UAW Incorporated: The Triumph of Capital 1244775894, 9781244775893

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UAW INCORPORATED: THE TRIUMPH OF CAPITAL VOLUME I By Thomas F. Adams

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY History 2010

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ABSTRACT UAW INCORPORATED: THE TRIUMPH OF CAPITAL By Thomas F. Adams

This study examines the transformation of the United Auto Workers from a membership-driven labor organization into a capital-driven, business organization. The transformation of the UAW began in 1980 and was complete by the turn-of-the-century. The establishment ofjoint labor-management committees facilitated changes in bargaining trends, union structures and industrial relations in the auto sector. The UAW was transformed by the implementation of a series of joint labor-management programs that circumvented long-established labor contracts and the UAW Constitution. The preservation of the union's organizational bureaucracy and its capital resources became the essential purpose of the UAW. The New Deal industrial relations system in the auto sector was replaced by a corporate partnership. The UAW and General Motors incorporated joint nonprofit human resource corporations that established and administered working conditions, attendance policy, welfare benefits and healthcare trust funds. This peculiar industrial relations model is called, "UAW Inc." The UAW became a labor organization that didn't need members.

Copyright by Thomas F. Adams 2010

Dedicated to the memory of my beloved sister Pam.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not have been possible without the patience and support of my wife Terry, and our children Bryan and Jamie. Many people have assisted me in this project. I am ever indebted to my dissertation directors, David Bailey and Mark Kornbluh for their patience and understanding. Their constant encouragement and intellectual support gave me the confidence necessary to complete this work. Everyone on my dissertation committee strengthened my resolve to continue this study. I also appreciate the support from Neil Leighton, Nora Faires and Thodosia Robertson. They have all taught me invaluable lessons about the craft of history. . This dissertation is a collaborative project that included research assistance, the exchange of ideas and research materials with many friends and colleagues. Dick Danjin is a friend, mentor and a valuable resource of knowledge about inner workings of the leadership of the International UAW. I wish to thank Bill Hanline and Allan Nielsen for introducing me to the corporate nature of the modern UAW. Their insight, the countless discussions and research assistance was invaluable. The encouragement from Dave Yettaw, Dean Braid, Henry Kraus, Sol Dollinger and Victor Reuther sustained me through the rough patches on this journey. I received assistance from a host of people who remain unnamed. I cannot mention them all here, but many touched this project and have my sincere thanks. Finally, I must thank Joe Oldeck for his sage advice and guidance that set me free to travel this path. I've learned valuable lessons from everyone along the way—both good and bad.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures

x

Introduction

1

Chapter 1 The Study of American Industrial Labor History

42

Chapter 2 The Requisite System

81

Chapter 3 The Vanguard

106

Chapter 4 Buick Local 599

170

Chapter 5 GM-UAW Corporate Culture

215

Chapter 6 Human Resources Incorporated

262

Chapter 7 Dissent, Reform, Conformity

338

Chapter 8 UAW Inc.: The New Direction

358

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A International Union, UAW Documents Parti 1939 Preamble

371 371

Part II

1980 Preamble

373

Part III

1974 International Strike Fund

375

Part IV

1980 OEC Fund Strike Insurance

376

PartV

1989 OEC Fund Strike Insurance

377

Part VI

1995 General Fund Strike Insurance

378

Part VII

2002 Emergency Operations Fund

379

Part VIII

2006 OEC Fund

380

Appendix B GM-UAW Collective Bargaining Agreements Parti 1940 National Agreement

381 381

Part II PartllA PartUB

1973 National Agreement Health and Safety Quality of Work Life..

381 381 387

Part III PartlllA PartHIB PartHIC

1982 National Agreement Quality of Work Life Job Security Funding

389 389 391 396

Part IV PartlVA PartlVB PartlVC PartlVD PartlVE Part IVF PartlVG Part IVH

1984 National Agreement Quality of Work Life Quality of Work Life Joint Activities Health and Safety Funding Attendance Procedure Substance Abuse Tuition Assistance Plan

398 398 399 400 405 408 409 410 413

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PartlVJ PartlVK PartlVL PartlVM PartlVN PartlVP PartlVQ PartlVR

JOBS Program JOBS Program JOBS Program Job Security JOBS Funding Growth and Opportunity Funding Paid Education Leave

414 420 425 426 430 431 434 435

PartV PartVA PartVB PartVC PartVD PartVE PartVF PartVG PartVH Part VJ PartVK PartVL Part VM

1987 National Agreement JOBS Program JOBS Program Job Security Quality of Work Life Joint Activities Joint Skill and Training Health and Safety.. JOBS Program Paid Education Leave Product Quality Quality Network Joint Activities Representatives

436 436 442 447 449 451 456 458 461 466 467 469 470

Part VI Part VIA PartVIB Part VIC PartVID Part VIE Part VIF

1990 National Agreement Human Resource Development Attendance Joint Activities Health and Safety Quality Network Joint Program Representatives

471 471 473 475 480 489 492

Part VII PartVIIA PartVIIB

1993 National Agreement Quality Network Product Quality

495 495 499

Part VIII

1996 National Agreement

501

Part IX PartlXA

1999 National Agreement Quality Network

506 506

PartX PartXA PartXB PartXC Part XD PartXE

2003 National Agreement Quality Network Quality Network Quality Network Activities Quality Network Training Joint Funds

516 516 518 520 524 527

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Appendix C Joint UAW-GM Corporate Entities Part I Retraining and Employment Program

528 528

Part II

Retraining and Employment Program

529

Part III

Skill and Training Program

530

Part IV

Skill and Training Program

533

PartlVA

Name & Address Change

534

Part V

Human Resource Center

535

Part VI

Human Resource Center

536

Part VII

Center for Human Resources

538

Part VIII

Center for Human Resources

541

Part IX

Center for Human Resources

542

Appendix D GM Corporation Documents Part I Bargaining Actions

543 543

Part II

Influencing UAW Leadership

546

Part III

1984 Negotiations Objectives

548

Appendix E US Federal Government Documents Parti UAW-GM Joint Funds

550 550

Appendix F Center for Human Resources Documents Part I Quality Network Action Strategies

563 563

Appendix G Table 1: GM-UAW: Sales, Market Share, Employment and Membership Data

567

Bibliography

568 ix

List of Figures

Figure 1 International UAW Structure

92

Figure 2 1982 Joint Program Structure

270

Figure 3 1984 Joint Program Structure

283

Figure 4 1987 Joint Program Structure

315

Figure 5 1990 Joint Program Structure

324

Figure 6 1993 Joint Program Structure

328

Figure 7 1999 Joint Program Structure

332

Figure 8 GM Market Share

335

Figure 9 GM-UAW Employees

336

Figure 10 GM Sales

336

x

Introduction The United Auto Workers invokes the Flint Sit-down Strike as the iconic struggle between labor and capital that marked the beginning of the union. In the decades that followed GM's recognition of the UAW, the rank-and-file won some of the skirmishes, but capital won the war. The seeds of capital's victory were planted in the 1940s by Walter Reuther when he formed a political apparatus within the UAW that evolved into an authoritarian system by the 1980s. Politics in the UAW serves the same purpose in the union as in any bureaucratic organization. Politics is about who gets the power and how they get it. Power in the UAW is derived from two sources; democratic systems and administrative systems. The governance of UAW was designed as a democratic system of checks and balances on the administration of power within the union. Reuther's political machine established an administrative system that overwhelmed the democratic system. The emergent totalitarian system subverted by the UAW Constitution transformed the union that was intended to provide voice to workers and promote social justice into a capital-driven organization that perpetuated the bureaucratic structures on both sides of the labor-management divide. By the turn of the 21st century the UAW was an entirely different kind of labor organization than the one Reuther ruled until his death in 1970. The UAW evolved into a labor organization in which the interests of the workers have been supplanted by interest of capital. This is the story of the transformation of the UAW from a membership-driven labor organization to a capital-driven, business-oriented organization that I call "UAW Inc." UAW Inc. emerged from a joint labor-management project that was initiated in the early 1980s by the UAW and domestic automakers to improve competitiveness thereby

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strengthening the job security of its workforce. The cooperative effort was a reaction to the challenges facing the domestic car industry in the wake of the energy crisis of the 1970s and foreign competition. The project failed in both of its primary objectives. First, the project failed to improve the competitive position of the industry and second, it failed to protect the job security of the workers. The project did succeed in creating a complex organizational bureaucracy and a new industrial relations system. UAW Inc. is unique labor-management organization that operates beyond the scrutiny of the U.S. Department of Labor, the union membership and GM's investors. However, the UAW-GM joint programs had numerous unintended consequences. The emergence of UAW Inc. was accompanied by the creation ofjoint labor-management nonprofit corporations that were "separate and distinct" from both the UAW and General Motors. The directors of the nonprofit corporate entities and newly created professional staff of UAW Inc. were appointed from the ranks of the UAW partisans and GM management. The positions were an additional outlet for political patronage within the union bureaucracy. The rise of joint programs or "jointness," erased the boundaries that separated labor from management. Appointed union representatives assumed management responsibilities and vice versa. Joint committees usurped the authority of the union bargaining committee. Joint committees more often determined the conditions of employment on the factory floor. Shop floor issues like seniority rights, grievance procedure and a "fair days pay for Special Convention Proceedings, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, Cobo Hall, Detroit MI, March 28-30, 1999, p. 223-224. International UAW President, Stephen Yokich explained the peculiar nature ofjoint funds and the Center for Human Resources at the 1999 UAW collective bargaining convention. David Yettaw pressed for an accounting of joint funds, "I want to ask that they be reported out in the form of an LM2 (A U.S. Departmental of Labor required annual disclosure form of union finances.) because it is a separate entity of which our union is part of that corporation..." Yokich replied, "It's a separate corporation which is not part of this labor organization, that's why.... It's not in our L&M (LM2). We went over this with our lawyers. We do not report out a separate corporation. As a union structure, we have to pour out everything we do in an L&M, but not what a separate corporation does. It has nothing to do our L&M."

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a fair days work" were decided by the various joint committees rather than in accordance with traditional bargaining agreements. These developments caused negative reactions on both sides; on the shop floor and in the front office. Joint programs failed to slow either the decline of GM's market share or the dismissal of thousands of factory workers. The UAW and GM relentlessly pursued a collaborative strategy in spite of the losses on both sides of the factory divide. Even as the ranks of the UAW continued to shrink, the International Executive Board aligned the union's organizational philosophy more closely with the interests of capital. Why would the union leadership collaborate so closely with General Motors when such a relationship was clearly harming the membership? The short answer is that it was a market share issue. The UAW had already aligned its political and organizational structure within the context of GM's postWWII dominance in auto manufacturing. The UAW and GM shared a common interest in preserving their share of vehicle manufacturing and represented industrial labor. However, in the 1980s the UAW and GM suffered losses of market share to foreign competitors regardless of the joint programs designed to improve product quality and competitiveness. More significantly, the architects of UAW Inc. erected additional institutional structures that increased the divide between union leaders and the rank-andfile. The result was the transferring of political power away from the membership. The constitutional mandates on the checks and balances of power were ignored or rendered irrelevant. The UAW leadership engaged in a form of financial engineering in order to supplement the lost revenues caused by the loss of thousands of dues paying members. They established a formula that effectively diverted funds from the strike insurance fund

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into the international union coffers. The self-styled "Joint Fund Reimbursement" program was established to channel joint training funds into the international union for the purposes of underwriting the salaries of international staff. Joint training funds that were intended for improving job skills and health and safety programs became a cash cow for the international Union. Joint funds evolved into a mechanism that provided GM with a tax-exempt funding scheme to underwrite operational budgets and endowed the union with additional supplementary funding to offset its dwindling membership. GM did not explicitly account for Joint Funds in its SEC filings and the UAW was not required by the Department of Labor to file detailed reports of joint funds reimbursements. Joint funds remained beyond the scrutiny of most interested parties. Consequently, the emergence of UAW Inc. enabled corporate and union executives to expand and finance an alternative organizational bureaucracy beyond the scrutiny of corporate investors, union members or government regulators. These developments occurred in concert with other constitutional funding schemes that transformed the UAW from a membership-driven organization into a capital-driven organization. The International UAW shifted its emphasis from representing the interests of the rank-and-file to bureaucracy building and the administration of human resource and welfare benefits programs. The UAW human resources bureaucracy was richly rewarded for its efforts. Millions of dollars were channeled into the union under the rubric of Joint Activities. The ranks of appointed joint representatives swelled as joint programs increased in size and scope. Health-care cost-shifting schemes became yet another frontier in the expansion of joint programs. Impending changes in health-care benefits promises to be yet another lucrative source of patronage for the international union. The

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restructuring of UAW funding resources transformed the union into a labor organization that no longer needed members in order to maintain the core bureaucracy. The UAW constitution was rendered irrelevant with the emergence of UAW Inc. In the search for the explanation for the decline and fall of the American labor movement this study provides a crucial and unexamined piece of the puzzle. What caused the most socially progressive, economically and politically influential labor unions in U.S. history to become an instrument of capital interests? The story of UAW Inc. provides the perspective of an emergent parallel organization to explain the dilemma. UAW Inc. has many facets shaped by numerous associations with employers of UAW members. Flint, Michigan is an appropriate setting for this story of industrial fragmentation that stripped both the UAW and GM of their economic and cultural dominance. The General Motors Corporation was organized around the Flint-based Buick motor car to become one of the largest employers in the United States. In 1952, Charles E. Wilson, president of General Motors summed up the corporation's standing in the American economy in closed hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, "For years I thought that what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa." The UAW distinguished itself in the labor movement by successfully organizing GM workers in the Flint Sit-Down Strike of 1936-37. Thus began the parent-child relationship between the UAW and General Motors. The UAW mirrored the parent. For the next four decades the strength of the UAW was tied to the centralized model of industrial organization. The larger narrative of the changes experienced by General 2

"Armed Forces: Engine Charlie," Time, 10-6-1961, online archive: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,827790,00.html, President Dwight Eisenhower chose Wilson for the job of Secretary of Defense. Wilson made the comment at the Senate Confirmation Hearing.

5

Motors and UAW was also reflected in the decline of the auto industry in Flint. The trend in industrial organization was shifting in the 1980s toward decentralization and divergent manufacturing and labor relations systems. Nearly every technical operation that involved manufacturing automobiles was present at Buick manufacturing; product engineering, metal casting in the Buick foundry, forge, heat treat, sheet metal stamping of body panels and the vehicle final assembly operations. Buick even had its own railroad and fire department. External market forces severely undermined the centralized manufacturing model at Buick. Faced with strong foreign competition GM was forced to consider closing industrial sites like Buick altogether. As a consequence, the UAW was presented with a choice of losing thousands more members or entering into a dramatically new relationship with GM. The Buick City project was celebrated as one of the answers to the problems that faced the American auto industry. The Buick City project was part of Roger Smith's ambitious and expensive renaissance of General Motors. The Smith renaissance proceeded along two trajectories. The first was a technical solution that was driven by Roger Smith's dream for a computerized factory of the future where the latest in technology would replace the workforce. The second area of change was the work place culture. The idea was to inculcate the remaining workforce with a philosophy of teamwork and company loyalty. GM management and union officials formed cooperative labor-management teams in an attempt to reclaim the corporation's former dominance. However, as with many of GM's grand initiatives there were unanticipated and unintended consequences.

6

The joint organizational bureaucracy produced a cadre of union professional staff whose loyalties were with the new joint organizational bureaucracy rather than the union rank-and-file. Buick City was a microcosm of the UA W-GM corporate project. When the Buick City project was in its planning stages the union political structure was firmly controlled by the Administration Caucus, the dominant political faction within the international UAW. At the same time there was a political reform movement stirring around the country in opposition to the new philosophy of labor-management cooperation. The largest and most well-known reform movement called the New Directions Movement was organized by Jerry Tucker in St. Louis, Missouri. UAW local 599 President David Yettaw introduced the New Directions Movement to the Flint area in the late 1980s. David Yettaw's career at General Motors and union involvement epitomizes the transformation of the UAW during the struggles between the old and new industrial and political order within the UAW. The ensuing political struggle over UAW identity played out on the shop floor, within UAW Local 599, the International Union, at city hall and numerous media outlets. The conflict pitted Tucker, Yettaw and the New Directions Movement against the international union, the General Motors Corp. and a consortium of local business and civic leaders. The story of the rise and fall of Buick City is a microcosm of the significant elements that were held in tension during the transformation of the American auto sector. GM, UAW and industrial communities like Flint were dismantled in the face of economic globalization. GM evolved into a financial and welfare benefits institution rather than a car company. The UAW evolved into a labor organization that did not need members in order to survive.

7

This study it is separated into three separate sections. The first section examines the organizational development of the UAW. It begins by laying out the organizational ideal that is presented in the UAW constitution. This is the UAW's required system. It is the organization that the union's founders intended for UAW members. This examination also includes various changes to the UAW Constitution by narrow interests in the union. A thorough discussion of the technical, political and cultural development of the UAW is not complete without the discussion of its parent organizations which include the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Unions and the General Motors Corporation. The UAW experienced crippling internal political conflict in the years immediately following the successful organizing drive in General Motors and to a lesser extent after WWII. Those years had a strong influence on the organizational structure and political system that would govern the union for over three decades. Since the late 1940s the UAW was guided by an organizational ideal embodied by Walter Reuther. At his direction dissenting groups within the UAW were swept aside. His governing "Administration Caucus" supported democratic principles and socially progressive public policy, but within the union the administration suppressed opposition. While Reuther outwardly promoted a social-democratic philosophy of pluralism as a model for a prosperous working class, there remained a conservative intolerance. Hard-line left factions, Communists and Trotskyites were marginalized or forced out of the union during the anti-Communist crusades of the 1940s and '50s. The UAW leadership sometimes exhibited racist tendencies that flared up in UAW regions throughout the country. Reuther was known to personally deploy harsh tactics to suppress opposition.

8

Reuther's domineering style and his failure to establish a path of succession created a crisis of leadership when he died suddenly in 1970. The political dynamics that dominated the UAW in the subsequent years left little room for effective internal opposition. Changes to the UAW Constitution reflected the shifting political dynamics of the UAW. The UAW Constitution defined the purpose of the union, its organizational structure and guiding principles. The Constitution provided a framework for social, political and economic justice that extended beyond the factory floor. It was a model for the democratic process both within the union and within society at large. The UAW Constitution clearly set the interests of the union membership apart from corporate management. In the post-Reuther years this began to change. The political apparatus that Reuther firmly controlled for nearly 25 years was up for grabs and the integrity of the UAW constitutional process became a casualty of shifting ideals. The transitional period beginning in the early 1980s marked the passing of the Reutherite cohort who linked the union leadership to the formative struggles in the 1930s. Reuther personified the organizational ideals that were practiced by the UAW during his administration. Some of those principles were written into the preamble to the constitution after his untimely death. The passing of Reuther foreshadowed the decline of the UAW. The 1979 national contract with General Motors reflected the lagging consciousness of Reuther's leadership. The 1979 agreement was also one of Irving Bluestone's premiere achievements before retiring. It was one of the richest labor agreements ever negotiated. By 1980, Leonard Woodcock and Irving Bluestone were retired and Douglas Fraser was soon to follow. In the ensuing years Reuther's political

9

apparatus experienced fundamental changes as well. Union business in the 1980s was not the stuff of direct action by rank-and-file; rather it was more closely in tune with preserving the union and corporate bureaucracies. The next generation of UAW leaders was part of a different cultural experience within the labor movement. Those union leaders were bureaucrats. Union activism was distilled to a narrow professional class of UAW representatives. They identified more closely with their management counterparts rather than the member on the shop floor. The second section of this study examines the crisis in the American auto industry in the 1980s and how it changed the UAW. The reaction of the auto industry and the UAW to the energy crisis and foreign competition served to hasten the demise of both institutions. The American carmakers had fallen victim to their own rhetoric, believing that their monopoly on the auto industry was the natural order of the market. Foreign competitors were certainly a nuisance, but GM and the UAW considered them little more than a passing aberration. They were confident that consumers would certainly come to their senses and return to buying whatever Detroit produced. The destiny of the UAW was inextricably linked to the fate of the American car industry. The American dominance in the industry delivered prosperity to both UAW and GM in spite of cyclical confrontations at the bargaining table. So it seemed that by the 1970s the American carmakers supremacy would continue. However, the technical and political challenges of the late 1970s and early 1980s marked the beginning of a permanent decline of the American auto industry. The foreign competitors were here to stay and American consumers for the first time in decades had a clear choice.

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A new generation of leadership arose at GM and the UAW. This brought about philosophical and organizational changes that transformed industrial relations and the main institutions in the auto sector. The financial side of GM's organizational structure emerged as the dominant culture within the corporate hierarchy. Financial considerations became the organizing ideal behind product development and long-termed corporate strategy. Roger Smith's career was nurtured in the financial school of management. He was celebrated by auto industry analysts as the "visionary" corporate leader for the twenty-first century. Smith proceeded to launch an expensive and self-destructive strategy during his tenure as CEO that cost GM over ten percent of market-share, $70 billion in capital expenditures and hundreds of thousands of lost jobs. The organizational developments within the UAW followed a similar trajectory as GM. The union launched a cooperative management relations philosophy. Beginning in 1973, the joint initiatives appeared in all the subsequent GM-UAW collective bargaining agreements under the titles Quality of Work Life, Health and Safety and Quality Network. The promise of the joint philosophy was enhanced job security for autoworkers while improving GM's competitive market position. Labor-management cooperation delivered neither. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s GM continued to lose market share while the UAW membership declined by nearly one-half. Jointness drove a period of UAW organizational restructuring that both maintained and expanded the UAW bureaucracy. Those developments resulted in a political backlash at local unions that fueled widespread dissent within the rank-and-file. Joint programs appeared during the UAW President Douglas Fraser administration, but increased in size and scope under Owen Bieber and Stephen Yokich.

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Owen Bieber was president of UAW during the years when the UAW institutionalized its corporate relationship with General Motors. Bieber was born December 28, 1929 in the small town of North Dorr, Michigan. In 1948, he went to work making frames for car seats at Mclnery Spring and Wire Company in Grand Rapids where he joined UAW Local 687. He was elected shop steward in 1949, became a member of Local 687 Executive Board in 1951, and was elected to the bargaining committee in 1955. Bieber was elected vice president of the local in 1955 and local president in 1956. Bieber remained president of the local until 1961 he went on International Union staff at Region ID. In 1972, Bieber was appointed as assistant to Regional Director, Ken Robinson. Robinson resigned in 1974 and Bieber was elected to replace him in a special election. Bieber served six years as Region ID Regional Director. In 1980, he was elected international vice president and appointed to direct the General Motors Department. Bieber was elected president of the UAW by acclamation in 1983. Bieber led the negotiations with New United Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI), the joint GM/Japanese small car manufacturing project in Fremont, California. The NUMMI pact established a framework for the labor-management cooperation that characterized UAW-GM relations for the rest of the century. The Bieber administration policies led to the exodus of the Canadian Auto Workers and the 3

formation of the New Directions Movement. He retired in 1995. Some in the union leadership truly believed in the idea that labor-management cooperation was in the best interest of the rank-and-file. While others, especially those who were rooted in the formative years of the UAW were outraged by the new turn in 3 Biographical Sketch of a UAW Vice President Owen Bieber, News from the UAW, May 1986, p. 1-4.

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UAW philosophy. Still others driven by political ambition seized on the issue of joint programs as an opportunity to expand their power. Joint programs proliferated into a sprawling organizational apparatus that eventually overshadowed the purpose of the UAW itself. Donald Ephlin was a true believer in cooperative relations with management as a strategy to improve the work place through employee involvement. Ephlin's background in the traditional collective bargaining system influenced his belief and innovation. Ephlin was born in on October 11,1925 in Framingham, Massachusetts. He became active at the General Motors assembly plant in Framingham UAW Local 422. He served from 1949 to 1960 as financial secretary and president of the local. He was appointed to the International Union staff in 1960 working as a member of the GM department where he handled umpire cases and benefits programs. Ephlin was assigned to work with North American Rockwell aviation and served as assistant director of the Continental Motors Council. He served as administrative assistant to UAW President Leonard Woodcock from 1970 to 1977. He participated in the 1973 and 1976 national negotiations with GM, Ford and Chrysler. Ephlin was elected UAW Region 9A Director in 1977. In 1980, Ephlin was first elected International Vice President of the UAW Ford Department. He was reelected in 1983 and took over the General Motors Department. Ephlin made his mark at Ford Department by developing "employee involvement" programs. He carried that legacy into GM where he made his mark on the industry by promoting Quality of Work Life programs. His enthusiasm for QWL programs aligned powerful enemies against him within the union. Changes proceeded

4

Biographical Sketch of a UAW Vice President Donald F. Ephlin, News from the UAW, April 1986, p. 1-3.

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incrementally in the organizational structure at General Motors and the UAW. There was widespread experimentation with manufacturing and human resource management processes. General Motors was the most eager of the big three in the implementation of labor-management committees. The UAW and GM launched numerous QWL programs that were intended to soften the decades-old adversarial relationship. QWL had many believers and skeptics on both sides of the labor-management divide. Workers distrusted union officials getting too close to management and foremen were reluctant to abrogate authority. Those suspicions were in some cases well founded. In some circumstances QWL provided workers with an outlet for their concerns and frustrations. However, management also used QWL to subvert the labor contract by short-circuiting the grievance procedure. For some QWL was viewed as a way to empower individuals within their work environment. Other workers were opposed to any form of labor-management cooperation, but the union leadership was determined to continue the programs because of the threat posed by foreign competition. The third section of this study addresses the dramatic change in direction of employee participation programs. Political changes within the union transformed joint programs into a totalitarian industrial relations system. The UAW leadership changes in 1980 and again in 1989 marked significant cultural and political turning points for the union. There was a sharp philosophical divide within the UAW over labor-management cooperation programs. There was dissent within the ranks of the political structure of the international UAW and a significant reform movement arose in some out-lying regions of the UAW. By 1989, Donald Ephlin was on his way out. He was pushed aside by Yokich who took over the GM department.

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Stephen P. Yokich was born in Detroit on August 20,1935 to a family with deep roots in the UAW. Both of Yokich's grandfathers were retired UAW members and both his parents were active in Detroit area UAW locals. He served in the US Air Force from 1952 to 1956. He served a skilled trades apprenticeship at the Heidrich Tool and Die Company in Oak Park, Michigan, where he was first elected to union office at Amalgamated UAW Local 155. In 1969, Yokich was appointed by UAW President Walter Reuther to the Region 1 International Union staff. In 1977 he was elected Director of UAW Region 1. Yokich directed the UAW Agricultural Implement Department from 1980 to 1983, directed the UAW National Ford Department from 1983 to 1989, and also directed the UAW Skilled Trades Department from 1980 until 1995 when he consolidated the UAW Skilled Trades and Technical Office and Professional (TOP) departments. He also directed the Organizing Department from 1983 to 1989. In 1989, Yokich was selected to direct the UAW General Motors Department. In 1995, Yokich was elected president of the UAW. One month after he was elected, Yokich announced plans to create a unified industrial union with the United Steel Workers of America and the International Association of Machinists. The idea of unification didn't get beyond the stage of preliminary discussions. Yokich made his mark by opposing QWL programs. Stephen Yokich put an end to QWL in large part because it bore the name of his predecessor. The QWL program was phased out and replaced with a wide-ranging industrial relations program called Quality Network. QN proved to be a powerful political and cultural apparatus that facilitated GM's industrial relations policies and the UAW Administration Caucus

Biographical Sketch of a UAW Vice President Stephen P. Yokich, News from the UAW, June 1996, p. 1-4.

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political machine. The labor-management participation schemes that began with Quality of Work Life had evolved into a complex system of institutional corruption that served in the narrow interests of corporate and union bosses who controlled the emergent labormanagement bureaucracy. UAW and GM were more concerned with the preservation of the organizational bureaucracy than with increasing competitiveness, market share or the job security of the workforce. The history of UAW Inc. is an intersection of the fields of labor history and industrial relations. The history of UAW Inc. is an institutional history that integrates cultural and political dimensions into the analysis of the transformation of the UAW. This study acknowledges the important contributions of the studies that re-create the experiences of ordinary working people and their communities. A thorough understanding of industrial labor requires a careful analysis of the larger system as well as the small. This account of UAW history draws heavily from primary documents, but is supported by the select secondary literature from the fields of industrial relations, sociology, and organizational psychology. Much has been written by scholars of labor history and industrial relations with regard to the economic, social and political implications of the UAW. The UAW was a leader in promoting social equality, racial justice, women's rights and political action. By the end of the 1970s the union had become an aging bureaucratic organization that was losing touch with its members. The beginning of the 1980s marked a convergence of forces, both internal and external that would change the nature of auto work in America well into the 21st century. Scholars labeled the UAW as " the American Vanguard" of society in the mid-twentieth century,

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but by the late 1980s the union was an isolated, internally-focused bureaucracy that in many ways paralleled the General Motors Corporation. Analytical Framework This study will examine this peculiar industrial relations model as it was pioneered at GM and experienced by its workers. The story of UAW Inc. is approached from the perspective of individual workers as they encountered class differentiation within their own union. In the early 1980s David Yettaw was a conventional UAW representative which meant that he could be an effective union representative as long as he played by the rules, but that all changed in 1986 at the UAW National Convention. He discovered at the convention there was more than one set of rules in the UAW. Yettaw's union career began in the bumper pit at Buick final assembly where he witnessed abusive supervisors and apathetic union officials. He first got involved in the union at the plant level after encouragement from his comrades. Yettaw was elected to union office and became politically involved at the union hall. The experience taught him to trust the system as it was defined by the UAW constitution. If there was a problem, the constitution provided a mechanism to resolve it. The system worked. He arrived at the 1986 National Convention holding the office of Education Director for UAW local 599 and chairman of the political mainstream group called the Unity Caucus. Yettaw soon learned that he was a political virgin in the world of International UAW politics. The stage for the National Convention had been set by recent concessionary bargaining and

American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004). Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995). Nelson Liechtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995).

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joint labor-management cooperation programs. The widespread political turmoil that was simmering in local unions across the country erupted into violence at the convention as political dissidents clashed with international union officials. Yettaw witnessed the confrontations at the convention where he met two reform movement leaders who would change his union career forever. There was controversy surrounding Victor Reuther and Jerry Tucker who were promoting the New Directions Movement (NDM), a dissident group that was opposed to recent developments in the UAW. The experience brought into sharp contrast ideological contradictions on display at the UAW convention. As Yettaw entered the convention hall: There were all kinds of leaflets and stuff being passed out. And I have a fairly open mind. I was taking literature from everyone who was passing it out. And of course there's people there from the far Right, NRA and there's people there from the far left. There's the Socialists and there's Communists and Trotskyists and all these people. I take everybody's literature. And I took some literature of Jerry Tucker's New Directions. And I'll never forget this Sergeant at Arms. Now this is the Sergeant at Arms at the UAW convention. He doesn't know me and I don't know him. And he says, "You aren't taking that Communist literature are you?" And I said, "Well I don't know Region 5—I didn't even know these people." And he said, "Yeah, you see that guy's picture right there?" I said, "Yeah." He said, "Well that's Jerry Tucker, and he's married to that nigger Aunt Jemima." And I thought, Jesus Christ! I said, "You're a Sergeant at Arms?" So at that point I thought there's something crazy

18

going on here. Because I don't care if a guy's wife is polka dot, that's his business. Then there was a fight. I remember seeing a fight take place. And one of these Administrative Caucus guys actually beat up this woman from Region 5. And so I mean here's all this controversy flying around the convention. We're seeing what these people are. And that was my first dose of the Administration Caucus. At first Yettaw found himself surrounded by what seemed to be a free and open exchange of ideas, but then there was the outburst by the Sergeant at Arms. The Sergeant at Arms' behavior reflected his own personal views to be sure, but as an officer in the International Union he was projecting the image of the Administration Caucus to newcomers like Yettaw. The position of Sergeant at Arms at those conventions was typically the newest and lowest seniority international UAW representatives. They were generally instructed by senior staff members of the international union about what to say and who to watch out for. The verbal insults to Jerry Tucker and the NDM was emblematic of the paranoid style of the Administration Caucus's totalitarian system. "Organizational totalitarianism" is at the heart of this discussion of the transformation of the UAW as a labor organization. Organizational totalitarianism is a process in which an organization or participant's identity is determined by the organization. It was an institutional feature that the union modeled after its organizational parent—General Motors. The organizational structure and behavior of the international UAW closely replicated the General Motors system in the post-World War II era. Organizational totalitarianism had the effect of taking away an organizational

7

Dave Yettaw, BLH Interview by Thomas Adams, transcript, p. 6.

19

participant's own moral authority and replaced it with the "organizational ideal." The organizational ideal refers to the committed participant's idea of what the organization is supposed to be. The organizational ideal isn't necessarily rational or based on reality because the UAW leadership was detached from the membership and isolated from the environment outside the union bureaucracy. It is determined by the leadership of the organization. I use the term "leadership" in this study to describe those individuals or coalitions of individuals who have the authority to make important decisions and control the organization. The leadership of the UAW from the International Executive Board, down to the shop floor committeeman is dominated by a single political group, the Administration Caucus. Political advancement within UAW is contingent upon membership in that mainstream political caucus. Caucus partisans are required to behave in strict compliance with the International Union's code of conduct. The committed participants and their masters in the leadership of the international UAW were obsessed with organizational rank.

Organizational rank translated into power in a union culture

where power was respected above all else. There are other features that sustained that

Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 16. Organizational totalitarianism is a concept that Howard Schwartz discusses in this study of corporate decay in two case studies involving General Motors and NASA. He proposes the "theory of organizational ideal" as a practical application of theories of organizational behavior to the irrational behavior within these two bureaucratic institutions. 9 Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 18-19, 31, and 37. Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p.31, 58-59. According to Schwartz, totalitarianism represents a rejection of reality. Communication between totalitarian leadership and subordinates is not communication at all, it is instead deception. It is an indication of contempt toward subordinates. Schwartz sees this as a mockery of all attempts to break down status barriers that stand in the way of effective communication. Improving communication is behind the Quality of Work Life initiatives between the UAW and General Motors.

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authoritarian system, but they will be discussed later in the study. It is sufficient to state that The International Union regarded any form of dissent as a threat. The national convention was clearly not the open democratic forum that Yettaw imagined. Instead, it was a demonstration of the moral standing of the International UAW's totalitarian system. The Administration Caucus defined what the international union should be for the committed participants like the Sergeant at Arms. The international union had the effect of forming its own moral community that was the basis for commitment and loyal behavior by committed participants. They will do whatever is necessary to be a part of that community, even engage in reprehensible acts on behalf of the organization.

In this example, the Sergeant at Arms' invoked Aunt Jemima as a

symbol to ridicule Jerry Tucker's New Directions group. His remarks were packed with harmful gender, racial and cultural implications. The Mammy image evoked wellunderstood negative stereotypes of the sexual order, racial status and class identity in 12

society.

The racist and misogynistic overtone of those comments offers up a window

into the nature of the international union's moral community. Yettaw's encounter with the Sergeant at Arms at the National Convention demonstrated the distance between the UAW's totalitarian bureaucracy and the organizational values stipulated in the UAW constitution. The experience proved to be a turning point in his union career. He felt that something was terribly wrong with the UAW, "I thought, Jesus, Christ this can't be. I had great admiration for the Reuthers—as Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 31. 12 Manring, M. M., Slave in a Box: The Strange Career of Aunt Jemima, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998), p. 9. "Jemima" is synonymous with images of the loyal and submissive plantation "mammy" who labored in the Old South. The Jemima image is a symbol of white supremacy and black subservience. The myths and realities of Jemima remain in dispute, but the mammy image has been a racial and sexual symbol used by blacks and whites and men and women from the North and South.

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all of us did. Sometimes Walter wasn't everything he should have been, but until you get 13

into the man's shoes you don't know—I went to a New Directions meeting."

Yettaw set

aside a promising mainstream UAW political career and chose the path of dissent. The experience called in to question what the UAW stood for and what a labor union is supposed to be. The UAW arrived in the twenty-first century as a very different labor organization institution than the union that was created in the 1930s. The UAW transformed organized labor into a model of working-class prosperity in the twentieth century. The formative years of the UAW that were defined by the battle grounds of the sit-down strikes in the 1930s gave way to a system of predictable labor relations. The militant union tactics of direct action that won UAW recognition matured into a bureaucratic system that negotiated with capital for "pure and simple" issues of wages and working conditions. The relationship was contained in the industrial relations system conceived by the framers of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA recognized that labor and management had inevitably adversarial interests and sought to bring stability and prosperity to that relationship. The purpose of the NLRA was to promote equality of bargaining power between employers and employees in order to reduce labor conflict. The drafters of the NLRA did not intend to promote cooperation between labor and management. It was the framers' intention to encourage labor to cooperate with each other to create a balance of bargaining power with management.

A labor organization is defined by Section 2(5) as

13 Dave Yettaw, BLH Interview by Thomas Adams, transcript, p.7 14 David H. Brody, "The Future of Labor-Management Cooperative Efforts under Section 8(a)2 of the National Labor Relations Act, Vanderbilt Law Review, Volume 41, (1988), 545-547.

22

"any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee, or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers, concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."

Section 8(a) 2 was included in the

NLRA to prevent management from dominating labor unions. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it." The main purpose of the UAW was to serve as a social means through which union members could achieve the objectives that are outlined in the preamble of the 17

UAW Constitution.

The preamble defined the UAW's founding organizational ideal.

The technical aspects of the beliefs and values outlined in the preamble were operationalized in the articles and sections that followed. UAW Inc. departed from the UAW's main purpose when the International Executive Board established a joint bureaucracy that served the interests of management, created alternative funding mechanisms that were detached from the union membership, assumed management responsibilities and organized nonprofit corporations with GM and other employers. Since the mid-1970s, the UAW entered into a joint relationship with General Motors that undermined and dismantled the constitutional structures of the union. UAW administration also established a number of alternative funding mechanisms that replaced Morris, Charles J., The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act, (Washington, DC: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1971), p. 136. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ [152], Sec. 2(5). National Labor Relations Act, Title 29, Chapter 7, Subchapter II, Section 8.[§158], Unfair Labor Practices, United States Code 17 Tichy, Noel M., Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political and Cultural Dynamics, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), p.l 17.

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the International Union's declining revenues due to the plummeting membership levels. The alternative funding schemes weakened the already tenuous connection between the rank-and-file and the union. The UAW evolved from a system that was devised as a social mechanism to improve the lives of workers into UAW Inc., a business corporation that functioned as a human resource and welfare benefits administrator of UAW members on behalf of GM and other employers. This examination of UAW Inc. takes a systems approach to the changes that took place in the UAW since the 1970s. The UAW is governed by a defined set of doctrines, ideals and principles intended to benefit the entire union membership. The UAW interacts with the employer within the context of a prescribed industrial relations 18

system.

The analytical model applied to this study examines the interaction of the

technical, political and cultural systems that influenced the transformation of the UAW in a continually changing economic and political environment. The interaction of these systems is set in the context of the UAW's organizational lifecycle. A basic social systems model is used to mark significant events and illustrate organizational change in 19

the UAW. The first feature is a variation of the organizational lifecycle theory.

The

organizational lifecycle is a useful gauge to measure the health of the UAW overtime by mapping the stages of its growth, stabilization, aging and decline. The various stages 18 John T. Dunlop. 1950. "Economic Model of a Trade Union" in Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, (New York: Augustus M. Kelly. Inc., 1950), p. viii. Every Industrial relations system has three groups of actors; workers and their organizations, managers and their organizations and government agencies that interact with the workplace. Every employment relation system is subject to a complex set of rules that governs the environment in which they operate. 19 Ichak Adizes, Corporate Lifecycles: How and Why Corporations Grow and Die and What to Do about It, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1988). Dr. Adizes received his undergraduate degree in economics and political science from Hebrew University, Jerusalem in 1963. He received both his MBA in 1963 and Ph.D. in 1968 from Columbia University, New York.

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correspond with significant events in society, General Motors, the UAW and how those events affect people in those groups. The second feature is based on the technical, 20

cultural and political (TPC) systems theory.

Under ideal circumstances, technical,

political and cultural systems are held in relative balance. In the real world a state balance is rarely the case in any system especially in the UAW's aging bureaucracy. The third feature is the perspective of organizational behavior of the UAW's cultural system. This aspect of the study relies on Howard Schwartz's theory of the "organization ideal" that depicts the group behavior that accounts for the failure of leadership in the UAW to 21

adapt to the threats to its membership at critical stages of its lifecycle.

"Organizational

totalitarianism" is a key feature in the organizational decay at both General Motors and the UAW. Organizational totalitarianism is defined by Schwartz as a dysfunctional characteristic in organizational behavior that causes individuals to relinquish their own personal autonomy and replace it with the goals and aspirations of the organization. Selfdeception is at the core of the organizational totalitarianism. Tichy, Noel M., Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political and Cultural Dynamics, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), p. ix-xii. Noel Tichy did his Ph.D. work at Columbia University. He is currently a Professor of Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management at the University of Michigan Ann Arbor. The study examined organizations ranging from radical political movements to mainstream business consulting firms. Tichy observed that a common weakness of organizational analysts was that they typically viewed organizational change from the technical, political and cultural systems separately. That was a problem because those systems continuously interact and influence one another. TPC system theory was formulated by Dr. Noel M. Tichy in the field of organizational change. Dr. Tichy developed TPC theory as a way to understand and manage organizational change. He developed the TPC theory over a period of years beginning with the research for his Ph.D. dissertation At Columbia University on change agents. Tichy applied his TPC theory while working at the Martin Luther King Health Center in the South Bronx and with organizational development consultants with Volvo, Saab and General Motors in the early 1970s. 21 Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 16-19. Dr. Schwartz holds undergraduate and master's degrees from University of California, San Diego University of Pittsburgh and Antioch College. In 1980, Schwartz received his Ph.D. in Organizational Behavior with minors in Sociology and Social Psychology from Cornell University, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations. He served a faculty internship at the Chrysler technology Center in Auburn Hills, Michigan in 1996.

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The organization lifecycle concept is the first analytical feature that provides a method to track the transformation of the UAW "required system" and growth of "emergent systems." The UAW required system is the preamble to the UAW Constitution. The UAW Constitution establishes the union's guiding principles, system of governance, and the structures necessary to operationalize the organization. Amendments to the constitution since 1980 exposed technical and political changes in the union administration. In 1980, the UAW constitution was amended to allow the diversion of the interest earned on the International Strike Fund in order to finance the newly created Organization, Education, and Communication (OEC) fund. This was the first of several diversions of financial resources to the direct control of the IEB that contributed to the emergence of UAW Inc. The lifecycle concept is arranged into two primary phases, growth and aging. The growth phase includes infancy, adolescence, and prime and the early-stable stage. The size of the organization and its overall age are not necessarily the causes of growth or decline. A young organization usually can change easily, but there is a low level of control and that can result in unpredictability. The aging phase includes the late-stable, 22

aristocracy, early bureaucracy, bureaucracy and the death stages.

A well-established

organization typically has a high level of control, but too much control can restrict its ability to respond to events. The lifecycle concept is not meant to be a predetermined outcome of UAW organizational health. The lifecycle concept is a practical device to illustrate the various stages of the UAW from its early growth period beginning in 1935, through its peak years 22 Ichak Adizes, Corporate Lifecycles: How and Why Corporations Grow and Die and What to Do about It, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 2-13.

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in the 1950s, its decline beginning in the 1970s, until its ultimate death as a membershipdriven organization at the turn of the 21 st century. The presence of bureaucracy does not necessarily indicate decline. Mature organizational bureaucracies that are isolated from the outside environment tend towards totalitarian control. The leadership often make decisions that are not based in reality. Aging bureaucracies require a strategic plan that encourages renewal and innovation in 23

order to survive.

The inflexibility of the American Federation of Labor illustrated that

point. When the AFL first chartered the UAW in 1935, it took a dim view of industrial workers. It was slow to adapt to the needs of the industrial workforce because of the discriminatory attitudes of the conservative trade unions. That attitude was evident in the AFL's refusal to share control of UAW with the ethnic and racial diverse industrial rankand-file. Insurgents transformed the fledgling UAW in 1936 when the AFL Executive Board's hand-picked UAW president, Francis Dillon was forced out. They replaced Dillon with a cohort of Communists, Socialists and Trotskyists. " The same year John L. Lewis unceremoniously left the AFL to form a confederation of industrial unions, the 25

Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).

The UAW followed Lewis out of the AFL

and into the CIO. At the end of the year the legendary sit-down strike at Flint brought General Motors to its knees in 1937. The UAW's success in GM set off a wave of industrial organizing that swept the nation. One of the problems that faced the young 23 Ichak Adizes, Corporate Lifecycles: How and Why Corporations Grow and Die and What to Do about It, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 325-348. Tichy, Noel M , Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political and Cultural Dynamics, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), p.185-202. 24 De Caux, Len, Labor Radical: From the Wobbly Is to the CIO (Boston: Beacon press, 1970), p. 251. "Purge & Pistol," Time Magazine, Monday, October 11, 1937, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,770906,00.html. 25 Jack Stieber, Governing The UAW, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p.3.

27

UAW-CIO leadership was the lack of discipline by some of the workers in the plants. The adolescent behavior became a problem for the leadership. Shop floor militants engaged in wildcat strikes or sat down on their jobs at the slightest of provocation by foremen. The UAW leadership needed to control its own members in order to preserve its credibility with employers and society at large. The UAW was in the throes of adolescence when it was torn by political infighting. The union struggled to establish its identity as the conflict between the old and new cultural order took hold in the union halls and on the shop floor. Restoring order became a test of legitimacy for the leadership of the young labor organization. There was an urgent need to end the factional infighting and stabilize operations in the plants.

The

CIO prevailed in the political contest with AFL, but the deployment of power remained strikingly the same as the old federation. The end of political infighting was a signal that the UAW had entered the prime stage. Organizational stability was purchased at the cost of shifting power away from the shop floor to a centralized bureaucracy. Institutional stability also reduced flexibility and internal democracy. After Walter Reuther was elected president he created a powerful political machine that took control of the ruling apparatus of the UAW. This was the bureaucratic UAW of the late 1940s and 1950s. The UAW entered the aristocratic stage when Walter Reuther initiated a closed political system to ensure long-term control. Reuther's political machine, the Administration Caucus and its rump organizations in local unions have been in control of

Ichak Adizes, Corporate Lifecycles: How and Why Corporations Grow and Die and What to Do about It, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 45-50, 77.

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the UAW ever since.

During this period the organizational structure of the union

remained relatively unchanged, but the political and cultural systems were very different. The stability that settled over the UAW indicated a power shift. What was once been a responsive shop floor-oriented system had been replaced by an elaborate procedural bureaucracy run by a professionalized staff. There was competition between the staff as they maneuvered for positions of authority in the union. When things went wrong, assessing blame was the time honored ritual. The mainstream union leadership was measured by their loyalty to the Administration Caucus rather than the union 28

membership.

In the minds of the UAW leadership the political machine (emergent

system) appropriately supplanted the required system. A similar shift in power took place in General Motors when finance people became more important than product 29

research, engineering, or marketing.

The dominance of financial people in General

Motors management was underlined when Roger B. Smith was named GM Chairman Gary Brandt, International Representative Region 2, UAW (Cleveland, OH) v. International Union, UAW (The United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America), Decision on Reconsideration, The Public Review Board International Union, UAW, Case No. 787-11, (Decision on Reconsideration, April 22nd, 1988), p. 2. The PRB summarized Leonard Woodcock's description of the International Union administrative structure to the PRB. "The strength of the UAW administration, Woodcock states, arises out of the recognition that not only is loyalty to the Union required on the part of its officers, but also a loyalty to one another." The Unity Caucus at UAW Local 599 is an example of a subgroup or extension of the Administration Caucus at the plant level. 28 Ichak Adizes, Corporate Lifecycles: How and Why Corporations Grow and Die and What to Do about It, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 164. According to Adizes, respect is directed towards the individual during the adolescence stage. In the prime stage, respect is directed to individuals and the team. And the aristocracy stage respect is directed towards the system itself. 29 Paul Ingrassia and Joseph B. White, Comeback: The Fall and Rise of the American Automobile Industry, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 290. Since the ascension of Frederick Dormer as chairman in 1958, it was more likely that Elvis would be found alive in GM's board would stage revolt against management. Maryann Keller, Rude Awakening: The Rise, Fall, and Struggle for Recovery of General Motors, (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1989), p. 28-29. A retired GM executive noted that the tyranny of "numbers crunchers" began to take root chairman Fred Erick Donner in the 1960s. Roger Smith idolized Dormer. During this period, "an attitude started to develop that the financial types could run things better than manufacturing or marketing people." It got to the point where if you were not in favor of financial people, your career with GM was in jeopardy.

29

1980. As the bureaucracy ages it takes fewer risks, has less incentive to be innovative 30

and focuses its attention inward.

If this process is left unchanged and a reform strategy

was not implemented, the organization enters "late-bureaucracy." Aging and death are the final stages of the organizational lifecycle. At this stage the organization doesn't generate sufficient resources on its own. The late-stage organization justifies its existence just by the mere fact that it exists. It can survive as only by means of "artificial life support." It becomes detached from its environment and 31

focuses only on itself.

That was General Motors and the UAW as the twentieth century

drew to a close. General Motors had become a car company that could no longer produce cars. It was for the most part a financial institution that depended on alternative sources of cash flow from sources unrelated to the car industry. Similarly, the aging UAW bureaucracy lost its bearing as a labor organization. The interests of the membership became secondary to maintaining the union bureaucracy. The UAW lost its ability to adjust to the shifting technical, political and cultural environment. The UAW entered into innovative agreements with General Motors to preserve jobs, but the agreements lacked the crucial element to make it work. The labormanagement cooperation schemes were meaningless because GM refused to compromise on its right to "the schedules of production, the methods, processes and means of 32

manufacturing are solely and exclusively the responsibility of the Corporation."

The

30 Ichak Adizes, Corporate Lifecycles: How and Why Corporations Grow and Die and What to Do about It, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 62-63. 31

Ichak Adizes, Corporate Lifecycles: How and Why Corporations Grow and Die and What to Do about It, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 79. 32 Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAW-CIO, June 24, 1940, Recognition, Paragraph 3(c), p. 6. Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAW-AFL/CIO, September 26, 2007, Recognition, Paragraph 8, p. 13. Also see Appendix B, Part I.

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UAW leadership squandered opportunities to preserve manufacturing jobs by using labor-management cooperation schemes to expand the organizational bureaucracy rather than strengthening their competitive position. The UAW's elaborate collaborative relationships with General Motors and other employers resulted in the abandonment of the union's basic organizational ideal. The key to the UAW's organizational growth was the close linkage to the American auto industry. The UAW prospered as long as the "Big Three" dominated the industry, but as market share declined in the 1970s and so did the union's monopoly on autoworkers. Japanese carmakers began producing cars in North America and captured twenty percent of the American car market. For the first time there was domestic competition for UAW jobs by nonunion labor. The UAW and GM joined each other in a twisted dance of decay in the early 1980s. The union and the corporation demonstrated their inability to respond to political and economic threats to their existence. The UAW leadership's reliance on labor-management cooperation sealed its fate. The union lost its political and cultural underpinnings. The decay of the UAW was illustrated its inability or unwillingness to cultivate new leadership. The activists who initiated the internal debate in the union were purged along with their reform movements. Reuther's cohorts in the Administration Caucus: Leonard Woodcock, Irving Bluestone, Emil Mazy, Ken Bannon and Pat Greathouse were retiring by 1980. Fraser's tenure as UAW president proved to be a transitional stage into an era of decline. The Reuther cohort was replaced by a new generation of organizational men,

31

Owen Bieber, Stephen P. Yokich and Donald Ephlin.

The UAW bureaucracy became

the focus of the union's organizational ideal under the new leadership cohort. The financial cornerstone of UAW Inc. was laid when the union leadership created alternative sources of funding to offset the decline in the membership. They created elaborate fund transfers under the guise of joint programs and used the strike fund as a bank in order to finance International Union.

The UAW's existence was intertwined with General

Motors and to a much lesser extent Ford and Chrysler. By 1980, the UAW and GM were already in a terminal decline that would continue for the next two decades. It ended in 35

the death of both organizations. The second important analytical feature that brings clarity to the evolution of the UAW involves the interaction of technical, political and cultural systems. Organizations like the UAW function best when the TPC systems are in relative equilibrium. Therefore, it is crucial that TPC systems are considered together rather than separately because if one system is over emphasized, then one or both of the others will be unstable. The technical system consists of the physical environment, organizational design, procedures and methods that enable the organization to function properly. Technical systems also include the legal framework, the market and economic environment, trade policies, communication and transportation technology and the geographical orientation 33 William Serrin, "Auto Workers Begin a Period of Transition" New York Times, December 2, 1980, p. 24.

34 Proceedings 26th Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, 1980, Article 16, Section 14, p. 195. Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at Anaheim CA, June, 1980, p. 35. Strike fund diversions required amendments to the UAW Constitution. In 1980, the Constitution was amended to transfer "An amount, not in excess of 50 percent of interest and dividends received by the international strike insurance fund, may be set aside as the Organization, Education, and Communication (OEC) Fund, to be expended, as authorized by the International Executive Board ...." This was the first of several diversionsfromthe strike fund. See Appendix, Figure 1.1.

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of its sphere of influence. The political system facilitates the leadership's access to the power, resources and decision-making capability that leads to reaping benefits from the organization. A great deal of time and energy is expended in the UAW on who gets the power, how it's obtained and the allocation of resources. The cultural system consists of the values, objectives, beliefs and interpretations that are shared by the organizational members. The main function of culture is to give content, direction and meaning to the world around us.

The UAW's cultural system ideal is spelled out in the Preamble of 37

the UAW Constitution.

However, the union leadership ultimately determines the

formal organizational culture. The UAW is an inherently political organization. The emphasis on politics creates cultural problems as those in the union bureaucracy maneuver for positions of power and influence. They became more consumed with issues of status and prestige rather than the needs of the rank-and-file. The political situation in the UAW repeatedly produced emergent systems of class and cultural differentiation within the union staff and the membership. The following three examples illustrate political and cultural imbalances in the UAW that led to unintended emergent systems. First, the UAW international staff rejected Reuther's call for binding arbitration to settle issues of salaries 38

and benefits. They formed a staff union called the Staff Council in 1963.

The second

example is placed in the context of the 1960s when political and cultural turmoil in Tichy, Noel M., Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political and Cultural Dynamics, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), p. 10, Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 18. 37 Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at Anaheim, California, June, 1980, Article 3-8, Conventions, Preamble, p. 3-4. 38 John D. Pomfret, "Auto Workers' Staff Sets up Own Union; Reuther Fights Step," The New York Times, October 2, 1963, p. 39. "Walter P. Reuther, president of the Auto Workers was said to have been 'hurt and shocked' by the development."

33

society also fueled insurgency movements within the UAW. By 1968, there were over 2 1/2 million African American members of the AFL-CIO and the UAW. Although the UAW was considered a leader in equal rights policies since 1947, there were still plenty 39

of informal restrictions on African Americans, especially in the South.

There was still

widespread racist hiring practices, speedups, unequal pay between white and African American workers and inadequate facilities for African Americans in the factories.

The

UAW was unable or unwilling to resolve their grievances. As a result of the failure of the required system to address the African American autoworkers' concerns, an emergent system evolved. In a spirit of the civil rights and militant African American Power movements, a group of African American autoworkers and intellectuals organized the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM). The Revolutionary Union Movements (RUMs) quickly spread to Ford (FRUM), and General Motors (GRUM). Emil Mazy deliver the UAW's that characterized the RUMs as anti-working-class and a radical "African American peril" that was even worse than the "Red peril" of earlier years. The union then resorted to paternalistic methods in order to split off the older workers from the insurgents.

The third example of an emergent system is the rise of the New

Directions Movement that rose up in opposition to the joint labor-management programs in the early 1980s. The NDM was founded by union insiders opposed to the technical

International Executive Board, UAW-CIO, Fair Practices Policy: Seniority Statement, Chicago, June 1947, Handbook/or Local Union Fair Practices Committees, Published by the UAW Fair Practices and Anti-Discrimination Department of the International Executive Board, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 1981. 40 August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, Black Detroit and The Rise of the UA W, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 207-215. 41 Manning Marable, Raced, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black of America, 1945-1990, (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), p. 116-119.

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changes that that were occurring in the UAW that were contrary to the UAW Constitution. The NDM movement went as far as incorporating as a legal education foundation. The UAW IEB was quick to accept the Staff Council, but resisted the RUMs' demands in some of the most racist terms. The NDM was another matter. The IEB was so threatened by the NDM that it mobilized the entire international staff, the Administration Caucus, its rump organizations in local unions, the media, employers, and state and local politicians to undermine the reform movement and discredit its members. The result was a more powerful, detached and aristocratic international Union and a crippled overall labor movement. The General Motors Lordstown, Ohio plant is an example of unintended consequences that were caused by overemphasizing technical systems while neglecting the cultural and political systems. The Lordstown plant was built in the early 1970s to produce the Chevrolet Vega. GM boasted that it was the most technologically advanced and efficient auto plant in the world. The Vega was going to chase the Japanese automakers off shore. Lordstown was designed by management and production engineers without considering of the impact that the fabulous new technology would have on the workers. Productivity and quality was far below management expectations. There was high absenteeism and shop floor conflict that resulted in wildcat strikes. The problem was GM's reliance on technology to solve all their problems. Their technical fix triggered cultural and political problems as workers rebelled against the over mechanized plant. A three week wildcat strike in 1972 represented the peak of the political cycle. 42 Tichy, Noel M., Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political and Cultural Dynamics, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), p. 8, 12. Brock Yates, The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry, (New York, Empire Books 1983), p. 58. Yates refers to the three week strike in 1972 as a response to the "Lordstown Syndrome."

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The cultural problems originated with the fact that individual workers had no influence over their jobs. Lordstown highlighted the "blue-collar blues," a situation where workers were subject to arbitrary speedups, forced overtime, high absenteeism and dangerous working conditions. The highly public three-week labor strike damaged General Motors reputation. As a result GM and UAW went to work shoring up the cultural problems in the plant. GM brought in organizational consultants to learn how to humanize their organization.

One of the responses was to develop joint labor-management Quality of

Work Life programs in which workers would have some input over their workspace. Some of the programs encourage workers to identify problems and others to solve them as well. Those early QWL programs were not universally designed or applied. Over the course of the next two decades both GM and the UAW forgot the lessons of Lordstown, Linden, New Jersey, Saturn, NUUMI, Buick City, Factory 81, Chevrolet Gear and Axle, and other collaborative projects. GM and the UAW overemphasized cultural and technical systems, but neglected political systems when addressing competitiveness, quality and job security issues. The structure of political systems in the UAW and GM were entrenched in both organizations. The UAW leadership considered any ideas that wavered from the existing political system as a threat to their authority. The UAW leadership was oblivious to the changes taking place in the auto industry. It was as though nothing had changed in forty years. The union continued to grow their bureaucracy despite its shrinking constituency. Twenty years after the UAW partnered with the three American automakers the membership levels dropped by more

Jerry M. Flint, "Automakers Face Blue-collar Blues," New York Times, January 7, 1973, p. 222. Susan Chira, New York Times, August 11, 1984, p. 29. Michael Massing, "Detroit's Strange Bedfellows," New York Times Sunday Magazine, February 7, 1988, p. SM 20. Brock

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than one-half, but the labor organization's revenues doubled.

The UAW agreed to

historic labor-management cooperation in their bargaining agreements that promised to increase the union's voice in product development, quality and productivity decisions. But that was impossible because GM didn't budge on the rights provision. The framers of those agreements argued that labor-management cooperation enhanced job security. The rationale was by giving workers a stake in improved product quality and efficiency, GM would be more competitive and produce a higher quality product. That would improve GM's competitive position, thereby ensuring better job security for the workers. However, the collaborative relationship failed to either improve the competitive position of the company or protect the job security of our workers. GM's market share fell from forty-five percent in 1980 to twenty nine percent in 1998. The celebrated UAW-GM partnership didn't work even though there was an elaborate industrial relations mechanism in place to strengthen both organizations. The problem was not with the system or with agreements designed to improve GM's competitive position. The problem was with how the various programs were implemented or failed to operationalize them. Why would the UAW leadership allow the membership to fade away while they continued to grow and enrich the union bureaucracy? The UAW leadership seemed to be unconcerned with what was happening beyond the walls of Solidarity House. The governing framework outlined in the UAW Constitution was manipulated by a narrow

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America. 1998 Report of the Trustees 32ndConstitutional Convention, Las Vegas, Nevada, 22-26 June 1998, p. 17. In 1980, there were 1,357,141 UAW members. The UAW total revenues in 1980 were $339,687,290.21. The 1980 strike insurance fund contained $286,160,036.39. In 1997, there were 764,089 UAW members. The UAW total revenues in 1997 were $875, 474, 843.39. The 1980 strike insurance fund contained $728,471,021.67.

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band of self-selected leaders.

This leads to an examination of a psychological

perspective of organizational leadership behavior. The third analytical feature of the transformation of the UAW is based on theory of the "organizational ideal." The ideal organization can be thought of as the "model organization" where everything functions according to plan and on time like "clockwork." The organizational ideal is not an actual organization but the committed participant's idea of what the organization should be. The organizational ideal is usually described in some form of mission statement. The mission statement defines cultural system, code of conduct and structure of the model organization. The leadership sets the example of proper decorum for everyone else within the organization. The model organization is a place where everyone knows what they are doing. There is no conflict. Communication is open and direct. The way to get what you want is through collaboration. The model organization can work only if those with whom you collaborate want you to have what you want and are interested in working with you to get it. People want to do what needs to be done and work for the common good. This clockwork organization operates as though everyone knows what the organization is all

Lipset, Martin, Martin Trow and James Coleman, Union Democracy: What Makes Democracy Work in Labor Unions? (New York: Anchor Books Doubleday & Co., 1956). P.3, According to Lipset, Martin, Trow and Coleman, the experience of the UAW bureaucracy is common among other trade unions, professional societies, business associations and cooperatives. The clauses in the constitutions that established the machinery for translating membership interests into organizational purpose and action have little relationship to the actual political processes which determine what their organizations do. At the top of most organizations is a small group of men who have held high office in the organization's government for a long time. Their control is rarely threatened by serious organized internal opposition. The real and permanent power rests with the men who hold the highest positions. Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1962. P. 160, According to Michels, trade union leaders organize themselves into an oligarchy, a small group that exercises control for corrupt or selfish purposes. This is an abuse of power leaves to the membership with little more than the right to provide funds and accept the decisions of the ruling oligarchy. 46 Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 14-19.

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about and is concerned solely with carrying out its mission. People are basically happy at their work and the anxiety level is low. People interact with each other smoothly and mutually support and cooperate with one another. There are no administrative, political or technical problems that cannot be resolved by utilizing the required system. Problems are easily solved by someone with the proper skills or techniques available to the leadership. Such an organization is truly an "ideal organization." Members of the model organization want to belong. The organizational ideal is the person the organization determines one to be.

In other words, the organization defines the person in terms of

what the organization needs the person to be. The UAW constitution is the supreme law of the union. It defines the organizational ideal of the UAW. That is not to say that the constitution describes how the union actually functions. It describes an appealing system, 48

but it is a fantasy. The model organization has never existed and never will. The organizational ideal is defined in the context of "organizational totalitarianism," a process in which a person's identity is determined by the organization. It has the effect of taking away a person's sense of self-direction and moral authority and replaces it with the organizational ideal. Organizational totalitarianism alienates people from themselves and others in the organization. That stands in stark contrast to the preamble to the UAW constitution which states: "that all men and women are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights that among

Ibid, p. 112, 15. The organizational ideal is based on what Schwartz calls the ego ideal. The ego ideal defines what the person one is supposed to be. The organizational ideal functions in similar fashion. The organizational ideal is the model identity for the committed organizational participant. The organizational ideal bridges the gap between the self and others within the organization. Disciples of the notion of a "model organization" present the organization as the ideal self. 48 Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 9,21.

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these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

Internal political conflicts have

short-circuited those ideals. The emergent system created by Walter Reuther in 1946 called the Administration Caucus established a totalitarian political system that remains in control of the International Executive Board. The IEB decides the needs, desires and happiness of the committed participants in the political environment of the UAW.

The UAW

International Executive Board is the technical structure that is supposed to transmit the union leadership's organizational ideal through the subordinate union staff/' The UAW's ideals were altered dramatically since 1980, when the union leadership focused less on the well being of the membership and more on expanding and perpetuating the union's organizational bureaucracy. The organizational ideal is a variation of cohort analysis. A cohort refers to a number of individuals who have some characteristics in common. Cohort analysis is restricted to those individuals who experience a particular event during a specified period 52

of time.

The UAW leadership cohort that has the most influence on the creation of

UAW Inc. includes those with power in the union and those who use coercion to sustain them. They include the UAW president, the IEB, the international staff, local union officers, bargaining committees and appointed representative. The Administration 49 Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at Anaheim, California, June, 1980, Article 3-8, Conventions, Preamble, p. 3-4. Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 15-16. Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 24-25. According to Schwartz, in organizational totalitarianism the organization, as defined by its leadership's understanding of their own actions, is proclaimed to be the organizational ideal; and the organization's power is used to impose this as an ego ideal for the organization's participants. Glen, Norval D. Cohort Analysis, (Thousand Oaks, 2005), p. 2.

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Caucus and its affiliate organizations in local unions are important factors that make up the leadership cohort. They contribute to shaping the organizational ideal in one way or another. They were power brokers as well. The caucus determined who moves up in the organization and when they are to be promoted. There is an important generational dimension to the UAW leadership cohort. The last group of Reutherites retired from the union in the 1980s. They were symbols of the lagging consciousness from the formative struggles that created the UAW. The leadership that followed them had an entirely different union experience and created an entirely different kind of labor organization.

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Chapter 1 The Study of American Industrial Labor History The historiography of labor history and the development of American employment/industrial relations are inextricably intertwined. The state performs an important function in the relationship between capital and labor in the United States. The state establishes the ground rules for commerce, business and labor organizational structures and employment relation systems. It is central to this discussion of how industrial relations and labor history are defined. The very idea of the "state" varied over time and location. Before the Civil War, local and state governments commanded more authority than the federal government. Encounters between labor and the "state" in the first half of the nineteenth century were mostly a local or regional matter, not a federal concern. Federal involvement in labor disputes became more common after the civil war when the United States established a strong centralized government. Interstate commerce was the catalyst for federal involvement in labor disputes as a constitution issue. Throughout American labor history, the state determined the status of labor in American society. The power of labor to influence the state has been restrained by the prominence of capital in the American political system. Since historians first began to study labor as a distinct field, the relationship between labor and the state has either been implicitly or explicitly a constituent of the field of labor history. A number of fine studies examine the

Employment or industrial relations are used interchangeably throughout this study because they mean the same thing. The expression, "employment relations" was used to describe the employer/employee relationship prior to the Industrial Revolution and in the post-industrial economy. The term "industrial relations" described the employer/employee relationship when large-scale industrial manufacturing dominated the American economy. In recent years the term employment relations has been used more often because industrial employment no longer dominates the American economy. The New Deal industrial relations system defines the labor-management relationship that existed in the mid-twentiethcentury. The New Deal system doesn't conform to the modern American economy.

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history of the relationship between the state, the law and labor-management relations. This study relies on Christopher Tomlins's The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Charles J. Morris's Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960, The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act, and Melvyn Dubofsky's The State and Labor in Modern America. Since 1920, industrial relations scholars and labor historians have written about a broad spectrum of historical changes in employment relations, labor and working-class culture. Industrial relations scholars studied the technical aspects of laws that shape the organizational dynamics of industrial firms, labor organizations and the effects on labormanagement relations. One may ask; what is important about the development of employment relations in the United States to the understanding of labor history? The answer is everything. The work lives of individuals in America is determined by their status at any given time and place within the context of the employment relations system. The dominant employment relations system in the United States today is the "employment-at-will doctrine." The employment-at-will doctrine was shaped by numerous court decisions and constitutional interpretations regarding the individual right to contract between an employee and employer. It was rooted in the master-servant relationship dating back to indentured servitude. Employment-at-will doctrine stipulates

2

Melvyn Dubofsky, The State of Labor in Modern America, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), Charles J. Morris, The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act, (Washington, DC: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,1971), Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960 (New York 1985), Including Tomlins more recent work, Law, Labor and Ideology in the Early American Republic (Cambridge university Press 1993). 3 Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation, New York: (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 7-8, 68-69, 74-75 By 1887, the ascendance of the contract transformed labor from a relationship of dependence to a commodity exchange in which buyers and sellers were equal and free, but mutually dependent on each other.

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employee and employer are free to end the employment relationship at any time, for any 4

reason, without liability providing that determination does not violate the Constitution. Provisions and the New Deal industrial relations policy that interfered with this doctrine were rolled back by the Taft-Hartley amendment. The development of the American employment relations system is essential to understanding American labor history. Employment relations from colonial times until the Revolutionary war were dominated by the master-servant principal that was inherited from British common law. Early settlers to the United States arrived as "indentured servants." They were sold to employers for a certain number of years in exchange for the cost of their passage. Most were agricultural workers, but the need for skilled artisans transformed employment relations in urban areas. The high demand for skilled labor resulted in wage competition between communities to lure artisans. The Massachusetts Bay Colony and other local government authorities tried to regulate competition by placing a limit on artisanal wages. Those early attempts to regulate the labor market failed because of the high demand for skilled labor. There was limited interest in collective labor organization until the emergence of the factory system. The first notable example of the labor organization was the Federal Society of Journeyman Cordwainers, the union of Philadelphia shoemakers established in 1794. John R. Commons provided the context for early labor disputes in "American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: a Sketch of Industrial Evolution." Common's study of the 4

Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Legal Regulation of Unions and Collective Bargaining," p. 63-64. Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 17-19.

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"industrial evolution" of the American political economy into an industrial society traced the progression of manufacture from the "primitive itinerate cobbler to the modern factory." Cordwainers and other artisans were organized into societies that policed the "trade." These organizations upheld traditional trade standards (as well as self-interest) by controlling the production and the knowledge of the craft. Labor conflicts arose when artisanal masters centralized manufacturing operations through the division of labor. Class divisions arose when "master societies" became "employer associations." When masters sought to regulate wages rather than prices, their interests diverged from the journeymen. There was no longer a "vertical cleavage between the producer and the consumer," but "horizontal cleavage between employer and laborer." During the early phases of industrialization employment relations were regulated by common-law traditions transmitted to the colonies from Great Britain. The obligations of employers and workers rights were not yet addressed in constitutional, state or federal laws. That left it up to the courts to decide the rights and obligations under employment contracts. The courts consistently ruled against collective action by labor organizations as criminal conspiracies. Protecting the community was basis for judicial involvement in employment relations. The Colony of Massachusetts Bay granted the first American gild charter of incorporation to the shoemakers of Boston for the purpose of "suppression of inferior

John R. Commons, "American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: a Sketch of Industrial Evolution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 24, Issue 1 (Nov., 1909), 40. 7 John R. Commons, "American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: a Sketch of Industrial Evolution," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, Volume 24, Issue 1 (Nov., 1909), p. 48. Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p.21.

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workmen who damaged the country." In order to protect the community from gild abuse of charter powers, "cases of difficulty" were disposed in the county courts. Commons explained the judicial regulation of labor in the Trial of Boot and Shoemakers of Philadelphia in terms of class separation. The conflict was between capital and labor, the market and labor, employers and wage earners, and the linkage of wages to prices.

The

"combinations trials" were supposed to protect the interests of the consuming public in the absence of a stable employment relations system. Artisans turned to political organizing in the early 1830s to protect their interests. They formed working men's political parties in New York and Philadelphia. The working men's parties didn't last long because they were wracked by competing interests. They disintegrated over internal disputes during the course of the 1832 election that was won by Andrew Jackson. The combinations trials established the first legal foundation for labor unions and determined labor's relationship to the state. The core of the judicial scrutiny was whether or not the organized artisans had a right to challenge the state's authority. The journeymens' demands for control over employment, production and wage rates were 12

condemned as attempts to "assert the regulatory privileges of corporation."

The

outcome of the debate determined the future course of the republic, either one based on 9

John R. Commons, "American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: a Sketch of Industrial Evolution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 24, Issue 1 (Nov., 1909), p. 41. John R. Commons, "American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: a Sketch of Industrial Evolution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 24, Issue 1 (Nov., 1909), 78. Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 21. Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960 (New York 1985), p. 43.

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democratic politics or on political restraint.

These cases were the "primary forum

during the formative period of American industrialism for formal encounters between a nascent labor movement and a nascent state."

Prosecutors charged that journeymen's

combinations were an illegitimate encroachment of "unlicensed power upon republican institutions."

The dispute culminated in the 1842 Commonwealth vs. Hunt decision

that recognized labor unions as legitimate organizations under the law.

The Hunt

decision was considered the "Magna Charta of trade-unionism" because it removed the 17

stigma of criminality from labor organizations. The period between the mid-1800s until 1910 was an era of violent warfare between labor unions and employers. The violent conflict illustrated the overwhelming power of capital and the willingness of the state to support capital interests. Coal mines and steel mills were the sites of violent labor conflict. Coal and steel mill operators unilaterally cut wages. The Molly Maguires, a group of militant Irish miners battled with mine owners in the 1860s and 1870s. Labor relations at the mines were handled by the Pinkerton Detective Agency. They used spies to infiltrate the Molly Maguires and gathered dubious evidence which was used to convict and execute ten members for murder. The Homestead Strike in 1892 pitted the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor and Ideology in the Early American Republic (Cambridge university Press 1993), p. 101. John R. Commons, "American Shoemakers, 1648-195: a Sketch of Industrial Evolution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 24, Issue 1 (Nov., 1909), p. 125. 14 Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor and Ideology in the Early American Republic (Cambridge university Press 1993), p. 109. 15

Ibid. p. 131.

Ibid. 108. Marjorie S. Turner, The Early American Conspiracy Cases, Their Place in Law: A Reinterpretation (San Diego, 1967), p. 13-30. 17 Ibid. 13-30. Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor and Ideology in the Early American Republic (Cambridge university Press 1993), p.209. Walter Nelles agrees with this view although Tomlins as well other scholars disagree with Leonard's sweeping assertion regarding this decision.

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Steel and Tin Workers against the Carnegie Steel Company in 1892. Henry Clay Frick was in charge of negotiations with the union. Frick barricaded the steel mill, hired 300 Pinkerton guards and hired strike breakers as replacement workers. The strikers engaged the Pinkerton's in a gun battle that resulted in dozens of deaths on both sides. The violence spread to other mills and lasted for several months. The Amalgamated Association was destroyed and unions in the steel industry were eliminated in Pittsburgh. The Haymarket Affair that occurred in Chicago in 1886 was the result of a violent labor strike at the McCormick Harvester Works. The company also locked out the strikers and brought in replacements. The police responded to a fight at a picket line by shooting at the protesters. Four were killed. A rally was held in Haymarket Square to protest the shootings. When the police arrived a bomb went off. The police fired into the crowd and killed ten more people. Eight anarchists were rounded up and convicted of the bombing. Four were hanged, one committed suicide and the rest received lengthy prison terms. The Pullman Strike is the final example of state-sanctioned violence against organized labor. The Pullman Palace Car Company was based in the company town Pullman, Illinois. Pullman workers lived in Pullman houses, paid for their food, utilities and taxes to the company. In 1893, a year of economic depression, the Pullman Company cut the worker's wages by twenty-two percent. Workers who protested were fired, so they appealed to the American Railway Union for help. Union president, Eugene V. Debs instigated strikes in rail yards across the country. President Grover Cleveland sent in Federal troops to restore order. The strikes were crushed, Debs was arrested and charged 18

with conspiracy to restrain commerce.

He was jailed, but emerged from prison as the

18 Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial

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leader of the American Socialist party. Industrial relations were a one-sided affair at the turn of the twentieth-century. Capital interests could always count on the local and state police, and the Federal government to defeat labor unions. Employers were free to hire private armies to brutalize workers who dared object to wages and working conditions. Federal legislation to protect against the power of monopoly capital was turned instead against organized labor. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was designed to prevent unfair business practices in the railroad industry. The law shifted responsibility for economic regulation from the states to the federal government. The Supreme Court ruled in 1895 against Debs because of his involvement in the Pullman strike that he as leader of the American Railway Union had violated the commerce clause. The federal 19

courts became an arena for granting injunctions against labor unions.

The Sherman

Antitrust Act of 1890 was intended to rein in monopolies, cartels and trusts. In 1893, two federal courts ruled the two acts could be used against unions for obstructing interstate commerce. The Sherman Act was first applied against the United Hatters of America in 1908. The union called for a consumer boycott against the D. E. Lowe Company to try to gain union recognition. They went even further by calling boycotts against other firms doing business with the Lowe Company, a practice known as a secondary boycott. The so-called Danbury Hatters decision directed the union to pay $250,000 in damages to the company. Federal commerce legislation introduced the court injunction as a potent weapon into the employment relationship. Unions campaigned to end the practice. In Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 24-26. Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 29-30. Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960 (New York 1985), p. 50-51.

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1914 the Clayton Act declared that labor was not a commodity or an article of commerce. However the courts continued to restrict strikes, pickets and boycotts. Unions did not get relief from injunctions until the 1930s. The 1932 Norris LaGuardia Act outlawed the use of injunctions in most labor disputes. "Yellow dog" contracts were outlawed. Yellow dog contracts were agreements in which workers were prohibited from joining a union as a term of employment The Progressive Era gave rise to a new order of modern occupational professionals, management practices and their associations. The special needs of the ascendant urbanindustrial society were met by members of the "new middle-class" who possessed unique skills in medicine, law, economics, social science, education, labor and business administration. Members of various fields organized associations in order to establish 'professional' standards for skills and training. Professional associations were organized by doctors, the American Medical Association, by lawyers, the American Bar Association, by teachers, the National Education Association. University professors organized into distinct disciplinary associations in the fields of history, economics, political science, sociological and behavioral sciences. Businessmen organized into groupings that reflected their particular industry or financial discipline. Numerous associations sprung up in the railroad industry, the American Society of Railroad Superintendents, Car Accountants Association, the Society of Railroad Comptrollers and so on. Two of the formidable associations that continue to wield influence today include 20

the National Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers.

Alfred D Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 1977), 131. Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang) 1967), 112-123.

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The Chamber is notable for its promotion of business and NAM for its anti-labor position. Management approached labor as just another problem that could be solved scientifically. Industrial engineering experts introduced "scientific management" to the organization of industrial processes. Frederick Taylor appropriated the idea of squeezing the most productivity of the least amount of movement in the late 1890s and applied the concept to industrial production. Production efficiency was the primary purpose of scientific 21

management, but a more important feature was worker control. Management combined economic incentives with industrial engineering to establish a best way of organizing production. Scientific management linked workers wages to output. Managers expected the profit motive of scientific management to undercut any desire for collective bargaining. Professional managers were separated from the line foremen. The line foremen were the "drive system" of management. Line foremen oversaw the hiring, firing and supervising of the day-to-day operations. Foremen used arbitrary and discriminatory treatment to control the works. The drive system caused extremely high turnover rates in the factories. The high turnover rate was a problem that plagued the early auto industry. In 1913, Henry Ford famously responded to the high turnover rate in his plants by offering five dollars a day wages. The five dollar wage rate

Harry Braverman, Labor And Monopoly Capital: The Denigration Of Work In The Twentieth Century (New York, 1974), 59-61. Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang), 294.

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was successful at maintaining stable employment levels. Ford's use of financial 22

incentives and the moving assembly line transformed industrial relations. Management combined the technical systems of scientific management with paternalistic workplace cultural systems. The human relations movement gained traction in the 1920s as a method of winning the hearts and minds of workers. Human relations theory suggested that contented workers were more productive. It coincided with the "American plan," the post World War I campaign by employers to reverse the gains labor unions made during the war. Unions were labeled unpatriotic and un-American because they undercut individualism and personal freedom. Companies launched an open shop campaign to eliminate independent unions and replace them with company unions that were dominated by the management. The enlightened employer avoided both state 23

interference and labor militancy by engaging corporate paternalism.

"Welfare

capitalism" instilled company loyalty by providing workers with a variety of social welfare programs. Welfare capitalism competed with ethnic charities by providing sickness benefits, group insurance and stock plans. Employers were determined to undermine the workers' cultural allegiance with ethnic programs. General Motors joined with nine other American corporations at the close of World War I to secretly establish the Special Conference Committee, an antiunion organization that introduced welfare capitalism for employees. GM's goal was to reduce 22 Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 33. 23 Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939, (New York: Cambridge University Press 1990), 160-161 and 171. Joseph A McCartin, Labor's Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern American Labor Relations, 1912-1921, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1997), 3-4. Mike Davis, Prisoner of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the Working Class, (Thetford: The Thetford Press 1986), 108.

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labor turnover and instill loyalty by creating a housing program and the Employee Savings and Investment Plan. "Modern Housing Corporation" built 3,200 homes in Flint for GM workers between 1919 and 1930. More than 35,000 GM workers lived in corporation housing by 1929 across North America. GM's "Employee Savings Fund" paid 6% interest on deposits of up to $300 a year for GM workers, with about 90 percent of eligible employees participating in the plan by 1928. The Employee Savings Fund also made low-cost mortgage loans to 18,000 GM employees who bought or built homes during the 1920s. In 1923 GM established The Industrial Mutual Association. The IMA provided education programs and recreational facilities for GM workers who paid dues of ten cents a week. In addition to sponsoring sports teams, the IMA offered members a gymnasium, bowling alleys, billiard tables, card rooms, facilities for dancing, an auditorium seating 6,500, and a summer-resort at Potters Lake. The IMA also sponsored a male glee club, a women's chorus, several bands, gardening clubs, hiking, and bridge clubs. The IMA also provided modest benefits to GM workers who paid half the premium cost for health insurance, sick pay, funeral insurance, and low-cost life insurance. In 1924 GM adopted a preferred start ownership plan for employees. GM gave common stock to workers who deposited money in the Employee Savings Fund, matching half the amount deposited. Employees gained full ownership of the stock if they kept their money in the Fund for five years. Most welfare capitalism programs collapse with the onset of the Great Depression, but the IMA thrived until 1932. The Buick production levels told the story of GM's financial problems. Buick production dropped from 266,758 in 1926, to 119,000 in 1930 and fell to 41,000 in 1932.24 The GM Stock

Duane Russell Brown, The Industrial Mutual Association: Contributor to the Educational, Recreational

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plan was canceled in 1930. Housing contracts were canceled because laid off workers couldn't make their payments. The homeowners blamed the corporation. The success of corporate welfare programs was difficult to measure and there were unintended 25

consequences.

The corporate-sponsored social programs created cultural

homogenization that encouraged the kind of rank-and-file solidarity that facilitated collective action when conditions got tough. The Great Depression was the catalyst for the New Deal policies that institutionalized the modern industrial relations system. By early 1933 unemployment reached about 13 million or twenty-five percent of the workforce. Farm income was down sixty-six percent, hourly wages were down sixty percent and industrial output was cut in half. The staggering unemployment that was created by the Depression erased management's progress of personnel policies. The National Industrial Recovery Act was passed in 1933. Section 7(a) declared that employees had the right to self-organize into labor unions. One year later rates of union density returned to similar levels witnessed at the end of World War I. However, in 1935 the Supreme Court ruled that the NIRA was unconstitutional.

The rejection of NIRA set the stage for a more comprehensive

national labor policy. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 established a framework for the American industrial relations system in the post-World War II era. The NLRA emerged from depression era political reforms that were aimed at restoring the economy. It was a and Charitable Betterment of Flint, Michigan, Michigan State University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1973, p. 143. 25 Sidney Fine, Sit-down: General Motors Strike of 1936-1937 (Ann Arbor: The University Of Michigan Press, 1969), p.23-27. Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 36-37.

54

major turning point in industrial relations because it shifted political power from capital interests in favor of workers' rights. The NLRA established the New Deal industrial relations system. It signaled change in the strategy of the labor movement from the trade union voluntarist model of the American Federation of Labor to industrial unionism of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The NLRA was a major turning point in industrial relations because it encouraged collective bargaining. The law gave workers the right to organize into unions, set standards for union elections and established unfair labor practices by employers. Once a majority of workers decided they wanted a union to represent them, management was required by law to negotiate wages, hours and working conditions. Managements' exclusive right to run the business was left intact. The key principle of the collective bargaining was "management acts, and labor reacts." The collective bargaining process affected the shop floor by establishing rules that were based on the existing system for organizing work. The principles of scientific management became the principles of job control unionism. The outcomes from negotiating labor contracts created more uniformity and fairness for the workers and increase work for 27

stability or management. The mobilization for World War II pulled the U.S economy out of depression and reinforced the New Deal industrial relations system. The necessity of war production demanded the cooperation of labor, management and the state. In 1942 Franklin Roosevelt established the War Labor Board, a tripartite agency of government, labor and management officials to arbitrate labor-management disputes. The goal was to avoid

Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 36-39.

55

labor strikes, wage and price inflation. The WLB didn't have any enforcement capability, but did promote wider acceptance of collective bargaining. Union membership increased dramatically during the war. For example, UAW had 246,038 28

members in 1940 and 1,065,030 by the end of 1944.

At the close of the war the union

rank-and-file were frustrated with the wage freezes and no strike pledges. The first six months of 1946 marked the highest concentration of labor-management conflict in 29

American history with 2,970,000 workers on strike. The postwar strike wave marked a turning point in industrial relations policy. The political climate in the postwar period shifted to the Conservatives as the Republicans took control of Congress. The NLRA was amended in 1947 with the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act or Taft-Hartley Act. Management's power was strengthened at the bargaining table by limiting the rights of unions to boycott and by establishing union obligations to bargain. Despite the setbacks in Congress union density reached its peak in the mid-1950s with thirty-five percent of private-sector workers organized into unions. The AFL and CIO federations merged in 1955 to become AFLCIO. The major industrial unions focused on expanding wage and benefits to include supplementary unemployment benefits, pensions, and severance payments for workers dislocated by technology, plant closings and other fringe benefits. In the meantime management and Republican lawmakers pressed for more limitations on unions. Congressional hearings in the late 1950s into corruption in the Teamsters Union culminated in the passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act or 8

33rd Constitutional Report UA W June, 2002, "Average Dues Paying Membership 1936-2002," p. 19.

29 Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 40-41.

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Landrum Griffin Act. The act established reporting and disclosure requirements for union finances, specified the rights of individual union members and regulated how union leaders represented their members. The 1960s was a period of economic growth and widespread social movement activity that influenced industrial relations. The movement culture of the 1960s was illustrated by the civil rights campaign and anti-Vietnam War protest and urban riots. Workers expressed their feeling of powerlessness in the workplace by engaging in wildcat strikes and militant opposition to union leadership. The wave of shop floor conflict was labeled the "blue-collar blues" a situation where workers rebelled against arbitrary speedups, forced overtime, and dangerous working conditions. The disorder in the workplace resulted in a resurgence of the use of human relations theory by industrial labor relations. Human resource professionals and organization of psychologists were brought into labor relations departments to organize employment strategies and policies. New high-tech companies developed human resource strategies and policies that made it difficult for unions to organize. Human resource movement in industrial relations spawned Quality of Work Life programs that were aimed at easing employee anxiety, 31

improving job satisfaction and productivity.

Employer directed human resource

development was insufficient in solving the employment problems associated with deindustrialization.

Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 40-42. 31 Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 42-43.

57

The 1970s marked the beginning of renewed experimentation with labormanagement cooperation programs. Labor-management committees were established and union and nonunion workplaces. Labor-management committees were nothing new in employment relations. There had been sporadic experiments with labor-management committees in Toledo, Ohio and Louisville, Kentucky in the 1940s. The committees 32

were established in Northeast and Midwest communities through the 1950s and 60s. Those communities shared common characteristics of high unemployment, poor labor relations between companies and their unions, high rates of unionization and a deteriorating local economic base. Local civic leaders typically worked closely with business and labor officials to establish common goals for the mutual benefit of the entire community. Labor-management committees were established to improve labormanagement relations, human resource development, training, increased productivity and local economic development. The bulk of the funding came from the Department of 33

Labor under provisions of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. Labor-management committees were successful in some communities but they ran the risk of running afoul with provisions of the National Labor Relations Act that prevent employers from interfering with union activity. In 1973, Eric Trist, a leader in the field of organizational development programs in Europe became a consultant for the Jamestown New York labor-management committee. He recommended that employee

Richard D. Leone and Michael F. Eleey, "The Origins and Operations of Area Labor-Management Committees," Monthly Labor Review, 1983 Vol.106, No. 5, p. 37. Michael Schuster, "The Impact of Union Management Cooperation on Productivity and Employment," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, April 1983, p. 416. 33 Richard D. Leone and Michael F. Eleey, "The Origins and Operations of Area Labor-Management Committees," Monthly Labor Review, 1983 Vol.106, No. 5, p. 38.

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participation committees be established at local work sites.

Workplace employee

participation committees were subsumed in "Quality of Work Life" programs. QWL programs took on a variety of forms that included problem-solving teams and quality (improvement) circles. Evidence for the increase in labor-management cooperation activity was reflected in the increased number of joint safety committees. The Bureau of National Affairs reported a survey of collective bargaining agreements that included provisions for joint committees: thirty-one percent in 1970, thirty-nine percent in 1975 35

and forty-three percent in 1979. Congress acted in 1978 to preserve independent collective bargaining and promote the successful aspects of labor-management committees. The LaborManagement Cooperation Act of 1978 was designed for that purpose.

Legislative

history for LMCA began in 1976 when Congressman Stanley Lundine (and the former mayor of Jamestown, New York) introduced a Human Resource Development Act. The act called for Federal support of labor-management cooperation. However, those provisions were already included in the Humphrey Hawkins Full Employment Act. In 1978 labor-management cooperation provisions were included as a rider to the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. The Labor-Management Cooperation Act of 1978 was a self-contained amendment to the NLRA that encouraged joint approaches to problems, and labor-management relationships. The LMCA was 34 Richard D. Leone and Michael F. Eleey, "The Origins and Operations of Area Labor-Management Committees," Monthly Labor Review, 1983 Vol.106, No. 5, p. 39. 35 Michael Schuster, "The Impact of Union Management Cooperation on Productivity and Employment," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, April 1983, p. 416. Michael Schuster, "The Impact of Union Management Cooperation on Productivity and Employment," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, April 1983, p. 416. See Appendix E, "Assistance to Plant, Area, And Industry-wide Labor-Management Committees."

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implemented by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service which also became the 37

sole source of Federal funding for labor-management committees.

The LMCA was

supposed to address problems that could not be solved collective bargaining. Collectivebargaining and joint labor-management committees were supposed to complement each other to the benefit of employers, workers and their communities. Labor and management were on the verge of a prosperous collaborative relationship. The events that unfolded in the 1980s told a different story. Ronald Reagan's election as President in 1980 reflected the conservative political shift in America that marked the beginning of the end of the New Deal industrial relations system. Reagan's confrontation with the Professional Air Traffic Controller Union (PATCO) in 1981 illustrated the direction of industrial relations were going in the 1980s. PATCO dramatically misread the depth of Reagan's antiunion ideology when they endorsed his run for the presidency in 1980. Reagan returned the favor one year later by disbanding PATCO because the union engaged in an illegal strike. Reagan's actions sent a strong message to employers and organized labor. By firing the striking air traffic controllers Reagan demonstrated that unions have lost much of their political power and public support. After the PATCO firings, employers seized the initiative at the bargaining table. The steep recession of 1981-83 emboldened employers to avoid or abolish collective-bargaining altogether. There were massive layoffs and heavily unionized industrial sectors. With the deindustrialization of America well underway, concessionary bargaining became the new pattern for industrial relations. Job loss, wage and benefits cuts were common in the industrial sector. New forms of employee 37 Richard D. Leone and Michael F. Eleey, "The Origins and Operations of Area Labor-Management Committees," Monthly Labor Review, 1983 Vol.106, No. 5, p. 41.

60

participation and a work organization appeared in the auto industry.

The

implementation of labor-management committees led to the transformation of the UAW. The conditions that gave rise to the post-World War II industrial relations system was rooted in the New Deal policies intended to address the collapse of the capitalist system in the 1930s. In the 1980s the New Deal industrial relations system was failing to provide prosperity for American workers in the global economic environment. The consensus between labor and capital crumpled as union strength dropped below pre-New Deal levels. The employment relations trends tracked the decline in union density. Workers were treated as commodities as they lost bargaining power. The changing status of workers was a symptom of the unbridled expansion of capitalism on a global scale. Industrial relations was created as an independent academic field in 1920 with the establishment of the Bureau of Commercial and Industrial Relations. John R. Commons, a professor of economics at the University of Wisconsin in early twentieth century was the father of labor history and industrial relations. The field of industrial relations was defined as "the multidisciplinary study of the employment relationship, with particular emphasis on the relations between employers and workers. Industrial relations scholars seek to understand the forces of an economic, social, political, psychological and organizational nature that affect the employment relationship; the goals, behaviors, practices, and organizations of employers and workers; the causes and consequences of imperfections and maladjustments in the employment relationship that adversely affect economic efficiency, workplace equity, and industrial well-being; and the practices and

Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), "The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Industrial Relations System," p. 43-44.

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policies that resolve these problems."

Under the direction of Commons, the Bureau

offered courses in industrial relations in the Department of Economics as an extension of the University of Wisconsin. The industrial relations field of study included labor legislation, labor history, industrial government, labor-management and the causes and cures for unemployment.

Commons and his proteges, Selig Perlman, Philip Taft and

Don Lescohier founded the "Wisconsin School" of labor history.

The institutional

approach to labor history emphasized the political and economic factors related to organized labor. Three important events marked the birth of industrial relations. The first event was the publication of monthly employment management periodicals beginning with the Industrial Relations: Bloomfield Labor Digest. The second event was the establishment of the Industrial Relations Association of America in 1920. The IRAA was previously called the Employment Managers' Association, an organization of business people interested in personnel work. The IRAA published a monthly journal entitled Personnel. Most of the members of the IRAA were involved in management or personnel work, but some were academics. The instructors in the industrial relations program at the University of Wisconsin were institutional labor economists. They were interested in all aspects of the employment relationship, but focused primarily on research and teaching of labor history, collective bargaining, labor legislation and unemployment. Most academics advocated interventionist public policies to encourage collective bargaining, 39 Bruce Kaufman, The Origins and Evolution of the Field ofIndustrial Relations, Cornell studies in industrial and labor relations, no. 25, (Ithaca: Industrial Labor Relations Press, 1993), p. 18. 40 Bruce Kaufman, The Origins and Evolution of the Field ofIndustrial Relations, Cornell studies in industrial and labor relations, no. 25, (Ithaca: Industrial Labor Relations Press, 1993), p. 10. 41 Simeon Larsen and Bruce Nissen editors, Theories of the Labor Movement, "The Labor Movement as "Pure and Simple": Business Unionism," (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), p 131.

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establish minimum wage, employment standards and income security insurance programs.

The third important event was the passage of the Kansas Industrial Court

Act of 1920 that created the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations. It was the first court in 43

the nation authorized to settle labor disputes through binding arbitration. Industrial relations literature focused on three approaches; neoclassical economics, neo-Marxist and institutional economics. The neoclassical economic approach to employment relations are subject to the market laws of supply and demand where workers are treated as commodities. Workers were considered instruments of production. Karl Marx rejected that view of labor as overly simplistic. Marx believed industrialization and the capitalist system created an irreconcilable conflict of class interest between labor and capital. Workers were the transformative agents who added value and created wealth in the production process, rather than the owners of capital. Marx believed that workers would continue to be exploited as long as they didn't own or control the means of production. He predicted that the continued exploitation of workers would lead to a revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system and the creation of a socialist state. Industrial relations scholars have either built upon certain aspects of Marxist theory or rejected them in total. Two well-known British political economists, Sidney and Beatrice Webb agreed with Marx's concept of class-conflict, but rejected his notions of revolutionary transformation. The Webbs argued that workers would join with allies in their community to organize a socialist state by establishing an industrial democratic 42 Bruce Kaufman, The Origins and Evolution of the Field of Industrial Relations, Cornell studies in industrial and labor relations, no. 25, (Ithaca: Industrial Labor Relations Press, 1993), p. 19. 43 Bruce Kaufman, The Origins and Evolution of the Field of Industrial Relations, Cornell studies in industrial and labor relations, no. 25, (Ithaca: Industrial Labor Relations Press, 1993), p. 11.

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system. Industrial democracy referred to a range of plans to empower ordinary people through legislation, union representation, collective bargaining, socialization of industry and the economy. Institutional economists favored a market-centered philosophy of employment relations. John R. Commons and Selig Perlman rejected Marx's notions that class conflict would lead to an overthrow of the capitalist system. Commons agreed that there were inherent conflicts of interest between workers and their employers under the capitalist system. However, Commons believed markets rather than class-conflict influenced policies, structures and processes that governed employment relations. The workers' enemy was the markets, not the capitalists. Selig Perlman rejected the idea of classconflict in favor of a jobs-conscious employment relations system. Perlman argued that workers were interested in protecting jobs and equitable allocation of employment opportunities rather than raising political challenges to the capitalist system. The neoclassical treatment of workers-as-commodities and instruments of production illustrates the imbalance of power between labor and capital. The struggle for power is a central feature of employment relations and the control of the means of 44

production involves power.

However, ownership is not always the only aspect of

power. The inequality of power in the employment relationship is possible when public attitudes, political power and government policies favor an unregulated capitalist system. Balance can be brought to bear on the system through the maintenance of democratic institutions such as trade unions and government regulations that can restrict the power of capital. 44 Richard Hyman, "What is Industrial Relations?" in Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction , (London: MacMillan, 1975), p. 26.

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At the turn of the twentieth century, the Webbs identified the spread the Industrial Revolution, the massive expansion of international trade and the "evil effect" of unbridled competition as a structural problem that was incompatible with a pluralist state. They argued that the framers of the United States constitution retained autocratic centers of power "unchecked in the factory, farm and mine." The middle and upper-class could "see no more inconsistency between democracy and unrestrained capitalist enterprise, 45

than Washington or Jefferson did between democracy and slavery".

The state provided

the owners of the means of production with the judicial protections that allowed them to dictate the terms of employment to workers. The "freedom of contract" system required individual workers to negotiate their terms of employment. The sellers of labor cannot readily withhold it from the market because "labor power is perishable" in the capitalist system.

The capitalist system offered workers few alternatives beyond continued

unemployment and poverty. The remedy for this imbalance of power was industrial democracy. The Webbs envisioned a system of industrial democracy to balance the distribution of power throughout industry and society. They preferred collective bargaining within a framework of trade unions as the means to give workers a voice in the employment relationship. Strong trade unions could provide workers with access to education, social welfare benefits and political power. The Webbs' scheme for industrial democracy placed trade unions at the center of a process to transform the capitalist system into a socialist society. 45 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, (London: Longmans, 1897), p. 841. 46 Richard Hyman, "What is Industrial Relations?" in Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction , (London: MacMillan, 1975), p. 23

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Institutional economists valued labor unions as a means to integrate workers into the capitalist system rather than oppose it. Trade unions served to strengthen workers bargaining power with employers. Commons believed that workers were not class conscious in the socialist sense, but "wage conscious" in a common effort with other workers to gain better wages.

Commons provided many of the ideas for New Deal

policies that regulate collective bargaining through modern trade unions. Industrial relations scholars continued to analyze and develop employment relations theory within the New Deal framework. John T. Dunlop developed a systems model to in order better understand how the various actors engaged in employment relations adapt to economic changes. Dunlop identified common properties and structures that respond to specific market influences. The status of labor was determined by the interaction with the employer, potential rival workers and their organizations and 48

government agencies.

Management and their organizations retained their power under

the New Deal industrial relations system. Labor organizations abandoned claims to control of the workplace and settled into a collaborative relationship with management. Socially progressive ideals of some unions in the labor movement were silenced during the Cold War and consigned to rhetoric within the Democratic Party. The post-World War II industrial relations system benefitted labor and capital as long as the economy and labor unions remained strong. The institutional approach to industrial relations was the dominant technical system under the New Deal framework, but everything changed in the 1980s. 47 John R. Commons, "Introduction," in Commons, et al., History ofLabor in the United States. Vol. 1, (New York: Macmillan, 1935), p.15. 48 John T. Dunlop. 1950. "Economic Model of a Trade Union" in Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, (New York: Augustus M. Kelly. Inc., 1950), p. 99.

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Harry Katz examined the impact of global economic pressures on the industrial relations system in the auto industry in his 1985 book, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the US Automobile Industry. The UAW was the leader in establishing pattern bargaining in the industry. Until 1980, industrial relations with automakers were illustrated by strict wage rules, work standards and numerous job classifications with carefully defined tasks. Wage rates were attached to job classifications, seniority and COLA adjustments rather than individual performance. Pattern agreements with the big three automakers guaranteed a labor system of minimal cost variation. The system delivered rising living standards and job security for UAW members until 1980. A severe recession in 1981 and a flood of foreign imports caused the UAW to accept contract concessions in the hope of improving company competitiveness. The union agreed to wage freezes, stock ownership plans and the reduction of job classifications. Concessionary bargaining to allow employers greater flexibility and saying wage rates and assigning labor. The assembly line was replaced by a team production system that was labeled Quality of Work Life. Katz argued that QWL programs improved the performance and plants with poor industrial relations. He felt that QWL programs reduced absenteeism and grievances. Katz advocated the increased use of QWL programs over traditional collective bargaining. For Katz, the only viable path for unionized workers was increased cooperation with employers. The theme of the changing industrial relations system was broadened in Converging Divergences: Worldwide Changes in Employment Systems to include other advanced industrialized countries. Katz and Darbishire focused on the increasing 49 Harry C. Katz, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the US Automobile Industry, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985).

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variations in employment systems since 1980 in automobile and telecommunication industries in seven industrialized countries: the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Japan, Sweden and Italy. Although individual countries had standard internal employment relations systems, global economic pressures were forcing them to increase the (diverge from the standard employment system) variation of employment practices. The authors found that employment relations systems were converging towards four common patterns; low wages, human resource management (HRM), Japanese oriented practices and joint team-based production. Katz and Darbishire showed that the changing structure of global labor markets is forcing changes in the established national industrial relations systems. The authors linked the increase of employment systems variation to wage inequality in the auto industry and suggest that it is likely to continue. Historiography Institutional labor historians have argued that the promise of post-World War II prosperity extended from the bargaining table to the larger American society. The UAW was a favorite subject. Irving Howe and B. J. Widick's 1949 sympathetic history of the UAW recognized the potential of Walter Reuther's leadership even as he was still consolidating his power. Reuther embodied the paradox of the UAW's ideological past in the emerging right wing political climate. Reuther the Socialist was a dedicated antiCommunist who purged the left from the union, but he had no choice—at least that was the narrative of the Cold War era historians. Sidney Fine's 1969 encyclopedic history of the sit-down strike in Flint, Michigan titled Sit Down: The General Motors Strike of

Harry C. Katz and Owen Darbishire, Converging Divergences: Worldwide Changes in Employment System, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

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1936-1937-was published as the civil rights movement turned violent in Detroit and other major industrial centers. His examination of the auto industry and the UAW was at its core a struggle for power. It was a political battle in which both sides used any means available, both legal and illegal to justify the outcome. Sit down was the essential reference of the GM sit-down strike, but contained little knowledge of the rank-and-file or their experience. Some labor historians followed in the institutional tradition of Fine while writing about the UAW, but offered alternative perspectives to the customary Cold War narrative. Henry Kraus was a union activist and labor journalist in the 1930s who participated in the founding of the UAW as the editor of the official union newspaper, The Autoworker. In 1947, Kraus first published The Many and the Few, an incomplete and admittedly sympathetic account of Communist involvement in the Flint sit-down strike. Kraus published the second edition in 1985 that included additional information about his personal involvement and oral histories of sit-down participants. It significantly expanded the narrative of the tactics and actions of the sit-downers. Critics have dismissed the work for its lack of objectivity. Some labor historians choose to ignore it altogether. Kraus won a MacArthur Foundation grant in 1984 for his work in Europe as an art historian. He used the grant money to research a second book about the UAW, Heroes of Unwritten Story: The UAW, 1934-39. The Heroes of Unwritten Story returned to the story about the sit-down strike that he started in The Many and the Few. Kraus broadened in the story of the formation of the UAW by including the union's 1934 activity in Cleveland, the factional infighting and the role of the AFL in the efforts to sabotage UAW organizing. Kraus enriched the historical archival material about the

69

formation of the UAW by using a portion of the MacArthur Foundation grant to transcribe the comprehensive oral histories of the sit-down strike that were recorded for the University of Michigan Flint Labor History Project. The Wisconsin school historians were challenged by a new generation of historians in the 1960s and 1970s. The "new labor historians" rejected institutional approach for being narrowly focused on large organizations who were led by white Anglo-Saxon men. There were other actors who shaped history besides the politically and economically powerful. The trouble with the institutional labor history was the absence of the workers. The new labor history was the study of labor from the bottomup. Their studies focused the ordinary, the inarticulate, their families, workplaces and communities. The new labor historians transformed the field by expanding the categories of historical interpretation. New labor historians often criticized institutional historians for producing unimaginative studies of men, their institutions and social and cultural viewpoints while ignoring the human aspects of labor history. Working-class histories that emphasized individual agency were in style, whereas studies of institutions and organizational bureaucracies were out of fashion. They produced a prolific body of micro-histories that examined and re-examined social aspects of the working-classes. The studies broadened the understanding of immigrants, African Americans and women where they lived and toiled in the homes, shops, factories and communities. Herbert Gutman, David Brody and David Montgomery defined modern American labor history. They were inspired by British historians Edward P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawn who applied the tools of sociology and anthropology. Gutman modeled his

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work after Thompson's The Making of the English Working-Class, a study of preindustrial customs, traditions and community. Gutman identified two problems with the old labor history in his 1973 article "Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919."

First, labor history ought not to be limited to the experiences of

union members or their unions because few workers belonged to unions before 1940. Second, the older labor historians tended to isolate American workers from their own subcultures and the larger national culture. A broader approach to working-class history was necessary. Gutman focused on community to investigate working-class values, activities and class relations. David Brody's Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era, was inspired by E.P. Thompson. Brody focused on class development of steel 52

workers and their communities in the nonunion steel industry.

David Montgomery's

1967 book, Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862-1872 placed workers and their organizations at the center of the national political debate over the future of American society. Montgomery showed that there were competing versions of republicanism between the commercial interests and the working class. He examined class formation in the shop floor conflict and how it was transmitted through the familiar social and political organizations. The working-class sought to improve their status by acting through reform associations, labor parties, trade unions and the International 53

Workingmen's Association.

Montgomery's The Fall of the House of Labor: The

Workplace, The State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 was a turning point in Herbert G. Gutman, "Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919," American Historical Review, LXXVIII (June 1973). 52 David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). 53 David Montgomery, Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862-1872, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967).

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the analysis of workers' control of the shop floor. He argued that skilled workers not employers controlled the factory production process. "There was no way that late nineteenth-century employers in the iron industry could dispense with the functional autonomy of the craftsmen, but they could make use of it."

At the turn of the century

mechanization and the stopwatch became symbols of "scientific management." "The last thing a good manager would think of doing would be to make his possibilities of shop management the subject of referendum."

Scientific management perfected the "drive

system," a process that radicalized the workers. The workers took direct action to regain control of the workplace. The state sided with the corporations prevailed in a decisive battle labor. The slogan "workers control" became part of the corporate public relations rhetoric.

Management's prerogative to control business was enshrined in the New Deal

industrial relations system in the twentieth-century. Peter Friedlander's 1975 work, The Emergence of a UAW Local, directly influenced by David Montgomery's emphasis on shop floor culture, is based almost entirely on the 57

oral account of Edmond Kord, one of the founders of UAW Local 229.

It is a detailed

history of how a small group of radicals at the Detroit Parts Company transformed themselves from the first generation of Polish peasant immigrants into a militant UAW local. Contrary to the previous work of institutional historians, Friedlander views the emergence of bureaucratic unionism at Local 229 as a bottom up phenomenon.

David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, The State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925, (New York, 1987) 20. 55

Ibid. 256.

56

Ibid. 464. 57 Peter Friedlander, The Emergence of a UAW Local, 1936-1939: A study in Class and Culture, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1975).

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Ronald Edsforth's 1987 study of class formation, community politics and shop floor militancy in GM's hometown of Flint, Michigan contained all the features of the new labor history. Before GM turned Flint into a company town it fell under the spell of the Socialist Party. In 1911, a year after GM's financial breakdown, the citizens of Flint elected John Menton, a Socialist, cigar maker and longtime union member as mayor of the city. The reaction of the business community was swift. C.S. Mott mobilized businessmen and mainstream politicians to defeat Menton in the next election. Mott remained a strong influence on Flint politics and GM long after the company shifted its weight to Detroit. For Edsforth, the auto industry represented a second industrial revolution that had different social and political implications than the first. Ordinary people benefited from industrial capitalism in a way that wasn't possible before. The rise of the auto industry created a mass consumer culture that diffused class tensions. GM's institutional corporate welfare program called the Industrial Mutual Association (IMA) sponsored movies, concerts, dances and other recreational programs to instill employee loyalty. The Depression destroyed the benefits of welfare capitalism and created workers' resentment that fueled the class consciousness. But this was a different kind of class consciousness according to Edsforth. The workers' resentment was driven more by 58

the loss of access to consumer culture than the desire for social transformation. The issue of race was an important analytical category and reinterpreting labor history. In their 1979 collaborative work Black Detroit and the Rise of the UA W, August Meier and Elliot Rudwick discuss the impact of race in the UAW. Prior to the 1941 Ford strike, African Americans were excluded from unions or used as strike breakers. In 58 Ronald Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint Michigan, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press 1987)

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General Motors they were relegated to the foundries in Flint, Saginaw and Detroit. Some African-Americans joined the sit-down strike in Flint, but most were bystanders. At the sit-down strike at the Detroit Chevrolet Gear and Axle, most African-Americans sided 59

with those who opposed the strike.

The Ford strike was a turning point for race

relations the auto industry. The UAW cracked down on white workers who conducted wildcat 'hate' strikes to protest African American promotions in the plants. Detroit's African American community subsequently forged an important political alliance with the UAW that would lead to the integration of the production lines, but, racist attitudes persisted. The shifting social and political currents of the 1960s strained the alliance. The civil rights movement reinvigorated shop floor radicalism of a different variety. In 1968, the Black radical movement erupted in Detroit's auto plants. Black revolutionary labor organizations were created at all the Detroit plants; Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM), Fort Revolutionary Union Movement (FRUM), General Motors Revolutionary Union Movement (GRUM) and the Forge Revolutionary Union Movement (FORUM). They also spread to other cities and states; The Harvester Revolutionary Union Movement (HARUM) in Chicago, the Black Panther Caucus in Fremont, California and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers.

Militant reform

movements forced the UAW was to revisit the issue of racism in the union. Heather Thompson brought the issue of UAW African American militant race reform movements into the historical mainstream. Thompson's work on dissident caucuses within the UAW 59 August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, Black Detroit and The Rise of the UA W, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 36-37. Manning Marable, Raced, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black of America, 1945-1990, (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), p. 116-119. Heather Ann Thompson, "Auto Workers, Dissent, and the UAW: Detroit and Lordstown," Robert Asher and Ronald Edsforth, Autowork, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 188-195.

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in Detroit and Lordstown illustrates the International's virulent intolerance of rank and file dissent. The study of the role of women in interpreting labor history developed into an entire field of gender studies. Pioneers in the field of women's labor history like Alice KesslerHarris and Joan Wallach Scott sought to correct the historical narrative in which women's perspectives were absent. Wallach recognized that both women's and men's perspectives were characterized by gender. For Wallach, historians often incorrectly used the term gender as a synonym for women. Gender is like race in that gender is not a natural experience any more than skin color determines race, they are social constructions.

Perceptions of gender and race are historically and regionally

determined. Ava Barron argued that gender should be included as an analytical category in all historical writing. The problem with labor history was that men set the agenda as though history was exclusively a male experience. Nancy Gabin and Dorothy Cobble incorporated the study of the history of the American feminist movement into their studies of the struggle for women's rights in the UAW, on the shop floor and in the political arena. The UAW successfully pressed for the elimination of two-tiered wage systems, discrimination against married women and sexual division of labor. The UAW institutionalized women's place in the union when it established the UAW Women's Department in 1944. Sexually discriminatory features weren't fully removed from collective bargaining agreements for another 15 years. With

Joan Wallach Scott, Editor, Feminism and History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 153156. Ava Barron, Editor, Work Gendered: Toward a New History of American Labor, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 6-24.

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those obstacles removed, women still faced laws that limited the amount of hours that women were allowed to work or the amount of weight they were allowed to lift.

Gabin

and Cobble discovered that seniority-based unions were critical conduits for genderbased protest at the bargaining table and to reform discriminatory wage and hour laws. The proliferation of the social and cultural dimensions perspectives enriched our understanding UAW history, but structural and cultural changes to the union went unnoticed. Sociologist, Ruth Milkman's case study of the GM assembly plant in Linden, New Jersey Farewell to Factory, began to address the transformation of the UAW. She introduced the uninitiated observer of the UAW to the bargaining trends of concessions, Jobs Opportunity Bank-Security (JOBS) and the "jointness" concept. However, her conclusions about the effects on workers who took buyouts and participated in jointness retraining were overly optimistic. Only two years after workers took buyouts, just one in five regretted their decision.

Josie Kearns conducted a similar case study of

auto workers displaced from their jobs at Fisher-I and Buick in Flint, Michigan. She found that as plants close psychological and financial hardships are certain. Workers are suddenly forced to deal with the dual loss of identity and livelihood. Her interview with a local director at the UAW-GM Human Resource Center (HRC) indicated that massive training programs "do not necessarily work." Half of the people dropped out of training

Dorothy Sue Cobble, Recapturing Working-Class Feminism: Union Woman in the Postwar Era, Chapter 4 in an anthology: Joanne Meyerowitz, Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1994), 57-83. Nancy Gabin, "Time out of Mind: The UAW's Response to Female labor Laws and Mandatory Overtime in the 1960s, Chapter 14 in an anthology: Ava Barron, Editor, Work Gendered: Toward a New History of American Labor, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 351-374. Nancy F. Gabin, Feminism in the Labor Movement: Women and the United Auto Workers (1935-1975), (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990), p. 180-185. 64 Ruth Milkman, Farewell to Factory: Auto workers in the Late Twentieth Century, (Berkley: University of California Press 1997), 113.

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and others who complete their programs could not find work in their field. Milkman and other historians accepted jointness, job security and employee training programs at face value. Nelson Lichtenstein briefly addressed these new cooperative trends with skepticism but did not fully elaborate upon the lasting implications of the union's turn toward "enterprise unionism."

Observers of the UAW typically express concern over

the 'closeness' of the relationship between labor and management, but fail to recognize the structural changes that have taken hold in the union. To better understand the implication of the jointness in modern UAW labor contracts one must peer deeper into the union's institutional relationship with the auto industry. There was a return to the institutional approach to UAW history in the mid-1990s that focused on Walter Reuther and the political developments during his administration. Reuther continued to struggle for social democracy until the 1960s. Political consensus was the most potent obstacle to social democratic reforms in Boyle's 1995 account of the UAW. Reuther's vision of a social democratic society faded because racial division and the Vietnam War splintered the Democratic Party coalition. Many of the UAW's commitments to social change ended with the death of Walter Reuther in 1970. The union's agenda for an American version of social democracy was consistently at odds with the philosophy of neo-liberal economics which guided business unionism. Jonathan Cutler argued that the failure of the UAW to produce a durable social and economic consensus represented "the road not taken." His 2004 study of the River Rouge complex near Detroit, Labor's Time: Shorter Hours, the UAW, And the Struggle for American

Josie Kearns, Life After the Line, (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1990), 11-12. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit; Walter and the Fate of the American labor Movement, (New York, Basic Books 1995), 444.

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Unionism argued that UAW and the American labor movement missed an opportunity to become politically and socially progressive institutions. Cutler placed the shorter hours movement at the center of the racially and politically charged factional debates within the UAW in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, John Barnard's recent contribution American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years is yet another sympathetic and comprehensive examination of the UAW leadership, union structure, UAW bargaining achievements and the union's role in the postwar political economy. Melvyn Dubofsky and Lawrence T. McDonnell were skeptical of the proliferation of social and cultural micro-histories that characterized the new labor history. They criticized the trends in labor history that over-sentimentalize the role of workers and their subcultures. For Dubofsky, the emphasis on the private rather than the public, the cultural rather than the political makes it difficult to understand two major themes of labor history. The major themes are the relationship between capital and labor, and the growth and decline of unions.

Similarly McDonnell argues that historians need to

redirect the "romantic notion of the rank-and-file" struggle for power, control and survival under the capitalist system. Herbert Gutman and David Montgomery presented the limitations of workers under the capitalist system, but ignored capitalism's triumph over labor. There is a need to determine the social, economic and political price workers pay for the triumph of capitalism.

Melvyn Dubofsky, The State of Labor in Modern America, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 1994), xi. /TO

Lawrence T. McDonnell, 'You Are Too Sentimental: Problems and Suggestions for a New Labor History," Journal oj Social History, Volume 17, (Summer, 1994), 644-46.

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The new-institutional history by Christopher L. Tomlins contributed to the discussion of the triumph of capital over labor. Tomlins viewed the Wagner Act as an oppressive law that restricted the labor movement and robbed unions of their autonomy. He observed that modern unions exist at the pleasure of a conservative state bureaucracy. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Tomlins conclude that New Deal policy was a conservative triumph of capital over labor. The economic and political realities of modern America has by most accounts placed labor on a short leash. That became abundantly clear in 1994 when the Republicans captured Congress. The Republican and employers turned the Wagner Act against labor unions. The rise in popularity of labormanagement committees was augmented by a strict adversarial labor relations regime. Employers shed jobs and shipped operations overseas. Tomlins's analysis of labor law was in a sense a response to McDonnell's and Dubofsky's call for a return to the foundation of labor history studies so that we can better understand organized labor's defeat in America. McDonnell and Dubofsky emphasized the path to a better understanding of the working-class experience requires a more thorough examination of the labor process and the world economy. The emphasis on working-class culture led to the neglect of the changes that were occurring in the institutional structures within which people spend their work lives. Just as workers must adapt to life within a particular social and cultural environment; institutions of employment must also adapt to the changing technical and political dynamics capitalism. Labor historians must also be mindful of the technical, political and cultural dimensions of the organizational structures within which workers live every day.

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Historians and industrial relations specialists who studied the UAW failed to recognize significant events that changed the course of history and industrial relations in the auto industry. There is a range of historical studies that examine a wide range of perspectives regarding the UAW. Industrial relations scholars who examined the UAW focused on technical issues like institutional structure, bargaining trends and outcomes, and interactions with management. Scholars have noted that the rise of the UAW enhanced both the economic position of the working-class and strengthened the position of business in society by creating a culture of consumption. The presence of the unionstabilized labor-management relationship in the auto industry established a pattern of predictability throughout the industrialized sector. It's a familiar story, workers lost interest in social and political activism after they had gained comfortable access to the 69

"consumer oriented society."

Scholars have missed the crucial events that triggered

the unraveling of labor-management consensus that began with the concessionary bargaining in the auto industry. This study is an effort to bridge that gap.

69 Ronald Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society In For, Michigan, (New Brunswick and London: second edition 1987), 33.

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Chapter 2 The Requisite System The UAW Constitution was drafted as the UAW's organizational framework. The UAW's "requisite system" was defined in the preamble to the Constitution. The "required system" of the UAW was a membership-oriented labor organization that promoted democracy, social, political and economic justice for both its membership and American society at large. The UAW preamble was an ambitious expression of the triumph of virtue over the laws of human nature that were on display in industrial capitalism. The preamble asserted a declaration of rights to "life, liberty and happiness," free from the tyranny of an authoritarian management. The power of management as in all governing institutions should be subject to the consent of the governed. The 1939 UAW-CIO preamble: We hold these truths to be self-evident, expressive of the ideals in hopes of workers who come under the jurisdiction in this International Union, United Automobile Workers of America; that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Within the orderly processes of such Government lies the hope of the worker. We hold that the Exigencies of the Times, the complete subdivision of Labor in the development and operation of the industrial mass production

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system imposes conditions under which the worker is gradually but surely absorbed and controlled by the machine. We hold these conditions to be utterly at variance with the Spirit of Justice and the needs of mankind. We believe the right of workers to organize for mutual protection is a culminating growth of a great industry, which is evident not only in its increased power but also of an economic and social change in our civilization. We believe that Organized Labor and Organized Management possess the ability and all with the duty to society of maintaining, through cooperative effort, a mutually satisfactory and beneficial employer-employee relationship based upon understanding through the medium of conference. The worker does not seek to usurp management's function or ask for a place on the Board of Directors of concerns where organized. The worker through his Union merely asks for his rights. Management invests thousands of dollars in business. The worker's investment in the business is his sinew, his blood and his life. The organized worker seeks a place at the conference table, together with management, when decisions are made which affect the amount of food he, his wife and family shall consume; the extent of education his children may have; the kind and amount of clothing they may wear and their very existence. He asks that hours of labor be progressively reduced in proportion as modern machinery increases his productivity. He asks that the savings due to the inauguration of machinery and changes in technical method shall be

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equitably divided between management and the worker. The organized worker asks that those who may be discharged be paid adequate dismissal wages to enable him to start afresh in another field; the society undertake to train him in new skills and that it make provisions through amelioratory social laws for the innocent and residual sufferers from the inevitable industrial shifts which constitute progress. The preamble was a mandate for UAW members to practice democratic principles in all aspects of their lives. For the UAW social, political and economic equality were the guiding principles of the union and the cornerstone of a civilized society. Equality was not attained by merely asserting its existence. Labor-management was won first through militant action at point of production, and only then workers could claim the basic rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These were powerful ideals that remained within the boundaries of the ordinary worker. The preamble remained unchanged until 1980 when the UAW and the auto industry were in crisis. The unprecedented contract concessions that were triggered by the Chrysler Corporation's brush with bankruptcy resonated through the industry. The UAW agreed to unprecedented contract concessions. The agreement with Chrysler granted the UAW a seat on the Chrysler Board of Directors. He was prohibited by law from participating in sessions that dealt with labor-management relations. It was a nonvoting seat on the board. The 1939 preamble that eschewed "management's functions or ask for any place on the Board of Directors."

Constitution of the International Union, United Automobile of America and Laws Governing Local Unions, Adopted in Cleveland, Ohio March, 1939, Preamble, p. 3-4. See Appendix A, Part I.

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The debate over the provision was limited. Bob King, the delegate from UAW Local 600, Region 1A spoke in favor of the amendment: I strongly support the resolution, and I strongly support brother Fraser's new position on the Board of Directors of Chrysler as giving us a voice in the decision-making process. It's one thing to try to counteract the decision after it's been made; it's another thing to have advanced notice and to have notice and to have a voice and a say before the decision is made. I think having more of our members on the corporate board of directors will do this. If we as workers through our sweat and toil make the companies and corporations create their profits and create the dividends for the shareholders, how was it that we don't have any voice and the shareholders have a much greater voice in the corporations? Pete Kelly, the delegate from Local 160, Region 1, an Amalgamated local that represented several product engineering facilities in Warren, Michigan was the only delegate to speak against amending the preamble: I'm extremely disturbed about what has happened to the preamble of our Constitution. I happen to like the way it was written. The preamble of our Constitution made it extremely clear that we saw no position on the board. I can understand the co-determination of labor and management in other countries, but again as Brother Gardner previously pointed out, that we don't have a political party in this country that is looking after our interests. I would perceive at this point, even with all of the aid that

2

Proceedings 26th Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, 1980, Preamble, p. 142-143.

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Chrysler is getting, that Brother Frazer would be on that executive board and preside over the death of Chrysler. I basically believe at this particular point that 30 years of cooperation with this corporation has led us to this terrible crisis. They don't really give a damn about our job or our union, because that's not their interest. Their interest is just more profit and more greed. Additional changes to the preamble in 1980 reflected social and economic objectives of the Reuther administration. Reuther often declared that it was the responsibility for all UA W members to promote social and economic justice for all of society. The 1980 additions to the preamble emphasized the importance of democracy within the union and in the communities of the rank-and-file. Leonard Woodcock and Douglas Fraser continued those traditions during their administrations. However, Fraser was in his final term as president of UAW. His impending retirement was about to sever the link between the UAW leadership and the cohort that built the union. The organizational ideals that the Reuther cohort personified were reduced to writing in the 1980 preamble. The only other change to the UAW preamble was made in 1995 when women were formally included on an equal basis with men. After 1995, "all men and women" were recognized as having been created equal. The 1980 changes include to the preamble include: We hold these truths to be self-evident; expressive of the ideals in hopes of the workers who come under the jurisdiction of this INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE

Proceedings 26th Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, 1980, Preamble, p. 143-144.

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AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW): "that all men and women are created equal, they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men and women, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Within the orderly processes of such a government lies the hope of the worker in advancing society toward the ultimate goal of social and economic justice. The precepts of democracy require that workers through their union participate meaningfully in making decisions affecting their welfare and that of the communities in which they live. Managerial decisions have far-reaching impact upon the quality of life enjoyed by the workers, the family, the community. Management must recognize that it has basic responsibilities to advance the welfare of the workers and a whole society and not alone to the stockholders. It is essential, therefore, that the concerns of workers and of society be taken into account when basic managerial decisions are made. The structure of work established by management is designed to make the workers an adjunct to the tool rather than its master. This, coupled with the authoritarian climate of the workplace, robs the worker of her/his dignity as an adult human being. This belies the Democratic heritage we cherish as citizens in a society rooted in Democratic values.

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Essential to the UAW's purpose is to afford the opportunity for workers to master their work environment; to achieve not only improvement in their economic status but, of equal importance, to gain from their labors a great measure of dignity., of self fulfillment and self worth. Workers must also participate meaningfully in political and legislative action because government impacts importantly on their lives and on their communities. If government is to be the means by which people achieve a humanitarian and equitable society, it must be responsible and accountable government. Therefore, the UAW has the duty and responsibility to promote real and meaningful participatory democracy through its members and their families, so that free people and their institutions may be heard in the consuls of government and so that officeholders are guided by principal alone. To achieve these wholesome objectives: •

Management must accept the union organization and collective bargaining as an essential in constructive force in our Democratic society:

•

The workers must be provided a meaningful voice in maintaining a safe and healthful workplace with decent working conditions, and must enjoy secured rights, together with a satisfactory standard of living in maximum job security;

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•

The workers must have a voice in their own destiny in the right to participate in making decisions that affect their lives before such decisions are made;

•

The UAW must play an active role in all levels of government to protect the lives and rights of its members and their families. We must work constantly on the political and legislative problems facing the whole society;

•

Union members must take seriously their responsibilities as citizens and work, through their union and individually, to realize the goals of participatory democracy and responsible and accountable government. (1980 underlined, 1995 changes italicized)

The existing management structure "robs" workers of their human dignity by treating them as machinery in the "authoritarian climate of the workplace." This preamble declared that management's decisions must be sensitive to the concerns of workers and of society. The new preamble asserted that workers "have a voice in their own destiny in the right to participate in making decisions that affect their lives before such decisions are made." Union members were called to participate in decisions that affect their lives on the shop floor, in their communities and in government. Thus, industrial democracy was a fundamental principle for the UAW. Industrial democracy and a democratic society reinforced one another in the UAW preamble. The preamble asserted the ideals of the UAW-style system of codetermination that was about to unfold in the auto industry.

Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at Anaheim, California, June, 1980, p. 3-4. See Appendix, Part II. Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at Anaheim CA, June, 1995, p. 3-4. See Appendix A, Part II.

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The UAW's responsibilities to union members were spelled out in article two. The objectives in this section are emblematic of the labor movement. The constitution defines the UAW as an organization that is dedicated to improve working conditions, unite all workers, educate and advocate for political action to benefit workers and to work with other like-minded organizations. Under the UAW Inc. model these objectives were ignored because preserving the organizational bureaucracy became the main objective. The administrative powers were defined in Article 7 of the UAW Constitution. The article stipulates the organizational structure and distribution of authority of the union. The Constitution is the supreme law of the UAW and can be amended only by majority votes of local union delegates at regular or special constitutional conventions. According to the UAW Constitution the highest tribunal in the UAW is the international convention which is composed of delegates elected by the local unions. From the 1930s until the 1960s constitutional conventions were convened biannually, then every three years until 1995. The convention has since convened every four years. The number of International Executive Board members was determined by the number of geographical regions. A number of geographical regions were joined together because of union shrinkage. For example, Regions 1A and IE were joined together. Regions 1A and IB were joined together. Regions 5 and 6 were joined together. Regions 2 and 2A were joined together. The incumbent Region 2 Director, Warren Davis had agreed to retire and not run for the position prior to the 2002 Constitutional Convention. However, to the consternation of the Administrative Caucus and many of the convention delegates Davis changed his mind. When the geographical

See Appendix Figure 2.1.

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regions convened their Caucus meetings to select regional officers, Davis was reelected Region 2 Director. However, Davis was not sworn in. The following day an amendment to the UAW Constitution was presented to the delegates to dissolve Region 2 and combine its portions with Region 2B, Region 8 and Region 9. A spirited debate was punctuated by boos, cheers, applause and the chant "Hey, hey, hey, goodbye." The delegation voted to amend the Constitution and dissolve Region 2. Warren Davis was not returned to the IEB. The organizational structure of the UAW places the membership in the position of the highest authority. (See Figure 1) The International Executive Board (IEB) is the highest authority in the UAW between constitutional conventions. The International Executive Board consists of the elected directors of geographical regions, the International President, the International Secretary-Treasurer and the International Vice Presidents. The IEB has the power to issue strikes, issue charters and punish subordinate bodies for violations of the Constitution. When the International Executive Board is not in session, the authority of the International Union is vested in the international president. International Union staff representatives are appointed by the president and subject to approval by the IEB. The number international representatives are out of proportion to the rank and file in recent years due to the expanded ranks of appointed representatives. For example, the size of the international UAW staff in 2004 was recorded at 558 with a general membership of 654,657, while in 1980 there were 800

Proceedings 33 Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, June 3-6, 2002, Article 10, Section 21, p. 231-238. Proceedings 32 Constitutional Convention UAW, Las Vegas, June 22-26, 1998 Article 10, Section 1 & 4, p. 118-128. The Constitution was amended to add a new International Vice President for organizing. The amendment increased the number of VPsfromfour to five.

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on staff with a membership level of 1,357,141. These numbers don't account for appointed joint representatives. The most powerful individual in the UAW is the 9

international president.

Report: Board of International Trustees and International Secretary-Treasurer, Raymond Majerus, UAW, January 1, 1980 to December 31, 1980, p.9. 33r Constitutional Report UAW June, 2002, "Average Dues Paying Membership 1936-2002," p. 19. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Office of Labor-management Standards, Form LM-3 Labor Organization Annual Report, UAW Staff Council, 2004, p.2, 9 Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted June, 2002, Article 3-8, Conventions, p. 7-13, Article 10, Section 20, Officers and Elections, p. 28, Article 12, Duties of the International Executive Board, p. 33. A prime example of the power of the UAW president was illustrated when Region 2 was eliminated in at the 2002 Constitutional Convention as a result of a dispute over who would assume the office of the Director. Warren Davis was elected to the posted against the wishes of out-going President Stephen Yokich. As a result, Region 2 was summarily disassembled and its parts were apportioned to adjacent regions.

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The UAW Operates under the authority: Constitution Law Policy

International UAW Structure

The UAW asserts authority through: Meetings: Local/Regional Convention/Special Convention Elections: Delegates Elections: Officers Councils: Delegates Appeals Committee Constitutional Appeal Public Review Board

Membership

Quadrennial Constitutional Convention

President

VicePresident

VicePresident

VicePresident

Region 1

Region 1A H Region 1C N Region 1D H

Region 3 H

Secretary- |-| ViceTreasurer President

I

Region 4

I

Region 5 N

Region 8

-I

VicePresident

Region 2 N Region 2B Region 9 W Region 9A

HZ

Appointed by the President: Standing Committees

Trustees (3)

znz

I

~

International Councils

Assistant Regional Directors/ Administrative Directors

Other Committees

I

Outside Assignments and appointments

Department Directors/ Assistant Directors

International President, Secretary Treasurer and Vice-Presidents serve as Representatives to:

Coordinators

Staff/National, Regional, Technical, Washington D.C.

I

AFL-CIO International Metalworkers Federation

Security

Office Staff/National, Regional, Sub-Regional, Black Lake

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

Source: International UAW (1998)

Figure 1: International UAW Structure Region 2 was disbanded at the 33 r Constitutional Convention, June 3-6, 2002. A fifth UAW Vice President for organizing was created at the 32 Constitutional Convention, June 22-26,1998. 92

The financial well-being of the international UAW was historically linked to the union membership through initiation fees and dues. Increases in union funding were subject to the approval of the constitutional conventions. For obvious reasons including inflation, the fluctuation in union membership and the expansion of the organizational bureaucracy, the UAW required more financial resources. For example, in 1939 the union initiation fee was $2 and the local union membership fee was $15.

In contrast,

in the 2002 UAW Constitution the fees are $10 for initiation and no more than $50 for membership in the local union. Five dollars is set aside for orientation of the new member and one dollar is forwarded to the international UAW. The minimum monthly dues in 1942 were one dollar per month, five cents (50) of each month's dues were put aside and by the local union for a special fund to use in case of strike or lockout. Two and 1/2 cents of each month's dues were laid aside by the local union as a special fund to be used only for educational or recreational purposes.

By 1974, union dues were

assessed at two hours straight time pay per month with 38 percent going to the local union, 30 percent went to the International Union Strike Insurance Fund, the General Administrative Fund received 30 percent and the remaining 2 percent went to the international union's "Family Education Center Fund." Local unions also received a monthly rebate of 10 percent of each member's dues from the International Strike Fund as long as the strike fund balance remained above $550 million. If the balance dropped below that level, monthly rebates to local unions ceased until it is restored to $550

Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted March, 1939, Article 15, Initiation Fees and Dues, Section 1, p. 30, Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted June, 2002, Article 16, Initiation Fees and Dues, Section 1, 1 lb, 1 Id, p. 44. Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted August, 1942, Article 15, Initiation Fees and Dues, Section 2, p. 36.

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million. In 1983, the strike insurance fund had grown to over $536 million. By 1984, the 12

strike fund exceeded $597 million and exceeded $1 billion in 2001.

The strike fund

was a growing source for union funding and a disincentive to utilize the strike as bargaining leverage. The purpose of the strike fund was defined by the UAW constitution. According to the 1974 UAW Constitution: The International Union shall set aside all sums remitted by local unions as Union Strike Insurance Fund dues and the funds resulting shall be a special fund to be known as the International Strike Fund, to be drawn upon exclusively for the purposes of (1) aiding local unions engaged in authorized strikes and in cases of lockouts, (2) assisting by donations or loans to other International Unions in nonaffiliated local unions similarly engaged, and (3) meeting financial obligations or expenditures which this international union or its affiliated local unions incur as a result of authorized strikes or in cases of lockouts, and then only by a two-thirds 13

vote of the International Executive Board. The strike fund was established in the Constitution for the purpose of meeting the financial needs of the membership and administrative obligations associated with labor

12 Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted May, 1983, Article 16, Initiation Fees and Dues, Section 1, 2, 1 la, 1 lb, 1 Id, p. 30-33, i / Constitutional Report UAW June, 2002, "Funding Balances 1953-1978," June, 2002, p. 14. 13 Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at Los Angeles, California, June, 1974, Article 16, Initiation Fees and Dues, Section 14, p. 34.

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strikes. The strike was the most potent leverage available to labor in collective bargaining. The constitutional changes initiated in 1980 established a multi-layered funding mechanism in order to supplement the financial resources of the UAW bureaucracy. The emerging funding mechanism further segregated the IEB from the union membership. The funding methods consisted of direct transfers of funds from the International Strike Insurance Fund and the diversion of interest earned on the strike fund to the international union. The UAW constitution was amended in 1980,1989,1995 and 2002 in order to create additional sources of revenue for the international union. These changes established a funding mechanism that disassociated the union's operating revenue from the size of the membership. The significance of this cannot be understated because a large portion of its financial resources was linked directly to the size of the strike fund. Maintaining the large strike fund was essential to retaining the union bureaucracy. In 1980, the UAW constitution was amended to allow diversions of strike fund earnings: An amount, not in excess of 50 percent of interest and dividends received by the international strike insurance fund, may be set aside as the Organization, Education, and Communication (OEC) Fund, to be expended, as authorized by the International Executive Board, for such 14

purposes. According to Constitution Committee chairman, the proposed change would give the International Executive Board additional tools and additional ways of supporting Proceedings 26th Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, 1980, Article 16, Section 14, p. 195. Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at Anaheim CA, June, 1980, p. 35. See Appendix A, Part IV.

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programs that needed subsidizing in the areas of organizing, education, communication, and so forth. However, no details about the OEC Fund were provided to the delegates. The OEC fund proposal was vigorously opposed by delegates Karl Dyksterhouse, Local 730 and Herbert Wyatt, Local 23. Dyksterhouse argued that the strike fund should not be used as a financial reservoir for the International Union because many local unions were suffering financial hardship: That fund has grown to the point where strikes against almost any corporation barely make a dent in the fund. In fact, from 1976 through 1979, the fund more than doubled in size. In this same period of time man/local unions have seen their financial resources drained or have been barely able to keep their heads above water. In fact, many of them could not even afford to send delegates to this convention. Herbert Wyatt did not want to stray from the original purpose of the strike fund. What's more, it wasn't clear exactly what the purpose of the OEC fund was: I am sure all of you can remember that several years ago when we had the strike in GM we had to borrow money from the Corporation to pay our (healthcare) insurance. We had to hock Solidarity House. We had to put Black Lake in hock. I am not opposed to using money for organizing, and any time that our international officers come to me to vote money to organize with, I will give them whatever I have got.

Proceedings 26th Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, 1980, Article 16, Section 14, p. 195.

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But you are talking about $25 million a year in interest that is earned on our strike fund. Now, the change in the language of the Constitution is worse than some of the language we get in our contracts. It is as vague as it can be. When you say you're going to use it for education and communication, what in the world are you talking about? Wyatt got it right, the International Union could use the OEC fund for anything as long as the IEB authorized it. The proposed change was supported by the delegate Roger Robinson from the Ford Tractor Plant, Local 400. He expressed his anxiety over massive layoffs and argued passionately in favor of the new fund: President Fraser's letter a couple of years ago, which indicated that there is a class war. Probably the only class which is fighting that war is the corporate class in America, and they have been heaping a tremendous amount of abuse upon working people, upon the workers' organizations, and we have been suffering from that. The 300,000 brothers and sisters who are on the street are a direct result not only of an organized effort to destroy our organizations, and destroyed 40 years of history in our standard of living, but to destroy the unions that have fought to establish that standard of living. I don't like going into the strike fund for anything, but at the point that our membership in shrinking I think we need those funds, and I am confident

16

Ibid. p. 198.

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that our Executive Board is capable of making the appropriate determinations and where we should counterattack and how we should counterattack. The advocates for diverting strike fund income was couched in terms of a class war that the UAW needed more resources in order to fight. The leadership did not offer a concise strategy to deal with the massive layoffs or have a plan fight the war with the "corporate class." In the end, the emotional appeal persuaded the delegation to adopt the amendment. In 1989, the rhetoric of class war continued at the 29 Constitutional Convention and the International UAW needed a larger war chest in order to carry on the struggle with the corporate class. At the end of 1988 the OEC Fund contained nearly $13 18

million.

However, according to Bonnie Reffitt, Local 730 the International Union

urgently needed more money because: Everyone in this hall has long been firmly committed to "organizing the unorganized." It is the lifeblood of our union. Your committee takes this charge very seriously, especially in the face of a dwindling membership, unfavorable public opinion in the political and judicial system stack solidly against us. Employer opposition to unionization is at an all-time high. The struggle at Eastern Airlines demonstrates management's disdain for union workers. A study of organizing campaigns in the private sector indicated 95 percent 17 Proceedings 26th Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, 1980, Article 16, Section 14, p. 195.196. 18 Report of Board of Trustees and International Secretary Treasurer Bill Casstevens, International Union, UAW, January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1989, p. 5.

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of employers actively resist unionization and that 75 percent hire union 19

busting consultants. The call went out again to amend the constitution to increase the OEC Fund diversions of 20

strike fund interest from 50 percent to 75 percent.

The increase infused an additional

$14.4 million into the OEC Fund. At the end of the year, the balance in the OEC Fund 21

was over $27.2 million. In 1995, The UAW constitution was amended to transfer money directly from the International Strike Insurance Fund to the General Administrative Fund of the international union. A couple things happened in this change of financial allocation. First, the two percent allocation that had gone to the Family Education Center (Black Lake) went directly into the general fund instead. In the future, Black Lake would be financed through the OEC Fund. Second, the new language directed the International Executive Board to make a one-time transfer of $50 million from the International Strike 22

Fund.

Constitutional committee member Jim West argued that: This looks like a lot of money, but to put things into perspective, it's less than the amount needed to fund a one-week national strike against General Motors.

Proceedings 29th Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, June 18-23, 1989, Article 16, Section 14, p. 157. 20 Proceedings 29th Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, June 18-23, 1989, Article 16, Section 14, p. 156-157. See Appendix A, Part V. 21 Report of Board of Trustees and International Secretary Treasurer Bill Casstevens, International Union, UAW, January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1989, p. 5. 22 Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at Anaheim CA, June, 1995, p. 48. The final language read, "On June 15, 1995, the International Executive Board shall make a one-time transfer of $50 millionfromthe International Strike Fund to the General Fund of the International Union." See Appendix A, Part VI.

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History shows that the UAW's elected leadership has been very disciplined and prudent when it comes to the union's finances. Given this, your committee believes that the onetime payment will strengthen the general fund assuring your unions future and yet maintain a healthy Strike Insurance Fund. We are determined not to fall into the trap that has snared so many other unions of having to increase dues or level special assessments every few years because of some unanticipated crisis. The UAW is the only union that has not changed its basic dues structure in the last 28 years. West was confident that the loss of membership was behind the international UAW's reallocation of financial resources. He had faith in the "disciplined and prudent" handling of the union's finances. When the resolution was open to a floor debate, only two delegates were recognized. Both delegates spoke in favor of the resolution before a third delegate rose to call for an end to the debate. The amendment to transfer $50 million from the strike fund to the general fund passed overwhelmingly. In 2002, the constitution was amended yet again to reallocate money from the strike fund to the direct control of the IEB. The proposed change to the constitution was explained by Constitutional Committee member Irvine Heidbrink, $75 million shall be transferred from the net resources of the Strike Insurance Fund to a newly established Emergency Operations Fund.

23

st

Proceedings 31 Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, June 11-15, 1995, Article 16, Section 2 and 14, p. 107-108. 24 Ibid. 14, p. 109-110.

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The assets of the Emergency or Operations Fund, including accrued interest on investments in earnings and investments, shall be available to finance operations of the International Union in the event Operating Fund resources are insufficient to sustain operations due to the effects of a protracted or expense of strike, a series of strikes, or other events posing a serious threat to economic viability of the International Union.

What this amendment really does is create a rainy day reserve to be used only in those difficult times when the need for an operating, functioning International Union is more critical, not less; when more problems must be solved, not fewer.

This $75 million is less than 9 percent of the Strike Fund's total net worth. 25

That is a small price to pay to assure the UAW's survival. The 2002 funding revision was couched in terms of the survival of the UAW in the event of a protracted strike. However, the last protracted strike by the UAW was conducted in 1970 and the increased collaboration between the union and management made the likelihood of a major labor strike ever more remote. This new OEC fund was another discretionary fund that was at the disposal of the IEB. When the question went to the

*7S

rA

Proceedings 33 Constitutional Convention UAW, Anaheim CA, June 3-6,2002, Article 16, Section 1 IF, p. 159. "No later than June 30th, 2002, $75 million shall be transferred from the net resources of the Strike Insurance Fund to a newly established Emergency Operations Fund." See Appendix A, Part VII.

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floor for debate only one delegate spoke in favor of the resolution before the question was called to a vote. The change was adopted. The continuing process of change in the auto sector continued during the course of this study. Even as this study was being written, the UAW entered into yet another constitutional convention in which the funding mechanism was further altered. To summarize the strike fund transfers to this point, 75 percent of the investment earnings on the strike fund were directed to the union's Organizing, Education and Communications Fund. In 1995 the convention authorized transfer of $50 million from the strike fund to the general fund. In 2002 the convention authorized transfer of $75 million from the strike fund to the Emergency Operations Fund. By 2006, that EOF remained untouched and had grown to $89 million. Contrary to Owen Bieber's assertion at the 1995 constitutional convention, the $50 million transferred from the strike fund to the UAW general fund was not a "one time transfer." The IEB wanted more. In 2006, the final 25 percent interest of the investment earnings on the strike fund were placed at the disposal of the IEB: Beginning on July 1, 2006 and continuing thereafter, unless otherwise directed by the International Executive Board, the remaining twenty-five (25) percent of the interest in earnings on investments received by the International Assistance Strike Fund shall be a allocated to the General Fund, the Organization, Education and Communication Fund or to such

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other purpose as the International Executive Board shall determine to be in 26

the best interests of the UAW. In addition to capturing the rest of the interest earned on the strike fund, the International Union established two additional lines of credit to the tune of $50 million and $60 million. The chairperson of the Constitutional Committee, Kevin Bollman argued that more money was needed to assure that the UAW could remain strong and provide services to the membership in the event of a "financial catastrophe." With that in mind, Bollman presented a new funding proposal: The proposal would make a transfer identical to that which was done over a decade ago by authorizing a transfer of $50 million from the Strike Fund to the General Fund, to make that money available to the International so that it can continue to meet its financial obligations, provides services our membership deserves, and avoid tapping the Emergency Operating Fund. Bollman was proposing to create an additional $50 million line of credit for the International Union so that the Emergency Operating Fund would remain untouched. The rationale for creating the EOF fund was to address unforeseen financial crisis, but remained untouched. Moreover, the EOF had earned over $15 million in interest. Bollman continued:

Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at MGM Grand Convention Center, Las Vegas NV, Article 16, Section 14, June, 2006, p. 47-48. See Appendix A, part VIII. 27 Proceedings 34th Constitutional Convention UAW, MGM Grand Convention Center, Las Vegas NV, Article 16, Section 14, June 12-15,2006, p. 178. Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at MGM Grand Convention Center, Las Vegas NV, Article 16, Section 14, June, 2006, p.48.

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In these challenging times the UAW needs to be able to call on resources, perhaps significant resources, to engage in innovative and large-scale initiatives designed to organize new workers, to raise targeted or national awareness of UAW beliefs or principles. For example, unfair trade with China and other low-wage countries, the impact of off-shoring and plant closings on our families and our communities, the campaigning for national health care to maintain and increase our union's bargaining strength and to assess both our membership and the working people generally. The final component of the proposal would authorize the International Executive Board to draw resources from the Strike Fund specifically authorized by IEB action to support particular projects or activities designed to further these goals. This authority would be limited to a maximum of $60 million between any two consecutive Constitutional Conventions. This new flexibility would allow our union, for example, to engage in a significant 28

long-term organizing effort in a targeted industry. In this case the International Union secured a $60 million line of credit to "engage in significant long-term organizing in a targeted industry." Moreover, those additional funds were earmarked to communicate and educate a "targeted or national" audience about the "UAW beliefs or principles." The stated purpose of the additional $60 million 28 Proceedings 34th Constitutional Convention UAW, MGM Grand Convention Center, Las Vegas NV, Article 16, Section 14, June 12-15,2006, p. 178-179. Constitution of the International Union, UAW adopted at MGM Grand Convention Center, Las Vegas NV, Article 16, Section 14, June, 2006, p.48. See Appendix A, Part VIII.

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line of credit was vague, redundant and parallel to the rationale for establishing the OEC Fund. The reallocation of the UAW funding structure was a strategic response to the loss of membership and foreign competition. The UAW administration needed alternative sources of income to maintain the union bureaucracy. The creation of the OEC Fund and the EOF Fund were constitutionally sanctioned discretionary funds that were placed at the disposal of the IEB. The financial engineering assured the organization a source of revenue that was unrelated to membership levels. The UAW was well on its way to becoming an organization that no longer needed members to survive because of the constitutional reallocation of union financing. The structural changes accelerated within the process of the collective bargaining. The additional structural changes produced new technical and political systems within which the UAW Inc. model functioned.

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Chapter 3 The Vanguard The American labor movement is a cumulative project that was built upon previous cycles of labor organizing. The lifecycle of American labor institutions were informed by their predecessors. Dave Yettaw's encounter with that Sergeant at Arms at the 1986 UAW National Convention encapsulated nearly a century of cultural conflict and political ideology of the mainstream American labor movement. The Sergeant at Arms' remarks offer a glimpse into the UAW's political and cultural environment. The presence of New Directions Movement was evidence that the ideals of historic workingclass movements were still present in the veins of some groups within the UAW in 1986. The NDM presented the first significant threat to the UAW administration since WWII. The NDM carried with them the legacy of the Knights of Labor, the Industrial Workers of the World, Socialists and other dissident groups that shaped the UAW since the early days of the CIO. Those political movements were rooted in the demands of ordinary working people as they confronted capital at the point of production. The radical political and cultural influences that breathed life into the early CIO proved to be an aberration. It didn't take long for the political power that was generated from below to be harnessed from above. What began as a framework for industrial democracy and social justice was overtaken by a centralized bureaucracy. The power generated by direct action of the rank-and-file was contained by the UAW's emergent single party political structure. The leadership in CIO resembled the leadership of the AFL. The Sergeant at Arms expressed an attitude that was shared by many in the administration. They regarded any form of dissent, difference or opposition with contempt. The UAW

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administration considered any outspoken opposition as more than an annoyance, they were the enemy. Samuel Gompers, George Meany or Lane Kirkland would have felt at home with the political scene on display at the 1986 national convention. They were the architects and guardians of the political and cultural systems that defined AFL and AFL-CIO organizational bureaucracies. These were men who embodied an organizational ideal during a time when various forms of bigotry were fashionable. The AFL Executive Council authored the technical framework for the UAW's organizational bureaucracy. The AFL model emphasized top-down bureaucracy rather than grass roots democracy. The UAW charter was crafted by the AFL in 1935 as a system of governance that relied on indirect democracy. Democratically elected delegates represented the voice of the rank-and-file at international conventions. The delegate system granted ordinary union members the right to serve as convention delegates, in practice the delegates were almost exclusively local union officials and political activists. Local union officials were generally members of the mainstream political caucus, the most prominent among them were affiliated with the Administration Caucus. The delegates elected the top international UAW officers including the UAW President, Secretary-Treasurer, Vice Presidents and Regional Directors. Together, this group made up the International Executive Board that controlled the day-to-day operations of the union.

This was a system that was designed to leave the ordinary union member on the

periphery. Even though the UAW was an industrial union, a system of government was

Constitution of the International Union, United Automobile of America and Laws Governing Local Unions, (Cleveland, Ohio March, 1939), Article 7, Powers of Administration, Article 8, Conventions, Article 9, Officers and Election, p. 10-18.

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designed in the tradition of artisanal republicanism that was deeply rooted in the AFL. The AFL clung tightly to those republican cultural traditions even as the world changed around them. The technical, political and cultural systems that were deployed during the Industrial Revolution transformed the American political economy. The political and cultural conflicts that emerged from mass production made a cohesive labor movement unworkable. New factory processes undercut artisanal control of production—the foundation of organized labor until then point in time. The displacement of craft workers was further exacerbated by the influx of unskilled immigrant labor. The introduction of immigrant labor disrupted the traditional workplace culture. The racial and ethnic comingling of the urban-industrial workforce was viewed by trade unionists with contempt. Industrial workers were refused admission to trade unions on the grounds of 2

their inferior racial, ethnic or religious status. It was an attempt by trade unions to retain control. The trade union resistance set in motion political forces that resulted in the irreconcilable divisions in the labor movement. The ensuing conflicts created by industrialization made collective action under the existing trade union system all but impossible. The upheaval resulted in competing visions of the American labor movement. The formation of the early auto workers union was similarly rooted in the turmoil that characterized the labor movement at the turn of the twentieth century. The organizational philosophy of the early UAW was inspired by the ideals pioneered by the Knights of Labor. The Knights' organizational philosophy was perhaps ahead of its time because they embraced all working people. They ignored the 2

Mike Davis, Prisoner of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the Working Class, (Thetford: The Thetford Press 1986), p. 20-29.

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exclusionary nineteenth century American social conventions. The Knights of Labor invited women, non-whites, ethnic and racial minorities and immigrants into labor assemblies. Their extraordinary success was met with fear and resentment from mainstream trade unionists. The seeds of the demise of the Knights of Labor were planted by an array of political and cultural forces. The Knights decline in the 1880s presented the American Federation of Labor with the opportunity to take the lead in the American labor movement. Over time the AFL evolved into a totalitarian bureaucratic system. The aging AFL bureaucracy was overcome by the emergence of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in the 1930s because of its inability to adapt to the technical, political and cultural consequences of twentieth-century industrial production. The formation of industrial unions like UAW emerged from the confluence of the ancient and modern ideological forces that split the AFL and the CIO. The Knights of Labor was a Gilded Age radical working-class organization that believed that workers had an important role in the emerging capitalist system. The Knights emphasized economic, political and cultural issues that affected allies of ordinary working people. The Knights of Labor began as a secret society of ordinary workers; skilled and unskilled, both rural laborers and urban tradesmen who identified with republican themes of self-reliance, equal rights, and family. The Knights organized in opposition to the capitalist system and corporate monopolies that destroyed small firms and independent producers. The preamble to the Knights of Labor constitution warned that republican institutions were threatened by the conditions of permanent wage labor imposed by mass production. The constitution sought to abolish industrial wage slavery, a wage system that separated workers from the benefits of their own labor. The factory

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system created, "an inevitable and irresistible conflict between wage the wage system of labor and republican system of government." The Knights membership grew to include all producing groups including shopkeepers, farmers and common laborers. There was an explicit class dimension that crossed racial lines. They excluded those associated with idleness, corruption and social parasites which included lawyers, doctors, bankers, stockbrokers, professional gamblers and those who sold liquor. The circumstances that gave rise to the Knights of labor eventually led to its decline. The Order remained largely a secret organization until the great railroad strikes in 1877. Afterwards the order organized on a national scale. The Order welcome to African Americans from the industrialized south and other traditionally excluded groups such as Mexicans and East Europeans. Hard times in 1880s were in part due to typical economic cycles, but were exacerbated by widespread wage cuts and unemployment in a variety of industries. The Knights led Strikes and boycotts by miners, railroad workers, telegraph operators, cotton spinners, carpet weavers, shoemakers, iron molders and meatpackers. In the some conflicts, the Knights simply took over factories reorganize production in a democratic fashion without interference from management. Other strikes brought the national transportation system and commerce to a halt. After a successful strike against Jay Gould's Western Union Telegraph Company in 1885, the

Dubovsky, Melvyn and Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America: a History, (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 2004), p. 116. Fink, Leon, Workingmen's Democracy: the Knights of Labor and American Politics, (Chicago: University Of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 4. Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919, "New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987), p.31. The Knights of Labor 1878 constitution called for the creation of cooperatives, land settlement, the eight hour day, equal pay for women, as well as government ownership of railroads, elimination of private banks and paper currency to be issued by the federal government. 4 Buhle, Paul, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of American Labor, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), p. 36.

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Order's membership grew to over 700,000 in 1886. That year marked the peak of success and the beginning of the end for the Knights of Labor. The decline of the Knights of Labor symbolized the passing of the preindustrial model of labor organization. In 1886, Terrence Powderly, Grand Master of the Order still held firm to the principle of abolishing wage labor under the outmoded model that every worker could aspire to ownership of an enterprise or that workers should control an entire industry. The problem was that Powderly misunderstood the impatience of strikers in 1886 who labored daily in the factories. He considered the demands for an eight hour day a wasted of time that diverted his attention from more important goals of creating a cooperative society. The Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions which later reorganized as the American Federation of Labor had revived the eight hour movement. A general strike for the eight hour cause was called on May 1,1886. The nationwide strike of nearly 200,000 workers was uneventful in most major cities, but will forever be remembered for the Haymarket bombing in Chicago near the McCormick reaper works. The newspapers warned that the labor violence was a sign of foreign inspired revolution. The public opinion turned against labor as Chicago was caught up in a full-blown red scare. The Knights refusal to organize along craft lines created internal political turmoil that was expressed by workers leaving the union. Membership in the Order dropped

Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919, "New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987), p. 41. Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919, "New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987), p. 46. 7 Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: the United States, 1877-1919, "New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987), p. 46-47.

Ill

200,000 within two years and fell to 75,000 in 1893. The Knights' opposition to the capitalist system and their refusal to differentiate craft workers from unskilled workers provide an opportunity for political conservatives, employers and rival craft unions. Industry and the conservative press celebrated the Knights decline as many local assemblies simply dissolved while others that were made up of craftsmen joined the AFL. The American Federation of Labor exploited racial, ethnic and political differences to emerge as the dominant labor organization. Mass production expanded opportunities for a more abundant material culture to a larger segment of society, but it was purchased at a high cost to working people. Material abundance changed society as it offered wider variety of affordable goods and transformed the nature of work. This set in motion the epic conflict between traditional craft producers and industrial labor. Rapid industrialization at the turn of the twentieth century upset the established economic and social framework. The cultural shift from agrarian and independent producers to an industrial society fostered discontent among traditional small-scale manufacturers, tradesmen and those with few choices but to enter the factories or become entrepreneurs. The influx of foreign immigrants upset the long standing cultural and political systems. The emerging industrial working-class were desperate for some sort of relief from the grinding physical and psychological demands of factory production. Workers forced into harsh working conditions, low wages, periodic economic depression and poverty more frequently expressed their frustration through violent labor unrest. Those technical and political forces collided with cultural differences of the growing industrial workforce and traditional tradesmen. The labor

Dubovsky, Melvyn and Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America: a History, (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 2004), p. 135.

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movement adjusted to these converging forces with varying degrees of success. Those shifting forces altered the nature of work in industrial society and the influenced ideological framework of the labor movement. Trade unionists at the turn of the twentieth century held republican ideals that American identity was based on free, equal and independent citizens. Samuel Gompers and the cofounders of the AFL channeled those ideas into a uniquely American labor philosophy. The AFL was comprised primarily of white, male Protestant skilled tradesmen. Gompers emerged as the dominant personality in the federation's leadership. He personified the federation's organizational ideal that reflected his own personal biases. The AFL was an exclusive society that served needs of white Anglo Protestant tradesmen who ardently enforced a code of racial, ethnic and sexual exclusion. AFL considered itself the aristocracy of labor. Its organizational ideal laid claim to the ancient artisanal creed that emphasized white privilege. Samuel Gompers and the cohort emerged from the post-Civil War socialist movements in the late 19th-century to create the American Federation of Labor. He often extolled the Marxist philosophy to "emancipate the working class". The terms of that emancipation conformed to the American environment. Karl Marx wrote the inaugural address for the Working Men's International Association (First International) in 1864, the same year Gompers entered the labor movement in America. It was a review of the working-class movement since the publication of The Communist Manifesto in 1848. Marx was writing in the 1860s with British workers in mind. He was particularly interested in the new model that had taken hold in British labor unions in the 1850s. The new model pursued a practical approach to protecting workers from the exploitation

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inherent to wage labor. Craft unions were the vanguard of the new model because skilled workers could afford to pay the higher dues that were essential to provide benefits. The unions made modest demands on employers and the government. The goal was to obtain gradual increases in economic security that would generate social and cultural opportunities for skilled craftsmen. For Marx, "the emancipation of the working classes 9

must be conquered by the working classes themselves." Trade unions provided a model for the working-class to gain the economic power necessary to free themselves from the capitalist system. Marx's ideals took far less radical form when transmitted to America. The first American national labor federation, the National Labor Union (NLU) was organized in 1866 as a coalition of the producing classes to resist the fragmenting of society caused by industrialization. The NLU was led by William Sylvis, a journeyman ironworker and president of the National Union of Iron Molders. Sylvis echoed Marx in his belief that labor unions were only a first step in the emancipation workers. The NLU advocated an economic system that was based on producer and consumer cooperatives. For, Sylvis cooperatives offered the only true remedy for low wages, strikes or lockouts. The NLU coalition attracted a mixture of working-class organizations that included the construction and craft unions in part because of the support of the eight hour work day. However, by 1870 the NLU was dominated by middle-class organizations including reform clubs, fraternal organizations, and political parties. The NLU lost most of its union support when it emphasized monetary reform and electoral politics as its main agenda. Labor unions were more interested in economic security than political

Stuart B. Kaufman, Samuel Gompers and the Origins of the American Federation of Labor 1848-1896, (London: Greenwood Press 1973), p. 3-5,25. Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 1978), "Inaugural Address of the Workingman's International Association," p. 512.

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involvement. The NLU and most of the gains made by organized labor collapsed with the onset of economic depression in the 1870s. The lesson that Gompers learned from Marx was that political power had an economic basis.

Without economic security,

there was no political power. Gompers recognized that the development of trade unionism was inextricably linked to capitalism. Samuel Gompers was probably learned about the British trade union model as a boy in England. It proved to be an organizational system that remained relevant long after he left the country in 1863. The British model became the basis for the AFL years later. Gompers began his journey in the world of labor at the age of 10 years-old working as an apprentice shoemaker in London, England in 1860. He worked as a shoemaker for only eight weeks before his father intervened. His father was a member of the Cigarmakers' Society and arranged for young Samuel to become an apprentice cigar maker. The Gompers family left England for New York in 1863. Gompers entered the trade union movement in the Local Cigar-Makers Union Number 15 of New York City in 1864 where he was surrounded by trade unionists who had led the First International in America. As a young apprentice, Gompers had close associations with members of the First International and socialist organizations from which he learned to be well-versed in their radical vocabulary. The depression in the early 1870s that collapsed the NLU nearly destroyed the Cigar Makers International Union (CMIU). The rebuilding of the CMIU by fresh leaders

Ronald L. Filippelli, Labor in the USA: A History, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 63-65. Stuart B. Kaufman, Samuel Gompers and the Origins of the American Federation of Labor 1848-1896, (London: Greenwood Press 1973), p. 34. Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor: an Autobiography, (New York: ILR Press 1925, 1984), p.8. Stuart B. Kaufman, Samuel Gompers and the Origins of the American Federation of Labor 1848-1896, (London: Greenwood Press 1973), p. xii-xiii, 22-23.

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transformed the trade union federation. During the 1870s Gompers emerged as a militant leader in the Cigar Makers Union. He learned how to advocate radical principles to advance his position in the labor movement. In 1875 Gompers partnered with Ferdinand Laurell and Adolph Strasser to organize Local 144 of the CMIU in New York City. Gompers became first president of the local. The following year he urged the Cigarmakers to create a fund of unemployment and sick benefits. Gompers offered the benefits proposals to be written into the Constitution at the Cigarmakers convention in 1877. The idea of a benefit system was much like an insurance system. The system than gain strength as the pool of contributors increased. Gompers saw that this concept could be applied to a federation of local unions. Smaller, poorer local unions could benefit from "equalizing" larger more financially stable locals. The same concept could be applied to strike funds, but with a caveat that strike actions would be approved by a referendum. According to Gompers, "trade unionism had to be put on a business basis in 12

order to develop our adequate to secure better working conditions." The first attempt to create an alliance of national and international unions occurred at a meeting of labor leaders in Pittsburgh in 1881. The conference was attended by delegates from trade unions and the Knights of Labor. The preamble to the constitution of the newly created Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada (FOLTU) called for unification of industrial workers on the basis of mutual protections and benefits. The promise of the FOLTU federation was short-lived because of insurmountable rivalries between the Knights of Labor and the Melvyn Dubofsky and Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America: a History, (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 2004), p. 139-140. Stuart B. Kaufman, Samuel Gompers and the Origins of the American Federation of Labor 1848-1896, (London: Greenwood Press 1973), p. 57, 98.

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CMIU. Subsequent attempts to resolve the disputes failed. In December of 1886 delegates of trade unions from the remnants of the FOLTU met in Columbus, Ohio and organized a new federation, the American Federation of Labor and elected Samuel 13

Gompers as its first president. The AFL's "new unionism" was the practical alternative to the collapsed Knights of Labor. The AFL's approach the labor-management relationship was called "business unionism," an approach that Gompers considered a practical solution to the "labor problem." Business unionism was a based on strong support for the capitalist system. The AFL ran unions like businesses, often collaborating closely with employers. The plan was to run unions like businesses where the union officials ran the organization and members' main contribution to the system was in the form of dues payments. The AFL rejected the class arguments of the Knights of Labor, focusing instead on organizing strictly on a trade union basis that emphasized job protection, higher wages and shorter hours. The AFL didn't organize the industrial workers because they considered them unfit. The AFL instituted of craft-centered structure for its local union charters, but eventually changed that approach to include non-skilled factoring workers because of the rapid growth of large-scale industrial manufacturing. The AFL had always been suspicious of outsiders represented by the large influx of immigrant labor it was feared harbored radical influences. At first the local union structure was restricted to executive Melvyn Dubofsky and Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America: a History, (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 2004), p. 144. Stuart B. Kaufman, Samuel Gompers and the Origins of the American Federation of Labor 1848-1896, (London: Greenwood Press 1973), p. 163-165. 14 Buhle, Paul, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of American Labor, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), p. 18.

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board members who were by AFL appointees. The system officially suppressed local autonomy. The AFL later included industrial workers in positions of authority only grudgingly. The earliest attempts to organize autoworkers were modeled after the traditions of craft guilds. The auto unions had difficulty from the beginning because early auto manufacturing was a highly specialized enterprise that required combination of distinct skilled sets. At the time the industry workforce mostly consisted of painters, trimmers, blacksmiths and woodworkers. As early as 1891, the Carriage and Wagon Workers' International Union (CWW) expressed an interest in organizing the auto industry. The CWW adjusted to the demise of the carriage industry by including the increasing number of unskilled and semiskilled workers that made up the bulk of the auto workforce in the early twentieth century. In 1911 CWW responded to the changing makeup of the workforce and became the Carriage, Wagon and Automobile Union (CWA), the first true industrial auto union. However, trade line disputes led to the demise of the CWA. Craft unions 1917 AFL convention demanded that the CWA remove "automobile" from its name because of overlapping jurisdiction complaints. Even though the CWA complied, the AFL voted to suspend the CWA effective as of 1918. The CWA then went its own way included industrial workers within its ranks and added automobile to its name to became The United Automobile, Aircraft and Vehicle Workers (UAVW). The UAVW did well on its own, at least through the end of WWI. By 1920 the UAVW doubled in size to over 45,400 members before being crushed in the post-war recession and

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employer resistance to unions.

The Communists gained control of an old Detroit

UAVW local that was originally established by wagon workers. In 1928, the UAWV boasted a membership of 407 autoworkers just before the named was changed to the Auto Workers Union (AWU). The failure of business trade unionists encouraged radical movements to fill the void. The auto plants attracted workers from around the country, some of whom introduced radical ideology to the rank-and-file. Some of the early shop floor leaders in Flint gained their first union experiences in the coal mines. Clayton Johnson of Fisher Body 2 and John McGill, an important leader at the Buick local were coal miners in the 1920s. Tom Klasey gained his union experience with the IWW in the Pacific Northwest organized workers at Chevrolet for the AFL local. Bud Simons at Fisher Body 1 was a Communist and a member of the Auto Workers Union.

The AWU affiliated with the

newly created Trade Union Unity League (TUUL) in 1929. The Trade Union Unity League as a later version of the Trade Union Educational League (TUEL) that dated back to 1921 when the Profitern or the Red International of Red Labor Unions, a division of the Communist International rejected the idea of armed insurrection. It preferred to "bore from within" to reform the AFL unions for progressive purposes rather than replace them. The TUUL's strategy was to build unions that were altogether independent from the AFL. They held conferences, organized the unemployed and under marches that called

Sidney Fine, "The Origins of the United Automobile Workers," The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 18, No. 3, (September, 1958), p. 249. Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and the Auto Workers' Unions, (New York: International Publishers, 1980), p. 32. Jack W. Skeels, "Early Carriage and Auto Unions: The Impact of Industrialization and Rival Unionism," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 (July, 1964), p. 572-581. Ronald Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint Michigan, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press 1987), p. 159.

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for a "united front" of autoworkers against the capitalists. The TUUL's radical 17

pronouncements made them enemies of companies, the government and the AFL. The Great Depression energized the struggle to organize autoworkers. In 1929, Flint was a major automotive production center and particularly vulnerable to the economic collapse. The result in the Flint auto plants was massive layoffs and for those who retained new jobs, wages were cut and production was speeded up. By the spring of 1930 unemployment reached twenty five percent. The Communist leaders of the AWU seized the opportunity to organize an unemployment protest march that attracted 15,000 people. They marched from Chevrolet to the Flint City Hall where they were met by riot police who dispersed the crowd and arrested six AWU leaders and jailed them without charges. The open display of force by police was endorsed by the local press. This was St

followed by a spontaneous strike on May 1 by semiskilled workers at Fisher Body Number 1. The strike of 3,600 workers turned into a lockout of 7,500 workers when the plant manager R.J. Whiting closed down the plant. Whiting refused to meet with strike representatives who were "foreign agitators." For the four days tens of thousands of supporters and demonstrators took to the streets infrontof the Buick and Fisher body plants as the state police prepared to disperse the crowds. Meanwhile, local AFL officials refused to get involved unless the strikers severed their ties with the AWU. On May 6 the police descended on a mass meeting of autoworkers, made several arrests and chased others out of the county entirely. The following day Fisher 1 reopened under police 17 Bert, Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict That Shaped American Unions, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 21-23,44-45, 62-63. Sol and Genora Dollinger, Not Automatic: Women and the Left and the Forging of the Auto Workers Union, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), p. 4. Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and the Auto Workers' Unions, (New York: International Publishers, 1980), p. 31.

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protection.

The radical impulses by the rank-and-file to organize the auto plants moved

the reluctant AFL to get involved. The AFL's push to organize auto workers in 1934 was modeled on the existing system local federal labor unions. Some of these federal unions covered individual 19

plants, while in other cases a single local serviced several plants in a single city.

The

federal locals approach to organizing was flooded from the beginning because it was largely seen as a recruiting ground for existing craft unions. They were soon to be objects of the same old jurisdictional disputes. Another problem facing these new industrial federal unions was their second-class status to traditional trade unions. The federal auto unions didn't have the autonomy that prevailed in AFL federal trade unions. Even though they could elect their own officers, the AFL Executive Council exercised 20

direct control over everything else. Militant activists within the ranks of the early UAW refused to be contained by the technical and cultural restrictions placed on them by the AFL. Its aging federation was in decline as the industrial landscape shifted beneath them. The unwillingness of the AFL Executive Council to organize industrial workers created a political crisis that threatened to undermine the aging AFL. The obvious renewal strategy would involve organizing industrial workers. When the AFL chartered the UAW in 1935, it was in large part a technical remedy to ensure political dominance of auto workers. It was sincere effort to organize industrial workers on an equal basis. The technical and 18 Ronald Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint Michigan, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press 1987), p. 127-134. 19 Sidney Fine, Sit-down: General Motors Strike of 1936-1937 (Ann Arbor: The University Of Michigan Press, 1969), p. 66-67. 20 Sidney Fine, "The Origins of the United Automobile Workers," The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 18, No. 3, (September, 1958), p. 253-254.

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political imbalance of the UAW-AFL organizational structure amplified in existing cultural conflicts with the rank-and-file. William Greene and his cohort on the AFL Executive Council tried to contain autoworkers with fraternal structure of federal local unions. Greene and the council ascribed to the organizational ideal of the pre-eminence of trade unionism and the infallibility of their organization of bureaucracy. But the industrial workers in the auto factories were not easily contained. Political rivals within the AFL led by John L. Lewis took advantage of the cultural disconnect between AFL leadership and the industrial workers. The political factionalism that tore the union apart between 1936 and 1940 originated in the ideological struggles between the extreme Left represented by the IWW, Communists and Socialists, and the far Right. In 1935, the AFL Executive Council tried to outflank their left-wing critics when they issued union charters for the first time in the auto industry. However, from the onset on the new organization AFL president William Green insisted upon controlling the new auto union. The first UAW officers were appointed by the AFL Executive Board. The first UAW Constitutional Convention was held in Detroit at the Fort Shelby Hotel on August 26,1935. Green agreed to call the convention only after repeated calls from local union leaders who were dissatisfied with the AFL's system of federal locals. Green attended the convention to grant the official AFL charter for an auto workers union. It was an extraordinary measure for the AFL because it included industrial production workers as well as skilled tradesmen in the same .

union.

21

Proceedings IstConstitutional Convention UAW-AFL, Detroit, MI, August 26-31,1935, Mr. William Green, President, American Federation of Labor, p.l 1.

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Green presided over the selection of a hand-picked cadre of executive officers joined on your eight The International Union of Automobile Workers. When local union delegates defeated a resolution that would have selected Francis Dillon as President, William Green overruled the delegates and appointed Dillon to the position. Homer Martin was named vice president, Ed Hall was appointed secretary-treasurer, and the entire UAW Executive Board was appointed as well. Nearly all of them were Dillon supporters. Local UAW delegates lost no time in protesting the appointed officers to the AFL Executive Council. The council ignored their protests, setting the stage for an 22

acrimonious 1936 convention.

Delegates to the second constitutional convention held

in South, Bend Indiana in April, 1936 ousted Dillon and unanimously elected Homer Martin as president, Wyndham Mortimer, Ed Hall and Walter Wells as vice presidents, and George Addes as secretary-treasurer. Walter Reuther was among the officers elected to the Executive Board. Even though the officers were elected unanimously, the convention marked the beginning of a decade-long factional fight within the UAW. In July, 1936 the UAW left the AFL and joined the newly formed Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). By the next constitutional convention in 1937 the UAW-CIO had 23

organized General Motors workers and increased its membership tenfold.

The

explosive growth of UAW was a source of cultural and political conflict between various factions, both union insiders and outsiders. Those factional disputes triggered additional restrictions to democracy within the UAW. Jack Stieber, Governing the UAW, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p.l, Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A History of the American Labor Movement 1935-1941, (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1960), p. 123-130. William Green told delegates this action was in the line with a decision of the AFL Executive Council and the no vote of approval was necessary. Jack Stieber, Governing the UAW, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p.3.

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The tendency toward autocratic control of the UAW was prompted by the internal factionalism that emerged during the organizing drive at General Motors. One aspect of the internal division was the precarious alliance of ideological forces within the union during the critical series of sit down strikes in 1936 and 1937. Another aspect that contributed to widespread upheaval in the plants was the decentralized bargaining structure of the UAW in the early days. The decentralized nature of the UAW was a consequence of the auto companies' insistence on plant level rather than corporate-wide bargaining. That served to isolate individual plants and amplified the role of local leaders like Walter Reuther, the president of the large Detroit Westside Local 174. The conservative factions were associated with the Catholic Trade Union Federation and those loyal to the AFL. On the Left there was a spectrum that included the Communists, 24

Socialists and Trotskyites.

The tenuous balance between forces unraveled as the ranks

of the UAW rapidly multiplied in just a few months. The UAW grew from 30,000 members when it convened its first convention in 1936 in South Bend IN, to over 25

350,000 members at its second annual convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1937. The factional disputes tore the union apart. UAW factional disputes were aggravated UAW President Homer Martin's erratic behavior during the period of sit down strikes of 1937. Martin, a former Baptist minister 24 Charles Denby, Indignant Heart: A Black Worker's Journal (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), p. 120, 163-174. Jack Stieber, Governing the OW(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), p. 4-5. Jack Stieber, Governing the UAW(H&N York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), p. 3. 25 Sidney Fine, Sit-down: General Motors Strike of 1936-1937 (Ann Arbor: The University Of Michigan Press, 1969), p. 327. Sidney Fine cited numerous primary and internal UAW documents that indicated UAW membership mushroomed to over 400,000 members by October 1937. He argued that the explosive growth in UAW membership was a result of the momentum created by the sit down strikes rather than simply attributed to the NLRA because the constitutionality of the statute and yet to be decided by the Supreme Court. Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, The UA W and Walter Reuther (New York: Da Capo Press, 1949), p. 69.

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was known as the "Leaping Parson of Leeds" after having won the national hop, step and jump championship at age 22. He left the pulpit at the Leeds Baptist Church near Kansas 1ft

City, Missouri to work on the Chevrolet assembly line.

Martin was popular with the

rank-and-file because of his considerable oratorical skills. His popularity propelled him into a leadership position in the union for which he was ill-equipped. Martin's decision to strike GM's Fisher Body plants in Atlanta in November of 1936 without consulting the UAW international officers is an example of his incompetence. Martin went ahead with the strike despite warnings from Adolph Germer, the CIO's Atlanta representative not to take ON General Motors. It made more sense to Germer at the time to take on Chrysler first because it was more unionized than the other automakers. However, a strike against the smaller Chrysler Company would not have had as large of impact for overall 27

organizing drives. The decision to strike GM was potentially a major blunder because neither UAW nor the CIO had the money or manpower to take and the world's biggest corporation. The timing of the walkout made it difficult to exert significant economic pressure on the corporation. GM had substantial cash reserves that could easily neutralize union actions by prolonging negotiations and bleeding union resources. Soon after the GM strike began Martin disappeared from his office. He was found several hours later in a drugstore downstairs from where the UAW offices were located in a or

De Caux, Len, Labor Radical: From the Wobbly Is to the CIO (Boston: Beacon press, 1970), p. 251. "Purge & Pistol," Time Magazine, Monday, October 11, 1937, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,770906,00.html. 27 Sidney Fine, Sit-down: General Motors Strike of 1936-1937 (Ann Arbor: The University Of Michigan Press, 1969), p. 133. The beginning of the General Motors sit down strikes was not a spontaneous action taken by rogue local union leaders. Homer Martin declared the need for a general strike during the current production season while speaking to a group of representatives from GM union locals in September 11, 1936. Fred Peiper, general executive board member from the Atlanta local to Martin's remarks as a call to strike GM. Victor G. Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 147.

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hysterical condition. Martin was giving a speech to anyone who would listen claiming 28

that General Motors was determined to kill him.

He played directly into the company's

hands by publicly contradicting CIO and UAW negotiators, hinting that the union was willing to negotiate at the plant level rather than corporate-wide. CIO President John L. Lewis was infuriated by Martin's behavior. Lewis was already preoccupied with organizing drives in the steel and coal sectors as well as the conflict with the AFL 29

returned to Detroit to bring the auto strike under control.

In order to keep Martin from

further poisoning the negotiations he was sent on a speaking tour to "increase union membership."30 Homer Martin took action to deal with what he considered betrayal by union officials almost immediately after the GM strike. Publicly humiliated and marginalized within his own union, Martin resented those who played a prominent role during the sit on strikes. He made quick work of getting rid of the key sit down strike organizer Wyndham Mortimer and strategist Robert Travis. At the 1937 Milwaukee UAW convention Martin initiated a purge of his opposition by bypassing Mortimer to elevate Richard Frankensteen to the newly-created job as assistant president. Robert Travis was demoted and transferred out of Flint. Ideological disputes that simmered between the two main rival groups burst into the open at the 1937 UAW convention. Both groups were struggling for control of the 28 Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A History of the American Labor Movement 19351941 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 152-153. 29 Sidney Fine, Sit-down: General Motors Strike of 1936-1937 (Ann Arbor: The University Of Michigan Press, 1969), p. 133-136. Fine writes Victor G. Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 147-148. 30 Victor G. Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UA W: A Memoir, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 149.

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UAW at the convention. Homer Martin and the majority of the Executive Board were part of a fiercely anti-Communist group called the "Progressives." Martin called the first meeting of the Progressive Caucus in June 1937 with the goal to centralize control of the UAW. The opposition group, "Unity Caucus" was organized in response to the creation of the Progressive Caucus. Unity Caucus was organized by George Addes, Wyndham Mortimer, the Reuther brothers, Big John Anderson from Local 155, Nat Ganley, Emil Mazey, Kermit Johnson and Genora Johnson. They represented the left wing Communist 31

and Socialist faction of the UAW.

John L. Lewis sought to defuse the situation with a

compromise. He convinced the delegates to accept biennial conventions, increase the power of the international officers and increase the number of international Vice Presidents from three to five. The compromise allowed members of both factions to gain representation. The agreement did little to relieve tension and the factional disputes continued into the next year. The conflict came to a climax over a disputed Executive Board vote that went against Homer Martin. He responded by suspending four of the five executive vice presidents including all from the Unity Caucus. Martin fired Frank Winn, Robert Kantor, Victor Reuther and Walter Reuther. His actions set off outrage in several UAW delegations who picketed the Detroit Eddystone Hotel where Martin took refuge. Martin pointed a pistol at Robert Gallagher, the leader of one of the delegations who 32

confronted Martin at his hotel room.

The next day six more Unity Caucus board

members walked out in support of the suspended officers. Subsequent trials of the 31 Sol and Genora Dollinger, Not Automatic: Women and the Left and the Forging of the Auto Workers Union, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), p. 36. "Big John Anderson" was the Communist Party leader at Local 155. There was another John Anderson, "Little John Anderson," a Trotskyist from Fleetwood Local 174. 32 "Purge & Pistol," Time Magazine, Monday, October 11, 1937, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,770906,00.html. The article describes the controversial aftermath of 1937 Milwaukee UAW convention.

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remaining Executive Board members resulted in several more suspensions and expulsions. The dispute was settled when CIO president John L. Lewis reinstated the expelled and suspended officers, but the damage was done. Homer Martin had 33

discredited himself and lost control of the Executive Board. The tables turned on Martin in 1939 when the opposition controlled Executive Board stripped him of control of the main instruments of communications within the union. Martin responded by suspending fifteen of twenty-four members of the Executive Board and calling for a special convention to enable the rank-and-file to decide on the dispute between the two factions. Homer Martin convened a special convention in Detroit on March 4. The main source of Martin's strength lay within General Motors plants in Flint, Lansing and Pontiac. The Martin faction controlled three of the five Flint local unions; the Fisher Body No. 1, Fisher Body No. 2 and Chevrolet locals supported Martin, while the Buick and AC local unions went with the CIO. The special convention in Detroit proceeded to select a new Executive Board, elected Homer Martin president. Martin dismissed the notion of CIO affiliation because the UAW never received a formal charter from the new organization. He instructed the officers of the Executive Board to re-affiliate with AFL. The suspended officers formed their own parallel Executive Board, named R. J. Thomas as acting president and called a separate special convention on March 27th in Cleveland, Ohio. The opposition faction had the full support of the CIO. The theme of the 1939 UAW-CIO convention was the decentralization of union authority. Power was 33 Ibid, p.4, Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A History of the American Labor Movement 1935-1941, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 159-162. 34 Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A History Of the American Labor Movement 19351941, (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1960), p. 167-169.

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momentarily transferred from the president's office to the International Executive Board in 1939 as more emphasis was placed on local union autonomy. The authority to interpret the constitution between conventions was transferred from the president to the International Executive Board. The President's power to assigned duties to officers was subject to appeal to the executive Board. The authority to suspend or expel officers or members was subject to a trial before a jury of rank-and-file members. Annual constitutional conventions were replaced by biennial conventions. Executive board positions were made full-time assignments and board members were required to relinquish their positions and local unions. The ability of the international union to impose receiverships of local unions was made subject to an elaborate procedure. Internal councils were established as a check on the power of international union to negotiate and administer national agreements with multi-plant corporations such as 35

General Motors.

In the selection of officers in the UAW-CIO was subject to a

compromise between competing forces in the Unity Caucus. The year following the conventions was a period of intense warfare between the two competing UAW organizations. The UAW-CIO was by far the most popular organization with the rank-and-file in strike actions, collective bargaining and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation elections. The dispute ultimately culminated in NLRB representation elections held in GM plants in 1940. The UAW-CIO had majorities in forty-eight GM plants while the UAW-AFL only managed majorities in

Constitution of the International Union, United Automobile of America and Laws Governing Local Unions, (Cleveland, Ohio March, 1939), Article 7, Powers of Administration, Article 8, Conventions, Section 1, p. 10-11. Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge To TheAFL: A History Of the American Labor Movement 1935-1941, (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1960), p. 171. Jack Stieber, Governing the UAW, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 6.

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five GM plants.

Those NLRB elections closed the door on Homer Martin and the

UAW-AFL. Martin was forced out of the union altogether and the UAW would not associate with the AFL for another fifteen years. Walter Reuther distinguished himself as a rising star in the UAW in the formative years of the union. The Reuther forces became a dominant force during the schism between the AFL and CIO factions. Reuther was elected to the International Executive Board at the UAW's 1936 convention as part of a coalition of Socialists, Communists and independents who aligned with John L. Lewis's Committee for Industrial Organization. When Lewis walked out of the AFL to establish the CIO as a rival labor federation, the UAW followed. Reuther was named president of the newly formed Westside Local 174, one of the largest locals in the UAW. He immediately became an influential voice in the union. Reuther resigned from the Socialist Party in 1938, the same year he was appointed director of the UAW's General Motors Department. At the time the UAW had almost no members, but within year's time it was one of the largest and most powerful unions in the country. When the UAW held in its 1940 convention, conditions had changed dramatically. The UAW claimed and membership of over 294, 000, with contracts in 674 plants. Workers in all of the major car companies except Ford were 37

represented by the UAW.

Reuther was elected vice president of the UAW at the

convention. It should be remembered that UAW officers were selected individually by roll call votes in the 1940s. Reuther had been in the national spotlight as early as 1937 Sidney Fine, Sit-Down: the General Motors strike of 1936-1937, (Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan press, 1969), p. 329. Jack Stieber, Governing The UAW, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p.5. Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge To The AFL: A History Of the American Labor Movement 1935-1941, (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1960), p. 165-175. 37 Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge To The AFL: A History Of the American Labor Movement 19351941, (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1960), p. 177.

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when a series of sensational pictures were published in Time magazine and other national newspapers of the "Battle of the Overpass" during the organizing drive at Ford Motor. 38

The images were a devastating symbol brutality of the Ford Service Department.

After

World War II, Reuther marshaled the forces necessary to ascend to the top of the UAW 39

leadership.

Reuther held public attention for the rest of his life by proposing sweeping

social policies, writing numerous position papers, meeting with five American presidents, Senators, foreign leaders, academics and appearing before congressional committees. Walter Reuther's journey to the top of the labor movement began at home. Valantine Reuther inspired Walter and his brothers with the social and political principles that carried them to the top leadership positions of the largest and most socially progressive labor unions in American history. Reuther and his siblings, Christine, Theodore, Roy and Victor came of age at the tumultuous technical, political and cultural crossroads of 19th-century artisanal production and 20th-century industrial mass production. The Reuthers grew up in Wheeling, West Virginia the children of workingclass German immigrants Anna and Valentine Reuther. The parents met in Wheeling at a local pub where Valantine delivered beer and Anna washed dishes. Anna was the daughter of a local wagon maker and a devout Lutheran. She insisted on prayers before family meals and the children attend Sunday school

Valentine entered the steel

38 John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 106-107. Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, The UAW and Walter Reuther (New York: Da Capo Press, 1949), p.96. Nelson Liechtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 84-85. 39 Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), p. 21-22. 40 Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), p. 18, Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 6-7. Victor Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1976), p.15, 35-36.

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industry at Wheeling's ironworks, first as a general laborer before moving up to a skilled job as a "heater" in the rolling mill. He joined the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers of Homestead. In 1909, Valantine served a term as president of the Ohio Valley Trades and Labor Assembly. He also helped organize brewery workers in a nearby town. Valantine remained a member of the Brewery Workers Union, one of the few industrial AFL unions. Valantine was both a dedicated unionist and an active Socialist. His brand of Socialism emphasized political action instead of confrontation because strikes disrupted the carefully balanced relationships craft unions and their employers. Valantine was a dedicated disciple of Eugene V. Debs. Valantine there passed on the Socialist tradition to the Reuther children at the dinner table where he nourished in their minds but organizing family debates on current issues such as 41

Prohibition, women's suffrage, capital punishment and the rights of workers.

Walter

Reuther, followed his father in the artisanal tradition as a tool and die maker. Walter entered to an apprenticeship at Wheeling Corrugating at the age of 15 years old. Reuther eventually made tooling and machinery for the quintessential 20th-century massproduced product—the automobile. Reuther made his way to Detroit in 1927 where he made his entry into the automobile industry and began storied journey into the corridors of political power in the house of labor. He quickly learned how to navigate the appropriate technical and cultural channels at the "Ford's" in order to get what he wanted. Reuther first put his die maker 41 Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), p. 18, Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 2-8. Victor Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1976), p. 36-37. 42 Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 10. Victor Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1976), p. 39.

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skills to work at the Briggs Corporation, a supplier offenders and body panels to Ford and Chrysler. After a brief stint at Briggs, he hired in as a die maker at the Ford Highland Park factory, the birthplace of the Model T. Six months later he transferred to the massive River Rouge complex where he established himself as an up and coming new talent at the company. He rose quickly to the position of die maker leader, a kind of straw boss with the responsibilities of a foreman in the tool and die room, but without the formal title. Reuther's ability to capitalize on his intelligence and strong personality was limited by at the cultural dynamics at Ford. Advancement at the Ford required more from the committed organizational participant than loyalty. It required political connections. Even though Ford was a family-owned enterprise that lacked the stifling bureaucracy of its competitor General Motors, the political infighting was no less intense. The flow of politics at Ford was channeled from three cultural tributaries of influence within the organization. The Ford political system was influenced by factional competition, ethnic conflict and nepotism. The Ford Service Department that was run by the infamous Harry Bennett was the first tributary of power. The Service Department functioned as an oppressive police force in a totalitarian state. The Ford servicemen enforced a strict moral code on the Ford workers by monitoring their behavior on-the-job and after-hours. The second tributary consisted of the northern European management cadre from factory superintendents, down to production foreman. That was in keeping with Mr. Ford's belief in eugenics and the "scientific" approach to social hierarchy. There was a mounting acceptance of the idea that certain racial and ethnic groups were biologically superior, destined to be intellectual workers and managers, while others were 43 Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 14-18.

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inferior, and meant to toil beneath the machinery of the assembly-line. The third branch of political power flowed from a peculiar source, the Freemasons order. The Masonic Lodge recruited members from the lower middle-class male office workers and Protestant skilled workers from factories, railroads and offices. Lodge members were attuned to the prevailing social and cultural attitudes that were openly anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic. The "free and accepted" brotherhood was dedicated to taking care of their own within the Lodge, the workplace and in society. Membership in the Masonic order was often a qualification for getting a job, keeping a job or career advancement at the Ford. The connection to the Lodge was especially important in the Depression years. Reuther experienced the political influence of Freemasonry in the auto industry firsthand in 1931 when a friendly plant superintendent advised him to join the Masonic order as a measure to prevent layoff. Reuther paid the initiation fee, submitted to the Masonic ritual and received his ring. His membership in the order paid off later that year when Reuther was one of the few workers who avoided the deep layoffs that hit the industry.

The

Freemasons are an interesting source of power because the Masons were also an important cultural and political influence in the relationship between UAW and GM. Membership in the Masons played a crucial role in who ascended the UAW organizational bureaucracy for decades. Walter Reuther returned to his Socialist roots in 1930 when his brother Victor joined him in Detroit just as the Great Depression grew deeper. Even as Walter retained his job at Ford in 1932, more than one half of the autoworkers in Detroit lost their jobs as production dropped by two thirds. The social impact was devastating. Walter and Victor 44 Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 19.

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attended Detroit City College (later called Wayne State University) where they studied economics and sociology. They were attracted to radical instructors and the Socialist movement. In the early 1930s, the Socialist Party was gaining in popularity in Michigan. The state-wide party claimed its 6000 members, published 11 newspapers and got Socialist mayors elected in cities across Michigan including Flint and Kalamazoo. The Reuther's distinguished themselves on the Detroit campus by organizing the DCC Social Problems Club as an affiliate of the League for Industrial Democracy, protests, public debates of social issues and delivering impassioned speeches in favor of pacifism. They decried the pervasive of social and economic injustice in America. The Reuther brothers campaigned across southern Michigan for Socialist party presidential candidate Norman Thomas.

Walter wasfiredfromFord in March of 1932 for Socialist activities.

Just before Walter left the Ford Motor Company, he became intrigued by the Socialist experiment in economic planning in the Soviet Union. In his final months at Ford, Reuther became acquainted with some Soviet technicians who were working at one of the Ford plants. The Soviets had purchased all the tooling and machinery necessary to manufacture the Model A which was discontinued at Ford in 1931. The Soviets needed skilled labor to set up the machinery and the industrial complex in Gorky, especially tool and die makers. Walter and Victor to left for the Soviet Union in 1933 and toured Europe just as the Nazi revolution was getting underway. They witnessedfirsthandthe spread of

Richard W. Judd, Socialist Cities: Municipal Politics and the Grassroots of American Socialism, (Albany: State University of New York Press 1989), p. 95-117. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 25-31.

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Nazi fascism in their parent's homeland before they left for Moscow.

Walter expected

the socialist system in the Soviet Union to be a countervailing force to the rise of fascism. The Reuther brothers arrived in the Soviet Union just as the "First Five-Year Plan" almost complete. The Soviet industrialization plan was supposed to be a well coordinated effort to deploy the country's resources with an efficient program of production to benefit all of society. They learned that Moscow wasn't exactly the Socialist promised-land that was described in Soviet propaganda. The Russian weather was bitterly cold, the train stations were slow, crowded and chaotic, and there was evidence of grinding poverty everywhere. The Reuthers and other western workers destined for Gorky were insulated from the suffering experienced by the peasantry caused by Stalin's push for industrial modernization. Agricultural collectivization resulted in the starvation of millions in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus. The Gorky industrial project was an experiment in Soviet-style production planning, but it was plagued by rampant overstaffing and mismanagement from the beginning. When the Reuthers arrived at the Gorky Auto Works the building was unfinished and managers routinely falsified production figures in order to meet quotas. The few cars that were produced were assembled from imported parts and were of poor quality. The Reuther's lived in "American Village" with about a hundred American workers employed at the Gorky complex, thirty of whom were from Ford Motor Company. Walter chose to see the problems as mismanagement rather than trouble with systemic social and economic planning. Even though the Reuthers were aware of the brutality of the police-state and

Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 32-35. Victor Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1976), p. 66-74.

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other contradictions of the Soviet social and economic system, they returned to the 47

United States with a favorable impression of the Soviet Union in 1935.

Walter's

enthusiasm for the Soviet Socialist system remained undiminished until the antiCommunist crusade in America rendered those ideas politically indefensible. Reuther era union politics were influenced by World War II government industrial policy and the Cold War. The political ideology of the Cold War was in place in the UAW even before World War II began. The faith of American Communists in the Soviet Union was shaken by the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact and the invasion of Finland, Poland and the Baltic states by the Red Army. The non-Communist left was swift to align in opposition to Communists, Nazis and Fascists. Reuther was an attractive figure to the non-Communist left because of his anti-Communist credentials. He further distinguished himself from the radical left by challenging management's exclusive authority and promoting a social Democratic national agenda. For Reuther, the answer to basic problems in America and elsewhere in the world could not be found in the formulas of Fascism, Communism or any other kind of totalitarian system. "Totalitarianism of all varieties offers the people of the world economic security at the price of freedom. Hitler, Joe Stalin, and all the dictators promise to put bread in your stomach at the price of putting your soul in chains. The answer must be found by developing the democratic tools, by developing the social mechanisms through which we can assure that we will mobilize our economy, realize its potential, and gear that potential and that abundance to

Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 37-45. Victor Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1976), p. 110-111.

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the people's needs."

The Reuther forces laid the foundation for "democratic tools" in

the UAW by putting radical elements within the union on notice. At the 1940 national convention a resolution was passed that condemned "brutal dictatorships" of the "totalitarian governments of Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan." In 1941, a constitutional amendment was passed that barred Communists, Fascists and Nazis from union office. 49

The amendment was supported by Reuther, but opposed by George Addes.

Reuther's

vision for developing "social mechanisms" was to transform capitalism into a more humane economic system, not replace it. The technical basis for those reforms could be found in evenhanded collaboration of labor, government and industry. World War II presented Reuther with an opportunity to extend New Deal economic planning and portray labor as a legitimate actor in the national political economy. Reuther's plans for war production went beyond the notion of a "guns and butter" formula. The guns and butter formula was an idea that war production could provide prosperity alongside war production. Instead, in 1940 he presented a far more ambitious war conversion plan that place labor at the center of industrial planning. Reuther's plan called for utilizing idle factory capacity to produce "500 planes per day" for the war effort. The "Reuther plan" was well received in some corridors of Washington, but not in the corporate boardroom. The auto companies dismissed the idea as impractical, but more importantly, capitalists did not want labor to participate 48 Walter P. Reuther, "The Economics of Collective Bargaining," speech [transcript] at University of California, Institute of Industrial Relations, November 30, 1948, box 542, folder 15, Walter P. Reuther collection, The Archives of Labor History and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University. 49 Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge To The AFL: A History Of the American Labor Movement 19351941, (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1960), p. 190. Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, The UAW and Walter Reuther (New York: Da Capo Press, 1949), p. 79. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 155-157. Jack Stieber, Governing The UAW, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 8.

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alongside management to establish production standards. GM President William Knudsen refused to consider the "socialistic" pooling of company resources, at least not on Reuther's terms. The industrialists were not opposed to a planned war production economy as long as management did the planning. The Office of Production Management eventually implemented a watered-down version of the Reuther plan. Labor would have a subordinate advisory role in the decision-making process that was dominated by industrialists. Industry successfully resisted attempts by labor to set the conditions of production, but agreed to limits on profits. The UAW agreed to a no-strike pledge and to forgo overtime premiums on weekends and holidays in return for strict price controls. The so-called "equality of sacrifice," formula was seen by the rank-andfile as anything but equal. Even though the Reuther plan was rejected, Reuther himself received extraordinary notoriety and access to Washington insiders. He established important contacts with President Roosevelt and powerful New Dealers including Harold Ickes and Lyndon Johnson, and liberal economists like John Kenneth Galbraith and Robert Nathan. War production stimulated an unprecedented technical and cultural transformation in industrial manufacturing. Flint received substantial technical benefits from industrial expansion during World War II. The federal government subsidized GM expansion with state-financed construction of new factories at the Flint Buick site for war production. Federal hiring guidelines accompanied the federal money. The hiring guidelines transformed the shop floor culture. Millions of rural migrants, women and

Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, The UAW and Walter Reuther (New York: Da Capo Press, 1949), p. 108112. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 162-171.

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African Americans traveled to the industrial cities in search of manufacturing jobs. At the beginning of war women and African Americans were systematically excluded from war industry jobs. For the most part the UAW regarded women and African Americans as interlopers who were trespassing on white male territory. Those attitudes change as labor shortages in the factories became more acute because of the war. Racial and gender discrimination in war production factories and surrounding industrial communities fueled a nascent civil rights movement. In 1941, A. Phillip Randolph led the March of Washington Movement that encouraged President Roosevelt to sign an executive order against job discrimination. In 1941, the UAW Research Department determined that Michigan auto plants and employed 14,675 women. In 1942, a discrimination case was brought against GM by the UAW and the United Electrical Workers before the National War Labor Board. The board established an "equal pay for equal work" principal that supported wage rates for women to be the same as men when they do similar work. By the end of 1943, during the peak of war production, Michigan auto plants employed 203,300 women.

That

amounted to twenty six percent of the overall auto production workforce. The number of African American men employed in manufacturing soon doubled. UAW membership more than doubled between 1941 and 1944 as well. White auto workers reacted to having to work alongside African Americans with a wave of 'hate strikes.' In 1943,25,000 whites struck the Packard Work in Detroit. Subsequent race riots

Nancy F. Gabin, Feminism in the Labor Movement: Women and the United Auto Workers (1935-1975), (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990), p. 55-63.

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claimed thirty-four lives.

Although the UAW leadership suppressed the white racist

elements, they rejected demands for an "African American seat" of the IEB. Reuther persuaded the leadership that an exclusive African American seat was a hypocritical idea that amounted to reverse discrimination. A series of compromises at the tenth UAW national convention led to the establishment of an institutional framework to discourage all forms of discrimination. In 1944, the UAW created the Fair Employment Practices Department and Anti-discrimination department and a 53

Women's Bureau as a part of the War Policy Division.

Government investigations

into discriminatory company and union practices led to an increase in the hiring of African Americans and women in the Flint plants. In the Flint plants most African Americans were hired into the lowest tier jobs at Buick, Chevrolet and AC. The rapid infusion of women and African Americans into the plants was resisted by local unions and employers. Racial discrimination continued to frustrate organizing efforts in the South, the surge of minority hiring laid the foundation for future civil rights movements. Even with seniority agreements in place, past discriminatory practices disproportionately affected African American and women workers. The UAW's antidiscrimination commitments didn't erase unequal racial and gender boundaries; in many cases they simply redrew the lines. The new rules didn't change the fact that those last hired were still the first fired during a layoff. Many of the women 52 Mike Davis, Prisoner of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the Working Class, (Thetford: The Thetford Press 1986), p. 74-81. 53 John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 197,203. Kevin Boyle, The UA W and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), p. 43. Nancy F. Gabin, Feminism in the Labor Movement: Women and the United Auto Workers (1935-1975), (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990), p. 93. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 211. August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, Black Detroit and The Rise of the UAW, (New York: Oxford University Press 1979), p. 207-215.

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employed in the auto industry viewed their employment as temporary. For the most part women accepted the cultural expectations that they should get married, raise children and not have to work outside the home. African American women were an exception to that conformist attitude. They were especially eager to keep their jobs because war production provided them with the first meaningful work experience at decent wages. As the war production winded down, thousands of autoworkers lost their jobs and UAW membership plummeted.

Persistent discriminatory practices

added to the existing worker resentment over wage controls at the close of the war. The no strike provision of the war-time agreements fueled dissent that erupted into a militant labor backlash as the war ended. In July of 1944 a group of rebellious local union presidents and shop committee members formed the "Rank-and-File caucus." The caucus included secondary leaders from the Flint area including John McGill, president from Buick Local 599 in 1941 and again in 1945, F. J. (Red) Palmer from Chevrolet Local 659 and Robert Carter of AC Spark Plug. The Rank-and-File caucus wanted to rescind the no strike pledge and forced the international union to support independent political action on behalf of labor. They presented a significant challenge to the Reuther forces in the September 1944 convention in Grand Rapids but their success was short-lived. The convention delegates were presented with three resolutions; retain the strike pledge, rescind the strike pledge, and a compromise by the Reuthers to retain the strike pledge only in war production plants. The Reuther compromise gathered the

Nancy F. Gabin, Feminism in the Labor Movement: Women and the United Auto Workers (1935-1975), (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990), p. 134-138. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America. "1998 Report of the Trustees 32ndConstitutional Convention," (Las Vegas, Nevada 22-26 June 1998), 17. The UAW reports dues paying membership levels in 1941 at 460,791, in 1944 at 1,065,030 and in 1946 at 677,310.

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support of only thirty seven percent of the delegates. Defections within his ranks of supporters at the convention meant that Reuther barely retained the vice presidency. Meanwhile, the Rank-and-File caucus agreed to a compromise that placed the no strike issue to a vote of the entire membership. Even though the rank-and-file voted two to one to support the no strike pledge, the incident was seen as a major defeat for Reuther. The war soon ended, and with that the major plank of Reuther's opposition, the no strike pledge. The Rank-and-file caucus dissolved and most of its members returned to the Reuther camp.

The Rank-and-File caucus represented the last major obstacle to

Reuther taking control of the UAW. In 1946, Walter Reuther was poised to capture the top office in the UAW. He had been UAW Vice President in charge of General Motors Department since 1942 and the rank-and-file was eager for a wage increase as World War II ended. Reuther led GM employees out on a strike in November of 1945 that lasted 113 days. Reuther used the 1945-46 GM strike push a social agenda and to channel worker resentment at the locals to defeat his political opponents. In this round of contract negotiations he successfully suppressed shop floor militants and dismantled rank-and-file insurgency that led frequent wild-cat strikes. Reuther managed to outflank his opponents on the Left by placing demands on the industry in the context of social democratic principles. He embarked on an ambitious bargaining strategy that included a public-relations campaign intended to get the public to side with the union. Reuther sought to create mass purchasing power through wage increases while protecting consumers by restraining General Motors from

Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, The UAW and Walter Reuther (New York: Da Capo Press, 1949), p. 121. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 214-216. Sol Dollinger, Not Automatic: Women and the Left in Forging of the Auto Workers' Union, (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2000), p.71-73.

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raising car prices. He demanded a 30 percent wage increase for UAW members who had just experienced wartime wage restraints and had relied on overtime to maintain living standards. The pay increase was necessary Reuther argued to counteract postwar inflation and to fuel the pent-up consumer demand. Reuther tried to persuade public opinion to support his position by offering to accept less than any 30 percent wage increase if General Motors agreed to "open their books" to justify the need to raise car prices in order to make a fair profit. General Motors refused claiming that corporate finances were proprietary information. More importantly, GM refused to surrender management prerogatives to Reuther's "Socialist" demands. The UAW's position was undermined when Ford and Chrysler settled agreements for eighteen and one half percent wage increase with the UAW. The United Electrical Workers also settled with General Motors for an eighteen and one half percent increase. To make matters worse, the union strike fund was exhausted during the strike. Reuther eventually accepted similar terms. Although the strike was widely considered a defeat for the UAW, Reuther's bold leadership during the strike earned him enough support with the rank-and-file to propel him into the president's office. Reuther was elected UAW president at the 10th constitutional convention. The election signaled the end for the Communist influence in the UAW leadership even

John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 212-221. Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), p. 30-31. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 229, 237-237 According to Lichtenstein the UAW won a mix victory in the propaganda war with General Motors. A nationwide poll indicated that 60% of the country believed that autoworkers deserved a raise, 44% sided with the strikers and 35% sided with GM. Americans blamed the UAW for the strike, 42% faulted the UAW versus 19% for GM. Victor G. Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 147. 249-255. Robert H. Zieger, The CIO 1935-1955, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 1995), p.219-225.

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though Reuther was elected by slim margin. His strongest support came from General Motors plants, but there was persistent opposition where Communists retained a significant presence.

Even though the Reuther Caucus controlled only 7 votes out of

the 25 members of the International Executive Board, he had the sole right under the UAW Constitution to appoint staff. Through judicious exercise of authority, Reuther was able to consolidate his power, and the following year his political caucus, the Reuther 58

Caucus, was successful in gaining all but three or four positions on the IEB.

When he

was reelected President 1947 the administration's slate of candidates took control of eighteen of the twenty-two positions on the International Executive Board. Reuther rode a post-World War II wave of anti-Communist sentiment that swept the country to justify the systematic elimination of his opposition. For the first time in the history of the UAW one political party had complete control of international union. The Reuther Caucus controlled the Rules Committee in 1949 when the committee made changes to the convention rules regarding the election of international officers. Previously, the positions for international office were voted on individually by roll call vote. The rules change provided that all officers and international trustees elected on a single roll call vote. The changes made it nearly impossible for individual opposition candidates to get elected to office. This began the trend of running politically-oriented groups of candidates on "slates." This made it almost impossible for an individual

John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p.223-225. 58 UAW Public Review Board International Union UAW Decision, "Appeal of: Gary Brandt, International Representative Region 2, UAW (Cleveland, Ohio) vs. International Union UAW (The United automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America)" Case No. 787 II. (28 August 1987), 2:4

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candidate to run for international office. If those convention rules had been in place in 59

1946, Reuther probably would not have become president of the UAW. The dawn of caucus system as the dominant force in the UAW had its origin in 1946 when Walter Reuther was first elected president. Reuther wielded his Constitutional authority to consolidate his power. The following year the Reuther Caucus gained control of the IEB. Leonard Woodcock campaigned as an Administration Caucus candidate to become a member of the IEB on the pledge to "eliminate his opponent's staff." The strength of the UAW administration arose from of the recognition that not only was loyalty to the UAW required on the part of its officers, but also a loyalty to one another. The UAW Public Review Board (PRB) weighed in on the issue of the Administration Caucus's domination of UAW government in the 1988 "Brandt decision.""" The PRB was created at the 16th UAW Constitutional Convention as an impartial body whose purpose was to ensure "high moral and ethical standards in the Administration in operative practices of the International Union and its subordinate bodies."

The PRB stated in the Brant decision that "we cannot ignore the fact that the

UAW is now, and has been for over 20 years, a one-party institution not in all respects unlike that found in many national governments in which is a single political party controls the government, and the officials who formally make and administer those laws pursuant to which the country is governed are selected wholly by that party. As a 59 Jack Stieber, Governing The UAW, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 22-23. Gary Brandt, International Representative Region 2, UAW (Cleveland, OH) v. International Union, UAW (The United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America), Decision on Reconsideration, The Public Review Board International Union, UAW, Case No. 787-11, (Decision on Reconsideration, April 22nd, 1988), p. 2. Constitution of the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW (Atlantic City: New Jersey, April 1957), Article 31, Public Review Board p. 75.

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consequence, the lines of demarcation in the UAW between the party, the Administration Caucus, and the formal governing body, the International Executive Board, has become blurred, for 100 percent of its personnel are, and traditionally have been, members of the Administration Caucus."

The basis of power in the caucus system was contingent on

the willingness of its committed organizational participants to adhere to the organizational ideal of the caucus leadership. The Reuther caucus or the "Administration Caucus" as it later became known, was an emergent system whose sole purpose was to maintain control over the UAW political system. Administration Caucus rules allowed for the discussion of union and caucus business providing of course one belonged to the caucus. The caucus decisions were decided by majority vote and supported by its membership at all official union gatherings. The integration of the Administration Caucus into the UAW structure of councils and sub councils, education programs and communications programs reinforced the existing power structure. The Administration Caucus consisted of three levels. The first level, the Board Caucus included the members on International Executive Board. After Reuther was elected president for the second time, nearly the entire International Executive Board were Board Caucus members. They met prior to the regular Executive Board meetings to Discuss Recommendations from the IEB officers. The second level, the Steering Committee, included elected leaders from the region and officers from the larger UAW locals. The Steering Committee met a couple months before UAW conventions to establish consensus for convention floor actions. The third level, the 62 Gary Brandt, International Representative Region 2, UA W (Cleveland, OH) v. International Union, UAW (The United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America), The Public Review Board International Union, UAW, Case No. 787-11, (Decision on Reconsideration, April 22nd, 1988), p. 6.

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entire caucus, consisted of all Caucus members elected as delegates to the national conventions. They met a day or two before the conventions to gain information about recommendations from the steering committee. That is where they got their marching orders for convention strategy. The expenses for the Administration Caucus were paid for out of the so-called "flower fund." The flower fund functioned as a political slush fund that was financed by contributions officers, staff members who dutifully supported the Administration Caucus agenda. Although the fund did pay for funerary flowers and other occasions, it was used primarily for political purposes.

The support for

administration proposals at union conventions had predetermined outcomes that were orchestrated within caucus chambers and executed on the convention floor by caucus partisans. The caucus system rendered the formal process of union governance into a well-choreographed political machine that consigned the ordinary rank-and-file to the periphery. The national Administration Caucus had its counterparts in the regions and in local unions. The regional caucuses were typically led by the Regional Director who had strong control over the region. Union members in the regions identified closely with the Regional Director. Regional Director's had direct a connection to the international union because they were also a member of the International Executive Board. A strong Regional Director could exert considerable influence at the international level. The regional caucus selected the administration candidate or regional director. The absence

John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 250. John Lippart, "UAW Officers Fund Used to Derail Dissidents," Detroit Free Press, 28 February 1989, P. 5-C. The Administration Caucus flower fund became the subject of a 1997 lawsuit. David Sparks v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, United States District Court of Ohio, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern District, Case No: 1:86-CV-1154.

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of meaningful opposition in the regions meant that the nomination by the Regional Administration Caucus was equivalent to an election. The political system functioned the same way in local unions. The local union administration caucus affiliates typically dominated local union elections, but there was always more room for opposition to operate. Local plant issues sometimes overrode the will of the mainstream caucus system. The caucus system served the UAW Leadership as a conduit of rank-and-file attitudes. The regional and local caucus systems had their own flower funds to maintain political apparatus. It was illegal to use union funds to finance political functions that involved hall rental, travel, hotels, meals, convention parties or election campaigns. The flower funds were financed by direct contributions from officers, executive Board members, international representatives, local union officers and appointed representatives. The UAW flower funds were scrutinized by the McClellan Committee where Walter Reuther testified that there was no regular contribution pattern. The amount of the flower fund contributions varied widely from the early 1960s to the 1990s from $10 per week to more than $500 lump payments. The use of flower funds was especially controversial in local union election contests where international and regional funds could be secretly channeled to support caucus partisans for local office. The caucus system brought stability to the UAW and the auto industry after a decade of political upheaval. Political unity presented a sense of solidarity that 64 Jack Stieber, Governing the UAW, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p.70-72. John Lippart, "UAW Officers Fund Used to Derail Dissidents," Detroit Free Press, 28 February 1989, P. 5-C. The Administration Caucus flower fund became the subject of a 1997 lawsuit. David Sparks v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, United States District Court of Ohio, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern District, Case No: 1:86-CV-l 154. Jack Stieber, Governing the UAW, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 72-73.

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strengthened the union's dealings with employers. The factional disputes that racked the organization were routinely exploited by General Motors and Ford. The central bureaucracy that Alfred P. Sloan instituted at General Motors prevented the UAW from pitting one plant against another. In a similar fashion, Reuther's caucus system made it more difficult for management to manipulate union. Management's new attitude towards the union caused a widespread turnover in top management immediately after World War II. Executive control of General Motors transferred from Sloan to the new GM President, Charles E. Wilson. Wilson was convinced by 1945-46 strike that the UAW was in the plants to stay. Henry Ford died in 1947 and he was replaced by his grandson Henry Ford II. The violently antiunion Harry Bennett, the head of the infamous Ford Service Department was fired.

The new generation of management redirected the labor conflict

from coercion of the rank-and-file to the bargaining table. With Reuther in charge, formal collective bargaining overruled shop floor militancy. By 1945, rank-and-file had grown weary of the factional disputes that dated back to 1937. The Reuther caucus represented political unity. Political unity enabled the UAW to achieve unprecedented prosperity for the membership. The Reuther leadership cohort that emerged in the post-World War II era; Leonard Woodcock, Douglas Fraser and Irving Bluestone propelled the UAW into the position of the "vanguard of America" into the 1970s. Reuther himself personified the UAW organizational ideal that promoted a social democratic vision for America of an equitably controlled economy as the formula to meet the needs of society. Reuther

John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 263. Nelson Liechtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 142-143.

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positioned the UAW at the forefront of the important social issues that confronted postWorld War II America. The Reuther forces took advantage of the technical, political and cultural developments that emerged from the war economy to push a social democratic agenda. The international UAW dominated bargaining process in the auto industry immediately after the war. The power to formulate and implement contracts, and execute strike actions was centralized from the locals to the international union. The UAW established a pattern bargaining system that doubled wages and established one of the richest systems employer funded welfare benefits for industrial workers. Pattern bargaining became the formal strategy across all major employment sectors.

Union

officials focused their attention on winning better wage and benefit packages free of the distraction political infighting. Workers focused their attention on acquiring more material comforts and leisure time instead of the continuous cycles of crisis before the war. The rank-and-file were less ideological because of the huge influx of World War II new hires that were disconnected from the formative battles that created the UAW. As long as the bargaining agreements delivered consistent wage and benefit gains, the members were content to have union bureaucracy deal with management. The UAW was intimately involved in shaping the post-World War II welfare state, the struggle for civil rights and the Vietnam War debate. In the final analysis, Reuther's caucus system presented a false impression of solidarity because it had the appearance of political unity. The caucus system institutionalized rank-and-file insurgency. Reuther's election signaled the UAW's turn away from its militant roots. The dues check off system was inaugurated in the 1946 settlement. Up to this point the UAW

John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 248.

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relied on a network of shop stewards to process grievances, collected dues and bargain with management. The successful suppression of the union steward system by the company, the government and the UAW destroyed the institutional basis for insurgent activity. Dues check off severed a vital link between the shop floor and the union leadership. The union revenue stream no longer flowed up from the rank-and/TO

file. Funding was instead channeled from above the checkoff system.

The union's

defeat in 1946 also demonstrated the limits of collective bargaining in the postwar period. The outcome of the 1946 GM strike revealed the limits of the New Deal's ability to influence the political economy, but other forces were at work as well. The labor movement's inability to close ranks around a common social and bargaining agenda left them vulnerable to right-wing attacks. Three events in Reuther's administration influenced the conservative tendency of UAW politics in the post WWII era. The first event involved the conservative backlash that was fueled by the post war strike wave that swept the country and the paranoid style of American politics of the Cold War. The widespread labor conflict had an unsettling effect on public opinion towards unions. Conservatives in Congress couched the surge in labor conflict in the rhetoric of the Cold War, linking labor unions to Communism, Socialism, unpatriotic subversive activity and corruption. The second event was the UAW's failed challenge to management's exclusive control over the decision-making process for production. In 1948, the UAW raised the last significant challenge to the management's rights provision. For Reuther, respecting the sanctity of contract was an Ronald Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint Michigan, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press 1987), 212. 69 Nelson Liechtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), 246.

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essential organizational ideal that legitimized the UAW's role in the industrial relations system. The labor contracts placed the union in the position of monitoring the behavior of its members. The third significant event was the merger AFL with the CIO in 1955. The strict adherence to contract and the AFL-CIO merger marginalized insurgent elements and situated the UAW firmly within the American political mainstream. Capital interests used the anti-Communist hysteria that defined the Cold War era as a weapon to attack organized labor. Republican lawmakers crafted the Taft-Hartley Act as a measure to weaken labor unions. Taft-Hartley was an amendment to the 1935 National Labor Relations Act that was meant to impose legal restrictions on organized labor. The NLRA broke with 130 year tradition of judicial repression of union activity. The NLRA ran counter to the American cultural tradition of self-reliance by encouraging collective bargaining. The NLRA was an historic aberration in American employment relations because it equalized the bargaining power between employers and employees. Many on both sides of the labor-management divide and considered the NLRA an extreme policy that was created because of the financial collapse of the Depression. Capital interests worried that labor was giving too much power through government supported collective bargaining. The AFL opposed state-regulated collective bargaining as an infringement on its freedom to decide for itself what was best for labor. The economic stimulation that was created by World War II reversed effects of the Great Depression. Opponents of the New Deal saw an opportunity to reverse many of its programs. Conservatives framed postwar domestic politics within the context of the emerging hostility with the Soviet Union as a matter of patriotism. Taft-Hartley was vigorously opposed by most Democrats, organized labor and especially the UAW. In the

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spring of 1947 be UAW organized a massive work stoppage to protest Taft-Hartley. The rally turned out more than 200,000 workers at Cadillac Square in Detroit. Republicans overrode Harry Truman's veto June 23,1947. The technical, political and cultural systems at the UAW in the post World War II conformed to the dominant corporate organizational structures. The UAW bureaucracy was organized in parallel structures to the GM bureaucracy in order to effectively interact with management. The technical, political and cultural systems at the UAW in the post World War II conformed to the dominant corporate organizational structures. The purpose of Taft-Hartley was to shift the balance of power toward management and to individuals. Taft-Hartley placed restrictions on union organizing activity, strike actions and established "unfair labor practices by unions." It defined workers' rights to not engage in union activity. The amendment provided provisions for workers to decertify unions and employers were allowed to make antiunion statements during union organizing campaigns. Supervisors were excluded from coverage under the NLRA. The act outlawed the use of union funds in political campaigns, strikes by government employees and "closed shops." A "closed shop" is a place of employment that requires union membership. The anti-Communist provision affected the political dynamics of the major industrial unions. The provision stipulated that union officers should sign an affidavit stating that they were not members of the Communist Party. Although there wasn't a legal penalty for not signing affidavits, there were more practical negative effects. Noncompliance with the anti-Communist provision tarred the defiant union with suspicion of being under Communist influence and deprived the union of federal certification under the NLRA. The union wouldn't have the right to appear

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before the National Labor Relations Board to resolve disputes with employers or other unions. For the Reuther administration, access to the NLRB was crucial, especially in light of the recent factional disputes with the union's left wing. Reuther wielded the anti70

Communist provisions of Taft-Hartley as a weapon against his opponents.

Most of the

UAW rank-and-file supported Reuther's anti-communism as a patriotic gesture amidst the Cold War era red scare. The Taft-Hartley restrictions on unions were toughened again in the late 1950s because of the perception of widespread union corruption. The 1959 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) or "Landrum-Griffin Act" instituted federal penalties for labor officials who misused union funds, were found guilty of corruption or prevented their union members from exercising their legal rights. The LMRDA was passed into law after a series of well-publicized hearings into union corruption that were conducted by the McClellan Anti- Racketeer Committee. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters was the primary target by the committee which led to the expulsion of the Teamsters from the AFL-CIO. The primary purpose for the LMRDA was to guarantee individual workers rights and transparency of union finances.

The new requirements

included a strict ban on secondary boycotts (union efforts to stop one employer from dealing with another employer who is being struck or boycotted) and empowered John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 233-234. Richard N. Block, Peter Berg and Dale Belman, "The Economic Dimension of the Employment Relationship " In The Employment Relationship: Examining Psychological and Contextual Perspectives, edited by Jacqueline A-M Coyle-Schapiro, Lynn M. Shore, M. Susan Taylor in Lois E. Tetrick, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 94-95. Kevin Boyle, The UA W and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), p. 32. Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), p. 40-41. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 263 .Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985), 279.

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individual states to set the terms of labor relations within their borders. Title I of the LMRDA established Bill of Rights for members of labor organizations that included the freedom of speech and assembly, the protection against dues increases without a vote, and improper disciplinary action. Title II required reporting by labor organizations. Unions were required to record officers' names, provisions for members' rights and annual financial statements. Title III defined the reason for trusteeships and reporting mechanisms for the trusteeships. For example, trusteeships for welfare benefits programs and joint training programs such as apprenticeship training. Title IV required regular local and national elections by secret ballot of all members in good standing. Title V established safeguards for labor organizations by defining officials' fiduciary responsibilities to the union membership. The law anyone who handled required all 71

individuals who handled union funds or property to be bonded.

It is important to

remember that these provisions required reporting and disclosure of labor organizations. These rules were circumvented with the creation of UAW Inc., a labor organization that was not foreseen by the authors of the National Labor Relations Act, the Taft-Hartley or Landrum Griffin amendments. The failure by the Reuther administration's to dislodge the management's rights provision of the contract contributed to UAW's conservative trend. UAW had to demonstrate it was a responsible citizen in its relationship with employers, especially in the context of the anti-Communist hysteria. Major companies and the federal government encouraged unions to centralize authority, take more responsibility, honor contracts, maintain production and define divisions of authority between management and labor. 71 Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), p.55, 60.

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The rise of industrial unions during the World War II and the increase of wildcat strikes convinced corporate management that unions were trying to take over important responsibilities from management. Reuther's demands for GM to open its books in 1946 underlined those concerns. Reuther's social democratic vision was to extend the WWII corporatism into the postwar period. He demanded a limited version of codetermination that would provide workers a voice in corporate decision-making. General Motors seized the 1946 contract negotiations as an opportunity to take a hard-line towards the UAW. The contract settlement reaffirmed management's control over the business and centralized union authority to the international. The UAW agreed to company security agreements that recognized the corporation's right to discipline local union officers who participated in wildcat strikes. The national agreement stipulated that strike actions by local unions were subject to the approval of the international union. In 1948, the UAW mounted its last major assault on management prerogatives at GM. The union wanted to delete the corporation's right to promote, discharge or discipline workers for cause to maintain efficiency from the 1940 company security agreement. The union demanded a role in deciding the location of plants and production schedules. GM's successfully resistant the union attempt to usurp management authority. The company agreed to a "union security" provision in return for the UAW's reaffirming management's prerogative. The union security provision strengthened the Reuther administration's authority within the UAW. The provision created a dues check-off system that automatically transferred union dues and initiation fees directly from the members' 72

paychecks to the UAW.

The UAW accepted responsibility to enforce contract

72 John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970,

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provisions and to allow GM to operate without interference from the union. The 1948 agreement institutionalized the trend to centralize authority to the International Union. The 1948 contract negotiation with General Motors signaled the last major challenge to "Reuther's UAW" from the left-wing Unity caucus stronghold in Flint. The presidents of the five Flint locals presented the idea of an escalator clause or cost-ofliving adjustment (COLA), a linkage between wages and the cost of living. Reuther rejected the idea, branding the leader of the initiative, Jack Palmer a "Red." Palmer was neither a Socialist nor a Communist, but he was discredited by Reuther's red-baiting campaign. Reuther instead advocated an Annual Improvement Factor (AIF). Even though Reuther opposed the COLA formula because it had the potential of lowering wages, it was popular with the rank-and-file. While Reuther lay in a hospital bed recovering from an assassination attempt, GM placed the escalator clause on the table to avoid another costly strike. The COLA wage index was linked to changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index. The UAW signed a two year agreement that included the AIF and COLA. The COLA agreement became a pattern for other industries. Reuther's apprehension of wage cuts materialize the following year when the 73

BLS index dropped and UAW wages were cut by three cents per hour.

(Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 248-249. The UAW signed "company security" agreements with Ford and Chrysler in 1946 that were similar to the GM-UAW "recognition" provision that was signed in 1940. Agreements between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Collective Bargaining Gains by Date ofSettlement: UAW-General Motors 1937-1982, Agreement Dated May 29, 1948-May 29, 1950, Union Security, p.5. General Motors Interpretations of 1984 GM UAW National Agreement, Paragraph 8, Explanatory Comments: (1) and (2), p.30-31. See Appendix B, Part I, 1940 National Agreement, Recognition, Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAW-CIO, June 24, 1940, Recognition, Paragraph 3(c), p. 6. 73 Collective Bargaining Gains by Date ofSettlement: UAW-General Motors 1937-1982, Agreement Dated May 29, 1948-May 29, 1950, Annual Improvement Factor, Insurance, p. 5-6. Sol Dollinger, Not Automatic: Women and the Left in Forging of the Auto Workers' Union, (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2000), p. 119. Ronald Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint Michigan, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press 1987), p.208. Nelson

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In 1950, GM and the UAW reached a landmark five-year agreement that was hailed by Fortune Magazine as the "Treaty of Detroit." GM was quick to agree to a historic billion-dollar wage and benefit package in exchange for the stability of and fiveyear agreement. Health-care provisions made their first appearance with the company agreeing to pay half the cost. There were limited provisions covering hospitalization, surgery and dependent coverage. Reuther took ownership of the COLA in the AIF formula as a step towards a Guaranteed Annual Wage (GAW). GM used the 1950 agreement to ease concerns about the wage escalator by dramatically improving the COLA and the AIF formula. Hourly wages were increased $.20 per hour for production workers and $.45 per hour for skilled tradesmen over the life of the contract. Pensions were increased to $125 per month and the company agreed to pay half the cost of health care. For the UAW, the most important provision was the improvements to the union security agreement that created a modified union shop in spite of the constraints of TaftHartley. The modified union shop meant that the workers who were already UAW members remained in the union and all new employees had to join UAW. The workers were already GM employees, but not union members were not required to join UAW. By 1955, GM became a full union shop requiring all hourly employees in a UAW74

represented plant to be union members. The 1950 "Treaty of Detroit," was a five-year contract that signaled a trend toward collaboration rather than conflict between capital and labor. The five year Liechtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p.279. 74 John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 278-281. Collective Bargaining Gains by Date of Settlement: UAW-General Motors 1937-1982, Agreement Dated May 29, 1950-May 29, 1955, Wage Adjustments, p. 6-7. Nelson Liechtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 280.

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agreement set a pattern for industrial relations for the rest of American manufacturing. It also marked the end of Reuther's attempts secure a role for organized labor in the governance of American industry. The UAW all but abandoned its crusade to force corporations to be socially responsible to American consumers. For Reuther, the economic stability of the long-term labor agreement was a two-way street. He pushed for the GAW in 1955 as measure to ameliorate the effects of seasonal layoffs due to model changeover and retooling in the auto industry. Reuther hoped to eliminate income stability that was inherent to the hourly wage formula. GM never did agree a formal guaranteed annual wage. The 1950 agreement had already set the pattern that GM would accept, the explicit linkage of wages to economic factors and industrial productivity. GM reaffirmed its control over management functions; the right to hire and discipline employees, determined plant locations, production methods, processes and scheduling by essentially purchasing labor peace. Workers continued to be marginalized by the growing technocratic nature of the union bureaucracy as the union focused its attention 75

on the administration of labor agreements.

The agreement was an indication that the

philosophical differences that set the UAW-CIO apart from its parent, the AFL had narrowed dramatically. The CIO and the UAW's ability to mobilize political power were diminished after the expulsion of the radical Left from the leadership. The official push by the CIO and the UAW for a Labor Party was abandoned. The labor movement's place in New Deal consensus politics was consigned to the role of an interest group within the

See Appendix B, Part I, Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAW-CIO, June 24, 1940, Recognition, Paragraph 3(c), p. 6. General Motors Management Interpretations, Explanations and Comments Manualfor Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, September 21, 1984, p.3031.

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Democratic Party. By the early 1950s, the UAW remained a vibrant force for social democracy, but the CIO lost its relevance as a catalyst for social and economic change. The mounting philosophical convergence between the CIO and the AFL was formalized in 1955 when the labor federations merged into the AFL-CIO. There had been episodic discussions of a merger since 1937, but fundamental ideological differences and personal animosity prevented agreement. The Cold War political environment swept aside many of the ideological differences. The election of Eisenhower and the death of the presidents of the AFL and the CIO severed the direct link to the leadership cohort of the 1935 partition. CIO president Philip Murray died in 1952. He was replaced by Walter Reuther. Reuther planned to use his new position as a platform to advance social reforms. However, the momentum that created the CIO was lost by the 1950s. Its political power was diminished with a membership at about half of the AFL's ten million. Twelve days later AFL president William Green died. Green had been president of the AFL since the death of Samuel Gompers in 1924. He was replaced by George Meany. Meany was technically a plumber but had not worked his trade since 1922. He was in the purest sense a labor bureaucrat who had spent 30 years fighting his way up the bureaucratic latter. Meany was a more militant anti-Communist than Reuther. Meany emerged as the president of the AFL-CIO and as a compromise Reuther was named director of the newly created Industrial Union Department (IUD) within the merged federation. The AFL had grown closer to the Democratic Party since the New Deal, but did not share the CIO's social agenda. Meany shared his predecessor's belief in Kevin Boyle, The UA W and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), p. 2. See Appendix B, Part I, Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAWCIO, June 24, 1940, Recognition, Paragraph 3(c), p. 6. General Motors Management Interpretations, Explanations and Comments Manual for Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UA W, September 21,1984, p.30-31.

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the capitalist system and that the purpose of the labor movement was improve the economic well-being of its membership. He believed political power should be used to 77

get more for its union members, but not to transform society.

The merger of the AFL

and CIO did not meet Reuther's expectations as a means for social reform. Reuther and Meany frequently clashed over industrial policy, racial equality and foreign-policy issues. Instead of nudging the labor movement to the left, Meany positioned the AFL-CIO further to the right. The UAW continued in its traditional role as a leading force in the social reform, in spite of the disappointment of the AFL-CIO merger. The UAW's commitment to social reform began the same year Walter Reuther was elected president of the UAW. In 1946, Reuther was a cofounder of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and The Leadership Conference of Civil Rights (LCCR). The UAW contributed millions of dollars to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the National Council of Churches, The National Planning Association, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and took an active role in the election campaigns for liberal politicians. The UAW cultivated political activism along with college students since the 1930s when union helped finance the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID). In 1960, the SLID was reinvigorated and renamed Students for Democratic Society (SDS). In 1961, Victor Reuther and Irving Bluestone began a correspondence with SDS that resulted in UAW funding for its activities. The SDS held its pivotal 1962 conference at the UAW summer at Port Huron, Michigan. 77 Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), p. 100-103. Buhle, Paul, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of American Labor, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), p. 132. Robert H. Zieger, The CIO 1935-1955, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 1995), p. 357-363.

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Reuther gained access to the White House where he was able to directly influence social policy. In October of 1960, Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy delivered a Labor Day speech at the University of Michigan in which he pledged to create a Peace Corps. 78

The Peace Corps was an idea that Walter Reuther first proposed in 1950. The assassination of Kennedy in 1963 ushered in a new era of liberal social reforms. Lyndon Johnson tried to define his presidency as a champion of equal rights with the announcement of the War on Poverty in his 1964 State of the Union address. Later that year in a speech in Ann Arbor, Michigan he used the expression "Great Society" to describe a series of domestic programs to end poverty and racial injustice in America. It signaled a new era for liberalism and the American welfare state. The UAW was at its pinnacle of its influence during the Great Society. Reuther developed a close personal relationship Johnson. Johnson frequently mined Reuther for his thoughts on social and economic policy. Reuther viewed the civil rights movement as a vehicle for broader economic and social reform. He sought to link the civil rights with economic change. In 1965, Reuther presented the "Demonstration Cities" plan to Johnson that was modeled after the Tennessee Valley Authority to rehabilitate impoverished urban areas. The plan called for the federal government to restore old houses and build new ones and selected "demonstration neighborhoods." Johnson adopted Reuther's plan and renamed it "Model Cities." The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act was passed in 1966. Detroit, Michigan became "Model City USA." In the meantime, Reuther and George Meany set aside their personal differences at the AFL-CIO to support the

Kevin Boyle, The UA W and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), p. 4-5, 144, 158-160.

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1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

Momentum for the Great

Society programs was brought was stalled as America plunged deeper into the Vietnam War. In the 1960s urban industrial centers experienced significant transformations as whites fled to suburbs and African Americans moved into the city centers. Urban racial tension was transmitted into the plants. African American autoworkers encountered the worst jobs, working conditions and racial slurs. They were often the focus of racist foremen and found their UAW representative indifferent to racial discrimination. As a result a number of insurgent caucuses sprang up. The UAW was unprepared for the 1970s surge in African American radicalism that was fueled by the movement culture of the 1960's. The International felt especially threatened by African American radical Revolutionary Union Movement (RUMs). The Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) presented a new perspective on urban racism. DRUM accused the UAW leadership of perpetuating shop floor racism. In the early 1970s shop floor insurgency became increasingly multiracial and focused on unsafe work conditions and speed ups. Wild-cat strikes spread from one plant to another in Detroit. The International UAW declared war of dissident groups rather than absorb their militant energy into traditional union channels. The union leadership and management combined forces to suppress shop floor militancy. In 1973 rank and file members of UAW Local 212 confronted Chrysler in a wild-cat strike at the Mack 79 Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995), p. 202-203. Paul Buhle, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy ofAmerican Labor, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), p. 173, 181. Sidney Fine, Violence in the Model City: The Cavanagh Administration, Race Relations, and the Detroit Riot of 1967, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press 2007, 1967), p.87. Nelson Liechtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (New York: Basic Books 1995), p. 402-403.

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Stamping plant over dangerous working conditions. Even after the police attack on workers who sat down on the line, the strikers continued to defy of the International UAW's order to return to work. As a result the strikers were met with violent reprisal. Several hundred UAW officers organized a vigilante force to break the strike. Armed with baseball bats and other weapons, the union officers attacked the picketers and 80

brought end to the wild-cat strike.

The UAW administration was determined retain

control. The UAW took a leadership role in all the high-profile social issues of the 1960s and 70s. Walter Reuther marched with the civil rights workers in Selma, Alabama and famously supported Cesar Chavez and farm workers movement in California. However, the UAW took a halfhearted approach to the issue of environmental pollution, the Vietnam War, housing for the poor and institutionalized racism. The UAW gradually withdrew from its position as the social, political and economic "vanguard in America" and focused on securing more welfare benefits programs for its members. By the late 1970s the UAW was no longer having serious discussions about social problems that affected workers outside the union. The UAW rank-and-file didn't associate social 81

problems with class or disassociate social problems from the issue of race.

For well-

paid autoworker it was as though social problems no longer existed. Auto workers had become above all consumers in the American free market economy. The dominance of the American auto industry following World War II created an environment of working-class prosperity and affluence. The majority of the rank-and-file 80 Heather Ann Thompson, "Auto Workers, Dissent, and the UAW: Detroit and Lordstown," Robert Asher and Ronald Edsforth, Autowork, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 198-200. 81

William Serrin, The Company and the Union: The "Civilized Relationship" f the General Motors Corporation and the United Auto Workers, (New York: Knopf, 1973), p. 146-149.

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seemed content with the politics and culture of the UAW. This was the generation of industrial workers who moved to the suburbs and had time for leisure activities. Despite resistance from Reuther, demands for shorter hours and wage escalators found their way 82

into UAW contracts in various forms.

Between 1948 and 1979 the union continued to

make advances in wages and benefits that included the annual improvement factor (AIF), cost of living allowances (COLA) that adjusted for inflation, a defined pension program, health-care and other welfare benefits programs. The culture of struggle and solidarity of the autoworkers in Flint, Detroit and Toledo before the war was fragmented by the new affluence and social mobility they enjoyed because of union contracts. The rank-and-file was more concerned with living the middle-class lifestyle than widespread social i,

83

reform. Reuther's campaign to consolidate power within a single-party political system remains the fundamental paradox of the Reuther administration. He was the president of the UAW for almost the entire postwar period until his death in 1970. His administration boasted many innovations in collective bargaining and for the most part remained loyal to objectives of the preamble to the UAW constitution. While Reuther ruled the UAW, the union maintained an active role in public policy issues to protect civil rights and promote social welfare programs. Even though Reuther was a militant anticommunist in the 1940s and 1950s, he continued to promote social democracy in his work within the political and legislative processes of national government. The painfully divisive experience with Homer Martin during the early years of the UAW had left a deep 82 Jonathan Cutler, Labor's Time: Shorter Hours, the UAW, and the Struggle for American Unionism, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), p. 14-20. 83 John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 270

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impression on Reuther. He understood that the top leadership could easily lose touch with the needs of the rank-and-file and "fall victim to bureaucratic practices that deny others and functional rights." Reuther's concerned about bureaucratic excess was 84

demonstrated in his support for the creation of the Public Review Board in 1957. Notwithstanding his concern for constitutional purity, he made sure that political factionalism would never again threaten the UAW's existence. The Reuther administration eliminated political opposition before it could challenge his authority. Reuther's commitment to democratic ideals ironically did not always extend to the governance of his own union. The concentration of power at the top of the UAW by Reuther's caucus laid the foundation for a totalitarian system that suppressed internal democracy and any form of insurgency. The UAW administration's tactics were sometimes brutal expressions of red baiting and violent suppression of opposition. As the UAW's bureaucracy matured, such tactics were transformed into formal procedures that were administered by the international UAW's growing professional staff. In 1963, Walter Reuther strongly objected to the international representatives and staff members forming a separate staff 85

union, the Staff Council.

The separate organization was a defining feature of UAW's

internal cultural divide. The Staff Council is and other emergent system that illustrated

John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 255. Victor G. Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), 321. Jack Stieber, Governing the UAW, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p.78. 85 John D. Pomfret, "Auto Workers' Staff Sets up Own Union; Reuther Fights Step," The New York Times, October 2, 1963, p.39. "Walter P. Reuther, president of the Auto Workers was said to have been 'hurt and shocked' by the development."

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the autocratic tendency of the International Union's single party political system. According to the Staff Council constitution and bylaws: This organization shall be officially known as: "The UAW Staff Council." Its Jurisdiction shall include all UAW International Representatives, Technicians, Inside Security Staff and others, active and retired, in (39) units except for those who have been charged with the responsibility of directing the activities of members if this council in a supervisory 87

capacity. Under this arrangement the IEB assumed the role of employer and the Staff Council were the employees. IEB members were by extension also members of the Staff Council. Thus, the practice formulating salaries and benefits was an exercise the International Union bargaining with itself. When the Staff Council engaged in contract negotiations with the IEB for pension, severance pay, healthcare insurance and other benefits, members the IEB shared the same benefits package. Even though the Staff Council salaries and pensions are substantially higher than ordinary members, UAW Secretary Treasurer, Ruben Burks explained that the Staff Council and the UAW are separate and distinct organizations. Burks further argued that institutional integrity was maintained because the Staff Council agreement was "bargained at arm's-length, is no secret, and 88

governs the wages we pay to members of that bargaining unit."

UAW staff pensions

include a Cost of Living Allowance and health care benefits not availed to the rank-andMichels, Robert Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 16-17. 87 UAW Staff Council, UAW Staff Council Constitution and Bylaws, 30 November 1994, 1. 88 UAW Secretary-Treasurer, Ruben Burks, to Alan Nielson, 4 December 1998, A personal letter that is in possession of the author. Ruben Burks confirmed for Mr. Alan Nielson that the Staff Council is a separate union with separate Employee Identification Numbers.

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file. The staff contracts were subject to approval by a vote of the delegates at the UAW 89

Constitutional Convention.

The absence of an effective countervailing political force

all but guaranteed the approval any proposal the administration sent to the convention delegates. Successive generations of UAW leaders formed an elite culture that was detached from the rank-and-file and oblivious to outside forces.

89 Department of Labor, "Summary/Questions and Answers: International UAW Staff Retirement Income Plan," (13 December 1995). Staff council members can draw multiple pensions. Staff members can receive company pensions in addition to Staff Council pensions. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America. "1980 agreement between the UAW and the Staff Council of international Representatives."

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Chapter 4 Buick Local 599 The rise and fall of GM and the UAW can be traced to the post WWII sense of invulnerability that both organizations acquired in the uncontested terrain of the American auto industry. GM and the UAW benefitted considerably from the government intervention in the economy during WWII and the postwar New Deal political consensus. During the war the UAW membership grew rapidly as government subsidized war production schemes contributed generously to the expansion of the manufacturing capacity of GM. UAW collective bargaining outcomes in 1950s and 1960s placed a middle-class lifestyle within reach of the rank and file. The UAW governance system matured into centralized bureaucracy that placed the union on a parallel organizational trajectory with General Motors. The UAW experienced impressive postwar gains, but after 1980 an equally dramatic decline. GM and the UAW adopted unrealistic organizational ideals that were defined at a moment when both organizations dominated their respective markets; autos and auto labor. That growth of the UAW professional staff as an elite class within the union is an example of that trend. Political patronage became a dominant feature of UAW staffing decisions. The story of the rise and fall of UAW and GM since WWII is a tale of tragically missed opportunities, hubris and willful ignorance that eventually led to institutional isolation, corruption and atrophy in both organizations. Since the death of Walter Reuther in 1970, the UAW evolved from a socially progressive organization into a business-oriented capital-driven organization. That was in sharp contrast to the heyday of the 1950s and 1960s when the UAW was a potent force

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in politics and socially progressive public policy. But was the UAW really the socially progressive organization when it came to the union itself? Reuther often declared that union democracy was a fundamental principal in the UAW. These values were echoed by union officials, the UAW constitution and other union literature. Reuther often asserted that UAW members of diverse ethnic, racial, religious groups were guaranteed an equal voice in union governance. A close examination of the union's internal strategy and structure suggests otherwise. The transformation of the UAW into a business oriented organization was made possible because of the political system instituted by the Reuther administration. It was a structure that isolated the union leadership from accountability to the rank-and-file. It was a system that prevented meaningful reforms or challenges to the political status quo. The centralized political structure in the UAW was common among the large industry unions, but the capital-driven organization that emerged in the post-Reuther years was an unintended consequence of that single party system. Reuther's immediate successors, Leonard Woodcock and Douglas Fraser continued that trend. Leonard Woodcock was elected UAW President from 1970 to 1977. Woodcock was born February 15,1911 in Providence Rhode Island into a family with deep roots in the labor movement. His father Ernest Woodcock was one of the first members of the Mechanics Educational Society of America. MESA organized several thousand

Lipset, Martin, Martin Trow and James Coleman, Union Democracy: What Makes Democracy Work in Labor Unions? (New York: Anchor Books Doubleday & Co., 1956), p. 2-13, Michels, Robert Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 16-17. Michels argues that "Political parties, trade unions, and all other large organizations tend to develop a bureaucratic structure, that is, a system of rational (predictable) organization, hierarchically organized. The price of increased bureaucracy is the concentration of power at the top and the lessening of influence of the rank and file members." He further argued that "those who become fulltime officials of union, political parties, or who serve as parliamentary representative, whilst belonging by social position to the class of the ruled, have in fact come to form part of the ruling oligarchy."

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autoworkers during the 1930s before the UAW was formed. When Leonard was three years old his family moved to Germany where his father installed machinery in German plants for a Providence firm. His father was interned in Germany during World War I, but the rest of the family fled to England. Woodcock remained in England until 1926 when he moved to Detroit and like the Reuther brothers, attended Detroit City College. He later studied at Walsh Institute of Accountancy. In 1933, Woodcock found work as a machine assembly at Detroit Gear and Machine Division of Borg-Warner Corporation. He joined the AFL federal local union that later became part of the UAW. In 1938 and 1939 Woodcock served as education director of the Wayne County CIO Council. He was appointed to the International Union staff of UAW Region ID in 1940. In 1944 he returned to the shop floor as dynamometer operator at Continental Aviation and Engineering in Muskegon, Michigan. After Walter Reuther was elected president in 1946, he appointed Woodcock as his first administrative assistant. In 1947 he returned briefly to his job at Continental and was elected regional director. Woodcock was reelected five times as Region ID Director and was elected UAW Vice President in 1955. He was named a director of the Agricultural Implement Department and Aerospace. In December 1955 Woodcock took over the General Motors Department where in 1961 the first contract provision barring discriminatory employment practices was written into the GM agreement. He was named president of the UAW following the death of Reuther in May 1970. He led a sixty-seven day strike against General Motors that restored cost-ofliving protections and establish early retirement after thirty years service. Woodcock was

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elected to a full-term as UAW president in 1972 and reelected in 1974. He retired in 1977.2 Douglas Fraser was UAW President from 1977 to 1983. Fraser was born in Glasgow Scotland on December 18,1916. He came to the United States with his parents and settled in Detroit in 1922. After high school he worked as a metal finisher at a DeSoto plant of the Chrysler Corporation. Fraser became active and UAW Local 227 where he was elected steward, chief steward and recording secretary In 1943, he was elected local president and served three terms. Fraser was appointed to the International Union staff in 1947 and was assigned to the Chrysler Department. In 1951, Walter Reuther selected him as administrative assistant, a position he held for eight years. He was elected codirector of Region 1A in 1959. In 1962 he was elected to the UAW International Executive Board as a member at large. He was reelected to the position in 1964,1966 and 1968. He was elected International Vice President in 1970 and a UAW President in 1977. Fraser led the negotiations in 1979 that won the richest labor agreement in history with General Motors. He also presided over the beginning of an era of concessionary bargaining. The following year the UAW won representation on the Chrysler Board of Directors. Fraser was elected to the Chrysler Board on May 13,1980, a position he held for one year. In 1981, Fraser led the UAW back into the AFL-CIO after a 13 year absence from the labor federation. He retired in 1983.

Biographical Sketch of Leonard Woodcock, UAW President Emeritus, Newsfromthe UAW, March 1977,p.l-4. 3 Biographical Sketch of Douglas A. Frazer, UAW President, Newsfromthe UAW, April 22, 1983, p. 1-4.

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The 1979 GM-UAW National Agreement represented the richest agreement that was ever negotiated with GM, but the pact was short-lived. The union declared that the agreement was "continuing on the road toward an eventual four-day workweek" by increasing the number of "Personal Paid Holidays" (PPH days) from twelve to twenty-six over the life of the new agreement. The additional PPH days adjusted the average work week pay ratio to 33.4 hours worked for 40 hours pay. The purpose of PPH days was to provide additional job opportunities. From the union perspective, the plan protected membership levels by encouraging new hiring in reducing excessive overtime. From the perspective of workers the agreement meant more time off with no loss of pay. The PPH days added nine additional paid vacation days to 14 paid holidays and up to twenty vacation days. By 1979, UAW bargaining agreements were benchmarks for other industrial sectors. American auto workers were by most measures entering the 1980s more successful than ever. However, the economic and political environment would not sustain labor's accomplishments. The 1979 GM-UAW agreement did not survive the dawn of the Reagan revolution or the impending crisis in the American auto industry.

Dick Danjin Interview,2/15/2006. Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, November 14, 1979. Memorandum of Understanding, Scheduled Personal Holiday Plan, p. 188-201, UAW Report on the UAW UAW-general Motors 1979 Tentative Agreement Settlement, ( A publication of the General Motors Dept. and council, International Union, UAW), September 18, 1979, p. 11. Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, November 14, 1979. Paragraph 203, Holiday Pay, "Employees shall be paid for specified holidays and holidays in each of the Christmas holiday periods. This paragraph accounts for 14 paid days off. p. 132-139. Paragraph 189, the number of hours a vacation pay allowance and paid absence of allowance credit to which an eligible employee shall be entitled shall be based on the employee's seniority as of his eligibility date and the number of a periods during which he has worked in his eligibility year. An eligible employee who has worked at least 26 pay periods is eligible for up to 160 hours or 20 paid vacation days. Therefore in total, 20 vacation days, plus 14 paid holidays, plus 9 PPH add up to 43 paid days off or 344 hours. The standard workweek is 40 hours. Multiplying 52 weeks per year times 40 hours, equals 2080 standard work hours per year. Subtracted 344 hours from 2008, for a total of 1736 actual hours worked per year for a standard workweek. Divide 1736 hours by 52 workweeks for a total of 33.4 hours.

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Just two years after the landmark 1979 agreement the UAW agreed to accept unprecedented concessions and radically transform industrial relations in the auto sector. Employment levels of hourly workers at General Motors declined by one-third between 1979 in 1982. By the time the union membership was voting to give up concessions there were over 140,000 GM workers laid off indefinitely. At the time GM had twentyfive assembly plants. By 1982 six plants were closed, five were reduced to one shift and five operated at reduced line speeds. Only nine plants maintained 1979 production levels. The vehicle sales had reached levels not seen since 1948. At the beginning of 1982 GM announced plans to permanently close seven plants. The concessionary agreement conceded cost of living increases on wages and the long-standing annual improvement factor (AIF). That concession amounted to a loss of a three percent yearly hike in base wages. The union also gave up the remaining PPH days which would have amounted to twenty-six additional paid days off per worker if the 1979 contract had gone to its expiration date. The average GM assembly worker lost $3800 in real wages o

because of the concessions. In return, General Motors removed four plants from the permanent closing list and agreed to a 24-month moratorium on further plan closings. The corporation established a Guaranteed Income Stream (GIS) program the guaranteed at least 50 percent of base wages for those with at least ten years seniority or those laid off due to plan closing. GM also agreed to a "lifetime employment" experiment for the duration of the 1982 agreement. A Profit-Sharing Plan and Employee Stock Ownership Plan were established. Nonetheless, the union broke a long-standing bargaining pattern 7 Bruce Kauffinan and George Martinez-Vasquez, "Voting for Wage concessions: The Case of the 1982 GM-UAW Negotiations," Industrial Labor Relations Review, Vol. 41, No.2 (Jan., 1988), p. 185. g Burt Stoddard, Ward's Auto World, "1984 Bargaining: Armageddon Now?" June, 1984.

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in the auto industry that had also set high standards for other industrial sectors. The concessionary agreement of 1982 drew a dividing line through the membership between low seniority and high seniority workers. The GIS program was only available to high seniority workers. Similarly, the profit-sharing and stock ownership programs applied to those workers who remain employed. Even though the union leadership endorsed the contract by emphasizing better job security provisions, laid off workers were unprotected. The agreement enriched high seniority workers at the expense of low seniority workers. The 1982 agreement ruptured rank-and-file solidarity by instituting seniority-linked benefits standards. The concessionary period in the early 1980s set in motion the organizational and ideological transformation of the UAW that started the union on a path to becoming a different kind of labor organization altogether. The concessions marked the dawn of a generation of technical, political and cultural changes. Management was no longer an adversary in the emergent UAW model. The UAW became more attentive at fulfilling management's objectives; controlling shop floor behavior, administering human resource programs, attendance policies and welfare benefits. The emergent model contradicted the principal objectives of the preamble to the UAW Constitution. The reasons for the decline of the UAW were shared by GM and other domestic organizations; technical and political factors, foreign competition, unrestrained markets and an increasingly hostile political environment. They all contributed to the demise of the UAW as a labor organization. However, the most significant problems were internal, from within the organization itself. The second generation of UAW leadership 9

Bruce Kauffman and George Martinez-Vasquez, "Voting for Wage Concessions: The Case of the 1982 GM-UAW Negotiations," Industrial Labor Relations Review, Vol. 41, No.2 (Jan., 1988), p. 189.

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abandoned many of the features of the organizational ideals that were described in the constitution. By the 1980s, the men of power in the UAW were not directly connected to the formative battles on Chevrolet Avenue, Saginaw Street or the overpass at the Ford Rouge that built the union. The new generation consisted of seasoned bureaucrats, caucus partisans and professional staff. They were products of an organizational bureaucracy that identified more closely with management counterparts, than the rank and file. Their political stature was measured in terms of loyalty to the Administration Caucus and the UAW's organizational bureaucracy. However, some local unions remained incubators of insurgency. Dave Yettaw exhibited personal qualities soon after hiring into the Buick Motor Division that thrust him into a leadership position on the shop floor. Yettaw was born January 8, 1947 in Mt. Morris, Michigan a small town just north of Flint. In 1965 Yettaw graduated from Mt. Morris high school and hired into Factory 4 Buick final assembly. There were nearly 20,000 hourly workers employed in the nearly 30 individual plants at the Buick site. New hires always got the worst jobs in the plants, so Yettaw was assigned to the bumper pit. The bumper pit was a chamber under the assembly-line where workers had to crouch beneath the cars as they moved along the line and install bumpers. Yettaw left the Buick to serve a three-year hitch in the military where he was stationed in Vietnam. He returned from Vietnam went back to work at Buick final assembly. He exercised his seniority rights and transferred to a better job in inspection. He spent five or six months as a salaried clerk while attending Mott Community College on the GI Bill. He studied business, social science and labor studies

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Everything at the time seemed to be coming together for the Yettaw. He was married and had two children. He was a Vietnam veteran and had returned to a stable job with benefits. His prospects for the future were strengthened by the promise of a college education. The Yettaw's had just signed the papers to purchase a house, but there was trouble brewing at the Buick. There were some big cutbacks coming that were going to affect his job, but no one in management bothered to tell him. For Yettaw, "that was a good example of what management was."

He lost his clerk job and was sent back to

the factory floor. Yettaw's third trip back to the assembly line was the path into union politics: I'd become involved in the union as I got back on the floor because I found myself having to fight with my committeeman, who happened to be Jim "Bear" Baier, to get my rights. Then there was a guy named Earl Davies, he was little bit of a shyster, and I was unhappy about that. So I started becoming involved in the union in 1970 when we had a strike that lasted sixty-three days for COLA on our wages. After that I started attending classes for committeeman as well as going to college. I ran for committeeman in 1971 and lost. The district committeeman is the rank-and-file member's direct connection to the union. The committeeman represents the contractual rights of UAW members in a defined bargaining unit district. The bargaining structure or bargaining unit is defined by the GM-UAW National Agreement. Committeemen were permitted to leave the regular work assignments to adjust grievances within the framework of a formal grievance David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998. David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998.

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procedure and other legitimate representation functions. The configurations of bargaining unit districts were determined by the plant management and the local shop committee. Production and skilled trades workers were sorted into separate bargaining unit districts. The size of each district in a GM plant in the 1970s, when Yettaw stood for election to the bargaining committee was one committeeman for every 250 members. The configuration the districts were sometimes manipulated for political purposes, but could not be changed more frequently than six-month intervals. Depending on the number of employees of the plant or multiple plants in the case of Buick, the shop committee represented zones of individual bargaining districts. The number of shop committeemen was determined by a formula based on the total number of members in the plants. The individual shop committeemen were elected at large. The entire production workforce elected the production shop committeemen and the entire skilled trades workforce elected the skilled trades shop committeemen. In the 1970s there were nine production shop committeeman and two skilled trades shop committeemen at Buick. The Chairman of the Shop Committee was not elected at large at the Buick, but was selected by consensus of the standing shop committeemen. The chairman almost always was a production shop committeeman because of their overwhelming majority on the shop committee. The Chairman of the Shop Committee was the most powerful union official at the local union because the chairman directed negotiations with management. The configuration of the shop committee zones of representation were determined by mutual agreement between the Shop Committee and the Buick site management. The manner in

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which shop committee zones were configured and the assignment rotation of individual 12

shop committeemen to the zones were sometimes subject to political manipulation. The grievance procedure was defined in the GM-UAW National Agreement as a four step system for resolving rank-and-file complaints. In the event a UAW represented employee had grievance to take up with management, the person was required to attempt to resolve the issue with the foreman before calling in the union. If the issue could not be resolved, the worker made a formal request to the foreman to consult the committeeman. If the committeeman determined the issue was a legitimate grievance, a formal grievance would be filed with management. At that point the grievance was no longer just an issue between the worker and management; it became the property of the union. Step one in the formal grievance procedure involved the presentation of the grievance to the foreman through the committeeman. If the grievance cannot be adjusted with the foreman, the committeeman takes it to the second step in the procedure. The second step is an appeal to Shop Committee. The Chairman of the Shop Committee and the rest of the shop committee discussed the issue with the appropriate level of management in a formal Shop Committee Meeting. The final decision regarding the grievance at the second step of the appeals process was issued by highest level of local management. If the grievance is not satisfactorily settled at the second step, it went on to the third step in the grievance procedure. Step three was an appeal to the Corporation and the International Union. In the event the International Union and the Corporation did not reach an agreement, the case is automatically appealed to step four, an impartial umpire. All decisions by the

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, November 19, 1973, Representation-District Committeemen, Paragraphs 9-10, Representation-Shop Committeemen, Paragraphs 11-15, p. 13-22. David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998.

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umpire are considered final. There is no further appeals process beyond and umpire decision unless the individual grievant chooses to appeal to a court or the Department of Labor. If the member chose to pursue the issue in the courts or at the DOL, the UAW 13

was forbidden to participate in that process. The bargaining committee meetings that were held in the individual plants and multiple plant conferences were effective training forums for union representatives. There was a time when separate bargaining committee meetings were held for morning shifts and night shifts because of the large membership at a local. The meetings were held once a month on Sundays to discuss new umpire decisions, laws that were impacting the membership, important bargaining achievements or grievance settlements. For example, if someone made major inroads with grievances dealing with job assignments, overtime or job classification flowcharts. Yettaw was elected chairman of the site wide committee body meetings. The position was different than the shop committee chair. The meetings were an opportunity for a committeeman with a grievance that was going to the second step of the grievance procedure to practice his bargaining skills by presenting the issue to his peers. Committee members would critique the grievance and evaluate its merits. Similar meeting took place in the individual factories as well. Presenting grievances at the committee body meetings was an effective method for improving individual competency and strengthened the overall bargaining committee. The committee body would meet every day before the shift began to discuss the issues of the day or the week and their problems with grievances. It was how the system nurtured the

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, November 19, 1973, Grievance Procedure, Paragraphs 28-55, p. 26-43.

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up-and-coming leadership at that time, but they eventually got away from that with the emergence of Quality of Work Life programs in the 1970s. The 1970s was a transitional decade for the auto industry and the UAW. It was also a transitional period for the Buick and Local 599. In 1972 the production of a new Buick carline started in Factory 40. Yettaw and a bunch of other Vietnam veterans moved to the new line because they saw better job opportunities. They aspired to better jobs as inspectors or repairman at the new production operation. The local union leadership appointed a committeeman named John Pugh to represent the night shift of the new line. It wasn't long before Pugh was at odds with the veterans. They were a pretty militant group. Later that year Yettaw ran against Pugh for committeeman and was elected by a two to one margin. When the oil embargo hit the car industry came in 1973. Production at the Buick was hit especially hard because they produced full-sized cars. Yettaw was forced to the day shift because second shift was eliminated. In the meantime Yettaw stood for election to the school board in his hometown of Mt. Morris in 1974. Throughout the 1970s he was active in the UAW Community Action Program (CAP) Council and as a delegate to the Democratic Party County Convention. When the second shift started back up in late 1974 or early 1975, he returned to the night shift. Yettaw and his cohorts continued to hold the district in the bargaining committee elections.

Constitution of the International Union, UAW, Article 23, "Community Action Program Councils," Section I, Adopted at Los Angeles, California, June, 1974, p.43. The objective and purpose of the UAW Community Action Program Councils were developed to promote and implement policies and programs designed to improve the quality of American life. The UAW CAP engaged in community, civic, welfare, educational, environmental, cultural, citizenship, legislative, consumer protection, community services and other activities to improve the economic and social conditions of UAW members and their families and to promote the general welfare and democratic way of life for all people. Notice by the County Clerk of Election as Delegate to the County Convention, Office of County Clerk Genesee County, Genesee Township No. 4, George G. Dunn, Clerk of the County of Genesee, August 14, 1976.

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Yettaw's foray into politics occurred during a period when direct action on the Buick shop floor overlapped with the social movements in the larger society. In the 1970s a substantial number of women were being hired into the auto plants for the first time since WWII. Women and African-Americans were being integrated into employment positions that were previously reserved for white men. Even though Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, discriminatory practices persisted at GM. GM's resistance to equal pay for women was well-known. Despite the fact that GM was the largest manufacturing employer of women dating back to the 1950s, gender inequality remained. The 1964 Civil Rights Act established the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), but the commission lacked enforcement authority until the 1970s when Congress provided it with litigation enforcement authority. At the same time women were mobilizing in the labor movement. UAW women were instrumental in organizing the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW) in 1974. The mounting political and cultural pressure resulted in a surge of hiring women and African Americans into skilled trade apprenticeships for the first time in the factories across Flint.15 GM sought to align its hiring practices with Title VII mandate to avoid EEOC entanglements. When women began to join the ranks of the skilled trades their progress was sabotaged by management and hourly coworkers. Sandra Stiven hired into the Buick main office as a janitor in 1972. In 1973 she transferred to Factory 10 and ended up on John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press 2004), p. 397-398,492. Nancy F. Gabin, Feminism in the Labor Movement: Women and the United Auto Workers (1935-1975), (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990), p. 191,208,225,227. Harry C. Katz and Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2000), p. 66-67.

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the transmission assembly line. While on the assembly line Stiven, was treated poorly by the foreman and threatened with discharge. When she was laid off in January 1974, lower seniority men retained their jobs. Fortunately, Stiven was hired across town at the Chevrolet Metal Fabricating plant and within six months she was hired as an apprentice electrician. Stiven was the first woman to hire into skilled trades at Chevrolet Metal Fab. The mere presence a woman on skilled trades was a source of resented and fear for male coworkers. Some of the men told her that she was taking the place of a man who needed the job to support a family. That was despite that fact that Stiven was a single mother supporting four children on her own. Even the friendly coworkers would sometimes treat her as a pariah. One of Stiven's fellow electricians told her "that if you see me on the outside (the factory), don't talk to me because my wife doesn't know that there are women on skilled trades." Just before Stiven's left Metal Fab to return to the Buick, someone deliberately sabotaged her work in an apparent effort to get her fired. It was a common practice among electricians who took pride in their job to "sign" the work by writing their name on the wiring panel. An observant coworker told Stiven "I want you to know that I know you didn't do it, but every wire on every terminal in that panel you worked on is loose. Somebody in here is trying to sabotage you. I didn't say anything to anybody. I just went ahead and tightened everything up. I thought you would want to know." Men's attitudes toward women's elevated status on the shop floor were mixed. Stiven's found a home at the Buick where she got involved in the local union. She was an active member of the on the "Union Label" committee and was an outspoken

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supporter of Dave Yettaw. In 1975, women accounted for over 300,000 of the 1,356,670 total UAW membership level. Technical and cultural issues involving working conditions and the presence of women and African-Americans in the plants converged on the shop floor at the same time Yettaw became active in the union. Difficult working conditions in the factories were exacerbated by a pervasive atmosphere of racism and sexism in the 1970s. Some women were subject to sexual coercion and nearly all women experienced some form sexual harassment at one time or another. The second shift crib attendant in the foundry was an outspoken advocate for the Ku Klux Klan in the mid-1970s. Some of the foremen in the foundry openly used racial insults on the shop floor. A Native American truck driver was routinely referred to as "Chief." One afternoon while passing out paychecks the foreman didn't have a check for "Chief." When the truck driver asked where his check was, the foreman exclaimed "I don't have it, but I'll send it out on pony express and stick it to your door with a flaming arrow." Sometimes these issues were addressed in the 17

grievance procedure, other times workers took matters into their own hands. In the 1970s the Buick had a reputation for shop floor militancy. Entire departments sometimes walked off the job in the foundry to protest excessive overtime or unsafe working conditions. Buick workers were experiencing what the mainstream press labeled the "blue-collar blues." The rank and file were expected to endure extended hours in extreme conditions of heat in the summer, noise, clouds of oil, cutting fluids, dust, core sand, ash, paint thinner, paint, and other toxic chemical compounds. Workers' Nancy F. Gabin, Feminism in the Labor Movement: Women and the United Auto Workers (1935-1975), rd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990), p. 227. Sandra Stiven Interview, 5-18-2007. 33 Constitutional Report UAW June, 2002, "Average Dues Paying Membership 1936-2002," p. 19. 17 James (Cap) Wheeler, Interview, 12 August 1998.

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resentment was intensified by GM's workplace class culture. Hourly and salaried employees often had separate and unequal facilities. GM maintained hourly/salary segregated parking lots, dining facilities, bathrooms, and in some cases, separate drinking 18

fountains.

Hourly employees were occasionally written up for crossing the divide into

areas reserved for salary employees. Management sometimes disregarded basic working standards. For example, on March 9,1977 there was a work stoppage in Yettaw's district in Factory 40 (also part offinalassembly) because management refused to supply the workers with aprons. Yettaw blamed management for the problem because it was a safety issue that needed an immediate response. He counseled the members to always rely on the grievance procedure rather than resort to a wildcat. "Such acts under our agreement with the corporation could result in many forms of discipline up to and including discharge. More often than not in acts of heroism there is some stigma that 19

stays on one's mind and on one's record or disrupts the home life."

Technical and

cultural issues from shop floor frequently played out in local union politics. Caucus politics were a defining feature of Local 599 elections. When Yettaw became active in union politics there was only one active caucus at Local 599, Unity Caucus. So naturally, Yettaw joined the Unity Caucus. By 1978 the younger guys in the caucus were unhappy with the leadership. The local president, Al Christner was getting deeply involved in Quality Work Life programs with management. QWL fomented division in

Gordon Lafer, The Job Training Charade, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 152. 19 Jerry M. Flint, "Automakers Face Blue-collar Blues," New York Times, January 7, 1973, p. 222. Susan Chira, New York Times, August 11, 1984, p. 29. Michael Massing, "Detroit's Strange Bedfellows," New York Times Sunday Magazine, February 7, 1988, p. SM 20. Dave Yettaw, "Forty Report," Headlight, Wednesday, March 30, 1977.

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the local union leadership and was viewed with suspicion by the rank-and-file. Yettaw and his group of young veterans decided to look outside the mainstream caucus for relief. In 1978 Yettaw, Sam Evans and Ray Carter left the Unity Caucus and ran as independents for the production shop committee. They made a strong showing, but did 20

not garner enough votes to capture any of the top nine positions necessary.

Even

though they were not elected to the shop committee, the close outcome was an indication of how strong the opposition was on the shop floor. The discontent of the rank-and-file was underlined by the fact that the young insurgents only had six to eight years experience on the bargaining committee when they ran for the shop committee. The following year, in 1980 the Local 599 executive board and committeeman elections were held. Yettaw ran for committeeman as an independent and was reelected. It was a common practice at Buick to redistrict "outsiders," of the Unity Caucus. Redistricting was a practice that the incumbent leadership sometimes used as a measure to gerrymander the shop floor bargaining units to ensure that only caucus partisans would get elected. Yettaw had been redistricted three times in eighteen months but he was still able to get re-elected. He was also elected to represent Factory 40 on the local executive board and as an alternate delegate to the National Convention in 1980. The Local Executive Board functions in a similar fashion to the IEB in the international union. The Local Executive Board oversees all business of the local union, the grievance structure and all the plants covered by the local, membership meeting decisions and bylaws interpretations. The local leadership eventually left Yettaw alone because he was

1978 UAW Local 599 Election Results, Total Production Ballots Cast: 7262, Sam Evans: 3487, Dave Yettaw: 3180, Ray Carter 3077.

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obviously doing his job well enough to get reelected in spite of the caucus campaigns. Besides, the union leadership had other things on its mind. Yettaw made peace with the Unity Caucus at a moment when the American auto industry and the UAW was about to go to war with itself. Danny Sain convinced Yettaw that in order to be successful in union politics he would have to stop fighting the Unity Caucus. Sain told him "Look, you've burned so many bridges that if you're going to go anywhere in this leadership, you are going to have to mend fences. You have to get back 22

in get involved in Unity Caucus."

That's not what Yettaw want to do, but he

understood how the machine worked, so he rejoined Unity. Yettaw was elected Local 599 Education Director in 1984 during a divisive election campaign that was emblematic of the political turmoil in local unions across the country. Yettaw path in the union became entangled in the restructuring of the auto industry. The restructuring at Buick and Local 599 was microcosm of the technical, political and cultural changes taking place throughout GM and the UAW.23 Yettaw emerged as one of the central figures in the technical and political transformation of the UAW in the 1980s. American auto industry was decimated by the oil crisis of 1973, the recessions of 1975 and 1981-82 and the arrival of Japanese transplants. American car-makers closed down twenty facilities between 1979 and 1980 Bylaws All Buick Local Union No. 599, Automobile Workers of America AFL-CIO, Revised 1984, Article XV Executive Board, Article XVI Duties of the Executive Board, p. 10-11. The executive board in 1984 was composed of nine Executive Officers, The Chairman of the Shop Committee and one member from each bargaining unit district regardless of the number of members in each district. David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998. 23 Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 120, US Representative, Dale E. Kildee, (Thursday, September 11, 1997, Danny Sain was a fixture in union politics and the Michigan Democratic Party. He worked at Fisher Body plant at nights. In 1953 Sain took a job at Buick where he began a long partnership with the UAW. He served as committeeman, trustee, shop committeeman, newspaper editor, and vicepresident at Local 599. In 1972, Dan was elected president of the UAW Community Action Council (CAP), a position he held until 1996. David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998.

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that employed over 50,000 workers. Seven of those were GM plants. An additional 80,000 workers lost their jobs when suppliers to the industry closed nearly a 100 additional plants. Several thousand more jobs were lost as the downturn in the auto industry rippled through the economy. Estimates of the total job losses measured by the Congressional Budget Office and the AFL-CIO ranged from 350,000 to 650,000. Japanese transplants intensified the problems of the American auto industry. In the 1980s Honda, Nissan, Subaru-Isuzu and Toyota built six assembly plants across North America. The "big three" decided that if they could not beat the Japanese they would join them in joint ventures. The alliances included GM-Toyota; New United Motors Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI), Chrysler-Mitsubishi; Diamond-Star, GM-Suzuki; "CAMI" and a Mazda 25

transplant that later became a joint venture with Ford; the Auto Alliance International. By the end of the decade GM created "Saturn," a joint UAW-GM experiment in small car production that was supposed to chase the Japanese out of North America. The UAW responded to the crisis in the auto industry by entering into concessionary bargaining. The $1.2 billion government loan guarantee to the Chrysler Corporation initiated a series of contract concessions that would fundamentally change the ideological direction of the UAW. Between 1979 and 1981 the UAW agreed to three rounds of wage and benefit concessions with the Chrysler Corporation. The UAW was granted a seat on the Chrysler Board of Directors. The provision contradicted the fundamental organizational ideals that were established in the UAW Constitution since 24 Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry, (New York: Basic Books 1982), 36. 25 William C. Green and Ernest J. Yanarella, North American Unions in Crisis: Lean Production as Contested Terrain, (Albany: state University of New York Press 1996), 1. Parker, Mike and Jane Slaughter, Working Smart: A Union Guide to Participation Programs and Reengineering, (Detroit: A Labor Notes Book 1994), 68-70.

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1939. The Constitution was amended in 1980 to align the union's stated principles to coincide with the bargaining outcome at Chrysler.

Ford and General Motors pressured

the UAW to reopen the 1979 contract, arguing that the Chrysler agreement left them at a competitive disadvantage. GM-UAW reopened the contract seven months early. Even though GM turned a $333 million profit in 1981, by 1982 the corporation had 150,000 employees on indefinite layoff. With the threat of more plant closings the company 27

managed to get the UAW to agree to $2.5 billion in concessions. The future of Buick manufacturing was threatened by the events that began to unfold in the 1970s. Americans woke up with an identity crisis that was brought on by defeat in Vietnam, each shift to the political right, and a sudden oil shortage that brought the American auto industry to its knees. The decline General Motors accelerated the decline of the City of Flint. In 1978 more than half of Flint's citizens worked for General 28

Motors. By 1982, over 18,000 of those jobs were lost forever.

The problems that were

associated with the American auto industry's lack of innovation and flexibility threatened the survival of the Buick complex. GM's dominant role in the American industry was rapidly changing. In 1973 UAW's membership peaked at over 1.5 million members was on a slide that would cut that number in half by the 1990s. Back-to-back recessions in the mid-1970s and early See Appendix A, Part I and Part II, Constitution of the International Union, United Automobile of America and Laws Governing Local Unions, Adopted in Cleveland, Ohio March, 1939, Preamble, p. 3-4. Constitution of the International Union, UAW Adopted in Anaheim, California, June, 1980, Preamble, p. 34.

27 Associated Press, "GM Workers Ratify Concessions Pact by Narrow Margin," Boston Globe, 9 April 1982, "Run of the Paper Section." 28 James D. Ananich, Neil O. Leighton, and Charles T. Weber, Economic Impact ofGM Plant Closings in Flint, Michigan: A Summary Research Excellence and Economic Development Fund of the State of Michigan, 13 June 1989.

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1980s decimated the ranks of the UAW. The 1980s was a decade of concessionary bargaining and job losses. At its peak, GM's American market share was at nearly 50 percent in 1978, but by the end of the 1990s sales fell below 29 percent. Throughout this period GM continually reduced its operations in the Flint area. GM hourly employment in Genesee County dropped from a high in 1955 from 81,000 to 47,000 in 1987. In 1987, 6000 were released as a result of permanent closing of the Flint Body Assembly Plant 29

(Fisher-I) and an assembly line at the Flint Truck and Bus plant.

From the mid-1990s

to the end of the decade the GM hourly work force dropped from 33,000 to 17,000. The Buick site employment levels peaked in the 1950s at over 27,000 plummeted to just over 30

3,000 by the end of the 1990s.

The end of the 1990s brought an abrupt end to Buick

manufacturing in Flint. The Buick complex has been at the center of changes in the auto industry for decades. Yet during the period of deindustrialization that characterized the auto industry in 1980s the Buick came close to closing the assembly plant. At the beginning of the 1970s Buick manufactured nearly every component that went into the production of an automobile. The complex nature of that operation required a large workforce. The Buick was still one of the largest manufacturing sites in the world. However, traditional methods of manufacturing and labor-management relations had to change in an environment where GM no longer dominated the world market. For the first time the Japanese cars presented the Americans with serious outside competition. GM rushed into 29 James D. Ananich, Neil O. Leighton, and Charles T. Weber, Economic Impact ofGM Plant Closings in Flint, Michigan: A Summary (Supported by the Research Excellence and Economic Development Fund of the State of Michigan, Briefing, June 13 1989), p.l. 30 James D. Ananich, Neil O. Leighton, and Charles T. Weber, Economic Impact ofGM Plant Closings in Flint, Michigan: A Summary (Supported by the Research Excellence and Economic Development Fund of the State of Michigan, Briefing, June 13 1989), p.l. William J. Donahue, "Steel Mill a Step Toward Diversification," The Flint Journal, 24 May 1998, HI.

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production shoddily designed vehicles that could not compete with the higher quality Japanese imports. The debut of the "Vega" was plagued with design and manufacturing defects. GM's overreliance on technology ignored the cultural upheaval that was created by emphasizing mechanization while ignoring the workforce. Labor disputes at the single source of Vega production at the Lordstown, Ohio assembly plant amplified GM's difficulties. General Motors Assembly Division (GMAD) took control of the plant. Management immediately cut hundreds of workers by replacing them with robots and increased the production line speed. Workers walked off the job in a three-week long 31

strike.

The "X" car, GM's initial foray into the front wheel drive market was only

slightly more successful. Buick responded to the oil crisis by reintroducing the V6 engine, smaller transmissions, shifted to alternative materials, and radically redesigned their product in favor of front-wheeled drive. Buick was forced to fundamentally rethink the design and manufacture of their product. Yettaw's district was at the center of the changes that were planned for General Motors operations in Flint operations in the 1970s. The GMAD was on a mission to consolidate assembly plant operations as a part of GM's overall capital improvement effort. The effort involved combining all the Fisher body and vehicle assembly operations around the country. GMAD already decided to close the massive Fisher-I body assembly plant across town when Buick workers learned that Flint was in danger of losing the Buick assembly plant. The outlook for the old Buick assembly plant which was built in the 1920s was poor. The Buick assembly process was inherently 31 Maryann Keller, Rude Awakening;. The Rise, Fall, and Struggle for Recovery of General Motors, (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1989), p. 54-55. Heather Ann Thompson, "Auto Workers, Dissent, and the UAW: Detroit and Lordstown," Robert Asher and Ronald Edsforth, Autowork, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 200-203.

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inefficient because the bodies were trucked from the Fisher-I plant across town. Buick's plight was aggravated by the 1973 oil embargo. The Flint Buick assembly built only large, gas-guzzling rear-wheel-drive vehicles while the public demanded fuelefficient. Buick simply didn't have the right product at the right time. The entire Buick complex was geared to produce an obsolete product. Rumors were circulating for years that the aging Buick Foundry would close. Much of the machinery in the foundry was over fifty years old. It finally succumbed to the changing market and over capacity. The oil crisis reduced the need for iron in the new lighter, more fuel efficient cars. The three year phase out of the foundry ended when the last engine block was poured in 1980. Salaried employees transferred to other GM foundry 32

operations while 1,500 hourly employees were absorbed into other Buick operations. Buick was losing its iron works, rear drive axles, transmissions and V8 engine production, but was expanding the V6 engine, trail axle and transmission component operations. Despite the changing operations the Buick site was still able to absorb most of the displaced workers. In the 1970s Buick Local 599 was the largest UAW-GM local in the world and shared the militant reputation associated with Fisher-I, the site of the Great Sit-Down Strike of 1937. The Buick labor-management relations were a model of adversarial conflict. Al Christener had been Buick Local 599 president since 1971 and had a reputation as a tough bargainer and an effective advocate for the rank and file. Every month the union presented the company with hundreds of grievances, nearly every six months the union voted to strike and absenteeism was a constant problem. The newly 32 Buick Public Relations brochure, Buick Factory 81, Public Relations department, Buick Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, Flint, Michigan, 1981, 8.

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appointed Buick personnel manager, Bill Rowland was equally as stubborn as Christener. According to Buick general manager Lloyd Reuss labor-management relations appeared bleak: "We had the worst union-management relationship in history; 33

we had more strikes than anyone." In 1975 GM management told Al Christner, that Buick Final Assembly was in trouble. GM cited poor labor relations and slumping vehicle sales. Christner invited the Buick personnel manager, Bill Rowland to the Local 599 union hall to discuss the problems that faced the Buick plant. They agreed that unless something was done to improve labor-management relations, the managers in Detroit would likely close Buick assembly. GM was already in the process of closing plants around the country. So Rowland and Christner decided to convene a meeting at a neutral location between union officials and Buick managers to discuss how they might improve relations. They met at the local Sheraton Hotel near 1-75. The meeting was later dubbed the "Halloween Party" for a couple reasons. First they met on Halloween, and second because Christener and Rowland walked into the meeting wearing devil masks. They took off the masks and shook hands to emphasize that neither side was the "devil." The audience was at first startled by their unusual display, but their silliness immediately dissolved the tension. This was the beginning of a new path for labor and management at Buick.

Ted West, "Buick City, The Halloween Party: Two Detroit Devils Shake Hands and a Company Comes Back From the Dead," Road& Track, February 1984, 62. 34 Albert Christner, Interview, 21 September 1999. Ted West, "Buick City, The Halloween Party: Two Detroit Devils Shake Hands and a Company Comes Back From the Dead," Road & Track, February 1984, 64. Don Vogel, "Buick's Best in Class Leads to sales increase," The Oakland Press, 26 July 1981.

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A new cooperative work philosophy, QWL was introduced at Buick as a strategy to save UAW jobs and restore GM profitability. The new program was first put to the test at the Buick Foundry. Christner committed the Local 599 to addressing the labor 35

situation and Rowland committed to bring new work to the Buick complex.

The first

order of business to save Buick was to build trust between workers and management. Since its heyday in the 1950s, membership levels at the UAW Local 599 declined steadily from 27,000 to 8,000 in the 1970s. Christner demanded more jobs, but he also wanted Rowland to get the "foremen off the members' backs." Rowland wanted promises from the union to stop the flow of grievances and strike letters. So the union worked to reduce the number of grievances and the company found new work for the site. The first test of labor-management cooperation was at Factory 70, the Buick foundry that was scheduled to close in 1980. However, the Buick foundry seemed a most unlikely choice for the new work philosophy. Management and the rank-and file considered the foundry as the "dumping ground" of the Buick. In the early days of the auto industry the foundry work force was compromised primarily of Polish, Slavic and African American workers. During the sit-down strike almost all the African American autoworkers in Flint were employed in the Buick foundry. The dirtiest, most physically demanding and dangerous jobs were reserved for African Americans. This continued throughout the 1950s and into the early

Albert Christner, Interview, 21 September 1999. Ted West, "Buick City, The Halloween Party: Two Detroit Devils Shake Hands and a Company Comes Back From the Dead," Road& Track, February 1984, 62. Bill Rowland is quoted in this article as the one who initiated the meeting.

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1960s.

The civil rights movement initiated cultural changes on the foundry shop

floor, but not its reputation. The foundry continued to be stigmatized as a source of troublemakers. Dispute resolution techniques on the Buick Foundry shop floor was not exactly the stuff the architects of the Wagner Act had in mind when they promoted collective bargaining. The committeemen routinely amassed hundreds of grievances. Foundry workers had a militant reputation. The "sand shovelers" were a particularly belligerent group. Their job was to remove excess casting sand (core sand) from drainage troughs around machinery. During the evening shifts, cold beer by the can and marijuana by the joint was freely available in the sand crib. The gang leader of the sand shovelers ran that area of the foundry. The work always got done as long as management left them alone. Occasionally an overzealous foreman would try to assert authority over the sand shovelers, but swiftly suffered the consequences. The gang leader spit in the face of one foreman who announced that things were going to change because "he was the boss." Some foremen had their tires slashed or iron castings dropped on them from overhead walkways. The iron pourers and janitors were no less imaginative in dealing with management. One notorious incident involved a supervisor who enjoyed prowling the walkways in the overhead steel looking for beds where workers would hide to take naps. One night while on a hunt, he stepped on a piece of cardboard that was lying in the middle of the steel mesh walkway. Someone had cut a hole in the steel mesh and

James (Cap) Wheeler, Interview, 12 August 1998. James Miller, "The Sit-Down Only Had One African American," The Flint Journal, 8 February 1987. August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, African American Detroit and The Rise of the UAW, (New York: Oxford University Press 1979), 35.

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covered it with the cardboard. The foreman stumbled through the hole in the walkway and plummeted several feet to the floor below. He was permanently maimed by his "accident." The bed checks halted after that. Management also had unorthodox disciplinary methods. One superintendent was known to have taken his obstinate supervisors into the foundry basement to settle disputes. Once there they would literally fight it out. The superintendent almost never lost those arguments. Labor and management in the foundry were accustomed to pioneering methods in conflict resolution, but they rarely involved labor-management cooperation. Despite the 37

foundry's checkered past, GM proceeded with the renovation. The Buick foundry's nineteenth century technology was replaced by a state-ofthe-art torque converter facility. At a cost of 190 million dollars the 800,000 square foot foundry was gutted and rebuilt in 1981. The new "Factory 81" was transformed into a transmission torque converter plant, the sole producer of the 245mm torque converter. The "245" torque converter was the transmission component for the future of Buick and GM, the new generation of front-wheel-drive cars. Management included the union in the planning from the beginning. GM and UAW officials formed a design team to plan TO

social and technical aspects of the factory layout and production process.

The

successful implementation of QWL in the Factory 81 project was influential in GM's decision to create the Buick City concept.

The author worked in the Buick Foundry from 1976 until 1981. Elmer Krebsbach Interview, Buick Foundry Industrial Truck Repairman, 7 November 2001. The author served as an apprentice under Mr. Krebsbach. 38 Buick Public Relations brochure, Buick Factory 81, Public Relations department, Buick Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, Flint, Michigan, 1981, 2.

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Yettaw was among the early critics of QWL. He saw it as "a way (for management) to dodge and sidestep or circumvent issues, expecting the union to ignore 39

the contract." final assembly.

Yettaw was concerned about the goal to reach zero grievances in Buick In Yettaw's mind the grievance procedure was essential to holding

management accountable. He worried that management's use of QWL programs amounted to an assault on the member's rights to dignified representation that was guaranteed under paragraphs 11 and 16 in the National Agreement. Zero grievances meant there was no need for committeemen or shop committeeman. Yettaw appealed to Irving Bluestone to improve QWL to better serve the membership: "the union needs for its members' good, clean working conditions, opportunities to be creative, to give personal initiative and sustain a rewarding work week, fairness and equitable treatment stripped of the air of coercion and compulsion typical of the average workplace; the chance to participate in the decision-making processes which affect the workplace—these are the ingredients that comprise achievement of true "Quality of Work Life" worthy of our industrial society. Workers need not be depicted as second-class citizens at the workplace. Workers need the measures of discipline to fit the violations.

Dave Yettaw, District Committeeman, UAW Local 599 to Irving Bluestone, Vice President General Motors Department, International Union, UAW August 25, 1977, p.l. 40 David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998.

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Improvement of Quality of Work Life means for filling the fundamental concept that no employee is less human than any other and second-class 41

citizenship is compatible to our values and with human dignity." Yettaw was speaking to Bluestone's confidence in industrial democracy in the hope that the International Union could persuade the corporation rein in the Buick management's aggressive behavior. For Yettaw, the only way QWL could benefit the rank-and-file was if it was evenhanded. Trust was not a necessary component, that's what the grievance procedure was for. Bluestone was not familiar with the problems with QWL between Local 599 and Buick management. Bluestone reiterated his support for QWL programs: "Quality of Work Life programs jointly undertaken by UAW local unions with General Motors local managements initiated through the UAW-GM National Committee to Improve Quality of Work Life have been very careful to avoid domination by management.

The International UAW remained committed to QWL. Bluestone might

just as well have been speaking in a foreign language. General Motors and the International Union continued to implement joint labor-management processes that caused political upheaval at GM sites across the country. The restructuring of the manufacturing process at the Buick with QWL programs laid the foundation for political conflict at Local 599. The collaborative relationship that developed between Al Christner and Bill Rowland was crucial to the successful implementation of QWL in Factory 81. The apparent success at Factory 81 was instrumental in gaining approval from Detroit for 41 Dave Yettaw, District Committeeman, UAW Local 599 to Irving Bluestone, Vice President General Motors Department, International Union, UAW August 25, 1977, p. 2-3. 42 Irving Bluestone, Vice President General Motors Department, International Union, UAW to Dave Yettaw, District Committeeman, UAW Local 599, September 7, 1977.

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the "Buick City" project.

The creation of Buick City required collaboration between

GM, the local government and the UAW. The corporation's original plan was to close the Flint assembly plant and build a new plant under the control of the GMAD. The Assembly Division planned to build the new plant outside the city in Vienna Township.

Lloyd Reuss, head of the Buick Motor Division, did not want to lose

control of assembly operations to the Assembly Division. Reuss presented the Buick City proposal to top managers in Detroit. Reuss convinced them of the economic and process advantages of rebuilding the old plant over build a new one. The body assembly work from Fisher-I plant was integrated into the "Buick City" assembly plant. As the renovation moved forward approximately twenty-two hundred Fisher Body workers followed their work to Buick City.

They displaced low seniority Buick

Workers. However, the UAW leadership was convinced that the compromise needed to be made in order retain work in Flint. The City of Flint assembled a plan to keep Buick final assembly in the city. City leaders took advantage of recently enacted tax abatement legislation in order to assemble a package of property, tax incentives, state and federal grants that the city 46

hoped GM would accept.

Property tax abatements were reluctantly awarded to GM in

Bob Roth Interview October, 6 1999. 44 Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, The Sustaining Hand: Community Leadership and Corporate Power, (Lawrence: University of Kansas 1993), 192. 45 James (Cap) Wheeler Interview, August 12, 1998. According to Wheeler, UAW Vice-President Don Ephlin negotiated the number of Fisher 1 workers that moved to Buick City. Ken Scott Interview, May 27, 1998, transcript p. 5. David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998, transcript p. 5. 46 Interview with Community Development Manager, Nancy Jurkiewicz, in her office at Flint City Hall. 10 March 1997 (notes in my possession), City of Flint Community and Economic Development Department, DCED Economic and Housing Development Project tracking sheet obtained on 27, March 1997.

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the 1970's.

When GM continued to remove work from the community, the issue of

tax abatements became the focus of union and public debate. The city government had few options to stop the loss of high waged GM jobs Flint faced a potential crisis when GM announced in 1980 that GMAD was planning to replace the Buick facility with a "Poletown-type" plant. Poletown was a controversial plant that was built in the middle of a working-class Polish community in Detroit. However, unlike Poletown, the GMAD planners were looking to relocate the Buick plant at a rural "greenfield" site. City officials discovered that GM was buying up property in the rural Vienna township area. Flint Mayor James Rutherford convinced GM president Thomas Murphy to agree to delay the site selection process so that the City of Flint could present an alternative to the Vienna location. Rutherford understood the problems at the Poletown project, so he never considered the possibility of clearing a location within the city. Instead, he proceeded with a plan to annex land from surrounding townships. Flint already owned a large piece of property adjacent to Genesee Township that was an ideal location, but more land was needed. The City of Flint offered to split the tax proceeds from the new plant with Genesee Township if they agreed to be annexed by the city. The township agreed to the plan. The city also received an approval for a state and federal $17.5 million Urban Development Grant to

Michigan, Public Act 198 of 1974, Public Act 198 of 1974, as amended is designated to maintain existing jobs and create new job opportunities for Michigan residents by providing substantial property tax incentives to industry to renovate and expand aging manufacturing plants or build new plants in Michigan. Tax benefits under the Act are granted by the legislative body of the city, township or village in which the facility is located, 9 July 1974.

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prepare the site. Flint presented the proposal to GM as an alternative to the Vienna 48

Township location.

The plans for the new plant were shelved by the failing economy.

In 1981 car sales were plummeting and GM profits were dropping to post WWII lows. GM's ambitious plan for a new Buick assembly plant was put on hold. The economic recession paradoxically aided Lloyd Reuss in his effort to retain control of Buick production. He assembled a Buick City team to present an alternative plan to corporate managers that involved the renovation of the old Buick assembly facility. Under the plan GM would invest $280 million to renovate Buick. Fisher-I would be closed and its operation merged into Buick City. Even though some 3600 jobs would be lost in the consolidation the union officials were optimistic about the Buick City project. The new relationship between Rowland and Christner continued to blossom into a new level of openness between GM and the UAW in Flint. They embraced QWL in order to alleviate labor-management conflict. The Buick City Team included union officials from the beginning. Union representatives also served on the project implementation committees to provide worker input. Buick management used union participation in the planning committees to sell the Buick City project to their bosses in Detroit. In the end the Reuss proposal was considerably less expensive than the GMAD 49

plan so the corporation decided to build Buick City. The Buick City plan was a departure from GM's traditional relationship with its suppliers. Buick City production involved the "just in time" delivery of parts. Buick expected its suppliers to locate within a radius of the plant that allowed for parts 48 Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, The Sustaining Hand: Community Leadership and Corporate Power, (Lawrence: University of Kansas 1993), 192-193. 49 Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, The Sustaining Hand: Community Leadership and Corporate Power, (Lawrence: University of Kansas 1993), 194.

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delivery directly to the line within a few hours. Ideally the corporation wanted the suppliers to locate just outside the Buick facility. So the city helped Buick acquire the surrounding land. The land west of the Buick complex was a blighted section of housing that had been designated as a housing renewal site in the 1960s. However, the housing project never got off the ground. So the city secured federal and state grants to purchase the land for Buick expansion. Years earlier the city developed the "St. Johns Industrial Park" just east of Buick in an unsuccessful bid to attract new industry. Flint provided 10.5 million in rehabilitation bonds of the $26 million price tag for St. John's Park.

Even though Buick City designers set aside space for suppliers, they chose not

locate in Flint. Despite the generous tax breaks, Buick City project was not successful in attracting suppliers to Flint. Flint is located at the nexus of an interstate highway system that links the city to outlying industrial centers on the periphery of Detroit, Lansing and Saginaw. The Buick City Complex had its own expressway artery, the 1-475 loop was constructed to connect Buick directly to 1-75 (north-south) and 1-69 (east-west). The efficient highway system had unintended consequences. Suppliers didn't need to locate in Flint to meet the "just-in-time" production requirements at the plant. What's more, Flint's Bishop Airport received federal designation as a "free trade zone" which allowed suppliers to ship components from Canada and Mexico free of import duties.

Domestic

free-trade zones (or freeports) were modeled after international free trade zones like

Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, The Sustaining Hand: Community Leadership and Corporate Power, (Lawrence: University of Kansas 1993), 199-201. George F. Lord and Albert C. Price, "Growth Ideology in a Period of Decline: Deindustrialization and Restructuring, Flint Style," Social Problems 39 no.2 (May 1992): 161. George F. Lord and Albert C. Price, "Growth Ideology in a Period of Decline: Deindustrialization and Restructuring, Flint Style," Social Problems 39 no.2 (May 1992): 161. 203

Hong Kong. They allow industries to "operate outside the scope of taxes, social services, 52

industrial and other regulations."

The easy ground and air access to Flint and the

federal tax breaks encouraged parts suppliers to locate in low wage markets rather than come into the city. Flint continued to hemorrhage jobs. Management abuse of QWL programs caused a negative back lash that reverberated through UAW locals across the country. The consequences were particularly severe for local labor leaders who strongly supported QWL programs in plants that later experienced mounting layoffs and job displacement. The 1981-82 concessionary bargaining caused a lot of anger among the rank-and-file. In 1983 workers at the Chevrolet plant in Flint voted overwhelmingly to put QWL program on hold because of GM's plan to lay off 1,350 workers. GM's abuse of QWL and mounting 53

profits continued to take a toll on local union leadership in the 1984 elections.

Buick

Local 599 was no exception. The QWL programs that were promoted by UAW Local 599 president, Al Christner at Buick Motor Division in Flint were largely credited for creating Buick City. Even though Christner had a thirteen-year long reputation for hard bargaining as president, it was his cooperation with management that led to his downfall. Many union officials resented Christner's ability to bypass the international officers in the UAW Regional 1C office to work directly with corporate executives and members of the UAW Administration. During the transition of Buick, Christner moved easily among corporate management; Lloyd Reuss and Bill Rowland, and the International Union hierarchy; 52 Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization ofAmerica: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry, (New York: Basic Books 1982), 173,225. 53 Associated Press, "GM Workers Quit Quality Control Program at Plant," Boston Globe, 7 November 1983.

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Irving Bluestone and Donald Ephlin. Local union leaders were suspicious of Christner's close relationship with both management and the International Union: There were people who wanted to move up in the organization as well, but they felt there was no movement within that structure or the Unity Caucus. For quite a while, Before Buick City came in, there was a number of people there that were not comfortable with working that close to management in the pay for knowledge system. That was the same timeframe that they decided to put the old Fisher-I body operation over there. They consolidated it with Buick City assembly operations. And basically there was a lot of animosity on that because people still believed that Fisher Body people came over and took their jobs.

There was a great deal of distrust of QWL with management and among the rank-andfile despite well-publicized success of the program. Supervisors viewed QWL as a threat to their authority and workers saw it was just another management scheme to a eliminate jobs. The continuing loss of jobs in the early 1980s seemed to confirm those suspicions. Al Christner and the presidents of four other local unions in the Flint area who started QWL experiments were turned out of office in 1984. Christner would never see the inside of Buick City, the plant he helped create.

The cooperative relationship

fueled resentment within the union at the local and national level. In 1984 dissenting

54 Ken Scott Interview, May 27, 1998, transcript, 4-5. Ronald Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint, Michigan (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987), p. 227.

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local officials from across the country formed a national organization the "Local Unions Opposed to Concessions (LOC) to protest concessions.

In 1984 Yettaw attended a

LOC meeting in Chicago where he met Don Douglas and Pete Kelly. He developed a close relationship with them in the years that followed. "We were at many meetings to find out what was in the contract before it was announced. Because you see, we had "Deep Throats" in Solidarity House who were men of union principles and they didn't like what was going on. So they would leak to us the information of what these things (in the contract) actually meant." Yettaw attended the founding conference of National 57

Rank-and-File Against Concessions in Chicago the next year.

Mounting concessions,

job losses and the abuse of QWL at many GM sites confirmed the doubts of skeptics on both sides of the employment divide. The anger of the rank-and-file cost Christner his job, others used the members' fear to get elected. Christner's spiral from office in the 1984 election was an indication that the political foundation at local 599 was shifting. While Christner was the local president, he was also the leader of the Unity Caucus. Christner's ability to bypass the officers at International Region 1C office created friction within the ranks of the union leadership. According to Christner: I think he (Stan Marshal) had a lot to do with defeating me because I ran the Buick local union. I did not call on the International for nothing. And I wanted these programs (QWL), the only thing I did was get the OK from

Ruth Milkman, Farewell to Factory: Auto workers in the Late Twentieth Century, (Berkley: University of California Press 1997), 84. Milkman identifies the local caucus, Linden Auto Workers (LAW) as the militant contingent from linden New Jersey that attended the LOC conference. 57 David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998, transcript p. 8.

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Bluestone, but from there on I handled them. I think a lot of them were sort 58

of jealous over this program. Christner was in a powerful position because he was in direct contact with Irving Bluestone and Ephlin at Solidarity House, and Bill Rowland and Lloyd Reuss at GM. Christner's prominence at the local and international level limited opportunities for others who wanted to advance in the union. Activists in Local 599 used the turmoil surrounding the creation of Buick City and QWL to maneuver for power: There were people who wanted to move up in the organization as well, but they felt there was no movement within that structure or the Unity Caucus. For quite a while, Before Buick City came in, there was a number of people there that were not comfortable with working that close to management in the pay for knowledge system. That was the same time-frame that they decided to put the old Fisher-I body operation over there. They consolidated it with Buick City assembly operations. And basically there was a lot of animosity on that because people still believed that Fisher Body people 59

came over and took their jobs.

Christner did some maneuvering of his own by refusing an International appointment to the UAW regional office. By turning the job down, Christner managed to eliminate one of his chief rivals in the local by putting him in the position of accepting an appointed job at the Region 1C. "Don Ellis who was the Director (Region 1C) at the time came over and wanted to know if I would take a job with the International. And I thought it 58 Albert Christner Interview, 21 September 1999. 59 Ken Scott Interview, May 27, 1998, transcript, 4-5.

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ain't gonna do me no good; I've always been at Buick. And so I said no I'll stay here. So Marshal took the job."

This gave Christner all the more power in the local.

Marshal was out of the local, but this was not the last that Christner would hear from him. Christner's critics backed by Stan Marshal formed an opposition caucus, the Unl Caucus (Pronounced as "U and I".).

The effort to form a new caucus was

spearheaded by Fred Myers. Fred Myers to this point had been in the Christner camp, but he was troubled by the new QWL programs. However, that was not the only motivation behind Unl. At the time strong UAW local presidents like Christner projected political power well beyond their individual local. They were still a force in UAW regional politics: Stan Marshal was the drive behind creating the Unl caucus. And the reason Marshal did that, Marshal had ambitions to be director (of UAW Region 1C). Well, he had always felt threatened by Christner. Christner always had the better mind and always had the greater charisma. Christner was the better speaker. But he (Marshal) also knew he had to get elected Director. And he felt that Christner was a threat to him. At that time, all the Local union presidents were a powerful group in the city

Albert Christner Interview, 21 September 1999. Cap Wheeler, Christner, Freddie Willbanks and Yettaw argue that Stan Marshal was involved in the 1984 local election. At this time Stan Marshal was Regional Director of UAW Region 1C. He is a former Chairman of the Local 599 Shop Committee. (The Local 599 Union hall is named after Stan Marshal.) James (Cap) Wheeler Interview, 12 August 1998. Wheeler said Marshal was involved in the creation of Unl. He (Marshal) was heavily involved in our campaign. Albert Christner Interview, 21 September 1999. Freddie Willbanks Interview, 29 September 1999. David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998, transcript p. 3, 5.

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politics as well as politics regionally. So he felt he had to defeat Christner, and he did.

Marshal and Fred Myers used the argument that Christner was going to give away Buick jobs to Fisher Body people very effectively. He also made a separate agreement for Buick City that weakened the structure of the contract. As a result only three people on the Unity slate got elected. Marshal was there for the UNI victory celebration "highfiving" Myers and others . Unity still retained the Shop Committee and Dave Yettaw was elected to the position of Education Director. After the 1984 election Myers appointed Fisher-I people to openings on the bargaining committee and within his administration. Myers decision to include Fisher-I people intensified factional divisions in the local. Myers faced the same charges of political cronyism that plagued Christner. The merger between Fisher-I operations and the Buick City body shop resulted in more than twice as many Fisher-I workers displacing Buick workers than were originally expected. Christner was originally only willing to accept 800, but the Myers administration was left with no choice but to accept over 2,200. It proved it to be political poison. Myers paid the price for decisions that were being made at Solidarity House. By the time the next election rolled around in 1987, Myers was accused of being closer to management than Christner. Yettaw and Bob Roth put together a slate of candidates for Unity Caucus to recapture the administration of Local 599 1987. It was the last time that the lifelong

64

David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998, transcript, p 3. Freddie Willbanks Interview, 29 September 1999.

James (Cap) Wheeler Interview, 12 August 1998. Christner, Scott, Yettaw and Willbanks were in agreement on this. Cap Wheeler says Myers was blamed by the membership.

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friends agreed on much of anything. The two grew up together as kids, they went to kindergarten together. They were from the same neighborhood. Roth hired into the Buick foundry in 1964 a year before Yettaw hired into final assembly. Roth's entire shop floor experience was in the foundry where he was elected committeeman. The two friends ascended the ranks within local union politics together. It was Roth who convinced Yettaw to first run for committeeman. They planned the 1987 election strategy over lunch; Yettaw would run for president and Roth would run for education director.

The Unity slate swept almost all the positions in 1987. Yettaw was elected

local president and Roth easily took the education director position. Ken Scott was one of the few Unl members to be reelected to the shop committee. A few months later the regional office (UAW Region 1C) encouraged Unity Caucus to readmit Unl members. Yettaw and a few others within Unity opposed allowing the Unl people to return to the Unity. "I adamantly opposed it. So did Dave Ogle, so did Denny Carl, but there was a couple Judas's among us. Bob Roth wanted them to go in and so did Art Reyes. Well, Art Reyes was representing the skilled trades. He was a shop committeeman at the time. And Roth was in a Unity group. And he (Bob Roth) was the Education Director because he replaced me. First Roth went on staff and then Reyes went on staff. And that's how they (International UAW) pay these guys I think."

In the end the Unl members were

brought back into Unity almost at the same moment Dave Yettaw had decided to leave the caucus. Ken Scott eventually became chairman of the shop committee and one of

Bob Roth Interview October, 6 1999. David Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998, transcript p. 5-6.

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Yettaw's most outspoken opponents at the local.

The political maneuvering in the 1987

election characterized the factional conflicts well into the 1990s. Yettaw was so emboldened by his election to president of the local that he chose to challenge the International Union and General Motors. Yettaw was elected president while still serving as chairman of Unity Caucus, but that was about to change. Bob Roth noticed a change in Yettaw's behavior after the election. "Dave Yettaw got on a plane and flew out to Oklahoma where he seen a guy named Jerry Tucker. Dave Yettaw's plane landed (returning to Flint) and you'd never know it was the same guy. He got off the plane and all those caucus members will tell you that he thought he was the second /TO

rising of Walter Reuther or something."

Yettaw announced to Roth that there was

going to be changes at the local, especially when it came to education. From now on Yettaw's approach to labor relations was very adversarial, "fuck management, they're all wrong and we are all right."

Roth and others in Unity blamed it Yettaw's defiant

attitude for the continuing job losses at the Buick. Roth believed the defeat of Al Christner heralded the death of the Buick site. He felt Yettaw's obstinate attitude and repeated attacks on the International Union and GM in the press sealed Buick's fate. "You don't go to the (Flint) city council every meeting and damn the Corporation. You don't make statements to the Wall Street Journal and on television damning the Corporation day in and day out. Are there times when they need that? Yes, but to go on and on for so long. Damning them for tax abatements—they said OK, we don't need this shit. So, if the union can't defeat him, we'll take our business somewhere else—and they Ken Scott Interview, May 27, 1998, transcript, 6, "So when the caucus, the Unity Caucus (decided) to go ahead and take everybody in that wanted to come in, we came together again." Bob Roth Interview October, 6 1999. Bob Roth Interview October, 6 1999.

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did."

Yettaw resigned from Unity and joined the New Directions Movement. The

decision to join NDM gave the Local 599 factional dispute a national dimension. Yettaw's experience on the shop floor and with the emerging insurgent movements reinforced his sense of what was right and wrong with management and the union bureaucracy. Management had rules to live by that were prescribed in the contract and the UAW was supposed to follow the constitution. As far as he could determine neither side was following the rules. Yettaw's involvement with LOC and the events that he witnessed in the 1986 National Convention smoothed the path to the New Directions Movement. NDM's organizational philosophy was a natural fit for Yettaw. The NDM was chartered for the purpose of restoring internal democracy and accountability to the 71

UAW.

Yettaw viewed the NDM as a platform to stop concessionary bargaining, joint

labor-management participation programs and restore the UAW to its formative role in the labor movement and in society. Yettaw's decision to join NDM defined his union career for the rest of his life. Almost the moment that Yettaw joined the NDM, he was involved in an intractable conflict with GM and the Administration Caucus. Yettaw's militancy was not always welcomed across the Buick site, and appreciated even less at Solidarity House. Dave Yettaw's UAW was supposed to be a vibrant force for workers' rights as well as social and economic justice. Working people were supposed to look out for one another. It was a lesson that Yettaw learned while serving in Vietnam. Those were values were reinforced by the progressive movement culture of the 1960s. Yettaw 70 Bob Roth Interview October, 6 1999. 71 Steven P. Dandaneau, A Town Abandoned: Flint, Michigan, Confronts De-industrialization, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 13-15. UAW New Directions Movement, UA W New Directions Movement 1992 Convention Platform, 1-4.

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carried those principles to the factory floor. He had faith in constitutional structure and avoided direct action by the rank and file. For the most part, the grievance procedure worked as it was designed. Individual complaints were taken into the grievance 72

procedure where they were systematically removed from workers control.

The shop

floor wasn't a truly contested space because conflict was institutionalized within a bureaucratic system controlled by a narrow band of political partisans. The UAW yielded management's prerogative as the sole decision maker in the business. The role of management, workers and organized labor was defined by statute, the union constitution, bylaws and various bargaining agreements. The labor movement was contained by post WWII labor laws to comply free market capitalism. Consequently, radical impulses within the rank and file were systematically suppressed long before Yettaw had arrived at the Buick. The UAW and GM were managed by a well-defined set of rules and Yettaw was determined to make both organizations live by them. In the years since Yettaw became active in the UAW, the union's emphasis on civil rights, social justice and even environmental issues fell away as autoworkers' social and economic position diverged from workers outside the unionized industrial sector. The UAW focused its attention inward as General Motors shifted its economic weight away from the urban centers. There was widespread union cooperation with industrial conglomerates in auto, steel, transportation, and communication to contain the movement culture that spawned the industrial labor movement. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the UAW settled into a collaborative relationship with the American automakers. GM conceded wage and benefits packages to workers and the cost could easily be passed 72 Yettaw Interview, 5-28-1998.

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along to consumers. Workers in small enterprises were forced to settle for lower employment standards. That divergent trend undermined the American labor movement as competition expanded in the 1980s. Structural economic inequality was one unintended consequence of the American industrial relations system. Another was the displacement of membership-oriented labor organizations by market-oriented organizations. The principles that guided Dave Yettaw union career proved to be an aberration in the larger system of UAW politics. There were certainly pockets of rank and file militancy within some union locals and individual plants, but for the most part the American labor movement was contained in an institutionalized technical and political framework that emphasized conformity.

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Chapter 5 GM-UAW Corporate Culture When the Japanese entered the American car market with reliable fuel-efficient cars, General Motors responded in the only way it knew how, they threw money at the problem. It was up to GM's new "visionary" Chairman Roger B. Smith to overhaul GM. When Smith took over as chairman in 1981, the corporation was at a crossroads. It was losing market share and hemorrhaging money. In 1980, General Motors recorded its first loss since the 1920's. When Alfred Sloan had left the company GM was the industry lowcost producer. Smith took over when GM was the high cost producer. By 1986 the average number of cars produced per GM employee stood at 11.7, at Ford the number was 16.1, and Toyota produced 57.7. A bold plan was needed on the scale of Alfred Sloan's restructuring of General Motors nearly 60 years earlier. However, Smith was no Alfred Sloan, he was afinancialguy. He signed on with as a general accounting clerk in Detroit ascended the corporate ladder entirely within GMfinancialoperations. Smith was promoted to treasurer of the corporation in 1970, vice president offinancein 1971, became group executive over nonautomotive operations in 1972 and became executive vice president forfinancein public relations and a member of the Board of Directors in 1974. He had risen through the Corporation viewing the auto industry from an accountant's prospective. Labor was just another input cost that needed to be controlled or eliminated.

Sydney Finkelstein, "GM and the Great Automation Solution," Business Strategy Review, Autumn 2003, Vol. 14, issue 3, p. 22. 2 Paul Ingrassia and Joseph B. White, Comeback: The Fall and Rise of the American Automobile Industry, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 71.

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The Smith project to revitalize GM was strictly a technical issue that could be resolved by containing costs with technical innovation. The plan involved controlling labor costs with automation to solve GM's problems. His solution ignored the cultural and political consequences to the overall system. GM announced generous bonuses for its executives on the same day the UAW agreed to $2 billion in concessions. Smith's plan to save General Motors relied on eliminating labor costs with automation and computer technology. Roger Smith's answer to GM's problems was to go on a spending spree. Smith's restructuring plan would eventually cost the corporation of over $70 billion. Smith's dream was to modernize and automate its factories to the tune of $40 to $45 billion. In 1983, GM announced the joint venture with Toyota, New United Motors Manufacturing Inc. project. NUMMI was publicly intended to be a laboratory that would teach General Motors Japanese management techniques. For all practical purposes though NUMMI was a laboratory to see if American workers would perform under the Japanese system. GM spent $6 billion in technological upgrades at Lake Orion, Michigan and Wentzville, Missouri assembly plants. Robots and computer technology led the parade of "high-tech" automation. A similar level of capital spending was predicted for GM's newly announced Saturn project. Saturn was GM's low-cost import fighter of the future. In many ways the Saturn and NUMMI projects were redundant with respect to basic manufacturing process and human relations. Saturn went beyond experimentation with employee participation programs. The UAW members were included in the product planning stages, but at the same time engaged in punitive self-management schemes in the name of employee involvement. The Buick City arrived on the scene in 1983. The Buick City project was

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an experiment in Japanese-style manufacturing techniques that included just in time parts delivery and continuous improvement through teambuilding and employee participation. The same year GM broke ground on the GMF robotics headquarters in Troy, Michigan. The plan was to build a major robotics development facility in the state. GM established the Quality Institute in Detroit. A major component of the institute was GM's investment in management consultant firm Philip Crosby Associates, Inc. GM managers and union leaders attended weeklong training conferences at the Quality Institute to learn "quality decision-making." In 1984, GM's massive reorganization plans were initiated and capital spending continued to escalate. The Saturn Corporation was formally established with the commitment of over $5 billion. GM's new low-cost import fighter was strapped with a $2000 fixed cost per vehicle five years before one even rolled off the assembly line. An additional $9 billion was spent on technological upgrades to factories. The Hamtramck plant in Detroit was GM's sparkling example of the high-tech plant of the future, but its start up was plagued with technical problems and did not lived up to its expectations. The futuristic automation simply created expensive and complicated problems. The robots in Hamtramck were painting each other instead of cars and the robots in Buick City were installing windshields in the back seats. GM purchased Electronic Data Systems (EDS) in order to upgrade corporate data processing in one fell swoop. A new class of common stock was created in order to guarantee EDS independence and satisfy H. Ross Perot. For Smith, one of the best parts of the EDS deal was the addition of the 3

Paul Ingrassia and Joseph B. White, Comeback: The Fall and Rise of the American Automobile Industry, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p.33, 78, 111. Maryann Keller, Rude Awakening: The Rise, Fall, and Struggle for Recovery of General Motors, (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1989), p. 129-135, 145-152, 164-165. Albert Lee, Call Me Roger, New York: Contemporary Books, 1988), p. 113115.

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celebrated Texas entrepreneur to the GM Board of Directors. Smith's acquisition of EDS turned into another example of his political and cultural miscalculation after Perot publicly criticized GM management and spread chaos within the GM-EDS ranks. In 1985 GM purchased Hughes Aircraft Company for $5 billion. Smith coveted Hughes research facilities as the scientific engine that would drive the industrial manufacturing of the future. The Buick operations in Flint had all the elements of the Roger Smith's renaissance plan for GM. At the time Flint was still a primary center for GM's North American operations which placed it on the front line of the technical, cultural and political challenges faced the auto industry. In 1980, Buick was still one of the largest centralized manufacturing facilities in world. The facility was a sprawling two mile long complex that manufactured nearly every component in a single site. Workers in the Buick foundry poured the iron into molds for engine blocks that were assembled into the 6 and 8 cylinder engines in factory 36. Factories 5 and 10 manufactured and assembled components and complete transmissions. The machines in the forge plant, factory 3 spewed flame and smoke as they belched forth suspension components. Workers in Factory 31 assembled axles and differentials for driveline systems. The machines in the stamping plant, Factory 12 shook the earth for several city blocks as they transformed sheet metal into hoods and fenders. Across town at Fisher 1 the car bodies were being assembled in the factory that made history as the site of the great sit down strike of 1936 and 37. The car bodies were trucked to Buick final assembly where all the components

Maryann Keller, Rude Awakening: The Rise, Fall, and Struggle for Recovery of General Motors, (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1989), p. 96. Albert Lee, Call Me Roger, (New York: Contemporary Books, 1988), p.l 15.

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converged onto the final product, the massive full-size road yachts. The lumbering, oversized vehicles produced in Flint were a metaphor for what was wrong with the American auto industry. The expansive enterprise employed tens of thousands of workers and was an economic engine which one way or another provided employment for over 75 percent of the regional workforce. The scale of everything involved in manufacturing in Flint became a symbol of the bloated, outdated industrial bureaucracy that was the General Motors Corp. The industrial operations were sprawling and inefficient. Flint was the birthplace in General Motors where William Crapo Durand built his modern automobile empire in the heart of the worldwide carriage industry. It was the cradle of GM manufacturing and corporate culture. Flint was the home of the General Motors Institute (GMI), GM's intellectual factory that produced GM managers and engineers. GMI was an inherent part of the corporation that shaped the hearts and minds of GM personnel. Management was indoctrinated with the GM organizational ideal that emphasized loyalty to the corporate culture regardless of the external environment. The General Motors Institute emerged from the training programs that were organized by the Vehicle Workers' Mutual Benefit Association before WWI. It was first a school for production workers and management personnel, but the curriculum expanded into engineering, applied science and advance technology. GMI became a fully accredited university, first the General Motors Institute of Technology, then the General

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Motors Institute. There was little interest in the humanities. There was some training in labor-management relations, but liberal arts courses were rare. GM's organizational ideal was defined by the head of the organization whether that was the corporate CEO, division director or department manager. Regardless of the size and scope of the unit everyone within that unit worked together to maintain that system and project the accepted values of the system. At GM, a successful career was not about business competence; rather it was about being a team player: A system which puts emphasis on form, style and unwavering support for the decisions of the boss, almost always loses its prospective about an executive's business competence. Even if the man in power is a competent businessman, but adheres to the system, the chances of his successors' being equally competent are reduced because they are granted not on how they perform as businessman but on how they perform as system-men. Once they get into power, they don't tamper with the system that promoted them. Within that culture building cars was secondary to attaining and retaining organizational rank. The GM corporate-men denied or discredited anyone who threatened their rank or worldview. Not only is the system perpetuating itself, but in the act of perpetuating itself as system has fostered several district of practices which are harmful Brock Yates, The Decline and Fall of the Young American Automobile Industry, (New York: Empire Books 1983), p. 100-101. Kettering University web site: http://www.kettering.edu/visitors/about/gmi.jsp. In 1982, General Motors divested its ownership of GMI and name was changed to GMI Engineering & Management Institute. In 1998, the university changed its name to Kettering University after one of its founding members Charles Kettering J. Patrick Wright, On a Clear Day You Can See General Motors: John Z. DeLorean's Look Inside the Automotive Giant, (Grosse Pointe MI: Wright Enterprises, 1979), p. 40.

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to executive morale. Once in the position of power, a manager who promoted by the system is insecure because, consciously or not he knows that it was something other than his ability to manage and his knowledge of the business that put him in his position. He knows that he is one step or more past his Peter Principle Equivalent. He thus looks for methods in defense mechanisms to ward off threats to his power. In the GM world adherence to the corporate ideal was more important than interaction with the external business environment. Appearance was more important than reality or functionality: At General Motors, good appearance meant conservative dress. In my very first meeting is in GM employee in 1956 at Pontiac, half the session was taking up in a discussion about some vice-president downtown at headquarters who was sent home that morning for wearing a brown suit. Only blue or Black suits were tolerated then.

Corporate culture in politics was what was important in General Motors even when presented with formidable competition from foreign automakers. The GM corporate men were consumed with keeping their political adversaries at bay by maintaining strict loyalty to the corporate ideal. GM executives were certainly wearing the appropriate suits when they failed to take the Japanese seriously. GM and the UAW were presented with the culture shock in the early 1980s that would change the relationship forever. Japanese carmakers began manufacturing cars in 7

Ibid. p. 40.

8

Ibid. p. 33.

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North America and for the first time since 1940 produced cars with nonunion autoworkers. The big three American carmakers scrambled for a solution to the curious dilemma of American consumers buying foreign cars in large numbers. It was a problem they never faced before. General Motors chose to throw money and technology at the issue. GM set out to copy the Japanese manufacturing practices, but failed to boost productivity. It was incomprehensible. GM deployed the might of its political and technical systems, but the problem was in the corporate culture. Japanese success was not the resulted of a regime of political bureaucracy or the latest technology, but instead by implementing balanced technical, political and cultural systems that allowed workers to do their jobs more easily. The Japanese embraced W. Edwards Deming's philosophy that quality delivers productivity in an ever changing competitive environment. Deming began formulating the "14 Points for Management" system in 1950 to continually identify problems and improve quality. For Deming, quality improvement automatically improved productivity. GM instead imposed some of the concepts observed at NUMMI and Toyota City at some select plants while leaving the overarching corporate culture intact. Rather creating a quality-driven manufacturing process, GM management nurtured the expansion of the UAW-GM corporate partnership. The UAW Inc. model represented a fundamental redefinition of a labor organization within a radically altered system of industrial relations in the American auto industry. UAW Inc. was conceived during the crisis that confronted the American auto industry in the late 1970s. American politics shifted to the right as ordinary people were coming to terms with of the Vietnam War, the recurrent oil crisis, the hostage crisis in 9

W. Edwards Deming, Quality, Productivity, and Competitive Position, (Cambridge, MIT Press 1982), p. 16-17.

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Iran and economic global competition presented by Japanese automakers. The "Reagan Revolution" marked a major turning point in pro-business politics that was the beginning of the end of industrial labor movement's dominance in the American economy. Reagan signaled that the New Deal consensus was over. Reagan made his intentions clear when he thanked the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization for endorsing him for president by dissolving PATCO after the union engaged in an illegal strike.

The nearly

bankrupt Chrysler Corporation needed wage and benefits concessions from the UAW as a condition to receive federal loan guarantees. Three rounds of concessionary bargaining in the auto sector from 1979 to 1981 signaled the decline of the entire labor movement. The auto concessions set a precedent that was followed by the rubber, meatpacking, steel and agricultural implement industries.

While General Motors, Ford and Chrysler

struggled with Japanese imports, the United Auto Workers were presented with tens of thousands of layoffs as factories closed across the country. The American car companies restructured both the technical aspects of manufacturing and the system of industrial relations with the UAW. General Motors in particular pursued a strategy of employment relations that was a radical departure from the adversarial collective bargaining that spanned the post-World War II era. GM engaged in widespread experimentation with new manufacturing and human resource processes. The corporation claimed that changes were made to revitalize the American

Ronald Reagan to Robert E. Poli, President, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, October 20, 1980, Reagan sent the letter to Poli to thank him for PATCO's support of his campaign and to "pledge to you that my administration will work very closely with you to bring about the spirit of cooperation between the president and the air traffic controllers. Such harmony can and must exist if we are to restore the people's confidence in their government." Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Great U-Tum, (New York: Basic Books 1988), 87. Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy and the History of the U.S. Working-Class, (London and New York: Verso 1999), p. 140-141.

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car industry. There were major changes in the industrial relations system in the auto sector. A new legal framework was established to accommodate a new system of labormanagement committees and funding schemes to operate joint programs. Previous attempts at forming labor-management committees had run up against the provisions of the Wagner Act that prohibited employers from dominating employee organizations or making financial contributions to labor organizations. The solution to legal obstacles 12

resulted in federal legislation titled the "Labor-management Cooperation Act of 1978." The UAW and GM engaged in a two decades long experiment in industrial relations based on labor-management cooperation that transformed to the union into an extension of corporate labor relations. By the turn of the 21st century the UAW was overshadowed by UAW Inc., the corporate entity that was a labor organization in name only. The emergence of UAW Inc. signaled a fundamental transformation of the union. The UAW-GM collective bargaining agreements were used as instruments to construct a parallel organization and industrial relations system that overshadowed the existing union and employer institutions. The emergent organizational bureaucracy was distinct from 13

union and corporate institutions.

The power shifted within the union from the

democratically elected representatives on the bargaining committee to an expanding cadre of administrative appointed representatives. Labor-management committees were Patrick Hyde, Policy and Law Adviser, Office of Labor-Management Standards, U.S Department of Labor, Position Paper Outline: UA W Joint Funds Are Not a "Labor-management Committee" Under 29 USC 186(c)(9) But Are, Rather, Labor Trusts Mandated to Make Audits Available for Inspection Pursuant to 29u.S.C. §186(c)(5)(B),Presented to the Office of the Solicitor General in 2004. Federal law strictly prohibits employers and associations of employers from making payments or otherwise giving things of value to unions, their representatives, or employees outside the context of compensation for work performed. 29 USC §§ 186(a) & (b). See Appendix E for a detailed description of this relationship. See Appendix for the provisions of the Labor-management Cooperation Act in its entirety "Assistance to Plant, Area, and Industry-Wide Labor-Management Committees." 13 Special Convention Proceedings, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, Cobo Hall, Detroit MI, March 28-30, 1999, p. 223-224.

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presented as the solution to GM's problems. UAW employment levels were among the first casualties of the UAW-GM corporate agenda. The continuing job losses led the international UAW to reengineer the funding mechanism for the union bureaucracy. The UAW was faced with the dilemma of reducing the existing bureaucracy under the traditional funding formula or seeking alternative financial resources. The international UAW chose to preserve organization by adopting the auto industry's agenda rather adhering to the prescribed system defined by the UAW Constitution. The UAW and GM industrial relations experiment centered on team-based problem solving and conflict resolution techniques. The team-based approach is a remnant of the General Motors "Southern Strategy," a union avoidance program initially aimed at southern nonunion plants. Even while GM was engaged in joint cooperation projects with the UAW, the company opened nonunion plants in Mississippi and Georgia that offered high wages, worker participation groups and problem solving teams were workers elected their own leaders. Management wanted to show workers they did not need a union. GM's Southern Strategy endangered QWL programs by because of the skeptics' fears employee involvement schemes were designed to break the union. The problem of domestic runaway plants was addressed in the 1979 national agreement when GM agreed to treat new facilities that perform similar operations as union transfer sites. New GM facilities were automatically recognized by the corporation as UAW represented The Southern Strategy officially ceased in the course of concessionary bargaining in 1981, but a more insidious corporate campaign in the form of labormanagement committees took its place. 14 Michael Maccoby, The Leader: A New Face for American Management, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), p. 100.

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It is important to understand the collective bargaining structure of the American auto industry in order to better comprehend the technical, political and cultural changes that have taken place in industrial relations in the American auto industry. General Motors represents the multi-plant single employer model. UAW collective bargaining agreements in the American auto industry are covered by an overarching national agreement that sets standards in wages, seniority and transfer rights, pensions, healthcare, grievance procedures, holiday pay, various fringe and welfare benefits, income protections and work hours. The UAW national agreement supersedes any plant level agreements. The UAW's traditional strategy in dealing with national contract negotiations was to establish strong pattern agreements between auto sector employers. Pattern agreements were possible during the heyday of the 1950s and 1960s when the UAW's bargaining leverage high was due to high levels of union density in the auto industry. Local unions negotiate plant level or local agreements that supplement the national agreement. Local agreements cover issues such as work rules, seniority rights and pay rates for specific jobs at a particular plant. Job characteristics differ from one plant to another therefore; there was a need for variation in production standards. This model provided for in fluctuating degrees of autonomy for local unions depending upon their size and the critical importance of their products. Large local unions like Buick local 599 had as many as 27,000 members in the 1950s and often challenged the authority of the international UAW.

Since the 1960s, General Motors moved to decentralize its

operations by moving production from union strongholds to the suburbs, southern states,

James D. Ananich, Neil O. Leighton, and Charles T. Weber, Economic Impact of GM Plant Closings in Flint, Michigan: A Summary (Supported by the Research Excellence and Economic Development Fund of the State of Michigan, Briefing, June 13 1989), p.l.

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Mexico and overseas. As a result, large local unions lost both their membership and political power. The focus in recent years at the plant level has been on the variation of work practices that diverge from national pattern bargaining. It would seem appropriate to conclude that power would shift to the local unions as plant level variation increased within the auto sector. However, since the arrival of Joint Activities as an industrial relations strategy in the collective bargaining process just the opposite has occurred. Joint Activities endowed the UAW administration with uncontested authority over the political processes of the union and opened the door to undue management influence over union activities. This development diverges from the American system industrial relations as established by the NLRA because UAW-GM Joint Activities are not subject to the same checks and balances that stabilize collective bargaining. The shift to interest based approach to industrial relations was initiated by the slump in the auto industry in the 1970s. Interest based bargaining was also called the "win-win" approach where labor and management applied joint problem solving techniques to achieve gains for both sides. This was at a time when conflict characterized industrial labor. General Motors was caught in a widespread shop floor revolt often called the "Lordstown syndrome" after a militant plant in Ohio. In 1972, Lordstown highlighted the "blue-collar blues," a situation where workers were subject to arbitrary speedups, forced overtime, high absenteeism and dangerous working conditions. The result was a highly public three-week labor strike that damaged General Motors reputation and highlighted the intense conflict on the shop floor. In addition, the Shah of Iran was deposed in 1979. This cause fuel prices to skyrocket just as Japanese fuelefficient cars were flooding the market. With the Chrysler Corporation on the verge of

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bankruptcy, UAW President Douglas Fraser joined Lee Iacocca to lobby the federal government for loan guarantees. As a part of this deal the UAW accepted wage and benefit cuts and Chrysler accepted Fraser onto its Board of Directors. While Fraser's role on the board proved to be largely ceremonial, the transformation of industrial relations was not. A new era of labor-management cooperation emerged from the concessionary bargaining agreements at the domestic automakers. General Motors looked to the Japanese for inspiration in cost-cutting strategies and to organizational consultants to help humanize the organization. The 1980s crisis in the American auto industry marked an end to the industrial labor relations system based on Frederick W. Taylor's scientific revolution on the factory floor that promised benefits everyone. In Taylor's world, the operational knowledge of manufacturing proceeded from the manager's office while workers were little more than tools of production. For Taylor, the average worker had an inherent dislike for work and avoided it whenever possible. He was convinced factory workers lacked ambition, responsibility and were content to follow orders. Moreover, Taylor believed workers would welcome his methods once they realized scientific management would earn them more money for less effort. The others just needed to be directed, coerced and threatened 17

with punishment in order to achieve management's organizational directives.

However,

not everything was well in Taylor's world. As early as the 1920s and 1930s there were serious doubts being raised about Taylor's methods. The celebrated "Hawthorn Jerry M. Flint, "Automakers Face Blue-collar Blues," New York Times, January 7, 1973, p. 222. Susan Chira, New York Times, August 11, 1984, p. 29. Michael Massing, "Detroit's Strange Bedfellows," New York Times Sunday Magazine, February 7, 1988, p. SM 20. 17 Charles G. Burck, "Working Smarter," Fortune, June 15, 1981, p. 71, John Simmons and William Mares, Working Together, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983, p. 27,38.

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experiments" at the Chicago Western Electric, Hawthorn Works facility indicated that 18

workers' attitudes often influenced output more than pay levels or working conditions. Workers who had no control over their jobs and felt completely alienated from the production process. Second generation factory workers would no longer settle for a factory life of simply following orders as their fathers had. Their alienation was expressed through sabotage, high absenteeism and ultimately one of the most famous walkouts in American labor history. The Lordstown strike illustrated how advanced engineering design inevitably collided with the limitations of the willingness of factory workers to perform as machines. Lordstown showed that Taylor's method of separating planning from doing had run its course in the American auto industry. Autoworkers and demanded to be treated like human beings and worker participation programs appeared to offer that opportunity. The Lordstown strike set in motion a shock affect in industrial relations that heralded a popular trend of worker participation that was sweeping across the country in the early 1970s called Quality of Work Life (QWL). Quality Work Life is broadly defined as activities that improve organizational performance and the working life of employees. QWL programs include small workgroup meetings, labor-management committees, study teams and sometimes involvement in business decisions. Irving Bluestone was considered the father of the quality work life programs in the UAW. For Bluestone, QWL was a conduit for industrial democracy. Bluestone's advocacy of industrial democracy is not surprising considering that he was a protege of Walter Reuther. Both had a Socialist background. His parents were both supporters of 18

Charles G. Burck, "Working Smarter," Fortune, June 15, 1981, p. 72.

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Norman Thomas in 1928. After the stock market crash in 1929, Bluestone was able to attend college at City College of New York because they offered free schooling and books. Bluestone received a degree in German literature from City College in 1937. After graduation he traveled to Europe and spent a year at the University of Burne in Switzerland. He bought a bicycle and planned a European tour. However, the tour was cut short in Austria where he encountered the terror of Nazi regime firsthand. Bluestone arrived in Vienna just after German troops marched into Austria and Hitler declared 19

Anschluss, the union of Austria with Germany.

Hitler's destruction of labor

organizations in Germany convinced Bluestone that only a strong labor movement could preserve democracy. Bluestone's career in the UAW spanned the post-World War II period. When Bluestone first returned from Europe he got a job at the Harrison Radiator plant in New 20

York. There he soon got involved with newly formed UAW.

At the beginning of

World War II he went to work in a GM bearing factory in New Jersey as a production grinder. Bluestone was elected to several UAW positions including: alternate committeeman, committeeman, chairman of the shop committee. He was also served as chairman of the Education Committee, the Political Action Committee and became vice president of New Jersey State CIO. He was appointed to the staff of the International Union, UAW in 1945 at the New York City UAW regional office. Shortly after Reuther was elected president of the UAW, Bluestone was appointed to the UAW's GM department staff. Leonard Woodcock was elected vice president of the GM department 19 Michael Maccoby, The Leader: A New Face for American Management, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), p. 108. 20 Agis Salpukas, "Director of Union's GM Section: Irving Bluestone, New York Times, September 17, 1970, p. 80.

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in 1955 and appointed Bluestone as his administrative assistant. In 1961, he was appointed Reuther's administrative assistant. After Reuther's death in 1970 the UAW Executive Board selected Bluestone to direct the General Motors department. He was elected vice president of the GM department in 1972,1974 and 1977. He retiredfromthe UAW in 1980 after 38 years.21 Bluestone was the UAW Vice President of the GM department when unlike his contemporaries in the labor movement; he advocated a European-style system of industrial democracy. Bluestone believed that workers should 22

have control over their jobs and eventually management of the companies as well. Organized labor in the United States had reached a turning point in the 1970s. At that moment in time workers in the United States had made good progress in economic well-being, but management remained authoritarian. For Bluestone, the road to industrial democracy was traveled in two stages. The first stage was being covered by better living standards and working conditions, but that was not enough. "The notion that unionism would bring into the workplace not only decent living standards in the economic life of the workman and his family, and decent working conditions, but bring some measure of 23

democratic values. The notion of industrial democracy is what unionism is all about." Bluestone felt that in order to achieve industrial democracy the second stage required challenges to management's sole responsibility of management prerogative.

He argued

that management was locked into scientific management techniques that used workers' 21 Michael Maccoby, The Leader: A New Face for American Management, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), p. 109-110. 22 David Jenkins, "Industrial Democracy: It Catches on Faster in Europe Than U.S.," New York Times, May 13, 1973, p. 151. 23 John Simons and William Mares, Working Together, (New York: Knopf, 1982), p. 58-59. 24 Michael Maccoby, The Leader: A New Face for American Management, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), p. 96-97.

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bodies while completely disregarding their brains, "this was wrong and not only an abuse of the individual who is a worker and an adult, yet is treated as a child, but also very bad 25

management."

Scientific managers gave orders and workers followed orders or faced

discipline. For Bluestone, scientific management was neither scientific nor good management—it was a work structure that was responsible for much of the workplace alienation. High levels of absenteeism and grievances illustrated the failure of scientific management. There was another way to structure work in the factories. Bluestone observed the alternative organizational philosophy in the European model of industrial relations. Bluestone advocated worker participation programs that were modeled after industrial democracy found in European industries. GM's QWL approach evolved from work organization projects that were based on behavioral science studies that began in the early 1950s. In 1952, Yale researchers Charles R. Walker and Robert H. Guest collaborated on any study of autoworkers titled, The Man on the Assembly Line. The study showed that typical mass production jobs alienated workers. Their alienation was measured by high rates of turnover, absenteeism and grievances. Contrary to Taylor's theory, the study indicated workers were eager to share more responsibility in their work. A more comprehensive approach was underway in the 1950s at a social and industrial If*

research organization, the Travistock Work Research Institute in England by Eric Trist. Similar work was conducted by psychologist Einar Thorsrud at the Work Research Institutes in Norway. Their work focused on Welsh coal miners use of autonomous work teams. The Travistock Institute developed in the "soldo-technical" system that would 25 John Simons and William Mares, Working Together, (New York: Knopf, 1982), p. 58-59. Charles G. Burck, "Working Smarter," Fortune, June 15, 1981, p. 72.

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balance technical and human demands in the workplace. The Travistock theories held that organizations were most effective when based on small groups with high levels of autonomy. These ideas ran contrary to the Taylorist system that removed thinking from the job process by reducing work processes to its simplest tasks. Similarly, Thorsrud, who was a harsh critic of Taylorist work practices, favored industrial democracy as a workplace organizational ethnic. For Thorsrud, the brain under the workman's cap was management's most valuable asset. Workplace enrichment was directly related to involving workers in decision-making. Thorsrud observed that both workers and management endorsed participative work groups in several factories where teamwork was applied. In the early 1970s Thorsrud and Trist brought their ideas to the United States. Trist applied his Travistock theories in the coal mining industry in Pennsylvania. He was an adviser to the Jamestown Area of Labor-Management Committee. Thorsrud assisted Sidney Harman in setting up a workplace participation project at Harman International Industries, a conglomerate that owned Harman Automotive in Bolivar 27

Tennessee

The celebrated "Bolivar project" was a show place of labor-management

cooperation that later failed. The "Bolivar project" got started at the Harman Automotive rearview mirror factory in Tennessee when Sidney Harman and Irving Bluestone first met in 1972. The two men met when they were called to testify before a United States Senate Subcommittee about anger and alienation in the workplace. For Harman, workplace alienation was caused by treating workers like pieces of machinery. The Bolivar project was intended to tear down the barriers between labor and management that perpetuated 27 John Simons and William Mares, Working Together, (New York: Knopf, 1982), p. 41-42.

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hostility. For Bluestone, the Bolivar project was an opportunity to introduce industrial democracy by giving workers control over their surroundings. The project attracted research grantsfromthe Federal Government, leading universities and the Ford Foundation. The Bolivar project promised to increase workers job security, training, safety and a role in decisions that affected working conditions—but above all recognized their importance as individuals with varying interests, talents and aspirations. By 1975, the project seemed to be working. The company avoided declines in productivity in the workers' income was not disrupted by strikes or layoffs. Over time a level of trust was established between union and management negotiators that instrumental in reaching a contract agreement three months ahead of the deadline. The early contract settlement allowed Harman to avoid the time-honored practice of stockpiling parts leading up to negotiations and the inevitable disruptions caused by post-contract production cuts and disciplinary problems. The cooperation between union and management at Harman saved over 100 jobs because they were able to attract more work from General Motors. In return for union cooperation with retiming jobs and resetting production standards, 28

Harman opened its financial records to the union.

Workers were redesigning their jobs

in ways that improved productivity. They were rewarded with specialized training, personal enrichment classes, increased leisure time, onsite child care, a stock ownership

Michael Maccoby, The Leader: A New Face for American Management, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), p. 104.

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plan and even established an "earned idle time" plan that allowed workers to go home 29

after they completed their production. The success of labor-management cooperation created some inadvertent cultural hallmarks that contributed to the downfall of the Bolivar project. The freedom to leave the plant undercut the social cohesiveness and reduced skill levels on the shop floor at any given time. Bluestone objected to the plan because he believed it would encourage some to work to quickly at the expense their co-workers. Shop floor solidarity and product quality would suffer in the rush to finish the job and get out of door as soon as possible.

Earned idle time created conflict between workers because some jobs

required constant attention. Quality and productivity declined as the shorter work day became viewed as an entitlement. Absenteeism soared as workers lost interest in their jobs. Harman's managers lacked the appropriate training to deal with the workers' newfound freedom. Some of them simply let the workers go home rather than deal with conflict. In addition, Harman Industries failed to stay current with the product technology in plastics. The inability to merge worker training and individual responsibility with the introduction of personal freedom and new technology characterized the institutional downfall of the Bolivar project. The project ultimately collapsed when Harman Industries was sold in 1976 to Beatrice Foods, a highly leveraged conglomerate with interests in food, chemicals and luggage. Beatrice placed little significance in the Harman automotive group and resold the enterprise in 1984. Even though the Bolivar project ended in failure, Bluestone credited the experiment as 29 Barnaby J. Feder, "Others Learn in Failure of Worker Democracy," The New York Times, 21 February 1998, Dl, D3. 30 Michael Maccoby, The Leader: A New Face for American Management, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), p. 105.

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the inspiration for the General Motors Tarrytown, New York assembly plant reorganization. Bluestone was determined to formalize a system of industrial democracy in the auto industry. As early as 1971, Bluestone made an informal "hallway agreement" with Vice President of Labor Relations, George B. Morris to launch a QWL program at 32

Harrison Radiator in Lockport, NY.

At that time Morris refused to give Bluestone 33

anything official on QWL because "he really hated the whole thing."

Morris believed

that it was management's role to tell workers what to do and workers role to do what they were told. If Bluestone was going to achieve his dream of democracy in the workplace, changes needed to take place in management. Those changes were already in the works. The corporation already had a strategic plan to do Quality of Work Life and the George Morris model of labor relations was on its way out. While Bluestone was eagerly promoting industrial democracy, GM was restructuring its Organizational Research and Development (OD) department. In 1971, the corporation hired Dr. Stephen H. Fuller, a professor of union-management relations in the Harvard Business School to create a whole new approach to the union. For GM, the New Deal industrial relations model from the 1930s through the 1970s had run its course. The IR system was perpetuating mistrust within both the management structure and in its relationship with UAW. More importantly, the dysfunction of the existing system was reflected in corporate losses. Fuller was brought in on ten-year contract to come in and completely restructure industrial relations at the Corporation. Fuller formed the 31 Barnaby J. Feder, "Others Learn in Failure of Worker Democracy," The New York Times, 21 February 1998,D1,D3. 32 Dick Danjin Interview, February 15, 2006. 33 Dick Danjin Interview, August 10,2005.

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Personnel Administration and Development (PAD) staff. Under PAD, there were industrial relations, the OD department and the Education and Training department. Delmar "Dutch" Landen, out of Wayne State University directed the OD staff that was comprised of sociologists and psychologists. General Motors had long considered psychological characteristics when selecting management counterparts for union officials. They had psychiatrists and handwriting analysts to help them determine personality traits of top UAW officers. The idea was to pair the management personnel with union officers to make "a complete whole" who could function as a competent organizational individual within the long-term strategic ideal.

Alfred Warren's career

in management was a product of GM's strategic plant to integrate worker participation programs into corporate labor relations. In 1973, Warren was brought onto Fuller's staff as director of personnel development. He was not brought on staff to promote industrial democracy. 1973 was the same year Bluestone negotiated the first Quality of Work Life agreement with Morris. The agreement became a model for just about all others signed since. However, the problem with QWL, especially in its early stages was that there was no standard program or universal approach to "Quality of Work Life" programs. Members of both the UAW leadership and GM management could not agree on exactly what Quality of Work Life meant even though QWL was included in the 1973 GM-UAW National Agreement: In discussions prior to the opening of the current negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, General Motors Corp. and the UAW 34 John Simmons and William Mares, Working Together, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983, p. 58-62, Simmons and Mares are consistent with Dick Danjin's account. Dick Danjin Interview, August 10, 2005.

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gave recognition to the desirability of mutual effort to improve the Quality of Work Life for the employees. In consultation with union representatives, certain projects have been undertaken by management in the field of organizational development, involving the participation of represented employees. These and other projects and experiments which may be undertaken in the future are designed to improve the Quality of Work Life, thereby advantage in the worker by making work a more satisfying experience, advantage in the Corporation by leading to a reduction in employee absenteeism and turnover, and advantage in the 35

consumer through improvement in the quality of products manufactured. The document was a general understanding to encourage local management and local unions to cooperate in QWL experiments. The joint labor-management committee, the (National) Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life made its first appearance in this contract provision. As a result of these earlier discussions and the further discussions during the course of the credit negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, the parties have decided that a Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life composed of representatives of the International Union and General Motors will be established at the national level. This committee will need periodically and have the responsibility for:

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, November 19, 1973, Quality of Work LifeNational Committee, Document no. 81, p. 283-285. See Appendix B, Part II.

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1) Reviewing and evaluating programs of the Corporation which involve improving the work environment of employees represented by the UAW 2) Developing experiments and projects in that area. 3) Maintaining records of its meetings, deliberations and all experiments and evaluations it conducts. 4) Making reports to the Corporation and the union on the results of its activities. 5) Arranging for any outside counseling which it feels is necessary or desirable with the expenses thereof to be shared equally by the Corporation and the union. The question was just how to "improve the Quality of Work Life for the employees," and what were these "projects and experiments?" The 1973 QWL letter did not offer a clear definition of precisely what the projects and experiments were, but both sides did agree to remain open to new ideas. The QWL language remained unchanged for the next two subsequent contract cycles in 1976 and 1979. Bluestone saw QWL as a pathway for industrial democracy into the workplace which meant local autonomy in shop floor participation. The union had to be on an equal footing with management. QWL could not be imposed from the top-down, but "must be cooperatively and voluntarily developed and implemented from the bottom up—at the

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, November 19, 1973, Quality of Work LifeNational Committee, p. 283-285. See Appendix B, Part II.

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local union management level."

Although the questions remained; what exactly was

QWL and how was the UAW going to operationalize such a program? Bluestone saw the role of the National Joint Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life as a facilitator to assist and advise local management and union shop committees to set up were a participation programs in problem-solving and workplace decisions. He was careful to draw a sharp distinction between adversarial collective bargaining issues and issues subject to labor-management cooperation. In the summer of 1979, Bluestone laid out the guiding principles for UAW involvement in Quality of Work Life programs at the conference on "Critical Economic and Work Force Issues Facing Western Nations" in Washington D.C.: •

There must be no increase in production standard as a result of quality of the work life program—an assurance against speed up.

•

There must be no loss of jobs as a result of the program—an assurance of job security.

•

The provisions of the national agreement and of the local agreements and practices remained inviolable.

•

The program will be voluntary. No worker will be compelled to participate.

•

The union representatives will be involved in all aspects of the program—sharing with management equally in the development and implementation of the program.

Irving Bluestone, Conference Papers: "How Quality of Work Life Projects Work for the United Auto Workers," Monthly Labor Review, July 1980, p. 40.

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•

Either party may cancel the program anytime—an assurance 38

against either being tied to a project in which it has lost faith. Bluestone's understanding of quality work life was limited by his lack of direct involvement with particular programs as they were implemented in local plants. He reiterated the need for a normal collective bargaining relationship with management because a "Quality of Work Life program" could not solve all the plant problems. Bluestone was careful to make the distinction between the role of the QWL committees and the local shop committee. The QWL committee was to be based on mutual respect and cooperation, whereas the local bargaining committee remained an adversarial entity that handled grievances and legally defined bargaining issues of such as wages and working conditions. Even in 1980, Bluestone was unable to concisely define QWL. He didn't explain what "it" was. The elusive concept of industrial democracy on shop floor was no closer to being realized through QWL. Regardless of the degree of mutual respect and cooperation, QWL could not solve the plant problems because the control of the physical plant remained at the exclusive domain of management. Bluestone's enthusiasm for labor-management cooperation was in contrast to GM's vision for QWL. GM's plan was on an altogether different trajectory. GM's move toward QWL was stimulated by Japanese competition and the increasingly unstable workforce rather than management's impulse to improve workers' "work life." The 1979 GM-UAW contract gains arrived just as American carmakers were being hammered by a poor economy and the loss of market share. In 1980, the ink was barely dry on that agreement when GM pled poverty to get the workers to give up 38 Irving Bluestone, Conference Papers: "How Quality of Work Life Projects Work for the United Auto Workers," Monthly Labor Review, July 1980, p. 40.

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the gains of the 1979 agreement. The concessionary bargaining in the early 1980s accelerated experimentation with Quality of Work Life programs. On September 1st 1980, Al Warren was promoted to Vice President in charge of industrial relations. His 39

enthusiasm for worker participation programs was a key factor for his promotion.

With

Morris finally out, Al Warren intensified employee participation projects. In the 1970s and 1980s UAW-GM experiments with Quality Work Life (QWL) and other human resources initiatives were introduced to the collective bargaining process. Some experiments produced positive results while others caused great deal of hostility. Whether the labor-management participation programs were embraced or rejected by workers, the cooperative initiatives changed the philosophical orientation of the union itself.

GM asserted that the QWL processes were intended to humanize the

factory floor, promote employee input to work environment decisions and most important, improve consumer satisfaction and product quality.

GM promoted QWL as

a cultural system conceived to improve worker satisfaction and team-based problem solving. However, the workers on the shop floor remained skeptical because neither the company nor the union had a precise program in mind.

Ed Stein, "Industrial Democracy: Workers Help Shape Their Jobs," Flint Journal except article from Los Angeles Times, November 27, p. Jl & J12. 40 Labor Contract, Local Agreement "Home of the Living Agreement", Bay City Powertrain Bay City Plant General Motors Corp. and Local No. 362 UAW, May 14, 1986, p. 2-1 to 2-2, The UAW's Cooperative philosophy was summed up in this policy statement, " we are committed to creating a plan environment were all people: Support working together, employee involvement, and joint process. Recognize mat employees need to be properly trained and informed to help them achieve their full potential. Walk like they talk, are consistent, truthful, and accept responsibility for their actions. Are willing to listen and treat each other with respect. Take risks, are proactive, and utilize problem solving techniques. Engaging continuous improvement in all aspects of our business. 41 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, November 19, 1973, Quality of Work Life-National Committee, p. 283.

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In the 1970s General Motors settled on a standard concept for implementing QWL processes by adopting copyrighted material called Employee Participation Groups (EPG). EPG was based on work teams that focused on improving efficiency of production by encouraging group cohesiveness, a sense of internal and external competitiveness and loyalty to the company. The EPG program was implemented by the OD department like almost everything else in General Motors. It was designed as an elaborate organizational structure and process. Corporate control seemed to be what was most important. The Corporation sold the program to Don Ephlin who in turn agreed to encourage its implementation on the factory floor. In the early days QWL programs were not universally implemented throughout the corporation and EPG was not the only QWL model. Some local unions went along with the EPG corporate standard, but other locals crafted their own programs.

One notable example of the corporate standard took place

in 1980 at the Buick manufacturing complex in Flint, Michigan. The Buick experiment stood in contrast to the QWL process that developed at the Chevrolet Gear and Axle. Both QWL programs were implemented at the same time, but were vastly different. The QWL was first implemented at Buick on a large-scale when GM decided to close the Buick foundry and transform the building into a new manufacturing facility. The impending loss of jobs caused UAW Local 599 President Al Christner to try something new to attract new work to the Buick site. Local 599 already had some experience with labor-management participation dating back to the 1976 local contract negotiations. During those negotiations the union and management agreed to a common

Dick Danjin Interview, January 31,2006.

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goal of bringing new work to the Buick site.

Christner looked to the example of the

Tarrytown NY experiment in labor-management cooperation as an example of a successful turnaround during a period of massive job loss in plant closings. The Tarrytown plant and the Buick complex in Flint shared similar problems of difficult relations with management. They shared a reputation of poor production records, absenteeism, labor conflict, numerous grievances, high operating costs and labor relations characterized by distrust and fear. The Quality of Work Life program was credited for turning the plant around, making it one of GM's better operated facilities. The Tarrytown plant originally scheduled to close in 1970 lasted until 1996.

The renovation of the old

Buick foundry into "Factory 81" became GM's "Granddaddy Team Plant" where they union and management alike encouraged closer relations between the workers and the bosses. GM built the new torque converter manufacturing facility within the shell of the old Buick Foundry building. The new plant was intended as a showplace of the QWL philosophy. In a GM public relations brochure N.B. Gonzales, Factory 81 Plan Manager, praised the new industrial relations program: At Buick, we believe that the potential of the human resource in the workplace has been virtually untapped and the programs such as the one in Factory 81 will be tremendously important to our viability. The approach,

43 Joseph B. Espo, "Buick Trying New Approach to Auto Work," Flint Journal, April2, 1981, p. Al & A5. 44 Edward Hudson, "The Auto Plant That Could," New York Times December 23, 1979, p. F-12, In 1970, Robert H. Guest, professor of organizational behavior of the Dartmouth College Amos Tuck School of Business Administration said the North Tarrytown NY Plant "had one of the poorest labor relations and production records in GM." 45 Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter, Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team Concept, (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1988), P. 192.

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which we have adopted, is to attempt to balance the company's needs for survival and growth with the employees' needs to be utilized as human beings. With this approach, Buick's senior management believes that the system operating in Factory 81 could well become a model not only for Buick, but for the entire auto industry. GM appeared to be willing to completely rethink its manufacturing philosophy. The workers were divided into "work units" of eight to fourteen employees, which operate as individual businesses. Traditional classifications were eliminated in favor of "pay for knowledge." Quality was supposedly valued above quantity. For example, in the past when a bad part was spotted in the production process, the line continued, and repairs were made later. The new concept allowed everyone on the line the ability to stop the line for quality concerns. The multiple job classifications were reduced to a single classification called "quality operator." Pay for knowledge encouraged everyone to achieve maximum pay rate by learning all the jobs in two work units. This generally resulted in higher pay than in a traditional plant because there was less differentiation between skill levels. The authority of the foreman was transferred to work unit teams. The unit teams elected a fellow worker as "coordinator" or "team leader" to facilitate assigning work, resolve problems and evaluate the level of individual performance. Foremen were henceforth called advisors and time clocks were removed.

Antagonistic,

"old school" foremen either transferred out or were given assignments that minimized their involvement with hourly employees. The whole operation was supposed to be 46 Buick Public Relations brochure, Buick Factory 81, Public Relations department, Buick Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, Flint, Michigan, 1981, 9. 47 Buick Public Relations brochure, Buick Factory 81, Public Relations department, Buick Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, Flint, Michigan, 1981,2.

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voluntary for hourly employees. Those who refused to work under the new program transferred to other plants. Others who opted in were supposedly protected from being reduced out in the event of layoffs. Participants and observers at Factory 81 were enthusiastic about the new program, but it didn't take long for attitudes to resort back to familiar confrontational behavior. Al Christner appointed Bob Roth, with a reputation as a contentious committeeman to sitewide QWL coordinator. Roth quickly became a believer in the cooperative labor relations system. Roth echoed N.B. Gonzales's views of the QWL program at the 1981 GM Executive QWL conference, "We don't think of what's in it for the union, or for each individual, or for Buick or GM, we think of it as one united group of management 48

and workers accepting the challenge."

Later that year Buick management and the

UAW jointly hosted a QWL seminar from outside business, government agencies and other GM facilities. The organizers said participation indicated the strong interest in finding creative methods of involving employees in the work place, to provide dignity on 49

the job and to develop a more effective work environment.

For Al Christener the QWL

program spelled success because the Buick was getting more work while absenteeism and grievances fell and the quality of the product rose.

For Bob Roth the QWL program

became a new career path within the emergent system of labor-management cooperation. He was among the first of a burgeoning class of appointed UAW representatives to the new joint-organizational bureaucracy. As the Factory 81 came fully on line, the promise 48 Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter, Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team Concept, (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1988), 192. Bob Roth Interview October 6, 1999. 49 Unauthored, "150 Outsiders Study "Quality of Work Life" Plans," The Flint Journal, 3 October 1981. Ronald Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint, Michigan (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987), P. 227. Albert Christner, "Buick Labor History Project: Interview" Number Four, September 21, 1999.

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of QWL gave way to the reality of the GM factory system. The corporate architects who created the Factory 81 concept moved on to new positions. They were replaced by management personnel who remained hostile to the union.

As time passed, the Factory

81 system reverted back to old factory system with a new title. When production quotas conflicted with the quality philosophy GM management 52

routinely reneged on the promises of QWL teamwork.

Foremen arbitrarily disregarded

the quality agreement that allowed production workers to shut off the line when bad parts were being produced. Poor car sales contributed to the problems by causing layoffs across the Buick site. Factory 81 job security guarantees in the local agreement were scrapped as production cutbacks spread across the site. The layoffs resulted in senioritydriven displacement of quality operators in Factory 81. For example, Michele Sullivan was an eleven and a half year seniority employee when she was laid off from Factory 81. She expressed her anger and frustration toward the union and the company for breaking their promise of "protected employment" to the workers in Factory 81. Ms. Sullivan had given up a good job in another plant to come to Factory 81 for the promise of job security and better wages. "The head honcho, says, you've done a fine job for at least five years. Now get out and don't come back! Basically, and I just went nuts, because I bought into that plant. I didn't get shipped down. I didn't get reduced in. I gave up a super job for 53

more money."

The guarantee of job security, quality operations and teamwork proved

Bob Roth Interview October, 6 1999. 52 Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter, Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team Concept, (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1988), P. 195. Bob Roth explained how the reintroduction of traditional foremen and superintendents into the plant destroyed the "the new concept." When asked: what was management's motivation for starting Factory 81? "They were hoping to improve productivity, up time on the machines, quality, cost and schedule. So they seized on QWL." 53 Josie Kearns, Life After the Line, (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1990), 56. During the

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to be inconsequential when they conflicted with union seniority rights and GM's prerogative to have exclusive control of production. The events indicated that once GM achieved its production objectives the fascination with QWL was over. Many workers felt betrayed by management's Quality of Work Life promises in Factory 81. The training was all but abandoned because management wouldn't allow workers to the time away from production. Roth explained that the return of antagonistic management into the plant destroyed the team concept. The production schedule again determined the structure of work, as it always did in any GM plant. Workers reacted to management's hostility in typical fashion. "As far as Factory 81, though it isn't any different from a traditional plant. The money is the only good thing about it."

The

workers lost faith in the team concept in Factory 81. The higher rate of pay seemed to be the only thing that the rank-and-file found appealing about QWL. The implementation of QWL in Factory 81 revealed institutional resistance to labor-management cooperation. Management was reluctant to surrender authority to workers and workers were reluctant to concede well-established work rules. Quality of Work Life programs provoked insurgency on the shop floor and in union halls across the country because of the coercive nature of the teams and pay for knowledge schemes. In the early 1980s, the International Union dispatched "QWL experts" investigate the problems at various GM local unions. There was one site GM system that had extraordinary success with the QWL program. The Chevrolet Gear and Axle facility in Detroit, Michigan was running 192 quality circles with about 2000 people Interview, Michele Sullivan repeated her indignation for the fact that she volunteered for Factory 81 in order to reduce mandatory overtime and for the promise better job security. 54 Bob Roth Interview October, 6 1999. Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter, Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team Concept, (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1988), 195.

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meeting weekly. First time quality was up, scrap was reduced, and overall plant productivity soared at the Gear. The record at the gear stood in stark contrast with the reputation that QWL was getting in other GM facilities. Corporate industrial relations was wondering why it was working at the gear and not elsewhere? EPC system was getting a lot of attention from outside the corporation as well. The architect of the Gear's QWL system was Dick Danjin. With Ephlin's blessing, GM industrial relations turned to Danjin to do damage control at the troubled sites. Buick UAW Local 599 was one of the local unions that Danjin visited. It was serendipity that Danjin traveled to Flint where he met Dave Yettaw for the first time. They and became friends immediately. The collaboration that evolved into a lifelong friendship. After Danjin became more involved in labor-management programs and it became an international representative, he was in a position to provide Yettaw with insight into how joint programs worked and the politics of the international Union. Dick Danjin entered factory life in similar circumstances as Dave Yettaw, but their journey in the union led them on diverging and sometimes opposing paths. Born in Detroit inl935, Danjin attended the East Detroit high school. His interest in the union was not inspired at home. The union found him after he entered the factory. Factory work came natural in Detroit. Danjin entered the U.S. Marine Corp in 1954 for a fouryear hitch. He returned home and in 1958 enrolled in Detroit Junior College. Danjin was trying to figure out what he wanted to do with his life when he got married for the first time. He aspired to be a lawyer, but marriage change all that. He did stints as a bank teller at Detroit Bank & Trust, a manager at a local super market and a local job shop. In

Dick Danjin Interview, June 12, 2005.

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1963, Danjin left the job shop to work at the Chevrolet Gear and Axle because the pay was better. Beginning in 1968, coworkers at the Gear encouraged him to run for committeeman, but he refused. Danjin's union career began in 1970 when long standing committeeman, Bill Brown convinced him to run as alternate committeeman. Danjin didn't know anything about the UAW or the contract, but agreed to run if Brown would train him in the grievance procedure. Brown was threatened by all the favorable attention Danjin was getting from the membership, so the ploy was to neutralize the opposition. The alternate committeeman functioned as the grievance handler when the committeeman was absent. Once they were elected Brown ignored him. The first time he functioned as committeeman, it was a set up to make him look incompetent. That's when he learned that the union and management structures at the time were dominated by members of the Masonic lodge. The Masonic Order was a shadow organization that operated within the union and management The Order was determined to ensure that the "free and accepted" lodge brothers would succeed and the "profane" non-members would not. So Danjin ran the Masonic gauntlet, a test that forced him to learn the union job by doing it. He studied the contracts and got involved in caucus politics. He was elected to all of the union standing committees, elected convention delegate a couple times and unseated Brown as vice-president of the local political caucus. Danjin went on to be elected to the shop committee and reelected four times. In 1981, when the QWL programs started hitting the plants, Shop Chairman, George Robertson appointed Danjin as QWL coordinator.

Dick Danjin Interview, March 10, 2010.

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QWL was introduced to the Chevrolet Gear and Axle in the late 1970s while Danjin was a UAW shop committeemen at the site. He agreed to become QWL coordinator at the Gear because the personnel department was implementing the program without the input of the workers. In the beginning, Gear and Axle labor relations presented QWL as a typical management-driven program, "they did all the right things 57

for the wrong reasons."

GM used QWL as a strategy to extract concessions from the

UAW while undermining the union's role on the shop floor. Management dominated employee participation programs rather than asking workers what was needed to make their job easier. Management had it wrong. They were asking workers to do the impossible. They couldn't improve their work lives or self-actualize the existence on the shop floor without the authority to control their environment. It was outside the workers' field of discretion. Workers were cogs within a factory system that was controlled entirely by management, a fact that was codified in the national contract since 1940. It was management's exclusive right "to maintain discipline and efficiency of employees," and "the products to be manufactured, the location of plants, the schedules of production, the methods, processes and means of manufacturing are solely and exclusively 58

responsibility of the corporation."

Organizations are structured to get things done and

management controls the resources required to make the system work. When viewed from the perspective of the worker; the purpose of management is to create and operationalize an organizational structure to control and distribute resources so that workers perform their tasks with the least resistance. Workers' role in the system is to 57 Dick Danjin Interview, February 15,2006, 58 Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAW-CIO, June 24, 1940, Recognition, Paragraph 3(c), p. 6. Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAW-AFL/CIO, September 26, 2007, Recognition, Paragraph 8, p. 13. See Appendix B, Part I.

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perform their tasks within a defined field of discretion, hopefully in a safe workplace in a manner that does not require a worker to expend any physical or mental energy fighting 59

the system to do their job. The Chevrolet Gear and Axle QWL program had little in common with factory 81. The local union representatives balked at the idea of pay for knowledge schemes, employee involvement, self-actualization, self-fulfillment on the job, or any other elaborate team arrangements. Management on the other hand wanted the organizational structure that was presented in EPG. The Gear and Axle was different than the Buick because Chevrolet comprised of sixty-four percent of General Motors whole business at the time. Chevrolet was the "engine of General Motors" and from an industrial relations prospective very conservative.

That was part of George Morris's legacy.

The essence of QWL at the Chevrolet Gear and Axle was presented in John Simons and William Mares employee involvement study published in 1982 titled, Working Together from the institutional prospective of General Motors. For Simons and Mares, QWL represented "the New Industrial Relations," a concept that fostered trust and cooperation instead of adversarial labor relations.

Missing from the study was the

inter- and intra-organizational conflicts between the primary actors GM and the UAW. There was a lack of consensus how to proceed with QWL. At the corporate level there was institutional reluctance to QWL until the departure of George Morris. During the 1970s the main obstacle to QWL at the Gear was the local shop committee chairman, Moses Green's refusal to participate. The situation changed after Green was defeated in 59 Dick Danjin, "Making Things Run Well: A paradigm shift: use the perspective of the worker and the result will be...," Journal For Quality And Participation, (March 1993), 40-44. Dick Danjin Interview, August 10,2005. John Simons and William Mares, Working Together, (New York: Knopf, 1982), p. 51.

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the shop committee elections by George Robinson. When Robinson took over as shop chairman management renewed the push for a Q WL program. In 1979 Quality of Work Life was discussed during local contract negotiations. At some point in the negotiations an unfamiliar face showed up at the bargaining table. Dick Danjin, who was on the shop committee at the time wanted to know "who this guy was and what exactly his role was at the Gear?" It was Jacques Pasquier. The personnel department at the Chevrolet Gear and Axle hired Pasquier in 1973 to coordinate QWL programs. Pasquier was a former Jesuit priest whose path to the OD department at the Gear ran through the OD department in Pontiac where his wife worked. Danjin bristled at Pasquier's presence because he knew nothing about Chevrolet Gear and Axle yet was on the shop floor setting employee participation groups. Soon afterward the plant manager at the "Gear," Ray McGarry announced during the 1979 negotiations that an agreement on QWL was reached. Management set about implementing a worker participation program based in EPG. The GM cultural expression of EPG was typified by its top-down approach to personnel management and so was the first incursion of QWL of at the Gear. The paradox of management domination of the QWL program was not lost on the local shop committee. Management's rollout of QWL engineered by Pasquier stalled soon after it began. Management's first foray into QWL at the Gear involved orientation sessions about absenteeism. A flyer was distributed on the floor about absenteeism and it appeared that Pasquier was behind it. Danjin strongly objected: ".. .that is not what this is about, absentee control. This is about making work easier to do. I know they don't teach you that at Harvard. When you tell management to make work easy they think someone is preaching

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Marxism. Work is not easy—work should be hard. Work should be like water it should follow the path of the least resistance. No expended energies fighting the system to do your job. That's what this is about. It's about making work easier for people. Pasquier appeared to be running things. Danjin wanted to know who had put him in charge. He would not tolerate Pasquier conducting meetings with workers on the floor by himself. Quality of Work Life is jointness right? We're supposed to be working together. And Jacques says we are, but no one is working with this guy. He needs to have a partner. Someone needs to be working with him as a full and equal partner that's my understanding of the literature I've read. Everything has to be done jointly. So management and the shop chairman paired Danjin with Pasquier as QWL coordinators for the Gear. As far as Danjin was concerned any QWL program in his plant was going to be designed to make were easier for the rank-and-file. The QWL programs at the Gear were not the elaborate structure described by Simons and Mares. They described worker "quality circles" (QC) participation meetings that began with the first line supervisor distributing the agenda in facilitating the meeting. Under that formula there were six categories; purpose of the meeting, brainstorming, evaluations, decisions, action plan and re-evaluation. Pasquier tried to implement the EPG program preferred by GM, but when the shop committee found out about it, the local union put an end to it. Then Danjin sat down with management to jointly design the Dick Danjin Interview, August 10, 2005. Dick Danjin Interview, August 10, 2005.

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"Employee Participation Circles" (EPC) model that did not include brainstorming or problem solving. Under EPC brainstorming was not allowed.

The workers that were

involved in QCs merely identified the problems that made their jobs more difficult and offer solutions. It was up to management to solve the problems. It was management's role to control the schedules of production, the methods, processes and means of manufacturing.

Only management had the means to affect change in the factories.

Danjin observed early on in the development of QWL that workers couldn't solve problems if they didn't have the appropriate authority to influence their work environment. "In any administrative bureaucracy you cannot solve a problem unless you are allocated legitimate institutional power. And management was not going to give any legitimate institutional power to some "Harry Hubcap" running a machine to say throw this out and buy a new one."

GM wasn't prepared to surrender that kind of control, so

the shop committee at the Gear and Axle refused participate in "problem-solving groups" as the company defined them. The Gear and Axle was an example where the workers and management jointly developed the Quality of Work Life program. The resulting EPC process that forced management to be accountable for the production process. The focus of EPC was on making work easier to do. The shop committee insisted on doing EPC as a structured process in which workers could communicate their needs to management so that management could solve the problems. The shop committee defined a simple structure for the EPC groups. First, 64 Dick Danjin Interview January 31, 2006. Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAW-CIO, June 24, 1940, Recognition, Paragraph 3(c), p. 6. Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAW-AFL/CIO, September 26, 2007, Recognition, Paragraph 8, p. 13. See Appendix B, Part I. Dick Danjin Interview, August 10,2005.

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they did not want the groups controlling organizational resources. Second, it was mandatory for the foreman to be a member of EPC but could never facilitate a group, nor could they excuse themselves from the meetings. EPC groups were meetings of peers. There was no official facilitator. The facilitator's role was rotated around the members of the group every 30 days. If a natural leader rose from the ranks and no one else wanted it, that was okay, but every 30 days the group had to reconfirm who the facilitator would be. The date and time for the scheduled meeting was chosen by the group. The agenda for the meeting followed an EPC form that was developed to identify and document problems on the shop floor. The EPC form was simply a piece of paper that listed 1) problem, 2) cause, 3) solution and then, 4) who? The facilitator opened the meeting by asking, who has a problem? If someone says yes, the facilitator would ask, what caused it? The group would discuss the problem and reach of consensus on the cause of the problem. Everyone would have to agree before they would move on to discussing a possible solution. The group would then discuss potential solutions. Everyone would have to agree on a solution to the cause of the problem before moving on. The final step was to identify who in the system can best deal with the solution. Once the group identified who in the system could affect a solution, it was the foreman's role to carry the EPC form into the system to seek a solution. For example, there might be a problem with parts that were milled on a machine recently had its cutting bits changed. Afterwards, the machine produced a lot of scrap parts. The EPC identified the replacement bits as the cause of the problem. They agreed the solution to the problem was to go back to the old cutting bits. The "who" in this instance might be the one person in the purchasing department who could say "yes or no" to buying the old-style cutting bits. That might be

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the superintendent over purchasing. When he got the EPC form he could say "yes, we will purchase the old-style bits," or "no," and was required to explain why not. Either way, whoever was responsible within the GM bureaucracy was held directly accountable. Workers did not encroach upon management's prerogative to control the business. After the meeting the workers returned to their jobs on the shop floor leaving the problem solving up to management. The Buick and Chevrolet Gear and Axle projects illustrate the variations in QWL programs within General Motors. Local management and the union representatives determined the scope and content of individual programs. The early 1980s of labormanagement cooperation at GM the union leadership had a choice to implement the corporate EPG plan for QWL as was illustrated in factory 81 or the local union could influence the process as they did and Chevrolet Gear and Axle. The Buick Factory 81 experience was consistent with General Motors corporate culture. It relied on additional layers of bureaucracy that depended on meetings, meetings—and more meetings. EPG established class separation between workers; team leaders, operators, etc. Some got clipboards and offices , while the rest got more tasks added to their job assignments. On the other hand, the EPC program at the Chevrolet Gear and Axle bypassed several layers of bureaucracy. Workers indentified the obstacles to performing their assigned tasks. The most important difference was that not class differentiation was established on the shop floor. There was no EPC on the shop floor—it ceased to exist the moment everyone left the EPC conference rooms. There were no "team leaders" or "clipboarders on the shop floor. The EPC system placed the responsibility on management to either fix a problem or not. From the perspective of the GM bureaucracy it was:

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anarchy in the workplace. It totally goes around bureaucracy. It doesn't require teamwork or employee involvement. The foremen's only real role there was to bring his perspective as to what caused the problem and his only physical roll there was to carry of piece of paper into the system.

For all the stuff you can read about employee involvement, selfactualization, self-fulfillment on the job, it's all hubris. Nobody was born wanting to work in a factory. They go there for the money. There is no self-actualization. There is no self-fulfillment or all that jazz about intrinsic motivation...

Well, if the workers care about their jobs and want their jobs to persist over time then management will manage won't they? Then management will have the sole aim in their company to dominate the world market in the product they produce thereby providing long-term job security not only for the current generation of workers, but for their offspring and their offspring's offspring. And then everybody goes home knowing that the • i_ •

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job is secure. In either case, management always had the final word. GM's unwillingness to relax the management's rights provision enshrined in the national agreement made all the lofty promises about employee involvement and cooperation impossible. Dick Danjin Interview, August 10, 2005.

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The bargaining structure in the auto industry was turned on its head in subsequent bargaining cycles. The emphasis on labor-management cooperation shifted from "making work a more satisfying experience" for individual workers to improving GM's product quality, corporate competitiveness and shaping employee behavior. Labormanagement cooperation was supposed to be a "win-win strategy" that would help GM to compete more effectively in the marketplace, thus securing jobs for UAW members. Joint activities eventually overshadowed the core provisions of the traditional collective bargaining agreements. Local bargaining committees were marginalized by the expanding joint labor-management and bureaucracy. Joint labor-management committees became the basis for an emergent totalitarian system. The power that once flowed from democratic union structures was appropriated by joint labor-management structures. In the 1980s, GM experimented extensively with team based or joint processes in plants such as Hamtramck, Lake Orion, NUMMI, Saturn and Buick City. The team based approach presented GM with a strategy to compete with the Japanese and ensure labor peace by promising employee input while at the same time containing workplace militancy. The union philosophy that called for "taking labor out of competition" was reversed. The system of defined job classifications, seniority-based rights that determined which workers received transfers, promotions, shift-preferences was disappearing. The emergent system sought to create open-ended "living agreements," implement "pay for knowledge" schemes and eliminate classifications.

Whipsawing,

Labor Contract, Local Agreement "Home of the Living Agreement", Bay City Powertrain Bay City Plant General Motors Corp. and Local No. 362 UAW, May 14, 1986, p. 2-1 to 2-2, Labor Contract, Local Agreement between GM Powertrain, Flint Engine South Plant and UAW Local 659, February 24, 1987, p. 4, "Memorandum of Understanding-Living Agreement, "As full partners in the business, we are dedicated

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the practice of pitting one work unit against another became a matter of policy rather than something to be avoided. The UAW Inc. model blurred the traditional line between union and management as appointed union representatives increasingly performed tasks that were traditionally the exclusive province of management. GM used QWL programs to gain a short-term advantage over the workforce rather than foster the long-termed potential for improving manufacturing and product quality. The GM's foray into QWL had a more significant pay off in terms of labor relations. After the UAW agreed to concessions in 1982, GM withdrew financial support for QWL programs. As a result, many QWL programs collapsed for lack of resources. Though many of the early QWL programs were inconsistent and poorly conceived, the UAW and GM proceeded with the development of the next generation of labormanagement committees. Subsequent joint programs blossomed into a joint unionmanagement organizational bureaucracy that rivaled the UAW bureaucracy in size and authority. The new bureaucratic structure was a pillar of the UAW Inc. model. It provided an organizational form to the practical function of increasing the GM's productivity and control over the workplace. Regardless of how many new programs were introduced, the grind of the production line remained the same. Auto work to achieving in maintaining significant competitive advantages over the entire industry relative to safety, quality, responsiveness, and cost. We have benchmarked not only where we are relative to our competitors, but also where we need to be in the coming years. It is no longer sufficient to simply need our competition, we must become the benchmark producer and remain in the Vanguard. Labor Contract, Local Agreement between Local 652 UAW and General Motors North American Car Group-Lansing Grand River Assembly Plant Complex, September 29, 1999, Introduction, "We will continue to work in the spirit of a living agreement to enable both parties to enhance the foundation of our goal-job security." Labor Contract, Local Agreement between Powertrain Flint North and Local 599 UAW, October 7,2003, Supplement to Local Seniority Agreement, Factory 81 Torque Converter, p. 85 to 87 Pay for Knowledge Workgroups, Level III, "Each Work Unit will identify tasks that would be deemed as sufficient number for in employee to be a flexible team member." Labor Contract, Local Agreement between BOC-Flint (Buick City) General Motors Corp. and Local 599 UAW, November 22, 1987, p. 107 to 110. Wage Agreement, Rate Progression, Variable Assignment classifications in the material control department will be based on the minimum rate established for the classifications in operations according to jobs learned that varyfrom2 jobs, 5 jobs and 8 jobs.

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remained what it was, factory work, the repetitive jobs they had always been. The growth of joint programs did nothing to change the nature of the work, but did signal a change in UAW ideals.

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UAW INCORPORATED: THE TRIUMPH OF CAPITAL VOLUME II By Thomas F. Adams

A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY History 2010

Chapter 6 Human Resources Incorporated The sagging economy and the conservative political shift in Washington was fertile terrain for the transformation of the UAW. Thanks to the "Reagan Revolution," employers no longer needed to be concerned with troublesome unions, work rules, environmental laws, industrial taxes or high wages. Reagan's fiscal policies encouraged American manufacturers to abandon traditional industrial areas, shift production overseas or disinvest from the core industry. The Reagan administration made good on promises to "get the government off the backs of business" by reforming the tax code and appointing conservatives to the federal courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). There were immediate advantages for business. With the help of tax breaks and weakened labor laws US Steel in Pittsburg was able to dispense with its unionized workers and get a hefty Federal subsidy to finance disinvestment from the steel industry. When the company announced plans to close fourteen mills in Ohio and Pennsylvania and lay off over 13,000 workers, the federal government stepped in and awarded US Steel with an $ 850 million tax break to save the troubled company. Instead of investing the capital into upgrading its steel mills, US Steel became a quasi-oil company. In 1982, US Steel used the federal money as a down payment to purchase Marathon Oil. By 1984, eighty percent of US Steel's capital was diverted to oil development. The auto industry, used the opportunity to divest its union workforce. Between 1979 and 1983, the UAW membership dropped from 1,523,858 to 1,057,376.

Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization ofAmerica: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry, (New York: Basic Books 1982), p. 4. Mike Davis, Prisoner of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the Working Class, (Thetford:

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Organized labor's inability to counter the Reagan Revolution was the undoing of New Deal industrial relations system. Union members unwittingly contributed to their own downfall by supporting Reagan for president. After assuming office he rewarded them by undermining organized labor's legal standing. A turning point came in 1981 as Reagan fired all the members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Union (PATCO) after they engaged in a labor strike. The union was summarily decertified. The brutal treatment of PATCO has since become an enduring symbol of the powerlessness of organized labor. To emphasize that militant labor action would not be tolerated, Reagan appointed to the chair of the NLRB, Donald Dotson, an outspoken opponent of unions and collective bargaining rights. Labor's retreat was immediately reflected in the dramatic decline in labor strikes. Strike actions numbered 235 in 1979,145 in 1981 and dropped to 81 in 1983. By 1999 the Department of Labor recorded only 17 strikes. Since PATCO, organized labor has been in retreat. Business heard Reagan's message as well. During the Reagan years, state regulation of business was relaxed, unenforced or repealed altogether. Companies increasingly interfered with organizing drives, ignored collective bargaining rights and pushed for union decertification. With the government off their backs and the collapse of organized labor complete, corporate profits soared. Deindustrialization was an intermediary step in the restructuring of the technical and political landscape in the modern industrial economy. The new production processes consisted of a centrally controlled network of small firms that employed non-union, low

The Thetford Press 1986), p. 241. i / Membership 1936-2002," p. 19.

Constitutional Report UAW June, 2002, "Average Dues Paying

2 Melvyn Dubofsky, The State ofLabor in Modern America, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Pressl994), xiii. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2000 (120th edition.) Washington, DC, .2000, Table No.711, p.444.

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waged and often temporary workers. Workers in this system were compelled into a continuing cycle of competition and cost cutting. Auto workers were especially vulnerable to corporate restructuring. The factories that survived the restructuring process operated with far fewer workers. Other plants simply closed. Overseas manufacturing capacity provided automakers with the leverage they needed to lower costs and flexibility. The corporation extended the hand of labor-management cooperation to the UAW while simultaneously waging war on the union in its new plants. GM's "Southern Strategy" was an effort to open nonunion plants in "right to work" states where the union shop was outlawed. In 1981, UAW President, Douglas Fraser announced a "call to arms" in a letter that he presented to the Business Roundtable. Fraser blasted the American automakers' plans to abandon unionized urban centers and to move to areas where they could "keep workers from choosing democratically to be represented by unions." He had an explicit message for GM: General Motors Corporation is a specific case in point. GM, the largest manufacturing corporation in the world, has received responsibility, productivity and cooperation from the UAW and its members. In return, GM has given us the Southern Strategy designed to set up as a non-union network that threatens the hard-fought gains won by the UAW. My message should be very clear: if corporations like General Motors want confrontation, they cannot expect cooperation in return from labor.

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I cannot assure you that we will be successful in making new alliances and forming new coalitions to help our nation find its way. But I can assure 3

that we will try. In February of 1981 American carmakers built 325,000 units, a thirty-two percent decline in domestic production. It was the lowest monthly production total since 1948. There were 441,282 UAW members still working at GM, but 140,000 were on layoff.

The

threat of plant closings and outsourcing was enough incentive for the UAW to change its posture with management. One year later the UAW agreed to reopen the national agreement in their quest for organizational security and corporate profits. The UAW broke with its long held tradition to remove labor from competition by embracing a philosophy that linked job security to competitiveness.

Corporate labor relations

stressed the virtues of teamwork, jointness and "just-in-time" manufacturing. The assault on the UAW received a boost from political changes in the federal government. The Milwaukee Spring Corp. vs. UA W was an important ruling that affected the UAW's relationship with the automakers. The case turned on the issue of concessions. When the UAW refused to grant concessions to Milwaukee Spring, the company tried to move the work to a nonunion plant. The Carter NLRB ruled that an Anonymous, "Developments in Industrial Relations," Monthly Labor Review, May 1982, Volume 105, Number 5, p. 59. 4 Douglas Fraser, to Business Round Table, 1981, 2-5. Mike Davis, Prisoner of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the Working Class, (Thetford: The Thetford Press 1986), 176. An alliance of the largest corporations organized the Business Roundtable in 1981. The emergence of the Roundtable was part of an explosion in non-profit Political Action Committees (PACs) that were organized between 1974 and 1981. See Appendix G, Table 1. Sol Dollinger, Not Automatic: Women and the Left in Forging of the Auto Workers' Union, (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2000), Dollinger quoted Walter Reuther at the Eighth UAW Convention in 1943: "We have got to take labor out of competition. We have got to make them (GM) pay the same rate every place in the country where a fellow does the same job." p. 191. 191.

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employer could not relocate production from a unionized plant to a nonunion facility during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. The company appealed the decision to the federal district court which remanded the case back to the newly revamped Reagan NLRB. In 1984 the Board ruled that unless the contract contained explicit language that prohibited relocation, the company could run away from the union contract. In a similar case, the 1984 Otis Elevator the NLRB ruled that the company could move its property whenever it pleased. The Reagan Board found that employers did not need to bargain over plant relocation or closure. As a result of these decisions, labor no longer had a legal mechanism to prevent employers from contracting out work, reopening contracts or demanding concessions. The rulings left nothing standing in the way of GM's strategy to outsource UAW work or demand concessions from the union. When the UAW agreed to reopen the 1979 contract, it marked the first time that the union placed the competitiveness of the employer ahead of the interest of the rank and file. The controversial Quality of Work Life provision was expanded. The 1982 national agreement established three significant structural changes to industrial relations system at General Motors. First, the agreement institutionalized labor-management committees addressing productivity. Second, it formalized joint "problem-solving", joint training and joint administrative structures. These new structures established a mechanism whereby the union would assist management to monitor and apply corrective measures involving its own members. Under this agreement workers began to evaluate their own performance. Finally, the agreement established a funding mechanism to pay for joint

Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Great U-Turn, (New York: Basic Books 1988), 101. Mike Davis, Prisoner of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the Working Class, (Thetford: The Thetford Press 1986), 140

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processes. The new structures were the first expansion of labor-management committees since the National Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life that was established in 1973. According to Document No. 36, "Quality of Work Life-Development and Training": .. .the parties recognized the need for improved communication and better understanding of each other's concerns. Never in our history have we been faced with more important challenges than we are today. In order to meet these challenges, it is necessary for us to adjust to the fundamental changes that have occurred in our industry and their impact on our employees, the union, the stockholders, our customers and the management. The successive our business is predicated on the parties' recognition of the competitive requirements of today's market.

To address this challenge the parties have established three additional organizational structures: The Joint Skill Development and Training Committee will identify and promote training, retraining, and skill development activities.

The Joint Council for Enhancing Job Security and the Competitive Edge at both the national and local levels will improve communication and the exchange of information, and it will provide joint problem solving opportunities concerning issues relating to job security and the competitive edge.

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The Executive Board-Joint Activities will direct in support the two organizational structures and ordered above and the existing National Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life. The new structures were described in the letter, "Joint UAW-GM statement on Job Security and the Competitive Edge in the Marketplace". The letter declared that the UAW and GM shared the "common and inseparable goals" to secure jobs for union members and make GM more competitive in the world marketplace. General Motors and the UAW issued a joint statement that established corporate competitiveness as the most important factor for improving job security. The statement reiterated the commitment to Quality Work Life and defined the responsibilities and functions of the newly established UAW-GM structures that included the Joint Skill Development and Training Committee, National and Local Joint Councils for Enhancing Job Security and the Competitive Edge and the Executive Board-Joint Activities. The joint statement declared that: A Joint Skill Development and Training Committee will be established under the general direction and guidance of the Executive Board-Joint Activities. The objective of the Joint Skill Development and Training Committee is to promote the development and implementation of training, retraining, and skill development activities.

Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, March 21, 1982, Document No. 36, •Quality of Work Life-Development and Training" p. 277-278. See Appendix B, Part IIIA.

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It is agreed that a Council to address this matter will be established at both the local and national level. Such councils will be known as the Joint Council for Enhancing Job Security and the Competitive Edge.

The National Joint Council for Enhancing Job Security and the Competitive Edge will have an equal number of Union and Corporate members to be appointed by the Vice President and Director of the GM Department (UAW) and the Vice President of Industrial Relations (GM).

The Local Joint Council (for Enhancing Job Security and the Competitive Edge) will be established, organized in operated in keeping with the stated objective. Each party will appoint an equal number of members to the Council. It is suggested Local Joint Councils meet monthly.

The Executive Board-Joint Activities will direct and support the Skill Development and Training Committee, the National Joint Council for Enhancing Job Security and the Competitive Edge and the existing National Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life.

It is agreed the Co-Directors of the Executive Board will be the Vice President of (GM) Industrial Relations and (UAW) Vice President and Director of the GM Department. Each will appoint an equal number of

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persons from their respective organizations as members of the Executive Board. (Emphasis added) The Co-directors of the Executive Board-Joint Activities were made up of an equal number appointed representatives by the UAW and GM. The new joint committees were the first phase of the technical and political transformation of the UAW's organization of bureaucracy. The appointments to subordinate committees were made by the Vice President and Director of the GM Department-UAW and the Vice President of Industrial Relations-GM. The selection of appointed representatives by the UAW was entirely at the discretion of UAW administration. (See Figure 2) 1982 Joint Program Structure GM/ UAW

National Joint Committee Health & Safety

Executive Board Joint Activities

National Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge.

Joint Skill Develop & Training

National QWL Committee

Local Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge.

Develop & Provide Joint Training Programs

Local QWL Committee

Source: 1982 GM-UAW National Agreement

Figure 2: 1982 Joint Program Structure Labor Contract, Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, March 21, 1982, "Joint GMUAW Statement on the Job Security and the Competitive Edge in the Marketplace," p. 279-288. See Appendix B, Part III B.

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The advance of Joint Activities was based upon the rationale that job security was strengthened by improving the competitiveness of General Motors. There were 360,255 UAW members working for GM in 1982. GM car sales were at 4,510,186 vehicles 9

which amounted to 43.6 percent of the U.S. market.

The new organizational

bureaucracy became another political outlet of the UAW administration. The parallel structure was organized to administer a host of UAW-GM joint training, health, safety and eventually welfare benefits programs. The structural changes continued with the increasing number of joint labor-management committees. These joint committees were staffed by an equal amount of appointed representatives from the union and for management. The International UAW Executive Board expanded the union political bureaucracy through political patronage. The joint bureaucracy was accountable to the UAW administration and their management counterparts. The appointed representatives' jobs security depended on their loyalty to the UAW-GM administrators of Joint Activities rather than the union rank-and-file. This growing body of appointed representatives provided the UAW administration with devoted partisans at the national, regional and individual plant level.

Bureaucracies require a source of revenue in order to survive

and Joint Activities was an up-and-coming system of government. The 1982 agreement established a joint funding mechanism for joint programs. Until this point, there was no formal funding mechanism for Quality Work Life programs. The new funding mechanism known as "the nickel fund" was funding mechanism the newly established finance joint projects: 9

Annual General Motors Employment Level of GM-UAW Represented Employees, GM Market Share and Vehicle Sales, UAW Research Department, 2009, Appendix G, Table 1. See Appendix, Iteml, "Full Time Plant Level Appointed Joint Programs Representatives Formula"

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It is agreed the Corporation make available to the Executive Board Joint Activities (Executive Board) funding at a rate of 5 cents (50) per hour worked. The funds are to be used to accomplish the objectives noted in the Joint UAW-GM Statement on Job Security and Competitive Edge in the Marketplace (Joint Statement).

The Executive Board may commit Board and authorize expenditures to meet the objectives set forth in the Joint Statement with the understanding that no expenditures for capital items will be authorized without approval of the appropriate divisional comptroller or chief financial officer. It is also agreed that payment of fees in services and expenses provided by Union and Corporation representatives to the Board will be authorized, at rates to be agreed upon, by the Executive Board.

In addition to the 5 cents (50) per hour worked funding, a sum will be provided by the Corporation to the Executive Board which will average, over the term of the new National Agreement, $6.7 million per month (annual rate of $80 million). These additional funds will be utilized primarily in the plants for current to and expanded training for bargaining unit employees. It is understood that the cost of joint programs, wages of trainees, travel expenses and other training expenses may be chargeable against these additional funds provided the project is approved, in

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advance, by the Executive Board and the expenses were within the limits so established. The nickel fund was intended to pay for training workers for jobs within the corporation and for the laid off employees who were not likely not be rehired. The UAW in GM established training centers in impoverished urban areas as a part of this retraining program. Joint funded regional training programs were created in California, Pontiac, 12

Flint, and Saginaw, Michigan.

This was the beginning of a corporate partnership

between the UAW and GM that was organized as a co-directed nonprofit corporation. The first training program was incorporated by the UAW and General Motors as a public charity in an alliance with the State of Michigan was called the "GM-UAW Metropolitan Pontiac Retraining and Employment Program" or "Metro PREP." The Metro-PREP was: organized exclusively for charitable purposes, including, for such purposes than making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under 501(c)3of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code and the training, retraining and/or the direct placement of dislocated workers, and all . .

13

activities incidental thereto.

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, March 21, 1982, "Funding: Executive BoardJoint Activities," p. 424-425. For more information about funding see Appendix B, Part IIIC. 12 UAW-GMPeople, UAW-GM Center for Human Resources, Millennium Issue, Winter 2001, p. 6-7. 13 Articles of Incorporation, GM-UAW Metropolitan Pontiac Retraining and Employment Program, CIN no. 706-253, Article II, November 10, 1983, p. 1, Addendum to the Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, p. 3. See Appendix C, Part I and Part II to review the complete articles of incorporation and the addendum.

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The funding mechanism for the training program was a combination of the nickel fund and matching funds made available through the Michigan Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA) Title III: The Corporation is to be financed under the following general plan: 50 percent funding from the General Motors Corp. with matching funds (50 percent) from Michigan Job Training and Partnership Act Title III Discretionary Funds made available for distribution by the Secretary of Labor. The JTPA was a product of the neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism that had asserted political power during the Reagan administration. Reagan's job training policy was part of an assault on the New Deal welfare and unemployment programs. The Federal program existed when Reagan took office was the Comprehensive Employment and Training Administration (CETA). He was going to let CETA expire in 1982, but the unemployment rate was over ten percent when he took office. The Republicans settled on a job-training program that fit conservative social and economic values. The theory asserted the problem with unemployment and poverty stemmed from the failure of the individual, not the market. The market in fact was the solution to systemic poverty. Federally funded job-training needed to be privatized. The neo-cons argued that there were plenty of jobs around, but workers simply didn't have the appropriate skills (or willingness to work). The JTPA was created to promote jobtraining at the expense of government support for the poor and unemployed. The Reagan administration successfully diverted Federal money from Democratic strongholds in Rust

14

Ibid, p. 2.

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Belt industrial cities. The Bush and Clinton administrations also latched onto jobtraining to fight poverty. The federal government spent $85 billion on JTPA and its successor, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), but didn't make any measurable impact on poverty rates. The premise that there was a mismatch of skilled workers for the available jobs was false. There was simply a shortage of well-paying jobs. The Metro PREP and its financial resources were eventually folded into the Human Resource Center because more extensive joint programs were launched during subsequent bargaining cycles. The 1982 labor agreement marked the institutionalization of organizational structures that were separate and distinct from the union. At this stage the union's ideals were still moored to the UAW constitution, but the leadership was beginning to shift its weight toward the emergent organizational model. The IEB and management co-directed the Executive Board-Joint Activities. The Executive Board-Joint Activities directed the existing National Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life and the National and Local Joint Committees on Health and Safety, and the newly created Joint Skill Development and Training Committee and the National Joint Counsel for Enhancing Job Security and the Competitive Edge. The Executive Board-Joint Activities was positioned as the highest tribunal in the emerging joint bureaucracy. Health and Safety developed into an additional pillar of the UAW bureaucracy. The development of joint programs gained momentum when Al Warren Jr. assumed the post of corporate vice-president of labor relations. His counterpart in the union was Don Ephlin, UAW Vice President of the GM Department. Ephlin also 15

Gordon Lafer, The Job-Training Charade, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University press, 2002), p.4-6, 88.

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supported labor-management cooperation. Warren pushed labor-management cooperation as part of a long-term strategy to roll back UAW wage and benefit gains. GM's bargaining strategy depended on expanding "joint problem solving strategies" to achieve worker buy-in to variable wage layers, benefits reductions and the elimination of income security formulas such as GIS, COLA and AIF.

In 1983, Warren presented the

details of a two-pronged strategy for corporate industrial relations to GM personnel directors titled "Actions to Influence the Outcome of Bargaining" on October 11, 1983. First, the Corporation planned to utilize joint problem solving programs to influence the hearts and minds of the UAW rank-and-file by emphasizing mutual gains. Second, the Corporation's strategy depended on gaining the acceptance of the UAW leadership. The "Warren Strategy" was spelled out in five main bargaining objectives for the 1984 negotiations. The first objective was to contain reduce labor costs by eliminating COLA and AIF, reduced benefits, restructure the Guaranteed Income Stream, and established multitier wages and benefits. The second objective was to reduce the "per car" labor costs by changing work and seniority rules, reduce skilled trades classifications, introducing more labor saving technology, and eliminating the lifetime employment pilot program. The third objective was to make it easier to outsource work by retaining management's right to determine the location and means of manufacturing and make it easier to subcontract. The fourth objective was to promote more labormanagement cooperation by increasing the "jointness" of QWL programs, strengthening the existing National and Local Joint Councils, and replace the cyclical local bargaining

Alfred S. Warren, VP Chief Labor Negotiator, General Motors, Actions to Influence the Outcome of Bargaining: Presentation to Personnel Directors, 1984 Negotiations Objectives, Objective I, (11 October 1983), p. C-8, See Appendix D, Part III.

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with "Living Agreements." The fifth objective was to emphasize individual accountability through the greater use of the joint training fund, shift the focus of training from laid-off workers to the active workforce, and adopt more "pay for knowledge" systems. Warren's strategy depended on convincing the union leadership to sell the corporate agenda to the membership. "As our mission statement indicates, our approach to communications will be two-fold efforts initiated by management and efforts initiated 18

jointly with the union."

Warren knew that he would have a tough time selling this to

the rank and file because right after they agreed to concessionary contract in 1982 management received raises and Roger Smith launched into the largest capital expenditure in GM's history. The economy was improving and GM was experiencing higher sales and earnings. GM's higher profits added weight to the UAW's demand to "Restore and More in '84." The threats to job security that were evident in 1982 were less apparent leading into the 1984 contract negotiations. For example, at the beginning of March, 1982, GM had 143,000 workers on lay off and in the job cuts to nearly 172,000 eight months later. However, in the first three months of 1983 GM had called back nearly 70,000 people from layoff and expected to have fewer than 40,000 still laid off by 19

1984.

Warren expected the improvement in the auto industry to exacerbate the

Alfred S. Warren, VP Chief Labor Negotiator, General Motors, Actions to Influence the Outcome of Bargaining: Presentation to Personnel Directors, 1984 Negotiations Objectives, Objective I, (11 October 1983), p. C-8 to C-12, See Appendix D, Part III. Yettaw Papers, box 16, MSU Stadium Storage. 18 Alfred S. Warren, VP Chief Labor Negotiator, General Motors, Actions to Influence the Outcome of Bargaining: Presentation to Personnel Directors, (11 October 1983), p. 5, Yettaw Papers, box 16, MSU Stadium Storage. 19 Alfred S. Warren, VP Chief Labor Negotiator, General Motors, Actions to Influence the Outcome of Bargaining: Presentation to Personnel Directors, (11 October 1983), p. 5-6. See Appendix D, Part I. Yettaw Papers, box 16, MSU Stadium Storage.

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membership's militancy and that would be reflected in the UAW's bargaining position. Warren expressed concern about the rank and file's reaction when they learned more about GM's profitability, executive bonuses and profit-sharing. I think you will agree that many of our employees are not at all sure their sacrifices were worthwhile and really necessary. There is uncertainty that there really has been "equality of sacrifice." They are wondering whether GM's profits have been used to increase our competitiveness and thereby their job security. There is a widespread perception that business is back to normal and "GM can afford it" so why not "Restore and More in '84?"

Executive bonuses could be another issue. When they are made public next year just a short time before negotiations began, the amounts 20

probably will have a significant impact on what employees think. Warren told his personnel directors that they needed to do a better job of making employees understand the Corporation's problems were not over and that the issue was "not how much General Motors was making, but rather a much money GM needed for the business." GM employees needed to understand "the couple billion dollars in profits is nothing compared to the nine or ten billion General Motors was spending" on its facilities. "However, Don Ephlin, you'll recall gave us some idea of just how receptive employees will be to that kind of message." Workers were outraged with executives' bonuses in the face of the concessions they gave up to the Corporation. GM somehow Alfred S. Warren, VP Chief Labor Negotiator, General Motors, Actions to Influence the Outcome of Bargaining: Presentation to Personnel Directors, (11 October 1983), p. 6-7. See Appendix D, Part I. Yettaw Papers, box 16, MSU Stadium Storage.

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had to get the message across to hourly employees that executive bonuses are "earned 21

and that some special privilege."

Warren was counting on his cordial relationship with

Ephlin to help persuade the UAW leadership to accept the joint problem solving agenda. In part two of the Warren strategy there were three action strategies; dialogue with Don Ephlin, the National Bargaining Committee, and regional and local UAW leaders. Al Warren considered his close relationship with Don Ephlin as an essential feature to influencing the UAW leadership. Influencing the union depended on continuing the one-on-one briefings between Warren and Don Ephlin. Warren's discussions with Ephlin were to be duplicated in similar sessions with key members of the local management and unions. This would include tours of several plants to teach Ephlin about "innovative solutions" to the competitive challenges of the market. The first strategy was to convince Ephlin further labor-management was the answer to all their troubles. All levels of the union had to be convinced that job security could be strengthened by improving competitiveness. Convincing the union to accept a "win-win strategy" was critical to implementing the GM plan. Warren hoped to influence the UAW National Bargaining Committee by hosting monthly workshops for both the UAW Bargaining Committee and GM negotiators. GM intended to use these workshops to establish a "common information base, an opportunity for dialogue in a problem solving context, and a focus on the business needs as a reference point for future bargaining." Second, they planned a joint union-management conference to review the state of the auto industry. The objectives of the conference 21 Alfred S. Warren, VP Chief Labor Negotiator, General Motors, Actions to Influence the Outcome of Bargaining: Presentation to Personnel Directors, (11 October 1983), p.9-10. See Appendix D, Part I. Yettaw Papers, box 16, MSU Stadium Storage.

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would be to shift the focus of bargaining to future business needs and foster a mutual interest bargaining process. GM ultimately planned to develop joint principles for unionmanagement relationships for the 1980s. Finally, Al Warren was confident that Don Ephlin would join him to appoint a Joint Task Force on Bargaining based on those joint principles. The role of the task force would be to review the formal bargaining process and recommend changes to facilitate "mutual objectives." Warren was well aware of the negative reaction at the plant level to contract concessions and negative experiences with early Quality of Work Life programs. He understood that GM's strategy to influence the union needed to involve a "bottom-up educational process" to influence local and regional union leaders' beliefs and values as they entered the 1984 contract 22

negotiations.

Many of Warren's industrial relations objectives appeared in the 1984

GM-UAW National Agreement. The Warren Strategy proved to be a long-term industrial relations policy that was implemented over the next twenty-five years. The Warren strategy "increased the jointness" in the 1984 GM-UAW National Agreement. The Quality of Work Life—National Committee was expanded into the local unions by establishing Joint Local QWL Committees. QWL was being transformed from program that was intended to "make work a more satisfying experience," into an administrative bureaucracy. General Motors had already implemented widespread experiments in QWL whether the local unions chose to participate or not. This left the International Union clamoring to be included in the process of developing QWL programs. 22 Alfred S. Warren, VP Chief Labor Negotiator, General Motors, 'influencing UAW Leadership," Actions to Influence the Outcome of Bargaining: Presentation to Personnel Directors, Influencing UAW Leadership, (11 October 1983), p. C4-C6, See Appendix D, Part II. Yettaw Papers, box 16, MSU Stadium Storage.

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The UAW and GM recommitted to joint programs in spite of rising opposition within local unions. Modifications were made in the QWL in order to address the abuse of the program. The Memorandum of Understanding-Quality of Work Life addressed some the union's complaint that QWL "in many instances, involved a lack of jointness in the development and implementation of the endeavor. The parties recognize that a QWL process cannot succeed unless both parties come together in a relationship of mutual trust in respect to jointly develop and support the process. Therefore, the parties agree that all Quality of Work Life activities will be jointly conceived, implemented, monitored and 23

evaluated."

The union and management agreed to establish Joint Local Committees

that were composed of the President of the Local Unions, Shop Committee, the Plant Manager, the Personnel Director and other management representatives. The responsibility of the Joint Local Committee was to determine whether to participate in joint QWL activities. The committees were authorized to set the goals and policies of local joint QWL programs. More training was made available for local union, International Union and management representatives. The Joint Skill Development and Training Committee took on the role of developing training programs for QWL. The Warren objectives for strengthening the National and Local Joint Councils appeared in the Memorandum of Understanding Joint Activities. The agreement established a blueprint for a human resource organizational bureaucracy with Joint Activities at its core. Joint programs involving training, health and safety, job security, Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, September 21, 1984, Memorandum of Understanding-Quality of Work Life, p. 247-248. See Appendix B, Part IVA for more information. 24 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, September 21, 1984, Attachment A, Memorandum of Understanding-Quality of Work Life, p. 249-250. See Appendix B, Part IVB for more information.

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attendance, tuition assistance, substance abuse and Paid Educational Leave (PEL) were formally institutionalized under the designation of "Joint Activities." (See Figure 3) The institutional legitimacy ofjoint programs was guarantee by the creation of a formal funding mechanism called "Joint Funds." Financial resources are the lifeblood of any bureaucracy.

1984 Joint Program Structure

GM/ UAW

National Joint Committee Health & Safety

Executive Board Joint Activities

Health & Safety

National Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge.

National QWL Committee

Local Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge.

Local QWL Committee

Job Opportunity Bank Security

Substance Abuse

Joint Skill Develop & Training

Training Substance Abuse

Tuition Assistance

Quality Work Life Growth & Opportunity Committee

Source: 1984 GM-UAW National Agreement

Tuition Assistance

Attendance

Job Opportunity Bank Security

Paid Education Leave

Figure 3: 1984 Joint Program Structure 282

The Joint Activities agreement called for a common understanding with the union in order to meet the competitive challenge. The competitive challenge was an ambiguous reference to anything GM decided to blame for their poor performance. "Success in these endeavors benefits all of the parties: "the UAW to a strong viable membership, the employees through job satisfaction and job security' and the Corporation through 25

achieving its goals of becoming a world-class competitor."

It declared that the only

way to address those challenges was to improve workers' skills and encourage their "mutual dedication" to a "meaningful involvement in the decision-making process." If GM became a world-class competitor, then the UAW could secure stable membership levels and the rank-and-file that could win "job satisfaction and job security." But, GM was already a world-class competitor. It controlled over 43 percent of the overall domestic vehicle market share at the time.

There were 354,222 UAW members

working for GM in 1984. GM car sales were at 5,972,971 vehicles which amounted to 27

42 percent of the U.S. market.

The primary challenge to GM's market share was not a

labor problem, it was a management problem. GM insisted on jointness as a "facilitating mechanism" to effectively administer workplace change. The employment relationship is like any other social system in that it requires conflict to exert enough pressure to change. GM-UAW already had a facilitating mechanism in place called the grievance procedure. Labor-management conflict was a competitive force that encouraged innovation on both sides. The human relations 25 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, September 21, 1984, Memorandum of Understanding-Joint Activities, p. 239-245. Annual General Motors Employment Level of GM-UAW Represented Employees, GM Market Share and Vehicle Sales, UAW Research Department, 2009, Appendix G, Table 1. 27 Annual General Motors Employment Level of GM-UAW Represented Employees, GM Market Share and Vehicle Sales, UAW Research Department, 2009, Appendix G, Table 1.

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approach to industrial conflict emphasizes a common purpose for the whole organization of the factory while denying the underlying problems. Suppressing conflict has the 28

unintended consequence of slowing technological innovation and progress.

Jointness

was the new thing—it was promoted labor-management cooperation as the answer to GM's competitive problems. But what exactly was jointness? The memorandum defined jointness: .. ."jointness" is understood to mean that the decisions for these activities will be jointly conceived, implemented, monitored, and evaluated. Furthermore, decisions must be arrived at in a setting which is characterized by the parties working together in an atmosphere of trust; making mutual decisions at all levels which respect the concerns and interests of the parties involved; sharing responsibility for the problem 29

solving process; and sharing the rewards of achieving common goals. It was a declaration of harmony in which labor and management could implement new ideas that would mutually benefit. Together the UAW and GM would "jointly conceive, implement, monitor, and evaluate" human resource decisions. What jointly conceived means is when an individual member of the union or the corporation has an idea, they immediately discuss it with their counterpart. The consensus that emerges from that discussion is the "jointly conceived" decision. The notion that the union would be permitted participate equally in that process strayed into management's prerogative to Lewis A. Croser, "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change," The British Journal ofSociology, Volume 8, No. 3, (September, 1957), p. 197-8. 29 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, September 21, 1984, Memorandum of Understanding-Joint Activities, p. 239. For more information about Joint Activities, see Appendix B, Part IVC.

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control every aspect of running the business. GM never agreed to that. The UAW and the corporation did agree to trust and respect one another, share responsibility, solve problems together, seek common goals and share the rewards of joint endeavors. Everyone was on the same team and they shared a common organizational ideal. Internal conflict would in theory be washed away, but such an organization was not challenged. It was Schwartz's "clockwork" organization. Everything was fine because that was how things were supposed to be. The declaration of harmony neither made the organization more capable nor creative.

The system was wedded to yesterday's

accomplishments. The developing human resource bureaucracy was administered by of the Executive Board Joint Activities. The memorandum also broadened the responsibilities of the Executive Board beyond directing the National Joint Skill Development and Training Committee and the National Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life to include: The National Joint Committee on Health and Safety, the National Committee on Attendance, the National Substance Abuse Recovery Program, the Tuition Assistance Program, JOBS program, Paid Educational Leave, and other national joint committee's and activities as 31

may be mutual aid agreement to by the Union and the Corporation. 30 Lewis A. Croser, "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change," The British Journal of Sociology, Volume 8, No. 3, (September, 1957), p. 199. Schwartz, Howard S. Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay and the Theory of the Organizational Ideal, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 1419. 31 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, September 21, 1984, Memorandum of Understanding-Joint Activities, Executive Board Joint Activities, p. 240. For more information about Joint Activities, see Appendix B, Part IVC.

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The joint bureaucracy continued to expand locally. The authority of Joint Skill Development and Training was also increased. The Joint Activities program was expanded to include local committee structures: Joint Skill Development and Training Committee will be established at the local level. This Joint Local Skill Development and Training Committee will be comprised of the President of the Local Union, the Chairman of the Shop Committee or their representatives and the Plant Manager, the Personnel Director or their designated representatives. The UAW Regional Director and/or his representatives should be fully involved regarding Local skill development and training efforts including any 32

action of each Joint Local Committee. Management agreed to "meaningful involvement in decisions" to improve job satisfaction, build trust and of course, share the rewards of becoming a "world class competitor." More avenues for employee input were created in the expansion of joint 33

processes, but GM did not relinquish control of the business. The 1984 Memorandum of Understanding on Joint Activities established a new joint funding formula for national and local training, health and safety programs. Until this point the nickel fund provided revenue for the joint structures and administrative committees. The money from the nickel fund that was sent to local unions had few 32 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, September 21, 1984, Memorandum of Understanding-Joint Activities, Joint Skill Development and Training, p. 241. For more information about Joint Activities, see Appendix B, Part IVC. 33 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Recognition, Paragraph 8, September 21, 1984, Recognition, Paragraph (8), p. 1. Paragraph (8) states: "the products to be manufactured, the location of plants, the schedules of production, the methods, processes and means of manufacturing are solely and exclusively the responsibility of the Corporation."

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restrictions. QWL coordinators could spend their nickels in any way that could be interpreted as a training expense. Joint funds were divided into national, reservoir and local funds. The funds were a dedicated revenue source for the growing bureaucracy, but they were accompanied by new restrictions. The funding formulas were linked to hours worked by UAW members: National Funds: It is agreed that the Corporation will make available funding at five cents (50) per hour worked for the use at the national level. In addition, fifty cents (500) per overtime hour worked in excess of five percent (5%) of straight time hours worked (calculated on the 12 months rolling average) will be made available by the Corporation. Reservoir and Local Funds It is agreed that the Corporation will make available funding at ten cents (100) per hour worked for use either in plants (LOCAL FUNDS) or certain nationally approved projects (RESERVOIR FUNDS). The parties will allocate ten cents (100) between LOCAL FUNDS and RESERVOIR FUNDS on an as required basis over the term of the agreement. The financial resources that were left over from the 1982 nickel fund and the $6.7 million per month contribution by General Motors was carried forward to into the new 1984 funding mechanism. The administration National and Reservoir" joint funds required approval in advance from the Joint Skill Development and Training Committee and the

34 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, September 21, 1984, Memorandum of Understanding Joint Activities, IV Funding, p. 243. For more information about funding of Joint Activities, see Appendix B, Part IVC.

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Executive Board Joint Activities. All substantial requests (Any request excess of $ 10,000.) for j oint funds expenditures were directed toward the National Joint Skill Development and Training Committee, which was subject to the authority the Executive Board: Requests for authorization to expand LOCAL FUNDS must be jointly approved by local parties. In addition, all requests to lease or purchased real property, and those requests to purchase capital items in excess of $10,000 per item must be approved by the National Joint Skill Development and Training Committee. In situations where mutual agreement regarding fund approval cannot be reached locally, either party may appeal the issue to the National Joint Skill Development Training 35

Committee for resolution. Guidelines for the use of joint funds were written in a separate unpublished document. The approval process for the expenditure of joint funds required agreement between union and management members of joint committees. Any expenditure of joint funds was contingent upon the joint-corporate mandate to improve GM's competitive position. In order for the UAW to gain access to joint funds, the union had to frame the request to conform to the joint philosophy to improve GM's competitive position. Health and Safety programs were another area of Joint Activities expansion in the 1984 national agreement. The National and Local Health and Safety Committees that were established under the 1973 agreement were folded into Joint Activities. A Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, September 21, 1984, Memorandum of Understanding Joint Activities, IV Funding, p. 244. For more information about funding restrictions for Joint Activities, see Appendix B, Part IVC.

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memorandum of understanding established new ground rules for health and safety training, and research programs. The National Committee developed health and safety program content and the Joint Skill Development and Training Committee facilitated training. The Executive Board Joint Activities remained the overall administrator for the joint program, but an additional joint structure, the Joint Health and Safety Training SubCommittee was created.

The field of discretion for health and safety was also expanded

to include ergonomics, hazardous materials and technological factors related to health and safety. The UAW-GM established a pilot project to study ergonomics or "human factors engineering." The goal was to design processes that would reduce repetitivemotion injuries. As a part of this process the Local Health and Safety Committees were allowed to review new plant layouts new manufacturing equipment in major process changes. An additional structure was created, the Plant Hazardous Materials Control 37

Committee.

The new committee would be comprised of a member of management and

a member of the union appointed from the existing local Health and Safety Committee. The agreement also made additional funding provisions for health and safety programs on the same model as joint training funds mentioned above. The health and safety funds formula was calculated based on the hours worked by every UAW represented GM employee. All of the training funds, whether they were intended for jobrelated training or health and safety, were administered by the newly formed Joint

Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Attachment "A" to the Memorandum of Understanding, Health and Safety Activities, September 21, 1984, p. 282-284. For more information about Health and Safety, see Appendix B, Part IVD. 37 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Attachment "A" to the Memorandum of Understanding, Health and Safety Activities, September 21, 1984, p. 285. For more information about Health and Safety, see Appendix B, Part IVD.

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Activities structures.

The health and safety program remained within a distinctive

bureaucratic structure because it had its own source of revenue. Several other programs were added to Joint Activities including attendance, substance abuse, tuition assistance, job security, and employee awareness programs. The attendance program was intended to address casual and short-term absenteeism. The program was presented to the membership as an attendance benefit award program. The Benefit Eligibility Procedure and Attendance Recognition Award administrative guidelines were jointly administered by another labor-management structure, the 39

Coordinators on the Attendance Control Team.

GM and UAW shared a "joint

determination to deal cooperatively and constructively with the problem of substance abuse among GM workers represented by the UAW." The National Substance Abuse Committee was established to administer the substance abuse plan. A joint program of tuition assistance for active and laid off UAW represented employees was also created. The tuition program was administered through the UAW-GM Skill 41

Development and Training Program. An extensive job security program called the Job Opportunity Bank-Security (JOBS) ProgramAgreement was established in 1984. The expressed concern to Activities, General Labor Contract, General Motors Corp. andUAW the UAW, Funding:their Health and Safety September 21, 1984, p. 475. For more information about Health and Safety funding, see Appendix B, Part IVE. 39 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding, The Attendance Procedure, September 21, 1984, p. 258-260. For more information about the joint attendance program see Appendix B, Part IVF. 40 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document 39, Statement of Cooperation between General Motors and UAW to Assist Employees Represented by the UAW In Recovering from Substance Abuse, September 21, 1984, p. 354-355. For more information about the joint substance abuse program see Appendix B, Part IVG. 41 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding, Tuition Assistance Plan, September 21, 1984, p. 251-254. For more information about the Tuition Assistance program see Appendix B, Part IVH.

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Motors during negotiations about the loss of UAW jobs to imported car and auto parts. The corporation illustrated their long-term strategy to remain a strong U.S. corporation by providing a historical perspective of the problems in the U.S. auto industry. It was a brief history lesson that ranged from the energy crisis of 1974, the psychology of the American market, the penetration by in foreign imports, to a lengthy list of GM's recent investments in North America. GM negotiators itemized "over $24 Billion in capital expenditures" in new products, technology, facilities and manufacturing processes. General Motors illustrated their commitment to American jobs by presenting Saturn as the jewel in the crown of the GM strategy to fend off Japanese imports.

GM responded

by proposing the creation of the JOBS Bank to the UAW. Workers who were laid off because of automation or productivity increases went into a Jobs Bank and received 95 percent of their pay instead of hitting the street. The JOBS Program established additional joint structures called the Growth and Opportunity Committee and the New Business Venture Development Group. GM made available up to $100 million of funding to provide for the new committees. Operating expenses were provided from the National Training Funds upon approval of the Executive Board-Joint Activities and the Joint Skill Development and Training Committee.

General Motors sought to limit their liability to the Job Opportunity Bank-

Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document 10, Job Security Letter, September 21, 1984, p. 291-296. For more information about the new job security measure, see document 10 in Appendix B, Part IVM. 43 Job Security Subcommittee Proposal, Item I, Employee Development Bank, Submitted to the UAW, September 22, 1984, The Collection's of Archives of Labor and Industrial Affairs University Archives, Wayne State University, p. 1. Paul Ingrassia, Crash Course: The American Automobile Industry's Road from Glory to Disaster, (New York: Random House, 2010), p. 87. 44 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document 12, Growth and Opportunity Committee Letter, September 21, 1984, p. 299-303. Funding: Growth and Opportunity

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Security Program. The cost of the JOBS Program could not exceed $1,000,000,000 45

during the term of the JOBS Memorandum of Understanding. Despite the heavy upfront costs the JOBS Bank provided the corporation with a tax-exempt funding mechanism for operating its facilities. GM was able to manipulate the program so that employees could be placed in factories, but instead of paying them from the plant budget, they were paid from the JOBS Bank fund. Employees were essentially "invisible," because they weren't accounted for on the factory books. The practice artificially boosted the productivity of those plants. The JOBS program did provide workers with unprecedented security, but GM used the JOBS program to downsize the work force. How did GM use the JOBS program to cut jobs, even though it was jointly administered with the union? The wages of laid off workers were paid by the Jobs Bank Fund rather than collecting unemployment benefits. It was supposed to be a disincentive for the corporation to arbitrarily cut jobs because they were still paying the workers full wages while they awaited new job assignment. GM abused the system by temporarily placing Jobs Bank employees into plants to cover short-term labor shortages caused by sick leave, absenteeism, and so on. They weren't permanent job assignments. It created a flexible workforce for the corporation and had no impact on the continuing job cuts. Moreover, workers that were placed in the plants were paid from the Jobs Bank Fund, rather than from the plant payroll. They were essentially free employees for the plants that weren't accounted for. The practice created the illusion of higher productivity for Committee, p. 475. For more information about the JOBS Growth and Opportunity Committee see Appendix B, Part IVP. 45 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document 11, Job Opportunity BankSecurity-Funding Letter, September 21, 1984, p.297. For more information about the JOBS funding provisions see Appendix B, Part IVN.

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those plants because they were maintaining productivity with fewer employees on the books. The irony is the artificial boost in productivity encouraged management to reduce Aft

employment. By 1992, GM had over 50,000 auto workers in the JOBS Bank.

The

abuse of the JOBS Program was made public in 1992 when the JOBS Bank Fund ran out of money. The corporation and the union agreed make an illegal transfer of $600 million of Joint Funds into the JOBS program. The law prohibited the use of Joint Funds to be used for contractually negotiated costs. GM and UAW convinced the Department of 47

Justice and the Department of Labor not to prosecute. The UAW and GM negotiators agreed to establish "Paid Education Leave" program for a select group of employees. The employees would be paid full wages and benefits to attend training programs. In a letter from Al Warren to the International Union, UAW was inserted into the 1984 contract that fulfilled in the Warren strategy to influence national, regional and local union leadership. Groundwork was laid without providing details about the PEL program. According to the letter: This will confirm our understanding that the parties agreed to sponsor paid education leaves for selected employees to take full-time training to enhance their skills. Application to sponsor candidates for such Leaves must be approved in advance by the Joint Skill Development and Training

Paul Ingrassia and Joseph B. White, Comeback: The Fall and Rise of the American Automobile Industry, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 305. 47 Anonymous Associated Press author, "Jobs Bank Dollars Misspent, UAW Says: Scheme Made Plants Appear More Efficient," The Flint Journal, November 12, 1992, P.A1. Helen Fogel, "UAW Says GM Plants Abused Fund: Some managers used laid-off workers to reduce payrolls," The Detroit News, November 12, 1992. Dick Danjin Interview, June 27, 2007.

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Committee. Upon approval, expenses and lost time for the employee on 48

Leave will be provided from National training funds. PEL was conceived as political device by Don Ephlin to retain his position within the International Union. The PEL program was promoted by General Motors and Don Ephlin as a mechanism to familiarize the UAW leadership with the competitive challenges facing the American auto industry. This approach was specifically identified in the Warren strategy, "as our mission statement indicates, our approach to communications will be 49

twofold—efforts initiated by management and efforts initiated jointly with the unions." GM favored Don Ephlin to direct the UAW-GM Department because his political opposition in the union strongly opposed QWL. Opponents to QWL threatened to derail the both Ephlin and the Warren's strategy. GM considered Ephlin's role essential to influencing the UAW leadership. The Warren letter became a crucial tool in both the 1984 contract negotiations and for Ephlin's political opponents in the UAW. The Warren letter and the PEL program became political weapons in the struggle for power in the union. The disclosure of internal GM labor relations documents has been the subject of considerable controversy over the years. The letter appeared amidst spreading distrust of joint programs. In 1981, a sensitive GM memo was leaked to the public. The memo urged corporate executives to use Quality of Work Life programs to convince workers

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document 36, "Paid Educational Leave," September 21, 1984, p. 348. For more information about the PEL program see Appendix B, Part IVR. 49 Alfred S. Warren, VP Chief Labor Negotiator, General Motors, "Actions to Influence the Outcome of Bargaining: Presentation to Personnel Directors," (11 October 1983), p. 5.

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that wage demands would hurt the company.

The Wall Street Journal published an

article about the Warren letter prior to the 1984 GM-UAW contract negotiations. The authenticity of the Warren letter was corroborated by a General Motors spokesman, but he refused to comment on it.

In addition, Al Warren reported the disclosure of the

strategic letter to a meeting of General Motors top 500 managers in the fall 1983: Let me begin by now talking to you about some of the strategies operations that took place during the (1984) negotiations. You'll recall that one of the things that happened was a strategic planning document fell into the hands of some members of the UAW. I don't think there can be any doubt that the lost document, the disclosure of that document seriously 52

affected negotiations. One of the popular rumors among UAW dissidents was that the Warren letter was retrieved from discarded office documents. Widespread resistance to joint programs had by this time solidified into an opposition movement within the rank-and-file. As delegates gathered for the 1984 bargaining convention Pete Kelly and other local officials staged a demonstration urging negotiators to "Restore and More" in the new contract. "We've got to get away from this 'joint-effort' thing in this industry and starting to really 53

take on the corporations, or we'll destroy the union."

According to Kelly the GM

William Serrin, "Giving Workers of Voice of Their Own," New York Times, December 2, 1984, p. 136. Dale D. Buss, "GM Weighing More Big Cuts in the Work Force—Internal Data Say Reduction of Up to 120,000 People Possible in Next 21/2 years," Wall Street Journal, February 21, 1984, p. 1. 52 Alfred S. Warren, Jr. Report to key General Motors management officials regarding the status of the tentative 1984 G.M.-UAW national collective bargaining agreement. Audiotape transcript, September 1984, p. 4, Yettaw Papers, box 16, MSU Stadium Storage. 53 Dale D. Buss, "UAW Faces Tough Hurdle in Reconciling Locals' Diverse Demands in Bargaining," Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1984, p. 1. 295

documents were produced by a disgruntled janitor connected to the dissident movement. The source of the Warren document was through the International Union itself. The Yokich faction distributed the letter to UAW leaders around the country. Their intention was to derail Don Ephlin's political career within the International Union. The disclosure was timed to coincide with the bargaining convention that would clear the way for Stephen Yokich to gain control of the GM department. Yokich made no secret of his opposition to Quality of Work Life programs. The QWL was already a source of anxiety for many union leaders because many of the early supporters had already been turned out of office. Not only did Yokich oppose QWL, but the "International Union staff hated it" as well.

Ephlin was already closely associated with Al Warren and QWL, so he was an

easy target for Yokich. The Warren letter was released to discredit Don Ephlin prior to the 1986 convention. Similarly, the PEL program became a political instrument that Ephlin used to promote himself to the local and regional union leadership. The National Quality of Work Life Committee meetings in 1984 revealed the political fissures in the union leadership. Don Ephlin insisted on having Dick Danjin who was still on the shop committee at the Gear and Axle attend the committee meeting and help address the problems they were having with the Pontiac Local 653 QWL program. Danjin was recruited because of all the notoriety generated by the successful EPC program at the Gear and Axle. In contrast to the EPC program at the Gear, the Pontiac QWL program was modeled on the EPG protocol that was set forth by the GM

54 Dean Braid Interview, Interview by Thomas F. Adams, January 3,2007. (Also see Jerry Tucker's account of the origin of the Warren letter.) 55 Dick Danjin Interview, January 31, 2006.

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Organizational Development department. Ephlin wanted Danjin to meet with the people in Pontiac because they were having major problems with QWL. Danjin discovered the UAW leadership in Pontiac wasn't interested in QWL. "They had this huge EPG program in Pontiac that was nothing but smoke and mirrors."

It was little more than a political

organization for the Yokich faction. However, because Ephlin was not a Mason, he did not know that the Yokich forces were building "another Masonic hierarchy" in the QWL program at UAW Local 653. At that time the Freemasons were a powerful force both in the union and in the Corporation. Yokich used his connections in the Masonic Lodge to build a political network to boost his union career and consolidate power. The Masonic connection between union and the Corporation was the likely conduit for the Warren strategic letter into the hands of the International Union. It was in the context of that politically-charged environment, the National Committee decided to hold a first national Quality of Work Life conference. The National Quality Work Life Conference was supposed to be an information and training conference for the top people in the corporation and in the union. That included UAW Regional Directors, Assistant Regional Directors, International servicing representatives and their management counterparts. The conference was a total bust because most of the IEB members boycotted the meeting. The word had gone out through the Lodge network to stay away from the conference. Only twenty-five percent of those expected actually attended conference. Most of those who did attend the

Dick Danjin Interview, January 31, 2006.

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conference were substitutes. Nonetheless, the union and the corporation proceeded with 57

a series of QWL training sessions at the Black Lake facility in northern Michigan. The Black Lake training sessions established an effective model for indoctrinating union and corporate officials in the cooperative QWL philosophy. Keith Brooks who was head of the GM's corporate OD department put together a program that was based on Danjin's leadership training sessions from the Michigan Quality of Work Life Council. For a three-year period spanning 1984 through 1986 there were 4000 people trained in those Black Lake sessions. They were mixed sessions of between 370 and 380 union and management people per week. They conducted 14 weeks of the training per year. At that time it was the largest single labor-management training program of its kind. The Black Lake sessions were viewed by the ascendant Stephen P. Yokich and his cadre as a political threat. There remains no official record of it because Yokich wanted it suppressed. For Yokich, QWL was an instrument to be used against his political opposition. The Black Lake sessions illustrated "how good life could really be between union and management, but they had to return to an unchanged environment." However, the corporate culture was not ready for such drastic change and Yokich used that to his political advantage. He knew QWL was identified with Don Ephlin and Irving Bluestone. Yokich would have none of it because he was "not going to have anybody 58

talking about great things that he didn't do."

QWL became both a target and a weapon.

It was during this period the Warren strategy letter began to appear in union offices around the country. The letter presented both QWL and Don Ephlin as key elements and GM's industrial relations strategy. The PEL program endorsed GM's cooperative strategy 5 7

,UA

Ibid. 58 Dick Danjin Interview, January 31,2006.

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and provided Ephlin with an apparatus to access union leaders from across the country. Yokich was similarly determined to remove Quality of Work Life and Don Ephlin from the union lexicon. The PEL program was Don Ephlin and General Motors' response to the release of the Warren letter. For nearly a year after the PEL provision appeared in the 1984 national agreement there was no defined program in place. However, as union politics heated up in the weeks leading up to the 1986 constitutional convention, "Ephlin was getting a lot of pressure from Yokich. Yokich was trying to do Ephlin in after his first term in the GM department. That is when he busted out the Warren letter." PEL was Ephlin's response with the support of the corporation's strategic planning behind him. Ephlin assigned Rufus Coleman to the PEL program. Coleman was charged with running a pilot program for PEL, but he needed a framework. Ephlin had been prodding Danjin for several weeks for ideas for developing the program. Danjin was brought onto the International Staff in 1985, but was involved with the Governor's Conference on Labor-Management 59

Cooperation when he agreed to develop the PEL program.

The goal for PEL was to

get all of the local presidents and the shop committee chairmen through the program before the convention, "so that they would all become Ephlin lovers."

Danjin was

summoned by Ted Miller, his coordinator to go to a conference meeting. During the course that meeting the first National PEL program took shape. He went to the conference room ...and here sits Frank Meyer from Health and Safety, Hal Stack from Wayne State University Labor Studies, Keith Brook, the number two guy 59 Dick Danjin Interview, march 10 2010. Dick Danjin Interview, December 24,2006.

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from corporate OD, Dr. Howard Carlson the head of OD, Ken McCormick who was the co-director of the HRC, Don Davis who was also a codirector and at least 20 or so other people. The walls were covered with flip charts and brainstorm lists. Rufus Coleman was there. Rufus was the guy in charge of PEL for the UAW. He came out of Walter Reuther's Local 174 on the Westside. Cal Rapson and Charlie Best were there. They had Truck and Bus. Cal was always Steve's (Yokich) guy and he was always snitching on Ephlin. Cal Rapson was a Yokich sycophant and Lodge Brother. The primary purpose for Rapson's presence was to keep an eye on Ephlin and keep Yokich informed of everything that was going on with QWL and PEL. Even after Danjin was seated at the meeting he had no idea why he was there: Dr. Carlson got up and said "Ted said that you are going to give us a hand." And Danjin said, "I don't even know what you are doing here." Rufus said "didn't anyone tell you what we were doing here?" He said, "We are trying to design PEL. Danjin, you and me done talked about PEL. You said that it ought to be some stuff and I can't remember all that stuffyoutoldme. So Keith got up and did all of these flip charts. You are here to do the design for us. We had all of this stuff up on the wall and we

Dick Danjin Interview, December 24,2006.

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don't know what the hell to do with it. All we've been doing is arguing about it."62 Danjin was invited to synthesize the various concepts that PEL was supposed to convey into usable program. Danjin: .. .got up and drew five boxes on the blackboard. One of the pieces of PEL would be an understanding of the auto industry. Another thing would be about understanding what's going on in Washington, the legislative aspect. Another part of PEL would be to understand how the money works, the economics. And another piece would be strategic planning. And Howard Carlson stopped and said not strategic planning, more like where do we go from here? Irving Bluestone's son Barry Bluestone who was professor of economics and director of the Social Welfare Research and Institute at Boston College was at the meeting along with Alan Reuther, the international union legislative director. As far as economics are concerned, we could have Barry Bluestone develop a syllabus about micro and macro economics. For example, a macro view of world economics and a migrant view of kind of what an economic plan might look like for a plant or division. Working with the macro world economics and how it works its way down to General Motors at the plant level. What does the corporate financial statement really say? How do they put the corporate budget together?

Dick Danjin Interview, December 24,2006. Ibid.

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As far as the government was concerned, we had Alan Reuther there who was the legislative director for the union. We would have visiting members of Congress and senators. We would visit a session of Congress. 64

Alan would work that out. The core outline for PEL was established in that meeting. The PEL pilot training session lasted for four weeks. The training materials consisted of four three-inch ring binders, one for each week. The weeklong sessions were held at the GM Tech Center in Warren, MI, in Massachusetts to cover economics with Barry Bluestone, Wayne State University in Detroit, in Washington D.C. and University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. The 1984 GM-UAW National Agreement institutionalized joint programs. The next step was to incorporate nonprofit companies that were separate legal entities from either the UAW or General Motors. The UAW and GM soon established a separate facility to house the emerging administrative structures. The independent entities were manifestations of the newly created governing structures for joint processes. The UAW and GM expanded their bureaucracies by appointing additional administrative staff to joint programs in keeping with the bargaining agreement. The staff of these organizations administered various job, health and safety training programs that were conceived as labor-management committees. The UAW-GM Skill Development and Training Program appeared in 1984 as the center for health, safety and job training programs. The JSDTP was incorporated as a 501(c)5 nonprofit corporation. The configuration of the nonprofit entity evolved over 64 Dick Danjin Interview, December 24, 2006. Dave Yettaw personal PEL notes, PEL outline and syllabus, 1986, Yettaw Papers, box 16, MSU Stadium Storage, Dick Danjin Interview, December 24, 2006.

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subsequent contract bargaining cycles to accommodate the growing collaborative relationship between the union and the company. A closer reading of the UAW-GM contract provisions regarding joint UAW-GM program reveal an increased integration of the union and the company through those the non-profit entities. The UAW-GM officials that make up the Executive Board-Joint Activities were also the same individuals who form the Board of Directors and the trustees of the UAW Inc. The same individuals presided over the formation of particular joint programs, who administers them, how they were administered and the funding that was allocated to the programs. Since the Board of Directors and the trustees were the same individuals, they could exercise institutional authority on one hand and discretionary oversight over themselves on the other. The location of the UAW-GM's Skill Development and Training Program corporate headquarters were first housed in an office suite and the Fisher Building in Detroit MI. According to articles of incorporation the purpose of: This corporation is organized exclusively for the education and training of GM employees and the betterment of the conditions of those involved in the auto industry and the improvement of the quality of their products, and the development of a higher degree of efficiency and their respective occupations, and to carry on any Activities allowable by an organization described in section 501 ©5 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Within those purposes, the Corporation's purpose is to promote and provide

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individual and group training, retraining and developmental opportunities to employees (including workers on lay-off) of General Motors Corp. The governance of the JSDTP was defined in Article III. The selection of trustees described here is the same structure described in the UAW-GM national agreement all national joint committees. in Article IV.

The responsibilities of the Board of Trustees were described

The framework for the Board of Directors was described in Article V.

The Board of Directors of the JSDTP Corporation called the same individuals that the GM-UAW National Agreement defined as the Executive Board-Joint Activities.

The

organization of the JSDTP Corporation is like the relationship between the International Executive Board of the UAW and the members of the International Staff Council. When the IEB engage in collective bargaining with the Staff Council, it was essentially negotiating with itself. The directors of the JSDTP were the same directors of the Joint Activities Executive Board. A year after the JSDTP was incorporated the UAW and GM Co-Directors participated in a ground-breaking ceremony for a new $5.5 million office complex to house the UAW-GM Human Resource Center at the campus of Oakland Community Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, "UAW-GM Skilled Development and Training Program," CIN no. 895-076, 8 June 1984, p. 1. The quotation comesfromthe bylaws of the UAW GM Skilled Development and Training Program that were adopted on May 11, 1984. The official filing date for this incorporation was May, 14 1984. The registered office f the UAW-GM Skill Development and Training Program was listed as 615 Griswold Street, Detroit, MI, 48226. See Article II, Appendix C, Part III. Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, "UAW-GM Skilled Development and Training Program," CIN no. 895-076, 8 June 1984, p. 3. See Article III, Appendix C, Part III. fXf

Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, "UAW-GM Skilled Development and Training Program," CIN no. 895-076, 8 June 1984, p. 4-5. See Article IV, Appendix C, Part III. Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, "UAW-GM Skilled Development and Training Program," CIN no. 895-076, 8 June 1984, p. 6. See Article V, Appendix C, Part III.

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College in Auburn Hills, Michigan.

UAW Vice President of the GM department, Don

Ephlin and GM Vice President for Industrial Relations and Al Warren released a joint statement. "As the union recognizes the competitive challenge to the industry, so must the Corporation recognize the union as its full partner in solving this challenge. Our shared goal is a workforce that is more highly trained, more involved, more secure and 71

therefore, more able to contribute to the ultimate success of the enterprise."

In October

of 1985 the UAW-GM Skill Development and Training Program articles of incorporation 72

were amended in order to change the name to the UAW-GM Human Resource Center. The HRC operated as a 501(c) 5 nonprofit organization until 1987. The HRC operated as a parallel human resources organization that was separate and distinct from both the UAW and GM. By 1984, the HRC had legal standing as an independent corporation. With the construction of the office facility on the Oakland University campus in 1985, the HRC had its own physical structure in Auburn Hills, MI. The 1987 contract negotiations cycle was a pivotal moment in the transition of Joint Activities. The JOBS program was expanded in a new memorandum of understanding. The JOBS bureaucracy increased exponentially as the corporation

UAW-GM People, UAW-GM Center for Human Resources, Millennium Issue, Winter 2001, p 6. 71 UAW-GM Report: Quarterly Newsletter, "New UAW-GM Human Resource Center Begins with a Bang" Spring 1985, p. 1. Notice of Commencement, Register of Deeds, State of Michigan, County of Oakland, User 9048, p. 501, Name of party contracting improvements: UAW-GM Human Resource Center, a Michigan Nonprofit Corporation, Address: Northfield Plaza 2, 5700 Crooks Road, Troy MI 48098, June 28, 1985. 72 Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, "The name of the Corp. is UAW-GM Human Resource Center," CIN no. 895-076, October 10, 1985. The registered office f the UAW-GM Human Resource Center was registered as 300 East Long Lake Road, Suite 380, Bloomfield Hills, MI, 48013. See Appendix C, Part IV.

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committed to Secure Employment Levels, a form of guaranteed employment.

There

were 366,515 UAW members working for GM in 1987. GM car sales were at 5,213,205 74

vehicles which amounted to 35 percent of the U.S. market.

Quality of Work Life

would appear for the last time in the National Agreement as a distinct provision or memorandum of understanding. Up to this point labor-management cooperation consisted of Quality of Work Life experiments at the individual plant level. A new provision in 1987 national agreement provided the basis for a change in emphasis from the factory floor to the corporate level. The cooperative rhetoric shifted the emphasis from employee self-actualization to corporate competitiveness. A "Product Quality" letter appeared in the national agreement that introduced the term "Quality Network" (QN) into the lexicon of UAW-GM industrial relations. QN programs immensely expanded the number appointed representatives within the joint programs framework. The new appointed representatives worked with management cross the full range of company divisions. QN further established the structural basis for much of the labor relations initiatives spelled out in the Warren strategy. QN also provided a platform for the political objectives of Stephen Yokich. The Yokich faction used the rhetoric of product quality and job security to its political advantage to both eliminate his chief rival Don Ephlin and established an organizational bureaucracy with QN that served as a powerful political machine. Yokich was determined to capture the General Motors Department and erase the QWL from the labor-management lexicon. 73 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Appendix K, Memorandum of Understanding, Job Opportunity Bank-Security (JOBS), October 8,1987, p. 191-201. See Appendix D, Part VA. Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Attachment C, Memorandum of Understanding, "Memorandum of Understanding Goals and Objectives of JOB Security and Operational Effectiveness," October, 1987, p.217-219. See Appendix D, Part VB. 74 Annual General Motors Employment Level of GM-UAW Represented Employees, GM Market Share and Vehicle Sales, UAW Research Department, 2009, Appendix G, Table 1.

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Don Ephlin's hold on the GM Department deteriorated since the controversy over the Warren letter. The PEL program was instrumental in maintaining Ephlin's presence among UAW representatives. The QWL conferences strengthened Ephlin's relationship with the growing ranks of trainers and appointed representatives within the joint bureaucracy. The QWL program renewed the emphasis labor-management cooperation, but the core philosophy was changing. The 1987 contract cycle was the last time QWL appeared as a prominent contract provision because Stephen Yokich was now in charge 75

of the GM Department.

Yokich was determined to make joint programs his own. The

QWL program went beyond the "self-actualization" of the workforce. The objective of QWL was "directed at organizational change to improve the quality of employees' lives and to enhance the corporation's efforts to become a world-class competitor." Corporate competitiveness was both the underlying theme of joint processes and the organizing philosophy of the Human Resource Center. The Joint Activities Program were further expanded by increasing the responsibilities of the existing joint committees, establish additional structure and further integrating the union bureaucracy into the GM's culture. GM and UAW agreed to a new Memorandum of Understanding-Joint Activities. The new memorandum redefined "jointness" in a way that diminished the role of the union in creating joint programs. For GM management, the 1984 definition of jointness strayed too far into the territory of management's prerogative to run a business. In 1984 the contract stated, "the concept of jointness" is understood to mean that the decisions for these activities will be jointly

Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding Quality of Work Life, October 8, 1987, p.256-258. See Appendix B, Part VD.

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conceived, implemented, monitored, and evaluated."

In 1987, the word "conceived"

was replaced by "developed." The union's role in the decision making process was limited to discussing ideas regarding jointness. GM historically guarded managerial prerogative as defined by paragraph (8) in the GM-UAW National Agreement. The 1987 language stated, "the term jointness" is understood to mean that concepts for these 77

activities to be jointly developed, implemented, monitored, and evaluated."

The

functional role for the union was not to conceive the programs, but rather to assist management and their implementation. The responsibilities of the Executive BoardJoint Activities were expanded. The 1987 contract reaffirmed the Board's authorities to direct the National Joint Skill Development and Training Committee, the National Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life, the National Committee and Attendants and National Substance Abuse Recovery Program, the Tuition Assistance Program, the 78

JOBS program, PEL and all national joint committees and activities.

The

responsibilities of the Executive Board were increased to coincide with the emerging Quality Network program. After Yokich took over the GM department he put his stamp on joint programs. The Paid Education Leave was turned into a political tool for the Yokich administration. The 1987 agreement established local PEL programs. Local PEL enable the Yokich regime to directly reach the rank-and-file. 1ft

Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, September 21, 1984, Memorandum of Understanding-Joint Activities, p. 239. See Appendix B, Part VE. 77 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding -Joint Activities, October 8, 1987, p.243. See Appendix B, Part VE. 78 UAW-GM Report, Contract Highlights, "Joint Activities to be Expanded, Improved, Better Coordinated," October 1987, p. 18. Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding -Joint Activities, October 8, 1987, p.244. See Appendix B, Part VE.

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Local union and management officials were more closely integrated into the emergent human resource bureaucracy with the creation of a Local Joint Activities Committee. The Local Joint Activities Committee was "the appropriate local facilitating mechanism for all local joint activities is a Local Joint Activities Committee consisting of the President of the Local Union, Shop Committee Chairman and members of the Shop Committee, Plant Manager, Personnel Director and other appropriate Management Representatives. The Local Joint Activities Committee is responsible for actively supporting and directing the Local Joint Skill Development and Training Program, Local Quality of Work Life Process, Local JOBS activities and to provide coordination among 79

all other local joint activities." The joint funds formula was enhanced to generate more money for Joint Activities. An "overtime penalty" was negotiated and enrich the National Funds. The overtime formula was increased from fifty cents to a $1.25 per overtime hour worked per overtime hour worked in excess of five percent. The UAW referred to increases in joint funds formula is based on overtime as penalties. The paradox of that description lies in the fact that joint funds neither belonged to the union nor benefited the membership without permission from the corporation. Joint Funds expenditures were contractually dedicated to the purpose improving the competitive position of General Motors. The guidelines for the use of joint funds were also made more flexible in the agreement. "Funds allocated as Reservoir Funds may be used for National activities, upon the approval of the Executive Board-Joint Activities." There were shortfalls in National Funds because of all of the activities at the national level. The Human Resource Center 79 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding -Joint Activities, October 8,1987, p.245-246. See Appendix B, Part VE.

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was gobbling up in excess of $75 million per year. At the same time the nickels that were set aside in the Reservoir Fund were piling up. An additional provision was added regarding the governance of joint funds in the event of plant closings. Every individual plant held a pool of Local Joint Funds. The question was; what would happen to those 80

local training funds in the event of a plant closure? The rationale for the Reservoir Fund was to assist small locals to gain access to training funds to augment the lack of local joint funds. This was a period of human resource experimentation. For example, if a small local needed $1 million for a pilot program to develop a special training project and the cost far exceeded their local joint funds resources, they could apply to the Reservoir Fund. It was like a grant fund that small locals could apply to for training funds. Local funds were invariably used up quickly because there was no oversight and locals exercised a great deal of autonomy in how the money was spent. That all changed when Yokich took over the General Motors department. Before Steve Yokich came to the GM department local union officers and international representatives were free to allocate joint funds within their fields of discretion. Before Yokich's arrived at the GM department it was not unusual for a QWL coordinator to budget over $1 million for training projects. There was a lot of money freely available in joint funds at the time. Dick Danjin, the QWL coordinator for the Chevrolet Gear and Axle was told by his boss at the international union, Ted Miller that $1.5 million was available for him to do Quality Work Life. While Danjin was putting

Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding -Joint Activities, October 8, 1987, p.245-248. See Appendix B, Part VE. UAW-GM Report, Contract Highlights, "Joint Activities to be Expanded, Improved, Better Coordinated," October 1987, p. 18.

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together his budget, his colleague Larry Jolly made a request for funds for Social Technical Systems training: Ted (Miller) told me to ask you to put a quarter of $1 million in the budget to do STS. So I did. The following Friday Ted Miller came to my office—just to give you some idea of the money that we had in those days, he said "Dick did you put a quarter million dollars in the QWL budget for STS?" I sure did. He then said," making it a half of a million." No problem. That's how much money was being thrown around in them days. After Yokich arrived in the GM department all requests for funding and to be approved by his administrative assistants. QWL and the Human Resource Center were destined for dramatic change under his administration. The Joint Skill Development and Training became more prominent in the 1987 contract. The Memorandum of Understanding Joint Skill Development and Training expanded the duties of the national committee, and placed the Local Joint Skill Development and Training programs within the field of discretion of the Local Joint 82

Activities Committee.

Jointness functioned as a top-down system. From an

organizational standpoint, the joint bureaucracy remained vertically integrated. The administrative power flowed from the top. The UAW and General Motors wanted more of appointed representatives to administer the growing joint bureaucracy. The union in the corporation acknowledged 81 Dick Danjin Interview, February 10, 2007. 82 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding -Joint Skill Development and Training, October 8, 1987, p. 252-254. See Appendix B, Part VF.

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the "need for additional representatives to assist Shop Committees in coordinating joint programs, in those plants which have demonstrated that an active Joint process is in place. Accordingly, it was agreed that within ninety (90) days following these negotiations, forty five (45) Joint Activities Representatives positions will be made available for appointments by the International Union, in accordance with the guidelines established by the UAW-GM Human Resource Center and approved by the Executive 83

Board-Joint Activities."

The Human Resource Center was becoming the center of

training activities. The health and safety bureaucracy was also significantly expanded in the areas of health and safety training, ergonomics, job design, fatality prevention, chemical hazards, and cardiovascular risk reduction. UAW and General Motors were creating an extensive health and safety bureaucratic structure in tandem with the Skill Development and Training programs. The committee structures in the health and safety bureaucracy continued to spin off subcommittees and special "task force" assignments for appointed 84

representatives.

While the new structures continued to multiply within a specific field

of discretion, they also created the need for additional staff, trainers and training programs. All of which added to the growth in the joint bureaucracy. The organizing principle for joint activities was focused on making sure that General Motors would remain a world-class competitor. According to the 1984 and 1987 Joint Activities contract language corporate competitiveness was driven by labormanagement trust and a contented workforce. In turn, Quality of Work Life, job 83 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Joint Activities Representatives, October 8, 1987, p.498. See Appendix B, Part VM. 84 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, "Attachment A, Memorandum of Understanding -Health and Safety," October 8, 1987, p. 292-296. See Appendix B, Part VG.

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satisfaction and viable job security were all contingent upon General Motors producing a quality product. Therefore, product quality became the organizing principle of the next phase in the developing joint bureaucracy. The 1987 contract included the preliminary launch of GM's comprehensive industrial relations program called Quality Network (QN). Product quality was the organizing principle for this new provision, but it represented much more. QN represented a technical break from the constitutional UAW. That was the difference between QWL and QN. QWL programs functioned within the UAW constitutional framework. With QWL there were all sorts of experiments with social technical systems (STS). The idea behind STS was to establish an amicable marriage of social and technical systems in order to have a better work environment. A work environment occupied by a content workforce would theoretically produce top-quality products and guarantee profits and security for everyone. QWL programs didn't (or shouldn't) intrude into traditional areas of collective bargaining such as wages and working conditions. QN represented a shift away from the employee involvement programs of QWL. QN was more directly targeted at how work was being done in workplace and how to circumvent contractual work standards. Quality Network made its first appearance in the National Agreement of as a modest letter from Al Warren to Donald Ephlin. The UAW and the corporation committed to establishing a Corporate Quality Council that was "devoted to the subject of quality both on the national and local levels, exemplified by the institution

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of improvement teams in plants, strategy teams on the divisional and group levels, and 85

the formation of the UAW-GM Quality Network on the national level." 1987 Joint Program Structure GM/ UAW

Local Health & Safety

National Joint Committee Health & Safety

Executive Board Joint Activities

HRC

Corporate Quality Council

National Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge.

National QWL Committee

Local Joint Activities Committee

Car & Truck Groups Quality Council

Local Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge.

Tuition Assistance

Local Job Opportunity Bank Security

Component Groups Divisional Quality Council

National Job Opportunity Bank Security

Substance Abuse

Local Quality Work Life

Plant Quality Council

Growth & Opportunity Committee

National Paid Education Leave

Local Paid Education Leave

Quality Network Steering Committee

Attendance

National Joint Skill Develop & Training

Local Joint Skill Develop & Training

National Joint Training Programs

Local Joint Training Programs

Source:1987 GM-UAW National Agreement

Figure 4: 1987 Joint Program Structure The bureaucratic framework or the Quality Network mirrored the corporate structure already in place within General Motors and the UAW. The overarching governing body of QN, the Corporate Quality Council was co-chaired by the GM 85 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 99, "Product Quality," October 8, 1987,p.491-492. See Appendix B, Part VK.

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president and by the union GM Department Vice President. Like Joint Activities, the corporate divisional, UAW regional and local plant Quality Network structures were occupied by corporation and union representatives and their appointed representatives. The Director of the UAW-GM Department appointed International UAW Quality Representatives to serve on the Car and Truck Groups Quality Councils and Component Divisional Quality Councils. The Plant Quality Council included a member of the Plant Manager's staff, Shop Committee Chairman, local union president, UAW Regional Servicing Representative and an appointee by the Director of the UAW-GM Department. A Quality Network Steering Committee was established to develop and implement guidelines for the new program.

(See Figure 4)

The purpose for a comprehensive Quality Network was a commitment by the top union and corporate leadership to produce a quality product. While QN was clothed in the familiar rhetoric of product quality and job security, the focus of quality programs shifted from the workforce to the corporate bottom line. The QN emphasized the wellbeing of the corporation and customer. Quality Network was announced in a separate memorandum that was printed on the inside of the back cover of the published 1987 GMUAW National Agreement. Three corporate benchmarks were established by Quality 87

Network: product quality, industry market share and the job security of its employees. Those benchmarks were the metrics that measured the performance of Quality Network. The changes in the 1987 National Agreement also heralded changes in the UAWGM Human Resource Center corporate structure. In 1987, the Metro-PREP was Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 99, "Product Quality," October 8, 1987, p.491-492. See Appendix B, Part VK. 87 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, October 8, 1987, The "Toledo Accord" printed on the inside of back cover of the 1987 National Agreement contract book.

315

dissolved and the HRC absorbed the organization's staff and financial resources. The HRC applied to the Internal Revenue Service for 501(c)3 tax-exempt status as a part of the process. It was necessary for the HRC to acquire 501 (c)3 "public charity" status in 88

order to absorb the assets of the Metro-PREP.

The sole source of financial resources

for the CHR was the UAW-GM Nickel Fund and the JTPA funds granted by the Governor of Michigan. There were no other fund-raising programs in existence or planned. The Human Resource Center was organized as a "nonprofit corporation created in May of 1984 as a joint effort involving General Motors Corp., the United Auto Workers and the State of Michigan in order to provide administration, development or coordination of training strategies and joint programs established to training and retrained displaced workers to enable them to become gainfully employed and to enable their employers to become competitive in the world marketplace." The HRC absorbed the financial resources of the GM-UAW Pontiac Retraining and Employment Program. The HRC was "an active conduit for the UAW-GM Nickel Fund provided to the GM-UAW Pontiac Retraining and Employment Program (PREP), a Michigan non-profit corporation granted 501(c)3status under the Internal Revenue Code (EIN 38-2493220). The Metro PREP organization is currently in the process of dissolution, with all assets and personnel being absorbed by the applicant which will continue the "JTPA" and "Nickel Fund" 89

retraining programs previously developed and sponsored by Metro PREP."

The HRC

was administered by a six-member Board of Trustees, three of whom are appointed by the United Auto Workers and three of whom are appointed by General Motors. 88 Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501 © (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, Form 1023, EIN 38-2533493,13 August 1987, Part III-l, p.l. 89 Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501 © (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, Form 1023, EIN 38-2533493, 13 August 1987, Part III, p. 2.

316

The directors of the HRC were same structure that was identified in 1987 GMUAW National Agreement as the "Executive Board-Joint Activities." The co-directors of the Executive Board included the Vice President of Industrial Relations of General Motors Corp. and the Vice President and Director of the GM Department of the UAW. Each co-director appointed in an equal number of people from their respective 90

organizations as members to the Board.

In the articles of incorporation for the JSDTP 91

and the Human Resource Center Board was one in the same.

On December 29,1987,

the HRC was granted tax-exempt status backdated to the original date of the tax-exempt 92

the application submitted to the IRS on July 8,1987.

The HRC continued to operate

under this configuration until 1992. The bargaining trends in joint programs shifted after Stephen Yokich took over the GM department in 1989. The most important development in the 1990 national agreement was the expansion of the number ofjoint program representatives under Document 46. The Quality Network program continued to grow by establishing new organizational structures and added a host of additional appointed QN representatives to the ranks of joint activities. The PEL, JOBS, substance abuse, and health and safety programs also expanded as did the need for additional appointed representatives. The growing joint bureaucracy required additional training and financial resources, so the 90 Labor Contract, Agreement General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding-Joint Activities, Section I. Executive Board-Joint Activities, October 8, 1987, p. 244. 91 Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, "UAW-GM Skilled Development and Training Program," Article V. "Incorporators" CIN no. 895-076, 8 June 1984, p. 2. Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, UAW-GM Human Resource Center, if Board of Trustees: Donald F. Ephlin and Alfred S. Warren Jr., Co-President & Co- Executive Directors, CIN no. 895-076, June 8, 1984, p. 2. See Appendix C, Part III. 92 Letter James J. Ryan, Internal Revenue Service District Director to UAW GM Human Resource Center, 317 December 29, 1987.

joint funding formula was modified to generate more money. The Quality Work Life terminology began to disappear. It was replaced by "Human Resource Development." The QWL was a moniker associated with Don Ephlin, the darling of Al Warren's corporate industrial relations department. Warren and Ephlin were already at work implementing the next generation of quality-driven joint programs when he was ousted from the GM Department by Yokich. The change in leadership created a sudden role reversal for the UAW and GM. This time the union acted and management reacted. Corporate industrial relations adjusted to the new political reality in the union. They had already decided that the social technical systems that characterized the QWL programs didn't deliver the control over how the work at the point of production they had hoped for. Corporate industrial relations repackaged Ephlin's joint program as Quality 93

Network. The Memorandum of Understanding-Quality of Work Life was changed to Human Resource Development in 1990. GM and the UAW emphasized that people were their most important asset. The "focus should revolve around People and the beliefs and value of the Quality Network, recognizing that the total involvement of People and all that we do is essential to job security and the success of both the UAW and the 94

Corporation."

There was a "need for organizational strategies that focus on large 95

systems change and the integration of all people involvement efforts."

Training was

made available to international and local union and management representatives at the Human Resource Center. 93 Danjin Interview, 2-15-2006. 94 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding -Human Resource Development, September 17, 1990, p.275-277. See Appendix B, Part VIA. 95

Ibid.

318

Quality Network emerged was the framework for the new corporate industrial relations. The Quality Network Document 40 defined the makeup and function of the Plant Quality Council. It consisted of the "President of the Local Union, Shop Chairman and members of the Shop Committee, UAW Regional Servicing Representative, Plant Manager, Personnel Director, other appropriate Management Representatives, Joint Activities Representatives, were provided, and the UAW Quality Network Representative 96

appointed by the Vice President and Director of the UAW National GM Department." The duties of the Quality Network Representatives were to assist in the implementation of the Quality Network processes and related Action Strategies as directed by the Plant Quality Council. Quality Network began as a quality assurance process, but as time went on, it morphed it a workforce management system. QN was an industrial relations 97

system that functioned "independent of the grievance procedure."

QN programs were

directed by Quality Council decisions which meant they were joint labor-management agreements. If workers on the shop floor had a problem with the QN working conditions, there was no avenue of redress. The Quality Network Action Strategies originated from a quality strategy conference held in Toledo, Ohio in 1987. The result of the conference was the "Toledo Accord," joint partnership in "addressing processes, engineering and manufacturing methods, and the work environment throughout General Motors." It was the basis for GM's total quality management system called "Quality Network." Quality Network was Thomas L. Weekley and Jay C. Wilber, United We Stand: The Unprecedented Story ofGMUAW Quality Partnership, (New York: McGraw-Hill 1996), p.76-77. Weekley and Wilber were Center for Human Resources Co-Directors when they authored this book. 97 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 40, "Quality Network," September 17, 1990, p.418-421. See Appendix B, Part VIE.

319

the "one process for managing General Motors, jointly developed by GM and the UAW 98

leadership, encompassing participative management at all levels of the corporation." The notion of "participative management" was an illusion. GM never wavered from the exclusive right to "hire; promote; discharge or discipline for cause; and to maintain discipline and efficiency of employees" or forget that the "products to be manufactured, the location of plants, the schedules of production, the methods, processes and means of 99

manufacturing are solely and exclusively the responsibility of the Corporation."

The

Quality Action Strategies were developed under the pretext of improving quality, satisfy the customer, make GM more competitive, and thereby strengthen job security. The number of Quality Network Action Strategies grew to thirty-eight by 2003. In 1990 Quality Network programs permeated every aspect of work life. Quality Councils were making decisions that defined and controlled working conditions. Joint Activities provided the manpower and the funds necessary to execute QN programs. The most significant provision of the 1990 national agreement was Document 46. It established the permanent status of appointed Joint Activities representatives. These representatives were administratively generated as opposed to democratically elected. Joint Activities representatives held lifetime appointments as long as they didn't commit some grievous offense or turn against his political patrons in the UAW leadership. Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 40, "Quality Network," September 17, 1990, p.418-421. See Appendix B, Part VIE. 99 Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAW-CIO, June 24, 1940, Recognition, Paragraph 3(c), p. 6. Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the UAW-AFL/CIO, September 26, 2007, Recognition, Paragraph 8, p. 13. The management rights provisions in the 2007 National Agreement remains unchanged since 1940. See Appendix A, Part I. Quality Network, Overview of the UA W-GM Quality Network Action Strategies Work Shop Participant Manual, QN-2681, Prepared by: Quality Network Implementation Team, June 2003, p. 3-9. See Appendix F, Part I.

320

Document 46, established the formula for the number of Joint Activities representatives based the number of UAW represented workers in the plants. The formula ranged from one representative in plants with less than 200 workers, one representative for every 250 workers in plants with less than 5,000 workers and 1 for every 275 in plant exceeded 5,000 that exceeded 5,000.

Few plants exceed 5000. A rough estimate of Document

46 representatives can be determined by dividing the number GM employees by 250. In 1990 there were 277,036 hourly workers, divided by 250 account for at least 1,108 appointed representatives. The number of appointed representatives could exceed the number allowed in the formula at the discretion of management. The number of appointed representatives agreed to the corporation was a source of leverage when dealing with the union. The number of appointed Joint Activities representatives exceeded the number of democratically elected union representatives. The union administration that appointed the Document 46 representatives easily trumped the democratically elected representatives. The joint funds formula had to be adjusted to compensate for the increase in Joint Activities and reduction of the rank and file. Joint Activities added more appointed representatives to service QN. Joint Activities structures grew. The substance-abuse program was transformed into the Employee Assistance Program (EAP). A new structure was created in health and safety, called the Ergonomics Committee. The Local Joint Activities Committee was given additional authority over Local Human Resource Development, local Health and Safety, EAP and Quality Network. (See Figure 5) The national joint funds formula was increased because the Joint Activities bureaucracy was

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 46, "Joint Program Representatives," September 17, 1990, p. 433-437. See Appendix B, Part VIF.

321

expanding at the same time GM hourly employment levels were dropping. There were 277,036 UAW members working for GM in 1990. GM car sales were at 4,934,308 102

vehicles which amounted to 35.5 percent of the U.S. market.

The GM shed 89,479

103

between 1987 and 1990.

That created a problem for a funding mechanism that was

based on hours worked by UAW members. The so-called overtime penalty was increased from a $1.25 to $5.00 per hour.

102 Annual General Motors Employment Level of GM-UAW Represented Employees, GM Market Share and Vehicle Sales, UAW Research Department, 2009, Appendix G, Table 1. 103 Annual General Motors Employment Level of GM-UAW Represented Employees, GM Market Share and Vehicle Sales, UAW Research Department, 2009, Appendix G, Table 1. 104 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Memorandum of Understanding Joint Activities, Attachment A to the Memorandum of Understanding -Health and Safety," September 17, 1990, p. 261-270 and 312-327. See Appendix B, Part VIB and VIC.

322

1990 Joint Program Structure GM/UAW

National Joint Committee Health & Safety

UAW-GM Center for Health & Safety

Ergonomics Committee National Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge. Local Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge. National Job Opportunity Bank Security Growth & Opportunity Committee

Executive Board Joint Activities

HRC

Corporate Quality Council

National Human Resource Development

Local Joint Activities Committee

Car & Truck Groups Quality Council

Tuition Assistance

Local Job Opportunity Bank Security

Component Groups Divisional Quality Council

National EAP Committee

Local Human Resource Development

Plant Quality Council

National Paid Education Leave

Local Quality Network Committee

Corporate Quality Network Steering Committee

National Joint Skill Develop & Training

Local Joint Skill Develop & Training

National Joint Training Programs

Local EAP Committee

National Attendance Committee

Local Joint Training Programs

Local Health & Safety

Source: 1990 GM-UAW National Agreement

Local PEL

Figure 5: 1990 Joint Program Structure In 1992, GM and the UAW got into trouble over illegal transfer of Joint Funds to the Jobs Bank Fund. The HRC operated as a 501(c)3 for five years and in 1992 the IRS denied their appeal to continue to operate as a public charity. But the scandal over the Jobs Bank Fund rendered their effort to retain charitable status moot. In 1993, GM and 323

the UAW revised the HRC articles of incorporation to a 501(c)5 nonprofit private foundation. The 501(c)5 nonprofit status permitted GM to use joint funds to pay for contractual costs. The only noticeable change for the rank and file was benefits such as tuition assistance were transformed to taxable income. In 1995, UAW-GM incorporated yet another variation of the HRC, "UAW-GM Center for Human Resources".

The

CHR became the center of Joint Activities, Health and Safety, and Quality Network. By 1999, the HRC and the CHR spent over $3 billion on joint programs. The UAW Inc. model established a unique category of labor representatives. The CHR was created through collective bargaining though it was not considered a labor 107

organization according to the Department of Labor.

The CHR was a stand-alone

corporation that was funded by UAW members and GM. The CHR was a tax-exempt non-profit corporation that provided services to the UAW and GM according the national contract. Total disbursements are nearly $100 million per year that created significant tax breaks for GM. One-third was for administration; one-third was for UAW-GM programs and one-third for the 262 employees at the center. At least 50 of those employees were Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation. "UAW-GM Center for Human Resources," CIN no. 730-390, December 6, 1994, p. 1,2,4, 5, 6. See Appendix C, Part VI. UA W-GMPeople, UAW-GM Center for Human Resources, Millennium Issue, Winter 2001, p 5. Joint UAW-GM Program Website, General Information, http://207.37.252.232/uaw/joint_general.htm. 107 Kay H. Oshel, Chief, Division of Interpretations and Standards, Department of Labor, Employment Standards Division, Office of Labor-Management Standards, to William D. Hanline, 19 February 1998, letter in possession of the author. This letter is a response to Mr. Hanline's request for information regarding "Joint Funds" and training centers established by the UAW and corporations (GM, Ford, Chrysler etc.). "Although the Labor-Management Reporting Act (LMRDA) is not applicable to the joint union-employer organizations and the funds you refer to, several other statutes which do not fall within the scope of the Office of Labor-Management Standards authority may be pertinent." In other words the CHR is not a labor organization as defined by LMRDA. The LMRDA "provides for the establishment of certain joint union-employer organizations and trusts." "These centers may be tax exempt under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 501 ©5 as labor organizations, the definition of "labor organization" in the IRC and the implementing IRS regulations and rulings is different from LMRDA definition." Federal regulatory agencies have contradictory definitions.

324

Join Activities representatives appointed by the International Union.

In 1994 the

UAW was reimbursed $8.2 million for "wages, benefits and expenses for UAW 109

employees assigned to work at HRC."

LMDRA regulations indicated that joint

activities representatives were employees of the HRC or CHR, rather than the International Union. According to LMRDA regulations and interpretations: "Employees of a trust in which a labor organization is interested. As in the case of labor organizations, all individuals employed by a trust in which a labor organization is interested are "employees," regardless of whether, technically, they are employed by the trust, by the trustees, by the administrator, or by the trust officials in similar positions." That presented a peculiar situation for the staff assigned to the CHR because they received salaries and benefits negotiated by the Staff Council with the International Union, though the CHR employed them. Who did they work for the union or the center? Since the CHR was not considered a labor organization by the DOL, they were not reported in the UAW's annual LM 2 report. The 1993 National Agreement saw some additional changes to The Quality Network Program. There were additional organizational structures and Quality Network appointed representatives. For example, the newly created Quality Network Suggestion Plan Action Strategy added to the ranks of the Joint Activities. The Corporate Quality Council became the (North American Operations) NAO UAW-GM Quality Council. The NAO UAW-GM Quality Council directed all Quality Network activities that included 108

Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Department of Labor Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Form 5500, (1994), 3, Line h. 109 Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Return of 501(c)3Exempt Private Foundation, Form PF-990, (1994), 12, part XVII, Line 1C, "$8,243,749.00." 110 U. S. Department of Labor Employment Standards Administration, Office of Labor-Management Standards, LMRDA Regulations and Interpretative Bulletins, Section § 453.6 ©, 39.

325

new management quality and productivity improvement programs. In addition, the Division/Platform, the Automotive Components Group (ACG) and the Technical Staffs Quality Councils were created. (See Figure 6) The Plant Quality Council was changed to the Plant/Staffs Quality Council.

The JOBS program continued to grow even as GM

shed an additional 37,968 jobs between 1990 and 1993. There were 239,068 UAW members working for GM in 1993. GM car sales were at 4,666,988 vehicles which 112

amounted to 33.5 percent of the U.S. market.

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 40, "Quality Network," October 24, 1993 p. 399-404. See Appendix B, Part VIIA. Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 41, "Product Quality," November 15, 1993, p.405-406. See Appendix B, Part VIIB. 112 Annual General Motors Employment Level of GM-UAW Represented Employees, GM Market Share and Vehicle Sales, UAW Research Department, 2009, Appendix G, Table 1.

326

1993 Joint Program Structure GM/UAW

_L National Joint Committee Health & Safety

Ergonomics Committee

National Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge.

Executive Board Joint Activities

HRC

NAO UAW-GM Quality Council

National Human Resource Development

Local Joint Activities Committee

Division/Platform Quality Council

Tuition Assistance

Local Job Opportunity Bank Security

Powertrain Quality Council

National EAP Committee

Local Human Resource Development

Technological Staffs Quality Council

National Paid Education Leave

Local Quality Network Committee

SPO Quality Council

Local Health & Safety

Plant/Staff Quality Council

Local Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge. National Job Opportunity Bank Security

Growth & Opportunity Committee

National Joint Skill Develop & Training National Joint Training Programs

Local EAP Committee

Local PEL

National Attendance Committee

Source: 1993 GM-UAW National Agreement

Local Joint Skill Develop & Training

Figure 6: 1993 Joint Program Structure

327

Local Joint Training Programs

In 1996, the only structural change to joint programs was renaming the NAO UAW-GM Quality Council to "UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council." l 13 GM shed an additional 19,787 jobs between 1993 and 1996. There were 219,281 UAW members working for GM in 1996. GM car sales were at 4,743,557 vehicles which amounted to 31.3 percent of the U.S. market. The revised IRS status of the CHR opened the door for the union administration to use joint funds in new and creative ways. The following two examples illustrate the wide-ranging application of joint funds by the Yokich administration. The first example involved the use of joint funds to pay for lost vacation pay for UAW members resulting from the 54 day strike at the Metal Fabrication Center in Flint, Michigan. Gene Ridley editor of the UAW local 599 newspaper, The Headlight, wrote: "Anyone who was otherwise qualified, but for the strike, would receive the holiday pay and four shutdown dates will get it. We will give the company credit for that payment, that otherwise would have been made to the Joint Training Fund."

The second example was after GM

decided to close Buick City. The UAW offered several million dollars in Joint Funds to the City of Flint 1998 Federal Empowerment Zone project. The project involved a proposal by General Motors to donate GM property to The Flint-Genesee Growth Alliance.

UAW Region 1C Director, Cal Rapson (At the time he was also a CHR Co-

in Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 40, "Quality Network," November 2, 1996, p.412-419 See Appendix B, Part VII. 114 Annual General Motors Employment Level of GM-UAW Represented Employees, GM Market Share and Vehicle Sales, UAW Research Department, 2009, Appendix G, Table 1. 15 Jean Ridley, The Headlight, August 6, 1998, P.l. John F. Smith, Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and President, General Motors Corporation to Mayor of the City of Flint, Woodrow Stanley, "City of Flint 1998 Federal Empowerment Zone Application: Exhibit 1," General Motors Corporation Letter of endorsement, Community Development Empowerment Zone Strategic Plan, 1 October 1998, 1.

328

Director) committed Joint Funds to the City of Flint 1998 Federal Empowerment Zone application. The UAW's commitment to the Empowerment Zone is over ten million 117 dollars in Services during the next ten years."

This included the services of the CHR

as well. Art McGee, President of UAW Buick Local 599 committed three million dollars 118 of Joint Training Funds and one million dollars of Health and Safety funds. The City of Flint failed to receive the federal empowerment designation. The move to use Joint Funds to underwrite efforts to expand tax exempt zones was meant to make GM more competitive with the hope of attracting employment to Flint.

Cal Rapson to Mayor of the City of Flint, Woodrow Stanley, "City of Flint 1998 Federal Empowerment Zone Application: Exhibit 1," UAW Region 1C Letter of endorsement, Community Development Empowerment Zone Strategic Plan, 1 October 1998. 118 Art McGee to Mayor of the City of Flint, Woodrow Stanley, "City of Flint 1998 Federal Empowerment Zone Application: Exhibit 1," Local 599 Letter of endorsement, Community Development Empowerment Zone Strategic Plan, 1 October 1998, 1, 2. McGee never informed the Local 599 membership of this offer. The Joint Activities Coordinator for UAW Local 599 denied the existence of this letter and Art McGee's offered to contribute $4 million in joint funds to the Empowerment Zone Application. In 1998,1 attended a weeklong PEL Program hosted by UAW Local 599. It was afive-daysession that concluded each day with a question and answer forum. Every day a Document 46 appointed Joint Activities representatives addressed the group and explained the particular joint program he or she was responsible for. The Joint Activities Coordinator for UAW Local 599, Jerry Scott (Mr. Scott was the chairman of the shop committee, Ken Scott's brother.) explained his role in overseeing how joint funds were spent at the local union. Mr. Scott declared that all requests for joint funds at Local 599 were reviewed by him personally. During the question-and-answer session I asked Mr. Scott "Please tell the group how it is you came to the decision to spend $4 million of UAW Local 599 training and health and safety joint funds on the Empowerment Zone Application to create a tax-free zone for General Motors?" Mr. Scott declared that "it never happened." When I explained to Mr. Scott that I had copies of the letters from Region 1C Director, Cal Rapson, and similar letters from every UAW local union in Flint that were included in the Empowerment Zone Application. What's more, Art McGee was the only local union president to offer up joint funds in that effort. Mr. Scott replied, "that's a bald-faced lie!" I offered to show Mr. Scott copies of the letters because the copies of the letters were in my car. One of the other trainers called for a 10 minute break in the session and requested that I retrieve the letters. Mr. Scott read McGee's letter and declared, "this doesn't say what it says it says" and it refused to discuss it further. Another interesting point about the letters from Delphi East UAW Local 651 signed by the local union president, Danny Thetford and Chevrolet UAW local 659 president, Norman McComb. Both letters were written verbatim and both letters misspelled "Empowerment" as "Impowerment." Region 1C Director, Cal Rapson also denied any knowledge of the letters and the offer of joint funds. After and an initial discussion of the matter, Mr. Rapson refused to discuss it further. 329

The UAW's commitment to use Joint Funds to create a tax-free empowerment zone was important for two reasons. First, the 1998 Empowerment Zone application was that GM had given up on Buick City and offered to donate the land to the Growth Alliance. Therefore, any "training and retraining our (Local 599) members for any new work brought to this site" would be for non-GM work. Second, this indicated a philosophical change for the UAW leadership. In the 1989 open letter to the UAW membership entitled Open Response to Victor Reuther," co-signed by five former UAW presidents and vice-presidents condemned the use of tax abatements. "The system that allows GM or any other company to exploit the taxpayers—a practice long characterized by the UAW as "economic cannibalism"—is an issue to be decided as social policy and concerning which the union, both in the past and currently, has taken strong 119

objection."

Less than ten years later the International Union agreed to put 14 million

dollars of CHR services, Joint Training Funds and Health and Safety Funds on the table to create an a special tax free zone of "economic cannibalism." The UAW Administration obviously changed their mind. In 1999, the Joint Activities portion of the published National Agreement was larger than the traditional agreement that was subject to the grievance procedure. JOBS Program continued to grow even as GM shed an additional 20,696 jobs between 1996 and 1999. There were 198,585 UAW members working for GM in 1999. GM car 120

sales were at 4,974,359 vehicles which amounted to 29.2 percent of the U.S. market.

Leonard Woodcock and Douglas Fraser and Ken Bannon and Pat Greathouse and Irving Bluestone to UAW Membership, February 1989,9. 120 Annual General Motors Employment Level of GM-UAW Represented Employees, GM Market Share and Vehicle Sales, UAW Research Department, 2009, Appendix G, Table 1.

330

1999 Joint Program Structure GM/ UAW

r National Joint Committee Health & Safety

1

Executive Board Joint Activities

CHR

UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council

T

Ergonomics Committee

National Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge. Local Joint Council Job Security & Competitive Edge. National Job Opportunity Bank Security Growth & Opportunity Committee

National Human Resource Development

Local Joint Activities Committee

Group/Divisional Quality Council

Tuition Assistance

Local Job Opportunity Bank Security

Powertrain Quality Council

National EAP Committee

Local Human Resource Development

Technological Staffs Quality Council

National Paid Education Leave

Local Quality Network Committee

SPO Quality Council

National Joint Skill Develop & Training

Local Health & Safety

Plant/Staff Quality Council

Local EAP Committee

National Joint Training Programs

Local PEL

National Attendance Committee

Local Joint Skill Develop & Training

Source: 1999 GM-UAW National Agreement

Local Joint Training Programs

Figure 7: 1999 Joint Program Structure Quality Network got its own memorandum of understanding in 1999. The MOU defined Quality Network as GM's required system for all aspects of product development, manufacturing and labor relations. The Division/Platform Quality Council was renamed "Group/Divisional Quality Council. (See Figure 7) Management retained 331

control over all aspects of Quality Network, but considered "UAW leaders and members are valuable partners in the development of the process, the action strategies, and its 121

implementation plans." The Quality Network undermined union representation and the grievance procedure because anything that was decided by the Joint Quality Councils was not subject to the grievance procedure. What emerged from Quality Network was when a violation of the contract occurred; the committeeman couldn't do anything about it because he/she was prohibited from filing a grievance on a QN activity. It doesn't matter what was in the local agreement because Quality Network drove the shop floor. Indeed, QN established an alternative conflict resolution procedure sought "product quality" as 122

the outcome. Redeployment became mission of QN industrial relations intervention in 2003. Redeployment emphasized placing in to "meaningful work assignments, which include 123

regular productive assignments and non-traditional work."

Redeployment was a

process in which a Quality Network team decided how many people was really needed to do a job. For example, let's say there are twelve workers in a department and nine can do the work. The redeployment means three workers leave the department. The memorandum states that no one will be laid off as a result of redeployment. It doesn't say they won't lose their job. The continued lay-offs belied the promises of jobs security. 121 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 40, "Memorandum of Understanding Quality Network," September 28, 1999, p.422-438. See Appendix B, Part IX. 122 . Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, "Attachment "B" to the Memorandum of Understanding Quality Network Product Quality Resolution Process," September 18, 2003, p. 434-436. See Appendix B, Part XB. 123 . Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, "Attachment "A" to the Memorandum of Understanding Quality Network Implementation Redeployment and Meaningful Work," September 18, 2003, p. 431-433. See Appendix B, Part XA.

332

GM shed an additional 75,945 jobs between 1999 and 2003. There were 122,640 UAW members working for GM in 1999. GM car sales were at 4,666,868 vehicles which amounted to 28 percent of the U.S. market. Quality Network and "redeployment is an assault on a fair days work for a fair 125

days pay."

Additional attachments to the QN-MOU emphasized corporate marketing

plans, vehicle sales and training programs for the swelling ranks of Quality Network 1 "J ft

representatives.

Finally, in 2003, if the Joint Funds formula couldn't keep up with the

Joint Activities outlays, GM agreed to "make- available such additional monies as are 127

necessary for continued operation of Joint Activites." Quality Network was trumpeted by General Motors and the UAW as the "unprecedented story of the UAW-GM Quality Partnership" that was going to save the corporation and deliver job security to the rank and file. Instead, Joint Activities and QN "participative management" resulted in the loss of GM's U.S. market share from 35 percent in 1987 when Quality Network was first introduced, to 28 percent in 2003. (See Figure 8) The market share data disguises the fact that the total U.S. car sales increased from 14,895,772 in 1987, to 16,675,733 in 2003. GM's market share was indeed smaller, but the market was much larger. The billions of dollars spent on "quality" and "redeployment" resulted in the continuous reduction of the workforce from 366,515 in 124 Annual General Motors Employment Level of GM-UAW Represented Employees, GM Market Share and Vehicle Sales, UAW Research Department, 2009, Appendix G, Table 1. 125 . Dick Danjin Interview, February 15,2006. . Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, "Attachment "C" to the Memorandum of Understanding Quality Network Activities," September 18,2003, p. 437-442. See Appendix B, Part XC. Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, "Attachment "D" to the Memorandum of Understanding Quality Network Representative Training," September 18, 2003, p. 443-448. See Appendix B,PartXC. 127 . Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW (White Book-Bargainers Copies), Not to Be Published Letter, "Additional Funding," September 17,2003, p. 311. See Appendix B, Part XE.

333

1987, to 122,640 in 2003. (See Figure 9) Productivity soared. In 1987 GM produced 5,213,205 cars with 366,515 workers and in 2003 produced 4,666,868 cars with 122,640. Between 2008 and 2009 the UAW lost another 18% of its membership or 75,846 128

members. The total membership of the UAW stood at 355,191.

(See Figure 10) GM's

productivity nearly tripled.

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Figure 8: GM U.S. Market Share

128

David Shepardson, "UAW Lost 18 Percent of Members in 2009," The Detroit News, Washington Bureau, March 30, 2010. See Appendix G, Table 1. Form LM-2, Labor Organization Annual Report, Auto Workers AFL-CIO, March 29, 2010, p. 1.

334

GM-UAW Employees

o General Motors Truck Operations > Midsize and Luxury Car Group > Small Car Group Operations > Design and Engineering Centers > Manufacturing Center/Worldwide Facilities > Metal Fabricating Division > General Motors Powertrain > Service Parts Operations o Delphi Automotive Systems > Delphi Energy and Engine Management Systems > Delphi Chassis Systems > Delphi Harrison Thermal Systems > Delphi Interior and Lighting Systems > Delphi Saginaw Steering Systems o Additional Quality Councils > Allison Transmission Division > Delco Electronics Corp. > GM Locomotive Group These individuals have responsibility to assist in overall implementation of the Quality Network and the Division/Platform, ACG, Powertrain, SPO, and Technical Staffs levels. These joint Quality Network Representatives will be members of their respective Division/Platform, Powertrain, SPO, and Technical Staffs Quality Councils and will attend scheduled meetings.

•

The Group/Division Quality Councils will meet a minimum of four times per year. The General Managers/Vice Presidents for the above Group/Division Quality Councils, along with the assigned UAW International Servicing Representative from the GM Department will co-chair these scheduled meetings. The appointed UAW International Representative from UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff and the Management counterpart, along with the Group/Division co-chairs will determine the membership for such Quality Council meetings.

•

These Quality Council meetings will be supplemented by an annual group leadership meeting to be held once per year. The General Motors Group Vice President and designated UAW International Servicing Representative will co-chair this meeting. Attendees for Management will consist of the following: Group/Division General Managers, Personnel Directors, Group/Division Quality Network Representatives, Plant Managers, Plant Personnel Directors. Attendees for the Union will consist of the following: UAW International Representatives (Solidarity House, Regional, 503

Quality Network), UAW Group/Division Quality Network Representatives, Local Union Presidents, Local Union Shop Chairpersons. •

Plant/Staff Quality Councils will meet a minimum of once per month and shall consist of the following: President of the Local Union, Shop Committee Chairperson and that members of the Shop Committee, UAW Regional Servicing Representative, Plant Manager, Personnel Director, other appropriate Management Representatives, Joint Activities Representatives, we're provided, and the UAW Quality Network Representative appointed by the Vice President and Director of the UAW National GM Department. Management Representatives will be assigned and have the authority to perform the required management Quality Network responsibilities. It has recognized that the duties of the Quality Network Representatives are to assist in the implementation of the Quality Network process and related action strategies as directed by the plant quality Council. Additionally, the Quality Network Representatives will support the principle that all employees have a responsibility for product quality by exercising due care and diligence in performing their duties.

•

Minutes of all meetings will be taken and distributed to the members of the Quality Council.

•

Quality Network Representative Workshops may be scheduled during the term of this Agreement as determined by the Vice President and Director of the UAW-GM Department and the Vice President NAO Personnel.

•

The Plant/Staff Quality Council will implement a expeditious process flow for employees to voice their product quality concerns, independent of the grievance procedure, or timely resolution of such concerns based on the following: o Employee/supervisor discussion to attempt to resolve concern, consulting as required with plant quality resources. o If unresolved, the District Committeeman, or if requested will a cyst in the resolution of the employee's concern. o The supervisor and/or District Committeeman may request the assistance of the Quality Network Representatives to participate in the resolution of the concern. o Thereafter, if unresolved, the concern will be discussed with the Plant/Staff Quality Council and the next meeting. If unresolved, either Plant/Staff Quality Council Co-chair will request the issue to be referred to the Co-chairs of the next higher level Quality Council. Thereafter, such concerns, if unresolved, will be referred to the NAO UAW-GM Quality Council for discussion. o The Quality Network Representatives will advise the Plant/Staff Quality Council on the status of quality concerns referred to them. Feedback regarding the status of employee concerned will be provided to the originating supervisor and the employee on a regular basis by the plant Quality Network representatives until the concern is resolved.

•

The Quality Network Representatives will receive appropriate training necessary to effectively perform the above duties. Each Quality Network Representative will be 504

required attend appropriate personal skill enhancement training sessions including those offered at the Center for Human Resources associated with his/her product responsibilities. Guidelines for such training in the method of delivery will be established and communicated to Quality Network representatives. During overtime hours, such Quality Network Representatives will be scheduled to perform Quality Network related activities if they would otherwise have work available in their equalization group. •

Any issues related to the foregoing may be referred to the co-directors for the UAWGM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff for resolution, including unresolved Quality Council concerns at requiring cross-organization involvement prior to the discussion at the Leadership UAW-GM Quality Council.

Finally, during these negotiations the parties discussed the necessity that all GM employees must take individual responsibility for product quality. Management will provide employees with the appropriate training, methods and systems, materials, and equipment in an appropriate environment to perform their work. It is then incumbent upon employees to exercise diligence and properly performed there were to produce the highest customer-valued products. It is only through personal commitment from every GM employee to provide the highest customer-valued products that we will satisfy our 52

customers and maintain job security for all. Very truly yours, Gerald A. Knechtel. Vice President

52 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 40, "Quality Network," November 2, 1996, p.412-419

505

Appendix B PART IX:

1999 NATIONAL AGREEMENT

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING DOCUMENT NO. 40 QUALITY NETWORK During the course of prior negotiations, General Motors and the International Union, UAW, held extensive discussions about the quality of our products and services. There is an ongoing recognition on the part of both parties to the National Agreement that the cornerstone of Job security for all General Motors employees is the design, engineering, and manufacturing of the highest quality, customer-valued products and services. This is reflected in the extensive efforts both parties have devoted to the subject of quality, both on the national and local levels, exemplified by the formation and institution of the UAW-GM jointly developed Quality Network process. The Quality Network process is General Motors' only Total Quality Management System utilized in UAW-represented locations. Further, the parties a recommitted themselves to the ongoing implementation of the Quality Network. This jointly developed quality improvement process emphasizes customer satisfaction and enthusiasm, continuous quality improvement, and the elimination of waste in the design, engineering and manufacturing of products and services provided. During the past several years, the Corporation in cooperation with UAW leadership, together with the men and women of General Motors, have worked together within the spirit of teamwork to improve product and service quality. This spirit of cooperation has resulted in substantial improvement in the quality of the Corporations' products and services. The parties recognize that the design, engineering and manufacturing of the highest quality, customer-valued products and services is essential to secure the Corporation's position in the global market and assure job security. The Corporation stated that highquality products and services have to be the result of a total quality improvement process if General Motors is to continue to be the world leader in transportation products and related services. Accordingly, General Motors' process for total quality management is the Quality Network-the one process for total customer satisfaction and enthusiasm utilized in at UAW-represented locations. Although Management has the ultimate responsibility for the Quality Network, it is recognized that UAW leaders and members are valuable partners in the development of the process, the action strategies, and its implementation plans.

506

This relationship is reflected in the extensive efforts both parties have devoted to the subject of quality, both on the national and local levels, exemplified by the institution of quality councils at appropriate levels throughout the GM North American (GMNA) Region, Electro-Motive Division, and Allison Transmission Division. It is recognized that the point where product design, technology, process and materials come together and it must work in harmony is that the worker/supervisor level in the organization. High-quality products and services a result from a well managed process that motivates employees to work together within a spirit of teamwork to continuously improve customer satisfaction and enthusiasm. In this process, it is recognized that seeking opportunities for continuously improving product and service quality must be the foundation for customer satisfaction. It has acknowledged that it is ultimately Management's responsibility to establish and a sure product and service quality requirements. Further, it is Management's responsibility to provide the processes for a continuous quality improvement that support all employees based on the Beliefs and Values, as it recorded in the General Motors Corporate Policy Manual referenced as "Quality Network" (revised 1/10/95). This manual outlines specific policies to be followed throughout General Motors Corp. and states in part: "Guided by the Beliefs and Values, implementation of the Quality Network will lead to the highest satisfaction of the ultimate customers-those who buy GM products and use our services. This value system represents significant expectations. It is crucial that behavior is aligned with these values and that decisions and actions are tested against them. We must constantly monitor our behavior to be certain our actions are consistent with the commitments that have been made to the men and women of General Motors." It is recognized the performance of high-quality work is everyone's responsibility and, as a result, it is intended that the Quality Network Representatives and UAW leadership working together with local management will reinforce other ongoing quality improvement activities. The parties also discussed the necessity for all GM employees to take individual responsibility for product and service quality. Management's business planning process will include the necessity of for providing employees with the appropriate training, methods and systems, materials, and equipment in an appropriate environment based on the Quality Network Beliefs and Values to perform their work. It is done in common upon employees to exercise diligence and properly perform their work to produce the highest quality, customer-valued products and services. It is only through personal commitment from our GM employee to provide the highest quality, customer-valued products and services that we will satisfy our customers and maintain job security for all. Quality Council leadership at all levels within the GMNA Region, Electro-Motive Division, Allison Transmission Division and the UAW will review and apply training

507

and principles set forth in the Quality Network Environment Action Strategies to assure the necessary level of understanding to lead this effort. The general guidelines for the parties to provide additional support to employees in this quality improvement process are as follows: I. QUALITY NETWORK STRUCTURE The term of the 1993 GM-UAW National Agreement, restructuring within the corporation resulted in the NAO UAW-GM Quality Council being renamed the "UAWGM Leadership Quality Council." The following represents the Quality Network Structure: A. The UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council is co-chaired by the President and Chief Operating Officer of General Motors Corporation, the President of the GM North America Region and that the Vice President and Director of the UAW General Motors Department. All Group/Divisional Quality Councils, as listed herein, will be subject to and in compliance with the direction and support provided by this Council for Quality Network activities. The UAW-GM Leadership Council membership includes representatives from the GMNA Region Strategy board camp that and it designated UAW leadership. The UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council will meet a minimum of twice per year. The responsibilities of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council include, but are not limited to: 1. Providing direction and support for quality network activities. 2. Establishing annual objectives and goals. 3. Utilizing appropriate common measurements to monitor progress towards accomplishing the annual Quality Network Objectives and Goals as agreed to by the Council. 4. Reviewing Group/Divisional status reports on that gap closure initiatives for the annual Quality Network Objectives and Goals. B. In addition, the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council will review accompanying-wide new management quality or productivity improvement programs potentially involving UAW-represented employees prior to assigning resources for development and implementation. These reviews will extend it to the UAW the opportunity to provide input into management's plans and discuss the union support and involvement. It is management's desire to implement all such quality improvement processes cooperatively with UAW leadership at all levels. C. Similar reviews and opportunities for involvement in new management quality and productivity improvement programs or utilization of consultants, potentially involving UAW-represented employees, will be provided at the appropriate Quality Council level. This review will assure the UAW opportunity to comment on management's plans and to discuss the union's support and involvement.

508

Management recognizes that the UAW input to such improvement programs may create opportunities for collaboration and support. Accordingly, in an effort to avoid parallel programs, the parties agreed to establish a joint committee comprised of management representatives from the Quality, Reliability and Competitive Operations Implementation organization and the co-directors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff to discuss such opportunities for collaboration in support and to discuss and it resolve issues that may arise. In the event such new company-wide management quality and productivity improvement programs that the Union has agreed to support required training and/or instructional materials, the co-directors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff will assign appropriate resources to work with the designated management content experts for developmental purposes. Once approved by the development team, the training and/or instructional materials will be finalized by such co-directors for inclusion in the UAW-GM Quality Network training materials. GROUP/DIVISIONAL QUALITY COUNCIL MEETINGS In order to provide meaningful discussions, regular meetings as set forth below will be scheduled by the Quality Council Co-chairs at all Quality Council levels consistent with the direction provided by the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council. Attendance by co chairs is required in order to maintain organizational focus on continuous quality improvement and ongoing communications. The Group/Divisional Quality Councils are as follows: 1. GM North America Region GM Truck Group GMNA Car Group GM Technical Centers GM Metal Fabricating Division GM Powertrain Service Parts Operations Additional Quality Councils Allison Transmission Division Electro-Motive Division Other Quality Councils deemed appropriate by the co-chairs of the UAWGM Leadership Quality Council The Group/Divisional Quality Councils will meet a minimum of four times per year. The General Motors Managers/Vice Presidents for the above Group/Divisional Quality Councils and the assigned UAW International Servicing Representative from the GM Department will co-chair the scheduled meetings. The UAW International Representatives from the General Motors Department assigned to Quality Network and that the Group/Divisional Management counterpart, along with the Group/Divisional Co-chairs, will determine the 509

membership for such Quality Council meetings. In addition, the designated Management Representative from the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff will also be a member of the Group/Divisional Quality Council. D. These Quality Council meetings will be supplemented by a Group/Divisional leadership meeting to be held at least once per year. Addition meetings may be scheduled by mutual agreement of the Group/Divisional Quality Council Cochairs. The General Motors Group Vice President and designated UAW International Servicing Representative will co-chair this meeting. Attendees will consist of the following: • Group/Divisional Quality Council members, • Group/Divisional Quality Network Representatives, • Plant Managers, • Plant Personnel Directors, • UAW International Regional Representatives, • Local Union Presidents, • Local Union Shop Chairpersons. • UAW Document 46 Quality Network Representatives and Management Counterparts. E. The responsibilities of the Group/Divisional Quality Councils include, but are not limited to: 1. Preparing and monitoring specific business and action plans to accomplish the annual Quality Network Objectives and Goals and reviewing progress. 2. Providing direction and support for Group/Divisional Quality Network activities. 3. Reviewing Plant/Staff status reports on the gap closure initiatives for the annual Quality Network Objectives and Goals. 4. Submitting a status report to the core directors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff on gap closure initiatives prior to and for reviewing and each UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Meeting. F. Quarterly meetings with the respective Document 46 Quality Network Representatives and their Management counterparts will be coordinated by the UAW International Representative from the General Motors Department assigned to Quality Network and his/her Group/Divisional Management Quality Network counterpart. G. The Group/Divisional Quality Network Representatives consistent with the "Roles and Responsibilities and Personal Development Guidelines for Quality Network Representatives" (QN-1455). III.

PLANT/STAFF QUALITY COUNCILS A. Plant/Staff Quality Councils will meet a minimum of once per month and shall consist of the following: • President of the Local Union, 510

• • • • • • •

Shop Committee Chairperson and members of the Shop Committee, UAW Regional Servicing Representative, Plant Manager, Personnel Director, Other appropriate Management Representatives, Join Activities Representatives, were provided, or and UAW Document 46 Quality Network Representatives and their Management counterparts

B. The responsibilities of the Plant/Staff Quality Councils include, but are not limited to: 1. Preparing specific business and action plans to accomplish annual Quality Network Objectives and Goals and reviewing progress. 2. Providing direction and support for plant/staff Quality Network activities. 3. Reviewing gap closure initiatives for the annual Quality Network Objectives and Goals. 4. Supporting training for and implementation of the Quality Network Action Strategies. 5. Submitting a monthly status report to the Group/Divisional Quality Council Co-Chairs on gap closure initiatives. IV.

QUALITY NETWORK REPRESENTATIVES ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES A. Management Representatives will be assigned and will be provided appropriate time and authority to perform the required management Quality Network responsibilities. It is recognized that the duties of all Quality Network Representatives are to assist in the implementation of the Quality Network process and related action strategies as directed by the Plant/Staff Quality Council. B. Additionally, the Quality Network Representatives will support the principle that all employees have the responsibility for product and service quality by exercising due care and diligence in performing their duties as follows: 1. Understanding the Quality Network Action Strategies. 2. Coordinating achievement of the annual Quality Network Objectives and Goals with the Plant/Staff Quality Council, including but not limited to: • Supporting balanced implementation of the Leadership Initiatives to: > Build a Supportive Environment, > Create an Organization-Wide Customer Focus, > Synchronizing the Organization, and > Detect, Solved, and Prevent Quality Problems. 3. Minutes of all meetings will be taken and distributed to members of the Quality Council. 4. Assisting in the overall implementation of the Quality Network process consistent with the "Roles and Responsibilities and Personal Development Guidelines for Quality Network Representatives" (QN-1455). 511

C. Quality Network Representative Workshops may be scheduled during the term of this Agreement and is determined by the Vice President and Director of the UAW-GM Department and the Group Vice President-Labor Relations. D. The Quality Network Representatives will receive appropriate training necessary to actively perform his/her duties. E. Each Quality Network Representative will be required to attend appropriate personal skill enhancement training sessions, including those offered at the Center for Human Resources, associated with his/her responsibilities. Guidelines for such training and method of delivery have been established and communicated to the Quality Network Representatives. In addition, the parties agreed to investigate additional internal and external resources for development of training for advanced technical skills and certification for Quality Professionals. V.

PRODUCT QUALITY RESOLUTION PROCESS A. The parties also discussed employees having opportunity to raise product quality concerns in the course of carrying out their required work assignments. It is recognized that such concerns require proper attention and response in the spirit of being potentially valuable contributions to product quality improvement. B. As a result, the Plant/Staff Quality Council at each location will implement a process for employees to voice their product quality concerns, independent of the grievance procedure, for timely resolution of such concerns based on the following: 1. Employee/supervisor discussion to a tempted to resolve concern, consulting as required with plant quality resources. 2. If resolved, the District Committeeperson, if requested, will assist in the resolution of the employee's concerned. 3. The supervisor and/or District Committeeperson may request the assistance of the Quality Network Representatives to participate in the resolution of the concern. 4. Therefore, if unresolved, the concern will be discussed with the Plant/Staff Quality Council at the next meeting. 5. If unresolved, either Plant/Staff Quality Council Co-chair will request the issue to be referred to the co-chairs of the next higher level Quality Council. 6. Thereafter, such concerns, if unresolved, will be referred to the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council for discussion. 7. The Quality Network Representatives will advise the Plant/Staff Quality Council on the status of the quality concerns referred to them. 8. Feedback regarding the status of the employee concern will be provided to the originating supervisor and employee on a regular basis by the Plant/Staff Quality Network Representatives until the concern is resolved.

VI.

EMPLOYEE VEHICLE ASSISTANCE CONTACT (EVAC) 512

A. During these negotiations, the parties discussed issues regarding employee personal vehicle concerns. In that regard, the parties agreed that: 1. Employees having quality concerns with their personal GM vehicles or the vehicles of customers with whom they come in contact are encouraged to utilize currently unavailable dealer and marketing division channels; 2. If unresolved, such concerns may be referred for assistance to a representative designated by the Plant/Staff Quality Council with existing Corporate Guidelines and Policies; 3. Such representatives will be periodically provided a summary of recall and special policy notices via hardcopy distribution or through electronic medium, such as CD-ROM or the Quality Network Website. Guidelines for access and Quality Network Representative assistance for retrieval will be communicated to the Employee Vehicle Assistance Contact (EVAC) representatives; 4. Further, rally developed process awareness training materials will be made available on a request basis; 5. This process will be communicated to dealers to ensure their awareness and encourage their cooperation. B. The parties agreed to study the opportunity for even greater UAW leadership and employee involvement in the promotion of GM products, services and the customer assistance process. The co-directors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff will develop a plan to accomplish this goal. The plan will be reviewed with the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council for approval. QUALITY NETWORK SUGGESTION PLAN A. As a result of the UAW-GM joint administration and ongoing support of the Quality Network Suggestion Plan, significant improvement in the areas of participation, savings and processing time were experienced. The Company informed the Union that Management would continue to implement the Quality Network Suggestion Plan Action Strategy as a single suggestion process in all UAW-GM plant and staff locations. The parties further recognized the necessity for joint leadership involvement at the plant and staff levels in order to gain support and confidence from employees to submit their ideas and, in turn, to a cheese mutually established Quality Network Objectives and Goals. B. The parties discussed at length the purpose of the Suggestion Plan. Both parties agreed that the purpose of the Suggestion Plan is to enhance job security for all employees, not to reduce employment levels. Therefore, consistent with the objectives of the Quality Network Suggestion Plan guidelines, the parties agreed to place emphasis on: • Generating ideas that contribute to a save work environment for all employees. • Encouraging greater participation of employees in all aspects of the business. • Recognizing employees for their ideas. 513

• •

Encouraging cost reduction and continuous improvement in all aspects of our business. Encouraging a greater level of teamwork to recognition of team suggestions.

PLANNED MAINTENANCE The UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council as directed via the Quality Network Objectives and Goals, that the Quality Network Planned Maintenance Action Strategy is to be utilized at all UAW-GM locations as the one process for planned maintenance. The purpose of the Quality Network Planned Maintenance Action Strategy is to involve people to improve safety, quality, throughput, and that responsiveness and to reduce costs thereby enhancing overall job security. The parties agreed that Quality Councils at all levels will continue to measure and guide progress towards full implementation. CORPORATE MARKETING CAMPAIGNS A. Management will continue to provide the union with opportunity for input into Corporate Marketing campaigns. The parties discussed at length the importance of domestic vehicle advertising campaigns involving or detecting UAWrepresented J. nonemployee, and the positive impact the message such campaigns can have on our employees and customers. The Corporation informed the Union that it will schedule meetings between the leadership of GM's Vehicle Sales, Service, and Marketing (VSSM) Group and the Vice President on the UAW-GM Department and/or a designated representative on an as-needed basis to review future advertising and marketing efforts. During such reviews, the Union will be provided an opportunity to input into such efforts. B. The parties recognized the benefits of providing the Union the opportunity for input to development and implementation of national sales promotion activities, providing for joint participation by bargaining unit and salaried employees. These activities include the Ambassador Program, Auto Shows, Motorsports and the Olympics. Management informed the Union that it will continue the process utilized during the term of the 1996 National Agreement. Similar Local Plant or Staff initiatives will be discussed by the Plant/Staff Quality Councils. C. The co-directors for the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff will work with appropriate Management representatives from the Vehicle Sales, service, and Marketing Group to explore ways to develop an ongoing extra no media campaign reinforcing UAW-GM cooperation and its role and improving the quality of General Motors' products and services. VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS The UAW and GM have jointly developed the Four Phase Vehicle Development Process Action Strategy. The UAW participates in this process. To provide an awareness of future development and direction, GMNA leadership will provide the Vice President of the UAW-GM Department with a GM product and capacity plan 514

review on a periodic basis. New developments will be reviewed periodically, as required. XI.

XII.

LABELS AND/OR DECALS During prior negotiations, the Union expressed a desire for UAW members who have contributed significantly to improve product quality to be permitted to display on completed assembled vehicles and packaging and shipping containers a joint label or details certifying that the product is proudly built by GM workers who are members of the UAW. During the current negotiations, the Corporation agreed to continue this approach to employee recognition and assured the Union of its commitment to employee recognition through such practices in the component plants. ISSUES RESOLUTION PROCESS Any issues related to the foregoing may be referred to the co-directors of the UAWGM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff for resolution, including unresolved Quality Council concerns requiring cross-organization involvement prior to 53

discussion had the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council. International Union, UAW Richard Shoemaker Jim Beardsley Henderson Slaughter Richard J. Monczka Thomas W. Walsh

General Motors Corp. Gary L. Cowger Dean W. Munger J. C. Wilbur

53 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, Document No. 40, "Memorandum of Understanding Quality Network," September 28, 1999, p.422-438.

515

Appendix B PART X:

2003 NATIONAL AGREEMENT

PART XA:

ATTACHMENT "A" TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING QUALITY NETWORK IMPLEMENTATION REDEPLOYMENT AND MEANINGFUL WORK

During the term of the 1990 GM-UAW National Agreement and sure the direction of the North American Operations (NAO) UAW-GM Quality Council (currently referred to as the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council), the focus of the Quality Network evolved and changed from development to implementation. During the same period, GM North American Operations experienced operating losses requiring more efficient practices and a renewed focus on product quality. Implementation of Synchronous Workshops, Accelerated Workshops (i.e., PICOS), Lean Manufacturing and other quality improvement activities, such as, best practices, resulted in health and safety, ergonomic, and operational improvements affecting quality and the cost of GM products and services. In many cases, these activities resulted in UAWrepresented GM employees being placed in a JOBS Bank under the terms of the 1990 GM-UAW National Agreement. The Union leadership felt they could not be party to asking their members to assist in "working themselves out of a job" by supporting these efforts. In any joint effort, job security and "people issues" had to be considered so that people would be redeployed to meaningful work. This issue was discussed at the January 13, 1992, GM Quality Council (currently referred to as the UAW and GM Leadership Quality Council) meaning resulting and specific commitments to integrate synchronous efforts into the joint Quality Network Process and explore ways to employee people more effectively with meaningful work and help improve business. When funding for the JOBS Bank was exhausted and ended a program discontinued, management recognized that employee support and involvement in plant quality and productivity involvement activities were essential. As a result, on March 2, 1993 after the JOBS funding was exhausted and employees in the JOBS Bank were laid-off, an "Employment Policy" was made effect of which resulted in employees being retained at work and not laid-off when such employees were impacted by jointly initiated product quality and operational effectiveness improvement efforts. During the 1993 negotiations, the parties discussed the above events and the Union provided examples of successful redeployment processes. These redeployment processes, implemented at divisions and plants, resulted in people being retained at work and at redeployed to meaningful assignments after they had gone made available as a result of quality and productivity improvements and other initiatives. Following 1993 negotiations, the parties agreed to jointly develop guidelines for redeployment processes, similar to those reviewed by the parties, to assist plant and staff 516

locations with planning and redeployment opportunities. Such guidelines were intended to assist the local parties with the development of plans that that put first emphasis on redeployment of employees to meaningful work assignments, which include regular productive assignments and "non-traditional" work, as well as efforts to competitively retain and insource new work. According during these negotiations, the parties again restated their intent to not place employees in underutilized or unproductive assignments or only in contemplate utilization of the job security provisions of the National Agreement. Further, the parties agreed to reissue the document "Guidelines for Redeployment and Meaningful Work" (QN-2251). Following the effective date of this agreement, a survey will be conducted by the Co-Directors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff of all GM-UAW facilities to determine the extent of compliance with this provision of the agreement. The results of the survey will be communicated to respective Group/Divisional Quality Council Co-chairs. Thereafter, the Group/Divisional Quality Councils will work together to be certain all plants and staffs have a redeployment plan in place and have the communicated such a redeployment plan to affected UAWrepresented employees.

54 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, "Attachment "A" to the Memorandum of Understanding Quality Network Implementation Redeployment and Meaningful Work," September 18, 2003, p. 431-433.

517

Appendix B PART XB:

ATTACHMENT "B" TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING QUALITY NETWORK PRODUCT QUALITY RESOLUTION PROCESS

During the course of the past negotiations, the parties discussed employees having the opportunity to raise product quality concerns in the course of performing their regular work assignments. In doing so, employees play a crucial role in continuous improvement of our products and, ultimately, in meeting quality expectations of our customers and assuring the job security of UAW-represented employees. It is recognized that product quality concerns require an immediate and thorough response. The parties agreed the Product Quality Resolution Process set forth in this document provides for such immediate and thorough response; and they will, therefore, reinforces the value of the current process with all Quality Councils. The Plant/Staff Quality Council and each location is to implement a common process for employees to voice their product quality concerns, independent of the grievance procedure, for timely resolution of such concerns based on the following: PRODUCT QUALITY RESOLUTION PROCESS 1. Employee/supervisor discussion to attempt to resolve concerned, consulting as required with all the resources. 2. If unresolved, the District Committeeperson, if requested, will assist in the resolution of the employees concern. 3. If unresolved the supervisor and/or District Committeeperson will advise the joint Quality Network Representatives, who will assist in the resolution of the concern. 4. If unresolved, such concerns will be tracked and communicated to insure all affected employees are aware of the quality concern and resolution effort. 5. All documented concerns will be forwarded immediately by the joint Quality Network Representatives to the Co-chairs of the Plant/Staff Quality Council, who will designate an appropriate level of plant management and union representation to work towards resolution of the concern prior to read you at the next Plant/Staff Quality Council Meeting. 6. Thereafter, if unresolved, the concern will be discussed with the Plant/Staff Quality Council and the next meeting. 7. The status of all documented quality concerns raised through this process will be reviewed by the Quality Network Representatives with the Plant/Staff Quality Council at each meeting. 8. Feedback regarding the status of the employee concern will be provided to the originating supervisor and the employee on a regular basis by the Plant/Staff Quality Network Representatives until the concern is resolved. 9. If unresolved, either Plant/Staff Quality Council Co-chair may request the issue be referred to the co-chairs of the next higher level Quality Council for assistance to resolve the matter. 518

10. Thereafter, such concerns, if unresolved, will be referred to the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council for resolution. During the current negotiations, the parties acknowledge that several GM locations are using the process effectively, and that certain common factors generated in this success. These include, but are not limited to, the following: • Employees are aware of the Product Quality Resolution Process as defined in Document 40 of the 1999 GM-UAW National Agreement. • The joint leadership acknowledges the quality resolution process as a positive tool in resolving quality problems. • The process follows a standard practice from initial notification through resolution. • The process is tracked and it reported to the local joint leadership at the Plant Quality Council Meetings. Accordingly, the parties agreed that they will review current awareness materials for potential revision and distribution to all UAW-GM Quality Councils and employees during the first quarter of 2004. The purpose of such materials will be to encourage full awareness of and participation in the process by employees, supervisors, committeepersons, and Quality Network Representatives, and to jointly leverage agreedto best practices in implementing this critical aspect of the continuous improvement of products and services. Further, during these negotiations, the parties discussed how the Product Quality Resolution Process supports operators in their desire to build the highest quality products in our plants. Accordingly, the parties agreed that all quality concerns, documented under the provisions of this process, will be displayed consistent with the plant's existing local quality system. Further, the parties agreed that each Plant Quality Council will determine the appropriateness of incorporating this process within its all the procedures.

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, "Attachment "B" to the Memorandum of Understanding Quality Network Product Quality Resolution Process," September 18, 2003, p. 434-436.

519

Appendix B PART XC:

ATTACHMENT "C" TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING QUALITY NETWORK ACTIVITIES

I.

QUALITY NETWORK SUGGESTION PLAN As a result of the UAW-GM joint administration and ongoing support of the Quality Network Suggestion Plan, significant improvement in the areas of participation, savings, and processing time were experienced. The Company informed the Union that Management would continue to implement the Quality Network Suggestion Plan Action Strategy and is the single suggestion process in all GM-UAW plant and staff locations. The parties further recognized the necessity for joint leadership involvement at the plant and staff levels in order to gain the full support and confidence of employees who submit their ideas and therefore, achieved the jointly established Quality Network Objectives and Goals. The parties discussed at length the intent and purpose of the UAW-GM Suggestion Plan. Both parties agreed that the purpose of the Suggestion Plan is to enhance job security for all employees, not to reduce employment levels. In that regard, suggestions that specifically target illumination of a job or jobs will be deemed ineligible. Consistent with the objectives of the Quality Network Suggestion Plan guidelines, the parties agreed to continue to place special emphasis on: • Generating ideas that contribute to the health and safety of all employees. • Encouraging greater participation of employees in all aspects of the business. • Recognizing employees for their ideas. • Encouraging cost reduction and continuous improvement in all aspects of our business. • Encouraging a greater level of teamwork through recognition of team suggestions.

II.

PLANNED MAINTENANCE The UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council as directed via the Quality Network Objectives and Goals, that the Quality Network Planned Maintenance Action Strategy is to be utilized at all UAW-GM locations as the one process for planned maintenance. The purpose of the Quality Network Planned Maintenance Action Strategy is to involve people to improve safety, quality, throughput, and that responsiveness and to reduce costs thereby enhancing overall job security. The parties further agreed that Group/Divisional Quality Councils will direct Plant/Staff Quality Councils to attain Phase III status will be measured to the Quality Network reporting in assessment process.

In order to effectively gain knowledge from the MAXIMO database, The Quality Network Planned maintenance process requires accurate and complete data for input into the system. Therefore, it is expected that skilled trades and other assigned employees, will provide such accurate and complete data. In recognition of employee concerns, 520

Management has stated that such information from the MAXIMO database will not be used for disciplinary action, outsourcing, or subcontracting. It is understood that both parties will have full and complete access to MAXIMO data. CORPORATE MARKETING CAMPAIGNS AND VEHICLE SALES PROMOTION ACTIVITIES Following ratification of this agreement, the Co-Directors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Councils Support Staff and appropriate Management representatives from the Vehicle Sales, Service, and Marketing (VSSM) Group will establish any joint national committee having the responsibility to: • Develop ongoing external media campaigns and reinforcing UAW-GM cooperation and its role in improving the quality of General Motors' products and services (e.g., Olympics, Keep America Rolling, NYC Vehicle Delivery, etc.). • Continue to provide the Union in a timely fashion the opportunity for input into Corporate Marketing campaigns domestic vehicle advertising campaigns when domestic vehicle advertising campaigns involved or depict UAW-represented GM employees. • Enhance the current sales promotion program were redesign a new national vehicle sales promotion activity, providing for joint participation by UAW-GM active hourly, salaried, and retired employees (e.g., Talking It Up, GM in the Driveway, etc.). Funding for jointly developed and implemented projects will be derived from Corporate and/or Joint Funds based on the nature of the initiative, consistent with historic practices. Corporate funding will be subject to approval by the President of GMNA on a project by project basis. All the requests for joint funds will be submitted in accordance with the process set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding-Joint Activities. The newly established joint national committee will meet on a quarterly basis. All recommendations for this committee will be subject to review by the Co-chairs of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council. THE VEHICLE PROMOTION AND ASSISTANCE CONTACT (VPAC) In support of the new joint national committee, all employees currently designated as "Ambassador Local Coordinator" and "Employee Vehicle Assistance Contact" will be responsible for and designated as "Vehicle Promotion and Assistance Contacts" (VPAC). Management and UAW-represented employees will be identified from existing resources at all GM-UAW locations and will combine their roles in support of all joint vehicle and sales promotion activities. Further, during these negotiations, the parties discussed issues regarding resolution of employee vehicle concerns. In that regard, the parties agreed that: 1. Employees having quality concerns with their GM vehicles or the vehicles of customers with whom they come in contact are encouraged to utilize currently unavailable dealer and marketing division channels.

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2. Unresolved, such concerns may be referred for assistance to the VPAC Representatives. 3. Such representatives will be periodically provided a summary of current sales promotion activities, recall and special policy notices via hardcopy distribution or through electronic medium, such as CD-ROM or the Quality Network Website. Guidelines for access and Quality Network Representative assistance for retrieval will be communicated to a VPAC Representatives. 4. The existing Call-Center processes would be leveraged, including any future changes and/or enhancements. 5. The parties will develop and make available for VPAC Representatives process awareness training and materials. 6. This process will be communicated to dealers to ensure their awareness and encourage their cooperation. NATIONAL VEHICLE SALES PROMOTION ACTIVITIES The joint national committee, comprised of the Co-Directors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Councils Support Staff and representatives from the VSSM organization, will address program function, structure, activities, training, and communication materials. The current Ambassador Program will cease on December 31, 2003. The joint national committee will determine a potential replacement program to the existing Ambassador Program during the fourth quarter of 2003, which will include a premium component for conquest sales (maximum of $100 per vehicle) and it will not provide any premium for employees and eligible family member sales (i.e., GMS pricing). The premium must be used towards the purchase of a new, unused GM vehicle. Verification of all premiums will be subject to review, audit and charge-back. The brand name, "Ambassador," may be leveraged. In addition, it is understood that the effective date January 1, 2004, "Ambassador points" accumulated under the current "Ambassador Program," may be combined in applied to merchandise currently available for selection under the "non-monetary" recognition process associated with the Quality Network Suggestion Plan. Effective January 1, 2004, the merchandise options currently available under the terminated Ambassador Program will then be discontinued. Active UAW-GM employees and retirees will be notified during the fourth quarter 2003, as to their Ambassador point status. Such employees and retirees will be provided with Ambassador point status and information relative to the Suggestion Plan merchandise selection (i.e., website and is/or other material). Retirees, once notified, will have 90 days or until March 31, 2004, whichever is later, jury deemed their outstanding Ambassador Program points. LABELS AND/OR DECALS During prior negotiations, the Union expressed a desire for UAW members who have contributed significantly to improved product quality to be permitted to display on completed assembled vehicles and packaging and shipping containers a joint label or decal certifying that the product is proudly built by GM workers who are members of the 522

UAW. During the current negotiations, the Corporation agreed to continue this approach to employee recognition and assured the Union of its commitment to employee recognition through such practices in the component plants.

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, "Attachment "C" to the Memorandum of Understanding Quality Network Activities," September 18,2003, p. 437-442.

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Appendix B PART XD:

ATTACHMENT "D" TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING QUALITY NETWORK REPRESENTATIVE TRAINING

I. QUALITY NETWORK REPRESENTATIVE TRAINING GUIDELINES During the term of the 1999 Agreement, the parties discussed aspects of Quality Network Certification including curriculum, course content, training delivery, and other issues related to implementation of this certification process. During the 2003 GM-UAW negotiations the parties discussed at length the current status of the Quality Network Representative certification process and suggested enhancements for continuous improvement. The parties reviewed and approved a revised minimum curriculum for Basic Quality Network Representative Certification. The parties further agreed that, after the effective date of the 2003 GM-UAW National Agreement, all appointed Document 46 Quality Network Representatives and their Management counterparts who have not completed the former Quality Network Representative Certification requirements will continue to be required to achieve Basic Quality Network Representative Certification as outlined in this document. Further, all such Quality Network Representatives and any new appointed or assigned representatives are expected to prepare a training plan for approval by the Plant/Staff Quality Council within 30 days of appointment or assignment. Progress towards completion of the training plan will be reviewed with the Co-Chairs of the Plant/Staff Quality Council. This plan must result in completion of the basic certification curriculum within specified timeframes. Additionally, the parties agreed that Quality Network Representatives who, prior to the effective date of this Agreement, have fulfilled the requirements of the former Quality Network Representative Certification Process, will not be required to participate in the new Basic Quality Network Representative Certification Process. In the area of Basic Quality Network Representative Certification, it was agreed that the following classes continue to be required within specified timeframes: • Role of the Quality Network Representative (replaces Role of the Individual or Boot Camp) - within 60 days of appointment/assignment • Facilitator skills - within six months of appointment/assignment • Basic computer skills - within nine months of appointment/assignment > Microsoft PowerPoint > Microsoft Word > Microsoft Excel

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• • • •

Overview of the Quality Network Action Strategies - within 12 months of appointment/assignment Quality Network Problem-Solving Workshop - within 18 months of appointment/assignment Quality Network Error Proofing Workshop - within 18 months of appointment/assignment Other prerequisites for the Advanced Certification for Quality Professionals as determined appropriate by the Co-Directors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff

Quality Network Representatives will also be provided an opportunity to demonstrate evidence of proficiency for the above courses that will result in credit for completion. This evidence may include certificates from prior classes or on-the-job experiences. The UAW International Representative assigned to the Quality Network and his/her Group/Divisional Management counterpart will assess the submitted requests for proficiency based on the evidence submitted and will recommend a credit to the CoDirectors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Councils Support Staff. During the course of the 2003 negotiations, the parties also agreed to implement training for advanced technical skills in certification for quality professionals as part of the Quality Network Representative Roles and Responsibilities. During the first quarter of 2004, the Co-Directors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff will communicate to Quality Network Representatives the details of the Advanced Certification Process. This curriculums, referred to as Advanced Certification for Quality professionals, is being jointly developed between the parties. The objective of this training will be to further advance the capabilities and skills of the Plant/Staff and Group/Divisional Quality Network Representatives. In order to maintain their Quality Network Representative positions, it is mandatory that all Quality Network Representatives appointed or assigned after the effective date of the 2003 GM-UAW National Agreement successfully complete all Advanced Certification for Quality Professionals courses. Quality Network Representatives will also be provided the opportunity to complete a pre-test for each course. Current Quality Network Representatives should participate in the Advanced Certification for Quality Professionals training. Additionally, the parties agreed that, upon completion of the Basic Quality Network Certification process, all new Quality Network Representatives will be required to prepare a training plan for completion of the Advanced Certification for Quality Professionals process and submit to the respective Quality Council for approval. The plan, upon approval, will be forwarded to the Co-Directors of the UAW-GM Leadership Quality Council Support Staff. Progress towards completion of the training plan will be reviewed with the Co-Chairs of the Planet/Staff Quality Council. This plan must result in completion of the Advanced Certification curriculum within 36 months of achieving basic certification.

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The parties further agreed that the Advanced Certification curriculum will be made available to others within the Corporation on an as-available basis, with priority given to the new Quality Network Representatives. The parties further discussed and recommended that, when making Quality Network Representative selections and/or recommendations, Quality Council leadership take into consideration the significant investment in training and time there will be involved in achieving the basic and advanced certifications. Accordingly, the Quality Network Representative selection process should focus on respective candidates who will be able to maintain their position for an appropriate period of time commensurate with this investment as well as supporting the parties' joint quality improvement objectives. It is further understood that costs associated with the Quality Network Representative advanced certification process will be covered by joint funds consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding-Joint Activities. II.

SIMULATED WORK ENVIRONMENT During these negotiations, the joint parties discuss the creation of a Simulated Work Environment (SWE) to be located within the UAW at GM Center for Human Resources facility. The intent of this SWE will be to: • Accelerate the rate of development of certified Quality Network Action Strategy trainers. • Provide Quality Network Representatives and other plant/staff personnel with a hands-on understanding of key Quality Network Action Strategies/GMS Tools. Accordingly, the QN-GMS National Joint Committee will appoint a subcommittee to investigate and provide recommendations for implementation of the SWE.

This subcommittee will be appointed following the effective date of this Agreement and will report its recommendation to the QN-GMS National Joint Committee by the end of the first quarter 2004. Based on these recommendations, the QN-GMS National Joint Committee will give a specific direction toward the creation of the SWE and will monitor progress to completion by midyear 2004. National Joint Funds will be requested in accordance with the provisions of the 57

Memorandum of Understanding-Joint Activities set forth in this agreement.

Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW, "Attachment "D" to the Memorandum of Understanding Quality Network Representative Training," September 18, 2003, p. 443-448.

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Appendix B PART XE:

ADDITIONAL (JOINT FUNDS) FUNDING (UNPUBLISHED LETTER) GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION

September 17, 2003 Mr. Richard Shoemaker Vice President and Director General Motors Department International Union, UAW 8000 E. Jefferson Ave Detroit, MI 48214 Dear Mr. Shoemaker: This confirms the understanding reached during these negotiations regarding additional funding under the Memorandum of Understanding on Joint Activities. If, during the term of the 2003 Agreement, the Corporation and the Union determined that the accrued uncommitted fund balances are inadequate, the Corporation will make available such additional monies as are necessary for continued operation of joint activities. The provision of additional funding by the Corporation shall be subject to the implementation by the Executive Board-Joint Activities of all feasible measures to reduce and manage the operating cost of joint activities. In addition, the provision of any additional funding will be suspended in the event the Corporation experiences financial hardship due to events such as a significant decline in sales or market share, operating losses or significant 58

liquidity constraints. Very truly yours, Troy A. Clarke Group Vice President Manufacturing and Labor Relations

58 Agreement Between General Motors Corp. and the UAW (White Book-Bargainers Copies), Not to Be Published Letter, "Additional Funding," September 17,2003, p.311.

527

Appendix C ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION-JOINT UAW-GM CORPORATE ENTITIES PART I:

GM-UAW METROPOLITAN PONTIAC RETRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM

ARTICLE I: The name of the Corporation is GM-UAW Metropolitan Pontiac Retraining and Employment Program. Article II: The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized are to train, retraining and/or directly place dislocated workers, and all activities incidental thereto. ARTICLE III: 1. The corporation is organized upon a non-stock basis. 2. The corporation is to be financed under the following general plan: 50% funding from General Motors Corp. with matching funds from Michigan Job Training and Partnership Act III Discretionary Funds made available for distribution by the Secretary of Labor. The Corporation is organized on a Directorship basis. ARTICLE IV: 1. The address of the registered office is: 300 E. Long lake Road, Suite 380, Bloomfield Hills, MI 48013. 2. Mailing address: Same. 3. The name of the resident agent is: George A. Googasian. ARTICLE V: The names and addresses of all the incorporators are as follows: Russ Bressman Gary Johnson

59 West Huron Street, Pontiac, MI 48058 59 West Huron Street, Pontiac, MI 48058

59 Michigan Department of Commerce-Corporation and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, GMUAW Metropolitan Pontiac Retraining and Employment Program, Corporation Identification Number: 706-253, November 10, 1983, p. 1-2.

528

Appendix C PART II:

ADDENDUM TO THE CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION: GM-UAW METROPOLITAN PONTIAC RETRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM

ARTICLE II: Said corporation organized exclusively for charitable purposes, including, for such purposes than making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under 501(c)3of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code and the training, retraining and/or the direct placement of dislocated workers, and all activities incidental thereto. ARTICLE VI: No part of the net earnings of the Corporation shall inure to the benefit of, or be distributable to its members, trustees, officers, or other private persons, except that the Corporation shall be authorized and in power to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered to and to make payments and distributions in furtherance of purposes set forth in Article II hereof. No substantial part of the activities of the Corporation to influence legislation, and the Corporation shall not participate in, or intervened in open parentheses including the publishing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf on any candidate or public office. Notwithstanding any other provision of these articles, the Corporation shall not carry on any other activities not permitted to be carried on: a) By a corporation exempt from Federal income tax under §501 ©(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code, or b) By a corporation, contributions to which are deductible under §170©(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future tax code. ARTICLE VII: Upon the dissolution of the Corporation, assets shall be just sure did for one or more exempt purposes within the meaning of §501 ©(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code, or shall be distributed to the federal government, or to a State or local government, for a public purpose. Any such assets not so disposed of shall be disposed of by the Circuit Court of the county in which the principal office of the corporation is located, exclusively for such purposes or to such organization or organizations, as said Court shall determine which are organized and operated exclusively for such purposes.

Michigan Department of Commerce-Corporation and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, GMUAW Metropolitan Pontiac Retraining and Employment Program, Corporation Identification Number: 706-253, Addendum to the Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, September 25, 1985, p. 3.

529

Appendix C PART III:

UAW-GM SKILL DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAM

ARTICLE I: The name of the Corporation is: UAW-GM Skill Development and Training Program ARTICLE II: The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized are: This Corporation and is organized exclusively for the education and training of GM employees and the better men of the condition of those involved in the automobile industry, the improvement of the quality of their products, and the development of a higher degree of efficiency in their respective occupations, and to carry on any activities allowable by an organization described in Section 501(c)5 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (or corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law). Within those purposes, the Corporation's purpose is to promote and provide individual and group training, retraining and developmental opportunities to employees (including laid-off employees) of General Motors Corp. in no event is the Corporation to conduct for the purpose of granting credits or degrees, a will, Academy, seminary, college or other institution of learning, but the Corporation may sponsor or our range for training meeting to credits or degrees qualified institutions of learning. ARTICLE III: The corporation is organized up on a nonstock basis. 2. If organized on a nonstock basis, the description and value at its property assets are: none and a description and value of his personal property assets are: none. The corporation is to be financed under the following general plan: by camp that contributions to it of funds and property absolutely or in trust by payment by others of expenditures made by it, in furtherance of its purposes as herein stated and for no other purpose. The corporation is organized on a directorship basis. ARTICLE IV: 1. The address of the registered office is: 615 Griswold St, Detroit, MI 48226. Mailing address: UAW-GM Skill Development and Training Program Suite 326, Fisher Building Detroit, MI 48202

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3. The name of the resident agent at the registered office is: The Corporation Company. ARTICLE V: The names and addresses of all the incorporators are as follows: Donald F. Ephlin James H. Lain Robert L. Walker Alfred S. Warren Jr. Byron P. Crane Robert C. White

8000 East Jefferson, Detroit, Michigan 48214 8000 East Jefferson, Detroit, Michigan 48214 8000 East Jefferson, Detroit, Michigan 48214 3044 W. Grand Blvd, Detroit, Michigan 48202 3044 W. Grand Blvd, Detroit, Michigan 48202 3044 W. Grand Blvd, Detroit, Michigan 48202

ARTICLE VI: All of the property of this Corporation and accumulations thereof shall be held and administered to effectuate its purposes, and the following prohibitions apply: • No part of the earnings of the Corporation shall inure to the benefit of, or be distributed to, its members, trustees, officers, or other private persons, except that the Corporation shall be authorized and empowered to a reasonable compensation for services rendered and to make payments and distributions in furtherance of the purposes set forth in Article II. • No substantial part of the activities of the Corporation shall be lobbying, the carrying on of propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and that the Corporation shall not participate in or intervene in (including the publishing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. • Notwithstanding any other provision of these articles, the Corporation shall not carry on any activities not permitted to be carried on by a corporation exempt from Federal income tax under Section 501(c)5 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law). ARTICLE VII: Neither the Corporation, nor the trustees will discriminate in any way on the basis of race, color, creed, national or ethnic origin, sex, age, handicap, religion or political affiliation with respect to a) participation or admissions, b) use of facilities or the terms of participation, c) faculty or administrative staff, and d) any programs of the Corporation. ARTICLE VIII: Upon the dissolution of the Corporation, the Board of Trustees shall, after paying and making provisions for the payment of all liabilities of the Corporation, dispose of all of the assets of the Corporation exclusively for carrying out the purposes of the Corporation. Any such assets not so disposed shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws of Michigan. ARTICLE IX:

531

The Corporation reserves of the right to alter, amend or appeal any provision contained in these Articles of Incorporation or any amendment here of in the manner now or hereafter prescribed by law.

Michigan Department of Commerce-Corporation and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, UAW-GM Skill Development and Training Program, Corporation Identification Number: 895-076, June 8, 1984, p. 1-6.

532

Appendix C PART IV:

CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, UAW-GM SKILL DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAM

1. The present name of the Corporation is: UAW-GM Skill Development and Training Program. 2. The Corporation identification number assigned by the Bureau is: 895-076. 3. The location of its registered office is: 615 Griswold St., Detroit, MI 48226. ARTICLE I: The name of the Corporation is UAW-GM Human Resource Center. ARTICLE II: This Corporation is organized for the education, training, retraining and/or placement of workers and all activities incidental hereto, to reduce the burden nongovernment of retraining the workforce in order to effectively compete with foreign manufacturers and workers, and to carry on any activities allowable by a tax exempt organization described in Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code 1954. In no event is the Corporation to conduct for the purpose of granting credits or degrees, a school, academy, seminary, college or other institution of learning, but the Corporation may sponsor or arrange for training leading to credits or degrees through qualified institutions of learning. ARTICLE IV: The address of the registered office is 300 East Long Lake Road, Suite 380, Bloomfield Hills MI 48013. The name of the resident agent is Stephen J. Hopkins.

f%1

Michigan Department of Commerce-Corporation and Securities Bureau, Certificate of Amendment, Articles of Incorporation, UAW-GM Skill Development and Training Program, UAW-GM Human Resource Center Corporation Identification Number: 895-076, October 10, 1985, p. 1.

533

Appendix C PART IVA:

CERTIFICATE OF CHANGE OF REGISTERED OFFICE,UAW-GM HUMAN RESOURCE CENTER

1. The name of the Corporation is UAW-GM Human Resource Center. 2. The address of its registered office as currently on file with the Corporation and Securities Bureau is: 300 East Long Lake Road, Suite 380, Bloomfield Hills, MI 48013. 3. The address of the registered office is change to: 2630 Featherstone Rd., Auburn Hills, MI 4805763

Michigan Department of Commerce-Corporation and Securities Bureau, Certificate of Change of Registered Office, Articles of Incorporation, UAW-GM Human Resource Center Corporation Identification Number: 895-076, September 19, 1986, p. 1.

534

Appendix C PART V:

CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, UAW-GM HUMAN RESOURCE CENTER

Articles II, VI, and VII of the Articles of Incorporation is hereby amended to read as follows: ARTICLE II: This Corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, and scientific purposes, including, for such purposes, the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code, and including the education, training, retraining and/or placement of workers and all activities incidental hereto in order to reduce the burden on government of retraining the workforce in order to effectively compete with foreign manufacturers and workers. ARTICLE VI: No part of the net earnings of the Corporation shall inure to the benefit of, or be distributable to its members, trustees, officers, or other private persons, except that the Corporation shall be authorized to and power to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered and to make payments and distributions in furtherance of the purposes set forth in ARTICLE II hereof. No substantial part of the activities of the Corporation shall be carrying on of propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and the Corporation shall not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. Notwithstanding any provision of these permitted to be carried on a) by a corporation exempt from Federal income tax under Section 501 (c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code, or b) by a corporation, contributions to which are deductible under Section 170(c)2 of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code. ARTICLE VII: Upon the dissolution of the Corporation, assets shall be distributed for one or more exempt purposes within the meaning of Section 501(c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code, or shall be distributed to the federal government, or to a state or local government, for a public purpose. Any such assets not so disposed of shall be disposed of by the Circuit Court of county in which the principal office of the corporation is located, exclusively for such purposes or to such organization or organizations, and said Court shall determine, which are organized and operated exclusively for such purposes.

Michigan Department of Commerce-Corporation and Securities Bureau, Certificate of Amendment, Articles of Incorporation, UAW-GM Human Resource Center Corporation Identification Number: 895076, October 23, 1987, p. 1 and 4.

535

Appendix C PART VI:

CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION,UAW-GM HUMAN RESOURCE CENTER

Articles II, VI, VII, VIII and IX of the Articles of Incorporation is hereby amended to read as follows: ARTICLE II: The purpose or purposes for which the Corporation is organized our exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, and scientific purposes, including, for such purposes, the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under Section 501(c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code, and including the education, training, retraining and/or placement of workers and all activities incidental hereto in order to reduce the burden on government of retraining the workforce in order to effectively compete with foreign manufacturers and workers. ARTICLE VI: The Corporation will just distribute its income at such time in such manner as not to become subject to the tax undistributed income imposed by Section 4942 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Corporation will not engage in any act of self-dealing as defined in section 4941(d) of the Internal Revenue Code. Corp. will not retain any excess business holdings such as defined in section 4943(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Corporation will not make any investments in such manner as to subject it to tax under Section 4944 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Corporation will not make any taxable expenditures as defined in Section 4945(d) of the Internal Revenue Code. ARTICLE VII: No part of the net earnings of the Corporation shall inure to the benefit of, or be distributable to its members, trustees, officers, or other private persons, except that the Corporation shall be authorized to and power to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered and to make payments and distributions in furtherance of the purposes set forth in ARTICLE II hereof. No substantial part of the activities of the Corporation shall be carrying on of propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and the Corporation shall not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. Notwithstanding any provision of these permitted to be carried on a) by a corporation exempt from Federal income tax under Section 501(c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code, or b) by a corporation, contributions to which are deductible under Section 170(c)2 of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code. ARTICLE VIII: Upon the dissolution of the Corporation, assets shall be distributed for one or more exempt purposes within the meaning of Section 501 (c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code, or 536

corresponding section of any future federal tax code, or shall be distributed to the federal government, or to a state or local government, for a public purpose. Any such assets not so disposed of shall be disposed of by the Circuit Court of county in which the principal office of the corporation is located, exclusively for such purposes or to such organization or organizations, and said Court shall determine, which are organized and operated exclusively for such purposes. ARTICLE IX: The Corporation reserves of the right to alter, amend or appeal any provision contained in these Articles of Incorporation or any amendment here of in the manner now or hereafter prescribed by law.

Michigan Department of Commerce-Corporation and Securities Bureau, Certificate of Amendment, Articles of Incorporation, UAW-GM Human Resource Center Corporation Identification Number: 895076, July 19, 1993, p. 1,4, 5.

537

Appendix C PART VII:

UAW-GM CENTER FOR HUMAN RESOURCES

ARTICLE I: The name of the corporation is: UAW-GM Center for Human Resources. ARTICLE II: The UAW-GM Center for Human Resources is a nonprofit corporation created in October of 1994 as a joint effort involving General Motors Corp. and of the UAW International Union. It provides development, delivery, coordination and administration of strategies and joint programs designed to educate and train both active and dislocated workers needed to enable the employer to compete in a global marketplace. The Center offers education and training opportunities in several areas, including, but not limited to, health and safety, interpersonal relationships, adult basic education, career development, employee assistance, product quality strategies, and dislocated worker programs. In addition, the Center sponsors school-to-work and work-family programs to improve worker conditions and provide support to communities in which General Motors Corp. operates. The Center is administered by an eight member Board of Trustees, for each appointed by the UAW International Union and General Motors Corp. The purpose of the Center includes efforts to: • Improve communication between representatives of labor and management; • Provide workers and employers with opportunities to study and explore new innovative joint approaches to achieving organizational effectiveness; • Assist workers and employers in solving problems of mutual concern not susceptible to resolution within the collective bargaining process; • Study and explore ways of eliminating potential problems which reduce competitiveness and inhibit the economic development of the plant, area or industry; • Enhanced the involvement of workers in making decisions that affect their working lives; • Expand and improve working relationships between workers and managers; and • To encourage free collective bargaining by establishing continuing mechanisms for communication between employers and their employees. ARTICLE III: The corporation is organized upon a nonstock basis. The corporation is to be financed under the following general plan: gross receipts as consideration for admissions, sales of merchandise and/or performance of services or furnishing of facilities. The corporation is organized on a directorship basis.

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ARTICLE IV: The address of the registered office is: 6895 Telegraph Rd-, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48301-3138 The name of the resident agent at the registered office is: Stephen J. Hopkins Esq. ARTICLE V: The names and addresses of the incorporators are as follows: Stephen P. Yokich 8000 East Jefferson Ave., Detroit, MI 48214 Calvin T. Rapson 8000 East Jefferson Ave., Detroit, MI 48214 Henderson Slaughter 8000 East Jefferson Ave., Detroit, MI 48214 Richard J. Monczka 2630 Featherstone Rd., Auburn Hills, MI 48326 Gerald A. Knechtel 3044 West grand Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48202 Frederick R. Curd, Jr. 3044 West grand Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48202 Douglas VanBroklin, M.D. 3044 West grand Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48202 Leary E. Knox 2630 Featherstone Rd., Auburn Hills, MI 48326 ARTICLE VI: Except as may be provided timer in Internal Revenue Co Section 501(c)(5), no part of the net earnings of the Corporation shall inure to the benefit of, or be distributable to, its shareholders, directors, officers, or other private persons, except that the compensation for services rendered and to make payments and distributions in furtherance of the purpose set forth in Article II hereof. Notwithstanding any other provision of these Articles, the Corporation shall not carry on any other activities not permitted to be carried on by a corporation except from Federal Income Tax under Section 501(c)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law). ARTICLE VII: Upon dissolution of the corporation, the Board of Directors shall, after paying or making provision for payment of all the liabilities of the corporation, disposable assets of the corporation exclusively for the purposes of the corporation in such manner, or to such organization or organizations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, educational, religious or scientific purposes as shell at the time qualify as an exempt organization or organizations und Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law) as the Board of Directors shall determine. ARTICLE VIII: If at any time the corporation is or shall become a private foundation within the meaning of Section 509 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law), then the corporation will be subject to the following as of such time and thereafter: 1) The Corporation shall distribute its income for each taxable year of such time and in such manner as not to become subject to the tax or undistributed income imposed by Section 4942 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law); 539

2) The Corporation shall not engage in any act of self-dealing as determined in Section 4941(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law); 3) The Corporation shall not retain any excess business holdings as defined in Section 4943 (c)of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law); 4) The Corporation shall not make any investments in such manner as to subject it to tax under Section 4944 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law); 5) The corporation at the Shell not make any taxable expenditures as defined in section 4945(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law). ARTICLE IX: A volunteer director of the Corporation shall not be personally liable to the Corporation or its shareholders or members for monetary damages for breach of voluntary director's fiduciary duty, except for liability: 1) For That any breach of volunteer director's duty of loyalty to the Corporation or its shareholders or members; 2) For acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve intentional misconduct or knowing violation of the law; 3) For a violation of Section 551(1) of the Michigan Nonprofit Corporation Act; 4) For any transaction from which the volunteer director derived in improper personal benefit; 5) For any acts or omissions occurring before the date of filing of this document; and 6) For any acts or omissions that are grossly negligent. If the Michigan Nonprofit Corporation Act is hereafter amended to authorize the further elimination or limitation of liability of directors of nonprofit corporations, then the liability of a director of the corporation (in addition to the elimination and limitation of personal liability contained in this ARTICLE) shall be eliminated or limited to the fullest extent permitted by the Michigan Nonprofit Corporation Act as so amended, except to the extent such illumination and limitation of liability is inconsistent with the status of the corporation as an organization described in Section 501(c)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law). No amendment or repeal of this ARTICLE shall apply to or have any effect on the liability or alleged liability of any director of the corporation for or with respect to any acts or omissions of such director occurring prior to the effective date of any such amendment or repeal.

Michigan Department of Commerce-Corporation and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, UAW-GM Human Resource Center Corporation Identification Number: 730-390, December 6, 1994, p. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6.

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Appendix C PART VIII:

CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION TO THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION-UAW-GM CENTER FOR HUMAN RESOURCES

5. The document to be corrected to read as follows: ARTICLE III: 2.(c) The corporation is to be financed under the following general plan: All financial support will be provided from negotiated joint funds between General Motors and the UAW, as provided under the terms of the National Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Michigan Department of Commerce-Corporation and Securities Bureau, Certificate of Correction to the Articles of Incorporation, UAW-GM Human Resource Center Corporation Identification Number: 730390, March 3, 1995, p. 1,2.

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Appendix C PART IX: CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATIONUAW-GM CENTER FOR HUMAN RESOURCES 4. Articles IV(3) & X of the Articles of Incorporation is hereby amended to read as follows: ARTICLE IV: 3. the name of the resident agent at the registered office is: Thomas Hill. ARTICLE X: Neither That the corporation nor the trustees will discriminate in any way on the basis of race, color, creed, national or ethnic origin, sex, age, handicapped, religion or political affiliation with respect to a) participation or admissions, b) use of facilities or the terms of participation, c) program or administrative staff, and d) any programs of the corporations. 68

Michigan Department of Commerce-Corporation and Securities Bureau, Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, UAW-GM Human Resource Center Corporation Identification Number: 730390, October 1,1998, p. 1,4.

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Appendix D GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION DOCUMENTS PART I:

ACTIONS TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF BARGAINING A.S. WARREN, JR. PRESENTATION TO PERSONNEL DIRECTORS OCTOBER 11, 1983

As our mission statement indicates, our approach to communications will be twofold— efforts initiated jointly with the unions and Jim Pryce will be the person most responsible for the latter on my committee. This might include things such as jointly developed a film's. And that Jim told me last week he already has developed such a film on the absenteeism program. (Call Jim Pryce for comment.) I'm sure we will be looking more seriously at many other things we can do together to increase the acceptability and credibility of our messages to employees. In what we, of course, have to remember here is that whatever we do has to be a "win-win" situation for us and the union, or it won't work. Some of the forces that will be working against us... and, this is the rationale for our image management program... includes the following: • The improving economy, our higher sales and earnings and other positive effect is that obviously strengthened the union's position. • The anticipation of high level of GM's profits will fuel the memberships drive for "Restore and More in '84". (Page 5) •

Real and imagined threats to job security that were evident in 1982 will be less evident next year as increasing numbers of employees are called back from indefinite layoff. At the beginning of March, 1982, we had something like 143,000 on layoff and we were well on our way to the high water mark of 172,000 layoffs last winter. But we have called back nearly 70,000 people from layoffs so far this year and we expect that number to rise to 90,000 by early next year, leaving fewer than 40,000 still on layoff.

There are a number of other issues that have potential of exacerbating the union membership's militancy, the rigidity of the union's position in the reasonableness of bargaining demands. Profitability, for instance. I think you will agree that many of our employees are not at all sure their sacrifices were worthwhile and really necessary. There is uncertainty that there really has been "equality of sacrifice." They are wondering whether GM's profits have been used to increase our competitiveness and thereby their job security. There is a widespread perception that business is back to normal and "GM can afford it" so why not "Restore and More in '84?"

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Almost every speaker yesterday told us why not, so it's up to us to spread the message in a convincing way. Executive bonuses could be another issue. When they are made public next year just a short time before negotiations began, the amounts probably will have a significant impact on what employees think. (Page 6) Per-employee profit-sharing amounts probably will be considered "puny" compared to executive bonuses, so they will want more on top of profit-sharing. The amount of executive bonuses versus the amount sacrifice by hourly workers and what they got for it surely will be compared unfavorably and will impact the union's position. We will be working very hard to counteract that very real possibility, hopefully before it becomes a major flap. There are a number of other event-driven and date-driven things that will... or could... influence of the Union, its membership, the media and the general public. These are just a few of the things that will or might happen and have a bearing on the negotiations climate: • The 1983 earnings report. • Any plant closings between now and then. • Special year-end dividends for stockholders. • Outsourcing • Whipsawing between plans to get lower costs. • More joint venture announcements. • Our position on the voluntary import restraints, and what has been described as GM's "Japanese strategy." • Any other issues that have a bearing on worker job security and income. (Page 7) So there are the things we're looking at as we move forward. In addition to doing things that are proactive, we are going to have to be vigilant as hell to make sure we don't do something stupid and shoot our feet off. In response to my call for help from above Divisional Advisory Group, I have received several memos as to what you in the divisions feel the major issues are that should be addressed before the 1984 negotiations get underway. Without trying to put them in priority order at this point, these were the most frequently mentioned: • We need to do a better job of making employees understand our problem was are not over and that the issue is not how much money GM is making but rather how much money GM needs for the business. I noticed this was pretty high on Alex Cunningham's list, too. • Cost competitiveness is still required, especially in component divisions, even in light of GM's 1983 earnings and profits, in GM must still discharges financial obligation for the $40 billion investment. 544

(Page 8) In other words, employees need to understand that a couple billion dollars in profits is nothing compared to the $9 or $10 billion we're spending on facilities. However, Do Ephlin, you'll recall gave us some idea of just how receptive employees will be to that kind of message. • Health care cost containment is a must. We're spending about $2.2 billion on health care delivery this year in the cost will double in about five years if nothing is done about it. • We need to emphasize that all GM employees will share in a portion of GM's profit through the new profit-sharing plan, and that the best avenue for future wage increases is profit-sharing. Other things I'm hearing include these items: • Doing something to further improve the absenteeism problem... which is still a problem despite the good we made since 1982. • Getting at the problems associated with the cost, increased mobility of the workforce and need to confinement bumping under the GIS program. • Getting greater product quality in addition to increasing the cost competitiveness. (Page 9) And to those I might add that will have to do some serious thinking on how to get the message across that executive bonuses are earned it and not some special privilege. I suppose I could go on, but you get the idea of what we're looking at. And if you have other ideas, please call me because we need your input on both what we have to do and how we're going to get at it... especially in terms of what you need for the first-line supervisors and what form it out to take and in what way it should be delivered. You'll recall that Ed Czapor talked yesterday about our dismissal record on communicating with our employees and the importance of involving first-line supervisors to improve that record. So we intend to do something about that. My initial thinking has been that a lot of this could be accomplished through "facts books" and position papers... such as Bob Appel is working on now on What's Wrong with "Restore and More in '84." I'll be asking other people to develop other position papers. Gil Waechter and I have had some preliminary discussions on the "facts book" of some type that would give us a lot of necessary information to tell our story inside and outside GM—with all of us using the same facts and figures. (Page 10)

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Appendix D PART II:

INFLUENCING UAW LEADERSHIP

Action: Provide opportunities for union management dialogue and joint problem-solving. Need: • For union to understand the competitive challenge. • For management to understand concerns of union and hourly rank-and-file. • To share successful joint problem-solving experiences. Leadership Tiers: • Bieber • Ephlin • GM Department • UAW Technical Staff • Regional Directors • Local Presidents and Shop Chairman Specific Ideas: • Ephlin o Continue one-on-one briefings. o Dialogue with key executives. o Planned visits with MacDonald and Warren. o Educate union leadership on profit-sharing. • UAW National Bargaining Committee o Joint information workshops. o Joint off-site auto industry in the '80s. o Joint task force on bargaining. • Key Thought Leaders o Joint comparison of U.S. and Japanese facilities. (Page C4) o In the area of influencing UAW leadership, we plan to undertake action to provide opportunities for Union-Management dialogue and a joint problemsolving. • In the area of influencing UAW leadership, we plan to undertake action to provide opportunities for Union-Management dialogue and a joint problem-solving. • There is a need: o For the union to understand the competitive challenge, o For management to understand the concerns of union and hourly rank-andfile, and o To share successful joint problem-solving experiences. • There are a number of leaders to tiers that we must worry about: o Bieber o Ephlin 546

o GM Department o UAW Technical Staff o Regional Directors o National Bargaining Committee o Local Presidents and Shop Chairman Actions to influence the UAW will be concentrated on three levels: Ephlin, the National Bargaining Committee, and regional and local UAW leaders. Some of the ideas being considered for being implemented include: • Dialogues with Ephlin: o Continuation of one-on-one briefings with Ephlin by AS W. o A series of one-on-one sessions for Ephlin to exchange views with key members of management. o It is proposed that Ephlin, together with a SWR and FJMC, visit a number of plants where innovative solutions have been devised, o Provide Ephlin the time to educate secondary leadership and the regional sub councils on profit-sharing. • National Bargaining Committee: o A series of one-day workshops would be scheduled on a monthly basis for both the UAW National Bargaining Committee and GM. The intent would be to provide a common information base, an opportunity for dialogue in a problem-solving context, and a focus on business needs as a reference point for future bargaining. o A joint Union/Management off-site on the auto industry of the '80s could be scheduled. The objectives would be too shifted the focus of bargaining to future business needs and foster a mutual interest in improving the bargaining process. Presentations by Management, Union and the external speakers would be made. The group would develop joint principles for Union/Management relations in the 1980s. o Based on the joint principles for the 1980s, a Joint Task Force on Bargaining would be appointed by ASW and Ephlin to review the formal bargaining process and recommend changes to facilitate achieving the mutual objectives. geC5) • Our success at the bargaining table depends on how successful we are in dealing with the Union well before bargaining begins. • There is a strong need to influence The Union leaders' of values/positions through bottom-up educational processes, in addition to direct GM-UAW executive-level communications. • The effectiveness of communication efforts will be affected by the consistency of messages being sent by all levels of management. It is those important that these messages are coordinated and it at all levels of management (including foremen) understand the direction of the corporation chooses to take it in the forthcoming negotiations. • A focus on "win-win" strategies, joint problem-solving approaches, and expensive communication/education efforts will enhance the potential for success. geC6) 547

Appendix D PART III: 1984 NEGOTIATIONS OBJECTIVES: • Reduce labor cost per car. • Increase quality of work force OBJECTIVE I: Contain the cost per hour with the following strategies. Strategies: 1. Shift forms of compensation to gain sharing: expanded profit-sharing in lieu of returning annual improvement factor (AIF) and additional wage/COLA increases. Seek solutions in the elimination of COLA and AIF 2. Reduce the annual rate of increase in benefit costs 3. Restructure the Guaranteed Income Stream (GIS) program to reduce administrative difficulties and contain costs, while still addressing job security concerns of hourly employees. 4. Contain pay for time not worked. 5. Established the principal of multi-tier wages and benefits so that wages and benefits are responsive to competitive pressures. (Page-C8) OBJECTIVE II: Reduce hours per car. Strategies: 1. Actively support local changes in work practices and seniority bumping procedures that increase productivity. 2. Provide more effective utilization of skill trades workforce. 3. Further implementation of new technology or manufacturing processes that increase productivity, reduce costs, or improve quality area. 4. Discontinue pilot employment guarantee. (Page-C9) OBJECTIVE III: Enhance ability to source competitively both internally and externally. Strategies: 1. Retain the current procedures regarding outsourcing decisions and pursue fair implementation by management. 2. Avoid infringement of management's right to effect internal sourcing decisions. 3. Facilitate competitive approach to subcontracting. (Page-CIO) OBJECTIVE IV: Continue to shift the union/management relationship toward joint problem solving process. Strategies: 1. Increase the "jointness" of QWL program. 548

2. Strengthen the National and Local Joint councils for job security and the Competitive Edge. 3. Initiate joint problem solving activities at the international and local levels. 4. At the local level, replace the three-year cycle for formal bargaining with continuing problem solving process ("Living Agreement"). (Page-Cll) OBJECTIVE V: Enhance individual accountability and commitment. Strategies: 1. Achieve greater impact from use of training fund. 2. Shift the focus of training support to upgrading the skills of the active workforce. 3. Continue and/or strengthen the absenteeism program. 4. Actively support adoption of "pay for knowledge" systems. 5. Obtain union support for more rapid diffusion of statistical process control by hourly employees. (Page-C12) Table 18: POTENTIAL MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS FOR TARGET OPERATIONS • Modification to selected new wage and/or benefit provisions otherwise provided by the 1984 National Agreement. • Time-lagged introduction of selected economic provisions. • Reduced hiring rates and extended it grow-in provisions for new employees. • Contractual modifications to provide for local approval of wage agreements. • Subcontracting of service work. • ?

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Appendix E UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS PART I:

OFFICE OF COUNSEL TO THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT STANDARDS—OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT EXPLAINING THAT: UAW JOINT FUNDS ARE NOT A "LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE" UNDER 29 USC 186(c)(9) BUT ARE. RATHER. LABOR TRUSTS MANDATED TO MAKE AUDITS AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION PURSUANT TO 29U.S.C.SS 186(c)(5)(B).

This considers a legal position taken by Mr. Thomas P. Hill, Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") of the UAW-GM Center for Human Resources ("Joint Funds" or "CHR") in response to an August 4, 2003 letter by UAW member William Hanline and in other correspondence since that time. Mr. Hanline's letter requested access to the annual audits of the UAW-GM Joint Funds pursuant to §302(c) (5) (B) of the Labor-management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA). 29 USC 186(c) (5) (B). The Joint Funds CFO denied the request, stating that: Section 302(c)(5)(B) of the Taft Hartley Act imposes certain obligations with respect to trust funds established for the purpose of providing health, pension, disability and similar benefits. The CHR, however, is a "labormanagement Committee" under Section 302(c) (9). This provision does not require the CHR to make its annual audits available for inspection. -Thomas P. Hill Letter of November 7, 2003. CFO Hill's position is erroneous as a matter of fact and law. The Joint Funds are joint funds subject to the requirements of &302(c)(5)-(8). CHR is the central administrative agency for these joint funds and has declared itself to the Internal Revenue Service as a nonprofit educational & training corporation. The funds are required to comply with the independent audit disclosure requirement as a condition of their legal existence. This is explained below. Federal law strictly prohibits employers and associations of employers from making payments or otherwise giving things of value to unions, their representatives, or employees outside the context of compensation for work performed. 29 USC §§ 186(a) & (b). Violation of this provision is a felony carrying a penalty of up to five years in prison and a $15,000 fine. The reason for this provision is to obviate the possibilities of bribery, kickbacks, extortion and other abuses of power. Toyota Landscaping Co.. Inc. v. Southern California Dist Council of Laborers. 11 F.3d 114 (9th Cir. 1993).

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29 USC § 186(c) provides some limited exceptions to the criminal prohibitions set forth in 29 USC §§ 186(a) and (b). Payments made to employees in the normal course of business or as part of a lawsuit are excepted by 29 U.S.C. §§186(c)(l)-(4) Payments made to joint labor-management trusts are excepted by 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(c) (5)-(8). Payments made to an industry-wide labor-management committee are excepted by 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(9). Any payments which do not satisfy the express terms of these exceptions are still subject to the criminal bar set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) & (b). One of the express terms for the exception permitting payment to labor-management trusts in 29 USC 186(c) (5)-(9) is that the trust fund documents: "shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other places as may be designated in such written agreement..." 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). The inspection requirement set forth in &302(c)(5) is incorporated applied to funds legally permitted to exist under &302(c)(5)[health & welfare and pension plans] &302(c)(6)[apprenticeship & training programs], &302(c)(7)[scholarship, childcare and housing programs], and &302(c)(8)[legal services programs]. 29 USC. &186(c)(5)-(8). All of these trusts must comply with the annual audit inspection provisions as a condition of their legal entitlement to exist. Unlike the labor-management trust provisions, the &3 02(c) (9) industry-wide labor-management committee is not required to comply with an audit inspection requirement. 29 U.S.C. &186(c)(9). The exception stated at &302(c) (9), 29 U.S.C. &186(c) (9), was added by Public Law 95-524 known as both the Comprehensive Employment and Training Amendment Section 6 of that amendment is subtitled the "Labor-management Cooperation Act" (LMCA) and is codified at 29 U.S.C. &173, 175a, and 38 U.S.C. 2002. LMCA in its totality provides as follows: ASSISTANCE TO PLANT, AREA, AND INDUSTRY-WIDE LABORMANAGEMENT COMMITTEES Labor Sec. 6. (a) This section may be cited as the "Labor-Management Cooperation Act of Management Act of 1978." (b) It is the purpose of this section— (1) to improve communication between representatives of labor and management; (2) to provide workers and employers with opportunities to study and explore new and innovative joint approaches to achieving organizational effectiveness; 551

(3) to assist workers and employers in solving problems of mutual concern not susceptible to resolution within the collective bargaining process; (4) to study and explore ways of eliminating potential problems which reduce the competitiveness and inhibit the economic development of the plant, area or industry; (5) to enhance the involvement of workers in making decisions that affect their working lives; (6) to expand and improve working relationships between workers and managers; and (7) to encourage free collective bargaining by establishing continuing mechanisms for communication between employers and their employees through Federal assistance to the formation and operation of labormanagement committees. (c)(1) Section 203 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "(e) The Service is authorized and directed to encourage and support the establishment and operation of joint labor-management activities conducted by plant, area, and industry-wide committees designed to improve labor-management relationships, job security and organizational effectiveness, in accordance with provisions of Section 205A." (2) Title II of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, is amended by adding after section 205 the following new section: Sec. 205A. (a) (1) The Service is authorized and directed to provide assistance in the establishment and operation of plant, area and industry-wide labormanagement committees which"(A) Have been organized jointly by employers and labor organizations representing employees in that plant, area, or industry: and "(B) are established for the purpose of improving labor-management relationships, job security, organizational effectiveness, enhancing economic development or involving workers in decisions affecting their jobs including improving communication with respect to subjects of mutual interest and concern. (2) The Service is authorized and directed to enter into contracts and contracts to make grants, where necessary or appropriate, to fulfill its responsibilities under this section. "(b) (1) No grant may be made, no contract may be entered into and no other assistance may be provided under the provisions of this section to a plant labor-management committee unless the employees in that plant are represented by a labor organization and there is in effect at that plant a collective bargaining agreement. 552

"(2) No grant may be made, no contract may be entered into and no other assistance may be provided under the provisions of this section to an area or industry-wide labor-management committee unless it participants include any labor organizations certified or recognized as the representative of the employees of an employer participating in such committee. Nothing in this clause shall prohibit participation in an area or industry-wide committee by an employer whose employees are not represented by a labor organization. "(3) No grant may be made under the provisions of this section to any labor-management committee which the Service finds to have as one of its purposes the discouragement of the exercise of rights contained in section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.157), or the interference with collective bargaining in any plant, or industry. "(c) The Service shall carry out the provisions of this section through an office established for that purpose. "(d) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of this Appropriation section $10,000,000 for the fiscal year 1979, and such sums as may be necessary thereafter." (d) Section 302 ( c) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, is amended by striking the word "or" after the semicolon at the end of subparagraph (7) thereof and by inserting the following before the period at the end thereof: ";or (9) with respect to money or other things of value paid by an employer to a plant, area or industry-wide labor-management committee established for one or more of the purposes set forth in section 5(b) of the Labor-Management Cooperation Act of 1978". -Ante, p. 2020. "(e) Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section shall affect 29 USC 175a the terms and conditions of any collective bargaining agreement whether in effect prior to or entered into after the date of enactment of this section. REPEALER Sec. 7. Section 104 of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974 38 USC 2002 (Public Law 93-567) is hereby repealed. -Note. Approved October 27, 1978

The Historical and Statutory Notes to 29 U.S.C. &186 state that "Section 5(b) of the Labor-management Cooperation Act of 1978, referred to in subsection C(9) probably means section 6(b) of Pub. L. 95-524..." A comparison of &6(b), set forth above, indicates a discrete set of purposes for a committee which may, under the LMCA, receive funds by the Federal Mediation And Conciliation Service or may, pursuant to &302(c)(9), receive employer funds. In either case, a comparison of the structure and 553

function of the UAW-GM Joint Funds with the committees contemplate by the LMCA affirms that these joint funds are not mere committees. The Labor-management Cooperation Act of 1978 contemplates labor-management committees fostered by the Federal Mediation And Conciliation Service to improve relationships, job effectiveness and other related concerns. 29 USC §175a. This statute attempts to facilitate meetings and discussions and provides some federal funds to achieve this objective. By contrast, the Joint Funds are an administrative facility for various benefit trusts created through employer contributions. They are trusts subject to the independent audit requirements set forth in 29 U.S.C. & 186(c)(5)(B). The UAW-GM joint fund has a $180 million, 420,000-square-foot headquarters on the Detroit River. Located on 16 acres, the center has a seven-story office tower, a threestory training center, and a 400-seat auditorium with Internet access from every seat. "A Shroud of Secrecy Surrounds Joint Funds", by Jennifer Dixon, Detroit Free Press at May 18, 2001. (Free Press 5/18/2001). From this center a multi-million dollar system operates with little government reporting and no substantive government regulation. This massive corporate entity and its subsidiary trusts is no more of a "committee" than the cruise ship Queen Mary is a row boat. The UAW-GM fund reported to the IRS that $85.6 million of the $186.9 million it spent in 1999, or 46, was for management or overhead, expenses. (Detroit Free Press 5/18/01) Each fund operating under the CHR banner is either wholly financed or heavily subsidized by General Motors. The Joint Funds web site explains that the CHR is an administrative agency for programs in eight main categories: (1) CHR Services (2) Diversity (3) Education & Training (4) Health & Safety (5) Motorsports (6) Quality Network (7) Tuition Assistance (8) Work & Family -Web Site 11/27/03 An examination of each of these categories illustrates the broad parameters of the Joint Funds involvements and the applicability of §302(c) (5)-(8) independent audit disclosure requirements. 29 U.S.C. §186(c)(5)-(9). These funds are tax-exempt institutions, not committees. (1) CHR Services CHR Services is the administrative arm for the joint funds. It is a nonprofit corporation established for education and training. The web site explains that:

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UAW-GM CHR Area Centers are located in the Midwest, northeast and southern sections of the country to assist in the delivery of education, training and support services to UAW-represented GM workers and work places in the respective areas. -Web Site 11/27/03 The services referred to as "CHR Services" are the other seven items listed above. In that CHR is funded by General Motors and "assist[s] in the delivery of education, training and support services to UAW-represented GM workers, it is legally permissible only under §302(c)(6) of the LMRA, which provides an exception to the ban on employer contributions for payments to a trust fund to pay "pooled vacation, holiday, severance or similar benefits, or defraying the costs of apprenticeship or other training programs." 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (6), as stated above, such funds are subject to the same requirements set forth in §302(c) (5) (B). The payments must be made according to a "written agreement with the employer"; the fund must be jointly administered by employers and employees, and "an annual audit of the trust fund ... shall be available for inspection by interested persons" at specified locations. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (B). (2) Diversity Programs Diversity Programs are not explained in any detail. Instead, the web site leads to a one page statement of principle in support of diversity without listing any specific program. (3) Joint Funds Education and Training Program The UAW and General Motors Corporation proudly call their joint fund "the largest privately funded educational program in the world." Quoting "A Shroud of Secrecy Surrounds Joint Funds", by Jennifer Dixon, Free Press 5/18/2001. These programs are explained in detail below. In that the CHR is funded by General Motors and provides a myriad of apprenticeship and training programs it is legally permissible only if it complies with the terms §3 02(c) (6) of the LMRA, which provides an exception to the ban on employer contributions for trust fund payments to a trust fund for "defraying the costs of apprenticeship or other training programs." 29 U.S.C.§186(c)(6). The number of education and training programs operated under the Joint Funds Education and Training program is as notable as the lack of accountability for such employer-funded operations. One of these is the Education/Training program: Since the early 1980's, the UAW and General Motors have jointly developed education and training programs that have provided workers with a variety of lifelong learning opportunities. At the national and local levels, union and management representatives work together to develop and deliver programs that have helped employees strengthen basic skills, earn college degrees and better apply their technical skill and knowledge at work. 555

The UAW-GM focus is on continuing development of education and training opportunities that address both organizational needs and strengthen employee job security. -Web Site 11/27/03 The Joint Funds also operate 87 "Skill Centers" established for UAW-GM members all across the United States, and "Transition Centers [to] provide joint programs assistance and additional support to UAW-represented GM workers indefinitely laid off due to a plant closing or reduction in the work force." -Web Site 11/27/03 Because of the complex financial arrangements involved in the educational program, Joint Funds Education & Training programs have a Funding Department: The Funding Department administers and monitors requests for Local Joint Fund approvals and Joint Reservoir funds, provided through the National Agreement, in support of Joint Skill Development and Training activities. The funding process assists plants in meeting contractual guidelines to assure the best use of available training funds for UAW-represented GM employees. Funding assists Joint Training Representatives on how to use, manage and track Local Joint and Reservoir funds, and how to apply for Reservoir Grants. The department also provides training on the Joint Funds Monitoring System and conducts joint fund audits at plants. Web Site 11/27/03 A "School to Work" of the Joint Funds provides extensive community education program: Manufacturing / School-To-Career / Work To jointly develop and establish a viable School-to-Work program which will allow qualified Seniors to elect at their high schools or "career centers" a course of study focusing on manufacturing, coupled with real world, "hands on" manufacturing work/career related experiences. School-To-Career

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School-to-career programs combine school-based learning and on-the-job instruction into a structured learning sequence. Employers reinforce academic lessons, schools emphasize career applications, and students gain experience in the adult world of work and connections to a range of post secondary options, including college, technical training, and skilled entry-level work. The school-to-work approach seeks to change the educational experience by combining high academic standards and learning. School-To-Career / Work The UAW and General Motors Corporation have formed partnerships with public education to develop and implement school-to-work programs to prepare high school students to enter the workforce of the 21st century. This has been accomplished by providing an integrated curriculum (classroom instruction combined with work-based learning experiences), which equips students with lifelong learning skills, employability skills and manufacturing proficiencies. Currently, there are two (2) school-to-career / work projects, Lansing Area Manufacturing Partnership (LAMP) and the Detroit Manufacturing Partnership (DMP). In addition, the CHR has developed a service learning program, UAW-GM POWERTEAMS. LAMP is entering its fourth year. Currently there are two (2) classes and 60 students. DMP is in its second year pilot stage in partnership with the Detroit Hamtramck Assembly and the Detroit Public Schools. Twenty-eight students are enrolled for September 2001. UAW-GM POWERTEAMS Program The UAW-GM POWERTEAMS (Positive Organizations Where Everyone's Rewarded Through Engaging and Mentoring Students) initiative is a service-learning program designed to encourage high school students to be responsible citizens through community involvement. In a classroom environment, participants have an opportunity to work as a team, build workplace skills and produce a grant proposal. All grant proposals are community-based volunteer projects and will be implemented during national volunteer week. The POWERTEAMS program will begin its fourth year, September 2001 and is a partnership with five (5) Detroit Public High Schools. There were 250 students participating in this year's program. -Web Site 11/27/03

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UAW-GM Joint Skill Development and Training Department Another education program, the UAW-GM Joint Skill Development and Training Department provides: Consulting services and supports the development and expertise of Joint Training, Joint Activities and Human Resource Development Representatives at the local level. These courses address communication skills, training needs and professional development to assist local representatives to successfully implement joint programs. Many of the courses for local joint representatives provided through the UAW-GM CHR are recommended for college credit by the American Council on Education/Program. -Web Site 11/28/03 Human Resource Development (HRD) Program The Joint Skill Development and Training Department also contains a Human Resource Development (HRD) program . The HRD program provides: Training and consulting services for UAW local union and plant management leadership to help improve working relationships and joint activities at their location. Working with joint plant leadership, HRD assists in identifying organizational needs and developing training programs and change strategies. -Web Site 11/28/03 Program Development and Delivery Program. The Program Development and Delivery (FDD) program provides: Research and development to help joint training representatives conduct training needs and task analysis; write and present funding proposals; collect and analyze data to measure skill and knowledge levels required to meet current and future organizational needs. -Web Site 11/28/03 Under the umbrella of the Joint Skill Development and Training Department, the Joint Funds provide courses in over twenty areas as well as certification for Joint Training Representatives (JTR), Joint Activities Representatives (JAR) and HRD representatives.

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The detailed education program provided under the rubric of the UAW-GM Education and Training program are legally permissible only under §302(c)(6) of the LMRA, which provides an exception to the ban on employer contributions for payments to a trust fund for "defraying the costs of apprenticeship or other training programs." 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (6). As stated above, such funds are subject to the same requirements set forth in §302(c) (5) (B). The payments must be made according to a "written agreement with the employer", the fund must be jointly administered by employers and employees, and "an annual audit of the trust fund shall be available for inspection by interested persons" at specified locations. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (B). (4) Health and Safety Center The Joint Funds operate an extensive Health and Safety Center. The Center provides programs and training for all UAW-represented GM facilities. Workers receive health and safety training designed to suit their specific job requirements. It also conducts audits of facilities to insure proper implementation of Health and Safety Programs. For twentyfive years the center provides leadership and support for local joint health and safety committees. The web site explains that: The UAW and GM have led the way nationally in developing such industrial health and safety programs as Ergonomics, Lockout and Energy Control, Confined Space Entry, Fall Hazard Control and Industrial Hygiene, just to name a few. The Health and Safety Center, part of the UAW-GM Center for Human Resources, coordinates joint training and programs. Since 1985, more than 20,000 plant-based safety trainers have completed courses at the Health and Safety Center. They are trained to implement joint health and safety programs at the local level throughout the UAW-GM system. -Web Site 11/28/03 The Health & Safety Center is an educational program for UAW-GM workers. It is legally permissible only under §302(c) (6) of the LMRA, which provides an exception to the ban on employer contributions for payments to a trust fund for "defraying the costs of apprenticeship or other training programs." 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (6), as stated above, such funds are subject to the same requirements set forth in §302(c) (5) (B). The payments must be made according to a "written agreement with the employer", the fund must be jointly administered by employers and employees, and "an annual audit of the trust fund ... shall be available for inspection by interested persons" at specified locations. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B). (5) Motorsports Program The Joint Funds operate an extensive Motorsports program. This entails sponsorship of a Nascar driver at between eight and sixteen million dollars a year conducting a race named the UAW-GM Quality 500, and other racing-related involvements. See "A Shroud of Secrecy Surrounds Joint Funds", by Jennifer Dixon, Detroit Free Press at May 18, 2001. 559

These activities are not extensively described on the CHR Web Site. A summary page explains as follows: UAW-GM's involvement in Motorsports is an extension of our commitment to the teamwork that is the foundation of our joint programs. A winning race car is the product of a partnership between highly skilled Winston Cup crew members, drivers and owners. Similarly, the cooperative spirit of UAW-GM allows us to achieve excellence in the cars and trucks that we build. Motorsports provides UAW-GM a unique opportunity to showcase these world-class quality products and the proud men and women who build them. It also provides us with a unique opportunity to introduce UAWGM joint programs to millions of race fans thought the country. -Web Site 11/28/03 The Motorsports program has operated as a GM-sponsored boondoggle for union officers and their friends. It is difficult to see how such a program is legal. As one dissident publication states: The Center for Human Resources [CHR] which administers joint fund for GM/Delphi is tax exempt because it's a nonprofit corporation whose purpose is education and training. How sponsorship of NASCAR fits into that criteria I don't know. But top UAW and company honchos certainly deserve luxurious skyboxes complete with wet bars and catering. They work hard. They play hard. The CHR spends millions of dollars on salaries, allowances, and expenses for UAW International Reps. Is that why the Big Three can't afford to pay COLA on pensions? Because too much money is lavished on jointness? -Quoting Live Bait & Ammo #20, by Greg Shotwell (6) Quality Network The UAW-GM Quality Network program is a §302(c)(6) GM-funded training program established to implement a program of quality-consciousness within the work force in the aftermath of market share loss to Japanese manufacturers following the quality control programs of W. Edwards Deming. The CHR Web Site states: General Motors process for Total Quality Management (TQM) is the UAW-GM Quality Network - the one process for total Customer Satisfaction and Enthusiasm - through People, Teamwork and Continuous Quality Improvement.

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Guided by the beliefs and values, implementation of the UAW-GM Quality Network will lead to highest satisfaction and enthusiasm of the ultimate customer - those who buy GM products and use our services. The Quality Network is based on people. It involves the union employees, suppliers and customers. It encourages meaningful contributions and participation in decision-making to influence the work environment and the manufacturing process. The UAW-GM Quality Network is based on Teamwork. It encourages each individual to contribute to everyone's success. It fosters open, effective communication so that roles, responsibilities and requirements are clearly defined and easily understood. The Quality Network is based on continuous improvement. Customer satisfaction and enthusiasm is achievable through improvements in the products and services General Motors provides. The Quality Network can ensure business success for General Motors and job security for UAW members. Jointly conceived and implemented, the Quality Network is the process which will assist in improving every aspect of the manufacturing Web Site 11/28/03 As stated above, §302(c) (6) provides an exception to the ban on employer payments in the case of a trust fund to pay "costs of apprenticeship or other training programs." 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (6). Such funds are subject to the same requirements set forth in §302(c) (5) (B). The payments must be made according to a "written agreement with the employer", the fund must be jointly administered by employers and employees, and "an annual audit of the trust fund ... shall be available for inspection by interested persons" at specified locations. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (B). If the CHR won't give an interested person such as Mr. Hanline access to an annual report for this program, the program is not legal (7) Tuition The UAW-GM Tuition Assistance Plan (TAP) is a GM-funded scholarship program permitted under the §302(c) (6) exception for employer-funded education and training programs and the §3 02(c) (7) exception for employer-funded scholarship programs. The CHR Web Site states: The UAW-GM focus is on continuing development of education and training opportunities that address both organizational needs and strengthen employee job security. The UAW-GM Tuition Assistance Plan (TAP) has helped hundreds of thousands of workers prepare for the future and fulfill individual goals.

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TAP provides prepaid financial assistance when an employee enrolls in education, re-training or other approved courses. Up to $2,100 in TAP benefits can be applied to approved job-related training courses, and up to $1,450 in TAP benefits can be used for personal enhancement classes. Each application is reviewed and issued the appropriate program type based on TAP procedures. Web Site 11/28/03 The TAP program is subject to the same requirements set forth in §302(c) (5) (B). The payments must be made according to a "written agreement with the employer", the fund must be jointly administered by employers and employees, and "an annual audit of the trust fund ... shall be available for inspection by interested persons" at specified locations. 29 U.S.C. §186(c) (5) (B). If the CHR won't give an interested person such as 69 Mr. Hanline access to an annual report for this program, the program is not legal.

69 Patrick Hyde, Policy and Law Adviser, Office of Labor-Management Standards, U.S Department of Labor, Position Paper Outline: UAW Joint Funds Are Not a "Labor-management Committee" Under 29 USC 186(c)(9) But Are, Rather, Labor Trusts Mandated to Make Audits Available for Inspection Pursuant to 29u.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B), Presented to the Office of the Solicitor General in 2004.

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Appendix F CENTER FOR HUMAN RESOURCES DOCUMENTS PART I: QUALITY NETWORK ACTION STRATEGIES 1. Top Leadership & Function Provides opportunity for leadership to impact product quality through personal participation and visible action. Process for institutionalizing Beliefs & Values throughout UAW-GM. Process for satisfying internal customers and leads to satisfaction of ultimate customers. 2. Top Leadership Commitment & Involvement Provides guidance for developing and administering a process for recognizing those whose behavior exemplifies the Beliefs & Values and who contribute to quality and customer satisfaction and enthusiasm. 3. Support for the Employee Fosters conscious efforts to create an environment that supports people and enhances their ability to produce quality products and services. 4. Communication Creates the opportunity for three-way communication (up, down and across the organization) that provides awareness, fosters understanding, builds commitment and leads to action for continuous improvement. 5. Education & Training Create the ongoing base of knowledge and skills that empowers employees to continuously improve their personal skills. Provide the skills needed to understand, analyze and continually improve work processes in order to achieve increased levels of customer satisfaction and enthusiasm. 6. People Recognition |Provides guidance for developing and administering a process for recognizing those whose behavior exemplifies the Beliefs & Values and who contribute to quality and customer satisfaction and enthusiasm. 7. Suggestion Plan Focuses the people of General Motors on continuous improvement by soliciting, evaluating, implementing and recognizing their ideas. 8. Employee Excellence Development Establishes an environment that supports lifelong learning, so that people have an opportunity to grow personally, on the job and in their organization. Assists people in the full development of their skills, abilities and talents. Promotes an environment in which people and the organization excel. 9. Assessment of the Quality Network Process To evaluate, on an ongoing basis, a unit's performance compared to the Quality Network Process. 563

10. Change Methodology Develops opportunities for institutionalized change throughout the organization, leading to continuous improvement and customer satisfaction and enthusiasm. 11. Validation Assesses whether the output of a process meets the Voice of the Customer. 12. Lead Time Reduction Reduces the amount of time required to deliver quality products and service to internal and external customers. 13. Key Characteristics The Key Characteristic Designation System (KCDS) is the common system for the identification and documentation of Key Product Characteristics (KPCs) and their related Key Control Characteristics (KCCs). 14. Loss Function Loss Function is used to estimate the loss of value that occurs when our products or services vary from a customer-based target. 15. Statistical Methodology To support the development of a systematic thought process and an environment conducive to the use of statistical methods for application in continuous improvement efforts. 16. Cost of Quality To identify improvement opportunities in the cost of doing things wrong, the cost of the wrong things, and the cost of preventing mistakes. 17. Quality Function Deployment Translates customers' wants and needs into requirements and deploys them throughout all aspects of our business including product design, manufacturing and assembly processes for continuous improvement. 18. Reduction of Variation Defines a process for producing uniform, consistent high quality products and services by reducing variation around customer defined target values. 19. Design of Experiments Provides a family of methods for improving the quality of both processes and products by effectively investigating several sources of variation at the same time. 20. Pull System Communicates customer-forecasted material requirements to suppliers and authorizes the movement of material from suppliers to customers, thereby reducing in-process inventory while supporting the timely production of quality products. 21. Small Lot Reduces lot size until the optimum of one piece flow is realized in order to allow quick response to customers' needs for quality products.

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22. Containerization Packages finished parts to optimize the material flow processes of both supplier and user while protecting the quality of the part at the lowest overall system cost. 23. Transportation To deliver quality products in the most cost-effective manner while accomplishing distribution of material and vehicles in the required quantity and at the right place and time. 24. Machine/Process Capability To statistically compare the performance of a stable process to a customer's actual requirements on an ongoing basis to ensure high-quality parts and products at all times. 25. Quick Setup To reduce changeover time so that it is not a restriction in meeting the requirements of the next user while providing a continuous flow of quality parts/products. 26. Plant, Machine & Office Layout Positions processes, departments, equipment and work areas to optimize an organizations effectiveness in achieving its operating and quality objectives. 27. Planned Maintenance To improve uptime and quality of output and reduce repair maintenance costs through the continuous improvement of equipment operation. 28. Quality System Requirements Provides organizational structure, procedures, processes and resources needed to implement the quality policy, quality planning, quality control, quality assurance and quality improvement. 29. Level Scheduling To generate schedules that are simultaneously level, stable and smooth that provide for a continuous improvement focus while being responsive to the marketplace. 30. Process Reference Guide The PRG contains current reference material for all of the QN Action Strategies. These should be viewed as process overviews which can be used to acquaint GM employees with specific strategies. 31. Session "G" Objectives Identify each Strategy and its function. Identify its relationship to the Initiatives. Describe the role of the QN Rep in relationship to each Strategy. 32. Error Proofing To anticipate, prevent and detect errors which adversely affect quality, customers and result in waste. 33. Problem Solving To identify, analyze and eliminate the gap between the current situation and 565

where you want to be to achieve product quality improvement and customer satisfaction and enthusiasm. 34. Quality Verification To provide employees with control over their work processes to be certain that quality is correct before they pass their product or service on to the next step of the process. 35. Voice of the Customer To assist us in identifying customers, customer relationships and customer requirements necessary for continuous improvement. 36. People Focused Practices Identifies organized processes and practices, including critical requirements, that enhance the opportunities for employees to have input into how to perform their work in the most effective and safe way to promote continuous improvement. 37. Workplace Organization & Visual Controls Organizes the workplace to provide a safe, clean, neat arrangement with a location for everything required, eliminating things not required and supporting the employee. Uses readily apparent and easily understood visual and audio signals to identify, instruct or indicate that normal or abnormal conditions exist and that action may be required to ensure high quality products. 38. Conserve Resources/ Prevent Pollution (WE CARE) Identifies a process for effectively conserving resources and preventing pollution, through teamwork and continuous improvement, so that GM will become a corporate leader in protecting the environment while becoming a low cost producer.

70 Quality Network, Overview of the UA W-GM Quality Network Action Strategies Work Shop Participant Manual, QN-2681, Prepared by: Quality Network Implementation Team, June 2003, p. 3-9.

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Appendix F

Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 H985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

GM Total U.S. Market GM-UAW Total UAW Share GM Sales Sales Employment Membership 44.50% 1,357,141.00 4,981,841.00 11,188,890 413,869.00 43.50% 1,275,313.00 4,591,067.00 10,554,743 441,282.00 43.60% 1,151,086.00 4,510,186.00 10,354,069 360,455.00 5,288,208.00 12,149,259 43.50% 1,057,376.00 323,667.00 42.00% 5,972,971.00 14,210,932 354,222.00 1,123,716.00 40.80% 6,282,975.00 15,401,472 1,161,171.00 382,035.00 38.90% 6,229,178.00 16,026,426 1,106,477.00 377,831.00 35.00% 1,002,675.00 5,213,205.00 14,895,772 366,515.00 35.60% 5,511,420.00 15,466,493 323,952.00 943,582.00 5,106,224.00 14,549,232 35.10% 306,225.00 921,926.00 35.50% 4,934,308.00 13,886,818 277,036.00 867,564.00 4,319,730.00 12,335,003 35.00% 861,658.00 269,134.00 34.10% 4,397,537.00 12,885,216 258,594.00 796,729.00 13,917,245 33.50% 750,436.00 4,666,988.00 239,068.00 33.20% 765,903.00 5,015,926.00 15,089,356 233,312.00 4,841,581.00 14,766,454 32.80% 756,538.00 230,869.00 4,743,557.00 15,140,223 31.30% 219,281.00 769,685.00 31.10% 764,089.00 4,713,247.00 15,160,313 210,417.00 29.20% 4,548,016.00 15,596,546 209,383.00 741,687.00 29.20% 746,259.00 4,947,359.00 16,959,237 198,585.00 4,875,404.00 17,402,486 28.00% 179,548.00 728,510.00 28.10% 715,621.00 4,824,337.00 17,177,789 178,851.00 28.40% 638,722.00 4,782,212.00 16,848,074 161,472.00 28.00% 4,666,868.00 16,675,733 122,640.00 624,585.00 27.30% 654,657.00 4,617,300.00 16,914,139 118,273.00 26.00% 107,200.00 557,099.00 4,416,042.00 16,997,182 24.30% 88,820.00 538,448.00 4,028,992.00 16,561,482 23.50% 464,910.00 3,789,900.00 16,154,010 75,347.00 22.10% 431,037.00 2,933,451.00 13,246,604 69,009.00 * Canadian Auto Workers split from the UAW in 1985.

Table 1 GM-UAW: SALES, MARKET SHARE, EMPLOYMENT AND MEMBERSHIP DATA (1980-2008) (Source: International UAW Research Department)

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UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 1973. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement\ 1976. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 1979. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 1982. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 1984. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 1987. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 1990. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 1993. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 1996. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 1999. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 2003. UAW-General Motors. National Agreement, 2007. UAW-GM Report, Health-Care Changes for Active and Retired Workers, October 1985. UAW-GM Report, Contract Highlights, October 1987. UAW-GM Report, Contract Highlights, September 1990.

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UAW-GM Center for Human Resources Documents Quality Network, Overview of the UAW-GM Quality Network Action Strategies Work Shop Participant Manual, QN-2681 UAW-GM Quality Network philosophy pamphlet #QN851 -.Quality Network Belief and Values. UAW-GM Center for Human Resources, UAW-GM People, Millennium Issue, Winter 2001.

Interviews Christner, Albert, Former President UAW Local 599, 1999. (Recording in my possession and the University of Michigan-Flint, Genesee Historical Collections, "Buick Labor History Project.") Danjin, Dick, Former International UAW Staff, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2010. (Recordings in my possession and the University of Michigan-Flint, Genesee Historical Collections, "Buick Labor History Project.") Hanline, William D. March 2006. (Recording in my possession and the University of Michigan-Flint, Genesee Historical Collections, "Buick Labor History Project.") Jurkiewicz, Nancy. Community Development Manager, in her office at Flint City Hall. 10 March 1997. (Notes in my possession.) Krebsbach, Elmer, Buick Foundry Truck Repairman, 2001. (Notes in my possession.) Roth, Bob, Former International UAW staff and Region 1C Education Director, 1999. (Recording in my possession and the University of Michigan-Flint, Genesee Historical Collections, "Buick Labor History Project.") Scott, Kenneth, Former Shop Committee Chairman UAW Local 599, International UAW Staff, Servicing Representative, 1998. (Recording and transcripts in my possession and the University of Michigan-Flint, Genesee Historical Collections, "Buick Labor History Project.") Stiven, Sandra, Electrician, 2007. (Recording in my possession and the University of Michigan-Flint, Genesee Historical Collections, "Buick Labor History Project.") Tucker, Jerry, Former Regional Director, UAW Region 5, 2000. (Notes in my possession).

572

Wheeler, James (Cap), Former UAW Local 599 Financial Secretary, 1998. (Recording in my possession and the University of Michigan-Flint, Genesee Historical Collections, "Buick Labor History Project.") Willbanks, Freddie, Former Skilled Trades Shop Committee UAW Local 599, 1999. (Recording in my possession and the University of Michigan-Flint, Genesee Historical Collections, "Buick Labor History Project.") Yettaw, Dave, Former President UAW Local 599, 1998. (Recording and transcripts in my possession and the University of Michigan-Flint, Genesee Historical Collections, "Buick Labor History Project.")

Legal Cases David Sparks v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, United States District Court of Ohio, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern District, Case No: 1:86-CV-l 154. Earl L. Henry, Bonnie J. Lauria, Raymond B. Bailey, Theodore J. Genco, Marvin C. Mariow, Charles R. Miller, and Laverne M. Soriano, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America; Plaintiffs, v. General Motors Corporation, Defendant, Class-Action, United States District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division, Case No: 05-73991, "Henry I." Earl L. Henry, Bonnie J. Lauria, Raymond B. Bailey, Theodore J. Genco, Marvin C. Marlow, Charles R. Miller, and Laverne M. Soriano, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America; Plaintiffs, v. General Motors Corporation, Defendant, United States District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division, Case No: 07-cv-14074, "Henry II."

Local Government Documents Flint, Michigan Billy Durant Automotive Commission A Living Agreement: A Presentation To the General Motors Corporation, 1997. Flint, Michigan. Tax Abatement Records and Associated City Council Resolutions, July 1984-August 1994. Flint, Michigan. City of Flint Department of Community and Economic Development Department, DCED Economic and Housing Development Project Tracking Sheet, 27, March 1997. 573

Flint, Michigan. City of Flint 1998 Federal Empowerment Zone Application,

1998. St

Flint, Michigan. City of Flint, Flint Area Enterprise Community: A Roadmap to the 21 Century, 30 June 1994. Pamphlets Buick Public Relations brochure: Buick Factory 81, 1981. UAW-GM Report: Quarterly Newsletter, Spring 1985.

Personal Letters Bluestone, Irving, Vice President General Motors Department, International Union, UAW to Dave Yettaw, District Committeeman, UAW Local 599, 7 September 1977. Boal, Ellis, Attorney, to Rich Feldman and Larry Reichle, 26 June 1998. Burks, Ruben to Allen Nielson, 4 December 1998. Fraser, Douglas to Business Round Table, 1981. McGee, Art to Mayor of the City of Flint, Woodrow Stanley, 1 October 1998. Oshel, Kay H., Chief, Division of Interpretations and Standards, Department of Labor, Employment Standards Division, Office of Labor-Management Standards, to William D. Hanline, 19 February 1998. Rapson, Calvin Regional Director, UAW Region 1C, to Mayor of the City of Flint, Woodrow Stanley, 1 October 1998. Reagan, Ronald to Robert E. Poli, President, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, 20 October 1980. Ryan, James J., District Director, Internal Revenue Service to UAW-GM Human Resource Center, 29 December 1987. Smith, John F., Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and President, General Motors Corporation to Mayor of the City of Flint, Woodrow Stanley, 1 October 1998. Woodcock, Leonard and Douglas Fraser and Ken Bannon and Pat Greathouse and 574

Irving Bluestone to UAW Membership, February 1989. Yettaw, Dave District Committeeman, UAW Local 599 to Irving Bluestone, Vice President General Motors Department, International Union, UAW, 25 August 1977. Yokich, Stephen P., International UAW President to Darryl Greer, Chairman UAW Staff Council, 13 May 1983.

Public Review Board, International Union, UAW Decisions Appeal of: Gary Brandt, International Representative Region 2, UAW (Cleveland, Ohio)-vs. - International Union UAW (The United automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America), Case No. 787, 28 August 1987. Appeal of: Gary Brandt, International Representative Region 2, UAW (Cleveland, Ohio)vs. - International Union UAW (The United automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America), Case No. 787 II, 22 April 1988. Appeal of: Gregg Shotwell, Member, Local Union 2151, UAW, Coopersville Michigan v. International Union, UAW (The United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America), Case No. 1504, 29 November 2005. Appeal of: Hazen John Warner, Dave Yettaw, Dean Braid, Doug Jackson and Mike Keeler vs. Local Union 599, UAW, Region 1C, v. International Union, UAW (The United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America), Case No. 1291, 25 April 2000.

State of Michigan Documents Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation. GM-UAW Metropolitan Pontiac Retraining and Employment Program, CIN no. 706-253, 10 November 1982. State of Michigan Department of Consumer and Industry Services: Corporations, Securities and Land Development Bureau: Articles of Incorporation. Labor-Management Councilfor Economic Renewal. CIN no. 878389, 3 July 1991.

Michigan Department of Consumer and Industry Services: Corporations, Securities and Land Development Bureau, Articles of Incorporation. UAW Region 1A IPS Labor-Management Council. CIN no. 879599, 18 February 1992.

575

State of Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, / 986Annual Report- Non-Projit Corporations, GM_ UA W Metropolitan Pontiac Retraining and Employment Program, CIS No. 706253, 19 October 1986. State of Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, UA W Region IA IPS Labor-Management Council, CIN No. 879-599, (21 February 1992), 1998. Nonprofit Corporation Information Update, ID No. 879599.

State of Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation. UAW-GM Human Resource Center, CIN no. 895-076, 19 September 1987. State of Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation. UA W-Ford National Development and Training Center, CIN No. 884-097, 21 June 1982. State of Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation. UA W-GM Skilled Development and Training Program, CIN No. 895-076, 8 June 1984. State of Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation. UA W-GM Skilled Development and Training Program, CIN No. 895-076, 10 October 1985. State of Michigan Department of Commerce Corporations and Securities Bureau, Articles of Incorporation, UAW-GM Human Resource Center, CIN No. 730390, 6 December 1994. State of Michigan, Industrial Property Tax Abatement, Public Act 198, 1974.

Transcripts Walter P. Reuther, "The Economics of Collective Bargaining", Speech at University of California, Institute of Industrial Relations, November 30, 1948.

United States Government Documents

Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 120, US Representative, Dale E. Kildee. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Department of Labor Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Form 5500, 1994.

576

Federal Register, Vol. 74, No. 180 Hyde, Patrick. Policy and Law Adviser, Office of Labor-Management Standards, U.S Department of Labor, Position Paper Outline: UAW Joint Funds are not a "Labor-management Committee". Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Return of 501(c)3Exempt Private Foundation, UAW-GMHuman Resource Center Form PF-990, 1994. Internal Revenue Service, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501 © (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, Form 1023, EIN 38-2533493, 13 August 1987. Internal Revenue Service, UAW-GM Human Resource Center Form 872-C, 21 December 1987. Internal Revenue Service, 1987 Exempt Organization Continuing Education Text On Permissible Benefits Provided by Labor Organizations IRS Code Rev. Rule 75-473, 1975-2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2000 (120th edition) Washington DC. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities, On December 21, 1994. U. S. Department of Labor Employment Standards Administration, Office of LaborManagement Standards, LMRDA Regulations and Interpretative Bulletins, Section § 453.6 ©. U.S. Department of Labor, Work Opportunity Tax Credit, March 1997. U.S. Department of Labor, Summary/Questions and Answers: International UAW Staff Retirement Income Plan, 13 December 1995. U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Labor-Management Standards, Labor Organization Annual Report, FormLM-2, 1999. U.S. National Labor Relations Act, 1935, Section 8(a) 2. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: (116th edition.), 1996. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: (120th edition.), 2000. 577

Video Recording Yokich, Stephen P, Proceedings of the 1999 UAWBargaining Convention, Taped by Dean Braid, 30 March 1999.

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