Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power 9781685852078

Citation preview

Turkey in World Politics

Turkey in World Politics A N EMERGING MULTIREGIONAL POWER

edited by B A R R Y RUBIN K E M A L KIRI§CI

LYN NE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 2001 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 2001 by Barry Rubin and Kemal Kiri§ci All rights reserved by the publisher

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Turkey in world politics : an emerging multiregional power / edited by Barry Rubin & Kemal Kirisci. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-954-3 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Turkey—Foreign relations. 2. Turkey—Politics and government—20th century. I. Rubin, Barry M. II. Kirisci, Kemal, 1954DR477.T795 2001 327.561-dc21 00-045983 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

(pt^

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5

4

3

2

1

To our wives, Candan and Judy and to our children: Eda and Gabriella, Sinan and Daniel

Contents

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Acknowledgments

ix

Turkey: A Transformed International Role Barry Rubin

1

The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s §ule Kut

5

The Military and the Making of Foreign Policy in Turkey Gencer Ozcan

13

Turkey and the European Union: The Long Road to Membership William Hale and Gamze Avci

31

The Balkans: Turkey's Stabilizing Role Man Uzgel

49

What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-Greek Relations Amikam Nachmani

71

The Future of Turkish Policy Toward the Middle East Kemal Kiri§ci

93

The Strategic Glue in the Israeli-Turkish Alignment Efraim Inbar

vii

115

Vlll

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Contents

U.S.-Turkish Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership Kemal Kiri§ci

129

Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership Duygu Bazoglu Sezer

151

Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus Gareth Winrow

173

The Challenge of Globalization and Turkey's Changing Political Economy MineEder

189

Turkey's Energy Politics Brent Sasley

217

Water Conflict: The Euphrates-Tigris Basin Ali f arkoglu and Mine Eder

235

Understanding Turkey's New Foreign Policy Barry Rubin

251

Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

257 261 265 270

Acknowledgments

This book is the first to be p r e p a r e d by the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), a quarterly journal and monthly magazine on Middle East politics and research. Several of the chapters in this book originated as articles in MERIA, and the authors were brought together through the project's activities. We would like to thank Cameron Brown, Ôzgiil Erdemli, and Linda Sharaby for their production and editing assistance during this process.

ix

1 Turkey: A Transformed International Role Barry Rubin

Turkey has transformed its foreign policy and self-image more thoroughly than any noncommunist country in the post-Cold War era. But while this factor has made Turkey's international role far more important, what makes it really distinctive is that virtually no other state— except for the United States—plays a part in so many different geographical regions. Moreover, all these areas are on Turkey's borders, making relations with them a matter of immediate importance. In addition, each area has its own set of political systems and issues. Consequently, Turkey has one of the most complex foreign policy situations in the world. Since the establishment of the Turkish republic by Kemal Atatiirk in 1923, the country followed a relatively consistent course. Turkey had been generally inward-looking and avoided foreign entanglements whenever possible, though the country's main goals were oriented toward gaining acceptance in the West, and especially to be seen as part of Europe. Two specific f a c t o r s are critical in explaining T u r k e y ' s historic restraint in foreign affairs. First, Turkey was reacting to the dramatic decline and fall of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. The entanglement in Europe's great-power politics and the attempt to preserve an extended empire led to disaster in World War I. Not only was the empire lost but the country itself was devastated, and came close to being partitioned by other E u r o p e a n empires. Turkey had to distinguish itself clearly f r o m the Ottoman Empire to assure neighbors that it was not threatening them by trying to revive old boundaries. Foreign adventures, spheres of influence, alliance systems, and ambitious international interests were all considered foolish, risky, and even suicidal. Moreover, because Atatiirk's goal was consolidating the Turkish nation, extending Ankara's dominion over non-Turks would defeat the purpose of a nation-state replacing a multinational empire. At the same time, seeking to build a pan-Turkic empire would have brought Turkey into colli-

1

2

Turkey in World

Politics

sion with the Soviet Union and other states, again threatening the country's progress or even its very survival. In short, Atatürk's basic approach might be described as turkism in one country. Second, Atatürk's other priority was rapid, systematic socioeconomic development. While many countries have seen development as consistent with empire building and foreign activism (e.g., seizing raw materials and strategic areas, expanding national markets), Atatürk conceived these two strategies as contradictory, rejecting the historic model set by Britain, France, and Germany. Socioeconomic development required avoiding war, just as nation-state development required avoiding imperial expansion. After all, entanglement in conflict had strangled the ambitious development programs promulgated by the Young Turks, the party to which Atatürk had belonged in the pre-World War I period. In Atatürk's conception Turkey would maintain a large military only as a deterrent. The lessons of the 1930s and, after Atatürk's death, of World War II, largely reinforced these assumptions. And, indeed, the history of the Balkans and of the modern Middle East amply demonstrates the wisdom of Atatürk's view. Foreign ambitions and pan-Arab or pan-Serb ideologies have brought disaster repeatedly to both regions, as well as to the countries that promulgated such doctrines. Resources have been squandered, democracy subverted, people's lives plagued, and regimes rendered unstable by such diplomatic games. Of course, since the late 1940s, an era that also coincided with a domestic transition to political pluralism, Turkey has not remained strictly isolationist. Most notably, it joined NATO and became a partisan in the Cold War. There was a brief foray into the Middle East in the 1950s, a deep involvement in the Cyprus issue since the 1960s, and an effort to integrate with Europe intensifying in the 1980s. Yet as significant as these developments were, each had to be accepted and justified as an exception to the overall Turkish strategy and self-image. The alignment with the United States and NATO, for example, was a defensive reaction to an unprecedented Soviet threat. It could also be argued that NATO membership was a strategic portion of the long-term plan to join Europe and the West. The Turkish military expedition in Cyprus, unlike any other act in the republic's first half-century, was also triggered by external forces. Still, despite the gravity of the conflict with Greece, this rivalry was largely restricted to a rhetorical level, even though Turkey knew itself to be by far the stronger country. Turkey's effort to be included in the various projects for European integration was not so much an innovation as it was an integral continuation of Atatürk's program of socioeconomic development, Western-patterned modernization, and becoming part of Europe. The Cold War's end, however, forced a major reassessment of Turkey's

A Transformed International

Role

3

geostrategic role. Since then, the country has become a far more active international player. It played a central part in the 1991 Gulf War and, for the first time, began to be an important actor in the Middle East. Crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, among other events, made Turkey a central factor in the turbulent Balkans and southeastern Europe. The independence of ethnically Turkish republics from the Soviet Union also made Turkey a leading force in the Caucasus and Central Asia, areas of strategic importance and potential oil wealth. The reluctance of the European Union to accept Turkey as a member also shaped new Turkish responses. Turkey, historically almost a pacifist power, sent troops into northern Iraq to fight separatist Kurds and threatened all-out war with Syria during the 1990s. Within Turkey itself, largescale industrialization and urbanization transformed the country's social structure. The ups and downs of democracy, periodic military interventions, the rise of Islamic parties, and a bloody Kurdish revolt have left Turkey with a foreign policy and strategic situation more complex and varied than that of practically any other country. Given the new, increasingly important role of Turkey in the world, a reassessment of Turkey's foreign policy and international role is needed. This book provides a detailed inventory and analysis of Ankara's diplomacy. In addition, it presents several themes for Turkish foreign policy that run across the different geographical fronts it faces. One of the book's main themes is that this is no mere quantitative change. Arguably, Turkey has entered a post-Atatiirk era in this regard. While the original isolationist-oriented strategy of the republic had been eroded—by alliance with the United States and NATO membership or the 1974 intervention in Cyprus—the basic principle of limiting international entanglement had survived. But this approach no longer sufficed for Turkey in the 1990s and certainly will not for the twenty-first century. A second theme of this book explores Turkey's restructuring of its international strategy in the post-Cold War era. To preserve its strong ties with the United States and with Western Europe, Turkey had to find a new way to present itself as an important factor and asset for these allies. In some cases, as with the new orientation in the M i d d l e East and the Caucasus, Turkey turned to other fronts to balance a potentially reduced relationship with the NATO allies. Thus, while Turkey continues to face westward—with entry into the European Union one of its main priorities— it has had to develop a policy that looks in all directions from its borders. A third theme is Turkey's greater assertiveness in defining and seeking to fulfill its interests. In the Middle East, Balkans, and Caucasus, Ankara has been willing to confront Arab or Iranian or Russian criticism. There has been a greater readiness not only to take risks—albeit relatively small ones—but also to project Turkish influence.

4

Turkey in World

Politics

Fourth, economic factors have figured more prominently in Turkey's foreign policy efforts. This is due partly to the development and international competitiveness of the Turkish economy, now seeking export markets and certain raw materials. Larger factors of globalization have also affected Turkey, as they have other countries. Oil, natural gas, and water have been especially important forces shaping Turkey's diplomacy. For these reasons, this book includes a full evaluation of such economic factors in Turkish foreign policy. Finally, domestic politics and various interest groups have broadened the Turkish policymaking system. The armed forces, ethnic communities, Islamist organizations, business leaders, regions, and political parties compete to affect decisions. Public debate has also broadened, and no longer are foreign policy issues considered immune from criticism or proposal of alternative approaches. This situation relates to the growth of civil society in Turkey and greater democratization, but it is also the result of foreign policy's increased relative importance for Turkey and the number of issues facing the country. Individual chapters explicate and illustrate these themes. The book begins with an overview of Turkey's changing foreign policy (§ule Kut) and an analysis of the military's role in the decisionmaking process (Gencer Ozcan), which has evolved to become relatively more open and pluralistic. It then examines Turkey's interests, policies and relations with various regions: Europe (William Hale and Gamze Avci); the Balkans (ilhan Uzgel); Greece and Cyprus (Amikam Nachmani); the Middle East (Kemal Kiri§ci, Efraim Inbar); Russia (Duygu Sezer); and Central Asia (Gareth Winrow). The economic aspects of Turkey's foreign policy have also become extremely important and relate directly to a range of domestic issues as well. Chapters discuss Turkey's international economic policy (Mine Eder) and the role of energy (Brent Sasley), and water (Ali Qarkoglu and Mine Eder). Such factors have become major forces in setting the priorities and problems faced by Turkish diplomacy. The concluding chapter (Barry Rubin) summarizes the new features and increased importance of Turkey's foreign policy, putting into context the preceding chapters and analyzing its main themes and underlying trends.

2 The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s §ule Kut

The Soviet bloc's collapse and the Cold War's end eliminated the security situation that had characterized international affairs for almost a halfcentury. Turkey entered the post-Cold War era with the advantage of having been on the winning Western side while also facing many challenges to its foreign policy. This new era quickly manifested itself through a variety of crises during the 1990s. The 1991 Gulf War and the dissolution of two multiethnic socialist federations—the Soviet Union in 1991 and Yugoslavia in 1992— u s h e r e d in a n e w i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r r e p l e t e w i t h i n s t a b i l i t y and ambiguity. 1 In just two years, the number of states neighboring Turkey increased by 50 percent. 2 These newly independent states and ethnic conflicts that emerged in the new era quickly became vital issues for Turkish foreign policy. This new foreign policy agenda—along with traditional issues such as European Union membership, Turkish-Greek relations, and Cyprus— sparked unprecedented debate among policymakers and the Turkish public. In this situation, Turkish foreign policy required a new strategy, identity, and set of goals.

Active Foreign Policy The collapse of the Cold War system brought some predictions that Turkey, whose place in the world had been defined by NATO membership and alliance with the United States, had lost its strategic importance. At the same time, there were questions about Turkey's ability to handle its new position and multiregional geopolitical importance, since it stood at the hub of several conflict areas. 3 Simultaneously, Turkey faced several internal problems, including the Kurdish issue and economic difficulties, which

5

6

Turkey in World

Politics

also had an effect on its foreign policy priorities and decisionmaking process. After Iraq seized Kuwait in August 1990, Turkey joined the U.S.-led international coalition against Iraq, a step that protected both its national security and its position in the relatively unipolar international system. Most policymakers reluctantly agreed with President Turgut Ozal's decision to participate more directly in the Gulf War coalition, despite some internal debates. 4 Still, it is misleading to see Turkey's Gulf War activism as a transition to a genuinely active foreign policy. Given the regional and international situation of the day, any Turkish government would have sided with the international community. But the Persian Gulf crisis did reveal Turkey's new policy supporting multilateralism and internationally sanctioned military intervention in conflicts where Turkey was not directly involved. Turkey did, however, pursue a relatively more active foreign policy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a neighbor to the east and north, and of Yugoslavia, a near-neighbor to the west. 5 Although Turkey played no role in the emergence of these crises, as in the Persian Gulf situation, it could not escape involvement in their resolution. Leaders from almost all the newly independent states in Europe and Central Asia—from BosniaHerzegovina to Ukraine, to Kazakhstan and Georgia—visited Ankara seeking its support. Turkey's interest and involvement in the neighboring regions also had a domestic political dimension. As the Ottoman Empire shrank in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Turkey had been a safe haven for Turks and other Muslim peoples who migrated to the motherland in waves. The descendants of these immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus identified with the suffering of those left behind, while the Muslim background of these minorities abroad also created sympathy among Turkey's citizens. Such domestic lobbies created additional pressure on governments to be more active. During the 1990s Turkey, as never before during the Cold War, found itself with both the will and the opportunity to take an active approach beyond its borders. Despite failures to achieve some of its goals, or at least maximal objectives, in this new era Turkey's efforts were generally quite successful. The June 1992 establishment of Turkey's first active foreign policy initiative, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project, did not attract the attention it deserved because the focus was perhaps on cooperation rather than on handling a conflict. 6 But this step was an important sign both of Turkey's new activism and its involvement in additional regions. Ankara quickly recognized newly independent states from Central Asia to the Balkans; developed diplomatic, economic, and aid relations with

The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s

7

ex-communist states; and participated in international efforts to solve conflicts f r o m Nagorno-Karabakh to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkish troops served simultaneously in peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania. Turkey became a foreign aid donor, too, helping states in transition and contributing to multilateral reconstruction efforts in war-torn areas. During this era, Turkey also succeeded in its long quest for candidate status in the European Union and signed agreements with Azerbaijan and Georgia to build the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. In Turkish-Greek relations, there was a remarkable turnaround toward improvements, especially visible after the August 1999 earthquake in Turkey. In the Balkan, Black Sea, Caucasus, and Central Asian areas, Turkey tried to influence and even direct developments following the collapse of communist states. It used not only its geopolitical position but also its historical and cultural ties with the newly independent states to play this role. This new type of activity was not seen as an alternative to engagement with the West. On the contrary, Ankara carefully stressed that its special relations with former Soviet and Yugoslav republics would in fact prove Turkey to be more valuable to the West.

Turkey's New Geopolitical Position and Its Neighbors The 1990s saw the emergence of twenty-seven states in transition in the vast Eurasian region that stretches from Central Europe to Central Asia. These states, whether newly independent or undergoing a regime change, tried to transform their economies from Soviet-style socialism to market systems, and their political structure f r o m one-party rule to pluralist democracy. Nineteen of these became UN members after the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. One-quarter of these states have a border with Turkey; more than half of Turkey's neighbors are in transition. All these nearby newly independent states and most of the states in transition have historical, ethnic, and cultural ties to Turkey. Alongside the Cyprus issue, Turkey had bilateral problems with four of its old neighbors (Greece, Iran, Iraq, and Syria) and only one of its new neighbors, Armenia. The Soviet Union's main successor state, the Russian Federation, remains Turkey's most serious regional rival among its immediate neighbors, even though Turkey and Russia also developed strong economic relations during this period. On the positive side Turkey enjoyed better relations with many states. In the post-Cold War period, links with Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania improved drastically. 7 Good ties were also established with most of the new states, including Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova, and all the four

8

Turkey in World

Politics

states splitting away from the old Yugoslavia. The same is true for the independent Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, this being based on linguistic similarities. All these new connections and changing circumstances made Turkey's diplomatic plate quite full in this new era. 8

Turkey as a Regional Power The concept of regional power has been often mentioned in evaluating contemporary Turkish foreign policy. It was often synonymously used with terms such as regional state and sometimes hegemonic power. There was confusion over Turkey's new role, triggering exciting but shallow debates among politicians and the public in terms of whether or not Turkey could or should fulfill such roles. With respect to its geographical position, economic level, human resources, and military power, Turkey is indisputably important for all regions surrounding it: Turkey is uniquely effective in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East simultaneously. By contrast Greece, for instance, a regional power in the Balkans, does not have a strong presence in other regions. Similarly, Russia, still the most visible power in Central Asia and the Caucasus, is hardly a serious regional power in the Middle East. Turkey's different status stems in large part from its strategic location. 9 The priority that Turkey gave to surrounding regions reflects the realistic policies of a state wary of how problems in various regions may affect its own security. Yet the key point about being a regional power is not hegemony, because other states need not acquiesce to a regional power's authority. Rather, the regional power can expect that its views and interests are taken seriously by others. Turkey, given its geostrategic position in the post-1991 order, must be taken into account by those in surrounding regions or other states interested in influencing developments in any of those areas.

The Turkish Model During the 1990s, Turkey was promoted by various Turkish leaders and Western statesmen as a model of a democratic, secular, free-market society to the newly independent states of Central Europe and Central Asia. Advancing the "Turkish model" was a leading foreign policy tool and asset for Turkey in its regional rivalries with Greece, Iran, and Russia. 10 Skepticism about this model soon emerged, with critics claiming that there was in fact no such model, or, even if there was, it was not something

The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s

9

to be admired. They pointed to Turkey's domestic problems and its inability to export or impose its model on others. In contrast to this negative view, however, some advocated Turkey's being a "big brother" to Turkic peoples "from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" and to the Muslim population in the Balkans. 11 Turkey has some valid credentials to present itself as a model. There are, for example, its republican experience since the 1920s, building a modern nation on the remains of a centuries-old empire, transition from oneparty rule to pluralist democracy, advancement from a planned economy to a market economy, and uniqueness as a Muslim society with a secular state. Of course, it is debatable whether Turkey has performed successfully enough with regard to these points. Considering the country's ethnic problems, the rise of a political Islam, economic problems, and defects in the nation's democracy, it can be argued that the Turkish model does not work well in Turkey itself. But like the Chinese or Iranian models, the existence of the Turkish model cannot be disputed. At the same time, though, Turkey has no ambition to lead a Muslim or Turkic bloc in surrounding areas or to establish a neo-Ottoman zone of influence. It seeks merely to ensure its own national and internal security through regional stability. Indeed, the notable rise of the armed forces' influence in the policymaking process is based on this very self-conscious defensive aspect of Turkish strategic thinking. Serving as a model for other states does not entail claiming leadership over them. For instance, Turkey is not a leader or even a regional power in Central Europe, but in countries like Hungary and Poland the Turkish model was seriously discussed (if only briefly), especially among some bureaucrats, in the early 1990s. Furthermore, to adopt the Turkish model or draw lessons from it a state need not resemble Turkey completely. Newly independent Central Asian republics can certainly draw on the Turkish experience of creating a secular state in a Muslim society. The Russian Federation can learn from Turkey about how to build a new republic that respects its neighbors' internal affairs and does not seek to reconquer them to reverse an imperial collapse. The European Union's decision to accept Turkey as a candidate for membership also demonstrates respect for the Turkish model. Many European advocates of Turkey's membership in the union stressed Turkey's potential contribution to European cultural diversity and pluralism, as well as how Turkey could help Europe's contacts with the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Conclusions It is important to remember that the changes in Turkey's foreign policy after the Cold War did not come from any revision of the basic principles,

10

Turkey in World

Politics

objectives, or even priorities of Turkey's foreign policy. Any new features were a result of the change in political geography and relationships outside Turkey. In other words, there has been no change in Turkey's foreign policy line of the status quo, but a change of the status quo in the regions surrounding Turkey. Similarly, the existing conflicts and instability in the surrounding regions are not something that Turkey created. In short, post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy can be outlined as a pragmatic policy that supports the international community's consensus positions, advocates multilateral cooperation, and remains cautious. There is, then, much that has not changed. Turkey's principal orientation is still toward the West and Europe and an alliance with the United States. Equally, Turkey does not seek to expand its national territory or to build a monopolistic sphere of influence. Alternative ideas offered by some forces within Turkey have not been accepted, most obviously the Islamist party's call for Turkey to turn away from the West and become leader of a large Muslim bloc. 12 One sign of rejection of such ideas (as well as of the military's influence on policymaking) is the military agreements with Israel that were signed during a coalition government led by the Islamist party. 13 Another example is the Islamist party's losing support in the April 1999 elections partly because of its foreign policy adventurism during its time in running the government. On one hand, Turkish makers of foreign policy in the 1990s inherited many issues from previous years. Relations with the European Union, 14 the Cyprus, 1 5 and, primarily, the Aegean dispute 1 6 and other problems with Greece still have primary importance for Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey's areas of interest have suddenly become diversified in the postCold War period. Indeed, though, all these additional issues directly affect Turkey's relations with the West, which Turkey sees as its natural place. In this respect, an important characteristic of the 1990s was that all these problems became tied into one complex knot. For instance, it is no longer possible to deal with the problems with the European Union, Cyprus, and Greece separately. Questions about Turkey's human rights policy and the Kurdish question have also become European issues. Equally, events in the Balkans, Middle East, and Central Asia have become integral parts of the Turkish-U.S. relationship. In Turkey's relations with its neighbors in the Middle East, the region where Turkey perceives its highest security threat, foreign support for separatist terrorism constituted the primary issue. The connection between domestic threats and such issues as water availability with Syria, 17 Islamic fundamentalism with Iran, 18 and Turkish involvement in northern Iraq 19 again increased the mixing of domestic and foreign policy. Turkey is a country at the hub of the world's most problematic regions.

The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s

11

Consequently, it can be said that developments after the Cold War presented an environment that both enabled and required Turkey to pursue an active foreign policy. This often brought to the fore political leaders' attitudes and public o p i n i o n s wavering b e t w e e n e x c e s s i v e c o n f i d e n c e and unnecessary fear about Turkey's position, role, and power. Still, in a chaotic environment resulting from drastic developments that had caught everyone unprepared and often brought serious miscalculations in other countries, Turkey navigated its difficult transition without making any serious foreign p o l i c y mistake. On the contrary, Turkey managed to c o p e with these problems and even to make gains on some of its old foreign policy issues. Moreover, Turkey was able to use these opportunities to prove to others that it was a responsible actor and useful ally in dealing with the new set of international problems and efforts to find solutions.

Notes This chapter is based on my article, "Turkiye'nin Soguk S a v a j Sonrasi Di§ Politikasinin Anahatlari" in Gencer Ozcan, £>ule Kut, eds., En Uzun Onyil: Turkiye'nin Ulusal Giivenlik ve Di§ Politika Giindeminde Doksanli Yillar (Istanbul: Boyut Kitaplan, 1998), pp. 4 5 - 6 4 . 1 thank B. Rubin, K. Kiri§ci, and G. Kut for their comments, and O. Erdemli and L. Sharaby for editing. 1. The Alma Ata Declaration signed on December 21, 1991, is the accepted date of the Soviet Union's dissolution, and the declaration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on April 27, 1992, is the accepted date for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Another socialist country, Czechoslovakia, divided into two separate states on January 5, 1993. With the dissolution of these three federations, nineteen new independent states became members of the UN within two years. 2. Formerly Turkey had land borders with Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as well as having close connection with Romania and Cyprus by sea. Now the number has risen to twelve: Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Cyprus. 3. For an early study of Turkey's new position, see Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lessler, Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993). 4. For the decisionmaking process during the Persian Gulf crisis, see Oguz Eri§, "Korfez Krizi ve Tiirkiye'de Karar Alma Siireci," in Faruk Sonmezoglu, ed., Degi$en Diinya ve Tiirkiye (Istanbul: Baglam Yayinlari, 1996), pp. 249-266. 5. For the impact of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and of the BosniaHerzegovina conflict on the Turkish foreign policy, see £ule Kut, "Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives for Bosnia-Herzegovina," in Giinay Goksu Ozdogan and Kemali Sayba§h, eds., Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order (Istanbul: Eren Yayincilik, 1995), pp. 295-315. 6. For the B S E C , see $ u l e Kut, " K a r a d e n i z E k o n o m i k I s b i r l i g i ' n i n Boyutlari," Strateji, 1, 3 (1995): 93-105; Ercan Ozer, "The BSEC and the EU," Perceptions (Ankara) 1, 3, (September-November 1996), pp. 72-86.

12

Turkey in World

Politics

1. See §ule Kut, "Soguk Sava§ Sonrasinda Türkiye'nin Balkan Ülkeleriyle Iliskileri," in Ismail Soysal, ed., Qagdap Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yillik Siireg (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), pp. 3 8 7 ^ 0 8 . 8. By the end of 1993, Turkey had established diplomatic relations with eighteen new states: all of the ex-Soviet republics (except Armenia), four exYugoslav republics, and Slovakia. Turkey was among the first of countries opening embassies in the eighteen new capitals. 9. See Oral Sander, "Yeni Bir Böigesel GÜ9 Olarak Türkiye'nin Di§ Politika Hedefleri," in Faruk Sönmezoglu, ed., Türk Di§ Politikasinin Analizi (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 1994), pp. 607-613. 10. For the Turkish model, see Gün Kut, "Yeni Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Uluslararasi Ortam," in B. E. Behar et al., Bagimsizligin Ilk Yillari: Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, Kirgizistan, Özbekistan, Turkmenistan (Ankara: Kültür Bakanligi, 1994), pp. 9-24. 11. The concept of "from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" was first mentioned by Henry Kissinger; see G. Kut, ibid. p. 13. 12. For foreign policy during the Welfare-True Path coalition, see Gencer Politikada Refah-Yol Özcan, ed., Onbir Aylik Saltanat: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Dönemi (Istanbul: Boyut Kitaplan, 1998). 13. For Turkish-Israeli relations, see Gencer Özcan, "Türk-lsrail Ili§kileri 50. Yilina Girerken," in Faruk Sönmezoglu, ed., Türk Di§ Politikasinin Analizi, 2d ed. (1998), pp. 159-177; §ule Kut, "Filistin Sorunu ve Türkiye," in Haluk Ülman, ed., Ortadogu Sorunlari ve Türkiye (Istanbul: TÜSES, 1991) pp. 5-34. 14. For Turkey-European Union relations, see Esra £ayhan, Dünden Bugüne Türkiye-Avrupa Birligi Iliskileri ve Siyasal Partilerin Konuya Bakipi (Istanbul: Boyut Kitaplan, 1997). 15. For a resourceful book that includes basic documents relating to the Cyprus dispute, see Clement H. Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1998). 16. For the significance of the Aegean Sea dispute in Turkish-Greek relations and Turkish foreign policy, see §ule Kut, "Türk Di§ Politikasinda Ege Sorunu," in Sönmezoglu, ed., Türk Di§ Politikasinin Analizi, pp. 253-270. 17. For the water problem, see Gün Kut, "Burning Waters: the Hydropolitics of Euphrates and Tigris," New Perspectives on Turkey 9 (Fall 1993): 1-17; Gün Kut, "Ortadogu'da Su Sorunu ve Türkiye," in Haluk Ülman, ed., Ortadogu Sorunlari ve Türkiye, pp. 99-122. 18. For Turkish-Iranian relations, see Atilla Eralp, "Facing the Challenge," in H e n r y Barkey, ed., Reluctant Neighbour: Turkey's Role in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 93-112; Gökhan £etinsaya, "Türk-Iran Iiigkileri," in Sönmezoglu, ed., Türk Di§ Politikasinin Analizi, pp. 135-158. 19. For Turkey's policy in northern Iraq, see Kemal Kiri§ci, "Turkey and the Kurdish Safe-Haven in Northern Iraq," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 19, 3 (1996), pp. 21-39.

3 The Military and the Making of Foreign Policy in Turkey Gencer Ozcan

As in all parliamentary democracies, Turkey's foreign and security policy decisions are made by the prime minister and cabinet members, who are responsible to the national legislature. But these leadership bodies are supplemented, advised, and influenced by other forces. There has been a great deal of continuity in Turkish policymaking, but there have also been shifts in degrees of involvement and power among these factors and institutions. Traditionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has always been a critical actor in this process. Depending on the issue at hand, various other government bureaucracies also participate, and recently civil society groups have gained some influence. But the most important change in shaping foreign and security policy during the 1990s was the increased role of the Turkish military. One reason for this development was the way the Cold War's end left Turkey's external and internal security environment much more complex and intertwined. While the threat of a military attack by the Soviet Union seemed to ebb, Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism gained greater importance. The two latter issues have had both domestic and external security dimensions. The active involvement of some neighboring countries in support of separatist and religious fundamentalist groups threatened Turkey's stability. These developments pushed the military to the forefront of decisionmaking, often in a manner that undermined the authority of civilian institutions. Literature on Turkish foreign policy appears to have overlooked the military's role in the making of Turkish foreign and security policy. 1 To highlight the means by which the military is able to influence Turkey's foreign affairs, this chapter examines the legal background of this influence as well as informal instruments the military uses toward this end. In addition, cases in which the military and government differed over foreign policy are presented to analyze the outcomes. The military's place in Turkey's political system is covered, and the 13

14

Turkey in World

Politics

nature and powers of the main policy body, the National Security Council (NSC), are looked at in detail for a better understanding of the institutional leverage used by the military to affect or compete with civilian authority. Also, light will be shed on the omnipotence of the military in the formulation of the National Security Policy Document, which is strategically critical in setting the main parameters of foreign and security policy. Finally, there will be an evaluation of the military's de facto involvement in Turkey's foreign affairs.

The Military and the Political System The multipolar executive structure in Turkey is one of the striking characteristics of the country's political system, which allows the military and the presidency to enjoy executive powers along with the government (i.e., the prime minister, cabinet, and parliament). In practice, this occasionally leads to a situation where the military and the presidency either make their own policies without consulting the elected government or initiate new policies with the intention of circumventing the government. The power sharing among all these institutions creates significant consequences for the conduct of the country's foreign affairs. According to article 104 of the 1982 constitution, the president is expected to perform a wide range of duties and holds extensive powers related to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Notwithstanding his extensive constitutional powers, article 105 does not hold him accountable for his decisions. However, in contrast to the office of president, it is the military that reaps the benefits of freedom of maneuver in security and foreign policy vis-à-vis the government. So, it is difficult to consider this juxtaposition an example of democratic power sharing. Quite the contrary, this multipolar structure leads to fragmentation of the power of the executive branch whereby offices and institutions that are not politically accountable to the electorate take an active part in forming policy. The problem of multipolarity also raises difficulties in coordinating the direction of foreign affairs: in some cases, there have been sharp conflicts between the elected government and the office of the president. Such struggles between President Turgut Ôzal and Prime Minister Siileyman Demirel were common between 1990 and 1993. In many cases Prime Minister Demirel openly expressed his opposition to the active role that President Ôzal had assumed in foreign affairs. In February 1993, when President Ôzal decided to visit the United States, the government expressed its disapproval and Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin refused to accompany the president. In addition, Deputy Prime Minister Erdal inônù declared that the president could not represent the government

The Military

and the Making of Foreign

Policy

15

there. 2 In other cases, the Foreign Ministry appears to have been excluded by President Ozal when making a critical decision, such as the shutting of the Iraqi oil pipeline in August 1990 immediately after that country's invasion of Kuwait. Foreign Minister Ali Bozer only found out about the decision from journalists. 3 Further, during an official visit to Washington in September 1990, President Ozal excluded Foreign Minister Bozer from his meeting with President George Bush, whereas U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was present. 4 This was a major departure from established practice where high-level diplomatic negotiations always include a Foreign Ministry official. Similar tugs-of-war took place under Prime Minister Tansu (filler ( 1 9 9 3 - 1 9 9 5 ) , who tried to undermine President Siileyman D e m i r e l ' s authority and to put her own personal imprint on foreign and security policy issues. The decrees for appointing ambassadors became a frequent source of conflict among the president, prime minister, and foreign ministry. (filler also frequently clashed with high-ranking ministry officials. 5 She bypassed Foreign Minister £etin on many occasions as well. 6 In May 1995, Prime Minister f i l l e r tried to carry out a plan to strike against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) bases in Iran without taking the issue to the NSC or consulting the president. The plan was shelved after President Demirel categorically opposed it. 7 In some cases, the conflicts have also been between the military and the office of the president. The most striking example was in December 1990 when Chief of the General Staff Necip Torumtay and President Ozal disagreed over the extent of Turkey's participation in the Gulf War. As President Ozal revealed his personal plans, which required the involvement of the Turkish armed forces (TAF) in the occupation of Mosul and Kirkuk, the debate ended with the resignation of Torumtay in protest. 8 His resignation was seen as the military's warning to Ozal, whose plans were not implemented. In addition to its influence on the presidency and elected government, the military also enjoys influence over the state bureaucracy. Particularly after its September 12, 1980, coup, the military has possessed sophisticated institutional instruments to affect political developments. 9 Moreover, the military establishment retains a considerable degree of administrative, judiciary, and financial autonomy: the Military Court of Appeal and the Supreme Military Council (SMC) keep military jurisdiction separate from civilian. The scope of military criminal courts is framed in such a way that military prosecutors can issue warrants for civilians involved in unlawful acts that concern the military. 10 Regarding drafts of defense budgets or other financial appropriations submitted by the military, neither the civilian government nor parliament can bring counterproposals. 1 1 As for the promotion of top commanders,

16

Turkey in World

Politics

prime ministers and defense ministers seem to play a negligible role in SMC meetings. Promotion and dismissal of officers are carried out by the SMC, whose rulings are beyond judicial review and thereby cannot be appealed. Further, top military officials alone are known to determine on the basis of army tradition promotions, retirements, and expulsions at the SMC's annual meetings. In cases when the government or president opposes the military's decisions, the latter has the final say. The position of the chief of the general staff in the state bureaucracy illustrates the military's power. First and foremost, the constitution's article 117 has him responsible only to the prime minister, thus making the chief of the general staff equal to cabinet ministers. His position at the NSC furthers his position in relation to other, non-NSC, ministers and gives him a status almost equal to that of the prime minister. In March 1992, Chief of the General Staff Dogan Giire§ could therefore insist that "the office he assumed had been given by the nation." 12 After the president, the speaker of parliament, and the prime minister, comes the chief of the general staff, this arrangement having been made during the era of military rule after 1980. The protocol issue occasionally stirs up political disputes. In April 1992, when the Motherland Party (MLP) proposed that the chief of the general staff should be accountable to the defense minister, the chief of the general staff publicly expressed "uneasiness about the debate." 13 Further, through occasional public statements, the military's centrality in the state is plainly underlined by high-ranking military officers. For instance, in October 1992 Giire§ confidently announced that "Turkey is a military state." 14 Another example is the analogy drawn in August 1999 by commander of the Aegean army, Gen. Dogu Aktulga: "The Turkish Armed Forces are the backbone of the state." 15 Leading politicians hint that the military's position in the polity should be changed. On the eve of the 1991 elections, Motherland Party Chairman Mesut Yilmaz declared that he was planning to intensify the process of subordinating the military to civilian control. 16 In April 1992, Prime Minister Demirel stated that "the army should be [made subordinate to civilian power] in a democratic state" and declared a "readiness to take the necessary initiative should the opposition parties lend support." 17 In September 1994, declaring the Motherland Party's strategy for the coming century, Yilmaz set the as his party's first aim: "The status of the office of the chief of the general staff would be brought into line with the practice of other developed countries." 18 And in April 1995 Yilmaz reiterated that if Turkey would be a democratic country, "the armed forces' sui generis position in the state structure should be changed." 19 However, despite the tone of these statements, no resolute attempt has been made so far to amend the system. It is worth noting that opposition parties initiate such debates but that parties in power tend to end them on

The Military and the Making of Foreign Policy

17

the grounds that "it requires the Constitution be amended," 20 or "the time and conditions are not ripe to make such a change since Turkey had been facing internal and external threats," 21 or "while the soldiers are fighting in the southeast, it is not appropriate to talk about it." 2 2 The military seeks to influence the security and foreign policy decisionmaking processes in two ways. First and most important, the military's strong presence in the NSC, the top decisionmaking body for security policy, gives the military significant leverage. Second, the military enjoys considerable power based on informal authority accumulated during the prolonged periods of martial law, emergency rule, and military regimes established following coups d'état. The National Security Council and the Military The NSC is ostensibly an advisory body, yet it functions as the principal decisionmaking body on foreign and security policy issues. 23 Technically, the NSC can only "advise" the government, but in practice governments tend to follow its suggestions. Since its establishment in 1949 the NSC's overall authority has steadily expanded. 24 The council is composed of highranking civilian and military officials, however, over time the political weight of the military in the NSC has increased at the expense of the civilian members. This occurred especially as a result of the 1961 constitution, by which the NSC gained its constitutional status. 25 The 1982 constitution's article 118 gave the NSC its present form, redefining the NSC's duties, enlarging its authority, and improving its status vis-à-vis the cabinet. In addition to the commanders of the army, navy, and the air force, the commander of the gendarmerie was also included among the permanent NSC members. Its civilian members were designated as the president, prime minister, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and interior. Article 118 stipulates that "the Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary." For instance, in setting the NSC's agenda, the chief of the general staff was granted power equal to the prime minister's. Moreover, the military representatives and their staffs are more likely to operate as a bloc than their civilian counterparts, giving the armed forces an added advantage. In 1983, on the very eve of the transition of power to civilian rule, the military government promulgated a special law on the NSC that laid out the working principles of the body and established an extensive organization for its general secretariat. 26 The secretariat, associated with the chief of the general staff, was given the authority to prepare all background work and to set the agenda for regular monthly NSC meetings. The secretariat's central

18

Turkey in World

Politics

place is also enhanced by other capabilities, which not only coordinate the government's efforts to implement NSC decisions but control whether decisions proposed by the council are fully implemented on time. It is clear that these duties enable the secretariat to exert great influence on the preparation of the NSC agenda. The structure, function, and procedures of the NSC circumscribe civilian politicians and boost the military's influence. A striking example is the NSC's "28 February Decision" of 1997 (see below), prepared by the secretariat and the chief of the general staff and submitted to the NSC for the approval of the government representatives. The extremely broad definition of national security embedded in the constitution and the law setting up the council's secretariat has substantially increased the NSC's authority over foreign policy. 27 It is therefore often difficult to find any issue that in one way or another does not fall within the NSC's prerogatives. A review of the agendas of NSC meetings clearly indicates that many political and/or social issues that might otherwise be in the sphere of other government organs are considered as issues to be handled by the council. 28 This lets the NSC extend its authority over a wide spectrum of government bodies. 29 It is understood that NSC meetings are meant to be a platform where civilian and military officials can come together monthly to discuss security issues and make decisions. Although a balance between the military and civilians in the N S C exists in theory, with a 5:5 ratio, the military is stronger. Moreover, it should be remembered that one of the civilian members—the defense minister—is virtually nominated by the military. 30 While information on internal procedures is limited, issues are apparently not put to a vote. As Chief of General Staff Gtire§ once put it: "We do not count fingers; we just convince each other." 31 It is safe to speculate that the military's ability to present a unified bloc lets it easily "convince" the less coherent civilian group to accept the former's line. And in fact, despite clashes between the military and the civilian wings or among the NSC's civilian members, no clash has ever been reported among the members of the military wing. For instance, the NSC's recommendations to extend the mandates for Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) between January 1991 and December 1996 on six-month intervals illustrate the military's role. Ironically, the political parties that had bluntly criticized OPC's extension while in opposition followed the NSC's recommendations when they were in power. In this regard, it is interesting to see how the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) bowed to NSC recommendations in June 1996, despite the party's public position that OPC was a "calamity for Turkey" and would be scrapped as soon as the WP came to power. 32 Yet when the military recommended to the NSC in December 1996 (and the NSC in turn proposed to

The Military

and the Making of Foreign

Policy

19

the cabinet) not to extend the mandate, OPC was replaced by a new force dubbed Northern Watch. 33 After its termination, WP authorities made statements to the effect that "they drove OPC away as they had promised": this caused a sharp public debate between the military and WP about who had dropped OPC. "Secret" documents leaked by the military showed that it only was responsible for the change. 34 The period between July 1996 and June 1997 was particularly significant for the NSC's increasing say in forming foreign and security policies that was often at the expense of the authority of the government's civilian authorities. There were times when this process took the form of open conflict in which the military prevailed. This was particularly so under the WPTrue Path Party (TPP) government, when the military stood against the government's policy. When Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, despite warnings from the foreign and security policy establishment, signaled his intention to change the course of established foreign policy, he provoked an unprecedented reaction from the military. When he embarked on his controversial visits to Iran, Libya, and Nigeria, the military expedited the development of bilateral relations with Israel. Ironically, under the WP-TPP government, Turkey's relations with Israel were intensified to a degree that made plain the military's autonomy in steering foreign affairs. In February 1997, the military proposed to the NSC a list of measures to tackle religious fundamentalism and pressured the government to approve them. One measure blamed Iran for supporting terrorist organizations inside Turkey and interfering in Turkey's internal affairs. 35 In many NSC meetings held while the WP-TPP coalition was in power, the military appeared to have overpowered the civilian political wing so much that proposals made by the military were transmitted to the cabinet with no alterations. These proposals, which had been drafted by the office of the chief of the general staff, eventually took the form of eighteen points, dictated to the WP-TPP coalition government at the N S C ' s meeting of February 28, 1997. Taken together, the eighteen points of the February 28 decision amounted to severe limits on the WP's power. Although the document dealt mostly with a domestic threat, it deliberately humiliated the WP by criticizing Iran for its efforts "to destabilize Turkey's regime" 36 and called for taking necessary precautions. Prime Minister Erbakan initially attempted to reject these demands on the grounds that government policies were formed in the parliament, not at the NSC, but he had to back down and sign the document. Nevertheless, his reluctance to abide by the text and ongoing pressure by the military led to his downfall in June 1997. Afterward, though, enforcing NSC decisions remained a matter of debate among the political parties. Several times the military issued stern

20

Turkey in World Politics

warnings that the government should follow the council's decisions and complained about foot dragging by conservative politicians.37 In February 1999, Chief of the General Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu resolutely expressed the military's determination to stand behind NSC decisions even if the process took "10 years, if necessary, 100 years, if necessary, 1,000 years."38 Finally, in June 1999 the NSC developed a strategic outlook for the government, telling it how to fight and eradicate Islamic fundamentalism.39 In this wise, not only did the NSC meeting of February 28, 1997 reveal the council's decisionmaking process, but resolved the debate over whether its decisions were simply advisory or not.40 The Military and the National Security Policy

Document

The military's influence on foreign policy is shown as well in the central role assigned to the chief of the general staff in preparing the National Security Policy Document.41 Nicknamed the "red booklet," the document lists the threats to national security, sets out priorities, lays down policy guidelines, and provides a detailed framework of foreign and security policies for governments and state institutions.42 The national security policy includes matters of both "internal and external defense" and tells governments "to formulate these policies in the [context of] views determined by the National Security Council."43 It is regularly updated by the end of each year, and more often if necessary. For instance, in 1992, after the Soviet Union's demise, the list of security priorities set by the Cold War was rearranged accordingly: replacing the communist menace, the major threat was defined as Kurdish separatism. In these revisions the military played a key role, particularly through the NSC secretariat. In 1997, another major revision was made identifying a radical Islamist challenge as equal to separatism in endangering national security.44 The revisions were approved in the October 1997 NSC meeting and "proposed" to the government in November 1997. 45 The document led to a debate in Ankara.46 While Prime Minister Yilmaz announced that all the laws and international treaties should be in compliance with the document,47 politicians from the TPP and WP criticized the document and, in return, were scolded by unnamed military sources.48 The new recommendations were accepted by the MLP-Democratic Left Party (DLP)-Democrat Turkey Party (DTP) coalition government in December 1997 through two secret government decrees that were not published in the Official Gazette.49 It was later revealed that the second decree had "dealt with the foreign affairs and attempted to determine Turkey's bilateral relations with its neighbors."50 In other words no government can pursue a policy that contradicts the document, which was concluded without any parliamentary debate, classified as top secret, and retained by the NSC secretariat.51 This authority has

The Military and the Making of Foreign Policy

21

been underscored by other legal arrangements having the force of law, such as government decree No. 174-176, which stipulates that all ministries carry out their services "in compliance with the national security policy documents." 52 In July 1993, when Prime Minister (filler attempted to form a new body for national security policy in parliament, she was reminded by Mesut Yilmaz, chairman of the main opposition MLP, that the policies formulated by any parliamentary commission should conform to these documents. 53 The background work for the revision of the National Security Policy Document is coordinated and organized by the NSC secretariat, which submits a first draft to all government organs and related ministries. Taking into account their responses, the draft is edited and sent to the NSC by the secretariat. 54 As in the case of the 1992 revision, press reports indicate that the revision is submitted by the chief of staff in person at a council meeting. 55 Publications by military sources claim that the document should be prepared under conditions "free of pressure" from political parties and groups, which seek "personal, regional or party interests." 56

The Military's de Facto Authority In contrast to the Cold War years, the parameters of Turkish security and foreign policymaking changed significantly during the 1990s. The new generation of security challenges facing Turkey were intertwined with domestic issues and required the military's involvement, leading to greater military participation in all aspects of foreign policy. Therefore, despite the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "retains significant influence," as Alan Makovsky put it, "a policy strongly advocated by the military will almost certainly be implemented; a policy strongly opposed by the military almost certainly will not." 5 7 The post-Cold War security environment thus helped the military expand its already established de facto authority. 58 Another important development during the 1990s was that the military developed the practice of appealing directly to public opinion regarding Turkey's foreign affairs. Especially toward the end of the 1990s, the military introduced the practice of giving briefings to high-level bureaucrats of the ministries of foreign affairs and of justice, academics, and leading journalists. Military authorities also made public statements, issued press releases or—in some cases—leaked sensitive information to the press. On numerous occasions, military indiscretions brought about adverse effects on bilateral relations with some countries. Two relevant examples stand out: at the time of President Demirel's visit to Ukraine in May 1994, Chief of the General Staff Giire§ referred in an interview to the revival of Russian assertiveness in the Caucasus and blamed Moscow for pursuing

22

Turkey in World

Politics

"tsarist expansionism." His remarks led to a suspension of high-level military visits f r o m the Russian Federation. The Turkish ambassador in Moscow was called to the Russian Foreign Ministry and asked to explain the statement. 5 9 And, in February 1997, just after the Sincan events in which Iran's ambassador was involved (see below), Deputy Chief of the General Staff £evik Bir gave a speech in Washington calling Iran a "registered terrorist state" and accusing it of exporting "Islamic revolution to Turkey," "supporting the PKK," and "manufacturing weapons of mass destruction." The speech undermined bilateral relations between Iran and Turkey. 60 The military's influence became even more conspicuous when issues would produce the armed forces' operational engagement. In this context, the military particularly increased its influence over top-priority issues related to northern Iraq, Syria, Greece, Cyprus, and the Aegean Sea. 61 For instance, during the crisis in January 1996 when the military reportedly decided to land troops on the islet of Kalalimnos near the Kardak Isles in the Aegean Sea, the Foreign Ministry rejected the decision on the grounds that it surely belonged to Greece. President Demirel's energetic intervention reportedly was required to ensure the landing's cancellation. 62 In a number of other cases, military officials may have directly intervened in the diplomatic sphere. In January 1997, it was reported that the office of the chief of the general staff sent a letter to the Foreign Ministry asking that the p a s s i v e policy r e g a r d i n g the A e g e a n Sea should be changed." 6 3 Similarly, when Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi stated in October 1996 stated that the "Turkish army is governed by Jews," top military authorities were quoted as having asked the president to withdraw Turkey's ambassador in Libya. 64 In March 1998, General Bir asked Deputy Prime Minister Ecevit to withdraw Turkey's ambassador to the Vatican when the pope met Fethullah Gulen, leader of an Islamic religious group in Turkey. 65 The military considers Giilen a supporter of Islamic fundamentalism and hence a security threat. In other cases, the military authorities have taken an active part in public debates over foreign policy issues. In June 1997, in a briefing given to bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry, General Bir criticized Foreign Minister filler, complained that she paid little attention to bilateral relations with Europe, and accused her of not keeping "her promises that she had given to the Europeans." 66 The WP's coming to power in a coalition with the TPP led to the surfacing of deep differences between the government and military and thus created a dualism in Ankara's foreign policy. Prime Minister Erbakan's visits to Iran, Libya, and Nigeria displayed the WP's readiness to take an alternative route in foreign affairs. This led to a major confrontation of wills between the two forces. "In addition to telling the government what the

The Military

and the Making of Foreign

Policy

23

military leadership expects to be done," as liter Turan observed, "the military wing of the NSC, the president and the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [acted] independently as if there were no g o v e r n m e n t . . . in the field of foreign affairs." 67 Although the WP took every opportunity to normalize relations with Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and displayed much enthusiasm for promoting Turkish-Iranian relations, the WP's efforts were strictly contained by the military establishment. 68 A striking example of the polarization between the military and the government over broader foreign policy issues occurred subsequent to a gathering named as the "Night for Jerusalem" organized in Sincan, a town on the outskirts of Ankara, whose local government was run by the WP. A c t i v i t i e s w e r e held in a tent d e c o r a t e d with L e b a n e s e Hizbollah and Palestinian Hamas posters. Iranian ambassador Muhammed Riza Bagheri was an honorary guest and denounced "those who every day sign agreements with America and Israel." He threatened that "youngsters will deliver them the punishment of God." The next day, tanks and troops were sent to Sincan to take the tent down. 69 During his following visit to Washington General Bir blamed Iran for "supporting terrorism." His visit coincided with the visit to Israel by Chief of the General Staff Ismail Hakki Karadayi, who endorsed General Bir's remarks. 70 Eventually, the incidents triggered a diplomatic crisis with Iran that led to the recall of ambassadors. More important, the event was a critical development paving the way to adoption of the February 28, 1997, decision by the NSC that subsequently led to the toppling of the WP-TPP coalition government in June. Turkey's rapprochement with Israel was initiated and led by the military and, ironically, reached its peak during the WP-TPP coalition government. The Military Training Cooperation Agreement and Agreement on Cooperation in Defense Industry with Israel were concluded in 1996 and signed by the military despite the W P ' s avowedly political opposition. Chief of the General Staff Karadayi's February 1997 visit to Israel and the visits of Israeli foreign minister David Levy and Defense Minister Itzhak Mordechai's to Ankara in the same period proved that Turkish-Israeli relations were expanding despite the WP's opposition. On the other hand, in December 1996, when Iranian President Hashami Rafsanjani visited Ankara, the military authorities broke established protocol to boycott the official dinners. They also ignored their Iranian counterparts' requests to visit the Turkish Aviation Industry factory where F-16s are manufactured. Moreover, notwithstanding the government's contrary wish, the Turkish military flatly refused Iranian offers for cooperation in defense industries. 7 1 When the Organization of Islamic Countries summit in Tehran was held in December 1997, Turkey's defense establishment hosted Israeli Defense Minister Mordechai in Ankara. The April 1997 visit of Israeli

24

Turkey in World

Politics

Foreign Minister Levy is another outstanding example. Once he understood that the visit was inevitable, and after a lengthy resistance to minister of foreign affairs' suggestions that he should receive Levy, Prime Minister Erbakan seemed to have been convinced only after Chief of the General Staff Karadayi asked him to do so. 72 Only with such heavy pressure from the military was Erbakan was compelled to give up his anti-Zionist/antiIsraeli discourse, which had long been his party's trademark. Finally, joint naval exercises with Israel (dubbed Reliant Mermaid) were held in January 1997 despite the ruling WP's recalcitrance. The Kurdish problem and the violence that surrounded it also encouraged the military to further its influence over foreign and security policy. The military's engagement became most evident in the operations carried out in northern Iraq, which facilitated and even legitimized the military's deepening role in foreign policy. One striking example of such a role was played by the army commander, Gen. Atila Ate§ in September 1998, when he argued that there was an undeclared war between Turkey and Syria over the latter's support for the PKK. These remarks precipitated a major political and military crisis between the two countries that culminated in Syria's decision to expel the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in October 1998. 73 There were also cases when the military deliberately kept the government uninformed of major decisions. In May 1997, the military reportedly did not tell the government before it launched a large operation in northern Iraq. Having been informed by "a major general serving at the highest echelons of the army," an ex-ambassador, £ukru Elekdag, reported that the office of the chief of the general staff had intentionally not briefed the government to ensure that the information was not leaked to the other side. 74 During the 1990s the military's engagement in foreign affairs gained dramatic momentum. In December 1993, Chief of the General Staff Gure§ claimed that "the army, in the face of recent international developments, has to assume duties that are far more important than it used to carry out." 75 In a strategic document, "Turkish Naval Strategy Toward the Open Seas," published in November 1997, the Turkish navy spelled out broadly defined regional perspectives. 76 The military authorities' new mindset is evident in three areas. First, the armed forces' power projection capabilities were dramatically enhanced and explicitly emphasized by military sources. 77 As the range of fighter aircraft was improved by the acquisition of midair refueling platforms in June 1996, Gen. Cumhur Asparuk pointed out that "new tanker planes enabled Air Force fighter jets to fly beyond and bombard places as remote as Chile and come back to their bases in Diyarbakir." 7 8 In March 1998, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Bir confidently suggested that the air force was able to deploy a regiment in round-the-clock airborne operations. 79 Second, as Chief of the General Staff Gure§ claimed in April 1993,

The Military

and the Making of Foreign

Policy

25

Turkey is not a flank state in the post-Cold War era but remains a front-line state, confronting different threats and problems. 8 0 In many ways his remarks were proven right when NATO found itself benefiting greatly from the Turkish military's participation in a series of operations in the former Yugoslavia. Against this background and evaluating Turkey's role in NATO, General Bir argued that Turkey's role in that organization had been enhanced. He went on to add that Turkey had become a much more critical ally contributing tangibly to the security of the Western world in facing "the new risks and challenges" of the post-Cold War era. 81 Third, the Turkish armed forces (TAF) assumed a leading role in the peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations in many countries, making Turkey a security-producing country. 82 The military authorities have noted w i t h a c e r t a i n s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e that m i s s i o n s in S o m a l i a , B o s n i a Herzegovina, Albania, Georgia, and other places turned had the TAF into a "global" army. 83 For the military authorities, another aspect of the selfconfidence is that Turkey is a model for former Soviet republics and, to that end, the TAF plays an important role through training programs. In June 1998, after mentioning that around 2,000 officers and cadets from former Soviet republics have been trained in Turkish military academies, General Bir stressed that "it is the main aim and policy for them to present Turkey as a model." 84

Conclusion This chapter primarily focused on the assertive role played by the military in Turkey's foreign policy process. This does not necessarily mean that the Foreign Ministry has ceased to retain significant influence over the formulation and implementation of foreign policy decisions. However, the military's role has become more perceptible, and in some cases uncomfortably coexists with the role of the elected government and the Foreign Ministry. Having found itself at the epicenter of profound international changes, the military seemed to have modified its mindset to tackle the new challenges and develop more assertive security policies. A striking aspect of this development is the way the military developed cooperation agreements with some countries. By the mid-1990s, for instance, the military's involvement in international politics gained additional dimensions after Turkey signed military cooperation agreements with more than thirty countries in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and on the Black Sea rim. In some cases, as with Turkey's agreements with Israel and Jordan, the Turkish military establishment was the primary driving force. Similarly, in the TAF's deployment in Bosnia and Kosovo as part of an international operation, the military played a leading role. Another example of the

26

Turkey in World

Politics

military's taking a central part was in the close cooperation with the United States regarding Turkey's involvement in OPC since its inception in 1991. It is one of the ironies of Turkey's politics that the military increased its influence during a period in which the sources of foreign policy became diversified and policymaking became more pluralistic. Political parties were also becoming more active, establishing special commissions, working groups, and institutional links with think tanks or foundations in Turkey and abroad. Equally, the decade witnessed the gradual formation of a distinct civil society that displayed unprecedented activity on behalf of citizens' diplomacy. Furthermore, trade unions, business associations, and a vast spectrum of civic organizations tried to be involved in the foreign policy process. Institutions such as the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen, Board of Foreign Economic Relations, and Foundation for Economic Development tried to influence the government regarding relations with, among others, Greece, Armenia, the Russian Federation, and the European Union. Pluralism also involved participation by ethnoreligious organizations mobilizing religious and ethnic affiliations in support of Palestinian, Bosnian, and Chechen causes. These organizations successfully organized protest rallies, massive fund-raising campaigns, and related activities, among them the sending of volunteers to Bosnia between 1991 and 1995, the hijacking of a Russian ferryboat in January 1996 to protest Russian actions in Chechnya, and the ostensibly spontaneous mass rally in Ankara protesting the massacre carried out by Serbian forces in Gorazde, Bosnia. 85 Under certain circumstances—Turkey's relations with Greece, Syria, and Iran improved, a PKK under control, and European Union membership prospects enhanced—the military's visiblity in foreign and security policy might start to diminish. There is a strong consensus among the political parties to meet the European Union's Copenhagen Criteria, which among other issues indirectly emphasizes the need to reduce the military's role in government decisionmaking. This view was endorsed by reports prepared by the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the State Planning Organization on the Copenhagen Criteria that call for democratization of the government. 86 Yet both domestic politics and the international situation would have to shift even more for the military to give up its legal and institutional leverage built up over the years. 87

Notes 1. For a few studies addressing the issue, see Btilent Tanor, "Tiirkiye'de Di§ ili§kilerin Hukuk Rejimi," in Faruk Sonmezoglu, Turk Dig Politikasinin Analizi

The Military

and the Making of Foreign

Policy

27

(Istanbul: Der, 1994), pp. 317-332; Oguz Eri§, "Korfez Krizi ve Tiirkiye'de Karar Alma Siireci," in Faruk Sonmezoglu, ed., Degigen Diinya ve Ttirkiye Istanbul: Baglam, 1996, pp. 249-267. 2. Erhan Karadag and Ya§ar Ufar, "Di§i§leri Bakani Her Geziye Gitmez," Sabah, February 13, 1993. 3. Semih Idiz and Yasemin f ongar, "Di§ Politikada f a n k a y a R o t a s i , " Cumhuriyet, January 1, 1991. 4. Ufuk Giildemir, "ABD ile Duran Sorunlar," Cumhuriyet, October 3, 1990. 5. For the details of events in which Prime Minister f i l l e r publicly discredited the Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ozden Sanberk and Ambassador Niizhet Kandemir during the official visit she paid to the United States in October 1993, see Murat Yetkin, " f i l l e r vs. Foreign Ministry?" Turkish Probe, October 26, 1993. 6. Ertugrul Ozkok, " f i l l e r Di§ Politikaya El Koyuyor," Hurriyet, September 14, 1993. 7. Sedat Ergin, " f i l l e r Demirel'i Nasil Yaniltti," Hurriyet, April 28, 1996. 8. "Torumtay: 1991 Yilinda Miidahaleye Kar§iydik," Cumhuriyet, February 9, 1998. 9. liter Turan, "The Military in Turkish Politics," Mediterranean Politics 2, 2, (Autumn 1997): 134. 10. The Erhan Akyildiz-Ali Tevfik Berber Case is one of the events that showed the extent of the military jurisdiction. "2 TV'ciye Soru§turma Emrini Giire§ Verdi," Hurriyet, December 18, 1993. 11. Tanju Erdem, "Savunma Butijesinin Politikasi," Cumhuriyet, December 11, 1990. 12. " O r g e n e r a l Giire$, ' O r d u d a £ e f f a f l a § m a m n S i i r e c e g i n i S o y l e d i , " Gunaydin, March 19, 1991. 13. "Ordu Protokoldeki Yerinde Israrli," Cumhuriyet, May 1, 1992. 14. Sebahattin Onkibar's interview, "Bosna'da Musliiman Katliami Yapiliyor," Turkiye, October 9, 1992. 15. "Zehir Zemberek Veda," Hurriyet, August 28, 1999. 16. Fikret Bila's interview, "Nasil Bir Turkiye," Milliyet, September 26, 1991. 17. Hasan Cemal's interview, "Mesut Yilmaz: 'Ben H a z i n m ' , " Sabah, April 17, 1992. 18. "ANAP'tanYeniHedefler,"Mi7/i>ei, September 26, 1994. 19. Ne§e Diizel's interview, "Masada Kaybetmekten Korkuyorum," Hurriyet, April 2, 1995. 20. Sami f a g i r i c i ' s interview, "Genelkurmay Ba§kanligi'mn Milli Savunma Bakanligina Baglanmasi Askida," Giine§, December 23, 1991. 21. D i l e k O n d e r ' s i n t e r v i e w w i t h D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r M e h m e t G o l h a n , "Giire§'in Arkasinda Yiiruriim," Hurriyet, January 22, 1994. 22. Hasan Cemal, "Koalisyonda Esen Hava '§imdi de Sirasi m i ? ' " Sabah, April 26, 1992. 23. Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," Comparative Politics (January 1997): 151-166. 24. For the text of the Law on the Supreme National Defense Council and Its Secretary, see Milli Guvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterligi: 24 Nisan 1933'den 1993'e 60 Yd (Ankara: Milli Guvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterligi Yayini, 1993), p. 6. 25. Ibid., pp. 7 - 8 . 26. For the text of the "Law on the National Security Council and The General Secretariat of the National Security Council," No. 2945 of November 9, 1983, see Ilhan Gulsiin, ed., Milli Guvenlik Konseyince Kabul Edilen Kanunlar, Yayinlanan

28

Turkey in World

Politics

Bildiri ve Kararlar ile Onemli Mevzuat (V.VIII.) (Ankara: Ba§bakanlik Basimevi, 1984), pp. 422-429. Olugturul27. Cenap Duru and Mehmet Ho§der, Milli Giivenlik Siyasetinin masi (Istanbul: Harp Akademileri Komutanligi Yayini, 1994), p. 63. 28. For a compilation of NSC agendum, see Biilent Tanor, " M G K ' m n Ilgi Alanlan," Milliyet, July 13, 1998. 29. Similar to The Regulation on the Prime Ministerial Crisis Management Center, through the draft of The Regulation on the Supreme Radio-TV Council, the secretariat is entitled to appoint a member to the council. 30. For the military's veto on two nominees to this post, see Yavuz Donat, "Demokrasiye Uf Ayar," Milliyet, February 27, 1998. 31. Dogan Giire§, "Bize Birakin iddialan Asilsizdir," Tempo, September 6-13, 1992; Ugur §efkat, "Giire§'ten M G K ' y a A f i k h k " Sabah, April 25, 1993. 32. "Qekif Gtif Belasi Turkiye'yi Bolecek," Cumhuriyet, July 19, 1996. 33. Mete Belovacikli and Bargin Yinang, "£ekif Giif Kiran Kirana," Milliyet, July 24, 1996. 34. Tutkun Akba§,"£ekif Giig'iin Miman TSK," Radikal, January 2, 1997. 35. The tenth item was not disclosed until early June 1997. For its text, see Aryeh Shmulewitz, "Turkey's Experiment in Islamist Government (1996-1997)," (Data and Analysis, The Moshe Dayan Center Publications, Tel Aviv University, 1999) p. 26. 36. "Government Due to Receive MGK Recommendations Today," Turkish Daily News, March 3, 1996. 37. Sedat Ergin, "Askerden 12 Mesaj," Hiirriyet, September 4, 1999. 38. Serpil £evikcan, "Cumhuriyet'ten Beri 28 §ubat Var," Hiirriyet, February 14, 1999. 39. Metehan Demir, "Stratejik Sava§," Hiirriyet, June 24, 1999. 40. Muharrem Sankaya, "Kararlara Uyulacak," Hiirriyet, March 26, 1997. 41. Information on the guidelines, which the document set out, has been provided from a limited number of reports that appeared in dailies. For the "MGK Giivenlik Politikasim Saptadi," see Milliyet, August 1, 1992. 42. Duru and Ho§der, Milli Giivenlik Siyasetinin Olu§turulmasi, p. 51. 43. Giilsiin, Milli Giivenlik Konseyince Kabul Edilen Kanunlar, p. 423. 44. "i§te Tarihi Karar," Hiirriyet, November 4, 1997. 45. "irtica Tehdidi Belgesi i?in Gizli Kararname," Hiirriyet, November 3, 1997. 46. Turan Yilmaz, "Tarihi Siyaset Belgesi Biiyiik Deprem Yaratti," Hiirriyet, November 5, 1997. 47. "Milli Siyasete Uyulacak," Milliyet, November 3, 1997. 48. Sezai §engun, "MGK: f i l l e r Iki Yiizlii," Hiirriyet, November 12, 1997. 49. For the two unpublished governmental decrees that were "issued" to operationalize the document, see "Milli Siyasete Uyulacak," Milliyet, November 3, 1997. 50. Yalgm Dogan, "Milli Siyaset Belgesi Yuriirliikte," Milliyet, December 26, 1997. 51. Giineri Civaoglu, "Belgeler ve Kafalar," Sabah, July 14, 1993. 52. Duru and Holder, Milli Giivenlik Siyasetinin Olu§turulmasi, p. 76. 53. Giineri Civaoglu, "Belgeler ve Kafalar," Sabah, July 14, 1993. 54. Sedat Ergin, "irtica Tehdidi, Devletin En Onemli Belgesinde," Hiirriyet, November 2, 1997. 55. "MIT Muste§ari Veda Etti," Cumhuriyet, August 1, 1992.

The Military

and the Making of Foreign

Policy

29

56. Duru and Ho§der, Milli Giivenlik Siyasetinin Olugturulmasi, p. 76. 57. Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy," Insight Turkey 1, 2 (April-June 1999): 18. 58. It is to be noted that as far as its intervention in politics is concerned, the military exerts much of its authority under the Internal Service Act of the Armed Forces, which states the duty of the TAF "to protect and safeguard the Turkish land and the Turkish republic." See Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz, The Institutionalization Process of the "Turkish Type of Democracy" A Politico-Juridicial Analysis of Human Rights, 2d ed. Istanbul: Amag, 1989), p. 7. 59. Fatih (Jekirge, "Giire§: 'Rusya Biiyiik Tehdit O l d u , ' " Sabah, May 31, 1994. 60. Yasemin £ongar, 'Bir: Iran Tescilli, Milliyet, February 21, 1997. 61. Ertugrul Özkök, "Kostiimlü Prova," Hiirriyet, May 2, 1997. 62. Faruk Bildirici, "Kalalimnos'a £ i k m a Karan Nasil Önlendi," Hiirriyet, December 9, 1999. 63. Sezai §engün ve Zeynep Giircanli, "Genelkurmay'dan Di§i§leri'ne Ege Uyansi," Hiirriyet, January 8, 1997. 64. Ertugrul Özkök, "Büyükelijiyi Kim £ekti," Hiirriyet, October 11, 1996. 65. Faruk Bildirici, "Ecevit'in Bir'e £ok Cevabi," Hiirriyet, December 10, 1999. 66. "£evik Bir'den £iller'e Agir Elegtiri," Hiirriyet, June 27, 1997. 67. Turan, "The Military in Turkish Politics," p. 135. 68. Deniz Zeyrek, "Apoletli Diplomasiye Tam Gaz Devam," Radikal, April 11, 1997. 69. Sedat Ergin, "O £ a d i n Kazayla Yik," Hürriyet, August 25, 1997. Hiirriyet, 70. Sezai ß e n g ü n , " £ e v i k Papa B i l g i m D a h i l i n d e K o n u g t u , " February 27, 1997. 71. Deniz Zeyrek, "Diplomat-Hükümet £ati§masi," Radikal, December 21, 1996; Ertugrul Özkök, "Iki Devlet," Hürriyet, December 21, 1996. 72. Utku fakirozer, "Hoca, Sonunda Kabul Etti," Milliyet, April 8, 1997. 73. Deniz Zeyrek, "Suriye ile Diplomasi Bitti," Radikal, October 2, 1998. 74. §ükrü Elekdag, "Hesapla§ma," Milliyet, May 19, 1997. 75. Tamer Erkiner, "Gtire§: ' T S K ' y a Önemli Görevier Dü§üyor,"' Milliyet, December 25, 1993. 76. " A f i k Denizlere Dogru Türk Deniz Stratejisi," Deniz Kuvvetleri Dergisi 270 (November 1997): 18, 26. 77. "Artik Biz de Süperiz," Hürriyet, July 25, 1995. 78. "Korgeneral'in iddiasi: §ili'yi Bile Vuracak Güfteyiz," Hürriyet, June 10, 1996. 79. "Ordumuz Globalle§ti," YeniYüzyil, March 17, 1998. 80. Emin Varol, "Org. Güre§: Riskli Kom§ulanmiz Var," Sabah, April 30, 1993. 81. £evik Bir, "Turkey's Role in the New World Order: New Challenges," National Defense University Strategic Forum Publications 135 (February 1998). 82. Ibid. 83. "Ordumuz Globalle§ti," YeniYüzyil, March 17, 1998. 84. Esen Ünür, "Orgeneral Bir: Laik Türkiye Modelini Yaymali," Hürriyet, July 18, 1998. 85. Turan Aydin ve Olgan Bekar, Türkiye'nin Orta ve Uzun Vadeli (Jikarlari Agisindan Türk Rus Ilifkileri (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfi, 1997), p. 99, and dailies dated April 5, 1997.

30

Turkey in World

Politics

86. Adnan Keskin, "Türkiye Bunlara Mecbur," Radikal, March 8, 2000, and Adnan Keskin, "Digigleri Kar§i Atakta," Radikal, June 19, 2000. 87. See the latest draft report prepared by the NSC secretariat claiming that the European Union's demands are "exaggerated" and do "not correspond Turkey's realities." Adnan Keskin, "Kopenhag'a MGK gerhi," Radikal, June 14, 2000.

4 Turkey and the European Union: The Long Road to Membership William Hale and Gamze Avci

At the December 1999 European Union (EU) summit, Turkey's candidacy for membership was finally confirmed after a process of thirty-six years. Turkey was still a long way from actual membership, after a long and arduous history marked with many disappointments in its relations with the European Union. Even this progress came only after a catastrophic August 1999 earthquake in Turkey brought the country worldwide sympathy. Since the Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963, 1 Turkey's relationship with the European Union 2 passed through numerous low points. The Luxembourg summit of 1997 marked the beginning of another strained period. Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz announced the end of the political dialogue with the European Union after that summit effectively excluded Turkey f r o m the list of prospective candidates for EU m e m b e r s h i p . Instead, Turkey was offered a "European strategy" to bring it closer to the union by intensifying the customs union and financial cooperation, changing its laws, and participating in certain programs to be decided case by case. Turkey approached the December 1999 summit by saying that this was the "final stop" and it would not reapply if it was not accepted as a candidate. 3 Of course, Turkey's vital trade with the European Union and the customs union with that group since 1996 ensured that EU-Turkish relations w o u l d r e m a i n i m p o r t a n t in any e v e n t . 4 A c c o r d i n g to the E u r o p e a n Commission, Turkey has made great progress in fulfilling its commitments within the customs union. 5 Turkey's vexed and fascinating relationship with the European Union has been much studied. 6 Three issues of particular importance for Turkish foreign policy are the role played by the customs union as a crucial link with the European Union; 7 the role of the European Union in bilateral relations between Turkey and European states; and the effect on Turkish policy of the long-term prospects for EU membership. 8 31

32

Turkey in World

Politics

The Customs Union: Effects and Evaluations The acceptance of the long-planned customs union between Turkey and the European Union by the Turkey-EU Association Council in March 1995, and its ratification by the European Parliament in December, marked a major watershed in the evolution of Turkey's links with Brussels since the original Association Agreement in 1963. At the same time, its limitations were clear from the start. All customs duties and "charges having equivalent effect," as well as quantitative restrictions, on trade in industrial products between Turkey and the European Union were abolished from the beginning of 1996, and Turkey was obliged to apply the union's common external tariff (CET) in trade with third countries. 9 For Turkey the removal of quota restrictions, particularly on textile and garment exports to the European Union, was more important than the abolition of import duties, given that its previous association agreements with the union had already given it duty-free access to the union market for industrial products. On the other hand, the removal of duties and other charges on imports, which Turkey had been introducing in stages over previous years, was of definite benefit to EU exporters. The most important restriction on trade contained in the customs union agreement affected agricultural products, for which the European Union's barriers were retained, although the two sides committed themselves to move toward free movement of such products, and Turkey undertook to adjust its policies to achieve this. In return, the union pledged to "take account" of Turkey's agricultural interests in developing its agricultural policy (article 25). Steel was also excluded from the customs union, but the European Union Commission was expected to negotiate a separate agreement that would eventually provide for free trade in this product. 10 Under articles 31 and 32, Turkey was required to pass laws providing for the protection of intellectual property and eliminating barriers to free competition in its domestic market, although government aid to particular sectors "having a social character" and aid to less developed regions could be retained (article 34). The first two conditions were fulfilled on schedule, as a Law for the Protection of Competition and a Law on Intellectual Property Rights worked their way through the Turkish parliament in 1994-1995. The customs union agreement left the issues of budgetary transfers and free movement of labor relatively unaffected, since the agreement did not deal with them (except for the special financial assistance Turkey was to be offered as part of the transition). These crucial questions would only be handled if and when Turkey became a full EU member. Estimates from the late 1980s put the cost to EU agricultural funds of Turkish accession at ECU 2 billion per year. The cost to regional and social structural funds would clearly be heavy, but impossible to assess." Problems relating to the

Turkey and the European Union

33

free movement of labor—an important issue given the number of Turkish emigrant workers in Europe, primarily in Germany—would also wait until full EU membership was achieved. 12 How should the gains and costs of the customs union agreement be assessed? Many of the results, of course, will be clear only after more time has elapsed. In the first year Turkey's trade with the European Union grew much faster than its overall trade, while Turkish imports grew much faster than exports. However, between 1996 and 1998 Turkey's trade with the European Union grew much more slowly and at about the same rate as total trade. 13 The European Commission explains this trend in its 1999 evaluation report as resulting from the "relatively low growth of import demand in the EU and secondly from a dynamic increase of Turkish export markets in Central Asia." 1 4 This seems to confirm predictions by those pessimistic about the effects of the customs union on Turkey, arguing that it would suck in a flood of imports without compensating gains in exports. 15 However, it was not clear that this worsening situation could be attributed to the customs union itself. As on many previous occasions, the rapid increase in imports could mainly be accounted for by fast growth in the Turkish economy caused by inflationary policies and general lack of government control over the economy before and since the general elections of December 1995. Thus, it could also be argued that the principal problem was the failure of successive governments to get a grip on the domestic economy. In the longer term, assuming sensible and effective macroeconomic policies on the Turkish side, Turkey was bound to benefit from freer access to the EU market, it was argued. Equally, the knowledge that they could import inputs into Turkey duty free from the European Union (or at low rates from third countries) and freely export finished products to the European Union, should encourage foreign firms to increase direct investment in Turkey. Hitherto, such investment has been remarkably low, given the size of the Turkish economy, running at an average of $1 billion per year during 1990-1998.16 Until the 1980s, the main argument against dismantling Turkey's protective barriers had been that nascent Turkish industry would not survive the impact of unhindered external competition. However, official attitudes, as well as those of most of industry, were then altered rapidly as Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's governments began to implement policies to liberalize the economy both internally and externally. In 1988, the State Planning Organization reported that only 2 percent of manufacturing surveyed would not survive in an unprotected environment, but that 40 percent were already able to do so, and that the remaining 58 percent could become internationally competitive if appropriate measures were applied. 17 Not all sectors of the Turkish economy were affected the same way by

34

Turkey in World

Politics

the customs union. Naturally, the textile industry was an enthusiastic supporter, for example, while the automotive industry pushed to retain some measure of protection. 1 8 Manufacturers of other consumer durables— refrigerators, television sets, washing machines, and the like—were also worried by the prospect of higher imports from third countries, under the lower duty rates imposed by the CET. In general, large firms were more confident of their ability to survive than small- or medium-sized ones. Among business organizations, the Turkish Union of Chambers, which mainly represents smaller firms, had come to support the customs union. The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSÍAD), representing mainly big business, continued to do so. Given that the agreement did not cover agricultural products, the chambers of agriculture were less concerned and less well informed on the subject, but evidently hoped that if the common agricultural policy was eventually applied in Turkey, then farmers would benefit. 19 Not all of these expectations by different industrial groups have been borne out. As examples, exports of vehicles and spare parts actually rose by 32 percent in the first half of 1996, after the customs union had been implemented. 20 Admittedly, automotive imports almost certainly increased during the same period, but the idea that the industry would not be internationally competitive seems to have been exaggerated. On the other hand, the expected surge in exports of textiles and clothing did not occur. Exports of textiles grew by 11 percent during that first five months of 1995, but overseas sales of ready-made clothing fell by 0.8 percent, so that exports of the two industries combined rose by only 2.4 percent. Rapid increases in yarn prices and the relatively low rate of devaluation of the Turkish lira were held to account for this, but the effect of the European Union's antidumping measures had not yet become clear. 21 It seems rational to expect that those industries that have already developed substantial external markets—such as textiles, clothing, fibers, leather goods, and processed foodstuffs—would gain from the customs union. On the debit side, the notoriously inefficient state industries would find it hard to compete. Rationalization of the state sector (by whatever means) should be an urgent economic priority for the government any way, regardless of the customs union. As Mükerrem Hif points out, Turkish industry has proved itself to be flexible and resilient, in particular during the 1980s when foreign trade and financial movements were substantially liberalized. Given the exceptions and postponements included in the customs union agreement, it should be able to survive and even flourish, assuming effective government management of the economy, which has often been lacking in recent years. 22 On the political side, the main domestic criticisms of the customs union agreement have come from Islamist groups ideologically opposed to

Turkey and the European Union

35

further integration of Turkey into Europe. There are also secularist critics who support strengthening Turkey's links to Europe but suggest that the specific deal over the customs union shortchanged Turkey. As an example, some have argued that the customs union should be made contingent on full E U membership. Others have pointed out that while the customs union places important economic obligations on Turkey, it does not give the Turkish government an effective role in the decisionmaking machinery of the European Union that defines those obligations. 23 T h e European Union is evidently s e n s i t i v e to this c r i t i c i s m . Accordingly, the customs union agreement provides that whenever the European Commission is drawing up new legislation of direct relevance to the operation of the customs union, it will "informally consult" Turkish experts, as it does in the case of the existing member states. However, if such consultation fails to produce an agreement, the matter is to be submitted to the Customs Union Joint Committee. Similarly, Turkish experts are to be involved in the work of technical committees that advise the commission. 24 Perhaps as a means of making the situation more acceptable to Turkish opinion, it has been suggested that Turkey could be given some kind of "association status" in discussions of the E U Common Foreign and Security Policy. 25 Admittedly, it can still be argued that these procedures for consultation or association still fall well short of effective involvement, and that the real powers of decisionmaking remain in the hands of member states or the European Union's own institutions. However, it is not clear how a refusal by Turkey to go ahead with the customs union could have improved the situation effectively. Even without the customs union, the European Union would still be Turkey's leading commercial partner by a wide margin. In 1998, for example, the European Union accounted for 50.0 percent of Turkey's exports, and 52.4 percent of its imports. 26 Five of the top 8 countries (making up about 85.0 percent of the total) investing in Turkey were EU members. 27 In other words, rejection of the customs union by Turkey would still have left it fundamentally dependent on the European Union in the commercial field, without even yielding the limited mechanisms for consultation contained in the customs union agreement.

Turkey's Relations with EU Member States In dealing with the European Union, Turkish policymakers have to handle fifteen different member states as well as the European Union's own complex (sometimes rival) institutions and a host of influential pressure groups, both in Turkey and the European Union. On any particular issue, there are a

36

Turkey in World

Politics

range of competing interests and separate organizations—including NATO, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—which interact with EU decisions. 28 What the EU bodies say on any particular issue is normally a tortuously worked-out compromise between the governments of the sovereign member states. Hence, for Turkey bilateral relations with the main member-state governments are vital when shaping its policy toward the European Union as a whole. Germany, France, Britain, and Greece are the key countries, but other states are still important, especially the one currently holding the EU presidency. For Turkey, Greece is in a category by itself. Successive Greek governments have emphasized that Turkey must abandon its "territorial claims" (as they put it) in the Aegean, and withdraw its troops from Cyprus as a precondition for Turkish accession. Greek governments also argue that Turkey's internal political system is insufficiently democratic, and its economy too weak, to allow it to become a member of the European Union. Greece has been normally expected to take positions highly hostile to Turkey and to attempt to gain EU support for them. Equally, the Turkish government has tried to prevent other member states from backing the Greek line. This situation has also led to complaints that the other states may try to "hide behind Greece"—that is, use Greek objections to turn down Turkish proposals when they actually have their own reasons for doing so.29 However, relations improved between the two countries following the devastating August 1999 earthquake in Turkey. At the Helsinki summit, Greece did not stand in the way of Turkey being put on the membership list, 30 and in the same context Greece has stated that it may end its long opposition to some packages of financial aid.31 Among the other EU members, Germany is the most important for Turkey because it is Turkey's biggest trading partner, accounting for 20.2 percent of its exports and 15.9 percent of imports, though it is behind France and the Netherlands in terms of foreign direct investment. 3 2 Germany has consistently supported the principle of closer association between Turkey and the European Union but has been reluctant to develop this into full membership. Already 1.9 million Turks live there, and Germany fears it would be deluged with more migrants if free movement of labor came as part of Turkish accession. 33 On occasions, the Bundestag has also been highly critical of the Turkish government on the Kurdish issue, putting temporary embargoes on deliveries of military equipment to Turkey in 1992 and 1994. The German government officially delegalized the PKK on its territory in 1993, and both government and society have been perturbed by violent actions by the PKK in Germany. Still, the presence of around 300,000 Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin means that the Kurdish question figures more prominently in domestic political debates in

Turkey and the European Union

37

Germany than in other EU countries. 34 When Gerhard Schroder became chancellor in 1999, however, his coalition increased support for Turkish membership Attitudes in the other main member states vary, though all of them appear to agree with the German line that Turkey should be more closely associated with the European Union without becoming a full member, at least in the near future. Britain has often been perceived in Turkey as traditionally pro-Greek, but more recently has been seen as more favorable to Turkish accession than the other member states. This may be partly because Britain puts greater weight on Turkey's strategic role, especially in the Middle East, and partly because the British prefer a looser European Union in which cultural differences between member states would matter less than in a more politically integrated European architecture. 35 Indeed, critics suspected that the British backed the idea of enlargement in general precisely because they have seen it as a way of preventing the European Union from moving toward a federal political union. 36 Across the channel, France's relations with Turkey have gone through difficult phases, notably during the late 1970s, when France was one of the main supporters of Greek accession to the European Union. Since the mid1 9 8 0 s , however, relations between Paris and Ankara have improved markedly. In general, France does not now oppose the principle of Turkish accession and emphasizes the expansion of Turkey as an export market and field for direct investment, in which latter respect it leads all the other EU members. 37 This position was repeated by President Jacques Chirac during Foreign Minister Ismail Cem's 1999 visit to France. 3 8 Among the smaller member states, there is often a greater readiness to pressure Turkey on human rights and other issues, possibly because such states have less interest in Turkey's strategic role. For example, in July 1992, the British presidency of the European Union presented a report to the Council of Ministers urging adoption of an enhanced political dialogue with Turkey and greater cooperation on economic and security questions. The report was criticized by Belgium and some other members on grounds that it did not put "sufficient emphasis on respect for human rights." 39 Even Italy, with whom Turkey had a major row over extradition of the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, declared that Turkey's membership should be approved. Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini stated that Turkey's "right" to a place must be recognized at Helsinki. 40 The temporary refuge given to Ocalan by Italy between November 1998 and January 1999 and Germany's refusal to comply with an Italian request that he be extradited to Germany, where there was a warrant, had caused resentment in Turkey. The affair led to anti-Italian demonstrations in Turkey and an unofficial boycott of Italian goods. Before the September 1999 EU foreign ministers' consultative meeting,

38

Turkey in World

Politics

the French, German, Italian, and British ministers came out in favor of Turkish candidacy. The Greek position was more positive than before. Initially some opposition has appeared to come from Sweden, supported by Denmark, which proposed that Turkey would have to meet tight conditions before it could even be placed on the candidate list. This opposition, however, was watered down later. Two developments prior to the Saariselka meeting and the Helsinki summit were important for the mood change. One of them has been German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's visit to Turkey in July 1999. He was reported to have told President Demirel that the Luxembourg decision was a mistake and that Germany would support Turkey's candidacy at the Helsinki summit. Second and more significant was Turkish Prime Minister Biilent Ecevit's letter to Chancellor Schroder, stating that Turkey would be prepared to meet the Copenhagen criteria.

Longer Term Prospects The EU member states have mostly favored a development of relations that falls short of full membership for Turkey, but most Turkish governments and articulate public opinion have consistently supported the idea of eventual accession, regarding the customs union as no more than a stepping stone toward it. As an example, although Tansu (filler was not prone to underestimate her achievement in negotiating the customs union, she still declared soon afterward that "the Customs Union is not enough for us, our basic goal is full membership of the European Union." 41 Will Turkish governments continue to press for accession, giving changing internal and external conditions? Atila Eralp, for instance, has suggested that, due to the Soviet Union's dissolution and consequent emergence of independent "Turkic" republics, Turkey now has other options, and "among the Turkish governing elite, there is an increasing feeling that Turkey can do without the European Community." 42 Similarly, Ian Lesser argues that Turkey will be excluded from the process of European integration, at least in the short and medium term and that the political and economic elite is therefore looking for opportunities outside Europe. 43 Another and more immediate factor has been the shifts of ideological currents within Turkey itself. The center-right parties firmly support the principle of eventual accession to the European Union. The center-left parties, which formerly opposed the principle of accession, have also now moved to a supportive position because they hope that integration into Western Europe will strengthen democratic and secularist forces in Turkey as well as improve the human rights situation. 44 In the past, the main opposition to the European Union has come from the Islamists. Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (WP), like its predecessor

Turkey and the European Union

39

the National Salvation Party, has consistently opposed strengthening links with Western Europe, arguing instead for closer collaboration with the Islamic countries. As an example, at the time of the Association Council's acceptance of the customs union agreement in March 1 9 9 5 , the WP opposed the deal outright. Compared to that, the recent reaction from the Virtue Party, the WP's successor party, to the outcome of the Helsinki summit was relatively positive, yet reluctant. It is hard to see how a "Central Asian" or "Islamic" option could emerge as effective alternatives to continuing alignment with the European Union or how any government could put them into effect at acceptable cost, either economic or political. For their part, the Central Asian republics do not seem anxious to enter a political or economic union comparable to the European Union—with or without Turkey—because of mutual rivalries and Russia's continuing, vital role in their economies and defense arrangements. 4 5 Nor does Central Asia offer an effective economic alternative. Even though Turkey's exports to the "Turkic" republics have been growing fast, they still accounted for only 3.1 percent of the total in 1998—a minuscule share compared with the European Union's 50.0 percent. The share of the Middle East in Turkey's total trade, at 8.1 percent of exports and 4.2 percent of imports in 1998, is also relatively small. 46 The Middle East is notoriously politically unstable and divided, and there is no "club" of Islamic or Middle Eastern nations remotely comparable to the European Union that Turkey would be entitled to join. Developing links with both the Middle East and Central Asia should be regarded as supplementary to its links with the West rather than as an alternative. All these points appear to have been recognized by Necmettin Erbakan once he had stepped into the prime minister's office. Admittedly, his government's program did not specifically mention the aim of eventual accession to the European Union, but this could be interpreted as no more than a realistic recognition that such an outcome, if it ever came about, was likely to be some way off any way. 47 More crucially, there was no mention of the withdrawal from the customs union or even renegotiation, which had previously been threatened by Erbakan. Instead, the program confirmed a commitment to fulfill the targets of the customs union agreement. This still leaves open the question of whether the EU members would be willing to accept Turkish membership eventually. The obstacles can be summarized as (1) Greek objections to any accession as long as the Aegean and Cyprus disputes continue; (2) serious criticisms of Turkey's human rights regime; (3) EU fears about the prospect of massive budgetary costs, under existing agricultural, regional, and structural programs, and a prospective free movement o f labor between Turkey and the European Union; and (4) doubts on the EU side about Turkey's "European identity." 48

40

Turkey in World Politics

Cyprus The Greek Cypriot government, as the only internationally recognized political entity on the island, submitted an application for full EU membership in 1990. In its opinion on the application, issued in June 1993, the European Commission declared that Cypriot accession would not create any special problems in the social or economic field, but that "Cyprus integration with the community implies a peaceful, balanced, and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question." The EU Council of Ministers accepted the opinion without qualifications in October 1993. 4 9 Meanwhile, under its customs union agreement Turkey is obliged to apply E U policies in its trade with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), including the virtual ban on exports to the European Union imposed by the European Court in 1994, an obligation it would be hard for any Turkish government to fulfill.*» In 1995, the (French) presidency of the European Union took an upbeat line, suggesting that the union would be able to negotiate with both communities in Cyprus—in effect, that the prospect of accession would be a catalyst for an intercommunal settlement. On the other hand, the European commissioner for external affairs, Hans van den Broek, was quoted as saying that the European Union could not wait indefinitely for an agreement on Cyprus. 51 This suggested that the European Union might be ready to go ahead with an accession agreement purely with the Greek Cypriots, leaving the Turkish Cypriots out in the cold. This was contrary to the principle adopted by the European Union in the past, that both communities should benefit from the EU-Cypriot relationship. Nor would it necessarily be to the Greek Cypriots' advantage, because it would imply that Cyprus is effectively two countries and even that the TRNC might eventually be able to join the European Union as a separate state. Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalijin told the meeting of the Turkey-EU Association Council on 6 March 1995 that Turkey would not be bound by any talks between the European Union and the Greek Cypriots alone, and that if this happened, Turkey could move toward a merger of the TRNC with the mainland. The European Union thus seemed to have locked itself onto a potentially dangerous course that, if not properly handled, could seriously damage rather than enhance the prospects of a settlement—besides making the chances of an eventual Turkish accession even more remote. 52 At the Luxembourg summit, a crucial development was the addition of Cyprus to the "fast track" country list with which the European Union would start negotiations. It appeared, though, that the European Union's opening of membership negotiations with Cyprus did not contribute to reconciliation on the island. 53 The Helsinki summit urged both sides to find a

Turkey and the European Union

41

political solution as soon as possible, but continued deadlock would not prohibit eventual membership of Cyprus and no candidate country—i.e., Turkey—could block the accession of another candidate country. Human Rights and the Kurdish Problem Deficiencies in Turkey's human rights regime came to the fore during the run-up to the debate in the European Parliament on the customs union agreement in December 1995. Their concentration on the Kurdish issue, rather than the wider question of human rights in Turkey, may have helped to confirm nationalist Turkish opinion that "the West" was seeking to undermine the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. In June 1996, the European Parliament announced its position with a resolution making ratification of the customs union with Turkey dependent on the release of the six former parliament members of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party who had been sentenced to lengthy prison terms in December 1995. In response to EU demands, as well as domestic concerns and commitments, the Turkish parliament passed constitutional amendments in July that enhanced the powers of trade unions but did not address the Kurdish issue or affect the fate of the six prisoners. 54 The European Parliament's attention then switched to article 8 of the Law for the Struggle against Terrorism of 1991, which (filler's government had earlier pledged to revise. This law had made it an offense to make any written or verbal propaganda or hold any meeting or demonstration aiming to damage "the indivisible unity of the state." In October, the Turkish parliament passed amendments to the law, but these only removed the condition "regardless of the means, purpose or intention" at the beginning of the clause. Although the punishments were also reduced, this fell well short of the European Parliament's demand for full withdrawal of article 8. Meanwhile, Turkey's supreme court ordered the release of two of the six imprisoned ex-members of parliament, leaving the remaining four to serve out their fifteen-year prison sentences. 55 The limited nature of these changes naturally left the European Parliament's verdict on the customs union in serious doubt. As the date for the debate drew near, Turkish government ministers engaged in an intensive lobbying campaign in Strasbourg and European capitals. In this they had the support of the main European governments, which could hardly have gone back on the commitment to the customs union. Their efforts paid off on December 13, when the EP voted to approve the customs union by a margin of 343 votes to 149, although, as Pauline Green, leader of the Socialist Group claimed, many deputies voted yes only with "sorrow, with heavy hearts and without enthusiasm." 56 The story demonstrated that Turkey could not afford to ignore the

42

Turkey in World Politics

human rights and Kurdish issues in its relations with the European Union, but also that outcomes were likely to depend on the critical balance of power between E U institutions. Equally, it appeared that the European Parliament understood that although human rights issues are rightly part of the Turkish-EU agenda, "like it or not, Turkey occupies too important a place in the geopolitical scheme of things for the West to make human rights the sole yardstick of its relationship with Turkey." 5 7 An important issue arose with the capture o f the P K K ' s leader, Abdullah Ocalan. He was sentenced to death under article 125 of the Turkish Penal Code, which makes it an offense to attempt to remove any part of Turkish territory from the control of the state. He was found guilty of causing the deaths of thousands of innocent people. Consequently, this brought the issue of capital punishment again on the agenda. The E U presidency and European Parliament both urged Turkey not to carry out the sentence. In June 1999, the Ecevit government changed the constitution to remove military judges from the state security courts, primarily to avoid a prospective annulment of the verdict in the Ocalan trial by the European Court of Human Rights. But Ocalan's arrest also increased the prospects of an end to the P K K ' s armed struggle, and thus that issue's removal from the sphere of Turkish-European relations.

Identity

Issues

The question of Turkey's " E u r o p e a n " identity is harder to defuse. 5 8 It would be hard for E U leaders to deny that Turkey is sufficiently European for membership, in view of their previous commitments and pronouncements. The strongest argument on this score is that under the original Association Agreement of 1963, the European Union undertook to "examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey" once sufficient progress had been made in the application of the agreement. The union could hardly have taken on this commitment if it had assumed that Turkey was disqualified by geography, religion, or culture. To confirm the point, Walter Hallstein, president of the European Commission, declared at the time that "Turkey is part of Europe." Similarly, at the time of the publication of the commission's opinion on Turkey's application for accession in December 1989, Commissioner Abel Matutes confirmed that "Turkey is eligible to become a member of the Community," and pointed out that there was no reference to religion in the opinion. 5 9 However, the idea that the European Union cannot admit a Muslim nation to its ranks may still form part of the semihidden agenda of many Western European politicians and have some effect on public opinion. Even among themselves, Western Europeans are quite divided on what sort of identity they want for the European Union. Should it be a full political

Turkey and the European Union

43

union, with a stronger degree of implied cultural homogeneity, or a looser group restricted primarily to the economic sphere? This debate within the union has great relevance to the future of its relations with Turkey. 60 Eastern

Europe

Prospects have also been fundamentally affected by the end of communism in Eastern Europe, and the fact that the European Union realizes that if it rebuffs applications from the former Warsaw Pact states (excluding Russia) then it runs the risk of recreating something like the old iron curtain, at least in economic terms. Hence, as the declaration at the end of the Madrid summit in December 1995 put it, "enlargement is both a political necessity and a historic opportunity." Turks are likely to resent the fact that as faithful members of NATO and other Western institutions since the early 1950s, they are now being ranked in the same queue as the formerly communist countries, and not even at the head of it. 6 1 On the other hand, they may actually benefit from the eastern extension of the European Union's frontiers, since the potential enlargement forces the union to consider how it can accommodate a string of countries whose economic conditions are not so different from Turkey's. The main factor that makes Turkey's possible accession notably more problematic than those of other Eastern European states is the sheer size of the country, an estimated 64 million people as of 1998. For the European Union, the main economic obstacle to incorporating the ten Eastern European states is the enormous burden they might place on its agricultural and structural funds. The same considerations apply in the Turkish case. It has been suggested that accession of "the ten," under present rules, would result in a 60-percent increase in the union's budget. Institutional reform is also not fully resolved. 62 Critical issues relate to the rotation of the presidency, the problem o f representation in the European Parliament, Commission, and Council of Ministers and the possibility of weighted voting in the council, and the question of much wider use of majority voting. 63 It is suggested that to cope with these, as well as prospective economic burdens, the European Union will have to adopt a more radical change in which the same rules would not be applied uniformly to all member states. 64 Within this architecture, the mechanisms for representation in the union's decisionmaking machinery could thus be worked out flexibly for different groups according to the topics under discussion. If the European Union redefines its identity in this direction, it could overcome some of the obstacles to the accession of Turkey, as well as those of the other Eastern European countries. 65 In this context, it seems that the Turks will have to consider the future of their relationship with the European Union in collaboration, rather than in competition, with the Eastern European states. 66

44

Turkey in World Politics

T h e trend, then, is that the i s s u e s surrounding Turkey's relationship with the European U n i o n increasingly resemble "moving targets," meaning the nature of the relationship between Turkey and the European U n i o n has e v o l v e d , the ambitions and nature of Turkey have changed, and the union itself has obviously been transformed. This dynamic has concrete implications for understanding the relationship b e t w e e n the European U n i o n and Turkey. First, it appears that the customs union has affirmed Turkey's economic ties with the European U n i o n but that Turkey is more than ready to make progress on membership. S e c o n d , although Turkey's domestic and regional interests have at times distanced Turkey from the European Union, these factors have never derailed progress. Finally, there n o w s e e m s to be agreement in principle on Turkish membership, though the actual process could take a long time to complete.

Notes 1. Association Agreement: "Agreement establishing an Association between Turkey and the European Economic Community," Official Journal of the European Communities, vol. 16, no. C 113 (24 D e c e m b e r 1973). ( I n c l u d e s both t h e Association Agreement of 1963 and the Additional Protocol of 1970). 2. "European Union" and "EU" is used throughout this chapter to refer also to the previous European Economic Community and European Community. 3. Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in an interview with the Financial Times, September 2, 1999. 4. Respectively, see Mehmet Ugur, "The Customs Union as a Substitute for Turkey's Membership? An Interpretation of EU-Turkey Relations," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, X, 1 (1996); Mine Eder "Becoming Western: Turkey and the European Union" in Jean Grugel and Wil Hout, eds., Regionalism Across the North-South Divide (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 79-94. 5. 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession. October 13, 1999. 6. See, for example, Barry Buzan and Thomaz Diez, "The European Union and Turkey," Survival, 41, 1, (1999): 41-57; Canan Balkir and Allan M. Williams, eds., Turkey and Europe (London and New York: Pinter, 1993); Atila Eralp, "Turkey and the European Community in the Changing Post-war International System," in Canan Balkir and Allan M. Williams, eds., Turkey and Europe (London and New York: Pinter, 1993); William Hale, "Turkey: A Crucial but Problematic Applicant," in John Redmond, ed., Prospective Europeans: New Members for the European Union (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994); Heinz Kramer, "Turkey and the European Union: A Multi-Dimensional Relationship with Hazy Perspectives," in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, eds., Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996); John Redmond, The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus and Malta? (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993). 7. Miikerrem Hi•0 "O es On on o rt

£

05

en r-; r^

NOoo ON Tt; Ñ Ooó NO OÑO CN On O ON eN eN en in oo CN O in eN

O oo O CN

p t- toÑ oo NO^CM ONun en a\ no" en en

NO ^ eN en ON ONOÑ on lo NO ONren oo en On ONoo eN en NO On en T—1 CN ^

NO C^ en CN en

^

un p NOun NOen NO00 CN

en vo NO O ioÑNO -

r- oo 00 un oo Ö r^ ^ Ö OÑ en

no ^

^t

en cn en

O NO

o ^f CN 00 un un 00 en

NO OÑ o CN

un CN en

~ tÑ

CN unOCÑ N NOrCN

CN O t*

CN

un io OÑCN

ON CÑ -

ON O ON

ONO NOen un o un CN

CN CN C^ oo en

CN TT

OO•ar-Ñ CN

NO OÑ

en

„en ooc-Ñ en

00

ON CN NOÖ 00 CN -5t"'

-

^

„

O un CN

oo lo flCN io" es

eN On es

On en 00 NOen oò ^ in en O oo en oo NOO NONOeN CN) en o" ^ CN ^ ^

NO cn oo cn

o r-Ñ en CN

rON ule Kut is vice rector of Bilgi U n i v e r s i t y and c h a i r p e r s o n of the Department of International Relations at Bilgi University. She is the coeditor of En Uzun Onyil, Turkiye'nin Ulusal Guvenlik ve Dip Politika Giindeminde Doksanli Yillar, (The Longest Decade: Agenda of Turkey's National Security and Foreign Affairs in 1990s). Amikain Nachmani is a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies and a senior lecturer in political studies at Bar-Ilan University. He is the author of Israel, Turkey, and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean and They Have Oil, We Have Water: Let Them Drink Their Oil. Gencer Ozcan is a member of the faculty of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Yildiz Technical University. He has edited or coedited several books on Turkish foreign policy: Yeni Balkanlar, Eski Sorunlar (New Balkans, Old Problems)', Onbir Aylik Saltanat: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Dip Politikada Refahyol Donemi (Governance for Eleven Months: Period of Welfare Party-True Path Party Coalition in Politics, Economics and Foreign Affairs)-, and En Uzun Onyil, Turkiye'nin Ulusal Guvenlik ve Dip Politika Giindeminde Doksanli Yillar (The Longest Decade: Agenda of Turkey's National Security and Foreign Affairs in 1990s). Barry Rubin is deputy director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, editor of Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), and e d i t o r of Turkish Studies. His b o o k s i n c l u d e The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building; Revolution Until Victory: The Politics and History of the PLO; Cauldron of Turmoil: America in the Middle East; Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran; Arab States and the Palestine Conflict; Islamic Fundamentalists in Egyptian Politics; and The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947. Brent Sasley is a doctoral candidate at McGill University, studying international relations and Middle East politics. He is the author of "Turkey's Energy Politics in the Post-Cold War Era," in MERIA.

The Contributors

263

Duygu Bazoglu Sezer is professor of international relations at Bilkent University. She has published various articles in journals, including Comparative Strategy, SAIS Review, and Harvard Ukrainian Studies. Ilhan Uzgel is assistant professor on the faculty of political science, Ankara University. He has published articles in such journals as the International Yearbook of Turkish Studies and Turkish Review of Balkan Studies. He is currently coediting a book on Turkey's neighbors' foreign policies and is a contributor to a textbook on Turkish foreign policy from 1919 to 1999. Gareth Winrow is a professor in the Department of International Relations at Bilgi University. He has been the recipient of two NATO Research Fellowships and a U.S. Institute of Peace Fellowship. He wrote Turkey and Caspian Energy; Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia; and Where East Meets West: Turkey and the Balkans, and coauthored The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict.

Index

Aegean Sea, 10,16,22,36, 39, 50, 73, 76; continental shelf, 77 Agopyan, Agop, 178 Akbulut, Yildinm, 95 Aktulga, Dogu, 16 al-Ban, Hasan, 104 Albania, 7, 25,49, 166 Aliyev, Heydar, 161,178, 223, 225 Altan, Ozer, 185 Anatolia, 77, 94 Ankara, 50, 76 Annan, Kofi, 144 Anti-fundamentalism, 105 Apostolakis, Dimitris, 86 Arab, 3, 152; Pan-Arab ideology, 2; Israeli relations, 101,243; policy, 124; Turkish relations, 101,103 Arafat, Yasir, 102 Arda River, 58 Armenians, 7, 26, 83, 156, 157,162, 163,171 Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation of Armenia (AS ALA), 178 Arrow Project, 118 Asad, Hafez, 117,241 Asparuk, Cumhur, 24 Ataturk, Kemal, 1-3, 87, 89, 239, 244-245 Ate§, Abdulkadir, 115 Ate?, Atila, 24, 96 Avramopoulos, Dimitris, 86 Aykut, imren, 225 Azerbaijan, 7, 155, 156,160,161,162,

166,175; International Operating Company (AIOC), 183, 223,229 Aziz, Tarik, 95 Baghdad Pact, 98-99, 102 Bahçeli, Devlet, 180, 224 Baker, James, 15, 52, 54 Baku, 155,161-162; Ceyhan pipeline, 7, 162-3,133,155,162,178,183,186, 221-222,225-228, 230-231; Novorossiisk pipeline, 155, 162, 224; Supsa line, 227 Balkan Pact, 50, 72 Balkans, 2-4,6-10,25,49-54,56-57, 59,63,65,252 Barak, Ehud, 107, 115, 117 Belgrade, 49 Berisha, Sali, 54 Bir,Çevik, 22-25, 105, 119 Bishkek Summit, 179 Black Sea, 7-8, 25; Economic Cooperation Project (BSEC), 6,192 Bled Treaty, 50 Blue Stream, 157,164,184, 221 Bosnia, 3, 6-7, 25-26, 52-53 Bozer, Ali, 15, 100 Bozkurt, 78 Bucak, Sedat, 178 Bugra, Ay§e, 203 Bulgaria, 7,49 Bush, George, 15, 72, 84, 129 Çakmakoglu, Sabahattin, 86 Campbell, Ben Nighthorse, 142

265

266

Index

Caspian: oil fields, 183; Sea, 218, 223-224,231,251 Çatli, Abdullah, 178 Caucasus, 3, 6 - 9 , 21, 25, 49, 72 Çelik, ilhan, 121 Cem, Ismail, 62, 64, 88,106, 226 Central Asia, 3-4, 6-10, 33, 3 9 , 4 9 Central Treaty Organization, 98 Çetin, Hikmet, 14-15,57, 100-101, 115, 124,179 Chechens, 26, 166, 177-178 Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 157 China, 9 Chirac, Jacques, 75 Churchill, Winston, 130 Çiller, Tansu, 15, 21, 38, 41, 73, 75, 77, 101, 103, 115, 157, 180,185,204 Clinton, Bill, 71, 75, 87, 129, 138, 145-146 Cold War, 2, 5, 20, 49-50, 66, 93, 130; post-Cold War era, 1 , 3 , 5 , 7 , 1 0 - 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 5 , 5 1 , 5 4 , 6 4 , 7 2 , 9 4 , 9 7 , 101, 131-132,251 Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 142 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 193; CIS Collective Security Treaty, 180 Constantinople, 72-73 Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE), 152,156, 162, 175, 259, 315 Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Watercourses, 238 Convention on the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency, 197 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 76 Coordinating Council for Russia's Military-Technical Policy, 175 Culali, Saffet, 55 Culture Ministry of Turkey, 181 Customs Union Treaty, 134 Cyprus, 2 - 4 , 5, 7 , 1 0 , 22, 36, 39^11, 50, 73, 77, 78; crisis, 132; partition of, 72; war, 1974,74

Democratic League of Turks (DLT), 60 Democratic Left Party (DLP), 106 Dostum, 180 Durres, 55, 64

D'Amato, Alfonso, 142 Davydov, Oleg, 175 Dayton agreement, 53, 137 Demirel, Süleyman, 1 4 - 1 6 , 2 1 - 2 2 , 38, 101-102, 1 0 7 , 1 1 5 , 1 3 8 , 1 5 7 , 161, 180,184,204,227

gas, natural, 4 Gazprom, 221 General Dynamics, 121 Georgia, 6, 7, 25 Ghab Valley, 243 Giray, Sefa, 100

Earthquake of August 1999, 7, 31, 36, 86,143-144 Ecevit, Bülent, 22, 38, 42, 71, 88,106, 133,136, 1 4 3 , 1 5 7 , 1 6 4 , 1 8 1 , 2 2 1 , 251 Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), 103, 181 Economic Cooperation Project (BSEC), 6 Elchibey, Abulfaz, 155, 178 Elekdag, §ükrü, 96 energy consumption, 98, 253; in Turkey enosis, 79-81 Erbakan, Necmettin, 19, 22, 24, 38-39, 75, 103-105, 1 2 4 , 1 4 0 , 1 8 1 , 1 8 3 Ersümer, Cumhur, 184 Euphrates River, 235 Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 235-236, 240, 243 Eurasian Islamic Council Organization, 182 Europe, 1^1, 6, 10, 22, 49; Central, 7-9; Eastern, 51 European Union, 3, 5, 7, 9-10, 26, 31—44, 51, 79, 85, 109, 251; Ankara Agreement, 31; customs union, 32-35, 38^11,44; Helsinki Summit decision, 109; Luxembourg summit, 31 Evans, Peter, 205 Evren, General Kenan, 86 Federation of Western Thrace Turks in Europe, 82 Felgengauer, Pavel, 159 Flight Information Region (FIR), 76-77 Foreign Capital Framework Decree, 198 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 189, 196-197, 199 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 72, 84

Index

Glenny, Misha, 55 Gönensay, Emre, 185 Gray Wolf paramilitary, 78 Greece, 2,4, 5,-7-8,10, 22, 26, 36^10, 50 Grossman, Marc, 142 Gülen, Fethullah, 22, 182 Gulf War (1991), 3, 5-6, 15,98, 101, 132, 173,228,239 Giire§, Dogan, 16, 18, 21, 24, 57, 60 Gürtuna, Ali Müfit, 86 Hagia Sophia, 82 Hamas, 104 Hashemite, 101 Hebron agreement, 135 Helsinki: decision, 85; Summit 133, 144 Herzog, Haim, 115 High Council of Turkic Republics, 180 Hizballah, 104 Hussein, Saddam, 95, 100, 107,135, 139 Hussein, King, 101 inönü, Erdal, 14 Inönii, Ismet, 132 International Civilian Aviation Organization, 77 International Court of Justice, 85 International Monetary Fund, 190 Iran, 3, 7-10, 15, 19, 22, 23, 26; Iraq War, 239; Libya Sanctions Act, 140, 220 Iraq, 3 , 6 - 7 , 1 0 , 1 5 , 2 2 - 2 4 , 4 9 , 5 2 Islamic conference organization, 103 Islamic parties, fundamentalism, 3,10, 13,18,20,22,34,118; Islamist Welfare Party (WP), 18-24, 38, 51, 103, 118, 140,181; True Path Party (TPP), 19-20, 22-23; National Salvation Party, 99; Salvation Front, 104 Israel, 10, 19, 23-25, 242-243; Aircraft Industry (IAI), 120-121; Defense Forces, 119; PLO agreement, 135; Turkish relations, 101,103,109,119, 135; Syrian talks, 141 Istanbul Stock Exchange, 63 Johnson, Lyndon,132 Jordan, 24 Jupiter missile removal, 132

267

Kaf-Der, 177 Kahil, Adnan, 60 Kalalimnos, 22 Kalaycioglu, Ersin, 81 Kandemir, Nuzhet, 125 Karadayi, Ismail Hakki, 23, 24, 105 Kassim, Abdul Karim, 99 Kazakhstan, 6, 8 Kazantzakis, Nikos, 74 Kebar Dam, 244 Kemal, Mustafa, 153 Kerkuk-Yumurtahk Oil Pipeline, 98 Khatemi, Muhammed, 106 Kinkel, Klaus, 85 Kirkuk, 15 Kivnkoglu, Hüseyin, 20 Kosovo, 3 , 7 , 2 5 , 5 4 , 6 1 , 6 2 , 8 7 Kyrgyzstan, 8 Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 95 Kurds, 3, 5 , 1 0 , 1 3 , 2 0 , 24, 36,41^12, 239; PKK, 15, 41-42, 58-59, 74, 76, 79, 83, 87, 107,116, 136, 139, 157, 165,239,246 Kut, Giin, 242 Kuwait, 6, 15, 129, 134 Kuznetsov, Vadim, 178 Lausanne agreement, 77 Levy, David, 23-24,105, 115 Libya, 19,22-23 Likud Government, 99 Maastricht Treaty, 192 Macedonia, 55, 59,60, 83-84 Madrid peace process, 134-135 Mafia connections, 178 Main Export Pipeline (MEP), 222 Marshall Plan, 130 Middle East, 2-4, 8, 10, 25, 37, 39,49, 93,253 Mikhailov, Vyacheslav, 160 Military, Turkish: intervention in politics, 3^t, 10,13-26, 42; spending, 79,94, 120; training, 55 Military Court of Appeal, 15 Military Exchanges of Information and Prenotification of Certain Military Activities, 101 Milosevic, Slobodan, 62 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish, 13, 15,21-23,25-26 Mirzaoglu, Ramazan, 225

268

Index

Moldova, 7 Montreux Convention, 130, 226 Mordechai, Itzhak, 23, 115 Mosul, 15 Motherland Party, 16, 20-21, 106, 204 Movement for Rights and Freedom, 56 Mubarak, Hosni, 102 Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, 101 Muslim Brotherhood, 104, 241 Nagorno-Karabakh, 7, 174, 178 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 102 Nationalist Action Party, 176, 180 National Security Council (NSC), 14-21,23, 175 NATO, 2 - 3 , 5, 25, 3 6 , 4 3 , 51-53, 55, 58-62,64,72,74,84,118,130; Russian Founding Act of 1997, 151 Neighborhood Forum, 107 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 105, 117, 124-125 Nezeretis, Dimitris, 75 Niyazov, Sapa Murad, 184 North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 133 Northern Watch, 19. See also Operation Provide Comfort Nukhayov, Hosh-Ahmed, 177 Öcalan, Abdullah, 24, 3 7 , 4 2 , 7 4 , 7 6 , 7 9 , 85, 89, 96,107, 116, 124,136,143, 157,165,246 Öcalan, Osman, 97 oil, 3 - 4 , 7 , 1 5 Öni§, Ziya, 203 Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 6 , 9 5 , 100,217 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 129, 142,229 Organization of Islamic Countries, 23, 55 Orizova, 58 Orontes Dam, 244 Orontes River, 243 Ottoman Empire, 1 , 6 , 9 , 73-74 Öymen, Onur, 117 Özal, Turgut, 6, 14-15, 33, 59-61, 72, 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 2 9 , 132,134, 138, 173, 179,203-204,239 Özener, Barlas, 116

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 99 Palestinians, 26; Israeli negotiations, 101 Pangalos, Theodoros, 64, 74—75 Papandreou, Andreas, 56, 88 Papandreou, George, 78, 83, 89 Partnership for Peace, 60, 62, 133, 180 Party of Democratic Alternative, 60 Pasha, Enver, 153 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 95, 97 Pena, Federico, 228 Peres, Shimon, 115, 117 Perry, William, 54 Persian Gulf, 6, 52; Crisis. See Gulf War PKK. See Kurds, PKK Platias, Athanasios, 73 Primakov, Yevgeny, 157 Putin, Vladamir, 157 Qaddafi, Muammar, 104, 106 Rabin, Yitzhak, 117 Rafsanjani, Hashami, 23, 104 Refah party, 106 Reliant Mermaid, 119 Republican People's Party, 204 Research Foundation of the Turkish World, 180 Rodrik, Dani, 206-207 Romania, 7 , 4 9 , 58 Rugova, Ibrahim, 61 Russia, 3-4, 7 - 9 , 21-22, 26, 43, 51; Chechen war, 162; Iranian agreement, 97; lobbying, 183; tourism, 165; missiles, 77. See also Soviet Union S-300 missiles, 152, 156 Saddam River, 240 Sarajevo, 53 Sargisian, Yazgan, 162 Schifter, Richard , 64 Serb, 26; pan-Serb ideologies, 2 Sèvres phobia, 138 Shaposhnikov, Yevgenii, 156-157, 175 Shevardnadze, Edvard, 161 Simitis, Costas, 6 3 , 8 8 Sincan, 22-23 Skopje, 6 0 , 6 3 - 6 4 Smith, Christopher, 142 Sofia document, 57

Index

Solana, Xavier, 161 Solzhenytsin, Alexander, 159 Somalia, 7, 25 Southeastern Anatolian Development Project (GAP), 94, 99, 235, 237, 240-243, 253 Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI), 63-64 Southeast Europe Multinational Force (SEEMNF), 62-63 Soviet Union (USSR), 2-3, 5 - 7 , 13, 20, 25, 38, 93; Soviet bloc, 5, 7. See also Russia Soysal, Miimtaz, 173 Srebrenica, 53 State Hydraulic Works Administration, 242 State Planning Organization, 26 State Water Works, 244 Stefanopoulos, Constantine, 64 Stroyev, Yegor, 159 Sungurlu, Oltan, 75 Supreme Military Council (SMC), 15-16 Syria, 3, 7, 10, 22-24, 26, 86, 102, 116-117, 141 Tabqa Dam, 236, 241, 244 Tabriz-Ankara pipeline, 184 Talbott, Strobe, 138, 227-228 Taliban, 180 Tayan, Turhan, 115 Tekfen, 183 Thessaloniki harbor, 60; Aris, 73 Thrace, Western, 50, 82 Tigris River, 235 Tirana, 54 Torumtay, Necip, 15, 100, 175 Transcaucasus, 174, 217 Treaty of Friendship, 157 True Path Party, 103, 204 Truman doctrine, 130 Turan, liter, 242 Turkey Alparslan, 180 Turkey-Iran pipeline, 220 Turkic Cultures and Arts Joint Administration (TURKSOY), 181 Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation Foundation(TUDEV), 180-181

269

Turkic Trade and Development Bank, 179 Turkish: Armenian Business Development Committee, 177; Cultural Research Association, 180; Daily News, 74; European Union relations, 94; exports, 97; Foreign Ministry, 173-174, 177; Grand National Assembly, 100; Greek relations, 51 ; International Cooperation Agency (TIKA), 176; Iraqi Mixed Economic Commission, 244; Minority of Western Thrace, 82; mistrust of United States, 132; National Security Council (NSC), 104; Petroleum Corporation(TPAC), 182, 225; Petroleum Refineries (TUPRAS), 182; Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), 78-80; Russian relations, 153, 175; State Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), 182 Turkmenistan, 8, 98 Ukraine, 6, 7, 21 UN, 7; actions, 137; sanctions, 107, 134, 136 United States, 1-3, 5-6, 10, 14, 15, 26; alliance with, 122-123 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 190 Uzbekistan, 8 Uzun, Hayrettin, 185 Vardar Valley project, 61 Vatican, 22 Waldner, David, 203 water, 4, 10, 108, 117 Waterbury, John, 203 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 118, 135 Weizman, Ezer, 115 West-East Motorway Project, 64 Yeltsin, Boris, 157 Yetim, Muserref, 241 Yilmaz, Mesut, 16, 20-21, 31, 96, 106-107, 115, 125, 157, 184, 204 Yugoslavia, 5-8, 25 Zhivkov, Todor, 56

About the Book

Once characterized by an avoidance of foreign entanglements, Turkey's diplomacy has changed dramatically in the present era of regional agreements and organizations. Tracing the evolution of that change, this comprehensive study explores the country's new international posture. The authors assess Turkey's policy toward Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and the U.S., as well as its growing role within the Middle East region. They also address in depth the critical issues of economic, energy, and water policy. Their discussion of the interest groups and institutions affecting the policymaking process and the challenges facing the country's rapidly urbanizing and industrializing economy contribute to the picture of a complex, dynamic nation. Barry Rubin is deputy director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, Israel. He is editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs and has published extensively on Middle Eastern politics. Kemal Kirifci is professor of political science at Bogazigi University, Istanbul. He is coauthor of The Political Economy of Cooperation in the Middle East.

270