S. (1997). “Pantheism.” Monist 80: 191–217. __________. (2006). The God of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

12 Conclusion The Future of Global Axiological Investigations

12.1 Introduction This book marks the first attempt to bring contemporary African philosophy in general, and ideas from ubuntu in particular, into conversation with ideas found in the axiology of theism literature. It is thus fundamentally a work in comparative philosophy. While much more remains to be said, I hope that I have pushed the debate forward in new and exciting ways. I especially hope that I have shown readers from the Western tradition that there is much we have to gain from interacting with the growing field of African philosophy. To conclude I’m first going to highlight the most important conclusions from Parts II, III, and IV of the book in order to give the reader a bird’s eye view of the main themes that emerged. After that I’ll explore what we learned about the scope of intersubjective agreement and disagreement, which was one of the main motivations for this project. I’ll then point to some promising future directions.

12.2  Main Conclusions Here are the major discoveries made in each section of the book. Part II: Ubuntu and the Axiology of Theism •

• • • •

Anti-theism is more difficult to establish on the assumption that ubuntu is true, than from the original Western perspective in which it is first discussed. Ubuntu values relational goods more than intrinsic goods. The goods associated with anti-theism tend to be intrinsic. Pro-theism is easier to establish than anti-theism on the assumption that ubuntu. The goods associated with pro-theism tend to be relational.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003141747-12

202  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism Part III: The Axiology of Ubuntu • • • • • •

• •

The Reliance Argument is the strongest argument for anti-ubuntu. Wide Personal versions of anti-ubuntu are difficult to establish. There are sound arguments for personal versions of ubuntu based on reconciliation, shared identity, solidarity, and consensus. Pro-ubuntu appears easier to establish than anti-ubuntu. Secular ubuntu is axiologically superior to supernatural ubuntu when evaluated using the current arguments in the axiology of theism literature. Disadvantages associated with Traditional African Religion show that secular versions of ubuntu are axiologically superior to ­religious versions. Secular versions of ubuntu are axiologically superior to religious versions. The advantages of TAR can probably be had in atheist worlds (where the disadvantages are simultaneously avoided). This is some evidence for the conclusion that the very best worlds are atheistic. Part IV: Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism

• •

Pro-ultimism is easier to establish than anti-ultimism on the assumption that ubuntu is true. Pro-pantheism is easier to establish than anti-pantheism on the assumption that ubuntu is true.

12.3  Summing It Up Pro-theism appears easier to establish than anti-theism on an ubuntu ethic. When examining the axiology of ubuntu itself, it became clear that it’s easier to establish pro-ubuntu than anti-ubuntu. Furthermore, it became clear that secular versions are axiologically superior to supernatural versions. So, one major conclusion of this book is that, when evaluating ubuntu, we should want to be in an atheistic world where a secular version of ubuntu is true. More work needs to be done to know whether we should wish such a world to also be naturalistic. More comparative work is also needed regarding how other views like ultimism and pantheism compare axiologically directly with ubuntu. My evaluation of them in this book focussed on evaluating them within the context of the current axiology of theism literature.

12.4 Intersubjective Disagreement and the Future of Global Axiological Investigations Recall that much of the motivation for writing this book was to explore a claim I made elsewhere about widespread intersubjective agreement

Conclusion 203 about axiological judgments (1.4). This claim was immediately put to the test in Part II, when we discovered that anti-theism is indeed more difficult to establish on the assumption that ubuntu is true. Furthermore, it was noted that there is an important distinction between personal intrinsic goods and personal relational goods. The latter are more valuable than the former on a worldview that affirms ubuntu. However, this might not necessarily be the case for Western worldviews. While there is certainly some agreement between African Communitarianism and Western worldviews, I have shown that there are very real ethical disagreements that clearly impact how one assesses the current arguments in the axiology of theism. My previous contention about widespread ethical disagreement was false. Or at the very least we know the scope of ‘widespread’ is not as broad as I originally thought (see Lougheed 2020a, 17–22). Note that there is even more work to be done in exploring the extent of ethical disagreement just based on the topics discussed in this book. Consider that in Parts III and IV, I proceeded on the assumption that an ubuntu worldview is true. However, a further comparative study would examine the claims made based on a Western ethic. Furthermore, talk of a unified ‘Western ethic’ is problematic. I submit that taking time to evaluate the arguments laid out in these sections from different specific Western ethical theories will almost certainly yield different results. The only way to confirm this is to actually conduct the comparative study. Finally, while I have introduced African philosophy to the Western reader, this book hardly constitutes a work in global philosophy by just discussing two different traditions. There are many more philosophical traditions that Western philosophers (who make up most of the world’s professional philosophers) have longed ignored. Further comparative axiological studies need to include these other traditions, particularly those from the East. If it turns out there really is a lack of intersubjective agreement in ethics, then we need to work a lot harder to discover which ethical theory is true in particular, and which worldview is true in general. This is something this book has explicitly not been concerned with examining. However, inasmuch as this work shows that there is significant ethical disagreement in our judgments about the axiological status of different worldviews, it only further highlights the need for us to discover which of these worldviews is in fact true. In spending this time on axiological questions, then, one lesson is that I may have reinforced the importance of answering existential questions. This means Western philosophers should pay more attention to Traditional African Religion and also to the various versions of ubuntu that are on offer. Further comparative work between Traditional African Religion and Western religions may help us discover which, if any, is in fact true. Likewise, further comparative work between African communitarian ethics and various Western ethical theories may help us discover which of the ones on offer, if any, is in fact true.1

204  Ubuntu and Axiological Explorations Beyond Monotheism As I stated in the introduction, it’s not wrong in itself for Western philosophers to focus on ideas found in the Western tradition (Chapter 1). Indeed, there are probably a plethora of historical and sociological reasons for why this is the case. It’s natural enough to focus on the tradition that drew one to philosophy in the first place, in addition to staying in the tradition in which one was originally trained. However, not only would it be morally wrong to stifle inquiry into other traditions, but it would also be epistemically harmful. It is extremely likely that we in the West are missing out on important insights by restricting our philosophical canon to the Western tradition. I hope that this study shows the Western reader that there is much we can learn from engaging with the African philosophical tradition in particular, and other non-Western philosophical traditions in general.

Note 1. Of course, there are many more traditions that should be included here that have not been my focus, especially Eastern ones.

Index

Bourget, D. 3 Bujo, B. 30n24, 83, 153n12 Chalmers, D. 3, 13n5 Christian (also Christianity) 3, 30n4, 30n13, 123–4, 186 Communality 18, 19, 24–7, 61–2, 73, 84, 92, 190 Consequentialism (also Consequentialist) 8, 88–9 Davison, Scott A. 57–8 Deep time, 169, 170, 172–3, 176–7, 183; deep future, 170 Deontology (also Deontological) 8, 20 Dolamo, Ramathate 16–17 Doyle, T. 41, 54n9 Dragos, C. 62, 13n7, 54n13 Draper, P. 3 Dumsday, T. 185–7, 200 Etieyibo, E. 16, 23–4 Gyekye, K. 13n11, 18, 30n14, 31n25, 54n5, 83–4, 142 Harmony (also Harmonious, Harmoniously, J) 25–6, 28–9, 43, 63, 76, 91, 101–2, 102, 140–1, 151, 190, 194 Hendricks, P. 54n7, 54n17, 156 Ikuenobe, P. 19, 30n9, 101, 140 Imafidon, E. 138, 140–1, 153n8 Islam 17, 48, 124 Judaism 16, 48 Judeo-Christian 3–5, 7, 44, 48, 60, 73, 101, 117–18, 122, 133n6, 149, 194 Jugira, A.M. 118

Kahane, G. 5, 38, 40, 51, 54n2, 156–64, 164n1 Kantianism 24, 31n34 Korsgaard, C. 58 Kraay, K.J. 6, 7, 13n6, 13n7, 13n9, 54n13, 62, 69n2 Lewis, D. 5–6 Lougheed, K. 8, 9, 13n9, 31n36, 37– 8, 40, 42–6, 48, 52–3, 54n1, 54n6, 54n7, 54n8, 54n11, 54n12, 55n18, 63, 69, 70n3, 79–80, 89, 96, 99n2, 99n3, 126–7, 131, 133n4, 133n8, 136, 143, 156–8, 160–1, 164, 173–6, 178–83, 187–90, 193, 196–99, 203, 204n2 Magesa, L. 118–20, 135, 152n1, 152n3, 153n7, 153n12, 118 Mandela, N. 95, 102 Mander, W. 185, 192–5, 198 Mbiti, J. 30n6, 30n7, 118, 120–3, 129, 135, 137–8, 150, 151, 153n5 Menkiti I. 18–19, 30n7, 30n15, 30n16, 30n18, 83 121 Metz, T. 9, 11, 13n11, 15, 24–8, 30n4, 30n5, 30n17, 30n21, 30n22, 30n23, 31n30, 31n31, 31n32, 31n33, 31n34, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 49–50, 54n3, 54n4, 54n5, 54n10, 54n15, 55n19, 59, 76, 83–4, 86, 92, 93, 99n6, 101, 104–8, 114n3, 133n9, 139–40, 144, 153n6, 153n10, 153n12, 199 Mill, J.S. 77, 81 Molefe, M. 18, 29, 30n7, 30n8, 30n9, 30n13, 30n15, 30n18, 30n20, 30n21, 30n23, 30n28, 31n35, 31n36, 76–8, 82–4, 93, 111, 139–40, 153n10

206  Index Murove, M. F. 24, 31n29 Nagel, T. 37–8, 31n27 Ngcoya, M. 23, 31n27 Nichols, R. 3 Nkondo, G.M. 39 Nkulu-N’Sengha, M. 139, 153n8 Oppy, G. 48–9 Paris, P.J. 24, 26, 69, 145–6 Pascal’s Wager 5 Penner, M. A. 38, 40, 48, 54n2, 63, 200n4 Relationality 18–20, 22, 24, 27–8, 31n34, 41, 58, 60–2, 98, 116, 177

Schellenberg, J.L. 3, 13n8, 67, 169–73, 175–79, 183 Shutte, A. 16, 21 Spinoza 193–4 Sprigge, T.L.S. 186–7, 195 Stalnaker, R. 5–6 Tempels, P. 13n8, 69n1 Tooley, M. 13n8, 160 Tutu, D. 16, 20, 24, 26, 30n10, 30n14, 46, 102 Utilitarianism 24, 31n34 Wiredu, K. 10–2, 30n12, 31n25, 31n28, 54n5, 54n14, 84, 89–90, 99n8, 99n9, 110, 111–2, 114n5, 114n7, 121, 123–4, 142 Wood, Allen 9, 13n10