Turkey and the Karabakh Conflict 9993044806

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HAYK DEMOYAN

TURKEY AND KARABAKH CONFLICT At the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries Historical and comparative analysis

Yerevan - 2006

UDC 325: 327 (496.1) BBK 66. 3 (2Ar) + 66.4 (5Tu) D310 Editor M. Grigoryan

In memory of compatriots victims of the genocide in the Ottoman Empire The author expresses gratitude for the support in the publication of the work to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia © Center for European and Armenian Studies "PROSPECTUS", 2006. Karabakh conflict research project of the Prospectus Center. D 310 Demoyan Gayk Turkey and the Karabakh conflict in the late XX - early XXI centuries. Historical and comparative analysis. - Yer.: Author's edition, 2006 - 255s. The study examines aspects of Turkish foreign policy towards the Karabakh conflict in the historical and modern dimensions. On the basis of a wide factual material, the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh is analyzed in the context of the Armenian-Turkish relations and the new foreign policy doctrine of neo-panturkism. Turkish initiatives aimed at ensuring a pro-Azerbaijani position in resolving the conflict, intra-Turkic disagreements around the Karabakh problem, the factor of religious solidarity, as well as the spread of a network of international terrorism in Azerbaijan due to the recruitment of mercenaries from Islamic countries are analyzed separately. The book is intended for experts, students and researchers studying the Karabakh conflict, Turkish foreign policy, as well as for a wide range of readers. ISBN 99930-4-480-6 Cover design: Tamara Mikeladze BBK 66. 3 (2Ar) + 66.4 (5Tu) The content of the book expresses the personal opinion of the author. © G. Demoyan, 2006 © Design, Collage, 2006 Scanning, recognition and correction: Lina Kamalyan

FOREWORD FROM THE AUTHOR The Karabakh conflict in its historical and current manifestation is a separate link on a very dangerous break in the global confrontation between conflicting civilizations. This postulate is not an exaggeration. The invasions of the Turkic nomadic tribes into the Middle Eastern and Caucasian regions caused significant geohistorical and geoethnic changes, which led to irreversible transformations in the ethnic and political configuration of these regions. The new mega-ethnic substratum, having populated the area from the Adriatic to the Caspian Sea, eventually extended its dominance over the peoples of the Christian East, and, in particular, over the Armenians. The region of Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenian Artsakh), being a historically Armenian-populated territory with a cultural and historical heritage characteristic of the Armenian civilization, retained its semi-independent status and effectively fought against external forces that sought to impose their dominance on the region. The Karabakh conflict can thus be seen as a struggle between the trend towards further Turkification of the South Caucasus region and opposition to this process by the local Armenian element. In other words, this can be called a struggle between the expansionist, newcomer ethnic community and the autochthons, who for several centuries have been holding back the further spread of a foreign ethnic area both geographically and politically. Thus, the conflict also has an ideological background, which, on the one hand, manifests itself from the position of expansionism in the face of the ideology of pan-Turkism and the policy of Turkization, and, on the other hand, is motivated by the desire for survival and restoration of historical justice. Both at the beginning of the 20th century and at the turn of the millennium, the mission of opposing the plans for the deployment and implementation of the pan-Turkic doctrine adopted by Turkey, as well as the leaders of Azerbaijan, who saw in new geopolitical transformations a convenient chance for the implementation of their long-standing ideas, fell to the lot of Armenia and Karabakh. In other words, the struggle of the Armenian people of Karabakh against the Azerbaijani colonial rule is also a clash of opposing identities, where on the one hand an ethnos with a long-established national identity, culture and historical memory, and on the other hand, an artificially constructed state and ethnos - the fruit of geopolitical and odious experiments of Turkish and Soviet strategists. In this book, we have tried to compare, analyze and evaluate the role of Turkey in the Karabakh conflict, considering the problem through the prism of the neo-Pan-Turkist doctrine of Ankara, which dominated the country's foreign policy in the early 1990s. On the basis of rich factual material, specific cases of violation of the norms of international law by Turkey and Azerbaijan in the policy of both countries towards the Armenian population of Azerbaijan in general, and Nagorno-Karabakh in particular, are also given.

INTRODUCTION The policy of perestroika and glasnost in the USSR, proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the 20th century, very soon found itself in a dead end, mainly because of the inconsistency of this policy in the field of resolving urgent problems in the national question. Deprived of any effectiveness, the attempts of the Soviet authorities to suppress national movements within the country gave rise to unprecedented social tension, political instability, and hotbeds of ethnic tension in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the country as a whole. It was ethnic conflicts that ultimately became one of the main gravediggers of the Soviet Union. However, the collapse of the USSR not only did not help to freeze the further escalation of these conflicts, but rather the opposite: the disappearance of the Soviet state from the historical arena marked a profound transformation of socio-political relations, value systems and ideologies, further contributing to a new escalation of ethnic conflicts that escalated into full-scale wars. Hotspots of inter-ethnic tension received additional fuel from the outside - from third parties involved in the conflict dynamics, thereby expanding the area of hostilities, their duration, and creating new opportunities for further escalation. In the internationalization of these conflicts, the factor of ethno-cultural and confessional solidarity becomes a significant factor, on the basis of which the latent radical nationalist ideologies, in particular pan-ideologies, were reanimated. The internationalization of conflicts was also characterized by the involvement of international organizations (OSCE, UN, etc.) in the process of settling these conflicts and developing mediation initiatives. The South Caucasus region, due to its geographical location and geopolitical significance, has always been in the center of attention of large neighboring powers and has repeatedly become the object of territorial redistribution and bloody wars. One of the reasons for this interest can be called the buffer location of the region at the junction of Europe and Asia, North and South, where ethno-confessional and civilizational borders meet. The struggle for the Soviet legacy did not bypass the Caucasus, which by that time had already turned into a zone of fierce nyh ethnopolitical conflicts. Turkey, Iran, the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United States did not hide their interest in spreading their political, economic and cultural influence in the region. The West in the first post-Soviet years predetermined a new geopolitical role for Turkey, considering it as a conductor of its geopolitical interests in regional politics. RESEARCH RELEVANCE Turkey's policy towards the Karabakh conflict has rarely become the object of a separate study and needs a deeper analysis within the framework of a monograph. In the scientific literature, only its individual components have been analyzed. However, it should be noted that in most cases these studies are distinguished by a certain predisposition, if not to say one-sidedness, especially in the works of Western researchers, who have a fairly common point of view about the existence of a “delicate balance” in Turkey’s attitude to the Karabakh conflict. According to this point of view, Ankara refrained from any aggressive actions against the Republic of Armenia (hereinafter RA) and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (hereinafter NKR).

The problem also lies in the traditions of a selective approach or one-sided coverage of problems related to the country of study that have persisted in the scientific literature. Another problematic factor in scientific research is the approaches of researchers based on banal lobbying, or, more simply, lobbying the interests of the country that is the object of research through scientific publications. Turkish as well as Azerbaijani political culture has developed a vicious tradition of using, if it is possible to characterize them that way, foreign "mercenary authors". Unfortunately, this is becoming a negative trend in the scientific literature in general. The problem raised in this work can be called urgent coverage of the current history, since it is the study and analysis of recent history that allow us to delve into the events of the recent past in more detail, draw appropriate conclusions and refrain from gross mistakes and untenable decisions in the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia in the future. History is to some extent a political science and, unfortunately, leniation, is not guaranteed against politicization. The lessons of the Soviet past teach us that in the conditions of various political upheavals and market difficulties, the historian should, as far as possible, remain true to professional conscientiousness, not keep up with fashionable party and ideological clichés, and even more so, not become simply an instrument of international politics. In this context, the study of current history seems to us to be extremely relevant, since it is the contemporaries of the events who should learn what over time, one way or another, will become available to the public of a particular country. The study analyzes the preconditions and motives of Turkish expansionism in the South Caucasus, both in historical terms and at the present stage. The work is also intended to debunk the myth of Turkish neutrality in the Karabakh problem, revealing the true motives and goals of the neo-Pan-Turkist doctrine in the context of this issue. Accordingly, the main theses of the study are as follows. First: Turkey played a specific and decisive role in the emergence of the Karabakh issue, second: during the new escalation of the conflict in the first half of the 1990s, Turkey was one of the parties to the conflict. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE WORK The main purpose of the work is to identify the dynamics of Turkey's involvement in the Karabakh conflict zone, the degree of involvement, the multi-vector approaches and the results of this policy in the context of the neo-Pan-Turkist doctrine and their impact on regional developments. The work is designed on the basis of available materials to solve the following main tasks: 1. to reveal the historical motives of the Turkish expansionist policy in the Caucasus and the place of Nagorno-Karabakh in this policy; 2. to consider the dynamics of the Armenian-Turkish relations and the role given by Turkey to the Karabakh conflict in the context of these relations;

3. trace the evolution of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Karabakh problem and its influence on the foreign and domestic political struggle; 4. identify the features of the contradictions in the positions of the regional powers around the Karabakh conflict; 5. trace the process of transformation of Turkish policy towards the Karabakh conflict since its new escalation since 1988. until 2001; 6. to compare and analyze the facts of military assistance provided by Turkey to Azerbaijan in the period between 1991-1994; 7. to reveal the degree of interest of the Central Asian Turkic-speaking states in the Karabakh problem; 8. analyze the significance for Turkey of the factor of religious solidarity in the context of the conflict; 9. to assess the relevance and causes of contradictions between the Turkic states in bilateral relations and at the Turkic summits in the context of the Karabakh issue, 10. to analyze the facts of attracting Islamic mercenaries to the zone of the Karabakh conflict and the consequences of this policy for Azerbaijan in the context of the spread of the network of international terrorism in Azerbaijan and Turkey. SCIENTIFIC NOVELTY The work is an attempt, within the framework of one monograph, to consider Turkey's policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the degree of its involvement in the conflict dynamics, to identify hitherto little-known data on Turkish intervention in the conflict zone on the side of Azerbaijan in the context of Turkey's neo-Pan-Turkist doctrine. The object of the study is the Karabakh conflict and a wide range of issues related to Turkish approaches to the conflict. The methodological basis of the work was objective historical and political approaches, historical and comparative analysis, based on the principle of complementarity of sources and their analysis based on a multilateral scientific approach. Sources in Armenian, Russian, English, French and Turkish were used to prepare this work. The scientific basis of the work is distinguished by the use of documents from the Open Society Archive (Budapest, Hungary), the National Archives of Armenia (hereinafter - NAA), materials from the Armenian, Russian, Turkish, Azerbaijani and Western press, literature on the study of Pan-Turkism, etc.

In modern foreign and Russian historiography, there is an opportunistic tendency to consider the problem of modern pan-Turkism in the context of only humanitarian cooperation with a conscious or unconscious underestimation of the importance of facts proving the destructive role of this ideology in relations between state cooperation and interethnic relations both in the historical context and in modern times. Some authors, for example, the well-known expert on Pan-Turkism Jacob Landau, touching upon the problem of Turkish military intervention in the Karabakh conflict, are even inclined to limit the provided military only 150 Turkish officers, and he considers the indications of the presence of more than 1,500 Turkish soldiers in the zone of the Karabakh conflict an exaggeration 1 . Another researcher, Svante Kornell, believes that in the issue of the Karabakh conflict, Turkey adhered to the position of delicate balancing, “providing neither weapons nor finances for their acquisition, and not even threatening intervention on the side of Azerbaijan ...” 2 . Unfortunately, such a one-sided interpretation of the issue is not unique, and biased and simplified interpretations of researchers are transferred to the pages of foreign media and occupy a strong place in journalistic articles. To substantiate the basic concept of the work, various primary sources, as well as secondary sources, were studied. Given the novelty, as well as the modernity of the subject matter of the work, it is possible that over time, new literature on the subject will appear, which will complement the theses and conclusions put forward. The scientific and theoretical significance of the work lies in the selection of little-studied details of the conflict, the generalization of scattered sources in different languages and the compilation of a holistic picture of Turkish policy towards the Karabakh crisis. Particular attention was paid to highlighting such issues as the provision of military assistance to Azerbaijan by Turkey and the involvement of Islamic mercenaries by the Azerbaijani authorities in the zone of the Karabakh confrontation, as well as the use of the religious factor in the conflict discourse. On the basis of these facts, theoretical conclusions were drawn about the essence of the policy of neo-Pan-Turkism, the role of the religious factor, as well as the origins of the penetration of the network of international terrorism into Azerbaijan. Chronologically, the work covers the period from the beginning of the 20th century to 2001, that is, the entire 20th century as a whole, but with an emphasis on the events of 1988-1994. and subsequent developments until 2001, i.e. until the time of the terrorist attacks on the United States, which became an epochal watershed in modern history. Scientific and practical significance of the work. The study, prepared on the basis of a broad factual material, can be used for a specific and practical purpose in the development of the foreign policy guidelines of the Republic of Armenia at the present stage, and the theses and recommendations presented may be useful in the process of developing a modern foreign policy line of the Republic of Armenia.

KARABAKH CONFLICT AND REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS Among the centers of post-Soviet interethnic confrontations, the Karabakh conflict stands out for its intensity and duration. The escalation of the conflict dynamics in Nagorno-Karabakh and its negative transformation was directly or indirectly influenced by the involvement of third parties in the conflict zone. One of these parties was Turkey, acting on this issue from the standpoint of ethno-linguistic and historical-cultural solidarity with Azerbaijan. Thus, it again became obvious that the attempts to implement pan-Turkic plans "were and remain tragic for the Armenians and other non-Turkic communities of Turkey and Transcaucasia" 3. As a rule, intervention on the side of compatriots or ethnically related peoples living in other states also occurs in the event of a general consensus that the state has strong motives "Realpolitik" for intervention outside its borders 4 . The weakening of Russian influence at the initial stage of the post-Soviet reality led to the active political, economic and cultural penetration of other regional powers into the post-Soviet space, thereby pursuing the goal of keeping the newly sovereign republics in the orbit of their influence. Among these states, Turkey stood out for its active and consistent policy, especially in the Turkic-speaking states. Emphasizing the linguistic, cultural and ethnic community, Ankara sought to take on the role of the second "big brother" for these countries, while promising significant economic assistance and investment. In the first post-Soviet years, statements by the leaders of the Turkic-speaking countries about their adherence to the "Turkish model" of state building and economic development led Ankara to believe that the South Caucasus and Central Asia would in the future be in Turkey's zone of influence. Faithful to this conviction, the Turkish leaders began an active foreign policy game on the southern periphery of the former USSR, trying to get as many dividends as possible from the current geopolitical chaos. Given the current situation, the West regarded Turkey as almost the only guarantor of peace in the South Caucasus, at the same time stipulating the resolution of the Karabakh conflict through the mediation of Ankara 5 . In the new geopolitical situation, a very influential stratum of intellectuals and politicians appeared in Turkish circles, who advocated revising the existing Kemalist attitude about non-interference in disturbances outside the country, especially in the Middle East and other regions adjacent to Turkey. The doctrines known as "neo-Ottomanism" and "neo-Pan-Turkism" were called upon to provide Turkey with the role of a new geopolitical axis and regional power, in other words, to replace "status quoism with the search for new horizons" 6 . The spread of Turkish influence in the southern regions of the former USSR was also considered by the West as a way to counter Iranian influence in Muslim areas and prevent Russia's "return" to these regions. Thus, with the approval of the West in the early 1990s, Ankara adopted the factors of civilizational, historical, cultural and ethno-confessional solidarity as an ideological base to

ensure the implementation of new and very ambitious foreign policy initiatives. Persistent emphasis on the ethno-linguistic, cultural and historical community of Turkey with the Turkic-speaking states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia received a special scope and was aimed at achieving its own goals. Calls for the unity of the Turks on the basis of a common language, culture, history, religious and ethnic affinity are combined at the present stage with the militant aspirations of pan-Turkism, which manifested themselves in the form of direct intervention in armed conflicts in the Caucasus (Karabakh, Abkhazia, Chechnya) 7 . Turkey adhered to a similar policy in the Balkans, providing significant military and political assistance to "kindred" peoples in this region. It should be noted that for the ruling circles of Turkey, the pan-Turkic doctrine did not look completely outdated, moreover, as the geopolitical situation changed, it periodically became more active. The annexation of the Sanjak of Alexandret in 1938, the revitalization of pan-Turkist plans during the Second World War and active cooperation with the Wehrmacht, the military occupation of Northern Cyprus in 1974. and the subsequent Pan-Turkic rhetoric of the early 1990s proved again and again that on this issue the Turkish leaders of the republican period did not at all deviate from the foreign policy line of the Young Turks. Indeed, the Kemalists did not create a new ideology and strategy. The strategy of the Kemalists was, in fact, a continuation of the policy of the Young Turks, adapted to the new realities 8 . Since the beginning of the Cold War, in the geopolitical conjuncture of international relations, the West has attached particular importance to Turkey as a country with a strategic geographical position, as well as the ability to influence the "Soviet Turks" on the other side of the "Iron Curtain". This circumstance was well understood in Ankara, trying in every possible way to play the card of a "special role" in order to receive new political and economic dividends. It is no coincidence that the "architect of Turkish liberalization" Turgut Ozal back in 1980. pointed out unequivocally that 87 million people in the Soviet Union, half the population of Iran, 15 million people in China are Turks "and if Turkey wants, it can change the balance of power in the world" ... if our allies are aware of the importance of Turkey's role "9 . In general, it can be stated that the ideology of pan-Turkism in republican Turkey has not disappeared at all, but since the 1960s it has also received political form, institutionalizing its presence in the political field of Turkey in the person of the Nationalist Movement Party headed by Alpaslan Turkes. The new political elites emerging in the early 1990s in Soviet Azerbaijan, in turn, placed great hopes on Turkey in terms of gaining independence and even spoke in favor of uniting with Turkey in the form of a confederation in the next 20-30 years 10 . For example, the leaders of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan believed that "Turkey is a window that looks to the West for all Turkic peoples in Asia and the Caucasus regions ... Our goal is the creation of a "Great Turkey" or the unification of Turks abroad under the auspices of Turkey" 11 . Even before the collapse of the USSR, pan-Turkist circles within the Soviet state stepped up their activities - not without the help of Turkish undercover intelligence. The capital of Azerbaijan

has become one of the centers of pan-Turkic Propaganda. It is no coincidence that at the first meetings with the participation of delegates from the Central Asian Turkic states, ideas were expressed about establishing close ties "with the last independent Turkish state" 12 . At the same time, even before the collapse of the USSR, statements were made from the lips of Turkish officials that directly supported pan-Turkic intentions in the future. So, at the beginning of 1990. Turkish State Minister Ercument Konukman stated that “in the coming years, the Turks living in neighboring states will form independent states under the Turkish flag. The old and sick Ottoman Turk will regain its former strength” 13 . And Turkish Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut used the expression “our citizens” in relation to the residents of Nakhijevan 14 . The initial euphoria after the collapse of the USSR, the periodic visits and meetings of the leaders of the Turkic-speaking countries and communities, and the apparent success of Turkish diplomacy created the illusion that "the 21st century will be the century of the Turks" and soon it will be possible to talk about the "emergence of the Turkic world from the Adriatic to the Great China walls" 15 . The pan-Turkic rhetoric of Turkish politicians exactly repeated the one that was in service with the Young Turk leaders at the beginning of the 20th century. The more obvious the inevitability of the collapse of the Soviet Union became, the more frankly pan-Turkist statements came from Ankara. Back in the spring of 1991, Turgut Ozal was the first of the Turkish presidents to visit Baku, and on November 9, 1991. Turkey was the first to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan, after which serious important steps to establish bilateral, political, economic, cultural, and military ties. These changes gave a powerful impetus to the strengthening of nationalist sentiments within Turkish society 16 . Pan-Turkic ideas and programs were again revived, and the Karabakh issue in this context was seen as an obstacle to their implementation. According to Russian researcher VN Nadein-Raevsky, pan-Turkic ideas received new impetus during the Karabakh conflict and the collapse of the Soviet Union 17 . This was especially clearly manifested in Turkey's initial position towards Armenia in general and towards the Karabakh issue in particular. The Turkish rulers, taking into account the experience of the unpunished invasion of Cyprus in 1974, attempted to repeat the Cypriot scenario in the Karabakh conflict zone, mainly taking advantage of the temporary weakening of Russia and the short-sighted and compliant policy of Moscow towards the former Soviet outskirts. History reveals clear parallels between current events and Turkish policy towards Karabakh in the early 20th century. Once again, Armenia and Karabakh stood in the way of Turkey's pan-Turkic aspirations, obscuring Turkish expansion into the Caucasus and beyond. The monstrous plan of genocide developed by the Young Turks resulted in the loss of the historical homeland and the total destruction of the centuries-old Christian culture for the vast majority of Armenians. As a result of this policy in the period from 1915 to 1923. about two million

Armenians were exterminated, maimed and deported. The geography of Turkish atrocities included the territory from Istanbul to Baku, from Georgia to the Syrian deserts. One of the bloody pages of the Armenian Golgotha at the beginning of the 20th century was the Turkish occupation of the Armenian-settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh. Impunity for the crimes committed against national minorities and, first of all, against the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, pushed Republican Turkey to commit new genocidal acts up to the present day. Under the guise of republicanism and democracy, the rights of religious and national minorities are severely violated, and there are still huge gaps in the issue of observance of basic human rights in Turkey. At the same time, the geopolitical ambitions of modern Turkey extend to a fairly wide area of Eurasia, including territories from the Balkans to Yakutia, Crimea, the Caucasus, the Chinese province of Xinjiang, Mongolia, Central Asia, as well as Northern Iraq and Cyprus. Thus, the doctrine of pan-Turkism is a system of concepts and political views on the essence and goals of Turkey's domestic and foreign policy and is aimed at strengthening the political foundations, territorial integrity, economy and armed forces of the state, ensuring mono-ethnicity and monoculturalism within the country, as well as the spread of Turkish influence on Turkic speaking areas of Eurasia 18 . The main goal of the pan-Turkic doctrine at the present stage is to secure the status of a regional power for Turkey, to guarantee the acquisition of new energy resources for the future development of the country, as well as the weakening of Russian influence in the regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia. With the change in the geopolitical and geo-economic landscape at the turn of the millennium, the Caucasus acquired great geopolitical significance for the implementation of Turkey's pan-Turkist plans, turning into one of the priority regions for foreign policy and intelligence aspirations and a field of subversive activity for Turkish special services and pan-Turkist organizations 19 . Azerbaijan was assigned the role of a conductor of Turkey's pan-Turkist aspirations in the Caucasus, since this country, within its current borders, is largely the result of Turkish expansionist plans to seize the Caucasus, while Azerbaijan was considered by Turkey as an intermediate entity in the process of further annexation of the entire Caucasus. In this sense, in the context of the expansionist aspirations and military programs of Turkey, Azerbaijan has historically been viewed as a "stronghold" for the unification of all the Turks of the Caucasus and even Central Asia with the Ottoman Empire 20 . After the formation of the Turkish Republic, the ideas of a pan-Turkic alliance with the Caucasian Turks did not disappear at all and only for a time "were politically sacrificed on the sacrificial table of the Soviet Turkish friendship" 21 . In the context of the Soviet-Turkish Entente, the Kemalists cherished hopes that Azerbaijan would join Turkey, naturally at the expense of Armenia. Back in May 1926. The eastern department of counterintelligence of the OGPU of the

USSR uncovered a conspiracy of the Musavatists, who intended to seize power in Azerbaijan with the help of Turkish troops, but this attempt was failed 22 . The existence of an independent Armenian state was unacceptable to the Kemalists, and in this sense, in the Armenian issue, the new political forces in Turkey did not deviate from the path paved by the sultans and the Young Turks. Turkish plans to eliminate Armenia on the way to unification with Azerbaijan at a certain point corresponded to the geopolitical calculations of the Bolshevik leaders. Most researchers studying the phenomenon of Pan-Turkism and the issues of the origin of the Kemalist movement have a certain consensus in assessing the actions of Kemal Ataturk and the Kemalists in relation to Pan-Turkism and the idea of joining the "Outer Turks" to Turkey. The main postulate is the assertion that Kemal Atatürk completely abandoned pan-Turkist plans. At the same time, this point of view needs a specific revision and reassessment, since pan-Turkic aspirations and plans have by no means disappeared over the entire period of the existence of the Turkish Republic. Rather, on the contrary: periodically being in a latent state, the forces and movements that come out with pan-Turkic ideas, again acquired specific legitimization, Such an opinion was common, in particular, among Soviet researchers of the Kemalist movement, who focus on those statements of Ataturk that criticize pan-Turkist plans and steps that are fraught with undesirable complications for Turkey in Soviet-Turkish relations. In reality, as the American researcher Charles Hostler notes, many political groups within the new Turkey have by no means abandoned the idea of uniting with the Turks living outside the Turkish Republic 23 . Moreover, the period of cooperation with the Soviets from 1919 to 1925. proved to be very fruitful in this regard. Kemalists were unhappy with the Russian-Turkish border 1914 and sought to open a territorial passage to the "Turanian world." According to the same author, one of the postulates for the implementation of such a policy was the destruction of the independent Armenian Republic, which separates Azerbaijan from Turkey 24 . It should be noted that back in the early 1920s, the same Kemalists expressed a desire to see representatives of Azerbaijan in the Turkish parliament 25 . Contrary to the opinions established in the scientific community, Ataturk, if he opposed the pan-Turkist plans, this concerned only foreign policy, and inside the country the doctrine of Turkism was organically connected with the ideology of Pan-Turkism. In addition, the temporary rejection of pan-Turkist plans was due to the desire of the Kemalists not to harm their relations with Bolshevik Russia, from which the Kemalists expected military and political support to overcome geopolitical isolation. In addition, Atatürk was well aware that at this stage the implementation of the pan-Turkist plans of the Young Turks in relation to the Turkic-speaking areas was unrealistic and fraught with negative consequences. Only in relation to Azerbaijan, as the country closest to Turkey from the Turkic area, the Kemalists had a specific plan to join Turkey, or at least secure a territorial corridor with the Eastern Caucasus. It was the latter that caused the transfer of Nakhijevan to Azerbaijan. The Turkish factor became decisive in the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to the jurisdiction of Soviet Azerbaijan.

Regarding Azerbaijan, Atatürk “always saw a deep kinship (kinship) between the Azeri-Turks and believed that the national government should act as a patron of the emerging Azerbaijan Republic” 26 . Without completely abandoning the pan-Turkist views inherited from the Young Turks, Kemal Atatürk also foresaw the possibility of creating a pan-Turkist union in the future. These are his words, spoken in 1933. on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, were widely cited in Turkey in the early 1990s as proof of the pan-Turkic views of the “father of the Turks”: “Today Russia is our friend, our neighbor and ally: we need this friendship. But no one can predict what will happen tomorrow. Like the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary, it can be divided and fragmented. Peoples who hold fast to each other may run away from each other tomorrow. The world can come to a new balance. In this case, Turkey should know its business. Under the rule of this friend, our brothers live, who share a common language and faith with us. We must be ready to call them... We cannot wait for them to reach us. We ourselves must achieve them.” 27. Further “...Being ready does not mean being silent and waiting, it is necessary to prepare. And to prepare means from the very beginning to build spiritual bridges between fraternal peoples... Such bridges are language, faith, history. By creating a new Turkey today, we are creating the foundation for the future Great Turkey” 28 . These are by no means the only words of the founder of the Turkish Republic, in which the pan-Turkist ideal is exalted and the emphasis is placed on Great Turkey 29 . The Turkish authors themselves were not averse to noting that "Ataturkism includes in its entire breadth the ideal of pan-Turkism" 30 . “Ataturk was the largest Turkist and Pan-Turkist. The "national vow" referred only to the years of the struggle for independence. For example, the formulation and successful solution of the Khatai problem made the “National Vow” the property of history” 31 . For obvious reasons, after the Second World War, political relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan were practically absent, except for the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel to Baku in 1967, as part of an official visit to the Soviet Union, during which Demirel "met with an enthusiastic reception resembling a political manifestation" 32 . After the end of the Cold War, one of the main directions of Turkish foreign policy was the development of new initiatives and their activation. These initiatives, as a rule, were aimed at drawing the attention of the international community to the idea of the expediency of applying comprehensive initiatives, the implementation of which proceeded from the interests of Turkey itself 33 . After raising the issue of joining the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region to the Armenian SSR, the Turkish press was not slow to present the problem in the context of pan-Turkic views. Back in the spring of 1988. The Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, pointing to the importance of the Turkic factor in the Karabakh issue, wrote: “... Soviet Armenians, compared to Soviet Azerbaijanis, are more willing to sacrifice themselves in the name of communism. But the Kremlin, analyzing the events that take place between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, takes into account the weight of not only Azerbaijani Turks, but all Turks: and there are fifty million of them

in the USSR. Against this huge mass, the Armenians, despite their value in the calculations of the Kremlin, will not have the importance of the Turks” 34 . If during the Cold War period Turkey was presented as the southern bastion of NATO and skillfully used its strategically important geographical position, then after the end of the confrontation between the two blocs and the subsequent collapse of the USSR, Ankara faced the dilemma of defining a new geopolitical role. Geopolitical upheavals have turned into a change in external and internal threats and a revision of seemingly basic external guidelines. The war in the Persian Gulf and a particularly sharp weakening of the USSR contributed to the fact that Turkey had the opportunity to turn from the southern flank of NATO into a potential regional power and a conductor of Western interests in the post-Soviet regions. In this regard, it is no coincidence that Samuel Huntington, the author of the sensational theory of the "clash of civilizations", pointed out that, being "turned away from Mecca and Brussels", Turkey sought to take advantage of the collapse of the USSR, focusing on the Caucasus and Central Asia and at the same time counteracting the spread of Iranian influence and strengthening the influence of Russia. At the same time, acting as a country opposing the growth to the influence of Russia and the spread of radical Islam, Turkey expected certain concessions on the issue of gaining full membership in the EU 35 . In this regard, S. Huntington unequivocally points out that it is expedient for Turkey to adhere to the historical role with the former identity as an Islamic country, rather than tolerate the humiliating role of a petitioner for full members of the European Union 36 . Turkey acted as a country that stood on the position of a unifier of ethnically kindred states and peoples, and through the neo-Pan-Turkist policy, sought to secure the role of a regional power in the new geopolitical space. Neo-Pan-Turkist doctrine was supposed to reserve for Turkey the role of the state-leader in the region of the Greater Middle East. As noted above, neo-Pan-Turkism did not at all mean a revision of the Kemalist doctrine, but was only a part of this doctrine itself. The new geopolitical imbalance was presented to Turkish leaders as a chance to gain a new geopolitical advantage in the light of the defeat of Iraq and the collapse of the USSR. And it is no coincidence that Turkish President Turgut Ozal said that with the end of the Cold War, "the process of retreat that began from the walls of Vienna has reversed for Turkey" 37 . The West, primarily the US, initially predetermined a new role for Turkey in promoting its influence in the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union, also based on Turkish rhetoric about the cultural and historical homogeneity of the population of these regions with Turkey. The notion of "neo-Ottomanism" or "neopan-Turkism" that entered the scientific literature characterized Turkey's "renewed" interest in Azerbaijan, the Turkic states of Central Asia and other Turkic-speaking areas. Turkey's new geopolitical claims were characterized by excessive ambitions and their obvious inconsistency with real possibilities 38 .

It should also be taken into account that pan-Turkism did not seem to be a phenomenon alien to the Azerbaijani socio-political elite. Moreover, it can be assumed that individual elements of this ideology continued to exist, of course, in a latent form, even in the Soviet years. On this occasion, the Azerbaijani researcher A. Yunusov believes that in the Azerbaijani society of the 20th century the ideas of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were never forgotten and, albeit behind the scenes, always had supporters. At the same time, as the national identity of the Azerbaijanis strengthened, the role of pan-Turkism increased noticeably. According to the author, even the attitude towards Islam in Azerbaijan was largely determined through the prism of pan-Turkism 39 . Even before gaining independence and in the first post-Soviet years, the leaders of Azerbaijan saw Turkey as their main strategic partner, preferring the Turkish model of state structure and development from the very beginning. And the slogan "two states - one nation" has taken a firm place in the political rhetoric of both countries in foreign policy relations . As Prof. Bassam Tibi points out, “neo-Ottomanism,” that is, the resurrection of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, does not necessarily mean the revival of Turkey’s ancient imperial expansionism, since the country lacks the means of any kind to do so. At the same time, such a development may lead to the fact that in the relations between the Turkic peoples a certain organic situation will arise in the field of geopolitics, culture and economics, in which these peoples will “find themselves”. Added to this is an openly promoted self-esteem, according to which the Turks are the "center of the world." This neo-Ottoman self-esteem, marked by megalomania, causes fear and rejection not only in the West, but also among Islamic neighbors, whether they be Arabs or Iranians.41 . Modern Pan-Turkism appears in a new incarnation. If at the beginning of the 20th century the Young Turks, with the help of military aggression, tried under the slogan of pan-Turkism to bring together all the Turkic-speaking peoples and tribes, on under the flag of the Ottoman Empire, then in modern world politics, the pan-Turkic ideology has undergone a significant transformation and is presented as the need to spread the influence of secular and committed to Western democratic values of Turkey in the Turkic-speaking regions and countries through the so-called "Turkish model" of development. The neo-Pan-Turkic doctrine differed from the original one in that it was aimed at creating not a closely related Turkic political union, but a group of Turkic states, within which Turkey would play a leading economic and political role 42 . After the collapse of the USSR, having failed in its desire to create a political union under its rule, Ankara purposefully continues to implement various initiatives in the field of educational and economic cooperation. Tens of thousands of young people from Turkic-speaking countries receive education in Turkish universities or in Turkish educational institutions that are open in almost all Turkic-speaking countries and regions. According to the Turkish side, in the future they will become a reliable support for Turkey in creating a huge Turkic-speaking political union.

At the present stage in foreign, including Russian, historiography, there are tendencies to mitigate or justify neo-Pan-Turkist sentiments and to consider them from the point of view of bilateral mutually beneficial cooperation. This work largely runs counter to these sentiments, since it reveals specific facts of an aggressive policy towards Armenians and Armenia, which are considered by pan-Turkists in Azerbaijan and Turkey as obstacles to the implementation of joint plans. After gaining independence by the two Armenian states, the war unleashed by Azerbaijan against the NKR and the Republic of Armenia brought new trials to the Armenian people. The chronicles of those turbulent years once again prove that even in the conditions of the struggle against historical injustice, the Armenian people are able to prove the right to exist on their historical lands and are ready to defend them from any encroachment. It should be noted that before Armenia gained independence, Turkey, on the way to realizing its geopolitical ambitions and active steps to penetrate into the South Caucasian and Central Asian regions, did not hide her negative attitude against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, seeing them as the main "obstacle" on her way. In the case of Turkish intervention in conflict zones, the classic scheme of involving a third country, outside its own borders, is clearly manifested on the basis of ethnic kinship, geopolitical interests and the expected new balance of power 43 . The monograph mainly touches upon the issues of the Karabakh vector of Turkish foreign policy in the period between 1991-2001, with an emphasis on the period of the active military phase of the Karabakh conflict. Turkey's military-political assistance to Azerbaijan during and after the Karabakh war contained components of political lobbying of Azerbaijani interests in the West and among Muslim countries, the provision of a limited number of weapons (light weapons, mortars, combat vehicles, etc.). The logic and essence of the "Karabakh" vector of Turkish foreign policy was based on the desire to provide a free and safe territorial corridor for pumping Caspian oil through the territory of Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as to provide direct communication for expansion into the Turkic-speaking areas of Central Asia and the Volga region. The position of the Central Asian republics in the Karabakh issue is also analyzed, in particular, during the Turkic summits, specific facts of the manifestation of Turkic solidarity and intra-Turkic disagreements around the Karabakh conflict are revealed. Ankara's mediation initiatives and their real political background are also considered separately. The relevance of the work is also due to modern developments in international relations, which have undergone dramatic changes after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. This event became a milestone not only in terms of the historical development of mankind, but also caused significant rethinking in the minds of the world community. The global battle with the evil of our time - international terrorism makes us simultaneously look for the causes and determining factors of its development. These problems are in the field of study of

historians, journalists, political scientists, diplomats and other specialists dealing with global problems of our time. So far, no attempts have been made in scientific circles to systematize and comprehensively analyze documents and materials related to the recruitment of Chechen, Afghan, Pakistani and other mercenaries by Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war. The above facts are more than obvious in order for the world community and conscientious researchers to have a clear idea of the origins and causes of the emergence of terrorist cells in the Caucasus, as well as the patronage and regulation of their activities by the state structures of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Moreover, the direct patronage of terrorist groups by these countries subsequently turned into a dangerous challenge - both for themselves and for their neighboring states. The struggle of the Karabakh Armenians for self-determination and self-preservation was often viewed as an ordinary and not encouraged by the world community desire for secession, while the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was forced to fight not only with the regular units of the Azerbaijani army, which sought to expel the Armenians from their historical homeland at any cost , but also with an impressive number of foreign mercenaries from different countries involved in the hostilities by the Azerbaijani authorities. Without any exaggeration, the Karabakh war can be considered the first stage in the fight against global terrorist groups, and only the military successes of the Armenians partially prevented their further spread throughout the Caucasus. The aggressive policy of Azerbaijan towards the NKR and the Republic of Armenia, supported by Turkey, did not receive a proper assessment from the world community, becoming a classic example of adherence to double standards in world politics. Characteristically, in the first days of Azerbaijan's independence, US Secretary of State James Baker warned Baku in its desire to build up military power to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue precisely by military means. In particular, he noted: “... The internal arms race between the former Soviet republics poses a serious potential threat to European security. We are already seeing signs that some republican governments - namely Azerbaijan - are arming for war against other republics. Those who pursue this erroneous and anachronistic policy must know that they will receive neither recognition nor support from the West...” 44 . Adopted in October 1992 907th The amendment to the “Freedom Support Act” of the US Congress, unfortunately, also did not deter Azerbaijan from its determination to achieve a military solution to the Karabakh problem. After all, this document clearly stated that Azerbaijan would not be able to count on the provision of assistance from the United States “until the government of Azerbaijan takes demonstrative steps to stop all types of blockades and other aggressive use of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh” 45 . According to Vice Speaker of the House of Lords of Great Britain Caroline Cox, at least for the reasons listed below, it was the Azerbaijani side that was the true aggressor in the Karabakh war:

1. For the first time, Azerbaijan undertook a systematic and unilateral deportation of the Armenian population with the help of Soviet troops from the Armenian-populated villages of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent regions during the joint operation "Ring". 2. In November 1991 Azerbaijan annulled the autonomous status of the NKAO, thereby expressing its uncompromising position in resolving the Karabakh issue. 3. It was Azerbaijan that was the first to use Grad rocket launchers against the civilian population, which are prohibited by international conventions. 4. Only the Azerbaijani side carried out aerial bombardments of civilian targets, deliberately designed to kill women and children first of all. 5. Only the Azerbaijani Armed Forces used surface-to-air missiles designed to destroy the civilian population. 6. Azerbaijan, together with Turkey, undertook and continues to blockade Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh 46 . At the turn of the millennium, Turkish officials still hope for a geopolitical revenge on Russia and do not hide their threats against neighboring states. "Russia is too weak to oppose us," - such a statement on the creation of a commonwealth of Turkic states was made by the Turkish Minister for Relations with the Turkic-Speaking Republics of the former USSR Abdulhaluk Chay in 2000 year, adding that the Republic of Turkey - "the successor of the Great Ottoman Empire" - can and should create an allied association with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, even if the price for this will be a sharp increase in the Turkish-Russian confrontation" 47 . After a short time, the words of the Turkish minister were repeated by Vafa Guluzade, a former state adviser to H. Aliyev, in an interview with Turkish television channels, proposing Azerbaijan's entry into Turkey. “By uniting, we, like the entire people of Turkey, will automatically become a NATO member, a candidate for the European Union, Article 907 will lose its meaning, and the occupation of Karabakh will become a matter of Turkey's territorial integrity,” Guluzade motivated his proposal 48 . At the same time, the problems of exploitation and transportation of the Caspian energy resources are a source of contradictions on a wider international scale, because they directly concern the national interests of regional (Russia, Turkey, Iran) and extra-regional powers (USA, European Union) 49 . Today, Turkey is purposefully establishing relations at the level of power structures (army, special services) with the special services of the Turkic-speaking republics of the CIS, and first of all, Azerbaijan, thus hoping, in the future, to provide loyal and pro-Turkish military-political elites on the ground. The Turkish side is speeding up the development and signing of relevant protocols on cooperation, which without fail provide for the exchange of intelligence information

on the so-called "common goals". The Turks include access to the state secrets of Russia and its CIS allies, in particular Armenia 50 , as such . This work is only a part of the general idea, representing the little-studied elements of the Neo-Pan-Turkism doctrine. Separate topics of its study will be the issues of cultural and educational pan-Turkism, the role of national minorities in the context of neo-pan-Turkist foreign policy, as well as the political and economic components of this doctrine. Turkey's political rhetoric increasingly emphasizes the country's growing energy needs in the future and the importance of operating the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Behind it worthwhile is the desire of Turkish politicians not only to provide the country with energy resources, but also to significantly strengthen its political influence in the region51. After the commissioning of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Ankara set its sights on building the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway line - bypassing Armenia and contrary to the existing Kars-Gyumri branch. It is in these initiatives that Ankara sees the future goal of strengthening its geopolitical weight in the Caucasus region, which is to establish a strategic partnership with Georgia and Azerbaijan and further attempts to isolate and marginalize the role of Armenia.

CHAPTER ONE NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND PAN-TURKIST AMBITIONS IN THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The ideology of pan-Turkism and the plan for the complete and widespread extermination of Armenians under the veil of the First World War were closely intertwined in the plans of Turkish leaders. It was in this vein that the Young Turk strategists saw the primary task of implementing the expansionist plan to seize the Turkic-speaking areas and eliminate the “Armenian wedge” along the way. For the leaders of the Ottoman Empire, the plan for the widespread destruction of the Armenian ethnos meant, first of all, the final solution of the Armenian issue, which was called by the Minister of Finance of Kaiser Germany M. Erzberger "one of the blackest pages in the debt book of Europe" 1 . It should be noted that the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire was planned by the Young Turks long before the outbreak of the First World War, and among other tasks, the goal was to establish a direct connection between the Ottoman Turks and the Turkic-speaking population of the Russian Empire and Persia. The first stage of this plan provided for the destruction of the Armenian population on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The next step was to exterminate the Armenians from the territories of Eastern Armenia, in particular, Nakhijevan and Nagorno-Karabakh, and establish direct communication with the Caucasian Turks. The purposeful policy of genocide was once condemned by many countries and the world community. “We are forced to admit,” says one of the resolutions of the American Congress in 1919. — that the Turkish government deliberately seeks to destroy the Armenian people...” 2 . Thus, the liquidation of the Armenians was the central task of the Young Turk policy 3 . The idea of eradicating the Armenian element as the primary task of pan-Turkism was defined by Dr. Nazim, one of the leaders of the Young Turks, “justifying” the actions of Turkish ideologists as follows: “... The Armenian people must be destroyed at the root, so that not a single Armenian remains on our land and this very name is forgotten. Now there is a war going on, there will be no such opportunity again. The intervention of the great powers and the noisy protests of the world press will go unnoticed, and if they find out, they will be presented with a fait accompli, and thus the question will be settled. This time, our actions must take on the character of the total extermination of the Armenians; it is necessary to destroy every single one...” 4 . The Armenian Genocide was condemned by the leaders and figures of civilized countries, although their share of guilt in condoning the commission of this crime against humanity is more than obvious. Speaking about the extermination of the Armenians, Lloyd George, in particular, wrote: “In Armenia, Abdul-Hamid and the Young Turks deliberately simplified all the difficulties, exterminating and driving out the people, which they considered the people of traitors and

infidels. In this wild reprisal, they really succeeded. Like death swept through the plains of Armenia. Survivors could be found only in the inaccessible mountains, here hunted fugitives found a harsh and unreliable refuge from Turkish barbarism. The well-known English historian Arnold Toynbee considered the main reason for the Turkish policy of deportation and extermination of Armenians and Aisors (Assyrians) to be Turkey's desire to ensure communication between Russian Azerbaijan, Persia and the Muslims of the East by ensuring a homogeneous Turkish population in this area with the parallel destruction of the non-national and non-confessional elements. 6 . Turkish penetration into the southern Turkic-speaking areas of the former Russian Empire took place permanently, and partly Turkic-populated areas on the territory of Nagorno and Plain Karabakh were chosen as the main strongholds for substantiating Turkish agents. It should be noted that back in 1905-1906 during the so-called Armenian-Tatar clashes in the Transcaucasian region, the Turkic-Tatar nationalists received significant assistance in the form of weapons from the Ottoman Empire. 7. Young Turkish organizations have established secret ties with Caucasian Muslim organizations. In this sense, Behaeddin Shakir's secret letter, written in March 1906, is very significant. from Paris and entitled "Caucasian Islamic Brothers". In particular, it says: “We have received your letter, which we read at a meeting of our organization. We unanimously welcome your creation of scientific and political communities in all parts of the Caucasus in the name of protecting Islamic and national rights, the use of Ottoman Turkish in schools and in publishing, as well as your intention to send representatives to Europe to strengthen relations with us. The seventh paragraph of this letter stated the following. “Armenians are our enemies and the main obstacle to your liberation from the Russian yoke. Develop a specific program to weaken them"8 . It is characteristic that this letter was written during the period of violent Armenian-Tatar clashes, when in all corners of the Caucasus raging bands of Azerbaijani Turks, in search of profit and with the connivance and sometimes instigation of the tsarist authorities, attacked the Armenian quarters in the cities of Baku, Shushi, Elizavetpol, Nakhichevan. , Tiflis, etc., as a result of which hundreds of Armenian villages suffered. At the same time, attempts by the Young Turk organizations to create their branches among the Muslim population of Russia and spread Young Turk literature in the Transcaucasus became more frequent. Karabakh and its capital, the city of Shushi, were chosen as the center of the Young Turk. Since that moment, the Armenians of Karabakh have become the main target of the future Azerbaijani-Turkish military-political cooperation. The plans for the capture and subsequent Turkization of Karabakh implied the implementation of a specific stage of pan-Turkic aspirations in the Caucasus and the exclusion of the possibility of forming a single Armenian state. Subsequently, the new state formation of the Caucasian Turks called Azerbaijan became the conductor of aggressive Turkish plans in the territory of the South Caucasus. For the annexation of the Armenian-populated regions of Karabakh, Nakhichevan, Zangezur, Azerbaijan made a

bet on the help of the Turkish military forces. The history of the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance around the Karabakh issue was completely repeated at the end of the 20th century. The emergence and strengthening of pan-Turkic sentiments among the Azerbaijani Turks of the Russian Empire aroused anti-Armenian sentiments not only for the reason that pan-Turkism is a racist ideology by its nature, but also because Armenia itself was seen as a geographical barrier dividing the unity of the Turkic world 10 . Before the war, a secret military-political agreement was concluded between the Musavatists and the Young Turks. In 1913 In the city of Bayazet on the border with Russia, a secret meeting was held with the participation of delegates from the Ottoman Empire and Azerbaijani Turks, at which a decision was made to direct all efforts to unite the Western and Eastern Turks, as well as to coordinate subversive activities on the territory of the Russian Empire with Turkish intelligence and political institutions 11 . With the outbreak of the First World War, the Young Turks came to grips with the implementation of pan-Turkist plans. October 31, 1914 The Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire, Enver Pasha, ordered the commander of the 3rd Turkish Army, Izzet Pasha, to launch an offensive operation in the direction of the Caucasus to capture Karabakh, Baku and Dagestan with four cavalry divisions. In order to destroy Russia's military supply system and foment uprisings of Muslims in its rear, he demanded that the troops "leave no stone unturned, destroy railways and bridges, burn stations, and raise the population of the entire Caucasus to their feet 12 . The plans of the Turkish conquerors included the complete annexation of the Caucasus with access to the banks of the Volga, and subsequently the “liberation of Turan”, that is, penetration into Central Asia. As the well-known researcher of Turkish conquests in the Caucasus Firuz Kazemzade writes, “the greed of the conquerors knew no bounds. Intoxicated with success and aware of the defenselessness of their victims, the Turks did not stop at anything to seize as many territories as they could" 13 . As a result of Turkish propaganda and sympathy for the relatives of Anatolia, Azerbaijani youth actively began to join the ranks of the Ottoman armies to fight against Russian troops in the Caucasian theater of operations. With the offensive of the Turkish troops in the area of Kars and Ardagan, the Caucasian Muslim Turks collaborated with the Turks in the rear of the Russian armies, carrying out sabotage operations - blowing up bridges, setting fire to railway stations, destroying communications and transport, etc. 14 . At the end of 1914 Turkish troops led by Minister of War Enver Pasha made a campaign towards Persian Azerbaijan and in January captured the almost defenseless Tabriz. The next goal of the Turkish troops was an attack to the north, towards the Caucasus, in the hope of capturing the Turkic-populated regions of eastern Transcaucasia. In this regard, one of the well-known Young Turks, Omer Naji, was appointed inspector of the Unity and Progress Party for Azerbaijan and the Eastern Caucasus. His appointment foreshadowed the intention of the Ottoman rulers to unite the territories north and south of the Araks, with the subsequent establishment of Turkish control over them 15.

According to the plan of the ideologists of Pan-Turkism and the leaders of the Young Turks, in particular, Minister of War Enver Pasha, the Caucasian front was to play a major role on the path to the realization of the ideal of Pan-Turkism. “The Caucasus is the path to Turan”, “Turan is in the Turkish heart”, and “Azerbaijan must become a fortress, part of the main great motherland, the great and strong Turan” 16 . And it is no coincidence that during the First World War, out of 45 Turkish divisions, 10 were on the Caucasian front 17. According to the ideologists and supporters of pan-Turkism, the main goal of the eastern campaign of the Turkish army was to create a powerful empire "from the shores of the Adriatic to the borders of China", the basis of which was to be the linguistic, religious and national unity of the peoples inhabiting this vast territory . The main goal of the Ottoman military-political elite was not only in the conquest of specific territories and their exclusion from the zone of Russian influence, but also in the creation of controlled state formations in the territory of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia 19 . In February 1915, Aslan Khan Khoysky, a representative of the Transcaucasian Turks, secretly made his way to Enver's headquarters in Erzurum to discuss the possibility of state formation with the inclusion of the territories of Baku, Elizavetpol, Erivan provinces, as well as Dagestan and Terek - with the consent of Turkish military circles 20 . However, after the failure of the Sarykamysh operation and the subsequent massive advance of the Russian army deep into the Ottoman Empire, the pan-Turkist plans of the Young Turks faded for a while, and their main task was to save the collapsed empire. Soon, however, an unexpected geopolitical opportunity arose for the Turkish side to make up for losses and future gains as a result of the October coup in Petrograd in 1917. After the Bolsheviks seized power, Russian troops began to hastily retreat on all fronts, including the Caucasian one, thus leaving the defense of these territories to the share of small Armenian and Georgian formations, which simply could not stand against the regular and numerous Turkish troops. Although there were no regular Azerbaijani formations at that time, the leaders of the Caucasian Turks unequivocally spoke out against any resistance to their fellow Turks, since "they stood closer to the enemy than to the state of which they were a part" 21 . Later, the Turkish military themselves admitted that during the offensive, the Muslim population of Azerbaijan “began to openly show sincere feelings for the Turks” and left the Transcaucasian Seim22 . Moreover, according to them, by the beginning of the invasion of Transcaucasia, the Turkish military intended to compensate for losses in manpower by recruiting recruits among the Muslim population of Azerbaijan 23 . To organize secret work among the Caucasian Turks and Turkestan peoples, on the initiative of the Young Turks, a special Caucasian department was created, headed by Hasan Rusheni, who, in March 1918 moved to Baku on a secret mission, where he created a network of agents and established contacts with the pro-Turkish elements of the eastern and northern Caucasus and Turkestan 24 . In February 1918 The Transcaucasian Seim was proclaimed, designed to separate the region from Russia in the form of a buffer territorial entity. By the time negotiations began between

representatives of Germany and the Bolsheviks in Brest-Litovsk in early 1918. the Turks violated the truce concluded in Yerznka in December 1917, and went on the offensive along the entire front in order to capture the Caucasus, and first of all, Baku with its rich oil fields. Sowing death and ruin on the way, the Turkish troops met the stubborn resistance of the Armenian troops at Sardarapat, Karaklis and Bash-Aparan, but did not move away from the main Baku direction.

KARABAKH AND TURKISH AZERBAIJAN With the approach of Turkish troops to the borders of the Caucasus, cooperation with the Caucasian Turks began to take a special place in the plans of the Turkish military and politicians to facilitate the movement of Turkish troops in the Caucasus, as well as replenish the thinning ranks of the Turkish army. In early 1918, even before the collapse of the Transcaucasian Seim, representatives of the Azerbaijani Turks made another attempt to negotiate with the Turks on the future political status of the southeastern Caucasus, sending a secret delegation to Istanbul to negotiate with the Young Turks in order to obtain assistance in proclaiming a “second Turkish state”. At a meeting with the leaders of the Young Turks, both sides agreed on further plans for cooperation, in particular, on the assistance of the Turkish military in creating the armed forces of the future Azerbaijan, their financing, assistance to Turkish troops from the local Turkic population, etc. 25. Among the Caucasian Turks at that time there were strong tendencies to join Ottoman Turkey, however, due to its geopolitical interests, Turkey did not want to come up with open plans of conquest in relation to the southwestern Caucasus, having also encountered the opposition of its main ally - Germany. This is eloquently evidenced by the letter of the Musavat delegation at the Batum conference in the spring of 1918. Turkish Minister of War Enver Pasha, who said “Despite our request for the complete annexation of the Muslim part of Transcaucasia to Turkey, we were reasonably explained that Turkey’s big policy requires that we be independent and strong for the time being ... We accepted these instructions, consciously agreeing with them” 26 . According to French military intelligence, "the Turks pushed the Muslims of the Caucasus to declare independence, establish a Turkish protectorate, expel the Russians from the region, turn it into an integral part of the Ottoman Empire ..." 27 . With the collapse of the Transcaucasian Seim at the end of May 1918. independent states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were proclaimed, which immediately presented territorial claims to each other, referring mainly to the administrative-territorial structure of the former Russian Empire. Azerbaijan laid claim not only to those regions where the Muslim population constituted an insignificant majority, but also to regions inhabited exclusively by Armenians 28 . Among these areas, Karabakh was of particular importance, since it occupied a strategic position in the region and, depending on who controlled it, “Nagorno-Karabakh could become either a corridor or a barrier in communication between Azerbaijan and Anatolia 29 . On June 4, 1918, during the peace talks in Batumi with the participation of Turkish, Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijani representatives, agreements were signed between the Ottoman Empire and the newly formed Azerbaijan in the field of political, economic and military

cooperation. According to these documents, the parties agreed that, if necessary, Turkey would assist the government of Azerbaijan with armed forces and troops "to maintain order and ensure security" 30 . The paramount importance of the military assistance promised by Turkey to Azerbaijan, according to T. Sventochovsky, consisted in solving two main problems. This meant that in the event of the outbreak of hostilities with Armenia for the annexation of Karabakh, Nakhichevan and Zangezur, Azerbaijan could count on military assistance from the Ottoman Empire. Vehib Pasha, the head of the Turkish delegation at the talks in Batumi, addressing the Armenian delegation, said the following on this occasion: “You see that fate is driving Turkey from the West to the East. We have left the Balkans, we are also leaving Africa, but we must spread to the East - there is our blood, our life and our language. This is natural gravity, our brothers are in Baku, Dagestan, Turkestan and Azerbaijan. We need a road to get there, and you Armenians are standing in our way. By demanding Van, you block the road to Persia for us; demanding Nakhichevan and Zangezur, you become an obstacle on our way to the Kura valley and Baku. Kars and Akhaltsykh block our way to Kazakh and Ganja. You must step back and make way for us. That's what we're arguing about..."32 . Against the background of the above, the words of the commander of the group of troops of the Ottoman army that invaded the Transcaucasus, General Khalil Pasha, who, while in Yerevan in the summer of 1918, declared: “I tried to destroy the Armenian nation to the last man” 33 . In turn, one of the prominent leaders of the Young Turks Behaeddin Shakir, addressing the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Al. Khatisyanu, stated that “Armenians stand in the way of the implementation of our pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic sacred ideals, and we will inevitably collide with them. It is beyond our feelings and moods. We are compelled to spontaneously destroy everything that can become an obstacle in our path” 34 . The efforts of the Turkish troops in the northeastern direction amounted to attempts to establish contact with the Azerbaijani gangs and thus completely encircle the Armenian Republic 35 . After the total annihilation of the Armenian population in the territory of Western Armenia, the Turkish troops proceeded to the total extermination of Armenians now in the territories of Eastern Armenia, including Karabakh. The capture of Karabakh by Turkish troops completely opened the way to the rich oil fields of Baku, where at that time Soviet power already existed in the person of the Baku commune under the leadership of Stepan Shaumyan. Thus, by concluding a peace treaty with Armenia in Batumi, the Turks only sought to buy time to capture Baku and Karabakh. In May 1918, having failed in Sardarapat, the Turkish troops moved towards Baku in the direction of Karaklis-Kazakh, and separate army formations, numbering several thousand people, stopped at the gates of Karabakh, destroying and devastating Armenian villages on their way. In a letter sent in July 1918. German General von Kress to the German Chancellor from Tiflis, said: “At present, Turkey wants to launch an offensive from Azerbaijan to Karabakh populated by Armenians, to ruin the population there under the pretext that the Armenians there are aggressively disposed against Muslims. Turkish policy is clear. The Turks have an intention

to destroy the Armenians. Armenians are persecuted wherever possible, they are provoked and given pretexts for new attacks. If this fails, then they are forced to starve and beg ... "36 . To conduct military operations in the Caucasian theater of war, the Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire, Enver Pasha, transferred leadership of the Turkish troops in the Caucasus to two of his relatives. They were Khalil Pasha and Nuri Pasha. The Turkish troops sent to Ganja were to serve as the core of a special Caucasian-Islamic army, into which the Muslims of the Caucasus were supposed to be mobilized. In Mosul, the headquarters of this army was established, headed by Nuri Pasha. On May 25, this headquarters with a large number of Turkish officers left through Tabriz to Ganja 37 . Nuri Pasha became the commander of the "Caucasian Islamic Army", and Enver Pasha authorized Vehib Pasha to organize military assistance to Azerbaijan. In his telegram to the representative of the Supreme Military Command, Vehib Pasha indicated that the Fifth Caucasian Division under the command of Colonel Mursel Bey had been sent and, if necessary, space will be replenished. In general, in the Fifth Caucasian Division of the Turkish Army, there were 257 officers and 5575 soldiers to strengthen the Caucasian Islamic Army. Together with the Fifteenth Division, the number of Turkish armed forces on the outskirts of Baku and Karabakh amounted to 11,564 soldiers and 448 officers. In parallel with this, Turkish officers began to organize the Azerbaijani armed forces, allocating several million Turkish liras for the educational needs of future officers of the Azerbaijani army 38 . As noted, one of the links in the implementation of pan-Turkic aspirations and the plan for the destruction of Armenians was the targeted extermination of the Armenian population by Turkish-Azerbaijani troops in Karabakh to ensure a Muslim and Turkic-speaking corridor I between Turkey and the newly formed Azerbaijan. As the Kavkazskoye Slovo newspaper wrote in those days, the Musavatist government intended to “disarm the Armenian population of Karabakh and Azerbaijan with the help of Turkish soldiers, arm the Muslims, exterminate the Armenians in their ancestral land, putting the Constantinople Conference in the face of a fait accompli” 39 . The destruction of the Armenian element took place through military annexation and the annexation of the Armenian-populated regions of Transcaucasia to the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) proclaimed under the Turkish protectorate, which became an artificial state formation, fully relying on the help of the Turkish military 40 . In unison with the Musavatists, Turkish politicians and military advocated the annexation of the Armenian region in favor of the ADR. The Young Turks, represented by one of their leaders, Talaat Pasha, motivated the “belonging” of Karabakh to Azerbaijan by the fact that “local Turks use pastures, and therefore it is impossible to give this country to Armenia” 41 . It should be noted that the unceremonious intervention of the Turkish military in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan created a certain discomfort among the local Turkic elites, who, moreover, could not influence the events in the country in any way and acted only as puppets. For example, in his confidential letter to Nuri Pasha, Prime Minister F. Kh. Khoysky noted that “the

ever-increasing cases of interference by the military officials of the Ottoman army in the affairs of the internal administration of Azerbaijan and even the complete disregard of the Azerbaijani authorities violate the principles of autocracy and thereby undermine the authority of the authorities, create anarchy in all spheres of the state and public life of the country” 42 . “The Azerbaijani government is an instrument in the hands of the Turks,” the head of the Austro-Hungarian mission in the Caucasus, von Frankenstein, reported from Tiflis to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary Stefan Burian on August 4, 1918. 43 And according to the remark of one of the German officers, “Nuri was hiding behind the government of Azerbaijan, and the latter behind him” 44 . Thus, the Young Turks secured for Azerbaijan the role of a conductor of their expansionist-pan-Turkist programs and considered this republic as a springboard for penetration into the Turkic-speaking regions of the North Caucasus, the Volga region and Central Asia. According to Professor Tadeusz Swietochowski, the Ottoman military authorities viewed Azerbaijan as a territory destined to eventually become part of Turkey. It is for this reason that after signing the treaty of friendship with the Ottoman government, the latter, guaranteeing assistance to the self-proclaimed republic, at the same time did not intend to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. Such a position proceeded from the idea that Azerbaijan was soon destined to become part of the Ottoman Empire 45 . The vatists, who were originally supporters of pan-Turkic ideas and champions of the Turkish military advance into the depths of the Caucasus, soon after the repressive actions of the "Turkish brothers" as an alternative to pan-Turkism began to gradually lean towards Azerbaijani nationalism 46 . The desire of the Young Turks to annex Azerbaijan is also confirmed by the reports sent from the Transcaucasus to Berlin and Vienna by the German and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic and military services. In particular, they said that “the Turks frankly desire the accession of the North Caucasus, including Dagestan, to the East Caucasian Muslim Republic, which is called here Azerbaijan” (July 15, 1918) 47 . After entering Elizavetpol (Armenian Gandzak, Turkic Ganja) and proclaiming the ADR, Turkish troops led by Nuri Pasha began to advance towards Baku. Separate Turkish units launched an offensive in the direction of Karabakh, planning to quickly occupy the capital of the region, the city of Shushi. In parallel with the offensive of the Turks, the Musavatists kindled chauvinistic sentiments among the Muslim population, and not only against the Armenian population. Rampant chauvinism led to the fact that several tens of thousands of Russian settlers, fleeing the pogroms organized by the Musavatists, fled to Russia 48 . In the course of the implementation of openly predatory plans in relation to the Armenian regions of Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan relied entirely on the Turkish military force. As the regional press of that time reported, having met opposition from the

Karabakh people to the plans of the Azerbaijani government, Baku was going to occupy Karabakh “with the help of Turkish bayonets and appoint its officials there” 49 . August 10, 1918 the head of the German mission in the Caucasus, Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein, informed the diplomatic representative of Armenia in Georgia that, according to the information received from the Turkish commander-in-chief, “Turkish military commandants have been appointed in some places of Karabakh” 50. He also reported from Tiflis to Berlin to Reich Chancellor Hermann von Gertling that “the Turks want penetrate from Azerbaijan into the purely Armenian province of Karabakh and disarm its population” 51 . After entering Baku in mid-September, Turkish troops, together with irregular units of the Caucasian Turks, subjected the city to mass looting and extermination of the Armenian population. According to the results of the investigation, the total number of only killed Armenians approached ten thousand. In September 1918, immediately after the capture of Baku, to suppress the resistance of the Armenians of Karabakh and capture the region with its subsequent inclusion in the newly formed Azerbaijan Republic, the First Azerbaijani Division (Caucasian Muslim) was formed from Turkish units under the leadership of Colonel Jamil Javid Bey 52 . According to Turkish sources, the transfer of troops to Karabakh began on September 23, 1918. immediately after the capture of Baku and ended on the 27th. The goals of the troops sent to Karabakh were "punitive" and "carried out by troops up to a division" 53 . Invading the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish soldiers sowed violence and robbery on their way and, using tried and tested methods, set about disarming the Armenian population and arresting prominent Armenian figures in the region. After approaching the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh, Nuri Pasha ordered Colonel Jamil Jahid Bey to begin an operation to capture the center of the edge of the city of Shushi. Jahid Bey, whose troops were stationed in Aghdam at that time, demanded from the Armenian population unconditional recognition of the power of Azerbaijan, the opening of the road to Shushi and disarmament 54 . Otherwise, the Turkish commander threatened to completely destroy those villages that would not submit to the Azerbaijani-Turkish forces. On September 26, J. Jahid Bey, at the head of the Galipoli division, numbering about 6,000 soldiers, 9 field guns, 66 machine guns and three armored cars, entered the city of Shushi 55 . Although Ahmet Izzet Pasha, who by this time constituted the new government in Turkey, ordered the Caucasian Islamic Army to suspend the Karabakh campaign on 23 October 1918, however, the military campaign of the Turkish troops against Karabakh, which began in September, ended on November 8 with the transfer of command of the troops to the Azerbaijani general Yusufov 56 . The Armenian government tried in every possible way to stop the intrusion of Turkish formations into the region. German General von Kress at the time was asking the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia: “Do you think your government can watch the massacre

in Karabakh with indifference?” (report of the diplomatic representative of Armenia in Georgia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia dated September 28, 1918) 57 . The fall of Shushi did not demoralize the Armenian population of Karabakh. It continued to resist the penetration of the Turks into the interior of the region. In a stubborn battle near the village of Msmna, the Armenian detachments defeated the Turks, forced them to retreat, and thus prevented the Turks from completely occupying Karabakh 58 . It is curious to note that the events in Karabakh forced Nuri Pasha to publish a special “appeal to the Armenians of Azerbaijan”, in which he demanded that they stop fighting and at the same time complained that detachments of armed Armenians were waging a partisan war on the border of the Kazakh district with passing echelons Turkish troops 59 . To suppress the resistance of the Armenian population of Karabakh, the Turkish command forcibly mobilized local Muslim residents into their military units, which caused indignation among the Muslims of Azerbaijan 60 . At the initiative of the Turkish military, the local Muslim population, under pain of punishment, stopped all trade and economic relations with the local Armenians. After the military occupation of Plain and Nagorno-Karabakh by Turkish troops, Azerbaijan began to assert its "indisputable" rights to the Armenian region. Initially, Turkey and Azerbaijan ensured that the Karabakh issue turned into a problem of a "disputed" territory. The Turkish occupation of Karabakh and subsequent repressions against the Armenian population clearly showed that Azerbaijan and Turkey were not at all going to wait for the decisions of any "peace" conference. Military occupation, mobilization of the local Muslim population against the Armenians and the total and widespread destruction of the latter, the devastation of villages and the blockade brought the region to the brink of starvation. All this was a well-thought-out policy aimed at the physical destruction of the Armenian population of Karabakh and the solution of the issue before the peace conference 61 . One way or another, the Turkish-Azerbaijani occupation troops in Karabakh did not achieve the main goal - the complete occupation and pacification of the Armenian population of the region. At the same time, full power, or rather, the possibility of carrying out terror and violence in the region, was in the hands of the Turkish military. This is also confirmed by a telegram from Shusha district chief Abish Kalabekov to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ADR about the arbitrariness of the Turkish commandant in the city of Shushi. In particular, he pointed out that “the Turkish commandant of Shushi has taken all the power into his own hands, he does not recognize anyone ... He is powerless to do anything ...” 62 . The Musavatist government, headed by Khan-Khoisky, who received the "blessing" of the Turkish Sultan himself, contributed to the further strengthening of the Turks in Transcaucasia 63 . The newspaper "Azerbaijan", reporting on October 20, 1918. about the reception by the Turkish sultan in Hagia Sophia of the Azerbaijani delegation consisting of Rasulzade, Khasmamedov and Safi-Kurdsky, wrote that the sultan assured the delegation that now "Azerbaijan will prosper under the patronage of the sultan" 64 .

However, it soon became clear that there would be no decisive turning point in the war in favor of the Triple Alliance: the Ottoman Empire was defeated and was forced, under the terms of the Entente, to evacuate its troops from the Caucasus. Baku and other settlements throughout the Caucasus were subjected to destruction and massive looting by the departing Turkish troops 65 . Soon the place of the departing Turkish troops was occupied by the British occupation units. Characteristically, the commander of the British troops, General Thomson, initially refused to recognize the Azerbaijani government, which, in his opinion, was created as a result of Ottoman intrigues and could not claim to represent the will of the people 66 . With the departure of the majority of the Turkish troops, the persecution and mass extermination of the Armenian population living in the territories of the former Baku and Elizavetpol provinces continued with renewed vigor. According to a contemporary Muslim, at that time the Azerbaijani government was busy with only two things - "the extermination of Armenians and the formation of Azerbaijani troops" 67 . Forced to evacuate its troops from Baku, the Turkish government still hoped to keep part of its strongholds and military presence there after leaving the Caucasus. After the signing of the Mudros truce, Nuri Pasha at first sought to simply transfer Turkish troops under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan, but the allies opposed this idea 68 . “The Turkish command will spare no funds to organize the fraternal Azerbaijani army, and all the ranks of the Turkish army located in Azerbaijan must be in the service of the Azerbaijani state and will be left as long as they are needed,” said the head of the political department of the Muslim Caucasian Army Javadbey 69. Nuri Pasha himself recommended that his soldiers join the ranks of the Azerbaijani army. Hundreds of Turkish officers took advantage of this opportunity to continue their careers "and became an important element of the Azerbaijani armed forces" 70 . The significance of the Turkish military presence for the ADR was pointed out by one of the Musavatist leaders Mammad Emin Rasulzade, who stated that “the Turkish army left, there are no Azerbaijani units. Because the command that arrived did not recognize the troops that called themselves Azerbaijani units. Actually, the Azerbaijani troops did not represent an organized force...” 71 Thus, the signing of the Armistice of Mudros and the subsequent partial withdrawal of Turkish troops from the territory of Azerbaijan after the defeat of Turkey in World War I did not at all mean the exclusion of the Turkish factor from the socio-political life of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Former Ottoman military personnel, numbering about three thousand soldiers and officers, as well as Turkish teachers in Azerbaijani educational institutions, continued their work in the republic, being the most prominent symbol of Turkish presence and pro-Turkish sympathies in Azerbaijan, which became active again with the beginning of the Kemalist movement 72 . In a letter to Azerbaijani Prime Minister Fatali Khan-Khoisky, Turkish War Minister Izzet expressed hope that after the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Azerbaijan, the Ottoman government "will try to create a Muslim state." The main mission in this matter was intended for

the Musavat army, which was to be created on the model of the Turkish one. “The fraternal Ottoman Empire, which came to defend our country with its illustrious army, with the best commanders at the head, set the first task to help Azerbaijan create its own troops. It gives us everything we need for a strong army: weapons, ammunition, experienced officers, and most importantly, the spirit of national identity that reigns in the entire Turkish army. All we need is manpower to defend our homeland.73 . Turkish officers and soldiers joined the ranks of the Azerbaijani army, and in the political field of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the so-called ilhagists, supporters of unification with Turkey, played an active role. M. Rasulzade, who acknowledged, however, that “during the entire time the Turks were on the territory of Azerbaijan, party life froze” 74 noted that “the Turks came to us as warriors to protect the people. It's right. But among us were our own beks and pashas, who aspired to have Istanbul rule here” 75 . The recently declassified documents of the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff of France contain a document dated January 1920. and analyzing the situation in Transcaucasia in 1918-1920. The reference about Azerbaijan stated that the Azerbaijani Musavatists are striving for “an alliance with Turkey through Karabakh and Zangezur, that is, the annexation of the corridor of the middle reaches of the Araks to Julfa and the Nakhichevan region. This is at the expense of Armenia” 76 Close military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey received a qualitatively new development after the signing of the Azerbaijani-Turkish agreement on November 29, 1919. in the Stambul. On the basis of this agreement, Turkish officers began active training and equipping the Azerbaijani army. Moreover, Turkish and Azerbaijani military specialists began to form army structures in other self-proclaimed and supported by the Turks states, such as the South-Western Caucasian Democratic Republic (SWKDR), created in December 1918, during the withdrawal of the Turks from Transcaucasia. The SWKDR set itself the task of uniting the Muslim population of Kars, Batum, Ardagan, Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki, Sharur, Nakhichevan, Surmalinsky and part of Erivan districts and sought to include these regions in the self-proclaimed republic 77 . In March 1919 in Kars, a parliament (Milli Shu-ro) was convened, which created the government of this republic. Assistance in the formation of the South-Western Caucasian Democratic Republic or Milli Shura, according to the Azerbaijani consul in Batumi, was necessary "in order to strengthen the influence of Azerbaijan" 78 . Within a short time, with the assistance of the Turks and Azerbaijanis, armed detachments of the so-called Kars Republic were formed, the number of which, according to some information, reached 15 thousand people. In the process of formation of the armed forces of other self-proclaimed formations, military specialists from Turkey and Azerbaijan took direct part 79 . As mentioned above, immediately after settling in Ganja in the spring of 1918. The Turkish military leadership has begun to form and equip Azerbaijani military formations. It was decided to form four infantry regiments consisting of two infantry divisions. In June 1918 with the help of Turkish officers in Ganja, the first Military school for ensigns was opened, the first graduation

(100 people) of which took place in October of the same year, and the second school was opened in August of the same year 80 . Graduates of these schools were soon involved in the campaigns of the Azerbaijani army against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent regions. These forces were also headed by Turkish officers who served in the Azerbaijani army. The newspaper "Kavkazskoye Slovo" at that time wrote: "Among the Azerbaijani troops making a campaign against Karabakh, Turkish officers play a huge role" 81 . Given the circumstances, the representative of the Republic of Armenia was forced to make a statement at the Paris Peace Conference, where, in particular, it was said: “The program for the conquest of Karabakh by the government of Azerbaijan is aimed at the implementation of pan-Turkic aspirations, through which they are trying to connect Azerbaijan, through Karabakh and Nakhichevan, with Turkey and Persia, thus creating a compact Muslim array, to tear off Russian Armenia from Turkish Armenia, preventing the creation of a united Armenia” 82 . The Armenian government understood that the Turks would not stop at the annexation of Karabakh and would in every possible way achieve the separation of Nakhichevan and Zangezur from Armenia. However, in the future, the attempts of the Armenian government to send troops to the region to protect the civilian population met with fierce resistance from the British military, who, in turn, proceeding from their own geopolitical interests, tried in every possible way to consolidate power over the region for Azerbaijan. However, despite all attempts to achieve the annexation of the region in favor of Azerbaijan, the Armenian population continued to resist the Azerbaijani-Turkish troops. At the congresses of the National Council, local Armenians repeatedly emphasized their determination to become part of the Republic of Armenia. The resolution of the Fifth Congress of Karabakh Armenians on this occasion stated: “..Azerbaijan has always acted as an accomplice and accomplice in the atrocities committed against Armenians in general and Karabakh Armenians in particular, which attitude remains to this day..We are sure that modern Azerbaijan, following the example of its older brother Turkey, it seeks to destroy the Armenians, as the only cultural element that gravitates not to the East, but to Europe, especially the Karabakh Armenians, who have up to now defended their freedom and have not been subjected to destruction and barbarism” 83 . In addition to openly expansionist plans regarding the Armenian-populated regions of Karabakh, Nakhichevan and Zangezur, Turks and Musavatists also nurtured plans of conquest in relation to the North Caucasian territories. The Azerbaijani authorities saw their mission in the North Caucasus as follows: “in order to unite all the heterogeneous mountain tribes, it is necessary to proclaim a gazavat, deploy the green banner of the prophet, conduct an energetic offensive in the direction of Grozny-Beslan-Prokhladnaya, clearing the entire right-bank part of the Terek region and the strip of Russian population , adjacent to the Vladikavkaz - Cool. The old accounts of the Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians and Kabardians with the invaders of the land of their ancestors will rally them around Nuri Pasha ... The disappearance of the Cossack wedge from the Sunzha and Terek valleys and in general,84

IN THE GRIP OF KEMALISTS AND BOLSHEVIKS The next year after the defeat of Turkey in World War I, a powerful nationalist military movement unfolded in Anatolia, led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, on whose initiative in 1919. two documents of the so-called "National Pledge" are adopted in Erzurum and Syvaz on behalf of the congress of the Society for the Protection of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia. The main purpose of these documents was to prevent the return of the deported Armenians to their historical homeland and the creation of an Armenian state in the future. The third paragraph of the document adopted at the Erzurum Congress read as follows. “Any occupation of territories, just like any kind of interference, must be considered as attempts to create a Greek or Armenian community, what must be resisted and against what a defense must be organized. Christian elements should not be allowed to receive privileges of such a nature as to be detrimental to our sovereignty and social balance.”85 . According to the Turkish historian Taner Akçam, complicity in the crimes of the Ittihadists and the appropriation of the property of the Armenians deported after the proclamation of the second constitution frightened the representatives of this stratum and became the main reason for their rapprochement with the Ankara government. The main reason for the creation of the Societies for the Protection of Rights by representatives of the local nobility and their support for the Kemalist movement, according to a Turkish historian, “was their animal fear of the revenge of the Armenians for the atrocities they committed. In other words, complicity in the Armenian genocide and appropriation of the property of the victims pushed large sections of Turkish society to the War of Liberation. Consequently, the demand to bring to justice the perpetrators of the genocide meant to condemn the War of Liberation itself, to condemn the patriots of Turkey.”86 . Thus, Mustafa Kemal's attitude to the Armenian question can hardly be called otherwise than as a logical continuation of the policy of the Young Turks. Trying in every possible way to prevent the return of Armenian refugees to their homes in Western Armenia, the Kemalists at the same time began a policy of inciting local Muslims in Karabakh and Nakhichevan and adjacent regions in order to de-Armenize these primordially Armenian regions. It was thanks to the agitation of Turkish agents among the Muslims of Sharur-Nakhichevan that unrest began, followed by a massacre in the region of Nakhichevan, when up to ten thousand Armenians died 87 . As noted, Turkey and Azerbaijan have actively begun to create new artificial state formations, thus striving to create a dense Turkic-Muslim ring around Armenia and Georgia. The SWKDR proclaimed on the territory of the Kars region was entrusted with the functions of weakening Armenia with periodic raids of bandit formations in the rear of the Armenian army, as well as strengthening the position of Azerbaijan in the Caucasus region. Another puppet formation was proclaimed on the territory of Nakhijevan - the Republic of Araks, where the Turkish command appointed permanent military adviser Khalil Pasha as a representative to the government of the

"republic". In addition, on this Turkish military contingent was stationed in the territory in the amount of 300 soldiers and 5 officers. Turkish officers participated in the formation of regular units and acted directly at the headquarters of the self-proclaimed republics. 88 . Everywhere Turkish agents agitated the local Muslim population against the Armenians and the Armenian authorities. In the spring of 1919 compiled by the government of the Republic of Armenia. Turkish emissaries say the following about the arming and training of the Muslim population of the regions adjacent to Armenia in military affairs: Thus, through Zangezur and Karabakh with Azerbaijan, Turkish agents surround us with a hostile ring that threatens our very existence” 89 . M. Rasulzade spoke openly about the plans of the Kemalists through the idea of pan-Azerbaijaniism and the creation of Great Azerbaijan on April 8, 1920, noting that “Turkey sets as its task the creation of southwestern Azerbaijan from part of the territory of Erivan, part of the Tiflis province (districts of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki) and the Republic of Azerbaijan after the accession to Azerbaijan of southwestern Azerbaijan, Adzharia, the Muslim population of Terek, Dagestan, Karabakh, Persian Karadag, Tabriz, Marat. In this way, great Azerbaijan must be created under the protectorate of Turkey” 90 . The independent Armenian state was perceived by the Kemalists as the main obstacle on the way of the army of Kemal Pasha towards their Azerbaijani brothers of the same faith, and also as an obstacle to the free flow of Bolshevik aid 91 . The elimination of this "wedge" has become a strategic task for the Turkish troops, and for the Armenian side, the fight against the Turkish-Bolshevik forces has become a matter of existence or complete destruction. Turkish nationalists, according to the British military, sought to "draw fresh strength" from other Islamic countries. Moreover, “Turkish nationalists and Bolsheviks were united by calculations on capitalizing on the growing anti-British and pan-Islamic sentiment among the Muslims of Central Asia” 92 . British General T. Bridges reported to the British Foreign Secretary and Chief of Military Intelligence that the Muslim riots seemed to be coordinated, as "Muslim agents" set the local Muslims against the Armenians 93 . According to him, “one of the dangerous points is Karabakh, the cradle of the Armenian nation. Azerbaijanis with great pleasure “would take him into their hands” 94. British intelligence also reported that the conflict between the Armenians and the Muslim population in Nagorno-Karabakh was also directed by a “Turkish agent”, possibly the leader of the Unity and Progress party, General Enver Pasha, who, according to General T. Bridges, in July 1919. was in the region of Karabakh 95 . At that time, the Azerbaijani government tried to establish ties with the Kemalists, bypassing the British. Hundreds of volunteers from Azerbaijan joined the troops of Mustafa Kemal, and the government in December 1919. even subsidized the Turkish movement in Anatolia 96 . Trying to get out of international isolation, and also in the hope of obtaining military and economic assistance, the Kemalists tried in every possible way and through various channels to establish contacts with the Bolsheviks, who also needed allies, through Azerbaijan. Former Ottoman commanders Nuri Pasha, Enver, Khalil Pasha were involved in mediating negotiations

between the Bolsheviks in Baku and Mustafa Kemal. The main link in these negotiations was Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of War during the war years, who fled Turkey after the armistice and settled for a while in Berlin. Negotiating with the Bolshevik leaders on the formation of a powerful front against the allies, in the middle of 1920. he came to Moscow and continued negotiations there with the Bolsheviks, who played an important role in establishing Soviet-Turkish relations97 . One of the main tasks of the Kemalists at that time was to provide a strategic corridor connecting Anatolia with Azerbaijan, while simultaneously supporting bandit formations in Nakhichevan involved in subversive actions against the Armenian Republic in Nakhichevan 98 . In this sense, for Mustafa Kemal, the presence of the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus was seen as preferable in terms of creating a joint Turkish-Bolshevik alliance against the Entente. After the occupation of the Turkish capital, M. Kemal ordered Karabekir to make attempts to establish contacts with the Bolsheviks. At the same time, Rustu Bey, commander of the third army in Trabzon, asked Karabekir for permission to attack Armenia under the flag of Bolshevism, also informing about the possibility of new territorial acquisitions for Turkey in Transcaucasia 99 . The strategic interests of the Kemalists also forced them to make a deal with the Bolsheviks regarding the entry of Azerbaijan into the sphere of influence of the Bolsheviks, while simultaneously obtaining a policy of free hands in relation to Armenia. The suppression of Armenia, ensuring the neutrality of Georgia and Soviet control over Azerbaijan - thus, the latter became a bridge for the transfer of Soviet aid to Anatolia, which the Kemalists badly needed 100. To achieve this goal, Mustafa Kemal did everything possible to transfer control of the Caucasus to the Bolsheviks. It is possible that the Kemalists hoped, by mutual agreement with the Bolsheviks, to obtain from them certain territorial concessions in the Caucasus in the future, which, incidentally, was done at the Moscow and Kars conferences. At the same time, it should be noted that the Kemalists and Mustafa Kemal himself did not at all abandon the idea of annexing Azerbaijan in favor of Turkey. Among the Turkish "persuaders" of the Azerbaijani government regarding the position on the offensive of the Bolshevik units, Khalil Pasha played a major role in persuading the Musavat leaders not to be afraid of the Red Army units moving into Azerbaijan, which, according to him, should only move towards Armenia and Karabakh, where by that time the main units of the Azerbaijani army were tied up, and subsequently to unite with the Turkish troops 101 . However, this geopolitical combination was only a prelude to the subsequent calculations of the Kemalists for the sake of their political interests. M. E. Rasulzade later admitted with disappointment that ordinary Muslims of Azerbaijan believed that “the Russians, as soon as they come, will solve the Armenian issue and send their troops to help Mustafa Kemal Pasha” 102 .

Soon, the Kemalists began to actively lobby for the possibility of establishing bilateral relations with the Bolsheviks in the hope of receiving military and political assistance from the north. One of the main goals of the Kemalists, who acted as fighters against world imperialism, was Azerbaijan, whose accession to Turkey promised many economic and political benefits. In addition, for the Turks, the issue of ensuring the pro-Turkish position of the Bolsheviks regarding the Armenian Question and preventing the return of Armenians to their homeland in the spirit of the documents adopted at both congresses of Turkish nationalists was seen as vital. In their position on the Armenian question, the Bolsheviks appealed to the principle of national self-determination and were supporters of the return of Armenian refugees to Western Armenia in accordance with the adopted at the end of 1917. "Decree on Turkish Armenia", however, later this issue with the light hand of the Bolsheviks was sacrificed to the idea of a world revolution. Ankara received assurances of support for Turkish positions in relation to the proclamation of national states in the former eastern territories of the former Ottoman Empire from the Bolsheviks when Semyon Budyonny during a meeting with Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Havz in May-June 1919. assured that Moscow would support Turkey and would not allow the creation of a Kurdish, Armenian or Pontic state on Turkish soil 103 . This foreshadowed the future of Soviet-Turkish cooperation, for which Armenia paid dearly. Subsequently, the result of a political deal between the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks was the rejection of Nakhichevan and Karabakh in favor of Soviet Azerbaijan, and the Kars region, together with the Surmalinsky district, was transferred to Kemalist Turkey. On April 26, 1920, i.e. two days before the sovietization of Azerbaijan, the Government Council in Ankara addressed the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR with a letter declaring that Turkey undertakes to fight together with the RSFSR against imperialism and to influence Azerbaijan so that Azerbaijan enters into the circle of Soviet republics (sic!) 104 . With this message, Kemal, on the one hand, acted as a supporter of more visas of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and on the other hand, got the opportunity to act against Armenia, under the guise of Bolshevik and anti-imperialist slogans. This appeal, which is at the same time an act of recognition of the RSFSR, actually indicated a conspiracy between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists, which did not leave Armenia any chance for maneuver. As a result of the Turkish-Bolshevik deal on April 28, 1920. Soviet power was established in Azerbaijan - not without the help of the same Turkish officers who blocked the escape route for the Azerbaijani government and seized the money that the Musavatists were going to take with them to Ganja 105 . In those days, Sergo Ordzhonikidze reported to Kirov and Lenin: “The troops of Azerbaijan have completely gone over to our side. A very active role in favor of the revolution in Baku was played by Turkish askers and officers, a detachment of which crossed the government's opportunity to escape from Baku . As Turkish author Ömer Kocaman points out, Turkish nationalist leaders and officers played an important role as intermediaries in manipulating the moods of Muslims in Azerbaijan. They tried to convince the Azerbaijani authorities and Musavat leaders that the Bolsheviks were not depriving them of their independence, but, on the contrary, were trying to provide military

assistance to the national movement in Anatolia. In April, Turkish nationalists, together with the communists, organized rallies in Baku, trying to win the support of the population of the Azerbaijani capital 107 . In April 1920 the same General Khalil Pasha, who was allowed by the British to escape from prison and resume his activities in Karabakh, reported to the commander of the Kemalist armed forces, General Karabekir, that in Azerbaijan “the soldiers intend to clear Karabakh of Armenians”, and that the people and soldiers are looking forward to crossing the borders of the Turkish army in order to "achieve this goal in a short period of time." In a reply message on April 28, 1920, noting that "the goal of all Turks is to unite Turkic brothers", Karabekir demanded "not to weaken the military campaign against Karabakh". Khalil was instructed to convey to Azerbaijani circles that the campaign against the Armenians should be carried out “with all cruelty and terrify” 108 . The newspaper "Islam Gurcistani" published in Batumi in the issue of May 4, 1920. wrote: “... the Azerbaijani government, the Azerbaijani Red Army is starting to take action in order to move on Armenia and, after defeating it, unite with the Ottoman Turks in Anatolia...” 109 . The corridor along which Bolshevik aid was to be provided to the Kemalists passed through the Armenian territories of Karabakh, Nakhichevan and Zangezur, which were under Armenian control, thus preventing the advance of Bolshevik forces through this corridor. By this time, the Turks proposed to the commander of the 11th Army, Lewandovsky, to capture Nakhichevan and Zangezur with joint efforts . And soon, as a result of a joint military operation, Turkish troops from Anatolia connected with units of the Red Army in Nakhichevan. After the establishment of Soviet power in Baku with surprising speed, all the Musavat military immediately took on the Bolshevik guise. So, the executioner of the Karabakh Armenians, the governor of the Karabakh region Khosrovbek Sultanov became the Revolutionary Committee in Shushi, the generals of the Azerbaijani army - Ali Aga Shikhlinsky, L. Nakhichevansky, the Minister of War Mammadbek Mehmandarov, and others became red commissars. Such a rapid transformation of the Azerbaijani Turks into "Bolsheviks" gives rise to suspicions that such a decision was made with the consent of the "Anatolian milli", under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. “The subjugation, destruction of the Armenian people will be the main task of the Muslim Turks who put on the Bolshevik mask, for the Armenian people are a wedge in the Turkic-Muslim world and a dangerous obstacle in their relations with the European Christian world for the complete domination of pan-Turkism in the East and its development to the limits of its race” , - it was said in the “Memorandum” submitted to the British military representation under the commander-in-chief of the troops of the south of Russia, Wrangel 111 . Around the same time, Nuri Pasha, through the mediation of the Turkish headquarters, was sent to Dagestan, allegedly to organize a partisan movement against the Whites, but was soon expelled from there by the Bolsheviks themselves for pan-Turkist agitation and soon became the organizer and inspirer of anti-Bolshevik demonstrations in Ganja, Lankaran and Karabakh 112 . Enver Pasha, who at that time was in Baku and took part in the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, in a letter addressed to M. Kemal, expressed his readiness to send two

divisions formed from Azerbaijani Turks to the fronts of Anatolia. At the same time, in a letter dated September 7, 1920. he persuaded Kemal in every possible way to go on the offensive against Armenia 113 . The Caucasian front remained a priority for the Kemalists, who, in their aggressive plans for the Transcaucasus, were not inferior to the Young Turks, but simply continued their foreign policy line in this direction. The Kemalists did not at all abandon the idea of joining Azerbaijan to Turkey and sought to realize this idea through a war with Armenia. Kemal himself wrote in his memoirs about the decision taken in advance to attack Armenia back in June 1920, although at the same time he placed all the blame for the outbreak of war on the Armenian side 114 . For this purpose, Turkish emissaries sought to organize an uprising of Muslims living in the Republic of Armenia against the government. The letter of the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia dated January 30, 1920, addressed to the commander of the British troops in the Transcaucasus, spoke of the need to provide assistance to prevent Azerbaijan's attempt to connect with Turkey through the Nakhichevan region. In particular, it was stated in it, “... that the departure of the British troops means the moment has come when the Muslims must implement a plan to unite Azerbaijan with Turkey through Nakhichevan. According to the information just received, now the Azerbaijanis, not being able to break through Zangezur,115 . In the report of the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Azerbaijan dated August 27, 1920. the following was said: “The desire of Musavatist Azerbaijan and Ittihad Turkey to create a single Turkish state from Constantinople to Baku has by no means disappeared: the goals of Soviet Azerbaijan and “revolutionary and red Anatolia” are the same” 116 . Kazim Karabekir, before the offensive against Armenia, counted on Azerbaijan's help in opening a second front. Former military Enver Pasha, the Minister of the Ottoman Empire, having settled in Azerbaijan, led the Kemalists to the idea of the possibility of capturing Armenia and the formation of the Azerbaijani army. In Enver's letter addressed to Atatürk, we read: “... I am very pleased with the eastern congress. It will give very good results in the future. Before the onset of winter, an operation against Armenia may begin. However, in my opinion, you should have started this operation before today and not give the Armenians the opportunity to strengthen. God willing, Azerbaijan will gather strength and go on the offensive before the Georgians, Armenians and Iranians go on the offensive. In any case, even if the Red Army does not wish it, you must go on the offensive ... and reach the border of 1877. 117 . To remove the "Caucasian obstacle" Mustafa Kemal announced mobilization 118 . In September 1920 Kemalist troops under the command of Kazim Karabekir launched an armed aggression against the Republic of Armenia. One of the goals of the war unleashed against Armenia was an attempt to annex Azerbaijan to Turkey. A few days before it began, on September 14, Mustafa Kemal wrote to the Turkish general Ali Fuad Jebesoy: “Start a favorable war against the Armenians and not abandon the idea of Azerbaijan joining Turkey” 119. The fact that the Kemalists did not hide their “fraternal

feelings” towards Soviet Azerbaijan is also evident from the following words of Kemal Atatürk: “In this sacred struggle, our nation is proud of serving the cause of the liberation of Islam and the well-being of the oppressed world. Our nation is happy to hear that this truth is confirmed by the representative of fraternal Azerbaijan. The peoples of Rumelia and Anatolia know that the hearts of the Azeri brothers beat together with their hearts... They do not want the Azeri Turks to be captured again and deprived of their rights. The sorrow of the Azeri Turks is our sorrow, and their joy is our joy. We will be glad if their wishes are fulfilled and they live freely and independently” 120 . One of the messages from Soviet diplomats from Ankara said that “recently, meetings of the Supreme National Assembly of the National Assembly, attended by representatives of the Constantinople government, have often been held in Ankara. The work of the meeting is conducted in a pan-Islamic spirit. Noticed desire to occupy Batumi and Baku. There were representatives of Dagestan in the national assembly who spoke in favor of joining Dagestan to Turkey. Agents are sent to Dagestan and Baku as Kemalists” 121 . With regard to Armenia and Armenians, the future “father of the Turks” did not hide his aggressive intentions and, not wanting to cede “not an inch of land to the Armenians”, Mustafa Kemal considered the Armenian-Turkish war of 1920 as a means to “destroy the Armenian army and the Armenian state” 122 . Soviet diplomat I. Abilov, accredited in Turkey, reported to Moscow the following: “Many Turks still have not given up their aggressive intentions and are pinning their hopes on Azerbaijan joining Turkey. For example, during a small reception that I gave recently, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, in concluding his pan-Turkist speech, expressed a desire to see deputies from Azerbaijan in the Turkish parliament in the near future” 123 . On the issue of preferences, the Bolshevik leadership did its best to “play along” with the Muslim Bolsheviks of Azerbaijan, including in territorial issues, in order to secure itself in the matter of supplies of Baku oil, which were so necessary during the civil war. It is no coincidence that one of the well-known Bolshevik leaders, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, believed that "fuel is now the backbone of the entire Soviet Russia, the entire world revolution" 124 . Such an attitude among the Bolsheviks dominated in the future, after the Sovietization of Armenia, which ultimately turned out to be fatal in determining the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan, as well as the transfer of Armenian territories to Turkey. With the beginning of the aggression of the Kemalists against Armenia in September 1920. the Bolsheviks on the issue of territorial disputes, for obvious reasons, took the side of Soviet Azerbaijan, although at the same time they continued to consider Karabakh, Nakhichevan and Zangezur as disputed territories. Soviet Russia used these disputes to establish direct links with Kemalist Turkey by occupying the strategic zone of Karabakh-Zangezur- Nakhichevan . Here is what the well-known Bolshevik nationalist Mirsait Sultan-Galiev writes about the importance of Azerbaijan for the Bolsheviks: “If Red Turkestan has until now played the role of a revolutionary beacon for Chinese Turkestan, Tibet, Afghanistan, India, Bukhara and Khiva, then

Soviet Azerbaijan with its old and experienced revolutionary proletariat and the already quite strong communist party "Gummet" in this respect will be a red beacon for throughout Persia, Arabia and Turkey. It will also directly affect the Trans-Caspian region, through Krasnovodsk. The fact that the Azerbaijani language is a language understandable for the Istanbul Turks, and for the Tabriz Persians and Kurds, and for the Turkic tribes of the Transcaspian region, and for the Armenians, and for the Georgians, only exacerbates the international political significance of Soviet Azerbaijan in the East. From here you can harass the British in Persia, reach out to Arabia and lead the revolutionary movement in Turkey,126 . The top leadership of the Bolsheviks also did not hide their geopolitical "sympathy" towards Azerbaijan, seeing it as a reliable stronghold for the spread of the Bolshevik ideology to the Muslim East. It is no coincidence that November 27, 1920. The Politburo, following Stalin's report, adopted a resolution drafted by Lenin and which stated the following: Do not set as your task a campaign either against Georgia, or against Armenia, or against Persia. The main task is to recognize the protection of Azerbaijan and the firm possession of the entire Caspian Sea...” 127 . After the Sovietization of Armenia, the Kemalist troops remained within the borders of Soviet Armenia for some time, plundering and destroying the local population. After their evacuation, the Soviet authorities created a commission to calculate material damage and human losses. According to incomplete data from archival documents, in the areas occupied by Turkish troops in 1920. 116,000 people were killed and wounded, most of them women and children; 32,000 people died of starvation, 50,000 women and girls were raped and 8,000 were forcibly taken away . According to incomplete data, 19,743,680 gold rubles worth of Armenian property was looted and destroyed.” Attempts to use revolutionary and religious rhetoric by the Azerbaijani Bolsheviks to obtain concessions in territorial issues are also visible from the following document, signed by the Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee N. Narimanov and several members of the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP (b) on July 10, 1920. It says: “... The Muslim masses will consider an unexpected turn to the old and the inability of the Soviet government to keep Azerbaijan within the old borders as a betrayal, armenophilia or weakness of the Soviet government. Both of these can be the cause of a tense uprising against Soviet power, the installation of Dashnaks in Zangezur and Karabakh will undermine the development of the revolution in Turkey, deprive them of our help and communications, and create a threatening rear for them. We warn the center against hesitation on the issue of Karabakh and Zangezur in the interests of129 . In turn, a member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army, S. Kirov, unambiguously stated that “the cession of these regions (Armenia) now will ... discredit Soviet power not only in Azerbaijan, but also in Persia and Turkey" 130 . On this issue, the telegram of I. Stalin to S. Ordzhonikidze dated July 8, 1920, is also verbose, where, in particular, it says the following: “My opinion is that you can’t maneuver endlessly between the parties, you need to support one of the parties, definitely in in this case, of course,

Azerbaijan and Turkey. I spoke with Lenin, he doesn't mind" 131 . And it is no coincidence that Ordzhonikidze then declared that "...Red Azerbaijan is the key to the Muslim East..." 132 . The Bolshevik leadership of Azerbaijan, in turn, used the Turkish card in every possible way to incline the Moscow Bolsheviks towards Azerbaijan and Turkey in the territorial conflicts between Armenia and Turkey. In a letter addressed to V. Lenin, the chairman of the AzRevkom N. Narimanov writes. “I categorically declare that given the current situation in the Caucasus (Dagestan and Georgia), if we want to keep Azerbaijan behind us, we must conclude a strong alliance with the Angorians at all costs. I emphasize: this alliance will give us the entire Muslim East and the general discontent that we have created by our inept oriental policy will be liquidated and in this way we will snatch the instrument of provocation from England's hands . Soviet Russia supported the Kemalist movement, seeing it as a "reserve for world revolution" 134 . In turn, the Kemalists skillfully used the Bolshevik plans in their own interests and did not disdain even to speak with Bolshevik rhetoric. Thus, in the government instructions for the Turkish delegation, which is in Moscow to sign the Russian-Turkish agreement, among others, the following points were noted: 1) our goal is to protect the internal and external independence of Turkey within today's borders. If Russia recognizes our borders, we are ready to unite our fate and conditions with Russia 2) to achieve success in the joint struggle, Turkey uses all its influence in the Muslim world 135 . In Moscow negotiations with the Bolsheviks on the signing of a peace treaty and an agreement on cooperation, the Kemalists focused on its ratification by individual Soviet republics, giving paramount importance to the treaty with Soviet Armenia. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kemalist Turkey Yusuf Kemal Bey, addressing the Soviet representative Abilov, noted: “... we are invited to a conference on the Eastern question. But in the West, there are rumors and discussions around the Armenian issue. It is possible that this question may be brought up by England or America at this conference. Then we, having agreements in hand with both the Armenian Dashnaks and the Armenian communists, can come out in defense of our interests. If the Treaty of Kars is ratified not separately by each of the republics, but by the All-Union Council,136 . The Turkish-Russian negotiations were very tense in the context of the February uprising against the Bolshevik authorities in Armenia, which broke out on February 18, 1921, as a result of which the rebel forces occupied Yerevan, and on February 28 the Kronstadt uprising began in Petrograd. In November 1920 Ali Fuad Jebesoy was appointed Turkish Ambassador to Soviet Russia. Upon arrival in Moscow in February 1921. he agreed to Stalin's persuasion (with Lenin's consent) to use his influence as a "hero-commander and Muslim" in order to persuade the Tatar divisions (located one in Moscow, the other in Kazan) to participate in the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising 137 . It was with Stalin, according to Jebes, that he worked closely in resolving the impasse that arose in the bilateral negotiations around Kars, Ardagan and Batumi, as well as in the question of the participation of Muslim units in the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion, which was

dangerous for the Soviet government 138 . Jebesoy also cites the words of Stalin, spoken in response to a request from the Turkish delegation regarding discussions on the Armenian issue. Stalin, as always, was laconic: “You have already resolved the Armenian issue, if something remains, decide for yourself” 139. Another well-known Bolshevik, Karl Radek, unambiguously declared to the Turkish delegates in Moscow that "if you have a desire to solve the Armenian problem, we will also assist you in this matter, after which our capabilities and strength will increase a hundredfold" 140 . The military services of the Turks and Azerbaijanis to the Bolsheviks did not end there. After the suppression of the anti-Bolshevik rebellion in Ganja in the summer of 1920, among others, generals of the former ADR M. Mehmandarov and A. A. Shikhlinsky were also arrested. But the Bolsheviks, who were in dire need of professional military personnel, decided to use them in the cause of the world revolution. N. Narimanov addressed Lenin with a message, which, in particular, said: “During the Ganja uprising, all the officers of the old Azerbaijani army were arrested, among them were the well-known generals Mehmandarov and Shikhlinsky. After a thorough investigation, it turned out that these generals were not involved. Having determined their positions with Soviet Azerbaijan in advance, at the Moscow Conference, the Kemalists achieved their demands for the inclusion of the territory of the Kars region and the Surmalinsky district into Turkey, and Nakhichevan was transferred under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, being soon simply annexed and becoming an autonomous republic within Soviet Azerbaijan 142 . In subsequent years, the authorities of Soviet Azerbaijan systematically and purposefully expelled the Armenian population from the Nakhichevan region: as a result of ethnic cleansing, by the time the Karabakh issue was raised, there were practically no Armenians left there. Thus, the transfer of Nakhichevan under the control of Azerbaijan and the formation of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were partly connected with Turkey's long-term ambitions in the region 143 . The fate of Karabakh developed similarly. 4th July 1921 meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP (b) decides to include Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian SSR, but a day later, according to some reports, under pressure from Stalin, it takes a completely different decision, according to which the region passes under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan with the following wording: “Based on the need national peace between Muslims and Armenians and the economic connection of Upper and Lower Karabakh, its permanent connection with Azerbaijan, leave Nagorno-Karabakh within the AzSSR, provide it with broad autonomy with an administrative center in the mountains. Shusha, which is part of the autonomous region" 144. Azerbaijani Bolsheviks, bypassing the adopted resolution, transferred the capital of the region from Shushi to Stepanakert. This was done on the basis of the intent to prevent the return of Armenian refugees to their homes in Shushi, which at that time was practically deprived of the Armenian population due to its mass. Having determined their positions with Soviet Azerbaijan in advance, at the Moscow Conference, the Kemalists achieved their demands for the inclusion of the territory of the Kars

region and the Surmalinsky district into Turkey, and Nakhichevan was transferred under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, being soon simply annexed and becoming an autonomous republic within Soviet Azerbaijan 142 . In subsequent years, the authorities of Soviet Azerbaijan systematically and purposefully expelled the Armenian population from the Nakhichevan region: as a result of ethnic cleansing, by the time the Karabakh issue was raised, there were practically no Armenians left there. Thus, the transfer of Nakhichevan under the control of Azerbaijan and the formation of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were partly connected with Turkey's long-term ambitions in the region 143 . The fate of Karabakh developed similarly. 4th July 1921 meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP (b) decides to include Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian SSR, but a day later, according to some reports, under pressure from Stalin, it takes a completely different decision, according to which the region passes under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan with the following wording: “Based on the need national peace between Muslims and Armenians and the economic connection of Upper and Lower Karabakh, its permanent connection with Azerbaijan, leave Nagorno-Karabakh within the AzSSR, provide it with broad autonomy with an administrative center in the mountains. Shusha, which is part of the autonomous region" 144. Azerbaijani Bolsheviks, bypassing the adopted resolution, transferred the capital of the region from Shushi to Stepanakert. This was done on the basis of the intent to prevent the return of Armenian refugees to their homes in Shushi, which at that time was practically deprived of the Armenian population due to its mass extermination and persecution by the Azerbaijani and Turkish troops. It is generally accepted that the decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP (b) was taken under pressure from Stalin, however, more likely, it reflected the broader strategic aspirations of the Bolsheviks: to appease Kemal Atatürk and calm the grumbling of the Muslim population, which at that time subjugated the USSR. Azerbaijan, with its larger population than Armenia, was considered by the Bolsheviks, like Kemalist Turkey, as a beacon of revolution in the East and seemed more important than Armenia from the point of view of the interests of the revolution 145 . According to O. Kocaman, the Turkish factor was definitely decisive in the Soviet government's decision to annex Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan 146 . The fate of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani Turks, as well as other Turkic-speaking regions of the former USSR, was in the focus of attention of Turkish nationalists until the collapse of the Soviet Union. During World War II, in October 1942, a committee was set up in Ankara, which set itself the task of “separating Azerbaijan from the USSR and joining it to Turkey” 147 . Among other Turkish commanders advising the Wehrmacht was Nuri Pasha, who settled in Berlin for some time. After the end of the Second World War and with the subsequent strengthening of pan-Turkist movements in Turkey, Azerbaijani committees and other organizations were organized on the initiative of the Turkish leadership and special services to carry out specific tasks.

Formed in 1924 The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region within the Azerbaijan SSR existed until the proclamation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on September 2, 1991. 148 .

CHAPTER TWO ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR AND THE KARABAKH PROBLEM The turning point in the history of Armenian-Turkish relations was the acquisition of independence by Armenia and its transformation into a subject of international law and a geopolitical entity. After the collapse of the USSR and the formation of the CIS, the issue of developing a certain modus vivendi in further relations became of paramount importance for Armenia and Turkey. Armenian-Turkish relations, or rather, their actual absence, can serve as a clear example of "unconventional diplomacy", that is, bilateral relations between states in the absence of diplomatic relations 1 . Initially, both states had certain concerns about each other. In Armenia, it was expressed in the fear of being face to face with a powerful neighbor, which was the legal successor of the Ottoman Empire, guilty of committing the Armenian Genocide on the territory of Western Armenia, and at the same time denying the very fact of this genocide. Turkey's fears related to the fact of the emergence of an independent Armenian statehood, which could initiate the process of international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and thereby redouble the efforts of the Armenian Diaspora in this direction. Ankara was even more worried about the possibility of reparations to the Armenian side, especially territorial concessions, in the event of internationalization of the issue of recognition of the Genocide. An additional difficulty for the Turkish side in the context of the desire of European countries to block Turkey's path to Europe in every possible way was the inclusion of the Armenian issue on the agenda of international relations. These fears were particularly intensified after the European Parliament on June 18, 1987. approved by a majority of votes the resolution “On the political solution of the Armenian question”. The most important provision of this resolution was the paragraph stating that: “... The tragic events that took place in 1915-1917. In relation to the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire, is the genocide in accordance with the UN Convention "On the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide", adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1948" 2 . At the same time, Turkish "pragmatism" in the matter of establishing trade and economic relations with Armenia proceeded from the desire to appear before Western partners as a peaceful and willing to compromise, albeit an unfriendly state. From the first days of the collapse of the former USSR, Turkey did not hide its interests in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics. In this regard, the Turkish leadership attached great

importance to the strategy of its relations with the Republic of Armenia, since Armenia, largely due to its geographical position, could become a serious obstacle to the implementation of Ankara's expansionist, neo-Pan-Turkist plans. Thus, the development of a strategy for relations with the Republic of Armenia was a priority for Turkey in terms of establishing direct ties with Azerbaijan and the Central Asian region 3 . In the political rhetoric of the Armenian leaders at an early stage of the development of the state, there was a certain revision of the traditional view of Armenia as a blocking factor in the implementation of pan-Turkic programs and the problem of involving the Armenian issue in the sphere of complex international diplomacy with unpredictable consequences. According to the first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, when he was one of the leaders of the Karabakh movement, pan-Turkism has now lost its content as a political factor, and any calls for “crusades” can only turn it into one again, making Armenia a target for pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism 4. Thus, addressing at that moment the issues of Pan-Turkism and the Armenian territories occupied by Turkey as a result of the genocide, according to the leaders of the Armenian National Movement (L. Ter-Petrosyan, Vazgen Manukyan, etc.), could give Armenia the image of a revanchist-minded state, discredit fair demands in the Karabakh issue and prevent the help of the allies, while making the Armenians a tool for achieving the goals of other states 5 . At the same time, it was stipulated that the establishment of political and economic relations with Turkey does not mean the oblivion of the Genocide and claims regarding the return of historical Armenian territories 6 . Most of the political factions in Armenia in the early 1990s were inclined to believe that the establishment of relations with Turkey was to some extent inevitable, but there were significant differences in questions of reconciliation and the conditions under which it should take place 7 . In the inaugural speech of the first President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the need to establish stable trade and economic relations with the immediate neighbors of the Republic of Armenia - Iran and Turkey "in order to turn Armenia from a dead end into a busy international crossroads" was noted 8 . In the publications of the Turkish press dedicated to Armenia at the end of 1991. The following arguments were given in favor of the development of bilateral relations. First, given Turkey's tense relations with most of its neighbors, establishing good neighborly relations with Armenia would help keep the latter from rapprochement with a group of states that take an anti-Turkish stance. Secondly, the establishment of such relations with independent Armenia would help to ease the pressure on Turkey from Western states, serving as a convenient pretext for withdrawing from consideration in international structures the issue of international recognition of the Armenian Genocide of 1915-23 in the Ottoman Empire and the further development of undesirable problems caused by the recognition of the Genocide. for Turkey processes. Thirdly, April 1991 Yerevan was visited by Turkish Ambassador to the USSR Volkan Vural. During bilateral meetings with the Turkish ambassador, the Armenian leaders pointed out the absence of any territorial claims against Turkey from Armenia, and this was accepted with satisfaction.

Subsequently, however, cracks emerged in the benevolent position of both sides at the initial stage of establishing bilateral relations. The reason for this was the interview of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR L. Ter-Petrosyan to the newspaper "Arguments and Facts", in which, among other statements, it was noted that "after the failure of the idea of a permanent revolution in Europe in 1920-1921, Soviet Russia turned its attention to East, seeking to gain the sympathy of the Muslim peoples and, above all, Turkey. To achieve this goal, Armenia was dismembered. Russia ceded the Kars region to Turkey, and Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Forced deportation of Armenians was carried out in the Kars region and Nakhijevan” 9. Such an interpretation of historical events clearly did not suit the Turkish side, and its reaction was not long in coming. The Turkish embassy in Moscow issued a note of protest, which stated: “Not a single state entity neighboring Armenia can and should not give the Republic of Armenia an inch of land ... it is unacceptable to appeal to historical facts, and even more so to falsify them. If the Republic of Armenia puts forward any territorial claims against Turkey, the interests of the Armenian people will suffer first of all” 10. In response to the presented note, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta published the answer of Alexander Arzumanyan, Assistant to the Chairman of the RA Supreme Council. In particular, it said that “such a reaction of the Turkish embassy to an elementary statement of historical fact is bewildering. The new Armenian authorities have repeatedly stated that they have no territorial claims against Turkey. Recently, Turkish President Turgut Ozal made a statement that Iraq was historically part of the Ottoman Empire. But it never occurred to anyone to regard this statement as a territorial claim 11 . Thus, the process of establishing preliminary interstate relations between Armenia and Turkey was postponed from the very beginning, and the subsequent development of events in Nagorno-Karabakh further toughened Turkey's intransigent position on the issue of establishing bilateral relations. The parties made a new attempt to normalize relations in August 1992, when Turkish diplomatic delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Bilal Unal. The latter called the purpose of the trip the improvement of relations between countries in all directions, and in the future - the creation of a basis for establishing diplomatic relations, friendship and cooperation. The delegation also included the director of the Caucasus Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. During bilateral meetings, the Armenian side stated that it was ready to establish diplomatic relations with Ankara at any moment. In a counter statement, B. Unan said that Ankara also stands for the normalization of bilateral relations, however, he believes that Armenia should take the first step in this direction, officially declaring the immutability of its state borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.12 . In this context, the position of the Armenian authorities, and, in particular, the figure of Levon Ter-Petrosyan, was considered in certain Turkish circles as the most acceptable from the point of view of starting a political dialogue on issues that Turkey considers problematic. Thus, the well-known Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand in one of his publications at the end of 1991. advocated the soonest establishment of political and economic relations with Yerevan, motivating it with the following considerations: 1. in Armenia and in the Diaspora, forces that are

in opposition to Levon Ter-Petrosyan and strive to continue the confrontation with Turkey can win; 2. If Turkey is not the first to open the doors of the West to Armenia, then others will do it for her (in particular, the United States and France), perhaps even13 . Turkey was one of the first to recognize Armenia's independence in December 1991 and at the same time put forward three preconditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations. From Ankara's point of view, Armenia should have formally abandoned: - territorial claims against Turkey, - accusations against Ottoman Turkey of committing genocide and demands for its international recognition, - "aggressive policy" against Azerbaijan. Thus, there was a certain contradiction in Turkey's approaches from the very beginning. Turkey not only put forward preconditions for establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia, but also linked them to Armenia's relations with a third party - Azerbaijan. Armenia insisted on the establishment and development of bilateral relations without any preconditions. From the very beginning, the Karabakh conflict became the decisive and one of the main factors influencing the further dynamics of the Armenian-Turkish relations. In this sense, Turkey's irreconcilable position on the issue of establishing bilateral relations has turned Armenia and Karabakh into obstacles to the implementation of Turkish foreign policy programs in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In a sense, the failure of Ankara's aspirations to gain a foothold in the Central Asian region and create a "Turkic Union" under the rule of Turkey can be linked to a large extent precisely with the Armenian factor 14 . For Turkey, it was important to confirm its image as a country responsible for the Turkic countries and communities, and some of Ankara's initiatives, including lobbying the interests of these states in the international arena, primarily Azerbaijan, were designed to provide her with the status of a patron country. In this regard, the pro-Azerbaijani position of Turkey in the Karabakh issue should have become a clear example of the manifestation of Turkic solidarity. In February 1992 During a meeting between Turkish Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel and US President George W. Bush in Washington during a discussion of issues related to counteracting the spread of Iranian influence in former Soviet territories, the Turkish Prime Minister called on the American side to refrain from supporting Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Later, returning to this statement, Demirel pointed out that "Armenia's support in the dispute with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is fraught with a regional war, in the event of which Turkey will not be able to remain neutral" 15 .

The all-Turkic ideas and statements about the creation of a “Turkic union” resurrected after the collapse of the USSR formed. According to the Turkish scholar Taner Akçam, the atmosphere of “lack of security in Armenia”16. It was obvious that any manifestations of support or sympathy of the West for Armenia, and even more so in the Karabakh issue, did not suit Ankara, since they gave rise to Turkey's fear of possible territorial concessions in the future. The Armenian side argued that any easing of tension in the Armenian-Turkish relations would have a positive impact on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, against the background of neo-Pan-Turkist aspirations widely promoted by Ankara, Moscow and Yerevan, whose interests largely coincided, were interested in developing common approaches to neutralize Turkish initiatives on the southern borders of the CIS. At the beginning of 1992 the Turkish side made an attempt to prevent Armenia's membership in the CSCE at the Prague summit of the organization. This step was motivated by the fact that the Armenian side allegedly had territorial claims against Turkey. Based on this, the Turkish representatives demanded from the Armenian side to ratify the Kars Treaty, not to assist those organizations that make territorial claims, and to sign legal acts prohibiting racial, religious and ethnic hostility towards the CSCE member states. Otherwise, the Turkish representatives threatened to use their veto power. In response, the Armenian side noted that there are issues between Armenia and Turkey that need to be resolved, and that the claims that were made by the Turkish delegates against Armenia,17 . Turkish attempts to put pressure on the Armenian delegation and threats to veto Armenia's membership in the CSCE proceeded from peremptory demands on Armenia to make a more specific statement about the absence of territorial claims against Turkey. Ankara was not satisfied with the requirements stipulated by the standard procedure for accepting new members of the CSCE. But the likelihood of a response veto from third countries on the issue of Azerbaijan's membership forced Turkey to retreat from its initial positions 18 . On March 19, 1992, a month after the summit, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia Raffi Hovannisyan criticized Turkey's ambitious regional policy, at the same time warning about the possibility of unleashing a full-scale war if "Turkey does not want to return to its original position, in any case, emphasized neutrality 19 . Hovhannisyan's speech at the Istanbul meeting of the Council of Europe in September 1992 was also rather sharp. In the text of his speech, in particular, the following was noted: "...Turkey refuses to establish diplomatic relations and slightly open the border with Armenia, in every possible way hinders the delivery of humanitarian cargo." Further, the non-constructive role of Turkey within the framework of the CSCE was discussed. R. Hovhannisyan actually accused Turkey of being involved in the Karabakh war, pointing to the presence of Turkish officers and military advisers, as well as to the facts of the delivery of weapons from Turkey to Azerbaijan. Referring to Turkish opposition to Armenia's membership in the CSCE, he called Turkish

attempts in this direction "ridiculous", noting also that "despite the fact that Turkey is an old-timer in the Council of Europe,20 . Such sharp accents in the speech of the head of the Armenian Foreign Ministry were also criticized by the Armenian leadership. Ruben Shugaryan, Press Secretary of the President of the Republic of Armenia, called the Foreign Minister's speech "emotional and very tough" 21 . Despite the existence of such serious differences between the positions of both sides, it is also noteworthy that certain steps of the first President of Armenia L. Ter-Petrosyan, dictated by the logic of the domestic and foreign political development of the republic, found positive responses in Ankara and were perceived as Yerevan’s readiness to establish with Turkish side of the relationship of a new quality. In this vein, they interpreted, in particular, the dismissal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia R. Hovhannisyan after his speech in Istanbul, the ban on the activities of the Armenian Revolutionary Party in Armenia. It should be noted that Turkey also did not at all try to “burn bridges” in relations with Armenia, demonstrating in every possible way its readiness to establish good neighborly relations in case of concessions from the Armenian side. An obvious manifestation of this contradiction was Ankara's initiative to invite Armenia to participate in the founding conference of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). It was intended to draw Armenia, on the one hand, into the wake of Turkey's regional policy, and on the other hand, indirectly into the sphere of political influence of the West 23. At the same time, it was obvious that in establishing bilateral relations for Ankara, the priority was not economic, but primarily political issues, which was manifested in Turkey's emphatically pro-Azerbaijani position on the Karabakh issue. During the founding summit of the heads of states - members of the BSEC in June 1992. Istanbul also hosted the first meeting of Armenian President L. Ter-Petrosyan with Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel. The main topic of discussion was the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Turkish side demanded the withdrawal of troops from Shusha and Lachin, using characteristically ambitious rhetoric and motivating the need for such a step by the interests of the Armenians themselves. In turn, the Armenian side stood for the solution of the problem within the framework of the CSCE. The proposal put forward by S. Demirel during the meeting to organize a bilateral meeting of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Ankara did not find a response from the Azerbaijani President A. Elchibey. The position of the latter is explained by the fact that in the summer of 1992.24 . But subsequent events showed that these successes of the Azerbaijani forces were only temporary and by the end of the year the Armenian forces launched a counteroffensive, fully regaining control over the positions they had lost earlier and thereby causing disappointment in Ankara. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that during this meeting Turkey at the same time emphasized the special importance for itself of Nakhijevan 25 , and, referring to the Kars Treaty of 1921, in essence issued an ultimatum to Armenia. Citing some of the provisions of this

agreement, official Ankara claimed that it was she who was the guarantor of the security and inviolability of the borders of Nakhichevan. Another article of the claims of the Turkish side's accusations against Armenia, made to obtain additional leverage of pressure on the Armenian side, was the unfounded accusations of Yerevan's patronage of the Kurdish national liberation movement. Turkish newspapers periodically published materials about the existence of PKK bases in Kurdish villages on the territory of the Republic of Armenia and about the presence of Abdullah Ocalan in Armenia to assist the Armenians in Karabakh and develop a joint action plan against Turkey 26 . Aggravation of the situation on the Nakhichevan section of the Turkish-Armenian-Azerbaijani border in May 1992. on the part of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan clearly pursued the goal of drawing Armenia into hostilities away from Nagorno-Karabakh in order to create grounds for the involvement of the Turkish armed forces in the conflict zone. To this end, the Azerbaijani side deliberately initiated military operations in this area, while simultaneously accusing Armenia of aggressive actions. On this occasion, Armenian President L. Ter-Petrosyan issued a statement, which, in particular, said that the aggravation of the situation on the Nakhichevan section of the border "is being dictated by a third party and is aimed at creating the ground for direct intervention" 27 . With the growing tension around Nagorno-Karabakh, under the pretext of military exercises, large military units of the Turkish Armed Forces, deployed to wartime states, were pulled to the Armenian-Turkish border. In the spring of 1992, when the situation in the Nakhichevan sector became more complicated, analysts pointed to the likelihood of Turkish military intervention. It must be assumed that the Turkish military-political circles in Ankara, with the help of the escalation of the situation in the Nakhichevan sector, tried to probe the state of affairs on the southern borders of the CIS and thus reveal the real potential and viability of the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST) signed in May 1992 in Tashkent 28 , as well as divert part of the Armenian forces from the NKR. In parallel, one with a different interpretation of the Moscow and Kars treaties on the status of Nakhijevan, signed in 1921, Turkey tried to include Nagorno-Karabakh in its sphere of competence, insisting on the impossibility of resolving the problem without taking into account the interests of Turkey. Subsequently, it will become clear that the CST has become a kind of straitjacket for Turkey in its attempts to involve Armenia in large-scale military operations with the help of provocations and playing the Nakhichevan card and, under this pretext, to bring Turkish armed forces into the conflict zone. Throughout 1992. and subsequently the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became the main and decisive factor in the further dynamics of the Armenian-Turkish relations. In the still frustrated Armenian-Turkish relations, any manifestation of tension was the result of the military successes of the Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey instantly reacted to this with statements about its own readiness to carry out an armed intervention. Although these statements were mostly intended for “internal use” and aimed at providing moral support to Azerbaijan, nevertheless, they were made in parallel with the provision of military assistance to Azerbaijan, bypassing international agreements.

It should also be noted that in the leading circles of Turkey there was no unified approach regarding a possible reaction to the events in the South Caucasus, and this was reflected in internal political clashes and contradictions between various political groups in Turkey. The cautious and measured line of Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel clashed with the tougher position of President Turgut Ozal. The question arises: why did Turkey adhere to an aggressive position towards Armenia from the very beginning? It was obvious that the military actions in Karabakh could not have any consequences for Turkey's national security. Most likely, Ankara's behavior can be explained by the phenomenon of a very ambitious pan-Turkist policy, and in this vein, the demands of the Armenians of Karabakh were seen as nothing more or less than a threat to Turkey's national security in the light of possible reparations on its part in the issue of genocide in the future. Declaring Azerbaijan its strategic partner, Turkey put into practice the idea of pan-Turkic solidarity and tried to back it up with a series of anti-Armenian actions. Thus, since March 1992, the Turkish side began to inspect aircraft carrying humanitarian aid to Armenia through its airspace, ignoring the protests of Western states. Official Ankara justified this step by referring to the decision of the CSCE Prague session February 28, 1992 "On the introduction by the member countries of the CSCE and the states of the region of an embargo on the supply of weapons and military equipment to the parties participating in the Karabakh conflict", although Turkey itself has repeatedly violated the terms of this agreement. August 17, 1992 The US Ambassador in Ankara demanded an explanation from the Turkish Foreign Ministry regarding Turkey's actions with respect to air transport vehicles heading to Armenia. The statement of the Turkish side stated that “Turkey does not intend to change its policy regarding the control of all aircraft flying to the region of the Karabakh conflict under someone's pressure” 29 . The statement of the RA Foreign Ministry on this occasion stated that the Turkish side "shows discrimination against Armenian flights." These actions, and the reasons that justify them, “are untenable, both from a legal and political point of view. Turkey's interpretation of the CSCE decision on the embargo on the import of weapons into the regions covered by the Karabakh conflict is clearly biased and discriminatory.”30 The next step was Turkey's accession to the economic blockade of Armenia carried out by Azerbaijan, which resulted in the prohibition of the transportation through its territory of any goods sent to Armenia. In November 1992, under the pressure of a powerful wave of protest on the part of Azerbaijan, an agreement on the supply of 300 million kilowatts of electricity to Armenia from Turkey was annulled 31 . This agreement of the Turkish side was regarded by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Tofik Gasimov, as a "stab in the back of Azerbaijan" 32 . According to Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, "the signing of the protocol on the supply of electricity was aimed at pushing Armenia towards a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh issue" 33 .

Thus, Turkey found itself, as it were, between two fires. On the one hand, the pressure of the West aimed at weakening unfriendly attacks against Armenia, on the other hand, the calls of the opposition forces and the general Turkish public not to betray the “Azerbaijani brothers”. Only under pressure from the West did Turkey let through its territory a consignment of EU humanitarian cargo, primarily wheat (35,000 tons), although it charged for these services at high commercial prices. Ankara refused to concede the second game 34 . It can be stated that there was a certain dose of mutual disappointment in the Azerbaijani-Turkish relations, against the background of which, after the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement in May 1994 in Bishkek with the participation of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Karabakh sides, there is some weakening of Turkey's tough position towards Armenia. which resulted in the opening of an air corridor between Istanbul and Yerevan. But on the issue of opening the borders, Turkey still did not retreat a single step. Moreover, Istanbul refused the request of the European Parliament to open the borders with Armenia and provide transit for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Armenia. The refusal of the Turkish side was motivated by the position taken by Armenia in the Karabakh issue 35 . Although Ankara was clearly aware that "passivity" in the Karabakh issue could be very costly in further relations with Azerbaijan, the temptation to repeat the "Cyprus option" gave way to relatively sober and realistic political calculations. However, it must be emphasized that Ankara, making any, even the most insignificant attempts to enter into a dialogue with Yerevan, had to reckon with Baku's clearly expressed negative reaction, thus becoming a kind of hostage of its neo-Pan-Turkist policy. To a certain extent, the "oil fever" of the first half of the 1990s contributed to the revision of Turkish policy towards Armenia. In particular, in 1995. opinions were expressed that the blockade of Armenia harms, first of all, Turkey itself, and that it is necessary to conduct border trade with Armenia. In addition, Turkish Foreign Minister Murad Karayalchyn stated that Turkey is not against laying the Caspian oil pipeline through the territory of Armenia. Such statements were due to the temporary weakening of Russia's position in the South Caucasus, which was occupied with the Chechen problem, and the Turkish side sought to strengthen its own positions by weakening Russian influence in the region 36 . Ankara openly showed dissatisfaction with the strategic cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation, and also reacted sharply negatively to the deepening of bilateral political, trade, economic and military cooperation between Armenia and Greece and Iran. Signed in the summer of 1997. the bilateral agreement "On Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" between Armenia and Russia, which, among other things, provides for the provision of assistance in the event of aggression by a third party, dispelled all Ankara's hopes for establishing its own strategic dominance in the South Caucasus region. Official Yerevan has repeatedly offered Ankara to differentiate the problems of establishing bilateral relations and Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, President L. Ter-Petrosyan's adviser Zh.

Libaridyan suggested building Turkish-Armenian relations according to the Turkish-Greek model, which proved its viability, despite serious problems between the two countries in the issue of separating the continental shelf and Cyprus 37 . However, more popular among Turkish circles was the opinion expressed by the newspaper Milliyet in the issue of September 9, 1997. in an article entitled “Brotherhood, of course, but ..”, according to which “taking into account painful issues for Baku and accepting its policy in the Caucasus is not only a matter of solidarity based on brotherhood for Turkey, but also a necessity in terms of its own interests. The growing importance of Caspian oil can bring significant benefits to Turkey in terms of production and transit transport; in this context, Turkey cannot risk relations with Azerbaijan” 38 . S. Demirel spoke about the establishment of trade relations with Armenia in the same spirit, but more categorically. He noted that "Turkey cannot afford to risk displeasure of its Azerbaijani brothers for the sake of some of us gaining" 39 . And yet, despite the absence of diplomatic relations and the closed border, the total amount of trade between Armenia and Turkey reaches, according to various estimates, up to 300 million dollars. In mid-1997, the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Committee 40 was established . Although the issue of border trade with Armenia is still under discussion, however, some steps taken by the Turkish leadership indicate that it is aimed at intensifying economic processes in the backward eastern vilayets directly adjacent to Armenia, and at stopping the process of population migration from these areas, using, among other things, the option of indirect trade through Georgia. In general, it should be stated that since the collapse of the USSR, the Armenian vector of Turkish foreign policy has not been able to differentiate between strategic interests and small tactical propaganda attacks, which were mostly made for considerations of the internal political situation. In the absence of diplomatic relations, another equally interesting field of interaction between the two states is the cultural and humanitarian area. In order to reduce antagonism, in some cases attempts are made to establish a dialogue between non-governmental organizations, there are visits to musical groups and the signing of agreements on cooperation between Armenian and Turkish higher educational institutions 41 . Both sides came out with the intention to provide mutual humanitarian assistance in the elimination of natural disasters. After the December earthquake in Armenia in 1988. The Turkish side, through diplomatic channels, expressed its readiness to provide assistance to the victims of the disaster and sent humanitarian supplies to the disaster zone 42 . In November 1999, Armenian rescuers took part in rescuing the victims of the earthquake in Turkey. After the devastating August earthquake in the Istanbul region, the Armenian government expressed its readiness to send humanitarian aid to Turkey and addressed a corresponding request to the Turkish Foreign Ministry. But the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow

stated that there was no need to involve Armenian rescuers in the disaster zone due to the sufficient number of specialists already involved in the affected areas 43 . In fact, there was an urgent need to provide additional humanitarian assistance to the victims in the earthquake zone, and this refusal was most likely motivated by political reasons. On November 12, 1999, after the second earthquake in Duzce, 25 Armenian rescuers and doctors participated in rescue operations and provided immediate assistance to the victims 44 . This time, the Turkish side did not interfere with the Armenian initiative, and such a decision, apparently, was due to the upcoming OSCE summit in Istanbul. Nevertheless, these factors turned out to be secondary and could not have a significant impact on the initial settings of the Turkish side's policy of preconditions in establishing bilateral relations. The Armenian side has repeatedly pointed out that normal relations can develop only after the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations. In the absence of bilateral relations, both sides directly or indirectly also conducted diplomatic correspondence, delegations from Armenia and Turkey participated in solemn and mourning ceremonies. For example, the President of the Republic of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan participated in the funeral ceremony of Turkish President Turgut Ozal in April 1993, and after the terrorist attack on the Armenian parliament, as a result of which the Speaker of the Parliament, the Prime Minister and deputies of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia were killed, at the funeral ceremony funeral at the end of October 1999, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Grand National Assembly, an official delegation from Ankara headed by Turkish Minister of State Mehmet Ali Irtemchelik arrived in Yerevan.

THE BURDEN OF THE PAST Closely intertwined with the Turkish-Armenian conflict discourse is the issue of official recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey today and the inclusion of this issue as a priority in Armenia's foreign policy agenda since independence, and especially after President R. Kocharyan came to power in 1998. It is interesting to note that the Turkish side was the first to raise this issue even before the collapse of the USSR, considering it necessary for official Yerevan to influence the initiatives of the Diaspora aimed at the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The legacy of the Young Turks, which still strongly influences Turkish political culture, is clearly manifested in the example of the continued refusal to recognize the historical fact of the Genocide, around which the Turkish state developed its official version and its interpretation, thus trying to erase the memory of this crime from the collective memory of its people 45 . In official Turkish circles, the resolution of the European Parliament of June 18, 1987 caused serious concern. on the political solution of the Armenian issue, which called on the Turkish side to recognize the historical fact of the Genocide. The President of Turkey, General Kenan Evren, referring to this resolution in one of his speeches, noted the following: “...after this there will be many demands. I will tell you what type of demands: they will say that at one time there was

Armenia on the territory of Eastern Turkey, and now give these lands to the Armenians. This resolution was the first step, and the demand will be the second. If they (Armenians - G.D.) are so strong now, let them come and try. Then they will receive their answer. ” 46 In the "Declaration of Independence" adopted by the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR on August 23, 1990. the determination to promote the international recognition of the 1915 Genocide was emphasized. Paragraph 11 of the Declaration reads: “The Republic of Armenia stands for the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia” 47 . Turkey, unilaterally implementing an economic blockade and keeping the border with Armenia closed, often tightened the visa regime for the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, depending on new facts of recognition of the Armenian Genocide by third countries 48 . For Armenia, the issue of official recognition and condemnation of the Genocide, in addition to moral and psychological, has political significance. in the sense that recognition by Turkey of the fact of the genocide will become a guarantee of its non-recurrence in the future. That is why Armenia sees the guarantee of its security in the recognition and condemnation of the Genocide. On the other hand, the Armenian position on the issue of recognition of the Genocide is, as it were, a lever of pressure on Ankara in response to Turkey's uncompromising position towards Armenia in general, and in the Karabakh issue in particular 49 . The Turkish side, in turn, fears the consequences of such recognition, believing that this will entail demands for material compensation to the descendants of the victims, as well as possible territorial losses. Turkey's position on the issue of the Armenian Genocide back in 1991. Volkan Vural, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the USSR, announced that the fact of the genocide "has not been proven by Turkish history" 50 . In the early 1990s, Turkish policy led to the opposite effect, namely, to a sharp intensification of the efforts of the Armenian organizations of the Diaspora in lobbying for the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Suffice it to say that in the period 1991-2005. the historical fact of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire was recognized by more than 15 states, including members of the European Union - Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Cyprus, Greece, France, Slovakia, Holland, Poland, Lithuania, etc., as well as the Vatican and Switzerland . The recognition of the fact of the genocide by France led to a powerful round of protest and the rejection of bilateral economic agreements. Azerbaijan has also joined the Turkish protests. In the rhetoric of European politicians and in some official documents adopted by the EU, there are moderate calls for Turkey to "recognize the historical fact" of the Armenian Genocide and "come to terms with its past." The issue of recognizing the fact of the Armenian Genocide, in all likelihood, also serves as a powerful lever to block or slow down the process of Turkey's entry into the EU.

Turkey is pursuing an intensive policy of denying the fact of the Armenian Genocide and is taking active steps to oppose the process of its international recognition. In autumn 2000 The Turkish National Security Council made a decision according to which the issues related to the Armenian Genocide were raised to the rank of issues of Turkey's national security. In this regard, on the task of preventing the discussion of this topic in the US Congress in every possible way was entrusted to the Russian Foreign Ministry. May 26, 2001 On the initiative of the Turkish government, a "Coordinating Council to Combat Allegations of Genocide" was established 52 . In order to counteract the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish side actively involves the US Jewish lobby, thus trying to neutralize a possible discussion or adoption of resolutions on the Armenian Genocide in the US Congress. These efforts are supported by the top officials of Israel against the backdrop of the strategic partnership between Tel Aviv and Ankara, but sometimes they also encounter opposition from the public, scientific circles, and even officials from Israel and the Jewish diaspora 53 . A new Turkish initiative aimed at partially neutralizing the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide was the establishment in the summer of 2001. Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission (hereinafter ATRP) with the participation of several former diplomats and scientists from the Turkish and Armenian sides. In Azerbaijan, the creation of the Armenian-Turkish commission caused very negative, if not to say, clearly panicky moods. Murtuz Aleskerov, speaker of the Azerbaijani Milli Majlis, regarded this as a betrayal of Azerbaijan and spoke out against the establishment or improvement of cultural and economic ties between Armenia and Turkey 54 . According to Ilter Turkmen, a former Turkish foreign minister and one of the members of the ATCP, “this was the first attempt to establish a structural dialogue between the civil societies of Turkey, Armenia, and the Armenian Diaspora” 55 . Perhaps more frank were the statements in Baku by one of the Turkish members of the commission that “the main task of the commission is to prevent the issue of the Armenian Genocide from being permanently on the agenda of Western countries” 56 . During the third meeting, the members of the commission decided to apply to the International Center for Transitional Justice with a request to investigate this issue and make a decision on whether the massacres and deportation of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire fall under the definition of genocide according to the UN Convention of December 9, 1948 57 . Opposition, or it would be more correct to say - Ankara's attempts to deny the historical fact of the Genocide did not lead to a noticeable result. In his speech at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. RA President Robert Kocharian noted that "the continued denial of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire by modern Turkey only strengthens our desire to achieve historical justice" 58 . The official Turkish position on this issue is based on the formula "history should be left to historians." At the same time, the Turkish side does not stop making efforts to falsify historical

data and lobby for pro-Turkish positions in Western research institutes, the media and educational institutions. Colossal sums are allocated to support the "denial industry", but in some cases these steps take on such a rabid character that they provoke protest and indignation on the part of conscientious and incorruptible scientific circles 59 . It is obvious that with the recognition of the historical fact of the Armenian Genocide, the whole structure of the Turkish official historiography of the last decades collapses. And this, in turn, leads to an increase in the share of moral responsibility to their own citizens, from whom one of the bloodiest pages of Turkish history was hidden, which, in addition to the destruction of the Armenian population, included57 In the conclusion of the analysis of the International Center for Transitional Justice on the question of the legality of the application of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. to the events of 1915. states: “...the events, taken in their entirety, make it possible to assert that they include all the elements of the crime of genocide, as defined in the Convention, and thus legal scholars, as well as historians, politicians, journalists and others, are entitled to describe them henceforth thus". See The Applicability of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to Events which occurred during the Early Twentieth Century. See http://groong.com./ICTJ-analysis.html 58 For the text of the speech, see at www.president.am 59According to Taner Akcam, 10 million dollars are allocated annually for these needs, see Taner Akcam. Dialogue Across an International Divide, p. 14. See also Amy Magaro Rubin. Critics Accuse Turkish Government of Manipulating Scholarship, "The Chronicle of Higher Education", October 27, 1995. For more on the denial and falsification of the historical facts of the Armenian Genocide, see Vahakn N. Dadrian. The Key Elements in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and Falsification, The Zoryan Institute, Toronto, 1999. There were also facts of appropriation of their property by the new republican elites. The international recognition of the fact of the Armenian Genocide has become a powerful stimulus for the internal Turkish discourse around this problem, which was previously strictly taboo and under the tight control of state censorship. As Turkish researchers Bulent Araz and Havva Karakash-Kelesh point out, for the Kemalist system, based on the priority of the “supranational”, the recognition of the fact of the Armenian Genocide is impossible “because of the fear of losing its long dominance. Consequently, the denial of the fact of the Armenian Genocide has both historical and social foundations associated with Turkey's nationalist perception of its state establishment...and Turkey's refusal to recognize the Armenian Genocide is the result of ultra-nationalism - the still living legacy of the Kemalist ideology. This situation has existed since the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. In a sense, it is the weight of its almost century-old history that determines the foreign policy of today's Turkey” 60 . Given the rapid growth in the number of countries officially recognizing the Genocide, the position chosen by the authorities of the Republic of Turkey to deny the fact recognized by the international community and received an appropriate international legal assessment of the fact

is unpromising. There is no doubt that the authorities of the Republic of Turkey will have to agree with the decisions and recommendations of the international community on the public recognition of the genocide and on accountability for this heinous crime 61 . This statement is especially relevant in the context of Turkish aspirations to become a full member of the European Union and the possible inclusion of the issue of official recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey as a precondition for EU membership. Only through condemnation and readiness to assume the burden of responsibility is it possible to maximally mitigate the consequences of the genocide and create civilized prerequisites for establishing bilateral relations between neighboring peoples. At the same time, the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh is still viewed as the most real obstacle to the implementation of Turkey's geopolitical and geo-economic plans, and the revival of pan-Turkic and expansionist aspirations that have de facto entered the agenda of Turkish foreign policy may become serious challenge to the balance of power in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. With the coming to power in Ankara of the cabinet of Bulent Ecevit in the spring of 1999. Turkey's position towards Armenia became more and more hardened. This time, Ankara put forward an additional demand from Armenia to establish diplomatic relations in the form of providing the strategically important Meghri corridor directly connecting Turkey with Azerbaijan. Washington tried to make every effort to normalize relations between Yerevan and Ankara, and at the talks with S. Demirel during the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999. US President Bill Clinton called on the Turkish President to intensify relations with Yerevan. But S. Demirel again linked the issue of improving Turkish-Armenian relations with the settlement of the Karabakh conflict 62 . After the Istanbul OSCE summit, in January 2000. Turkish President S. Demirel came up with the idea of signing the "Caucasus Stability Pact", which, in the opinion of the Turkish side, is called upon to promote the establishment of cooperation, security and conflict resolution 63 . Yerevan clearly expressed its position on this Turkish initiative, stressing that it will be viable after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey. Moreover, President Kocharian came up with the initiative to create a "Caucasus Security Pact" with the inclusion of Turkey and Iran in it. At the same time, despite the pacifist rhetoric and the desire to act as a mediator in the Karabakh issue, Turkey, together with Azerbaijan, continues the policy of transport blockade of Armenia and in every possible way seeks to isolate it from regional transport and economic projects, such as TRACECA, INOGATE, the Silk Road and etc.

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OPENING OF THE TURKISH-ARMENIAN BORDER FOR ARMENIA

Even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Ankara has stepped up its political initiatives on the southern borders of the CIS. This activity in the South Caucasus was most pronounced in Georgia and Azerbaijan and was aimed at further isolating Armenia in the region and at the same time weakening Russia's positions. On this it would not be wrong to interpret Turkish activity only as Ankara's desire to successfully implement the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan export oil pipeline project. In fact, these initiatives are a manifestation of the internal and external crisis of the Turkish state, which over the past 10-15 years has not achieved any significant success both at the domestic political (except for the temporary neutralization of the PKK) and economic, and at the foreign policy levels (continued futile attempts to join the EU, euphoria about the possible establishment of a "Turkic union" is on the decline, etc.). The fact is that the Turkish establishment is trying to solve the existing and expected internal structural crises in the future through active external initiatives. This was especially clearly manifested in Ankara's position regarding military operations in Afghanistan: the initially negative attitude towards conducting large-scale operations in a short period was replaced by direct support for the anti-Taliban coalition. The direct military presence in the war zone suggests that Turkey expects to get "carte blanche" from the West in pursuing its neo-expansionist policy not only in the countries of Central Asia, but also in the South Caucasus64 . At the same time, it can be noted with confidence that such initiatives will not be effective if they are directed against the regional interests of Armenia and Russia. The assertion is also indisputable that without the establishment of more or less normal bilateral relations with the Republic of Armenia, Turkey will not achieve any advantages in the South Caucasus region. Against the backdrop of growing military-political cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan, Turkey is increasingly talking about the need for a partial “defeat” of tension in Armenian-Turkish relations 65 , in particular, a proposal is being put forward to open a Turkish trade mission in Armenia. At the same time, however, Ankara's position regarding the establishment of diplomatic should be noted that after the November 2002 parliamentary elections in Turkey, certain expectations arose regarding a change in Turkey's position in the Turkish-Armenian discourse, which intensified after the first positive signals received from Ankara. In particular, Turkish Foreign Minister Yashar Yakysh stated that “we will take into account Azerbaijan's concerns about Turkish-Armenian cooperation. But if our economic interests require establishing relations with Armenia, we will do it.” See Turkish Daily News, 17.12. 2002. Official Yerevan accepted this statement with marked satisfaction. However, Turkey continued to avoid a possible improvement in relations with Armenia, in every possible way looking back at the reaction of Azerbaijan. This relationship is still built on the preconditions noted above. And although the results of the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan in May 2002 in Reykjavik, as well as in June 2002 in Istanbul, are yet another evidence that one should not harbor special illusions about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey in the next In the future, however, one should analyze the pros and cons of opening the Turkish-Armenian border for Armenia itself after the possible establishment of bilateral relations and proceed in this analysis from the need to ensure the national security of the Republic of Armenia.

Since Turkey is crossed by railways and highways of strategic importance, especially for Armenia's access to the foreign market, the opening of the Turkish border is an integral part of the question of whether Armenia can effectively develop trade and economic relations in the context of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh problem. In certain circles of the Armenian establishment, there was and still exists the following point of view: the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border will lead to the normalization of relations with Turkey, gradually weaken the perception of Turkey as a threat to the security of Armenia and thereby reduce the level of Armenia's dependence in the spheres of economy and security from others. states56. Without denying the prospects for possible positive shifts, one should simultaneously pay attention to all those possible negative consequences and developments that will directly affect the interests of Armenia's national security. These problems, which have economic, political and other components, are of a general, interconnected nature, arising from the requirements of the full-fledged provision of national security. We consider it necessary to dwell on the following points: 1. Industrial safety . The opening of customs points on the Armenian-Turkish border and an increase in the flow of Armenian private entrepreneurs to Turkey will lead to a large-scale import of cheap Turkish industrial goods and essentials to Armenia, which will inevitably put a new, emerging national industry, completely stopping or slowing down the development of some of its branches. The Turkish "economic impact" will be sensitive, in particular, for Armenian companies producing food, textile and sanitary products. 2. Financial security. It is known that this area is the “Achilles heel” of the Turkish economic system. The policy of liberalization of the Turkish economy carried out in the 1980-90s by the former Prime Minister of Turkey, and later by its President Turgut Ozal, did not lead to the elimination of the chronic depreciation of the Turkish national currency - the lira, and this circumstance, along with other systemic problems, is one of the reasons recurring economic crises in the country. Under these conditions, the establishment of large-scale economic ties with Turkey will directly affect the economic situation in the Republic of Armenia, including the indicators of the stability of the Armenian national currency - the dram. 3. Export and import . Partial or complete replacement of the existing routes of Armenian exports and imports with transit routes passing through the territory of Turkey may lead to unwanted dependence, given the potential for new rounds of tension in the Armenian-Turkish relations. Such dependence can become extremely dangerous if Armenia becomes a transit country between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In this case, the likelihood of joint sabotage and reconnaissance operations of the Turkish and Azerbaijani special services will increase many times over. 4. Drug traffic . As a result of the opening of borders for intensive traffic and bilateral commercial ties, the likelihood of using the territory of the Republic of Armenia for the transport and transportation of drugs and other smuggled goods from Central Asia, Iran and Georgia, and probably also from Azerbaijan, will increase.

5. Emigration . The opening of the Armenian-Turkish border can become a new way for the population of Armenia to emigrate to Europe, which, of course, will be encouraged by the Turkish authorities. Presenting a far from complete list of possible negative consequences, the Armenian side should take into account that in the process of establishing bilateral Armenian-Turkish relations in the future, one should be guided by a realistic approach and sober calculation, attaching the utmost importance to the full security of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani-Turkish initiative to block the communication paths of Armenia is the most striking manifestation of the practical implementation of the idea of Turkic solidarity. Less well-known, but no less significant, is Turkey's military-economic assistance to Azerbaijan, although it turned out to be ineffective from a practical point of view. After gaining independence, Azerbaijan signed a number of Turkish-Azerbaijani agreements relating to cooperation in the economic, military and political fields. Obviously, the Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation is in opposition to the Armenian-Russian strategic partnership in the region. Turkey, unilaterally closing the border with Armenia and refusing to establish diplomatic relations with it, moreover, providing all kinds of assistance to Azerbaijan against the Republic of Armenia and the NKR, continues to be perceived by the Armenian side as part of the problem and a party to the conflict, and not part of its resolution 67. The Turkish blockade, although seen as an act to support its strategic ally Azerbaijan, according to Richard Giragosian, in itself poses a threat to Armenia's national security and goes beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or Turkey's relationship with Azerbaijan. According to the author, the Turkish role in the joint blockade of Armenia is motivated more by the desire to look like a regional power than by support for Azerbaijan 68 . During this period, Turkey's behavior towards Armenia can only be described as hostile. At the same time, attacks and threats against Turkish citizens of Armenian origin have become more frequent. Yes, in 1992. an attack was made on Armenian athletes returning from the Paniran Games to Armenia through Turkey. There were attempts to set fire to churches, schools and desecrate cemeteries in Istanbul 69 . After the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by France in early 2000, Former Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller called for the deportation of several tens of thousands of Armenian citizens of Armenia from Turkey. Research institutes working in Turkey, and the Armenian delegation was expelled from Kars, which was there at the invitation of the mayor of the city 70 . In general, the failed Turkish-Armenian dialogue was a manifestation of Turkey's uncompromising and openly hostile policy, which, through political, economic and military pressure, sought to obtain concessions from Armenia on the Karabakh issue, as well as refusal to support the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide, including by influencing organizations of the Armenian Diaspora. The issue of recognizing the fact of the Armenian Genocide and taking on obligations to eliminate its consequences will be Ankara's main arguments in its determination to further

democratize Turkish society, respect for human rights in the country and its sincere commitment to European values. As T. Akçam aptly remarked, a society that creates taboos around the discussion of historical events and establishes bans around it cannot have a democratic future 71 . Considering Armenia as an adversary state and acting from the position of ambitious, neo-imperial foreign policy, Turkey thereby sharply limited its geopolitical opportunities not only in the South Caucasus region, but throughout the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union.

CHAPTER THREE NEO-PANTURKISM IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND THE KARABAKH ISSUE The tense situation in the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations in the late 1980s did not leave indifferent both the leadership and the public of Turkey. On the whole, the initial position taken by the Turkish side can be characterized as restrained, or rather, expectant, due, first of all, to Ankara's unwillingness to provoke a negative reaction from the USSR. The Turkish media as a whole conducted a wait-and-see policy and transmitted mostly scarce information from Soviet information sources. All this, of course, does not apply to ultra-right publications, for which pan-Turkic themes and publications about the fate of "foreign Turks" were not new. After the Armenian pogroms in Sumgayit and the negative image of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis being replicated in the Western media, the Turkish press and television called on the country's leaders to be more actively interested in the fate of the "Soviet Turks". In this context, Turkey was concerned about the sympathy of the world community, in particular, the Western press towards the Armenian national movement, and Turkish periodicals reflected this mood on their pages. For example, the Moscow correspondent of the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet assessed the Armenian pogroms in Sumgait as follows: “What happened in Sumgait is explained by the indignation of the people and is an understandable reaction to the territorial demands of the Armenians” 1 . It should be noted that Turkish foreign intelligence has stepped up its activities in Azerbaijan and, in the person of the Popular Front, has found a reliable support for its residency. It is curious that the first pogroms of Armenians in Sumgayit were held under the slogan "Turkey will help us", and Turkish flags became an integral part of the demonstrations in Azerbaijan. Supporters of the Turkish ultra-national terrorist organization "Grey Wolves" have also appeared, and the leaders of the Azerbaijani Popular Front have already found themselves in the center of attention of Turkish foreign intelligence 2 .

The Karabakh movement was perceived in Turkey in the context of the Armenian demands for compensation for the consequences of the genocide, therefore, in the Turkish socio-political discourse, the possible success of the Armenians in the Karabakh issue was seen as the first step towards the resurrection of the “Sevres ghost” 3 , which Turkish politicians feared most of all. In general, interest in events on the other side of the border developed in Turkey on the rise. The demonstrations in Armenia and Azerbaijan, according to the Milliyet newspaper, "caused public attention in Turkey to be directed towards the Soviet Turks" 4 . If in the early days of the Karabakh movement, Turkish nationalist-Islamist publications considered the activation of the Karabakh issue as “the beginning of a crusade of the Soviets against the Turkish nation”, others, like “Hurriyet”, cited the statement of the head of the information service of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, I. Batu, that “Turkey has the right of speech in the issue of Nakhijevan” and that “this right also extends to NKAO and Zangezur” (“Hurriyet”, April 18, 1988) 5 . And the Milliyet newspaper in its issue of 04/02/1988 wrote that "according to a number of Turkish observers, if Nagorno-Karabakh is annexed to the Armenian SSR, then the Armenians will put forward territorial demands against Turkey as the next step" 6 . The Turkish press also regularly cited arguments about the historical belonging of Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh to the “Turkic people of Azerbaijan”. Also, in unison with the official circles, dissatisfaction was expressed with the position of the Western media, which, according to the Turkish side, spoke from pro-Armenian positions. At the same time, Hassan Koni, an employee of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, speaking on Turkish television in a discussion on the Karabakh issue, noted that the Turkish Foreign Ministry "indirectly" contacted the Soviet side, opposing "the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is Azerbaijani territory, to the Armenians" 7 . From the point of view of Turkey's initial position on the Karabakh issue, the publication of Ilnur Cevik, editor-in-chief of the English-language newspaper Turkish Daily News, in which it was noted that Turkey has nothing to do with Azerbaijan and that the West is trying to draw Turkey into the showdown between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Pointing to similar moments in the contradictions between Turkey and Bulgaria, the author made it clear that the West is striving to create a new scenario in which the Armenian-Azerbaijani contradictions will be portrayed as part of the "historical" confrontation between Turks and Armenians. Continuing his thought, I. Cevik notes that the Western media overly exploit the topic of the presence of Turkish flags at demonstrations in Baku and thereby try to push Turkey to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. “We sympathize with their (Azerbaijanis - G.D.) problems, but we have no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of any neighboring state.8 . Some circles in Turkey considered the involvement of the Karabakh issue even dangerous, rightly fearing the possibility of tension in Soviet-Turkish relations. The echoes of the Karabakh events in the Turkish media and in public circles at the initial stage were manifested primarily by concern about the possibility of changing the status of Nakhichevan without taking into account Turkey's opinion. Any talk about the possibility of

changing the status of the NKAR, and even more so - transferring the region to the Armenian SSR, caused some discomfort in Turkey, where the next demand of the Armenian side was the activation of the Nakhichevan issue. The fears emanating from the prospect of possible territorial changes on the part of the Soviet leadership soon made themselves felt, and the Turkish side, on various occasions, albeit cautiously, made very controversial, from the point of view of international agreements, statements about Turkey's status as a guarantor of Nakhichevan's security.9 . Decision of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR of December 1, 1989 about the entry of the NKAR into the Armenian SSR was unexpected for the Turkish side, and, according to the Milliyet newspaper, "turned the eyes of the Turkish government towards Armenia." And the former Turkish Foreign Minister V. Halefoglu stressed that “Soviet Armenia has neither the right, nor the authority, nor the power to make such a decision. This is a highly untenable solution. ” 10 In my eyes, for example, T. Atesh, professor at the Faculty of Economics of the Istanbul Faculty, compared the decision taken by the Armenian Parliament with the actions of “a child who insists on a ball that does not belong to him” 11 . Turkey's position towards Azerbaijan changed dramatically after the Armenian pogroms in Baku and the entry of Soviet troops into the capital of Azerbaijan in January 1990. After these events, Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz, criticized for "insufficient reaction" to the events in Azerbaijan, referring to the "natural right to closely monitor the situation in Azerbaijan", said that "Turkey is following the processes taking place in Azerbaijan with particular sensitivity, since Azerbaijanis have common cultural and linguistic ties” 12 . The Grand National Council of Turkey (GRNC), following discussions outside the agenda of events in Baku, condemned Moscow's decision to send troops to the Azerbaijani capital and demanded the immediate withdrawal of military units from Azerbaijan13 . After the entry of Soviet troops into Baku to suppress the anti-Soviet rebellion and prevent further pogroms of the Armenian population of the city, the Soviet side, in particular, TASS, commenting on some statements of the Turkish deputies of the VNST regarding the events in Azerbaijan, noted that they “do not meet the requirements of the normal development of the Soviet-Turkish relations” 14 . After these events, the ideas of turning to Turkey for help and creating a single state were increasingly discussed in the socio-political circles of Azerbaijan. Unprecedented in the history of the Soviet Union was the destruction of Soviet border facilities and communications along the entire length of the Soviet-Iranian border and on the Nakhichevan section of the Soviet-Turkish border in January 1990. This line also includes the fact that the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic announced its withdrawal from the USSR, the Supreme Council of which, at its extraordinary session on January 20, decided to join Turkey 15 . The decision of the Supreme Council of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic put the Turkish authorities, who were still afraid of serious complications in bilateral relations with the USSR, in a difficult position. However, after the meeting of the National Security Council with the participation of President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief of the

General Staff of Turkey, it was stated that Turkey "intends to use all legal rights in case of possible unforeseen developments" 16 . The reaction of the Turkish Foreign Ministry to these events was not long in coming. The Turkish Foreign Minister stated that he was satisfied that "Azerbaijan is trying to open up to the outside world" 17 . Immediately after the entry of Soviet troops into Baku, Turkish President Turgut Ozal, who was undergoing treatment in the United States, made a sensational statement that "Azerbaijanis are Shiites by faith and are closer to Iran." At the same time, T. Ozal dissociated himself from the Karabakh issue, pointing out that the Armenian-Azerbaijani problem cannot bear any parallels with the Turkish-Armenian historical issue 18 . True, later, in an interview with the French magazine Politique e'trange're, T. Ozal stated the following: “In my opinion, separatism, similar to Lithuanian, is gaining strength. And the clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which arose because of the unacceptable claims of the Republic of Armenia to the historical Azerbaijani lands, should not be used to suppress separatist movements” 19 . The first statement of the Turkish president generated strong indignation among a wide range of Turkish socio-political organizations, causing bewilderment and criticism from the former President of Turkey Kenan Evren, deputies of the Supreme National Assembly and ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Turkey. The chairman of the "Azerbaijani Society" operating in Ankara, Feyzi Akyuzum, noted on this occasion that what is happening in Azerbaijan is not a religious, but a national revival, and that the Turkism of Azerbaijan will fail without the assistance and patronage of Turkey. At the same time, he expressed regret that people like Özal, who were elected to the post of the country's president, could make such statements on behalf of Turkey 20 . Despite the fact that there is a certain consensus in the research literature about T. Ozal's statement and its interpretation as Turkey's dissociation from the events in Azerbaijan, it, at the same time, had a very specific goal. Firstly, Ozal emphasized the religious side of the conflict, which was typical for deceitful rhetoric in interpreting the origins of the conflict, and secondly, he thus veiled the true reason for Turkish attention to Azerbaijan, trying to shift the emphasis towards Iran and thereby provide his own, so to speak, geopolitical alibi about pan-Turkist aspirations, and at the same time set Iran vs Armenia. A week after the Baku events, at a meeting of the NATO Council, Turkey's permanent representative to this organization, Unal Unsal, spoke on the situation in Azerbaijan and pointed out three main points. First, Turkey expected the NATO member countries to show the same attention to the events in Azerbaijan that they pay to the "nationalist movements" in the Soviet Baltic republics and thereby confirm that the bloc is not pursuing a policy of "double standards". Secondly, it was pointed out that only the point of view of the Armenian side is reflected in the Western media, and, according to Turkey, the approach of the Azerbaijani side is also of great importance: the West will not be able to draw the right conclusions based only on one-sided

information. At the same time, the Turkish representative made a reservation21 . Representatives of the member countries of the North Atlantic bloc ignored U. Unsala's statement. With the weakening of the Soviet Union, Turkey's interest in the Karabakh issue increased noticeably. In this regard, it is also noteworthy that the visit of the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev to Turkey immediately after the signing of the Zheleznovodsk agreements was given special importance for obtaining first-hand information about the ongoing events, so to speak. N. Nazarbayev thus acted not only as an intermediary between the parties, but also between Turkey, ensuring its indirect influence on the processes 22 . After the adoption of the Act on the Sovereignty of Azerbaijan in September 1991, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a special statement that “Turkey met with approval and understanding the decision to declare independence of the fraternal Azerbaijani people, with whom we are connected by common historical and cultural values. We believe that this decision will be carried out in accordance with the desire and will of the people themselves, within the framework of the restructuring processes initiated by our northern neighbor, through peaceful negotiations between the parties” 23 . On September 7, 1991, the Vesti program of Russian television reported that the chairman of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan, E. Kafarova, met with the Turkish ambassador to the USSR and asked that Turkey not yet declare recognition of Azerbaijan by Turkey, otherwise, as she put it, "Nagorno-Karabakh will be taken away from Azerbaijan" 24 . A few hours later, a message was broadcast on Azerbaijani television refuting this information with reference to the provocations of the “Armenian lobby” 25 . Was it random? Most likely, the Azerbaijani side was afraid that after Turkey recognized the independence of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, on the basis of the current Soviet laws, could legally secede from Azerbaijan, which was subsequently done. One of the first to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan (November 9, 1991) and the Central Asian republics, the Turkish side at the same time expressed its readiness to act as a mediator in the Karabakh issue. Thus, with the recognition of Azerbaijan's independence, Turkey crossed the rubicon between the previous, more cautious policy and an openly pro-Azerbaijani position. After the collapse of the USSR, Turkey's active efforts in the Karabakh issue were intended to show that Ankara is ready to provide all possible assistance to its relatives, not only in words, but also in concrete deeds. Undoubtedly, the South Caucasus, from a geopolitical point of view, occupied a strategically important position in terms of establishing a direct connection between the North Caucasian, Volga, Central Asian Turkic-speaking area and Turkey. For Turkey, the geographic location of Azerbaijan seemed most important, since, as Zbigniew Brzezinski notes, “the independence of the states of Central Asia can be seen as a practically meaningless concept if Azerbaijan is completely subject to Moscow control” 26 .

Based on this paradigm, Turkey recognized the following as priority tasks in relation to Azerbaijan: - promoting the independence of Azerbaijan; - assistance in ensuring Azerbaijan's control over Nagorno-Karabakh; - the desire to stop the strengthening of Russia's positions in the region; - participation in the extraction of Azerbaijani oil and its transportation through Turkey; - preservation of a friendly pro-Turkish government in Azerbaijan 27 . In 1992 The Iranian newspaper Resalat, quoting the words of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Vayezi, wrote that “Turkey pursues three main goals in the Karabakh issue: firstly, to increase its authority in Azerbaijan and pave the way to Central Asia, and secondly, to consign to oblivion the Armenian-Turkish enmity and, finally, thirdly, to fulfill the obligations in the region assigned to it by Europe and the USA...” 28 . Of course, Turkey was not interested in the emergence of a hotbed of military tension near its northeastern borders in the context of the ongoing Kurdish armed resistance in the eastern vilayets. One of the manifestations of such sentiments can be the message of the Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel to his Azerbaijani counterpart Hasan Hasanov after the abolition of the autonomous status of the NKAR. In this message, S. Demirel called on the Azerbaijani side to refrain from drastic steps, “not to succumb to provocations” and “not to aggravate the situation by making decisions that in the future may lead to undesirable consequences” 29 . In his reply message, Gasan Hasanov welcomed the Turkish mediation in the settlement of the Karabakh issue 30 . It should be noted that this message of S. Demirel caused some dissatisfaction in Azerbaijan, where Turkey was expected to have an unconditional and clear pro-Azerbaijani position on the Karabakh issue. Against this background, Turkish circles did not lose a convenient pretext for criticizing the West and expressing their dissatisfaction with the "pro-Armenian" position of the latter 31 . And yet it was clear that Ankara was not at all going to play the role of an "honest broker" in the Karabakh issue. Both the leading circles and the Turkish public were in favor of this issue in the name of Azerbaijan. Turkish leaders very often referred to the pressure of public opinion in their aggressive statements against Armenia, but such rhetoric was only a reliable cover to justify the expansionist and ambitious foreign policy line 32 . It is worth noting that Turkey tried in every possible way to disguise its involvement in the conflict zones in the Balkans and the Caucasus with convenient official rhetoric, referring to the presence of Turkish citizens of one origin or another, who, they say, sympathize with the fate of their compatriots. In the spring of 1992 T. Ozal, referring to the hostilities in Karabakh, noted that Turkey will take a neutral position if the war does not expand, otherwise it will be difficult to do, since 2-3 million

Azerbaijanis live in Turkey 33 . Rallies and demonstrations in solidarity with Azerbaijanis were especially active in Ankara, Istanbul and Kars. The latter circumstance was due to the fact that in Kars and its environs in 1918-1925. settled Turkic-speaking immigrants from Armenia, who called themselves Azerbaijanis 34 . Quite significant is the fact that during a public opinion poll in Turkey in July 1992. 51% of opponents and 38% of supporters of the military intervention of the Turkish government and assistance to Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict were recorded 35 . The resolution of the conflict in favor of Azerbaijan would undoubtedly bring a lot of political dividends to Turkey, especially since Turkish foreign policy initiatives were supported by Baku, and part of the Azerbaijani political elite has repeatedly expressed its readiness to enter into an interstate alliance with Turkey on the basis of ethno-linguistic and cultural community. Pan-Turkic sentiments were particularly pronounced during the presidency of the leader of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, although it should be noted that the pro-Turkish orientation of Azerbaijan in foreign policy has always had a strong position, since all more or less influential political forces in the country were pro-Turkish 36 . At the beginning of 1992 Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel stated that Turkey will be able to contribute to the settlement of the conflict if Armenia and Azerbaijan trust it 37 . On the other hand, the pressure of the Turkish public on the authorities in the issue of providing comprehensive and "effective" assistance to the Azerbaijanis increased. These sentiments became especially strong after the Armenian formations occupied the village of Khojaly and the city of Shushi. At the beginning of March 1992 Chairman of the Society for Culture, Arts and Friendship with Azerbaijan operating in Izmir Namyk Kemal Babekar and reserve officer Ziya Keseoglu expressed their willingness to fight against the Armenians as volunteers. Rallies in solidarity with the Azerbaijani side were also organized by students from the universities of Istanbul and Ankara38 . In turn, the leader of the ultra-nationalist Turkish Nationalist Action Party and the Gray Wolves, Alparslan Turkes, did not miss the chance to speak out with the rhetoric of pan-Turkic solidarity 39 . Demanding that the Turkish Parliament adopt a decision condemning Armenia and authorizing armed intervention, he stressed that "Turkey cannot remain inactive when the territories of Azerbaijan are seized" 40 . Addressing the speaker of the HNST Husamettin Cindoruk, he proposed to convene an assembly in Ankara with the participation of parliamentarians from Turkey and the Turkic-speaking states to develop a common "Turkic" position around the Karabakh problem 41. At this meeting, Mesut Yilmaz proposed to deploy Turkish military formations along the Turkish-Armenian border, while recalling that Turkey has the status of a guarantor in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh 42 . To increase the effectiveness of propaganda and develop a common position on this issue among the audience of Turkic-speaking countries and childbirth, Ankara also used the possibilities of satellite television and the Union of Turkic World News Agencies 43 .

At the same time, Turkish President Turgut Ozal, in unison with the opposition, sharply criticized the position of the Demirel government on the Karabakh issue, urging him to take more decisive action. Mesut Yilmaz, chairman of the Fatherland (Anavatan) party, in turn, stated that “on the issue of the status of Karabakh, Turkey has obligations arising from international agreements, and without the consent of Turkey it is impossible to change the status of Karabakh” 44 . After the liberation of the city of Shushi by the Armenian self-defense forces, S. Demirel, speaking at an emergency meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, convened to discuss the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh, said that what happened in Shushi is "another terror of Armenians against Azerbaijanis." Demirel called the failure to prevent the "capture of Shusha" a "real disaster." Continuing his thought, the Turkish prime minister stressed that henceforth Turkey cannot be in the role of an outside observer, "when an attempt to resolve the Karabakh conflict by force is obvious" 45 . The escalation of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh largely contributed to the strengthening of nationalist sentiments within Turkish society. And for some opposition figures, such as Bulent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Turkes, these events served as a convenient pretext for criticizing the authorities in the internal political struggle, although each of them had his own vision of Turkey's role in the Karabakh issue 46 . Opposition figures took advantage of the opportunity to criticize the government, accusing the authorities of "betraying the Azerbaijani brothers." Among the supporters of aggressive actions against Armenia, the leader of the Democratic Left Party B. Ecevit stood out. He was a supporter of the introduction of Turkish troops into Nakhichevan "to repulse the Armenian forces" 47 . And this is not an accident. Indeed, by the direct decision of B. Ecevit in 1974, Turkish troops landed in Northern Cyprus, and the Turkish military contingent is still located on the island. Speaking at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, he proposed the suspension to develop the sending of humanitarian cargoes to Armenia through the air corridor of Turkey. “If the government of Turkey wishes,” said B. Ecevit, “without involvement in hostilities, it is necessary to provide assistance to Azerbaijan, at the same time assisting the military training of the Azerbaijani armed forces” 48 . According to Ecevit, delay or abstaining from decisive action may ultimately lead to the loss of both Turkey's authority in Azerbaijan and Central Asia and the loss of confidence in the Turkish political model 49 . Already in 1992. it became clear that the role and authority of Turkey in Central Asia in the future depends on the final outcome of the Karabakh confrontation. Trying to compensate for the limited possibility of military intervention in the Karabakh war, Turkey directed its efforts to lobbying the pro-Azerbaijani position around the Karabakh issue in international organizations. Its activity in this regard was clearly manifested in various initiatives within the framework of the UN, the CSCE, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, etc. During the CSCE summit in Prague, it was thanks to Turkish activity that Karabakh was recognized as part of Azerbaijan, and after the military successes of the Armenian forces during

the counter-offensives in 1993. Ankara strenuously sought the adoption of a resolution condemning Armenia in the UN Security Council. In October 1993 Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller sent a message to the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali and the heads of the member states of the Security Council, calling for an end to "Armenian aggression", which is a "threat to peace and security in the region" 50 . At the same time, T. Chiller made a visit to the United States, the purpose of which was to get the United States to oppose the counteroffensive of the Armenian forces with the main motivation that if the Armenians succeeded, the region would again be under the influence of Russia 51 . During the same period, Turkish leaders repeatedly made aggressive and militant statements. After the liberation of Shushi in May 1992, while in Houston, T. Ozal hinted at the need to send troops to Nakhichevan. Otherwise, in his opinion, "the events that took place in Nagorno-Karabakh could be repeated there." At the same time, S. Demirel was quick to compare "Armenia's actions" with the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait 52 . After the fall of Kalbajar in April 1993. T. Ozal came out with a desire to “frighten the Armenians a little” or “to throw a few bombs on the Armenian territory - to intimidate” 53 . T. Ozal substantiated his decision by the fact that without outside intervention it is impossible to achieve a ceasefire. In addition to threats against Armenia, T. Ozal has repeatedly demanded to stop the supply of foreign cargo to Armenia through Turkey. Most likely, it was these statements that inspired the loaders of the Turkish port of Mersin, who refused to unload the goods addressed to Armenia 54 . The arrogance, or it would be more correct to say, the feeling of impunity of the Turkish president reached the point that, alluding to the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915-1918, he openly stated that “Armenians did not learn a lesson from what happened in Anatolia” 55 . Continuing his thought, the Turkish president added: “If they try the same thing here (in Azerbaijan - G.D.), relying on the help of this or that country (hinting Russia - G.D.), then something awaits them » 56 . Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin noted that Turkey would not allow the status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be changed by force and that Armenia would be responsible for the consequences of such initiatives 57 . In this regard, the definitions of the Argentine newspaper La Prensa are very precise, who wrote that “Turkey is looking for an excuse to intervene militarily on the side of Azerbaijan and thus take a leading position in the former Soviet Muslim republics” 58 . Internal political disagreements and the struggle for power in Turkey also emerged in the situation around the Karabakh conflict. This primarily applies to the confrontation Ozal-Demirel. The more cautious and balanced approach of S. Demirel differed from the ambitious speeches of President T. Ozal. In his interview to the French newspaper Le Figaro, Demirel, having

criticized Ozal's statements about the need to "frighten the Armenians a little", directly connected such "amateur activity" with the violation of the president's powers given by the Turkish Constitution. “In order to find out who governs the country, look not at those who speak (a hint of T. Ozal - G.D.), but at those who act,” said S. Demirel 59. Elsewhere, referring again to Ozal's said statement, Demirel characterized it as "very erroneous" 60 . Different approaches to the Karabakh conflict among the Turkish political elite, in addition to ideological incompatibility, were also a manifestation of the domestic political crisis, which became apparent after the defeat of the Fatherland party of Turgut Ozal in the parliamentary elections in 1991. Avoiding the pressure of political opponents in every possible way, especially the militant right, S. Demirel explained the incompetence and danger of Turkish military intervention by the fact that “when making political decisions, it is unacceptable to be led by street emotions” 61 . Analyzing Turkey's position on the Karabakh issue, we can conclude that in its ambitious foreign policy in this issue, Ankara lost rather than won. After all, it is obvious that a more flexible policy towards Armenia, and even more so in the Karabakh issue, would promise Turkey concrete advantages in terms of strengthening its positions not only in the South Caucasus, but also in Central Asia. One can agree with Svante Kornel's assertion that to some extent the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be seen as a test of Turkey's ability to act in the early 1990s as an independent regional power in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moreover, according to some researchers, Tashkent and Almaty were closely following Turkey's actions precisely in the context of those of the Karabakh conflict. It is obvious that these actions ultimately debunked the illusions that may have existed about Turkey as a regional power 62 . According to Turkish professor Zia Onish, in case of pursuing a more far-sighted foreign policy and establishing good neighborly relations with Armenia, Turkey would gain more political dividends than from laying oil and gas pipelines and the successful implementation of these programs 63 . By pursuing an active foreign policy, in particular in the Karabakh issue, the Turkish leadership overestimated its capabilities in terms of implementing the outlined foreign policy programs. Moreover, making aggressive, militant statements, but not being able to put them into practice, Ankara found itself in a kind of dead end of its own ambitions, subsequently content with the role of just a supplier of weapons and military equipment to Azerbaijan.

CHAPTER FOUR TURKISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE DURING THE KARABAKH WAR

TO

AZERBAIJAN

Geopolitical changes led to the revision by Turkey of the old military doctrines and their adaptation to new, neo-Pan-Turkic tasks in the southern regions of the former USSR and in the Balkans. After the annexation of Northern Cyprus, the Turkish armed forces were actively involved in the organization of military operations, and the limited contingents of the Turkish Armed Forces were directly involved in hostilities in conflict zones. In the context of the new military doctrine of a limited but effective presence, Turkish generals after the Balkans attached great importance to the Karabakh theater of military operations, the outcome of which significantly depended on the implementation of Ankara's neo-Pan-Turkist foreign policy plans in relation to the southern periphery of the former USSR. If at the initial stage of the Karabakh confrontation, official Ankara took a neutral position, considering the Karabakh issue an internal affair of the Soviet Union, then already in the early 90s, the political circles and the public of Turkey sharply intensified their actions in the direction of ensuring a pro-Azerbaijani position on this issue. To achieve its goals, and first of all - to ensure its influence in Azerbaijan, Ankara provided this country with comprehensive diplomatic, economic, as well as military and military-technical assistance. The manifestation of Turkic solidarity in the Karabakh issue in the first half of the 90s did not bypass the military sphere either. The development of events in the zone of the Karabakh conflict once again testifies to the direct involvement of Turkey in the conflict on the side of Azerbaijan, including by providing the latter with tangible military assistance. The first official information about the provision of military assistance to Azerbaijan by Turkey appeared in a TASS report dated January 24, 1990. In it, a warning was issued to the Turkish side for the supply of weapons and ammunition to Nakhichevan 1 . Official Moscow also rejected the proposals of the Turkish side, in particular, the Turkish Red Crescent, to provide humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan, pointing out that it cannot accept aid provided "with political intentions" 2 . By that time, according to Azerbaijani sources, Turkish citizens had already taken part in the first clashes with Armenian irregular units - more than a dozen militants from the extremist organization "Gray Wolves", who had crossed the 3rd Nakhichevan section of the Soviet- Turkish border. Back in mid-1991, the Turkish newspaper Milliyet wrote that “if the Armenians try to carry out a massive attack on Karabakh, Turkey will have to intervene. The Turkish government has informed Moscow of this.” Any other government, according to the paper, would have done the same .

In this sense, Turkey's comprehensive interest in Azerbaijan in the last months of the existence of the Soviet Union did not bypass the sphere of military cooperation. Already in October 1991, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Army General Dogan Gyures 5 visited Baku . Already in the first months of 1992, it became obvious that the prospect of securing Turkish influence in Central Asia depended to a large extent on the outcome of the Karabakh confrontation. It is no coincidence that B. Ecevit, being in opposition at that time, said that "the indecision of the Turkish government in the issue of providing assistance to Azerbaijan could ultimately lead to the loss of confidence in Azerbaijan and Central Asia in the Turkish political model" 6 . Ankara's futile attempts to act as a mediator in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict directly predetermined the decision of the Turkish authorities to promote Baku's military victory over Stepanakert by providing military support. It should be noted that such support and assistance was provided to Azerbaijan even before the formation of the Azerbaijani armed forces as such. Already in 1991-1992. the Turkish side carried out secret operations transfer of weapons and military uniforms to Azerbaijan. In particular, during this time, as a result of two air shipments, about 5,000 machine guns, a large number of uniforms and mortars were delivered to Nakhichevan 7 . In parallel with the supply of weapons and uniforms, the Turkish side also began organizing the training of Azerbaijani officers and soldiers in military schools in both Turkey and Azerbaijan. It is symptomatic that at the end of January 1992, during an official visit to Turkey by Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov, an agreement was reached on the retraining of Azerbaijani officers in Turkish military schools. According to the Azerbaijani President, Baku hoped for Turkey's support in creating its own army 8. Speaking about the role of Turkey in the Karabakh issue, Mutalibov noted that Turkey's neutral position on this issue during the existence of the USSR was correct, but "today Azerbaijan is an independent state ... and in the current conditions, Turkey must be aware that the issue has an international character and must help us . " Thus, from that moment on, Turkey assumed the main role in the military development of Azerbaijan. The basis of the Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation in the military sphere was laid by the agreement signed in August 1992, as well as subsequent agreements in this area. As noted, Turkish leaders believed that it would be impossible to achieve a ceasefire in the conflict zone without external pressure . In March 1992, Azerbaijani Prime Minister G. Hasanov addressed an official message to Turkish President T. Ozal and Prime Minister S. Demirel, "counting on urgent assistance from brothers and relatives" 11 . At the same time, Turkish military inspectors began training about 450 Azerbaijani conscripts for territory of the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan 12. It is important to note that in the issue of supplying the Azerbaijani forces with weapons and ammunition, the Turkish side showed some caution, fearing possible revelations if weapons either of Turkish production or delivered from NATO warehouses get into Azerbaijan. For this reason, Ankara

mainly supplied to Azerbaijan weapons of the Iraqi army of Soviet production, which were in large quantities in the possession of the Turkish military after the end of the war in the Persian Gulf, as well as trophy stocks taken from the Kurdish partisans. Moreover, since 1990, Turkey has been importing Soviet-style weapons from the arsenals of the army of the former GDR. A direct confirmation of the supply of "German weapons" to Azerbaijan by Turkey is a letter of protest from the German organization "Union of Enslaved Peoples",13 . It is symptomatic that on February 20, 1992. Hearings were held in the Russian Parliament with the participation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Forces of the CIS Marshal E. Shaposhnikov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation A. Kozyrev, where, in particular, the nature of the exercises of the third field army of Turkey near the Turkish-Armenian border was discussed. At that time, seven thousand servicemen of the Turkish army were involved in the exercises, who were deployed along the Kars-Sarykamysh-Igdir line in full wartime staff. As a rule, in the case of the participation of Turkish military personnel in exercises near the border in such a volume, the Turkish side was not obliged to notify neighbors in advance. At the same time, it was noted that "the actions of the Turkish military are caused by the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, and that the exercises of the Turkish troops are not similar to those that were carried out before"14 . In addition to the direct participation of individual Turkish detachments in the hostilities on the Karabakh fronts, about 150 high-ranking officers of the Turkish army, including 10 generals (retired - G.D.), at the beginning of 1992. took an active part in the development of combat operations and training of assault and sabotage units of the Azerbaijani army 15 . According to the Russian press, these officers, although retired, were nevertheless experienced professional soldiers selected by a special commission of the Turkish Army General Staff 16 . Against this background, it is not surprising that Turkish General Yashar Demirbulak, who later became a member of the Security Council of Azerbaijan, became a military adviser to the new President of Azerbaijan A. Elchibey 17 . According to the Turkish press, along with the delegation of Turkish officers to Azerbaijan, Ankara provided Azerbaijan with a loan of $30 million to purchase Turkish weapons 18 . In parallel with the military structures, the Turkish “National Intelligence Organization” (Turkish abbr. - MIT) has also stepped up its activities, closely cooperating with pan-Turkist organizations, in particular with the Azerbaijani branch of the ultranationalist Turkish organization “Grey Wolves”, which is the radical wing of the Turkish “Party of the Nationalist movement” (PND) under the leadership of A. Turkes. The nationalist views of the MHP were distinguished by a pronounced pan-Turkic and pan-Turanist character 19 . "Grey wolves" in Azerbaijan were in a legal position. There were about 15 thousand members of the organization, and all of them were "under arms", serving in the National Army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as in independent armed groups 20. The activities of the "Grey Wolves" in the territory of Azerbaijan were not limited only to participation in hostilities, but was also aimed at strengthening the positions of this organization in Azerbaijan. It is no coincidence that the leader of the Azerbaijani "Grey Wolves" Iskander

Hamidov considered the Azerbaijani "Bozkurt" (the Turkish name of the organization) the guarantor of the security of the Azerbaijani people and the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan 21 . According to the Turkish press, on the initiative of the leader of the Turkish "Grey Wolves" Alparslan Turkesh, about 300 "Bozkurt" militants were sent to Azerbaijan, the expenses of which were covered by the IGY 22 . It is worth noting that MIT activities are always synchronized with the plans of the Turkish General Staff 23 . It follows from this that both power structures of Turkey acted on the territory of Azerbaijan in close cooperation. In addition to intelligence activities and providing operational information to the Azerbaijani side, not far from Baku, at the Nasosnaya station, the IGY organized a training center for the training of sabotage and reconnaissance groups 24 . And near the Turkish-Armenian border, in the provinces of Kars and Igdir, on the territory of special units of the Third Field Army of Turkey, the Gray Wolves organization began recruiting and training Turkish volunteers for their further transfer to Azerbaijan. To complete the picture, let us note that, for example, only 237 volunteers came to the assembly point of the Turkish city of Seydishehir, expressing their desire to fight against the Armenians 25 . Azerbaijani officers also recruited Turkish mercenaries in Turkey. One of the Turkish prisoners of war, a native of the city of Sivaz, A. Yumakh, admitted that a group of officers from the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan recruited Turkish mercenaries to participate in hostilities in Karabakh, mainly among the poor sections of the population of Trebizond, Ankara, Kars, etc. 26 . "Literaturnaya Gazeta", with reference to its own information, in September 1992. wrote about the facts of the Turkish authorities closing the airspace on the outskirts of Azerbaijan and refusing to fly over a large area to civilian airliners. This is due to the fact that since the spring of 1992. Turkish officers, “reservists” who had served in the Turkish national army, were transported from Erzurum to Azerbaijan on Turkish Air Force planes. According to the newspaper, their age is 30-35 years, which is clearly too early to be transferred to the reserve 27 . As of 1992, about 3,000 Turkish mercenaries and volunteers were stationed in Nakhichevan and other regions of Azerbaijan . Future personnel for the Azerbaijani army were also trained at Turkish military bases, in particular, in the Sarikamysh Mountain Garrison. According to Turkish soldiers, the financial expenses of the Azerbaijani units were covered by Saudi Arabia 29 . According to the Russian press, at the end of 1992, between 5,000 and 6,000 Turkish officers and soldiers were transferred from Turkey to Azerbaijan. The provision of Turkish military and military-technical assistance to Azerbaijan through official and unofficial channels undoubtedly posed a serious threat in terms of the expansion and further escalation of the conflict. But the latter circumstance clearly did not bother the Turkish authorities, who sought to increase these deliveries and, thus, increase the chances of the Azerbaijani army for a military victory.

According to the Turkish weekly Gercek, under the guise of medicines and food, by June 1992, five thousand Stinger missiles, rocket launchers, mines and mortars, including anti-tank ones, were delivered from Turkey to Azerbaijan. The same source indicates that the government tried not to include Turkish-made weapons in this batch in order to avoid accidental publicity, and mainly light small arms of Soviet or Eastern European production, taken as trophies from Kurdish rebels during the punitive operations of the Turkish army, were included in the batch. in Eastern Anatolia 31 . With the growing tension in the Armenian-Turkish relations, under the pretext of military exercises from the Turkish side to the border with large military units, including armored units, deployed to wartime states, were periodically pulled up to the border with Armenia. These activities, similar to "flexing muscles", certainly pursued the goal of intimidating and blackmailing the Armenian side with the possibility of Turkish military intervention in the conflict. In the spring of 1992, when the situation on the Nakhichevan section of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border was aggravated, analysts pointed to the likelihood of such an intervention. At the same time, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Ground Forces, Mukhittin Fisunoglu, stated that “all the necessary preparations have been made and the army is waiting for an order from Ankara in order to march” 32 . It was obvious that “there was no large-scale aggression and aggressive plans on the part of Armenia against Nakhichevan. What happened can be regarded as a deliberate fanning of anti-Armenian hysteria by certain political circles in Turkey” 33. It must be assumed that the Turkish authorities thus probed the state of affairs on the southern borders of the CIS, trying to identify the potential and viability of the CIS Collective Security Treaty signed in May 1992 in Tashkent. Under the far-fetched pretext of "aggression" on the Armenian side, the Turkish government, in essence, presented an ultimatum to Armenia, while appealing to the Kars Treaty of 1921. Referring to some provisions of this agreement, Ankara claimed that it was the guarantor of the security and inviolability of the borders of Nakhijevan. However, it was clear that this was done "in order to pave the way for direct intervention" 34 . Based on the current unforeseen situation, on May 20, 1992, speaking at a press conference, the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces, Air Marshal E. Shaposhnikov, warned the Turkish side, stating that “if one more side is added there, then we may be on the verge of a third world war" 35 . In turn, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Turkey, Albert Chernyshev, referring to Moscow's possible reaction to Turkey's intervention in conflict, noted that "the Treaty of Kars of 1921 gives neither Turkey nor Russia the right to military intervention" 36 . These statements had a significant impact on the further behavior of the Turkish military and political circles in relation to Armenia and the Karabakh problem. Moscow's warning against a possible military action by Turkey in the zone of Karabakh confrontation came from the desire of the Russian leadership to prevent a sharp change in the balance of power in the South Caucasus and the emergence of new threats to the national security of the Russian Federation. Moreover, in the case of Russia and Iran, Turkish

intervention would be regarded as a direct threat to the territorial integrity of these countries due to the rather significant proportion of Turkic-speaking peoples in their population. It should be added that Turkey felt constrained in the Karabakh issue, as the international community did not recognize the direct participation of Armenia in the conflict. It is for this reason that Ankara sought to play the Nakhichevan card. A possible Turkish military intervention in the conflict in the Caucasus would create a dangerous precedent for armed confrontation between Russia and Turkey in the new geopolitical environment that has developed since the end of the Cold War. Such an intervention could also entail undesirable complications for Turkey itself, in particular, seriously complicating the process of its accession to the European Union and causing dissatisfaction among NATO allies 37 . Turkey's military intervention in the Karabakh conflict did not suit the United States either, and this was stated by State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutuyler 38 . The Turkish leadership, perhaps at the very last moment, realized that direct intervention in the conflict across the Araks River would further aggravate Turkey's relations with Russia and Iran, and also cause serious dissatisfaction in the world community. Another important factor that directly influenced the decision of the Turkish authorities was the issue of the Armenian Genocide of 1915: by committing a military action, Ankara would thereby prove its aggressive position towards the Armenians and Armenia. It is no coincidence that Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel said that “although the Turks cannot be indifferent to the suffering of Azerbaijanis, but one wrong step of his country can lead to the fact that the whole world will support Armenia” 39 . Despite the warning of Marshal E. Shaposhnikov, Turkey continued to provide military and military-technical assistance to Azerbaijan. According to Western military analysts, the military successes of the Azerbaijani army during the large-scale offensive in the summer of 1992 were due to the participation of Turkish volunteers in military operations 40 . At the start of the offensive, the Azerbaijani troops were also assisted by 40 senior officers of the Turkish army, who shortly thereafter were sent into early retirement in order to be able to support their Azerbaijani brethren 41 . These successes were also due to the offensive military operations of the Azerbaijani army, developed and implemented by Major General of the Turkish Army Khalil Kalaichi. Back in May 1992, during the visit of Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Hyusamettin Cindoruk to Baku, General Kalaichi was appointed to the "very important" position of military attaché 42 . According to the Russian media, Turkish military specialists took an active part in the operation to liquidate the Lachin humanitarian corridor between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in August 1992 43. Against this background, it is no coincidence that in March 1993, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev called the cessation of military and military-technical assistance from Turkey to Azerbaijan one of the preconditions for the development of Turkish-Russian cooperation in the military sphere 44 . Later, during an official visit to Turkey in May 1993, P. Grachev expressed regret that some countries were supplying weapons and ammunition to Azerbaijan 45 , clearly alluding to Turkish military supplies.

It should be noted that during the period of hostilities, Baku repeatedly turned to Ankara with a request for direct military intervention. After the fall of the city of Shushi in early May 1992, the vice-speaker of the Azerbaijani parliament, Tamerlan Karaev, stated that if events continue in this direction, the leadership of Azerbaijan reserves the right to turn to Turkey with a request to “stop the aggression of Armenia” 46 . However, this was not necessary, since Turkey already provided substantial military assistance. On the other hand, official Baku highly appreciated Turkey's lobbying of its interests in the international arena, which aimed to persuade the international community to accept the Azerbaijani point of view regarding the Karabakh problem 47 . Official Ankara sought to dissociate itself from the facts of its own military presence in Azerbaijan at every opportunity. In an interview, Turkish Defense Minister Nevzat Ayaz, referring to the issue of the presence of high-ranking Turkish retired officers in Azerbaijan, noted that this has nothing to do with the Turkish government, since it is a personal matter for everyone, and that “the Turkish government does not have the ability to encourage or prohibit their activities” 48 . However, the Turkish government is known to have been directly involved in these initiatives and, according to the Turkish weekly Ikibine Dogru, The recruitment of Turkish officers for their subsequent dispatch to Azerbaijan was carried out at the expense of the "secret funds" of the state, and each officer was given a monthly salary of 7,500 US dollars 49 . The direct Turkish military presence in the early 90s was noticeable not only in Azerbaijan, but also in the conflict zones in the Caucasus and the Balkans. There are many facts of the transfer of weapons, ammunition and financial resources by Turkey to Chechen formations and Bosnian Muslims. Indirect evidence of the involvement of the Turkish government in military supplies to the conflict zones is the criticism of the government by the opposition forces. Thus, in July 1996, the chief secretary of the Turkish Labor Party leader Dogu Perincek accused the country's Prime Minister Tansu Chiller of buying and transferring weapons to Chechen and other "secret groups" at the expense of special secret funds 50 . However, in 1996, when Tansu Çiller was the Prime Minister of Turkey, a huge scandal occurred in the Turkish parliament. The opposition accused Chiller of corruption, drug trafficking and collaboration with organized crime. November 1996 near Istanbul, in the town of Susurluk, a car accident occurred, which caused the largest political scandal in the history of the Republic of Turkey. The bodies of a member of the Turkish Parliament from the Party of the Right Path (T. Chiller's party), Abdullah Chatly, one of the leaders of the Gray Wolves, as well as one of the leaders of the Turkish mafia, were found in a passenger car. At that time, A. Chatly was wanted by Interpol in the case of drug smuggling, he had connections with representatives of the highest authorities 51 . Despite the demands of the Turkish opposition, T. Çiller categorically refused to publish data on the government's spending, because, according to her, this could lead to a sharp deterioration in relations with Russia. According to Turkish observers, the Turkish government transferred significant sums (millions of dollars) to organizations of North Caucasian mohajirs (natives of the

North Caucasus who settled in Turkey in the last century), which, in turn, supplied Chechnya and Abkhazia with this money. The Turkish government tried to hide this fact 52 . There is little doubt that a significant part of these funds went to the military expenses of the Azerbaijani army. The enclave of Nakhijevan became a transshipment point for the transfer of Turkish military cargo to Azerbaijan, from where they were further transferred inland. By that time, Nakhichevan had actually become a convenient springboard for Turkish military intervention, in particular, an attack on Armenia. The strategic importance of Nakhichevan for the implementation of Ankara's ambitious foreign policy goals was well understood by Azerbaijani politicians. Not without reason, in March 1992 in Kars, the then head of the Autonomous Republic G. Aliyev noted that “Nakhijevan, where 350 thousand citizens live Turkic nationality is an open door for Turkey to Central Asia” 53 . In turn, Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel, speaking about the opening of the bridge across the Araks, said: “Dear Azerbaijani Turks, dear Nakhichevan Turks. We are here to let you know that you are not alone! The bridge of hope across the river of separation Araks, which we are opening today, is the first step towards opening the road from the Aegean to China” 54 . On the other hand, the Turkish opposition, represented by Bulent Ecevit, criticized the country's leadership for "not using its status as a guarantor of Nakhichevan and not providing military-technical assistance to kindred Azerbaijan, which added courage to Armenia" 55 . In fact, in addition to Turkish military supplies to Nakhichevan, individual military units and officers from Nakhichevan were trained in Turkey, and wounded soldiers were treated in the military hospitals of Kars and Erzurum 56 . It is noteworthy that in September 1992, the army leadership of the Ninth Corps of the Turkish Army, discussing the appeal of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic for military assistance, decided to satisfy this request 57 . During the operation to neutralize the firing points of the Azerbaijani army in the territory of the Kalbajar region, T. Ozal stated that Turkey would increase military cooperation with Azerbaijan and send weapons to this country 58 . In this sense, the fact that, during the last visit of T. Ozal to Azerbaijan in mid-April 1993, the Turkish delegation also included Lieutenant General of the Turkish Army Erdogan Oznal, head of the Special Combat Operations Department of the Turkish General Staff 59 . In April 1993, during the Kelbajar operation of the NKR self-defense forces, about 30 trucks with Turkish volunteers passed daily from the Turkish side to Nakhichevan, which were subsequently transferred to Ganja. These transfers were made through the airspace of the Republic of Armenia. Based on this, the Armenian party was forced to issue a warning statement that if these flights were not stopped, "Armenia would be forced to take adequate measures to protect its borders" 60 . After the Kelbajar operation, Turkish President T. Ozal once again strongly advocated the use of Turkish military force against Armenia. This time, however, trying to disguise his aggressive intentions, Ozal, being in Baku in April 1993, said: “Azerbaijanis are our friends, I would say, relatives ... In the international arena, we defend our Azerbaijani brothers, but no one should count on more . " And the representative of Turkey to the UN, Mustafa Akshin, in turn, publicly

confirmed Ankara's readiness to take measures to protect Azerbaijan. "Turkey will not allow an attack on Azerbaijan, and if necessary, we will act," he said, while not excluding the possibility of a military action 62 . After Turkish efforts to impose sanctions on Armenia failed, the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, China, Russia and France were invited to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, who were bluntly told the following: “You must do everything to stop the seizure by Armenia of territory of Azerbaijan. In 1974 The Security Council did not react in any way to the seizure of Cyprus by Greece, and did not listen to Turkey at that time. After all, we sent troops there to restore peace to the island. Pay attention to the fact that today the events in Azerbaijan are reminiscent of Cyprus” 63. After such a statement, the border military units, which are part of the Third Army of the Turkish Armed Forces, were put on alert, and the General Staff announced that all border troops were already conducting maneuvers in order to cross the Armenian border on the first order 64 . In April 1993, an agreement was signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan, according to which the Turkish side was obliged to provide Azerbaijan with light weapons and train military specialists. This was followed by the transfer of a new batch of weapons to the conflict zone 65 . By signing such an agreement, Turkey thus flagrantly violated the decision of the CSCE Prague Summit of February 28 of 1992, according to which all military supplies to the zone of the Karabakh conflict were prohibited. According to the former assistant of A. Elchibey Ulvi Khakimov, in 1992-93. Turkey provided Azerbaijan with all kinds of assistance in the Karabakh issue. This assistance was provided in the first place in the process of formation of the national army, which Azerbaijan "greatly needed". On the fronts, the Turkish military had duplicating functions. Azerbaijani officers were duplicated by Turkish officers, and in order to avoid capture and accidental exposure, the Turkish military did not directly command units and institutions, acting as advisers 66 . Meanwhile, at the Turkish Air Force base near the city of Eskisehir, 4 Phantom-type aircraft switched to 24-hour military duty, ready, if ordered, to make a sortie within fifteen minutes 67 . And Bulent Ecevit again proposed to launch air strikes on the southern territories of Armenia to open a corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. For this, according to Ecevit, the consent of the President of Azerbaijan A. Elchibey was enough 68 . In parallel with the provision of military and military-technical assistance, the Turkish leadership and army circles have begun to develop mechanisms to facilitate the formation of the Azerbaijani army. In Turkey, a program for its modernization until 1995 was developed. It was planned to send about 3,000 military specialists from among the reserve officers of the Turkish armed forces to Azerbaijan. Ankara planned to allocate about 300 million dollars for the modernization of the Azerbaijani army 69 . Expectations for the expansion of Turkish military assistance in Azerbaijan grew in parallel with the failures and defeats of the Azerbaijani armed forces on the Karabakh fronts. At the same time, official Baku was actively playing the oil card to receive military assistance in the war in

Karabakh. Azerbaijani Prime Minister Hasan Hasanov stated that the oil pipeline would be laid through the territory of the country that would assist Azerbaijan in resolving the Karabakh problem 70 . In turn, President G. Aliyev called on Turkey the idea to send military equipment and soldiers in exchange for obtaining the right to export Azerbaijani oil through Turkey 71 . In general, during the Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan used the issue of the route for transporting energy resources to world markets as a trump card in negotiations with Turkey. Baku's calculation in this sense was simple: in exchange for Azerbaijan's support for the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, Turkey was to become a guarantor of its security. In this regard, Turkey was perceived as a military ally, not a diplomatic partner. It should also be noted that on the basis of the signed in the summer of 1992. of the Consular Convention between Turkey and Azerbaijan, no challenge was introduced for Turkish advisers 72 . And Turkish help was not long in coming. In July 1993, the NKR self-defense forces discovered a warehouse with still unused Turkish-made machine guns and mortars near the village of Shahbulakh in the Aghdam region. The arsenal was presented to the chairman of the CSCE Minsk Group, Mario Rafaeli, who was in Stepanakert at that time, as material evidence of Turkish military assistance to Azerbaijan . The officers, who, after Heydar Aliyev came to power, were extradited to Turkey in order to find assistance in Moscow, returned to Azerbaijan after Baku finally lost hope for Russia's help. Turkish officers again found themselves in the most important positions and actively participated in the development of military operations on the Karabakh fronts. In September 1993, the accumulation and activation of Turkish military formations on the Turkish-Armenian border was once again recorded. Armored vehicles and artillery of the 220th mechanized and 9th artillery group of the 9th Sarikamysh division of the Turkish army were deployed in the regular wartime order in the village of Bayraktaran bordering Armenia 74 . The new Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, worried about the success of the Armenian forces in Karabakh, threatened that in the event of further advances by the Armenians, “Turkey is not going to sit idly by” 75 . At the meeting of the Turkish Security Council with the participation of the Prime Minister, official Ankara issued a statement, which, in particular, said that if the Armenians did not leave the occupied territories without any conditions, then the conflict could affect the countries of the region and the international community 76 . Thus, the Turkish side actually hinted at the possibility of its own intervention in the conflict. In the memoirs of the Greek Ambassador to Armenia of those years, Leonidas Chrysantopoulos, it is said that in early October, the Turkish side sought to use the parliamentary crisis in Russia to strike at Armenia under the pretext of fighting against the Kurds of the PKK, as well as at Georgia under the pretext of protecting Abkhazia. On October 5, the armed forces of Armenia were put on high alert to repel a possible attack from Turkey in the event of the withdrawal of the Russian contingent of border troops (ten thousand soldiers) from the republic 77 .

According to the information of the French special services, which was later confirmed by the US Ambassador to Armenia, there was a verbal agreement between Ruslan Khasbulatov and Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Chiller, according to which, if the anti-Yeltsin forces were successful, the Turkish armed forces were going to inflict limited strikes on Armenia. This decision was made at the National Security Council of Turkey. For this purpose, Turkish military units, in addition to being concentrated along the line of the Armenian-Turkish border, were also deployed on the territory of Nakhijevan as part of two brigades and fifteen helicopters 78 . At the same time, shooting from Turkey at the Russian and Armenian border outposts became more frequent. It is even difficult to imagine the consequences of the Turkish invasion of Armenia for the entire South Caucasus region in the event of the defeat of the pro-Yeltsin forces in Moscow. In September 1993, on the eve of a large-scale offensive by the Azerbaijani army, a delegation of Turkish parliamentarians headed by Ayub Ashik (Anavatan Party) and Turkish Foreign Minister X. Cetin visited Azerbaijan. Summing up the results of this visit, H. Aliyev stated that Turkish-Azerbaijani relations drank into a new stage "with confirmation of Turkey's intention to provide comprehensive assistance to Azerbaijan" 79 . Publications about deliveries of rockets, ammunition and small arms to Azerbaijan have become more frequent in the Turkish press. At the same time, Turkey ratified the bilateral agreement "On Solidarity and Cooperation", signed at the end of 1992. and providing "a legal basis for rendering assistance to Azerbaijan." In the September offensive of the Azerbaijani troops in the eastern direction, according to Western sources, about 200 militants from the Turkish Gray Wolves organization, who arrived here as part of Turkey's military assistance to Azerbaijan, participated 80 . In parallel with this, Turkish military formations were strengthened on the Armenian-Turkish border. These measures, according to the Turkish side, were taken to ensure Turkey's security and protect the independence and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. In November, Baku made an appeal to several countries, including Turkey, with a request to send troops, and on November 2 and 12, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister G. Hasanov visited Ankara, who met with the Turkish Chief of General Staff Dogan Gyures. According to Turkish media, he handed over to President S. Demirel a personal message from G. Aliyev, which allegedly contained a request for direct military assistance to Azerbaijan 81 . There is no doubt that these meetings became a prelude to a new large-scale military operation against the Armenian self-defense forces, and that thereby Baku wanted to make sure that Ankara could assist in the preparation and conduct of this operation. It should be noted that after H. Aliyev came to power, relations between Ankara and Baku definitely cooled, which temporarily affected the sphere of military cooperation. Many agreements signed by A. Elchibey were frozen, and for the Turkish citizens, a visa regime was introduced when entering Azerbaijan. At the same time, H. Aliyev expelled from the country more than 1,600 (!) Turkish military experts and volunteers located on the territory of Azerbaijan 82 .

However, most of the Turkish officers working in the Azerbaijani army, including General Demirbulak, after Colonel S. Huseynov's "campaign against Baku" returned to Turkey themselves. Soon, however, most of them returned to Azerbaijan - before the winter offensive campaign of the Azerbaijani army at the end of December 1993, 83 The publication of the Turkish newspaper Aydinlyk at the end of 1993, according to which the Turkish side provided the General Staff of Azerbaijan with five thousand ( !) soldier of the Turkish army. The journalist who published this article was arrested by the Turkish authorities 84. Apparently, after Azerbaijan joined the CIS, Ankara decided to use every opportunity to prevent the strengthening of Russian influence in the country. In mid-December 1993, the Azerbaijani army made a new attempt to seize the initiative through a large-scale offensive on the Karabakh fronts in all directions. At the beginning of this campaign, at the cost of huge human and material losses, the Azerbaijani forces managed to regain some previously lost positions. Correspondent for the Turkish newspaper Milliyet! Tunja Bengin linked the military successes of the Azerbaijani forces' winter campaign with the successful activities of Turkish military instructors and advisers 85 . In turn, another influential Turkish newspaper Hurriyet cited a specific number of high-ranking Turkish military in Azerbaijan - 256 86 . By February 1994, when it became clear that another Azerbaijani offensive was in danger of being thwarted, President Azerbaijan G. Aliyev during his official visit to Ankara appealed to President S. Demirel and Prime Minister T. Chiller with a request to send a large contingent of Turkish officers to train the Azerbaijani army. The Turkish side promised all kinds of assistance 87 . Speaking at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, H. Aliyev did not pass over in silence the importance of Turkish assistance in the formation of the national army of Azerbaijan 88 . As a result of this meeting, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the two countries for ten years, providing for the provision of mutual assistance in the event of aggression by a third state . Soon, part of the promised Turkish military supplies was discovered in the north of Karabakh, where, during the operation to liberate the Omar Pass, the Armenian self-defense forces of the NKR found a large warehouse with Turkish-made ammunition, including anti-tank mines and artillery shells 90 . In this regard, the dialogue that took place between S. Demirel and the leader of the Crimean Tatar movement Mustafa Dzhemilev (Dzhemiloglu) in May 1994 is impressive. during the official visit of the Turkish President to Ukraine. Demirel, in particular, noted: “.. Azeri must also compose their heroic epic. We in Azerbaijan have done everything possible. There are events that I cannot talk about, but we cannot allow clashes between Christianity and Islam in Azerbaijan. I am not an adventurer and I will not allow my country to get involved in an adventure. This would play into the hands of those forces that demanded to intervene, but I answered them - if we go, we will run into Russia . The territory of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)92 was also used to recruit Turkish and foreign specialists. After negotiations with the Azerbaijani authorities,

on the initiative of the English Lord Erskine and the Turkish business, it was from Northern Cyprus that British and Turkish mercenaries were transferred to Azerbaijan, not to replace Mustafa Mutlu. For this purpose, charter flights were organized, through which British mercenaries and arms shipments were transported by Russian aircraft from Northern Cyprus to Azerbaijan. This deal also involved high-ranking Turkish politicians and British arms dealers. According to the Turkish and British press, in exchange for this service, the Azerbaijani side was obliged to pay about 150 million pounds sterling annually, mainly in the form of oil supplies 93. The British Foreign Office was also aware of the deal. Northern Cyprus was not chosen by chance: on the territory of the unrecognized republic there were no international agreements prohibiting the sale or transfer of weapons to the conflicting parties. Baroness Caroline Cox, Vice Speaker of the House of Lords of Great Britain, who repeatedly visited Nagorno-Karabakh with a group of international observers and recorded the use of weapons of mass destruction, including Turkish-made, prohibited by international conventions, by the Azerbaijani army, in the issue of The Independent newspaper dated January 24, 1994. cites an excerpt from a conversation with a high-ranking official of the British Foreign Office, who, when asked by the baroness about the presence of British mercenaries in Karabakh, noted that “no country is interested in the fate of another country, each has only interests. We have oil interests in Azerbaijan.” The Vice Speaker of the House of Lords concluded her letter with the following words: “I have never been so ashamed of being British.” 94. K. Cox, in her letter to the editor of the newspaper, pointed out: “If this continues, I will be ashamed when my grandchildren and great-grandchildren find out that our state preferred trade interests to human rights and contributed to the destruction of Armenians in their historical homeland - in Nagorno-Karabakh” 95 . In response to the letter of the Armenian Ambassador to Great Britain A. Sargsyan regarding the publication in The Independent newspaper, the British Foreign Office stated that the British government would not allow military assistance to Azerbaijan. However, in just a few By the days of February 25, 1994, Radio Liberty reported on the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of England, Douglas Hurt, that a number of British societies and organizations were supplying weapons and mercenaries to Azerbaijan for waging war in Nagorno-Karabakh 96 . Even after the signing of the Bishkek ceasefire protocol in May 1994, the Turkish side did not abandon plans for its own military presence in the south of the Caucasus under the pretext of a peacekeeping mission. This time, the belligerent statements of the Turkish "hawks" were due to the tension in Russian-Turkish relations that arose in connection with the revision of the regime for the passage of the Black Sea straits. "We are ready to send as many soldiers to the region of the Karabakh conflict as the Azerbaijani government requests," - such a statement was made in July 1994 by the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces Dogan Gyures during a visit to Baku. Regarding the statement of the Armenian side that neither Yerevan nor Stepanakert would agree to a Turkish military presence in Karabakh, Guresh unequivocally stated,97 . In response, a sobering statement again followed from Moscow. This time, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev reacted rather harshly to the statement of the Turkish general,

saying that “we will not allow the Turkish army to interfere” and adding that “Russia has its own interests in Azerbaijan” 98 . Later, while in Yerevan, P. Grachev made it clear that his visit to Armenia would force the Turkish side to think more soberly 99 . Summarizing the above, we can draw the following main conclusions. First, one should not exaggerate the importance of Turkish military and military-technical assistance to Azerbaijan during the period of intensive hostilities in Karabakh, although the mere fact of large-scale Turkish military supplies to Azerbaijan speaks volumes. The fact that the US Congress expressed its concern about Turkish military supplies to Azerbaijan testifies to the threatening volume and nature of this assistance 100 . True, Turkey did not directly intervene in the conflict, but, as American analyst Michael Collins Dunn rightly noted, “the threat of a Turkish invasion could well be real if Turkey was going through a period of political uncertainty” 101 . Secondly, no strategic agreements were signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey during this period. In 1992, the parties signed the Military Cooperation Pact, which obligated them to come to the aid of each other in the event of aggression from a third state. However, this agreement contained a significant caveat: it was governed by UN principles and international treaties. This fact effectively ruled out Turkey's direct intervention in the course of the Karabakh conflict, since this would require not only the official recognition of Armenia as an aggressor in the UN Security Council, but also the consent of Turkey's NATO allies 102. Ankara realized that the signing of such an agreement and direct actions based on it in the South Caucasus region could be regarded as a clear challenge not only to Russia, but also to other countries in the region, which would not leave the first steps to implement the Turkish-Azerbaijani military agreement unanswered. Undoubtedly, the successes of the Karabakh forces radically changed the geopolitical situation in the region, but Ankara, nevertheless, was aware that direct intervention in the conflict would not leave indifferent neighboring states, and above all Russia and Iran. And this, in turn, could cause a military crisis on a global scale. Thirdly, direct and large-scale intervention in the Karabakh conflict was not included in Ankara's plans due to the specific nature of the foreign non-political interests of Turkey 103 . In this matter, the Turkish side tried to act cautiously. One of the manifestations of this caution was the refusal of Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Ozdem Sanberk to sign the joint security agreement proposed by Baku in the summer of 1992 104 . The "euphoric" period of Turkey's foreign policy in the first years of post-Soviet reality very soon outlived itself, and Ankara began to show relatively sober approaches both towards the Caucasus and Central Asia, adjusting its regional policy in a more pragmatic direction. It is obvious that despite the great desire, Turkey in its relations with Azerbaijan tried to avoid steps that would make Turkish policy dependent on the actions of the Azerbaijani side. Fourth, the fact that Turkish-made captured weapons fell into the hands of Armenian forces prevented the expansion of Turkish supplies to Azerbaijan, which was confirmed by international observers. Meanwhile, disappointment with the actions of Azerbaijani politicians and the military

was growing in Ankara itself. And there were good reasons for that. Most of the Azerbaijani soldiers who received military training in Turkey, upon returning home, for the most part shied away from participating in hostilities. Thus, in the summer of 1993, during the counter-offensive of the Armenian forces, the Turkish Hurriyet wrote: having nothing to do with military affairs" 105. The same newspaper: “Turkey gave weapons to the Azerbaijanis in order to fight against the Armenians, and they direct these weapons against each other (we are talking about internal political “showdowns” in Azerbaijan and about Suret Huseynov’s “campaign” against Baku in the summer of 1993 - G. D.). Further, the newspaper sums up: "Turkey is not responsible for the defeat of the Azerbaijani formations, which are several times superior to the Armenian forces" 106 . According to the Turkish press, during the winter offensive of the Azerbaijani forces in 1993-94. military officials from the Turkish General Staff were skeptical and seriously feared for the outcome of a hastily organized military operation. Turkish officers who were on the territory of Azerbaijan and trained the Azerbaijani forces to military operations, they indicated in their reports that the offensive undertaken on the orders of Heydar Aliyev was initially not only untimely, but also poorly planned and carried out 107 . According to the Turkish newspaper "Turkish Daily News", not only Turkish advisers, but also the personal military adviser to the Azerbaijani President, General Nuretdin Sadykov, also persuaded Heydar Aliyev in every possible way to postpone the start of military operations until the onset of favorable weather conditions and the completion of training and education of the Azerbaijani forces. Further, the newspaper pointed out that General Sadykov, who was in close contact with the Turkish General Staff, even threatened to resign if his recommendations were not taken into account 108. Obviously, acting in unison with the Turkish General Staff, General Sadykov simply followed the instructions and recommendations of the Turkish military, who, following the development of events on the Karabakh fronts, were against hasty and ineffective operations. On the other hand, Heydar Aliyev, who came to power a few months earlier, sought to achieve military successes in Karabakh at the cost of numerous losses and thus strengthen his power. During this period, the Turkish side even pointed out to Baku the facts of misuse of Turkish military assistance and warned about the inadmissibility of such precedents in the future 109 . One way or another, the removal of A. Elchibey and the inability of Ankara to retain power in Azerbaijan for the pro-Turkish president revealed the limitations of Turkey's foreign policy opportunities even in the most pro-Turkish oriented country. In general, the war in Karabakh, according to Stefan Blank, showed the weakness of Turkey's strategy and policy 110 . During the Karabakh war, Ankara failed to differentiate between strategic interests and small tactical propaganda attacks, which were made based mainly on the domestic political situation. Although Ankara was clearly aware that "passivity" in the Karabakh issue could be very costly in further relations with Azerbaijan, nevertheless, the temptation to repeat the "Cyprus option" gave way to more sober and realistic calculations. However, this does not mean the end of

Turkish military supplies to Azerbaijan and the further deepening of Turkish-Azerbaijani military cooperation. After the signing of the ceasefire agreement in the Karabakh conflict zone in May 1994, qualitative changes took place in this area. Hundreds of Azerbaijani servicemen are trained in more than 20 military specialties in Turkish military schools. Dozens of Turkish officers work on a permanent basis in the Azerbaijani army, carrying out training of conscripts under the programs of units like the Turkish army 111 . The interaction of the parties in this area takes place at all levels, including the training and consulting of Azerbaijani soldiers and officers in Turkey and in the frontline zone, as well as the supply of the latest weapons, ammunition and military equipment 112 . At the initiative of Turkish specialists, the officer cadres of the Azerbaijani army are being trained according to the NATO system. At the same time, groups of Azerbaijani officers are regularly taking advanced training courses in Turkey. The Turkish military is also actively involved in the modernization of military camps in Azerbaijan 113 . The Turkish armed forces are especially actively infiltrating Nakhichevan, where dozens of Turkish officers work on a permanent basis, and all the expenses for the allowance of the 11,000th Azerbaijani contingent, including medical support, were covered by the Turkish armed forces 114 . There is also a military representative of Turkey in Nakhijevan as a military attaché 115 . In the modern Azerbaijani army, leadership is gradually moving to the officer corps, educated in Turkish military universities according to the NATO standard. Azerbaijani cadets are trained in Turkey, one might say, in wartime, practicing in military operations against the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia 116 . In the second half of the 1990s, a number of important agreements on bilateral military cooperation were signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan cooperation containing components of a strategic contract. Bilateral agreement dated June 11, 1996 implies cooperation in the field of combat training of personnel, the defense industry, military technologies and the conduct of joint exercises 117 . At the same time, the Azerbaijani side periodically made statements about its intention to place Turkish bases on the territory of Azerbaijan, thus giving the Turkish-Azerbaijani military cooperation the function of a counterbalance to the Russian-Armenian military alliance. From the point of view of the Azerbaijani leadership, Russian-Armenian military cooperation poses a serious threat to the country's security and requires adequate measures. The purpose of such plans, according to the Azerbaijani side, is to restore "the military-strategic balance allegedly violated by Armenia." All this coincided with Azerbaijan's statement about withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS countries 118 . Spring 1999 between Turkey and Azerbaijan, an agreement in principle on strategic cooperation was signed, which included two significant points. First: Azerbaijan cannot take decisions on the

start of hostilities without the consent of Turkey, and second: Turkey guarantees the security of Azerbaijan in case of any aggression against it, providing military and political assistance 119 . The coming to power of a radical government led by Bulent Ecevit in early 1999. was marked by a more implacable stance towards Armenia with a new demand to provide Nakhichevan with a territorial corridor to connect with the rest of Azerbaijan. Moreover, former Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey, who is in Turkey, after a short conversation with Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit in April 2000, pointed out during a press conference the need to resolve the Karabakh issue by military means 120 . In fact, under the patronage of NATO, a Turkish-Azerbaijani military alliance is being created, which was confirmed by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Army General I. Karadayi at one of his meetings with G. Aliyev 121 . Given the military potential and capabilities of Turkey, the assistance provided to Azerbaijan during the military phase of the Karabakh conflict can be considered limited. Naturally, this does not mean that by providing such assistance, Turkey did not seek to influence the further course of hostilities to a certain extent. However, this was not enough for a radical change in the course of hostilities. Nevertheless, for a conflict of such a scale as the Karabakh one, given the amount of human resources and military equipment involved on both sides, the volume of Turkish assistance known to us from open sources should not be underestimated. Thus, it will not be an exaggeration to say that Turkey has its share in the defeat from the Armenian formations during the Karabakh war. Therefore, it can be stated with confidence that in the event of a new round of tension in the situation around Karabakh, Turkey, as in the early 90s, will not stand aside. To summarize the chapter with an assessment of Turkey's actions based on "War Correlations", according to which there are 14 types of military actions (military acts), grouped in three categories. The first category is the threat to use force, the second is the demonstration of force, and finally the third is the use of force 122 . In the first category, three types of hostilities took place on the Turkish side: the threat of the use of force, the threat of a blockade, and the threat of a declaration of war. In the second category, the Turkish side registered a partial activation of the Armed Forces' readiness for actions against another state and, of course, a demonstration of military force in the form of deployment of troops along the Armenian-Turkish border. Finally, in the third category, Turkey used a blockade against Armenia, an action that is in the same category as the direct declaration of war and occupation of the territory 123 . Thus, at least six types of military actions were used by Turkey against the Republic of Armenia and its territory.

CHAPTER FIVE ATTEMPT TO CREATE A TURKIC ALLIANCE AND THE LIMITATION OF TURKIC SOLIDARITY At the initial stage of the Karabakh conflict, the Western press mainly presented it as a conflict between Christian Armenians and Muslim Azerbaijanis, while the Turkish press mostly assessed the events in Nagorno-Karabakh as a conflict between Armenians and "Azerbaijani Turks". For the Turkish socio-political circles, Azerbaijan was of particular importance, including due to the historical factor and the attitude towards Azerbaijan as the brainchild of Turkey itself. It is no coincidence that the closest relations among the Turkic-speaking states have developed precisely between Turkey and Azerbaijan 1 . After January 1990 B. Ecevit criticized the position of the Turkish authorities in relation to the events in Baku, pointing out the need to provide all kinds of assistance to Azerbaijan, since in the future "Armenia may become a serious problem for Turkey" 2 . Events in Baku in January 1990 became a powerful impetus for the activation of pan-Turkic sentiments and manifestations of Turkic solidarity. The aforementioned statement by Turkish State Minister Ercument Konukman about the possibility of creating a Turkic union “under the flag of Turkey” put the country’s foreign policy department in a difficult position, which tried in every possible way to dissociate itself from pan-Turkic plans and designs. At the same time, it marked a radical revision of Turkey's policy towards the USSR in general, and the "Soviet Turks" in particular. Such sentiments in the socio-political circles of Turkey could not but affect the country's position in the Karabakh conflict and on the issue of the future of Azerbaijan. It is no coincidence that the slogan “one nation, two states” subsequently became the ideological basis in the development of bilateral relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which fits well into the neo-Pan-Turkist doctrine of Ankara. As mentioned above, the events in Karabakh significantly hampered the process of Turkey's further strengthening in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. As for the Turkic solidarity from the side Turkic-speaking republics of the former USSR, no significant manifestations of it were recorded in that period. And it is clear why: under the conditions of total Soviet control, it would be a mistake to talk about the existence of solidarity between the former Soviet Shiite or Sunni communities. At the same time, it should be noted that even under such conditions, weak manifestations of solidarity were, of course, in favor of the same faith Azerbaijan, and not Armenia 3 . The absence of any sympathy for the Armenian national movement in the Crimean Tatar press, for example, can be considered a sluggish manifestation of solidarity. For example, in the newspaper "Vatan" in 1988. The well-known "Open Letter" by A. D. Sakharov was published,

addressing M. S. Gorbachev on two issues: "On the return of the Crimean Tatars and on the reunification of Karabakh with Armenia." Of this letter, only one was left - the Crimean Tatar question, and everything related to Nagorno-Karabakh was replaced by dots 4 . From the very first years of the Karabakh movement, emissaries were sent from Baku to different parts of the Soviet Union to stir up anti-Armenian sentiments and create pro-Azerbaijani public opinion. Baku agitators did their best in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where Armenian refugees temporarily settled in Baku after the bloody pogroms. The geography of inciting anti-Armenian sentiments among the Muslims of the Soviet Union embraced Soviet Central Asia, the North Caucasus and even Yakutia.The activists of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan were especially distinguished in this, they distributed proclamations, clippings from Azerbaijan newspapers and other materials locally5. Azerbaijani propaganda coincided with the process of formation and development of national movements in these regions, therefore, initially, anti-Armenian sentiments were seen as a means of mobilizing anti-Russian and anti-Christian forces on the basis of ethnic and confessional solidarity and, at the same time, as a catalyst for the processes of sovereignization and decentralization on the ground6. As a rule, anti-Armenian sentiments had a domestic manifestation, caught by the difficult socio-economic situation in these republics. Baku emissaries took advantage of this, spreading rumors about the allocation of apartments to Armenian refugees in the capitals of the Central Asian republics. In the spring of 1989 A wave of anti-Armenian demonstrations took place in the capital of Turkmenistan, Ashgabad, and in the city of Nepid Dag, which intensified after the appearance of the first Armenian refugees from Baku, who temporarily settled in the port of Krasnovodsk. This time, thanks to the pragmatism and timely actions of Saparmurad Niyazov, the unforeseen development of events was halted 7 . After the collapse of the USSR, manifestations of ethnic solidarity in Turkey and the Turkic-speaking countries mainly took place in the context of neo-Pan-Turkist programs. So, in mid-January 1992. Makhachkala hosted an off-site meeting of the Association of Turkic-Speaking Peoples (ATN) of the CIS, during which a resolution on the Karabakh issue was adopted. In particular, it stated that "an attempt to tear away an integral part of independent Azerbaijan is a criminal act of the official circles of Armenia and its power structures." The Congress also condemned the President of Azerbaijan A. Mutalibov "for the conciliatory policy towards the provocative actions of the Armenian Republic and its government" 8. At the same time, the resolution of the rally in the city of Khasavyurt stated that "the conflict in Karabakh is a major conspiracy and a challenge to the Turkic world" and that "the Kumyks and other Turkic peoples must provide all possible assistance to the Republic of Azerbaijan, which is in the face of a formidable danger" 9 . The Karabakh issue was considered by Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as pan-Turkist national movements of the Central Asian region, as a factor nullifying the implementation of pan-Turkist

projects. Widely advertised by Turkey, these plans are based on three "pillars": belonging to the community of Turkic-speaking peoples, the Islamic religion and the commonality of the linguistic, cultural and historical character and the Eastern mentality 10 . It should be noted that at the first stage of the process of determining foreign policy priorities, the Turkic-speaking states of the Central Asian countries accepted Turkish initiatives with sympathy and enthusiasm, considering Turkey as a reliable conductor of partnership relations with the West. In addition, initially such an attitude largely predetermined the expectations of large financial investments and humanitarian assistance from Turkey. The seriousness of such expectations is also evidenced by the fact that the Uzbek side pushed back the deadlines for the spring of 1992. visit of Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan to Tashkent, justifying this decision in a special message by the fact that “at the moment, due to circumstances, I am not ready to receive such a distinguished guest at the proper level” 11 . Most likely, however, such a decision of the Uzbek side was due to the fact that it was for this period that Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel was scheduled to tour the Central Asian region and the coincident visit of the Armenian leader could cause negative signals to Ankara. In this situation, Baku's attempts to intensify the creation of an all-Turkic alliance around the Nagorno-Karabakh problem with the aim of isolating Armenia look quite natural. In February 1992 The Baku Radio Azadlig reported that “the only city that resists the Armenians in Karabakh is Shushi, and in the absence of help it will also fall. We expect help in the form of weapons and ammunition from all the Turkic republics” 12 . To confirm its status as a regional power and increase its authority among the Turkic-speaking states, Ankara tried in every possible way to advertise its own efforts to provide assistance to Azerbaijan (excluding, of course, the facts of providing military and military-technical assistance). It is noteworthy that Ozdem Sanberk, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, called Turkey "Azerbaijan's patron" 13 . Ankara's desire to create a "Turkic front" against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh was also manifested in attempts to give anti-Armenian shades to the humanitarian aid provided by the West. The Turkish press, criticizing the West, pointed to the fact that Armenia with a population of three and a half million people was allocated 540 thousand tons of humanitarian cargo, while "six Turkic states with a population of 70 million people were provided with only 303 thousand tons of cargo" 14 . The unified position of the Turkic republics regarding the events in Nagorno-Karabakh was first announced at the summit in Ashgabat in May 1992, when, at the initiative of Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel, the leaders of these countries issued a joint statement pointing to the need for “the withdrawal of Armenian formations from Shusha and the resolution of the Karabakh issue on the basis of international principles” 15 . At the same time, materials appeared in the Turkish press emphasizing that no matter what advantages Armenia had, it was impossible to defeat Turkey and the entire Turkic world, and the fact of capturing such an important city as Shushi was unforgivable 16 .

It should be noted that it is necessary to distinguish between the position on the Karabakh issue of the official circles of the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia, who spoke from more pragmatic positions and spoke in favor of a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and the actions of the opposition forces in these countries, represented by nationalist parties and movements, who made statements and initiatives in support for specific pan-Turkic programs. It was these forces that attempted to form and send detachments of volunteers to the zone of armed conflict in Karabakh to participate in hostilities on the side of Azerbaijan. In general, such initiatives were made by forces with a clearly anti-Russian and pan-Turkist bias, in addition, their activities were not widespread and were very limited. In March 1992, a delegation of the Kazakh People's Democratic Party "Zheltoksan", headed by its leader Khasan Kozhakhmedov, participated in the congress of supporters of the idea of a united Turkestan in Tashkent, where it was proposed to form a "Muslim brigade" to be deployed from Kazakhstan to Karabakh. This congress advocated the unification of the Central Asian republics into a single state called "Turkestan" 17 . April 1992 "Zheltoksan" issued an appeal to the people of Kazakhstan with an appeal to help "Azerbaijani brothers in the fight against Armenian militants." About 300 people responded to this call, but due to lack of funds, only 20 of them were able to reach Tashkent to join with Uzbek volunteers and be sent to Baku. In addition, on the initiative of Zheltoksan, funds were collected for these purposes 18 . X. Kozhakhmedov himself in one of his interviews stated that he intended to meet with President N. Nazarbayev to discuss the issue of providing money, uniforms and weapons. In the event that the authorities refused, the Kazakh nationalists counted on private donations 19 . In the fact of recruitment of volunteer detachments for the same purpose by another Kazakh party "Alash", some authors tend to see the manifestation of not Turkic, but rather Islamic solidarity, which was the reason for opposition from the authorities of Kazakhstan 20 . In the same period of time, a "Committee for Assistance to Karabakh" was created in the capital of Uzbekistan to assist the Azerbaijani side in the Karabakh issue. The committee also included representatives of the Uzbek parties "Turkestan" and "Birlik" 21 . The Armenian Cultural Center of Tashkent expressed its concern about the activities of this committee, rightly pointing out that the activities of such a structure could become a source of conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis living in the Uzbek capital. It is quite possible that this was the reason for the decision of the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov to dissolve this committee. At the same time, several activists of another Uzbek party, Erk, were prosecuted for inciting anti-Armenian sentiments, when anti-Russian and anti-Armenian materials were published in the party's press organ of the same name, where, among other things, there were calls for support for the "fair struggle" of Azerbaijani brothers 22 . Be that as it may, Azerbaijan did not receive the expected assistance and assistance from the Turkic republics in the brutal war unleashed against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh in the required amount, and even more so at the official level. Instructions

and pressure from the Turkish side did not help either. It was clear that Turkey's active involvement in military operations in the Karabakh zone "could provoke a Russian-Turkish conflict, which the Central Asian republics avoided in every possible way" 23 . The Azerbaijanis living in Iran did not remain outside the sphere of attention of the Baku authorities either. Steps were taken to "refresh" the Turkic identity of the local population using the idea of ethnic and confessional solidarity as the main pretext. On the other hand, the Azerbaijani side sought to put pressure on the Iranian authorities in such a way that they would take a more or less pro-Azerbaijani position on the Karabakh issue. And in this context, it is by no means accidental that the representative of Azerbaijan in Moscow, Hikmet Hajizade, said that in the Karabakh issue Azerbaijan counts more on the help of Iranian Azerbaijanis than Iran 24 . After the Armenian formations suppressed Azerbaijani positions in the Kelbajar region and entered the regional center of Kelbajar, Azerbaijani students of Tehran University organized a protest rally in front of the Armenian embassy, at the same time calling on the Iranian authorities to provide military assistance to Azerbaijan 25 . Outbursts of anti-Armenian hysteria in Turkey received new manifestations after each success of the Armenian self-defense units in Nagorno-Karabakh. Rallies and demonstrations in solidarity with the Azerbaijanis intensified in Ankara, Izmir, Kayseri, Kyrykkale, Sivaz, Trabzon, as well as on the territory of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 26 . At the same time, the nationalist university students in Istanbul organized a protest procession, during which some students shouted pro-Armenian in response to anti-Armenian chants. As a result of the ensuing fight, there were 27 wounded . Most likely, the latter were students of Kurdish origin. The Turkish press and Turkish organizations operating abroad were also involved in pro-Azerbaijani activities. Thus, the Milliyet newspaper published the English text of an appeal to the presidents of France, the United States and Russia with their postal addresses. The editorial office intended, with the help of its readers, to "bomb" these addresses and achieve condemnation of the actions of the Armenians. In the said text, in particular, it was said: “Dear Sir.... I ask you to suspend ruthless massacre of Azerbaijani Turks by Armenians. We hope that you and other leaders of the world will act quickly and decisively. The organization "Turkish-Islamic Public-Cultural Union" operating in Basel in April 1993. issued an appeal to the Muslims of the world, which said: “Our brother Azerbaijan, which gained independence after the collapse of the USSR, is being attacked by enraged Armenians who have lost all measure ... Blood is shed in Azerbaijan. On TV, you see that Russia, France and other countries of the world openly help the Armenians in every possible way, and no one, except Turkey, extends a helping hand to Azerbaijan. The whole Christian world helps the Armenians, but having no friends, except for a Turkic Muslim, not expecting help from any country, our brother Azerbaijan calls on you for help ... " 29

It can be stated that in terms of “Turkic solidarity”, Azerbaijan, with the exception of Turkey, did not receive more or less serious assistance in the war unleashed against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Not succumbing to provocations under the slogans of "Turkic solidarity and brotherhood" and pressure from Turkey and Azerbaijan, the leaders of the Central Asian republics took a more pragmatic position regarding the Karabakh conflict, thus trying not to spoil their relations with Armenia, and even more so with the Russian Federation, with whom they were members of the CIS. In this context, in the first half of the 1990s, Russia's role in countering the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Tajikistan and Afghanistan to Central Asia was given special importance.

INTRA-TURKIC DISAGREEMENTS AND THE KARABAKH ISSUE Counting on the sympathy of the "outside Turks" for their foreign policy plans, Turkey nevertheless had to state that relations between the former "Soviet Turks" were by no means smooth. The absence of a single Turkic identity among the Turkic-speaking peoples of the Soviet Union was an objective phenomenon, since all nationalist sentiments, especially on the basis of ethnic homogeneity, were suppressed in every possible way by the Soviet authorities. Bloody clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in Ferghana in the summer of 1989, as well as between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh in the summer of 1990, were evidence of the absence of any consolidating sentiments among the Turkic-speaking population of the USSR, the victims of which were hundreds of people. Despite the solemn entry of Turkey into the Central Asian region, facts were registered that did not at all correspond to this pomposity. Yes, in 1992. in Kyrgyzstan, the plenipotentiary ambassador of Turkey to this republic, Metin Goker, was robbed 30 . Similar cases occurred with Turkish journalists accredited in these countries. Ankara noted with annoyance that relations between Azerbaijan and the Turkic-speaking countries of Central Asia are far from being considered “fraternal”. Intra-Turkic disagreements were especially acute in the Azerbaijani-Uzbek relations. In response to the decision of the Uzbek President Islam Karimov to dissolve the Uzbek “Karabakh Relief Committee”, Azerbaijani President A. Elchibey condemned the dissolution of the Uzbek opposition party “Birlik”, whose activists found refuge in Baku 31. After winning the presidential election, in an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Elchibey very harshly commented on this step by Karimov, noting that “... this man lost his sense of proportion so much that he dared to send commandos to Azerbaijan to arrest activists of the Uzbek opposition here. And the press does not want to expose such an anti-democratic person. Is it because Karimov has become a toy in the hands of the Armenian lobby?! 32 . Against this background, it is also interesting that the fifth congress of the Uzbek Birlik party condemned President I. Karimov "for indirectly assisting the aggressive policy of Armenia, for refusing assistance to Azerbaijan and signing the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty" 33 .

Officials of Kazakhstan were also dissatisfied with the position of Baku - for granting political asylum to the Kazakh dissident, the founder of the Alash party, Aron Nutushev, who was wanted and was hiding in the Azerbaijani embassy in Moscow 34 . After his tour of the Central Asian republics, one of the leaders of the Turkish opposition, Bulent Ecevit, in an interview with the Cumhuriyet! that these republics are trying to distance themselves from Azerbaijan and establish good neighborly relations with Iran 35. Another source of tension between Azerbaijanis and representatives of the Central Asian republics was the growing number of Azerbaijani traders in the markets of the region. This was especially evident in the example of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where the authorities at the initial stage of independence did not take protectionist measures in the sphere of trade in their countries 36 . Any manifestation of Ankara's dialogue with Yerevan or a hint at the possibility of lifting the blockade of Armenia caused an indispensable reaction in Baku. So, November 26, 1992. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry sent a note of protest to Turkey over Ankara's decision to provide Armenia with 2 billion kWh of electricity since 1993. The text of the protest stated that such a decision "would not contribute to the development of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations" and dealt a "dangerous blow to the relations between the fraternal countries" 37 . On this occasion, the Azerbaijani Ambassador to Turkey, Novruzoglu Aliyev, stated that “a brother does not help the enemy of his brother. Providing assistance to Armenia is tantamount to helping the PKK and the Serbs” 38 and that “in the event of assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan will turn towards Iran” 39. After some time, Ankara denounced its original decision to supply electricity to Armenia. The efforts of Turkish President Turgut Ozal to create a united "Turkic front" in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, undertaken by him shortly before his death, during his last visit to the region in April 1993, also failed. Moreover, during the stay of the Turkish President in Ashgabat, one of the employees of the Turkmen Foreign Ministry told the Turkish press that "we will not interfere in resolving issues between Armenians and Azerbaijanis" 40 . Differences in Azerbaijani-Turkish relations intensified in the first months of Heydar Aliyev's coming to power. At the same time, the Azerbaijani authorities established censorship over pan-Turkic publications. For example, the publication Bozgurd was closed, and Menlik ceased publication under pressure from the authorities due to ties with the Turkish ultra-radical Nationalist Movement Party of A. Turkes 41 . A conflict is brewing latently between Azerbaijan and Turkey around the so-called Kurdish factor in Azerbaijan. Repeatedly during their visits to Baku, Turkish officials point to the presence of PKK bases on the territory of an ally and to their patronage by influential persons in the leadership of Azerbaijan 42 . In 1994 Serious disagreements also existed in Turkish-Uzbek relations. In the summer of the same year, the Uzbek ambassador to Turkey was recalled from Ankara after the Turkish side granted political asylum to the leader of the Uzbek opposition Erk party, Mukhamed Salih 43 . However, the Turkish special services were accused of trying to organize an assassination attempt on the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov 44 .

Another serious basis for intra-Turkic disagreements was the issue of ownership of oil fields. In particular, Turkmenistan insisted on the principle of dividing the Caspian into national sectors, while Azerbaijan opposed this. These disagreements took on an acute and conflict ogenic character. The verbal skirmish between Presidents S. Niyazov and G. Aliyev reached the level of mutual threats to use military force. On this occasion, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan unequivocally stated: “Does Azerbaijan need another Karabakh, in the Caspian Sea?” 45 . Due to Turkmen-Azerbaijani disagreements, Saparmurat Niyazov did not attend the regular summit heads of Turkic-speaking states, held in Baku in early April 2000 46 . In 2001, Turkmenistan, among other countries, introduced a visa regime for Azerbaijan. In addition, the visits by the leaders of the Turkic republics during their visits to Armenia to the Memorial Complex to the victims of the Armenian Genocide also caused a certain coldness in relations with Ankara. In 1997 President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev laid wreaths at the memorial in Tsitsernakaberd, after which, at a press conference in Yerevan, he regarded the crime committed in the Ottoman Empire as genocide 47 . In April 2001, during the seventh Turkic summit in Istanbul, he left unanswered the question of Turkish journalists about the compatibility of Turkic solidarity, laying wreaths in memory of the victims of the Armenian Genocide and participation in Turkic summits 48 . It should be noted that the Turkic republics of Central Asia understood very well the role of Russia in preventing the possible penetration of Islamic fundamentalism into the region. In addition, the presence of a Russian-speaking community did not provide wide opportunities for the manifestation of Turkic solidarity. The Russian Federation, to a certain extent, was seen as a kind of guarantor of stability in the region, given the events in Tajikistan and Russia's role in resolving the intra-Tajik conflict. In addition to the Turkic states, Ankara attached great importance to the involvement of Christian Georgia in the anti-Armenian front: according to the director of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, Seyfi Tashan, "at the regional level, Turkey needs Georgia's support against Armenia" 49 . Thus, in Ankara's policy in the South Caucasus region, there is clearly a frank desire not only to isolate Armenia from regional processes, but also to build a strategic axis of Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan as opposed to strategic cooperation between Armenia and Russia. It can be argued that the presence of political and economic disagreements within the Turkic world largely predetermined the failure to develop a common "Turkic position" and synchronize actions in the Karabakh issue. It is indisputable that each of these republics sought to pursue its own foreign policy line and had its own political calculations, in every possible way avoiding acting under dictation from outside and protecting itself from possible negative reactions, the appearance of which was quite real due to the dubiousness of solidarizing rhetoric.

CHAPTER SIX MEDIATION INITIATIVES OF TURKEY AND TURKIC STATES As mentioned above, the government of S. Demirel pursued a more or less cautious policy in the Karabakh issue, trying mainly to act as a peacemaker-mediator and through this status to strengthen its positions in the South Caucasus. In the West, they were also not slow to declare that “being a horror of the Caucasus for a long time, Turkey can become a great peacemaker here” 1. Turkish officials, in turn, made efforts to limit possible pro-Armenian sympathies from the West. It is no coincidence that on February 11, 1992, during a meeting with the US President, Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel, discussing the need to counter the penetration of Iranian influence into the Central Asian region, called on the US government to refrain from supporting Armenia in the Karabakh issue 2 . In addition to trying to directly act as a mediator in the Karabakh conflict, Turkey sought to be involved in this process within the framework of NATO. On March 11, 1992, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, at the NATO summit in Brussels, presented the Turkish version of the conflict resolution, which provided for the deployment of troops of the North Atlantic bloc, including units of Turkish groups, to the confrontation zone. But this plan did not find support from the NATO leadership: Secretary General Manfred Warner said that the organization could not send troops to the conflict zone 3 . There is no doubt that with this step Ankara pursued the goal of gaining a foothold on the other side of the Araks and ensuring its own military presence there under the cover of the North Atlantic Alliance. In 1992 Turkey was included in the number of countries participating in the Minsk Group, but its participation in this mediation initiative, especially given the Turkish military presence on the side of Azerbaijan, could not lead to any serious progress. Moreover, Ankara's efforts aimed at ensuring Turkey's international involvement in the Karabakh settlement process are practically in all cases were called upon to provide solutions that suit Azerbaijan. March 1992 The Turkish Foreign Ministry has developed the following plan for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem: 1. The President of the Security Council calls for an immediate ceasefire and a political solution to the conflict. 2. A ceasefire is announced and the parties are invited to a meeting of the CSCE to work out a decision on the formation of a special commission to monitor the peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh.

3. All embargoes imposed by the parties on each other are accordingly lifted with the introduction of the ceasefire regime. There will be no obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian aid. 4. The governments and parliaments of both countries declare the resolution of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as other disputes and disagreements, exclusively by peaceful means, through negotiations. 5. With a view to the most complete implementation of the decisions of the CSCE and the Agreement reached in Moscow on February 20, 1992. between the foreign ministers of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the parties begin continuous negotiations. 6. If an agreement is reached, both parties may resort to all peaceful means of settlement, including those not specified in the decision of the CSCE 4 . At the same time, the Turkish side made proposals on territorial exchanges and the creation of corridors, in particular, during the summit of foreign ministers in Helsinki 5. The territorial exchange plan put forward by the American analyst Paul Goble and providing for the exchange of the Zangezur and Lachin corridors, however, suited Ankara more. This would provide additional and serious opportunities for further pushing through Turkey's pan-Turkist initiatives not only in the Caucasus, but also in the Central Asian regions. The advocates of the idea of exchanging territories and thus establishing direct communication with Azerbaijan were President T. Ozal and Foreign Minister Hikmet Chetin. It is clear that after the implementation of this project, Turkey received not only unhindered penetration into Azerbaijan and Central Asia, but also huge advantages in laying an oil pipeline through the Azerbaijani-Turkish corridor 6 . Along with the official meetings, there was also a secret meeting between the leader of the "gray wolves" A. Turkesh and the President of the Republic of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan on March 12, 1993. in Paris. The Armenian side submitted documents on the principles of the conflict settlement, consisting of six points, but they were rejected by the President of Azerbaijan A. Elchibey 7 . July 26, 1993 Turkey came up with the initiative to send peacekeeping forces to the conflict zone with the inclusion of Turkish units in this contingent. According to S. Blank, this initiative of Ankara was most likely an attempt to save Baku and the Elchibey regime on the eve of S. Huseynov's military march on Baku in the summer of 1993 8 . With the subsequent escalation of hostilities in the Karabakh conflict zone, Ankara's peacekeeping rhetoric increasingly gave way to militant statements and demarches. Ankara's active steps within the CSCE envisaged, first of all, securing decisions and positions beneficial for Azerbaijan, in case of their rejection by Armenia, Turkish officials would blackmail Yerevan with the coming winter cold and a complete ban on the transit of Western humanitarian aid through Turkey 9 .

A new proposal for the settlement of the conflict with the participation of Turkey was prepared in the spring of 1993. This document was developed as a result of the meeting held on April 29-30, 1993. in Moscow, meetings of the personal representative of the President of Russia V. Kazimirov, representatives of the US Embassy John Mareska and the Turkish Embassy V. Vural. The details of this document, published in the Russian press, boiled down to the following agreements: the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Kelbajar region, a ceasefire and the movement of troops, the resumption of the negotiation process within the CSCE Minsk Group between Armenia and Azerbaijan under the auspices of Russia, Turkey and the United States 10 . It should be noted that Turkish mediation initiatives were primarily aimed, if not at exception, at least at limiting Russia's role in the negotiation process. As for the deployment of peacekeeping forces with the inclusion of Turkish units in them, the Karabakh side has repeatedly stated that it will never agree to the presence of Turkish troops in the conflict zone as separation forces. On this occasion, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the NKR A. Ghukasyan stated that “in Turkey's desire to intensify its role in the conflict settlement, one can see an attempt under a plausible pretext to increase the number of Turkish troops in Azerbaijan. A state that continues the blockade of Armenia, sends in its military instructors and supplies weapons to Azerbaijan, cannot act as a peacemaker....» 11 . After the armistice was established in May 1994. Turkey again came up with a proposal to send joint peacekeeping troops under the auspices of NATO. Prime Minister Tansu Çiller proposed the creation of a Logistic Supply Center for this purpose in the Erzurum region for further monitoring of the situation in the Caucasus by the CSCE and on this issue requested a parliamentary mandate to send a Turkish military contingent as part of an international peacekeeping mission. However, this proposal was rejected by the Armenian side, which believed that sending Turkish troops to the Karabakh conflict zone would destabilize the situation in the region 12 . May 1995 Another Turkish mediation initiative was taken by the speaker of the TUTS, Husamettin Cindoruk, who unsuccessfully tried to use the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) for this purpose 13 . In 1995, in an effort to strengthen Turkey's role in the Minsk process, the Turkish Foreign Minister appointed his former ambassador to Moscow, Ayhan Kamal, as Ambassador-at-Large for negotiations on the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict 14 . At the same time, Turkish President S. Demirel during his visit to Washington in 1995. again did not rule out that the role of a mediator in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict might be assigned to Turkey, which should be ready for this mission 15 . The leaders of the Central Asian states were also involved in mediation initiatives in the Karabakh conflict and even became the initiators of peacekeeping processes. After the failure of the August putsch of the State Emergency Committee, on the initiative of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, a meeting was held in Zheleznovodsk between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a result, the

Zheleznovodsk communiqué was signed, providing for a gradual easing of tension and the establishment of a truce between the parties. However, the rapid process of the collapse of the USSR and the rapid development of events overshadowed the interest in resolving the Karabakh issue. On the other hand, the Zheleznovodsk meeting can serve as an example of a mistake when influential political figures are involved in conflict resolution, but in the very process of resolving complex issues, the direct actors are, as it were, "out of the game."16 . Undoubtedly, the further escalation of hostilities in the Karabakh conflict zone posed a serious threat to the formation of the CIS, and this was the reason for various mediation initiatives within the Commonwealth. President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev showed particular activity in this direction. Back in March 1992. N. Nazarbayev made an official statement in connection with the events around Nagorno-Karabakh. In particular, it noted that the crisis situation around Nagorno-Karabakh was becoming threatening and had practically led to a direct military conflict. The ineffectiveness of the mediation missions of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and other countries, the statement noted, became the cause of hostilities, which led to civilian casualties and material damage. In order to stop further bloodshed and localize the conflict, President N. Nazarbayev held talks with the Presidents of the Republic of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as with the Chief of the General Staff of the CIS Armed Forces Viktor Samsonov. The statement went on to say that the following steps should be taken: the first - at the Council of Heads of State to decide on an immediate ceasefire and lifting the blockade from roads and communications; the second - to temporarily suspend the process of creating their own Armed Forces in all CIS states in order to demonstrate goodwill and peaceful aspirations; third, immediately start creating special peacekeeping forces in the crisis regions of the CIS, subordinate to the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth. The Republic of Kazakhstan will propose a project for the creation of these forces; fourth - to support the peacekeeping efforts of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and send representatives of the Commonwealth to participate in the activities of mediation groups to resolve conflicts 17 . In June 1992 The Kazakh Foreign Ministry issued a similar statement, expressing concern over the "further development of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan", while calling for "good will and resilience" and "creating conditions for a political settlement of the conflict." In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan expressed its assistance to the efforts of the UN and the CSCE in the peaceful settlement of disputed territorial issues 18 . In August of the same year, N. Nazarbayev came up with a new mediation initiative, which received positive feedback both in Baku and Yerevan. Such a position of Baku as a whole is explained by the fact that the Azerbaijani side was not against taking a similar initiative of a

Muslim and, moreover, a Turkic country in the person of Kazakhstan, which, at the same time, would not do anything against the interests of Azerbaijan. This version is also supported by the fact that a few days before the mediation initiative of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev was left unanswered by Baku 19 . August 27, 1992 A meeting of the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan took place in Alma-Ata. During this meeting, the parties reached an agreement on a 60-day truce, starting from September 1, which was to be inspected by representatives of the President of Kazakhstan - Gani Kasymov in Azerbaijan and Khasan Kazhokov in Armenia 20 . Hope was expressed that the conflict would be settled on the basis of the principles of the CSCE, and, in the opinion of the Azerbaijani side, the guarantors agreements were to be international observers of the CSCE, which at the first stage was represented by Kazakhstan 21 . On the very first day of the truce, the representative of the Kazakh president in Armenia announced the violation of the terms of the truce by the Azerbaijani side. The Azerbaijani side made similar accusations 22 . Interestingly, Leyla Yunusova, director of the information and analytical center of the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry, said that the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry exceeded its authority by signing a ceasefire document and not coordinating its actions with the republic's defense ministry. In turn, the press secretary of the President of Azerbaijan stated that the signed agreement was supposed to operate along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and as for Nagorno-Karabakh, this is an internal affair of the republic (i.e., Azerbaijan - G.D.) 23 . President of Azerbaijan Abulfaz Elchibey also made a similar statement during his trip to Ganja 24 . Baku's position was quite understandable, since it was at that time that the Azerbaijani army launched large-scale military operations against Nagorno-Karabakh with some success. After the violation of the truce, the Republic of Armenia unilaterally appealed to Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the member countries of the Arab League with a request to send observers 25 . Another message of the President of Armenia, addressed to the CIS countries with a request to influence Azerbaijan, received a response from Askar Akayev, who unsuccessfully appealed to the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey 26 . At the same time, President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov, speaking about the escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, said that "Armenians and Azerbaijanis should find an acceptable solution themselves without any intermediaries" 27 . However, the position of the Central Asian republics is understandable, since the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh in the difficult socio-economic conditions of the first post-Soviet years was not perceived as a matter of paramount importance in the process of state building. In April 1993, N. Nazarbayev again proposed mediation, having previously talked with B. Yeltsin, L. Ter-Petrosyan and A. Elchibey 28 . In December of the same year, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Suleimanov, at a meeting with the Ambassador of Armenia, stated that under the current conditions, his country could not support any of the parties to the conflict and

that Kazakhstan did not object to the participation of Karabakh in the negotiations as a party to the conflict 29 . It was clear, however, that this initiative was doomed to fall into a series of failed attempts to suspend hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. In early March 1993, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement in support of the Azerbaijani position on the Karabakh issue 30 . This was accepted with approval in Baku, while in Yerevan the statement was left unanswered. At the end of 1993-beginning of 1994. Kyrgyzstan made an extremely important attempt towards a ceasefire in Karabakh, when a group on the Karabakh issue was created within the framework of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, in which the former speaker of the Kyrgyz parliament Medetkan Sherimkulov took an active part. After the December meeting of the parliamentary delegations of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Aland Islands, M. Sherimkulov proposed to continue the Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue in Bishkek. At the beginning of May 1994, such a meeting finally took place and the “Bishkek Protocol” was signed at it. This document was ratified by the Ministers of Defense of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the NKR on May 12, 1994. and marked the beginning of the establishment of a long-term truce along the entire line of confrontation 31 . Thus, it can be stated that the mediation initiatives of the Central Asian states, unlike the Turkish ones, did not proceed from pan-Turkic aspirations, but were attempts aimed at establishing peace in the region.

CHAPTER SEVEN KARABAKH ISSUE AT THE TURKIC SUMMITS Another expression of the vulnerability of Turkey's neo-Pan-Turkist plans was Ankara's unsuccessful attempts to achieve an "all-Turkic agreement" at summits with the participation of the heads of Turkic-speaking states, which was especially evident during discussions on the Karabakh issue. Despite all the efforts of Turkey and Azerbaijan, there was no mention of the Karabakh conflict in the final Ankara statement, signed following the results of the first Turkic summit in early November 1992. The leaders of the Central Asian republics flatly abandoned the idea of adopting a separate document on the Karabakh issue and of applying unilateral measures against Armenia. During the final press conference, the President of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev, unequivocally stated that "the Turkic states cannot support one of the parties in this conflict"1 . Nazarbayev also opposed the idea of applying an economic embargo against Armenia, believing that such a move could further complicate the situation in the region. He also ruled out the possibility of any statement on the Cypriot or Bosnian issue. In general, this summit can be considered a big disappointment for Turkey, although, in subsequent years, Ankara actively continued to take new initiatives in this direction 2 . As a result of the summit, Azerbaijani President A. Elchibey only had to declare that if a separate resolution on the Karabakh issue was adopted, “we could be accused of being a united front against Armenia, which is a Christian country” 3 . It was obvious that the obligations undertaken by the Central Asian republics (except for Turkmenistan) within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty signed in Tashkent turned out to be at that moment more influential and decisive than the prospects for creating a pan-Turkist union. The Tashkent Treaty actually predetermined the partial “return” of Russia to the former regions of the USSR in the form of the deployment of military bases on the territory of Armenia and Tajikistan. Russia's position on the Turkic summits was unequivocal: Moscow covertly expressed her dissatisfaction with the participation of the Turkic republics-members of the CIS at these summits. It should also be noted that the obligations assumed under the Tashkent agreement also did not receive an unambiguous interpretation on the part of the Central Asian countries regarding, for example, a probable war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Indeed, in this case, according to the agreement, Armenia could count on the support of not only the Russian Federation, but also Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Thus, the chairman of the State Committee of Kyrgyzstan Janibek Umeldiyev, commenting on Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s statement that in the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of Armenia, a collective security treaty will come into force, and the CIS armed forces will fulfill allied obligations, noted that “commitment to the signed obligations does not mean automatic participation of Kyrgyzstan in hostilities” 4 .

In turn, the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, in an interview with the Turkish newspaper "Turkiye", urging Turkey to avoid direct involvement in the zone of the Karabakh conflict, noted that "they should solve the problem themselves (meaning Armenians and forces of the CIS will be of little effectiveness. The problem must be resolved within the framework of the UN. Some countries (among these countries I. Karimov also meant Turkey - G. D.), wanting to gain authority, want to intervene, but any intervention by a third party can lead to a great tragedy. We, as Muslims and Turks, are at one with our Azerbaijani brothers, but for the moment we must remain aloof” 5 . The failure of Turkish efforts to create a united Turkic front against Armenia during the Ankara summit of the heads of Turkic states, as well as the inability to save the pro-Turkish regime of Abulfaz Elchibey in Azerbaijan, once again proved that Ankara's real capabilities do not correspond to its regional ambitions. The removal of A. Elchibey's regime from power actually showed that Turkish ambitions regarding the status of a regional leader in the South Caucasus are too vulnerable and unrealistic 6 . Moreover, according to the opinion prevailing in some intellectual circles in Turkey, the elimination of A. Elchibey caused more “disappointment than a feeling of defeat.” This event was also symbolic in terms of revealing Turkey's unpreparedness for the role of a regional leader, which it aspired to and which subsequently turned into a complete review of Turkey's ability to exert any serious influence on the development of events in the region 7 . Thus, the results of the first Turkic summit clearly showed that the ties of Central Asia with the Russian Federation dominated the cultural and ethnic ties with Turkey 8 . Even in Azerbaijani circles, they well understood the danger and futility of pan-Turkic plans for the future of the republic and in some cases compared such ideas with Hitler's plans, predicting the same fate for them as for the fascist plans 9 . The close relationship between the leader of the Turkish "Grey Wolves" Alparslan Turkes and his Azerbaijani colleague, the leader of the National Independence Party of Azerbaijan (ANIP) Etibar Mammadov was perceived ambiguously in Azerbaijan 10 . In addition, in the Russian-speaking intellectual environment of Baku, they were rather pessimistic about the replacement of the dominant influence of Russian culture with Turkish, and any emphasis on the Turkic identity of Azerbaijanis and the need to spread Turkish influence was considered unacceptable. This was clearly manifested, in particular, in the reaction of the Baku intelligentsia to the law adopted by the Azerbaijani parliament, which states that the state language of Azerbaijan is Turkic. And although Turkey eventually secured its cultural and educational presence in the Turkic regions of the former Soviet Union, the positions of the Russian cultural and educational presence continue to be strong here. During the first Turkic summit, it was decided to hold the second summit in Baku at the end of 1993, but the Russian side, through the mouths of the first persons, expressed its dissatisfaction in every possible way with the holding of such a summit in the capital of Azerbaijan. Last

December 1992 At the next CIS summit in Ashkhabad, B. Yeltsin spoke out against the planned meeting in Baku and on this occasion put some pressure on the President of Uzbekistan I. Karimov 11 . It is obvious that holding such a summit in the capital of Azerbaijan with the participation of the leaders of the Central Asian republics would have a certain negative impact on their relations not only with Armenia, but also with the Russian Federation. Trying in every possible way to achieve the holding of the second Turkic summit in Baku, Azerbaijani officials have repeatedly pointed to past visits of the leaders of the Turkic countries to the capital of Azerbaijan 12 . However, the idea of holding a summit in Baku was a complete fiasco. First, the dates were moved to January 1994, and subsequently the meeting was canceled altogether. In addition to the direct pressure of the Russian leadership on the participants of the Turkic summits, the cancellation of the planned Baku summit can also be explained by the following important points. Firstly, the involvement of hundreds of Afghan Mujahideen in military operations in the zone of the Karabakh conflict could not but disturb the Central Asian republics, which, in turn, tried in every possible way to stop the penetration of Islamic fundamentalism into Tajikistan and into the territory of their own countries 13. Undoubtedly, the plans of Azerbaijani President G. Aliyev to attract Afghan mercenaries to the Karabakh conflict zone would seriously jeopardize the security of the entire Eurasian region. From the middle of 1993 serious disagreements appeared in Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. They were due to the first steps of H. Aliyev as president of Azerbaijan, which Ankara considered as attempts to return Azerbaijan to the bosom of the CIS and thus resolve the Karabakh issue. Official Baku, in turn, also did not particularly hide the reasons for this approach. In August 1993 G. Aliyev openly stated that he was asking Russia for help to "stop the Armenians" and that "he doesn't care if it worries some people" 14 . From the very first days after coming to power, Aliyev took unprecedented steps towards the citizens of Turkey. Firstly, citizens of Turkey were expelled from the republic, then the introduction of a visa regime between the two countries followed. Among the Turkish citizens expelled from Azerbaijan were about 1,500 military instructors and soldiers who took part in the fighting in Karabakh and in the formation of the Azerbaijani army 15 . Western journalists even recorded the facts when Turkish citizens without visas were caught on the streets of the Azerbaijani capital and deported to their homeland 16 . Turkish military intervention in the conflict zone and the high likelihood of raising the issue of economic and political blockade of Armenia now at the Baku summit also played a significant role in the disinterest of Central Asian leaders in participating in the Baku summit. At the same time, Baku and Ankara have repeatedly stated that the holding of the summit is not directed against any country, at the same time not hiding their desire to make a joint statement condemning Armenia. The Central Asian republics were also criticized for their economic

cooperation with Armenia. For example, Azerbaijani Ambassador to Turkey Mehmet Novruzoglu Aliyev criticized Turkmenistan for gas supplies to Armenia, which, according to him, were of strategic importance and this fact "did not comply with the principles of brotherhood" 17. According to one Turkish diplomat, the Baku summit was postponed because some leaders of the Turkic republics feared that their presence in Baku would be seen as joining the "anti-Armenian front." This delay, according to others, only pointed to the isolation of Azerbaijan from the Turkic republics, which became noticeable especially during the presidency of A. Elchibey 18 . Contrary to his statements that the Baku summit would not be directed against any country, G. Aliyev nevertheless stated on this occasion that "it is a matter of conscience for everyone to do something when their brother is being slaughtered" 19 . In the end, the leaders of the Central Asian republics during a meeting at the World Economic Forum in Davos in early 1994. decided to hold the second Turkic summit in October 1994. in Istanbul 20 . The agenda of the summit also included a discussion of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh with the intention to achieve solidarity with Azerbaijan's position on this issue. Even before the start of the summit, Turkish Foreign Minister Mumtaz Soysal stated that “the war in the Caucasus is a serious obstacle in the relationship between Turkey and Central Asia, as well as for relations between Central Asia and Europe” 21 . The purpose of this statement was clear: to persuade the Central Asian leaders to adopt more specific language regarding the Karabakh conflict for inclusion in the final document of the summit. At the Istanbul summit, the Karabakh conflict was mentioned for the first time as a separate item in the final declaration. It noted the following: “The heads of state expressed their deep concern about the conflicts in the region, which are the result of open violation of the principles of the UN and the CSCE, and called on all parties to comply with the above principles. The heads of state stressed the need for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council” 22 . In the final document of the Bishkek summit, adopted on August 28, 1995, as well as in the declaration of the Tashkent summit in 1996. separate articles relating to the Karabakh conflict were also included. This paragraph was included in the Tashkent Declaration in the following wording: “... The Heads of State reaffirmed the need for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and noted that the unsettledness of this conflict is detrimental to the peace process of building confidence and security in the region » 23 . In the declarations of subsequent summits, this wording regarding the Karabakh conflict did not undergo any serious changes, although neither Azerbaijan nor Turkey abandoned plans to obtain the consent of Central Asian leaders to use tougher language regarding Armenia. At first glance, such a wording should have suited the Azerbaijani side, since the UN resolutions on the Karabakh issue spoke of the need to withdraw Armenian troops from the occupied

territories. But at the same time, these resolutions also included demands on the Azerbaijani side, from the implementation of which official Baku denied in every possible way. And yet, the limitations of Turkic solidarity were evident during the second Turkic summit. Turkey and Azerbaijan, as during the first summit, tried to influence the participants for the latter to take a tougher stance towards Armenia and express support for Azerbaijan in the Karabakh issue. But N. Nazarbayev unequivocally opposed the definition of Armenia as an aggressor, and Heydar Aliyev expressed his dissatisfaction with the position of the Central Asian leaders, noting that relations between Central Asia and Azerbaijan are not at the desired level 24 . It was obvious that the anti-Armenian position would not have brought any serious foreign policy dividends to the Central Asian countries. On the contrary, in this case, they could spoil their relations with Armenia, and even more so with Russia, which in this case could take an uncompromising position in relation to the CIS member countries, and the leaders of the Central Asian republics did not want this. In the case of Turkmenistan, such a wording was also undesirable given that Armenia was an important consumer of Turkmen gas. Azerbaijan remained dissatisfied with the neutral position of the Turkic republics of Central Asia in the Karabakh issue. In 1995 At the Bishkek summit, S. Demirel again called on the Turkic states "to assist Azerbaijan in its efforts to end the occupation of Azerbaijani lands by Armenia" 25 . But there were no major changes in both the initial wording of the final declaration regarding the Karabakh conflict, and in the initial position of the leaders of the Turkic-speaking leaders. As well as during the presidency of A. Elchibey, and during the reign of Heydar Aliyev, there was no sharp warming in Azerbaijan's relations with the Central Asian republics. This circumstance was also due to geo-economic factors, in particular, such as the issue of exporting oil and gas resources and the rights to certain fields in the Caspian Sea. This had concrete consequences for the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. The Turkish side understood that in the conditions of the weak Turkish presence in Azerbaijan, Russia was gradually “returning” to the region, so Ankara made several attempts to overthrow the regime of Heydar Aliyev, up to organizing assassination attempts on the Azerbaijani leader 26 . Thus, in March 1995, the Azerbaijani side accused the Turkish special services of organizing an assassination attempt on the country's president. It all started with a speech by a special police detachment led by Rovshan Javadov, which later turned into an armed rebellion with political demands. However, Aliyev then managed to suppress the rebellion, and its leader was killed. The well-known Turkish ultranationalist Abdullah Chatly (A. Chatly participated in the assassination attempt on the leader of ASALA Hakob Hakobyan - G.D.) and Turkish professor, member of the Azerbaijani parliament and adviser to G. Aliyev Ferman Demirkol were suspected of organizing the assassination. Later, at the request of Ankara, Demirkol was extradited to Turkey, on the condition that there would be no public statements on his part. However, his statements were leaked to the Turkish media and described by officials in Baku as "false". It was F. Demirkol that G. Aliyev hinted at when, during his visit to Turkey, he remembered the persons "involved in attempts at coup d'état" in Azerbaijan 27 .

A month later, in April 1995, during his visit to Azerbaijan, Prime Minister Tansu Chiller, excluding the participation of official Ankara in these events, nevertheless apologized to G. Aliyev "for the activities of the uncontrollable rightists" 28 . G. Aliyev also spoke about the Turkish trace in the coup attempt in one of his speeches in December 1996. 29 . According to one of the leaders of the Turkish opposition, Dogu Perincek, some circles in the Turkish leadership decided that after Elchibey came to power in Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev does not suit Ankara. Moreover, the fact that G. Aliyev was a general of the Azerbaijani KGB and at one time supervised the Turkish direction in foreign intelligence caused serious concerns in Ankara. Azerbaijani special services established that even before the 1994 coup attempt, A. Chatly spoke with Elchibey. However, at the last moment, the then President Demirel, having learned about the plans of the putschists, only a few hours before the assassination attempt warned Aliyev about this, who was on an official visit to Europe 30 . By the end of the 1990s, Turkey had a direct impact on the foreign and domestic policy of Azerbaijan, influencing both the course of parliamentary and presidential elections and the placement of personnel in the government apparatus, including in law enforcement agencies and special services. Ankara actively generates opposition forces, regulates their attitude towards the current authorities, and conducts mass propaganda 31 . Ankara's attempts, following the example of Turkish hegemony established in relation to the first Azerbaijani republic, to put political processes in the "fraternal republic" under its control and directly participate in the rotation of political elites in Azerbaijan are clearly traced. Another attempt by the Turkish special services to eliminate Heydar Aliyev was revealed in 1996. This time, among those arrested on suspicion of organizing the assassination were members of the Turkish military intelligence and members of the Azerbaijan Cultural Association 32 . At the beginning of May 1997 Azerbaijani President G. Aliyev made an unexpected statement during his visit to Turkey. Speaking to Turkish parliamentarians in Ankara, he demanded that Turkey extradite those involved in the coup attempts 33 . The Turkic summits, or more precisely, the failures of Ankara and Baku at these meetings, revealed clear gaps in the ambitious neo-Pan-Turkic doctrine of Turkish foreign policy. The initial euphoria about the possible organization of a "Turkic union" gradually faded away. According to Turkey's Senior Foreign Policy Adviser Hassan Koni, "The bitter truth is that the bottom line is that all this is some talk about the creation of the Commonwealth of Turkic states and the image of Turkey in these countries remained mere chatter” 34 . Subsequent Turkic summits were held in Astana (1998), Baku (2000) and Istanbul (2001). During the summit in Istanbul in April 2001. the Azerbaijani side again tried to bring the Karabakh problem on the agenda in a favorable interpretation for itself. At the initiative of the Turkish and Azerbaijani sides, a paragraph "on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan" was included in the original text of the Istanbul Declaration. Prior to the start of the summit,

Azerbaijani President G. Aliyev noted that "if there are no objections, this issue will be reflected in the Istanbul Declaration" 35 . In the Istanbul Declaration, the Karabakh problem was again mentioned. The leaders of the Turkic countries reaffirmed their commitment to resolving the conflict on the basis of the relevant UN and OSCE resolutions. Thus, Baku's efforts were not crowned with success, since the original version of the wording in the declaration, as can be seen from the text of the Istanbul Declaration, was changed and, most likely, this happened under pressure from representatives of the Central Asian republics.

CHAPTER EIGHT THE FACTOR OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE KARABAKH CONFLICT The new philosophy of Turkey's foreign policy doctrine was also distinguished by a certain degree of "confessionalization" of the country's foreign policy programs and interests, namely: the promotion of the postulate of Islamic solidarity in foreign policy, especially in conflict zones, where the opposing sides were the Christian and Islamic countries adjacent to Turkey and communities. Both Turkish and Western researchers point to the secondary role of religious solidarity in Ankara's foreign policy priorities. However, the rhetoric of Islamic solidarity was adopted by the leaders of Turkey, who, in an effort to voice their concerns and claims, in specific cases pointed to Turkish interests, common history and values, including religious ones 1 . Turkey initiated the entry of the Turkic republics into international organizations, including the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). At the 6th session of the heads of the OIC member states in Dakar, Ankara actively supported the idea of admitting Azerbaijan to this international organization. And soon Azerbaijan joined the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), created with the participation of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey 2 . Another feature of the pan-Turkic ideology is that for its implementation, pan-Islamic rhetoric is also heavily used as an additional argument. This makes it possible for the apologists of pan-Turkism to play on the religious feelings of Muslims, especially Turkic-speaking ones, thereby exerting a concrete, suppressing influence on the emergence of irredentist movements among other Muslim peoples - Arabs, Kurds, etc. According to Joseph Bodansky, the obvious tilt towards pan-Turkist sentiments among the law enforcement agencies of modern Turkey reflects the general social trend towards revival as Islamic and Pan-Turkic identity. Even if the main motives and driving forces in Ankara's use of pan-Turkic rhetoric are nationalist and economic projects, Turkey was forced to resort to the factor of Islamic revival in order to implement its policy on the territory of the former USSR - in particular, in Chechnya, as well as in the Balkans 3 . As the Russian researcher Igor Dobaev notes, “modern pan-Turkism, as a socio-political phenomenon — ideology and political practice — is a syncretic union of ethnic and confessional components, which have been in various proportions throughout the modern history of Turkey (Turkism-Pan-Turkism-Pan-Turanism) , but in any case, the national and confessional in the phenomenon are inseparable unity, forming a kind of Turkic-Islamic synthesis” 4 . Obviously, Islamic rhetoric was adopted for tactical reasons. The religious factor for the Pan-Turkists is just

an additional means to strengthen their ambitious postulates, intended for domestic and foreign policy use. In the internal political struggle, as well as in foreign policy, references to religion in official Turkish rhetoric also pursued the goal of neutralizing Iranian influence in the Central Asian region, although it was clear that the political elites on the ground preferred the Turkish secular model of government rather than the Iranian one. . The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh was essentially a national liberation movement of the Armenian population of the region, "brought to the point of physical survival, economic blockade, deportation and murder" 5 , against the policy of ethnic cleansing and state terror. The conflict was also caused by serious mistakes in Soviet nationality policy and ethnic intolerance based on the historical experience of interethnic coexistence. The conflict, having gone through several stages, turned into a large-scale war, during which the parties were ready to use any methods in order to attract their side to the world community and thereby gain sympathy and sympathy for their position. In addition, for the Azerbaijani side, the ideas of Islamic unity and the corresponding statements became a convenient pretext for attracting the attention and sympathy of Islamic states to their side in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Worthy of mention is the fact that the ideas of Islamic unity were rather weakly manifested in the Islamic republics of the former USSR and at the initial stage of the conflict, such sentiments, as such, did not manifest themselves. It can be stated that the conflicts between the Christian and Muslim elements of the former USSR did not have a pronounced religious coloring, which is explained by the secular nature of the mass consciousness and the more nationalist nature of these movements 6 . For example, the foreign policy of the Central Asian republics was distinguished by the almost complete absence of Islamic rhetoric. According to some researchers, it was the absence of the phenomenon of Islamic solidarity in the Central Asian republics on the issue of the Karabakh conflict that to a large extent contributed to a certain distancing of the President of Azerbaijan A. Mutalibov from the former Islamic republics of the USSR 7 . Back in the early 1990s, the Turkish newspaper Milliyet wrote that “the rest of the Islamic republics may perceive the acute Armenian-Azerbaijani disputes as a war between Islamism and Christianity, and in this case, events may also unfold in the Central Asian regions. In such a situation, the Soviet leadership may face unpredictable consequences and serious problems” 8 . It should be noted that there were also religious overtones in the origins of the Karabakh conflict. This is evidenced at least by the decision of the RCP(b) of the Caucasian Bureau of July 5, 1921 on the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan "based on the need for national peace between Muslims and Armenians" 9 . In 1988, at the initial stage of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the religious intolerance of the parties was weakly expressed. True, at the rallies in Baku, some participants, along with the flags symbolizing Islam, also raised Ayatollah Khomeini, but such

manifestations could not direct the conflict into the mainstream of religious confrontation, although it would be wrong to completely reject the existence of the latter. Moreover, the Armenian pogroms in Sumgayit (February 1988) and Baku (January 1990) were accompanied by anti-Christian and pro-Turkish rhetoric 10 . In the same period, in connection with the onset of the holy month of Mugaram, the spiritual leader of the Caucasian Muslims, Ayatollah Ala Shukur Pashazade, condemned the "enemies of Islam" and called on "believers to unity" 11 . Along with the intensification of hostilities, Baku increasingly began to appeal to the religious side of the conflict, bringing radical Islamic slogans to the fore. In June 1992, on the eve of the large-scale Azerbaijani offensive, calls were heard on the Baku radio at the state level to declare a holy war (jihad) against the "gentile Armenians" 12 . In addition, in international instances, especially in those international structures where Muslim countries participated, Azerbaijan did not miss the opportunity to use the religious factor with the hope of strengthening the pro-Azerbaijani position of these countries in the Karabakh issue. Despite the political fragmentation of the Islamic world, Muslims, in comparison with other religions, have a more pronounced sense of religious unity 13 . In this sense, some Islamic countries, such as Pakistan, were inclined to attach a religious connotation to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Karabakh and support the Azerbaijani (Muslim) side, although at the same time Islamabad rejected violent methods 14 . Obviously, in the context of using the idea of Muslim unity, some countries want to spread their influence, acting as an organizer of such unity 15 . Such a position acted in terms of increasing the international prestige of a particular country. Paradoxically, in the case of the Karabakh conflict, secular Turkey acted with such a mission, combining pan-Turkic rhetoric with pan-Islamic rhetoric. Back in the 70-80s of the 20th century, Turkish foreign policy began to pay special attention to the so-called idea of "Islamic unity", using it as an important factor in obtaining the support of Islamic countries in the Cyprus issue 16 . Ankara used a similar policy in the issue of protecting the rights of the Turkish population in Bulgaria. In the spring of 1988 The Turkish Department of Religious Affairs organized a meeting of religious Islamic leaders from the regions of the USSR, who did not ignore the current events around Nagorno-Karabakh. At this meeting, the delegates from the Soviet Union were careful in their statements and did not make any statements of solidarity on religious grounds 17 . It is also interesting that in January 1990, after the entry of Soviet troops into Baku and the appearance of casualties among the civilian population, the first responses from the Turkish side were of a religious nature. Former Turkish President Turgut Ozal, during his stay in the United States, noted that "Azerbaijanis are Shiites, and Turks are Sunnis, so this issue should worry Iran more than Turkey" 18 . But this statement testifies more to the caution of the Turkish side, which tried to disguise its interest in the fate of the Azerbaijani Turks.

After the collapse of the USSR, Turkey actively sought to use the idea of Turkic unity against Armenia, openly showing a pro-Azerbaijani position in the Karabakh conflict. In the context of neo-Pan-Turkist plans, Ankara considered it important to develop a common position of the Turkic countries on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, using, among other things, Islamic rhetoric 19 . Along with efforts towards achieving Turkic unity, the Turkish side also actively participated in the construction of mosques, in the training and retraining of the clergy in independent Islamic republics, attaching particular importance to the role of the Islamic factor in the process of state building. The leader of the Turkish Islamist Prosperity Party Nejmetin Erbakan, pointing to the pro-Armenian position of the West, called for "turning to the support of the Islamic world in the issue of protecting the infringed rights of Azerbaijan" 20 . The entire “bouquet” of the processes of Islamization of Turkish society and the deepening of Islamic self-consciousness, which are growing from year to year, manifested itself in demonstrations in support of fellow Azerbaijanis, during which anti-Armenian and anti-Russian slogans were side by side with calls directed against the republican and secular orders 21 . The expansion of hostilities in the Karabakh conflict zone aroused concern among Turkish leaders, who feared that interethnic conflicts in the regions adjacent to Turkey would further deepen the processes of Islamization within the republic and, thus, become a serious challenge to the secular structure of the Turkish state. According to Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Volkan Vural, “the continuation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh could acquire religious overtones, turn into a confrontation between Muslims and Christians” 22. In turn, the Azerbaijani side, manipulating the religious factor in its relations with the West, urged to support Azerbaijan in every way to neutralize Iranian influence and a possible outbreak of Islamic fundamentalism in the republic, and not to take a one-sided position on the Karabakh conflict, supporting Christians. Va-fa Guluzade, adviser to President Heydar Aliyev, noted that Washington's support for Armenia could force Azerbaijan to turn its face to Iran under Islamic slogans, which, in his opinion, is the only way to spread fundamentalism in Azerbaijan 23. And Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, excluding the Turkish military intervention in the Karabakh issue, also connected this with the religious side of the problem, noting that such steps could involve Turkey in such disasters from which it would be impossible to recover within 20 years, and the problem will be transformed into a Muslim-Christian conflict 24 . However, Turkish, as well as Azerbaijani politicians, used the rhetoric of the clash of civilizations to warn the West against unilateral support for Armenia in the Karabakh issue. In an interview with the Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta, S. Demirel stated the following: “We warned the leaders of European countries that if Western countries publicly and openly support Armenia, and Muslim countries come to the aid of Azerbaijan, then a Muslim-Christian war will begin in the Caucasus.” 25 . The accents of the Turkish leader's rhetoric had their own intent: they were

aimed at warning European countries to refrain from assisting Christian Armenians, hinting at a possible "balkanization" of the situation in the South Caucasus. During the military phase of the conflict, as already mentioned, the Azerbaijani side involved in the war an impressive number of mercenaries, including those from Islamic countries Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and other countries 26 . The Christian Science Monitor, pointing to the involvement of Afghan mercenaries in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, emphasized the likelihood of the transformation of the ethnic essence of the conflict and the strengthening of the religious side of the confrontation, as well as its international character, which could lead to an expansion of the war, pushing Turkey and Iran to active action 27 . There is no doubt that the emphasis on the religious subtext of any ethnic conflict and the strengthening of religious intolerance against this background can serve as an additional factor in its subsequent escalation. The use of foreign mercenaries, mainly from Muslim countries, is clear evidence of this. In the war against Artsakh, Chechens, Afghans, Pakistanis, Iranians, Arabs, Turks and representatives of other nations fought on the side of Azerbaijan.

KARABAKH CONFLICT AT OIC MEETINGS AND TURKEY The Organization of the Islamic Conference was founded in 1969. with the participation of several dozen Muslim countries with the main goal of discussing the current problems of the Islamic world and promoting Islamic unity, in particular, in the protection of the rights of Muslim minorities and in the existing problems between Muslim and non-Muslim states. Turkey, being one of the active members of this international organization, did not miss the opportunity to further expand the list of countries anti-Armenian in the Karabakh issue and, thus, to acquire new allies for Azerbaijan, especially since back in the late 1980s . Turkey managed to get some support from the OIC in the Cyprus issue. Already in December 1991. in the capital of Senegal, Dakar, during the 6th OIC summit, Azerbaijan became its full member, and Turkish President T. Ozal called on other member countries to recognize its independence 28 . It should also be noted that in relation to specific issues, the positions of this organization are in the nature of applying double standards. Thus, considering the right of the Palestinians to self-determination as indisputable, the OIC, on the other hand, in its documents rejects the same right of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. On the other hand, it is clear that the interest of Islamic countries in the fate of their fellow believers is due not so much to their concern as to the possibility of achieving certain political goals and the desire to gain international prestige by using these problems as a factor for pressure and political bargaining. At the same time, addressing such problems often has internal propaganda purposes 29 . In the second half of June 1992 in Istanbul, on the eve of the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OIC member countries, Acting President of Azerbaijan Isa Gambar, receiving Pakistani Ambassador to Russia Jahangir Kazn in Baku, persuaded the latter to support the

proposal of the Azerbaijani side to include the issue of "Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan" in the agenda Istanbul meeting. The Azerbaijani side was also consistent with regard to the application of economic and political sanctions against Armenia. On June 14, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin issued a statement in which he supported the proposal to include the issue of the Karabakh conflict on the agenda of the OIC meeting in Istanbul 30 . Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Tofig Gasimov, speaking to the participants of the Istanbul forum, called on the OIC "to use all its authority to stop the aggression of Armenia and force it to withdraw its armed forces from the territory of Azerbaijan" 31 . In his speech, he expressed the opinion that after the success of the Armenian armed forces in the confrontation with the Azerbaijani army, the nature of the conflict has changed radically. They also spoke about the losses of the Azerbaijani side during the war, about the plight of the Azerbaijani refugees and the "need to return them to their homes." Naturally, the presence of hundreds of thousands of Armenian refugees, forcibly expelled from their native lands, and the aggressive policy of Azerbaijan towards the Armenian population were kept silent. Despite the fact that during the Istanbul meeting no separate resolution on Karabakh was adopted, the 14th section of the final resolution called on Armenia to "renounce aggressive policy in the region", and the international community was invited to support the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and put pressure on Armenia 32 . In fact, the Istanbul meeting, while declaring its intention to expand efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, at the same time emphasized its commitment to the interests of "a single-faith Azerbaijan", based on the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, and not on the principle of self-determination of national minorities, which the organization adhered to in the issue of protection interests of Islamic minorities. After the Istanbul meeting in various formats of all official meetings within the framework of the OIC, Turkey and Azerbaijan sought to achieve tougher formulations regarding Armenia. The following year, 1993, anti-Armenian activities among Muslim countries were continued within the framework of the permanent mission of the OIC member countries operating at the UN. In general, in the adopted documents, the position of the Armenian side was condemned and characterized as “aggressive”. At the initiative of the representative of Iran, a monitoring group was set up to monitor the situation in the region 33 . In July 1993, Hikmet Cetin took part in a special meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OIC member countries on the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Karachi, where he achieved the inclusion of the Karabakh issue in the joint communiqué. The document demanded from the Armenian side "immediately withdraw troops from the Azerbaijani territories" 34 . It should be noted that Turkey actively used the factor of Islamic solidarity in securing its own interests in another Balkan conflict. In particular, with the support of Islamic countries, Turkey managed to pass a resolution through the UN Security Council, which demanded that the Serbian side suspend military operations until January 15, 1993, otherwise threatening to use military means. Turkey received the expected assistance from the OIC member countries, and

H. Çetin unequivocally stated that the Islamic world could use oil as a means against the West's inaction on this issue 35 . In parallel, the Azerbaijani side deliberately used the diplomacy of "oil blackmail". Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Hasan Hasanov in early December 1993 stated at a meeting within the framework of the CSCE that Azerbaijani oil will flow to international markets through the country that will provide more assistance to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. It was obvious that this statement was primarily addressed to Turkey, since, according to Hasanov, his country could not adhere to the terms of the protocol signed with Turkey, which provided for the construction of an oil pipeline from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean terminal Ceyhan. The Turkish newspaper literally quoted the following statement of the Azerbaijani minister: “It is not at all necessary for us that the oil pipeline be laid through Turkey. Our parliament does not consider it possible to make a decision on the oil pipeline until the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh is resolved. And for that we need soldiers. Every country that can send soldiers should do it for us."36 . However, it should be noted that at the last in Tehran in 1997. At the 7th meeting of the heads of the OIC member states, on the initiative of the Iranian side, this wording was neutralized 37 . It can be said that Iran spoke at the OIC summits rather from the standpoint of protecting the interests of Armenia, rather than Azerbaijan, which takes a far from friendly position towards Iran. It is worth noting that the anti-Iranian rhetoric of the former President of Azerbaijan A. Elchibey did not stop. In one of his statements, Elchibey stated that in the future Iran would be divided into several independent state entities, and at the next congress of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan in January 1998. Turkey's representatives proposed to Elchibey that Tabriz be proclaimed the capital of "United Azerbaijan" with the motivation that "if we fail to solve the problem of Tabriz, we will not be able to return Nagorno-Karabakh" 38 . The factor of Islamic solidarity in the Karabakh issue was also involved in the framework of another interstate structure - the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). However, at the first summit of the heads of the ECO member states in Tehran, despite the efforts of Ankara and Azerbaijan accepted into the ranks of the ECO, a resolution was adopted that supported the rights of the people of Kashmir and “the restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people 39 . Nevertheless, the Karabakh issue was included in the resolution adopted at the second ECO summit. It condemned "the attacks of the Armenian occupying forces on the Aghdam, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Kubatly regions of Azerbaijan" 40 . At the same time, of course, not a single word was mentioned about the participation of an international mercenary army from Islamic countries, which participated in the war on the side of Azerbaijan. Another manifestation of Turkish initiatives in the field of using the factor of Islamic solidarity in international politics was the meeting of the ambassadors of Islamic countries accredited in Ankara with Turkish President Suleiman Demirel, during which the Turkish leader stated that “... anti-Islamic sentiments are increasing in the world, and in Bosnia and a real genocide of Muslims is being committed in Azerbaijan” 41 .

In general, the religious factor in the conflict discourse around the Karabakh problem did not play a decisive role in the war unleashed by Azerbaijan against the Armenian population, but was intended to become only an additional, auxiliary factor in ensuring success in the international arena.

CHAPTER NINE ISLAMIC MERCENIES IN THE KARABAKH WAR: TO THE ORIGINS OF PENETRATION OF THE NETWORK OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INTO AZERBAIJAN AND TURKEY The events of September 11 in the United States clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the world community to the challenge posed by radical religious groups and the network of international terrorism. For a thorough understanding of the processes of formation and coordination of the actions of modern extremist and terrorist groups operating in many regions of the Eurasian space, it is very important to trace the history of their emergence, as well as their involvement in events taking place in conflict zones. Undoubtedly, the “hot spots” that appeared on the territory of the former USSR and Yugoslavia in a certain way contributed to the establishment of close ties between radical Islamic groups operating in different countries. Among them are conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Chechnya and Bosnia appear to be areas of interaction and cooperation both between radical Islamist groups and between them and the power structures of the countries that patronize them or direct their actions. In this regard, the protracted conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is interesting from the point of view of studying the prerequisites for the emergence of a network of interaction between international terrorist groups in the Caucasus, in particular, in Azerbaijan, where these forces found reliable support and patronage in the face of power structures to expand their activities. Even today, when a fragile truce is observed in the zones of bloody conflicts, one of the varieties of militarized Islamist ideology, the Mujahideen factor, is increasingly making its presence felt. This is clearly seen in the example of post-war Bosnia. Part of the Arab volunteers - "warriors of Allah", who came here to fight against the Serbs in 1992-1995, settled in the country, institutionalizing their presence by mixed marriages. Another part took part in the Chechen war, and the third part joined the emerging structures of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 1 . Similar processes took place in Azerbaijan after the signing of the Bishkek Protocol and the establishment of a ceasefire in Karabakh. It was in Azerbaijan that the first cells of al-Qaeda appeared on the territory of the former USSR, when this organization established its representative office in Baku and began to support the Azerbaijani forces in their war for control of Nagorno-Karabakh 2 . Islamic radicals began to play a special role in the spread of terrorist actions around the world, who, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, launched their activities in the "hot spots" of the Eurasian space - in search of new "jihadist wars". In the first half of the 1990s former Arab Mujahideen or, as they are also called, "Arab Afghans", who once fought against Soviet troops in Afghanistan, made "conflict cruises" in "hot spots" - Tajikistan, Karabakh, Chechnya, Bosnia, etc. 3 . By 1992, receiving funding from the Pakistani intelligence agencies,

the Armed Islamic Movement began to fund and train Islamic terrorists and militants in their camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan to wage jihad around the world. The Caucasus region, located between the hot spots in the Balkans and Central Asia, has become a transshipment area. Azerbaijan, Chechnya and the northern regions of Georgia have turned into well-equipped military bases for various radical groups that launched their terrorist activities against the Russian Federation, the Republic of Armenia and the NKR. Recently declassified documents (dated 1998) by the US Defense Intelligence Agency regarding al-Qaeda's plans in the North Caucasus and Central Asian republics and revealing al-Qaeda's goals, contacts, methods, and financing and training bases, contained information about the presence of a "direct route to Chechnya from Pakistan and Afghanistan via Turkey and Azerbaijan” 4 . The deployment of terrorist activities of various local Islamist groups both in Azerbaijan and Chechnya were largely promoted by the Turkish side, more precisely, by the Turkish special services, which are trying in this way to achieve their main goals: weakening Russian influence in the region and tightening the vulnerability of the security of the Republic of Armenia and the NKR. In the early 1990s, the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, J. Dudayev, made visits to Turkey, the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as well as a number of Muslim countries in the Middle East. During these visits, he managed to agree on the supply of weapons to Chechnya. By the autumn of 1994 transport planes of the national Chechen airline operated shuttle flights on the Khartoum-Baku route with unmarked cargo. Soviet-made weapons purchased by Turkey from East Germany were transported by air via the Turkish city of Bitlis to the Azerbaijani Nasosnaya military airfield, located near Baku 5. At the same time, the militants of the Turkish and Azerbaijani branches of the ultranationalist organization Gray Wolves stepped up their activities in Chechnya, some of whom were trained in the training camps of the Turkish special services. The main geopolitical goals of the Chechen leaders in the Caucasus region were outlined by Dzhokhar Dudayev in an interview with the Turkish newspaper Zaman in March 1994. They boiled down to the following: “My plan involves the creation of a union of Caucasian countries, signifying a united Caucasus, directed against Russian imperialism. Our main goal was to achieve independence and freedom together with the Caucasian republics, which for 300 years were under the yoke of Russia. After that, we will propose to jointly exploit the rich natural resources and oil of the Caucasus and transport them through Turkey to world markets” 6 . In turn, in the war unleashed against the peaceful Armenian population of the NKR and the Republic of Armenia, Azerbaijan made attempts to attract mercenaries from Islamic countries to participate in hostilities.

It must be said that terrorist groups and radical Islamist movements settled in Azerbaijan even before the country declared independence. However, it is generally accepted that a fertile ground for the activities of such organizations in Azerbaijan arose with the coming to power of Heydar Aliyev, who began to attract mercenaries from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey and other countries to fight against the Karabakh Armenians 7. In this matter, H. Aliyev continued the tradition of his predecessors, which was to use foreign military force to resolve the Karabakh conflict. The presidents of Azerbaijan tried to resolve the Karabakh problem and increase the combat effectiveness of the army through the use of Soviet armed forces or foreign mercenaries and military instructors. Thus, A. Mutalibov "successfully" used the Soviet troops to carry out a policy of ethnic cleansing in the Armenian-populated northern regions of Karabakh. During the reign of President A. Elchibey, the Azerbaijani army was instructed by military advisers from Turkey, Russia, Pakistan and the United States. Azerbaijan also sought to use its ties with Islamic countries, as well as with radical Islamic organizations, to isolate Armenia diplomatically and receive financial and military assistance in order to continue the military campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh. One of the convenient ways to suppress the resistance of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani authorities considered the involvement of Chechen fighters and Afghan Mujahideen in military operations on the Karabakh fronts in the period from 1992 to 1994.

CHECHENS IN KARABAKH In the policy of secession from Russia pursued by the Chechen authorities, great importance was attached to actions aimed at acquiring allies, especially in the Caucasus region. In this regard, Grozny considered Azerbaijan as one of the main pillars in the South Caucasus. The circumstance was also taken into account that until the end of 1993 official Baku was not a part of the CIS. This solidarity was also based on the idea of a common Caucasian home, which was designed to consolidate the peoples and countries of the Caucasus in the struggle against Russian influence. Already in the early 90s. the leader of the "People's Front" of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, visited Grozny and established friendly relations with General Dzhokhar Dudayev 8 . In the middle of spring 1992, a delegation of Azerbaijani Muslim leaders visited Chechnya and met with General J. Dudayev. According to some sources, this delegation also included representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan incognito. In addition to discussing issues of a protocol nature (establishing ties between the two countries and peoples, joining efforts to revive Islam, etc.), the issue of military cooperation was also discussed during bilateral meetings. In particular, the possibility of the participation of soldiers of the armed forces of Chechnya in the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh was discussed, with the Azerbaijani side undertaking to equip the latter with armored vehicles and ammunition . However, J. Dudayev, apparently, was not interested in the open involvement of Chechnya in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and it was decided to involve only Chechen volunteers in

hostilities - for an appropriate fee. According to various sources, the fees of Chechen mercenaries ranged from 600 to 1,000 rubles a day 10 . The recruitment of mercenaries took place on the territory of the former military unit on Butyrina Street in Grozny. Fueled by the ideas of Islamic and Caucasian solidarity, Chechen fighters arrived in Azerbaijan under the leadership of the notorious field commander Shamil Basayev. The Baku leadership hoped, with the help of Chechen detachments, to finally defeat the military pressure of the Karabakh Armenians. At the beginning of July 1992, there were already about 300 Chechen mercenaries in Karabakh. During the very first clashes with the Armenian units, the Chechens suffered serious losses, and among the dead Azerbaijani soldiers, the Armenians often found Russian citizens from Chechnya 11 . According to the Chechen mercenaries themselves, the main factor that influenced the decision to participate in hostilities in Karabakh was the idea of Caucasian and Islamic solidarity, as well as the proximity conflict area to Chechnya 12 . Taking into account the discipline and courage of the Chechens, the Azerbaijani army leadership appointed them as commanders of platoons and companies, and often with their participation barrage detachments were formed to shoot deserters and retreating Azerbaijani soldiers. In July 1993 "Chechen-Press" reported on the participation of Chechens in the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh, which was confirmed by the first casualties among them 13 . In contrast to the hostilities against the Georgian troops in Abkhazia, Sh. Basayev's affairs in Karabakh did not go so well and, having suffered significant losses, the Chechen detachments very soon left the Karabakh theater of military operations, which was to a large extent connected with both intra-Chechen and Russian - Chechen problems. During the hostilities, several Chechens were taken prisoner by the Armenian self-defense forces. For their release, a representative of the official Chechen authorities arrived in Stepanakert, and the extradition of the prisoners was agreed upon during negotiations with the Armenian authorities of the NKR. The Chechens, who were in the personal bodyguard of the Azerbaijani president, were also recalled. By a strange coincidence, this happened on the eve of the armed action of the rebellious Azerbaijani colonel Suret Huseynov in Ganja and the subsequent march of the rebels on Baku in June 1993. It should be noted that among the soldiers of S. Huseynov there were also Chechen soldiers 14 . It will not be an exaggeration to say that Chechen mercenaries played a certain role in the internal political reshuffles in Azerbaijan. After the signing of the Bishkek ceasefire protocol 15 in May 1994, Chechen leaders repeatedly promised to come to the aid of fellow Azerbaijanis and “liberate” Karabakh from the Armenians after they sorted out “household matters” 16 . The participation of Chechens in the fighting in Karabakh was motivated by the desire to acquire military skills for their subsequent use in the expected military conflict in their homeland. On the

other hand, the involvement of the Chechens in the fighting was an attempt on the part of Baku to overcome the inefficiency of the Azerbaijani army. The ineffectiveness of the Chechen detachments in the fighting in Karabakh was due to the nature of the conduct of military operations in Karabakh, which in many respects differed from the war in Abkhazia. The "Chechen experience", in particular, could not be useful in combat operations in open areas using offensive and counter-offensive tactics in the presence of more or less clear front lines and communications. The essence and advantage of the "Chechen experience" of warfare lay in the tactics of street fighting and battles in mountainous areas 17 . Here it is appropriate to ask the question: what exactly attracted the Chechens to the hell of the Karabakh war? Material interest or religious solidarity? Most likely, neither one nor the other. According to the Ichkeria newspaper, by agreement with the Azerbaijani side, the transfer of weapons from Azerbaijan to Chechnya was put on a grand scale. Apparently, this was a good stimulus for the Azerbaijani-Chechen cooperation. It was in this way that Grozny wanted to replenish his arsenal of weapons. At the beginning of July 1992 began the transfer to Chechnya of a large amount of ammunition and weapons previously used in the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. The transfer of weapons to Chechnya took place along the route Samur (Azerbaijan) - Kasumkent - Dulbug Khadzhalmakhi - Glokh - Harami Pass (Dagestan). Given the involvement of the Chechen National Guard in the recruitment of mercenaries - and this took place on the territory of its location, part of it - official circles in Grozny were involved, or at least aware of ongoing operations to recruit mercenaries and transfer weapons 18 . Thus, on the one hand, Chechen mercenaries gained combat experience in Karabakh, and on the other hand, Grozny, represented by Azerbaijan, had a fairly solid logistics support in its confrontation with Russia19 . Chechen mercenaries led by Sh. Basayev took part in the fighting in Shushi in May 1992, Agdam in the summer of 1993. and were among the last to leave their combat positions under the pressure of the Armenian forces 20 . Hundreds of Chechen mercenaries remained in Azerbaijan until the very end of the Karabakh war. The detachments led by Shamil Basayev, Ruslan Gelayev and others, according to the Azerbaijani military and experts, "due to heavy losses, were forced to leave the battlefield and leave" 21 . These field commanders use the Karabakh experience in subsequent Chechen wars. It must be assumed that the weapons acquired by the Chechens during the short-term Karabakh campaign were used in military operations against the federal forces in the very first days of the Chechen war. Russian military sources have repeatedly reported that the above route was used to supply Chechen forces with weapons from Azerbaijan and Turkey during the first Chechen campaign. Moreover, during the first war, an air transfer of weapons from Azerbaijan to Chechnya was also recorded 22. The transfer of weapons through the territory of Dagestan by sea was also established. The Azerbaijani wing of the Turkish ultranationalist

organization "Gray Wolves" and its leader Iskender Hamidov played an active role in supplying the Chechen forces with weapons and volunteers from Azerbaijan, and the leadership of Azerbaijan, by and large, did not create obstacles for the participation of the Azerbaijani "Grey Wolves" in hostilities on the side of the Chechens 23 . Suffice it to quote I. Hamidov's interview with the BBC radio station in December 1994, in which he announced that 270 members of his party were sent to Chechnya to take part in the war against Russia 24 . Accusations against Azerbaijan, at the official level, facilitating the supply of weapons and the transfer of Mujahideen to Chechnya, were heard from the lips of FSB Director Sergei Stepashin during his visit to Baku in 1995, as well as from the disgraced Azerbaijani Prime Minister Suret Huseynov, who stated that "the Azerbaijani government supplied the Dudayevs with weapons and allowed the Mujahideen to penetrate into Russia through Azerbaijan" 25 . Moreover, in December 1994. On the advice of Turkey, two special units were sent from the Karabakh zone to Chechnya via Azerbaijan . The actions of religious extremists in Dagestan and Chechnya received significant support from official Baku. Thus, the adviser to President Heydar Aliyev Vafa Guluzade immediately after the attack of Basayev and Khattab militants on Dagestan in August 1999. stated that "the struggle of the Chechens and Dagestanis under the leadership of Khattab and Basayev is not, as the official bodies of Russia claim, terrorism, it should be qualified as a national liberation war" 27 . The closest ties between the Azerbaijani and Chechen sides, according to the testimony of Azerbaijani military expert A. Yunusov, were established in the arms business: weapons were supplied to Chechnya through Azerbaijan from Turkey and the countries of the Muslim East 28 . Available data indicate that the channels for the transit of significant financial resources and equipment from Turkey to Chechnya continue to function. All this shows ample opportunities for terrorists to use the territory of Turkey and the infrastructure located here. The Moskovskiye Novosti newspaper lists Turkish organizations as the Middle East Turkic Union, the Foundation for Friendship between Turkey and Saudi Arabia among the sponsors of the Chechen fighters 29 . On this occasion, at the very beginning of the first Chechen war, on January 5, 1995, the leadership of the Russian Federation appealed to the Turkish government with a demand to take the necessary measures and prevent the participation of Turkish volunteers in the events in the North Caucasus. Kaze is on the side of Dudayev 30 . Moscow was also strongly dissatisfied with two visits by J. Dudayev to Turkey, where he was received by Turkish officials, in particular, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel in October 1993 31 . Solidarity on the basis of the Islamic religion, the sentiments of the Turkish leadership sharply increased, especially after the coming to power of the Islamist government of Necmedtin Erbakan. With the active participation of Erbakan, B. Yashar, a Turkish citizen and a Chechen by origin, was appointed to the post of state minister and press secretary of the government of the

Republic of Ichkeria, who was recommended to this position by T. Chiller. B. Yasar was a member of the Istanbul committee of the True Path Party. At the same time, Yashar was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Ichkeria to Turkey 32 . The Chechen forces, according to the Swedish analyst Svante Kornel, ensured the continued use of Azerbaijan as a base for their activities, and the Turkish side maintained almost daily contact with Dzhokhar Dudayev until his assassination in 1995 33 . In the recruitment of Turkish volunteers, the so-called “Islamic Order Centers”, created by the Great Unity Party represented in parliament, played a big role. Volunteers previously underwent military training in special camps - in Turkey - near Trabzon and Girne - in Northern Cyprus. The Turkish leadership itself attributed such initiatives to the Chechen diaspora 34 . It was typical for official Turkish rhetoric to "justify" the presence of Turkish traces in Chechnya by the activity of Turkish citizens of Chechen origin, the presence of sympathy and interest in the fate of their compatriots in Chechnya. However, more than once the facts and evidence fell into the hands of the Russian side, testifying to the support of the Chechen forces by Turkish official circles. The geopolitical calculations of Turkey and Azerbaijan were more than clear. As the American researcher Shirin Hunter points out, the Chechen conflict created opportunities for Turkey and Azerbaijan to weaken Russia's positions in the South Caucasus 35 . According to some reports from the Turkish press, up to 2000 citizens of the river, including volunteers from the Turkish and Azerbaijani "Grey Wolves" 36 . Given the scope of the fighting and the number of casualties on both sides, this number does not seem too high. As already mentioned, support for the Chechen forces from the territory of Azerbaijan was also carried out during the second Chechen campaign. As in the case of the first campaign, one of the main routes for the transfer of weapons, ammunition and mercenaries to Chechnya from Turkey and other countries of the Middle East passed through Azerbaijani territory. In Turkish hospitals, wounded Chechen soldiers were treated, and several organizations financed the purchase and delivery of weapons to Chechnya. In Turkey, for some time, there was a server on which the Internet site of Movladi Udugov "Caucasus Center" was operating 37 . And all this took place under the vigilant control of the Turkish military and special services. Moreover, Turkish intelligence officers were often found among the killed militants after the operations of the federal forces 38 , and Chechen volunteers, who at one time fought in Karabakh on the side of the Azerbaijanis, soon joined the terrorist structures, receiving solid support from Turkey 39 .

AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN IN KARABAKH Initially, Afghanistan expressed its attitude to the events in Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan in the form of a warning to the leadership of the USSR and India, voiced by the opposition Islamic Party of Afghanistan. Its leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar early 1990 made a statement regarding the events in Azerbaijan and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In particular, it said that “The Mujahideen of Afghanistan cannot remain indifferent to burning Islamic problems. We confirm that the Afghan Mujahideen will provide humanitarian assistance to our brothers” 40 .

However, this "humanitarian aid" turned out to be not humanitarian at all, and a few years later, with the assistance of Azerbaijani leaders, the supply of manpower and weapons to Azerbaijan was arranged from Afghanistan. One of the factors that influenced the strengthening of the activities of radical terrorist organizations in today's Azerbaijan is also the cooperation of official Baku with the Afghan Mujahideen during the Karabakh war. It was from that moment that representatives of various radical Islamic organizations settled in Azerbaijan, which had extensive ties with international terrorist organizations, and later established contacts with Benladen's al-Qaeda. For the latter, Azerbaijan has become one of the strongholds for conducting terrorist activities 41 . The prehistory of the appearance of the Afghan Mujahideen in the territory of Azerbaijan is as follows. In the summer of 1993, when the Azerbaijani troops were failing on the Karabakh fronts, official Baku turned to the leadership of Afghanistan for help to involve the Afghan Mujahideen in military operations against the Armenian self-defense forces of Nagorno-Karabakh. In July 1993 Azerbaijani Deputy Interior Minister Rovshan Javadov arrived in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and met with Afghan Prime Minister G. Hekmatyar, leader of the Afghan Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) party, to negotiate the dispatch of Afghan fighters to Azerbaijan 42 . And in mid-December, the son-in-law of the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, along with a representative of Hekmatyar's ally, General Rashid Dostum, visited Baku. Hezb e-Islami was "one of the cores of the 'Afghan branch' which organized the training of the Algerian and Egyptian Mujahideen" in Afghanistan 43 . G. Hekmatyar, who was previously the main recipient of foreign aid, faced financial difficulties by the mid-1990s due to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and a significant reduction in funding from foreign donors, who began to look for new, more effective conductors of their interests in Afghanistan 44. Most likely, this circumstance played an important role in the agreement of the Afghan leaders to cooperate with the official circles of Azerbaijan in the supply of manpower for the Azerbaijani army, which suffered a complete fiasco. It should be assumed that all this was not done for reasons of Islamic solidarity, but was based on a certain financial interest. However, in the recruitment of Afghans, the religious factor, more precisely, the cliché about the struggle "between Christian Armenia, assisted by Russia, and Muslim Azerbaijan" was still used 45 . As some analysts rightly remark, the attraction of Afghan Mujahideen by Azerbaijan to the Karabakh conflict zone could become an impetus for a new round of tension in Karabakh. As a matter of fact, the Afghans could not do anything significant in the subsequent development of the situation, except that by their presence they only testified to the hopelessness of the position of official Baku, which “was brought to its knees and clung to everything that was possible” 46 . The Afghan Mujahideen who arrived in Karabakh were mainly from the Hekmatyar group "Hezb e-Islami". A certain Vaydallah acted as an intermediary between the Azerbaijani side and the Mujahideen, who organized and coordinated the work to attract and deploy mercenaries in

Azerbaijan 47 . According to the journalist Thomas Goltz, in the process of transferring Afghan mercenaries to Azerbaijan, the American military, who in the past were in the US special forces and involved in the well-known Iran-Contra deal, took part 48 . At the same time, Azerbaijani pilots were trained in Texas, and some American military instructors took an active part in training Azerbaijani army units 49 . A front organization called MEGA Oil was created to cover up this unprecedented operation. It was "headed" by American officers, Richard Secord, Harry Aderhold and Harry Best. According to the Americans, back in 1992. Representatives of the administration of the President of Azerbaijan A. Mutalibov asked them to organize the work of recruiting a contingent of Afghans, training Azerbaijani recruits, and also to organize the supply of weapons through channels known to them 50 . However, American oil companies were accused of embezzlement of millions of dollars, intended not only to give bribes to the Azerbaijani government, but also aimed at replacing the latter. According to Turkish intelligence sources, the Exxon and Mobil oil companies were "behind the coup" in 1993, which brought G. Aliyev to power. The same source informed about a meeting in Baku with the participation of "key persons" from British Petroleum, Exxon, Amoco, Mobil and the Turkish Oil Company, at which, at the insistence of the Azerbaijani side, the issue of supplying Azerbaijan with weapons was discussed. 51 . The Afghans who arrived in Azerbaijan were deployed on the territory of the former Soviet military units. The training of the Afghan Mujahideen took place under the supervision of American and Turkish instructors and, according to the Afghans, was very difficult, since the instructors turned out to be very demanding and one of the Afghans was even shot during an argument with a Turkish instructor 52 . In fact, Afghan mercenaries were the first foreign armed groups to find themselves in the zones of interethnic and intrastate conflicts on the territory of the former USSR. Afghan fighters fought in Tajikistan and Nagorno-Karabakh. It is worth noting that if in the first case the Mujahideen sided with the Tajik opposition on an ethnic and ideological basis, then in Karabakh, material interest was in the first place. One of the first who responded to the call to fight against the Armenians in Karabakh was the then still little-known Arab Mujahid Khattab. He ended up in Afghanistan in the mid-80s, among the many Arabs who arrived here to participate in the resistance to Soviet troops. They began to be called " Arab Afghans " 53 . There are about 15,000 Arab veterans of the Afghan war. The "Afghans" have established themselves as the most extremist part of the radical Islamists, giving priority to the terrorist method of struggle and acting with particular cruelty. Their role was significant in the bloody civil war in Algeria. The presence of Arab religious fanatics in Bosnia has in some cases caused discontent and disagreement with secular Bosniaks 54 . Most of the Arabs who remained in Afghanistan supported Hekmatyar. There were about 3,500 Arab Afghans in Hekmatyar's Hezb e-Islami 55 .

There is little doubt that certain groups of "Arab veterans" of the Afghan war fell into the ranks of the Mujahideen who arrived in Azerbaijan, especially since at that time most of them were going to leave Afghanistan in the hope of finding new regions for the implementation of combat experience "in the name of Islamic solidarity ". Azerbaijan has prepared to receive the Afghan Mujahideen at the proper level. Translators, experts in Dari and Pashto were drafted into the active army. From the documents and reports of Azerbaijani officers that fell into the hands of the Armenian forces, it becomes clear that the Afghans eventually became a burden for the Azerbaijanis, since most of them were very demanding in terms of food and medical care. One of the Azerbaijani military documents is curious, containing the words of the Azerbaijani lieutenant colonel D. Latifov that there was such a feeling that “they (the Mujahideen — G.D.) came to us for treatment, and not to fight” 56. Among other things, documents testifying to the “Afghan presence” in Azerbaijan fell into the hands of the Armenian side: Islamic literature published in Afghanistan and Pakistan, records and unsent letters in Dari and Pashto, as well as military maps and instructions for organizing artillery crews. Based on photographs taken in the city of Ganja, it was possible to establish that part of the Afghan Mujahideen were deployed on the territory of the training center of the 104th Ganja Airborne Division of the former Soviet army 57 . By the end of August 1993, in the Fuzuli and Zangelan directions of the Karabakh front, the corpses of Afghan Mujahideen in traditional national costumes were found on the battlefield. In references-reports of Azerbaijani commanders, Afghan units were designated as "special contingent". Interestingly, the army leadership of Azerbaijan followed the actions of the Mujahideen in order to suppress attempts to agitate against the leadership of the republic 58 . According to the Karabakh people, the Mujahideen fought stubbornly, but could not help the retreating Azerbaijani units in any way. Despite official Baku's attempts to refute the presence of Afghans in the republic, informed sources pointed to the presence of between 1,500 and 2,000 Mujahideen 59 . Moreover, no more than two or three hundred Mujahideen were at the front at the same time. The Afghans fought according to the established schedule: one day a week they were in positions, and the rest of the days they rested. During the rest they were allowed to leave for Baku, Mingachevir and other cities in Azerbaijan, and some were even taken by special flights to Afghanistan 60 . The arrival of the Afghan Mujahideen ensured not only the replenishment of the thinning ranks of the Azerbaijani army, but also a new channel for the transfer of arms shipments to Azerbaijan from the Afghan arsenals 61 . The bulk of the Mujahideen were stationed in the southern direction of the Karabakh front, close to the Iranian border. One of the Afghan prisoners of war - Bakhtior Verballah Baberzai (ra-shiddustan tribe) from the city of Mazar-i-Sharif took part in hostilities in the Fizuli direction of the Karabakh front. According to him, the Azerbaijani command promised at the end of the contract to each of the Afghan mercenaries a reward of up to five thousand US dollars. In the first months of their stay in Azerbaijan, the mercenaries received a fee of one thousand manats

(slightly more than one US dollar). Depending on how they proved themselves in the future, and success on the fronts, the Afghans were entitled to earn money in foreign currency 62 . Mostly Afghan mercenaries served in the infantry, using their skills in mountain warfare in assault squads. Possession of various types of small arms, mainly of Soviet production, as well as combat experience in fighting against Soviet-type armored forces, acquired during the Afghan war, at the initial stage of their participation in hostilities caught the Armenian forces by surprise, especially in the southern direction of the front. The "Afghan experience" in the fight against tanks was as follows: if with the help of one grenade launcher it is impossible to disable an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) or a conventional tank, then a simultaneous salvo from several grenade launchers led to the detonation of the tank's ammunition and the vehicle then exploded 63 . Nevertheless, it was obvious that the experience of conducting combat operations, accumulated by the Afghan Mujahideen in their homeland, was not suitable in the conditions of Karabakh 64 . It should be noted that the level of maintenance of Afghan mercenaries in comparison with the Azerbaijani units was an order of magnitude higher. The Afghans lived in separate sectors and rarely had contact with Azerbaijani soldiers. There were several reasons for this. First, the Azerbaijani soldiers did not comply with Sharia requirements regarding abstinence from drinking alcohol. The Afghans followed the daily rituals prescribed by the Koran. For this reason they ate separately and cooked their own food 65 . Interestingly, a winery near the Azerbaijani city of Aghdam was blown up by the Afghans themselves due to the excessive consumption of wine by Azerbaijani soldiers. As a result, there were losses among the Azerbaijani forces. Clashes between Afghans and the local Azerbaijani population over the observance of Islamic rituals and traditions were quite frequent. Thus, for example, there were several cases of Azerbaijani women being beaten by Afghans because the women walked with their heads uncovered 66 . Secondly, Slavic mercenaries also fought in the Azerbaijani forces, whom the Afghans called "shuravi" and with whom there were frequent skirmishes with losses for both sides on the basis of mutual hostility. There were also cases when ethnic Russian conscripts or Azerbaijanis with blond hair were withdrawn from Afghan-dominated sectors so as not to provoke clashes between them 67 . Intra-Afghan skirmishes were also frequent, in particular, between groups of mercenaries belonging to various political currents and parties. And finally, thirdly, the Azerbaijani military leadership avoided excessive advertising of the participation of the Afghans in the hostilities and tried to isolate them from the main contingent of the Azerbaijani army. In order to avoid scandals and because of the unwillingness to incur indignation of the relatives of the killed Mujahideen, the Azerbaijani authorities carefully concealed the real number of losses among the "Afghan contingent" and for this reason, not all the dead Afghans were sent home 68 .

However, some Azerbaijanis still came into contact with the Afghans. Basically, these were people who were interested in establishing contacts for the purchase of drugs from Afghanistan and their further distribution 69 . The drug business promised big profits for the Azerbaijani military and government structures, and they immediately began to establish close ties with the Afghans in order to organize reliable drug trafficking routes. Although Baku still denies the participation of Afghan fighters in the Karabakh war, official Stepanakert has sufficient material to dispel any doubts on this score. In view of the danger of the deployment and further escalation and internationalization of the conflict, the President of the Republic of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan was forced to send a letter to the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Burkhanuddin Rabbani and the Prime Minister of the country Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in which he expressed concern about the participation of the Afghan Mujahideen in the Karabakh conflict in the ranks of the Azerbaijani army. In addition, Adviser to the President of the Republic of Armenia Zhirayr Liparidyan arrived in Kabul to discuss the issue of the participation of Afghan mercenaries in the Karabakh confrontation zone, expressing the concern of the Armenian side. In a response letter addressed to the President of the Republic of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the leadership of Afghanistan, represented by the country's President Burhanuddin Rabbani, condemned the participation of Afghan citizens in the armed actions in Nagorno-Karabakh and advocated a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In his message, Rabbani wrote: “... The Afghan side is aware of the experiences of the Armenian leadership. I want to inform you with great regret and in your person and the people of Armenia that, indeed, some groups of adventurers who undermine social and political stability in Afghanistan, for the financial support of their goals ... worsen relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan ... The participation of some mercenaries under the name of the Mujahideen cannot worsen relations between Afghanistan and Armenia. The Afghan side is striving in every possible way to prevent such an inhuman business, which is carried out by extremists who use their proceeds from it to increase instability in Afghanistan. In the near future, Afghanistan will try to stop this business ... "70 . This letter, of course, can be considered a clear example of diplomatic maneuvering. The involvement of the Afghan leadership in the export of mercenaries thousands of kilometers from their own country received publicity in the Western media, and for this reason the Afghan leadership tried in every possible way to deny these facts. The involvement of Afghan mercenaries in the Karabakh war in some cases was also ambiguously perceived in the Muslim world. Thus, for example, the Muslims of Canada, in a letter addressed to the leadership of Afghanistan, expressed their indignation and called for a halt in the recruitment of Mujahideen 71 . Afghan mercenaries took part in combat operations on the side of the Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh until 1994. In battles with the Armenian armed forces, the Afghan Brigade

suffered heavy losses and was disbanded in 1994. Its surviving fighters were sent to sabotage and subversive work and terrorist activities 72 . After the signing of a tripartite ceasefire agreement in May 1994, a certain part of them settled in Azerbaijan 73 , creating the ground for the deployment of extensive terrorist and subversive activities under the guise of various Muslim religious and charitable organizations. Their role was more than significant during the military campaign of the federal forces of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, especially in organizing military and financial supplies from Turkey to Azerbaijan, and from there to Chechnya. In the course of the Karabakh campaign of the Afghan Mujahideen and other Islamist groups, contacts were established between different groups and individuals. During their stay in Azerbaijan, Afghan mercenaries flew on charter flights from Kabul to Baku, and Chechen fighters flew back to Afghanistan to military training bases near Kunduz and Tolukan. The bases of the Tajik opposition were located here, the detachments of which by this time had been forced into Afghanistan. It was here that the Chechens met Khattab. Having returned by this time from Nagorno-Karabakh, Khattab joined the ranks of the Tajik opposition, and in the spring of 1994, with a group of "Afghan Arabs" as part of the Afghan-Tajik detachment (20 people), he participated in the attack on the Russian 12th outpost of the Pyanj border detachment 74 . Later, Khattab, using Chechen connections established back in Nagorno-Karabakh, made his way to Chechnya, where he led Chechen detachments in confrontation with federal forces until his death in 2002. During this time, under the guise of pilgrims from Saudi Arabia, militants of various international Islamic extremist organizations penetrated Khattab’s detachments quite legally through the territories of Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, mainly through the Yarag-Kazmalyar checkpoint on the Russian-Azerbaijani border 75 . The links between Khattab and the international terrorist Osama bin Laden are mentioned in declassified documents of the US Defense Intelligence Agency. They note that the close cooperation of the Chechen leaders with bin Laden and the training of terrorists took place under the supervision of military instructors from Afghanistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, who entered Chechnya through a corridor from Azerbaijan and Turkey 76 . Moreover, all this time, Turkey has contributed to the movement of Arab and other Islamic Mujahideen from one conflict zone to another. In the first half of the 90s. this support was based, first of all, on Ankara's desire to "return" to the Balkans and "restore the former greatness of the Ottoman Empire." The interest of the Turkish special services and the military in cooperation with various radical Islamist groups operating in the countries of the Middle East, Bosnia and Herzegovina, came precisely from Turkey's desire to gain a foothold in the Balkans and recruit Islamic mercenaries as conductors of Turkish foreign policy interests, both in the Balkans and in the Caucasus 77 . The Mujahideen who fought on the territory of the former Yugoslavia did not bypass the Turkish special services. Mujahideen from the Hekmatyar faction fought in Karabakh, representing mainly Pashtuns, who also took part in military operations against Serbian forces in the former

Yugoslavia 78 . After the entry of Mujahideen in Kabul in early 1992, about 2 thousand Mujahideen arrived in Bosnia and acted as part of the military formations of Bosnian Muslims. After the signing of the Dayton agreements, according to one of the conditions of which foreign volunteers had to leave the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in March 1996. more than 300 Mujahideen flew from Sarajevo to Istanbul, where, after a warm reception given to them by the Turkish Islamist Refah Party, the best of them were "selected" by the Turkish MIT. Of these, 100 people went to a training camp in Northern Cyprus; 200 jihadists returned to Jalalabad, a camp controlled by Hekmatyar, awaiting a possible transfer to Chechnya 79 . Turkey used them in punitive operations against Kurdish rebels. Part of this contingent was also deployed on the territory of Northern Iraq 80 . It should be noted that the experience of Turkish authorities flirting with various terrorist groups has a long tradition. An example is cooperation with the ultra-radical fascist organization "Grey Wolves" and the carrying out of terrorist acts by members of this organization against objectionable persons. Another terrorist group, Hezbollah, was used by the Turkish government in the fight against Kurdish nationalists 81 . Subsequently, the organization got out of the control of the Turkish law enforcement agencies and turned into a serious threat to national security and internal stability in Turkey itself. According to Turkish authors, many Turkish Islamic radicals who took part in the jihadist wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya continued to maintain contacts with Mujahideen groups upon their return to their homeland 82 . It is possible that many of them were subsequently recruited by the Turkish special services to carry out military-terrorist operations both inside Turkey and abroad. As mentioned above, the patronage of terrorist groups by Turkish officials also manifested itself during the two Chechen wars. The capture of the Avrasiya ferry in early 1996. with the direct participation of the Turkish special services, as well as the hijacking of a Russian plane en route from Istanbul to Moscow, the participation of Turkish militants and special services agents in the fighting in Chechnya, allowed the Russian special services to talk about open support for terrorist and radical groups from official Ankara. Ankara was involved in political and propaganda activities, providing treatment for wounded Chechen fighters in Turkish infirmaries, as well as organizing Chechen military training bases on its territory and on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Thus, Turkey has turned into a kind of corridor for the redeployment of various paramilitary Islamist forces from one front to another, in particular, from the North Caucasus to Afghanistan 83 . According to Russian military data, officers of the Turkish General Staff were not only actively involved in intelligence operations, but also actively assisted the Chechen rebels in carrying out specific combat operations against Russian troops in Chechnya 84 . Moreover, Turkish sources indicate that Chechens who took part in the hostilities and were treated in Turkey got jobs in Turkish construction companies that had contracts with Russian commercial structures. As part of construction brigades, according to Russian special services, they penetrate into Russia and conduct reconnaissance for the preparation of special operations 85 .

With the withdrawal from Karabakh, the Chechen leaders repeatedly promised to "return" there to provide assistance to Azerbaijan in the event of a resumption of hostilities. Such statements were due to the desire of the Chechen leaders to further get the support of Azerbaijan in the war against the federal forces, and in some cases, their gratitude for the assistance already provided was expressed in this way. So, for example, Azerbaijan’s contribution to the military successes of the Chechen formations in the first Chechen war was openly expressed in Baku Vice-President of the Chechen Republic Vakha Arsanov. According to the Turan agency on August 27, 1997, he called Azerbaijan a brotherly country that provided solid assistance to Chechnya, noting the following: “We do not forget either good or bad. If the Karabakh conflict is not resolved peacefully, we are ready to provide any assistance to Azerbaijan and bring anyone to their knees” 86 . Another well-known leader of the Chechen forces, Amir of the Supreme Military Majlis Shamil Basayev, wrote in an address to the President of Azerbaijan. “...Allah sees, we have serious intentions to help the Muslim people of Azerbaijan after we defeat the Russian aggressors. And we have no doubt that this day is not far off . The involvement of Chechens and Afghans in the fighting in Karabakh and their substantiation on the territory of Azerbaijan eventually turned into a serious problem for Baku. Some of them, instead of taking part in hostilities, were involved in criminal relations or demanded high fees for participating in military operations. In addition, the Chechen factor in Azerbaijan had a great influence on the process of Wahhabitization of the northern regions of the republic. In Azerbaijan, the process of Wahhabitization of some regions is on the rise, and this raises serious concerns in terms of the emergence of new hotbeds of tension. Moreover, the Armenian side has facts that the Azerbaijani leadership is deliberately resettling Chechen refugees in the territories of the former Armenian-populated Shaumyan region - for their subsequent involvement in hostilities in the event of the latter.

CONFLICT AND DRUG TRAFFICKING The existence of a relationship between the drug trade and armed conflicts is known only from the limited literature on this topic. At the same time, conflicts and drug trafficking, being different phenomena and having a different nature, enter into a certain interaction. The drug business has become one of the "internal" sources of funding for the "war economy", which can be determined as the production, mobilization and distribution of the economic resources necessary to sustain the armed struggle. Funds received from the sale of drugs are also used to finance transnational terrorist networks in the context of globalization 88 . On the example of the Karabakh conflict, we have a case where the conflict becomes a powerful incentive for the drug business during the armed confrontation and at the subsequent stage of the conflict. The main source of drug trafficking to Azerbaijan and the main factor in turning Azerbaijan into a transit country for transporting drugs to Europe and Russia was the attraction of hundreds of

Afghan Mujahideen to the conflict zone, with whom Azerbaijani representatives entered into business ties to establish the transfer of drug cargo, in particular, opium and heroin from Afghanistan. In the conflict zones, the drug trade was a very profitable business, and sometimes the amount received for military services could not stand any comparison with the amount received from the sale of drugs. It should be noted that G. Hekmatyar, largely due to external support (mainly from the CIA and Pakistani intelligence), became the main supplier of heroin to the world market. In close cooperation with Pakistani intelligence, he controlled six heroin laboratories in Koh-i-Sultan in the province of Baluchistan 89 . Note that only for the period from 1992 to 1995. Afghanistan produced between 2,200 and 2,400 tons of drugs annually. Starting in 1991, Hekmatyar's group, in search of new sources and means, began to specialize in the production of heroin and controlled more than 86 field laboratories 90 . Soon, a well-functioning drug trafficking route was organized through the countries of the so-called "Golden Crescent", including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan. The political leaders of these countries, up to the level of top officials, were involved in drug trafficking to Europe. Among these countries, Turkey remains a key state providing transit to Europe and America of heroin produced in the Golden Crescent countries. The very process of drug trafficking is control is being monitored by Turkish security forces, in particular, employees of the national security service - MIT, who are closely involved in drug trafficking as a result of the anti-terrorist campaign against the Kurds in the east of the country 91. Revealing publications appeared in the Turkish press about the mutual accusations of two law enforcement agencies: MIT, the national intelligence service and the General Directorate of Gendarmerie Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Turkey, of the participation of employees of both agencies in international drug trafficking. In particular, one MIT report stated that a rival agency “produced fake police documents and diplomatic passports for members of specific groups for their activities in Germany, Holland, Belgium, Hungary and Azerbaijan for drug trafficking under the guise of anti-terrorist activities” 92 . In turn, the head of the General Directorate of the Gendarmerie Troops of the Turkish Interior Ministry, Hanefi Avci, presented a list of MIT 93 employees involved in drug trafficking . The Turkish military, who participated in the punitive operations against the PKK, were also involved in drug trafficking. Drug trafficking has even become the reason for a showdown between the Turkish military, up to the elimination of competitors among the army ranks. So, after the assassination of Cem Ersever, a major in counterintelligence of the Turkish army, responsible for special operations of Turkish intelligence, the Turkish Security Council and senior military officials were concerned that “these involvements, as a result of actions in Anatolia and in the Turkic-speaking territories (Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans ) did not infect the Turkish military with the virus of corruption” 94. Western sources spoke of a direct connection between the participation of the Turkish military "in the Caucasian wars" as military advisers and the experience gained in the drug business 95 .

According to the French researcher M. Zhego, the war in Eastern Anatolia contributed to the flourishing of the shadow economy in general and the drug business in particular. If in the 1970s Turkey was considered only as a transit point for drug transit, by the end of the millennium it had acquired the status of a heroin producer and exporter. Clandestine laboratories for its processing arose throughout Turkish Kurdistan, and the only real reason for the observance of the ceasefire by the warring parties (detachments of the RCP and government troops) was the need to ensure the unhindered passage of convoys with goods through the so-called "heroin triangle" (Yuksekova, Van, Hakkari) . According to the American Drug Enforcement Agency, about $50 billion worth of drugs pass through Turkey every year.96 . As noted above, the key role in organizing and transporting the Afghan Mujahideen in the western direction was played by Pakistan, more precisely, the Pakistani Interdepartmental Intelligence, which since the spring of 1994 has been directly involved in active support of jihad in Chechnya 97. It was at this time that the Pakistani-backed Taliban launched a powerful offensive against the Northern Alliance in order to secure the channels for transporting heroin from Afghanistan, which subsequently provided an opportunity to finance Chechen fighters. Simultaneously, Islamabad took steps to ensure the flow of drugs and strengthen relations between Chechens and Afghans backed by Pakistan. In order to expand direct contacts between the Pakistani special services and the Chechen leadership, the Hezb e-Islami structures of G. Hekmatyar 98 were involved in this process . Laboratories for the production of morphine and heroin operated in the north of Afghanistan, along the borders with the countries of Central Asia - in the territories controlled by the Northern Alliance, although the most significant volume of Afghan opium processing was mainly in Pakistan and Turkey. One of the branches of drug trafficking from Central Asia to Turkey passed through the South Caucasus 99 . Even during the Karabakh war, the ties between the Azerbaijani military and Afghan mercenaries made it possible to obtain drugs brought from Afghanistan 100 . Former Canadian diplomat Peter Dale Scott does not deny the possible involvement of American instructors and recruiters of Afghan Mujahideen for the war in Karabakh in drug trafficking, when heroin had already begun to flow to Chechnya through Baku, Russia and even North America. Moreover, P. Scott believes that the operation to transfer the Afghan Mujahideen to Azerbaijan was partially covered by the proceeds from the sale of Afghan heroin 101 . According to P. Scott, US assistance to elements close to al-Qaeda, especially in Azerbaijan and Kosovo, led to a sharp increase in the flow of heroin to Western Europe and the US 102 . The use of drug proceeds in the war economy was not an innovation for Azerbaijan. Back at the end of 1992. 184 heroin laboratories were found in Moscow, the owners of which turned out to be Azerbaijanis, “who, with the proceeds from the sale, bought weapons for delivery to Azerbaijan and subsequent use in the war in Karabakh 103 .

By the mid-1990s, the territory of Azerbaijan had become one of the main transit routes for international drug trafficking. The republic turned out to be a strategic corridor on the way of drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Russia and then to Europe. It should be noted that the territory of Azerbaijan was used for this purpose even in Soviet times, passing drug cargo from Central Asia. The case of Azerbaijan, as a country used for drug trafficking, differs from others in several ways. Firstly, the drug business in this country was established at the level of state officials of the republic, and one of the main consequences of this was the involvement of Afghan mercenaries in the zone of the Karabakh confrontation. As a result, specific business ties were established between Afghan and Azerbaijani leaders, including among government officials. Secondly, as a result of the Chechen conflict and the drug trafficking to Chechnya, Azerbaijan turned out to be a donor country, while at the same time passing drug cargoes through its territory. This was largely facilitated by the involvement of Chechen leaders in the drug business, and drug trafficking through Chechnya due to the established ties between Chechen leaders and Afghan Islamic radicals, and the receipt of "humanitarian aid" in the form of drugs 104 . Thirdly, the drug business and drug trafficking received new impetus after the emergence of large oil companies in Azerbaijan to transport Azerbaijani oil 105. Turkish special services and military circles, closely involved in drug trafficking to Europe, also played a significant role in the development of drug trafficking through Azerbaijan. Suffice it to say that the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan R. Javadov - the main negotiator with the Afghan leadership on the issue of attracting the Mujahideen to the Karabakh confrontation zone - was the owner of drug laboratories in Sumgayit and other regions of Azerbaijan and controlled drug trafficking from Afghanistan. It was in Sumgayit that Afghan opium was processed into heroin before being transported to Turkey by members of the Azerbaijani Gray Wolves. Abdullah Chatly, who was involved in international drug trafficking and was repeatedly convicted for such activities in Europe, using the patronage of the Turkish authorities, closely cooperated with Azerbaijani politicians not only in the drug business, but also in an attempt to assassinate H. Aliyev in order to seize power more than pro-Turkish political group 106. The Turkish right-wingers came into the spotlight after this assassination, mainly the Gray Wolves organization, which is actively involved in the drug business. A. Chatly himself had close ties with this organization and at the same time was an active agent of the Turkish special services. It was he who set up a network of heroin production in Azerbaijan, in particular, in Nakhijevan, for its transportation to European countries. Nakhichevan turned into a transit base for the subsequent shipment of opium to Turkish laboratories. It is possible that it was this tandem that was interested in the elimination of G. Aliyev, and part of the government of Turkey used the money obtained from drug trafficking to purchase weapons and ammunition for Chechen and Bosnian groups. Thus, the drug business took a stable place in the economy of the Karabakh war and was a significant factor in the attempts of the Turkish side to establish an acceptable regime in Azerbaijan.

However, another well-known military figure in the modern history of Azerbaijan, former Prime Minister Suret Huseynov, was also involved in drug trafficking and owned the so-called "Ganja cartel." The Ganja drug labs were tightly covered thanks to the family ties of their owners with the authorities of the republic, including in the power ministries. It is noteworthy that even during the war in Karabakh, at the insistence of S. Huseynov, more than 700 convicted of especially grave crimes were released from prisons under the pretext that they should take part in hostilities. These people, who had a penchant for drug use, were distributed in small groups among the fighting units. Groups of drug dealers associated with the environment of Colonel S. Huseynov,107 .

AZERBAIJAN TERRORISM

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After the signing of the Bishkek Protocol and the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh in May 1994, part of the Mujahideen left Azerbaijan in search of new territories for "holy jihad" in the North Caucasus and the Balkans. However, the cells and "charitable organizations" created by them continued their active work in the territory controlled by the Azerbaijani authorities. Azerbaijan has become a convenient infrastructure for maintaining a sustainable escalation both in the Caucasus and on the southern borders of the Russian Federation. This was facilitated by the presence of a certain consensus between the Azerbaijani authorities and the leaders of radical Islamist groups operating in Chechnya, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The "gentlemen's agreement" between President G. Aliyev and the Islamists took place in 1997, when the parties came to a mutually agreeable agreement, according to which, in exchange for a promise not to be involved in coup attempts and armed uprisings against Azerbaijani authorities, the Islamists received the right to free movement of mercenaries and weapons through the territory of Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Islamic radicals also promised the participation of the Mujahideen in carrying out operations against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh 108 . According to Josef Bodansky, this infrastructure was of multidisciplinary importance and was intended to become a transshipment base for the Mujahideen arriving in the Caucasus and their further transfer to Chechnya, as well as in the development of operations against Russia and Armenia (including Nagorno-Karabakh). On the other hand, the terrorist infrastructure in Azerbaijan performed the function of concentrating, obtaining combat skills, as well as initial acclimatization and indoctrination of foreign volunteers and mercenaries, most of them Arabs, Pakistanis, Afghans and immigrants from the Central Asian republics before sending them to commit terrorist attacks and military training at bases located in Chechnya, in particular, in the Urus-Martan region, and supervised by Khattab. Khattab also created an educational structure,109 . Among the trainees in the training centers located in Azerbaijan were future suicide bombers, who underwent initial training at bin Laden's bases in Afghanistan. In this regard, it is also interesting that the Islamist infrastructure in Azerbaijan was designed not only to attract veterans of the Afghan war, but also to contribute to their further transformation into a fairly close-knit elite

corps. These activities have received significant financial support from Islamic charities, or organizations operating under such cover. Among them are the Al-Ibrahim Foundation, the International Organization of Islamic Salvation and the World Assembly of Islamic Youth, located in Ganjlik, a suburb of Baku. Some organizers and leaders created in the north of Azerbaijan,110 . These facts could not remain without consequences and contributed to the establishment of ties with other terrorist groups and organizations acting operating abroad. Thus, the terrorist organization "Jeyshullah", which has ties with Khattab and Basayev, in 1998. entered into contact with the international underground organization "Fidai Islam" on the territory of Chechnya. On the initiative and with the support of this very organization, the Azerbaijani militants "Jeyshullah" in June 1999. attempted to hijack a Mi-8 helicopter from the Zabrat airport near Baku in order to carry out terrorist attacks against the US and Israeli embassies in Baku 111 . The capital of Azerbaijan has become a real transit point for terrorists and terrorist activities and their subsidies. Among the Islamic charitable organizations, Al-Haramain, whose office was located in Baku, stood out. Only in 1999 the volume of monetary assistance to Chechen fighters from this organization amounted to one million dollars 112 . The connections of Azerbaijani and other Islamic radical extremist organizations operating in Azerbaijan with Benladen's al-Qaeda are no longer in doubt. Moreover, even before the events of September 11, the American media speculated about the “Azerbaijani trace” of the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. As it became clear later, both explosions were coordinated and directed from Baku. August 7th, 1998 Islamic terrorists almost simultaneously blew up the American diplomatic missions in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. As a result of the attacks, 250 people were killed and several thousand were injured, many buildings in the center of the capitals of the two African states were destroyed.113 . According to FBI reports, the perpetrators of the attacks had close contacts with Baku. After the terrorist attacks on American embassies in African states, the FBI recorded about 60 calls from bin Laden to his associates from the Azerbaijani branch of Islamic Jihad in Baku, as well as calls from Baku to his other accomplices operating in Africa and London. It turns out that in August 1998, the Azerbaijani branch of the Islamic Jihad organization, which was associated with Benladen's al-Qaeda, coordinated the bombings of American embassies in Africa 114 . According to the Azerbaijani press, an hour before the explosions in African capitals, a fax was sent from Baku to London in Arabic, in which the terrorists claimed responsibility for the crime and indicated the reasons for its commission 115 . In the accusation of the American court in New York in the case of terrorist acts just a few days before the September 11, 2001 attacks. it was pointed out that the al-Qaeda organization operated under different names, such as the Islamic Group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others in different countries, including Azerbaijan 116 . Jamal Ahmed el-Fadl, a member of the al-Qaeda organization, who carried out many assignments for al-Qaeda from 1989 to 1992, admitted to this at the trial in the case of explosions in American embassies, often visiting Egypt, Pakistan, Somalia, Azerbaijan and a number of other countries. Its main task was to provide members of "al-Qaeda" with financial resources 117 .

Thus, it becomes obvious that international terrorist organizations deploy their command posts where there are favorable conditions for their activities, and one of such countries is Azerbaijan 118 . More than one organization with terrorist intentions operates on the territory of this republic. The leaders of Azerbaijani militant training centers do not limit their aspirations to only the territory of Russia and the CIS. According to the statements of the leaders of these structures, "the technologies that will be tested in Dagestan are also planned to be used against legitimate governments in Arab countries, in particular, the royal house of Saudi Arabia" 119 . A month after the September events of 2001. Under pressure from the United States, the Azerbaijani authorities began a real raid on Islamic missionary organizations operating in the republic on suspicion of their links with al-Qaeda. Immediately after that, several people were arrested in Baku. Roundups of Islamic radicals in Azerbaijan began in September 1998, when Ahmed Salam Mabrouk, assistant to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, head of the Jihad military organization and associate of Bin Laden, was expelled from the country 120 . It is known that the "Egyptian Jihad" of Ayman al-Zawahiri and "al-Qaeda" united in February 1998, approved the Fatwa under the name "World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders", which became known as the "World Jihad Front". The fatwa called on Muslims to kill Americans and Jews, including civilians, wherever they were found 121 . According to Y. Bodansky, director of the task force for the study of terrorism and unconventional methods of war of the US House of Representatives, over time, Azerbaijan has become a stronghold not only for Chechen fighters, but also for various Islamic extremist groups operating in Russia and other CIS countries. 122 . Mainly due to the presence of “Afghan Arabs” and other radical Islamic groups and organizations, Azerbaijan, like post-war Bosnia, has become a “new center” of Islamic radicals who have established extensive networks of training camps and charitable organizations and underground cells attached to mosques . Egyptian Ibrahim Eidaruz, accused in the case of terrorist attacks against the embassies of the United States, according to the US State Department, since 1995 led the Azerbaijani branch of the "Egyptian Islamic Jihad" and came into direct contact with bin Laden in 1998, i.e. after the unification of "Jihad" with al-Qaeda 123 . In addition, under the auspices of the World League of Islamic Youth, a Wahhabi training camp was opened in the Ganjlik microdistrict in Baku. Saudi Arabian Mohammed Salem Abdel Hamid, Somali Mohamed Ali Khoroko, Yemenis Aref Abdallah and Hawruzi qaid Abd al-Rahman, who taught there, trained Islamists and distributed religious literature and video cassettes in the North Caucasus. Kaze, including Chechnya 124 . According to the Azerbaijani press, terrorist cells were organized in the mosques of Baku, where Islamic radicals set the tone. They were also attended by employees of the administration of President Heydar Aliyev 125 . There is evidence that after the armed invasion of Chechen forces into Dagestan in the summer of 1999, a number of extremist Islamic organizations sharply intensified their activities on the territory of Azerbaijan, aimed at organizing support bases for Chechen fighters. Emissaries from

Islamic Jihad also joined in this. The Russian press reported on the creation of at least three well-known fundamentalist Islamic organizations of paramilitary camps on the territory of Azerbaijan. It was about the organizations of the Al-Ibrahimiyya Foundation, the World Assembly of Islamic Youth and the Organization of Islamic Salvation. All of them at one time opened their regional headquarters in Baku and created several camps, where, according to the official version, they were supposed to study the Koran in "a calm atmosphere."126 . The activities of branches and departments of international Islamic organizations operating in Baku were focused on the development of Islamist ideas in the republics of the North Caucasus, which, in turn, testified to the use by Azerbaijan of the religious factor in weakening Russia's position in the North Caucasus region 127 . It should be noted that local Islamic radicals in Baku were also preparing a terrorist attack against the American embassy in Azerbaijan, but at the last moment, according to Azerbaijani sources, they abandoned this intention, “not wanting to spoil good relations in Azerbaijan” 128 . However, according to the American press, it was the American intelligence officers who thwarted bin Laden's plans to blow up the US embassy in Azerbaijan 129 . As mentioned above, after the publication of these facts, the pressure of the US administration on the authorities of Azerbaijan with the requirement to stop the activities of terrorist organizations on its territory is intensifying. However, Baku refused to extradite those accused of terrorism to the United States, deporting them to third, mostly Muslim countries (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, etc.). Among the expelled terrorists was Ahmad Salam Mabrouk, who at one time headed the Azerbaijani branch of al-Qaeda, and was detained while trying to acquire chemical and biological weapons in Azerbaijan 130 . In 1999, 14 members of the international terrorist organization "Jeyshullah" were arrested in Baku, and in 2001, six members of the terrorist group "Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami". It was proved in court that members of these groups were preparing to blow up the American embassy in Azerbaijan, and in the future they hoped to turn Azerbaijan into an Islamic state 131 . At the same time, on suspicion of links with international terrorist organizations, six charitable foundations were closed in Azerbaijan, among them Al-Haramain, International Charitable Appeal, Revival of the Heritage of Islam, Benevolence International Foundation, two employees of these organizations - citizens of Egypt - were extradited to Cairo, 22 employees were expelled from Azerbaijan132 . The conclusion of the well-known security specialist Shirin Hunter is interesting. on the consequences of Turkish religious initiatives in Azerbaijan. In fact, a kind of rebound occurs, since Turkey, unwittingly contributing to the penetration of extremist ideas into Azerbaijan and threatening the traditional religion of Azerbaijanis, thereby increases the susceptibility of the population of this country to Wahhabi and other Islamic ideologies. This became an additional stimulus for creating opportunities for the followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Osama bin Laden to penetrate and settle in Azerbaijan 133 .

In order to legitimize their presence on the territory of Azerbaijan, these organizations, as a rule, came out in support of Baku's official position on the Karabakh issue 134 . And finally, the National Commission's "Final Report" on terrorist attacks against the United States stated that the terrorists involved in the attacks on New York on September 11, 2001, initially made an attempt to enter Chechnya, but, having failed, ended up in Afghanistan , where they joined al-Qaeda 135 . The report also lists Azerbaijan and its capital, Baku, as a concentration of known terrorists and their organizations. Summarizing, we consider it necessary to draw the following conclusions. The Azerbaijani side saw the resolution of the Karabakh conflict either in the complete expulsion of the Armenian population from Karabakh, or in the restriction of its cultural and administrative rights, followed by the expulsion of Armenians from their historical homeland. To implement this political line, the Azerbaijani authorities resorted to forceful methods, hoping to break the resistance of the Karabakh Armenians with the help of foreign military force. However, a large number of losses among the Chechen and Afghan mercenaries fundamentally undermined their determination and military pressure, thereby weakening their positions and depriving them of hope for strengthening in Karabakh itself and partly in Azerbaijan. It can be stated that the unrecognized NKR became the first state to stand in the way of the spread of poisonous tentacles of international terrorism throughout the world. Nor will it be an attraction to assert that the military success of the Karabakh Armenians largely contributed to the weakening of the scale of exports and the spread of religious extremism and terrorist organizations. In this regard, it is not difficult to foresee what consequences the elimination of the “Karabakh barrier” could lead to in the event of a different status quo. In fact, the involvement of mercenaries from among radical Islamist groups in the zone of the Karabakh conflict later turned into an “import” of paramilitary religious extremism, the consequences of which in Azerbaijan are still visible today. For both Turkey and Azerbaijan, terrorist challenges have become a serious problem. However, the reason for this was by no means external threats, but, first of all, purposeful cooperation with these structures at the state level, contributing to further installation of such structures on the territory of these states and for their activities to get out of control 136 . In accordance with international law, which obliges states not to use armed force in order to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence, based on the above facts, the actions of Turkey and Azerbaijan in relation to the legally proclaimed independence of the NKR and the Republic of Armenia were taken actions that fall under definition of "aggression". We are talking about resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the UN General Assembly of December 14, 1974 on the “Definition of aggression”, the Seventh paragraph of the third article of which, among others, qualifies an act of aggression as follows: “the sending by the state or on behalf of the state of armed bands, groups, irregular forces or mercenaries who carry out acts of armed force against another state,137 .

Another document, "International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries" of December 4, 1989. also contains legal definitions for the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries for activities that violate such principles of international law as sovereign equality, political independence, the territorial integrity of states and the self-determination of peoples. In particular, the second paragraph of the fifth article of this document reads: “States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries for the purpose of counteracting the lawful exercise of inalienable right of peoples to self-determination, recognized by international law, and shall take appropriate measures in accordance with international law to prevent the recruitment, use, financing or training of mercenaries for this purpose. ” 138 As can be seen from the above facts, the aggressive policy of Turkey and Azerbaijan towards the NKR and the Republic of Armenia is contrary to international obligations, and is a concrete rule of expansionist and aggressive policy.

CONCLUSION The study of the problems of the escalation of interethnic conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union and the post-communist space as a whole forces one to be more attentive to the problem of the participation or involvement of third parties in them. As a rule, the involvement of third parties in a conflict occurs in the presence of foreign policy, geopolitical interests of a particular country and is often covered by the rhetoric of ethno-national or ethno-confessional solidarity. From this point of view, the Karabakh conflict was no exception. The conflict dynamics involved both states directly adjacent to the region, as well as countries far from it, ethnic groups and diasporas. The neo-Pan-Turkist vector of Turkish foreign policy with pronounced foreign policy ambitions, adopted after the collapse of the USSR, envisaged, as one of the main tasks, involvement in the Karabakh conflict zone in order to ensure its pro-Azerbaijani resolution. This was also a certain hope for the successful implementation of Turkey's foreign policy goals in the southern regions of the former USSR. At the initial stage of the conflict, fearing a possible negative reaction from the Soviet authorities, Turkey took a restrained, rather wait-and-see position. Ankara began to take an active interest in the events in Azerbaijan in the last years of the existence of the USSR. A month before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey was the first to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. Based on widely publicized pan-Turkic rhetoric, Ankara sought to act as a patron and protector of the interests of the newly sovereign Turkic-speaking republics and thus extend its influence to the regions of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Against this background, Turkish efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict in favor of Azerbaijan should have become a weighty proof of Ankara's readiness for this role, while simultaneously emphasizing Turkey's geopolitical weight. On the other hand, it was the Karabakh conflict that revealed the modest possibilities of Turkey in terms of geopolitical ambitions in the post-Soviet space. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was considered by Turkey as one of the main obstacles on the Path of substantiation in Azerbaijan and further penetration into the Central Asian region. At the same time, this conflict revealed a discrepancy between Turkey's real foreign policy potential and its ambitious plans after the end of the Cold War. As the Swedish researcher Svante Cornell notes, the Karabakh conflict was one of the factors that dealt a blow to the illusions of the Turkish rulers regarding their own ability to influence the processes in the territory of the former Soviet Union 1 . A well-known expert on pan-Turkism, Y. Landau, who believes that “the rejection of direct intervention in the zone of the Karabakh conflict has led to a weakening of Turkey’s popularity in Azerbaijan2, shares a similar opinion .

In order to obtain specific diplomatic and military advantages, as well as material support from outside, in particular, from Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Chechnya, etc., the political elite of Azerbaijan tried to play the card of ethnic and confessional solidarity. External interference in a conflict zone can have several manifestations. Intervention begins when a third party assists one of the parties to the conflict or interferes with the provision of assistance. Such assistance may take the form of encouraging the continuation of the struggle or manifest itself in the form of a change in the strategy of the conflicting party. In addition, a third party may seek to resolve the conflict on its own, as a mediator, or to impose sanctions 3 . Taking into account the role of Turkey in the zone of the Karabakh confrontation, it should be stated that, firstly, Turkey stood at the origins of the Karabakh problem as such, and secondly, Turkey itself is a party to the conflict due to its direct and indirect involvement in it . At the armed stage of the Karabakh conflict, Turkey and Azerbaijan tried to present the conflict as a confrontation between the "Turkic brothers" and the Armenians, thus trying to enlist the support of the Central Asian republics. Turkey joined the economic blockade of the Republic of Armenia, and put forward a number of preconditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations, including regarding the Karabakh problem. The Turkish factor in the Karabakh war manifested itself both in the form of the provision of weapons and ammunition, and in the direct participation of the Turkish military in hostilities and their planning. The successful counter-offensives of the Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh did not suit the Turkish military-political circles and, as a result, aggressive-militaristic statements against Armenia were increasingly heard. The issue of possible military intervention in the conflict zone on the side of Azerbaijan was also on the agenda of Turkish political leaders. However, the harsh statement of Marshal E. Shaposhnikov in May 1992 about the possibility of a large-scale war if other parties were involved in hostilities forced Turkey to abandon the idea of military intervention. At the same time, Turkey has begun to provide, albeit limited, As a rule, this assistance was provided not openly, but through the channels of non-governmental organizations and special services. Hundreds of high-ranking Turkish officers, commandos and thousands of soldiers and volunteers took part in military operations on the side of Azerbaijan. Western authors also cite data on military deliveries of weapons to Azerbaijan from the arsenal of the former GDR, transferred to Turkey. It seems to us that the problem of the "Turkish presence", especially the military one, in the zone of the Karabakh conflict requires further analysis, as new facts and sources appear. Some of the Turkish initiatives aimed against Armenia took on a frankly military-militaristic character. Among them are the threat of the use of military force, the demonstration of force in the form of deployment of military units along the Armenian-Turkish border, the violation of the airspace of the Republic of Armenia, as well as the use of pressure methods, as can be seen from the ongoing blockade of Armenia, firing on the territory of Armenia, etc. .d.

Although Turkey continued to supply Azerbaijan with batches of weapons and military specialists and volunteers, in the end, Ankara refrained from direct involvement in the conflict zone. There are several reasons for this position. Firstly, Turkey is a member of NATO and this circumstance can explain the excessive caution in the issue of military intervention: any arbitrary advance of the Turkish Armed Forces outside the borders of Turkey would not have gotten away with Ankara. Secondly, the United States and the Russian Federation opposed such an action. In the case of the United States, this could also result in the application of specific sanctions, in particular, an embargo on arms supplies and the provision of financial assistance, as was the case after the rare invasion and annexation of Northern Cyprus in 1974, which, in turn, had a negative impact on the economic situation in Turkey. Moreover, the large-scale plans of the Turkish military to modernize the country's armed forces could be in jeopardy. As for the position of the Russian Federation, official Moscow has repeatedly and in a very sharp form expressed itself against the Turkish military intervention in the Karabakh conflict. Although Moscow's positions were weak in the early 1990s, the Kremlin clearly did not want a sharp change in the military-political balance of power in the post-Soviet space. In addition, since May 1992, Armenia and the Russian Federation have been in the Collective Security Treaty, which provides for assistance in the event of foreign aggression from third states. One of the imperatives of Turkish foreign policy after World War II is Turkey's desire for membership in the European Union. In this regard, in the event of a military intervention against Armenia, Turkey seriously risked forever failing its European policy. The Kurdish factor has also become an equally important deterrent. The Turkish-Kurdish confrontation, which escalated in the period 1993-1995, led to the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces operating in the eastern regions of the country against the Kurdish PKK militants. In the event of military aggression against Armenia, the Turkish army would be forced to conduct military operations on two fronts. Given the many facts and factors of Turkish intervention in the Karabakh conflict zone, we can assume that Turkey itself became a party to it, openly supporting Azerbaijan. Turkish participation in the conflict was expressed by the following main components: • threat of military invasion • transport and energy blockade of Armenia • provision of military assistance to Azerbaijan • . actions aimed at creating an anti-Armenian coalition states and informational isolation of Armenia • lobbying for pro-Azerbaijani positions in international organizations.

Despite all the efforts of the Azerbaijani and Turkish sides, at the first summit of the heads of Turkic-speaking states in Ankara, the leaders of the Central Asian countries abandoned the proposed plan for the economic blockade of Armenia and condemnation of the actions of the Armenian side. Due to intra-Turkic disagreements, the planned second Turkic summit in Baku did not take place. Subsequently, in the final resolutions of the Turkic summits, a wording was fixed that did not quite suit official Baku. It should be noted that, despite all the efforts of Ankara, Azerbaijan did not receive the expected assistance from the Central Asian republics, which did not want to spoil relations with Armenia and Russia, with which they were joint members of the CIS, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan - also in the Collective Security Treaty, signed in May 1992 in Tashkent. The leaders of the Turkic-speaking republics of Central Asia took a more flexible position and did not succumb to the overly politicized designs of "Turkic solidarity." Despite the fact that since 1992 Turkey has repeatedly declared its readiness to come up with a peacekeeping or mediation initiative on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, however, given its overly aggressive and pro-Azerbaijani position, the Armenian side, in particular, the political leadership of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, refused Turkey in this role. In attempts to expand the anti-Armenian position among Muslim countries, Turkey also used the factor of Islamic solidarity, which, in particular, manifested itself in attempts to develop a common pro-Azerbaijani position at sessions of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as well as in lobbying for the adoption of anti-Armenian resolutions at meetings of the Economic Cooperation Organization. The involvement of mercenaries in military operations in conflict zones on the territory of the former USSR was widely practiced in Tajikistan, in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, in Bosnia, in Nagorno-Karabakh, etc. In the case of the Karabakh war, there was, on the one hand, the material interest of the recruits, and on the the other is the playing of the ideological-religious card by the employers. Turkish military-political support to Azerbaijan and the participation of mercenaries from different countries in the Karabakh war to a large extent contributed to the further escalation and internationalization of the Karabakh conflict. For Azerbaijan, this subsequently turned into the appearance on the territory of the country of various kinds of organizations with direct ties to international terrorist organizations. It was on the territory of Azerbaijan and in Nagorno-Karabakh that various militarized groups underwent solid combat training, which subsequently joined the global network of international terrorism. As in the case of the Karabakh conflict, in the Balkans, Turkey also undertook similar covert military supplies and assistance in the development of military operations with the participation of the Turkish military on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. K. M. Alekseevsky, chairman of the “Karabakh” Committee of the Russian intelligentsia, noted that “the Karabakh crisis helps the Turkish nation, allowing it to demonstrate pan-Turkic

solidarity and the role of the "defender of the Turkic peoples", to tie it more closely to its chariot ... All Turkey's actions show that it is not interested in a peaceful solution to the Karabakh crisis, even such a peaceful solution that suits Azerbaijan, Armenia and the NKR , but runs counter to the pan-Turkist aspirations of Turkey itself” 4 . We should also not neglect the fact that the Turkish government used its initiatives in the South Caucasus and Central Asia to divert public opinion from the tense social situation inside the country and the attention of the international community from protests against repression in Kurdistan 5 . This statement has a real basis, especially since in the early 1990s the Turkish economy experienced another crisis, which turned into a complete collapse of the economic system in 1994. Turkey's attitude to the Karabakh conflict, as well as the policy of pressure towards the Republic of Armenia, clearly showed that Turkey does not meet the standards of a democratic state with European values, but only demonstrates a neo-imperial foreign policy and its implementation in defiance of international obligations and agreements. Such a position runs counter to many of Turkey's international obligations and is a flagrant violation of international law. Among these fundamental documents, we can mention the "Declaration on the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations", adopted on October 24, 1970. One of the principles of interstate relations, proclaimed by this document, is the principle that states refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The document also states: “No state can either apply or encourage the use of economic, political measures or measures of any other nature with the aim of obtaining the subordination of another state in the exercise of its sovereign rights and obtaining from it any advantages whatsoever. No state should also organize, help, kindle, finance, encourage according to which states refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other way inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The document also states: “No state can either apply or encourage the use of economic, political measures or measures of any other nature with the aim of obtaining the subordination of another state in the exercise of its sovereign rights and obtaining from it any advantages whatsoever. No state should also organize, help, kindle, finance, encourage according to which states refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other way inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The document also states: “No state can either apply or encourage the use of economic, political measures or measures of any other nature with the aim of obtaining the subordination of another state in the exercise of its sovereign rights and obtaining from it any advantages whatsoever. No state should also organize, help, kindle, finance, encourage nor to encourage the use of economic, political measures or measures of any other nature with a view to achieving the subordination of another state in the exercise of its sovereign rights and obtaining from it any advantages whatsoever. No state should also organize, help, kindle, finance, encourage nor to encourage the use of economic, political measures or measures of any other nature with a view to achieving the subordination of another state in the exercise of its sovereign rights and obtaining from it any

advantages whatsoever. No state should also organize, help, kindle, finance, encourage accept or allow armed, subversive or terrorist activities aimed at changing the order of another state through violence, as well as intervene in the internal struggle in another state” 6 . The "Turkish trace" in the Karabakh conflict - both historically and from a modern standpoint clearly shows that Turkey, even as a regional power, has no moral right to be involved in the processes of its resolution.

REFERENCES Introduction 1

See Jacob Landau. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, London, Hurst&company, 1995, p. 214.

2

Svante E. Cornell. Turkey and Nagorno-Karabagh: A Delicate Balance, "Middle East Studies", 1998, Vol. 34, no. 1, p. 51.

3

J. Eibner, C. Cox. Ethnic cleansing continues. War in Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan, 1998, p. 31.4

cm

. David Carment and Patrick K. James, Third Party States in Ethnic Conflict: Identifying the Domestic Determinants of Intervention, in "Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalations", Edited by Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri, Palgrave Macmillan 2004, p. 23. 5

A. Chakryan. The Karabakh problem in the context of Armenian-Turkish relations,

Yerevan, 1998, pp. 6-7 (in Armenian). 6

cm. Atilgan Bayar. Neo-Osmanlilar, "Aktuel", no. 49, 11-17.06.1992, quotation from Malik Mufti. Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy, "The Middle East Journal", vol. 52, no. 1, Winter, 1998, pp. 46-49, Ola Tunander. A New Ottoman Empire? The Choice for Turkey: Euro-Asian Center vs National Fortress, "Security Dialogue", vol. 26(4), 1995, pp. 413-426. 7

. I. P. Dobaev. Islamic Radicalism: Genesis, Evolution, Practice, Rostov-on-Don, Publishing House SKNTS VSH, 2003, pp. 168-169. 8

A. Avagyan. Turkey's position as the patron of Muslims during the Moscow conference, "The problem of Nakhijevan in the Russian-Turkish agreement on March 16, 1921", (materials of the conference), Yerevan, 2001, p. 47 (in Armenian). 9

As-Safir, Beirut, 06/10/1980, quotation from G. Simonyan. From the history of Armenian-Turkish relations, Hayastan, 1991, pp. 554-555, (in Armenian). 10

Gareth Winrow. Turkey and the Caucasus. Domestic Interests and Security Concerns, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2000, p. Nine. 11

Al-Bayan, Abu Dhabi, 09/17/1989, quotation from V. Nadein-Raevsky. Turkey, Russia and the Turkic-speaking peoples after the collapse of the USSR, "World Economy and International Relations", N0. 4, 1994, p. 45. 12

Daniel Pipes. Moscow's next Worry: Ethnic Turks, The New York Times, 02/13/1990.

13

Ibid.

14

Hugh Pope. Turks Identify with Azerbaijanis' Flight, "The Wall Street Journal", 01/31/1990, Nicole and Hugh Pope. Turkey Unveiled. Ataturk and After, London, UK, John Murray, 1997, pp. 280-281. 15

Ibid.

16

V. K. Egorov. Russia and Turkey: a line of contradictions, "The Middle East and Modernity", M., 2000, p. 325-326.

17

Viktor Nadein-Raevsky. Turkophone Peoples in the Historic Path of Russia, "The Southeast European Yearbook 1992", Athens, 1993, p. 22. 18

A. Svarants. Pan-Turkism in Turkey's Geostrategy in the Caucasus, Academy of Humanitarian Studies, M, 2002, p. 4

19

Ibid., p. 12.

20

Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan, by T. Swietochowski and Brian C. Collins, The Scarecrow Press, Inc, Lanham, Maryland, and London 1999, p.131. 21

George G. Arnakis. Turanism. An Aspect of Turkish Nationalism, Balkan Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1960, p. 31, Vahap Yurtsever, Ataturk ve dis turkler, "Azerbaycan", yil 1, sayi 8 Kasim 1952, ss. 3-5.

22

See Independent Military Review, 25.09.2003.

23

Charles W. Hostler. Turkey and Soviet Turkism and the Soviets: the Turks and Their Political Objectives, London, Geo. Allen and Uniw, 1957, p. 169. 24

Ibid.

25

CSAOR Azerb. SSR, f. 28 op. 1, d. 129, ll. 106-112, quotation after E. A. Bagirov, From the history of Soviet-Turkish relations, (1920-1922), Baku, 1965, p. 87.26 William Reese .

Turkish Claims to Say in the Status of Nakhichevan, RFE/RL Research Institute, RL 136/88, March 28, 1988, p. 3, KRAN1Y ARKHIV, Armenia, Open Society Archives (hereinafter HU-OSA), Budapest, Hungary, 300/80/1/49. 27

Malik Mufti. Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy, The Middle East Journal, vol.

52, no. 1, Winter, 1998, p. 33.28 Metin Karaors .

Ataturk ve Butun Turkluk, Dogu Turkistan'in Sesi, No. 29, 1991, ss. 13-15. Quote by Anush Hovhannisyan. The collapse of the USSR, the idea of “Turkic unity” and the Karabakh issue (in the light of Turkish publications of the 1990-95s), “Countries and peoples of the Near and Middle East”, vol. 20, Yerevan 2001, p. 75, (in Armenian) 29

See also Atatürk's speech to the army, quoted in YeniIstanbul, 03.06.1967, s. 3. See also Dis turkler ve gercekler, Milliyet, 09/03/1970. thirty

Aryn Engin. Ataturkism and the struggle between the Muscovites and the Turkic world, Istanbul, 1953, translated into the NAA.

31

Ibid.

32

Frank Huddle. Jr. Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijanis, Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, Ed. By Zev. Katz, Rosemarie Rogers, Frederic Harnol, The Free Press, New York-London, 1975, p. 196. 33

Kemal Kirisci. New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior, in "Turkey: Political Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s", Leiden, New York, EJ Brill, 1995, p. 4. 34

See E. Oganesyan. Age of Struggle, Volume II, Munich-Moscow, 1991, p. 584.

35

Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996, p. 146.

36

Ibid., p. 178.

37

"Der Spiegel", 12/23/1991, in Dietrich Jung, Wolfango Piccoli. Turkey at the Crossroads. Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East, London-New York, Red Books, 2001, p 176. 38

Graham E Fuller. Turkey Face East. New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union, RAND, 1992, Graham E. Fuller, Ian O. Lesser. Turkey's New Geopolitics, From the Balkans to Western China, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1993. Jacob Landau. decree. pa6., Gareth Winrow. Turkey and the Former Soviet South, RIIA, London 1995, ero ace Turkey and the Caucasus, London, RIIA, 2000, Turkey's New World. Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, ed. by Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000. 39

See A. Yunusov. Islam in Azerbaijan, Baku, Zaman, 2004, p. 179.

40

The Independent, 10/31/1990, A. Mutalibov. We prefer the Turkish model, Abroad, No. 44, 1991, p. 3, S. I. Chernyavsky. New way of Azerbaijan, M., Azer media, 2002, p. 227. 41

Bassam Tibi. Turkey after Kemal, International Politik, http://www.deutschebotschaft-moskau.ru/ru/bibliothek/internationale-politik/1998-01/article02.html 42

1998,

no.

1,

see

Omer Kojaman. South Caucasus in the policy of Turkey and Russia in the post-Soviet period, M., Russian panorama, 2004, p. 87.

43

See. Shale Horowitz. Explaining Post-Soviet Ethnic Conflicts: Using Regime Type to Discern the Impact and Relative Importance of Objective Antecedents, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 29, no. 4, p. 633. 44

Artur Rasizade. Azerbaijan: new political guidelines, "Asia and Africa Today", M., 1993, no. 2, p. 6.

45

cm. Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (Freedom Support Act). US Public Law 102-511, 102d Cong. 3d sess., 24 October 1992, Michael P. Croissant. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict. Causes and Implications, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London, 1998, Appendix K. 46

J. Eibner, C. Cox. decree. work, ss. 7, 87.

47

Reuters, 19.01. 2000, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21.01. 2000.

48

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23.06. 2000.

49

Omer Kocaman. decree. work with the. 9.

50

Interaction with the Ministry of National Security and the GRU of Azerbaijan has been transferred to a planned basis, see Independent Military Review, 25.09. 2003.

Chapter 1 _____________________________ 1

M. Erzberger. Germany and the Entente, M.-L. 1923, p. 80, quotation from "From the history of foreign intervention in Armenia in 1918." Documents and materials, Yerevan, 1970, p. 205.2 Congressional

Records, Vol. LVII, pp. 3483-3484, quotation after A. M. Poghosyan, Kars region as part of Russia, Yerevan, Hayastan, 1983, p. 223. 3

1 See David Marshall Lang. Armenia: Cradle of Civilization, London, 1970, p. 287, G. 3. Aliev. Turkey during the reign of the Young Turks, M., Nauka, 1972, p. 276 See Arnold J. Toynbee. Armenian Atrocities. The Murder of a Nation, NY 1975. 4

Mevlan Zade Rifat. Turkiye inkilabinin ic yuzu, Halep, 1929, s. 89-93, quoted from the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire. Collection of documents and materials, ed. M. G. Nersisyan, Yerevan, Hayastan, 1983, ss. 408-412. 5

David Lloyd George. The truth about peace treaties, v. 2, M., 1957, ss. 199-200.

6

A. Toybnee. Turkey:A Past and FutureN.Y. 32-43, quoted by John Kirakosian. The Young Turks before the Court of History, Prince. 1, Hayastan, Yerevan, 1982, p. 227. 7

G. Simonyan. Ideology and politics of the Turkish national bourgeoisie, Yerevan, 1986, p. 178, (in Armenian), T. Vardanyan. Manifestations of Tatar nationalism in the Transcaucasus, Bulletin of Yerevan University, 3, 2000, pp. 91-92, (in Armenian). 8

See AB Kuran. Inkilap tarihimiz ve Ittihad ve Terakki, Istanbul, 1948, 85. 214-215, quoted by Haykazn Ghazaryan. Tsehaspan Turk, Beirut, 1968, her. 353-354. (in Armenian). See also M. Sukru Hanioglu. preparation for a revolution. The Young Turks, 1902-1908, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 158, 422-423. 9

G. 3. Aliyev, decree. work, ss. 87-88.

10

Michael P. Croissant. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, r. 8.

11

Zarevand. Turkey and Panturanism, Paris 1930, p. 108. However, one of the leaders of the Musavatists, M. E. Rasulzade, denied his participation in this meeting, see M. E. Rasulzade. About Panturanism. In connection with the Caucasian problem, with a preface by N. Zhordania, Edition of K. N. K., Paris, 1930, ss. 25-26. 12

See Aydemir S. Suyn Aryan Adam, Istanbul, 1967, s. 160, quotation from G. Avetisyan. On the issue of the "Caucasian home" and pan-Turkic aspirations, in "Ethnic and regional conflicts in Eurasia", Book. 1. Central Asia and the Caucasus. - M: All the World, 1997, p. 134. 13

14

Firuz Kazemzadeh. The Struggle for Transcaucasus (1917-1921), New York, 1951, p. 116.

Firuz Kazemzadeh. decree. work with the. 96, Musa Gasimov. Russian Struggle Against Islamism and Turkism During hte First World War, "The Turks", vol. 5, Yeni Turkiye publications, Ankara, pp. 802, 804.

15

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in A Muslim Community, London, New York, 1985, p. 79. 16

See Grant Avetisyan. On the question of the "Caucasian home", p. 134.

17

A. Badaev. Azerbaijan national movement in 1917-1918, ELM, Baku, 1998, p. 45.18

_

A. H. Kuran. Inkilap tarihimiz ve Ittihad ve Terakki, Istanbul, 1948, see Yu. A. Petrosyan,

Young Turk Movement, M., Nauka, 1971, p. 233. 19

A. Malashenko. Islamic landmarks of the North Caucasus, Carnegie Moscow Center, M., Gendelf, 2001, p. 39.

20

Tadeus Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, b. 80.

21

F. Kazemzadeh. decree. work with the. 115. This was also stated by one of the leaders of the Caucasian Turks, Usubekov, see Tadeus Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, b. 121. 22

Our actions in the North Caucasus in the World War and the fighting of the 15th division, Colonel I. Berkuk, Askeri mecmua, 1 Eylul 1934, translated to the NAA. 23

5th Caucasian Infantry Division on the way to Baku during the World War, Chief of Staff of the 5th Division Ryushtu, Askeri mecmua, 1 Khaziran, 1934, No 34, transfer to the NAA. 24

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Ruisian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, pp. 119-120.

25

Naki Keykurun (Seykhzamanli). The Memoirs of the National Liberation Movement in Azerbaijan, by Tomris Azeri New York, 1998, http://www.zerbaijan.com/azeri/tomris-book2.htm 26

A. B. Kadishev. Intervention and Civil War in Transcaucasia, Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, M., 1960, p. 63. 27

See G. Avetisyan. Brest-Litovsk: how Turkey was torn away, Kars, Ardagan and Batum, Yerevan, 1994, p. 46-47.

28

S. Zolyan. Nagorno-Karabakh: problem and conflict, Yerevan, Lingua, 2001, p.19.

29

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russia and Azerbaijan. A Borderland in Transition, Colombia University Press, New York, 1995, pp. 75-76, his own Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, p. 131. 30

Nasir Yuceer. The Military and Political Assistance of the Ottoman Empire to Azerbaijan and Dagestan in the First World War, "The Turks", vol. 4, Ankara, 2002, p. 439, A. Balaev, decree. work with the. 221. 31

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russia and Azerbaijan, p. 69.

32

Al. Khatisyan. The emergence and development of the Republic of Armenia, Athens 1930, p. 70, (in Armenian) quotation A. M. Pogosyan, Kars region as part of Russia, p. 264.33 Nalil

Pasa. Ittihat ve Terakki'den Cumhuriyet'e. M. Taylan Sorgun ed., 1972, s. 241, quotation from the publication: Yu. G. Barsegov. The Armenian Genocide is a crime under international law, M., XXI century-Consent, 2000, p. 220. 34

See Al. Khatisyan. The emergence and development of the Republic of Armenia, Athens 1930, p. 60.

35

F. Kazemzadeh. decree. work, p.110.

36

Johannes Lepsius. Deutschland und Armenia (1914-1918), Potsdam, 1919, doc. 426, quotation from From the History of Foreign Intervention in Armenia, pp. 214-215. See also the report of the Austrian-Hungarian ambassador to Constantinople in Artem Ohadjanian. 1915. Irrefutable Evidence. Austrian Documents on the Armenian Genocide, Yerevan, 2004, pp. 170-171.

37

A. B. Kadishev. Intervention and civil war in Transcaucasia, p. 77.

38

Nasir Yuceer. decree. work, ss. 440-441, Hycein Bajkar. Azerbaijani stiglal mubarizesi tarihi, Azerbajchan dovlot neshrijjaty, 1992, ss. 238-242, Nesib Nesibzade. Azerba]chan democratic republics, Baki, Elm 1990, ss. 10-11. 39

“Caucasian word”, 06/17/1918, G. Avetisyan. On the question of the "Caucasian home" and pan-Turkic aspirations, p. 142.40

_

It is curious that after the proclamation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Ambassador of Persia to Turkey sent an official protest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire, which stated that “Azerbaijan is a region in the north-west of Persia. Assigning the name “Azerbaijan” to the newly formed neighboring state is a big mistake.” See Wienn, HHSta PA X, 156. Wien, 12 Juli 1918, Nr 143990 (AO, VOL. VIII, p. 6202) in Artem Ohadjanian. decree. work with the. 157. The founder of the historiography of Azerbaijan, E. A. Pakhomov, noted the following on this occasion: “The name Azerbaijan was provisionally given to this state. This idea was not implemented, and only Eastern Transcaucasia became part of the new Azerbaijan Republic, but the name had to be left, for lack of a better one. See E. A. Pakhomov. A short course in the history of Azerbaijan, Baku department of public education, Baku, 1923, p. 11, see also V. M. Sysoev. Brief essay on the history of Azerbaijan (Northern) Baku, 1925, p. V, Shireen T. Hunter. The Transcaucasus in Transition. Nation-Building and Conflict, CSIS, 1994, p. 15, her own, Shireen T. Hunter. Greater Azerbaijan: Myth or Reality? "Le Caucasie postsovietique: la transition dans le conflict", Bruylant-Bruxelles, LGDJ - Paris, 1995, pp. 125-126. Bruylant-Bruxelles, LGDJ-Paris, 1995, pp. 125-126. Bruylant-Bruxelles, LGDJ-Paris, 1995, pp. 125-126. 41

G. Avetisyan. Brest-Litovsk, with. 124.

42

See A. Badaev. Azerbaijan National Movement, p. 220.

43

Hungarian State Archives, OLFT-W-1110, 98/2, fol. 30, citation after G. Avetisyan. On the Question of the “Caucasian Home” and Pan-Turkic Aspirations, p. 141. 44

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, p. 140.

45

Tadeusz Swietochovsky. Russian Rule, Modernizing Elites and the Formation of National Identity in Azerbaijan, "Azerbaijan-Russia: Societies and States", ed. D. E. Furman, M., 2001, p. 26, see also Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan, p. 25. 46

Avie Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empire: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East 1914-1923. New York: Routledge. 2001, p, 100 47

See G. Avetisyan. On the Question of the “Caucasian Home” and Pan-Turkic Aspirations, p. 142.

48

Documents and materials on the foreign policy of Transcaucasia and Georgia, Tbilisi, 1919, p. 192.

49

“The Caucasian Word”, 07/27/1918, see Rem Kazanchyan. To the prehistory of self -determination

of Nagorno-Karabakh, M, 1997, p. 9.50 51

G. Avetisyan. On the question of the "Caucasian home" and pan-Turkic aspirations, ss. 141-142.

52

E. F. Ludshuveit. Turkey during the First World War, M., 1966, p. 259-260.

53

I. Berkuk, and Ryushtu. decree. Job.

54

Yeghishe Ishkhanyan. Nagorno-Karabakh 1917-1920, Hayastan, Yerevan, 1999, p. 205, Nasir Yuceer,. decree. work with the. 444. 55

Yeghishe Ishkhanyan. decree. work with the. 239.

56

Nasir Yuceer. decree. slave. from. 444.

57

Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1923. Collection of documents and materials, Yerevan, 1992, pp. 28-29.

58

Yeghishe Ishkhanyan. decree. work, ss. 267-268.

59

See “Azerbaijan”, Baku, 19.09.1918, quotation from “Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1923”, p. 411.

60

Ibid., p. 380.

61

S. Zolyan. decree. work with the. 25.

62

The struggle for the victory of Soviet power in Azerbaijan 1918-1920, Documents and materials, Publishing house of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, Baku, 1967, p. 13.63

64

Finiz Kazemzadeh. decree. work with the. 148, G. 3. Aliyev, decree. work with the. 321.

A. B. Kadishev. decree. work with the. 156.

65

The struggle for the victory of Soviet power in Azerbaijan 1918-1920, Documents and materials, Publishing house of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, Baku, 1967, p. 37. 66

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, p. 141 See also Richard G. Hovannisian. The Republic of Armenia, Vol. 1, University of California Press, 1972, p. 158. 67

"Caucasian word", 12/20/1918. Quote from "Pogroms of Armenians in the Baku and Elizavetpol provinces in 1918-1920." Collection of documents and materials, otv. ed. A. Virabyan, comp. S. Mirzoyan, A. Kaziyan, Yerevan, 2003, pp. 169-170. 68

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, p. 161.

69

G. Avetisyan. On the Question of the “Caucasian Home” and Pan-Turkic Aspirations, p. 145.

70

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russia and Azerbaijan, p. 74.

71

Nesib Nesibzade. Azer6ajchan democratic republics, Baki, Elm, 1990, p. 15.

72

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russia and Azerbaijan, p. 85.

73

"Azerbaijan", 10/16/1918, see G. Avetisyan. On the Question of the “Caucasian Home” and Pan-Turkic Aspirations, p. 145.

74

A. Balaev. Azerbaijan National Movement, p. 217.

75

"Azerbaijan", 12.02.1919, quotation from Aydin Badaev, op. op., p. 207.

76

See Free Thought, no. 16, M., 1991, p. 41.

[p. 46] CHAPTER ONE _____________________________ 77

A. B. Kadishev. decree op., p. 170.

78

Aydin Hajiyev. Democratic republics of the southwestern Caucasus (Kars and

Araz - Turkic republics), Baku, Nurlan, 2004, p. 60. 79

Ibid., p. 86.

80

P. Darabadi. Military problems of the political history of Azerbaijan at the beginning of the 20th century, Baku, 1991, p. 132, Mehmet-Zade Mirza Bala. Milli Azerbaycan Hareketi, istanbul, 1938, s. 169, Nasir Yuceer. decree. work with the. 442. 81

See The Caucasian Word, 06/17/1919.

82

Statement by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference, see Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1923, pp. 332-334. 83

Resolution of the 5th Congress of the Armenians of Karabakh, adopted in Shushi on April 24, 1919, ibid., ss. 162-163.

84

Military-political review of the situation in Dagestan and the North Caucasus, compiled by the chief of the general staff of the military ministry of the Azerbaijani Musavat government, Document, no. 425, see Struggle for the Establishment of Soviet Power in Dagestan, 1917-1921. Collection of materials and documents, M., 1958, ss. 362-364. 85

Mustafa Kemal. The path of the new Turkey, vol. 1, M., 1924, p. 381.

86

Taner Akcam. Turkish national "I" and the Armenian genocide, M., 1995, ss. 141, 144, Taner Akcam. Dialogue Across an International Divide: Essays Towards a Turkish-Armenian Dialogue, Zorian Institute, Toronto, 2001, pp. 92-94. 87

TsGIA RA, f. 200, op. 1, d. 44, l. 107. copy, Typescript ss. 186-187, quote from “Nakhijevan-Sharur 1918-1921. Documents and Materials”, “Bulletin of the Archives of Armenia”, no. 1-2, 1993, Yerevan, 1993. 88

Ibid., p. 108.

89

Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1923, p. 139.

90

TsGIA Arm SSR f. 66. file 318. sheet 76, citation after E. Sargsyan, Expansionist Policy of the Ottoman Empire in Transcaucasia, Yerevan, 1962, p. 435, Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, p. 121. 91

O. Kocaman. decree. work with the. 56.

92

G. L. Bondarevsky. The Tragedy of the Caucasus: Facts of History (based on documents from the Public

Record Office, London), "New Eurasia: Russia's Relations with the Countries of the Near Abroad", Issue 2, M., 1994, p. 11. 93

Ibid.

94

Ibid., p. 12.

95

Ibid., p. 12. See also E. Ishkhanyan. decree. op., p. 361.

96

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, p. 164.

97

Omer Kojaman. decree. work with the. 47 See also Richard G. Hovannisian. The Republic of

Armenia, Vol. 2, University of California Press, 1982, p. 158. 98

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, p. 162.

99

Omer Kojaman. decree. work with the. 50, Bulent Gokay. Turkish Settlement and the Caucasus,

"Middle Eastern Studies", vol. 32, no. 2, April 1996, London, p. 65. 100

Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, pp. 162-163.

101

Ibid., pp. 179-180, Bulent Gokay. decree, work, p. 66.

102

M. E. Razulzade. Siyavush of our century, "Khazar", 1990, no. 1 s. 60, see Arif Yunusov.

Islam in Azerbaijan, Baku, Zaman, 2004, p. 142.

103

See R. Pirumyan. decree. op. from. 133.

104

Mustafa Kemal. The path of the new Turkey, vol. 3, M., 1934, p. 304.

105

Naki Keykurun. decree. Job.

106

Bolshevik leadership. Correspondence 1912-1927, ROSSPEN, M., 1996, p. 122.

107

O. Kojaman. decree. work with the. 52.

108

See Yu. G. Barseghyan. The Armenian Genocide is a crime under international law, p. 221

109

See Mustafa Kemal, The Path of a New Turkey, vol. 3, p. 293.

110

O. Kojaman. decree. work with the. 53.

111

See Hrant Avetisyan. Brest-Litovsk, with. 130.

112

R. E. Zeynalov, Military construction in the Azerbaijan SSR, Baku, 1990, p. 21, S. Karapetyan. Armenian-Turkish war of 1920 and Soviet Russia, Yerevan 1965, p. 19, A. B. Kadishev. decree. work with the. 205. 113

Correspondence between Enver and Kemal Pasha, see NAA translation into Russian.

114

Mustafa Kemal. The path of the new Turkey, vol. 3, M., 1934, ss. 108, 117.

115

Nakhijevan-Sharur 1918-1921. Documents and materials, p. 113.

116

Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1923, p. 583.

117

Correspondence between Enver and Kemal Pasha, see NAA.

118

See M. Kemal. The path of a new Turkey, volume 3, p. 313, see also p. 117.

119

See AF Cebesoy, Milli mucadafe hatiralari, Istanbul, 1953, ss. 139-140, quotation from. E. Sargsyan, decree, Op. from. 437.

120

See Ataturkun Soylev ve demecleri, cilit 2, Istanbul 1945, s. eighteen.

121

TsGAKA, f. 109, op. 3. case 298, l. 28, citation after E. K. Sargsyan. The Great October Socialist Revolution and the National Liberation Struggle in Turkey, Yerevan, 1958, p. 59. 122

Mustafa Kemal. The path of the new Turkey vol. 3, ss. 102, 313.

123

Tadeusz Swietochowski. decree. work with the. 105.

124

G. K. Ordzhonikidze. Articles and speeches, Gospolitizdat, M., 1956, v. 1, p. 145.

125

R. Pirumyan. decree. work with the. 136.

126

See The Life of Nationalities, no. 13 (70), April 29. 1920, in "Mirsait Sultan-Galiyev and the ideology of the national liberation movement", M., 1990, pp. 140-142. 127

Bolshevik leadership, p. 167.

128

D. S. Zavriev. On the recent history of the northeastern vilayets of Turkey, Tbilisi, 1946, pp. 96-97.

129

Letter from members of the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP(b), Central Committee of the AzKP and members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Red Army to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) about the need to transfer Karabakh and Zangezur to Azerbaijan, see Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1923, ss. 530-531. 130

S. M. Kirov. Articles, speeches, documents, vol. 1, M., 1936, p. 231.

131

TsGAOR USSR, f. 130, op. 4, d. 496, l. 142., quotation on Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1923, p. 524.

132

G. K. Ordzhonikidze. Selected articles and speeches, M. 1939, p. 95.

133

Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1923, ss. 614-616.

134

N. G. Kireev. Secularism and nationalism are two ideological whales of Turkey's modernization, in "Turkey: modern problems of economics and politics", M., IV RAS, 1997, p. 7. 135

K. Karabekir. istiklal harbimiz, Istanbul, 1960, s. 756. The first Russian translation was published by A. Shamsutdinov, see A. M. Shamsutdinov. On the issue of establishing diplomatic relations between the government of the RSFSR and the VNST, in Sat. "Turkey: history and economy", M., 1978. p. 12. 136

CSAOR Azerb. SSR, f. 28, op. 1, d. 129, ll. 17-21, citation after Yu. A. Bagirov. decree. work with the. 99.

137

Ivar Spector. General Ali Fuat Cebesoy and the Kronstadt Revolt (1921): A Footnote to History, "International Journal of Middle East Studies", 3 (1972), p. 492. 138

Ibid.

139

See Ali Fuad Cebesoy. Moskva hatiralari (11/21/1920 - 06/02/1922), Istanbul 1955, s.140.

140

See A. Avagyan. decree. work., p. 49.

141

A. Shikhlinsky. My memories, Baku, Azerneshr, 1984, p. 199.

142

A separate clause in the Moscow Treaty read: "Nakhichevan forms an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, provided that Azerbaijan does not cede this protectorate to a third state." According to the Treaty of Kars, the phrase "under the protectorate" was replaced by "under the protection". See Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, Gospolitizdat, M., 1959, vol. 3, ss. 598-599, ibid., vol. 4, M., 1960, p. 423. 143

Suzanne Goldenberg. The Pride of Small Nations. The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder, Zed Books Ltd, London and New Jersey, 1994, p. 38. 144

Minutes of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), see Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1923, p. 650. 145

A. Zverev. Ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus 1998-1994, in "Disputed borders in the Caucasus", M., 1996, p. 17.

146

O. Kocaman. decree. work with the. 80.147 Charles Warren Hostler

.

Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the World and Their Political Objectives. London, Allen & Unwin, 1954, p. 152.

148

The proclamation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic took place on the basis of the USSR Law of April 3, 1990. “On the procedure for resolving issues related to the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR” stating that “The peoples of autonomous republics and autonomous formations retain the right to independently resolve the issue of staying in the Union or in the seceding union republic, as well as to raise the question of their own state- legal status". See "Vedomosti of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR", 1990, No. 15, p. 252, citation after A. S. Manasyan. Karabakh conflict. Internationally recognized foundations of the problem. Open folder of legal documents, Yerevan, 2004, pp. 28-30.

Chapter 2 1

For more details on this, see R. Safrastyan. "The Significance of the Study of Armenian-Turkish Relations for the Modern Theory of International Relations: Preliminary Remarks" in "Countries and Peoples of the Near and Middle East", Volume 21, Yerevan, 2002, p. 147. 2

"The Official Journal of the European Communities", No (190/119), "Droshak" English Supplement, January, Athens, 1988, pp. 18-19. 3

Elizabeth Fuller. Nagorno-Karabakh: Internal Conflict Becomes International, RFE/RL Research Report, 13 March 1992, p. 2, Nagorny Karabakh, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15. 4

Session of the Supreme Council of the Arm. SSR, 06/23/1989, see "Droshak", Athens, 07/05/1989, V. Manukyan. The Armenian Dream in the Dead Ends of Survival, Yerevan, 2002, pp. 7-8, (in Armenian). 5

Armenia at the Crossroads. Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era, edited by Gerard J. Libaridian, Blue Crane Books, Watertown, 1991, pp. 2, 156, Shireen T. Hunter, The Transcaucasus in Transition. Nation Building and Conflict, pp. 24, 44. 6

Armenia at the Crossroads, pp. 43, 73.

7

Shireen T. Hunter, op. work with the. 44.

8

Republic of Armenia, 11/12/1991.

9

“Arguments and Facts”, 05/11/1991, quote from “Turkey between Europe and Asia. Results of Europeanization at the End of the 21st Century”, M., Kraft+ IV RAS, 2001, p. 366. 10

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 14, 1991, Hurriyet, May 14, 1991.

11

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 16, 1991.

12

See “Turkey between Europe and Asia”, p. 366, A. A. Kurtov, A. M. Khalmukhamedov, “Armenia-Turkey: confrontation or cooperation?” in "Armenia: problems of independent development", RISI, M., 1998, pp. 451-452. 13

Mirror of the World Press, no. 46, 27.11. - 03.12.1991.

14

N. Hovhannisyan. "Armenia as a factor of the Transcaucasian, Middle Eastern geopolitical region" in "Countries and peoples of the Near and Middle East", volume 18, Yerevan, 1999, p. 26 (in Armenian). 15

Nicolay Hovhannisyan. The Karabakh Problem. Factors, Criteria, Variants of Solution, Yerevan, 1999, pp. 53-54.

16

L'interview de Taner Akcam a' "Milliyet", "Les Nouvelles d'Armenie", Novembre, No. 7,

1995, p. 23. 17

See Azg, 12.02.1992.

18

S. Zolyan. decree. work, ss. 180-181.

19

Elizabeth Fuller. Nagorno Karabakh: Can Turkey Remain Neutral?, RFE/RL Research Report, April 3, 1992, p. 38, Nagorno-Karabakh, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15. 20

Suzanne Goldenberg. decree. work with the. 149.

21

"Droshak", no. 11, 09/23/1992, p. 27.

National Federation "Dashnaktsutyun" in 1994, some interpretations of the issue of the Genocide, etc. 22

22

Paul B. Henze. Turkey and Armenia. Post problems and future prospects, "Eurasian studies", Ankara, Vol. 3, 1996, Spring, No. l, p. 48. 23

A. Chakryan. The Karabakh problem in the context of Armenian-Turkish relations, p. 29.

24

A. A. Kurtov, A. M. Khalmukhamedov. decree. work with the. 451.

25

Hurriyet, 06/16/1992.

26

See Hurriyet, 10/25/1993, Turkiye, 02/20/1994, Terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan reported to be in Lachin, Turkish Daily News, 03/17/1994. See also Turkish accusations in Armenien eine "unheilige Allianze mit PKK", "Neue Zuericher Zeitung", 21.04.1994. 27

"Republic of Armenia", 21.05.1992.

28

Since 2002 - Organization of a CIS collective security treaty.

29

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 06/23/1992.

30

"Republic of Armenia", 22.04.1992. The letter (dated July 16, 1993) of the RA MFA addressed to the Turkish MFA stated that the ban on Armenian flights through Turkish airspace “...does not contribute to the strengthening of good-neighborly relations and gives rise to an inappropriate public mood towards the Armenian-Turkish relations . See Letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 10/2/96, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, file 291, fol. 17. 31

Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott. Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 192. 32

Ibid., p. 192.33

_

Elizabeth Fuller. The Thorny Path to an Armenian-Turkish Rapprochement, RFE/RL, Research Report, vol. 2, no. 12, 19 March 1993, Slavic, Baltic&Eurasian Archive, Turkey, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15. 34

Suzanne Goldenberg. decree. work, ss. 54-55, Thomas de Waal. black garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New York University Press, New York and London 2003, p. 213. 35

Turkey Rejected EU Request to Open Border With Armenia, 11.11.1994, Slavic Baltic&Eurasian Archive HU-OSA, 300/80/3 box II.

36

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 18, 1995.

37

See Omer Kocaman. decree. work with the. 141.

38

Burcu Gultekin. Border Cooperation between Turkey and the South Caucasus: Prospects for Subregional Integration, in "From the Economy of War to the Economy of Peace in the South Caucasus", London, International Alert, 2004, p. 79. 39

The Stakes of the Opening of Turkish-Armenian Borders. TABDC, Istanbul, 2004.

40

A. A. Kurtov, A. M. Khalmukhamedov. decree. work, ss. 459-460. See also the official website of the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Committee, vvww.tabdc.com. 41

For example, the concert of the presidential quartet "Ankara" in Yerevan, ("Armenpress", 10.18.2001), or the idea of joint restoration of Armenian historical monuments in Turkey, "Turkish Daily News", 18.05. 2002. 42

NAA, fund 1, op. 127, d. 700, ll. 83-84.

43

See telephone conversation between RA Deputy Foreign Minister Armen Bayburdyan and Turkish Ambassador to Russia Nabi Shansoy, see RA MFA Archive, file 243, op. 5. 44

Ibid.

45

Taner Akcam. Dialogue Across an International Divide: Essays Towards a Turkish-Armenian Dialogue, The Zoryan Institute, Toronto, 2001, p. vi. 46

Droshak, English Supplement January 1988, p. 18.

47

For the text of the Declaration of Independence, see Armenia at the Crossroads. Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era, pp. 107-110. 48

P. Safrastyan. The Importance of Studying Armenian-Turkish Relations, p. 147.

49

Khachik Der Ghugassian. The Genocide on Armenia's Foreign Policy Agenda, "Armenian

Forum", vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 63-73. 50

"Republic of Armenia", 12/26/1991.

51

P. Safrastyan. It is impossible to create barriers between neighbors in the 21st century... Armenia and Turkey in regional processes, Yerevan, 2003, p. 41, Richard Giragosian. Turkish-US Relations: The Role of the Armenian Issue, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 4, no. 1, p. 133. 52

Yves Ternon. The Armenian Genocide and Armenian-Turkish Relations, Vestnik-Armenian Institute of International Law and Political Science, no. 1, Moscow, 2004, p. 72-73. 53

Thomas Ambrosio. Entangling Alliances: The Turkish-Israeli Lobbying partnership and Its Unintended Consequences, in "Ethnic Identity Groups and US Foreign Policy", Ed. by Thomas Ambrosio, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London, 2002, pp. 143-167. 54

Camer Kasim. Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission: A Missed Opportunity, "Armenian Studies", Ankara, issue 4, December 2001-January-February 2002, p. 265, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18.07. 2001. 55

Kamer Kas?m. decree. work with the. 257.

56

Yves Ternon. decree. work, ss. 70 -71.

60

Bulent Araz, Havva Karakash-Kelesh. Armenian-Turkish Relations: A Critical Analysis, Central Asia and the Caucasus, no. 4 (22), 2002, p. 125, 129. 61

See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 21. 2001.

62

See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 20, 1999.

63

Moscow News, 17-23, 2004.

64

See M. Sogolovsky. "The Turks Want to Teach Americans and British to Defend Freedom", Eurasia Today, no. 6, April 2002, p. 54.65 66

Gerard Libaritian. The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking Since the Independence, Yerevan, 1999, p. 113.

67

Gerard J. Libaridian. Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State, Transaction Publishers, New

Brunsweek (USA) and London, 2004, p. 195. 68

Richard Giragosian. Turkish-US Relations, p. 128.

69

Tessa Hofmann. Armenians in Turkey Today. A Critical Assessment of the Situation of the

Armenian Minority in the Turkish Republic, FAAE, Uppsala 2003, p. 2, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 03/19/1992, Armenians in Turkey Receive Threatening Letters, Reuter, 10/28/1994,

Slavic, Baltic & Eurasian Archive, HU-OSA, 300/80/3 box II. 70

.

Tessa Hofmann. decree. work with the. 16, Taner Akcam. decree. work with the. 3.71 Taner Akcam

Dialogue Across an International Divide, p. 29.

Chapter 3 1

NAA, f. 1, op. 127, d. 537, l. 39.

2

In particular, one of the leaders of the Azerbaijan Popular Front, Neymat Panahov, regularly met with a resident of Turkish intelligence. This was stated by Yevgeny Primakov during his visit to Baku in the summer of 2004. See "Echo", Baku, 27.07. 2004. 3

We are talking about the Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10, 1920, which provided for the formation of an Armenian state with the inclusion of historically Armenian-populated territories. 4

See Milliyet, 25.03.1988.

5

s NAA, f. 1, op. 127, d. 536, ll. 13-14.

6

Ibid., l. 14.

7

Turkey has nothing to do with Azerbaijan, Munich, December 21, 1988, (RLIMU/Erkin Alptekin), F575, RL Research, Red Archive, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/944. 8

Ibid.

9

William Reese. Turkish Claims to Say in the Status of Nakhichevan, RFE/RL Research Institute, RL 136/88, March 28, 1988, p. 1, Krasny Arkhiv, Armenia, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/49. 10

HAA, f. 1, on. 127, d. 784, l. 7.

11

Ibid., see also HAA, f. 1, op. 127, d. 784, ll. 7-8.

12

Francoise Chipaux,. Ankara a pris garde de ne pas compromettre ses relations avec Moscou,

"Le Monde", 03.02.1990, HAA, f. 1, op. 127, file 784, fol. 92. 13

Ibid.

14

See Milliyet, 25.01.1990.

15

See Milliyet, 21.01.1990.

16

Fuat Borovali. Azerbaijan: From Trauma to Transition, in Nationalism and the Breakup of an Empire. Russia and Its Periphery, ed. by Miron Rezun, Praeger, London, 1992, p. 116. 17

RFE/RL Reports on the USSR January 19, 1990, pp. 29-28, HU-OSA, 300/8/38/box 1.

18

cm. "Milliyet", 01/19/1990.

19

"Mirror of the world press", 27.11 - 04.12.1990.

20

See “Azg”, 24.07.1991.

21

“Statement of the Turkish representative to NATO”, TASS, January 28, see NAA, f. 1, op. 127, d. 784, l. 67.

22

See “Hurriyet”, 26.09.1991, Azg, 05.10.1991, S. Zolyan, op. work with the. 124.

23

"Baku worker", 09/05/1991.

24

V. B. Harutyunyan Events in Nagorno-Karabakh. Chronicle, Part 5 January 1993 - July 1995, Yerevan, Gitutyun 1997, p. 75.

25

Ibid.

26

Sb. Brzezinski. Great chess board, M., International relations, 1998, p. 62.

27

Suha Bolukbasi. Ankara's Baku-Centered Transcaucasia Policy: Has It Failed?, The Middle

East Journal, vol. 51, no. 1, Winter, 1997, p. 81. 28

See “Azg”, 24.02. 2001.

29

"Azg", 12/11/1991, "Republic of Armenia", 11/30/1991, William Hale. Turkey, the Black

Sea and Transcaucasus, in "Transcaucasian Boundaries", New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996, p. 62. 30

Elizabeth Fuller. Nahorno-Karabakh: Internal Conflict Becomes International, 03/13/1992,

RFE/RL Research Report, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15. 31

Elizabeth Fuller. Nagorno-Karabakh: Internal Conflict Becomes International, RFE/RL

Research Report, March 13, 1992, p. 2, Nagorny Karabakh, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15. 32

See Mustafa Aydin. Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of Change, Central Asian Survey, vol. 15, no. 2, 1996, p. 168.

33

"Azg", 04/25/1992.

34

Lowell Bezanis. Soviet Muslim e'migre's in the Republic of Turkey, Central Asian Survey, vol. 13, No. l, 1994, p. 63.

35

"Azg", 06/23/1992. According to the Turkish newspaper Turkish Daily News, 51 percent of those polled in Turkey were against Turkey's involvement in the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation, 38 percent were in favor of military intervention. At the same time, 70 percent of Turkish respondents characterized Turkish policy towards Armenia as “too soft”. See "Republic of Armenia", 05/20/1992. 36

G. Kovalskaya. During Wartime Democracy Doesn't Fare Well, "New Time International", no. 27, 1992, p. 7.

37

"Azg", 12.02.1992.

38

"Azg", 07.03.1992.

39

In particular, he noted: “Armenians should not forget that they are surrounded on three sides by the Turks and are doomed by fate to live next door to them”, see “Komsomolskaya Pravda”, 10.07.1991. 40

Scott A. Jones. Turkish Strategic Interests in the Transcaucasus, in Crossroads and Conflict. Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia", New York-London, 2000, p. 61. 41

"Azg", 03/07/1992.

42

Scott A. Jones, op. work with the. 61.

43

Fredi De Pauw. Turkey's policy in the Caucasus, in the book. "Disputed borders in the Caucasus", M., Ves Mir, 1996, p. 203.

44

Ibid.

45

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 13, 1992.

46

Hugh Poulton. Top Hat, Gray Wolf and Crescent. Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish

Republic, HURST&COMPANY, London, 1997, p. 288. 47

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 05/14/1992, Milliyet, 03/09/1992, Milliyet, 03/15/1992.

48

Elizabeth Fuller. Nagorno-Karabakh: Can Turkey Remain Neutral?, RFE/RL Research Report, April 3, p. 38, Nagorno-Karabakh, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15. 49

Svante E. Cornell. Turkey's Prospects in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Its Regional Implications, Marco Polo, No. 4-5, 1998, p. 2, Elizabeth Fuller. Nagorno Karabakh: Can Turkey Remain Neutral?, RFE/RL Research Report, April 3, 1992, p. 38, Nagorny Karabakh, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15, Tercuman, 03/07/1992. 50

Turkish Daily News, 29.10.1993, TACC, 10.28.1993.

51

Leila Alieva. The Institutions, Orientations, and Conduct of Foreign Policy in "Post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia", editors Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, ME Sharpe, NY 1995, p. 298. 52

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 21, 1992, Hurriyet, May 23, 1992.

53

Washington Times, 09/04/1993, see Nikolay Hovhannisyan. The Karabakh Problem. Factors, Criteria, Variants of Solution, p. 52, Milliyet, 03/07/1992, Pravda, 03/09/1993. 54

Elizabeth Fuller. Nagorno Karabakh: Can Turkey Remain Neutral?, RFE/RL Research Report, April 3, p. 37, Nagorno-Karabakh, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15. 55

See Human Rights Advocates. Nagorno-Karabagh. Working Paper Submitted to the UN Economic and Social Council, Fiftieth Session 31 January to March 11, 1994, p. 22, Richard G. Hovannisian. Historical Memory and Foreign Relations. The Armenian Perspective, in "The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia", Ed: S. Frederick Starr, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London, 1994, p. 255. 56

"Turkiye", 04/16/1993, see Tessa Hofmann. decree. work with the. 20.57 Levon Chorbajian

.

Patric Donabedian, Claude Mutafian. The Caucasian Knot. The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno - Karabagh, London-New Jersey, Zed Books, 1994, p. 33, Les nouvelles d'Armenie, numero 0, juin, 1992, p. 32. 58

cm. New Times International, no. 16, 1993, p. 24.

59

"Atlas", 05/11/1992, No. 19.60 William Hale

.

decree. work with the. 62.

61

Turkish Daily News, 14.04.1993.

62

Svante Cornell. Great Powers and Small Nations, p. 313.63

Ziya

Onis. Turkey and Post-Soviet States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, no. 2, Summer 2001, p. 71.

Chapter 4

1

cm. George S Harris. The Russian Federation and Turkey, in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran, edc. Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolensky, New York-London, M. E. Sharpe, 1995, p. 13. 2

"Asbarez", English edition 01/27/1990, George S. Harris. The Russian Federation and Turkey, p. 13.

3

Hugh Pope. Azerbaijan Looks to "Blood Brother" Turkey, "The Independent", London, 31.10.1990.

4

Gresh Alain. Nouvelle donne au Prosh-Orient et en Union Sovietique, "Le mond diplomatique", Juillet, 1991, pp. 16-17, Baku Worker, 08/06/1991, Red Star, 08/03/1991. 5

"Azg", 02.11.1991.

6

Fuller Elizabeth. Nagorno-Karabakh: Can Turkey Remain Neutral? RFE/RL Research Report, April 3, p. 38, Nagorno-Karabakh, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15. 7

Bhatty Robin and Bronson Rachel. NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia, "Survival", vol. 42, no. 3, Autumn, 2000, p. 134. 8

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29.01.1992, Azerbaijan and Turkey to cooperate in Military Training, Krasniy Arkhiv, RFE/RL Records, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/13. 9

"Azg", 01/29/1992.

10

See Izvestia, 03/09/1992. It should be noted that the 3rd field army of the Turkish Armed Forces was deployed on the border with Armenia. It was then armed with over 1500 tanks, about 2500 guns and mortars, more than 1100 armored personnel carriers. The ground force was supported by the 2nd Tactical Aviation Command (up to 270 combat aircraft). Much attention was paid to the possible conduct of psychological warfare. The 3rd Army had a special psychological warfare company. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 07/17/1994. 11

Hurriyet, 03/20/1992.

12

Bhatty Robin and Bronson Rachel, op. work., ss. 134-135.

13

See "Azg", 29.02.1992, "Literaturnaya Gazeta", 23.09.1992. Ankara purchased Soviet-made military equipment from Germany worth more than $800 million. At the same time, the true price of these weapons was much higher, which caused a major government scandal that led to the resignation of the German defense minister. Two years later, in 1994, Ankara purchased $500 million worth of weapons from Russia. All these weapons, the total real price of which exceeds $3 billion, were transferred by Turkey to Azerbaijan, since the Turkish army, , did not need such weapons at all. According to the Armenian Foreign Ministry, only in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, which directly borders on Turkey, by 1997, up to 500 armored vehicles of East German origin were concentrated. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 3, 1997. East German-made weapons were also used against the Kurds. See "Russian Thought", 04/03/1992. 14

Izvestia (Moscow evening edition), 02/21/1992, Pravda, 02/19/1992.

15

L. Bausin. Why Ankara Supports Baku, Asia and Africa Today, no. 3, 1993, pp. 40-41, Milliyet, 07/09/1992, Daily Telegraph, 07/07/1992, in Elizabeth Fuller, Azerbaijan at the Crossroad, RIIA, 1994, p. 8. 16

F. Mikhailov. "Wild Geese" in Karabakh, "Chimes", 08/19/1992.

17

Hurriyet, 11/13/1993.

18

Carol Migdalovitz. Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, updated August 17, 1995, p. 11. 19

E. Burak Arikan. Turkish Ultra-nationalists Under Review: A Study of the Nationalist Action Party, Nations and Nationalism, 8(1), 2002, p. 368. 20

"Today", 04/06/1993.

21

Izvestia, 10/24/1992.

22

"Milliyet", 06/21/1993. This information was subsequently confirmed to Western journalists by Turkish officials. See Daily Telegraph, London, 06/21/1993, see also US News & World Report, July 6, 1992. 23

Mehmet Ali Birand. Shirts and Steel. An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces, London, New York, IB Tauris&Co Ltd, 1991, pp. 208-209. During the trial of the former Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan, Rahim Gaziyev, the leader of the National Independence Party of Azerbaijan, Etibar Mammadov, noted that in the spring of 1992. Turkish special services organized through it the delivery of 500 thousand US dollars for the defense needs of Azerbaijan. Further, he said that Turkish officers who advised Azerbaijani commanders took part in the defense of the city of Shushi. See "Mirror", Baku, 06.09. 2002. Other sources reported casualties among the Turkish officers who organized the defense of the city. See Les nouvelles d'Armenie, no. 2, juin/juillet, 1993, p. 9.24 _

I. Muradyan. Turkish Intelligence System and Pan-Turkist Organizations, "IRAN & CAUCASUS", III-IV Research Papers From the Caucasian Center for Iranian Studies, Yerevan, 2000, Leiden 1999-2000, pp. 341-342. 25

Hurriyet, 03/19/1992.

26

"Azg", 11.01.1994.

27

Literaturnaya Gazeta, 09/23/1992.

28

A. Chakryan. decree. work, ss. 24-25.

29

"Azg", 25.10.1992.

30

Literaturnaya Gazeta, 09/23/1992.

31

A. Chakryan. decree. work, ss. 24-25.

32

William Hale. decree. work with the. 64.

33

"Red Star", 05/27/1992.

34

Statement of the President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan, 05/20/1992, see Republic of

Armenia, 05/21/1992. 35

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 22, 1992, Hurriyet, March 25, 1992, Hurriyet, May 22, 1992, The Financial Times, London, May 22, 1992. At the same time, adviser to the President of the Russian Federation Gennady Burbulis stated that "there can be no question of Turkish intervention in Nakhichevan", see "Hurriyet", 05/23/1992. 36

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 22, 1992.

37

Jacob M. Landau. Pan Turkism. From Irredentism to Cooperation, p. 214, L. S. Perepelkin. Armenia: Current Socio-Economic and Political Situation, Ethnographic Review, no. 5, 1992, p. 28. 38

See Krasnaya Zvezda, May 23, 1992.

39

Abroad, 1992, no. 22, p. 4.40 Joseph Masih

.

Millitary Strategy in Nagorno Karabagh, "Jane's Intelligence Review", October, 1993, p. 461, On the role of Turkish military advisers in the development of offensive operations of the Azerbaijani army, see Radio "Mayak" June 13, 1992, p. 7, in Elizabeth Fuller. Azerbaijan after the Presidential Elections, RF/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 26, June 26, 1992, HU-OSA 300/80/1/13. 41

42

J. Eibner, C. Cox. decree. work with the. 69.

"Hurriyet", 05/18/1992, Elizabeth Fuller. Azerbaijan After the Presidential Elections, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 26, 26 June 1992, p. 7, Slavonic, Baltic&Eurasian Archive, Azerbaijan, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/13.

43

"Milliyet", 08/04/1992.

44

D. Trenin. Security interests and Russian policy in the Caucasus region, in the book. "Disputed borders in the Caucasus", M., 1996, p. 109, Stanislav Lakoba. Abkhazia de facto or Georgia de jure? (On Russia's Policy in Abkhazia in the Post-Soviet Period, 1991-2000) Sapporo/Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University 2001, p. 62. 45

Izvestia, 14.05.1993.

46

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 23, 1992.

47

Svante E. Cornell. Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A Delicate Balance, "Middle Eastern Studies", Vol. 34, no. 1, January 1998, p. 60. 48

"Azg", 11/18/1992.

49

Ikibine Dogru, Istanbul, 12/20/1992, see Human Rights Advocates. Nagorno-Karabagh. Working Paper Submitted to the UN Economic and Social Council, Fiftieth Session 31 January to March 11 1994, p. 6. 50

Hurriyet, 10.06.1996.

51

Independent Military Review, 01/09/1998. See the last chapter for more on this.

52

A. Safronov. Terrorism in the Caucasus region, Independent Military Review, 01/09/1998.

53

Hurriyet, 03/25/1992.

54

Thomas Goltz. Azerbaijan Diary. A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York London, 1998, p. 213. 55

Hurriyet, 05/18/1992.

56

Milliyet, 04/02/1992, Milliyet, 06/16/1992, Hurriyet, 05/26/1992.

57

Turkey Providing Weapons to Nakhichevan? RFE/RL Reports, September 10, 1992, HU-OSA-300/80/1/1054, Azg, 09/10/1992, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 09/12/1992. 58

Svante E. Cornell. Small Nations and Great Powers, p. 297.59

_

Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Documents, Data, and Analysis, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Paige Sullivain (ed.), The Center for Strategic and International Studies, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London, England 1997, pp. 605-606. 60

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 04/17/1993, Hurriyet, 04/17/1993. May 1993 Russian media reported that Turkey had begun delivering weapons to Azerbaijan and that by that time 800 Turkish troops were fighting there. See Pravda, 05/14/1993. 61

"Azg", 18.08.1993.

62

"Red Star", 04/27/1993.

63

Izvestia, 04/10/1993.

64

Ibid.

65

"Red Star", 04/17/1993.

66

"Echo", 14.02. 2003.

67

Hurriyet, 11.04.1993.

68

Hurriyet, 07/28/1993.

69

"Republic of Armenia", 05/06/1993, V. B. Harutyunyan. Events in Nagorno-Karabakh. Chronicle, part 5, p. 80.70

Liz

Fuller. Russia, Turkey, Iran and Karabakh Mediation Process RFE/RL Research Institute, February 16, 1994, HU-OSA, 300/80/6/2. 71

Itar-Tass 03.12.1993, Human Rights Advocates. Nagorno-Karabagh, p. 8.

72

S. I. Chernyavsky. Azerbaijan's New Way, p. 228.

73

S. Gasratyan. Karabakh war, Yerevan, 2001, p. 112-113, (in Armenian).

74

Hurriyet, 09/11/1993, Milliyet, 09/13/1993, Turkish Troops put on Alert on Armenian

Border, RFE/RL Records, September 3, 1993, HU-OSA, 300/80/6/2. 75Azerbaijan

. Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki,

NY 1994, p. 37, The New York Times, 09/10/1993. 76

London Times, 09/03/1993.

77

Leonidas T. Chrysanthopoulos. Caucasian Chronicles. Nation-Building and Diplomacy in

Armenia, 1993-1994, Princeton and London, Gomidas Institute Books, 2002, pp. 76-78. 78

Ibid.

79

Leila Alieva. The Institutions, Orientations, and Conduct of Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, editors Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, ME Sharpe, NY 1995, p. 298, Turkish Daily News. 09/07/1993. 80

Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Documents, Data, and Analysis, pp. 605-606, 615-616.

8 1

"Hurriyet", 11/01/1993, "Hurriyet", 11/03/1993, "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 11/04/1993, "Today", 11/18/1993, see: S. I. Chernyavsky. Azerbaijan and Turkey - strategic partnership, "Independent Azerbaijan: New Landmarks", ed. EM Kozhokina. RISI, volume 2, M., 2000, ss. 173-188, Azerbaijan Asks Turkey for more Military Training, RFE/RL Records, 12/30/1993, HU-OSA, 300/80/6/3. 82

Newspaper "Ayd?nl?k", Istanbul, 05.09.1993; in "1640 Turkish Military Personal Dismissed," FBIS-SOV-93-72, September 8, 1993, p. 91, Quoted from Joseph A. Kechichian and Theodore W. Karasik. The Crisis in Azerbaijan; How Clans Influence the Politics of an Emerging Republic, "Middle East Policy", Vol. IV, no. 1&2, September 1995, p. 64, Svante E. Cornell. Small Nations and Great Powers, p. 293. 83

Hurriyet, 10/13/1993.

84

"Azg", 01/28/1994.

85

Milliyet, 01/19/1994.

86

"Hurriyet", 01/17/1994, Other authors indicate that at certain periods there were up to 450 Turkish military specialists in Azerbaijan, most of whom were sent through the Turkish national intelligence service. See V. Meshcheryakov. Azerbaijan-Russia: Parameters of Interdependence, "Asia and Africa Today", M., 1997, no. 8, p. 66. 87

BBC: World Broadcasts, 2/14/1994; According to the publications of the US Office of Foreign Military Research, Turkish special operations officers were involved in the winter campaign of the Azerbaijani army during the period of 1993/94. See John E. Sray. Turkish SOF Trains Azerbaijani Forces. "Foreign Military Studies Office", January 1994, at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/turksof.htm.

88

Turkish Daily News, 02/09/1994.

89

Svante E. Cornell. Small Nations and Great Powers, p. 109.

90

Stepanakert Claims Azeris Increasingly Use Turkish Weapons in Karabakh, INTERFAX, RFE/RL Records, 04/06/1994, Slavonic, Baltic&Eurasian Archive, Azerbaijan, HU-OSA, 300/80/6/2. 91

"Azg", 06/14/1994.

92

The "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", proclaimed in 1983, was officially recognized only by Turkey.

93

"Milliyet", 01/26/1994, Tim Kelsey. Azeris Hire British Mercenaries, The Independent, 01/24/1994, Les mercenaires britanique recrute par l'Azerbaijan, Liberation, 01/25/1994. 94

The Independent, 01/24/1994. Translation into Armenian in the newspaper "Kamk", 01/27/1994. See also V. B. Harutyunyan. Events in Nagorno-Karabakh. Chronicle. Part 5, January 1993 - July 1995, Yerevan, Gitutyun, 1997, p. 293. 95

V. B. Harutyunyan. decree. work with the. 293.

96

Ibid.

97

See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 07/09/1994. Note that this grouping of Turkish troops was there under the auspices of the UN. Prior to this, informed sources close to the Turkish General Staff reported that about 1,000 soldiers of the Turkish Armed Forces were preparing for a secret transfer to Bosnia to participate in hostilities on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. See Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere, William T. Johnsen. Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs, December 3, 1993, p. 75, see http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdfnles/PUB178.pdf 98

Freddy De Pauw. Turkey's Politics in Transcaucasia, in "Contested Borders in the Caucasus", ed. by Bruno Coppieters, Brussels, VUB Press, 1996, pp. 185-186, Svante E. Cornell. Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A Delicate Balance, "Middle Eastern Studies", Vol. 34, no. 1, January 1998, p. 66. 99

V. Stupishin. "My mission to Armenia" (1992-1994). Memoirs of the first ambassador of Russia, M., 2001, p. 276.

100

CRS Issue Brief. Transcaucasus Newly Independent States: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests. Updated August 17, 1995. By Jim Nichol. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress, Washington DC, 1995, see Nikolay Hovhannisyan. The Karabakh Problem. The Thorny Road to Freedom and Independence, Yerevan, Zangak - 97, 2004, p. 77, H. Hovhannisyan Armenia as a factor of the Transcaucasian, Middle Eastern geopolitical region, in "Countries and peoples of the Near and Middle East", volume 18, Yerevan, 1999, p. 31 (in Armenian). 101

Michael Collins Dunn. Turkey Loses Ozal at a Crucial Moment, "Washington Report on Middle East Affairs", June, 1993, p. 46.102 _

"Izvestia", 04/17/1993.

103

Interview with Ayaz Mutalibov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 04/02/1992.

104

Armenia and its nearest neighbors, Yerevan, 1992, p. 43 (in Armenian).

105

See Hurriyet, 06/24/1993, Azg, 07/09/1993.

106

Hurriyet, 06/23/1993, Azg, 07/09/1993.

107

Turkish Daily News, 28.01.1994.

108

Ibid.

109

Hurriyet, 12/23/1993.

110

Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere, William T. Johnsen. decree. Job.

111

S. I. Chernyavsky. Azerbaijan and Turkey - strategic partnership, p. 186.

112

So, 30 September 1996 German media reported on the supply of weapons to Azerbaijan by one of the Turkish state-owned companies, manufactured under a German license, allegedly for the NATO armed forces. The Turkish press has repeatedly testified to the presence of Turkish military advisers in the Azerbaijani army and the supply to Azerbaijan of standard NATO military communications equipment produced by the Turkish company Aselsan. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 8, 1998. 113

"Echo", 01.09. 2004.

114

Burcu Gultekin. Atteindre la Caspienne. Les relations economiques entre la Turquie et I' Azerbai'djan, les dossiers de I'IFEA, se'rie: la Turquie aujourd'hui, no: 14, Istanbul, juin, 2003, p. 38, "Echo", 01.09. 2004. 115

S. I. Chernyavsky, op. work with the. 187.

116

Gareth Winrow. Turkey in Caucasus and Central Asia, London, RIIA, 2000, p. 26.

117

V. Shorokhov. Turkish Policy in Transcaucasia and Russia's National Interests, in "Russia and Turkey on the Threshold of the 21st Century: On the Way to Europe or Eurasia?", M., Carnegie Center, vol. 14, 1997, p. 49. 118

Republic of Turkey. Directory, Managing editors N. Yu. Ulchenko E. I. Urazova, M. 2000, Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, Institute for the Study of Israel and the Middle East ss. 107-108. 119

I. Muradyan. US Policy and Security Problems in the South Caucasus Region, Yerevan, Antares, 2000, p. 78. After the Iranian Air Force violated the airspace of Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea in response to Azerbaijani claims to some oil fields in July 2001, a month later, aces of the Turkish Air Force defiantly performed aerobatic maneuvers in the sky of Baku, showing the Iranian side Turkey's determination to defend the rights of its junior ally. See "Echo", 24.08. 2001. Nasib Nasibli. Azerbaijan: Policy Priorities Towards the Caspian Sea, in The Caspian. Politics, Energy and Security, Edited by Shirin Akiner, Rout-ledge Curzon, London and New York, 2004, p. 175. 120

See Cameron S. Brown. Wanting to Have Their Cake and Their Neighbors Too: Azerbaijani Attitudes towards Karabakh and Iranian Azerbaijan, "Middle East Journal", vol. 58, no. 4, Autumn 2004, p. 582. 121

V. Meshcheryakov, op. work with the. 67.

122

See Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz. Militarized Inter-State Disputes 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns and Insights, "Journal of Conflict Resolution", 18 December 1984, pp. 588-589, 606-15, in. International War. An Anthology, by Melvin Small, J. David Singer - Second edition The Dorsey Press, Chicago, Illinois 1989, pp. 44-45. 123

Ibid.

Chapter 5 1

Erik Cornell. Turkiye Avrupa'nin Esiginde, Istanbul, 1998, s. 171.

2

"Droshak", Athens, March 1990, citation after S. Poghosyan. decree. op. from. 73.

3

A. Lean pair. Soviet Muslims: Between the Past and the Future, "Social Sciences and Modernity", M., 1991, no. 6, p. 111.

4

Crimean Tatar National Movement, TsIMO, Moscow, 1992, volume 1, ss. 260-261.

5

G. Simonyan. From the history of Armenian-Turkish relations, Yerevan, 1991, p. 624, (in Armenian).

6

V. E. Grigoryants. Armenians of Central Asia. History, current situation, prospects, Yerevan, 1994, pp. 37-38.

7

Ibid., pp. 38-39.

8

“Voice of Armenia”, 01/21/1992.

9

R. F. Mukhammetdinov. The Origin and Evolution of Turkism (From the History of Political Thought and Ideology of the Turkic Peoples; Ottoman and Russian Empires, Turkey, USSR, CIS, 70s of the 19th century - 90s of the 20th century), Kazan, publishing house "Zaman" , 1996, p. 245. 10

A. A. Vardanyan. Politics and morality, M., Humanitarian, 1997, p. 259.

11

"Azg", 15.04.1992.

12

Hurriyet, 02/25/1992.

13

Hurriyet, 02/28/1992.

14

Milliyet, 03/07/1992.

15

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 14, 1992.

16

"Hurriyet", 05/13/1992.

17

Dilip Hero. Between Marx and Muhammad. The Changing Face of Central Asia, London,

1995, p. 122. 18

"Azg", 04.04.1992.

19

Kazakhstan Muslims to Fight in Karabakh?, RFE/RL Records, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15, Milliyet, 03/13/1992.

20

James Critchlow. The Ethnic Factor in Central Asian Foreign Policy, in National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Edited by Roman Szporluk, Armonk, New York ME Sharpe, Inc, 1994 p. 277. 21

"Azg", 03/25/1992.

22

"Azg", 02.05.1992, O. Vasileva. Central Asia: a year after the coup, Moscow, 1993, p. 28.23

Gul

Turan and liter Turan. Turkey's Emerging Relationship with Other Turkic Republics, in "The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era. Going West and Looking East?, Ed. By Libby Rittenberg, Westport, 1998, p. 190. 24

"Azg", 22.04.1993.

25

Brenda Shaffer. Borders and Brethren, Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2002, p. 195, K. S. Gadzhiev. Geopolitics of the Caucasus, p. 343. 26

Hurriyet, 03/09/1992.

27

"Tercuman", 03/04/1992.

28

"Milliyet", 03/08/1992.

29

Author's archive.

30

"Azg", 25.07.1992.

31

A. Rasizade. Azerbaijan: new political guidelines, "Asia and Africa Today", M., 1993, No.l, ss. 19-20.

32

Interview of the President of Azerbaijan A. Elchibey, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17.06.1992.

33

"Hurriyet", 05/26/1992, Henri Hale. Islam, State-building and Uzbekistan Foreign Policy, "The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands", edited by A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 167. 34

Express Daily, no. 32, 3-10.01, 1992.

35

cm. "Cumhuriyet" 05/28/1992.

36

Graham E. Fuller. New Geopolitical Order, "The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its

Borderlands", pp. 31-32. 37

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10/28/1992, Hurriyet, 11/28/1992.

38

Hurriyet, 01/28/1993.

39

"Milliyet", 09.02.1993.

40

Hurriyet, 04/13/1993.

41

Busra Ersanli Behar. Turkism in Turkey and Azerbaijan in the 1990s, Eurasian Studies,

Ankara, (1996), vol. 3, no. 3, p. 15. 42

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19.09. 2003.

43

Gareth M. Winrow. Turkey and the Former Soviet South, p. 24, H. I. Petrov. Political stability in the conditions of the command-administrative regime, “Post-Soviet Central Asia. Losses and gains”, M., Vostochnaya Literature, RAS, 1998, pp. 105-106. 44

E. I. Urazova. Economic cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic states of the CIS, M., IIIBV, 2003, p. 111, Rasul Yalcin. The Rebirth of Uzbekistan. Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era, Durham Middle East Monograph Series, Ithaca Press, London 2002, p. 252. 45

Togrul Juvarli. Azerbaijani oil: search for the resultant, "Azerbaijan and Russia: Societies and States", M., 2001, p. 406, see also Farian Sabahli. Oil Diplomacy in the Caspian: The Rift Between Iran and Azerbaijan in Summer 2001, in “The OSCE and the Multiple Challenges of Transition. The Caucasus and Central Asia, edited by Farian Sabahli and Daniel Warner, Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2004, pp. 131-148. 46

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 04.03. 2000.

47

A. Papazyan. Armenian Question and Genocide, Yerevan 2000, p. 23, (in Armenian).

48

"Echo", Baku, 28.04. 2001.

49

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 13. 2001.

Chapter 6 1

See Quotidien de Paris, 29.07.1991, see Azg, 11.09.1991.

2

Elizabeth Fuller. Nagorno-Karabakh: Internal Conflict Becomes International, March 13, 1992, RFE/RL Research Report, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/15. 3

V. B. Harutyunyan. Events in Nagorno-Karabakh. Chronicle, part IV, p. 124.

4

Izvestia (evening Moscow edition), 03/12/1992.

5

"Hurriyet", 03/25/1992.

6

Scott A. Jones. Turkish Strategic Interests in the Transcaucasus, in Crossroads and Conflict. Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia", New York-London, 2000, p. 63. 7

"Azg", 17.05. 2005.

8

Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere, William T. Johnsen. decree. Job.

9

BBC: World Broadcasts 10/ 20, in "AGBU News attachment", October 15-October 29,

1993, p. 10A. 10

See Izvestia, 05.05.1993.

11

V. B. Harutyunyan. Events in Nagorno-Karabakh, Chronicle, Part 5 January 1993 July 1995, ss. 267-268.

12

Turkey seeks Debate on Peacekeepers for Caucasia (Reuter) 27 June, 1994, Slavic, Baltic & Eurasian Archive, HU-OSA, 300/80/3 box II, Turkish parliament allows troops to be sent to Azerbaijan, Echo, 14.02. 2003. 13

Turkish Daily News, 05/19/1994, Gareth Winrow. Turkey in Central Asia, p. 12.

14

"Mirror", 06/17/1995.

15

William Hale. Turkey the Black See and Transcaucasus, p. 62.

16

Moorad Mooradian, Daniel Druckman. Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh, 1990-1995, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 6, 1999, p. 710, BH Ryabtsev, S. M. Safaryan. "Karabakh knot": ethno-national conflict in the aspect of regional geopolitics, Rostov-on-Don, 1996, p. 34. 17

"Kazakhstanskaya Pravda", 05.03.1992.

18

"Azg", 06/25/1992.

19

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 08/27/1992.

20

"Azg", 01.09.1992.

21

Ibid.

22

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 09/02/1992.

23

Ibid.

24

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 09/03/1992.

25

"Azg", 10.09.1992.

26

J. Eibner, C. Cox. decree. work with the. 11.

27

"Azg", 03.10.1992.

28

"Azg", 13.04.1993.

29

"Azg", 02.12.1993.

30

"Azg", 02.03.1992.

31

V. Kazimirov. The humanitarian catastrophe in the Karabakh zone was perhaps greater than it is now around Kosovo, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, M., 1997, no. 5, ss. 9-12.

Chapter 7 1

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 03.11.1992.

2

Suzanne Goldenberg. decree. work with the. 51.

3

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 03.11.1992.

4

"Azg", 02.07.1992.

5

"Turkiye", Istanbul, 04/09/1992, see Henry Hale. Islam, State-building and Uzbekistan Foreign Policy, p.

148.6

Mehmet Tutuncu . Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Caucasus, Turkestan Newsletter, vol. 97-1:14a, Special Analysis Issue, 23 June 1997. 7

cm. Elizabeth Fuller. Azerbaijan at the Crossroads, p. 15.

8

Ola Tunander. A New Ottoman Empire?, p. 419.

9

Interview with research associate of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences E. Hasanova, Cumhuriyet, 07/06/1992, see Droshak, 08/12/1992, p. 39. 10

A. Rasizade. Azerbaijan: new political guidelines, "Asia and Africa Today", M, 1992, no. 12, p. 9-10.

11

Milliyet, 01/27/1994.

12

Gareth M. Winrow. Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia, RIIA, London, 1995, p. 20.13

cm

. Joseph A. Kechichian and Theodore W. Karasik. The Crisis in Azerbaijan: How Clans Influence the Politics of an Emerging Republic, "Middle East Policy", Vol, IV, No. 1-2, September 1995, p. 63, For the participation of Afghan mercenaries in the Karabakh war, see CHAPTER 9. 14

Turkish Daily News, 30.08.1993.

15

Joseph A. Kechichian and Theodore W. Karasik. decree. slave. from. 64.16 Elizabeth Fuller

.

Azerbaijan at the Crossroads, p. 15.

17

Turkish Daily News, 01/19/1994, Azg, 01/27/1994.

18

Turkish Daily News, 19.01.1994.

19

Ibid.

20

Turkey between Europe and Asia. The results of Europeanization at the end of the 20th century, (editor-in-chief N. G. Kireev), M., 2001, pp. 433-434. 21

Ankara: Turkey has no Pan-Turkist Intentions with Summit, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10/18/1994.

22

"Documents d'actualite Internationale", Paris, 1995, 15 Janvier, no. 2, p. 68.

23

E. Urazova. Economic cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic states of the CIS, M., IIIBV, 2003, p. 22.

24

Gareth M. Winrow. Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia, p. 30.

25

Turkish Daily News, 29.08.1995.

26

In 1993, a Turkish student was arrested in Azerbaijan, who was accused of having links with the Turkish organization Gray Wolves, which was preparing an assassination attempt on President Aliyev. See "Echo", 26.04. 2001, see also interview with G. Aliyev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 03/14/1993. 27

"Independent military review", 01/09/1998. According to the American journalist Thomas Goltz, Ankara played a decisive role in the transfer of power from A. Elchibey to G. Aliyev after S. Demirel put decisive pressure on Elchibey in this matter. See Thomas Goltz. Azerbaijan Diary, cc. 366-368. 28

"Turkish Daily News", 04/14/1995, Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan, p. 101. On charges of involvement in the March 1995 coup attempt. A Turkish citizen, President of the Azerbaijani-Turkish Joint Venture Kanan Gurel was also brought to criminal responsibility. The indictment of the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan also mentions the deputy head of the Turkish National Security Council, Yalcin Erkan. Embassy officials, including religious adviser Abdurgadir Sevgin, also played a key role in organizing the coup. There was also evidence of involvement in the coup of the ex-ambassador of Turkey in Baku, Altan Karamanoglu, shortly after the suppression of the coup, the Turkish Foreign Ministry was recalled to his homeland. See Independent Military Review, 01/09/1998. 29

Gareth M. Winrow. Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 1, No. 2 - July 1997 http://meria.idc.acu/journal/1997/issue2/jvln2a5.html, David I. Hoffman. Azerbaijan: The Politicization of Oil, in Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed by Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, London, New York, Rowman&Lillefield Publishers, INC, p. 74. 30

"Independent military review", 01/09/1998.

31

I. Muradyan. US Policy and Security Issues in the South Caucasus Region, Antares, Yerevan, 2000, p. 13.

32

"Cumhuriyet", 06/23/1996, quotation after M. Feigan, Transcaucasian Knot, "New World", 1998, No. 8, p. 147.

33

Independent Military Review, 01/09/1998.

34

The Daily Telegraph, London, 09/08/1993, see also Svante Cornell. Small Nations,

Great Powers, pp. 299-300. 35

"Echo", 26. 04. 2001.

Chapter 8 1

See Esra Bulut. The Role of Religion in Turkish Reactions to Balkan Conflicts, "Turkish

Policy Quarterly", Spring 2004. pp. 71-83. 2

V. Danilov. Turkish vector of Karabakh, Pravda, 05/14/1993.

3

Jossef Bodansky. Some call it peace. Waiting For http://members.tri-pod.com/Balkania/resources/geostrategy/bodansky_peace/bp_part3.html

War

In

The

Balkans

4

I. P. Dobaev. Islamic Radicalism: Genesis, Evolution, Practice, Rostov-on-Don, Publishing House SKNTS VSH, 2003, pp. 131-132.

5

G. Starovoitova. National self-determination: approaches and case studies, St. Petersburg, 1999, p. 113.

6

A. Azimova, V. Kuvaldin. Soviet Muslims: searching for their place in the world, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 05/15/1992.

7

D. A. Trofimov. The Islamic Factor and Problems of Internal Stability in Central Asia (on the example of Uzbekistan), Bulletin of the Moscow University, series 13, Oriental studies, 1996, p. 61. 8

"Milliyet", 01/19/1990, quotation from S. Poghosyan. Pan-Turkism Yesterday and Today, p. 69.

9

See Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1923, pp. 601-602.

10

For more details, see The Sumgait Tragedy: Pogroms against Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan, Volume 1, Eyewitness Accounts, Edited by Samvel Shahmuratian, Aristide D. Caratzas & Zoryan Institute, New York & Cambridge, 1990. 11

Svante E. Cornell. Religion as a Factor in Caucasian Conflict, "Civil Wars", vol. 1, no. 3, 1998, p. 12, see also N. Tchilingirian. Religious Discourse and the Church in Mountainous Karabagh 1988-1995, Revue du mond armenien modern et contemporain, No. 3. 1997. 12

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 06/11/1992, Republic of Armenia, 07/09/1992, Elizabeth Fuller. Azerbaijan After the Presidential Elections, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 26, June 26, 1992, p. 5, Azerbaijan, Slavic, Baltic&Eurasian Arvhive, HU-OSA, 300/80/1/1. 13

A. Malashenko. Russian nationalism and Islam, in the book. "Ethnic and regional conflicts in Eurasia", book. 2, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, M., 1997, p. 19. 14

D. Novoselov. Reaction in Pakistan to Events in Soviet Central Asia and Transcaucasia (Based on the Pakistani Press), Special Bulletin, no. 3, M., 1991, ss. 146-151. 15

I. V. Zhdanov, A. A. Ignatenko. Islam on the threshold of the XXI century, M., 1989, p. 203.

16

I. I. Ivanova. The role of Turkey in the Muslim world and the policy of the West, in the book. "Islamic factor" in international relations in Asia" (70s - first half of the 80s), M., 1987, p. 142. 17

See Milliyet, 13.03.1988, quotation from Droshak, Athens, 27.04.1988, p. 25.18

Shireen

T. Hunter. Azerbaijan: Searching for New Neighbors, "New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet States", by Ian Bremmer and Roy Taras, London, 1997, p. 447. 19

G. Demoyan. The Karabakh conflict and the relations between the Turkic-speaking states, "Central Asia and the Caucasus", no. 4, 2000, pp. 196-204. 20

"Azg", 03/07/1992.

21

"Milliyet", 03/08/1992.

22

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 14, 1992.

23 Atlas, no. 25, 06/18/1990. 24

Kemal Kirisci. New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior, "Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s", New York, EJ Brill, Leiden, 1995, p. 4, O. Kojaman. decree. work with the. 119. 25

Interview with S. Demirel, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11.03.1994.

26

More on this in the next chapter.

27

The Christian Science Monitor, 11/16/1993.

28

"Azg", 12/25/1991.

29

H. G. Prusakova. Foreign policy aspect of the problem of Muslim minorities

in international relations, in "Islamic factor" in international relations in Asia", p. 152. 30

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 06/16/1992.

31

Ibid.

32

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 06/11/1992.

33

"Azg", 14.04.1993.

34

Turkish Television, 14.06.1993, see also Tercuman, 01.12.1993

35

The Christian Science Monitor, 12.01.1993.

36

Azerbaijan Says Karabakh Issue is Key to Oil Deal, Turkish Daily News, 02.12.1993.

37

For more details see A. Pashayan. Organization of the Islamic Conference: goals, activities, position on the Karabakh conflict, Yerevan, Zangak-97, 2003, (in Armenian) 38

"Mirror", No 2. 1998, see Vagan Baiburdyan. Iran-Azerbaijan. Neighbors or geopolitical and geo-economic rivals?, “Countries and peoples of the Near and Middle East”, vol. 22, Yerevan, 2003, p. 24, (in Armenian) 39

Brenda Shaffer. Borders and Brethren. Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2002, p. 186. 40

Azg, 07/09/1993.

41

"Azg", 03.03.1994.

Chapter 9 1

Yaroslav Trofimov. Mujaheen Factor: Militant Islam Gains in Postwar Bosnia, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 19.03. 2002. See also: Yossef Bodansky. Chechnya. The Mujahedin Factor, Online edition, Web Address: http://www.freeman.org/m_online/bodansky/chechnya.htm 2

P. Colonels. al-Qaeda in the Caucasus. Hundreds of its fighters fought in Karabakh, Chechnya and Central Asia, Independent Military Review, no. 2 (317), 24.01. 2003, "Echo", 01.09. 2001. 3

Ahmed Rashid. Bitter Afghanistan Struggle Helps Fuel Asian Conflicts, The Daily Telegraph, 11/10/1993.

4

Defense Intelligence Report Details Al Qaeda's Plans For Russia, Chechnya and WMD, November 16, 2004 Contact: Press Office, 202-646-5172, http://www.judicialwatch.org/3883.shtml 5

See V. Avyutsky. The North Caucasus as Russia's "Internal Abroad", "Central Asia and the Caucasus", no. 5 (23), 2002, p. 75.

6

See John B. Dunlop. Russia Confronts Chechnya. Roots of a Separatist Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 140.

7

Congressional Research Service (CRS, 9/10/2001). cm. http://www.cilicia.com/Azeriterrorism.htm

8

S. Shermatova The Islamic Factor in the Hands of Political Elites, in “Islam in the Post-Soviet Space: A View from the Inside,” op. ed. A. Malashenko and Martha Brill Olcott, M., 2002, p. 221, A. Rasizade. Azerbaijan: new political guidelines, "Asia and Africa Today", M., 1993, no. 1, p. 16. 9

Express Chronicle, no. 28. 1992.

10

See: Justice, no. 16, 1992, Ichkeria, No. June 8, 25, 1992, Republic of Armenia, 08/01/1992.

11

Express Chronicle, no. 28. 1992, see also “Journalists in the war in Karabakh”, M., 2002, p. 63.12 "Republic of Armenia", 01.08.1992. 13

Chechen mercenaries fight in Transcaucasia, Izvestia (Moscow evening edition)

07/21/1992. 14

S. Shermatova. Islamic factor in the hands of political elites, p. 221.

15

The Bishkek Protocol was signed on May 5, 1994 by the Ministers of Defense of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia through the mediation of the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation V. Kazimirov and the head of the peacekeeping group of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly on Nagorno-Karabakh M. Sherimkulov. Initially, the protocol was signed by the representatives of Armenia and the NKR. Azerbaijan joined the protocol three days later. 16

See Obshchaya Gazeta, 28.10.1999.

17

Personal communication with director of the Caucasus Media Institute, political scientist Alexander Iskandaryan.

18

Express Chronicle, no. 28, 1992, Republic of Armenia, 08/01/1992.

19

A. Rasizade. Azerbaijan: new political guidelines, "Asia and Africa Today", M., 1993, no. 1, p. 16.

20

See Thomas de Waal. black garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New York University Press, New York and London, 2003, pp. 179, 181. 21

The Observer, no. 1, Baku, 7-13.01, 2005, A. Yunusov. Brief ethno-demographic characteristics of Azerbaijan, in Refugees and forced migrants: ethnic stereotypes (Experience of sociological analysis), Vladikavkaz, 2002, p. 12.22 Sebastian

Smith. Allah's Mountains. Politics and War in Russian Caucasus, London-New York, IB Tauris Publishers, 1998, p. 186.

23

Zurab Todua. Azerbaijani solitaire, M., 2000, p. 45, A. Yunusov. Brief ethno-demographic characteristics of Azerbaijan, p. 12.

24

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 27, 1994.

25

Stepashin: Azerbaijan a channel for arms to Chechnya, Jamestown Monitor. Volume 1, Issue 26, June 6, 1995, "Arguments and Facts" 03/10/1995. 26

I. Muradyan. Turkish Intelligence System and Pan-Turkic Organizations, "IRAN & CAUCASUS", III-IV Research Papers From the Caucasian Center for Iranian Studies, Yerevan, 2000, Leiden 1999-2000, see "Echo", 23.09. 2004. 27

“Vremya MN”, 24.08.1999, see Bloody terrorism, M., OLMA PRESS, 2000, p. 67, Yossef Bodansky. The New Azerbaijan Hub: How Islamist Operations Are Targeting Russia, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh, Source in Internet: http://www.anca.org/anca/ actio n_docs. asp?docsid=3 8.28

A. Yunusov. Brief ethno-demographic characteristics of Azerbaijan, p. 13.

29

N. G. Kireev. Russian-Turkish relations in the context of Eurasian concepts, "Russian-Turkish relations: history, current state and prospects", Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, M. 2003, p. 255, Bloody Terrorism, p. 261. 30

David Gudiashvili. Turkey and the Russian-Chechen War 1994-1996, Central Asia and the Caucasus, no. 5 (23), 2002, p. 90.31 Malik Mufti, op .

work with the. 33.

32

See Aktuel, 1995, no. 198, quoted by David Gudiashvili. decree. work with the. 93.

33

See Svante Cornell. Small Nations and Great Powers, pp. 310-312.

34

David Gudiashvili. decree. work with the. 93.

35

Shireen T. Hunter with Jeffrey L. Thomas and Alexander Melikishvili. Islam in Russia, p. 348.

36

David Gudiashvili. decree. work with the. 93, Shireen T. Hunter with Jeffrey L. Thomas and Alexander Melikishvili. decree. work, r. 349. 37

“Turkey among states financing terrorism”, Izvestiya, 17.04. 2003.

38

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov during his visit to the US in early 2005. called the main problem of Russian-Turkish relations "double standards in the fight against terrorism", noting that "Turkey is the record holder among countries whose citizens were killed in Chechnya", See Most of Foreign Mercenaries Killed in Chechnya Are Turks, "RIA Novosti" , January 13. 2005. See also Turkish Daily News, 25.12. 2003, Mercenaries flee from Chechnya http://www.vesti-rtr.ru/, see www.vesti.ru, 05.11.2004, Izvestiya, 02.09. 2000.39 _

According to Cypriot Justice Minister Dorus Theodorou in an interview with the Greek newspaper Phileleftheros, the Chechen fighters who took part in the attack on a school in Beslan in September 2004 were trained in the Turkish part of Cyprus, preparing "for attacks in Russia." See also. Cyprus Minister Says Chechens Being Trained In North To Strike Russia, http://www.turkishpress.com/turkishpress/news.asp?ID=28590, Agence France Presse, 26.09. 2004, www.gazeta.ru/2004/09/27/oa_134678.shtml 40

HAA, f. 1, op. 127, file 784, p. 36.

41

According to unconfirmed by other sources, one of bin Laden's associates claimed that the terrorist leader himself was in Azerbaijan during the war in Karabakh and twice led the Arab-Afghans into the attack, see "Associated Press" , 11/14/1999. 42

Azerbaijan Enlists Afghan Mercenaries, RFE/RL Records, November 8, 1993, SB&Eurasian Archive, Azerbaijan, HU-OSA, 300-80-6-3; Joseph A. Kechichian, and Theodore W. Karasik. The Crisis in Azerbaijan, p63, Steve LeVine. Azerbaijan Throws Raw Recruits Into Battle: Desperate 'Human Wave' Tactics Reportedly Cost 4,000 Lives In Winter Offensive, The Washington Post, 04/21/1994. 43

R. Jaccard. In the name of Osama bin Laden, M., 2002, p. 196.

44

Yu. V. Bosin. The role of the religious and ethnic factor in the intra-Afghan conflict, "Afghanistan: the problem of war and peace", M., 2000, pp. 71-72. 45

David Filipov. For Afghan Everyman, War is in his Body, Soul, The Boston Globe, 12/19. 2001.46

_

Alexis Rowell. US Army Veterans "Drill" Azeris Under Cover of Oil Firm, "The Observer", October 28, 1993. For the Afghan Mujahideen who fought on the side of Azerbaijan, see also Auerbach John. Azerbaijan Hires Afghan Troops to Bolster Army, "The Boston Globe", 08.11.1993, Daniel Schneider. Afghan Fighters Join Azeri-Armenian War, The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, November 16, 1993, p. 3, Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, New York, 1994, p. 46. 47

Up To 2500 Afghan May Be Fighting in Azeri Army, RFE/RL Records, April 27, 1994, Azerbaijan, HU-OSA, 300/80/6/2.

48

The scandal over this case erupted at the end of 1986. The proceeds from the sale of weapons to Iran were to be used to finance the Nicaraguan Contras. At the same time, according to the agreement, Tehran was supposed to send part of the weapons to Shiite militants in Afghanistan to fight against Soviet troops. See James G. Hershberg. The War in Afghanistan and the Iran-Contra Affair: Missing Links?, "The Cold War History", Vol. 3, no. 3 (April 2003), p. 24 See also John K. Cooley. Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism, London, Pluto, 1999, p. 180. 49

Thomas Goltz. Azerbaijan Diary, pp. 270-279.

fifty

Mark Irkali, Tengiz Kodrarian and Cali Ruchala. God Save the Shah: American Guns, Oil and Spies in Azerbaijan at http://vvfww.diacritica.com/sobaka/2003/shah.html 51

Sunday Times, London, 26.03. 2000, "Stratfor", 16.10. 2003. Materials used from a chapter of Peter Dale Scott's unpublished book, The Road to 9/11, posted on the author's website at the time of publication of this work. See http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/q.html 52

Mark Irkali, Tengiz Kodrarian and Cali Ruchala. decree. Job.

53

S. Shermatova. Islamic factor in the hands of political elites, p. 221, V. Kudryavtsev. The phenomenon of "Arab Afghans", "Middle East and Modernity", Vol. 17, Institute for the Study of Israel and the Middle East, M., 2003, p. 163.54 James

Bruce. Arab Veterans of the Afghan War, Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1, 1995, Vol. 7, no. 4, p. 175.

55

Shaul Shay and Yoram Schweitzer. The "Afghan Alumni" Terrorism Islamic Militants against the Rest of the World, The International Policy Institute For Counter Terrorism, November 6, 2000, www.ict.org.il, A. V. Kudryavtsev. The “Arab Afghans” Phenomenon, p. 169. 56

The text of the report of Lieutenant Colonel D. Latifov to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, see Azg, 13.01.1994. Part of the documents and photographic materials at the disposal of the NKR authorities were published by the author. See Science Demoyan. Karabakh Drama: Hidden Acts. Yerevan, Caucasian Center for Iranian Studies, 2003. 57

Daniel Shneider. Afghan Fighters Join Azeri-Armenian War, The Christian Science Monitor, 11/13/1993, Steve LeVince, Afghan Fighters Aiding Azerbaijan in Civil War, The Washington Post, November 8, 1993, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 01/29/1994. 58

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 01/15/1994, Conflict International, April 1994, Shay Shaul and Schweitzer Yoram. decree. Job.

59

Elizabeth Fuller points to 1500 Mujahideen, see Elizabeth Fuller. Azerbaijan at the Crossroads, p. 19.

60

According to the testimony of Afghan prisoner of war Bakhtior Verballakh Baberzai, see Golos Armenii, 26.05.1994.

61

Ralph H. Magnus, Eden Naby. Afghanistan. Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, Westview Press, Boulder 2002, p. 174.

62

Afghan Mujahid Ready To Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh, RFE/RL Records, May 4, 1994, Slavic, Baltic&Eurasian Archive, Azerbaijan, HU-OSA, 300/80/6/2. 63

The author thanks Levon Melik-Shahnazaryan for providing this information.

64

K. Gajendra Singh. Azerbaijan: An era Draws to a Close, Asia Times, Hong Kong, 21.05. 2003, See also Combat and Survival, Volume 11, Issue 5, August 1999, pp. 5-10. 65

G. Kovalskaya. War. And under Mutalibov, and under Elchibey, and under Aliev, "New Time", no. 11, 1994, p. 20.

66

Curiously, in Bosnia, the Mujahideen tried to force women to wear black headscarves, men to wear beards, smashed cafes and practiced “Sharia weddings” with Bosnians. See Gilles Kepel. Jihad. Expansion and decline of Islamism, M., Ladomir, 2004, p. 245. 67

Thomas Goltz. decree. work with the. 276.

68

“Voice of Armenia”, 05/26/1994.

69

Moscow News, no. June 23, 5-12, 1994.

70

"Republic of Armenia", 05/31/1994; Moscow News, no. 23, June 5-12, 1994, Afghan Mujahideen Said To Be Involved in Karabakh Fighting, RFE/RL Records, December 23, 1993, Azerbaijan, HU-OSA, 300/80/6/2. 71

"Azg", 18.01.1994.

72

John K. Cooley. decree. work with the. 181. See also Arab-Muslim world on the threshold of the 21st century. Abstract collection, M., 1999, p. 63. 73

According to Azerbaijani media, 6 thousand Afghans lived in the republic, of which 2-3 thousand settled here in 1993-1999, see Zerkalo, 07.09. 2002. According to the head of the mission of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Azerbaijan, Didier Laye, the majority of refugees in Azerbaijan are from Afghanistan. See "Turan", 21.11. 2000, "Echo", 02.05. 2001. 74

S. Shermatova. decree. work with the. 221, Shermatova Sanobar. Khatab and Central Asia, Moscow News, 13.09. 2000, "The Financial Times", 01.05. 2002. See also Yevgeny Primakov. The World After September 11, Thought, Moscow 2002, pp. 24-25, Gilles Kepel. decree. work with the. 232.

75

K. I. Polyakov. Arab countries and Islam in Russia, M., 2001, p. 83.

76

For electronic copies of documents, see http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/102/dia.pdf

77

Yossef Bodansky. Some Call It Peace Waiting http://members.tripod.com/Balkania/resources/geostrategy/bodansky_peace /index.html

For

in

78

Roland Jacquard. Fatwa contre I'occident, Paris, Albin Michel 1998. pp. 134-135, 139.

79

Gilles Kepel. Jihad. The Expansion and Decline of Islamism, p. 401.

80

Yossef Bodansky. Some call it peace...

81

R. Kasaba, S. Bozdogan. Turkey at the Crossroad, Journal of International Affairs, 2000, vol. 54, no. 1, p. 9.

the

Balkans,

82

Gunduz S. Aktan and Ali M. Koknar. Turkey, in Combating Terrorism. Strategies of Ten Countries, edited by Yonah Alexander, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2002, p. 289, see also Brian Glyn Williams. Turkey's al-Qaeda Blowback, "Terrorism Monitor", Jamestown Foundation, Volume II, Issue 8, April 22, 2004, p. 4, see http://www.jamestown.org. Turks trained in Osama bin Laden's Camp in Rishkhor, Turkish Daily News, 11/25. 2003. 83

Dmitrii Trenin, Anatol Lieven, AV Malashenko, Aleksei Malashenko. Russia's Restless Frontier. The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC 2004, p. 183. See also Shireen T. Hunter with Jeffrey L. Thomas and Alexander Melikishvili, Islam in Russia. The Politics of Identity and Security, ME Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London, 2004. p. 369. 84

Dmitrii Trenin, Anatol Lieven, A.V. Malashenko, Aleksei Malashenko. decree. work, r. 183.

85

Independent Military Review, 01/09/1998.

86

Shireen T. Hunter with Jeffrey L. Thomas and Alexander Melikishvili. decree. work, r. 349, A. Grigoryan, The Baku-Grozny Alliance and the Interests of Armenia, “View from Yerevan”, Armenian Center for Strategic and National Studies, no. 1, April, 1998 (in Armenian), ss. 42-43. 87

"Kavkazskiy vestnik", 13.10. 2000.

88

See E. A. Stepanova. The role of the drug business in the political economy of conflicts and terrorism, Ves Mir, M., 2005, pp. 33, 55, 198. 89

Peter Dale Scott. drugs. Oil, and War. The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and

Indochina, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford, 2003, pp. 46, 86. 90

Rashid Ahmed. Taliban. Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism, New Haven and London,

Yale University Press, 2000, p. 119, Jaccard R. op. work with the. 263. 91

Kendal Nezan. La Turquie, plaque tournante du trafic de drogue, "Le mond diplomatique", juillet, 1998, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1998/07/NEZAN/10656, Gunduz S. Aktan and Ali M. Koknar. Turkey, in Combating Terrorism. Strategies of Ten Countries, edited by Yonah Alexander, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2002. 92

93

Kendal Nezan. decree. Job.

Ibid. In an interview with the Sunday Times on January 26, 1997. UK Home Secretary Tom Sackville confirmed that 80 per cent of heroin in the UK is of Turkish origin and that "Members of the Turkish government and Turkish police are involved in drug trafficking", Kendal Nezan. decree. Job.

94

Conflict, Drugs and Mafia Activities. Contribution to the Preparatory Work for the Hague Peace Conference, May 11-16, 1999, MARCH 1999, http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/l/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/ille-e /presentation-e/labrousse2-e.htm 95

See "La Depeche internationale des Drogues", no. 40, February 1995.

96

M. Zhego. Turkey. Republic in crisis, in "Turkey". Collection of reviews, M. RAN, 2002, p. 89.97

Yossef

Bodansky. Chechnya: The Mujahedin Factor, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/bodanslcy/chechnya.htm

98

3. S. Arukhov. Armed conflicts in the North Caucasus in the light of the theory and practice of jihad, "South Russian Review", Issue 1, 2001, CD version. E. A. Stepanova, decree. work with the. 13. According to the Israeli newspaper Dvar Hashavua (28.05.1993), during the Karabakh war, Pakistani pilots taught Azerbaijani pilots the skills of combat missions. See Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Documents, data, and Analysis, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Paige Sullivain (ed.), The Center for Strategic and International Studies, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London, England 1997, p. 226. 99

E. A. Stepanova, op. work, ss. 68, 230.

100

Afghan "Wild Goose" in a Karabakh Cage, Moscow News, June 5-12, 1994.

101

Peter Dale Scott. The Road to 9/11, http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edU/~pdscott/q.html

102

Peter Dale Scott. 9/11 in Historical Perspective: Flawed Assumptions Deep Politics: Drugs, Oil, Covert Operations and Terrorism: A briefing for Congressional staff, July 22, 2005, http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edU/~pdscott/911 Background. htm 103

See. San Francisco Chronicle, 12/18/1992.

104

Extremist Movements and Their Threats to the United States. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United State Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, November 2, 1999, Washington, 2000, pp. 27-30. Roland Jacquard, Fatwa contre I'occident, Albin Michel, Paris 1998, p. 166. 105

John K. Cooley. Unholy Wars, pp. 157, 159.

106

On the Turkish trace and version of the relationship between drug trafficking and the coup attempt in Azerbaijan in March 1995. see "Echo", 17.03. 2001, 15.03. 2001. 107

See Azer Mursaliyev. "Drug coup", http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/ie/print/42599. 108

"Mirror

of

the

week",

no.

7(20),

February

18-24,

1995,

at

Yossef Bodansky, The New Azerbaijan Hub.

109

Ibid., see also Konstantin Polyakov. Arab-Muslim influence on Islam in Russia: problems and contradictions (90s of the XX century), in "The threat of Islam or the threat to Islam" (According to the results of the international conference), M, 2001, p. 177. 110

Yossef Bodansky. decree. work, see also A. Yunusov. Islam in Azerbaijan, p. 260

111

A. Yunusov. decree. work with the. 263.

112

Julie Wilhelmsen. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamization of the Chechen Separatist Movement, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, no. 1, January 2005, p. 35, Al Harameini Foundation was also suspected of supplying weapons to Chechnya through Azerbaijan, see A. Yunusov. decree. work with the. 268. 113

M. Sakanova. “The actions of the terrorists were directed from Absheron? "Baku trace" in the case of the bombings of American embassies", "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 05.09. 2001, The 9/11 Commission report. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Official Government Edition, p. 127, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/ 114

The 9/11 Commission report, p. 70, The Washington Post. 03.05. 2001, "Echo". 08/28/2001.

115

See Echo, 18.08. 2001, "Echo", 29.08. 2001.

116

"Echo", 01.09. 2001.

117

Ibid. The presence of foreign Islamic radical organizations in Baku was funded through bin Laden's structures, See 9/11 Commission Report, 58. 118

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 05.09. 2001.

119

Alexander Alf, Rodion Nikolaev. “Cannon fodder for “religious” wars is being prepared in Azerbaijan”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 07.10.1999. 120

R. Jaccard. decree. work, ss. 242, 302. Ayman al Zawahiri since 1985. took part in the war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. 121

A. Yunusov. decree. work with the. 264.

122

Yossef Bodansky. The New Azerbaijan Hub: How Islamist operations are targeting Russia, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh, Defense and Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, October, 1999, see also John E. Sray. Turkish SOF Trains Azerbaijani Forces. "Foreign Military Studies Office", January 1994, http://fmso.Ieavenworth.army.mil/documents/turksof.htm 123

P. Jacard op. op., p. 196, Samir Razimov, Bin Laden's Azeri Connection, IWPR, Caucasus Reporting Service, no. 100 (5 October 2001), Echo, 01.09. 2001.

124

Independent Military Review, October 5-21, 1999.

125

See Turan News Agency, Baku, 21.11.2000, Ekho, 02.05. 2001.

126

3. S. Arukhov. decree. Job.

127

Ibid. According to the report "Global Terrorism in 2003" released by the US State Department, from the end of 2001 to mid-2004. Azerbaijan extradited to various states of the world "approximately 32 foreign citizens" suspected of having links with terrorism. "Echo", 01.05. 2004. 1 28

"Mirror", 22.07. 2000, "Echo", 28.08. 2001, The Washington Post, 03.05. 2001.

129

"Time", 21.12.1998, see also "Echo", 30.06. 2001.

130

Agence France Presse, 18.03.1999, The Sunday Times, 18.7.1999, Zerkalo, 22.07. 2000, "Echo", 29.08. 2001. Selections of articles from the news agency Regnum were used, see also Echo, 01.09. 2001, Dmitrii Trenin, Anatol Lieven, AV Malashenko, Alesksei Malashenko. decree. work., p. 100. 131

"Echo", 09.08. 2003.

132

Ibid.

133

Shireen T. Hunter with Jeffrey L. Thomas and Alexander Melikishvili. Islam in Russia. The Politics of Identity and Security, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London, 2004, p. 343, For the substantiation of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Azerbaijan, see Zerkalo, 02.01. 2002, "Echo", 29.11. 2003, also Wahhabis in Azerbaijan, "Zerkalo", 04.01. 2002, Bin Laden's colleague was captured in Baku, "Echo", 07.10. 2003. For Turkish links to al-Qaeda, see Ilnur Cevik. Turkish Terrorists Interrogated at Centers in Kuwait and Pakistan, None Sent to Cuba: Al Qaeda Turks in US Custody, Turkish Daily News, 17.01. 2002, Turks Trained in Osama bin Ladens Camp in Rashkhor, Turkish Daily News, 25.11. 2003, Two Turk Al Qaeda Suspects Extradited, http://www.dawn.com/2005/01/03/top8.htm. 134

"Echo", 01.09. 2001, Congressional Research Service, (CRS, 9/10/2001).

135

The 9/11 Commission report, p. 233.

136

The Gulf News newspaper published in the United Arab Emirates wrote that the Islamic Front of the Fighters of the Great East, which was responsible for a number of terrorist attacks in Turkey, was once engaged in recruiting "holy fighters" for the war against the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the source, the "Islamic Front of the Warriors of the Great East" also sent fighters to Chechnya and Dagestan. See Extremist Organization Guilty of Istanbul Attacks Recruited Militants for War in Nagorno-Karabakh, November 28, 2003, URL: http://www.day.az/news/armenia/2323.html network of international terrorism see also Brian Glyn Williams, Feyza Altindag. El Kaide Turka: Tracing an Al-Qaeda Splinter Cell, "Terrorism Monitor", The Jamestown Foundation, vol. 2, Issue 22 (November 18, 2004), Brian Glyn Williams, Feyza Altindag. Turkish Volunteers in Chechnya, Terrorism Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, vol. 3, Issue 7 (April 07, 2005) www.jamestown.org 137

Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the UN General Assembly of 14 December 1974 on the "Definition of Aggression", see http://www.un.org/russian/documen/gadocs/convres/r29-3314.pdf 138

International Convention against the Recruitment, http://www.un.org/russian/documen/convents/r44-34.pdf

Use,

Financing

and

Training

of

Mercenaries,

available

at

Conclusion 1

Svante E. Cornell, Turkey's Prospects in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Its Regional Implications, "Marco Polo", no. 4-5, 1998, p. 3.2 Jacob

Landau. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, London 1995, p. 215.3 Intervention

of

Ethnic Conflict. A Publication of the International Center for Ethnic Studies, Ed. By KM de Silva a. RJ May, London, 1991, p. 6.

4

V. B. Harutyunyan. decree. slave. Part V, pp. 282-283.

5

Olivier Pay and Eric Remacle. UN and CSCE Policy in Transcaucasia, "Disputed Borders in the Caucasus", ed. Bruno Kopiters, All the world, M., 1996, p. 150. 6

“Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, adopted on 24 October 1970, available at http://www.un.org/russ-ian/documen/gadocs/ convres/r25-2625.pdf