Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the consolidation of the Turkmen Regime (Central Asia Research Forum) 0415454409, 0203892313, 9780415454407, 9780203892312

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Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy

Turkmenistan, an independent nation since 1991, is a strategically important Central Asian state. This book covers the most significant period of the establishment of the Turkmen political regime. At the core of this book is the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, which, from 1995 onwards, constituted the theoretical backbone for the foreign policy of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. The author analyses the reason and aim of the concept, its significance for and impact on the country’s domestic and foreign relations, its practical implementation and its transformation into a tool of strengthening of absolute personal authority. Furthermore, he establishes whether Positive Neutrality has to be seen as a ‘domestic-oriented’ foreign policy, which has been used by the Turkmen regime to reinforce its internal position. This is the first book-length and thorough analysis of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. It furthers our understanding of Turkmenistan, and provides an informed background for the study of its foreign policy. It fills a void in the current literature, and it will constitute an essential reference for most scholars and researcher focusing on contemporary Central Asia, Russian foreign policy, Foreign Policy, International Relations and Comparative Politics. Luca Anceschi is Research Associate at the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University, Australia. He is a graduate of the University of Naples ‘L’Orientale’ and of La Trobe University. His main research interests include the international politics of post-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Central Asian studies series

1 Mongolia Today Science, culture, environment and development Edited by Dendevin Badarch and Raymond A. Zilinskas 2 Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire Daniel Brower 3 Church of the East A concise history Wilhelm Baum and Dietmar W. Winkler 4 Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia Communal commitment and political order in change Paul Georg Geiss 5 Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924 Seymour Becker 6 Russian Culture in Uzbekistan One language in the middle of nowhere David MacFadyen 7 Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia Maria Elisabeth Louw 8 Kazakhstan Ethnicity, language and power Bhavna Dave 9 Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus Post-Soviet disorder Edited by Moshe Gammer

10 Humanitarian Aid in Post-Soviet Countries An anthropological perspective Laëtitia Atlani-Duault 11 Muslim–Christian Relations in Central Asia A. Christian van Gorder 12 The Northwest Caucasus Past, present, future Walter Richmond 13 Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy Positive Neutrality and the consolidation of the Turkmen regime Luca Anceschi

Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy Positive Neutrality and the consolidation of the Turkmen regime

Luca Anceschi

First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2009 Luca Anceschi All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Anceschi, Luca, 1976Turkmenistan's foreign policy : positive neutrality and the consolidation of the Turkmen regime / Luca Anceschi. p. cm. – (Central Asian studies series) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Turkmenistan–Foreign relations. 2. Turkmenistan–Politics and government–1991– I. Title. DK938.8658.A53 2008 327.585–dc22 ISBN 0-203-89231-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-45440-9 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-89231-3 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-45440-7 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-89231-2 (ebk)

To the memory of Pier Giovanni Donini (1936–2003)

Contents

List of illustrations Acknowledgements List of abbreviations Introduction

xii xiii xiv 1

PART I

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy 1

Establishing a conceptual framework for the policy of Positive Neutrality

7

9

Turkmen foreign policy in the late Soviet era: statements and objectives 10 Turkmen foreign policy in the early post-Soviet era (January–August 1992) 12 The path towards neutrality (August 1992–December 1995) 22 The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality: contents and objectives 26 Conclusion 30 2

Turkmen authoritarianism in the post-Soviet era The establishment of the regime (1992–1996) 33 Regime consolidation (1997–2002) 37 The strengthening of authoritarianism (2003–2006) 40 The post-Niyazov era (2007) 43 Conclusion 47

32

x

Contents

3

The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality as a key element in nation-building

49

Sultanistic accretions in Niyazov’s Turkmenistan 51 The place of foreign policy in the Turkmen rhetorical paradigm 53 Conclusion 59 PART II

The operational dimension of Turkmen foreign policy

61

4

63

The economic foreign policy of neutral Turkmenistan Turkmen economy: a brief outline 65 Redirecting Turkmen trade 71 Turkmenistan’s energy policy 81 Conclusion: the impact of internal factors on Turkmenistan’s economic foreign policy 93

5

Neutrality as equidistance from sources of dependency: Russo-Turkmen relations in the post-Soviet era

97

Shifting paradigms: Russo-Turkmen mutual perceptions in the Kozyrev era 98 Russo-Turkmen relations in the post-Soviet era: the multilateral dimension 103 Russo-Turkmen relations in the post-Soviet era: the bilateral dimension 112 Conclusion 122 6

Neutrality as a policy of insulation: the international community and human rights violations in Turkmenistan

124

Human rights rhetoric in the Turkmen foreign policy paradigm 126 Insulating Turkmenistan: Positive Neutrality and human rights 128 Conclusion 137 7

Turkmen foreign policy in the post-Niyazov era Declaratory foreign policy 140 Operational foreign policy 143 Conclusion 145

139

Contents xi Conclusion: continuity and change in Turkmen foreign policy-making

147

Phase 1 (1992–1995): equidistance 148 Phase 2 (1996–1999): rapprochement with Russia 150 Phase 3 (2000–2007): insulation 152 Concluding observations: the key objective of Positive Neutrality 154

Appendix

156

Notes Bibliography Index

158 196 206

Illustrations

Figures 1 4.1 4.2 4.3

Map of Turkmenistan The USSR pipeline system Turkmenistan: overview of pipeline projects Turkmenistan (2007): completed natural gas pipelines

xvi 85 88 92

Tables 1.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.1

Post-Soviet Turkmenistan: membership in major international organisations Turkmenistan: selected production indices (1990–1991) Turkmenistan: selected production indices (1992–2003) Soviet Republics: intra-union trade and external commerce (1990) Turkmenistan: structure of trade (1992–2003) Turkmenistan: destination of exports (1994–2005) Turkmenistan: origin of imports (1994–2005) Turkmenistan: proved reserves of oil and natural gas (most recent estimates) Turkmenistan: foreign direct investment overview (selected years) Qualitative assessment of Turkmenistan’s role in relations with Russia (1992–2006)

18 67 69 72 76 78 79 81 83 122

Acknowledgements

Without the support of many colleagues and friends, writing this book would have been far more difficult. This is my place to thank them all. Professor Joseph Camilleri from La Trobe University has motivated me from the very first day and encouraged me throughout the writing and editing processes. Joe’s continued support has been indispensable for the completion of the book. Lengthy conversations with Professor John Miller (La Trobe University) have assisted me in making sense of Turkmen politics and Turkmen history. Dr Gwenda Tavan and her lovely family have been a fantastic support during my years in Australia. My colleagues at the Centre for Dialogue, Dr Michális S. Michael, Mr Ben Zala and Dr George Myconos have also shared some of their time with me to hear about Turkmenistan and its obscure politics. I am particularly grateful to the staff at the International Library Loan desk at the Borchardt Library at La Trobe University, who have spend many days in trying to get hold of books and articles on Positive Neutrality. I also acknowledge the support of the Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of La Trobe University, which funded my research trip to Moscow and Europe in 2004. Dr Andrea Teti (University of Aberdeen) and Dr Damien Bailey (La Trobe University) expressed very insightful comments on prior versions of this book. I also want to express my gratitude to Professor Isabella Camera d’Afflitto of the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’, who kindly donated to me the Central Asian section of the library of her late husband, Professor Pier Giovanni Donini, to whose memory this book is dedicated. My friends Fabio, Pizzi, Vesna, Lence, Johnny, Kosta, Chiara and Mauro have supported me across two continents. My partner Lisa Maree has always been there for me. I thank her deeply for this. Dulcis in fundo, I want to thank my family in Italy. A loro, non posso che dire grazie. Salerno, 28 January 2008

Abbreviations

ADB BSSR CAC CAT CCPR CEDAW CERD CESCR CiO CIS CPT CRC CSCE DPT EAPC ECO EU FAO IEC ILO IMF IPA KNB/MNB MID NAM NATO ODIHR OSCE PRC RSFSR SCO

Asian Development Bank Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic Central Asia–Centre Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Chairman in Office Commonwealth of Independent States Communist Party of Turkmenistan Convention on the Rights of the Child Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe Democratic Party of Turkmenistan Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Economic Cooperation Organisation European Union Food and Agriculture Organisation Interstate Economic Committee International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund Inter-Parliamentary Assembly Committee/Ministry of National Security Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Needs Assessment Mission North Atlantic Treaty Organization Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe People’s Republic of China Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Abbreviations TACIS TAP TCGP TSSR UN USSR WTO

xv

Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline Trans-Caspian gas pipeline Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic United Nations Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) World Trade Organization

Source: United Nations Map No. 3772, January 2004.

Introduction

Turkmenistan occupies a peculiar place in the political landscape of post-Soviet Central Asia. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), Turkmen politics has been primarily defined by the emergence and consolidation of an authoritarian regime, which has become the most repressive in Central Asia and one of the most authoritarian in the world. The progressive strengthening of authoritarian rhetoric and methods has been the main factor that has brought Turkmenistan to the attention of the international community. At the end of 2007, the regime appeared to enjoy total control over every facet of Turkmenistan’s political life. The regime stands firmly at the centre of Turkmen politics as it has been able, since its establishment, to dominate the Turkmen political milieu. This suggests that any analysis of contemporary Turkmen politics ought to begin with an in-depth examination of Turkmen authoritarianism. Internationally, the Turkmen regime has attracted attention by virtue of a distinctive foreign policy, whose primary feature is the acquisition of an internationally recognised neutral status. Turkmen officials coined the term Positive Neutrality to describe the foreign policy pursued by the regime. Positive Neutrality has characterised the international dimension of Turkmen politics throughout the post-Soviet era. This policy became operational on 12 December 1995, when the General Assembly of the United Nations approved an ad hoc resolution [A/50/80(A)] in which it endorsed Turkmenistan’s intention to acquire a neutral status. Amongst the foreign policies of the post-Soviet states of Central Asia, Turkmenistan’s is the most difficult to interpret, in no small measure because of its highly rhetorical content and largely opaque operational implications. The aim of this book is to examine the foreign policy direction pursued by Turkmenistan in the post-Soviet era, and specifically to focus on the role played by the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The analysis presented here departs from the fragmented picture that the current literature has provided of Turkmen neutralism. Western writing on Turkmenistan has usually placed Positive Neutrality in the content of a general analysis of Turkmen authoritarianism1 or an examination of specific (economic, military) aspects of Turkmenistan’s international relations.2 Western scholars have successfully identified the main outcome of

2

Introduction

Turkmen neutralism,3 noted a few of its determinants,4 and reconstructed the principal operational strategy of Turkmen neutralism.5 Most importantly, the scholarly literature, which has generally considered Positive Neutrality as a domestically-oriented policy, has argued that ‘the nexus between domestic policy and foreign policy’6 has proven crucial in consolidating the stability of the Turkmen regime. This last proposition constitutes the launching pad for the analytical framework of this study. To this extent, the argument presented here is based on conclusions drawn by antecedent scholarly writing. Nevertheless, the literature has so far failed to elaborate a comprehensive approach to the study of Positive Neutrality. This study intends to fill this gap. This book concurs with the view that matters of domestic political consideration (regime survival) have been the principal determinant of Positive Neutrality. The interconnection between regime survival and Positive Neutrality, which other scholars have identified as a core element in Turkmen foreign policymaking, is the central issue to be investigated here. In addition, this study presents a number of new elements to the debate on Turkmen foreign policy. Of these, by far the most important is the proposition that Turkmen foreign policy has been constantly re-elaborated around the perceived impact of the Russian Federation on the internal stability of the Turkmen regime. This study considers the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality as the product of the regime’s peculiar character, namely its authoritarianism. Positive Neutrality does not operate in a vacuum; its analysis, we will argue, has to be placed within the context of the regime’s wider interests and priorities. To be properly understood, Turkmen neutrality ‘must be seen as defined through the lens of the leadership’s perception of its own survival’.7 In other words, a direct connection is envisaged between the domestic and external dimensions of Turkmen politics. The present literature has concluded that, since its establishment, the Turkmen regime has constantly considered the preservation of its power within the domestic landscape as its primary political objective.8 Repression of political opponents, nation-building and the penetration of the regime into every aspect of the political landscape are the three main vectors through which this target has been achieved. This book seeks to establish whether Turkmen foreign policy has served to achieve analogous objectives, and whether Positive Neutrality has to be seen as an instrument used by the regime to reinforce its internal position. To do so, this study revolves around the central question: What are the underlying objectives of the policy of Positive Neutrality? In order to answer this question, the study of Turkmen neutrality has been divided in two distinct, though clearly related facets: the declaratory content of Positive Neutrality on the one hand, and the operational elements of the policy on the other. We use the expression ‘declaratory policy’ to define the ensemble of official documents and pronouncements on foreign policy issued by the Turkmen elite between 1992 and 2007. In turn, the expression ‘operational foreign policy’ indicates the numerous strategies and actions that the regime has devised to give effect to the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The implementation

Introduction

3

of the doctrine could be properly set in motion only after international recognition of Turkmen neutralism had been secured. For this reason, the analysis of the operational stage of Turkmen neutrality is mostly focused on the period 1996–2007. The subdivision of the study of Turkmen foreign policy into facets (and, in one sense, in two stages) is the principal methodological tool selected to develop the central hypothesis of this study, namely that the most significant of the undeclared objectives of the policy of Positive Neutrality relates to the political consolidation of the Turkmen regime. This subdivision is the element that confers to this study much of its innovativeness. The analyses of Positive Neutrality presented so far have not relied on official documents, and have generally neglected to examine the degree to which operational foreign policy has accorded with the declaratory statements issued by Turkmen officials. Conversely, this study is based on this methodological approach, which may be reasonably said to break new ground. In order to identify the objectives pursued by Turkmen neutralism, the methodology used here is developed in three steps: 1 2 3

The analysis of the declaratory statements, which will identify the objectives of Positive Neutrality as expounded by the Turkmen elite; The study of operational foreign policy, which will, in turn, throw light on the objectives that the policy has actually pursued; A comparison between declaratory objectives and those implicit in operational policy, which will clarify the degree of convergence between the two facets (or stages) of Turkmen foreign policy.

The results of this comparative analysis will highlight the inconsistencies that have permeated Turkmen foreign policy-making in the post-Soviet era. The study of the inconsistencies present within and/or between the two facets of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy holds an important key to identifying a number of undeclared objectives. Three levels of inconsistency are considered especially relevant to the purposes of this study: • •

•

Inconsistencies within declaratory policy, whose occurrence is revealed by comparison over time of divergent official declarations on specific issues; Inconsistencies within operational policy, which can be inferred through comparison over time of divergent applications of a specific aspect of declaratory foreign policy; Inconsistencies between declaratory rhetoric and operational outcomes, which are detected by observing the degree of discrepancy that has emerged over time between the two facets (stages) of foreign policy.

Inconsistencies within declaratory policy are germane to the emergence of evolutionary patterns in the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Divergent statements on a specific issue can, in fact, be explained with reference to partial and/or total

4

Introduction

revisions of the ‘Declaratory section’ of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. This study will carefully address this issue, and consider the possibility that Turkmen foreign policy-makers revised the original declaratory statement of the doctrine, but failed to disclose the nature or significance of these revisions. Establishing whether Turkmen policy-makers did revise the doctrine is necessary to reveal the nature (and implications) of such change. The second and the third types of inconsistencies help to shed light on the existence of foreign policy objectives that remained undeclared in the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality but were actually pursued at the operational level. Once the existence of undeclared objectives is confirmed, it should be possible to connect these with significant developments in the nature of Turkmen authoritarianism, to observe whether the evolution of the domestic landscape influenced to any extent Turkmenistan’s foreign policy and, most importantly, to determine how the pursuit of undeclared foreign policy objectives related to considerations of regime survival. The distinction between declaratory and operational foreign policy is therefore crucial to the purpose of this study. Its importance has strongly influenced the selection of the sources upon which the argument is developed. Official policy is the object of this study; public perceptions of official policies are not, except indirectly. The argument presented here is therefore predominantly based on official documents issued by the Turkmen government. A number of publications on Turkmen neutrality (mostly in the Russian9 and English languages) issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan and the official mouthpiece of the Turkmen regime, the Russian-language daily newspaper Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan,10 constitute the most important sources of information and data on which the analysis of the policy of Positive Neutrality is based. These sources have proved indispensable in reconstructing the declaratory framework of Turkmen foreign policy. At the same time, they have helped to identify many operational policies developed by the Turkmen government within the context of Positive Neutrality. Secondary sources, mostly in Western languages (English, French and Italian), have been used to round off the analysis of the operational stage of Turkmen neutralism. This study is not directly concerned with the ways in which the Turkmen population has understood the policy of neutrality, neither is it designed to assess the degree of success or failure encountered by the policy. This focus helps to explain why non-governmental publications in the Turkmen language are largely absent from the range of sources consulted here. The subdivision of Turkmen foreign policy into two facets (declaratory and operational) is mirrored in the book’s structure. This study is organised in two main sections. Part I (Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy) is focused on the analysis of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, while Part II (The operational dimension of Turkmen foreign policy) examines in depth how the declaratory elements of doctrine were translated into operational foreign policy. The core of the book is taken up with an analysis of the factors that shaped this translation.

Introduction

5

The analysis of the declaratory segment of Turkmen neutrality is introduced in Chapter 1. This chapter addresses the central question of the book by examining simultaneously the content of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality and the political circumstances that led to its introduction. The aim here is to place the introduction of the doctrine within the dynamics of regime consolidation during the early post-Soviet era (1992–1995). The last section of the chapter analyses in depth the aims, objective/subjective determinants and operational strategies of the doctrine, as enunciated by Turkmen policy-makers in late 1995. The second part of the study will rely heavily on the conclusions drawn in this chapter, since it is these conclusions that will permit an analytically useful comparison between declaratory objectives and operational outcomes. Chapter 2 describes in detail the evolution of Turkmen authoritarianism in the post-Soviet era, both prior and subsequent to the death of Saparmurat Ataevich Niyazov (21 December 2006). As the two main dimensions of Turkmen politics are closely connected, understanding Turkmenistan’s domestic politics will facilitate the process of identification of the main determinants of the policy of Positive Neutrality. In Chapter 3, particular attention centres on the domestic relevance and implications of the policy of Positive Neutrality: the nation-building process that the regime has fostered in the post-Soviet era. To do so, the chapter links Turkmenistan’s foreign policy with official rhetoric, to tackle one of the most important subsidiary problems to be investigated in this study: Is the declaratory component of the policy of Positive Neutrality directed primarily at an international or a domestic audience, or both? The operational stage of Turkmen neutralism is dealt with in Part II of the book. The four chapters in this section address the three dimensions in which Positive Neutrality is supposed to operate: political, economic and humanitarian. The investigation departs from the analysis of the main targets of Turkmen neutralism as described by the declaratory policy, and places the spotlight on the objectives actually pursued by the foreign policy of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. This section constitutes the core of the study, since key elements that form part of the answer to our central question are contained here, especially in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 delves into the economic foreign policy of neutral Turkmenistan. Particular attention centres on energy issues, as the development of the energy sector represents a crucial factor in Turkmenistan’s economic system. The chapter examines the processes through which the regime manipulated the external dimension of the Turkmen economy to consolidate its power position at home. Economic neutralism is considered a key factor in shaping the evolution of Turkmen foreign policy. Here again, the same key question arises: What are the fundamental objectives of the economic foreign policy of Turkmenistan? In addressing it, the chapter takes account of change and continuity over time and the influence of domestic considerations in the periodic redefinition of the objectives of economic neutralism. Chapter 5 examines Turkmenistan’s relations with Russia through the lens of

6

Introduction

the regime’s perception of the various forms of leverage (political, economic, military) enjoyed by Moscow over the Turkmen state. This chapter is therefore concerned to establish how the Turkmen regime interpreted its multifaceted dependency on Russia and how the policy of neutrality, operating at both multilateral and bilateral levels, was designed to reinforce and/or weaken the links between Ashgabat and Moscow. Of particular relevance here is Russia’s support for Turkmen authoritarianism as a key factor pointing to the undeclared foreign policy objectives of Turkmen neutralism and, most importantly, to their connection with the consolidation of the regime’s hold on power. Chapter 6 seeks to throw light on how the Turkmen regime used the policy of Positive Neutrality to insulate the country from international (largely Western) pressures for political liberalisation. The international perception of the regime’s human rights record emerges as an important barometer for assessing the degree of support and/or dissent that surrounds Niyazov and his associates. Turkmenistan’s responses to international criticisms of the human rights record by the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) help to throw light on the dynamics through which neutralism made way for calculated isolationism. This chapter argues that isolationism was not so much an unanticipated outcome but a carefully considered means to pursue key objectives. The isolationist thrust of Turkmenistan’s response, which to all intents and purposes has to be considered as analogous to the policy of Positive Neutrality, is once again shown to have as its principal rationale the strengthening of the Turkmen regime’s hold on power. Chapter 7 centres its attention on the foreign policy course implemented by Gurbanguly Myalikgulievich Berdymuhammedov. The aim here is to establish whether the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, both in its declaratory statement or in its operational stage, has been subjected to substantial modifications by the regime that emerged after Niyazov’s death. This chapter argues that, in the postNiyazov era also, the Turkmen regime has continued to perceive Positive Neutrality as an indispensable tool to reinforce its hold on power.

Part I

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

1

Establishing a conceptual framework for the policy of Positive Neutrality

Neutralism has been the central element in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy for more than a decade. In the period June 1992–December 1995, the acquisition of international support for neutrality constituted the primary objective of Turkmen operational foreign policy. Following the UN endorsement of Turkmen Neutrality (12 December 1995), the state’s external relations have been reportedly conducted in strict conformity to the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Hence, Neutrality characterised Turkmen foreign policy for most of the post-independence era. Turkmen official publications usually presented the adoption of neutrality as an objective constantly pursued by the Turkmen government since the achievement of independence.1 However, foreign policy declarations issued in the last months of 1991 and in the early post-Soviet era did not hint in any way at the possibility of adopting a neutral foreign policy. In January–June 1992, neutralism was not the keyword in the foreign policy agenda of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. It is therefore possible to suggest that neutralism became an option in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy only after specific policy determinants, linked with the external and/or internal dynamics typical of the post-Soviet era and clearly detached from the political landscape of the final Soviet period, came to the surface of Turkmen politics. One of the main aims of this chapter is to identify these foreign policy determinants. To do so, it is necessary to compare foreign policy documents issued by the Turkmen government prior and subsequent to June 1992 (the date of the earliest declaration on neutrality). The first section of the chapter will describe in detail the foreign policy declarations issued during the late Soviet era (October–December 1991) by the government of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (TSSR). In these documents, eventually used as outlines for the earliest declarations on foreign policy of the post-independence era, neutrality was neither a significant component of declaratory policy nor a primary objective for operational policy. Reference to the neutral principle is also missing in foreign policy declarations issued during Avdy Ovezovich Kuliev’s tenure of the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs (January–August 1992). The analysis of Turkmenistan’s international relations during that period will constitute the core of the second section of the chapter, which will also touch upon the first operational steps of Turkmen foreign policy

10

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

before clarifying the circumstances that led to the removal of the first foreign minister of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. The third part of the chapter will examine the consequences of Kuliev’s dismissal, and, at the same time, will describe the diplomatic actions through which the Turkmen government accomplished the international recognition of Turkmenistan’s neutral status. This section will present a comparison between strategies and methods typical of the Turkmen foreign policy of early 1992 and those of the period following Kuliev’s removal, to highlight the extent to which operational policy during this period was significantly different from that of the first six months of 1992. The final section of the chapter will present the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, by discussing in greater details its sources and determinants, as well as by analysing its declared objectives and priorities. Overall, the chapter is designed to assess the extent to which the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality has brought discontinuity into the foreign policy paradigm of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. The detailed examination of foreign policy documents issued before and after June 1992 will illustrate what degree of homogeneity is shared by the foreign policy courses implemented in these two chronological phases. The analysis of pre-neutrality foreign policy will hence be instrumental in highlighting the degree of innovativeness enjoyed by the doctrine, and, furthermore, will present a number of elements that will favour a more precise understanding of the political milieu in which the policy itself was formulated.

Turkmen foreign policy in the late Soviet era: statements and objectives On 1 October 1991, the Turkmen government issued the first official statement on independent policies (Zayavlenie Prezidenta Turkmenskoi SSR S.A. Niyazova i Verkhovnogo Soveta Turkmenskoi SSR ‘O Vnutrennei i Vneshnei Politike Turkmenistana’ – Declaration of the President of the TSSR and of the Supreme Soviet of TSSR on domestic and foreign policy).2 This document outlined the governmental positions on domestic and foreign policies, and constituted part of the text of the referendum on national independence submitted to the Turkmen electorate on 26 October.3 The historical-political milieu in which the national elite drafted this document strongly influenced the general tone of the declaration, reducing its political significance to a purely symbolic one. The uncertainty about the future of the Soviet Union, mainly caused by the long and relatively fruitless inter-republican debate on the adoption of a new Union Treaty, led to the release of a text generally pervaded by a high degree of vagueness in describing the development of Turkmen independent policies. Moreover, the unenthusiastic attitude of the national elite (and of the Turkmen population as well) towards the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union motivated the overall tentative tone of this declaration, characterised by constant allusions to the necessity of preserving the Union. It is worth remembering that, in Soviet Central Asia, the accomplishment of full independence (i.e. total emancipation from the Soviet Union) was neither an issue in the political

A conceptual framework for Positive Neutrality

11

agendas of the republican leaders4 nor a political objective shared by the various popular movements active in the region.5 This coincidental relationship between the aims of the Turkmen elite and the opinions of the popular masses would prove decisive in determining the outcome of the national referendum. Nevertheless, this document contained a number of useful, albeit vague, indications of the future course of Turkmen independent political life. A particular interest in Western models of political organisation emerged from the declaration. To begin with, the constant mention of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and of the Soviet Deklaratsiya Prav i Svobod Cheloveka (Declaration on Human Rights and Liberties, issued by the Congress of People’s Deputies in September 1991), suggested that the Turkmen elite was looking at both Soviet and non-Soviet juridical prototypes to base its own constitutional development. As far as economic policy was concerned, the declaration flagged the intention of abandoning planned centralism in a relatively short period of time, in favour of a market-oriented economic system. Besides a number of general (and highly rhetorical) remarks on the necessity of implementing competitive democracy in Turkmenistan, avoiding social, religious and ethnic conflicts and solving the economic crisis, the TSSR government vaguely announced its foreign policy strategy, by portraying the basic conduct of its international relations as follows: ‘Turkmenistan will not interfere in other states’ domestic politics, will respect international law, will conduct a non-aggressive foreign policy and will build peaceful relations with other nations’.6 On 26 October 1991, 94.1 per cent of the Turkmen electorate voted in favour of national independence, while a similarly large majority of voters (93.5 per cent) supported the adoption of the governmental declaration issued on 1 October.7 The Supreme Soviet of TSSR convened the same day to outline the draft of a Constitutional Law on Independence. On 28 October, the Konstitutsionnyi Zakon Turkmenistana o Nezavisimosti i Osnovakh Gosudarstvennogo Ustroistva Turkmenistana (Constitutional Law on Independence and on the Fundamental National Structures of Turkmenistan), was adopted.8 The document, consisting of 20 clauses, provided rather detailed information on domestic, social and economic policies, and outlined (clause 14) the guidelines of the national foreign policy as follows: Turkmenistan, as an independent state and as a full member of the international community, will formulate and implement its foreign policy in accordance with the directives of the United Nations and other International organisations; will establish diplomatic, consular, commercial relations [with other states], will exchange diplomatic missions and will be entitled to be part [sic] in international agreements. (Turkmenskaya Iskra, 29 October 1991) As far as defence policy was concerned, the Constitutional Law of 28 October included more extensive information (clause 15)9 about the aims of the elite, while reaffirming the intention of promoting the creation of a national army.

12

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

The Constitutional Law of 28 October 1991 can be considered a benchmark in Turkmen diplomatic history. At the same time, it constituted the last document on foreign policy issued by the Turkmen government in the Soviet era. The proclamation of Turkmenistan as a full member of the international community and the statement of intention to establish full diplomatic relations with other state entities were the first political steps towards the complete emancipation of Turkmen foreign policy from the central control of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Because of its centrifugal implications and its deceptively secessionist tone, this law could be considered as thoroughly inconsistent with the objective of participating in a renewed Soviet Union which, in October 1991, constituted the primary foreign policy objective of the TSSR government. Nevertheless, the necessity of preserving Turkmen participation in the Union emerged as the guiding factor in the reaction of the Turkmen ruling class to the events of December 1991. After the signature of the Minsk Agreement (8 December 1991), the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the temporary exclusion of the Central Asian republics from the membership of this organisation, Turkmenistan found itself isolated from the former centre of the Union and, consequently, the accomplishment of its primary foreign policy seemed to be seriously compromised. However, in the days following the creation of the CIS a significant diplomatic effort was performed by the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs to persuade the other Central Asian republics to reach a common position regarding the newly born organisation. The Ashgabat meeting (14 December 1991) was the concrete result of this effort. During that summit, the Central Asian leaders clearly stated their intention to join the CIS and their claims would be eventually accepted (21 December) by the three founding members of the organisation (RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus). Therefore, Turkmen diplomacy contributed to the establishment of the post-Soviet order.10 The preservation of vital links with the former centre of the Union was consequently accomplished through the creation of the CIS. The creation of this organisation, however, provoked the break-up of the Soviet Union and formalised the independence of 15 new states, including Turkmenistan.

Turkmen foreign policy in the early post-Soviet era (January–August 1992) Creating foreign policy ab initio was Kuliev’s main task. Unavailability of experienced personnel and lack of funding were among the main difficulties impinging upon the effectiveness of the Turkmen MID.11 Furthermore, the intention of coordinating the foreign policies of the CIS member states, aired in 1991 during the debate on the New Union Treaty,12 was not contained in the Agreement on Establishment of the Commonwealth. The text included only vague provisions on the level of coordination of the member states’ foreign policies and did not spell out the creation of supranational structures specifically devoted to the accomplishment of this target.13 Therefore, the newly independent states

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had to formulate their foreign policy objectives simply on the basis of their own diplomatic experience, which, in the case of Turkmenistan, was extremely limited. Further, in early 1992, the Turkmen government turned its attention to the domestic aspects of the state-building process,14 largely neglecting foreign policy-making. As a consequence, the Turkmen MID was not reformed or expanded, and a comprehensive analysis of objective and subjective foreign policy determinants did not take place. This resulted in the release of a number of foreign policy statements analogous to the declarations of October 1991 and to the implementation of rather linear and unsophisticated operational policies. In developing Turkmen foreign policy, the first step was to secure international diplomatic recognition for Turkmenistan through the establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign countries and, where possible, the exchange of diplomatic missions. More specifically, the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated a number of countries whose relations with Turkmenistan had to be immediately strengthened, because of their significant strategic importance. They included:15 • • • •

The Russian Federation; Other former Soviet republics; Neighbouring states, including Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Afghanistan; Western states.

Turkmenistan’s list of strategic partners approximately coincided with those of Kyrgyzstan,16 Kazakhstan17 and Uzbekistan.18 Similarities in assessing the Central Asian republics’ geopolitical position and in selecting rather obvious strategic partners were not the only common elements in the early stages of their foreign policy-making processes. Analogies in historical determinants, economic priorities, geographical position and, to a greater extent, similar logistic problems in creating their own diplomatic institutions, led the different Central Asian foreign ministries to develop embryonic foreign policy paradigms whose form and content were frequently parallel. In other words, the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia ended up elaborating foreign policy by default. The analysis of Turkmenistan’s relations with its international partners must necessarily connect with the discourse of foreign models of development, which, in the first part of the 1990s, dominated the scholarly debate on Central Asian politics.19 This discourse contains a number of naïve arguments and several clichés. To begin with, the initial supposition was that the Central Asian regimes were to engage in transitional processes of economic liberalisation, part of a more general political liberalisation paradigm. A rather linear vision of postSoviet politics seemed to fascinate several Western scholars and perhaps members of the intelligentsiya of the newly independent states. The initial assumption was based on the idea that the Central Asian republics (as well as other former members of the Soviet Union) wished to become Western-style liberal democracies.20 The long and non-democratic Soviet rule failed to provide

14

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

the Central Asian political cultures with the prerequisites necessary to initiate the process of political liberalisation and to engage in economic transitions oriented towards market capitalism. Therefore, to accomplish these objectives, the Central Asian republics were to imitate the political experiences of foreign countries and import in toto external models of development into their own political and economic systems. Turkey and Iran were among the first states to look at newly independent Central Asia with interest. For this reason, early scholarly literature on postSoviet Central Asia considered the secular ‘economic liberalism à la Mustafa Kemal’21 and the more religious political paradigm sponsored by Iran as the models of development more likely to be followed by the Central Asian states.22 The expression ‘Great Game’, formerly labelling the British–Russian rivalry in Central Asia during the late nineteenth century, regained its former currency,23 and it was used to indicate the international struggle aimed at obtaining growing influence on the post-Soviet states of Central Asia. Turkey and Iran were considered to be the main competitors in this new version of the Great Game. Evolutions in the internal situations24 of the international actors that, supposedly, were offering economic ‘models’ to be imitated in Central Asia and, more importantly, the emergence of authoritarian regimes25 in the region were the factors that progressively reduced the relevance of the discourse on foreign models of development in Central Asia. In fact, while the developmental models of the external actors were no longer appealing to the Central Asian states, the authoritarian direction towards which the republics of Central Asia oriented their own transitions virtually excluded the possibility of introducing any democratic or semi-authoritarian patterns in the different post-Soviet republics. Especially in the earlier stages of development of their external relations, the Central Asian elites maintained a rather pragmatic attitude towards the states whose economic systems were considered to be more likely to be replicated in Central Asia.26 The analysis of the Turkmen position on this matter will be used here to describe more generally the regional perception of the issue. Political pragmatism drove the Turkmen elite to forge relationships with both Turkey and Iran. Kuliev accepted frequent offers of cooperation from different international actors only to expand the geographical dimension of Turkmenistan’s web of relations, hitherto crystallised within the CIS borders. The notion of adopting one particular model of development was not endorsed by official Turkmen statements. In contrast, different branches of the Turkmen government loudly stated that their process of institution-building would have to follow an independent direction. Kuliev publicly refused the idea of following a pre-determined path to organise the Turkmen state and the national economy.27 Concerning the relationship between state and Islam (and ultimately the possibility of embracing the Iranian model), Niyazov preferred to describe Turkmenistan as a religiously moderate state, based on a secular structure where religion and politics are clearly separated.28 In dealing with the problem of Turkmen relations with Iran and Turkey, Foreign Minister Kuliev repeatedly suggested the necessity of strengthening

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partnerships with both countries.29 Turkmenistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran signed a preliminary protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations in February 1992.30 Shortly after (29 February), a similar memorandum was concluded with Turkey31 and Ankara’s embassy in Turkmenistan was inaugurated during Demirel’s (then Turkish Prime Minister) first official trip to Ashgabat.32 In March 1992, the Turkmen government opened consulates in the Turkish republic. Halil Ugur and Nejdet Göktepe were appointed to head the Turkmen consulates in Ankara/Istanbul and Izmir respectively. Interestingly, both newly appointed consuls were not Turkmen citizens but Turkish businessmen with significant economic interests in Turkmenistan.33 Turkmenistan was the first Central Asian republic to be visited by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (May 1992). On that occasion, the then-President of the Iranian republic visited not only the Turkmen capital but also reached Mary velayat, the bordering region between the two countries. In Ashgabat, Rafsanjani officially opened a Centre for trade between Iran and Turkmenistan, a branch of the Iranian bank Saderat,34 and signed an agreement on energy cooperation with Turkmenistan.35 In Mary, the Turkmen and Iranian ex-Presidents discussed exploring the possibilities for expanding transport infrastructures between the two countries.36 Ata Charyev (June 1992) and Khan Akhmedov (August 1992) were appointed as the first Turkmen ambassadors to Tehran and Ankara respectively. Their high profiles37 demonstrated the high regard in which relations with Iran and Turkey were held within the Turkmen MID. On the other hand, the absence of diplomatic experience in their curricula clearly indicates the shortage of qualified personnel existing within the ranks of the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1992. The strengthening of Turkmenistan’s relationship with Turkey and Iran was an objective pursued throughout Kuliev’s tenure of the Turkmen MID. At the time of the Minister’s dismissal, the preliminary steps in forging relations with these countries (diplomatic recognition, creation of diplomatic representations) had been completed. Consequently, Turkmenistan’s links with Ankara and Tehran were ready to be fully expanded. In discussing the relations with the Russian Federation, the Turkmen Foreign Minister maintained a position as pragmatic as the one displayed in dealing with Turkey and Iran. When asked about developments in relationships with ‘traditional sister-republics, and especially with Russia’,38 Kuliev simply reaffirmed that Russia did not occupy any special place in the Turkmen partnerships system.39 This response had to be interpreted as an invitation for states outside the CIS, and in particular China, to expand their cooperation with Turkmenistan and not as an attempt to diminish the strategic importance of Russia in Turkmenistan’s external relations. Indeed, disengagement with the Russian Federation did not follow the Minister’s declaration. Ever since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia has played a pivotal role in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy, even though Turkmen officials have seldom issued political declarations clearly admitting the existence of a special relationship between Moscow and Ashgabat. A number of links established during the

16

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

Soviet era that survived beyond the Soviet Union itself facilitated the normalisation of the Russo-Turkmen relations and their transition to a post-independence paradigm. Nevertheless, this relationship and its further developments cannot be compared with other political processes driven by the Turkmen MID to forge new diplomatic ties with other states or to normalise the relations with other former members of the Soviet Union. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone has carefully listed elements linking the former centre of the Union and the Central Asian periphery.40 Moshe Gammer has brilliantly reorganised them in a post-colonial paradigm and highlighted the extent to which different forms of dependencies inherited from the Soviet system have shaped the regional states’ foreign policy priorities immediately after the collapse of the Union.41 In so far as in Soviet times Moscow constituted the main source of support (political, economic, financial) for the Central Asian Soviet republics, after the demise of the Union the Russian Federation started playing an almost identical role for the newly independent states of the region. Links established and strengthened during a timeframe stretching over 140 years (including the Tsarist period) could not vanish overnight. The centre–periphery relationship did not disappear: it was only re-elaborated by post-Soviet policymakers in a post-independence perspective. The relationship with Russia, and the different interpretations given to it by the Turkmen elite during the 1990s and onwards, is the central element of the whole Turkmen foreign policy-making system. Turkmenistan has constantly shaped its foreign policy by taking into account the role of primus inter pares that Russia has inevitably played. However, this relationship has been frequently characterised by the alternation of highlights and lowlights. The observation of these fluctuations can help to identify not only changes that took place at the declaratory level of Turkmen foreign policy, but, most importantly, might also facilitate the comprehension of the processes through which internal elements of Turkmen politics, and primarily the progressive consolidation of authoritarianism, have impacted on the country’s foreign policy. To do so, the RussoTurkmen relationship in the post-Soviet era will be analysed in greater depth in Chapter 5 (see pp. 97–123), whereas this section merely provides an outline of the early developments of the relationship, namely those that occurred in the first six months of 1992. Loosening ties with Moscow was not an option in Kuliev’s agenda nor was it a subject contained in the foreign policy platform progressively advanced by Niyazov after April 1992.42 The new links established with other states were not intended gradually to replace Russia as the focal centre of Turkmenistan’s web of relations but only as subsidiary, albeit not temporary, solutions to the international insulation inherited from the Soviet Union. As previously shown, Russia was at the top of Turkmenistan’s list of most important strategic partners. Nevertheless, in the first half of 1992, bilateral diplomatic contacts between Moscow and Ashgabat were not as frequent as the centrality of Russia in the Turkmen international paradigm would suggest. More regular interaction was provided by the two meetings of the CIS Heads of State organised during the

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first half of 1992, in Kyiv (20 March) and Tashkent (15 May).43 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev led a high-level delegation to Turkmenistan on 8 April 1992, to start negotiations for the agreement on the establishment of mutual diplomatic relations. The protocol was signed by Boris Nikolaevich El’tsin during his first official visit (2–3 August 1992) to Turkmenistan and was considered as an ‘historical step’44 in the relationship between the two countries. However, the most significant document finalised between the two countries in 1992 was the agreement on defence cooperation, signed during a visit of a highlevel Russian military delegation to Ashgabat (Chapter 5, see p. 113). The impact of the Soviet legacy on Russo-Turkmen relations was particularly visible when considering the logistical aspects of diplomacy, which, as far as foreign policy was concerned, traditionally constituted one of Turkmenistan’s weaknesses. Lack of funding generally delayed the procedures for opening national representations abroad. Nonetheless, the Turkmen Embassy in Moscow was among the earliest to be opened. A compelling necessity of having permanent representation in Russia was not the only explanation: more simply, the Turkmen government transformed the building used during the Soviet era as a permanent postpredstvo45 into its ambassadorial residence.46 At the beginning of September 1992,47 the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Russian Federation was conferred to Niyazlikh Nurklychev,48 Turkmen permanent representative in Moscow since 1991. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, US diplomacy towards Central Asia was primarily oriented towards addressing the issue of the nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union. Consequently, US officials were predominantly focused on normalising relations with Kazakhstan,49 while the other republics, including Turkmenistan, did not occupy a particularly important place in Washington’s policies towards the region. At the same time, the republics perceived the United States as an actor geographically too distant (and hitherto not involved enough in regional politics) to dedicate a whole chapter of their foreign policy agendas to the relations with Washington. Common logistical problems in creating diplomatic institutions played a significant role in this decision. However, establishing formal relations with the United States became a priority for the Central Asian republics in 1992. Secretary of State James Baker included Ashgabat as one of the destinations of his February 1992 regional tour. In addition to preliminary talks for the Turkmen acquisition of full membership in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Baker discussed with Kuliev matters relating to bilateral diplomacy between their two countries.50 Although a permanent US representation in Ashgabat opened the following March,51 relations between the two countries did not evolve significantly until the mid-1990s.52 A particular feature of Turkmen diplomacy in the early post-Soviet era was the regularity with which Turkmenistan engaged with Arab nations. Outside the CIS, the Middle East was the region with which Turkmenistan increased its interaction in early 1992. In that period, diplomatic contacts with Arab states were much more regular than those Turkmenistan held with, for instance, the

18

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

equally Muslim states of South-East Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia). Geographic proximity was not the only reason. The career background of Foreign Minister Kuliev might help to explain this phenomenon, which encountered no equal in subsequent stages of Turkmen diplomacy and, more generally, in the analysis of the links established between post-Soviet Central Asia and the Middle Eastern states. Kuliev was not only fluent in Arabic, but his diplomatic activity during the Soviet era took place mainly in Arab countries, namely Yemen, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar,53 where he worked as advisor in the local Soviet embassies. The Minister’s profound knowledge of the Middle East, combined with the common Islamic identity shared by those states with Turkmenistan, facilitated his interaction with Arab statesmen and diplomats. Kuliev was the principal architect of Turkmen relations with the Arab countries. In the first half of 1992, a large number of delegations from the Arab peninsula and from the Middle East visited Ashgabat, and Turkmenistan successfully established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia,54 Bahrain,55 Kuwait56 and Syria.57 Interestingly, the Islamic factor did not occupy a particularly important position in the agendas of these relationships, which were based on more secular considerations, including technological and economic cooperation.58 The multilateral dimension of Kuliev’s foreign policy did not employ different strategies from those used in bilateral diplomacy. In fact, the Minister’s main objective was the progressive entry of Turkmenistan into the system of multilateral diplomacy, accomplished through the acquisition of membership in the major supranational organisations. As shown in Table 1.1, in the first six months of 1992 Turkmenistan acquired membership in a large number of international organisations. Since the dismissal of Foreign Minister Kuliev, the national elite has conferred less Table 1.1 Post-Soviet Turkmenistan: membership in major international organisations International organisation

Date of accession

Asian Development Bank European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Economic Cooperation Organisation Food and Agriculture Organisation International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) Islamic Development Bank International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund Non-Aligned Movement Organisation of the Islamic Conference Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe NATO Partnership for Peace United Nations United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation

August 2000 1 June 1992 28 May 1992 20 October 1995

Note Accession dates are provided by the official websites of the organisations.

1992 November 1994 24 September 1993 22 September 1992 20 October 1995 1992 30 January1992 10 May 1994 2 March 1992 17 August 1993

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significance on the multilateral dimension of Turkmen diplomacy than on the bilateral dimension. Multilateralism was the preferred means through which to seek support for the international recognition of Turkmenistan’s neutral status. However, after the acquisition of permanent neutrality, bilateral diplomacy progressively replaced multilateralism as the most common dimension of Turkmen foreign policy, provoking a gradual disengagement from the activities of the international organisations of which Turkmenistan acquired full membership. Lack of expertise and, presumably, time constraints did not allow Kuliev to develop a complete and detailed theoretical background for Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. It must be said that the situation inherited from the membership in the Soviet Union compelled the Turkmen MID to identify suitable solutions with which to emerge rapidly from international isolation and give Turkmenistan a place in the international community. These objectives were accomplished through the establishment of bilateral ties with strategic partners and active participation in the activities of the major international organisations. The process of emergence from international isolation did not leave much space for analyses focused on determining Turkmenistan’s place in the world and hence useful as guidelines for operational foreign policy. Consequently, Turkmen declaratory statements in the first half of 1992 were unsophisticated and, at the same time, did not significantly differ from those produced by the other Central Asian foreign ministries. The earliest declaration by the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning Turkmenistan’s priorities as a regional and international actor was issued by the then Deputy Foreign Minister Amangel’dy Rakhmanov. In commenting on Turkmenistan’s accession to the United Nations,59 Rakhmanov briefly illustrated Turkmenistan geopolitics as then perceived by the national elite: The geopolitical position of Turkmenistan as an Asian state is naturally a major determinant in the state’s foreign policy. At the same time, Asia is nevertheless not isolated from other continents and its relationship with them involves a vast range of aspects, from economic interaction to transcultural intersections. For this reason, Turkmenistan should perform as a connecting link between Asia and Europe, almost as a bridge between the two continents. (Turkmenskaya Iskra, 4 March 1992) The perception of Turkmenistan as a linking element between Europe and Asia is evocative of similar declarations on Eurasianism issued by the Kazakh government in the early 1990s.60 The image of Central Asia (and more specifically of Kyrgyzstan) as a mid-point between two or more cultural or geographical entities has been also used by Askar Akaev. The former Kyrgyz President had repeatedly portrayed his country as ‘a connecting bridge between the countries and civilisations of Europe, the Middle East and the Far East’.61 Another major factor limiting Kuliev’s potential for producing an all-inclusive

20

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

analysis of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy, shaped in order to accomplish aims modelled according to objective and subjective policy imperatives, was the growing hostility showed by Niyazov (and his entourage) in their personal, as well as institutional, interaction with the Minister and his staff. The relationship between government branches has to be situated within a more general discourse on the Turkmen domestic landscape. The internal political arena was characterised, during the first six months of 1992, by debates concerning institutionbuilding and the directions of the post-Soviet transition. At the same time, Niyazov was successfully disempowering existent institutions, in order to acquire stricter control on internal decision-making processes. After crushing the timid opposition forces,62 drastically reducing the role of the party,63 drafting a Constitutional text that conferred quasi absolute powers to the President and running as sole candidate in the first presidential election, Niyazov progressively engaged in a conflictual relationship with a number of ministries that had hitherto failed to fall under his complete control. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was on this list. Steady progression towards strong authoritarianism would sooner or later encompass the control of the mechanisms of foreign policy-making and the manipulation of the state’s international relations in order to accomplish political objectives interconnected with the existence of the regime itself. Political isolation, and eventually removal, of any opposing (or insufficiently loyal) member of the diplomatic elite were essential steps towards the accomplishment of these objectives. In general terms, it is highly probable that, behind the scenes of the Turkmen MID, events unfolded according to this pattern. Our examination of the dynamics that resulted in the dismissal of Kuliev from the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs has suggested that policy determinants linked with regime consolidation played a significant role in the adoption of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The introduction of the doctrine is, in fact, the main consequence of the extension of the regime’s control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the early post-Soviet era, Turkmen foreign policy was not concerned with neutrality. Following the Minister’s dismissal, Turkmenistan’s foreign policy was defined almost exclusively by the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The connection between the introduction of the doctrine and the removal of the Foreign Minister is therefore not accidental. In this sense, the policy of neutrality as a whole can be described as a by-product of the regime’s political strategy. The evidence provided below will add further weight to this conclusion. Providing a precise account of the political circumstances that led to the dismissal of A.O. Kuliev is an extremely difficult task, because of the lack of reliable sources of information. Two sets of factors have been taken into account here to bring to light the increasing political isolation affecting Kuliev between April and August 1992: a b

Personnel mobility in the MID top ranks; Kuliev’s presence as reported on the pages of Turkmenskaya Iskra.

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A complete reorganisation of the top echelons of the MID took place on 19 March 1992. On that occasion, A. Rakhmanov was removed from his position as Deputy64 and replaced by Berdymurad Begliev and Gurbangeldi Veliev,65 whose strong diplomatic experience was consolidated during their service for the allUnion MID. Links between Kuliev and Begliev have been admitted by the Minister himself.66 Veliev’s appointment might suggest an intention to place a pro-Niyazov element in the top ranks of the Turkmen MID. In fact, although both Deputy Ministers were removed from their positions immediately after Kuliev’s resignation,67 Veliev continued to occupy influential positions in the Turkmen MID and in late 1995 he was Chief Advisor to the Minister.68 Kuliev’s political isolation within the Turkmen Cabinet of Ministers was noticeably augmented by Charyev’s appointment as ambassador to Iran (June 1992). Charyev, Kuliev’s personal link with the Presidential Administration, was sent abroad69 and, subsequently, Kuliev’s communication problems with Niyazov increased on an almost daily basis. A quantitative analysis of Turkmenskaya Iskra’s coverage of Kuliev’s political activities might help to clarify the assumptions made in the observation of personnel movements within the MID between March and August 1992. After 1924, this government-controlled daily has always been the official mouthpiece of the Turkmen Communist Party and of the TSSR Supreme Soviet. In Soviet times, cadres’ presence in main articles and photographs certainly indicated political power, whereas absence from the pages of the Iskra had to be most likely interpreted as a sign of a declining influence in the republican domestic arena and in the party as well. Between January and March 1992, Kuliev was granted two major interviews (10 January and 25 February) and it is possible to identify him in photographs nine times. On three occasions, he is portrayed while receiving foreign guests alongside Niyazov. The other six photographs show the Foreign Minister unaccompanied, while receiving foreign delegations at Ashgabat airport or during the opening of embassies or consulates. After March, Kuliev’s presence on the pages of Turkmenskaya Iskra significantly decreased. Only one major interview was granted to the Foreign Minister (2 June), and he appeared in photographs only twice, namely on 9 April, during Kozyrev’s trip to Turkmenistan, and on 19 June, on the occasion of the visit of one of the Saudi royal princes. Both times, he was accompanying Niyazov. The existence of a press campaign orchestrated to diminish his political visibility (and perhaps his popularity) is therefore clearly indicated by this data, which furthermore establish a chronological connection between Kuliev’s isolation from the Turkmen political elite and his progressive disappearance from the pages of the national press. To further highlight the importance of the coverage initially dedicated to Kuliev’s political activities, it is worth remembering that, throughout the Niyazov era, the domestic media never granted to a single Turkmen political personality (excluding Niyazov) as much space as they had done with him. The other element that suggests the existence of a political design intent on assuming complete control of the Turkmen MID is the appointment of

22

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

Khalykhberdy Ataev70 as Kuliev’s successor. Diplomatic expertise was not present in Ataev’s curriculum vitæ. Appointing a jurisprudence expert and a low-profile elite member in a crucial position suggests the ministry’s subordination to other branches of central government and their acquisition71 of full control over the process of foreign policy-making. At the same time, ideas and themes not previously contained in Kuliev’s political vocabulary started to emerge as central elements of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. Positive Neutrality was the most visible of these concepts.

The path towards neutrality (August 1992–December 1995) Since the dismissal of Foreign Minister A.O. Kuliev, the acquisition of neutral status has been the main objective of Turkmen foreign policy. Until international recognition for that status was granted by the UN General Assembly in December 1995, the vast majority of Turkmen diplomatic efforts were dedicated to obtaining international support for the policy of Positive Neutrality. Between 1992 and 1995, rhetoric on foreign policy revolved around the necessity of establishing a course of neutral foreign policy for post-Soviet Turkmenistan. After its official adoption, the policy of neutrality was maintained as the most central amongst the symbols of that rhetoric, whilst a number of foreign policy issues (most notably the quarrel over Caspian Sea energy reserves72 and the relations between Ashgabat and the Taliban regime) began to be developed independently from the provision of the doctrine. The theoretical infrastructure of the policy, eventually labelled the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, was repeatedly conveyed to domestic and foreign audiences by Niyazov and other policy-makers between 1992 and 1995. Turkmen propaganda purportedly attributed the paternity of the policy exclusively to the President.73 This point is largely debatable. The doctrine has to be considered as the result of a team effort performed by the top-leaders of the Turkmen MID, almost certainly under the close supervision of the Presidential Administration. Compliance with Niyazov’s inner circle of power and diplomatic expertise (the former more than the latter) constitutes the two essential features that Turkmen cadres needed to possess in order to be included in the restricted elite group dominating foreign policy-making between 1993 and 1995. Identifying with accuracy the personalities who did participate in the theoretical elaboration of the policy constitutes a difficult task, due to the lack of reliable primary sources dedicated to the issue. Nonetheless, a shortlist of names can be deduced from the pages of Turkmenskaya Iskra, which, between 1993 and 1995, published a number of articles providing the Turkmen population with details of the theoretical aspects of the state’s foreign policy. Top MID cadres authored those articles. Interestingly, Foreign Minister Ataev did not do so and, more remarkably, did not participate in any visible way in the process of promoting the policy to domestic and international audiences. For this reason, it may be reasonable to exclude Ataev from the équipe actively participating in the elaboration of the doctrine.

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In all probability, Chief Advisor G. Veliev, Department Secretary Yolbars A. Kepbanov, Deputy Foreign Ministers Batyr Ataevich Berdyev and Boris Orazovich Shikhmuradov,74 (Foreign Minister since January 1995), were among the elite members playing a central role in developing the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Although Turkmen propaganda has traditionally considered Niyazov as being solely responsible for the international promotion of the doctrine, Berdyev and Shikhmuradov were actively involved in that process. At the same time, an equally central role in the search for international endorsement for Turkmen neutrality was played by Aqsoltan Toreyevna Ataeva, Turkmen Permanent Representative to the United Nations since January 1995. A complex combination of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy led to the international recognition of Turkmen neutrality. At the same time, an intense public relations campaign targeted the Turkmen population, to highlight the internal benefits that the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality might provide to the state. Furthermore, domestic legislative institutions constantly integrated the international dimension of this political action, by providing resolutions helpful in the acquisition of bilateral and multilateral support or by incorporating provisions consistent with the principle of neutrality in Turkmenistan’s legal system. To describe the multi-layered and multi-nodal policy driven by the Turkmen government between 1992 and 1995, a specific chronology75 is provided here. The initial date of the chronology coincides with the earliest political statement about neutrality whereas the last entry is devoted to the completion of the placement of Turkmen neutrality within the national constitutional system. 10 June 1992: during a CSCE meeting in Helsinki, Niyazov announced for the first time the intention to adopt the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality as the main pillar of Turkmen foreign policy. Speaking to the Plenary Session of the Summit, the Turkmen President stated that his country: ‘[. . .] will openly and fairly cooperate with all the countries which try to achieve noble objectives [. . .]. Non-interference into internal affairs of other countries, positive neutrality – this is the mainstream of the policy of independent Turkmenistan’.76 8 August 1992: two days after Ataev’s appointment as Turkmen Foreign Minister, Turkmenskaya Iskra published an interview granted by Niyazov to al-Ittihad, the United Arab Emirates’ principal newspaper. The interview’s title77 had to be interpreted as a clear political statement. In declaring that ‘Our policies are Positive Neutrality and Open Doors’,78 Niyazov highlighted his country’s keenness to acquire a neutral status. 29 September 1993: during his visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the Turkmen President informed Manfred Wörner, Secretary General of the organisation, about Turkmenistan’s intention of pursuing the acquisition of neutral status. At the same time, he asked NATO to support this initiative.

24

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy 17 January 1994: in his annual speech to the Khalk Maslakhaty, Turkmenistan’s supreme legislative body, Niyazov proclaimed that Positive Neutrality is the focal element of Turkmen foreign policy and provided the assembly with detailed information about the new policy. 14 August 1994: during his official visit to Pakistan, President Niyazov obtained the support of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to Turkmenistan’s search for Positive Neutrality. 14–15 November 1994: in his official visit to Austria, Niyazov held talks with local diplomats and academics who advised him on political opportunities linked with the acquisition of neutrality. 14 March 1995: during an ECO meeting in Islamabad, Niyazov issued the so-called ‘Islamabad Declaration’, in which he clearly listed the nature and objectives of Turkmen neutralism, by stating that Turkmenistan ‘constitutionally assumed the responsibility of the status of a permanently neutral state and it is ready to build itself as a peace-making centre in the region under relevant international guarantees’.79 At the same time, the Turkmen President asked the ECO member states to show strong support for Turkmenistan in pursuing that objective. 16 March 1995: the Turkmen Mejlis passed the resolution ‘On the approval of the Policy of Positive and Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan’. The approved text completely matched the ‘Islamabad Declaration’. 18 May 1995: during his official visit to Moscow, President Niyazov provided his Russian counterpart, B.N. El’tsin, with any necessary information about the Turkmen concept of neutrality and its possible impact not only on the bilateral relationship between Russia and Turkmenistan, but also on the Turkmen commitment within the CIS framework. May 1995: during Niyazov’s visits to Egypt (22–24 May), and Israel (24–26 May), the local leaderships issued significant declarations of political support to Turkmen neutralism. Similar declarations would be released by the President of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, visited by the Turkmen President at the beginning of June. 2 July 1995: in Crans Montana (Switzerland), Foreign Minister Shikhmuradov attended an international conference on Cooperation in the Caspian region. Turkmen neutrality was also discussed during the proceedings. 28 July 1995: receiving a Permanent Representative delegation headed by Permanent Representative Ataeva, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was informed about the significant impact that Turkmen neutrality might have on regional processes of peace-building and peace-keeping.

A conceptual framework for Positive Neutrality

25

5–6 September 1995: the international conference ‘Turkmen neutrality and the International relations of Asia’ was held in Ashgabat. Diplomats, journalists, political scientists and International Relations scholars from different countries convened in the Turkmen capital to discuss aspects and perspectives of the policy of Positive Neutrality. A detailed outline of the doctrine supporting the policy was provided by Niyazov during his speech at the conference. 29 September 1995: in New York, Shikhmuradov met with the staff of the Political Department of the United Nations to discuss the registration of Turkmen neutrality in the legal framework of the organisation. At the same time, the Minister promoted Turkmen neutralism amidst different national representatives to the United Nations. 14–20 October 1995: Shikhmuradov participated in the Summit of the NonAligned Movement held in Cartagena (Colombia). At the end of the meeting, the Assembly granted Turkmenistan full membership to the Movement and issued an ad hoc declaration supporting the policy of Positive Neutrality. 22 October 1995: President Niyazov participated in the proceedings of the UN General Assembly 50th Session. The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was presented as the main pillar of Turkmen foreign policy in the speech delivered on that occasion. 9 November 1995: a draft resolution on Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality was discussed by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. The representatives of Tajikistan, Bangladesh, Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, Malaysia, Germany, Austria, Georgia, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan expressed their support for the draft.80 29 November 1995: Ramiro Peres-Ballon, special envoy of the UN Secretary General to Turkmenistan, discussed with members of the Turkmen government the placement of Turkmen neutrality in the UN legal framework. 12 December 1995: the UN General Assembly approved Resolution A/50/80(A), which formally endorsed Turkmenistan’s neutral status. Russia and France were amongst the strongest supporters of the resolution.81 27 December 1995: the Khalk Maslakhaty approved three laws (Constitutional Law on Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality; Declaration of international commitments assumed by Neutral Turkmenistan in the area of human rights; Concept for foreign policy of Turkmenistan as a neutral state), which concluded the placement of Positive Neutrality within Turkmenistan’s legal system.

26

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality: contents and objectives Governmental propaganda commonly presented Turkmen neutrality as the most recent development in the historical-political evolution of the concept of neutralism.82 References to previous forms of neutrality that emerged in more remote historical eras (Switzerland, Belgium) or in the Cold War period (Cambodia, Austria, Laos) constituted common elements in Turkmen official publications dedicated to the analysis of the state’s international legal status.83 Careful descriptions of the different legal mechanisms through which permanently neutral states obtained their status (imposition through a treaty between external powers, self-imposed neutralisation as a consequence of a lost war, deliberate acquisition) not only represented instruments to provide the Turkmen neutrality with some extent of historical legitimacy, but, at the same time, have to be seen as essential parts of specific rhetoric discourses emphasising the uniqueness of the policy of Positive Neutrality. As highlighted by Yo.A. Kepbanov, ‘Turkmen neutrality is not based on the consequence of any war, nor is the outcome of an agreement between powers but it is the result of an independent choice, of a voluntary desire from Turkmenistan’.84 Its legal origins and its placement into a new international paradigm hence represented the two main factors that the regime claimed were unique and innovative in Turkmenistan’s neutrality. To begin with, Turkmen officials insisted on highlighting the potentially unique role of Turkmen neutrality in the new international landscape emerging after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The logic, roles and the significance itself of non-alignment were completely redefined by the disintegration of one of the two blocs that politically and militarily dominated the international arena after 1945. In the new scheme of international relations since the end of the bipolar system, forms of neutrality adopted and consolidated during the Cold War became increasingly inadequate or lost a great deal of political relevance. Reportedly, Turkmen policy-makers were compelled to elaborate an entirely new definition of neutrality due to the emergence of a number of factors, most notably the progressive abandonment of the discourse on the law of war; the adoption of multilateralism as an increasingly common solution (political as well as military) for inter-state conflicts; and the appearance of new regional centres of power, which, to different extents and under different aspects, replaced or integrated the two main poles. As Western scholars debated the relevance of neutrality in the post-Cold War world,85 a number of post-Soviet states86 openly announced their intention to pursue a neutral foreign policy. It could be argued that the post-Soviet fascination with neutrality had its roots in geopolitical and geo-economic assessments typical of the bipolar world. This argument has been completely rejected by Turkmen policy-makers. The discourses about Moldovan and Belarusian neutralities were based on influences deeply entrenched in conflicts and political tensions typical of the Cold War era. The break-up of the Soviet Union left Moldova surrounded by more powerful neighbours (Ukraine and Romania) and, at the same time, an

A conceptual framework for Positive Neutrality

27

inter-ethnic conflict erupted within its territory. Neutrality was therefore adopted to distance Moldova from its bordering states and to avoid any sort of dependence from the international actors (Ukraine and the Russian Federation) indirectly involved in the Transdnestrian conflict. National security, as Robert Weiner has underlined, was at the core of the Moldovan decision to adopt permanent neutrality.87 Pre-Lukashenka Belarus’ neutrality was motivated by security concerns related to the nuclear problem, itself a recurrent issue in Cold War politics. In declaring Belarus’ sovereignty and in announcing that the territory of the state would become a nuclear-free zone, the BSSR Supreme Soviet indicated that those were the first steps towards permanent neutrality.88 Turkmen officials tended to downplay the impact of security concerns when listing the causes motivating the adoption of neutrality. In contrast, they claimed their decision was clearly unrelated to conflicts and dynamics proper of the Cold War period. This rhetorical discourse was essentially aimed at identifying one of the allegedly innovative aspects of Turkmen neutrality. The Turkmen official discourse on neutrality emphasised the extent to which this policy had to be placed in the regional and international context of the ‘third millennium’,89 whose main characteristics did not share common traits with the political dynamics of previous historical eras. Because it originated in an entirely new global system regulated by the ‘law of peace’,90 Positive Neutrality was therefore considered an innovative policy. Being a ‘peace-loving’91 state, Turkmenistan would employ its neutrality to contribute to the replacement of the ‘culture of war with the culture of peace’92 by introducing a ‘new concept of peace and regional cooperation’93. Interestingly, official documents illuminating the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality do not clarify the essence of the novelty of the new system of international relations, limiting themselves to affirming its existence. Turkmen neutrality’s innovativeness was also entrenched in the policy’s legal origins. The international recognition of the status, acquired through the UN General Assembly Resolution A/50/80(A), is not only commonly portrayed as a benchmark in Turkmenistan’s independent politics, but it is considered to be ‘an unprecedented event in the 50-years’ history of the United Nations’94 as well. The resolution automatically transformed Turkmen neutralism into permanent neutrality, by completing its evolution from a unilaterally declared status to a unanimously recognised policy. Most importantly, this resolution regulated duties and rights of Neutral Turkmenistan. Between 1993 and 1995, Turkmen officials often listed a number of specific features of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy and frequently labelled them as prerequisites for neutrality.95 Indicating that, even prior to the adoption of the UN resolution, conceptual attitudes as well as policy postures typical of neutral states were already contained in the Turkmen political agenda, was therefore instrumental in obtaining international support for Turkmen neutrality. More specifically, the fact that Turkmenistan enjoyed a stable internal situation, recognised the authority of international organisations, observed the principles of

28

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

non-interference in other states’ internal affairs, unconditionally refused to use force in solving international disputes, signed the principal international conventions on the non-proliferation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and, finally, did not host any foreign military forces on its territory, were all considered by Turkmen officials as significant components of Turkmenistan’s neutralism. Permanent status was conferred to these aspects of Turkmen foreign policy with the adoption of Resolution A/50/80(A). As previously stated, the adoption of the three laws of December 1995 completed the recognition of neutral principles in the Turkmen legal system. Turkmen policy-makers then possessed all elements necessary to conceptualise more systematically the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, in order to present it both domestically and internationally. According to official publications on Positive Neutrality, the ‘quintessence’96 of Turkmen neutral status resides in: a b c

Its initial recognition; Its permanent time dimension; Its constructive component.

Having already discussed the origins and permanent status of the policy, it is worth underlining that the adjective ‘Positive’, which usually describes Turkmen neutrality, indicates that Turkmenistan will maintain an active and cooperative attitude towards the international community. Turkmen officials have therefore often stated that the country’s neutrality does not constitute ‘self-isolation [but] it does entail a positive, constructive position’97 in the regional and the international environments. The analysis of Turkmen foreign policy priorities might help to identify modes and aspects of Turkmenistan’s active participation in global politics. The Foreign Policy Concept of Turkmenistan as a Neutral State, approved by the Khalk Maslakhaty on 27 December 1995, listed the main foreign policy objectives of the Turkmen state as follows: • • • • • •

Maintain and build up the national sovereignty of Turkmenistan, enhance its role and relevance in the system of international relations; Create the best-possible external environment for the country’s domestic growth; Pursue Turkmen national interests through the use of all forms of the current international diplomacy; Provide for the security of Turkmenistan via political and diplomatic means; Develop constructive and mutually beneficial cooperative ties with all international partners on the grounds of parity and mutual respect; Assure that Turkmenistan’s foreign policy moves are fully in line with the international law and the UN Charter. (Foreign Policy Concept of Turkmenistan as a Neutral State)98

A conceptual framework for Positive Neutrality

29

The absence of a sophisticated analysis of Turkmen geopolitics and geoeconomics designed to assist a well thought out foreign policy concept helps to explain the vague nature of this list. At the same time, the need to maintain a number of foreign policy objectives undeclared might have justified the inclusion of non-specific aims in the Turkmen Foreign Policy Concept. Vagueness and non-specificity emerge yet again from an analysis of the three aspects around which Turkmen policy-makers intended to implement the policy of Positive Neutrality. To begin with, the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality includes a ‘Political section’. According to government publications on foreign policy, the political dimension of Turkmen neutrality is linked to the necessity of establishing a network of political ties (bilateral rather than multilateral) with regional and more distant international actors, in order to ‘open wide projects for development of mutually beneficial cooperation, creation of mutual respect and atmosphere of confidence’.99 In that sense, neutrality became the main tool to drive the political action aimed at facilitating the acceptance of Turkmenistan in the world community. As we have seen earlier, this objective constituted the pivotal point of Kuliev’s foreign policy agenda. Since the adoption of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, its accomplishment has been completely incorporated into the new theoretical framework supporting Turkmen foreign policy. In Turkmen official statements, neutrality will provide the necessary foundation to facilitate national integration into the world economic system. To some extent, the ‘Economic dimension’ of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality is a subsidiary/complementary tool of its political aspect. Only after full integration in world politics, guaranteed by the Turkmen constructive posture in the international community, will the national economy be ready to be integrated in the global economic system. Well established political ties will pave the way to the progressive expansion of the economic dimension of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. Freedom from the ‘policy of economic pressures exercised by one country [. . .] or another’100 will permit more ready integration of the Turkmen economy into the global economy. At the same time, Turkmen policy-makers consider the implementation of domestic economic reforms as paramount in accomplishing this objective. Moreover, international financial organisations will ‘help Turkmenistan to solve disparate economic problems’.101 Unlike the ‘Political section’, provisions on the ‘Economic dimension’ of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality contained a more detailed (albeit not particularly sophisticated) outline of the operational mechanisms considered viable to implement the policy. In fact, the existence of one elementary operational pattern (domestic reforms – support from other states – aid from relevant international organisations) clearly emerged from the text approved in 1995 by the Khalk Maslakhaty. The analysis of the third dimension of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality constitutes a more difficult task. The so-called ‘Humanitarian aspects’ of Turkmen neutrality contained a number of highly rhetorical statements insisting on the fundamental importance conferred to human rights by Turkmenistan.102 The respect for similar principles will constitute the cornerstone of Turkmen

30

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

foreign policy, deeply characterising Turkmenistan’s interaction with other states and inspiring the cooperative policy with the international organisations dealing with human rights issues.103 References to any specific operational policy designed to put these principles into practice are completely missing in this segment of the declaratory statement. Non-specificity is a strong characteristic of this section, which, overall, does not seem to deal with issues treated as politically relevant by Turkmen policy-makers. Only the regulation of multilateral diplomacy, a secondary instrument of Turkmen operational foreign policy (albeit guaranteed high importance from the declaratory statement), seems to be governed by the ‘Humanitarian section’ of the doctrine. The official publications dedicated to Turkmen foreign policy did not spell out in any way the existence of evolutionary patterns affecting the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality during the last decade. Throughout the post-Soviet era, no branch of the Turkmen government has ever engaged in revisions of the declaratory statement of Turkmen foreign policy. In other words, the doctrine’s main body, elaborated in the mid-1990s, remained unchanged until the end of 2007.

Conclusion From the analysis presented in this chapter, two striking elements have emerged, and they both relate to the raison d’être of Turkmen neutrality. First, we have seen that the selection of the principle of neutrality as the core element of Turkmen foreign policy represented a break with the past. Statements on foreign policy issued immediately after independence did not contemplate neutrality as a viable foreign policy option. Under Kuliev, Turkmen foreign policy tended to move in more traditional directions and did not contain any original (let alone innovative) elements, if compared with the foreign policies of the other postSoviet states. In this sense, neutrality was a groundbreaking development. The era of neutrality commenced immediately after the removal of Kuliev, whose foreign policy expertise was widely acknowledged. The political circumstances preceding the dismissal of Kuliev suggest that the Turkmen regime, in mid-1992, acquired full control over the MID’s decision-making apparatus. The low visibility of Kuliev’s successor, Ataev, offers additional support to the proposition that the policy of Positive Neutrality was designed by a number of MID officials in line with the wishes of the presidential office. Foreign policymaking was placed under the strict control of the emerging regime. It is reasonable to conclude that in driving this process the regime shaped it according to its political needs. Simply put, the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, by origin and design, has to be seen as central to the Turkmen regime’s attempts to consolidate its hold on power. This conclusion is also supported by the analysis presented in the last section of this chapter, which examined in detail the declaratory aspects of Positive Neutrality. On the basis of this analysis, it is possible to identify the policy’s major determinants and its key objectives. The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality contains a number of puzzling elements. To begin with, the doctrine, as described by Turkmen officials, has lacked

A conceptual framework for Positive Neutrality

31

clarity and complexity. Stated objectives were generally vague and there was little evidence of operational strategies to achieve them. Thirdly, the tone underlying the doctrine’s text was filled with clichés and rhetorical ambiguity. Fourthly, textual analysis does not support claims repeatedly made in official publications about the groundbreaking nature of the policy. The innovativeness of Turkmen neutrality has to be located first and foremost not in the principles contained in declaratory statements or in the procedures through which the international community endorsed it, but, as we noted earlier, in the role that Positive Neutrality played in the dynamic of regime establishment and consolidation. These defects also suggest that the formulation of the doctrine was not supported by a well thought out analysis of Turkmenistan’s position in the regional and global arenas, or of its foreign policy objectives and priorities. It does not follow, however, that these defects were accidental. The list of rather vague objectives articulated in official publications was meant to obscure, or at least divert attention from, a number of non-declared objectives. The rhetorical quality of official pronouncements and claims of originality and innovativeness of the policy connect the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality with other regime objectives, in particular those related to the enhancement of state propaganda and the promotion of the cult of the leader’s personality.104 Turkmen domestic politics is therefore the appropriate site for the investigation of the doctrine’s underlying motivation. In other words, an explanation of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality requires us to place it in the context of a more general analysis of the strongly authoritarian character of the regime that ruled Turkmenistan since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

2

Turkmen authoritarianism in the post-Soviet era

Different Central Asian republics perceived their post-Soviet political transition at different speeds and with different approaches. The outcomes of these processes shared, nonetheless, a significant degree of similarity, namely the emergence of strongly authoritarian regimes throughout the region.1 The most obscure transitional process took place in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. Prima facie, Turkmen politics appears unchanged since the achievement of independence. A genuine process of political liberalisation, that is ‘qualitative change in authoritarian rule’,2 has simply not got under way. Political and socio-economic reforms have been persistently oriented towards regime preservation.3 Further, most constitutional and institutional innovations have been rapidly transformed into cosmetic exercises on the part of an increasingly authoritarian regime. An in-depth account of Turkmen domestic politics does, however, suggest the existence of a well defined evolutionary pattern in the authoritarian nature of the regime itself. In other words, even though the Turkmen state has not changed its structure since 1992, internal dynamics and rhetoric have undergone substantial change over the course of the post-independence period. This chapter examines the evolution of Turkmen authoritarianism in the postSoviet era. This issue is crucial to the core argument of the book, as developments that occurred within the domestic political landscape appear to have significantly influenced the policy of Positive Neutrality. Three key aspects of domestic politics will be analysed here to describe the evolution of Turkmen authoritarianism since 1992: institutional policy, intraelite relations and political liberalisation. These three aspects have been selected because they throw light on the dynamic through which the regime progressively acquired leverage vis-à-vis (1) Turkmenistan’s institutional infrastructure; (2) its supporters; and (3) the wider Turkmen population, including the opposition. This will allow us to trace the evolutionary path that has led the regime to acquire a monopoly on power. This chapter addresses the problem of continuity and change in Turkmenistan’s domestic politics. To this end, our analysis will be divided into four different sections, each focusing on a different stage of regime evolution:

Turkmen authoritarianism 1 2 3 4

33

Establishment (1992–1996); Consolidation (1997–2002); Strengthening of authoritarian rule (2003–2006); The post-Niyazov era (2007).

The first three periods relate to the long rule of Saparmurat A. Niyazov, who occupied the post of President of the Turkmen Republic for much of the postSoviet era. The fourth centres on developments after Niyazov’s death (21 December 2006), and in particular on the accession to power of Gurbanguly M. Berdymuhammedov and the consolidation of the post-Niyazov order. This chronological division will allow us to compare Turkmen authoritarianism across the two eras, and establish whether the rules and methods developed under Niyazov have been maintained by the ensuing regime. In presenting an accurate image of Turkmenistan’s domestic politics (and more specifically of the regime that dominated the Turkmen political landscape after 1992), this chapter contextualises the issues to be discussed in later sections of the book. Given the close connection between the internal and external aspects of Turkmen politics, understanding the regime that produced the policy of neutrality is tantamount to understanding the policy itself. The identification of developments in Turkmen domestic politics will also shed light on the inconsistency that characterises Turkmenistan’s foreign policy as a whole.

The establishment of the regime (1992–1996) The Niyazov era commenced well before the achievement of independence: S.A. Niyazov was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee of the TSSR Communist Party in December 1985.4 His accession to the highest party position in the republic was intended by Moscow to help combat the pervasive corruption then characterising Turkmen politics.5 The turbulent years of perestroika saw Niyazov acquire increasing control of the domestic political process, and become the most prominent political personality of the Turkmen republic. The positions he took in the debate on Soviet political developments made him one of the most conservative republican leaders: he failed to condemn the August coup,6 and strongly opposed any political action likely to dissolve the Soviet Union. As we saw earlier (see Chapter 1, p. 12), Niyazov pressured the Slavic republics after the signature of the Minsk Agreement to accept the inclusion of Turkmenistan (as well as the other Central Asian Soviet republics) in the newly born Commonwealth of Independent States. The accomplishment of independence, however unplanned and unexpected it might have been, raised nonetheless a number of difficult political questions. Among these, none was more urgent than the need to create new structures of government. A large programme of institution-building was rapidly implemented by the Turkmen government, beginning in 1992. It was essentially driven from above and designed to provide the newly independent state with the

34

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

institutions it needed to negotiate the post-Soviet political transition. Institutionbuilding in Turkmenistan involved: • • • • •

The transformation of state structures typical of the Soviet administration and the reorganisation of the Cabinet of Ministers;7 The approval of a constitutional text; The introduction of a directly elected Parliament;8 The creation of new political institutions allegedly inspired by Turkmen traditions (Khalk Maslakhaty, Yaqshular Maslakhaty);9 The approval of administrative reforms at local level.

The programme of institution-building favoured the establishment of a strong presidential system, whose legitimacy was to be found in the provisions of the constitutional draft adopted on 18 May 1992. The third chapter of the Constitution regulates the functions and duties of the presidency and grants an impressive range of constitutional powers to the highest authority in the Turkmen political system. In the words of the Constitution, the President: enacts the Constitution and laws and ensures their exact execution [. . .]; is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces [. . .]; presents the People’s Council with a yearly report about the state of the country[. . .]; presents for review and approval to the Parliament the governmental budget and a report on its utilization; signs laws and has the right, within two weeks, to return laws to Parliament [. . .]; schedules referenda approved by the People’s Council and has the right to convene Parliament ahead of schedule; decides questions about the granting of Turkmenistan citizenship and asylum; awards orders and other awards of Turkmenistan;[. . .] with Parliament’s preparatory consent, appoints and recalls the Chair of the Supreme Court, the Chair of the High Commercial Court, and the General Procurator; grants pardons and amnesties; decides other issues ascribed to his or her jurisdiction by the Constitution and laws. (Art. 57 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkmenistan) The decision to establish a presidential system emerged, then, from the Constitutional draft adopted in May 1992.10 However, the circumstances of the constitutional debate preceding the adoption of the text raise a number of questions about the legitimacy of the draft. A preliminary text of the Turkmen Constitution was presented to the population in March 1992.11 Only a few amendments to the original draft were proposed and their discussion occurred within the

Turkmen authoritarianism

35

Turkmen Supreme Soviet, thereby excluding the population from the constitutional debate.12 The Parliament completed the process of revision and amendment of the draft in less than one month. On 18 May 1992, the adoption of the Constitution of independent Turkmenistan was solemnly proclaimed and the approved text published on the main national media. Constitution-making in Turkmenistan was essentially a top-down process, in which non-political and, more specifically, non-governmental actors were prevented from playing any role, largely through the regime’s high control over the media.13 Powers predating independence were thus consolidated through the adoption of the constitutional text. By selecting presidentialism as the preferred institutional form, the Turkmen government was able to conceal its authoritarian ambitions behind a constitutional façade. As Timothy Frye has pointed out, ‘institutional choice lies at the heart of the politics of transition’,14 and often determines the outcome of the transition itself. Turkmen presidentialism rapidly evolved into authoritarianism. Two key factors contributed to the corruption of the Turkmen political system. First, a genuine process of political liberalisation did not get under way in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. From the late Soviet period, the government resisted most forms of political dissent. Its rhetoric and methods were largely characterised by repression and often by violence. For the Turkmen regime, a political milieu devoid of any significant form of participatory politics was the ideal setting in which to establish, and eventually consolidate, its power. In the late 1980s, the Turkmen opposition, unlike its Baltic counterparts, did not express Popular Fronts, whose political programmes usually contained nationalistic motives or well defined political objectives. The only opposition movement allowed to operate in Turkmenistan, Agzybirlik,15 was exclusively composed of intellectuals and its agenda focused primarily on ‘health concerns and broader nationalist demands pertaining to the legal status of the Turkmen language and religion’.16 Its elitist leadership and objectives notwithstanding, this movement seemed capable of mobilising the Turkmen population. This impression was confirmed by the organisation of a large demonstration in GökTepe (12 January 1990), a symbolic site for Turkmen nationalism.17 A few days later, the government of the TSSR outlawed Agzybirlik,18 the most significant among the few non-governmental actors hitherto active in the republic. This ban effectively excluded it from participating in the political debate regarding the position that the TSSR should adapt vis-à-vis the collapsing Union. In the 1990s, the Turkmen government used similar repressive methods to deal with forms of dissent emerging in different parts of the country. Second, the regime moved quickly to deprive the Turkmen electoral process of any political meaning. Non-competitive elections became a distinguishing feature of Turkmen politics. Niyazov ran unopposed in the presidential election of 21 June 199219 and his party (the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan – DPT) was the sole political organisation allowed to participate in the three Parliamentary elections held after 1994. As the election of the Turkmen Mejlis was regularly organised on a five-year

36 Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy basis (1994, 1999 and 2004), the vote of June 1992 was the only presidential election held in Turkmenistan between 1992 and 2006. Niyazov cancelled the vote scheduled for 1997 by holding a national referendum (15 January 1994) that prolonged his first term to 2002. It is worth noting that the Turkmen Constitution did not include any provision for such procedure. The result of the referendum was astonishing: 99.99 per cent of voters agreed to the cancellation of the 1997 presidential election, whereas only 212 people throughout Turkmenistan opposed the proposal.20 The referendum of January 1994 was a watershed in the evolution of authoritarianism in Turkmenistan and in the Central Asian region as a whole. Following the example set by Niyazov, other Central Asian leaders began to use referenda to extend their stay in power (I.A. Karimov in January 1995, N.A. Nazarbaev in April 1995) or to amend the Constitutional text to consolidate their powers vis-à-vis other institutions (A.A. Akaev in October 1994). In relation to the Turkmen political landscape, the referendum of January 1994 ‘marked a turning point in the country’s domestic policy’,21 initiating the process of the personalisation of power, and completing the corruption of Turkmenistan’s electoral institutions. The failure of participatory democracy in Turkmenistan was the product, on the one hand, of the repressive attitude maintained towards opposition forces and, on the other, of the high level of control exercised by the Turkmen state over virtually every form of organisation in the territory. The parliamentary elections of December 1994 concluded the Turkmen process of state-building.22 However, the newly independent state did not possess independent political institutions, as the regime acquired effective control over the whole institutional apparatus. The Constitution, in fact, guaranteed Niyazov, his close entourage and the DPT full control over the executive.23 By eliminating any opposition and corrupting the electoral institution, they also acquired a similarly dominant position in relation to the legislative function of the Turkmen state, assigned by the Constitution to the Mejlis.24 As far as the judiciary was concerned, the powers of appointment that the Constitution granted to the President guaranteed the submission of the courts to the ruling regime. In post-Soviet Turkmenistan, the separation of powers was a constitutional fiction. In the early post-Soviet period, intra-elite relations in Turkmenistan were relatively stable. As Shahram Akbarzadeh has noted, ‘the Turkmen government has maintained a very low turnover rate among its staff members’.25 Between 1992 and 1996, a high degree of continuity was maintained with the senior cadres appointed during the late years of Soviet rule. Most ministers in the last Soviet Cabinet retained their jobs. Similarly, top regional Party cadres were appointed at the head of the newly created velayatlar (regions).26 Between 1992 and 1995, a high degree of stability characterised top positions in the five most influential ministries (Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Defence, Economics and Finance), which, it is reasonable to assume, managed the process of institution-building in close cooperation with the Presidential Administration.

Turkmen authoritarianism

37

Only a minor number of changes involved the top ranks of such governmental structures during that period: two in the Foreign Ministry (Kh. Ataev replacing A.O. Kuliev in August 1992,27 B.O. Shikhmuradov replacing Ataev in January 1995) and one in the Ministry of Economics and Finance (V.G. Otchertsov replacing M.H. Abalakov on 4 April 1995). The turnover rate increased after 1996, when Niyazov became well known for his frequent cabinet reshuffling, often performed during public sessions of the Cabinet of Ministers.28 The institution of hakimlik (regional governorship) enjoyed similar stability, at first. This trend too was soon reversed and the turnover rate appreciably increased after 1996, when the central government expanded its role in relation to regional appointments. The event that concluded the first stage of regime evolution was a turning point in Turkmenistan’s intra-elite relationships. In less than one year, Niyazov removed all the five hakimlar (regional governors).29 Their demotions took place almost simultaneously with the abolition of concurrency of governmental positions for regional governors, sanctioned by a presidential decree issued in August 1996.30 It is evident that the removal of the five regional governors was ultimately aimed at removing their networks of patronage. Thereafter, the regime pursued its policy of centralisation with increasing vigour. In conclusion, regime establishment in post-Soviet Turkmenistan occurred concurrently with state-building. Between 1992 and 1996, Niyazov and his associates were primarily concerned with expanding their control over the political institutions that were originally designed to facilitate the de-Sovietisation of Turkmen politics. This scenario helps to explain the two different postures maintained by the emerging regime vis-à-vis its supporting elite and its opponents respectively. As the regime flexed its muscles in dealing with the opposition, it conversely maintained a more relaxed attitude towards the elite. The existing opposition forces were quickly marginalised, and the emergence of dissenting voices was discouraged through brutal and violent repression. As a result, the Turkmen political arena was rapidly transformed into a monopoly. On the other hand, the acquisition of total control over the elite did not seem to be a top priority for the regime between 1992 and 1996. Stability of cadres, which largely characterised intra-elite relationships in the early post-Soviet era, was, in fact, intended as a tool to acquire leverage over the processes of policymaking occurring at different levels.31 This strategy indirectly allowed the consolidation of alternative centres of powers (especially in the peripheral regions) that the regime soon interpreted as threats to its own stability. Once the state institutions were completely subjugated to the regime’s interests and the opposition cracked down, purging the elite became a primary objective for the regime.

Regime consolidation (1997–2002) After the establishment (and simultaneous corruption) of political institutions, the Turkmen regime began to consolidate its power. This process was intensified after 1997, and lasted until the end of 2002, when the tumultuous events of 25

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Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

November raised questions about the stability of the regime and even its survival. To retain its monopolistic control over Turkmenistan’s political landscape, the regime elaborated a comprehensive strategy, which targeted both the population and the institutions. On the one hand, the strengthening of authoritarian rule was evident in the intensification of repressive measures, aimed at the population and equally at the opposition forces. After 1993, dissenting groups grew in number but operated exclusively outside Turkmenistan.32 In addition to brutal repression, the regime built an impressive propaganda machine, designed primarily to promote the glorification of the leadership. Niyazov and his associates wanted to produce a lasting change in Turkmen political behaviour, that is to ensure compliance with the regime, by developing a new sense of identity whose source and expression were exclusively grounded in the achievements of the present regime. The progressive introduction of slogans and rhetorical discourses aimed at establishing a personality cult of the President (who adopted the title of Turkmenbashi), the promotion (to internal as well as external audiences) of Niyazov’s new vision of world history (Rukhnama) and global politics (Positive Neutrality) were the most salient aspects of this cult. On the other hand, the progressive disempowerment of the loci of power noticeably reduced the number of relevant political actors in Turkmenistan: at the end of the 1990s, when the process of regime consolidation was completed, decision-making at every level was restricted to the very selected circle dominated by Niyazov himself. The party was perhaps the most significant political institution to be disempowered. The transformation of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan (CPT) into the DPT occurred on 16 December 1991.33 The DPT retained the apparatus, structures and resources of the former CPT. The change of designation involved exclusively nominal de-ideologisation of the party, even though M.B. Orazov, First Secretary of the DPT Politsovet between 16 December 1991 and 11 August 1992 and Ambassador to the United States, specifically denied the completion of a ‘cosmetic treatment’34 to keep the party alive. The DPT’s political significance in relation to decision-making and cadres’ management processes was nevertheless drastically reduced. The influence and role of the party were transferred to other loci of power, more directly controlled by the Presidential Administration. A close survey of the official biographies of Turkmen officials published in the governmental press confirms the diminished importance of the party in the Turkmen political equation. Unlike Soviet times, DPT membership was no longer a precondition to access to positions of political influence: official biographies of Turkmen cadres failed to include DPT membership as a significant factor in elite career profiles. Moreover, a low degree of political visibility was granted to party nomenklatura: regional and local party organisations seemed to have little leverage and there is insufficient evidence to assert that the DPT,

Turkmen authoritarianism

39

locally as well as nationally, was contributing to propose and/or appoint governmental cadres.35 The declining importance of the party was evidenced in the process of disempowerment of the Mejlis. The Presidential Administration, in close cooperation with the KNB/MNB (Committee/Ministry of National Security), carefully selected the candidates for the 50 electoral districts. Party membership was not a criterion of eligibility, as compliance with regime indeed appeared to be.36 Quantitatively, the presence of DPT cadres in the Parliament rapidly diminished. In the first election, nine elected MPs were party workers, in 2004 this number decreased to three. On the other hand, the proportion of local administrators in the Mejlis increased to 50 per cent in 2004, whereas in 1994 it accounted for less than 20 per cent of the total.37 Although its powers were seriously reduced by the Turkmen government, the DPT was kept alive artificially. Its real functions are yet to be fully appreciated by present analysts, who seem not to grant any relevance to the DPT in relation to the processes of decision-making and cadres’ management. It can be reasonably inferred that the DPT maintains a window-dressing role in Turkmen politics. This conclusion can also be drawn from numerous articles published in the official press that, while constantly advocating the necessity to overcome the impact that the monopoly of the CPT had had on the level of experience of the Turkmen elite, have never identified the DPT as an important resource for the training of new cadres.38 Regime consolidation was therefore accomplished through the preservation of the monopolistic powers of the regime within the Turkmenistan political landscape and through the progressive withdrawal of political power from the institutions established in the early post-Soviet era. Effective power was forcefully transferred to a much more restricted circle, headed by Niyazov and composed of no more than 50–60 of his associates, who alternated in occupying the most influential political positions in the country. Niyazov maintained total control over this restricted elite, as indicated by frequent dismissal of important officials, and by strange justifications for their removal.39 The increasing use of repressive and punitive approaches to elite members who accumulated too much power or expressed dissenting views demonstrates the extent to which Turkmenistan’s intra-elite relations, especially after 1997, have been characterised by violence, mistrust and growing fear of the leader’s increasingly erratic behaviour. The following examples will lend further weight to this proposition. Between 1992 and 1996, appointment of ambassadorial and diplomatic posts usually represented the first step towards complete elimination from the Turkmen elite. The cases of A. Charyev, Ambassador to Iran from June 1992 to November 1993, and Kh. Akhmedov, last Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the TSSR and first Turkmen Ambassador to Turkey (1992–1995), confirmed the existence of this practice.40 Although similar strategies were sporadically employed in the second part of the 1990s, Niyazov’s increasing control over Turkmen politics resulted in the

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more frequent adoption of direct punishment rather than manoeuvres to justify demotions and the almost systematic recourse to force against former elite members and dissidents. The composition of the elite that helped to disempower national institutions was therefore significantly different from that which had participated in the process of institution-building between 1992 and 1996. After 1997, the mechanisms used by the Turkmen regime to remove potential rivals to Niyazov changed radically. Confiscation of their financial assets became much more frequent than it had been in the first five years of the postSoviet period. Only after 1997, when Niyazov had significantly consolidated his power and the regime had progressively strengthened its authoritarian tones, did confiscation of the financial resources become widespread. Notable instances of this technique were the cases of former Ministers H. Ishanov (whose assets were confiscated after 1996), D. Babaev (1997) and Kh. Khalikov (2001).41 The frequent defections of diplomatic personnel that occurred after 1996 can be explained by the diverse methods adopted to exclude elite members. While sending potential rivals abroad was the practice before 1997, fear of violent repression prevented potential dissidents returning to Turkmenistan after that time. The most significant of these defections was that of B.O. Shikhmuradov, who joined the opposition in 2001, while serving as Ambassador to Beijing.42 In conclusion, the Turkmen regime achieved the consolidation of its powers through a well defined strategy. The disempowerment of Turkmenistan’s political institutions, the marginalisation of the opposition, the establishment of a state-run propaganda machine and the acquisition of central control over the elite represented the main vectors of this strategy. To all intents and purposes, regime consolidation was equivalent to regime personalisation, as the strategy that strengthened the regime’s position within Turkmenistan’s political landscape contributed at the same time to the enhancement of the personalistic component of Turkmen authoritarianism. Between 1997 and 2002, personalism hence became a key factor in Turkmen politics, which began to be primarily shaped by Niyazov’s political figure and, most importantly, around his own interests.

The strengthening of authoritarianism (2003–2006) The controversial events of late 2002 represented a watershed in the process of the strengthening of Turkmen authoritarianism and, at the same time, opened the third stage of regime evolution. On 25 November 2002, Niyazov claimed to have survived an assassination attempt in Ashgabat, while on his way to work. According to Western sources, ‘several of the attackers were reported dead and at least one bodyguard seriously wounded’.43 Turkmen official media never clarified the circumstances of the assassination attempt but promptly44 accused a number of dissidents and former elite members of being the organisers of the attack.45 The regime responded to the assassination attempt in a violent fashion, by embarking ‘on a widespread purge of hundreds of people with actual or putative links to the opposition’.46

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One of the most prominent political figures caught up in the repressive wave that followed the events of 25 November was B.O. Shikhmuradov, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan. Shikhmuradov has perhaps been the Turkmen official most well known outside Turkmenistan, alongside Niyazov, and, most recently, Berdymuhammedov. Because of his high diplomatic profile, language skills and cosmopolitan background, Shikhmuradov was held in high regard in the West and in numerous Asian countries as well. During his tenure of the Turkmen MID, Niyazov and his close entourage respectively began to consider him as a potential successor and as a strong rival in the possible succession process. Therefore, Shikhmuradov’s political career was brought to an end: after his dismissal from the position of Foreign Minister, he was firstly appointed to the position of Presidential Representative for Caspian Affairs and then (11 March 2001) to the post of Turkmen Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China. On 30 October 2001, he was dismissed from the latter position after he publicly joined the opposition, creating the National Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan. As we have seen earlier, appointing Shikhmuradov to positions based abroad was an instrumental strategy in the undermining of his political basis within Turkmenistan and a temporary tactic to prepare his ultimate expulsion from the Turkmen political elite. After November 2001, Shikhmuradov was actively involved in organising the opposition to Niyazov: his activities took place primarily outside the Turkmen territory (where he could use the contacts he made while occupying the position of Foreign Minister) and reportedly did not consider the creation of a common platform of all opposition movements as a viable strategy with which to overthrow Niyazov.47 After the events of November 2002, Niyazov accused Shikhmuradov of having masterminded the assassination attempt. Shortly after, the former Foreign Minister was arrested, in unclear circumstances, while he was supposedly trying to organise a coup against the President. His trial, publicly televised, was reminiscent of Soviet show-trials that occurred in the 1930s; during the legal procedure against him, he (perhaps under the influence of drugs) publicly confessed his wrongdoings and implored Niyazov for pardon. However, he was condemned to life imprisonment and, eventually, his sentence was converted to 25 years’ imprisonment.48 So far as intra-elite relations were concerned, the period 2002–2006 saw the regime increase its efforts to eliminate governmental officials who appeared to have the political strength to aspire to the presidency. Among those, the case of Rejep S. Saparov, Head of the Presidential Administration and Vice-President of the Khalk Maslakhaty until July 2005, has to be considered as particularly significant, given Saparov’s high political profile. After Niyazov, R.S. Saparov appeared to be, at the beginning of 2005, the most influential political personality in Turkmenistan. Saparov was amongst the very restricted circle of cadres who, since independence, uninterruptedly occupied top ministerial, governmental and/or diplomatic positions within the

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Turkmen administration.49 In July 2005, he was accused of ‘bribery, embezzlement, appropriation of entrusted property, illegal acquisition and storage of guns, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices, abuse of office, and exceeding of authority’.5 The case against him, appropriately fabricated by the regime, resulted in 20 years’ imprisonment.51 The controversial events of November 2002 greatly impacted upon intra-elite relations: after the crackdown on the opposition, Niyazov proceeded to appoint military cadres to top governmental positions and state structures.52 The last three years of the Niyazov era saw the conclusion of the process through which the Turkmen regime disempowered the Turkmen Parliament. This process was, in fact, completed in August 2003, when a newly approved Constitutional Law transformed the Khalk Maslakhaty into the highest legislative organ of post-Soviet Turkmenistan.53 Article 16 of the Constitutional Law regulates the power of the Khalk Maslakhaty, by assigning it total control over: (1) the adoption of the Constitution of Turkmenistan, constitutional laws, introduction of amendments and addenda to them; (2) the establishment of the Central Committee for Elections and Referenda in Turkmenistan, introduction of changes in its structure; (3) the assessment of issues on conducting nation-wide referenda; (4) the appointment and the elections of the President of Turkmenistan, Mejlis deputies, Khalk Vekillery members; (5) the approval of programmes for main political, economic and social developments of the country; (6) the administration of the state border and administrative-territorial division of Turkmenistan; (7) the hearing of information of the President of Turkmenistan on the situation in the country, main important issues of domestic and foreign policy; (8) the hearing of activity reports of Mejlis of Turkmenistan, Cabinet of Ministers, Supreme Kaziyet, General Prosecution [. . .]; (10) the ratification and denouncement of treaties on interstate unions and any other formations [. . .]; (Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 16 August 2003) Turkmenistan’s Khalk Maslakhaty – which constitutes a unique institutional phenomenon in the post-Soviet area54 – is composed of 2507 members, who gather no less frequently than once each year. The transformation of the Khalk Maslakhaty into the highest legislative Assembly of Turkmenistan further eroded the power and competence of the Turkmen Mejlis, and, at the same time, allowed the regime to expand its influence over Turkmenistan’s institutional infrastructure: controlling a body composed of more than 2500 members is certainly easier than manipulating the activities of one mono-cameral Parliament. In other words, the Khalk Maslakhaty has substituted the Mejlis in rubberstamping the president’s decisions. Niyazov used the People’s Assembly as ‘a public forum to present the basic guidelines of domestic and foreign policy,

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assess the performance of officials, and gain the approval of the country’s nominally supreme body for his policy initiatives’.55 This praxis, as we will see in the next section of the chapter, has been maintained by Berdymuhammedov. Four elements appeared to have played a major role in the political dynamics of the late Niyazov era. All four elements were used to strengthen the personalistic dimension of Turkmen authoritarianism. To begin with, the elite ranks were substantially reduced, mainly as a consequence of regular purges. Ultimately, this contributed to the narrowing of Turkmenistan’s patronage network and its substitution by a more restricted clientele, largely dominated by Niyazov and his close entourage. Second, the militarisation of the Turkmen government that followed the events of November 2002 confirmed the existence of a strong and long-lasting alliance between the inner circle of the Presidential Administration and military sections of the elite, with the former relying on the latter to monitor and contain any form of internal opposition. Further, the propaganda machine established in previous stages of regime evolution was not dismantled and continued, between 2003 and 2006, to foster Niyazov’s cult of personality. Finally, the elevation of the Khalk Maslakhaty to the rank of the highest legislative authority in Turkmenistan completed the process of subjugating post-Soviet institutions to the regime’s political needs. If personalisation of power was the principal intended outcome of this strategy, one of its main indirect consequences was the substantial modification of the essence of Turkmen authoritarianism. Between 2003 and 2006, the Niyazov regime concluded its evolution into an extreme form of authoritarianism.

The post-Niyazov era (2007) On 21 December 2006, Turkmen official media announced the death of S.A. Niyazov.56 On the same day, a resolution jointly issued by Turkmenistan’s Security Council and the Turkmen Cabinet of Ministers appointed G.M. Berdymuhammedov57 as Turkmenistan’s Acting President. Berdymuhammedov was elected President of the Republic on 11 February 2007. Within two months of the death of its first post-Soviet leader, Turkmenistan entered the post-Niyazov era, with a new President who enjoyed the support of a largely unchanged political elite. The first official declaration issued by the Turkmen interim administration granted continuity to Niyazov’s main policies, including Positive Neutrality.58 As this section will demonstrate, the authoritarian methods put in place by the new regime also shared a large degree of continuity with those of the Niyazov era. From the outset, however, Berdymuhammedov and his entourage seemed preoccupied with projecting – externally and internally – an image of discontinuity with the Niyazov regime. To this end, in the early months of his tenure, the Turkmen President repeatedly flagged his intention to liberalise Turkmenistan’s political landscape.

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He announced the organisation of multi-candidate elections and included a number of statements in his electoral agenda that were interpreted by several Western observers as evidence of an imminent relaxation of the regime’s grip over the Turkmen political landscape.59 In January 2007, the regime also accepted the deployment of a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM), which would operate under the guidance of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This decision was unprecedented in Turkmenistan’s electoral history. However, due to time constraints, the NAM could not be followed by a standard Electoral Observation Mission.60 It soon emerged that these political statements would not translate into operational policies. To begin with, Berdymuhammedov’s accession to power did not proceed in accordance with the Constitution of Turkmenistan, which, in the case of the death or incapacity of the President of the Republic, assigns the role of provisional leader to the Parliament’s speaker.61 Automatic transfer of power could not occur in the aftermath of Niyazov’s death, as Ovezgeldy Ataev, the speaker of the Mejlis, was arrested on 21 December on charges of ‘abuse of office to protect his relatives’ illegal activity’.62 A newly introduced Constitutional Law – approved on 26 December 2006 by the Khalk Maslakhaty – legitimised Berdymuhammedov’s position as the Turkmen interim President.63 Simply put, Berdymuhammedov did not hesitate to manipulate Turkmenistan’s constitutional framework to facilitate his accession to power. A crucial role in the achievement of this objective was played by the Khalk Maslakhaty, which, after Niyazov’s death, continued to rubber-stamp the president’s decisions.64 Second, Berdymuhammedov was elected through a flawed election that was preceded by a regime-driven electoral campaign. In staging a showcase election, Berdymuhammedov used a constitutional/electoral façade to obscure his authoritarian ambitions. Although the February 2007 ballot represented the first multi-candidate election ever held in post-Soviet Turkmenistan, it may be reasonably said that its competitive nature was merely cosmetic. Beside interim leader Berdymuhammedov, the other five candidates running for the presidential elections of 12 February 2007 were:65 • • • • •

A. Atadzhikov, First Deputy Hakim of the Tashauz velayat; M.S. Gurbanov, Hakim of the Karabekevyul province (Lebap velayat); O. Karadzhaev, Mayor of Abadan (Ahal region); I. Nuryev, Deputy Minister for Oil and Gas; A.A. Pomanov, Mayor of the city of Turkmenbashi (Balkan velayat).

No candidate from the opposition was allowed to run.66 All six competitors were carefully selected by the regime amongst the ranks of the elite that supported Niyazov until his death.67 Their admission to the ballot was therefore designed to enhance the new regime’s international and domestic legitimacy. The selection of those six candidates was intended to have a particular impact

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on Turkmen domestic politics. More specifically, the diversified geographical origins of the six contenders have to be interpreted as a regime response to stability threats caused by the fragmented tribal composition of Turkmen politics.68 Low-profile contenders did not pose a serious threat to the interim President, who enjoyed public support from top members of the elite (including the Chairman of Turkmenistan’s Central Electoral Commission, M. Karryev),69 and was also granted extensive media coverage throughout the campaign, whereas very little space was devoted to his competitors.70 These elements raised legitimate questions about the overall fairness of the electoral campaign, which concluded with Berdymuhammedov’s landslide victory.71 International reaction to the largely deficient Turkmen vote was mixed. While the US government and the EU decided to remain silent,72 the UN opted to praise the election and labelled it a ‘fateful step in the history of Turkmenistan’.73 On the other hand, loud criticism was expressed by members of the delegations that visited Turkmenistan during the electoral campaign. Albert Jan Maat (Chairman of the EU Interparliamentary Delegation to Turkmenistan) denounced the non-democratic nature of the vote. In pointing out that all candidates were part of the former regime, he concluded that the vote of 11 February was ‘not a good start for a more open society’74 in Turkmenistan. It must be said that Berdymuhammedov maintained a dualistic attitude in relation to the liberalisation of Turkmenistan’s economic landscape and to the relaxation of the regime’s grip over the Turkmen political scene. The following examples will lend further weight to this proposition. So far as socio-economic reforms were concerned, he generally delivered on his electoral promises. During the campaign meeting held in the Lebap region (18 January 2007), Berdymuhammedov pledged to increase the salaries of Turkmen workers and announced several reforms to Turkmenistan’s educational and health systems.75 In the first two months of his presidency, Berdymuhammedov intervened in Turkmenistan’s educational system and introduced a new legislation on social security.76 Although these reform packages were limited to reversing disastrous policies previously set by Niyazov – and did not therefore contain groundbreaking measures – their impact on the lives of ordinary Turkmen citizens was generally positive.77 However, when it came to creating genuine reform of Turkmenistan’s political landscape, Berdymuhammedov chose to perform a number of cosmetic adjustments in open contradiction of most of his electoral promises. His commitment to liberalise Turkmen media outlets, and electronic media in particular,78 was not followed by practical measures. Throughout 2007, only a very small number of Internet cafés were opened in Ashgabat.79 On 12 October 2007, users were finally allowed to post comments on the pages of the government’s official website. Nevertheless, after a number of users openly criticised Berdymuhammedov and his government, this feature quickly disappeared from the website.80 Finally, the list of almost 9000 prisoners freed during Turkmenistan’s annual amnesty – a practice introduced by Niyazov – included no political prisoners.

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The consolidation of Berdymuhammedov’s powers suggests a number of commonalities with the dynamics of Turkmen authoritarianism during the Niyazov era. From his outset, Berdymuhammedov has marginalised potential rivals to enhance his control of Turkmenistan’s political landscape. After Mejlis speaker Ataev (December 2006), Berdymuhammedov dismissed and arrested A.K. Redzhepov, the powerful Head of Turkmenistan’s Presidential Guard (16 May 2007).81 Redzhepov’s removal is a watershed in the evolution of the intra-elite relations of post-Niyazov Turkmenistan. Prominent international analysts82 identified elite backing as the most crucial factor in facilitating Berdymuhammedov’s accession to power. After Niyazov’s death, a segment of the elite centring on Berdymuhammedov and Redzhepov launched an unchallenged drive for power and quickly acquired full control of Turkmenistan’s political landscape. Redzhepov’s support was considered crucial for Berdymuhammedov, due to the former’s large web of patronage and his long-lasting alliance with military sectors of the Turkmen elite. The image of a diarchy83 (comprising Berdymuhammedov and Redzhepov, two of Niyazov’s most loyal officials) has often been used to describe the leadership of post-Niyazov Turkmenistan. Redzhepov’s removal has therefore to be seen as the first of Berdymuhammedov’s moves towards the establishment of his own power base and as the earliest step in the ‘de-Niyazovisation’ of Turkmenistan’s armed and security forces. To consolidate his power base, Berdymuhammedov initiated a process of renewal of Turkmenistan’s political elite. In appointing his first Cabinet of Ministers (23 February 2007), he confirmed many of the top cadres, but, at the same time, surprisingly, he included a few officials that Niyazov previously excluded from the governmental elite.84 The Turkmen President carried out the ‘de-Niyazovisation’ of Turkmenistan’s armed and security forces through the removal of cadres who had retained top jobs within Turkmenistan’s security structures since the Niyazov era.85 In late 2007, Berdymuhammedov’s attempts to form a ‘new guard’ within Turkmenistan’s security apparatus gathered new momentum: on 7 October, two presidential decrees dismissed G. Ashirmuhammedov, Turkmenistan’s National Security Minister since December 2004, and Kh. Annagurbanov, the Minister of Interior Affairs.86 We may reasonably conclude that, in order to reshape Turkmenistan’s political elite, Berdymuhammedov adopted a clear strategy. To begin with, the Turkmen President removed ‘key behind-the-scenes political figures’.87 In doing so, he purged the elite of a number of long-serving officials, who controlled large patronage networks. He then reinstated the powers of a number of top officials originally marginalised by Niyazov, in order to forge alliances with more established centres of power. In the second part of 2007, Berdymuhammedov began to reshuffle governmental positions with increasing regularity88 and ultimately attempted to expand his control over the military sections of the elite. A large degree of continuity characterised the ruling methods of the two

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regimes that ruled Turkmenistan since 1992. If we look closely at two of the three elements that have constituted the principal focus of our analysis (most specifically political liberalisation and institutional policy), the regime headed by Berdymuhammedov did not appreciably differ from that of its predecessor. So far as the intra-elite relationship is concerned, we have seen that, after an initial period of relative stabilisation – in which the regime was essentially managed by a diarchy – the Turkmen President began to expand his personal power basis through a higher turnover of government officials and, most importantly, the removal of potential rivals. In relation to the personalistic dimension of Turkmen authoritarianism – a prominent feature of the last two stages of the Niyazov era – it seems that Berdymuhammedov’s powers are not as unencumbered as those of his predecessor. In other words, elite backing still appears, at the end of 2007, as an essential element of keeping Berdymuhammedov’s power base. Further, an official propaganda aimed at glorifying Berdymuhammedov is yet to be launched, even though significant steps towards the dismantling of the cult of Niyazov’s personality have already been made by the new regime.

Conclusion In his analysis of the process of de-Sovietisation of Turkmen politics in early 1993, Christopher Panico listed the salient traits of the (then) newly established Niyazov regime as follows: ‘commitment to one-party rule; maintenance of the illusion of democratic institutions and a democratic constitution; repression of dissent; manipulation of the media; [and] minor concession to an impoverished population in lieu of real political reform’.89 Mutatis mutandis, Panico’s words could be also used to describe the state of Turkmenistan authoritarianism at the end of 2007. Continuity is the keyword to understanding the evolution of Turkmen domestic politics. Non-democratic governance remained a constant factor in Turkmenistan throughout the post-Soviet era. From 1992 onwards, the intensity of authoritarian rule within the Turkmen political landscape steadily escalated, reaching a peak in the late Niyazov era. After the passing of Niyazov, the establishment of a new dictatorship failed to change the domestic political landscape, as most of the techniques that allowed Niyazov and his entourage to acquire unchallenged influence over Turkmenistan’s political scene quickly re-emerged during the Berdymuhammedov era. Regime monopoly has been the overriding feature of Turkmen domestic politics. The two dictatorships that ruled Turkmenistan since the achievement of independence enjoyed an equal degree of hegemonic influence vis-à-vis the different Turkmen polities. By using similar rhetoric and implementing similar strategies, Niyazov and Berdymuhammedov achieved the same end: the acquisition of control over virtually every aspect of Turkmen politics. In the dictators’ view, this would maximise the chances of regime survival. This chapter has demonstrated that, since 1992, the Turkmen regime

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progressively expanded its leverage vis-à-vis Turkmenistan’s institutional infrastructure and key polities (the elite and the wider population). This strategy allowed the regime to maintain firm control of the main processes of decisionmaking, including those concerned with formulation and operationalisation of the country’s foreign policy. Bearing in mind the strongly authoritarian character of Turkmen politics, the analysis of the policy of neutrality has therefore to be developed in close connection with the dynamics of regime survival. The essence of the policy (and of the political milieu in which it was formulated) has been sketched out in these first two chapters, which conclude that Positive Neutrality is, to all intents and purposes, an opaque policy shaped by a strongly authoritarian regime. Its raison d’être is deeply entrenched in the regime’s non-democratic nature. The focus of our analysis can now turn to the different applications of Positive Neutrality, in order to shed more light on the policy’s underlying motivations and modes of operation.

3

The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality as a key element in nation-building

Foreign policy operates within a political environment external to the state. Yet it has, at the same time, to deal with an environment that is internal to it. In some cases, foreign policy may develop largely as a function of the state’s domestic environment, which is not to say that the external environment does not set constraints and opportunities for the conduct of foreign policy. The mix of domestic and external variables that impact on foreign policy-making will vary from one state to another and, for the same state, from one period to another. The examination of one of the facets of the domestic application of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy is the central focus of this chapter, in which we intend to place the policy of Positive Neutrality within the context of nation-building1 promoted by the Turkmen regime after 1992. To this end, the chapter draws upon the analysis presented in Chapter 2 and relates the Turkmen political landscape to non-democratic regimes generally, and to the ‘sultanistic’ model in particular. As an archetypal form of authoritarian governance, the sultanistic category is useful for an understanding of the Turkmen regime, which, as we have seen earlier, evolved into extreme forms of authoritarianism after 2002. In 1975, while classifying modern forms of non-democratic regimes,2 Juan J. Linz revived the notion of sultanism, originally formulated by Max Weber in his Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. Weber coined the term ‘sultanism’ to describe a particularly extreme form of patrimonialism, deeply characterised by the leader’s arbitrariness and irrationality.3 The choice of the Arabic concept of sultan (indicating both the power and the person who controls it) to label this category of regimes does not, however, appear to be accidental. Weber identified in the Near East the geographical location in which sultanism could flourish most favourably, and he considered the Ottoman Empire as the most representative example of sultanistic regimes in his own historical era.4 The Weberian concept of sultanism was therefore specifically associated with Western perceptions of the political experience of the ArabIslamic world. This precise geographic association reduced the opportunities to use the category of sultanism, which, as Linz and Chehabi pointed out in a later essay,5 remained largely unapplied in the literature of the twentieth century. Sultanism,6 as a theoretical category for non-democratic regimes, became indeed widely accepted in the literature published after 1975. In this sense, Linz7

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revitalised the concept, re-elaborated it, expanded its geographic dimension and transformed it into a generally accepted label used to indicate a highly authoritarian and deeply personal form of rule. The current scholarly debate on the issue is hence almost entirely shaped around the definition eventually provided by Linz and Chehabi, which can be summarised as follows: [Sultanism] is based on personal rulership, but loyalty to the ruler is motivated not by his embodying or articulating an ideology, nor by a unique personal mission, nor by any charismatic qualities, but by a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators. The ruler exercises his powers without restraint, at his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rules or by any commitment to an ideology or value system. [. . .] The staff of such a ruler is constituted not by an establishment with distinctive career lines, [. . .] but largely by people chosen directly by the ruler. Among them we very often find members of his family, friends, business associates, or individuals directly involved in using violence to sustain the regime. Their position derives from their purely personal submission to the ruler [. . .]. Although such regimes can in may ways be modern, what characterises them is the weakness of tradition and legal-rational legitimisation and the lack of ideological justification. (Chehabi and Linz, A theory of sultanism I, op. cit. p. 7) Most features of the Niyazov regime, which ruled Turkmenistan between 1992 and 2006, fit rather well into the theoretical category outlined by Linz and Chehabi, especially in relation to the profound personalisation in which power is reportedly exercised and to the lack of an ideological architecture overseeing the state’s politics. The first section of this chapter is aimed at answering the question: Was Niyazov’s Turkmenistan a sultanistic regime? In addressing this critical issue, the section draws heavily upon the analysis presented in the previous chapter, which illustrated the evolution of Turkmen authoritarianism since 1992. Once the nature of the regime is established, the analysis can go on to place the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality within the Turkmen process of nation-building. The second part relates to Turkmen foreign policy in so far as the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality represented a significant part of the propaganda system sponsored by the Turkmen government after 1992. This section will first describe the key elements of the rhetorical discourse introduced by the regime in the postSoviet era, and will then go on to examine the way in which Turkmen neutrality has been introduced within this discourse. In short, this chapter examines one critically important dimension of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, which relates to the internal Turkmen political arena and more specifically to the connection that the Turkmen regime established between declaratory policy and the nation-building process it sought to promote in the post-Soviet era.

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Sultanistic accretions in Niyazov’s Turkmenistan Turkmenistan under Niyazov shared a substantial number of common elements with Ceaus¸escu’s Romania, considered by J.J. Linz and Alfred Stepan8 as one of the archetypal examples of sultanism. Specifically, the fusion of state power and national legitimacy in the leader’s figure,9 the complete subordination of any state structure to the leader, the exaltation of his personality, of his ideas and his visions; the construction of impressive architectural complexes in spite of widespread socio-economic difficulties, the utterly arbitrary control of the leader over any process of decision-making occurring at different levels (political, economic, social, religious), characterised Niyazov’s Turkmenistan just as they did Ceaus¸escu’s Romania and other similar political milieux. Nevertheless, Sally Cummings’ and Michael Ochs’ description of the Niyazov regime identified with a great degree of precision a few elements10 whose existence complicates the placement of Turkmenistan within Linz’s and Chehabi’s definition of sultanistic regimes. The dichotomy between personalism and dynasticism is one of these elements. Turkmenistan’s sultanism was, in fact, characterised by the absence of the leader’s blood relatives in the top echelons of the ruling elite. Familial links are a relatively common basis to leadership succession for sultanistic regimes.11 Niyazov’s immediate relatives were not involved in domestic politics, nor did they play any significant political role after his death. Unlike the Philippines’ Imelda Marcos or Romania’s Elena Ceaus¸escu, Niyazov’s wife has been absolutely absent from Turkmenistan’s political landscape. A similar attitude was shared by their offspring, who are reportedly living outside Turkmenistan.12 This element reinforces the parallel between Niyazov and J.V. Stalin. Analogies between the two leaders have been traditionally based on the fact that the cult of personality that characterised Turkmenistan echoed that of the Stalinist era in the Soviet Union. But the absence of blood relatives from the top echelons of power represents an even more important common feature shared by these leaders, especially in relation to its impact on the politics of the two systems. Nevertheless, though the leader’s family circle wielded no power, emphasis on it was a recurrent element in the regime narrative: Niyazov’s late parents, Atamurat and Gurbansoltan Edzhe, were both presented as national heroes of Turkmenistan.13 In assessing the personalistic component of the Niyazov regime and its impact on dynasticism, two factors have to be taken into account. Time is the first. As Chapter 2 (see p. 33) has already demonstrated, Niyazov’s appointment as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party did not occur until December 1985, after he occupied top positions in the Ashgabat’s party organisation and in the Council of Ministers of the TSSR. Although his prominent party role surely allowed him to build up a strong network of patronage, Niyazov, at the beginning of the 1990s, still needed to enlarge his support basis, mainly through forms of political bargain with already well established sources of power.

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Elite composition as inherited from the pre-sultanistic political structure of Turkmenistan is the second key factor in explaining the unavailability of dynasticism as a viable option for Niyazov’s succession. In the early post-Soviet era, a relatively restricted economic oligarchy – which was not completely acquiescent to the ‘sultan’ – emerged concurrently with the regime.14 These circumstances forced Niyazov, at the outset especially, to share his power with a political base not immediately identifiable with his close or extended family and to negotiate his influence with a number of oligarchs. On this basis, it follows that nepotism could have brought some disadvantages to the former Turkmen President: favouring his immediate family might have complicated Niyazov’s relations with his elite and set in motion destabilising dynamics analogous with those that emerged in Kyrgyzstan in 2005.15 Nonetheless, the exclusion of Niyazov’s immediate family from the highest echelons of power continued after 2003, when the unconstrained powers of the President could have allowed him to establish a succession mechanism purely based on nepotism. Total personalisation of the regime, however, seemed to be a relatively accurate image of Turkmenistan at the time of Niyazov’s death. In fact, even though the late President needed the support of an extremely restricted elite to take ‘all major and many minor decisions’,16 he appeared to exert his almost unlimited powers entirely on the basis of personal charisma and widespread fear: this indeed represented one of the most peculiar features of sultanistic rulership. The theoretical framework of sultanistic dictatorships seems therefore the most suitable to represent Turkmenistan under Niyazov. This proposition does not however ignore that ‘it is the combination of personalism and dynasticism that is specific to sultanism’,17 nor does it disregard the remarks of Cummings and Ochs on the semi-sultanistic nature of the Turkmen regime.18 Nevertheless, as observed by Linz and Chehabi, ‘no empirical reality fully matches all characteristics of a sultanistic regime’.19 The absence of one feature, albeit as crucial as dynasticism, could complicate, but not altogether prevent, the placement of Turkmenistan under Niyazov in this category of non-democratic regimes. Sultanistic tendencies, it seems clear, emerged at different times during the Niyazov era, to become a recurrent feature in the third stage (2003–2006) of regime evolution in Turkmenistan. At the time of the President’s death, the regime might be said to have consummated the evolution into the sultanistic archetype described by Linz and Chehabi, notwithstanding the lack of arrangements for the sultan’s succession. It seems thus reasonable to include Niyazov’s Turkmenistan in the category of modern sultanistic regimes, alongside with Kim Jong Il’s North Korea and Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Belarus.20 During its ‘sultanisation’, the Turkmen regime identified the conservation of power and the prevention of political developments that might lead to its toppling as two of its principal political objectives. Simply put, responding to threats to stability, both external and/or internal to Turkmenistan, became a vital priority for Niyazov and his associates. In relation to internal threats, it is possible to identify two principal strategic responses implemented by the Turkmen regime: violent repression of political

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opponents and introduction of rhetorical narratives aimed at enhancing the population’s compliance with the set of norms and rules designed by the regime. After 2002, repressive methods, notably the resort to violence and systematic human rights abuses, featured prominently in the regime’s political strategy. A ‘mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators’21 became the distinguishing feature of Niyazov’s hold on power. Regime rhetoric, as articulated by Niyazov and his associates, helped to reinforce the stability of the regime. Positive Neutrality appeared to have played a significant role in this rhetorical discourse. This would suggest that regime narratives, viewed as part of a more comprehensive nation-building programme, played a significant part in the domestic application of Turkmen foreign policy.

The place of foreign policy in the Turkmen rhetorical paradigm Regime rhetoric in Turkmenistan was essentially aimed at glorifying the leader, through the establishment of a cult of his personality. In this sense, Turkmen propaganda is another element that is directly connected with specific features of sultanistic rulership. As we have seen earlier, (see Chapter 2, p. 38) Turkmen propaganda aimed at leaving an imprint on the political behaviour of the Turkmen population. In general terms, sultanistic regimes do not aim to modify their citizens’ political culture,22 they tend to present an ideology that ‘is more likely to be mere window dressing, [and] elaborated after the onset of the ruler’s regime to justify it’.23 The Turkmen regime did not constitute an exception to this norm. Elements of regime rhetoric in post-Soviet Turkmenistan In Niyazov’s Turkmenistan, the core of regime rhetoric has been the portrayal of the President as the single most important unifying element in shaping postSoviet Turkmen identity and as the focal figure of the post-independence historical era. Khalk, Vatan, Turkmenbashi (People, Homeland, Turkmenbashi) was perhaps the most famous amongst the slogans of Turkmen propaganda in the Niyazov era. It was designed to identify the three pillars on which contemporary Turkmenistan has been purportedly built. The slogan is reminiscent of comparable elements contained in modern propaganda systems. However, the inclusion of the leader’s personality as one of the foundation stones of the new society established a particularly direct link with the most renowned political slogan of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Khoda, Qur‘an, Khomeini (God, Quran, Khomeini), whose ultimate aim was the identification of the main pillars upon which develop the post-revolutionary Iranian society. The use of Khalk reflected the opportunistic intention of emphasising the centrality of the population in the process of state-building, yet the selection of the other two elements of the slogan requires further discussion.

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The term ‘vatan’ was used to identify the current geographical borders of the state as the ancestral homeland of the Turkmens. The idea of vatan was a common trait in the nationalistic discourses of pre-revolutionary Iran24 and modern Turkey.25 After the ‘national-territorial delimitation’ (razmezhevanie) of 1924, when the ‘nationality question seemed closed [to Central Asians], [and] their nations [could be] definable in concrete terms’,26 the theme of vatan became central in the nationalistic narratives of the region. As remarked by Shahram Akbarzadeh, ‘this widened source of spatial identity also appears to have made significant inroads into the intellegentsia’s perception of self’27 to become a recurrent theme in the literary works of the 1960s and 1970s.28 In post-communist Turkmenistan, nation-builders re-elaborated the traditional notion of vatan to identify the current29 territory of Turkmenistan as the historical homeland of the Turkmen population.30 Turkmenbashi, the self-attributed title with which Niyazov liked to be addressed, is the last of the three elements that the propaganda placed as central to the formation of post-Soviet Turkmen identity. The leader was portrayed as the ultimate source of identity for the Turkmen population. According to the regime, Niyazov not only represented an element not immediately associated with prior (and thus imposed by a colonial power) forms of identity, but, and perhaps more importantly, he embodied the unity of the Turkmen people, his persona prevailing over tribal, clanic and ethnic divisions.31 The conceptualisation of the Turkmen leadership has been channelled primarily through the establishment of the cult of Niyazov’s personality. This has been fostered through the construction of towering monuments dedicated to him,32 the permanent display of his image in almost every corner of the country, the glorification of his ancestry (his mother Gurbansoltan Edzhe and his father Atamurat) and the continuous reference to his name during Islamic prayers or in the weekly khutba.33 At the same time, the cult of Niyazov’s personality has also left traces on Turkmenistan’s urban, territorial and administrative organisation. Many of the streets in central Ashgabat and at least one etrap (province) per velayat have been renamed after him, and the important Caspian port (and capital of the Balkan velayat) of Krasnovodsk is now known as Turkmenbashi. Significantly, the cult of Niyazov’s personality also featured the constant promotion of the leader’s historical, social and political visions. It is common, in sultanistic regimes, to include the leader’s speeches and declarations in more general ideological systems that, regardless of their usually questionable innovativeness and inner logic, are presented to the population as immune to debate.34 Niyazov’s Turkmenistan largely conformed to this rule. Although the official state ideology of Niyazov’s Turkmenistan was never called ‘Niyazovism’, the President’s new concepts of societal organisation and historical evolution of the Turkmen nation, originally presented in the Rukhnama, became an essential part of the subjects taught at every educational level in Turkmenistan,35 and were constantly implemented through the enactment of rather odd presidential decrees. At the same time, Niyazov’s conceptualisation of global politics was por-

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trayed to domestic audiences as well as to international observers as revolutionary and highly innovative. The mechanism chosen to accomplish this objective was the declaratory statement in Turkmen foreign policy. The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality is therefore best understood as a significant element in the regime’s rhetorical paradigm and an integral part in the process of regime consolidation. The place of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality within Turkmenistan’s regime rhetoric In depicting Turkmen foreign policy as a representative element of regime propaganda, it is possible to draw more important conclusions about the determinants that shaped the policy. First, the vague manner in which the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was formulated allowed nation-builders to manipulate the content of the doctrine itself, in order to align it more closely with the rhetorical system progressively developed in the 1990s. Second, the portions of the doctrine most pertinent to nation-building have been presented to domestic audiences through the systematic use of clichés and constant repetition of general and imprecise arguments. Finally, related strategies have also been adopted in order to emphasise the exclusive connection that supposedly linked the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality and the Niyazov regime. The following examples illustrate these points. To begin with, national propaganda assigned the agency of the policy exclusively to the leader. As previously indicated,36 Niyazov has been traditionally considered solely responsible for both the conceptualisation and the international promotion of the doctrine. The governmental press played a decisive role in this strategy, by presenting (in a non-critical fashion) the subjects of discussion, results and implications of most meetings between Niyazov and prominent members of the international political community.37 Ultimately, the glorification of the leader who supposedly shaped the policy inevitably led to the idealisation of the policy itself. In order to increase the appeal of the foreign policy among the Turkmen population, the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was presented as a ‘purely Turkmen’ concept. Niyazov often remarked that Turkmen neutrality had been adopted not by imitating the political experience of other neutral states (Austria, Switzerland) but as part of an innovative policy reflecting the unique characteristics of the Turkmen people.38 No further explanation was ever presented to clarify this argument. The regime claimed that the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was ‘the outcome of the entire course of development of the Turkmen nation’.39 Throughout the last decade, prominent members of the Turkmen government underlined the extent to which the strategic development of foreign policy is clearly connected with the historical evolution of the Turkmen population. Niyazov has often stated that the principle of neutrality ‘meets the historical reality [of the country]’,40 whilst erstwhile Foreign Minister Shikhmuradov maintained that the doctrine had been formulated after a comprehensive analysis of the historical

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uniqueness of Turkmenistan.41 In other words, Positive Neutrality was presented as the main result of the modern re-elaboration of the traditional way in which the Turkmen nation has interacted with its neighbours. This concept directly relates to Marat Durdyev’s claim portraying the Iranic and sedentary societies of ancient Central Asia as the starting point for the ethnogenesis of the Turkmens.42 The description of the Turkmens as a population that has eternally considered ‘peacefulness, good neighbourliness, and diligence’43 as the basic principles of international conduct does not match the most commonly accepted pattern of interaction between nomads and their neighbouring societies.44 The often belligerent behaviour of the Turkic tribes of Central Asia, their conflicting relations with sedentary populations and, more specifically, their destructive impact45 on the evolution of an urbanised culture in the Central Asian region, constitutes at best a contested historical past, which hardly forms the origins of a foreign policy based on cooperation and peacefulness. It is only by attributing sedentary origins to modern Turkmenistan, that the elite has been able to forge links between the adoption of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality and the ‘historical specificity’46 of the Turkmen population. A similarly controversial claim requires more detailed examination. To begin with, government propaganda, in automatically associating nomadic society with violence, failed to take into account that war has also been a feature of sedentary societies: the historical experience of modern and contemporary Europe, where nomadic societal organisation disappeared well before the Middle Ages, provides an obvious but strong counterargument to the Turkmen rhetoric on this regard. Second, Durdyev’s claim, which establishes peacefulness and unfamiliarity with war as significant features of traditional Turkmen society, is not analytically connected to the post-Soviet process of foreign policy-making. The regime seems to have simply manipulated its own rhetoric to assert a direct link between these characteristics and the benefits that neutrality would bring to the political development of Turkmenistan. Finally, the alleged Iranic origins of the modern Turkmen population are yet to be supported fully by significant historical and archaeological evidence. The persistence with which the propaganda acknowledged the link between the Turkmens and the Parthians rests on a simplistic rhetorical reconstruction aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of the Turkmen regime. Beyond the question of history, the Turkmen public has been presented with a somewhat misleading picture of the aims of the doctrine. The principle of neutrality has been generally depicted as the key factor ushering in a new Turkmen Golden Era, in which human rights and egalitarianism would dominate the domestic political landscape, while the international relations of Turkmenistan would be characterised by peace and a spirit of cooperation.47 Explanations as to how precisely these objectives would be achieved have been strikingly absent in foreign policy speeches aimed at domestic audiences. Not surprisingly, misconceptions about the principle of neutrality have been quite common among the Turkmen population.48

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As already indicated (see Introduction, p. 4), popular perceptions of the policy are not the focus of this book. Nor does this study provide an assessment of relative success encountered by the policy. The examination of the rhetorical manipulations of the doctrine performed by the regime when presenting the policy to the Turkmen public is not therefore intended to establish whether Turkmens have accepted the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality as a pivotal symbol of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. Rather, the aim is to demonstrate that foreign policy was assigned a crucial role in the regime’s rhetorical discourse. To give additional weight to its propaganda machine, the regime progressively associated different elements of the daily life of Turkmens with the country’s foreign policy. The construction of the Arch of Neutrality in the centre of Ashgabat, the introduction of the month of Bitarap (Neutral), which, in the new Turkmen calendar approved in August 2002, replaces the month of December, the renaming of the official newspaper Turkmenskaya Iskra, which, since 14 December 1995, has been known as Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan (Neutral Turkmenistan),49 and the celebration of Neutrality Day (12 December) represent only the most visible of the many elements that constantly remind the population of the country’s neutral status and, ultimately, of the regime’s success in gaining international recognition of this status. Anthony D. Smith emphasised how national ceremonies are one of the ‘most potent and durable aspect(s) of nationalism’.50 The commemorative celebration of the international recognition of Turkmen neutrality has been made into a major national holiday. Here, it is worth analysing a little more closely the celebratory protocol used by the Turkmen government to commemorate the adoption of the doctrine, because it so neatly synthesises the strategies used to place foreign policy at the centre of the nation-building paradigm. The presidential decree (reproduced below), issued on 6 December 1996, originally determined the protocol. Decree of the President of Turkmenistan on Activities to be held to Mark Neutrality Day Turkmenistan’s national holiday51 In connection with the first anniversary of the December 12, 1995 Resolution on the Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation, the Neutrality Day – Turkmenistan’s national holiday, and taking into account the historic and political relevance of the date in the evolution of Turkmenistan and its people, as well as seeking to impart special solemnity to the event, the following be ruled hereby: 1 On December 12, Neutrality Day, the President of Turkmenistan shall annually appear with an address to the people of Turkmenistan. 2 On December 12, national flags of Turkmenistan and UN membercountries, as well as the UN flag shall be annually raised in ceremony on Saparmurat Turkmenbashi Square in Ashgabat.

58

Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy 3 A gala reception in Ashgabat and formal reception at Turkmenistan’s mission with the United Nations Organisation in New York City (the USA) shall annually be held to celebrate Neutrality Day. 4 All educational establishments of Turkmenistan shall annually on the eve of Neutrality Day hold a dedicated class on the topic Neutrality: Policy of Peace and Concord. 5 On December 12, military units and facilities shall annually hold a national flag raising ceremony and have the newly enlisted servicemen and servicewomen take the oath of allegiance. 6 The cities of Ashgabat, Mary, Chardzhou, Tashauz and Nebit-Dag at 20.00 hours on the first anniversary of Turkmenistan’s neutrality shall fire a festive salute of 12 salvoes to stand for December 12 – Turkmenistan’s Day of Neutrality, with every year’s salute adding another salvo to mark yet one more year of the nation’s neutrality. 7 The Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan shall draft proposals to introduce in the National flag and State Seal – state symbols of Turkmenistan – certain elements, which would manifest Turkmenistan’s neutrality. 8 On December 12, 1996, a dedicated ceremony shall be held in Ashgabat to lay the symbolic Arch of Neutrality. 9 Karl Marx Square shall be renamed Neutrality Square. 10 December 12 shall be established as an off-day.

The terms set by this decree suggest two important conclusions. To begin with, the renaming of a central square in Ashgabat in honour of the country’s foreign policy attests the importance assigned to the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality in the nation-building paradigm. The strategy of progressively replacing Soviet (or even pre-Soviet) symbols with elements enhancing a sense of national self-consciousness exclusively based on ‘nationality’ is a common feature of Central Asian processes of nation-building, and changes in urban toponymy are a central element in this strategy. Usually, nation-builders adopted symbols located in the ancestral history of the state to replace Soviet toponyms.52 The Turkmen government, on the other hand, has chosen symbols associated with the post-independence era (and ultimately with the regime) to reorganise the urban geography of Turkmen cities. Neutrality features prominently in this regard.53 Furthermore, the presidential attempt to promote the discussion of topics related to foreign policy in educational structures throughout the country suggests that the propaganda apparatus has been particularly aimed at younger generations. Through the indoctrination of young Turkmens, the national government hoped to realise the rhetorical objective of gradually transforming neutrality into the ‘flesh and blood of the Turkmens’.54 Semi-erudite clichés, misleading information, inaccurate historical accounts and deceptive descriptions of the objectives and historical determinants of foreign policy have widely characterised the rhetoric used by the regime to

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depict the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Quite apart from the desire to bestow some sort of historical legitimacy on the doctrine, official rhetoric is primarily designed to portray the country’s foreign policy as a construction of the regime and, ultimately, of Niyazov. In this sense, underlining the beneficial impact that neutrality offers the Turkmen state is ultimately intended to elevate and ‘glorify’ the authors of the policy itself.

Conclusion Previous chapters have indicated that divorcing the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality from the regime that formulated it greatly complicates the task of interpretation. This chapter has sought to address this gap, by analysing in depth one of the facets of the ‘domestic’ application of the policy: its connection with nationbuilding. The characterisation of the ‘sultanistic’ component of the Niyazov regime has helped us to contextualise the rhetoric fostered in Turkmenistan. ‘Sultanistic’ ideology is exclusively aimed at providing some sort of legitimation for the leader. Its dreary and highly rhetorical contents derive from the need to fill the ideological gaps typical of sultanistic rulership, which in this regard differs from other non-democratic regimes. This chapter has concluded that the rhetorical discourse promoted by the Niyazov regime fits the ‘sultanistic’ model rather well. The placement of Niyazov’s Turkmenistan within the category of ‘sultanistic’ regimes has also underlined the importance that the dynamics of regime survival have played in Turkmen politics. Niyazov and his associates understood regime survival as the process of identifying effective responses to internal and external threats to regime stability. In relation to internal threats, this chapter has established that neutrality played a not insignificant part in shaping the regime’s responses to such threats and, more specifically, the response formulated in the context of nation-building. The regime understood the shaping of public attitudes and perceptions as a key element in the task of ensuring the population’s compliance with the regime’s norms and priorities. Turkmen nation-building was therefore generally designed to accomplish this objective. As the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality played a central role in the rhetorical discourse fostered within the nation-building mechanism, we are led to believe that the regime perceived the doctrine as potentially useful in the shaping of the population’s outlook. This may be considered the principal mechanism through which the regime used foreign policy to reinforce its hold on power. As we have seen in the introductory section of this chapter, foreign policy-making operates simultaneously within the domestic and external environments. It is reasonable then to assume that Positive Neutrality has also had to operate within the regional and international arenas. Given the centrality that regime survival was given in Turkmen politics, it is also reasonable to expect Positive Neutrality to have played an important role in the responses that the Turkmen regime formulated in relation to external threats.

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Two key questions are suggested by these propositions: Is regime survival the main determinant of the policy of Positive Neutrality? Has Positive Neutrality been used by the Turkmen regime to address external threats to its stability? The next four chapters of the book, which analyse Turkmen operational foreign policy, are designed to address these two questions.

Part II

The operational dimension of Turkmen foreign policy

4

The economic foreign policy of neutral Turkmenistan

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Turkmen government initiated simultaneous economic and political reforms. In the economic sphere, the intended transitional trajectory was to open the Turkmen economy to the global economic system, by facilitating its exit from the highly centralised Soviet system. Similarly to the process of political transition, economic reforms in post-Soviet Turkmenistan had been controlled by the central government. Economic policies implemented since 1992 had facilitated the process of regime establishment and a number of economic reforms had helped to strengthen the position of Niyazov and his associates. There is no reason to think that the economic foreign policy, driven within the framework of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, represented an exception to this norm. Economic matters lie at the very heart of Turkmen foreign policy. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkmen policy-makers had consistently taken into account issues of economic relevance when formulating the country’s foreign policy. The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, whose declaratory statement is generally vague, does nevertheless contain relatively detailed information on Turkmenistan’s economic foreign policy. Previous chapters highlighted1 the existence of a rather precise (albeit unsophisticated) operational pattern that, according to Turkmen official views, was designed to promote, through the launch of a number of programmes of economic reforms and the constant support of international aids, the full placement2 of Turkmenistan’s economy into the global economic system. In his comprehensive analysis of the Turkmen economy, Gregory Gleason identified three economic policy dimensions to the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality: the identification of new export routes for Turkmen gas, the attraction of direct foreign investment to restructure the national energy sector and the expansion of Turkmen trade.3 A particular conceptualisation of Russia’s role vis-à-vis Turkmenistan’s external economic development derived from the priorities of economic foreign policy as identified in Gleason’s analytical framework, which has offered a valuable guideline for the discussion to be presented in this chapter. The first two objectives relate to Turkmenistan’s energy potential and its need to locate suitable new directions for the export of Turkmen gas. New pipelines

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had to circumvent the old Soviet system of energy transportation that granted Russia total control over Turkmen gas. Secondly, the attraction of direct foreign investment entailed the strengthening of Turkmenistan’s partnerships with states located in the West. Therefore, both objectives may be said to have had an identical theme: the dilution of Russia’s economic leverage over Turkmenistan. A different Soviet legacy had to be faced to achieve the third objective. Turkmen trade in the Soviet era was conducted predominantly within the Soviet Union: the economic foreign policy of independent Turkmenistan had therefore to enlarge the geographic dimension of Turkmen trade. Expansion of the trade directions primarily involved the placement of Turkmen exports in non-CIS (and preferably Western) markets. Mutatis mutandis, the third objective in Gleason’s list is therefore connected with the previous two. In fact, stretching out the boundaries of Turkmen commerce beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States involved a reduction of Russia’s central role in the Turkmen trade system. It is worth noting at the outset that none of the three objectives met with much success. This chapter argues that the regime soon abandoned the achievement of these objectives and replaced them with a new set of priorities. In fact, the emergence of new foreign policy determinants, as suggested by Chapter 3 (see p. 59), led Turkmen policy-makers to revise the economic objectives to be pursued under the umbrella of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The evolution of the objectives of Turkmenistan’s economic strategy under the banner of neutrality is the main issue to be considered in this chapter. In order to trace the evolution of these objectives, as well as its determinants, the analysis presented here takes into account the problem of continuity and change in Turkmen foreign policymaking. As argued in Chapter 1 (see p. 30), at no stage did the Turkmen government undertake any theoretical revision of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Therefore, this chapter intends to identify and explain the inconsistencies that have emerged during the operationalisation of the doctrine, particularly those related to economic foreign policy. The first section of the chapter is designed to present a concise outline of the Turkmen economy. This section will examine the role played by the economy of the TSSR in the Soviet system and, in particular, will assess more precisely the impact of selected Soviet legacies on the economic development of independent Turkmenistan. Moreover, this section will briefly describe a number of postindependence economic policies, in order to establish whether the current regime has been able to modify the production patterns of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. The second section will describe the process of redirection of Turkmen trade, managed under the guidance of the ‘Economic section’ of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. This section will establish a link between the evolution of the new trade policy and the unachieved completion of economic reforms at domestic level, to describe the economic milieu in which the regime decided to reconceptualise its economic foreign policy. The third section will analyse Turkmenistan’s energy policy since independence, by concentrating on policies

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aimed at: (1) increasing a regular flow of foreign direct investment into Turkmenistan; (2) identifying new routes for the export of Turkmen gas. The concluding section will examine the evolution of the objectives that Turkmenistan’s economic foreign policy had to accomplish and will link the new targets with the shifts in the regime’s perception of (internal as well as external) sources of instability.

Turkmen economy: a brief outline The Soviet economic system divided the Soviet Union into eighteen different regions. The TSSR was included in the Central Asian economic region, alongside with the Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz Soviet republics. The principle of cooperative production – which oversaw every aspect of the Soviet economy – assigned to the TSSR a role analogous to those of other republics in the Central Asian economic region: the production of primary commodities that were eventually manufactured in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) or in other republics located outside Central Asia.4 Put simply, Turkmenistan’s economic role, in Soviet times, was primarily confined to the production of raw cotton and the extraction of gas. Cotton crops dominated Turkmen agricultural production in the Soviet era. At the end of 1992, Turkmenistan produced 1393 thousand metric tons of seed cotton and almost half (42 per cent) of Turkmenistan’s labour force was employed in cotton production. As far as other crops were concerned, the agricultural sector of the TSSR did not specialise in any other major agricultural product.5 Traditionally, two main factors negatively affected any developmental prospect for the Turkmen agriculture: water shortages and major debilitating effects on the soil caused by the cotton monoculture. In Central Asia, the uneven distribution of water resources in relation to the amount of arable land is an issue that remains unresolved. Approximately 80 per cent of total water supplies for the whole Central Asian region are located within the territories of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On the other hand, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which account for the majority of Central Asia’s arable land, possess only 20 per cent of total water reserves.6 In addition to its negative implications regarding potential increase in productivity of already existing crops, water shortage has also impinged upon the opportunity to enlarge the surface of arable land in Turkmenistan. The Soviet administration therefore decided to augment the capability of the Karakum canal, in order to provide more substantial amounts of water to the southern region of Turkmenistan, where the majority of agricultural areas were located. ‘An increase in the total sown area from 368,000 hectares in 1950 to over 1.3 million hectares in 1990’7 resulted from continuous restructuring works on the canal. Major environmental problems emerged as an unintended consequence of this project, which worsened the already compromised ecological balance of the Aral Sea. As Soviet agricultural policies increasingly concentrated on the cotton monoculture, no significant progress was made to boost the production of any other

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crop. The increased total surface of arable land resulting from the continuous amelioration of the Karakum canal was mostly reconverted in cotton fields: the strengthening of agricultural sectors other than cotton (fruits, vegetables, cereals) was not an option taken into account by Turkmen economic policymakers, nor, most significantly, was an objective included in the agenda of the central Gosplan.8 Similarly, Turkmen economic planners did not attempt to reconvert that land into pasturelands for livestock. At the end of the Soviet era, Turkmenistan remained a large food importer. The energy sector represented the other major feature of the Turkmen economy. At the end of 1991, Turkmenistan produced more than 84 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 4828 million cubic meters of crude petroleum.9 Turkmen oil and gas, which in 1992 accounted for 80 per cent and 64 per cent respectively of (excluding Kazakhstan) Central Asia’s total oil and gas reserves,10 were sent, through an intra-Union pipeline system, to the European zone of the Soviet Union, whose high demand for fuel could only be satisfied by massive imports of oil and gas from other regions of the USSR. The production and processing of oil, gas and electricity, and the manufacture of machinery for the oil industry, constituted the core of the industrial sector of the TSSR. At the same time, light industry (particularly textile enterprises) represented a sizeable proportion of the industrial production of the Turkmen republic; in 1991, it accounted for 40 per cent of the total industrial output. The industrial sector of Soviet Turkmenistan also included the production of construction materials, food processing and a small chemical sector.11 Soviet administrators opted not to concentrate on the national industrial output. In Soviet planning, the principle of ‘proximity to the consumers’ was the key to justifying industrial development in the regions of the Soviet Union. The remote geographic position of the TSSR was the single most important factor that persuaded central planners not to invest in the industrialisation of the TSSR.12 Failure to boost the industrial sector of the TSSR brought to a halt the diversification of Turkmen industry and, perhaps more significantly, helped to consolidate Turkmenistan’s exclusion from the process of manufacturing cotton produced within the republic’s territory. Although textile manufactories represented a large portion in the structure of the light industry of the TSSR, by the end of the Soviet era the bulk of the cotton produced in Turkmenistan was processed and manufactured outside the republic.13 In this regard, Soviet planners seemed to have applied more restrictively the principle of ‘proximity to the consumers’, as they deliberately refused to enhance the textile industry in the TSSR as well as in the other Central Asian republics.14 In conclusion, the economy of Soviet Turkmenistan was predominantly based on two sectors: energy and cotton. The latter represented the largest employer in the country, while the former guaranteed the most significant revenues to the national government.15 A quantitative picture of the main production indicators for the Turkmen economy at the end of the Soviet era (1990–1991) is illustrated in Table 4.1. In the post-independence era, the Turkmen regime claimed that the comple-

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Table 4.1 Turkmenistan: selected production indices (1990–1991) Production (thousand metric tons) • Agriculture Cotton Wheat Cotton (lint) Grapes Barley Rice, paddy Maize Potatoes • Mining Natural gas (million m3) Crude petroleum Salt • Manufacturing Cement Crude steel Fuel oils Wheat flour Nitrogenous fertilisers Energy • Electricity (billion KWh) Production Exports Imports Consumption

1990

1991

1457 134 437 169 144 47 159 35

1433 205 430 110 128 54 124 30

87767 4995 508

84348 4828 650

1085 2191 1620 412 59

904 1755 – 446 –

14.60 6.10 1.10 15.70

14.90 6.30 1.13 16.03

Source: Gleason, Markets and Politics in Central Asia, op. cit., pp. 100–1.

tion of significant reforms of the national economy deeply modified Turkmenistan’s production pattern. The grandiose rhetoric that characterised every aspect of post-independence Turkmen politics has also been used to announce groundbreaking economic reforms. In fact, the government of post-Soviet Turkmenistan periodically launched different reformist frameworks with such pompous names as Novoe Selo (New Village),16 10 let blagopoluchiya, spokoistviya, edinstva, stabil’nosti (Ten years of prosperity, tranquillity, unity and stability),17 and dedicated a good portion of the larger programme Zolotoi Vek (The Golden Era)18 to economic matters. Given the average duration of these programmes and the rigidity with which their objectives were set (especially in relation to accomplishing sharp increases in industrial and agricultural production), the approach was reminiscent of the different pyatiletki (five-year plans) of the Soviet era. The ‘Ten years of stability’ programme strictly regulated the first stage of Turkmen economic reforms which, according to the regime propaganda, was put in practice between 1992 and 1996.19 This framework was based on the achievement of five preliminary targets:

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Operational foreign policy

1 2

The creation of a legislative structure in which to place economic reforms; The implementation of a comprehensive plan of structural economic reforms; The reform of the economic institutions of the Turkmen state; The adoption of a new national currency; The launch of a large privatisation programme.

3 4 5

The second stage of economic reforms in Turkmenistan was placed within the framework of the programme ‘A thousand days’, which managed the reformist path between 1997 and 2001. Its objectives were grouped in four separate baskets:20 1 2 3 4

The activation of new forms of investment; The increase in bank activity; The continued diversification of the economy; The consolidation of an export-oriented economic development.

Turkmen and non-Turkmen sources had strongly diverged in their assessments of the outcomes of these reformist paradigms. Turkmen official publications on economic transition regularly underlined the efficacy of the economic reforms implemented by the regime and paid tribute to the originality of the reformist path chosen by Turkmen policy-makers.21 On the other hand, Western scholars,22 annual reports issued by international financial organisations,23 Russian observers,24 and Turkmen dissidents25 have maintained a more sceptical stance in relation to this assessment, drawing attention on to the ineffectiveness of the economic reforms introduced by the Turkmen government. The Niyazov regime sought to convey a rosy picture of the state of the Turkmen economy, by continuously providing unrealistic data on the economic achievements of the governmental policy.26 On the other hand, the current literature has convincingly argued that Turkmenistan ‘remained the most deprived of the Central Asian states in terms of education, social, and economic development’27 and, more generally, tended to look with increasing suspicion28 on any official statistical report issued by the Turkmen government.29 The analysis of the numerous non-Turkmen publications taken into account while researching this chapter suggests that the content of the reformist frameworks designed by Turkmen policy-makers remained largely unapplied. Further sections of this chapter will delve into the principal causes of the failure to promote economic reforms, by arguing that the diverse reformist programmes previously described have undergone constant modifications in order to adjust their objectives to the necessities of regime consolidation. The analysis presented here will limit itself to the discussion of the main consequences of this failure and will demonstrate that Turkmenistan’s production patterns had not substantially altered since the collapse of the USSR. To do so, Table 4.2 illustrates the main indicators for Turkmenistan’s production for the first decade of the post-Soviet era (1992–2003).30

88.9 – –

99.4 – –

12.64 4.44 1.25 9.45

1118 – 1399 429 79

65154 4301 173

1341 509 402 114 198 88 214 32

1993

105.8 – –

10.50 3.69 1.04 7.85

690 – 1150 429 92

35722 4083 –

1283 675 385 147 203 92 150 30

1994

103.9 41.7 82.3

9.80 1.50 – 7.78

437 1107 1371 515 90

32264 4394 254

1293 695 379 163 207 79 121 21

1995

68.1 – –

10.10 1.50 – 7.30

438 – – 374 95

35182 4424 –

437 453 131 165 50 60 60 30

1996

78.2 – –

9.50 1.50 – –

– – – – 110

– – –

635 707 190 160 100 55 50 28

1997

82.5 26.9 109.9

9.42 1.20 – 6.3

750 636 1575 372 110

13257 6384 220

707 1245 200 177 100 55 50 25

1998

98.6 27.4 130.4

8.86 0.40 – 8.5

780 350 1347 513 72

22943 6729 223

1304 1506 234 153 5 19 7 44

1999

95.6 50.6 147.9

9.85 0.90 – 9.0

420 341 1453 545 103

47153 6692 201

1031 1705 184 195 4 32 16 89

2000

89.1 53.7 167.6

10.60 1.0 – 9.60

448 356 1475 561 72

51270 7719 218

1137 2010 – 238 53 47 10 115

2001

91.0 – –

10.70 0.7 – 10.10

487 685 1509 537 103

53999 8225 221

490 2312 – 246 60 83 12 140

2002

106.4 – –

10.80 0.1 – 10.3

239 – 1750 503 96

– 8401 219

714 2536 114 246 – 111 – 160

2003

Source: Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, issued annually by the Statistical Department of the Asian Development Bank, various editions, 2000–2004.

Production Indexes (1991= 100) Agriculture Mining Manufacturing

• Electricity (billion KWh) Production Exports Imports Consumption

13.18 5.45 1.15 8.88

1050 1486 1942 453 –

• Manufacturing Cement Crude steel Fuel oils Wheat flour Nitrogenous fertilisers

Energy

60102 5200 483

• Mining Natural gas (million m3) Crude petroleum Salt

Production (thousand metric tons) • Agriculture Cotton 1290 Wheat 377 Cotton (lint) 390 Grapes 125 Barley 127 Rice, paddy 64 Maize 159 Potatoes 35

1992

Table 4.2 Turkmenistan: selected production indices (1992–2003)

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Operational foreign policy

The reality of a substantially unreformed economic context emerges from the data on agricultural and energy production contained in Table 4.2 and originally transmitted by the Turkmen government to the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The Turkmen government had always considered the shift to a cerealbased agricultural system as one of its most important economic targets and consistently claimed its achievement31 through the completion of the programme Zerno (Grain).32 In the period 1992–2003, cotton production quantitatively diminished by approximately 50 per cent, while the production of wheat skyrocketed. Cereals reportedly became, from 1997 onwards, the single most important product in the Turkmen agricultural system. However, it is only after 2001 that official statistics reported a significant decrease in cotton production: prior data did not highlight the occurrence of any substantial reconversion of Turkmen agriculture. This led several Western scholars to question the reliability of any claim about the completion of significant agricultural reforms.33 Furthermore, government claims were not consistent with the figures on total agricultural production, which did not increase through the last decade; this should have been the case if a genuine shift in the pattern of production had actually occurred. In 2003, the total agricultural production of Turkmenistan was approximately the same amount as the average for 1990 and 1991 (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Energy production remained steady throughout the post-Soviet era. After the sharp drop in gas production during 1997–1998, the total amount of Turkmen gas extracted annually began to rise again. However, as Table 4.2 reveals, total gas extracted in Turkmenistan, at the end of 2002, still did not match the production figures recorded in the late Soviet era. In relation to other industrial sectors, there is no reasonable evidence to maintain that the government, despite the usual rhetorical claims,34 had promoted any serious reformist programme able to modify Turkmenistan’s industrial output. The privatisation programmes implemented in Turkmenistan reinforce doubts on the real occurrence of structural reforms in the Turkmen economy. In 2007, the Turkmen economy was still overwhelmingly controlled by the government. Substantive initiatives for promoting the privatisation of the different production sectors had not been pursued. The Turkmen government systematically excluded the energy sector35 from the different privatisation programmes launched since 1992. In 1998, only 1948 out of the more than 4300 businesses declared eligible to be sold had been successfully privatised.36 Turkmenistan’s small privatised sector was accountable only for approximately 25 per cent of the Turkmen gross domestic product (GDP).37 More specifically, Turkmen agriculture was also under full governmental control: the introduction of a system of state order provided ‘input and credit subsidies to farmers and the prospect of land ownership’,38 which allowed the Turkmen government to maintain complete control over the production of wheat and cotton.39 In the apparent privatisation of the Turkmen economy, the government assigned a particularly interesting role to a number of para-statal organisations. Between 1992 and 1996 especially, the Turkmen government announced the

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devolution of the supervision of important economic sectors to a number of a state-concerned institutions: Turkmenistan’s energy sector was supervised by Turkmenneftgaz and Turkmengasprom, while the management of Turkmenistan’s cereal and cotton production was handed over to Turkmengallaonumlery and Turkmenpagta respectively. The devolution of these functions was nonetheless only tokenistic: although Turkmen state concerns appeared to be ‘private and independent’,40 the central government has been able to maintain firm control over their activities. A significant indicator in this direction was also represented by the unlimited powers that the Presidential Administration enjoyed vis-à-vis the management of top cadres within the organisational structures of these institutions. We may reasonably conclude that, in 2007, no reformist programme was able to make substantial modifications to the essence of the Turkmen economy, or to alter its production pattern. As a consequence, the economy has continued to centre largely on the extraction and, to a lesser extent, the processing of natural gas.

Redirecting Turkmen trade Soviet economic planning did not aim to transform the fifteen republics into self-sufficient economic units. Indeed, it opted to enhance the specialisation of the different economic regions in order to conform it to the needs of the Soviet Union as a whole. The republics were exclusively viewed as part of a single economic system, whose endurance and advancement constituted the main objectives for the central authorities. The unusual conceptualisation of the Soviet economic structure caused considerable complications in the integration of the republican economies into the world market. The fifteen republics ‘formed part of a framework with a division of labour oriented towards the domestic Soviet market’.41 The latter therefore became the primary dimension in which the republics performed their trade. In this sense, the comparison advanced by Martha Brill Olcott, who associated interrepublican trade to a ‘zero-sum game’,42 represents perhaps the most appropriate definition of what has been generally perceived to be one of the most significant aspects of Soviet economic integration.43 The trade patterns of the 15 Soviet republics evolved in a most unusual direction, as the percentage of intra-Union commerce in their respective trade balances became over-inflated to a significant degree. The composition of Turkmen exports was essentially restricted by Turkmenistan’s own production pattern. Central planning assigned to the TSSR the role of producer of raw materials. As a consequence, Turkmenistan had to import manufactured goods from other regions of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, on the basis of the elevated specialisation of the Turkmen agricultural sector, the republic was not self-sufficient in relation to food and, as previously demonstrated, the TSSR was – still in 1990 – a large food importer. At the end of the Soviet era, the trade44 of Soviet Turkmenistan was

72

Operational foreign policy

conducted within the Soviet Union. Table 4.3 presents a comparative analysis of the trade patterns of the 15 Soviet republics in 1990. The table clearly indicates that the TSSR constituted one of the most extreme examples of trade systems almost entirely based on inter-republican commerce. It is nevertheless worth remembering that the bulk of extra-USSR Turkmen trade was exchanged with the satellite states of Eastern Europe or with other communist countries located elsewhere. Trade with the West constituted a small percentage of the overall trade of the TSSR. It is important to underline the fact that a specific price system was introduced to govern intra-Soviet commerce. In fact, the prices for inter-republican trade were different from those used in the rest of the world. This particular feature of the Soviet economic system provided a good opportunity for Turkmenistan (and, in general, for any other economy focused on the production of raw materials), once the Turkmen independent state entered the world market and adjusted the prices of its exports to world standards. Turkmenistan, among the former Soviet republics, was second only to the Russian Federation in receiving benefits for adjusting the price of its exports to world levels: in the first two years of the post-Soviet era, the Turkmen state accumulated, approximately, a striking +50 per cent in terms of trade gain, while Russia scored a stunning +79 per cent.45 Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the sensible increase in export revenues resulting from the shift to world prices might have convinced Turkmen policy-makers not to revise the list of Turkmenistan’s principal trade

Table 4.3 Soviet Republics: intra-union trade and external commerce (1990, %) Republic

RSFSR Ukraine Belorussia Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Georgia Azerbaijan Lithuania Moldova Latvia Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Armenia Turkmenistan Estonia

Imports

■

Export

Intra-USSR

Extra-USSR

Intra-USSR

Extra-USSR

51 73 79 86 84 80 75 83 82 82 80 87 82 86 81

49 27 21 14 17 20 25 17 18 18 20 13 18 14 19

68 85 91 85 91 93 94 91 95 92 98 86 98 92 90

33 15 9 15 9 7 6 9 5 8 2 14 2 8 10

Source: Ünal Çeviköz, ‘A brief account of the economic situation in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia’, Central Asian Survey, 18 (1), 1994, p. 46.

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73

partners. Another important factor in motivating such choice was the prospect of using the Soviet pipeline system to export Turkmen gas. Earning more significant revenues by selling the same product (gas) to the same partners (Ukraine, Russia and Georgia) by using the old Soviet pipelines was thus interpreted by the Turkmen government as a viable solution to manage the earlier stages of economic transition. In the medium term, however, they had to reconsider this position. As the next section of this chapter argues, ‘the existing transportation infrastructure made Turkmenistan dependent upon customers in countries that were not in a position to pay’.46 Difficulties in ensuring a regular flow of gas revenues represented one of the two major factors that convinced the national government of the absolute necessity to reconceptualise Turkmenistan’s trade policy. The realisation that Russia was not a reliable47 partner, at least in relation to monetary and trade policies, represented the other decisive factor in this regard. The sudden decision taken by the Russian government in June 1993 to make significant reform to its currency system forced Turkmenistan and other post-Soviet states to reconsider their own position within the monetary union that developed from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkmenistan exited the Rublevaya Zona (Rouble Zone) on 1 November 1993, when the Turkmen government decided to adopt a new currency (the manat). Delay in abandoning the old Soviet monetary system also provoked a significant reduction of the gains resulted from the shift to world prices. Furthermore, successive negotiations for transforming the CIS into a relevant economic forum in which to coordinate the trade policies of the member states were regularly perceived by the Turkmen government as the visible manifestation of Russian attempts to reaffirm Moscow’s economic hegemony over the post-Soviet area. As a consequence, Turkmenistan decided not to participate in any integrative initiative promoted within the Commonwealth’s framework.48 As the monetary union ceased to exist, and the numerous attempts to coordinate the trade policies of the Soviet successor states within the CIS framework failed, Turkmenistan had to revise its trade policy, mainly to face the reality that, already by the end of 1993, the post-Soviet economic order had collapsed. In the views of Turkmen officials, the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality became the theoretical umbrella under which to place the re-orientation of Turkmen trade.49 As usual, a rhetorically grandiose tone was used in official declarations on the economic dimension of the doctrine. According to the national propaganda, Turkmen neutralism would have ‘created conditions for equal [. . .] economic relations of Turkmenistan with other countries’,50 and would have become ‘an important guarantee for foreign investment and international bank capital flows into the economy of Turkmenistan’.51 Notwithstanding its general rhetoric, the declaratory statement of the doctrine elaborated rather clearly the targets of the national economic foreign policy. In fact, as Chapter 1 (p. 29) pointed out, the ‘Economic section’ of the doctrine identified, with a significant degree of precision, the reduction of external economic pressures over Turkmenistan as the most crucial objective for Turkmen

74

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economic foreign policy. The accomplishment of this target represented the culmination of a multi-faceted policy aimed at achieving a number of secondary targets, of which the redirection of Turkmen trade constituted an extremely significant element. The Otkrytye Dveri (Open Doors) policy became the designated instrument to supervise Turkmenistan’s trade relations in the post-independence era. Turkmen documents usually tend not to disclose determinants, objectives and operational strategies of official policies. The Open Doors policy did not constitute an exception to this rule. Niyazov himself often provided several definitions for this strategy, stating that the Open Doors policy ‘implies seeking international partnership based on mutually profitable economic cooperation’.52 The vagueness of this definition was in line with the vagueness characteristic of official statements on Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. It might then be inferred that the Open Doors policy, which was carried out with significant emphasis between 1993 and 1998, was intended to operate on two levels. To begin with, the new Turkmen trade policy was meant to identify new trade routes for traditional exports (oil, gas, cotton). Secondly, it had to select new foreign destinations to which to export a whole new range of products. The latter establishes a direct link between the diverse programmes of economic reforms operating at the domestic level and the foreign dimension of Turkmenistan’s economics. It is then possible to observe the extent to which the Open Doors policy reflected a range of problems that lie at the heart of Turkmen economic foreign policy: energy issues, pipeline politics, construction of infrastructures to increase trade, strengthening of economic partnerships with non-CIS actors and domestic economic reforms. Interestingly, every item in this list connected, in varying degrees, with a more general issue: the dilution of Russia’s influence over the Turkmen economy. In this sense, the Open Doors policy, as an auxiliary segment of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality,53 was designed to achieve this end, which, in the first few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was identified as vital to the survival of the Turkmen regime. The Open Doors policy failed as a result of the interplay of two factors: 1 2

The unachieved transformation of Turkmenistan’s production pattern; The failure in forging long-lasting and fruitful economic partnerships with states located outside the boundaries of the CIS.

In general terms, it is possible to state that the failure to introduce domestic economic reforms at different levels reduced the efficacy of the new trade policy. The Turkmen government did not approve trade regulations capable of attracting the interests of foreign economic actors. The State Commodity and Raw Material Exchange, the main instrument of foreign trade in the country,54 oversaw Turkmenistan’s foreign trade. Although Turkmenistan did not apply tariffs to imported goods,55 a large number of non-tariff barriers nonetheless existed within the legislative framework that regulated Turkmenistan’s commercial

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75

law.56 Most specifically, there were ‘numerous excise rates on imports, which can differ from rates on domestically produced goods’.57 International financial organisations assessed the trade regulations in force in Turkmenistan negatively and called for the introduction of reforms ‘geared towards offering greater incentives to foreign trading partners and by reducing bureaucratic requirements for commercial contracts’.58 At the same time, the Turkmen government did not enter into any free trade agreement, or apply for WTO membership. Neither did it participate in the CIS Custom Union. A ‘Most Favoured Nation Trade Agreement’ (1993) regulated the US–Turkmen trade relationship. However, the two parties failed to finalise either a dual tax treaty or a bilateral investment treaty. Overall, access to the Turkmen market had proven difficult for foreign partners, largely because of Turkmenistan’s poor trade regulations and the Turkmen government’s superficial involvement in relation to international trade activities. The failure to diversify the industrial and agricultural production of Turkmenistan – as we have seen earlier in this chapter – reduced the likelihood of success for the Open Doors policy. As a consequence, Turkmenistan’s production patterns continued to limit the composition of Turkmen foreign trade. This suggests that Turkmen post-Soviet policy-makers had not effectively overcome the weaknesses of Soviet economic policy. The impact of insufficient structural reforms over the diversification of Turkmenistan’s exports and imports is quantified by Table 4.4, which analyses the evolution of the structure of trade for Turkmenistan between 1992 and 2003,59 by looking at a number of categories of products covering almost every sector of the national economy. The figures in Table 4.4 indicate that the structure of Turkmenistan’s trade had remained substantially unchanged since the conclusion of the Soviet era. Energy products continued to comprise the lion’s share in Turkmenistan’s exports, while food products and machinery represented the vast majority of the imports. Incidentally, Table 4.4 confirms what Table 4.2 suggested concerning the unaccomplished reconversion of Turkmenistan’s production patterns. An in-depth observation of the external performance of Turkmenistan’s textile sector sheds more light on the links between the shortcomings that occurred at the domestic level and the failure to carry out a trade diversification. The unsuccessful modernisation of the Turkmen textile sector resulted in the production of low-quality manufactured goods. Due to its generally poor quality, Turkmen cotton could not be exported at prices comparable to world standards. Only the export of textile products directed to the CIS was conducted at worldlevel prices. Bearing in mind the trade gains obtained by the Turkmen government in adjusting the price of gas to world standards, it followed that the export of cotton or textile manufactures did not produce the intended profits. Therefore, Turkmen textiles remained largely traded within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Furthermore, Table 4.4 clearly points out that the percentage of basic manufactured goods over the total imports steadily increased throughout the post-Soviet era, reinforcing the impression that the structure of the Turkmen total output remained confined within the first stage of production.

0.0 – – 85.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Exports

2.2

0.2 – 0.1 62.3 0.5 0.1 35.9 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.3

6.6 2.6 32.7 2.9 11.2

0.1 0.5 54.7

19.0 0.0 7.5 0.6 16.9 0.0

2.2 – 0.3 0.0 40.0 –

{

1993

0.8 0.5 0.6 78.7 0.6 0.0 17.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5

10.3 5.9 29.5 7.4 8.3

13.3 0.3 10.5 6.0 7.3 1.2

1994

0.3 0.1 0.2 72.6 0.6 0.0 25.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.6

6.4 12.0 26.1 4.3 6.0

12.2 0.3 13.9 6.2 11.3 1.3

1995

0.2 0.0 0.1 76.8 0.5 0.0 21.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.6

6.5 11.4 30.8 3.0 5.1

18.2 0.4 8.1 3.3 10.8 2.4

1996

}

}

3.7

–

–

–

1.6

0.0 83.8 0.9 9.9

0.2 83.9 1.2 13.4

0.2

0.4

6.5

0.9

5.0

32.7

–

6.5 4.8 10.1 27.2

–

12.1

0.7 4.8 10.3 26.7

1999

7.7

} 43.7

}

1998

1.8

0.6

–

0.0 91.3 0.4 5.6

0.3

5.9

43.8

–

1.4 2.0 8.4 27.6

10.3

2000

4.2

0.6

–

– 89.3 0.3 5.4

0.2

5.9

51.3

–

2.4 2.4 7.6 24.6

5.8

2001

4.3

0.6

–

0.0 88.6 1.0 5.3

0.1

14.1

40.5

–

3.3 2.3 9.9 23.9

5.9

2002

9.32

0.49

–

0.01 89.09 1.59 –

0.08

6.20

44.83

–

2.68 0.86 10.80 19.42

5.19

2003

Sources: Sodruzhestvo nezavisimykh gosudarstv – Statistichestikii Ezhegodnik, Moskva: Mezhdugosudarstvennyi Statistichestikii Komitet SNG, various editions, 1995–1997; Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, issued annually by the Statistical Department of the Asian Development Bank, various editions, 2000–2006.

Food products (vegetable) Food products (animal) Beverage and tobacco Crude materials (including oil) Chemicals Basic manufactures Textiles; manufactured textiles Non-precious metals Machines Transport equipment Unclassified goods

Food products (vegetable) Food products (animal) Beverage and tobacco Crude materials (including oil) Chemicals Basic manufactures Textiles; manufactured textiles Non-precious metals Machines Transport equipment Unclassified goods

Imports

1992

Table 4.4 Turkmenistan: structure of trade (1992–2003, % of total)

Economic foreign policy

77

The figures on import of food products contained in Table 4.4 appear particularly puzzling. Although the collection of reliable statistics on this issue is difficult, official data disseminated by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) lend weight to the conclusion that the Turkmen government was systematically providing untrustworthy figures on food imports, in order to underline the selfsufficiency60 reached by Turkmenistan in relation to food production.61 In 2002,62 the FAO estimated that a restricted list of twenty food products accounted for almost 6 per cent of the total Turkmen imports. Significant items, including bovine meat and numerous fruits and vegetables, were not included on the list. On the other hand, official Turkmen data indicated that all food products (including tobacco) represented approximately 9 per cent of the total Turkmen imports. On the basis of the FAO statistics and on data underlining the unachieved transformation of the structure of Turkmen production (sharp increases in cereal production did not necessarily imply general food selfsufficiency), it is possible to conclude that the complete list of food products imported by Turkmenistan in 2002 ought to account for approximately 13–14 per cent of total imports. There is no reasonable ground to think that this trend reversed after 2002. Unaltered production patterns also impinged upon the achievement of the second objective of the Open Doors policy: the diversification of the geographic dimension of Turkmen trade. Given that domestic economic reforms did not modify the composition of Turkmenistan’s exports, only the massive construction of new transport infrastructures (pipeline and gas ducts) could have resulted in a profound change in the trajectory of Turkmenistan’s exports. The next section in this chapter will establish that Turkmen policy-makers encountered little success in this regard. Consequently, no sensible variation in the destination of Turkmenistan’s exports seems to have emerged in the last decade. The data presented by Table 4.5 supports this conclusion. The table observes the quantitative evolution of Turkmenistan’s exports to three groups of countries. These were selected in order to assess more objectively the impact that old and new economic partnerships have over Turkmenistan’s trade. The first group contains Russia and Ukraine, which represent Turkmenistan’s old Soviet partners. The other two groups relate to a number of Turkmenistan’s economic partners that are not located in the post-Soviet area: the Islamic Republic of Iran, the People’s Republic of China and, to a lesser extent, Turkey are situated in Turkmenistan’s immediate neighbourhood, whereas the European Union is a more distant economic actor. Fluctuations over time in trade with each of the three groups pointed to substantial change in the geographic distribution of Turkmenistan’s trade. A number of significant conclusions can be drawn from Table 4.5. To begin with, there is no evidence of any substantial redirection of Turkmen exports. In fact, even though the share of trade exchanged with partners external to the postSoviet area grew from approximately 11.77 per cent in 1994 to 47.66 per cent in 2005, this growth was not complemented by a decrease in the trade exchanged with Russia and Ukraine, which accounted for the bulk of Turkmenistan’s

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Operational foreign policy

Table 4.5 Turkmenistan: destination of exports (1994–2005, US$ million, %) Total

Russia, Ukraine %

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

2010.0 1737.0 1693.0 751.4 593.5 1187.1 2505.2 2555.0 2815.8 3449.1 3400.5 4742.0

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Turkey, Iran, PRC

% 604.8 786.2 844.0 57.7 30.3 365.3 1194.2 1351.5 1369.0 1380.0 1729.2 2178.5

30.09 45.26 49.85 7.68 5.11 30.77 47.67 52.90 48.62 40.01 50.85 45.94

EU

% 95.0 12.6 98.0 178.5 258.8 293.3 432.0 429.4 524.7 736.6 762.2 979.3

4.73 0.73 5.79 23.76 43.61 24.71 17.24 16.81 18.63 21.36 22.41 20.65

% 141.6 93.3 86.6 71.0 139.0 202.0 201.0 224.0 358.0 504.0 949.0 1281.0

7.04 5.37 5.12 9.45 23.42 17.02 8.02 8.77 12.71 14.61 27.91 27.01

Sources: For the 1994-1996 data, see: Sodruzhestvo nezavisimykh gosudarstv – Statistichestikii Ezhegodnik, Moskva: Mezhdugosudarstvennyi Statistichestikii Komitet SNG, various editions, 1995–1997; for the 1997–1998 data, see: Turkmenistan: Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country Report no. 99/140, op. cit., p. 122; for the 2000–2005 data, see: Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, issued annually by the Statistical Department of the Asian Development Bank, various editions, 2000–2006; International Trade Statistics, issued annually by the World Trade Organization, various editions, 2002–2006.

exports to the CIS. At the end of 2005, the principal destinations of Turkmenistan’s exports remained essentially unchanged from 1994. Second, Table 4.5 pinpoints rather clearly that the geographical spread of Turkmenistan’s exports had paradoxically narrowed, as Turkmen goods were exported to an increasingly restricted group of countries. In fact, exports directed to the three groups of countries listed in Table 4.5 accounted for 41.86 per cent of total exports in 1994. Eleven years later this figure reached 93.60 per cent. Such figures mainly resulted from the drastic reduction of commerce exchanged by Turkmenistan with CIS countries other than Russia and Ukraine.63 Third, the data highlights the pivotal role played by the export of energy products in Turkmenistan’s trade system. The significant share of trade with Russia and Ukraine was composed almost entirely of energy products. More specifically, Ukraine was the major purchaser of Turkmenistan’s gas, and, at the end of 2004, exports to Ukraine represented almost half of the total merchandise exported by Turkmenistan. The controversy that arose in 1997 between the two countries over gas payments had an enormous impact upon Turkmenistan’s foreign trade: data on total exports reported a decrease of more than 50 per cent in one year (1996–1997), mainly as a result of the interruption of gas deliveries to Ukraine. This occurrence, which will be dealt with more extensively in later sections of this chapter, offers another strong indication of Turkmenistan’s dependence on gas exports. In any case, the data on exports to Ukraine underlines the unreliability of the statistics provided by the Turkmen government. According to official statistics

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79

disseminated by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine,64 a much more significant amount of Turkmen exports reached Ukraine in 2005. The Turkmen government claimed that in 2005 exports to Ukraine accounted for 44.72 per cent of Turkmenistan’s total exports (Table 4.5), while official Ukrainian statistics reported that, in the same year, the total volume of Turkmen exports to the Ukrainian state reached US$2678 million. This represented over 57 per cent of the total exports for Turkmenistan. The rationale behind the dissemination of unrealistic figures on exports was represented by the necessity of portraying, to external observers as well to the internal population, Turkmenistan as a successful economic actor that, due to the reforms implemented by the regime, was able to export a larger number of products to a larger number of partners. However, the main conclusion suggested by the data of Table 4.5 is that the mono-dimensional essence of Turkmenistan’s production patterns, predominantly based on the energy sector, had continued to limit Turkmenistan’s trade. In fact, both the drastic drop in Turkmenistan’s total exports that occurred in 1997–1998 and the simultaneous rapid rise of Iran as one of the most important economic partners for Turkmenistan were direct consequences of energy related occurrences, most notably the gas dispute with Ukraine and the completion (1997) of a small pipeline linking southern Turkmenistan and northern Iran. The analysis of Turkmenistan’s trade policy also requires that we consider the geographic origin of Turkmen imports. Table 4.6, which is designed with the identical methodology selected for Table 4.5, delineates a rather precise image of the provenance of Turkmen imports in the post-Soviet era. Table 4.6 Turkmenistan: origin of imports (1994–2005, US$ million, %) Total

Russia, Ukraine %

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

894.0 720.0 1313.5 1222.7 1007.3 1478.3 1787.8 2110.0 2127.9 2510.7 2950.3 2821.5

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Turkey, Iran, PRC

% 333.2 394.9 282.1 447.9 315.4 349.9 468.8 661.6 574.2 921.6 820.0 554.1

37.27 54.85 21.48 36.48 31.31 23.67 26.22 31.36 26.98 36.71 27.79 19.64

EU

% 43.2 31.6 176.5 204.6 173.2 333.3 360.6 344.8 424.1 434.5 440.7 519.1

4.83 4.39 13.64 16.67 15.23 22.95 20.17 16.34 19.93 17.31 14.94 18.40

% 93.5 29.6 141.6 160.0 177.0 222.0 222.0 141.0 439.0 556.0 734.0 597.0

10.46 4.11 10.78 13.03 17.57 15.02 12.42 6.68 20.63 22.15 24.88 21.66

Sources: For the 1994–1996 data, see: Sodruzhestvo nezavisimykh gosudarstv – Statistichestikii Ezhegodnik, Moskva: Mezhdugosudarstvennyi Statistichestikii Komitet SNG, various editions, 1995–1997; for the 1997–1998 data, see: Turkmenistan: Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country Report no. 99/140, op. cit., p. 122; for the 2000–2005 data, see: Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, issued annually by the Statistical Department of the Asian Development Bank, various editions, 2000–2006; International Trade Statistics, issued annually by the World Trade Organization, various editions, 2002–2006.

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Table 4.6 indicates that Russia and Ukraine had continued to occupy a significant role in the Turkmen import system, even though their combined percentage of Turkmenistan’s total imports had fallen by 18 per cent over the last ten years. In 2005, the Russian Federation still represented the largest source of Turkmenistan’s imports. Although the Turkmen government did not disseminate specific data on the geographic origin of the single categories of imports, there is reason to believe that Russia provided the overwhelming majority of the machinery and chemical products imported by Turkmenistan.65 Further, the data upon which Table 4.6 has been constructed suggests that, between 1994 and 2005, Turkmenistan’s imports from CIS trade partners had declined, while the import of EU products had grown by approximately 10 per cent. However, imports from regional actors (China, Turkey and Iran especially) did not markedly increase. This trend differentiates Turkmenistan from the other Central Asian republics, which had significantly expanded their trade with neighbouring actors (China, in particular) since the collapse of the Soviet Union.66 It is likely that the figures related to Turkmen imports from Iran, Turkey and China, which in 2005 accounted for 18.40 per cent of the total Turkmen imports, were inflated by the regime. The percentage of imports from China, Iran and Turkey may be more reasonably assessed at 9–10 per cent of total goods imported by Turkmenistan in 2005. Official data on Iranian exports provided by the Central Bank of Iran67 indicate a fluctuating trend in the evolution of Turkmenistan’s purchase of Iranian goods, whereas Turkmen data suggest a steady increase of this indicator since 1994. Data on imports from Turkey also appear unrealistic. Official statistics provided by Turkish governmental departments68 set the amount of Turkish goods imported by Turkmenistan in 2005 at US$181 million, 30 per cent less than the figures declared by the Turkmen government. Further, data on external economic activity provided from the ministry of commerce69 of the People’s Republic of China estimated the value of Chinese imports to Turkmenistan for 2005 at US$17.1 million: this figure accounted for less than 1 per cent of Turkmenistan’s total imports. Official data provided by the Turkmen government calculated total imports from China to be 3.5 per cent of total imports for 2005. The data that Table 4.6 has presented have been appropriately fabricated by the regime. One can reasonably assume that the motivation behind such misleading information is the perceived need to portray the Turkmen economy as a substantially reformed entity. As a consequence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the geographic distribution of Turkmenistan’s imports had not enlarged under the Open Doors policy. The statistical analysis presented here suggests that the unsuccessful transformation of Turkmenistan’s production patterns was the single most important factor contributing to the failure of the Open Doors policy. A substantially unchanged economic landscape could not support the ambitious trade policy developed by the Turkmen government in 1992. In 1998, the regime decided to abandon the Open Doors policy, though the decision had only a limited impact on Turkmenistan’s commercial relations. As Tables 4.5 and 4.6 indicate, even

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after 1998, Turkmenistan’s trade system remained unaltered. The abandonment of the Open Doors policy had greater visibility on a rhetorical level: after 1998, official propaganda ceased to refer to the Open Doors policy in its periodical accounts of Turkmenistan’s external trade.70

Turkmenistan’s energy policy Since the achievement of independence, the development of Turkmenistan’s energy sector had been limited by ‘lack of certainty in [. . .] export options’71 rather than by ‘capacity’.72 Table 4.7 identifies more precisely the quantitative dimension of Turkmenistan’s proved reserves of oil and natural gas, as reported by the Energy Information Administration. Quantitatively, Turkmen reserves are the second largest in the post-Soviet area (Russia’s being the first) and the eleventh in the world. For oil, Turkmenistan’s reserves are sufficient to satisfy the internal demand and, as a consequence, are exported only in small amounts. Geographically, oil fields are predominantly concentrated in the Cheleken peninsula (Balkan velayat), while several complexes under development are located in central Turkmenistan, close to the border between the Ahal and the Tashauz regions. Gas reserves, extracted in eastern Turkmenistan (Lebap and Mary velayatlar), are processed mainly in the giant complex of Dauletabad (Mary velayat), close to the Turkmen–Iranian border.73 Reportedly, the Turkmen sector of the Caspian Sea contains a significant portion of Turkmenistan’s hydrocarbon reserves. Natural gas is the cornerstone of Turkmenistan’s economic system, and, more importantly, it constitutes the core of Turkmenistan’s exports. However, the Turkmen government had not been able to translate the impressive energy potential into a significant source of revenues. Two factors, direct consequences of the industrial policies implemented by Soviet planners, seem to have impeded the take-off of the Turkmen gas sector. To begin with, the technology74 supporting the development of the Turkmen energy industry is lagging well behind world standards. Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, infrastructural constraints have limited the expansion of the exports of Turkmen natural gas. The interplay of these factors impacted negatively on the success of initiatives aimed at increasing the production of

Table 4.7 Turkmenistan: proved reserves of oil and natural gas (most recent estimates) Oil (billion barrels)

Natural Gas (trillion cubic feet)

BP Statistical Review (31.12.2005) 0.546

BP Statistical Review (31.12.2005) 102.370

Oil & Gas Journal (01.01.2007) 0.600

Cedigaz (01.01.2006) 102.414

Oil & Gas Journal (01.01.2007) 100.000

Source: Data retrievable at the official website of the Energy Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov/ emeu/international/reserves.xls, accessed on 26 June 2007.

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Turkmenistan’s energy resources. As indicated by the data presented in Table 4.2, Turkmenistan’s gas production for 2003 was less than the average figures for the late Soviet era. In order to overcome shortcomings in the energy industry inherited by the TSSR, the government of post-Soviet Turkmenistan decided to give particular emphasis to energy related issues while developing its own economic foreign policy paradigm. As previously argued, Turkmen officials identified two strategies to restructure the national energy sector: (1) ensuring a regular flow of foreign direct investment; (2) establishing new routes to export Turkmen gas. The flow of foreign capital into Turkmenistan was intended as a necessary pre-condition to sensible improvement in the technological level of Turkmenistan’s energy industry.75 Externally funded technical know-how was needed to expand the exploration and exploitation of the natural reserves located in Turkmenistan’s subsoil. From 1992 onwards, a limited amount of foreign capital entered Turkmenistan. Three factors76 contributed to Turkmenistan’s failure to attract substantial foreign investment. To begin with, foreign investors perceived the region surrounding Turkmenistan as generally unstable. Second, investments were discouraged by Turkmenistan’s limited export options. Third, the domestic investment climate was generally perceived as non-transparent. The repeated failure to decrease government control over the domestic economy was the principal disincentive.77 As Germana Canzi puts it, ‘the lack of transparency in official procedures, the endless bureaucratic red tape, the high turnover of personnel at levels of the system and the increasingly idiosyncratic behaviour of Niyazov’78 significantly prevented foreign companies from investing in Turkmenistan. Between 1992 and 1996, limited progress was made in the attraction of foreign direct investment into Turkmenistan. Extensive legal reforms were introduced in the organisation of the energy sector. The new legal framework approved in March 1997 attempted to increase the participation of foreign actors79 in the development of Turkmenistan’s energy sector, although the Turkmen government retained a 51 per cent share in every new joint venture.80 On the basis of the small success resulting from the adoption of these reforms, the Turkmen government decided to go further in cooperation with the European Programme TACIS.81 The ‘Rules and Regulations for the Development of Hydrocarbon Fields of Turkmenistan’, officially issued in October 199982 were explicitly designed to expand the opportunities for investment in Turkmenistan. However, Table 4.8 shows that, despite the adoption of new legal measures, the flow of external capital did not increase after 1999. Paradoxically, the main reason for the failure to secure a stable inflow of foreign investments into Turkmenistan has to do with the provisions contained in legislation adopted in 1997 and 1999. Here, we see an underlying inconsistency. On the one hand, the new laws helped to modify the Turkmen investment climate. On the other, they failed to achieve a substantial decrease in the control83 enjoyed by the Turkmen government over the energy sector and did not therefore address the main obstacle to foreign investment.

118 –

170 –20

2001 100 –176

2002 100 –126

2003 –15 –

2004 62 –

2005

■ 10.6 –

1990–2000 (avg.)

15.2 –1.8

2001

8.1 –14.3

2002

6.3 –8.0

2003

As a percentage of gross fixed capital formation

–1.0 –

2004

3.7

2005

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report (various editions), retrievable at the official website of the UNCTAD (www.unctad.org/wir), accessed on 26 June 2007.

Inwards Outwards

1990–2000 (avg.)

US$ million

Table 4.8 Turkmenistan: foreign direct investment overview (selected years, $ million, per cent )

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The Turkmen government lacked no opportunity to claim rhetorically84 that the correct implementation of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality had encouraged the participation of foreign financial actors in the economic activities of Turkmenistan.85 However, these statements regularly failed to clarify the exact mechanism through which Turkmen neutralism contributed to an improvement in the national investment climate. Lack of clarity in declaratory statements was also accompanied by contradictory operational strategies. The Turkmen economic landscape, at the end of 2007, remained generally unwelcoming for foreign investors. The US embassy in Ashgabat described Turkmenistan’s investment climate as follows: Turkmenistan has a generally closed investment climate. Decisions to allow foreign investment are often politically driven; companies from ‘friendly’ countries are more successful in winning tenders and signing contracts. [. . .] The Government of Turkmenistan has a history of capricious and arbitrary expropriation of the property of local businesses and individuals. The government has often refused to pay any compensation, much less fair market value, when exercising ‘the right of eminent domain.’ A current project to widen Ashgabat’s streets is an example; hundreds of homes and some local businesses have been destroyed in the course of ‘city beautification’. Homeowners were given short notice and little, if any, compensation for loss of their dwellings. Foreign investors have not been exempt from such acts. (‘Turkmenistan: 2007 Investment Climate Statement’)86 A general reluctance to introduce economic reforms also limited the flow of multilateral aid. International financial organisations regularly considered Turkmenistan’s unreformed economic landscape as the major obstacle to increased cooperation with the national government.87 Since 1992, the activities of the World Bank in Turkmenistan had been limited to the completion of three financed projects of technical assistance. After 1997, the World Bank offered its support for three more projects, but the Turkmen government decided not to approve their implementation. Subsequently, the World Bank decided to cease any form of cooperation with Turkmenistan. The Turkmen government joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 22 September 1992. As of December 2007, however, there is no evidence of the Fund’s intention of financing projects in Turkmenistan. Cooperation with European financial institutions has proven more successful for Turkmenistan. In the 1990s, the TACIS programme, sponsored by the European Union, granted Turkmenistan approximately C20 million,88 mainly for technical assistance.89 In 2002–2004, Turkmenistan ‘received some C2 million per year in assistance from the European Union, increasing to C4 million per annum under the Indicative Programme for 2005–2006’.90 In the first time frame, European funds were used largely to foster sustainable rural development in Turkmenistan and to

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support economic reforms. After 2005, EU assistance opted to improve the level of technical education in the Turkmen state. Turkmenistan joined the Asian Development Bank in August 2000. Since its accession to the Manila-based international organisation, the Turkmen government received financial assistance for only two projects. The first, approved in 2002, focused on the construction of a road linking the cities of Atamurat and Imamnazar, located in the Lebap velayat. The second project provided assistance to the Turkmen government to improve the methodology of the Turkmen Statistical Institute. Moreover, the ADB provided Turkmenistan with a detailed report about the feasibility of the Trans-Afghan pipeline.91 The failure to secure the regular flow of foreign investment into Turkmenistan had a negative impact on the establishment of new routes for the export of Turkmen gas. For the Turkmen government, expanding the geographic dimension of Turkmenistan’s gas exports essentially meant overcoming the infrastructural constraints inherited from the USSR. In Soviet times, the export of Turkmen gas was channelled into the Soviet ‘steel umbilical cord’,92 a unified pipeline system, which encompassed the whole territory of the USSR. The Soviet pipeline system is depicted in Figure 4.1. The gas produced in the TSSR was processed mainly in complexes located near Mary and Nebit-Dag,93 and pumped to the European zone of the USSR through the Central Asia–Centre (CAC) pipeline, which crossed the territories of three republics: the Uzbek SSR, the Kazakh SSR and the RSFSR. There, it

Figure 4.1 The USSR pipeline system (source: USSR Energy Atlas, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1985, p. 32).

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connected to the Siberia-to-Western Europe natural gas duct,94 which allowed Soviet-produced gas to reach the satellite states of eastern Europe and, eventually, the western part of the European continent. The CAC pipeline was built in different stages between 1960 and 1974. Its Turkmen section is divided into two main branches: one carries gas extracted in eastern Turkmenistan and southern Uzbekistan in a north-western direction and the other pumps natural gas extracted in western Turkmenistan northwards. The two branches meet in western Kazakhstan where they proceed northwards to enter the Russian pipeline network. The CAC’s total length is approximately 13500 km as the combined capacity of the system is 90 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year.95 After the collapse of the USSR, energy trade in the post-Soviet area continued to make use of this pipeline, which de facto fell under control of the Russian Federation. From 1992 onwards, the Turkmen state found itself surrounded by resources-rich neighbours (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Iran), which did not need to import energy.96 Exporting energy to destinations located in the European part of the former USSR became a vital objective for Turkmenistan. Gas exports were therefore destined for distant partners, located mostly within the CIS borders. Of these, Ukraine was by far the most important. The peculiar geographical structure of its gas trade made Turkmenistan ‘entirely dependent on the Russian pipeline system’,97 whose direct administration was handed over to Gazprom, the national gas company of the Russian Federation. Russia’s monopoly over the transit of gas in the post-Soviet area forced the Turkmen government into the automatic acceptance of Moscow’s price policy. Between 1992 and 1996, Turkmenistan and Gazprom concluded a number of unsatisfactory gas agreements. Slow payments from the customers forced Gazprom to delay its payments to Turkmenistan, and the Turkmen government was overall unsatisfied with the prices set in the deals.98 After the 1997–1998 export quarrel between Turkmenistan and Ukraine, Russia’s policy price became even harsher: Gazprom began to pay Turkmenistan only US$32–36 per 1000 cm of gas imported and, eventually, sold Turkmen gas to Ukraine, Western Europe and Turkey at much higher prices.99 Total reliance on the old Soviet pipeline system also forced Turkmenistan to establish trade relationships with partners whose economic situations were at best precarious. To begin with, Turkmenistan’s gas trade was predominantly performed on a barter basis, due to the partners’ inability to make payments in hard currency. This greatly limited the opportunity to convert gas revenues into liquid funds to improve the Turkmen energy industry. Further, the importers of Turkmen gas were not in a position to produce regular payments. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and, to a greater extent, Ukraine were each, between 1992 and 1997, insolvent in their dealings with Turkmenistan. In early 1997, their overall arrears to the Turkmen government reached US$1.2 billion.100 Turkmenistan’s biggest debtor was Ukraine, which, between late 1996 and March 1997 alone, accumulated arrears of US$302.6 million.101 Kyiv’s insolvency became systemic in late 1996, when two developments ultimately compromised Ukraine’s ability to comply regularly with payments. To begin with, in 1996, Turkmenistan’s total gas deliveries to

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Ukraine (19.0 bcm) inadvertently surpassed the contracted amount (15.0 bcm). Second, the price of Turkmen gas (as delivered at the Ukrainian border) increased to US$80 per 1000 cm, while in 1995 it was set at US$65 per 1000 cm. The Ukrainian government had to pay a higher price for a larger amount of gas, and this proved impossible. The Turkmen government opted in March 1997 to cut off gas shipments to Ukraine. Turkmenistan’s unilateral decision to suspend gas shipments to Ukraine had a negative impact over the Turkmen energy industry. At the same time, it provoked a general realignment in the post-Soviet energy market. Total interruption of energy trade with Ukraine, which lasted until December 1998, resulted in the sharp decrease in Turkmenistan’s gas production reported in Table 4.2. Moreover, Turkmenistan registered a negative trade balance in both 1997 and 1998. As the Turkmen government ceased to deliver natural gas to its principal customer, revenues from gas exports, constituting the major income source for Turkmenistan, were drastically reduced. This affected the Turkmen economy at large. In 1998, the Turkmen government wanted to conclude a new agreement with Ukraine, for the resumption of gas deliveries. However, no negotiation could be successful without Moscow’s prior approval, given the transit monopoly enjoyed by Moscow vis-à-vis the Turkmen–Ukrainian gas trade. After long negotiations, a deal was finally struck in December 1998,102 when Ukraine agreed to purchase approximately 20 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan, at US$36 per 1000 cm. Russia’s companies Gazprom and Itera played a key role in this agreement, taking responsibilities for the transit of the gas. Although the Turkmen government was not entirely satisfied with the price set by the deal, the 1998 agreement was as convenient for the two signatories as it was for Russia. Turkmenistan re-established its gas exports and ensured a steady flow of revenues; Ukraine temporarily satisfied its internal energy demand, while Russia reinforced its economic leverage over the two post-Soviet states. However, the circumstances that led to the conclusion of the agreement forced Turkmenistan to accelerate the construction of new infrastructure to diversify the geography of its gas exports. New gas pipelines were intended to diminish Russia’s monopoly over the transit of Turkmen gas exports. A multifaceted and multi-directional pipeline policy would have allowed Turkmenistan to exports its gas in three directions: south, east and west. Turkmen officials identified five major pipeline projects (‘Trans-Afghan, Trans-far-Eastern, TransEuropean, Iranian and Trans-Caspian’103) to expand the geographical structure of Turkmenistan’s gas trade and ‘ensure quantitative increase of volumes and world energy supply diversification, [and] provide an opportunity to stabilize and secure international energy distribution’.104 Figure 4.2 gives details of the routes, length, estimated capacity and the likely costs of Turkmenistan’s principal projected pipelines. Cooperation with the other member states of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) represented a focal point in Turkmenistan’s pipeline policy.105 Turkmenistan has tried to involve at least one ECO member in every pipeline plan and Niyazov repeatedly underlined that Turkmenistan’s pipeline

Figure 4.2 Turkmenistan: overview of pipeline projects (source: P. Mathieu and C.R. Shiells, ‘The Commonwealth of Independent States’ troubled energy sectors’, Finance & Development, 2002, 39 (3)).

Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey Route: Turkmenbashi, via Iran, linking with the Turkish natural gas pipeline system and, then, in Bulgaria, with the European system Length: 3870 km (to the Bulgarian border) Estimated capacity: 23 bcm/year (2005) 30 bcm (2010) Estimated costs: $7.85 billion

Trans-Far Eastern (also known as Turkmenistan–China) Route: Turkmenistan to Central China via Xinjiang Planned extension to Japan. Length: 6700 km to China, at least 8000 km to Japan Estimated capacity: 30 bcm/year Estimated costs: US$10–20 billion

Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) Route: Turkmenbashi , via Baku and Tbilisi to Erzurum, linking with Turkish natural gas pipeline system Length: 1800 km Estimated capacity: 16–30 bcm/year Estimated costs: US$2–3 billion

Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (TAP) (also known as Centgas) Route: Dauletabad via Herat to Multan (Pakistan) Planned extension to India Length: 1400 km to Multan (additional 675 km to India) Estimated capacity: 20 bcm/year Estimated costs: > US$3 billion

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projects always conformed to ECO programmes.106 In practice, Turkmenistan used this organisation as a launching-pad to foster bilateral intra-regional cooperation in energy infrastructure. These activities were not carried out under the official umbrella of ECO.107 Although ‘it is wrong to belittle the achievements and dismiss all plans as unrealisable’,108 it ought to be remarked that Turkmenistan’s pipeline policies encountered little success: to date, none of the pipelines described in Figure 4.2 has gone beyond the planning stage. Germana Canzi pointed out that the finalisation of these projects had been complicated by ‘political constraints and technical problems’.109 The political factors relate directly to the internal inconsistencies that permeated the implementation of Turkmenistan’s pipeline policy. It is therefore possible to suggest that the Turkmen regime itself held significant responsibility for the unsuccessful enlargement of Turkmenistan’s pipeline system. In this sense, Turkmenistan’s pipeline policy was seen as an important contributor to the stabilisation of the Turkmen regime. This conclusion is supported by the analysis of the dynamics that prevented the successful completion of the different pipelines projected by the Turkmen regime. The Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline (TAP) traditionally represented the preferred export route by Turkmen officials.110 Preliminary talks on the project began as early as 1993. In the mid-1990s, Argentine energy giant Bridas and US-based firm UNOCAL showed interest in the realisation of this project, but eventually withdrew.111 The rise of the Taliban regime slowed down the pace of negotiations aimed at determining more concretely the feasibility of the pipeline. In late 2001, operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ removed the leadership of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: under the Karzai Administration, talks on the TAP gathered momentum and culminated in the adoption of a tri-partite declaration of intent, which reportedly ushered in a new era in the development of this project.112 Incidentally, the long and unfruitful negotiations to finalise the TAP epitomised Turkmenistan’s ‘triangular diplomacy’, which, according to Turkmen officials, was an innovative approach to Turkmenistan’s international relations. Niyazov described trilateral diplomacy as necessary when ‘we discuss those forms of cooperation, which, so to say, have something to do with a specific situation’.113 Turkmenistan’s attitude to the TAP negotiations suggests that triangular diplomacy was not pursued with determination. After the 2002 memorandum, the ADB issued a report on the feasibility of the pipeline, in which a generally positive tone encouraged the parties to intensify their efforts to advance the project.114 More specifically, two factors contributed to slow progress. To begin with, security matters impinged heavily upon the actual feasibility of the TAP: the projected route had to cross Afghanistan, running through highly unstable areas, including the environs of Herat and Kandahar.115 Even after the fall of the Taliban regime, neither the Karzai government nor the international troops stationed in Afghanistan were able to deliver security in these areas. Similar concerns also applied to the Pakistani segment of the pipeline, which had to cross the increasingly unstable region of Baluchistan.

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Second, it is generally accepted that India, and not Pakistan, would be the most likely market for the gas exported through the TAP. Besides reasonable doubts on geopolitical factors (‘Will India buy the gas that will come to it from Pakistan?’),116 the appeal that the pipeline could have over the Indian market is a matter of difficult judgement. India’s potentiality as a significant gas market is yet to be explored.117 Moreover, even if the Indian demand for gas could be established, geographically closer exporters (Iran and most Gulf states) would have easier access to the Indian subcontinent.118 It is nevertheless the case that, in the post-BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) era, the Indian government has expressed increasing interest in the TAP.119 In the late Niyazov era, the quadripartite negotiations for the TAP gathered new momentum. On 14 February 2006,120 the Energy Ministers of Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, and senior ADB representatives met in Ashgabat to discuss the outcome of the international audit of 13 February 2006, which confirmed that the reserves of the Dauletabad gas site accounted for 4.5 trillion cm.121 Nevertheless, no practical development followed from the February 2006 talks, and, as of December 2007, construction works for the TAP had not started and funding remained elusive. The Trans-Caspian gas pipeline (TCGP) received constant US support, especially during the second Clinton administration, which considered this project as capable of reducing Russia’s and Iran’s influence over Turkmenistan.122 As the US government committed to fund most expenses for the TCGP, the Turkmen government signed two joint-venture agreements with Western consortia,123 in order to obtain the technical support needed to carry out the project. Negotiations were successfully concluded in November 1999 when, after five months of intense diplomatic activities performed by James Wolf (US Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy), the four states involved in the TCGP (Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey) signed an intergovernmental declaration in which they reaffirmed ‘their readiness to realise the TCGP and start gas exports to Turkey in 2002’.124 In 2000, negotiating processes underwent a number of sudden changes that reduced the concrete likelihood that construction works would begin. The discovery of significant gas reserves in the offshore Azeri field of Shah-Deniz led the government of Azerbaijan to diminish its commitment to the TCGP substantially, in order to channel as many resources as possible into the development of the newly discovered reserves. After the declaration of November 1999, the Turkmen government abruptly reduced its own involvement in the project. Although several observers identified in Niyazov’s behaviour the main motive behind Turkmenistan’s diminished interest in the TCGP,125 the leader’s erratic personality cannot be considered as the only significant variable in the equation. In fact, Ashgabat and Washington developed substantially diverging views regarding the scope and aims of the TCGP. The interest showed by the United States towards the project has to be understood as an essential part of the ‘Dual Containment’ policy, designed by the Clinton administration to isolate, politically as well as economically, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The TCGP was there-

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fore meant to bypass Iran, which, according to the US official position, was competing with Turkmenistan ‘for the lucrative Turkish market’.126 Turkmenistan concluded that the United States ‘looked at the problem of Turkmen gas exports as an issue of secondary importance, being resolved to use the project to consolidate its influence in the region’.127 As the TCGP progressively became a geo-strategic tool in Washington’s hand, the Turkmen regime made the judgement that any continuing commitment to the project could have drastic repercussions for Turkmenistan’s gas trade at large. The Turkmen relationship with Iran, which had noticeably improved after the completion of the Korpeje–Kurt Kui gas pipeline, would inevitably deteriorate. Moreover, Turkmenistan’s enthusiastic participation in a US-sponsored project could have jeopardised the finalisation of a major export agreement between Moscow and Ashgabat. News items carried in the official Turkmen press seems to confirm the impression that the Turkmen government always intended to keep a low profile on the TCGP, to avoid negative reactions in Russia and Iran. The grandiose tones that normally accompanied the negotiations for the development of the TAP did not feature in reports describing the progress made on the TCGP project.128 In conclusion, the actual opportunities to carry out the TCGP project decreased after 2000 and, most certainly, were definitively shelved by the complete withdrawal of Royal Dutch/Shell from the project (March 2003).129 Unlike the TAP and the TCGP, the other two major pipeline projects in which Turkmenistan has been involved since the collapse of the USSR had always lacked feasibility. Extremely high costs have so far hampered the finalisation of the Trans-far Eastern pipeline. Some initial steps were nevertheless taken: in the early 1990s Mitsubishi and Exxon did perform a feasibility study for this project,130 and the Chinese government made plans for the construction of a Trans-China gas pipeline,131 to which the Trans-far Eastern gas duct could connect. However, finding partners ready to spend more than US$10 billion on the project has proven difficult. At the same time, Turkmenistan, eager to find quick solutions to its export problem, progressively lost interest in the project. In the late Niyazov era, the prospect of expanding the Trans-far Eastern pipeline to Japan lost much of its relevance and the Turkmen government preferred, instead, to engage in bilateral talks with China to revive the idea of exporting Turkmen gas eastwards. In April 2006, during an official visit to Beijing, Niyazov signed a 30-year gas deal with the Chinese government.132 According to the provisions of the agreement, due to operate from 2009, the Turkmen government committed to sell to China 30 million bcm of natural gas per year, through a gas pipeline whose construction works were to be started in late 2006.133 In August 2006, Niyazov reaffirmed that the pipeline would be ready by 2009.134 These developments notwithstanding, several observers continued to express doubts about the overall feasibility of the process.135 As of late 2007, however, factual progress has not followed from negotiations and the Trans-far Eastern pipeline remains a ‘castle on sand’.136 A number of factors impeded the realisation of the Turkmenistan–Iran–

92 Operational foreign policy Turkey pipeline. First, the projected route had to cross unstable areas, namely the Iranian and Turkish regions of the larger Kurdistan. Second, the three parties involved did not possess large financial resources. Therefore, financial reliance on external partners was a necessary pre-condition to advance the project. As the Iranian involvement automatically excluded the participation of both US public and private partners, it looks increasingly unlikely that any European or British firm could participate in this project.137 The Turkmen government, despite the total lack of concrete steps towards the finalisation of this pipeline, opted to give great publicity to even the smallest step along the way. Niyazov ‘prematurely held a ground-breaking ceremony for this project’,138 repeatedly mentioned it in his speeches,139 and the official press loudly celebrated the signature of a preliminary memorandum between Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey.140 The only achievement of Turkmenistan’s energy policy is represented by the finalisation of a minor project carried out with substantial Iranian aid. In December 1997, Niyazov and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammed Khatami, celebrated the completion of a small natural gas pipeline linking Korpeje (Balkan velayat) and Kurt Kui (northern Iran).141 Figure 4.3 describes the route of this pipeline

Figure 4.3 Turkmenistan (2007): completed natural gas pipelines (source: M. Brill Olcott, ‘International gas trade in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Iran, Russia and Afghanistan’, in Victor, D.G., Jaffe, A.M. and Hayes, M.H. (eds), Natural Gas and Geopolitics from 1970 to 2040, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 204).

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and, at the same time, offers a more detailed outline of the CAC pipeline, which, to date, is the major export route for Turkmen gas. Although Turkmen propaganda regularly portrayed the completion of the Korpeje–Kurt Kui project as a benchmark in Turkmenistan’s energy development, the impact of the pipeline on Turkmenistan’s gas trade remains relatively ‘modest’.142 To begin with, the pipeline’s length was only 200 km. Further, its capacity was extremely limited: the gas trade between the two parties was regulated by a 1995 agreement, which had fixed the pipeline peak capacity at 8 bcm per year.143 The amount of Turkmen gas exported annually to Iran never reached this figure: ‘in 1999 only 1.5 bcm were moved, the figure for 2000 being two billion (instead of four billion, as per the original plan)’.144 Total gas pumped through this pipeline amounted to 4 bcm in 2001145 and 6.5 bcm in 2003.146 Finally, the payment system regulating the export of Turkmen gas to Iran had not allowed the Turkmen state to make substantial profits from the construction of the pipeline. Iran financed 90 per cent of the total costs (US$190 million): however, this loan applied exclusively to the Turkmen section (140 km) of the pipeline. Turkmenistan was committed to paying back this sum in gas deliveries, over a three-year period. As the pipeline did not work at full capacity, it is possible to infer that the Turkmen government had yet to make full repayment of the loan. The Korpeje–Kurt Kui pipeline did not solve Turkmenistan’s export problem, and its role in the Central Asian energy context remains marginal. The irrelevance of the Korpeje–Kurt Kui pipeline notwithstanding, Turkmen officials continued to consider gas trade with Iran as crucial for Turkmenistan’s economic prospects.147 Such statements, however, should be treated as largely rhetorical, since the energy policy carried out by Turkmenistan in the early 2000s did nothing but reinforce Moscow’s hegemony over Turkmen gas. As of December 2007, Turkmenistan’s gas was still almost entirely pumped through the Gazprom pipeline, which in the preceding few years transported over 90 per cent of Turkmenistan’s gas exports. In this sense, Turkmenistan’s energy policy, originally designed to break out from Moscow’s stronghold, failed substantially.

Conclusion: the impact of internal factors on Turkmenistan’s economic foreign policy This chapter has argued that the persistent failure to reform Turkmenistan’s domestic economy seriously impaired the achievement of several economic foreign policy objectives. In particular, political instability did not encourage foreign economic actors to invest in Turkmenistan and prevented the major international financial organisation to pledge donors to the Turkmen government. Furthermore, unaltered production patterns did not support the ambitious trade policy designed by the government. Finally, the Turkmen government decided to break Russia’s monopoly over the transit of its energy resources by becoming involved in pipeline projects whose completion proved difficult, and, in a number of cases, extremely unlikely. However, a deeper appreciation of Turkmenistan’s policy-making cannot rest

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on a mere assessment of the correlation between ‘intended objectives/actual outcomes’. De-contextualising the analysis of Turkmenistan’s economic foreign policy from the dynamics of the regime evolution that occurred during the 1990s complicates the comprehension of Turkmen economic foreign policy enormously. As this chapter has suggested, Turkmen propaganda established a direct link between the introduction of domestic economic reforms and the success of the ‘Economic section’ of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. It is, however, reasonable to raise doubts about the regime’s genuine intention to create effective reform in the national economy, even in the early post-independence era. As numerous Western scholars148 have argued, reformist programmes had been usually redirected by the Turkmen government towards necessities of regime consolidation. In 1993–1994, the regime began to perceive economic stagnation149 as a crucial element to favour the consolidation of its internal position. Accordingly, the Turkmen government appeared to have deliberately150 slowed down the pace of economic reforms.151 After 1997–1998, reforming the national economy became a purely rhetorical objective.152 An unreformed domestic economy could not, in turn, effectively support the ambitious economic foreign policy designed by the regime. There is therefore reasonable ground to presume that, after 1997–1998, the ‘Economic section’ of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was subjected to a complete reorganisation, primarily focused on a redefinition of the objectives the policy had to accomplish. It is important to remark that no official publication on foreign policy and, most significantly, no statement issued by national officials, hinted at this revision. Its emergence, therefore, can only be inferred by observing the operational stage of economic foreign policy. Chronologically, it seems reasonable to locate the threshold in 1997–1998. In those two years, three important events took place. To begin with, the Turkmen regime began to evolve towards more extreme forms of authoritarianism. Second, the quarrel between Turkmenistan and Ukraine over gas payments convinced the Turkmen regime to reconsider its perception of Moscow’s hegemonic position in the post-Soviet energy market. Finally, Turkmen officials drew a similar conclusion from the disastrous impact that Russia’s financial crisis had over Turkmenistan in 1998. The domestic economic stagnation required by the evolution of the regime was mirrored by increasing immobility in the international economic arena: in this sense, the regime selected a precise economic scenario in which to place its own international consolidation. The political tool that had to oversee the concrete realisation of this scenario was the ‘Economic section’ of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, which had then to accomplish objectives totally opposite to those it had to pursue at the moment of its original design. Prior to 1997–1998, Turkmen neutralism was designed to facilitate Turkmenistan’s interaction with external economic partners. After the revision of the regime’s priorities, the doctrine began to be more regularly interpreted as a tool with which to diminish Turkmenistan’s involvement in international economic activities. Interestingly,

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changes in the operational targets of this section of the doctrine were not accompanied by significant revisions of its declaratory segment. Turkmenistan’s participation in economic activities at international level was sensibly reduced, and the Turkmen state engaged exclusively in basic economic partnerships aimed at maintaining the regular flow of revenues from gas exports, which constituted a vital element for the regime. It can be stated that, from 1997–1998 onwards, Turkmenistan’s economic foreign policy was constantly redefined around energy issues, as its other dimensions were progressively abandoned. The data on the structure of Turkmenistan’s exports (Table 4.4) confirmed the prominence of energy products in the Turkmen trade system. Furthermore, the propaganda continued to emphasise with regularity the central role occupied by energy issues in Turkmenistan’s economic foreign policy.153 Disentanglement, however, could not be total, as the level of gas exports had to be maintained relatively constant. In this sense, economic foreign policy had to make the careful selection of a restricted number of partners with which entertain basic economic relations. Russia emerged as the most viable option for the Turkmen regime. In the first part of the 1990s, loosening the economic ties with Moscow was considered necessary in order to decrease Turkmenistan’s dependency on external sources of economic power. From 1997–1998, Turkmenistan began to look at fruitful economic cooperation with Moscow as a necessary step to strengthen the strategic alliance with Russia, which de facto became the international patron of the increasingly sultanistic Turkmen regime. The importance attributed by the Turkmen regime to the negotiations aimed at finalising a new energy agreement with Russia was the single most important factor confirming the impression that a substantive change in the Turkmen conceptualisation of Russia’s role occurred in the late 1990s. From 1999 onwards, Turkmenistan implemented an increasingly erratic energy policy: the Turkmen government abruptly abandoned the TCGP project, but did not take significant steps to accelerate the development of the TAP. In short, little was done to dilute Russia’s leverage over the transit of Turkmen gas. On the contrary, the two parties come closer together, a trend that culminated (April 2003) in a 25-year agreement on gas exports.154 The deliberate choice made by the Turkmen regime to accept the transit monopoly exerted by Gazprom until 2025 clearly indicates that the Turkmen regime had changed its perception of Russia’s role in Turkmenistan’s energy trade and assigned to the Kremlin a critical role in Turkmenistan’s external relations. This had a paradoxical impact on the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Changes in Turkmen operational foreign policy did not stem from a recasting of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality; instead they were instigated by constant preoccupation with factors, internal as well as external, likely to increase the stability of the Turkmen regime. The proposition that ‘Turkmenistan sought to remain aloof and neutral with respect to all relationships that might be risky or costly and to remain engaged and positive with respect to all relationships that might be beneficial or

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reliable’,155 is no doubt an accurate one. What this chapter has argued is that the Turkmen regime revolutionised its perception of what could damage or enhance its stability. More specifically, Russia’s influence, initially considered detrimental by Niyazov and his associates, was increasingly viewed as an essential source of support for Turkmenistan. The policy of Positive Neutrality had to adjust to this new political reality.

5

Neutrality as equidistance from sources of dependency Russo-Turkmen relations in the post-Soviet era

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reinterpretation of the relationship between the former centre (the Russian Federation) and the former periphery (the other 14 republics) of the Union occupied a crucial position in the foreign policy paradigms of the 15 post-Soviet states. The demise of the USSR radically transformed this relationship: what once constituted an intra-Union affair suddenly became a matter of international relations. In determining the content of these relations, post-Soviet foreign policy-makers had therefore to take into consideration new needs and priorities, no longer linked with the necessity of preserving the USSR or facilitating its advancement, but exclusively tied to the specific interests of the newly emerging political entities. A number of factors endogenous to the conceptualisation of Russian foreign policy negatively affected Russia’s interaction with the former Soviet periphery. In the post-Soviet era, Russian policy-makers encountered significant difficulty in developing a coherent foreign policy system. Inevitably, this impinged upon the establishment of fruitful and long-lasting cooperative interaction with the former Soviet republics, regardless of the dimension (multilateral and/or bilateral) in which these relations developed. A similar dynamic emerged in relation to foreign policy formulation in the other successor states of the USSR, though they responded by selecting divergent approaches to their relationship with the Russian Federation. The three newly independent states of the Baltic region (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) decided to identify integration with Western Europe as the primary objective of their foreign policies, and minimised the significance of any continuing interaction with the former Soviet Union. A number of republics (Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine) also tried to emancipate themselves from Moscow, but for different reasons found it necessary to participate in the activities of the CIS. Conversely, most post-Soviet political elites decided not to cut the umbilical cord between their states and Russia, and, initially at least, extended enthusiastic support to the CIS. At first, Turkmenistan situated itself in the latter category. After 1993, however, the Turkmen government modified its attitude to multilateral cooperation in the post-Soviet region, becoming one of the strongest opponents on the grounds that CIS reinforcement would violate the policy of neutrality as endorsed by the United Nations.

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The analysis presented in this chapter is focused on the relationship between Russia and Turkmenistan. It develops the concluding observations of Chapter 4, which suggested that domestic consideration redirected Turkmenistan’s policy towards Russia. The aim here is to examine the impact of domestic imperatives upon the policy of Positive Neutrality to highlight how medium-term objectives were revised by Turkmen foreign policy-makers in response to pressures internal to the Turkmen domestic political landscape. For this purpose, a holistic approach has been selected to analyse the bilateral relationship. Four different evolutionary processes (mutual perceptions, developments in domestic politics, foreign policy trends and changes in the regional geopolitics) will be taken into account in characterising and explaining the fluctuating Russo-Turkmen relationship. The first section of the chapter will examine whether the foreign policies of the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan conceived the Russo-Turkmen relationship in a divergent or convergent perspective, and will then go on to determine the evolution of Russo-Turkmen mutual perceptions in the period 1992–1995. This chronological delineation is not accidental, as both processes occurred simultaneously. The most significant shifts in the perception of Russia’s posture towards the CIS area occurred in the first four years of the post-Soviet era when Kozyrev occupied the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1992–1995, as we noted in Chapter 1, the Turkmen diplomatic elite conceived, promoted and finally obtained international recognition for the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The focus will then move to the economic, political and military dimensions of the post-Soviet Russo-Turkmen relationship. As the relationship developed both multilaterally and bilaterally, its discussion has to take into account both stages of interaction. Our analysis will then go on to discuss Turkmenistan’s membership in the CIS. Chronologically, this particular investigation will focus mostly on the period between 1992 and 1995. Two factors explain this periodisation. To begin with, Turkmenistan’s participation in the integrationist initiatives promoted by the CIS was limited largely to that period. Further, it was only in the first four years of the post-Soviet era that the member states of the CIS debated and fostered meaningful forms of economic, political and military cooperation. The final section will describe Turkmenistan’s bilateral relations with the Russian Federation, by looking at developments in political, economic and military cooperation spread across the entire Niyazov era. The state of the Russo-Turkmen relationship in 2007 will be discussed in Chapter 7, which aims at examining Turkmenistan’s foreign policy in the post-Niyazov era in greater detail.

Shifting paradigms: Russo-Turkmen mutual perceptions in the Kozyrev era Immediately after independence, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs encountered similar difficulties to those experienced by the other former Soviet republics. Solving structural problems was to some extent eased by the fact that

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the Russian foreign ministry inherited almost in toto the structures of the Soviet MID. This facilitated the recruitment of qualified personnel entrusted with the task of overseeing Russia’s international relations and the establishment of diplomatic representation abroad.1 On the other hand, the Russian MID had to overcome a number of obstacles in the formulation of an independent foreign policy. Russian foreign policy-making in the 1990s seemed ‘caught in an identity crisis’2 which lasted throughout El’tsin’s first term in office. This identity crisis greatly complicated the identification of a precise position in which to place the region known as the ‘near abroad’ within the Russian foreign policy paradigm. Alternative foreign policy visions resulted in shifting policy orientations. In the long run, this prevented Russia from producing a coherent operational foreign policy in relation to the post-Soviet regions, and ultimately contributed to a dilution of Moscow’s leverage over the former periphery of the Union. Central Asia and Turkmenistan, more specifically, were not an exception to this norm. At the same time, Russia’s shifting policies towards the near abroad had serious implications for the process of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy formulation. Turkmen policy-makers modified their perceptions of the leverage Russia enjoyed vis-à-vis the former periphery of the USSR in line with the significant shifts occurring in Russian foreign policy. An analysis of the evolution of Russo-Turkmen mutual perceptions is a necessary first step if we are to understand the wider framework of the post-Soviet relationship between Russia and Turkmenistan. The three subsections that follow will therefore look at three shifting paradigms: (1) Russia’s diverse conceptualisations of the near abroad; (2) Russia’s inconsistent policy towards Central Asia; and (3) the changing perception of Russia’s role within Turkmenistan’s decision-making inner circle. Paradigm I: Russia’s competing foreign policy visions Two factors have played a significant role in the emergence of Russia’s identity crisis. To begin with, the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism as the official basis upon which to build the whole social sciences edifice left an enormous vacuum in the theoretical framework needed to support Russian foreign policymaking.3 Secondly, the fragmentation of the Russian political landscape significantly complicated the process of foreign policy formulation. Different social groups, espousing different foreign policy visions, occupied at different times leading positions within the Russian MID, influencing directly the formulation of Russia’s foreign policy. In general terms, it is possible to condense the wide range of political stances expressed by the different forces (political institutions, political parties, political groups, pressure groups) present within the Russian polity into three macro-factions: Liberal Westernisers, Fundamentalist Nationalists and Pragmatic Nationalists.4 These forces influenced foreign policy-making between 1992 and 1996 by producing three competing foreign policy orientations whose interaction resulted in continuous

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fluctuations in the initial formulation of Russian foreign policy. Similar fluctuations would be reflected in Russia’s conceptualisation of the post-Soviet space. In the long run, however, the interplay of the three orientations became less conflictual. This trend was more evident in the period preceding the appointment of Evgeny Maksimovich Primakov to the position of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (January 1996). Nicole J. Jackson suggested that between 1992 and January 1996 the Russian foreign policy paradigm evolved decisively from Liberal Westernism to Pragmatic Nationalism. This was as a result of the influence of Fundamentalist Nationalism and the continuous amalgamation of visions contained in the three foreign policy orientations.5 In other words, the stabilisation of the social basis of the Russian MID led to the stabilisation of Russia’s foreign policy stance. To highlight the trajectory of this evolution, the initial phase of Russia’s foreign policy-making may be divided into three phases. 1

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3

Atlanticism (early 1992–mid 1992). In this period, the Liberal Westernist orientation greatly influenced the top ranks of the Russian MID. Atlanticists placed the relations with the West at the top of the list of foreign policy priorities for Russia. To all intents and purposes, the humanistic universalism contained in the novoe politicheskoe myshlenie (new political thinking)6 introduced by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in the late 1980s, was considered by Liberal Westernisers as the single most important source of influence for their foreign policy vision.7 Eurasianism (mid 1992–late 1993). In this period, Fundamentalist and Pragmatic Nationalists forces acquired increasing influence over foreign policymaking. Evraziistvo (Eurasianism), the cornerstone of the foreign policy vision of these forces, emerged as the most influential factor in foreign policy formulation. Eurasianism understood Russia’s territory as separate from Europe and, more specifically, as a bridge between East and West.8 The Eurasian paradigm downplayed the relevance of relations with the West and stressed instead the importance of ‘maintain[ing] stable relations with the East and the South’.9 Eurasianism defined Russia’s national interest largely in terms of the country’s geographical position.10 Consequently, the non-European zones of the former Soviet Union became the highest priority in Russia’s international relations between 1992 and 1993. These visions were echoed in the Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 1993.11 Consensus (late 1993–late 1995). In this third period, Russian foreign policy-making was characterised by increasing stability. In the late Kozyrev era, Eurasianism consolidated its hegemonic position as the single most influential factor in foreign policy formulation. The ‘near abroad’ maintained a pivotal position in the debate surrounding Russia’s international posture. Here, the emphasis was on interaction with the states of the CIS, the method of reintegration amongst the post-Soviet states and, most importantly, the problem of identifying alternatives to military intervention when responding to the instability that, at that stage, characterised much of the southern tier of the CIS.

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At the time of Primakov’s appointment, the process of stabilisation of Russia’s foreign policy paradigm was completed. This long process was concluded with the definitive establishment of two important benchmarks in Russian foreign policy-making: the identification of the CIS as the primary sphere of influence for the Russian Federation and the preservation of stability in the post-Soviet space as the primary Russian foreign policy objective. Paradigm II: Russia’s policy towards Central Asia The fluctuations in Russian foreign policy formulation had an adverse impact on Russia’s influence over Central Asia. Two factors contributed directly to the dilution of Moscow’s leverage over Central Asia. The first was endogenous to the Russian process of foreign policy-making. Fluctuations in foreign policy formulation resulted in a rather inconsistent operational foreign policy towards the region. It is worth remembering that at the time of signing the Almaty Agreement, in late December 1991, the five Central Asian republics looked at Moscow from an identical perspective.12 The republican leaders perceived Russia as the principal source of regional stability, as well as an indispensable partner in managing the transitional processes set in motion by the collapse of the Union, especially with regard to economic liberalisation. Moscow’s inconsistent policies towards the region between 1992 and 1996 did not match the expectations of Central Asian leaders. Nor did they satisfy the need to diversify forms of cooperation that already emerged in the political agendas of the Central Asian republics.13 A brief analysis of Russia’s operational policy in the region will add further weight to this analysis. The first phase (1992–1993) of Russia’s policy towards Central Asia was characterised by unilateral disengagement, permeated with ‘withdrawal and confusion’.14 During this period, Russia showed a high degree of disinterest in Central Asia, taking hegemony over the region more or less for granted. Further, the decision to select Atlanticism as the first foreign policy priority in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Union prevented Russia from elaborating a well thought out approach to relations with Central Asia. The many problems in the emerging relationship between Moscow and the Central Asian republics were subsumed in a rather confused post-imperial paradigm that focused mainly on reassessing and re-elaborating the Soviet legacy: border delimitation, economic and military cooperation, and possible political integration. Management of these concerns was assigned primarily to the CIS. The ascent of Eurasianism influenced the second phase (1993–1995) of Russian operational foreign policy in Central Asia, which was characterised by inefficacy and inefficiency. Unlike the Atlanticists, Eurasianists maintained that Russian hegemony in the CIS space ‘[was] yet to be earned’,15 and therefore constantly advocated the need to re-establish Moscow’s influence over Central Asia. This renewed interest in the near abroad notwithstanding, Russian policy towards the Central Asian republics in this period was ineffective. The exclusive focus on security, which followed from the signature of the CIS Collective

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Security Treaty (Tashkent, 15 May 1992), did not take into account the needs of the Central Asian republics that, between 1993 and 1995, pushed with different degrees of intensity for greater economic cooperation with the former centre of the Union.16 The absence of a clear ‘strategy for Central Asia that would integrate Russian security, political, energy and economic interests’17 forced Russia to advance incomplete proposals of integration to the regional states. The discrepancy between the ways in which, at least in 1992–1995, Russia and the Central Asian states perceived cooperation diluted Moscow’s regional influence more substantially than the competitive influence of external powers (Iran, Turkey). The second factor contributing to the decline of Russian influence vis-à-vis the republics of Central Asia is endogenous to the five different processes of political transition initiated in the region after 1992. Since Turkmenistan is the exclusive focus of this study, the analysis will centre on the Turkmen case. Paradigm III: Turkmenistan’s conceptualisation of Russia The crystallisation of the concept of Turkmen sovereignty impacted on the Turkmen leadership’s perceptions of and attitude to CIS integration.18 The Turkmen regime understood sovereignty (and still does) in the traditional sense, similarly to ‘states [that] bind themselves to international regime only when they have something to gain, specifically when the results of that regime have something to offer them directly to compensate them for their loss of latitude and independence’.19 Niyazov explicitly confirmed the correlation between Turkmen sovereignty and post-Soviet integration in one of his 1995 speeches: ‘[w]e will build bilateral and multilateral relations in the CIS, [but] we will sign agreements beneficial for our state’.20 In general terms, the Turkmen regime’s vision of national sovereignty, as it developed between 1992 and 1995, did not relate to political experiences that emerged prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union. This new understanding of national sovereignty would change the overarching perspective from which Turkmenistan addressed its relationship with the former centre of the USSR. Between 1992 and 1995, Turkmen foreign policy-makers thoroughly reassessed their relationship with Russia, so as to bring it into line with the new foreign policy paradigm, which had as its core the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Interestingly, this understanding was directly at odds with the trajectory of Russia’s conceptualisation of the ‘near abroad’. When Turkmenistan was eager to cooperate, Moscow was looking for extra-CIS international partnerships. Conversely, when Russian pressure for CIS integration became stronger, Ashgabat decided to follow its own independent course. In this sense, it is clear that the Russo-Turkmen perceptions, at least during 1992–1995, evolved in rather divergent directions. In the early post-Soviet era (January–August 1992), all-inclusive integration within the CIS and the preservation of a special relationship with Russia constituted the basis of Turkmenistan’s interaction with Moscow. After Niyazov’s ear-

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liest pronouncements on the intention of adopting neutrality (July 1992), Turkmenistan gradually began to disentangle itself from any form of integration within the CIS framework and simultaneously attempted to reduce the intensity of its bilateral ties with the Russian Federation. During 1992–1995, the period in which the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was formulated, repeated references to the principle of neutrality punctuated the pronouncements of Turkmen foreign policy-makers when addressing issues relating to Turkmenistan’s interaction with Russia. After the UN endorsement of Turkmenistan’s neutral status, the operationalisation of the doctrine was designed to reduce the level of Turkmenistan’s political dependency on the former centre of the Union. In the early post-Soviet era, the crystallisation of the concept of Turkmen sovereignty was the principal factor affecting Turkmenistan’s relationship with Russia. As time went on, domestic considerations would exercise greater influence. As we noted earlier (see Chapter 2, pp. 37–40), the rise of Turkmen authoritarianism that occurred in 1997–1998 forced the Turkmen regime to somewhat change its foreign policy priorities. It is, in any case, misleading to consider the Turkmen concept of sovereignty as essentially detached from domestic considerations. There is good reason to suggest that the idea of Turkmen sovereignty was itself an attempt to promote the regime’s interests. Turkmenistan’s unwillingness to cede significant portions of its sovereignty contributed directly to the loosening of ties with Russia. In other words, ‘sovereignty’ became a banner for regime consolidation. Indeed, the restrictive international application of the Turkmen concept of sovereignty was meant to reinforce the regime. This proposition, which sheds useful light on the two issues outlined above, does show that, in the early post-Soviet era, Turkmen domestic politics influenced the country’s multilateral and bilateral interaction with Russia. Domestic considerations played a key part in Turkmenistan’s refusal to participate in the activities of the CIS and in its attempts to loosen ties with Russia.

Russo-Turkmen relations in the post-Soviet era: the multilateral dimension After the meeting of Ashgabat (14 December 1991) and the signature of the Almaty declaration (21 December 1991), Turkmenistan obtained full membership in the CIS. As we have seen in Chapter 1 (see p. 12), significant efforts, especially with regard to the organisation of the Ashgabat meeting, were made by the government of the TSSR in order to achieve this objective. After a short period of cooperative engagement with all forms of integration promoted by the CIS central bodies, Turkmenistan gradually reduced its commitment to the activities of the CIS. Total disentanglement was finally achieved in August 2005 when a unilateral decision to downgrade Turkmenistan’s membership to a merely associative one was communicated to the other members of the Commonwealth.

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On the occasion of the CIS meeting held in Kazan’ (Tatarstan, Russian Federation) on 26 August 2005, Niyazov (who incidentally did not attend the meeting) presented the participating delegations with an official document (Ob osnovnykh printsipakh uchastiya Neytral’nogo Turkmenistana v Sodruzhestve Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv – On the fundamental principles for the membership of Neutral Turkmenistan in the CIS),21 which contained detailed clarifications in support of Turkmenistan’s unilateral decision to downgrade the status of its membership in the CIS. In this document, consisting of highly rhetorical pronouncements that did not substantially differ from other official documents on the CIS issued by the Turkmen MID, the Turkmen government highlighted the incompatibility between Turkmen neutrality, as sanctioned by UN Resolution A/50/80(A), and Turkmen membership in the CIS. The document redefined the terms and conditions under which Turkmenistan would understand its commitment to the activities of the CIS, and concluded that only through a reduction of the status of its membership to an associative one could Turkmenistan accomplish the declaratory objectives of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Strikingly, the incompatibility between the aims and scope of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality and Turkmen integration in the CIS did not emerge in the first significant declaration on Turkmen membership in the CIS, issued by Niyazov after the international recognition of Turkmen neutrality. At the Council of the Heads of State held in Moscow (19 January 1996), the former Turkmen President, in expressing gratitude to the other CIS leaders for the support they expressed in a number of international political fora for Turkmen neutrality, remarked that ‘[Turkmenistan] remains deeply committed to cooperation in the CIS framework, [. . .] and [that] neutrality allows it to raise its participation in integration processes to a higher level’.22 From then on, however, this tone would change dramatically, and the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality would be regularly presented as justification for Turkmenistan’s growing disenchantment with the CIS.23 The section that follows analyses the evolution of Turkmenistan’s stance on multilateral cooperation within the CIS framework between 1992 and 1995, particular attention being given to the three principal dimensions (political, economic and military) in which it developed. Our purpose here is to identify the evolution of the underlying determinants of Turkmenistan’s disentanglement from the CIS. Although Turkmen officials usually portrayed their hostility to multilateral integration as derived from their restrictive interpretation of Turkmen sovereignty, this section argues that regime consolidation was, in fact, the critical consideration. Political integration The first two years of the post-Soviet era (1992–1993) were characterised by frequent meetings whose agendas focused predominantly on the practical effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.24 Political integration, understood as the process aimed at introducing the ‘unitary constitution and parliament of a new

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confederation among the CIS states’,25 represented the central theme around which the entire CIS paradigm was oriented. The Russian Federation coordinated most political efforts towards the attainment of this goal and promoted the CIS Charter and the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (IPA) as the preferred political tools for advancing its reintegrationist strategy. Negotiations for the CIS Charter dominated the debate over CIS integration throughout 1992. The numerous meetings held during that year (Minsk, 14 February 1992; Tashkent, 15 May 1992; Bishkek, 9 October 1992) culminated in the adoption of a final draft that was endorsed by the Summit of the Council of the Heads of States in Moscow (25 December 1992). Far from furthering fully-fledged integration amongst member states, the draft did ‘little to threaten any CIS member’s sovereignty or territorial integrity’.26 It contained diluted provisions on supranational integration and envisaged the creation of a number of consultative institutions designed to coordinate the integrationist effort. After the approval of a Charter that was substantially non-integrationist, the likelihood of an effective Inter-Parliamentary Assembly was drastically reduced. The IPA was formally established on 27 March 1992, and began its work on 14 September 1992 when seven member states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) held an inaugural meeting in Bishkek. The original powers and competence of the IPA were extremely limited, as this body was ‘merely consultative, its decisions [had] only a recommendational character [. . .], it [had] no right to demand reports from the CIS’s leading bodies or leaders and thus even its oversight functions [were] limited’.27 After the approval of the CIS Charter, the IPA membership expanded. Between 1993 and 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine joined the IPA. However, the conventions signed by the participant states did not enhance the powers of the IPA, which by the end of 2007 remained an ineffectual political forum struggling to overcome disparities between the different legislative frameworks of member states.28 In the debates on the CIS Charter and on the strengthening of the IPA, Turkmenistan maintained a consistently passive role. So far as the Charter was concerned, the non-Russian members generally interpreted the integrationist initiatives promoted by Moscow as attempts to reconstruct Russia’s hegemony over the post-Soviet bloc. As a consequence, they either boycotted initiatives for political integration completely (as did Turkmenistan) or limited their support to the approval of ‘declaratory and immaterial’29 proposals. Turkmen hostility towards the CIS Charter emerged more strikingly during the Moscow summit. On that occasion, delegations from Turkmenistan and Ukraine were the only two to reject the entire document, creating de facto the first significant ‘sceptical bloc’ within the hitherto (relatively) homogenous CIS. At the end of 2007, Turkmenistan had yet to ratify the CIS Charter. Unusually, the Turkmen government provided a detailed explanation of its initial decision not to sign the Charter, which it reiterated at the Minsk summit of 22 January 1993. In a lengthy interview to Interfax, Shikhmuradov explained

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that the Turkmen elite did not agree with the conceptual framework of the Charter, underlining that: [W]e oppose rigid structures and deny the idea of creation of any centre. Life demonstrates that any issue within the so-called single space can be solved on the basis of bilateral relations. [. . .] We welcome a flexible approach with respect to the draft of the charter [. . .] It is necessary to develop horizontally the fragile sovereignty we have now. (Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States – Documents, data and analysis, op. cit., p. 425) Two key concepts underpinned Shikhmuradov’s declaration. To begin with, Turkmen foreign policy viewed the recreation of dependent links with the former centre of the Union rather negatively. Bearing in mind the foreign policy declarations that had been issued in the first part of 1992, this position reflected a substantial shift in foreign policy. Turkmenistan’s sovereignty was said to be incompatible with any integrationist initiative promoted at CIS level. Interestingly, this position was enunciated without reference to neutrality, which suggests that this principle played a rather limited role in the redirection of Turkmen foreign policy that occurred in the second half of 1992. It follows that other considerations must have prompted Turkmen leaders to identify the dilution of Russia’s leverage over Turkmenistan as the single most important foreign policy objective. After the dismissal of Kuliev, the Turkmen MID was under the total control of the emerging regime. It is reasonable, then, to suggest that the need to consolidate the regime’s power was a key factor shaping the role assigned to Russia in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy paradigm. Second, Shikhmuradov clearly pinpointed bilateralism as Turkmenistan’s preferred option. Numerous official declarations confirmed Shikhmuradov’s formulation, as did the operationalisation of foreign policy.30 In relation to the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, Turkmenistan opted for non-involvement. After 1992, Turkmenistan absented itself from IPA meetings and Turkmen members were not included in the list of participants of any other successive Assembly. At the end of 2007, Turkmenistan had yet to join the Assembly. The failure of the Charter and of the IPA resulted in the progressive loss of efficacy of the broader process of CIS political integration. Turkmenistan significantly contributed to this failure, even though the impact of Turkmen rejection of political integration was less influential than was Ukraine’s. Turkmen officials consistently pointed out the institutional rigidity of both the Charter and the IPA, and expressed particular concern that such initiatives reflected Russia’s hegemonic designs vis-à-vis the other CIS members. Niyazov and other Turkmen officials repeatedly stated that ‘one centre should not be replaced by another’.31 A consistent policy of non-involvement in CIS activities resulted in Turkmenistan being the least engaged CIS member. By 1999, it had failed to participate in 31 CIS bodies.32 After 2000, Turkmen delegations regularly absented themselves from most CIS summits.

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In the early post-Soviet era, political declarations issued by Turkmen officials did not raise the question of incompatibility between CIS political integration and the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Conversely, the August 2005 document considered the CIS integrationist paradigm as thoroughly incompatible with the aims and the scopes of Positive Neutrality. As the essence of CIS integration and the ‘Declaratory section’ of Turkmen neutrality both remained unchanged throughout the years, it is reasonable to conclude that inconsistent application of the doctrine in relation to Turkmenistan’s involvement in CIS political integration resulted from a shift of the undeclared objectives of the policy. Economic integration In general terms, the initiatives on economic integration promoted within the CIS in the first two years of the post-Soviet era followed from the economic debate that accompanied the negotiations for the adoption of a new Union Treaty. The fact remains, however, that the highly integrated Soviet economy failed to evolve into an equally interdependent post-Soviet economic order. Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber see ‘the pressing imperatives of asserting economic sovereignty and giving priority to tackling economic domestic crisis’33 as the main cause of the difficulties encountered in CIS economic integration. As a consequence, the post-Soviet states oriented their attitudes towards multilateral economic cooperation in line with their perception of economic sovereignty. Turkmenistan rejected economic integration on much the same basis as it had opposed political integration. The initial period of economic integration within the CIS involved measures that had little relevance to the post-Soviet economic transition. This may have persuaded Turkmen officials to participate actively in the early stages. High-level delegations from Turkmenistan participated in the first two meetings of the Heads of Government, held in Moscow on 8 February and 13 March 1992. At this meeting, a compromise was reached amongst the successor states on the problem of dividing the foreign debt and the foreign credit of the USSR.34 Niyazov participated in the Minsk meeting of the Council of Heads of State (14 February 1992), which issued the ‘Agreement on the Regulation of the Relations between the States of the Commonwealth in the Sphere of Trade and Economic Cooperation in 1992’.35 The Turkmen delegation was involved in the preparation of the final draft of this agreement: an addendum fully credited to ‘the representatives of Turkmenistan’36 is contained in the text that was adopted in the meeting. Turkmenistan also decided to stay in the Rublevaya Zona. Turkmen officials did not manifest any intention to follow Ukraine’s lead and introduce a new national currency. As noted earlier, Turkmenistan was one of the last postSoviet states to abandon the monetary union that developed in the wake of the collapse of the USSR. The adoption of the manat was, to all intents and purposes, forced by Moscow’s decision to reform its own monetary system. The collapse of the Rouble Zone is therefore a watershed in the evolution of CIS economic integration. It resulted in the approval of more specific forms of

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economic integration amongst CIS members, which Turkmenistan pointedly rejected. In reality, the collapse of the post-Soviet monetary order reduced the relevance of the Treaty on the Formation of the Economic Union, finalised on 24 September 1993. Instead of creating an Economic Union, the treaty provided for the introduction of ‘a free trade area, a customs union, a payment union and a monetary union’,37 which were considered necessary steps to consolidate an Economic Union analogous to the European Union. The long negotiations of early 1993 preceded the finalisation of the treaty. Significant progress was made in this regard during the extraordinary meeting held in Minsk (May 1993), and in the following Moscow summit (June 1993). Turkmenistan’s intention not to participate in the agreement was clearly conveyed during these meetings. The Turkmen delegation did not participate in the Minsk summit, and at the Moscow summit, Niyazov underlined the ‘inopportune timing and the illusory nature of an economic union’38 and restated his rejection to the preliminary treaty signed in Minsk. In September 1993, Turkmenistan decided not to sign the treaty on the Economic Union. However, the Turkmen government eventually revised its decision, and joined the Union during a CIS meeting organised in Ashgabat.39 This sudden shift in Turkmenistan’s policy did not result from a reassessment of the benefit of economic integration. After the collapse of the Rublevaya Zona, the efficacy of the Union was severely circumscribed.40 Only then did Turkmenistan decide to sign the agreement. As for the Interstate Economic Committee (IEC), Turkmenistan’s position was clear. The IEC was created on 9 December 1993 to coordinate the activities of the Economic Union and synchronise member states’ economic legislations. Turkmenistan refused to sign the protocol establishing the IEC. Niyazov argued that the IEC envisaged a level of economic integration that would require a ‘voluntary restriction of sovereignty’,41 which Turkmenistan was not ready to accept. Similarly, Turkmenistan refused to participate in the finalisation of the Concept of Economic Integration of CIS States, signed in Moscow in March 1997. The draft of the Concept, which acknowledged the problems that emerged in the consolidation of the Economic Union, proposed abandoning the coordination of fiscal, customs and investment policies in favour of the full establishment of the Union, which was envisaged for 2005. Turkmenistan insisted that the ‘proper implementation of the Concept would impinge upon national economic sovereignty’42 and decided not to sign the document. It is worth noting here that in the various official declarations accompanying Turkmenistan’s rejection of CIS economic integration there is little reference to the policy of neutrality. Rather, the emphasis is placed on the potential infringement of Turkmen sovereignty that would result from participation in multilateral economic cooperation. To summarise, Turkmenistan consistently refused to participate in any CIS coordination of the economic activities of member states. This position has been reiterated throughout the post-Soviet era. As we noted earlier (see Chapter 4,

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pp. 63–5), economic foreign policy in the early post-Soviet era aimed at the geographic diversification of the Turkmen economy beyond the CIS, in order to dilute Turkmenistan’s dependence on the former centre of the Union – a strategy that was seen as essential to the consolidation of the emerging regime. The Turkmen elite understood Turkmenistan’s involvement in CIS economic cooperation as an element that could put at risk the effectiveness of this strategy. The regime therefore opted not to participate in the integration of CIS economies. Passive cooperation with the CIS in relation to economic issues was motivated by the need to avoid any course of action that might threaten the stability of the regime. Military integration Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, the ‘prodigious [Soviet] armed forces were left in an ambiguous position’,43 as the post-Soviet states had to decide whether these forces belonged to the CIS as a whole or had to be divided according to their geographical deployment. The Preliminary Agreement on Joint Armed Forces, which was signed on 20 March 1992 during the Kyiv meeting of the CIS Heads of State, attempted to address the controversy. The end result, however, was even greater polarisation, with several member states following the lead of Ukraine and deciding to create their own military structures. As a consequence, the provisions of this agreement remained largely in abeyance. The Treaty on Collective Security, approved at the Heads of State meeting held in Tashkent (15 May 1992),44 represented a watershed in post-Soviet military evolution. It was the most significant attempt at military cooperation within the CIS framework, but also the most visible example of the failure to foster supranational integration. The Collective Security Treaty removed any prospect of creating a Joint Army amongst CIS members. The fact that no ‘full consensus [has] been reached on a draft agreement regarding the basic principles of military and technical cooperation among the member states’45 indicated the significant constraints upon meaningful military cooperation. Similar problems beset the CIS Collective Security Concept (February 1995). This was the last serious attempt to promote multilateral security cooperation within the CIS framework. Only a small number of CIS states signed the Concept and, in any case, the agreed draft mirrored the divergent opinions expressed by member states. Hence, the absence of a clear definition of ‘external threats’, without which it would be difficult to bring into play the security mechanism envisaged by the Concept.46 Thereafter, CIS military cooperation lost momentum. For its part, the Turkmen government established its own military structures immediately after the collapse of the USSR, and the Turkmen Ministry of Defence was created by presidential decree on 27 January 1992.47 In December 1991, Turkmenistan had already acquired direct control over the Soviet military units located on the territory of the TSSR. It is worth noting that the creation of Turkmen independent

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armed forces did not result in the interruption of bilateral military cooperation with the Russian Federation, which, throughout the 1990s, provided Turkmenistan with ‘military-technical assistance and operational-technical assistance’.48 Military cooperation between Moscow and Ashgabat developed exclusively on the basis of bilateral treaties. After the creation of independent military forces, Turkmenistan steadfastly avoided military integration in CIS structures. At least initially, neutrality was not advanced as a significant impediment to Turkmenistan’s participation in supranational military integration within the CIS. The decision to reject the 1992 Collective Security Treaty was defended on the grounds that the terms and objectives of the Treaty clashed with Turkmenistan’s intention to establish a fully equipped national army.49 States with limited military power – those such as Turkmenistan and Moldova – felt it necessary to reject the Treaty in order to avoid increasing dependence on the CIS, and ultimately on Russian military structures.50 To conceal the nature of its foreign policy objectives, however, Turkmenistan presented its rejection of the CIS Security Treaty by recourse to grandiloquent rhetoric and well worn clichés.51 The use of rhetorical themes to convey Turkmenistan’s military policy became pervasive after the adoption of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality and the Military Doctrine of post-Soviet Turkmenistan, a piece of legislation that was meant to embody the military expression of Turkmen neutralism.52 The doctrine’s text was meant to facilitate Turkmenistan’s military cooperation beyond CIS borders. The doctrine downplayed the role of multilateral integration within the CIS53 and, at the same time, indicated a desire to promote military partnerships with regional states outside the CIS.54 Simply put, the Military Doctrine was designed to dilute Russia’s hegemonic position vis-à-vis Turkmenistan’s newly created armed forces through progressive detachment from CIS military integration and the development of security arrangements with non-CIS states. From 1992, Turkmen officials frequently referred to the Military Doctrine and the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality in declarations dealing with issues of CIS military integration. The provisions of the ‘Constitutional Law on Permanent Neutrality’, they argued, obliged Turkmenistan to avoid involvement in ‘military blocs, alliances, or inter-state associations either committed to abide by rigid obligations or tailored to have shared responsibility’.55 A similar justification was offered for the decisions to reject the Collective Security Concept of February 1995,56 the Treaty on Borders’ Protection between CIS and non-CIS states (May 1995) and other substantive57 forms of military cooperation.58 Turkmenistan perceived Russia’s leading role in the CIS military initiatives as a crucial element in Moscow’s strategy to reassert its influence over the postSoviet region generally, and Central Asia in particular.59 Systemic disentanglement from multilateral military cooperation was in this sense a crucial feature of Turkmen foreign policy between 1992 and 1997. Opposition to multilateral integration was aimed at counter-balancing Russia’s attempts to expand its military influence over the post-Soviet region. The fact that Turkmenistan did not similarly oppose involvement in military

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alliances that did not include Russia suggests that multilateral military cooperation was not in itself considered as an impediment to Turkmen sovereignty or to the provisions of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Observing how Turkmenistan perceived its participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme60 lends weight to this conclusion. Turkmenistan was the first Central Asian state to join the PfP programme.61 The protocol that Turkmenistan signed in 1994 regulated the military cooperation between NATO and the Turkmen state, and listed the establishment of programmes for the training of officers of the Turkmen Air Force as its main objective.62 In commenting on the endorsement of the protocol, Shikhmuradov did not raise any technical incompatibility between the provisions of the PfP programme and the principle of neutrality, which had not yet been endorsed by the UN General Assembly.63 Similarly, a later speech on Turkmenistan’s role within the PfP programme, presented by A. Mammetgeldiyev, then Minister of Defence, at the Summit of Defence Ministers of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) (held in December 2003 at the NATO headquarters in Brussels) made no reference to neutrality.64 After the Turkmen government approved the Framework programme for cooperation between Turkmenistan and NATO for the time frame 2004–2005,65 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, visited Turkmenistan in October 2004. Immediately after his visit, Niyazov alluded to the possibility of expanding military cooperation with NATO. Once again, no reference was made to neutrality as an obstacle to the enhancement of this partnership.66 It is evident then, that, in the case of the PfP programme, the application of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was not entirely consistent. In declaratory terms, the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality excluded Turkmenistan’s participation in military alliances. On this basis, Turkmenistan had categorically refused to integrate its forces into CIS military structures. The same rationale did not seem to apply to the NATO PfP programme. The identification of the causes of such inconsistency is crucial to the argument presented in this chapter. In assessing the pros and cons of military cooperation with the CIS and the PfP programme, the Turkmen regime seemed to apply two different interpretations of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, but in pursuit of the same foreign policy objective, namely the dilution of Moscow’s military influence over Turkmenistan. More specifically, Turkmenistan’s decision to stand aside from the CIS military initiative was meant to avoid military cooperation with Russia. Turkmen involvement in the PfP programme formed part of the same foreign policy agenda. As we have seen, Moscow’s military leverage over Turkmenistan was considered detrimental to regime stability in the early post-Soviet era. As Turkmen foreign policy was intent on diluting such leverage, it is apparent that the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality between 1992 and 1997 was meant to achieve objectives that were different from, or at least not clearly aligned with, the doctrine’s declaratory face. What of Moscow’s reactions to Turkmenistan’s policy? Once Russia understood that multilateral military policies could not be sustained, it

112 Operational foreign policy began to offer CIS members, including Turkmenistan, bilateral forms of military cooperation. It is to this facet of the relationship that we now turn.

Russo-Turkmen relations in the post-Soviet era: the bilateral dimension Bilateralism is the main avenue through which Turkmen foreign policy has been pursued both prior and subsequent to the introduction of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The evolution of Turkmenistan’s system of bilateral alliances is therefore crucial to an understanding of its foreign policy as a whole. This section argues that the bilateral relationship between Russia and Turkmenistan is the most telling aspect of the entire foreign policy paradigm of postSoviet Turkmenistan. As previous chapters have noted, the assessment of Russian leverage over Turkmenistan has played a key role in the development of Turkmen foreign policy generally, and its neutrality in particular. Indeed, the Turkmen regime periodically reformulated its foreign policy so as to bring it into line with shifting perceptions of Russia’s influence. To develop this analysis, a two-pronged approach is required. First, the Russo-Turkmen bilateral relationship needs to be located in time. Important personnel changes that occurred at the top levels of Russia’s political class, and which coincided with significant policy shifts, are useful in demarcating the three key periods in the evolution of Russo-Turkmen bilateralism. Second, this analysis traces how the relationship developed in relation to the three key dimensions of bilateral cooperation: political, military and economic. Phase 1: the Kozyrev era (January 1992–December 1995) During 1992–1995, when Russia’s policy towards CIS member states was primarily driven at the multilateral level, the bilateral relationship between Moscow and Ashgabat was concerned mainly with the identification of a common platform on which to advance political, economic and military ties. Inevitably, the continual fluctuations that occurred in the mechanisms of foreign policy formulation of the two states would impinge upon the efficacy of this process. As Russia and Turkmenistan assigned different degrees of salience to different issues, the task of establishing a common agenda turned out to be complex and elusive. At the end of the Kozyrev era, the two governments had finalised few weighty agreements – none of which were economic in nature. Between 1992 and 1995, only a few official visits67 were exchanged between Russian and Turkmen officials: El’tsin visited Turkmenistan only once (22–23 December 1993), following on from the CIS Heads of State meeting in Ashgabat; Niyazov visited Moscow only twice (31 August–1 September 1992; 17–19 May 1995). Turkmen leaders68 met with greater regularity with representatives of other states. Between 1992 and 1995, Niyazov performed seven official visits to Iran and three to Turkey. Foreign Minister Kozyrev made only two official

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visits to Turkmenistan, both in 1992 (8 April and 6 November). Other significant bilateral meetings were held on the occasion of the visit of Russia’s Minister of Communication G.M. Fadeev to Ashgabat (27 May 1994) and during the official visit (11–12 August 1995) of A.A. Bol’shakov, Russian Deputy Prime Minister, to the Balkan velayat (western Turkmenistan). Two issues dominated the agenda of those meetings: negotiations over dual citizenship and the identification of viable ways of military cooperation. Security issues featured prominently in the all-inclusive agreement of cooperation with Russia, which Niyazov signed during his first official trip to Moscow.69 The main outcome of this agreement was the establishment of a joint command for Turkmenistan’s military structures.70 The treaty also regulated the procedure for the handover to Turkmenistan of more than half of all military units and equipment. Out of the more than 300 Soviet military units (accounting for approximately 120,000 troops) located within the territory of the TSSR at the time of signature: 65 per cent passed under the full control of the Turkmen Ministry of Defence, almost 25 per cent remained under Russian jurisdiction, and only 10 per cent were dismantled.71 During the transitional period (ten years), Russia was expected to participate in the joint command and to provide Turkmenistan with military-technical and operational-tactical assistance. In general terms, the agreement seemed to satisfy both parties. On the one hand, Turkmenistan, by granting Russia complete supervision of the training of Turkmen troops and by acquiring formal control of the former Soviet military apparatus present within its boundaries, solved the key structural problems associated with the establishment of a national army. Further, the agreement envisaged that the two parties would be equally responsible for the ensuing financial costs. For Russia, on the other hand, the agreement meant that Ashgabat was prevented from concluding comparable pacts with Iran or any of its other southern neighbours.72 The strategic importance of this agreement was reaffirmed during El’tsin’s first official visit to Turkmenistan, when he and his Turkmen counterpart signed another treaty on military cooperation, which regulated the status of the former pogranvoiska (State Border Guards) more directly.73 The treaty established that a special segment of the Russian Federal Border Service, formed by 3000 men headquartered in Ashgabat, would be responsible for the protection of Turkmenistan’s land and sea borders and for the training of Turkmenistan’s military personnel. The acquisition of long-lasting influence over Turkmenistan’s armed forces brought with it direct control over the process of securitisation of the Turkmen–Iranian and Turkmen–Afghan borders, two of the most troubled borders within the CIS umbrella. However, the treaty of December 1993 saw the beginning of a decline in Russo-Turkmen military cooperation. In January 1994, Turkmenistan unilaterally decided to withdraw from the 1993 treaty and dismantled the Joint Command, establishing de facto a national army, although training and technical assistance were still entrusted to Russia. Thereafter, military cooperation lost momentum. Security was not among the key issues discussed during Niyazov’s trip to Moscow in May 1995.74

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The settlement of the outstanding issues concerning the status of the Russian minority in Turkmenistan and that of the Turkmen minority living within the Russian Federation was the most significant outcome of Russo-Turkmen political cooperation during 1992–1995. Negotiations commenced during the Ashgabat bilateral summit of December 1993, in which El’tsin received the honorary citizenship of Turkmenistan and, most importantly, the two parties produced a protocol on dual citizenship.75 However, the conclusion of ancillary agreements regulating these aspects did not occur until May 1995.76 The provisions of the treaty obliged both Russia and Turkmenistan to respect the rights of their respective minorities, to avoid forced assimilation and to undertake measures to prevent systemic ethnic discrimination. Furthermore, the treaty commits the signatories to safeguard and promote the rights of permanent legal residents, who enjoy all the rights of citizens – including participation in privatisation – except for voting of holding high elective office, or serving in executive branch or judicial agencies. (Ochs, ‘Turkmenistan: the quest for stability and control’, op. cit., pp. 336–7) Both presidents praised the conclusion of these agreements: El’tsin described them as extremely relevant ‘examples’77 of bilateral political cooperation within the CIS, and Niyazov stressed their importance for the ‘strengthening of peace, stability, and national accord in Turkmenistan’.78 Rhetoric notwithstanding, it is worth noting that the 1993–1995 Russo-Turkmen agreements on dual citizenship were not a core aspect of either states’ foreign policy. In the early postSoviet era, the protection of the Russian-speaking diaspora in the CIS space was not pursued with determination by the Russian MID, even though it did represent a frequent theme in the rhetoric surrounding Moscow’s foreign policy.79 Furthermore, the status of the tiny80 Russian minority in Turkmenistan – the real issue at stake during the negotiations, since the Turkmen minority in Russia was numerically and politically much less significant – was not a matter of serious dispute between 1992 and 1995. Its relevance emerged later, notably when the Turkmen government viewed it as an opportunity to weaken Russia’s political influence on Turkmenistan. In short, two elements emerge from the analysis of the first stage of Russo-Turkmen bilateralism. First, economic issues were not an important part of the agenda. As we noted earlier, the geographic diversification of Turkmenistan’s trade was the main economic foreign policy objective for the Turkmen state at the beginning of the post-Soviet era. This entailed a reduction in the emphasis of economic relations with Russia. At the same time, the Russian Federation placed greater emphasis on multilateral economic cooperation with CIS states as the principal mechanism with which to increase its economic influence over the postSoviet bloc. These two conflicting strategies resulted in the absence of any significant initiative to promote bilateral economic cooperation.

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Second, it would appear that Turkmenistan did not succeed in diluting Russia’s leverage, though this was arguably its main foreign policy objective between 1992 and 1995. The net effect of the military agreements was to reinforce Russia’s military hegemony over Central Asia, while the signature of the agreement on dual citizenship also contributed to reinforcing the links between the two states. Phase 2: from Primakov to Putin (January 1996–December 1999) After Primakov’s appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, a noticeable shift occurred in the evolution of the CIS. Primakov set out to relaunch Moscow’s leading role in the post-Soviet region both multilaterally and bilaterally, by reformulating the integrationist strategy of the CIS and by focusing more emphatically on the strengthening of Russia’s bilateral relations with each former Soviet republic. At the same time, Turkmenistan reiterated its opposition to multilateral cooperation within the CIS and continued to disregard integrationist initiatives. As a consequence, Turkmenistan’s relations with Russia from 1996 onwards tended to develop only bilaterally, with the emphasis largely on energy cooperation. The period 1996–1999 witnessed an increase in the frequency of official visits. Turkmen delegations visited Russia eight times. Niyazov attended three bilateral summits in Moscow (8–9 August and 14–15 October 1996; 6–7 August 1997) and five CIS meetings held in the Russian capital (19 January and 17 May 1996; 27–28 March 1997; 29 April 1998; 2 April 1999). At first sight, the assiduous presence of Niyazov in CIS political fora would seem to contradict Turkmenistan’s isolationistic policy vis-à-vis the CIS. However, on closer inspection it emerges that Turkmenistan used its participation in CIS meetings to strengthen the bilateral relationship. The number of Russian delegations visiting Turkmenistan increased as well. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin made an official visit on 13–14 January 1998, and two Russian Deputy Prime Ministers travelled to Turkmenistan between 1996 and 1999: Bol’shakov (15 March 1996) and Pastukhov (7 April 1998), both to promote economic cooperation. Economic issues were also discussed during the visit to Turkmenistan of two different Russian Foreign Ministers: Primakov (8 July 1998) and Ivanov (16 July 1999). Another important high-level Russian delegation headed by A. Tuleyev, Minister for CIS Affairs, met with Niyazov on 26 October 1996. Three factors had contributed to Russia’s increasing importance in Turkmen foreign policy during this period. Greater interaction between the two governments and an enlarged economic agenda were the two key factors. The third may be inferred from a careful reading of the Turkmen official press. Between 1996 and 1999, Russo-Turkmen relations developed under the conceptual umbrella of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Turkmen official propaganda repeatedly underscored the extent to which this principle was positively received in Russia. In early 1996, El’tsin labelled the international recognition for Turkmenistan’s

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neutrality as a ‘colossal success’81 for the Turkmen state, and described Turkmenistan as ‘Russia’s most reliable partner’.82 The question of the compatibility of Turkmen neutralism and cooperation with Russia was discussed at the very first high-level bilateral summit (Moscow, 14–15 October 1996). On that occasion, Chernomyrdin, when responding to Niyazov’s stated intention of furthering relations with Moscow exclusively on bilateral terms, ‘conveyed complete support of such a thesis, and stressed that the tremendous potential of TurkmenRussian partnership could be revealed in full only on [a]bilateral basis’.83 The Russian Prime Minister restated his support for Turkmen neutrality during his first visit to Ashgabat.84 At the same time, the Turkmen official press made much of the way in which Turkmenistan’s neutrality was received by Russia’s public opinion and intelligentsiya.85 In other words, the Turkmen press (in lieu of the Turkmen regime) began to emphasise Russia’s positive perception of Turkmenistan. The Niyazov regime was, at least indirectly, signalling its wish to upgrade the relationship with Russia. In the late El’tsin era, economic issues and energy cooperation were assigned increasing importance by both Russian and Turkmen foreign policy-makers. Immediately after the appointment of Primakov, prominent members of Russia’s energy industry began to visit Turkmenistan with greater frequency. On 25 January 1996, a high-level delegation, including Gazprom Chairman Vyakhirev and Russian Deputy Minister for Cooperation with the CIS Khusnuditnov, held talks with Niyazov to explore new possibilities of energy cooperation between the two states.86 This meeting’s main outcome was the creation of Turkmenrosgas, a joint company that acquired a monopoly in the export of Turkmen gas through the CAC gas pipeline: this company was officially established by Niyazov during his visit to Moscow in August 1996. Energy cooperation was also the principal item on the bilateral agenda of the Moscow summit (October 1996). The former Turkmen President met with thenPrime Minister Chernomyrdin to discuss a common approach to world energy markets and to explore a viable mechanism that would allow Russian energy companies to invest in the Turkmen energy industry.87 Similar themes constituted the core of the bilateral summit of August 1997. On that occasion, El’tsin publicly endorsed Turkmenistan’s unilateral decision to annul the joint venture that had resulted in the creation of Turkmenrosgas. The two delegations discussed in depth the possibility of energy cooperation in the Turkmen Caspian littoral zone but failed to finalise an overarching export agreement.88 Russia also played a major role in the gas crisis that erupted between Turkmenistan and Ukraine in 1997–1998. After Turkmenistan’s unilateral decision to suspend gas shipments to Kyiv, Moscow was left as ‘the only player of consequence in inter-republican gas trade’.89 This privileged position was unaffected by the agreement signed in December 1998, which saw the re-establishment of gas exports to Ukraine. As we saw in Chapter 4, the Gazprom transit monopoly over gas exports in the post-Soviet area was not weakened by the agreement between Turkmenistan and Ukraine. Indeed, these events convinced Turkmenistan of the necessity to accelerate negotiations for a

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new gas deal with Russia. This theme would dominate the economic dimension of Russo-Turkmen bilateralism in the Putin era. The latter part of the El’tsin era was also characterised by a significant decrease in military cooperation. On 25 May 1999, Turkmenistan announced its intention to revoke unilaterally the treaty that regulated cooperation on Border Guards. The dismantlement of the Russian military unit controlling Turkmenistan’s borders was completed by December 1999, in accordance with the procedures envisaged by an ad hoc treaty signed in July 1999.90 To conclude, Russo-Turkmen bilateralism, in the second half of the 1990s, expanded in depth with energy cooperation assuming a higher profile. Military cooperation on the other hand was halted by Turkmenistan’s unilateral decision to withdraw from the Border Treaty. However, the most important conclusion discovered from this analysis thus far relates to the emerging perception by the Turkmen regime of Russia’s positive role vis-à-vis its own consolidation. Phase 3: from Putin’s election to Niyazov’s death (2000–2006) Pragmatism has been a distinguishing feature of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin’s foreign policy. Overall, the Russian President achieved an all-encompassing normalisation of ‘the goals of foreign policy and [of] the manner in which it was conducted’.91 A higher level of differentiation, however, now characterised Russia’s policies towards the main areas of geopolitical interest (the West, the CIS, the Asian continent as a whole). The adoption of a new Foreign Policy Concept, officially approved on 28 June 2000,92 was the most important benchmark of Russia’s foreign policy during Putin’s first term in office (2000–2004). In relation to the near abroad, the text of the Concept envisaged the formulation of a comprehensive strategy driven simultaneously (and coherently) at the multilateral and bilateral levels.93 At the same time, as Sally Cummings has pointedly remarked, the Concept recognised ‘both Russia’s limited capabilities and the need to make political concessions’.94 This same pragmatism resulted in a progressive downgrading of CIS integration in Putin’s foreign policy rhetoric and in the adoption of a ‘ruthlessly realistic’95 attitude towards multilateral cooperation in the post-Soviet region. Russia’s new approach to Central Asia offered important clues to Putin’s wider strategy regarding the near abroad. To begin with, the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept contained a clear-cut definition of Russia’s interests in the Caspian basin.96 Secondly, multilateral cooperation in Central Asia was no longer focused on the increasingly ineffectual CIS framework. In this sense, the positive evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) represented the most successful outcome of political efforts in this direction. Thirdly, a well thought out bilateral diplomacy would now consistently accompany and support multilateralism. Changes in Russian foreign policy were not the only factor to impact upon Russo-Turkmen bilateralism after 2000. Indeed, the hardening of Russia’s domestic policies also substantially contributed to the improvement of this

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relationship. Since Putin’s accession to power, ‘steadily growing limitation on democracy’97 characterised the Russian political landscape, complicating to a large extent the success of the internal process of political liberalisation. Putin’s ‘centrally sponsored authoritarianism’98 not only revolutionised Russia’s domestic politics, but contributed to changing the perception that authoritarian leaders in the post-Soviet area, and Niyazov in particular, had of the Kremlin’s understanding of authoritarian policies in the near abroad. Simply put, the more authoritarian Russian politics became, the closer post-Soviet dictators moved towards the Kremlin. Recent improvements in Moscow’s relationships with Lukashenka’s Belarus,99 Karimov’s Uzbekistan,100 and, most importantly to the purposes of this study, Niyazov’s Turkmenistan, lend more weight to this proposition. During the Putin era, multilateral cooperation was steadfastly discarded by Turkmen foreign policy-makers intent on completing their emancipation from the CIS. They pointedly refused to participate in the SCO framework, leaving Turkmenistan as the sole Central Asian state uninvolved in this supranational organisation. Bilateralism, then, was the only dimension in which RussoTurkmen relations developed during this period. Interestingly, discussions on energy and economic cooperation became the cornerstone of the relationship. The comparison of themes and rhetoric characterising Russo-Turkmen bilateralism during the Putin years with those of the first four years of the post-Soviet era highlights a striking evolution in the underlying dynamics of this relationship. Economic matters, which hardly featured between 1992 and 1995, became the most important pillar of Russo–Turkmen cooperation in the Putin era. The decision to focus on economic cooperation emerged in the earliest contacts between Putin and Niyazov. In a letter to his Turkmen counterpart (March 2000), the Russian President expressed his satisfaction with ‘positive change in key directions of the Russian-Turkmen cooperation’,101 and emphasised the importance of economic cooperation. A similar tone characterised the telephone conversation that followed (April 2000).102 These contacts prepared the first summit between the two Presidents (Ashgabat, 19 May 2000), at which significant agreements on energy cooperation and a framework agreement on the principles for bilateral trade were finalised. Turkmen propaganda stressed that, after the first meeting between Niyazov and Putin, ‘Turkmen–Russian relations had been entering a new stage, reflecting contemporary realities of political and economic development of the two countries, and a qualitatively higher level of partnership between them in the twenty-first century’.103 The decision to make economic cooperation the single most important aspect of the relationship can be considered a watershed in the evolution of RussoTurkmen bilateralism. For the first time since the break-up of the USSR, the two governments perceived the relationship as the product of converging interests and perspectives, especially in relation to the preferred dimension (energy/ economic) of their interaction. A comparable improvement resulted from the convergence of strategic objectives and, most importantly, from ‘Moscow’s endorsement of [. . .] authoritarian practices’.104 The latter point, central to our

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main argument, emerges even more clearly from the analysis of the political and military dimensions of the bilateral relationship. In the area of military cooperation, the Putin era witnessed a continuing reduction of Moscow’s influence over Turkmenistan. Besides the dismantlement of the Russian Special Unit overseeing Turkmenistan’s borders, an appreciably smaller proportion of Turkmen military personnel received their training in Russia. By the end of 2003, the majority of Turkmen military cadres trained abroad were sent to the Ukraine and Turkey, while only 10 per cent (approximately 450) trained in Russian military academies.105 Russia’s influence over the Turkmen Ministry of Defence also declined as a consequence of the systematic removal of personnel (specifically officers) with a Slavic background from the top echelons of the ministerial structure overseeing Turkmenistan’s armed forces.106 At the same time, the Turkmen government made considerable efforts to expand Turkmenistan’s defence budget, which rose from US$108 million in 1999 to US$157 million in 2000,107 and to some US$200 million at the end of 2003.108 It is important to underline the fact that recent geopolitical shifts in the Central Asian landscape did not impact on Russia’s influence over Turkmenistan’s military policies. Such dilution as did occur was primarily a consequence of the regime’s decision to revise its military cooperation with Moscow. At the moment of the eruption of the Afghan war (October 2001), Turkmenistan limited its support to US military operations in neighbouring Afghanistan ‘to the use of its own ground and air transport corridors to deliver humanitarian freight in the course of the anti-terrorist operation in the region’.109 Turkmen officials repeatedly invoked the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality to explain Turkmenistan’s steadfast refusal to support US military operations against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,110 and, during 2003, its firm stance against the war in Iraq.111 This dynamic regained relevance in 2005, when mounting rumours about the possibility of the establishment of a US military base in Mary velayat (southern Turkmenistan) were given credence by the Russian media.112 Turkmen officials once again rejected such scenarios, stressing the incompatibility of hosting foreign military bases on the territory of Turkmenistan with the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality.113 For his part, Niyazov promptly reassured Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (who incidentally underscored the extent to which Russia respects Turkmenistan’s neutrality) that the rumours were without foundation.114 It is difficult to establish with any degree of certainty the factors that lay behind this disinformation campaign, but there is good reason to believe that the rumours were closely connected to Turkmenistan’s decision to downgrade its membership of the CIS. In this sense, the disinformation campaign can be read as part of the wider Russian strategy designed to express Moscow’s displeasure with the Turkmen regime. As regards political cooperation, an important benchmark was set during the meeting of the Leaders of the Caspian States held in Ashgabat (23–25 April 2002).115 On that occasion, Putin signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Turkmenistan,116 which substantially renewed the provisions contained in

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the Treaty signed by El’tsin in August 1992. Both parties viewed the agreement as ‘a solid foundation for the development of cooperation in the economic and humanitarian spheres’.117 In 1992, a Russo-Turkmen all-inclusive treaty was finalised to boost military cooperation. Ten years later, an analogous document was intended as a more general framework within which to place economic cooperation between the two parties. This development neatly describes the evolution of the larger bilateral agenda. The issue of minority rights became an important feature of the relationship in 2003.118 After the events of 25 November 2002, Turkmen officials initiated an extensive process of repression against dissidents. In this respect, Niyazov informed Russian authorities of his decision to suspend the treaty on dual citizenship in order to facilitate the identification and punishment of those alleged to have attempted to assassinate him.119 Although Russia’s response hinted at general dissatisfaction with Niyazov’s rhetoric,120 the Kremlin’s practical response conveyed altogether different signals. After the reintroduction of the exit visa regime for Turkmen citizens who intended to leave the country (21 February 2003), the former Turkmen President (22 April 2003) signed a decree ‘giving residents of Turkmenistan who hold both Turkmen and Russian citizenship two months to decide which of them they want to keep’.121 This decree completely ignored the provisions on partial cancellation of the dual citizenship agreement of 1993 contained in a bilateral protocol signed in Moscow during the Russo-Turkmen summit of 10–12 April 2003.122 The presidential decree saw a substantial deterioration in the treatment of the Russian minority living in Turkmenistan. Holders of double passports were not only forced to decide hurriedly which citizenship to surrender but, more dramatically, were impeded in their free return to Russia as a result of the exit visa regime and of Turkmenistan’s abrupt decision to abolish most flight connections with Russia. In this controversy, the Russian government made a number of political declarations, but with little practical follow-through. The Russian Duma repeatedly addressed the issue of human rights violations in Turkmenistan (23 May, 2 June, 10 June, 20 June and 22 July 2003),123 and pressed Putin to find a quick political solution. The President, it was claimed, had mishandled the whole issue of dual citizenship in Turkmenistan, and ignored the fact that, according the Russian Constitution, cancellation of the agreement had to be endorsed by the Parliament. Putin responded to these allegations by quoting his frequent phone conversations with Niyazov,124 in which he reportedly obtained guarantees regarding the status of Russians living in Turkmenistan. After the establishment (7 June 2003) of a bilateral commission to deal with the technicalities surrounding the Protocol on the cancellation of the ‘Dual Citizenship’ agreement, the dispute intensified. After another suspension of the commission’s works, unilaterally provoked by Turkmen officials, the Russian MID canvassed more substantive measures to deal with the problem.125 In response to this threat, in the first months of 2004 the Turkmen government relaxed the procedure of the exit visa regime,126 thereby attenuating the intensity

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of the quarrel. The issue was not raised at the first meeting between Niyazov and Russian officials (namely A. Molochlov, Russian Ambassador to Ashgabat127) neither was it mentioned in subsequent political contacts with Putin.128 Two conclusions emerge from this survey of the dispute. First, the two governments did not resolve the issue in a definitive way, preferring instead to lower the intensity of the rhetoric. Second, economic cooperation was not at any stage put at risk by the political quarrel over Turkmenistan’s Russian minority. Significantly, not only did Niyazov meet regularly (and signed important agreements on energy cooperation) with Gazprom chief executives during the most tense period of the political quarrel with Russia, but Putin himself, during his final remarks on the occasion of the signature of the Protocol on cancellation of the ‘Dual Citizenship’ agreement (10 April 2003), elaborated lengthily on the importance of Turkmen gas for Russia’s energy complex, devoting only a few words to the hitherto contested issue of dual citizenship.129 The gas protocol finalised by Putin and Niyazov on 10 April 2003 represented the climax of bilateral energy cooperation. The main outcome of the gas deal was the ‘amalgamation of Turkmen and Russian gas reserves into one export pool under Russian control’.130 More specifically, the agreement regulated the transport and marketing for Turkmen natural gas for a 25-year period.131 Under the new arrangements, Turkmenistan’s gas production could reach 100 bcm per year in 2007. Furthermore, Russia committed itself to buy 6 bcm in 2004, 10 bcm in 2006 and 80–90 bcm in 2009.132 The 2003 Russo-Turkmen gas deal was part of a wider convergence of interests between Moscow and Ashgabat, as both parties approached the finalisation of the agreement on the basis of opportunistic considerations. The Russian government decided to grant almost unconditional support to an extremely authoritarian regime in order to expand its control over the Eurasian energy market. In the case of Turkmenistan, the advantages it gained from the deal have to be assessed in relation to the process of regime consolidation. Niyazov and his associates perceived the finalisation of an economically disadvantageous deal as an essential step towards the strengthening of their relationship with the Kremlin, which they considered as a necessary means by which to dilute the international isolation that was surrounding Turkmenistan in 2003. To all intents and purposes, the deal brought significant economic benefits to Russia exclusively. The impact of the agreement on Russia’s domestic gas market was substantial.133 As the price fixed was extremely low, Russia could continue to sell gas domestically at the pre-agreement price, which was set at US$21.5 per cm. The quantity of gas imported from Turkmenistan also allowed Gazprom to reschedule the exploration of a number of energy fields located in Siberia to a later date. At the same time, the gas agreement gave Moscow considerable leverage over the energy market. The deal confirmed Russia’s monopoly over the transit of energy resources in Eurasia. Most significantly, the agreement greatly reduced the geopolitical and geo-economic relevance of the other pipeline projects in which Turkmenistan had hitherto participated. On the other hand, the deal ‘rendered Turkmenistan wholly dependent on Russian gas

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pipelines’.134 Turkmen gas, according to the provisions of the deal, was sold to Russia at about half the world price, and this drastically reduced the amount of potential revenues for Turkmenistan, even though it did not interrupt the flow of rent directed towards the small circle in power. Politically, the agreement concluded an evolutionary process whereby Russia had become the sole source of international support for the Turkmen regime. Further weight to this conclusion is added by Russia’s reactions to Turkmenistan’s human rights violations in the period immediately prior to the signature of the gas deal. After the events of November 2002, Russian officials issued significant declarations of support135 to Niyazov, endorsing de facto the crackdown against the opposition staged by the Turkmen regime in late 2002 and early 2003. The position taken by the Russian presidency in relation to the dual citizenship dispute clearly indicates that the Kremlin preferred to ‘sell out Russian compatriots’136 living in Turkmenistan rather than place obstacles in the path of the conclusion and subsequent implementation of the agreement.

Conclusion In light of the preceding analysis, the evolution of the Russo-Turkmen relationship can be summarised as follows: As Table 5.1 shows, the multilateral and bilateral dimensions of the relationship evolved in a diverging trajectory; more significantly, the table indicates that, in the different periods, Turkmenistan and Russia accorded different weight to the three main areas of interaction (political, military and economic). Multilateral cooperation evolved according to a linear pattern. Total disentanglement from the activities of the CIS, which Turkmenistan accomplished in 2005, represents the ultimate outcome of a strategy consistently pursued by Turkmen foreign policy-makers from 1992 onwards. Conversely, the bilateral dimension of the relationship represents a more complex phenomenon. This facet of the relationship appears to be connected with the evolution of the regime’s perception of external threats to its stability. The analysis of the period 1992–1995 suggests that bilateral emancipation from Moscow was a primary objective of Turkmen foreign policy and a key consideration for the survival of the regime. During the conceptualisation of the Table 5.1 Qualitative assessment of Turkmenistan’s role in relations with Russia (1992–2006) Time frame

1992–1995 1996–1999 2000–2006

Participation at multilateral Level (CIS) Low Low Very low

Intensity of Bilateral Cooperation in regard to: Political cooperation

Economic cooperation

Military cooperation

Overall relationship

Very high Decreasing High

Very low Increasing Very high

High Decreasing Low

Stable Decreasing High

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Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, and more emphatically after its official adoption, a timid attempt to redirect Turkmenistan’s international partnerships took place. Simply put, Turkmen foreign policy-makers tried to revise Kuliev’s list of strategic partners, to identify external actors that could replace Russia as sources of political, economic and military assistance for Turkmenistan. The main channel through which this objective was pursued was the exclusion of economic cooperation from the agenda of bilateral relations with Russia. Turkmenistan explored the possibilities of more substantial cooperation with other international actors, particularly with those that were located in Turkmenistan’s immediate neighbourhood (Iran, Turkey and Pakistan). As a consequence, Turkmenistan’s cooperation with the former Soviet republics was dramatically reduced. The little success encountered by this strategy increased the economic isolation of Turkmenistan. Such isolation was perceived by the Turkmen regime as detrimental to its internal stability. As we noted earlier, preservation of its hold on power became the regime’s principal political objective from 1998 onwards. Positive Neutrality had to be redirected towards the achievement of this objective, hence the need to redefine the role that Russia might play vis-à-vis the stability of the Niyazov regime. Niyazov and his associates concluded that maintaining a controlled economic, military and political dependency from Russia would strengthen the Kremlin’s support for Turkmenistan. In this sense, the Turkmen regime, following a pattern rather common in the evolution of sultanistic rulership,137 chose its own international patron, even though this choice was contrary to the one it had adopted in an earlier phase. The Russo-Turkmen relationship was profoundly influenced by this realignment. Economic issues began to play a central role in the bilateral agenda from 1998 onwards, when energy cooperation rapidly became the focal point of the entire relationship. Turkmenistan perceived the intensification of the political support granted by the Kremlin to the increasingly isolated Turkmen regime as a necessary precondition for the expansion of its energy cooperation with Moscow. This dynamic would, if anything, gather added momentum during the Putin era. To summarise, Turkmen diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia has been driven by a complex pattern of entangling/disentangling policies that has been constantly reshaped around the necessities of regime survival. The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality is the umbrella under which these policies were implemented. In this sense, after 1998, Positive Neutrality began to pursue what was essentially the opposite of its original goal, as the same policy that was originally framed to emancipate Turkmenistan from Russia became a strategic tool to bring Ashgabat closer to Moscow. The regime’s perception of Russia’s role in the context of its political survival became the single most important factor to have provoked shifts in the operational strategies and medium-term objectives of the policy of Positive Neutrality. Simply put, the operational facet of the policy of neutrality was constantly redirected, as we have seen earlier, to take account of Russia’s shifting role, even though such realignment heightened the inconsistency within Turkmenistan’s foreign policy paradigm.

6

Neutrality as a policy of insulation The international community and human rights violations in Turkmenistan

Western publications often refer to Turkmenistan as ‘the most repressive of all post-Soviet regimes’1 and as one of the most authoritarian anywhere in the world.2 The frequency with which numerous international non-governmental organisations have reported human rights violations within Turkmenistan attests to the gravity of the situation. Amnesty International labelled the human rights record of the government of Turkmenistan as ‘appalling’.3 Nations in Transit, Freedom House’s annual report on the political transitions taking place in the post-Communist area, argued that the Turkmen regime systemically ‘denies civil liberties to its populace, squanders the intellectual and cultural talents of its people, and promotes a reverence to Turkmenbashism and the sage father figure of President Saparmurat Niyazov’.4 Human Rights Watch observed that, at the end of 2006, Turkmenistan’s ‘human rights record [. . .] was disastrous’.5 The Press Freedom Index, released annually by the Paris-based NGO Reporters sans Frontières, regularly sees Turkmenistan (alongside North Korea and Eritrea) at the bottom of the list that ranks countries in terms of their respect for freedom of information.6 Previous chapters have shown7 that the Turkmen regime prevented the emergence of any oppositional force in order to consolidate its power domestically. The methods used to repress Turkmen civil society and to silence political dissent became increasingly aggressive and violent as the regime completed its ‘sultanisation’. The wave of repression that followed the attempt at Niyazov’s life heightened international perceptions of Turkmen authoritarianism. Condemnations by international actors and multilateral organisations became quite regular after November 2002. In 2003, the Parliament of the European Union approved a resolution in which it ‘deplore[d] the deterioration of the human rights situation in Turkmenistan, [. . .] urge[d] the Turkmen authorities to respect Turkmenistan’s obligations under international law and stop the attacks on, and torture and ill-treatment of, political opponents’.8 Emmanuel Decaux, the Rapporteur to Turkmenistan for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, advocated a firmer international response to the deteriorating political situation inside Turkmenistan. In his report, he underlined ‘the importance of a new vigi-

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lance in the light of an effective respect of the commitments of the human dimension, the rule of law, democracy and human rights’9 in Turkmenistan. In April 2004, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights issued a resolution on Turkmenistan that severely condemned ‘the persistence of a governmental policy based on the repression of all political opposition activities’.10 Since its establishment, the Turkmen regime has had to handle several demands calling for political liberalisation. Niyazov and his associates adopted two quite distinct responses to internal and external pressures on human rights. Internally, the regime perceived any relaxation of repressive methods as liable to destabilise its hold on power. It opted therefore for a policy of total intransigence when responding to pressures for political liberalisation emanating from within Turkmenistan. When it came to external demands for political liberalisation, Turkmen officials tended to respond by referring to the declaratory elements of the policy of Positive Neutrality. This chapter seeks to analyse the regime’s responses to international pressures for political liberalisation, in order to identify the dynamic whereby Positive Neutrality was transformed into a ‘fig leaf for permanent human rights abuse’.11 Prima facie, the regime’s response was to ignore these pressures and not to comply with demands made of it. It is difficult to assess the extent to which international criticism actually worried the Turkmen elite. In all probability, Niyazov and his associates interpreted international reports condemning Turkmenistan’s human rights record as a significant indicator of the declining international support for the regime. However, their strategic response was to overlook these reports. The rationale for this policy is somewhat puzzling. The first section of the chapter examines the rhetorical discourse through which Turkmen propaganda has presented the international promotion of human rights as one of the major objectives for the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The second section focuses on the instrumental use that Turkmen officials made of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality when responding to the widespread international condemnation of the Turkmenistan human rights record. This section will, in particular, examine the Turkmen response to pressures for political liberalisation exerted by the UN, the EU and the OSCE. To put it crudely, but not inaccurately, this chapter argues that the Niyazov regime’s response to international criticism was heightened repression at home and increased attempts to insulate from international pressure – a strategy to which the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was assigned an important role. Positive Neutrality therefore became equivalent to ‘insulation’, a status that the regime understood as essential in the reinforcement of its internal stability. The policy of insulation can be characterised as the ensemble of efforts coordinated by the Turkmen regime to seal Turkmenistan off from unwanted external influences on the Turkmen domestic landscape, especially as far as human rights were concerned. This policy had two main strategic prongs: (1) the cosmetic support for human rights discourse and instruments; and (2) the

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adoption of a low-profile attitude, at times bordering on passivity, in relation to international criticisms. The first strategy was driven through the rhetorical presentation to domestic and international audiences of the Turkmen regime as a supporter of human rights. The second was, in turn, driven by regularly ignoring the criticisms of Turkmenistan’s human rights record advanced by the international community.

Human rights rhetoric in the Turkmen foreign policy paradigm Turkmen propaganda has rhetorically over-emphasised the importance accorded to human rights in the Turkmen political system. Paradoxically, the collapse of the USSR was defined as the event that initiated ‘the transition from totalitarianism to democracy’.12 The primacy of human rights in Turkmenistan’s constitutional system is enshrined in the Constitutional text itself.13 The independent Turkmen state was said to be conceptually organised around a number of principles, including such ‘universal values as humanism, the civil rights of the people and their basic interests’.14 These values, it was claimed, also inspired the country’s foreign policy.15 The tone and content of Turkmenistan’s principal foreign policy pronouncements reflect the centrality assigned by official propaganda to human rights. The Foreign Policy Concept of Turkmenistan as a Neutral State stressed that Turkmenistan ‘shall recognise and honour the basic democratic rights and freedoms recorded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and seeks to create political, economic, legal, and other safeguards for those freedoms to be exercised’.16 Further, the Declaration on International commitments assumed by Neutral Turkmenistan in the area of human rights, approved by the Khalk Maslakhaty in December 1995, insisted that Turkmenistan is ‘aware of the responsibility to safeguard and protect the basic human rights and freedoms coming out of the country’s assuming the internationally-recognised permanent neutrality status’.17 The Turkmen regime also claimed that, prior to the official adoption of the doctrine, a number of state institutions (notably the Committee for International and Inter-Parliamentarian Relations of the Mejlis) ensured that the declaratory aspects of Turkmen foreign policy would neatly accord with the parameters set by international law, and especially the UN Charter.18 Official propaganda aimed at an international audience also claimed that Turkmen operational foreign policy accorded special importance to universal humanitarian values. Former Foreign Minister Shikhmuradov repeatedly argued that, in implementing the policy of Positive Neutrality, ‘Turkmenistan recognises and respects the human rights and freedoms adopted by the world community and reflected in the norms of the international law’.19 Former President Niyazov described the ‘recognition and respect of main rights and freedoms of citizens adopted by the world community’20 as the single most important guideline for Turkmen neutralism.

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Turkmen officials sought to reinforce this impression by arguing that: one of the important components of the political course undertaken by Turkmenistan is the human dimension. In this area, our country carries out joint work with international organisations [. . .] to create real guarantees of enjoyment of personal, political, economic social and other rights of citizens. (Statement by His Excellency Mr. Rashid Meredov, UN, 27 September 2004)21 One explanation went so far as to assert that: the philosophy of neutrality has become an important factor for conflict-free internal development, for the creation in multi-ethnic Turkmenistan of conditions of harmony among faiths, races and ethnic groups, political stability and social partnership; and for the consistent humanisation of all aspects of public life. [. . .] Five years of Neutrality have provided them [the Turkmen citizens] with the opportunity for peaceful and constructive labour in conditions of internal harmony and stability, [. . .] the gradual introduction of democratic standards and institutions, and the elevation of the country in the near future to the ranks of the world’s modern developed states. (UN Doc. A/55/732)22 To translate such statements into concrete political acts, the regime proposed the launch of a number of initiatives. To begin with, Turkmenistan presented its accession to the United Nations and to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as indirect confirmations of the intention of the Turkmen leadership to respect human rights principles enshrined in international law. Second, in the first half of the 1990s, the Turkmen government declared its intention to transform Ashgabat into a regional and international centre for peace talks.23 In this sense, neutrality was seen as enabling Turkmenistan to play a role comparable to that played by Switzerland in the European and international arenas. Third, the Turkmen government announced, in 1997, the opening of the National Democracy and Human Rights Institute, operating under the supervision of the Presidential Administration. The Institute, whose primary duties are the promotion24 and the monitoring of human rights in Turkmenistan,25 was portrayed by the Turkmen regime as a highly prestigious institution. The prominent role assigned to the Institute in negotiations26 with international actors, and the high profile of two of the Institute’s directors (Kepbanov from 1997 to 2001 and Foreign Minister Rashid Ovezgeldiyevich Meredov27 from July 2001 to 28 February 2005) were meant to support this image. Fourth, the Turkmen government decided to become a party to the major international conventions on human rights. The Turkmen government acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) on 19 October 1993, as the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was ratified on

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29 October 1994. In May 1997, Turkmenistan joined in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), as it acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) on 1 August 1997. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) was also signed by Turkmen officials on 25 July 1999.28 Finally, the regime has made considerable play on the occasional improvements of the Turkmen human rights record. The reform of the Turkmen judicial system introduced in 2000, which incidentally abolished the death penalty, was lauded by official propaganda as ‘clear evidence of Turkmenistan’s adherence to its international commitments in protecting and respecting individual rights and freedoms’.29 In March 2004, the regime relaxed the exit visa regime and approved new legislation for the registration of religious organisations. The introduction of these reforms was regulated by a presidential decree which was rhetorically portrayed as ‘pursuant to the international commitments to the norms and principles in the field of human rights and freedoms recognized by the international community’.30 At the rhetorical level, the Turkmen regime sought to present itself as a supporter and guardian of human rights, but as the regime’s human rights record progressively worsened, this strategy soon lost any effectiveness it may have once had. As Turkmenistan’s human rights rhetoric became progressively less persuasive, the international community began to question the regime’s domestic policies on a more regular basis.

Insulating Turkmenistan: Positive Neutrality and human rights As time went on, the international community reported with increasing frequency that the Turkmen regime had systematically violated civil and political liberties since its establishment. Turkmenistan’s standard response was to ignore any international calls for an improvement in the regime’s human rights record. There were nevertheless a few isolated initiatives. These were formulated through official documents and generally followed a clearly recognisable structure. First, the regime recalled the rhetorical architecture described earlier and situated the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality within it. It then went on to outline the occasional efforts to relax its repressive methods. Generally, these pronouncements were seldom followed by concrete action. In short, the regime systematically failed to comply with the requests advanced by the international community. Turkmenistan’s voluntary retreat from the international arena entailed a number of steps. To begin with, the Turkmen regime opted not to implement many of the human rights instruments to which it had acceded. As one OSCE report explained, Turkmenistan had failed ‘to report to the treaty-bodies or to the special procedures of the Human Rights Commission, as well as to the ILO

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procedures’.31 Turkmenistan’s initial reports to the CRC and CEDAW Committees have been overdue for almost a decade.32 As of December 2007, the Turkmen government has not presented periodic reports to the various treaty bodies that were meant to monitor compliance with the CCPR, CESCR and CAT. In other words, Turkmenistan’s accession to human rights treaties had little positive impact over the process of political liberalisation. A somewhat more cooperative attitude was shown in relation to the CERD. On 12 August 2004, Turkmenistan submitted its report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which operates under the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. This document clearly illustrates the duality intrinsic to Turkmenistan’s human rights policy. On the one hand, the Turkmen government presented a rather vague (and well overdue)33 report, which yet again underlined the crucial position occupied by humanitarian values in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. The report argued that: [T]he status of permanent neutrality proclaimed by Turkmenistan and recognised and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and Turkmenistan’s international commitments associated with this status, have been influential in securing equality between citizens and compliance with international demands to ban all form of discriminations. (UN Doc. CERD/C/441/Add.1)34 But, as the Committee noted, the report was grossly deficient given ‘the lack of consistent data relating to the ethnic composition of the population’.35 The CERD’s primary concern is the respect of minority rights. The failure to provide a reliable estimate of the Turkmen ethnic balance drastically reduced the utility of the report. Its vagueness and inaccuracies were deliberately aimed at concealing Turkmenistan’s poor human rights record. On examining the Turkmen report, the CERD committee issued a highly negative assessment, with 20 of the 29 chapters in the document attracting negative comments (listed in the subsection ‘Concerns and recommendations’).36 As part of the policy of insulation, Turkmenistan opted not to comply with the various demands contained in official documents issued by international organisations and foreign states critical of the political situation in Turkmenistan. As noted earlier, the repressive campaign launched by the regime after November 2002 changed the attitude of the international community. Multilateral organisations, foreign states and NGOs began, with increasing frequency and vehemence, to express their concern for Turkmenistan’s poor human rights record. Most of the condemnation emanated from multilateral organisations. A small number of states, notably the United States, were also critical of the deteriorating situation in Turkmenistan and raised this issue in their bilateral relations with the Turkmen government. For its part, the Turkmen regime largely ignored these representations, choosing not to respond in any significant way.

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Here, we limit ourselves to an examination of Turkmenistan’s responses to criticisms advanced by multilateral international organisations. Of these, the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe were most vocal in denouncing Turkmenistan’s human rights violations. The rhetorical flourishes that characterised Turkmen official responses and the passivity that followed them may be regarded as two facets of the same policy, the net effect of which was to accentuate Turkmen insulation and reduce international support for the regime. UN criticism on human rights The Turkmen government has repeatedly affirmed that ‘a priority area of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy is cooperation with the United Nations’,37 whose ‘aims and principles’38 are supposedly granted a pivotal role in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. In reality, notwithstanding regime rhetoric, Turkmenistan has generally played a passive role in the United Nations. The consistency with which the Turkmen government maintained its non-cooperative attitude largely accounts for the negativity of UN reactions to the deteriorating human rights situation in Turkmenistan. The UN Human Rights Commission issued two resolutions (2003/11 on 16 April 2003 and 2004/12 on 15 April 2004) condemning human rights abuses in Turkmenistan. The 2003 Resolution denounced: the persistence of a governmental policy based on the repression of all political opposition activities and on the abuse of the legal system through arbitrary detention, imprisonment and surveillance of persons who tried to exercise their freedoms of thought. (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/34/Rev.1)39 The text was adopted by a vote of 23 in favour to 16 against (Russia included), with 14 abstentions. Turkmenistan vehemently reacted against the adoption of this document, which may be considered the UN’s first significant step in denouncing the appalling human rights record of the Turkmen regime. During the Commission’s deliberations, a representative of the Turkmen government declared that ‘the emergence of the draft resolution on the human rights situation in Turkmenistan was an unpleasant surprise’,40 given the efforts the government had made to promote human rights. Not surprisingly, no significant relaxation of the regime’s oppressive policies followed the adoption of the Resolution. The resolution agreed to by the UN Human Rights Commission in 2004 was even harsher and firmer in the condemnation of Turkmenistan. The text expressed concern over Turkmenistan’s poor human record and urged the Turkmen government [T]o ensure full respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the freedoms of expression, religion, association and assembly;

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the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law and the protection of the rights of persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, and to stop imprisoning conscientious objectors. (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/34/Rev.1)41 The resolution was passed by a vote of 25 to 11, with 17 abstentions, amongst which Russia’s was the most notable.42 Turkmen officials did not comment on the adoption of this resolution, nor did they respond in any practical way to the demands it contained. No official comment appeared in the pages of Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan immediately after the release of the document. However, Niyazov made his displeasure known by commenting publicly on the need to accelerate the reform of the United Nations, in order to protect the ‘interests of all nations, big and small’.43 Other UN bodies were also critical of the Turkmen regime. After 2002, the Third Committee of UN General Assembly, which is focused on social, humanitarian and cultural issues, regularly discussed the situation in Turkmenistan. Between 2003 and 2005, the Committee drafted three reports on Turkmenistan. It is important to underline the fact that the Russian Federation, the most prominent international supporter of the Turkmen regime, did not appear in the list of countries sponsoring the Committee’s reports. These texts were endorsed by the General Assembly in 2003, 2004 and 2005, when the Assembly passed44 resolutions highly critical of the human rights situation in Turkmenistan. The two most recent documents (A/Res/59/206 issued in 2004; A/Res/60/172 issued in 2005) requested the UN Secretary-General to submit a report to the Assembly ‘on the implementation of the present resolution’.45 This provision, not contained in the text of the earliest resolution on Turkmenistan (A/Res/58/194 issued in 2003), reflected a more coercive use of language and a desire to monitor the country’s human rights record more closely. None of the three UN resolutions made any reference to the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. An examination of voting patterns for the three resolutions indicates a shift in Russia’s voting behaviour. Moscow voted in favour of Resolution A/58/194 (2003), opposed Resolution A/59/206 (2004), and abstained in the vote for Resolution A/60/172 (2005). The milder tones of the text of the first resolution and, more importantly, the fact that the draft text was discussed shortly after the dispute between Moscow and Ashgabat on the situation of the Russian minority in Turkmenistan, might have prompted Russia to show its displeasure with Turkmenistan. However, Russia strongly opposed the adoption of the following two resolutions, which, in fact, carried a much stronger condemnation of the Turkmen regime. Turkmenistan’s official reaction to the three UN resolutions was generally passive. Although the Turkmen delegation to the United Nations opposed Resolution A/58/194 (2003),46 it did not comment publicly on the document. The Turkmen press made no mention of this resolution when listing the most significant events in Turkmenistan’s international life for 2003.47 References to

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the document were also absent in the statement delivered by Turkmen Foreign Minister Meredov to the 60th session of the UN General Assembly. Meredov briefly touched upon the ‘human dimension’48 of Turkmen foreign policy, but said nothing about Turkmenistan’s failure to respond to the requests contained in Resolution A/58/194 and, more significantly, he made little mention of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Turkmenistan opposed, somewhat more vehemently, the passing of Resolution A/59/206 (2004). Speaking before the Third Committee, Meredov gave a glowing account of the human rights situation in Turkmenistan.49 During the plenary discussion on the report presented by the Third Committee, Turkmenistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ataeva, stressed ‘the active, open and constructive approach taken by Turkmenistan to resolve issues pertaining to the advancement of human rights’,50 declared her aversion to country-specific draft resolutions, and requested the Assembly ‘to consider other ways of achieving human rights goals than the biased and selective use of such resolutions’.51 Ataeva then presented a no-action motion, which was voted against by 76 members of the Assembly. On this occasion, Russia supported the Turkmen position and abstained from voting. Once the resolution was approved, the Turkmen government resumed its passive stance. Throughout January 2005, the Turkmen press failed to comment in any way on the resolution. The Turkmen government, for its part, did not issue any official declaration on the matter, nor did it introduce any measures in response to the UN resolution. Official statements made by Turkmen officials within the UN framework made no reference to Resolution A/59/206 (2004). In late 2005, Foreign Minister Meredov and Permanent Representative Ataeva addressed the General Assembly. The contents of these statements did not substantially differ from those presented in previous documents. In fact, after remarking that ‘Turkmenistan consistently undertakes efforts to create and develop real guarantees of realisation of personal, political, economic, social and other rights of citizens’,52 both documents emphasised the important role played by the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality in relation to human rights.53 EU criticism on human rights The European Union, too, became increasingly critical of the repressive policies implemented by the Turkmen regime. Turkmenistan’s appalling human rights record became an insurmountable obstacle to any improvement in the bilateral relationship. Turkmenistan would often claim that its partnership with the European Union was solidly based, pointing to significant successes in the economic field54 and the beneficial effects on the promotion of universal humanitarian values within Turkmen society.55 For its part, the European Union had a very different view, as it has reported that the status of its bilateral relationship with Turkmenistan is not advanced.56

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The European Union and Turkmenistan signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in May 1998. However, by the end of 2007 most member states and the EU Parliament itself had yet to ratify it. An Interim Agreement, signed in November 1998, met a similar fate. As these agreements did not become fully operational, the EU–Turkmen relationship was still regulated by the 1989 Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation concluded between the European Community and the Soviet Union. EU concern with the human rights situation in Turkmenistan grew appreciably after November 2002. In the immediate aftermath of the attempt on Niyazov’s life, the European Union preferred to convey its criticism through other international organisations, whose activities were more directly embedded within the domestic Turkmen situation. In fact, the earliest EU declarations on Turkmenistan were presented to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. On 19 December 2002, during a Council meeting, the delegate from Denmark, which held the EU presidency for the second half of 2002, observed that the ‘necessary measures are not being taken to comply with Turkmenistan’s international human rights obligations, including OSCE commitments’,57 and expressed the Union’s growing concern over the situation in Turkmenistan. Following this statement, the European Union made a point of following Turkmen politics much more closely. As the Turkmen regime did not ease its repressive policies, the European Union began to criticise human rights violations with increasing regularity. On 12 June and 24 July 2003,58 European representatives on the OSCE Permanent Council returned to raise the issue of human rights in Turkmenistan, observing that ‘no progress has been made’59 in that regard following previous EU statements. However, the Turkmen regime chose to ignore the demands contained in the EU documents of July 2003, which led, in turn, to heightened EU criticism. On 23 October 2003, the EU Parliament passed an ad hoc resolution severely condemning abuses of human rights in Turkmenistan. The draft ‘call[ed] on the government of Turkmenistan to move swiftly towards democracy and the rule of law, to conduct democratic elections under the supervision of international observers and to restore the legitimate power of Parliament’.60 As before, the Turkmen government offered no response to the resolution and made no attempt to adjust its policies in line with EU demands. After the resolution of October 2003, the European Union did not issue any further statements on Turkmenistan. However, its representatives continued to express their criticisms within the major international institutions. On 20 December 2004, during the General Assembly debate on Turkmenistan, the delegate of the Netherlands, who then held the EU presidency, strongly opposed the no-action motion proposed by Turkmen Permanent Representative Ataeva, insisting that the adoption of the resolution was made necessary by ‘the fact that the overall picture of human rights in Turkmenistan remains one of serious concern and requires the greatest attention of our Organisation’.61 A similar strategy was implemented by the EU representatives within the OSCE framework. Delegates from both the EU Presidencies for 2006 (Austria and Finland)

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were most vocal in condemning the abuses perpetrated by the regime and presented two statements before the OSCE Permanent Council.62 Thereafter, the European Union treated the human rights issue as a serious impediment to the development of its relationship with Turkmenistan.63 On 4 October 2006, the International Trade Committee of the EU Parliament adopted a resolution in which it decided to stop the negotiations on an interim trade agreement with Turkmenistan, and stressed that discussions on that particular matter will be reinstated only ‘if concrete progress on the human rights situation is achieved’ by the Turkmen regime.64 OSCE criticism on human rights Since Turkmenistan’s accession to the OSCE (30 January 1992), human rights have been a critical issue in its relationship with the organisation. The establishment of a Permanent Centre in Ashgabat is the most visible element of OSCE involvement in Turkmenistan. The Centre, operational since January 1999, was originally designed to ‘promote the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments as well as the cooperation of Turkmenistan within the OSCE framework, with special emphasis on the regional context, in all OSCE dimensions, including the economic, environmental, human and political aspects of security and stability’.65 The Centre organised its activities around three main macro-areas of competence: political-military, economic-environmental and human, with a special focus on ‘rule of law and human rights; democratization and civil society; migration; gender issues; education’.66 The Centre also established regular contacts with Turkmen officials as well as with non-governmental social actors, granted assistance in relation to its three main areas of expertise, and launched different programmes in cooperation with the Turkmen government. The Centre was intended as ‘political antenna channelling regular information to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the internal and external developments’67 of Turkmenistan. More importantly, it served as a transmission belt between civil society and the central government, to which it reported claims of human rights violations made by Turkmen citizens and other actors of Turkmen civil society. The efficacy of the Centre’s activities depended, of course, upon the level of cooperation extended by the Turkmen regime. Its engagement was limited to small initiatives, which had to be coordinated with the Turkmen government. Given the strict control that the regime exercised over all facets of the Turkmen political life, only citizens selected by the regime had access to these initiatives.68 The Centre reported to the OSCE the frequent violations of human rights occurring in Turkmenistan.69 Using its valuable field experience, the Centre was able to set in motion a process that commanded that attention of different OSCE organs and institutions. Several OSCE Chairmen in Office (CiO) who visited Turkmenistan throughout the years would regularly raise the issue of human rights during their

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meetings with Turkmen authorities. The Turkmen government’s responses were predictably passive. In June 2001, Mircea Geoana, Romanian Foreign Minister and OSCE CiO, visited Turkmenistan, where he held meetings with Niyazov, Foreign Minister Berdyev and Meredov, then Speaker of the Turkmen Mejlis. Political liberalisation and respect for human rights were the crucial issues on Geoana’s political agenda. He later reported that an agreement was reached with Turkmen officials on cooperation in the area of human rights.70 He went on to describe his visit as a positive ‘step towards re-engaging Turkmenistan on the human dimension of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’.71 However, as with previous initiatives, OSCE pressure appeared to have no discernible effect on the extent of human rights violations. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Netherlands’ Foreign Minister and OSCE CiO, visited Turkmenistan in March 2003. During his meeting with Niyazov, the OSCE Chairman pressed the former Turkmen President on specific human rights issues, most specifically the detention of environmental activist Farid Tukhbatullin, the recent introduction of restrictive pieces of legislation, and, most importantly, Turkmenistan’s refusal to cooperate with the Mission of E. Decaux, OSCE Rapporteur to Turkmenistan.72 The words of de Hoop Scheffer had no effect on Turkmen officials, who continued to ignore international criticism of the regime’s human rights record. Requests by OSCE CiO Dimitrij Rupel (Slovenian Foreign Minister), who visited Turkmenistan in April 2005, met a similarly non-cooperative response. Although the Chairman expressed confidence after his visit that ‘OSCE standards would be applied in Turkmenistan in the future’,73 the Turkmen regime made no visible effort to restrict its repressive methods and continued with systematic violations of civil and political rights. The Turkmen government did make one small concession: in late 2005, the Turkmen delegation participated in the Annual OSCE Human Dimension Meeting, held in Warsaw, an activity that it had not undertaken for several years. Within the OSCE framework, the ODIHR74 became the loudest and most frequent critic of Turkmenistan’s human rights record. The first step in the interaction between the ODIHR and Turkmenistan took place in 1997. At that time, the ODIHR had started negotiations with the Central Asian states on five Memoranda of Understanding dealing with the development of civil society in the region. No agreement was concluded with Turkmenistan. The ODIHR labelled Turkmenistan ‘the worst offender of OSCE commitments for democratic elections’.75 It refused to deploy official observers to the election of the Turkmen Mejlis on 12 December 1999, arguing that the Turkmen electoral framework fell short of OSCE commitments contained in the 1991 Copenhagen Document.76 On the occasion of the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Turkmen government refused to grant entry visas to ODIHR observers, impeding the international monitoring of the electoral process. After the official publication of the electoral results, prominent members of the National Democracy and Human Rights Institute claimed that the Turkmen vote had complied

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with most international regulations, and with the requirements of the principal international organisation, including the OSCE.77 Since the outset of the new regime, Turkmenistan seems to have engaged in a more productive relationship with the ODIHR,78 which deployed a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) to the Turkmen presidential election of 11 February 2007. It is nevertheless critical to underline the fact that the initial steps towards the establishment of the NAM were not made by the Turkmen interim government, which accepted the deployment of the mission only after it received a letter from the ODIHR, in which the organisation’s Director indicated ‘that OSCE/ODIHR had an interest to conduct a NAM to Turkmenistan’79 in early January 2007. Due to time constraints,80 the ODIHR could only deploy an Election Support Team – and not a standard Election Observation Mission – to the February 2007 election, whose democratic credibility, as we have seen earlier,81 was nevertheless questioned by many international observers. The OSCE has been responsible for leading the single most important initiative of condemnation for the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Turkmen regime. Following the events of November 2002, in late December 2002 ten OSCE member states (Germany, the United States, Austria, Canada, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway and Sweden), activated the rarely used Human Dimension Mechanism, also known as the Moscow Mechanism. As a consequence, a Special Rapporteur was appointed to investigate on the events of 25 November. According to the provisions of Article 10 of the Moscow Document, the Turkmen government had the option of appointing a second rapporteur from a list of governmental officials presented to the OSCE. The Turkmen regime failed to do so and, as a consequence, the ODIHR issued a unilateral report based on the fact-finding mission headed by Professor Emmanuel Decaux. The mandate of the mission was ‘to investigate all matters relating to the conduct of the investigations, including allegations of torture’82 perpetrated by the Turkmen regime in the aftermath of November 2002. The report outlined the legal frameworks (international and Turkmen) within which allegations of human rights abuses had to be considered. It then carefully reported the results of the mission, describing with great precision the different aspects of the repression that followed the attempt on Niyazov’s life. The report ended with a number of recommendations that addressed both the international community and the Turkmen government. It is instructive to note that Decaux used this opportunity to issue a strong condemnation of the course of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. He argued that ‘[the] permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan cannot be reduced to the absentee policy when it comes to the mere accountability of the implementation of international commitments, before OSCE human dimension meetings, UN treatybodies or ILO committees’.83 This assessment lends weight to the argument developed in this chapter, namely that the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was consciously used as a shield to protect the Turkmen regime from international criticism of its human rights violations.

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The report called on the international community to monitor the Turkmen situation with greater frequency, as ‘international guarantees are an important element in the strengthening of domestic guarantees’.84 Turkmenistan’s reaction to the report was predictably ambiguous. On the one hand, it ignored the allegations contained in the report and made no effort to change or moderate its repressive policy. On the other hand, the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded angrily to the OSCE decision to give the situation in Turkmenistan a higher priority. The Turkmen Delegation to the OSCE issued an ad hoc document, in which it strongly criticised the release of the report, describing it as an ‘attempt to exert pressure on Turkmenistan’.85 Paradoxically, the Turkmen response to the OSCE report condemns the one-sideness of this document, even though Turkmenistan had chosen not to appoint a rapporteur.

Conclusion In response to mounting international criticism, the Turkmen regime implemented a two-pronged strategy designed to insulate Turkmenistan against external pressures. The first prong of the strategy was developed most actively between 1992 and 1995, when the Turkmen elite presented the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality to the international community. In asking the United Nations to endorse neutrality, the Niyazov regime was searching for a guarantee of ‘noninterference’ in its internal affairs.86 In other words, it was hoping that the grandiloquent principles enunciated in the context of Positive Neutrality would somehow earn it the kind of credit that would lead the international community to turn a blind eye to its human rights violations. The United Nations did endorse Turkmenistan’s neutrality but expected, in return, that Turkmenistan would respect the universal principles enshrined in the Charter. In the light of the regime’s systematic violation of human rights, especially after 1997–1998, Turkmenistan’s declaratory policy lost credibility and the international community became increasingly vocal in its criticism of Turkmenistan’s human rights record. As international support for Niyazov and his associates progressively eroded, the regime was left little option but to turn towards Russia for support. The strengthening of the relationship with Moscow, in fact, constitutes the second prong of Turkmenistan’s insulating strategy, which was pursued with increasing emphasis after 2002 when international criticism of the Turkmen regime intensified considerably. As condemnation of its repressive policies intensified, Turkmenistan withdrew into a cocoon of self-imposed isolation, except for the progressive strengthening of the strategic alliance with Putin’s Russia. Faced with the steady erosion of international support, which no doubt the regime perceived as a threat to its future stability, the Niyazov strategy entailed, on the one hand, a passive response to external pressures and, on the other, a steady rapprochement with Russia. The more assertive the demands of the

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international community, the closer the Turkmen regime got to Russia. Insulation therefore became equivalent to isolation, especially in terms of relations with the West. The Turkmen regime devised a strategy that it hoped would effectively shield it from destabilisation, even though it had no intention of complying with the international conventions on human rights or of responding positively to international criticism. Positive Neutrality played a significant, if at times rhetorical, function in the development of both prongs of the strategy.

7

Turkmen foreign policy in the post-Niyazov era

Since the death of S.A. Niyazov, a large number of international observers began to look with growing interest at G.M. Berdymuhammedov’s foreign policy, speculating whether the new Turkmen President would promote a significant shift from the policy strategy of his predecessor. More particularly, the international community expected the new Turkmen leadership to reshape three key foreign policy areas:1 • • •

The interpretation and implementation of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality; Turkmenistan’s energy strategy; The relationship with the Russian Federation.

During 2007, many of Berdymuhammedov’s foreign policy initiatives were interpreted as indicators of a departure from the policy paradigm consolidated in the Niyazov years. The participation of a Turkmen delegation at the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Bishkek, 16 August 2007), the energy negotiations that the Turkmen government held with China, together with the organisation of a summit of CIS Heads of Government in Ashgabat (22 November 2007) were amongst the events that convinced a great number of Western observers of the emergence of evolutionary developments within Turkmenistan’s foreign policy and, ultimately, about the imminent abandonment of the policy of Positive Neutrality.2 This brief chapter centres its attention on the role played by the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality in the foreign policy paradigm of post-Niyazov Turkmenistan. The aim here is to establish whether the Berdymuhammedov regime has promoted a foreign policy strategy that is to any degree different from that operating between 1992 and 2006. To this end, the chapter, much like the body of the book itself, will grant equal relevance to both stages (declaratory and operational) of the new regime’s foreign policy. Our analysis will first attempt to detect whether, after the end of the Niyazov era, the Turkmen government had engaged in revisions of the declaratory statement of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The chapter will then focus on the operationalisation of the doctrine in the post-Niyazov era to ascertain whether new policy ends motivated the adoption of new strategies.

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Initially, the chapter will examine the declaratory stage of Berdymuhammedov’s foreign policy. After discussing the relevance given to foreign policy in the electoral campaign of early 2007, this section will investigate whether, during 2007, the Turkmen elite initiated a revision of the doctrine’s body and will then go on to analyse the role assigned to the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality in the regime rhetoric of the post-Niyazov era. The second section will, in turn, focus on the operationalisation of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality in the Berdymuhammedov era. Two main issues, notably the regime’s energy policy and its interpretation of the strategic partnership with the Kremlin, will be discussed in order to throw light on the existence of new operational approaches. Overall, this chapter will argue that Turkmenistan’s foreign policy did not experience change following the death of Niyazov. In spite of the adoption of a more proactive posture in the global arena – which, to all intents and purposes, was intended to increase the international legitimisation of the regime headed by Berdymuhammedov – the new Turkmen leadership did not elaborate, neither did it promote, a new foreign policy. After Niyazov’s death, Turkmenistan’s foreign policy, which at the end of 2007 remained firmly under the conceptual umbrella of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, continued to pursue targets closely related to the dynamics of regime preservation.

Declaratory foreign policy On 21 December 2006, a few hours after his appointment as Turkmenistan’s interim leader, Berdymuhammedov issued his first foreign policy statement in which he declared that Turkmenistan would stay committed to the policy of Positive Neutrality.3 In stating his intention to follow the policy strategy set by his predecessor, Berdymuhammedov listed ‘good neighbourliness, mutual respect, equality and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries worldwide’,4 as the guiding principles for Turkmenistan’s foreign policy in the postNiyazov era. The tone and content of this declaration shared a striking degree of similarity with statements on foreign policy issued by Turkmen officials during the Niyazov years. This suggests that, from the outset, Berdymuhammedov decided not to bring discontinuity into the declaratory statement of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. In other words, he opted to stay fully committed to the policy of Positive Neutrality. As we will see in this segment of the chapter, this attitude has not changed throughout his first year in office. The regime’s intention to persevere with the policy of neutrality was also flagged during the electoral campaign that led to the presidential election of February 2007. Although the campaign was to all intents and purposes orchestrated by the central regime, the analysis of statements made by one or more candidates on specific issues is critical if we are to understand the regime’s top policy priorities. As we have seen previously (see Chapter 2, pp. 44–5), all candidates were carefully selected by the interim leadership, which also strictly regulated

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their political agendas. It follows that the six candidates have to be considered as spokespersons for the central regime. As Askar Abdrakhmanov has suggested, ‘the new leaders [of Turkmenistan] used alternate candidates to inform the nation about some of their plans’5 through a precise strategy: at least two candidates would elaborate on a specific issue to illustrate the regime’s position on that matter. This was certainly true for a number of policy platforms within the socio-economic area.6 The following evidence will demonstrate that foreign policy did not constitute the exception to this norm. As Turkmenistan’s place in the world and global politics were not key topics in the electoral campaign of January–February 2007, the leadership’s intention to reinforce its commitment to Positive Neutrality was the only foreign policy issue presented to the Turkmen electorate. Berdymuhammedov himself failed to elaborate at length on foreign policy throughout the campaign. The duty of presenting the regime’s foreign policy strategy to the wider Turkmen population was assigned to M. Gurbanov and A. Atadzhikov. Throughout the campaign, neither candidate issued declarations hinting to any degree at the emergence of new directions in the country’s foreign policy. In early January 2007, Gurbanov stated that the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality and its economic segment (the Open Doors policy) would establish Turkmenistan as a ‘significant peace-keeping centre in Central Asia’.7 While the themes and rhetoric of this statement did not differ from official declarations issued during the Niyazov era, the reference to the Open Doors Policy represented a relatively innovative element in Turkmen declaratory foreign policy. As we have seen earlier (see Chapter 4, pp. 74–5), this policy was de facto abandoned after 1998. Gurbanov’s words might have flagged the regime’s intention to restore the Open Doors policy. This significant policy shift failed to occur, as specific reference to the Open Doors policy is missing in documents and statements issued by the Turkmen MID throughout 2007. Most importantly, Turkmen economic foreign policy continued to operate along the lines set in the late Niyazov era, which did not take into consideration the operational mechanism established by the Open Doors policy. Atadzhikov’s campaign statements, to an even greater degree, echoed foreign policy documents issued during the Niyazov era. In January 2007, while addressing the population of the Tashauz velayat, he underlined that ‘Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality, supported by 185 nations in 1995, will not only guarantee the future development of our country, but will also allow Turkmenistan to play a key role in the overall stability of the Central Asian region’.8 Vague rhetoric, presentation of well ridden clichés along with an absolute lack of information about operational strategies characterised this statement just as they did with Turkmenistan’s declaratory foreign policy in the Niyazov era.9 The analysis of statements on foreign policy made by presidential candidates Gurbanov and Atadzhikov during the electoral campaign lends weight to two important propositions. On the one hand, it indicates that the regime did not intend to abandon the policy of neutrality. On the other, it suggests that no

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revision of the declaratory statement of the policy was performed by the Turkmen regime in early 2007. In relation to rhetoric, themes and general tone, foreign policy statements issued during the electoral campaign of 2007 were reminiscent of official documents published immediately after the formulation of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. This attitude has not changed throughout the Berdymuhammedov era. After his inauguration, President Berdymuhammedov began to refer with increasing regularity to the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality while addressing foreign policy issues. Although reference to the doctrine was completely absent in the speech delivered at his inauguration (14 February 2007),10 the President underlined the central role played by the principle of neutrality within Turkmenistan’s foreign policy paradigm during a number of important occasions, most notably his interview with the Chinese press agency Xinhua (February 2007),11 his visit to the People’s Republic of China (July 2007),12 and in his first address to the UN General Assembly (26 September 2007).13 Continuity with the declaratory foreign policy of the Niyazov era is particularly evident in Berdymuhammedov’s UN address, perhaps the single most important foreign policy speech delivered by the Turkmen President in 2007. The text presented by Berdymuhammedov to the UN General Assembly contained all the defects that the analysis presented in Chapter 1 (see pp. 27–30) had identified in the original draft of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality: obscure rhetoric, misleading information and no evidence of operational strategies to achieve the altogether vaguely defined policy targets. Further, the draft presented the adoption of the policy of neutrality as a key factor behind the (alleged) flourishing socio-political situation enjoyed by Turkmenistan’s population.14 This rhetorical sentence ultimately aimed at glorifying the regime that formulated the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. Its inclusion in the draft establishes a direct connection with the regime rhetoric of the Niyazov era. Since the outset of Berdymuhammedov’s presidency, the Turkmen leadership has continued to depict a misleading image of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality – and, in this case, of its impact on the daily life of Turkmen citizens – when presenting it to the Turkmen population.15 As we have seen in Chapter 3 (see pp. 53–9), this particular strategy was widely used by Turkmen nation-builders during the Niyazov era. Idealising the policy through the misrepresentation of its achievements is equivalent to the glorification of the regime that framed the policy itself. For this reason the post-Niyazov propaganda attempted to establish a direct link between the nation’s leader and the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. In the 1990s, Turkmen official propaganda presented the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality as the product of the individual efforts of Niyazov. The regime rhetoric of the Berdymuhammedov era continued to use this theme and the late Turkmen President has been often portrayed as the ‘architect of Turkmen neutrality’.16 At the same time, Turkmen propaganda has begun to place the postNiyazov leadership within the regime rhetoric surrounding the country’s foreign

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policy. To this end, President Berdymuhammedov has been assigned the role of ‘guarantor of neutrality’.17 In conclusion, continuity is the key word to understanding the evolution of Turkmen declaratory foreign policy in the post-Niyazov era. Official documents on foreign policy issued in 2007 did not provide evidence leading to the conclusion that Turkmen foreign policy-makers reshaped the doctrine’s main objectives and selected new operational strategies. Most importantly, the main determinants of Turkmen neutrality remained those of the late Niyazov era. At the end of 2007, rhetorical ambiguity, semi-erudite clichés and misleading images still characterised the declaratory statement of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy, which remained largely opaque 12 years after its initial formulation. Continuity with the Niyazov years also emerged in one of the domestic applications the regime made of the state’s foreign policy. The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality remained, at the end of 2007, a central element in the nation-building mechanism promoted by the regime. Following a strategy implemented in the 1990s, the post-Niyazov leadership has continued to see the policy of neutrality as a powerful symbol capable of influencing the political behaviour of the Turkmen population.

Operational foreign policy In 2007, the operationalisation of Turkmen foreign policy did not encounter substantial modifications. A large number of international observers expected the occurrence of significant shifts within Turkmenistan’s foreign policy paradigm. However, the Turkmen leadership continued to use policy practices and strategies consolidated during the Niyazov era. Regime maintenance has remained a critical issue for Turkmenistan’s foreign policy paradigm. As suggested by Chapter 2 (see p. 47), Berdymuhammedov was mainly preoccupied with consolidating his powers within the domestic political landscape. Nevertheless, two main medium-term targets closely related with regime survival were to be achieved by Turkmen foreign policy: the increase of the international legitimisation of Berdymuhammedov and the preservation of a reasonable amount of international support for the regime. Following the path set in the Niyazov era, Turkmen foreign policy-makers continued to consider the Kremlin as the principal source of support for the Turkmen regime. The existence of a special relationship between Putin’s Russia and Berdymuhammedov’s Turkmenistan was confirmed immediately after the inauguration of the new Turkmen leader (14 February 2007), when President Berdymuhammedov met with Russian Prime Minister M.E. Fradkov. In commenting on the outcome of the meeting, the Turkmen President declared that Russo-Turkmen relations ‘will be further consolidated in all areas, including the energy, oil and gas sectors, and in the humanitarian sphere’.18 This declaration lends substantial weight to the proposition that the bilateral relationship with Russia remained, after Niyazov’s death, the most crucial aspect of Turkmen foreign policy.

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During Berdymuhammedov’s first year in office, political contacts between Turkmen and Russian officials were rather intense. Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov visited Turkmenistan in April 2007 to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states. Russian Deputy Prime Minister S.E. Naryshkin visited Ashgabat to attend the meeting of the Russian-Turkmenistan Commission for Economic Cooperation (October 2007). Berdymuhammedov completed his first official visit to Moscow on 24 April 2007.19 Oil and gas were at the core of his meeting with President Putin. This confirmed that the post-Niyazov bilateral agenda continued to be mainly shaped by energy issues. The summit failed to produce any significant progress on bilateral cooperation and the Russo-Turkmen energy partnership continued to be regulated by agreements negotiated and finalised during the Niyazov era. A number of analysts considered the lack of success encountered by the first Berdymuhammedov–Putin meeting as an indicator of a broader deterioration in the Russo-Turkmen partnership.20 The relevance of similar perceptions was nonetheless eroded by the outcome of the trilateral summit held in Turkmenbashi (12 May 2007) that was attended by Putin and his Kazakh and Turkmen counterparts. On that occasion – which incidentally coincided with Putin’s first official visit to Turkmenistan since Niyazov’s death – the three Presidents signed a crucial protocol on energy cooperation.21 According to the protocol’s provisions, the Turkmen and the Kazakh governments agreed to expand their respective segments of the Central Asia–Centre pipeline without Russian assistance. Refurbishing works would result in a substantial expansion of the pipeline’s capacity and would ultimately double Russia’s imports of gas from Central Asia.22 The Turkmenbashi agreement had three main immediate outcomes. To begin with, it significantly reinforced Russia’s monopoly over gas transportation in Eurasia. Secondly, Turkmenistan’s participation in the agreement was an indicator of Berdymuhammedov’s intention not to be involved in the TCGP project, which the US government had attempted to revamp after Niyazov’s death.23 In relation to the purposes of this book, the main outcome of the agreement, is, however, the revitalisation of the energy partnership between Russia and Turkmenistan, which was brought to a halt by the failure of the first Berdymuhammedov–Putin summit. The primacy of cooperation with Russia within Turkmenistan’s energy policy strategy was not eroded by the 30-year agreement with China concluded by Berdymuhammedov in July 2007.24 To all intents and purposes, the China– Turkmenistan gas agreement – which also proposed the construction of a SinoTurkmen pipeline – was not to be considered as a Turkmen initiative to break Moscow’s energy hegemony. To appreciate the significance of this energy protocol for Turkmenistan’s foreign policy paradigm fully, we must relate it to the other main foreign policy target pursued by Berdymuhammedov, namely the increase of international legitimisation for his regime.

Foreign policy in the post-Niyazov era

145

The international isolation inherited from the prior regime forced Berdymuhammedov to pursue a more pro-active foreign policy strategy, which ultimately aimed at providing the new regime with international legitimisation. The most visible components of this strategy were his rapprochement with China, his trip to Saudi Arabia (during which he performed the pious practice of the umra),25 and his visit to the United States of America, during which he addressed the UN General Assembly.26 In those instances, three crucial international audiences – Turkmenistan’s immediate neighbourhood (China), the broader Muslim world (Saudi Arabia) and the Western world (the US Administration and the UN) – were reached by Berdymuhammedov’s foreign policy message, which, as we have seen in the prior segment of this chapter, was formulated through the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The message conveyed by Berdymuhammedov during his visits invited his Chinese, Saudi27 and US28 counterparts to increase political and economic cooperation with Turkmenistan. However, with the exception of the gas agreement with China, no significant operational steps were made to expand Turkmenistan’s cooperation with these partners. The political need to emerge from Niyazov’s isolation – and not the genuine intention to establish a new alliance system – was therefore at the core of these official visits. To put it simply but not inaccurately, Berdymuhammedov’s opening to the world was only cosmetic and, at the end of 2007, Turkmenistan’s international position remained substantially unchanged. During 2007, Turkmen cooperation with major multilateral organisations failed to take off. In relation to the CIS, the Turkmen government has confirmed that the organisation of a Heads of Government meeting in Ashgabat does not necessarily entail a rethinking of Turkmen involvement in the activities of the Commonwealth.29 At the same time, Berdymuhammedov’s participation in the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has not been followed by a request for membership from any branch of the Turkmen government.30 Nevertheless, the establishment of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia in Ashgabat (10 December 2007) could open a new era in cooperation between the United Nations and the Turkmen government. Although the Centre is a ‘major boost to [Turkmenistan’s] international profile’,31 its opening will have to be considered a watershed in Turkmen foreign policy only if its long-term impact on the broader Turkmenistan–UN relationship and, more particularly, on the human rights record of the Turkmen regime – which has not sensibly improved in the post-Niyazov era – will be significant.

Conclusion This brief chapter has suggested that Berdymuhammedov continued to perceive the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality as an instrument to reinforce his regime’s position of power. In this sense, we may reasonably conclude that the new Turkmen President’s interpretation of the country’s foreign policy is identical to that of his predecessor.

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Operational foreign policy

Nevertheless, the political needs of a new regime are much different from those of an already consolidated dictatorship. Consequently, if the Turkmen MID had failed to revise the declaratory statement of the policy of neutrality, the Turkmen President and his entourage reshaped the medium-term policy ends of Positive Neutrality. This helps to explain the more proactive foreign policy pursued by Berdymuhammedov during 2007. Berdymuhammedov perceived the international isolation inherited from Niyazov as a serious threat to the stability of his regime. The emergence from isolation, we are led to believe, is not an indicator of an altogether new policy. Conversely, it represents a (relatively) new strategy with which to achieve an identical policy outcome: the stability of the Turkmen dictatorship. In relation to the partnership with Russia, it is crucial to highlight that the milieu in which the Russo-Turkmen relationship is developing in the postNiyazov era appears unchanged. As the nature of Turkmen domestic politics is still authoritarian, President Putin has announced that he would continue to play a major role in Russian politics after the end of his second term in office. In other words, Russia’s understanding of non-democratic rulership is not doomed to change following the presidential election of 2008. Consequently, Berdymuhammedov has continued to look to the Kremlin as an indispensable source of support. This explains his decision to commit to a long-term gas agreement. After the death of Niyazov, Russo-Turkmen bilateralism – the most telling aspect of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy paradigm – has continued to be shaped around a common understanding of authoritarian practices and a mutual interest in oil and gas issues.

Conclusion Continuity and change in Turkmen foreign policy-making

This book has sought to answer the core question: What have been the underlying objectives of the policy of Positive Neutrality? As we have seen, the answer lies principally in the domestic sphere of Turkmen politics. At the end of 2007, Positive Neutrality could best be described as a ‘domesticallyoriented’ foreign policy. This is not to say that declaratory policy, formulated in the early post-Soviet era and never subjected to revisions, clearly spelt out that the aim of Turkmen neutralism was regime consolidation. Conclusions as to Positive Neutrality’s key aim can only be drawn by careful analysis of the operationalisation of the policy, which in the post-Soviet era experienced major revisions, particularly in relation to medium-term foreign policy objectives. In addressing the central question, this concluding chapter, much like the body of the book itself, is obliged to tackle the problem of continuity and change in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. It observes how two types of influences have impacted on four different foreign policy elements over three distinct chronological periods (1992–1995; 1996–1999; 2000–2007). Prior chapters established that two types of influence (endogenous and exogenous to Turkmenistan’s political life) impacted on Turkmen foreign policymaking throughout the period in question. Endogenous influences refer primarily to shifts in Turkmen authoritarianism as domestic factors playing a significant role in the evolution of the objectives of Turkmen neutralism. Positive Neutrality concentrated more emphatically on domestic objectives after 1997–1998, when Turkmen authoritarianism began to move more decisively towards ‘sultanism’. Exogenous influences relate, in turn, to shifts in the regime’s perception of the regional/international environment as Turkmen policy-makers reshaped foreign policy objectives in line with their perception of externally generated threats to stability. The four key elements in our analysis of Turkmen foreign policy-making can be summarised as follows: 1 2 3

The declaratory content of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality; The operational content of the policy; The policy’s intended audience(s);

148 4

Conclusion The interconnections between the policy’s medium-term objectives and regime survival.

This concluding chapter presents the contextual framework of the evolutionary processes of these four elements. This analysis, which ultimately leads to the identification of the key objectives of the policy, can be said to constitute the answer to the central question of our research. This study has demonstrated that Turkmen foreign policy is the complex outcome of a generally vague declaratory policy and an extremely inconsistent operational policy. To make sense of the policy as a whole, both facets of the policy have been given equal analytical relevance in the book in general, and in this chapter in particular. This chapter also seeks to identify the ‘intended audience’ of the policy of Positive Neutrality. Here, we have in mind two kinds of potentially overlapping ‘audiences’: the targeted audiences for the foreign policy statements issued by Turkmen officials since 1992; and the international actors towards which operational policy was directed after the adoption of Resolution A/50/80(A).

Phase 1 (1992–1995): equidistance This phase is chronologically delineated by the break-up of the USSR (December 1991), and the adoption of UN Resolution A/50/80(A) (12 December 1995), through which the international community recognised Turkmen neutrality. The major endogenous influence on the process of foreign policy-making was associated with the emergence of the regime, which, as we noted in Chapter 2 (see p. 37), acquired a hegemonic position in relation to Turkmenistan’s political life. The regime achieved total control over foreign policy-making through the dismissal of Foreign Minister Kuliev and the introduction of a new foreign policy agenda, formulated mainly under the supervision of the Presidential Administration. In this agenda, neutrality became the keystone of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. Between 1992 and 1995, Turkmen policy-makers developed the declaratory core of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The analysis of the doctrine’s text presented in Chapter 1 (see pp. 27–30) identified overall vagueness as its most striking characteristic. High-sounding rhetoric distinguished the entire declaratory content of Turkmen foreign policy, as Positive Neutrality’s key objectives, its sources and its major determinants remained substantially undisclosed in the text. The regime appeared to have made instrumental use of such vagueness. The doctrine’s non-specificity allowed official propaganda to assign foreign policy a crucial role in the regime’s rhetorical discourse. Positive Neutrality became an important element in the regime’s attempt to influence the Turkmen population’s compliance with the norms and rules imposed by the regime. This suggests that Turkmen foreign policy was significantly, albeit not exclusively, directed towards a domestic ‘audience’, and assigned a key role in Turkmenistan’s nation-building programme.

Conclusion 149 Between 1992 and 1995, the operational content of the policy was primarily concerned with the internal/external promotion of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, in order to gather support (domestic and international) for the recognition of Turkmenistan’s neutral status. The domestic ‘audience’ emerged yet again as a significant recipient for the messages contained in the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. However, the analysis of operational policies carried out in this phase allows us to identify the international targets of Positive Neutrality. Turkmen propaganda conferred on the United Nations a special role in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. The regime considered the UN endorsement of Positive Neutrality as a guarantee for the preservation of its neutral status. Turkmenistan’s ‘special relationship’ with the United Nations cannot be assessed in isolation, but must be related to the influences on Turkmen foreign policy-making exerted by the complex geopolitical landscape (regional as well as international) that surrounded Turkmenistan in the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War allowed important regional actors (Iran, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, China) to have freer access to Central Asia. At the same time, the break-up of the USSR revolutionised the core of the relationship between Russia (the former centre of the Union) and the post-Soviet states (the former periphery). Turkmenistan, as a newly independent state located in the Central Asian region, had to deal with the pressures imposed by these foreign states. Turkmenistan preferred to maintain an equidistant position in relation to Russia (Chapter 5, pp. 112–15) and to other regional powers (Chapter 1, pp. 14–15). Moscow’s pressures over Turkmenistan were more significant, given also the leverages (political, economic, military) inherited from the centralised USSR. Equidistance from sources of dependency became the principal objective for Positive Neutrality during this period. The principal instrument through which Turkmenistan accomplished equidistance from major centres of power was the United Nations, which it viewed as the principal international guarantor of Turkmen neutrality. The deliberate choice to have neutrality recognised by the United Nations demonstrates that Turkmenistan, during 1992–1995, essentially understood its neutral status as ‘non-interference’. The nature of this term has to be clarified. In emphasising that, since its independence, Turkmenistan ‘observed the principles of non-interference into other states’ internal affairs’ (Chapter 1, p. 28), the clear implication was that, with the acquisition of neutrality, Turkmen policy-makers expected other states to observe the same principles in their interaction with Turkmenistan. The guarantee of non-interference was sought from the United Nations, which granted it through the adoption of Resolution A/50/80(A). But which were the foreign states that were not supposed to interfere? And what were the matters that were not to be the subject of interference? The most immediate answer to the first question is the Russian Federation. In the early El’tsin era, Russia sought to increase its influence on the post-Soviet region and on Turkmenistan in particular. The Turkmen regime was anxious about Russia’s post-imperial intentions, and therefore felt the need to neutralise

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Conclusion

Moscow’s attempts to maintain hegemony over independent Turkmenistan. Attempts to loosen ties with Moscow were carried out mainly through Turkmenistan’s systematic refusal to participate in the CIS integrationist activities, describing them as liable to infringe Turkmenistan’s sovereignty. This leads to the identification of the answer to the second question alluded to earlier. The refusal to participate in supranational political and economic integration was meant to exclude Russia from spreading its influence over the Turkmen processes of political and economic transition. As we noted earlier, in Turkmenistan, these processes were essentially aimed at facilitating the consolidation of the regime. Simply put, in the early post-Soviet era Turkmenistan saw Russia as a potential threat to the stability of the emerging regime. The evidence surveyed in this book points to a direct link between the determinants of the policy of equidistance, pursued by Turkmenistan during 1992–1995 under the conceptual umbrella of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, and domestic considerations. It is reasonable to suggest that, between 1992 and 1995, the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was formulated with two important actors (or intended ‘audiences’) in mind: the United Nations and Russia. In relation to the former, Turkmenistan sought to achieve a guarantee of non-interference in its interaction with foreign states. This was meant to maximise the efficacy of Turkmenistan’s attempts to disentangle itself from external sources of power/dependency. As far as Russia was concerned, the message delivered by the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality between 1992 and 1995 was clear. The Turkmen regime was not disposed to accept Moscow’s hegemony. Independent Turkmenistan was ready to extricate itself from Russia’s sphere of influence and to extend its cooperation with the international community. Russia perceived this strategy as an element that could dilute its influence over the Turkmen state. Conversely, the Turkmen regime considered it as a necessary step for the consolidation of its own internal position. Their bilateral relationship therefore developed in diverging directions.

Phase 2 (1996–1999): rapprochement with Russia The beginning of the operationalisation of the policy of Positive Neutrality, which followed the approval of Resolution A/50/80(A), and the appointment (in August 1999) of Putin to the post of Prime Minister of the Russian Federation are the two events that chronologically demarcate this phase. During this second phase, the declaratory content of the policy of Positive Neutrality remained unchanged. However, the vagueness characteristic of the declaratory policy allowed the Turkmen regime to take account of the changing domestic and external environment and revise the policy’s medium-term objectives. Between 1996 and 1999, the evolution of the nature of Turkmen authoritarianism was by far the most important endogenous influence bearing upon Turkmen foreign policy-making. As the preservation of power became one of the regime’s pivotal preoccupations, formulating an effective response to per-

Conclusion 151 ceived threats to regime stability became a key policy determinant. Decisionmaking processes at any level had to adapt to the revised needs of the Turkmen regime, and, as a consequence, policy objectives were reassessed. Foreign policy did not constitute an exception to this norm. Regionally, this phase was characterised by significant geopolitical shifts. The Kremlin’s new perception of the post-Soviet area had a beneficial impact on the bilateral relationship with Turkmenistan. As Moscow made new overtures to Ashgabat, the role of other regional actors in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy (particularly Iran and Turkey) correspondingly diminished. At the same time, the small success encountered by the policy of equidistance vis-à-vis external sources of economic and political power enhanced in practice Turkmenistan’s isolation in the geopolitical and geo-economic regional arenas. Domestic and external developments prompted the Turkmen regime to realign the priorities of its foreign policy. After 1997–1998, the Turkmen regime understood political and economic isolation as being detrimental to its stability. Turkmenistan therefore had to look for new international supporters. The declining influence of Iran and Turkey reduced Turkmenistan’s options. Conversely, the shift in Russia’s policy on the ‘near abroad’ seemed to open up new possibilities for the Turkmen regime. Russia’s potential contribution to the stabilisation of the Niyazov regime underwent reassessment. The Turkmen elite now began to consider Moscow as a possible source of support. The second phase of Turkmen foreign policy-making witnessed the outset of the rapprochement between Turkmenistan and Russia. In this sense, the operational content of the policy of neutrality underwent modification, although this fact remained undisclosed in official foreign policy declarations. This conclusion emerges only from a comparison of the operational content of the policy during 1996–1999 with the content of the first phase of Turkmen foreign policymaking. If the medium-term objective of Positive Neutrality shifted towards the strengthening of Turkmenistan’s strategic alliance with Moscow, the determinant for this evolution remained firmly entrenched in regime survival, as Russia’s support was understood in Ashgabat as critical to this objective. To summarise, between 1996 and 1999, the Russian elite constituted the main ‘intended audience’ for the policy of Positive Neutrality. It is worth noting that the message the policy was meant to deliver was the direct opposite of what was conveyed between 1992 and 1995. In the late 1990s, Turkmenistan began to strengthen its ties with the former centre of the USSR. Accordingly, the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, originally designed to shield Turkmenistan from the influence of external sources of power/dependency, now provided the basis for a policy of engagement between the two states. There was, however, a constant. Between 1996 and 1999, the regime continued to present Positive Neutrality as a central element of its rhetorical discourse, and in the second half of the 1990s the Turkmen domestic ‘audience’ remained a significant target for the policy of Positive Neutrality.

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Conclusion

Phase 3 (2000–2007): insulation The election of Putin to the Presidency of the Russian Federation (31 December 1999) is the event that inaugurated this phase,1 which stretches until 31 December 2007, the date that represents the chronological end of the analysis presented in this study. The wave of repression that followed the attempt on Niyazov’s life was one of the principal domestic factors to influence Turkmenistan’s foreign policy-making, not least because it attracted vehement and widespread international condemnation. As a consequence, the international isolation surrounding the regime intensified considerably. Positive Neutrality had to tackle this issue, respond in some way to the criticisms, and somehow preserve the regime’s hold on power. Quite unexpectedly, Niyazov’s death did not have a significant impact on the process of Turkmen foreign policy-making. This is not to say that the passing of the dictator was not a crucial event in the political history of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. Nevertheless, the Berdymuhammedov regime, as we have seen in Chapter 2 (pp. 43–7), did not revolutionise the domestic political landscape, preferring instead to guarantee continuity of the policies of the prior regime. As Chapter 7 (pp. 145–6) demonstrated, Positive Neutrality remained the cornerstone of Turkmen foreign policy in the post-Niyazov era. The new ‘near abroad’ policy implemented by Putin and his endorsement of authoritarian practices were the two most important external factors that impacted on Turkmen foreign policy-making at this time. They convinced Turkmen foreign policy-makers of the need to accelerate Turkmenistan’s reentry into Moscow’s orbit, and to conclude the rapprochement that was initiated between 1996 and 1999. The declaratory content of Positive Neutrality, however, remained intact during this third phase, thereby lending weight to the proposition that a full grasp of the direction of Turkmen foreign policy can only be attained through the comparison over time of operational strategies. Between 2000 and 2007, the operational content of Positive Neutrality was redefined on the basis of the interplay between regime survival and international perceptions of Turkmen authoritarianism. In taking these issues into account, the Turkmen regime identified two new medium-term objectives of the country’s foreign policy: insulating Turkmenistan from externally generated pressures for political liberalisation and ensuring a degree of external support sufficient to stabilise the regime’s internal power base. Turkmenistan’s official responses to international criticism on human rights violations offer the most reliable barometer of the new direction of the policy of Positive Neutrality after 2000. Abandoning the cosmetic rhetoric of the 1990s, Turkmenistan has now adopted a low profile when responding to the various reports issued by multilateral organisations (mainly the United Nations, European Union and the OSCE/ODIHR) in condemnation of the regime’s poor human rights record. Systematic passivity rather than sporadic attempts to defend the Turkmen human rights policy characterised such responses.

Conclusion 153 However, as we have seen in Chapter 6 (p. 125), the regime could not but perceive these critical reports as signs that its international position was weakening. In determining its practical response, the regime decided to ignore the content of international reports and resolutions, and the implicit or explicit demands they contained. The rationale for this strategy is difficult to understand, but some light can be shed on Turkmen thinking when one connects Turkmenistan’s voluntary retreat from the international arena with its simultaneous rapprochement with Russia. As the rest of the international community accentuated its criticism of Turkmenistan’s poor human rights record, the Kremlin remained silent, while steadily expanding its cooperation with Ashgabat in the energy sphere. Turkmenistan, in 2002–2003 especially, appears to have identified Russia’s clear support on human rights issues as the essential precondition for the finalisation of any gas agreement with Moscow. Putin’s attitude in relation to the quarrel over dual citizenship provides added evidence in support of this conclusion. After 2000, international actors progressively reduced their interaction with the regime, which continued to insulate Turkmenistan from external influences. Russia’s backing thus became crucial for Niyazov and, eventually, Berdymuhammedov. In order to obtain a long-term guarantee for this support, Turkmenistan agreed to conclude a 25-year gas deal with Russia in April 2003. This agreement’s main outcome, as we noted in Chapter 5 (p. 121), was the strengthening of Gazprom’s monopoly over the export of Turkmen gas. This single event may be interpreted as the culmination of two processes: the rapprochement between Moscow and Ashgabat, and the evolution of key economic objectives under the broad umbrella of Positive Neutrality. Obtaining Russia’s long-term support allowed the Turkmen regime to accelerate its insular position within the international arena. From April 2003, a studied policy of passivity in response to international pressures on human rights violations became the norm. This suggests that the Turkmen regime had decided to rely exclusively on Russia for the support it needed to hold on to power. The Kremlin now became the ‘international patron’ of the Turkmen regime. As for economic foreign policy, we saw in Chapter 4 (pp. 63–5) that the dilution of Russia’s control over the routes through which Turkmen gas is exported represented one of the three key goals of economic neutralism throughout the 1990s. In order to guarantee its survival, the Turkmen regime was now willing to extend its cooperation with Russia to the energy sphere. The conclusion of the energy deal with Moscow in 2003 was the result of this shift in Turkmen foreign policy efforts. Berdymuhammedov’s energy policy, as we noted in Chapter 7 (pp. 143–5), continued to give high priority to cooperation with Moscow. In short, regime consolidation once again proved decisive in the practical application of the neutrality policy. In conclusion, it is possible to identify Russia and the West (defined here as the group of states that most vocally denounced Turkmenistan’s poor human rights record) as the main international ‘audiences’ of the policy of Positive Neutrality between 2000 and 2007.

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Conclusion

In relation to the West, Positive Neutrality aimed, during this third phase, at promoting ‘non-interference’, as it did between 1992 and 1995. The message delivered after 2000, however, was the opposite of that conveyed during the early post-Soviet era. In 1992–1995, Turkmenistan declared its intention of not interfering in the domestic affairs of other states and asked the United Nations (representing the West) to guarantee that the international community would do so in relation to Turkmenistan’s internal affairs. After 2000, Turkmenistan reiterated this request, and asked the West not to interfere in its internal affairs, especially in relation to the human rights policy it was pursuing domestically. After 2002, the policy of ‘non-interference’ became almost synonymous with the policy of ‘insulation’. The Turkmen regime, both prior and subsequent to Niyazov’s death, saw the latter as the most effective form of damage control, as it sought to limit the detrimental impact that external pressures for political liberalisation could have on the regime’s internal stability. After 2000, the message that Positive Neutrality had to deliver to the Russian Federation was substantially analogous to that of 1996–1999. Both Niyazov and Berdymuhammedov concluded that Russia’s support has become crucial for the survival of their own regimes, and therefore attempted to play the ‘energy card’ to ensure that support. To do so, a complete reassessment of key economic foreign policy objectives took place. This process ultimately impacted on the acceleration of the operational strategy of the policy of Positive Neutrality, which, after 2000, continued to operate as an ‘engaging’ tool between Russia and Turkmenistan. As far as the impact of foreign policy over the Turkmen population was concerned, regime rhetoric in Turkmenistan was not subjected to any revision; neither did the emphasis vary much over the years. As a consequence, Positive Neutrality, prior and subsequent to Niyazov’s death, has continued to address its ‘domestic audience’ during this period, much as it had done during the 1990s.

Concluding observations: the key objective of Positive Neutrality This study has demonstrated that a high degree of inconsistency characterised the policy of Positive Neutrality. The key element that remained constant in the evolution of Turkmen foreign policy was the determining influence on the policy of Positive Neutrality. The preservation of the regime was, in fact, the principal objective that Turkmen foreign policy-makers had set for the policy of Positive Neutrality. Shifts in the nature of Turkmen authoritarianism and in the geopolitical and geo-economic regional environments changed the regime’s perception of what external factors could reinforce its internal position. These shifts forced Turkmen foreign policy makers to periodically adjust the operational contents of the policy of Positive Neutrality and its medium-term objectives. However, the underlying long-term objective of the policy remained constant throughout the post-Soviet era.

Conclusion 155 The analysis in this study has discerned another constant, namely the central role that Russia has occupied in Turkmen foreign policy. Between 1992 and 1997, the Turkmen regime perceived Russia’s political, economic and military hegemony as detrimental to its hopes of independence. Positive Neutrality was therefore intended to provide strategies that could dilute Moscow’s leverage over independent Turkmenistan. After 1997–1998, but more strikingly from 2000 onwards, the Turkmen regime concluded that Russia’s support was vital to its future stability. Accordingly, Positive Neutrality became primarily focused on strengthening Turkmenistan’s relation with the Russian Federation. In this sense, this book has established that Positive Neutrality is a ‘domestically-oriented’ foreign policy that has been periodically reshaped around the role (negative or positive as the case may be) that Russia played or might play in the future vis-à-vis the consolidation of the Turkmen regime.

Appointed 6 Jauary 1995 Dismissed 28 July 2000

SHIKHMURADOV Boris Orazovich

Appointed 5 August 1992 Dismissed 6 January 1995

ATAEV Khalykberdy

Appointed 1 January 1992 Dismissed 5 August 1992 Deceased on 10 April 2007

Year of birth: Place of birth: Ethnicity: Education:

KULIEV Avdy Ovezovich

1963–1988 Juridical Apparatus, Supreme Soviet TSSR 1988–1989 Deputy Minister of Justice 1989–March. 1991 Minister of Justice March 1991–5 August 1992 Chairman, Supreme Court, TSSR/Turkmenistan

1949 1992–1995 Ashgabat Deputy Minister, Turkmen 1st Deputy Minister of Foreign Moscow State University Affairs Diplomatic Academy 1994–8 January 1999 (MID USSR) Deputy Prime Minister

Year of birth: 1942 Place of birth: Kipshak, Ashgabat oblast’ Ethnicity: Turkmen Education: Law School (Turkmen State University)

Year of birth: Place of birth: Ethnicity: Education:

Career outline

1936 1981–May 1991 Ashgabat Different positions, Soviet Turkmen Embassies in Yemen, Kuwayt, Russian Philology Oman and Qatar Faculty (Turkmen State May 1991–31 December 1991 University); Institute for Minister of Foreign Affairs, Asia and Africa (USSR Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences); Diplomatic academy (MID USSR)

Biographical data

Name

Independent Turkmenistan: Profiles of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1 January 1992–31 December 2007)

Appendix

28 July 2000–10 March 2001 Special Assistant on Caspian issues, Presidential Administration 11 March 2001–30 October 2001 Ambassador to China 2001–2002 Leader, Gundogar (Opposition Party) December 2002 Arrested after the events of November 2002, sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment

6 January 1995–1997 Minister of Social Security

1992–2007 Leader, Erkin Turkmenistan (Political movement part of Turkmen opposition in exile)

Jobs after MID

Appointed 7 July 2001

MEREDOV Rashid Ovezgeldiyevich

Appointed 28 July 2000 Dismissed 7 July 2001

BERDYEV Batyr Ataevich

Year of birth: Place of birth: Ethnicity: Education:

Year of birth: Place of birth: Ethnicity: Education:

1960 Ashgabat Turkmen Law School (Moscow Lomonosov State University)

1960 Ashgabat Turkmen Foreign Languages Faculty (Turkmen State University)

1987–1990 Senior Lecturer, Law Department, Turkmen State University. 1990–1991 Senior Adviser, Ministry of Justice 1991–1993 Head, Law enforcement bodies’ sector, Coordination Council of law enforcement bodies at the office of the Turkmen President March 1993–1994 Head, Legal department, Office of the President of Turkmenistan December 1994–1996 Head, Legal department, Mejlis 1996–1999 Deputy Director, National Institute for Democracy and Human Rights 24 May 1999–27 June 2001 1st Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs December 1999–7 May 2001 Deputy Chairman, Mejlis 7 May 2001–7 July 2001 Chairman, Mejlis

Before 1990 CURRENTLY Chief Editor, INCOMMUNICADO Komsomolets Turkmenistana 1992–1994 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 6 January 1995–4 July 2000 Ambassador to Austria, the UN agencies headquartered in Vienna, and the OSCE June 2000–28 July 2000 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Notes

Introduction 1 See: S.N. Cummings and M. Ochs, ‘Turkmenistan – Saparmurat Niyazov’s inglorious isolation’, in Cummings, S.N. (ed.), Power and change in Central Asia, London–New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 115–29. 2 See: Gregory Gleason’s analysis of Turkmen economic neutralism, in Gleason, G. Markets and politics in Central Asia, London–New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 99–116. 3 ‘While regularly affirming Turkmenistan’s official policy of neutrality, however, President Niyazov continues to lead his country down a path more akin to isolationism’ (A. Bohr, ‘Independent Turkmenistan: From post-communism to sultanism’, in Cummings, S.N. (ed.), Oil, transition and security in Central Asia, London–New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 16). 4 ‘Turkmenistan’s policy of Positive Neutrality has further helped to maintain Niyazov in power’ (Cummings and Ochs, op. cit., p. 123). 5 ‘The principle of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy [. . .] is to prefer bilateral to multilateral relations’ (R. Freitag-Wirminghaus, ‘Turkmenistan’s place in Central Asia and the world’, in Atabaki, T. and O’Kane, J. (eds.), Post-Soviet Central Asia, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998, p. 166). 6 M. Ochs, ‘Turkmenistan: The quest for stability and control’, in Dawisha, K. and Parrott, B. (eds.), Conflict, cleavage and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Cambridge-Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 314. 7 G. Nonneman, ‘Analyzing the foreign policies of the Middle East and North Africa: A conceptual framework’, in Nonneman, G. (ed.), Analyzing Middle East foreign policies and the relationship with Europe, London–New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 10. 8 See: International Crisis Group, ‘Repression and regression in Turkmenistan: A new international strategy’, Asia Report, n. 85, 4 November 2004, p. i. 9 In relation to the transliteration of Russian names, we have followed the system adopted by the eminent periodical Europe-Asia Studies. 10 Until 14 December 1995, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan was known by the Sovietimposed name of Turkmenskaya Iskra. 1 Establishing a conceptual framework for the policy of Positive Neutrality 1 S. Niyazov, ‘Neutrality of Turkmenistan: History, world outlook and state strategy – Lecture on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of Permanent Neutrality of Independent Turkmenistan’, in Khramov, V. (ed.), Turkmenbashi diplomacy: To the new world through Neutrality (1991–2000), Ashgabat: Türkmendöwlethabarlary, 2001, p. 75.

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2 For the complete text, see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 2 October 1991, p. 1. 3 In greater detail, this referendum consisted of two questions. In the first, Turkmen voters were asked to express their opinion on national independence, while the second question aimed at enhancing the level of popular participation in the process of policy-making, by asking the electorate: ‘Do you endorse the text of the Declaration of the President of the TSSR and of the Supreme Soviet of TSSR “On domestic and foreign policy” and support its practical implementation?’ (‘Ob itogakh referenduma o nezavisimosti Turkmenistana’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 28 October 1991, p. 1). 4 On this issue, see: M. Brill Olcott, ‘Central Asia’s post empire policies’, Orbis, 1992, 36 (2), p. 255; V. Fiorani Piacentini, ‘The disintegration of the Soviet Empire: Problems of nationalism and collective security in Central Asia’, Islamic Studies, 1994, (2–3), p. 287; A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner, ‘Introduction’ in Banuazizi, A. and Weiner, M. (eds), The new geopolitics of Central Asia and its borderland, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 6. 5 In Turkmenistan and in the other Central Asian Soviet republics as well, the outcome of the 1991 popular referendum on the future of the USSR was massively in favour of the continuation of the Union (B. Brown, ‘The all-Union referendum in Central Asia’, Report on the Soviet Union, 3 (13), 29 March 1991, pp. 1–3). 6 Turkmenskaya Iskra, 2 October 1991, p. 1. 7 ‘Ob itogakh referenduma . . .’, op. cit., p. 1. 8 For the complete text, see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 29 October 1991, p. 1. 9 ‘Turkmenistan will pursue its defensive policy, will protect its territorial borders and its independence, and will create its national army. Turkmenistan will remove from its territory any nuclear, chemical, bacteriological weapons and of other types of weapons of mass destruction’ (Turkmenskaya Iskra, 29 October 1991, p. 1). 10 Niyazov referred to the Ashgabat summit as the ‘most significant step’ in the political path towards the establishment of the CIS (‘11 Nezavisimykh gosudarstv obrazovali sodruzhestvo ot SSSR do SNG’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 25 December 1991, p. 1). 11 This is the abbreviation for the Russian expression Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 12 Nevertheless, Article 1.6 of the Draft of the New Union Treaty only made inferences about the necessity of coordinating the different foreign policies: ‘The Union of the Soviet Sovereign Republics will act in the international community as a sovereign entity, as a subject of international law and as a successor of the USSR. [. . .] The states participating in the Union will be full members of the international community. They will be exercising the rights of: (a) establishing diplomatic and consular relations with foreign states, (b) exchanging representatives and concluding agreements with them, and (c) joining international organisations, by not interfering with the interests of the other member states and, more generally, with the Union as a whole’ (See: K soyuzu suverennykh narodov – Sbornik dokumentov KPSS, zakonodetel’nykh aktov, deklaratsii, obrashchenii i prezidentskikh ukazov, posvyashchennykh probleme natsional’no-gosudarstvennogo suverniteta, Moskva: Institut teorii i istorii sotsializma TsK KPSS, 1991, p. 5). 13 ‘The High Contracting States hereby recognise that the sphere of their joint activity realised on an equal basis through common coordinating institutions of the Commonwealth including the coordination of foreign policy activity’ [Art. 7] (For the complete text of the Almaty Agreement, see the official website of the CIS, http://cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid=178, accessed on 17 July 2007). 14 See Chapter 2, pp. 33–6. 15 See: J.P. Nichol, Diplomacy in the Former Soviet republics, Westport–London: Praeger, 1995, p. 162. 16 Eugene Huskey indicates ‘Turkey, the United States, Russia and other Central Asian states’ as Kyrgyzstan’s preferred partners in the early 1990s (E. Huskey,

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18

19

20

21 22 23

24

25

26 27

Notes ‘Kyrgyzstan in world affairs’, in Fawn, R. (ed.), Ideology and national identity in Post-Communist foreign policies, London–Portland: Frank Cass, 2004, p. 116). In the first part of the 1990s, the Kazakh diplomatic elite indicated Russia, China, United States and Turkey amongst the most important strategic partners for Kazakhstan (R. Abazov, Practice of foreign policy-making: Formation of Post-Soviet politics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, NATO Research Fellowship Final Report, 1998, pp. 25–6). In 1993, Uzbek Foreign Minister Sadyk Safaev indicated the three top foreign policy priorities for Uzbekistan: ‘cooperation with Central Asia, integration into the Asian world, and cooperation with CIS countries, primarily Russia’ (see: J. Critchlow, ‘The Ethnic Factor in Foreign Policy’, in Szporluk, R. (ed.), National identity and ethnicity in Russia and the new states of Eurasia, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 268). See: A. Mango, ‘The Turkish model’, Middle Eastern Studies, 1993, 39, pp. 726–57; M.E. Ahrari, ‘The dynamics of the New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia’, Central Asian Survey, 1994, 13 (4), pp. 525–39; M. Brill Olcott, ‘Central Asia’s catapult to independence’, Foreign Affairs, 1992, 71 (3), pp. 108–30; I. Lipovsky, ‘Central Asia: In search of a new political identity’, The Middle East Journal, 1996, 50 (2), pp. 211–14. The concept of democracy as the most likely outcome of post-Soviet political transitions was influenced by Fukuyama’s ideas on the ultimate success of Western political and economic models (F. Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man, Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan, 1992). D. Pioppi, ‘La politica estera della Turchia’, in Aliboni, R. (ed.), Geopolitica della Turchia, Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1999, p. 113. Other examples of models of development were more linked with economic development and considered South Korea, Indonesia and the PRC as viable examples for the Central Asian republics. Between 1990 and 1998, more than 35 major scientific publications about Central Asia contained the expression ‘New Great Game’ in their title (Data extracted from the electronic version of the database Index Islamicus, distributed by Cambridge Scientific Abstract). The consequences of the economic crisis affecting Turkey in the second part of the 1990s negatively affected the financial dimension of Turkish policy in Central Asia, causing the progressive decline of Ankara’s influence in the region. At the same time, the foreign policy of the Iranian ‘Second Republic’ progressively abandoned the idea of exporting the Islamic revolution abroad, reducing the religious dimension of the ‘Iranian model’. This more pragmatic attitude was aimed at normalising Iran’s relations with moderate Muslim countries, including the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. In Central Asia, political transitions have been oriented towards the emergence of authoritarian regimes. Political liberalisation never took place in the region. Instead, the post-Soviet regimes systematically demolished opposition movements and any other political force not clearly linked with the ruling class, to build solid singleparty systems. In the only countries (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) where fictional political pluralism has emerged, electoral consultations have been used to ‘reaffirm the position of the elites and to anaesthetise the population’ (J. Anderson, ‘Elections and political development in Central Asia’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 1997, 13 (4), p. 28). See: R. Abazov, ‘Central Asian republics’ search for a model of development’, in Central Asia in Transition, Slavic Research Centre Occasional Paper N. 61, Hokkaido: Slavic Research Centre, 1998. ‘Turkmenistan i Turtsia: Status osobykh otnoshenii’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 23 December 1991, pp. 1–2.

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28 See: S. Niyazov, ‘Turkmenistan ne budet ni kommunisticheskim, ni islamskim’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 24 February 1992, pp. 1–2. 29 Nichol, op. cit., p. 163. 30 The protocol was signed during Niyazov’s first official visit to Iran (see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 20 February 1992, p. 1). A more complete and detailed protocol on the cooperation and friendship between the two countries was signed in May 1992 (see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 13 May 1992, p. 1). 31 ‘Ustanovleni diplomaticheskie otnosheniya mezhdu Turkmenistanon i Turtsiei’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 2 March 1992, p. 1. 32 See: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 4 May 1992, p. 1. The First Turkish Ambassador to Turkmenistan, Seljuk Niçeli – a professional diplomat – was appointed at the beginning of March 1992 (Turkmenskaya Iskra, 3 March 1992, p. 1). 33 For the biographies of Ugur and Göktepe, see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 19 March 1992, p. 1. 34 Turkmenskaya Iskra, 12 May 1992, p. 1. 35 S.K. Sadjapour: ‘Iran, the Caucasus and Central Asia’, in The new geopolitics of . . ., op. cit., p. 209. 36 Turkmenskaya Iskra, 12 May 1992, p. 1. 37 Charyev (born 1932) and Akhmedov (born 1936), at different times during the 1980s and the early 1990s, occupied the position of Chairman of the Cabinet of Minister of the TSSR. At the moment of their appointments, both ambassadors were members of the Turkmen Presidential Council, one of the transitory institutional structures created during the last two years of the Soviet era and progressively dismantled after the demise of the Union. For biographic information on Charyev and Akhmedov, see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 1 January 1991, p. 1. 38 ‘Kitai priznal Turkmenistan i obeshchal okazyvat’ nam podderzhku na mezhdunarodnoi arene’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 10 January 1992, p. 2. 39 Ibid. 40 T. Rakowska-Harmstone, ‘Soviet legacies’, Central Asia Monitor (online supplement), 3, 1994. 41 M. Gammer, ‘Post-Soviet Central Asia and post-colonial Francophone Africa: Some associations’, Middle Eastern Studies, 2000, 36 (2), pp. 124–49. 42 See, for instance: the interview released by the former President on 8 April 1992, on the occasion of Kozyrev’s visit to Turkmenistan. The interview’s title clears every doubt on Niyazov’s intentions towards Russia (‘Al’ternativy druzhbe s Rossey u Turkmenistana net’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 9 April 1992, p. 1). 43 A qualitative analysis of the Turkmen membership in the CIS will be presented in Chapter 5, pp. 104–12. 44 ‘Turkmenistan-Rossiya: Vstrecha na vysshem urovne’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 4 August 1992, p. 1. 45 In Soviet times, permanent representations (postoyannie predstavitel’stva, contracted to postpredstva) of each Soviet republic were attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The nature of the competence of the postpredstva underwent several changes at different stages of the Soviet era and, after Stalin’s death, their main roles were the discussion of regional applications of centrally planned economic policies. Brezhnev’s return to more centralised policies negatively affected the importance of these structures, and removed any diplomatic function from their agendas. Under Brezhnev, the process of restriction of the diplomatic activities of the postpredstva was finally completed and these institutions were transformed into ordinary instruments of policy transmission between the centre and the periphery in the Soviet Union. The postpredstva, however, were to be revitalised under Gorbachev and would become significant diplomatic instruments in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union (see: P.J. Potichnyj, ‘Permanent representations (Postpredstva) of Union republics in Moscow’, in Potichnyj, P.J. and

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46 47 48

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

65 66

67 68

Notes Schapiro, L. (eds), Politics and participation under Communist rule, New York: Praeger, 1973, pp. 50–83). The Turkmen diplomatic representation in Moscow is still in the building used as a postpredstvo in Soviet times and located at no. 22 of the central Filipovskiy Perspektiv. Turkmenskaya Iskra, 5 September 1992, p. 1. Similarly to the appointees to the embassies in Turkey and Iran, N. Nurklychev (born 1947) was a top cadre in the Turkmen government. After a career in the Komsomol organisational structure, he became the Head of Administrative Affairs of the Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party. At the moment of his appointment to the ambassadorial position, he was a member of the Turkmen Presidential Council. For more biographic information on Nurklychev, see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 1 January 1991, p. 1. See: F. Hill, ‘Une stratégie incertaine: La politique des États-Unis dans le Caucase et l’Asie Centrale depuis 1991’, Politique Étrangère, 1/2001, pp. 95–108. Turkmenskaya Iskra, 13 February 1992, p. 1. Turkmenskaya Iskra, 18 March 1992, p. 1. The Turkmen embassy in Washington opened in May 1994. For a complete biographic account of A.O. Kuliev, see the Appendix. Turkmenskaya Iskra, 27 February 1992, p. 1. Turkmenskaya Iskra, 6 February 1992, p. 1. Turkmenskaya Iskra, 27 February 1992, p. 1. Turkmenskaya Iskra, 27 March 1992, p. 1. See, for instance: ‘S.A. Niyazov: Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo mezhdu Turkmenistanon i Saudovskim Arabiey budet poleznym i vzaimovygodnym’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 31 March 1992, p. 1. ‘Turkmenistan prinyat v chleny Organizatsii Ob’’edinnykh Natsii’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 4 March 1992, p. 1. F. Vielmini, ‘Références eurasiennes au Kazakhstan contemporain’, Cahiers du Monde Russe, 2000, 41 (1), pp. 109–34. Huskey, op. cit., p. 130. See: M. Haghayeghi, Islam and politics in Central Asia, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, p. 127. After the ban, the Turkmen Communist Party was transformed (December 1991) in the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, whose Central organs were overwhelmingly controlled by Niyazov (see Chapter 2, p. 38). Postanovlenie Preszidenta Turkmenistana No 563, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 19 March 1992, p. 1. This decree explained the dismissal with Rakhmanov’s transfer to another position (s perekhodom na druguyu rabotu), more specifically the Chair of the Turkmen Permanent Representative to the United Nations. For their complete biographical accounts, see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 19 March 1992, p. 1. In an interview given to the eminent Russian Human Rights Centre Memorial, Kuliev stated that he gave Niyazov a list of names that he wanted to be appointed as his Deputies. B. Begliev was his preference to occupy the position of First Deputy Foreign Minister, whereas he indicated Boris O. Shikhmuradov, then working in the Russian embassy to India, as another suitable candidate for that position. (For the Russian complete text of the interview, see Besedy s Avdy Kulievym, www.memo.ru/hr/politpr/asia/turkmenistan/kuliev1.htm, accessed on 28 April 2007). See: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 6 August 1992, p. 1. His position is quoted at the end of an article he authored in Turkmenskaya Iskra (G. Veliev, ‘Vazhnyi prioritet vneshnei politiki Turkmenistana’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 22 November 1995, p. 2).

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69 Besedy s Avdy Kulievym, part 2, www.memo.ru/hr/politpr/asia/turkmenistan/ kuliev2.htm, accessed on 28 April 2007. 70 A complete biographical account of Ataev is provided in the Appendix. 71 The Constitution of Turkmenistan identifies the President as the person solely responsible for the country’s foreign policy. More specifically, according to Article 52 of the 1992 Turkmen Constitution, the President: ‘manages the implementation of foreign policy, representing Turkmenistan in relations with foreign governments, appoints and recalls ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives of Turkmenistan in other countries and in intergovernmental and international organisations, and accepts the credentials and departures of the diplomatic representatives of foreign governments’. Article 78 of the same Constitution also establishes that the Cabinet of Minister ‘develops and introduces in the People’s Council proposals concerning the basic directions of the government’s domestic and foreign policy activity’ and ‘effectuates foreign economic policy and ensures the development of cultural connections with foreign governments’. (For the full text of the 1992 Turkmen Constitution, see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 19 May 1992, pp. 1–3). It could be suggested, then, that, in the early post-Soviet era, the MID was not playing an autonomous role in the Turkmen process of foreign policy-making. 72 See Chapter 5, pp. 112–22. 73 See: ‘Neytralitet Turkmenistana: put’ k priznannomu’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 25 August 1995, p. 1. 74 Complete biographical accounts of Berdyev and Shikhmuradov are provided in the Appendix. 75 The main source for this chronology is constituted by the daily edition of Turkmenskaya Iskra between 1992 and 1995. Unless differently expressed, the information quoted is taken from the editions of the indicated date. 76 B.O. Shikhmuradov and Yo.A. Kepbanov (eds), Foreign policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches and interviews by President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, Ashgabat: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, 1997, p. 15. 77 The interview was republished in the 8 August 1992 edition of Turkmenskaya Iskra (p. 1), with the title ‘Nasha politika – Pozitivnyi Neytralitet i Otkrytye Dveri’. 78 The Open Doors policy constitutes the core of the economic segment of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. For the analysis of this policy, see Chapter 4, pp. 74–81. 79 Yo.A. Kepbanov, ‘Neutral Turkmenistan in the system of international relations’, Journal of Asian Civilisations, 22 (1), July 1999, p. 131. 80 See: UN Doc. GA/DIS/3036, 9 November 1995. 81 ‘Rezolyutsiya OON – start bol’shoi i otvetstvnnoi raboty’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 22 December 1995, pp. 1–2. 82 ‘The Turkmen model of neutrality essentially changes former conceptions of neutrality’ (Kepbanov, ‘Neutral Turkmenistan . . .’, op. cit., p. 134). 83 Yo.A. Kepbanov, Postoyanniy Neytralitet Turkmenistana: Programma na XXI vek, Ashgabat: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, 1999, pp. 10–20. 84 Ibid., p. 47. 85 See, for instance: L. Goetschel, ‘Neutrality, a really dead concept?’, Cooperation and Conflict, 1999, 34 (2), pp. 115–39; P. Joenniemi, ‘Neutrality beyond the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 1993, 19 (3), pp. 289–304. 86 The Moldovan Constitution declared permanent neutrality as one of the basic pillars of the foreign policy of post-Soviet Moldova. Article 11 of the Constitutional text approved in 1994 additionally stated that ‘[Moldova] will not admit the dislocation of foreign armies on its own territory’ (for the complete text of the Moldovan Constitution, see the official website of the national Parliament, www.parlament.md, accessed on 1 May 2007). Although the Moldovan Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 1995 envisaged possible adaptation of Moldovan neutrality to changes in regional and international dynamics, the return to power of the Moldovan Communist Party

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96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103

104

Notes (2001) has provoked a return to a policy of strict neutrality (R. Weiner, ‘The foreign policy of the Voronin Administration’, Demokratizatsiya, 2004, 12 (4), p. 556). The acquisition of neutrality was an issue largely debated in Belarusian politics in the early post-Soviet era. However, A. Lukashenka’s victory in the 1994 presidential election provoked the removal of neutrality from the Belarusian foreign policy agenda (see: S. Shushkevich, ‘Belarus: To democracy through neo-communism’, Demokratizatsiya, 2003, 11 (1), pp. 55–63). Weiner, op. cit., pp. 542–4. U. Latypov, Belorussian neutrality as a factor of national and European security, NATO – IDIR Research Fellowship Final Report, 1996. B.O. Shikhmuradov, ‘Positive Neutrality as the basis of the foreign policy of Turkmenistan’, Perceptions – Journal of International Affairs, 1997, 2 (2). Kepbanov, ‘Neutral Turkmenistan . . .’, op. cit., p. 134. Kepbanov, Postoyanniy Neytralitet Turkmenistanan . . ., op. cit., p. 20. Niyazov, ‘Neutrality of Turkmenistan: History, World Outlook and State Strategy . . .’, op. cit., p. 72. Shikhmuradov, ‘Positive Neutrality as . . .’, op. cit. Kepbanov, Postoyanniy Neytralitet Turkmenistanan . . ., op. cit., p. 37. See: Kepbanov, ‘Neutral Turkmenistan . . .’, op. cit., p. 132; Shikhmuradov, ‘Positive Neutrality as . . .’, op. cit.; Kepbanov, Postoyanniy Neytralitet Turkmenistanan . . ., op. cit., p. 35. Similar terminology has been often used by late President Niyazov during his speeches to international audiences. See, for instance: Speech of S.E. Saparmurat Niyazov, President of Turkmenistan at the Third ECO Summit, Islamabad, 14–15 May 1995 (the complete text of the speech is accessible at the official website of the ECO General Secretariat, www.ecosecretariat.org, accessed on 21 May 2007). Kepbanov, ‘Neutral Turkmenistan . . .’, op. cit., p. 134. ‘Pozitivnyi Neytralitet Turkmenii: Osnova dlya rasshireniya sotrudnichestv’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 4 April 1995, p. 1. For the full text of the ‘Foreign Policy Concept of Turkmenistan as a Neutral state’, see: Foreign policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches . . ., op. cit., pp. 105–9. A.H. Dani, ‘Turkmenistan: Progressive path of neutrality’, Journal of Asian Civilisations, 1999, 22 (2), p. 162. ‘Foreign Policy Concept of Turkmenistan as a Neutral State’, op. cit., p. 108. Ibid. For a complete description of this rhetoric, see Chapter 6, pp. 126–8. ‘Turkmenistan shall actively cooperate with global and regional humanitarian organisations as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Organisations, UN bodies – WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF and UNHCR’ (‘Foreign Policy Concept of Turkmenistan as a Neutral State’, op. cit., p. 109). One of these is definitely the Rukhnama, the book written by Niyazov and here consulted in its Russian edition (Ashgabat: Turkmenskaya Gosudarstvennaya Izdatel’skaya Sluzhba, 2002).

2 Turkmen authoritarianism in the post-Soviet era 1 See the categorisation of Central Asia’s regimes presented in J. Ishiyama, ‘Neopatrimonialism and the prospect of democratization in the Central Asian republics’, in Power and change in Central Asia, op. cit., pp. 42–58. 2 G. Pridham, The dynamics of democratization, London–New York: Continuum, 2000, p. 18. 3 On the role played by economic reforms in the process of regime consolidation, see Chapter 4, pp. 68–70.

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4 For a complete account of Niyazov’s career, see: Ezhegodnik Bol’shoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopidii, 1986, p. 565. 5 See: J. Anderson, ‘Authoritarian political development in Central Asia: The case of Turkmenistan’, Central Asian Survey, 1995, 14 (4), p. 509. 6 Keesing’s Record of World Events, 37, August 1991, p. 38373. 7 The ministries and a number of state committees of the TSSR were used as institutional models for new Ministries of independent Turkmenistan. For instance, the newly created Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs was assigned most competences previously attributed to the national Gosplan (Gosudarstvennoe planovaya komissiya – State Committee for Planning) (see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 6 August 1992, p. 1). A few ministerial structures were nonetheless created ex novo during the 1990s. Amongst them, it is worth noting the Ministry of Defence (instituted on 27 January 1992), the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (3 November 1992), the Ministry of Energy and Industry (27 January 1995) and, more recently (12 September 2003), the Ministry of Railways. (Data extracted from the editions of Turkmenskaya Iskra/Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan of the quoted dates). 8 The 1992 Turkmen Constitution assigned the control of the legislative activity of Turkmenistan to the Mejlis. The Turkmen Parliament is mono-cameral, and its 50 members are elected every five years in 50 territorial districts. The Mejlis never played any role in Turkmen politics: yet to be formed during the debate over the Constitution, the Parliament, since its creation (11 December 1994), has been exclusively limited to rubber-stamping presidential decisions. 9 ‘From ancient times Turkmens held a general Maslakhat (Council) to decide matters concerning all the people. Here key decisions were taken collectively. And this relay democratic tradition was adopted and developed in independent Turkmenistan in the form of the People’s Council, which was prompted by the historic experience and the recent practice of discussing critical issues of state life with the elders, that had been typical of our people’ (The policy of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi: Achievement and prospects, Ashgabat: Archives Fund of the President of Turkmenistan and the Scientific Centre of the Main Archives Department under the Turkmenistan Cabinet of Ministers, 1996, pp. 180–1). 10 ‘Turkmenistan is a democratic secular state operating under the rule of law whose government takes the form of a presidential republic’ (Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkmenistan). 11 Turkmenskaya Iskra, 19 March 1992, pp. 1–3. 12 ‘Obsuzhdaetsya proekt Konstitutsii Turkmenistana’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 29 April 1992, p. 1 13 See: J. Anderson, ‘Constitutional change in Central Asia’, in Oil, transition and security in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 78. 14 T. Frye: ‘A politics of institutional choice: Post-Communist presidencies’, Comparative Political Studies, 1997, 30 (5), p. 527. 15 On the etymology of this name, see: S. Kadyrov, ‘Turkmenistan’s political elite’, in: Oil, transition and security in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 113. 16 S. Akbarzadeh, ‘National identity and political legitimacy in Turkmenistan’, Nationalities Papers, 1999, 27 (2), p. 272. 17 R. Safronov, ‘Opposition in exile: Turkmenistan’, Central Eurasia Project Series on Opposition Movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 12 September 2002, www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav120902.shtml, accessed on 23 September 2007. 18 Akbarzadeh, op. cit., p. 272. 19 For the results of the election, see: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 23 June 1992, p. 1. 20 Turkmenskaya Iskra, 17 January 1994, p. 1. 21 A. Kurtov, ‘Elections in the Turkmenistan power system’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2006, 2 (38), p. 102.

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22 For the results of the first election to the Turkmen Mejlis, see: ‘Spisok deputatov Medzhlisa Turkmenistana’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 12 December 1994, pp. 1–2. 23 In the Turkmen constitutional system, the President of the Republic automatically heads the Cabinet of Ministers (Art. 75 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkmenistan). 24 ‘The Parliament is the legislative organ of Turkmenistan’ (Art. 62 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkmenistan). 25 Akbarzadeh, op. cit., p. 278. 26 Before their appointments as hakim, four of the five regional governors appointed on 26 June 1992 (P. Odeev, S. Motaev, R. Pukhanov and K.M. Orazov) occupied the position of Predsedately Oblastnovo Soveta Narodnykh Deputatov, perhaps the highest regional rank in late Soviet politics. The new hakim of the Ahal velayat, J. Amansakhatov, spent his entire career in the party and administrative structure of one of the rayoni of the velayat (Geok-Tepenskij rayon), which he headed prior to his promotion to hakim. 27 See Chapter 1, pp. 21–3. 28 See, for instance: ‘Niyazov lashes out against corrupt officials’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 3–9 September 2000; ‘Turkmen President disciplines two cabinet members’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 11 March 2001; ‘Turkmen President makes further reshuffles’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 13 May 2001. 29 Amansakhatov, Odeev and Orazov were simultaneously removed in March 1996, Motaev was dismissed in September 1996 and the powerful hakim of the Balkan velayat, Pukhanov, lost his job in July 1997. 30 Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 6 August 1996, p. 1. 31 An alternative tool with which to achieve the same objective was the removal of potentially non-acquiescent cadres. As we have seen earlier (Chapter 1, pp. 21–3), this was the case for Foreign Minister A.O. Kuliev. 32 For a detailed description of the different components of Turkmenistan’s opposition, see: International Crisis Group: ‘Cracks in the marble: Turkmenistan’s failing dictatorship’, Asia Report, 44, 17 January 2003, pp. 12–14. 33 Turkmenskaya Iskra, 17 December 1991, pp. 1–2. 34 ‘Dempartiya: Politicheskie tseli’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 22 January 1992, p. 1. 35 E. Ovlyakuliev, ‘Voprosy upravleniya i kadry’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 17 March 1999, p. 2. 36 See the regular section ‘Slovo – Kandidatam v deputaty’, published in Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan throughout the campaigns for elections to the Mejlis in 1999 and 2004. 37 Data extracted from the lists of candidates elected to the Turkmen Mejlis and published in Turkmenskaya Iskra, 12 December 1994, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 12 December 1999 and 20 December 2004. 38 See, for instance: Ovlyakuliev, op. cit., p. 2. 39 Quoting the circumstances behind the removal of Agriculture Minister A. Nobatov might provide an instance of Niyazov’s arbitrary management of cadres’ policy and erratic behaviour. On 22 May 1998, Niyazov was flying ‘over areas west of the capital and noted that there was ‘not a single normal field there’: he then dismissed Agriculture Minister Ata Nobatov’ (‘Turkmen President Dismisses Agriculture Minister’, RFE/RL Newsline, 2 (99), 26 May 1998). 40 Chapter 1, pp. 15–16. 41 See: ‘Gosudarstvennaya selektsiya po-Niyazovski’, www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php4? st=1034280780, accessed on 7 October 2007. 42 ‘Former Turkmen Minister announces opposition to President’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 31 October 2001. 43 ‘Niyazov escapes assassination attempt’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 2 December 2002. 44 ‘Kto oni?’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 26 December 2002, p. 3. 45 ‘Human rights violations in Turkmenistan 25 November 2002–24 January 2003’, pre-

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pared by the Turkmenistan Project of the Open Society Institute, 24 January 2003, www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/files2/hrviolations.pdf, accessed on 29 September 2007; Amnesty International Document EUR 61/015/2003, ‘Turkmenistan: Clampdown on dissent – A background briefing’, September 2003. A. Bohr, ‘A failed coup after all? November 2002, Ashgabat’, Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, 18 June 2003. On the division within the ranks of the Turkmen opposition-in-exile, see: ‘Cracks in the marble: Turkmenistan’s failing dictatorship’, op. cit., p. 14. ‘Shikhmuradov sentenced to life for plot against President’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 30 December 2002. For the biography of R.S. Saparov, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 22 March 2003, p. 1. Turkmen State News Service, 27 July 2005. ‘Former Turkmen Deputy Premier jailed for 20 years’, RFE/RL Newsline, 9 (141), 28 July 2005. See: ‘Cracks in the marble: Turkmenistan’s failing dictatorship’, op. cit., pp. 8–11. For the full text of the law, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 16 August 2003, pp. 1–2. J. Sˇir, ‘Halk Maslahaty in the context of the constitutional evolution of post-Soviet Turkmenistan’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 2005, 6 (2), p. 327. Ochs, ‘Turkmenistan: the quest for stability and control’, op. cit., p. 319. ‘Skonchalsya Prezident Turkmenistana Saparmurat Niyazov’, Internet Gazeta Turkmenistan.ru, 21 December 2006, www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id= ru&elem_id=8995&type=event&sort=date_desc, accessed on 22 October 2007. At the moment of his appointment as Turkmenistan’s interim leader, Berdymuhammedov occupied the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Health and Pharmaceutical Industry. For the official biography of G.M. Berdymuhammedov, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 27 December 2006, p. 1. ‘Vnutrennyaya i vneshnyaya politika Turkmenii ostaetsya neizmennoy’, Internet Gazeta Turkmenistan.ru, 21 December 2006, www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3& lang_id=ru&elem_id=8995&type=event&sort=date_desc, accessed on 22 October 2007. See: ‘Turkmenistan: Presidential campaign opens with surprising promises of reform’; RFE/RL Feature Article, 4 January 2007, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/01/18A4B4F3–62C0–4E6B-BDF0–5770EEC7F02C.html, accessed on 18 October 2007. For a detailed analysis of the Needs Assessment Mission in Turkmenistan, see Chapter 6, p. 136. Art. 61 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkmenistan. See: ‘Reshenie Gosudarstvennogo Soveta bezopasnosti Turkmenistana i Kabineta Ministrov Turkmenistana’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 22 December 2006, p. 1. ‘Konstitutsionnyi zakon Turkmenistana o vneseniyi izmenenyi i dopolnenyi v Konstitutziyu Turkmenistana’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 27 December 2006, p. 1. Following a praxis consolidated in the Niyazov era, Berdymuhammedov was elected President of Turkmenistan’s Khalk Maslakhaty on 30 March 2007. For a detailed description of the profiles of the five candidates and of their respective electoral platforms, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 27 December 2006. Immediately after Niyazov’s death, the Turkmen opposition nominated one of its leaders (former Deputy Prime Minister K.A. Orazov) as its candidate for the forthcoming presidential election. Loyalty towards the late President represented an essential criterion in running for the presidential post. All six accepted candidates ‘pledged their loyalty to the policies and ideas of the late Saparmurat Niyazov’ (‘People’s Council approves six presidential candidates’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 23 December 2006–4 January 2007).

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68 ‘Eleven candidates were nominated in the course of the 26 December meeting of the Khalk Maslakhaty and six of them, one from each of the five regions of Turkmenistan and one from Ashgabat including the Acting President, received the necessary number of votes in the Khalk Maslakhaty’ (OSCE/ODIHR, Turkmenistan Presidential Election 11 February 2007 – OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, Warsaw, 18 January 2007, p. 6). 69 International Crisis Group, ‘Turkmenistan after Niyazov’, Asia Briefing, 60, 12 February 2007, p. 5. 70 On this note, see the different treatments that the official website Turkmenistan – Zolotoy Vek (www.turkmenistan.gov.tm) granted to Berdymuhammedov and to the other presidential candidates during the electoral campaign. 71 For the official result, see: ‘Soobshchenie Tsentral’noi komissii po vyboram i provedeniyu referendumov v Turkmenistane ob itogakh vyborov Prezidenta Turkmenistana’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 15 February 2007, p. 2. 72 See: German Presidency of the European Union, EU Statement on the presidential elections in Turkmenistan, PC.DEL/21/07, 18 January 2007. 73 See the comments of V. Goryaev, Deputy Director of the Asiatic-Pacific section of the UN Department of Political Affairs, in: ‘Nash vybor – prozvetayushchii, stabil’nii Turkmenistan’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 12 February 2007. 74 B. Pannier, ‘Turkmenistan: sorting out the presidential candidates’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 7 February 2007, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/02/D52D02C0-BA3E4FD4-B217-E00655400664.html, accessed on 18 October 2007. 75 See: ‘Kandidat v prezidenty Turkmenistana Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov vstretilsya s izbiratelyami Lebapskogo velayata’, Internet Gazeta Turkmenistan.ru, 18 January 2007, www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id=ru&elem_id=9170&type= event&sort=date_desc, accessed on 23 October 2007. 76 For more details on the reformist packages introduced by Berdymuhammedov during the first month of his presidency, see: C. Durdiyeva, ‘Berdymuhammedov embarks on significant educational reforms’, Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, 27 June 2007; ‘Turkmen government to restore pensions’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 16 March–22 March 2007. 77 See: C. Durdiyeva, ‘New law on social security takes effect in Turkmenistan’, Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, 27 July 2007. 78 ‘Turkmen Acting President hints at reforms’, RFE/RL Newsline, 11 (2), 2 January 2007. 79 See: ‘Internet cafés link Turkmenistan to outside world, but at a price’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 16–22 February 2007. 80 ‘Turkmen State website removes readers’ comments feature’, RFE/RL Newsline, 11 (191), 16 October 2007. 81 ‘Turkmen leader replaces head of Presidential Guard’, RFE/RL Newsline, 11 (89), 16 May 2007. 82 See: G. Gleason, ‘Turkmenistan after Turkmenbashi’, EurasiaNet Commentary, 23 December 2006, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122306.shtml, accessed on 22 October 2007; R. Abazov, ‘Will Berdymuhammedov be a Gorbachev or an Ahmadinejad?’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 February 2007. 83 ‘Turkmenistan after Niyazov’, op. cit., pp. 2–3. 84 Three out the 27 members occupied ministerial positions under Niyazov before being excluded from the elite. They were: Kh. M. Saparlyev (Minister of Education from April 2004 to October 2005), T. Tagyev (Minister of the Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resources from November 2002 to March 2003) and J.A. Geoklenova (Minister of the Textile Industry from June 1997 to August 2002, and Deputy Ambassador to Russia from 2002 to 2007). As Geoklenova was appointed as the head of the State Concern for the Carpet Industry (Turkmenhaly), Tagyev and Saparlyev were reintegrated in the Turkmen elite at the highest level, both being appointed as Deputy

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Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. (See: ‘Prezident Turkmenistana proizvel ryad kadrovykh naznachenii’, Internet-Gazeta Turkmenistan.ru, 21 February 2007, www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id=ru&elem_id=9413&type=event&sort=da te_desc, accessed on 16 October 2007). See: G. Saidazimova, ‘New Turkmen president still bound to clans, nepotism’, RFE/RL Newsline, 11 (188), 11 October 2007. For the text of the decrees, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 8 October 2007, p. 1. F. Najibullah, ‘Turkmenistan: New President shows shades of Turkmenbashi’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 3 July 2007, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/07/553 cbfb1–46aa-4757-ae2b-2069350baf5f.html, accessed on 18 October 2007. See: ‘President Berdymuhammedov makes new appointments’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 13–19 June 2007; ‘Turkmen president fires heads of Ashgabat and Tashauz province police departments’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 12–18 October 2007. C.J. Panico, ‘Turkmenistan unaffected by winds of democratic change’, RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (4), 22 January 1993, p. 6.

3 The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality as a key element in nationbuilding 1 This chapter understands nation-building as the ‘use of political means to reinforce and to shape a national identity’ (W.J. Norman, Negotiating nationalism: Nationbuilding, federalism, and secession in the multinational state, Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 17). 2 J.J. Linz, ‘Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes’, in Greenstein, F.I. and Polsby, N.W. (eds), Handbook of political science, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975, vol. 3, pp. 175–412. 3 ‘Patrimonialism and in the extreme case, sultanism tend to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master [. . .] Where domination is primarily traditional, even though it is exercised by virtue of the ruler’s personal autonomy, it will be called patrimonialism; where indeed it operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called sultanism [. . .] Sometimes it appears that sultanism is completely unrestrained by tradition, but this is never in fact the case’ (M. Weber, Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 232–3).) 4 Ibid., p. 234. 5 H.E. Chehabi and J.J. Linz, ‘A theory of sultanism I – A type of nondemocratic rule’, in Chehabi, H.E. and Linz, J.J. (eds), Sultanistic regimes, Baltimore-London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998, pp. 4–5. 6 Because of its etymology, the term ‘sultanism’ appears to have been coined on the basis of an ‘orientalistic’ approach. In modern social sciences, there has been much discussion of Weber’s choice to adopt an Arabic term to describe highly authoritarian regimes, and careful assessment of the opportunity to adopt it. Halil Inalcik (‘Comments on sultanism: Max Weber’s typification of the Ottoman polity’, Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies, 1992, 1, pp. 49–72) stressed (pp. 54–6) that, in the Ottoman Empire (considered by Weber the archetypal sultanistic regime), a significant number of elements imported by the Arabs from the two major empires conquered (totally or partially) in the seventh century AD (Sassanian and Byzantine) contributed to the emergence of that particular social structure that allowed the consolidation of ‘sultanistic rulership’ (on this note, see also: E. Ashtor, Storia economica e sociale del Vicino Oriente nel Medioevo, Torino: Einaudi, 1982, pp. 69–116). The nonIslamic heritage of these elements excluded the possibility of automatically identifying the political organisation of the dar al-Islam as ‘sultanistic’. After 1975, a number

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of regimes located outside the Islamic world (Philippines, Nicaragua, Zaire and, more recently, Romania, Belarus and North Korea) have been placed within the ‘sultanistic’ label. The geographic dimension of the term was expanded and, therefore, its automatic association with Islam lost relevance. Linz, op. cit., pp. 263–9. J.J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation – Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 344–65. Cummings and Ochs, ‘Turkmenistan – Saparmurat Niyazov’s inglorious isolation’, op. cit., p. 117. ‘In short, while successfully conveying the excesses, personalism and arbitrariness of Niyazov’s rule, sultanism falls short in a number of important respects as a classification of this regime: the absence of an army; the unavailability of dynasticism; the absence of international norms or actors to determine or buttress his rule; and the inability to exploit resources easily and deeply’ (Cummings and Ochs, op. cit., p. 120). Several sultanistic regimes successfully engaged in transitions in which the leader’s role was occupied by one of the close relatives of the ‘sultan’. Contemporary North Korea is probably the most visible example of nepotistic links living beyond the leader himself. In post-Soviet Central Asia, nepotism is progressively emerging as a common element in authoritarian developments. Former Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev’s offspring (daughter Bermet and son Aydar) played a central role in the leadup to the parliamentarian elections of February–March 2005 and were considered as possible candidates for an eventual presidential succession. This possibility was, in the event, halted by the popular uprisings that erupted in the aftermath of the elections. See: ‘Turkmenistan after Niyazov’, op. cit., pp. 3–4. At the beginning of May 2000, the Turkmen Mejlis conferred the highest state title, Turkmenistanin Gakhumanu (Hero of Turkmenistan) to the late President’s father, Atamurat Niyazov, a Red Army soldier who died during World War II. On July 2002, the same honour was granted to Gurbansoltan Edzhe Niyazova, who died during the 1948 earthquake. State titles are not the only honours granted to Niyazov’s relatives: several monuments have been dedicated to his father, a month of the year and Turkmenistan’s major women’s weekly periodical renamed after his mother. Further, portraits of both Niyazov’s parents are often reproduced on the pages of Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan. This is further testified by A.O. Kuliev, the former Turkmen Foreign Minister. See, for instance, his: ‘Turkmenskaya elita – Vzglyad iznutri’, published on the website of the International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, www.iicas.org/articles/library/libr_rus_20_03_01_t.htm, accessed on 21 April 2007. The existence of a correlation between nepotism and regime (in)stability in postSoviet Central Asia is suggested in: J. Bransten, ‘Kyrgyzstan: Are further revolutions inevitable in the CIS?’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 31 March 2005, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/03/9e1d587e-1553–4f09-b2c9-b1cdc8ad1445.html, accessed on 22 May 2007. ‘Repression and regression in Turkmenistan: A new international strategy’, op. cit., p. 2. Chehabi and Linz, ‘A theory of sultanism I’, op. cit., p. 17. Cummings and Ochs, op. cit., p. 117. Chehabi and Linz, ‘A theory of sultanism I’, op. cit., p. 9. Even though it has retained strong authoritarian features, the Berdymuhammedov regime cannot be analysed through the lens of sultanism. The previous chapter (Chapter 2, p. 47) identified personalisation of power – a crucial element of sultanistic rulership – as one of the few prominent features of the Niyazov regime that failed to

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re-emerge in the Berdymuhammedov era. During 2007, the Berdymuhammedov regime did not show the sultanistic tendencies that characterised Turkmen authoritarianism between 1992 and 2006. The transformation of Turkmen authoritarianism does not impinge on the centrality the importance of this chapter’s analysis in relation to the central argument of the book. The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality was, in fact, formulated and implemented for more than a decade by a sultanistic regime. Ibid., p. 7. Archie Brown describes political culture as ‘the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups’. See: A. Brown, ‘Introduction’, in Brown, A. and Gray, J. (eds), Political culture and political change in Communist states, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977, p. 1. H.E. Chehabi and J.J. Linz, ‘A theory of sultanism II – Genesis and demise of sultanism’, in Sultanistic regimes, op. cit., p. 7. See: F. Kashani-Sabet, Frontier fictions: Shaping the Iranian nation, 1804–1946, London: I.B. Tauris, 1999, pp. 51–5. In the national anthem of the Republic of Turkey, the homeland of the Turks is referred to as ‘paradise of a homeland’ (cennet vatanı). See: E. Allworth, ‘The nationality idea in Czarist Central Asia’, in Goldhagen, E. (ed.), Ethnic minorities in the USSR, London–New York: Praeger, 1968, p. 246. S. Akbarzadeh, Nation-Building in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Politics, Sociology and Anthropology, La Trobe University, 1998, p. 153. On this note, see: E. Allworth, ‘Regeneration in Central Asia’, in Allworth, E. (ed.), The nationality question in Soviet Central Asia, New York: Praeger, 1973, pp. 15–16. The first chapter of Marat Durdyev’s book Turkmeny is dedicated to addressing the question: ‘Where to find the Homeland of the Turkmens?’ (p. 8). In the very last paragraph of this chapter, the Turkmen historian and ethnographer provides the answer to that question, by saying that ‘it is not necessary to look for the ancestors of the Turkmens in Mongolia [. . .], not in the valleys of the Ili or the Chü, not on the shores of the Issyk-Kul, and not even in Mesopotamia’. He then presents modern Turkmenistan as ‘the holy land of our ancestors’ (M. Durdyev, Turkmeny – Poiski predkov turkmenskogo naroda i ego istoricheskoi prarodiny, Ashgabat: Kharp, 1991, p. 15). The results of this operation are nevertheless controversial. To begin with, the acceptance of the present borders of Turkmenistan as being traditional borders entails a post-independence legitimisation of the Soviet regional razmezhevanie of 1924. The ‘sense of spatial identity’ (R.J. Kaiser, ‘Nations and homelands in Soviet Central Asia’, in Lewis, R.A. (ed.), Geographic perspectives in Soviet Central Asia, London–New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 280) is a central element in the new Turkmen national self-consciousness. The current Turkmen elite is constantly referring to present-day Turkmenistan as the ‘Motherland of ancestors [of the Turkmen population]’ (Turkmen national anthem Independent and Neutral Turkmenistan, whose full text is reported in Turkmenbashi diplomacy: To the New World through Neutrality (1991–2000), op. cit., pp. 2–6), but, at the same time, is accepting a geographic entity artificially created in the 1920s to conceptualise the contemporary vatan. Consequently, the Soviet razmezhevanie has been treated, by the current Turkmen elite, as a ‘launching pad’ (Akbarzadeh, ‘National identity and political legitimacy in Turkmenistan’, op. cit., p. 280) for post-Soviet nation-building. A.T. Kuru, ‘Between the state and cultural zones: Nation building in Turkmenistan’, Central Asian Survey, 2002, 21 (1), p. 73. Numerous statues have been erected to honour the President, but perhaps the most renowned is the Arch of Neutrality, one of the architectural symbols of modern

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Ashgabat. The Arch’s shape is inspired by the traditional Turkmen trivet, surmounted by a 12-metre sculpture of Niyazov that rotates in line with the movements of the sun. Anderson, ‘Authoritarian political development in Central Asia: The case of Turkmenistan’, op. cit., p. 514. Chehabi and Linz, ‘A theory of sultanism I’, op. cit., p. 16. Maryia Rasner (‘Learning to love Turkmenbashi’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 3–9 September 2000) lists a number of subjects taught in Turkmen educational institutions. Amongst them, two aim to indoctrinate young students with ‘Saparmurat Turkmenbashi’s Teachings about Society’ and ‘Introduction to Patriotism’, whereas two others relate to the international dimension of the regime policies, namely ‘Domestic and International Politics of the Turkmenbashi’ and ‘Politics of Independence and Neutrality’. Chapter 1, p. 22. A similar campaign was launched by Turkmenskaya Iskra even before the official adoption of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. The slogan Politika Turkmenbashi: Otsenka liderov mirovogo soobshchestva (The Politics of Turkmenbashi: Opinions from the leaders of the international community), was extensively used throughout 1994 to comment on every message of congratulations received by the Turkmen government on the occasion of Turkmenistan’s national holidays or to celebrate important political achievements. The ultimate aim of this campaign was the internationalisation of the figure of Niyazov. ‘It is against the traditions of our nation to blindly imitate someone else’s experience, borrow without thinking someone else’s patterns and views. [. . .] The Turkmen notions of good and evil, of true values, moral and ethics determine the style of our politics.’ (Niyazov, ‘Neutrality of Turkmenistan: History, world outlook and state strategy – Lecture on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of permanent neutrality of independent Turkmenistan’, op. cit., p. 75). Annex to the letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/55/732, Ashgabat, 11 December 2000. ‘Statement by the President of Turkmenistan of December 12, 1996 on the Occasion of the First Anniversary of Adoption by the UN General Assembly of Resolution A/50/80(A) ’The Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan’, in Foreign Policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches and interviews by President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, op. cit., p. 80. See: B.O. Shikhmuradov, ‘Introduction’, in Foreign Policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches . . ., op. cit., p. 5. Marat Durdyev has depicted the ethnogenesis of the modern population of Turkmenistan as a multilayered process. Modern Turkmens were originally an Iranic, semi-sedentary and rural population that, as a result of the historical development of the Turkmen region, has been extensively Turkicised. Establishing a direct linkage between the modern Turkmens and the Parthians or other Iranic populaˇ tions living in the era of the Gahiliyya (the pre-Islamic era) drastically reduced the role played by other forms of self-consciousness (i.e. the nomadic-Turkic identity and the Muslim identity) in the process of the Turkmen ethnogenesis. Durdyev’s multilayered approach hence considers Turkic and Islamic identities only as chronologically secondary factors in the process of formation of the modern Turkmen nation. Shikhmuradov, ‘Positive Neutrality as the basis of the foreign policy of Turkmenistan’, op. cit. A.M. Khazanov characterised the relations between nomads and sedentary societies as generally non-peaceful and non-cooperative. More specifically, he described the spectrum of these relations as a phenomenon varying from ‘irregular raids and robbery of agriculturalists and townsmen to the imposition on them of more or less

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long-term relations of protection and dependence’ (A.M. Khazanov, Nomads and the outside world, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 222). A superb example of the traditionally negative perceptions that sedentary societies had of nomads is provided by Ibn Khaldun: ‘the Arabs [i.e. the Bedouins] need stones to set them up as supports for their cooking pots and [. . .] they take them from buildings which they tear down to get the stones. Wood, too, is needed by them for props for their tents and for use it as tent poles for their dwellings. So, they tear down roofs to get the woods for that purpose’ (Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, New York: Pantheon, 1958, vol. 1, p. 303). Kepbanov, ‘Neutral Turkmenistan in the System of International Relations’, op. cit., p. 126. S. Niyazov, ‘Speech at the Session of the People’s Council (Khalk Maslakhaty), 27 October 1997’, in Foreign Policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches . . ., op. cit., pp. 56–7. Ahmet Kuru (op. cit., p. 76) in fact reports that some Turkmens believe that ‘because of its neutral status, Turkmenistan cannot be invaded and it could become the regional centre of Central Asia’. See: The Current Digest of post-Soviet Press, 47 (50), 10 January 1996, p. 21. A.D. Smith, National identity, London: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 77. Source: Foreign Policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches . . ., op. cit., p. 125. In Tashkent, the government has decided to rename squares, streets and an underground station after Amir Timur, presented by local nation-builders as the forefather of modern Uzbeks (C. Kurzman, ‘Uzbekistan: The invention of nationalism in an invented nation’, Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East, Fall 1999, 15, pp. 77–98). One of the most central avenues of Ashgabat has recently been renamed ‘Neutral Turkmenistan Street’. Important buildings, including the Central Bureau of the Ministry of Oil and Gas, are located in this avenue. S. Niyazov, ‘Speech at the 6th Conference of Elders of Turkmenistan, 26 October 1995’, in Foreign Policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches . . ., op. cit., p. 43.

4 The economic foreign policy of neutral Turkmenistan 1 See Chapter 1, p. 29. 2 Domestic economic reforms were considered by the Turkmen government as an essential platform to launch ‘the market mechanism on the basis of [the] national priority’ (‘Ekonomika, Investitsii, Partnerstvo – Economy, Investments, Partnership’, in Shikhmuradov, B.O. and Nurklychev, N. (eds), Stabil’nost’, Reformy, Neytralitet – Stability, Reforms, Neutrality, Ashgabat: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, 1996, p. 59). 3 Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 115. 4 Ibid., p. 105. 5 See: R. Pomfret, The economies of Central Asia, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 34. 6 B.Z. Rumer, Soviet Central Asia – A tragic experiment, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 76. 7 R. Pomfret, ‘Turkmenistan: From communism to nationalism by gradual economic reform’, MOCT–MOST, 2001, 11, p. 167. 8 Gosudarstvennoe planovaya komissiya. 9 Data extracted from: Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 100. 10 Rumer, op. cit., p. 46. 11 See: Pomfret, The economies of . . ., op. cit., p. 123. 12 As Alec Nove and J.A. Newth have remarked, ‘the largely desolate and remote Turkmenistan would hardly be a rational location for any industrial development

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Notes calling for transport outside the bounds of that sparsely populated republic’ (see: A. Nove and J.A. Newth, The Soviet Middle East – A model for development?, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1967, p. 51). This feature was also present in the other economic systems of Soviet Central Asia. In 1989, in fact, the Central Asian Soviet republics produced 88.6 per cent of the total cotton produced in the Union, whereas only 10.4 per cent of the total manufactured textiles produced in the USSR came from Central Asia (see: D. Akagül, ‘L’insertion des républiques turcophones dans l’économie mondiale et le role de la Turquie’, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, 16, July–December 1993, p. 275). ‘Proximity to the source of the raw material does not have the significance for the textile industry that it does for machine building of metallurgy. It has been well known for a long time that the shipment of raw cotton is more economic than the shipment of textiles. Therefore, based on the opportunities [offered by] a high concentration, it is far from expedient to create everywhere new districts of textile industry’ (I. Iskenderov, ‘Eshche raz of vtoroi tektstil’noy baze strani’, Ekonomika i zhizn’, 4, 1973, p. 12; quoted in: Rumer, op. cit., p. 73). Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 102. ‘The strategic objective of the New Village policy is to provide the country with sufficient amount of inexpensive food, with Turkmenistan-grown agricultural raw material and to achieve an absolute independence in this respect in the coming years’ (The policy of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi: Achievement and prospects, op. cit., p. 192). For an outline of this programme, see: ‘10 let Stabil’nost’ – Istoricheskaya programma pervogo Prezidenta Turkmenistana Saparmurata Turkmenbashi’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 3 January 1997, p. 1. See: Bohr, ‘Independent Turkmenistan: From post-communism to sultanism’, op. cit., p. 16. G.O. Khalova and M.V. Orazov, ‘Economic reforms and macro-economic policy in Turkmenistan’, Russian and East European Finance and Trade, 1999, 35 (5), pp. 17–22. Ibid., pp. 27–9. ‘Turkmenistan is undertaking serious measures for the establishment of market economic relations [. . .] and such measures yield fruit’ (The policy of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi . . ., op. cit., p. 185); ‘Having been appreciated by the United Nations, UNICEF, IMF as the model of economic reformation, the Turkmen model in the nearest future will [. . .] transform Turkmenistan from a developing country to a developed [economic system]’ (‘Ekonomika, Investitsii, Partnerstvo . . .’, op. cit., p. 63); ‘The current social and economic situation in Turkmenistan is relatively prosperous compared with the other CIS members [. . .] Turkmenistan opted against rapid privatisation and shock therapy and time has shown this is the right path’ (Khalova and Orazov, op. cit., p. 36). ‘In 1997, the unreformed [Turkmen] economy suffered a deep decline and, although it has enjoyed some recovery after 1999, the overall performance of GDP since independence is some of the worst among all transition economies’ (Pomfret, ‘Turkmenistan: From communism . . .’, op. cit., p. 174). ‘During the last three years (1996–1999), there has been very little progress with structural reform, reflecting the authorities’ strategy to transform to a market economy at a gradual pace, while keeping key economic sectors under state control’ (Turkmenistan: Recent economic developments, IMF Staff Country Report no. 99/140, December 1999, p. 6). See the doubts expressed by Sergey Kamenev (‘Turkmenistan’s foreign policy’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2002, 4 (16), p. 76) in relation to Turkmenistan’s data on the total gas reserves and on official Turkmen figures on energy exports.

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25 For instance, dissident B.O. Shikhmuradov has often accused the Turkmen regime of inflating data on economic development (see: M. Lelyveld, ‘Turkmen opposition leader on US tour continues criticism of his government’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 13 May 2002). 26 ‘Commenting on the country’s economic performance in the first eight months of this year (2004), Niyazov noted that Turkmenistan’s GDP grew by 21.2 per cent, with industrial growth of 22.7 per cent and agriculture production by 20.5 per cent’ (‘Niyazov orders deputies to report on feasibility of increasing wages, pensions, and educational allowances in 2005’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 13 September 2004). 27 Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 102. 28 ‘Turkmenistan’s figures are highly untrustworthy. Most information relating to output, the budget, and even the country’s population is secret. It is rumoured that there are two sets of books, one for planning and one for international consumption, and government inflation statistics are particularly suspect’ (H. Boss Heslop, ‘The Caspian States of the former Soviet Union: Economic performance since 1988’, in Oil, transition and security in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 187). 29 The argument presented in this chapter is in line with the latter position. This research is predominantly based on data presented by official branches of the Turkmen government to international financial organisations (ADB, CIS Statistical Committee). At the same time, no particular relevance has been granted to the extremely unrealistic data (especially in relation to agricultural production) periodically published on Turkmenskaya Iskra and Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan. 30 After 2003, the Turkmen government ceased to transmit data on the structure of Turkmen industrial and agricultural production. For this reason, data in Table 4.2 only relates to the period 1992–2003. 31 Niyazov repeatedly stated that Turkmenistan would have become self-sufficient in relation to food imports by 1998 (see: ‘Ekonomika, Investitsii, Partnerstvo . . .’, op. cit., p. 57). 32 On this programme, see the constant updates published on Turkmenskaya Iskra during 1992–1993. 33 Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 102. 34 ‘Efficient implementation of the investment policy within a relatively short period of time facilitated the building of Turkmenistan’s textile industry, which processes more the one-third of the cotton-wool produced in the country’ (Shikhmuradov, ‘Introduction’, in Foreign Policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches and interviews by President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, op. cit., p. 11). 35 ‘The Government has no plans to privatise the energy sector of the economy or the cotton industry, although it is actively seeking foreign partners to develop these resources’ (‘Accession to the World Trade Organisation: Issues and recommendations for Central Asian and Caucasus economies in transition’, Studies in Trade and Investment, 188, Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific, 2001, p. 263). 36 Turkmenistan: Recent economic developments, op. cit., p. 53. 37 A. Giroux, ‘Turkménistan 1998–1999: Une économie dans l’impasse’, Le courrier des pays de l’Est, 439, April–May 1999, p. 104. 38 Turkmenistan: Recent economic developments, op. cit., p. 57. 39 In 2001 there were only 100 private farms active within the entire territory of Turkmenistan (‘Accession to the World Trade Organisation: Issues and recommendations . . .’, op. cit., p. 263). 40 Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 105. 41 B. Rumer and S. Zhukov, ‘Structural Changes’, in Rumer, B. and Zhukov, S. (eds), Central Asia – The challenges of independence, Armonk–London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, p. 89. 42 M. Brill Olcott, ‘The myth of Tsentral’naia Aziia’, Orbis, 1994, 38 (4), p. 552.

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43 In the highly integrated Soviet economic system, negative economic performances occurring at central level inevitably had repercussions on the volume of trade amongst the republics. More specifically, the economic crisis affecting the USSR in the late 1980s provoked a sensible decline in trade balances of the Soviet republics. In relation to the Central Asian SSRs, intra-republican trade dropped by 15 per cent in 1991, while, in the same year, exports towards extra-USSR destinations were reduced by 35–40 per cent and imports dropped off by 39–48 per cent (see: Pomfret, The economies of . . ., op. cit., p. 37). 44 In 1991, the TSSR’s total amount of imports was approximately US$846 million, while the total Turkmen exports accounted for US$1,187 million, of which US$1,052 million represented the total revenues for the gas exports (see: Pomfret, The economies of . . ., op. cit., p. 38). 45 See: D.G. Tarr, ‘The terms-of-trade effects of moving to world prices on countries of the Former Soviet Union’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 1994, 18 (1), pp. 1–24. 46 Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, p. 109. 47 ‘When monetary cooperation appeared to be too costly and when trade cooperation contradicted Russian economic interests, the Russian government decided to sacrifice the interests of the CIS states’ (R. Abdelal, National purpose in the world economy – Post-Soviet states in a comparative perspective, Ithaca–London: Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 67). 48 See Chapter 5, pp. 107–9. 49 ‘Neytral’nyi status Turkmenistana – Garant ekonomicheskogo razvitiya’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 10 December 1997, p. 1. 50 Kepbanov, ‘Neutral Turkmenistan in the system of international relations’, op. cit., p. 136. 51 Shikhmuradov, ‘Positive Neutrality as the basis of the foreign policy of Turkmenistan’, op. cit. 52 ‘Ekonomika, Investitsii, Partnerstvo . . .’, op. cit., p. 69. 53 ‘The granting of a permanent neutral status for Turkmenistan helped it to intensify considerably the pursuance of the Open Doors policy, which had been underway in the country since of the first days of the independence’ (Shikhmuradov, ‘Introduction’, op. cit., p. 9). 54 ‘The State Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange of Turkmenistan was founded by Turkmenistan President Decree dated August 1994. It is considered to be an important economic establishment, authorized to function as a head body, regulating export-import transactions. Compared with other exchanges, Turkmenistan State Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange scope of work is extremely wide. Besides its traditional functions of acting as an intermediary, its main objectives are: (1) to create equal terms and conditions for its participants, both international businessmen and Turkmenistan entrepreneurs; (2) to increase and speed up turnover; (3) to saturate the domestic market with required consumables and technical production and equipment intended to modernize the country’s economy; (4) to supervise the country’s natural and mineral resources to be effectively disposed of, and; (5) to comply with prices stated per goods, taking their real cost price into consideration’ (M. Haghayeghi, ‘Accession to the WTO: The Case of Turkmenistan’, Paper presented at the Sub-regional Workshop on Accession to WTO – Economies in Transition, Tashkent (Uzbekistan), 25–27 July 2001, www.unescap.org/oes/speca/docs/Divisions/TID/Accession_to_WTO-Tashkent/StudyTurkmenistan.pdf, accessed on 29 April 2007). 55 ‘The Law of Turkmenistan on foreign economic activities in Turkmenistan’, is the main legislative instrument that regulates Turkmenistan’s commercial law. The full text of the law, which was approved on May 1992, is available electronically at the official website of the Main State tax service of Turkmenistan (www.tax.gov. tm/english/law0004en.html, accessed on 12 April 2007).

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56 ‘Accession to the World Trade Organisation: Issues and recommendations . . .’, op. cit., p. 270. 57 Turkmenistan: Recent economic developments, op. cit., p. 45. 58 ‘Accession to the World Trade Organisation: Issues and recommendations . . .’, op. cit., p. 280. 59 After 2003, the Turkmen government ceased to transmit data on the structure of Turkmen trade to the ADB. For this reason, data in Table 4.4 only relates to the period 1992–2003. 60 See: Giroux, op. cit., p. 105. 61 In 1997, Shahram Akbarzadeh pointed out that Turkmenistan was heavily ‘dependent on imported grain from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan’ (Akbarzadeh, ‘National identity and political legitimacy in Turkmenistan’, op. cit., p. 274). In 1999, the IMF remarked that Turkmenistan was ‘still heavily dependant on imports of food stuff’ (Turkmenistan: Recent economic developments, op. cit., p. 49). 62 Data extracted from the official database of the Food and Agriculture Organisation, at http://faostat.fao.org, accessed on 28 May 2006. 63 On this note, see Chapter 5 (p. 109). 64 Data consulted at the official website of the Ukrainian Statistical Committee (www.ukrstat.gov.ua), accessed on 9 July 2007. 65 See: ‘Torgovo-ekonomicheskie otnosheniya’, www.mid.ru/ns-rsng.nsf/6bc38aceada 6e44b432569e700419ef5/f97e62745daaea8d43256a65002b2f3a?OpenDocument, accessed on 10 July 2007. 66 L. Freinkman, E. Polyakov and C. Revenco, Trade performance and regional integration of the CIS countries, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004, p. 11. 67 Islamic Republic of Iran: Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report no. 04/307, September 2004, p. 50; Islamic Republic of Iran: Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report no. 60/129, April 2006, p. 47. 68 ‘Foreign trade statistics’, available electronically at the official website of the Undersecretariat of the Turkish Prime Ministry for Trade (www.dtm.gov.tr), accessed on 9 July 2007. 69 ‘Imports and exports by countries and regions (2004)’, at the official website of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (http://english.mofcom. gov.cn), accessed on 9 July 2007. 70 See, for instance: ‘Vneshnotorgolyi oborot Turkmenistana za desyat’ mesyatsev byros v 1,6 rasa’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 21 November 2000, p. 1. 71 J.P. Dorian, ‘Turkmenistan’s future in gas and oil hinges on certainty for export options’, Oil and Gas Journal, 7 October 2002, p. 20. 72 Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 109. 73 In November 2006, Niyazov announced the discovery of a giant gas field located in South Iolotan (Mary velayat). The former Turkmen President claimed the field ‘has proven reserves of 7 trillion cubic meters of gas’ (R. Kupchinsky, ‘Turkmenistan: Potential “Super-Giant” Emerges on Energy Scene’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 10 November 2006, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/11/cb06dcde-c0d7–40c7b0e9–8ac1bd48f6f2.html, accessed on 12 July 2007). On 21 November 2006, the Turkmen government signed a deal worth US $152 million with China National Petroleum Corporation for the exploration of the Iolotan gas field (see: ‘Kitaiskie partnery Turkmenistana primut uchastie v osvoenii krupnogo neftegazovogo mestorozhdeniya Yuznyi Iolotan’, Internet-Gazeta Turkmenistan.ru, 21 November 2006, www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id=ru&elem_id=8862&type=event& sort=date_desc, accessed on 14 February 2007). As of December 2007, the size of actual reserves of the field has not been proved. 74 For a detailed overview of the technological level reached by the Turkmen industry in the Soviet era, see: USSR Energy Atlas, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1985, pp. 24–9.

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75 ‘Given its tremendous natural resources, Turkmenistan shall use the national capacities to carry out a series of large-scale international projects aimed at setting up joint-ventures and luring foreign investments to be made by state-run or private companies, banks or international financial institutions’ (‘Foreign Policy Concept of Turkmenistan as a Neutral State’, op. cit., p. 108). 76 Dorian, op. cit., p. 22. 77 The Turkmen investment climate is regulated by the ‘The Law of Turkmenistan on Foreign Investment in Turkmenistan’. The full text of the law is available electronically at the official website of the Main State tax service of Turkmenistan (www.tax.gov.tm/english/law0004en.html), accessed on 9 July 2007. 78 G. Canzi, ‘Turkmenistan’s Caspian resources and its international political economy’, in Akiner, S. (ed.), The Caspian – Politics, energy and security, London–New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, p. 186. 79 This law, with great precision, regulated the relationship between the Turkmen government and foreign partners, by describing the three types of licences issued by Turkmenistan: ‘an exploration licence, an extraction licence, and single exploration and extraction licence’ (Dorian, op. cit., p. 22). 80 See: V. Mesamed, ‘Turkmenistan: Oil, gas and Caspian politics’, in Croissant, M.P., and Aras, B. (eds), Oil and geopolitics in the Caspian Sea region, Westport– London: Praeger, 1999, p. 219. 81 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States. 82 For the text of the law, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 22 October 1999, p. 1. 83 More specifically, the 1999 legislation assigned the control of decision-making in energy-related issues to an obscure governmental agency, named ‘Competent Body for the Use of Hydrocarbon Resources’. The presidency of this agency was assigned to Niyazov (see: Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 106). 84 ‘Permanent Neutrality is an important guarantee for foreign investment and international bank capital flow into the economy of Turkmenistan’ (Shikhmuradov, ‘Positive Neutrality as the basis . . .’, op. cit.). 85 On this note, see also: ‘Neftegazovyi kompleks Turkmenistana na poroge novykh krupnykh investintsii’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 26 March 1998 p. 1; ‘Neftegazovyi kompleks Turkmenistana: Na osnove dostizhenii k novym tselyam’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 11 January 2001, p. 1; Saparmurat Niyazov: ‘Uchastnikam “Kruglogo Stola” “Dostup Turkmenskikh energoresursov na mezhdunarodnye rynki”, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 2 March 2005, p. 1. 86 ‘Turkmenistan: 2007 Investment Climate Statement’, http://turkmenistan.usembassy.gov/ic_report07.html, accessed on 9 July 2007. 87 ‘The Bank is seriously concerned by Turkmenistan’s continued failure to take any measures which would indicate a willingness to make progress towards multi-party democracy, pluralistic society and a market-based economy. Since the adoption of the last Strategy for Turkmenistan in July 2004, there has been no evidence of improvement in the authorities’ commitment to the principles of Article 1 of the Agreement Establishing the Bank’ (Strategy for Turkmenistan as approved by the Board of Directors at its meeting on 15 June 2006, Document of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, p. 1); ‘The Bank is currently unable to engage more actively with Turkmenistan in light of the country’s failure to report its external debt, a violation of the Bank’s negative pledge clause, and the fact that Turkmenistan has not yet met minimum public resource management standards’ (Turkmenistan: Country Brief 2005, retrievable at the official website of the World Bank, www.worldbank.org, accessed on 9 July 2007). 88 Canzi, op. cit., p. 185. 89 The TACIS Programme Annual Report 1999, http://europa.eu.int/comm/ external_relations/ceeca/tacis, accessed on 27 June 2007.

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90 See: ‘The EU’s relations with Turkmenistan’, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ relations/turkmenistan/intro/index.htm, accessed on 7 July 2007. 91 See: ‘Turkmenistan and the ADB – A Fact Sheet’, www.adb.org/Documents/Fact_ Sheets/TKM.asp, accessed on 3 July 2007. 92 S. Blank, ‘Russian democracy: from the future to the past’, Demokratizatsiya, 1998, 6 (3), p. 564. 93 In the 1990s, this city, located in Western Turkmenistan, became known by the regime-imposed name of Balkanabat. 94 USSR Energy Atlas, op. cit., p. 10. 95 See: M. Brill Olcott, ‘International gas trade in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Iran, Russia and Afghanistan’, in Victor, D.G., Jaffe, A.M. and Hayes, M.H. (eds), Natural gas and geopolitics from 1970 to 2040, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 222. 96 See: V. Ginsburg and M. Troschke, ‘The export of Turkmenistan’s energy resources’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2003, 6 (24), p. 110. 97 Canzi, op. cit., p. 187. 98 Brill Olcott, ‘International gas trade in Central Asia . . .’, op. cit., p. 223. 99 In the 1990s, Russia was selling gas imported from Turkmenistan to three main customers: Ukraine (which paid US$80 per 1000 cm), Western Europe (US$110 per 1000 cm), and Turkey (US$133 per 1000 cm) (see: Ginsburg and Troschke, op. cit., p. 110). 100 Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 109. 101 M.J. Sagers, ‘Turkmenistan’s gas trade: The case of exports to Ukraine’, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 1999, 40 (2), p. 145. 102 Ibid., p. 142. 103 Kepbanov, Postoyanniy Neytralitet Turkmenistana: Programma na XXI Vek, op. cit., pp. 83–4. 104 Saparmurat Niyazov, Speech at the Fifth ECO Summit, Almaty (Kazakhstan), 11 May 1998, retrievable at the official website of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), www.ecosecretariat.org, accessed on 16 June 2007. 105 See: ‘Turkmenistan realizuet novuyu model’ vneshneekomicheskogo svyazei v ramkakh EKO’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 7 May 1996, p. 1; ‘Marshruty truboprovodov – garantiya mira, stabil’nost’ i sozidaniya’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 7 September 2000, p. 1. 106 See, for instance: Niyazov, Speech at the Fifth ECO Summit, op. cit. 107 In fact, Turkmenistan’s economic interaction within the ECO area has traditionally been extremely limited (see: M.S. Behace and M. Saremi, ‘Assessing Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) performance: 1992–1997’, International Journal of Commerce and Management, 2002, 12 (3-4), pp. 14–31). 108 S. Kamenev, ‘Turkmenistan: Energy policy and energy projects’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2003, 6 (22), p. 125. 109 Canzi, op. cit., p. 187. 110 See: A. Kurbanov, ‘Gazoprovod Turkmenistan-Afganistan-Pakistan otkroet novuyu epokhu v regional’nom sotrudnichestve’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 5 November 1997, p. 1; B. O’Rourke, ‘Turkmenistan: A pipeline long in the pipeline’, RFERL Feature Article, 14 February 2006, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/b8cadc86b102–44ea-bce5–6d68c87b6ec9.html, accessed on 11 July 2007. 111 See: Brill Olcott, ‘International gas trade in Central Asia . . .’, op. cit., pp. 217–20. 112 For the full text of the declaration, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 31 May 2002, p. 1. 113 ‘Interview of ITAR-TASS with Saparmurat Niyazov’, in Foreign Policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches . . ., op. cit., p. 34. 114 ‘The TAP project has significant potential for enhancing stability and improving living standards in South and Central Asia. It will be a pioneering effort in linking

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118

119 120 121 122 123

124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133

134

Notes the energy-deficit economies of South Asia to the hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian countries [. . .] it has very long-term and widespread positive implication for the countries involved, and for the region as a whole’ (Technical Assistance for the Feasibility Studies of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Asian Development Bank Doc. TAR: STU 3648, December 2002, p. 1). See: ‘Afghan, Pakistani, Turkmen officials approve pipeline route’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 8 July 2003. Kamenev, ‘Turkmenistan: Energy policy . . .’, op. cit., p. 122. ‘[India] needs a thorough overhaul of its marketing and regulatory structure to make gas a widespread commercial fuel’ (J. Roberts, ‘Caspian oil and gas – How far have we come and where are we going?’, in Oil, transition and security in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 155). More recently, doubts about India’s attitude towards the project seem to have been clarified when the Indian government manifested a clear intention to join the TransAfghan pipeline (see: ‘India agrees to join Trans-Afghan pipeline project’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 8–14 July 2005). However, a more precise assessment in this regard could only be produced after the beginning of construction works for the pipeline. See: ‘New Delhi gives approval for talks on gas pipeline’, RFE/RL Newsline, 9 (27), 10 February 2005; ‘India says it wants to join TAP pipeline project’, RFE/RL Newsline, 9(107), 7 June 2005. O’Rourke, op. cit. See: ‘International Audit Places Reserves of Dovletabad Gas Field at 4.5 Trillion Cubic Meters’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 10–16 February 2006. See: Canzi, op. cit., pp. 187–8. In early 1999, the Turkmen government appointed PSG International, a 50:50 partnership between General Electric Services and Bechel, with special responsibilities in relation to the TCGP. Few months later (August 1999), Royal Dutch/Shell entered the project to develop the gas fields from which the pipeline would have originated (see: Roberts, op. cit., p. 156; Canzi, op. cit., p. 188). Kamenev, ‘Turkmenistan: Energy policy . . .’, op. cit., p. 121. Reportedly, the former Turkmen President asked an exorbitant anticipated pay-off (US$500 million) to Royal Dutch and Shell (Roberts, op. cit., p. 157; Canzi, op. cit., p. 188). U.S. interest in the Central Asian Republics, Hearing before the Sub-committee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Session, Washington, DC, 12 February 1998, p. 7. Kamenev, ‘Turkmenistan: Energy policy . . .’, op. cit., p. 121. See, for instance: the official account of the signature of the joint-venture with Royal Dutch/Shell, ‘Transkaspii: vazhnyi shag k realizatsii proekta’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 7 August 1999, p. 1. Canzi, op. cit., p. 189. Roberts, op. cit., p. 157. ‘Turkmenistan faces challenges in export transportation options’, Oil and Gas Journal, 28 October 2002, p. 49. See: ‘Turkmen TV details China gas deal’, RFE/RL Newsline, 10 (66), 10 April 2006. See: ‘V Pekine po itogam peregovorov na vysshem urovne podpisan ryad turkmenokitaiskikh dokumentov’, Internet-Gazeta Turkmenistan.ru, 3 April 2006, www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id=ru&elem_id=7961&type=event&sort=date_desc, accessed on 14 February 2007. See: ‘Turkmenistan–China pipeline to open in 2009’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 21 August 2006, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/08/7d30e5fa-efb1–4b34-b49bee5632149f86.html, accessed on 22 July 2007.

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135 On this note, see: D. Klimmage: ‘Central Asia: Turkmenistan–China pipeline project has far-reaching implications’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 20 April 2006, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/55f9574d-407a4777–9724–944e6c2ecd7b.html, accessed on 16 March 2007. 136 Kamenev, ‘Turkmenistan: Energy policy . . .’, op. cit., p. 121. 137 See: Dorian, op. cit., p. 26; Kamenev, ‘Turkmenistan: Energy policy . . .’, op. cit., pp. 121–2. 138 Roberts, op. cit., p. 156. 139 See, for instance: S.A. Niyazov, Inaugural statement at the ECO Extraordinary Summit, Ashgabat, 14 May 1997, retrievable at the official website of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), www.ecosecretariat.org, accessed on 21 June 2007. 140 For the full draft, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 15 May 1997, pp. 1–2. 141 ‘Iranian President comes to Turkmenistan on Sunday’, ITAR-TASS, 27 December 1997. 142 Brill Olcott, ‘International gas trade in Central Asia. . .’, op. cit., p. 213. 143 Dorian, op. cit., p. 20. 144 Kamenev, ‘Turkmenistan: Energy policy . . .’, op. cit., p. 120. 145 Dorian, op. cit., p. 21. 146 Brill Olcott, ‘International gas trade in Central Asia . . .’, op. cit., p. 213. 147 ‘Turkmen President proposes oil pipeline across Iran’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 21 January 2004. 148 See, for instance: Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 105; Bohr, ‘Independent Turkmenistan: From post-communism to sultanism’, op. cit., p. 15. 149 ‘Since independence, Turkmenistan has essentially maintained a command economy of the Soviet era. [. . .]. This economic policy has remained unchanged, with little progress in market-orientated structural and institutional reforms. Rich resource endowments and economic performance in recent years have allowed the government not only to resist demands from the international community to accelerate reforms, but even to extend its control over all spheres of the economy’ (EBRD Document, ‘Strategy for Turkmenistan, as approved by the Board of Directors on 23 June 2004’, www.ebrd.com, accessed on 12 June 2006). 150 ‘By 1993 economic reform had ground to a halt as official ideology proclaimed the success of the reform programme. [Then] President Niyazov received honorary doctorates in political science and in economics, and he was elected to Turkmenistan’s Academy of Sciences for his contribution to economic reform’ (Pomfret, The Economies of . . ., op. cit., p. 125). 151 ‘During the last five years [1994–1999], Turkmenistan’s progress with the implementation of structural reforms and the transformation to a market economy has been very limited’ (Turkmenistan: Recent economic developments, op. cit., p. 53). 152 See: Giroux, op. cit., p. 104. 153 On this note, see: G. Melikov, ‘Neytralitet Turkmenistana – Fenomen mirovoi politiki’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 27 November 1998, p. 1. 154 For a detailed analysis of the Agreement, see Chapter 5, pp. 121–2. 155 Gleason, Markets and politics in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 115 (emphasis added). 5 Neutrality as equidistance from sources of dependency: Russo-Turkmen relations in the post-Soviet era 1 See: I. Touline, ‘Russian diplomacy: The problems of transition’, in Mozaffari, M. (ed.), Security politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States – The Southern belt, Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997, pp. 35–54.

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2 M. Skak, From empire to anarchy – Post Communist foreign policy and international relations, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 142. 3 A.A. Sergounin, ‘Russian Post Communist foreign policy thinking at the crossroads: Changing paradigms’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 2000, 3 (3), p. 216. 4 For an exact description of the ideas contained in the agendas of these political groups, see: N. Malcolm, A. Pravda, R. Allison and M. Light, Internal factors in Russian foreign policy, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 34. For a description of the political forces aligned in these three groups, see: N.J. Jackson, Russian foreign policy and the CIS – Theories, debates and actions, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 39–47; J. Miller, ‘Alternative visions of the Russian future’, in Saikal, A. and Maley, W. (eds), Russia in search of its future, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 190–206. 5 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 54–78. 6 For a detailed description of the new political thinking, see: A. Brown, The Gorbachev factor, Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 220–5. 7 See: Malcolm, Pravda, Allison and Light, op. cit., p. 45. 8 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 32–3. 9 Sergounin, op. cit., p. 219. 10 See: S. Stankevich, ‘Toward a new national idea’, in Sestanovich, S. (ed.), Rethinking Russia’s national interests, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994, pp. 24–32. 11 For the full draft of the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, see: ‘Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, 1993, 3, pp. 3–23. 12 See: Brill Olcott, ‘The myth of Tsentral’naia Aziia’, op. cit., p. 554. 13 See: M. Mesbahi, ‘Russia and the geopolitics of the Muslim South’, in Mesbahi, M. (ed.), Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994, p. 283. 14 L. Jonson, Russia and Central Asia – A new web of relations, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 17. 15 S. Gretsky, ‘Russia’s policy toward Central Asia’, in Jonson, L. and Esenov, M. (eds), Political Islam and conflicts in Russia and Central Asia, Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1999, (full text at: www.ca-c.org/dataeng/political_islam_and_conflicts.shtml, accessed on 20 November 2007). 16 On this note, see: ‘The debate on economic integration’, in Brzezinski, Z. and Sullivan, P. (eds), Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States – Documents, data and analysis, Armonk–London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, pp. 367–413. 17 R. Allison, ‘Strategic reassertion in Russia’s Central Asia policy’, International Affairs, 2004, 53 (2), p. 283. 18 See: M. Brill Olcott, A. Åslund and S.W. Garnett, Getting it wrong – Regional cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999, pp. 22–5. 19 E. Sievers, The Post-Soviet decline of Central Asia: Sustainable development and comprehensive capital, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 129. 20 Niyazov, ‘Speech at the Session of the People’s Council – Khalk Maslakhaty, 27 December 1995’, op. cit., p. 49. 21 For the full text of the document, see: ‘S uchetom neytral’nogo statusa – Turkmenistan budet uchastovat’ v SNG na pravakh assotsiiarovannogo chlena’, InternetGazeta Turkmenistan.ru, 27 August 2005, www.turkmenistan.ru/index.php? lang_id=ru&page_id=3&sort=date_desc&filter=date_2005–08–27%2000:00:00_200 5–08–27%2023:59:59, accessed on 21 November 2007. 22 ‘Niyazov thanks CIS leaders for support of Turkmen neutrality’, BBC Summary of World Broadcast, 22 January 1996.

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23 On this note, see an analysis of Niyazov’s remarks during the CIS Summit of 27–28 March 1997: ‘Saparmurat Turkmenbashi: Nuzhny novye podkhody k vzaimnomu sotrudnichestvu’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 31 March 1997, p. 1. 24 In that time frame, in fact, the organisation held twelve meetings of the Council of Heads of State and eleven Sessions of the Council of Heads of Government. 25 ‘On constitutional and parliamentary processes’, in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, op. cit., p. 414. 26 Ibid. 27 R. Sakwa and M. Webber, ‘The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991–1998: Stagnation and survival’, Europe-Asia Studies, 1999, 51 (3), p. 392. 28 ‘The Interparliamentary Assembly’, in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, op. cit., p. 429. 29 Sakwa and Webber, op. cit., p. 392. 30 ‘The priority of bilateral relations in the foreign policy remains steadfast for us’ (‘Rech’ Prezidenta Turkmenistana S.A Niyazova na otkrytii ocherednogo zasedaniya Soveta Glavnkomanduyushchikh Pogranichnymi voiskami stran SNG’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 31 March 1995, p. 1); ‘Bilateral relations [. . .] are a high priority in the Turkmen system of international relations’ (Kepbanov, Postoyanniy Neytralitet Turkmenistana: Programma na XXI Vek, op. cit., p. 77); ‘Turkmenistan sees its role as a partner developing the connection with everybody without exception on bilateral basis only’ (‘Vneshnyaya Politika, Neytralitet – Foreign policy, Neutrality’ in Stabil’nost’, Reformy, Neytralitet – Stability, Reforms, Neutrality, op. cit., p. 79); ‘In establishing long-term partnership relations based on the principle of openness and observance of the national interests Turkmenistan is known to prefer the format of bilateral cooperation’ (‘Finding friends and like-minded persons’, State Information Agency of Turkmenistan (TDH) Weekly Commentary, 28 November 2005). 31 ‘Niyazov opposes tough CIS structures’, in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, op. cit., p. 211. 32 See: Sakwa and Webber, op. cit., p. 395. 33 Ibid., p. 386. 34 See: ‘S zasedaniya Soveta Glav pravitel’stv SNG’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 11 February 1992, p. 1; ‘Zasedanie Glav i Predstavitelei pravitel’stv stran SNG v Moskve’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 14 March 1992, p. 1. 35 For the text of the agreement, see: ‘Trade, economic cooperation accord’, in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, op. cit., p. 513. 36 Ibid. 37 Brill Olcott, Åslund and Garnett, op. cit., p. 41. 38 The Current Digest of post-Soviet Press, 45 (20), 16 June 1993, p. 9. 39 See: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 23 December 1993, p. 1. 40 Brill Olcott, Åslund and Garnett, op. cit., p. 41. 41 ‘Vneshnyaya Politika, Neytralitet . . .’, op. cit., p. 75. 42 Sakwa and Webber, op. cit., p. 387. 43 ‘The military evolution’, in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, op. cit., p. 441. 44 Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were the initial signatories of the Collective Security Treaty, originally valid for a five-year period. On 2 April 1999, the treaty was renewed for another five years by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, whereas Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan opted not to enter this treaty again. The six members of the treaty decided to establish a treaty organisation (named CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organisation) on 7 October 2002. 45 R. Burnashev, ‘Regional security in Central Asia: Military aspects’, in Rumer, B. (ed.), Central Asia: A gathering storm?, Armonk-London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002, p. 134.

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46 See: Sakwa and Webber, op. cit., p. 382. 47 See: Turkmenskaya Iskra, 28 January 1992. 48 R. Burnashev and I. Chernykh, ‘Turkmenistan’s armed forces: Problems and development prospects’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2003, 4 (22), p. 41. 49 On this note, see, for instance, the analysis of the Tashkent summit provided by the Turkmen press: ‘Vchera v Tashkente: Itogi i vyvody’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 16 May 1992, p. 1. 50 See: Sakwa and Webber, op. cit., p. 384. 51 ‘For Turkmenistan, the collective agreement was inadmissible in principle. To rely on the own forces, rationality and industry of people, natural and intellectual resources, simultaneously developing mutually beneficial partnership and regional ties was more reliable and reasonable’ (Turkmenbashi diplomacy: To the new world through Neutrality (1991–2000), op. cit., p. 115). 52 For the full text, see: ‘Major Provisions of the Military Doctrine of Turkmenistan (10 May 1994) with the amendments and additions passed by the Khalk Maslakhaty on 27 September 1996’, in Foreign Policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches . . ., op. cit., pp. 112–13. 53 ‘Major provisions to assure military security of Turkmenistan imply the efforts to [. . .]: build up a system of bilateral arrangements between states in order to refrain from the power politics and rule out the threat or use of force (Military Doctrine of Turkmenistan, Art. 8). 54 ‘In the matters of preserving world peace [. . .], Turkmenistan [. . .] shall seek to build cooperative ties with member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the question of foreign policy and defence building. Turkmenistan shall apply the same approach in its relations with other neighbouring nations in the region’ (Military Doctrine of Turkmenistan, Art. 10). 55 For the full text of the law, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 28 December 1995, p. 1. 56 Following the refusal to join the 1992 Collective Security Treaty, Turkmenistan decided not to take part in the 1995 Security Concept. In justifying their rejection of the 1995 Concept, Turkmen officials presented the usual cliché regarding the incompatibility of the course of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy and security cooperation at a multilateral level. In addressing the Khalk Maslakhaty a few months after the rejection of the Concept (and, incidentally, a few weeks after the international recognition of Turkmen neutrality), Niyazov indirectly referred to the nature of the agreement, stating that Turkmenistan is ‘not going to participate in military alliances of side with one state against another’ (Niyazov, ‘Speech at the Session of the People’s Council . . .’, op. cit., p. 49). 57 If uncooperativeness is the general rule in Turkmenistan’s attitude towards military cooperation within the CIS, it is worth noting the Turkmen participation in the signature of two minor agreements. Interestingly, both related to a similar thematic. On 10 February 1995, in Almaty, the Turkmen government decided to join the CIS United Air-Defence Agreement, which provided for the joint protection and monitoring and use of air space (for the text of the Agreement, see: Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, op. cit., pp. 543–4). Almost a decade after, Turkmenistan joined nine other CIS member states in the finalisation of the CIS United Anti-aircraft Defence System Agreement, designed to protect the ‘collective air space, enhance joint control over the use of the air space, and increase the exchange of information on missile and air-raid warnings and how to respond to them’ (see: ‘CIS united anti-aircraft defence system accord signed’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 11–17 February 2005). 58 In delivering a 90-minute-long lecture entitled ‘The Doctrine of Neutrality: Its historical bases and its role in building state policy’, Niyazov clarified the Turkmen posture towards multilateral military cooperation: ‘A summit of the CIS Heads of State was scheduled in Minsk for today. I did not go there and some people inter-

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60

61 62 63 64

65 66 67

68

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preted this in the wrong way. The agenda of the summit does not concern us. One point on the agenda relates to creating joint military forces. We cannot participate in this for we have a status of neutrality recognized by the United Nations which does not give us the right to join in military alliances and treaties with others’ (for excerpts of the lecture, which was incidentally fully televised on the First Channel of the Turkmen National Television, see: J. Burke, ‘Turkmen head defends neutral status, transitional democracy’, Turkmenistan Daily Digest, 4 December 2000, www.eurasianet.net/resource/turkmenistan/hypermail/200012/0002.html, accessed on 21 November 2007). Previously, Turkmenistan was the only CIS member not to sign the agreement on the establishment of the CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre during the June 2000 CIS summit in Moscow (‘Boris Mylnikov appointed chief of CIS anti-terrorist centre’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 18–24 June 2000). The observation of Turkmenistan’s reaction to CIS peace-keeping operations that were conducted under Russia’s leadership supports this conclusion. After the Abkhazia crisis (which erupted in 1992) and the ethnic conflict erupted in neighbouring Tajikistan, the Turkmen government became ‘deeply suspicious of Russian motives’ (Brill Olcott, Åslund and Garnett, op. cit., p. 95) and objectives in relation to collective security. Essentially, the NATO PfP programme is based on individual agreements finalised between the Alliance and the participating states. Each state has to sign the PfP Framework Document, which ‘sets out specific undertakings for each Partner country and enshrines a commitment by the Allies to consult with any Partner country that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security’. Furthermore, NATO and the participating states developed Individual Partnerships Programmes, valid for two years, ‘drawn up from the Partnership Work Programme. The Work Programme offers activities in over twenty areas ranging from defence policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, to air defence, communications and information systems, crisis management, and civil emergency planning’ (‘NATO transformed – Extending security through partnership’, www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/html_en/nato_trans05.html, accessed on 18 November 2007). ‘Turkmenistan prisoedinnilsya k programme Partnerstvo vo imya mira’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 11 May 1994, p. 1. See: ‘Comments on partnerships with NATO’, in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, op. cit., p. 466. Ibid. For the full text of the speech, see: ‘Speech by Colonel-General A. Mammetgeldiyev, Minister of Defence of Turkmenistan at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meeting in Foreign Ministers’ session with invitees’, available at www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/12-natohq/1201-natohq.htm, accessed on 22 November 2007). ‘Dan start novomu etapu partnerstva Turkmenistana s NATO’, Internet-Gazeta Turkmenistan.ru, 30 March 2004, www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id=ru& elem_id=3159&type=event&sort=date_desc, accessed on 22 November 2007. See: ‘Visiting NATO Secretary-General finds President’s support for expansion in Afghanistan’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 15–21 October 2004. The chronological reconstruction of Russo-Turkmen bilateral relations in 1992–1995 and similar descriptions presented in further parts of this chapter are based on the analysis of the complete collection of Turkmenskaya Iskra and Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan (1 January 1992–31 December 2006); and also on: ‘Year after year: Visits, meetings, negotiations’, in Turkmenbashi Diplomacy . . ., op. cit., pp. 89–478. In order to present Niyazov as the sole conductor of the state’s foreign policy, the Turkmen official press did not report visits of Turkmen ministers abroad.

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69 For the text of the agreement, see: ‘Dogovor o druzhbe i sotrudnichestve mezhdu Turkmenistanon Rossiiskoi Federatsiei’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 3 August 1992, p. 1. 70 See: Burnashev and Chernykh, op. cit., p. 40. 71 Shishlevskiy, op. cit., p. 52. 72 See: Mesbahi, op. cit., p. 290. 73 See: ‘Sovmestnoe zayavlenie po itogam vizita Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii B.N. El’tsina v Turkmenistan’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 29 December 1993, p. 1. 74 See: ‘Official visit to the Russian Federation (May 17–19 1995)’, in Turkmenbashi diplomacy . . ., op. cit., pp. 248–51. 75 ‘Ob uregulirovannii voprosov dvoynogo grazhdanstva’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 24 December 1993, p. 1. 76 ‘Dogorov mezhdu Turkmenistanon i Rossiiskoi Federatsiei o pravovom statuse grazhdan Turkmenistana, postoyanno prozhivayushchikh na territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii; i grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii postoyanno prozhivayushchikh na territorii Turkmenistana’; ‘Dogorov mezhdu Turkmenistanon i Rossiiskoi Federatsiei o sotrudnichestve v tselach obespecheniya prav turkmenskogo men’shinstva v Rossiiskoi Federatsii i rossiiskogo – v Turkmenistane’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 22 May 1995, pp. 1–2. 77 ‘Boris El’tsin: “Dinamika razvitiya Turkmeno-Rossiiskikh otnoshenii mozhet sluzhit’ primerom dlya mnogikh gosudarstv SNG”’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 24 December 1993, p. 2. 78 ‘Niyazov reassures Russian-speaking population’, in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, op. cit., p. 211. 79 See: Jackson, op. cit., p. 77. 80 Although there is controversy about the current size of the Russian minority living within Turkmenistan, the most recent data (2003) quoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation quantified its size as 100000–150000, which represented approximately 3 per cent of the total Turkmen population (see: ‘Russians flee Turkmenistan’, BBC News, 20 June 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/3007598.stm, accessed on 26 November 2007). 81 Turkmenbashi diplomacy . . ., op. cit., p. 284. 82 Ibid. 83 See: ‘Visit to the Russian Federation (October 14–15 1996)’, in Turkmenbashi diplomacy . . ., op. cit., p. 320). 84 See: ‘Turkmenistan i Rossiya podtverdili priverzhennost’ uglubleniyu druzhestvennykh, ravnopravnykh i vzaimovygodnykh otnoshenii’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 15 January 1998, p. 1. 85 ‘Rukovoditeli rossiiskikh SMI o neytralitete Turkmenistana’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 13 December 1997, p. 2. 86 Turkmenbashi diplomacy . . ., op. cit., p. 282. 87 Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 16 October 1996, p. 1. 88 See: ‘Russian, Turkmen Presidents meet to discuss oil and gas but no export agreement reached’, RFE/RL Newsline, 8 August 1997. 89 Sagers, ‘Turkmenistan’s gas trade: The case of exports to Ukraine’, op. cit., p. 144. 90 See: Burnashev and Chernykh, op. cit., p. 40. 91 R. Sakwa, Putin – Russia’s Choice, London–New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 215. 92 For the official text of the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept, see: ‘Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (2000)’, www.ln.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa 34209743256c630042d1aa/fd86620b371b0cf7432569fb004872a7?OpenDocument, accessed on 21 November 2007). 93 The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of June 2000 dedicates an entire section (IV) to the analysis of Russia’s Regional Priority. The first provision of this section states that ‘[a] priority area in Russia’s foreign policy is ensuring conformity of multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the member states of the CIS’ (‘Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (2000)’, op. cit.).

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94 S.N. Cummings, ‘Happier bedfellows? Russia and Central Asia under Putin’, Asian Affairs, 2001, 33 (2), p. 146. 95 Sakwa, op. cit., p. 230. 96 ‘Serious emphasis will be given to the increase of economic cooperation, including the establishment of a free trade area and the implementation of projects of joint use of natural resources. More specifically, Russia will work for the establishment of this status for the Caspian Sea, to enable the littoral states to promote mutually beneficial cooperation in using the resources on a fair basis while taking into account the legitimate interests of the actors involved’ (‘Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (2000)’, op. cit.). 97 K. Stoner-Weiss, ‘Russia: Authoritarianism without authority’, Journal of Democracy; 2006, 17 (1), p. 104. 98 C. Ross, ‘Federalism and electoral authoritarianism under Putin’, Demokratizatsiya, 2005, 13 (3), p. 363. 99 See, for instance: T. Ambrosio, ‘The political success of Russia–Belarus relations: Insulating Minsk from a color revolution’, Demokratizatsiya, 2006, 14 (3), pp. 407–34. 100 G. Gleason, ‘The Uzbek expulsion of US forces and realignment in Central Asia’, Problems of Post-Communism, 2006, 53 (2), pp. 49–50. 101 ‘Putin pleased with Russian–Turkmen relations’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 25 March–1 April 2000. 102 ‘Turkmen, Russian heads stand for stronger ties’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 2–8 April 2000. 103 Turkmenbashi diplomacy . . ., op. cit., p. 448. 104 Cummings, ‘Happier bedfellows? . . .’, op. cit., p. 149. 105 See: Burnashev and Chernykh, op. cit., p. 38. 106 Shishlevskiy, op. cit., p. 50. 107 Burnashev, ‘Regional security in Central Asia . . .’, op. cit., p. 155. 108 See: ‘Niyazov congratulates Army on 12th anniversary’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 4 February 2004. 109 ‘Turkmens offer humanitarian corridor for action against Afghanistan’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 24 September 2001. 110 See: RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 1 (11), 4 October 2001. 111 See: B. Pannier, ‘Five degrees of separation: The Central Asia states’ positions towards war in Iraq’, RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 3 (12), 21 March 2003. 112 See: ‘Is Washington exploring a base deal with Turkmenistan?’, Eurasia Insight, 31 August 2005, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav083105.shtml, accessed on 25 November 2007. 113 S. Blank, ‘Turkmenistan’s base rumour likely part of a Russian disinformation campaign’, Eurasianet Commentary, 7 September 2005, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav090705a.shtml, accessed on 25 November 2007. 114 In reaffirming the coincidence of interests between Russia and Turkmenistan, Niyazov emphatically underlined that ‘If we start to set up military bases here, you [Russian leaders] will certainly not welcome it [. . .] Do not worry much, dear Russian friends, as in all of our plans we take into account the interests of Russia’ (see: S. Blagov, ‘Russia seeks to keep pressure on United States in Central Asia’, Eurasia Insight, 25 October 2005, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav102505.shtml, accessed on 26 November 2007). 115 The dispute over the status of the Caspian Sea is a pivotal issue in the foreign policy paradigms of the five Caspian littoral states (Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan). The quarrel revolves around the allocation of the significant energy resources present on the Caspian seabed. To date, two solutions have been generally considered as most viable for the settlement of the Caspian dispute. The first is the so-called ‘condominium’ scenario, in which the five states jointly administer and

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Notes exploit the resources. The second envisages the delimitation of the Caspian basin into five different national sectors, allowing each littoral state to enjoy exclusive rights over its own sector. The adoption of one solution instead of the other could have a significant impact on the prospects for economic development of the Caspian states. To date, despite the frequent meetings of their leaders, the littoral states have not arrived at an agreed solution to this problem (see: W. Razcka, ‘A sea or lake? The Caspian long odyssey’, Central Asian Survey, 2000, 19 (2), pp. 189–221; C. Romano, ‘La Caspienne: Un flou juridique source des conflicts’, Cahiers d’ètudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde turco-iranien, 1997, 23, pp. 39–63). The problem of the legal status of the Caspian Sea has a threefold impact upon Turkmenistan’s foreign policy paradigm: (1) it affects the prospect for the development of the Turkmen energy sector; (2) it represents a source of instability in relationships with small neighbouring states (Azerbaijan in particular); and (3) it complicates the relationship with two important regional powers (Russia and Iran). During the negotiations on the issue, the Turkmen government has maintained a rather inconsistent posture, supporting different solutions at different times (see: S.S. Zhil’tsov, I.S. Zonn and A.M. Ushkov, Geopolitika Kaspiiskogo regiona, Moskva: Mezdhunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2003, p. 278). The study of the official documents examined here has established that Turkmen officials have not usually referred to the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality when providing explanations for their shifting position on the dispute. This might strengthen the case that the doctrine has been open to opportunistic use (see Chapter 1, p. 22; Chapter 4, pp. 95–6; Chapter 5, pp. 111, 116; Chapter 6, pp. 126–8). Simply put, Turkmenistan’s Caspian Sea policy, which throughout the post-Soviet era has occupied a prominent position within the Turkmen state’s foreign policy paradigm, has developed independently of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. For this reason, the Caspian Sea dispute, important as it is in Turkmenistan’s external relations, is not considered to have played a major role in the formulation or execution of the policy of neutrality. For the text of the Agreement, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 24 April 2002, pp. 1–2. ‘Putin, Niyazov sign Russian–Turkmen friendship treaty’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 29 April 2002. Although Niyazov apparently associated the 2003 quarrel over dual citizenship with the assassination attempt on himself, it in fact represented the last step of the systemic campaign of de-Russification of Turkmenistan’s language and culture that had been implemented since 2000. This campaign occurred under the broader umbrella of Turkmenistan’s nationality policy, through which the regime aimed to accomplish the ‘Turkmenisation’ of the country. Amongst the ethnic minorities (Uzbek, Kazakh, Russian) living in Turkmenistan, the Russian community paid the highest price in Niyazov’s repressive campaign. De-Russification of Turkmenistan was promoted through a two-pronged strategy. First, the Russian language lost its privileged status within the Turkmen cultural milieu. As the large majority of teachers with Russian background was banished from working in Turkmen schools, educational structures working in the Russian language were progressively closed (see: ‘Turkmen officials consider Russian schools unnecessary’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 31 August 2002). The second prong of this strategy related to the systematic closure of any Russian media outlet and the prohibition of importing publications and broadcasts from Russia (‘Repression and regression in Turkmenistan: A new international strategy’, op. cit., pp. 7–8). ‘We are suspending the granting of dual citizenship for the time being,’ Niyazov said, addling that ‘as a crime against Turkmenistan is committed, holders of dual citizenship must be answerable and punished in accordance with Turkmen legislation’ (‘Niyazov to suspend double citizenship accord with Russia’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 15 January 2003).

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120 ‘Putin aide says Russia to defend its nationals in Turkmenistan’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 20 January 2003; ‘Russia worried over Ashgabat plan to stop dualcitizenship deal’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 29 April 2003. 121 ‘Holders of Turkmen-Russian dual citizenship have two months to decide’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 29 April 2003. 122 For a complete coverage of the summit, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 12 April 2003, p. 1. 123 Data extracted from the weekly editions of the RFE/RL Turkmen Report. 124 See: ‘O telefonnom razgovore Prezidenta Rossiskoi Federatsii V.V. Putina s Prezidentom Turkmenistana S.A. Niyazovym’, 11 July 2004, www.mid.ru/nsrsng.nsf/6bc38aceada6e44b432569e700419ef5/432569d800221466c3256fd6002cff5 3?OpenDocument, accessed on 27 November 2007. 125 See: ‘Russia considering measures against Turkmenistan’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 1 December 2003. 126 For the decree abolishing the exit visa regime, see: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 10 March 2004, p. 1. 127 ‘Turkmen President, Russian Ambassador discuss cooperation’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 14 June 2004. 128 See: ‘O telefonnom razgovore Prezidenta Rossiskoi Federatsii V.V. Putina s Prezidentom Turkmenistana S.A. Niyazovym’, 28 June 2003, www.mid.ru/nsrsng.nsf/6bc38aceada6e44b432569e700419ef5/432569d800221466c325702e002301 5c?OpenDocument, accessed on 27 November 2007. 129 See: ‘Zayavlenie dlya pressy Prezidenta Rossii V.V. Putina po itogam rossiiskoturkmenskikh peregovorov, Moskva, Kreml’, 10 aprelya 2003 goda’, www.mid.ru/ns-rsng.nsf/6bc38aceada6e44b432569e700419ef5/432569d800221466 43256d050029efc9?OpenDocument, accessed on 28 November 2007. 130 Bohr, ‘A failed coup after all? November 2002, Ashgabat’, op. cit. 131 See: ‘V Kremle podipisany rossiisko-turkmenskie dokumenty’, Internet-Gazeta Turkmenistan.tu, 10 April 2003, www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_ id=ru&elem_id=2123&type=event&sort=date_desc, accessed on 29 November 2007. 132 See: A. Cohen, ‘The Putin–Turkmenbashi deal of the century: Towards an Eurasian gas OPEC?’, Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, 7 May 2003. 133 Ibid. 134 S. Blank, ‘Turkmenistan strikes back: The energy wars’, Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, 22 February 2006. 135 ‘On 3 January [2003] in Ashgabat, Security Council secretary Vladimir Rushailo emerged from a five-hour meeting with Niyazov to declare Russia’s firm support for the autocratic ruler, after the purported attack on his motorcade on 25 November. Speaking on Turkmen television, Rushailo said, ‘Russia has always stated its position, and we would like to stress once again, that we consider the incident as a manifestation of terrorism, and we are ready to cooperate in the context of the law-enforcement bodies and secret services’ (M. Lelyveld, Russia, ‘Iran seeking to protect Caspian energy interests’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 6 January 2003). 136 S. Blank, ‘The Russia–Turkmenistan gas deal gone awry’, Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, 2 July 2003. 137 ‘Sultanistic regimes are often dependent of foreign patrons, who supply critical military aid and material resources that can help fuel their domestic patronage networks’ (R. Snyder, ‘Paths out of sultanistic regimes’, in Sultanistic regimes, op. cit., p. 58).

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6 Neutrality as a policy of insulation: the international community and human rights violations in Turkmenistan 1 Cummings and Ochs, ‘Turkmenistan – Saparmurat Niyazov’s inglorious isolation’, in Oil, transition and security in Central Asia, op. cit., p. 115. 2 ‘Repression and regression in Turkmenistan: A new international strategy’, op. cit., p. i. 3 Turkmenistan: Clampdown on dissent – A background briefing, Amnesty International Document EUR 61/015/2003, 12 September 2003. 4 S. Sabol, ‘Turkmenistan’, in Karatnycky, A., Motyl, A. and Schnetzer, A. (eds), Nations in Transit 2004: Democratization in East Central Europe and Eurasia, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, electronic version at www.freedomhouse.org/ research/nattransit.htm, accessed on 7 August 2007. 5 ‘Turkmenistan’, in Human Rights Watch World Report 2007, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007, p. 430. 6 The 2006 Worldwide Freedom of the Press Index is available electronically at the official website of Reporters sans Frontières, www.rsf.org, accessed on 8 August 2007. 7 See Chapter 2, pp. 35–6 8 European Parliament resolution on Turkmenistan, including Central Asia, P5_TAPROV(2003)0467, 24 October 2003. 9 OSCE Rapporteur’s Report on Turkmenistan, ODIHR.GAL/15/03, 12 March 2003, p. 3. 10 Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/12, 15 April 2004. 11 OSCE Rapporteur’s Report on Turkmenistan, op. cit., p. 3. 12 A.A. Esykov, ‘Preemstvennost’ i novatorst’ v sovremennoi ideologii Turkmenistana’, in Mollaeva, M.M. (ed.), Aktual’nnye problemy ideologii S. Turkmenbashi, Ashgabat: TOO Novina, 1995, p. 103. 13 ‘The rights of the person are inviolable and inalienable. No one may deprive another person of any rights or freedoms or limit her or his rights in any manner other than in accordance with the Constitution and laws. Any list of rights and freedoms of the person in the Constitution and laws may not be used to deny or diminish other rights and freedoms’ (Art. 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkmenistan). 14 The policy of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi: Achievement and prospects, op. cit., pp. 176–7. 15 ‘The human dimension [. . .] represents the central feature of the reform of the Turkmen society and of its foreign policy course, which has identified in human values, humanitarian ideals and universal justice the basis of the policy of Neutral Turkmenistan’ (‘Izbiratel’noe zakonodatel’stvo Turkmenistana i mezhdunarodnoe pravo’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 16 December 2004, p. 1). 16 ‘Foreign policy concept of Turkmenistan as a neutral state’, op. cit., p. 108. 17 For the full text of this declaration, see: Foreign Policy of Neutral Turkmenistan: Speeches and interviews by President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, op. cit., pp. 103–4. 18 ‘Vneshnyaya politika i eyo zakonodatel’naya baza’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 21 July 1999, pp. 1–3. 19 Shikhmuradov, ‘Introduction’, op. cit., p. 8. 20 Niyazov, ‘Neutrality of Turkmenistan: History, world outlook and state strategy – Lecture on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of Permanent Neutrality of Independent Turkmenistan’, op. cit., p. 75. 21 Statement by His Excellency Mr. Rashid Meredov, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, in the General Debate of the 59th session of the United National General Assembly, New York, 27 September 2004.

Notes

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22 Annex to the letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/55/732, op. cit. 23 See: Kepbanov, ‘Neutral Turkmenistan in the system of international relations’, op. cit., p. 137; Speech of S.E. Saparmurat Niyazov, President of Turkmenistan at the Third ECO Summit, op. cit.; Shikhmuradov, ‘Positive Neutrality as the basis of the foreign policy of Turkmenistan’, op. cit.; Kepbanov, Postoyanniy Neytralitet Turkmenistana: Programma na XXI Vek, op. cit., pp. 66–75. 24 The Institute periodically organises workshops, conferences and public exhibitions related to human rights (see, for instance: ‘Human Rights Primer’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 30 January 2001; ‘Human rights exhibition opens in Ashgabat’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 18 December 2000; ‘National model UN conference jointly sponsored in Ashgabat’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 23–29 September 2005). 25 ‘The Institute of Democracy and Human Rights was created by presidential decree for the purpose of the effective realisation of the social and economic reforms programme, fulfilment of the international obligations in the field of human rights, and conducting scientific research in this area’ (Shikhmuradov, ‘Positive Neutrality as . . .’, op. cit.). 26 See, for instance: ‘Delegation in Turkmenistan to discuss election process’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 4 November 2000. 27 For a complete biographic account of Meredov, see the Appendix. 28 See: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of ratifications of the principal international human rights treaties (as of June 2004), available electronically at: www.ohchr.org, accessed on 8 August 2007. 29 ‘Amnesty International praises Turkmen rights policy’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 16–22 April 2000. 30 ‘Niyazov approves free exit from Turkmenistan’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 16 March 2004. 31 OSCE Rapporteur’s Report on Turkmenistan, op. cit., p. 11. 32 The Turkmen report to the CRC Committee, initially due in 1995, was submitted by Turkmen authorities in March 2005 (see the English version: Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under Article 44 of the Convention – Initial reports of states parties due in 1995: Turkmenistan, UN Doc. CRC/C/TKM/1, 5 December 2005). The initial report to the CEDAW Committee, due in 1996, was in turn submitted in November 2004 (see: Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women – Combined initial and second periodic reports of states parties: Turkmenistan, UN CEDAW/C/TKM/1–2, 22 November 2004). 33 Turkmenistan did not submit its report to CERD in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003. The first report was therefore ‘nine years overdue’ (see: Consideration of reports by states parties under Article 9 of the Convention – Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of racial Discrimination: Turkmenistan, UN Doc. CERD/C/TKM/C/5, 1 November 2005, p. 1). 34 Consideration of reports by states parties under Article 9 of the Convention – Fifth periodic reports of states parties due in 2003: Turkmenistan, UN Doc. CERD/C/441/Add.1, 1 April 2005, p. 14. 35 Consideration of reports by states parties under Article 9 of the Convention – Concluding observations . . ., op. cit., p. 2. 36 Ibid. 37 Letter dated 26 January 2000 from the Permanent representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/54/722, New York, 28 January 2000. 38 ‘Vystuplenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana Saparmurata Turkmenbashi na 50-i

192

39 40 41 42

43 44

45 46

47 48 49 50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57

58 59 60 61

Notes

yubileinoi sessii General’noi Assemblei OON’, Turkmenskaya Iskra, 24 October 1995, p. 1. Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/34/Rev.1, 16 April 2003. See: ‘UN Human Rights Commission adopts resolution on Turkmenistan’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 14–20 April 2003. Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan, op. cit. See: R. MacMahon, ‘UN: Commission condemns Belarusian, Turkmen rights abuses’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 16 April 2004, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/4/ED4052B2–5444–42AF-8123–07E8AA981134.html, accessed on 17 July 2007. ‘President Niyazov calls for “Protection of interests of all nations, big and small” within UN system’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 16–22 April 2004. Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan, UN Doc. A/Res/58/194, 22 December 2003; Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan, UN Doc. A/Res/59/206, 20 December 2004; Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan, UN Doc. A/Res/60/172, 16 December 2005. A/Res/59/206, op. cit.; A/Res/60/172, op. cit. In September 2003, the Turkmen delegation decided to withdraw without explanation from the list of speakers of the 58th Plenary Session of the UN General Assembly (see: ‘Turkmenistan withdraws from UN General Assembly debate’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 7 October 2003). See: ‘Dorogoi nezavisimosti, dukhnogo vozrozhdeniya Turkmenskogo naroda’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 2 January 2004, pp. 1–2 Statement by His Excellency Mr. Rashid Meredov . . ., op. cit. ‘Why did Turkmenistan lie to the UN?’, Forum 18 News, 22 November 2004, www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=459, accessed on 18 July 2007. UN Doc. A/59/PV.74, 20 December 2004. Ibid. Statement by His Excellency Mr. Rashid Meredov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, at the High-level Plenary meeting of the 60th session of the United National General Assembly, New York, 16 September 2005. ‘The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality is an important measure [in] determining equality for citizens’ (Statement by H.E. Dr. Aqsoltan Ataeva, Chairperson of the delegation of Turkmenistan, at the General Debate of the 60th session of the General Assembly, New York, 21 September 2005). See, for instance: ‘Turkmenistan-ES: Sotrudnichestvo na osnove vzimnogo interesa’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 7 February 1998, p. 1; ‘Turkmenistan-ES: partnersvo stanovitsiya krepche’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 7 March 1998, p. 1. ‘Turkmenistan i Evropeiskii Soyuz opredelili strategiyu partnersva v XXI veke’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 6 June 1998, p. 1. See: The EU’s relations with Turkmenistan, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ turkmenistan/intro/index.htm, accessed on 8 August 2007. Journal of the 427th Plenary Meeting of the Permanent Council, OSCE Doc. PC.JOUR/427, 19 December 2002; ‘EU statement on Turkmenistan – OSCE Permanent Council no. 427’, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/osce/stment/tur191202. htm, accessed on 8 August 2007. Journal of the 454th Plenary Meeting of the Council, PC.JOUR/454, 12 June 2003; Journal of the 462nd Plenary Meeting of the Council, PC.JOUR/462, 24 July 2003. ‘EU statement on Turkmenistan – OSCE Permanent Council no. 462’, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/osce/stment/07_03/turk.htm, accessed on 8 August 2007. European Parliament resolution on Turkmenistan, including Central Asia, op. cit. UN Doc. A/59/PV.74, op. cit.

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62 Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, EU statement on Turkmenistan, PC.DEL/351/06, 6 April 2006; Finnish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, EU statement on Turkmenistan, PC.DEL/901/06, 21 September 2006. 63 EU Parliament Committee on International Trade, Opinion of the Committee on International Trade for the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the proposal for a Council and Commission decision on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Turkmenistan, of the other part, 31 March 2006. 64 EU Parliament Committee on International Trade, Motion on a Resolution on the Conclusion of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters with Turkmenistan, 21 September 2006. 65 PC/DEC/244, 23 July 1998. 66 See: ‘Activity outline’, accessible electronically at the official website of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, www.osce.org/ashgabad. 67 V.Y. Ghebali, ‘OSCE regional policy in Central Asia: Rationale and limits’, in Sabahi, F. and Warner, D. (eds), The OSCE and the multiple challenges of transition – The Caucasus and Central Asia, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, p. 5. 68 Recently, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat has organised an annual course on international legislation on human rights. Attendance was confined to governmental personnel and members of other regime-controlled organisations (see, ‘OSCE concludes course in Turkmenistan on international human rights law’, OSCE Press Release, 29 November 2002; ‘OSCE Centre holds course on human rights in Turkmenistan’, OSCE Press Release, 29 November 2003). 69 See: Mission Reports on Human Dimension Activities submitted for the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, held 17–27 October 2000, pp. 10–13. 70 See: ‘OSCE Chairman, Turkmen President meet in Ashgabat’, RFE/RL Turkmen Report, 10 June 2001. 71 ‘Re-engaging Turkmenistan on the human dimension of the OSCE’, OSCE Press Release, 8 June 2001. 72 ‘CiO appeals to Turkmen President to work with OSCE on human rights’, OSCE Press Release, 4 March 2001. 73 ‘Chairman offers Turkmen leadership OSCE’s help to boost its participation in the ation’, OSCE Press-release, 20 April 2005. 74 The ODIHR is a specific OSCE institution, entitled to the observation of elections, the provision of guidelines and assistance for the processes of political liberalisation, and the supervision of the respect of human rights within the OSCE area. Conceptually, the ODIHR role in relation to human rights and democratisation contributes to the preservation of security in Europe, which, to all intents and purposes, is the OSCE main objective. 75 Ten Years of ODIHR: Working for human rights and democracy (1991–2001), Warsaw, OSCE/ODIHR, 2001, p. 34. 76 For the full text, see: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 29 June 1990, www.osce.org/documents/ odihr/1990/06/13992_en.pdf, accessed on 8 August 2007. 77 See: ‘Izbiratel’noe zakonodatel’stvo Turkmenistana i mezhdunarodnoe pravo’, op. cit., p. 1. 78 On the relationship between ODIHR and the new Turkmen regime, see also: ‘ODIHR Director offers cooperation with Turkmenistan on elections, rule of law and human rights’, OSCE Press release, 22 May 2007. 79 OSCE/ODIHR, Turkmenistan Presidential Election 11 February 2007 – OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, op. cit., p. 1. 80 ‘OSCE election body sends expert team to Turkmenistan ahead of 11 February election’, OSCE Press release, 31 January 2007.

194

Notes

81 82 83 84 85

See Chapter 2, p. 45 OSCE Rapporteur’s Report on Turkmenistan, op. cit., p. 2. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 4. Delegation of Turkmenistan to the OSCE, Communication No. 01–25/4–64, 10 March 2003. 86 See Chapter 1, p. 28. 7 Turkmen foreign policy in the post-Niyazov era 1 M.S. Erol, ‘Turkmenistan’s foreign policy and its energy dimension in the Berdimuhammedov era’, USAK Energy Review, 8, 26 February 2007, p. 11. 2 See: Jean-Christophe Peuch, ‘Turkmenistan: New President modifying Niyazov’s neutrality policy’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 11 May 2007, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/5/D1165CF8–4CE2–4E7E-B13A-F8CDD86057F3.html, accessed on 3 January 2008. 3 See: ‘Vnutrennyaya i vneshnyaya politika Turkmenii ostaetsya neizmennoy’, op. cit. 4 ‘Turkmenistan to remain neutral – Acting President’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 23 December 2006–4 January 2007. 5 A. Abdrakhmanov, ‘Turkmenistan: Changing state power constructs and politics’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2007, 3 (45), p. 133. 6 Ibid. 7 ‘Vstrecha izbiratelei s kandidatom na post Prezidenta Turkmenistans M. Gurbanovym vo Dvortse “Mekan”’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 9 January 2007, p. 2. 8 Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 10 January 2007, p. 2. 9 See Chapter 1 (pp. 26–30). 10 For the full text of Berdymuhammedov’s inauguration address, see: ‘Rech’ Prezidenta Turkmenistana G.M. Berdymuhammedova’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 15 February 2007, p. 3. 11 ‘Ukreplenie Turkmeno-Kitaiskogo sotrudinchestva – Velenie vremeni i istorii. Interviyu Prezidenta Turkmenistana G.M. Berdymuhammedova informatsionnomu agentstvu Xinhua’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 23 February 2007, pp. 1–2. 12 See: ‘Bolshoi uspekh vizita Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedova v Kitai’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 21 July 2007, p. 1. 13 For the full text of Berdymuhammedov’s speech at the UN General Assembly, see: UN Doc. A/62 PV.6, 26 September 2007. 14 ‘The status of permanent neutrality not only imposes on our country important foreign policy obligations but also obliges us to shape our foreign and social policies accordingly’ (UN Doc. A/62 PV.6, 26 September 2007). 15 Strikingly, the same segment of the UN speech quoted in note 14 is reprised in one of the articles posted on the official website of the Turkmen government on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the adoption of UN Resolution A/50/80(A) (see: ‘S missei mira i sozdaniya – v budushee’, Gosudarstvennoe informatsionnoe agentstvo Turkmenistana, 17 December 2007, www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/?idr=2&id=071217a, accessed on 3 January 2008). This confirms, once again, the impression that the Turkmen government has often presented the Turkmen population with a misleading image of the policy of neutrality. 16 Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 2 February 2007, p. 3. 17 See: ‘Zakon Turkmenistana o Prezidente Turkmenistana’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 4 July 2007, p. 2. 18 ‘Turkmenistan to boost energy cooperation with Russia’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 16–22 February 2007. 19 See: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 25 April 2007, p. 1. 20 See: S. Blagov: ‘New Turkmen leader visits Moscow and doesn’t blink’, EurasiaNet

Notes

21

22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30

31

195

Commentary, 24 April 2007, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav 042407a.shtml, accessed on 6 January 2008. For the official text of the declaration, see: ‘Sovmestnaya Deklaratsiya Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan, Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Prezidenta Turkmenistana o stroitel’stve Prikaspiiskogo Gazoprovoda’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 14 May 2007, p. 3. S. Blagov, ‘Russia celebrates its Central Asian energy coup’, EurasiaNet Business and Economics, 16 May 2007, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/ eav051607.shtml, accessed on 12 January 2008. See: Peuch, op. cit. For a detailed analysis of the outcome of Berdymuhammedov’s visit to Beijing, see: ‘Turkmenistan i Kitai vukhodyat na novye rubezhi doveriya i praticheskogo vzaimodeistviya’, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 18 July 2007, p. 1. See: Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, 15 April 2007, p. 1. B. Pannier, ‘Turkmenistan: President’s first US trip to mix business and politics’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 21 September 2007, http://rferl.com/featuresarticle/2007/9/587BFE47-D77C-468B-82BE-D28A77BB8973.html, accessed on 12 January 2008. ‘Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia to sign general agreement on cooperation’, OSI Turkmenistan Project Weekly Report, 13 April–19 April 2007. R. Weitz, ‘Berdimuhammedov–Rice meeting highlights US interest in Turkmenistan’s energy’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 3 October 2007. B. Pannier, ‘Turkmenistan returns to the stage in hosting CIS summit’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 22 November 2007, http://rferl.com/featuresarticle/2007/11/ 0C1FDEA4–3371–41D2–8BAB-E0FB1F85D18F.html, accessed on 18 January 2008. ‘Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov pribyl v Bishkek dlya uchastiya v sammite SHOC’, Internet Gazeta Turkmenistan.ru, 16 August 2007, www.turkmenistan.ru/? page_id=3&lang_id=ru&elem_id=10777&type=event&sort=date_desc, accessed on 14 January 2008. B. Pannier, ‘Turkmenistan: UN opens Regional Preventive Diplomacy Center’, RFE/RL Feature Article, 11 December 2007, http://rferl.com/featuresarticle/2007/12/ A7A1134D-AC74–4956–9E8D-0A118D892196.html, accessed on 18 January 2008.

Conclusion: continuity and change in Turkmen foreign policymaking 1 In presenting the evolution of Turkmen foreign policy-making, adopting chronological boundaries related to political developments of other states might seem puzzling. However, it ought to be remarked that, in the early twenty-first century, Turkmen foreign policy has been mainly redefined around Russia. The sudden policy shift that resulted from Putin’s accession to power had a significant impact on Turkmen foreign policy-making. Therefore, this occurrence represents a benchmark not only for Russia’s domestic politics, but for Turkmenistan foreign policy as well.

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Index

Abalakov, Muhammed H. 37 Abdrakhmanov, Askar 141 Afghanistan 13, 25, 88, 89, 90, 119; see also Turkmenistan-AfghanistanPakistan pipeline (TAP) agriculture in Turkmenistan 65, 67, 69, 70, 175n26; cereals 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 76, 77; food imports 66, 71, 76, 77, 175n31; food production: 66, 67, 67, 69, 75, 174n16; fruit 66, 67, 69, 76, 77; privatisation 175n39; tobacco 76, 77; see also economic reforms in Turkmenistan; Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Agzybirlik 35; see also opposition Ahal velayat 44, 81, 166n26 Akaev, Askar A. 19, 36, 170n11 Akbarzadeh, Shahram 36, 54, 177n61 Akhmedov, Khan 15, 39, 161n37 Ankara 15 Annagurbanov, Khodzhamurat 46 Aral Sea 65 Armenia 86, 105, 183n44 Armenian SSR 72 army see military Ashgabat 15, 17, 18, 21, 25, 40, 45, 51, 54, 90, 119, 127, 134, 145; 1991 summit in 12, 103, 159n10; CIS summits in 108, 112, 139, 145; neutrality symbols in 57–8, 172n32, 173n53; Russian delegations in 17, 113, 114, 116, 118, 121, 144 Ashirmuhammedov, Gel’dymuhamed 46 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 70, 89, 90, 177n59; and Turkmenistan 18, 85 Atadzhikov, Amaniyaz 44, 141 Ataev, Khalykhberdy 22, 23, 30, 37; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkmenistan Ataev, Ovezgeldy 44, 46 Ataeva, Aqsoltan T. 23, 24, 132, 133

Atamurat 85 Austria 24, 25, 26, 55, 133, 136 authoritarianism: in Belarus 118; in Central Asia 14, 32, 36, 161n25; in Russia 118, 146; and Turkmen foreign policy 2, 16, 20, 31, 48, 103, 118, 124, 150–1; and Turkmen nation-building 51–3; and Turkmen state-building 34–6, 44; in Uzbekistan 118; see also Niyazov, Saparmurat A.; sultanism Azerbaijan 86, 90, 97, 105, 183n44, 187n115 Azerbaijan SSR 72 Babaev, Dzhoraguly 40 Bahrain 18 Baker, James 17; see also United States of America (USA) Balkan velayat 44, 54, 81, 92, 113, 166n29 Baluchistan 89 Bangladesh 25 Begliev, Berdymurad 21, 162n66 Beijing 40, 91, 195n24 Belarus 52, 105, 170n6, 183n44; and neutrality 26–7, 164n86 Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) 12, 72 Belgium 26 Berdyev, Batyr A. 23, 135 Berdymuhammedov, Gurbanguly M.: authoritarianism 45, 167n64, 170n20; and CIS 145; election 44–5; energy policy 145; interim mandate 43–4, 167n57; and Positive Neutrality 139–40, 142–3; and Putin 144–5; and Turkmen political elite 46–7; UN address 142, 145; USA visit 142, 145 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 90 Bhutto, Benazir 24 bilateralism 16–19, 23, 29, 89, 97, 102,

Index

207

106, 112, 115, 117–18, 132, 143–4, 146, 151, 158n5, 183n80 Bishkek 105, 139 Bol’shakov, A.A. 113, 115 Boutros Ghali, Boutros 24; see also United Nations (UN) Brill Olcott, Martha 71 Brussels 23, 111

Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 17, 29 Constitution of Turkmenistan 20, 32, 34–6, 42, 44, 126, 163n71, 165n8, 166n23 cotton: in Turkmen trade system 74–5; 175n34; in Turkmenistan 65–71, 174n13 CRC 127, 129, 191n32 Cummings, Sally N. 51–2, 117, 170n10

Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan 21, 34, 36, 42, 43, 58, 163n71, 166n23; reshuffles 37, 46 Cambodia 26 Canada 136 Cartagena 25 Caspian Sea 22, 24, 81, 116, 117, 119, 187n115 CAT 128, 129 CCPR 128, 129 Ceaus¸escu, Elena 51 Ceaus¸escu, Nicolae 51 CEDAW 128, 129 Central Asia: authoritarianism 14, 32, 36, 161n25; in late Soviet era 10–11, 12, 33; oil and gas reserves 66; political transitions 13–14, 16; and Russia 101–2, 110, 117–18; water resources 65 Central Asia-Centre pipeline (CAC) 85–6, 93, 116, 144; see also gas in Turkmenistan; oil in Turkmenistan CERD 127, 129, 191n33 CESR 128, 129 Charyev, Ata 15, 21, 39, 161n37 Chehabi, Houchang E. 49–52 Cheleken 81 Chernomyrdin, Viktor 115–16 Clinton Administration 90 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 15, 16, 17, 63, 82, 84, 86, 98, 100, 101, 122, 150, 184n57; Charter 105–6; Collective Security Treaty 102, 109–10, 183n44, 184n56; IPA 105–6; and Positive Neutrality 24, 97, 102–4, 106–7, 110; Summits of the Heads of Government 107, 139, 145; Summits of the Heads of State 17, 104–5, 107, 109, 112, 185n58; Turkmen membership 12, 73, 75, 97–8, 101–2, 104, 139, 145, 185n58; Turkmenistan’s relations with member states 14, 73, 75, 78–80 Communist Party of Turkmenistan (CPT) 21, 33, 38, 39, 51, 162n48, 162n63; see also authoritarianism; Niyazov, Saparmurat A.

Dauletabad 81, 88, 90 de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap 111, 135 Decaux, Emmanuel 124, 135, 136; see also Moscow mechanism; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) declaratory foreign policy 15, 26–30, 50, 73–4, 111, 125, 126, 147–52; during Berdymuhammedov era 140–3; inconsistencies 3–5, 63, 84, 95, 111, 112, 123, 137, 153; in late Soviet era 19; and nation-building 55; objectives 3–5, 10, 14, 20, 28, 31, 40, 56, 74, 104, 107, 125, 142, 147–52; vagueness 29–30, 31, 63, 74, 147, 148, 150; see also Doctrine of Positive Neutrality Demirel, Süleyman 15 Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) 35, 36, 38, 39, 162n63; see also authoritarianism; Niyazov, Saparmurat A. Denmark 133 Doctrine of Positive Neutrality: agency 20, 22–3, 55, 143–4; and CIS 104, 107, 110–12; economic section 29, 63–5, 73–4, 84, 94, 141; humanitarian section 29–30, 124–5; innovativeness 27–8; international promotion 23–5; and nation-building 55–9, 142–3; and NATO 111; and operation Enduring Freedom 119; political section 29; and regime rhetoric 27–8, 55–9, 126–8, 132, 136, 142–3, 145; revisions 30, 64, 94, 95, 123, 140, 143 Durdyev, Marat 56, 171n29, 172n42; see also propaganda Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) 18, 24, 87, 89, 179n107 economic reforms in Turkmenistan: during Berdymuhammedov era 45; and Positive Neutrality 93–6; and regime consolidation 32, 63, 68; and regime rhetoric 67–8, 70; see also authoritarianism Egypt 24

208

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El’tsin, Boris N. 17, 99, 115, 117, 120, 149; official visits to Turkmenistan 112–14; and Positive Neutrality 24, 116; see also Russian Federation elections in Turkmenistan: Mejlis 35–6, 39, 136; presidential (1992) 20, 35; presidential (2007) 44–5, 133; see also authoritarianism energy see gas in Turkmenistan; KorpejeKurt Kui pipeline in Turkmenistan; oil in Turkmenistan; Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline (TCGP); Turkmenistan– Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline (TAP) Energy Information Administration (EIA) 81; see also gas in Turkmenistan; oil in Turkmenistan Eritrea 124 Estonia 97 Estonian SSR 72 European Union (EU): criticism of Turkmen regime 45, 124, 132–4; and Turkmenistan 78–80, 84–5, 152; see also TACIS Exxon 91 Fadeev, M. 113 Finland 133 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 18, 77 Fradkov, Mikhail E. 143 France 25 Freedom House 124 Frye, Timothy 35 Gammer, Moshe 16 gas in Turkmenistan: agreements 86, 121–2, 144 (see also Gazprom, Turkmenrosgas); export 73–4, 77, 82, 86–93 (see also Central Asia-Centre pipline (CAC); Korpeje-Kurt Kui pipeline; Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline (TCGP); Turkmenistan–Afghanistan– Pakistan pipeline (TAP)); processing 85; production 67, 69, 70, 82; reserves 66, 81, 177n73; Turkmenistan-Ukraine dispute 86–7, 94, 116 (see also Ukraine) Gazprom 86, 87, 93, 95, 116, 121, 153; see also Russian Federation Geoana, Mircea 135 Georgia 25, 73, 86, 90, 105, 183n44 Georgian SSR 72 Germany 25, 136 Gleason, Gregory 63–4

Göktepe, Nejdet 15 Gorbachev, Mikhail S. 100, 161n45; see also Soviet Union (USSR) Gosplan 66, 165n7 Great Game 14, 160n23 Greece 136 Gurbanov, Muhammednazar S. 44, 141 Helsinki 23 Herat 88, 89 human rights: and Positive Neutrality 26, 29–30, 56, 125–8 (see also Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); United Nations (UN)); in Turkmenistan 35, 37–8, 40, 42, 44, 47, 53, 120–1, 124, 133 (see also authoritarianism; Niyazov, Saparmurat A.; Shikhmuradov, Boris O.) Imamnazar 85 independence 9, 11, 12, 30, 33–5, 41, 81, 102–3, 159n3 India 88, 90, 162n66, 180n117, 180n118 Indonesia 18, 24, 160n22 institution-building 14, 33–4, 36, 40 Interfax 105 International Labour Organisation (ILO) 18, 127, 128, 136 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 18, 84, 174n21, 177n61 Iran: economic links with Turkmenistan 77–80, 81; energy policy 87, 88, 90–2, 123, 188n115; political links with Turkmenistan 13–15, 21, 39, 102, 112–13, 149, 151, 160n24, 161n30, 162n48; political propaganda 53–4; see also Korpeje-Kurt Kui pipeline Ireland 136 Ishanov, Hakim 40 Islamabad 24 Israel 24 Istanbul 15 Italy 25, 136 Itera 87; see also gas in Turkmenistan Ivanov, Igor S. 115 Izmir 15 Jackson, Nicole J. 100, 182n4 Japan 88, 91 Kandahar 89 Karadzhaev, Orazmurat 44

Index Karakum canal 65–6 Karimov, Islam A. 36, 118 Karryev, Myrat 45 Karzai, Hamid 89 Kazakh SSR 72, 85 Kazakhstan 13, 17, 66, 86, 105, 160n17, 160n25, 177n61, 183n44, 187n115n Kazan’ 104 Kepbanov, Yolbars A. 23, 26, 127 Khalikov, Khudaykuly 40 Khalk Maslakhaty: and Berdymuhammedov 44, 167n64, 168n68; functions 34, 41, 42; support for Positive Neutrality 24, 25, 28, 29, 126, 184n56; see also Mejlis Khatami, Mohammad 92 Kim, Jong-Il 52 Korpeje-Kurt Kui pipeline 92–3; see also gas in Turkmenistan; Iran Kozyrev, Andrei 17, 21, 98, 100, 112, 161n42; see also Russian Federation Krasnovodsk 54 Kuliev, Avdy O. 12, 14–22, 30, 37, 106, 123, 148; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkmenistan; Niyazov, Saparmurat A. Kurdistan 92 Kuwait 18 Kyiv 17, 109 Kyrgyz SSR 65, 72 Kyrgyzstan 13, 19, 25, 52, 65, 105, 159n16, 160n25n 170n11, 183n44 Latvia 97 Latvian SSR 72 Lavrov, Sergei V. 119, 144 Lebap velayat 44, 45, 81, 84 Linz, Juan J. 49–52 Lithuania 97 Lithuanian SSR 72 Lukashenka, Alyaksandr 27, 52, 118, 164n87; see also sultanism Maat, Albert J. 45 Malaysia 18, 24, 25 Mammetgeldiyev, Agagel’dy 111 manat 73, 107 Marcos, Imelda 51 market economy 11, 14, 64, 71, 72, 173n2, 174n21, 174n23, 178n87, 181n49, 181n51, see also economic reforms in Turkmenistan; World Bank Mary 15, 58, 85 Mary velayat 15, 81, 119, 177n73

209

Mejlis: corruption and disempowerment 39, 42–4, 170n13; elections 35–6, 135; functions 165n8; support for Positive Neutrality 24, 126 Meredov, Rashid O. 127, 132, 135; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkmenistan Middle East: political links with Turkmenistan 17–18 military: CIS military cooperation 101, 109–12, 184n56; and Turkmen political elite 39, 42–3, 46; Turkmenistan’s defence forces 28, 46, 58, 109–10, 113, 117, 119; see also Russian Federation; Turkey; Turkmen SSR (TSSR); Ukraine Ministry of Defence in Turkmenistan 36, 109, 113, 119, 165n7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkmenistan: decision-making 12–13, 16, 19, 137, 141, 163n71; diplomatic elite 15, 16, 18, 19, 20–2, 41, 98, 106, 109, 137; and Positive Neutrality 104; (see also Ataeva, Aqsoltan T.; Berdyev, Batyr A.; Kepbanov, Yolbars A.; Kuliev, Audy O.; Meredov, Rashid O.; Shikhmuradov, Boris O.) Minsk: CIS summits in 105, 107, 108; Minsk agreement 12, 33 Mitsubishi 91 Moldova: and CIS 97, 105, 110; neutrality; 26–7, 163n86 Moldovan SSR 72 Molochlov, A. 121 Moscow: Berdymuhammedov’s visits to 144; CIS summits in 105, 107, 108, 115; Niyazov’s visits to 24, 104, 108, 112, 113, 115, 116, 120; Turkmen embassy in 17 Moscow Mechanism 136; see also Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) multilateralism 6, 18–19, 23, 26, 29, 84, 90, 97, 102, 103–12, 114, 117, 118, 124, 129, 145, 152–3, 184n56, 184n58 Naryshkin, Sergei E. 144 nation-building: and Positive Neutrality 57; in Turkmenistan 49, 53–5, 57, 169n1 National Democracy and Human Rights Institute 127, 135 National Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan 41; see also Shikhmuradov, Boris O.

210

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Nations in Transit 124 NATO 23; Partnership for Peace 18, 111; see also Doctrine of Positive Neutrality Nazarbaev, Nursultan N. 36, 144 Nebit-Dag 58, 85 Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) 44, 136; see also elections in Turkmenistan Netherlands, The 133 New York 25, 58 Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan 4, 57, 131, 170n13, 175n29 Niyazov, Atamurat 51, 170n13 Niyazov, Saparmurat A.: assassination attempt 40, 124, 133; authoritarianism 20, 36–7, 39, 42, 51–3, 118, 122, 124; and CIS 102, 104, 106, 107, 159n10, 184n58; cooperation with ECO 87; corruption 82, 90; death 43; and dual citizenship quarrel 120, 188n118; election 33; energy policies 87–92, 177n73; and foreign policy-making 16, 20–1, 22, 162n66, 185n58; glorification of ancestry 51, 170n13; immediate family 51; and Iran 15, 92, 112, 161n30; and Kuliev 21; and NATO 111; and Open Doors policy 74; and OSCE 135; persecution of rivals 40–2, 52, 166n39; personality cult 53–4, 124, 143, 172n32, 181n150; and Positive Neutrality 22, 23–5, 38, 55, 59, 102–3, 125, 143, 164n95; and Russia 16, 96, 113, 114, 116, 118, 119, 12 1, 123, 154, 161n42; Soviet career 33, 51; sultanistic tendencies 51–3, 59; trilateral diplomacy 89; as Turkmenbashi 38, 54, 57, 172n35, 172n37; views on Islam 14; visits to Russia 112, 115; see also Rukhnama Niyazova, Gurbansoltan Edzhe 51, 54, 170n13 Non-Aligned Movement 18, 25 North Korea 52, 124, 170n6, 170n11 Norway 136 Nurklychev, Niyazlikh 17, 162n48 Nuryev, Ishankuly 44 Ochs, Michael 51, 52 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): criticism of Turkmen regime 135–7, 152, 193n74; and Turkmen elections 44, 135–6; see also Needs Assessments Mission (NAM); Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

oil in Turkmenistan: export 74, 77, 81; processing 66; production 66, 67, 69; reserves 66, 81 Oman 18 Open Doors Policy: and Berdymuhammedov 141; failure 77, 80–1; objectives 74–5 operational foreign policy in Turkmenistan 3–5, 9, 19, 29, 63, 103, 106, 123, 126, 147–52; during Berdymuhammedov era 143–5; inconsistencies 3–5, 64, 84, 94–5, 148, 151; in late Soviet era 13–14; objectives 3–5, 14, 20, 63–4, 74, 94–5, 107, 110–11, 140, 143, 147–52; see also Doctrine of Positive Neutrality opposition: during Berdymuhammedov era 44–5, 167n66; in exile 38 (see also National Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan); in late Soviet era 20, 35 (see also Agzybirlik); repression 36–7, 40–2, 122, 125, 160n25 (see also Saparov, Rejep S.; Shikhmuradov, Boris O.) Orazov, Meret B. 38 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): criticism of Turkmen regime 128–9, 152; and Turkmen elections 44, 135–6; and Turkmenistan 133–4, 193n68; see also Moscow Mechanism; Needs Assessment Mission (NAM); Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Otchertsov, Valerii G. 37 Ottoman Empire 49, 169n6; see also sultanism Pakistan 13, 24, 88, 89, 90, 123 Panico, Christopher J. 47 Pastukhov, Boris 115 People’s Republic of China (PRC): economic links with Turkmenistan 77–80, 144, 160n22, 177n73; pipeline projects 88, 91, 144; political links with Turkmenistan 13, 15, 41, 142, 145. 149 personality cult see Niyazov, Saparmurat A., propaganda; sultanism Philippines 51, 170n6 plebiscitary politics: in Central Asia 36; extension of Niyazov’s term 36 political elite in Turkmenistan: and DPT 38–9; during Berdymuhammedov era 44, 45–7, 140, 168n84 (see also Redzhepov, Akmurad K.); during Niyazov era 37, 39, 40, 41–2, 51, 52,

Index 125; and independence 10–11; and nation-building 56–8, 171n30 (see also Durdyev, Marat) political liberalisation: external pressures for 125, 129, 152, 154; in Central Asia 13–14; in Russia 118; in Turkmenistan 32, 35 Pomanov, Ashirniyaz A. 44 Presidential Administration in Turkmenistan 22, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43, 71, 127, 148; see also Niyazov, Saparmurat A., Saparov, Rejep S. Primakov, Evgeny M. 100, 101, 115, 116 privatisation 68, 70–1, 114, 174n21, 178n75 propaganda: during Berdymuhammedov era 47, 142–3; and economic reforms 67, 81, 94; on Niyazov 22–3, 31, 38, 40, 43, 53–5; on Positive Neutrality 22–3, 26, 55–9, 73, 115, 125–8, 142–3; in Uzbekistan 173n52; see also authoritarianism; Niyazov, Saparmurat A.; sultanism Putin, Vladimir V.: authoritarianism 118, 137, 146, 152; and Berdymuhammedov 143–4; and dual citizenship 120–1; foreign policy revisions 117–18; and gas issues 121–2, 144; and Niyazov 118, 120–2; see also Russian Federation Qatar 18 Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi 15 Rakhmanov, Amangel’dy 19, 21, 162n10 Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa 16 Redzhepov, Akmurad K. 46 referendum: on Turkmen independent policies 10–11, on Union treaty 159n5 regional administration in Turkmenistan 36–7, 38, 166n26, Reporters sans Frontières 124 Romania 26, 51, 170n6 Royal Dutch/Shell 91, 180n123, 180n125, 180n128 RSFSR 12, 65, 72, 85 Rublevaya Zona 73, 107–8 Rukhnama 38, 54, 164n104 Rupel, Dimitrij 135 Russian Federation: economic links with Turkmenistan 63, 73, 74, 77–80, 86, 93, 118–19; energy links with Turkmenistan 63–4, 86–7, 90, 91, 116–17, 121–2, 144, 179n99; foreign policy formulation

211

99–101, 117, 186n93; hardening of domestic politics 118; military links with Turkmenistan 110–11, 113, 117, 119, 187n114; political links with Turkmenistan 13, 15–16, 17, 94–5, 96, 102–3, 106, 114–15, 119–21, 143–4, 186n80, 188n118; role in post-Soviet region 27, 72, 73, 99–101, 102, 105–6, 110, 117, 176n47, 183n44, 185n59, 187n96, 187n115; support for Positive Neutrality 24, 25, 115–16; and Turkmen regime 94–5, 96, 102–3, 112–22, 130–2, 137, 149–55, 189n135 Sakwa, Richard 107 Saparov, Rejep S. 41; see also authoritarianism; Niyazov, Saparmurat A. Saudi Arabia 18, 21, 145 Shah-Deniz 90 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 117, 118, 139, 145 Shevardnadze, Eduard A. 100 Shikhmuradov, Boris O.: as Foreign Minister 37, 162n66; and Positive Neutrality 23, 24, 25, 55–6, 105–6, 111, 125; trial 41; and Turkmen opposition 40, 175n25 Smith, Anthony D. 57 Soviet Union (USSR): collapse 12; economic system 65–6, 174n14, 176n43; late political developments in 10–12, 33, 159n5, 159n12; pipeline system 66; 85–6; relationship with the EU 133; trade system 71–2; Union Treaty 10, 12, 107, 159n12 Stalin, Josip V. 51, 161n45 sultanism 49–52, 59, 147, 169n3, 170n10, 170n20; see also authoritarianism; Chehabi, Houchang E.; Linz, Juan J.; Niyazov, Saparmurat A.; Ottoman Empire, Philippines, Romania Sweden 136 Switzerland 24, 26, 55, 127 Syria 18 TACIS 82, 84–5; see also European Union (EU) Tajik SSR 65, 72 Tajikistan 25, 65, 105, 183n44, 185n59 Taliban 22, 89 Tashauz velayat 44, 58, 81, 141 Tashkent: CIS summits in 17, 102, 105, 109

212

Index

textile industry: in independent Turkmenistan 69, 75, 76, 175n64; in TSSR 66, 67, 174n13 Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline (TCGP) 88, 90–1, 95, 144, 180n123 Tuleyev, Aman 115 Turkey: economic links with Turkmenistan 77–80, 86, 123, 179n99; military links with Turkmenistan 119; nationalism 54, 171n25; pipeline projects 88, 90, 91–2; political links with Turkmenistan 13–15; 39, 102, 112, 149, 151, 160n24; support for Positive Neutrality 25 Turkmen SSR (TSSR): economic structure 65–71, 72, 82, 85; foreign policy 10–12, 35; leadership 21, 39, 51; military forces 109, 113; political opposition 35; and Soviet politics 33, 103 Turkmenbashi, Balkan velayat 44, 54, 88, 144 Turkmengallaonumlery 71 Turkmengasprom 71 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline (TAP) 85, 88, 89–90, 91, 95, 179n114, 180n118 Turkmenneftegaz 71 Turkmenpagta 71 Turkmenrosgas 116 Turkmenskaya Iskra 20, 21, 22, 23, 57 Ugur, Halil 15 Ukraine: and CIS 26–7, 97, 104–8; economic links with Turkmenistan 73, 77–80, 177n61, 179n99; gas dispute with Turkmenistan 86–7, 94, 116; military links with Turkmenistan 119; support for Positive Neutrality 25; see also gas in Turkmenistan, Gazprom Ukrainian SSR 12, 72 United Kingdom 136

United Nations (UN): criticism of Turkmen regime 45, 130–2; endorsement of Positive Neutrality 22, 26, 27, 103; Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia 145; Resolution A/50/80(A) 1, 25, 28, 104, 148, 149, 150; role within Turkmenistan’s foreign policy 11, 18, 19, 57–8, 127, 129–30, 137, 144–5, 149–52, 154, 174n21; and Turkmen officials 24, 25, 29, 142–5, 131–2; Universal Declaration of Human Rights 11 United States of America (USA): criticism of Turkmen regime 45, 129, 136; economic links with Turkmenistan 75, 84, 92; military presence in Central Asia 119; pipeline projects 90–1, 144; political links with Turkmenistan 17, 38, 145 UNOCAL 89 Uzbek SSR 65, 72, 85 Uzbekistan 13, 65, 86, 105, 118, 160n18, 183n44 Veliev, Gurbangeldi 21, 23 Vienna 133 Vyakhirev, Rem 116 Webber, Mark 107 Weber, Max 49, 169n3 Wolf, James 90 World Bank 18, 84, 178n87 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 75 Wörner, Manfred 23 Xinhua 142 Yaqshular Maslakhaty 34 Yemen 18