True Islam, Jihad, and Terrorism: The Science of Islamic Foreign Policy 163485506X, 9781634855068

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RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY

TRUE ISLAM, JIHAD, AND TERRORISM THE SCIENCE OF ISLAMIC FOREIGN POLICY

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RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY Additional books in this series can be found on Nova’s website under the Series tab.

RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY

TRUE ISLAM, JIHAD, AND TERRORISM THE SCIENCE OF ISLAMIC FOREIGN POLICY

JAAN S. ISLAM

New York

Copyright © 2016 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. We have partnered with Copyright Clearance Center to make it easy for you to obtain permissions to reuse content from this publication. Simply navigate to this publication’s page on Nova’s website and locate the “Get Permission” button below the title description. This button is linked directly to the title’s permission page on copyright.com. Alternatively, you can visit copyright.com and search by title, ISBN, or ISSN. For further questions about using the service on copyright.com, please contact: Copyright Clearance Center Phone: +1-(978) 750-8400 Fax: +1-(978) 750-4470 E-mail: [email protected].

NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Islam, Jaan, author. Title: True Islam, jihad, and terrorism: the science of Islamic foreign policy / Jaan S. Islam (Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University, Global Organization for Faith, Wisdom, and Peace, research associate, Nova Scotia, Canada). Description: Hauppauge, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., [2016] | Series: Religion and spirituality | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016023903 (print) | LCCN 2016024251 (ebook) | ISBN 9781634855068 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781634855426 () Subjects: LCSH: War--Religious aspects--Islam. | Just war doctrine. | Islam and politics. Classification: LCC BP190.5.W35 I845 2016 (print) | LCC BP190.5.W35 (ebook) | DDC 297.2/7--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016023903

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

The Author would like to dedicate this book to Ali Omer Islam, his younger brother, a future researcher of knowledge.

CONTENTS About the Author

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Preface

xiii

Chapter 1

Introduction: Bridging the Modern and Classical

Chapter 2

The Islamic Cognition Model

15

Chapter 3

Understanding Political Islam and Morality: Ibn Khaldun versus Hobbes and Locke

55

Chapter 4

1

Comprehensive Analysis of the Jus Ad Bellum in the Early Islamic Era

107

The Islamic Jus in Bello: Restrictions Surrounding Warfare in Islam

131

Chapter 6

Rebellion and Civil War in Islam

143

Chapter 7

The Modern Scholarship: A Contemporary View

169

Chapter 8

Terrorism, Islamic Legitimacy, and Regulations on Islamic Warfare

187

Summary and Conclusion

215

Chapter 5

Chapter 9 Bibliography Appendix Index

227 Letters of the Prophet Muhammad to Heads of State and Tribal Leaders

239 249

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jaan Islam is a research associate at the Niyah Institute. He has been active in research on several social sciences, with a focus on Political Theory. His previous works include Reconstituting the Curriculum (with M. R. Islam & Gary Zatzman), and co-authorship of a four-volume book series entitled The Greening of Pharmaceutical Engineering. He has works in law, medicine contemporary history, philosophy, and education.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to point out the fact that in terms of teaching and explaining cognition from an Islamic perspective, most teachers and role-models have ended up being subject to criticism, forming much of the book’s arguments. That being said, there is an undeniable positive role several figures have played, either through their explanation and discussion of the Islamic cognition approach, understanding of delinearized history and its importance, or their views on the current socio-political atmosphere. There are several noteworthy figures with ideological contributions:         

Dr. Sadeq Maghboub: for contributions regarding foundational Islamic political thought Prof. Sk. Saad Dabbous: for discussing the foreign policy of an Islamic state, Qur’anic exegesis, and Islamic theology Prof. M. Rafiqul Islam: for ideological contributions regarding delinearized history and the Islamic cognition approach Prof. Christopher Cutting: contributions on modern Islamic thought: ijtihad and Muslims in North America. Imam Sayed Muhammad Aqeel Shah: for contributions on Islamic theology and early Islamic political history Ali Islam: contributions on Islamic rebellion history and Oppression Syndrome Theory Prof. Marcella Firmini: ideological contributions on political philosophy and divine law discourse M. Ali Hassan Mughal: for contributing to the development Islamic cognition model and Islamic philosophy Prof. Frank Harvey: for ideological contributions on realist international relations theory

PREFACE In every epoch, political elites have controlled major avenues of the legal and political arena, redefining fundamental values and rights. Jihad, the Arabic term for ‘struggle’ was the target and ‘Islamic terrorism’ and ‘Islamic fascism’ became the buzzword of the decades that would follow 9/11. After terror attacks and other “excitement-inducing” information found on the media, the observers—we in the west—consider reiterating our stance on toleration and views on whether or not Islam is really a “peaceful” religion. At the very least, the nature of Islam is often blurred and incomprehensible in today’s world. This book provides the answer to this ultimate question, “what is true Islam?” I attempt to clear all misconceptions that eluded nearly all contemporary Islamic scholars as well as historians of modern epoch. I make this bold statement consciously knowing that I have applied Qur’anic cognition. It is the only dogma-free process that once catapulted many Islamic scholars to an unprecedented height of research excellence and scholarship during the golden era of Islam. This cognition starts from the Qur’an and evaluate in the context of Prophetic narrations. We are well aware of the two sides of the argument, that predominant in the liberal west, purporting that Islam is really peaceful and not political—and of course that the political Islamists and militant movements advancing the cause of their version of Islam are not true Muslims, not following the teachings of the Qur’an. The other camp, found in the right-wing west and certain people in conservative Muslim countries (like Saudi Arabia), believe that Islam is political, and that Shari’ah law and violence is a representation of true Islam, that the Prophet Muhammad preached and acted upon such teachings. Within the former group, there are two camps; one denying the existence of political Islam altogether, and the other wishing to use ‘ijtihad’ to ‘apply Shari’ah to a modern context.’ There is a vast amount of room for confusion and importantly, misinterpretation of both the holy book of Muslims (the Qur’an), and its compliment, the Hadith (prophetic narrations). In face of this confusion and the search for the truth in the theological and historical texts, I have made it my duty to make this information available to all. Throughout the course of the book, we realize that in terms of war, Islam certainly does not command relentless war against all disbelievers, nor does it only apply in self-defense (Chapter 4). At the same time it challenges the apologetic group of Muslims, both types. It demonstrates that Islam indeed—contrary to popular belief and practice—has a political aspect that is observed through the injunctions of the Qur’an and Hadith, and through historical analysis.

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All in all, if one is to get anything out of this read, it is that the only way to find truth is by applying purely objective analysis, that the truth can be discovered when we drop our agendas and prejudices and turn our intentions towards seeking knowledge. Jaan Islam 30 January 2016

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: BRIDGING THE MODERN AND CLASSICAL 1.1. THE CONTEXT The terror attacks of 9/11 was a defining moment in modern history that brought back the ‘clash of civilizations’ debate to the forefront. Even though post 9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dissipated much of the credibility of the USA led western coalition, bringing an end to the ‘honeymoon’ period triggered by ‘war on terrorism’ by USA President G W Bush,1 the emergence of the idea of an “Islamic Caliphate” in the most restive part of the Middle East has brought back the debate, and people are questioning how a ‘peaceful religion’ can give rise to such insane extremism. The self-declared proponents of Islam that include the vast majority of Muslim nations are saying IS (Islamic State) or ISIS (Islamic State of Syria and Iraq) is anything but true Islam.2 On the other hand, the detractors of Islam are saying that IS is the impersonation of true Islam that is inherently evil. This debate, however, is not new. At the core of today’s struggles over US hegemony and the New World Order, almost all the issues that have become critical arise directly out of the Orientalism-Islam divide going back to the time of the Crusades. For those that are familiar with the “pre-historic” Qur’anic narration of history, the debate is much longer than that and finds root in original Satanic plan to deviate mankind from its natural path. The Qur’an quotes Satan as below and warns anyone against taking Satan as an ally: And I will mislead them, and I will arouse in them [sinful] desires, and I will command them so they will slit the ears of cattle, and I will command them so they will change the creation of Allah” And whoever takes Satan as an ally instead of Allah has certainly sustained a clear loss [Qur’an 4:119]

The arrival of the ‘phenomenon’ of ISIS in 2014 that claimed to bring back the Prophet Muhammad’s long-promised Caliphate, the discussion of Islam as a political force has come back to the forefront. For the first time in modern history, both “pro-Islam” and “anti-Islam”

1 2

Igor Khrestin, The Honeymoon Is Over, The Weekly Standard, Feb. 21, 2007. Even US President Obama and UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon have joined the chorus.

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entities are calling IS evil. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau famously said, “If we can highlight how Islam is not incompatible with free and open western democracies, that’s a nice punch in the face to [ISIS]. 3 On the other hand, people that once made a career out of calling Prophet Muhammad a terrorist are having a heyday, fueling Islamophobia all around the globe. Anytime there is an act of violence and a “Muslim” can be identified as the perpetrator, all attacks are directed toward Islam. If anyone attempts to explain in terms of Islam’s stance on violence, the detractors of this ‘religion of peace’ fire back and cite Qur’anic verses that are taken out of context. The defenders come back with apologetic explanation of these verses, yet others fire back with lines that “terrorism is inevitable as the sword must be used to combat the evil of the infidel.” This rhetoric feeds political greed, as evidenced in remarks of former US republican candidate Dr. Ben Carson4 that are matched by the infamous ‘Muslim ban’ demand.5 Even though this drew immediate criticism—many likening it Nazi era6—consensus arose that ‘radical Islam’ is indeed dangerous, lending to the pointed question, “why shouldn’t Muslims that can be radicalized anytime be considered a danger to the democratic society?” As life goes on, one cannot be oblivious to hate crimes that are directly related to the perception of Islam perpetrated in the media.7 Unfortunately, it is a fact that people that start off with either of the two premises, i.e., that Islam is inherently evil and is a ‘religion’ (just another ‘Abrahamic faith’) are likely to dismiss much of the discussion of the nature of true Islam as an overblown hangover from the false and self-serving discourses unleashed after 9-11 about the so-called “clash of civilizations.” Among conscientious communities that are willing to adjust their first premise, meanwhile, this struggle indeed finds its reflection in a wide number of social fields. Yet, everyone seems to have missed the crucial point, viz., although the lines of development in Islamic and Christian societies diverged continuously from the start of the European Middle Ages, there was no true ideological basis for them to clash in the first place. At the same time there have arisen no genuinely urgent issues between these differently oriented collectives on which to launch a real dialog.8 Thus, neither scholarly nor similarly non-military engagement of the different claims of the defenders of the Qur’an and the followers of the Christian God (with the life and person of Jesus Christ at its center) could even take place in the conditions of that time. Yet, there is a disconnect that continues to purport the line that there is something inherently wrong with Islam. While the Qur’anic criteria for ‘just violence’ is clear and intact for last 1400 years, and the practice of Prophet Muhammad and his “rightly-guided caliphs” 3

Canadian Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau speaking at Davos, Switzerland, at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, Jan. 21, 2016. 4 “I would not advocate that we put a Muslim in charge of this nation. I absolutely would not agree with that,” Ben Carson. (Jose A. DelReal, Ben Carson says he would not support a Muslim for president, The Washington Post, September 20). 5 Donald Trump advocates for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States, until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.” Donald Trump quoted by Jenna Johnson & David Weigel. (2015) Donald Trump calls for ‘total’ ban on Muslims entering United States, The Washington Post, Dec. 8. 6 French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls twitted, “Monsieur Trump, comme d'autres, entretient la haine et les amalgames: notre SEUL ennemi, c'est l'islamisme radical.” "Trump, like others, stokes hatred and conflations: our ONLY enemy is radical Islamism." (Washington Post, Annie Gowen, “British, French leaders join world condemnation of Trump's proposed ban on Muslims entering U.S.,” The Washington Post, Dec. 8, 2015) 7 CBC News, Peterborough mosque arson is suspected hate crime, Nov 15, 2015. 8 M.R. Islam, G.M. Zatzman, and Jaan S. Islam, Reconstituting the Curriculum (Scrivener-Wiley 2013), 113.

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(Khulafā` al-Rāshidūn) are well known,9 there is no shortage of disinformation from either side of the Jihad debate. One group of Islamic scholars subscribe to the notion that Islam is inherently expansionist and, therefore, incompatible with modern democracy and ‘man-made’ rule of law.10 On the other hand, ‘the apologist’ camp promotes the notion that the Qur’an only allows fight in self-defense and the highest form of Jihad is in self-atonement.11 Ironically, the conservative segment of Muslim scholars mostly supports the first type.12 It is no surprise that the younger generation doesn’t find the argument of any of these scholars convincing, thus becoming vulnerable to online ‘education’ in Islam. This book is aimed at unraveling the mysteries of “Islamic terrorism” and providing one with a systematic analysis of current events. Critical analysis of all major wars fought by Prophet Muhammad and his ‘rightly guided’ caliphs is performed, followed by deconstruction of contemporary theories of both sides of the ‘terrorism’ debate. Current stereotypes are replaced with a scientific framework for education and recommend a groundbreaking proposal for developing a political science model that can curtail all levels of terrorism.

1.2. THE YARD STICK Stille wrote in the New York Times:13 Christoph Luxenberg, a scholar of ancient Semitic languages in Germany, argues that the Koran has been misread and mistranslated for centuries. His work, based on the earliest copies of the Koran, maintains that parts of Islam’s holy book are derived from pre-existing Christian Aramaic texts that were misinterpreted by later Islamic scholars who prepared the editions of the Koran commonly read today. So, for example, the virgins who are supposedly awaiting good Islamic martyrs as their reward in paradise are in reality “white raisins” of crystal clarity rather than fair maidens.

The problem with any modern Islamic scholarship has been: Historians don’t know Islam; Islamic scholars don’t know history; Muslim scholars don’t know European history; 9

Safiur Rahman Mubarakpuri, The sealed nectar (Darussalam Publications 1979) 132; Ahmed Al-Dawoody, ‘War in Islamic Law: Justifications and Regulations’ (DPhil thesis, University of Birmingham 2009) 44. 10 See for example: Fred M Donner, ‘The sources of Islamic conceptions of war’ in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (eds), Just war and Jihād: historical and theoretical perspectives on war and peace in Western and Islamic traditions (Greenwood Press 1991) 34; Reuven Firestone, Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (OUP 1999); Christopher J. van der Krogt, ‘Jihād without apologetics’ (2010) 21 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 127, 131. 11 See for example: Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, ‘War in Islamic Law: Justifications and Regulations (DPhil thesis, University of Birmingham 2009) 100-116; Jamal Badawi, ‘Muslim/Non-Muslim relations, an integrative approach’ J. Islamic L. and Culture 8 (2004): 23; Kathleen A Cavanaugh, ‘Speaking Law to War’ (2012) 17 J Conflict Security Law 4. 12 As Islamists have consistently done: Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Holy Koran Publishing House 1978); Abul A’la Maududi, ‘Jihad in Islam’ (The Holy Koran Publishing House 1980). 13 Stille, A., Scholars Are Quietly Offering New Theories of the Koran, The New York Times, March 2, 2002. Available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/02/arts/scholars-are-quietly-offering-new-theories-ofthe-koran.html?pagewanted=all.

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European historians don’t know Islam. Typically, whatever is said about Islam (an example above), few historians would give it a second glance. The new Atheism is sustained by a fervent group of bad historians and self-styled philosophers who have little credibility beyond their limited following. New Atheism is the philosophical equivalent of evangelical Christianity and Zionism—the pervasive use of religion as ideology is a damning reality but has nothing whatsoever to do with religious truth and the viability of faith. This is the state of the world today. Numerous authors mentioned14 there was an epoch that saw a remarkable surge in social development, initially mostly outside Europe. This social development was led by Prophet Muhammad. Even beyond the Muslim world, this individual has been ranked number one as the most influential ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ leader of all time.15 After his death, the institution or nation (ummah) that he founded became an example of an “ideal society” 16 Islam, Zatzman and Islam discuss the historical context and presents a chapter entitled: ‘Delinearized history: Educational Development and Knowledge Gathering during the Rise of Islamic Society’ that presents the values and cognition style of the Prophet Muhammad’s time. They recognized the scientific superiority of the ideals of the Prophet and cited the following statements to set direction of the cognition pathway:17 An Arab is no better than a non-Arab, and a non-Arab is no better than an Arab; a red man is no better than a black man and a black man is no better than a red man – except if it is in terms of piety. — Prophet Muhammad, 632 I, as much as any other man, stand in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race… I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races. — Abraham Lincoln, 1858

One should have no illusion as to which direction our cognitive ability is heading irrespective of who the leadership has been (left and right). Recently, US Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’ dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, the case that officially made “marriage equality” the law of the land in USA, the Supreme Court justice claimed that enslaved Africans weren’t deprived of their “dignity” simply because they were enslaved. Therefore, Thomas argued, same-sex couples weren’t actually being deprived of anything - at least not anything important - when they couldn’t get married. One does not need a PhD in law to understand what cognitive malfunction the Honourable Justice is having as he doesn’t stop for a moment to reflect another starting point, that is: slavery did eliminate the dignity of the slaves because it was a brutal and racist system of state-sanctioned bondage. Yes, human dignity is innate, but of course it can be undermined by discriminatory government policies. Just because the government didn’t bestow something doesn’t mean it can’t take it away. We’ll see in Chapter 2 how such cognitive malfunction is corrected by examining the first premise, including the intention of the observer.

14

For a comprehensive list, see M.R. Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum. Michael H. Hart The 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Persons in History It was first published in 1978, reprinted with minor revisions 1992 and 2000. ISBN 978-0-8065-1068-2. 16 M.R. Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 325. 17 ibid, p. 191. 15

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Chapter 2 makes it clear that the government that Paul Craig Roberts18 calls the ‘most completely criminal organization in human history’ (even supported by a CNN headline, see figure 1.1) cannot be taken as the ideal; and if it is, there surfaces contradictions over contradictions. Unless this is detected at the root, there is no stopping of “Muslims” that paint Prophet Muhammad as terrorist and longs for tweaking Islam to fit the western Imperialist model. If Prophet Muhammad has to be vindicated,19 there has to be a serious deconstruction of all existing theories, including those advanced by Islamophobes, apologists and extremists.

Figure 1.1. CNN headline from January 20, 2016.

1.3. HOW IT ALL BEGAN: FUNDAMENTALS OF IBN KHALDUN, LOCKE AND HOBBES In the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) wrote extensively on the history of civilization. Ibn Khaldun’s work was later recognized as ‘undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place.’20 The British philosopher-anthropologist Ernest Gellner characterized Ibn Khaldun’s definition of Government, “an institution which prevents injustice other than such as it commits itself,” as the “best in the history of political theory.”21 Little known, however, is the fact that Ibn Khaldun was convinced in his mind that the only institution that can prevent injustice in an objective fashion without resorting to its own injustices is the Rashidun Caliphate model, leaving out the Umayyad dynasty that followed. This is an important discovery because the vast majority of Muslim apologists as well as non-Muslim Islamic scholars pin extra ordinary 18

Paul Craig Roberts, “The Proof Is In: The US Government Is The Most Complete Criminal Organization In Human History,” Institute for Political Economy (2015). 19 Qur’an calls the Prophet Muhammad a gift of Rahma (Kindness), who is the embodiment of the Qur’an. 20 Encyclopaedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/biography/Ibn-Khaldun. 21 Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword, and Book: The Structure of Human History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

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importance to the legitimacy to the Ummayads dynasty. In Chapter 3, we examine the original works of Ibn Khaldun and compare his fundamental premises with those of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. Such comparison unravels the fact that Ibn Rushd’s cyclic model of civilization still holds true and what Locke and Hobbes really do is invoke God and Nature, respectively in coming to the same conclusion, in essence erasing any influence of the term ‘God’ on how a state operates. More importantly, none of their models make any headway toward explaining the trait of a utopian state. For Ibn Khaldun, however, that utopian state was the Rashidun Caliphate and the other model was in fact the cyclic ‘chaotic’ model. Using Ibn Khaldun’s vocabulary, his model has Prophet Muhammad as the lawgiver whereas both Locke and Hobbes impose themselves as the lawgiver. Of course, it is no surprise that both Locke and Hobbes models are rife with contradictions and paradoxes. This chapter hopes to paint a picture of exactly how Islam is political by nature, starting from the most fundamental statement: the Islamic declaration of faith. Just in one stroke of the pen the fact that the Islamic declaration of faith (Shahadah) requires direct cognition with Qur’an and Sunnah by the most righteous is reduced to an entirely new paradigm. Chapter 3 deconstructs Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, one of the most prominent contemporary Muslim apologists. It shows how these scholars took John Locke’s model as the standard and attempted to retrofit Islam in that model.

1.4. DOES ‘MY JIHAD’ EVER BECOME MEIN KAMPF? This book is about unearthing layers of opacity that has shrouded the perception of real Islam. This is not an easy task as terrorism has become synonymous with Islam ever since Reagan era or perhaps since the emergence of Iran as an “Islamic Republic.”22 After the 9/11terror attacks, the word ‘Islamo-fascism’ gained traction and Washington Times boasted the use of the term hundreds of times. They wrote:23 On July 20, 2001, our former religion editor, Larry Witham, interviewed the Muslim scholar who is sometimes credited with inventing the term. Daring to question hardline Islam, the German-born Khalid Duran told The Washington Times that Islamism is really “Islamo-fascism” because it seeks to impose a forceful religious orthodoxy on the state and the citizenry. Use of the term has mushroomed ever since. It’s easy to see why. It describes a real phenomenon.

The scientific meaning of the term ‘Jihad’ is the struggle of conscience to prevail over short-term self-interest. It is the highest form of self-sacrifice. In many areas of German philosophy, on the other hand, the struggle (Kampf) is all about becoming truly or completely individual. The fascist doctrine of Hitler in Mein Kampf is an extreme egoistic form of such individualism. The essence of this conception has little or nothing to do with justice or any other social or collective category. This notion developed out of certain trends in German philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Weber, etc.) on the one hand, and—on the other hand—the AngloAmerican utilitarian ideal, which predicated the health of the individual and of the 22 23

Alexandra Silver, “How America Became a Surveillance State,” Time Magazine, March 18 (2010). “Islamofascism by any other name,” The Washington Times, September 1, 2006.

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individual’s larger social collective on the Benthamite notion of “the greatest good for the greatest number.” The divergence in philosophical outlook (between Islam and western philosophy, including Christianity), as manifested in Chapter 3, creates two different pathways. For Islam or Qur’an-Hadith cognition, the pathway of Jihad is clearly opposite to the notion of fascism (or nationalism, for that matter). With the Qur’an as the starting point, every action (including actions of violence or war) originates from the principle of pleasing God. As shown in Figure 1.2, it also means longterm benefit to the individual (heaven). As such, Islam stipulates the strictest of criteria for an act of war, the risk being falling on the negative side of the graph. Within the western Eurocentric framework, meanwhile, anything pertaining to what are considered “matters of religious belief” cannot be comprehended rationally according to any of its so-called “scientific” criteria. In fact this is a very arrogant assumption taken up by neo-Orientalists and followed as well by those who bow—consciously or otherwise—before them. It turns out, however, that the erection of such a Chinese wall between “conscience” on the one hand and “real,” i.e., New, “science” on the other is actually fraudulent even on the Orientalist’s own terms. Utterly pragmatically, to justify many of the special doctrines they advanced in opposition to the claimed authority of the Roman Catholic Church, the leading figures of the Protestant Reformation advanced the notion of “right reason.” Those views advanced by the leaders of the Protestant Reformation that contradicted Roman Catholic teaching and/or rejected papal authority and were condemned as heresy by the Vatican were justified by the leaders of the Protestant Reformation as the fruit of what they called “right reason” and what today would be called conscience.

Figure 1.2. Legitimate violence is necessary and is rewarded in the long term. Terrorism is just opposite. Legitimacy is determined by jus ad bellum given in the Qur’an and executed by the prophet and his four rightly guided Caliphs.

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There is a very important key difference between this kind of conscience and conscience that is purified through jihad. For “conscience” as purported in Europe, what matters 100% is the quality and quantity of the information summoned to the task of correcting the previous understanding of some phenomenon or phenomena. The individual’s personal and active commitment to getting at the truth does not matter. This book starts off with the premise that Islam is best defined by the Qur’an and case laws offered during the events of the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad and four rightly guided Caliphs. Chapter 4 starts off with the Qur’anic criteria for declaring war. Then it analyzes all major wars and conflicts during the time of the prophet. This is followed by the wars fought during the rightly guided Caliphs during the 30 years after the Prophet Muhammad’s passing. It is shown all wars were necessary and sufficient to create a model Caliphate that lived Qur’anic injunctions. It is worth noting here that I consider all sahih (“authentic”) graded hadiths (Prophetic narrations) as historically valid and juridically crucial to interpreting the Qur’an.

1.5. JUS IN BELLO There is nothing inherently bad about death, violence, or war. They are all part of natural order, at least according to the Islamic notion of Qadr (fate). If one understands the purpose of life in Islam, it becomes clear that criticizing natural events is like criticizing the homework given by your favourite schoolteacher. What one should be wary of is what intention prompts one’s actions, including participation in and support of a violent action. Just violence is the essence of Jihad, whereas unjust violence is terrorism, be it instigated by an individual, a group or a state. Of course, this narration of Islam is not known or discussed in Eurocentric culture. For instance, Former US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, gained fame by proclaiming: “I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity.” Just like Locke and Hobbes, the only option discussed in this culture is the one that sees humans as a selfish creature, devoid of higher conscience. Not surprisingly, this mindset also introduced many methods of contemporary war, nuclear warfare in particular, that are inescapably in violation of the principles of proportionality and non-combatant immunity. Qur’anic injunctions would have none of these. The most important criterion of war (Qur’an 2:190) stipulates: “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors.” Chapter 4 shows that every article of jus ad bellum comes with a limit and a warning is issued to anyone that attempts to transgress the limit, the ultimate goal of any war being justice. Chapter 5 shows how Qur’an mandates strict morality even during the most unstable moments of warfare. The following Hadith dictates the guideline of jus in bello. “Once a person came to the Prophet and said that some people fight for the spoils of war, some for fame and some to show off their valour; he then asked the Prophet: “Which one of them fights in the way of Allah.” The Prophet replied: “Only that person fights in the way of Allah who sets foot in the battlefield to raise high the name of Allah.” [Sahih Bukhari 2810]

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An anecdotal story from the battle of Trench (CE 627) shows literal embodiment of this hadith: ‘While fighting a duel in a battle, Ali had thrown his opponent on the ground and had drawn his sword to cut off his head, when the latter spat on his face. Ali then left his enemy and sheathed his sword. Asked why he left such a dangerous foe alive, Ali said, “I would have killed him in the way of God, but when he spat on my face, I lost my temper and his death at that juncture would have been caused from motives of retaliation rather than in the spirit of holy war.”’

This runs contrary to the notion that morality does not exist in warfare, and therefore there is no such thing as just war. With this false premise, war is considered to be hell, justifying therefore the pragmatism of doing whatever necessary to ensure victory. Some do lament such ruthlessness but fail to provide a logical response to the question of how to achieve victory in the face of ruthless enemy24. The Qur’an defines victory as one’s ability to surrender to the Will of God – not a fictitious, irrelevant god but the god that created everything with a purpose and placed humans as viceroy on earth. Chapter 5 describes all possible scenarios involving warfare and how the morality of Islam can be maintained throughout. The scenarios include children, elderly, non-combatant women, collateral damage, war crime, prisoner of war, and others.

1.6. REBELLION AND CIVIL WARS In a manmade system, it is unthinkable rebellion that means an act of violent or open resistance to an established government or ruler would be presented as an option in the constitution. It should be clarified, in theory such provision can be extrapolated from this excerpt of declaration of US independence: “Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.” However, the problem is in having the criterion in place as well as a case law to that effect. It boils down to ‘who will bell the cat?’ Islam, however, is not man-made—or at least claimed to be. Rather, it is the only divine system that offers only logical solutions to any problem, including problem of governance. Islam is unique in the sense that the system itself puts the most righteous one to the helm. He is the reluctant ruler who knows the hadith that puts everyone in a position of guardianship and holds him/her accountable. Allah’s Apostle said, “Surely! Everyone of you is a guardian and is responsible for his charges: The Imam (ruler) of the people is a guardian and is responsible for his subjects; a man is the guardian of his family (household) and is responsible for his subjects; a woman is the guardian of her husband’s home and of his children and is responsible for them; and the slave of a man is a guardian of his master’s property and is

24

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York City: Basic Books, 2006), 44.

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Jaan S. Islam responsible for it. Surely, everyone of you is a guardian and responsible for his charges.”25

Chapter 6 discusses options when rebellion becomes an obligation and gives examples from the 7th century. Irrespective of how many people joined the rebellion or how brutally they were suppressed, the fact remains that they were in act of Jihad, a collective obligation in Islam, as already established in previous chapters. With this light, acts of some of the most prominent companions of the prophet are presented, including the most known cases during the rule of Ali Ibn Abu Talib, the last of the rightly guided Caliphs.

1.7. WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE WORD ‘JIHAD’? Islam is often represented as a house with foundation that represents Iman (Trust in God), the pillars are fundamentals of Islamic rituals and jihad is the roof. This picture is actually a depiction of some authentic Hadiths. For instance, the book of Muslim26 cites a Hadith: ‘Umar bin Al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) said: One day we were sitting in the company of Allah’s Messenger (peace be upon him), when there appeared before us a man dressed in extremely white clothing; his hair was extraordinarily black. There were no signs of travel on him and none of us knew him. He (proceeded until) he sat before the Messenger (peace be upon him), his knees supported against the Prophet’s, his palms placed on his thighs, and said, “O Muhammad, tell me about Islam.” The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said, “Islam is to do shahadah testily that there is no ilah deity but Allah, and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah; and that you establish salah (prayer), pay zakah (obligatory charity), observe the saoum fast of Ramadan, and perform hajj (pilgrimage) to (Allah’s) House if you have the means to do so.” (The inquirer) said, “You have told the truth.” ‘Umar bin AI-Khattab commented, “It astonished us that he would ask and then verify the truth.” (The inquirer) said, “Inform me about iman (faith).” Allah’s Messenger replied, “It is that you believe in Allah, His angels, His Books, His Messengers, the Day of Judgment, and that you believe in Divine Preordination, whether good or bad.” (The inquirer) responded, “You have told the truth.” He then said, “Inform me about ihsan (beneficence).” Allah’s Messenger said, “(It is) that you worship Allah as if you see Him, for though you don’t see Him, (you know) He sees you.” The inquirer said, “Inform me about the saat (of the Day of Judgment).” The Messenger of Allah remarked, “The one being asked knows no more than the questioner.” The inquirer said, “Tell me some of its signs.” He (the Holy Prophet) said, “(They are) that the slave-girl will give birth to her mistress (or master), and that you will find barefooted, destitute goat-herders vying with one another in the construction of magnificent buildings.” The narrator, (‘Umar bin AlKhattab] said, “Then he [the inquirer] went on his way but I stayed with him [Allah’s Messenger] for a long while.” He then said to me, “’Umar, do you know who this

25 26

Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih Al-Bukhari, Volume 9, Book 89, Hadith no. 52. Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, no. 1/8.

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inquirer was?’ I replied, ‘Allah and His Messenger know best.’ He remarked, ‘It was (the angel) Gabriel. He came to you [people] in order to teach you your din (religion).’”

In the pictorial (Figure 1.3), the external/internal or tangible/intangible divide is important. As the first hadith of the book of Bukhari mentions, any good deed has to originate with good intention, which is entirely internal and scientifically only thing humans have full control of.27 So, in depicting Islam (collection of Shahadah, salah, saoum, zakah, hajj – the pillars) based on Iman, we are confirming the internal logical nature of Islam.

Figure 1.3. Depiction of Internal and external components of Islam.

It is meaningful that the above Hadith describes the word Ihsan (right conduct) after Iman, as without Ihsan, there is little hope to reach the pinnacle of Islam. Perhaps this hadith is the only external manifestation of Qur’anic injunction that clarifies what Islam is. Qur’an 2:112 states: “Yes [on the contrary], whoever aslama (submits) his face to Allah while being a Muhsin [with Ihsan] will have his reward with his Lord. And no fear will there be concerning them, nor will they grieve.”

Clearly, Ihsan is the measure of resolve and intensity of Iman, the foundation of Islam. With it, any form of self-sacrifice (all in the tangible sense – as no one has to sacrifice his long-term) is now understandable, or logical. For instance, the mere proclamation of 27

Jaan S. Islam, M.R. Islam and G.M. Zatzman, “A Knowledge-Based Cognition Model,” Journal of Information, Intelligence and Knowledge 6 (2014): 1-30.

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shahadah can invoke great danger to a person from enemies of Islam. Praying, compulsory charity, pilgrimage, fasting, they all involve sacrifice in favour of long-term benefit. The ultimate of this sacrifice is Jihad, hence forming the canopy over Islamic pillars. Chapter 7 shows how Jihad was understood in prophet’s time. It highlights the importance of jihad as depicted in Figure 1.3, but focusing on Jihad that involves Islamic state’s foreign policy or jus ad bellum. This chapter clarifies why many hadiths of the prophet put Jihad as the highest form of good deed. Here are some samples. A man came to Allah’s Messenger and said, “Instruct me as to such a deed as equals Jihad (in reward).” He replied, “I do not find such a deed.” Then he added, “Can you, while the Muslim fighter is in the battle-field, enter your mosque to perform prayers without cease and fast and never break your fast?” The man said, “But who can do that?” Abu-Huraira added, “The Mujahid (i.e., Muslim fighter) is rewarded even for the footsteps of his horse while it wanders bout (for grazing) tied in a long rope.”28 Somebody asked, “O Allah’s Messenger! Who is the best among the people?” Allah’s Messenger replied “A believer who strives his utmost in Allah’s Cause with his life and property.” They asked, “Who is next?” He replied, “A believer who stays in one of the mountain paths worshipping Allah and leaving the people secure from his mischief.”29 The Prophet said, “Nobody who dies and finds good from Allah (in the Hereafter) would wish to come back to this world even if he were given the whole world and whatever is in it, except the martyr who, on seeing the superiority of martyrdom, would like to come back to the world and get killed again (in Allah’s Cause).”30

After reading Chapter 7, one would appreciate why such an extraordinary emphasis has put on Jihad. Then the question arises, why so many contemporary scholars have so many views contrary to what is being said here? Chapter 7 deconstructs the major misconceptions about jihad that are perpetrated by both sides of the jihad debate.

1.8. REALITY CHECK Recently, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu gained notoriety by accusing UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon of “bolstering terrorism” by describing the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements as “provocative,” adding that “there is no excuse for terrorism, period!”31 Terrorism is not new. What is new is how the word terrorism has been used to thrash rule of law or any resistance arising from conscience. Even the current US war on terror that is often tagged with 9/11 terror attack is not new. In reality, it was Reagan administration that used that term. What 9/11 did is crack open the terrorism debate. This is particularly important considering that the same debate unleashed

28

al-Bukhari, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 2785. al-Bukhari, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 2786. 30 al-Bukhari, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 2795. 31 CNN, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/27/middleeast/netanyahu-united-nations-terror/index.html?eref=rss_ latest. 29

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unipolar hegemony of United States. Chapter 8 investigates all contemporary events related to Islam and terrorism and answers crucial questions like:32 (1) What is terrorism? (2) How should we go about explaining it? (3) How is it defended or excused? (4) How should we respond? (5) What will be the signs of a successful response? Most major terror events as well as wars are analyzed, including 9/11, Paris Attack, hostage taking, beheadings, treatment of prisoners, Mideast wars, and others. Each event is tallied against Islamic criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello and legitimacy of each action examined. An index is created to see where countries like Saudi Arabia as well as groups like ISIS stand in terms of “Islamic-ness.” This is useful because the same indexing can be used to examine legitimacy of any future act.

32

Michael Walzer, Five Questions about Terrorism, DISSENT / Winter (2002): 5.

Chapter 2

THE ISLAMIC COGNITION MODEL 2.1. THE STANDARD AND IDEALS Muslims believe in the Islamic declaration of faith: “There is no deity but God, and Muhammad is His messenger.” This declaration essentially states one major and one minor premise (albeit with major implications) of the cognition axis. The declaration of faith implies that the Qur’an can be taken as the source of truth, and that the lifestyle of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah) be taken as model for contextualizing every order of the Qur’an. This formation of two points of the cognition that also involves delegation of authority from God to His messenger puts Islamic cognition on a unique position. The Qur’an is considered by traditionalists to be the literal, direct speech of God,33 and consequently, must be obeyed on literal terms. It also follows from the same premise that authority is delegated to the Prophet Muhammad, who is then accepted as the ‘lawgiver’ with direct jurisprudential, political, and interpretive authority in all matters of Islam.34 Hence, political authority is handed down from God directly to the Prophet Muhammad, who then creates an entire system for his political authority to continue over the years. As we know, the Prophet deliberately left no successor, leaving the Ummah (Islamic community) to elect and pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr as the first Caliph, marking the first transition of power from the God’s designate (Viceroy) to Abu Bakr, the Ummah’s35 representative36 over political authority of the Islamic state. The election of Abu Bakr to the office of highest authority is logical considering that Prophet Muhammad named him the most righteous among his companions. Even the Qur’an (9:40) referred to him as ‘second of the two.’ Abu Bakr himself nominated a successor, thus fulfilling the third 33

Sunni traditionalists take a very literal, almost mathematically-based construct of God; i.e., when the Qur’an states “speech of God,” it is believed to be literal speech (indeed if you are thinking what the author is, it is impossible to truly conceptualize, as the Sunnis will admit to). 34 Indeed the teachings of Muhammad are accepted to be truthful interpretations and applications of Islam, as the Qur’an itself states: “O you who have believed, obey Allah and His Messenger and do not turn from him while you hear [his order].” (8:20) and “Say: ‘Obey Allah and obey the Rasool (Messenger). If you do not, the Rasool is still under obligation to fulfill his duty, as you are under obligation to fulfill yours; and if you obey him, you shall be rightly guided. Note it well that the responsibility of the Rasool is only to deliver Allah's message clearly.’” (24:54). 35 The word Ummah means a population of identical faith, typically the group of Muslim believers. 36 The Arabic word Khalifah (Caliph) has triple meanings, namely, viceroy, successor, and representative. The Qur’an (2:30) designates every human as a Khalifah, thereby, making it mandatory for each individual to connect with God, albeit through the political process of Caliphate.

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meaning of the word, Khalifa.3 Abu Bakr’s selection, coupled with his election sets precedent as to how one ought to select the new leader of the Ummah. Sunnis’ belief, as well as the position of logical Islamic thought, dictates that this selection process is likely to produce “infallibility” in a sense.37 It turns out all four Caliphs that are called “rightly guided” (Rashidun) by vast majority of Islamic scholars were elected to the office through this process and all of them were among those that received the promise of paradise.4 This is a crucial point, because this guarantee of “salvation” is a symbolic guarantee of rightful conduct on earth. It was well understood, however, that all Caliphs were required to obey the instructions of God and His messenger. The precedent in this matter was set by Abu Bakr, as he ordered himself that others correct him if he goes against Islamic rulings (see his inaugural speech in latter section). It was understood at the time, obviously, that all of the commands of God and His messenger were to be followed. After Abu Bakr, the next caliph was ‘Umar, then ‘Uthman, then ‘Ali, until the “rightly-guided” (Rashidun) caliphate had come to an end at ‘Ali’s death, ending at the start of a new, unlawful “Caliphate” was created (see Chapter 6). The Qur’an itself does not provide explicit instructions as to the succession of the Caliphate, but does give great authority to the Caliph and there are historical narrations of the Prophet stating that the one who disobeys the (righteous) leader disobeys the prophet, and whoever disobeys him, in fact disobeys God.38 This is believed to be ordered by God Himself, supported in a verse commanding that “those with authority amongst you” are to be obeyed: “O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result” (Qur’an 4:59). This transfer of divine authority is unlike what has precipitated in European political philosophy as a hangover of the Roman Catholic Church doctrine. For instance, Robert Filmer (1653) also argues for the transfer of divine authority in his major work, Patriarcha (1680) and states that God gave Adam sovereignty over the earth (the divine right to rule), and that this right is delegated from Adam to his descendants, thereby creating a divinelybacked ‘absolute’ monarchy-similar to how natural rightful paternal authority works.39 John Locke, the father of classical Liberalism deconstructed this Biblical justification in his First Treatise of Government, stating that the Bible didn’t really specify that Adam was given the right to rule over people, but rather, over “the fish and the fowl.” Though I would have several comments to make about Locke himself, it only needs to be known that the reason for Locke’s and general logical identification of Filmer’s inability to prove, through the bible, that God bestowed his sovereign power over the earth he created to absolute Christian monarchies around the world, is due to the fact that he was unable to (even if the Bible were to be considered to be God’s revelation) prove a direct and explicit chain of authority coming

37

Indeed not real infallibility, but in the sense that these great figures were personally confirm by the Prophet himself that they would not make any major mistakes in their lives, being among those that received the assurance of paradise: See Jami’ al-Tirmidhi Book 49, Hadith 4114 and 38 See Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 89, Hadith 251. 39 D.A. McWhirter and J. D. Bible. Privacy as a constitutional right: Sex, drugs, and the right to life, (Greenwood: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992).

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from God, onto each and every one of the Kings. In Islam, however, there is a chain of authority, and hence, the Islamic political system is fully, internally free of inconsistencies.40 There is another important question to answer; is the Qur’an and Sunnah to be applied as a model that transcends time and space? In answering this question, we assume that, as per Islamic fundamental belief, the Qur’an is the absolute source of legal derivation. Using fundamental logic, we understand that if this is the case, then all Muslims are required to accept it in whole and follow it word to word, and if there is any discrepancy in interpretation of the Qur’an (i.e., in application) the Hadith is the explanatory evidence, which is also a requirement to follow word for word. Additionally, the actions of the rightly guided Caliphs define the latitude of permissibility by setting precedent for certain actions. Only those actions set legitimate precedent, and the Caliphs serve as fully legitimate interpreters of the Qur’an and Sunnah, because the Qur’an and Hadith explicitly accord their political and Islamic authority through the political delegation process. There is a very fine line between “any random person” setting precedent in interpreting the golden standard, and those (the Prophet and his successors) that were given the right and confirmation of interpreting them without mistake. Hence, at the end of the day, a follower of Islam is given three tools that essentially define what Islam is: the Qur’an, as it is considered the actual work of God, the Sunnah, the legitimate interpreter of the Qur’an, given legitimacy by the Qur’an explicitly and directly, and finally; the actions of the rightly-guided Caliphs that have also been delegated political authority by a framework set up by the prophet, and hence, through God. If these are the only three things that define what Islam is on an absolute basis, it means that Islam is contained within these three fundamental entities, which essentially means that no other person or group of persons have an absolute right to define what Islam is, or what ‘God’ allows of disallows. Hence, it should be considered that Islam, its orders, commands, and the determination of “right” and “wrong” is provided in these three entities, due to the belief that God himself allowed these three entities to define right and wrong. For any Muslim who believes in the Qur’an and Sunnah (as all are required to stipulate be believing in the Shahadah), only these three entities define right and wrong, and all actions of right and wrong are to be compared to the three entities. These standards are rigid and don’t change with time for two reasons: a) God (in the Qur’an or through the Prophet) has not given anybody other than the three entities to define right and wrong, and b) the fact that it is a standard superseding previous revelations of God,41 it is a standard, and applies until the time of the end of the world. Indeed, the Qur’an, Sunnah, and precedent set by the rightly guided Caliphs are frozen through time and space (starting from its revelation) and set as a pure, golden standard. The presence of this standard makes Islam in deductive cognition that in turn governs all aspects of social order and policy

40 41

Jaan S. Islam, “Comparison of Political Models of Ibn Khaldun, Hobbes, and Locke, and Implications,” Journal of Cosmopolitanism and Globalization 1 (2016): 1-22. This is discussed in Chapter 3. The Qur’an, without qualification of time and space (nor is it given anywhere else), requires that the Qur’an and the Prophet’s sayings be followed directly: “And We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, confirming that which preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. So judge between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth. To each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; so race to [all that is] good. To Allah is your return all together, and He will [then] inform you concerning that over which you used to differ.” (5:48).

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making. Islam et al.42 put this originality to the education system implemented by the prophet and attribute the unparalleled achievements in all aspects of civilization during the Islamic golden era (7th to 17th century) to that education system.

2.2. DEDUCTIVE LOGIC AND ISLAMIC COGNITION The emergence of Islam as a comprehensive way of life is synonymous with the emergence of the Prophet Muhammad and the divine revelation, encapsulated in the Qur’an. The Qur’an proclaims Muhammad to be the last prophet or messenger, and promises that the entire mankind will have enough to resolve any crisis based on the Qur’an and the practical examples of the prophet, encapsulated in the books of Hadith (his sayings, actions, and actions he condoned or gave tacit approval). Islam et al.43 describe the cognition process that can be called Islamic (in the sense of “endorsed by the prophet”) as being through a five-point cycle set out below. This cognition postulates that humans’ primary purpose is to obey God’s order (in conformance with universal order, Qadr), according to which the seeking of knowledge is obligatory.44 In an Islamic system, it is the knowledge that makes up the most important qualification of the leadership. The most ‘learned’ one is the one that uses the following cognition process with the most passion:    



Cognition starts with a real question that has only a Yes (1,+) or No (0,-) answer. Such question does not arise if it has already been resolved in the Qur’an or Hadith; make niyah (original intention) to start the cognition process solely in search of the truth (haq), so that a right (haq) decision is made at the end of the cognition process; collect all available data and filter out questionable sources; the fuzzy logic (manteq) phase: ask questions of dialectical nature (manteq) that will have qualitative answer (by collecting a series of yes/no answers). Each manteq question should be motivated by qsd (dynamic intention) that is in line with niyah; and logic (aql) phase: Ask the final question to determine the yes/no answer to the question asked in Point 1.

This five-point process constitutes the essence of ‘seeking knowledge,’ something that is obligatory in Islam. A Hadith (prophetic narration) of the Prophet clearly states that,9 “[i]t is obligatory for each Muslim man and woman to seek knowledge.” He then ordered the knowledge-seeker to “seek the purpose of Allah and does not learn it except in aspiration of the world will not meet (with) the fragrance of paradise on the day of resurrection.” So, there is no value to knowledge that doesn’t start with good intention. In other words, it is obligatory to seek knowledge in order to please the Creator or to conform to the universal order (qadr in Arabic). When it comes to collecting and disseminating knowledge, this active seeking of knowledge is of utmost importance. For the first time in history, knowledge- gathering, 42

Islam et al, Reconstituting the Curriculum. M.R. Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 330, 331. 44 "The seeking of knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim." At-Tirmidhi, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Hadith 74. 43

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knowledge-based practice, and knowledge dissemination became an obligation from the moral as well as a practical point of view. To summarize: To exist in and contribute fully and properly to Islamic society, one must strive to gather knowledge, so one can become closer to God, whom one represents in actions and to whom one is accountable. This knowledge will help the person to follow the path of universal order (shari’ah), leading one to success in the hereafter, which is the ultimate purpose of life in this world. This purpose of gathering knowledge marks the sharpest departure away from the education system to which Europe, overwhelmingly Christian in its religious outlook and including the Americas and other colonial extensions, had become accustomed from the days of the earliest popes. The five main features of this Islamic purpose may be summarized as follows:     

Seeking knowledge is obligatory; Knowledge for sake of determining one’s duty toward the Creator; Knowledge brings one closer to the Creator; (Those who fear Allah are the ones who have knowledge...ُ[Qur’an 35:28]); Knowledge is the reason for succession to authority and power; and Knowledge repulses unfair gains and undue favors from the ruler 
(rulers seek out scholars, scholars don’t seek rulers out)

As shown in Figure 2.1, the Prophet Muhammad formalized the cognition process that with a deductive tool that remains unparalleled today. This tool is the impetus for any research on any topic. It should be noted that conducting research is synonymous to seeking knowledge. The term ‘research’ is not to be confused with modern vocabulary that somehow connects this term of ‘funded projects.’ The true meaning of Arabic words of for ‘reading’ (iqra45 in Arabic) is ‘deduction’ and true meaning of the word ‘ilm’ has to do with conscious, conscientious, and purposeful seeking of knowledge. In a way, this seeking knowledge epitomizes research with a higher conscience. Figure 2.1 shows how Islamic scholars used Qur’anic sources, then formed an axis with sayings of the prophet (Hadith) to be able to time scale any event. No other premise was allowed, thereby eliminating spurious sources of theories. In line with Averroes’ (Muslim philosopher, d. CE 1198) logic, this cognition starts with the Qur’an, and then time-scaling is performed by putting in the context of related hadiths. Currently, such approach is known as approach of obliquity or the long-term approach.46 Of importance in Figure 2.1 is the existence of multiple practices or interpretations all of which are acceptable, as long as the intention of cognition is to conform to the truth. It is so because they satisfy all three requirements of phenomenal deduction procedure, outlined in previous sections. The latitude of permissibility is valid only for individuals that started the cognition with a good intention. It is understood that there would be a time when there is a need to use the practice of one of the rightly guided Caliphs as the pivotal point. It is so because there are events that required these Caliphs to use this cognition process in order to arrive to a conclusion in a matter that didn’t have a precedent in prophet’s time. The most famous of these events is the onset of 45 46

iqra is the first word revealed on the Prophet Muhammad (Qur’an 96:1). M.M. Khan and M.R. Islam, Zero waste engineering (NYC: Scrivener-Wiley, 2012).

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Ridda wars (will be discussed later) by Abu Bakr. Because there was no precedent in the Prophet’s time that required waging war against fellow “Muslims,” Abu Bakr had to deduce through Qur’anic verse, 49:9 and interpretations of the prophet (from the rights accorded to the Caliph) to come to the conclusion that a war is warranted. Similarly, the third Caliph ‘Uthman ordered finalization of the compiled version of the Qur’an, something that was not done in Prophet’s time. Another example is that of Caliph Ali, who ordered death sentence be carried out by fire for a certain group (which was not previously practiced). These ‘case laws’ from the time of the rightly guided caliphs are important indicators as to how to conduct deductive analysis in the following situations: 1) new situation/event arises that didn’t exist in prophet’s or Rashidun time; 2) extra ordinary changes occur that warrant enactment of new provision in terms of ordinance or Act.

Figure 2.1. Key to Islamic cognition is to take Qur’an as the source and Hadith as the contextual pivotal point of the axis that can be extrapolated to define the latitude of permissibility.

2.2.1. Role of Intention in Cognition In human cognition, intention is of utmost importance. Without correct intention, there cannot be any knowledge. Instead, there will be only gathering disinformation in order justify the false premise. If intention has to be the root of any action, it cannot be elusive, evasive, or fleeting—it must be held constant. If intention has to be the source of accountability, it also has to be immutable and truly intangible to others. Such form of ‘intention’ is absent in English language. In Arabic, on the other hand, there are two words for intention. One (Niyah) is static and constant after it appears. It is the root of all actions and the literal meaning is ‘real objective.’ Two things are known about this word. First, humans will be judged by the niyah of an action (first Hadith in the book of Bukhari).47 Secondly, niyah sets direction. There is an Arabic proverb that says, niyah sets the direction (of the saddle). Scientifically, it means if niyah (root) is real, subsequent events will also be phenomenal or in conformance with the niyah. This is the definition of real, i.e., it must have a real source.48 47

48

Sahih Bukhari 1:1 states: I heard Allah's Messenger saying, "The reward of deeds depends upon the intentions and every person will get the reward according to what he has intended. So whoever emigrated for worldly benefits or for a woman to marry, his emigration was for what he emigrated for." M.R. Islam, H. Mousavizadeghan, S. Mustafiz, and J.H. Abou-kassem, Reservoir Simulation: Advanced Approach,” New York City: Scrivener-Wiley, 2010; M.M. Khan and M.R. Islam, Zero-Waste Engineering, 2012.

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However, having a real source is not a sufficient condition for phenomenal destination/outcome. The pathway or subsequent steps must also have real roots, every time there is a bifurcation point. Because these branches already have an original root, each branching cannot have a different root. Another word is needed to describe that process of bifurcation. In Arabic language, there is a term for ‘dynamic intention.’ It is called qsd. This word is the root word for economics (in economizing sense) and is used for dynamic optimization. So, for an action to be phenomenal, it must have a real niyah and all subsequent dialectical branching must have qsd that is aligned with the niyah. This point is illustrated in the following example. Consider you are going to the airport. Before you leave, your niyah is to go to the airport. This is static intention, the real purpose of your departure. You are turning left on a traffic light, your qsd is to avoid delay. However, as the driving continues and the driver comes across a red light or a traffic jam or a detour, he says, “my qsd (dynamic intention) to turn is to avoid delay” (See Figure 2.2). This is dynamic intention and is in line with niyah, hence, phenomenal (logical). Then, you are stopping at a coffee shop. Your phenomenal qsd is to make sure you don’t fall asleep on the road. Why is it phenomenal? It’s because your Niyah is still the same. However, if you stopped at a bar and started to drink, your qsd is not in line with your Niyah—the ultimate objective to go to the airport. This aphenomenal qsd is not optimized and the entire process risks becoming aphenomenal. This process of optimization is called iqtisad, the term used for ‘economics’ in Arabic. This is the essence of ‘intentionbased’ economics49 as well as ‘zero-waste’ engineering.50 Scientifically, intangibles are continuous time functions, ranging from 0, extending to infinity. Zero here refers to source and infinity refers to end. In a yin yang process, this forms a duality and balance. The source of a human act is the intention, Io. The source of each of the subsequent bifurcation points is the dynamic intention, Id. Correct intentions at each decision point lead to de-linearized optimization of time, coinciding with total conformance with Nature and universal order. There will be no paradox if the first premise is correct and it is followed by continuous logical pursuit, in line with the overall broad phenomenal intention. If the first premise is false, either because of ‘belief’ in a theory with aphenomenal assumptions or an intention that has an ulterior motive (e.g., other than seeking the truth), then no real knowledge or objective is really achieved. This point is made in Figure 2.3. The role of intention becomes clear when the purpose of any action (e.g., seeking knowledge) is identified. Any purpose will have a connection to a fundamental premise. For instance, if someone is seeking knowledge to make money, the fundamental premise becomes Money is somehow important and worth the trouble of seeking knowledge. Such analysis eventually connects to the concept of original premise that defines the impetus of every action. It is similar to the process of comparing fruits, leaves, and branches of two trees. If the root is not real in one tree, the comparison of other parts has no bearing on conclusions. Every fact is connected to a theory and every theory is connected to a premise. Islamic cognition is about relating every quest to the fundamental premise, connected to Shahadah.

49 50

Gary Zatzman and Rafiq Islam, Economics of Intangibles, New York City: Nova Science Publishers, 2007. M.M. Khan and M.R. Islam, Zero-Waste Engineering. New York City: Scrivener-Wiley, 2012.

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Figure 2.2. Niyah is original intention, whereas qsd is dynamic intention.

Figure 2.3. Cognition becomes aphenomenal either with false first premise or false original intention.

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Figure 2.4. Good intention launches off knowledge-based model where as a bad intention throws off the cognition to ignorance and prejudice. Cognition process with a desired outcome can lead to an increase in ignorance and arrogance.

It turns out that everyday we go through hundreds of thousands of such decision points. However, for an action to be absolutely phenomenal, we must meet the conditions at every juncture. That is why it is impossible for any human to be perfect or to complete even one action that is 100% in tune with original intention, or niyah. This fact is supported by the meaning of the word insan (human in Arabic) that literally means, adorable, forgetful, and trusting all in one. In this chapter, it suffices to say that both niyah and qsd are disconnected from the tangible action and contribute only to the infinitely long term of the individual. These actions are infinitely beneficial to them if their niyah and qsd’s are phenomenal and infinitely harmful if they are not. Figure 2.2 shows how a phenomenal intention sets the direction of subsequent cognition. The aphenomenal niyah (in Arabic it is called Ammaniya, which means ‘wishful thinking’), on the other hand represents the myopic approach that drives the aphenomenal model (see Figure 2.5). Subsequent cognition that follows this intention increases arrogance and ignorance at the same time—because it is based on the intention to prove something that is not necessarily true. Note that all conclusions appearing in the top part of the graph are acceptable, whereas all the ones at the bottom part are unacceptable. This explains why Figure 2.1 gives rise to latitude rather than a singular point. Figure 2.4 shows how a long-term approach is crucial to increasing knowledge instead of increasing ignorance and arrogant adherence to dogma. This process starts with a fundamentally true or false premise. If the intention is to achieve certain results, instead of arriving at the truth, one starts off in a wrong direction – the direction that diverges away from knowledge. This time factor is also closely associated with human conscience. Only

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phenomenal intentions count toward the long-term future of an individual, while they have no bearing on the universal order. If one connects the definition of conscientious deed (Am’al in Arabic, it is rooted in intention that is in conformance with universal order), it becomes clear that everything is connected through the time function. The static intention, niyah, cannot be part of time function, because if it does, humans would have no control over it and therefore, they would have zero freedom, thereby making accountability absurd and illogical. On the other hand, if 100% control and ownership of intention is given to intention, humans can be held accountable without being responsible for the universal order, which is clearly not under their control and remains independent of human intervention. This is the logic used in the Qur’anic claim that people will be judged for their Am’al— meaning, judged by their niyah. It is of interest to note that there are two distinctly different words for deeds or actions. They are y’afal, action that is part of universal order but not associated with original intention, niyah; and y’amal, individual action that is connected to original intention (akin to conscientious act). The Qur’an presents a clear directive to do y’amal. In fact, every time the word iman (trust – the original trait of a human) is mentioned, it is followed with well-intended deeds or similar directive connected to conscience. The task at hand for humans is to make sure their original intention is in conformance with universal order and their subsequent dynamic intentions also turned in the same direction as the original intention. The term turning is also the root word for heart (qlb) in Arabic. The word qsd is the root word for economics (as in economizing) in Arabic. That’s why Zatzman and Islam51 called scientifically consistent economics ‘intention-based’ economics. Figure 2.5 depicts how a phenomenal niyah (moving upward) launches the cognition process in the direction of knowledge. Such movement continues for subsequent bifurcation points where a qsd in line with niyah can assure continuously increasing knowledge. This bifurcation point is the location in time that asks the Manteq question.52 On the other hand, if the root intention is aphenomenal, subsequent cognition continues to increase ignorance, even when some qsd’s are in line with phenomenal intention. This figure depicts how conscience is a matter of heart. The flip-flop at every decision point is both literal and metaphorical. In Arabic, the word qlb (heart) has the meaning of turning, which applies to both flip-flop and turning around to a certain direction. If majority of the qsd’s are phenomenal, we have a continuous rise in knowledge. Otherwise, the opposite takes hold. If a civilization were based on falsehood, similar decline in knowledge would take hold. This type of cognition gives rise to the broad picture of knowledge quest. It is of interest to note that this model was first implemented by Prophet Muhammad in early 7th century and it was brought to Europe by Muslim scholars, most notably by Averroes, who is known to be the ‘father of secular philosophy in Europe.’ This model has recently been hailed as the “knowledge-based” model, as opposed to the currently used model that finds its root in Thomas Aquinas, the ‘father of doctrinal philosophy.’53 Figure 2.6 shows how every theory advanced in Europe since the time of Thomas Aquinas are wrong-headed. Thomas Aquinas (CE 1225-1274) took the logic (essentially the Islamic cognition tool) of Averroes and introduced it to Europe with a simple yet highly 51

Gary Zatzman and Rafiq Islam, Economics of Intangibles, 2007. Manteq in Arabic stands for fuzzy logic that was introduced in Europe in 1967 by modern Muslim scholars. Ever since it has become part of Modern mathematics, but has lost its root in Islamic cognition. 53 M.R. Islam, A.B. Chhetri, M.M. Khan, Greening of Petroleum Operations (New York City: Scrivener Wiley, 2010). 52

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consequential modification: he would color the (only) creator as God and define the collection of Catholic church documentation on what eventuated in the neighborhood of Jerusalem some millennium ago as the only communication of God to mankind (hence the title, bible – the [only] Book). If Aristotle was the one who introduced the notion of removing intention and time function from all philosophical discourse, Thomas Aquinas is the one who legitimized the concept and introduced this as the only Cognitive Science (as in process to gaining knowledge). Even though Thomas Aquinas is known to have adapted the logic of Averroes, his pathway as well as prescribed origin of acquiring knowledge was diametrically opposite to the science introduced by Averroes. This is because the intrinsic features of both God and bible were dissimilar to the (only) creator and Qu’ran, respectively.54 For old Europe and the rest of the world that it would eventually dominate, this act of Thomas Aquinas indeed became the bifurcation point between two pathways, with origin, consequent logic, and the end being starkly opposite. With Aristotle’s logic, something either is or is not: if one is ‘true,’ the other must be false. Because, Averroes’ ‘the creator’ and Thomas Aquinas’s ‘God’ both are used to denominate monotheist faith, the concept of science and religion became a matter of conflicting paradox. Averroes called the (only) creator as ‘The Truth’ (In Qur’anic Arabic, the word ‘the Truth’ and ‘the Creator’ refer to the same entity). His first premise pertained to the book (Qu’ran) that said, “Verily unto Us is the first and the last (of everything)” (89.13). Historically, challenging the first premise, where the divergence is set, has become such a taboo that there is no documented case of anyone challenging it and surviving the wrath of the Establishment (the Church alone in the past, the Church and Imperial forces after the Renaissance). Even challenging some of the cursory premises have been hazardous, as demonstrated by Galileo. Today, we continue to avoid challenging the first premise and even in the information age it continues to be hazardous, if not fatal, to challenge the first premise or secondary premises. It has been possible to keep this modus operandi because new “laws” have been passed to protect ‘freedom of religion’ and, of late, ‘freedom of speech.’ For special-interest groups, this opens a Pandora’s Box for creating ‘us vs. them,’ ‘clash of civilizations’ and every aphenomenal model now in evidence.55 It flows directly from a Eurocentric bias that pervades, well beyond Europe and North America, the gathering and summation of scientific knowledge everywhere. Islam et al.56 show that the dogma-free knowledge gathering is not only possible; it is necessary. The knowledge is conditioned not only by the quantity of information gathered in the process of conducting research, but also by the depth of that research, i.e., the intensity of one’s participation in finding things out. In and of themselves, the facts of nature’s existence and of our existence within it neither guarantee nor demonstrate our consciousness of either, or the extent of that consciousness. Our perceptual apparatus enables us to record a large number of discrete items of data about the surrounding environment. Much of this information we organize naturally and indeed unconsciously. The rest we organize according to the level to which we have trained, and-or come to use, our own brains. Hence, neither can it be affirmed that we arrive at knowledge directly or merely through perception, nor can we affirm being in

54

Karen Armstrong, A History of God, New York City: Ballantine Books, 1994. See citations under Zatzman and Islam and Islam et al. 56 Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum. 55

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possession at any point in time of a reliable proof or guarantee that our knowledge of anything in nature is complete. Figure 2.6 demonstrates this point.

Figure 2.5. Number of decision points increases ignorance unless the starting point is phenomenal (Modified from Islam et al. .57).

Figure 2.6. The only cognition style Europe has seen is that of Thomas Aquinas (modified from Islam et al.).58 57

M.R. Islam et al., Reservoir Simulation: Advanced Approach,”2010.

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Islam et al.59 highlighted the contrast between these two starkly dissimilar pathways of cognition. From what we know from existing literature and history of our civilization, before the rise of Islam in the 7th century, no social order or ideology encouraged or supported the idea that the individual has a responsibility to increase his knowledge. Even though it has long been recognized that the thirst for knowledge is inherent to being a human, the notion of seeking knowledge as an individual obligation is uniquely related to Islam and the teachings by the Qur’an and the traditions of Prophet Muhammad. In western society, this is an ideal that is paid much lip service, but not taking up such a responsibility carries no downside, thus trivializing the aim.

2.3. HSSA DEGRADATION FROM ISLAMIC COGNITION Since 2007, Islam and associates60 have striven to popularize this Honey  Sugar  Saccharin®  Aspartame® (HSSA) pattern as a kind of shorthand reference to a particularly critical insight, often overlooked or only tangentially acknowledged, into the essence of the transformation of natural into artificial or from phenomenal to aphenomenal. This is a pattern so characteristic and widespread across every department of modern industrialized commodity production as to have become invisible. Natural deductive cognition becomes aphenomenal if one of the following situations arises. In case a third premise that contradicts with one or both of the fundamental premises are invoked, the cognition axis is no longer a deductive tool, and it is an inherent hyperbole. In Arabic, this would stand for ‘dhawallin’ – a word reserved in prophet’s time to describe people that believed in Trinity. Figure 2.7 shows how such introduction of a third point makes all conclusions inherently aphenomenal. This stands even if one of the premises may be true. The best-case scenario for the third-point cognition is when the third point is aligned with major and minor premises. It is clear that the introduction of a third premise should be avoided because it adds nothing to the robustness of the cognition axis. Equally flawed cognition arises when there is only one premise. For instance, Atheism, Capitalism, Communism—they all have just one premise, making the cognition process equivalent to cognitive schizophrenia (Islam et al., 2014a). In theology terms, this is the effect Qur’anists’ cognition (those who avoid looking into Hadiths). For them, it is possible to pick up any verse of the Qur’an and extrapolate it based on another premise that is their invention (befitting their desired conclusions). This is the case that was discussed in the Qur’an as an example of Maghdboub (literally meaning the ‘cursed’ ones). In brief, it means, such cognition process allows for anyone to be the transmitter of knowledge (and ultimately causing everyone to become the transmitter), while in reality it is only ignorance and arrogance that are gained by this process.

58

M.R. Islam, A.B. Chhetri, M.M. Khan, Greening of Petroleum Operations (New York City: Scrivener Wiley, 2010). 59 Ibid. 60 See citations of Islam et al., Zatzman and Islam, and Khan and Islam.

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Figure 2.7. The introduction of a third point creates inherently dogmatic conclusion that is aphenomenal, even when one of the premises might be true.

In absence of two true points of cognition, the cognition becomes ‘schizophrenic’ with numerous possibilities. This is the natural progression of dogma culture. Today, the essence of Atheism is that everyone is correct and as long as the self-cognition matches the desire, a person is entitled to following any cognition path. In other words, the phenomenality of cognition has not improved as Europe transmitted from the concept of original sin to the “murder gene,” even though the latter has been claimed to belong to a group of enlightened thinkers. In fact, only arrogance has increased during this process and cognitive dissonance has set in. Cognitive dissonance is described as:

Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they are presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new evidence cannot be accepted. It would create a feeling that is extremely uncomfortable, called cognitive dissonance. Because it is so important to protect the core belief, they will rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that doesn’t fit in with the core belief.

What dogma did is introduced one aphenomenal standard of trinity invoking cognitive dissonance,61 whereas the ‘western philosophers’ have introduced numerous such standards. The scientific equivalent of this transition is a quantum leap from bipolar to multi-polar (schizophrenia) and is best described as ‘deliberate schizophrenia.’62 As an example, one can cite the word ‘quantum.’ In physics it means: a) The smallest amount of a physical quantity that can exist independently, especially a discrete quantity of electromagnetic radiation; and b) This amount of energy regarded as a unit. This formulation that starts with the false premise that something ‘independent’ can exist in nature disconnects mass and energy and 61

62

G.M. Zatzman and M. R. Islam, “Truth, Consequences and Intentions: The Study of Natural and Anti-Natural Starting Points and Their Implications,” Journal of Nature Science and Sustainable Technology 1 (2007): 169174. M.R. Islam et al., Greening of pharmaceutical engineering, Volume 1: Practice, Analysis, and Methodology, 2015.

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renders subsequent build up irrelevant. Apparently, such ‘isolation’ is necessary to observe phenomena. However, the invoking of false premise and subsequent truncation of history render the entire process aphenomenal. This has been going on for millennia. Ever since the concept of atom that was thought to be fundamental particle of everything, including even thought material or God, scientists have only made the scope of atom bigger or smaller, ending up with an aphenomenal point.63 One important aspect of dogma cognition is that once an aphenomenal conclusion is made, there is no way to tweak toward the phenomenal conclusion, no matter how many arguments are advanced in support of or against the conclusion. The only recourse is to shun any dogmatic point and restart from the origin (Qur’an) to form an axis with Hadith. In summary, truly natural cognition, as described in Islamic cognition process has suffered the following incessant degradation. Dogma  Theism  Agnosticism  Secularism  Atheism Following the HSSA degradation, Dogma (sugar) has been introduced, later changing to Theism (saccharine), followed by Agnosticism (Aspartame) and finally Atheism (say, Sucralose). During this process, a false perception exists that we are making progress, leading to increasing ignorance packaged within the most dogmatic arrogance. It is also important to note that surveys confirm more than 90% of the world’s 7 billionplus people still profess to embrace some form of faith so those who claim not to have a faith remain very much in the minority and those “political atheists” who seek to foster a world devoid of religion and faith are a much tinier minority again, albeit one that for obvious reasons enjoys disproportionate power and influence. Unfortunately, it is people with such inclinations who, driven by the imperative of seeking profit, for the most part control our mass media and fashion/entertainment related industries that clearly have found forbidden fruit to be the most profitable and easily sold. All these concepts belong to the bottom half of the cognition graph (Figure 2.2). None of these concepts as describing a natural state or a choice we make, let alone one that is mutually exclusive with all others. Rather, these abstract concepts as being associated with inclinations that are, from time to time, experienced by all researchers of all creeds. That said, the ‘Sucralose’ concept of atheism is in many ways the odd one out, since unlike the doubts embraced by agnosticism, what Atheism describes–an unqualified conviction that there is no God—does actually exist not in any reality that one knows of. After all, what it presumes is that people who fully embrace logic and the scientific method somehow arrive at the entirely illogical and unscientific premise, not of living in a state of extreme doubt about the origin of all things, but rather of illogically claiming to know that which they cannot possibly know with committing their own leap of faith. Secularism, in a world of people who overwhelmingly profess both faith and religious affiliation, is scarcely less unreal than the pretense of atheism and requires no fewer artificial and impractical distinctions, not to mention a historical disconnect. It is also important to observe about these concepts which were formulated to describe and understand collective inclinations is that they have little meaning as devices to describe 63

M.R. Islam, J.S. Islam, G.M. Zatzman, M.S. Rahman and M.M. Khan, “God, God’s Particle, God’s Wrath and Force of Nature: Delinearized History of Mass, Energy and Time,” Adv. Sust. Pet. Eng. Sci., 6 (2015).

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individuals, yet what we see is that these terms which describe individual strands of our human psyche have been politicized and turned into badges which people like to pin on their chests as a fashion choice as much as anything else. Then, these badges presume our spiritual state is static, when in reality all people will go through periods of doubt about their core convictions, including both people of faith and so-called atheists. Of course, people of faith would not describe these doubts as agnosticism which projects a condition in which people who have never inculcated in dogma or for some reason abandoned their religious convictions, have conceded their spiritual ground to their preponderance of doubt. However, the agnostic condition and struggles by the faithful with their core beliefs are certain born of the same inclinations. The difference is that people of faith are encouraged by dogma to traverse these turbulent waters by continuing with their religious practices and by taking strength from the lifestyle they have constructed around their faith. Perhaps it is the fact that we presume safety in moments of doubt by tacitly understanding that our collective religious practices will see us through, that gives rise to sectarianism. Finally, what one should observe is that in terms of our societies as a whole, there are indeed progressions and decadent digressions or trends, which are set into play by the extent to which these various inclinations achieve disproportionate weight within our collective consciousness. Indeed we are born with a natural but intangible inclination to the truth. However, in an age dominated by all powerful, artificial entities created for the sole purpose of seeking profit and power; an age in which the cult of individualism, hedonism, personal liberty have seen a withering of conscientious thoughts while mass communication has at the same time facilitated the widespread promulgation of false dogma, corrupted ethics and general iconoclasm, there certainly seems to be a temporal progression in the manner we have described above, which, in turn, has created an environment that seems to make genuine longterm cognition something of an endangered species. The above discussion summarizes external, overarching ideological presence and explains the general difference between the Islamic, uniquely deductive approach, and the non-Islamic, agenda-driven approach to knowledge. Understanding Islamic cognition is the key to understanding true Islam—cognition based on/derived from something claimed to be the absolute truth, as a starting point.

2.4. THE BASICS: ISLAM AND POLITICS We have established in the previous sections that Islamic cognition derives its rulings and standards from two points in order to create an axis: the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In matters of Islam and politics, the most important question that needs to be answered is, “why does politics play a role in Islam?” Indeed, there have been several scholars, especially in the 21st century western Muslim scholars, such as Hamza Yusuf, who has condemned the notion of an Islamic state, or “caliphate” existing at all.64 Additionally, there is another group of scholars that point out all of the perceived problems of the Rashidūn Caliphate and come to the conclusion that modern supporters of the existence of an Islamic state (typically labeled 64

He said “The concept of Islamic state is a fantasy”: Morocco World News, 2013. http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2013/08/100828/the-concept-of-islamic-state-is-a-fantasy-sh-hamzayusuf/

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extremists of some sort) claiming it to never truly existent. Such view is predominant among scholars, such as Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im and those at Majid Nawaz’s65 think-tank, the Quillam Foundation. Let us first define what “Islamism” is according to the modern scholarship, and then examine what the empirical historical facts and where true Islamic thought (Qur’an and Hadith) stand on the issue. The Oxford dictionary defines Islamism to mean “Islamic militancy or fundamentalism,” whereas the Wikipedia for the article “Islamism” lists several definitions of Islamism, all of which fall under the category of a general description of an ideology that claims that Islam is a religion and also has a political element, tending to being somewhat reformative and fundamentalist. The best definition, however, seems to come from the Quillam foundation itself, as “the belief that Islam is a political ideology, as well as a faith.”66 For our purposes, we may see it as a term used to describe those that believe that Islam has a political aspect to it, like a governing and legal system that transcends the limits of simple personal life. Before we take a brief look at this ongoing debate, we must first establish what Islam is, and whether or not it is inherently political, can accommodate politics, or cannot accommodate politics at all, using the Islamic cognition standard. Before we get to Islamism, let us define Islam. Islam, the Arabic “‫ ”إسالم‬comes from the root letters “,‫ ”سلم‬S-L-M. The principal meanings of the root word include submission, peace, and others. It is also the root word of Al-Islam, one of God’s 99 attributes specified in the Qur’an. It implies that God Himself is the epitome of Islam. It is reasonable to stipulate that such meanings and significance of the root word of Islam should indicate that the religion Islam advocates peace and not violence. However, this stipulation would be shortsighted that ignores the purpose of this worldly life that is nothing but a test-period.67 To conflate hereafter with eternity would be preposterous when it comes to defining Islam. Not surprisingly, the notion that Islam is about creating peace on earth is in direct contradiction to what is evidenced in the Qur’an as well as Sunnah. Islam is defined as a lifestyle or complete code of life,68 i.e., the life one must pursue in order to seek the pleasure of God (though it sounds like submission, it is not described explicitly as such), as explained in the following verses of the Qur’an:  

“Whoever seeks a faith other than Islam, it will never be accepted from him, and he, in the Hereafter, will be among the losers” (3:85). “Indeed, the religion (dīn, the path to God’s acceptance) in the sight of Allah is Islam…” 3:19 and in several other verses such as 4:17, 6:125, 2:208, etc.

Other verses specifically imply that the meaning ‘ought to be submission, as it would be fallacious - linguistically and logically - to imply the meaning of “peace” in such a verse:

65

Maajid Nawaz and his think tank, the Quillam foundation, claim to debunk the notion of “Islamism.” I like to see them as extreme apologists: there are regular apologists (like those at the North American Fiqh Council) who claim that Islam can adopt to western Islamic values, versus extreme apologists; apologists who attack anybody that claims such a thing as political Islam even existed. 66 The Quilliam Foundaiton. http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/about/faqs/ 67 “[He] who created death and life to test you [as to] which of you is best in deed - and He is the Exalted in Might, the Forgiving” Qur’an 67:2. 68 The word is deen or dīn, which means ‘natural traits’ or Dharma in Sankskrit.

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

  

“O ye who believe! Fear Allah as He should be feared, and die not except as a Muslim.” 3:102. A Muslim in this case refers to someone committing the act of Islam. It obviously cannot mean “peace,” as God would certainly not imply that “dying in the state of peace” is the key to salvation. “Wherefore if they contend with thee, say thou: have surrendered myself unto Allah and he who followeth me. And say thou unto those who have been vouchsafed the Book and unto the illiterates; do you [also] accept Islam? Then if they Aslamū [submit], they are of a surety guided; and if they turn away, then upon thee is only the preaching, and Allah is Beholder of His bondsmen.” 3:20 “And they proffer unto Allah submission [Al-Sallam] on that day, and all that they used to invent hath failed them.” 16:87 “Do not rebel against me, and come to me in submission.” 27:31. “But if the right is on their side they come to him with all submission.” 24:49. etc.

There are also narrations of the Prophet confirming this definition of Islam: “Bahz bin Hakim narrated from his father, that his grandfather said: ‘I said: O Prophet of Allah, I did not come to you until I had sworn more than this many times the number of fingers on his hands that I would never come to you or follow your religion. I am a man who does not know anything except that which Allah, the Mighty and Sublime, and His Messenger teach me. I ask you by the Revelation of Allah, with what has your Lord sent you to us? He said: With Islam. I said: What are the signs of Islam? He said: To say, I submit my face to Allah and give up Shirk, and to establish the Salah and to pay the Zakat.’” 69 “Narrated Abu Hurairah: Allah’s Messenger said, ‘Do you consider or see that my face is towards the Qiblah? By Allah, neither your submissiveness nor your bowing is hidden from me, surely I see you from my back.’” 70

The definition of Islam is submission to God; someone must submit to God to become a Muslim (someone who follows Islam) to achieve his acceptance. As discussed in previous sections, it involves making intentions that are in line with pleasing God in order to properly fulfill the purpose of creation. This purpose is described as being the viceroy (khalifah),71 whose success in this life depends entirely on how often his intentions were aligned with that of Universal order. There are many verses of the Qur’an (e.g., 2:112 that states “Yes [on the contrary], whoever submits (aslama) his face to Allah while being a doer of good (Muhsin) will have his reward with his Lord. And no fear will there be concerning them, nor will they grieve”) that confirm that the word ‘Islam’ relates to dynamic state of submission. In another word, Niyah (static intention) dictates the state of ‘Believer’ (mu’min in Arabic), whereas qsd (dynamic intention) dictates the state of Muslim. This is discussed in the context of qsd (dynamic intention) in previous sections. 69

Ahmad al-Nasa’i, Sunan an-Nasa’i, Vol. 3, Book 23, Hadith 2438. Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 8, Hadith 410. 71 Qur’an 2:30 describes humans as the Khalifah as in viceroy. The term Caliphate is derived from this word that also means ‘successor.’ 70

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2.4.1. Islam versus Politics Now that we understand what Islam is, we can give it a formal working definition. I suggest “Submission to God” as a definition from the inner, Muslim perspective, and “Muslims’ perceived way to achieve submission to God,” from the perspective of a nonMuslim. Both capture the notion that the goal of a Muslim is to submit to God, this notion itself being established by the prophet himself directly through the Qur’an,72 transmitted through him (the Messenger). The messenger is to be seen as an example or a role model to follow, as the Qur’an states that “in the messenger of Allah a good example [that] has been set for the one who seeks Allah” (emphases added) (33:21). Through the fact that Muhammad sets precedent (interpretation of how to practice orders of the Qur’an), the authority of Muhammad’s legitimacy and example-setting can be found directly in the Qur’an, as it states “Say, ‘Obey Allah and the Messenger.’ But if they turn away - then indeed, Allah does not like the disbelievers” (3:32). The Qur’an also gives explicit right to the Prophet Muhammad to ultimately interpret the Qur’an, it states: “O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result” (4:59). The Qur’an, then, directly transfers authority from God Himself, to the Prophet, to set the example and precedent of exactly how to submit to God, which is the goal of every Muslim, in line with the notion that he is charged with the responsibility of being the viceroy on earth (Qur’an 2:30). We can now confirm from the Islamic perspective that a Muslim is required to obey God and learn the practicalities of the Qur’an through the messenger. Let us analyze a few verses of the Qur’an and see how it is absolutely necessary that the Prophet’s example be used as an interpreter to the Qur’an: a) “O you who believe! When you intend to offer the prayer, wash your faces and your hands (forearms) up to the elbows, wipe your heads, and (wash) your feet up to the ankles. If you are in a state of Janaba purify yourself.” 5:6 b) “[The god-fearing are] those who believe in the unseen, establish prayer, and spend out of what We have provided for them” 2:3 c) “And proclaim that the people shall observe Hajj pilgrimage. They will come to you walking or riding on various exhausted [means of transportation]. They will come from the farthest locations.” 22:27 The first verse is referring to the processes of cleanliness required for prayer. Though we are given the basics of cleanliness, and the encouragement that we be clean in general, we are not given a standard set of criteria on how and when to physically purify one’s self. The Sunnah of the prophet details on the specifics; it sets requirements on the maximum amount of days one can grow their public hair, descriptively analyzes the process of physical purification, defines when the first (wash face and hands, etc.) and when the latter is required, as well as the processes in this purification.73 The next verse strongly advocate for the prayers 72 73

As it is believed that the Qur’an is the word of God directly, the absolute truth. For Hadith references see Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 2, Hadith 502; Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Book 43, Hadith 2984 for trimming parts of the body; Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-

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to be fulfilled. The entire details of how to pray, how many times to pray, the actions and utterances in Muslim prayer, etc. are all discussed there. It is impossible to pray correctly (as the Qur’an commands) without taking the example of the Prophet Muhammad.74 The third verse commands Muhammad to make it an obligation for Muslims to perform the pilgrimage; the rites of pilgrimage are defined by the Prophet’s example as well. The point being made there is that it is absolutely necessary to use Muhammad’s example as a standard and interpreter of the Qur’an, and is required in order to fulfill Islam wholly. In absence of the Prophet Muhammad as a model, one loses the ability to cognize as per Figure 2.1 and falls in the dogmatic regime outlined in Figure 2.7. As a result knowledge-cognition is replaced with disinformation. Figure 2.8 shows how disinformation starts with a decision (related to intention) that needs to be justified. The representation with inverted triangle stresses the inherent instability and unsustainability of the model. The source data from which a decision eventually emerges already incorporates their own justifications, which are then massaged by layers of opacity and disinformation. The disinformation referred to here is what results when information is presented or recapitulated in the service of unstated or unacknowledged ulterior intentions. The methods of this disinformation achieve their effect by presenting evidence or raw data selectively, without disclosing either the fact of such selection or the criteria guiding the selection. However, the data has no relevance whatsoever. Any fact can be used to claim some sort of objectivity but will be useful only to design disinformation and justification in case the planted stories or fallacious cognition is discovered.

Figure 2.8. The apehnomenal model that has no relevance to facts (from Islam et al. 75).

Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 5, Hadith 259 and Vol. 1, Book 4, Hadith 142 on details of washing one’s self; Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 3, Hadith 636 on the definition of Janabah and the Ghusl; Muhammad alBukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 5, Hadith 272 for the details of the “bath.” 74 See Ahmad al-Nasa’i, Sunan an-Nasa’i, Vol. 2, Book 11, Hadith 890; Ibn Majah al-Qazwīnī, Sunan Ibn Majah, Book 5, Hadith 887 for the basics of Prayer. 75 M.R. Islam et al., Reconstituting the curriculum, 2013.

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Figure 2.9. Islamic cognition has no meaning without ijtihad and ijtihad has no meaning without divine authority and focus on the ‘interest of God.’

Islamic cognition, however, starts off with the Qur’an that is the ultimate of facts. These facts have to be contextualized with Hadith. Only then useful information or scaling76 laws for time scaling can emerge. Only then cam Islamic decisions be made. This is scientific version of the common protocol ‘what would Jesus do.’ The idea is to ask, “what would the Prophet Muhammad do?” Imbedded in this concept is the notion of ‘for sake of God’ (as opposed to the public interest). As will be elaborated in latter section, the intention is integral part of Islamic cognition. This is similar to the “knowledge-based model,” a term originally coined by Khan and Islam77 except that there is no refinement involved, as the role of refinement is to improve the data, which are static in this Islamic model. As can be seen from the figure, final decision-making is knowledge-based, only if the time scaling follows the upward path (marked by the direction of ijtihad). Now let us enter the realm of politics. We understand that Islam has basic five pillars (proclamation of the shahadah, and practices of daily prayer, fasting, obligatory charity, and pilgrimage), orders a certain level of cleanliness, and has several other rites related to individual care and rites. One may think that the entire religion, i.e., the definition of submission to Islam, is only related to personal actions. However, accepting such a notion disregards the fact that the entire body of orders that was founded within the context of the existence of an Islamic state, Madinah. The entire practice of Islam and orders requiring submission to God took place within the context of there being a jurisdiction in which Islam

76 77

The Arabic word is qiyas, which is best translated as ‘time scaling.’ However, the real meaning is to scale all dimensions. M. I. Khan and M.R. Islam, 2007, True Sustainability in Technological Development and Natural Resource Management, New York City: Nova Science Publishers (2007).

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is free to exist, flourish, and be practiced. Madinah allowed for the flourishing of an Islamic state, and most importantly, for the allowance of the ability of hundreds of verses of Qur’an to be revealed and adhered to: all of which pertain to the maintenance of and ruling regarding the administration of the Islamic community within an Islamic, political state. In other words, there are hundreds of verses of Qur’an that require the existence of an Islamic state, which in turn must be created in order to fulfill all of the orders in the Qur’an. On the issue of cleanliness, there are only a couple of verses regarding commands revolving around the notion of physical cleanliness, less than 100 verses on the most fundamental pillar of Islam, prayer,78 and the third pillar of Islam is mentioned less than 50 times.79 However, there are hundreds of verses pertaining to law, community-building, state administration, foreign policy, taxation, and so on—all functions of a state. It is important to note that these verses are not dos and don’ts – they are rather broad guidelines as to how to cognize and observe a lifestyle complete with social order. It is a matter of fact that the most used word of the Qur’an is Allah whereas the second most used word is ilm – the root word for cognition or science.80 Let us examine a few verses of the Qur’an pertaining to the law, state administration, and foreign policy (random selection for representative sample): a) “O ye who believe! the law of equality is prescribed to you in cases of murder: the free for the free, the slave for the slave, the woman for the woman. But if any remission is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any reasonable demand, and compensate him with handsome gratitude, this is a concession and a Mercy from your Lord. After this whoever exceeds the limits shall be in grave penalty.” Qur’an: 2:178 b) “And those who have responded to their lord and established prayer and whose affair is [determined by] consultation81 among themselves, and from what We have provided them, they spend [are due to receive their reward from Allah]” 42:40 c) “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors.” 2:190 These verses, upon all of which there are several examples of application upon them in the time of the Prophet Muhammad and in the Caliphate,82 show that—as was the case with the personal hygiene—the Qur’an has many injunctions Muslims must follow regarding politics. There are hundreds (if not thousands) of Hadiths elaborating on hundreds of verses 78

Counting of a search engine ended in less than 100 verses being counted, a total of exactly 70 verses referring to prayer, commandment of prayer, etc. 79 There are only 47 verses referring to the Zakah, the required annual charity to be paid by Muslims on taxable networth. 80 M.M. Khan and M.R. Islam, Zero-Waste Engineering, 2012; M.R. Islam et al., Greening of pharmaceutical engineering, Volume 1: Practice, Analysis, and Methodology, 2015. 81 Consultation, the Arabic is “shura,” it indicates governance, as it refers to the collective in the next verse, stating that they also “And those who, when tyranny strikes them, they defend themselves.” 82 A fundamental rule in Islamic criminal law is the notion of Qisas, equal retribution for physical harm: Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Book 65, Hadith 4499 reconfirms its use and Vol. 5, Book 45, Hadith 4756 shows an example of its administration. The Caliph Umar is documented as having a formal consultation council: Hadith 50 and Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 5, Book 59, Hadith 506 and Ibn Majah al-Qazwīnī, Sunan Ibn Majah, Book 20, Hadith 2668 show Umar IIs and Uthman’s instances of consultation, respectively. As is discussed in the jus ad belly section, we know that the Prophet, Abu Bakr, and ‘Ali used the above criteria to go to war.

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of Qur’an relating to the fields of family, criminal, financial, constitutional, and all other types of laws, discussing basic rules of governance, delegation of divine authority, and so on. Any look at any of the Islamic Hadith books each provides one with hundreds, and together, thousands of commandments regarding law and government. None of the Muslim and nonMuslim historians, including modern-day historians, ever doubted that there was a fullfledged Empire/State/Legal operation in occurrence in the Middle East under the name of the Rashidūn Caliphate. Even Harvard Law school flaunts a plaque that quotes the Qur’an 4:134: “O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses To Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether It be (against) rich or poor: For Allah can best protect both.”83 How then, can someone claim that Islam has no space in law? Nothing other than cognitive dissonance can be the impetus for such egregious claim. In reality, similar conclusions based on cognitive dissonance can be easily applied to any other part of Islam; the communal, familial, and even personal life. The simple and arbitrary “shunning” of an entire part of Islam, what served as a foundation for the flourishing of Islam—if such as thing can simply be taken out of Islam—can also, using the same arbitrary logic, be used for any other “part” of Islam, including the personal and non-political aspects of Islam. This is indeed the scheme that has become popularized by such entities as Quillam Foundation of Majid Nawaz and other Islamophobes in the post-9/11 era. As I have stated earlier, the fact of the matter is that the entire foundation of Islam and of all of the verses of Qur’an, Hadith, and centuries of studies of Islamic law, not only make up “a part of” a general theme of a religion, but the state, as an entity, provides a foundation (in literal and atmospheric sense) to carry out the commandments of God and the Prophet pertaining to anything inherently political. Any separation or isolation of any issue injects dogma in the dogma-free stature of Islam. This being said, it is often claimed that there is nowhere in the Qur’an or Hadith that explicitly order Muslims to establish a Caliphate governance system. This is a very simplistic argument that lies in the premise that the only time something is an Islamic requirement is when it is explicitly stated in the Qur’an or hadith. We know this cannot be true, as logically, we have known that the fundamental basis for Islam is logic, which is also thought of as the basis for the faith of Islam itself. This stipulates that Muslims are required to do what is logical at the end of the day, in order to fulfill the commands of God. In order to clarify this point, let us consider an example from the “personal” commands of the Qur’an, say prayer. The first prayer of the day is known as the Fajr (dawn) prayer, which, in the western world of luxury and late-awakening, it may not be normal for the average person to wake up at dawn on a regular basis, and hence, requires extra effort (i.e., an alarm clock) in order to be able to wake up to pray. Now, we know there is the requirement to pray, and to pray a ‘make-up’ prayer for accidental missed prayers. However, if somebody is prone to not waking up on an early basis, this person is logically expected to take the necessary measures to be able to fulfill the command of praying on time, by buying an alarm clock. The fact that the word ‘alarm clock’ does not appear in the Qur’an does not relieve a person of the obligation to make such provision. Another example can be cleanliness; it is indeed permissible for a Muslim to pray without washing with water (as an exception) 83

The actual verse continues: So follow not [personal] inclination, lest you not be just. And if you distort [your testimony] or refuse [to give it], then indeed Allah is ever, with what you do, Acquainted., but Harvard University Law faculty entrance quotes only the first part. Available online at: http://library.law.harvard.edu/justicequotes/explore-the-room/west/.

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beforehand, if none is available. However, the simplest rules of logic tell us that if it is foreseeable in the future that no water will be available in a particular place, it is necessary to fulfill the obligation of taking water, as the person (still at home) is able to foresee and prepare for the upcoming difficulty of not having water, and is given the choice between preparing and not preparing. It is logically a requirement, as the person is being given a choice at the beginning of the day to prepare or to deliberately reject the order and not pray. A more allegorical but understandable example (especially to the readers not acquainted with Islamic practice) can be the example of a hypothetical Qur’anic injunction to build a house. Let us say that there are several verses of the Qur’an and Hadiths explaining such— that every Muslim is required to have windows, walls, a floor, and collectively, all forming a house. However, in order to form certain parts of the house, such as the roof (for example), which is also required for the windows, the second floor, and so on, there is a requirement of pillars and a foundation of the house itself that must be built to maintain the structure, in order to fulfill the orders of erecting, maintaining, and living in that house the person was commanded to build. Indeed, when looking at the blueprints of the (hypothetical) house that the Prophet used 1400 years ago, we can see that there are pillars and a foundation, however, there is no mention of a requirement for a foundation or pillars to be built; there is no explicit requirement that pillars be built. This may seem to pose a dilemma, though, as with the other examples, the answer is clear; the person is required to use the blueprint, and build the necessary foundation and pillars, in order to build the house and prevent it from collapse. There are two schools of thought, however; one which sees the house, with the pillars and foundation within it as one, all a requirement to build, thereby fulfilling the commandment, whereas the other claims that because of the fact that there was no explicit order to create the pillars, and that creating a house without pillars or a foundation for a house would collapse it and render the building process worthless, that it is not required at all to fulfill the commandment. We can see how illogical the latter position is. The purpose of this example was to demonstrate that a) what is not explicitly commanded in Islam is still required if it is necessary to fulfill an order in the Qur’an, and b) the required actions of a believer (viz. declarer and believer in the Muslim declaration of faith) looking to submit to God, must take all logical and pre-emptive actions in order to fulfill the command. The house allegory can be used in the context of an Islamic political state. We take it as a given that a) A very large part of Islam finds its basis in legal and political rulings, and b) In order to fully live out Islam, i.e., all of the commands of God in the Qur’an and Hadith, an Islamic state would be required,84 and c) The verses of Qur’an pertaining to law and governance assume that an Islamic state is in place,85 then the only logical conclusion, based on these assumptions, would be that in order for someone to be able to obey all orders of God (i.e., definition of Muslim), they are required to operate within an Islamic political state, and hence, require for a state to be built. In the allegorical case, the foundation and pillars of the house resemble the Islamic state, which allows a large part of Islam (all the verses of Qur’an and Hadiths) to be carried out. Though this is certainly not what the majority of public opinion of Muslims believe in, because it adheres fully to the Islamic cognition process, it is the Islamic way of thinking, and indeed, the way of thinking of the Prophet and the Caliphs

84 85

Unless one would like to try enforcing Islamic criminal law in foreign countries. Indeed, the Ummah in Madinah and the Rashidun Caliphate were political entities.

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under the Rashidūn Caliphate, and even those living under the so-called Umayyad, Abbasid, and even Ottoman ‘Caliphates.’ Additionally, there are several verses as injunctions in the Qur’an that either a) Mandate for a political system, or b) Order an action that is only feasible to carry out under an Islamic state. Firstly, the Qur’an mandates that all Muslims use the Prophet Muhammad as a guide to settle practical disputes between people; today this is considered the Sunnah (collections of Hadith). As providing a contingency for not doing so; it states, “[b]ut no, by your Lord, they will not [truly] believe until they make you, [O Muhammad], judge concerning that over which they dispute among themselves and then find within themselves no discomfort from what you have judged and submit in [full, willing] submission.” (4:65). Another verse states that it is a requirement to uphold Islamic law (shari’ah)86 and judge between people using the divine law: “so judge between them by what God has revealed”; “[a]nd We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, confirming that which preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. So judge between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth. To each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; so race to [all that is] good.” (5:48). Regarding actions only feasible to carry under an Islamic state—though large portions of the Hadith, thousands of accounts deal with the issue—there are some foundational verses of the Qur’an that they are based upon. For instance, the third pillar of Islam, the Zakat, stipulates required enforcement in verse 9:103: “Take, [O, Muhammad], from their wealth a charity by which you purify them and cause them increase, and invoke [ Allah’s blessings] upon them. Indeed, your invocations are reassurance for them. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing.” Another verse stipulates obedience to the legitimate ruler amongst the Islamic Ummah: “O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.” There are also verses prescribing physical punishment for adultery,87 treason,88 stealing,89 retribution, blood money,90 and so on. Any verse prescribing fighting, viz. relating

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89 90

Though the root meaning of the word is “SH-R-‘A” which could form the word “Shari’ah,” the meaning of “Shari’ah” as is found in the Qur’an literally means law in a general sense, it could also mean charter, bill, statute, or declaration, see: Rohi Baalbaki, Al-Mawrid: A modern Arabic English Dictioary 19th ed. (Beirut: Dar El-Ilm Lilmayin, 2005), 225. Qur’an 24:2: “The fornicating woman and the fornicating man, flog each one of them with one hundred stripes. No pity for them should prevail upon you in the matter of Allah’s religion, if you really believe in Allah and the Last Day; and a group of believers must witness their punishment.” The Hadith re-confirms the issue, as Muhammad stated “For the married person who commits adultery with a married person is one hundred lashes, then stoning. And for the virgin who commits adultery with a virgin is one hundred lashes and banishment for a year.” Vol. 3, Book 15, Hadith 1434 Jami’ Tirmidhi. “The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter.―Except for those who repent before they fall into your power: in that case, know that Allah is OftForgiving, Most Merciful.” 5:33-4. This could also be the punishment for highway robbery. “As for a man or a woman who commits theft, cut off the hands of both to punish them for what they earned, a deterrent punishment from Allah. Allah is Mighty, Wise.” 5:38. “It is not for a believer to slay another believer unless by mistake. And he who has slain a believer by mistake, his atonement is to set free from bondage a believing people and to pay blood-money to his heirs, unless they

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to Islamic foreign policy, defining the jus ad bellum and jus in bello can be found in verses as described in the next chapter: 2:190 in self-defense, 4:75 to save a group of oppressed Muslims in a foreign land (who cry out for help), 49:9 to fight a Muslim group pressing another Muslim group, and 60:8 to fight and not even deal justly those who expel Muslims from their homes or attack them for their faith. Since these verses must be carried out under the guide of an Islamic state, it follows that an Islamic state must be formed to carry out all of the Qur’an’s orders. Let’s then summarize in a few phrases; Islam is a way of life prescribed by God required for all Muslims to fulfill wholly.91 The commands of God include a divine law and governance system mandated by God, which requires a state in order to provide the jurisdiction to fulfill the commands of the laws. Therefore, Islam is certainly not a “faith” nor has anything to do with “politics,” let alone politicking, but is rather a comprehensive form of life, a path to submit to God, which includes spiritual, personal, familial, communal, and political life defined by the Qur’an and Hadith. Note that in the modern world, the conservative side of Muslim scholarship tends to support the notion that Islam is political. Throughout the jus ad bellum argument discussed later, we see that both the conservative Sunni Traditionalists as well as the anti-Islam ‘scholars’ of the academic world reach a surprisingly tranquil equilibrium with on another in defining the basics of Islam. For instance, Khan92 supports the notion that Islamic inherently political and that religion includes a law, stating that “Sharia laws cover all spheres of Muslim life; spiritual, social, financial, and political” and are “the indisputable complete guide to the Muslim life and society for all times and places.” Though Khan, throughout the book makes prejudicial attempts and conclusions that includes the taking out of context and lack of key historical insight, he does, however, recognize that Islam includes a political sphere, and that by removing the political sphere, one is actually removing a piece of Islam itself out of the religion. Recently, former-US Senator and 2016 US republican Presidential candidate, Rick Santorum was quoted supporting the notion that Islam is inherently political, saying that “Islam is different…Islam is not just a religion, it is also a political governing structure…93 This is the same view shared by Sunni traditionalists, such as the Wahhabis ( at least before their pact to not speak against the House of Saud),94 as well as the view supported by Hizb ulTahrir, an Islamic political movement.95 Other Sunni traditionalists include Abul ‘Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb,96 Hasan al-Banna, and other Islamists in general. It remains an forgo it by way of charity. And if the slain belonged to a hostile people, but was a believer, then the atonement is to set free from bondage a believing person.” 4:92. 91 In order to be Muslim, all Muslims are expected not to “believe in part of the Scripture and disbelieve in part” (2:85), thereby the recompense would be “disgrace in worldly life; and on the Day of Resurrection they will be sent back to the severest of punishment,” and classification as a disbeliever (4:150-1). 92 M.A. Khan, Islamic Jihad: A Legacy of Forced Conversion, Imperialism, and Slavery (Indiana: iUniverse, 2009). 93 The Washington Post, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/republicans-prepare-to-debate-tonight-inlas-vegas/2015/12/15/c8f4d354-a33f-11e5-ad3f-991ce3374e23_story.html. 94 “In 1744, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab arrived in al-Dir'iyya … This was the origin of the pact between religious mission and political power that has endured for more than two and half centuries…” see: David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (New York: I.B.Tauris 2009), 18. 95 Their so-called “constitution” explains their basic beliefs and constitution of their Islamic state: Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Draft Constitution by Hizb ut-Tahrir,” (n.d.). https://web.archive.org/web/20070927200116/http://www.hizbut-tahrir.info/english/constitution.htm. 96 “From it [Islam] we must also derive our concepts of life, our principles of government, politics, economics and all other aspects of life.” In: Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Holy Koran Publishing House, 1978), 6.

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undeniable fact that Islam is not a religion at all, that it was not intended to be a personal, but rather a way of life including politics. Of course, this does not mean that all Muslims (or even the majority) believe that Islam is a political system, especially in the west. This is unless, as Robert Spencer97 humorously claims, that “American Muslim groups are engaged in a huge cover-up of Islamic doctrine and history.”98

2.4.2. Ijtihad and the Apologists There is another camp of scholars who propose that Islam, though may posses a political aspect to it, is foldable and adaptable to a modern, western society. In the modern age the notion of ijtihad, however, has changed meanings. Of course, it is frivolous to suggest that the meaning has changed, it’s rather a matter of “interpretation and reasoning based on the sacred texts” that has evolved. Even then, the second part of the definition of Ijtihad adopted by United States Institute for Peace (USIP) is rather peculiar, adding that the purpose is to “understand and apply the message of the Qur’an to varying societal needs and conditions.”99 Let us examine some of the Prophet Muhammad’s own definition of Ijtihad: “If a judge makes a ruling, striving to apply his reasoning [ijtihad] and he is correct, then he will have two rewards. If a judge makes a ruling, striving to apply his reasoning and he is mistaken, then he will have one reward.”100

We are given little in regards to definition, however we get the sense that Ijtihad is the action of a judge in an Islamic state who cognizes, to the best of his ability, with the Qur’an and Hadith (two points) in order to give an Islamic ruling. We are required to delve into the examples of the Caliphs after the prophet to find precedent of Ijtihad, in order to define it and create boundaries around it, still using the Islamic cognition method. An example of ijtihad can be seen in the example of taxation. Under ‘Umar, the Islamic state increased cross-border trading up to the point where a taxation issue became a problem; how do we tax Zakat on traded goods? ‘Umar confronted the issue by establishing an official tax for Muslim traders across borders, applying the regular 2.5% Zakat tax to trading revenue.101 Another problem ‘Umar faced during the Caliphate’s expansion was a social, rather than an economic problem; the issue of his male soldiers divorcing their Arab wives in order to marry foreign, Byzantine and Persian women. In response, he prohibited the act. Another example is ‘Umar’s formalization of the section of judiciary, stating that they may not be from a low social class, must be paid with a high salary, have no other job: several conditions were applied in order to decrease any chance of corruption or intimidation of judges. Another very important reform was Abu Bakr’s decision to compile and preserve the 97

Robert Spencer, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades) (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2005). 98 Robert Spencer, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades), cover page. 99 United States Institute for Peace, “Ijtihad Reinterpreting Islamic Principles for the Twenty-first Century” USIP Special report 125 (2004): 2. 100 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 18, Hadith 4261. 101 Volker Neinhous, “Zakah, taxes, and public finance in Islam” in Islam and the Everyday World: Public Policy Dilemmas eds. Sohrab Behdad and Farad Nomani (London: Routledge, 2006): 178.

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Qur’an in writing, and not only depend on the memories of people, so that Muslims do not “differ” on the revelation of God as the Christians and Jews have in the past (as the narration102 states). All in all, it explains how Islamic law puts “Allah’s interest” (God’s interest) first—as opposed to the public interest. Others’ interests come as per God’s order and cannot be arbitrarily set by humans, through popular demand, autocracy, or otherwise. All of the above cases of Ijtihad are done by the people of the highest office, the Caliphs themselves, whereas when we see that the prophet allowed Judges to ‘do their best’ to come up with the most Islamic answer; the judge was not creating new law or amending old laws, rather, he was judging by the existing laws and best applying it to his specific situation. The above type of amendments to laws, setting a precedent for all of Islam, and defining the latitude of permissibility (see section 2.3) can only be done by the legitimately elected Caliph himself. Therefore, all of the examples defining the latitude of permissibility within the Qur’an and Hadith, as well as precedent-setting, stops abruptly at the last Caliph’s death, ‘Ali, meaning that the Islamic cognition process is required to work its way around firstly the Qur’an, secondly, the Sunnah to interpret the Qur’an, and thirdly (if applicable), the four Caliphs who set precedence and put Muhammad’s rulings into context. Regarding the nature of the ijtihad, it is not a matter of theoretical conception of what the previously defined scripture and Hadith that form Islam is, rather, it leads to practical solutions to social, economic, and organizational problems faced by the Caliphs. We may now set a few limits regarding our Islamic ability to apply Islamic law into a “modern context” from the above discussion. Firstly, the nature of the Ijtihad can take into account the precedence of the four Caliphs, and of the Prophet in defining the Qur’an; as we have previously noted, the Prophet Muhammad is the definer of Islamic law and interpreter of Qur’anic governance and legal orders. Secondly, the nature of the law, as a concept (i.e., defined as backward, or progressive or adaptable) has no bearing in Islamic cognition, due to the fact that in Islamic cognition, the law sets an order and creates a model that transcends through time; because the nature of God’s law is divine, it cannot logically be subject to the beliefs and opinions of people—rather, there is a clearly defined golden standard that people, regardless of time and space, can compare to. Amendments, though can be made serving practical purposes103 balancing between God’s several commands, they cannot be made for any other reason than to counter the problem of the conflict, an existence of something new that affects the lives of people, i.e., technology. The purpose of Ijtihad is not to define whether or not there is applicability of something today, but rather, to make possible amendments due to every-day practical problems that are faced by the Islamic community. Now that we have established what (Islamically permissible) Ijtihad is, we can now compare it to the so-called Ijtihad being done by “progressive” Muslims. Wael Hallaq104 claims that the purpose of Ijtihad is done “for the purpose of discovering God’s law.” However, we have established that this is factually not the case. Though it may 102

A long narration of history describes Zaid bin Thabit’s narration on the discussion between ‘Umar and Abu Bakr, eventually the former convincing the latter (who was Caliph at the time) to compile the Qur’an, see: Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 89, Hadith 301. 103 Note that the only reason any sort of amendment is permissible at all in Islamic law is because of the fact that Islamic cognition allows for the use of precedent from the four caliphs, and because they amended laws, Islam does as well. 104 Wael B. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 16 (1984): 3.

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certainly have been the definition of later jurists,’ it is not the definition discovered through the Islamic cognition process. Though the book Hallaq refers to gives a linguistically accurate definition, i.e., exertion of one’s self for the sake of finding the judicially accurate decision,105 it is far from the notion of “discovering” God’s law, but rather has to do with applying, and not discovering it. Throughout the work, Hallaq claims that the “doors of ijtihad” that were “declared” closed logically could not have been, as it is required to apply laws to newer contexts in each unique case, and additionally, always historically not the case for the first five centuries of Islam. The issue of the historical discussion of the so called “closing of the doors” of Ijtihad is not our concern. What is of concern is the theme throughout the paper that the concept that Ijtihad, or Islam as an identity, was created as it progressed from the time of the Prophet, through the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates, and so on. He states that “[t]he idea of closing the gate of ijtihad or the notion of the extinction of mujtahids did not appear during the first five Islamic centuries.”106 This implies that Islam, or at least its rules and the distinction between “right” and “wrong” or “permissible” and “forbidden” was not already established at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. In fact, the notion of Islam providing a model to follow, the precedent, latitude of permissibility being set, and so on, as already being established, is completely absent. Hallaq makes bold statement in fact regarding this, “The Qur’an and the Sunnah of the prophet do not, as a rule, specify the law as it might be stated in specialized law manuals, but only contain some rulings (ahkim; pl. of hukm) and indications (dalalat or amiart) that lead to the causes (‘ilal; pl. of cilla) of these rulings. Based on these indications and causes the mujtahid may attempt, by employing the procedure of qiyas (analogy) to discover the judgment (hukm) of an unprecedented case (far’; pl. offuru’). But before embarking on this original task, he must first search for the judgment in the works of renowned jurists. If he fails to find a precedent in these works he may look for a similar case in which legal acts are different but legal facts are the same. Failing this he must turn to the Qur’an, the Sunnah, or ijma' (consensus) for a precedent that has a 'illa identical to that of the farc. When this is reached he is to apply the principles of qiyas (analogy) in order to reach the ruling of the case in question. This ruling may be one of the following: the obligatory (wijib), the forbidden (mahzur), the recommended (mandub), the permissible (mubaih), or the disapproved (makriih).” 107

As proof of inconsistency with Islam, there are several points to note from Hallaq’s summary of the Sunni traditionalist understanding of Ijtihad. Firstly, the fact that it is claimed quite explicitly that Muhammad’s rulings do not constitute a model goes contrary to the Islamic cognition model; the notion that only examples of case law exist and one can only extrapolate the intended meaning of it is simply not true. The claim is that it does not “specify the law as it might be states in specialized law manuals”; perhaps, however the larger notion that Hallaq and the others are missing is that it does not need to be. Even in judicial systems with so-called “specialized law manuals” (such as any national criminal code), there is a lot of room for disparity and clarification. Hallaq’s declaration assumes that God’s law has not been

105

The Spiritual Background of Early Islam: Studies in Ancient Arab Concepts p. 189. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?,” 39. 107 Ibid, 7-8. 106

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“discovered.” Indeed, it may be the case with discovering “new technology” or something of the sort, but the foundational premises—and not only rulings—have been established. The much larger problem, however, is the notion that so called “case laws” continue to exist, or can define what Islam is, based on judicial rulings made after the four Caliphs. If we see the Umayyads and others as non-legitimate, then the notion of treating Umayyad Caliphs’ actions as case laws goes against the purpose of ruling on the Qur’an and Sunnah. The notion of “renowned jurist” cannot provide as a precedent, or axis,108 in of itself. Rather, after the jurist consults the Qur’an and Sunnah, he can examine the applicability of others’ uses of legal derivation based on the Qur’an and Sunnah. Therefore, there use of Ijtihad is heavily qualified: the only time others’ interpretations of cases matter is in the case that they use the Islamic cognition axes, and additionally, the judge of an Islamic state is required to only search in the Qur’an and Sunnah, and later (for clarification) in a bank of case law of jurists who have used the Islamic cognition approach. Additionally, the latitude of permissibility (which can be considerably wide) can only be based on or defined by the a) Qur’an, b) Hadith, and c) The Caliphs; viz. only their actions may be taken as a precedent or case law. Discussion in previous sections regarding Islamic cognition (Figure 2.1) as well as disinformation created because of dogmatic manipulation (Figure 2.7) clarifies this point. Hallaq, as well as Weis109 purpose the notion that “few of these rules have been precisely spelled out for man’s convenience,” and that “[t]he law as a topically-organized finished product consisting of precisely worded rules is the result of juristic interpretation,” and hence, law is to be discovered.110 This conception is far from the truth, as there is much more weight put on interpretation of the law, rather than the law itself. It nearly completely discredits the injunctions of the Qur’an and Hadith; i.e., the command to amputate the thief’s hand can be reinterpreted and through the guise of multiple case laws (of any “respected jurist” who declared it such) can cause it to mean something completely different from the intended meaning. It creates grounds to make the entire study of Islamic jurisprudence a study of peoples’ conceptions of what God had intended to mean, by taking interpreters, rather than the true text, as the standard. Contrary to Islamic cognition, where a text ‘means what it means,’ this version of ijtihad stands to be perverted by people with an agenda to make Islamic law something it is not. The entire notion that a) one can take somebody’s interpretation as a standard, and b) that there is some kind of formalized case law bank and codified Islamic law, other than the Qur’an and Hadith, is false and completely absent from Islamic cognition. Before this notion is taken on a tangent and expanded to justify things that go contrary to the text, we must establish that a) the Qur’an and Hadith is not a “jurists’ text,”111 but a text that exists and that is explicitly clear on several issues relating to law and governance, and b) authoritative ijtihad can only be considered authoritative or precedent in the case of explicit Qur’anic, Sunnah, or Caliph’s actions and injunctions; all other interpretations are subject to interpretation based on the golden standard which has been created and exists, the Qur’an and Sunnah. In other words, the Qur’an and Sunnah’s laws are not subject to ‘interpretation,’ all laws and interpretations of law are subject to its

108

Or it would be considered “blind following,” going against the Islamic cognition model. Bernard Weiss, “Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihād” The American Journal of Comparative Law 26 (1978): 199. 110 Ibid, 200. 111 Ibid, 201. 109

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interpretation. Hence, I only use the Qur’an and Sunnah, and interpret the opinions of those based on their interpretation of the texts. It embodies Islamic deductive rules as shown in Figure 2.1 (See also Figure 2.9). As a result a new paradigm in cognition is introduced. Such technique has been hailed elsewhere as the knowledge-based cognition. The technique employed by Hallaq is clearly an example of the disinformation model (Figure 2.8) that falsifies the entire cognition process. Of recent, so-called “progressive” Muslims have advanced a new “type” of ijtihad, if you will. This ijtihad goes contrary to the scientific definition, as well as the Sunni traditional definition. An example of the supporter of this ijtihad is the United States Institute for Peace. They claim that the definition of Ijtihad is to “understand and apply the message of the Qur’an to varying societal needs and condition.” This statement is simply false under the realm of the Disinformation model (Figure 2.8). There is not a single hadith of the Prophet Muhammad or any context of the Rashidun Caliphate that would tell us that this statement has any merit vis-à-vis ijtihad. As we have established, the true definition has two types of ijtihad, firstly, when somebody in authority (i.e., the Caliph himself) declares, through extensive studying and consultation, that a specific rule already in place deserves a permanent or temporary amendment, due to a specific problem that has arisen. We also know, through the ‘house’ analogy, that these amendments are made to rules that are in practice within the context of a pre-existing Islamic state, not in the context of a non-Islamic state. There is no indication in the Qur’an, Hadith, or Rashidūn Caliphate precedent that stipulates that ijtihad could be made outside the context of an Islamic state, as the whole purpose of ijtihad is to make practical rulings due to real-life problems of Muslims living within a state. Ijtihad is about making decisions regarding the policy making. It has no meaning in absence of divine authority. As has been said earlier, there are thousands of verses of the Qur’an along with Hadiths that have built in assumption that an Islamic state already exists. In our ‘house’ analogy, we saw how it would be understood that an Islamic state, the foundation for the flourishing of Islam, was an assumption made in several injunctions of the Qur’an and Hadith. In fact, the problem with USIP’s interpretation of Ijtihad, as being necessary to the Ummah in absence of an Islamic state, is the source of the sustained disinformation. When there is no legitimate Islamic state, there is no authority that can conduct ijtihad. USIP claims that in the modern day, an example of ijtihad can be when several Muslim scholars in the US and Europe decreed that the law prohibiting interest no longer applies, as for the majority of Muslims, it is impossible to purchase a home without a mortgage, which of course includes interest.112 Such an example perfectly describes how it is impossible and illogical to attempt to practically “do” ijtihad without the presence of an established authority within an Islamic state. Firstly, we see the presence of invisible “formalization” of the clergy; in Islam, there is no formal entity that “decrees” or “declares” something to be lawful of unlawful as with Roman Catholic Christianity, except in the case of someone using the Caliphate model, which is considered to be directly approved by God. Therefore, these so-called “decrees” are in fact much better described as self-proclaimed scholars’ opinions, having no authority to decree. Secondly, we can see how in an Islamic state, such a Fatwa (Islamic judicial ruling) would never have to be issued in the first place, as interest on mortgate, the issue in question, would

112

USIP, “Ijtihad: Reinterpreting Islamic Principles for the Twenty-first Century,” 2.

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be completely disallowed,113 and hence, there would be no need to address the problem of interest on mortgages. This specific example illustrates the absurdity of invoking a non-state Islamic authority, as well as the observance of Islamic law (Shari’ah law) without the umbrella of an Islamic state. So, why would USIP promote such an absurd concept? Zatzman and Islam gave a useful hint: “Thus, for the international financial groups contending against the further expansion of the interests of U.S.-based groups, “Islamic banking” offers a lifeline, or the promise of a lifeline, for retaining within the existing international system of financial enslavement the possibility for these giant groups to contend and collude even when one side cannot muster anything approaching the military means of its rival.” 114

Clearly, USIP’s ‘interest’ doesn’t lie within pleasing God (God’s interest), but rather having more to do with the normative approach to cognition. Regarding USIP’s claim on “who can do ijtihad?,” it quotes Shi’a cleric, Hasan Qazwini, who allegedly gave such authority to anyone with designation of “a recognized expert in jurisprudence” as being qualified to do ijtihad. Even if we took such a claim prima facie, it has already been established that without an Islamic state, which has direct authority of God, nobody has the divine right—which is the only Islamically legitimate type of right—to impose or “declare” what is right and wrong. Incidentally, it is unclear why USIP decided to quote a Shi’a cleric but it is understandable because Sunni traditionalists even promote the belief that the ‘gates of ijtihad have been closed’ some 400 years after the passing of the prophet. However, the same Traditionalists have no problem giving authority to give Fatwah (decree of divine authority) that is ubiquitous in Muslim communities. Finally, another important point to address is the fact that such a version of ijtihad follows the exact anti-knowledge sequence discussed in the beginning of the chapter; the cognition process starting with a decision or conclusion, and ending with justification (normative rather than deductive, as summarized in Figures 2.7 and 2.9). After establishing the fallacious notions of ijtihad without Islamic state, USIP claims that Ijtihad can be used to reassess the role of women and gender equality, the gap between Shi’ites and Sunnis, the “spirit of globalization” (cosmopolitan vs. clash of civilizations), economics (making it procapitalist), and unity among Muslim states. Although these positions can be discussed and new problems can be solved (such as Globalization) under the context and authority of an Islamic state, ending in some sort of “decree,” it is not the purpose of Ijtihad to a) discuss problems that have already been dealt with, such as, the issue of the separation of Muslim states (there should only be one Islamic state, viz., the Caliphate), the role of women in Islam, the world of Islam vs. the world of war, and position of the gap between Shi’ites and Sunnis;115 and b) address issues with the tool of ijtihad only because the beliefs and norms amongst people (which constantly change) have changed, and no practical concern has 113

An Islamic state operates by a non-interest economic system, which has several benefits. See Gary Zatzman and Rafiq Islam, Economics of Intnagibles (New York: Nova Publishers, 2007), 295-301: “On Islamic banking.” 114 Ibid, 301. 115 If an Islamic state were to come about, it is indeed their responsibility to consolidate already-discussed laws and understandings, but not their responsibility to (with an agenda) attempt to make Islam compatible with current thoughts beliefs of people in the west, as it goes contrary to a) the deductive knowledge process, and b) the fact that Islam has a fixed, and not time or space-dependent view on “right” and “wrong.”

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arisen.116 For instance, a new technology would constitute a case, for which a new incidence affecting peoples’ lives comes into place, triggering ijtihad by the Caliphate (similar to the practice of Rashidūn caliphs). On the other hand, the fact that “most people believe that Islam is comparable with democracy” does not constitute a new problem facing the Ummah that requires examination. It is so because change in belief, which, incidentally, is ubiquitous, does not establish the ground for a ‘new scenario’ for a scenario that doesn’t have an established solution in prophet’s time. In other words, people’s changing beliefs of right and wrong have absolutely no effect in Islamic thought on the actual determination of right and wrong. As a thought experiment, we can just imagine how much of a disaster it would be to change the difference between right and wrong based on beliefs of what is right and wrong. Just 300 years ago, slaves imported from Africa were not even considered human by many, and today, people are questioning the existence of gender. Without commenting on the moral stance of those issues themselves, we can see that if Islam were defined by the beliefs of the people, what is defined as “right” and “wrong” will change constantly. Scientifically, it would be equivalent to removing the origin of the cognition axis (Figure 2.1) or replacing the base of the knowledge triangle (Figure 2.9) making them arbitrary, similar to the dogma model (Figures 2.7 and 2.9). Logically, it means that a) there is no such thing as Islam, as it is a product of peoples’ beliefs, and b) there is no criterion by which God judges right and wrong; if what is right and wrong is determined subjectively and collectively, rather than in comparison to an eternal standard, then even God Himself cannot decide what is right and wrong. It is so because the notion of an externally laid out “right” and “wrong” no longer exists. Essentially, USIP has reduced Islam into dogma or its degenerated alternatives. In other words, Islam has been reduced to something that can justify a greater good, not constituting a declaration of “good” and “bad” itself. This process has been called ‘deliberate schizophrenia’ aimed at creating opacity.117 Seeking any moral “good” involving tweaking of the laws and injunctions of the Qur’an and Sunnah in order to reach a so-called common good of unity and cross-cultural diversity and acceptance is beneath the pale of hypocrisy and Eurocentric claim of moral supremacy. Such form of cognition does Islam, as a religion and a field of study for the sake of knowledge, a great disservice and injustice. As we will see in latter section, such cognition in the case with apologetic Muslims defending the pro-defensive Jihad cause, factual and jurisprudential misinformation is prevalent among the scholarship and think tanks conducting research on Islam. In the following sections, this point is made through deconstruction of a few articles. It is established that: a) it is indeed misinformation occurring amongst the Islamic scholarship today, and b) such actions go against the true purpose of research; seeking knowledge through a deductive process.

2.4.2.1. Governance-Related Misinformation: Islam and Democracy Here I give a political example as to how modern scholars attempt to change Islam’s view of right and wrong by using the same so-called ‘ijtihad.’ Indeed, we can expect no less than the agenda-driven cognition, as Hashish,118 in his discussion on how Islam can establish 116

The insertion of such purpose would trigger dogmatic cognition, corrupting the Islamic deductive rule. M.R. Islam et al., Greening of pharmaceutical engineering, Volume 1: Practice, Analysis, and Methodology. 118 Adam Hashish, “Ijtihad Institutions: The Key to Islamic Democracy Bridging and Balancing Political and Intellectual Islam Hashish” Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 9 (2009): 63. 117

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the cornerstone of democracy, states that “[t]his article focuses on the role of ijtihad in building institutions of Islamic democracy.” Such an approach is precisely the type that uses the aphenomenal model (normative approach, see Figure 2.8) instead of the knowledge-based approach (Figure 2.9). Before we look at the main statements and problems, it is important to say something about Ijtihad and Taqlid (blindly-following renowned scholars). Interestingly, both Islamists as well as progressive Muslims are against Taqlid and support ijtihad. For instance, regarding ijtihad, though it may be used for regular purposes, Islamists tend to use it to advance their agenda of denying what scholars say without backing evidence from the Qur’an and Sunnah.119 Progressive Muslims, as we have seen, also are pro-ijtihad for the purpose of advancing their own agenda. Hashish in essence claims that because Islam encourages something in general, it is okay to expand that notion through the process of ijtihad and reach the desired conclusion, by stating that “[o]verall, Shari’ah is a path of pursuing justice…However, pursuing justice does not mean denying its relative nature. In this sense, pursuing justice through providing dynamic readings of the sacred texts of legal structure in Muslim societies.”120 The problem with this assumption is the fact that such a concept of “dynamic readings” is exactly what caused the chaotic, anarchic model discussed several times above. Additionally, Hashish quite openly states that Ijtihad is the “third source of Islamic law,” i.e., third point axis on the cognition axis – the point that renders Islam into a dogma. In the beginning of the chapter we established that any conclusion is possible to arrive at by introducing such a third point. Hashish further claims that because Muhammad himself encouraged knowledge-seeking, Islamic law is to be adapted into new contexts and times. Besides the fact that this leads us into the chaos model, it is ironic to see how Hashish uses evidence that indirectly supports his desired conclusion (by assuming Muhammad’s intention), but completely ignores the Hadith related to need to establish Caliphate – a notion that would discard Democracy automatically off-hand. Much of Hashish’s later discussion presents the relationship between the Islamic judiciary (four madhabs), ijtihad, and politics after the Rashidun caliphate’s fall, hence having no real effect on the argument—as we know that scholars’ later discussions of Islamic cognition have no bearing on the Prophet Muhammad’s actual cognition. What is important to see is that Hashish justifies the perverted version of ijtihad due to his insinuation that political Islam is separated from its religious base. It is misleading to establish such cognition as a standard, and then attempt to find theocratic-democratic schisms in early Islamic governance, as it assumes that post Rashidun Caliphate developments define what Islam ought to be. It is no small irony that such cognition can lead to any number of conclusions, because we know that Islamic theological and Ijtihad development legitimately stopped at the Rashidun caliphate, as such it is impossible to extrapolate what Islam is beyond that point. In other words, he examines the early Islamic period as he believes it should have been, not as it was. Hashish also mentions, in his discussion of “early Islamic governance” that Islam developed the glimpse of non-theocratic political ideology. He states that because the Caliph

119 120

Daniel Ungurneanu, "Wahhabism, Salafism and the Expansion of Islamic Fundamentalist Ideology." In Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric (2011), 143. Hashish, “Ijtihad Institutions: The Key to Islamic Democracy Bridging and Balancing Political and Intellectual Islam Hashish,” 64-65.

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Umar changed his title from “Caliph of God” to another title,121 and because he strictly defined the limits of several institutions, Islamic theology stopped being incorporated into law from that point on, as well as due to his practice of ijtihad. He eventually, separated the ability to interpret a law from the political ability to exercise the law in several cases. Such cases are: a) he did not intervene on judges’ rulings based on their personal legal opinion through ijtihad; b) institutionalized judicial practices;122 and c) he personally corrected himself when proven wrong.123 Indeed these are facts, but have no effect on democratizing Islam, because political Islam was not separated from ideological Islamic development for several reasons. Firstly, regarding the judiciary, Umar respected the judges’ ijtihad in individual unique cases, this does not set up the grounds for changing the definition of “right” and “wrong” in Islam, as ultimately, the laws (Qur’an and Sunnah) were not changed or amended institutionally except with the doing of the Caliphs himself. In other words, he did not allow the constitution (the Qur’an and Sunnah) to be changed. Furthermore, the type of judiciary is not such that Umar separated Islamic lawmaking from government; there is no historical evidence that Umar was personally subject to law of the judiciary (as modern parliament is by constitutional courts). Hashish’s claim is misleading, at the very least. Additionally, he points out that Umar himself was corrected when confronted for his actions. His argument that it indicated the separation between ideology and state boomerangs, as this very fact simply reaffirms Umar’s conviction to divine law: he corrected his own interpretation of the law when he realized it went against the divine law. Again, this reaffirms the sovereignty of God over all political and jurisprudential matters in the Caliphate. In practice, for instance, the judiciary would have no say on Umar’s decree on punishments for criminal law, nor could they create or amend a law themselves; there is no indication that the judiciary was given the ability or authority to make laws, their sole responsibility being weigh in facts and use Islamic cognition or ijtihad to pass a judgment. Umar was responsible for decreeing and amending law, as we know he has done above. Instead of a transfer from Umar’s political power to an independent judiciary, it was indeed the divine Islamic law that was supreme over both Umar (though he is the ultimate custodian of the divine law) and the judiciary that applied it. This also explains for Umar’s selfcorrection of his own law, realizing it went against the divine law, thus confirming Figure 2.1 as the ultimate standard. Finally, Hashish seems to forget the elephant (or Caliphate) in the room; the fact of the matter is that the entire institution of the Rashidun Caliphate, since its inception to its end, was upheld and governed by the example of Muhammad and was ruled by the Qur’an and Sunnah. It is appropriate to end with Umar’s own quote summarizing the legacy of the judiciary in the Caliphate: “People were (sometimes) judged by the revealing of a Divine Inspiration during the lifetime of Allah’s Apostle but now there is no longer any more (new revelation). Now we judge you by the deeds you practice publicly, so we will trust and favor the one who does good deeds in front of us, and we will not call him to account about what he is really 121

Which, by the way, though not mentioned, is “Leader of the believers,” which is not quite an improvement. Note that his title as Caliph did not change either; this is the reason why Caliphs Uthman and Ali still possessed the title of Caliph. 122 Hashish, “Ijtihad Institutions: The Key to Islamic Democracy Bridging and Balancing Political and Intellectual Islam Hashish,” 73. 123 Ibid, 77-78.

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Esposito125 also makes several arguments attempting to support Islamic grounds for democracy. There are a few (but surprisingly brief) arguments Esposito makes in his claims that Islamic governance is truly democratic. For instance, it is argued that because God sees all as equal, it is impossible for someone to have political authority over another, such as a dictator or king, and hence encourages equality—a liberal democratic value. Along this line of argument, it is further proposed that because God has made us viceroys of God himself on earth (Khalifah, as it can be interpreted), and because they are all expected to uphold Islamic values such as the Qur’an and Sunnah, it is in their position, as a whole, to uphold the Shari’ah law and create a “theo-democracy” as Esposito quotes Maududi. Such a system emphasizes on equality as well as political representation. Esposito also claims to find democratic values in the Shura (consultative framework to make judicial decisions), ijma126 (consensus, a rule established after the Rashidun caliphate stipulating that the majority of scholars’’ agreement on an issue is grounds for sovereignty), and independent ijtihad are all examples of an egalitarian model providing a bedrock for the foundation of democracy. Additionally, Esposito cites an argument claiming that the details of governmental methods (which may be democratic) are to be constructed by the leaders of individual countries. Esposito’s compilation of arguments in favor of democratic Islamic government represents the epitome of sewing the cognitive process. Simply identifying and discussion all of the egalitarian-based components of Islam, regardless of their true application or time of formation, and concluding that Islam can accommodate a democracy represents the exact problem of having an agenda, taking concepts out of context, gathering the support of people who agree, and coming to a conclusion the agenda came up with in the first place represents a complete perversion of the concept of seeking knowledge on a deductive basis. The only thing Esposito does not do is attempt to identify what Islam says about governance, then observing the potential democratic notions within it. The entire history of the Caliphate, the hierarchical political system of governance, the Islamic injunctions setting up the grounds for a political governance system, the Prophet Muhammad’s and the Rashidun Caliphate’s example of Islamic government is completely ignored. In describing the aphenomenal model of cognition or disinformation (Figure 2.8), these steps were clearly identified. Esposito personifies the disinformation model. Had he any objectivity, he would have realized that one cannot take notions surrounding Islamic ideology and group them into one, creating a government that fits the needs of his book (i.e., a democracy). Rather, one has to take and observe things for what they are: the Caliphate. Had he examined facts before trying to retrofit Islam into Democratic doctrines, he would realize that the caliphate is not a democracy, and there is no verse of Qur’an or prophetic narration indicating that sovereignty to create and amend Islamic law is in the hands of people. Rather, through the example of the 124

Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 3, Book 48, Hadith 809. In general see: John L. Esposito and John Obert Voll, Islam and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 25-32. 126 Such a concept, though not discussed above, simply reaffirms the false notion of legitimacy in the postRashidun period. Through the Islamic cognition model, it is impossible to simply make Islam’s definitions of right and wrong a product of the personal beliefs of people, people not even being sanctified by God to be given the authority to be scholars, for that matter. 125

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explicitly God-sanctified Caliphate, we see that it is the job of the Caliphs to create and amend law. This does not mean that there are democratic notions within the Caliphate, as the nomination process of the Caliphate implies (i.e., pledge of allegiance for legitimacy of the Caliph, ability of people to overthrow the Caliph in certain circumstances [see rebellion section], the concept of Shurah, etc.), but it does mean that there are no grounds for setting up a democracy or even amending the Caliphate form of government, as there is no Islamic precedent to do so. It is refreshing to consider the possibility that a true Caliphate would be free from the obvious toxic outcomes of Democracy that promised the rule of the people, by the people, for the people turned into rule by the Rich, of the Rich, for the Rich.127 My choice to only discuss the examples of liberal, “apologetic” viewpoints of Islam is mainly because these viewpoints have gone largely un-criticized and in fact are encouraged by scholars in the fields of sociology, religious/Islamic studies, gender studies, and so on (though not history, unsurprisingly). Additionally, the anti-Islamic scholars as well as conservative Islamic scholars’ opinions of political Islam have already largely been criticized. It is important to note, however, that the anti-Islamic view uses the exact same logic of discussing agenda-relevant portions of Islam and concluding that it is war-mongering, staunchly political, against human rights, dictatorial, fascist, and so on. For instance, Ali Sina, the so-called Iranian ex-Muslim has, as Esposito has for democracy, pointed out and described all of the dictatorially-leaned components of Islamic governance and concluded that it advocated for a Fascist, unequal, imperial system.128 In regards to Jihad we see that both apologetic and objective scholars have harshly criticized the out-of-context undertaking of such arguments.129

2.5. The Latitude of Permissibility: Example of the Caliphs With the self-proclaimed scholars out of the way, let us enter a brief discussion on the definition and length of the Latitude of Permissibility (LOP). When it comes to Islamic jurisprudence and legal rulings pertaining to structure and function of government, we use the same tools to find the “correct” answer to a legal question. However, as with part of Islam (personal, familial, and political life), there is also another tool to be able to tell the LOP: we have established that Islam does not require unique rigid solutions or only one single ‘way’ to reach an objective, there is a latitude of permissibility as shown in Figure 2.1. The way to understand this in politics is by looking at the precedent of the key political figures who actually ruled the Caliphate. The Prophet Muhammaad was consistent and had his own line of permissibility, and many of his rulings and practices do not give necessary information on the specifics of the latitude of permissibility. This is given by the Caliphs that came after, who certainly formed two extremes on the socio-political spectrum, ranging from “merciful” to “harsh” rulers – all within the confines of permissibility in Islam. These boundaries are useful in determining the entire envelop of Islamic Caliphate. These extremes can be found with all 127

M.R. Islam et al., Greening of pharmaceutical engineering, Volume 1: Practice, Analysis, and Methodology, 2015. 128 Ali Sina, “Is Political Islam Fascist?” in Beyond Jihad: Critical Voices from Inside Islam eds. Kim Ezra Shienbaum and Jamal Hasan (Palo Alto: Academica Press, 2006): 113-125. 129 Ibid, 1: just on the first page, we see a quotation of the Qur’an 9:5 using a textual, and not contextual approach, making a very big difference in the conclusions and observations.

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of the Caliphs, especially two, who had opposite personalities, though they both ruled permissibly. These two Caliphs and highly venerated Companions of the Prophet Muhammad are Umar and Uthman. Indeed, they both are disliked by the post-Ali Shi’ites,130 however, their personalities and rulings as a result of their personality are undoubtedly different. For instance, while Abu Bakr and Uthman (first and third Caliphs) only prescribed 40 lashes as the punishment for drinking alcohol, Umar prescribed 80.131 We can take both examples as standards, and they are both within the LOP. Another issue relating to the LOP is the fact that there is no set criteria of the types of reforms allowed to be made in the Caliphate. In the time of the Prophet, the Ummah and Caliphate that existed was relatively small in power and population. However, it grew to be much more powerful, and hence, it required several bureaucratic, tax-related, military, and other types of reforms in order to function properly. Around the time of Umar, when the Caliphate expanded into the nearly-entire territory of the Sassanian Empire and modern-day Egypt, such reforms were necessary; key principles regarding formalization of border patrol, taxation, bureaucracy, and even trade wars, were set in stone by Caliph Umar. Another logical reason the Islamic political cognition process takes example from the Caliphs’ actions and case law is because there are several questions regarding the caliphate that could not be resolved by the prophet. For instance, the process for selecting the new Caliph, the process of nomination and the criteria for nomination could clearly not have been established by the prophet himself. Another problem that could not be resolved is the issue of how to deal with rebellion and setting the criteria on when it is allowed to rebel against a socalled Caliph. The reason for analyzing the four rightly-guided caliphs’ lives and using their actions as case laws and examples of the LOP is that it is necessary to understand the practical aspects of foundational principles laid out by the prophet (the political LOP) and practiced by the Rashidun Caliphs. As a quick note, it is important to understand, contrary to popular belief, that the Umayyad, Abbasid, and other self-proclaimed Caliphates do not set such LOP precedent. The reason for this is simple; they do not follow the explicitly clear rules of delegation of authority set by the golden Islamic standard. As we see in the section on Fitnah, the Umayyad dynasty seized power and governed unlawfully, contrary to Islamic laws. Because this is the case, though the Umayyads may have continued to use several of the laws and policies of the Rashidun Caliphate before them, they themselves cannot form a case law. At best they are hypocritical as they operate un-Islamically under the guise of Islam. As is quite often heard about ISIS and other Islamist groups,132 the phrase, whether it applies to ISIS and others is discussed later on, certainly applies to the Umayyads as discussed in Chapter 6. For this reason, the scope of standardization is stopped abruptly at the end of the Rashidun Caliphate.

130

I say “post-ali” because it is thought by many (especially in the encyclopaedia of Islam) that ‘Ali, Hasan, Husayn, etc. were shi’ites in a way. Howver, the fact of the matter is that the core theology and ideology of Shi’ism was founded after the long civil strife between the Umayyads and the Alids. 131 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 17, Hadith 4226 and Abu Dawood al-Sijsitānī, Sunan Abi Dawood, Book 39, Hadith 4465. 132 I.e., The phrase “they use Islam to do what they want,” or “they claim but to not represent what true Islam is.” Indeed, we even have a quote from Barak Obama, stating that “ISIS is not Islamic”: “Strong reaction to Obama statement: 'ISIL is not Islamic,’” CNN 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/obama-isil-notislamic/. Ban Ki Moon has stated that: “…groups like ISIL – or Da’ish -- have nothing to do with Islam.”: United Nations 2014. http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=8040.

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2.6. CONCLUSION This chapter addressed the fundamentals of Islamic cognition, theology, and the relationship between Islam and Politics. We first defined the very basics: the normative vs. deductive approach to cognition, and we established that Islam requires that the deductive approach be taken. Examples of the normative (agenda-driven) approach regarding both the personal and political aspects of Islam were given. We also discussed Ijtihad, its true meaning, goal(s), permissibility of its application, and that the most common form of ijtihad is the agenda-driven type; this is logically inconsistent and goes against the fundamental requirements of deductive logic. Another important discovery was the notion of an Islamic golden standard; that the right and wrong has been defined clearly by God, as has the latitude of permissibility within the context of the Qur’an and Hadith. Therefore, it is the responsibility of Muslims to adhere to that golden standard, rather than attempting to make themselves a standard and justify their actions through Islam. In the debate surrounding ISIS, it is common to state that ISIS does not represent Islam, specifically, that it is “taking our name.”133 This certainly applies regarding the actions of those who use agenda-driven beliefs to change Islam, the path of surrounding to God, altogether for the sake of justifying Islam’s compatibility with democracy. Regarding the relationship between Islam and politics, we know that Islam is not a way of life that is contained to the spiritual and personal life, but also the communal and political spheres of life. Because it is impossible to practice the latter two spheres of life without a system in which Islamic governance is prevalent, it is necessary for Muslims to construct such a government system in order to fully practice their religion. Finally and most importantly, we have established that, unlike Christianity, there is an explicit delegation of authority outlined by the Qur’an and Sunnah, paving the road for the only legitimate form of government, the likes of the Rashidun Caliphate, to be formed. All other forms of government do not rule by or adhere to the ‘divine’ structure of law, and hence, have no legitimacy from an Islamic perspective.

133

This is what triggered the “#notinmyname” movement.

Chapter 3

UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL ISLAM AND MORALITY: IBN KHALDUN VERSUS HOBBES AND LOCKE 3.1. INTRODUCTION Sir Winston Churchill famously said, “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.” Yet, there is a great deal of romanticism surrounding democracy and democratic values and many people remain optimistic even though they are not quite sure of what is the source of that optimism. Others resort to optimism just because pessimism is too depressing an idea, thus oscillating between dangerously risky optimism and depressive pessimism.134 This mindset governs the entire political environment today. The east has a different take on politics and reality. Al-Ghazali (1106-1107) quoted Ali Ibn Abu Talib [Fourth Caliph of Islam] as saying, “Do not know the truth by men, but rather, know the truth and you will know its adherents.” This premise dictates that we know the essence before we decide on veracity of a given philosophy135. This chapter investigates how two philosophical giants of the enlightenment era compare with a Medieval (also known as the Islamic golden age) one in defining the essence of politics that govern our civilization. Abd ar-Raḥmān Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun, popularly known as Ibn Khaldun is considered to be one of the greatest empirical social scientists of history. Some western scholars consider him to be the founder of the field of Sociology, specializing in modern empirical methods of deduction.136 Ibn Khaldun pre-empted many enlightenment and renaissance-aged thinkers. His major work is the Muqaddimah (1377), or ‘Prolegomena,’ which clearly lived up to its name, recognized as a prolegomena to political science, ranging from world history to social Darwinism.137 This chapter sheds light on the fundamental philosophical differences in various political models. Ibn Khaldun’s political theory is contrasted with those of Hobbes and Locke, based 134

D Hecht, “The Neural Basis of Optimism and Pessimism,” Experimental Neurobiology 22 (2013): 173-199. Al-Ghazali and R. J. McCarchy, Deliverance from Error: An Annotated Translation of Al-Munqidh Min Al Dalal and Other Relevant Works of Al-Ghazali (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 1999), 12. 136 F.H. Hassan, “Ibn Khaldun and Jane Addams: The Real Father of Sociology and theMother of Social Works.” In: Congreso Ibn Khaldun, Madrid, Spain, 3-5 November 2006. Encuentro Internacional; W.E. Gates, “The spread of Ibn Khaldun's ideas on climate and culture,” Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (1967): 415-422. 137 F. Baali, Society, state, and urbanism: Ibn Khaldun's sociological thought, Albany: University of New York Press: 1988. 135

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on their works titled The Leviathan (1651) and the Two Treatises of Government (1689), respectively. This chapter will analyze the premises of the three scholars regarding the principles upon which they build their foundational political theories, and then discuss the issue of the applicability of these premises in the real world. The immediate implication of this chapter is in introducing a new paradigm into political thought in view of the current status of world politics. It is a potent demonstration of how Islamic political thought plays out in relation to that of the west, providing further understanding as to why and how policies (like foreign policy) are governed by Islamic principles.

3.1.1. The Fundamental Premises of Ibn Khaldun Ibn Khaldun is most known as an empiricist, having based his theories around hard facts.138 However, similar to his predecessors, such as Averroes (1126-1198), who is recognized as the ‘father of secular philosophy in Europe,’139 Ibn Khaldun’s first premise was the Islamic declaration of faith, “There is no deity but God, and Muhammad is His Messenger,” being a devout Muslim.140 This premise founded Ibn Khaldun’s government model, assuming that the prophet of Islam, Muhammad, is the “lawgiver,” and, therefore, the Islamic Caliphate he founded was the model form of government.141 We see the impact of this fundamental premise when in Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun talks about human civilization, Bedouin civilization and tribal codes, the effect of climate and physical environment on the behavior and formation of people, psychological factors influencing the behavior of people (the famous ‘Asabiyyah142 theory), the formation and destruction and maintenance of royal ‘dynasties,’ economics, etc. Logical explanation of each of these events could be found through deductive reasoning starting from the first premise. For Ibn Khaldun, the notion of Justice, be in a ‘Just society’ or ‘Just war,’ was embedded in the first premise that takes Allah (Creator) as the ultimate Justice and His messenger, Muhammad as the lawgiver that assured justice. There are some scholars that believe Ibn Khaldun’s premises were strictly secular. While may be true for Christianity that shunned science, this does not apply to Islam whose holy book has the word ‘science’ (ilm in Arabic) as the second most frequently used word.143 Rabi144 points out how misinterpretation, along with prejudicial “modernization” of Ibn Khaldun’s terms and concepts led several European authors to go the extreme of equating Asabiyyah with nationalism. Such criticism was pre-empted by Gibb.145 In Gibb’s words, such mischaracterization “arises from a misapprehension of his [Ibn Khaldun’s] outlook,

138

L.E. Goodman, “Ibn Khaldun and Thucydides,” Journal of the American Oriental society 92 (1972): 250-270. M.R. Islam et al. Reconstituting the Curriculum, 148. 140 M.M. Rabi, The Political Theory of Ibn Khaldun (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 132. 141 M.R. Islam et al. Reconstituting the curriculum, 2013, 110. 142 Asabiyyah refers to the concept of what we may call group consciousness and solidarity. 143 M.R. Islam, J. S Islam, G.M. Zatzman, M.S. Rahman and M.A.H. Mughal, The Greening of Pharmaceutical Engineering, Volume 1: Practice, Analysis, and Methodology, New York City: Scrivener-Wiley, 2015, 557. 144 Rabi, The Political Theory of Ibn Khaldun. 145 H.A.R. Gibb, “The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldun's Political Theory,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 7 (1935): 23-31. 139

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especially in its relation to religious questions.”146 Gibb had his own share of misinterpretation and prejudices,147 but in matter of his analysis of political power and divine rule, there was no ambiguity. In fact, according to Gibb, “it is impossible to avoid the impression that Ibn Khaldun, besides setting out to analyze the evolution of the State, was, like the other Muslim jurists of his time, concerned with the problem of reconciling the ideal demands of the Shari’ah (God’s prescribed pathway) with the facts of history. The careful reader will note how he drives home the lesson, over and over again, that the course of history is what it is because of the infraction of the Shari’ah by the sin of pride, the sin of luxury, the sin of greed. Even in economic life it is only when the ordinances of the Shari’ah are observed that prosperity follows.”148 Gibb points out the belief of Ibn Khaldun as to what will occur in absence of Shari’ah, “it is condemned to an empty and unending cycle of rise and fall, conditioned by the ‘natural’ and inevitable consequences of the predominance of its animal instincts. In this sense Ibn Khaldun may be a ‘pessimist’ or ‘determinist,’ but his pessimism has a moral and religious, not a sociological basis”149. Note that this division between moral and sociological category does not conform to Islamic cognition that draws no distinction between morality and science.150 Islam et al.151 summarized Ibn Khaldun’s philosophy, “Ibn Khaldun got his inspiration from the Qur’an that defines humans as the Viceroy (khalifah) of the Creator (e.g., 2:30 of the Qur’an specifies man’s role as the viceroy), charged with law and order on Earth that seems to be abandoned not withstanding the grand plan of the Creator in the form of universal order. This outlook is clearly different to the Eurocentric notions, ranging from the vastly discredited ‘original sin’ to widely accepted ‘evolution’ theories that detach human conscience from its functioning in a society.”152 From the above fundamental premise of Ibn Khaldun emerges the role of Caliphate as the model or ideal community that in his word rules by shari’ah, the divine set of laws that is deduced from the Qur’an and hadith. The Caliphate system of government is the standard and ‘right’ system of government, and all empirical findings and data interpreted are tallied against an external standard. An “external standard” means that the standards by which a theory is built upon is insulated from the belief of a person that often sets an internal standard. The lack of such standard can lead to spurious cognition pattern,153 criticized as ‘deliberate schizophrenia’ by some authors.154 The external standard grounds empirical findings and becomes the impetus for single-solution outcomes. The presence of such external standard will prove to be the key determinant in creating bifurcation of Ibn Khaldun’s model from Locke’s or Hobbes’ models. In absence of this standard, his theory explained the rise and fall of empires. For Locke, Hobbes etc., the standard is in subjective or subject to change.155 146

Ibid. 25. Rabi, The Political Theory of Ibn Khaldun, 8. 148 Ibid. 31; H.A.R. Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 173. 149 Ibid, 174. 150 J.S. Islam et al., “A New Cognitive model.” 151 M.R. Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 117. 152 Ibid 113. 153 A.I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1986. 154 M.R. Islam et al., Greening of pharmaceutical Engineering, 675. 155 It's similar to latest version of Oxford dictionary vs the Qur’an as standards of languages (English and Arabic, respectively). 147

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Although there are dozens more significant philosophical schools, the case-laws of Hobbes and Locke are used as representative examples.

3.1.2. The Premises of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke Hobbes believed that people are naturally prone to competition, including violent competition, fighting out of fear, and seeking out reputation. The Leviathan, after describing these qualities of men, summarizes that there are three “principal causes of quarrel.” Being “competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.” He adds that people therefore use violence to “to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles.”156 The logic is that because some have these qualities at times, people are in a constant state of war, and that as a result is “continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” 157 This occurs as long as there is no authority or “sovereign” to govern them.158 Therefore, there is a need for people to get together and create an non-revocable covenant to create a sovereign (person or office) that takes all the rights of the people with the exception of self-preservation, in order to establish peace and order.159 Herein lies the fundamental premise of Hobbes that pertains to how to derive a ‘standard.’ In search of such standard, Hobbes invoked the possibility of having a process that can select a sovereign based on consensus. By ceding power to the sovereign, the general public is no longer a party to the process of creating and enforcing laws. This means that the standard or grounding starts from the self (internal standard) to create an arbitrary external standard. Locke, on the other hand, had a different perception of how government should be set up and operated, as well as how the standards to be enforced by the government. Locke being considered the ‘father of classical liberalism,’ it is safe to assume that he was in favor of creating government by consent.160 In terms of creating a political standard, Locke’s notion of universal natural law contrasts sharply with that of Hobbes for whom the laws have the single purpose of the creation of the sovereign. Also, Locke believed that sovereignty is in the people in contrast to Hobbes that believed in sovereignty belongs to the Sovereign. Locke believed that ‘god’161 endowed man with natural laws that govern people in a state of nature.162 From this, our fundamental rights are derived from the premise, “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker”163 which we have a right to defend and punish

156

Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, 77. Ibid., 78. 158 Tom Sorrel ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 222. 159 Ibid. 160 A. Moseley, “Political philosophy of John Locke,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005). 161 John Locke is considered by many to be a deist, i.e., with the belief that god created nature with inherent natural laws. 162 Forde, S. “Mixed Modes” in John Locke's Moral and Political Philosophy.” The Review of Politics 73 (2011): 581. 163 John Locke, Two treatises of government (Hamilton: McMaster University archive of the history of economic thought, 2014), 107. 157

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transgressions.164 When people get together and set up government by their consent, the government is to provide these rights to the people and enforce the law for the “common good.”165 Consequently, the limit to Locke’s government is that the people have the right to revolt against the government and change their legislators when they act against the purposes for which they were elected.166 From these thoughts, we may derive two premises upon which theories of government and governance are based; a) the sovereignty lies in the people, and b) Nature dictates what is right and wrong; while government serves the purpose of ensuring these rights and being the common authority that enforces these rights.167

3.2. COMPARING STANDARDS When it comes to Ibn Khaldun’s political grounding (standards), there is observed logical consistency, based on the logically (deductively) connected major premise (there is a unique deity, God) and minor premise (Muhammad is His messenger), and the model government, the Caliphate, is formed by the Prophet Muhammad, the ‘law-giver.’ This is tied to the notion that the purpose of humans is to be the viceroy of the creator, charged with law and order, and being accountable for only their intention. Therefore, the source of all rights is the creator, who explicitly delegated limited rights to His designated Caliphs, selected by the most righteous humans as per the standard of the Qur’an and the Hadith.168 The purpose of the Caliph and the system is to be “a substitute for the lawgiver (Muhammad) inasmuch as it serves, like him, to protect the religion169 and to exercise leadership over the world.”170 It is derived then that according to Ibn Khaldun, the ultimate source of law and power is God, political power comes from ‘religion’ of God.171 Although outwardly similar to Ibn Khaldun’s, Locke’s model poses a problem, as Grant put it, when “the people consent to a form of government or to a government action that does not protect the lives, liberties, and property of the subjects,” as “without a clear articulation for the relation between claims based on the origin of power, consent, and claims based on its ends, protection of life, liberty, and property, we cannot identify legitimate authority.”172 Similarly, Kendall opines on the issue of majority sovereignty:

164

Ibid, 108. Ibid, 161. 166 Ibid, 204. It’s important to note that for each of these topics it is possible to go into a lot of depth on the individual issues; however, the goal is to understand the basic concepts. 167 A. Moseley, A. Political philosophy of John Locke, 2005, In: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available from: http://www.iep.utm.edu/locke-po/. 168 Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 118. Hadith is the collection of the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, actions and activities condoned by him (actively or tacitly). 169 The Arabic word ‘dīn’ stands for natural traits and not a set of doctrine as in organized religions. 170 ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal. (1967). https://asadullahali.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/ibn_khaldun-al_muqaddimah.pdf, 257. 171 Ibn Khaldun believed that the aspect distinguishing the Caliphate from Christian and Jewish authoritative figures is that for the latter two, there is division of religion and politics (as the goal of those religions was to establish religion amongst themselves only and not politically across the world): Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, 183. 172 R. W. Grant, John Locke's liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2010). 165

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This inability to derive a standard for law - a criterion to differentiate between right and wrong - is a problem that has significant practical concerns, as will be detailed in the following section. Locke’s model gives rise to two logical paradoxes. The first is in regard to natural law; there is a discontinuation between God’s intended natural law, and Locke being the definer of natural rights. In other words, there is no logical connector of Locke to God (or to nature), no connection to make him the rightful interpreter of the “infinitely wise maker.” As a consequence, Locke gives no elaboration onto what may be considered moral and immoral.174 The second paradox is the problem identified by Grant earlier that lies within identifying the ultimate authority of law (the sovereign) as the people, and acknowledging a natural law that is above everything else. We see that the exact criteria by which natural ends and popular sovereignty begins is ambiguous, to say the least. What is perhaps even more interesting is that the same central argument Locke used against Robert Filmer (1588 -1653) applies to Locke himself. Filmer argued in his major work, Patriarcha (1680)175 that God gave Adam sovereignty over the earth (the divine right to rule), and that this right is delegated from Adam to his descendants, thereby creating a divinely-backed ‘absolute’ monarchy-similar to how natural rightful paternal authority works. Locke deconstructs this Biblical justification in his First Treatise of Government, identifying the disconnect of the pattern of authority moving from God to Adam, and to his descendants. A representative example of an argument could be him stating that the Bible did not really specify that Adam was given the right to rule over people, but rather, over “the fish and the fowl.”176 Locke’s own argument follows discontinuity of equal rigor. Hobbes’ model entails the formation of only one type of government, a tyrannical and authoritarian one (to say the least).177 Once set up, the rights (with an exception to self preservation) of individuals are given up to the sovereign that becomes the legal standard. There are two main problems that we encounter in Hobbes’ theory regarding its logical continuum. The third of Hobbes’ 19 laws of nature state that people ‘ought to set up a sovereign,178 leads to groups of people choosing their own sovereigns, each sovereign 173

W Kendall, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-rule (Urbana--Champaign: The University of Illinois press, 1940), 113. 174 P. Sheridan, “Locke's Moral Philosophy,” in ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summar, 2014 [online]). 175 Summarized by D.A. McWhirter and J. D. Bible. Privacy as a constitutional right: Sex, drugs, and the right to life, (Greenwood: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992). 176 Ibid, 39. 177 Whether or not the government Hobbes envisioned was meant to be tyrannical and/or totalitarian is debated. Nevertheless, the fact remains that power is vested in (favorably) one individual. 178 Noberto Bobbio, Daniela Gobetti tr., Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1993), 148.

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creating its own standards of law. This implies that; a) there may logically be several different legal standards for one human race, and; b) the sovereign itself is able to exercise tyrannical power, to oppress and suppress the people who set him up, an extraordinary amount of optimism is put into the notion of the sovereign not abusing his power,179 which may eventually lead to internal chaos, and; c) even if the sovereigns of the world are all righteous, there is nothing stopping endless warfare between states,180 posing obvious problems that Hobbes himself would seem averse to (as the purpose of the state is to create peace and order). Note that this dichotomy arises from the assumption that the only two options for humanity is to either descend into a constant state of war, or to have a sovereign dictate everything to the people. If this assumption is false, there is absolutely no basis for the rest of Hobbes’ theory. In stark contrast, Ibn Khaldun’s model starts off with a global standard that not only provides a domestic solution, but a global one as well. As Figure 3.1 depicts, Hobbes’ theory can be seen as a ‘last-ditch’ attempt to solving the problem of forming a government in absence of global standards. Therefore, people are disconnected from their purpose, creating moral dilemma181 and logical fallacies. For example, different people, even proximal neighbors, can have radically different notions of “right” and “wrong” imposed upon them, leading to what constitutes “right reason” according to Hobbes. Figure 3.1 depicts the direction of ‘legal derivation,’ the process by which law is discerned, for each of the theorists’ models. Ibn Khaldun’s model is straightforward in the direction of legal derivation with a standard. Hobbes’ model is also straightforward and similar to that of Ibn Khaldun’s, but in the opposite direction (legal derivation without a global standard), because the standard (the sovereign) is created by individuals and then sovereign itself. Note that this standard does not apply globally, or even nationally, in fact, even the smallest of communities can create their own standards. Conversely, this model takes us into the direction of the opposite of the goal of a global order, into an order that fosters chaos. Hobbes’ derivation is much more rapid and starts earlier than Ibn Khaldun’s (and Locke’s), as the so-called laws of nature he speaks about are merely a justification to create an all powerful sovereign (as rule #3 states). As the graph depicts, Hobbes’ model swerves in the direction of legal derivation relatively earlier in time, because the purpose of his natural law is to create government as fast as possible. Locke’s model starts off in the direction of Ibn Khaldun’s, when discussing a universal natural law and possibly a future vision for mankind, but cuts off and goes into the direction of chaos. This is inevitable when there is no defined logical criterion to determine if an action is “moral,” “just,” or “ethical.” This progression is similar to what Ibn Khaldun termed as deliberate departure from shari’ah, in which case humans behave like animals, meaning without purpose and the society falls into chaos or anarchy. In essence, both Locke and Hobbes have only looked into the chaotic model (in absence of adherence to shari’ah), albeit attempting to retrofit it as a standard model, leading to the absurdity of Caliphate without shari’ah and humans without conscience.

179

Wolfenden, K. J, “Hobbes' Leviathan and Views on the Origins of Civil Government: Conservatism by Covenant,” Student Pulse 2 (2010). 180 Hobbes is seen by many to be the “representative example of a ‘realist’ in international relations” implying that individual states are actors and behave as humans do in the state of nature. 181 M.R. Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum.

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Figure 3.1. Depicts the legal derivation directions of the three theorists’ model government models.

The above discussion regarding the relegation of authority is summarized in Table 3.1. As discussed, Ibn Khaldun started with believing in a major premise (God) and a minor premise (Muhammad is the prophet of God). The Qur’an, which was given by god, delegated political and religious authority to Muhammad, who himself explicitly allowed for the delegation of his authority after his death. Hence, the current Caliph, provided that he abides by God’s law, is given power. John Locke believed that the law of nature is naturally manifest in nature (created by God). This natural law, through the authority of Locke himself, delegates power to the people, being the new sovereign. Government under the people has the purpose of creating and enforcing laws with the consent of the people. Robert Filmer believed that God is the source of all authority and sovereignty, and that the power was delegated to Adam and therefore to the ‘kings’ who are descendants of Adam. Locke uses the same argument identifying Filmer’s political authority discontinuation that, in fact, applies to himself. Hobbes believed that people are all fundamentally equal, and their individual powers and rights are delegated to a sovereign given the right to do anything to maintain peace and order, with the exception of unlawful killing. It should be noted that Hobbes creates paradoxes for himself as well, discussed above.

3.3. APPLICATION OF THE MODELS This section is dedicated to applying the theoretical models and analyzing representative examples, in order to identify the practical advantages and disadvantages of the models.

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As we discussed in previous sections, Ibn Khaldun’s model is the Caliphate. It’s important to know that historically, the caliphate lasted for 30 years,182 ruled by the Khilafat al-Rashidun (the ‘rightly-guided’ caliphs). Ibn Khaldun saw the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties following the rightly-guided Caliphate as absolute monarchies,183 which, according to Okene and Ahmad,184 Ibn Khaldun himself was “repulsed” by as being a perversion of the Caliphate.185 Maddy-Weitzman notes how Ahmed Yessine observed that Ibn Khaldun saw the rise and fall of Muslim dynasties general (as many existed) to be a part of the cyclical version of history.186 Indeed, this ‘Shari’ah-free’ state is the state of nature notion portrayed by international relations realists. Ibn Khaldun agreed with the explanation of Abu al-Hasan alMas’udi (896–956) discussing the decline of the Umayyads, in that many of the ‘caliphs’ were more concerned about their worldly pleasures, ruled with tyranny, blindness, and power was “passed to their wasteful descendants who were only concerned with the gratification of their desires and with sinful pleasures” and so on, which is how the “caliphate is transformed into royal authority.”187 One can see that Ibn Khaldun’s model of the Caliphate is the original caliphate, the one that was ruled by the “most righteous” and not monarchial heirs. Ibn Khaldun’s model, unlike Hobbes,’ already existed, providing a continuum for jurisdiction from God to the Caliphs through Muhammad.188 Ibn Khaldun’s first claim of the Caliphate is that it would provide security and order and prevent corruption and injustice.189 This model was personified by the life and work of Prophet Muhammad, whose influence catapulted 1000 years of unparalleled boost in knowledge. The book that he claimed was a divine revelation had the word ‘science’ (ilm in Arabic) “cited over 700 times (second most used word only second to the word ‘Allah’) and has no dogma.”190 It lays out the foundation of a society based on conscious and conscientious participation of every individual. With the Qur’an as the starting point, it adds an axis that is the practice of Prophet Muhammad, then asks its followers to time scale (qiyas in Arabic) that scenario to the époque of interest and treat worldly belonging (including time) as a trust and defines human role as the ‘viceroy of the creator’191. In other words, functioning of the government is similar to running a trust. Such governance is possible only through just and measured application of human conscience to the solving of social problems, all definitions having been standardized by the Qur’an and the life of Prophet Muhammad. It also follows that most notable of his companions are the ‘rightly guided’ Caliphs who were elected to serve according to criteria and a process established by the prophet and his rightly182

Starting from the death of the Prophet Muhammad (632) to the death of the fourth caliph, Ali (661). Scott, P and W. T. Cavanaugh, eds. The Blackwell companion to political theology (New York City: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 505. 184 Okane, A. A. and S. B. Ahmad. “Ibn Khaldun, Cyclical Theory and the rise and fall of Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria, West Africa.” International Journal of Business and Social Science 2 (2011): 83. 185 “Repulsed” by the rising and declining of monarchies and the moral corruption that comes with it. 186 B. Maddy-Weitzman, “Islamism, Moroccan-style: the ideas of Sheikh Yassine.” Middle East Quarterly 10 (2003): 43-51. This is the “cyclical history” theory that Gibb had earlier presented us with in the context of Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of the world without a caliphate. 187 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, 275-276. 188 Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 123. 189 D'Agostino, F. and I. Jarvie, eds, Freedom and Rationality: Essays in Honor of John Watkins from his Colleagues and Friends. Vol. 117 (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012), 127. By injustice, we are talking about the typical lawless oppression, over-taxation, and things that we can universally see as “bad.” 190 Islam et al., The Greening of Pharmaceutical Engineering, Volume 1: Practice, Analysis, and Methodology, 577. 191 Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 57. 183

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guided caliphs. At his deathbed, the Prophet Muhammad made sure that the transfer of power takes place following God’s prescribed pathway, known as shari’ah. This process involves both nomination by the current leader and election by the electoral body made out of the most righteous ones. The leader is called, Khalifah (Caliph) that stands for ‘viceroy,’ ‘deputy,’ or ‘representative’ of God, who gave Qur’an as the Constitution192. In today’s term, the Caliph is similar to a prime minister who reports to an Autocratic (yet Benevolent, Merciful, Forgiving) Monarch as the Monarch’s viceroy. The most important feature of Caliphate is the selection of successor that would lead the world. Let’s examine the traits of Abu Bakr, the first successor nominated by Prophet Muhammad, who said about Abu Bakr, “If I were to take a friend other than my Lord, I would take Abu Bakr as a friend.” Abu Bakr was known for his truthfulness and strong Faith in God (he was called “Siddique,” meaning the truthful), which forms the most important criterion of selection of a leader. Abu Bakr, in his own right, outlined the limit of the power of the Caliph. When, Abu Bakr passed away, he nominated Umar, who was later unanimously elected by the most righteous representatives of various tribes. Umar, on the other hand, nominated a group of 5 most righteous people and ordered them to nominate one Caliph who would later be elected by the most righteous representatives. Both Uthman and Ali were assassinated and there is no indication as to whom they nominated as successors. Table 3.2 shows clearly when the model Caliphate ceased to exist and monarchy was started. In summary, Ibn Khaldun’s model Caliphate fulfills all criteria of benevolent governance, starting from Constitution through legislation process, selection of leader, enforcement of rule law, welfare of the society, just war193, national security, international relations, global peace, and overall justice. The model of Hobbes is intellectually intriguing, as it is essentially the opposite of Ibn Khaldun’s, as morals and laws are created by groups’ individual sovereigns or ‘mortal gods.’ It is important to note that Hobbes’ model was not a historical one, at least in its fullest sense, as there is no documented civilization in the state of nature where people together created a covenant to have an unconditional sovereign that would be the absolute ruler and source of law. Because of this contradiction, all we can do is to create hypothetical scenarios and analyze absolutist governments to get an idea. There are many fundamental practical problems to Hobbes’ approach. Firstly, the fact that humans are only given a choice between the state of nature or an absolutist government is simply empirically incorrect, as people can create stable, limited governments to enforce our fundamental right to self-preservation without an absolutist regime.194

192

It is of interest to note that each individual also enjoys the same position as every person is a khalifa of God as per the Qur’an (2:30). The Caliph, however, is the one with dual responsibility. He is the viceroy as well as ‘representative’ of the people. 193 The concept of ‘just war’ features prominently in Ibn Khaldun’s work but is beyond the scope of this paper. 194 Note that Hobbes does distinguish between so-called “good” and “bad” laws; good being necessary for the people and the power of the sovereign, and not to “bind voluntary actions”: see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 213-214. That being said, the fact that bad laws are possible to create and not considered unjust paves the road for an absolutist state.

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Table 3.1. Comparison of the fundamental premises of various political models regarding the transfer of power Theorist Ibn Khaldun

Origin of authority Allah (God)

John Locke

People (or God?*)

Robert Filmer Thomas Hobbes

God People

Transferring of authority

Where authority currently lies

The Qur’an, considered the direct word of God, delegates authority to his prophet, Muhammad. He, directly delegated/allowed for the transference of authority from the Prophet to the Caliph who is chosen from the most righteous (as Ibn Khaldun explained earlier) Undefined

The authority then lies with the selected Caliph, however the ultimate authority that the caliph (and people) is required to rule by is by God’s law as identified in the Qur’an and Hadith. The authority of who decides what is natural law and natural rights, the rightful structure-r of government and delegator of authority (to the people) is Locke himself. Undefined according to Locke and reason Kings or ‘princes’ The political and ideological authority of the The authority would then lie state comes from the sovereign, the people in the sovereign that is given delegate authority to it however the power no the full right to create and longer holds. enforce law.

Table 3.2. Head of state and process of social structure during Islamic era (modified from Islam et al.195) Name of the head of the state Prophet Muhammad* (570-632) Abu Bakr Siddique* (573634)

Timeline of head of state 622-632 (natural death)

Denomination

Selection process Overall contribution

Prophet of Allah

Divine selection

632-634 (natural death) by electors (Majlis)

Rashidun (rightly guided) Caliphate

Nominated by the prophet, later unanimously accepted

Umar Ibn Khattab* (579644)

634-644 Rashidun assassinated by (rightly guided) a Persian Caliphate

Nominated by Abu Bakr, elected by council of electors (Majlis)

195

Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 328-329.

Establish cognition at all levels, starting with the Qur’an, applied in context of Hadith Continue the legacy of Prophet Muhammad; crush uprising by false prophets, fought “Muslim” oppressive regimes, subjugated two most powerful empires of the time. He was an expert Islamic jurist and is best known for his pious and just nature, which earned him the title AlFaruq (“the one who distinguishes between right and wrong”). He expanded Caliphate to include Persian Empire and more than two thirds of the Eastern Roman Empire. He is recognized setting aside the Christian ban on Jews and allowed Jews into Jerusalem and to worship. He is known to have introduced numerous social benefits, including child benefit for single mothers.

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Name of the head of the state Uthman Ibn Affan (577 – 656)*

Timeline of head of state

Denomination

Selection process Overall contribution

644-656 assassinated by a rebel group

Rashidun (rightly guided) Caliphate

Nominated by Umar and elected by council of electors.

Ali Ibn Abu Talib* (656-661)

601-661 (assassinated by ‘deviant’ groups)

Rashidun (rightly guided) Caliphate

Elected by prominent companions of the Prophet

Ummayad Dynasty Caliphs of Damascus Omar Ibn** Abdul-Aziz (682-720) Emires of Cordova Caliphs of Cordova Abbasid Caliphs Caliphs of Baghdad Caliphs of Cairo Other Caliphs Fatimid caliphs Almohad caliphs Ottoman Empire Caliphs

661-750/1031

Autocracy

661-750

Autocracy

717-720 (poisoned) 756-921

Nominated, unanimously accepted Appointed

929-1031

Appointed

750-1258/1517

Autocratic

750-1517

Autocratic

1261-1517

Autocratic

909-1261 909-1161 1145-1269

Autocratic Autocratic

1517-1922

Autocratic

Uthman was born into the Umayyad clan of Mecca, a powerful family of the Quraish tribe. He was a companion of Muhammad who assumed the role of leader (caliph) of the Muslim Empire at the age of 65 following Umar ibn al-Khattab. Under his leadership, the empire expanded into Fars in 650 (present-day Iran), some areas of Khorasan (present-day Afghanistan) in 651 and the conquest of Armenia was begun in the 640s. Some of Uthman’s notable achievements were the economic reforms he introduced, and the compilation of the Qur’an into the unified, authoritative text that is known today. He introduced the notion of minimum wages for all workers. Ali is respected for his courage, knowledge, belief, honesty, unbending devotion to Islam, equal treatment of all Muslims and generosity in forgiving his defeated enemies. Ali retains his stature as an authority on Qur’anic exegesis, Islamic jurisprudence and logical thought. He fought against rebel “Muslim” factions as per Qur’an 49:9. Expansion of the Islamic empire

Reinstated Islamic Caliphate

Scientific and technological breakthroughs

Formalization of civil service, military

* Corresponds to Ibn Khaldun’s model state ** Many consider Umar ibn Abdul Aziz to be the 5th rightly guided Caliph because of the fact that he ceded power and was subsequently elected to power.

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Practically, absolutist regimes are not beneficial to humanity because they set the table for ideology, control, over-taxation, property stealing, unjust violence, etc. The latter one is very problematic, as it defeats the purpose of Hobbes’ state itself. Yates points out two views on this issue. The first is that of Locke and others that believe that the Sovereign has a right to do what it pleases, including violence and infliction of harm. The second view is that only the sentence to the pre-determined law may be executed196. Obviously, from a practical perspective, such a government would be very frightening. A look at any human rightstoleration map shows us that the very worst states are the most authoritative ones. The cases in point are Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Egypt, etc. that are and have historically been involved in human rights abuses.197 A parallel version to Hobbes’ state can be found in Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler. People of Germany democratically elected Hitler, rendering him a ‘Sovereign,’ who obviously took over the state matters and personified Hobbes’ ‘Sovereign.’ We do not need a history lesson to realize how brutal absolutist states can be. The problem lies within the theory that allows a sovereign to possess the powers to do evilthe opposite of peace and order which is the purpose of the state in the first place-even if he didn’t intend it to be such, paves the road for oppression and tyranny. Even if we accept the second view on Hobbes’ delegation of authority, there is no doubt that a sovereign, with its ideals and potentially evil goals, will be able to use the judicial system to bolster more authority/control over people that he is supposed to rule with benevolence. A modern-day example is with the case of the “President” of Egypt, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. Though he does not judge directly, or even create new laws without so called democratic consent, yet, he has been able to oversee the unlawful detainment of many of the 41,000 peaceful protestors arrested, and oversee the killing of thousands of people over a very short period of time.198 The goal here is not to demonize Hobbes or his theory, but to point out that the theoretical flaws in his model make it impossible to predict reality in any governance, let alone good governance. It doesn’t stop at predicting chaos or anarchy, it goes further and asserts that the chaos/anarchy model is the only model and there cannot be an alternative model. One of the overarching problems of Hobbes’ model is that it only pays attention to the single state, and not the big picture of a global vision for humanity. This is shown in Figure 3.1. The fact of the matter is that the theoretical notion of there being a sovereign for every group of people is myopic,199 in the sense that when only the group of one state is of concern, and other groups or the general global situation is ignored, the results are detrimental to the global situation. Such is the practical case with historic infighting amongst different sovereigns, each with their own agendas fighting with each other for their own self-interest. This, at least until modern times, was the case amongst empires and dynasties, each fighting for their survival. This key feature of Hobbesian myopia was pre-empted by Ibn Khaldun, and picked up by modern historian, Turchin that observe a “cyclical process of rise and fall”200 in 196

Arthur L. Yates, “Thomas Hobbes on Punishment,” (PhD Diss., Univeristy of Western Ontario, 2012), 52-54. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015: Events of 2014 (Bristol: Policy Press 2015), 460, 408, 201. 198 Ibid, 203-204. 199 By myopic, what is meant is the notion that the theorist is focused only on a partial outcome rather than a general equilibrium as proposed by economists Zatzman and Islam: see Gary Zatzman and MR Islam, Economics of Intangibles, 116. In our case, by myopic, I mean that only one aspect (i.e., the people and sovereign of one group) are of concern and other issues are ignored. 200 P. Turchin, War and peace and war: the rise and fall of empires (City of Westminister: Penguin, 2007), ch. 8, p. 2-3. 197

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France and Western European countries and in general as observed throughout the book. The model of Hobbes then, as stated in Figure 3.1 caption, is a fostering of global chaos and is inherently unsustainable. The implication of Locke’s inability to strictly define the criteria by which ‘right’ or ‘moral’ is that a series of practical difficulties human civilization faces in its path to prosperity. There is no specific model of government that Locke envisions. Today, we can consider the US government based on fundamental Lockean ideas, at least in comparison to other governments. As Stephens, representing the John Locke Foundation put it, “John Locke is the intellectual father of our country. While a number of thinkers…made important contributions, this political and social philosopher of 17th century England influenced the author of the Declaration of Independence and the Framers of the Constitution more than any.” Uhr tells us that United Kingdom took less from Locke, or “domesticated” it, whereas the Americans were much more insistent upon his ideas.201 When one takes in account the model of the American government as an example, one identifies a number of problems. The first problem one encounters is the issue of basic logical consistency applying to laws; if one assumes that in order for a law to be ‘right,’ it must be consistent throughout the state and theoretically, the world, as the human race is one according to Locke.202 In the case of the US, excluding the world (for now), even within the country, every single state has a different rule of law, and hence, many conflicting laws. This means that a person in the US who committed X crime may receive life imprisonment in state A, while just one kilometer across the state border, it would be legal for the person’s life to be taken away in state B, someone who does something in state A may be free, whereas one kilometer down, it may be legal for the person to be incarcerated for the same act. This tells us two things, firstly, that there is no logical consistency or standard even within countries, and secondly, that there is no standard to determine in which jurisdiction which laws are made. The implications are dual: a) US laws are hypocritical,203 as a crime cannot be a function of space or place committed, and; b) there is no legal basis (standard) for laws to be created separately across areas within a country. Then, there is equally catastrophic implication when it comes to race discrimination in implementing laws through the legal system. In this regard, Islam et al. provide a succulent review of the ‘sociological degeneration’ throughout US history.204 One could cite numerous publications to validate this point, however it suffices to say Lockean model has imploded spectacularly in its application in USA. Associated with (b) is the issue of the right to establish a certain type of democratic government. For instance, there is no criterion given on how people are to be represented: rules on whether any member of the public be elected, requirement for party-membership, requirement for a party member have to always agree with the party leader, etc. In absence of the notion of acting on conscience, which is a requirement in Ibn Khaldun model, the entire democratic process becomes arbitrary. All of these questions have a significant impact on the 201

Uhr, I. “Executive-Legislative Relations: Learning from Locke.” Canadian Parliamentary Review 10 (1987): 10. M.M. Curtis, An outline of Locke's ethical philosophy (G. Fock, 1890), 65. 203 This is the case for decisions of policy making (for instance, districting vs. popular vote to support a law may have a ginormous effect on how governments work and what acts are declared legal and illegal (ex. 2000 presidential election, is Al Gore or Bush President the winner) or who gets to choose the process). 204 Islam et al, The Greening of Pharmaceutical Engineering, Volume 1: Practice, Analysis, and Methodology, 9296. 202

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effectiveness of democracy and on its laws. For instance, it is possible that we are really not given the choice of electing who we want to, but rather a few elite groups are given the right to determine who runs for the predetermined parties, and the people ending up requiring to choose the “less of two evils” that is a key idea in the two-party system. Another scenario might be the case of party discipline, which is used in Canada.205 Although the government argues that it assures voters with ideological guarantee, it can be twisted to mean that we are not even given the choice to elect representatives that will act for the voters, but rather a general political ideology.206 Recently, the former Prime Minister of Australia, Tony Abbott, was replaced with current Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull without election, only by the decision of a few representatives. These types of hindrances of true popular sovereignty require logical justification, on top of the moral justification required for popular sovereignty itself. On the subject of representation alone, an entire volume of book can be written. Islam and associates point out the hopelessness of western democracy by citing the following facts:207 



Less than two per cent of the population in the U.S. and Canada are registered with a political party. This effectively means that, statistically, less than one percent are involved in deciding, i.e., selecting, who will actually seek office in an upcoming election and represent the remaining 99 per cent. After the election primaries, the game is pretty much: whoever has the most money wins. Incidentally, both parties in USA and all four dominant parties in Canada are supported by the same financial and industrial conglomerates.

Recent movements involving ‘Occupy Wall Street,’ ‘Black lives matter,’ etc. highlight the ‘prophecy’ of Karl Marx that commented on how money runs our lives that marginalizes vast majority of the population, catapulting current civilization where 1% of rich owns almost 50% of the wealth and 100% of power. An extension of the problem (a) leads us into the international realm. If there were many different rules of law in the world at the same time, it would mean that artificially created states208 might choose radically differing laws for the same people. For instance, in the Palestinian legislative election of 2006, Hamas (the Change and Reform Party) won a clear majority. This seemingly non-controversial, UN supervised, democratic, and legitimate election was declared void over the West Bank, followed by Israeli blockade of Gaza, and

205

H. Chodos et al., “Party Discipline and Free Votes” Parliament of Canada, last modified 2006, www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/tips/tip81-e.htm 206 An example where this can be concerning may be when a specific constituency has a concern (ex. oil spills), where people support a party, but are against the party’s views in a specific vote for allowing environmental control—this poses the problem of whether or not people should be subject to one of many party affiliations, or rather someone who can directly represent them, as a person. 207 Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 444. 208 Note that states are not created on cultural/tribal basis but rather on an arbitrary basis, so one cannot make the argument that laws are different due to culture. Additionally, different people moving to that state are also subject to the same laws, therefore the culture excuse does not logically apply. Not to mention, there is nobody with the logical authority to create those laws or structure government, whether or not the laws are universal or pertain to a specific culture.

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consequently the declaration of Hamas as a terrorist organization.209 In Chile, Salvador Allende of the Socialist Party of Chile won absolute majority, which was removed in a USbacked coup d’état – fact that was concealed for decades.210 In both cases we observe a situation in which foreign powers intervened in other countries’ democratic selection processes. This model that had been previously applied also Algeria, Afghanistan, Iran, was applied in Egypt in 2013, in which instant a coup against a democratically elected government was hailed as ‘salvaging democracy.’211 This negation takes place at the level of entire peoples and countries. The question that must be asked, but cannot be answered without a global standard (that Locke doesn’t provide), is ‘by which criterion (global standard) is a foreign entity morally justified to go against the country’s democratic process?’ Do the US or UN or any entity have any right to intervene in any state of affairs of a democratically elected government? These moral and legal dilemmas cannot be answered with Locke’s model, as there are no global standards morality or ethics. Furthermore, there are numerous issues that cannot be resolved in absence of global moral and ethical standards. They include defining the age of consent, drinking, smoking (if at all), driving, ability to make own decisions (marriage, medical procedures, etc.); age of legal witness; permission of slavery of races not deemed human (hence all “people” are equal); definition of human (cannot be explained with nominal standards); purpose for humanity; definition of right, liberty, or justice; rights of non-humans; environmental integrity; definition of liberty and selected liberties; definition of consent (marriage, sex, medical procedures); definition of sanity; right to rebellion; the list goes on indefinitely. There is no standard in Locke’s model that can answer any of these questions, as natural law does not pave the way for there being a divine law dictating everything (like problems in the above list), and people being the standard can obviously prove detrimental to problems we face today and have faced since the beginning of humanity. These findings naturally suggest that there be fundamental revision of this incomplete theory. The problem with Locke’s model, as with Hobbes, is that there is no moral standard provided, which can weigh in on moral dilemmas (majority vs. morality), and no governmental structure provided for Locke’s government. Ultimately both are simply engaged in an exercise of trying to legitimizing the transfer of power from the people to a ‘sovereign state’ without saying much at all about where the moral imperative for recognizing that power rests with people comes from. Of course, historically, their practical concern was with establishing basis for moving away from hereditary rule by kings (without consent). However, they both leave the door wide open for replacing the tyranny of kings with the pragmatism of a ‘secular’ or ‘democratic’ government empowered by the people to represent them. It seems, the political philosophies were concerned with describing a process rather than with addressing the substance of that process and what makes it moral and, therefore, legitimate. For each of them, especially Hobbes, it’s mostly form over substance. Both the models lead to the problem of having to deal with moral dilemmas, within a state and across borders, which have impacts on human rights and on the true power of the people. The latter problem of government structure (representation, parties, etc.) leads to the possibility of 209

I. Kershner, “Abbas’s Premier Tells Israel to Reopen Gaza,” The New York Times, last modified December 14, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/14/world/middleeast/14mideast.html?_r=0. 210 “CIA Reveals Covert Acts In Chile,” CBS News.com, last modified September 11, 2000, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-reveals-covert-acts-in-chile/. 211 Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 425.

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substantial disparity between peoples’ true power across countries or the same country at different periods in time. This chapter explored the theories behind Ibn Khaldun’s, Hobbes,’ and Locke’s government models, and the moral and global consequences of their paths of legal derivation. It is found that Ibn Khaldun’s model is based on a universal standard for humanity, and there are no logical inconsistencies found in the derivation of the standard, stemming from the purpose of life (representing God), to practical legal derivation through the Qur’an and Hadith (prophetic narrations). In contrast, Hobbes’ theory is partially complete; complete in the sense that there is a clear instruction to how government should work, however there are logical inconsistencies - with great moral implications - that are unexplainable. Locke’s model lies in between the former two, as his begins with a universal standard, however he is unable to explain the criteria by which standards are created (i.e., who gives him the right to make law?), and why his theory is an appropriate explanation for government in the first place (i.e., criteria for natural rights vs. popular sovereignty). In the application, one observe that Ibn Khaldun’s model cannot have any moral unsolved and unexplainable dilemmas, because; a) there is such thing as a clearly defined, logically derived moral standard, and b) his vision is for humanity as a whole, not a state or smaller sub-political entity. In contrast, Locke’s and Hobbes’ models - even if one ignores their logical inconsistencies - are by structure myopic in approach, and are unable to explain current, global moral problems. For instance, the issues of global intervention and limitations of democracy (legal and structural) cannot be explained by Locke’s model. In both of these models, the result ends with what is by definition, chaos (“complete disorder and confusion”), because the logical inconsistencies in the models are not straightened out, and therefore, international conflicts cannot be resolved (through subjective, myopic standards). These findings have two significant implications. The first is that the so-called ‘democracy’ that we are incredibly fond of, is unable to explain basic concepts of justice and humanity, in absence of a global standard—we confuse believing something is right with something actually being right (e.g. in terms of policy). It is no exaggeration to say that western representative democracies have largely abandoned the social contract and are not entirely pragmatic as everything is measured by reference to what serves the corporate sector. At the end of the day, despite lofty claims about some vague notion of natural law, the systems which grew out of their philosophical reaction against the arbitrariness of rule by hereditary kings has left with a system of “representative democracy” which arguably is no less amoral than what preceded it. This mandates substantial revision, from ground up, of what we hold sacred, namely, democracy, hopefully in the direction of a global standard like what Ibn Khaldun envisioned. The second major implication is on the field of political science; this discussion allows for a completely new paradigm by introducing a way to analyze theories by unraveling their moral and ethical standards manifest in their fundamental premises. In a nutshell, the Islamic form of governance is based upon injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunnah, which are given the authority to be “right” or legitimate because God, a superior entity, has dictated those laws to the People.

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3.4. DECONSTRUCTION OF ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM’S MISINFORMATION AND CRITICISM OF POLITICAL ISLAM In the theme of constitutionalism, democracy, and the Caliphate with standards, I have chosen to take a very strong representative argument from the anti-political Islam camp of scholars; that of Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im, in order to put the Islamic form of governance into the context of the modern day. We will discuss An-Na’im’s position on political Islam later in the chapter. This subsection is dedicated to deconstruct his favoring of constitutionalism over Islamic governance. The reason why we discuss this latter section, promoted by An-Na’im as “the solution” to the problem of political Islam, is due to the fact that it ties along with the above discussion of how dogmatic cognition leads us into a situation of chaos, with no true ruling authority, and how even the basics of morality, the fundamentals of “right” and “wrong” that Islam establishes, cannot be defined without an external value system. When An-Na’im assumes that “[c]onstitutionalism provides a legal and political framework for realizing and safeguarding equal dignity, human rights, and the well-being of all citizens,”212 he assumes Islam cannot possibly solve any such problems. The problem with An-Na’im’s stipulation is that the constitution does not have any value other than the fact that people agree that has moral value. An-Na’im admits that the individuals of the state must acknowledge the constitution as legitimate, and that the people are the ultimate holder of the territory. The problem with establishing a perfect, complete, nearly unchangeable law of the land is the fact that it is impossible for anybody—without an external value system—to create a law and claim a moral highground to do so. An-Nai’m’s notion that Islam is simply a product of public understanding is actually the case for the constitution of the model state he creates. In the constitutional model, the law, definition of human rights, fundamental values, rules regarding governance, and all of the other relevant constitutional issues, are only the product of the people who accept it, viz., the only reason that any man-made law can be considered “right” is due to the fact that it is an accepted norm. Hence, the only moral ground An-Na’im stands on, as was the case with John Locke, is the fact that it is accepted by the majority of people, or at least by enough people to be able to rule over a land. This aphenomenal basis has very serious implications. If such concepts as what is “right” and “wrong” or “human” and “human right,” are only based on human perception of what they should be, they are not inherent, inert qualities of the body, but rather, subjective (and current) interpretations of morality. This means that people’s rights and inert qualities, as An-Na’im claims to be inert amongst everybody—poor or rich, European or nonEuropean, etc.213—are only a product of the public opinion ad accepted norms. The effects of leaving the decision of right and wrong ultimately in the hands of the majority of the population can be found throughout history. An example of the past can be found even just three hundred years ago, in the age of the “enlightenment,” being the age of the slave trade. It was loudly declared and accepted by many that African people, those being taken into the slave trade, were sub-human. Indeed, it is necessary to understand even the most sensitive of topics to be able to understand the exact implications of Na’im’s support for the concept of “right” (or legitimate) to be decided by the people. Here, even the definition of 212

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 84. 213 Ibid, 118.

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who or what can be considered a human being is called into question. Though the response may be “we have developed and advanced our current state of knowledge and are aware of such things and we can defend against them,” I have two answers. Firstly, if you take any of the definition and extend to time tending to infinity, it has to be true continuously.214 Not only is there no guarantee of such would be the case, one can actually guarantee if we let a lone scholar define humanity, the definition would implode in matter of time. Secondly, there is evidence of us going into the direction,215 learning to accept things we would not have ever accepted to be moral today. Also, note that when I say we, it is the West, as even in one point of time, each group of people have different views of right and wrong, and fundamental rights, hence, there is no external authority that can adjudicate who is right or wrong. In other words, these definitions not only do not surpass time, they do not even work in space at a given time (as we saw with the US state law dilemma). An example of what may possibly be acceptable in society, and hence, stands the chance of being incorporated positively into law, is the issue of pedophilia. The Telegraph reported that it was said about pedophilia at a conference that “Paedophilic interest is natural and normal for human males… At least a sizeable minority of normal males would like to have sex with children … Normal males are aroused by children.”216 As early as 30 years ago, we considered pedophilia to be a completely taboo topic, certainly much more than today. Such extreme taboo to any sexual deviance has relaxed217 because of liberalized views on sexuality, allowing “the darker passions and sexual desires to come into the open.” This has changed the current view of pedophilia from being a disgusting crime, to a disorder—as the Harvard medical journal treats it218—to becoming a simple matter of sexual orientation. A presenter at a Canadian standing senate committee on the subject stated that “[y]ou cannot change this person’s sexual orientation”219 in reference of paedophillia. The American psychiatric Association stated that “[i]n the upcoming fifth edition of the book, DSM-5, the Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders Work Group sought to draw a line between atypical human behavior and behavior that causes mental distress to a person or makes the person a serious threat to the psychological and physical well-being of other individuals”220 as will be classified into their new Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders edition. The point being made here is not necessarily the prediction that pedophilia will become an accepted norm, or that things like child pornography will soon be legal, but that there is certainly is a chance of it considering the recent and current trends of sexual liberalization. In

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Truth criterion, first advanced by G.M. Zatzman and M. R. Islam. “Truth, Consequences and Intentions: The Study of Natural and Anti-Natural Starting Points and Their Implications.” Journal of Nature Science and Sustainable Technology 1 (2007): 169-174. 215 I say ‘going to the direction,’ because it would be a great taboo-breaking if I were to comment of the morality of the current state of affairs regarding morality and rights. 216 The Telegraph, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/10948796/Paedophilia-is-natural-and-normal-formales.html. 217 William E. Thompson and Allan J. Buttell, “Sexual Deviance in America,” in The Emporia State Research Studies 33 (1984): 10. 218 Health Harvard states: “The goal of treatment, therefore, is to prevent someone from acting on pedophile urges — either by decreasing sexual arousal around children or increasing the ability to manage that arousal.” Harvard University. http://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/pessimism-about-pedophilia. 219 The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights [Canada], no. 48, 3rd session (2011): 1540. 220 The American Psychiatric Association, “Paraphilic Disorders,” in American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013. http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Paraphilic%20Disorders%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.

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such case, it would, even by today’s western standard, according to many, be necessary to bring in the use of an alternate, separate moral code to distinguish between right and wrong. The argument made above is also valid for homosexuality, incest, zoophilia, and practically everything that we used to consider unlawful even in modern era. Islam et al.221 pointed out how the logic that perpetrates ‘homosexuality is natural because more than 400 species practice part-time homosexuality’ will also yield to incest and zoophilia being natural. In fact, the likes of Richard Dawkins are already freely talking about ‘mild pedophilia’ and even incest being natural.222 One can correctly argue that the entire discussion of how humans should behave has little relevance in absence of a God-given criterion that defines the purpose of human lives. This purpose in Islam is clear through Qur’anic decree (e.g., verse 2:30). However, the ‘enlightenment’ phase of European history made the entire process of fulfilling purpose of life travel further down the degradation route. The original purpose was perverted by the Roman Catholic Church to be ‘salvation through Jesus’–a dogma the post ‘enlightenment’ replaced with replaced by notions of inalienable natural rights and the potentialities of reason, and universal ideals of love and compassion gave way to civic notions of freedom, equality, and citizenship. For this reason, “respecting the freedoms of opinion, belief, and association of individual persons is the only way in which the collective freedoms of ethnic or religious groups can be protected”223 is an absurd concept from an Islamic point of view, in which God defines the definition of, and rights of people. Even the American founding fathers’ belief in the doctrine that “All men are created equal” has no meaning, without first invoking God, and then why Founding fathers’ definition of human and equal is any more valid than anybody else saying it (i.e., with moral authority). Prime Minister of England, David Cameron, has recently stated that he believes that Christianity can be used as a “moral code” to guide the behavior of people in general, echoing the likes of Edmund Burke.224 Perhaps from a Christian-insider point of view, a Christian moral code ‘ought to be enforced; though it can still be argued that Christianity has not external grounding. In the case of Islam, the belief is that it does not only give an individual moral code, but also a political code, giving explicit authority and command to do so. This code then becomes the golden standard, the constitution, if you will. If the true nature of Islam is not recognized, conflating with any religion or dogma, such as ‘Christianity,’ there cannot be any logic left in having a discourse on Islam.

3.4.2. An-Na’im and Kharajite Ideology An-Na’im also claims that the Caliphate of the Prophet could not be replicated by anybody other than the prophet himself, thereby supporting his claim that the Caliphate was not a religious (i.e., Islamic) entity.225 This line of talk that has seen numerous citations in Christianity has no relevance to Islam. In Islam, everything the Prophet Muhammad did is a 221

M.R. Islam et al., Greening of pharmaceutical engineering, Volume 1: Practice, Analysis, and Methodology. J. Kutner, “Genetic sexual attraction is normal, and very real: A woman describes the reality of parent-child incest,” Salon Feb. (2015): 17. 223 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 103. 224 The Guardian. 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/apr/16/david-cameron-evangelical-aboutchristian-faith. 225 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 106. 222

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model for the rest of the mankind to follow. The Qur’an repeatedly stated the reason behind sending a human as a messenger was for mankind to follow.226 Of course, someone that doesn’t agree with the fundamental premise, i.e., that “the Qur’an is absolute and its rulings cannot be replaced” finds any logic that ends up with a conclusion that Caliphate is replaceable. It is no coincidence that the Prophet himself stated that the “Caliphate of the Prophecy” would last for 30 years. Even though he was referring to the political institution considered an Islamic state after his death, it is indicatory of the fact that the Prophet explicitly intended and expected for a state to be in place. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Qur’anic verses and Hadiths reviewed clearly stipulate for an Islamic state to be in place, which is obviously indicatory of its ability to happen. The Qur’an itself states that the dīn, the path to God has been completed, meaning that there is a golden standard to be compared to.227 If Muslims accept the Qur’an as it is given to them, as required per the Islamic condition model, then they are also required to strive to achieve that goal. As the apologists love to discuss in their vocabulary of Jihad, the word is not only for war, but for the general struggle of every day personal life as well. Perhaps the example of personal life may help the Apologists’ understanding regarding political injunctions in Islam: all Muslims are expected to strive to adhere to the personal aspects of Islam (5 pillars), through the Qur’anic and Sunnah injunctions. Though the Islamic personal legal code is impossible to follow without any infringement, as even the Prophet repeatedly sought forgiveness,228 it is still the duty for a Muslim to try his/her best to adhere to the Qur’an and Sunnah as much as possible, feasible to the human ability. It is commonly cited in response to those who claim nobody can enter heaven that “Allah burdens not a person beyond his capability” (2:286). The demonstration for the personal life scenario highlights that though Islam may be strict, especially relative to Christianity; from an inside view, one is still required to abide by the orders as much as possible. Unlike Christianity, salvation is not in proclaiming Jesus as a savior but relying on the fact that if one has best of intentions, God will grant him heaven out of His infinite mercy.229 Hence, the exact case of An-Na’im’s accusation of non-conformance because of one’s inability to make a political state exactly like the prophet’s also applies to all other aspects of Islam. This fallacious argument would make any Islamic duty a moot point be it personal or political. Interestingly, the same deconstruction applies to the deviant Kharajite (Arabic Khawarij, meaning “outside” the fold of Islam, often refered to as extremists or non-conformists) Muslim ideology, which An-Na’im seems to implicitly support. The Kharajites believed that because the decision of right and wrong is defined to God and God alone, it is not up to humans to decide—hence they had a green light to disobey ‘Ali, the fourth Caliph of Islam, for deciding and Islamic verdict based on the interpretation of fallible human beings.230 Though it is true that the Qur’an and Sunnah are subject to individual interpretations of the 226

e.g., the Qur’an 33:21 states: “There has certainly been for you in the Messenger of Allah an excellent example for anyone whose hope is in Allah and the Last Day and [who] remembers Allah often.” 227 “This day I have perfected for you your religion and completed My favor upon you and have approved for you Islam as religion” (The Qur’an, 5:3). 228 “I swear by Allah that I seek Allah's Pardon and turn to Him in repentance more than seventy times a day.” Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 8, Book 75, Hadith 319. 229 The Prophet Muhammad said: "’No one of you will enter Paradise by his deeds alone.’ They asked, ‘Not even you, O Messenger of Allah?’ He said, ‘Not even me, unless Allah covers me with His Grace and Mercy.’” 230 For a basic description of the Kharajite cause, see: Joseph P. Schultz, Judaism and the Gentile Faiths: Comparative Studies in Religion (Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981), 175.

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writer that may at times take verses out of context to support his conclusion, it is no small irony that An-Na’im and the apologists do exactly that (take a verse out of context) who do exactly that when it comes to “reform” ideologies of gender equality and so on, while preaching to avoid any cognition that would disprove their conclusions regarding ‘political Islam.’ We logically assume that when the Qur’an instructs Muslims to rule/practice according to the rulings of the Prophet and the Qur’an itself, that objective analysis, with a true intention to please God231 will occur, because without doing so, it opens for and allows the path for people to chase Islamic justifications for acts that would objectively be considered prohibited in Islam. Indeed, there is no safeguard or authority to dictate right and wrong,232 just as there is no authority to dictate right and wrong for issues relating to personal life. For example, when there is a command in the Qur’an to keep physically clean, any interpretation of such can be considered “clean,” even after looking after the example of the Prophet. What is wrong, however, is to state that because not everybody (or even very few) Muslims would truly be able to follow the “true” interpretation, or that because there is variance in opinion, that it is impossible for Islam to be followed at all, as there is no current legitimate authority to spell each and every problem of life out; this applies to personal and political life. How is this logic different from the “he who never sinned cast the first stone!” fallacy? As we also stated above, the notion that because one cannot perform perfectly, one should make no effort to perform at all is contrary to fundamental Islamic values that give utmost importance to intention. It is Pragmatism that emphasizes on the outcome, perfection of results, and other externals. In Islam, the universal order is in the hands of God and we are but accountable for our intentions. We then, again revert to the cognition model, reasserting that it is a requirement to—based on our ability to rationalize—seek knowledge and implement it in our own lives, our personal, familial, communal, and political lives, based on the Qur’an, as explained by the Prophet, and so on. In the analysis of this book, we assume that adult humans are able to a) cognize, and b) use that cognition to interpret verses of the Qur’an and use the explicit meaning: if it says “X” then one must do “X,” unless there is reason to believe that it is not true, such as in the case where a certain context the verse is applied to, in which case we are to take the historical context. In his earlier chapter discussing the applicability or possibility for an Islamic state to exist, An-Na’im also advances the same logical fallacy. He claims that “whenever someone mentions verses of the Qur’an, he or she is providing a personal understanding, not the totality of all possible meanings or the only and exclusively valid meaning.”233 Interestingly, An-Na’im—the liberal democrat, of all people—is implicitly accusing Islam of having no standard, because people interpret what it is differently. However, we, as any rational person, 231

The importance of righteous intention is stressed in Reconstituting the Curriculum, which proves that Islam, as well as any logical knowledge-seeking process, assumes that the intention is a prerequisite to analysis of any given subject. 232 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 107: An-Na’im claims that Islam cannot be deduced politically because of the existence of sects to prove the above point; p. 112 “Since traditional interpretations of ShariÀa are human and not divine, they can change through the process of reinterpretation and consensus building outlined in Chapter 1”—This is surprisingly similar to the Khawarij understanding of the faith. He reaffirms this view in the case of separations between madhabs who differ, stating: “[they differ] on almost every conceivable subject,” ibid, 108. However, such a statement assumes that all of the Madhabs can be right, indeed not. 233 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 46.

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assume that people are rational in our empirical studies. Though one’s individual interpretation may not be the truth, just as the scientist is required to interpret lab results, Muslims are required to do their best and follow the right path, based on rational theory. This theory in Islamic cognition is not only rational, but any departure from that logic creates dogmatic contradictions. It is unfathomable how An-Na’im misses this fundamental theme in Islam. The Qur’an asserts that few ever followed the right path in the past (11:40, 15:59, 2:83, 246, 249, 4:66, 11:116, etc.) and the Prophet is said to have predicted it for the future.234 Muslims, of all people, ought to know that the Islamic standard cannot be set by the majority as historically majority of people are misguided by Satan, according to Muslims. Regarding the standards, it must be reasserted that even if something is difficult to deduce (i.e., requires objective analysis and conscientious thinking–something that is rare today), there is a standard and a set of guidelines that Islam provides. As expounded in Chapter 2, this set of standard is unique. The assertion is not that Locke, Hobbes, and all of the An-Na’im’s of this world are wrong, it is that they cannot create a model standard for the human being, and even if they could, they could not prove that it has any ground to be a model in the first place. For this reason, it was Ibn Rushd (Averroes)–father of secular philosophy in Europe–that stated in his criteria of truth that nothing can be true unless it has the source in the Qur’an, the standard of truth.235 Ironically An-Na’im quotes Ibn Rushd’s alleged opinion that there is ultimate uncertainty regarding human (all) interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah.236 Though that is the case, Ibn Rushd does not deny in his treatise (The Decisive Treatise) that there is an ultimate law to find, and explicitly states his bleief that law is discernible—though he did warn of the “corrupt” interpretations.237 After his discussion of describing the various ways and possible corruption found in legal interpretation, he concludes that: “[f]rom this, it has become evident to you that sound interpretations, not to mention corrupt ones—must not be established for books in the multitude. Sound interpretation is the deposit mankind was charged with holding, and held, whereas all existing things shirked it…”238

Ibn Rushd was conveniently let out from having it mentioned that he did believe in an ultimate interpretation of the Qur’an. An-Na’im forgets the fact that Islam—in fact uniquely—is the only religion/path/way of life that claims to have a divinely revealed law that governs personal, familial, social, and political life in its totality. In the absence of the Islamic criteria of cognition that An-Na’im is missing, he reverts to the Kharajite—indeed the epitome of a defeatist239 ideology. This is the reason why the criterion has to exist first, prior to the occlusions being drawn. This way, there can be a right and wrong. Though individuals may differ, the fact is simply that the individuals that ignore the true criterion are wrong. However, in the case of European political thinking, there is no 234

Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Book 49, Hadith 4309. G.M. Zatzman and M. R. Islam, “Truth, Consequences and Intentions: The Study of Natural and Anti-Natural Starting Points and Their Implications.” 236 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 47. 237 Muhammad Ibn Rushd, The Decisive Treatise (Maryland: The University of Maryland, 2000), 29, last modified December 18, 2000, http://www.honors.umd.edu/219V/Averroes%20Decisive%20Treatis.pdf. 238 Ibid, 29-30. 239 Though the Kharijites physically never accepted defeat or being under the rule of others, they faced a certain ideological defeat; a defeat of uncertainty to know the truth, and hence, a complete rejection of it. 235

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right and wrong: the declaration of right and wrong do not have any logic (anything can be right or wrong), nor is their any proof given as to why something can be right or wrong.

3.4.3. “Reform” Interpretations It is not to say that An-Na’im’s desired reinterpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah should not occur in order to come to a consensus on the absolute truth the Qur’an claims to have, the problem lies in the reinterpretation for a purpose other than to seek the truth within the Qur’an and Hadith, and certainly not with an agenda of any sort. In interpreting Figure 2.8, we discussed how such aphenomenal cognition starts with a decision. The decision of AnNa’im is clearly to render Islam into an apology. It is known that such disinformation mode can render anything into anything. An-Na’im states that “we [reformers] must avoid arbitrary selectivity among competing Qur’an and Sunnah texts without addressing texts that can be cited in support of the opposite view.”240 Though it is true that in objective analysis, all possible injunctions related to the subject in question should be analyzed, it is not true that the texts in the opposing view can discount the other view arbitrarily, due to the fact that the Qur’an itself requires that people, in order to not “stray” from Islam (3:7), must use the authoritative verses of Qur’an to come to a verdict. An-Na’im claims that because there may be incidences in the opposing view, and therefore because there is not unanimous support, it is logically sound to accept the view “in favor” of something such as current human rights norms. He gives the example of a jurists’ reform ruling on apostasy being death penalty.241 I will use this example of misinformation-based cognition in order to correct it to show how the Islamic cognition process works, perhaps for our friend An-Na’im to understand. Specifically, this jurist cites the verse of Qur’an that states: “Indeed, those who have believed then disbelieved, then believed, then disbelieved, and then increased in disbelief - never will Allah forgive them, nor will He guide them to a way” (4:137). This was appearently indicatory of the fact that apostates may revert from and to Islam several times without punishment. Based on the verse, it is clear that someone who does not openly revert from Islam can revert, convert, and revert a again. Since it is impossible for people to know who truly believes or disbelieves, one cannot punish someone for what they do not know. Even the worst enemies of God, the Munāfiqs (traitors, crypto-Muslims) cannot be killed or even expelled from mosques, because of the fact that nobody knows who they are. However, we know that this could not have been the case for open disbelievers—realize the qualification of open—due to the fact that the Prophet said: “Whoever changes his religion, kill him.” 242 Another Hadith, which provides a more detailed version of the same account of him saying it, stated that “Some Zanadiqa were brought to `Ali and he burnt them”243 whereupon it was justified by the above hadith of the Prophet. Another Hadith, with several accounts, however, states that the Prophet said this: “The blood of a Muslim man, who testifies that none has the right to be worshipped Allah, is not lawful except for one of three cases: The (previously married or) 240

An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 134. 241 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 119-123: discussion on apostasy. 242 Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 84, Hadith 57. 243 Ibid.

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married adulterer, a life for a life, and the one who leaves the religion and parts from the Jama’ah (the community of Muslims).”244 From this information, collected out of the data (Qur’an and Hadith), we must find a logical solution. Instead of taking the fatalist approach to Islam as An-Na’im does, simply concluding that because of the difference of opinion, we can opt out for the pro-west definition, we have to find a ruling to this seemingly contradictory information within the Hadiths—the explanation of the Qur’an, the second criteria, and ask: “does Islam warrant the death penalty for open apostates in general, or only in a specific case, or not at all?” Let us examine the first Hadith seemingly requiring the death of anybody who apostatizes from Islam. The Arabic word, Zanadiqah as states in that Hadith, has the singular form of Zindīq. The meaning, according to the Al-Maany Arabic to English dictionary,245 ranges from apostate, to unbeliever in general; from somebody openly hostile to Islam to an atheist or a “person who deserts a political party; religious group, etc.” The jurist Al-Asqalani mentioned246 that the other accounts of the same Hadith state that either the people were atheists, apostates, secret idol worshippers, or those who believed in Ali’s divinity. Since we do not know which one, we cannot define the conclusion based on possibly incorrect data (this particular Hadith). Here then, we must turn to the other Hadith that speaks on the issue. The other hadith gives a much more precise explanation of the death penalty for this case, and it clearly mandates it. It states that it is to be applied on “the one who leaves the religion and parts from the Jama’ah,” indicating physical as well as religious separation form the Muslim community. This definition then applies to the common term of Zindīq used by the Prophet’s companions; i.e., the people must have committed a political treason along with the religious treason. Based on this understanding, it is understandable how secret idol worship, for example, could qualify the people to be Munāfiqs—faking their true religion (and hence political commitment and affiliation) while enjoying the benefits of being Muslim and deceiving others. The punishment would also work in the case of apostasy, if the apostasy were a group apostasy that, in one way or the other, constituted a political threat to the Islamic state. There is also another Hadith, a case of a purely religious apostasy in which the Prophet himself did not punish an apostate, a Bedouin who wanted to cancel his pledge of Islam shortly after converting.247 This clearly indicates that strictly faith-based apostasy does not constitute the death penalty, i.e., the person was not punished because he did not join and become a part of the Islamic community to be able to defect. Notice how deduction is made; the Prophetic case law is ised to put the prophet’s first saying into proper context. In addition, we must define “splitting from the Jama’ah [group of Muslims].” It is arguable that by renouncing Islam religiously and openly, one is automatically splitting from the Jama’ah, the political institution they joined, and therefore, that any religious acceptance and rejection is considered such. However, we still must reconcile the case of the Prophet not punishing one Bedouin man for reverting from Islam. Just as a scientist is expected to make sense out of two lab tests with different results and find the reason why they were different, 244

Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Vol. 3, Book 14, Hadith 1402; Ibn Majah al-Qazwīnī, Sunan Ibn Majah, Book 20, Hadith 2631; Ahmad al-Nasa’i, Sunan an-Nasa’i, Vol. 5, Book 37, Hadith 4021. 245 Al-Maany Arabic-English Dictionary. http://www.almaany.com/en/dict/ar-en/‫قيدنز‬/. 246 Ibn Hājar al-Asqalānī, Al-Fath Al-Bārī (Beirut: Dar al-Ma’rifa, n.d.), Vol. 12, 270-271. 247 Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 92, Hadith 424; Vol. 9, Book 89, Hadith 316; Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Book 49, Hadith 4299.

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we must continue our logical deduction to explain this apparent infraction. The most logical explanation would be that this Bedouin never joined the group of Muslims; the Hadith notes that he accepted, and shortly after, retracted Islam due to his getting a fever, hence, he never joined the Muslim community, did the required practices, engage in the political and societal matters in Madinah, and so on. This means that the man’s reversion never affected his status as a Jama’ah member. Therefore, if somebody becomes a member of the Jama’ah—the society—by being Muslim, and then retracts his Islam by withdrawing form the Jama’ah, the person is liable to face the death penalty. One can draw parallel with the process of the Central Intellegence Agency (CIA), for instance. After somebody applies, is accepted into, and has necessary qualifications to become a member of the CIA (being exposed to things a regular person would not), that person cannot simply decide to renounce his citizenship and live in another country. In Islam, due to the fact that when one becomes Muslim, they enjoy the full protection, equality, and permissibility to enter state matters/gain valuable information as with nearly any other Muslim, the person cannot simply decide to convert back to this religion with all of the state, societal, and other privileged and classified information. This would create a ripe ground for a way of spying on the affairs of Muslims. Because the religious and political are infused into one, and because someone who considers himself Muslim has so much access to important matters of Muslims, it cannot be logical to permit somebody to enter and leave the religion— and hence the political arena—at their desire, while carrying information that non-Muslims would be forbidden from having. Note that it was a practice in Prophet’s time to allow repentance for apostasy,248 as was the case with Umar, who formalized that time should be given for their repentance (for the sake of reflection and final decision), three days.249 Logically, this is very gracious and speaks volumes about the individualism accorded in Islam. Even though it may seem simplistic (i.e., too good to be true), any analysis of the arguments of even the most famous medieval jurists relies on the same Hadiths. For instance, Malik, the founder of the second-largest Muslim Sunni Madhab (school of thought), based his entire analysis of apostacy upon the former Hadith.250 Though the scholars are respected and have a high level of education and cognitive ability, we have to acknowledge that they are still confounded to their time and place and did not always posses the necessary information (compared to the information age we live in today) to collect all the necessary data in order to derive a ruling. One of my primary criticisms of the Madhab ideology is the fact that because they did not posses enough information, they made biased rulings based only upon the Hadiths they possessed at the time: for instance, large collections of Bukhari may not have existed or were not available. Today, with access to such historical data at our fingertips, there is a need to change the centuries old Madhab stance on Islam. Nevertheless, we can see how simple analysis can be though objective analysis. I also advocate for the reinterpretation of scholar-based interpretations, however, An-Na’im’s call for reinterpretation of Islam with an agenda is something no knowledge-seeking scholar of Islam would encourage. Islam qualifies knowledge (ilm–the 2nd most commonly used word in the Qur’an) as something that 248

Abu Dawood al-Sijsitānī, Sunan Abi Dawood, Book 39, Hadith 4341: Mu’adh ibn Jabal, governor of Yemen required that an apostate be killed, it was reported that he was asked to revert and it was denied. 249 Malik ibn Anas, Muwatta Malik, Book 36, Number 36/18/16. 250 Malik ibn Anas, Muwatta Malik, Book 36, Hadith 1419.

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brings a person closer to God. Obviously, agenda-driven cognition (aphenomenal model as in Figure 2.8) cannot generate real knowledge. By reading the Qur’an or Hadith with an agenda, based on findings in chapter two, we know that it is impossible to be able to come to the intended and true meaning of something (i.e., data, the Qur’an) when you read it with a preconceived idea of what you think is the conclusion. Interestingly, An-Na’im does not at all seem to be interested in finding the empirical Islamic truth on any subject. As he gives an impression, “… apostasy and related notions cannot simply be abolished through purely secular legislation without sufficient Islamic justification because of the paramount moral and social authority of Shari’a among Muslims.”251 He doesn’t stop at discounting Islam into a product of peoples’ beliefs, but recognizes and has a full-fledged agenda to convert the Muslim population to make them prodemocracy and pro-constitutionalist. Even though such an idea is not logical for reasons already proven (i.e., constitutionalism has no moral authority to become a rule of law), especially in Islam, An-Na’im’s assumption is based upon his theory that Islam has no constitutionalism, despite the fact that most of the Qur’an after the migration from Mecca to Madinah, the interpretation of the Qur’an by the Prophet as the Qur’an mandates itself, and the Rashidun Caliphate’s defining the latitude of permissibility, forms a model of a state. This model is much more thorough and exhaustive than any constitution in the world, and according to Muslims, the only text with authority to decide right from wrong, including in political context. An-Na’im himself accepts the notion of fundamental logic, and encourages the use of all of the different contexts a verse can be applied to, in order to know how it may be applied.252 However, he advances a bold theory; the notion that it is okay to use the Qur’an and Sunnah to advance a certain agenda that would eventually rip apart fundamental tenets of Islam. He writes, “It is possible to develop alternative interpretations of Shari’a that would completely eliminate discrimination on grounds of religion, but that does not justify denying that existing views in fact require such discrimination.”253

Let us clarify that An-Na’im is explicitly endorsing the use of interpreting the Qur’an and Hadith in order to advance an agenda, that agenda being to make Islam agree with nonIslamic values. He believes, for the reason that anybody may interpret verses to apply them different contexts, and because they have different meanings when interpreted in different ways, that the Qur’an and Hadith may be examined, just as classical scholars have examined them, to advance a certain agenda. Specifically, he states that the reason for this reinterpretation is for the sake of a) gender equality, b) Muslim—Non-Muslim equality, and c) liberal democratic values (specifically, constitutionalism).254 Let us examine the logical inconsistencies that this theory proposes.

251

An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 123. An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 109. An-Na’im stipulates that all different possible meanings of verses should be applied, though, as we see, he uses it for a strikingly different justification. 253 Ibid, 109. 254 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 110. 252

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Firstly, it goes against the empirical approach of deducting a conclusion from observations on what can be considered “true,” deriving a justification in the process. Such a process, stated in the previous chapter (Section 2.1, also see Figure 2.9), is the process in which the scholar first analyzes authoritative documents and facts; lab tests for science or historical documents for history, the Qur’an and Sunnah for Islam. The next stage is to, through direct analysis of the data, find the empirical truth, and analysis of possible explanations for the same phenomena, to create information out of the data; i.e., factual injunctions and useful suppositions that may be used to derive a definitive ruling on the matter. The final stage is to analyze this “information” (useful data) objectively, and formulate the best-possible explanation of the observations, while keeping in mind alternative explanations of the phenomena and ruling them out. Such objective analysis is not necessarily Islamic, but better classified as the foundational basis of empiricism. As Islam is an empirical way of life, and as the rulings of Islam are derived from empirical analyses of the relevant documents, one logically reaches the conclusion that fully objective analysis of the documents will, if done correctly and rationally, arrive at the absolute truth that Islam claims to provide.255 Under this backdrop, Islam then prohibits any non-empirical non-objective analysis of the Qur’an or Sunnah. Exactly for the fact that anybody can conclude anything based on their first premise,256 it is required that in order to empirically follow Islam, a first premise is not injected by the scholar into the Qur’an and Hadith analysis. This means that An-Na’im’s attempt to interpret Islam based on the premise that Islam can be interpreted based on an unrelated premise, does not fall under the category of Islamic objective analysis, and hence, cannot be regarded as permissible in Islam to accept. I argue that An-Nai’m’s inability to provide an objective method of interpretation is due to his belief that because anybody can arrive at any conclusions with any data, that there is no standard golden criteria of Islam. Quite interestingly, such an interpretation of what Islam is goes against he Qur’an’s own description of itself,257 which also warns against people who use general verses of the Qur’an to prove a general opinion not related to the actual verses on the issue itself, stating: “It is He who has sent down to you, [O Muhammad], the Book; in it are verses [that are] precise - they are the foundation of the Book - and others unspecific. As for those in whose hearts is deviation [from truth], they will follow that of it which is unspecific, seeking discord and seeking an interpretation [suitable to them]. And no one knows its [true] interpretation except Allah. However, those firm in knowledge say, ‘We believe in it. All [of it] is from our Lord.’ And no one will be reminded except those of understanding.” (Qur’an 3:7). The Qur’an, here and numerous other places as described in Chapter 2, explicitly commands Muslims to follow it as a criteria between right and wrong, which implies that objective and empirical analysis of it will lead to the right and wrong. All in all, the problem with An-Na’im’s interpretation of how to seek knowledge in Islam is that he does not believe it is a model, but rather, a product of the opinions of people; this is the purpose for his bifurcation from objective analysis of finding the truth. If, as from a Muslim-insider point of view, we assume that the Qur’an is a 255

Unless anybody is objecting to the fact that the Qur’an claims to be the truth, and that the Prophet is the explainer of relevant phenomenon found in it, one can refer to the previous chapter which cites textual evidence of the Qur’an and Hadith proving such an argument is not the case. 256 Explanation from Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum. 257 “Blessed is He Who hath revealed unto His slave the Criterion” (25:1). Furqān—criterion, refers to the tool to find the point of bifurcation between right (Islam) and wrong (non-Islam).

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source for truth (as it states, and it can be explained by the Prophet), we come to the conclusion that it is impossible to chase a desired conclusion derived from the Qur’an and Hadith. Hence, An-Na’im’s statement that “[s]peaking of Islam is really speaking about how Muslims understand and practice their religion rather than about religion in the abstract” is false and contrary to fundamental tenet of Islam. This line of argument implies God is unable to define right from wrong, falsifying everything Islam stands for. What about the principles An-Na’im states are common between Islamic and western values? Firstly, An-Na’im claims that “[t]he relationship between Islam and these principles [the standard of human rights] is un-avoidable, because Islam directly affects the legitimacy and the efficacy of these principles and institutions in present Islamic societies,”258 implying that a) the purpose of Islam has nowhere in its constitution a definition of rights, and b) that such “standards of human rights” are Islamic in the first place. How preposterous—our ongoing analysis shows that the notion of widely accepted “standards of human rights” has no moral authority, being a product of belief and opinion, contrary to that structured with exact hierarchy in Islam that connects the creator to creation through a well defined objective and rule of law. Islam’s strength lies within explicit mention of these connections and the weakness of Eurocentric cognition is the lack of that very connection. Recall from Section 3.3 that even the definition of human cannot be ascertained without the Qur’anic criteria. Secondly, An-Na’im presumes that a state that incorporates everybody’s views is a requirement, and hence, a constitutional arrangement is required to be able to mediate the inherently conflicting views of different interests within and outside of the state. He adds that religion should be allowed to exist and operate within the state and not be hindered, and even have a voice in government, but cannot be the ultimate ruler of right and wrong, and must be willing to accept the injunctions of the independent judiciary once they advance their claims. He elaborates that because a state’s actors each have several of different interests, as the American federalists have argued, that governments function the best “when the state structures are centralized, complex, and governed by clear rules among specialized organs.”259 Such a model implies that the government has a supreme body of individuals representing the people, who are the custodians of the state, and ensure that the state protect the rights of the people.260 Let us then deconstruct the “Islamicness” of this type of government; a liberal democracy. Such a government, as discussed earlier, is inherently hypocritical; not just in the general logical sense that it cannot provide a standard for justice, but in the Islamic sense that accepting to regard a non-Islamic state as Islamic goes against the fundamentals of the Qur’an and Hadith, which requires that all injunctions of the Qur’an, in full, be fulfilled in an Islamic state. In other words, despite the Qur’anic order to accept every verse of Qur’an to qualify as a Muslim,261 An-Na’im states that it is possible, not only that Muslims ‘ought not to strive to 258

An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 84. An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 91, 10. An-Na’im discusses constitutional governance with definite legal principles. 260 Ibid, 92, 93. See for role of the people in civic reason and Ibid, 104, for discussion on representative government that has the separation of powers, and all of the other classical liberal democratic government structures that states posses. 261 The Qur’an (2:85) states: “So do you believe in part of the Scripture and disbelieve in part? Then what is the recompense for those who do that among you except disgrace in worldly life; and on the Day of Resurrection they will be sent back to the severest of punishment.” It also (4:150-151) states: “Indeed, those who disbelieve in Allah and His messengers and wish to discriminate between Allah and His messengers and say, ‘We believe 259

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create an Islamic state, but that even if Muslims had a state, they are allowed to not accept the clear and explicit injunctions regarding criminal, foreign, domestic, financial, and constitutional law, all fields which the Qur’an and Hadith discusses. An-Na’im’s justification comes from yet another illogical assumption that such governing verses can be “reinterpreted”–a process he aspires to continue until there is nothing substantive left about Islam. This argument can be summed up by rephrasing his doctrine: Reinterpretation of the verses of Qur’an requiring Shurah (consultation) in legal and political matters should continue in order to extend that requirement to reinterpret into a requirement to accept the decisions of Shurah’s advisors, rather than accepting Authoritarian government, solely for the sake of making the government non-Authoritarian. He claims, “For instance, the traditional oath of allegiance (bayöa) should now be seen as an authoritative basis for a mutual contract between the government and the population at large, whereby the former assumes responsibility for the protection of the rights and general well-being of the latter in exchange for their acceptance of the authority of the state and compliance with its laws and public policy. However, any modern constitutional theory, whether founded on Islamic principles or not, must develop adequate mechanisms and institutions for the election and accountability of government and for the safeguarding of fundamental rights like freedoms of expression and association for that notion of mutual allegiance to be meaningful today. This can be done by developing the idea of shurah into a binding principle of representative government rather than merely discretionary consultation.”262

This contradicts the established basics of empirical knowledge-gathering. Islamically and scientifically, any reinterpretation of the ruling that made a government legitimate with the intention of delegitimizing the same government (rendering it into a ‘democratic government’ in An-Na’im’s case) is in the core of aphenomenal logic (Figure 2.8). It contradicts the Islamic cognition process that must have an intention to ‘come closer to Allah.’ Clearly, AnNa’im had no intention to understand and apply the Islamic verse as it would be applied in its context: the Bay’ah, meaning the pledge of allegiance people gave to the prophet, and to which, in several narrations, the same Bay’ah the Prophet mandated to be given to the Caliph of an Islamic state (see Chapter 6). Instead of taking the Qur’an explained by Hadith as a standard, he is taking representative democracy as a standard, and applying Islam to it—by taking notions like the Bay’ah, which has no intended inference to democratic rule, but rather to the Caliphate. This proves the larger notion that any cognition process that is driven by a first premise cannot and will not arrive at the truth. The same deconstruction applies to AnNa’im’s conclusion that because of reciprocity in Islamic citizenship, and because the Ottomans and Muslim minority populations ruling of India treated Muslims and non-Muslims equally, it serves as evidence that Islam in fact may abolish the Dhimmi system. 263 It is becoming increasingly evident that An-Na’im’s accusation of scholars who cherry-picked verses to determine Islamic ruling in the modern day, specifically, the “arbitrary selectivity of in some and disbelieve in others,’ and wish to adopt a way in between—Those are the disbelievers, truly. And We have prepared for the disbelievers a humiliating punishment.” Islam is very strict on accepting it in totality. 262 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 110-111. 263 The policy of the Rashidun Caliphate and the prophet’s state to treat Muslims with unequal rights as Muslims: Ibid, 133-134.

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other modern scholars, who fail to explain what happens to the verses they choose to overlook”264 does apply to An-Na’im, rather than to scholars using the Islamic cognition process (if the scholars he refers to indeed use it); i.e., that takes into account explicit injunctions, rather than chasing Islamic texts with an ulterior motive. An-Na’im quotes the Qur’an (42:38)265 stating that the righteous are those “who [conduct] their affairs by mutual consultation,” could be reinterpreted to pave way for democratic—as opposed to Caliphate-based—rule. Therefore, the previously authoritative verse asking the Prophet to make the ultimate decision could be overridden by this verse that proposes mutual, perhaps more democratic consultation should be asked to occur. However, An-Na’im makes two important mistakes. Firstly, he does not realize that the order of the Prophet to consult and make the ultimate decision is what is expected to be done exactly by the Caliph. Because the Caliph is the successor of the Prophet (Abu Bakr was, and Umar was Abu Bakr’s successor, and so on), he is given that authority. Even in the verse that An-Na’im quotes—and this is the second point—there is a very important context to acknowledge: the fact that this verse has no operational authority. An-Na’im recognizes that, but believes that the verse can still be manipulated in order to adhere to a democratic process. This is a precise example of taking unspecific verse of the Qur’an and applying them to prove specific cases that the Qur’an warns against (Qur’an 3:7). Instead of taking the obvious and clear verse in the context of the Prophet’s life, and taking the further example of precedence of the Caliphs, such as Umar who formalized the shurah process to find what the Islamic process of shurah is, his cognition point stops at the Qur’an and democracy is his second point, and therefore, he comes to a conclusion outside of the latitude of permissibility. In essence, what he has done has replaced Prophet Muhammad with Democracy as the ‘law giver.’ Technically speaking, An-Na’im’s call for universal rights for everybody and the discounting of Islam through biased analysis does not even require an Islamic justification. If An-Na’im is going to end up with the conclusion that Islam is synonymous to current western understandings of human rights, then there is no point in advocating for the Islamic argument at all, simply due to the fact that Islam does not play a role in morality, if it is true that Islam is the product of the opinions of the reader. If An-Na’im will re-interpret all Islamic laws according to the standards of our time and place, then the reinterpretation is not required, because we know at the end that Islam is only a product of peoples’ opinions, i.e., that Islam only has a functional value. The bottom line is that An-Na’im discounts Islam’s autonomous value system in whole, in which we come to the realization that if Islam is whatever people want it to be, then Islam—the path to submission to God—does not exist, as even God is then required to judge people by their understandings of right and wrong. We again return to the system of chaos, where in the end, right and wrong is decided not by the Qur’an, but by people’s desires or at least people’s conceptualization of right and wrong. I am not painting a realist or amoral picture of the world, rather, I am proving from a Muslim view, that without Islam, morality is a product of belief—even the greatest of scholars such as the enlightenment scholars, are unable to prove that their definitions of right, human right, and wrong are true. Note that from the Islamic perspective, such a compromising understanding of “justice” is impossible. Because Islam provides a new way to live, from the personal, spiritual, communal, and hence political, the establishment of Islam in any area has to be seen as 264 265

Ibid, 136. Ibid, 107.

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transformative for the region. For instance, the individual people of Arabia, and their hundreds of individual tribes and clans within tribes isolated from civilization managed to undergo a paradigm shift (cognitively, religiously, financially, etc.), transforming the outlook of people: to monotheism and prayer from previous idolatry, the political system from a few small isolated tribes into a major political structure, forever changing the culture, religious, financial, familial, and communal relationships of people. Islam et al.266 write that, at least in the field of education and cognition, nothing short of a complete paradigm shift was necessary in order to create such a meaningful transformation. An-Na’im writes as if Islam will simply come to sit atop the government of, say, Europe, and attempt to rule accordingly as the Prophet would have—this forms a part of his critique of the universality fo the Prophet’s ruling style. Rather, the case is that (whether it be seen as good or bad) the fact is that Islam will, either involuntarily or voluntarily, shift the landscape and outlook of the people it rules—if it is indeed to rule—as has already occurred 1400 years ago. This is similar (or the opposite) to An-Na’im’s attempt to facilitate ideological change from traditional to reformed Shari’ah.267 How would Islamic government accommodate for competing interests? What one would expect, from a government truly adhering to Islam, that all of the factors of interest: corporations (economics), trade unions (common people, oppression), rights groups, and so on, would certainly be of concern to the ruling Caliph and the advisory board, but would only be concerned of what the Qur’an and Sunnah say on the issues, through objective empirical analysis. Though in some cases, Ijtihad and other innovations will have to be used as is required with the expansion of government (as Caliph ‘Umar has done), the ultimate ruler on policy will be the best possible interpretation of God’s will: if trade unions are complaining, the question will be “what is a decent minimum wage” according to God, to which ‘Umar and ‘Uthman have in fact ruled on 1400 years ago;268 if corporations want to lower it, the question will be “is it oppression against God (thorugh the people) to do so?”; if there are reports of potential invasion from the enemy, the question will be “what does Islamic foreign policy say about this?” Even though An-Na’im tries to give the impression that Islam was so simplistic, the Qur’an so incomplete, that it could not possibly be used as a manual for governance,269 whereas we have seen that it has, and can even be applied in the context of the modern world, through out study of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Islam being political as well as reformative ideologically, includes a giant change in outlook of the individual once the political comes into the mainstream; the likes of something much more ideologically revolutionary than the Iranian revolution.270 This failure of An-Na’im is typical of Eurocentric philosophers that cannot see beyond their Eurocentric outlook and constantly avoid mentioning any positive outlook toward Islam. Islam, at least in theory, takes an opposite view and puts the Prophet’s Muhammad’s regime as the standard (Figure 2.7). This is in sharp contrast to An-Na’im’s suggestion that Islam needs to be redeemed through

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M.R. Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum. Ibid, 134. 268 For ‘Umar, see Jamiyat-ul-Falah, The Voice of Islam, Volume 23, Issues 1-12 (Bilariyaganj: Jamiyat-ul-Falah, 1974), 400. For ‘Uthman, see: Sri Lanka Foundation, Human Rights and Religions in Sri Lanka: A Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Colombo: Sri Lanka Foundation, 1988), 216. 269 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 106, 107. 270 Giles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 106, 132. 267

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democratic values that have long-been discarded many critiques, including Karl Marx, as pointed out by Zatzman and Islam271 as well as Islam et al.272 An-Na’im’s claim that political Islam “still has to account for the lack of practical institutional arrangements for peaceful political dissent and orderly transfer of power to freely selected leaders throughout Islamic history”273, therefore Islamic governance is not constitutional. There are two major points that An-Na’im has missed. Firstly, he completely disregards the Rashidun Caliphate as being a model for Islam, due to his separation between the Caliphate and individual religious preferences (deconstructed in the next section). What should be noted for now is the fact that if the process of selection of leader as exemplified by Abu Bakr and his successors were not operative according to Prophet’s model, then it means that Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali were fake, illegitimate Caliphs that grabbed power without divine authority. Because of the fact that they considered themselves righteous successors,274 and that they would face being non-Muslim by definition of the fact that they claimed an office not rightfully theirs. This cannot be supported by any of the Hadith that predicted righteousness of these individuals or by any of the Sunni (that supported all four caliphs) and Shi’ia scholars (that supported at least Caliph Ali). So, even if we accept that truth is decided by majority opinion (An-Na’im’s ‘democracy theory’), An-Naim’s thesis implodes. On the other hand, the anti-thesis advanced by Islam recognizes the Rashidun Caliphate as legitimate and a model for constitutional continuity of power makes the entire process logical and also in line with what Prophet predicted when he said the rightly guided caliphate would last for 30 years (see Chapter 6). So indeed, there is no Prophet-approved book that details every guideline about everything relating to Islam, but, just when it comes to personal rites, one is expected to use the Qur’an, Hadith, and the example of the Caliphs in order to understand exactly how the Qur’an and Sunnah are to be applied. There are no specific orders, but there is the necessary history required to form and operate an Islamic state, as even the position of police officers, anti-corruption courts, trade wars, and other “modern” phenomena can be traced back to the Rashidun Caliphate. An-Na’im’s ignorance about the most widely documented history of mankind, along with the most comprehensive biography (in the form of books of Hadith) of the Prophet cannot have any justification. It should also be noted that even constitutionalist countries that An-Na’im reviews as a model for Muslim countries, they do not have a preset operative process of governance, as found in legislative dynamics, in the crisscrossing of authority within the legislature and other institutions, and other power-changing dynamics. There are several instances in which constitutional convention was broken, in face each so-called “developed” country has broken them—or have developed the constitutional conventions, uncodified constitutional law275 (Canada, US, UK, Switzerland, Spain, Norway, Denmark, etc.). In this sense, the case laws of the Rashidun Caliphate are far more matured and advanced, as all definitions of ‘who gets how much power’ have been pre-defined, written down, and historically verified. There is not 271

Gary Zatzman and Rafiq Islam, Economics of Intangibles. M.R. Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum. 273 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a,102. 274 Abu Bakr referred to himself as “Caliph [successor] of the Prophet” (Book 42, Hadith 1023 Adab al-Mufrad) and obviously demanded the oath of allegiance, as did all other caliphs, indicates that they claimed to be righteous caliphs of the Caliphate. 275 See: Xenophon Contiades, Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and the USA (London: Routledge, 2012), 435-440. 272

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one rule regulating the power of individuals that has not been defined by either the Qur’an, Sunnah, or the Rashidun Caliphate. The Caliphate system’s functions and legal systems are all written down and available to examine, nothing is “invented” or considered “convention” in such a government. A third problem encountered in attempting to understand An-Na’im’s argument against political Islam is the majority-rule vs. fundamental rights problem incurred by John Locke in the first part of the chapter. An-Na’im states that although we do have fundamental rights (he claims), one cannot ‘vote away’ these rights from a majority-vote perspective, though the rights cannot be absolute, due to the fact that the state is always given flexibility in regards to “qualifications” on the rights (he gives the example of a case of state of emergency).276 Here we revert to the above discussion(s) about how rights are to be defined, and the question of who gets to decide the right and wrong amongst things that liberal democracy provides flexibility within. In fact, this occurs because there is no way that one can logically define, let along have moral basis for, the basic elements of each states’ constitution/rule of law. Additionally, the “rights” that An-Na’im is so fond of, only exist due to the discretion of the people for them to exist. Owing to the terrifying reality that humans cannot be relied upon (this is both Locke’s and Hobbes’ take on human nature) to do justice let alone have ultimate moral authority over others, or at least to have the authority of telling others what constitutes justice, right, and wrong, the criteria cannot be established through an internal (i.e., human) process of legal deduction, as there is no standard which one can derive law from. This would invariably take us into a world of chaos regarding the decision of right and wrong. On the other hand, Islam has the clearest definitions of what constitutes rights, humans, and what rights humans have, all preserved in the oldest document ever preserved in the Qur’an and case laws of Prophet Muhammad, whose biography is the most detailed work of history known to mankind. In sharp contrast, An-Na’im writes, “the people of the country are generally assumed to be the ultimate source of power and authority of the state, which in turn exists to serve its people”277 indicatory of the “by the people, for the people” government Locke advocated for; i.e., morality defined by people. Fourthly, it should be noted that An-Na’im is using the cognitive approach of applying Islam, the finished product, into a society, which does not operate with Islamic values. In any society today, there are thousands of different groups of people, all with their separate interests; hundreds of kinds of activists, common population, corporations, human rights groups, etc., in which the country is required to balance between them, causing every bill or law to be a compromise (theoretically). An-Na’im refers to post-modern and post-colonial forms of governance, changing norms, etc. as “postcolonial realities”278 in an attempt to paint a grim look for the practicality of the imposition of Shari’ah law. I agree that from an outsider perspective to Islam, this is certainly the case, and that there is no doubt that if the Prophet’s (and the Rashidun) Caliphate were to exist today, it would be the most harshly opposed. However, from an insider perspective, there is an important point to make. The difference between “modern” states and an Islamic state is that an Islamic state has only one objective; pleasing God, and the entire means of doing so has been defined in Islam, whereas in cocalled secular countries, laws are a product of justice (public interest, if we may call such 276

An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 113. Ibid, 88. 278 Ibid, 127. 277

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“justice”), the large and scary influence of corporations (i.e., buying and using politicians, peoples’ only means of justice), corruption, and violation of fundamental rights in the name of “security”—whatever other influences have affected the development of such laws. So, despite problems with practicality and the desire to opt out taking the easier way (i.e., current government norms), Islamic duties must not be hindered by public opinion. Regarding the practical aspect, it should be noted that it is not an excuse for a Muslim to abide by only a certain part of the Qur’an, and leave out the other, just due to the fact that “it may be hard” or inconvenient. It would indeed be hard to deal with human rights groups, to demolish the private interests of individuals, especially financial ones (in the process of making law), to even convince the population to take the oath of allegiance, however, this can and should not form a strictly logical point of view (within Islam), stop Muslims from attempting to achieve their goal, carrying out the commands of the Qur’an. It would be just as bad as denying Islam (2:85; 4:151-151) to not rule by Islamic law once a state was created. We will discuss this aspect in latter sections, while judging the “Islamicness” of so-called Islamic or Muslim countries, such as Pakistan (An-Na’im calls them “Islamic countries”),279 to demonstrate that these countries do not fall anywhere near the Islamic criteria for upholding Islamic law. Secondly, the analysis at the first part of the chapter has already proven how it would be unfeasible and very simply unjust from an Islamic perspective, to change Islam due to changing attitudes and norms in Western society (happening primarily in Western society, but certainly Eastern as well). For the sake of clarification, An-Na’im has stated that in the “Islamic” country he envisions, Muslims would not be able to change law that would violate fundamental Islamic practices, violating the freedom of religion.280 Such attitude is well defined in the Qur’an as hallmark of Israelites that routinely “rejected some” and “accepted some” of their holy scripts (i.e., the Torah). Indeed, Islam may be considered intolerant for imposing fundamental laws by banning alcohol, cigarette smoking, pornography, prostitution, and so on, but this is precisely the perfect value system that Muslims believe to have, that nothing is to be added or taken from it. This is the inevitable outcome of a system that offers rigid and unchangeable paradigm for creating overall guidelines for every aspect of life. This is in contrast to the schism An-Na’im creates between religion and politics, and then uses that schism as an evidence of his assertion that religion can be discounted in governing of a state. The deconstruction of this comical assertion is made in the following section. The difference then, between Islam, and people “assert[ing] their religious convictions politically,”281 is that Islam was never meant to be a religious or personal code of conduct, but a political and moral code of conduct that transcends time and space, and allow for “…justice and good conduct and giving to relatives and forbids immorality and bad conduct and oppression.”282 From a Muslim point of view—as we saw with Ibn Khaldun—the Qur’an, being the criterion to judge between good and bad, is able to define “good” and “bad” in order to enforce them.

279

An-Na’im calls for “seek[ing] alternative interpretations that are more consistent with the evolving cultures and the context of Islamic societies today”: Ibid, 108. 280 Ibid, 96. 281 Ibid, 85. 282 The Qur’an, 16:90.

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3.5. DECONSTRUCTION OF AN-NA’IM’S VIEW ON THE HISTORICAL ISLAMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND STATE An-Na’im quotes283 historian Ira Lapidus, who said “The historical evidence also shows that there is no single Islamic model for state and religious institutions, but rather several competing ones.” Though her quote may mean that Islamic theology has no single government model that may be titled Islam, i.e., that there are several empires and institutions claiming to be Islamic whereas they exercise political authority in name of Islam, the observation does not apply to the Rashidun caliphate which based its political model on the Qur’an and Sunnah. Nevertheless, An-Na’im makes a long argument attempting to prove that firstly, even the Prophet himself and the four caliphs exercised political authority separate from religious authority, and secondly, that all other Caliphates and Islamic empires have spiraled down (especially the Mamluk and Fatamid ones) and made an incredibly clear distinction between religion and political institutions. I agree that under several of the Empires, it was very common to see a distinction between the religious and symbolic authority and the political authority (e.g., Caliph and the Vizier). However, in the case of the Rashidun Caliphate, we will see a very different picture; that Islam does not have a faith and personal aspect separated from a political aspect, rather, that Islam has political injunctions and orders just as the Qur’an contains orders pertaining to personal life, and that the prophet and the four Caliphs abided by these Qur’anic injunctions—and never strayed from them—in their public policy decisions. An-Na’im also cites a recurring theme; the notion that nobody can truly decide the Islamic legitimacy of a political state. As discussed earlier, this is a hallmark of Khawarij cognition. Also, throughout the discussion we will see that An-Na’im creates a schism—the one between personal faith and public policy—by artificially categorizing several actions into “primarily political” and “primarily religious” and then claim that because the actions are categorized differently, that the Rashidun Caliphate did not operate on Islamic grounds.

3.5.1. Islam and Secularism The first problem, right from the start, is An-Na’im’s interpretation of both Islam and secularism. For instance, he states that a “secular state is more consistent with Islamic history than is the so-called Islamic state model proposed by some Muslims since the second quarter of the twentieth century.”284 He does not realize that the European model of a constitutional state is in fact much less secular (as in ‘dogma-free’) than the true Islamic state based on the empirical analysis of the Qur’an, which is in fact the true secular state. It is interesting how An-Na’im attempts to draw comparison between the separation of church and state in current Islamic societies; he is ironically promoting the anti-secular, dogma-imposed state formulated by ‘enlightened’ Europeans hundreds of years ago. It is commonly claimed that postrenaissance Europe has got rid of its dogmatic past and developed a truly secular process, starting with scientific cognition. The recent work of Islam et al.285 demonstrated that this 283

An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 45. Ibid. 285 See bibliography for complete citations. 284

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claim is false. Even though Averröes is claimed to be the ‘father of secular philosophy in Europe’ and Thomas Aquinas the ‘father of doctrinal philosophy,’ all evidence support the theory that European cognition adopted throughout modern history is anything but secular and addiction to dogmatic thinking has only become worse. In Chapter 2, we have seen a glimpse of the history of logic that shows true logic is patently Islamic. In addition, Islam et al.286 demonstrated that Dogma is patently Eurocentric and it has only become worse in the enlightenment era. Ever since the introduction of dogma, European cognition has gone haywire. There have been several levels of disconnection. The first one is the disconnection with the logical God, the creator of everything. This is followed by the disconnection of humans from the purpose, followed by disconnection of conscience (and hence intention) from humans. It is noted that life’s purpose in Christianity is to seek divine salvation through the grace of God and intercession of Christ (cf. John 11:26). The New Testament speaks of God wanting to have a relationship with humans both in this life and the life to come, which can happen only if one’s sins are forgiven (John 3:16–21; 2 Peter 3:9). This is where dogma comes into play and the nonsensical argument emerges as: “I (God) am going create man and woman with original sin. Then, I am going to impregnate a woman with myself as her child, so that I can be born. Once alive, I will kill myself as a sacrifice to myself. To save you (humans who accept me as the ‘savior’) from the sin I originally condemned you to.” The ‘enlightenment’ phase of European history made the entire process of fulfilling purpose of life travel further down the degradation route. The original purpose was perverted by the Roman Catholic Church to be ‘salvation through Jesus’–a dogma the post‘enlightenment’ era replaced with replaced by notions of inalienable natural rights and the potentialities of reason, and universal ideals of love and compassion that gave way to civic notions of freedom, equality, and citizenship. There the definition of ‘natural’ and ‘universal’ remained arbitrary, devoid of any reasoning of logical thought. That made these notions of ‘freedom, equality, and citizenship’ more dogmatic and original dogma itself. This has been the era of roller coaster ride of the spiraling down of all values through a successive degradation through ever more lunatic dogmas and false premises: 1) Classical liberalism (humans as beings with inalienable natural rights (including the right to retain the wealth generated by one’s own work), and sought out means to balance rights across society. Broadly speaking, it considers individual liberty to be the most important goal, because only through ensured liberty that the other inherent rights are protected.) 2) Kantianism (all actions are performed in accordance with some underlying maxim or principle, and for actions to be ethical, they must adhere to the categorical imperative. Kant denied that the consequences of an act in any way contribute to the moral worth of that act, his reasoning being that the physical world is outside one’s full control and thus one cannot be held accountable for the events that occur in it. 3) Utilitarianism (“Nature” has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure,’ then, from that moral insight, deriving the Rule of

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4)

5)

6) 7)

8)

9)

10) 11) 12)

Utility: “that the good is whatever brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people.”) Nihilism (Life is without objective meaning. A natural result of the idea that God is dead, and insisting it was something to overcome. This is fighting the God that is now ‘dead’) Pragmatism (Truth is whatever works, and “only in struggling with the environment“ do data, and derived theories, have meaning, and that consequences, like utility and practicality, are also components of truth. Purpose of life is discoverable only via experience.) Theism (God created the universe and that God and humans find their meaning and purpose for life in God’s purpose in creating.) Existentialism (Each man and each woman creates the essence (meaning and purpose) of his and her life; life is not determined by a supernatural god or an earthly authority, one is free.) Absurdism (the Absurd arises out of the fundamental disharmony between the individual’s search for meaning and the apparent meaninglessness of the universe. As beings looking for meaning in a meaningless world, humans have three ways of resolving the dilemma: 1) Suicide; 2) “Religious” belief; and 3) Acceptance of the Absurd). Secular humanism (the human species came to be by reproducing successive generations in a progression of unguided evolution as an integral expression of nature, which is self-existing. People determine human purpose without supernatural influence; it is the human personality (general sense) that is the purpose of a human being’s life.) Logical positivism (the question: what is the meaning of life? Is itself meaningless) Postmodernism (seeks meaning by looking at the underlying structures that create or impose meaning, rather than the epiphenomenal appearances of the world.) Naturalistic pantheism (the meaning of life is to care for and look after nature and the environment).

Benjamin Franklin famously claimed: “We are all born ignorant, but one must work hard to remain stupid.” Margaret Thatcher infamously stated: “There is no alternative.” Overall, decline of human values can be summarized in the following transition. Creator’s viceroy  fallen sinner with original sin in need of salvation  inherently selfish and stupid (as part of the animal kingdom)  inherently selfish but intelligent  selfsustained and capable of controlling his surrounding to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The first distortion was introduced by St. Augustine, who was the first one to break down the most important feature of truth–uniqueness. He wrote in his “Trinity,” “God is truth for he, too, has a true [real] soul who has not a great soul; since the essence of body and soul is not the essence of the truth [reality] itself; as is the Trinity, one God, alone, great, true, truthful, the truth…” Then came Thomas Aquinas. He had access to Avicenna, Averroes, as well as Aristotle (through Muslim scholars’ translation efforts). He wrote: “A natural thing, being placed between two intellects, is called true insofar as it conforms to either. It is said to be true with respect to its conformity with the divine

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intellect insofar as it fulfills the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect... With respect to its conformity with a human intellect, a thing is said to be true insofar as it is such as to cause a true estimate about itself.” 287

All of a sudden truth became subject to human intellect. This would be the beginning of today’s insane definition of truth. Note the following degradation of the definition of truth. 1) Correspondence theory (stresses a relationship between thoughts or statements on one hand, and things or objects on the other). 2) Coherence theory (truth is primarily a property of whole systems of propositions, and can be ascribed to individual propositions only according to their coherence with the whole, i.e., Authority). 3) Constructivist theory (truth is constructed by social processes, is historically and culturally specific, and that it is in part shaped through the power struggles within a community.) 4) Consensus theory (truth is whatever is agreed upon, or in some versions, might come to be agreed upon, by some specified group. Such a group might include all human beings, or a subset thereof consisting of more than one person.) 5) Pragmatic theory (truth is verified and confirmed by the results of putting one’s concepts into practice.) 6) Minimalist theories (truth does not denote a real property of sentences or propositions.) 7) Redundancy and related theories (truth is a redundant concept; that is, it is merely a word that is traditionally used in conversation or writing, generally for emphasis, but not a word that actually equates to anything in reality.) 8) Pluralist theories (there is a particular property the having of which makes a belief or proposition true. Pluralist theories of truth assert that there may be more than one property that makes propositions true: ethical propositions might be true by virtue of coherence. Propositions about the physical world might be true by corresponding to the objects and properties they are about.) In summary, what we have is a comical assembly of research questions ranging from Harvard College’s “How many angels can dance on a pin head?” to the 18th century classic “If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?” These have created a world in which systematic falsehoods have become the truth while the truth can be dismissed as ‘conspiracy theory’ whenever it happens to gore some powerful individuals’ oxen. We have graduated from Dogma and trinity only to fall for multiple history of the same physical point—otherwise known as quantum theory. Today, we debate what should be the sex of a child, if an adult has the right to declare himself a six-year-old girl if he truly believes so.288 287 288

M.R. Islam et al., The Greening of Pharmaceutical Engineering, Volume 1: Practice, Analysis, and Methodology, 272. 'I've gone back to being a child': Husband and father-of-seven, 52, leaves his wife and kids to live as a transgender six-year-old girl named Stefonknee. Daily Mail Online. 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ femail/article-3356084/I-ve-gone-child-Husband-father-seven-52-leaves-wife-kids-live-transgender-SIXYEAR-OLD-girl-named-Stefonknee.html#ixzz3xq9GBGZ0.

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What the likes of An-Na’im call period of progress has actually been a moral perpetual slide downhill. Today, the purpose of life has been reduced to ‘be happy,’ ‘have fun,’ ‘live to the fullest’ (translation: maximize pleasure and minimize pain). Everything in history has been reconstructed to support this latest notion of the purpose of life. For instance one can cite the example of Antisthenes, a pupil of Socrates. He is known to have outlined the themes of Cynicism, stating that the purpose of life is living a life of Virtue, which agrees with Nature. Happiness depends upon being self-sufficient and master of one’s mental attitude; suffering is the consequence of false judgments of value, which cause negative emotions and a concomitant vicious character. This philosophy has no contradiction with the purpose of life outlined above. In fact, it is further stated that Cynical life rejects conventional desires for wealth, power, health, and fame, by being free of the possessions acquired in pursuing the conventional. Once again, there is no contradiction with the status of humans being ‘viceroy.’ However, how is this interpreted by new scientists? It is said: “as reasoning creatures, people could achieve happiness via rigorous training, by living in a way natural to human beings. The world equally belongs to everyone, so suffering is caused by false judgments of what is valuable and what is worthless per the customs and conventions of society.” Then it is described whatever comes naturally is called ‘natural’ and whatever gives one instant pleasure and quick short-term victory is valuable, turning everything into a race for pleasure in this world. This is complete disconnection from the purpose that was known since the beginning of time. Another case in point is: Epicurus, a pupil of Pamphilus of Samos. He allegedly taught that the greatest good is in seeking modest pleasures, to attain tranquility and freedom from fear (ataraxia) via knowledge, friendship, and virtuous, temperate living; bodily pain (aponia) is absent through one’s knowledge of the workings of the world and of the limits of one’s desires. This is entirely consistent with the original purpose of human life as stated earlier in this section and is supported by numerous verses of the Qur’an (e.g., 79:37-41). However, later interpretation took it to the other extreme making it in line with Roman Catholic Church’s stance on self emollition and avoidance of social responsibilities and such conclusions were made: “Combined, freedom from pain and freedom from fear are happiness in its highest form. Epicurus’ lauded enjoyment of simple pleasures is quasi-ascetic “abstention” from sex and the appetites.” Besides the mix-up of secularism and religious dogmatic ideology as applying to Europe and Islam, respectively, there are several points in which An-Na’im advances his theory based upon the non-existence of the truly Islamic Rashidun caliphate. Note that the impact of neglecting the Rashidun Caliphate cannot be understood, as discounting it eliminates the true model of Islam in its totality—the latitude of permissibility and existence of hundreds of important incidences of precedent and Ijtihad are lost in doing so. Firstly, he claims that the political state that Muslims lived in was never truly ‘Islamic’ in the sense that it ruled by religious principles, but that there was always a historical difference and a mention between pragmatic ruling of the state and ‘religion’—being the unachievable ideal always at conflict with the state’s interests. He uses the case of “Islamic history” to support this claim.289 Though this is the case since the inception of the Umayyad Caliphate onward,290 and An289 290

An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 46. “The permanent paradox of the Umayyad and all subsequent regimes that ruled over Muslims is that they sought to satisfy their need for genuine religious legitimacy by making the impossible claim of replicating the model

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Na’im admits this, it is not true that the Rashidun Caliphate was ever governed by principles disconnected from Shari’ah law, leading us to the converse conclusion that they always governed within the bounds of Islamic law as defined in the Qur’an and Hadith. If the schism between religion and politics was invented after the Umayyad Caliphate, then it is wrong to say that Islam cannot be political, and also wrong to say that state governance by Muslims was never done in accordance to Shari’ah. Note that the fact that there was no true Caliphate after the Rashidun caliphate indicates not that Islam was defined by those states, but rather that none of those states were truly Islamic, and were picking and choosing Islam in order to gain political legitimacy, making them in fact the worst of the rejecters of Islam, as per Qur’anic injunctions 2:85 and 4:150-151. An-Na’im’s analyses of the Fatamid and Mamluk dynasties, for example, are irrelevant to the discussion of Islamic politics, because Islam stopped being defined though politics once it was separated from alternate interests of the state. These dynasties and empires all fall under the category of European-style (even Roman), classical, “religion vs. state” created dogmatic states. This is the one Ibn Khaldun described as the ‘cyclic model,’ in absence of Caliphate.

3.5.2. An-Na’im’s Schism between Religion and Politics in Islam Before discussing the specific historical arguments that An-Na’im proposes in his attempt to prove that Islamic governance of the Rashidun Caliphate has nothing to do with Islam as a faith, it is important to analyze the cognitive schism that An-Na’im creates. He forms a situation in which he categorizes actions and policies as “religious” and others as “secular,” hence, because many of the actions of the Caliphate were pragmatic rather than religious, governance by Muslims was never Islamic—i.e., faith-based. There are two problems in such creation of this schism; a) throughout An-Na’im’s historical and religious analysis, he does not realize that Islam is not a faith, but actually a way of life, which explicitly delegated political authorities that the Muslims ruled by; and b) that just because the leaders may have done something that seemed political rather than only faith-based, it does not imply that they are not adhering to Islam. When An-Na’im states that “attempting to show the inherent contradictions in the conflation or convergence of religious and political authority and the unavoidable dangers of attempting to implement a fusion of the two,”291 he does not seem to be aware of the fact that Islam has a lot to do with political authority, and that the religious authority (i.e., messenger of God and the Qur’an) actually remains in full control of the political policy. As is absolutely the case with the Jus in bello and Jus ad bellum in Islam (discussed in chapters 4 and 5), the ‘political’ and ‘religious’ are not separate from each other. In other words, the notion of “political” was neither an independent concept, nor was the notion of “religious”—i.e., faith—because Islam is not a faith, it is a way of life that clearly has injunctions across the board. In other words, Islam is neither a faith, nor a personal or familial guideline-giver, nor a political entity, it is the God-ordained way of attaining success in the next world, which has a wide variety of injunctions that require faith (more accurately, ‘trust in God’) to accept as the truth, and require the practicing upon the Qur’an as a whole. of the Prophet or at least that of the first four caliphs of Medina”: Ibid, 42. This is true, because on an absolute bases, through the empirical Islamic approach, it can be proven that they were not legitimate—see Chapter 6. 291 Ibid.

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An-Na’im creates a notion in which he creates a paradox along the lines of the following dichotomous syllogism: All Americans speak French {False major premise}; President Hollande is an American {False minor premise}; Therefore, President Hollande speaks French {Aphenomenal conclusion}.

Because Pragmatism encourages us to focus on the final conclusion, there is temptation to accept the above syllogism as true. An-Na’im does exactly that but doesn’t stop there. He then reconstructs the false first premise based on the aphenomenal conclusion and states that “All Americans speak French” is a true premise. The dichotomy for An-Na’im is between his creation of the notion of “personal” or “religious” Islam. It does not matter how much one proves that Hollande speaks French, viz., it does not matter how much An-Na’im proves that Muslims have mad political rather than religious actions, such identification has no validity, because An-Na’im has categorized Islam as covering only personal aspects and politics as being pragmatic and unrelated to Islam. When he states that piousness has nothing to do with political pragmatism employed by the prophet and the four Caliphs of Islam (as we discuss below), or points out that a Caliph has done something political rather than religious, the argument is invalid, because the validity of the argument is not based on whether or not actions were religious, but is based on the assumption that politics has no place in Islam, the assumption itself arising from the false categorization of certain actions as “Islamic” (individual) and some actions as “Political,” whereas Islam makes no difference between the two. He restates his premise several times, for instance, he claims that “the state was inherently political and not religious because of differences between the nature of religious authority and political authority.”292 Let us deconstruct this phrase. Firstly, we can notice that he creates a schism between the state’s pragmatism and religion (Shari’ah). Though this may not be the case for the Umayyads onward, the Rashidun Caliphate and Caliphate under the prophet only acted upon political values found in the Qur’an, interpreted by Hadith. All of the political and legal injunctions found in the Qur’an have an obvious purpose; to govern the policy of the state by the standards of God. Thus, when a leader only makes policy based upon, or contained within the injunctions, permissions, and prohibitions in the Qur’an unexplained by the Hadith, there is no contradiction between the political actions and the Shari’ah, if the state is following the Shari’ah. In the time of the Rashidun Caliphate, as it has been restated several times, that there is no policy in which one can identify a non-Islamic (not based on Qur’an and Sunnah) aspect that was established by the Rashidun Caliphate. Perhaps An-Na’im’s creation of the schism between politics and religion was strongly influenced by his opinion of the Umayyads, Abbasids, and those onwards, who constantly conflicted with scholars willing to impose the Shari’ah, which he admits was a problem starting from the Umayyad regime, namely, the “confusing the political authority of the caliph with his religious authority.”293 Proof of the fact that the Caliphate’s (the Prophet to ‘Ali) public policy and the Qur’an went hand in hand can be found in two historical events. The first event is that the Prophet 292 293

Ibid, 49. Ibid, 61.

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Muhammad’s domestic, foreign, financial, and legal laws all have roots in and were initiated by the Qur’anic revelation. In our study of foreign policy, we can see how revelations of God directly influenced the Prophet’s policy; the march to Mecca, Banu Qurayzah treason execution, expulsion of the Banu Nadir, invasion of the Byzantine/Ghassanid Empire at Tabuk, and several other incursions that for the Islamic foreign policy have roots in the Qur’an. The same parallel can be found in personal life; if there was never any divine inspiration, there would be no reason for the Prophet to start the practice prayer. The same applies to the inception of the Zakah and other Islamic taxes (Ushur: land-tax, Khums: warspoils tax, Fai’: new property tax, and Jiziyah: non-Muslim’s poll-tax) that form the full of the Islamic taxation policy, as well as of course, the criminal legal Islamic code; the law of retribution, just sentence, defamation law, regulation of disallowed substances, and so on. There is no case in which the Prophet formed legal precedent that was not based on the Qur’an (or has roots in it). The same applies for the Rashidun Caliphs. Though it can be argued that many of their fundamental actions forming precedent are not based on Islam, such as the Islamic selection process. However, it should be noted that the fact that a) they were interpreting the Qur’an and Sunnah to their best of their ability, and b) they are given divine, personal confirmation. Unlike what can be confirmed about the writers of Biblical texts for example, it is true, as discussed in chapter two, that these Caliphs—for the purpose of setting an example and explaining what the Prophet could not have explained—were given direct divine authority294 to confirm their absolute authority. Though they are certainly not given authority anywhere comparable to the Prophet, they are assured to have minimal coverage in the sense that they would not make any major mistakes (declaring themselves the political and religious figurehead would obviously apply as such). From this brief discussion, we see that in terms of Islamic governance, it is not only feasible, but proven feasible through the vast economic, cultural, intellectual, and physical expansion of the Rashidun Caliphate, that only adhering to the laws of the Qur’an as explained by the prophet are enough to govern a political state and all of its institutions. Hence, An-Na’im’s claims that religious leaders (whatever that is, I will assume someone who knows the Shari’ah well) “can and should insist on the ideals of justice and fidelity to Shari’a in theory, they have neither the power nor the obligation to confront practical questions of maintaining the peace among local communities, regulating economic and social relations, or defending the realm against external threats.”295 The similarity of this narration to Papal authority within the Roman empire is uncanny. Though we cannot examine every single one of those claims; i.e., the claim of domestic stability and regulation of economic and social relations, his claim is certainly, unequivocally false and disproven by the history of the Rashidun Caliphate in regards to the field of “defending from external threats.” However, regarding those other aspects, it is true that the Rashidun Caliphate has at least some hint of precedent of ruling regarding aspects of economic policy,296 criminal jurisprudence,297 family law,298 and other forms of law. 299

The Prophet Muhammad had commanded to “follow my Sunnah and that [the Sunnah] of the rightly-guided caliphs.”See: Abu Dawood al-Sijastānī, Sunan Abi Dawood, Book 41, Hadith 4590. Clear authority from the Prophet is given to the four Caliphs. 295 Ibid. 296 For Islamic banking, see G.M. and M.R. Islam, Economics of Intangibles, 295-300 for a section on Islamic banking. There are also thousands of articles and books on Islamic finance. Even the Prophet Muhammad himself makes several statements regarding price control, bargaining, quality control, and the Rashidun caliphs have commented on minimum wage, trade wars, and other advanced topics. 294

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Whenever anybody uses the un-Islamic approach to deciding public policy that is guided by the Qur’an and Hadith—just as how when someone does the same with personal/familial life—it is simply classified as un-Islamic. For instance, if somebody were to engage in premarital sex, where the Qur’an disallows even something that may lead to it (17:32, 24:2, 4-5, 30-31, 23:5, etc.), it is fair to say that somebody who commits the act is guilty of doing something un-Islamic. Similarly, when somebody does not abide by the Qur’an and Sunnah in forming political policy, it is qualified as un-Islamic. When somebody chooses Pragmatism over Islam, i.e., the ends justify the means rather than the source and means (the Qur’an and Sunnah) justify the ends, it becomes outside the fold of Islam to attempt to pursue something un-Islamic. Hence, the notion of pragmatic political authority is non-existent in Islam, and goes against the whole notion of Islamic governance and laws.

3.5.3. An-Na’im’s Interpretation of Religious and Political Authority Further purposting his mission of creating the invisible division between Islam and politics, An-Na’im refers to the case of leadership. An-Na’im makes the case that political authority is and is required to govern a state in general, piety cannot be a criteria when it comes to the hard task of guiding the domestic, judicial, economic, and foreign policy to maintain stability and prosperity of the state. As we have just discussed, pragmatism has no place in Islam, this includes the responsibility of the establishment of a state, for the fact that the Qur’an and Hadith provide a political agenda in all fields of governance. Hence, in reality, Islam requires piety and willingness to submit to God as a priority for being the Caliph, because the practice of governance in Islam is not about maintaining power or ability to achieve an ends through various means, but based on the willingness and ability of applying the means to fulfilling the ends of achieving the salvation of God (following Islam, Islam is submission to God, as the careful reader recalls). We know that An-Na’im takes an “ends justify the means” approach to governance. Though the approach is qualified by the need to respect human rights and related issues, he chases a political end, that of sterility and limiting civil strive, by allowing certain means to find that.300 An-Na’im classifies political and religious authority and creates a separation between the two on basic (not Islamic) terms, and then concludes that because someone with religious authority has a number of problems with its political ability to rule, that a political and pragmatic leader is required to maintain the state’s existence. An-Na’im claims that “political authority tends to be based on more ‘objectively’ assessed qualities regarding the ability to exercise coercive power and execute effective administration for the general good of 297

298 299 300

There are several verses in the Qur’an pertaining to punishments for individual punishments for specific crimes, the acceptance of certain witnesses, required evidence for crimes, and so on, which are vastly expanded upon by the Prophet in the Hadith (see the books on “prescribed punishments” found in all major Hadith collections) and even more by the Caliphs of the Rashidun Caliphate. There are hundreds of Hadiths regarding divorce law, marriage law and consent, the concept of the best interest of the child, wills and inheritance, rights and responsibilities of the state in family life, and so on. There are hundreds of narrations of the Prophet and precedent set by the Rashidun Caliphs that pertain to acceptable evidence, qualifications for positions of judges, witnesses, small-claims law, and inheritance. An-Na’in states: “the qualities of effective political leadership must therefore be determined on a large and public scale, in a decisive and settled manner, to minimize the risks of civil strife and violent conflict,” AnNa`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 50.

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the community.”301 The only problem that Islam has with such a criteria is that if it is applied, then the entire Rashidun Caliphate becomes completely irrelevant. The historical evidence shows that Abu Bakr and Uthman, especially the latter, were not strong political leaders at all. They were chosen amongst the thousands of Muslims who could have been chosen by the Muslim community at the time. While people knew that there were much more authoritative and stronger leaders than Abu Bakr, such as ‘Umar (who is famous/infamous for his drive for political compliance), who would make much better political leader, however, even ‘Umar proposed that Abu Bakr be the Caliph. When ‘Umar died, one of the people he chose for his running of the Caliph, amongst a group of six, was ‘Uthman, well-known to be softhearted and a weak leader,302 who was surprisingly nominated by group (by political leadership standards) and given the election (pledge of allegiance) by all. If one were to deduce the primary criterion to decide the qualities by which the Caliphs are to be chosen, it makes sense that “religious” criteria is the most obvious choice; righteousness, piety, adherence to Islam in general. We learn this criteria from the narrations of the Prophet that emphasize “cling[ing] stubbornly to it [the Sunnah]” and to follow “the path of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs,”303 whose definition, “righteous and guided” Caliphs: “ َ‫” ُخلَفَا ِء الرَّا ِش ِدينَ ْال َم ْه ِديِّين‬, reaffirms emphasis of the requirement of the Caliph to adhere strictly to the divine law. It also explains the reason why, even after the death of ‘Uthman, no nondivinely-confirme304 Companion of the Prophet was even considered to be in the running for the Caliphate. In the running of the Caliphate after the Prophet’s death, ‘Umar, Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Ubaidah bin al-Jarrah were all considered in the running for possible election as Caliph.305 All three are considered to be of the “ten companions” of the Prophet said to be “entering paradise” (thereby acting as divine affirmation of their righteousness). Then, Abu Bakr elected ‘Umar as Caliph before his death directly,306 who was one of those companions. Before ‘Umar had died, he appointed six men to decide amongst themselves who he successor would be,307 they were ‘Ali b. Abu Talib, ‘Uthman b. Affan, Al-Zubayr b. alAwwam, Talha b. Ubayd Allah, Abd al-Rahman b. Auf, and Sad bin Abi Waqqas; all of whom are considered to be amongst those ten companions. As noted before, they did not choose amongst each other by “political qualities,” but rather—as ‘Abd al-rahman b. ‘Auf said—by such qualities: relation (familial and spiritual) to the Prophet Muhammad, adherence to Islam, promise to “do justice.”308 Based upon the implications of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s criteria, it is evident that the Caliph is selected by so-called “religious” qualities. Additionally, the pledge of allegiance seems to make the religious obligation of the office clear:

301

Ibid. Hadi F. Eid, Islam: The Alien Faith (Bloomington: Trafford Publishing, 2013), 95; Glenn Earl Perry, The Middle East: Fourteen Islamic Centuries (London: Pearson, 1996), 40. 303 Ibn Majah al-Qazwīnī, Sunan Ibn Majah, Book 1, Hadith 45; Abu Dawood al-Sijsitānī, Sunan Abi Dawood, Book 41, Hadith 4590 has a similar narration. 304 There are ten Muslims who have been given the confirmation of their entry into paradise, i.e., affirming their righteousness and upholding of Islam. 305 A long tradition of Bukhari accepted by modern historians is found at: Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih alBukhari, Vol. 5, Book 57, Hadith 19/. 306 James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia (New York City: Infobase Publishing, 2010), 49. 307 Ibid, 51. 308 Another long narration from Sahih al-Bukhari describes the event: Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 5, Book 57, Hadith 50. 302

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Jaan S. Islam “We pledged to the Messenger of Allah to hear and obey, both in times of ease and hardship, when we felt energetic and when we felt tired, that we would not contend with the orders of whomever was entrusted with it, that we would was entrusted with it, that we would stand firm in the way of truth wherever we may be, and that we would not fear the blame of the blamers.”309 Another adds, “…that we would stand for justice wherever we may be, and that we would not fear the blame of any blamer for the sake of Allah.” 310

This religious obligation is explicit when we examine the Islamic position on when a population may rebel against the Caliph; when he commits “open kufr” (justification of sin in the open) as Chapter 6 discusses. Another stipulation of the Prophet is that an individual is not even required to obey the leader when his order is explicit conflictual with God’s orders. Indeed, as An-Na’im points out; there is no external mediator who can decide the righteousness of a decree or order. Though this is the case, the fact remains that people are still responsible for their deeds; if the ruler is wrong, he is wrong, end of story. If the ruler is right and the subject is wrong, the subject will be responsible for the sin he committed on the day of ‘divine judgment’ that Muslims believe in (amongst the six “articles of faith”). To answer An-Na’im’s concern: the fact that there is no guider to the truth does not mean that the subjects are absolved from seeking and attempting to act on the truth. The Islamic perspective on justice and leadership is not pragmatic at all, rather, there is a pre-designated set of options that the ruler is given in order to decide a verdict; from an external perspective, it may by an exemplary example of a weak and unsustainable government, but from an insider perspective, this is the most logical course of action for several reasons. Firstly, it makes rulers only responsible to obey God and not face the conflict between state-driven pragmatism and the God-given rights of people (which is very difficult to balance). Secondly, it assures both the subjects and the ruler the best way to operate a political state and obey God at the same time. Thirdly, in practice, it worked pretty well from a societal, political, financial, and military perspective, and only fell due to large numbers of people who rebelled against Islam (see Chapter 6 on the first fitna). An-Na’im explains that because things such as “piety and knowledge” are only determinable by “by the private judgment of individual persons,”311 it is unfeasible to decide who can be the most righteous in a state, and hence, a publicly, politically known leader will then rule more effectively. An-Na’im does not recognize that, just as what happened with he Rashidun caliphate, people’s piety can certainly be reputable. A person’s history, favoring by the Caliph, previous positions that require piousness (i.e., judge, advisor), knowledge, etc., can form a person’s reputation. It is illogical to think that people cannot be famous for their knowledge in Islamic jurisprudence, previous positions served, dedication to Islam,312 and ability to serve justice when given the authority. The Caliph is not chosen directly for righteousness as a human being, but such high qualities are indicatory in their political and military service to Islam, appointments to positions in the state (which of course are indicatory of their knowledge and piousness as a Muslim as well as proof of their ability to 309

Ahmad al-Nasa’i, Sunan an-Nasa’i, Vol. 5, Book 39, Hadith 4154; Vol. 5, Book 39, Hadith 4156; Vol. 5, Book 39, Hadith 4158 adds to stand for justice; Vol. 5, Book 39, Hadith 4157 adds speaking the truth, etc. 310 Ibid, Vol. 5, Book 39, Hadith 4158. 311 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 51. 312 Dedication to Islam as a whole, meaning spiritually, family-wise, and of course politically and militarily.

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enforce Islamic law), reputation as a jurist or person of knowledge in general, and so on. Just as how today, we can tell the righteousness (what hundreds of Islamic jurists have done) of people by simply reading incidents that happened around them (especially when the person had political authority), their actions, their opinions as detectable by public opinion, scandals, relations to the Caliph and other righteous people, and so on. The picture An-Na’im is drawing regarding the piety of people is almost such as a hermit, clerical, or monk-like sense that only people who have known them (family, neighbors, etc.) would be able to tell their righteousness. However, in Islam, the true face of righteousness can be found through the qualities/assessments above. In the Caliphate form of governance where piety is the primary consideration for any political position, political authority is also indicative of religious piety. An-Nai’m’s claims that political and religious leadership are different and have different qualities.313 This is not true, because in Islam, the ability to rule according to the laws of God is judged by piety, and because the leader’s responsibility in an Islamic system is to uphold Islam (which has a political and legal aspect to it), rather than to uphold power of the state. We see how the schism created by An-Na’im between religion and state in the Caliphate developed into a matter of how to control he relationship between them. He uses this antagonism to then provide grounds to say that Islam (the personal part) is compatible with democracy. He states: “With the European model of the state under which all Muslims live today, that alternative requires the establishment of constitutionalism, human rights, and citizenship” in order to balance between politics and religion.314 The only problem is that AnNa’im still has to claim the existence of the historical schism in the Rashidun Caliphate, this is discussed in the final below.

3.5.4. An-Na’im’s Accusations of the Political and Religious Institutions Clashing in the Prophet’s Time and Time of the Rashidun Caliphate One of the major assumptions made by An-Na’im is that religion and politics are fundamentally, necessarily separated in Islam. The assumption is that somehow, the Prophet used statesmanship in order to propagate his religion. This, off the bat, is a false notion given, at least from an Muslim point of view, where it is believed that the Prophet acted upon divine command (The Qur’an) to make the major decisions as a “statesman.” However, upon realization we see that Islam is not really a religion in a personal sense, rather, it is a collections of commands listed out that are required for one to submit to God correctly, it includes how to “do” politics, guide familial and personal life, etc. We have to realize, especially in our study of foreign policy, that the Prophet either made his decisions to go to war by direct Qur’anic injunction such as the one found in 9:24 leading to the battle of Tabuk, ‘divine inspiration’ of some sort, or he made the decision in accordance to a verse of Qur’an already revealed (Badr, Uhud, Trench, Khaybar, March to Mecca, etc.). This means that the so-called “religion” in a personal sense does not exist—if we assume that Islam is compilation of all of the orders of the Qur’an—because the Qur’an contains several injunctions discussing foreign policy, law, economics, and so on. Before further discussion it simply needs to be established that when the Prophet and all of the Rashidun Caliphs were 313 314

Ibid, 51. Ibid, 53.

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acting based on the ultimate order of God; decisions of how to execute that order, and prioritization of different orders were individually done by the Caliphs. An-Na’im cites Ibn Taymiyyah (and Ibn Qayyim), who allegedly supported his view that when it comes to state interests and governance of a state, the state judges as per pragmatic— and not Islamic—qualities of individuals.315 The example of Khalid bin Walid, a famous companion of the Prophet, is given. Ibn Taymiyyah argues that despite the fact that the Prophet disliked the actions of Khalid, he was constantly appointed general when he sent expeditions. This is said to support the view that the Prophet, even being a religious leader, had to choose people by their pragmatic ability to use force, and not be religious principals. There are several major problems encountered in An-Na’im’s argument. Firstly, it is simply not true that Khalid bin Walid was in a way disliked by the Prophet or that he was thought amongst the companions or others to be impious in any way. In fact, Khalid was amongst one of very few companions given honorary titles, being called “a sword among the swords of Allah” and “an excellent slave of Allah”316 by the Prophet himself, who had respect for his dedication to his personal physical and financial dedication towards Jihad.317 Though the Prophet disliked and disapproved of some of his acts, such as his killing of war captives (prior to its prohibition), there is no indication that Khalid ever deliberately disobeyed the Prophet’s orders. Secondly, An-Na’im makes the mistake of differentiating from political and religious objectives. Because Islam dominates the political agenda, there is no conflict between the state’s interests and the religion’s interests—the key lies in this assumption. Let us consider a command of God (a ‘religious’ command) ordering the Prophet to declare war on a certain entity. It would be the Prophet’s religious obligation to fulfill this political order (notice the interconnectedness of religion and politics). Therefore, by using primarily pragmatic means to fulfill the command of God (i.e., win the battle), the Prophet is in fact executing the most efficient and least harmful way of carrying out this religious order. That being said, there is a limit—also set by God—regarding how far one can go in applying those pragmatic means; obeying the jus in bello, for example, prohibitions against using fear tactics, killing war captives, civilians, etc. So, in order to fulfill this pragmatic duty and adhere to the religious standards set regarding battlefield conduct (i.e., jus in bello, to assure that within the war that there is no injustices [infractions on God] are being committed), Muslims who have the dedication and have made the pledge to uphold the orders of God and the leader, are custodians of divine law in the battle field. In other words, fighters on the battlefield are still bound to divine law. Therefore, non-Muslims may not be selected to fight in or lead armies due to lack of trust to uphold that law as given in the pledge of allegiance (which requires one to be Muslim). Upon being given these boundaries, the Prophet was required to achieve a God-given objective, that is, to find the best military strategist and fighter to lead the army in war. This strategist, however, must also have pledged allegiance to uphold God’s commands throughout the course of the battle. Therefore, he picked an intelligent military strategist— Khalid—who was also a Muslim and could be trusted to uphold the divine law of war. Thirdly, An-Na’im assumes that because Ibn Taymiyyah acknowledged that there should be pragmatism in politics, that Ibn Taymiyyah was “clearly aware of the importance and 315

Ibid, 49. Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Book 49, Hadith 4217. 317 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 5, Hadith 214. 316

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indeed the necessity of separating the religious dimension of any individual from his function or role in the state, which must be entrusted to those who are best qualified to accomplish the task.” He says this without realizing that the entire purpose of the state is to uphold divine law, injunctions of God—even according to Ibn Taymiyyah.318 He also forgets that there are still limits as to pragmatic objective. Despite what Ibn Taymiyyah’s view may have been on the religion of the state, the example An-Na’im proposes does not lead to any other definitive conclusion that proving the fact that Islam and politics are fused together. An-Na’im also makes the claim that political authority and pragmatism was employed in the selection process of the Caliphate. He claims that specifically, the fact that the selection process of the Caliph was political (i.e., some groups supported Ali and others supported Abu Bakr, for instance), that the Caliphate is a political, and not a religious organization.319 Perhaps An-Na’im ‘ought to see the narrations of the selection process from the first hand, again, if he has not already done so. Regarding the accusation that the selection process was “pragmatic” and political, let us examine the narration. During the selection process, it was proposed that there be two leaders—one from the Muhajirun, and the other from the Ansar (two groups of Muslims). Abu Bakr has responded that “[w]e are the rulers and you [the Ansars] are the ministers [i.e., advisers].”320 This seemingly political event was in fact based on several Prophetic narrations asserting that to be the case.321 Despite that, the fact that Abu Bakr was selected for being “best amongst us [the Quraish] and the most beloved of all of us to Allah’s Messenger,” is rather evidence of the ‘religious’ reality of the selection of the Caliph. One of the major claims An-Na’im makes to consolidate is his theory that even in Abu Bakr’s era, the political and religious authorities were in conflict, as demonstrated in the issue of his decision to declare war on people who refused to pay Zakah (compulsory tax)—known as “the wars of Ridda.” He claimed that Umar amongst other companions opposed the descision, and that the question was whether or not it was the job of the state (i.e., not being a religious entity) to impose Zakah collection.322 Let us examine the narration found in several Hadith books that record the discussion between Umar and Abu Bakr: “Abu Hurairah said When the Messenger of Allah died and Abu Bakr was made his successor after him and certain Arab clans apostatized. Umar bin Al Khattab said to Abu Bakr How can you fight with the people until they say “There is no God but Allah” so whoever says “There is no God but Allah,” he has protected his property and his person from me except for what is due from him, and his reckoning is left to Allah. Abu Bak replied I swear by Allah that I will certainly fight with those who make a distinction between prayer and zakah, for zakah is what is due from property. I swear by Allah that if they were to refuse me a rope of camel (or a female kid, according to another version) that they used to pay the Messenger of Allah, I will fight with them over the refusal of it. 318

See for example: Talal Saleh Bannan,"Ibn-Taymiyyah's Theory of Political Legitimacy.” PhD Diss., University of Nebraska--Lincoln, 1988, 1. Ibn Taymiyyah attempted to “to draw dissimilarity between man and God in order to proclaim God's sovereignty over the universe and declare man's servitude to God.” 319 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 56-57. 320 Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 5, Book 57, Hadith 19. 321 Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 4, Book 56, Hadith 705 “’Authority of ruling will remain with Quraish, even if only two of them remained.’” and Vol. 4, Book 56, Hadith 700 and Vol. 9, Book 89, Hadith 329, etc. 322 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 54.

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Jaan S. Islam Umar bin Al Khattab said I swear by Allah, I clearly saw Allah had made Abu Bakr feel justified in fighting and I recognized that it was right.” 323

In this widely-cited hadith, we find that the purpose for the confrontation of ‘Umar was on religious grounds; Umar accused that Abu Bakr did not have the right to go to war as it did not adhere to the Islamic jus ad bellum—going to war on people who had proclaimed the Islamic declaration of faith. It was not at all about the political role of the state in the personal lives of Muslims (as An-Na’im asserts), but rather, it was about the religious authority for the state to do such an action. This reconfirms the fact that the state was governed by the Qur’an and Sunnah, andwas therefore a “religious” entity. It is also interesting to note that ‘Umar himself admitted to being in the wrong, after realizing that he had made a mistake, and that Abu Bakr was justified to fight. An-Na’im also makes the claim that it was not clear whether or not it was the job of the state to collect zakah, then attempting to justify the Prophet’s non-requirement of taking zakah by claiming that it would be political unlawful. However, based on several narrations, we find that it was an order upon the governors324 and the Zakah collectors325 to (even forcefully) collect Zakah.326 We also see that An-Na’im’s claim that Abu Bakr’s “view prevailed because he was the political leader of the community and not because the other Companions accepted it as a matter of religious authority”327 is simply not true. Rather, his view prevailed because ‘Umar had accepted Abu Bakr’s religious justification of the jus ad bellum, the exact criteria it was justified with is discussed in the jus ad bellum section. AnNa’im also proposes that Abu Bakr did something out of the ordinary by forcing the payment of Zakah, and that the Prophet himself did not. However, he seems to have been misguided by Wilferd Madelung’s opinion that there was no historical incidence of tribes refusing topay, concluding that “there must have been more than a few.”328 This does not constitute evidence as to the optinality of the Zakah. Additionally, the indications given from the Prophet’s orders to governors tell us if anything, that it was expected payment. An-Na’im, speculates whether the reason for fighting under Abu Bakr was religious (tantamount to apostasy) or political treason. He concludes that Abu Bakr was also upholding his religion while enforcing the state’s authority329. What An-Na’im does not realize is that the war was declared with the purpose of defending the religion as the state is a tool of the religious commands—viz., the requirement of Zakah. This happened to include the other offence of apostacy against Islam—which is also apostacy against the state in the sense that one renounces political affiliation by renouncing Islam. Regarding religious justification, AnNa’im himself noted that the following verse of Qur’an justified Abu Bakr’s actions: that 323

Abu Dawood al-Sijsitānī, Sunan Abi Dawood, Book 9, Hadith 1551; parts are also found in Muhammad atTirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Vol. 5, Book 38, Hadith 2607; Ahmad al-Nasa’i, Sunan an-Nasa’i, Vol. 5, Book 37, Hadith 3978; Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 2, Book 24, Hadith 536, and Sahih Muslim Book 1, Hadith 29. 324 Ahmad al-Nasa’i, Sunan an-Nasa’i, Vol. 3, Book 23, Hadith 2437; Ibn Hājir al-Asqalānī, Bulugh al-Maram Book 4, Hadith 600. Note that this is the same narration quoted by Madelung (p. 48 1997) who An-Na’im refers to. 325 Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 86, Hadith 87. 326 Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 2, Book 24, Hadith 547. 327 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 54. 328 Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad, 47. 329 An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, 60.

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those who “wage war against Allah and His Messenger and strive upon earth [to cause] corruption” are to receive the death penalty or exile (5:33).330 An-Na’im concludes out of the Riddah wars that because ‘Umar and the others obeyed Abu Bakr due to their political and not religious authority, and that because if ‘Umar was in power he would have decided not to go tot he Riddah wars and people would have obeyed his political authority, that the Rashidun Caliphate did not really act on religion, but rather about state preservation.331 This proposition is put in its place when we see that ‘Umar himself admitted to being wrong and conceded, recognizing his incorrect legal interpretation. Therefore, if ‘Umar was Caliph—though fake scenarios do not constitute evidence—and it was challenged by Abu Bakr, he still would have conceded, and even if he would not, then ‘Umar’s decision would have been wrong and against Islam. Though An-Na’im would be right if he was able to find an actual incidence where political—and not religious—authority was obeyed, or where any of the Rashidun Caliphs ruled anything not at par with the Qur’an and Hadith, his claim remains false. Out of this discussion, we realize that there is no case of “political” or “religious” in Islam, but that religion (Islam) dominates all forms of life, and that there is no proof that Abu bakr or ‘Umar used non-Islamic means to operate the Islamic state. An-Na’im also attempts to interpret why Abu bakr “was asserting his succession to the Prophet,”332 whether it was political or religious. He believes that because nobody could possibly assume the ‘religious’ authority of the Prophet, that it was only political authority, and therefore, that the Rashidun Caliphate was a political state not governed by religious laws. There are two mistakes in taking the cognitive approach. Firstly, An-Na’im creates a “political” and “religious” authority not realizing that politics and religion are infused into one—religion dominates politics. Hence, if Abu Bakr (or anybody) were to govern by political authority that was not governed by the Qur’an and Sunnah, he would be breaking his role as a righteous leader and would be defying the several commands of the Qur’an and Sunnah, which would make him a non-Muslim due to his governing by non-Islamic laws. Secondly, we must understand that the role of the Prophet did not consist of a “religious” or “political” authority, for the fact that authority in Islam (Qur’an and Sunnah—and note that the Prophet’s sayings are only authoritative because God gave him that authority) governs the political agenda, Abu Bakr’s succession to the Prophet was a succession in the sense that he was given the same authority pertaining to governance: to enforce divine law. The only difference between Abu Bakr and the Prophet is that Abu Bakr ruled by pre-established laws, whereas the Prophet frequently changed his policies after the receival of divine revelation. An-Na’im makes the historical claim that there are two “polar models” in regards to the separation between politics and religion in Islam. The first is the Prophet’s model, where a religious and political authority is combined into one human being, the source of all religious and political law together. On the theory hand, there is a model with a balance (which is really a conflict) between religious legitimacy and political interests.333 He claims that after the Prophet, all empires and “Caliphates” in Islamic history balanced between the two. Again, this is not true. Rather, there are two polar models; a) the Islamic model where the rulers rule 330

Ibid. Ibid, 54-55, 60. 332 Ibid, 57. 333 Ibid, 53. 331

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solely by the Qur’an and Sunnah as the Rashidun Caliphs and the Prophet did, and b) the historical European model of a mix of politics with dogmatic religious authority. There are no empires that fit between the two, for the reason that if one does not adhere to the Qur’an and Sunnah in their ruling, they automatically fall into the category of a state without Islamic legitimacy. The problem in An-Na’im’s inability to identify the difference lies in the assumption that Islam is a faith that claims authority only in personal practice (the private sphere), and hence, that it does not have room in politics, and that even if it did, it cannot possibly be expected to rule a modern state, and that even if it could, it is impossible to know whether or not the Prophet’s political model is being followed due to the fact that the Qur’an and Sunnah are based on the interpretations of humans. We have proved all of these assertions to be false in the second part of this chapter. Hence, the conclusion that “[a]ll rulers since Abu Bakr…have had to negotiate or mediate the permanent tension between religious and political authority, because none of those rulers has been accepted by all Muslims as capable of holding the supreme position of the Prophet, who defined Islam and determined how it could be implemented”334 is a “ridiculous statement, an unfair statement,” as US Senator Bernie Sanders would put it, because there is no case where any of the Rashidun Caliphs ever went against the law in the Qur’an and Sunnah. If they ever did (hypothetically), they would not be fulfilling their job as Caliph: someone who upholds the divine law.

334

Ibid, 53-54.

Chapter 4

COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE JUS AD BELLUM IN THE EARLY ISLAMIC ERA 4.1. SUMMARY Two theories have emerged in defining Islam and the role of Jihad in Islam. The first is that of the apologists that define Jihad as an internal struggle; the second sponsors the concept of ‘offensive’ Jihad. Ironically, both Orientalists and pro-Islam ‘extremists’ subscribe to the latter version. However, whereas one camp justifies it as a necessary evil to create peaceful world order, the other camp calls it inherent feature of Islam that is incapable of tolerance of ‘other views.’ In this chapter, existing theories are deconstructed to establish that there is no such thing as ‘offensive’ Jihad or ‘internal’ Jihad. Debunking both branches of political thought was possible using a cognition tool derived from the education system instituted by Prophet Muhammad, as described in Chapter 2. The deconstruction is then followed up with examination of an actual historical case viz. the wars for Islam at the time of The Prophet as well as during the four rightly guided Caliphs. Carefully elaborating the context of Prophet Muhammad and his ‘rightly guided’ successors (Caliph), this chapter systematically eliminates all confusions regarding Jihad. By addressing the fundamental premises involved in both sides of controversy, the chapter develops an analytical tool that is free from dogmatic assertions and ensuing contradictions, eventually defining the significance of this analysis for a properly balanced understanding Islamic foreign policy and Shariah law. A clear directive is produced in order to analyze any violence that takes place today and determine if the justification provided is Islamic or not.

4.2. QUR’ANIC CRITERIA FOR HOSTILITY After forced migration (hijra) to Madinah, The Prophet Muhammad had his first Islamic community in Medina, where Muslims could practice Islamic duties without hindrance. Only then, following Qur’anic criteria for justified violence were revealed (listed in chronological order):

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Criterion 1. Qur’an 2:190, when Islamic state is attacked by non-Muslims; Criterion 2. Qur’an (60:8), when a group of Muslims is expelled from their homes or attacked for their faith, one isn’t allowed to make peace with the aggressor; Criterion 3. Qur’an 4:75, when a Muslim group is oppressed by non-Muslims and the group cries out for help; Criterion 4. Qur’an 49:9, when a Muslim group is oppressing another group and conciliation has failed, it becomes obligatory to fight the oppressive “Muslim” group; Criterion 5. Qur’an 9:29, when people of the book under protection of Islamic state refuse to pay jizyah.

Other controversial verses are discussed, however these form the foundation of Qur’anic justifications to declare war.

4.3. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS The case laws selected from Islamic history will be the major battles/conquests of the early Islamic Caliphate, specifically into the life of the Prophet Muhammad and the four ‘rightly guided Caliphs.’ These case laws help put perspective to the application of war/Jihad by the state, hopefully capturing a full picture of the nature of Islamic foreign policy, relating to the jus ad bellum. The battles of the Prophet include the battle of Badr, Uhud, ‘the trench,’ invasion of Mecca, and the fight against Jewish tribe of Banu Nadir. Larger, and more questionable engagements (from the perspective of ‘defensive’ Jihad scholars) include Abu Bakr’s invasions into eastern Byzantium and Sassanid Iraq, as well as the Ridda wars. Finally, Umar’s conquest of the Sassanian Empire will be analyzed. During the analysis, some of the historical analysts’ opinions will be discussed in order to elucidate proper context and facts, while classical Islamic historians’ work will also be discussed to complement the facts. This section does not look at the varying opinions, but rather takes an objective approach to finding the causation behind a certain war—it is not a matter of neo-Orientalist vs. Apologetic, it is rather simple historiography that is adopted here. What differentiates the historical analysis of this chapter from others is the fundamental premise that Abu Bakr (and ‘Umar when he continued Abu Bakr’s wars) followed the model of their prophet. The Prophet Muhammad was their spiritual leader and closest companion, each being related by marriage (e.g., the Prophet Muhammad married both Umar’s and Abu Bakr’s daughters and ranked Abu Bakr and Umar as among the most righteous companions). Without going into citing the hundreds of hadiths and even Qur’anic verses about these two Caliphs’ closeness to the prophet and adherence to Islam, it suffices to quote Abu Bakr, who stated after being nominated Caliph:335 “Oh people, as I have now been placed in a position of authority over you and I am not the best of you, if I do good, then help me, and if I do wrong then correct me. Truth is a trust and lying is betrayal. The weak amongst you is strong with me until I get his rights returned to him, God willing; and the strong amongst you is weak until I [justly] take the

335

Karen Armstrong and A. Muhammad, Biography of the Prophet (London: Victor Gollanc, 1992), 258.

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right from him, God willing… Obey me as long as I obeyed Allah and His messenger, so if I disobey Allah and His messenger then you owe me no obedience.”

Furthermore, one has Umar’s conversation with a young man who visited him at the time he was on his deathbed:336 “O son of my brother! Would that all that privileges [being a martyr, ruling with justice, etc.] will counterbalance (my shortcomings), so that I neither lose nor gain anything.”

This shows Umar’s strict adherence to Islam and fear of Allah (god) as per the mainstream Sunni Islamic view. Even though he was given glad tidings of heaven from the prophet personally, became a martyr, and the second successor of the prophet; he was so humble and fearful that he was only able to say his good deeds “counterbalance” his shortcomings. Additionally, both Caliphs had memorized the Qur’an and were instrumental in preliminary writing, and of course understood the seriousness behind having to follow it. Hence, regarding the issue of war and conquests, they must have been very aware of two things; the repercussions of declaring war on false pretense (un-Islamic), as we know the Qur’an is very strict about unlawful killing/war, 5:32 stating that killing one person unlawfully “is as if he had slain the entire mankind.” They also knew the repercussions of not declaring war when it is required, as they obviously had to abide by Qur’anic verses that require the Caliph to fight. So, overall, the assumption that Caliphs adhered to the Qur’an, and based their decision on the case laws of the prophet himself,337 is reasonable. However, as the previous section has shown, this premise has been missing from both sides of the analysis of Islamic history (i.e., not considered by either side as an assumption).

4.4. THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD’S MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS After being forced to escape (make hijra) to Madinah due to severe oppression of the Quraish (the Prophet’s tribe). The Prophet Muhammad had his first Islamic community. This is where Muslims could practice shari’ah law, and observe religious duties without hindrance and objections from the establishment.

4.4.1. Ghazwah, Badr, and Uhud A number of historical scholars have attempted to give the impression that the Muslims338 were regularly attacking caravans due to being under economic pressure. However, the arguments made do not consider that the notion of Ghazwah (plural Ghazawat) was very much present and active in the then Arab region. Instead of seeing the battle of Badr 336

Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih Bukhari (Riyadh: Darusalam, 2007), narration 1392. Based on: Islam, Islam and Zatzman, Reconstituting the curriculum, 326-330. 338 The term ‘Muslim’ to describe members of the Islamic community came to existence only during Umayyad dynasty. 337

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as an attempt at Ghazwah (in which the Meccan reacted to), it is important to see the real context behind the battle. After the Meccan fled from Mecca, they were forced to leave behind their property, wealth, and any other connections. So, if this historical context is invoked, any battle would be in retaliation to the unlawful seizure of the Muslims’ properties. In other words, the Muslims were forced out of Mecca, and later attacked a large Meccan caravan in compensation for the Quraish’s seizing of the Muslims’ resources.339 The Qur’an is quite clear as to the legitimacy of such action. The Qur’an in 60:8340 prohibits even making peace with entities that drive people away from their home or oppress them for their conscience, the Islamic justification for hostility and reluctance to make permanent peace with the Meccan can be found here.341 However in this instance, the theories based on the premise that raids and attacks on the Quraish by the prophet were normal, clearly don’t grasp the concept of ghazwah,342 the notion that it is a very normal part of life in Arab culture. Even Donner343 acknowledges that ghazawat are “a frequent, almost routine part of life.” Coming back to the principal point, the prophet then sent out an expedition (after gathering the proper information) to capture the caravan’s wealth. Abu Sufyan’s men, having predicted such a raid, were on the job: scouting and reporting the advance of the Prophet’s army.344 The Quraish quickly gathered everything they could, led by several high ranked tribal leaders (Such as Abu Sufyan and Abu Jahl) that joined in. They were able to gather 950 troops that were much better equipped with multifold advantage of camels and cavalry over the Muslim. However, the caravan was able to escape without incident and was no longer the concern of either party. It was Abu Jahl, who coerced the Meccan into fighting.345 When the Prophet heard, he had no choice but to advance, gather as much information as possible, and camp overnight at Badr. The battle endued the next day, bringing clear defeat of the Quraish, scores of their men were killed or captured, and Abu Jahl was killed.346 Clearly, the criterion for fighting, as stipulated in 2:190 and 60:8 [which applied even before Badr] was in practice in Badr. Ironically, this verse (“Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors”) is the single most important criterion for war is often overlooked whereas the next verse, 2:191 (And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah is worse than killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al-Haram until they fight you there. But if 339

Safiur Rahman Mubarakpuri, The sealed nectar (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1979), 132; Ahmed Mohsen AlDawoody, "War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations” (PhD Diss., Univeristy of Birmingham, 2009), 44. 340 “Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes - from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.” 341 Hence, we can see that the first open violent hostility to occur started with Muslims’ persecution in Madinah. 342 William Montgomery Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 105; Zāfir al-Qāsimī, Al-Jihād wa al-Huqūq al- Dawliyyah al-‛Āmmah fī al-Islām (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al‛Ilmiyyah, 1982), 116-122. 343 Fred M. Donner, "The sources of Islamic conceptions of war." In Just war and jihad: historical and theoretical perspectives on war and peace in Western and Islamic traditions by, John Kelsay and James T. Johnson, 34. USA: Praeger, 1991. 344 Not that it was an ill prepared army, as it was only expecting to fight the few guards surrounding it. This included 314 men, a few horseman, and the Prophet himself. 345 Karen Armstrong and A. Muhammad, Biography of the Prophet, 174. 346 William Montgomery Watt, “Badr.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition by Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 2012.

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they fight you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the kafirs) is possibly the most commonly cited by scholars of both pro-Jihadist and Orientalist roots. The battle of Uhud is less controversial, in the sense that the explanation for the war is unanimous: the Quraish wanted revenge for their loss in the battle of Badr.347 This was the second battle with the Quraish, and the first defeat of the Muslims. Later on, after the invasions of the Jewish tribes of Banu Qaynuqa and Banu Nadir, the Quraish had allied with the tribes348 (in revenge) and with other tribal leaders to carry out a final blow to end the existence of an Islamic entity.349 In response to this act of aggression, the Prophet Muhammad had consulted with knowledgeable companions and came up with the solution to dig a trench around the entire city, so as to prevent men and horsemen from crossing, at least temporarily. The strategy, aided by the terrible weather—rain, cold, and sandstorm that tore up the tents and extinguished the fires of the Besiegers, worked and the Quraish and other tribes were forced to withdraw. Uhud and the battle of the trench are by no doubt, not offensive or done out of self-interest or for theological reasons. These battles were purely defensive. Another issue of controversy or debate was the treatment of the Jewish tribes Banu Nadir and Banu Qaynuqa. First let us analyze Banu Nadir. The contextual story begins with one of the chiefs of the Banu Nadir, Ka’b Ibn Ashraf, showing clear hostility to the Muslims. After the battle of Badr, he is noted to have said “By Allah, if Muhammad has indeed struck down those people, then it were better to be buried in the earth than to walk upon it!”350 Ka’b clearly the had anger, and enough motivation to go to other parties (at war with Muslims) and plot to gather against the Muslims for fighting—as the Prophet Muhammad has stated regarding him: “He (Ka’b) has openly assumed enmity to us and speaks evil of us and he has gone over to the polytheists (who were at war with Muslims) and has made them gather against us for fighting”351 In addition to this case of Banu Nadir, and there are other Hadiths in the accounts regarding other Jews living in Madinah:352 “Narrated a man from the companions of the Prophet: Abdurrahman ibn Ka’b ibn Malik reported on the authority of a man from among the companions of the Prophet: The infidels of the Quraish wrote (a letter) to Ibn Ubayy and to those who worshipped idols from al-Aws and al-Khazraj, while the Messenger of Allah was at that time at Medina before the battle of Badr. (They wrote): You gave protection to our companion. We swear by Allah, you should fight him or expel him, or we shall come to you in full force, until we kill your fighters and appropriate your women. When this (news) reached Abdullah ibn Ubayy and those who were worshippers of idols, with him they gathered together to fight the Messenger of Allah…”

347

Chase F. Robinson, “Uḥud,” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition by Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 2012. Ibn Sa'd al-Baghdadi, Kitab al-tabaqat al-kabir: Volume 2 (Pakistan Historical Society, 1967), 82–84; Mubarakpuri, The Sealed Nectar, 196-198. 349 Watt, Prophet and Statesman, 166. 350 Abd al-Malik bin Hisham, As-Sirah an Nabawiyyah: volume 2. Eds. Mustafa as-Saqqa and Ibrahim al-Hafiz Shalab (Karachi, Oxford University Press 1955), 51. 351 Muhammad al-Zurqani, Sharh al-Mawahib al-Ladunniyyah: Vol. 2 (Dar al-Ma'rifah, 1973), 10-12. 352 Abu Dawood Al-Sijistani, Sunan Abi Dawood (Darusalam, 2008), narration 3004. 348

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The rest of the Hadith provides a history as to how the original exile/deportation of the Banu Nadir occurred: “When this news reached the Messenger of Allah, he visited them and said: The threat of the Quraish to you has reached its end. They cannot contrive a plot against you, greater than what you yourselves intended to harm you. Are you willing to fight your sons and brethren? When they heard this from the Prophet, they scattered. This reached the infidels of the Quraish. “The infidels of the Quraish again wrote (a letter) to the Jews after the battle of Badr: You are men of weapons and fortresses. You should fight our companion or we shall deal with you in a certain way. And nothing will come between us and the anklets of your women. When their letter reached the Prophet, they gathered Banu an-Nadir to violate the treaty. They sent a message to the Prophet: Come out to us with thirty men from your companions, and thirty rabbis will come out from us till we meet at a central place where they will hear you. If they testify to you and believe in you, we shall believe in you. The narrator then narrated the whole story. When the next day came, the Messenger of Allah went out in the morning with an army, and surrounded them. He told them: I swear by Allah, you will have no peace from me until you conclude a treaty with me. But they refused to conclude a treaty with him. He therefore fought them the same day. Next he attacked Banu Quraish with an army in the morning, and left Banu an-Nadir. He asked them to sign a treaty and they signed it. He turned away from them and attacked Banu an-Nadir with an army. He fought with them until they agreed to expulsion. Banu an-Nadir were deported, and they took with them whatever their camels could carry, that is, their property, the doors of their houses, and their wood. Palm-trees were exclusively reserved for the Messenger of Allah. Allah bestowed them upon him and gave them him as a special portion.”

This provides one with the political context of the Banu Nadir-Quraish-Muslim relationship. There was previous plotting of the enemies of Islam against them, and the Muslims retaliated and deported the Banu Nadir, hoping they would no longer be a problem. The Banu Nadir tribe then settled in Khaybar after being exiled.353 During the battle of the trench, the chief at the time of Nadir was Huyayy bin Akhtab, who had joined along with his son the battle of the trench. Historians also say that he went to the Banu Ghatafan354 tribe to gather more support against the Islamic community. They were able to gather the support of thousands of men and hundreds of horsemen to fight Muslims among many tribes355. The battle of the trench ended in a defeat for the Quraish and other tribes. In this battle, Huyayy Ibn Akhtab was captured in Madinah (he and others had crossed 353

They were clearly expelled for their role in conspiracy with the Quraish and further attempts to gather to fight the prophet (as discussed): William Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Medina, OUP, 1956, 211-212, shows they were expelled for plotting with nomads, after the battle of Uhud. However there is a history to this as discussed, they also had conspired with Quraish in the battle of Badr as in the Hadith—the Prophet’s decision was not arbitrary. 354 Ibid. 34-37. 355 Martin Lings, Muhammad: his life based on the earliest sources (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 2006), 222-223. It also discusses cooperation between the Quraysh and Jewish tribes.

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the trench and entered Madinah) and executed by the Muslims.356 His successor, Abu al-Rafi ibn Abi al-Huqayq then took charge in Khaybar, and subsequently continued plotting against the Muslims in the same manner.357 Later, he was also assassinated, and succeeded by Usayr ibn Zarim, who then, according to Zurqani,358 followed suit. The point behind the repetition of history is to prove the fact that the Banu Nadir tribe did not seem to be neither giving in nor stopping its incessant hostility toward the young Islamic state. Some logically believe that the prophet had no other choice but to end these plots and hostilities by invading Khaybar.359 The evidence shows that the invasion of Khaybar (and other allied tribes) were not motivated by “spreading Islam” through offensive Jihad, as some put it. Instead, there is a clear history and justification behind attacking Khaybar. When the prophet invaded, won, and started negotiations, there was no one forcibly converted, and the Jews under a tax agreement, were allowed to continue using their orchards and farmlands, and live there under their own religious laws.360

4.4.2. The Banu Qurayzah Incident Technically speaking, the Banu Qurayzah (also Quraiza or Quraizah) incident is considered a judicial and domestic issue. However, because of the fact that it is very controversial and often exploited by those critical of Islam, I have decided to cover it.361 Of course, as usual, critiques seem to dislike the very important use of contexts in their historical “analyses,” if we may regard them as such. First, I will give a brief summary history into the Banu Qurayzah incident, analyze what is considered main historical narrative, provide a reason for the incident, and compare the substantial facts to the interpretations of others. The reason for the incident is due to the events in the “Battle of the trench”: a major battle and siege of Muslim Madinah by the Quraish, Banu Ghatāfān, and Banu Nādir, and Banu Qaynūqa tribes (and several others) in January-February of 627 CE. The Muslims managed to outlast siege under and the tribes withdrew, the siege and goal of the seize (ending Muhammad and Islam) was not accomplished. In the mean time, during the course of the 27-day siege, the Banu Nādir chief, Huyayy bin Akhtab, was secretly negotiating with the Banu Qurayzah to get them to join his military cause; the Banu Qurayzah had given him refuge at the time.362 As Watt tells us, attempts to make them act did not succeed.363 However, it was said that Akhtab “induced the Banu 356

Muhammad, Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq's’ Sirat Rasul Allah, with Introduction and Notes by Alfred Guillaume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 461-464. 357 Shibli Nomani, Sirat-un-Nabi: Volume 2 (Kazi Publications, 1979), 156. 358 Muhammad Al-Zurqani, Sharh al-Mawahib al-Ladunniyyah: Vol. 2. (Damascus: Dar al-Ma’rifah, 1973), 196. 359 William Montgomery Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 189; Amina Adil Hajjah, Muhammad, the Messenger of Islam: His Life & Prophecy (Washington: Islamic Supreme Council of America, 2002), 436-437: “so they poured large sums of their money into this scheme…they tried to motivate the other tribes to ally with them against the Muslims.” 360 William Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 218; Al-Sijastani, Sunan Abi Dawood, narration 3006. 361 See Islamic Imperialism: A History; Islamic Jihad: A Legacy of Forced Conversion, Imperialism, and Slavery; The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World's Most Intolerant Religion. 362 Richard Gottheil and M. Seligsohnm, “Ḥuyayy Ibn Akhtab” in The Jewish Encyclopaedia (USA: Funk and Wagnalls, 1901), 511; Martin Lings, Muhammad: his life based on the earliest sources (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 2006), 221: “He now went to the fortress of Ka'b ibn Asad, the chief of Qurayzah…” 363 William Montgomery Watt, Prophet and Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961), 171.

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Ḳuraiẓa [Qurayzah] to support him,”364 and even that the Banū Qurayzah helped the enemy by providing shelter to Akhtab. Therefore, the “instigation of Huyayy ibn Akhtab” could have constituted grounds to the charge of treason, Peters says.365 Watt additionally argues that the Banu Qurayzah’s act of “intriguing with Muhammad’s enemies and at one point had been on the verge of attacking Muhammad in his rear” caused them to be “guilty of treasonable activities against the Medinian community.”366 It is also possible that the Banu Quriaizah were expected to actively help in defense of the city,367 to which they did not—note that not doing so would also be in breach of the Madinah constitution (discussed below). Peters adds that “Muslim jurists argued: the Banu Qurayza had broken their treaty with the Prophet by assisting the Azhab at the Battle of the Trench and so Muhammad was justified in dissolving the pact and declaring a state of war against the Qurayza.”368 Incorporating a Muslim insider perspective, Muhammad was even said to have divine inspiration telling Muhammad of the suspicious activities of the Banu Qurayzah, which caused him to have suspicion and take further action in the first place.369 Links has added that Huyayy was in fact able to convince the Banu Qurayzah to revoke their pact: “…when some of the hypocrites brought news which confirmed what Huyay had said, and when some of their own men went singly and unobtrusively to see for themselves, the general opinion began to swing in favor of Quraysh and their allies…The Bani Qurayzah’s renunciation of their pact did not remain hidden.”370 Muhammad and the Muslims sieged the Banu Qurayzah neighborhood in response to this violation. The Banu Qurayzah-allied Banu ‘Aws tribe was said to “somewhat hesitantly” ask for reprieve from the Banu Qurayzah.371 Muhammad allowed that one of their own leaders of the ‘Aws tribe arbitrate the dispute of the charge of treason. Sa’d bin Mu’adth, a Muslim convert to Islam who belonged to the ‘Aws. The parties agreed on his selection: “all the Aws and the others present swore to abide by his decision.”372 Sa’d ruled in favor of the Muslims and declared that the punishment is to be death for the Jewish adult men, and that the women and children soled as slaves373 (“captives” is the literal word use by the Prophetic narration in Bukhari).374 Lings importantly noted that many of the women and children were ransomed as captives to the surrounding Banu Badir tribe375. Watt376 speculated over what Sa’d must have been thinking; this is not our concern. Our concern is regarding the legitimacy of the process. 364

Gottheil and Seligsohnm, “Huyyay Ibn Akhtab,” 511. Francis E. Peters, Muhammad and the Origins of Islam (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 222. 366 William MontegomeryWatt, Prophet and Statesman, 171-172. 367 Ibid, 170. 368 Francis E. Peters, Muhammad and the Origins of Islam, 224. 369 Ibid, p. 222 from Ibn Ishaq’s account, as much of the entire narrative is taken from. 370 Martin Lings, Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 2006), 222. 371 Francis E. Peters, p. 223; Watt, Prophet and Statesman 172; Lings, Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources, 231. 372 William Montegomery Watt, Prophet and Statesman, 173; see Bukhari supra note; Lings, Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources, 231. 373 ibid. 374 Sahih Bukhari 3084 “Some people (i.e., the Bani Qurayzah) agreed to accept the verdict of Sa`d bin Mu`adh so the Prophet sent for him…Then the Prophet said, "O Sa`d! These people have agreed to accept your verdict." Sa`d said, "I judge that their warriors should be killed and their children and women should be taken as captives." The Prophet said, "You have given a judgment similar to Allah's Judgment (or the King's judgment).” 375 Martin Lings, Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources, 233. 376 William Montegomery Watt, Prophet and Statesman, 173-174. 365

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Regarding the “charge” of treason, breaking of the pact, and so on, what issuing referred to is the constitution of Madinah. Watt holds that it must have included the several major tribes not named in Ibn Ishaq’s account, tic as the Banu Qurayzah and the Banu Nadir, in an earlier document of the constitution;377 they were amongst the several feuding Jewish tribes the Prophet was asked to make peace between.378 Let us then examine the articles of the Constitution of Madinah to see where, besides the clear infringement of renunciation the pact, the Banu Qurayzah went against/potentially went against the agreement: 

  

Article (37) states that “Each must help the other against anyone who attacks the people of this document. They must seek mutual advice and consultation, and loyalty is a protection against treachery.” Article (38) “The Jews must pay with the believers so long as war lasts.” Article (43) “Quraysh and their helpers shall not be given protection.” Article (44) “The contracting parties are bound to help one another against any attack on Yathrib.”

These four articles in the Constitution were broken by the Banu Qurayzah tribe. Firstly, they did not actively help the Muslims in defending the city, rather they broke their loyalty and did the opposite of “seek[ing] mutual advice and consultation”. In the process, they secondly helped and protected the leader of the tribe who was actively at war with Muhammad. Thirdly, they broke and renunciated the constitution itself, which obviously proves the charge of treason on the Banu Qurayzah’s behalf. Qureshi’s directly translated version379 of the Madinah Constitution found in Ibn Hisham’s and Ibn Kathir’s primary works380 states that “[n]either shall any non-Muslim who is a party to this agreement, provide refuge to the life and property of any Quraish not shall assist and non-Muslim against a Muslim.”381 It further states that “[n]one shall provide protection to the Quraish of Mecca or any of their helpers.”382 Note that even though Muhammad had the right—by the rights awarded to him in the Constitution of Madinah—to unilaterally decide the fate of the Banu Qurayzah,383 Muhammad decided to settle the case through the use of an arbitrator. The Constitution stated that Muhammad was to settle any “mutual difference” about anything in the agreement.384 Due to the clear and explicit breach of the Madinah constitution, it is fair to say that the Banu Qurayzah was guilty of the charge of treason, based on the historical accounts. The question now is whether or not the sentence was just or not. Let us consider the punishment for treason in an Islamic state. Though it was discussed slightly in the beginning of the chapter, we should make sure that the definition of “treason” in Islam is sound. Some may 377

William Montgomery Watt, “Ḳurayẓa” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition edited by P. Bearman et al. (Leiden: Brill Online, 2012). 378 The Prophet Muhammad’s Models of Coexistence and the Constitution of Medina” p. 6. 379 Sultan Ahmad Qureshi, Letters of the Holy Prophet, 31-37. 380 Ibn Hisham’s edited version of Ibn Ishaq’s sira, Al-Bidayah wal-nIhaya, Al-Wathaiq al-Siyasiya, respectively: Ibid, 31. 381 Ibid, 33. 382 Ibid, 37. 383 Ibid, 36-37. 384 Ibid, 34.

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interpret it as apostasy; i.e., renouncing Islam provides for grounds to kill them, as the Prophet said, “Whoever changes his religion, kill him.”385 However, it is important to clarify that the treason charge is qualified in other narrations that explicitly state that in addition to “one who deserts his religion,” they must have separated “himself from the community.”386 This adds that in addition to the religious treason, a political treason is to follow in order for grounds to exist for the application of capital punishment. In this case, then, we can define that punishment for religio-political treason as capital punishment. The punishment of the death penalty applied to the Banu Qurayza, who broke the pledge of the constitution of Madinah is sound, Islamically speaking. It is important to note, however, that the treason sentence was not carried out by jurisdiction of Islamic law, but it was indeed the ancient tribal Arab law governing the legality behind the execution. This is because a) the agreement was formed (and hence arbitrated upon) Arab tribal law, not Islamic law, which was not formed at the time, and b) the arbitrator between the tribes was not expected to adhere to any rule of law (Muslim of Jewish), other than the law common amongst the two; the Arab tribal law—such law was obviously recognized and known by both parties before entering the contract. In the case of the judicial injunction of Sa’d bin Mu’adh, because he was accepted as a mutual arbitrator and expected to rule considering the facts based not he common Arab rule of law (not Islamic or Jewish, as the ‘Aws tribe would object to ruling according to Islamic law, and vice versa); the death penalty was obviously a considerable possibility in that Arab rule of law.387 Hence, the facts relevant to the judicial proceedings can be summarized as such: the Muslims compacted with the Banu Qurayzah tribe, the Banu Qurayzah tribe betrayed several articles in the Constitution and revoked it altogether, the parties agreed upon an arbitrator to determine the fate of the guilty Banu Qurayzah according to Arab custom, the arbitrator gave his verdict, the verdict was carried out by the Muslims. We can observe no internal inconsistency in the process of arbitration. In fact, it would be expected the Muhammad would unilaterally decide the just ruling as per the Madinah constitution, however he allowed for an independent arbitration to take place. It seems that the only breach in the agreement and arbitration process was the fact that Muhammad did not himself decide if the Banu Qurayzah were to be executed as just sentence. Even in the modern context, it would seem unutterably ridiculous for any country, say, the US, to agree with a group like the Taliban to approve a “moderate contented-upon arbitrator” who would declare a verdict for peace or war, considering the US policy of “not negotiating with terrorists.” Regarding the external validity of such a ruling, viz. the debate on the application of the death penalty and related subjects, is should be noted that such external validity—from a purely logical approach— does not exist; there is no external standard by which to judge right and wrong. If we take the opinion of the majority of people on a standard, we find it is inherently contradictory through time and pace; therefore, common norms cannot be taken as a logical axis or golden standard 385 386

387

Sunan al-Nasa’i Vol. 5, Book 37, Hadith 4064 narrated by Ibn Abbas and by Al-Hasan in Vol. 5, Book 37, Hadith 4068 Sunan Nasa’i. Sunan Abi Dawood Book 39, Hadith 4338 and Jami’ Al-Tirmidhi, Vol. 3, Book 14, Hadith 1402 “the one who leaves the religion and parts from the Jama'ah (the community of Muslims.),” both in Arabic the same that ُ ‫ار‬ ُ ‫ار‬ “.‫ق لِ ْل َج َما َع ِة‬ ِ َ‫ك لِ ِدينِ ِه ْال ُمف‬ ِ َّ‫” َوالت‬ Watt states that such, even unilateral treatment would be expected by any Arab tribe. Note that though Watt takes an orientalist approach to Muhammad’s treatment of the Banu Qurayzah by stating Muhammad himself was limited to his Arab tribal legal boundaries, it is quite obvious that such a law was required to be governed by the Arab, rather than Islamic law. See Watt, Prophet and Statesman, 175.

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to compare one’s actions to. Three hundred years ago Black people were not considered human by a large portion of Europeans and Americans (even more 500 years ago, imagine 1400 years ago!); if we are to compare to the standard of the time, some pretty horrible (by the standards of today) things would be sanctified by European thought. Though it is not the time and place to address the validity of the moral standard ebing governed by a majority of people,388 it should be understood by the reader that it is logically absurd to compare Muhammad’s actions with the standard of peoples’ view of “right” and “wrong” today, as such a perception is constantly changing through time and space. Nevertheless, regardless of its external validity as a just sentence, the fact remains that it was not only Muhammad’s right—by internally validated contractual agreement—to unilaterally decide the fate of the Banu Qurayzah, he did an additional service to the Jews of the Madinah community by allowing for a consented-upon arbitrator to do so in place of Muhammad. Form this conclusion, we can see how the notion that Muhammad unilaterally decided and carried out his own judicial verdict based on no prior agreement or on no rule of law (other than his own) is preposterous. A traditional critique of Islam, Efraim Karsh, writes: “Charged [by the Muslims] with collaboration with the enemy, the tribe’s six to eight hundred men were brought in small groups to trenches dug the previous day, made to sit on the edge, then beheaded one by one and their bodies thrown in.” M.A. Khan writes: “In other instances—Muhammad’s dealing with the Jews of Banu Qurayzah, for example—they [Jews] were attacked, their males were slaughtered en masse, and their women and children were made Muslim through enslavement.”389 Indeed, it is convenient to cherry-pick the parts of the history from a full timeline to prove one’s point; this is why the study of contextualization is incredibly important in the study of history (as any self-respecting history knows). Hypothetically, for example, if we were to consider a situation where “X killed Y,” the simply statement of this fact would cause us to think badly of X. However, when given the proper context, like for instance, that “Y committed treason against X by revoking a compact between the two parties, X allowed for Z, a neutral arbitrator to give a verdict with all options on the table. Z ruled in favor of X for applying the death sentence, hence, X killed Y,” the story is different. Such behavior is exactly the ‘historical discrimination’ applied by scholars that I mention in Chapter 7. It not only does injustice to the person as an academic and researcher, but is either a) deliberate depicts to spread hatred and lies,390 or b) non-deliberate misinformation if the Author did not really know the context which it was in (to which I would suggest to the publishers to revise the manuscripts in the future).

4.4.3. March to Mecca The final major engagement of the prophet with the Meccan was the historic march of Mecca (CE 629/ Hijri 8), with an estimated 10,000 Muslims marching straight into Mecca. There was nearly no bloodshed, and as they entered Mecca they shouted, “Even he who 388

See Sources of Legal Derivation Chapter for full deconstruction. Khan, Islam: a History of Imperialism, Forced Conversions, and Slavery, 56. 390 Considering that one can find Khan’s book at “http://www.islam-watch.org/books/islamic-jihad-legacy-offorced-conversion-imperialism-slavery.pdf” in a full, free PDF on an Anti-Islamic site; it is certainly not an understatement to say it has been read and influenced racist thought. 389

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enters the house of Abu Sufyan will be safe,”391 “he who entered a house is safe, he who throws the weapon is safe.”392 The historical context to this event begins with the treaty of Hudaybiyyah. This treaty was a temporary (10 year) peace agreement between the Meccan and the young Islamic state that stipulated complete cessation of violence, allowed the Muslims to perform hajj (after the first year), and compelled the Islamic state to send back any runaway member of Quraish that sought refuge in Medina (Appendix A).393 After the ‘first pilgrimage’ the tribe of Banu Bakr attacked the tribe of Banu Khu’azah in revenge for killings they had done earlier. However, the Banu Khu’azah tribe allied with the Islamic state and such killings were considered by the prophet to be a clear breach in the treaty. This has been detailed by Ibn Ishaq.394 Paragraph 805 of his work mentions that “Quraish and B. Bakr combined against Khuza’a and killed some of them, thereby breaking the covenanted word with the apostle…”395 and 806 even mentions; “Then Budayl b. Warqa came with a number of Khuza’a to the apostle in Madinah about…how Quraish had helped B. Bakr against them.” It was based on this information that the Prophet had then decided to invade Mecca as a direct consequence of the breaking of the treaty.396

4.4. INVASIONS OF EASTERN BYZANTIUM AND THE RIDDA WARS The final major military conflict in Prophet’s lifetime is the battle of Tabuk (invasion of eastern Byzantium, Ghassanid territory). The history starts with the prophet, but continues with Abu Bakr and Umar. After the conquering of Mecca, the prophet had sent out several letters to kings and other leaders, outside Arabia. For the discussion of this purpose, only the letter to Hercules, the Byzantine king, is necessary. Following is the content (English translation) of a letter that was sent to Heraclius from the prophet:397 In the name of God the Beneficent, the Merciful: From Muhammad son of Abdullah to Heraclius the Great of the Romans. Peace be upon him, he who follows the right path. Furthermore I invite you to establish peace (can also mean submit to God); establish peace (or submit to God) and you will have peace, and God will double your reward, and if you reject, you bear the sins of persecuting the Arians (a minority sect of Christians). ‘And people of the scripture! Come to a word common to you and us that we worship none but God and that we associate nothing in worship with Him, and that none

391

Al-Sijastani, Sunan abi Dawood, narration 3024. Ibid. 393 Several details of the treaty are found in Bukhari’s narration: Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari. 9 Volumes. Darussalam, 2007, book 50 narration 891. 394 Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq's’ Sirat Rasul Allah, with Introduction and Notes by Alfred Guillaume, para. 802-803. 395 Ibid, para. 805. 396 Wan Kamal Mujani, “Sirah Narratives in Early Muslim Historiography,” Advances in Natural and Applied Sciences 6 (2012): 961; Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq's’ Sirat Rasul Allah, with Introduction and Notes by Alfred Guillaume, para. 805-809; Daniel Pipes, “Lessons from The Prophet Muhammad's Diplomacy.” Middle East Quarterly (1999); formation on the March to Mecca: William Montgomery Watt, “Makka,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 397 Bukhari, Sahih Bukhari, narration 7. 392

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of us shall take others as Lords beside God. Then, if they turn away, say: Bear witness that we are Muslims.’”

The letter is interesting in many ways (and similar to other letters to heads of states). Firstly, contrary to popular belief, it is not confrontational or coercive, in fact it is very softly worded and welcoming. We see phases such as “Peace be upon you,” or “Establish the will to god and you will have peace,” or else “bear the sin of persecuting the Arians,” in the place of “Pay us tribute, submit to us, or fight to death” notion often portrayed by pro-offensive Jihad supporting scholars and by more conservative elements of Islam. Such is the case with all letters of the Prophet (Appendix A). This letter and discussion was to strike down that argument, showing that the prophet simply did not decide to attack empires, or have the threepronged coercive agenda being sent to all empires surrounding him. That raises the question, what did start the war? It’s very important to know the initial pivotal point between the Byzantines and the Muslims that defined the purpose for the invasion of the Byzantine land. The first battle between the two parties was the Battle of Mu’tah in CE 629. The first incident was triggered by the Ghassanid king Al-Harith bin Abi Shamir (under the Byzantine empire), who, upon being delivered a letter of invitation to accept Islam,398 had the Prophet’s emissary killed as he was returning. The Battle of Mu’tah was an initial backlash to the killing.399 In the battle of Mu’tah, the Muslims were largely outnumbered and lost militarily. The Battle of Tabuk that followed, according to Mubarakpuri, the causation of this invasion for two main reasons; the initial killing of the prophet’s emissary, and because there were rumors of troops being gathered for invasion,400 as he states: “The hypocrites who were conspiring against the Muslims so that they might stab them in the back whereas Byzantines would attack them from the front. If such a thing became known and they succeeded in their evil attempts, the Prophet and his Companions’ efforts to spread Islam would collapse and their profits, which were the consequences of successive and constant fights and invasions, would be invalidated. The Messenger of Allah realized all that very well. So — in spite of the hardships and drought that Muslims were suffering from — the Prophet was determined that the Muslims should invade the Byzantines and fight a decisive battle at their own borders.” 401

Sultan Ahmad Qureshi, Letters of the Holy Prophet (Chowk Fawara: Idara Taleefat-e-Ashrafia), 62; Ibn Sa’d alBaghdad, Tabaqat Ibn Sa’d: Volume 3 (Beirut: Dār Sādir), 17: “In the Name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful. From Muhammad, Messenger of Allah—To Haris Bin Abi Shimr. Peace be upon him who followes the right path, believes in it, and regards it to be true. I invite you to believe in One Allah, who has no associate. Your country would remain with you.” 399 David S. Powers, Zayd (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 50. 400 There are also narrations of such a fear. According to Bukhari, Sahih Bukhari, narration 5843: “[D]uring that time all the rulers of the nearby lands had surrendered to Allah's Messenger except the king of Ghassan in Sham, and we were afraid that he might attack us. All of a sudden the Ansari came and said, 'A great event has happened!' I asked him, 'What is it? Has the Ghassani (king) come?' He said, 'Greater than that! Allah's Messenger has divorced his wives!” 401 Mubarakpuri, The Sealed Nectar, 272. 398

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Furthermore, the book “Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests” by Walter Kaegi,402 which takes a strictly historical approach, acknowledged regarding the false reports of Byzantines invading after the Battle of Mu’tah, and how Prophet Muhammad was concerned about these invasions/attempted restoration of power leading to “some scholars [to] sensibly believe, to send an expedition against Tabuk” (citing Donner, Waqidi, and Tabari)403. What we do know as a fact today, is that Hercules, after exhausting battles with the Sassanian, did try to reassert control over the near east area. Kaegi also mentions that the Byzantines, following the threat of Islam in Arabia had conspired to and at least considered fighting the Arab tribes, to promote the Christian tribes (who would be asking for help) in Arabia.404 The point being that it was common sense and fact, that he would naturally reassert power over the areas. The Muslims, as we will see, may have misinterpreted (falsely or may true) that the Byzantines were amassing Christian tribes against the Muslims. Mustering troops was a common thing to do in the area in the past,405 but especially common during the riddah wars, it was very common for several tribes to apostate and to oppose the Islamic state. These reports were even more likely to be true because of re-establishment of Byzantine control over the region. From this historical backdrop, we can understand the purpose behind Abu Bakr’s initial incursion into Syria. Kaegi mentions that Abu Bakr had received reports of an amassing of several Christian tribes, 30km North of Mu’tah.406 These reports were noted false, however the writer notes that since that area was a “traditional site for Byzantine troops” that “these reports are not to be ignored and discarded.” meaning that Abu Bakr certainly took them seriously, and that it may have even been possible that the reports were true (even if they weren’t for the sake of attacking the Muslims). In fact, it is even possible there were troops at the time, Tabari noted that when Abu Ubaydah (in charge of taking Neareastern Byzantium) took the city of Ma’ab, he fought Byzantine troops who apposed, but later surrendered, becoming the first city to surrender.407 Heraclius then decided to send an expedition into the Near East to prevent any further advancement, perhaps a double misinterpretation, or a correct interpretation on the Muslims side, followed by a counterattack to their attempted pre-emptive attack. This specific battle occurred in/around Areopolis (eastern Jordan near the Dead Sea) the Muslims had surprise attacked the incoming army, sending them to flee into Arabia while the Muslims moved north. These events were taking place in the heat of war, back and forth fighting, and the eventual conquering of much of Shām (Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon area).408 Regarding the perspective of the Byzantines, if they were not really advancing against the Muslims preemptively, it is possible that they were simply regrouping not only for the sake of regaining lost territory of the Persians, but also because of border threats from non-Muslim neighboring tribes.409 There 402

Walter E Kaegi, Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Ibid, 80. 404 Ibid, 81. 405 Ibid. 406 Ibid, 83. 407 We there were troops gathered, but not necessarily to fight the Muslims, most likely there for the sake of reasserting authority in the area: Ibid., 84. 408 The specific details of back-and forth-engagements and the eventual conquering of much of the Near East, consult Kaegi: Ibid., 81-111. ‘Sham’ is the area of modern day Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, and Syria. 409 David Nicolle, The Great Islamic Conquests AD 632-750. Vol. 71. Osprey Publishing, 2009: 48. Nicolle mentions that when Khalid b. Walid was invading Iraq, there were raids of non-Muslim tribes against he Byzantines on their borders. 403

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are, of course, several explanations of this history. In fact, it is the general understanding that conquests were started by the Muslims, either imperial conquest or initial invasion leading to full-scale war.410 None of the sources mention any specific reason for Abu Bakr’s conquest of Byzantium. This is why the smallest of details of cause-and-effect analysis was required to find the reason why they attacked at all. There would be no problem among the scholarship, or in this chapter, if there was any proof that Abu Bakr’s invasion was arbitrary or to spread the cause of Islam, or attacking due to rejection of Islam or Jizyah from Byzantines and Ghassanids. This was not the case. Regarding the jurisprudential aspect of the invasion, we have to examine where Abu Bakr and the prophet himself were acting in the Qur’an. For the prophet’s invasion of Tabuk, the verse 9:29 was revealed. Tafsir Ibn Kathir noted that this verse came down as an order to the prophet in the 9th Hijra, which subsequently led to the battle of Tabuk.411 Ibn Kathir states: “This honourable Ayah was revealed with the order to fight the People of the Book…Allah commanded His Messenger to fight the People of the Scriptures, Jews and Christians, on the ninth year of Hijrah, and he prepared his army to fight the Romans and called the people to Jihad announcing his intent and destination … The Messenger of Allah marched, heading towards Ash-Sham to fight the Romans until he reached Tabuk, where he set camp for about twenty days next to its water resources.”

The verse states:412 “Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture - [fight] until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled.” This verse is essentially what made the prophet go after the Ghassanids. This forms another criterion for war against the people of the book: if they infringe upon the sovereignty of the Islamic state, then Muslims must attack and fight the People of the book, until they give the jizyah tax. Two infringements on the Islamic state’s sovereignty were the Ghassanids’ killing of the Prophet’s emissary, as well as several rumors of invasion. Mubarakpuri maintains it was a Christian tribal army gathering against the Muslims based on serious rumors.413 Similarly, Abu Bakr’s invasion also falls under the above verse, as well as upon verse 2:190 that stipulates that Muslims are supposed to fight those who fight them. A preemptive strike would certainly apply, as it did with Tabuk and with Abu Bakr’s invasion of Ma’ab. In the era early of Abu Bakr, the primary concern of the Caliphate was what is termed as the ‘Ridda’ (apostasy) wars. Despite the term, there are two important concepts regarding the wars that should be brought into light. Firstly, despite the term apostasy, much of the fighting and battles were not related to apostasy, and at times even included practicing Muslims 410

Ira Marvin Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 2002, 49; Nicolle, David. Yarmuk AD 636: The Muslim Conquest of Syria. Osprey Publishing, 1994; Khan, M. A. Islamic Jihad: A Legacy of Forced Conversion, Imperialism, and Slavery. iUniverse, 2009, 61 mentions that the Prophet sent several letters to the Ghassanids and Byzantines and attacked them once they did not accept Islam. All across the spectrum, from those of the ideology of Esposito (the so-called aspologist), to M.A. Khan (who believes Islam is of violent nature): all are of the opinion that the Muslims started the conquests. 411 Safiur Rahman Mubarakpuri, Tafsir Ibn Kathir: Vol. 4 (Darussalam, 2003), verse 1370. 412 The Qur’ān, 9:29. 413 Mubarakpuri, The Sealed Nectar, 272.

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(because they withheld the charity tax ‘zakah’). Secondly, even though several ‘false prophets’ such as Musaylama, Al-Aswad Al-Ansi, and Tulayha, emerged, the only reason for Abu Bakr’s declaration of war was the fact that this apostasy politically threatened the Islamic state, as discussed in the literature review section of the chapter, the only time war can be declared is in a case of treasonous apostasy. The declaration of a new religion with its own territory and supporters certainly qualifies as political treason. Shortly after the prophet’s death in 632, Abu Bakr was nominated to be the Khalifah (Anglicized, Caliph, literally meaning successor or viceroy), a group of Muslims in Arabia declared that they would no longer be paying the Zakah to the state,414 claiming they owed nothing to the new successor, as the prophet had died. A hadith415 shows the reason for Abu Bakr declaring war: It was narrated from ‘Ubaidullah bin ‘Abdullah bin ‘Utbah bin Mas’ud that Abu Hurairah said: “When the Messenger of Allah died and Abu Bakr (was appointed Khalifah) after him, and some of the ‘Arabs disbelieved, ‘Umar, may Allah be pleased with him, said: ‘O Abu Bakr, how can you fight the people when the Messenger of Allah said: I have been commanded to fight the people until they say La ilaha illallah (there is none worthy of worship except Allah.) Whoever says La ilaha illallah, his life and his property are safe from me, except for its right, and his reckoning will be with Allah?’” Abu Bakr, may Allah be pleased with him, said: “I will surely fight those who separate prayer and Zakah, for Zakah is what is due on wealth. By Allah, if they withhold from me a small she-goat that they used to give to the Messenger of Allah I will fight them for withholding it.’ (‘Umar said) ‘By Allah, when I realized that Allah, the Mighty and Sublime, had opened the chest of Abu Bakr to fighting, then I knew that it was the truth.’”

The other group of people that Abu Bakr fought was the several self-declared prophets. Perhaps the most notorious was the case of Musaylama, often referred to as “the liar.”416 We know that he declared himself to be a prophet while Prophet Muhammad was still alive. However, the Prophet Muhammad did not declare war on him, and in fact after Abu Bakr became the Caliph, Musaylama’s influence, and followers grew. Watt, in the Encyclopedia of Islam acknowledges that Musaylama’s power grew substantially with the Banu Hanifah tribe (largely Christian), posing a serious threat to the Islamic state. Reynolds discusses the issue of Musaylama, and states that he and Sajah (a self proclaimed prophetess) gathered forces together to fight against Abu Bakr.417 Akram418 notes, “the real…danger of apostasy arose after the prophet’s death, when a wild wave of disbelief-after-belief moved across the length and breadth of Arabia and had to be tackled by Abu Bakr.” There are grounds to say that the threat of Musaylama was political. Another false prophet was Al-Aswad al-Ansi of San’ah, Yemen. He claimed prophethood while the prophet was still alive, and engaged the Muslims

414

Michael Lecker, ”Al-Ridda.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, by Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 2012. Al-Nasa’i. Sunan An-Nasa’i (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2007), narration 3092. 416 Referred to as “the liar” by ‘Abdullah Ibn Abbās: Bukhari, Sahih Bukhari, narration 3620, 3621. 417 Gabriels Said Reynolds, The Emergence of Islam: Classical Traditions in Contemporary Perspective. Fortress Press, 2012, 63-65. 418 A.I. Akram, Sword of Allah: Khalid Bin Al-Waleed His Life & Campaigns. Adam Publishers, 2009; ch. 11, 1. 415

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militarily. He started a military movement419 in Yemen (much of it under Islamic rule), and was able to take over parts of Yemen and Najran—expelling the Muslims rulers and proclaiming himself to be a prophet. Before he could get any further, he was assassinated. Davies and Gustafson mention that the prophet ordered this assassination, to stop his movement “before any further damage occurred” 420. The book: Sword of Allah also mentions “Unknown to the false prophet, the real Prophet at Madinah had already initiated measures to deal with him. Having received full reports of Aswad’s mischief, the Holy Prophet sent Qais bin Hubaira to organise the liquidation of Aswad.”421 The final major false prophet being discussed is Tulayha. After accepting Islam himself in 630, he became an apostate a year later and claimed to receive divine revelation. He was able to gather support of several tribes, to lead the rebellion and make them pledge allegiance to him.422 Ja’farian423 mentions that Tulayha “also gathered men from the tribes of Ghatafan and Banu Fazara and tried to compose rhythmic prose to claim prophethood and stand against the… government. In a battle between his men and the Muslim’s army, ‘Uyayna Ibn Hisn and his tribesmen from Banu Fazārah were defeated heavily and Tulayha fled to Damascus. Thus, another revolt was suppressed.” There seems to be a developing pattern among these rebellions, they were not necessarily apostasies, but it was the fact that they challenged the Islamic state’s sovereignty (a rebellion, treason) is what caused the Islamic state to go to war with them. As stated in the literature review section, now reinforced by historical evidence, the riddah wars were about bringing back political stability to the subsequent rebellions of the false prophets, and other tribes who either explicitly (by giving allegiance to a fake prophet) or implicitly (stopped paying the Zakah) committed treason and posed a threat to the Islamic state. Not paying Zakah tax also falls under the category of one group of believers oppressing another group (the poor) of believers, as they would be the rightful benefactors of the Zakah tax. In the Qur’an, in Chapter, Hujirat (49:9) commands Muslims to fight a group of believers transgressing over the other: “And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the two. But if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. And if it returns, then make settlement between them in justice and act justly. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.”

Aḥmad bin Yaḥyā al-Balādhūrī, “Al-Aswad al-‘Ansi and those in al-Yaman who apostatized with him” in Kitāb Futūḥ al-buldān (Brill Online, 2015): . 420 Philip H.J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, Intelligence elsewhere: spies and espionage outside the anglosphere (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 106. 421 Akram, Sword of Allah, ch. 11, 2. Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari. The History of al-Tabari: Volume 10 (SUNY Press, 1993), 18-35: It is discussed that three parts of Yemen were divided to three provinces, each of which had an appointee of the Prophet to rule the respective areas, and that Mu’adth bin Jabal was the leader of the political Islamic operation in Yemen. When he started his movement, it faced resistance (by the Muslims tribes of ‘Akk and Tihama) while al-Ansi was gaining momentum in Yemen and surrounding areas. He clearly had a political and military operation; Tabari notes that certain clans were afraid of being attacked by his armies, also taking note of his organization of generals and governors. The Prophet told Mu’adh to fight them; he subsequently released the order to the Muslims of Yemen to do so. He was assassinated a little while after the Prophet had died. 422 Ibid: Several people of the Tayy and Asad tribes pledged alliegence to him. 423 Rasul Ja'farian, History of the Caliphs: from the death of the Messenger (s) to the decline of the Umayyad Dynasty 11-132 AH (Qom: Ansariyan Publications, 2003), 15: citing Khalifah Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh khalifat Ibn khayyat (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam), 102-103. 419

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4.5. THE INVASION AND CONQUEST OF SASSANID PERSIA The final case law, another major invasion, is the conquest of the Sassanian Empire. Although the decision of the Islamic state to invade the Sassanid was made by ‘Umar, the original invasion of Sassanid Mesopotamia was carried out under the command of Abu Bakr, near the end of the Ridda wars.424 The initial raids against the Sassanian Empire started after the Ridda wars had ceased, and control over Arabia proper had been secured. They were at the border of their neighboring superpowers, the Byzantines and the Persian Sassanians.425 Some scholars insinuate without evidence that Abu Bakr simply wanted to take advantage of his current military strength and favorable conditions to attack the empire. On the other hand, there are very important historical accounts that discuss Abu Bakr’s intention and reasoning regarding fighting the Sassanian Empire. The first considerations to be discussed are simple facts. In the region of Mesopotamia, there were several Arab tribes426 that migrated from Arabia across Mesopotamia in pre-Islamic times.427 In this area, conflicts were common among the warring tribes of Banu Shayban and Bakr b. Wael vs Taghleb and Eyad, the former fighting the Persian ruling elite present, the latter defending them.428 The Lakhmid client state of the Sassanians was initially with the Sassanians, until they had revolted in 502.429 Such fighting goes back centuries, however the recent developments are what shaped the context. The Persians historically relied on the Lakhmids, until the king of Persia at the time Khorsaw II Parvez disposed of the Lakhmid king and appointed a Persian governor, causing rebellion of the Lakhmids—subsequently, the Arabs (Bakr bin Wael, Shayban, and Lakhmids) entered an open fight with the Persians, and were able to defeat them.430 More importantly, one should know the source of this hostility. Most likely it came from the Persian subjugation of several Arabs, who fought (and were constantly fighting) against the Sassanians who in turn fought back. It’s important to note that while this was all happening, the Prophet had no interest in invading the Sassanian Empire, nor showed desire to aid (or fight) any of the parties. It was only when certain tribes, such as the Muslim parts Shayban tribe, came to Abu Bakr asking for help against the Tamim and Taghleb tribes (and importantly the Persians who were supporting them), did the state begin its fighting in Iraq.431 Note that this was not a tribal issue, it was not that the prophet’s clan Banu Hashim was allied to the Shayban, but because the Shayban were Muslim and asked for the help of the state. This is briefly discussed by

424

M. Moroney, “ARAB ii. Arab conquest of Iran.” In Encylopedia Iranica (New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press, 2011). 425 Ibid. 426 Such as the Tanūḵ, Kenda, Ṭayy, Šaybān, Taḡleb, ʿEǰl, Tamīm, ʿAbd al-Qays, and parts of the Bakr b. Wāʾel tribes. 427 Afshoun Mehrdad, Hossein Moftakhari, and Parviz Perez Talebzadeh, "The reasons for the fall of the Khuzestan Province." Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences 46 (2012): 112. 428 E.L. Daniel, “Arab settlements in Iran.” In Encyclopaedia Iranica (New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press, 2011). 429 Clifford Edmund Bosworth, “Lakhmids.” In Encyclopaedia Iranica (New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press, 2012). 430 Ibid. 431 E.L. Daniel, “Arab Settlements in Iran.”

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Khalid,432 who entailed, in his modern hagiography of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (translated from Arabic) the reasons for the invasion, stating that it was due to oppression and persecution of the minority Arab population (by the Sassanians), whose conversion to Islam posed a threat to the establishment. This implies that some form of persecution of Muslims was present in Mesopotamia. Even if such reports are unfounded, it is a fact that historical fighting occurred between Arab tribes and the Sassanian empire forces,433 which were previously allied with Nestorian Christians, the Lakhmids, and also with the Taghleb and Eyad tribes. It was upon this historical backdrop that the Muslim elements of the Shayban tribe came to Madinah, and sought help against the Sassanians. This was the first time the Muslims engaged the Sassanians. The summary based on these facts is as follows. The tribes of Tagleb and Shayban/Banu Bakr have had historical fighting, the former party backing the Sassanian Empire with the latter opposing it. The Nestorian Christian kingdom the Lakhmids were initially with the Taghleb and a client state of the Sassanid, however broke off after internal conflict with the Sassanians. Shortly after, the Arab tribes that opposed the Sassanian Empire attacked and defeated the Sassanians in the Battle of Dhi Qar (CE 609), more fighting ensued. Then, after the Ridda wars and battle of Yamama (the final fight against Musaylama, the last standing ‘false prophet’), the Muslim elements of the Shayban and Banu Bakr tribe asked for help against the Sassanians. The Muslims invaded Khuzestan province and surrounding areas in Mesopotamia and put an end to the historic fighting and rivalry, restored the settlements of the Banu Bakr and Shayban (which where there originally), and destroyed Persian rule behind the fighting. It would be fair to say, based on the facts, that the Sassanians were ‘brought into’ the conflict and that Abu Bakr’s intention was to defend their Muslim tribal parts engaged in war instead of the way Encyclopedia Iranica puts it, negotiating for ‘anti-Sassanian moves.’ The only fact we know is that they did negotiate, and Abu Bakr helped. Based on this, the most reasonable conclusion would be as above. Additionally, Zaki434 mentions that after the subduing of Bahrain, Bakr bin Wael forces (although not necessarily authorized) were attacking tribes loyal to the Sassanians. What he did not acknowledge is the previous hostility and fighting amongst them. The bottom line is that this was a tribal dispute issue, not an imperial Sassanian issue, and not the agenda of Abu Bakr, as stated above, it was only after the tribes came to Abu Bakr is when he helped. The analysis finds that the reason for invasion was a tribal fighting issue, and Abu Bakr only pitched in when they asked for help, after they had converted to Islam. The notion that they fought because it was anti-Sassanian is wrong (the assertion proposed by the Iranica), because the fighting was tribal-and the Sassanians were drawn in later on. Regarding the Islamic justification of the invasions, it would seem to fall under the verse 4:75435: “And what is [the matter] with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women, and children who say, ‘Our Lord, take us out of this city 432

Khalid, M. Khalid, Men around the Messenger, (Selangor: Islamic Book Trust, 2005), 129. Ibid: It is a fact that there was fighting between tribes, such as the Taghleb and Bakr b. Wa’el tribes as mentioned by E.L. Daniel, Arab Settlements in Iran. The Sassanians of course supported the tribes that subdued the uprisings (Such as the Taghleb tribe). 434 Muhammad Zaki, History of Muslim Rule - The Prophet and The Early Rulers (Boston: Beacon Publishers, 2006). 435 The Qur’ān, 4:75. 433

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of oppressive people and appoint for us from Yourself a protector and appoint for us from Yourself a helper?’” This implies that any Muslim who asks for help, while being oppressed requires that the state does so. This would mean the Persians or associated tribes were suppressing the Muslim tribal population in Persia. This is one probable cause. Another possibility is that the Muslims were attacked first. Although the fighting and hostility between tribes were historic, it is possible that the newly converted Muslim tribes were attacked after they became Muslims. We know that this is a sufficient condition, because it was the case in the Prophet’s time. As stated earlier, the Meccan had broken the Hudaybiyyah treaty because the Quraish’s affiliated tribe had attacked a Muslim-affiliated tribe, in revenge. (See appendix A for a translation.) However, the fact that they had allied with the Muslims before being attacked in revenge (several people killed), and after instigating (one person killed) the Mecca affiliated tribe. This called for the dissolution of the Hudaybiyyah treaty and subsequent march to Mecca. In this case, it is possible that after the Muslim tribes had converted to Islam (parts of Ejl, Bakr b. Wael, and Shayban), Persian-affiliated tribes attacked them, and this called for a strictly defensive war. Unfortunately, it is difficult to tell what the exact cause was due to the lack of detailed data on tribal interactions. Back to the larger picture of diplomacy, Khalid Bin Walid, let the Sassanid in Iraq know that they have a few choices: accept Islam, pay jizyah, or go to war.436 This form of negotiation is sometimes proposed as being the default diplomatic interaction with all surrounding states. However it’s important to know that these options were given after the decision to go to war (based on the Islamic criteria), before the battle. If there was no initial attack on the state or its sovereignty, oppression of Muslims in a land, a group of believers oppressing another, then there would be no reason to declare war in the first place. This is why the prophet’s letters to non-hostile heads of state were never coercive or confrontational (Appendix A). It was only after the Muslims had decided to invade, that Khalid bin Walid warned the Sassanians and let them know of their option to pay tax [be semi-autonomous this way], convert to Islam [join the state], or fight.437 The practice of such warnings was certainly not arbitrary or done without reason, the only time these warnings were asked for were after the Islamic state had decided to attack, in response to a breach of its sovereignty. This was the practice in the state since the prophet’s time, the only indications in the historical accounts of such threatening letters were sent after the decision to fight. We see how peaceful the Islamic state’s foreign policy is, even giving the option to make peace on the battlefield; quite contrary to the notion mainstream conservative Islamic scholars portray the Islamic foreign agenda to be. This is narrated in Sahih Muslim’s hadith:438 “It has been reported from Sulaiman b. Buraid through his father that when the Messenger of Allah appointed anyone as leader of an army or detachment he would especially exhort him to fear Allah and to be good to the Muslims who were with him. He would say: Fight in the name of Allah and in the way of Allah. Fight against those who disbelieve in Allah. Make a holy war, do not embezzle the spoils; do not break your 436

John C. Ridpath, Ridpath’s History of the World: Volume 6 (Jones Brothers Publishing Co, 1910), book 12, 463. 437 He wrote a letter to the Sassanid leader he was invading: Ridpath, Ridpath’s History of the World, Book 12, 463. This practice was done since the prophet’s time: offering a chance of surrender before the actual engagement. 438 Muslim Ibn Al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim (Riyadh: Darusalam, 2007), ch. 4 narration 4294.

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pledge; and do not mutilate (the dead) bodies; do not kill the children. When you meet your enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, you also accept it and withhold yourself from doing them any harm. Invite them to (accept) Islam; if they respond to you, accept it from them and desist from fighting against them. Then invite them to migrate from their lands to the land of Muhairs and inform them that, if they do so, they shall have all the privileges and obligations of the Muhajirs… If they refuse to accept Islam, demand from them the Jizyah. If they agree to pay, accept it from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to pay the tax, seek Allah’s help and fight them. When you lay siege to a fort and the besieged appeal to you for protection in the name of Allah and His Prophet…”

Finally, there is Umar’s battles against the Sassanian Empire, the conquest of Persia. After the initial invasion of Iraq, the governor of Iraq at the time, Hormuzan, fled into the nearby province Al-Ahwaz, just east of Khuzestan.439 He was open to making a peace agreement, they agreed upon it, ‘Umar did not go after him because of this peace agreement. However, the moment he had received reinforcements he attacked the Muslims, there were a series of raids on the border of Khuzestan. ‘Umar counterattacked Hormuzan’s uprising and went after him after several victories440. Again, Hormuzan asked for peace, and ‘Umar agreed upon the deal again. Hormuzan attacked a second, and final time. This time ‘Umar fought back and in 638 Hormuzan had lost and fled further east to Ramhormoz, he agreed to a peace treaty a second time in exchange of Jizyah (as with the last time).441 Hormuzan upon refusal to pay tribute as per the agreement, was invaded upon by the Muslims, this time he was chased further east into Persia and eventually captured.442 This treaty-breaking frenzy was acknowledged by Al-Shinnawy443 who also mentions that it was Yazdegerd III’s involvement throughout the timeline. The Sassanians, under Yazdegerd III, continued fighting for Mesopotamia (in the years 638-641) and the surrounding lost lands that were conquered in pursuit of Hormuzan. It has been noted that some forces were even as large as an estimated 180,000 soldiers,444 such as in the battle of Qadisiyyah (CE 636). Such battles in this counterattack caused staggering casualties on both sides. After several battles, the Muslims were slowly emerging victorious, consolidating several large battles, such as Qadisiyyah (636) and the successful Siege of Ctesiphon (CE 637). Years later, after the battle of Nahavand (CE 642), although ‘Umar originally showed the intention to keep Iraq as the border, he is noted to develop a largely offensive policy toward the Sassanians,445 which would make sense as to his statement, implying that it is technically impossible to keep peace between them, but also desiring that peace. From this point, ‘Umar decided to pursue an all-out invasion of Persia and destroy the 439

Laura Veccia Vaglieri, “al-Hurmuzān.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition by P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 2012: “after putting up a feeble resistance there, he withdrew to the Ahwāz." 440 Saeid Jalalipour, “The Arab Conquest of Persia: The Khūzistān Province before and after the Muslims' Triumph.” Graduate paper for e-Sasanika, 6 (2013). 441 Ibid, 7. 442 Ibid, 8; Abd al-Husain Zarrinkub, "The Arab conquest of Iran and its aftermath." The Cambridge History of Iran 4 (1975): 15. 443 ‘Abdul `Aziz Al-Shinnawy, The Islamic Openings (Kuwait: Umm Al-Qura University Press, 2006), 69-70. 444 John Laffin, Brassey's Dictionary of Battles (New York City: Barnes & Noble, 1998), 217. 445 Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Umar-al-Farooq (1944), 130. This implies a shift from the previously defensive policy of protecting the borders of Khuzestan, to invading the persistent Sassanians.

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last of the Sassanian Empire, after years of negotiations and cessation of violence had failed to bring about peace. It seemed that ‘Umar wanted to finally rid of Yazdegerd III (as he did with Hormuzan). Since Qadisiyyah, there was no arrangement for peace and negotiation, it was an evidently an all-out war. From this historical analysis we learn several things about the nature of warfare in the time of the prophet and his first two successors (who started major conquests). The initial invasion into Ghassanid land as well as Abu Bakr’s conquest of Sham were based on the idea of countering a preemptive attack. After rumors of threats, and the killing of the prophet’s emissary, Prophet Muhammad had received the revelation to fight them until they pay the Jizyah, the reason for the battle of Tabuk. Abu Bakr did the same, based on real (or possibly exaggerated) reports of Byzantine collection and hostile tribal and troop gathering, fuelled by Heraclius’ policy of reinstating control over the Near East, possibly conflicting with Abu Bakr’s agenda of reinstating control of Arabia proper after the Ridda wars. The conquest of Khuzestan province was declared by Abu Bakr based on two possibilities; Muslim tribes were being suppressed by the Sassanian ruling class and affiliated tribes, or after being forced to fight the Sassanid-affiliated tribes after converting to Islam. Both of these scenarios fall under 4:75 of the Qur’an ordering Muslims to fight for an oppressed Muslim community that calls out for help, and the self-defense verse (2:190), respectively. If the former case were the scenario, it would be a new precedent, but still clearly following the Qur’anic order. If the latter case were the scenario, it would fall under the basic defense rule (2:190). After all of this, some still claim the objective of the Islamic state was done under the desire to establish Islamic law throughout the world, or done out of desire for power and wealth. If this were the case, they would logically continue their conquest to finish the Sassanians.446 They would not hesitate to invade mainland Persia immediately after taking Iraq. Instead, they suffered major casualties with their policy of staying defensive on the Khuzestan borders. It took ‘Umar until 642 to launch a truly offensive policy, whereas he was capable of doing the same thing after the invasion of Mesopotamia in 633. Throughout the nine years, Umar remained defensive, causing him to lose thousands of men. Furthermore, showing Umar’s disgust with the hostility of Sassanians, he said “I wish there was a mountain of fire between us and the Iranians, so that neither they could get to us, nor we to them.”447 Clearly, this could not have been the statement of someone willing to spread Islam all over the world. In summary, the conquest of the Sassanian Empire was the result of several rounds of negotiation that resulted in all-out war, giving rise to Muslims fully controlling modern-day Iran, Afghanistan, parts of Pakistan and central Asia.

4.6. CONCLUSION This historical analysis provides a thorough look into the Qur’anic application of Jihad that is demonstrated through warfare launched by the Prophet and his successors’ military engagements. There are four Qur’anic verses that serve as criteria to engage in Jihad, all of 446

This would also apply to the Byzantine invasion, however this argument technically does not apply to the Byzantine conquest case, because it was done subsequent to the end of the Ridda wars. The conquest of Persia took much longer. 447 Muhammad ibn Jarir, al-Tabari, Tareekh-ul-Umam wal-Muluk: Volume 3 (Cairo, 1939), 176.

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which were exhibited during the prophet’s and immediate two successors’ lives. Specifically, there are four verses commanding Jihad on Muslims for four different scenarios. Qur’an 2:190 commands Muslims to fight anyone who attack them; Qur’an 49:9 compels Muslims to fight a Muslim group that oppresses another Muslim group; Qur’an 4:75 triggers war against a non-Muslim regime that oppresses a Muslim group that seek out help from the Islamic state; and Qur’an 9:29 authorizes hostility against the people of the book that refuse to pay jizyah. In addition, Qur’an 60:8 forbids Muslims to make peace or deal justly with any entity that drives its citizens out of their homes or kills them because of their faith. When it comes to those who drove Muslims out of their home because of their faith, Muslims are commanded to fight and not give up what they had lost. The Prophet in his war against the Meccan, who drove Muslims out because of their religion, demonstrated the command of this verse. Umar ibn Khattab declared the conquest of the Sassanian Empire, the justification being in the Qur’an 4:75. The Ridda wars’ purpose was to fight treason, and oppression of one Muslim group over anther, the command to fight being under the verses 2:190 and 49:9, respectively. Regarding the invasion of eastern Byzantium by Abu Bakr, the case of self-defense is the most reasonable explanation. Defense against the initial first-hand reports of troops gathering near Muslim borders, fuelled by the growing perceived (we don’t know if there was confirmed intention of the Byzantines to invade Muslim lands) growing threat of Byzantine re-establishment near or at the newly defined borders of the Islamic state. 3. Muslims are commanded to fight a group of Muslims who are transgressing over another Muslim group (Qur’an, 49:9). As a part of the Ridda wars, Abu Bakr fought Muslims refusing to give tribute, which would be used to aid poorer Muslims. In that case, treason against the state and oppression of a Muslim group took place. 4. In the case of oppression against Muslims. We found that Abu Bakr originally invaded the Sassanian Empire possibly because of oppression. This chapter’s finding is unlike any other study done, as both Islamic history and jurisprudence are analyzed thoroughly and without an agenda, specifically, the invasions of the Byzantine and Sassanian empires have not been discussed from a cause-and-effect perspective.448 Islamic criteria for war are very strict, and only allow it to be in self-defense of the state, fighting severe oppression against Muslims (including own group), and to stop a group of Muslims from fighting each other.

448

Apologetic scholars generally stay away from the topic, and neo-orientalist scholars briefly address the history without getting into details as to why the wars were started.

Chapter 5

THE ISLAMIC JUS IN BELLO: RESTRICTIONS SURROUNDING WARFARE IN ISLAM In Islamic military jurisprudence, we find several restrictions, regulations, and requirements surrounding three major issues. The first is regarding rules actively in the war, this topic includes rulings on collateral damage, burning architecture, and defining who may be killed/attacked in the heat of war. It also addresses the regulations that surround what the Islamic army/state does after taking over territory and wealth, women and children, as well as captives of war. There is no section specifically as it pertains to Islamic domestic governance, rather than treatment of the enemy outside the boundaries of the Islamic state, though issues that such dealing with war captives and potential distribution of property after war will be discussed. The jus in bello discussion consists of a) treatment of innocent people and architecture during war, b) treatment of captives, and c) treatment of newly acquired territory and the women and children.

5.1. REGULATIONS SURROUNDING WARFARE: IN THE HEAT OF WAR The Qur’an, as expected, gives only a brief injunction regarding the law of war, and leaves the practical application to the discretion of the Prophet, and further clarification by the four rightly-guided Caliphs. The famous verse of Qur’an often quoted (5:32) in the discussion of Islam’s stance on unjust killing states, “Because of that [when Cain killed Abel], We decreed upon the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land – it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one – it is as if he had saved mankind entirely.” Killing anybody unjustly, Muslim or nonMuslim, is strictly, explicitly prohibited in the Qur’an; the clarification, or perhaps qualification to this verse lies within the definition of what is considered a ‘just’ killing. The verse states that it could only have been done in the case of retributive penalty or to stop “corruption” done on in the world. Note that this specific verse refers to what is considered a “just” killing as decreed upon the Bani Israel (original Jews, followers of Moses); though the fact that unjust murder is equivalent to the sin of killing mankind entirely remains, the criteria by which Muslims are governed in regards to just war and killing are different.

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When and who is it just to kill in war? There are several narrations of the Prophet, as individual narrations, combining several criteria that pertain to rules in war: a) “[A] woman was found killed in one of the battles fought by the Messenger of Allah. He disapproved of the killing of women and children.”449 b) The Prophet said: “[D]o not embezzle the spoils; do not break your pledge; and do not mutilate (the dead) bodies; do not kill the children.”450 c) “We went out to fight alongside the Messenger of Allah, and we passed by a slain woman whom the people had gathered around. They parted (to let the Prophet through) and he said: ‘This (woman) was not one of those who were fighting.’ Then he said to a man: ‘Go to Khalid bin Walid and tell him that the Messenger of Allah commands you: “Do not kill any women or any labourer.’”451 These annotations indicate that women, children, and non-combatants are amongst those not permissible to kill in war. Additionally, mutilating dead bodies is also prohibited. Abu Bakr, the first Caliph of Islam, formalized a set of 10 rules surrounding the behavior of Muslim soldiers during the war. Specifically, they were told given to an army setting out from Arabia to Syria, fighting the Byzantine Empire.452 They are found in his speech; “O people! I charge you with ten rules; learn them well! Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy’s flock, save for your food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them alone”453

Mutawwa Malik’s narration adds/clarifies: “not destroy an inhabited place. Do not slaughter sheep or camels except for food.”454 From these criteria we derive a very important set of regulations to warfare. Firstly, there is a clear observed distinction between a combatant and non-combatant, and special emphasis on not killing women and children. This is implied in the Prophet’s concern of the women’s death because she “was not one of those who were fighting” (Hadith [a]), as well as in his saying that the “labourer” ‘ought not to be killed. Abu Bakr added the elderly and noncombatant religious people; i.e., hermits, priests, etc. Regarding the destruction of land, burning of property and religious monasteries, the injunctions of Abu Bakr confirm that such pillaging and destruction of inhabited villages is also unlawful.

449

Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 19, Hadith 4319. Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 19, Hadith 4294. 451 Ibn Majah al-Qazwīnī, Sunan Ibn Majah,, Book 24, Hadith 2949; Abu Dawood al-Sijsitānī, Sunan Abi Dawood, Book 14, Hadith 2663. 452 Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare, Strategic Studies Institute (Collingdale: Diane Publishing Co., 2004), 22. 453 Ibid. 454 Mālik ibn Anas, Muwatta Malik, Book 21, Hadith 971. 450

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There is, however, a qualification made to the “no killing civilians” stipulation of the Prophet’s and Abu Bakr’s sayings; the often-debated topic of collateral damage. Much of the debate/rulings on collateral damage from Islam come from a narration of the Prophet Muhammad. The incident found in Sahih Muslim455 (a very abridged account) states that a Companion of the Prophet notified the Prophet of their killing of the “children of the Polytheists” in night attacks (likely referring to the Meccans), where the Prophet replied “they are from them,” impliying permissibility to carry out the attack. Though it is possible to stop there in the analysis and use it to justify the indiscriminate killing of non-Muslims in general, it is important to see the further, more detailed accounts.456 Another account indicates that the questioner was referring to the accidental killing of children, by the Cavalry they rode in the night raid,457 in which case the reply of not prohibiting the act applies to the act of night raids, not to the act of killing the children (i.e., he did not oppose their accidental killing). This is supported by hadith commentary in the Bulugh al-Maram by jurist Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (d. 1449 CE) calling the incident a question pertaining to the “probability that some of their women and offspring were killed or hurt”458 [emphasis added]. Such seems to be the more accurate definition, as a) the details and understanding of the detail of ‘accidental’ rather than deliberate killing of innocent Muslims indicate that the prophet’s approval was for accidental killings, and b) by accepting the Prophet’s approval of the indiscriminate killing of civilians, it annuls the Qur’anic injunction as well as the Prophet’s previous saying. Hence, it is only logical to accept that the Prophet Muhammad approved of accidental killings. Such an injunction implicates that collateral damage is permitted according to the Islamic jus in bello. Al-Shafi’i, Al-Shaybani, Al-Munjid, Imam Malik, Idris al-Qarafi, Al-Shirazi, and dozens of other renowned jurists, forming a common consensus, reject the killing of women and children not playing a combative role.459 The Jurists seem to be very concerned about the details of who and when certain types of people may be killed, discussing the bare details, such as the role of women who guard but don’t fight, the age of distinction between “children” and “men,” and so on. Though there is the distinction between children (up to the puberty age) and women with men who are able to fight (Muqātilah),460 there is also a distinction between those who are actively fighting and not fighting. Though some, such as Al-Ghazali, believed that the reason women were not to be fought to be killed in war was due to physical weakness, the more accurate and pertinent to the Hadith of the Prophet is the view of Ibn Qudamah, who stated that the reason was due to the fact that they were not fighting.461 As the Hadith stated, the Prophet disapproved of the killing of a women due to the fact that she was not playing a combative role. It also supports the other jurists’ rulings that even the ‘Asifs, hired men, including those on the battlefield were not to be killed due to their non-

455

Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim,, Book 19, Hadith 4322. Muslim’s and Bukhari’s accounts of Prophetic narrations tend to be abridged and do not cover all necessary details of the story. 457 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 19, Hadith 4323. 458 Ibn Hājir al-Asqalānī, Bulugh al-Maram, Book 11, Hadith 1284. 459 Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations” (PhD Diss., Univeristy of Birmingham, 2009), 202. 460 Ibid, 201; Referring to Sa’d bin Mu’adh’s distinction of men with women and children in his ruling regarding the Banu Qurayzah. 461 Ibid, 204. 456

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combative role462 (Al-Shaybani interestingly quotes 2:190 of the Qur’an which states to “[f]ight in the way of Allah those who fight you.”).463 It is unanimously agreed upon by the jurists that those who play a non-combative role are not to be killed, and that non-combatants should not be attacked, though some jurists argue that it is not even desirable to specifically target or fight women and children playing a combative role.464 In the modern context, such an injunction allows for a Muslims army to attack military targets where there will be possible collateral damage. To rephrase; potential collateral damage should not be an obstacle to carrying out an attack directed toward military targets. Note that there should be emphasis on collateral damage; the permitting of directed civilian killings and indiscriminate killing of non-military targets is certainly forbidden in the Islamic law of war. The jurists are in favor—based on the Hadith—that night raids are permissible, though they tend not to go into the details or context of the Hadith or elaborate further.465 A related issue developed by the jurists is the scenario of the enemy taking human shields, using a typical case of the enemy’s taking of human shields to prevent the use of catapults against besieged castles. Some jurists make the distinction between non-Muslim Dhimmis (Christians and Jews living under Islamic jurisdiction), people whom Muslims have a peace compact with, and Muslims themselves, whereas others’ stress the notion that it is more unfavorable in the case where Muslims are taken as human shields. For instance, the Maliki and Hanbali Madhabs (schools of thought) hold that it is never permissible to attack a place where either Muslims, Dhimmis, or peace-compacted people are taken as hostages, due to the possibility that they be killed (recall that the strong reprimand of killing unjustly in the Qur’an). However, most jurists, such as Abu Hanifah and Sufyan Al-Thawri, state that it is permitted, due to the military necessity, as well as due tot he fact that the enemy would make is a practice take human shields, as Ibn Qudamah argues. Another camp of jurists argue that even if Muslims are taken captive, if the Muslim army is in danger, the act is permitted, unless in the case where many are taken captive. There is a wide distribution of opinion, and the general notion amongst the jurists. Al-Dawoody ends with a very reasonable conclusion: “This typical jurisprudential discourse indicates the impracticality of providing a specific position as being representative of Islamic law simply because, in such cases, the jurists gave conflicting rulings…Concerning the application of these rulings, it would be left to the Muslims in question to decide which rulings to endorse.”466 Though it may be thought that by allowing room for the potential sacrifice of Muslim lives, the Jurists “override[d] the Qur’anic injunction on the basis of the principle of Muslim public interest,”467 there is an important difference. That is, that in the Qur’anic injunction prohibiting a specific attack (due to the possibility of Muslims existing amongst the population)468 refers to an attack specifically on Mecca—an attack which would not threaten the sovereignty of the Islamic state. In other 462

Ibid, 210. Ibid, 205. 464 Ibid. 465 Ibid, 217. 466 Ibid, 215. The stances of the jurists are explained in: Ibid, 212-215. 467 Ibid, p. 215. 468 The Qur’an, 48:25: “They are those who disbelieved and hindered you from Al-Masjid Al-Haram…Had there not been believing men and believing women [amongst them] whom you did not know, that you may kill them and on whose account a sin would have been committed by you without (your) knowledge, that Allah might bring into His mercy whom He wills if they had been apart We verily, would have punished with painful torment those of them who disbelieved.” 463

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words, this Qur’anic injunction refers to a scenario in which the Muslims’ sovereignty or lives were not in threat. It is then not a matter of “public interest,” but a different scenario where the lives of thousands of Muslims in immanent danger, rather than a matter of “rightfully owning” the ka’bah in Mecca. Also, if such a verse were to be extrapolated further, it would theoretically prevent any attack from occurring due to the fact that “some” of the population may have been “hiding their faith for fearing for their safety.”469 We can conclude from this, then, that this does not form a direct command or injunction, which is to be universally accepted (without the ruling of the Jurists), but rather a case of dialogue pertaining to this specific scenario. Additionally, we should note that this is the case of God speaking from in insider point of view; God knew that there were Muslims amongst the population for a fact, stating; “Had there not been believing men and believing women…” Because this is the case, and it is not the mere “possibility” of there being non-Muslims, this is not an injunction, but rather, more likely an explanation to the Prophet and the companions as to the reasons why war should not have been declared, considering their frustration from not being able to attack the Meccans, instead concluding the treaty of Hudaybiyyah.470

5.2. AFTER THE WAR: DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY, DEALING WITH CAPTIVES AND NON-COMBATANTS (WOMEN AND CHILDREN) In Islamic taxation law, of the eight taxes471 implemented by Islamic government by the Prophet Muhammad and the Rashidun Caliphate, four apply to dealing with non-Muslims after seizure of land and territory by the Islamic state. Firstly, there is the Jizyah tax, a head tax imposed upon all non-Muslims living under the protection of the Islamic state. Secondly, the Fai: tax imposed on newly acquired property from acquired territory through war. Thirdly, there is the land-tax agreement: an agreement between the Islamic state and non-Muslim population. Finally, we have the Khums tax: tax on war spoils.

5.2.1. War Spoils and Property First is the issue of war spoils. War spoils apply to any valuable goods recovered from the battlefield: weapons, wealth, left-over livestock, equipment, etc. The Qur’an states that the division of the war booty is to be made by the Prophet personally: “They ask you, [O Muhammad], about the bounties [of war]. Say, ‘The [decision concerning] bounties is for Allah and the Messenger.’ So fear Allah and amend that which is between you and obey Allah and His Messenger, if you should be believers.” (8:1). Logically, the duty would be carried out by the leader of the Islamic state; the Caliph. The Prophet is narrated to have 469 470 471

Ismail Ibn Kathir, “Tafsir Ibn Kathir,” qtafsir.com (n.d.), http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view&id=2006&Itemid=104, commentary on 48:25. Ibid: Ibn Kathir appropriately titles his explanation of the verse as “Some of the Benefits gained from the Treaty at Al-Hudaybiyyah.” The author classifies the Islamic taxes as: Zakah (al-māl is imposed by the government), ‘ushur (farming tax of Muslim farmers), Rikaaz (buried treasure tax), Jizyah (poll-tax on non-Muslims living in the Islamic state), Border-tax, Fai (goods acquired from acquired territorty), land-tax agreement (agreed rate of land-tax on nonMuslim farmers), and Khums (war booty tax).

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divided property in Sahih al-Bukhari,472 and fixed the share of the war spoil shares to be proportional to the amount they invested into the war, as he “fixed two shares for the horse and one share for its rider.”473 In Islam, it is permissible for the state to confiscate battle-field property/goods and distribute them amongst those who fought. Additionally, there is a tax, known as the “khums” tax (English: ‘one fifth’), which is to be given to the state for the purposes of providing for those in need, as well as to the political leader himself.474 Related to the war spoils is the fai; property and valuable belongings that are conquered without direct fighting, i.e., not from the battlefield. Caliph ‘Umar classifies the wealth that was gained without fighting, or “expedition,” giving the example of the left-over wealth of the Banu Nādir tribe.475 Recall that the Banu Nādir tribe was attacked in their settlement in Khaybar (150 km far from Madinah), ‘Umar noted that their wealth/goods were classified as the fai. Ibn Kathir defines fai as such: “For instance, the booty collected from Bani An-Nadir was not acquired because of fighting them using horses and camels. The Muslims did not fight Bani An-Nadir in battle, but Allah forced them out of their forts on account of the fear that He placed in their hearts for Allah’s Messenger. Therefore, it was Fai’ that Allah awarded His Messenger, with his discretion to spend it however he sees fit.” (commentary on 59:6, Tafsir Ibn Kathir).

The Qur’an provides the same definition: “And what Allah restored [of property] to His Messenger from them - you did not spur for it [in an expedition] any horses or camels, but Allah gives His messengers power over whom He wills, and Allah is over all things competent.” (59:6). Note that, in the Khaybar case, the Banū Nādir tribe agreed to surrender their land and leave Khaybar; hence, the wealth was considered without fighting, even though the wealth was given in an agreement after the Muslim invasion of Khaybar (628 CE).476 However, several Jews returned to Khaybar and asked Muhammad to settle for a new agreement in which a part of the land’s produce would be given to the Muslims on a yearly basis, they agreed on 50% of the agricultural harvest.477 Here we find evidence of a land-tax. Note that the Prophet distributed the wealth of the time amongst the Muslims, as would be the case with Khums, except it was not distributed to fighters, but to the state.478 472

Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 5, Book 59, Hadith 621; Vol. 5, Book 58, Hadith 122. Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 4, Book 52, Hadith 115; Also Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ atTirmidhi, Vol. 3, Book 19, Hadith 1554; Ibn Majah al-Qazwīnī, Sunan Ibn Majah, Book 24, Hadith 2963. 474 Specifically, the Qur’an states “And know that out of all the booty that ye may acquire (in war), a fifth share is assigned to Allah,- and to the Messenger, and to near relatives, orphans, the needy, and the wayfarer” (8:41). 475 “It was narrated that 'Umar said: ‘The wealth of Banu An-Nadir was among the Fay' that Allah bestowed upon His Messenger, in cases where the Muslims did not go out on and expedition with horses and camels. From it he kept for himself food for one year, and what was left he spent on cavalry and weapons equipment for the cause of Allah.’” Susan Nasa’i Vol. 5, Book 38, Hadith 4145. 476 Detailed in: Watt, Prophet and Statesman, 188-191. 477 “The people of Khaibar said to him: “We know the land better, so give it to us so that we may work the land, and you will have half of its produce and we will have half.” He maintained that, he gave it to them on that basis.” Sunan Ibn Majah, Vol. 3, Book 8, Hadith 1820 mentioned in Book 19, Hadith 3008 Sunan Abi Dawood. 478 See Abu Dawood al-Sijsitānī, Sunan Abi Dawood, Book 19, Hadith 3006 and 3007 (has a similar narration): “When the Messenger of Allah conquered Khaybar, he divided it into thirty-six lots, each lot comprising one hundred portions. One half of it was for the Messenger of Allah and for the Muslims; and he separated the remaining half for the deputations which came to him, other matters and emergent needs of the people.” 473

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In Caliph ‘Umar’s time, after the Muslims conquered the highly-fertile lands of the Sawad in modern-day Iraq, though ‘Umar could have distributed the land amongst the Muslim fighters willing to take the land, being wealth acquired through fighting rather than on agreement. However, he decided to also make a land-tax agreement with the non-Muslim workers in which ijār (rent) was paid as tax to the state. Here we find precedent of making a land-tax agreement with the Khums. From this fact, we can deduce that although the property acquired from fighting: valuable, tangible items such as harvest, gold, etc. are to be distributed to the fighters, or, in the case of Fay,’ to the state, the land may stay in the hands of non-Muslims in exchange for a reasonable negotiated rent. Note that it is important to draw the line between the spoils of war, fai, and private property.479 Due to the fact that the Sassanian government invested heavily in the local agriculture over the centuries,480 Adams describing it as an “ambitious development program.”481 Indeed, the Sawad of Iraq was a major operation and was a major source of food and gain in the surrounding regions. Additionally, Christensen notes that the agricultural taxes in Khuzestan (which contains the Sawad) had “apparently a fixed rent on all crown estates,”482 indicating that there was land in the Sawad area owned by the monarch to which the farmers there would pay rent. It then makes sense how ‘Umar had the right to consider assigning land and employment to these lands—if he indeed did so; we are hinted at this form the fact that ‘Umar made a land-tax agreement, either telling us that the other option may have been to evacuate, or simply, that it was his way of establishing the land tax on non-Muslims. Either way, very importantly, there is no historical occasion or incidence in which the Muslims—under the Prophet’s watch or the Rashidun Caliphate’s—confiscated private property and wealth from individuals, homes, land, etc. as a result of fighting. The only time land and wealth may be lawfully distributed is in the case that the Muslims, without fighting, had it agreed that the wealth of a group of people be surrendered to them, or wealth that was left behind. We can now summarize the Islamic stance on pillaging, confiscating of private property or wealth; unless there is a prior agreement to do so, or it is found on the battlefield (being war spoils), the Islamic state is unauthorized to take any wealth or property from a conquered Muslim / non-Muslim population, unless it is in the form of an authorized tax. Of the authorized taxes, one is the land-tax agreement made with non-Muslim farmers; a fixed negotiated rent, the other tax levied on non-Muslims is the Jizyah tax. Bostom483 tells is that when an area is conquered, a non-Muslim population that accepts to pay jizyah and landtax and recognize the authority of the Islamic state pays the land-tax called Kharaj (also known as ijar). However, if the land is taken by force, i.e., a township is sieged and fought over, the land is liable to distribution amongst the Muslims. Note that this implies the non479

Ziauddin Ahmad, “Financial Policies of the Holy Prophet- A Case Study of the Distribution of Ghanima in

Early Islam” Islamic Studies 14 (1975): 15. Robert M. Adams, “Agriculture and Urban Life in Early Southwestern Iran; Agriculture and Urban Life in Early Southwestern Iran” Science 13 (1962): 117–120; Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests Donner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 167, 171-172. 481 Adams, “Agriculture and Urban Life in Early Southwestern Iran; Agriculture and Urban Life in Early Southwestern Iran,” 109, 117. 482 Peter Christensen, The Decline of Iranshahr: Irrigation and Environments in the History of the Middle East, 500 B.C. to A.D. 1500 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1993), 38. 483 Abu Yusuf al-Ansari, “Kitab al-Kharaj” in The Legacy of Jihad ed. Andrew G. Bostom (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2010), 175. 480

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Muslim men then, that are responsible for the fighting and attack, are taken as war captives; their property and option to pay tax is not given. On the other hand, for non-combatant civilians; farmers, laborers, and others hired to do a job, even if it be on the battlefield484 etc., their property is free for them in exchange for the jizyah and charm taxes.485 Imam Malik stated, regarding the Jizyah and war-spoil relationship: “As for the people of force who use force, if one of them surrenders, his land and property belong to the Muslims because the people of force are overcome in their towns, and it becomes booty for the Muslims. As for the people of peace, their property and selves are protected so that they make peace for them.” 486

5.2.2. Inhabitants and Fighters The Jizyah tax is a poll-tax levied on non-Muslims given in exchange for their protection by the state, the only type of tax non-Muslim civilians are required to pay. The purpose of the Jizyah tax is to—like a regular tax—be directed towards its purpose of protecting the people under the custodianship of the Islamic state. Caliph Umar himself stated that the purpose of the tax was to protect the non-Muslim population, and made the order to his successor(s) not to “over-tax them beyond their capability.”487 The Jizyah tax, though portrayed as a fixed head-tax for all (i.e., a ‘regressive’ tax), it can also take the shape of a proportional tax: “Umar differentiated the [Jiziyah] rate according to the income of the taxpayer. He charged one dinar form the poor, two dinars from the middle, and from rich non-Muslims.”488 For the sake of clarification, it is important to distinguish between the treatment of civilians belonging to a conquered territory, and so-called “renegades,” or those who committed treason against an agreement (like the Banu Qurayzah). Though it is at the discretion of the Imam in the end, the fate of those who committed treason has death permitted in their sentence (as with the Banu Qurayzah), and an expulsion settlement is also permitted (as with the Banu Nadir). In the case of a conquered population, the fate of the inhabitants logically boils down to two options: a) convert to Islam and pay the Zakah (as would any other Muslim) and Ushr (land) taxes, or b) face expulsion and leave your land behind. Reason (b) is considered an option, as the only logical recourse to denying taxes used in their protection, would be to take them out of the protection, i.e., live outside the protective territory of the Islamic state. Though it has been proposed that the option is to “convert to Islam,” “pay the jizyah” or “die” is not a notion supported in the Qur’an or Hadith: there is no incident where people, be them idolaters, polytheists, or the people of the book (Jews and Christians) were ever told to pay 484

Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations,” 201 writes that “Al-‘Asif” refers to anybody hired to do a job. 485 Ibid, 179. 486 Mālik ibn Anas, Muwatta Malik, Book 21, Hadith 49. 487 Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 4, Book 52, Hadith 287: “I urge him (i.e., the new Caliph) to take care of those non-Muslims who are under the protection of Allah and His Apostle in that he should observe the convention agreed upon with them, and fight on their behalf (to secure their safety) and he should not over-tax them beyond their capability." 488 Volker Neinhous, “Zakah, taxes, and public finance in Islam” in Islam and the Everyday World: Public Policy Dilemmas eds. Sohrab Behdad and Farad Nomani (London: Routledge, 2006): 178.

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the tribute, die, or convert. Indeed, the top jurists have done a so-called “ijma” (consensus) ruling, declaring that the polytheists and idolaters were to be given only the choice between death and Islam,489 this was supported and acknowledged by Ibn Khaldun, a Maliki jurist (who is also considered the father of modern Sociology). In fact, Ibn Khaldun seems to not only acknowledge the consensus, but implicitly find the false assumption that the ruling is based upon: “in the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the (Muslim) mission and (the obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force.”490 The assumption of these jurists, if Ibn Khaldun’s understanding is correct, is that the jurists have assumed that it is permissible to declare that the “ends justify the means,” rather than follow Islam as it is, which clearly does not sanction such behavior. The origin of the notion of “convert or die” in Islam may have been derived from a specific Hadith referring to Muhammad’s instructions to generals on their mission to conquer individual townships. The narrations state that a Muslim army, after besieging the city, is expected to invite the township to Islam, if they refuse, they are to ask for the Jizyah tax in exchange to safe dominion under the Islamic state, if they refuse that, they are to fight.491 Note that the expansionary implications of the narration were already deconstructed in Chapter 4. Interestingly, this narration refers to how to deal with Mushriks (“ َ‫)” ُم ْش ِر ِكين‬, polytheists. This narration then annuls the misconception that polytheists (Arab or non-Arab) are not to be given the opportunity to pay the Jizyah tax. Now, this Narration may have made its way into the interpretation that it is okay to kill people who refuse Islam or the Jizyah, however, the narration only states to fight (non-civilians, of course). Of course, there is also the verse of Qur’an commanding to “kill the polytheists wherever you find them” (9:5), which has already been debunked. Other than these injunctions, there is no Qur’anic evidence or evidence form the Sunnah that those who refuse to pay jizyah or who refuse to accept Islam are to be put to death. This leads to the only logical conclusion one can make; it is a myth that a) people may be put to death for not accepting Islam, and b) people may be put to death for refusing to pay the Jiziyah tax. It is a major misnomer on part of the Jurists in their claim that individual adult, nonMuslim men may be killed as a result of their rejecting Islam or the Jizyah tax. Jurists such as al-Shafi’i and Ibn Hazm developed the opinion that any single, individual, non-Muslim adult male who refuses to either accept Islam or be subject to the Jizyah tax is a “legitimate target in war”492, with al-Shaif’i giving the exception of hermits or monks who dedicate their lives to monastic services, based on the above (or similar) hadith stating that the monk is not to be killed. Some scholars, such as those in the Hanafi madhab, take the same opinion that those who reject Islam as well as the Jizyah tax may be killed. Contrary to our above analysis, then, there are several major jurists who believe that defying Islam either alone (in Abu Hanifah’s formulation with polytheists) or defy Islam as well as refuse to pay the Jiziyah tax may be killed. Perhaps the discretion between the opinion of “lawful target of war” and killing based on rejection of religion or tax, stands at the discussion of the Prophet’s ruling of declaring war

489

Andrew G. Bostom, The Legacy of Jihad (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2010), 34. Franz Rosenthal, N. J. Dawood, The Muqaddimah: an introduction to history; in three volumes, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 183. 491 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 19, Hadith 4294. 492 Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations,” 202. 490

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on whoever does not pay the jizyah. It makes sense that the famous Hadith discussed above may have been interpreted to include individual non-combatants. Such extrapolation makes a fundamental assumption. It assumes that when the Prophet ordered his generals to fight principalities or townships to accept Islam, pay Jiziyah, or fight, that it also applies to the individual resident. There is no indication, either in the Hadith or with historical precedence, that a Muslim army went around killing people who didn’t accept Islam or pay jizyah, even if they were “polytheists.” In fact, Abu Yūsuf al-Ansārī (Jurist and Abbasid Chief Justice, d. 798 CE) notes that the “fire-worshippers and mages” in Persia were not subject to such treatment despite being polytheists.493 Hence, it would be inaccurate to claim that Islam permits the notion of “convert, pay the jiziyah, or die” under any circumstances regarding individual residents. However, if a state, or group of people gather adjacent the state and refuse to pay the jizyah, they, being treasonous renegades, are to be fought by the state, as Abu Bakr had done with the Muslims who withdrew Zakah. That being said, even regarding apostasy, we saw above that if the apostasy is not a political threat, it is not permissible to fight those apostates; the same thing applies to peaceful non-Muslim civilians living in townships and villages. We can then conclude, out of our brief but important discussion, that Islam never sanctions the killing of non-politically threatening cases of refusal to pay Jiziyah, and absolutely never causes civilians to face the decision between conversion to Islam, or death.

5.2.3. Captives of War When it comes to relatives of fighters who are non-male, non-combatants; women and children, it is understood that they are to be captured and either ransomed or put into slavery. Precedence of this comes from the Banu Qurayzah incident where the Muslims first ransomed, then enslaved the women and children. Note that this is not the fate of civilian populations or village inhabitants, but rather the wives and children of the killed or executed male combatants (whose property are seized). There are narrations of the Prophet and companions discussing the non-combatant captives’ as being regarded as slaves.494 For male war captives, there is a verse of Qur’an indicating that after the war, those that have been captured must either be let go or ransomed for money or other prisoners: “So when you meet those who disbelieve [in battle], strike [their] necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon them, then secure their bonds, and either [confer] favor afterwards or ransom [them] until the war lays down its burdens. That [is the command]. And if Allah had willed, He could have taken vengeance upon them [Himself], but [He ordered armed struggle] to test some of you by means of others. And those who are killed in the cause of Allah - never will He waste their deeds.” Qur’an 47:4.

493

Abu Yusuf al-Ansari, “Kitab al-Kharaj,” 176. Though al-Ansari made several comments regarding their “Arabness” or “non-Arabness” in determining the procedure of treatment, this cannot be substantiated unless it can be proven that Arab polytheists were subject to different treatment that the others. 494 Sahih al-Bukhari Vol. 4, Book 53, Hadith 372; Sunan abi Dawood Book 19, Hadith 2992.

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The Prophet Muhammad himself has released prisoners for ransom, even for as basic a service as to “teach ten Muslim children how to read and write.”495 The consensus of the Prophet’s Companions: Ibn Abbas, Abdullah Ibn Umar, and others,496 believed that it is not allowed to enslave or kill prisoners of war, as was done in the past before the verse was revealed. The Prophet Muhammad reputedly said to “[s]et free the captives and accept invitations.”497 Regarding practical precedent, it was said that Khalid Bin Walid had ordered the killing of captives, and Ibn ‘Umar had objected to it, saying “By Allah, I shall not kill my captive and none of my companions shall kill his captive!,” whereupon the Prophet confirmed that it was prohibited.498 The Qur’an also states regarding the treatment of captives that they are to be provided with ‘food,’ stating “And they [the righteous slaves of God] give food in spite of love for it to the needy, the orphan, and the captive—[Saying], ‘We feed you only for the countenance of Allah. We wish not from you reward or gratitude.’” (46:8-9). The captive, in Islamic law, is seen as a trust upon the Muslims; they are responsible for their wellbeing. The Prophet is reported to have said “Treat women kindly, they are like captives in your hands;”499 indicating that as women are said to be, the captives are a representative example of someone entrusted upon the Muslims. Additionally, in an incident with war captives after the battle of Badr, the Prophet ordered that there be “good treatment” towards the captives of war and called for them to be held in individuals’ homes or the mosque.500 Logically, such treatment would include clothing, shelter, food, descent treatment, and certainly not torture. It was reported the Prophet said that “God would torment those who torment people in the world.”501 This implies that without lawful cause, such as conviction for breaking a law sanctioning physical punishment (flogging, mutilation, etc.), it is forbidden in Islam to torture anybody, including war captives. What would naturally come along this line of treatment towards prisoners include necessary protection from any danger,502 and freedom from mental torture or hardship. By any standard, based on our investigation of the Prophet’s injunctions and statements of his companions, the Islamic behavior towards war captives are very humane, and certainly surpass those of even the most “developed” countries today. Despite a long history of misinformation, agenda-driven rhetoric, centuries of non-factbased jurisprudence, and historical discrimination, the truth about Islam, through studying the Qur’an, Sunnah, and the Rightly-guided Caliphs, can be easily found. It is upon these basic jus in bello and (some) jus ad bellum rules that modern application is based upon.

495

Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations,” 251. Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations,” 251, 252. 497 Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 89, Hadith 285; Abu Dawood al-Sijsitānī, Sunan Abi Dawood, Book 20, Hadith 3099. 498 Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 89, Hadith 299. 499 Abu Zakaria al-Nawawi, Riyad-us-Saliheen (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1999), Book 1, Hadith 276. 500 Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations,” 256. 501 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 32, Hadith 6328. 502 Yusuf ‘Ali writes as commentary on the verse of Qur’an 9:6 regarding asylum given to polytheists: “If they do not see their way to accept Islam, they will require double protection: (1) from the Islamic forces openly fighting against their people, and (2) from their own people, as they detached themselves from them. Both kinds of protection should be ensured for them, and they should be safely escorted to a place where they can be safe.” http://Qur’anexplained.net/p/Sura-9.html. 496

Chapter 6

REBELLION AND CIVIL WAR IN ISLAM 6.1. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR: THE ISLAMIC STANCE This major event in Islamic history, venerated and discussed by mainly Shi’a and also Sunni Muslims, defines the respective identities. Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the fourth Caliph of Islam, and first Shi’a Imam, have a common point in acceptance as a legitimate caliph, good person, and one of the few scholars who were “promised Paradise” by the Prophet Muhammad himself.503 Sunni Islam, backed by several classical Sunni Scholars504 and citation of verses of Qur’an, believes that all companions of the Prophet Muhammad, defined as anybody who died a Muslim, and had any contact with him, met him, narrated from him, etc. enjoy a special status in the eyes of God. Though some definitions differ, Sunni Muslims include people like Mu’awiyah and the other Umayyad companions to be devout Muslims who should not be questioned because of the special status accorded due to the assumption that he was a companion (Sahabah) of the Prophet. The doctrine of Sunnism stipulates that all of the companions of the Prophet were on the right path. The explanation that Sunni Muslims give when one asks them about the fierce and bloody conflict between Ali and Mu’awiyah is that the event was not really a big deal or conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, but simple disagreement over different stances of Islamic outlook. Later on it seems that this view was romanticized by Sunnis, who avoided the deep historical analysis pertaining to the conflict, and saw it more as an ideological conflict within the bounds of Islam, and, that because Mu’awiyah was a Sahabah, he must have been a righteous Caliph—at least not evil or tyrannical as the Shi’a Muslims say they are. A representative example of how Sunnis view the conflict and legitimacy surrounding the

503

504

Sunni Muslims believe that ‘Ali, along with all four Caliphs, al-Zubair ibn al-Awwam, Talha bin Ubayd-Allah, And al-Rahman bin ‘Awf, Sa’d bin Abi Waqqas, and Abu ‘Ubadah ibn al-Jarrah will go to heaven, as per this Hadith and derivatives: Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi. Ali b. Kahlīl al-Tarāblusī, Mu‘een al-Hukkam feema Yataraddadu baynal Khasmayn min al-Ahkam (Cairo: Maktabat Mustafà al-Bab al-Halabi, 1973), 187; Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-`Aqidah Al-Wasitiyah (Skokie: IQRA' International Educational Foundation), 33-35. http://www.masjidhalton.com/pdf/miscellaneous/ Aqeedah-al-Wasitiyyah-Ibn-Taymiyyah.pdf; Taqiy al-Deen al-Subki, Fatawa al-Subki fi Furu al-Fiqh al-Shafi (Beirut: Darul Kutubul Ilmiyyah, 2004), Vol. 2, Fatwa 575.

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details of the conflict is the view of classical Sunni scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1338) who believed that, at the end of the day, everyone was right:505 “Mu’awiyah did not call himself to be a khaleefah and was not given the oath of allegiance to it when he fought Ali. He fought not because he considered himself to be the khaleef or deserving of the khilaafah. This they all agreed upon and he himself would affirm this to whomever asked him. He and his companions did not consider it permissible that they initiate the fight against Ali and his companions. But Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) and his companions believed that Mu’awiyah and his companions must pledge allegiance and show obedience to Ali, due to his authority such that there be only one khaleefah for the Muslims. Considering them defecting from this obligation he decided that Mu’awiyah and his companions should be fought until they fulfilled it. All this so that obedience and unity occur. Mu’awiyah and his companions did not see that it was obligatory upon them and if they were fought against they would consider themselves oppressed because Uthman was killed oppressively as was agreed by all the Muslims at the time and his killers were in Ali’s camp, he having authority over them.”

Other great scholars, such as Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, seemed to have the desire to not discuss the intimate details of the conflict, leaving the judgment to God, quoting the verse that states: “That was a nation who has passed away. They shall receive the reward of what they earned and you of what you earned. And you will not be asked of what they used to do” (2:134).506 Unfortunately, it seems the Sunni literature has missed out on a lot of potential for learning about political Islamic theology, and Islamic international law. The reality is that in terms of implications on the legal formation of Islam, this prolonged conflict is key to determining several things, namely: a) Implications of the collapse of the Caliphate; b) Islamic political rulings on the unjust usurpation of power (as Shi’as elaborate on); and c) what pertains to our interest for this book; the implications this has on Islamic international foreign policy, dealing with treason, attempted usurpation of power, war, and unjust fighting. Simply ignoring this giant gap in history does not solve any of the above problems. In this chapter, we will first deconstruct the timeline of several key events, in order to develop a historical axis for analysis, and then, discuss the implications specifically on war, civil war, and unjust war, in Islam.

505

Abdul-Muhsin Ibn Hamad Al-Abbaad, Mu'aawiyah Ibn Abee Sufyaan (Madinah: Dar as-Sahaba Publications), 48. 506 Ismaʻil Ibn Kathir, The Caliphate of Banu Umayyah, The First Phase, (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2012), 121.

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6.1.1. Historical Discussion We start the timeline at the death of ‘Uthman, the third ‘rightly guided’ Caliph. The entire historical timeline of ‘Uthman’s final days are detailed by Madelung.507 Uthman faced a long and hard rebellion against the Egyptians who were obsessed with ‘Ali becoming Caliph; this occurred after several grievances many had pertaining to the Islamic actions of ‘Uthman. We will not get into the details, however it suffices to know that ‘Uthman’s house was seized by those rebels eventually, and he was murdered in his home after a short siege lasting likely a few days (though the conflict lasted years). Note that this was not a SunniShia or pro-Quraish/anti-Quraish conflict as some may portray it, as several of the to-be antiUmayyads (Ali’s son Hasan and Abdullah ibn Zubayr) stood firmly behind Uthman, even guarding his home:508 there is no indication of explicit dissatisfaction of these men, though the Shi’as (with their own agenda) did believe that Ali implicitly was discontent of ‘Uthman’s selection as Caliph, even though the tradition tells us that he pledged allegiance to him after his selection.509 Upon the death of Uthman, people rushed to Ali, as there was already a sentiment amongst some of the Muslims (like the Egyptian Kharijites), and asked home to be caliph— he was urged especially by the Ansar to take allegiance and claim the Caliphate, which he accepted.510 Haylamaz notes that all of the alive, previously chosen candidates by ‘Umar, and a few notable Companions, Talha, Al-Zubayr, Sa’d bin abi Waqqas, and Abdullah ibn Umar, rejected the suggestion of their appointing to caliph.511 What was clear, however, was that ‘Ali was the natural, clear, and qualified candidate to lead the Ummah amongst the others: Ali was selected as Caliph in Madinah unanimously in 656 CE. Though the exact details are disputed—especially between Shia and Sunni sources—it can be said that it is a fact that ‘Ali was a legitimately selected Caliph. By ‘legitimate,’ I mean following the Islamic criteria accepted by Sunni Islam, described by Islam et al, following the nomination of nomination and election process,512 who was elected by “prominent companions of the prophet.”513 With the election of Ali, the first Fitna (civil war, literally meaning “test” or “trial”) occurred. Though the first fitna is conceived of as if Mu’awiyah’s and Aisha’s armed struggles against Ali were the same, but it must be noted that these were two, separate struggles. Even if the cause may have been the same, or one armed struggle fuelled the latter in sentiment, Aisha (leader of the first struggle) let go of her struggle and retired in her political life after the battle of the Camel. The battle of the camel was headed by Aisha and supported by prominent Companions Talha and al-Zubayr. The Ummayads and their supporters, blood relatives of ‘Uthman, being of the same clan within the Quraysh, the Bani Umayya, along with thousands of Basrans gathered together and led a 30,000 strong force against Ali’s 20,000 men. The purpose was to seek vengeance for Uthman, the battle being a 507

Wilferd Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 81-97. 508 The Murder of the Caliph Uthman, M. Hinds, in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1972. 509 Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 5, Book 57, Hadith 50. 510 Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 33. 511 Resit Haylamaz, Ali ibn Abi Talib: The Hero of Chivalry (Clifton: Tughra Books, 2011): 73. It also notes that he was reluctant at first. 512 Islam et al, Reconstituting the curriculum, 326-330. 513 Ibid, 328.

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statement ordering Ali to capture and kill Uthman’s murderers. Said bin Al-Musaiyab tells us that “[w]hen the first civil strife (in Islam) took place because of the murder of Uthman, it left none of the Badr warriors alive.”514 The end of the battle left Ali decisively victorious. Some Sunni scholars may refer to the fact that two great companions—two of whom are said to be amongst those ‘entering paradise’ (Zubayr and Talha)—were killed in the battle of the camel. This could be used as evidence to say that it is not logically consistent that two groups, if one were pro-Islam, and one were anti-Islam, that people on both sides, both ‘heaven-goers,’ could possibly fight each other without both of them being ‘right’ in a sense—thereby proving that these major differences in ideology do not matter. To this I have two logical responses; firstly, the fact of the matter is actually quite ironic: both Al-Zubayr and Talha were murdered by the Ummayads on their side according to historical narrations,515 rather than in the battle by Ali’s forces, as they were both suspected of deserting the battlefield or having second thoughts about the fight. The struggle was nowhere near the end; Ali had to face the Umayyads in Syria. Fuad Jabali thoroughly reconstructs the events of the battle of Siffin and its aftermath. He writes of the main sentiments of the two groups growing out of the fitnah. Firstly, there is the group that supported Ali (pledged allegiance to him, and vowed to take his side). Jabali notes that this group was the more “righteous” of the two, as in devoted to Islam,516 as many more great companions of the Prophet were fighting on Ali’s side. Note that two of the greatest companions (Zubayr and Talha) that actually took Mu’wayiah’s side later regretted their decision, and were both killed by Mu’wayiah’s fighters. Amongst Ali’s group, there was a sub-group following a companion named AMmar bin Yasir. They did this based on the Prophet Muhammad’s prediction of the battle,517 from the hadith that follows: Ibn `Abbas said to me and to his son `Ali, “Go to Abu Sa`id and listen to what he narrates.” So we went and found him in a garden looking after it. He picked up his Rida,’ wore it and sat down and started narrating till the topic of the construction of the mosque reached. He said, “We were carrying one adobe at a time while `Ammar was carrying two. The Prophet saw him and started removing the dust from his body and said, “May Allah be Merciful to `Ammar. He will be inviting them (i.e., his murderers, the rebellious group) to Paradise and they will invite him to Hell-fire.” `Ammar said, “I seek refuge with Allah from affliction.”518

This was used as evidence by some in Ali’s group as an order to fight with Ali, as Ammar bin Yasir took Ali’s side in the battle of Siffin.

514

Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 5, Book 59, Hadith 358. Sulaimān Nadvi, Hadhrat Ayesha Siddiqa: Her Life and Work (Safat: Islamic Book Publishers, 1986), 44 details that according to some reports, Marwan deliberately shot Talhah with a poisoned arrow for leaving the battle field due to disgracing his tribe, this was said to be after discussing with ‘Ali. The same source, as well as found in Tabari/tr Brockett, vol. 16, para. 3172, stating that Zubair was attacked from behind by a man named Umayr b. Jurmuz. 516 A “a struggle between religious ideas and worldly interests” as Jabali describes it: Fuad Jabali, The Companions of the Prophet: A Study of Geographical Distribution and Political Alignments (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 157. 517 Fuad Jabali, The Companions of the Prophet: A Study of Geographical Distribution and Political Alignments, 160. 518 Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 8, Hadith 438. 515

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The other group is that led by the Umayyads, led by Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan in Syria, the group that seemed to be less bent on fighting in the name of Islam, and more on fighting for the sake of tribal warfare and vengeance for Ali’s behavior towards the perceived killers of Uthman. Several other details and reports suggest that Mu’awiyah and his members were not behaving as they were in the name of Islam; for instance, there were reports of Mu’awiyah unjustly appropriating land from civilians (discussed below), and that he had less (or no) Islamic justification to claim the Caliphate. Regarding the character of Mu’awiyah in preponderance to Ali, Jabali states, after noting that he was “among the last of the Quraysh to convert to Islam,” that “he was certainly not known for his knowledge of Islam. Compared to Alì, whether in terms of family relation or those of emotion and knowledge, Mu’àwiya was far behind.”519 Another possible indicator of true Islamic legitimacy can be seen with the stance of other Muslims delegated (by the Prophet) with “special” virtues, viz., the position of a companion of higher authority, enough to tell the difference between “good” and “bad,” as Ammar bin Yasir was delegated with. One of those companions were Hudayfa ibn al-Yaman, a staunch anti-hypocrite,520 considered an “unbreakable upholder” of Islam; so much so, that he reported to be given a list of the so called “hypocrites” (crypto-Muslims) by Prophet Muhammad personally, but didn’t have the authority to reveal the names. Sahih Bukhari iterates that he was known as the “confidant of the prophet,” for receiving and holding the secret.521 From this, we can derive that Hudhayfah was not only an indicator of right and wrong because of good faith and solidarity, but had insight specially given by the prophet personally regarding the difference between good and evil within the early Muslim Ummah. It is surprising, knowing this, that Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman ordered his sons Safwan and Sa’id, upon hearing of the death of Uthman—right before his own passing—to pledge allegiance to Ali.522 Other companions who were incredibly close to the Prophet besides Ali himself, who were also so-called heaven-goers, are Hasan and Husayn, the two sons of Ali.523 Eventually, the lack of Islamic support from the Umayyads’ side was so little that Jabali notes, “[t]he view that Alì had more right to the caliphate and that Mu’awiyah’s claim to it was invalid can also be said to have prevailed among the traditionists.”524 It is undoubtedly clear how the Umayyads were more pushed towards tribal and non-Islamic inclinations.525 There are, however, other concerns with Mu’awiyah’s side. One of which includes a deal negotiated between Mu’awiyah and Amr bin al ‘As, governor of Egypt, who agreed to take Mu’awiyah’s side in the arbitration in exchange for being appointed his position as governor of Egypt if Ali

519

Fuad Jabali, The Companions of the Prophet: A Study of Geographical Distribution and Political Alignments, 167. 520 We get a tinge of his dissatisfaction towards hypocrites through his statement: “Narrated Abi Waih:Hudhaifa bin Al-Yaman said, 'The hypocrites of today are worse than those of the lifetime of the Prophet, because in those days they used to do evil deeds secretly but today they do such deeds openly.’” Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, 9/88/229. 521 Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari,: The Early Years of Islam, Imam al-Bukhari, p. 132 note. 6. 522 Fuad Jabali, The Companions of the Prophet: A Study of Geographical Distribution and Political Alignments, 158. 523 The prophet foretold that Hasan and Hussain were to be the “chiefs of the youth of Paradise,” reported in Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Book 49, Hadith 4136. 524 Fuad Jabali, The Companions of the Prophet: A Study of Geographical Distribution and Political Alignments, 169. 525 Ibid, 170.

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were to be defeated.526 Even this specific event demonstrates the lack of interest that Mu’awiyah had with Islam in the sense that two neutral arbitrators decide from the Qur’an and Sunnah (prophet’s lifestyle), who seemed interested in power. We also see that this confirms that Mu’awiyah’s ultimate goal was to become Khalifah, not follow the Islamic path (i.e., phenomenal cognition). This establishes grounds for seeing Mu’awiyah as acting in bad faith—from even the beginning of the civil strife. Back to the timeline, let us look at the events of the battle of Siffin. After the death of ‘Uthman, as we know, there was a growing Umayyad sentiment, being the kinsmen of ‘Uthman, that ‘Ali and his people were not legitimate, and that they ‘ought to punish who they though were the killers of ‘Uthman. They demanded the killers be sent to the Umayyads so they can fulfill the Islamic Qisas provision (retribution-based death sentence). The Umayyads then, outright defied the legitimacy of the Caliph by starting the civil war; this is what led to the first battle, the battle of the Camel. Ali had then moved the capital to Kufa,527 and faced continued armed opposition of Mu’awiyah. The Encyclopaedia Iranica528 notes that once ‘Ali took office, he cancelled all of the appointments for the office of governor that were made by ‘Uthman. Not only did Mu’awiyah (being the governor of Syria) not refuse the cancellation of his appointment, he refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Caliph altogether.529 Ali and Mu’awiyah’s negotiation before the battle proved inconclusive, and the battle started in Siffin, which is modern day ArRaqqah, Syria. The battle of Siffin ended with the agreement to enter an arbitration. Mu’awiyah’s camp appointed Abdullah ibn al-’As (in bad faith), and Ali elected Abu Musa al-‘Ashari, another companion of the Prophet Muhammad. These two were to agree upon a mutual solution based on the Qur’an and Sunnah. Tabari530 details that Abu Musa and Abdullah agreed that they despose of Ali and Mu’awiyah and let the people choose amongst themselves. Ali, in reaction to the descision, withdrew from the arbitration. Because Ali’s intention from the arbitration stipulated that the Qur’an and Sunnah be consulted, and these arbitrators (especially the governor of Egypt) were not acting in good faith and did not rule through the Qur’an and Sunnah, he stated:531 `You band, which a quarrelsome animosity and stubbornness have caused to rebel [the Kharajites], which your own inclinations have turned away from the truth and rashness carried away, and which has fallen into confusion and great misfortune! I warn you lest tomorrow this community find you laid low by the bends of this canal and the beds of this low land without a clear proof from your Lord or a conclusive demonstration. Do you not know that I ordered you not to accept the arbitration process (Hukumah) and that I told you that the enemy’s seeking it from you was (really) a ruse and a trick directed against you? And I informed you that they were not men of religion (din) or 526

Andrew Masham, “The Pact (amāna) between Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān and ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀṣ (656 or 658 CE): ‘Documents’ and the Islamic Historical Tradition” Journal of Semitic Studies (2012): 71-72. 527 Karim al-Zubaidi, Iraq a Complicated State: Iraq's Freedom War (New York City: AuthorHouse, 2010) 32. 528 I. K. Poonawala, “ʿALĪ B. ABĪ ṬĀLEB I. Life,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, Online Edition, 1982, available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ali-b-abi-taleb#pt1. 529 This taken as a given in the Historical scholarship: Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Thought: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), 115 reasserts this in a brief historical discussion. 530 Muhammad ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: 40 Volumes (New York City: SUNY Press, 1993), paras. 3358-3360. 531 Ibid, para. 3378.

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scripture (Qur’an); that I knew them better than you, for I knew them as children and as men and they are a people of cunning and treachery; and that if you rejected my opinion, you would be setting aside sound judgment. But you disobeyed me so that consequently I agreed to appoint an arbitrator. When I did so, I made conditions, extracted undertakings, and imposed on the arbitrators that they give life to that which the Qur’an effects and do away with what the Qur’an suppresses. But they did differently and opposed the authority (hukm) of the Book and the authoritative precedent (Sunnah). Therefore, we have rejected the whole procedure involving them and have gone back to our previous situation. What then is your position and what do you want?”

According to Nadvi,532 an agreement between ‘Ali and Mu’awiyah was signed prior to the arbitration stipulating that the two arbitrators—“whatever decision they take in accordance to the laws in in accordance the Qur’an and Sunnah, we [‘Ali and Mu’awiyah] are bound to accept it.” ‘Ali felt this was not in accordance to the Qur’an and Sunnah, and done in bad faith, according the report. It is noteworthy to see how Ibn Taymiyyah believed that Mu’awiyah was operating in good intention all along, it seems that even Ali—whom Ibn Taymiyyah recognizes as a righteous Caliph—did not believe that. Another report from Tabari states that the conclusion of the arbitration was that there was none, stating: “When the two of them left the arbitration disagreeing with one another, the Syrians gave the oath of allegiances caliph to Mu`awiyah, and his strength continued to increase, while the people of Iraq were in disagreement regarding Ali.”533 After the inconclusive arbitration, Mu’awiyah officially declared himself to be Caliph (based on the list of historical statements below) while Ali—the legitimate and “rightly guided” caliph—was still alive and in office. This has tremendous implications that are not discussed in the Sunni or historic literature. Firstly, it confirms the above accusation of Mu’awiyah having bad faith throughout. It is logical to believe that since Mu’awiyah started his political strife, that his true intention was not just to get vengeance from Uthman’s murder, but to make a political statement, emerging from lust for political authority and tribal hegemony. The Umayyads saw it as a tribal warfare and gathered all of their tribal supporters united for the sake of the tribe, starting from the defense of the honor of Uthman and his tribe. Furthermore, Mu’awiyah did not accept Ali as the caliph in the first place, and was even happily making arrangements of how he would declare himself to be the caliph and his actions while in office (i.e., appointing of governors). Finally, Mu’awiyah declared himself to be caliph whilst Ali was still in office; if he were in ordinance with Islamic law and ‘just happened’ to stumble along the position of Caliph through legitimate election—as traditionalist Sunni scholars try to frame it—534 he would have not violated such strict Islamic laws prohibiting and Qur’anic order prohibiting such acts. Even if it is not the case that he intended to become Caliph from the beginning and was doing it out of true love for Uthman, this proves not to be the case after his pact with Amr b. al-‘As. 532

Shah Moinuddin Nadvi, Hazrat Ali Martuza: the complete seerah i.e., biography of the fourth caliph of Islam (New Delhi: Idara Isha’at-E-Diniyat, 2005), 68-69. 533 Muhammad ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: 40 Volumes, Vol. 17, para. 3396. 534 That is, if we consider his few legitimate supporters to be enough for that, which was not the view of ‘Ali and the companions carrying the tradition of the rightly guided caliphs, who asked for at least consensus of the people of Madinah, as Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman were all elected as such. Jabali confirms that this was the case with all previous caliphs, and that this was ‘Ali’s response to his son Hasan, when he expressed his opinion that ‘Ali should have waited for a more widespread consensus.

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Additionally, there is other evidence pointing to the fact that before the arbitration, Mu’awiyah was considering himself as a candidate for the office of the Caliph. Between the exchanges of Abu Musa and ‘Amr, we hear suggestions pointing to this fact. The following is a list showing the different reports/phrases that imply Mu’awiyah was considering himself to be Caliph. Note that this is not an exhaustive discussion, but it does shed light on the issue, and prove Mu’awiyah’s thinly veiled sinister motives. All prove, at least, that Mu’awiyah was in fact planning to become Caliph during the time of the civil strife. a) “If you are afraid that the people will say, ’Abu Musa has given power to Mu`awiyah, but he is not one of the early Muslims,’ you have an argument in response to that. You will say, ‘I have found him to be the next of kin of `Uthman, the unjustly killed caliph, and the seeker of revenge for his blood, and I have found him adept in government land in managing things. He is the brother of Umm Habibah, the wife of the Prophet, and he was a Companion of the Prophet, one of the group of Companions.’ Then `Amr hinted to Abu Musa that he would obtain a position of authority and said, ‘If Mu`awiyah rules, he will bestow on you honors such as no caliph has ever granted.’”535 b) “Then `Amr and the Syrians went back to Mu’awiyah and greeted him as caliph.”536 c) “When the two of them left the arbitration disagreeing with one another, the Syrians gave the oath of allegiances caliph to Mu`awiyah” (quoted from above) d) The disingenuous agreement between ‘Amr and Mu’awiyah. e) The discussion between Abu Musa and Amr stipulating that Mu’awiyah was in the run for caliph: Amr states; “what is wrong with Mu’awiyah?”537 The same is indicated in the report with Tabari, where it was said that Amr “wanted him to declare in favor of Mu’awiyah, but he refused.” What is also important to note is that Mu’awiyah’s declaration of the pledge of allegiance—whether or not it was official—did exist. Though it was understood that Mu’awiyah would be and was caliph amongst his supporters, this was not at all a concern for Ali’s group. All likelihood is Ali’s group wasn’t aware of Mu’awiyah’s informal declaration to the office of Caliph. This is because shortly after Ali’s death, the Muslims on Ali’s side were quick to elect his son, Hasan as the caliph shortly after (661 CE).538 Hasan did accept the position and declared to take office. The Sunni scholarship does not consider Hasan as an illegitimate Caliph either. In conclusion, we cannot know how widespread the acceptance of Mu’awiyah’s being caliph was right before Ali’s death, but it is clear that when Hasan and Mu’awiyah were ready to fight, there was a dispute of who would become caliph, and it was explicit at the time that there were two official proclamations of the Caliphate; Mu’awiyah’s and Hasan’s. When Ali died, Mu’awiyah and Ali were still at a state of war;539 it was well understood that the issue was not nearly resolved after Ali’s death.

535

Muhammad ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: 40 Volumes, vol. 17, para. 3355. Ibid, para. 3359. 537 Nadvi, Hazrat Ali Martuza: the complete seerah i.e., biography of the fourth caliph of Islam, 71; Ibid, para. 3358. 538 Muhammad ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: 40 Volumes, vol. 18, para. 1. 539 Ibid, paras. 1-2. 536

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This encounter did not result into a full-fledged fight. It was averted single-handedly by Hasan. To understand this, we must understand the character of Hasan, who is known to be soft-spoken, and very much against the notion of bloodshed and war. He was much more inclined towards peace (unlike his brother Husayn). Tabari states that Hasan realized that “rule was beyond his grasp,”540 in terms of domestic instability, and this was the reason why Hasan entered negotiations with the Umayyads. Regarding the terms of the negotiations, there are many conditions: a term of peace between parties,541 a) that Hasan is to concede the revenue in his treasury from eastern Iran, b) that Ali is not to be cursed in Mu’awiyah’s/Umayyads’ sermons. Along the line of the legitimacy of Mu’awiyah as caliph, it is important to understand that there is no indication that Hasan (or Husayn) pledged allegiance to Mu’awiyah, and hence, Hasan did not concede moral or ideological defeat, i.e., admitting that he was wrong. Rather, he yielded to Mu’wayiah for the sake of stopping the bloodshed. This seems to be only reasonable explanation, as it is not only illogical, but untrue, that Hasan pledged allegiance to and recognized Mu’awiyah as a legitimate ruler. Some non-historic scholars claim that the office of the Caliph of transferred in some sort of fashion from Hasan to Mu’awiyah.542 This is an unfounded claim and a result of lack proper cognition. As noted in Chapter 2, the misplacement of chronological sequence of events and deliberate omission of details can reverse the whole historical sequence, rendering the oppressor into oppressed and vice versa. Once it is done, the entire picture is turned upside down. It is equivalent to turning Figures 2.5 and 2.6, portraying knowledge as ignorance and ignorance as knowledge. In summary, we can make the following statements regarding Mu’awiyah’s rise to power: a) it started with the first fitna which was not started in the name of Islam or for Islamic purposes, b) Mu’awiyah displayed a high level of opportunism and disingenuity in the processes of negotiation with ‘Ali and in his general will to the assention to power, c) the civil strife went directly against Islamic rulings to recognize and obey the Caliph (Ali), d) the civil strife and Mu’awiyah’s recognition as Caliph was not recognized by any highly notable companions of the Prophet.

6.1.2. Islamic Stance on Mu’awiyah’s Civil Strife Firstly, we will establish that Mu’awiyah committed a breach of several laws throughout his reign in power, denying his legitimacy as Caliph. Secondly, we will analyze the implications that Mu’awiyah’s lack of legitimacy has on a) Foreign policy of Ali, and b) Islamic foreign policy in general. We will list several codes of Islamic conduct breached by Mu’wayiah, some of which have been mentioned in previous sections. These breaches are listed under two sections; firstly, the sicussion surrounding his legitimacy as caliph and rise to power, and secondly, to his actions as caliph (discussed below)—both of which annul his legitimacy as a legitimate Caliph according to the laws of the Qur’an and Sunnah. In other words, even if his rise to 540

Muhammad ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: 40 Volumes, vol. 18, para. 3. Ibid, para. 4. 542 Najeba Marafi, The Intertwined Conflict: The Difference between Culture and Religion, (Bloomington: XLIBRIS, 2012), 67: Mu’awiyah would be the accepted “temporal political head of the Muslim empire.” 541

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power were legitimate, his misconduct during his reign would make it mandatory on Ummah to remove him from power. So where can Mu’awiyah broken Islamic law? Firstly, there is the Qur’anic order—backed by the Prophet’s Sunnah—ordering all Muslims to be subservient to the Imam, or leader of the group of Muslims. As discussed in the chapter of Islamic cognition, there is a clear chain of authority in Islamic legal ruling of whom to obey, viz., a clear and explicit chain of command and transfer of sovereignty. The Qur’an, 4:59, states, “O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.” From this we understand that in Islam, it is a requirement for all to obey the one in charge, politically given righteous power over the Muslims. The Prophet Muhammad himself clarifies this through several Prophetic Narrations that make it clear that the person that disobeys the Prophet’s appointed ruler, ultimately disobeys God: “Whoever obeys me, obeys Allah, and whoever disobeys me, disobeys Allah, and whoever obeys the ruler I appoint, obeys me, and whoever disobeys him, disobeys me.”543 “The Prophet said, ‘Listen and obey (your chief) even if an Ethiopian whose head is like a raisin were made your chief.’” 544 “Amr bin Al-Harith Al-Mustaliq said: ‘It used to be said that the people with the worst punishment [on the Day of Judgment] are two: A woman who disobeyed her husband, and a people’s Imam whom they dislike.’”545

The first chapter elaborates on the issue of the detailed transferring of power from the prophet to his Caliphs. Sunni Muslims agree that Ali was a righteous caliph, of course, this is not in question. As we saw earlier in the chapter, Ibn Taymiyyah made the case that because Mu’awiyah was well-intentioned and simply wanted justice, he only fought for that reason, and thereby, he is somehow legitimate in his actions that followed. Though we already debunked the notion that Mu’awiyah was a savior—much rather guilty of treason and unlawful usurper of power—even if his intentions were the ‘pure’ in some way, it is Islamically unjustified to disobey the Imam (Caliph, Ali at the time) and create a civil strife, if it is true that Ali was a righteous Caliph. From the Islamic delegation of authority stipulating that God’s sovereignty is eventually transferred to Ali’s (as a Caliph), it only takes the simplest of logic to realize that Mu’awiyah was indeed disobeying God by not obeying the Caliph of the time. Further elaborating on the notion of “good intention,” as proposed by Ibn Taymiyyah and the Sunni scholars today, we have to realize that this line of argument indeed has a long history of authority-enforced legitimatization and misinformation attached to it. Though it seems logical to claim that only God can only judge people, humans are not to guess and judge the intentions of people, etc., the reality is that ever since the death of the Prophet, it has been the practice of the Rightly-guided caliphs to judge purely based on the actions done

543

Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari,, Vol. 9, Book 89, Hadith 251. Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih Bukhari: Vol. 1, Book 11, Hadith 662. 545 Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi,: Vol. 1, Book 2, Hadith 359. 544

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publicly. Peoples’ intentions could not be judged, and the Caliphs were not judging according to intention, of course, but judged based on what they did, this is how wrong and right is determined. It is not true that Islamic law permits for people—especially those who have committed such injustices—to be relieved of accountability, or from being made an example out of, because someone’s intentions may have been good. It is not only impossible to ever know someone’s true intentions (as Ibn Taymiyyah claims to know), but completely irrelevant to the discussion of deciding on whether actions people committed were just, as it is the practice to judge such things based on the external actions of people. Umar eloquently summarized the Islamic opinion of judging based on intention and public action: “People were (sometimes) judged by the revealing of a Divine Inspiration during the lifetime of Allah’s Apostle but now there is no longer any more (new revelation). Now we judge you by the deeds you practice publicly, so we will trust and favor the one who does good deeds in front of us, and we will not call him to account about what he is really doing in secret, for Allah will judge him for that; but we will not trust or believe the one who presents to us with an evil deed even if he claims that his intentions were good.’” 546

It is no small irony that Umar is greatly revered by the Sunni scholars, yet they fail to use his criterion for justice when it comes to letting Mu’awiyah off the hook. Even in today’s society, such vindication of treason based on perceived good intention of the offender of treason. Of significance is the fact that there is no evidence that shows that Mu’awiyah declared his intention. Fighting the Caliph is a serious offence and of great historical significance—even akin to Iblis’s (Satan) notorious refusal to bow to Adam. No one disputes the legitimacy of Ali’ Caliphate much like no one disputes Adam’s honor in front of Iblis. Yet, the same group that vilifies Iblis (rightfully so) comes up with justification of Mu’awiyah’s actions. Another important point to realize is the fact that Mu’awiyah did not consider Ali to be a legitimate caliph at all. As discussed above, it was not that Mu’awiyah gave his pledge of allegiance and then disobeyed Ali, but that he disobeyed God’s order to obey Ali in the first place, as we have established that God’s only legitimate sovereign authority that all Muslims are required to submit to is the legitimate Caliph of Islam that was Ali at the time. Therefore, we can say that Mu’awiyah did not only disobey the orders of the Imam, who is mandated by God himself,547 but he refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of God on earth, the sovereignty of the legitimate Caliph, who is legitimate by Islamic, Sunni, and Shi’a standards. The Prophet stated in a Hadith reported in Muslim548 that: “…One who withdraws his band from obedience (to the Amir) will find no argument (in his defence) when he stands before Allah on the Day of Judgment, and one who dies without having bound himself by an oath of allegiance (to an Amir) will die the death of one belonging to the days of Jahillyya [pre-Islamic era].”

546

Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 3, Book 48, Hadith 809. Because God has objective and not subjective authority over the world, Mu’awiyah was still disobeying God and his Imam, even though he did not recognize him. 548 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 20, Hadith 4562, Arabic. 547

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In the Islamic doctrine, it is strongly stressed, by both the Qur’an and the Prophet, that it is an absolute requirement to pledge allegiance to, and obey, the Caliph; Mu’awiyah has done none of them. Though this additional point is closely related to the first two, it is important to see that Mu’awiyah committed treason against the Caliphate (and therefore, God) by refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of Ali. Mu’awiyah was faithful and loyal to the Caliphate, as an entity, when Uthman was in power; however, when this power of the same legitimate Caliphate was transferred to Ali, Mu’awiyah revoked his previous allegiance to the Islamic state. The act of treason stipulates that the person committing the action was previously associated to state. Though there is no definite example of non-apostatic treason in the Prophet’s time, during the Riddah wars, there were groups of Muslims, who asserted and claimed to be Muslims, and had simply revoked allegiance to the Islamic state, thereby withdrawing paying the compulsory charity (Zakah). Abu Bakr, the Caliph of the time, declared open war on them, even if it was such that he would fight “…if they even refuse to give me a tying rope which they use to give to Allah’s Messenger.”549 Similarly, the act of Mu’awiyah of revoking total and complete allegiance to the state can be considered an act of treason, indeed, high treason. Regarding the regulations of the jus ad bellum of Islamic law, we see how Ali was completely justified in putting himself at a state of war with Mu’awiyah.550 As discussed above, Mu’awiyah was accepting pledges of allegiance and recognition as Caliph while Ali was still alive. There is, in fact, a very specific Islamic ruling that prohibits the Muslims from forming a law on its own. This law is found in the Hadith, where Prophet Muhammad stated that “[w]hen oath of allegiance has been taken for two caliphs, kill the one for whom the oath was taken later.”551 Mu’awiyah violated a very fundamental and explicit law found in the Sunnah; according to the historical analysis and this tradition, Mu’awiyah, under the canons of Islamic law, was deserving of capital punishment. Another issue pertains to the actions Mu’awiyah committed after declaring himself caliph. Though we know that the caliphate truly ended with Mu’awiyah or, more accurately, Mu’awiyah ended the caliphate; it is worth noting that Mu’awiyah started the beginning of royal, monarchical authority, thereby, transforming the pure, divinely appointed Caliphate into an illegitimate governing Islamic system. A Hadith, with surprising overtness, discusses the issue of exactly when the Caliphate would end. This Hadith was the one that some companions of the prophets used to establish their stance on the civil war controversy. The Hadith itself states that the Prophet said the following: “The caliphate of Prophecy will last thirty years; then Allah will give the Kingdom to whom he wishes; or his kingdom to whom he wishes.” 552

Tirmidhi’s narration reportedly shows how two companions of the Prophet; Safīnah and Sa’īd bin Jumhan, were debating on whether a the Umayyads were speaking the truth in 549

Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari,: Vol. 9, Book 92, Hadith 388. That is, if Mu’awiyah did not explicitly, militarily do so first, though there is indication that he did. Either way, ‘Ali’s actions are justified and are within the bounds of the previously explained, established, jus ad bellum of the Islamic state. 551 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim,: Book 20, Hadith 4568. 552 Abu Dawood al-Sijsitānī, Sunan Abi Dawood,, Book 41, Hadith 4630. 550

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claiming that Mu’awiyah was a legitimate Caliph of Islam553 (as the others). Safīnah told Sa’īd the hadith and they then calculated the number of years the caliphate lasted as of that time. They found that the end of ‘Ali’s caliphate exactly added up to those thirty years, whereupon Safīnah explained,554 “[the] Banu Az-Zarqa’ [Umayyads] lie, rather they are a monarchy, among the worst of monarchies.” There is another report of a similar event where Safīnah narrated the same prophetic Hadith, the two calculated the number of years, coming to the same conclusion.555 Not only is there prophetic evidence that supposes that the Caliphate will end after 30 years, but that there were Companions of the Prophet who used this evidence to comprehend the crisis of faith of the time. A deplorable action of Mu’awiyah, proving the fact that the Caliphate was turned into an absolute monarchical regime—besides the fact that Mu’awiyah committed treason and unjustly usurped power—is his selection of his son as Caliph. According to Tabari, who cited Ibn Sa’d al-Waqīdī556, appointed his son Yazid near his death. Ibn Kathīr states that Mu’awiyah imposed that the allegiance be given to Yazid, whereas several people, such as Abdul Rahman bin Abu Bakr, Abdullah ibn Abbas, Husayn ibn Ali, Abdullah ibn Zubayr refused to pledge allegiance.557 So what we are seeing is someone who not only dismantled the Caliphate, but also assured that any recourse of the Ummah to reunite and re-impose a righteous Caliphate again be obfuscated. Following his rule and creation of dynasty, a continuity of unjust, un-Islamic rule took hold that runs until present day. As we know, the selection of Caliph (or even Imam) has to be the most righteous of the entire Ummah. Unless we are saying that Mu’awiyah truly thought Yazid was the most righteous of all in the entire Ummah, even with many of the divinely-appointed Companions still being alive! Mu’awiyah’s appointment was not in the interest of Islam, but only in favor of consolidation of the power of Bani Umayya over the population (as we know his movement had a very tribal connotation attitude to it). Regarding precedent of appointment of children to the Caliphate, Seyhun tells us that ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab “specifically told the elective council of his companions not to appoint his son Abdullah,”558 a restatement of the fact that the Rashidun Caliphate was not hereditary. He also states that Yazid was appointed for the sake of the unity of the Ummah and prevention of civil strife, this also goes contrary to the criteria for the election of the Caliph. The fact that the prophet predicted the transference of his Caliphate into a monarchy supports this notion. Now comes to the most important of the topics; Mu’awiyah’s war. Mu’awiyah, during his time in his self-proclaimed Caliphate, greatly expanded the Umayyad empire. We will not examine his engagements in detail, as they—unless as a result of bad intention (which we cannot prove)—do not explicitly go against the Islamic jus ad bellum. much of his personal mandated expansion; northern Africa fighting the Byzantine-allied Berber forced, the Byzantines themselves in/near Anatolia, and expansion and war with kingdoms/groups in and 553

More specifically, their claim that the Caliphate “is among them”; this could mean permanently amongst them, or just regarding Mu’awiyah. 554 Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi,, Vol. 4, Book 7, Hadith 2226. 555 Abu Dawood al-Sijsitānī, Sunan Abi Dawood,, Book 41, Hadith 4629. 556 Muhammad ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: 40 Volumes, vol. 18, para. 196. 557 Ismāʻīl Ibn Kathīr, Caliphate of Banu Umayyah From Al-Bidayah Wan-Nihayah Ibn Kathir (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2012), 82. 558 A Hadith supports his claim: Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 5, Book 57, Hadith 50.

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around Khorasān, seemed to be very much a continuation of the wars already waged by the rightly-guided caliphs. However, there is one, very important, and very large difference between Mu’awiyah and the successors from an Islamic just-war perspective. This difference it fundamental and decides—as per the divine law—the difference between right and wrong: legitimacy. One must realize, since the beginning of his war with ‘Ali, Mu’awiyah’s assent to power was illegitimate and based on treason and unjust war against the Caliphate. For the sole reason of Mu’awiyah’s caliphate not being a legitimate (and therefore God-Sanctioned) ruler, none of his actions of governance or attempted governance can be seen as legitimate; this, of course, includes war. Let me draw analogy to a police officer in a modern liberal democracy. The police officer is given authority, legitimate authority, by the state, delegated directly to the officer; namely, the authority to do the job and acts associated with policing. When somebody other than the legitimately-delegated police officer decides to dismantle the policing system in place and impose one’s own rule as a sole policing fire; though the actions during this usurper’s policing may be in accordance to the law, the fact that the usurper was not given delegation by the law (the ultimate authority) and took to power through illegitimate and unlawful means, this new policing organization’s actions cannot be legitimate. Mu’awiyah, because he was not given the authority to overthrow ‘Ali’s rule, establish his own rule, and rule according to Islamic law, the process of the delegation of authority is broken, and therefore, every action of governance that Mu’awiyah has done is considered an unlawful act of governance. By understanding this, we can see that ever since the Umayyads starting with Mu’awiyah, it is completely out of the question whether or not any of their acts followed the Islamic just war criteria. Finally getting to the point, this chapter’s purpose is to state that a) any group of people that is not given legitimate authority by God and declares war, it is considered an unjust war, and b) starting from Mu’awiyah through the Umayyads, and onward, none of their declarations of war can be considered as representing Islam, and certainly do not represent Islam, whether they obeyed the Islamic/Qur’anic criteria for war or not. According to Islam, all war is unjust and unlawful unless it is directly and explicitly mandated by God. When comparing groups like ISIS and so on to the true Islamic criteria, no precedent of war, from Mu’awiyah onward, may be considered as precedent or for interpretation of the Qur’an. This implicates that anybody who compares a group to Islam using Umayyad history, can be considered invalid, as all war of the Umayyads and nondelegated Islamic authorities are outside the fold of Islam, and can be used as examples unjust, rather than just war. The implications of the above discussion are enormous: Because the Umayyad Empire is not a Caliphate, Mu’awiyah, his son, and the successors of the Umayyad ‘Caliphate’ bear absolutely no weight on any legal formation of Islamic law. This includes some of the possible effect that it would have on Islamic international foreign policy. As we will se in the next chapter, there are several scholars who explain to us what exactly Islam is (and define what the nature of Islam is) from the historical narrative, viz., supportive of the notions that Islam transformed through time and that Islam itself is defined through historical events and the coming and going of governments. This chapter concludes that the Islamic narrative; the case law that can be used to interpret the Qur’anic criteria, come to a rough stop at the point of al-Hasan’s abdication.

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6.2. THE SECOND CIVIL WAR: ISLAM’S TRUE FACE OF REBELLION There is some contention regarding the issue of rebellion, revolving around the historic question of what constitutes the right to rebel in Islam. Since the time of Yazid, Mu’awiyah’s son and successor to the Umayyad Empire, the issue of legitimacy and rebellion have been problematic, though surprisingly, none of the hard-core Sunni literature question Mu’awiyah’s right to rebel. In the time of Abu Bakr, the Ridda wars were fought against people that committed treason, not a rebellion against Abu Bakr for being an illegitimate caliph. It was only in the time of Ali and later during Yazid’s rule where we observe two rebellions,559 the first and second fitnas. The first fitna has already been discussed, we found that it was an unlawful rebellion, because ‘Ali, who was a legitimate Caliph (by Sunni, Shia, and truly scientific means), was repelled against for not killing the alleged killer of ‘Uthman, Abu Bakr’s son Abdul Rahman. We can and will not judge the validity of the rebellion until the end of the section, for now it is just important to review the facts behind the first fitnah. The second fitnah, however, was a very different issue. It was led by the companion of the Prophet, Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr (the ‘great’ Zubayr’s son), who took up an armed struggle against the Umayyad regime after the death of Husayn. The difference between Husayn’s rebellion and that of Ibn Zubayr is that the latter declared himself to be caliph, while Husayn had not yet come to that position at the time of his killing. We will briefly discuss Husayn’s attempted rebellion before getting to Abdullah Ibn Zubayr’s. Even though Hasan abdicated to Mu’wayiah, it is reasonable to assume that Hasan expected the Caliphate to return to its original form. We understand that Husayn “submitted to the fait accompli,” perhaps in agreement with Hasan’s opinion of keeping the peace. However, one must ask, what triggered Husayn’s revolt after Yazid’s appointment? There are only two logical explanations, which are not mutually exclusive; a) he was waiting for Mu’awiyah to finish his time so that he/his group (the righteous group) may grasp the momentum and declare the caliphate in order to restore the true Caliphate, and b) he was ready to react to an injustice done to the office of the Caliph, i.e., he would only revolt if the new Caliph did not or was expected not to restore the Caliphate. Another explanation usually offered is that Husayn was opposed to the appointment of Yazid. However, knowing Husayn, it seems more likely that Husayn was concerned about the fate of the Ummah and the Caliphate rather than a smaller technicality within the Umayyad’s decision to rule over the others. Though there may have been reasons as to why Husayn would have the desire to revolt against the Umayyads in the first place (i.e., illegitimate takeover by Mu’awiyah), the causus belli for Husayn’s movement was due to his receipt of several letters from people in Iraq looking to make him Caliph. Before Husayn migrated, finding out about the disturbances in Iraq, Yazid replaced the governor with Ibn Ziyād, who “took energetic measures which terrified Ḥusayn’s sympathizers.” Husayn unknowingly left for Kufa. Despite receiving advice from many on the road and in Mecca that Husayn should abandon his claim to Caliphate, he was determined to fulfill his goal and start a rebellion against the Umayyads. ‘Ubayd Allah bin Ziyad gathered his army to block Husayn. When the command came to do so, he was camped in the area of Karbala with his some 70 supporters. 4,000 men from Kufa 559

For our purposes, a “rebellion” constituted overthrowing/revolting against the state for the purpose of reestablishing “true” Islam (of course this being by perception of the rebel).

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had arrived to support the blockade. However, the original blockade and warnings by Umayyad officials on the road turned into a point where the goal was to kill Husayn and his supporters, unless they pledged allegiance to Yazid. Of course, Husayn refused and intended to return to Mecca. Water being blocked, he wanted to go to the River Euphrates. On his way, he was caught up and in no position to fight. He was hit on the head and he fell to the ground injured, and died. This is a summary of the account in Tabari’s Tarikh.560 The leader of the ‘second’561 part of the second fitnah was Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr, a companion of the Prophet and narrator of hundreds of Hadith of the Prophet, the first baby to be born in Madinah amongst the migrants from Mecca.562 Ibn Zubayr grew up to be a knowledgeable and devout Muslim, and well-versed in the Qur’an.563 He was the nepher of the Prophet’s most beloved wife, Aisha, and the son of one of the 10 companions said to be entering paradise; Al-Zubayr. After Husayn was killed, Ibn Zubayr heard of the news, he exclaimed:564 “O people! No other people are worse than Iraqis and among the Iraqis, the people of Kufa are the worst. They repeatedly wrote letters and called Imam Husayn to them and took bay’at (allegiance) for his caliphate. But when Ibn Zeyad arrived in Kufa, they rallied around him and martyr Imam Husayn who was pious, observed the fast, read the Qur’an and deserved the caliphate in all respects.”

At this point, the Meccans under the leadership of Ibn Zubayr overthrew the young and inexperienced governor of Mecca appointed by Yazid. The people of Makkah then came to him asking that he be the caliph. This seemed to be the best choice for the Meccan looking for a new leader, after Husayn had died. He declared his caliphate in Mecca.565 Yazid and the Umayyads were able to take Madinah in the battle of al-Harra,566 however were not yet ready to face Ibn Zubayr in Mecca. It is noted that in the al-Harrah battle, a large number of companions of the Prophet were killed. It was reported that all companions belonging to the time of the Hudaybiyyah treaty (conquest of Mecca) were killed off during this battle.567 The event was seen as a horrific battle, or a “cause celebre” to people onwards.568 After taking Madinah, they went through a long and bloody parade of bloodshed, rape, and houseinvasion. The point here is not to identify all of the war crimes committed by Yazid’s forces but to understand that the Umayyads were not abiding by Islamic rules of jus in bello, and their causus belli was unjustified. Chenarani had done exhaustive work regarding the details and nitty-gritty of the battle, quotations, and so on. His description of the army under Yazid can be best summarized as such:

560

L. Veccia Vaglier, “(al-) Husayn b. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, eds. P. Bearman et al. (Brill Online 2016). 561 We can consider Ibn Zubayr’s revolt to be a follow-up to Hussain’s attempted revolt. 562 Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 5, Book 58, Hadith 249. 563 Based Ibn Abi Mulaika’s testimony: Ibid, Vol. 6, Book 60, Hadith 187. 564 Akbar Shah Najeebabadi, The History of Islam: Volume Two (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2001), 81. 565 Ibid, 82. 566 Ibid, 86. 567 Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 5, Book 59, Hadith 358. 568 Jacob Lassner, Islamic Revolution and Historical Memory: An Inquiry Into the Art of Abbāsid Apologetics (Ann Arbor: American Oriental Society, 1986), 51-52.

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“As Yazīd b. Mu‘āwiyah had advised, Muslim b. ‘Uqba ordered the Syrian army after conquering Medina: ‘Your hands are open! Do whatever you wish! Plunder Medina for three days.’ This way, the city of Medina was allowed as permissible to the Syrian troops to exploit and plunder in whatever way they wished, leaving no man or woman on their way secure from their carnage, killing the people, and pillaging their properties. More grievous than the Syrian’s plundering and slaying the people of Medina and the remaining generation of the companions of Prophet (s) as well as the Muhājirin and Ansār, was the rash and avaricious Syrians troops’ assault upon the chastity of the women of Medina!”569

Tabari gives an account mentioning the “three days,” but was much less descriptive: “Muslim gave up Madinah to pillage for three days, they killed people and seized goods. That frightened the Companions of the Prophet who were there.”570 Yazid had died unexpectedly in 683 CE, and his successor and son Mu’awiyah II had died shortly after. After Yazid’s death, Ibn Zubayr gained recognition from across Muslim territory, with the exception for the typically Umayyad-loyal areas in Syria.571 Ibn Zubayr was then able to retake al-Madinah and expel the young and inexperienced governor, Muslim bin ‘Uqbah, and consolidated his control and recognition in ‘Iraq and expelled Ibn Ziyād from his governance rule in Basra572. However, when Abd al-Malik took office, he was able to gather the support to fight Ibn Zubayr.573 He retook Iraq, and eventually advanced toward Ibn Zubayr’s stronghold in Mecca574 where a siege would take place. He had appointed the notorious al-Hajjaj bin Yusuf in to deliver the final blow to Ibn Zubayr. 575 During this siege, it is noted that the catapults of al-Hajjaj have been reported to even hit the holy Ka’bah, partially destroying it, whereupon history states that thunder and lightening commenced.576 After several months, al-Hajjaj offered security to those who defected; several did, including two of Ibn Zubayr’s sons. Hajjaj ordered his men to advance and deliver the last blow. Ibn Zubayr, knowing of his upcoming death, delivered farewell to his mother. During the final battle, he and his his few men were finally overpowered, and Ibn Zubayr was martyred. The demise of Ibn Zubayr has uncanny similarity to the glorious and emotional fate of Husayn and his family. It is reported that al-Hajjaj hung his body on a scaffold – an act strictly forbidden in Islam – before and eventually burying him.577 Much of the above narrative is captured by Tabari.578

569

Muhammad Ali Chenarani, The Battle of Harrah: A historic account of the invasion and horrific plunder of the Holy City of Medina by the army of Yazīd b. Mu’āwiyah (Mashad: Astan Quds Razavi), 33. 570 Muhammad ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: 40 Volumes, Vol. 19, para. 418. 571 Karen Armstrong, Islam: a short history (New York City: Modern Library, 2002), 44. 572 Najeebabadi, The History of Islam: Volume Two, 97. 573 Karen Armstrong, Islam: a short history, 44. 574 Najeebabadi, The History of Islam: Volume Two, 136. 575 Ibid, 137. 576 The events of ‘Abd al-Malik’s Caliphate leading up to Ibn Zubayr’s death are scribed in: Abu al-Hasan alMas’udi, Prairies d’or (Paris: Societe Asiatique, 1861-77), Vol. 5, 209-261; Ibid, 139. 577 Explained in Najeebabadi, The History of Islam: Volume Two, 140-143. 578 Muhammad ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari: 40 Volumes, Vol. 21, para. 844-852. Though Najeebabani does not give reference, it seems much of the material if found in this reference of Tabari.

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This rebellion, though not the most well-known (that would be Husayn’s), it is the most successful and politically impactful Islamic rebellion against the Umayyad regime, considering that it lasted for a whopping twelve years. If we assume that the reason or the rebellion was to restore the true caliphate; the non-monarchical, non-corrupt Rashidun Caliphate,579 we can look at this rebellion, as well as Husayn’s rebellion, against the backdrop of the Islamic criteria of when one can rebel against a proclaimed “Islamic” establishment. We have to realize that the second fitnah, in the eyes of Islamic law, is not a case of a failed rebellion against a legitimately selected caliph, but a rebellion countering the unjust usurpation and establishment of power over the Ummah. As we have already established that Mu’awiyah and his successors all headed unlawful, non-Islamic governments; the fact of the matter is that there was no Caliph to rebel against, much more a self-proclaimed, illegitimate caliph. How do we know whether a caliph is legitimate or not? The difference between perhaps an ideal democracy, as those portrayed by the US government580 or by John Locke, and the Islamic criteria, is that there is a definite, frozen, established criteria to determine whether or not a political regime is worthy to rule. Having established the illegitimacy of the offices of Mu’awiyah’s, Yazid’s, Marwan’s, And al-Malik’s, and others’ offices as not being legitimate, it becomes clear that it was a collective responsibility of the Ummah to restore the Caliphate, hence Husayn was justified in attempting to revolt against the Umayyads empire and declare the Caliphate. Because there is no formal selection process to elect the real Caliph once a fake Caliph has taken over, the onus is upon the left-over of the Ummah to decide and nominate the Caliph. In Husayn’s case, it was only him and his supporters who were aware of the fact that the Caliph was illegitimate and that the Ummah needed a true one. This led to the Ummah to elect Husayn as the legitimate Caliph. Ibn Zubayr did nothing different from Husayn. He was elected, as Husayn was, through the consent of what was remaining of the Ummah (perhaps just the people in Mecca). They, as they did with Husayn, elected Ibn Zubayr to be the caliph: the difference between the latter and the former is that Ibn Zubayr was actually able to declare his Caliphate. Hence, we can conclude that in the case of the second fitnah, and more generally, in the case of there being a power vacuum in the Ummah, it is up to the remaining portion of the Ummah to elect the Caliph and topple the ‘fake’ Caliph. Note that such a precedent could not have existed with the Rashidun Caliphate or, of course, the Prophet Muhammad himself. In the next section, the issue of “not challenging the authority” will be brought up, and this will be used as a tool to deconstruct a number of Sunni, pro-Umayyad establishment rhetoric. Though we have solved the question on how the Ummah is to deal with a clear, obvious usurpation of power, in which several explicit laws were openly broken, we did not solve the issue of when it is okay to topple a righteous Caliph. Perhaps the closest thing we can get to a statement regarding the ‘infallibility’ of a Caliph is in Abu Bakr’s inauguration speech, where he stated: “if I do wrong, then correct me.” The next section examines when rebellion and civil strife is permitted to be initiated by a group of people.

579 580

Karen Armstrong, Islam: a short history, 44. The American standard is provided in the declaration of independence: National Archives. http://www.archives. gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html. It states: “But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government…”

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6.4. ISLAMIC STANCE ON REBELLION: THE QUR’AN AND SUNNAH It has been proposed by several Sunni scholars (classical and modern) that rebellion is almost never permitted, giving some sort of fatalistic notion to how one is to obey the leader and surrender to the establishment blindly without ever questioning the authority. This is the exact line of talk we hear, indeed, a nearly 2000-year-old one, finding its humble origins in the Roman Catholic Church. As discussed in earlier chapters, the regurgitated form of dogma has been the only modus operandi in post Rashidun Caliphate world. Indeed, even in the 21st century, we have news of scandals arising from the church coming from the questioning of the supreme authority of the Papacay on religious matters.581 In the 17th century, we can find the same thing happening; episodes of controversy and debate over the Pope’s authority to rule on certain issues—in the case of that time, the discussion over the theological debate on the topic of the status of nature versus grace.582 Islam et al. find that the same, historical, ancient Roman tradition of memorization, coupled with the unlimited Christian Papal authority, has solid foundations in our current education system.583 I propose that this was exactly the case that Islam: since the beginning of the Umayyad rule, through the Abbasid period of theological debates and scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah, all the way to the current day, no “true” Muslim (i.e., non-Shi’a according to the Sunnis) has challenged these pseudoPopes’ legitimacy to rule in contrary to explicit commands and prohibitions in the Qur’an and Sunnah. With the Umayyad rulers, we saw the flourishing of theological debate, which continued throughout the Abbasid debate; debates on the nature of God, Predestination, the Qur’an, and so on. Islam et al. state: “The original Mu’tazilite movement was a backlash to political tyranny that had been initiated by Umayya, who declared himself the Caliph in breach of Islamic principles already outlined decades earlier by the Prophet Muhammad and the ‘rightyguided’ Caliphs that followed his line… While questioning politics was forbidden, people continued doing research as mandated by the Prophet Muhammad. The Ruling class started to oppose certain groups that were perceived as creating public opinion against the ruling group, while promoting a group whose conclusion was favourable. One group, known as Jabria, promoted the notion that the universal order (qadr), could not be changed (correct premise), therefore “a man is not responsible for his actions, because all actions proceed from God” (incorrect inference). This was a convenient conclusion, because the Umayyad Caliphate was in need of a theory of Predestination or fatalism. This school of thought was propped up by the Umayyad dynasty.” 584

Historical evidence of this event started before the later period of the Umayyad dynasty (8th century) when the Mu’tazilite period started, but even before that, being propped-up by Mu’awiyah. Donner states, regarding the Umayyad period, that

581

Daily Mail, 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3168531/Senior-cardinal-breaks-ranks-questioningPope-s-authority-pronounce-climate-change.html. 582 James Corkery and Thomas Worcester, The Papacy Since 1500: From Italian Prince to Universal Pastor (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), 91-92. 583 M.R. Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 456. 584 Ibid, 336.

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Jaan S. Islam “[d]ocumentary and literary evidence suggests that during the Umayyad period, institutions and practices central to the operation of the state were renamed using terms from the Qur’an. The goal of this process was to legitimate the Umayyad state and government by linking them with the divine revelation and the person of the Prophet Muhammad.”585

Though this may be the case for re-naming terms, it does not seem to have stopped early ‘followers’ to fabricate Hadiths in favor of the pro-Umayyad ideology of political fatalism. The hadiths that follow serve as evidence of this severely uncomforting and eye-opining reality of the manipulation of history since the early Umayyad period. The first hadith is a narration of the same event that comes into direct, mutually exclusive conflict with two other reports of the same event that have a different outcome, indicating to us that it must have been fabricated. The great Hadith compilers did not consider potential pro-Umayyads as suspicious narrators, so it is entirely possible that anybody along the chain could have been such. The reasons I conclude that it must have been fabricated, based on the following facts; a) it is not possible that the first hadith is correct and the other two (the follow) are incorrect, despite coming from different narrators, b) the same event was being narrated, it was mutually exclusive, and c) it is most likely to benefit the Umayyads in power: “It his been narrated through a different chain of transmitters, on the authority of Hudhaifa b. al-Yaman who said: Messenger of Allah, no doubt, we had an evil time (i. e. the days of Jahiliyya or ignorance) and God brought us a good time (i. e. Islamic period) through which we are now living Will there be a bad time after this good time? He (the Holy Prophet) said: Yes. I said: Will there be a good time after this bad time? He said: Yes. I said: Will there be a bad time after good time? He said: Yes. I said: How? Whereupon he said: There will be leaders who will not be led by my guidance and who will not adopt my ways? There will be among them men who will have the hearts of devils in the bodies of human beings. I said: What should I do. Messenger of Allah, if I (happen) to live in that time? He replied: You will listen to the Amir and carry out his orders; even if your back is flogged and your wealth is snatched, you should listen and obey.”586

The other Hadiths that report the same event contrary to the previous follows: “It has been narrated on the authority of Hudhaifa b. al-Yaman who said: People used to ask the Messenger of Allah about the good times, but I used to ask him about bad times fearing lest they overtake me. I said: Messenger of Allah, we were in the midst of ignorance and evil, and then God brought us this good (time through Islam). Is there any bad time after this good one? He said: Yes. I asked: Will there be a good time again after that bad time? He said: Yes, but therein will be a hidden evil. I asked: What will be the evil hidden therein? He said: (That time will witness the rise of) the people who will adopt ways other than mine and seek guidance other than mine. You will know 585 586

Fred M. Donner, "Qur’ânicization of Religio-Political Discourse in the Umayyad Period," Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée 129 (2011): 79. The chain is as follows: Muhammad bin Sahl bin ‘Askari al-Tamimi, Yahya bin Hassaan, And Allah bin Abd al Rahman al-Darimi, Yahya ibn Hassaan, Mu’awiyah ibn Sallam, Zayd bin Sallaam, Abu Sallaam, Hudhayfa bin al-Yaman. Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj. Sahih Muslim, Book 20, Hadith 4554.

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good points as well as bad points. I asked: Will there be a bad time after this good one? He said: Yes. (A time will come) when there will be people standing and inviting at the gates of Hell. Whoso responds to their call they will throw them into the fire. I said: Messenger of Allah, describe them for us. He said: All right. They will be a people having the same complexion as ours and speaking our language. I said: Messenger of Allah, what do you suggest if I happen to live in that time? He said: You should stick to the main body of the Muslims and their leader. I said: If they have no (such thing as the) main body and have no leader? He said: Separate yourself from all these factions, though you may have to eat the roots of trees (in a jungle) until death comes to you and you are in this state.”587 “Narrated Hudhaifa bin Al-Yaman: The people used to ask Allah’s Messenger about good, but I used to ask him about evil for fear that it might overtake me. Once I said, “O Allah’s Messenger! We were in ignorance and in evil and Allah has bestowed upon us the present good; will there by any evil after this good?” He said, “Yes.” I asked, “Will there be good after that evil?” He said, “Yes, but it would be tainted with Dakhan (i.e., Little evil).” I asked, “What will its Dakhan be?” He said, “There will be some people who will lead (people) according to principles other than my tradition. You will see their actions and disapprove of them.” I said, “Will there by any evil after that good?” He said, “Yes, there will be some people who will invite others to the doors of Hell, and whoever accepts their invitation to it will be thrown in it (by them).” I said, “O Allah’s Messenger! Describe those people to us.” He said, “They will belong to us and speak our language” I asked, “What do you order me to do if such a thing should take place in my life?” He said, “Adhere to the group of Muslims and their Chief.” I asked, “If there is neither a group (of Muslims) nor a chief (what shall I do)?” He said, “Keep away from all those different sects, even if you had to bite (i.e., eat) the root of a tree, till you meet Allah while you are still in that state.”” 588

Bukhari narrates the same Hadith twice, under the topic: “if there is no righteous group of Muslims,”589 as well as the same Hadith from a different narrator going through the same chain of reporters.590 Both of the Hadiths stipulate that Hudayfa was told to do two contradictory actions regarding the same event. Hence, due to the fact that the two lattermost Hadiths have more historical validity, we will accept the second version of the narration of the event—let us keep this in mind for now. There are also several narrations that pertain to the issue of overthrowing vs. obeying the ‘ruler’ in charge. Note that because the Qur’an is silent on the issue of overthrowing a Caliph, the amendment made to the requirement of obeying the leader must be made by the prophet, which still requires a second axis, that being the historical events in the early Islamic period. A Caliph must be the pivotal point of the cognition axis, because the Qur’an does not ‘exist’ in pertinence to this issue. Figure 6.1 makes this point. 587

Muhammad bin al-Muthnaa, Walid bin Muslim, Abdul Rahman bin Yazid bin Jabir, Busr bin ‘Ubayd Allah alHadrami, Abu Idrees al-Khowlani, Hudhayfa bin al-Yaman. Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj. Sahih Muslim, Book 20, Hadith 4553. 588 Ibid. 589 Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 88, Hadith 206. 590 See Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari,, Vol. 4, Book 56, Hadith 803.

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Figure 6.1. In absence of Qur’anic ruling, Hadith should form the origin and Rashidun Caliphate should form the pivotal point in order to complete Islamic cognition.

The following are a few necessary parts of several authentic narrations from the Hadith. Note that they only pertain to an un-appointed leader, i.e., the Caliph, not governors which have a separate ruling.591 See the footnotes for important comments: a) “It has been narrated on the authority of ‘Auf b. Malik that the Messenger of Allah said: The best of your rulers are those whom you love and who love you, who invoke God’s blessings upon you and you invoke His blessings upon them. And the worst of your rulers are those whom you hate and who hate you and whom you curse [detest] and who curse [detest] you. It was asked (by those present): Shouldn’t we overthrow them with the help of the sword? He said: No, as long as they establish prayer among you. If you then find anything detestable in them. You should hate their administration, but do not withdraw yourselves from their obedience.”592 b) “It has been narrated on the authority of Abu Huraira that the Messenger of Allah said: ‘One who defected from obedience (to the Amir) and separated from the main body of the Muslims - if he died in that state-would die the death of one belonging to the days of Jahiliyya [i.e., non-Muslim]. One who fights under the banner of a people who are blind [to the cause for which they are fighting, i.e., do not know whether their cause is just or otherwise], who gets flared up with family pride, calls [people] to fight for their family honor, and supports his kith and kin [i.e., fights not for the cause of Allah but for the sake of this family or tribe] - if he is killed [in this fight], he dies as one belonging to the days of Jahiliyya. Whoso attacks my Ummah [indiscriminately] killing the righteous and the wicked of them, sparing not [even] those staunch in faith and fulfilling not his promise made with those who have been given a pledge of security - he has nothing to do with me and I have nothing to do with him.’”593 c) “Narrated Ibn `Umar: The ‘Prophet said, ‘It is obligatory for one to listen to and obey (the ruler’s orders) unless these orders involve one disobedience (to Allah); but if an

591

Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 20, Hadith 4570 states that as long as appointed governors pray, their governors should not be challenged. Here, the word for prayer is “‫صلَّوْ ا‬ َ ” referring to literally praying, rather than the broader meaning the other term has. 592 Note that the translation states “curse”; curse has a specific and extreme meaning in Islam and has a larger impact, considered to be a sin altogether. The true translation of the verb “‫ ”يبغض‬means ‘hate’ or ‘detest’ or ‘disgust,’ see: Rohi Baalbaki, Al-Mawrid, 243; Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 20, Hadith 4573. 593 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 20, Hadith 4555.

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act of disobedience (to Allah) is imposed, he should not listen to or obey it.’”594 Book 20, Hadith 4533 Sahih Muslim states “he should listen and obey him whether he likes it or not, except that he is ordered to do a sinful thing.” d) “Narrated Junada bin Abi Umaiya: We entered upon ‘Ubada bin As-Samit while he was sick. We said…Will you tell us a Hadith you heard from the Prophet and by which Allah may make you benefit?’ He said, ‘The Prophet called us and we gave him the Pledge of allegiance for Islam, and among the conditions on which he took the Pledge from us, was that we were to listen and obey (the orders) both at the time when we were active and at the time when we were tired, and at our difficult time and at our ease and to be obedient to the ruler and give him his right even if he did not give us our right, and not to fight against him unless we noticed him having open Kufr (disbelief) for which we would have a proof with us from Allah.’”595 e) In Abu Bakr’s inauguration speech, he stated “ If I do well, help me; and if I do wrong, set me right.” f) ‘Umar was wearing two garments and delivering a sermon to the Muslims in which he commanded listening and obeying. One of the Muslims defied and remarked, “No listening, and no obedience, because you own two pieces of clothing, while we have only one.” ‘Umar shouted in a loud voice, “O ‘Abduallah bin ‘Umar!” So his son responded to him “Here I am father.” He said, “I beseech you by Allah, is not one of these garments one that you have given me?” He said, “Yes by Allah!” So the Man reciprocated, “Now, we can listen and can obey you, O ‘Umar.” g) Narrated Abu Huraira: When Allah’s Messenger died and Abu Bakr became the caliph some Arabs aspostated (Abu Bakr decided to declare war against them). ‘Umar said to Abu Bakr, “How can you fight with these people although Allah’s Messenger said, ‘I have been ordered (by Allah) to fight the people till they say: “None has the right to be worshipped but Allah, and whoever said it then he will save his life and property from me except on trespassing the law (rights and conditions for which he will be punished justly), and his accounts will be with Allah.’” Abu Bakr said, “By Allah! I will fight those who differentiate between the prayer and the Zakah, as Zakah is the compulsory right to be taken from the property (according to Allah’s orders) By Allah! If they refuse to pay me even a she-kid, which they used to pay at the time of Allah’s Messenger. I would fight with them for withholding it” Then ‘Umar said, “By Allah, it was nothing, but Allah opened Abu Bakr’s chest towards the decision (to fight) and I came to know that his decision was right.”596 From these key Hadiths and narrations, we can form a clear and explicit criteria on when it is allowed and required to fight against the legitimately-elected caliph, and what to do in situations, in which the criteria for overthrowing are not met. Figure 6.2 is a flowchart that 594 595

Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 4, Book 52, Hadith 203. In Arabic, it states: “ ‫ َما‬،ٌّ‫س ْم ُع َوالطَّا َعةُ َحق‬ َّ ‫ال‬ َ‫ْصيَ ٍة فَالَ َس ْم َع َوالَ طَا َعة‬ ِ ‫ فَإِ َذا أُ ِم َر بِ َمع‬،‫ْصيَ ِة‬ ِ ‫ ”لَ ْم ي ُْؤ َمرْ بِ ْال َمع‬Disobedience, “‫ْصيَ ٍة‬ ِ ‫ ” َمع‬means sin, i.e., disobedience against God. Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 88, Hadith 178. The Qur’an has several references to Kufr, amongst them includes believing in part of the Qur’an and disbelieving in the other: 2:85 in the Qur’an states: “…So do you believe in part of the Scripture and disbelieve in part? Then what is the recompense for those who do that among you except disgrace in worldly life; and on the Day of Resurrection they will be sent back to the severest of punishment…”

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summarizes each of the Hadiths’ stipulations. Surprisingly, as is the case in determining the Islamic jus ad bello, there is no established or researched specific criteria regarding when it is necessary to obey, not obey, and overthrow the Caliph based on the Hadith and Qur’an.

Figure 6.2. Depiction of the process by which a legitimately elected Caliph may be removed by force. Note that the justification of the ‘sin’ constitutes kufr, along with public justification or acknowledgement, and enforcement of the act.

Firstly, hadiths (a) and (b) clearly stipulate that it is Islamically unlawful to reject obedience of the Caliph based on personal hatred, rudeness, un-appreciativeness, because of race or tribal affiliation, because of actions thought of to be targeted at a specific person or a tribe, un-preferable judgment based on the Qur’an and Sunnah (i.e., unfavorable ijtihad), and any other action of the Caliph that may be deemed to be non-related to the Qur’an and Sunnah that may be personally, tribally, or otherwise unfavorable to the specific person in the Ummah. This is what the flowchart depicts; it is the responsibility of the citizen to obey the Caliph unconditionally in such a case. However, in the case of a ‘sin’ (i.e., something that is

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explicitly against the Qur’an and the Sunnah) being commanded upon the Ummah, it is not just the peoples’ right, but their responsibility to stop it. The Prophet Muhammad himself commanded people to help the Muslim oppressor by “preventing him from oppressing others;”597 this is accomplished in the case of a Caliph by disobeying him, and confronting him by challenging his order’s Islamic permissibility. Examples of such as (d, e, f) apply as precedent for times when confrontation occurred. Hadith (g) stipulates that an “open rejection [kufr]” constitutes grounds to overthrow the Caliph. Since an act of kufr itself stipulates rejection (and obvious attempted justification), once there is public challenge of the legitimacy of the Caliph’s order, and the Caliph does not correct himself, there are grounds to remove and reestablish the office of the Caliphate. Regarding the obvious question, “but who gets to ultimately decide if a breach has occurred in the first place?,” the answer can obviously not be a judiciary or legislature, as such power is not bestowed in the hands of anybody but the Caliph himself (being the trustee of political power of God), and certainly not the people (whose subjective feelings have no bearing on the divine law), the judgment ultimately is clear; it is found in the golden standard, the Qur’an and Hadith, the correct judge of which is and can only be God Himself.

597

Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 2, Book 24, Hadith 483. Note that the phrase “how can you fight with these people although Allah's Messenger said, ‘I have been ordered (by Allah) to fight the people till they say: ‘None has the right to be worshipped but Allah’’” does not ask Muslims to fight whoever is not Muslim, but rather, to not fight who is Muslim already; the fact that the phrase was used in such a context proves such a use of the expression.

Chapter 7

THE MODERN SCHOLARSHIP: A CONTEMPORARY VIEW 7.1. THE ISLAMIC JUS AD BELLUM There are a few approaches to the jus ad bellum rules in Islam, and also with the nature of Jihad. All scholarly works by Muslim and non-Muslim researchers fall under one of the two categories, namely, defensive Jihad and offensive Jihad. Cavanaugh598 briefly describes the same two approaches, albeit calling offensive Jihad ‘textual’ and defensive Jihad ‘contextual.’ Scholars, such as Firestone599 and Khadduri,600 take the superficial approach to analyzing Qur’anic verses (orders) regarding Jihad. On the other side, there is the contextual approach that looks at the historical context of the revelation of the verse, aided by the crucially important Hadiths (his sayings, actions, and actions he condoned or gave tacit approval), to develop a criterion of when Jihad may be waged against a group. This chapter presents a literature review along with a deconstruction of arguments offered in the two groups.

7.1.1. Supporters of the Notion of Offensive Jihad The first, perhaps more intriguing but less fashionable line of thinking would belong to the textual approach as categorized by Cavanaugh. In other words, supporting of the aggressive nature of Jihad. There are several arguments for the case of aggressive Jihad. The first and perhaps the most important one is the Qur’anic evidence. The verses, sometimes termed “sword verses” as stated by van der Krogt601 are often applied for evidence of the violent and very confrontational nature of Jihad. These verses, 9:5 and 9:29 clearly showing a confrontational and aggressive tone, when taken out of context, can raise obvious concern with the nature of Islam as a religion itself. In fact, there are several verses similar to this one that seem to clearly be ordering the mass slaughter of kafirs (who reject Islam) and people of 598

Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, "Speaking Law to War." Journal of Conflict and Security Law 17 (2012): 4. Reuven Firestone, Jihad: the origin of holy war in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 600 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Clark: The Lawbook Exchange, 2006). 601 Christopher J. van der Krogt "Jihād without apologetics." Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 21 (2010): 131. 599

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the book (Jews and Christians of the time), as outlined by Al-Dawoody, who adds verses 2:217 and 2:216 to the list.602 He provides a detailed rebuttal to the advancement of this theory of Firestone’s historic analysis. Firestone claims that throughout Islamic formative history, there have been developing stages of Jihad and when one is allowed to fight. The first stage is non-confrontation, the second permitting defensive fighting, the third allowing indiscriminate attacks-with guidelines provided, and the fourth ordering war on all nonMuslim entities and nations. Al-Dawoody correctly points out, “[i]t goes without saying that the Qur’anic verses on the issue of war must be read in their socio-political and linguistic contexts.” Hence, if someone were to simply state the text of a verse and apply it unconditionally, it would not reveal the real picture of what the criteria are. More importantly, it disregards the entire “metadata” of Islamic history used as a guide for centuries in war analysis and history, providing for anything but a lopsided view. The majority of Qur’anic verses and historical contextualization is discussed in a latter chapter of this book. For now, it suffices to state that there is an overwhelming amount of literature in opposition to the findings of Firestone. Cavanaugh, for example, also looks through this theory of textual analysis, but provides no specific rebuttal, except with the statement that studying the concept of Jihad would be impractical to engage in a discourse about Jihad, without acknowledging its historical context.603 A major misconception (that should be quickly deconstructed for further reference) about Jihad, is the “pay jizyah [poll] tax, convert to Islam, or fight” notion of how Islamic foreign diplomacy is ideally conducted. Perhaps one of the most misunderstood components of siyar (international Islamic law) is this notion, which has become an accepted wisdom by the academic majority, as is discussed in ‘The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law.’604 Also, the conservative Islamic view, as discussed later, accepted this as the norm. There are only a handful of accounts of the prophet and his four ‘rightly guided’ successors’ (Caliphs) sending coercive letters in the above tone, and only a handful of general state interaction with the prophet and state leaders. They are examined in the history section. The purpose of this section is only to deconstruct modern opinions and research methods that are ineffective (akin to misconceptions) and finding problems in common theories relating to the nature of Jihad. This is the clearing-the-table-phase that can then be set up the way Prophet Muhammad would have done it. For now, it need only be understood that such a notion is a misconception that is often supported by the progressive Jihad scholars, as well as more conservative Muslims (as we will see below). There are several articles and scholars in favor of “offensive Jihad,” some discussed by Ali and Rehman605 who cited the arguments of Mushkat, Khadduri, and Busuttil. Khadduri (discussed in Al-Dawoody),606 made some important historical points when discussing Islamic jurisprudence and siyar. Al-Dawoody acknowledges that according to great scholars such as Abu Hanifah and al-Shaybani, their discourse on Jihad was made on the assumption that there was a constant state of war—possibly drawing from the notion developed by 602

Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, "War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations” (PhD Diss., Univeristy of Birmingham, 2009), 100-116. 603 Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, “Speaking Law into War,” 8. 604 Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, "The concept of Jihad in Islamic international law" Journal of Conflict and Security Law 10 (2005). 605 Ibid, 328 – 330. 606 Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations,” 124.

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Islamic jurists, of Dar al Islam and Dar al Harb, and how non-Muslim land was all referred to as ‘abode of war’ – a term attributed to the rest of the world, with a few exceptions. AlDawoody cited Esposito’s counterargument to Khadduri’s claim, stating that the reason for this assumption was because the Islamic state in fact was at a constant state of war at the time, and that was the reason for why several classical Islamic scholars wrote as if the Islamic State was in a constant state of war.607 This is problematic because it would imply that these scholars viewed the Abbasid Empire (that was in power during the time of these scholars’ lifetimes) as a legitimate regime. We know that at least this could not be true in the case of Abu Hanifah, as he had several problems with the Abbasids; causing ultimate imprisonment, torture, and poisoning, due to his opinion that Al-Mansur (the Abbasid caliph) should be overthrown.608 So, if anything, a more reasonable conclusion to counter the argument of Khadduri would be that the original - albeit not the mainstream - classical scholars simply assumed that the Islamic state would be in a state of war because of the geopolitical situation of the entire world at the time. War was very common for any political entity at the time, especially on the borders of any state. Furthermore, a historical fact is that the Islamic state was constantly opposed militarily. It is reasonable to assume that the Islamic state would be at a constant state of war, given its history and the general situation of the world at the time. Mushkat609 states that because Dar al Harb and Dar al Islam are categorized as world sections, Islamic law “enjoins Moslems to maintain a state of permanent belligerence with all nonbelievers, collectively encompassed in the dar al-harb, the domain of war.” With no further explanation or historical argument, this seems to be a common feature among supporters of the offensive Jihad, all ignoring any discussion of crucial historical timelines. For instance, Donner, in his article “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War,”610 goes through an extensive amount of philosophy and understandings of Islamic jurisprudence. What one does not see throughout the article, even in his section ‘Historical circumstances’611 dedicated to historical case laws and analysis, is any indication of case law analysis or reasoning, but instead, one sees unfounded conclusions such as “[T]he earliest of Muslims already were motivated by a religiously legitimized zeal to conquer…”612 This is the same assumption that Donner makes in the conclusion of the section, and the section (and the article) contains no specific argument as to why he continues to assert such assumption. Such an assumption at the onset of cognition will, no doubt, lead to the conclusion that the assumption will hold true. This assumption substitutes, and consequently ruins, the whole notion of objective historical analysis. Again, this is a common feature among the more modern offensive Jihad-supporting scholars, none of whom had any trail of detailed historical analysis. The only time such analysis is present is in the older cases, particularly the case of Firestone, most of whose work has been deconstructed by Al-Dawoody and Esposito to make a case for defensive Jihad argument.

607

Ibid. Akbar Shah Najeebabadi, The History of Islam. vol, 2 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2001), 287. 609 Roda Mushkat, "Is War Ever Justifiable-A Comparative Survey." Loy. LA Int'l & Comp. LJ 9 (1986): 227. 610 Fred M. Donner, "The sources of Islamic conceptions of war." In Just war and jihad: historical and theoretical perspectives on war and peace in Western and Islamic traditions by, John Kelsay and James T. Johnson, 51-52. USA: Praeger, 1991. 611 Ibid, 48 – 50. 612 Ibid, 49. 608

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Another round of argument along this line can be found in van der Krogt’s theory613, which attempts to compartmentalize the several points of argument from the defensive-Jihad side of the scholarship. He overviews some brief history, but mainly refutes the existing literature of what he calls the writing of ‘apologists.’ There are several flaws in his style of argumentation in the article, along with technical flaws that should be discussed. First of all, he refutes whom he saw as the founder of the line of thinking that Jihad is defensive, namely, John Esposito. Van der Krogt focuses on less significant points about his work, for instance, accusing him of claiming himself to be an exegetist,614 instead of debating the core historical. Secondly, in van der Krogt’s brief take on history, he takes an approach in line with Firestone’s analysis. Although he provides no direct reference, the resemblance is clear. The following is a quote from him discussing the Prophet Muhammad’s state after being forced out of Mecca, “Forced out of Mecca in 622, the Prophet and his followers migrated to Medina (Yathrib) and soon began to raid Meccan caravans.” Al-Dawoody discusses from Firestone’s work,615 and mentions that the entire narrative (later going into specific examples) surrounds the notion that Muhammad was the troublemaker and that he mostly instigated battles/movements against him616, very similar to van der Krogt’s interpretation of history. Another example of this similarity is when he discusses the issue of the ‘Islamic conquests,’ and attempts to deduce from historical events to form criteria (in this case ‘encouraging war on all neighboring states’) that fit the presumption that Islam is inherently violent. This is surprising, considering that others have not generally gone so far as to doing this. The incident here is with Rabi‘ ibn ‘Amir, a Muslim envoy that was speaking with the Sassanid General Rostam Farrokhzad, “Allah has sent us and brought us here so that we may free those who desire from servitude [ibādat] to earthly rulers and make them servants of God, that we may change their poverty into wealth and free them from the tyranny of [false] religions and bring them to the justice of Islam. He has called us to bring His religion to all His creatures and to call them to Islam. Whoever accepts it from us will be safe and we shall leave him alone but whoever refuses we shall fight until we fulfill the promise of God.” 617

This event did occur. However, the problem lies within the lack of context. In this case, he uses this narration as evidence that the goal of Islam is indeed to fight anybody who refuses Islam. In reality, there are several important points that need to be considered. Firstly, the citation takes this event out of context. The context was that Rabi bin Amr was sent to negotiate with Rostam after they had fought, but before the battle of Qadisiyya.618 This implies that the decision to go to war has already been made, and that these were pre-battle negotiations/diplomacy taking place.619 Regarding the extrapolation from the last sentence, 613

Christopher J. van der Krogt, “Jihād Withough Apologetics.” Ibid, 131, speaking about Esposito’s commentary of the Qur’ānic verse 9:5. 615 Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations,” 26. 616 Ibid, 110. He cites Reuven Firestone, Jihad: the origin of holy war in Islam. 617 Christopher J. van der Krogt, “Jihad without Apologetics,” 132. 618 Kaveh Farrokh, Shadows in the desert: Ancient Persia at war (Osprey Publishing, 2007), 268. 619 In fact, this exchange occurred in a negotiation level prior to Qadisiyyah but after several other battles. See Yohanan Friedmann, The History of al-Tabari Vol. 12: The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah and the Conquest of Syria and Palestine AD 635-637/AH 14-15 (SUNY Press. 1992), para. 2235-2237 for full context. 614

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this is a simple case of misunderstanding due to wording. What was meant by the statement “whoever accepts it will be safe…but whoever refuses we shall fight…” is that before the battle starts, if anyone converts to Islam, they will be safe and not punished. Whereas, if they do not accept this offer, the Muslims would be required to fight. This means that if the king or others convert, there is no need to fight. This is supported by the Hadith (see next chapter) in which the prophet ordered all military commanders to present people with the offer of peaceful surrender so long as they accept Islam or pay the jizyah tax. The question arises as to why the issue of paying jizyah was not mentioned by Rabi in this narration. The most logical explanation is that, in earlier negotiations the opposing party was presented with that offer.620 A small exchange in the middle of the course of the long war in which a diplomat offered peace if they accept Islam, was misconstrued to show as if this was a first visit to general Rostam and Rabi was explaining the general criteria by which Muslims use to conduct their foreign policy. Again, a process of ‘history discrimination’ is evident. In reality, contemporary international affairs continue to use this technique, calling it ‘last ditch diplomacy to avert all out war,’ as evident from many wars after 9/11 and equally significant treaties that averted all out wars.621 Regarding Qur’anic analysis, the pattern is the same, van der Krogt does mention that scholars have raised concern, but did not contextualize. These are all examples of arguments and historical case law analyses of these scholars, who seem to have developed a clear pattern of inappropriate presumption regarding Islam. Perhaps, what van der Krogt and the others were correct in pointing out is that in the later periods of Islam, it became expansionist. In other words, they conflate true Islam with its expansionist counterpart instituted by the Ummayad dynasty. In his own admission622, van der Krogt states that only later on (3rd Hijra/9th CE century) Islam developed an expansionist policy. The scope of the chapter does not cover the entire progression of Jihad, but it would suffice to say that the historical analysis of the prophet’s and caliphs’ expeditions was incorrect, perhaps intertwined with the belief that the later century (from the Umayyads) Muslim expansions into India and so on were based on true Islamic teachings and case laws of the prophet’s time. Certain scholars (including even Esposito) have admitted,623 arguing along this line, that according to Islamic jurisprudence, the dar al Islam must be spread against the dar al Harb to advance the borders of divine rule. This could have very well been the case in the later expansionary period under the Umayyads, but just arbitrarily laid down to the case of the prophet and four rightly guided caliphs—unless of course they are debating the issue of the conquests of eastern Byzantium and the Sassanian empire as mentioned by Esposito.624 This latter argument has received its due deconstruction in Chapter 4. The point made here is that dar al Islam/Harb itself was an invention of classical jurists, possibly endorsing more offensive policies being undertaken by the Umayyads and Abbasids at the time, such as the conquest of Spain, India, through central Asia, and later on Ottoman expansion into western Europe. These policies and jurisprudential 620

Ibid, para. 2237. Oliver Meier, "European Efforts to Solve the Conflict over Iran’s Nuclear Programme: How has the European Union Performed." Non-Proliferation Papers 27 (2013). 622 Christopher van der Krogt, “Jihād without Apologetics,” 128. 623 Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic history: doctrines and practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 10; Mushkat, “Is War Ever Justifiyable?,” 227; John L. Esposito, Unholy war: Terror in the name of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 35. 624 John L. Esposito, Unholy war: Terror in the Name of Islam, 35. 621

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evidence of offensive Jihad may have been taken as a standard of Islam by scholars, such as Firestone, Donner, and van der Krogt. It is conceivable that they applied this logic into the Prophet’s mission of delivering Islam, reflecting a conflation of Prophet’s original mission and how latter Muslim rulers perceived Islam as. Sayyid Qutb, one of the most prominent revivalists of modern time, is also a strong proponent of the notion that Muslim ‘defeatists’ or ‘apologists’ are responsible for perpetrating the ‘defensive’ Jihad doctrine. He says, “They say, ‘Islam has prescribed only defensive war!’ and think that they have done some good for their religion by depriving it of its method, which is to abolish all injustice from the earth, to bring people to the worship of God alone, and to bring them out of servitude to others into the servants of the Lord.”625

We see that the apologists a detested for their defensive/defeatist ideology. From the eyes of somebody like Qutb – a man that led an Islamic political movement - it would make sense to be angry at the liberal/moderate Muslims, the likes of whom are present today in the form of “TV evangelists” that preach that Islam is a pacifist religion, akin to the Christian TV evangelical counterpart. These scholars (e.g., Dr. Zakir Naik and Dr. Bilal Phillips) will be discussed in latter segments of this chapter, but the point here is Qutb’s scorn for these pacifist Muslim scholars may have interfered with his historical reasoning. He makes the argument that Islam must be an expansionary religion, because not doing so would not permit potential Muslims to be exposed to the truth, and that the divine law must replace and destroy the ‘evil man-made destructive regimes.’ In reply to the ‘no compulsion in religion’ verse, which is often quoted by apologists, he mentions that people are not forced to accept Islam, but rather subject to Islamic rule.626 He claims that this sort of goal cannot be achieved through preaching; stating that the previous prophets’ message delivery would have been much easier to get across. His first premise, of course, throughout is that the goal of every Muslim should be to militarily establish the rule of God. He backs it up with a few points summarized as: obeying means worshipping other humans, referring to a hadith of the prophet making commentary on a verse of Qur’an (9:31, discussed in the next paragraph). For historical evidence of arbitrary expansion, he refers to the Roman and Persian conquests of Islam as evidence. For instance, the Rustam—Rabi ibn Amir interaction cited by van der Krogt was shown as evidence of the “convert, pay jizyah, or fight” policy. The other theory arguing that Muslims have been commanded to fight non-Muslims in four stages,627 the theory that Firestone subscribes to has already been deconstructed earlier in this book. Furthermore, Qutb mentions several times that orientalists take the stance of pro-defensive Jihad, and are trying to weaken the concept that Islam is political. Finally, he lists several verses of Qur’an to justify his stand. These verses are taken out of context, similar to Firestone’s Qur’anic analysis discussed in relation to offensive Jihad. Overall, Qutb makes the entire purpose of Jihad as to convert the world to Islam and establish supreme Islamic rule

625

Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Holy Koran Publishing House, 1978), 33. Ibid. 34. 627 Ibid. 39 – 42. 626

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on all of the infidels. Unsurprisingly, this is the same principle that governs mindset of Crusaders.628 Clearly, Qutb needs rigorous deconstruction. In his first argument, Qutb’s first premise is that Islam must be spread militarily. This is supported by the notion that not doing so is ‘worshipping,’ as he quoted a hadith where the prophet was reciting the following verse (9:31): “They (the People of the Book) have taken their rabbis and priests as lords other than God.’ ‘Adi reports: ‘I said, ‘They do not worship their priests.’ God’s Messenger replied, ‘Whatever their priests and rabbis call permissible, they accept as permissible; whatever they declare as forbidden, they consider as forbidden, and thus they worship them.’”629 There clearly is a difference between worshiping through obeying religious duties of leaders, and following the law of the land in a non-Muslim country. Qutb claims that if military action is not pursued, Muslims are not doing their duty to spread Islam and destroy the ‘evil man made’ system of governance. What he does through these types of arguments is create his own set of criteria of when to go to war, about what the foreign policy of Islam is, etc. This skews Islamic cognition and his reasoning is presenting his version of Islam as true Islam. In other words, he is not enforcing what the prophet did, but essentially what he believes the prophet should have done. If the prophet or four caliphs ever (as we will see in latter section) attacked a group of people for their man-made faith/administrative system, then his claim would have some validity. However, this was never the case, and was not an agenda of the prophet. To draw parallel to his argument, this would be equivalent to using logic to make the point of praying only one time a day and then providing evidence from the Qur’an. Nothing of this argument would be logical, because it was not the practice of the prophet, thus violating the minor premise of Islamic cognition: Muhammad is the messenger of God. Qutb’s line of argument simply goes against the mission of Islam. Such fallacious cognition has been termed ‘aphenomenal’ elsewhere.630 Qutb continues that the expansion of Islam militarily under Abu Bakr and ‘Umar was motivated by the need to spread Islam globally. We saw in Chapter 4 that this is not the case. Qutb also mentions multiple times of his contempt of the Orientalist ideology631, i.e., the portrayal that orthodox Islam and Middle Eastern society is passive and apologetic by nature. It is to be acknowledged that this was the norm of classical Orientalism by Tuastad.632 To turn the tables, Qutb would not be pleased to hear that neo-Orientalism, developed after the Iranian revolution, portrays classical Islam to be hostile and offensive as Tuastad said regarding the change from Orientalism to neo-Orientalism. He says: “This represents a continuity from Orientalist to neo-Orientalist thought, whereby Middle Eastern society is seen as either too weak or ... too strong.”633 Marranci also mentioned the neo-Orientalist view that Apologists’ claim that extremists’ views (such as Qutb’s) were “nothing other than apologetic.”634 Qutb is well versed in Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh). However, he does not

628

Islam et al., Reconstituting the Curriculum, 44, 71. Sayiid Qutb, Milestones, 36. 630 Islam et al., “A Knowledge-Based Cognition Model,” 1-30. 631 When criticizing orientalists see Sayiid Qutb, Milestones, 37-39, 43 and when criticizing Muslim apologists/defeatists see 34. 632 Dag Tuastad, "Neo-Orientalism and the new barbarism thesis: aspects of symbolic violence in the Middle East conflict (s)." Third World Quarterly 24 (2003): 591-599. 633 Ibid. 634 Gabriele Marranci, Jihad Beyond Islam (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 2. 629

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grasp the notion of using detailed historical case laws – a deficiency that has been mentioned regarding the scholars that support the notion of offensive Jihad. Syed Abul A’la Maududi, another influential Islamic scholar that led political Islamic movements in the Indian subcontinent has made the same general argument. 635 Consequently, the above deconstruction applies to his work as well. To his credit, however, Maududi is vociferously points out the events of the Crusade and categorically denies any resemblance of Crusade with Jihad, nonetheless arguing that an Islamic state needs to conduct Jihad in order to establish rule of Allah’s law. Just as with the second line of argument, there are several Muslim contemporary scholars/Imams with ‘fatwas’ or Islamic rulings. Ali, in ‘Resurrecting Siyar through Fatwas? (Re) Constructing ‘Islamic International Law’ in a Post–(Iraq) Invasion World,’636 analyzed the impact of the Iraq war on popular Muslim perspectives of Jihad and Siyar—through analysis of some online contemporary fatwas pertaining to the Iraq War. This enabled him to get a view of the overall environment among the Muslim community of the Iraq War pertaining to Jihad.637 This section takes a similar approach in order to construct a perspective based on contemporary fatwas. This represents a fatwa along conservative Islamic thought. The fatwa (below) was issued by Shaykh Muhammad Saalih al-Munajjid, one of the most reputed scholars of the Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia. He, and his well-known colleagues Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz (d. 1999) and Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen (d. 2001) are both very respected leaders of conservative Sunni Islam, forming the most esteemed of religious bodies in Saudi Arabia. Al-Munajjid’s fatwa638 has several reasons behind why Muslims go to Jihad. These reasons are: 

   

Fighting disbelief, there are several accounts of hadith and Qur’anic verses indicating the need to fight non-Muslims. These arguments are similar to Qutb’s, claiming the need to spread Islam to non-Muslim lands; Repelling aggression on those who attack Muslims; based on Qur’an 2:190 and 9:13; Removing fitnah: fighting ‘kafirs’ that oppress Muslims; Protecting the state; protecting borders and fighting people plotting against Muslims; For war booty, provided the booty is legitimate and is of ‘halal’ income (the stated reason for the battle of Badr).

From what we glean here, as well as in Qutb and Maududi, the conservative side of Islamic contemporary scholarship seems to be closer to the more aggressive side of Jihad, viz, the offensive Jihad – the one endorsed by neo-Orientalists. This is supported by common notions in the literature. For instance, Cavanaugh that acknowledges:

635

636 637 638

Abul A'la Maududi, Jihad in Islam (Holy Koran Publishing House, 1980). He mentions several similar arguments, mainly that military action is required to spread the authority of Islam, that it is not possible to achieve it thourgh preaching (you will be cracked down upon). Furthermore, he cites the invasions of Byzantium [Tabuk] and Persia and claims they were carried out as a consequence of rejecting Islam. Shaheen Sardar Ali, "Resurrecting Siyar through Fatwas?(Re) Constructing ‘Islamic International Law’in a Post–(Iraq) Invasion World." Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2009): 115. Ibid, 131: He quotes several online fatwas: from www.islamonline.net by Sheikh Ahmad Kutty; Ibid., 134: from Al-Azhar University; Ibid., 137: and from Sheikh Hamed Al-Ali (a prominent Kuwaiti Sheikh). Muhammad Saalih al-Munajjid, “Ruling on Jihād and kinds of Jihād.” IslamQ&A.info: It quotes the prominent scholars ‘Abd al-‘Azeez ibn Baaz and al-Sharh al-Mumti’ by Sheikh Muhammad al-Uthaymeen.

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“Conservative readings of Jihad ‘fossilizes the confrontational and conflictual element of Jihad, thus precluding alternative legal reasoning, compatible with present day requirements of coexistence in a world espousing diverse ideologies.” 639

It is the same conclusion that is offered by the likes of Ali and Rehman that state: “Implications of this conservative view in Islamic jurisprudence for doctrines such as Jihad are far reaching indeed. The predominance of this school of thought fossilises the confrontational and conflictual element of Jihad, thus precluding alternative legal reasoning…”640

It is fair to say that the more conservative elements of Islam believe that Jihad is confrontational or aggressive, in the sense that the goal of Jihad used by an Islamic state is to do Jihad on all non-Muslim states that either reject the hegemony of Islamic rule, or refuse to pay jizyah and maintain a semi-autonomous state.

7.1.2. Supporters of the Defensive Notion of Jihad, and Others There is a great deal of literature claiming an exactly opposite role and conditions of Jihad in an Islamic state. The following review examines a few articles that are supportive of the notion of defensive Jihad, along with systematic deconstruction of the arguments advanced in these papers. In the literature on international Islamic jurisprudence, Hallaq correctly points out that the word Jihad may have many meanings, as it has been exposed to several cultures throughout history.641 The modern literature has been aware of this, and often shows all of the sides of an argument to the real meaning of Jihad, before taking a position, as will be seen in latter sections. Ali and Rehman review several pro-defensive Jihad arguments. There are two important misconceptions on this side, picked up by some modern literature642 and by western Islamic scholars, especially relating to the concept of the greater and lesser Jihad and the implication that the more significant meaning of Jihad is in fact self-struggle. The first argument made in this case is the hadith of the prophet that says “Self-exertion in peaceful and personal compliance with the dictates of Islam (constitutes) is the major or superior Jihad.”643 Interestingly, this widely quoted narration is not considered authentic, belonging to one of the ‘kutub sidda’ or ‘six books,’ from which narrations are taken from, a general Islamic scholarly consensus of these books being the standard compilation of the prophet’s narrations. This comes along with specific nonconformity with the Qur’an644 and several Hadith,645 and

639

Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, “Speaking Law into War,” 4. Shaheen Sardar Ali, and Javaid Rehman, "The concept of Jihad in Islamic international law." Journal of Conflict and Security Law 10 (2005): 327. 641 Wael B Hallaq, Sharī'a: theory, practice, transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 324. 642 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward an Islamic reformation: civil liberties, human rights, and international law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 145; Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, “Speaking Law into War,” 5; Ali and Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” 1. 643 Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” 1. 644 The Qur’ān 4:95. 640

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runs contrary to several classical Islamic scholars and historians, including Ibn Taymiyyah,646 Al Bayhaqi,647 and several others.648 The second argument raised by scholars is that the root word of Jihad means ‘to strive,’ and the popular notion that self exertion and struggle is very important concept in Islam picked up by classical,649 as well as contemporary Islamic scholars—especially “apologetic” western Muslim scholars as we will see below. It is true that the root meaning of the word Jihad means sustained “struggle” or “striving.” However, the only meanings that are used in the Qur’an that refers to the word Jihad (as in “striving in the path of God”) 68 times, relate to fighting, with physical self or with funds, all relating to establishing the deen of Allah.650 They all point to personal sacrifice either with life or with wealth. While personal sacrifice may include ‘self actuation,’ there remains no confusion when these are seen in the context of relevant Hadiths. It is within the terminology of the prophet and his companions that one can discover the true meaning intended in the Qur’an..651 Each major hadith collection has a book dedicated to Jihad. For the purpose of this study, we will only look at the most popular/largest collection, Sahih Bukhari. The book contains 24 Hadiths with the word Jihad in them, all of them refer to war or fighting. However, it was acknowledged that there are other versions of Jihad, for instance, the prophet said that the Jihad for women, elderly, and children is Hajj.652 More importantly, the overall colloquial terminology refers to Jihad as being war or battle. Although it is important to acknowledge the internal struggle is necessary to accomplish anything in the faith (‘in the path of Allah’), the more significant term relating to war is evident. Now that the common misconceptions have been cleared, it is much easier to enter the realm of pro-defensive arguments. Perhaps one of the most extensive, exhaustive studies of Islamic war, with historical analysis, is the first chapter of the doctoral dissertation of AlDawoody “War in Islamic Law: Justifications and Regulations,” chapter one: War During the Prophet’s Time.653 The main aim of the study is to analyze the history of the prophet, or Sirat, and develop a theory of how war was declared under the Islamic state, while looking at two main interpretations of the history. Al-Dawoody was key to deconstructing Firestone’s interpretations, but more importantly, his historical deconstruction was intriguing. The detailed investigation of several battles and raids (ghazawāt) of the prophet, each in its own individual context, revealed that each and every belligerence conducted under order of the prophet was never started by the prophet himself, “nor motivated by Islamic teachings to

645

Ibn Majah Al-Qazwinî, and Imâm Muhammad bin Yazeed, Sunan Ibn Mâja: Volume 3 (Darussalam, 2007), narration 2794; Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih Bukhari (Darusalam, 2007), narration 26, 2786, 2792; Muslim Ibn Al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim (Darussalam 2007), narration 1884, 1910; Malik ibn Anas, Mutawwa Imam Malik. Darusalam 2007, book 21 narration 965. 646 Ibn Taymiyyah, Al Furqan Bayna Awliya Al Rahman Wa awliya Ash Shaytan (Riyasdh: Daar us-Sunnah Publications, 2000), 44-45. 647 Suhaib Hassan, An introduction to the science of Hadith (Al-Qur’ān Society, 1994). 648 Abdullah Azzam, Join the Caravan (London: Azzam Publications, 2001), 27 shows several scholars’ concern and statements regarding the authenticity of the hadith. 649 Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar: volume 19 (Al-Wafa, 1983) 182, tradition 31. 650 Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations,” 98. 651 It is more important to know the use of the term Jihād by the prophet and his companions, to get an idea of the application of Jihād from a practical point of view. 652 Al-Nasa'i. Sunan An-Nasa’I (Riyadh: Darusalam, 2007), narration 2626: there are several other accounts of similar Hadith. 653 Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations,” 21-75.

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engage in offensive attacks against non-Muslims because of their unbelief in Islam.”654 AlDawoody criticized authors, such as Firestone, for not looking into individual interactions, and others, such as Donner, for jumping to the conclusion that prophet was successful because he was a “genius strategist.” This conclusion is similar to that of Esposito, who looks into individual interactions, and concludes that other parties initiated the attacks and wars the prophet fought in. Whilst Esposito’s cognition is correct and logical, his failure appears to come from his analysis of the history involving the four rightly guided caliphs and their military expansion.655 There are also others who failed to include all cases656 and put in correct perspective. In their discussion about the nature of Jihad, they enter a discourse referring to the applicability of Jihad. They conclude (from the start to finish) that Islamic jurisprudence, the Sunnah, and the Qur’an have no consensus; there are no standard accepted criteria on when Jihad can be applied. They point out the ‘dichotomy’ in Islam, the ‘peaceful religion’ that does not force religion upon people, based on the verse of Qur’an.657 They show that at the same time, jurists such as Abu Hanifah state that the punishment of apostasy is death, based on the hadith that the prophet commanded his people to kill those who change their religion, while the prophet at the same time completely forgave the person who asked to kill Allah. Gamal Badr’s argument658 shows that the harsh punishment ascribed to apostasy applies only in the case of political treason. According to them, however, this would be absurd, for the reason that collective apostasy deserves the death penalty a (qualified as being fitnah), as per the Qur’anic verse 2:191 that says that apostasy is worse than murder and qualifies jus ad bellum - while at the same time, verse 109:6 states “For you [plural] is your religion, and for me is mine.”659 He attributes this confusion or perceived contradiction to the assumption that each verse of Qur’an has many alternative interpretations. While this would be typical of dogmatic cognition, it is unbecoming of a book that claims itself to be ‘dogma-free.’ Without resolving the misconception imposed by their own false assumptions, Ali and Rehman enter into the realm of several unfounded conclusions - based on the assumption that ‘Islam doesn’t make sense.’660 As pointed out by Badr,661 the first misconception is that ‘group apostasy’ as they put it, is a justification for war. An important distinction to be made before conclusion is that group apostasy, per se, is not punishable by death, unless it is a political advancement against the sovereignty of the Islamic state. For instance, with the ‘Ridda wars,’662 Abu Bakr declared war on the false prophets, a group of apostates. Whereas ‘Umar was Caliph, he was noted to have gotten angry at his governors for killing groups of

654

Ibid, 68. In our subsection analyzing ‘aggressive’ Jihād supporting scholars, we cite Esposito admitting to ‘progressive’ Jihād for the sake of establishing Islamic law: Esposito, Unholy war: Terror in the Name of Islam, 35. 656 Ali and Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” 335: They enter a discussion regarding the applicability of Jihād: “3.4 Observations Regarding Applicability of Jihād.” 657 The Qur’ān 2:256, “There is no compulsion in religion…” 658 Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, “The Concept of Islamic International Law,” 336. 659 Ibid, 337. 660 Similar to the conclusion Fred Donner is surprised to get, when he assumes that Islam is expansionary by nature. 661 Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” 335. 662 Terms apostasy wars, although there are several reasons for which the wars were started, some even upon Muslims for not paying zakah to declaring fake Prophethood. 655

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apostates.663 The major difference to note between the two reactions is that the apostates of Abu Bakr were threatening the sovereignty and power of the political Islamic state. Claiming prophethood, having their own community and laws declaring within the territory of the state is anything but simple non-political, ‘group apostasy.’ They are akin to uprising and treason and punishable by death penalty. By contrast, ‘Umar’s apostates were under control of the state and simply converted away from Islam.664 Hence, the rule of ‘no compulsion in religion’ holds, leading to ‘Umar’s refusal to sentence the offenders to death. There is no contradiction in these two practices of the two Caliphs. Regarding the verse 2:191 of the Qur’an cited that commands the Muslims to fight, and that fitnah is worse than killing, Rehman and Ali imply that they must be somehow connected, that fitnah means groups apostasy, which means war. This is a grave misconception that warrants no justification because the verse 2:190 gives the criterion for waging Jihad. It is not conceivable that a serious scholarly work would ignore the preceding verse that qualifies the act of fitnah while using a verse to qualify ‘group apostasy’ as fitnah. First of all, the word fitnah does not mean group apostasy or civil war in the Qur’an or hadith, the term was invented later on.665 Secondly, the order, in this verse, is to fight the people that initiated fight against the Muslim as seen in preceding verses, 2:189 and 2:190. Badr also makes a point about the three-choices injunction (“pay jizyah, convert, or fight”).666 As we will see in the next section, this injunction was only applied after the decision to fight as a last-minute negotiation tactic. Furthermore, a state that does surrender (instead of fighting, if they have infringed upon the Muslim state’s sovereignty), the only requirement is that the state allow Islamic laws, without any requirement of conversion to Islam. As for the state’s decision to pay jizyah, it even allows them to keep their own judicial system—as we know that jizyah paying states were allowed to keep their administrative system667 and of course their religion. For instance, they did not pay the zakah as Muslims did, but they instead paid jizyah. Evidently, Islam is not coercive in religion, and the only confusion regarding apostasy, politics in the Qur’an and Sunnah has been fabricated. At this point, it is important to review the contemporary, mainstream scholars’ views on Jihad. They have a vast influential plain, and often have millions of viewers, TV channels, universities and educational institutions, etc. Of course, the entire viewpoint of ‘moderate Islam’ cannot fit under the categories of a view influential speakers or scholars, but because of the large influence they do have on the mainly moderate (non-orthodox) Muslim population provides that they be briefly discussed, to get perspective of their popular ideology on Jihad. One of the most influential of scholars/debaters/speakers on the spectrum is Dr. Zakir Naik, the founder of ‘Peace TV,’ belonging to the more evangelical-type scholars had this to say about Jihad,

663

Gamal El-Shayyal, Towards a Civic Democratic Islamic Discourse II Islam, state and citizenship (Amman: AlQuds Center for Political Studies, 2007): 115. 664 This is implied, because the state was able to quickly gather them up and try them (for apostasy), it could not have been a rebellion. 665 Fred M Donner, "Qur’ânicization of Religio-Political Discourse in the Umayyad Period." Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée 129 (2011): para. 20: The real meaning is “temptation” or “seduction.” 666 Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” 336. 667 Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny, Law in the Middle East: Origin and Development of Islamic Law. Volume 1 (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1955), 37.

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“Jihad is misunderstood by both Muslims and non-Muslims. Jihad means to strive and struggle to make the society better. The best form of Jihad is to strive and struggle against non-Muslims, using the teachings of the Qur’an…” 668

Bilal Phillips, another influential speaker, in his statement669 on Islam and Terrorism, states that Islam was not spread by the sword even though the Islamic state expanded its borders. This is the only remark one can find about his view on Jihad. Finally, there is also the North American Islamic Fiqh Council, known for their rather liberal ideology, such as their endorsement of the unorthodox moon calculation method of determining the start of the month of Ramadan and the Eid holiday.670 In an article published on their behalf of them, Jamal Badawi — a Canadian Muslim scholar—671 that combative Jihad “[I]s allowed in the Qur’an for legitimate self-defense in the face of unprovoked aggression or in resisting severe oppression on religious or other grounds.” However, he does not go into the Roman/Persian invasion history, nor into the varying opinions of the usage of the word, Jihad. Instead, he simply lists Qur’anic verses and contexts without refutation or discussion of other scholars’ work. His interpretations are correct, in the sense that he was able to identify the historical contexts to the Qur’anic orders. His conclusion is correct, although insufficiently elaborate regarding the invasion of Persia and Byzantine empires. Badawi claims that the King of Persia sent letters to Sassanid governors commanding them to kill the prophet, as he did not recant his prophethood.672 This document doesn’t accompany any reference and lacks rigor in this important (what would be) incidence of jus ad bellum. Even if such letters were really sent, it was not the reason for the invasion of Sassanid Iraq by Abu Bakr. Again, we see an example of ‘historical tampering’ without reference to make his point. Another unique approach to the application of war in Islam is the opinion of the British Muslim speaker and Islamic scholar, Hamza Tzortzis. He argues in his essay ‘Is Jihad Terrorism?,’673 about the Islamic legitimacy of terrorism and extremist Islamic movements, relating it to modern day organizations like Al-Qaeda. He summarizes the use of Jihad in Islam, categorizing two types; defensive and progressive Jihad. Defensive Jihad, of course, is understood without saying. Progressive Jihad, however, has a more interesting approach. He defines progressive Jihad as applying in three conditions “The reasons include removing oppression, defending the weak and implementing the justice of Islam.”674 The first two conditions apply into a major criterion, humanitarian intervention. The last reason is about toppling oppressive legal systems, such as the one in Spain at the time Muslims had invaded them.675 The first two arguments do fit the history, and an example of it in the Caliphs’ time 668

Alieu Ceesay, “Gambia: Dr. Zakir Naik Condemns Atrocities Committed in the Name of Jihād.” AllAfrica. Philips, Bilal, “Islam and Terrorism – Contemporary Issues – Dr. Bilal Phillips.” Youtube. 670 Several articles/books associated with the council represent the innovative, liberal side of Islamic thought, such as the book: Shah, Zulfiqar Ali. "The Astronomical Calculations and Ramadan." 671 Jamal Badawi, “Muslim/ Non-Muslim relations: an integrative approach” at the conference “The stand of Islam on Terrorism, Violence, and Extremism” at Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University 20-22 April 2004. 672 Ibid: “Some of them wrote letters to their local governors to go and kill The Prophet Muhammad [P] unless he recanted his claim of prophethood, as was the case with the Emperor of Persia.” Such assertions are examples of historical manipulation. 673 Hamza Andreas Tzortzis, Is Jihad Terrorism? 5PillarsUK (2014). 674 Ibid. 675 Ibid, citing Zion Zohar, Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewry: from the Golden Age of Spain to modern times (Ney York City: NYU Press, 2005), 8-9. 669

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was Abu Bakr’s invasion into Iraq, for which we will argue there existed such a purpose. The only (major) discrepancy is his saying that the theoretical Islamic state may invade due to humanitarian reasons and suppressive conditions being committed against anybody. As per the verse of Qur’an 4:75,676 it is commanded that Muslims to fight those oppressing Muslims. Tzortzis, whose analysis was strictly historical, did not point this out. The last condition, invading for the sake of getting rid of oppressive administrative/judicial systems of other countries, was backed up by the case law of the Umayyad government’s invasion of Spain. There is no evidence provided that they had invaded for that reason, nor do they amount to case laws themselves. One should note that potential discrepancy of Tzortzis may be because he saw the Umayyads as a standard or legitimate extension of the legacy of the rightly guided Caliphs. Because he did not provide any other examples or arguments in literature or history, one can only say that the notion of the validity of attacking a nation to remove oppressive legal/administrative systems is unfounded.

7.2. CLASSICAL SCHOLARS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF JIHAD Though today, much of the discourse on Jihad relies on either the strictly offensive or strictly defensive Jihad, many of the classical Muslim scholars developed—though the may all be sided towards the offensive Jihad notion—different ways to understand how Jihad works, its purpose, and why it is Islamically necessary. Sharif677 discusses how Ibn Taymiyyah defined Jihad as “the struggle to remove fitna and until the religion, all of it, is for Allah,” quoting the verse of Qur’an 8:39 stating “And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah….” His conceptualization of Jihad has not as much a political, rather than religious objective; establishing the worship of God all over the world, and removing the primarily religious aspect of “Fitnah” from the entire world; Indeed, Ibn Taymiyyah defines fitnah as a primarily religious meaning, as evil or corruption of non-Muslims on the earth, referring to sin, transgression, and general “imperfections” or “disobedience” coming from non-devout Muslims or non-Muslims.678 This is religious in scope compared to the often political notion of “expanding the Islamic state,” almost ushering the Messianic notion of making the entire world worship God alone. Additionally, Ibn Taymiyyah sees Jihad not only as Physical, but also intellectual, through inviting people to Islam. In general, once a group of people or a kingdom refuses to accept Islam through intellectual da’wah, it is then necessary to carry out physical Jihad.679 In the sense of a jus ad bellum perspective, though Ibn Taymiyyah’s conceptualizations of Jihad are different, the result and criteria of when to use Jihad is the same—we cans the influence on the conservative Islamic element here. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah had two divisions of physical Jihad (the last of four types of Jihad in general); against Non-Muslims (Shahid says “polytheists” though it is generally 676

The Qur’an 4:75, “And what is [the matter] with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women, and children who say, "Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people and appoint for us from Yourself a protector and appoint for us from Yourself a helper?’” 677 Mohd Farid bin Bohd Sharif, “The Concept of Jihad and Baggy in Islamic Law: With Special Reference to Ibn Taymiyya,” (2006) PhD Dissertation at University of Edinburgh, 109. 678 Ibid, 110-112. 679 Ibid, 120-121.

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applies to simple non-Muslims) and the ‘disobedient’ Fāsiqs,680 which carries a very heavy term in Islamic thought. He states that, as per modern popular belief, the enemy is given the three options of conversion, paying the jizyah tax, or to fight.681 This notion is considered the expansionary, rather than defensive Jihad, and is hence, as al-Shafi’i, Al-Sarakhsi, Ibn Qudama, and Ibn Rushd classified it as something considered compulsory on every male Muslim in the case that there is not bough people to defend the land.682 According to these scholars, then, there is already a clear difference between the offensive and defensive jihad, citing both of them as necessary and an obligation to fulfill as a Muslim Ummah.683 Al-Shaybani, who is considered the father of Islamic international law, and the ‘grandfather’ of International law in general (taking the place of Hugo Grotius in the literature of recent),684 developed formalized justifications as to when Jihad may take place. Firstly, we should note that the Hanafi believe the cases are: to spread Islamic hegemony, to “discipline the Dhimmis,” fighting Muslim rebels, to bring apostates to repentance or justice, and in selfdefense of property and lives within the protection of the Islamic state. Al-Shaybani elaborated on the first justification; to spread Islamic hegemony. He says that there are several prerequisites to being justified to do so: a) righteous intention (for God, not personal gain and glory), b) legitimate authority (i.e., legitimate Islamic state), and c) very importantly, a peaceful invitation; as the purpose is to create Islamic hegemony, it is logical to do so peacefully before going for physical attack685. This overview of opinions was meant to provide basic understanding of the classical interpretation regarding the application of Jihad. The opinions of these renounced Muslim scholars has clear influence in conservative Islamic views. Additionally, we see that Islamists like Maududi and Qutb share the same religious ideology of the classical Muslims. More importantly, however, it explains how through centuries; from Abu Hanifah just a over century after Islam’s inception all the way to Ibn Qayyim in the 14th century and to Qutb and Maududi just a few decades ago, the Ideology of Islamic hegemony has been prevalent. The scholars discussed in the beginning of the chapter make it clear that their interpretations of Jihad being used as a tool to gain Islamic hegemony, the “convert, pay jizyah, or fight” myth, and to on, all developed from the Muslim scholarship after the fall of the Rashidun Caliphate. This means that the direct study of the originally incepted Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and the Rashidun Caliphate (which Islam is defined by) has, through the centuries, turned into the study of peoples’ opinions on Islam. In other words, empirical historical analysis of the period of Islam that defined the Islamic jus ad bellum has turned into the copy-and-paste of scholars’’ interpretations of what the jus ad bellum is. From the practical side of these scholars’’ arguments, we have already proved that jihad for the sake of speaking Islamic hegemony is not a criteria; as such arguments are based on out-of-context Qur’anic verses and misinterpretations of early Islamic history. As we saw 680

Ibid, p. 108. Ibid, p. 152. 682 This is a ruling known as Fardh-Kifaya, Adequate compulsory injunction, defined by Al-Shafi’i as “The indication in the verses is that it is not permissible that all men should fail to go forth; but that if some go forth, so that a sufficient number fulfills (the collective duty), the others do not fall into error, because the going forth by some would fulfill the duty.” (Ibid, 140). 683 Ibid, 137. 684 Fassbender et al., The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1082. 685 John Kelsay, “Al-Shaybani and the Islamic Law of War,” Journal of Military Ethics 2 (2003): 69-70. 681

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with Ibn Taymiyyah in quoting 8:39 to “fight them [disbelievers] until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah,” it is completely taken out of context of even the Qur’anic injunction, which states just 8 verses earlier discussing “disbelievers” who specifically “plotted against you [Muhammad] to restrain you or kill you or evict you [from Makkah],” which goes on to describe them in the next seven verses, finally giving the injunction to fight. The fact that it is not “any” disbeliever the Qur’an is commanding to fight, but rather, specifically the disbelievers who “plotted against you to restrain you or kill you or evict you,” changes the context from the inunction to fight any disbeliever unconditionally (as Ibn Taymiyyah states), to the context of when somebody acts in aggression, attempting to kill, plot against, and evict Muslims from their homes.

7.3. CONCLUSION The purpose of this chapter was to review the opinions regarding the criteria for the Islamic jus ad bellum in the scholarship. There are several articles and opinions, each differing and proposing a wide range of conclusions and observations. There are several patterns observed throughout the analysis. There are two main divisions of the interpretation of Jihad theory, namely, the neo-Orientalists (referred to as the ‘pro-aggressive Jihad supporters’), and the ‘Apologists’ or defensive-Islam supporters. The former group of literature seems to ignore historical context based on the first premise, that Islam by nature is expansionist.686 This is not a ‘bad’ conclusion per se, however, it lacks rigorous analysis and contextualization of historical events along with evidence in support of the underlying assumptions. Scholars, such as Qutb and Maududi who are obviously not neo-orientalist, still adhere to the notion of Jihad being offensive or expansionist. They are more likely to refer to historical events as a testimony to expansionist nature of Islam. Qutb directly refuted the apologists who analyzed only the prophet’s war interactions and emphasized the perhaps harder-to-prove defensive conquests of eastern Byzantium (and Ghassanid Empire) and the conquest of the Sassanian empire. For the two, having an offensive Jihad policy would seem fashionable, as the orientalist view at the time was dead against the stance of aggressive Jihad. It is also a pattern, it seems, that more political Islamists tend to have aggressive notions of Jihad, fitting the notions of political Islam. On the other side of the spectrum, there are the scholars supporting the defensive notion of Jihad, often referred to as apologists. They tend to be more objective in the sense that they analyze historical context and contextualize Qur’anic verses. However, one major discrepancy among nearly all of them should be noted. Without exception, all in the articles discussed; Esposito, Al-Dawoody, Cavanaugh, Badawi, and Ali and Rehman have all directly or indirectly acknowledged the ‘fact’ that Jihad mainly means struggle and self perseverance, and that the fighting portion of is a minor, less important part of it.687 Authors go from completely belittling the fighting Jihad and bringing 686 687

Fred Donner, “The sources of Islamic conceptions of war,” 49: Donner mentions this to be his starting-off assumption. See: Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, “Speaking Law into War,” 8; Badawi, “Muslim/ Non-Muslim relations: an integrative approach”; Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody, “War in Islamic Law: justifications and regulations,” 133; Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” 330; John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who speaks for Islam?: What a billion Muslims really think (Washington: Gallup Press, 2007), 10-11.

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great importance on self Jihad (as Badawi did), to acknowledging that the greater Jihad is self perseverance, while the combative Jihad is less significant-although important for the sake of the discussion (Cavanaugh’s, Al-Dawoody’s, Esposito’s conclusions). As stated above, we know that this is not a correct notion, but is advanced by the ‘apologists’ perhaps to soften the definition of Jihad, creating room for the argument that Islam is strictly defensive. The purpose of this chapter paper was to deconstruct current opinions in the literature, creating room to ‘set the table’; to conduct a historical and jurisprudential analysis of the application of Jihad, to eventually develop a standard criteria. This way, the onions groups of people, such as those in the contemporary literature and classical Islamic literature, can be analyzed and compared to the Jihad criteria in order to asses their legitimacy/conformity to the Islam of the Prophet and Four rightly guided Caliphs.

Chapter 8

TERRORISM, ISLAMIC LEGITIMACY, AND REGULATIONS ON ISLAMIC WARFARE 8.1. WHAT IS TERRORISM AND DOES ISLAM ALLOW IT? This study will first briefly overview our definition of terrorism for the purpose of being able to compare it to the injunctions of Islamic law. The definition will be split up into parts and compared to a summarized Jus in bello, in order to understand whether or not, and why Islam prohibits or allows certain acts that may be considered “terror.” Most of the analysis will be dedicated to comparing certain acts considered to be “terrorism” committed by certain groups and states. We finally decide, based on the pre-established Islamic criteria, how ‘Islamic’ those groups are based on these acts. Lastly, I cover a section that brings us into a conclusion regarding the state of the world and where Islam is found in it.

8.1.1. Logical Definition of Terrorism When we hear the word “terrorism,” aside from imagining a Middle Eastern man yelling “Allahu Akbar” (God is the greatest) in a chaotic setting, we imagine terrorism to display itself along the lines of there being violence against civilians, explosions, ideology or religion-based violence, and even violence during war. Progler correctly observes that “[b]ecause it has to agreed upon definition, terrorism can be used for a variety of purposes…[s]ometimes it means anybody who gets in our way, and at other times it means somebody who resists colonialisation or other forms of invasion”688 especially for the use of supporting US foreign policy through public opinion. Similarly, any state would be naturally inclined to accepting a definition that conveniently leaves out a place for their own actions. We have to be aware that our definition of “terrorism” is not that used in a political, public opinion-related, media-defined, or international law-defined vocabulary of terrorism, but we discuss terrorism that best applies to a universal standard. Such a definition then can only be a definition of actions or relating to the justness of certain actions and the contexts of 688

Yusef Progler, “Terrorism: Western definitions since 9/11” in Critical Thinking and Learning: An Encyclopedia for Parents and Teachers eds. Danny K. Weil, Joe L. Kincheloe (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004): 429.

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the actions, rather than the definition based on the opinion of a single state or that can be used to exploit a certain objective. The purpose here is not to do over definitions of terrorism or even discuss the application of terrorism in the chapter, but to rather be able to identify terrorism for our purpose (the Islamic definition), compare it to the Islamic standard, and then apply the Islamic viewpoint on terrorism to groups possibly practicing it. Let us list and analyze the several current definitions and compare them to the applicability before we proceed with our own definition. This would help understand the helplessness in modern-day vocabulary. The following is a list from a broad range of sources: 

 





689 690 691

692

FBI definition of International terrorism: “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”689 Oxford dictionaries’ definition: “The use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims.”690 United Nations Security Council: 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1566: “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature691” US Department of Defense: “The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political.”692 Alex Schmidt’s academic consensus definition for terrorism: “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of

"What We Investigate." FBI. Accessed November 9, 2012. http://www.fbi.gov/albuquerque/about-us/what-weinvestigate. Oxford Dictionaries, “Terrorism” definition: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_ english/terrorism. “Security Council Acts Unanimously to Adopt Resolution Strongly Condemning Terrorism as one of the Most Serious Threats to Peace” UN Security Council, 8 October 2004: http://www.un.org/ press/en/2004/sc8214.doc.htm. "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms." DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Accessed November 11, 2012. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.

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demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.”693 All of these definitions make the point of the act as having an objective; political, philosophical, idiosyncratic, etc. This makes a logical point; the act of violence has to be done with an ideological agenda of some sort, whether personal ideology, religion, political, etc. For the fact that we apply it to Islamic groups, individuals, as well as nations, we can accept all of the agendas from all of the definitions: idiosyncratic, philosophical, political, religious, racial, ethnic, etc. (or of similar nature)—though we are likely to only encounter terrorism for political and religious reasons. Another consideration is the description of violence, intended target, and so on. In Schmidt’s definition we find that the attack must be under the condition that “the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.” This has to be incorporated, and this way, the actions of targeting military and related targets under the justification of a just war is excluded. There is one illogical injunction found in Schmidt’s definition; the fact that the act must have “[t]hreat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims.” Because this injunction assumes the intention of the perpetrator of the act, it is never really or objectively possible to know whether or not something deliberately “sends a message.” Though each act could be discussed and possible intentions of the perpetrating individuals/groups/states can be guessed for every single attack, it is not necessary to invoke this intention-based criterion. Especially for our purposes, we find that in the case of an act’s adherence to Islam, the difference between whether or not it was “intended” to do something does not matter—unless in the case of truly noble cause— unless the act itself went against Islamic law in which the ends do not justify the means. The attempt to prove “intended” threats or fear-instillment is much harder than identifying the purpose of the act. Hence, we shall leave out this specific characteristic. Additionally, for our purpose of comparing certain acts to the Islamic standard, it is not necessary to identify why a certain act took place, but rather, whether it was made in the name of Islam or a related ideology. As usual, the US Department of Defense is quick to invoke the “lawfulness” of the act; if it is a lawful act—by American standards of course—then it cannot be classified as terrorism. Hence, no authorized act of the US government (authorized by themselves) can be characterized as terrorism. We cannot accept this definition due to the fact that such definition is not based on objective grounds. Our definition requires the act to be disconnected from its “lawfulness” for the exact fact that terrorism in its absolute sense should never be lawful (I would argue). Nevertheless, our definition is made for the purpose of comparing an isolated act or charge (terrorism) with an autonomous and separate value system/rule of law; Islam. Similarly, The UN Security Council (UNSC) states, “criminal acts, including…” We cannot accept “criminal acts” in a general sense, as that is also subject to a certain value system. The UNSC lists the acts intended to kill, injure, or take people hostage as potentially being terrorism. The UN Security Council (UNSC) also mentions the “inclusion” of civilians. The approach of also (potentially) including military targets is more logical, as acts against even

693

With over critique of 50 scholars: Alex P Schmidt, “The response problem as a definition problem” in Terrorism Studies: A Reader ed. John Horgan and Kurt Braddock (London: Routledge, 2007), 91.

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so-called lawful (such as military) targets can be considered terrorism if there is no justification for jus ad bellum or does not apply to jus in bello. Though I understand the limitedness of the analysis—I believe we can now form our definition of terrorism based on the above brief analysis of selected definitions. Because we will be comparing certain acts and ideological motivations behind the acts rather than the acts themselves, we must consider exactly which acts our definition covers—as Islam has a different viewpoint on each of these acts. We are also significantly leaving out the portion of the definition that attempts to examine the intention behind the attack, because it does not make a difference when it comes to the Islamic view (i.e., killing someone is not allowed of it is not allowed according to the divine law, despite whatever pragmatic objective it carries). Keeping this in mind, I define an act of terrorism as such: “An act committed by an individual, group or state actor with political, idiosyncratic, religious, philosophical, or other reasons of the like, which employs physical violence, death, injury, or damage of private or public property against either military or nonmilitary targets, unless during a state of war in which the latter target is exempt.”

From the perspective of most, such a definition is can not technically be classified as terrorism in the objective view of scholarly analysis. However, this definition fits the needs of our analysis, though being separate from others, due to several reasons. Firstly, the fact that either an individual, group, or state can commit terrorism is important to understand, because Islamic justifications of violent acts depend on the perpetrator and whether or not the perpetrator was authorized, ordered, or recommended to carry out the act. Secondly, I have limited the acts that can be classified as terrorism for our analysis to specific acts that employ violence, while making a distinction between death, injury, and property, for which each of the categories Islamic law may have a separate ruling. Thirdly, the military and non-military targets have been distinguished for the fact that the definition between terrorism and war interchange depending whether or not a proper jus ad bellum is issued by the Islamic state. Note that this is not a definition of terrorism in a universal or popular sense, nor should it be used as such. It is simply a definition of what I call terrorism throughout the analysis that being a comprehensive term for people who damage life, health, and/or property of a land based on an ideological, political, or religious agenda. An analysis of each of the factors discussed above is first applied into the context of the permissibility of such acts under the umbrella classification of terrorism under Islamic law. We thereby examine the relationship between Islam and acts of terrorism. The second part of the analysis is a classification of selected groups and nations in relation to their adherence to Islam and overall relationship with terrorism. Note that the Islamic permissibility does effect the definition in the sense that in the view of Islamic law, any act of violence based on a religious, ideological, or political agenda, and that what may be considered terrorism may not be considered as such from an Islamic perspective, if the Islamic jus ad bellum and jus in bello are properly used—this accounts for the “unless during a state of war” qualification.

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8.1.2. Terrorism and the Islamic Jus in Bello This section is dedicated to providing an Islamic perspective on certain acts of terrorism committed by armed groups and nations, also providing specific examples. We analyze the ‘basics’ of terrorist attacks; death and injury of Muslims and non-Muslims under specific circumstances, hostage-taking, damage of public or private property. Micolus and Simmons694 overview and discuss the 50 “worst” terrorist attacks that have occurred in the 20-21st centuries. Several examples from these will be analyzed.

8.1.2.1. Killing of Civilians As discussed in the jus in bello chapter (chapter 5), it is not lawful in Islam to conduct directed attacks towards non-combatants, even in a state of war, despite whether they may be Muslims, non-Muslims, polytheists, or of any religion. This means that any attack on civilians, in any country, committed by anybody, is not lawful in Islam. Some of the more clear-cut attacks, such as the September 2013 21-24 Kenyan Westgate Shopping mall attack, 2006 Mumbai train bombings, and the Boston Bombing attacks, in which civilians and civilian targets were explicitly and directly attacked, are completely prohibited in Islam. If you recall, the Kenyan West-gate shopping mall attack consisted of a three-day siege of a large Kenyan shopping mall in Nairobi which it is said the Somalian Al-Shabaab group had claimed responsibility for,695 resulted in the deaths of 67 people and 175 injured. The Mumbai train bombings in 2006 consisted of several subsequent bomb attacks in several “first class rail cars,” resulting in the death of 200 and injury of over 800.696 Very recently, a group of people claiming697 to belong to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or IS (Islamic State) attacked several locations—several restaurants and a theatre—that resulted in the deaths of 130 people with over 350 people injured. Such attacks, and attacks of the like, which meet the criteria of targeting civilians not engaged in any specific activity or working against the interests of the Islamic state, are impermissible in Islam. Furthermore, any attack committed by a group that is not a legitimate Islamic state cannot be allowed to carry out any attacks of any sort. Therefore, militias, individuals (“lone wolves”), or any clandestine or semiclandestine group that commits and action towards and group of people, military or nonmilitary, are not legitimate in the Islamic law. Though we have established that the general killing of targeted innocent people anywhere in the world at any time is unacceptable in Islam, there are some situations in which attacks that can be Islamically justified. It is important to acknowledge now that in the end many of these attacks have high skepticism. Even through reports of mainstream media, we find that— though nothing specific is being implied—not every attack can be considered to be committed by the group claiming it or blamed for. Though the actual validity of conspiracy theories for 694

Edward F. Mickolus, Susan L. Simmons, The 50 Worst Terrorist Attacks (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2014). “Somalia's al-Shabab claims Nairobi Westgate Kenya attack” BBC 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-24191606. 696 Edward F. Mickolus, Susan L. Simmons, The 50 Worst Terrorist Attacks, 219. 697 Though it was said ISIS had claimed responsibility for the attacks, and the Washington Post and several media outlets even provide a statement from ISIS found at their “wordpress” site. However, such claims can be vague and unambiguous. A former MI5 officer argued that is “bear[s] all the hallmarks of a Gladio-style operation.”: http://www.express.co.uk/news/weird/630279/Former-MI5-officer-outrage-claiming-Paris-terror-attacksinside-job-ISIS-Daesh That being said, such acitons go against Islamic jus in bello. 695

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several (less) significant attacks are not discussed in the literature, if mentioned at all, it is still important to keep in mind that there is valid skepticism related to the perpetrators and “claims of responsibility” in regards to several specific attacks. Even though it is impossible to complete a thorough analysis here, it must remain an open-door issue as to whether or not the groups committed the attacks. As scholars seeking the most logical explanation of observed phenomena, it is impossible to deny conflicting (or non-existent) evidence, logical inconsistency, scientific inconsistency, observed in many of the attacks. Let us examine the Islamic position on attacking military targets in valid times of war. Based on any standard, including the Islamic standard, it is just and permissible to attack military targets of the entity that has invaded the defending state’s territory. From an Islamic point of view, it would be permissible for the Taliban for instance, to resist invasion and complete eradication. It can be logically argued that though getting (killing) Bin laden was a reasons that adhered to the public opinion, the true invasion of Afghanistan had the larger motivation or eradicating “radical” Islam from the region. If this is the case, then the Taliban have a clear Islamic right to defend themselves and put themselves in a state of war with the US. Hence, any attacks on military targets, whether active or inactive, is justified from an Islamic point of view. It cannot be considered “terrorism” from an Islamic point of view to attack an invading force. The same thing can be said about the former-Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan and its defense, and the resistance against British colonial invasion. The Qur’an justifies attacking “those who fight you” (2:190)698 and prohibits “dealing justly with those that displaced you from your home and have killed (some of) you because of your faith” (60:8). Note that whether or not international law justified invading Afghanistan for the sake of Bin Laden, even if it were the true and only cause, still the Taliban had the right to resist their attackers, due to the simple fact that a) they themselves were not responsible for the attack and are put into the position of self-defense; and b) it is not considered an act of war by Islamic standard to give asylum to somebody accused of a crime by an external force. Now, in rebuttal, it could in fact be argued that the Muslims considered it an act of war for the Banu Qurayzah (back in Prophet’s time) to allow a person in a state of war with the Muslims into their custodianship and conspire with them. Therefore, it would mean the Taliban would be responsible for 9/11 and hence deserved invasion. However, this case has two points that make it inapplicable. Firstly, the Muslims in the Prophet’s time had a peace treaty (the Madinah constitution; See appendix A for terms) with the Banu Qurayzah which assumes at least trust and cooperation between the two, and specifically disallowed exactly what they had done. There is still a problem that we face, it is whether or not Bin Laden was working against US interests before 9/11, which he was with Al-Qaeda, which takes us back to the involvement of the US in other parts of the world. Because this is not the time and place to discuss just war as opposed to specific classifications of attacks, we can simply conclude that the Taliban, if acting in self-defense, which is at least the case after it was realized by the Taliban that the purpose of the invasion was to get rid of them completely, is Islamically justified in raising an armed opposition against the invading forces. Islamically, bad faith of US invading force was clear when Bin Laden was killed but occupation continued. Also, note that Islam puts great value on individual rights and liberty. For instance, if a person is killed defending his property against robbers/intruders, he is considered to be a 698

See Chapter 4, section two, “Qur’anic criteria for hostility.”

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martyr. A state is a collection of individuals, and even if Taliban didn’t have a strictly legitimate Caliphate, they would have the right to defend their land and take all measures to free themselves from occupation as per Qur’an 60:8. Note that the ruling doesn’t say the attack on property has to be related to faith, whereas attack of person is. It means that the right to retaliate is accorded against the invader no matter what the motivation is but the right to retaliate against state-sponsored killing is only related to ‘attack because of faith.’ From a much larger viewpoint of US hegemony and the larger guise of the “war on terror,” it would seem justified for Muslims to attack military targets that have been imposed upon Muslim countries. Discussing the legitimacy of the countries and groups is a separate issue, but what can be established is that Islam permits war in self-defense (not to confuse with pre-emptive attacks) against military targets—the legitimacy of the war, however, no longer exists when innocent civilians are targeted anywhere in the world. For this section (as it will be reassessed), the legitimacy of the war is not as much the concern as the question of whether or not acts of violence may be employed in self defense. If the Taliban’s armed struggle is seen as justifiable by the Islamic jus ad bellum, which it would if it were counteracting US hegemony, then it is justified to attack military targets, and even permit collateral damage as long as it is not directed to civilians. Finally, note that though injury does not carry the same heavy weight as unjust killing, unlawful injury or torture is also strictly prohibited.

8.1.2.2. Hostage-Taking There are no explicit jus in bello rules in the Qur’an and Hadith regarding hostage taking, though there are rules on how to deal with the enemy possibly taking hostages pertaining to collateral damage rules. We are left with more general principles to make our way around Islam’s permissibility of hostage-taking. When we refer to hostages, we refer to taking somebody for a specific purposes such as safe passage, and general demands. On the socalled battle-field, after war has been declared, there is no prohibition from seizing people and demanding things in exchange; ransom, exchange for captives, and so on, as we found in our jus in bello review regarding dealing with male war captives. It is also permissible to take the wives and children of surrendered/lawfully executed groups of people into slavery, for ransom, or set free, as the Prophet Muhammad had dealt with the Banu Qurayzah. Note that such a situation is very limited to judicial rulings in charges of treason and the dealing of families of killed combatants, with no other exception. This implies that even in a state of war, non-combatants and the families of non-combatants are not permissible to take captive, implying that hostage taking is not permissible in Islamic law. There are hundreds of incidences of hostage-taking in the modern world we live in today. Of the most famous Islamic hostage takings are two selected ones, one being an Islamically permissible case, and the other non-permissible; the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and the 1995 Chechen Mujahideen hostage-takings. After the Iranian revolution, hundreds of Iranian “radical” students sieged and were able to storm the embassy, taking all of the embassy members hostage. The new Iranian government backed the hostage-taking and demanded that the Shah be extradited, be acknowledged as a criminal, required the US to no longer be a part of or engage in internal domestic issues of the Iranian government. They also accused the diplomats of spying and coordinating with the Pahlavi Dynasty’s government. Several of the hostages, specifically women and African Americans, were released owing to their special status in Islamic law, though those thought to be spies were kept by the Iranian government.

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Several months after the hostage taking, the US had increased nearly-full sanctions and failed to rescue the remaining hostages. The hostages were released after a consented-upon international tribunal ruling that all hostages be released.699 The other example, that of June of 1995, Chechen Muslim separatists during the first Chechen war stormed a Hospital in the Russian city of Budennovsk, taking over a thousand hostages (around 1300). They had killed several hostages including police and military official captives, demanding Russian troopwithdrawal from the Caucuses. This followed with several deaths resulting in attempted rescue attempts, but no full success. The hostage issue was resolved after an agreement between the Chechens and Russian government, in exchange for free passage and a ceasefire agreement.700 There are many differences between the hostage takings, all of which prove the “Islamicness” of the Iranian effort and the unlawfully pragmatic efforts of the Chechens. While both took hostages, one was of an Islamically-granted, legitimate group of war captives, and the other was a hospital with only a handful of non-civilians. The taking of war captives only applies to those engaged in war, whether by fighting, espionage, or by other means working against the interests of the state. It was wrong to take all of the staff hostage, though it is interesting to see how that was corrected, and only those suspected of espionage and “meddling” with Iranian domestic policy working alongside the Shah government were kept as captive—this act is inherently Islamic. None of the captives were killed or harmed by the captors, there was no torture, and captives were given necessary food, water, and shelter, as per Islamic jus in bello law (see Chapter 5). The act of releasing the hostages based on the ruling of an independent arbitrator did not necessarily conflict with the Islamic order to either ransom or free the captives. On the other hand, the Chechen hostage-takers violated several Islamic jus in bello laws. Firstly, it is not lawful to take hostages that do not qualify as war criminals, and it is not even allowed to apprehend anybody unless suspected of committing a crime. Going into a hospital, apprehending 1300 innocent non-war-captives and putting their lives at serious danger all individually break Islamic jus in bello laws. Secondly, the killing of the five war captives, whether military, police, or civilians, also breaks fundamental Qur’anic injunctions. The selection and treatment of the captives oppose fundamental Islamic laws. Van Engeland-Nourai is correct to point out that, as we saw was Qutb’s and Maududi’s interpretation of Jihad, such extremists take a strictly pragmatic approach with the overall objective of reaching Islamic hegemony. Though Maududi did elaborate and put very correct restrictions on the Islamic jus in bello, people in the ideological camp of Ali al-Khudair701 claim that “each American is either a warrior or, a supporter in money or opinion, of the American government. It is legitimate to kill all of them, be they combatants or noncombatants like the old, the blind, or non-Muslims.”702 Perhaps it could be said that the Chechens had a “noble” cause of spreading the true religion of Islam as the other extremists view their mission. Whatever be the case, because Islam is ruled by the process (the means) and not the conclusion (the ends), it can be safely said that it is against Islam to pursue an agenda when it goes contrary to explicit Qur’anic orders. 699

Edward F. Mickolus, Susan L. Simmons, The 50 Worst Terrorist Attacks, 39-43. Ibid. 701 al-Khudair is a Muslim Saudi Arabian cleric arrested in 2003 in connection to the 9/11 attacks. 702 Anicée Van Engeland-Nourai, “The challenge of fragmentation of international law regarding the protection of civilians: an Islamic perspective,” In Jihad and its challenges to international and domestic law M. Cherif Bassiouni and Amna Guellali eds. (Hague: Hague Academic Press, 2010): 18. 700

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We can conclude out of these opposing examples that the acts of a group, whether claiming to be permissible by Islam or not, that each of the specific actions of the perpetrators actually determine whether or not Islamic laws were being followed. Hostage-taking is permitted only when lawful captives, viz. war captives, are taken. Furthermore, the captives can be used to negotiate for money or other demands, but cannot be killed even if they are suspected of espionage or even physically fighting the state.

8.1.2.3. Suicide Bombing In this case, the Islamic law is being compared to a process by which a person were to commit a violent act, whereto unlawful or lawful. Apologetic Muslims are quick to quote verses 2:195 stating “And spend in the way of Allah and do not throw [yourselves] with your [own] hands into destruction [by refraining]. And do good; indeed, Allah loves the doers of good.” and 4:29 stating “And do not kill yourselves703,” referring to committing suicide. Though when in a state of war one is obviously expected to desire martyrdom and is putting one’s life at risk, it is separate from directly being the physical cause of one’s own death, as the verses imply. Al-Tirmidhi (hadith scholar and commentator, d. 892 CE) notes that it was said the context of the former verse (2:195) was not referring to physical suicide, but that the “destruction” referred to not spending money for the sake of God and hoarding it704. However, the latter verse referred to a case narrated by Ibn Kathir705: “`Amr bin Al-`As said that when the Prophet sent him for the battle of Dhat AsSalasil, ‘I had a wet dream during a very cold night and feared that if I bathed, I would die. So I performed Tayammum (with pure earth) and led my company in the Dawn prayer. When I went back to the Messenger of Allah, I mentioned what had happened to me and he said, ‘O `Amr! Have you led your people in prayer while you were in a state of sexual impurity.’ I said, ‘O Messenger of Allah! I had a wet dream on a very cold night and feared that if I bathed I would perish, and I remembered Allah’s statement, And do not kill yourselves. Surely, Allah is Most Merciful to you). So I performed Tayammum and prayed.’ The Messenger of Allah smiled and did not say anything.’”

The narration implies that putting one’s self into a scenario in which there is serious risk of death is not allowed. The obvious exception would be that in the heat of war, the goal being seek martyrdom706 and fight the enemy, it is required to put one’s self in at risk. Though that is the case, it is obviously a separate issue to deliberately be the cause of one’s own death. From an empirical analysis of the Qur’an and Hadiths, it is clear that this explicit act is strictly prohibited. Van Engeland-Nourai lists the several arguments, Qur’anic verses, and supporters of this notion,707 and also lists the “fatwas” of a certain Al-Qaradawi and 703

Though “Lā taqtalū anfusakum” could be interpreted as “do not kill each other,” Ibn Kathir has proved it to mean “yourself” through quoting the Hadith to which it was applied, implying that killing one’s self or putting one’s self in a high-risk situation is not allowed (unless in war etc). See: Ismail Ibn Kathir, “Forbidding Murder and Suicide,” in Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir: 10 volumes. 704 Muhammad at-Tirmidhi, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Book 47, Hadith 3236. 705 See note 715. 706 The Prophet is reported to have said that “He who seeks martyrdom with sincerity shall get its reward, though he may not achieve it” in Book 20, Hadith 4694 Sahih Muslim. 707 Anicée van Engeland-Nourai, “The challenge of fragmentation of international law regarding the protection of civilians: an Islamic perspective,” 156-157.

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Hamid al-Ali.708 Their Fatwas advanced the argument that it is permissible in order to frighten the enemy and as a fulfillment of martyrdom. Again, these are both examples of the pragmatic Islam that we are observing among the ‘extremist’ Islamic line of thought.

8.1.2.4. Damage of Private and Public Property Just as death, injury, and hostage-taking can be applied to terrorism, destruction of private or public property, whether to achieve a goal or only to pass a message, can still be considered terrorism. Goppel believes it can constitute terrorism, giving the example of targeting “closed public buildings during the night or against chemical factories or nuclear stations.”709 I would add any examples of private property as well, as they fit within our definition. The Islamic jus in bello law covered the appropriation of and dealing with private property in different classifications. We established that even the appropriation of somebody’s private property after a takeover is not permitted, unless the person is killed fighting the Islamic state. Also, within the war, private property is not something that should intentionally be targeted. Though nowadays, especially in modern warfare, it is impossible not to damage private property. Because it is not the right of the people to deal with others’ property, it would logically follow that someone’s private property cannot be targeted either. Of course, there are large exceptions. For instance, the targeting of a major financial source(s) aiding the enemy would certainly be justified even if a person or corporation were to own it, making it a lawful military target due to its active role in combating the Islamic state. Other than this exception, however, it is unlawful to target peoples’ private property during the course of the war. Even military mercenary equipment can be regarded as “private” property; there is no distinction between public or private property if it is being used to actively fight the Islamic state. Public property has a different method of being dealt with under Islamic law. In Islamic jus in bello law, it is considered legitimate to appropriate, distribute, or create agreements with possible employees (the “land”-tax agreement). Within public property, there also has to be a distinction between the two types. The first type would be, as with private property, any property being used by the state to finance or otherwise help the government in war against the Islamic state; it becomes permissible to attack the target. The second type includes structures such as public offices, service-centers, and other things that help the state in a nonwar-related manner. For the first type, it would be Islamically justified, only when in a state of war. In fact, during the course of the war, anything or person actively or explicitly aiding the government in their battle against the Islamic state would be considered a just target. However, when not in a state of war, just as it is unlawful to even attack military targets, it would apply to property being used to attack military targets. Regarding the second type of public property, any other government-owned property, the same rule would apply in regards to the property. Because the goal in war is to weaken the enemy, it is justified to cause havoc, disorganization, and instability within the state, and justified to attack any government-owned property as it is not private property (someone’s right), but becomes the property (right) of the

708 709

Ibid, 21. Anna Goppel, Killing Terrorists: A Moral and Legal Analysis (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013), 22.

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Muslim government to posses it when it appropriates the territory.710 That being said, the civilians would not be allowed to be targeted, as it is not permissible to attack somebody not directly helping war against the state. Though, as usual, collateral damage is allowed, it must be minimized to the level of “possible” hurting; attacking in a situation where it is known there will be innocent civilians is not permissible, as with the human shield scenario discussed in Chapter 5. Unequivocally, the most controversial and largest terrorist attacks on US soil were the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Though it can be and is very disheartening to write about the Islamic legitimacy of such a public (and academic) taboo, it is necessary. Randall writes, “Indeed, this sensitivity borders the kind of sacralizing that occurred in the mainstream culture and media in the immediate aftermath of after 9/11. Such ‘sacred’ and ‘taboo’ discourses are precisely the ones that define how authors represent, or even feel able to represent, the attacks”711 speaking about the authors’ general sensitivity in writing on the topic. I believe such an attack would have to fall under this section, if it were to be attempted to be justified. I classify it in this section due to the fact that the only condition in which the attack could ever be justified is the justification of attacking public property, because it did have very serious negative economic,712 social and political impacts.713 However, this would only be permitted in the case that there was a war. Though Al-Qaeda could justify itself as being at war with he US (as it is), because it is not an Islamic state, it does not have the authority to even declare an act of war without doing so under the guise of a Caliphate (discussed in the next section). Additionally, the attack killed thousands of innocent civilians who were not actively and explicitly helping the US government (with the exception of the attack on Pentagon). We can now break down the reasons as to why 9/11 was not Islamically justified, and under which conditions it would be justified. The following are Islamic rules broken in the twin-tower attacks: a) Innocent, unjustified civilian-killing, b) Unjustified targeting of private property (arguably),714 and c) committing any violence without an Islamic state permitting it. For the attack on the pentagon, (a) would apply to the civilians o the place, as would (c) to the Islamic context. The following are conditions under which the twin-tower attacks would be justified: a) targeting the property at night to have no (certain) collateral damage, b) attack the towers without planes holding civilians (goes without saying), c) justifying that the twintower property was equivalent to that of a modern-day aristocracy, and d) doing so under the guise of an Islamic state. For the pentagon attack, (b) and (d) would only be needed to justify it from an Islamic perspective.

710

Even if the territory was not appropriated, the fact that it would have been the right of the Mulsims to appropriate, rather than individuals’ (as was an for the Sawad land), means that it is a lawful target due to the fact that it belongs to the government (the enemy) and not individuals. 711 Martin Randall, 9/11 and the Literature of Terror (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 24. 712 Bryan W. Roberts, “Macroeconomic Impacts of the 9/11 Attack: Evidence from Real-Time Forecasting” US Department of Homeland Security (2009), acknowledges short and potentially (or even likely) long-term negative economic effects. 713 Unlike with economic analysis, the psychological, political, militarily, societal, and other effects cannot be understated. 714 It depends on the level of assimilation between the highly rich people and government. It could possibly be justified that the property was of aristocratic nature—genuinely controlling government policy, in which case it would be equivalent to government property and justified to attack.

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8.1.2.5. The Perpetrators of Violence Matters As we have spent two chapters (2 and 3) establishing that war, criminal law, governance law, and all other non-personal or familial matters of life can only be practiced legitimately by a Caliphate. As the careful reader will recall, the only reason why a Caliphate—in which all and only Islamic laws are enforced—is the legitimate group or state under which Islamic laws can be enforced is because when a non-Caliphate enforces them, it implies that a group or state has the authority to enforce the ‘divine law,’ without declaring and taking responsibility for upholding the laws of God. This, of course, can be done precisely by creating the Caliphate, taking the oath allegiance, and so on. Additionally, a non-Caliphate state that enforces part Shari’ah law and part non-Shari’ah necessarily implies that the state is non-Islamic (falling under verse 2:85 and 4:150-151).715 Acts of violence by the state, as in the case of the US definition of terrorism, by definition cannot be terrorism if it is permitted by the. Similarly, actions that involve violence and war cannot be, by definition, non-permissible—i.e., God declared it unjust, unless the state is employing a non-divine foreign policy (against God’s rule of law). The difference regarding the permissibility to employ something that may be considered terrorism otherwise between a country like the US and the Caliphate model, is that the Caliphate model policies have a universally applicable policy; it is not a product of what one group of individuals is right for another group of individuals, such as someone in another country, just as the US defines its policies. Rather, the Caliphate model of policy does not change, and applies to mankind as a whole, where it is not what one group decides is better for a population, but God—who is of course considered to know better than any individual or group of individuals would. One of the primary problems with the non-autonomous value system model is that when it comes to international relations lacks complete global vision. When translated into terrorism policy, we realize that although Islamic law would justify an intervention, war, or immunity from terrorism (in the subjective sense)—because God justified it—the US or any other state cannot justify why an intervention would be applicable. God, as an external entity, has the ability to objectively deliver a set of laws that can be followed universally, as Islam states. Hence, anybody not following the rule of god cannot justify any enacted laws. This observation, in essence, eliminates the need for United Nations, let alone veto power to selected countries. Regarding international relations theory, even in an idealist716 world where there are common morals and understandings of right and wrong, there can be no reason why even a consensus of individuals would possess the moral authority to meddle in the affairs of another state at all.

715 716

It stipulates that people who “reject” a part of the orders of the Qur’an and accept another part are disbelievers, the worst amongst them, in fact. International Relations idealist Hedley bull defines the dominant Idealist international relations theory as understood by leading scholars such as Zimmern, Baily, Mitrany, Potter, and Moon, as “the belief, in particular, that the system of international relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order; that under the impact of the awakening of democracy, the growth of 'the international mind,’ the development of the League of Nations, the good works of men of peace or the enlightenment spread by their own teaching, it was in fact being transformed; and that their responsibility as students of international relations was to assist this march of progress to overcome the ignorance, the prejudices, the ill-will, and the sinister interests that stood in its way” in Hedley Bull, “The Theory of International Poliitcs 1919-1969” in International Relations: Section I. The nature and purpose of international relations theory. Section II. Idealism and realism ed. Andrew Linklater (UK: Taylor and Francis, 2000): 58.

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Regardless of the moral inconsistencies of non-Caliphate countries (from an Islamic point of view), the point being made here is that from an Islamic perspective, any act of violence whatsoever is absolutely prohibited in Islamic law without the establishment of an Islamic state first. From a subjective-Islamic perspective, this is very logical, for the fact that any act of violence or political action cannot be considered right or lawful unless it is approved by God. Hence, it can be considered terrorism to commit any act of violence without a jus ad bellum. For Muslims, they must have a state to have a jus ad bellum. For a non-Caliphate state, group, or individual, Muslim or non-Muslim, it is considered unlawful violence— terrorism—to engage in any act of violence. In this sense, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and any other Islamist group or nation is not even close to being an Islamically legitimate state, and therefore, their acts of violence, whether on military or non-military targets, whether there is correct jus ad bellum followed or not, cannot be legitimated by Islamic law. This is due to lack of divine authority, in absence of which there is no real rule of law. Again, the reason why any group or country is required to declare itself a state before doing something like declaring war, is that it serves as a prerequisite—it allows for God’s authority to be handed from the last successor (the Rashidun Caliphate) to the new successor, and gives a group or country the only Islamic state legitimacy in the world. As was said in Chapter Two717, the reason why Muslims must have a state to practice their religion in whole is so they can practice the Qur’anic orders otherwise not doable by a group of people or a nation. In absence of a Caliphate, the talk of executing Qur’anic laws is a moot point. To summarize, Ibn Khaldun put it thus: “Government decisions are as a rule unjust, because pure justice is found only in the legal caliphate that lasted only a short while. Muhammad said: ‘The caliphate after me will last thirty years; then, it will revert to being tyrannical royal authority.’”718

8.1.3. Conclusion The purpose of this section was to briefly overview the different actions that would fall under the category of “terrorism,” and compare it with the Islamic jus ad bellum, as discussed in Chapter 4. This discussion provides a bridge between Islamic laws and actions of so-called Shari’ah-compliant groups or countries. This also examines the alleged “Islamicness” of several countries and groups, such as ISIS. What is important to establish is that when discussing Islamic legitimacy, to commit any act of violence, there must be a Caliphate under which the act of violence—or even war—is done. If we are to find out the truth regarding anything, an objective approach must be taken. This section briefly provides an example as exactly how to apply Islamic scenarios into modern-day applications, by first defining permissibility of a specific act in Islam, and then applying that act to a modern context. Several other attempts to do so often either end up in attempts to discount the faith and transform it in a way to claim that Islam is liberal democratic, or in attempts to vilify Islam. The example of Van Engeland-Nourai’s analysis 717

Excerpt from Chapter 2: “The commands of God include a divine law and governance system mandated by God, which requires a state in order to provide the jurisdiction to fulfill the commands of the laws. THerefore, Islam is certainly not a “religion” or has anything to do with “politics,” but is rather a comprehensive form of life, a path to submit to God, which includes spiritual, personal, familial, communal, and political life defined by the Qur’an and Hadith.” 718 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, 4:16 Para 1.

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was a perfect example of such discourse, which is desires for the fact that it is objective, as well as that it inquires into the specific Islamic laws justifying specific acts. Such analysis can be used as a process of building an Islamic golden standard, as this book does, in order to compare this standard to the other self-proclaimed “Islamic” movements. This is a very useful cognition tool, as can be used to examine the Islamic viewpoint in any application, and can define Islam as it is, rather than as it should be.

8.2. EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION This second part of the analysis is dedicated towards demonstration of the application. The goal here will be to compare the established Islamic political structure, alongside the Islamic jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and compare them to certain selected groups and states. For the academic reader, this section demonstrates how a country or group, or their actions can be compared to the golden Islamic standard and determine the level of adherence to Islam they have. For other audiences, this section provides information as to why groups such as ISIS or so-called “Islamic countries” like Saudi Arabia do not represent Islam, and what factors their true Islamicness depends on. Note that this analysis is not so much about the conclusion or determination of “Islamicness” or “Un-Islamic-ness” as much as it is analysis that looks into how different factors and actions of these actors affect their Islamic legitimacy. No determinative answer can be expected—especially in the case of ISIS—as several actions and alleged actions have a significant amount of opacity, unless a much more in-depth analysis, with a much wider amount of confirmed information (i.e., declassified intelligence) pool, is made available. Throughout the analysis, it should also kept in mind that this line of discussion is not intended to be a part of a greater ideological stance or vision for Islam; and especially not apologetic. Though it may seem obvious with discussion in the book, it must be asserted that in doing this analysis, the conclusions that arise should not and are meant not to support any existing ideological discourse against the acknowledgement of Islam’s inherent political requirement. On June 29, 2014, the leader of ISIS Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi proclaimed the Caliphate. This was a very bold and reformative move on the side of militant Islamic groups that had entirely ignored the notion of the Caliphate since the 1930s. Even during the Taliban’s 5-year rule of Afghanistan (1996-2001), they did not proclaim the honorary, historic, and Islamically-required Caliphate government. ISIS claims to be ruling by the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet, fulfilling the Islamic obligation of an Islamic state. So far, the news headlines have been cluttered with headlines that focus on “horrifying” and “barbaric” forms of punishment for the violation of Islamic laws. Islamic scholars were quick to call ISIS ‘Khawarij’ (Kharajite), meaning like the Kharijites in the 7th century, ISIS is a splinter group that enforced their interpretation of extreme law. Though it is convenient to label ISIS as a splinter Kharajite-like group, the irony oozes out when one tallies the facts against Islamic history. It is a fact that the ideology of the scholars that are spewing out venomous accusations against ISIS are the ones that imitate the Kharajite ideology of “only God can rule” themselves, on top of their belief that Islam cannot have a state—a “fantasy” as Hamza Yusuf described it—just as the Kharijites believed once.

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8.2.1. Profiles: Saudi Arabia and ISIS A non-state group and a country will be used for the analysis. Firstly and most importantly, ISIS will be analyzed. Owing to a recent, dramatic, and highly controversial claim of the Caliphate, ISIS has positioned itself as the prime candidate for this particular analysis. The reason that the infamous Al-Qaeda cannot be analyzed is due to the fact that it is too diffused, remote, dispersed (in many countries) and elusive to be covered in a scholarly analysis. The state being analyzed is often depicted as the typical “Shariah country”; Saudi Arabia. Despite its Islamic legitimacy factor being nil (0), it remains the most “Shari’ahbased” country in the world, at least in public opinion.

8.2.1.1. Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia, a self-proclaimed Islamic state, was founded in 1932 by ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz Al Saud. Since then the country has been ruled by one of the male descendants of Al-Saud, classifying it as a monarchy. The Saudi Embassy to the United States has posted their decree, titled “The Basic Law of Governance” consisting of 83 articles719. They claim that the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunnah is their constitution, in which the “most upright among them shall receive allegiance” as per the Sunnah, the Bay’ah; pledge of allegiance.720 This King contains the executive, legislative, and judiciary powers ultimately, though there are divisions and independent powers operating on their own. Judges and advisory fatwas (decrees with divine authority) are to be consistent with the Qur’an and Sunnah ultimately; though generally, formally decreed fatwas are not challenged by individual judges. These judges rule following Islamic jurisprudence books, written by the Hanbali school of thought. King Abdullah reformed the judiciary in 2007, allowing for Appeals and Supreme courts, consisting of a panel of judges. These courts are charged with the ability to amend the ruling or order retrial, or reverse the verdict. The King serves as the ultimate judge, who is to consent to orders regarding amputation or capital punishment. There are also other cases of how division of types of trials and courts exist; for instance, a small level judge cannot give verdict on criminal matters. In low-level adjudication, there is also a difference between low-level, religious, mufti rulings (advisory) and legally binding judiciary rulings721. It can be said that there is a general disparity between generally King-approved fatwas, religious Mufti rulings, and the independent judiciary. The “council of ministers” headed by the King who is prime minister, as similar to the Privy Council of the UK, is expected to draft and oversee law implementation722. The king also has full control over the “Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia,” all positions of which are appointed by the king723. They are given autonomy to lay down certain “regulations and bylaws to meet the public interest, in accordance with the principles of the Islamic Shari’ah.” For instance, in 2003, they did not require consent from the King to pass legislation, and are

719

Saudi Arabia Government, “The Basic Law of Governance,” Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. https://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/laws/The_Basic_Law_Of_Governance.aspx. 720 Ibid, Article 5. 721 Jan Michael Otto, Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 156-161. 722 Saudi Arabia Government, “Basic Rule of Law,” Articles 56-57. 723 Ibid, 67-69.

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adhering to a trend to have more independence and ability to draft and pass laws in the future—which has even opposed government policy.724 Since its inception, the Saudi government has also included municipal elections to govern local affairs. Since 2011, women have been allowed to register and run for public municipal office as per royal decree by the late King Abdullah (d. 2015).725 In 2005, only half of the seats in municipal councils were allowed to be elected, compared to none previously726. Under King Abdullah’s rule, two Human Rights commissions were established and cooperated with international human rights groups. It also joined the WTO international trade monitoring organization in 2005727. Saudi Arabia is also infamous for its extremely cozy relationship to the United States. Blanchard writes, “The United States has played an integral role in the development, training, and arming of the Saudi Arabian military since the 1940s…The existence of US parallel training programs for different Saudi security forces reflects the relatively stove-piped nature of Saudi Arabia’s security and defence establishment…” 728

He then gave a long history of US Saudi cooperation and refuted some scholars’’ arguments that counterterrorism has had a rocky-road relationship with the United states, reaffirming a long-term positive relationship. Regarding the building of a guardian-like relationship, a US congressional record states that “[s]ince 9-11, our involvement in the Middle East and in Saudi Arabia has grown significantly. Though we can badger those countries whose leaders depend on us to keep them in power to stay loyal to the United States, the common people of the region have come more alienated”729. This has been true since the 40s, when Roosevelt states that “the defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defence of the United States” 730.

Clearly, there is no basis to deny the cozy, rich, strategic and loyalty-based relationship between the countries. Though there have been reported diminished influence731, there are strong political and economic ties between the two countries732. That being said, it would be comical to deny at least implicit political influence that US has on Saudi Arabia. Noreng writes, “Insofar as the United States has political influence in Saudi Arabia, it has because of 724

Jan Michael Otto, Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present, 152. 725 BBC News, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15052030. 726 Jan Michael Otto, Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present, 153-154. 727 Ibid, 154-155. 728 Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U. S. Relations (Collingdale: DIANE Publishing, 2010), 21-22. 729 US Government, Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 107th Congress Second Session (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 2001-2002), Vol. 148 Part 12, p. 16140. 730 Michael Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum (London: Macmillan, 2007), 33. 731 Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U. S. Relations (Collingdale: DIANE Publishing, 2010), 21. 732 Ibid.

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economic interests tended to oppose change rather than promote it.”733 Saudi Arabia also hosts of military pacts that not just limited to arms dealing and training. Finally, there is the issue of finding inherent inconsistencies with Saudi laws amongst people endowed with political power, corruption, and impiety. From Islamic perspective, this is serious accusation, as the ability for the state to govern by Islamic law is put into question, challenging its Islamic legitimacy. The sex parties, alcohol, drugs practiced even (or especially) at the highest levels of Saudi government is no secret. Holingsworth and Mitchell dedicate an entire chapter exposing dozens of cases of immorality and corruption at highlevel places of government734. It is certainly necessary from an Islamic point of view to highlight the personal conduct of government officials and accountability.

8.2.1.2. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) On June 29, 2014, the leader of ISIS Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi proclaimed the Caliphate. This was a very bold and reformative move on the side of militant Islamic groups that had entirely ignored the notion of the Caliphate since the 1930s. Even during the Taliban’s 5-year rule of Afghanistan (1996-2001), they did not proclaim the honorary, historic, and Islamically-required Caliphate government. ISIS claims to be ruling by the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet, fulfilling the Islamic obligation of an Islamic state. So far, the news headlines have been cluttered with headlines that focus on “horrifying” and “barbaric” forms of punishment for the violation of Islamic laws. Islamic scholars were quick to call ISIS ‘Khawarij’ (Kharajite), referring to the Kharijites in the 7th century, ISIS being a splinter group that enforced their interpretation of Shari’ah law. Though it is convenient to label ISIS as a splinter Kharajite-like group, the irony oozes out when one tallies the facts against Islamic history. It is a fact that the ideology of the scholars that are spewing out venomous accusations against ISIS are the ones that imitate the Kharajite ideology of “only God can judge” themselves, on top of their belief that Islam cannot have a state—a “fantasy” as former advisor to George Bush, Hamza Yusuf described it—just as the Kharijites believed once the Caliphate’s interests differed from theirs.’ The Islamic State has released a 24-page, 10-chapter document describing their history and some aspects of governance organization.735 It acknowledges the pledge of allegiance and its role as its equivalency of citizenship, though surprisingly, nothing relevant to their rule of law. Perhaps the most controversial problem ISIS faces is its criminal code, often criticized for being outside human rights-acceptable norms, medieval, brutal, and barbaric. ISIS has published a document regarding their “hudud,” physical punishments for certain infractions in the law, as shown in Figure 8.1. These are deconstructed in the following sections.

733

Oystein Noreng, Crude Power: Politics and the Oil Market (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006), 96. Mark Hollingsworth and Sandy Mitchell, “The Strictly Forbidden—Sex, Drugs and Alcohol” in Saudi Babylon: Torture, Corruption and Cover-Up Inside the House of Saud (New York City: Random House, 2012). 735 The translation is found at: Huffington Post, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/islamicstate-document-masterplan-for-power. 734

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Figure 8.1. ISIS criminal code summary.

ISIS Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi personally described some of the key components of the role of the Caliph and ISIS’s foreign policy during his first video appearance in 2014736. It bears surprising similar to that of Rashidun Caliph Abu Bakr (d. 634 CE). He states,

736

Alarabiya, 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/reports/2014/07/07/ISIS-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdidi-firstFriday-sermon-as-so-called-Caliph-.html.

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“I have been tasked with this burden, and this great responsibility. It is a great responsibility, and I was chosen to lead you, while I am not the best amongst you, and no better than you. If you see me doing the right-hood, help me, and if you see me on falsehood, advise me and lead my on the right path. Obey me as long as I obey Allah, and if I disobey him, you should not obey me.” [emphasis added]737

Though we do not know the every-day affairs or the nature of al-Baghdadi’s rulings and his relationship to others, we know that in theory, this follows the Caliphate model and is paraphrased from several Hadiths of the Prophet and the speech the first Caliph Abu Bakr. It is a largely agreed upon notion, as explicitly stated by the ISIS Dabiq magazine, that their vision is the establishment of the long-term Islamic Caliphate. Their 5th edition of the Dabiq magazine provides information of their explanation as to why they have an expansionary policy.738 Their doctrine, known as “Remaining and Expanding” is justified by Hadiths such as one where the Prophet said “Indeed, Allah gathered the Earth for me, and thus I saw its eastern and western extents, and indeed the reign of my Ummah will reach what was gathered for me from the Earth,” and the explanation of the eschatological claims of every Islam being promised to govern the whole world. Al-Baghdadi himself stated quoted verses such as “Jihad is ordained for you though you dislike it” and “Fight them until there is not Fitnah, and [until] the religion, all of it is for Allah,” and “And I [God] created the Jinn and mankind except they should worship me” justifying the spreading of Islam through military means. Sekulow,739 Rajan,740 and several others,741 all acknowledge that ISIS’s goal is to expand and impose global domination over the world, establishing the “global Caliphate,” which was promised by the Prophet during the end-times. ISIS’s foreign policy resembles that of the other Pragmatism-leaning Islamist groups and thinkers. Finally, regarding government structure, the Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs has provided a brief report outlining basic facts about ISIS’s governance.742 We know the following: the Caliph is the “sole decision-maker” of all affairs of the state, whereas his governors govern the affairs of their delegated provinces. They have an appointed military council to conduct planning-level military affairs, as well as a Shurah (advisory) council appointed by the Caliph. There is also a chief justice appointed with he responsibility to look after mainly low-level judicial issues; there is no “supreme” or “constitutional” court as with he Rashidun Caliphate. There is also an executive-like power council tasked with direct contact with the Caliph and implement his decisions. Recent information possibly describe

737

Ibid. Dabiq, 2015. http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue-5remaining-and-expanding.pdf; Thomas Joscelyn, US counterterrorism efforts in Syria: A winning strategy?, The long War Journal, last modified September 29, 2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/09/uscounterterrorism-efforts-in-syria-a-winning-strategy.php. 739 Jay Sekulow et al., Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore (Brentwood: Howard Books, 2014), 16. 740 V.G. Julie Rajan, Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis: The Islamic State, Takfir and the Genocide of Muslims (London: Routledge, 2015), 289. 741 Adil Rasheed, ISIS: Race to Armageddon (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2015), xiii; Peter Riga, Isis, Fundamentalism and Islam: Insights into America’s Mortal Enemies (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2015) chapter 20, paras. 8-9; Douglas C. Lovelance, Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents: Volume 138: The Resurgent Terrorist Threat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 176. 742 Jacques Neriah, “The Structure of the Islamic State (ISIS)” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Last accessed Septempter 8, 2014, http://jcpa.org/structure-of-the-islamic-state/. 738

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some sort of cabinet tasked with day-to-day implementation each member having several duties, such as “Prisoners and Detainees” or “General finance.”

8.2.2. Criteria and Critical Comparison The countries are evaluated according to adherence to Islam. When the country or group commits or sponsors any of the following categories, it invalidates their claim of Islamic legitimacy. The categories are chosen in accordance to jus ad bellum and jus in bello analyses, as well as on their fundamental political structure. The careful reader will recall that these criteria have all been discussed, defined, and applied into its relevance to the claim of Islamic legitimacy (note that the sequence is important): a) Claim of the Caliphate: without explicit statement of claim to the Caliphate, no government can be legitimate b) Caliphate government structure: The Rashidun Caliphate government structure is required in a legitimate Islamic government to best assure Islamic legal implementation c) Enforcement of Shari’ah law: the only Islamically accepted law d) Adherence to jus ad bellum and jus in bello: infringement can constitute prolonged injustice against civilians and even foreign military delegitimizing the claim to legitimacy Below is a table that summarizes the factors that affect the Islamic legitimacy of ISIS and Saudi Arabia. For the sections on ISIS, one will observe the several question marks under certain criteria. The explanation for each of the criteria is provided under the table, and is based on all known information. As stated earlier, due to the lack of information on ISIS, especially in the areas of state-involvement and authenticity/evidence from reports, many of the categories are marked with question marks. Even writers of congressional reports have expressed their own biased views when writing on events immediately post-9/11, we must always be aware, as scholars and people seeking knowledge, that we should remain objective and not change viewpoints or make assumptions before proven facts. This is the essence of dogma-free Islamic cognition. Below, I point out the relationship between the entities and their qualification for Islamic legitimacy for each of the criteria. [1] The government of Saudi Arabia explicitly declares itself to be a monarchy and an “Arab Islamic state.” The first criterion is not met. As noted earlier, even the breaking of one criteria annuls its Islamic legitimacy. We will still analyze the other factors for the sake of thorough deconstruction. Criterion 1 is also a pivotal 1 (see Figure 8.2), meaning violation of this one invalidates anything else and creates a false image of the true Islamic-ness. Similar to what we saw in Figure 5.2, the rest of the graph takes a country toward a path of ignorance and hypocrisy. On Figure 8.2, note the bifurcation point triggered by unlawful takeover of Mu’awiyah who diverted the Caliphate toward the path Days of darkness. Today’s Arabia is only further deterioration from that stage. In fact, Sevgur Islam743 pointed out how modern 743

S.B. Sevgur and M.R. Islam, “Research Guidelines for Affluent Developing Countries,” SPE paper no. 49552, Proc. SPE ADIPEC 98, Abu Dhabi, UAE (1998).

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Arabia’s condition is worse than what the Prophet Muhammad encountered, because in the Prophet Muhammad’s time, even the pagan Bedouins had fundamental good traits, such as, simplicity, bravery, and hospitality that have long been lost by the newest generations. Table 8.1. Saudi Arabia, ISIS, Rashidun Caliphate ranking according to Islamic legitimacy. Comparison of Saudi Arabia and ISIS is made in comparison to the Rashidun Caliphate, acting as a control Criteria

Saudi Arabia

ISIS

Rashidun Caliphate

1. Claim of the Caliphate

No [1]

Yes [5]

Yes

2. Caliphate government structure

No [2]

Yes [6]

Yes

3. Enforcement of Shari’ah law

No [3]

Yes [7]

Yes

4. Adherence to Islamic jus ad bellum and jus in bello

No [4]

No [8]

Yes

Islamic impact score

0 (0%)

3 (50%—75%)

4 (100%: required for Islamic legitimacy)

[2] Saudi Arabia does not have a caliph, but a monarch. The Rashidun caliphate came to halt when it was replaced by an absolute monarchical regime. Islam is squarely opposed to monarchy. Though it is permissible to have the son of the Caliph elected after the Caliph’s death, there is no precedent, provision, or even stay neutral to a monarchy. In fact, ‘Umar b. al-Khattab opposed his son to be considered in the running for the Caliph. The rule that the successor must be from the House of Saud is considered an unjustified, strictly prohibited innovation (bid’ah) in Islam according to Sunni traditionalists and our logical deduction. The same can be said about the creation of a court with multiple-judge panel. Note that throughout history, the problem of corruption and what Ibn Khaldun called “royal authority” has led to religious and political demise of an Islamic state—this cannot be truer for the Saudi monarchy. Additionally, in the absence of a true Caliph, the oath of allegiance has no meaning. The Saudi government has also signed international treaties and joined international memberships putting the state under the jurisdiction of a non-Islamic body. It logically follows that even a little amount of law and sovereignty is affected by such, hindering the ability to apply Islamic law. This explains for the law reform Saudi Arabia has undergone due to pressure from treaties, such as the CEDAW (The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) treaty.744 The separation between “mufti” and regular judge is another invention non-existent in the Rashidun Caliphate, as are the arbitrary restrictions and divisions of different types of courts ruling of different issues, as is the creation that the king must consent to death penalty and related sentences. The creation of a fixed number for the Shurah council, the lack of the leader’s involvement in it, and any sort of 744

Nisrine Abiad, Sharia, Muslim States and International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A Comparative Study (London: BIICL, 2008), 115.

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law-making ability of it are things not observed in the Islamic Caliphate, making room for possibly non-righteous (or not the most righteous) people to draft and enforce law, by creating a disconnection in the level of authority from God to the Prophet, to the Caliph, to the country. Finally, the creation of elected municipal government representatives has no place in Islamic law, where popularity is not the indicative of the ability to rule in an Islamic state. Government positions are also not chosen according to the Islamic criterion of piety, contrary to Islamic governance law.

Figure 8.2. Criteria and their sequence will dictate how close a state is in its Caliphate claim.

[3] In 2015, Saudi Arabia has given criminal ruling verdicts in several cases. For instance, Waleed Abu al-Khair, a Human Rights lawyer, was convicted of “vague charges arising solely from his peaceful activism.” He was sentenced to a 15-year travel ban, 15 years in prison, and a fine equivalent to $50,000 USD.745 There are several other cases and charges made against people. Such charges include such frivolous notions as “insulting the judiciary,” “setting up an unregistered organization,” and “trying to distort the reputation of the kingdom” that have no basis in Islamic Shari’ah law. Prison sentences, sentences including thousands of lashes, torture in detention, prolonged detention, capital punishment for drug offences, non-civil law-related fines, and several other “sentences”746 seem to be influenced by arbitrary and non-Sunnah derived rulings. It would be unfeasible and beyond the scope of the current analysis to cover all sentences and find their possible Islamic justifications; however, it suffices to say that there are several case-laws and precedent-giving rulings that are not made according to the Qur’an and Sunnah. By doing so, law other than Islamic law is being enforced, thereby annulling Saudi Islamic legitimacy once again. 745 746

Human Rights Watch, World Report, 460. Ibid, 460-463 for information on some individual cases.

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[4] Because Saudi Arabia is not a Caliphate, all of the actions of war and violence towards anybody, Muslim or non-Muslim, civilian or military, is considered terrorism by Islamic standards. However, even if it were the case that they were a Caliphate, there are several Islamic injunctions broken by the Saudi regime. We will review some recent major infractions. Firstly, Saudi bombing campaign against Yemen. Saudi Arabia has declared war against the Yemeni Houthi group that overthrew the Sunni government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. The US-Backed Saudi government launched an airstrike campaign to defend Hadi’s regime. As per Reuters, “Yemen on Tuesday asked the United Nations Security Council to back military action by “willing countries” to combat the Houthis’ advance, according to a letter from President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi seen by Reuters”747. If Saudi Arabia were an Islamic state, they would not attack a country or faction based on camaraderie or “ally-ship,” which does not exist in Islamic foreign relations. This is not to say that the Caliphate may not cooperate with other nations and sign peace-deals involving trust, it simply cannot have any loyalty to a non-Islamic state, let alone declare war for one—there is no precedence in jus ad bellum law. Additionally, backing a state or regime would imply that the Islamic state was sponsoring non-Islamically legitimate actions, indirectly causing the Islamic government to be a part of the non-legitimate injustice. Within the war, even if the attack was justified, the bombings have targeted several non-military infrastructures in Yemen. The Human Rights Watch found that at least 309 people were killed with undoubtedly no military justification. Markets, schools, gas stations, residential homes, and even a hospital, with no evidence of military use were found destroyed by coalition bombing. These actions are reprehensible under Islamic laws, the killing of hundreds of innocent civilians and targeting of non-military compounds are not justified under Islamic jus in bello, and constitute a severe form of state-sponsored terrorism, from an Islamic perspective. Finally, we must to address the elephant in the room; the US-Saudi relationship. In Islamic foreign policy, though there is no need for war with a neutral state, there is no such thing as “alliance” or “aid” (with or without strings). The justification with Yemen under Saudi Arabia applies here with Saudi Arabia with the US. It marks a break from Qur’anic injunction of not allying with any non-Muslim entities (individuals or groups). The Qur’an states, “You see many of them becoming allies of those who disbelieved. How wretched is that which they have put forth for themselves in that Allah has become angry with them…”748 Tafsir Ibn Kathir interprets it as such, stating: “Mujahid said that this Ayah refers to the hypocrites. Allah’s statement, “Evil indeed is that which they have sent forward before themselves” by giving their loyalty and support to the disbelievers, instead of the believers. This evil act caused them to have hypocrisy in their hearts and brought them the anger of Allah, that will remain with them until the Day of Return”749

The military alliance between US and Saudi Arabia has been increasing since the 1940s remains very strong today. The vast amount of economic exchange and interdependence, military foreign cooperation (e.g., current Syria and Yemen operations), allowing of US 747

Reuters, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-arabs-idUSKBN0ML1B420150325. Qur’an 5:80. 749 Ismail Ibn Kathir, “Tafsir Ibn Kathir,” qtafsir.com (n.d.), http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view&id=750&Itemid=60, commentary on 5:80. 748

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military bases to operate within Saudi borders in operation desert storm, and US involvement/influence/controlof Saudi policy750 are all indicative of the fact that Saudi Arabia is remote from Islamic legitimacy. If any model example of non-independence and alliance of an “Islamic” state to non-Muslim state would be the current and historical relationship of Saudi Arabia with the US. This greatly hinders the ability for a state to uphold the ‘divine law,’ while needing to balance between several forces, as with he case of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in intentional agreements and organizations. The lack of independence and true sovereignty, economic, military, and policy-related alliance with non-Muslim states, and influence and control of non-Muslim interruptions in the state destroy its credibility as a civic state, let alone an Islamic state. This is despite the fact that if Saudi Arabia were to declare a Caliphate, they would required to declare war with any state unlawfully and harshly oppressing any group of Muslims in the world. The Saudi modus operandi has been quite the opposite. Recent events show they have indeed participated in oppressing Muslim groups in Egypt, Yemen, Palestine, and others. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia is stanchly aligned with US foreign policy. Though reconstructing history and basing the theory on non-existent facts does not serve as evidence, Saudi Arabia’s refusal to adopt a true Islamic state can show how the entire foreign and domestic policy can change in the alternate scenario. [5] Since the 1920s with the Sharifian Caliphate after the Ottoman collapse, ISIS was the first group to claim the Caliphate. By doing so, they are given the Islamic legitimacy to declare war, enforce law, etc. If they are to be proven to be un-Islamic, it lies in their actions but at the root of their statehood. [6] The Caliph is the leader and has all of the power concentrated within him. The caliph is given the pledge of allegiance, acknowledging to only obey him if he obeys God. Caliph Umar set up several offices and positions, such as chief justice, secretary of the treasury for the sake of convenience and effective management. ISIS seems to have adopted this line of governance. Though a lot of trust lies into the council responsible for communication to him, we can only assume that he is able to veto and decree legislation. There are also several provinces with governors delegated to look after their respective areas. This was the practice ever since the prophet’s time. [7] Based on the available information provided by the government, there is no indication that IS has broken any Islamic law regarding punishment for certain acts. Though getting the necessary witnesses in some cases seems to be questionable, such as necessary witnesses required to stone somebody to death for sodomy or adultery751. Their penal code, presumably enforceable, does not break any Qur’anic or prophetic order. They go as follows, translated by The Independent:752   750

751

752

Blasphemy against Allah: Death Blasphemy against the Prophet Mohamed: Death – even if the accuser repents

Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi, 2013), Section 16 briefly discusses secret US influence of Saudi foreign policy in the 50s; Andrew Duff, The Struggle for Europe's Constitution (London: The Federal Trust for Education & Research, 2006), 96. All of which have been carried out. See for example: The Independent, 2051. http://www.independent. co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-throws-gay-men-off-tower-stones-woman-accused-of-adultery-andcrucifies-17-young-men-in-9986410.html. The Independent, 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-publishes-penal-codelisting-amputation-crucifixion-and-stoning-as-punishments-and-vows-to-9994878.html.

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Blasphemy against Islam: Death Adultery: Stoning until death in case the adulterer was married and 100 lashes and exile if he or she were unmarried. Sodomy (homosexuality): Death for the person committing the act, as well as for the one receiving it. Theft: Cutting off the hand Drinking alcohol: 80 lashes Slandering: 80 lashes Spying for the unbelievers: Death Apostasy: Death Banditry: 1: Murder and stealing: Death and crucifixion 2: Murder only: Death 3: Stealing (as part of banditry): Cutting off the right hand and the left leg 4: Terrorizing people: Exile

Are these punishments sanctified by the Qur’an and Hadith? Let us examine. Firstly, tt can be argued that blasphemy against God or the Prophet is ultimately treason and apostasy, to which we know the punishment is death for all people who have joined the community/state—to which I assume the pamphlet applies. When married couples commit adultery, they receive the death penalty by stoning, and 100 lashes plus one year of exile when unmarried.753 The punishment stated paraphrases a Hadith, as well.754 The punishment for theft of something more than a certain value requires the cutting of the right hand.755 The punishment for drinking alcohol has precedent by Caliph ‘Umar to make it 80 rather than 40 lashes.756 The punishment for slander of adultery is 80 lashes.757 The various punishments for highway robbery; death and robbery, is found in the Qur’an and Sunnah.758 The point here is not to do a complete or thorough analysis, but show that unlike Saudi Arabia, ISIS has only provided punishments found in the Qur’an and Sunnah. Whereas Saudi Arabia claims to be taking the Qur’an and Sunnah as their constitution and not practicing it, ISIS actually demonstrates practicing it. [8] Slavery and seizure of property is not prohibited according to Islamic law; the Prophet Muhammad himself owned slaves at times, and the Qur’an repeatedly mentions “those whom your right hand posses” referring to slaves.759 That being sais, it is considered very honorable

753

See for example, Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 17, Hadith 4191, Book 17, Hadith 4192, Book 17, Hadith 4194, Qur’an 24:2 for unmarried couples. 754 Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Vol. 3, Book 15, Hadith 1456. 755 Specifically, a “quarter od a dinar,” see Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 8, Book 81, Hadith 780, Vol. 8, Book 81, Hadith 781, Vol. 8, Book 81, Hadith 782. 756 See Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 17, Hadith 4226; Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 8, Book 81, Hadith 770; Abu Dawood al-Sijsitānī, Sunan Abi Dawood, Book 39, Hadith 4473. 757 The Qur’an mentions it for women: 24:4. See Mālik ibn Anas, Muwatta Malik, Book 41, Hadith 1519; Ibn Hājir al-Asqalānī, Bulugh al-Maram, Book 10, Hadith 1223 for Sunnah. 758 See 5:33; Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 7, Book 71, Hadith 590 and Vol. 8, Book 82, Hadith 794; Ahmad al-Nasa’i, Sunan an-Nasa’i, Vol. 5, Book 37, Hadith 4029 and Vol. 5, Book 37, Hadith 4032; Muhammad at-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Vol. 1, Book 1, Hadith 72. 759 Bernard Lewis, Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 146.

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and desirable to free slaves, and even Zakah charity can be used to free them; one is required to treat them in a dignified matter, and not doing so provides grounds for the slave’s freedom;760 the owner must provide food and clothing of the same quality of that of the owner and may not overburden him/her.761 Slavery is also not institutionalized, i.e., one cannot make a free person a slave, unless of course, they are war captives, as ISIS claims to have. Because there is little information on the specifics of how captives are chosen, it is hard to give a factbased opinion. We can leave it at this; if ISIS is enslaving people from the families of noncombatants, despite their religion or ideology, it is not allowed, and vice versa. If the former case is true, and the Caliph knows about it but refuses to do anything about it, it would eventually turn the offence into an “open kufr” scenario (see Chapter 6), which nullified the legitimacy of the state. Regarding treatment of slaves, there has been a lot of disparity between the media and firsthand recount of facts. Media narrations themselves are often indistinguishable from propaganda. For instance, recently, several media outlets have been circulating a headline stating that ISIS released an article on “how to rape slaves,”762 despite the US-government translated version763 not mentioning rape or consent, but rather, discussing the specifics of Islamic guidelines around treatment of the slave, one guideline saying that “[t]he owner of a female captive should show compassion towards her, be kind to her, not humiliate her….” A pamphlet that the Human Rights Watch claims is authentic allows for one impermissible act; intercourse with a female slave that has not reached puberty.764 However, it is hard to determine authenticity of this claim, based on the fact that it was a posting from a “pro-ISIS twitter account.”765 Because the direct authenticity cannot be confirmed (implying that twitter accounts should not be permissible as evidence to determine crimes adjacent humanity in formal international tribunals), we cannot draw conclusions from it. That being said, if ISIS did sponsor it, and it is a possibility, it would take the same open kufr course. Regarding absolute physical evidence, there are several examples of—especially—young Yezidi girls who have had to get psychological and even physical treatment for rape-related injuries.766 The act occurring itself does not constitute a breach of the state’s policy, though it certainly would in the case of the individuals committing it.767 If, however, this issue was not being actively addressed by the state by putting special action into place to stop it, the open kufr path would apply once again. Finally, there comes the issue of war captives. ISIS has killed several captured police officers and associated professionals, including religious leaders and civilians. They would be

760

See Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book 15, Hadith 4078. Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 8, Book 73, Hadith 76. 762 CBC, 2015. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/islamic-state-female-slavery-1.3383347; Huffington Post, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/islamic-state-rape-fatwa_568237e7e4b0b958f65a55ae. 763 ISIL Committee of Research and Fatwas, Fatwas No. 61, 62, and 64-68 (New York: Reuters, 2015): Fatwa No. 64, available at http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/doc/slaves_fatwa.pdf. 764 Human Rights Watch, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/slavery-isis-rules. 765 Ibid. 766 Ibid; Human Rights Watch, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/iraq-isis-escapees-describesystematic-rape. 767 Caliph ‘Umar dealt with rape the same way the state deals with adultery, except, of course, only the perpetrator is punished: Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 85, Hadith 81. 761

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killed after refusing to pledge allegiance to the Caliph or “repent” for apostasy. 768 Additionally, their considering of Shi’as for instance, as apostates, would explain the reason for their killing if they did not “repent.” The problem with this line of argument is that ISIS considers Shi’as as non-Muslims in the first place; if that is the case, they cannot be apostates if they never “truly” were Muslims. In our discussion on the topic of treason-related apostasy, we established that someone that never became a Muslim cannot be prosecuted for the act of apostasy that requires even expulsion, let alone death penalty. Additionally, even if they were religious apostates, they cannot be classified as such, because they never joined the Islamic state so as to be able to commit treason. Without this justification, and confirmation that it is unlawful to kill non-Muslim, non-combatant civilians, which ISIS has been doing,769 these two institutionally-backed actions constitute a clear break in Islamic jus in bello law. This is another reason for the non-legitimacy of ISIS, as even a systematic breach in one of the four criteria takes away any Islamic legitimacy of the state. In conclusion, we can make a few definitive statements regarding the relationship between current state of the world with Islam and Islamic legitimacy. Both major examples of “Islamic” rule—Saudi Arabia and IS—have proved to be non-legitimate for several reasons. In essence, Saudi Arabia even disqualifies itself from consideration of legitimacy due to not declaring itself a Caliphate (hence, all of its actions are non-legitimate as well). On the other hand, IS, though claiming the Caliphate, has several serious flaws that prevent it from gaining legitimacy—all of which are related to foreign policy (war, violence, etc.). Today, and for nearly 1400 years, there have been no genuine examples of legitimate Islamic rule. This has large consequences regarding the proposition that Islam has anything to do with groups purported to be “Islamic.”

768

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Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq:6 July – 10 September 2014 (Geneva: United Nations, 2014), 6-7, available from http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_POC_Report_FINAL_6July_10September 2014.pdf; Anthony L Celso, “Cycles of Jihadist Movements and the Role of Irrationality” Orbis 58 (2014): 229. ISIS has killed 5,000 male Yezidi civilians and taken thousands of women as captives: Daily Mail, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2792552/full-horror-yazidis-didn-t-escape-mount-sinjar-confirms-5000-men-executed-7-000-women-kept-sex-slaves.html. These actions seem to represent the argument (and misconception) of some jurists that polytheist civilians are given the choice of death or conversion.

Chapter 9

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 9.1. SUMMARY In every epoch, every major political force controlled major avenues of legal and political arena, redefining fundamental values and rights. In absence of a universal norm that transcends time, it has been easy for an establishment to dictate standards that would favor its position. The 9/11 terror attacks in New York provided a unique opportunity to exploit the decrepitude of the military establishment in post-Soviet Russia to assert a US claim to unipolar hegemony. Jihad, the Arabic term for ‘struggle’ was the target and ‘Islamic terrorism’ and ‘Islamic fascism’ became the buzzword of the decades that would follow 9/11. The true meaning of Jihad and its applicability (jus ad bellum) in ‘true’ Islam has been the subject of contention in the literature. One of the two predominant theories - that of the apologists - define Jihad as an internal struggle only to be deployed in self-defense; the second sponsors the concept of ‘offensive’ Jihad. Ironically, both neo-Orientalists and proIslam ‘extremists’ subscribe to the latter version. However, whereas one camp justifies it as a necessary evil to create peaceful world order, the other camp calls it inherent feature of Islam that is incapable of tolerance of ‘other views.’ In this book, the existing theories on Islam’s position on war are deconstructed to establish that there is no such thing as ‘offensive’ Jihad or ‘internal’ Jihad, and a historical analysis is used to construct what Jihad and war meant in early Islamic civilization, viz. the wars for Islam at the time of The Prophet as well as during the four rightly guided Caliphs. Both the jus ad bellum (rules to go to war), and jus in bello (rules in war) are addressed, and compared to the current state of affairs; Islamist groups, and even groups that do not identify with Islam. By addressing the fundamental premises involved in both sides of the controversy, the book develops an analytical tool that is free from dogmatic assertions and ensuing contradictions, eventually defining the significance of this analysis for a properly balanced understanding Islamic foreign policy and Shariah law. This book has deconstructed certain central arguments relating to contemporary opinions on Jihad. It is observed that each side of the Jihad debate is reluctant to discuss parts of history that seemingly do not support its conclusions (e.g., lack of historical rigor for one group and historical context to the Qur’an for the other). Both sides are shown to have missed Qur’anic cognition that should start from the Qur’an and evaluate in the context of hadith. Islam does not command relentless war against all disbelievers, nor does it only apply in self-

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defense. This book, through purely objective analysis, found that Islam has specific criteria of when to fight—none of which sanction “offensive” Jihad or terrorism of any sort.

9.2. 9/11 TERROR ATTACKS AND REDEMPTION OF ISLAMOPHOBIA No single event since the Second World War has made such a profound an impact on world politics as the terror attacks of 9/11 did. The brief moment of American moral supremacy after 9/11 was soon dissipated after armed aggression against Afghanistan and then against Iraq. After the rise of Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS), the new world is waking up with a new debate over and old issue, characterized by some as the ‘clash of civilizations.’ The incessant violence that followed 9/11 has manifested all the madness akin to what the world has known as Crusade. Yet, Jihad, the Arabic term for ‘struggle’ was the target and ‘Islamic terrorism’ and ‘Islamic fascism’ became the buzzword of the decades that would follow 9/11. By contrast, Islam has become the fastest growing religion of the world, with a high conversion rate in the USA in particular and throughout the West in general. Meanwhile, amidst Washington’s efforts, including endless war preparations and so-called “soft power,” to entrench its supremacy as the sole superpower, the emergence of “Islamic State” as a semi-independent power in the Middle East has fueled many more contradictions even as it is damaged by the increasing exposure of the bankrupt theories put forward to account for its appeal. In trying to make sense of current world events, ranging from St. Bernardino shooting massacre to Paris terror attack, from Yemen bombing by Saudi Arabia to Pakistan school massacre, from US bombing of ISIS cash to Afghanistan hospital run by medecin sans frontiers, numerous theories emerge and talking heads talk incessantly. The only problem is, none of them makes sense and none can predict the reason for such madness without resorting to dogmatic assertions, devoid of any logic. Muslims are no help. As usual, we are hit by the two extreme interpretations of Islam. There are the extremists that comically use verses like Qur’an 9:5 out of context and other “history” to prove that infidels can be massacred en masse-explaining why The Taliban and ISIS are doing what they are doing.770 On the other extreme, the apologists are denying that Islam, ‘the religion of peace,’ has anything to do with politics, or at least that they no longer apply.771 Non-Muslim outlets are similarly divided along the same line. There is the neo-fascist type that calls Islam as inherently evil and there is the neo-Orientalist camp that supports the apologist view and cry out for help to enlighten the Muslims with western values. None of these has any merit to be included in the annals of scholarly literature.

770 771

Glen Beck, It IS About Islam: Exposing the Truth About ISIS, Al Qaeda, Iran, and the Caliphate (Simon and Schuster, 2015), 32-48. Toni Johnson, and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Islam: Governing Under Sharia” by Council on Foreign Relations (2014); L. Ali Khan, A Theory of Universal Democracy: Beyond the End of History (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), 106.

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9.3. SO, WHERE IS THE TRUTH? Unfortunately, there is very little discourse regarding the exact jus in bello laws used or justified to be used. In western literature, discussion is largely centralized around the jus ad bellum. What we have is nonsensical debate between the two extreme positions, both being rigid and dogmatic. Yet, this civilization is sitting on two pieces of historical evidence that have no parallel. The Qur’an is the most authentic unique historical document ever known to mankind that claims itself to be the communication from God to mankind. It remained unaltered in its unique form for over 1400 years and is preserved through written documents (the original books still exist) and more importantly through millions of people that memorize the entire Qur’an. You can pick up a copy from Las Vegas and ask the Hafiz (someone that memorized the entire Qur’an) of Qur’an from Sydney, Australia to recite it and you would find not a single letter of discrepancy. Then, there are books of Hadith that are the most scientifically rigorous biography ever recorded in human history. Every statement of the Hadith is related back to a individual that saw the Prophet Muhammad in person or heard from him. Anyone can read all about the people that recounted those Hadiths and understand how their righteousness, memory, and cognitive ability used to be way superior to anything we can see today. Together, Qur’an is the communication from God and Hadith is the embodiment of the Qur’an. So, if there is a God that created everything with a purpose, it has to be the one that gave Qur’an to mankind and sent the Prophet Muhammad as the role model, so there is no excuse to leading a random, purpose-less life. Unlike Christianity, in which ‘what would Jesus do’ means nothing (no one can even confirm what language he spoke), in Islam, you know precisely what would the Prophet Muhammad do today. With Qur’an and Hadith, there can be no ambiguity as to what real Islam is. So, why did it take this long for someone to come up with a book whose title starts with “Real Islam”? It’s because Europe has buried 1000 years of Islamic scholarship even though it does recognize all great Islamic scholars as the father of individual disciplines (e.g., Ibn Rushd (Averroes) father of secular philosophy and education; Ibn Sina (Avicenna), the father of modern medicine and alchemy; Ibn Haitham (Alhazen), the father of modern optics; Al-Kindi (Alkindus), father of Information processing; Ibn Khaldun, father of modern social sciences; Al-Khwarizmī, the father of algebra and mathematics; Al-Farabi, the father of epistemology and metaphysics, etc.). Chapter 2 brings back true Islamic cognition to forefront so the study of real Islam can be accomplished. This cognition tool proved to be the most important instrument needed to sort out truth from falsehood and the first item is the fundamental doctrine of Islam, i.e., major and minor premises. This cognition reveals the true nature of Islam and how Islam is related to politics. The major premise of Islam implies that only God has the authority to create laws and the minor premise (with major implications, of course) implies that the Prophet is the embodiment of the laws. These laws extend to all aspects of our society, ranging from personal affair to international dealings. One important findings is the discovery that any cognition tool that adds another point to the cognition axis (e.g., scholarly opinion of either Sunni or Shia Imams) or eliminates or tweaks with the sequence of cognition (Qur’an the origin and Hadith the pivotal point) makes the entire process ‘aphenomenal’–totally meaningless. It means all the conclusions made in the post-Rashidun Caliphate period are without merit–at least when it comes to determining

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Islamic jus ad bellum or jus in bello. It is no surprise that this book finds that the true Islam pleases no one that has an agenda, be that a Sunni fundamentalist, Shia scholar, an apologist or an Islamophobe. So, why won’t they be pleased while the findings are 100% logical? Chapter 2 presents the role of intention and how a bad intention can ruin the cognition process and people keep discovering falsehood and claim that to be the truth.

9.4. GOD, GOD-GIVEN AUTHORITY, AND THE CALIPHATE The concept of God is ubiquitous, but so is the controversy over the nature of God. This controversy arises from the fact that none of the philosophers of non-Islamic root recognized the role of the minor premise (that is the human element). In Islam, it is the Prophet Muhammad that removes all controversies and paradoxes that arise from having the notion of God but no communication from Him. Chapter 3 points out how John Locke’s Godly model is only a pretext away from Hobbes’s Godless model. At the end, both liberal and conservative models of governance fall under the same category that was characterized as the ‘chaotic’ model by Ibn Khaldun. It is so because in absence of the Prophet Muhammad as the model, as the lawgiver, and as the legitimate authority, both Locke and Hobbes end up putting themselves as the law giver. This absurdity doesn’t arise only with the model Ibn Khaldun characterized as the Caliphate model. This is the model that assures social justice and this is the model that is never talked about by any of the extremist (both pro- and anti-Islam) or apologist Islamic scholars. Chapter 3 reveals that when fundamental premises of Hobbes, Locke and Ibn Khaldun are compared, Ibn Khaldun’s Caliphate model emerges as the only phenomenal one. This book agrees with the finding of Ibn Khaldun in that only prophet’s model and the Rashidun Caliphate model fulfill the requirement of true Caliphate, all other models, including that of the Ummayads and the rest fall under the same category as Locke’s (or Hobbes for that matter) or Ibn Khaldun’s empire model. This is a major finding that eluded all Islamic scholars, including the likes of Ibn Taymiyyah. Logically, the inclusion of Rashidun Caliphate in the God-given Caliphate model is both necessary and sufficient. It is necessary because, there are several legal matters that couldn’t be resolved by the prophet (e.g., transfer of power, lawful rebellion). Scholars talked about penal code but none addressed the political aspect, which is deemed to be the most crucial in Islamic governance. Unsurprisingly, Chapter 3 finds that Ibn Khaldun’s model is based on a universal standard for humanity, and there are no logical inconsistencies found in the derivation of the standard, stemming from the purpose of life (representing God), to practical legal derivation through the Qur’an and Hadith. In contrast, Hobbes’ theory is partially complete; complete in the sense that there is a clear instruction to how government should work, however there are logical inconsistencies -with great moral implications - that are unexplainable. Locke’s model lies in between the former two, as his begins with a universal standard, however he is unable to explain the criteria by which standards are created (i.e., who gives him the right to make law?), and why his theory is an appropriate explanation for government in the first place (i.e., criteria for natural rights vs. popular sovereignty). So, what is the bottom line? Locke’s invocation of God is little more than hypocrisy and Hobbes’ exclusion of God is nothing more than delusion. None saw or didn’t care how hypocritical and racist the concept of moral superiority is, as pointed out by Edward Said, “Every empire, however, tells itself and the

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world that it is unlike all other empires, that its mission is not to plunder and control but to educate and liberate.” Chapter 3 makes it clear that this ‘empire’ building started with Mu’wayiah as soon as he dismantled Rashidun Caliphate in favor of monarchial dynasty. It immediately follows that Democracy, Socialism, Communism, and every social system proposed in Europe to restore the damage done by Dogma suffer from the same logical fallacies that were first started by Locke and Hobbes. In terms of the cognition, every argument these social scientists used to criticize previously believed theories apply squarely against their own. As comical as it sounds, this is what the logical conclusion of Chapter 3 turns out to be. While such cognitive malfunction is expected from western philosophers that really didn’t graduate past the regurgitated dogma, it is surprising that apologist Muslims use the same logic. Chapter 3 deconstructs ‘scholarly’ work of Na’im, who has established himself as an academic, albeit through selling out Islamic cognition in favor of dogmatic cognition that has incapacitated western philosophers. What is interesting among Muslim apologists, like An-Na’im, is that they use Kharijites logic (some 1400 year old logic) to ‘prove’ that Islam and Democracy are the same. This irony becomes even more interesting when other Muslim apologists, such as Yusuf Hamza, Tariq Ramadan, etc. use the same logic to call ISIS as being based on Kharajite ideology.

9.5. JUS AD BELLUM IN TRUE ISLAM Once we establish how Islamic cognition works and how it can help distinguish between knowledge and ignorance, jus bellum in Islam can be studied. Unlike is the case with previous scholars, this book first identified which verse of the Qur’an the prophet was following in determining the legitimacy of war. This historical analysis provides a thorough look into the Qur’anic application of Jihad that is demonstrated by the Prophet. It turns out each war had a Qur’anic criterion attached to it. In Prophet’s time, the relevant criteria were: Qur’an 2:190 and 60:8. However, the Islamic Caliphate model is not complete without the Rashidun Caliphate. The first Caliph, Abu Bakr acted upon 49:9 and 9:29 in directing major wars of his time. Similarly, the second Caliph, Umar ibn Khattab declared the conquest of the Sassanian Empire which falls under the self-defense command (2:190). This also includes treason and rebellion: the Ridda wars’ purpose was to fight that rebellion. Regarding the invasion of eastern Byzantium by Abu Bakr, the case of self-defense is the most reasonable explanation. Defense against the initial first-hand reports of troops gathering near Muslim borders, fuelled by the growing perceived (we don’t know if there was confirmed intention of the Byzantines to invade Muslim lands) growing threat of Byzantine re-establishment near or at the newly defined borders of the Islamic state. As a part of the Ridda wars, Abu Bakr fought Muslims refusing to give tribute, which would be used to aid poorer Muslims. In that case, treason against the state and oppression of a Muslim group took place. In the case of oppression of Muslims by tyrannical regimes, we found that Abu Bakr originally invaded the Sassanian Empire possibly because of oppression (Qur’an 4:75). All available literature fail to relate wars to specific Qur’anic injunctions, thereby missing the first premise of jus ad bellum. The overarching conclusion is, in Islam, there is no ruling regarding ‘convert or die,’ nor is there anything called ‘expansionist agenda.’ The closest injunction comes from Qu’ran 9:29 that authorizes fight against Jews and Christians that refuse to pay jizyah while enjoying

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protection by the Islamic state. This is not an expansive war, this is akin to Ridda wars that were actually directed against factions of Muslims that didn’t want to pay zakah to the new state. The expansive type of wars are the product of Imperialism that were conflated with religion, starting with the Ummayads and culminating in Crusades. They have no Islamic legitimacy whatsoever. Sunnis didn’t see it because to them, the Ummayads were still legitimate Caliphate. Shias saw that but they failed to relate to any Qur’anic verses because in their doctrine, they give no legitimacy to the first three caliphs of the Rashidun Caliphate and Ali, their alleged Imam didn’t limited himself to Qur’anic verse 49:9 only. So-called ‘highly controversial topic’ of ‘mass killing of Jews (Bani Qurayzah)’ is also covered and examined against scientific criteria of Islamic jus ad bellum. It is concluded that, not only this killing conformed to Islamic jus ad bellum, the care the prophet took in handling the grave incidence of group treason is unparalleled in history. Overall, Chapter 4 offers a new approach that provides a full set of historical and jurisprudential-based criteria of when a theoretical Islamic state may engage in Jihad against another group. The criteria are very strict and only allow it to be in self-defense of the state, fighting severe oppression against Muslims, and to stop a group of Muslims from oppressing the other. If these criteria are not understood in their context of the regime of the prophet and Abu Bakr and Umar, one is susceptible to error and derive a conclusion that is in line with the person’s initial false assumption.

9.6. THE ISLAMIC JUS IN BELLO In Islam, any war that is not legitimately in accordance to Islamic jus ad bellum is an act of terror. Qur’an calls such violence, fassad (terrorism, chaos, disorder, corruption) and call out those that invoke good intention behind such senseless violence: And when it is said to them: ‘Create not fassad on the earth,’ they say: ‘We are only peace makers.’ (2:11) Beware! They are the fassad makers (terrorists) but they perceive it not. (2:12)

So, after understanding real Islam, Islamic Caliphate, and legitimacy of such Caliphate to declare war, Chapter 5 aptly discusses jus in bello. Once again, difficult topics, such as treatment of prisoners of war, collateral damage, targeting the non-military entities, treatment of children, elderly and women are discussed in light of jus in bello during prophet’s time and during the Rashidun Caliphate. This is a unique exercise because nothing in literature shows anyone explained these well documented actions of the prophet and Rashidun Caliphate and casted in an organized jus in bello. When these actions are compared with today’s warfare, including the so-called war on terror, it becomes clear that prophet’s regime as well as the regime of the Rashidun Caliphate represent the noblest of standard of all times. The contrast is particularly sharp when compared to post 9/11 obscenity of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay prison camps.

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9.7. WHEN REBELLION AND CIVIL WAR IS LEGITIMATE This book establishes that the Islamic caliphate–the only legitimate God-given authority– was misplaced as soon as the rightly guided caliphs passed away. The history of the Rashidun Caliphate is rife with violence, as three out of four of the Caliphs were killed in office. This is not unexpected. While Islam promises peace in hereafter, the purpose of this worldly life is to test the resolve of the believers so they can ‘earn’772 a place in heaven. In addition, the Rashidun Caliphate, being a model for rest of the world until the day of judgment must have all components that are lesson for mankind. These lessons cannot be restricted to some utopian state. As such, the Caliphate model does have case laws of how to handle unlawful uprising and threats of civil war. What it doesn’t have, however, is legitimate uprising that topples the government. Chapter 6 shows how a true Islamic model couldn’t have such case law from among rightly guided Caliphs. That example would come at later times when the Ummayad dynasty was confronted by rightly guided ‘rebels.’ In that, examples from both unsuccessful (Husayn Ibn ‘Ali) and successful (Ibn Zubayr) rebellions are discussed. It is shown that rightly guided Caliphate was revived by Ibn Zubayr even though at the end this Caliphate too was brutally removed in favor of the autocratic rule of the Ummayad regime. No other attempt to revive the Caliphate came close to fruition until the time ‘Umar Ibn Abdul Aziz, the Ummayad ruler who resigned from his unelected leadership and resumed leadership after it was confirmed that he was nominated because of his righteousness and not his ancestry.

9.8. SO, WHY DON’T ISLAMIC SCHOLARS GET IT? It is claimed in this book that its process and conclusion are both unique–at least in modern times. The question arises then, why didn’t anyone else get it, particularly the Muslim scholars? This question deserves some elaboration. The Qur’an is rife with the description of Israelite (Banī Isrā`īl) tribes that had “the knowledge” (“people of the book”) but refused to follow their revelation and in fact used them to advance their self interest in the short term. In Qur’anic language it is thus described: The true religion with Allah is Islam. The People of the Book adopted many different ways rather than follow the true way of Islam even after the knowledge of truth had reached them, and this merely to commit excesses against one another. Let him who refuses to follow the ordinances and directives of Allah know that Allah is swift in His reckoning. (Qur’an 3:19)

In order to put this in today’s context, we have to resort to prophet’s hadith. One such hadith states:

772

It should be noted that no one can claim heaven as by definition humans are given everything by God, without whose mercy humans would not even exist. However, they are rewarded for a job welldone (pleasing to God) of being God’s viceroy (khalifah).

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Chapter 7 reviews the opinions of the criteria for the Islamic jus ad bellum in the scholarship, both from Muslim and non-Muslim origins. There were two major trends/opinions observed. One group often labeled as “apologists” which are often backed up by western Muslim scholars (such as, Zakir Naik and Jamal Badawi) support the position that war may only be declared in defense of the Islamic state. This group often supports the notion that jihad is a mainly personal struggle and that striving for Islamic behavior is much more important and significant than the fighting and war type’ of Jihad. In their historical analyses, they often cite the battles and wars of the Prophet Muhammad, and without exception, steer clear of the rightly guided caliphs’ conquests of Persia and eastern Byzantium. The other opinion supports the notion that Islam is violent/war-mongering by nature, and that the goal of the theoretical and historic Islamic state is to spread the Shariah law all over the world, even if it takes violent means. Supporters of this opinion generally cite non-detailed summaries of the conquests of the Sassanian and eastern Byzantine empires as evidence, as well as more questionable engagements of the Prophet Muhammad. Generally, the conservative, non-western elements among Muslim scholars support this notion of Jihad. In the end, there was a major trend found in both of the opinions. They both use the evidence that help them make their point, as well as some false evidence that is also taken out of context. The apologetic opinion avoids very large developments in early Islamic history, done by the closest companions of the Prophet Muhammad. The supporters of this opinion have two things wrong, firstly, that war may be declared only in self defense. This was disproved as there are other verses and demonstrated examples of criteria for the Islamic jus as bellum. Secondly, they believe that the meaning of jihad is not war, but generally internal struggle. Let the record be straight, the Prophet Muhammad nearly always used jihad in reference to war. The pro-offensive jihad scholars are wrong in citing verses of Qur’an out of context (such as the sword verses), once the context is taken one realizes that the order to declare war (like in the sword verses) were confirmations from god telling the Muslims to carry out the already established Qur’anic criteria. Historically, they cite the narration of diplomats offering the enemy three options: to surrender, pay poll-tax (jizyah), or go to war. Again the context has to be taken in place, in this specific case the discussion happened as a last-minute negotiation prior to the battle, but after the decision to go to war was made. Finally, they believe that Abu Bakr’s conquests of the Sassanian and Byzantine empires were simply arbitrary. This is proven to be incorrect. In conclusion, none of the current opinions is comprehensive or logical. Such an outcome is expected because none bases his opinion on Islamic cognition. Such gross neglect of Islamic cognition cannot be out of ignorance, and fits what the Qur’an describes as ‘deliberate,’ motivated by self interest and lust for money. As per the Qur’an:

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Do you covet [the hope, O believers], that they would believe for you while a party of them used to hear the words of Allah and then distort the words (of Allah) after they had understood it while they were of knowledge? (Qur’an 2:75)

Major chapters of the Qu’ran (e.g., Al-Bakarah, Al-Imrān, Al-Mā`idah) give painstaking details of how Israelite scholars ended up misleading the entire mass that did everything possible to obfuscate rule of God’s law while maintaining they were the people of knowledge. We now have come full circle, where some 1.5 billion Muslims are acting like the same Israelites, all led by the ‘scholars’ that behave like Israelite scholars.

9.9. STEPPING INTO MODERN REALITY It must be understood that Islamic cognition employed in this book makes it clear that the only difference between Islam and modern, current international law, is that Islam provides an external, unchanging, i.e., true standard. The most important takeaway from our discussion on political Islam, especially in the field of international Islamic foreign policy, is that Islam has its own standards; it is neither the product of extremists’ beliefs of what Islam is, not is it the product of what so-called progressive Muslims’ beliefs of what Islam is; Islam is what it is, it is neither a violent, hateful ideology, nor has grounds to form a ‘liberal democracy.’ This book establishes what true Islam is by describing the ‘external standard.’ If we are to find out the truth regarding anything, an objective approach must be taken. This section briefly provides an example as exactly how to apply Islamic scenarios into modern-day applications, by first defining a specific act’s permissibility in Islam, and then applying that act to a modern context. Several other attempts to do so often either end up in attempts to discount the faith and transform it in a way to claim that Islam is liberal democratic, or in attempts to vilify Islam. There are very few analyses that objectively examine the sources of Islam, the Qur’an, Sunnah, and its interpretations, especially from an objective approach. Such analysis can be used as a process of building an Islamic golden standard, as this book does, in order to compare this standard to all so-called “Islamic” movements. This is a very useful cognition tool, as can be used to examine the Islamic viewpoint in any application, and can define Islam as it is, rather than as it should be, or ‘ought to be. By ‘should’ be, I am referring to the several ways in which scholars analyze data in order to suit their needs. I argue that the true moderate, real, fact-based Islam lies in direct, empirical, objective analysis, and only this type of analysis, for the fact that anybody with an agenda can transform Islam into whatever coincides with their personal beliefs and agenda. This book did not examine the different way different people believe in Islam, and is certainly not a representative of the beliefs of people, which we have confirmed can be very wrong. Rather, it is an examination of what Islam truly is in its abstract form: it is certainly political, and provides an external personal, communal and familial moral code. Within its government, there is a specific defined set of jus ad bellum and jus in bello laws, to which international law may or may not agree to. For instance, permissibility of noninstitutionalized slavery is permitted in Islam under certain circumstances, whereas that would be reprehensible according to most people in this time and place (forming international law). On the other hand, distinction between combatant and non-combatants in the law of war is recognized in both international law and Islamic law.

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The final task, then, becomes to answer, “So what do all these make Saudi Arabia or ISIS?” How about the random acts of “Islamic” terrorism? What about all the Shi’ite- Sunni name-calling? Chapter 8 provides the readership with answers to this question. An indexing system is prepared. At the end we see Saudi Arabia as the most anti-Islamic government with a score of 0, representing the lowest limit of religious hypocrisy. Not surprisingly, no country or group is found to be Islamic in line with the Rashidun Caliphate. Surprisingly, however, it that ISIS scored relatively high. Unlike their foreign policy and manner of dealing with prisoners/captives, the government structure is very close to how the Rashidun Caliphate was run. ISIS scores high in three out of four criteria. Their only problem is the foreign policy and the doctrine of ‘convert, pay jizyah, or die’ to Shi’ites, Yazidis and government officials. It is no small irony that Saudi Arabia comes out as the worst enemy of real Caliphate (even worse than Israel and USA), yet people that hate Saudi Arabia somehow fantasize about ISIS being “Made in Israel.” There isn’t one report that doesn’t go back to Iran—the arch enemy of ISIS—that talks about an ISIS-Israel connection. The long-lived irony is, it is the Shi’a sect that laments the loss of the true political Caliphate after the Caliphate of Hasan, and it is the Shia that consider the entire regime that followed Mu’wayiah (who single handedly ‘undid’ Caliphate), the same Shia that now purport the notion that the talk of Caliphate is so absurd that it must be orchestrated by Israel. On the Sunni side, conservative Sunnis people have no problem (mainly) calling Shias kafir (non-Mulim) because many curse the Prophet’s companions (including Mu’wayiah), while they are all up in arms if someone calls Mu’wayiah kafir because he cursed Ali (as per authentic historical accounts) and made it mandatory for his appointed ‘Imams’ to curse Ali—a tradition continued until the demise of the Ummayad dynasty. Even in modern time, Baghdadi is called a Mossad agent, a kafir, a hypocrite, but if anyone calls Saudi Arabia unIslamic, much of the Sunni population is outraged. There is an inherent cognitive dissonance in both Shia and Sunni lines of thinking. In more specific discussions that as on activities like as hostage-taking and suicide bombing are analyzed; it is concluded that the actions of Iran in US Embassy hostage crisis conformed to Islamic standard whereas those in Russia (by Chechen groups) did not (hence making it an act of terror), and that suicide bombing under any circumstance should be disallowed, due to it involving deliberate suicide. In the topic of terrorism, violent acts, such as 9/11, the 2015 Paris Attacks, etc. are analyzed and it is concluded that there is no Islamic justification for such acts and these acts alone can render a group un-Islamic. On the more controversial side, the suicide attack is ruled to be inherently un-Islamic, even when military installations are the target.

Figure 9.1. The bottom line lies in realizing that true Islam is the middle path.

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9.10. THE BOTTOM LINE At the end, if we just understand what Qur’an means when it states, “And thus we have made you [Muslims] a moderate community” (2:143), describing the so-called “moderate” Islam, we would have accomplished something that eluded centuries of scholars. All Muslims claim, whether extremist or (especially) apologist, that “moderate” Islam, which Islam is said to be, applies to their interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah. This book has established that the only way that this verse can be defined is by the Qur’an itself, which states “…that you [Muhammad] will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness over you” (2:243), implying a sense of unity or exemplary role of the Prophet. When we analyzed the Prophet’s example, which is the correct interpretation of the Qur’an, we saw that he was not confined to personal hermitage, nor just communal, familial, and societal practice, but indeed he was a statesman, as described by Michael Hart, who ranked the Prophet Muhammad as the most influential man of human history. Today, little is discussed about the five centuries that followed the life of the Prophet Muhammad, of ancient learning by the Muslim scholars inspired by Islam. During the period of post-Thomas Aquinas (father of doctrinal philosophy) cognition in Europe, the work of Islamic scholars continued and today it is well recognized that Ibn Sina (Avicenna) is named the father of modern medicine and alchemy, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) the father of secular philosophy and Education, Ibn Haytham (Alhazen) the father of modern optics, Al-Kindi (Alkindus)- father of information processing, Ibn Khaldun - father of modern social sciences, Al-Khwarizmī the founding father of algebra and mathematics, and Al-Farabi the father of epistemology and metaphysics. All of them are considered to be inspired by the Prophet Muhammad. This is truly an unprecedented event in human history that has received little attention from the Eurocentric ‘scientists’ and ‘scholars.’ If one follows the list of Michael Hart, who is second in that list? Sir Isaac Newton, the man who wrote more on Christian doctrine than on science. His Church wasn’t based in Rome, it was the Church of England, headed by the Monarch. The transition from ‘religion’ to ‘politics’ wasn’t even subtle. So, this book establishes, if we look back at the Prophet Muhammad and his true message, we will have no illusion about what the role of Caliphate is in creating Universal peace. On the other extreme, we have to acknowledge that according to Muslims—unlike several non-Muslim scholars agree (with the inert assumption that the Qur’an was his personal agenda)—the Prophet did not have an overall agenda and had the goal of simply fulfilling and competing Islam, and obeying God’s orders as they came down. Because of this, we cannot assume that the Prophet had a world-with Islamic vision based on expansionist warfare, or that he or any of the Caliphs ever intended to make Islam politically dominant, and therefore, certainly not willing to break the commands of God, such as the jus in bello, to achieve that goal. What several of the apologists have done is the rendering of any political, non-democratic, non-societally-friendly Qur’anic and Prophetic orders completely irrelevant, which, if we assume that the Qur’an and Sunnah define Islam, renders a piece of Islam irrelevant. It does a great disservice to society and to Muslims by not allowing them to see their true religion, and does society as a whole an injustice as to only providing lopsided views that can be easily deconstructed by those in the opposing extreme. The opposing extreme does injustice to Islam itself, as several of the proposed views about what Islam

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supports and does not support are misguiding and taken out of context, ignoring the other half of the religion (the historical background defined by the Prophet’s lifetime). When Glenn Beck writes, referring to Muhammad’s mission, that “[w]hat followed was a ruthless commitment of the ideology to the edges of the known world”773 we see a perfect example of historical discrimination; the positioning and explanation of historical events used to prove a false premise. We see how it not only vilifies Islam and does a disservice to people seeking peace and cooperation, it eggs on the clash of civilizations notion, threreby doing society, by any standards, a disservice. Similarly, when Ali Khan writes that “[u]niversal democracy refuses to cast sharia as a static, and finds it fully compatible with universal values”774 it does a disservice by discounting Islam in itself, reducing it to a product of peoples’ beliefs, and does society a disservice from a scholarly perspective, by refusing to acknowledge what Islam is really about. If we are to find out the truth regarding anything, an objective approach must be taken. There are very few analyses that objectively examine the sources of Islam, the Qur’an, Sunnah, and its interpretations, especially with an Islamic cognitive view. Such analysis can be used as a process of building an Islamic golden standard, as this book does, in order to compare this standard to all so-called “Islamic” movements. This is a very useful cognition tool, as can be used to examine the Islamic viewpoint in any application, and can define Islam as it is, rather than as it should be. By ‘should’ be, I am referring to the several ways in which scholars analyze data in order to suit their needs. I argue that the true moderate, real, factbased Islam lies in direct, empirical, objective analysis, and only this type of analysis, for the fact that anybody with an agenda can transform Islam into whatever coincides with their personal beliefs and agenda. Ironically, this fundamental Islamic cognition that I use in this book has been considered to be the original ‘secular philosophy’ credited to Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Whatever is concluded in this book has a number of immediate implications on the west. There have been reports of radicalization of youth, some from non-Muslim families. At a time, some 40 countries are fighting ISIS, reports that a significant number of ISIS fighters have been from the west has been a blow to the policies of counter-terrorism and foreign relations. It is becoming clear, today’s youth are unconvinced with either of the two predominant theories of Jihad. This book deconstructing existing theories (and, of course, myths) and brings to light the true meaning of Jihad that was intended to be exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad and his ‘rightly guided’ caliphs. This forms the core of the model that emerges directly from fundamental premises of Islam. This book shows that Islam is peaceful as the name suggests and any abuse of the originally intended narration would make it vulnerable to abuse. If the true meaning of the word is understood both in content and form, general public, particularly the youth will be sealed from the threat of radicalization and eventual terrorism. The findings of this book should be included in the educational curriculum in order to lay the foundation for a peaceful coexistence of Islam with modern liberal democracies. To summarize, we can put it thus: moderate Islam exists right in the middle of both western-backed apologetic Islam, and extreme, violent, expansionist Islam.

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Glen Beck, It IS About Islam: Exposing the Truth About ISIS, Al Qaeda, Iran, and the Caliphate, 40. L. Ali Khan, A Theory of Universal Democracy: Beyond the End of History (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 106.

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APPENDIX: LETTERS OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD TO HEADS OF STATE AND TRIBAL LEADERS The Prophet Muhammad sent many letters to the nearby and accessible Empire leaders, inviting them to convert to Islam. He sent letters to heads of empires and provinces, such as to Negus of Ethiopia (d. CE 630), Muqawqis of Egypt (representing the Byzantine Church), Khosrow II (d. CE 628), the Emperor of the Sassanian Empire, and Heraclius I (d. CE 641), the Byzantine emperor. The following letters all match the following criteria: 1) Sent by the Prophet Muhammad 2) It addresses a head of state (emperor), governor, or tribal leader 3) It is a first-time invitation to Islam. In other words, second and third letters are not shown, although are discussed if the context requires so. Upon observation, we see that none of the letters, nor any purported letter of the Prophet, threaten invasion, nor has rejection of any resulted in Muslim invasion of that country, as contrary to popular belief.

Figure 1. Letter from the Prophet Muhammad to Heraclius I. 775

775

Purported letter sent by Muhammad to Heraclius, emperor of Byzantium; reproduction taken from Majid Ali Khan, Muhammad The Final Messenger (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 1998), 250-251.

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1. THE LETTER SENT TO HERACLIUS I “In the name of God the Beneficent, the Merciful: From Muhammad son of Abdullah to Heraclius the Great of the Romans. Peace be upon him, he who follows the right path. Furthermore I invite you to submit [your will to God]; establish submition [to] and you will have peace, and God will double your reward, and if you reject, you bear the sins of persecuting the Arians (minority Christian sect who differed from other Christians on nature of Christ). ‘And people of the scripture! Come to a word common to you and us that we worship none but God and that we associate nothing in worship with Him, and that none of us shall take others as Lords beside God. Then, if they turn away, say: Bear witness that we are Muslims.”776

2. THE LETTER SENT TO KHORSOW II “In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful. From Muhammad, Prophet of Allah to Kisra, King of Fars May peace be upon him who follows the guidance, believes in Allah and his prophet. I testify that there is no Ilah except Allah, who is alone and without an associate and Muhammad is his servant and prophet. Allah has made me a Prophet and sent me for the entire world, in order that I may infuse the fear of Allah in every living person. Accept Islam and be secure. If you refuse, the sins of the Zoroastrians shall be your responsibility.”777

3. THE LETTER TO MUQAWQIS OF EGYPT (CYRUS OF ALEXANDRIA, D. CE 642) “In the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful. From the Apostle of Allah to the Mukaukis, chief of the Copts. Peace be upon him who follows the guidance. Next, I summon thee with the appeal of establish peace (or submitting your will to God ): establish peace (submit your will to God) and you will have peace. God shall give you your reward twofold. But if you decline then on you is the guilt of the Copts. O ye people of the Book, come unto an equal arrangement between us and you, that we should serve none save God, associating nothing with Him, and not taking one another for Lords besides God. And if ye decline, then bear witness that we have submitted our will to God.”778

776

Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 1 Book 1 Hadith 6. Sultan Ahmed Qureshi, Letters of the Holy Prophet (Pakistan: Idara Ishaat-E-Diniyat, 1986), 57. 778 Margoliouth, D. S. (1905). Mohammed and the Rise of Islam (Third Edition., p. 365). New York; London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons; The Knickerbocker Press. Cit. op. 3, Ibid, 58. 777

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Figure 2. The Prophet Muhammad’s letter to Al-Muqawqis.779

4. THE FIRST LETTER TO NEGUS OF ETHIOPIA “In the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful. From Muhammad the Prophet of Allah to Negus King of Ethiopia. I praise Allah, except whom there is none to be worshipped, who is the ruler of the world. He is innocent and pure. He gives refuge and sustains all. I do admit that Isa [Jesus] son go Maryam [Mary], was the soul from Allah and his word [order] he was infused to Maryam, who was clean and proof against evil. And Isa was born of Maryam. Allah created him from his soul and breath in the same manner as he created Adam 779

Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Muhammad: Seal of the Prophets, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980 (chapter 12). The drawing of the letter published in Al-Hilal was reproduced in David Samuel Margoliouth, Mohammed and the Rise of Islam, London (1905), p. 365, which is the source of this image.

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with his own hand. I invite you towards Allah the one who has no associate. Believe in him and join me in obedience to him. Follow me and accept my prophethood because I am the Messenger of Allah. I have wished you well in conveying the message of Allah in all sincerity. It is up to you to accept my sympathetic advice. Extend the same invitation to your subjects. I am sending my cousin Jaffer with the other Muslims. When they reach you, treat them hospitably, by setting aside the vanity and pride of a ruler. Peace be upon him, who has followed the derived path.”780

5. LETTER TO HORMUZ (HORMUZAN D. CE 644), THE SASSANID GOVERNOR OF IRAQ “In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful. From Muhammad, Prophet of Allah, to Hurmuz I invite you towards Islam. Accept Islam in order that you may get security in this world and the next”

6. LETTER TO HAUZA BIN ALI, GOVERNOR OF YAMAMA781 “In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful From Muhammad, Prophet of Allah— To Hauza bin Ali May peace be upon him who follows the guidance. It may be clarified that my deen [path, religion] shall reach the boundaries of the entire Arabia and Iran and shall prevail. Therefore you should accept Islam. Therein lies security I have nothing to do with you country. It shall, as before, remain under your jurusdiction”

7. LETTER TO HARIS GHASSANI, THE GHASSANID KING (OF DAMASCUS)782 “In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful From Muhammad, Prophet of Allah — To Haris bin abi Shimr Peace be upon him who follows the derived path, believes in it and regards it true. I invite you to believe in one Allah who has no associate. Your country will remain with you.”

780

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Zad al-Ma’ad (Beirut: Al-Dar al-Asrieh), Vol. 3, 60-61. Ibid, 61. 782 Ibid, 62. 781

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8. LETTER TO JAIFER AND ‘ABD, RULERS OF OMAN783 “In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful From Muhammad, Prophet of Allah — To Jaifer and ‘Abd. Peace be upon him who adopts the right course. Thereafter, I invite both of you to Islam. Embrace Islam. Therein lies security! Allah has sent me as a Prophet to his creatures, in order that I may instill the fear of Allah in his disobedient creatures and thus there may be left no excuse for those who deny Allah. My prophethood is about to reach your country. If you two accept Islam, your country will, as usual, remain with you. But if you refuse or object, it is a perishable thing”

9. LETTER TO THE KINGS OF HIYMAR (IN SOUTHERN YEMEN)784 “In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful From Muhammad, Prophet of Allah — To Haris, etc. May peace be upon you, till you believe in Allah and his Prophet. Undoubtebly Allah is he who is unique and who has no associate. He sent Musa [Moses] with miracle and created Isa by his word [order]. But the Jews say that “Uzair is the son of Allah” and the Christians say that Isa is the son of Allah and is one out of three” A secont letter with details on the rules of Zakah and Jizyah and its collection was sent to the kings785. There are several important observations to be made about the Prophet’s letter-writing styles. Firstly, they all contain certain features common amongst all. For example the phrase “Peace be upon him who follows the right path” is used for non-Muslims in letters (letters to Muslims had “peace be upon you”). To King Negus, whom he felt closer to, considering that he had given Muslims asylum in Ethiopia when they were being persecuted by the Meccans, the Prophet found a common ground between the Muslims and Christians: Jesus and Mary. In other letters, the Prophet assured leaders that if they do accept Islam, they will be granted immunity and ‘security’ in this life (they won’t be harmed and will be living safely under Islamic law) and the “hereafter,” i.e., they will be going to heaven. It is possible that phrases such as “Accept Islam in order that you may get security in this world and the next” or “Therefore you should accept Islam. Therein lies security,” or “If you two accept Islam, your country will, as usual, remain with you. But if you refuse of object [to accepting Islam], it [your kingdom] is a perishable thing” as being confrontational or threatening. This assumes that there is an implicit threat. A much more logical explanation to these phrases would be that he is simply assuring the rulers that if they do accept Islam, they will be secure in the world and in the hereafter. For the last phrase, the letter simply reminded the Omani rulers that their small kingdom is perishable, and in fact will parish. I advance this as a more logical explanation to such phrases, due to consistency of clear and consice in his speech, said to be 783

Ibid, 65. Ibid 66. 785 Ibid, 71-72. 784

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“so clear, unmistakable, that those who sat with him would memorize it.”786 If Muhammad desired to threaten any of the several groups which he had sent letters to, he could have clearly stated so. Additionally, King Nesus’ successor, Muqawqis, Khorsow II, Heraclius, the Ghassanid king, and Hormuzan’s invitations to Islam were not accepted. They were not subsequently attacked and invaded. Finally, the idea that “everything is perishable” was a common Arab phrase denoting that “[e]verything aside from God perishes.” 787 The letters of the prophet were clearly letters of invitation, combined with logical discussion (as he made with the Negus of Ethiopia) and advice. There are no threatening messages, nor any trace of a statement wherein the Prophet gave the option of accepting Islam, fighting, or paying the Jiziyah tax. As was discussed earlier (and confirmed by these letters), the Prophet only gave such an option or advised people to give such an option under the circumstances that a war is already imminent and the decisions have been made to fight, the options are given as a last option to avoid bloodshed and for the enemy to accept Islam and lose nothing.

10. THE MADINAH CHARTER Perhaps the most important of all treaties in the history of Islam is the Constitution of Madinah (Arabic: ‫)دستور المدينة‬, or the Madinah charter. There were several objectives of the constitution, one being to end the vicious fighting taking place between the two Jewis rival clans of Banu Aws and Banu Khazraj788. The prophet was invited to be the arbitrator of the community, in which he and his followers would be allowed to operate separately under their own law (Islamic law). The subsequent journey to Madinah after the pact, and the establishment of the Islamic state was marked as the first year of the Islamic Hijra calendar (622 CE).789 There are several documentations of the constitution in early and later sources, most notably in Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah.790 Modern Muslim scholars and historians, and nonMuslim western historians mainly agree on the authenticity.791 The basis of the agreement on Qur’an and Sunnah, and the veracity of the document assist in the authenticity. There are

786

787

Muhammad At-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2007), Book 49 Hadith 4000, “'Aishah said: "The Messenger of Allah (‫ )ﷺ‬did not speak quickly like you do now, rather he would speak so clearly, unmistakably, that those who sat with him would memorize it.”" Muhammad At-Tirmidhī, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2007), Book 43, Hadith 3086, Narrated Abu

Hurairah: that the Prophet (‫ )ﷺ‬said: "The best statement spoken by the Arab is the saying of Labid: 'Everything aside from Allah perishes.’” 788 R. B. Serjeant, "Sunnah Jāmi'ah, pacts with the Yathrib Jews, and the Tahrīm of Yathrib: analysis and translation of the documents comprised in the so-called ‘Constitution of Medina,’” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 41 (1978): 4. 789 Fazlur Rehman, Chronology of Prophetic Events (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 2001), 51–52. 790 Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah, with Introduction and Notes by Alfred Guillaume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 231-234. 791 Tarif Khalidi, Arab Historical Thought in The Classical Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 48; John Burton, “Those are the High-flying Cranes,” Journal of Semetic Studies 15 (1970): 265; Michael Cook, Muhammad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 65.

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several translations of the document, some not word to word. The following copy seems to be the summation of the most fair and common consensus of the document792: “In the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful. (1) This is a document from Muhammad the prophet (governing the relations) between the believers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib, and those who followed them and joined them and labored with them. (2) They are one community (umma) to the exclusion of all men. (3) The Quraysh emigrants according to their present custom shall pay the bloodwit within their number and shall redeem their prisoners with the kindness and justice common among believers. (4-8) The B. ‘Auf according to their present custom shall pay the bloodwit they paid in heatheism; every section shall redeem its prisoners with the kindness and justice common among believers. The B. Sa ida, the B. ‘l-Harith, and the B. Jusham, and the B. al-Najjar likewise. (9-11) The B. ‘Amr b. ‘Auf, the B. al-Nabit and the B. al-‘Aus likewise. (12)(a) Believers shall not leave anyone destitute among them by not paying his redemption money or blood with kindness. (12)(b) A believer shall not take as an ally the freedman of another Muslim against him. (13) The God-fearing believers shall be against the rebellious or him who seeks to spread injustice, or sin or animosity, or corruption between believers; the hand of every man shall be against him even if he be a son of one of them. (14) A believer shall not slay a believer for the sake of an unbeliever, nor shall he aid an unbeliever against a believer. (15) God’s protection is one, the least of them may give protection to a stranger on their behalf. Believers are friends one to the other to the exclusion of outsiders. (16) To the Jew who follows us belong help and equality. He shall not be wronged nor shall his enemies be aided. (17) The peace of the believers is indivisible. No separate peace shall be made when believers are fighting in the way of God. Conditions must be fair and equitable to all. (18) In every foray a rider must take another behind him. (19) The believers must avenge the blood of one another shed in the way of God. (20)(a) The God-fearing believers enjoy the best and most upright guidance. (20)(b) No polytheist shall take the property of person of Quraysh under his protection nor shall he intervene against a believer. (21) Whoever is convicted of killing a believer without good reason shall be subject to retaliation unless the next of kin is satisfied (with blood-money), and the believers shall be against him as one man, and they are bound to take action against him. (22) It shall not be lawful to a believer who holds by what is in this document and believes in God and the last day to help an evil-doer or to shelter him. The curse of God and His anger on the day of resurrection will be upon him if he does, and neither repentance nor ransom will be received from him. (23) Whenever you differ about a matter it must be referred to God and to Muhammad. 792

This text is taken from A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad — A Translation of Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1955; pp. 231-233. Numbering added.

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(24) The Jews shall contribute to the cost of war so long as they are fighting alongside the believers. (25) The Jews of the B. ‘Auf are one community with the believers (the Jews have their religion and the Muslims have theirs), their freedmen and their persons except those who behave unjustly and sinfully, for they hurt but themselves and their families. (26-35) The same applies to the Jews of the B. al-Najjar, B. al-Harith, B. Sai ida, B. Jusham, B. al-Aus, B. Tha’laba, and the Jafna, a clan of the Tha‘laba and the B. al-Shutayba. Loyalty is a protection against treachery. The freedmen of Tha ‘laba are as themselves. The close friends of the Jews are as themselves. (36) None of them shall go out to war save the permission of Muhammad, but he shall not be prevented from taking revenge for a wound. He who slays a man without warning slays himself and his household, unless it be one who has wronged him, for God will accept that. (37) The Jews must bear their expenses and the Muslims their expenses. Each must help the other against anyone who attacks the people of this document. They must seek mutual advice and consultation, and loyalty is a protection against treachery. A man is not liable for his ally’s misdeeds. The wronged must be helped. (38) The Jews must pay with the believers so long as war lasts. (39) Yathrib shall be a sanctuary for the people of this document. (40) A stranger under protection shall be as his host doing no harm and committing no crime. (41) A woman shall only be given protection with the consent of her family. (42) If any dispute or controversy likely to cause trouble should arise it must be referred to God and to Muhammad the apostle of God. God accepts what is nearest to piety and goodness in this document. (43) Quraysh and their helpers shall not be given protection. (44) The contracting parties are bound to help one another against any attack on Yathrib. (45)(a) If they are called to make peace and maintain it they must do so; and if they make a similar demand on the Muslims it must be carried out except in the case of a holy war. (45)(b) Every one shall have his portion from the side to which he belongs. (46) The Jews of al-Aus, their freedmen and themselves have the same standing with the people of this document in purely loyalty from the people of this document. Loyalty is a protection against treachery. He who acquires ought acquires it for himself. God approves of this document. (47) This deed will not protect the unjust and the sinner. The man who goes forth to fight and the man who stays at home in the city is safe unless he has been unjust and sinned. God is the protector of the good and God-fearing man and Muhammad is the apostle of God.”

11. THE TREATY OF HUDAYBIYYAH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS The treaty of Hudaybiyyah that took place on 6AH/628 CE and was a milestone treaty and major event in the history of the formation of the early Islamic state. For simplicity and quick reference, the following are the terms of the agreement:793 793

Several details can be found here: Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 3, Book 50, Hadith 891.

Appendix     

794 795

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It is between the Quraysh tribe and the Muslims (in Madinah) Neither party will fight for 10 years, this includes “theft or treachery,” and sincerity between them If someone in the Quraish runs to the prophet (without permission), he will be sent back, but this does not apply the other way794 For one year, the Muslims must withdraw from Mecca795 After a year (and so on), they may come to Mecca for three days with only personal weapons being permitted

Ibid, “[Quraish messenger:] We also stipulate that you should return to us whoever comes to you from us, even if he embraced your religion…” Ibid, “The Prophet said to Suhail, "On the condition that you allow us to visit the House (i.e., Ka`ba) so that we may perform Tawaf around it." Suhail said, "By Allah, we will not (allow you this year) so as not to give chance to the 'Arabs to say that we have yielded to you, but we will allow you next year." So, the Prophet got that written.”

INDEX 9 9/11, xiii, 1, 6, 12, 13, 37, 173, 187, 192, 194, 197, 206, 215, 216, 220, 224, 229, 235, 236

A Abu Bakr, 15, 16, 20, 36, 41, 42, 52, 64, 65, 85, 87, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 118, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 128, 129, 132, 133, 140, 149, 154, 155, 157, 160, 165, 175, 179, 181, 182, 200, 203, 204, 205, 219, 220, 222 Al-Baghdadi, 200, 203, 205, 227 Ali, v, xi, 9, 10, 16, 20, 36, 42, 49, 51, 52, 55, 63, 64, 66, 75, 78, 79, 87, 96, 99, 103, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 170, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 184, 194, 196, 216, 220, 221, 224, 226, 228, 229, 231, 233, 235, 236, 239, 242 Al-Shafi’i, 133, 183 Al-Shaybani, 133, 183, 233 An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed, 6, 31, 72, 228 Apologetic/Apologists, xiii, 2, 5, 6, 31, 41, 47, 51, 75, 76, 107, 108, 129, 172, 174, 175, 178, 184, 195, 200, 215, 216, 219, 222, 225, 226 apostacy, 80, 104

B Banu, 97, 108, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 122, 124, 125, 133, 136, 138, 140, 144, 155, 192, 193, 232, 244 Bakr, 15, 16, 20, 64, 85, 87, 99, 103, 104, 105, 108, 118, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 132, 157, 165, 180, 204, 219 Qurayzah, 97, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 133, 138, 140, 192, 193, 220

battle of, 9, 101, 108, 109, 111, 112, 118, 119, 121, 125, 127, 128, 141, 145, 146, 148, 158, 172, 176, 195 Badr, 108, 109, 111, 112, 141, 176 Mu’tah, 119 Siffin, 146, 148 Tabuk, 101, 118, 121, 128 the Camel, 145, 148 Uhud, 111, 112 Yamama, 125

C Caliphate, 1, 5, 8, 15, 16, 30, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 66, 72, 74, 81, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 103, 105, 108, 121, 135, 137, 144, 145, 147, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 161, 164, 167, 183, 193, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 213, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 224, 225, 226, 229, 232, 234, 235 Abbasid, 39, 43, 52, 63, 66, 96, 140, 161, 171, 173 Rashidun, 5, 16, 20, 38, 45, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 63, 65, 66, 81, 84, 87, 88, 90, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 105, 106, 135, 137, 155, 160, 161, 164, 183, 199, 204, 205, 206, 207, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 224 Umayyad, 5, 39, 43, 44, 52, 63, 66, 94, 96, 109, 123, 143, 148, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 180, 182, 230, 232 Civil war, 144, 145, 148, 154, 180, 221 First, 16, 20, 60, 111, 113, 135, 143, 144, 172, 180, 198, 241 Second, 110, 111, 115, 118, 122, 127, 157, 158, 202, 216, 231, 233, 236, 237 Classical Scholars, 81, 171, 182

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combatants, 132, 134, 135, 140, 191, 193, 194, 212, 223 conquest, 66, 108, 121, 124, 127, 128, 129, 158, 173, 184, 219, 234, 238 of Byzantium, 121 of Persia, 127, 128 contextualization, 117, 170, 184

D democracy, 3, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 69, 70, 71, 72, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 101, 156, 160, 198, 216, 219, 223, 226, 230, 231, 233 Donner, Fred, 230

E Esposito, John, 172, 230 ethical standards, 70, 71 Eurocentric, 7, 8, 25, 47, 57, 83, 86, 91, 225 extremist(s), 5, 31, 75, 107, 175, 181, 194, 196, 215, 216, 218, 223, 225

G Gibb, H.A.R., 56, 57 God's interest, 42, 46

H Hallaq, Wael, 42, 231 Hobbes, Thomas, 6, 58, 60, 64, 65, 67, 237 hostage-taking, 191, 193, 196, 224 HSSA degradation, 27

I Ibn Kathīr, Ismāʻīl, 155, 232 Ibn Khaldun, vii, 5, 17, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 89, 95, 139, 199, 207, 217, 218, 225, 228, 230, 231, 232, 235 Ibn Qayyim, 102, 182, 183, 228, 242 Ibn Taymiyyah, 102, 103, 143, 144, 149, 152, 161, 178, 182, 184, 218, 232 Ibn Zubayr, Abdullah, 157 Ijtihad, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 86, 94, 231, 237 Iranian revolution, 86, 175, 193

Iraq, 1, 108, 120, 124, 126, 127, 128, 137, 148, 149, 157, 159, 176, 181, 182, 191, 203, 213, 216, 228, 235, 242 IS (Islamic State), 1, 2, 171, 191, 203, 205, 210, 213, 216, 226, 229, 235 Islam, Jaan, ix, xiv, 232 Islam, Rafiq, 21, 24, 46, 87, 238 Islamic cognition, xi, 15, 20, 21, 24, 29, 30, 31, 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, 53, 57, 77, 78, 84, 152, 164, 175, 206, 217, 219, 222, 223, 226 Islamic cognition method, 41 Islamic cognition model, xi, 43, 44, 50 Islamic impact score, 207 Islamic state, xi, 12, 15, 30, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 75, 76, 79, 83, 84, 87, 88, 90, 105, 108, 113, 115, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 131, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 154, 171, 176, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 183, 190, 191, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201,203, 206, 207, 209, 210, 213, 219, 220, 222, 244, 246 Islamism, 2, 6, 31, 63, 234 Islamist(s), xiii, 3, 40, 48, 52, 183, 184, 199, 205, 215, 231 Israel, 70, 131, 222, 224

J Jabali, Fuad, 146, 147, 232 Jihad, xiii, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 40, 47, 51, 75, 86, 102, 107, 108, 113, 119, 121, 128, 137, 139, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 194, 205, 215, 216, 219, 220, 222, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 237 defensive, 47, 108, 111, 126, 127, 128, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184 offensive, 107, 111, 113, 119, 127, 128, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 182, 183, 184, 215, 216, 222 Jihadist(s), 111, 213, 229 Jus ad bellum, 7, 8, 12, 13, 40, 86, 95, 104, 108, 141, 154, 155, 169, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 190, 193, 199, 200, 206, 207, 209, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223 Jus in bello, 8, 13, 40, 86, 95, 102, 131, 133, 141, 158, 187, 190, 191, 193, 194, 196, 200, 206, 207, 209, 213, 215, 217, 218, 220, 223, 225

K Kharajite, 74, 75, 77, 200, 203, 219

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Index

L latitude of permissibility (LOP), 17, 19, 20, 42, 43, 44, 51, 52, 53, 81, 85, 94 legal derivation, 17, 44, 61, 62, 71, 218 Lock, John, 6, 16, 58, 59, 60, 62, 65, 68, 72, 88, 160, 218, 230, 231, 233, 234

M Madinah, 35, 38, 80, 81, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 123, 125, 136, 144, 145, 149, 158, 159, 192, 228, 244, 247 Malik, Imam, 133, 138, 178, 227, 231 Maududi, Abul ‘Ala, 40, 50, 176, 183, 184, 194, 234 monarchy, 16, 60, 64, 201, 206, 207 Mu’awiyah, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162

N neo-Orientalist(s), 7, 108, 175, 176, 183, 215, 216

O Orientalism, 1, 175, 236 Orientalist(s), 7, 107, 108, 111, 175, 176, 184, 215, 216

P Palestine, 120, 172, 210, 230 progressive Muslims/Islam, 48, 223 property, 135, 196 private, 89, 100, 106, 137, 190, 191, 196, 197 public, 33, 35, 38, 41, 42, 58, 68, 72, 84, 88, 90, 96, 98, 101, 134, 138, 153, 161, 166, 167, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 196, 197, 201, 202, 226, 235 public interest, 135

Q Quilliam Foundation, 31 Quraish, 66, 103, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 118, 126, 145, 247 Qur’an and Sunnah, 6, 14, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 71, 75, 77, 78, 81, 82, 86, 87, 90, 96, 97, 98, 104, 105, 106, 148, 149, 151, 161, 166, 180, 200, 201, 203, 208, 211, 225, 244

Qur’anic criteria, 2, 8, 82, 107, 156, 192, 222 Qutb, Sayyid, 235

R rebellion, vii, 9, 143, 157, 161, 221 Ridda wars, 20, 108, 124, 125, 128, 129, 157, 179, 219 rights, xiii, 20, 51, 58, 59, 60, 62, 65, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 98, 100, 101, 108, 115, 165, 177, 192, 202, 203, 215, 218, 228 human, 4, 5, 15, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 30, 47, 51, 56, 57, 61, 63, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 83, 85, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 98, 100, 101, 105, 117, 134, 162, 177, 197, 202, 203, 217, 218, 225, 228 inalienable, 60, 74, 91

S Saudi Arabia, xiii, 13, 40, 67, 99, 176, 194, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213, 216, 224, 229, 237 shari’ah, xiii, 19, 39, 46, 48, 50, 57, 61, 63, 64, 86, 88, 95, 96, 97, 109, 198, 199, 200, 201, 204, 206, 207, 209 slavery, 4, 70, 117, 140, 193, 212, 223 stoning, 39, 210, 211 suicide bombing, 224 sword verses, 169, 222

T Taliban, 116, 192, 193, 200, 203, 216 traditionalist, 43, 149 Tzortzis, Hamza Andreas, 181, 237

U Umar, 10, 16, 36, 41, 42, 49, 52, 64, 65, 66, 80, 85, 86, 87, 99, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 118, 122, 124, 127, 128, 129, 136, 137, 138, 141, 145, 149, 153, 155, 164, 165, 175, 179, 207, 210, 211, 212, 219, 220, 221, 227, 231 Umayyad(s), 5, 39, 43, 44, 52, 63, 66, 94, 96, 109, 123, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 173, 180, 182, 230, 232 United States Institute for Peace, 41, 45, 237 usurpation, 144, 160

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Uthman, 16, 20, 36, 49, 52, 64, 66, 86, 87, 99, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 154, 157

W war spoils, 135, 136, 137 Watt, William Montgomery, 110, 112, 113, 115, 118, 237

Z Zatzman, Gary, ix, 21, 24, 46, 67, 87, 238 Zionism, 4